Metaphysical Disputations III and IV: On Being's Passions in General and Its Principles and On Transcendental Unity in General [1 ed.] 081323655X, 9780813236551

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METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS III AND IV

E A R LY M O D E R N C AT H O L I C S O U R C E S Volume 6

Editorial B oard Ulrich Lehner

Trent Pomplun

University of Notre Dame Series Editor

University of Notre Dame Series Editor

Paul Richard Blum

Susannah Monta

Loyola University Maryland

University of Notre Dame

Jorge ­Cañizares-Esguerra

Felipe Pereda

University of Texas at Austin

Harvard University

Wim DeCock

J­ ean-Louis Quantin

KU Leuven

École Pratique des Hautes Études (PSL)—Sorbonne

Simon Ditchfield University of York

Carlos Eire Yale University

Marco Forlivesi D’Annunzio University of ­Chieti-Pescara

Erin Rowe Johns Hopkins University

Jacob Schmutz Catholic University of Louvain

J­ ean-Luc Solère Boston College

Fr a n c i s c o Suá re z

METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS III and IV On Being’s Passions in General, and Its Principles and

On Transcendental Unity in General Translated and annotated, with corrected Latin text, by Shane Duarte

The Catholic Universit y of America Press Washington, D.C.

Copyright © 2023 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, AN SI Z 39.­48-1984. ∞ Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress Hardcover ISB N : 978-0-8132-3655-1 eBook ISB N : 978-0-8132-3656-8

For the adjuncts, the lecturers, and all the other members of the academic underclass

Contents Contents

C ONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix Introduction xi DM 3.1: The nature of being’s properties  xi DM 3.2: The number and order of being’s properties  xxviii DM 3.3: The principles by which being’s properties are   demonstrated and the principle of ­non-contradiction  xxxii DM 4: Transcendental unity vs. quantitative unity  xxxvii DM 4.1: What one adds to being  xli DM 4.2: Whether one formally signifies only what it   adds to being  lvi DM 4.3: The kinds or modes of unity  lix DM 4.4: The division of being into one and many  lxvi DM 4.5: The analogical character of being’s division   into one and many  lxviii DM 4.6: How one and many are opposed  lxx DM 4.7: The priority of the one in respect of the many, and the priority of indivision in respect of division  lxxiii DM 4.8: Whether the division into one and many is the   first division of being  lxxv DM 4.9: Whether transcendental unity is numerical unity  lxxvii

Remarks on the Latin Text and English Translation

lxxxiii

Latin Abbreviations

lxxxix

English Abbreviations

xciii

L ATIN TE X T A N D ENGLISH TR A NSL ATI O N Metaphysical Disputation III: On Being’s Passions in General, and Its Principles Section 1: Whether Being as Being Has Some Passions,   and of What Kind They Are  5

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viii Contents Section 2: How Many Passions of Being There Are,   and What Order They Observe among Themselves  29 Section 3: By Which Principles Passions Can Be Demonstrated   of Being, and Whether This Is the First among Them: It Is Impossible   for the Same Thing at the Same Time to Be and Not to Be  51

Metaphysical Disputation IV: On Transcendental Unity in General

71

Section 1: Whether Transcendental Unity Adds Some Positive   Character to Being, or Only a Privative Character  73 Section 2: Whether One Formally Signifies Only the   Negation That It Adds to Being, or Something Else  115 Section 3: How Numerous the Unities in Things Are  131 Section 4: Whether Unity Is an Adequate Passion of Being,   and Regarding the Division of Being into One and Many  163 Section 5: Whether the Division of Being into One and   Many Is Analogical  173 Section 6: How One and Many Are Opposed  183 Section 7: Whether One Is Prior to Many, and   Indivision to Division  191 Section 8: Whether the Division of Being into One   and Many Is the First of All  197 Section 9: Whether Transcendental Unity Is Numerical   Unity, or Which Unity It Is  217

Bibliography 243 Index 249

Acknowledgments

A c kno w ledg m ents

I would like to thank a number of people for their help with this and the two previous volumes that make up my translation of Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations I–IV. First, thanks go to Theresa Walker, Trevor Crowell, John Martino, and Brian Roach, all with The Catholic University of America Press, for their help over the last few years. I would also like to thank Anne Kachergis, of Kachergis Book Design, for her beautiful work. Many thanks also to Amy Quinn, copy editor extraordinaire, for her patient and meticulous work on all three volumes. Thanks again go to Stephen Dumont for his readiness to answer my inquiries about Scotus and other matters. To Christopher Shields I wish to express my deep gratitude for his expert help throughout much of this project, on everything from the intricacies of Aristotle’s texts to challenges posed by the Latin text of the Metaphysical Disputations, and also for his kind encouragement and careful feedback. I am fortunate to have him as a friend and colleague. Finally, my greatest debt is to my wife, Michelle Karnes, for her support and encouragement during the many years of this project.

ix

Introduction

Introduction

I ntrod u c tion DM 3.1: The nature of being’s properties On the Aristotelian conception of a theoretical science, every such science has an adequate subject or object (subiectum vel obiectum adaequatum), which is what that science is primarily about and that in relation to which all other things discussed in the science are considered. Indeed, according to Aristotle, the theoretical sciences are defined and individuated by appeal to their adequate subjects, so that each science receives its essential character and unity from its subject. The adequate subject of a science, moreover, is typically a genus, or something common, and the various inferiors of this genus or common thing can likewise count as subjects—though not adequate subjects—of the same science. Thus, physics, for example, is typically understood to have mobile being (ens mobile) as its adequate subject, but it also treats of various species of mobile being (e.g., plants and animals) as subjects as well. Viewed in terms of its content, a speculative science is conceived to be composed of demonstrations connected in such a way that the conclusions of some demonstrations serve as premises in others. These demonstrations are themselves composed of categorical propositions in which some predicate is affirmed to belong necessarily to some subject. The notion of a demonstration (demonstratio, ἀπόδειξις) is crucial here: strictly speaking, science (scientia, ἐπιστήμη), according to Aristotle, is cognition of the conclusion of a demonstration, and it is the kind of cognition that one has by virtue of possessing a demonstration.1 The indemonstrable premises on which all of a science’s conclusions ultimately depend, which are deemed explanatory of these same con1. Aristotle, Post. An. II, ch. 19, 100b5–17, Nic. Eth. VI, chs. 3 and 6.

xi

xii Introduction clusions, are called “principles” of that science, and cognition of them is not called “science,” but “understanding” (intellectus, νοῦς). Such a principle is cognized per se through a grasp of the immediate and necessary connection that obtains between its subject and predicate. On this conception, the demonstrations of which a science is composed all have as their conclusions propositions in which some property or characteristic is predicated necessarily and universally of some subject of the science. These characteristics—variously called “per se accidents” (per se accidentia, καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα),2 “properties” (propria, ἴδια),3 “passions” (passiones, πάθη),4 and “per se affections” (per se affectiones, καθ᾿ αὑτὰ παθήματα)5—form no part of the essence of the subject of which they are predicated, although they are standardly understood to emanate from, or to be necessary consequences and expressions of, their subject’s essence. A subject and its property are also commonly understood to be convertible or counterpredicated—in other words, where A is a subject and ­B-ness one of its per se accidents, it is the case both that every A is B and that every B is A. Standard examples of properties or per se accidents include (i) the capacity to laugh (risibilitas) in relation to the human being (all human beings are capable of laughing, and everything capable of laughing is a human being) and (ii) having internal angles equal to two right angles in relation to the triangle (all triangles have internal angles equal to two right angles, and everything possessed of internal angles equal to two right angles is a triangle). The first of Suárez’s metaphysical disputations is introductory and devoted to the science of metaphysics itself. Given the connection between a science’s essential character and its adequate subject, in this disputation Suárez is in the first place concerned to identify the adequate subject of metaphysics, which, he argues, is real being (ens reale) or being as real being (ens in quantum ens reale) (DM 1.1.26).6 In the 2. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 30, 1025a30–33. 3. Aristotle, Top. I, ch. 5, 102a18–30. 4. Aristotle, Post. An. I, ch. 10, 76b15. 5. Aristotle, Post. An. I, ch. 10, 76b13. 6. See Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics, trans. Shane Duarte (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021).

Introduction xiii



Second Disputation, Suárez focuses on the ratio or nature of being and explains in what this ratio consists (DM 2.4.4–7).7 The next nine disputations—DM 3 through 11—are primarily devoted to being’s properties: transcendental unity, truth, and goodness. In the Third Disputation, Suárez first broaches the topic of being’s passions or properties, treating of them generally. The Fourth Disputation treats of the first such property, transcendental unity. The Fifth Disputation treats of a particular instance of transcendental unity—individual or singular unity—while the Sixth Disputation treats of another instance of transcendental unity—formal unity. Since Suárez holds that unity involves indivision, while “multitude is caused by distinction or division, which denies unity” (DM 4, Introduction), the Seventh Disputation is devoted to the various kinds of distinction. The Eighth Disputation is concerned with the second of being’s properties, transcendental truth, taking up also the question of how this sort of truth—truth in being (in essendo)—is related to truth in signification (in significando) and the truth of cognition (in cognoscendo). The Ninth Disputation treats of falsity, asking, among other things, whether falsity is found in things. The Tenth Disputation deals with transcendental goodness, and the Eleventh Disputation addresses evil, asking, among other things, whether there are any positive evils, or whether, as the treatment of transcendental goodness might be taken to imply, evil is invariably to be understood as a privation of being. Suárez understands being and its properties to be “transcendentals” (transcendentia), which were standardly taken to be a special concern of metaphysics.8 Unlike Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308), who classifies as transcendental any predicate which is not contained under one of the ten Aristotelian categories of being—including those which can truly be said of God alone (e.g., infinite) and supposedly univocal predicates that can truly be affirmed of God and some creatures (e.g., wise)9— 7. See Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation II: On the Essential Concept or Concept of Being, trans. Shane Duarte (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2023). 8. For a discussion of the transcendentals and their place in scholastic Aristotelian thought, see Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012). 9. On Scotus’s conception of the transcendentals, see Scotus, Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, ns. 113–15, in John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 4 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis

xiv Introduction Suárez subscribes to the standard p ­ re-Scotist view that a transcendental predicate transcends the categories by virtue of being predicable of every thing or being. Indeed, although one transcendental is predicable of another, according to Suárez, nothing is predicated of a transcendental in the way a superior is predicated of an inferior (DM 2.2.33). In other words, they are themselves the most common predicates. Since, however, Suárez understands the transcendentals to be predicated analogically of things, they do not count as universals in the strict sense (which requires every universal to be a predicable, i.e., a genus, species, difference, property, or accident), although in a loose sense and in a certain respect they can be termed universals in accordance with a conception of the universal as that which is one and common to many.10 The application of Aristotle’s conception of a theoretical science to metaphysics is standardly understood to give rise to a number of problems.11 One such problem comes into focus at the very beginning of DM 3.1 (entitled “Whether being as being has some passions, and of what kind they are”). Here Suárez lists four conditions that must be satisfied by the properties that a science demonstrates of its subject: (1) the property itself must be some thing (res); (2) it must in some way be distinct in reality—or “distinct ex natura rei”—from its subject, for if it is not, it will instead be, or pertain to, the essence of the subject; (3) the property must be convertible with its subject, since only this kind ­ on-essential characteristic admits of demonstration; and (4) the of n subject cannot belong to the essence of the property, for although a subject figures in the definition of its property, it does so only “as something added” (ut additum), since, according to Aristotle, properVaticanis, 1956), pp. 205–207; Allan Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946); and Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, ch. 9. 10. Francisco Suárez, R. P. Francisci Suarez, E Societate Jesu, Opera Omnia, vol. 25 (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1861), p. 235a: “Sed responderi potest huiusmodi transcendentia, non esse proprie & simpliciter universalia, quanvis interdum late & secundum quid ita appellentur, ea ratione qua omne id, quod aliquo modo unum est, & commune multis, potest universale vocari” (DM 6.8.12). See also DM 2.2.36, DM 28.3, and DM 32.2. 11. For one thing, the Posterior Analytics seems clearly to require that the subject of a science be a genus, but Aristotle insists that being, ostensibly the subject of metaphysics, is not a genus. For this and other problems, see Christopher Shields, “Being Qua Being,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, ed. Christopher Shields, 343–71 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Introduction xv



ties—and indeed accidents generally—must be defined “by addition” (ἐκ προσθέσεως), in the way oddness must be defined by appeal to number, or in the way snubness, which is a kind of concavity, must be defined by appeal to the nose, as “concavity of the nose.”12 As Suárez notes, however, it seems impossible for any alleged property of being to satisfy all of these conditions. For starters, according to the first condition, if the property is to be real, being must belong to its essence, but according to the fourth condition, being cannot form part of its essence. Moreover, in Suárez’s view, the second condition, requiring a distinction ex natura rei between being and its properties, cannot be satisfied if the first condition is also satisfied, since it was argued in DM 2.3 that no particular type of being is distinguished ex natura rei from being.13 Further, if the property is itself essentially a being, then it must be a particular type of being, and therefore one of being’s inferiors, but none of being’s inferiors is convertible with being. Finally, if a property of being is essentially a being, it must likewise have all the properties of being, which means that either it will be a property of itself—which is impossible—or it will have a property similar to and distinct from itself, and this property will likewise have another such property, which will have yet another such property, and so on, to infinity. Suárez presents three opinions on this issue. The first, attributed to Scotus, holds that being has real and positive properties that are both distinct ex natura rei from being and not themselves essentially beings. According to Suárez, the claim that these properties are in reality distinct from being and not themselves essentially beings is founded on the conditions for being a property. The claim that being has real and positive properties is proved by appeal to the fact that the commonly accepted properties of being, one, true, and good (unum, verum, and bonum) are not fictions of the intellect and are not predicated essentially of things in the way being is, and also by appeal to the fact that a real speculative science like metaphysics demonstrates only real properties of its object. Indeed, Aristotle himself, in Metaph. IV, ch. 1, 1003a21–22, 12. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 5. 13. See Shane Duarte, introduction to Metaphysical Disputation II: On the Essential Concept or Concept of Being, by Francisco Suárez, pp. li–lv.

xvi Introduction says that metaphysics “investigates being as being and those things which belong to it per se” (θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό), and only what is real can belong per se to a real being. The second opinion, which is attributed to unnamed Thomists, agrees with Scotus in affirming that being must have real passions, since only in this way can they belong always, per se and necessarily to being, which is required by the nature of a property or passion. They also grant that these properties are distinct ex natura rei from being, since this, too, is required of a property. However, this opinion disagrees with Scotus in holding that these passions are themselves essentially beings, and this on account of arguments like those which Suárez himself used in DM 2.5 to argue (again against Scotus) that being is predicated essentially of intrinsic modes and ultimate differences. On their view, in fact, it is not problematic (inconveniens), in the case of these transcendentals, for the subject to be included intrinsically and essentially in its properties, “since it is not included as a subject, but as determined to a particular mode” (DM 3.1.3). Finally, the third opinion is attributed to Thomas Aquinas (1224/5– 74), Paul Soncinas (d. 1494), Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli (ca. 1470– ca. 1538), Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), Cajetan (1469–1534), and Pedro da Fonseca (1528–99). According to it, being does not have real and positive passions. What one, true, and good add to being—or what the words “one,” “true,” and “good,” signify over and above being—is either a negation of reason (in the case of “one”) or a relation of reason (in the case of “true” and “good”).14 This opinion, Suárez explains, is motivated by the four conditions identified earlier in formulating the problem posed by the passions considered by the science of metaphysics, “and strictly speaking it is true but nonetheless requires explanation” (DM 3.1.4). Suárez’s endorsement of this opinion—even if qualified—presents something of a puzzle for his reader, since he himself maintains, in agreement with the holders of the first and second opinion, that the properties which the metaphysician demonstrates of being must be real in a way that beings of reason are not. Indeed, on his view, since a being 14. For a discussion of Thomas Aquinas’s conception of the transcendental properties of being, see Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, ch. 6.

Introduction xvii



of reason, strictly s­ o-called, is something fashioned by the intellect and exists only objectively in the mind, it cannot be, nor can it form part of, a passion of being, for being’s properties must hold of it independently of any operation of the intellect. It is therefore necessary to consider why Suárez endorses the third opinion. Immediately after presenting this view, Suárez makes three points in preparation for his positive pronouncements on the nature of being’s properties. First, he draws attention to a distinction between true and real passions, which must satisfy the four conditions introduced at the beginning of the section, and those characteristics which are more properly predicated as attributes, “in the way theologians speak of the divine perfections” (DM 3.1.5). Attributes, he explains, need not satisfy all four conditions on being a true passion, especially the condition that a property be distinct ex natura rei from that of which it is predicated. In the case of an attribute, a distinction of reason suffices, by means of which one extreme of the distinction is in some way conceived as a subject possessed of some essence, while the other is conceived in the manner of a perfection or property. Such is the case, of course, with God and his perfections (e.g., wisdom), which are not really, but only rationally, distinct from him. Something similar is found in Aristotle’s discussion of quantity in the Categories, Suárez explains, when Aristotle attributes to quantity, as a kind of property of it, the function of serving as the foundation of equality and inequality.15 This property, he explains, is not in reality distinct from quantity itself.16 Second, Suárez further distinguishes between (1) the question of whether an attribute is real or only something fashioned by reason and (2) the question of whether an attribute is distinct in reality or only rationally from that of which it is predicated. To say of some attribute that it is distinct only rationally from that of which it is predicated is not to imply that the attribute itself is only a being of reason, he cautions. In fact, if an attribute is only rationally distinct from a real subject, then it must itself be real, rather than privative or a being of reason, for a 15. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 6, 6a26–35. 16. It’s worth noting that on several occasions Suárez insists that a distinction of reason between a demonstrable property and its ground or cause is sufficient for a demonstration. See DM 1.1.27–29 and DM 1.5.38. Indeed, Suárez repeats this point at DM 3.1.12.

xviii Introduction ­non-being (non ens) or fictitious being (ens fictum) is distinguished more than rationally from a real being.17 “For this reason,” Suárez goes on to say, it must be observed that in the case of such attributes it is frequently the case that what is formally signified by them is one thing, but what we mean to explain by means of them is another. For often what is formally signified is negative, but by means of it a positive and real perfection of the thing is explained [explicatur] by us. For instance, simplicity—which is ascribed by us as an attribute of God, or as an attribute of certain other beings in his grade— consists formally in a negation, but by means of it we explain a particular mode or entity of a simple thing. (DM 3.1.6)

Suárez’s claim here is that even if simplicity formally signifies a negation (i.e., a lack or want of composition), and it is true to predicate this negation of God, nevertheless, in saying that God is simple we are not implying that God is only rationally distinct from a negation. Rather, we are endeavoring to explain (explicare) a positive and real perfection of his, and it is the latter perfection which is only rationally distinct from God, not the negation formally signified by the predicate simple.18 17. See DM 7.1.2. 18. Suárez claims that although simplicity formally signifies a negation, nevertheless, this negation “circumscribes” (circumscribere) or “indicates” (indicare) a perfection or more perfect mode of being found in God. The idea seems to be that to say of the divine nature and substance that it is in no way composite is to point out or indicate a particular perfection of his. See DM 30.3.3, at Francisco Suárez, R. P. Francisci Suarez, E Societate Jesu, Opera Omnia, vol. 26 (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1861), p. 73a: “Scotus and Cajetan dispute about simplicity. For Scotus, Sent. I, d. 8, q. 1, ad 1, and Quodlibet 5 (whom Soncinas follows, Metaph. IV, q. 14), teaches that simplicity is an unqualified perfection. But Cajetan, On Being and Essence, ch. 2, teaches that simplicity signifies no perfection, since it signifies nothing positive, but a negation. The disagreement, however, seems to be verbal, rather than real. For it is certain that simplicity does not add some thing or positive mode to the thing that is denominated simple, but signifies only the negation of composition [. . .]. Yet nevertheless, it is true that by this negation a perfection is circumscribed or indicated, both because the imperfection of composition is excluded and also because, other things being equal, what is simpler is more perfect [. . .].” (De simplicitate contendunt Scotus & Caiet. Scotus enim in 1. d. 8. q. 1. ad 1. et quodlib. 5. quem sequitur Soncin. lib. 4. Met. q. 14. docet simplicitatem esse perfectionem simpliciter. Caiet. vero de ente & essent. c. 2. docet simplicitatem nullam dicere perfectionem, quia nihil dicit positivum, sed negationem. Dissensio tamen videtur esse potius in verbis, quam in re. Certum est enim simplicitatem supra rem, quae simplex denominatur, non addere rem aliquam, vel modum positivum, sed dicere tantum negationem compositionis [. . .]. Nihilominus tamen verum est per hanc negationem circunscribi seu indicari perfectionem, tum quia excluditur imperfectio compositionis, tum etiam quia, caeteris paribus, id quod est simplicius, perfectius est [. . .].) See also Francisco Suárez, Commentaria ac Disputationes in Primam Partem D. Thomae De Deo Uno et Trino, treatise 1, bk. 1, ch. 4, n. 1, in Francisco

Introduction xix



Third, Suárez notes that although “being” properly and strictly signifies the entity of a thing, still, whatever can be affirmed of something without qualification is sometimes also termed a being and is said to be, “even if it posits in them no entity” (DM 3.1.7). Such predicates are of two sorts, he explains: first, negations, for in this way we say that a moral act is evil or that a man is blind, and second, extrinsic denominations taken from things, as when God is called a creator from time or a wall is called seen from an act of vision. Regarding such a denomination, moreover, sometimes it is taken as actual (ut actualis), in which case both extremes (e.g., the wall and the onlooker) must exist, but sometimes it is taken as aptitudinal (ut aptitudinalis), as when a wall is called visible, and in the latter case only what is extrinsically denominated (namely, the wall) need exist. This third assertion of Suárez’s merits comment, since it is clearly motivated by the fact that on his view one adds to being a negation consisting in internal indivision (indivisio in se), while true and good each add an extrinsic denomination—in the case of true, an extrinsic denomination from the intellect, and in the case of good, an extrinsic denomination from the will or rational appetite. As regards the negation that one adds to being, Suárez will grant at DM 4.1.19 that it is not a privation, strictly speaking, since a privation is the lack or defect of a form in a subject by nature apt to receive it (carentia formae in subiecto apto nato), and a simple being is correctly termed unum transcendens (transcendentally one) notwithstanding its immunity to division. Still, he says that this negation is like, or is in the manner of, a privation (esse Suárez, R. P. Francisci Suarez, E Societate Jesu Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856), p. 13a: “For this truth [that the divine nature and substance is altogether simple] can be made clear in two ways [. . .]. One way, and briefly, is from the perfection of simplicity itself. For although the opinion of Cajetan is true, that simplicity by itself does not add perfection to a thing, since it consists in a negation, [. . .] nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that, other things being equal, it is better to have the entire perfection of a thing in a simple entity than from the union of several things. Simplicity of itself, therefore, circumscribes a more perfect mode of being, and therefore such a mode of entity is to be attributed to God, since whatever is more perfect is to be attributed to him.” (Duobus enim modis potest haec veritas [sc. Divinam naturam, & substantiam esse omnino simplicem] declarari [. . .]. Unus, & brevis est ex ipsa perfectione simplicitatis. Quamvis enim vera sit opinio Caietani, simplicitatem per se non addere rei perfectionem, quia in negatione consistit, [. . .] tamen dubitari non potest, quin caeteris paribus, melius sit habere totam rei perfectionem in simplici entitate, quam ex plurium adunatione. Simplicitas ergo ex se circumscribit modum essendi perfectiorem, ergo talis modus entitatis Deo tribuendus est; quia tribuendum est illi, quidquid est perfectius.)

xx Introduction ad modum privationis), since it is necessarily found in a subject—namely, a real being—unlike a pure negation (e.g., not pale, not a human being, not divided), which is truly predicable not only of real beings but ­ on-beings.19 Suárez, however, denies that unum transcendens also of n is correctly predicated of a ­non-being, and he further holds that unum is predicable only equivocally of a being of reason, just as being is. With respect to the extrinsic denominations signified by true and good, these are neither beings of reason nor real relations.20 Nor, as the expression “extrinsic denomination” might naturally be taken to suggest, is the denomination at issue here a matter of naming (nominare) one thing from (de) another, in the way a wall is called “seen” from the act of vision that exists in someone seeing it, although denomination in the sense relevant here might rightly be described as an aspect or element of that state of affairs which underlies or gives rise to this sort of naming. In particular, an extrinsic denomination is actually attributed to a precisely insofar as a is the term of a real relation, R, that b bears to a.21 19. See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio (Taurini & Romae: Marietti, 1950), p. 157b (n. 565): “an absolute negation can be verified both of a ­non-being, which is not naturally suited to having an affirmation, and of a being that is naturally suited to having [an affirmation] and does not have [it]. For n ­ ot-seeing can be predicated as much of a chimera as of a stone or even human being. But in the case of a privation there is a certain determinate nature or substance of which the privation is predicated, for not every ­non-seeing thing can be called blind, but only what is naturally suited to having sight.” (absoluta negatio potest verificari tam de non ente, quod [non] est natum habere affirmationem, quam de ente, quod est natum habere et non habet. Non videns enim potest dici tam chimaera quam lapis quam etiam homo. Sed in privatione est quaedam natura vel substantia determinata de qua dicitur privatio: non enim omne non videns potest dici caecum, sed solum quod est natum habere visum.) 20. Although scholastic philosophers debated various points concerning real categorical relations, there were a few things on which most agreed. First, the real relation of similarity that Socrates bears to Plato by virtue of his coloring is one thing, and the real relation of similarity that Plato in turn bears to Socrates is another. The former relation has Socrates as its subject and Plato as its term (terminus), while the latter relation has Plato as its subject and Socrates as its term. Second, in order for a relation to be real, (i) both its subject and its term must be real, (ii) the subject and term must be really distinct, and (iii) there must be in the subject an absolute foundation of the relation (e.g., Socrates’s coloring). Third, Aristotle and his scholastic followers standardly recognized a class of real psychological relations—for example, of knower to thing known, of desirer to thing desired—which are such that, if c bears such a real relation R to d, there is no converse real relation R’ which d bears to c. The thing known, by virtue of being known, does not bear a real relation to the knower, for example. For an accessible introduction to scholastic Aristotelian theories of relations, see Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 21. See Collegium Complutense Sancti Cyrilli, Artium Cursus sive Disputationes in Aristotelis Dialecticam, et Philosophiam naturalem (Compluti: apud Ioannem de Orduña,

Introduction xxi



A negation, of course, is not a real being. To say of a marble bust that it cannot see, or to say of Milton that he is blind, is not to posit some entity in the bust or in Milton, although to say of Peter that he is pale is indeed to posit some entity in him—that is, pallor, which is standardly understood to be a being in the category of quality. Much the same is true in the case of extrinsic denominations. To say of a wall that it is seen, or to say of a fruit that it is desired, is not to posit any entity in the wall or the fruit, but to say of Mary that she sees a wall or desires a fruit is indeed to posit some entity in her—not only an act of vision or a desire, but also a real relation to the wall or to the fruit. Moreover, Aristotelian philosophers commonly hold that to such real psychological relations—of cognizer to thing cognized, and of desirer to thing desired—there do not correspond any converse real relations that the objects of cognition or desire bear to the cognizer or desirer.22 Still, although neither the negation signified by one nor the extrinsic denominations signified by true and good are real beings, strictly speaking, Suárez insists that they are in a sense real, or at least real in a 1624), pp. 160b–161a: “although denomination, to be denominated, and denominative, and other such things properly and formally speaking do not belong to the order of things, but rather to the order of names, since things, not insofar as they are things, but insofar as they are signified by names, are said to be denominated or called denominatives (as is clear from the definition of denominatives handed down by Aristotle in the cited passage [sc. Cat. 1, 1a12–15])—denomination itself, thus formally taken, is a being of reason, since it is the very signification or derivation of the name. Although, I say, these things are so, in the present context, nevertheless, we are not speaking of denomination in this formal sense, but materially, and insofar as it is contained in the order of things, according as a form, in attributing its formal effect to a subject, or in being directed to its term, is said to intrinsically or extrinsically denominate those things. In this sense, when the denominating form is real, we truly say that a denomination, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, is given a parte rei. For a wall is a parte rei called white from the whiteness existing in it, and it is a parte rei called seen from the vision existing in an animal.” (Quanvis, Denominatio, denominari, denominativum, & alia huiusmodi, proprie, & formaliter loquendo, non pertineant ad ordinem rerum, sed potius ad ordinem nominum; siquidem res, non ut res sunt, sed ut nominibus significantur, dicuntur denominari, aut denominativae, ut patet ex diffinitione denominativorum ab Arist. traddita loco citato ac proinde, denominatio ipsa sic pro formali sumpta, sit ens rationis; si quidem est ipsa significatio, vel derivatio nominis: quanvis inquam haec ita sint; in praesenti tamen non loquimur [de] denominatione in hoc formali sensu, sed materialiter, & ut continetur in ordine rerum, secundum quod forma tribuendo suum effectum formalem subiecto, vel respiciendo terminum, dicitur intrinsice, vel extrinsice denominare illa. In quo sensu, quando forma denominans est realis, vere dicimus denominationem, tam intrinsecam, quam extrinsecam dari a parte rei: paries enim a parte rei dicitur albus ab albedine sibi inexistente, & a parte rei dicitur visus, a vissione existente in animali.) 22. See DM 47.13 and DM 47.14.

xxii Introduction way that a being of reason is not. To be sure, one might speak of them as beings of reason, but this is to use the expression “being of reason” in an extended sense, Suárez maintains, for in the strict sense beings of reason “are properly said to exist only objectively in the intellect, for which reason they exist only when they are cognized or fashioned by the intellect” (DM 3.1.10). Being’s properties, by contrast, “are not made by reason but are truly and really predicated of it,” since “it is without qualification true that each being is one and good,” and “for these things to be true, it is not necessary that the mind fashion some beings of reason, for even if the mind thinks not at all about things, gold is true gold, and it is one determinate thing distinct from others, and similarly, God is one and good, etc.” (DM 3.1.10). Given these three points that Suárez makes in advance of his own pronouncements on the nature of being’s properties, it should come as no surprise that he rejects the first two opinions (those attributed to Scotus and unnamed Thomists), declaring that “being as being cannot have true and altogether real, positive passions that are distinct ex natura rei from itself ” (DM 3.1.8).23 In his opinion, clearly, the transcendentals one, true, and good are better understood as attributes that are only rationally distinct from being. Given, moreover, his view that an attribute is only rationally distinct from that of which it is predicated, whereas a negation, like a being of reason, is distinguished from a real subject more than rationally, it is natural to think that for Suárez one, true, and good formally signify more than just what they add to being. And this is indeed his view, as he later makes plain: one, true, and good each formally signify entity itself in addition to what they each add to being (DM 4.2.7). In this respect unum, verum, and bonum differ from a connotative term like album (“white [thing]”), which formally (or principally) signifies only whiteness, and not the subject in which whiteness 23. As Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), 121, points out, J­ ean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 376, fundamentally misconstrues Suárez here, going so far as to misquote him. As Darge also notes, 122n62, Courtine’s misreading is reflected in J­ ean-Paul Coujou’s French translation of the relevant passage. See Franciso Suárez, Disputes métaphysiques I, II, III, trans. ­Jean-Paul Coujou (Paris: J. Vrin, 1998), 299: “j’affirme en premier lieu que l’étant en tant qu’étant ne peut avoir de véritables propriétés positives que si elles sont totalement réelles et s’en distinguent à partir de la nature de la chose.”

