Migrant Traders in South Africa: Migrant Traders in South Africa 3031211502, 9783031211508

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Sustainable Development Goals Series

Migrant Traders in South Africa Edited by Pranitha Maharaj

SDG: 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth

Sustainable Development Goals Series

The Sustainable Development Goals Series is Springer Nature’s inaugural cross-imprint book series that addresses and supports the United Nations’ seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The series fosters comprehensive research focused on these global targets and endeavours to address some of society’s greatest grand challenges. The SDGs are inherently multidisciplinary, and they bring people working across different fields together and working towards a common goal. In this spirit, the Sustainable Development Goals series is the first at Springer Nature to publish books under both the Springer and Palgrave Macmillan imprints, bringing the strengths of our imprints together. The Sustainable Development Goals Series is organized into eighteen subseries: one subseries based around each of the seventeen respective Sustainable Development Goals, and an eighteenth subseries, “Connecting the Goals,” which serves as a home for volumes addressing multiple goals or studying the SDGs as a whole. Each subseries is guided by an expert Subseries Advisor with years or decades of experience studying and addressing core components of their respective Goal. The SDG Series has a remit as broad as the SDGs themselves, and contributions are welcome from scientists, academics, policymakers, and researchers working in fields related to any of the seventeen goals. If you are interested in contributing a monograph or curated volume to the series, please contact the Publishers: Zachary Romano [Springer; [email protected]] and Rachael Ballard [Palgrave Macmillan; [email protected]].

Pranitha Maharaj Editor

Migrant Traders in South Africa

Editor Pranitha Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

ISSN 2523-3084 ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic) Sustainable Development Goals Series ISBN 978-3-031-21150-8 ISBN 978-3-031-21151-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Color wheel and icons: From https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/, Copyright © 2020 United Nations. Used with the permission of the United Nations. The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. Cover illustration: Nikolay Pandev/getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of Science and Innovation and National Research Foundation of South Africa [grant number 64816].

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Contents

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Introduction Pranitha Maharaj

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Migrants in the Informal Sector: What We Know So Far? Shanaaz Dunn and Pranitha Maharaj

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Hustling to Survive: Livelihood Strategies of Migrants Sachin Sewpersad and Pranitha Maharaj

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Escaping Poverty in Zimbabwe: Experiences of Informal Traders in South Africa Emma S. Chikovore and Pranitha Maharaj

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Innovation and Flexibility: Nigerian Women in Durban’s Informal Economy Sunday I. Oyebamiji

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Remittance Flow and Familial Relations in the Face of COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Social Ties During the Migration Period Thebeth R. Masunda and Pranitha Maharaj

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No Protection, No Support: Older Migrants Operating in South Africa’s Informal Economy Ganzamungu Zihindula, Pranitha Maharaj, and Shanaaz Dunn Collaboration or Competition? The Relationship Between Locals and Migrants in the Informal Economy Tronic Sithole and Pranitha Maharaj Changes in Public Attitudes and Behaviour Towards International Migrants in South Africa During the COVID-19 Pandemic Steven L. Gordon

10 The Inclusion of International Migrants in the Informal Economy: From Policy to Practice Mamokete Modiba and Thobelani N. Mdluli

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Notes on Contributors

Emma S. Chikovore is Postdoctoral Research Fellow for the South African Research Chair Initiative in Economic Development at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. She obtained her master’s and Ph.D. from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. She has worked in non-governmental organisations (NGO) and research sectors, both in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Her research interests include adolescent sexual and reproductive health, the intersection between migration and gender, HIV and AIDS, family well-being, and social determinants of health. Shanaaz Dunn is a researcher at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. She has a bachelor’s degree in Psychology as well as a master’s and Ph.D. in Population Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her research interests are in the fields of demography and population studies, specifically family demography, migration, ageing populations, and sexual and reproductive health among the youth.

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Steven L. Gordon is Senior Research Specialist at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa where he is a member of the Developmental, Capable and Ethical State Programme. Dr. Gordon has worked with the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) at the HSRC since 2012. He has a doctorate from the University of KwaZuluNatal (2016) as well as a master’s degree in Global Studies (2007) from the University of Freiburg and a master’s degree in Population Studies (2011) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Dr. Gordon is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg. Pranitha Maharaj is Professor and South African Chair in Economic Development at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. She has obtained her Ph.D. from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the United Kingdom. Recently, she completed a five-year term as the editor-in-chief of the Southern African Journal of Demography. She has worked extensively in the field of demography and has published a number of articles on migrants in the informal economy. Thebeth R. Masunda is a lecturer in the Department of Community and Social Development at the University of Zimbabwe. She holds a bachelor’s and Honours in Community and Development Studies. She also has a master’s and Ph.D. in Development Studies which she obtained from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her research interests include migration and family studies, social and economic development, and education and development. As an academic, development practitioner and researcher she is also interested in the socio-economic welfare of marginalised groups in society. Thobelani N. Mdluli is a researcher and master’s candidate at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He attained his Bachelor of Social Work degree at the University of Zululand in 2018 and has experience and practical training in the field where he worked with individuals and communities to address various socio-economic problems.

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Mamokete Modiba is a researcher at the Gauteng City-Region (GCRO), University of Johannesburg and University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. She obtained her Ph.D. in Urban Planning from the University of the Witwatersrand. Her research interests span across a variety of areas including inclusive economies, informal and township economies, urban governance, poverty, inequality, social mobility and spatial change. Her research also investigates the role and influence of street trader leaders in urban governance. Sunday I. Oyebamiji is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Durban, South Africa. He obtained his Ph.D. in International Relations from UKZN. Dr. Oyebamiji obtained Global Diplomacy and Moral Foundations of Politics certificates from the University of London, England, and Yale University, United States of America. Among others, his research interests include migration studies, international relations, politics, African studies, economic history, and gender studies. Sachin Sewpersad is a researcher at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. He obtained his bachelor’s degree in Geography and Environmental Management and master’s degree in Population studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research and academic interests include migration, human environments, and other environmental processes. Tronic Sithole is a researcher at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Durban, South Africa. He holds a bachelor’s and Honours degree in Social Sciences. He is currently completing his Masters in Population Studies at UKZN. His research interests are broadly in the field of population studies, including reproductive health, men’s and women’s health, mortality, and health-seeking behaviour among male students. Ganzamungu Zihindula has obtained his Ph.D. in Health Promotion and Public Health from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is an alumnae PEPFAR Fellow, and currently an Atlantic Fellow for Health Equity based at Oxford University, United Kingdom. He is also

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the Research Manager at the Institut Superieur de Development Rural (ISDR) Kaziba, Democratic Republic of Congo. Dr. Zihindula is an independent consultant in Public Health Epidemiology.

List of Figures

Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2

Fig. 9.3

Fig. 9.4

Fig. 9.5

Overall perceptions of foreigners in South Africa, 2003–2020 Public responses to the question: ‘Do you agree or disagree that immigrants increase crime rates?’, 2008–2020 Public responses to the question: ‘Do you agree or disagree that immigrants bring disease to South Africa?’, 2008–2020 Public support and opposition against zero-sum statements against the impact of international immigrants, 2020 Total number of shops looted during incidents of xenophobic violence, 2005–2021

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List of Tables

Table 9.1

Table 9.2

Adult population (thousands and %) who would take part in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in their neighbourhood Main reasons given to explain anti-immigrant violence in South Africa (multiple response)

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1 Introduction Pranitha Maharaj

The informal economy is expanding in many contexts and increasingly playing a significant role in the creation of employment and income generation. Alcock (2018) describes the informal economy as driving economic growth in South Africa as it is the way of life for the majority of low-income groups. The formal sector is the main source of employment; however, this sector has failed to keep pace with the expansion of the labour force (Davies & Thurlow, 2010). At present the unemployment rate is high, with the official unemployment rate at 34.5%. Under the expanded definition, which includes those who have given up on looking for work, the discouraged jobseekers, the rate is much higher at 45.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2022). South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world and over the past few P. Maharaj (B) School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_1

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years, the number of employed persons has been steadily decreasing while the number of discouraged work-seekers has been steadily increasing. Despite efforts to tackle high unemployment, the formal economy has failed to absorb thousands into the workforce. In the context of high rates of formal unemployment, the informal economy is increasingly emerging as a major source of employment generation. Many are seeking innovative and alternative measures to earn an income and secure a livelihood. In 2019, there were 4,995,000 people employed in the informal sector, accounting for 18.3% of employed South Africans (Statistics South Africa, 2021). Despite the high unemployment in South Africa, the informal sector constitutes a much smaller total share of employment. The informal sector contributes about 6% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Statistics South Africa, 2021). In the future, the informal sector is expected to play a pivotal role in the South African economy amidst the growing population. The growth of the population of South Africa has been rapid from 1950 to the present. Some analysts argue that the growing population creates an unprecedented opportunity for economic growth, however, the formal labour market is not able to create sufficient jobs to absorb the majority of the labour force (Davies & Thurlow, 2010); thus, elevating the importance of the informal economy. International labour migration is a powerful tool for reducing poverty for migrants, their families, as well as their host countries and countries of origin. International migrants constitute a significant share of the informal economy and are key players in promoting economic growth. In the context of high unemployment, the informal sector provides a promising economic opportunity for less skilled international migrants. While the focus on the informal economy has steadily increased, much less research has been directed at understanding the role of international, informal migrant traders. Mobility is essential to the operation of the informal economy in many African cities (Crush et al., 2015). More people are on the move today than ever before and they are increasingly transitioning across borders. An unquantifiable number of people have now built lives outside of the country of their birth and have experienced unprecedented changes. Some move across international borders to escape conflict, war, and political turmoil. Most international migrants

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move to improve their lives and that of their families; however, they often have to rely on the informal economy to better themselves while for others it is a desperate attempt to combat poverty and hunger. The informal sector is not easy to navigate, especially for international migrants. Amidst competition for scarce resources, low job security, high job dissatisfaction, and inadequate social security regulation, the informal sector has also been trying to grapple with the novel coronavirus. Migrants, like locals, have suffered serious setbacks as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In late 2019, a deadly virus was discovered in Wuhan City, China, and was later identified as COVID-19. The virus quickly spread and claimed the lives of many people globally. As the virus spread throughout the world, countries began closing borders and restricting trade and movement in a frantic effort to contain the spread of the virus. In 2020, COVID-19 was declared a global health emergency by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The first case of COVID-19 was identified in South Africa on the 5th of March 2020 (Broadbent et al., 2020). As the number of COVID-19 infections surged in the country, the government implemented a 21-day national lockdown. This was one of the most stringent lockdowns in the world including stay-at-home orders, the closure of non-essential businesses, the prohibition of the sale of alcohol and tobacco, and severe restrictions on travel and movement, including bans prohibiting people from exercising outside their homes. In addition, in order to ensure compliance, the police and defence force were deployed to enforce strict lockdown regulations. The intention of these stringent early measures was to flatten infection levels, avert deaths and protect the country’s health sector. These measures were implemented to give the country an advantage in containing the pandemic. During this period, violation of human rights, particularly for traders working in the informal sector, was rife as law enforcement agents brutally assaulted and confiscated the goods of those engaged in trading during the lockdowns. The first wave of the pandemic had been particularly disruptive resulting in major restrictions that severely interrupted economic activities causing limited operation of both formal and informal businesses. In terms of the regulations that were passed under the Disaster Management Act (Act No. 57 of 2002) informal traders were allowed to operate so that

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people could buy food at the nearest shops, but they had to first obtain permits. The intention was to limit movement as far as possible. Despite this, statements by a government minister, which implied that only South African-owned shops would be allowed to operate, and confusion around the varied municipal licensing systems, prevented many small traders from continuing with their economic activities (Wegerif, 2020). International migrant informal traders were adversely affected because they did not have the means to continue trading, specifically because many did not have the appropriate documentation to be living and operating in the country. In addition, they had limited or no access to support and assistance, and were often excluded from social relief measures. The COVID-19 pandemic led to restrictions on movement, closure of non-essential businesses, and widening economic inequalities, which all threaten the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs provide a framework for the action roadmap for attaining a better and more sustainable future by targeting global issues such as poverty, inequality, climate change, environmental degradation, peace, and justice. The 2030 Agenda, which is a universal framework for sustainable development, recognises for the first time the contribution of migration. Migration is a cross-cutting issue of relevance to all of the SDGs but special reference is made to migration in Target 10.7 to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and wellmanaged migration policies’. With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its guiding premise, ‘leave no one behind’, the international community has set itself the target to better the lives of the most impoverished and marginalised including migrants. The social implications of COVID-19 have threatened to reverse many gains which have been achieved over the past few years through progressive and inclusive policy and initiatives. This book acknowledges the shared vision of the 2030 Agenda by exploring the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international migrant informal traders who often operate on the fringe of the economy. This book focuses on international migrant informal traders who are key to attaining SDG 8 and 10, aimed at promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. A primary goal of the SDGs

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is to ‘leave no one behind’ . This is best attained through delving into new and emerging insights in a country like South Africa which is undergoing rapid change and transformation.

Migrants on the Fringe of the Economy Migration is one of the major defining features of the twenty-first century, and some argue it is vital, inevitable, and potentially advantageous for countries (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). While migration from less to more developed regions is common, migration in the African region is predominantly intra-continental with approximately 70% of sub-Saharan African migrants choosing to relocate to another African country (IOM, 2020). Over the past three decades, South Africa has received an influx of migrants from a number of African countries including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. The majority of international-born migrants are African (75%), with approximately 68% coming from the southern African region, mostly Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2021). While most migrants come from sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa also receives a sizeable number of migrants from Asian countries including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, among others (Statistics South Africa, 2016). In South Africa, as is the case in many parts of the African continent, statistics are often incomplete and unreliable, mainly due to shortcomings in the collection of migration data and the laxity of border control regulations in the country which sometimes makes it easy to evade border controls (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015). Estimates suggest that there is a large number of undocumented migrants in the country. However, it is difficult to obtain reliable information on the exact number of undocumented migrants in South Africa. Some people that enter into South Africa have valid travel documents such as passports and visas but they continue to live in the country even after their permits have expired. Some people also enter the country without valid documents (either a valid passport and/or visa that fits their purpose of travel and/or length of visit). An undocumented migrant refers to a person who is in a country

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without having been granted official authorisation to do so. Undocumented migrants, according to the United Nations (2014), are people who live and work in the shadows, afraid to complain, often denied basic rights and freedoms, and particularly vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation. There are many reasons why so many international migrants have left their home countries to come and settle in South Africa in search of a better life. Among the various factors responsible for their departure are civil wars, environmental disasters, armed conflict, and a lack of economic prospects. The peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa inspired much hope in many people throughout Africa. The decision to migrate to South Africa is also influenced by social networks that are currently in the country. Social networks including friends and family have an important effect on migration. For many migrants, social connections in both informal and formal economies are useful in securing a job and earning a living (Awumbila et al., 2017). Social networks also provide emotional support, making the migration process easier to tolerate emotionally, and consequently making it more bearable for migrants to extend their stay indefinitely (White & Ryan, 2008). Social networks may also serve as a safety net to cushion migrants against negative events. Migrants may also rely on social capital for accommodation, food, and basic services such as water and electricity when they initially arrive, especially relatives and friends who are already present at the migration destination (Awumbila et al., 2017). South Africa has been a popular destination for those escaping persecution and human rights violations in their home countries. Migrants are attracted to South Africa because of its commitment towards protecting individual and constitutional rights, including dignity, equality, and freedom. South Africa also has the second largest economy in the continent and has a more favourable economic outlook than many of its neighbours. Despite the high levels of unemployment in South Africa, it is comparatively slightly lower than many of its neighbouring countries, such as Zimbabwe (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015). South Africa is also well known for the high standards of its public universities. The top five universities in Africa, according to global rankings, are in South Africa. All these factors combine to improve the allure of South Africa.

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In contrast with much of Africa, South Africa is seen as having better economic prospects as well as modern infrastructure. Thus, for a long time, many perceived the country as an attractive destination to settle in order to improve their prospects. Migrants move across borders to improve their living conditions; however, they quickly realise that the reality does not match their expectations. Confronted with the high unemployment in South Africa, they rely on the informal economy to earn an income. Increasingly, international migrants are playing an important role in the informal economy. Worldwide, informality is a key feature of labour markets with almost 2 billion workers presently employed in the informal sector, accounting for approximately 60% of the global labour force (ILO, 2018). The sector is the largest in many developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and smaller in magnitude in regions with a higher level of socio-economic development, such as the Americas and Europe (ILO, 2018). Over the past several decades there has been a steady growth of the informal economy in developing countries because the formal labour market has not been able to generate sufficient jobs to absorb the continuously growing youthful workforce. Although the informal economy is a global phenomenon, there is great variation within and across countries of what it constitutes. For our purposes, the term ‘informal economy’, ‘informal work’, and ‘informal sector’ are used interchangeably. In some instances, the informal economy is seen as part of the hidden or underground economy and therefore all who work in the sector are frequently mistakenly stigmatised and depicted as ‘dishonest entrepreneurs’ and ‘tax evaders’ (Juergens-Grant & Alfers, 2021). Of course, there are some activities that may fit into these categories. However, the informal economy is far more complex and heterogeneous. The International Labour Organization (2015) explicitly states that the term refers to ‘to all economic activities by workers and economic units that are—in law or in practice—not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements’. According to this definition, the informal economy does not cover any illegal or illicit activities. Often informal workers including migrants do not pay taxes in the same way as the formal sector. This is mostly because their earnings fall below the national income threshold for the payment of personal

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income tax. Thus, researchers argue that labelling them as tax evaders is harmful and misleading (Rogan, 2019). However, informal workers contribute to the tax base by paying value-added tax on purchased goods sourced in the country. The informal economy is vast and large sectors of the population form part of it, encompassing a variety of economic activities, ranging from self-employed entrepreneurs or unpaid family labour to street vendors trading in a range of goods and services, and waste collectors (Chen, 2012). The informal economy is characterised by ease of accessibility, with limited requirements for education, technology, and capital. There are also minimal restrictions regarding access and the sector is open to all forms of trading activities. Informal workers operate in small or undefined workplaces, they often have lower levels of education, work irregular hours, and do not receive a stable income (ILO, 2002). Often their activities occur on the streets, in central business districts where it is best to attract customers. Informal sector entrepreneurs make a valuable contribution to South Africa’s economy. The type of work that is carried out in the informal economy is diverse. In South Africa, there is an often mistaken belief that the informal economy mainly constitutes street traders and small retail or ‘spaza’ shops, but in reality, it consists of a variety of trade and industries, not just informal retail and fast food outlets, but alcohol retailers, tailors, mechanical and electronic repairs, transportation services, and hair styling (Bernstein, 2020). While some businesses are located on fixed sites, others are more mobile. Traders operate on the streets, and at formal markets, as well as transport systems such as light delivery vehicles, and special events. A notable feature of the informal economy is the feminisation of the workforce (Rogan & Alfers, 2019). Women are disproportionally concentrated in the informal economy after struggling for many years to secure formal sector employment. Now the sector serves as a means for them to exercise some economic independence by earning an income to support their families; thus reducing the poverty and inequality gap. Limited employment opportunities in the formal labour market in South Africa also often result in migrants being forced into the informal economy. Thus, the informal economy offers some promise for improvement and plays a significant role in

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the entrepreneurial landscape by stimulating job creation, strengthening economic trade, and alleviating persistent social ills in society such as hunger, homelessness, and unemployment (Akintola & Akintola, 2015; Peberdy, 2016). It is important to reflect on the contribution of international migrants to the economy of South Africa, especially the informal sector. The ability to provide employment is one of the biggest ways that international migrant informal traders contribute to the economy. Migrants have served as agents of change in a range of sectors, often offering a means for locals to earn an income. This is an important step towards improving the daily living situation of locals who are confronted with the prospect of unemployment. Migrants also contribute to the economy in other ways. Migrants sell products in places convenient for the urban poor at lower prices than other outlets. In addition, they are sometimes preferred because their shops are better stocked and also have longer operating hours than local shops (Charman & Piper, 2012). Another contribution is in the form of payment of rent mostly to South Africans. Besides their economic contribution within this country, migrants have also contributed to improving the lives of their families and communities in their home countries through the transfer of skills and remittances. Remittances to low- and middle-income countries surpassed official aid flows by three times in 2021 (Smith & Floro, 2021). The cash influx from remittances may be used for educational expenses, such as books, tuition, and school uniforms, increasing job opportunities, reducing food insecurity, and accessing health care (Ajaero et al., 2018; Smith & Floro, 2021) In this way migrants are powerful drivers of sustainable development. As much as the informal sector presents itself as an opportunity for growth and prosperity for migrants, it is not without challenges. Migration may contribute to problems of over-urbanisation and poverty especially where there is shrinking economic opportunities in a country like South Africa, with unemployment affecting more than 30% of the labour force (Statistics South Africa, 2021). Local and migrant traders are, in many instances, in competition for the same market share and this may manifest in deep-seated conflict. To complicate matters further, language serves as a major obstacle to integration as many migrants

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find it difficult to communicate with locals. South Africa is a multilingual country with eleven official languages as well as many more languages, often as a result of the influx of people from various countries. The inability of migrants to communicate in the local language identifies them as non-South African and hence, reinforces their unequal social position. The visibility of migrants in the sector and their success may also attract unwarranted resentment from locals, sometimes even resulting in violent attacks. Violence has been a key defining feature during the apartheid era in South Africa but since the rise of a new democratic era, many were hopeful of a renewed opportunity of cultivating a peaceful existence in the country. However, over the past two decades, there has been an escalation in the number of violent attacks against the homes and businesses of migrants, and even the senseless murder of foreign nationals, especially those from other African countries. Crime is rife in South Africa and migrants often feel particularly vulnerable. South Africa has a high crime rate and this is a concern because it impacts negatively on their businesses. Not only do international migrants fear becoming a victim of crime but they are afraid to seek assistance from the police. Most often, they do not report the crime because they do not have the necessary permit to operate their businesses. Since migrants are reluctant to seek assistance from the police, they become easy targets for criminals. Migrants also become victims of crime because of their lack of access to banking services. This means that they have to carry their money on them or leave it at home. Criminals often are aware of this and prey on migrant traders for this reason. However, there is also a tendency to blame international migrants for the escalating crime in the country. Some writers like Jacobsen (2007) have portrayed migration negatively and have attributed the crime to international migrants. Jacobsen (2007) argues that South Africa as a country was not afflicted by crime, and was relatively peaceful, and orderly, before the perceived influx of migrants. The view is also widely shared by some sectors of the population but without data to support these claims. The narrative, however, has fuelled tensions between locals and migrants. In recent years, there have also been growing tensions between locals and migrants in South Africa. Attitudinal surveys suggest that anti-immigrant feelings are highly prevalent and deeply entrenched in

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society (Gordon, 2020). Some tension exists between locals and migrants because of competition for resources. Migrant traders are seen as more entrepreneurial and locals struggle to compete effectively against them because of their more favourable pricing and responsiveness to changing customer preferences. Other challenges experienced by migrant traders include the harsh treatment by the police and the lack of support for informal traders by the municipality. It is not uncommon for the police to confiscate their products and demand bribes from them. According to Moyo et al. (2018), the police harass and threaten foreign street traders to obtain bribes from them, and detentions and arrests are frequently accompanied by incidents of abuse. The police are known to demand bribes from migrant traders in return for not arresting them for trading without a work permit. Sometimes they are even arrested and not given any explanation or justification (Moyo et al., 2018). There have been a number of reports of international migrant informal traders being forcibly prevented from continuing with their economic activities. In some instances, informal businesses are forced to shut down. In this context, international migrants who continue to operate their businesses are worried about their ability to secure their livelihoods in the future.

Trading in the Era of COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the worsening economic situation in the country, especially for migrant traders who operate on the fringe of the economy. Informal traders are critical to ensuring food security for the urban poor. They were not only adversely affected by the stringent lockdown measures when the COVID-19 pandemic brought the economy to a standstill, their low-income customers were also unable to obtain readily available and affordable food sources. The first wave of the pandemic has been particularly disruptive resulting in major restrictions that severely interrupted economic activities causing limited operation of both formal and informal businesses. In terms of the regulations that were passed under the Disaster Management Act of 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002) informal traders were allowed to operate so that people could buy food at the nearest shops, but they had to first obtain permits.

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The intention was to limit movement as far as possible. Despite this, statements by a government minister, which implied that only South African-owned shops would be allowed to operate, confusion around the varied municipal licensing systems, prevented many small traders from continuing to work (Wegerif, 2020). International migrant informal traders were left destitute because many did not have the documentation required to be living and operating in the country. In addition, they had limited and in some instances, no access to support and assistance, and were often excluded from social relief measures. The restrictions on movement also meant that they did not have the freedom to move around and thus they had no chance of leaving the country. Even if they could, they were reluctant as they would have limited options to return. Therefore, they were forced to remain in the country and endure these conditions without any social and financial support. In the absence of support, many migrants likely felt ‘trapped’, ‘alone’, and ‘abandoned’. The stringent lockdown measures have had a devastating impact on livelihoods, especially for informal migrant traders. Informal workers are often unable to save even a minimal amount of their earnings and as a result, even a few days of not working can make them extremely vulnerable to poverty, especially those who need to work daily in order to earn an income. Many traders lost their only source of livelihood due to disruptions in informal market activities. This resulted in a loss of revenue and wastage due to informal traders being forced to stop working so they had to either give away their products or their products, especially fresh produce, go to waste due to the lack of customers and the inability to trade (Babalola et al., 2021). The restrictions on their economic activities placed traders and their households in an extremely vulnerable situation; threatening their livelihoods and access to food. Informal traders were reported to have been without the ability to earn an income during lockdowns and unable to provide for themselves and their families. Stringent measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 adversely affected informal workers, because of the nature of their income, which is heavily dependent on daily earnings. Furthermore, small traders depend heavily on face-to-face interaction with their customers in order to sell their goods and if they are not able to do so,

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money is not made, and their situation is severely compromised. As many informal workers are involved in the provision of face-to-face services, the risk of infection is also higher. In addition, for most informal traders, remote working or other measures that allow for social distancing are often not an option. Traders struggle to maintain social distancing in the crowded environments where they work, and they have limited access to water and sanitation, or protective equipment to stop the spread of infection (Bamu & Marchiori, 2020). Unlike some of the workers in the formal labour market, informal traders are most disadvantaged, as they are not given paid leave or the opportunity to work from home. In addition, they do not have the freedom to strike or protest against their poor working conditions. Informal traders often work long hours in physically and emotionally demanding conditions for little pay, without any social security or insurance coverage (Moyce & Schenker, 2018). The lack of social security meant that they did not have any means of mitigating the impact of the lockdown measures. The pandemic exposed the job crisis facing the country. Even in the best of times, the labour market in South Africa is characterised by high levels of economic inactivity. Over the last decade, there have been some clear indications that South Africa is on a download spiral which is not only evident by the high unemployment rates, but also the persistent power outages, lack of regular water supply, and poorly maintained infrastructure. Also, increasing hostile treatment of international migrants has meant that South Africa is no longer seen as a safe and attractive destination for international migrants. South Africa’s perpetual rising unemployment rates, along with declining economic opportunities, have created a crisis that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. These conditions have resulted in a resurgence of anti-migrant sentiments, fuelled by the populist rhetoric that foreigners are stealing the jobs of locals. Political leaders who benefit from antiimmigrant sentiments have fuelled this resurgence. These sentiments are used as a strategy to mobilise the crowds who are desperate for a solution to the pre-existing social ills, such as unemployment, inequality, declining service provision, and chronic poverty (Matema & Kariuki, 2022). Widespread corruption in South Africa’s asylum and migration

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systems have also added to the dangerous situation, resulting in a very hostile environment for migrants. As a result of the restrictions, many traders and their households became vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity, thus increasing the demand for food relief assistance. The lack of valid documentation has also meant that many migrants have not been able to access benefits, which may have been put in place to cushion others against the impacts of the pandemic. Furthermore, the temporary closures of homeland administration during the pandemic have effectively prevented migrants from obtaining or renewing residence permits, or processing of asylum claims. Some are even afraid to obtain their vaccination because of fear of detection. Vaccines are important in curbing the spread of COVID-19 in the country. This is because they provide protection at the individual level by reducing the risk of infection or the severity of symptoms, and also at a population level by providing population immunity. In 2021, the South African government extended its vaccination programme to include undocumented migrants but some might be reluctant to get their vaccinations because of fear of detection (Cassim, 2021). Undocumented migrants do not want to unnecessarily attract the attention of law enforcement agencies. The reluctance of undocumented migrants to visit vaccination sites is likely to mean that the proportion of unvaccinated adults in the country remains high which increases the risk of further waves of infection. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have been major and far-reaching for the informal economy. As the country struggled to contain the spread of COVID-19, much of the focus was on protecting their own citizens, ignoring the plight of foreign migrants living within their border. Despite the prominent role of migrants in the informal economy in South Africa, their contribution to the economy is not widely recognised. The dire effects of the pandemic on migrants have not been adequately considered in any successful response to the socioeconomic issues brought on by the COVID-19 epidemic. Participating in the informal sector is not always ideal and offers as many challenges as opportunities, especially for migrants. Earning a daily income does not necessarily guarantee the opportunity to escape from poverty; however, it may serve as a short-term measure to alleviate hunger. Due to

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this, researchers, policymakers, development practitioners, and government institutions will need to rethink and plan on how best to enhance the ever-expanding informal sector to improve livelihoods and increase economic growth for all including migrants. Given the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a need to take into account the situation of migrant traders that operate on the fringe of the economy.

Summary and Organisation of the Volume This book explores entrepreneurship among diverse groups of international migrants in the informal economy in South Africa. Globally, migration has been increasing in pace and magnitude as many seek to improve their standards of living. Many migrants move across international borders to improve their living conditions, escape political turmoil or war, and for employment opportunities. Migrants that come to South Africa in search of better economic prospects often have to rely on the informal sector as a result of limited employment opportunities in the formal labour market. Chapter two reviews past and current literature on the situation of migrants in informal trading in Africa, with a special focus on South Africa. For many migrants, informal trading is a way of life and a critical income generation strategy. The informal sector contributes to local and economic development but their operations are also critical for many individuals and families who have minimal social support. The emergence of the global coronavirus pandemic has led to economic loss and devastation in South Africa as in many parts of the world. However, there were other accompanying difficulties that were also experienced. Public healthcare systems became overburdened; food insecurity and levels of hunger became more pronounced and economic and social disruption became widespread. Even though the informal economy is a safety net for many, the adverse effects on migrant informal traders have been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Chapter three provides a portrait of the current landscape of the economic activities of migrant informal traders in the midst of a pandemic. A key focus

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of the chapter is on the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on the livelihood strategies of migrants. Migrants moved to South Africa many years ago. They were hopeful about their future and dreamt of starting afresh. However, securing employment was a struggle. Migrants adopted informal trading as a survivalist strategy in the face of unemployment. Their trading activities are varied, with many relying on the existing skills that they acquired in their home country to make a living. Often they have to use any other available means of securing an income to ensure that they are able to survive. Most do not become informal traders by choice, but rather they are forced by circumstances. Chapter four focuses on the economic situation of Zimbabwean informal migrant traders. Zimbabweans constitute a large proportion of the migrant population in South Africa. Their trading activities are characterised as volatile due to fluctuating returns and uncertainty which results in them always being on the periphery of the economy. Migrants struggle to live a dignified life in the host country, as they are not able to earn a decent living wage that gives them access to suitable accommodation, cover their daily living expenses, and remit money back home. In addition, the stringent lockdown measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 adversely affected informal workers, because of the precarious nature of their income which is often dependent on daily earnings. Women often constitute the bulk of workers in the informal economy. Participation in the economy by women is key to expanding their choices, improving livelihoods, and advancing gender equality. An important focus of this book is on understanding how female migrants navigate their journey into the informal economy. Traditionally men migrated while women assumed responsibility for the family in their absence. This is changing as more women move in search of opportunities. Chapter five explores the experiences of migrant Nigerian women trading in the informal sector. As the population of Nigeria is on the rise, women also make relentless efforts to secure better sources of income and explore new opportunities for a better life. Nigerian migrants, especially women, are present in many parts of South Africa. Increasingly, women are migrating independently from men, and this is attributed to continuous global recession and changing dynamics in gender roles. Migrant

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women are important role players in society and they have the potential to significantly contribute to sustainable economic development. International migration is also adopted as a risk aversion strategy to improve family well-being. Not only does it reduce poverty for migrants themselves, but also for their families and communities at large. As such, when a member migrates and earns an income in the host country, it is often expected that they will send remittances to the other members left in the country of origin. Remittances sent back to their home countries by migrants have become a major feature of contemporary migration. Sometimes the decision to migrate is a family, and not, an individual decision. The benefits of remittances have been extensively documented as a poverty reduction strategy. However, the flow of remittances is likely to be negatively impacted as many migrants struggle to deal with the economic devastation caused by the pandemic. Chapter six explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on familial relations and the flow of remittances between migrants in South Africa and their respective family members in their home country. Restrictions on mobility, supply chains, and trading activities ground much of the economy to a halt, with a particularly heavy impact on migrants in the informal sector. Chapter seven focuses on the experiences of migrants aged 50 years and older operating in the informal sector. In Africa and most other developing countries, international migrants move when they are younger and so they are not ageing in the country of their birth but in a foreign country. Migrants ageing in a host country brings forth new challenges because as people age, they become more reliant on others for their care and support. It offers them the opportunity to secure a livelihood and plays a vital role in maintaining their economic well-being. However, there is widespread concern about decent working conditions and quality of life particularly for older migrants. South Africa is one of the few countries in the African region that provides social protection in the form of an old age grant to those aged 60 years and over. However, older migrants, especially those without documentation, are not eligible for this social grant. As a result, older migrants do not have income security and have no other choice but to continue to trade in the informal economy. Older people’s labour force participation is often

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unrecognised; however, they make a significant financial contribution to both their households and communities. Among the endless challenges they encounter, establishing a relationship with locals remains paramount. Trading opportunities have to be negotiated and compromised, often to maintain peace and ensure that all are able to participate in informal trading without conflict. In chapter eight, the relations between local and migrant traders are explored in detail. Informal trading activities have been at the centre of ongoing conflicts between impoverished migrants and locals. This relationship has been especially strained during the pandemic when opportunities were more limited and many subject to harsh conditions. However, it would seem that the pandemic has not changed public attitudes towards international migrants. Using data from a nationally representative survey, public attitudes towards international migrants are explored in chapter nine of this book. Throughout the book the importance of the informal sector as a significant segment of the economy that provides livelihoods, work, and income for many is continually highlighted yet, it still operates in the shadows. The final chapter of the book reviews the inclusion of migrants in the informal economy in policy and practice in South Africa. While the country has a progressive and inclusive Constitution, this theory is rarely translated into practice. Thus, we need to renew our commitment to upholding and advancing not only national and regional efforts but on a global scale such as the SDGs to ensure safer peaceful spaces for all.

References Ajaero, C. K., Nzeadibe, C. T., Obisie-Nmehielle, N., & Ike, C. C. (2018). The linkages between international migration, remittances and household welfare in Nigeria. Migration and Development, 7 (1), 40–54. Akintola, O. O., & Akintola, O. (2015). West Africans in the informal economy of South Africa: The case of low skilled Nigerian migrants. The Review of Black Political Economy, 42(4), 379–398. Alcock, G. G. (2018). Kasinomic revolution: The rise of African informal economies. Jonathan Ball Publishers.

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Awumbila, M., Teye, J. K., & Yaro, J. A. (2017). Social networks, migration trajectories and livelihood strategies of migrant domestic and construction workers in Accra, Ghana. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52(7), 982– 996. Babalola, M. A., Mcata, B., & Maila, M. (2021). The impact of COVID-19 on informal food traders in SA. Human Sciences Research Council Press. Bamu, P., & Marchiori, T. (2020). The recognition and protection of informal traders in COVID-19 laws: Lessons from Africa. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) Bernstein, A. (2020). South Africa’s informal sector in the time of Covid-19. Centre for Development and Enterprise. Broadbent, A., Combrink, H., & Smart, B. (2020). COVID-19 in South Africa. Global Epidemiology, 2, 100034. Cassim, Z. (December 22, 2021). South Africa rolls out COVID vaccines for undocumented immigrants. VOA News. https://www.voanews.com/a/southafrica-rolls-out-covid-vaccines-for-undocumented-immigrants/6365760. html Charman, A., & Piper, L. (2012). Xenophobia, criminality and violent entrepreneurship: Violence against Somali shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape Town, South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 43(3), 81–105. Chen, M. A. (2012). The informal economy: Definitions, theories and policies [Working paper No. 26]. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Crush, J., Chikanda, A., & Skinner, C. (2015). Introduction. In J. Crush, A. Chikanda, & C. Skinner (Eds.), Mean streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa (pp. 1–24). African Books Collective. Davies, R., & Thurlow, J. (2010). Formal–informal economy linkages and unemployment in South Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 78(4), 437–459. Dinbabo, M., & Nyasulu, T. (2015). Macroeconomic immigration determinants: An analysis of pull factors of international migration to South Africa. African Human Mobility Review, 1(1), 27–52. Gordon, S. L. (2020). Associational life and “the dark side” of social capital in South Africa: A quantitative analysis of anti-immigrant behaviour. Social Indicators Research, 148(2), 473–490. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2002, January). Resolution and conclusions concerning decent work and the informal economy [90th Conference session]. International Labour Conference, Geneva, Switzerland.

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International Labour Organization (ILO). (2015). Transition from the informal to the formal economy recommendation. ILO. International Labour Organization (ILO). (April 30, 2018). More than 60 per cent of the world’s employed population are in the informal economy. ILO. International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2020). World migration report 2020. IOM. Jacobsen, K. (2007). Migration within Africa: The view from South Africa. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 31(1), 203–214. Juergens-Grant, F., & Alfers, L. (2021). Are unfounded assumptions About the informal economy undermining universal social protection? Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Kalitanyi, V., & Visser, K. (2010). African immigrants in South Africa: Job takers or job creators? South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 13(4), 376–390. Matema, T., & Kariuki, P. (2022, February 27). Anti-migrant sentiment is not good for democracy in South Africa. Daily Maverick. https://www.dailym averick.co.za/opinionista/2022-02-27-anti-migrant-sentiment-is-not-goodfor-democracy-in-south-africa/ Moyce, S. C., & Schenker, M. (2018). Migrant workers and their occupational health and safety. Annual Review Public Health, 39 (1), 351–365. Moyo, K. (2021). South Africa reckons with its status as a top immigration destination, apartheid history, and economic challenges. Migration Policy Institute. Moyo, I., Gumbo, T., & Nicolau, M. D. (2018). African migrant traders’ experiences in Johannesburg Inner City: Towards the migrant calculated risk and adaptation framework. South African Review of Sociology, 49 (1), 53–71. Peberdy, S. (2016). International migrants in Johannesburg’s informal economy. Southern African Migration Programme. Rogan, M. (2019). Tax justice and the informal economy: A review of the debates. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Rogan, M., & Alfers, L. (2019). Gendered inequalities in the South African informal economy. Agenda, 33(4), 91–102. Smith, M., & Floro, M. (2021). The effects of domestic and international remittances on food insecurity in low-and middle-income countries. Journal of Development Studies, 57 (7), 1198–1220. Statistics South Africa. (2016). Community survey 2016. Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa. (2021). Quarterly labour force survey 2021, quarter 3: 2021. Statistics South Africa.

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Statistics South Africa. (2022). Quarterly labour force survey 2022, quarter 1: 2022. Statistics South Africa. United Nations. (2014, April 24). Migrant workers: Living in the shadows. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Wegerif, M. C. (2020). “Informal” food traders and food security: Experiences from the Covid-19 response in South Africa. Food Security, 12(4), 797–800. White, A., & Ryan, L. (2008). Polish ‘temporary’ migration: The formation and significance of social networks. Europe-Asia Studies, 60 (9), 1467–1502.

2 Migrants in the Informal Sector: What We Know So Far? Shanaaz Dunn and Pranitha Maharaj

Introduction Living in rampant poverty; exploited, with no place to go for protection; ill from not having access to clean water or basic social services; maimed, or worse, as there aren’t even basic safety conditions at work; holding little or no hope that life can be better; struggling on a daily basis just to survive: this is the existence of informal workers. —International Labour Organization

S. Dunn (B) · P. Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_2

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Migration has become a topic of interest across the world as it has been termed a ‘megatrend’ that will have a global impact in the decades to follow (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). In 2020, there were approximately 281 million international migrants in the world, constituting approximately 3.6% of the global population. This equates to about 128 million more than 30 years earlier, in 1990 (153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million) (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). A broad spectrum of migration studies, which we draw on in this chapter, largely suggests that people move to improve their living conditions, escape political turmoil or war, and for employment opportunities. Thus, migration has often served as a catalyst for development, in both the home and host countries. However, migrants often experience many challenges in accessing formal employment and securing an income, irrespective of their level of education and skills. Securing work in the formal sector is particularly challenging in contexts where unemployment is high, and opportunities are scarce. In addition, many do not possess the relevant documentation to secure work in the formal sector. To escape the social and economic burden of unemployment many migrants turn to the informal economy, drawing on their own skills to create employment and earn a living. Thus, there has been much interest in the size and performance of the informal sector (Benjamin et al., 2014). A large share of the global workforce is engaged in the informal economy, which is growing in many contexts and appearing in new places and forms. Across much of Africa, lowskilled individuals who struggle to secure formal employment dominate the informal economy, including migrants who constitute a significant share of this sector. The informal economy, also known as the informal sector, has been commonly referred to as a ‘survival’ sector for many who are impoverished and unemployed (Blaauw, 2017). The informal economy is increasing in magnitude and size across the world and is frequently appearing in many debates and discussions which focus on development and progression; for instance, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Thus, the aim of the chapter is to profile studies on migrants in the informal economy in the African region, specifically focusing on the South African context. Particular

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attention is given to the magnitude and pace of migration for employment and the increasing presence of migrants in the informal sector. This chapter also reviews the literature on the opportunities and constraints of migrant entrepreneurship in the informal economy. The chapter begins by focusing on labour migration which is a key feature of the historical context of many regions, including South Africa. Thereafter this chapter focuses specifically on the informal economy by presenting the background and origin and later providing the available statistics on the sector. The latter part of the chapter specifically focuses on South Africa and the prominent challenges, which many international migrants encounter in the country including discrimination, crime and xenophobia. The last part of the chapter explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migrants in general and those operating in the informal economy. This section also highlights their resilience in continuing to operate despite the adverse conditions that they encounter in the host country.

Migration for Employment: Stock and Flow Migration is the movement of people from one place to another and it can be either permanent or temporary. Migrants either move within a country or across international borders. An internal migrant is an individual who moves from one region to another within the same country; whereas, an international migrant refers to a person that changes their country of usual residence. In this chapter, when we refer to migrants we are specifically focused on international migrants, or immigrants, unless otherwise stated. While many people move for a number of reasons, most do so for employment or work opportunities. For decades, labour migration has been pivotal for growth and development (Crush & Williams, 2010). While migration statistics are difficult to capture for a number of reasons, the estimates suggest that the magnitude and pace of movement have been increasing over the years. Understanding changes in emerging trends and shifting demographics are closely related to global social and economic transformations. While we may not be able to estimate the exact number of migrants, recent estimates suggest that

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there were approximately 169 million migrant workers across the world in 2019, accounting for nearly two-thirds (62%) of the global stock of international migrants (African Union Commission, 2020; IOM, 2021; McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age—regarded as 15 years and older (245.6 million)—migrant workers account for 68.8%. In 2019, 67% of migrant workers were residing in high-income countries, constituting an estimated 113.9 million people. An additional 49 million migrant workers (29%) were living in middle-income countries, and 6.1 million (3.6%) were in low-income countries (African Union Commission, 2020). Labour migration is a key feature in Eastern and Southern Africa as there are a sizeable number of migrant workers in this region. Intra-regional migration in these regions has increased over the years, driven mainly by the rise in migrant workers (IOM, 2021). Traditionally, Northern America and Europe have been major destinations for emigrants from East African countries such as Kenya. In 2020, the largest Kenyan diaspora resided in the United States (nearly 157,000) and the United Kingdom (around 139,000) (IOM, 2021). The Gulf States have also become a major destination for a growing number of Ugandan, Kenyan and Ethiopian migrant workers (IOM, 2021). In Africa, as the population rapidly increases, inter-continental migration has become a key feature. South-south migration is important in terms of remittance flow and substantially contributes towards the welfare of the home country of migrants (Ratha & Shaw, 2007). African countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total population include Gabon (19%), Equatorial Guinea (16%), Seychelles (13%) and Libya (12%) (IOM, 2021). South Africa remains the most popular destination country in Africa, with around 2.9 million international migrants residing in the country, which accounts for more than 5% of the total population (Moyo, 2021). This is a decline of more than 9% since 2015 when the country had over 3.2 million international migrants (IOM, 2021), a changing trend that we will explore in detail later in this chapter. However, these estimates should be interpreted with caution because of the presence of large numbers of unauthorised migrants, particularly from neighbouring countries (Moyo, 2021). Migration has increased over the last decade with most migrants coming

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from other parts of the African continent. Most migrants entering South Africa were from neighbouring countries including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi (Moyo, 2021) Using data collected from over 600 respondents in the Gauteng province of South Africa, Peberdy (2016) observes that less than 5% of these migrants had arrived in South Africa in 1994 or before. Around 80% of these migrant respondents had arrived since 2000, with a third arriving between 2000 and 2004, 30% between 2005 and 2009, and 15% between 2010 and 2014. The changing geography of economic growth and development in the African region is one of the major factors, which impact southsouth migration patterns (OECD, 2010). In addition to this, it may be easier for those from neighbouring countries to cross over land borders in search of peace, safety and a renewed future. However, later in this chapter, the focus is on exploring the causal effect of immigration on the local labour market and its contribution to rising anti-immigrant sentiment in a country with high levels of unemployment. Immigration has a negative and significant effect on the employment outcomes of locals and the total income earned (Biavaschi et al., 2018). In addition, there is competition for limited resources and opportunities. Thus, driven by the determination to survive, many search for alternative means to make a living.

Alternatives to Formal Employment Over the years, many countries have seen an increase in international migrants because of various economic, political and environmental crises in the continent which are contributing to an increase in movement. Many flee to escape the precarious conditions in their country and often relocate to nearby countries in the hope of a better future. They try to adapt to their new environment and securing employment is a priority in order to build their lives. However, the number of jobs created every year in Africa is not sufficient to absorb the growing working-age population. Thus, many people leave their home country in search of employment opportunities elsewhere (African Union Commission, 2020). Labour migration has traditionally been used as a strategy to protect families and

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households from economic difficulties through remittances (Schrieder & Knerr, 2000). However, securing opportunities in the formal labour market is challenging for those who are unskilled, especially international migrants, therefore, many decide to create their own employment as a means to secure a livelihood and improve the lives of not only themselves but also that of their family (Moyo & Yeros, 2015). Thus, the informal economy provides an opportunity to create a sustainable income for many individuals and the income generated aids in supporting many families. In many countries, migrants are increasingly visible in the informal economy and they constitute a significant proportion of informal workers. The connection between international migrants and the informal economy is profound. Migrants are more likely to create entrepreneurial and business enterprises in destination countries to generate income and construct livelihoods, especially where opportunities are scarce (Mbatha, 2020). For instance, informal economies typically emerge in contexts with high incidences of poverty and severe decent work deficits, where the formal labour market is unable to create employment for the workforce, such as that which is experienced in South Africa (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). Thus, many are forced to seek alternative means to secure a livelihood. The informal economy is also a means to survive and evade hunger (ILO, 2018). The activities that occur within the informal economy can operate from specific locations whereas others are mobile and business is conducted in different parts of the city, often where customers can be easily attracted (Crush et al., 2015a). However, navigating the informal economy is not easy as many international migrants experience xenophobia and crime as well as limited access to public health and social services (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Idemudia & Boehnke, 2020; Moyo, 2020).

The Informal Economy: Origin and Overview The concept of the informal economy dates back to the 1900s and has remained largely unchanged in definition. The term was coined by Keith Hart (1973) almost four decades ago. Over the years a number

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of terms have been used interchangeably with the informal economy namely the irregular economy, the black market economy, and the underground sector (Ferman & Ferman, 1973; Losby et al., 2002; Simon & Witte, 1982). More recently, it has appeared in the literature as the informal economy or the informal sector. It is part of the economy which remains largely unregulated by the government and because of this, it is commonly recognised as problematic and unmanageable. The historical roots of the informal sector appeared in the development realm in the 1950s and 1960s, and conceptually developed through to the 1970s (Bangasser, 2000). Many historical events, specifically the Cold War, provided political motivation to aid Third World countries in the development process. Many poorer countries with stagnant economies that were not progressing wanted to transform into growing, dynamic and modern ones. Thus, the birth of the informal economy became significant in many contexts because of the lack of employment, which could not be ignored. This is the major reason that the informal economy thrives in many lower income countries, especially in Africa, where there are elevated levels of unemployment and poverty (Bangasser, 2000). By the 1960s unemployment became a serious concern despite significant development efforts which were geared towards creating employment (Bangasser, 2000). By the 1970s, the Kenyan mission attracted considerable attention and was documented as the first comprehensive approach to the problems of employment, poverty and inequality; emphasizing the importance of the informal sector (Singer & Jolly, 2012). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1972), the informal sector played a key role in improving the unemployment situation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the term informal economy gradually dispersed into the evolving development agenda (Bangasser, 2000). Decades later, the informal economy continues to appear in many debates, discussions and national priorities and still constitutes an important part of the economies of many developing countries. For instance, Chen (2001) suggests that 93% of newly created jobs in Africa during the 1990s were part of the informal sector. A few years later studies indicate that the informal sector represents approximately 43% of the official gross domestic product (GDP), thus being almost equivalent to the formal sector (Lesser & Moisé-Leeman, 2009; OECD,

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2007; Schneider, 2006). Comparing the performances of the formal and informal sectors in terms of job creation, Xaba et al. (2002) suggest that the informal sector is experiencing remarkable growth. For some, it is a short-term solution to alleviate the burden that poor households experience (Lesser & Moisé-Leeman, 2009), whereas for others it is a significant means to improve their living conditions (Fourie, 2018; Fourie & Leibbrandt, 2012). Informal employment refers primarily to activities which occur in businesses and employment that lack registration and social security for their employees (OECD, 2002). In much of Africa, the informal labour market mainly includes casual day labourers, domestic workers, industrial outworkers, undeclared workers, and part-time or temporary workers without secure contracts, worker benefits, or social protection (ILO, 2002). The ILO (2002) suggests that the informal economy was formulated for those who were not officially working but were engaged in some form of economic activity, resulting in the term informal employment. Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007) characterise the informal sector as mostly constituting unskilled labourers in low-productivity jobs, engaging in marginal and small-scale activities which are usually under conditions that increase their vulnerability to social and economic challenges because of the lack of protection against health and unemployment shocks (Gasparini & Tornarolli, 2007). Migrants engage in a number of economic activities including hairstyling, taxi driving, carpentry, welding and shoe repair (Maharaj & Moodley, 2009). The informal economy constitutes economic activity, which is usually outside the framework of the official employment sector and takes many forms. It also refers to self-employment and trading activities that are not governed by laws and regulations. Hence, it is a highly precarious and vulnerable sector which is sometimes even associated with illegal and unethical activity (Chambwera et al., 2011); closely related to what is termed the black market, because of the lack of governance defining and regulating its operations (Schrieder & Knerr, 2000). However, for many others it is a means of making an honest living; a term that appeared in the literature since the early 1990s (see Austin, 1994), referring to a legitimate small business activity with entrepreneurs offering goods for sale to the general public. The concept of the informal economy has been

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increasing in popularity over time. The informal sector differs substantially from that of the formal sector. A multi-country study conducted in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe found that approximately two-thirds of informal businesses in these countries consist mainly of a sole entrepreneur (Haan, 2006). This is similar to other parts of the world with a similar socio-economic status such as Latin America (Maloney & Mendez, 2004). Gatti et al. (2011) finds that 20–40% of workers in the Middle East are informal, working mostly for small firms. However, despite decades of scrutiny, the informal sector continues to elicit diverging views (Bangasser, 2000). The informal economy is not always an appealing sector as incomes can be low and working conditions are inadequate (Institute for Economic Justice, 2018).

Magnitude and Size of the Informal Economy Africa is a largely under-developed region; thus, the informal sector serves as an opportunity not only for survival but also as a success measure. It is an opportunity to start a business and grow and develop it into a larger enterprise. Measuring the size of the informal economy is important given the benefits and challenges (Medina et al., 2017); however, there are a number of issues in doing so. In general, it appears that the informal economy has been growing in size. Internationally, there has been a growth in the numbers of people working in the informal economy, either self-employed in unregistered businesses or casual workers. The first-ever global estimates on the size of informal employment, published by the ILO in 2018, shows that 61% of all workers are informally employed, equating to 2 billion workers worldwide (ILO, 2018). According to the ILO (2018), more than 60% of the world’s employed population earn their livelihoods in the informal economy. The informal sector has emerged in all regions and countries regardless of the level of socio-economic development. Estimates indicated that developing countries account for 82% of the world’s total employment and has higher portions of informal employment than developed countries. More than two-thirds of the employed population in emerging and developing countries are in informal employment

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whereas less than one-fifth of the employed population are in developed countries (ILO, 2018). Regions with a higher level of socio-economic development, such as the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia have lower portions of informal employment (ILO, 2018). The share of the informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa remains among the largest in the world (Medina et al., 2017). In sub-Saharan Africa, the informal sector constitutes 72% of non-agricultural employment, which is the highest in the world in comparison to 65% in Asia, 51% in Latin America and 48% in North Africa (Devey et al., 2006). Years later, these estimates remain largely unchanged. The majority of employment in Africa is informal, which accounts for 85.8%. In other parts of the world, these estimates are approximately 68.2% in Asia and the Pacific and 68.6% in the Arab States while in the Americas it accounts for 40%. Interestingly, in Europe and Central Asia informal employment only accounts for 25% (ILO, 2018). Setsabi and Leduka (2008) argue that there is a persistent economic crisis in the African region, fuelled by high levels of unemployment and poverty. These challenges generally manifest across the continent’s largest cities. Thus, many have turned to the informal sector, especially street trading as an important source of livelihood, while to others, street trading supplements meagre formal sector incomes (Setsabi & Leduka, 2008; Skinner, 2008). According to Nguimkeu and Okou (2020), the informal economy accounts for 80.8% of jobs and is the foundation of economic activity in urban Africa. The presence of the informal economy is strong in many African cities where street vendors are key in ensuring food security and the transport sector is vital in ensuring movement for economic gain (Nguimkeu & Okou, 2020). While the informal economy hosts a range of employees and entrepreneurs, it is a key source of livelihood for migrants, especially those who have moved within the continent of Africa. It is difficult to measure the size of the informal economy; however, in South Africa, Rogan and Skinner (2018) suggest that there were over 2.4 million people in the sector in 2015. Migrants constitute a significant share of the informal economy. While it is not possible to count every migrant in the sector in the country, data from the 2017 South African Quarterly Labour Force Survey suggests that 47% of migrants are employed in precarious and unregulated environments,

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and of these, approximately 39% are employed in the informal economy (Carciotto, 2020).

Migrant Informal Traders in South Africa Since the country transitioned to a democratic state many migrants who were fleeing from political turmoil and hostile situations in their own country believed that South Africa was a favourable destination. Many were attracted to the country because of its middle-income status, stable democratic institutions, and comparatively industrialised economy. Historically, the main motive for migration to South Africa was labour. However, this is changing as many Africans from neighbouring countries are leaving their home country because they are motivated by their social networks who are already in the country and have established small-scale businesses in the informal sector. Some transition to South Africa as a gateway to other more industrialised and developed countries. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Division (UNDESA) estimates that South Africa is home to approximately 5.3 million migrants (United Nations, 2020). However, it is assumed that this estimate is much larger as not every migrant is documented. In Africa, there are distinct trends in inter-continental movement and this is reflected in the nationalities of immigrants. Most of the statistics suggest that the majority of migrants in South Africa come from other countries in the Southern African region. In a study conducted in the South African city of Johannesburg, Peberdy (2016) found that most informal traders had been able to secure employment before coming to South Africa. Only 5% were involved in informal entrepreneurial activity and only 2% had owned a business in the formal economy in their home country. In South Africa, they found it difficult to secure formal employment and therefore they decided to start their own business. In the same study, approximately 25% had previously done semi-skilled or unskilled manual work. However, few were professionals as only a minority of the entrepreneurs had prior entrepreneurial experience in South Africa. Approximately 13% were previously operating in the informal economy and 5% owned a business in the formal

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economy before becoming involved in the informal economy (Peberdy, 2016). Since the 1900s there was a growing emphasis on understanding the informal sector in South Africa in terms of its contribution to the GDP and as a valuable social safety net in South Africa for many locals and migrants (Daniel et al., 2004). The global economic recession of 2007/2008 created economic instability and amplified the global employment crisis in many African countries (Wolf, 2014). As a result, an unprecedented number of migrants fled to South Africa in search of better opportunities. South Africa became a preferred destination for many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, especially because of the ease of entry into the country post-apartheid (Conway & Leonard, 2014). In addition to this, South Africa is recognised as one of the more developed nations in the continent in comparison to other neighbouring countries. According to the United Nations Development Programme (2020) the country has a higher human development index (HDI) in comparison to other countries in the region. There is better access to resources and facilities and most of the larger cities are relatively developed. These cities offer the opportunity for many to engage in the informal sector and earn an income. One in six people who work in South Africa is an informal trader, and in 2013 it was estimated that about 880,000 people worked in the informal economy (Fourie, 2018) and this sector was valued at approximately R164 billion, contributing to over 30% of money spent on food (Fourie, 2018; Ingle, 2014). There were 2,647,000 people in the informal sector (non-agricultural) between October to December 2021 and this had increased from 2,521,000 a year earlier (Statistics South Africa, 2022). There were 915,000 women aged 15–64 years in the informal economy; however, this estimate was smaller than that of men, who constituted 1,732,000 in the period October–November 2021 (Statistics South Africa, 2022). Fundie and Chisoro (2015) and Mbatha (2020) explain that due to the economic growth potential, the informal economy is perceived as a gateway to the business sector for equal distribution of wealth. International migrants are often perceived as more entrepreneurial than South Africans. However, those who engage in the informal economy are often regarded as survivalists without entrepreneurial aspirations and skills as it is merely a means to make a

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living (Peberdy, 2016). Thus, the informal sector is a survivalist environment where many have to adapt and dedicate themselves to earning an income (Blaauw, 2017). Migrants have taken significant risks by leaving their home country for South Africa. As a result, their dedication to the business is often exceptional as it is their sole means of surviving in their host nation. Informal traders take risks by launching informal trading operations and conserving tiny sums of money, enhancing the poor’s entrepreneurial talents (Willemse, 2011). Rolfe et al. (2010) indicate that the growth in the informal sector has been significant; almost eight times the growth of the formal sector in South Africa. Over the past decade, the country has witnessed significant ideological, economic and physical changes in this sector as a result of the government’s continued engagement in stimulating economic growth, as well as shifts in ideology and attitudes towards inward migration of people from African countries (Horn, 2011). Between the 1990s and the 2000s, most migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa settled in large cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, which were favoured destinations (Peberdy & Rogerson, 2000). A study conducted by Peberdy (2017), which explores the experiences of 928 international and South African migrant entrepreneurs in informal sector businesses in Johannesburg, found that 59% operated in the informal economy. An estimated 67% of international migrants in the study moved into the country to secure employment and provide for their families however, 40% then began their own businesses to earn an income (Peberdy, 2017). A 2010 Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) survey of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town found that 20% were involved in the informal sector (Crush et al., 2015b). Studies of other migrant groups such as Somalis suggest even higher rates of informal economy participation (Gastrow & Amit, 2012; Jinnah, 2010). Asylum seekers and refugees from various countries are largely excluded from the formal labour market and show high levels of enterprise and innovation in the informal economy (Maqanda, 2012). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021) indicates that the largest proportion of migrant businesses in the city of Johannesburg were owned by Zimbabwean nationals (28.3%), followed by Mozambicans (14.9%), Malawians (10.7%), Nigerians (9.7%), nationals of the DRC

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(6.3%), Pakistanis (5.9%) and Ethiopians (5.4%). Most international migrants are coming from other parts of Africa or neighbouring countries but there are increasing numbers from countries outside the continent including Bangladesh, Pakistan and China (Lin, 2014; Munshi, 2013; Willemse, 2014). According to Callaghan and Venter (2011), in South Africa’s biggest cities, the informal economy reflects the dynamism of entrepreneurial activities. There is a wide variety of activities in the informal economy such as selling and production of goods, although some of the businesses are legal, many of the businesses in the sector are still perceived as illegal as they are tax non-compliant and not formally registered (Charman & Piper, 2012). These cities continue to dominate the informal trade industry as they are better developed, more urbanised and have large populations in comparison to the smaller cities in the country, thus, offering better opportunities to gain an income and engage in the informal trade (Crush et al., 2015a).

A Means to Make a Living: Street Trading Street trading has become a popular and prominent means of earning a living across the South African market. Often conducting their business in busy city areas, most migrants are involved in selling items such as clothes, leather goods and craft items. Street trading involves the sale of goods and provision of services that are on demand on the pavements or in busy public spaces in towns and cities (Mukhola, 2015; Skinner, 2008). On the street, they usually peddle their products beneath a temporary covering such as a tent or an umbrella (Masonganye, 2010). In Africa, street trading is a dynamic sector, which is thriving. Street trading began to expand in the early 1990s after the deregulation and amendment of the Business Act of 1991 in 1993; and the activities in this sector have increased over the years (Gamieldien & van Niekerk, 2017; Mukhola, 2015). Generally, the increase in street trading is attributed to the growth of unemployment and has been described as a livelihood strategy for those that cannot secure employment in the formal sector. A number of African immigrants in South Africa have resorted to street trading in many large cities in South Africa. For instance, Moyo

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et al. (2016) suggest that they are involved in street trading because there are less stringent controls governing their activity and there is the possibility of earning higher incomes. In their study, Moyo et al. (2016) found that Malawian, Tanzanian and Zimbabwean migrant traders engaged in street trading as they failed to get work permits which would allow them to look for jobs in line with their qualifications. Others have education qualifications but it is not recognised or they are unable to secure any formal employment. Thus, street trading is not entirely a lucrative industry; instead, international migrants enter this sector out of desperation, as they are unable to find any other economic opportunity. It is also a means to make an income to help kin and family back home. There is a diverse range of migrants operating in the streets of South Africa. In a study conducted in Durban, South Africa, Hunter and Skinner (2001) found that 44% of those involved in the hair industry originate from the DRC, while 19% are from Burundi and 11% are from Kenya. Furthermore, 28% of those who repair shoes come from the DRC and 25% come from either Ghana or Tanzania. In their study, Sidzatane and Maharaj (2013) also found a number of migrant street traders were from African countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone. They are often attracted to popular and large cities, such as Durban, because of available economic opportunities (Sidzatane & Maharaj, 2013). However, not all migrants have been welcomed into the country, and there are widespread negative perceptions of international street traders and this has often led to conflict. Although the South African Constitution of 1996 and the Business Act of 1991 protect the rights of migrant street traders, they continually face victimisation from the police (Hodgson & Clark, 2018). Migrant street traders face unique issues concerning policy and municipal by-laws in the major cities of South Africa which have often been left without any support (Rogerson, 2018). A study conducted by Mkhize et al. (2013) in the Durban Central Business District (CBD) indicated that most of the challenges experienced by migrant street traders were a result of governance by the local municipality. In addition, they needed to navigate difficult working conditions such as long hours and adverse weather conditions with no assistance and support (Austin, 1994).

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Feminisation of the Informal Economy: African Women in Business In the traditional African context, it was not common for women to work. Instead, they were responsible for taking care of the homestead and children. However, high levels of poverty are driving many women into the labour force. The challenge is that after decades of following traditional norms, many women from patriarchal contexts have minimal levels of education and barely any skills. Much of the research suggests that women are much more impoverished than men (Bastos et al., 2009; Chireshe, 2010). They are significantly impacted because many act as shock absorbers and often deny themselves basics, such as food in order to protect their children and/ or partners from the consequences of poverty. Thus, women put the needs of others above their own (Chireshe, 2010; Lister, 2005). There are a number of reasons why many women struggle to secure formal sector employment. For instance, many are paid less than men, even when they have the same qualifications and work the same hours (Jean, 2006). Moreover, they obtain low-paying jobs because of persistent sexual discrimination in terms of employment and salaries (Chireshe, 2010). According to Zarrilli and Linoci (2020), women, who represent as much 80% in some African countries, are primarily concentrated in the informal sector. In the current post-apartheid era, growing flexibility within South Africa’s labour market suggests a deviation from traditional, formal full-time employment contracts as well as a growth of precarious, marginal and atypical employment (Mabilo, 2018). Thus, feminisation of labour, which has placed emphasis on women’s movement into the labour market in South Africa, has concealed important continuities in the contemporary labour market by attracting women with low skills into the informal economy. As a result of the post-apartheid labour landscape, increasing numbers of women are setting up informal enterprises and entering informal employment arrangements. The labour of women in the informal sector is significant as it is a way to alleviate poverty and inequality. Thus, for many women the informal economy serves as an opportunity to gain economic independence and become less reliant on partners for financial support (Mabilo, 2018).

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Women usually occupy the domestic labour and hairstyling industry. According to the ILO (2015), domestic work attracts more than 11 million migrant workers of which the majority, or 8.5 million, are women. South Africa is known to have one of the more progressive legal frameworks for domestic workers globally. However, most domestic workers are not entitled to decent working hours because they are not formally registered with the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). The UIF is a short-term measure for employees who have become unemployed or are unable to work for health-related reasons, including maternity and paternity. Another prominent industry in which many women operate is the hairstyling industry. Ojong (2006) indicated that African female entrepreneurs who have relocated to South Africa in the hopes of better prospects, specifically Ghanaian hairdressers, have successfully established themselves. Even though restrictive immigration laws and other factors have been challenging for these women, they persisted in employing various innovative strategies to ensure that they are able to make a living (Ojong, 2006). Even though some women were unskilled and had a low level of education they felt a sense of autonomy from operating in the informal economy as they were working in their own space (Mhandu et al., 2018). Bachan (2018) suggests that migration offers women a choice to work and become financially independent. It has the potential to shift power relations within the family, especially when women are instrumental in lifting the family out of poverty. This is important as Chireshe (2010) stipulates that migrant Zimbabwean women were exposed to negative psychosocial experiences as a result of poverty. They exposed themselves to risky situations to earn an income. In light of equality efforts embedded in global agendas, it is important that women use the informal sector to become more independent and earn an income. Operating in the informal economy is not easy for many women. Often, many leave behind young children and families in order to secure a livelihood. A study by Muñoz (2019) among Zimbabwean mothers in Johannesburg and California observed that many immigrant women who are domestic workers expressed feelings of personal economic failure because they indicated that no matter how hard they work, they never seem to be able to pull their families out of poverty. This highlights the imminent need

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to redress the unique challenges facing women and not just migrants. Limiting women from earning an income widens the gender inequality gap and exacerbates violence against women. Thus, for those women who are unable to secure formal sector employment, the informal economy has been recognised as important (Bonnet et al., 2019). However, persistent challenges and hostile environments make it challenging to lead a decent quality of life.

Migration to the South: Is South Africa Still a Favoured Destination? Since the early 1990s the number of migrants in South Africa increased significantly (Crush & McDonald, 2001). After the demise of apartheid South Africa became an attractive destination to many migrants from neighbouring nations especially those who struggled financially and as a result of violence and unrest (Muanamoha et al., 2010; MudiOkorodudu, 2011). While it appears that migrants are safely integrated and protected by progressive laws, this is not always true. Many endured a lower quality of life in South Africa in comparison to what they experienced in their home country. They felt ashamed to return home, preferring instead to continue to engage in the informal economy even if it meant that they would be surviving on a daily, minimal income (Akintola & Akintola, 2015). Thus, the narrative of South Africa as a preferred destination for migration is increasingly being eroded. The country is no longer a favoured destination because of the adverse challenges that many immigrants are facing and the precarious situation in which they find themselves. The situation between locals and migrants has been worsening over the years because anti-immigrant sentiments are increasing. The rapid influx of migrants into the country has also fuelled many negative perceptions of migrants as ‘job stealers’ and ‘criminals’ and that they are deteriorating the economic situation in the country and competing with locals for limited resources (Chomsky, 2018; Misago et al., 2015). According to Crush et al. (2013), 60% of South Africans believe that migrants take jobs away from locals. In addition, locals believe that migrants engage in demanding work and

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offer cheaper labour, therefore, distorting the nature of employment where employees work for lower remuneration under harsher conditions (Moyce & Schenker, 2018). Almost half, or 48%, of South Africans surveyed in a study by Peberdy (2017) mentioned that the number of immigrant-owned businesses should be limited and 39% agreed that all immigrant businesses should be permanently closed. These negative sentiments may be reflective of the general levels of hostility towards international migrants rather than their status as entrepreneurs (Peberdy, 2017).

Xenophobia or Afrophobia? Crime, Violence and Harassment Almost twenty years after democracy South Africa is confronted with unprecedented levels of crime, violence and inequality; often at the forefront of these experiences are the poor, women and migrants. Over the past few years, the country has witnessed a series of xenophobic incidents which has been escalating in many major cities (Gordon, 2016). In 2008 xenophobia became a serious challenge which cost the lives of over 70 migrants nationwide. A few hundred migrants were forced to leave their communities by locals (McConnell, 2009). In addition, many migrant-owned businesses were affected during this chaos and many lost their only means to survive (Hassim et al., 2008). In the coastal city of Durban, one study found that Congolese migrants encounter social exclusion, exploitation and xenophobia on a daily basis because of the perceived competition over scarce resources (Amisi, 2006). Approximately 60% of locals believed that migrants ‘take jobs away from locals’ and this was the reason for the xenophobic violence that occurred in 2008 (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). Thereafter, the violence continued to increase in intensity across the country over the next few years. For example, Landau and Polzer (2007) detailed a number of attacks, some of them fatal, against African nationals in general and informal traders specifically (Moyo et al., 2016). In Gauteng, an increasing number of attacks on the shops of foreign nationals were inflicted by the residents of an informal settlement since 2011. In 2015, more attacks occurred

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in Johannesburg among foreign-owned businesses, specifically targeting African immigrants (Chinomona & Maziriri, 2015). Also in 2015, a text message was circulated via WhatsApp which instructed millions of African immigrants in South Africa to return home. The message used xenophobia and afrophobia to criminalise African immigrants in South Africa (Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, 2016). The situation between migrants and locals continued to worsen. Over the past year, in early 2022, hostility against migrants has been marshalled by organised groups such as Operation Dudula and Put South Africa First who have been targeting and unlawfully evicting foreign nationals from their homes and victimising informal traders (Boshoff, 2022). Tension between migrants and locals has motivated anti-immigrant riots, violence and prejudice which has negatively impacted many migrants (Gordon, 2016). While migrants may be contributing to the local economy, migrant businesses in and around major cities continue to be targeted and often by community members, as well as in policeled operations, accusing them of selling counterfeit goods, among other allegations. Approximately 54% of migrants continue to experience prejudice because of their nationality, 46% encounter verbal insults against their business and 24% have had physical attacks by South Africans. In addition to this, one in five respondents said xenophobia had affected their business operations (Peberdy, 2016). It is well documented that African immigrants generally experience discrimination, harassment, hostility and xenophobia as opposed to other immigrants in South Africa (Crush, 2008; Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Crush & Tevera, 2010; Moyo et al., 2016). Being perceived as an African foreigner in South Africa has become what the literature refers to as dangerous because many locals feel that migrants do not belong here and should ‘go home’ (Abdi, 2011; Ikuomola & Zaaiman, 2014; Jinnah, 2010). The term afrophobia is increasingly emerging in the literature as a concept which refers to the negative attitudes of South Africans towards immigrants from other African countries, especially Black Africans (Dube, 2018). Afrophobia is a term used to describe fear and hatred of the different cultures and people of Africa and the African diaspora by South Africans. In comparison to White or Asian immigrants, Africans are most disliked by South Africans (Dube, 2018). Using data from the 2013 South African Social

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Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Dube (2018) found that negative attitudes towards immigrants are widespread in South Africa and that Nigerians and Zimbabweans were the most disliked group among respondents in the study. This could be attributed to the large influx of Zimbabweans into the country (Desai, 2008). These sentiments make migrants especially vulnerable to constant victimisation, harassment and violence (Crush & Ramachandran, 2015). For migrants, one of the major challenges is that the arrival of refugees in their ‘new’ host country, such as South Africa, worsens the xenophobic attitudes which may already exist since immigrants and refugees are considered to be a threat to the existing social fabric and, consequently, they are not easily integrated into the host society (Amisi, 2006). Migrant and refugee entrepreneurs are believed to have a negative economic impact on South Africa and the livelihoods of South Africans. However, findings from Peberdy (2016) challenge these perceptions and suggest that migrant entrepreneurs create job opportunities. Negative attitudes towards international migrants are what influence the hostile relationships between locals and migrants. The success of migrant traders may also contribute to tensions with locals. A study conducted in the township of Khayelitsha by Basardien et al. (2014) found that international migrants dominate the market, often resulting in the closure of many local businesses. This has often led to tensions between locals and migrants, sometimes even resulting in violent confrontations. Crush et al. (2015a) document the regular occurrence of violence and hostility towards international migrants in the larger cities in the country. Abdi (2011) suggests that violence against migrants is rooted in South Africa’s history of structural violence and communal crisis. However, this unpleasant situation of constantly having to secure a livelihood and remain vigilant was a continuous, daily struggle (Abdi, 2011). However, it is not just local citizens who are hostile towards foreigners. The South African police are expected to provide protection and support to all; however, many migrants feel exploited and harassed, especially those who operate on street corners, with no valid work permit. This is what Charman and Piper (2012) refer to as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ which is the use of violence to intimidate and drive migrant entrepreneurs out of an area. Due to the lack of police

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support for migrants, many citizens have turned hostile attitudes into violent actions by forcibly shutting down migrant-owned businesses and attacking their owners and employees. These attacks manifest in crimes of a violent nature. Amidst these challenges, the world was taken by surprise when the ongoing global pandemic added a new dimension to the list of existing challenges.

The COVID-19 Pandemic: An Additional Strain The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the fore the difficulty of applying universal lockdown guidelines in cities where poverty, inequality and informality are dominant characteristics (Skinner & Watson, 2020). The growth of the informal sector plays an important role in serving as the economy’s primary source of income during times of uncertainty (Ingle, 2014), such as the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. For many foreign nationals discontinuing income-generating activities was a particular challenge given disruptions in remittances and income during the pandemic. The nationwide lockdown and stringent containment measures meant that many had to adopt new survival strategies because most immigrants felt vulnerable and marginalised (Mbeve et al., 2020). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic drastically affected all forms of human mobility and hindered the continuation of normal, daily activities. While the entire world was impacted by the ongoing pandemic, once again migrants, especially international ones, were stranded, unable to return to their countries or forcefully returned to their home countries earlier than planned, and many job opportunities perished. Migrants play an important role in the development of their countries, especially through remittances sent to improve the livelihoods of families and communities. These remittances are injected into investments in education, health, sanitation, housing and other infrastructure. However, due to the restrictions and economic shock caused as a result of the pandemic, flows of remittances to low- and middle-income countries are projected to drastically decline. For many families, the reduction of remittances is likely to have serious financial and social impacts (United Nations, 2020). According to the IOM (2020), informal workers have

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been affected by a double burden, where they faced reductions in both supply and demand as governments have imposed various measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. The closure of borders and movement restrictions in many regions has resulted in unemployment and loss of income for many in the informal sector, many of whom are migrants from countries within the sub-region of Africa (IOM, 2020). According to the Centre for Development Enterprise (CDE) (2020), it is difficult to predict what the impact of the pandemic will be on the informal sector as it has little capacity for resilience. In 2020, during the hard lockdown, the ability of migrants to work was severely impacted. In addition to this, they were often prevented from accessing relief measures to help them cope during the pandemic. Due to the precarious nature of their employment, they are often excluded from social relief measures and also prevented from receiving informal help, including childcare and economic hardship, during the crisis (Ismail & Valdivia, 2022). While this may have had an impact on migrants, it was also challenging for family members, friends and communities in the country of origin who relied heavily on remittances for their daily living. In South Africa, as in many other countries, workers in the informal economy and women in particular, have been disproportionately affected by measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (Skinner et al., 2021). Informal workers typically operate in the most vulnerable segments of the labour market, relying on daily earnings to survive and, as such, their prospects for recovery are far less certain than those of formal sector workers. In addition, many informal workers support households that are below or near the poverty line (Skinner et al., 2021). Many informal traders responded to the strict lockdown imposed by the government by defying COVID-19 regulations to secure their income in order to survive during the crisis (Thulare & Moyo, 2021). Mbeve et al. (2020) also found that when foreign migrants were confronted with restrictions on movement, loss of income and failure to send remittances to families they adopted different survival strategies. These included the use of fake permits to navigate the city, internal movements and adapting to new conditions and securing social support from friends and relatives. Thus, the government needs to recognise the vulnerability of migrants. Apart from the obvious restrictions in mobility,

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Walker et al. (2021) suggest that during the pandemic the majority of migrants were excluded from COVID-19 vaccine rollout programmes. This had far-reaching public health and social implications, as people living and working on the margins of society remain the most affected. It was not until much later into the pandemic did the government extend its programme to all, including undocumented migrants (Vearey et al., 2021); however, this widened inequality and exacerbated existing vulnerabilities of asylum-seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants in South Africa (Mukumbang et al., 2020).

The Importance of Remaining in the Informal Sector: Resilience Through Hardship There have been many changes; however, Blaauw and Pretorius (2022) suggest that South Africa continues to be a crucial African destination for immigrants from across sub-Saharan Africa. Many continue to settle in the country in the hope of a renewed future; however, they are sometimes forced to operate in the informal economy (Blaauw & Pretorius, 2022). The vast majority of the literature suggests that immigrants operating in the informal economy are doing so amidst fear and uncertainty. However, despite these challenges for some, it is their only means of surviving and supporting their families. Since the mid-1990s, international remittances have greatly surpassed official development assistance levels defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries (IOM, 2021). Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their countries of origin (IOM, 2021). Most migrant workers in Africa stay attached to their countries of origin by sending remittances to family members still living there (African Union Commission, 2020). Many migrants decide to settle permanently in their countries of destination because of the socio-economic opportunities that are open to them there. Migrants make a significant contribution to poverty reduction and socio-economic development in both countries of origin and destination when they operate in the economy (African Union Commission, 2020). The contribution of remittances to

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the development of migrants’ countries of origin, particularly towards alleviating poverty and social inequality in households and communities of origin, plays an important role. While most of the data is only an estimate, it suggests a fairly sizeable and significant portion of finances. Migrant remittances from Nigeria and Egypt amounted to an estimated United States Dollar (USD) 75,747.4 million in 2017, USD 69,616.77 million in 2016 and USD 70,795.57 million in 2015 (African Union Commission, 2020). Although there are issues in obtaining an accurate estimation of remittances, data suggests that international remittances in recent years increased from USD 128 billion in 2000 to USD 702 billion in 2020 (IOM, 2021). Remittances to low and middle-income countries account for the majority of the global total, which decreased in 2020 (from USD 548 billion in 2019 to USD 540 billion) after a positive trend from 2016 to 2018 (from USD 441 billion in 2016 to USD 478 billion in 2017 and USD 524 billion in 2018) (IOM, 2021). Though not confirmed, this could be attributed to the ongoing global pandemic (IOM, 2021). The journey to a new country, ongoing relationships with family back home, as well as their hopes and plans for the future are the reason for many migrants to persevere despite the deep-rooted challenges of surviving in a foreign country. Many informal traders have built their lives and livelihoods through various social networks within their new environment without losing contact with families back home and remain resilient and committed to improving their lives (Musiyandaka, 2021). It is through social networks that migrants learn about opportunities and conditions in potential destinations; thus, social networks shape their ability and desire to leave (Blumenstock et al., 2019; Gebre et al., 2011). Their social networks are also an important tool of support during challenging times. Many who leave their home in search of better prospects often have the support of other migrants who have already settled in the country. Friends and family help new immigrants navigate the terrain in the host country. This is important because those who transition to the country experience a number of challenges (Hlatshwayo, 2019). Families provide some moral and financial support for migrants. Immigrants in the country are usually always the first ones who assist newcomers on their arrival with accommodation and food, as well as assistance

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with seeking employment in South Africa (Muanamoha et al., 2010). Social capital at the place of destination has positive impacts on migration (Madhavan & Landau, 2011). Social networks are important for migrants when relocating because usually they seek to minimize their risks when they move and consider places where they know other individuals or organizations that can help them to settle in the country easily. Social networks provide the kinds of connections needed to make migration possible. In addition, having strong close social networks at home has the opposite effect by reducing the likelihood of migration intentions, both internationally and locally (Manchin & Orazbayev, 2018). Gallego and Mendola (2013) find that remittances boost household engagement in community-based social networks. This suggests that stable migration ties and higher income stability through remittances may strengthen social bonds (Gallego & Mendola, 2013). Thus, even though they experience a number of challenges many migrants remain motivated and resilient and continue to operate in the informal sector (Whitehouse, 2011) and adapt to difficult circumstances because they need to survive and support their families (Vermaak, 2017).

Conclusion The informal sector contributes significantly to alleviating poverty and inequality as the sector has the potential to create employment as well as provide a secure livelihood for many. Increasing the participation of poor and marginalised people is important for economic growth. The informal sector is an opportunity to absorb the unskilled and poor into the economy (Fourie, 2018, 2019). However, the discourse largely documents and outlines the challenges as well as the potential that this sector has especially in the African continent and within lower and lesser developed countries. The informal economy provides the opportunity to address some of the African continent’s core challenges of creating employment and stimulating economic growth in marginalised areas. Despite the noticeable impact of the informal economy, evidence largely suggests that this sector should emerge from operating in the shadows as it has the ability to significantly influence economic development. An

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evidence-based debate on migration policies is necessary if the global development agenda is to be successfully implemented, particularly with regard to providing access to decent work and improving social protection for both native and migrant workers (African Union Commission, 2020). For places like South Africa this is especially important because more than twenty years into democracy, the government is persistently challenged with combatting poverty and inequality amidst rising unemployment, particularly in urban centres and among the youth. Many nations acknowledge the widespread disruption caused by the ongoing global pandemic which has hindered a number of development efforts from being attained, including the SDGs. Labour markets and living conditions have been severely impacted and in some instances regressing which is threatening to those who are without social protection, in this case, migrants and informal workers. Given the interconnectedness of migrants operating in the informal economy, all aspects of development, at the national, regional and global level are under severe risk, if swift and timely interventions are not actioned.

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3 Hustling to Survive: Livelihood Strategies of Migrants Sachin Sewpersad and Pranitha Maharaj

Introduction Migrants often move to South Africa in search of better economic prospects and greener pastures. However, they often struggle to secure formal employment given the high levels of unemployment in the host country, therefore, many are forced to turn to the informal economy as a survival strategy to secure a livelihood. The informal sector is often viewed as materialising out of the need for survival, driving the necessity for starting a business to earn a livelihood. Livelihood strategies are a combination of economic activities that individuals use to support S. Sewpersad (B) · P. Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj e-mail: [email protected]

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themselves. For many international migrants, these strategies are generally low-paying work or small-scale entrepreneurial activities such as street trading and informal retail stores. Migrants operate in the informal economy as it serves as a means to earn money to support their families. Despite the various challenges they face, international migrants continue to engage in informal trading as a livelihood strategy. It is often mistaken that South Africa’s informal economy is mainly dominated by street traders and small retail or ‘spaza’ shops, whereas in reality it constitutes a variety of trading activities and industries. These may include informal vending and fast-food traders, alcohol retailers, electronic sales and repairs, transportation services, and hairstylists (Bernstein, 2020). Informal traders may also operate in malls and formal markets, on transport systems such as caravans and light delivery vehicles, and at special events. Therefore, engaging in the informal economy may be considered empowering especially since it provides migrants with the agency not only to run their businesses at their leisure, but also to meet their basic survival needs and have the desire to thrive (Sassen et al., 2018). Street trading is often used by migrants as a temporary employment endeavour in response to future plans or dreams and serves as a means of preparing or making provisions for their future (Mbatha & Koskimaki, 2021). This type of livelihood strategy is particularly important, especially for those who do not have the required paperwork to obtain formal employment, or those whose academic qualifications are not recognised by the host country (Sidzatane & Maharaj, 2013). Street trading attracts young migrants into the informal economy in pursuit of opportunities for financial growth and independence; however, they often have to work long hours and may have to hustle during periods of uncertainty (Mbatha & Koskimaki, 2021). While there may be some overlap in the livelihood strategies of migrant men and women, there are also distinct differences. Male migrants in the informal sector often work in small stores, selling groceries or items of clothing, and repairing electronic or mechanical goods. This contrasts with the work of women, who more often engage in hairstyling, nail art, the sale of cosmetics, clothing, small grocery items, and domestic work. Many migrants are involved in hairstyling

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which has created opportunities for them to provide services through unique skills that may not be available from local service providers as these skills are exclusive to the culture of the migrants themselves (Ojong, 2006). A study by Ojong and Mhandu (2018) found that Zimbabwean migrant women who are involved in hairstyling are satisfied with their occupation as this livelihood strategy is enough to provide for their basic needs such as food and shelter, and remittances. In addition, it is empowering to the women who engage in this type of economic activity as they have personal control over their earnings allowing them to enjoy personal and financial freedom and independence, which they may not have otherwise had if they relied on their spouses for financial support (Ojong, 2006). However, it is not only women who conduct this type of activity, some male migrants also work in the informal hairstyle and salon industry. Many of them, especially those of Asian origin, operate ‘traditional barber shops’, providing grooming services to men (Naidu, 2018). These services are a vital source of income and allow informal workers, particularly migrants, to earn an income in order to survive and live autonomously. Migrant women also explore other avenues, such as domestic work, due to difficulties in finding employment in the formal labour market. The domestic labour sector has expanded to fulfil the needs of the household, as more people require assistance with domestic activities (Fish, 2013), thereby creating an opportunity for migrant women who are unable to enter the formal economy. Migrant domestic workers in South Africa often lack the appropriate documentation due to the fact that they may have moved to the country out of desperation and as a result, have no other option but to take any job opportunity that comes their way (Griffin, 2011). They continue to seek work despite these limitations, demonstrating their willingness to earn a livelihood. Some fear deportation if they are detected by the authorities which may prevent them from engaging with employment agencies or other domestic workers (Griffin, 2011). Petty trading is another widespread informal activity with many migrant traders buying and selling various types of merchandise such as food items, handicrafts, firewood, and even liquor (Golooba-Mutebi & Tollman, 2004). These are often sold in small informal shops or outlets

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also known as ‘spaza’ shops. Spaza shops make a significant contribution to the socio-economic growth of both migrants and the host country’s economy. This is largely due to the large number of people who depend on this type of employment for their livelihoods (Mukwarami et al., 2018). Spaza shops play a major role in township communities as they provide easy access to a wide range of grocery items. They also act as a crucial method of entrepreneurship as they also provide an additional income to the many households who operate them (Liedeman et al., 2013). Not only are many operated by international migrants as an important livelihood source, but they are also highly competitive. Migrant-owned spaza shops are often cheaper and use discounted prices as a marketing strategy and also tend to stock a wider range of sale items and are quite favoured by local consumers (Liedeman et al., 2013). These traders also bargain with wholesale suppliers to get the best prices on their stock (Crush et al., 2015). Often migrants must hustle to secure their income. There are also many other informal operations that migrants engage in which include general-dealers, textiles (such as clothing, blankets, toys, and leather products), electronics, and houseware (Park & Rugunanan, 2010). These retail outlets are mainly operated by Chinese migrants, while Pakistani retailers tend to focus on electronics such as cell phone accessories and repairs, computer services, medical supplies, and houseware (Park & Rugunanan, 2010). Some migrants, especially refugees from Mozambique, provide various forms of traditional medicine, and some are registered with the South African National Traditional Healer’s Association as specialists in treating specific ailments (Golooba-Mutebi & Tollman, 2004). Migrants are globally classified as a vulnerable group, having to bear the impediment of being both poor and foreign, and this vulnerability has been exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (Bhagat & Kim, 2020). Lockdown regulations to curb the spread of the virus restricted the movement of people within and between countries and disrupted supply chains, tourism, and economic activities globally (Mbeve et al., 2020). Many economic activities, including informal trade, and transport systems had to be shut down. Migrants working in the informal sector were particularly affected by these measures as

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millions of them had their livelihoods lost or disrupted (Skinner & Watson, 2020). This was due to the lockdown restrictions preventing their trade operations and limiting face-to-face interactions, which are what migrant traders depend on daily to sell their products and operate their businesses. Moreover, the national regulations imposed by the government caused many migrants to experience severe food insecurity. The closure of all non-essential businesses meant that many were stranded without a means to earn an income and were therefore unable to afford food and other essential items. The majority of migrants survive on their daily earnings, which means that they lacked additional resources and savings to support themselves during this period. They had to make use of different strategies to sustain themselves during the lockdown such as false permits to enable their movement, and adapting to new conditions by resorting to online services and trade (Mbeve et al., 2020). Migrants tried to secure support via their communities and social networks, and adjusted their needs to suit the new economic constraints that they were experiencing. In addition, informal traders also found that they had little or no personal protective equipment to safeguard themselves from the virus (Schwettmann, 2020; Skinner & Watson, 2020).

Migrants Are Not Homogenous South Africa is a popular migrant destination as it has one of the strongest and most diverse economies in the Southern African region. The country is thus perceived to provide a variety of economic opportunities, with a large and prosperous market for migrants who wish to trade (Crush et al., 2010). However, migrants are not a homogenous group as many of them come from different parts of the world and are of various ages including men and women. This chapter draws on in-depth interviews that were conducted in 2021 with 40 migrant men and women operating in the informal sector in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape, South Africa. Most migrants were single, with only a few in marital or cohabiting unions. Almost 20 reported having no children, while the other half reported having at least

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one child. The age of the migrants ranged from 18 to 53 years. Their level of education was high with the majority having at least completed secondary school. The participants of this study, both male and female, originate from 15 countries across two continents, namely Africa and Asia. Most come from Mozambique, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Lesotho. These Southern African countries, particularly Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho, have been sending labour migrants to South Africa since the midnineteenth century when they first arrived to work in the Kimberley diamond mines (Crush et al., 2005). While migrants from neighbouring countries come to South Africa to look for work, they may also enter the country to visit family or to do shopping. With the end of apartheid there has been an influx of migrants from further afield including the DRC, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China. Moyo (2021) states that between 2016 and 2021, migrants entering the country were mainly from other African (894,400) and Asian (49,900) countries. The majority of African migrants come from the Southern African region, with most originating from Zimbabwe (24%) and Mozambique (12%) (United Nations, 2020). The countries in this region have more recently experienced major outflows of refugees to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, and also face significant internal displacement due to civil wars and political unrest (Crush et al., 2005). These countries also suffer from a severe lack of opportunities for economic growth. Zimbabwe, for example, had a receding economy due to fiscal instabilities and the removal of subsidies in several sectors such as farming and fuel, suppressed foreign exchange earnings, and excessive money creation (African Development Bank, 2021). This has resulted in many migrants leaving the country in search of better opportunities and quality of life. Most Asian migrants leave their home countries due to population pressures or, especially in the case of Bangladesh and Pakistan, are forced to leave due to political conflict. Their home towns and cities are often overcrowded and polluted and, therefore, they seek a better quality of life elsewhere (Park & Rugunanan, 2010).