Introduction xxiii



exists (commonly called album’s material or secondary significate). And this is entirely appropriate, according to Suárez, for “one, insofar as it is transcendental, does not formally signify something presupposing being and, as it were, adjectival on it and advening on it, as white formally signifies whiteness, since a thing is not understood to be one in the way it is white, since it is one inwardly through its very entity, but white through a form that supervenes on another entity” (DM 4.2.7).24 Since, according to Suárez, being’s passions include being itself, it would seem that he understands them to be rationally distinguished from being by reason of what they add to it. Indeed, Suárez will declare in the Fourth Disputation that “at root (so to speak) one is [. . .] distinguished from being by reason of the negation which it adds to being” (DM 4.2.8). Moreover, after affirming that “being as being has some properties or attributes that are not made by reason but are truly and really predicated of it” (DM 3.1.10), Suárez further explains that although one, true, and good formally add to being only a negation or extrinsic denomination, nevertheless, “a real and positive perfection of being is explained [explicatur] through them, not in terms of something real superadded to being itself, but in terms of the very formal or essential ratio of being” (DM 3.1.11). One, he explains, adds a negation that being does not signify, “although through this negation nothing is explained other than the very nature of being itself ” (DM 3.1.11). True and good, moreover, “signify being under a certain relation to something else, namely, insofar as being has in itself that on account of which it might be loved, or truly cognized, or something similar” (DM 3.1.11). On this conception of being’s attributes, he further claims, their usefulness is clear, “for since we do not perfectly cognize simple things as they are in themselves, we use negations, in part, and comparisons to other things, in part, to explain them distinctly” (DM 3.1.11). Accordingly, although these attributes formally add only a negation or an extrinsic denomination, still, “the nature of being is explained [explicatur] through them all, either as regards its perfection or as regards its wholeness, or something similar” (DM 3.1.11). Indeed, Suárez 24. See DM 7.1.12, at Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 25, p. 253b: “the entity of a thing is nothing other than a real essence posited outside its causes” (entitas rei nihil aliud est, quam realis essentia extra causas posita).

xxiv Introduction will conclude that “with respect to the intrinsic thing that they signify in being,” one, true and good “signify nothing that is distinct ex natura rei from being,” for which reason “it is usually said that in reality the entity of a thing is its goodness and truth, and vice versa” (DM 3.1.13). As regards Suárez’s somewhat surprising endorsement of Thomas Aquinas’s view that one, true, and good add to being only a negation or relation of reason, it is possible that this endorsement involves taking Aquinas to be using the term “being of reason” in an extended sense, that is, in the sense according to which real negations and extrinsic denominations count as beings of reason. Another possibility, however, is that Suárez’s endorsement here is motivated by his own view that, although one, true, and good do not add to being either a negation of reason or a relation of reason, nonetheless, in conceiving what one, true, and good add to being, the human intellect forms or fashions beings of reason. In DM 54, the disputation devoted to beings of reason, Suárez argues at some length that an extrinsic denomination, as such, is not a being of reason, not even when the extrinsic denomination is from the intellect (DM 54.2.6–14). However, he affirms that a negation or extrinsic denomination can serve as a foundation for a being of reason, since “a being of reason is properly made through that act of the intellect by which it conceives, in the manner of a being, what does not in reality have entity” (DM 54.2.15).25 Indeed, Suárez explains that negations and privations of reason are fashioned by the intellect in part as a result of “the cognition which our intellect endeavors to achieve of even negations and privations themselves, which are nothing.” “For,” he explains, “since the adequate object of the intellect is being, it can conceive nothing except in the manner of a being, and therefore, when it tries to conceive privations or negations, it conceives them in the manner of beings and thus forms beings of reason” (DM 54.1.8).26 Elaborating on this a little later, Suárez states that

25. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1022a: “Dicendum est ergo, Ens rationis proprie fieri per illum actum intellectus, quo per modum entis concipitur id quod in re non habet entitatem.” 26. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1017a: “Secundo colligitur ex dictis

Introduction xxv



blindness (for example)—and the same goes for a simple negation—can be conceived in two ways, first, merely negatively, by conceiving that in such an organ there is not a visual potency, and then no being of reason arises, since nothing is conceived in the manner of a being, but only in the manner of a ­non-being. But from this it results that, in order to form a simple concept of blindness, the intellect conceives it as an affection of the animal or organ, just as it also apprehends darkness as a certain disposition of the air. At that point, therefore, it conceives something in the manner of a being, and since it does not conceive a real being, it then properly forms such a being of reason. (DM 54.2.15)27

Suárez’s mention of a simple concept in this passage suggests that the first way of conceiving blindness is by way of a complex concept—that is, a mental proposition—and indeed, he here speaks of the intellect’s conceiving or affirming the proposition “that in such an organ there is not a visual potency.” According to Suárez, however, the intellect tries to achieve a better cognition of blindness by also forming a simple concept of it (i.e., a ­non-propositional apprehension of it), and it is at this point that it conceives the privation in the manner of a being or affection existing in the eye and therefore forms a being of reason. Something similar happens, according to Suárez, when the intellect forms relations of reason. For it is sometimes the case, he explains, that the human intellect “cannot cognize things as they are in themselves,” and so it “conceives them through a comparison of one thing to another thing, and in this way it forms relations of reason where there are no true relations” (DM 54.1.8). “For,” he says, just as the intellect—since it cannot distinctly cognize the whole perfection of one simple thing by means of a single concept—divides [that simple thing] quae sit radix vel occasio fingendi, aut excogitandi huiusmodi entia rationis. Triplex enim assignari potest. Prima est cognitio, quam intellectus noster consequi conatur de ipsis etiam negationibus & privationibus, quae nihil sunt. Cum enim obiectum adaequatum intellectus sit ens, nihil potest concipere nisi ad modum entis, & ideo dum privationes aut negationes concipere conatur, eas concipit ad modum entium, & ita format entia rationis.” 27. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1022a: “[. . .] caecitas, verbi gratia (& idem est de simplici negatione) dupliciter concipi potest; primo negative tantum concipiendo in tali organo non esse potentiam visivam, & tunc nullum insurgit ens rationis, quia nihil concipitur per modum entis, sed solum per modum non entis: inde vero fit ut ad formandum conceptum simplicem ipsius caecitatis intellectus concipiat illam ut affectionem animalis seu organi, sicut etiam apprehendit tenebras ut dispositionem quandam aeris: tunc ergo concipit aliquid per modum entis: cumque non concipiat ens reale, tunc proprie format tale ens rationis.”

xxvi Introduction by means of diverse concepts and thus forms a distinction of reason, so also, when it compares things that are not in reality related to each other, it forms a relation of reason. And it often stands in need of that comparison, because it cannot conceive the thing as it is in itself, or at any rate, because it wants to explain by a mode suited to it that which exists in reality without such a mode, as when it predicates the same thing of itself, saying that it is the same as itself. (DM 54.1.8)28

Again, elaborating on this later, Suárez says of extrinsic denominations that they can be conceived in two ways, and that in one way, “while the intellect directly cognizes that a thing is seen, insofar as vision existing in an eye is terminated at it, it forms or cognizes no being of reason through this cognition.” However, he immediately continues, since our intellect does not sufficiently conceive something as the term of a relation that another thing bears to it, without immediately conceiving it in the manner of a correlative, and then something is conceived in the manner of a relative being in the thing so denominated, and since that is not a real being, nor a real relation, it consequently turns out that it is a being of reason. (DM 54.2.15)29

The claim here is that the intellect does not rest content with conceiving an act of vision to be terminated at a wall (say), but rather endeavors to conceive in the wall a converse relation of being seen that the wall bears to the person seeing it, thereby positing in the wall something that does not in fact exist in it. In this way, it fashions a relation where there is no relation in reality, and so forms a relation of reason. 28. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1017a–b: “[. . .] ideo addenda est secunda causa proveniens ex imperfectione nostri intellectus, cum enim aliquando non possit cognoscere res prout in se sunt, eas concipit per comparationem unius ad aliam, & ita format relationes rationis, ubi verae relationes non sunt. Sicut enim, quia non potest unico conceptu distincte cognoscere totam perfectionem unius rei simplicis, eam partitur diversis conceptibus, & sic format distinctionem rationis: ita dum inter se comparat ea quae in re ipsa relata non sunt, relationem rationis format. Indiget autem saepe ea comparatione, quia non potest concipere rem prout in se est: vel certe quia modo sibi accommodato vult explicare id quod est in re sine tali modo; ut cum praedicat idem de se ipso, dicens esse idem sibi.” 29. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1022a: “[. . .] dum intellectus directe cognoscit rem esse visam, quatenus visio existens in oculo ad eam terminatur, per hanc cognitionem nullum ens rationis format aut cognoscit. Alio modo fiunt hae denominationes respective, quia intellectus noster non satis concipit aliquid ut terminum relationis alterius ad ipsum, quin statim concipiat illud per modum correlativi, & tunc concipitur aliquid per modum entis respectivi in re sic denominata, & quia illud non est ens reale, nec relatio realis, fit consequenter ut sit ens rationis.”

Introduction xxvii



According to Suárez, moreover, negations, privations, and relations of reason are “ordered to the cognition of something that can truly be said of things themselves” (DM 54.1.8). In this respect, they differ from other fictions which the intellect can fashion “by joining parts that in reality cannot be put together,” in the way it fashions a “chimera, or something similar, and so forms those beings of reason which are called impossibles, and by some are termed forbidden beings” (DM 54.1.8).30 It is also worth noting that Suárez is of the view that the human intellect’s recourse to beings of reason in trying to cognize what “can truly be said of things themselves” is a consequence of a certain imperfection in it. For this reason he denies that “beings of reason are formed by the divine intellect” (DM 54.2.20).31 It seems clear, then, that although Suárez denies that one, true, and good add to being a negation or relation of reason, he also holds that the human intellect will fashion beings of reason in the course of conceptualizing what one, true, and good add to being, and this in pursuit of a more perfect cognition of the nature of being.32 It is plausible to 30. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1017b: “Atque hi duo modi [by which the intellect forms negations or privations, on the one hand, and relations of reason, on the other] fundantur aliquo modo in rebus, vel ordinantur ad cognoscendum aliquid, quod vere de rebus ipsis dici potest. Est tamen tertia causa proveniens ex quadam foecunditate intellectus, qui potest ex veris entibus ficta conficere, coniungendo partes quae in re componi non possunt, quomodo fingit chymaeram, aut quid simile, & ita format illa entia rationis, quae vocantur impossibilia, & ab aliquibus dicuntur entia prohibita.” 31. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 1024b: “Nihilominus aliunde videtur repugnare perfectioni divini intellectus, ut per illum formentur entia rationis, quia ens rationis non formatur nisi concipiendo per modum entis id quod ens non est: at vero hoc provenit ex imperfectione intellectus, & repugnat perfectioni divinae cognitionis, nam haec in eo posita est, quod unumquodque clarissime cognoscit sicut est: ergo fieri non potest ut per divinum intellectum entia rationis formentur.” 32. As Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, 115–34, points out, Jorge Uscatescu Barrón and Jorge Gracia mischaracterize Suárez’s conception of being’s passions. See Jorge Uscatescu Barrón, “Acerca de la unidad: Un estudio sobre las Disputationes Metaphysicae (1596) de Francisco Suárez,” Éndoxa: Series Filosóficas 3 (1994), 195–223. According to Uscatescu Barrón, in Suárez’s opinion, the properties of being are “formally beings of reason” (formalmente entes de razón) (200). This is mistaken in two ways. First, it identifies the property of transcendental unity with what one adds to being, whereas Suárez’s view is that unum transcendens formally signifies not just this addition, but being itself. Second, it identifies this addition as a being of reason. Much the same, it seems, can be said of Jorge J. E. Gracia, “The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suárez and Kant,” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, edited by J. Aertsen and A. Speer, 213–25 (Berlin &

xxviii Introduction suppose that this is why he is willing to say of the third opinion, attributed to Thomas Aquinas and others, that “strictly speaking it is true but nonetheless requires explanation” (DM 3.1.4). Indeed, he may very well think that the view attributed to Thomas should be interpreted as amounting to his own view.

DM 3.2: The number and order of being’s properties The Third Disputation’s second section is devoted to enumerating the passions of being and determining their order. Suárez starts the section by noting that six transcendentals are commonly listed: being, thing, something, one, true, and good. Accordingly, he explains, one might think that there are five properties of being, since there are this many predicates convertible with it. But against this, he says, one might allege that the five transcendentals other than being cannot all be reckoned passions of it, since “thing” and “something”—unlike “one,” “true,” and “good”—seem rather to be synonyms of “being.” Moreover, it appears that there are other predicates common to all beings, such as to endure (durare) and to be somewhere (esse alicubi), and these can be abstracted from actual existence, just as being and one can, so that the proposition “a being has duration or local presence” is perpetually true (as any demonstrable proposition must be), just like the proposition “a being is one.” Further, there are disjunctive predicates like finite or infinite (finitum vel infinitum) which can plausibly be called passions of being, just as the disjunctive predicate even or odd (par vel impar) is called a property of number. Finally, Suárez notes, if negations or relations of reason can be properties of being, then being’s properties “will admit of being multiplied to infinity—for instance, to be the same, not to be impossible, to be lovable, to be intelligible, etc.” (DM 3.2.2). Suárez’s own view is that there are only three passions of being— namely, one, true, and good. After arguing that these passions are inNew York: De Gruyter, 1998). According to Gracia, the “difference between Kant and Suárez [. . .] is not in the ontological status of the transcendental attributes themselves, for in that, contrary to what Kant and others think, their views seem to be pretty similar, to the extent that in both cases the status is mental” (225).

Introduction xxix



deed distinct from each other (DM 3.2.3), he first discusses the transcendental predicates thing (res) (DM 3.2.4) and something (aliquid) (DM 3.2.5–6). Regarding the former, Suárez argues that the word “thing” is commonly used as a synonym of “being.” Moreover, even if one were to distinguish these terms in the way Avicenna (ca. 970–1037) does—holding that “thing prescinds from actual existence and signifies only the quiddity, whereas being is taken from ‘to be’ and signifies only being that is actually existent”33—thing would clearly not be a passion of being, but rather its most essential predicate, and “being” would formally signify, at least in the case of creatures, something outside the essence—that is, actual existence (DM 3.2.4). Nor could one argue in this case that being is a passion of thing, since actual existence is not a passion of any existing creature, for, unlike a passion or property, it neither emanates from a creature’s intrinsic principles (but rather comes to it from without) nor belongs necessarily and per se to any creature. If, on the other hand, one wanted to understand “being” as signifying what is apt to exist, and “thing” as signifying that which has a real quiddity, in this case, Suárez says, one might claim that being is the first passion of thing, the idea being that having a real quiddity is somehow distinct (perhaps only rationally) from being apt to exist, so that being apt to exist—i.e., being a being—can be understood as a passion or property of that which has a real quiddity—i.e., of thing. Suárez, however, rejects this suggestion, noting that he has already argued, at DM 2.4.6–7, that the aptitude for existing enters into the primary account of a real quiddity (in prima ratione quidditatis realis). Indeed, he says, the aptitude for existing serves to distinguish a real quiddity from a ­non-real or fictitious one. As regards something, Suárez notes that in accordance with one etymology the term is taken as signifying thing having some quiddity (habens quidditatem aliquam), in which signification “something” is simply synonymous with “being.” According to a second etymology mentioned by Thomas Aquinas, however, “something” (aliquid) is taken to mean “something else” (aliud quid). In this sense, Suárez explains, 33. See Jan Aertsen, “«Res» as Transcendental: Its Introduction and Significance,” in Le problème des Transcendantaux du XIVe au XVIIe siècle, ed. Graziella Federici Vescovini, 139–56 (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

xxx Introduction “the word formally signifies something distinct from being, namely, distinction from another thing or the negation of identity with another thing” (DM 3.2.6). However, he notes, in this sense “something” signifies a negation which is either (i) part of the very ratio of transcendental unity or (ii) a per se accident of the transcendental unit. (Suárez’s own view is that distinction or division from another thing, suitably understood, is a per se accident of the transcendental unit, but he takes up this issue only later, at DM 4.1.14–18.) In either case, he concludes, so understood, “this attribute does not increase the number of these passions in such a way that it is necessary to treat especially of something” (DM 3.2.6). Suárez, however, notes that in this sense something signifies the negation of identity with another thing “in aptitude” (in aptitudine), that is, it signifies a given being’s distinction from either an actually existent or a merely possible being. Failing that, we shall have to say, as Javelli does, that “before the creation of the world God was one, but not something,” which, Suárez thinks, “is said most improperly” (impropriisime dictum est). After an argument for the sufficiency of the three passions one, true, and good (DM 3.2.7), Suárez argues that transcendental unity is prior to transcendental truth and goodness, in part on the grounds that one is absolute, while true and good are relatives, and absolutes are by their nature prior to relatives (DM 3.2.8). As regards true and good, the former is prior to the latter, he argues, first because “goodness is in some way founded on truth, for in order for health to be good, it must be assumed to be true health,” and second because true signifies a relation to the intellect, while good signifies a relation to the will, and the intellect is prior to the will (DM 3.2.9). Finally, Suárez observes that if someone should wish to compare true and good in terms of perfection, this could conceivably be done either by considering what each adds to being, or by considering them insofar as they in some way signify being itself. In either way, however, comparison is impossible, he notes, since comparison in respect of perfection is possible only between distinct real and positive things; however, neither true nor good adds something real to being, and both express the very same perfection of being (DM 3.2.9). After explaining that the list of six transcendentals does not imply the existence of five different properties of being, since the differences

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between some of the corresponding names are due merely to different etymologies or impositions (DM 3.2.10), Suárez turns to consider the other mentioned candidates for being’s passions. As regards duration, he argues that either it is the same as actual existence (which has already been shown not to be a passion of being) or, if it is distinct ex natura rei from a creature’s existence, then it is itself a certain special type of being (DM 3.2.11).34 The same goes, he says, for local presence, although he is clear even here in DM 3 that his eventual conclusion in its case will be that it constitutes a special category (DM 3.2.11).35 Regarding disjunctive predicates, Suárez explains that some of these are actually divisions, rather than passions, of being—e.g., finite or infinite. Others are distinct states of the same being—e.g., to be in act or in potency. Yet other disjunctive properties, he explains, “are reduced to simples one, as the same and the diverse are reduced to unity” (DM 3.2.11). Finally, regarding negations or relations of reason that are attributable to all beings, Suárez insists that the three passions one, true, and good are sufficient, “either because they alone serve to explain the nature of being and have, both in reality and in the usage of human beings, a sufficient reason and usefulness on account of which they are devised and distinguished, or because, if there are some other passions of this sort that can be devised, they are contained virtually in these or can be reduced to them” (DM 3.2.12). Presumably Suárez’s reference here to both usage and usefulness is informed by his view that, on account of its limitations, the human intellect has recourse to beings of reason in order to secure “cognition of something that can truly be said of things themselves” (DM 54.1.8). The claim, perhaps, is that the limitations of the human intellect are not such as to warrant the formation of other beings of reason in its search for a complete cognition of being as being. As regards Suárez’s mention of “other passions” that might be devised, presumably he has in mind the real foundations of other possible beings of reason attributable to all beings. Indeed, one candidate that he mentions in this connection is assimilability—i.e., a thing’s capacity to bear a relation of similarity to something else. Of 34. Suárez affirms at DM 50.1.5 that real duration is only rationally distinct from existence. 35. See DM 51.1.14.

xxxii Introduction this supposed passion of being, Suárez says that it is reduced to unity, “for Aristotle says that similarity is in this way founded on unity” (DM 3.2.14).36 Likewise, he says, the denominations intelligible and signifiable are reduced to truth, and the denominations lovable, desirable, and the like, are reduced to good.

DM 3.3: The principles by which being’s properties are demonstrated and the principle of ­non-contradiction On the Aristotelian conception of a theoretical science, a science’s first principles are immediate (or “unmiddled”) propositions. At a first approximation, a proposition is immediate if and only if there is no middle term (medium) through which the predicate of such a proposition can be demonstrated to belong to its subject using a demonstration propter quid, which is the sort of demonstration that yields science strictly ­so-called. Such a proposition is therefore known per se (per se nota)—that is, through itself—thanks to an apprehension of the rationes of its terms (i.e., the rationes of its subject and predicate). The mediate propositions of a science, by contrast, are demonstrable by means of a demonstration propter quid through an a priori middle term and are therefore known per aliud—that is, through something else. Complicating this basic picture, however, is the view that a proposition can be immediate in itself (secundum se) but mediate in relation to us (quoad nos).37 Of this sort is the proposition that God exists. This proposition is immediate or known per se in itself, since, as a matter of fact, existence belongs to the essence of God and therefore agrees immediately with God. However, since we, at least in this life, cannot grasp the essence of God, the proposition is said to be immediate or known per se in itself, but not in relation to us. In this life, we can cognize that God exists only mediately and per aliud, and in particular, a posteriori or from his effects. Also counting as a proposition that is immediate in itself, but mediate in relation to us, is the proposition 36. See, for example, Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 9, 1018a15–19, ch. 15, 1021a8–14, and Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a20–b14. 37. See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 2, art. 1.

Introduction xxxiii



by which a primary passion (prima passio) is predicated of its proper subject. In reality, nothing mediates between a subject and its primary passion—between (say) the human being and the capacity for instruction (capacitas disciplinae), to borrow an example from Antonio Rubio, S.J. (1548–1615)38—since a primary passion arises immediately from its subject’s essence. However, we distinguish, thanks to a distinction of reason, between the subject and its definition, and we then use the definition of the subject as a middle term in demonstrating that the passion belongs to the subject. In such a case, the conclusion is mediate in relation to us, while both the major premise (the proposition affirming the primary passion of the definition) and the minor premise (the proposition affirming the definition of the subject) are immediate in relation to us. Subsequent passions of a subject are demonstrated of the subject using prior passions as middle terms.39 Suárez observes at the beginning of DM 3.3 that the foregoing conception of a theoretical science’s principles seems to be at odds with Aristotle’s claim in Metaph. IV, ch. 3, that the principle of ­non-contradiction (PNC)—that is, the principle that it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be—“is the first and almost only one to which all the demonstrations of this science must be resolved—and in fact those of the other sciences, too, at least virtually” (DM 3.3.1). Not long after doing so, however, Suárez notes that in saying this Aristotle could not have meant that all metaphysical demonstrations proceed from the PNC in the way that any given theoretical science’s demonstrations proceed from that science’s proper principles. For one thing, a demonstration requires at least two principles, since it is composed from three terms, and no principle contains three terms (DM 3.3.3). In describing the PNC as “the first” of all principles, and thus as prior to all other principles, Aristotle must therefore have meant that it is prior, not in the way that a science’s proper principles are prior to its demonstrated conclusions, but in another way, “namely, because it is better known to us, or because in use and causality it is 38. Antonio Rubio, Commentarii in Universam Aristotelis Dialecticam, vol. 2 (Compluti: Ex Officina Ioannis Gratiani apud Viduam, 1603), col. 371. 39. See Collegium Complutense Sancti Cyrilli, Artium Cursus sive Disputationes in Aristotelis Dialecticam, et Philosophiam naturalem, pp. 700b–702a.

xxxiv Introduction prior and more universal, or because it is in every way more indemonstrable” (DM 3.3.3). Suárez also adds that, even when the priority at issue is understood in this way, some thinkers have disputed the claim that the PNC is prior to all other principles. For example, some have argued that the principle of excluded middle (PEM) is prior to the PNC, in part because, unlike the PNC, it is affirmative, and because “every negation is founded on some prior affirmation” (DM 3.3.1). To clear up this issue and determine Aristotle’s meaning, Suárez distinguishes between two genera of demonstration: one is called “ostensive” (ostensivum), while the other is described as “leading to the impossible” (deducens ad impossibile). An example of the former sort of demonstration is that by which a subject’s primary passion is demonstrated of it using the essence of the subject as a middle term. This sort of demonstration, Suárez says, “is per se and directly required for a science, and in it one proceeds from causes to effects, and from a thing’s essence to the passions that are to be demonstrated” of it (DM 3.3.6). The second kind of demonstration is one in which a proposition is proved to be necessarily true by showing that its negation entails a contradiction when taken together with some other necessary proposition that is known to be true.40 Suárez explains that this kind of demonstration is not per se necessary for science, although it is sometimes included “on account of human defect, ignorance, or willfulness” (DM 3.3.6). The claim, in other words, is that human obstinacy (protervia) and human inadequacies—both avoidable and unavoidable, one imagines—make this sort of demonstration occasionally necessary. Back in the First Disputation, moreover, Suárez affirmed that all other scientific principles admit of being demonstrated through deduction to the impossible or by appeal to the PNC (DM 1.4.25). Indeed, on his view, it is partly because the PNC is proper to metaphysics that Aristotle assigns to first philosophy the task of confirming and defending the first principles of the other sciences. Here in the Third Disputation, Suárez notes that deduction to the impossible can serve to prove the conclusions of the sciences, too. Particularly important for present purposes, however, is Suárez claim that in all demonstrations, including ostensive ones, “the strength 40. See John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, trans. Gyula Klima (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2001), 384–85.

Introduction xxxv



of the inference [vis illationis] is virtually founded on a deduction to the impossible, because, namely, it cannot happen that the same thing at the same time is and is not, or that two contradictories are true at the same time” (DM 3.3.6). Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this last comment except to note that this is why Averroes (ca. 1126–98) affirms that without the PNC “no one can philosophize, dispute, or reason” (DM 3.3.6).41 The suggestion, perhaps, is that the PNC is a basic assumption informing all of our reasonings. In any case, it is clear that Suárez grants that in the science of metaphysics being’s passions are demonstrated of it a priori—that is, by means of an ostensive demonstration—using the ratio or essence of being as a middle term. Indeed, as he puts it, since the properties of being are in their own way passions of it, it is necessary that they arise from its intrinsic ratio and essence, since this pertains to the intrinsic ratio of a proper passion. Therefore, they will admit of being demonstrated through the same essential ratio of being, whether this be through a distinction of things themselves from each other, or through a distinction in relation to our concepts and reasonings in such a way that one [extreme of the distinction] truly is the ground of the other, which suffices for human science and demonstration. (DM 3.3.7)42

The implication here would seem to be that, in the ostensive or propter quid demonstration that every being is one, being will serve as the minor term, the ratio of being will serve as the middle term, and one will serve as the major term. (In an Aristotelian demonstration, the minor term is always the subject of the conclusion, and the major term is always the predicate of the conclusion.) Suárez adds that if being’s passions are ordered in such a way that the second arises from the first and the third from the second, then the first passion will serve as “a single principle for demonstrating the others,” whereas “if (as can 41. Fonseca makes the same remark. Indeed, Suárez’s discussion of the primacy of the PNC in DM 3.3 seems very much indebted to Fonseca’s discussion of the question whether the PNC is the first of all principles, although Suárez rejects Fonseca’s claim that a demonstration leading to the impossible proves the relevant proposition a priori. See Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae Lusitani, Doctoris Theologi Societatis Iesu, In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, Tomi Quatuor. Continet Hic Tomus Primus Quatuor Priorum Librorum Explicationem (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615), cols. 847–56. 42. The latter distinction is a distinction of reason. See n. 16 above.

xxxvi Introduction sometimes happen) several passions are immediately connected to the ratio of being, they will admit of being demonstrated of being only through the very ratio of being” (DM 3.3.7). Since Suárez holds that, among the passions of being, one is prior to true, and true is prior to good, the implication here would seem to be that, in the propter quid demonstration that every being is true, one will serve as the middle term, while in the propter quid demonstration that every being is good, true will serve as the middle term. Suárez further states that the PNC is nonetheless “without qualification the first in human science, and especially in metaphysics,” since “that principle is rightly called first from which all of human science takes its stability [firmitatem]” (DM 3.3.9). Elaborating on this, Suárez affirms that since the human mind does not immediately comprehend other first principles as they are in themselves, it is greatly helped and strengthened in its assent to them by deducing to the impossible, which in the case of other principles can be done through that first one. But it itself can in no way be shown through a deduction to the impossible as well, for nothing else can be inferred that is more impossible than what is pronounced in it, which is a sign that it is most known and first. (DM 3.3.9)

Suárez would seem to be claiming here that the PNC is prior to other first principles for all three of the reasons mentioned in DM 3.3.3: (i) it is better known to us, since other first principles are more difficult for the human mind to grasp, (ii) in use and causality it is prior and more universal, since it can be used to prove every other scientific principle, and indeed every other scientific conclusion, in a demonstration leading to the impossible, and (iii) it is in every way indemonstrable, since it itself does not admit of being demonstrated through a demonstration leading to the impossible. As regards the claim that the PNC is without qualification first not just in human science, but “especially in metaphysics”—which seems to be equated with the claim that it is most necessary (maxime necessarium) in metaphysics—Suárez explains that this is so because, “since being is most simple, it is scarcely possible to define it, explain its ratio quite distinctly, and employ it in the production of true demonstrations in such a way that the assumed propositions are not judged identical”

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(DM 3.3.9). Unfortunately, Suárez does not elaborate on this claim, either. But the suggestion would seem to be that the propositions making up the ostensive demonstration by which every being is shown to be one (for example) are liable to seem tautological, rather than doctrinal (doctrinales). Presumably, a demonstration leading to the impossible somehow avoids the appearance of tautology here. As regards the claim that the PNC cannot be the absolutely first principle because it is negative and thus presupposes some affirmative principle like the PEM, Suárez replies that there can indeed be an affirmative proposition that is prior to the PNC in the sense that it is prior in the order of generation or composition, but this does not undermine the claim that the knowledge of all other truths in some way depends on the PNC, or the claim that the PNC is so “true, known, and indemonstrable that it does not depend on another principle” (DM 3.3.11).

DM 4: Transcendental unity vs. quantitative unity It will be recalled that transcendental unity is a kind of unity that is common to every being, including God and items found in the Aristotelian categories. It is therefore to be distinguished from quantitative unity, which is a type of unity belonging intrinsically or per se to beings in the category of quantity in particular, although it also agrees with material substances denominatively and accidentally (denominative & accidentarie) insofar as they possess quantity (DM 4.9.8).43 Indeed, according to Suárez, transcendental unity differs from quantitative unity in the same way being differs from quantity: quantitative unity is a subjective part of—that is, a type of—transcendental unity, just as quantity is a type of being (DM 4.9.9). Furthermore, although Aristotle divides the category of quantity into exactly two genera—the genus of 43. This position assumes, against the nominalists, that a material substance is in reality distinguished from its quantity. See DM 4.9.4 and DM 40.2. The distinction between transcendental unity and quantitative unity is commonly termed by Thomas Aquinas the distinction between the “unit that is converted with being” (unum quod convertitur cum ente) and the “unit that is the principle of number” (unum quod est principium numeri). See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 155b (bk. IV, lect. 2, n. 557), and Summa theologiae I, q. 11, art. 1, ad 1, at: Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1888), p. 107.

xxxviii Introduction continuous quantity and the genus of discrete quantity or number— Suárez holds that a discrete quantity is not in reality a being, but several beings, and that quantitative unity therefore belongs intrinsically or per se only to continuous quantity (DM 41.1.16). On his view, in fact, a discrete quantity or number is in reality or a parte rei a plurality of continuous quantities or a plurality of things possessed of continuous quantity. This explains why he both grants that number results from the division of a continuous quantity (DM 4.9.9) and holds that “it must be said absolutely that number, taken properly for discrete quantity, is not found outside quantified and material things” (DM 41.2.6).44 The view that number is not found among spiritual beings is liable to perplex the ­twenty-first century reader, and all the more so when it is recalled that Aristotelians take number or discrete quantity to be the adequate object of arithmetic.45 But the fact that the view seems manifestly at odds with common sense was not lost on Christian Aristotelians, since they themselves believed (for example) that there were three persons in God and two natures in Christ. Indeed, the apparent implication that immaterial things do not fall under the science of arithmetic is arguably why scholastics so often felt the need to discuss the question of whether discrete quantity is found in spiritual things. Be that as it may, they commonly read Aristotle as affirming in Metaph. VI, ch. 1, that the division of theoretical science into metaphysics, physics, and 44. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 595a: “Quocirca absolute dicendum est, numerum proprie sumptum pro quantitate discreta non inveniri extra res quantas & materiales.” 45. Notwithstanding his view that discrete quantity is not in reality a being or accident, since it lacks the unity required of a real being, Suárez holds that insofar as number is conceived by us as one thing, we are warranted in speaking of it as a species of being and in locating it in the category of quantity (DM 41.1.16). He is explicit, moreover, that this view is motivated by the need “to explain the common manner of speaking about number [or] discrete quantity, lest we depart from it altogether, for in these matters, although it is often necessary to think with the few, one must speak with the many” (ad explicandum communem modum loquendi de numero quantitate discreta, ne ab illo omnino recedamus: in his enim rebus quanvis saepe cum paucis sentire necesse sit, oportet loqui cum multis) (DM 41.1.17). In confirmation of this view, moreover, Suárez observes “that discrete quantity as such is the object of a certain mathematical science, namely, arithmetic” (quod quantitas discreta ut sic est obiectum cuiusdam scientiae Mathematicae, scilicet Arithmeticae), and that “the object of a science is taken as something one, about which passions are demonstrated” (obiectum. . .scientiae sumitur ut aliquid unum, de quo passiones demonstrantur), from which it follows that “number is conceived by us as having in some way one essence and species” (concipitur a nobis numerus ut habens aliquo modo unam essentiam & speciem) (DM 41.1.17).

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mathematics is based on the relation that the object of each of these sciences bears to matter, and they took Aristotle to be of the view that quantity, the object of mathematics, is inseparable both conceptually and in reality from “intelligible matter,” that is, material substance.46 And many, though not all, scholastic philosophers accepted the view that quantity, the object of mathematics, is not found (at least not naturally) apart from corporeal substance.47 Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the disagreement here is verbal and has more to do with the fact that Suárez, like many scholastic philosophers, reserves the unqualified term “number” (numerus) and the expression “discrete quantity” (quantitas discreta) to refer to a plurality or multitude of quantitative unities or quantified things, in particular.48 For although Suárez holds that discrete quantity or number, strictly ­so-called, is not found among spiritual beings, he is prepared to grant that five angels (for example) constitute a “multitude” (multitudo), a “transcendental multitude” (multitudo transcendentalis), or even a “transcendental number” (numerus transcendentalis).49 Indeed, Suárez understands multitude to be related to number in a way similar 46. See DM 1.2 and the discussion of it in the introduction to Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics, xxxv–liv. 47. Suárez himself lists the following nominalists, among others, as holders of the view that discrete quantity is found among spiritual beings (DM 41.2.2): William of Ockham (ca. 1287–1347), Gregory of Rimini (ca. 1300–1358), Marsilius of Inghen (ca. 1340–96), Gabriel Biel (before 1425–95), and John Mair (ca. 1467–1550). 48. Compare Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. III, lect. 12, n. 5, at Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 2 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1884), pp. 139b–140a: “Regarding this, it must be known that division causes multitude, as has been said. But division is twofold: one formal, which is by opposites, and another according to quantity. The first division causes multitude, which pertains to the transcendentals, according as being is divided by one and many. But the division of a continuous quantity causes number, which is a species of quantity, inasmuch as it has the nature of a measure.” (Circa quod sciendum est quod divisio, ut dictum est, multitudinem causat. Est autem duplex divisio: una formalis, quae est per opposita; et alia secundum quantitatem. Prima autem divisio causat multitudinem, quae est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa: sed divisio continuae quantitatis causat numerum, qui est species quantitatis, inquantum habet rationem mensurae.) 49. Suárez repeatedly uses the unqualified term “multitude” in DM 4.4 to refer to a plurality of transcendental unities. See also DM 4.9.7, where he says that the “ratio of measure, if conceived in terms of the aptitude that is in the thing itself, is found with the same proportion both in the transcendental unit in relation to multitude [respectu multitudinis] and in the quantitative unit in relation to the number of quantity.” For the expression “transcendental multitude,” see DM 4.6.4, DM 4.8.13, and DM 4.9.5. For the expression “transcendental number,” see DM 4.9.12.

xl Introduction to that in which transcendental unity is related to quantitative unity: a number is a particular type of multitude (i.e., a multitude of continuous quantities or quantified things, in particular), just as quantitative unity is a type of transcendental unity (i.e., transcendental unity as found in, or determined to, the category of quantity).50 Indeed, since beings of any sort can constitute a multitude, Suárez sometimes refers to a multitude as a “number of any old beings” (numerus quorumvis entium).51 He himself even concedes that if “someone insistently contends that by the name ‘discrete quantity’ alone any multitude of things is signified, then he shall easily defend the claim that discrete quantity is found among angels” (DM 41.2.5).52 If Suárez nonetheless denies that discrete quantity is found among spiritual beings, it is partly because he thinks that those “who speak in this way misuse the word ‘quantity,’ since this word, spoken absolutely, signifies corporeal bulk in the usage of all philosophers, and therefore no philosopher concedes absolutely that there is quantity among angels” (DM 41.2.5).53 It must be admitted, however, that this way of looking at Suárez’s distance from us on the topic of number (i.e., as something of a verbal disagreement) leaves unanswered the question of why he should nonetheless hold that arithmetic has discrete quantity in particular, rather than multitude, as its adequate object, especially since he himself grants that everything arithmeticians demonstrate of the number three (for example) can also be shown to be true of the multitude consisting in the three persons of the Trinity (DM 41.2.4). To be sure, it was generally agreed that any science must have a genus or at least a single ratio for its 50. Suárez often uses the expression “numerical unity” (unitas numerica, unitas numeralis) as equivalent to “quantitative unity,” although he cautions that the former expression is ambiguous. In one sense, it is used to refer to quantitative unity, which is the principle of number. But in another sense, it is used more broadly as a synonym for “singular” or “individual unity,” in which sense it is contrasted primarily with specific or generic unity. See DM 4.9.12. 51. See DM 4.9.5 and DM 15.10.67. 52. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 594b: “Si vero quis mordicus contendat, nomine quantitatis discretae tantum significari quamcunque rerum multitudinem, facile defendet quantitatem discretam in angelis reperiri.” 53. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 594b: “Qui vero sic loquuntur [. . .] abutuntur voce quantitatis, cum haec vox absolute dicta in usu omnium philosophorum molem corpoream significet, ideoque nullus philosophus absolute concedet esse quantitatem in angelis.”

Introduction xli



adequate object (see DM 1.1.23), and so if one holds that discrete quantity is a genus of real being, one can insist that arithmetic has discrete quantity for its object on the grounds that it is a real being, unlike a transcendental multitude, which is a mere plurality of real beings. But this possibility is not open to Suárez, since he denies that a plurality of quantities can constitute a single being. In the end, it may well be that he sticks to the traditional conception of arithmetic’s adequate object largely out of a concern not to undermine the Aristotelian rationale for the division of theoretical science into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.

DM 4.1: What one adds to being The first section of the Fourth Disputation takes up the question, Does transcendental unity add a positive or privative ratio to being? In other words, when we say of something that it is one—meaning thereby that it is transcendentally one—what is affirmed of it, beyond the fact that it is a being? Suárez’s reply is that one adds to being “some negation in the manner of a privation” (DM 4.1.12), specifically, internal indivision or the negation of internal division (indivisio in se or negatio divisionis in se). As he makes clear in DM 4.2, the indivision at issue here is with respect to entity: to assert of a being that it is transcendentally one is to assert that it is undivided in its entity (DM 4.2.6–7). Suárez considers two alternatives to the opinion that he himself endorses. The first, attributed to Avicenna, Scotus, and Antonius Andreas (ca. 1280–ca.1320/5) affirms that one adds to being something positive which is distinct ex natura rei from being itself. This view is quickly dismissed on the grounds that it was already disproved back in DM 3.1. The second view, attributed to Bonaventure (ca. 1217–74), Alexander of Hales (ca. 1185–1245), and Domingo de Soto, concedes that unity is signified and explained by way of negation, “since simple things are not conceived and explained by us except by means of negations” (DM 4.1.2), but it affirms that the thing signified and understood is something positive that is distinct only rationally from being. In other words, one adds to being something positive that is only rationally distinct from being itself.

xlii Introduction Suárez presents four arguments and two confirmations in support of this view. The first alleges that one adds indivision to being, and that indivision is a positive ratio, even if it is signified in the manner of a negation. For since division is a negation, indivision must in reality be an affirmation, because in reality there is no such thing as the negation of a negation, since a negation “is removed by the opposed positive form” (DM 4.1.2). Therefore, in adding indivision to being, one adds a positive ratio to it. The second argument begins with the claim that in things that are one by virtue of composition, unity arises as a result of the union of several things, and this union is something positive in them. But since indivision signifies a lack of division, and division signifies a lack of union, it follows that in the case of a composite thing, indivision signifies a union. Therefore, since one adds indivision to being, it adds something positive (DM 4.1.3). In confirmation of this, Suárez notes that a negation, as such, does not admit of more or less, although unity does admit of more or less, since the simple is more one than the composite is. It follows that one adds something positive to being (DM 4.1.3). A second confirmation alleges that a negation does not signify a perfection, but that unity does, “for in God it pertains to his greatest perfection that he is only one, that he is one to the greatest degree, and that in him all things which are not opposed are altogether one.” Therefore, one adds something positive to being (DM 4.1.3). The third argument alleges that all modes or species of unity are positive, from which it follows that unity as such adds something positive. For example, quantitative unity arises from continuity, and continuity is something positive, since it consists in the relevant parts’ having a common terminus or limit.54 Likewise, the unity of composition is a positive ratio, for this is why generation, which aims at such a union, is a positive action, whereas corruption, which dissolves this sort of union, “formally consists in a privation” (DM 4.1.4). Finally, the fourth argument appeals to unity’s effects or properties, which, it is alleged, cannot be effects or properties of a negation. These include: (i) founding the relation of identity or similarity, (ii) being the first measure of a multitude, and (iii) composing a multitude. Therefore, one adds something positive to being (DM 4.1.5). 54. See Aristotle, Physics V, ch. 3, 227a10–13.

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After presenting these arguments, Suárez declares that one “adds nothing positive to being, whether rational or real, whether distinct ex natura rei from being or only rationally distinct from it” (DM 4.1.6), and he offers a fairly long list of thinkers who endorse this thesis. That one does not add to being some positive being of reason is clear, he explains, because all positive beings of reason are relations of reason, and “one” does not signify a relation or relative thing, but something absolute. Nor can it be said that one adds to being a relation of identity that a thing bears to itself, for “to be one and to be the same are very different predicates” (DM 4.1.7), since to be one is a real predicate that agrees with a being without any fiction of the intellect, whereas to be the same as oneself is a relation of reason that belongs to each thing by virtue of an intellectual operation. Regarding the claim that one does not add a real positive ratio to being, Suárez first rehearses a fairly common argument against this view (DM 4.1.8).55 If one adds to being some positive real ratio, then this ratio must itself be a being and thus one. Therefore, its unity will likewise be due to some positive real ratio belonging to it. But this second ratio will likewise be a being and thus one. We will therefore have to posit a third ratio by virtue of which this second ratio is one—and so on, in infinitum. After dismissing an attempt to evade this argument (DM 4.1.9), Suárez notes that someone might still respond to it by alleging that it succeeds against the view that one adds to being some real positive ratio that is distinct ex natura rei from being, but not against the view that one adds to being a real positive ratio that is distinct only rationally from being (DM 4.1.10). However, this response, Suárez says, entails a number of difficulties. First, on this view the ratio of the unit quidditatively includes being itself, which is incompatible with the nature of a passion. Second, on this view the ratio of the unit belongs to the essence of being, just as the divine attributes—which are only rationally distinct from God—belong to the divine essence. But this cannot be, in part because it would entail that no created thing’s quiddity could be distinctly conceived unless it were formally conceived as one, which is false. After noting that some might take these alleged difficulties not to be 55. The argument is found in Averroes and is often repeated by later thinkers. See Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8 (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), fol. 67G.

xliv Introduction problematic (inconveniens) in the case of trancendentals, Suárez presents three related arguments which, he seems clearly to think, are the strongest and most decisive arguments against the view that one adds a real positive ratio to being. In the first, he explains that if in God (say) there is such a ratio, then we can rationally prescind or conceptually separate God from this unity (since God and this ratio are claimed to be rationally distinct). But in God so conceived without this alleged ratio, Suárez claims, “a negation of division or partition that he has in himself can be conceived, and also a division, or a sufficient foundation of division, from all other things,” and by virtue of this God “is sufficiently conceived to be one.” “Therefore,” Suárez concludes, “whatever positive thing is thereafter added, even rationally, is superfluously fashioned, nor can what it is, or what it is for, be explained” (DM 4.1.11). The same goes for any being, he adds. The second argument offered by Suárez targets the earlier one alleging that the unity of a composite being is due to a union, which is something positive. Suárez concedes the point, but notes that the physical union of soul and body in a human being (for example) pertains to the nature or ratio of the human being and remains even when this ratio is rationally prescinded from the concept of the unit. Something similar can be seen in the case of a line, Suárez notes, for the union of its parts in a point pertains to its ratio as a species of continuous quantity. It follows that the ratio of the unit adds to being nothing positive which is even rationally distinct from it. A third argument alleges that if simplicity, which is the greatest unity (maxima unitas), does not formally signify a positive ratio, even one distinct only rationally from the simple being and its perfection, then neither can unity as such signify such a ratio. It further alleges that simplicity signifies no such ratio, for “even in the case of God, according to the more probable opinion of the theologians, simplicity as such adds no perfection to God, even rationally, over and above the perfection of his supreme actuality, on which is founded that negation which simplicity expresses” (DM 4.1.11).56 It follows that one adds to being nothing positive even rationally distinct from it. 56. See n. 18 above. See also Francisco Suárez, Commentaria ac Disputationes in Primam Partem D. Thomae, treatise 1, bk. 1, ch. 9, n. 4, at: Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 1,

Introduction xlv



Having argued that one adds to being no positive ratio of any kind, Suárez further declares that one adds a negation in the manner of a privation. For it must add something, he explains, because “one is in some way distinguished from being, since one is a passion of being and those names are not synonymous” (DM 4.1.12). But it cannot signify something fashioned altogether by reason, “since to be one truly agrees with things” (DM 4.1.12). And because it has been shown that it cannot signify a relation of reason, there remains nothing else that it can add save a negation or privation. In what remains of the section before Suárez responds to the arguments for the contrary view, he explains why he characterizes the negation signified by “one” as being like a privation, and he also addresses the question of which negation or negations one signifies. As mentioned, although he grants that internal indivision (indivisio in se) is not a privation, strictly speaking, since things incapable of internal division are likewise called one, it is nonetheless, he says, like a privation insofar as it must inhere in a particular subject, unlike a pure negation, which is truly predicable of both beings and ­non-beings. “One,” Suárez holds, signifies “a negation of division in a being” (DM 4.1.19). As regards the question of which negation or negations “one” signifies, p. 27: “The second division is of those names which are properly predicated of God, for some are negative, others positive or affirmative. The division is St. Thomas’s, ST I, q. 13, arts. 2 and 12. [. . .] Of the former kind are the following, ‘Uncreated,’ ‘Incorporeal,’ ‘Infinite,’ ‘Immeasurable,’ ‘Immutable,’ ‘Incomprehensible,’ ‘Invisible,’ ‘Ineffable.’ For I find only these six [sic] formally and expressly negative attributes attributed to God, either in scripture or in the Fathers and scholastics. There are, however, three others which in respect of mode of signifying do not signify an express negation, and therefore it is uncertain whether they signify a negation or not, and they are ‘Simple,’ ‘One,’ ‘Eternal.’ Of these, two have already been explained by us, and it has been shown that they signify beyond the entity of the thing nothing other than a negation. For by ‘simplicity,’ as St. Thomas rightly says at the beginning of q. 3 of ST I, it is indicated, not how God is, but how he is not, and the same goes for unity, by means of which it is also denied that there are other true Gods.” (Secunda divisio sit eorum nominum, quae proprie de Deo praedicantur, quaedam enim negativa sunt, alia positiva, seu affirmativa. Divisio est D. Thom. 1. p. q. 13. art. 2 & 12. [. . .] Prioris generis sunt haec, Increatus, Incorporeus, Infinitus, Immensus, Immutabilis, Incomprehensibilis, Invisibilis, Ineffabilis. Haec enim tantum sex attributa formaliter, & expresse negativa invenio, vel in scriptura, vel in Patribus, & Scholasticis Deo attributa. Sunt vero tria alia, quae in modo significandi non dicunt expressam negationem & ideo sub opinione versantur, an dicant negationem nec ne? quae sunt Simplex, Unus, Aeternus. Ex quibus duo iam sunt a nobis explicata, & ultra rei entitatem nihil aliud, quam negationem dicere ostensum est: Nam per simplicitatem, ut recte dixit Divus Thomas in principio quaestione 3. suae primae part. Non indicatur, quomodo Deus sit, sed quomodo non sit, & idem est de unitate, per quam etiam negatur, esse alios veros Deos.)

xlvi Introduction Suárez begins by observing that “all agree” (conveniunt omnes) that “one” signifies “a negation of division in a being itself ” (DM 4.1.13). This is what Aristotle affirms,57 he notes, and it is also clear by argument, “since we understand that one being is made several by division” (DM 4.1.13). Suárez further states that the negation of internal division (negatio divisionis in se) is to be distinguished from the negation of a thing’s division from itself (negatio divisionis a se), and that the latter sort of negation does not pertain to the ratio of the unit. This is so for two reasons. First, the negation of a thing’s division from itself is not a proper negation that is in reality added to being, but is rather “a negation which is conceived only through a reflection of reason” (DM 4.1.13). Second, this negation agrees also with a per accidens being or multitude, since “a heap of stones is as undivided from itself as a human being or angel is” (DM 4.1.13). Suárez further observes that some authors define the unit as “what is undivided in itself and divided from any other thing” (DM 4.1.14). These authors consequently assert that “one” signifies not just the negation of internal division, but also the negation of union with another (negatio unionis cum alio), which is explained by appeal to the expression “division or distinction from another” (divisio seu distinctio ab alio) (DM 4.1.14). An argument for this claim is presented here, an argument which equates being distinct from another (esse distinctum ab alio) with not being other than oneself (non esse aliud a se). (The latter equivalence is explicitly asserted at DM 4.1.17.) The argument runs as follows. Since to be other than oneself (esse aliud a se) and not to be other than oneself (non esse aliud a se) are contradictorily opposed, if one of these cannot be predicated of something, then the other must be predicated of that thing. But of course a unit cannot be other than itself. Therefore, it is necessarily not other than itself. Therefore, not to be other than oneself pertains to the ratio of the unit. Suárez adds that some affirm that the negation consisting in division from another agrees with being in a way that is rationally prior to the way being internally undivided does, from which it follows, according to these thinkers, that both negations enter into the ratio of the unit. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas affirms at ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4, that the con57. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a23.

Introduction xlvii



cept of division from another is rationally prior to the ratio of the unit. Suárez notes that this view is opposed by a number of thinkers, including Fonseca, who argues that to be divided from another is not required in order to be one, but only in order to be one among many. After all, even if there are not other things from which a being might be distinguished, it still counts as one. After noting that “one” is sometimes used to mean only one—as when we say that there is one God or one sun—and that in this sense “one” obviously does not signify a passion of being, Suárez notes that equivocation is likewise possible in the case of the expression “division from another.” For starters, it can be taken as referring to a real relation, which requires a real and existent term. That is, for A to be in this way divided from another involves its bearing a real relation to some other actually existent thing, B, from which it is divided or distinguished. In this sense, Suárez explains, division from another clearly does not belong to the ratio of the unit, since: (i) for A to be in this way divided from another presupposes that A is one (presumably because a real relation is an accident, which requires a single subject in which to exist); (ii) being in this way divided from another requires a multitude, but one is prior to multitude and is in no way dependent on it; in fact, a multitude is instead dependent on the unit, since a “multitude arises because there are several units” (DM 4.1.16); and (iii) being in this way divided from another does not agree per se with every being, since before creatures existed God was one even though there was no actually existent thing from which he was distinguished. That said, Suárez grants that it is indeed consequent on every being that it can in this way be divided from another thing, since the intrinsic ratio of being is such that “the existence of another thing is possible for any being” (DM 4.1.16). Accordingly, to be in this way divided from another “agrees aptitudinally and fundamentally with every being insofar as it is one” (DM 4.1.16). However, Suárez adds, the capacity to be in this way divided from another does not enter into the ratio of the unit. Presumably, this is so because even A’s capacity to be in this way divided from another is posterior to—that is, presupposes—A’s being one. This capacity, therefore, can at most be consequent on (consequitur) the ratio of the unit. That is, it must be a property or passion of the unit,

xlviii Introduction something predicated per se of the unit in the second mode of perseity (per se secundo modo). To be divided from another can also be understood purely as a negation. In this sense, to say that A is divided from B is to say that A is not B, or that it is other than B. Accordingly, Suárez explains, if B (or that which A is understood not to be) is a “positive and existent term”—both a possible being and an actually existent one—then the account of it is much the same as that which applies to division from another understood as a real relation (DM 4.1.17). On the other hand, if B is merely a possible being, whether existent or not, then to be in this way divided from another agrees with every being insofar as it is one. Indeed, the earlier argument that appealed to the contradictory opposition between being other than oneself and not being other than oneself (DM 4.1.14) succeeds in showing that being in this way divided from another belongs necessarily to every unit. But, Suárez observes, it does not establish that this division belongs essentially (or per se primo modo) to the unit. In fact, he notes, it seems rather to belong to the unit as a property. Finally, Suárez notes that when division from another is conceived purely as a negation, and B (or that which A is understood not to be) is taken for a negative and contradictory term—that is, for a n ­ on-being (non ens)—then in this way as well to be divided from another agrees with every being. For it is in fact true of every being “that it is divided from ­non-being, or that it is not a n ­ on-being” (DM 4.1.18).58 Suárez adds, however, that although this negation agrees with every being, it “is present only through a reflection of the intellect, as it were, for insofar as it is objectively understood to be present beforehand in a being, it is rather an affirmation, for an affirmation is not divided from a negation by another negation,” since if it were an infinite regress would arise (DM 4.1.18). The claim, in other words, is that although the intellect can conceive and attribute to a being the negation expressed by “not a ­non-being,” this negation is merely a being of reason, for in 58. Recall that being, understood as the adequate object of metaphysics, is defined by Suárez as that which has real essence (habens essentiam realem), where an essence’s being real can be understood as its involving no impossibility in itself and its not being wholly fabricated by the intellect. See DM 2.4.5–7.

Introduction xlix



reality an affirmation or positive item is not distinguished from a negation (in this case, ­non-being) by means of another negation, on pain of infinite regress. Rather, an affirmation is divided from a negation per se or through itself. Accordingly, Suárez explains, “most formally, to be di­ on-being is nothing other than to be a being” (DM 4.1.18). vided from n The negation consisting in division from a n ­ on-being is therefore in reality nothing and does not belong to the ratio of the unit. Suárez devotes the remainder of DM 4.1 to replying to the arguments offered in support of the claim that one adds to being a positive ratio which is distinct only rationally from being. It will be recalled that the first argument alleges that indivision, which one adds to being, is a positive ratio, for since division is a negation, indivision must in reality be an affirmation, because in reality there is no such thing as the negation of a negation. To this argument Suárez presents two replies. The first, which is given at DM 4.1.20 and is called the “common reply” (communis responsio), adheres to Thomas Aquinas’s view that one adds to being a negation of reason, since it signifies the negation of a real negation, and in particular, the negation of that negation by which one member of a multitude is distinguished from another.59 The second, which is presented at DM 4.1.21, asserts to the contrary that the negation which one adds to being is a real negation and the negation of something positive. It is this second response which Suárez himself endorses. 59. See Thomas Aquinas, Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, ad 1, at S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1, edited by R. Busa (­Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F ­ rommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 66b–c: “in a multitude there is a negation, insofar as one thing is distinguished from another by a negation, for which reason in a multitude there is real negation or privation insofar as one thing is not said to be another, and such a distinction by negation is what the negation imported in the ratio of unity negates. For this reason I say that this negation in which the ratio of unity is perfected is only a being of reason. For every relation which is borne by a being to a negation or ­non-being is only of reason. Accordingly, the relation by which a being is referred to a ­non-being is only of reason, and similarly, the privation by which ­non-being is denied of being is only in reason, as the privation of a privation, or the negation of a negation.” (in multitudine negatio est, secundum quod una res distinguitur ab alia per negationem; unde in multitudine est negatio vel privatio realis, secundum quod una res non dicitur esse alia: et huiusmodi distinctionem per negationem negat negatio importata in ratione unitatis. Unde dico, quod negatio ista in qua perficitur ratio unitatis, non est nisi negatio rationis tantum. Omnis enim respectus qui est entis ad negationem vel ad non ens, non est nisi rationis. Unde relatio qua refertur ens ad non ens, non est nisi tantum in ratione: et similiter privatio, qua de ente negatur non ens, est in ratione tantum, ut privatio privationis, vel negatio negationis.)

l Introduction The first reply is t­ wo-pronged. On the one hand, it affirms that although it is true that a negation is not in reality removed or destroyed by another negation, but only by the opposed positive form, reason can nonetheless conceive the negation of a negation, and it is this—a negation of reason—that one adds to being.60 Moreover, it also alleges that by means of this particular negation reason is able to “explain [explicare] some positive, simple thing which, as it is in itself, it cannot make clear” (DM 4.1.20). On the other hand, the reply grants that what is picked out or circumscribed in reality by this negation is something positive, but it adds that this positive thing is not what one adds to being; it is rather the very entity of the thing called one. As mentioned, Suárez does not endorse this reply, although he grants that it is plausible (probabilis) and can easily be defended. His explanation of why he does not endorse it, however, presents something of a problem. He does not endorse it, he explains, because it seems to suppose that the negation which “one” signifies is either the negation of this being’s division from another being or the negation of this being’s division from itself, which really are negations of reason. However, the former does not pertain to the ratio of the unit, as has been said; rather, it is consequent on it. And the latter negation is not proper to the unit, but is common 60. See Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae fratris Pauli Soncinatis (Venetiis: Impressae sumptibus heredumque Domini Octaviani Scoti civis Modoeotiensis ac sociorum, 1526), fol. 125vb: “in any multitude there is a real negation, that is, the negation of one thing in respect of another that is signified by saying this is not that. But one denies that in itself there is a negation and division of this sort. For a stone is said to be one not only because it is not divided into many stones (for in this way a pair would also be one, since it is not divided into many pairs), but rather a stone is said to be one because in it there are not many things in act one of which is not another. For although in a stone there are many quantitative parts, still, none of them is in act, but all are only in potency in a sense elsewhere made clear. And because the negation of a negation is a negation of reason, just as the relation of a being to a ­­non-being and the relation of a ­non-being to a n ­ on-being also pertain only to reason, Saint Thomas therefore says, Sent. I, d. 24, that one signifies a negation of reason.” (Ex quo patet quod in multitudine qualibet est negatio realis, id est, negatio unius de alia re quae significatur [1579 ed., p. 235a: signantur] dicendo hoc non est illud. Unum autem negat in se esse huiusmodi [1579 ed., p. 235a: huius] negationem & divisionem. Nam dicitur lapis esse unus: non solum quia non est divisus in multos lapides (quia etiam hoc modo binarius esset unus: cum non sit divisus in multos binarios) sed ideo dicitur lapis esse unus: quia in eo non sunt multa in actu quorum unum non sit aliud. Licet enim in lapide sint multae partes quantitativae, tamen nulla earum est in actu: sed omnes sunt tantum in potentia ad sensum alias declaratum: & quia negatio negationis est negatio rationis, sicut etiam relatio entis ad non ens & non entis ad non ens est rationis tantum, ideo dicit Sanctus Thomas 1. di. 24. quod unum dicit negationem rationis.)

Introduction li



to multitude also. Therefore, the negation of internal division properly pertains to the ratio of the unit, and this seems to presuppose no real negation in the thing itself that is rationally negated by indivision. (DM 4.2.20)

The problem has to do with the words here translated “the negation of this being’s division from another being”—“negationem divisionis huius entis ab alio ente.” The most natural translation of these words, I believe, is the one given here. Indeed, this is the sense given to them in the Spanish translation of Rábade et al.61 It is also the way they are taken by Raffaele Aversa (1589–1657), who in his Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens (first published 1625–27) explicitly mentions Suárez’s criticism at DM 4.1.20 of the view that “unity is a negation of a negation” (unitatem esse negationem negationis).62 It is also consistent with the Thomist view that one adds to being the negation of that negation by which one member of a multitude is distinguished from another. However, there is a significant problem with this interpretation of the words “negationem divisionis huius entis ab alio ente”: Suárez himself at no point in DM 4 says that the negation of one being’s division from another is consequent on the ratio of the unit. What is said by him to be consequent on the ratio of the unit, rather, is division from another, suitably understood as the division of the thing called one from another possible being (DM 4.1.17). Indeed, this is why it seems exactly wrong to claim that the negation of one being’s division from another is consequent on the ratio of the unit.63 61. Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones metafísicas, edited and translated by S. Rábade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, and Antonio Puigcerver Zanón, vol. 1 (Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1960), p. 501: “negación de división de este ente respecto de otro ente.” 62. Raffaele Aversa, Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens, vol. 1 (Bononiae: Ex Typographia HH. Evangelistae Ducciae, 1650), p. 163a. 63. See Raffaele Aversa, Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens, vol. 1, p. 163b: “Suárez criticizes the same explanation of division in another way in the Fourth Disputation, first section, paragraph 20. For that division either is understood as the division from other things, that by which each thing is divided from all others—that is, is not any of the other beings—or it is understood as the division of a being from itself, since every being is not other than itself. And so unity will be either the negation of any being’s division from other beings, or the negation of its division from itself. The former negation, Suárez says, does not pertain to the ratio of the unit, but is consequent on it. But he ought not to have spoken thus. It is rather the case that this negation destroys the ratio of the unit and is incompatible with unity. For the unit is said to be undivided in itself and divided from any other. Therefore, division from any other is consequent on the ratio of the unit. But the negation of this division instead destroys the ratio of the unit.” (Aliter eandem explicationem

lii Introduction Faced with this problem, one might be tempted to suppose that Suárez’s words should be otherwise construed. And it seems that they can be. In particular, they might be translated as “the negation consisting in this being’s division from another being.”64 The problem with this suggestion is that, although it makes sense of Suárez’s claim that the negation at issue has already been said not to pertain to the ratio of the unit, but rather to be consequent on it, his other comment that both this negation and the negation of a thing’s division from itself “really are negations of reason” is inconsistent with his earlier characterization of the negation consequent on the ratio of the unit. It also seems impossible to explain how the Thomists could be committed to the view that one adds this negation to being, since they seem to hold, rather, that it is the negation of this negation that one adds to being. I can see no satisfactory resolution of the problem posed by this text. It seems that we have no choice but to conclude that Suárez was confused, or that he expressed himself poorly, or that some error was introduced into the text of DM 4.1.20 by a copyist or typesetter. Be that as it may, whatever Suárez’s reasons for rejecting the Thomist view of what one adds to being, it is clear that he wants the negation signified by “one” not to be a negation of reason, but a real negation. He cannot, therefore, concede that the negation signified by “one” is the negation of a negation, since every such negation is a negation of reason. He must instead hold that it is the negation of something positive. Suárez accordingly distinguishes two things “in the division that one negates”: first, that beings which are divided from each other are divisionis impugnat Suar. disp. 4. sect. 1. num. 20. Quia illa divisio, vel intelligitur ab aliis rebus, qua unumquodque est divisum ab aliis omnibus, nempe non est ullum ex aliis entibus. Vel intelligitur divisio entis a se ipso: quia omne ens non est aliud a se ipso. Itaque unitas, vel erit negatio divisionis cuiusque entis ab aliis entibus, vel divisionis a se ipso. Prior negatio, inquit Suarez, non pertinet ad rationem unius, sed ad illam consequitur. Non sic dicere debebat. Sed potius, illa negatio destruit rationem unius, & unitati repugnat. Nam unum dicitur esse indivisum in se & divisum a quocumque alio. Divisio ergo a quocumque alio consequitur ratione unius. At negatio huius divisionis destruit potius rationem unius.) 64. See DM 3.2.7, where the genitives “indivisionis” and “divisionis” in the first edition’s “negatio illa indivisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio,” must be read as jointly specifying the negation to which Suárez is referring, and not as specifying two things negated by that negation. See also the text from DM 5.5.8 mentioned in note 24 on the Latin text of DM 3.2.7. Rolf Darge seems to interpret Suárez’s words in this second way, as meaning the negation consisting in one being’s division from another. See his Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, 208–10.

Introduction liii



“complete in themselves and terminated by their entities,” and second, that one of these beings is not another (DM 4.1.21). The second consists in a negation, he explains, but the first involves something positive which serves as the foundation of this negation, and this foundation is nothing other than the very entities of the distinct beings. According to Suárez, then, it is this positive element—the complete entity of each item into which the thing called one could be divided—that is negated or denied when a thing is called one. Against this conclusion Suárez entertains the objection that it implies that “one” signifies the negation of multitude (DM 4.1.22). Unfortunately, he does not explain how his conclusion might be thought to imply that “one” signifies this negation, nor is it obvious that it does. As he notes, Fonseca and Aquinas both deny that “one” signifies the negation of multitude, and this on the grounds that a negation or privation must be defined by appeal to what it denies. (E.g., blindness must be defined by appeal to sight.) For if “one” or “the unit” signified the negation of multitude, it would have to be defined by appeal to multitude, which would in turn imply that multitude is prior in account to the unit. But this is false, for the unit is instead prior in account to multitude, since a multitude is defined as a plurality or aggregate of units. According to Fonseca and Aquinas, then, one does not deny multitude, but an element found in every multitude—that is, the division of one thing from another—and this division, on their view, is prior in account to both the unit and multitude.65 65. In noting Aquinas’s claim that “one” signifies, not the negation of multitude, but the negation of division, Suárez explicitly mentions two texts: first, ST I, q. 30, art. 3, ad 3, and second, De natura generis, ch. 2. De natura generis is now generally attributed to Thomas Sutton (ca. 1250–after 1315). For the former text, see Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 340b: “To the third it must be said that one does not remove multitude, but division, which is according to reason prior to one or multitude. But multitude does not remove unity, but rather removes division from each of the items of which the multitude is composed.” (Ad tertium dicendum quod unum non est remotivum multitudinis, sed divisionis, quae est prior, secundum rationem, quam unum vel multitudo. Multitudo autem non removet unitatem: sed removet divisionem circa unumquodque eorum ex quibus constat multitudo.) For the second text, see Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 17 (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1864), p. 9a: “it is clear that unity does not convey the privation of multitude, for since a privation is posterior to that which it removes, if one removed multitude, it would follow that it was posterior to multitude, and since [the corresponding] habit pertains to the definition of a privation, it would follow that unity is defined by appeal to multitude—which is false, since then there would be a circle in

liv Introduction Since Suárez holds that “one” signifies the negation of an alleged positive element found in, or presupposed by, the division of one being from another, it is not altogether clear why his position should be thought to entail that “one” signifies the negation of multitude. If Aquinas and Fonseca can claim that “one” signifies, not the negation of multitude, but the negation of something found in every multitude (i.e., the division of one member of the multitude from every other member), then why can Suárez not claim that on his view “one” signifies, not the negation of multitude, but the negation of something positive found in every division of one thing from another?66 It is perhaps significant that Suárez mentions a text from Sent. I, d. 24, art. 3, ad 4, in which Aquinas states that one is not “the privation of that multitude which it constitutes, but the privation of the multitude which is denied in the thing called one” (nec unum est privatio illius multitudinis quam constituit; sed multitudinis quae negatur esse in ipso quod dicitur unum),67 and then immediately goes on to acknowledge that in this text Aquinas is speaking “of multitude as regards the negation included in it” (de multitudine quoad negationem in ea inclusam). The suggestion, it seems, is that Aquinas is willing to say that one is the privation of multitude, but that this is to be understood as implicitly qualified, and that for him one is the privation of multitude only insofar as multitude involves division, the definition, since multitude is defined by appeal to unity, for a multitude is an aggregate of unities.” (Manifestum est, quod unitas non importat privationem multitudinis: quia cum privatio sit posterior illo quod privatur; si unum privaret multitudinem, sequeretur quod esset posterius multitudine: et cum habitus sit de definitione privationis, sequeretur quod unitas definiretur per multitudinem: quod est falsum, quia tunc foret circulus in definitione: nam multitudo definitur per unitatem: multitudo enim est aggregatio unitatum.) See also Pedro da Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1, cols. 772–73: “But that this negation [which one adds to being] is the negation of division is clear from this: because the negation which one adds to being is either the negation of multitude or the negation of division (for there is nothing else that can be denied by it). However, it cannot be the negation of multitude insofar as it is multitude. For a negation is by the order of nature posterior to that which it denies. And the unit is by its nature prior to multitude. Therefore, it is the negation of division.” (Quod autem ea negatio sit divisionis, ex eo patet, quia negatio, quam unum addit enti, vel est negatio multitudinis, vel divisionis [neque enim quicquam est aliud, quod per illam negari possit] at non potest esse negatio multitudinis, quatenus multitudo est. Negatio enim est naturae ordine posterior eo, quod negatur. Unum autem est suapte natura prius multitudine. Igitur est negatio divisionis.) 66. Compare Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, 211–13. 67. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66c.