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Reasons for Moving Most of the migrants in this study relocated to South Africa for various reasons. The most common reasons for leaving their home countries were the lack of economic and education opportunities, political instabilities, and wars. Poverty appears to have the greatest influence on migration. Most migrants come from impoverished countries and their precarious economic situation is a major motivating force for them to move to South Africa. Most countries in Africa are ranked very low on the human development index but South Africa compares relatively favourably in terms of its performance. It is therefore not surprising that for many migrants South Africa was seen as an attractive destination with better prospects for growth. One Zimbabwean migrant described his experience: “I saw it was more of a developed country, so you get more opportunities, as in work-wise or school-wise”. At that time, the country was experiencing economic growth and the currency was stronger, hence, this was therefore a powerful force attracting migrants. South Africa’s currency, the Rand, is also among the strongest on the continent, with a higher financial value than most other countries in Africa. An Ethiopian migrant explained that “The currency here is stronger so when I go back home I earn more money in exchange”. This means that the money they earned in South Africa would have a high exchange rate when they returned to their home country. In most African countries, the currency is very weak especially when compared to the US dollar. Since the emergence of democracy, South Africa has been perceived by many African countries to be among the best destinations in the world in which to pursue an education (Hiralal, 2015). Some international students in the country who wish to pursue their tertiary education at local universities perceive it as a pathway to success and a means to settle in the country in the future. A migrant from Eswatini stated that he was aware of the high quality of education offered by institutions of higher education in South Africa. For him, “South Africa is like the America of Africa that is why I came here for greener pastures” . International students are usually attracted to South Africa because of the affordable high-quality education available in the country. Moreover, the prospects of receiving a bursary or finding employment while completing their

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studies may add to the appeal of the country. One migrant from the DRC explained: I came to seek opportunity. After finishing school, I could not further my education at the university in the DRC, and the resources in my family were limited. I was told by some of my friends who are in South Africa that South Africa has a couple of opportunities. You can do any kind of job just to survive. So, I decided to migrate. I worked as a waitress for years and later I found an opportunity to go to university and completed my degree.

For many migrants, South Africa is seen as a relatively peaceful country. Despite its violent past and history of apartheid, the country has been spared major political unrest and wars, unlike many of its neighbours on the continent. One Pakistani migrant notes: “I like the fact that I am able to make money, and it is so peaceful in this country there are no wars and conflict like in my home country”. Another migrant explained: “I was a student when I left my country; it was because of a political problem. I was involved. In Bangladesh there is political violence, I was with the opposite party, and it became difficult to stay that side and then I came to South Africa” . Others expressed that they did not have economic freedom in their home countries, with bureaucratic constraints preventing them from trading. One migrant pointed out that “In Zimbabwe, you cannot just do [trade] anyhow, like here in South Africa. We do have rights in Zimbabwe, but we are oppressed, we cannot survive” . Migrants were also attracted to South Africa because of its reputation as the ‘rainbow nation’. A migrant from the DRC stated that he migrated to South Africa many years ago because he perceived the country as a diverse nation where everybody has a sense of belonging regardless of race, and that the people of the country lived in solidarity. He explained: “What I like about this country, it is a rainbow nation, where everyone belongs according to who he is or they are, either Black or White you are accepted, the people are united”. Another migrant, from Mozambique, stated that his motivation to move to South Africa was the warm welcome he received from locals. He observed:

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The people, the way they treat me, they have humanity, ‘ubuntu’. In most cases I stay with people and I tell them about my story and you will find people showing empathy and showing me love and kindness. So I feel welcome.

In addition to South Africa’s perceived reputation of diversity, the country has a relatively high standard of living compared to many other Southern African countries. One female Zimbabwean migrant observed that she moved to South Africa because it gave her a chance to transform her life, mostly financially, and that it is a beautiful and accommodating country. The participant further explains that “I do not want to see myself going back to where I am coming from because my life is better here. I am able to support my family”. She has been living in South Africa for many years and is happy. She feels satisfied with her life as she is able to support her family. These sentiments are somewhat mirrored by another participant, from the DRC who explained that “The life here is better than back at home. I have also stayed in Mozambique but the local people did not treat me well like here” . South Africa’s geographic position also influences the decision of migrants to enter the country. The country shares a border with six other Southern African countries, namely, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Eswatini, and Mozambique. This position makes it easy for cross-border migration to occur from several of these countries in the region. A number of migrants stated that they moved to South Africa because it is near to their home country and this made it more affordable for them to travel. A Kenyan migrant further explained that she entered the country when the conditions for immigrants were much better. This shows South Africa was once a favoured destination for migrants. However, over time, many South Africans have developed an anti-immigrant attitude and this has resulted in high levels of hostility and xenophobia towards migrants. “It is near and within the continent, near our home, and also affordable to come here than other countries. In other countries you have to wait for visas and it is expensive, that time we could not afford to do so, but the only place we could afford was coming here in this country. Before, when the country was okay”. The close proximity of South Africa to its neighbours is also another pull factor for migrants. Migrants usually maintain contact with

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their home countries and therefore may prefer to move to a country that is close to their home country. This would lower the travel and other expenses of travelling great distances to enter the country. Moreover, it would be easier for them to return to their home countries should they wish to visit their families. One migrant stated that he chose to come to South Africa “because it is close to home and it is easily accessible as we jump the fence, the border, and come to South Africa. I expected to be able to make a living as the life here seems to be offering more opportunities than back home in Mozambique” . This may also be indicative of his entry being irregular, making his presence in the country precarious. Social networks provide invaluable social, financial, and political support for migrants as they act as a type of safety net during periods of negative events (Amisi, 2006). As a result, they may also influence migration decisions. Social networks also provide emotional support, making the migration process easier to navigate, and consequently making it more bearable for migrants to extend their stay indefinitely (White & Ryan, 2008). Regarding her decision to migrate and acclimatise to South Africa, an Ethiopian woman explained: “It is because most of people from my country are here so I believed that it will be easier for me adapt here, besides South Africa has better opportunities” . Similarly, a Ugandan migrant moved “mainly for career opportunities” with the intention of “making a bit more money and starting something. When I got here things were different, which led me to staying longer than I had anticipated mainly it was because I knew people here, I had a family, like my aunties. So, it was easier for me to opt for South Africa, since they have lived here for a very long time, than going to a different country where I totally do not know anyone to start all over” . Therefore, having social networks in the country made the transition somewhat easier for migrants. Migrants may often move to destinations to join members of their social network already living there.

Livelihood Strategies of Migrants The informal economy is likely to be a driving force for economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly for those struggling to find employment in the formal labour market. This sector serves as the leading source

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of urban jobs for the burgeoning urban poor (Brown et al., 2010) as it arises out of the lack of opportunities for formal employment. Migrants must therefore generate new strategies for growth. In this study, the migrant traders were involved in diverse trading activities to secure an income. The most common activity was the sale of food items namely fruits and vegetables, and other food or grocery items. This was followed by cosmetic services such as hairstyling and nail art. In addition, the sale and repair of electronics, and the sale of make-up, clothing, and textile goods were prevalent among migrant traders. Several migrants also ran spaza shops and others engaged in the provision of several other smallscale services. The livelihood strategies of migrants in the sample are also gendered, with females mainly engaging in activities such as domestic work and selling small items, while men mainly sold and repaired electronics, owned small informal shops, engaged in construction work, and performed shoe repairs. The majority of migrants were highly skilled and well-educated, with most holding at least a secondary level of education. Despite this, they faced many difficulties in finding formal employment in South Africa. Therefore, many of the migrants found themselves hustling to earn a livelihood using skills that they had acquired over time. One of the migrants from the DRC explained: “My mother taught me this business as I cannot sit at home and do nothing. I have to try to make some money. I do nails” . Migrants may also use their creativity to motivate themselves to engage in certain economic activities in order to learn and thus grow their businesses. They may share their product ideas with customers, who may in turn exchange ideas with migrants. This is evident from the statement of a female Kenyan migrant whose creativity fuelled her business. She explained: “My love for being creative kept me going and my creativity grew. More people liked the ideas. The more I listened to them, the more challenges they gave me; they choose from the pictures I show them of the work I created [nail-styling art]. I like anything to do with art” . This is also indicative of the innovation and creativity of informal migrant traders who capitalise on their talents and skills and use them to earn an income. Some of the migrants used their existing skills to provide services in order to earn a living. A Ghanaian migrant, who repaired shoes for a living, explained that “I knew it [the trade] before I came here, but I did

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not like it. My father was doing it, so automatically I learned how to do it, for myself. Growing up I did not like it. When I came to South Africa I had nothing else to do” . Migrants may not enjoy their jobs; however, their financial situation forces them to continue in order to make money and support their families. Similarly, a female migrant from Mozambique explained: “I do not love plaiting people’s hair, but my situation forced me to try and make some means of getting money so that I can support my children” . Some migrants did not enter the informal economy by choice or by capitalising on an existing skill or talent, but rather did so out of the necessity to earn a living. Migrants may sometimes obtain employment but the opportunity may not last. This is often due to locals not trusting foreign nationals who do not have legal documents. A migrant from Lesotho explained: “I started working as a domestic worker but now, because people do not trust foreigners without legal papers, I ended up losing those part-time jobs, so I had to start selling [cosmetics]… It is because everyone is selling either clothes or fruits so I had to differ”. This also indicates that migrants may choose to sell specific goods and services by identifying a niche in the market in which their products may be sold with minimal business competition. They may therefore end up selling items that they know are in demand in the community. A male migrant from India explains that he moved to South Africa to start his own business providing services to a particular community. He capitalised on the fact that the country has a sizeable Indian population and this motivated his decision to trade in traditional Indian clothing. He explained: “I know friends, who came here before me and are selling our clothing. Indian. They told me that here, also, there are a lot of Indian people who will buy these things” . Hairstyling is another service that locals may sometimes be unable to supply customers with due to the lack of expertise, therefore, migrants with the skills may often capitalise on this and create a niche in the market in the informal economy (Ojong, 2006). One of the migrants from the DRC, who was a barber, stated that he and his family decided to open up a salon after migrating to South Africa “because when we moved in here, we did not know what to do, the skills that we had was as a barber, cutting hair, so we thought that we should open a salon” and they used their skills to experiment with various hairstyles

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in order to promote their business. He observed that “during that time people were cutting the ‘chiskop’ hairstyle, so we came up with a new hairstyle called ‘fades’. That is what really motivated us to start the salon, it was to get an income and to give people good haircuts” . Spaza shops are usually operated by locals, however, they have recently been increasingly dominated by migrants (Pande, 2017). In addition to the wide variety of stock, they are usually open for longer hours and create employment opportunities for locals. They also sell their items cheaper than larger establishments (Mukwarami et al., 2018). Migrants may also start their businesses in areas where they are familiar with the community and their needs. It may be easy to obtain customers as there is limited competition in their area and their shops are very convenient for the locals. One such participant, from Pakistan, stated that he runs a “spaza shop where I sell most of the things needed by the community, like bread, cooldrinks, chips and many other things”. His familiarity with the community and their needs, and the lack of other similar shops in the area, gives his business a competitive edge. He explains that he chose to run this type of business “because it is easier than what I was doing before, and being in this place makes it easier to get customers as there is only this one shop. The competition is limited and also I sell what the community members always need so that they can get it fast without going to town” . Some migrants had formal jobs in their home countries before they came to South Africa. Even though they may find employment in South Africa, they may feel that they are exploited and may not receive the promised wage. It is therefore not feasible for them to continue and they decide to enter the informal economy. Informal economic activity may therefore be more viable for migrants to earn money on a daily basis. One of the Mozambican participants explains how he chose to trade as a means to have more control over his situation: “I started by building houses for people, working for someone else, but then I left that as I used to get hired and promised a certain amount on a certain day, and when that day comes I will not get the promised amount. It got very difficult for me to continue with that kind of job. I then decided to sell, as this is very easy to get money on a daily basis and you get the amount of money that you agreed on with the customer” .

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Businesses often require start-up capital before traders can begin sales and earn a wage. Furthermore, they may be difficult to operate and hiring assistants may be costly for migrants, who already face high levels of poverty and must survive on a hand-to-mouth basis. Therefore, migrants choose or create business endeavours that would have the lowest cost impact on themselves. In light of this, a Ugandan migrant stated that “getting into baking was easier because I did not need start-up capital to bake. I did not necessarily need [to buy] an oven. And it was one of the businesses I could do alone without having to worry about paying someone to help me”.

Challenges to Livelihood Activities Informal migrant traders also face various challenges that they cannot control. The majority noted that they faced a number of obstacles in their trading activities that threatened their livelihoods. However, migrants maintain optimism and seek to continue expanding their business endeavours (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). South Africa has notoriously high levels of crime and violence, which seem to increase with the country’s growing poverty and inequality. Crime does not uniquely affect migrant traders—it also affects South African businesses and local citizens (Charman & Piper, 2012). However, crimes including robbery and theft have negative implications on both the livelihoods and well-being of migrants. The loss of money and important business items to crime impacts their ability to continue with their work. A Zambian migrant explained that criminal activity severely impacted his ability to continue with his business and earn his livelihood, “There was a gang that came to me; they robbed me and took my money. They also took my camera [used in his photography business]” . The theft of important documentation and personal belongings demoralises and compromises the mobility of migrants and increases their risk of deportation. A Malawian woman reported that she lost several items of importance during a robbery, added that she was most likely a victim of this crime because of her foreign nationality, “They stole my passport, my phone, my money, my brother’s

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jacket, my sister’s bag also. I cannot get around with no passport. I think it is because we are not from here [that this incident happened]” . Migrants, especially those who are undocumented, face several difficulties when trying to open bank accounts in South Africa. A valid passport and proof of residential address are, among other documents, often required to open and access a bank account. Those who are unable to do so must therefore carry money in cash which, when coupled with their other vulnerabilities, makes them easy targets for criminals. A Zambian woman expressed how not having a bank account has affected her ability to safely remit money, “Since I am not a South African resident I do not have a bank account, so I usually ask a person from the community to send my money home. Sometimes they steal my money and that is the biggest challenge I have” . The high levels of crime may be a huge challenge as migrants working in the informal sector have no fixed wage or salary and must live off their daily earnings. Therefore, if they are victims of crime such as theft, it may take them a long time to recover the money that was stolen. It is not uncommon for migrants to face discrimination in South Africa. The country has experienced a number of violent xenophobic attacks in the past few years. Migrant traders and other informal sector workers face incessant discrimination, due to both their type of job and their nationality, and they are often subjected to extreme forms of hostility. They are often accused of being the reason behind the failure of South African businesses, taking job opportunities from locals, and using business secrets that give them an advantage in the trade sector (Peberdy, 2017). The various forms of exclusion and discrimination faced by migrants influence the way in which they strategise their livelihoods. These challenges may also determine whether migrants are able to integrate into the spaces and society of their host countries (Grant & Thompson, 2015). This type of socio-economic division may cripple not just the economic growth and well-being of migrants, but also that of the entire city (Gebre et al., 2011). One common assumption that South Africans have is that African immigrants are taking the jobs of national citizens. These assumptions often manifest as discrimination and violent xenophobic behaviour, as remarked by a participant who explained that the belief that migrants

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are taking business opportunities has resulted in violent attacks against foreign nationals. This migrant from Lesotho explained, “I think here in South Africa we have had many cases of xenophobia where people got burnt because South Africans think we have taken their business opportunities” . However, these assumptions are unsubstantiated as migrant traders often create their livelihoods due to their failure in securing formal employment in South Africa. In addition, some migrants noted that most formal South African businesses only employ locals. Some felt they were treated poorly by employers because of their status as migrants. A Kenyan migrant observed: “They employ locals. Even the call centres where they need people, I went to Umhlanga only to find out that they only employ locals. After searching and searching I got a job here in town in another call centre, only to learn that the manager hated me because I was a foreigner, [the manager was] swearing at me. I quit the job in three months because I could not bear the stress” . Owing to discrimination, locals may also suspect migrant traders of selling counterfeit goods, as stated by a Lesotho migrant: “Some of the people do not trust the products that we are selling they think that maybe we use containers of other cosmetics for products” . Migrants who were victims of discriminatory behaviour have stated that they are often called derogatory names. The labels are often insulting and are used with malice against foreigners, who often feel demoralised by the terms. This is in contrast to the way in which migrants behave towards each other, even though they may be from different countries. A Malawian participant exclaimed: “they [locals] are unfair; they call us ‘amakwerekwere’ [derogatory term] which is a problem because anyone can be a foreigner anywhere. If you would go to where I was born you will be a foreigner. The migrants here, we treat each other well” . During incidents of xenophobic violence, migrants are blatantly targeted because of their foreign national status. Some participants reported that they were victims of physical assault due to their foreign national status. A Mozambican participant stated that “They once came here and beat me up. Of course, they did it because they say I am a ‘kwerekwere’” . It is therefore not surprising that migrants live and work in fear, especially after seeing or hearing of fellow migrants being

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violently attacked. These incidences are very traumatising and emotionally stressful as they create a great deal of fear and uncertainty. Furthermore, foreign migrants reported that the police are reluctant to offer them assistance. This is not uncommon, as there has been a lack of police intervention during many episodes of xenophobic violence (Masuku, 2006; Mohamed, 2022). There have also been reports of acts of violence perpetrated by the police. It is not surprising that migrants feel abandoned by the system as there is little support for foreign nationals. A migrant from the DRC explains: I have witnessed it [xenophobia] personally, I have fear and I am scared especially because I have seen one of my fellow migrants get beat up with a hammer on the head; that made me scared for myself, it was very traumatizing. The police did not assist, and the incident happened in 2020. The police said they will not do anything for us.

Migrant traders who participate in the informal sector are also affected by gender disadvantages. The informal sector has a larger female presence as compared to the formal sector. These women are generally impoverished with very low-income levels (Neves & Du Toit, 2012). The majority of female migrant traders face multiple challenges. While some of these may not uniquely affect women, a larger female presence within the informal sector does increase their susceptibility to the challenges. These challenges include the lack of infrastructure and storage for trading, enduring longer waiting periods for trading licences, and the lack of access to credit and training. In addition, their contributions to the economy of the country are often overlooked (Ngomane, 2020). There was a strong feeling among the female migrant traders that they were being exploited. One Ugandan female trader observed: “They think because I am a foreigner, they can rip me off, they expect a cheaper price. That has been the main challenge and also sometimes they are a bit xenophobic and say abusive words. When we are arguing or negotiating about the price, especially the men, the male local traders, they are very difficult to work with” . Another female from Zambia also notes that: “When we women come from other countries like Zambia, Angola and other countries we are business minded and most of the people they laugh at us because they say our

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chances of being successful are zero. They rank us lower than men” . Genderbased violence may emerge in the informal workspace, with migrant women becoming victims, as stated by a woman from Lesotho, “There are lots of issues here, for example gender-based violence, and woman are being slaughtered. The people from my country are also at risk” . Migrants also face harassment from law-enforcement agents as their products are often confiscated by the police due to them not having the appropriate documentation or permits to sell their products. A Mozambican female participant adds: “Every time when we see police officers we have to collect our products and hide it, whereas the local traders have identity documents and permits that we do not have” . Customers also sometimes take advantage of migrant traders by taking their products or services and refusing to pay for them. They can often do nothing about this as they do not receive any assistance from law-enforcement. This creates financial problems as stock may be lost or services are unfortunately rendered for free. This therefore wastes the time and effort of the traders, “The only challenge that I have is the financial challenge. People will come here to cut their hair and end up not paying and there is nothing you can do as you cannot force someone to pay if he or she does not want to” . In these situations, migrants feel helpless as they are not in a position to shift the power imbalance. It is often very difficult for migrant traders to obtain proper documentation without enough money to access them, especially in cases where officials request bribes. Despite attempts by the South African government to stop the use of bribery and corruption to obtain legal documents, the practice persists at various institutional levels (Muanamoha et al., 2010). In addition, a migrant from Eswatini stated: “It is very difficult to find or have your proper documents if you do not have enough money for them. When you come here and have no relatives it is very difficult to find accommodation. Those are the main big problems” . This migrant suggests that social networks are important to make the transition in the host country easier. Language is another barrier to assimilation and the inability to speak local languages serves to distinguish international migrants from locals. South Africa is known for its diversity in culture and language. The country has 11 official languages which may often create barriers for migrants who may not be familiar with them. A Zimbabwean migrant

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expressed her challenges with language: “Sometimes if you speak in English, some people will not answer you, they will say ‘I am not like a White man’ or a ‘White lady’ so you must learn Zulu. I am trying by all means to learn it. That is another thing they want to speak in their language” . Language barriers may also pose a risk to migrants as “some of us cannot speak isiZulu properly so they can easily tell that ‘you are not from South Africa’” . This may cause more problems for them, singling them out and making them vulnerable to discrimination and violence. Furthermore, the inability to communicate clearly with customers may result in the loss of sales and the inability to successfully run a business. In order to overcome some of these barriers, migrant traders often try to learn the local languages, as a Zambian woman explained: “Most of the time language is a barrier because I could not understand. I always called my husband to translate. At least I know Xhosa, isiZulu and English. It is when my husband is not here that it becomes difficult” . Learning a local language can breach communication barriers and may help build trust between migrants and their customers, making their business interactions more fruitful.

Impact of the Pandemic While there are already a number of challenges in the informal economy for migrants, the COVID-19 pandemic brought on a new dynamic. Just a week into the lockdown, it was reported that informal traders have been struggling to feed their families (Skinner & Watson, 2020). Reportedly, only around 18% of migrants were able to remit money during the lockdown, many of whom could only send back a smaller amount than usual due to it not being affordable (Statistics South Africa, 2020). Informal work has an inherently precarious nature, particularly due to the lack of formal contracts and income protection, meaning that their livelihood sources were severely impacted by the pandemic and the various lockdowns imposed to prevent the spread of the virus (Ataguba, 2020). South Africa adjusted restrictions during the different levels of lockdown, however, certain constraints and requirements still severely disrupted informal supply chains, especially with food sales in the

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informal sector (Skinner & Watson, 2020). Some of the challenges faced were captured by a participant from the DRC who noted: “Many companies would not deliver, like my supplier. They were not delivering to South Africa. There were no flights coming in and out all the time like before the pandemic. So, it was very hard for orders to get into the country” . Due to the strict restrictions on movement and trade, migrant informal traders had to face dwindling demands which, compounded with the pre-existing challenges they face, threatened the very sustainability of their livelihoods. Many migrants stated that they had to rely on their savings in order to cope with the lack of income during the lockdown as informal businesses had to be closed down during the lockdown. A Zimbabwean trader observed: “We had to close. I work in town. People were not coming to town, because it was locked down. It affected us greatly because there is no money. There is nowhere you are going to get money from. You must live off savings, and those savings run out” .

Conclusion Despite facing a multitude of challenges that threaten their livelihoods, migrants continue to operate in the informal economy, demonstrating a high level of resilience due to the changing nature of trade in the era of a global pandemic. Informal trade is born out of a necessity to survive and earn a livelihood. Foreign migrant traders in South Africa come from many countries within and outside of the African continent and deploy a multitude of strategies in order to earn a livelihood. However, they do not operate in isolation as a result they face various challenges and obstacles such as discrimination, xenophobia, violence, and crime, from which they have little-to-no protection. The COVID-19 pandemic has also threatened the longevity and sustainability of informal trade. This highlights the fact that the informal economy is not shielded from global uncertainties as the livelihood sources for millions of people in informal economic activities were threatened (Khambule, 2020). It is difficult to ascertain the full extent that the pandemic will have on the informal sector in the long term, however, the informal economy is believed to withstand periods of crises as it usually acts as a safety net for

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those who have lost their formal jobs or need to augment their formal income during the setback (Bernstein, 2020). The lack of protection and recognition by social systems, labour laws, and national government structures needs to be addressed in order to protect the livelihoods of foreign informal traders.

References African Development Bank. (2021). African economic outlook 2021. African Development Bank. Amisi, B. B. (2006). Capital, social networks and refugee migration: An exploration of the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees. Centre for Civil Society. Ataguba, J. E. (2020). COVID-19 pandemic, a war to be won: Understanding its economic implications for Africa. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 18(3), 325–328. Bernstein, A. (2020). South Africa’s informal sector in the time of Covid-19. Centre for Development and Enterprise. Bhagat, S., & Kim, D. J. (2020). Higher education amidst COVID-19: Challenges and silver lining. Information Systems Management, 37 (4), 366–371. Brown, A., Lyons, M., & Dankoco, I. (2010). Street traders and the emerging spaces for urban voice and citizenship in African cities. Urban Studies, 47 (3), 666–683. Charman, A., & Piper, L. (2012). Xenophobia, criminality and violent entrepreneurship: Violence against Somali shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape Town, South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 43(3), 81–105. Crush, J., Chikanda, A., & Skinner, C. (2015). Migrant entrepreneurship and informality in South African cities. In J. Crush, A. Chikanda, & C. Skinner (Eds.), Mean streets: Migration, xenophobia and informality in South Africa (pp. 1–24). African Books Collective. Crush, J., Dodson, B., Gay, J., Green, T., & Leduka, C. (2010). Migration, remittances and development in Lesotho (No. 52). African Books Collective. Crush, J., Williams, V., & Peberdy, S. (2005). Migration in Southern Africa. International Organization for Migration (IOM). Fish, J. N. (2013). Rights across borders: policies, protections and practices for migrant domestic workers in South Africa. In D. du Toit (Ed.), Exploited,

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Moyo, K. (2021, November 18). South Africa reckons with its status as a top immigration destination, apartheid history, and economic challenges. Migration Policy Institute. Muanamoha, R. C., Maharaj, B., & Preston-Whyte, E. (2010). Social networks and undocumented Mozambican migration to South Africa. Geoforum, 41(6), 885–896. Mukwarami, J., Tengeh, R. K., & Iwu, C. G. (2018). Success Factors of Immigrant-Owned Informal Grocery Shops in South African Townships: Native Shop-Owners’ Account. Journal of Distribution Science, 16 (3), 49–57. Naidu, M. (2018). The butcher, the baker, the brewer... and barber: Reflections on migrant micro-entrepreneurship and informal economies. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 33(2), 61–84. Neves, D., & Du Toit, A. (2012). Money and sociality in South Africa’s informal economy. Africa, 82(1), 131–149. Ngomane, T. S. (2020). The challenges faced by female street vendors in Mbombela Municipality. The 5th Annual International Conference on Public Administration and Development Alternatives (IPADA) 5–9 October, Virtual Conference: IPADA. Ojong, V. B. (2006). The socio-economic impact of African migrant women’s entrepreneurial activities in South Africa. Africanus, 36 (2), 142–153. Ojong, V. B., & Mhandu, J. (2018). Virtuous life and enjoyable life: An overview of the well-being of Zimbabwean migrant women hairdressers in South Africa. Gender and Behaviour, 16 (2), 11678–11694. Pande, A. (2017). Mobile masculinities: Migrant Bangladeshi men in South Africa. Gender & Society, 31(3), 383–406. Park, Y. J., & Rugunanan, P. (2010). V isible and vulnerable: Asian migrant communities in South Africa. University of Johannesburg. Peberdy, S. (2017). Competition or co-operation? South African and migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg. Southern African Migration Programme. Sassen, S., Galvaan, R., & Duncan, M. (2018). Women’s experiences of informal street trading and well-being in Cape Town, South Africa. South African Journal of Occupational Therapy, 48(1), 28–33. Schwettmann, J. (2020). Covid-19 and the informal economy. Impact and response strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Sidzatane, N. J., & Maharaj, P. (2013). On the fringe of the economy: Migrant street traders in Durban. Urban Forum, 24 (3), 373–387. Skinner, C., & Watson, V. (2020). Planning and informal food traders under COVID-19: The South African case. Town Planning Review, 92(3), 1–7.

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4 Escaping Poverty in Zimbabwe: Experiences of Informal Traders in South Africa Emma S. Chikovore and Pranitha Maharaj

Introduction With the demise of apartheid in South Africa and the economic and political turmoil in Zimbabwe, both legal and illegal international migration flows into South Africa intensified significantly (Muzondidya, 2008). Although migration flows between Zimbabwe and South Africa date back to the late 1830s, the current estimates are the largest to date (Kiwanuka & Manson, 2009). Earlier migration flows between the two countries can be traced back as far as the 1830s when a contingent of the Khumalo clan led by Mzilikazi migrated from South Africa and headed E. S. Chikovore (B) · P. Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_4

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north to settle in modern-day Zimbabwe (Hakutangwi, 2022). Years later, the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold on the Witwatersrand would change the situation for many Zimbabweans, most of whom migrated to work in the mines in South Africa (Coetzer, 1979; Macheka, 2018). Ever since there has been a constant movement of people between the two countries. Over the years, South Africa has continued to attract migrants to work in various sectors such as commercial farms, manufacturing, domestic service, transportation, and construction (Machecka et al., 2015). The recent waves of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa have mainly been driven by three major events. As noted by Crush et al. (2015) the first wave was immediately after the end of apartheid in South Africa when the country started opening to the rest of the continent. The second wave, from the mid-1990s to around the mid2000s, coincided with the state-sponsored agricultural invasions within Zimbabwe and the intensified collapse of governance thereafter. As a result, the country experienced a political and economic crisis, which led many Zimbabweans to flee their country. The movement to South Africa was mostly met with strict migration restrictions. This, coupled with growing economic and political pressures within Zimbabwe, resulted in the rapid entry of many more migrants into South Africa, albeit via unregulated procedures (Ranga, 2018). Migration during this wave was relatively short-term. The third wave began around 2005 and has continued to date, driven by the total collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy, compelling many more to leave the country and forcing them to extend their presence in South Africa through several legal and interdicted strategies (Ranga, 2018). This protracted era of economic collapse was also exacerbated partly by the implementation of an Economic Structural Adjustment Plan earlier, which resulted in rising unemployment and increased suffering for Zimbabwean residents. The consequence of which was reduced public expenditure and the removal of subsidies on food, and essential public, and social services such as health and education. For example, it is estimated that by the mid-1990s, the approximate percentage of Zimbabweans living below the official poverty line doubled, reaching more than 80% (Coltart, 2008).

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The 2008 economic crisis had devastating human cost as it led millions of Zimbabweans to flee the country, with many migrating to South Africa (Coltart, 2008). More than 80% of Zimbabweans who remained in the country were now unemployed (Coltart, 2008). Previously many Zimbabweans relocated for work; however, as the political and socio-economic situation deteriorated many fled the country to escape these unprecedented conditions. Post-apartheid South Africa became an attractive destination because of its democratic state and thriving economy. As a result, many Zimbabweans sought economic refuge in South Africa and began working in various industries and sectors, most notably the informal sector (Crush & Ramachandran, 2015). On the other hand, a study by Crush and Tawodzera (2017) discovered that many Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa who had formal employment worked in semi-skilled jobs, mainly in the service industry, as domestic workers, security, and truck drivers.

Well-Being of Zimbabwean Migrants Without proper documentation and lacking scarce skills, many Zimbabweans in South Africa find themselves re-living similar conditions to those from which they fled, if not worse. For example, a study by Ranga (2018) highlighted the plight of low-skilled Zimbabweans working as general workers and earning a paltry 1,500 South African Rands (ZAR) (an equivalent to 90 United States Dollars (USD) at the current exchange rate) or less per month in South Africa. This amount makes it difficult to rent decent accommodation and cover daily living expenses and remit money back home. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of Zimbabweans in South Africa as many are thought to be undocumented (Makina, 2013). Moyo (2020) explains that estimates suggest that approximately 2.8 million Zimbabweans are living in the country. In contrast, Mathekga (2022) indicates that approximately one million Zimbabweans work and live in South Africa while keeping in touch with their home country through remittances. The estimates by Mathekga (2022) could be closest to the true figures considering that other authors

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have estimated that there are two million foreign migrants from different countries in South Africa (Mukumbang et al., 2020). The current wave of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa overlapped with the global COVID-19 pandemic resulting in a deficit of opportunities, especially formal employment for both migrants and locals. As noted by Mukumbang et al. (2020) the current COVID19 pandemic has worsened poverty levels in South Africa, more so for migrants who face inequality and exclusion. For example, the lockdown which was implemented to slow down the spread of COVID-19 meant that both formal and informal businesses could not trade (Mukumbang et al., 2020) which forced many into poverty. Poverty, according to Gaidzanwa (2019, p. 87), is “the phenomenon that is associated with people’s lack of access to services such as food, shelter, health, electricity, water, and education”. The poor are undermined, powerless, excluded, marginalised, and in many cases susceptible to human rights abuses and violations. From this perspective, poverty is not just the lack of money but includes “non-income related aspects of poverty” (Gaidzanwa, 2019, p. 87). By all accounts, it is therefore safe to say that many Zimbabweans experience some form of poverty one way or the other both in their country of birth and in South Africa (Dzingirai et al., 2015). To avoid living in absolute poverty, migrants resort to informal trading as a survival strategy (Gumbo, 2015; Muzondidya, 2008). They do so in an environment where they lack access to most civil and labour rights and social benefits (Bloch, 2010), which is compounded by the fear of exposure to immigration authorities (Bosniak, 2004). Although South Africa has policies that seek to advance Black-owned businesses, these policies apply mainly to locals (Mondliwa & Roberts, 2020), hence international migrants face exclusion (Hungwe, 2013). In this context, it is important to investigate the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants trading in South Africa. This chapter relies on interviews with Zimbabwean informal traders operating in South Africa. The focus is on motives for migration, how Zimbabwean migrants started their businesses to address poverty, and how running their own businesses and sending remittances affected their well-being. In migration research, there is a tendency to focus on quantifying migration in-flows and out-flows as well as the monetary gains

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and losses tied to migration, overlooking how “space, place, and location condition well-being” (Morrison, 2021). In instances where well-being is investigated, either the focus is on the family left behind or the impact of migrants on the receiving community and rarely on the migrants themselves. Fry and Wilson (2018) contend that it is easier for economists to measure migration effects on the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and social progress than to measure well-being. Well-being in migration encompasses the effects of immigration on the environment, social integration and cohesion, and the general wellness of both immigrants and the receiving community (Fry & Wilson, 2018), including economic well-being (Hungwe, 2020). According to Fry and Wilson (2018, p. 2), well-being is defined as “the capabilities of the people to live the life they value and have reason to value”. In other words, it is how people assign value to their existence taking into consideration the resources and environment around them. It also means a sense of belonging, and how vested or integrated the immigrants are in their new community and place of origin. When we talk of geography and wellbeing in migration, it is the attachment the immigrants have with either the place of origin and receiving country or community (Berg, 2020).

Methods In-depth interviews were conducted with 20 Zimbabwean informal traders living in various parts of South Africa. All the participants were involved in informal trading in South Africa at the time of the interviews. The interviews were done using a detailed interview guide and were conducted either in English or Shona. Participants consented in writing or verbally to be interviewed and recorded. All participants were recruited using the snowball technique as this is a hard-to-reach population due to several factors including threats of xenophobia and violence, mistrust among the study population, and busy work schedules among informal traders. Women informal traders were easier, and more forthcoming compared to their male counterparts. As a result, most (13) of the participants were female and the remainder were male.

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The Zimbabweans interviewed had varied educational levels, with most having at least some secondary education and a few having a college degree. Their average age was 35 years. They were residing in various provinces in South Africa, but the majority were operating their businesses from KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Participants were involved in many business activities including food vending and catering, hairdressing and beauty, cell phone repairs, arts, fashion and design, and shoe repair.

Reasons for Migrating to South Africa The participants had several reasons why they migrated to South Africa. Nevertheless, there was one broad reason for migration and that is worsening economic woes in Zimbabwe. The economic woes have left millions of people without formal employment; therefore, many Zimbabweans migrate to broaden their employment prospects. All except two of the participants indicated that the intention for moving to South Africa was to look for employment. I was struggling so much, and it was difficult for me to get something to eat. It has been nine years now [living in South Africa]. I moved for a better life, South Africa is a country that is booming economically. What pushed me to come to South Africa is the responsibility I had. I had to take care of my child and my parents, and myself. In Zimbabwe there was no employment. I would hustle, and it came to a point where my hustling could not work anymore. In Zimbabwe I did not get a chance to make money there, there are no jobs, I moved to South Africa to look for jobs

Evidently, the decision to move was informed by the worsening economic conditions and lack of employment prospects in Zimbabwe and the perception that South Africa provides better opportunity prospects. The family responsibilities faced by the labour force population coupled with the pressure to look after ageing parents informed their decision to migrate to South Africa. It seemed that participants

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were obligated to provide for family members which forced them to take the journey to South Africa. Furthermore, the lack of basic goods and services in Zimbabwe and the perceived South African booming economy all played a part in the migration of Zimbabweans into South Africa. The South African unemployment rate of 35% is lower than that in Zimbabwe which is 90%. It is estimated that 90% of the Zimbabwean population is employed in the informal sector due to the unprecedented unemployment rate in the formal market in the country (Mujeyi & Sadomba, 2019). Besides this reason, other pull factors included distance travelled to the destination country. From the interviews, it was apparent that Zimbabwean migrants also considered the distance between South Africa and Zimbabwe as shown by the following accounts. It is the nearest country, which is better, as my home is near South Africa. The decision to move to South Africa was because I wanted to be very far away from my estranged husband, and I also wanted to look for a job so I could look after my children. I decided to come to South Africa because although it is far enough from my ex [husband], it is very close to my country of birth. I also thought I was going to get a job.

The accounts above show how South Africa’s proximity to Zimbabwe and its better economic prospects attracts many Zimbabweans who perceive South Africa as the best migration destination compared to other countries in the region. Due to the proximity of Zimbabwe to South Africa, they can maintain strong ties with their families back home through frequent travel between the two countries. The mobility of Zimbabweans between the two countries has intensified over the years and the undocumented who work in South Africa make use of unregulated crossing points to visit home regularly. They also engage the services of smugglers, corrupt bus drivers, and border officials to move between the two countries (Musoni, 2020). Furthermore, the fact that the two countries are linked by good road networks also allows undocumented migrants to easily remit in cash or in-kind albeit through unconventional ways (Maphosa, 2007; Thebe, 2011).

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Expectations Versus Reality Participants indicated that the decision to migrate was based on information received in the pre-migration phase from their networks and expectations of a better life were high. Social networks portrayed South Africa as a country full of opportunities. However, some participants reported facing disappointment during the job-hunting process and they were quick to highlight that what they had heard about high employment prospects, and a better life was not true. Upon arriving in the country, many migrants realised that this impeccable picture of South Africa was far from reality. One participant shared how her friend’s mother who was engaged in cross-border trading convinced her that life was better in South Africa than in Zimbabwe and she shared her experience. Yes, my friend’s mother used to come and sell so she is the one who encouraged me to come to South Africa with her because she said I could easily get employment and that life was better here. That is how I came here. When I got here what I had perceived South Africa to be was different but because of poverty back home I had to persevere.

As highlighted above, most of the participants expected to get a job and integrate into South African communities but encountered joblessness and a negative reception from the host country. For example, those who managed to gain employment, soon discovered that they could only get into low-paying jobs and they reported mistreatment by former employers which forced them to think of self-employment and informal vending as an alternative source of livelihood. Another common finding among migrants once in South Africa was the daily occurrence of crime and violence. Crime in South Africa is a daily occurrence (Breetzke, 2018) and new migrants to the country might find it overwhelming. All the participants reported crime as their main concern in South Africa. One woman shared her experience of crime in South Africa. We were once robbed when I was still at Berea. At first, two armed guys came and took phones and weaves and everything. After one week they

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came back and took the equipment I use to do nails. They took everything. I think migrants are more affected by crime than locals because in the case that I just described to you, there were other valuable things they could have taken but they did not. They just took my things.

Although many Zimbabweans move to South Africa for economic reasons, they showed that they were concerned about crime in the country. The irony is that despite reporting fear of crime and violence, there was some hesitancy to return home, implying that they would rather live with crime than live in a country where the economic situation was in dire distress.

Going into Informal Business While social networks and family seemed to be important sources of information prior to migration, once in South Africa, Zimbabwean migrants must look for sources of income for self-sustenance. Hence, establishing informal businesses is out of necessity for many international migrants starting businesses in the country. Almost all, excluding two participants communicated how they went into business. Having encountered challenges in securing employment, mistreatment by employers, or being retrenched due to the COVID-19 pandemic, many decided to venture into informal trading. According to Njanike (2019), many Zimbabwean small business owners became entrepreneurs by default which was also highlighted by the participants. The economic challenges they faced forced them to think outside the box and come up with legal means of earning an income. The treatment was bad, I was the only foreigner, and I was working with South Africans, and I used to get more work and I would come out of work at 11 pm every day but at the end of the month, I would get paid less than everyone else. I said to myself, I have the skills why should I work for someone?

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I started in June 2020, I lost my job because of COVID-19, and I realised that people love braai meat, so I started a Tshisa Nyama.1

This is consistent with other studies which found that Zimbabweans had to adapt during the 2000–2008 crisis when the country’s formal economy collapsed (Kabonga, 2020; Shanahan, 2018). As evident in the quotes, informal trading offered a new lease on life for migrants, and it also offered flexibility and convenience compared to low-paying employment which can result in mistreatment. Low-paying employment is common among migrants who take up jobs that are usually shunned by South Africans. Therefore, informal trading was seen as an alternative to low-skilled formal employment. Despite the advantages of informal trading mentioned above, the informal traders mentioned the volatility associated with operating in the sector such as fluctuating returns and uncertainty which results in them always being at the periphery of the economy. None of the informal traders in this study had the capital to start their small businesses. All described the struggles they faced to start their businesses but with determination and sometimes with support from social networks they managed to start their informal businesses and they wanted to see their businesses thrive. The interviews also suggest that Zimbabwean migrants are not passive citizens who expect handouts from the host government but are innovative and they formulate strategies to earn an honest living and create livelihoods in the process. For example, in the absence of safety nets, Zimbabwean informal traders managed to reinvent themselves and use legal means to earn an income. Therefore, Zimbabwean informal traders seem to adapt very well to informal trading, as this is something they are accustomed to back home.

Growing the Customer Base The interviews revealed that informal traders provide services that are varied and important to the community. Their clientele base includes both local and other international migrants living in South Africa. Amid 1

A Tshisa Nyama is a business establishment that specialises in selling fire-roasted beef (braai).

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stiff competition from other informal traders and formal businesses, Zimbabwean informal traders devised ways of getting customers and growing their customer base. For example, participants shared that they maintain a good working relationship, practised good customer care, and offered value-for-money services as a way of attracting new customers and retaining old ones. They also utilised new and old ways of advertising their businesses. While some used printed leaflets to advertise their services, others used social media platforms and social networks to advertise and retain customers. The following quotes show how Zimbabwean informal traders ensured that their businesses were visible. I do not have much to offer because I am not yet stable, but what I do know is how to treat my customers. My customers are always happy. I do not shout at them; I treat them well and I know that the customer is always right. Because when they leave, I want them to come back and bring me more customers next time. At times it becomes intense, that is why it is better to market on the internet and speak directly to the customer. To give you an example, at [outside] Malls Tiles there is a bunch of guys always standing there seeking work and when a client comes and calls you, then the other guy would be eavesdropping and be mad at the prices I charge. I have got a child and a mouth to feed, so negotiating the price, also puts food on the table. It is better than nothing.

From the extracts, it was evident that the Zimbabwean informal traders were capitalising on good customer care, value-for-money service, and advertising through social media to retain and attract new customers. The passion to have their businesses seen and thrive was evident in the responses. This was in line with the observation of Gumbo (2015) who highlighted how Zimbabwean informal traders are innovative and want their businesses to be successful. As evident from one of the accounts above, sometimes Zimbabwean informal traders are willing to compromise on the price and obtain minimal or no profits just to retain their customers and put food on the table. This, however, means their businesses take longer or sometimes do not grow.

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Profile of the Customers Despite threats of violence and sporadic acts of violence, it was also clear that Zimbabwean informal businesses were well received by South African customers who are mostly locals and only a few are other migrants. Based on how locals were purchasing their products, foreign migrant informal traders felt that their services were needed and that they were filling a gap. Participants shared the following insights: 99% of my clients are locals and only 1% are foreign migrants. Our customers are mostly locals, but we also send our products overseas because sometimes when people buy from us, they tell other family members and friends about us, then we get more customers. We also get customers who are migrants buying from us.

The accounts above indicated that Zimbabwean informal traders were receiving support from several customers including locals. Participants also indicated that from time to time, they receive support from local businesses. For example, some formal businesses have accepted informal traders and they provide necessary support such as providing traders with places to advertise and conduct their business. The results convey the paradoxes of doing business in South Africa for the international migrant informal traders. On the one hand, they are welcomed and on the other hand, they are also easy targets during violent protests as indicated by participants in this study. As was shown earlier, participants showcased how they perceived that they were more likely to be victims of crime due to them being foreigners. Generally, participants considered South Africa a viable market for informal trading compared to Zimbabwe due to access to a large customer base. For some traders, there was the perception that trading in South Africa increased the prospects of reaching overseas markets due to the many tourists who visit South Africa compared to Zimbabwe.