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which is what one properly denies.68 It may be that it is only in a similarly qualified sense that Suárez’s position affirms that one signifies the negation of multitude. This is perhaps borne out by the fact that Suárez concludes his reply to the objection by saying that “it can be said that one signifies the negation of division, not insofar as it”—that is, division—“signifies the negation”—that is, the negation by which one thing is divided from another—“but insofar as it signifies the foundation of that negation, which is something positive, as I have made clear” (DM 4.1.23). The claim, again, is that “one” signifies the negation of some positive element found in the division of one thing from another. What’s more, to this Suárez immediately adds: “since multitude absolutely includes the formal negation, to this extent one does not completely signify the negation of multitude” (quoad hoc unum non omnino dicit negationem multitudinis) (DM 4.1.23). The claim, perhaps, is that “one” does not completely signify the negation of multitude because what it completely signifies is the negation of something included in multitude. Be that as it may, against the second argument for the claim that one adds a positive ratio to being, Suárez again replies that, although the union by which the parts of a composite are combined to constitute a single thing is indeed something positive, nevertheless, this union pertains to the essence of the composite and is not what is added to it when it is said to be one. To the first confirmation, which claims that unity admits of more or less, but a negation does not, Suárez grants that a “negation or privation formally and in itself does not admit of more or less,” but he claims that “it can by reason of its foundation,” and that a thing is more or less one according as it is more or less composite (DM 4.1.24). (Suárez would have done well here, perhaps, to antici68. Compare Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 476a (bk. X, lect. 4, n. 1996): “It must therefore be said that nothing prevents something’s being prior and posterior in account to the same thing, according as diverse things are considered in it. For in a multitude one can consider both that it is a multitude and division itself. By reason of the division, therefore, it is prior to the unit in account. For the unit is what is not divided. But insofar as it is multitude, it is posterior to the unit in account, since a multitude is an aggregate of unities.” (Dicendum igitur quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse prius et posterius eodem secundum rationem, secundum diversa in eo considerata. In multitudine enim considerari potest, et quod multitudo est, et ipsa divisio. Ratione igitur divisionis prior est quam unum secundum rationem. Nam unum est quod non dividitur. Secundum autem quod est multitudo, posterius est uno secundum rationem, cum multitudo dicatur aggregatio unitatum.)

lvi Introduction pate the principal conclusion of the next section, which is that “one” formally signifies not just the negation that it adds to being, but being itself.) To the second confirmation, which alleges that a negation signifies no perfection, whereas unity does, Suárez replies that although the negation signified by “one” adds no perfection to being, it nonetheless presupposes some perfection and the very entity of the thing that is said to be one. As regards the claim that it pertains to God’s perfection that he is only one—that is, unique—to be one in this sense does not always proceed from perfection, since the plurality of persons in God “is due to his supreme perfection” (DM 4.1.25). In response to the third argument, which alleges that all modes or species of unity are positive, Suárez replies that the argument’s appeals to quantitative unity and the unity of composition only prove that the negation which one adds to being is not a pure negation, but a negation necessarily founded on a being. As regards the fourth argument, which cites a number of unity’s effects or properties and alleges that these cannot be effects or properties of a negation, Suárez replies that insofar as the mentioned effects or properties are positive, they agree with unity by reason of its foundation, and not by reason of what one adds to being.

DM 4.2: Whether one formally signifies only what it adds to being According to Suárez, the concrete names of accidents—for example, “white” (album)—formally or primarily signify the same thing that the corresponding abstract names—for example, “whiteness” (albedo)— signify. Such a concrete name differs from the corresponding abstract name not with respect to its primary or formal significate, but because it secondarily signifies the subject in which the relevant accident exists, which is commonly called the concrete name’s “material significate.” And the concrete name’s “adequate significate,” or what it adequately signifies, is the composite of subject and accident. The corresponding abstract name, on the other hand, signifies only the accident or accidental form, as if existing per se or by itself, rather than in something else (in alio), its subject.69 Granted, then, that the passions or properties 69. See DM 34.8.6, at Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 421: “I judge it not [to

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that are demonstrated of a subject are normally accidents, it is natural to wonder whether “one” (unum) and “unity” (unitas) likewise formally signify only what they add to being, namely, the negation of internal division. As mentioned, Suárez’s view is that “one” formally signifies not just what it adds to being, but also entity or (in other words) “that by which be] true what some say, that in the case of accidents the concrete and the abstract [names] are distinguished only in respect of mode of conceiving, because in reality they signify altogether the same thing. And this is what Durandus thinks, Sent. I, d. 34, q. 1, citing Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on substance, text 7 [. . .]. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that white (and the same goes for similar names), although it formally signifies only whiteness, nevertheless adequately signifies more than whiteness, namely, the composite of subject and accident. Otherwise, how could it be taken or supposit for the subject, unless it signified or consignified it? And this is so clear from the common manner of conceiving that it can hardly be doubted in this case.” (Non enim verum censeo, quod quidam aiunt, in accidentibus concretum, & abstractum solo concipiendi modo distingui: nam in re idem penitus significant; quod sentit Durand. in 1. d. 34. q. 1. citans Aristotelem in praedicam. c. de substant. text. 7 [. . .]. Veruntamen negari non potest, quin album (& idem est de similibus) licet de formali significet solam albedinem, tamen adaequate significet plus quam albedinem, scilicet, compositum ex subiecto & accidente, alioqui quomodo posset pro subiecto accipi, vel supponere, nisi illud significaret, vel consignificaret, quod tam manifestum est ex communi modo concipiendi, ut vix possit in hoc dubitari.) See also DM 39.1.12, at Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 508a: “However, if we are speaking of the concrete by reason of the form alone, in this way it can indeed by called a complete accident. Still, there is no reason why the same abstract accident should be judged incomplete, because the concrete term formally signifies only the accidental form, according to the truer and commonly received opinion of St. Thomas and the Commentator, Metaph. V, text 14, who consequently say against Avicenna in his logic that the concrete and abstract names of accidents formally and principally signify the same thing and differ only because the concrete term signifies the same form as actually informing a subject and as constituting the composite, whereas the abstract term precisely signifies the same form as though it existed per se.” (At vero si loquamur de illo concreto ratione solius formalis, sic dici quidem potest accidens completum, tamen non est cur idem accidens abstractum incompletum censeatur, quia concretum pro formali tantum dicit ipsam formam accidentalem, iuxta veriorem & communiter receptam sententiam Divi Thomae, & Commentatoris 5. Metaphysic. text. 14. Qui consequenter aiunt contra Avicennam in sua logica: concretum & abstractum accidentis formaliter ac praecipue idem significare, solumque differre, quia concretum dicit ipsam formam ut actu informantem subiectum, & constituentem concretum ipsum: abstractum vero praecise dicit ipsam formam ac si per se esset.) See also Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae Lusitani, Doctoris Theologi Societatis Iesu, In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros, Tomus Secundus. Continet Hic Tomus Quinti Libri Explicationem (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615), cols. 457–58 (bk. V, ch. 7, q. 5, sect. 3), and Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 239a (bk. V, lect. 9, n. 894). On the early history of the question regarding the primary signification of concrete accidental terms, see Sten Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late ­Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as ‘Album’,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann, 107–74 (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).

lviii Introduction a being is a being” (quo ens est ens) (DM 4.2.10). Pedro da Fonseca is here identified as the main proponent of the contrary view, according to which “one” formally signifies only the negation of internal division. Again, Suárez’s belief that being’s passions differ only rationally from being itself would seem to require that he take the position that “one” formally signifies undivided entity, since, as he himself notes, a negation is distinguished more than rationally from a being (DM 3.1.6). It is somewhat curious, then, that shortly before presenting his own view here in DM 4.2 he says that the difference between the position advocated by Fonseca and his own “has more to do with the manner of speaking than the reality” (DM 4.2.6), and this because all agree in thinking that one’s adequate significate is undivided being (ens indivisum). As Rolf Darge suggests, Suárez’s reserve here may be due to a certain deference felt towards Fonseca, who, besides being a fellow Jesuit and one of the most respected philosophers of his day, was still alive when the Metaphysical Disputations were published.70 In any case, Suárez’s arguments in favor of his own view seem clearly to imply that his disagreement with Fonseca concerns more than a manner of speaking. The most decisive of these has already been mentioned, namely: that a being is not transcendentally one in the way a body is white, namely, by virtue of a distinct form which supervenes on it; rather, a being is one “inwardly through its very entity” (DM 4.2.7). Another argument alleges that if “one” formally signified only the negation of internal division, it could be predicated univocally of a being of reason and a real being, which cannot be the case, since real being and its passions are convertible or counterpredicated. Accordingly, Suárez explains, just as the names of artifacts are commonly held to formally signify not just the relevant figures or shapes, but also the materials from which the artifacts are fashioned—since an iron saw and a toy saw made from plastic are not univocally called saws—so neither will “one” signify only the negation of internal division, since it is not said univocally of all the things to which this negation can equally well belong.

70. Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition, 219n71.

Introduction lix

DM 4.3: The kinds or modes of unity

Suárez opens DM 4.3 by noting that it is necessary to determine the various modes or types of unity, and this so that it can be established which is a passion of being. The first division he presents, following Aristotle’s example, he says, is into the one per se and the one per accidens. This division is analogical in the sense that one is not predicated univocally of the one per se and the one per accidens, since that which is one per se is one without qualification, while that which is one per accidens is one only in a certain respect. In fact, as said of the one per se and the one per accidens, one is analogical by an analogy of proportionality (DM 4.5.2), which entails that there is no single ratio or objective concept which is divided by these two members. This division is, therefore, reasonably presented before other divisions of the one, Suárez observes, since distinguishing a word’s equivocates is preliminary to distinguishing the members that divide a single objective concept or ratio (see DM 4.8.5). Thus, before dividing real being into infinite and finite, for example, one ought first to distinguish real being from the being of reason, which is only equivocally called a being. Also informing Suárez’s treatment here, we are told, is the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of the division in Metaph. V, ch. 6, offers no definition of either the one per se or the one per accidens. Aristotle presents only examples, which, far from making clear the rationes of per se and per accidens unity, instead pose certain problems. In particular, among his examples of things that are per se one he includes some items which seem rather to be one per accidens, such as a house and other products of art. He also includes both real unities—for example, the individual unity of Peter or James—and rational unities—for example, the specific unity of several human beings or the generic unity of several animals belonging to different species. For this reason, Suárez explains, it is “difficult to reduce this teaching of Aristotle’s to some definite account and method” (DM 4.3.1). Suárez begins his discussion by noting that since one is consequent on being, the distinction between the one per se and the one per accidens ought to be treated together with the distinction between the per se being and the per accidens being. For a being is called per se or per

lx Introduction accidens, he explains, “in reference to the unity it has, or by reason of such unity, for example, because it consists in a single nature belonging to a single category or consists in several natures belonging to different categories” (DM 4.3.3). In other words, a per se being is one per se, while a per accidens being is one per accidens. Suárez considers and rejects several ways of defining the one per se and the one per accidens, as well as the per se being and the per accidens being, and this because he thinks they either assume something false or leave important questions unanswered (DM 4.3.4–5). His own view, he tells us, is that “the ratio of a per se being consists in this, that it has precisely those things which are per se and intrinsically required for the essence, wholeness, or completeness of such a being in its own genus” (DM 4.3.6). This, he says, is clear from the terms themselves; indeed, it is only by appeal to the rationes of the relevant terms that one can decide questions regarding such most common and simple things. Accordingly, Suárez goes on to say, since that which has essence or entity is a being, that which has one entity or essence will be a per se being properly and strictly, and “that essence or entity will be most properly one which in its genus has whatever pertains to its intrinsic ratio or completion” (DM 4.3.6). One might reasonably wonder just how useful or informative this account of a per se being is, particularly in the light of Suárez’s criticisms of alternative accounts for leaving important questions unanswered. Raffaele Aversa, for one, complains that Suárez’s account applies just as well to what is one per accidens, since “something composed from a subject and accident, and even a house, a ship, an army, can be considered something having precisely those things which pertain to its essence, wholeness, and completeness.”71 To the reply that a per se being must belong to a particular genus, and that this is why Suárez speaks of a being “in its own genus,” Aversa objects that in this case the account is useless, since in seeking an account of what a per se being is, we are seeking to determine which beings, in particular, belong to some genus.72 71. Raffaele Aversa, Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens, vol. 1, p. 170a: “Verum haec tota explicatio applicari posset etiam uni per accidens. Nam concretum & compositum ex subiecto & accidente, imo etiam domus, navis, exercitus, potest considerari ut habens praecise ea, quae ad essentiam, integritatem, & complementum eius spectant.” 72. Raffaele Aversa, Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens, vol. 1,

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Be that as it may, it is true that in the discussion that follows Suárez provides a better sense of what he means by the “things which are per se and intrinsically required for the essence, wholeness, or completeness” of a being in its genus. After noting that the question of what a per se being is can be further clarified if one distinguishes between simple and composite beings, Suárez states that simple beings present no difficulty, for every simple being is a per se being and one per se, since, precisely as simple, it “does not have an admixture of something foreign” that would make it a per accidens being (DM 4.3.7). Any given accident, taken in the abstract, is a per se being of this sort, he notes, as is the soul qua substance, even if it is also an incomplete being, although qua possessed of various potencies, habits or acts, the soul is more of a per accidens being. As regards composite beings, Suárez continues, it is clear that both the composite of matter and substantial form and the composite of a substantial nature and subsistence (subsistentia) are each per se beings and per se one.73 For neither matter nor form is by itself a complete or whole being in its own genus, since each is instead ordained by its nature to the composition of such a complete or whole being. Accordingly, the nature or essence composed from them is per se one. Likewise, since a whole nature or essence by itself lacks an intrinsic completeness in its own genus and must be per se terminated intrinsically and substantially by the mode of subsistence, the composite of nature and subsistence is also per se one. The per se unity of a composite, therefore, consists in the fact “that there results from the constituent things a complete being in some genus when a union obtains among things that are suited to constituting such a being” (DM 4.3.8). In addition to these two types of composition, Suárez explains, there is a third which is from integral parts. Examples of this include p. 170a–b: “Quod si dicatur, debere tale compositum esse ens quoddam certi generis: & ideo dictum esse talis entis in suo genere: quae conditio non convenit aggregato accidentali, & composito, quod non sit per se unum. Sic explicaretur idem per idem. Idem enim est hoc modo dicere ens per se unum, ac ens certi generis: neque hoc est clarius illo. Et idipsum est quod quaeritur, quodnam, sit ens per se unum, quod sit vere quoddam ens certi generis.” 73. According to Suárez, a created supposit or primary substance (as distinguished from a secondary substance—see Aristotle, Cat., ch. 5) is composed from an individual nature and a substantial mode called subsistence (subsistentia) or suppositality (suppositalitas). On the latter mode, see DM 34.1–7.

lxii Introduction the composition of a single quantity by means of a “true and natural continuity,” for it is through such continuity that the parts of a continuous quantity constitute a single thing (DM 4.3.9). Indeed, the parts composing a continuous quantity are several things only potentially, not actually, which, Suárez explains, is why Aristotle says that “number does not properly exist except where parts are not joined by a common terminus” (DM 4.3.9). Moreover, although a corporeal substance is denominatively said to be quantitatively one by virtue of the single continuous quantity inherent in it, under this same quantity there is another composition evident in homogeneous substances like fire and water. For such a material substance “has, under quantity, its own substantial entity, in which it also has entitative parts composing and making up the substantial entity itself and having among themselves their own substantial union” (DM 4.3.10). This unity, of the homogeneous material substance underlying a single continuous quantity, must be distinguished from the quantitative unity that the same substance has by virtue of the quantity inherent in it. In fact, this substance and its quantity do not constitute a per se being or something per se one. Rather, they constitute a per accidens being and something one per accidens. Suárez notes that a composition from integral parts is likewise found in a heterogeneous material substance, such as an animal or plant, and he further argues that although the parts of such a substance “do not seem to be so intrinsically united and continuous” as the parts of a homogeneous substance, they nonetheless also constitute a per se being (DM 4.3.11). One of his arguments here appeals to the fact that the parts of such a substance “serve each other and, when per se separated, can be preserved either not at all or for only a short time,” which, he explains, “is a sign that they are all incomplete beings in their own genus and are per se ordained to the composition of some being” (DM 4.3.11). Suárez also asserts that, aside from quantity, there are other individual accidents composed from integral parts. The composition here is of two sorts, he explains. One is by way of extension, “in the way there is one whiteness that is extended over the surface of a single body, and this composition makes something per se one in the manner of an integral whole” (DM 4.3.12). To be sure, the parts of this single white-

Introduction lxiii



ness have this union in a quantity, Suárez explains, but not “intrinsically and formally through the quantity itself, but through their own partial entities united among themselves by means of their own chain and union that is sui generis” (DM 4.3.12). Thus, if one half of a body’s surface is black, and the other white, these two colors will have a kind of continuity by virtue of the single continuous surface in which they inhere, but they will not have “the intrinsic union and conjunction with each other that two partial whitenesses would have with each other” (DM 4.3.12). The second kind of composition from integral parts that is found in accidents, Suárez continues, does not come about in quantity, but it is nonetheless to be explained by proportion to, or in some way on the model of, quantity. It is a composition by way of intension and is found in qualities that admit of increase or intensification, like heat.74 The assumption here is that an intense heat is a composite of degrees (gradus) that are distinct ex natura rei. These degrees, Suárez explains, “are like partial and incomplete beings within their own genus, and they are ordained by their nature to perfecting one thing within the same genus” (DM 4.3.12). Thus, the heat found in some particularly hot body, for example, is a composite of different degrees of heat, each of which is itself only an incomplete being that is by nature apt to compose a complete being—in particular, an item in the category of quality. Suárez further notes that there is no third type of composition from integral parts. In particular, neither the composition of several habits to form a single scientific habit, nor the composition of several quantitative unities to form a number, yields a per se being, Suárez insists. For in these the components “do not have some true and real union with each other by means of which they might compose something per se one” (DM 4.3.12).75 74. See DM 46.1.35, at Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 26, p. 764a, where Suárez argues that a quality capable of increase or intensification “is not in its entity indivisible, but has some latitude of parts, by reason of which it can in itself sometimes be in a subject as a whole, and sometimes by way of a greater or smaller part” (Primum enim dicendum est, qualitatem intensibilem non esse in entitate sua indivisibilem, sed habere aliquam latitudinem partium, ratione cuius potest interdum secundum se totam inesse subiecto, interdum secundum partem maiorem, vel minorem). 75. Regarding quantitative number (or discrete quantity), see DM 41.1 (“Whether discrete quantity is a proper species of quantity”). Regarding scientific habits, see DM 44.11 (“Of what sort is the extensive increase of a habit, and what unity of the habit corresponds to it”).

lxiv Introduction From what has been said about per se beings and things that are per se one, Suárez goes on to note, it is easily gathered what should be said about per accidens beings and things that are one per accidens. First, what is constituted from distinct things that are not physically and really united to each other is necessarily a per accidens being, since the ratio of a per se being that was specified earlier is not found here, and this thing cannot have a single essence, since a single essence must either be simple or arise from a union of several things. Second, when a thing counts as a being that is complete in some genus, and this thing is affected by the perfection of another genus as a result of being united to something else, the result is a per accidens being. For, once again, the specified ratio of a per se being is lacking here, Suárez says, and the thing in question is not possessed of a single essence. Generally, whenever there is something complete in its own genus, whatever is joined to it will constitute with it a per accidens being. It is therefore rightly said that where A and B belong to different categories, the union of them results in a per accidens being. The same is true, moreover, even when A and B belong to the same category but belong to diverse species or genera. From this, Suárez goes on to say, one can see that there are different kinds of per accidens being, and that these differ from each other in respect of degree. Furthest removed from a per se being is the per accidens being consisting in an aggregate of several beings, in which one finds several per se beings that are whole and perfect, heaped up without any union or even order, such as a pile of wheat or stones. The second class of per accidens being is said to consist in several complete per se beings which, though not physically united with each other, nevertheless maintain some order. This class exhibits great variety in respect of unity, since it includes armies, houses, mixed liquids composed of simple, imperfectly altered ones (e.g., wine diluted with water and oxymel), and even trees onto which the spray of another species has been grafted. To this class belong the products of art that are given as examples of per se beings in Metaph. V, ch. 6, for in comparison with that which is one only by aggregation, things of this class are wont to be called per se beings, “since intermediates share in the character of extremes” (DM 4.3.14). Finally, most like per se beings are the members

Introduction lxv



of the third class of per accidens being that Suárez mentions, the class consisting in composites of substance and accident. These are one to a greater degree than per accidens beings of the second type, since their components are not distinct particular substances, they are more physically united with one another, the substance is really in potency to the accident (albeit by an accidental potency), and the accident is a perfection of the substance to which it is joined. In all these ways, Suárez says, this sort of per accidens being more closely imitates a per se being. After noting again that the division into the one per se and the one per accidens coincides with the division into the one without qualification and the one in a certain respect (DM 4.3.15), Suárez further clarifies that the unity at issue here is real unity. Distinct from this is unity of reason, such as the unity of the genus or species, which is a product of the mind’s comparing distinct things. This latter sort of unity is not contained in the division into the one per se and the one per accidens, although Suárez adds that if one wanted to include rational unity under this division, it would be “that unity which is most of all in a certain respect” (DM 4.3.17). Finally, Suárez closes the section by underlining a distinction referred to earlier, between the unity that a being possesses precisely by reason of its own entity, and another unity attributable to it by reason of another being joined to it. For example, there is the unity that a material substance has precisely as such, and distinct from this is the quantitative unity which it has by reason of the quantity inherent in it, as well as whatever further unity it might have by reason of other accidents inherent in it, such as its color. The unity that agrees with a being immediately and per se, he explains, can be called per se unity, not in the sense in which per se is distinguished from per accidens, but in the sense in which per se is distinguished from per aliud (“through another”). Even the per accidens unity of pale Peter is in this sense a per se unity, since the per accidens unity attaching to the composite of Peter and pallor is not due to some third thing distinct from both. Unity which is per se in this sense, Suárez explains, can be called “entitative” or “intrinsic” unity, while unity that is per aliud can be called “extrinsic” or “denominative.”

lxvi Introduction

DM 4.4: The division of being into one and many Aristotle was commonly taken by Scholastic philosophers to have articulated a division of being into one and many. The precise origins of this attribution, its basis or justification in the texts of Aristotle, and the exact nature of the division itself are not especially clear.76 Thomas Aquinas, for one, affirms in Summa contra gentiles I, ch. 50, that Aristotle proves in Metaph. IV that one and many are per se accidents of being qua being,77 although at Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, he instead refers to the one that is converted with being and the many which corresponds to it as “first differences of being.”78 Whatever Aquinas’s considered opinion regarding the nature of the division, there is room to doubt whether Aristotle ever advances it. To be sure, Aristotle was traditionally read as claiming in Metaph. IV, ch. 2, that one (τὸ ἕν) is a property of being, but he there includes multitude (πλῆθος) among the things studied by the philosopher, not on the grounds that it too is a property of being, but on the grounds that it falls to a single science to investigate opposites, and multitude is opposed to unity. Suárez, for his part, claims that Aristotle advances the division of being into one and many in Metaph. X.79 However, although Aristotle does discuss the one and the many beginning in ch. 3 of that book, he never explicitly states that being is divided into one and many. Suárez, one suspects, is reading Metaph. X through a rather thick lens of commentary. 76. The attribution may have a source in Avicenna, who in bk. I, ch. 2, of his Metaphysics claims that the one and the many (mithla ­al-wāh.idi ­wa-l-kathīri) are like proper accidents of being, although the words “the one and the many” were rendered into Latin as unum et multum (“one and much”). See Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, translated by Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), p. 10, and Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, sive scientia divina I–IV, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain & Leiden: Peeters & Brill, 1977), p. 13. 77. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 13 (Romae: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918), p. 144b: “Per se autem accidentia entis, inquantum est ens, sunt unum et multa, ut probatur in IV Metaph.” 78. See Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66b: “Est ergo differentia inter duas opiniones primas, quia prima non distinguit inter unum et multa, prout sunt in genere quantitatis, et prout sunt primae differentiae entis.” 79. Suárez cites Metaph. X, ch. 1 (which coincides with our ch. 1 up to 1052b18) in particular, but this seems to be a mistake. He more likely means to cite ch. 5, which coincides with our ch. 3.

Introduction lxvii



Be that as it may, Suárez opens section 4 by announcing that he has thus far explained the ratio of the unit “and its various modes” (DM 4.4.1). By modes of unity here he seems to have in mind not just per se unity and per accidens unity, but also the various per se unities characterizing quantities, qualities, etc., that were likewise discussed in the last section, since quantitative unity is explicitly described as a mode of unity in DM 4.1.4. Two tasks therefore remain, he now says. First, it must be explained how one is converted with being and is an adequate passion of it, and second, it must be determined which unity is an adequate passion or property of being. As regards the former task, Suárez explains that one’s status as a passion of being seems difficult to reconcile with Aristotle’s claim in Metaph. X that being is divided by one and many. After all, the one cannot be both a particular type of being distinguished from another type of being—the many—while also being converted or counterpredicated with being in general, or with that which is divided into one and many. By way of response, Suárez reaffirms that one is indeed a passion or property of being, and he both cites authorities and offers arguments in support of this claim (DM 4.4.3). Regarding the challenge, Suárez presents two different ways of reconciling one’s status as both a property of being and a dividing member of being. The first takes as its ­starting-point Aquinas’s claim in ST I, q. 11, art. 1, ad 2, that “being is divided by the one and the many as by the one without qualification and the many in a certain respect,” since “a multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it were some way contained under one.”80 As Suárez understands it, Aquinas’s claim here is that a genuine or actual multitude is not a dividing member of being, and that the many which is said to be a dividing member of being is that which is one without qualification but potentially many—that is, the composite or divisible. So understood, he explains, the members of the division “are not necessarily distinguished in reality, but only rationally,” since one and the same thing can be both one without qualification and potentially many (DM 4.3.4). This will be the case, at least, unless we take 80. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108a–b: “ens dividitur per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi contineretur aliquo modo sub uno.”

lxviii Introduction the one here to be that which is one without qualification and in no way many, not even potentially, and the many here to be that which is one without qualification and potentially many, in which case the division will be equivalent to the division of per se being into the simple and the composite. Either way, Suárez observes, the division is perfectly compatible with the claim that being and one are converted or counterpredicated. The second way of reconciling one’s status as both a property of being and a dividing member of being takes as its ­starting-point Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas’s claim at ST I, q. 11, art. 1, ad 2. As Cajetan understands it, Suárez explains, Aquinas is to be understood as affirming that being is divided into what is without qualification one and what is one only in a certain respect, or equivalently, into the one per se and the one per accidens.81 When the division is understood in this way, what is divided is not per se being, but being that abstracts from per se being and per accidens being. Moreover, this understanding of the division of being into one and many is compatible with the convertibility of one and being, since “as each thing is one, so is it a being, so that, if it is a per se being, it is also one per se, whereas if it is a per accidens being, it is also one per accidens” (DM 4.4.6).

DM 4.5: The analogical character of being’s division into one and many The question addressed in this section is whether the division of being into one and many is univocal or analogical, that is, whether being is predicated of the dividing members univocally or analogically. Suárez’s view is that, however the division is understood, whether as a division of per se being—in accordance with Aquinas’s view—or as a division into per se being and per accidens being—in accordance with Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas—it is analogical. However, Suárez holds that there is a kind of analogy—the s­ o-called analogy of intrinsic attribution—that involves a single ratio or objective concept, which is why he can hold that being is analogical even though the objective concept of 81. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109b.

Introduction lxix



being is rationally one and rationally prescinded from its inferiors.82 So there is, for him, the further question of whether there is a single ratio or nature that is divided into one and many, just as there is, in his view, a single ratio of being that is divided into finite and infinite83 (see DM 28). If not, and there is no single ratio that is divided into one and many, then the division is merely of a word’s various significations. If the division is understood as Cajetan understands it, Suárez explains, it is analogical by an analogy of proportionality, which rules out a single ratio or objective concept. For, Suárez argues, to be one is to be undivided, and indivision is not found in what is one per accidens except in a rather attenuated sense and “according to a certain apprehension or relation,” from which it follows that the ratio of the unit agrees with what is one per accidens only “by a certain proportionality or imitation” (DM 4.5.2). Therefore, since being and one proportionately correspond to one another, being as well will agree with the one per accidens only by a certain proportionality or imitation. Besides, a being is called a being (ens) from essence (essentia) or existence (existentia), and in a per accidens being or multitude there is not an essence or an existence, but essences or existences. Nonetheless, Suárez observes, someone might object that unity of ratio is here ruled out only insofar as the one per accidens includes items that are one only by aggregation, such as a pile of stones, and that the other two kinds of per accidens unit identified by him at DM 4.3.14 can be contained with the per se unit under a single concept of the transcendentally one. In response, Suárez grants that since composites of substance and accident involve a true and physical union, they possess a unity that has a real agreement with the unity of a substantial composite, and that for this reason composites of substance and accident are legitimately conceived as per se one in some way. The matter is more doubtful in the case of houses and other products of art, however, “since in their case a real and physical union does not obtain, nor, consequently, a real indivision” (DM 4.5.4). Nonetheless, in the end Suárez 82. On this, see the introduction to Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation II: On the Essential Concept or the Concept of Being, xiii–xxxii. 83. Suárez discusses the division of being into finite and infinite (which he takes to be the first division of being) in DM 28 (“On the First Division of Being, into the Infinite without Qualification and the Finite, and Other Divisions Equivalent to This One.”)

lxx Introduction asserts that the inclusion of such artifacts under the concept of per se unity “can easily be defended, since the same composition with some conjunction or coordination is some sort of union that is sufficient for these beings to be conceived as per se one in some way” (DM 4.5.4). Indeed, he notes, it is for this reason that he said back in the First Disputation that such items, insofar as they are conceived as one per se, are directly contained under the object of metaphysics (DM 1.1.5). When the division of being into one and many is conceived as a division of per se being, Suárez explains, then the sort of analogy at work here allows for a single objective concept. That the division cannot be conceived as univocal, moreover, clearly follows from the fact that God is not a being univocally with creatures. Someone might argue that the negation of internal division that one signifies is predicated univocally of both God and creatures, since other negative predicates like immaterial can be predicated univocally of angels and God. Suárez, however, replies that even if this is true, one is nonetheless predicated analogically of God and creatures, since, as was argued in DM 4.2, one formally signifies not only the negation of internal division, but undivided entity.

DM 4.6: How one and many are opposed Aristotle recognizes four different kinds of opposition. Opposites (ἀντικείμενα) may be related as relatives (τὰ πρός τι), as contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), as privation and possession (στέρησις καὶ ἕξις), or as affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις).84 In Metaph. X, ch. 3, which begins with the question of how one and many are opposed, Aristotle was commonly read as claiming: (i) one and many are not opposed relatively, since neither is said in relation to something else (in the way something is called double in relation to its half and something is called half in relation to its double), and (ii) one and many are not opposed contradictorily, since any thing, whether a being or not, must be either A or n ­ ot-A, but neither one nor many is truly predicated of a ­non-being.85 Aristotle was also commonly taken as arguing in the 84. See Aristotle, Cat., ch. 10. 85. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a20–29. See also Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum

Introduction lxxi



same passage that one and many are opposed in some respects privatively and in some respects contrarily, and this, according to Suárez, because: (iii) one and many cannot be opposed purely privatively (in the manner of sight and blindness), since neither consists in a privation alone, but involves something positive, and (iv) they cannot be opposed purely contrarily (in the manner of blackness and whiteness), since each formally includes some negation. Suárez also notes that in Aquinas’s opinion, the opposition between one and many is more like the opposition between a privation and a habit, “since one [. . .] is opposed to many as the undivided is opposed to the divided” (DM 4.6.1). Here, division is conceived as a habit and indivision as the corresponding privation. Suárez’s own discussion of how one and many are opposed begins by distinguishing two ways in which the many can be compared to the one, namely, insofar as the many is many, and insofar as the many is in some way one. It is in the latter way, Suárez says, that the many counts as a member dividing being (on Cajetan’s understanding of the division, it should be noted). And so conceived, Suárez explains, “it differs from the one spoken of without qualification as the imperfect differs from the perfect, and in this way they are like two disparate and distinct rationes” (DM 4.6.2). On the other hand, when the many is conceived as many, the one and the many can be compared with respect to the positive element each includes, or they can be compared with respect to their negative elements. In the former way, Suárez says, one and many are related as part and whole, since units are parts of a multitude. Petri Fonsecae Lusitani, Doctoris Theologi, Societatis Jesu, In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Decimum, Undecimum, & Duodecimum, cum Sequentium Duorum Interpretatione: Tomus IV (Coloniae: Sumptibus Haeredum Lazari Zetzneri, 1629), p. 16a: “That one and many are not contradictories is clear from this, because it is always the case that one part of a contradiction is predicated of any being or ­non-being, whereas neither one nor many is predicated of ­non-beings, for the unit is nothing other than undivided being, while a multitude is several units, so to speak. But that they are not opposed relatively is clear, both because one and many are clearly absolute, and also because neither correlative [in a pair of correlatives] is negative or privative, as the unit is.” (Quod autem unum & multa non sint contradictoria, ex eo perspicuum est, quia semper altera contradictionis pars dicitur de quovis ente sive non ente, cum interim nec unum nec multa dicatur de non entibus; Est enim unum nihil aliud quam ens indivisum, multitudo autem plura una, ut ita loquar. Quod vero nec sint relative opposita manifestum est, tum quia unum & multa plane sunt absoluta, tum etiam quia neutrum correlativorum est negativum seu privativum, ut est unum.)

lxxii Introduction In the latter way, he explains, they “seem to be mutually opposed privatively according to diverse rationes, for one includes the negation of division, which pertains to the ratio of multitude, whereas multitude includes the negation of identity, or the negation of real conjunction, which pertains to the ratio of unity” (DM 4.6.2). The claim, in other words, is that the unit stands to the many as a privation does to its habit insofar as the unit includes the negation of something included in the many—namely, the division by which one member of a multitude is divided from another—and that the many likewise stands to the unit as a privation does to its habit insofar as the many includes the negation of something included in the unit—namely, identity or “real conjunction.” However, Suárez continues, since a multitude involves unity and requires indivision in each of the unities from which the same multitude is constituted, whereas one, to the contrary, does not include multitude, nor the division which pertains to the ratio of multitude, but rather denies it, one is therefore said without qualification to be opposed to multitude in the manner of a privation, rather than the other way around. (DM 4.6.2)

This is not terribly clear, but presumably the thought is that a privation does not require or presuppose its corresponding habit and the things constitutive of it. Therefore, since a multitude requires or presupposes units and the indivision that each such unit involves, whereas the unit does not require or presuppose multitude or the division that multitude involves (which it seems even to deny), it is better to understand the unit as the privation of multitude rather than the other way around. After arguing that Aquinas’s considered view is also that the unit composes a multitude by virtue of both its positive and negative elements (DM 4.6.3), Suárez further notes that one and many can be compared as measure and thing measured, which involves a relation. He argues, however, that the relation here is not real, but rational.

Introduction lxxiii

DM 4.7: The priority of the one in respect of the many, and the priority of indivision in respect of division

Suárez opens this section by noting that according to the Thomists unity is prior to multitude and division prior to indivision. With respect to unity and multitude, Suárez agrees, saying that unity’s priority relative to multitude is per se evident, in part because multitude is defined by appeal to unity, rather than vice versa. Regarding division and indivision, however, Suárez disagrees with the Thomists’ view that division is by its nature prior to indivision and therefore unity. After noting that the division and indivision at issue here are internal division and indivision, Suárez affirms that the internal division of a single being is “is in no way really prior to the unit or to the indivision included in it” (DM 4.7.3). The argument for this position assumes that internal division and indivision can be compared in either of two ways: first, “generally and in their entire extension,” and second, as they are found in each being. In the first way, he claims, indivision is prior to division, for “that some being is in itself undivided is prior to there being some division of one being from another, or to there being some division of some being in itself ” (prius est ens aliquod esse in se indivisum, quam quod sit aliqua divisio unius entis ab alio, vel alicuius entis in se ipso). The claim here seems to be that the existence of a being undivided in itself does not presuppose either the actual division of one being from another or the actual internal division of some being. After all, before creation God existed undivided in himself but there was no other being from which he could be divided, nor any being that was internally divided. In the second way, moreover, “each being by virtue of its nature has indivision in itself before division” (DM 4.7.3). The claim, presumably, is that to say of some being that it has been internally divided presupposes that it previously enjoyed a state of internal indivision. As regards the claim that if indivision is opposed to division as a privation is opposed to its corresponding habit, then division must be prior, since a habit is always prior to its privation, Suárez grants that in the case of a privation, strictly s­ o-called, the habit is by nature prior

lxxiv Introduction to the privation, and this because such a privation is found only in a subject which is by nature suited to the habit, with the result that the subject is related to the habit prior to its being related to the privation. However, Suárez adds, this is not necessary in the case of negations which are privations only in a looser sense, as the indivision signified by “one” is. He here offers, by way of example, two negations which are privations only in a looser sense, immateriality and the human being’s lack of teeth prior to their first appearance. Immaterial being (esse immateriale), he insists, is by its nature prior in reality to material being (esse materiale), and in the order of generation the human being’s lacking teeth is prior to her having them. What’s more, the latter negation more closely approaches the ratio of a privation strictly ­so-called than the unit’s internal indivision does. Therefore, it is even less necessary that internal division be prior by nature to internal indivision. In support of this conclusion Suárez adduces a passage in which Aquinas states that division is prior to unity, not without qualification, but according to the nature of our apprehension (ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4).86 By nature, then, indivision is prior to division, though in relation to us division is said to be prior to indivision because we cognize indivision as a negation, with the result that that of which it is the negation—namely, division—must be apprehended by us first, since for us affirmation is always prior to negation.

86. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b: “one is opposed privatively to many inasmuch as included in the ratio of the many is the fact that they are divided. For this reason, it must be the case that division is prior to unity, not without qualification, but according to the ratio of our apprehension. For we apprehend simple things through composites, for which reason we define the point as that which has no part, or as the principle of a line.” (Ad quartum dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita: unde definimus punctum, cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae.)

Introduction lxxv

DM 4.8: Whether the division into one and many is the first division of being

The question discussed in DM 4.8 is whether the first division of being is the division into the finite and the infinite or the division into the one and the many. Early in the section, Suárez attributes to the Thomists the view that the first division of being is the latter one. Soncinas and Javelli are mentioned by name as holders of this view. His own opinion, it will become clear, is that the division of being into finite and infinite is the first of all. At the outset, however, he pits Scotus against the Thomists, explaining that Scotus understands the division of being into finite and infinite to be prior to the division of being into one and many. Later, Suárez will explain that Scotus recognizes a division of being that is prior even to this one, namely, the division into quantified and unquantified (quantum & non quantum), where the quantity characterizing the first member of this division and lacking in the second member is quantity of perfection. This division is for Scotus prior, Suárez will explain, because according to Scotus there can be a real being that has no perfection, and the division into infinite and finite is a division of quantified being in particular. The argument that Suárez here attributes to Scotus affirms that the division of being into finite and infinite is prior to the division into one and many because finite and infinite divide being as being, whereas the division into one and many divide being insofar as it is one: since the ratio of being is prior to the ratio of the unit, the division that agrees with being insofar as it is being is prior to the division that agrees with it insofar as it is one. Similarly, Suárez says, if there were various modes of rationality and risibility in human beings, the division according to modes of rationality would be prior to the division by modes of risibility. Soncinas, to the contrary, argues that the first division of being is into one and many, which he understands to be a division into per se being and per accidens being. Soncinas attributes this view to Aquinas, Suárez reports, on the grounds that Aquinas maintains that being first presents itself to the intellect, then division, then unity, then multitude. Soncinas also argues that one agrees with being even insofar as it ab-

lxxvi Introduction stracts from finite and infinite, and therefore prior to being’s division into finite and infinite. Against Soncinas, however, Suárez argues that when Aquinas affirms that the intellect grasps being, division, unity, and multitude in this order he is not comparing the division of being into one and many with the division into finite and infinite. In fact, he says, from this sequence of intellectual apprehensions nothing can be inferred about which division is prior according to Aquinas. Moreover, Soncinas’s argument that one agrees with being prior to being’s division into finite and infinite proves nothing, for a comparison is not rightly made between one, qua adequate passion of being, and the division into finite and infinite. What needs to be compared to the latter division is the division into one and many, insofar as this is the division of a single ratio or objective concept, that is, a division of being understood as the adequate object of metaphysics. As regards Javelli, the Italian Dominican proposes various divisions of being and affirms a particular ordering of them, Suárez explains, but he offers an argument only for the claim that being is divided into one and many prior to its being divided into finite and infinite. This argument alleges that being is divided into finite and infinite only insofar as it is good, since this division is with respect to perfection, and to be perfect is to be good. But the division of being into one and many is a division of being insofar as it is one. Therefore, since one is prior to good, the latter division is prior to the former. Suárez prefaces the statement of his own view by noting, first, that the present question concerns the division of that being which is the object of metaphysics. This includes per se beings strictly s­ o-called as well as per accidens beings of the second and third type identified at DM 4.3.14, but neither beings by aggregation nor beings of reason. This object is what he calls per se being taken in the most common way (communissime sumptum). Second, Suárez identifies three ways in which various divisions of first philosophy’s adequate object can be compared: (i) in terms of universality, so that a given division is to be judged prior to another when the latter is contained under the former, as the division into quantified and unquantified is more universal, according to Scotus, than the division into finite and infinite; (ii) in terms

Introduction lxxvii



of the distance separating the dividing members, so that a division will be prior if its “dividing members differ primarily and to a greater degree” (DM 4.8.6); and (iii) in terms of the relation that the dividing members bear to the thing divided, so that a division whose “members per se and formally contract the thing divided according to its proper formal ratio” is prior to one whose members do not (DM 4.8.6). According to Suárez, neither the division of being into finite and infinite nor the division into one and many is prior to the other in terms of universality, even if Scotus would object that there is something that is neither finite nor infinite in perfection, for in fact there is no real being which is lacking altogether in perfection. When compared in the second way, however, the division into infinite and finite is seen to be prior, since this is the division into God and creature, and God is infinitely distant from even the creature that most closely resembles him in respect of perfection, whereas the distance between a human being and an army (say) is considerably less. Finally, when compared in the third way, the division of being into finite and infinite is again seen to be prior to the division of being into one and many, as the argument attributed earlier to Scotus proves. As regards Javelli’s argument, Suárez further notes, it is false that finite and infinite divide being insofar as it is good, where good is taken for a passion of being. For “to have some perfection as such is not a passion of real being, but the essence” (DM 4.8.11).

DM 4.9: Whether transcendental unity is numerical unity As Suárez notes at the outset of this section, the expression “numerical unity” (unitas numerica) can be taken in two ways—in one way, for quantitative unity, and in another way, for singular or individual unity. The former, according to Suárez, characterizes quantity per se, and although it agrees denominatively and accidentally with a material substance by virtue of the quantity inherent in it, it is to be distinguished from such a substance’s proper entitative or transcendental unity. Singular unity, on the other hand, is found in any individual being (e.g., Peter, Miriam’s coloring, Zayd’s quantity) and is properly contrasted

lxxviii Introduction with formal unity, both specific and generic. Suárez devotes most of this section to quantitative unity and its relation to transcendental unity. After rejecting the view, attributed to Avicenna, that transcendental unity just is quantitative unity, Suárez argues that the unity found in a quantity is a particular type of transcendental unity, and that it consists in nothing other than the quantity’s being undivided. The last few paragraphs of the section are devoted to transcendental unity’s relation to singular unity. Here Suárez asks whether transcendental unity is to be identified with singular unity, in particular, and he replies that transcendental unity is not to be limited to singular unity but includes formal unity as well. Regarding the question of whether transcendental unity is to be identified with quantitative unity, Suárez affirms that Avicenna thought so, and that he accordingly held that one adds quantity to being. Against this view, Suárez notes that if it is true, we shall have to say either that all beings are quantified, which is false, or that one is not an adequate passion of being but is found only in material beings, which is likewise false. Moreover, he has already argued that in a material being there is an entitative unity that is distinct from its quantitative unity. However, Suárez continues, if we merely claim, with Durandus of Saint Pourçain (1270/5–1334), that the unity of a quantity is “one of the transcendental unities”—in other words, that quantitative unity is the entitative or transcendental unity of a quantity in particular—then the view is certainly plausible (DM 4.9.3). After noting that it presupposes that a material substance and its quantity are really distinct, Suárez observes that if we deny the view then we shall have to affirm that there are “two unities in a single quantity, one transcendental and the other quantitative, which is superfluous and can hardly be conceived by the mind” (DM 4.9.4). Nonetheless, he says, some have affirmed precisely this, and they support their view by appeal to Aquinas’s assertion that quantitative unity differs from transcendental unity because the former adds to a being something real and positive, whereas the latter does not. These thinkers, in other words, take Aquinas to have thought, not merely that the quantitative and transcendental unities of a material substance (say) must be distinguished, since the quantitative unity which belongs denominatively and accidentally to a substance adds

Introduction lxxix



something real and positive to it, unlike its entitative or transcendental unity, but that even in a quantity these two unities must be distinguished. Their main argument, Suárez explains, appeals to the view that a plurality of quantitative unities constitutes a real being—namely, a number or discrete quantity. The thought is that only if a quantity’s quantitative unity is distinct from its transcendental unity can one explain how a plurality of quantitative unities constitutes a being of a particular type, rather than a mere transcendental multitude, which is not a real species of being. Capreolus (1380–1444), Javelli, and Giles of Rome (1243/7–1316) are mentioned as proponents of this view. According to Capreolus, Suárez explains, quantitative unity adds something real and positive to a quantity and for this reason differs from the quantity’s transcendental unity. This added thing, moreover, is what makes quantitative unity a principle of number or discrete quantity. As regards the question of what this added thing is, Suárez says that Capreolus “seems” (videtur) to hold that it is necessary to distinguish two things in a quantity, the form of continuity and the being (esse) that a continuous quantity gives to a subject, and he affirms that this being is what quantitative unity adds to quantity. Motivating Capreolus here, Suárez explains, is the belief that the form of continuity does not deserve to be called unity, since it is not indivisible, being divided when its subject is, whereas the being that the form of continuity gives to the subject is indeed indivisible, for when the subject or form of continuity is divided, each of the resulting parts has a new being, and not the being that it had before. For this reason, Suárez notes, Capreolus holds that this being which quantitative unity adds is really distinct from the quantity itself. Giles, on the other hand, agrees with Capreolus in holding that quantitative unity adds something real, but he also maintains that this added thing is only rationally distinguished from the quantity. For, according to Giles, insofar as it extends the parts of a substance, a quantity is called a continuous quantity, but insofar as it perfects a substance without regard to its parts, it is termed unity. Yet others, Suárez adds, hold that quantitative unity adds to quantity the ratio of a measure. Suárez presents three objections to Capreolus’s view. First, he claims that the distinction between the being (esse) that a quantity gives and

lxxx Introduction the quantity itself is “fictitious and clearly unintelligible” (DM 4.9.6). Second, even if the distinction is allowed, what Capreolus affirms of quantity will likewise have to be said of any other form, so that it will also be necessary to draw a distinction between the form of whiteness and its unity, which Suárez clearly thinks absurd. Third, even if a quantity and the being that it gives are distinct, there is no reason to suppose this being any more indivisible than the quantity. “For,” Suárez says, “who is there who believes that, when wood is divided, the same quantity that existed before remains in each of the divided parts, and that the same being of the quantity which the same quantity contributed does not remain?” (DM 4.9.6). In any case, Capreolus is wrong to think that indivisibility pertains to the ratio of unity, since it has been shown that not indivisibility, but indivision, pertains to this ratio. Against Giles’s version of the view, Suárez complains that quantity perfects a substance only by extending its parts, and that it is contradictory to say that quantity has the ratio of quantitative unity insofar as it abstracts from the parts of a substance, since it pertains to the ratio of this unity that it be in a substance that is quantified and possessed of parts. As regards the view that quantitative unity adds to quantity the ratio of a measure, Suárez objects that the ratio of a measure does not enter into the essence of unity, but instead belongs to unity in the manner of a property, as Aquinas teaches. He also objects that if the ratio of measure is conceived as an aptitude really existing in a quantitative unity before any operation of the intellect, then it is no more present in a quantitative unit in relation to number than it is in a transcendental unit in relation to multitude. If, on the other hand, it is considered in relation to the intellect, as a denomination coming from the mind, then it does not pertain to quantitative unity as it exists in reality. Finally, all the arguments presented in DM 4.1 for the view that one adds only a negation to being succeed when applied to the view that quantitative unity adds something positive to quantity. Particularly effective here, Suárez says, is that argument by which it was shown that a being is correctly conceived to be one even if it is conceived in isolation from the positive thing which unity allegedly adds to it (DM 4.1.11). After presenting these arguments, Suárez endorses Durandus’s view that quantitative unity is simply a quantity’s transcendental unity, and

Introduction lxxxi



that it adds to quantity only a negation, namely, the negation of internal division. He also explains that when Aquinas claims that quantitative unity, unlike transcendental unity, adds something positive, he is to be understood as affirming that quantitative unity adds to a substance something positive under a negation, namely, undivided quantity. Finally, Suárez explains that transcendental unity is found across the categories, that quantitative unity belongs per se only to items in the category of quantity, and that quantitative unity belongs accidentally and denominatively to material substances and other material accidents but is to be distinguished from their transcendental unity. The other question dealt with in this section is whether transcendental unity is to be identified with singular unity, which belongs to every individual being, regardless of category. In favor of this identification, Suárez observes, is the fact that transcendental unity is a passion of real being and must therefore be a real unity. Accordingly, since there is no real unity other than singular unity, singular unity alone is transcendental unity. The same conclusion is confirmed by appeal to the fact that numerical or singular unity is converted with real being, for everything that is numerically one is a real being, since even if a being of reason—a species, say—can be called numerically one, this is so “equivocally through extrinsic denomination alone” (DM 4.9.12),87 and every real being is numerically one, since only what exists in reality or is capable of real existence counts as a real being, and “in reality there is nothing but the singular, nor is anything capable of real existence except an individual thing” (DM 4.9.12). But if real being and the singular or numerical unit are converted, singular unity is the same as transcendental unity. However, Suárez goes on to say, this view involves a number of difficulties. For starters, it seems to be contradicted by Aristotle in a number of texts. After all, Aristotle includes specific, generic and analogical unity among the unities of being, and he says generally that anything lacking in division, insofar as it is such, is in this way called one. Moreover, he explicitly says that it pertains to the metaphysician to deal with the genus and species, since they are included among the 87. See DM 6.2.12.

lxxxii Introduction passions of being, inasmuch as they are contained under unity. In addition, an adequate passion of some common object should agree not just with the object’s inferiors, “but also with the same common object taken in itself and formally” (DM 4.9.13). Therefore, one must agree with being as such, which is not numerically one, but only analogically one. Further, anything called a being is transcendentally one. But being is said not only of individuals; it is said also of common natures as such. And this is why Aristotle says in On Interpretation that some beings are universal, others particular.88 Therefore, transcendental unity extends beyond individual or singular unity. Suárez closes his discussion by saying that a complete treatment of the question depends “on an understanding of that difficult question regarding formal and numerical unity, how they differ from each other, and whether each is a true unity existing in things, and consequently whether universal unity also exists in things” (DM 4.9.14). Accordingly, since individual unity is the topic of DM 5, and formal as well as universal unity the topic of DM 6, Suárez confines himself here to briefly stating that transcendental unity “is not to be limited to singular or universal unity, material or formal unity,” but “comprehends every unity that can be found in some real being or in the formal ratio of a real being” (DM 4.9.14). Therefore, any ratio of a real per se being, insofar as it is undivided in itself, will be a transcendental unity. 88. Aristotle, De Int., ch. 7, 17a38–39.

Remarks on Latin Text and Translation Remarks on Latin Text and Translation

Re m a r k s on th e L ati n Te x t a nd English Tr a nsl ation

My s­ tarting-point in the preparation of the Latin text that appears in this edition was the electronic version of the Third and Fourth Disputations prepared by Michael Renemann and Salvador Castellote.1 This version is based on a scan of the Latin text that appears together with the Spanish translation of Sergio Rábade et al.2 The latter text, moreover, is substantially the same as the one that appears in volumes 25 and 26 of the Vivès edition of Suárez’s works, although Rábade and his colleagues do sometimes make corrections to the text of the Vivès edition—without drawing attention to that fact—on the strength of readings found in earlier editions.3 I have, however, made changes to Renemann and Castellote’s text so as to bring it into line with the text of the first edition.4 Where the text of the Vivès edition differs from that of the first edition, I have signaled that fact in a footnote, and I have also given the readings found in various early editions, which are listed in the bibliography of this volume.5 1. See “Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae,” prepared by Michael Renemann and Salvador Castellote, last updated June 12, 2020, http://homepage.­ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ Michael.Renemann/suarez/index.html. 2. Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones metafísicas, ed. and trans. S. Rábade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, and Antonio Puigcerver Zanón, 7 vols. (Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1960–66). 3. Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vols. 25 & 26 (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1861). 4. Francisco Suárez, Metaphysicarum Disputationum, in quibus et universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, & quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur, Tomus Prior (Salmanticae: apud Ioannem & Andream Renaut Fratres, 1597). 5. My procedure in establishing the Latin text of DM 3 and 4 is the same as that used in my preparation of the Latin text of DM 1. For more on this procedure and my reasons for it, see “Remarks on the Latin Text and English Translation” in: Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics, trans. Shane Duarte (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021), xci–xcv.

lxxxiii

lxxxiv

Remarks on Latin Text and Translation

For ease of reference, I have retained the numbering of paragraphs found in the Vivès edition, which differs in spots from that of the first edition. I have also inserted into the Latin text bracketed page numbers that reproduce the paginations of both the first edition and the Vivès edition. The numbers appearing in square brackets—e.g., “[38a]”—refer to the pagination of the first edition, while the letters “a” and “b” immediately following these numbers refer to the first and second columns (respectively) appearing on that page. The numbers appearing in angled brackets—e.g., “⟨64a⟩”—refer to the pagination of the Vivès edition, and the letters which appear there refer (again) to columns. Most of the notes on the English translation of DM 3 and 4 serve to clarify or bring additional specificity to Suárez’s references to other authors. These notes are an important tool for the reader, in part because Suárez’s ways of citing other authors frequently differ from our own. This is often the case with his references to Aristotle’s works, since the chapter divisions of these works in Suárez’s day often differ from the ones we are familiar with. (There were even different and competing chapter divisions current at the time.) Accordingly, if Suárez refers to (say) Posterior Analytics I, ch. 7, but my note refers to Posterior Analytics I, ch. 9, 76a15–25, the reader should not assume that I am endeavoring to correct Suárez’s citation. I am rather ­re-casting it so as to bring it into line with our modern editions of Aristotle’s works. (Any corrections I make to Suárez’s citations are explicitly identified as corrections.) The reader will also see that Suárez often refers to a numbered text in a particular book of (say) Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This was a common way of citing a passage in Aristotle and is based on a division of books into numbered texts, which is a division that existed alongside their division into chapters. This division into numbered texts is not reproduced in recent translations of Aristotle’s works, or even in recent editions of medieval Latin translations of them. Other notes on Suárez’s citations refer the reader to various editions of works by other authors. A complete list of these editions will be found in the bibliography. I do not always refer the reader to a recent edition of such a work, or to a recent reproduction of some early edition. My choice of which edition to cite has been guided, for the most part, by considerations of reliability and availability. Having looked



Remarks on Latin Text and Translation lxxxv



through a good number of scans of early modern editions, I have found that such editions vary significantly in quality and reliability. Scans of most of the editions I have used are available for download from various sites, such as the HathiTrust Digital Library (https://www. hathitrust.org), the Internet Archive (https://archive.org), the Bavarian State Library (https://www.­bsb-muenchen.de), the ­Post-Reformation Digital Library (http://www.prdl.org/index.php), and Google Books (https://books.google.com). I have aimed for some measure of consistency in my rendering of key Latin words. The following are worth noting: cognitio cognition cognoscere to cognize to signifyd (in some contexts) dicere ens being esse  beinge, existencee, to existe (in some contexts) essendi being e, existing e existentia existence existere to exist notitia knowledgen notus, -a, -um knownn ratio accountr, argument, aspectr, basisr, characterr, classr, conceptr, conceptionr, considerationr, descriptionr, essencer, groundr, kindr, meaningr, methodr, naturer, notionr, rationaler, reason, respect r res thingr scientia knowledge, science scire to know significare signify unum what is one, one, unit unum transcendens transcendental unit, transcendentally one unitas unity

lxxxvi

Remarks on Latin Text and Translation

Those familiar with Latin know that it is frequently necessary to supply the English word “thing” when rendering Latin terms—e.g., album, “white thing.” This can be problematic in the context of scholastic philosophy, where res, “thing,” is a technical term. In order to spare the reader the need to look repeatedly over at the Latin text, I have, by means of a subscript “r,” indicated where “thing” renders res. As regards the Latin word ratio, it is not always possible or desirable to use one and the same English word to render it, even across instances where it is employed in pretty much the same sense—e.g., to mean something like nature or essence. (To do so leads to some rather ­strange-sounding expressions and can also lead to confusion—e.g., if one were to render ratio in ratio formalis as “concept.”) Therefore, since I have used various terms to render ratio, I have (for the most part) clearly indicated to the reader when one of these terms is being so used, again by means of a subscript “r.” (I do not, however, use a subscript “r” when I render ratio as “reason” or “argument.”) In many instances, readers should feel free to replace one of these terms with another, according as they see fit (e.g., “characterr” with “naturer,” or vice versa). I have also used subscript letters to mark various other distinctions—for example, between ens and esse (both of which can often be rendered “being”), and between scientia and notitia (both of which can often be rendered “knowledge”). The reader will note that Suárez often speaks of how a passion of being such as one “signifies” (dicit, significat) this or that. It is tempting to put “one” in quotation marks in such cases, to mark an instance of mention, rather than use, in accordance with the standard current practice among philosophers. But the reader will see that this is not always feasible. For example, Suárez writes: “if one is taken properly insofar as it signifies only to be internally undivided, it presupposes the entity of the thing and a union of parts” (si unum proprie sumatur, ut solum dicit esse in se indivisum, supponit rei entitatem, & unionem partium) (DM 4.1.25). It seems wrong to put “one” in quotation marks here, since to do so is to make Suárez out to be saying that the word “one” presupposes the entity of a thing and a union of parts. This is clearly not what he means. I have accordingly decided to omit quotation marks even when Suárez speaks of this or that as signifying something or oth-



Remarks on Latin Text and Translation lxxxvii



er. The result may strike the reader as odd. But it is an oddness that is there in the text, and to start inserting quotation marks here and there would be to conceal that fact. Finally, the reader is advised that in the first edition of the Metaphysical Disputations, there are no headers for sections 6 through 8 of DM 4. The headers that appear here have been supplied by me.

Latin Abbreviations Latin Abbreviations

L ati n a bbr e v i ations

Please note: I have given one form of the word corresponding to the abbreviation, normally the nominative form, unless the case of the word can be inferred from the abbreviation. But of course in many instances Suárez would have the reader understand the word to be in some case other than the nominative. E.g., when a text is being cited, ‘cap.’ should be read as ‘capite.’

& et &c.

et caetera

1 p. q. 54, art. 2 Summa Theologiae I, quaestio 54, articulus 2

1. par. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 4. Summa Theologiae I, quaestio 11, articulus 2, responsio ad quartum

Aegid. Aegidius



Alex. Alens.

Alexander Alensis



Ant. An.

Antonius Andreae



Anton. An.

Antonius Andreae



ar. articulus



Arist. Aristoteles



Aristot. Aristoteles



Aristotel. Aristoteles



art. articulus



artic. articulus



Averr. Averroes



Avicen. Avicenna



c. caput

lxxxix

xc

Latin Abbreviations

ca. caput ca. de Opposit.

caput de Oppositis



Caiet. Caietanus



Caietan. Caietanus



cap. caput



cap. de prop.

caput de proprio



cap. de Propr.

caput de Proprio



Capreol. Capreolus



cit. locis

citatis locis



cit. loco

citato loco



com. commentus



comm. commentus



Commen. Commentator



Commentat. Commentator



d.



D. Th.

Divus Thomas



D. Tho.

Divus Thomas



D. Thom.

Divus Thomas



D. Thoma.

Divus Thomas



de divin. nomin.



De passionib.



de pot.

De potentia



de Poten.

De potentia



de verit.

De veritate



dict. art.

dictus articulus



dict. lib.

dictus liber



dict. quaest.



dict. solut.

distinctio

De divinis nominibus De passionibus

dicta quaestio dicta solutio



Dionys. Dionysius



disp. disputatio



Latin Abbreviations xci



Disput. Disputatio



dist. distinctio



distin. distinctio



distinct. distinctio



Div. Divus



Dur. Durandus



Durand. Durandus



Fland.

Flandria or Flandrensis



Fonsec. Fonseca



Gabr. Gabriel



Greg. Gregorius



Gregor. Gregorius



Henric. Henricus



Iandun. Iandunus



Iavel. Iavellus



Iavell. Iavellus



in 2. d. 3. q. 2 In secundum librum Sententiarum, distinctio 3, quaestio 2 lect.

lectio



li. liber



lib. liber



memb. membrum

Met. Metaphysica Metap. Metaphysica Metaph. Metaphysica metaph. Metaphysica Metaphys. Metaphysica

opusc. opusculum

Ord. Ordinatio Periher. Perihermenias

xcii

Latin Abbreviations

Phys. Physica Physic. Physica

Poster. (Analytica) Posteriora



Posterior. (Analytica) Posteriora

praedic. c. de proprio

praedicabilia caput de proprio

Praedic. cap. de quant.

Praedicamenta caput de quantitate



q. quaestio



quaest. quaestio



quodl. quodlibet



quodlib. quodlibet



S. Bonav.

Sanctus Bonaventura



S. Bonaven.

Sanctus Bonaventura



sect. sectio



seq. sequens



Soncin. Soncinas



tex. textus



text. textus



Thom. de Argent.

Thomas de Argentina

tract. tractatus tract. de transc.

tractatus de transcendentibus



ult. ultimus



v. g.

verbi gratia

English abbreviations English abbreviations

English a bbr e v i ations

a. Abbreviations for titles of works and books:

Cat.



De Int.

Categories De Interpretatione

DM  Disputationes Metaphysicae (Metaphysical Disputations) DM 1.2.3 Metaphysical Disputation 1, section 2, paragraph 3 Metaph.

Nic. Eth.

Metaphysics Nicomeachean Ethics

Phys.

Physics



Posterior Analytics

Post. An.

Sent.

Sentences

ST

Summa Theologiae



b. Other abbreviations: ad 1 reply to objection 1



art. article



bk. book



ch. / chs.

chapter / chapters



col. / cols.

column / columns



d. distinction fasc. fascicle



fol. / fols.



lect.

folio / folios lesson or lecture

xciii

xciv

English abbreviations



n. / ns.

number / numbers



p. / pp.

page / pages



q. question



r. recto



t. / ts.

volume / volumes

v. verso vol. / vols.

volume / volumes

LATIN TEXT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens. [75a]⟨102b⟩

DISPUTATIO III. 1 in tres sectiones distributa.

DE PASSIONIBUS ENTIS IN COM MUNI, & PRINCIPIIS EIUS. Explicata formali ratione obiecti adaequati huius scientiae, antequam ad particularia obiecta descendamus per varias entis divisiones, oportet de passionibus illi adaequatis, & quae cum illo convertuntur, disputare: quoniam proprium munus scientiae est passiones de suo subiecto demonstrare. Hic ergo de his passionibus in communi, postea de singulis in speciali dicemus: quia vero scientia utitur aliquibus principiis ad suas passiones demonstrandas, hic etiam breviter declarabimus, quibus principiis uti possit, aut debeat haec doctrina. Agimus autem hic de principiis cognoscendi, quae solent principia complexa vocari: nam de principiis seu causis realibus inferius dicemus. ⟨103a⟩ 1. Regarding my procedure for establishing the Latin text of DM 3 and DM 4, see “Remarks on the Latin Text and English Translation,” pp. lxxxiii–lxxxiv.

2

Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind.

DISPUTATION III divided into three sections.

ON BEING’S PASSIONS IN GENER AL, AND ITS PRINCIPLES. Having explained the formal characterr of this science’s adequate object, before we descend to particular objects through various divisions of being, we must discuss the passions that are adequate to it and converted with it, since it is the proper function of a science to demonstrate passions of its subject. Here, therefore, we shall speak of these passions in general, and afterward we shall speak of each in particular. But since a science employs some principles to demonstrate its passions, here we shall also briefly make clear which principles this doctrine can or should use. And we shall be dealing here with principles of cognition, which are usually called complex principles, for we shall speak later of real principles or causes.1 1. DM 12 through 27 are devoted to causes.

3

Sectio I. Utrum ens inquantum ens habeat aliquas passiones, & quales ill ae sint. 1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia, ut aliqua sit vera, & realis proprietas alterius, quatuor conditiones ut minimum requirit. Prima est, ut ipsa proprietas sit aliqua res, nam si sit nihil, quomodo esse poterit realis proprietas? Secunda, ut distinguatur aliquo modo ex natura rei ab illo, cuius est proprietas: nam si sit omnino idem cum illo, potius erit essentia, vel de essentia eius, quam proprietas. Tertia, ut adaequate illi conveniat, seu cum illo convertatur: agimus enim de proprietate, quae per se secundo alicui convenit: nam haec sola est, quae sub scientiam cadit, & demonstrari potest. Quarta denique est, ut subiectum, seu id cuius est proprietas, non sit de intrinseca ratione & essentia talis proprietatis, quia, ut Arist. dicit lib. 7. Metaph. c. 5. tex. 18. & 1. Poster. c. 18. tex. 35. subiectum non cadit intrinsece & essentialiter, sed solum ut additum in definitione passionis: alioqui mutuo ita se haberent, quod passio conveniret subiecto per se secundo, subiectum autem passioni per se primo: quae videtur aperta repugnantia. Sed fieri non potest, ut respectu entis sit aliqua proprietas, quae has omnes conditiones habeat: nam, si proprietas realis est, intrinsece & essentialiter est ens reale: quia neque omnino non ens, neque solum ens rationis esse potest: quia (ut dicebam) quod nihil est, vel solum per rationem fingitur, non potest esse realis passio entis realis: debet ergo esse aliquid reale: ergo est ens reale quidditative & essentialiter: nam, ut supra contra Scotum probatum est, nihil potest esse reale, quod intrinsece & essentialiter ens reale non sit. Repugnat ergo esse proprietatem realem entis realis ut sic: quia si est proprietas realis: ergo [75b] ens est de essentia eius: si autem ipsa est proprietas entis, ens non potest esse de essentia eius: quia, ut dicebamus, subiectum non potest esse de essentia passionis. Rursus id

4

Section 1 Whether Being as Being Has Some Passions, and of What Kind They Are. 1. A reason for doubt here is: because, in order for something to be a true and real property of another thing, it must satisfy at least four conditions. The first is that the property itself must be some thingr, for if it is nothing, how can it be a real property? The second is that it must be in some way distinguished ex natura rei from that of which it is a property, for if it is altogether the same as it, it will be its essence, or will pertain to its essence, rather than being a property of it. Third, it must agree with it adequately or be converted with it, for we are dealing here with a property, which must agree with something per se in the second mode,2 for this alone is what falls under a science and can be demonstrated. Finally, in the fourth place, the subject or that of which it is a property cannot belong to the intrinsic naturer and essence of such a property, for, as Aristotle says in Metaph. VII, ch. 5, text 18,3 and Post. An. I, ch. 18, text 35,4 the subject does not figure in the definition of a passion intrinsically and essentially, but only as something added. Otherwise, they would be related to each other in such a way that the passion agreed with the subject per se in the second mode while the subject agreed with the passion per se in the first mode, which appears to be a manifest impossibility. However, in relation to being, 2. What came to be known as the first and second modes of perseity are discussed by Aristotle in Post. An. I, ch. 4, 73a34–b3. 3. Aristotle, Metaph. VII, ch. 5, 1030b28–31a2. What Aristotle says in text 19 is also relevant: see Metaph. VII, ch. 5, 1031a2–14. 4. What Suárez calls Post. An. I, ch. 18, text 35, is our Post. An. I, ch. 21, 82b35–36, and ch. 22, 82a35–84a6. As far as I can tell, Aristotle does not say here that some things are defined “by addition” (ἐκ προσθέσεως) or by appeal to their proper subjects. Suárez may have in mind text 36 instead, in which Aristotle speaks of things predicated in the second mode of perseity. See Post. An. I, ch. 22, 84a11–25.