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Challenges of Doing Business in South Africa Due to the nature of their businesses and the fact that they are at the periphery of the South African government’s focus, international migrant informal traders lamented the struggles they face when conducting business. One such example is how the sudden lockdown restrictions that were implemented to curb the spread of COVID-19 left them without an income and at the same time excluded them from receiving any relief grants that were given by the government to the unemployed. Participants also expressed that they sometimes find that conducting business in South Africa is challenging due to exclusion and sporadic threats of violence against them. They explained that they are easy targets for criminals who are willing to take any opportunity to close their business. For instance, there was a strike and my shop was the first to be trashed when I first got it in 2008. That was around the same time when the xenophobic attacks started growing, so I had to close shop and hide. They are always ready to attack any foreigners whenever there is a strike. I understand someone comes and say voetsek [go away] so that when you know they take a stand because they are South African, there is nothing you can do. So, it has been rough. I do not feel safe especially these days with Operation Dudula and there is a group of people who go around every month end collecting money they call ‘protection fee’. If you do not pay the so-called protection fee they do not hesitate, they will shoot you just like that, so I just make sure I pay them on the first day of each month. Foreigners are more vulnerable to this extortion because we are their target.

What was evident from the interviews is that Zimbabwean informal traders face many challenges but remain resilient and they perceive themselves to be more vulnerable to acts of violence compared to the South African population. For example, in the interviews, it was clear that migrant informal traders were sometimes forced to pay for protection or risk losing their lives. Furthermore, Operation Dudula, a vigilantism movement currently sweeping across South Africa is seen as a smear campaign targeting international migrant informal traders. Despite these threats of violence and experiences of violence, the Zimbabwean informal

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traders continued to show resilience opting to endure and navigate the murky waters in South Africa rather than to go back to Zimbabwe which most of them perceive as a country with limited opportunities. The threats of violence affect the well-being of migrants as they are always anxious regarding their safety. These results are consistent with the findings of a study by Cantekin (2019) which was conducted among Syrian refugees living in Turkey and found the negative effects of fear on the well-being of refugees.

Remitting in Poverty and Its Effects on Well-Being Zimbabwean migrants who are engaged in informal trading are making just enough money to survive. Despite this reality, they also face pressure to send remittances back home. All the informal traders in our study reported that they were sending remittances back home as it was something expected by their families back home in Zimbabwe. They also reported that although they are expected to send remittances back home, the pressures and expectations were overwhelming and sometimes overburdening especially now as businesses have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Remittances are an important source of livelihood in many households in Zimbabwe as they serve many purposes including paying for school fees, buying food, and health (Muyambo & Ranga, 2020). Accounts by participants showed how remittances are an integral part of migrant informal trading in South Africa. Most of the time you will be just working for rent and sending groceries to parents. To save enough for travelling is a struggle. No, the money I get is just enough for me to survive. In South Africa, I just look after myself, if I send money home, I can only afford US$30.

From these accounts, it was clear that although informal trading was providing a livelihood for the Zimbabwean migrants, the income was minimum and therefore affected the amount remitted. The ability to send remittances brings feelings of happiness and relief, while being

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unable to send remittances may bring depression and feelings of failure which affects wellness as was shown by the following accounts. I try to help my relatives by sending school fees and money to buy uniforms. It is something I feel good about although sometimes I wish I could do more than that. But because I do not get much [money], I just do what I can. I know they expect that I should help often but I cannot do it. I do have a challenge there. In Zimbabwe parents used to expect something from me but that was before things got bad due to COVID-19. They would know that every month there was something but now they do not expect anything from me because sometimes what I get is just enough for rent and food. These days they just remind me that if I get something I should not forget them. They do not expect much but, when I get something, I remember them. I cannot say it is a monthly thing because sometimes it will be quiet. When I send money home, I feel so happy and free, I would be sending more if things were okay. I cannot afford to send money now.

Participants in our study felt that due to the Zimbabwean economic woes, more pressure was exerted on them to provide financially for their families left at home at a time when there were massive job losses and reduced income streams including in South Africa. To sustain the connection with their home country and family of origin, migrants voluntarily or involuntarily fulfil financial obligations even in circumstances where they cannot afford to. For example, some participants reported how they rely on borrowing money from their social networks after they remit money home. Posel and Casale (2003) note how migrants tend to maintain ties with the sending families. As noted by Serumaga-Zake (2017, p. 1) migrants keep “orientation to a homeland as a source of value, identity and loyalty”. Psychologically, migrants may feel self-resentment for having left their families and try to show allegiance to the family they left behind by remitting as was noted by Dzingirai et al. (2014). It was as if remittances restored their relevance and were a way of showing that they were still living and present. As noted by Carling (1996) migrants might be labelled as deserters by their families and country of origin which affects them emotionally and places them under extreme pressure to fill the void they left. One way of filling the

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void is by remitting and taking care of extended family members left behind. However, as noted in the current study, COVID-19 disrupted the remitting patterns among Zimbabwean informal traders as their businesses were negatively impacted by the lockdown regulations and they lost revenue. As a result, some felt dejected and disappointed for failing to remit. Remittances became a source of pride and self-worth but the failure to remit brought misery and affected their well-being. If migrants cannot save in their new country of abode, they cannot remit back home and that can strain relationships between the migrants and the families left behind. Besides, the remittances sent home no matter how small, bring relief to families in a dysfunctional economy (Dzingirai et al., 2014). Therefore, informal businesses operated by migrants can address both poverty as well as restore well-being among migrants.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Zimbabwean Informal Traders It was also clear that many migrant informal traders were impacted negatively by the pandemic and were exposed to poverty by the pandemic itself and by the steps that were taken to stop the spread of COVID19. The lockdown impacted the economic activities of migrants as there was little movement and as a result, they struggled to find customers. Customers were afraid of the virus, and this affected their daily earnings, even after the restrictions on movement were relaxed. In addition, they felt dejected because they did not receive any financial support. After the first lockdown restrictions were relaxed, clients were not coming still because they feared contracting COVID-19. We lost a lot of revenue. We could not work still in the next level of lockdown. I could not do anything about the challenges because they are still bothering me. I have not recovered financially.

Many factors are at play that can affect both the economic and psychological well-being of migrants. These include living in poverty in the destination country, human rights violations in both the sending and

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destination countries, the attitude of both the sending and receiving countries, available support system, family responsibilities or expectations, and perceived attitudes of the receiving communities. The wellbeing of immigrants is also affected by policies that the receiving country may put in place that limit the potential and eventual life trajectories of immigrants and their children. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic and policies that were adopted to protect South African informal traders excluded migrant informal traders which drove them into deeper poverty. The support grants that were given by the South African government during the COVID-19 pandemic did not cater for migrants in the informal sector. The results were consistent with the study by Mukumbang et al. (2020), which noted how the pandemic exacerbated poverty among international migrants living in South Africa. In the current study, participants shared how they relied on social networks for survival. People in their social networks included previous clients, friends, family, and other migrants. Despite the hardships they faced, their businesses seemed to have given them a purpose to live and to continue working for their families. They also felt that they had to continue to try to ensure their livelihoods.

Conclusion For many Zimbabweans, informal trading offered them a lifeline during tough times. They were able to secure their livelihoods in the absence of formal employment. In the current global economic slumber triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, governments should focus on encouraging the informal economy to address poverty. However, the government should look at promoting informal trading so that the informal businesses do not remain informal but can expand and become formal businesses that create more employment (Chen, 2012). This will help eliminate what Rogerson (1996) termed the “survivalist enterprises” where informal businesses are more for survival than expansion. Such businesses are usually a one-person entity that does not address issues of unemployment in the long term. To address this challenge, the

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government can open avenues to register and regularise informal businesses, including those owned by migrants (Chen, 2012), which will help with the expansion of one-person informal businesses to multiperson enterprises (Fourie, 2018). That way the government can channel revolving loans to the informal sector and interest charges can support new informal and formal sector businesses. Furthermore, by regularising informal businesses, the government can widen the income tax paying base, and this will help the government with meeting its obligation of providing poverty alleviating grants. Based on the information shared by participants in the current study, it is important to pay attention to the well-being of migrants as they struggle mentally due to financial pressures to take care of families left behind and operate their businesses. Furthermore, well-being is also affected by legal issues concerning their right to live in the host country and fears of being deported back to their country of origin. The financial pressures are exacerbated by a lack of access to loans to expand their businesses and constant fears about their legal status to remain in the host country and a lack of permits to legalise their trading. Regarding the safety and wellness of immigrants, there should be a continued dialogue to resolve differences between immigrants and South Africans through initiatives such as skills-sharing programmes. Such initiatives will result in information sharing that can result in the expansion of businesses resulting in employment creation.

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5 Innovation and Flexibility: Nigerian Women in Durban’s Informal Economy Sunday I. Oyebamiji

Introduction Nigerian migrants are found in different parts of South Africa, and their population is on the rise as they make relentless efforts to secure better sources of income and explore new opportunities for themselves and their families. As of 2020, there were 1,670,455 migrants of Nigerian origin globally, of which 877,687 were male and 792,768 were female (UNDESA, 2020). Since the early 1990s, the number of Nigerians in South Africa has been steadily increasing from 1,698 in 2003 to 14,089 in 2012 (Enigbokan et al., 2015; Lehohla, 2009). In addition, the number of Nigerians in South Africa has doubled over a short span, from 14,089 in 2014 to 30,314 in 2016 (Statistics South Africa, 2017). The country’s political stability and positive economic outlook S. I. Oyebamiji (B) School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_5

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as well as infrastructural development made it one of the most soughtafter destinations for Nigerians. South Africa is seen as relatively stable in comparison to the harsh economic conditions and rising population levels in Nigeria (Big-Alabo, 2019). Economic migration is often associated with men, particularly in patriarchal societies like those found in many parts of Africa. The continuous global recession and changing dynamics in gender roles now mean that women, who hitherto were expected to remain at home while men migrated, are now at the forefront of migration as evidenced by the rising number of female migrants in South Africa. South Africa receives many Nigerian female migrants annually (UNHCR, 2010), although it is difficult to determine their exact population. However, according to Statistics South Africa (2017), Nigeria is among the top ten countries in respect of the population of female immigrants in South Africa. However, little is known about Nigerian migrant women in informal trade in South Africa. In light of this, it is vital to study the livelihood strategies of Nigerian immigrant women in informal trade. Part of the reason is due to the negative perception of the income sources of immigrants from Nigeria in South Africa, which has become increasingly contentious over time. Some sectors of the public hold the belief that Nigerians are involved in drug dealings and internet fraud, while others believe that they are contributing to the country’s high unemployment rate by taking the jobs of South Africans. It is therefore of interest to learn more about Nigerian women that are involved in informal trading activities in South Africa.

Women on the Move In recent times, studies on female migration have been on the rise in the context of international migration (Banjo, 2012; Dodson, 1998; Fouskas, 2014; Lefko-Everett, 2007). Although it is often assumed in migration studies that African women are dependent on their husbands and as such have not been viewed as active and independent participants in migration; the result is that the effects of migration are seen only through the male lens. Adepoju (2003) noted that the traditional

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pattern of migration within and from Africa was previously seen as maledominated, but long-term and long-distance migration is increasingly becoming feminised. By 2006, women represented almost half of the total number of international migrants, with many women migrating on their own rather than with other family members. They have constituted what a report by the UNFPA calls a “silent and mighty river” that has been growing since the 1980s (Benería et al., 2012, p. 6). There is also sufficient evidence to establish that the African continent has been part of this new trend (Adepoju, 2005; Diop & D’Aloisio, 2010). Commenting on the African scene, some writers observe that migration “once considered an act by single, male labourers looking for work, has increasingly been featured in the lives of women” who are “now more than ever migrating as a means of meeting their own economic needs rather than migrating to join a husband and family” (Diop & D’Aloisio, 2010, p. 4). In Africa, migration has become a way of life, with a growing number of women migrating independently. However, the migration of women remains relatively understudied (Gouws, 2010). Increasingly, migration is becoming more feminised, with more women progressively moving as independent migrants in their own right (Dodson et al., 2008). However, they generally maintain close ties to family that they have left behind in their home countries. In Southern Africa, women have always been a part of migration flows, however, they were still in the minority in comparison to male migrants (Dodson et al., 2008). They currently make up a significant component of contemporary migration in the region. The history and context of migration flows to South Africa have changed significantly in the last couple of decades. It has diversified and become more feminised, meaning both the proportion of total migrants and the actual number of migrant women have increased (Camlin et al., 2014). Historically, women migrated as dependents of their spouses while, now, many single women or women with children migrate independently in search of better economic opportunities, thus redefining and challenging traditional gender roles within families and societies (Gouws, 2010). The phenomenon of women migrating independently of men is referred to as the “feminisation of migration” and is often linked to the “feminisation of poverty” because of the increasing destitution of women

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and children due to severe economic instability in some developing countries, more specifically sub-Saharan Africa (Gouws, 2010). There is a visible gender divide in the migration patterns of men and women. Men migrate mainly in search of formal employment, while the migration of women is influenced by their reproductive roles (Gouws, 2010). Therefore, women often only migrate for shorter periods of time, either to trade or to do seasonal work, whereas men migrate for longer periods of time (Gouws, 2010). Often, females tend to remit smaller amounts of money due to their lower earnings, but they have a greater tendency to remit than men (Le Goff, 2016). This may be attributed to differences in their underlying motives for remitting, such as having stronger links to their dependents back home. While gendered migration data in many developing countries is mainly unavailable, there is a growing rate and number of women migrating to South Africa (Camlin et al., 2014). In the case of Nigeria, there is hardly any scholarly work on migration prior to the 1980s apart from a few references to rural–urban movements. However, one of the earliest studies by Kuper (1965) reveals that a large number of Nigerians were compelled to migrate due to economic and political agitation emanating from the disparity over resource allocation in the country since the 1960s. Europe and America also welcomed several Nigerian nationals who migrated solely for the purpose of education. A large percentage of them were from the wealthy class in Nigeria. The existing literature since the 1980s indicates that contemporary emigration among Nigerians is said to have commenced with the attainment of political sovereignty from the British in 1960. This is when many Nigerians started leaving their country in search of greener pastures (Akinrinade & Ogen, 2011; Ogbaa, 2003). Their destinations were mainly Western and African countries, including South Africa. Many of them left the country because of the deterioration in the Nigerian educational system, partly due to underfunding and the nature of government policies. Again, various international agencies were shut down in the country as a result of political uncertainty, labour unrest and protests. This compelled many labour migrants to move overseas and to other regions of Africa including South Africa.

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Literature reveals that African female migrants generally involve themselves in a range of economic activities that enable them to contribute simultaneously to the development of both their host and home communities (Adepoju, 2005; Dungumaro, 2013). This is particularly true of women in the East Africa economic zone and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regions. This arises from their traditional inclination to make sure that the family is sustained financially and provided with the basic material necessities and social empowerment to enable them to contribute meaningfully to communal development. In Mali, analysis of the female movement reveals that women, in reality, partake in profitable economic activities to enhance the commercial prospects of their families (Tienda & Booth, 1988). Some studies have focused on Nigeria–South Africa cross-border migration. According to Seteolu and Okuneye (2017), South Africa was not an attractive destination for Nigerians whether male or female. Similarly, before 1994, Seteolu and Okuneye (2017) argue that most Nigerian travellers were generally students, and South Africa was therefore not appealing to them. Instead, Britain was a more attractive destination for these students due to the colonial relationship between the two countries (Seteolu & Okuneye, 2017). Most Nigerian emigrants of the 1960s were primarily motivated by the desire to acquire an education and new careers and then return to Nigeria after their studies to partake in post-independence politics and nation-building. However, migrants of the mid-1980s were generally in search of better opportunities in terms of money-related ventures compared to most of the individuals who migrated in the pre-1980s (Seteolu & Okuneye, 2017). This set of migrants includes a large number of Nigerian women immigrants currently found in South Africa. Their population increased steadily, particularly after the restoration of democracy in South Africa (Seteolu & Okuneye, 2017). Women have been recorded to represent the highest population of immigrants across the African region, either alone or as accompanied spouses. Furthermore, some authors observe that Nigerian women embark on the journey across borders to seek their fortune in other countries such as South Africa in a bid to sustain their families (MakinwaAdebusoye, 1990; Sudarkasa, 1977). In addition, they migrated with the

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aim of developing their immediate communities following the dwindling economy as a result of the high rate of unemployment and insecurity in their nation which was placing many members of the extended family in a helpless situation (Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1990; Sudarkasa, 1977). The previous studies are relevant to this study; however, none have documented the experiences of Nigerian migrant women in South Africa. This study aims to explore the experiences of women in the informal trade in Durban.

Durban: An Attractive Destination for Nigerian Women All the women resided in Durban, which is situated in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Durban is the third most populous city in South Africa and the largest city in the province. The city is ethnically diverse, but the Zulus constitute the bulk of the population. This city is well-known for its historical background concerning socio-economic innovation and political dynamism which dates back to the era of King Shaka Zulu (Myeza et al., 2010). Like many of the country’s large cities, Durban has similar characteristics and is an attractive destination for migrants who are in search of better economic opportunities. Thus, over the last few decades, Durban has become an increasingly popular destination for immigrants (Maharaj & Moodley, 2000). This is because it has been rapidly industrialising and urbanising offering formidable prospects for development. In addition, the city is a promising environment for those who intend to conduct business along the streets as it is relatively modern and developed and has one of the largest and busiest harbours in South Africa. Thus, for a long period, the city has been known for its commerce and therefore has, over time, attracted a diverse range of migrants (Myeza et al., 2010). Durban is culturally diverse and there are a range of migrants who have settled in the city; therefore, many find it easy to adapt and integrate into local communities because of the city’s booming economic industry and, on average, life here is less expensive compared to other larger cities in the country such as Pretoria and Johannesburg.

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As a commercial centre, Durban attracts many migrants, including Nigerian women, because it is relatively easier to start a small-scale business or secure a livelihood through menial jobs which are sometimes readily available. This chapter draws on in-depth interviews that were conducted with Nigerian women who operate in the informal economy. Although Nigerian migrant women are found in different parts of Durban, their highest concentration in population is at South Beach, otherwise called “The Point”. The nature of the environment and settlement pattern make engagement in small-scale business relatively easier. For instance, it is apparently among the earliest settlements in Durban, with several old and dilapidated buildings that sometimes provide an avenue for informal businesses conducted by some immigrant women to support their families. A number of them also have business outlets or residences in the central business area (known as “The Workshop”). These areas are close to the Durban Harbour and have a relatively dense population of Nigerians and migrants from other African countries. Accommodation is somewhat less expensive in these areas, and it is, therefore, easier for low-income earners, the category to which most immigrants belong, to make ends meet in such places. Nigerian immigrant women in small-scale businesses, wage employment and key professions are also found in the Central Business District (CBD). This area consists of George Street, Park Street and Russell Street. During the early arrival of most immigrants, their focus centred on places where the cost of living is relatively low and where it is possible to render some skills for services to earn a livelihood. For this reason, they spread to areas like Warwick Junction and West Street in Durban. The Berea and Umbilo areas have also offered some commercial attractions to immigrants, and a reasonable proportion of Nigerian immigrant women in self-employment reside there. This structure of immigrant settlement across Durban gives the researcher a grasp of strategy to source information during the fieldwork. During the period of data collection, which took place in 2021, the researcher had to be cognisant of the ongoing global COVID19 pandemic; therefore, some interviews were conducted face-toface whereas others were conducted telephonically using voice-based messaging services. A qualitative approach provided intricate and detailed

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descriptions of the women’s daily, lived experiences. It allowed the researcher to gain undocumented insights among a sample of understudied women. In brief, the researcher found that all of the women in this study journeyed to the country in hope of a better future. The women were between the ages of 20 to 50 years, some were single whereas others were married and had families. The interview questions were carefully framed and structured in a manner that enabled the researcher to elicit detailed perspectives from the women.

Alone and in Search of Greener Pastures Like many other migrants, the women in this study were in search of better opportunities, not only for themselves but also for their families. Thus, they chose to relocate to South Africa to improve their living conditions. However, some expressed that it was not easy to relocate and leave their family behind, especially for women because of widespread expectations regarding household and family responsibilities, as one participant explains, “I know that like any other immigrant woman I am in search of greener pasture. But, these things have always been there and yet women did not respond appropriately to them in terms of leaving their home country. Many families’ attitude to the female is that she has to look up to her husband and therefore, could be denied her visions as a single woman, including the ambition to leave her country”. The women felt that it would have been ideal for them to relocate with their families; however, they could not afford to do so because they did not have the finances. Many travelled to South Africa alone while their families remained behind, as one woman explains: “I even came with a pregnancy and without my husband ”. The women were willing to make sacrifices in search of better opportunities. While it was difficult to leave their families behind, some of the women took the decision to relocate to South Africa and relied heavily on their social networks which played an instrumental role prior to them moving to South Africa, as one woman indicates that “I single-handedly took the decision to migrate and my friend assisted me to be here”. Social networks were a valuable source of support during the initial stages of moving to South Africa.

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Before migrating to the country, some of the women in this study indicated that they had professional qualifications; however, they had to leave Nigeria because they were unable to secure any employment. In Nigeria, it was difficult to secure employment even with professional qualifications. One woman explains that even those who recently graduated were not able to secure employment, as “fresh graduates have no employment ”. Nigerians move for many reasons including the desire to escape “poverty and hunger ” as well as lack of “electricity, infrastructure, and hospitals not functioning. The government does not care for the people while there is a high rate of corruption among political office holders”. In Nigeria, the situation is quite dire with many wanting to leave the country as there are few economic opportunities, which are also linked to the high levels of inefficiency that exists in the country. While most had aspirations of pursuing a professional career in the formal labour market, it was difficult to secure employment in South Africa and one woman pointed out that “foreigners cannot get a salaried job in South Africa, more so when you have no work permit because they see you as kwerekwere”. The word “kwerekwere” is a derogatory term used by South Africans to refer to international migrants and it is often a reflection of their dislike or non-acceptance of them. Thus, the women felt that they could only secure menial or poorly paid jobs that “South Africans do not want ”. Some women felt humiliated and angry, mentioning that they were referred to as “parasites” who should return to their home country, “They [locals] discriminate a lot. I have not applied for the job, but my friends who tried were declined because of discrimination”. The women were also intimidated by locals who threatened to “call immigration officers to send us home. We begged them to consider us but they said there are no jobs. They sent us home but we came back the following day only to be humiliated again”. There is a widespread belief that international migrants should not be employed in the formal sector in South Africa (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). The informal sector in South Africa is dominated by women in their effort to sustain the family. While some of the women had to leave their families behind, a few managed to reconnect with them once they could afford to relocate to the country; however, they struggled to keep their family together. This was because there was a lack of opportunities

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for their husbands to engage in paid work therefore they had to look for employment elsewhere. One woman shared her frustration in trying to bring her family back together in one place, “the lack of employment for my husband created a separate family for us. We tried to secure a job for him in Durban so that we can be together as a family but all efforts failed due to discrimination. For three years, my husband tried to relocate to Durban to keep the family together, but he was not allowed ”. When the woman was eventually able to finance the relocation of her husband to the country, she could not keep her family together. This was because there was a lack of opportunities for her husband to engage in paid work; thus they had to look for employment elsewhere. Thus, the women had to continue their search for employment in order to survive and support their families, and the informal economy became a promising means of survival.

Starting Afresh in the Informal Economy Once the women settled in the country they quickly realised that it was going to be difficult for them to secure employment in the formal sector even though some of them previously occupied professional positions in Nigeria and even possessed a tertiary level of education. One woman noted, “I am a university graduate and teacher. I intended to continue with the same career here in South Africa”, but this was not possible, at least in the beginning, when she first arrived in South Africa. As a result, many women decide to move to the informal sector to eke out a living. There was a heavy reliance on the informal sector for their survival. The women felt that the informal sector gave them a sense of dignity when they were struggling to find decent work. Some of them used their existing skills to operate their small business. Most of the women engage in a range of activities including their involvement in food canteens and hairdressing salons as well as sewing and selling of clothes. Others are involved in small businesses including the sale of electronics and other similar products. Some of the women used the skills which they learned back home to secure a living in the country, as one woman explains that “I was a hairdresser in Nigeria, and I rented a shop to continue the same business here ”. These informal activities provide them with finances that allow them to

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survive economically in the country because it is not easy for them to secure formal employment and they receive no financial assistance from any member of their family. The money that the women earn through operating in the informal economy is also helpful for a number of other reasons; for instance, it gives them the opportunity to send money back home and support their families financially. For many others, the money they received in the informal economy helped them to relocate their family members, who were later able to join them in the country. The women felt that it was important to have their families with them in the country. One woman explained, “I derive much satisfaction from having my children and husband around me”. The women, particularly those who were married, did not move to South Africa to start afresh with a new partner but their marriage was important to them. They maintained strong relations with their husbands and their children. Previous studies have indicated that migrant women believe that sponsoring their kin to join them constitutes an asset in a foreign land and is instrumental for their survival and well-being (Richmond, 1988). For many of the women, migrating and operating in the informal economy transformed their lives in the sense that they were able to secure an income and take care of themselves as well as their families, both in South Africa and Nigeria. However, operating in the informal economy was not easy for some of the women for a number of reasons. At first, the women struggled to navigate the informal sector because they needed to familiarise themselves with a new environment. A few of the women mentioned that they felt insecure because they were aware of other foreigners who were victims of crime and they felt that if their personal belongings such as their passports were stolen then they would not be able to leave the country. For instance, one woman indicates that in Nigeria crime is prevalent but in South Africa it is far worse, particularly for foreign nationals, “Boko Haram and Niger Delta Militants operate in Nigeria. I did not know we have worse than this in South Africa until my friends who became victims. They [locals] attack people and steal their laptops, passports, and similar valuables. One of my friends was stranded for years because he became a victim of this group”. The women were very

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worried about their personal safety because of the high levels of crime in South Africa. Despite these prominent concerns and challenges, the women have shown initiative by starting their businesses in the informal economy. Many of the women relied heavily on their existing skills for their survival in the informal economy. A few of the women used the skills, which they cultivated while in Nigeria to start and expand their businesses. For instance, one woman indicates that she grew her business and she now employs a number of staff including locals and migrants. She designs South African attire, particularly those that epitomise the essence of Zulu culture, rather than that of Nigerians and other nationalities. This allows her to attract a broad spectrum of clients and ensures that her business prospers. She explains that this was “never on my agenda, for now, my present focus is to make sure all those under me as apprentices complete their training and commence their own business. That is my joy”. Migrants are creating employment opportunities for locals which are also assisting in growing the economy. They are providing opportunities for locals to acquire skills and in this way, they are lowering the unemployment in the country and making a contribution to economy. Most Nigerian immigrants give accounts of the skills that they have acquired that help them to cope with their “new” environment. In the case of Nigerian immigrant women in Durban most were aware that in spite of their university education, they must at least learn one skill that could enable them to engage in the South African informal economy since employment in the formal sector is extremely difficult, especially for foreigners. Most of them, therefore, acquired skills in Nigeria before embarking on the journey to South Africa, particularly hairdressing and catering. Some are making remarkable progress in establishing their own business and also, growing their business. One woman shared: “I simply told myself you are already used to self-employment in Nigeria where the gains are minimal, but here you are sure of getting a better reward for your labour, while waiting for formal employment. That is how I revived my baking, catering, and decoration business here and I have never regretted it ”. Many of the Nigerian migrant women were entrepreneurial and they were willing to take risks to grow their businesses.

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For them, entrepreneurship and risk-taking were instrumental in generating an income. The women were very creative and had loads of innovative ideas to grow their businesses successfully. For instance, some of the women identified a trading area that would attract many customers while others looked for innovative means to reach a larger customer base. One woman travels to the homes of some of her clients to deliver her services. This allows her customers to receive a service in the comfort of their own homes. She is now able to expand her business and as a result, she says, “I am thinking of bringing my sister to support me because she used to work with me in Nigeria”. Most Nigerian women were able to carve a niche for themselves in the informal sector and as a result, have chosen to develop a career along this line. They are not just surviving in the informal economy they are also successfully growing their businesses. A number of women decided to explore opportunities in the informal economy to use their knowledge and talent to start small businesses that can sustain them and their families. Operating in the informal economy goes beyond the individual as it is a means to provide jobs for the majority of people who are less skilled (Mwaba, 2010).

Daily Challenges Experienced by Nigerian Women There are several challenges that migrants encounter when operating in the informal economy and many, particularly women, are vulnerable. The women explained that they faced a number of barriers which complicated their transition to becoming the sole provider. Most of the women were from highly patriarchal communities with clearly defined gender roles that stipulate acceptable behaviours for men and women. Due to the dominant nature of patriarchal systems in Southern Africa, most women have been widely recognised as subordinate to their male counterparts and experience unprecedented forms of discrimination against them. Patriarchy is a system that, in most cases, denies women growth opportunities rather than providing a structure for them to advance. Often women have less of a voice, autonomy, fewer opportunities and lower self-esteem (Mwaba, 2010). The Nigerian women in

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this study have encountered similar challenges because they are originally from highly patriarchal communities. In such communities, women are often assigned household and childcare responsibilities with restrictions on their mobility. Men tend to occupy dominant positions in the household, as one woman explains, “You know that in a traditional society, the woman’s respect is believed to be attached to the subordinate role of assisting the husband. In a polygamous family, the wives even sometimes compete among themselves trying to win the favour of the husband. Once married, your husband has a say on the nature of your job or business and even income, in most cases, more than the influence you have on his own”. In this case, women who left Nigeria without their male partners are not conforming to traditional gender roles. Women are not expected to travel and settle alone in another country. This is in contrast to widespread norms, expectations and gender roles. While “push and pull” factors have often been cited as prominent factors which influence movement, among these women there is also a complex interplay of cultural dynamics which women are challenging. These findings open a new realm of insight as it provides information into the underlying and primary propelling force in most traditional communities. Women are responding to motivating factors outside the scope of commonly known “push and pull” factors. In a way, this is linked to the complexities between “gendered geographies of power”. This demonstrates the breakdown of age-long traditional gender institutions and their related cultural benchmarks, and this enables women to respond to new propelling factors, thus modifying the gender structure of migration from Nigeria to South Africa. Patriarchy is a system that subordinates women to their male counterparts. However, the migrant women in this study have used the informal economy as a platform to advance themselves, grow their businesses and support their families. Apart from struggling with existing traditions and norms, which many of the women were accustomed to in their home country, they also needed to understand and navigate through the local culture and stereotypes about international migrants, which were central to assuming that they were criminals who were involved in illicit activities. Some of the women were constantly harassed by police officials who often search them and disrupt their trading activities. Due to widespread stereotypes,

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some women felt subjected to discrimination because “they [locals] believe that all Nigerians are drug pushers, which is not true. Thus, once they know that you are a Nigerian, they believe you are in this category, and they look at you with bad eyes. Like me as a lady, I do not know what drugs look like. Where I sell food, the police often search me; they said I am only using the selling of food as a pretext. Even there was a day they turned my coolers of food upside down”. Nigerian women face a number of hurdles that seem insurmountable. Negative stereotypes about Nigerians also affect their business but they find themselves trying to rise above them. Some women also explained that it was challenging to develop relationships with other South African women and they felt degraded as they were called derogatory names and even became victims of assault, as one woman explains: “a major challenge was discrimination in interacting with the natives. My worse experience so far was a misunderstanding with a Zulu woman who was not in any way known to me, but my husband knew her. On a number of times, she assaulted me and called me all sorts of names, ‘kwerekwere’, prostitute. I felt so bad, and as if that was not enough when I reacted, she charged me in court. But the court declared the case in my favour and warned her to stop calling me such names. This gave me much relief ”. Some locals hold very negative perceptions of foreigners and they sometimes use derogatory terms to describe them and this can lead to much unhappiness. Often women abandon their unique identities to conform to the local culture to easily blend into communities. “Its colour is green but as it moves around, whenever it comes across a brown environment, its colour changes to brown” (Ojong, 2002, p. 65). Many African women, including those in this study have struggled with issues of language and cultural dynamics, which have left many feeling threatened. Many of the women felt that they needed to navigate through hostile relations with locals and some believed that South Africans hate foreigners. For some of the women, it was difficult to form family relations because they felt that the locals were not accepting of foreigners as one woman explains that “the family of my husband hated me from the onset, and I discover South Africans hate foreigners! They harassed my husband and did everything to frustrate him for marrying a non-South African even though we got married when the man was an immigrant in

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Nigeria, and I then left my business in Nigeria to accompany him here as expected from a faithful wife. His mother was always at loggerheads with both of us”. In general, locals were not friendly towards the immigrants. Some women were not able to greet locals because of commonly held misperceptions about Nigerians. This was a very different culture from what some of the women were exposed to, as one woman explains, “people are not friendly. If you watch, back home in Nigeria we are very friendly. If you see a foreigner, you greet him with honour even more than the indigenous. But when I got to South Africa, the natives run away when they see me as if I am going to harm them. They call me ‘kwerekwere’ ”. Many of the women complain that locals are not friendly towards foreigners and they seem to resent them and this makes it difficult to form strong, lasting relationships with them.

Better Policy, Better Protection: Prioritising Women’s Needs The origin of xenophobic attacks in South Africa emanates from a blend of many factors, including competition for scarce resources between locals and migrants and widespread perceptions of the influx of foreigners into the country. Due to widespread negative perceptions of foreigners and Nigerians in particular, many of the women feel insecure. For many migrants living in the country, xenophobia is a serious concern. Some of the women expressed that they felt vulnerable and threatened; therefore, they felt that they needed more protection from law enforcers. To exacerbate the issue of xenophobia, many of the women also felt that they were given little protection and support by law enforcers, which often leaves them feeling voiceless as one woman explains that “the police once took me to their station to explain what I do not know about and, I tried to defend myself, but nobody was ready to listen to me”. Women are often excluded from policy processes even though they constitute a large share of the informal economy and this takes many forms. The women in this study felt that there was a need to introduce “some formalities into the sector to protect women against unnecessary harassment by law enforcement agents and similar officers” and “adoption

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of new policies for the progress of the small-scale business sector ” as they felt excluded and marginalised from broader efforts. Existing regulations and conventions in the informal sector often ignore the vulnerable position of women. Thus, there is hardly any consideration of the specific interests of women in some instances. The women also felt that the government should respond to the imminent needs of all women because although it is difficult to be a foreigner in the country, it is equally challenging to be a woman. One woman stated, “We are not asking the government to address just the interest of the Nigerian women in Durban, who constitute only a small proportion of all the women in South Africa; but the government should respond to the needs and interests of all women in the country”. Expressing the seriousness of a number incidents of xenophobia in the country, one woman suggests that locals are ill-informed about the major reasons for the social problems in the country, “they [locals] think foreigners take their jobs and husbands; many of the foreigners are selfemployed. The government needs to educate members of the group and give employment to some”.

An Added Stress: The COVID-19 Pandemic Besides the most prominent challenges which many migrants encounter, the ongoing global pandemic has caused widespread economic and social disruption and devastation to many, including migrants who felt especially vulnerable during this time. Prior to the pandemic operating in the informal economy was not easy and the women had to rely on the meagre income that they earned to survive. One woman noted that “the little I get; I make use of. Probably, to buy bread for my children”. A mother of five children explains that the income she makes every month is barely enough to support her family, as she explains that she earns “a small profit in this business, and it is not enough to feed the family, to pay rent and the house”. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated some of the existing challenges that the women were subject to in their daily lives and during their operations in the informal sector. The women felt that their only source of income was threatened and they were not sure how they would survive, “During the lockdown, I felt it was the end

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of my existence. Business ceased and yet landlords were demanding payment of rents for the shops, calling us frequently to remind us”. At the onset of the global pandemic, there were a number of restrictions put in place and the women struggled to continue with their activities not only because their movement was limited but also because many of their customers had also lost their jobs. One woman explained that “before the pandemic, at least customers were coming but when the pandemic came and there was restrictions and customers were affected. Customers who used to support me before the pandemic but after that all were affected; some lost their jobs, and some because of the restrictions were staying in their houses, so customers were not coming to buy”. With no reliable source of income, hunger became a serious concern for the migrant women in the informal sector because they depended on their daily earnings for their survival; “whatever I get in a day is what we use to survive with the children. But during the lockdown I was so stressed, with no help”. The lockdown almost destroyed their economic activities. Some lost their produce because they were not able to conduct any business, “most of my goods got rotten and I had to throw them away…there were no customers coming to support me due to the fact that the goods were rotting, so we had to throw some away and also feed on some”. One woman, who sells fruits and vegetables, explains that she was able to feed her family with some of the leftover stock that she was not able to sell before they got rotten. However, providing food for her family was a concern because she had no income and could not buy any food, explaining that “there was no capital to continue with the business because there were no customers, the challenge is there was nothing to even feed on”. Apart from securing finances to continue with their businesses, one woman explains that she found it difficult to continue with her trading activities as she was unable to replenish her stock as suppliers had closed down and the products were much more expensive, therefore, they could not secure business because of the high costs of their products. She observed: “even buying stock like we used to do before, we are buying it at a higher price than before. People cannot even afford to buy now because it is expensive, and the number of customers supporting us dropped. We have not yet recovered ”. The women felt helpless with their situation and expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of minimal relief and social support for migrants.

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The women felt that they were adversely affected by the lockdown and as a result, they could not sustain their businesses and support their families. The restriction of non-essential activities was difficult because some of the women earned “hardly enough to meet my responsibility” and had “little capital for investment. Before the pandemic, I had good patronage, but the pandemic paralysed this. Most of my stuff got bad and this affected my family adversely. Consequently, there was no capital to sustain the business”. Prior to the lockdown and the onset of the pandemic, the women were engaged in a number of small-scale activities such as hairdressing and selling snacks; however, one woman observed, “when the lockdown started my shop was closed and I could not make money from home”. Despite this, some of the women used this time to reflect on their businesses and think of alternative means to secure a livelihood. One woman explained that she had to “think of other things I can do after the lockdown that can give me more opportunities”. Another woman explains, “When the lockdown was eased in July 2021 allowing the sale of food, I managed to open a food canteen where I now work and earn an income”. This allowed her to continue to operate in the informal economy and survive financially. For others, recovering was not easy. While we are still in the midst of a global pandemic, it has proved to be a challenging time and many are trying to mend their lives. Some of the women are battling to recover financially since the onset of the lockdown because they accumulated debt as they were expected to pay rent even though they were not operating. The financial burden that the lockdown has imposed on the women is immense as is clear from the following statement by one woman: “I told them to wait for me until lockdown restrictions allow me to open and run the business again so that I can pay them in instalment. I am still paying even today”. The migrant women are struggling to recover financially from the effects of the pandemic and it will probably take them a long time before they are fully able to function as they did.

Concluding Remarks This chapter highlights that most of the Nigerian immigrant women in Durban employed in the informal economy earn an income that is

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minimal and often insufficient to cover their basic necessities. Besides, they must grapple with a number of limitations created by gender and inadequate government response to the sector. Specifically, their experiences, plights and challenges as a gender group are linked to two different geographical regions, thus creating a worldview polarised by the institutional intricacies and complexities from both sides, i.e. Nigeria and South Africa. Their ability to cope attests to the efficacy of their skills in relation to a good understanding of the requirements of the informal economy. The women in this study faced enormous challenges that were compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, since they constitute a small proportion of the entire female population in South Africa, it is hardly viable to single them out for a policy framework that can effectively respond to their socio-economic needs. A policy framework that impacts positively on the Nigerian immigrant woman in Durban would be a viable instrument for national development if its horizon is such that all other women derive equal benefit from it. Although most of the women struggled to survive and adjust to a new environment, many were also resilient and advanced in their businesses. When faced with unemployment and destitution, social networks and entrepreneurship became two key strategies in improving their situation. Continued resilience and individual prospects of attaining goals and dreams enabled the women in this study to create an unyielding spirit against any opposing forces during periods of insurmountable challenges and both economic and social shocks. The desire for a better life is driven by their aspirations of doing and being better, even as informal traders. Many of the women were committed to supporting and providing for their families. They were committed to creating and sustaining a remittance culture to enable them to contribute to the development and well-being of their family as well as the general communal development involving their respective immediate communities back home in Nigeria. This study highlights the importance of advancing, maintaining and upholding the status of migrant women. Women migrants should be included in regional and national development efforts through strategic, inclusive and well-managed migration policies. In addition, by specifically focusing on migrant women, there is a move away from marginalising them against broader efforts and moving towards good

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health and well-being, gender equality and creating an environment for peace and just communities where the human rights of all are upheld, maintained and respected.

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Enigbokan, O., Edkins, B., & Ogundele, O. (2015). Relevance of migration theories in the identification of influencing factors for Nigerian and Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA). Fouskas, T. (2014). Nigerian immigrants in Greece: Low-status work, community & decollectivization. Nova Science. Gouws, A. (2010). The feminisation of migration. Africa Insight, 40 (1), 169– 180. Kalitanyi, V., & Visser, K. (2010). African immigrants in South Africa: Job takers or job creators? South African Journal of Economic and Management Science, 13(4), 376–390. Kuper, L. (1965). An African bourgeoisie: Race, class, and politics in South Africa. Yale University Press. Lefko-Everett, K. (2007). Voices from the margins: Migrant women’s experiences in Southern Africa. Southern African Migration Project. Le Goff, M. (2016). Feminization of migration and trends in remittances. IZA World of Labor. Lehohla, P. (2009). Documented migration. Statistics South Africa. Maharaj, B., & Moodley, V. (2000). New African immigration to the Durban region. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 34 (1), 149–160. Makinwa-Adebusoye, P. K. (1990). Female migration in Africa: An overview. In the Role of Migration in African Development: Issues and Policies for the 90s. Union for African Population Studies. Mwaba, K. (2010). The informal economy and entrepreneurship training in Zambia: Can it lead to the empowerment of women. Erasmus University. Myeza, J., Mason, R. B., & Peddemors, V. M. (2010). Socio-economic implications of the KwaZulu-Natal sardine run for local, indigenous communities. African Journal of Marine Science, 32(2), 399–404. Ogbaa, K. (2003). The Nigerian Americans. Greenwood Publishing Group. Ojong, V. B. A. (2002). A study of independent African migrant women in KwaZulu Natal (South Africa): Their lives and work experiences [Masters dissertation]. University of Zululand. Richmond, A. H. (1988). Immigration and ethnic conflict. Springer. Seteolu, B., & Okuneye, J. (2017). The struggle for hegemony in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa relations in perspectives, 1999–2014. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 11(3), 57–67. Statistics South Africa. (2017). The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the Community Survey 2016 data. Statistics South Africa.

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Sudarkasa, N. (1977). Women and migration in contemporary West Africa. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 3(1), 178–189. Tienda, M., & Booth, K. (1988). Women’s position in the process of migration: Individual and familial perspectives of changing social roles. Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/intern ational-migrant-stock United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). (2010). 2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: South Africa. UNHCR.

6 Remittance Flow and Familial Relations in the Face of COVID-19 Pandemic: Rethinking Social Ties During the Migration Period Thebeth R. Masunda and Pranitha Maharaj

Introduction Migration has brought about significant change in society as more people move around the world. It has also been identified as one of the factors altering family structures in many developing countries as family members migrate in search of better social and economic prospects elsewhere. Research has found that not only does migration alter family structures, but also the relationships between migrants and T. R. Masunda (B) Department of Community and Social Development, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_6

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their non-migrant family members as well. Patterns of migration as a livelihood strategy have changed over the past years (Bakewell et al., 2009; Crush & Tevera, 2010; Crush et al., 2005; Makina, 2013). For instance, some migrants who were working in the formal sector in their countries of origin have settled for work in the informal sector after migration (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Makina, 2013). Given the lack of employment opportunities and poor working conditions in their home country and the availability of such in other parts of the world, many people have adopted migration as a strategy to earn a livelihood regardless of the form of employment that they get in the host country. Remittances sent back by migrants have become a major component of contemporary migration given their contribution towards poverty alleviation. Although the economic contribution of remittances is not well documented, because some migrants remit using informal channels, their socio-economic impact especially at the grassroot level cannot be disputed (Muzondidya, 2008). Remittances have impacted positively on the welfare of many migrant-sending households in developing countries. Although both migrants in the formal and informal sectors send remittances to their country of origin, those in the informal sector tend to remit more frequently and regularly than their counterparts in the formal sector (Masunda & Maharaj, 2021). Research has indicated that such remittance behaviour plays a crucial role in determining the relationship between migrants and non-migrant family members during the migration period (Mukwembi & Maharaj, 2018). However, not every migrant-sending household receives remittances. Relationships between some migrants and their non-migrant family members in the countries of origin have been impacted either positively or negatively by migration (Gibson et al., 2010; Masunda & Maharaj, 2021). The flow of remittances during the migration period has been identified as a factor determining the relationships between migrants and their nonmigrant family members. Conversely, the relationship that exists between migrants and their non-migrant family members was also identified as a factor that determines remittance flows during the migration period. Hence, remittance behaviour during the migration period can be used to assess the quality of relationships that exists between migrants and their non-migrant family members.