5

6

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

quod est essentialiter ens, non potest ex natura rei distingui ab ente: ut supra generaliter probatum est: ergo nec potest esse passio entis. Item, quod est essentialiter ens, & non est ipsum ens in communi, est inferius ad ens: ergo non convertitur cum ente: ergo non potest esse proprietas entis. Tandem, quod est essentialiter ens, debet habere om⟨103b⟩nes proprietates entis, si quae illae sunt: ergo non potest illud ipsum esse proprietas entis: alioqui esset proprietas sui ipsius, quod plane repugnat: vel certe includeret aliam proprietatem sibi similem, & a se distinctam: & idem rursus de illa dici posset: & sic procederetur in infinitum.

Variae sententiae referuntur.

Prima Scoti sententia.

2. In hac re tres invenio dicendi modos. Primus est, ens habere reales & positivas proprietates ex natura rei ab ipso distinctas, quae tamen in se intrinsece & essentialiter entia non sunt. Sumitur ex Scoto locis supra citatis in 1. dist. 3. q. 3. & dist. 8. quaest. 2. & in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 3. & 6.2 Fundamenta eius quoad duas ultimas partes tacta sunt in ratione dubitandi. Prima vero pars probari breviter potest, primo ex generali sententia omnium, qui has passiones enti tribuunt, unum, verum, bonum, quae non sunt confictae ab intellectu, sed vere & realiter 2. Reading “& in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 3. & 6.” with S, V1 , and V2 . The following read “& in dist. 2, q. 3 & 6.” instead: V5 and Vivès. The following read “& in distinct. 3. quaest. 3. & 6.” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , and V4.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 7



there cannot be some property that has all these characteristics. For if it is a real property, it is intrinsically and essentially a real being, since it cannot be altogether a ­non-being, nor can it be only a being of reason, for (as I have said) what is nothing or only fashioned by reason cannot be a real passion of a real being. It must, therefore, be something real. Therefore, it is quidditatively and essentially a real being, for, as was proved above against Scotus,5 nothing can be real which is not intrinsically and essentially a real being. It is, therefore, impossible for there to be a real property of real being as such, for if it is a real property, being belongs to its essence, but if it is itself a property of being, being cannot belong to its essence, since, as we said, a subject cannot belong to the essence of its passion. Further, that which is essentially a being cannot be distinguished ex natura rei from being, as was proved in a general way above.6 Therefore, neither can it be a passion of being. Further, that which is essentially a being, and is not itself being in general, is inferior to being. Therefore, it is not converted with being. Therefore, it cannot be a property of being. Finally, what is essentially a being must have all the properties of being, if there are any. Therefore, it cannot itself be a property of being, otherwise it would be a property of itself, which is manifestly impossible, or at least it would include another property similar to itself and distinct from itself, and the same thing could again be said of that property, and in this way one would proceed to infinity.

Various opinions are set forth. 2. In this matter, I find three ways of speaking. The first is that being has real and positive properties which are distinct ex natura rei from itself, but which, nevertheless, are not in themselves intrinsically and essentially beings. This view is taken from Scotus, in the places cited above, Sent. I, d. 3, q. 3,7 and d. 8, q. 2,8 and Sent. II, d. 3, q. 3 and 5. See DM 2.5. 6. See DM 2.3. 7. John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 3 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1954), pp. 83–85 (ns. 134–36). 8. The question of whether being is predicated in quid of its passions is connected for Scotus to various other questions, including those concerning the univocity of being and the way being is related to its inferiors. For this reason, when Suárez references Scotus in

8

Aristoteles.

Secunda sententia.

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

enti  con veniunt: & sunt extra naturam ipsius entis, quia esse unum &c. non ita essentialiter praedicatur de rebus, sicut esse ens. Item, quia scientia non demonstrat de obiecto suo reali, nisi proprietates reales: sed metaphysica est vera scientia demonstrans de suo obiecto has passiones: sunt ergo hae verae & reales passiones. Et hoc significavit Arist. 4. Metaph. c. 1. dicens, hanc scientiam contemplari ens, quatenus ens, & ea, quae illi per se insunt: neque enim per se inesse possunt enti3 reali, quae realia non sunt: habet ergo ens proprietates reales.

3. Secunda sententia, quam defendunt aliqui Thomistae convenit cum Scoto in primis in hoc, quod necesse est ens habere passiones reales: quia non potest omnino nullas habere, alioqui non posset esse obiectum scientiae: si autem reales non sunt, nullae sunt: quia quod reale non est, non potest semper, per se, ac necessario, enti convenire: quod tamen est de ratione propriae passionis. Unde consequenter concedunt, has passiones distingui formaliter ex natura rei ab ente, quia hoc etiam est de ratione proprietatis realis. Item, quia huiusmodi passiones non praedicant formaliter essentiam rei, sed modum extra essentiam. Unde haec propositio, homo est ens, est in primo modo dicendi per se: non tamen haec: homo est unus: Propter quod Arist. 4. Metaph. tex. 3.4 ait, ens & unum esse idem, non tamen simpliciter, & ut synonyma, sed ⟨104a⟩ ut principium, & causam. Addit vero haec sententia contra Scotum, has passiones, etiam formaliter sumptas, includere essentialiter ens, propter easdem rationes, quibus id supra probatum est, de differentiis vel modis realibus, eaedem enim procedunt de huiusmodi passionibus, supposito quod positivae sint, & reales. Unde consequenter asse[76a]runt, in his transcendentibus non esse incon ve3. Reading “enti” here with S, V1, and V2. The following omit “enti”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5, and Vivès. 4. Reading “3.” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, and V1 . The following read “2.” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4, V2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 9



q. 6.9 Its foundations with respect to the last two parts were touched on in the reason for doubt. But the first part can be proved briefly, in the first place, from the general opinion of all who attribute these passions to being: one, true, good, which passions are not fashioned by the intellect, but truly and really agree with being, and are outside the nature of being itself, since to be one, etc., is not essentially predicated of thingsr in the same way that to be a being is. Further, because a science does not demonstrate anything of its real object except real properties. But metaphysics is a true science demonstrating these passions of its object. Therefore, these are true and real passions. And this is indicated by Aristotle in Metaph. IV, ch. 1, when he says that “this science investigates being as being and those things which are in it per se.”10 For things that are not real cannot be in a real being per se. Therefore, being has real properties. 3. The second opinion, which some Thomists defend, agrees with Scotus first of all in this, that it is necessary that being have real passions, since it cannot have none whatsoever; otherwise it could not be the object of a science. But if they are not real, there are none, since what is not real cannot always, per se, and necessarily agree with being—although this pertains to the naturer of a proper passion. For this reason they consequently grant that these passions are formally distinguished ex natura rei from being, because this too pertains to the naturer of a real property. Further, because passions of this sort do not formally predicate the essence of the thingr, but rather a mode outside the essence. For this reason, this proposition, “a human being is a being,” is in the first mode of per se predication, but this one is not, “a human being is one,” for which reason Aristotle, Metaph. IV, text 3, says that being and one are the same, though not without qualification and as synonyms, but as connection with the question of whether being is predicated in quid of some thing—whether ultimate differences, intrinsic modes, or the passions of being—he often cites discussions that bear more directly on these other questions. (See, e.g., DM 2.5.2.) Thus I think that Suárez means to refer here to Ord. I, d. 8, q. 3, in which Scotus argues that it is compatible with God’s simplicity that there should be a concept common to him and creatures. See John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 4 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1956), pp. 171–89 (ns. 44–79) and pp. 198–216 (ns. 95–127). 9. John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 7 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973), pp. 418–21 (ns. 59–65) and pp. 463–94 (ns. 142–210). 10. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 1, 1003a21–22.

The first opinion, Scotus’s.

Aristotle.

The second opinion.

10

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

niens subiectum includi intrinsece in passione, quia non includitur ut subiectum, sed ut determinatum ad talem modum, qui modus est passio ipsius entis secundum se sumpti: & potest esse adaequatus illi, & converti cum illo, quia non determinat illud ad speciale genus entis, sed afficit illud quodam modo communi & universali omnibus entibus. Nam ut D. Tho. ait quaest. 1. de verit. artic. 1. dupliciter aliquis modus exprimitur, vel additur supra ens, scilicet, aut tanquam specialis modus entis, aut, tanquam modus generaliter consequens omne ens. Atque ex his putant huius sententiae autores posse expediri totam dubitandi rationem in principio positam.

Tertia sententia.

D. Thom. Soncin. Iavell. Sotus. Caietan.

4. Tertia sententia est ens non habere reales passiones positivas; sed omnia illa, quae attribuuntur enti, tanquam passiones eius addere ipsi enti solum negationem aliquam, vel respectum rationis. Haec est sententia D. Thom. dict. quaest. 1. de verit. art. 1. & quaest. 21. art. 1. quam etiam significat in 1. par. quaest. 5. 11. & 16. & ubicunque de his proprietatibus entis in particulari disputat. Eandem tenet Soncin. 4. Metaph. quaest. 1. ad 2.5 quaest. 17. & 19. ad 7.6 & lib. 5. q. 14. Iavell. 4. Metaph. q. 2. Soto in praedic. c. de proprio. q. 2. ad 2. Caiet. 1. p. q. 54. art. 2. Fonsec. 4. Metaph. cap. 2. q. 3. Fundamentum huius sententiae explicatum est in ratione dubitandi in principio posita: & in rigore est vera, indiget tamen explicatione.

5. Reading “2.” here with S, V1, and V2. The following read “1.” instead: C1, C2, G2, M1, M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4, V5, and Vivès. 6. Reading “7.” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “9.”: V5 and Vivès.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 11



principle and cause.11 But this opinion adds, against Scotus, that these passions, even taken formally, essentially include being, because of the same arguments by which this was proved earlier of differences or real modes,12 since the same arguments succeed regarding passions of this sort, granted that they are positive and real. Thus they consequently assert that in the case of these transcendentals it is not problematic for the subject to be intrinsically included in the passion, since it is not included as a subject, but as determined to a particular mode, which mode is a passion of being taken in itself, and it can be adequate to being and be converted with it, since it does not determine it to some special genus of being but affects it in a certain way that is common and universal to all beings. For as St. Thomas says in On Truth, q. 1, art. 1, some mode can be expressed or added to being in two ways, namely, either as a special mode of a being or as a mode generally following every being.13 And by appeal to these points the authors of this opinion think that the entire reason for doubt laid down at the beginning can be dispatched. 4. The third opinion is that being does not have real, positive passions, but that all those things which are attributed to being as passions of it add to being itself only some negation or relation of reason. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, in the mentioned q. 1, art. 1, of On Truth,14 and q. 21, art. 1,15 and he also says this in ST I, questions 5, 11, and 16,16 and wherever he discusses these properties of being individually. Soncinas holds the same opinion, Metaph. IV, q. 1, ad 2, q. 17, and q. 19, ad 7, and bk. V, q. 14,17 as do Javelli, Metaph. IV, 11. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–24. 12. See DM 2.5. 13. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Romae: ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1970), p. 5a–b. 14. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Leonina), pp. 3a–8a. 15. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 3, fasc. 1 (Romae: ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1973), pp. 591a–595b. 16. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1888), p. 56a–b (q. 5, art. 1), pp. 107a–108b (q. 11, art. 1), p. 210a–b (q. 16, art. 3). 17. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae (Lugduni: apud Carolum Presnot, 1579), p. 3a, pp. 26b–27b, p. 30b. So far as I can tell, Soncinas’s q. 14 on bk. V of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (pp. 62a–63a) does not discuss the passions of being at all. However, in q. 23 on bk. IV (p. 36a), he does claim that the passions of being “add something of reason to being, since relations of reason, and privations and negations are beings of reason”

The third opinion.

St. Thomas.

Soncinas. Javelli.

12

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

Declaratur vera sententia.

Proprietas quae a subiecto in re distincta, quae non item.

Exempla.

5. Est igitur in primis advertendum, aliud esse praedicatum aliquod esse veram & realem passionem subiecti: aliud vero concipi, explicari, & praedicari a nobis per modum passionis, seu proprietatis, quod proprius diceretur per modum attributi, ad eum modum quo Theologi loquuntur de divinis perfectionibus. De ratione igitur verae ac realis passionis sunt illae conditiones positae in principio: ad posteriorem ⟨104b⟩ autem modum attributi seu proprietatis non sunt omnes7 necessariae, praesertim illa de distinctione ex natura rei, sed sufficit distinctio rationis, qua unum ut subiectum habens aliquam essentiam seu rationem formalem, saltem confuse conceptam, aliud vero per modum perfectionis seu proprietatis concipiatur. Cuius rei exempla praeter adductum de attributis divinis sumi possunt ex Arist. in Praedicam. ubi varias proprietates illis attribuit, quae non possunt aliter distingui, aut explicari, ut v. g. docet esse proprietatem quantitatis, quod sit fundamentum aequalitatis, & inaequalitatis, quae proprietas nihil dicit in re distinctum a quantitate, sed est solum quaedam8 aptitudo, quae nihil aliud est, quam ipsa quantitas: concipitur autem a nobis, ut ratione distincta ad distinctius explicanda munera ipsius quantitatis. Et eodem modo posset attribui quantitati ut proprietas eius esse subiectum proximum corporalium accidentium, quod tamen in re nihil dicit ab ipsa quantitate ex natura rei distinctum.

7. Reading “omnes” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2 . The following omit “omnes”: C1, C2, G2, M2, M3, M4, V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 8. Reading “quaedam” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2 . The following omit “quaedam”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4, V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 13



q. 2,18 Soto, On the Predicables, in the chapter on property, q. 2, ad 2,19 Cajetan, ST I, q. 54, art. 2,20 and Fonseca, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, q. 3.21 The foundation of this opinion was explained in the reason for doubt laid down at the beginning, and strictly speaking it is true but nonetheless requires explanation.

Soto. Cajetan.

The true opinion is made clear. 5. It must, therefore, be noted in the first place that it is one thing for some predicate to be a true and real passion of a subject, but it is another thing for us to conceive, explain, and predicate in the manner of a passion or property that which would more properly be predicated as an attribute, in the way theologians speak of the divine perfections. Accordingly, the conditions laid down at the beginning pertain to the naturer of a true and real passion, but they are not all necessary for the latter sort of attribute or property, especially that condition regarding a distinction ex natura rei. Instead, a distinction of reason suffices, by means of which one [extreme of the distinction] is conceived as a subject having some essence or formal characterr, at least confusedly conceived, while the other is conceived in the manner of a perfection or property. Examples of this, aside from the one brought forth regarding the divine attributes, can be taken from Aristotle in the Categories, where he attributes to the categories various properties which cannot otherwise be distinguished or explained. For example, he teaches that it is a property of quantity that it is the foundation of equality and inequality,22 which property signifiesd nothing distinct in reality from quantity, but is only a certain aptitude which is nothing other than quantity itself, although it is conceived by us as rationally distinguished (passiones entis addant aliquid rationis ipsi enti, cum relationes rationis, & privationes & negationes sint entia rationis). 18. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1 (Lugduni: apud Antonium de Harsy, 1580), pp. 733b–735a. 19. Domingo de Soto, In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii (Salmanticae: Excudebat Andreas à Portonariis. S. C. M. Typographus, 1564), fol. 29va. 20. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 5 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1889), p. 46b. 21. Pedro da Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615), cols. 743–44. 22. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 6, 6a26–35.

Properties that are really distinct from their subjects, and properties that are not.

Examples.

14

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

6. Secundo observandum est, in huiusmodi attributis formaliter sumptis aliud esse, quod ipsa sint entia realia, vel rationis: aliud quod distinguantur re, vel ratione: optime enim fieri potest ut sint [76b]  realia, quanvis non re, sed ratione distinguantur, ut in exemplis positis facile patet; & ratio est clara, quia distinctio rationis, quae oritur ex praecisione intellectus, non est per conceptionem alicuius fictae entitatis, quae non sit in re, sed per modum solum inadaequatum concipiendi veram rem: potest ergo esse attributum reale, quanvis modus attributionis, & distinctionis, sit solum per rationem. Quin potius, si proprie loquamur, ut attributum sit sola ratione distinctum a reali subiecto, oportet quod sit attributum reale, & non rationis tantum, vel privativum: alioqui formaliter loquendo, plus quam ratione distingueretur, scilicet ut non ens ab ente, vel ut ab ente vero ens fictum. Quocirca observare etiam oportet, in huiusmodi attributis aliud saepe esse quod per illa formaliter significatur, aliud vero quod per illa a nobis explicari intenditur: saepe enim id quod formaliter significatur, est negativum: per illud autem a nobis explicatur positiva & realis perfectio rei, ut simplicitas, quae a nobis assignatur ut attributum Dei, vel quorundam aliorum entium in suo gradu, formaliter in negatione consistit, per eam vero nos explicamus talem modum, vel entitatem rei simplicis. ⟨105a⟩

Aristot. D. Thom. Entis duplex significatum.

7. Ultimo observandum est ex Arist. 5.9 Metaph. tex. 14. & D. Tho. 1. p. q. 48. art. 2. ad 2. & in 1. dist. 19. q. 5. art. 1. ad 1.10 ens proprie & in rigore significare entitatem rei, quomodo hactenus de illo locuti 9. Reading “5.” here with S, V1, and V2. The following instead read “ex”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2, M3, M4, P1, P2, V3, V4, V5, and Vivès. 10. Reading “ad 1.” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2  . The following omit “ad 1.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 15



so as to more distinctly explain the functions of quantity. And in the same way one could attribute to quantity, as a property of it, that it is the proximate subject of corporeal accidents—which, however, in reality signifiesd nothing that is distinct ex natura rei from quantity itself. 6. It must be observed, in the second place, that when it comes to such attributes taken formally, it is one thing for them to be real beings or beings of reason, but another for them to be distinguished in reality or according to reason. For it can well happen that they are real, although they are not really, but only rationally, distinguished, as is easily ascertained in the examples given. And the reason is clear, for a distinction of reason, which arises from a precision of the intellect, does not arise through the conception of some fictitious entity which does not existe in reality, but only through an inadequate mode of conceiving a true thingr. There can, therefore, be a real attribute, even though the manner of attribution and distinction is only rational. In fact, if we speak properly, in order for an attribute to be distinct from a real subject only rationally, it must be a real attribute and not only a thing of reason or something privative. Otherwise, formally speaking, it would be distinguished more than rationally, namely, as a ­non-being is distinguished from a being, or as a fictitious being is distinguished from a true being.23 For this reason, it must be observed that in the case of such attributes it is frequently the case that what is formally signified by them is one thing, but what we mean to explain by means of them is another. For often what is formally signified is negative, but by means of it a positive and real perfection of the thingr is explained by us. For instance, simplicity—which is ascribed by us as an attribute of God, or as an attribute of certain other beings in his grade—consists formally in a negation, but by means of it we explain a particular mode or entity of a simple thingr. 7. Finally, it is to be observed by appeal to Aristotle, Metaph. V, text 14,24 and St. Thomas, ST I, q. 48, art. 2, ad 2,25 and Sent. I, d. 19, q. 5, art. 1, ad 1,26 that being properly and strictly signifies the entity of a thingr, 23. See DM 7.1.2. 24. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 7, 1017a22–b9. 25. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 492b. 26. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1, ed. R. Busa (­Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: ­Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 55b.

Aristotle. St. Thomas. The twofold significate of “being.”

16

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

sumus: interdum vero dici ens quidquid simpliciter de aliquo affirmari potest: nam quia affirmatio fit per verbum essendi, quidquid simpliciter attribuitur rebus, quanvis in eis nullam entitatem ponat, dici solet ens, seu esse, huiusmodi autem praedicata seu attributa videntur posse ad duo capita revocari. Unum est eorum, quae in negatione, vel privatione consistunt: sic enim dicimus rem esse indivisibilem, actum moralem esse malum, hominem esse caecum, & similia. Aliud est eorum quae consistunt in denominationibus extrinsecis sumptis ex rebus ipsis, quomodo dicitur Deus creator ex tempore, vel paries visus, &c. haec autem denominatio interdum sumitur ut actualis, & requirit coexistentiam utriusque extremi, ut in  exemplis positis: interdum vero ut aptitudinalis, sicut dicitur paries visibilis, &c.

Non habet ens passiones positivas ab ipso in re distinctas.

8. His positis dico primo ens ut ens non posse habere veras, & omnino reales passiones positivas ex natura rei ab ipso distinctas. Haec est sententia D. Thomae citatis locis, qui recte advertit, sermonem esse de ente in quantum ens: nam, inquantum tale ens, bene potest habere passiones reales ex natura rei distinctas, quia tale ens ut sic potest esse extra essentiam alterius entis, & consequenter etiam extra essentiam suae passionis: ens autem in quantum ens non potest esse extra essentiam alicuius entis: & ideo nulla proprietas vel passio potest esse realis, quin in ea essentialiter includatur ens: & ideo non potest esse ex natura rei distincta ab ente: nam, ut supra ostensum est, ens in quantum ens, non distinguitur ex natura rei ab omni ente, in quo includitur essentialiter: & hoc est potissimum fundamentum conclusionis: quod variis modis confirmari, & explicari potest. Primo, quia sive ratio entis solitarie, ac praecise consideretur, sive ut est in rebus, nulla passio ex natura rei distincta invenietur manare ab illa, vel ab aliqua re [77a] ex eo praecise, quod concipitur esse11 ens: sed ex eo tantum quod est tale ens. Quod patet inductione, nam attributa entis hactenus inventa solum sunt illa, 11. Reading “esse” here with S, V1, and V2. The following read “est” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. (However, Charles Berton, editor of the Metaphysical Disputations in the Vivès edition of Suárez’s works, suggests reading “ut” in lieu of the “est” that he found in his sources. See Francisco Suárez, R. P. Francisci Suarez, E Societate Jesu, Opera Omnia, vol. 27 [Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès], p. 368b.)



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 17



and it is in this way that we have been speaking of it up until now. Sometimes, however, whatever can be affirmed of something without qualification is called a being, for since an affirmation is made by means of the verb “to be,” whatever is attributed without qualification to thingsr—even if it posits in them no entity—is wont to be called a being or is said to be. But it seems that such predicates or attributes can be reduced to two heads. One includes those things which consist in a negation or privation, for in this way we say that a thingr is indivisible, that a moral act is evil, that a human being is blind, and the like. Another includes those things which consist in extrinsic denominations taken from thingsr themselves, in the way that God is called creator from time, or as a wall is called seen, etc. And the denomination is sometimes taken as actual and requires the coexistence of each of the two extremes, as in the examples given, but sometimes it is taken as aptitudinal, just as a wall is called visible, etc. 8. These things having been laid down, I say, first, that being as being cannot have true and altogether real, positive passions that are distinct ex natura rei from itself. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the places cited,27 and he rightly notes that the discussion is about being as being, for, insofar as it is a being of a particular sort, a being can very well have real passions that are distinct ex natura rei, since a being of a particular sort, as such, can be outside the essence of another being, and consequently also outside the essence of its passion; but being as being cannot be outside the essence of some being, and therefore no property or passion can be real unless being is essentially included in it, and therefore it cannot be distinct ex natura rei from being.28 For, as was shown above, being as being is not distinguished ex natura rei from every being,29 in which it is essentially included, and this is the most powerful foundation of the conclusion, which foundation can be confirmed and explained in various ways. First because, whether the naturer of being is considered by itself and precisely, or is considered as it is in thingsr, no passion that is distinct ex natura rei will be found to 27. See notes 14, 15, and 16 above. 28. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 3, fasc. 1 (Leonina), pp. 592b–593a. 29. See DM 2.3.

Being does not have positive passions that are really distinct from itself.

18

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

quae transcendentia vocantur: illa autem, vel positiva non sunt, vel non ⟨105b⟩ sunt realia intrinseca, vel si aliquo sensu talia sunt, non sunt ex natura rei ab ente distincta: quod melius constabit tractando de singulis his attributis. Nunc breviter declaratur, quia haec attributa sunt communia Deo, & propriissime in illo reperiuntur absque distinctione ex natura rei. Quod si dicas, secus esse in creaturis, in primis hoc dicitur sine fundamento: oporteret enim speciale aliquod indicium distinctionis eius, vel necessitatem assignare: nihil autem huiusmodi afferri potest. Ac deinde est optima ratio, quia nunc agimus de ente in quantum ens, ut abstrahit a Deo, & creaturis: ergo, quae illi attribuuntur, vel attribuuntur ut ex natura rei distincta, vel non: si hoc posterius dicatur, id est quod intendimus: nam si in aliquo ente haec distinguantur, id erit ex peculiari ratione, de quo postea videbimus: si vero dicatur prius, sequitur in omni ente, etiam in Deo, distingui ex natura rei, quia quicquid superiori per se attribuitur, debet convenire omni inferiori.

9. Et potest hoc amplius urgeri, quia ipsum ens in quantum ens, ex eo praecise quod tale est, absque alio modo reali ei superaddito, & ex natura rei distincto habet quicquid positive necessarium est, ut sit unum, verum, bonum, &c. unde in ipsomet explicandi modo dicimus esse ens,12 quia habet veram essentiam, & perfectionem aliquam realem, &c. Nec refert, quod possit mens concipere & considerare rationem entis non expresse considerando alias rationes, quia hoc ad summum indicat distinctionem rationis, vel aliquid negativum aut extrinsecum in illis attributis inclusum, vel connotatum, ut postea declarabimus. Tandem huiusmodi distinctiones ex natura rei difficillime intelliguntur, & ideo sine sufficiente indicio, & ratione non sunt multiplicandae: hic autem nullum est apparens indicium huius distinc12. Reading “esse ens” with all the earlier editions. Vivès reads “ens esse” instead.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 19



emanate from it, or from some thingr precisely because it is conceived to be a being, but only because it is a being of a particular sort. This is clear by induction, for the attributes of being discovered so far are only those which are called transcendentals. But these are not positive, or they are not intrinsic real things, or, if they are in some sense such, they are not distinct ex natura rei from being. This will be better established in treating of these attributes individually. For now, it is briefly made clear because these attributes are common to God as well and are most properly found in him without any distinction ex natura rei. And if you say that matters are otherwise in the case of creatures, in the first place, this is said without foundation, for one would have to specify some special sign of this distinction, or some necessity for it. But nothing of the sort can be adduced. And hence the best argument is the following: because we are now dealing with being as being insofar as it abstracts from God and creatures. Therefore, the things that are attributed to a being are attributed either as distinct ex natura rei, or not. If the latter is said, then we have our intended conclusion, for if, in the case of some being, these are distinguished, this will be on account of some special naturer, which is a point we shall consider later on. But if the former is said, it follows that in every being, even in God, they are distinguished ex natura rei, since whatever is attributed per se to a superior must agree with every inferior. 9. And the view can further be pressed because a being itself, insofar as it is a being, precisely because it is such, without another real mode superadded to it and distinct ex natura rei from it, has whatever is positively necessary for it to be one, true, good, etc. And for this reason, we say, employing the very same mode of explanation, that it is a being because it has a true essence and some real perfection, etc. Nor does it matter that the mind can conceive and consider the naturer of being without expressly considering the other naturesr, since this, at most, points to a distinction of reason, or to something negative or extrinsic included or connoted in those attributes, as we shall later make clear. Finally, such distinctions ex natura rei are understood with the greatest difficulty and are therefore not to be multiplied without a sufficient sign and reason. But here there is no clear sign of this distinction, as will easily be seen from the things that are to be said and from

20

Vera attributa habet ens.

Passiones entis non dicunt de formali entia rationis, & contraria locutio quomodo explicanda.

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

tionis, ut facile patebit ex dicendis, & ex solutionibus argumentorum. Et alioqui propter transcendentiam entis est in eo multo difficilior haec distinctio, ut rationes etiam in principio factae ostendunt, praesertim illa, quod subiectum sit de essentia passionis, cum tamen passio sit veluti accidens subiecti. In quo etiam specialem repugnantiam involvit, quod ens in quantum ens, quod abstrahit ab essentia substantiali & accidentali, simplici vel composita, actuali vel potentiali, perfecta vel imperfecta, perficiente aut perfectibili, postulet aut requirat passiones distinctas, quae sint ⟨106a⟩ veluti quaedam intrinseca accidentia, quibus perficiatur. 10. Dico secundo, ens in quantum ens habere aliquas proprietates seu attributa, quae non sunt per rationem conficta, sed vere & in re ipsa de illo praedicantur. Hoc totum probatur optime rationibus tactis in prima & secunda sententia. Simpliciter enim verum est, unumquodque ens esse unum, & bonum, &c. ut autem haec vera sint, non oportet ut mens fingat aliqua entia rationis; quanvis enim mens nihil de rebus cogitet, aurum est verum aurum, & est una determinata res distincta ab aliis: & similiter Deus est unus, & bonus, &c. Praeterea hoc recte probatur illa ratione, quod [77b] Metaphysica, quae est realis ac vera scientia, haec demonstrat de ente: non autem demonstrat aliquid ab intellectu fictum. Quapropter, si in hoc rigore loquamur de ente rationis, non recte dicuntur haec attributa significare de formali entia rationis, quia huiusmodi entia proprie solum dicuntur esse obiective in intellectu: unde solum sunt, quando cognoscuntur aut finguntur ab intellectu: haec autem attributa re vera non pendent ex fictione intellectus, sed absolute & ante omnem intellectus considerationem enti ipsi conveniunt, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi ergo locutiones, ut verae sint, quadam latiori ratione exponendae sunt, quatenus omne id, quod non ponit in re, cui tribuitur aliquid reale positivum & intrinsecum, dici potest ens rationis, vel, ut distinguitur contra ens reale proprium, habens veram & intrinsecam entitatem: vel fundamentaliter, scilicet, quia intellectus ad distincte concipiendum, & praedicandum huiusmodi attributa, sumit ex eis fundamentum ad confingenda aliqua entia rationis.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 21



the solutions of the arguments. And besides, on account of the transcendence of being, this distinction is in its case much more difficult, as even the arguments made at the beginning show, especially this one, that the subject pertains to the essence of the passion even though the passion is like an accident of the subject. In this respect it also involves a special absurdity: that being as being—which abstracts from essence that is substantial or accidental, simple or composite, actual or potential, perfect or imperfect, perfecting or perfectible—needs or requires, in order to be perfected by them, distinct passions that are like certain intrinsic accidents. 10. I say, second, that being as being has some properties or attributes that are not made by reason but are truly and really predicated of it. All of this is best proved by the arguments touched on in connection with the first and second opinions. For it is without qualification true that each being is one and good, etc. But for these things to be true, it is not necessary that the mind fashion some beings of reason, for even if the mind thinks not at all about thingsr, gold is true gold, and it is one determinate thingr distinct from others, and similarly, God is one and good, etc. In addition, this is rightly proved by the argument that metaphysics, which is a real and true science, demonstrates these of being. But it does not demonstrate something fabricated by the intellect. For this reason, if we are here speaking of beings of reason in the strict sense, these attributes are not rightly said to formally signify beings of reason, since such beings are properly said to existe only objectively in the intellect, for which reason they existe only when they are cognized or fashioned by the intellect. However, these attributes really do not depend on the intellect’s fashioning, but rather agree with being itself absolutely and before every consideration of the intellect, as has been said. In order for such claims to be true, therefore, they must be explained by appeal to a broader accountr [of what a being of reason is], insofar as everything that does not posit something real, positive, and intrinsic in the thingr to which it is attributed can be called a being of reason; or insofar as a being of reason is distinguished from a proper real being that has true and intrinsic entity; or fundamentally, namely, because the intellect, in order to distinctly conceive and predicate such attributes, takes from them a foundation for fashioning some beings of reason.

Being has true attributes.

The passions of being do not formally signifyd beings of reason, and how the contrary way of speaking is to be explained.

22 Quid addant de formali passiones enti.13

Aristoteles.