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Migration and human mobility are regarded as important processes that influence various social outcomes, ranging from remittance flows to labour distribution across national borders (Deane et al., 2010). Regardless of the perceived benefits associated with migration, human mobility has been identified as a major factor in the spread of diseases. Mobile populations have been blamed for transmitting infectious diseases, given that mobility increases the rate of human interaction, exposing individuals to people from various and often, unfamiliar backgrounds. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced all aspects of life, from the way people interact to how they communicate, work and move around. In a bid to combat the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries across the globe introduced mobility restrictions to limit both internal and external human movement (Mamun & Griffiths, 2020). Given that human mobility has over the years been playing an important role, both as a livelihood strategy and economic growth strategy, the world has been deeply affected and battling to adapt to this ‘new normal’. The pandemic has also impacted patterns of migration as well as the flow of remittances between sending and receiving countries. There is so much uncertainty surrounding the future of migration, its trends and everything associated with it given the changes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. As indicated earlier, remittances sent by migrants have been adopted as a livelihood strategy in some developing countries; hence, the COVID-19 imposed mobility restrictions have impacted negatively on the welfare of remittance-receiving households. This chapter therefore explores the effects of remittance flows on familial relations and social ties in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the focus here is on how these restrictions impact migrants who work in the informal sector. The chapter draws on qualitative indepth interviews with Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and their respective family members in their home country. The primary focus of the interviews was to understand familial relations during the migration period given that remittance behaviour was likely to have been negatively affected by the pandemic.

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The Economic Fallout in Zimbabwe The economy of Zimbabwe has been on a downward spiral since the early 1990s as the country witnessed uneven trends in economic indicators since the adoption of the Economic Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) (Ncube, 2000). When ESAP was first introduced it was meant to initiate monetary policy reforms which included market-based interest rates, and liberalisation of the financial sector and the labour market (Mzumara, 2012). However, the programme failed to attain the aspired targets, resulting in the loss of more than 40,000 jobs in the formal sector between 1991 and 1995, followed by the economic meltdown witnessed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ndiweni et al. (2014) describe the period between 1998 and 2008 as a lost decade, as most of the social and economic benefits accrued during the first decade of independence were lost. Scholars argue that the ‘current’ economic crisis in Zimbabwe was triggered mainly by the unplanned grant payment of the ex-combatants in 1997 which was followed by the sending of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 (Mzumara, 2012). The situation was further exacerbated by the land redistribution of 2000 which saw many White owned farms taken by the government and redistributed to the Black majority (Dekker, 2009). After the land reform programme, Zimbabwe suffered the imposition of economic sanctions by the North which impacted negatively on the country’s trade and access to foreign currency (Mzumara, 2012). This was the same period that the country experienced hyper-inflationary rates. Dekker (2009) states that the inflation rate increased from 15% in 1990 to 525% in 2003 to 8,000% in 2007 and then 231,000,000% in July 2008. As a result, the country’s manufacturing and agriculture sectors suffered massive blows as they were both directly affected by this economic downturn. Many companies closed because they could not produce at their full capacity, while others downsized and retrenched. Mzumara (2012) states that in 2005 only 3% of the companies in Zimbabwe were producing at full capacity and in 2009 about 82% of the companies were operating at less than 50% capacity utilisation. There was, however, a positive turnaround in 2009, the post-conflict reconstruction era, a period of the Government of National Unity (Mzumara, 2012). During this period, the Zimbabwean

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Dollar was abandoned in favour of multi-currency, mainly the United States Dollar (USD) and the South African Rand (ZAR). During this period, the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) 1 and 2 were launched and tailored to reboot the country’s economy. Although the economy was still in danger, signs of improvement were appearing. The availability of consumer goods in retail outlets was a major indication that there were some changes in the country’s economy. This revived hope that the Zimbabwean economy had the chance and possibility to be resuscitated. Unemployment remained rife in Zimbabwe as many industries stayed idle while others shut their doors. This has been regarded as an impediment to any endeavour tailored to revive the country’s economy and move it forward. In Zimbabwe, only 900,000 out of the 13 million population were employed in the formal sector (Ndiweni et al., 2014). The production and manufacturing sectors did not recover and the economy continues to face a multitude of challenges. As such, the absorption of new employees in the labour market is still very limited. The situation was made more delicate after the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe’s ruling on 17 July 2015, which allowed companies to terminate workers’ employment contracts on notice (Uzhenyu, 2015). The challenge is no longer just about getting employment, rather it is also now about the ability to secure and hang-on to the job for those already employed. In response, many Zimbabweans have resorted to international migration as a strategy to secure a livelihood and provide for their families. The migration of Zimbabwean citizens to other countries is not a new phenomenon. However, the contemporary large-scale movement has its roots in the aforementioned economic instabilities that led to a high rate of unemployment, resulting in brain drain, as more skilled workers left the country (Crush et al., 2018). Although they are scattered across the globe, Zimbabwean migrants seem to prefer certain countries as their destinations. South Africa is one of the countries in the region that hosts many Zimbabweans seeking socio-economic refuge (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Crush et al., 2018). As such, the proportion of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa is comparatively large. With the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, people’s vulnerabilities increased as it added more pressure on an economy that is already

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strained. Lockdown measures to reduce the spread of the virus resulted in the closure of many businesses and that further exacerbated production challenges already experienced in the Zimbabwean economy. As a result, the economic woes of Zimbabwe continue to accumulate since the introduction of ESAP in the early 1990s.

Remittance Flow and Family Provision in the Country of Origin In Southern Africa migration is not a new phenomenon as it dates back to the nineteenth century but trends and patterns have been fluctuating over the years. Contemporary migration, when compared to the colonial era, which was mainly dominated by young unskilled males, is now open for men and women of various ages and from diverse backgrounds who can embark on the journey. Lucas (2015) postulates that the chances of employment in the destination country and the lack of such in the country of origin encourages people to adopt migration as an alternative. It has, however, been highlighted that, other than economic challenges, there are other factors responsible for initiating and sustaining migration. Chikanda (2005) identified economic, social, political, cultural, professional, organisational, motivational and environmental factors as being responsible for the continuous migration of both skilled and unskilled migrants. Hence, migration in contemporary society has become broader and more complex than before. Migration is adopted as a risk management strategy or a way to avert liquidity constraints in the absence of insurance (Lucas, 2015; Makina, 2014; Muzondidya, 2008). Traditionally, the literature presented migration as a result of the decision taken by individuals to move to areas with better life prospects than their communities of origin (IOM, 2017). Migration was regarded as a decision that individuals make, as they seek the means to secure a better livelihood and opportunities elsewhere. However, the household was later identified as the appropriate unit of analysis, as some writers propose that migration is a decision that is made by the family at the household level. Chakraborty and Kuri (2017) state that a breakthrough in studying migration decisions

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occurred when the household became recognised as an important unit of analysis, after Jacob Mincer published ‘Family Migration Decision’ in 1978. After Mincer’s work, research on household migration became more pronounced (Chakraborty & Kuri, 2017). Household migration decisions are different from an individual’s decision, in that, those decisions taken at a household level are more likely to benefit the family at large in contrast to an individual’s decision. Household decisions take into consideration the welfare of both migrant and non-migrant family members during the migration period (Chakraborty & Kuri, 2017). Due to the high costs of relocation, reasons for migration and uncertainties of the living conditions in the destination country, some migrants often leave their dependants in their countries of origin until they settle in the host country while others remain separated throughout the migration period (Maphosa, 2007; Tevera & Chikanda, 2008). Therefore, remittances become a major source of income in the countries of origin given that migrant family members are compelled to provide for those they left behind. It is for these reasons that remittance flows have been identified as one component that characterises the contemporary migration society. Literature has shown that migration and remittances can affect various socio-economic outcomes among those left behind (Makina, 2014; Maphosa, 2007; Masunda & Maharaj, 2021). Over the years, remittances have been particularly influential in addressing issues such as poverty, education, health and agriculture as well as establishing some income-generating projects. Transfer of remittances before the COVID-19 pandemic was widespread. Migrants would transfer remittances using both formal and informal transfer methods. Muzondidya (2008) reported that documented migrants use formal channels of remitting to their family members while irregular migrants use other informal channels such as cross-border truck drivers. Abdullah et al. (2021) explain that the basic purpose of migration is to seek better prospects and improve the living conditions of family members left behind. A review of the literature also suggests that these international remittances play a significant role in reducing poverty, from headcount poverty ratio to poverty gap and poverty severity ratios (Yoshino et al., 2017). When considering the linkage between migration and development, international remittances should be regarded as one

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of the major contributing factors given their increased volumes over the years. International remittances have a greater effect on poverty alleviation given that they are transferred directly to the beneficiary. There are fewer bureaucratic procedures for remittance transfer and collection as compared to other types of aid transfers. It can be argued that had it not been for remittance transfers, the situation within many Zimbabwean households would have been much worse, due to the economic crisis. Remittances in the country have reduced the vulnerability of households in terms of hunger, ill-health and poverty for both rural and urban households (Crush et al., 2005; Makina, 2014; Maphosa, 2007; Masunda & Maharaj, 2021; Mukwembi & Maharaj, 2018; Tevera & Chikanda, 2008). Many children have been able to remain in school due to the remittances sent by migrant family members. Unlike the recipients of remittances, households that do not receive remittances rely on borrowing from money launderers whose interest rates are extremely high, making it difficult to repay the loan. As a result, non-recipient households remain trapped in the vicious cycle of borrowing, as they end up borrowing to cover the initial loan, and hence maintain the cycle (Tevera & Chikanda, 2008). Research has shown that most of the remittances sent to Zimbabwe are used to acquire basic necessities such as food, clothing, the payment of school fees and medical bills, with very little invested in incomegenerating activities (Makina, 2013, 2014; Maphosa, 2007; Tevera & Chikanda, 2008). A study on the impact of migration to South Africa on rural livelihoods in Southern Zimbabwe by Maphosa (2007) found that a large percentage of the participants use the remittances they receive for consumption smoothing, highlighting the precarious food insecurity situation in the region. Although most of the received remittances were used for consumption, Maphosa (2007) also noted that some people were investing their remittances in buying livestock and agricultural inputs such as fortified maize seed and fertilisers as well as establishing small income-generating projects.

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Mobility Restrictions in the Era of COVID-19 Stringent COVID-19 policies have affected about 90% of the world’s total population as they resulted in a massive reduction in mobility. Human mobility is widely regarded as a key contributing factor in pandemic diffusion (Czech et al., 2021). The lockdown restrictions and the fear of contagion have influenced mobility patterns during the pandemic. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, like other countries across the globe, human mobility has been reduced since the emergence of the pandemic. Abulibdeh and Mansour (2022) state that the health crises caused by the pandemic translated into economic problems, which then triggered some social challenges in most, if not all, countries worldwide. As measures were taken to reduce the spread of the virus and flatten the curve of infection, the lockdown policies had a considerable positive effect on reducing COVID-19 cases. It was realised that there was a correlation between the number of COVID-19 cases and compliance with the imposed mitigation policies (Abulibdeh & Mansour, 2022). The more people comply with mobility restriction policies, the lower the rate of new infections. In this way, flattening the new infection curve. However, compliance with the mobility restriction regulations meant that fewer people could go to work, leading to a sharp decrease in the production of goods and services (Czech et al., 2021). Asmal and Rooney (2021) state that the COVID-19 pandemic has hit the economic sectors hard, especially in Africa and the effect is exacerbated by the efforts to combat the pandemic. As the literature indicates there is a sizable proportion of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa; thus, the reduced working hours in South Africa are likely to have had a negative effect on the economic welfare of many in Zimbabwe. Given that more Zimbabwean migrants are working in South Africa, the reduction in working hours in the country is likely to have affected the volume and trends of remittance flows to Zimbabwe. The level of remittance flows between the two countries dropped drastically as more and more livelihood strategies of migrants in the host country were affected. Many were left with little or no income to get a surplus to send back home. As the virus continues to prevail and measures to prevent its spread were being implemented, though at a much lesser scale, governments faced

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hard choices between reviving economies and preserving public health (Abulibdeh & Mansour, 2022). This is the case in developing countries, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, with vulnerable economies that are not strong enough to withstand the effects of lockdowns. These countries lack the capacity to bounce back from the economic turbulences brought about by COVID-19.

Family as a Unit of Analysis for Migration Literature suggests that migration of the workforce to secure a livelihood can exacerbate the crisis of the modern family (Ratha et al., 2011; Safta et al., 2014; Silver, 2006). It is argued that migration has caused many disruptions within family structures, as many household heads and other members migrate, leaving their family members behind. With migration, traditional family structures and gender roles within them are susceptible to undergoing massive changes. When individuals migrate, their duties and responsibilities are taken over by remaining family members. These changes are likely to have a great impact on the family structure and the carrying out of day-to-day activities. Traditionally, women in many societies took on the role of caregivers with limited decision-making powers in the private sphere (Chitsike, 2000; Schapiro et al., 2013). However, with migration, that role is changing as more women enter the labour market to earn a living. Also, when men migrate and leave women in charge of the household, they begin to play a more important role in the family and the community’s decision-making process (Ratha et al., 2011). Prior to migration, major family decisions were mostly taken by male members of the family who were also the head of the household. The departure of male household heads shifts the responsibilities to females who are then left in charge of the home. As such, women begin to control most of the family and household activities, hence expanding their role in the domestic sphere. Consequently, the migration of a family member is likely to put pressure on the remaining members, as they have to carry on with their usual duties and responsibilities as well as those of the migrant family members (Smit, 2001). Research also indicates that there are more extra-marital

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affairs because migrants leave their spouses in their home country. As a result, families are broken and relationships strained (Makina, 2010). Migration of family members, as mentioned earlier, can erode family structures and relationships. Ratha et al. (2011) argue that the longer the separation, the more migrants lose their attachment to, and authority over, their families and households, as they are gradually replaced by other members who are left behind. Smit (2001) concurs and adds that most of the migrant parents in their study reported that their children’s ill-disciplined behaviour can be attributed to the parent’s absence due to migration. Their argument is that the children lack proper supervision and discipline, as the parents are always away and as a result, the parent-child relationship becomes strained. Silver (2006) states that the family serves as a unit of social and emotional support because members protect each other from psychological distress brought about by stressful life events. Moreover, family members are an important source of support and they borrow from each other when the need arises. Separation of family members due to migration, therefore, causes the breaking down of support structures that individuals are supposed to draw from in times of need. The separation of family members can have different effects on both migrants and family members left in the country of origin (Coles, 2001; Safta et al., 2014; Silver, 2006). Without support from each other, migrants and family members left behind become vulnerable to social, psychological and emotional distress. Different research studies have been conducted on the effects of migration on migrants (Chikanda & Dodson, 2013; Makina, 2013, 2014) as well as on family members left behind (Maphosa, 2007; Sachikonye, 2006; Tevera & Chikanda, 2008) and more specifically children left behind by migrant parents (Coles, 2001; Safta et al., 2014). Of all the studies conducted, perceptions of both migrants and their non-migrant family members were not interrogated concurrently. It is, therefore, the aim of this research to examine the views of migrants concurrently with those of their family members in the country of origin regarding the effects of migration on family structures and relationships.

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Remittances: A Source of Family Tension A qualitative study was conducted with migrants in South Africa and their families in Zimbabwe in 2016. In this study, 30 interviews were conducted with Zimbabwean migrants living in Durban, South Africa and another 30 with their respective non-migrant family members living in Harare in Zimbabwe. Most of the participants interviewed in Zimbabwe were family members of the migrant participants in South Africa. They were mostly parents of the migrants or siblings but also, extended family members as well as a few hired caregivers (for more details see Mukwembi & Maharaj, 2018). These interviews revealed that not only does migration afford families the opportunity to improve their economic statuses through remittance transfer; but it also has some negative effects on the social well-being of families as it results in family disintegration. The qualitative in-depth interviews revealed that the effects of family disintegration during the migration period depend on various issues. Among others, the flow of remittances from the migrants to their family members left behind was identified as one of the major reasons for family disintegration (Mukwembi & Maharaj, 2018). The study revealed that the flow of remittances during the migration period depends on the social ties between the migrant and those left back home. This flow of remittances can either strengthen or weaken social ties between migrants and their non-migrant family members. Family tensions were identified as one of the factors that worth noting when assessing family ties and relationships between migrants and their families in their home country. Although the family is regarded as a social unit that supports its members (Dintwat, 2010). Mukwembi and Maharaj (2018) found that there are other inter-and intra-family conflicts that affect the relationships. Such conflicts in turn compromise the potential of the family to fully support its members. Moreover, the study indicated that as much as migrants remit during the migration period, these are not transferred randomly. Not every migrant-sending household receives remittances. Also, some non-migrants who used to receive remittances are no longer receiving this regardless of having their family members still in the diaspora. It was revealed that misuse of

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remittances by the non-migrant has the potential to ruin existing social ties. While, on the other hand, regular remittances to members of the extended families can help establish relations that were non-existent. There was a realisation that the pandemic is likely to have serious economic implications, which is also likely to impact on remittance flows and this in turn may, influence family relations. It is against this background that a follow-up study was conducted in 2020 to evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on remittance flows and familial relationships during the migration period. In this chapter the focus is on the follow-up interviews that were conducted with informal migrant traders in cities in South Africa as well as their respective family members back home in Zimbabwe. Due to its nature, the approach accorded the researcher the opportunity to access firsthand information from migrants and their non-migrant family members regarding the effects of COVID-19 on remittance flows and how that influenced their social relations during this migration period. Given the COVID-19 travel restrictions, the migrant participants were interviewed telephonically. For this study, interviews were conducted with 10 migrants working in the informal sector in South Africa as well as their 10 non-migrant family members back home in Zimbabwe. The focus of the study was on migrant informal traders and therefore the sample was restricted to only migrants working in the informal sector. It should, however, be noted that during the follow-up study some migrants from the earlier study had moved to other cities in South Africa. The same was also noted for the non-migrant family members as some had moved to different cities in Zimbabwe. Moreover, some households in the home country had new household heads, as there were some instances where interviews with the non-migrant household were done with another person from the one interviewed in the original study. This indicates that migrants had changed caregivers of their children and those overseeing their households in their home country during the migration period. Hence, the participants who remained constant are the migrants, although some changed their cities of residence. Since its emergence, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on migrants in the informal sector. The pandemic affected

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people’s ability to work and hence their salaries and incomes decreased thereby affecting their ability to remit to their family members back home. In the earlier interviews, it was reported that constant remittance flows between migrants and their non-migrant family members positively influenced their social relations during the migration period. It is therefore important that the assessment focuses on relationships between migrants and their non-migrant family members in this era of COVID-19. The interviews highlighted that although the pandemic affected remittance flows negatively, this did not have a greater impact on their familial relationship. Although the reduced remittance flows increased the incidences of poverty in the home country, its effect on familial relations was minimal.

Migrants Are Vulnerable During the Pandemic Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic was accompanied by a great deal of fear and uncertainty given its high rate of transmissibility. Both migrants and their non-migrant family members reported that they were very concerned for the lives and welfare of their migrant family members during this pandemic. Although non-migrants reported that the virus was spreading back home, they believed they were in a better place to protect themselves in comparison to their migrant family members in South Africa. One non-migrant participant reported that she was worried that her son and his wife in South Africa had no income to acquire basic necessities and she wished that they could come back home until the pandemic was over. Every time they call, they will be complaining that they do not have money to buy even the cheapest medication for flu. At least here we can make various home remedies which I believe have been sustaining us through these tough times.

The money sent back home by migrants provide a lifeline for families living in poverty and without remittances families may not be able to meet their essential needs (Makina, 2014; Tevera & Chikanda, 2008).

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However, most of the non-migrant participants revealed that although remittances were their main source of livelihood during the migration period, their main concern is now the well-being of their family members in a foreign country during this pandemic. The sad stories we hear about people dying of COVID-19 in other countries is very unsettling. I appeal to the government to facilitate the return of our children back home. Yes, we need them to work to provide for us but it will not help anyone if they die there. If they come we can all steam using zumbani and rufandichimuka [herbal remedies] rather than worrying where they can get the money to buy the COVID relief packs there.

Another migrant reported that the lack of income has affected her and this motivated her desire to return to her home. As a result of the severe lockdown, she was not able to earn an income and this affected her ability to secure her livelihood. Migrants were very worried about their health and well-being. There was a feeling that they were not in a position to protect themselves adequately in South Africa. People back home have access to zumbani, rufandichimuka which they get for free in the bushes, yet here we buy everything we need. There are so many things that people back home are using that we have no access to here.

Most of the migrants, especially those without documents were reluctant to seek the vaccine during the pandemic. Given the high rate of victimisation of international migrants, many felt that trying to access the vaccine was a trap that could expose their migration statuses and get them arrested and deported. As such, they did not get vaccinated; thus, increasing their chances of contracting the virus and experiencing serious symptoms and even death. The interviews revealed that when compared to the locals, migrants in the host country are more vulnerable to the effects of COVID-19. Migrants reported that factors such as victimisation by law enforcement officers, inability to access government relief funds, xenophobia as well as poor living conditions makes them vulnerable to contracting the virus

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while limiting their chances to access adequate health care services. They indicated that their migration status is a major determinant of their access to human rights as well as the level of inclusion in social security systems in the host country. Access to health insurance and other health services, especially for irregular migrants is very limited. One needs proper documentation to access such services. The situation is dire for the migrants given that they are in the informal sector and have no form of social protection from either the government or their employers. Some of us cannot go to the public clinic because they will take the opportunity to report us to the police and we will be deported. We do not have proper documentation to stay here so we cannot risk deportation by going to the clinic because once they know that you have no papers, they will quickly arrest you and send you to Lindelani. Worse still, we cannot afford to go to the private doctors because we do not have medical aid insurance. They are out of our reach because they are too costly.

Migrant participants indicated that their vulnerability to contracting the virus is exacerbated by the types of jobs they do in South Africa. Given that all participants of the study engage in the informal sector to earn a living, they normally operate on a hand-to-mouth basis. The lockdown regulations to combat the coronavirus affected their livelihoods negatively. During the lockdown they stayed at home, hence they could not earn any income since there was a ‘no work no pay’ agreement at their workplace. In order to survive they reported that they are compelled to risk their health and go to work so that they can earn a living. One of the participants said, I know very well that opting to go to work these days is putting my life in danger because I can contract the virus and die, but again if I stay at home what will I eat? I just pray that God will protect me from the virus so that I can work and earn a little to pay my rentals and get something to eat.

Although social distancing was strongly recommended to curb the spread of infections, most of the migrants resorted to sharing accommodation to reduce their expenses. Given that their income has depreciated, sharing

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accommodation in large numbers was the best way to save money, which they could redirect for other uses. By so doing, they continued to expose themselves to the risk of infection as they lived in overcrowded houses. Of greater concern is the fact that most of the migrants did not have health insurance, nor did they have access to the host country’s social services given their migration status. Although they are among the most vulnerable groups, the situation of migrants is aggravated by their limited access to health services. They reported that in recent times there has been increased tension between local citizens and migrants from other African countries which have obliged them to avoid any confrontation with the locals for fear of victimisation. For all these reasons, non-migrant family members pleaded with the migrants to return home until the pandemic was over. Non-migrant participants indicated that although they depend on remittances sent by the migrants, it is important to put the health of their family members first. In this case, the family placed more emphasis on the welfare of their family members before remittances. It will not help us if they stay there under such conditions and they contract the disease and then they die. Right now, they are not getting enough to send something back home. So, it is better they come back than to stay there and die for nothing.

Of particular concern was the increase in violent attacks against migrants. The pandemic has contributed to an increase in unemployment and this is often blamed on migrants. Over the past few months there has been a rise in tension between locals and migrants. One non-migrant raised his concern over the increased cases of fatalities due to xenophobia in South Africa and the loss of life of other Zimbabweans in particular. It is no longer about this virus. I am very worried because of the increased cases of Zimbabweans killed in South Africa due to xenophobia. Every day on social media we see people being burnt to death, some having their heads crushed and I always pray that God may protect my brother. If only he could come back home. It is better for him to come home than to stay there.

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Both migrants and their non-migrant family members bemoaned the working conditions of migrants. They were particularly concerned about the lack of social protection for migrants. They argue that it is in such times of crisis as this that one would realise the importance of staying in their countries of origin. At times, foreigners do not have all the social support systems they need to deal with pandemics of this magnitude. Migrants reported that it was difficult for the migrant community during the outbreak of the COVID-19 Delta variant which killed more people than the other variants. They reported that a great number of people contracted the virus and died because they did not have access to health care facilities and they could not follow all COVID-19 regulations due to their living conditions.

Remittance Flow and Relations During the Pandemic Both migrants and their non-migrant family members agreed that the pandemic impacted negatively on remittance flow. While the stringent lockdown measures were justified on the grounds of public safety, there were unintended consequences, such as the closure of money transfer outlets (Kpodar et al., 2021). The transfer of remittances is mainly based on cash transactions and requires physical access to service providers, therefore these lockdowns may have impacted remittances (Kpodar et al., 2021). Fewer working hours in South Africa and the closure of the Zimbabwean border are the major contributing factors to this change. Migrants reported that due to the lockdown regulations, they could not go to work daily and failure to go to work meant they could not get any money. Due to the reduced working hours in the host country, the welfare of family members that they had left in their home country deteriorated as the amount of remittances transferred dwindled during the pandemic. In the informal sector, workers are only paid for the days that they work. The restrictions had a major impact on their daily earnings as there were periods when they could not work at all. One migrant trader observed,

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Most of us are employed in Indian and Chinese shops and their policy is ‘no work no pay’, so with these lockdowns we have nothing. No salaries at all. We are now trying other means to earn a living. I have learnt to do braiding during the lockdown so that I can earn something.

The reduced income has had a greater impact on the remittance behaviour of migrants. Migrant participants reported that they are struggling to make ends meet in the host country. As a result, they cannot send remittances to their family members back home. Failure to send remittances during the pandemic has been identified as a factor affecting the migrants as most of them indicated they were worried about the welfare of their families back home. The majority of the non-migrant participants reported that before the pandemic their main income sources were remittances transferred by those in the diaspora. With this source dwindling at a rapid rate, many households have been moved below the poverty line. The increase in the incidences of poverty since the pandemic started is due to reduced remittance transfers. Remittances are typically spent on necessities for survival, such as food, clothing, medicine, and shelter. Therefore they help lift huge numbers of people in their home countries out of poverty by supporting a higher level of consumption that would not have been possible without remittance flows (Barajas et al., 2009). Other than the lack of income due to fewer or no working hours, some migrants indicated that they are struggling to send the little money they had back home since all national borders were closed. The government introduced stringent lockdown measures that made it almost impossible to move between the two countries. Sometimes we get the little we would want to send back home, but now that the borders are closed there are no malitshas [informal cross-border transporters] who used to take our groceries across the border.

As a result of the stringent lockdown, there has been very little or no physical visits between migrants and non-migrants. They all agree that before the pandemic migrants would find time to visit their home country and bring some groceries which they cannot do during the

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pandemic. Some migrants reported that after realising that their incomes were affected and they were no longer in a position to provide for their families in the host country, they sent their wives and children back home. I agreed with my wife that since she was no longer working, she should take the kids and go back home. Now I am staying with four more guys and we are sharing the rental.

The survival strategies in the host country became more unpredictable given the reduction in income among most, if not all, of the study participants. As a result, some migrants decided to send their dependents back home where they can receive support from their family members. They reported that their families had better chances of leading a decent life back home where they have access to stronger social safety nets than in South Africa. However, not all migrants sent their families back home due to the pandemic. Others could not send their children back home as they were worried about their survival given that they could not send remittances. They argued that since they are struggling to send remittances, they were not convinced that their extended families will provide for them. Hence, they opted to stay in South Africa with them. I believes it is better I stay with them here because if they go home how will I provide for them. At least here I know we will just eat whatever I can get.

The interviews revealed that the decision to either send children back home or stay with them in South Africa was dependent on different factors. Migrants who had more children in South Africa, especially those of school-going age opted to take their children back home. On the other hand, those with younger children or toddlers and not of school-going age opted to stay with their families in South Africa.

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Misuse of Remittances When evaluating their experiences during the migration period, both migrants and their non-migrant family members complained about the poor decisions they made as well as the misuse of remittances before the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants reported that prior to the pandemic they had better chances of saving and investing those savings in some income-generating initiatives they could have used as contingency plans in such a time as this. However, they had not been able to accumulate saving and are now vulnerable to poverty given that their sources of income are rapidly dwindling. Had I known that this was going to happen, I would have saved some of the money and started a grocery shop because I have realised those with grocery shops are making a killing [profit] in this community.

Such were the sentiments of one non-migrant woman whose husband is operating a spaza shop in Johannesburg. She reported that people selling groceries were making large amounts of money given that sometimes the lockdown levels were very strict; people would not be able to go and buy from the bigger supermarkets and could only rely on those selling groceries that are close to their place of residence. Remittance flows are not an entirely stable source of income, making it difficult to plan around them (Bonga, 2020). Most of the non-migrants reported that before the pandemic they were used to receiving substantial amounts in the form of remittances every month and as such they would not worry about the following month since it was almost given that money will be sent to them. My brother would send money every month to pay for children’s school fees and cover other household expenditure. In most cases they send money with the groceries and everything was really good.

Although remittances transferred prior to COVID-19 were used for the maintenance of the family, participants of the study agreed that sometimes they were overspending on that which was not a necessity. It is

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such overspending that they now wish they had invested and used more wisely. They now believe that if they get another chance, they will use their remittances differently and invest in initiatives that can sustain them in the event of shocks and uncertainties. They all concur that the pandemic has affected their social and economic welfare in a manner they never imagined. They appealed to the governments in both the host and sending countries to find ways of protecting migrants against such vulnerabilities.

Family Welfare First The interviews suggest that although remittance flows decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, it did not affect their familial relations as highlighted in the earlier study. Although the earlier study indicated that remittance behaviour has a bearing on familial relations (Mukwembi & Maharaj, 2018), the latter study shows that such may not be the case in circumstances where there are other variables to consider. Given that, in this instance the migrants had no control over their remittance behaviour, non-migrant family members back home did not hold this failure to remit against them. Families were more concerned about the welfare of the migrants and how they can protect themselves from COVID-19 and its effects; hence, they were not worried about receiving remittances. Increased concern over the welfare of migrants rather than worrying about the lack of remittances suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic has made people rethink their relations during the migration period. It can therefore be argued that although it appeared in the earlier study that the lack of remittance flows during the migration period affects familial relations, in essence, it is not just the lack of remittances that affected the relations, but rather, the lack of concern for those left behind that affected the relationship. Research has indicated that migration is regarded as a family decision in the context of risk aversion (Konseiga, 2006; Masunda & Maharaj, 2021). Remittances have poverty-alleviating effects on recipient households and also act as a cushion for migrant families during periods of economic instability in order to allow them to

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maintain their standard of living and ensure consumption smoothening (Issahaku et al., 2018). As such, under normal circumstances migrants were expected to remit for the upkeep of their family members back home. In the event that one fails to remit and neglects the needs of those left behind, familial relationships are therefore negatively affected. The current study has indicated that regardless of the increased levels of poverty due to reduced remittances, non-migrant family members were not worried about their lack. Rather they were more concerned about the welfare of the migrants in the host country. It is therefore important to note that the role of the family is to provide and care for each other. Literature has indicated that when migration is adopted as a livelihood strategy, a decision is made at the family or household level to diversify the family income. As such, when one migrates and earns an income in the host country, it is often expected that one is expected to send some remittances to the family members left in the country of origin. Given that in this instance migrants were not earning any income and were vulnerable to contracting the coronavirus, their family members back home did not expect them to send remittances and therefore the lack of remittance transfer did not have an effect on their relationships.

Conclusion Although migrants are regarded as a vulnerable group, research has shown that they are not a homogeneous group. Migrants in the informal sector are more vulnerable to various social and economic factors in the host countries as compared to their counterparts in the formal sector. The sustainability of livelihoods in the informal sector is not guaranteed as there are various shocks that can easily affect them. Those who rely on the informal sector for survival are prone to various economic and social challenges which often push them into severe poverty. Migrants in the informal sector have indicated that they are struggling to recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic given the lack of social protection for them. The pandemic has impacted the earnings of migrants and reduced their ability to send money back home. Regardless of this reduction in remittance flow, familial relationships between migrants and

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their non-migrant family members were not affected. Compassion for one another among family members is the key to strong familial relationships. In instances where migrants deliberately fail to remit to their family members in their home country, familial relations are negatively affected. However, in the event that failure to remit is caused by factors beyond the control of the migrant, family members left behind tend to sympathise with them and are not concerned by the lack of remittances. Rather they will be more worried about the factors that led to the failure to remit. It can therefore be concluded that it is not merely the lack of remittance transfer during the migration period that affects familial relations, but rather, an indication of lack of compassion for the welfare of those in the home country. This study suggests that families remain supportive and provide assistance to each other in times of need.

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7 No Protection, No Support: Older Migrants Operating in South Africa’s Informal Economy Ganzamungu Zihindula, Pranitha Maharaj, and Shanaaz Dunn

Introduction Africa has the smallest number of older people, approximately 74.4 million; however, by 2050 the number of older Africans is projected to triple to 235.1 million and will far exceed the estimates in other regions (He et al., 2020). While there are a multitude of challenges related to the phenomenon of population ageing, for many countries, one of the most prominent concerns is an increase in migrants who are ageing in a host country (Holecki et al., 2020). This is concerning as many strategic efforts have overlooked ageing migrants in broader social and G. Zihindula · P. Maharaj · S. Dunn (B) School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_7

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development efforts and the estimates are increasingly suggesting that more attention should be drawn to this. Migrants constitute a substantial portion of the world’s ageing population (Beauchemin, 2018; United Nations, 2020). Many migrants left their home country when they were much younger either for labour or to seek asylum thus, many are not ageing in ‘their place of origin’ but in a foreign country (Johansson et al., 2013). For instance, many migrants move at younger ages to seek greener pastures and secure a livelihood. Recent estimates suggest that 74% of all international migrants are between the ages of 20 to 64 years, indicating a sizeable share of near-old or older persons, aged 50 years and older (IOM, 2020). Often migrants who decide to leave their home country are attracted to better prospects for development and higher living standards or social care (Segal, 2019). Generally, the assumption is that older people migrate to make the most of their ‘golden years’ and ease into retirement. Often, those who have the financial means to migrate as they reach retirement or older age do so because they want to improve their socio-economic circumstances and living conditions (Segal, 2019). However, in Africa and many other developing countries, many move when they are younger and age in the country of destination, a term commonly known as ageing in place (WHO, 2018). Migrants ageing in a host country brings forth new challenges for health and social service sectors in the place of destination because as people age, they become more reliant on others for their care and support (Abdi et al., 2019; Holecki et al., 2020). As the population ages significantly, there is also increasing pressure on old age support systems as growing older increases the likelihood and risk of health-related and socio-economic vulnerability. This also elevates the likelihood of experiencing exploitation, marginalisation, and isolation (Bozzaro et al., 2018; Maharaj, 2020). Further to this, growing old presents an additional challenge of experiencing poverty and hunger because of the lack of financial stability, which many older people are subject to (United Nations, 2015). Thus, ageing is accompanied by specific vulnerabilities, which are exacerbated in low socio-economic contexts. It is within these contexts that people are ageing amidst limited or no access to health services, support, and basic resources that are needed to lead a reasonable quality of life (Maharaj, 2020). The rights

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of migrants to access healthcare are a complex matter. Even though South Africa has a progressive constitution which aims to ensure that all people, regardless of their nationality or legal status, should have access to health care services there have been several instances of migrants and refugees being denied health care; a term commonly known as ‘medical xenophobia’ (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). It is crucial to develop and maintain sustainable societies that foster active and independent living into old age for migrants, and the communities and societies that they are part of as this is often overlooked (WHO, 2018). Many poorer nations, especially in Africa, do not plan for ageing migrants because their focus is usually on the demographic dividend and other social challenges which affect the youthful population. Population ageing is a particularly relevant demographic phenomenon that is occurring during this era. Unlike before, the world’s population is living longer, and this is a sign of progress and development. As many people are living longer than ever, debates on healthy ageing are increasingly gaining importance (Maharaj, 2020). While it is crucial to find ways to maintain sustainable societies that foster active and independent living into older ages, it is not always a feasible approach and affects not only older individuals but also their communities. In countries where social support systems are not available, many individuals and families face pressure to assist the elderly during old age (United Nations, 2019). Due to the physiological changes associated with ageing, it is difficult for older people to continue to operate in paid labour (Sippli et al., 2021). To offset the economic and social vulnerabilities which accompany ageing, many rely on intergenerational support and care (Aboderin, 2017; Schatz et al., 2018). However, as the levels of poverty increase globally, many children and grandchildren who are expected to provide care for the elderly, are no longer able to do so. Thus, many older people are engaged in economic activities for much longer than expected in order to earn an income to support not only themselves but their families as well. The informal sector is viewed as an alternative opportunity to secure a livelihood and plays a vital role in driving economic well-being, especially among older people. However, there is widespread concern about decent working conditions and quality of life at older ages, especially because the informal economy is unregulated. Besides unfavourable

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working conditions, which many informal traders are exposed to on a daily basis, many are also battling with negative perceptions and stereotypes because of their migration status, or nationality. Thus, informal trading is not easy, especially in a context of limited resources; therefore, this chapter explores informal trading among a sample of older, migrant, street traders in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Older Traders Operating During a Global Crisis Older people’s participation in the labour force is often unrecognised yet they make a significant financial contribution to their households and communities (HelpAge International, 2015), especially in situations where other family members are unemployed. In Africa, a significant number of people aged 55 and older are required to work to maintain their livelihoods and access an income. Estimates suggest that the share of older workers aged 55 and older in the world’s workforce expanded from 10.5% in 1990 to 14.3% in 2014. By 2030, the number of older workers in the labour force is likely to reach 750 million (ILO, 2015b). The African economy is dominated by the informal sector and the majority of Africa’s older labour force finds themselves in this sector due to the need to earn a living even after retirement or out of choice because they remain able and interested (ILO, 2015a). A multi-country study conducted by Alfers et al. (2021) indicates that approximately 13% of those sampled in a number of countries are older, informal workers. For many older, informal workers, engaging in the sector is solely for survival (Alfers et al., 2021). The implications for older people remaining and participating in the informal economy remain grim as they are exposed to inadequate and unsafe working conditions, irregular working hours, and lower incomes and are physically and financially more vulnerable (ILO, 2015a). The conditions under which older people operate in the informal economy exacerbate challenges that they face including age discrimination and violation of rights which limits their access to healthcare and decent working conditions (ILO, 2015a). The onset of the novel COVID-19 outbreak became a worldwide threat affecting millions of people; however, the risk was highest among

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older people (Ningthoujam & Khomdram, 2020). To add to the myriad of challenges brought about during the pandemic, which caused widespread social and economic shocks, migrants and older people were more vulnerable to these precarious circumstances. According to Alfers et al. (2021), during the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic, older informal workers were directly impacted for a number of reasons. Firstly, older people were identified as an extremely high-risk group and were restricted in mobility (Brooke & Jackson, 2020). Secondly, many experienced a loss of income because of stringent national and global measures that affected their livelihoods and access to earnings. They were significantly impacted by the loss of income and older people found it difficult to re-enter the labour market because of the stringent measures and the complications associated with their age such as poor physical health (Alfers et al., 2021). In addition to this, the pandemic has heightened existing issues which previously posed challenges for older people in general such as the use of digital technologies, which holds the potential for resuming work for many (ILO, 2018). Alfers et al. (2021) argue that while older informal workers continued to work during a pandemic, they were forced to rely on a number of coping strategies which increased their debt, decreased their savings, and highlighted the threat to their livelihoods.

Income Security During Older Age While the estimated number of older migrants increased in high- and middle-income countries there was also a slight increase in those in low-income countries. However, topics relevant to ageing and migration are not thoroughly examined in the African context because the emphasis is geared towards economic development and the demographic dividend (Groth et al., 2019). However, they should be a particular group of interest because as they grow older and move towards retirement, concerns about healthy ageing and a decent quality of life are of paramount importance. In addition to this, in many African countries,

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older people are vulnerable to poverty due to weak social and contributory provision coverage in most of the region, estimated at approximately 22% (WHO, 2021). South Africa is one of the few countries in the African region that has a unique old age grant or pension system. This is a social support grant for older citizens known as the old age pension which is available to those who are 60 years and older. This type of social support is rarely available in most other African countries. This social support system is provided to eligible citizens on a monthly basis and is instrumental in ensuring the financial well-being of older people (Etinzock & Kollamparambil, 2019). Individuals are eligible to access this grant if they are South African citizens, permanent residents, or refugees with valid status. However, many migrants, especially those who are undocumented, are unable to access this grant. This would serve as an important safety net for those who are struggling financially; however, many migrants continue to age amidst economic uncertainty. As such, the informal economy is an opportunistic means to earn a living. The income security of people who work informally, especially as they become older, is a prominent issue of concern. Thus, the uncertainty of operating in the informal economy, especially for older individuals, raises concerns about decent work. Informal workers are generally excluded from social protection, labour legislation, and protective measures (ILO, 2002), thus their trading activities are precarious, and they are vulnerable to many social and economic shocks, which is heightened by their lack of protection under the law. Due to this, they are often unable to articulate their rights and this questions the notion of decent work (ILO, 2002). Given the challenges associated with operating in the informal economy, migrants are also subject to crimes of a violent nature, exploitation, and exclusion (Crush et al., 2015).

Researching Older Migrants The informal sector plays a significant role in generating employment and reducing poverty, especially among older people who struggle to earn an income or those who cannot survive on the social support that

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they receive. However, minimal studies have documented this experience for older migrants. It is these informal trading activities which hold the key to food security and the social well-being of many individuals and families. Informal trading is not easy, especially in a context of limited resources; therefore, this chapter aims to explore informal trading among a sample of older, migrant, street traders in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. In the context of this study, the focus is on international migrants. To better understand the lived experiences of older migrant, informal traders this study uses a qualitative approach and draws on one-on-one in-depth interviews. This study focused on a sample of migrants aged 50 years and older who are operating in the informal sector because little is known about their experiences. It is important to focus on older migrants because many have journeyed to the country a few years ago and are ageing in place. Thus, many national strategic efforts have not focused on the health and well-being of older migrants which is important to ensure that all people in the country maintain good health, improved quality of life, and independent living in old age, irrespective of their migrant status. Focusing on older migrants is an important aspect of the study because there is minimal social support available for foreign migrants, especially those who are undocumented, and many who operate in the informal economy do so without considering a sustainable retirement plan. In order to recruit and retain the study sample the researcher approached migrants who were engaged in street trading as these traders were easier to identify and locate. In total 20 interviews were conducted over a period of three months in 2021. All participants were over the age of 50 years. The migrants came from a range of countries in Africa and Asia namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Burundi, Lesotho, and Eswatini. A few of the migrants relocated to South Africa between three to four years ago, however; the majority settled in the country more than 10 years ago and some reported being here between 21 and 25 years ago. Interviews took place during the informal operating hours of the traders. This was a significant challenge and was time-consuming;

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however, the researcher ensured that the migrants were able to continue trading by pausing interviews when necessary. In this way, it offered them maximum comfort and privacy in order to reply to responses without the presence of customers. The researcher was aware that some of the issues being discussed were sensitive, given the challenges that many migrants encounter. Thus, they were informed that their participation in the research was voluntary, and they were free to withdraw from the study at any given time during the interview process. They were also reassured of their anonymity and confidentiality, as no identifying information was obtained. All the interviews were digitally audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim into English to capture the narratives shared by the participants. Using thematic analysis, the transcripts were analysed systematically, and key themes of interest were formulated from the findings.

Trading to Survive: Older Migrants Operating in the Informal Economy In the absence of government or social support, older migrants are heavily reliant on the informal economy for their income. From the interviews, it was clear that while many had professional qualifications, they could not secure formal employment. Upon arrival in South Africa, they quickly discovered that these qualifications were not helpful, and they were left unemployed and began desperately trying to find a job. They turned to the informal economy when they exhausted all their other options. Migrants conducted their activities on the pavements of popular business districts to attract customers and the most common items for sale were food items, such as fruits and vegetables, and secondhand (or previously used) clothing. These are generally low-value items which do not cost much to buy and re-sell. As a result, the profit margin from trading such goods is minimal and they barely make any money. Some days were extremely difficult as their businesses would attract no customers. Surviving on a daily income meant that these older migrants would often go to bed without having a meal; however, they had to return the next day in the hope that they would sell at least one item.

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To exacerbate these challenges, many did not have any family to turn to in times of need. One migrant explained the daily challenges facing informal traders: “I sell snacks like sweets on the street. It is hard to survive here sometimes when I am hungry. I do not have a family to run. I even go to bed without a meal if I managed to drink water then I am sorted ”. For many of the migrants, operating in the informal economy was stressful, and lonely. Many would sit on street corners hoping to attract at least a few customers. They had little support from family or friends, and they had only themselves to rely on to ensure they make money. Some felt that they did not have the physical strength to continue operating in the informal economy. They felt that standing for long hours is physically exhausting; however, they needed to continue to work to support their basic needs and provide financial support to their families. One migrant trader mentions that he could no longer engage in some of the activities which he previously had been doing as he was ageing and began to suffer from bodily pains. With very little opportunity to engage in the formal sector, where working conditions are more regulated and controlled, migrants have no choice but to continue to operate in the informal economy even when they felt that it became physically strenuous for them. Another migrant explained: “In 2015 I was tired of being a car guard and I was getting old. I was standing for long hours and that gave me back pains. There was no money anymore. I became sick and I was working for long hours”. As people age, they are also more likely to experience a deterioration in their health and their poor working conditions are likely to aggravate their health conditions making it difficult to continue with many of the activities they had done in the past. Many of the migrants in this study shared that their journey to the country began as far back as 25 years ago. Most were driven by their motivation to improve their living standards; however, apart from the economic motivation to migrate to a new country, many journeyed to South Africa to escape unstable and volatile conditions which were a result of the aftermath of war and political instability in their home country. They maintained, in their own words, that they “fled political persecutions and poverty” in search of “greener pastures”. Many were heavily influenced by other migrants already living in the country who portrayed the scene as ‘promising ’ and a ‘safety net ’ for those who needed

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to seek refuge as one participant suggests that “my migrant brothers told me that South Africa is a nice country”. Many believed the stories of their own family and friends and others that they were communicating with. They felt reassured that South Africa was indeed a favourable destination. One migrant shares his story of settling in the country: “I had no intention to move to South Africa, my destination was Zambia, but when I got here my friends who were living in South Africa; mostly locals from Congo, influenced me”. For all the migrants, relocating to South Africa was an opportunity to start a new life. It was also a pathway to transition to other more developed regions, such as Europe. For many migrants, moving to the country was also a chance to evade poverty and hunger and provide a better life not only for themselves but for their families, as there were widespread assumptions that there are better prospects to improve their financial situation here in South Africa. One migrant explained: “I moved to South Africa because of poverty and hunger, and I needed to provide a better life for my family. At that time, I heard in South Africa there are jobs and that you can easily make a living. Also, you have more of a chance to go to Europe”. However, their expectations were short-lived as many felt hopeless as they could not make their dreams a reality because when they arrived in the country, they soon discovered that there were limited opportunities available, as one migrant explains: “My expectations got crushed when I started working as a car guard ”. They found it difficult to secure employment in the formal sector even though most of the migrants possessed educational qualifications and skills. Thus, they had to resort to menial work to support themselves and their family. Their desperate financial situation forced them to take whatever opportunity arose.

Leaving My Life Behind There was a general feeling of unhappiness and dissatisfaction among the older migrants. By coming to South Africa, they feel they missed their opportunity to improve their lives. They had many dreams for their lives; however, many found themselves struggling to survive daily. There was a sense of disbelief at the way their lives had turned out. This is evident

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in the following observation by one migrant who said, “but look at my life as a street vendor, selling snacks”. When reflecting on their lives many of the migrants felt that they left their families in their home country to live alone in another country. One migrant explains that “In Ghana, I was an ordinary man”, who travelled to the country a few years ago and had hoped that his family would join him in South Africa; however, these aspirations were short-lived. Most often their dreams were not realised; with many finding themselves desolate, alone, and miserable. They were forced to survive on the measly income that they earned from trading in the informal sector. Also, they did not want their families and loved ones to experience their daily struggles and be subject to poverty and unemployment. They also could not afford to support their families with the meagre income which they are able to secure. For many of the older migrants in this study, operating in the informal economy was not profitable but a means to ensure that they did not go hungry and that they survived. Any aspirations of relocating their family to the country were shattered when they discovered that the money that they earned was not enough to finance their relocation. These experiences are reflected in the story of many of the migrants in this study: “I am alone. Although I had intentions to bring them after I have settled but I cannot even support myself. I cannot bring my family in this chaos. I do not earn or make enough money here ”. Among the elderly migrant traders, there is a sense of powerlessness because of their economic situation. Many tried to maintain close relations by continually communicating with their family and friends in their home country with one male migrant noting, “I call my wife almost every day”. However, maintaining constant communication with family and friends was not an easy task. Some migrants decided to minimise contact with those that they had left behind. A few explained that they chose to limit regular contact with their family back home because they do not want to give them ‘false hope’ and make them believe that they have money to support them. They also limited their communication with them because they did not want to be asked for financial assistance. After all, they were unable to provide support, as they did not make enough money from their trading activities. Some of the migrants who were not living with their wives in

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this country needed to send regular financial support home; however, they could not afford to do so because they struggled financially as their earnings were low. “I try not to communicate with those at home because they think I have a lot of money. The money I make is not even enough”. Their situation is dire, and they are struggling to make ends meet. While some of the migrants long for their family and friends back home they cannot maintain regular contact as they cannot afford the costs of international phone calls, one migrant explains: “I rarely call them (my family) because I do not want them to expect much from me. Also, I cannot afford to talk to them every day. I talk to my siblings on WhatsApp sometimes when I have data. Maybe once in a few months. I do not want to give them false hope because if you are in South Africa, it means you have money and when you call, they start asking for help, so to save myself I do not call them”. Their family back in their home country are not aware of the reality of their situation. Most migrants said they cannot afford to go home for a visit even after spending years trying to make money. Migrant traders are getting old, and they are trying to survive by spending most of their day sitting on the roadside trying to eke out a living. Sadly, their earnings are not enough for them to return to their home country and even if they are to return home, they would not be able to survive financially. In addition, many cannot travel with asylumseeker documents because if they do leave, they may not be able to return and will lose their only means of earning a livelihood. One migrant explained: “I do not visit them because I do not have travel documents. With this asylum seeker paper, I cannot travel, and they also cannot visit me because they do not have the means”. The general feeling was that they are barely surviving “by the grace of God ”. In addition, many have been living alone for many years. They have learnt to adapt to this situation over the years and if they are to journey back home, they may not be able to come back to South Africa because of their migrant status. This would be challenging as they would need to return to the country to continue with their trading activities as there were no other means of earning an income should they remain in their home country.

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Voiceless and Vulnerable: Older Traders Operating in Fear Given the high levels of unemployment in the country, many South Africans face uncertainty as they are vulnerable to hunger and poverty. Due to these insecurities, many locals feel that migrants should not be given employment opportunities. There are widespread stereotypes about migrants which make them feel more vulnerable and marginalised. Many of the migrants felt that they were blamed for the majority of the social ills that were ravaging the country. Even though they were not given any opportunity to secure formal sector employment they still felt like they were blamed for the lack of job opportunities. Some migrants feel that they are treated like “animals” by locals as one participant explains that “locals treat us like dogs. We are not living in peace”. Many of the migrants lived in constant fear; however, they needed to continue to work in these conditions to support themselves. Making an honest living was challenging because of the verbal and physical abuse they were forced to endure. Some shared their experiences of abuse which was inflicted daily by locals as well as police officials who want to exploit them for money and resources, “Every time I come to work; I know that at least one person will bully me and tell me that I should go back to my country. When others come to do hair and it is time to pay, they do not, and they say this is their country they can do whatever they want ”. Others shared their experiences of how they are insulted and belittled as they are often referred to as ‘kwerekwere’, a negative label used by locals to refer to African immigrants. The migrants felt that they were not in a position to protect themselves because they will be attacked or their merchandise destroyed; “your merchandise is seized and if you fight back, they will beat you or burn your stuff ”. Even in the presence of police officials many of the migrants did not feel secure because they would be offered little or no help, as one migrant explains that: “if we see the paras [drug addicts], coming, we run to hide with our stuff. One policeman was telling me this is not your country where you can do what you want to go back to your country so they will not take your things”. Many of the older migrants felt that their plea for assistance went unanswered as they were not given any assistance by local authorities

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in their desperate time of need. Often, they feel abandoned and helpless to change their situation, “I feel powerless and fearful every day. Nobody cares about migrants. If my business is burnt or seized, I will have to start over again with no government support or help”. They were also concerned that they are easy targets for criminals because of the hostility that exists between locals and foreigners. One migrant noted that locals are not well-informed as to the reason they are seeking refuge in the country and if the public were made aware of the volatile situations that many have escaped then they would be more accepting. A number of the migrant traders also felt that the relationships that they had with locals were hostile and they chose not to socialise with them because they fear that they will be targeted when xenophobic attacks start to rise in the country because of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. One woman explains the nature of her relationship with locals: “when a customer comes, they [locals] bribe her by speaking in isiZulu and the client will stand and leave half done or even before I start and go to them. That made me distance myself from locals, I do not socialise with local traders because I know soon when xenophobia starts, they will be the first to loot, and burn my stuff and merchandise so I do not befriend them”. Fear, discrimination, and uncertainty have become the daily norm for older, migrant traders. They lack protection from police officials. They also feel vulnerable because they are not able to protect themselves. They also cannot establish any unity among other migrant traders and defend themselves because they fear that their merchandise will be seized and without any supplies, they would not be able to continue their business, as one migrant explains: “whenever there is a local attack, I simply keep quiet and I do not react if they take my stuff. I do not fight them back because I know if I defend myself other migrants will be in trouble too, so I just watch. I keep quiet and let them do whatever they want. They take my things and show me a knife or gun so I cannot fight. I cannot fight back because I fear for my life and all other migrants”. Some believe that they are exploited by locals and officials because of the misconception that they have resources, “they think I have money because of how I look”. Even though most of the migrants had relocated to the country many years ago, they were not fluent in the local languages. It was not easy to learn the local language as they did not have anyone to teach them.

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Some of the migrants were familiar with a few basic words in the local language; however, they mostly communicated in English. Many of the locals were more accepting of foreigners if they were able to communicate in the local language. The migrants suggest that a quick grasp of the local language was a necessity if they were to continue operating on the streets as vendors; “language was a problem back then when I first started, they [locals] would speak to my clients in isiZulu to bribe them, but now I can pick up [speak] a few words”. Some migrants indicated that learning to speak the local language was the only solution to improving their business and forming relations with locals. One migrant finds it challenging as she is not able to fully understand the needs of some of her customers. Due to this misunderstanding, her clients do not pay, and this impacts her negatively as she relies on her daily income for basic needs such as food and rent. Without an income, she is unable to feed herself, as well as her daughter and they fear becoming homeless, as she explains: “still, language is a barrier. Sometimes I misunderstand my client and end up doing what she did not ask. Some clients will leave without paying ”. Language is a major barrier for migrants as it prevents successful communication with locals daily and it can make many feel isolated, hopeless, and anti-social.

Ageing During Uncertain Times While South Africa has a unique social support system for older people that is not available in many other developing countries, many migrants are not able to access support because they are either not permanent residents or do not possess valid documents. A few of the migrants reported that they felt stressed during the pandemic because they were aware of relief funds or government grants which were available, but they simply could not access them because of their migrant status. Thus, they feel that they are ageing in the midst of great economic uncertainty. The precarious nature of informal trading heightened feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. Many wondered where they would obtain their next meal or how they would get any support in times of need: “I was stressed that I could not even support my even my family. This period was trying my patience and the government made it worse because we foreign traders

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were not assisted like local traders also even the relief funds or SASSA [social support] was only available to citizens”. Most of the migrants were not happy to continue to live in the country; however, they had no choice and little means to leave. The oldest of the participants in this study, who was 61 years at the time of the interview, mentioned that he lives alone even though he has a family. He was not able to relocate with his wife and two children when he settled in the country many years ago because the money, he made in the informal economy was not enough to allow him to save. However, given his circumstances, growing old and lonely he suggested: “I would leave if I had the opportunity even by tomorrow”, but he did not have the financial means to do so. Others hoped that they could leave the country before they got any older as they held uncertain about what the future holds. Many had dreams of leaving the country in the near future because they do not see their business improving. They initially came to the country in search of better opportunities. However, they cannot even afford to have a decent meal at night. Many felt that they had not achieved any of their goals and it is too late for them to improve their lives: “I am old now and I have not done a single thing. I had dreams when I came to this country now my children are older, and I too am getting older before I accomplish them”. To add to their feelings of failure, defeat, and frustration many of the older migrants feel that they are ageing amidst challenging times and the situation is worsening. It has become normal for many to experience crime, harassment, and discrimination and because of this, many older people feel like they are treated inhumanely. This raises concern over the quality of life during old age, especially for migrants who are often left destitute and helpless, “This country only adds to my stress. The migrants are treated like animals I do not have any peace. I fear for my life every time I come to work. The killings and robberies, police harassment, seizing our stuff then fining us even when we are trying to work for our family. I sometimes wonder if these people think we are not human like them”. Many of the migrants explained that they felt dehumanised and reported that they felt as if they were treated inhumanely.

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COVID-19: Hunger Is the New Normal The pandemic has negatively impacted the food security of older migrants. One migrant trader shares her experiences of going to bed hungry because she could not afford to buy food. With limited access to help she believed that they were going to die from hunger. Due to the stringent lockdown, and restrictions implemented in the country, she could not continue to operate her business as it was classified as non-essential. The stringent lockdown measures meant that it was not possible to trade for many months and this meant most families could not put food on the table. One woman explains that if it were not for humanitarian relief from religious institutions, they would have starved to death because there was no assistance available. She also explained that she did not have any social networks to rely on. She observes: “for the period of four months of lockdown we were at home. I could not afford food for my family, was sometimes we will go to bed hungry, I stressed a lot. I struggled to even put food on my table. If it was not for Muslim people and Catholics, I was going to die of hunger with my daughter. I was not working during the pandemic. Everything was closed and it is not like I sell essential things”. The most challenging encounter during this experience was that the migrant traders felt abandoned. There was little to no assistance and support from the government. One migrant referred to his experience as tormenting because he felt under pressure to support his family. His inability to trade impacted his ability to secure a livelihood for his family. He felt that he was a failure because he believed that it was his responsibility to provide for his family and he was not able to do so. In his most desperate time of need, there was no form of assistance available. He describes this as “the worst, most painful experience because we will come or were only allowed to come trade when they were nobody assisting our businesses or families. Things were tough for us from level 5 to level 2 [lockdown] we did not receive any support from the government or any organization”. To make matters worse, many of the migrants who were selling fresh fruits and vegetables could not salvage their stock and when they were eventually able to operate again, the streets were empty, and customers were scarce. One migrant explained: “our stocks were spoilt; still nobody helped.

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The moment we were allowed to open, it was very quiet, and we could not make sales like before. There were no people in town so I could not make enough sales. This was a painful, stressful experience”. Regardless of these challenges, the migrants explain that their families still expected to be taken care of and provided with food and shelter. Many were unable to maintain their finances as they could not support their family; therefore, they felt like a failure. One migrant explains that: “the fact that my family expects support from me, and I could not assist and as a father, I must provide for my family and when I cannot do that, to me, it is a failure”. Even after lockdown measures eased across the country the situation for many older migrants did not improve. For many informal workers the situation was sudden and severe, and many were not prepared to handle the temporary loss of income: “The situation is ten times difficult. The lockdown extension made things even worse. It was hard to eat as someone who survived on a daily income”. Informal traders depend on their daily earnings and struggle to provide in the absence of this important source of income. Many locals and migrants are trying to recover from both the social and economic shock and as a result, business is very slow. To keep their businesses afloat, many will not have the opportunity to make any profit because their clients cannot afford to purchase any products at a higher price: “Even though the economy is collapsing sometimes we sell at the same price we stocked because there is no money”. There is a recognition of the dire state of the economy as a result of the severe lockdown restrictions imposed by the government as well as other factors. As a result of this, many migrants are not able to improve their situation, instead, they continue to live in a vicious cycle of poverty and every day is a struggle.

A Cry for Government Intervention The experiences that the migrants shared of their daily encounters paint a portrait of constant fear and uncertainty. However, many are resilient, and they remain hopeful as they are aware that are responsible not only for their survival but for their family as well. They keep their renewed commitment to trading in the industry by turning to religion, which

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gives them a renewed sense of hope even though they feel constantly fearful: “I am not safe. It is the only prayer that keeps me safe. You never know what will happen, but I believe that because I am covered by the blood of Jesus, I am safe”. Beyond this, the migrants feel that the key to improving their situation lies with the government if appropriate measures are put in place which will be enforced by local authorities. They believe that if other countries are able to ensure that migrants can integrate themselves into the host country and secure employment as well as qualify for benefits from the government they would be able to lead a better quality of life. Older migrants use social media to keep informed and they long for the lives that they believe other migrants are comfortably living. One migrant had this to say: “In other countries, like in European countries, we see on the television how they take care of refugees”. However, here in South Africa, many migrants face a very different reality. They feel trapped as they are not able to receive any assistance or support from the government even as asylum-seekers. One migrant said: “They provide documents but here in South Africa with this asylum paper we cannot do anything. It is difficult to get a job or benefits from government organisations”. As a means of surviving, the migrants try to provide for themselves by operating in the informal economy; however, as one migrant explains: “still the small jobs that we create for ourselves we are harassed ”. Given the experiences encountered by migrants living in South Africa, there was a general belief by most migrants regarding the urgent need for government intervention on issues of security in their businesses. In general, and among the majority of the participants, the lack of assistance and protection for migrants by law enforcers made it difficult for them to operate their businesses. This also threatens their daily income, which allows them to put food on their table because “Metro [police] coming here every day is disturbing and when they come, we have to hide our stock from them because they confiscate, and we are fined R600 or R400 depending on the day and how lucky you are and also the officer you are dealing with”. Uncertainty of how each day is likely to proceed is stressful for many of the migrants. There is hope for a better and safer environment for all, including migrants, but for the most part, they are overlooked and marginalised.

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Concluding Remarks Often the voices of the most marginalised remain unheard in research. Many are afraid to consent to share their lived experiences because they fear victimisation and discrimination. Recognising the varied experiences of migrant traders, this chapter documents the lived experiences of older, migrant traders in KwaZulu-Natal. This is an opportunity to include the voices of older migrants and ensure that relevant and timely interventions and strategies are implemented and that indeed ‘no one is left behind ’ against broader efforts. Many of the older migrants, face a great deal of uncertainty daily, which is similar to the experiences of many other migrants in the country. Many are fearful that their businesses will be attacked because of the widespread anti-immigrant sentiment that exists in the country. This threatens their only source of income because without operating in the informal economy they will not be able to feed themselves or have money for accommodation. The threat of violence, hunger, and homelessness have become normal because of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments and the unprecedented economic devastation that the global pandemic has caused. These experiences highlight the imminent need to not only ensure the safety and well-being of migrants, and informal traders but also to cultivate a safe and healthy environment for those who have settled in the country and are growing older. Focusing on older migrants is especially important because many sectors need to be mindful of their health and well-being. Although South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, the accounts of older migrants suggest that many feel dehumanised, and under-valued and are ageing amidst a great deal of uncertainty and fear. Across the world, many nations, including South Africa have been making a renewed commitment towards attaining the SDGs; specifically, those which aim to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for people of all ages. This offers an important opportunity for more ageinclusive services and programmes for people of all nationalities. This is especially important because population ageing is a significant success story of development; however, the complex nature of this demographic process is challenged by existing social ills experienced in many contexts. It is unacceptable for older people to face barriers in accessing services

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which ensure their protection and well-being. The costs of neglecting older migrants in the country may prove to be detrimental and affect the country’s development (HelpAge International, 2017). It is important to establish social protection programmes that can be sustained over the long term to prevent poverty, reduce inequality and promote social inclusion among older people. Policymakers and other key role players should strive towards leaving ‘no one behind’, especially given the ageing population in South Africa. South Africa has one of the largest ageing and immigrant populations in the continent; therefore, older, international migrants should be prioritised and included in broader development agendas to avoid immeasurable social and health-related challenges in the future. Beyond this, the challenges affecting older immigrants in the country should be continually discussed and debated to resolve the most concerning issues that need redress. The global COVID-19 pandemic has created much uncertainty, and many are unsure as to how they will recover from the social and economic shock. While many nations strategically try to recover from this devastation, they should be reminded of the important role of older people, particularly for their families. The lack of social support and protection for older immigrants has been identified as a serious issue thus, suggesting that more needs to be done to ensure that the rights of all humans are upheld and maintained.

References Abdi, S., Spann, A., Borilovic, J., de Witte, L., & Hawley, M. (2019). Understanding the care and support needs of older people: A scoping review and categorisation using the WHO international classification of functioning, disability and health framework (ICF). BMC Geriatrics, 19 (1), 1–15. Aboderin, I. (2017). Intergenerational support and old age in Africa. Routledge. Alfers, L., Galvani, F., Grapsa, E., Juergens, F., & Sevilla, A. (2021). Older informal workers in the COVID-19 crisis. Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and HelpAge International. Beauchemin, C. (2018). Migration between Africa and Europe. Springer.

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Bozzaro, C., Boldt, J., & Schweda, M. (2018). Are older people a vulnerable group? Philosophical and bioethical perspectives on ageing and vulnerability. Bioethics, 32(4), 233–239. Brooke, J., & Jackson, D. (2020). Older people and COVID-19 isolation, risk and ageism. Journal of Clinical Nursing. https://doi.org/10.1111/jocn.15274 Crush, J., Chikanda, A., & Skinner, C. (2015). Migrant entrepreneurship and informality in South African cities. In J. Crush, A. Chikanda, & C. Skinner (Eds.), Mean streets: Xenophobia and informality in South Africa (pp. 1–24). African Books Collective. Crush, J., & Tawodzera, G. (2014). Medical xenophobia and Zimbabwean migrant access to public health services in South Africa. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40 (4), 655–670. Etinzock, M. N., & Kollamparambil, U. (2019). Subjective well-being impact of old age pension in South Africa: A difference in difference analysis across the gender divide. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 22(1), 1–12. Groth, H., May, J. F., & Turbat, V. (2019). Policies are needed to capture a demographic dividend in Sub-Saharan Africa. Canadian Studies in Population, 46 (1), 61–72. He, W., Aboderin, I., & Adjaye-Gbewonyo, D. (2020). Africa ageing: 2020— International population reports. Government Printing Office. HelpAge International. (2015). Promoting decent work in old age in Africa. HelpAge International. HelpAge International. (2017). Healthy lives and wellbeing for all at all ages: A call to action. HelpAge International. Holecki, T., Rogalska, A., Sobczyk, K., Wo´zniak-Holecka, J., & Romaniuk, P. (2020). Global elderly migrations and their impact on health care systems. Frontiers in Public Health, 8, 1–8. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2002). Decent work and the informal economy. International Labour Office. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2015a, 30 November–3 December). The transition from the informal to the formal economy in Africa: The way forward. 13th African Regional Meeting; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2015b). What age means for the labour force. International Labour Office. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2018). Social protection for older persons: Policy trends and statistics 2017–19. International Labour Office.

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International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2020). World migration report 2020. International Organization for Migration. Johansson, K., Laliberte Rudman, D., Mondaca, M., Park, M., Luborsky, M., Josephsson, S., & Asaba, E. (2013). Moving beyond ‘ageing in place’ to understand migration and ageing: Place making and the centrality of occupation. Journal of Occupational Science, 20 (2), 108–119. Maharaj, P. (2020). Introduction. In P. Maharaj (Ed.), Health and care in old age (pp. 1–13). Springer. Ningthoujam, R., & Khomdram, D. (2020). WHO statement—“Older people are at highest risk from COVID-19”: Should the hypothesis be corroborated or rejected? Medical Hypotheses, 144, 109896. Schatz, E., Seeley, J., & Zalwango, F. (2018). Intergenerational care for and by children: Examining reciprocity through focus group interviews with older adults in rural Uganda. Demographic Research, 38, 2003–2026. Segal, U. A. (2019). Globalization, migration, and ethnicity. Public Health, 172(2019), 135–142. Sippli, K., Schmalzried, P., Rieger, M. A., & Voelter-Mahlknecht, S. (2021). Challenges arising for older workers from participating in a workplace intervention addressing work ability: A qualitative study from Germany. International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health, 94 (5), 919–933. United Nations. (2015). Income poverty in old age: An emerging development priority. United Nations. United Nations. (2019). World population ageing 2019: Highlights. United Nations. United Nations. (2020). Country profiles and international migrants stock estimates. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. World Health Organization (WHO). (2018). Health of older refugees and migrants—Technical guidance. World Health Organization. World Health Organization (WHO). (2021). Assessing the impact of COVID19 on older people in the African region. World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa.

8 Collaboration or Competition? The Relationship Between Locals and Migrants in the Informal Economy Tronic Sithole and Pranitha Maharaj

Introduction The early 1990s was accompanied by an influx of migrants from other countries in Africa with many coming to South Africa with some hope of improving their lives (Smit, 2015). However, the situation quickly changed as attitudes towards migrants progressively worsened. Over the past two decades, there has been rising anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the country, resulting in increased tension between migrants and locals. Some studies suggest that the increasing tide of anti-immigrant rhetoric is fuelled by high unemployment and stagnant T. Sithole (B) · P. Maharaj School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Maharaj e-mail: [email protected]

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economic conditions (Adepoju, 2022; Masikane et al., 2020). In 2021 the South African economy shed more than half a million jobs, and as a result, many struggled to secure employment and survive (Statistics South Africa, 2021). Given the high level of unemployment, many locals and migrants have turned to the informal economy to make a living. Migrants even found themselves involved in “dangerous” labour because they struggle to find employment in the formal labour market without the necessary documentation (Bloom & Feldman, 2011; Moyce & Schenker, 2018). They are often willing to work for long hours for meagre pay. In addition, employers are more likely to exploit undocumented migrants. The increasing visibility of migrants in the informal sector has also led to concerns that foreign nationals are benefitting at the expense of locals. Throughout the country, this has sparked antiimmigrant sentiment because of widespread perceptions that foreign nationals are distorting labour market access and competing with locals for limited resources (Misago et al., 2015). Many foreigners leave their home country in search of a dignified life and a chance for survival. They journeyed to the country because they wanted to escape poverty, persecution, and wars (Noyoo et al., 2021). However, many locals in South Africa believe that foreign migrants do not belong in the country and are worsening some of the conditions under which they live. This belief has contributed to the anti-immigrant sentiment ravaging the country. The rising anti-immigrant sentiment has also contributed to a spate of violent attacks against international migrants over the past few years. South Africa has experienced an increase in xenophobic violence against foreign nationals since 1994, especially in larger cities in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, and the Western Cape where there are greater migrant populations (Gumede, 2015; Mlambo, 2019). At least 67 foreigners died in xenophobic attacks between 2000 and 2008 (Beetar, 2019; McDonald, 2008). The main cause of these violent attacks is the tendency to perceive all foreigners as illegal, especially those who are from other African countries. This narrative creates a distinction between international migrants and South Africans (Gumede, 2015). According to Mbecke (2015), xenophobic attacks in South Africa are mostly directed towards Africans, thus the

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term “Afrophobia” is used to refer to the dislike or fear of African foreigners by Black South Africans. Recently, organisations such as “Put South Africa First ” have intensified calls to the government to prioritise employment for South Africans over migrants. “Operation Dudula” is another faction of “Put South Africans First ” that has garnered support on the ground. Some argue that these organisations are trying to create tension between locals and migrants and to divide the country. According to Boshoff (2022) “Put South Africa First ” and “Operation Dudula” have been targeting and unlawfully evicting international migrants from their homes, assaulting informal traders, and destroying their vending stalls. The escalation in xenophobic attacks has also created insecurity among migrants and many live in constant fear for their lives. Migrant businesses have been negatively affected by xenophobia, crime, and violence with some having to cease all their trading activities (Khosa & Kalitanyi, 2014). This is because they are continually harassed, even when they possess legal permits that allow them to work or trade. Crush et al. (2015) argue that the state itself is a dominant source of hostility. The South African government has consistently blamed the deaths, the attacks, as well as the widespread destruction of their property, as simple acts of criminality by isolated, anti-social elements. State enforcement agencies have also used these incidents to identify irregular migrants and deport them, and in this way, reinforcing the stereotypes and prejudices that fuelled the violence in the first place (Crush & Ramachandran, 2016). To exacerbate the range of challenges that many migrants navigate daily is the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, a nationwide lockdown was sanctioned in South Africa. The government implemented the Disaster Management Act, of 2005, and many were forced to cease their activities. Many locals and migrants became jobless, suffered from hunger, and became homeless (Bamu & Dinesh, 2021; Botes & Thaldar, 2020). For many migrants operating in the informal economy was difficult and their experiences worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to the pandemic migrants were vulnerable to abuse and exploitation and often could not access any social support or protection (Merry et al., 2017). Many would operate daily under conditions of uncertainty to survive. As a result of the pandemic, however, many informal traders

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were left even more vulnerable, forcing them to engage in a variety of strategies, some of which challenged and transgressed government regulations (Thulare & Moyo, 2021). During the lockdown, many informal traders reported that they were struggling to feed their families, as they had no savings and no income to rely on (Bamu & Dinesh, 2021). Most migrant informal traders were left destitute without any government support. However, most interventions were only available for locals which created more hostility between those who were competing for limited trading spaces and access to trading permits (Kwenge, 2020; Netshikulwe et al., 2022). Little is known about the changing nature of relationships that exist between locals and migrants and ensure a safe working environment for all. This chapter aims to redress this gap by documenting the nature of relationships and interactions that exists between local and migrant informal traders in South Africa.

Researching Local and Migrants Using a qualitative inquiry, this chapter focuses on the lived experiences of migrants and locals in the informal economy. It explores how migrants and locals interact and navigate the difficult and precarious environment of informal trading. For a number of years, studies have documented the tension that exists between migrants and locals in the country. However, while much of the discourse suggests that locals and migrants experience tense relations, little is known of what is occurring and if these relations are indeed tense and hostile. Thus, it is important to document these experiences first-hand. Examining the relations between locals and migrants is an important step towards successful integration and building peaceful, and economically strong communities that are more socially and culturally inclusive. Often, it is suggested that locals perceive migrants as negatively impacting the South African economy and undermining the livelihoods of locals. As such, Crush et al. (2015) suggested that these perceptions contributed to the growing xenophobic sentiment towards migrants. However, more research is needed to understand how these tensions have escalated in the current context.

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Thus, in order to uncover the voices of both locals and migrants, a total of 30 in-depth interviews were conducted with informal traders. The study was conducted amid the pandemic in two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the number of informal traders within these areas. Most engage in the informal sector to evade poverty. The unemployment rate is estimated at 59.3% in KwaZulu-Natal and 52.6% in the Eastern Cape (Statistics South Africa, 2022). Thus, in order to survive, earning a daily income through trading has become a prominent economic activity. In addition, both provinces have become popular tourist destinations and as a result, attracted migrants to the major cities. Many have also used this as an opportunity to engage in the informal economy, both locals and migrants. More than 20% of the workforce in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are part of the informal economy, highlighting the sector’s importance in local economic development (Benhura & Magejo, 2020). Generally, most busy areas have street traders, salons, and panel-beating services that are readily available to potential customers. Using a qualitative approach allowed for a deeper understanding of the daily interactions and nature of the relationship between locals and migrants. In 2021, 15 interviews were conducted with migrant traders, nine males, and six females. Participants from different African countries were selected to ensure greater diversity in responses. The migrant informal traders originated from various African countries including Ethiopia, Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Eswatini, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The level of education of migrant informal traders was generally low, with most having attained some secondary education. The ages of the migrant informal traders ranged from 24 to 49 years. To complement the interviews with the migrants, interviews were also held with local traders. Interviews were conducted with 15 local informal traders, seven males, and eight females. The ages of the local traders ranged from 24 to 35 years. The level of education of local informal traders is generally higher in comparison to that of migrant informal traders interviewed for the study. Five locals reported attending college or university and obtaining certificates (in hospitality, marketing, psychology, and social work) and one had a postgraduate qualification. In this study, local and migrant traders struggled

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to find employment even though they possessed at least some secondary education. In South Africa, graduate unemployment is a major issue facing the youth. Educational qualifications have been known to increase employment prospects (Baldry, 2016). However, the unemployment rate for graduates between the ages of 15 and 24 is 32.6%, while it is 22.4% for those between the ages of 25 to 34 (Statistics South Africa, 2022).

Locals and Migrants in the Informal Economy In cities throughout South Africa, the pavements are filled with informal traders selling a range of products. Across the informal industry, activities are diverse yet the landscape in which many operators trade is similar. Most informal traders are identified as those who are engaged in roadside trading and are often sheltered with a tent or umbrella and a few tables displaying their products to the public. One South African woman explains that: “I sell fruits and I sell for the people who catch the train. At home I also sell bread and small products like sweets and vetkoeks [deep fried dough] ”. The space for trading is often sparse, not lavish. Usually, informal traders protect themselves from adverse weather conditions with plastic coverings, such as tents and/or umbrellas. These materials are cheap, lightweight, and easy to transport. Most position themselves where they can easily attract customers. Generally, this is close to the central business district, schools or universities, or other areas where many people are passing by. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “it is because of the location where my business is situated, it is close to the school residence and whenever students are taking their lunch break, they just grab something quickly and it is an advantage for me because I am situated in their surroundings. It is the centre of everything ”. Their trading activities are geared to ensure customer convenience. Besides the food industry, there are a number of retail or buying and selling activities that locals and migrants use to make money. Engaging in the informal economy was not an ideal option for most of the traders in this study. For them, it was a means to earn an income and survive. For many locals, the lack of employment options meant that they were forced to engage in the informal economy. One South African

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woman mentions: “the problem of not finding employment made me come here. Before coming here, I was doing some petty jobs in the kitchens, cleaning other people’s houses because I needed the money. Then I saw that I was not making money there”. Even though some of the locals had more than a secondary education they could not secure any employment as there were very few job opportunities available in the formal labour market. One South African man explains that: “after I finished university, I could not get a job. A friend of mine told me about this business, that he has made a lot of money from it, then that is how I decided to start trading ”. In South Africa, job opportunities are limited and even locals struggle so they have to grasp every opportunity to secure their livelihoods. Social networks were instrumental in encouraging some of the locals to engage in the informal economy. A few of the locals also reported that they chose to operate in the informal economy because their relatives or friends were already involved in the informal sector, and this made it easier for them to start their own businesses. They are now able to provide food for their family, pay rent, and contribute to other household expenses, as one South African woman explains that: “in 2019, the reason that led me to start this trading business was that I have not received employment for the longest time now. So, I decided maybe this way I can make a living from it ”. If it were not for the informal economy, they would be in a difficult situation. Informal trading allowed them to make some money and support themselves as well as their families. Similar to that reported by locals, many of the migrant traders moved to the country seeking jobs so that they could improve their situation; however, they soon discovered that they needed to find other means to survive as they could not secure formal employment. One Mozambican man explains that he “decided to sell as this becomes very easy to get money on a daily basis”. A few migrants were able to secure some employment when they first came to the country, but they left these jobs because they received low wages. Many prefer self-employment over paid labour because some of them reported that they were more likely to be exploited by employers. They often receive much lower salaries and cannot support their families with that which they receive. For some of the migrants operating in the informal economy was a better option than securing employment elsewhere because they were promised wages which they

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did not receive. One migrant explains that: “when I first came here, I was working as a domestic worker, but I saw that they were not treating me well, so I left that job, and I started selling the following year ”. Working for an employer was not easy for some of the migrants because they did not have a formal working agreement, they often would not get paid on time or they did not receive the amount which was verbally agreed on. Employers also took advantage of their situation to exploit them. Some employers are reluctant to employ international migrants, even those with proper documentation and qualifications, because of difficulties with qualifications approval (Moyo, 2020; Theodore et al., 2017). Migrants remain in a marginal economic situation because they are willing to work for low wages and less than favourable conditions (Kamwimbi et al., 2010). A number of studies have suggested that migrants, regardless of their host country’s economic development, often experience periods of unemployment and that there is usually a substantial lag between participation and resettlement in the labour force (Gilpin, 2016; Mihi-Ramírez et al., 2017; Walmsley et al., 2017). Some migrant traders report that their employers treat them unfairly and threaten to send them home if they complain. The employers of migrant traders are often disrespectful to them. Many migrants found this situation untenable and so they decided to try and start a small business that will allow them to make a living. In some respects, this gave them more control over their lives as they did not have to feel exploited.

Nature of Relations Between Migrant and Local Traders The relations between the local and migrant traders were complicated and sometimes contradictory. Some locals maintain that migrants are creating jobs for South Africans, with one woman observing that: “they gave me a job and employed me”. However, others believe that if migrants were to leave the country, they would have better chances of securing employment as there were too many foreign nationals in the country. One South African man explains that he thinks: “the issue of nepotism

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plays a huge role. You find that you get the interview, but you never receive any feedback after. I have done so many interviewers but no luck since then. I think they just put their families and friends in those positions so you need connection in this country to get employment because if you are applying with a CV, it will be forever ”. Due to the precarious nature of relations between locals and migrants, many migrants continually live and operate in fear and uncertainty. They complained that they were easy targets for criminals. One Lesotho man mentions: “I was robbed, and they took my money, and it was these boys who are living on the streets. We are more vulnerable to crime”. Migrants feel vulnerable and complain that it is often locals who are familiar with them that are usually the perpetrators of crimes committed against them. Crime is rife throughout the country and both locals and migrants blame each other for it. The relationship between locals and migrants was cultivated because of their common economic activities. One South African woman explains that: “I have a relationship with them, as I have mentioned that it is my neighbour who found this spot here for me to start selling. We talk a lot and to find a new product we also engage a lot you know. Here you need support as it gets boring when there are no customers you need to socialise and talk to people”. This local woman explains that she socialises with other traders in close proximity as it is a means of cultivating unity and building a working relationship. However, most migrant informal traders found it easier to cultivate relations with other foreign nationals because they could relate to each other as they all settled in the country in the hope of a better future. Most migrants indicated that they offer each other support. There is little competition between them, instead, they share ideas and learn from each other and there is greater solidarity as they all came in search of greener pastures. One Zimbabwean woman explains, “we get along very well since we speak the same language, and our aim is all the same. The aim of hustling for our children and families that we left back at home in our home country”. Some also felt that they could identify with others from their home country because they shared the same language. In addition, a Zimbabwean woman explained that: “it is good because sometimes we even share business ideas to better our businesses”. Networking is important to migrants as it allows them to grow and flourish. One Mozambican woman explains that she has a good

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relationship with other migrant traders and because she cultivated these types of relationships, she was able to learn new skills. She was adamant that “we assist each other for instance if one does not know how to plait a certain hairstyle, she calls me to show her. Our relationship is good ”. Some migrants reported that local traders were friendly towards them and as a result, they had the opportunity to learn the local language. One Ethiopian man explains that: “when I first came it was a challenge because I did not understand it, but it is no longer a challenge because I am now used to it, and I understand it. I try to speak it a little”. Learning a local language is advantageous as migrants are able to communicate with customers and attract more clients. A few of the migrants suggested that they do not feel as if the local traders were jealous or hostile towards them because they were earning a living through legal activities. One Swazi man explains that: “we have a very good relationship in a way that we do help each other even if there are some parts of the car that I need I can call them and ask for it. They also do the same as well ”. This is interesting because of the popular discourse that locals and migrants are fiercely competing for limited resources and customers in order to make a living and survive. However, the interviews suggest that at times collaboration between locals and migrants drives their businesses and allows them to operate harmoniously.

Cultivating Good Relations Between Migrants and Locals Both migrant and local informal traders try to maintain a good relationship with one another by sharing trading sites, one Swazi man mentions: “I can say it is South African people who have helped me. No, I am not working alone I have people who help me. We have a good relationship”. While much of the discourse suggests that migrants most often face hostility from locals, a few of the participants in this study acknowledged the importance of locals. For instance, some without places to trade share their trading tents and space with other traders. This creates a sense of unity among the traders, regardless of citizenship. A few also mentioned that they also store their trading goods in the same facility.

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They work together to attract customers, and they also sell to each other when one of them is busy. They are driven by the same goal, which is to earn an income. One trader who sells alcohol explains that she refers her customers elsewhere if she runs low on stock. This is a strategy to promote business in the area as well as maintain good relations between traders. One Ethiopian man explains that: “our relationship is good. We do not have any problem and yes, we do socialise”. Some migrants maintain good relations with locals by offering them food that is leftover and also by referring customers to other traders when they are low on stock. Some of the migrants operating in the informal economy felt that it was important to not only maintain good relations with other traders but also with the local community to gain their trust and support. By maintaining good relationships, many of the traders, especially migrants, were able to ensure the continued success of their businesses. Most of their relationships are business-related, and they use this to maintain positive relationships with each other. In this way, they are able to focus on attracting customers. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “I have not experienced problems. We are just working well together because each one of us has the same aim to accumulate. We just have a business and there has never been any havoc. It is good because sometimes we even share business ideas to better our businesses”. Forming relations with other locals and customers was important to sustain their business. A few of the migrants mentioned that they needed to be accommodating towards their customers to maintain good relations. For example, one migrant explains that he needs to negotiate his prices with customers so that he can secure their loyalty so they would return to support his business again. One Mozambican man explains: “I do give my customers discounts or let us say a customer wants to buy the towel, but she or he does not have the sufficient amount which is R20 then I do give him or her for R15. Since I am not a supermarket I do not refuse and, in that way, I create a good relationship with my customers so that they can come more regularly”. Interestingly, most local traders reported good relations with other traders. By cooperating and working together, they support each other. They share a common goal of earning an income and strive towards this. Each local informal trader seems determined on improving their business despite the existence of competitors. One South African

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woman explains that: “we have good relationships with them [migrants], we get along well besides our competitors who want to compete with us and stand in the same corner as me whilst selling the same products but then we are good. We respect each other because we are here to hustle, all of us”. The shared and common goal of earning an income maintains amicable relations between local and migrant traders. The majority of local and migrant informal traders had favourable experiences, as they were able to run their businesses without too much interference and cultivate positive working relationships with other traders.

Navigating Tense and Hostile Relationships While there have been many reports of both locals and migrants trying to cultivate good relations, it is not always easy to do so. For many, the ability to work cooperatively is frequently undermined by competition, which affects earnings. Informal traders, both local and migrant, face intense competition. Migrants usually lower their prices to attract more customers; as a result, locals have limited choices, but to offer discounts. The traders often sell the same product, and this results in a great deal of competition for customers and is a major source of tension. In most instances, customers opt for the cheaper option. Due to this, both local and migrant informal traders are more likely to feel resentment and hostility. Migrants believe that locals tend to feel jealous as their businesses progress. They tried to maintain good relations; however, this was not easy as one Zambian woman explains that: “some local people in the community are jealous. I do not socialise with them, but we are fine, there are no problems”. Apart from competition for limited resources and customers, there are many other widespread negative perceptions about migrants in South Africa which contribute to tense relations between them and locals. Some migrants suggest that locals see them as a threat to their livelihoods and having a negative influence on the economy. In addition, some migrants in this study reported that they are perceived by local informal traders as drug dealers, and they experience discrimination because of these negative stereotypes. On the contrary, the interviews suggest that migrants

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trade in legal goods and services to earn a living. However, some local traders are not interested in establishing friendships with migrant traders. Instead, they are focused on growing their businesses, as informal trading is the only way to make money. In general, most local, and migrant traders get along; however, when they begin to attract more customers, it may lead to competition. This is best captured by one Mozambican woman who explains that: “I would say we do get along but once they see that you get more customers or more people are buying from you, they get jealous and complain. They want the people to go to them not you but other than that I will say we do get along since we are all here for one thing and all hustling for our families”. Both local and migrant informal traders have the same goal. A strong commitment to success is ensured by the survival needs of informal traders as well as those of their families. Locals and migrants see informal trading as beneficial to their families and themselves in many ways. For them, informal trading is a way of earning an income. Besides providing for their families, they also pay for their school fees and rent. Although the amount of earnings that they generate from informal trading is meagre, local and migrant traders still benefit from it. All the traders suggested that they are entirely dependent on their customers since they are the ones who support the business and ensure that there is an income. Migrant traders place greater emphasis on building relationships with customers than with other local traders because they see sales as key to their success. In comparison to their home countries, migrant traders in South Africa enjoy a major economic advantage. Migrants expressed appreciation for the large customer base they have in South Africa. In their home countries, they explained that they were not able to secure regular purchases from the locals, so having few customers can cause the business to fail. In contrast with their home countries where most people rarely purchase new clothes or takeaway foods due to lack of affordability, there is always a demand for food and clothing among locals. One Mozambican woman mentions: “I see growth because people are still supporting me, I have loyal customers and I receive more customers”. They have no time to socialise with other local traders due to the nature of their business, but they spend time with their customers who are more important to them.

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Language as a Barrier to Building Relations Language remains an obstacle for many migrants living in South Africa. Often, it is difficult for migrants to socialise with locals if they are not fluent in a local language. They feel as if locals are more receptive to them if they are able to communicate in their language. The majority of migrants in this study reported that they do not speak the local language. Most of them have basic knowledge of English, but not enough to communicate freely. Some of the participants stated that they are still struggling to communicate in many of the local languages; as a result, they rely on English as a form of communication with the local people. Some customers believe that because many of the migrants are from another African country, they should be able to easily grasp local languages; however, this is not the case. Some find it difficult to grasp the local language and rely on others to translate for them, which is problematic when they are communicating with customers. Some of the migrants felt that locals had an advantage over them because they were able to converse with customers and used language as an advantage. One Lesotho woman explains that: “the local traders are fortunate since they use the local language since we are in KwaZulu-Natal. It was difficult for me to attract people to my business since I do not understand their language, so the local people are much more fortunate with their customers since they speak the same language”. It was extremely difficult for migrants to grow their customer base because they could not converse with them in the local language, and this affected their earnings. Many of the migrants did not have anyone who could teach them the local language and they also did not have the time to try and grasp some of the terms as they were focused on making money. Learning a new language is not an easy task. Some of the migrants felt that other matters required their attention such as understanding the local currency. This was pivotal for the success of their business. One woman from Mozambique explains that language was “a big challenge especially when I first came here. Especially when I had to name the price or give the change to the customer in the local language because I also did not know the local currency”. Language barriers also limit interactions between locals and migrants as many of the migrants do not socialise often with other locals.

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However, their motivation to make an income and survive was greater than the language barrier they encountered. Language barriers weaken social relationships between migrants and locals due to the difficulty of having meaningful interactions. They struggle to assimilate because of their inability to communicate in the local language. Language plays a major role in business operations. It was also noted that some locals believe that migrant informal traders can speak isiXhosa or isiZulu, although many of them do not. As a result, social capital is adversely affected since they are unable to build relationships with locals. Khosa (2014) also found that a large number of migrants from Africa struggle with communication in the local language, which hinders them from successfully managing their businesses. Gebre et al. (2011) suggest that language barriers inhibit migrants from establishing deep and lasting social relationships. Communication problems also prevent migrants from developing and maximising their markets. Despite the language and cultural barriers, migrants are more likely to connect with other migrants than with locals. Their social capital is largely derived from people of similar backgrounds and ethnicities. In a study in Johannesburg, Jinnah (2010) found that Somalis had established a distinctive work environment and contributed significantly to the economy while maintaining their ethnic and religious identities.