D. Thom.

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

11. Dico tertio. Haec attributa entis de formali addunt, vel negationem, vel denominationem sumptam per habitudinem ad aliquid extrinsecum, per ea tamen explicatur realis positiva perfectio entis, non secundum aliquid reale superadditum ipsi enti, sed secundum ipsammet formalem seu essentialem rationem entis. Hanc conclusionem indicasse mihi videtur Arist. 4. Metaph. c. 2. simul dicens, ens & unum eandem dicere naturam, & nihilominus non idem formaliter significare: quia nimirum unum de formali addit nega⟨106b⟩tionem, quam non dicit ens, per eam vero nihil aliud explicatur, quam ipsamet natura entis, quod infra latius declarandum est. Similiter autem dicendum est de vero & bono, & si quae sunt alia huiusmodi attributa: haec enim formaliter, & in ordine ad conceptionem nostram non dicunt idem quod ens, neque etiam dicunt negationem, ut ex se constat: significant ergo ens sub quadam habitudine ad aliud, scilicet, quatenus in se habet unde ametur, aut vere cognoscatur, aut aliquid simile, prout suis locis declarabimus. Et ita videtur rem hanc plane exponere D. Thomas citatis locis. Ratio autem huius conclusionis est, quia haec attributa non sunt synonyma ipsi enti: alias nullo modo dici possent proprietates seu attributa, essetque nugatio dicere ens esse unum, aut bonum: oportet ergo ut de formali significent aliquid praeter ens, non possunt autem de formali significare entitatem aliquam superadditam enti, ab ipsoque ex natura rei distinctam, ut ostensum est: neque etiam significare possunt entia rationis in rigore sumpta, ut dixi: ergo nihil aliud dicere possunt, nisi aut negationem, aut privationem, vel aliquam habitudinem seu denominationem extrinsecam. Rursus omnis haec attributorum ratio eo tendit, ut perfectius a nobis cognoscatur, & explicetur entis natura: alioqui frustra esset & impertinens ad scientiam entis: non autem ita est, sed valde accommodata: nam, quia nos simplicia non perfecte cognoscimus prout in se sunt, partim negationibus, partim comparationibus ad res alias utimur ad ea distincte explicanda. Sic igitur, quanvis haec attributa de formali addant negationes vel alias habitudines, tamen per illas omnes explicatur entis natura, vel quoad perfectionem, vel [78a] quoad integritatem, aut aliquid simile. Dixi haec attributa solum addere supra ens, negationem, vel quid simile, 13

13. Reading “enti” here with S, V1, and V2. The following read “entis” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 23



11. I say, third, these attributes of being formally add either a negation or a denomination taken in relation to something extrinsic, but a real and positive perfection of being is explained through them, not in terms of something real superadded to being itself, but in terms of the very formal or essential characterr of being. Aristotle seems to me to have signaled this conclusion in Metaph. IV, ch. 2, when he says that being and one signifyd the same nature and yet do not formally signify the same thing30—since, undoubtedly, one formally adds a negation that being does not signifyd, although through this negation nothing is explained other than the very nature of being itself, which is something that must be explained more fully below. And one must speak similarly of true and good and other such attributes, if there are any, for these do not formally and in relation to our conception signifyd the same as what being does, nor also do they signifyd a negation, as is clear in itself. They therefore signify being under a certain relation to something else, namely, insofar as being has in itself that on account of which it might be loved, or truly cognized, or something similar, as we shall make clear in their proper places.31 And in this way does St. Thomas seem plainly to explain this matter in the texts cited.32 And the reason for this conclusion is: because these attributes are not synonymous with being itself. Otherwise they could in no way be called properties or attributes, and it would be tautological to say that a being is one or good. It must be the case, therefore, that they formally signify something beyond being. But they cannot formally signify some entity superadded to being that is distinct ex natura rei from it, as has been shown. Nor also can they signify beings of reason taken strictly, as I have said. Therefore, they can signifyd nothing except a negation or a privation or some relation or extrinsic denomination. Further, this whole accountr of the attributes is directed to the following end: in order that the nature of being might be cognized and explained by us more perfectly. Otherwise it would be in vain and irrelevant to the science of being. However, it is not such, but rather very useful, for since 30. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–25. 31. Suárez discusses truth and falsity in DM 8 and 9 (respectively), and he discusses goodness and evil in DM 10 and 11 (respectively). 32. See notes 14, 15, and 16 above.

What the passions formally add to being. Aristotle.

St. Thomas.

24

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

quia sub controversia positum est an formaliter seu in abstracto haec attributa dicant solam negationem, seu relationem, vel includant entitatem ipsam, quod melius in singulis passionibus explicabitur.

Solvuntur argumenta. 12. Ad rationem ergo dubitandi in principio positam simul cum adiunctis in prima & secunda opinione facilis est solutio ex dictis: iam enim concessum est haec attributa non esse proprias passiones reales cum eo rigore & proprietate, ut necessarium sit omnes con⟨107a⟩ditiones ibi numeratas, eis convenire. Declaratum etiam est, quo sensu haec attributa realia dici possint, scilicet, quia de formali dicunt aliquid, quod suo modo [est]14 in rebus, & vere ac simpliciter potest enti attribui per modum privationis, vel denominationis realis seu aptitudinis realis cum habitudine ad aliquid extrinsecum. Et hoc est satis, ut haec attributa secundum id totum quod includunt, non sint proprie essentialia: & ideo dicantur esse ad modum passionum, seu proprietatum. Sufficit etiam hoc, ut possint haec attributa sub scientiam cadere, quandoquidem, & in rebus sunt, & eo modo, quo sunt, ens ipsum consequuntur, & ad illius naturam explicandam conferunt. Eo vel maxime, quod ad rationem scientiae, & ad demonstrationes conficiendas sufficit distinctio rationis inter attributa, quia nos, sicut concipimus, ita etiam ratiocinamur: & ita de Deo vere demonstramus esse immortalem, quia immaterialis est: & sic posset etiam fieri in attributis entis, etiam si sola ratione ab ipso ente distinguerentur. Tandem ex dictis etiam constat, 14. Charles Berton plausibly suggests inserting “est” here, noting the words “quandoquidem, & in rebus sunt” later in this paragraph. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b.



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 25



we do not perfectly cognize simple things as they are in themselves, we use negations, in part, and comparisons to other thingsr, in part, to explain them distinctly. Therefore, although these attributes formally add negations or other relations, nevertheless, the nature of being is explained through them all, either as regards its perfection or as regards its wholeness, or something similar. I have said that these attributes only add to being a negation or something similar because it has been made a subject of controversy whether these attributes formally or in the abstract signifyd only a negation or relation, or rather include entity itself, which issue will be better explained in connection with our treatments of the individual passions.33

The arguments are met. 12. As regards, therefore, the reason for doubt laid down at the beginning, together with the things added in connection with the first and second opinions, the solution is easily inferred from the things that have been said. For it has already been conceded that these attributes are not real, proper passions in that strictness and propriety which would require that they satisfy all the conditions there enumerated. It has also been made clear in what sense these attributes can be called real—namely, because they formally signifyd something that [is] in its own way in thingsr and can truly and without qualification be attributed to being, either in the manner of a privation or in the manner of a real denomination or real aptitude with a relation to something extrinsic. And this is enough for these attributes—with respect to the whole that they include—not to be properly essential, and thus to be said to be like passions or properties. This also suffices for these attributes to admit of falling under a science, since they are in thingsr, and in that way in which they are they are consequent on being and contribute to explaining its nature. Especially in view of the fact that a distinction of reason among attributes suffices for the naturer of science and for making demonstrations, since, as we conceive, so also do we reason, and thus we truly demonstrate of God that he is immortal on the grounds 33. See DM 4.2.6–7, DM 8.7.24, and DM 10.1.3.

26

Sect. I. An & quales passiones habeat ens.

quomodo ens non dicatur essentialiter de his proprietatibus seu attributis suis, nam secundum rem quidem essentialiter dicitur de illis: quia illa nihil aliud explicant, quam ipsam entis naturam, tamen non est de essentia illorum quantum ad id quod addunt supra ens: quia negatio v. g. quam formaliter addit unum, non est essentialiter ens verum & reale, quale est illud quod dicitur esse quasi subiectum harum proprietatum: & ita evitatur processus in infinitum, & alia incommoda, quae in argumentis tangebantur.

Qualiter attributa entis inter se differant.

13. Ultimo ex dictis colligitur, quomodo possint hae proprietates seu attributa inter se distingui: nam quoad rem intrinsecam, quam in ente significant, non distinguuntur in re, cum nihil dicant ex natura rei distinctum ab ente, ut ostensum est: & hoc modo dici solet, quod in re entitas rei est bonitas eius, & veritas, & e converso. At vero, si consideremus id, quod de formali addunt, dici possunt formaliter differre, non quidem ratione formali intrinseca, & positiva, sed vel negativa, vel extrinseca, ut ex dictis satis constat, & patebit amplius ex dicendis in particulari de singulis. ⟨107b⟩



Section 1: Whether being has passions, and their kind. 27



that he is immaterial, and the same might be done in the case of being’s attributes, even though they are distinguished from being itself only rationally.34 Finally, from the things that have been said it is also clear in what way being is not predicated essentially of these, its properties or attributes, for in reality indeed it is essentially predicated of them, since they explain nothing other than the very nature of being. Nevertheless, it does not pertain to their essence when it comes to that which they add to being, since the negation that one formally adds to being (for example) is not essentially a true and real being in the way that that which is said to be the ­quasi-subject of these properties is. And in this way a progression to infinity is avoided, as are the other problems that were touched on in the arguments. 13. Finally, from the things that have been said, it is inferred how these properties or attributes can be distinguished from each other, for with respect to the intrinsic thingr that they signify in being, they are not really distinguished, since they signifyd nothing that is distinct ex natura rei from being, as has been shown. And thus it is usually said that in reality the entity of a thingr is its goodness and truth, and vice versa. But if we consider what they formally add [to being], they can be said to differ formally, not indeed by virtue of an intrinsic and positive formal characterr, but by virtue of a negative or extrinsic one, as is clear enough from the things that have been said, and as will be clearer still from the things to be said regarding each of them individually. 34. Cf. DM 1.1.27–29.

How the attributes of being differ from each other.

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis. Sectio II. Quot sint passiones entis, & quem ordinem inter se servent. Rationes quae15 reddunt quaestionem ancipitem.

1. Solent communiter sex transcendentia numerari, ens, res, aliquid, unum, verum, bo[78b]num: ex quibus videtur colligi quinque esse passiones entis, quia tot sunt praedicata, quae cum illo convertuntur, & non plura. In contrarium autem est, quia neque illa omnia possunt habere rationem passionis, & praeter illa possunt alia a nobis excogitari. Primum probari potest ex dictis, quia res solum dicit de formali rei quidditatem, & ratam seu realem essentiam: haec autem non est proprietas, sed potius essentia16 entis: unde multi censent magis essentiale praedicatum esse rem, quam ipsum ens. Similiter aliquid, cum distinguatur immediate contra nihil, nihil aliud formalissime significare videtur, quam ipsummet ens: perinde enim dictum videtur aliquid, ac habens aliquam quidditatem: haec autem formalis significatio coincidit cum significatione rei, & entis. 15

2. Secundum probatur, quia praeter illa praedicata videntur alia communia omni enti, ut, v. g. durare, & esse alicubi: haec enim necessario comitantur omnia entia. Quod si dicas, haec non convenire enti 15. Reading “quae” here with S, V1, and V2. The following omit “quae”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 16. Reading here “rei quidditatem, & ratam seu realem essentiam: haec autem non est proprietas, sed potius essentia entis” with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2 . The following instead read “rei quidditate, & rata seu reali essentia: haec autem non est proprietas, sed potius essentia entis”: C1, G2, M2, M3, and M4. C2 reads “rei quidditate, & rata seu reali essentia: haec autem non est proprietas, seu potius essentia entis” instead. The following instead read “rei quidditate, & rata seu reali essentiae: haec autem non est proprietas, sed potius essentia entis”: V3 and V4 . V5 reads “rei quidditate, & rata seu reali essentia entis” instead. Vivès reads “rei quidditatem, & ratam seu realem essentiam entis” instead.

28

Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions.

Section 2 How M any Passions of Being There Are, and What Order They Observe a mong Themselves. 1. Commonly six transcendentals are wont to be enumerated—being, thingr, something, one, true, and good—from which it seems to be inferred that there are five passions of being, since there are this many predicates that are convertible with being, and not more. But to the contrary: because not all of them can have the naturer of a passion, and moreover, aside from them, others can be devised by us. The first claim can be proved by appeal to the things that have been said, since thingr formally signifiesd only the quiddity of a thingr and a fixed or real essence. However, this is not a property, but rather the essence of being, for which reason many judge thingr to be a more essential predicate even than being. Similarly, something, since it is immediately distinguished from nothing, seems most formally to signify nothing other than being itself, for to say “something” seems to amount to saying “thing having some quiddity,” and this formal signification coincides with the signification of thing r and being. 2. The second claim is proved because aside from those predicates others seem common to every being, as, for example, to endure and to be somewhere, for these necessarily accompany all beings. But if you say that these do not agree with being except as existent, and that here the discussion concerns being in itself abstracting from actual existence, to the contrary: for these properties as well, of duration and local presence, can be considered in themselves by abstracting from actual existence, and as such they are understood to have a per se connection with being itself. For this reason, just as this predication, “a being is one,” is perpetually true detaching the copula from time, so also is this one, “a being has duration or local presence.” There is also a special

29

Arguments that make the issue uncertain.

30

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

nisi ut existenti: hic autem esse sermonem de ente secundum se abstrahendo ab actuali existentia: contra hoc est, quia etiam illae proprietates durationis vel localis praesentiae possunt secundum se considerari abstrahendo ab actuali existentia, & ut sic intelligentur habere connexionem per se cum ipso17 ente: unde, sicut haec praedicatio, ens est unum, est perpetuae veritatis absolvendo copulam a tempore: ita & haec, ens habet durationem, vel praesentiam localem. Est etiam18 specialis difficultas de ipso esse actualis existentiae, nam videtur esse proprietas quaedam ipsius entis secundum se sumpti, quia non convenit ei essentialiter nec omnino per accidens. Rursus praeter has passiones simplices videntur esse aliae complexae seu disiunctae: sicut enim proprietas numeri dici potest quod sit par vel impar, & quantitatis, quod sit finita vel infinita: ita entis passio dici potest quod sit finitum vel infinitum, actu vel potentia, aut similia. Ultimo, si ad passiones entis, ut dictum est, sufficiunt negationes, seu habitudines rationis, hae poterunt in infinitum multiplicari, ut esse idem, non esse impossibile, esse amabile, esse intelligibile, &c. ⟨108a⟩

Quaestionis resolutio. Passiones entis tres tantum.

3. Haec quaestio solum proponitur, ut tractationem hanc de passionibus entis ad certa capita revocemus, & ideo breviter dicendum est, si proprie loquamur, & non fingamus distinctiones minime necessarias, tres tantum esse proprias passiones entis, scilicet, unum, verum, & bonum. Quod enim hae tres inter se distinctae sint, saltem ratione formali, sive illa sit negativa, sive positiva, sive realis, sive rationis, facile quis sibi persuadebit. Primo ex communi sententia omnium scribentium de hac materia. Secundo, ex communi modo concipiendi, & significatione ac interpretatione ipsarum vocum: nam unum ut sic, solum significat, quod res sit in se integra & indivisa: unde formaliter negationem addit, in quo distinguitur a vero & bono. Haec autem inter se distinguuntur, quia verum dicit adaequa tio nem,  vel habitudinem ad intellectum: 17. Reading “ipso” here with S, V1, and V2. The following omit “ipso”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 18. Reading “etiam” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “autem” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5, and Vivès.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 31



difficulty concerning this beinge of actual existence, for it seems to be a certain property of being taken in itself, since it does not agree with being essentially, nor does it agree with it altogether per accidens. Further, aside from these simple passions there seem to be other complex or disjunctive ones, for just as being even or odd can be called a property of number, and being finite or infinite a property of quantity, so can being finite or infinite, being actually or potentially, and the like, be called passions of being. Finally, if, as has been said, negations or relations of reason suffice for passions of being, these will admit of being multiplied to infinity—for instance, to be the same, not to be impossible, to be lovable, to be intelligible, etc.

Resolution of the question. 3. This question is proposed only so that we might reduce this treatment of being’s passions to definite heads, and therefore it must briefly be said that, if we are speaking properly and do not fashion distinctions that are not at all necessary, there are only three proper passions of being—namely, one, true, and good. For someone will easily persuade herself that these three passions are distinct from each other, at least in respect of their formal charactersr, whether they be negative or positive, real or rational. First, from the common opinion of all those writing about this matter. Second, from the common manner of conceiving, and from the signification and interpretation of the same words. For one, as such, only signifies that a thingr is in itself whole and undivided, for which reason it formally adds a negation, in which respect it is distinguished from true and good. And the latter are distinguished from each other because true signifiesd an adequation or relation to the intellect, while good [signifiesd an adequation or relation] to the will or appetite, as something suitable to it, whether it signifiesd this formally

There are only three passions of being.

32

Res & ens non se habent sicut essentia & passio.

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

bonum autem ad voluntatem seu appetitum tanquam conveniens illi, sive hoc dicat formaliter, [79a] sive fundamentaliter: hae autem sunt rationes, vel habitudines valde diversae. Quod etiam a contrariis facile declarari potest, nam unitas opponitur multitudini: bonitas malitiae, veritas falsitati: haec autem valde distincta sunt. Tandem ex his, quae in particulari de his passionibus dicemus, hoc evidentius constabit, simulque ostendemus, quodlibet istorum attributorum convenire omni enti reali19: atque ita converti cum ente: sunt ergo hae tres passiones entis. 4. Quod autem praeter has non sint aliae, colligi potest ex D. Thom. doctrina: licet enim saepe numeret illa sex transcendentia, eorumque rationem & sufficientiam declaret, ut quaest. 1. de verit. artic. 1. quaest. 21. art. 1. & saepe alias: tamen, cum in particulari agit de his proprietatibus, nunquam tractat nisi de illis tribus, ut patet ex 1. p. q. 5. 11. & 16. & in dictis quaestionibus disputatis. Potestque in hunc modum declarari ex dictis: nam res & ens iuxta communem usum tanquam synonyma usurpantur: & interdum de ente actu existente dicuntur, interdum vero ab actuali existentia praescindunt, quare neutrum est passio alterius. Cuius etiam signum est, quod unum nunquam praedicatur de alio, & si ita praedicetur, censetur esse nugatio, seu identica praedicatio. Alia vero praedicantur de ente illique adiunguntur, ut adiecti⟨108b⟩vum substantivo: sic enim dicitur, ens unum, ens verum, &c. ens autem & res substantiva sunt, neque possunt eo modo coniungi: signum est ergo, unum non esse passionem alterius. Quod si velimus haec duo in eo rigore distinguere, quo D. Thom. supra ex Avicenna illa distinxit, quod res praescindat ab existentia actuali, & meram quidditatem significet: ens autem sumptum sit ab esse, & solum dicat ens actualiter existens: sic constat, rem non significare passionem entis, sed esse praedicatum maxime quidditativum. Et potius ens significabit aliquid extra essentiam, saltem in creaturis. Tamen etiam ens non poterit dici passio rei: existentia enim non est passio creaturae existentis, vel quia non manat ex principiis eius intrinsecis, sed ab extrinseco illi provenit, vel quia non convenit illi necessario ac per se: unde neque sub scientiam proprie cadit actualis existentia creaturae, quatenus actu pendet a vol19. Reading “reali” here with C1, C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4 . The following omit “reali”: V5 and Vivès.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 33



or fundamentally. And these are very diverse naturesr or relations. This can also easily be made clear from their contraries, for unity is opposed to multitude, goodness to evil, and truth to falsity, and these contraries are very much distinct. Finally, this will be more evidently established from the things that we shall say of these passions individually, and we shall at the same time show that each of these attributes agrees with every real being and is thus convertible with being. There are, therefore, these three passions of being. 4. And that there are no others besides these can be gathered from the teaching of St. Thomas, for although he often enumerates those six transcendentals, and explains their groundr and sufficiency, as in On Truth, q. 1, art. 1,35 and q. 21, art. 1,36 and frequently elsewhere, nevertheless, when he treats of these properties individually, he never treats of any except those three, as is clear from ST I, q. 5, q. 11, and q. 16,37 and in the mentioned disputed questions. And this can be made clear in the following way from the things that have been said: for “thingr” and “being” according to common usage are employed as synonyms, and sometimes they are said of an actually existent being, but sometimes they prescind from actual existence, for which reason neither is a passion of the other. A sign of this is that the one is never predicated of the other, and if it is so predicated it is judged to be a tautology or identical predication. But each of the others is predicated of being and is joined to it as an adjective is to a substantive, for in this way a being is called one, and true, etc. However, “being” and “thingr” are substantives, and they cannot be conjoined in this way. This is, therefore, a sign that the one is not a passion of the other. But if we want to distinguish these two with that strictness with which St. Thomas, above,38 distinguished them by appeal to Avicenna—on the grounds that thingr prescinds 35. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Leonina), p. 5a–b. 36. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 3, fasc. 1 (Leonina), pp. 591a–595b. In fact, Aquinas does not discuss thing (res) or something (aliquid) in this article. 37. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 56a–b (q. 5, art. 1: “Whether good differs in reality from being”), pp. 107a–108b (q. 11, art. 1: “Whether one adds something to being”), p. 210a–b (q. 16, art. 3: “Whether true and being are convertible”). 38. See DM 2.4.

Thingr and being are not related as essence and passion.

34

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

untate libera creatoris: quid autem sit haec existentia, & quomodo distinguatur ab essentia creaturae, res est obscura, quam infra tractando de ente creato in particulari disputabimus. Si autem iuxta opinionem quandam supra tractatam, ens non solum ut dicit actu existens, sed etiam ut dicit aptum ad existendum, distingueretur a re, prout absolute dicit habens quidditatem realem: sic ens esset prima passio rei: sed hoc supra improbatum est, quia in prima ratione quidditatis realis intrat aptitudo ad existendum, & in hoc primo distinguitur quidditas realis a non reali seu ficta. In his ergo duobus nulla passio entis continetur. Scio Averr. in sua paraphrasi cap. de Re, dicere, rem significare non solum rem veram sed fictam, sed hoc commune est enti, & solum est secundum aequivocam significationem. De qua20 & de aliis aequivocis significationibus harum vocum dicam in sequentibus.

Aliquid iuxta varias vocis etymologias, vel entis, vel unius est synonymum.

5. Rursus aliquid, duplicem etymologiam, seu interpretationem habere potest. Una est, quod idem [79b] sit aliquid, quod habens quidditatem aliquam: sive enim haec fuerit prima derivatio vocis, sive non: tamen iam in communi usu in hoc sensu accipi videtur: aliquid enim, & nihil contradictorie seu privative opponi censentur: nihil autem idem significat, quod non ens, vel non habens entitatem ullam: aliquid ergo idem est, quod habens aliquam entitatem, vel quidditatem. In hac ergo 20. Reading “qua” here with all earlier editions. Vivès reads “quo” instead.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 35



from actual existence and signifies only the quiddity, whereas being is taken from “to be” and signifiesd only being that is actually existent— then it is clear that thingr does not signify a passion of being, but is the most quidditative predicate. And being will instead signify something outside the essence, at least in the case of creatures. Nevertheless, being will still not be able to be called a passion of thingr, for existence is not a passion of an existing creature, whether because it does not emanate from its intrinsic principles, but comes to it from without, or because it does not agree with a creature necessarily and per se (for which reason the actual existence of a creature, insofar as it actually depends on the free will of the creator, does not properly fall under science). But what this existence is, and how it is distinguished from the essence of a creature, are difficult questions, which we shall deal with below when we discuss created being in particular.39 But if, in accordance with a certain opinion dealt with above,40 being, not only insofar as it signifiesd the actually existent, but also insofar as it signifiesd what is apt to exist, were distinguished from thingr, insofar as it absolutely signifiesd a thing having a real quiddity, then being would be the first passion of thingr. But this was disproved above,41 since the aptitude for existing enters into the primary accountr of a real quiddity, and it is in this respect that a real quiddity is primarily distinguished from a ­non-real or fictitious one. No passion of being, therefore, is included among these two. I know that Averroes, in his paraphrase, in the chapter on thingr, says that thingr signifiesd not only true thingr, but also fictitious thingr,42 but this is something common to being as well, and it is the case only according to an equivocal signification. Of this and other equivocal significations of these words I shall speak in what follows. 5. Further, “something” can have a twofold etymology or meaning. One is that something is the same as a thing having some quiddity, for whether this was the first derivation of the word or not, still, it now seems to be taken in this sense in common usage. For something and nothing are judged to be contradictorily or privatively opposed. But 39. See DM 31.1 and DM 31.7. 40. See DM 2.4.1–5. 41. See DM 2.4.6–7. 42. Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8 (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), fol. 359I–K.

“Something,” according to different etymologies of the word, is a synonym of either “being” or “one.”

36

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

si⟨109a⟩gnificatione constat aliquid non esse passionem, sed synonymum entis: & ita substantive praedicatur sicut ens:21 idemque censetur etiam secundum formalem rationem, & conceptum, dicere de aliquo esse aliquid, & dicere esse22 ens, & ita opinatur de hoc attributo Fonsec. 4. Metaph. c. 2. q. 5. sect. 2. 

6. Alia vero etymologia huius attributi est, quam tangit D. Tho. cit. locis, scilicet, ut aliquid, dicatur quasi aliud quid, quae videtur conformior primae impositioni huius vocis, ut constat ex Latinis autoribus: iuxta quam haec vox significat de formali aliquid distinctum ab ente, scilicet, distinctionem ab alio, seu negationem identitatis cum alio. Hoc tamen sensu attributum hoc, vel non est diversum ab uno, vel in eo includitur tanquam consequens illud. Unum enim dicitur, quod est indivisum in se, & divisum a quolibet alio, ut infra videbimus: ergo in ratione unius includitur illa negatio, quae importatur in voce aliquid, vel ad illam revocatur, & ideo hoc attributum non ita auget numerum harum passionum, ut oporteat de illo aliquid specialiter tractare, sed explicata ratione unius, & consequenter multitudinis, quae illi opponitur, & identitatis vel distinctionis, quae in eius ratione aliquo modo fundantur, explicatum manebit hoc praedicatum aliquid. Nam, licet negatio in illo inclusa23 possit distingui ratione a negatione inclusa in uno, quod unum dicat negationem multitudinis, aliquid vero solum dicat negationem identitatis cum alio, quomodo distinguuntur unum & aliquid a D. Tho. q. 1. de verit. artic. 1. tamen quia posterior negatio in priori fundatur, & nullam specialem habet difficultatem in doctrina de his passionibus tradenda, non oportet eas distinguere. Dicunt vero aliqui ut Iavellus in tract. de transcend. c. 3. aliquid dicere actualem divisionem ab alio ente, ita ut ante mundi creationem Deus esset unus, 21. Reading “& ita substantive praedicatur sicut ens:” here with S, V1 , and V2 . The following omit these words: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 22. Reading “esse” here with S, V1, and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3, M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 23. Reading “inclusa” here with S, V1, and V2. The following read instead “conclusa”: C1, C2, G2, M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. (Charles Berton, however, suggests reading “inclusa” here in lieu of the “conclusa” that he found in his sources. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b.)



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 37



nothing signifies the same as n ­ on-being or thing not having any entity. Therefore, something is the same as a thing having some entity or quiddity. In this signification, therefore, it is clear that something is not a passion, but a synonym, of being, and thus it is predicated substantively, like being. And to say of something that it is something is judged to be the same as saying of it that it is a being, even in respect of formal characterr and concept. And this is the opinion of Fonseca regarding this attribute, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.43 6. But another etymology of this attribute is that which St. Thomas mentions in the cited passages,44 namely, that “something” signifiesd, as it were, something else, which etymology seems more in conformity with the first imposition of this word, as is clear from Latin authors. And according to this etymology the word formally signifies something distinct from being, namely, distinction from another thing or the negation of identity with another thing. But in this sense this attribute either is not different from one, or it is included in it as consequent upon it. For what is undivided in itself and divided from anything else is called one, as we shall see below.45 Therefore, that negation which is either implicated in the word “something” or reduced to it is included in the naturer of the unit, and therefore this attribute does not increase the number of these passions in such a way that it is necessary to treat especially of something. Rather, having explained the naturer of the unit, and consequently the naturer of multitude, which is opposed to it, and the naturesr of identity and distinction, which are in some way founded on its naturer, this predicate, something, is left explained. For although the negation included in it can be distinguished by reason from the negation included in one, in that one signifiesd the negation of multitude, while something only signifiesd the negation of identity with another thing (and it is in this way that one and something are distinguished by St. Thomas in On Truth, q. 1, art. 146), nevertheless, since 43. Pedro da Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 763–65. 44. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Leonina), p. 5b. See note 36 above. 45. See DM 4.1.13–18. 46. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Leonina), p. 5b. Note that in this text Aquinas claims that a being is called one insofar as it is undivided in itself. The negation of multitude of which Suárez speaks here, then, is not

38

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

non autem aliquid. Sed hoc impropriissime dictum est: quis enim dicat, ens non esse aliquid, propterea quod alia non existant? imo in illo sensu, aliquid non potest esse passio entis, cum non conveniat omni enti: ergo ut est passio, solum dicit negationem illam in aptitudine, & respectu alterius entis existentis, vel possibilis: & hoc modo, ut dixi, in unitate fundatur, & cum illa simul explicatur.

7. Ex dictis ergo sex transcendentibus tantum relinquuntur tria supra numerata, quae possint esse passiones entis, quorum sufficientiam tradit D. Thom. cit. loco de verit. ⟨109b⟩ & quaest. 21, art. 1. quia passiones entis debent aliquid addere supra ens, & non possunt addere aliquid positivum reale: ergo vel negativum, vel positivum rationis, seu per denominationem aut convenientiam ad aliquid extrinsecum. Priori modo constituitur passio unius, quia negatio illa indivisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio,24 consequitur omne ens secundum se & absolute consideratum, & nulla alia est quae necessario conveniat omni enti ut sic. Poste[80a]riori modo constituuntur duae aliae passiones, una per respectum seu convenientiam ad intellectum: alia per habitudinem, & convenientiam ad appetitum & voluntatem: nam hae duae facultates, & nullae aliae sunt universales, & respiciunt omne ens sub diversa ratione. 24. Reading “quia negatio illa indivisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio” with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “quia negatio illa divisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. I take it that “indivisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio” is specificative. Thus, in referring to “negatio illa indivisionis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio,” Suárez is not referring to the negation of some state consisting in both internal indivision and division from anything else, i.e., to a combination of internal division and indivision from anything else. Rather, he is specifying the negation to which he is referring, namely, that which consists in both internal indivision and division from any other thing. Cf. DM 5.5.8: “De quo aliud etiam docet omnino falsum, & improbabile: scilicet, suppositum solum addere supra naturam specificam duplicem negationem, indivisibilitatis in se, & divisionis a quolibet alio, & per hanc [. . .].” See Jorge J. E. Gracia’s translation of this sentence at: Francisco Suárez, Suárez on Individuation. Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), p. 116. See also Berton’s note on this text, at: Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 39



the latter negation is founded on the former and involves no special difficulty in the doctrine that must be handed down regarding these passions, it is not necessary to distinguish them. But some, such as Javelli in his treatise On the Transcendentals, ch. 3,47 say that something signifiesd actual division from another being, so that before the creation of the world God was one, but not something. However, this is said most improperly, for who would say that a being is not something because other things do not exist? In fact, in that sense something cannot be a passion of being, since it does not agree with every being. Therefore, insofar as it is a passion it only signifiesd that negation in aptitude, and in relation to another existing or possible being, and in this way, as I’ve said, it is founded on unity and is explained simultaneously with it. 7. From the things that have been said, then, it follows that, of the six mentioned transcendentals, there remain only the three enumerated that can be passions of being, the sufficiency of which St. Thomas teaches in the mentioned text from On Truth, and in q. 21, art. 1.48 For the passions of being should add something to being and cannot add something that is real and positive. Therefore, they must add either something negative, or something positive belonging to reason, that is, through denomination from, or agreement with, something extrinsic. The passion one is constituted in the first way, since that negation which consists in internal indivision and division from anything else is consequent on every being considered in itself and absolutely, and there is no other negation that necessarily agrees with every being as such. The other two passions are constituted in the second way, the one through a relation to, or agreement with, the intellect, and the other through a relation to, or agreement with, appetite and will. For these two faculties and no others are universal and relate to every being under diverse conceptionsr. the one involved in saying that there is only one God, for example, but rather that which is involved in saying that John is one thing and not many things. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 2 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1884), pp. 139b–140a, where, commenting on Phys. III, ch. 7, 207b10–15, Aquinas says that “division causes multitude” (divisio. . .multitudinem causat). 47. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, pp. 465b–466a. 48. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2 (Leonina), pp. 5a–6b, & t. 22, vol. 3, fasc. 1, pp. 593a–594b.

40 Qualis inter passiones entis ordo servetur.

Collatio inter passiones entis in perfectione.

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

8. Atque hinc colligunt autores, ex his tribus passionibus unitatem esse primam, quia est absoluta: convenit enim omni enti ex se, & non per denominationem ab alio extrinseco, neque proprie per relationem ad aliud, quam significant aliquo modo verum, & bonum, quatenus convenientiam cum alio dicunt: absoluta autem sunt priora respectivis ex genere suo. Dices, etiam unum ut dicit divisionem ab alio, importare habitudinem ad aliud. Respondetur primum de ratione unius non esse illam negationem, quod sit aliud a quo distinguatur, sed solum consequi ad unum quod sit aptum distingui: Deus enim unus erit, etiam si nihil sit a quo dividatur. Deinde illa negatio non est relatio, sed potius negatio relationis, nam potius identitas est relatio, & illa est negatio identitatis, vel certe est fundamentum eius, & consequenter esse25 potest fundamentum alicuius relationis rationis. Denique, etiam si fingamus illam per modum habitudinis ad aliud, est de se prior aliis relationibus veri, aut boni, quia est quodammodo abstractior, quia solum respicit aliud sub ratione entis: sic enim dicitur unum divisum a quolibet alio, cuiuscunque alterius rationis illud sit. Itaque Arist. 4. Metaph. c. 1. unum coniungit cum ente tanquam primam passionem: & D. Tho. 1. par. q. 11. art. 2. ad 4. sentit post ens, unum esse quod prius de unoquoque ente cognoscitur, quod26 latius tractant Soncin. 4. Metaph. q. 24. & Iavel. tract. de transcendentibus. c. 1.