Competition for Limited Resources and Customers It is perceived by some local informal traders that migrants who earn large profits are a threat. As a result, there is a feeling of distrust and unhappiness among them. Competition between locals and migrants is driven by the limited amount of space available for trading, posing a problem for informal traders. In addition, at times customers are scarce because many are unemployed and spending their money only on necessities like food and transportation, so there are fewer customers. Many of the informal traders in this study argued that there were fewer customers per trader due to the increase in those who were selling the same product. Some traders sell products at lower prices to eliminate

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competition and ensure their customers would return. It is common for migrants to lower their prices to attract more customers. One South African woman explains that: “there is a fight for space here and competition for customers as we are selling different dishes. So, you know some get jealous and start being mean to you when you are doing good, and you need to make sure you secure your space because they want it ”. Some locals feel that migrants become jealous when their business is prospering. Among those who are street traders, on a typical day, there are general disagreements and quarrels because of potential customers. Both locals and migrants reported fierce competition for trading space and customers, and this created some tension between them. To navigate the terrain, most traders try to adopt similar strategies to attract customers. It is more likely that customers will be attracted to cheaper products. Thus, many traders attempt to lower their prices in order to attract more customers. However, many find that their businesses are negatively affected because although they are attracting more customers, they are reducing their profits, resulting in some financial hardships. One South African woman explained that: “there are a lot of people who have opened new businesses like mine around here, unlike before I was the only one here and everything was going well. But now it is tough as there is a lot of competition, other traders lower their price, so it is hard ”. In order to minimise competition, one local explains that she tries to provide her customers with good quality products so that she can easily attract customers and avoid any conflict with other traders. One South African woman explains that: “there are also people who sell cooked food, so I have to keep my game up and make sure that I make my customers happy all the time and deliver the best service”. Some of the migrants complained that they felt targeted by locals who continued to harass them about their business. One Mozambican man explains that locals are “always provoking us saying we should not sell their local products saying we always take their customers, which is not true. People buy where they want to buy”. In addition, some of the migrants complained that the locals felt entitled to the available trading spaces. One Mozambican man explains that: “there was also this other time when the official removed us from selling outside the supermarket and said we should pay R100 to buy the slot where we can sell around here. The local

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traders were saying we should be the only ones who pay, and they do not have to pay as they are the citizens”. It is these sentiments that have fueled some of the hostility which exists between the traders, particularly between locals and migrants. The migrant informal traders do not have a strong relationship with the local informal traders because every trader aspires to succeed, and migrants are more interested in keeping their customers satisfied. According to Crush and Ramachandran (2014), street vendors claim that strong customer service is vital for attracting customers. Migrant informal traders seem to understand the importance of building a relationship with customers in order to persuade them to purchase their products. Common misconceptions and negative views that locals hold of migrants have also made it difficult for migrants to build relationships with them. In a study conducted by Sidzatane and Maharaj (2013), respondents stated that they had come to Durban without the necessary funds to start a business. To start their businesses, most of them relied on relatives and friends for assistance. Migrant street traders also report difficulty accessing financial services, as they are considered highrisk clients, so they cannot obtain loans, but this does not prevent them from trading. As Tengeh et al. (2011) point out, despite the disadvantages African migrants face regarding capital access, they continue to pursue entrepreneurial efforts. Personal savings, informal loans, and family credit are among the methods they use. A significant number of informal street-trading businesses are started with loans from friends, family, and social networks (Willemse, 2011).

An Increasingly Hostile Environment Most migrants felt that they were treated differently by the locals. Most of the locals in the Eastern Cape referred to them as “amakwerekwere”, which is a derogatory term used to describe foreign nationals. Nyamnjoh (2010) notes that this term is used to refer to those who are unable to speak the local languages. Some migrants are confused that the term “amakwerekwere” is commonly used to refer to them and other African migrants, but not migrants from other countries. By using the term

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“amakwerekwere” to refer to them, they feel devalued and demeaned. Migrants feel particularly vulnerable to crime because of the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment across the country. In the interviews, some of the migrants revealed that they have been attacked by angry local residents who believe that they are stealing their jobs. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “I am currently a victim. I have been abused because I am not from South Africa”. Another Zambian man explains that he witnessed a crowd of locals attacking a migrant trader and destroying his business. There are random acts of violence that are committed against migrant businesses. In the local community, migrants feel that they are subject to discrimination because they are widely perceived as criminals who are selling drugs to the youth. Others feel threatened because they cannot speak the local language and it is easy to identify them as foreign nationals because of their indigenous accent. One migrant from Lesotho explains that: “I think South Africans should stop treating us like we are not human beings when we are not able to talk their language. They have to respect us. Language is key and if you know many languages your business can be easy”. Most locals are battling high levels of unemployment and because there are limited economic opportunities available, many believe that migrants are stealing the few available jobs. One Zimbabwean man explains that: “there was a time when they were saying we are here taking their jobs, but they do not have the skill and they do not know how to treat customers, and some they said they will not cut hair to our barbershops”. As a result, many felt victimised because they were easily identified as foreigners. In the context of limited opportunities and resources, the informal trading environment is difficult to navigate. Negative attitudes towards migrants have been a major issue in the informal trading sector because migrants live in small communities, and xenophobia has a direct impact on them. In towns and cities in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, businesses close whenever xenophobic outbursts occur. International migrants fear for their safety and become easy targets of attacks. As a result of the beliefs of locals, migrants are often blamed for shortages of resources, job loss, and drug smuggling into South Africa. Migrants, therefore, live in constant terror as a result of this. Some of the traders, both locals and migrants felt that crime was a major concern and the

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immigrants in this study felt more vulnerable because of their nationality. They are usually victimised by young people who use drugs, as they break into their businesses and steal from them. One South African woman explains: “one day there was a group of boys standing across my table and that day customers were flowing, it was busy so as I was packing up and getting ready to leave in the afternoon, they just came to my table pointed a gun at me and they requested all my money for that day. I had no choice to give them as there was no one around to help me”. Many of the traders feel helpless as others do not come to their aid when they are in dangerous situations. Instead, for their safety and well-being, they are forced to surrender their goods and money to criminals. As a result, many are forced to use their savings to compensate for stolen goods. During the July 2021 unrest that impacted many parts of KwaZuluNatal, there was widespread anarchy and looting. Many large-scale companies were the target of these lawless attacks, and some small traders were also affected. One trader explains that during the July 2021 unrest, all their fresh produce was either stolen or damaged. This was challenging as they had to use the little funds that they had available to sustain and rebuild their business. Unrest in their home countries had caused some migrants to flee. Some migrants said they sought employment in South Africa to escape the social unrest in their home countries. The lack of employment opportunities prompted them to start businesses. Despite the optimism of some migrants regarding their business prospects, others believed they would not stay in the country due to their experiences as foreigners. However, migrants continue to remain in South Africa due to the economic stagnation and political unrest in their home countries. Most of the migrants expressed dissatisfaction with the treatment they received from the police. Often, they received little, or in some instances, no assistance from the police even in emergencies. Instead, some felt that the police targeted them so that they could gain some money from those who were desperate and did not want to be imprisoned for operating on the street corner without a permit. One Ethiopian man explains that: “being scammed by police officers taking and demanding money from us, saying we are paying for permits”. Many including locals reported that they were fearful and constantly alert as the police could arrive at any time and seize their goods. One South African woman explains that: “it

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is the police, I have to always have to be on the lookout for Metro police at all times, or sometimes they take my stock and write a ticket for me, when they take the stock, I am working at a loss because I have to go release my package with a high price”. Most of the traders, especially the migrants, felt that they had no choice but to bribe the police with money or their goods because they did not have the required documentation to be trading. They felt resentment because they were not treated the same as the local traders. Police officers are perceived by street traders as misusing their legal powers by arresting, charging, and mistreating street traders because they are not citizens of this country, consistent with another study (Sidzatane & Maharaj, 2013). Migrant traders with valid permits that enable them to trade legally do not seem to be protected from the police (Sidzatane & Maharaj, 2013). The interviews suggest that there is no equality between migrant traders and local traders. Due to the fact that migrant traders are not citizens of this country, informal traders perceive the police as misusing their legal powers to arrest and mistreat them. According to migrants, their goods were confiscated, and their monies were paid for upfront rentals, yet their trading infrastructure was lost. There are no warnings when the police confiscate their goods, which makes it seem as if the police are stealing. According to Crush et al. (2015), state officials have been extorting migrant traders for money on an ongoing basis. Migrants feel resentment about their treatment by law enforcement agencies and, blame local traders for this. Informal traders are constantly harassed by police because trading on the street is considered criminal activity and street traders, particularly foreign nationals, are often faced with harassment (Willemse, 2011). Migrants, therefore, feel resentment about their treatment by law enforcement agencies and, blame local traders for this. They feel resentful that government policies prioritise locals. Often migrant street traders do not have access to trading permits, they have limited trading spaces, and no rights to address injustices (Willemse, 2011). In a city regulated by by-laws, informal trading is heavily restricted to trading spaces and permits.

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Lockdown Worsens the Situation for Informal Traders Informal trading was not easy to navigate given the multitude of challenges that many encounter on a daily basis. To exacerbate these challenges is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. During the hard lockdown in the country, many strict laws and regulations were passed and many activities, especially those considered non-essential were stopped. The lockdown measures introduced to slow down the spread of COVID19 worsened the economic situation of locals and migrants. Many were suddenly jobless, evicted from their homes, hungry, and trapped in camps without adequate physical distancing (Botes & Thaldar, 2020). This led to a great deal of helplessness, uncertainty, and anger which were fuelled by the conditions they found themselves in. Inequality among informal traders had been amplified by the pandemic. With no daily income and no money for food, these traders had no safety net to fall back on and used up their savings. There was tension between locals and migrants as a widely held view was that government resources cannot be wasted on migrants, as they are already stealing “jobs” from nationals. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “I could not generate an income and we had to close the business due to the high rate of COVID-19. So, I could not make any income”. Informal traders were in a very vulnerable position due to the stringent lockdown measures especially those who relied on informal trading for their survival. While many understood that they could not operate because of the nationwide lockdown others mentioned that in their last effort to desperately try and gain some money they tried to sell the last of their goods, but they were forced to shut down. One Ethiopian man explains, “we were forced by the police to shut down our shops, so we did not make any money and that meant I could not support my family”. Both locals and migrant traders could not meet their daily basic needs as a result of the lockdown measures. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “it was hard for my family because we were using the only money that I came back with, and that is a problem since there is no income, the money is only going out, so affording food and basic needs were difficult ”. When informal traders were eventually able to return to operating

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their businesses, they noticed that only a few customers were able to support them, and they continued to struggle to meet their basic needs. This was a common situation for both migrants and locals. One South African woman explains that: “during the COVID-19 lockdown, my business was very slow. Some other days were bad to the point where I slept without making anything, no customers came to buy. I could not even pay my rent and electricity”. In addition, implementing some of the proposed guidelines for minimising risks was not easy. During this period, some of the migrants mentioned that their local customers became reluctant to adhere to the national guidelines which were suggested to combat the spread of the virus. One migrant mentioned that his efforts to protect against the spread of infection were not effective. One Mozambican man explains that: “some of the customers refuse to sanitise and wear a mask, and when you offer to sanitise them, they insult me saying that I cannot tell them what to do. They said “ngeke bezwe ngekwerekere” meaning they cannot be told by a foreigner. I cannot force them to sanitise and since they insult me, I just keep quiet ”. Migrants expressed that they felt particularly vulnerable because they were overlooked and were not given support and assistance. They observed that because of their migrant status, they were not eligible to receive support. One Zimbabwean woman explains that: “the local people got some sort of help from the government, and we did not since we are not allowed to be here. We do not have legal papers that can help us to also get social relief, even the products that we bought from the supermarket to sell got spoiled and rotten since there was no one to buy them”. Many were hungry and unsure of how they would survive. At times, locals also did not know how they would survive or make it through to the next day. With limited, and in some instances, no support from the State a number of locals who were engaged in community work and humanitarian efforts came to the aid of the migrants. Without this support from local organisations, many of the migrants would have been left destitute and hungry. One Mozambican woman explains that during the pandemic she felt hopeless because there was no support. She explained: “I did not have money to buy them [her children] the food they wanted, and I did not know what to do, luckily my neighbouring school, Ekuthukuzeni Primary, gave me a food parcel so that assisted a lot. Other than that, there was nothing ”. Although most

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of the traders, especially the migrants, have experienced huge losses as a result of the stringent measures, many remain hopeful for their future as one participant from the DRC explains that: “lockdown closed many things for us. After the lockdown, it will be better, but that affected us a lot ”. Even though many of the migrants experienced a number of challenges before and during the pandemic they expressed their resilience by continuing to operate in the informal economy in order to survive and feed their families. For them, this appeared to be a greater motivation than the challenges which they navigated daily.

Concluding Remarks In some contexts, such as South Africa, anti-immigrant sentiment is fuelled by poverty which is a major driver of tension between local and foreign migrants. Many migrants seek a brighter future, but there are limited employment opportunities in their countries. While many migrants try to earn a daily living through informal trading, they are continually stereotyped by locals who perceive them as criminals and job-stealers. Many local and migrant informal traders interviewed had established good relationships with one another, although some of their relationships were strictly business-related. All the traders indicated they chose informal trading because they needed money to support their families. The informal traders in this study shared a common goal—to obtain an income and support their families. They were able to form a unifying relationship by sharing trading spaces and referring customers to each other. The study found that both local and migrant informal traders in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape use different livelihood approaches to sustain their businesses. Despite the harsh conditions they are experiencing on the streets, they continued to trade as this was important for their survival. The study found several challenges, including crime, violence, xenophobia, lack of documentation, and government inaction, exist which hinder the growth of businesses. Migrants also feel that the police treat them unfairly in comparison to the locals. Instead of being protected, they are sent home when there are outbreaks of xenophobia. However,

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migrants still prefer to be in the country because it is better than the current state of their home country. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, local and migrant informal traders struggled to make ends meet by selling their products as their only source of income, and the pandemic exacerbated the vulnerability of the informal traders and contributed to food insecurity. If migrants and locals are allowed to operate in a safe environment, they could strive towards ending poverty in all forms. Many would evade hunger, and this will promote healthy lives and well-being for all. However, persistent stereotypes are fuelling hostile relations which exist between migrants and locals. More efforts are needed to promote peace and collaboration between migrants and locals. This is especially important for those operating in the informal economy. Due to the lack of social security, COVID-19 exposed the vulnerability of workers in the informal economy. As poverty levels rise and social programmes are desperately needed in this volatile economic time in South Africa, the welfare nature of the state must be reconsidered. If South Africa does not introduce economic and social measures to spur economic growth, it is more likely that the responsive measures will only increase poverty and inequalities. Therefore, developing effective and inclusive mechanisms can help government institutions to respond to economic and social shocks, effectively and efficiently for all. This is a step towards creating a regulated and sustainable environment for post-lockdown employment in the informal sector, and, over the long-term.

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9 Changes in Public Attitudes and Behaviour Towards International Migrants in South Africa During the COVID-19 Pandemic Steven L. Gordon

Introduction A recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021) has detailed the economic contributions made by informal foreign-owned businesses in the City of Johannesburg. The study established that these businesses improved affordable access to goods and services for local communities. The IOM report acknowledged the positive impact these enterprises had on value chains in the Gauteng province. In other words, international migrants working in the informal economy are a boon to South African markets and contribute to S. L. Gordon (B) Developmental, Capable and Ethical State, Human Sciences Research Council, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

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economic growth. The IOM report concluded that foreign-owned businesses would be of even greater benefit to the province if they were further integrated into the economy and provided with developmental support. But the positive contributions of international migrants in this sector are consistently undermined by xenophobia. South Africa has experienced successive outbreaks of mass anti-immigrant hate crime in the last few decades, a phenomenon that seems to disproportionately impact informal migrant workers. There is increasing interest, from academic researchers, development practitioners and international organisations, in South African xenophobia and how it affects informal sector workers. A contemporary study of xenophobia in the country, however, needs to take the current COVID-19 pandemic into account. Existing theoretical frameworks suggest that the propensity of anti-immigrant activity should be influenced by large-scale pathogen threats. Research on pathogen stress would suggest that a mass disease event (like the current pandemic) would alter whether people see international migrants as threats. According to this body of knowledge, pathogen threat can translate into a willingness to distance from, and be suspicious towards, strangers (Schaller & Duncan, 2011). Pathogen stress can, as a result, boost xenophobic attitudes (also see Faulkner et al., 2004). Work by Esses and Hamilton (2021) suggests that there is a link between discriminatory attitudes in Global North countries and the pathogen stress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Little is known about the impact that mass disease-related threats (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) will have on human psychology in South Africa. Hoping to address this knowledge gap, this chapter draws data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) to assess changes in public attitudes towards migrants over the last decade. In particular, it examines attitudinal change during the pandemic period and whether these changes are consistent with past trends. The analysis reveals that there is little evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a considerable increase in anti-immigrant activity in the country. Current longitudinal public opinion data seems to show

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that contemporary levels of xenophobia are comparable with the prepandemic period. The chapter concludes by looking at how policymakers could better tackle xenophobia against informal migrant workers in the country.

Mass Views Towards Immigration Let us start by considering what public opinion towards international immigration looked like before the COVID-19 pandemic. During the apartheid period, there was limited public opinion polling on what ordinary South Africans thought about immigration. Large-scale attitudinal surveying on this issue began in the late 1980s, but it was not until the mid-1990s that detailed public opinion research on immigration was published. Work from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found that non-nationals were blamed for socio-economic problems (e.g. crime and disease) in the country (Minnaar et al., 1996). The South African Human Rights Commission (1998) held national dialogues on xenophobia and published the Braamfontein Statement in the late 1990s. This document argued that xenophobia was caused by popular misconceptions about immigrants and called for greater public education on the subject. Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a substantial expansion in public opinion polling on this subject with pollsters tracking deep hostilities towards international migrants. Immigration was included as a topic in the SASAS in the early 2000s, an annual cross-national opinion poll.1 The SASAS series was designed to measure the general adult public’s attitudes, beliefs, behaviour patterns and values with regard to a range of pertinent issues. The survey series is administered by the HSRC and is committed to measuring societal change over time. Beginning in 2003, SASAS respondents have been 1 All SASAS surveys are designed to yield a representative sample of persons residing in each of South Africa’s nine provinces, regardless of their nationality or citizenship. The SASAS sample is restricted to adults (16 years and older) living in private homes. Most SASAS rounds are completed between the months of October and December. In the first sampling stage, a set of 500 small area layers (SALs) was drawn. In each SAL, seven dwelling units (i.e. non-vacant residences) were randomly selected. In each round more than a hundred fieldworkers visited 3500 dwelling units.

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asked: ‘Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa: (i) All immigrants; (ii) Some immigrants; and (iii) No immigrants’. Results for the period 2003–2020 are presented in Fig. 9.1 and indicate that the adult population is quite divided on the international immigration issue. About a third of the South African populace said that they would welcome all immigrants in 2003. A similar proportion indicated that they welcomed some immigrants, and the remainder (32%) stated they would welcome none. The share of the adult public that would be prepared to welcome international migrants has tended to fluctuate within a narrow band over the period 2003–2020. But, from 2010 onwards, there has been a decline in the share who said they welcomed all international migrants. Only a quarter of the adult populace adopted this position in SASAS 2020. Since 2009 the portion who indicated that they only welcomed ‘some’ international migrants have grown Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa… 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2004 2003 0%

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appreciably. This segment constituted nearly half (46%) of the adult public in SASAS 2020, a 15 percentage point increase in the last eleven years. The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have had limited impact on welcoming attitudes towards international migrants. Reviewing the data between 2018 and 2020, we do not observe a significant increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. In 2008, SASAS began to introduce questions on whether immigration was linked to a range of socio-economic problems. Since 2008, for example, SASAS respondents have been asked whether they thought that international migrants increase crime rates. The portions of the adult population who agree and disagree with this statement are displayed in Fig. 9.2. As can be observed, a substantive segment of the country’s adult population links international migrants with increased crime rates in 2008. The percentage of the general public which holds this belief has not changed notably since 2008 indicating the durability of this belief. Stereotypes about international migrants’ involvement in crime have been a feature of several recent anti-immigrant riots in South Africa. This was particularly true of the September 2019 riots in which foreign business owners were targeted because of their alleged involvement in various criminal activities. Agree

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Another negative stereotype that often emerges in South African antiimmigrant rhetoric concerns the impact of international migration on health. Foreign nationals are frequently accused of spreading disease to the locally born. But how widespread is this belief? What share of adults living in South Africa thought that international migrants were carriers of disease? Data on this question is presented for the period 2008–2020 in Fig. 9.3. As with the belief that immigration was a major cause of crime, many believed that international migrants spread disease. Between 2014 and 2018, this belief appeared to go into decline. However, over the last two years, it has become more popular again. Most likely, this is a response to the current large-scale pathogen stress from the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the observed attitudinal change is consistent with the expectations of scholars like Esses and Hamilton (2021). Agree

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Fig. 9.3 Public responses to the question: ‘Do you agree or disagree that immigrants bring disease to South Africa?’, 2008–2020 (Source SASAS 2008–2020)

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Zero-Sum Thinking About International Migrants Opposition to international migrants (and foreign traders more specifically) in South Africa is often framed in terms of a resource allocation debate. The issue is imagined in the following zero-sum terms: the more the one group (i.e. non-nationals) acquires, the less there is available for the other (i.e. nationals). This is based on the implicit assumption that there exists a finite number of business or job opportunities in South Africa (i.e. the ‘fixed-pie’ bias). The belief that one group’s gain is another group’s loss, of course, is a dangerous way of thinking. If viewed in this way, a person’s opposition (expressed through violence or otherwise) towards a ‘competitor group’ is an economically beneficial and valid attempt to remove harmful competition. Such a view of human relations disincentives intergroup collaboration and incentivises conflict (for further discussion of this issue, see Ró˙zycka-Tran et al., 2015). In view of how dangerous zero-sum beliefs about immigration are, it would be worth asking how widespread these beliefs are amongst the South African citizenry. In other words, how popular are beliefs that immigrants’ achievement in business or the labour market reduces opportunities for everyone else? SASAS participants were asked different questions on whether they felt that immigrants’ success in accessing welfare or employment reduced opportunities for everyone else in the country. In addition, respondents were queried on whether they thought that when immigrants open businesses, it means less business opportunities for everyone else. Responses to these questions are depicted in Fig. 9.4. It was apparent from the figure that only a minority of the population demonstrated a zero-sum bias on these questions, with many people opposing the position that a foreigner’s gain would be another’s loss. How would the COVID-19 pandemic influence zero-sum bias against international migrants living? The current pandemic had a particularly dramatic (and negative) effect on the national economy in South Africa. As the availability of resources shrink, we may anticipate a rise in zerosum bias amongst the general public. Scholars who favour competitive threat theory, like Ruedin (2019), would argue that the perceived threat

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Fig. 9.4 Public support and opposition against zero-sum statements against the impact of international immigrants, 2020 (Source SASAS 2020)

of competition with immigrants increases during an economic downturn. A study by Kwak and Wallace (2018) on perceived threat in the context of immigration has shown that negative attitudes towards immigrants can develop when economic situational factors (e.g. a recession) create perceptions of group competition. This scholarship would lead us to expect a robust and immediate reaction to a large-scale macro-level event such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to better understand zero-sum beliefs about international in South Africa, Gordon (2022) examined zero-sum thinking related to immigration using nationally representative public opinion data. The study tracked how zero-sum thinking changed during 2020, recording attitudes between two time points, one at the start of 2020 and one at the end. Opposition to zero-sum thinking appears to have declined between these two periods, falling quite substantially. The uncertainty of the pandemic period seems to have increased the tendency of certain parts of the population to be undecided on how to answer zero-sum bias questions. This outcome is consistent with past research on the

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link between pathogen stress and discriminatory attitudes (Schaller & Duncan, 2011). However, a considerable increase in support for zerosum thinking was not observed. This outcome suggests that this form of thinking in the country is quite resistant to large macro-level events.

Elite Anti-immigrant Attitudes Academic research on the informal economy has tended to find that non-nationals working in that sector are regularly stigmatised as criminals, accused of illegal activities and of undermining local businesses by township elites. This was a recurrent theme, for instance, in research funded by Freedom House on xenophobic violence in sixteen diverse township communities (Misago, 2017). In all of the selected communities, representatives of local authority institutions (e.g. ward councillors) expressed strongly negative attitudes towards foreign traders who they perceive to be the cause of most problems in their respective constituencies. Foreign-owned enterprises operating in the informal economy were accused of closing business opportunities for locals. Moreover, this group was seen as involved in criminal activity and suspected of frequently peddling drugs and sexual immorality. These findings are similar to what Gastrow (2018) found when interviewing police and local authorities about foreign-owned spaza shops in the Western Cape. Anti-immigrant stereotypes are not just held by local township elites but appear to be widespread amongst municipal officials as well. Landau et al. (2011) gathered data on what officials in five municipalities thought about international migration and its impact on life in their jurisdictions. Data was collected through surveys as well as interviews. Officials expressed a range of different negative stereotypes associated with nonnationals, and respondents described international migrants as causing economic harm to South Africans and engaging in illegal activities. These sentiments were held despite limited and poor-quality data about international immigration at the subnational level. Indeed, despite operating in different information environments, anti-immigrant stereotypes expressed by officials appear undifferentiated from what is often found amongst ordinary citizens (also see Crush & Ramachandran, 2015).

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Anti-immigrant attitudes appear to be prevalent amongst many policymakers at the national level (including government ministers). In the early post-apartheid period, Human Rights Watch (1998) warned that South African politicians regularly made unsubstantiated and inflammatory statements about international migrants. For instance, the nation’s first Department of Home Affairs Minister (DHA) Mangosuthu Buthelezi was notorious for his anti-immigrant statements during his time in office. He blamed international migrants for crime and joblessness, helping to set political discourse on the question of immigration. Although Mr. Buthelezi stepped down in 2004, national officials continued to express anti-immigrant stances. In a 2019 address to the parliamentary portfolio committee on immigration, for example, DHA Minister Aaron Motsoaledi scapegoated international migrants as a source of the nation’s problems (Dawson et al., 2019). His 2019 stance is not surprising, when he was Minister of Health Motsoaledi also blamed foreign nationals for poor conditions in the public health system (Mbhele, 2018). In a recent report on xenophobia in South Africa, Human Rights Watch (2020) noted how high-ranking national officials frequently targeted international migrants in their public speeches. It could be argued that the COVID-19 pandemic has encouraged certain policymakers to increase their rhetoric against international migrants, especially towards those working in the informal sector. The 2020 period saw, for instance, the introduction by Gauteng Premier David Makhura of the Township Economy Bill; proposed legislation that would penalise small foreign-owned enterprises. But the Township Economy Bill was a product of pre-pandemic politics. Seeking votes in the 2019 National and Provincial Elections (NPE), politicians campaigned on the need for greater regulation of small foreign-owned enterprises. This seemed particularly true in the Gauteng province where the ruling African National Congress (ANC) sought to electioneer aggressively on the issue. In a March 2019 rally, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa declared to cheering crowds: “everyone just arrives in our townships and rural areas and sets up businesses without licenses and permits. We are going to bring this to an end. And those who are operating illegally, wherever they come from, must now know” (Hairsine, 2019). The ANC election manifesto for the NPE 2019 stated the matter

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clearly, calling for a “campaign to stop illegal trading in townships and villages, much of which is conducted by foreign nationals, with a view to promote and protect local ownership of grocery retail stores and other economic activities”.

Understanding Attacks on International Migrants In the national discourse anti-immigrant hate crime has gained greater prominence in recent years. This growing recognition is owed, in large part, to widespread anti-immigrant riots in May 2008. These riots resulted in the displacement of 150,000 people and required the deployment of national army units to subdue. The large-scale violence prompted an ongoing ‘crisis of interpretation’ as regards xenophobia on the part of government, civil society and academia. For a discussion of these riots and the crisis see Gordon (2019b). This crisis has endured despite the best efforts of past national presidents (and their allies in parliament) to downplay or deny the existence of xenophobic violence. However, it is important to remember that anti-immigrant hate crime predates the May 2008 riots. However, law enforcement does not gather adequate data on hate crime in South Africa, and it is difficult to track this form of violence over time. Civil society have tried to address government failures to adequately quantify anti-immigrant hate crimes. Using a wide variety of sources, the Xenowatch monitoring group has attempted to identify incidents of xenophobic hate crime since 1994. The group claims that there have been about 900 anti-immigrant hate crimes over the last two decades and these have involved the deaths of more than 600 people. Anti-immigrant violence has, in particular, affected small foreign-owned businesses in the country. Xenowatch has tracked 4831 shops looted between 2010 and 2021 (Fig. 9.5). The data presented does suggest that the scale of anti-immigrant violence against shops has decreased noticeably in the last two years. Due to the difficulty of gathering data on this issue, of course, these results may be an underestimation of the actual scale of xenophobic violence in South Africa. In addition, the overall number of

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violent xenophobic incidents recorded in 2020 (55) and 2021 (79) by Xenowatch was not that different from what was reported in 2019 (80), 2017 (45) or 2018 (49). In order to better understand adult participation in anti-immigrant hate crime in South Africa, a question on this subject was introduced into the 2015 round of SASAS. Respondents in that SASAS round were asked the following question: ‘Have you taken part in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in your neighbourhood?’ Public responses to the question on violent action against foreign nationals are displayed for the period 2015–2020 in Table 9.1. While respondents may be disinclined to disclose such potentially incriminating information due to social desirability bias, researchers have been able to undertake similar research with township residents without problems (e.g. Misago, 2017). In fact, Gordon (2020) has argued that social desirability bias on such questions may be quite minimal. However, we should be aware that there may be some underreporting of public participation on this kind of violence. The nationally representative SASAS 2020 survey results suggest that about a million adults admitted to recently committing a violent 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

Fig. 9.5 Total number of shops looted during incidents of xenophobic violence, 2005–2021 (Source Xenowatch [2022])

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Table 9.1 Adult population (thousands and %) who would take part in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in their neighbourhood Have done it in the past year Have done it in the more distant past Have not done it but might do it Have not done it and would never do it Can’t choose

2015

2016

2017

2018

2020

892 (2.41) 1272 (3.44) 4869 (13.16) 29,723 (80.34) 240 (0.65)

1224 (3.24) 2052 (5.43) 3827 (10.14) 30,087 (79.69) 565 (1.50)

355 (0.90) 1673 (4.24) 4592 (11.64) 32,510 (82.43) 310 (0.79)

804 (1.99) 2966 (7.35) 4468 (11.07) 31,319 (77.58) 815 (2.02)

944 (2.25) 3913 (9.33) 4563 (10.88) 30,915 (73.72) 1598 (3.81)

Note Percentage of total adult population in parenthesis Source SASAS 2015–2018; 2020

action against international migrants, and that nearly four million have committed such a crime in the more distant past. As can be seen from Table 9.1, public willingness to confess to participation in xenophobic violence tends to fluctuate somewhat over the period. Notwithstanding this trend, it appears to have increased somewhat between 2018 and 2020. Discouragingly, more than an eighth of the adult population (or about ten million adults) said that they had not taken part in such an action but would be willing to do so. That such a significant segment of the public would be prepared to take part in violent anti-immigrant action is a cause for concern. But, it is worth stating that in each round of surveying, a greater part of the adult populace claimed that they would never take part in anti-immigrant violence. This finding highlights the fact that a clear majority of South Africans reject xenophobic violence. Understanding the cause of a problem is essential to almost all decision-making. Indeed, it could be argued that such causal interpretations are at the heart of how many people think and behave. In both 2018 and 2020, SASAS respondents were asked the following question: ‘There are many opinions about why people take violent action against foreigners living in South Africa. Please tell me the main reason why you think this happens’. This question was open-ended which allowed survey participants to answer in their own words. When asked about the causes of anti-immigrant violence, ordinary members of the general public tend

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to give a wide range of answers (Table 9.2). More than half (56%) of the populace blamed the actions of international migrants for the violence in 2020. The most common of these stereotypes concerned lawbreaking and 27% of the adult populace attributed xenophobic violence to the criminal behaviour of international migrants in that survey round. A large share of the general public blamed the attacks on the alleged involvement of foreign nationals in the sale of illegal narcotics. Nearly a fifth (17%) of the adults said that xenophobic violence was a response to drug trafficking by foreigners. Economic-based explanations for xenophobia were popular amongst the general public. Almost a quarter (22%) of the general populace in 2020 attributed the violence to the way that foreign nationals allegedly stole jobs from locals. A small minority blamed the violence on general macro-economic conditions (e.g. poverty or unemployment), only 6% gave this answer in the last survey round. Nearly a fifth (19%) of the general public in 2020 provided explanations that centred on the perpetrator (i.e. perpetrator-based attributions). One of the most Table 9.2 Main reasons given to explain anti-immigrant violence in South Africa (multiple response) 2018 Victim-based Immigrants bring crime/sell drugs Economic practices of immigrants Other problems brought by immigrants Perpetrator-based Beliefs about immigrants Misinformation and Ignorance Emotional factors Environmental Macro-Economic conditions Criminals State authorities Other Miscellaneous (Don’t know) (Refused) Note Standard error in parenthesis Source SASAS 2018; 2020

2020

23% 23% 13%

(0.786) (0.781) (0.623)

27% 24% 15%

(0.789) (0.764) (0.633)

11% 3% 9%

(0.591) (0.320) (0.533)

7% 2% 11%

(0.441) (0.221) (0.569)

8% 7% 2%

(0.495) (0.482) (0.247)

6% 5% 1%

(0.427) (0.401) (0.183)

5% 3% 2%

(0.393) (0.339) (0.275)

6% 4% 4%

(0.438) (0.329) (0.344)

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common types of perpetrator-based answers concerned lay beliefs about international migrants (and their behaviours). Another frequently cited perpetrator-based attribute was emotion and 11% of the population put forward this explanation in 2020. Of all the emotions listed by respondents as main causes, jealousy or envy were the most frequent. The findings presented in Table 9.2 are consistent with research by Crush and Ramachandran (2015) on public attitudes towards the use of violence against immigrants. For a further discussion of the anti-immigrant stereotypes utilised to explain xenophobic violence see Gordon (2019b). Evaluating how public attitudes towards the cause of anti-immigrant violence changed between 2018 and 2020, we can detect very little variance between the two periods. It is interesting to note, however, that the tendency to blame violence on the criminal behaviour of immigrants has increased somewhat over the period. Overall, it would appear that a significant share of the general populace viewed xenophobic violence as a form of vigilantism. Empirical research has tended to find that vigilante actions are received quite favourably by the masses in South Africa. Gordon et al. (2021) found, for example, that more than half of all adults in the country thought that it was sometimes reasonable for individuals to take the law into their own hands. One of the primary reasons for this trend is, no doubt, the country’s poor and inadequate law enforcement systems.2 If law enforcement institutions (such as the police) are viewed as illegitimate and ineffective then scholars expect the public to engage in vigilantism (for a review of this scholarship, see Nivette, 2016).

Elite Assessments of Anti-immigrant Violence In April 2019 more than a hundred non-nationals were displaced during xenophobic attacks at the Burnwood informal settlement in Durban. The displaced were fleeing angry crowds which had looted foreign-owned 2

There are, of course, other contributing factors that may explain widespread support for vigilante actions amongst the South African populace. The apartheid state, for example, utilised different forms of non-state policing to maintain control, popularising this kind of violence. Smith (2019) provides an assessment of the competing explanations with a focus on structural factors in poor and working-class communities.

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shops and businesses. When asked about the matter by the press then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu said she did not know what was causing these kinds of attacks. She commented: “Since 2008, we have not been able to get to the bottom of what is happening in South Africa and to stop this” (Mavuso, 2019). But how do official elites understand the drivers of anti-immigrant hate crime in South Africa? Political elites have offered a number of different interpretations of this kind of crime. There has been a tendency to blame the phenomenon on third parties (i.e. agents outside the body public). References are often made to unnamed criminals while at other times the idea of a shadowy “third force” perpetuating anti-foreigner violence for nefarious ends has been floated.3 Moving beyond conspiratorial mythmaking, political elites sometimes depict anti-immigrant violence as a response to the business practices of international migrants. An example of this kind of interpretation was evident when large-scale xenophobic violence broke out in Johannesburg in early September 2019 and then spread to other parts of Gauteng. As the violence escalated, ANC party spokesperson Pule Mabe said in a statement: “We urge relevant authorities to enforce by-laws and deal decisively against those who trade in counterfeit goods and conduct businesses illegally” (Petersen, 2019). His statement noted that “Our law-abiding citizens are understandably sick and tired of those who are breaking the moral fibre of our society by turning our kids into prostitutes and drug addicts”. He applauded police actions against foreign traders and firmly rejected insinuations that “our police or government is xenophobic” when they raid businesses owned by non-nationals. The state has sought to frame an (more or less) official interpretation of anti-immigrant hate crime as part of a general investigation into South African social cohesion. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) published the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (hereafter the NAP) on March 25, 2019. The NAP was the 3 Following anti-immigrant riots in Johannesburg during September 2019, for example, then ANC Secretary-General Ace Magashule told the press that the violence could be the work of “imperialist and colonial forces with a motive to isolate South Africans from the rest of the African continent” (Stone & Khumalo, 2019).

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product of a four-year process that began in the aftermath of xenophobic riots in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal between March and May 2015. The document acknowledged the reality of xenophobic violence in South Africa and builds on the work of earlier state-funded investigations into the matter. In outlining the causes of xenophobia in the country, the NAP makes repeated reference to the 2015 Ad Hoc Joint Committee on Probing Violence Against Foreign Nationals (PVAFN) and its report. Indeed, one of the central NAP proposals on xenophobia was to implement the recommendations of the PVAFN report. Put together by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces following a wave of anti-immigrant riots in early 2015, the PVAFN was chaired by Nozabelo Bhengu and Tekoetsile Motlashuping. The committee considered a number of oral and written submissions from areas affected by xenophobia as well as provincial government and civil society organisations. One of the most important submissions received by the PVAFN was from the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration (IMC). Appointed in April 2015, the mandate of the IMC was to deal with tensions between locals and the foreign nationals. The IMC submission identified the heavy influx of foreign nationals, poor socio-economic conditions and the unfair (and often illegal) practices of foreign-owned businesses as the principal causes of anti-immigrant violence (PMG, 2015a). The IMC recommended that the South African government needed to increase border security and pursue greater oversight of enterprises owned by non-nationals. The PVAFN released its final report in November 2015, and the document reiterates a number of negative stories about the migrant community. It states, for instance, that ex-military foreign nationals are a security risk to South Africa (PMG, 2015b). Concern was also expressed about the failure of foreign nationals living in urban areas to integrate into local communities. As regards non-nationals operating in the informal economy, the report was especially scathing. It accused foreignowned small businesses of unfair practices and engaging in iniquitous competition that damaged locals. It also stated that foreign shop owners were frequently involved in illegal activity (such as selling drugs). The PVAFN report recommended that further violence could be prevented by curbing migrants from operating in the informal sector and calling for

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increased regulation of foreign-owned businesses from the South African Police Services (SAPS). Law enforcement elites appear to perceive xenophobic violence as a form of vigilantism, a response to the unfair and unlawful actions of foreign nationals. Following this logic, SAPS frequently respond to collective attacks on international migrants by launching police campaigns that target the criminal behaviour of non-nationals. One of the most famous was Operation Fiela, which was launched to much fanfare in 2015. Involving SAPS as well as support from the military, the campaign was criticised for harassing foreign shop owners, ransacking foreign-owned properties and unfairly confiscating their goods.4 Despite these concerns, the campaign was relaunched in 2018 (rebranded Operation Fiela II) by then Police Minister Fikile Mbalula. According to a report by Gastrow (2018), this pattern has repeated itself since at least 2006. An African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) report found that non-nationals were repeatedly targeted and profiled by law enforcement (Edwards & Freeman, 2021). The APCOF report noted that law enforcement was reluctant to acknowledge the reality of anti-immigrant hate crime and some officers denied its existence.5

Organised Non-state Anti-immigrant Actions It is possible that the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic encouraged civil society to organise actions against immigrants operating in the informal economy. Anti-immigrant actions by the uMkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans (MKMVA) during late 2020 in the city of Durban 4

Reviewing legal judgments regarding migrant detentions, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) argue that SAPS routinely violates the rights of non-nationals. The post-apartheid SAPS tradition of ‘over-policing’ international migrants can be traced back to the 1990s. Human Rights Watch (1998) raised serious concerns about the treatment of non-nationals by law enforcement during that period. 5 SAPS has a poor record of arresting and convicting perpetrators of anti-immigrant violence. Consider, for instance, perpetrators of the May 2008 riots. A South African Human Rights Commission (2010) investigation into the riots noted the limited ability of the judiciary to arrest and convict of perpetrators of anti-immigrant hate crime. Indeed, the commission’s report noted that the system provided a significant level of impunity for perpetrators of anti-immigrant violence.

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provide support for this argument. The goal of the MKMVA campaign was to remove foreign enterprise owners and would assist locals to take their over businesses. Speaking to reporters, MKMVA spokesperson Carl Niehaus defended his campaign, saying that: “This is not xenophobia at all” (Simelane, 2021). In January and February 2021, attacks on foreign businesses in Durban occurred during marches organised by the MKMVA. Reporting on the unrest, SAPS Superintendent Zama Dlamini confirmed the attacks as “xenophobic”, telling reporters: “It emanates from young MKMVA members vandalising and assaulting foreign shop owners” (Singh, 2021a). MKMVA spokesperson Dumisani Thango denounced the attacks to the press and blamed it on “rogue elements” who had taken advantage of the situation (Singh, 2021b). He admitted that tensions could be brimming over because of recent raids by his members. The MKMVA example presented above fits within a pattern that we have seen before in South Africa. Local civil society (especially small-scale business associations) have traditionally played a key role in mobilising community members against non-nationals. Charman and Piper (2012) apply the concept of ‘violent entrepreneurship’ to understand this process, noting the close relationship between business and crime in many townships. They argue that local associations exploit community traditions of collective action (such as imbizos) to mobilise popular anger. These groups typically utilise boycotts, demonstrations and public threats through letters or by radio (also see Crush & Ramachandran, 2015). The initial goal is often to force foreign traders to leave the community through the use of threats rather than direct violence. However, much like with the MKMVA campaign, events can quickly escalate and become violent. This issue was noted during community-based research by Misago (2017). The work noted that violent entrepreneurship is particularly an issue when community leadership structures are weak or divided. The fact that the MKMVA campaign against foreign shop owners turned violent is not unusual. There is a robust correlation between involvement in peaceful organised anti-immigrant activities (e.g. boycotts and demonstrations) and participation in xenophobic violence. Research by Gordon (2019a) found that past and potential involvement

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in violent behaviour was strongly correlated with previous participation in peaceful anti-immigrant activity. This finding demonstrates that xenophobic violence cannot be adequately understood independently of other forms of anti-immigrant activity. The fact that such activities are regularly launched and coordinated through non-profit organisations (such as MKMVA) demonstrates the ‘dark side’ of social capital (and more specifically the state of associational life) in the South African context. Recent public opinion work by Gordon (2020) found that the frequency of associational involvement has a positive effect on public participation in a range of anti-immigrant activities. This outcome suggests that many local organisations encourage uncivil behaviour towards outgroups (such as foreign nationals) and help rally communities against them. The growth of anti-immigrant civil society organisations in South Africa predates the COVID-19 pandemic. Small local explicitly antiimmigrant organisations (such as the Forum 4 Service Delivery and People’s Revolutionary Movement) seem to have sprung up in the last few years to contest local politics. Local community leaders have long mobilised their constituencies against international migrants and used non-nationals as scapegoats for social and economic problems in their constituencies. The power of local leaders to mobilise anti-immigrant rhetoric and deflect popular anger is not a new phenomenon and was noted by research on township politics in a joint study by von Holdt et al. (2011). However, following the 2021 Local Government Elections (LGE), it is clear that many new small-scale aspirant political parties see targeting international migrants working in the informal economy as an effective way to connect with the electorate. Seeking to build a constituency amongst voters after the 2021 LGE, some politicians have sought to support organised anti-immigrant activities. A recent example of this process can be seen in the civilian actions undertaken by the Patriotic Alliance against foreign-owned shop owners in January 2022. Party leader Gayton McKenzie told reporters that his members would be visiting all shops owned by illegal international migrants (Nkanjeni, 2022). Almost 500 foreign-owned stores, mostly in Johannesburg, were targeted by his supporters. These actions are clearly following the precedent set by former mayor of the City of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba. He once staged a citizen’s arrest of a foreign-born

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informal trader, and championed police raids on international migrants working in the informal sector.6 Mashaba resigned as mayor in October 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic. He continues to maintain his stance on migrants, however, telling reporters: “I don’t want to live in a country where foreign nationals come and open hairdressing salons and spaza shops. No. Those opportunities are for South Africans” (Simelane, 2019).

Conclusion There is little evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially increased anti-immigrant activity in South Africa. Existing attitudinal trend data suggest that present levels of anti-immigrant sentiment are consistent with previous periods. Examples of anti-immigrant actions during the pandemic, upon close inspection, appear to be part of longstanding trends. This is not to suggest that the pandemic (and the large-scale macro-economic changes it wrought) have had no influence at all on xenophobic sentiments or behaviours. However, it would seem that anti-immigrant sentiment is far more resilient to large-scale macrolevel change than we might have imagined. As far as we can tell from the data available, the source of persistent levels of xenophobia in the country is structural. Consequently, if we want to redress prejudice directed at non-nationals working in the informal sector, we need to prioritise institutional change. Government statements about international migration, and its impact on society, need to be considered. According to the legitimacy model of attitude formation, anti-immigrant statements from state officials can further entrench xenophobia in the minds of the public (Campbell, 2012). Moreover, such statements can legitimatise organised non-state anti-immigrant actions. Regulatory policies that penalise non-nationals may also have the same function. There is a need to shift the policy focus away from penalising international migrants and towards immigrant 6

These raids were later described as “cruel, humiliating, degrading and invasive” as well as “constitutionally invalid” by the city’s high court (Broughten, 2020).

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integration. Rather than counterproductive policies that focus on criminalising foreign business owners, policymakers should be devising interventions that help international migrants integrate into local community structures. Interventions of this kind will incentivise the formation of pro-immigrant sentiments, reduce xenophobic violence and improve social cohesion. Immigrant integration programmes must be understood as interventions that assist non-nationals to achieve full participation in a host society. Countries with efficacious migrant integration policies provide labour market support to immigrants that is in line with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For a realisation of the SDGs, particularly SDG 8, for non-nationals in South Africa this requires qualification recognition, language training and even funding for migrant employment assistance. In addition, migrants need to be able to access their labour rights to prevent exploitation and find decent work. Interventions that could improve the situation include shorter procedures, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and greater assistance for victims. This can include legal aid so that immigrants can better access justice via the legal system. But in order for such interventions to be successful, foreign nationals must be protected from violent discrimination. Failure to judiciously punish perpetrators for anti-immigrant hate crime sends the signal that such actions have tacit sanction. Moreover, this failure empowers criminal networks within local communities and helps them spread. Unable to seek police protection, foreign traders are available for resource extraction by criminals, both in the form of extortion as well as more violent acquisitions (i.e. robberies). Resources, once extracted, can then be utilised to expand criminal operations, an expansion that will undoubtedly make locals more vulnerable to unlawful exploitation. In the absence of police protection, the only alternative to criminal exploitation is to acquire arms and retaliate. Such vigilante practices will only perpetuate and normalise everyday violence in poor and working-class communities. Vigilantism, as an instrument of social control, propagates a brutal, patriarchal and hierarchical community structure, one that will promote intergroup conflict.

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Data Availability The data used in the current study is both publicly available and non-curated. The publicly available data is available from the Human Sciences Research Council: http://curation.hsrc.ac.za/Datasets-TAA MAA.phtml. Institutional access and permission to use the non-curated data was granted by the Human Sciences Research Council upon request.

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Simelane, B. (2019, September 5). Action SA’s Herman Mashaba: Unapologetic about stance on foreigners and driven to wear Joburg’s mayoral chain again. Daily Maverick. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-05-act ion-sas-herman-mashaba-unapologetic-about-stance-on-foreigners-and-dri ven-to-wear-joburgs-mayoral-chain-again/ Simelane, B. (2021, Feburary 5). More foreign-owned shops attacked and looted in Durban. Daily Maverick. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/202102-02-more-foreign-owned-shops-attacked-and-looted-in-durban/ Singh, K. (2021a, March 8). Foreign nationals attacked, shops petrol bombed in Durban CBD. News24. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/ news/foreign-nationals-attacked-shops-petrol-bombed-in-durban-cbd-202 10308 Singh, K. (2021b, March 9). ‘We are distancing ourselves from all that happened’—MKMVA denounce xenophobic attacks in Durban. News24. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-are-distancing-our selves-from-all-that-happened-mkmva-denounce-xenophobic-attacks-in-dur ban-2021b0309 Smith, N. R. (2019). Contradictions of democracy: Vigilantism and rights in postapartheid South Africa. Oxford University Press. South African Human Rights Commission. (1998). Xenophobia: Braamfontein statement and national plan of action. South African Human Rights Commission. South African Human Rights Commission. (2010). Report on the SAHRC investigation into issues of rule of law, justice and impunity arising out of the 2008 Public Violence against non-nationals. South African Human Rights Commission. Stone, S., & Khumalo, J. (2019, September 16). Xenophobic mob rampages through Joburg. City Press. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-0808-xenophobic-mob-rampages-through-joburg/ von Holdt, K., Langa, M., Molapo, S., Mogapi, N., Ngubeni, K., Dlamini, J., & Kirsten, A. (2011). The smoke calls insurgent citizenship collective violence and the struggle for a place in the New South Africa. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Society. Xenowatch. (2022). Dashboard & statistics. Retrieved May 2, 2022 from https://www.xenowatch.ac.za/statistics-dashboard/

10 The Inclusion of International Migrants in the Informal Economy: From Policy to Practice Mamokete Modiba and Thobelani N. Mdluli

Introduction The informal economy plays a significant role in addressing poverty, unemployment and inequality, particularly in the global south. The informal economy takes various forms but informal trading is the most dominant and highly contested economic activity. There is a growing call to acknowledge the informal economy’s role in sustaining people’s livelihoods and contributing significantly to poverty, unemployment and M. Modiba (B) Gauteng City-Region Observatory, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa T. N. Mdluli School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Maharaj (ed.), Migrant Traders in South Africa, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21151-5_10

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inequality reduction (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; Masonganye, 2010). Scarcity of formal jobs and barriers of entry into the mainstream economy generally spur the participation of people in the informal economy. Globally, the inclusion of international migrants in the informal economy has received significant attention. Debates about the role and place of international migrants in the informal economy are taking place in South Africa, in the context of heightening hostility, particularly in big cities where competition for resources is rife. International migrants, like South Africans, generally resort to working in the informal economy as a way to sustain their livelihoods in the face of growing unemployment. However, their participation in the informal economy is often seen as a threat rather than an economic contribution (Skinner, 2018) and their businesses are sometimes excluded and demonised (Peberdy, 2016). Informal migrant workers are largely excluded from mainstream processes such as state planning, infrastructure budget allocation, economic development and social support (Quazi, 2011). This chapter aims to unpack the dynamics of international migrants’ inclusion in the informal economy in policy and practice in South Africa with a specific focus on Gauteng province. The focus on Gauteng is prompted by the province’s role in housing international migrants and offering employment opportunities. Gauteng is often cited as a province of migrants as it attracts foreign nationals who are in search of better socio-economic opportunities (Geyer & Thoka, 2019; Peberdy, 2013). According to Statistics South Africa’s Community Survey, half of all international migrants living in South Africa are found in Gauteng (Statistics South Africa, 2016). The Gauteng City-Region1 (GCRO) Quality of Life2 (QoL) survey (2020/2021)3 shows that 55% of respondents were born in Gauteng, 36% are internal migrants and 9% are born in another country (Ballard et al., 2021). There is also a large number of 1 GCRO is an urban research observatory created in 2009 through a partnership- between the Gauteng Provincial Government, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Johannesburg, Gauteng South African Local Government Association and local municipalities. 2 The survey is conducted every two years in the Gauteng province’s 529 wards and engages in face-to-face interviews with respondents aged 18 and above. The survey gathers information including the socio-economic dynamics of Gauteng residents, migration, access to services and satisfaction with government. 3 This iteration of the survey has 13 616 respondents in total.

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international migrants in townships, particularly those running informal businesses such as spaza shops. Gauteng has also developed a policy imperative to revitalise and modernise township economies and this is articulated through a number of strategies. Part of developing these policies is to address the “foreign migrant problem” that has resulted in competition over scarce resources and business opportunities. Drawing on a review of policy documents and documentary analysis, we show that there are regulatory frameworks that exist at the various spheres of government, with some guidance by international principles to achieve inclusive economies. While our focus is on South Africa (Gauteng in particular), we show that internationally, there is a growing call to acknowledge the role of the informal economy as a permanent feature of the economy and a poverty alleviation strategy and to create inclusive economies (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; ILO, 2015). We show that at the national sphere, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has provisions that protect the rights of participation of foreign nationals in the informal economy. Other regulations at this level mainly adopt anti-foreign migrant sentiments, which are echoed in Gauteng’s policies on township and informal economies. We argue that while the legal framework (particularly the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa) acknowledges and protects international migrants in the informal economy, this does not translate into other legislative frameworks and practice. Foreign nationals operating in the informal economy are generally marginalised and excluded and this is exemplified by the ways in which the government addresses their (specific) challenges. The main aim of this chapter is to study international migrants operating in the informal economy and to provide insights into the policies that migrant traders must follow when doing business in the South African informal sector. The chapter unpacks the participation of international migrants in the informal economy and their experiences of attempting to access government support measures during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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The Informal Economy and International Migrants The informal sector is essential to the economy since it provides employment for millions of people worldwide (Kraemer-Mbula & WunschVincent, 2016; Rogan & Skinner, 2017; Skinner & Watson, 2018). Due to a lack of institutional capital, many informal enterprises begin with loans from social networks (Canagarajah & Sethuraman, 2001; Cichello et al., 2005). In the South African context, approximately 4.9 million people were employed in the informal economy in the first quarter of 20184 (SALGA, 2018). The informal economy is an important job creation avenue in cities of the global South, which are confronted by the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Compared to other countries of the Global South, the South African informal economy is relatively small but employs a third of the workforce (Peberdy, 2018). According to Moagi et al. (2020), over 60% of the world’s employed population works in the informal economy, with Africa accounting for 85.8%. Medina et al. (2017) estimate that South Africa’s informal sector accounts for 20–25% of the total economy. According to an economic breakdown of the informal economy by clustering, the informal sector accounts for 90% of employment in developing countries and 67% in emerging countries. The informal economy accounts for only 18% of total employment in developed countries, which is less than that of developing countries and nearly four times less than that of emerging economies (ILO, 2018). Mbatha (2020) notes that 1% of migrants entering South Africa helped contribute 0.2% to the employment of South African citizens. The outcomes were linked to the fact that South Africans do not compete for the same jobs. International migrants’ businesses are likely to grow and create employment opportunities for locals because they are more entrepreneurial and have a different set of skills than South Africans. Although the role of the informal economy is known and acknowledged to some extent, there are still some challenges associated with it. 4

These calculations are based on the Quarterly Labour Force Survey of the first quarter (Q1) of 2018.

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These challenges include a contradictory regulatory environment, access to adequate infrastructure and services, lack of enterprise support, inadequate organisation and representation of informal workers and social inclusion and protection (SALGA, 2018). The regulatory framework, which tends to be repressive and contradictory, remains one of the critical issues confronting the informal economy. There is an increasing focus on finding progressive ways of regulating the informal economy such that it is supported and nurtured. This progressive sentiment, particularly at the national level of government, has manifested in policy developments that have been confronted by conflicting rationalities at various spheres of government (Fourie, 2018; Skinner, 2018). There is an apparent fragmentation of policies and programmes related to the informal economy at the various spheres of government as well as between policy documents (Rogerson, 2015). ILO (2018, p. 2) argues that “a detailed analysis of local, provincial and national policy responses to the informal sector in the post-apartheid period concluded this has been a mix of ambiguity, omission, but also repression”. This means that the environment within which informal actors operate is not adequate and conducive for their efforts. Sidzatane and Maharaj (2013) discovered that certain government departments perceive street traders as a problem that must be controlled rather than as production models that contribute significantly to the urban economy, which explains why certain sites for informal traders have been left in deplorable conditions. The South African informal economy accounts for a large share of the labour force and the major contributing factor to its growth is migration (Peberdy, 2016; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). Sidzatane and Maharaj (2013) show that migrants from various countries including Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Senegal move to South Africa and primarily work as merchants in the informal economy. Peberdy (2013, p. 1) argues that Gauteng is “a province of migrants5 ”, and international migrants move to big cities such as Johannesburg in search of better socio-economic opportunities (Peberdy, 2016). The most significant sending country of foreign migrants in Gauteng is Zimbabwe, followed by Mozambique, Lesotho 5 In this context, migrants refer to both South Africans coming to Gauteng from other provinces and foreign nationals migrating into Gauteng from other countries.

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and Malawi (ibid.). Although international migrants constitute a fairly low proportion of Gauteng residents, they are more likely to operate in the informal economy (ibid.). Of those who reported working in 2020/21, over half (52%) of international migrants reported working in the informal economy compared to a third (33%) of those born in Gauteng and less than a third (32%) of migrants from other provinces in the country (ibid.). The participation of migrants in the economy, particularly in the informal sector has received massive policy attention in recent years, especially in the face of nation-wide xenophobic attacks (Crush et al., 2015; Mukoswa, 2020). Laher (2008, p. 2) defines xenophobia as “resentment or fear of foreigners, immigrants and refugees alike, by residents of a particular country”. Olijo (2015, p. 132) shows that “xenophobia in South Africa is not really about fear and dislike of foreign nationals, but rather about South Africans establishing intense pressure and violence towards African immigrants”. Laher (2008) observes that xenophobia in South Africa takes a different form, since it is mainly directed at Black migrants from other African countries, as compared to Asians, Europeans, or Americans, who are generally accepted. Several foreign businesses in South Africa also recently faced xenophobic attacks. A few of the attacks contributed to the looting of shops owned by foreign nationals as well as the torturing and murdering of shop owners (Olijo, 2015). Despite the hostility foreign nationals face in South Africa, there is evidence that international migrants play a productive role in the economy. The increased attention on international migrants in policy is in part due to the arising issues related to their participation and the (perceived) role they play in the economy and the generally negative perceptions by local authorities and the public at large. Crush et al. (2015) argue that although the numbers of international migrants are often exaggerated, it is clear that they have played an increasingly important role in the informal economies of South African cities over the last two decades and have shaped the nature of informality and entrepreneurship in the region. The positive role of migrants in the South African economy is acknowledged by national government policy documents. The National Planning Commission (2012, p. 252) states that “migrants have played an important role in South Africa’s economic development and regional

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integration since the late nineteenth century and it is likely that this trend will continue”. The GCRO Quality of Life Survey 2017/2018 and 2020/2021 reveal that international migrants are more likely to report owning a business than South Africans (Ballard et al., 2021; de Kadt et al., 2019). In the 2017/2018 survey, the proportion of international migrants in Gauteng who reported owning businesses was nearly a quarter (24%), with most of them operating in the informal economy (de Kadt et al., 2019). By contrast, only 12% of respondents born in Gauteng, and 11% of those who have migrated to Gauteng from other provinces reported owning a business (ibid.). While the proportion of international migrant-owned businesses decreased by two percentage points in 2020/2021 to 22%, this was still the highest compared to 15% of Gauteng born residents and 14% of internal migrants. This illustrates the contribution that international migrants make in the economy through entrepreneurship development. Various studies show that international migrant-owned businesses provide employment opportunities to some South Africans. A study conducted in Cape Town by Kalitanyi (2007) shows that 96% of migrant shops employed South Africans. Another study conducted in Cape Town on migrant-owned shops show that 48% of those employed are South African (Tengeh, 2012). In eThekwini, Durban, a study reveals that international migrants operating in the informal economy are more likely to employ locals than South African-owned businesses (Skinner, 2015). Evidence from other studies show that migrants pay rent largely to South African property owners or the municipality. One study with 500 international migrants owning businesses in Johannesburg shows that 43% reported paying rent to South Africans or the City council and are part of value chains that contribute to the economic make-up of the country (Peberdy, 2016; Skinner, 2015). For instance, international migrants source goods from South African-owned wholesalers and supermarkets. In a study conducted in Johannesburg, Peberdy (2016) shows that 41% of international migrants sourced their stock from wholesalers, 27% from factories and 17% from supermarkets. From the various research endeavours at various scales and contexts, it is evident that international migrants make considerable contributions to the South African economy in diverse ways. However, their

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role in the informal economy is not viewed as an economic contribution but rather as a threat and therefore criminalised (Crush et al., 2015; Skinner, 2018). Crush et al., (2015, p. 3) argue that since the postapartheid era, “migrant entrepreneurs have been consistently portrayed by the government and media as unwanted parasites”. The dominant view of international migrants, informed by generally negative perception, often manifests in anti-migrant sentiments by authorities and the public, driving punitive practices towards them.

Regulatory Framework As stated earlier, the informal economy faces a number of issues, in particularly inadequate regulatory frameworks at the various spheres of government. Rogerson (2015) argues that informal economy policy development has been on the national government agenda since the advent of democracy. The policy commitments to support informal economies have at best been “rhetorical” with no real change for actors in the space (ibid.). At the international level, there is growing recognition of the role and place of the informal economy in cities of the global south and the need to create inclusive regulatory frameworks that support the sector and its participants. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which culminated in 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), advocates for nations to adopt inclusive developments in order to achieve “peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future” (United Nations Development Programme, 2015). The SDGs, which are global goals for attaining sustainable development (balancing environment, social and economic aspects) provide policy guidance to nations across the world. While there are 17 SDGs in total, Goal 8 (Inclusive and sustainable economic growth and decent work) and Goal 10 (Reducing inequalities “leave no one behind” and inclusion of vulnerable groups and international migrants included as part of group) are the most relevant for our purposes. The International Labour Organisation’s Recommendation 204 (R204) is a regulatory framework at the international level, which facilitates the transitioning of informal economy towards formalisation. The R204 recognises that the majority

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of people participate in the informal economy because they cannot find opportunities in the formal sector. This policy has an aspect that focuses on the inclusion of vulnerable groups in society and migrants are specifically mentioned. The policy states that the rights of migrant workers should be acknowledged and protected. Moreover, the R204 states that “labour migrate on policies that take into account labour market needs and promote decent work and the rights of migrant workers” (ILO, 2015). At the national level, the policy emphasis is on the informal economy as a poverty alleviation and job creation avenue, with particular focus on small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) (SALGA, 2018; Van der Heijden, 2012). There are multiple regulatory frameworks at various spheres of government, with provisions that are sometimes contradictory. The state is caught between poverty alleviation imperatives through encouraging the informal economy and managing streets so that they conform to “global cities” standards. This has resulted in a disjuncture between initiatives at the national, provincial and local spheres of government (Van der Heijden, 2012). This effectively provides loopholes and leaves room for officials to selectively adopt provisions. The government’s rising policy attention is in part due to the increasing participation of international migrants in the country’s informal economy (Rogerson, 2015). The role of migrants in the economy generally and the informal economy in particular has received inadequate policy support (Skinner & Haysom, 2016). There are fragmented policy stances on the participation of foreign nationals in the informal economy, but the dominant sentiments are anti-foreign migrants, which drive punitive practices. At the national level, the relevant regulatory frameworks that address the issue of international migrants and their participation in the informal economy include the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996), 2012 National Development Plan, 2013 Draft Licensing of Business Bill, 2014 National Informal Business Upliftment Bill and the 2020 South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan. Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, gives citizens the right to choose one’s trade, occupation or profession (Republic of South Africa, 1996). This right is applicable to citizens of the country and legal international migrants operating in the informal sector (SERI, 2018).

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In addition to Sect. 22, there are four other provisions in the Constitution, which afford international migrants rights to participate in the informal economy. These include the (i) the right to dignity (all peoples in South Africa have the right to work, to earn a living in order to avoid destitution), (ii) respect for the rule of law (municipal conduct including policies, laws, actions must be guided by the Constitution and relevant laws), (iii) promotion of administrative justice (requiring municipalities to take decisions in a manner that is substantively reasonable and procedurally fair i.e. granting licenses) and (iv) respect for property rights (the deprivation of property can only be lawful if it is not arbitrary, that is, authorised by law, procedurally fair, and implemented for sufficient reason) (SERI, 2018). The South African Courts, through various judgments,6 have found that the right to human dignity is directly linked to one’s ability to participate in and carry out informal work (SERI, 2018). SERI (2018) argues that these Constitutional provisions extend to international migrants who are awaiting confirmation of their status through the activation of Sect. 10 (the right to human dignity) of the Constitution (ibid.). Therefore, because of various court rulings, the same provision protects foreign nationals who are in the country illegally. The 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) is a national roadmap directing development while focusing on reducing poverty and inequality and creating jobs. The plan acknowledges the role of the informal sector’s retail and business services in the economy. It states that “in South Africa, the formal retail sector accounts for almost 2 million jobs, and another 3 million jobs exist in informal activities” (NPC, 2012, p. 151). According to this strategic document, migrants that form part of the vulnerable groups include “women, children, rural communities, gay and lesbian people and African immigrants” and they “should enjoy equal protection and their vulnerability to be addressed through effective and coordinated responses by the police, business, community and civil society” (ibid., p. 470). The document goes on to state the positive roles that migrants can continue playing in the South African economy. “If properly managed, migration can fill gaps in the labour market 6 For examples of such court cases and judgments, see SERI. 2018. Informal Trade in South Africa: Legislation, Case Law and Recommendations for Local Government. Available: http:// www.salga.org.za.

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and contribute positively to South Africa’s development. Energetic and resourceful migrant communities can contribute to local and national development, and diverse, cosmopolitan populations are often the focus of cultural, economic and intellectual innovation. If poorly managed, however, the skills and potentials of migrants will be neglected. Migration will remain a source of conflict and tension, and migrants will be increasingly vulnerable, subject to continued abuse, exploitation and discrimination” (ibid., p. 105). In light of these challenges, the strategy proposes “South Africa will need to adopt a much more progressive migration policy in relation to skilled as well as unskilled migrants, and should better plan for rapid urbanisation. This can only be done if there is sufficient data on the movement of people within the country and on those entering the country” (ibid., p. 97). The state also needs to effectively address “the rights and vulnerabilities of migrants, ensuring better and more consistent law enforcement (by protecting victims and prosecuting perpetrators, addressing the specific need of migrants in South Africa” (ibid., p. 107). The 2013 draft Licensing of Business Bill emphasises regulation of the informal economy and every business, regardless of size, is required to register and obtain business licence from local government (Department of Trade and Industry, 2013). One of the aims of the Bill is to “provide for a simple and enabling framework for procedures for application of business licenses by setting national norms and standards” (ibid., p. 5). The draft Business Licensing Bill was criticised for a number of issues including the increase in red tape of acquiring business licences especially for micro enterprises. It was also largely criticised for its antimigrant sentiments. Section 6 (e) of the Bill states that “if the applicant is a foreigner, such application must be accompanied by a valid business permit issued under the Immigration Act, 2002 and other valid documentation required to verify the status of such a foreigner in the Republic issued under the Immigration Act, 2002 or the Refugees Act, 1998” (DTI, 2013). This provision restricts international migrants because they can only be licenced if they have secured a business licence under the Immigration or Refugee Act in their host countries. Section 24(a) states that “the licensing authority may not issue a license to any person who is an illegal foreigner prohibited or undesirable person in the Republic as

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defined in the Immigration Act or Refugee Act or any other legislation” (ibid, p. 15). This provision contradicts Sect. 10 of the Constitution on human dignity and Sect. 22, which protects people’s right to choose their trade, occupation or profession, a right that SERI (2018) argues extends to illegal migrants. According to the Bill, international migrants also must demonstrate that they have R2.5 million to invest in the country before they can be issued licences. Crush et al., (2015, p. 16) argue that “few, if any, cross-border traders and migrant entrepreneurs currently operating in the South African informal economy would qualify”. The 2014 National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) is the first post-apartheid legislation created specifically for regulating the South African informal economy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2014; Rogerson, 2015; Skinner, 2014, 2018). The strategy acknowledges the role of the informal economy and the structures required to support entrepreneurs so that they can contribute meaningfully to the economy. Overall, the strategy is regarded as progressive in so far as it acknowledges the role and place of informal economies in the country with some inclusive guiding principle (Rogerson, 2015; SALGA, 2018; Skinner, 2018). In line with the 2013 draft Licensing of Business Bill, NIBUS also contains anti-migrant sentiments. The strategy notes a foreign trader challenge and states that “there is evidence of violence and unhappiness of local communities with regard to the takeover of local business by foreign nationals, and that there are no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners” (DTI, 2014, p. 22). The prevailing sentiment that international migrants have taken over the economy and “steal jobs from South Africans” (Crush et al., 2015, p. 6) is yet again evident in this strategic document. In NIBUS, DTI (2014) refers to and hails the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act (2013) reserving certain economic activities to citizens only. NIBUS states that the Ghana Act “has reserved the sale of any goods in a market, petty trading and hawking, and the operation of metered taxis, car hire services, beauty salons and barber shops to nationals only” (DTI, 2014, p. 22). This is a clear indication of the direction taken by the government on the participation of international migrants in the informal economy. Rogerson (2015, p. 184) argues that “NIBUS is a pro-development approach for South African informal entrepreneurs which is allied to an

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anti-developmental agenda towards migrant entrepreneurs”. This reinforces the generally punitive approach to the informal sector and the participation of international migrants in it (SALGA, 2018; Skinner, 2018). The South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (SAERRP) (2020) aims to promote equitable and inclusive growth while addressing some of the structural issues in the economy to unlock development (South African Government, 2020). While the plan does not specifically focus on the informal economy, there are sections that speak about support for “informal SMMEs”. According to the plan, action will be taken in “reviewing and integrating government support for formal and informal SMMEs, start ups and cooperatives, including removing red tape and reducing timeframes for relevant licenses and permits to improve the ease of doing business” (ibid., p. 34). The plan highlights the importance of “protection of low income workers, the unemployed and vulnerable groups” (ibid., p. 8) including “promoting greater participation by black people, women, youth and persons with disability at all economic levels” (ibid., p. 15). There is, however, no specific mention of international migrants and how they will be supported through government interventions. In the COVID-19 context, the issue of the inclusion of international migrants in receiving vaccinations was given centre stage. During the outbreak of the pandemic, international migrants, particularly undocumented ones were not eligible to receive the vaccination in South Africa (Ntengento, 2021). After extensive consultation and assistance from non-profit organisations, the government is administering vaccines to international migrants, including the undocumented. According to the Department of Health (2021) a large number of foreign nationals in South Africa have expressed gratitude for the opportunity to vaccinate. According to Cassim (2021), the government, with the assistance of non-profit organisations, is providing the vaccination to the country’s estimated 2 million illegal residents in an effort to halt the spread of the coronavirus. Numerous people could not be vaccinated because they lacked the necessary identification but this changed as a result of the lobbying efforts of non-profit organisations. NOAH CAN, a non-profit organization, recently arranged for vaccinations to be administered at a

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Johannesburg shelter. A document issued by the Department of Health (2021) demystifies some of the common misconceptions associated with vaccinations and international migrants. One of those myths is that undocumented international migrants who try to be vaccinated will be deported back to their home countries. At the provincial level, with a specific focus on Gauteng, a number of important policies have been created in the informal economy domain, in particular to regulate economic activities in the townships. Townships have become spaces where international migrants dominate the informal economy, particularly the spaza shop economy. The 2014 Gauteng Township Economies Revitalisation Strategy (GTERS) was introduced as part of the government’s imperative to revitalise, modernise and reindustrialise townships. The strategy builds from existing government programmes to address issues of poverty, unemployment and inequality (Gauteng Department of Economic Development, 2014). Through this strategy, government attention is steered towards reconceptualising townships as mere residential areas to vibrant and productive urban spaces. There are several instances in the strategy where international migrants are made mentioned in generally negative terms. The strategy states that “the entrepreneurs who have thrived in the township before through trading activists in both formal and informal settings have been chocked off by the influx of foreign national entrepreneurs in the traditional township economic activities” (GDED, 2014, p. 12). The strategy makes the assertion that foreign nationals have crowded township spaces and taken over businesses that were dominated by South Africans. The strategy goes on to say that “informality has allowed, for example, the domination of township business like spaza shops by foreign nationals” (GDED, 2014, p. 19). This is a strong statement that relates to the sentiment that international migrants take away opportunities from locals. The issue of competition between South Africans and international migrants is also highlighted by the strategy. According to the strategy, the majority of the township enterprises “suffers from diseconomies of scale hence the ongoing vigilante uprising against non-South Africans. This has made them to be uncompetitive and many of them have either been crowded-out by shopping malls in the township and have suffered from hostile take-over by foreign entrepreneurs” (GDED,

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2014, p. 13). The competition between citizens and migrants is not viewed in productive terms that might spark innovation and collaboration. Instead, it is used to explain and justify the ongoing hostility and violence against international migrants. In order to deal with the “foreign migrant problem”, the strategy proposes the creation of “special regulatory measures [to] apply to microenterprises like spaza shops owned by foreign nationals in the townships” (GDED, 2014, p. 20). The informal economy is already confronted by an unconducive regulatory framework that stifles economic activities (Skinner, 2018). The proposal to create “special regulatory measures” for international migrant-owned enterprises adds another layer of exclusion. Following from NIBUS, the Gauteng government developed the Gauteng Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (GIBUS) in 2015 to address issues related to the informal economy in the province (GDED, 2015). The strategy aims “to promote inclusive economic growth and radically transform the Gauteng provincial economy such that the informal business sector is awarded the support that allows it to thrive and become more productive, competitive, profitable and able to create employment opportunities for others” (GDED, 2015, p. 10). The document makes mention of international migrants in the province in various parts of the strategy. The strategy argues that there is an “influx of foreign nationals” (GDED, 2015, p. 30) in the informal economy of Gauteng with “high occupancy of trading areas by illegal foreign nationals” (ibid., p. 33), presenting unfair competition to South Africans. The competition for trading spaces results in hostility towards international migrants and conflicts with South Africans (GDED, 2015). The migrants are also accused of flouting existing regulations in place by municipalities. “Foreign nationals also do not seem to observe by-laws as it is found that some of them use the same structure (building or shipping container) as a shop and also as sleeping ablution quarters. This is against health and safety standards of any by-laws” (GDED, 2015, p. 16). In light of the competition for trading spaces among citizens and internationals migrants, GIBUS recommends that municipalities use a quota system for allocation purposes. The strategy states that “each municipality needs to apply a quota system for allocating trading infrastructure

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and facilities whereby 95 per cent of trading infrastructure and facilities is prioritised for South African citizens. The remaining 5 per cent can be allocated to the legal foreign nationals with proper and legal documentation” (GDED, 2015, p. 50). The Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Home Affairs are encouraged through the strategy to work hand in glove in devising ways to control international migrant-owned businesses in the informal economy. The anti-immigrant sentiments are also echoed in this document. A recent policy development in the province is the 2020 Gauteng Township Economic Development Bill. During its inception, the Bill was aimed at creating an enabling environment, through governance and regulation, for the development of township enterprises (GPG, 2020). This is in line with the Gauteng Province’s vision to revitalise, modernise and reindustrialise townships in an effort to recreate them as productive economic spaces. Overall, the Bill contributes to the broader national vision of supporting enterprises in order to contribute to economic growth. While the Gauteng Township Economic Development Bill (2020) is hailed for being progressive as it portrays an extensive understanding of issues confronting townships, it was highly criticised for excluding international migrants (Mkentane, 2020; Omarjee, 2020; Pheto, 2020). Chapter 3 of the Bill deals with the reservation of economic activities for citizens and migrants with permanent residency status (GPG, 2020, p. 11). The Bill reserves certain business sectors within townships including wholesale and retail trade, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transport, community and social and personal services for citizens only. In essence, international migrants will not be permitted to operate in these sectors of the economy. After its introduction in 2020, there have been several opportunities for various stakeholders to make input in order to make the regulation inclusive. The Bill was revised and adopted as the Gauteng Township Economic Development Act in March 2022. The provision to reserve certain economic activities for South Africans and migrants with permanent residency was omitted from the Act. However, the Act prioritises the provision of “financial assistance to enterprises which are fully or partially owned by South Africans, who were previously and are currently economically disadvantaged” (Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 2022, p. 9).

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The Growing Gauteng Together (GGT) 2030 was adopted in 2020 to boost the province’s economy amid the COVID-19 pandemic. GGT 2030 places emphasis on the economy, jobs and infrastructure, with the manufacturing sector identified as a key driver (Global Africa Network, 2020). The strategy acknowledges that informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is also a key contributor to regional trade and retail economies throughout the region, which is instrumental in poverty alleviation (GPG, 2020). While there is acknowledgement of the contribution of international migrants to the South African economy, the strategy notes negative sentiments about them by Gauteng residents. Extremely worrying were some of the responses to questions pertaining to international migrants in Gauteng in the GCRO’s 2015/2016 QoL Survey with strong negative attitudes expressed towards foreign nationals. Some 23% of respondents agreed with the statement that: “Gauteng should be for South Africans only. They must send foreigners back to their countries” (Ballard & Hamann, 2018, p. 3). The strong negative perceptions of foreign nationals demonstrate the stark reality of xenophobia that exists in the province. While GGT touches on the state of xenophobia in Gauteng and residents’ attitudes towards international migrants, it does not share plans of how the issues will be addressed and how they will be included. At the city level, the City of Johannesburg approved an informal trading policy in April 2022, which addresses the issue of international migrants more explicitly. The policy states that “the right to human dignity (which is granted to “everyone”) also protects foreign nationals’ right to participate in informal trade. In essence, municipalities cannot prevent foreign nationals from participating in informal trade” (as long as foreign traders follow and comply with the laws of the country) (City of Johannesburg, 2022, p. 13). This provision is in line with the Constitution of South Africa which upholds the rights of everyone including foreign migrants. When applying for trading permits, foreign migrants are required to submit “documentary proof of authorisation to carry on business as an Informal Trader that has been issued by the immigration authorities” (ibid., p. 25). This provision makes it clear that the Constitutional right applies only to documented international migrants who are

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in possession of valid documents from immigration authorities. Undocumented migrants will not be able to meet this requirement and will therefore not be allowed to trade. While the policy has some progressive provisions, the Member of Mayoral Committee for Economic Development, in a video on twitter stated that “we managed to pass the informal trading policy that we’ve been working on. What does it mean for you? What does it mean for South Africans? It means that trading spaces will be reserved for South Africans…we’re cleaning up the inner city, we’ve created stalls for trade and priority is going to our people. This is going to bring livelihoods back to our people that have been stolen for the longest time”.7 This shows the disjuncture between policy provisions that may be progressive and the actual practices on the ground that informs punitive implementation. The regulatory landscape pertaining to the informal economy and the participation of international migrants in the sector is fragmented across government spheres and agencies. Although the creation of these various policies at the national sphere was an important gain for the informal economy nationwide, it contributed to an already fragmented legislative landscape that impact the sector (Skinner, 2018). There are multiple laws at national and provincial spheres, mainly dealing with anti-migrant sentiments. This provides room for officials to manoeuvre and selectively adopt provisions that exclude international migrants for the most part and implement punitive practices towards them.

Experiences of International Migrants in the Informal Economy As stated in the previous section, there are issues related to the inadequate regulatory framework, which facilitates punitive practices against all informal economy actors (including both South Africans and foreign migrants). Added to the challenges affecting all informal economy actors, international migrants have to navigate a range of other challenges specific to their status as migrants (Crush et al., 2015; SALGA, 7

https://mobile.twitter.com/MMCforDED/status/1519045109442129922.

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2018). Scholars have extensively covered the specific challenges experienced by migrants in the informal economy in the pre-pandemic context (Crush et al., 2015; Fatoki, 2012; Gastrow, 2013; Gebre et al., 2011; Rogerson, 2015; Skinner, 2018). International migrants mainly experience disdain and hostility from both above and below. This manifests in various ways including heightening xenophobic attacks, looting of their businesses, lack of financial support, and government shifting the blame to foreign migrants for dominating the informal sector and forming monopolies that disable citizens from participating in the sector (Crush et al., 2015; Rogerson, 2015; SALGA, 2018). There are also specific issues confronting international migrants due to inconsistent regulatory frameworks and practices. For instance, there are tensions between documentation requirements by the Department of Home Affairs and local government departments that issue trading licences (SALGA, 2018). International migrants might meet the requirements of one entity while at the same time failing to satisfy those of another because there are inconsistencies inherent in the system. This inconsistency between government spheres and departments opens space for the adoption of punitive practices against international migrants such as police harassment, confiscation of goods and rent seeking. Skinner (2018) argues that the practices of officials are facilitated by policies that are ambivalent or contain anti-immigrant sentiments. This leaves room for authorities to interpret policies in ways that are punitive and exclusionary against international migrants operating in the informal economy. This often manifests in attacks by officials targeting foreignowned businesses, which in some cases have also spurred xenophobic attacks. Armed with an understanding of issues faced by international migrants in the informal sector in the pre-COVID-19 context, it is important to investigate how the pandemic has affected the experiences of these entrepreneurs. Existing inequalities within the South African labour market have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related containment measures. Various studies conducted in the COVID-19 context show how the pandemic has disproportionately affected the informal relative to the formal economy (African Union Labour Migration Advisory Committee, 2020; Espi et al., 2021; Francis et al., 2020; GTAC, 2020;

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ILO, 2020; Jain et al., 2020; Khambule, 2020; Komin et al., 2021; Lee et al., 2020; Maree et al., 2021; Narula, 2020; Rogan & Skinner, 2020; WIEGO, 2020). Some informal economy workers lost jobs, had salaries and working hours reduced, especially during the hard lockdown in March 2020 as part of government’s measures to contain the spread of the virus. While the pandemic affected the informal economy disproportionately to the formal economy, the effects are varied among informal actors. Evidence suggests that the outbreak of the world’s biggest health and socio-economic shock has highlighted and deepened existing vulnerabilities of international migrants in general and in particular those operating in the informal economy (African Union Labour Migration Advisory Committee, 2020; Balbuena & Skinner, 2020; ILO, 2020). Their exclusion through various mechanisms has continued to take place during the pandemic. For instance, migrants, like citizens, were required to obtain special trading permits from municipalities to operate during the hard lockdown. The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) (2020) states that “in the case of non-South African citizens, the business owner must (a) have been lawfully admitted into the Republic and must hold a valid passport with a visa issued by the Department of Home Affairs in terms of Sect. 10 of the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No.13 of 2002), authorising him or her to operate a business; or alternatively, hold an asylum seekers permit issued in terms of Sect. 22 of the Refugees Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998), which allows him or her to work”. The provisions of COGTA require international migrants to have valid documents in order to be eligible for trading permits application. The challenge with this requirement is that asylum seekers’ permits, requires renewal every three months and offices where renewals can be made were closed during lockdown. Asylum seekers who were not able to get their permits were excluded from applying for trading permits during lockdown as it was a key requirement by authorities. The provisions also clearly exclude undocumented foreign migrants in applying for trading permits, even though many would have been trading (without licenses) in the pre-pandemic period. This provision largely affected the ability of international migrants from generating incomes during the lockdown period, contradicting the Constitutional provision

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on human dignity. COGTA (2020, p.6) also states that “permission to operate the business will be linked to the period covered by the asylum seekers permit”. Asylum seeker permit is valid for three months and requires renewal, meaning that a special permit will be given for the same period pending renewal. The issue here is that departments where asylum seekers permits are renewed were closed during the March 2020 lockdown. Rogan and Skinner (2020) argue that this is a continuation of government’s long-term vision of getting rid of international migrants through stringent application requirements. They argue that through the application requirements, international migrants are systematically excluded from working in the informal economy. During the first peak of COVID-19 infections and following the government’s directives to place the country under lockdown that affected people’s employment, various relief programmes were announced by the President, with some targeting the informal sector. The COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress was implemented under the auspices of the Department of Social Development for a monthly amount of R350 (GTAC, 2020; Khambule, 2020; Moyo, 2020). This relief mechanism did not explicitly target informal economy actors but they could apply provided they can prove being unemployed. This support mechanism was initially directed at South Africans only and excluded international migrants. This was amended to include international migrants in April 2022 with specific requirements for eligibility. The Department of Social Development (2022, p. 11) states that “the monthly amount of the COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress is R350 per person and is payable for the months in the period 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2023”. “Foreign migrants eligible to apply for the Social Relief of Distress include refugees; holders of a special permit under the Special Angolan Dispensation, the Lesotho Exemption Permit Dispensation or the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit Dispensation; or an asylum seeker, whose Sect. 22 permit or visa is valid” (ibid., p. 6). Another measure by the government included slightly increasing the child support grant and other social grants to cushion recipients against the impacts of the pandemic. Again, this intervention did not explicitly apply to informal economy operators except those who were already benefiting from the scheme. International migrants did not qualify to

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benefit from this intervention as they are not eligible for social grants in the country. The Department of Employment and Labour introduced the Temporary Employers/Employee Relief Scheme (TERS) with a minimum of R350 paid monthly to qualifying beneficiaries. This was largely implemented to supplement incomes for those who lost jobs during the pandemic or had salaries reduced. This scheme did not cover informal economy actors and international migrants, as they are not registered for Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). The Spaza Support Scheme was introduced to support businesses that experienced reduction in sales (DSBD, 2020). The requirements8 to qualify for the relief fund focused largely on South African-owned businesses and those with some form of registration. The issue is that the requirements for eligibility of the funds are stringent and require formal documents which informal operators do not possess. The informal sector is mainly made up of jobs that are survivalist rather than growth-oriented and many do not meet the legal compliance (such as business financial records and tax clearance). Based on the requirements stated above, there are no provisions for international migrants as the scheme is targeted at businesses owned by South Africans. In a meeting held in April 2020, the issue of support to international migrant-owned spaza shops was raised and the response contradicted the existing requirements. DSBD stated that “businesses owned by foreign nationals would be assisted in the remaining 30% over and above the 70% prioritising South African businesses. This is because the right to trade is a preferential right. Informal businesses may get a permit to trade if they are documented foreigners, but priority would be granted to refugees. Asylum seekers did not currently stand to be assisted as their permits last only three months at a time” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2020). In this statement, it is evident that government does not consider supporting international migrants as a priority. In addition, the only international migrants to be 8

These include a valid South African ID document, valid and original municipal trading license/ permit to trade or business license in case of a general dealer (must be willing to accept assistance to register with CIPC, SARS and UIF), registered with Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), South African Revenue Services (SARS) and UIF, 100% owned by South African citizens (emphasis added) and employees must be 70% South Africans, be registered on the SMME database and have proof of business being negatively affected by COVID-19.

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assisted are documented ones and asylum seekers are completely excluded from obtaining support. Moyo (2020) argues that the above “reflects a system that prioritises the interests of the formalised sector in lieu of vulnerable informal workers”. With the above schemes largely criticised for excluding the informal sector, DSBD also launched support mechanisms to specifically benefit workers in this sector. One of the schemes launched was to support informal and micro restaurants, tshisanyamas 9 and fruit and vegetable traders (Ntshavheni, 2020). As of September 2020, a total of R135 million has been allocated to benefit fruit and vegetable sellers (as well as butcheries) nationwide. The total number of fruits and vegetable traders targeted was 40,594 for the entire country with variations between provinces. For instance, the target for Eastern Cape was 5,120 and 8,592 for Gauteng (ibid.). Since March 2020, DSBD also launched the Township and Rural Entrepreneurship programme (TREP) and a total of R40 million was set aside to support fruit and vegetable traders operating in townships and rural areas (DSBD, 2020). Qualifying informal traders will receive grants of R1,000 (South African Rand) each, which they will use to buy stock. As part of TREP, informal traders are required to register on the National SMME website (https://smmesa. gov.za/) and complete an online form to access small business funding. The requirements for registration include a valid South African identity document and municipal trading permit and there are no provisions made for international migrant informal traders. The COVID-19 relief measures to support the informal economy are largely concentrated at the national sphere of government and do not effectively trickle down to informal actors. Informal traders alleged that a month after the president announced relief measures, Gauteng traders have not received any support (Gasa, 2020). One of the Johannesburg-based informal trader organisation leader interviewed stated that “we were comforted when the State President announced that there will be a relief fund available for the informal sector but surprised when our leaders were not approached for engagement to deal with strategic planning on how the funding would 9

Tshisanyama, is a Zulu slang expression for ‘roasting meat for sale’, started off as a way for township butcheries to increase their sales.

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be arranged in order to get to the hands of the trader on the ground” (ibid.). A significant number of these support measures are focused broadly on SMMEs and this category often excludes informal traders. The support often comes with stringent requirements that are unattainable for informal enterprises or systematically exclude them. For instance, in order to apply for funding, CIPC certificate and tax clearance are required to meet the qualifying criteria. Informal traders do not have these documents and this results in their exclusion. International migrants remain the most vulnerable as they are largely excluded from accessing government support. While they were affected by the pandemic, there were no specific government support measures designed to assist international migrants. In instances where they were included in general informal economy relief programmes, the requirements were stringent and few if any qualified. Therefore, international migrants continue to be systematically excluded from accessing government financial support targeted at informal economy actors during the COVID-19 pandemic (ILO, 2020; WIEGO, 2020).

Conclusion The informal economy plays a significant role in addressing issues of unemployment, poverty and inequality inherent in the South African labour market. This part of the economy offers limited barriers of entry for many people especially the unskilled, retrenched, unemployed and migrants. The inclusion of international migrants in the informal economy has received attention globally and South Africa in particular. Migrants are generally vulnerable as laws and policies do not protect them and preference is given to locals in the informal economy. In instances where policy is conducive and protects the right of international migrants (i.e. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa), it does not translate into practice. Instead, international migrants are criminalised, victimised and not treated as important role players in the economy. The participation of international migrants in the informal economy has been met by hostility and disdain from both government

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and the public. This manifests in xenophobic attacks, looting of foreignowned businesses and removal and confiscation of goods. The situation has been exacerbated during the COVID-19 context where international migrants in the informal economy are largely excluded from accessing government support measures. Relief measures targeted at the informal economy have largely excluded foreign nationals from accessing support through stringent requirements. The stringent requirements systematically exclude international migrants from becoming eligible to access support. The anti-foreigner sentiments in regulatory frameworks are influenced by attitudes and perceptions of international migrants by officials. There is a need for a general focus on supporting the informal economy in general without focusing on nationality as this will ensure deep-rooted challenges in the sector are addressed. This will inform adequate support of those affected by crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic including international migrants. Restrictive policies on the informal economy also restrict South Africans and this ultimately affects the country’s economy. Policies should focus on the productive nature of competition between South Africans and foreign migrants that spark innovation and possible collaborations.

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