9. Ex aliis autem duobus transcendentibus, seu passionibus entis verum est prius ⟨110a⟩ bono, ut docuit D. Tho. 1. par. q. 16. art. 4. Et patet, quia bonitas quodammodo fundatur in veritate: ut enim sanitas bona sit, supponitur esse veram sanitatem: nam, si sit ficta, non erit bona: & sic de aliis. Unde verum dicit ordinem ad intellectum, bonum ad voluntatem: intellectus autem est prior potentia, quam voluntas. Quod si quis velit, has passiones in perfectione etiam comparare, & 25. Reading “esse” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , V4 , and V5. Vivès reads “non esse” instead, Charles Berton having chosen to print “non esse” in lieu of the “esse” he found in his sources. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 364a. 26. Reading “quod” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following read “quae” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 41



8. And hence authors infer that among these three passions unity is the first, since it is absolute, for it agrees with every being of itself and not by denomination from something else that is extrinsic, nor properly through a relation to something else, which is what true and good in some way signify, inasmuch as they signifyd an agreement with something else; and absolutes are by their nature prior to relatives. You will say that one also, insofar as it signifiesd division from another, involves some relation to another thing. I reply, first, that that negation, that there is something else from which it is distinguished, does not pertain to the naturer of the unit; rather, it is merely consequent on the unit that it is apt to be distinguished (for God will be one even if there is nothing from which he is divided). Second, that negation is not a relation, but rather the negation of a relation, for identity, rather, is a relation, and that negation is the negation of identity, or at any rate its foundation, and consequently it can49 be the foundation of some relation of reason. Finally, even if we conceive it as a relation to another thing, it is of itself prior to the other relations of true or good because it is in some way more abstract, since it is only related to another thing under the conceptr of being: for thus do we say that the unit is divided from any other thing, whatever additional naturer it might have. And so Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 1, joins one with being as its first passion,50 and St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4,51 holds that after being, one is what is first cognized about each being, which is something that Soncinas, Metaph. IV, q. 24,52 and Javelli, Treatise on the Transcendentals, ch. 1,53 discuss more fully. 9. Of the other two transcendentals or passions of being, true is prior to good, as St. Thomas teaches, ST I, q. 16, art. 4.54 And this is clear, since goodness is in some way founded on truth, for in order for health to be good, it must be assumed to be true health, since if it is fictitious, 49. For reasons that are hard to make out, Charles Berton, editor of the Disputationes Metaphysicae in the Vivès edition of Suárez’s collected works, inserts a “not” (non) at this point in the text, so as to read Suárez here as saying “and consequently it cannot be the foundation of some relation of reason.” See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 364a. 50. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–1004a2. 51. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b. 52. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, pp. 37b–38a. 53. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 463b. 54. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 211a–b.

What sort of order is observed among the passions of being.

42

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

interroget, quaenam illarum perfectior sit, potest in primis facile responderi, de formali, & secundum id quod addunt supra ens, nullam dicere perfectionem, quia nihil reale dicunt, seu addunt ipsi enti: unde sub hac ratione non est, quod comparentur, quia comparatio supponit positivum: quatenus vero significant aliquo modo ipsum ens, eiusque naturam declarant, eandem omnino perfectionem entis exprimunt, & ita ex hac etiam parte comparari non possunt, quia comparatio distinctionem requirit.

Satisfit argumentis. Quare sex transcendentia numerentur.

10. Ad rationem ergo dubitandi in principio positam respondetur, non ideo sex transcendentia numerari, quia omnia significent distinctas passiones entis, sed aliqua distingui hac ratione: aliqua vero solum ex diversa etymologia, vel impositione vocis. Et ita distinguuntur res, & ens: quia hoc ab esse, illud a quidditate reali sumptum est. Et similiter aliquid, & unum [80b] ex prima impositione distinguuntur, quod unum ex negatione divisionis in se: aliquid vero ex negatione identitatis cum alio dicta sunt: in re vero eandem passionem significant: quia illa duo ad perfectam unitatem requiruntur.

11. Ad aliam vero partem, qua probatur, has passiones esse plures, respondetur, primum de duratione fortasse non esse quid diversum ab existentia actuali: & ita eadem erit de utraque ratio. Quod si forte ex natura rei distincta est in creaturis, merito non numeratur inter passiones entis, quia est speciale quoddam ens, ut infra suo loco videbimus. Et idem dicendum est de praesentia locali: nam ut est modus aliquorum entium, speciale praedicamentum constituit, ut infra etiam dicemus. De illis autem disiunctis, finitum vel infinitum, &c. dicendum est, vel proprie non esse passiones entis in communi, sed potius esse divisiones eius: quia vel essentialiter contrahunt ipsum ens, quatenus ens est, vel



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 43



it will not be good, and similarly in other cases. Hence, true signifiesd a relation to the intellect, good a relation to the will; but the intellect is a power that is prior to the will. And if someone should wish to compare these passions with respect to perfection as well, and ask which of them is more perfect, it can easily be replied, in the first place, that formally and with respect to what they add to being, neither signifiesd perfection, since they signifyd or add to being nothing real, for which reason there is nothing on which to base a comparison in this respectr, since comparison presupposes something positive. But insofar as they in some way signify being itself, and make its nature clear, they express altogether the same perfection of being, and so on this score too they cannot be compared, since comparison requires distinction.

Comparison of the passions of being with respect to perfection.

The arguments are met. 10. To the reason for doubt laid down at the beginning,55 then, I reply that six transcendentals are not enumerated because they all signify distinct passions of being, but rather some of them are distinguished for this reason, while some are only distinguished because of their names’ diverse etymologies or impositions. And it is in this way that thingr and being are distinguished, because the latter is taken from beinge, while the former is taken from real quiddity. And similarly, something and one are distinguished by their first impositions, since a thing is called one from a negation of internal division, but something from a negation of identity with another thing. But in reality they signify the same passion, since these two things are required for perfect unity. 11. But to the other part, by which it is argued that these passions are greater in number,56 I reply: first, regarding duration, it is perhaps not something diverse from actual existence, and so there will be the same accountr regarding both. But if by chance it is distinct ex natura rei in the case of creatures, it is not rightly numbered among the passions of being, since it is a certain special being, as we shall see below in its proper place.57 And the same should be said of local presence, for 55. See DM 3.2.1. 56. See DM 3.2.2. 57. See DM 50.1–2.

Why six transcendentals are enumerated.

44

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

certe neutrum membrum dividens ⟨110b⟩ illi convenit, nisi ut contracto seu determinato ad specialem aliquam rationem entis, ut de finito, & infinito infra videbimus: vel certe significant diversos status eiusdem entis, ut esse in actu, vel in potentia, ut infra etiam dicturi sumus: ubi etiam declarabimus quomodo existentia creaturae non sit passio eius. Vel certe hae proprietates disiunctae reducuntur ad simplices, ut idem vel diversum ad unitatem.

Aliquot rationis habitudines omnibus entibus communes cur non passiones entis.

Res non dicit formaliter negationem entis ficti.

12. Ad ultimum respondetur, posse quidem plures negationes, vel habitudines rationis excogitari a nobis in ente, quae illis passionibus, quae a nobis numeratae sunt, formaliter non explicantur: quomodo nonnulli dicunt, Rem esse passionem, quae formaliter addit supra ens negationem entis ficti, seu chymerici. Alii addunt, idem, & diversum, nam quodlibet ens habet relationem rationis identitatis ad se ipsum, & relationem diversitatis ab alio, saltem a non ente, seu ab ente rationis. Item fingi potest relatio similitudinis ad alterum, saltem fundamentaliter: ut, sicut aequale ponitur passio quantitatis: ita assimilabile (ut sic dicam) sit passio entis: nullum enim est ens, quod non possit habere aliquid sibi simile aliquo modo, saltem analogice, & infinitae27 aliae denominationes huiusmodi possunt multiplicari, ut in argumento tactum est. Dicendum nihilominus est illas passiones sufficienter numerari, vel quia illae solae conducunt ad naturam entis explicandam, & habent, tum in rebus, tum in usu hominum sufficientem causam, & utilitatem ob quam excogitatae sint, & distinctae: vel, si quae aliae huiusmodi excogitari possunt, in his virtute continentur, vel ad eas revocantur.

13. Quod igitur Res de formali dicat negationem aliquam entis ficti, fictum quidem est, & praeter omnem Latinam significationem vocis, & communem conceptionem hominum: nam Res non est terminus 27. Reading “infinitae” with C1 , C2 , G2 , M4 , S , V1 , V2 , and V5. The following read “infinite” instead: M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , and Vivès.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 45



insofar as it is a mode of certain beings, it constitutes a special category, as we shall also say below.58 But regarding those disjunctive [predicates], finite or infinite, etc., it should be said either that they are not properly passions of being in general, but rather divisions of it, since either they essentially contract being itself insofar as it is being, or neither dividing member agrees with being except insofar as it is contracted or determined to some special naturer of being, as we shall see below regarding the finite and the infinite59; or they signify diverse states of the same being, such as to be in act or in potency, as we shall also say below, when we shall also make clear how the existence of a creature is not a passion of it60; or these disjunctive properties are reduced to simple ones, as the same and the diverse are reduced to unity. 12. To the last argument, I reply that, to be sure, we can devise in being various negations or relations of reason that are not formally explained by those passions which have been enumerated by us, in the way some people say that thingr is a passion that formally adds to being the negation of fictitious or chimerical being. Others add the same and the diverse, for any being has a rational relation of identity to itself and a relation of diversity from another, at least from n ­ on-being or being of reason. Further, a relation of similarity to another thing can be imagined, at least fundamentally, so that, just as equal is posited as a passion of quantity, so is assimilable (so to speak) a passion of being, for there is no being that cannot have something similar to itself in some way, at least analogically, and infinitely many other denominations of this sort can be multiplied, as is touched on in the argument. Nevertheless, it must be said that the mentioned passions are sufficiently enumerated, either because they alone serve to explain the nature of being and have, both in reality and in the usage of human beings, a sufficient reason and usefulness on account of which they were devised and distinguished, or because, if there are some other passions of this sort that can be devised, they are contained virtually in these or can be reduced to them. 13. Therefore, the view that thingr formally signifiesd some negation of fictitious being is indeed a fiction and is at odds with every 58. See DM 51.1–2. 59. See DM 28. 60. See DM 31.7.2.

Why some relations of reason common to all beings are not passions of being.

Thingr does not formally signifyd the negation of fictitious being.

46

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

negativus, seu privativus, sed omnino positivus. Est etiam impertinens illa negatio, tum quia obscurius est ad explicandum quid sit ens fictum, quam quid sit res: tum etiam, quia, si illa negatio necessaria est ad passiones entis, potius in vero fundanda est: dicitur enim verum ens, quod non est fictum: vel, si formaliter sumatur, in uno, seu aliquo includitur: quia in negatione, quam dicit aliquid, includitur ut sit divisum a quolibet [81a] alio, & con⟨111a⟩sequenter etiam ab ente ficto. Eo vel maxime, quod ratio entis ficti ut sic in negatione consistit: illud enim est proprie ens fictum, quod ita mente apprehendi potest, ut in se involvat repugnantiam, & impossibilitatem, quae est negatio quaedam; & ideo reale ens non proprie dividitur ab illo per negationem, sed formaliter per suam realitatem, ut latius disp. seq. in simili dicemus. Et eadem ratione excluduntur similes negationes quae ex sola reflexione intellectus fieri possunt, ut non esse diversum a se, esse diversum ab ente rationis, non esse sibi inaequale, & similes; quae & inutiles sunt, & in infinitum multiplicari possunt, & sunt mera opera rationis, quae non sufficiunt ad passiones entis, ut diximus.

14. Atque hinc etiam constat, non oportere addere inter passiones entis identitatem, vel diversitatem, quia, ut haec possunt formaliter dicere relationes rationis, non pertinent ad passiones entis, ut supra dictum est generaliter: quia tales relationes non per se conveniunt enti, sed extrinsecus tantum per cogitationem, reflexionem, aut comparationem mentis: si autem sumantur, quatenus in re habent aliquod fundamentum positivum, vel privativum, sic sufficienter continentur sub unitate, ut infra dicemus. Et eodem modo reducitur ad unitatem similitudo (si haec communis est omni enti) nam, si sumatur pro vera relatione, illa sine dubio non est passio, quia nec convenit semper omni enti, & cui convenit, non per se, sed ex accidente convenit. Et si forte dicatur creaturae existenti semper convenire, tamen etiam respectu illius erit quoddam accidens, sicut relatio creaturae. Si autem sumatur fundamentaliter, sic ad unitatem reducenda est: sic enim dixit Aristotel.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 47



Latin signification of the word and with the common conception of human beings. For “thingr” is not a negative or privative term, but an altogether positive one. That negation is also irrelevant, both because explaining what a fictitious being is involves more obscurity than explaining what a thingr is, and also because if that negation is necessary for the passions of being, it should rather be founded on true, for that being is called true which is not fictitious. Or, if it is taken formally, it is included in one or something, for to be divided from any other thing, and consequently also from fictitious being, is included in the negation that something signifiesd—especially given the fact that the naturer of a fictitious being as such consists in a negation, for that is properly a fictitious being which can be apprehended by the mind in such a way that it involves in itself an absurdity or impossibility, which is a kind of negation, and therefore real being is not properly divided from it by a negation, but formally by its own reality, as we shall say more fully in the following disputation in connection with a similar matter.61 And for the same reason one should exclude similar negations that can be produced only through the intellect’s reflection, such as not being diverse from itself, being diverse from a being of reason, not being unequal to itself, and the like, which are useless, can be multiplied to infinity, and are mere works of reason, which do not suffice for the passions of being, as we have said. 14. And hence it is also clear that identity or diversity should not be added to the passions of being, because insofar as these can formally signifyd relations of reason, they are not relevant to the passions of being, as was said generally above. For such relations do not agree with being per se, but only extrinsically through the mind’s thought, reflection, or comparison. But if they are taken insofar as they have some positive or privative foundation in reality, in this way they are sufficiently contained under unity, as we shall say below. And in the same way similarity (if this is common to every being) is reduced to unity, since, if it is taken for a true relation, it is undoubtedly not a passion, because it does not always agree with every being, and that being with which it does agree it agrees with not per se, but accidentally. And if by 61. See DM 4.1.18.

48

Sect. II. De numero & ordine passionum entis.

similitudinem in unitate fundari. Denique iuxta hunc modum ad veritatem reducitur denominatio intelligibilis, significabilis; ad bonum reducitur ratio integri, & perfecti, & denominatio amabilis, appetibilis, & similes: non est ergo necesse plures passiones confingere.



Section 2: On the number and order of being’s passions. 49



chance it is said to agree always with an existent creature, nevertheless, in relation to it also it will be a certain accident, like the relation of creature. But if it is taken fundamentally, in this way it should be reduced to unity, for Aristotle says that similarity is in this way founded on unity.62 Finally, in this way are the denominations intelligible and signifiable reduced to truth; and the naturer of the whole and perfect, as well as the denominations lovable, desirable, and the like, are reduced to good. Therefore, it is not necessary to fashion more passions. 62. See, for example, Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 9, 1018a15–19, ch. 15, 1021a8–14, and Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a20–b14.

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum. Sectio III. Quibus principiis demonstr ari possint passiones de ente, & an inter ea hoc sit primum, I m p ossibile e st, id e m sim ul e s s e & no n es s e.

Ratio dubii pro utraque parte.

1. Haec quaestio praecipue proponitur propter Aristot. qui 4. Metap. ca. 3. text. 8. docuit il⟨111b⟩lud principium, Impossibile est, idem simul esse & non esse, esse primum ac fere unicum, ad quod resolvi debent omnes huius scientiae demonstrationes: imo & aliarum scientiarum, saltem virtualiter. In contrarium autem esse videtur primo, quia propria & intrinseca scientiae principia sumi debent ex causa seu ratione, ob quam praedicatum convenit subiecto: unde idem Arist. 1. Posterior. docet posteriorem passionem demonstrari per priorem; primam vero omnium, vel non demonstrari, sed immediate convenire subiecto, vel solum quoad nos demonstrari per definitionem subiecti: definitionem autem ipsam nullo modo demonstrari, sed immediate cognosci de subie[81b]cto. Sic igitur in omni scientia primum principium erit illud, in quo, vel prima passio de subiecto, vel definitio de definito praedicatur: ergo & in praesente scientia principia propria & intrinseca sumenda erunt ex connexione primae passionis cum ratione entis, vel rationis entis cum ipso ente: erit ergo hoc primum principium, Omne quod est, unum est, quia unum est prima passio entis, ut diximus, vel certe hoc, Omne ens est habens essentiam. Non ergo est illud, Impossibile est, idem simul esse & non esse, quia illud est valde extrinsecum; & non potest deservire ad proprias demonstrationes a priori, sed ut summum ad reductionem ad impossibile. Adde, principium illud a priori reduci ad illud, Omne ens est unum; ideo enim non potest simul esse, & non

50

Section 3: What the first of all principles is.

Section 3 By Which Principles Passions C an Be Demonstr ated of Being, and Whether This Is the First a mong Them: It Is I m possible for t he S a m e Thi ng at the S a me Tim e to Be and Not to B e. 1. This question is proposed especially because of Aristotle, who, in Metaph. IV, ch. 3, text 8,63 teaches that this principle, “It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be,” is the first and almost only one to which all the demonstrations of this science must be resolved—and in fact those of the other sciences, too, at least virtually. But in favor of the contrary view, there seems to be, first, the fact that the proper and intrinsic principles of a science should be taken from the cause or reason on account of which the predicate agrees with the subject. For this reason, the same Aristotle, in Post. An. I, teaches that a later passion is demonstrated through an earlier one, but that the first of all passions either is not demonstrated, but agrees immediately with the subject, or is demonstrated only in relation to us through the definition of the subject, and that the definition itself is in no way demonstrated, but is rather immediately cognized [as true] of the subject. Accordingly, in every science the first principle will be that in which either the first passion is predicated of the subject or the definition is predicated of the thing defined. Therefore, in the present science also the proper and intrinsic principles will have to be taken from the connection between the first passion and the naturer of being, or from the connection between the naturer of being and being itself. 63. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 3, 1005b2–20.

51

Reason for doubt on either side.

52

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

esse, quia unum tantum determinate esse potest. Quomodo multi dicunt, primo convenire enti quatenus est ens, esse divisum a non ente, quam proprietatem putant in unitate includi, de quo postea videbimus. Tandem augetur difficultas, quia etiam inter principia quodammodo extrinseca,28 & universalissima, non videtur illud esse primum; quia est negativum: omnis autem negatio in priori aliqua affirmatione fundatur: ergo datur aliud principium prius illo, in quo fundetur, quale erit, vel hoc, Necesse est idem esse vel non esse, vel hoc, Unum contradictorium necessario aliud destruit.

Aliquot certiora pronunciata pro sensu quaestionis declarando. Principiis eget Metaphysica in quae ultimo resolvat conclusiones.

2. In hac re omnes conveniunt in metaphysica (sicut in aliis scientiis) necessaria esse aliqua prima principia per se nota, quibus passiones demonstrentur; ⟨112a⟩ sive sit sermo de passionibus transcendentibus entis ut ens est; sive de proprietatibus specialioribus aliquorum entium, ut sunt intra latitudinem formalis obiecti metaphysicae, iuxta ea quae in prooemiali disputatione dicta sunt, quanvis, quia ens ut ens in ordine ad hanc scientiam est prius caeteris, passiones illi adaequatae sunt etiam priores, & consequenter etiam universalissima principia, quae ex ipsis transcendentibus aliquo modo constant, priora sunt reliquis; & ideo de illis nunc praesertim agimus. Quod ergo talia principia sint necessaria, eadem ratio est in hac scientia, quae est in caeteris, 28. Reading “extrinseca” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “intrinseca” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 53



This first principle, therefore, will be “Everything that is is one,” since one is the first passion of being, as we have said, or at any rate it will be this: “Every being is a thing having an essence.” It will not, therefore, be this principle, “It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be,” since this principle is very extrinsic and cannot serve for proper a priori demonstrations, but can at most serve for a reduction to the impossible. In addition, this principle is reduced a priori to the former one, “Every being is one,” for the reason why it cannot at the same time both be and not be is that it can determinately be only one. In this way many say that to be divided from ­non-being primarily agrees with being insofar as it is being, which property, they think, is included in unity, about which we shall later see.64 Finally, the difficulty is increased because, even among principles that are in some way extrinsic and the most universal, that one does not seem to be first, since it is negative, and every negation is founded on some prior affirmation. Therefore, there is another principle prior to that one, on which it is founded, of which sort will be either this one, “It is necessary for the same thing to be or not to be,” or this one, “One contradictory necessarily destroys the other.”

Some propositions that are more certain, in order to clarify the issue. 2. In this matter all agree that in metaphysics (as in the other sciences) some first principles that are knownn per se are necessary, in order that, by means of them, passions might be demonstrated, whether the discussion concerns the transcendental passions of being insofar as it is being or the more special properties that belong to some beings insofar as they fall under the scope of the formal object of metaphysics, in keeping with the things that were said in the proemial disputation— although, since in relation to this science being as being is prior to the others, the passions adequate to it are also prior; and consequently the most universal principles, which are in some way composed from the same transcendentals, are also prior to the rest; and therefore at present 64. See DM 4.1.18.

Metaphysics needs principles into which it ultimately resolves its conclusions.

54

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

quia etiam illa per demonstrationem procedit, resolvendo conclusiones in principia; in qua resolutione non potest in infinitum procedere: ut constat ex generali doctrina de causis: in nullo enim causarum genere in infinitum procedi potest: ergo necesse est ut sistat in principiis, seu propositionibus per se notis.

Unicum principium ad id muneris non sufficit.

3. Secundo ex hac ratione concludi videtur, haec principia non tantum unum, sed plura, & ad minus duo esse debere, saltem quoad hoc, ut sint propositiones immediatae, & a priori indemonstrabiles. Ratio est, quia ex uno solo principio nihil concludi potest, ut constat ex Dialectica: quia formalis illatio requirit tres terminos, qui in uno principio esse non possunt: ergo ultima resolutio necessario fit ad duo principia immediata. Quia, si unum sit immediatum, & aliud [82a] demonstrabile, illud quod demonstrabile est, ulterius erit resolvendum, & demonstrandum: non potest autem demonstrari per solum aliud principium immediatum: ergo adiungendum est aliud; quod si illud etiam demonstrabile sit, aliud inquirendum erit, per quod demonstretur; ne igitur procedatur in infinitum, sistendum est in aliquo, etiam indemonstrabili: sunt ergo necessaria plura principia prima etiam in hac scientia. Atque hinc sequitur, si de primo principio in hoc sensu loquamur, scilicet, ut solum dicit propositionem immediatam, seu per se notam: hoc sensu non esse quaerendum unicum principium primum in hac scientia; neque in eo potuisse loqui Aristotelem citato loco: quia re vera nullum est quod hoc modo sit unicum, & duntaxat primum. Igitur in alio sensu potest inquiri principium caeteris prius, scilicet vel quia est nobis notius, vel quia in usu, seu causalitate est prius, & universalius, vel quia omni modo est indemonstrabilius, & in hoc sensu est con⟨112b⟩troversia inter autores, quodnam sit primum metaphysicum principium.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 55



we are treating especially of them. The reason such principles are necessary, then, is the same in this science as it is in other sciences, since this science too proceeds by demonstration, by resolving conclusions into principles—in which resolution one cannot proceed to infinity, as is clear from the general doctrine of causes, for in no genus of cause can one proceed to infinity. Therefore, it is necessary that one come to a halt at principles, that is, propositions that are knownn per se. 3. Second, for this reason it seems to follow that these principles are not only one, but several, and must at a minimum be two, at least if they are to be immediate propositions and indemonstrable a priori. The reason is: because from one principle alone nothing can be concluded, as is clear from dialectic, since a formal consequence requires three terms, which there cannot be in a single principle. Therefore, the final resolution is necessarily made to two immediate principles. For if one is immediate and the other demonstrable, the one that is demonstrable will have to be further resolved and demonstrated. But it cannot be demonstrated only through the other, immediate principle. Therefore, another principle will have to be added. But if this one also is demonstrable, another will have to be sought, through which this one might be demonstrated. Therefore, in order not to proceed to infinity, one will have to come to a stop at some principle that is also indemonstrable. Therefore, several first principles are necessary in this science as well. And from this it follows that if we are speaking in this sense of a first principle, namely, insofar as it signifiesd only an immediate proposition, or one knownn per se, then in this sense a single first principle is not to be sought in this science. Nor could Aristotle have been speaking in this sense in the cited passage, since really there is no principle that is in this way unique and to this extent first. Therefore, one can seek after a principle that is prior to others in another sense, namely, because it is better knownn to us, or because in use and causality it is prior and more universal, or because it is in every way more indemonstrable, and in this sense there is a controversy among authors over which is the first metaphysical principle.

A single principle does not suffice for this function.

56

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum. Varia placita.

Anto. And.

Iavell.

4. Prima sententia est, non esse primum illud, quod ex Aristotele retulimus, sed hoc, Omne ens est ens. Ita tenet Antonius Andreas 4. metaph. q. 5. Et ad Aristotelem respondet, vocasse illud aliud primum principium inter ea quae circunferuntur ut generalia, ut sunt illa, Omne totum est maius sua parte, &c. Sed hic autor etiam in suis principiis non recte loquitur, quia illa propositio est identica, & nugatoria; & ideo in nulla scientia sumitur ut principium demonstrationis, sed est extra omnem artem. Alioqui in omni scientia primum principium esset illud in quo subiectum scientiae de se ipso praedicaretur. Et tam per se notum esset primum principium unius scientiae, sicut alterius, nam omnis propositio identica aeque nota est, ut ens mobile est ens mobile, sicut, ens est ens. Et in hac scientia, plura essent principia aeque nota, quanvis non aeque universalia, ut Substantia est substantia, Accidens est accidens. Apparentius ergo loqueretur, si loco entis sumeret aliquam definitionem, vel descriptionem explicantem rationem entis, eamque de ente praedicaret: nam, licet definitio & definitum in re idem sint, tamen propositio in qua definitio de definito praedicatur, non est identica, sed doctrinalis, quia in ea conceptus distinctus de confuso praedicatur. Et hoc modo favet huic opinioni ratio dubitandi in principio posita. Videtur tamen repugnare Aristotel. dicto ca. 3. lib. 4. metaph. dum absolute concludit, illud principium, Impossibile est, &c. esse simpliciter omnium primum, & ad illud omnes demonstrationes resolvi.

5. Alii dicunt, non illud ab Aristotele positum, sed hoc, Necesse est, quodlibet esse, vel non esse, esse primum principium omnium propter rationem supra tactam, quia hoc est affirmativum, illud vero aliud negativum. Neque enim verum est, quod Iavel. li. 4. metaph. q. 9.29 existimavit, illa duo principia eandem rem diversis verbis significare, & ita non esse reputanda duo, sed unum: nam, si res attentius consid29. Reading “9.” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “6.” instead: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 57

Various opinions.

4. The first opinion is that the principle we’ve reported from Aristotle is not the first, but rather this one: “Every being is a being.” This is what Antonius Andreas holds, Metaph. IV, q. 5.65 And as regards Aristotle, he replies that Aristotle called this other principle first among those which are regarded as general (as are “Every whole is greater than its part” and the like). But this author does not speak rightly even according to his own principles, since that proposition is identical and tautological, and therefore it is taken as a principle of demonstration in no science, but is rather outside every art. Otherwise in every science the first principle would be that in which the subject of the science is predicated of itself. And the first principle of one science would be as per se knownn as that of another, since every identical proposition is equally knownn. For instance, “Mobile being is mobile being” is as knownn as “Being is being.” And in this science there would be several principles that are equally knownn, although not equally universal, such as “Substance is substance,” and “Accident is accident.” He would therefore speak more plausibly if instead of being he took some definition or description that explains the naturer of being and predicated it of being, for although the definition and the thing defined are really the same, nevertheless, the proposition in which the definition is predicated of the thing defined is not identical, but doctrinal, since in it a distinct concept is predicated of a confused one. And in this way the reason for doubt laid down at the beginning favors this opinion. But it seems incompatible with Aristotle, in the mentioned Metaph. IV, ch. 3, when he concludes absolutely that that principle, “It is impossible,” etc., is without qualification the first of all, and that all demonstrations are resolved to it. 5. Others say that not the one laid down by Aristotle, but this one, “It is necessary that any thing be or not be,” is the first of all principles, and this for the reason mentioned above: because it is affirmative, whereas the other is negative. For what Javelli believes, Metaph. IV, q. 9, is not true—namely, that these two principles signify the same thingr in 65. Antonius Andreas, Questiones Antonii Andree super xii libros metaphysice (Venetiis: Impensis heredum Octaviani Scoti, 1523), fol. 19va.

Antonius Andreas.

Javelli.

58

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

eretur, diversae sunt res, quae illis principiis significantur: Sicut enim in contrariis, vel privative oppositis, aliud est, quod non pos[82b]sint simul convenire eidem, aliud vero quod alterum eorum necessario debeat convenire, ut per se est manifestum: ita ⟨113a⟩ etiam in contradictorie oppositis haec duo formaliter, & in rigore diversa sunt. Haec autem significantur per illa duo principia: nam per illud: Impossibile est, idem simul esse & non esse, significatur repugnantia contradictorie oppositorum; per illud vero, Quodlibet est, vel non est, significatur immediatio eorundem, scilicet, inter illa non posse cadere medium. Et ita, ut distincta ponuntur ab Aristotele lib. 4. Metaph. ca. 7. text. 27. & 28. & lib. 3. ca. 2. & 1. Poster. ca. 8. text. 26. & 27. ubi dialecticis terminis eadem principia ponit, Impossibile est idem simul affirmari, & negari de eodem; Necesse est idem affirmari, vel negari de eodem; quae aliis verbis a Dialecticis dici solent: Impossibile est, duas contradictorias esse simul veras; & impossibile est, esse simul falsas; quae duo constat esse valde diversa; & primum fundari in illo principio, impossibile est, idem simul esse & non esse; secundum vero in alio, necesse est esse, vel non esse. Ex his vero rationibus simul constat, comparando haec principia inter se, prius esse illud de impossibili ab Aristotele positum, quam aliud de necessario. Primo quidem, quia per se evidentius est, contradictoria habere inter se repugnantiam, quam habere immediationem; illud enim prius statim in ipsis terminis relucet, secundum autem nonnullo indiget discursu & declaratione. Unde illud prius commune est omnibus oppositis, nam quatenus opposita sunt, inter se pugnant; posterius autem non omnibus convenit, ut constat ex ca. de Opposit. Secundo, quia prius secundum rationem est duas contradictorias non posse esse simul veras, quam non posse esse simul falsas: sicut veritas ex se prior est falsitate.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 59



different words and so are not to be reckoned two principles, but one.66 For if the matter is considered more carefully, the thingsr signified by these principles are different. For just as, in the case of contraries, or things privately opposed, it is one thing to say that they cannot both agree with the same thing at the same time, but another to say that one or the other must necessarily agree, as is clear per se, so also, in the case of things contradictorily opposed, these are formally and strictly different. But these are signified by those two principles, for the principle, “It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be,” signifies the incompatibility of things that are contradictorily opposed, but the other, “Any thing is or is not,” signifies the immediacy of the same contradictorily opposed things, or that there can be no middle ground between them. And they are accordingly set forth by Aristotle as distinct, Metaph. IV, ch. 7, texts 27 and 28,67 and Metaph. III, ch. 2,68 and Post. An. I, ch. 8, texts 26 and 27, where he sets forth the same principles in dialectical terms: “It is impossible for the same thing to be affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time,” and “It is necessary that the same thing be affirmed or denied of the same thing,”69 which are usually put in other words by dialecticians: “It is impossible for two contradictories to be true at the same time,” and “It is impossible for two contradictories to be false at the same time.” And it is clear that these two principles are very different, and that the first is founded on that principle, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time,” while the second is founded on the other principle, “It is necessary that a thing either be or not be.” And from these arguments it is at the same time clear that, when these principles are compared to each other, the one posited by Aristotle regarding impossibility is prior to the other one regarding necessity. First, indeed, because it is per se more evident that contradictories are incompatible with each other than it is that there is no middle ground between them. For the former is more immediately evident by virtue 66. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 742b. 67. Metaph. IV, text 27, is 1011b1–1012a17, and Metaph. IV, text 28, is 1012a17–b8. Aristotle’s discussion of the principle of n ­ on-contradiction is found in Metaph. IV, chs. 3–6 (beginning at 1005b19). Metaph. IV, ch. 7, is devoted to the principle of excluded middle. 68. Aristotle, Metaph. III, ch. 2, 996b29–30. 69. Aristotle, Post. An. I, ch. 11, 77a10–35.

60

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

Quaestionis resolutio. Duo demonstrandi genera & proprietates eorum.

6. Igitur, ut quaestioni respondeamus, distinguere oportet duplex genus demonstrationis, unum dicitur ostensivum, aliud deducens ad impossibile. Primum est, per se & directe ad scientiam requisitum; & in eo proceditur a causis ad effectus, & ab essentia rei ad passiones demonstrandas; loquimur enim in scientia a priori & propter quid: nam, quae est a posteriori, non resolvitur in principia, de quibus nunc agimus, sed in experientiam potius. Secundum demonstrandi genus per se necessarium non est, sed interdum adiungitur propter hominis defectum, igno⟨113b⟩rantiam, vel proterviam: & utile est, non solum ad conclusiones, sed etiam ad prima principia persuadenda, & probanda, quod in priori modo fieri non potest, quia, cum sint immediata, non habent medium a priori per quod probentur; tamen ad impossibile deducendo ostendi potest eorum veritas, & convinci intellectus, ut eis assentiatur: Imo in omni genere demonstrationis, quanvis principia demonstrent a priori conclusionem; & per se nota sint, vis illationis virtute fundatur in deductione ad impossibile, scilicet, quia fieri non potest, quod idem simul sit & non sit, vel quod duae contradictoriae simul sint verae. Propter quod dixit Averroes 2. Metaph. cap. 1. sine illo principio ab Aristotele posito neminem posse philosophari, disputare, aut ratiocinari. [83a]



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 61



of its very terms, but the second requires some reasoning and clarification. For this reason the former is common to all opposites, for insofar as they are opposed they conflict with each other. But the latter does not apply to all opposites, as is clear from the chapter on opposites.70 Second, because the proposition that two contradictories cannot be true at the same time is prior according to reason to the proposition that two contradictories cannot be false at the same time, just as truth is of itself prior to falsity.

Resolution of the question. 6. Therefore, in order to reply to the question, it is necessary to distinguish between two genera of demonstration: one is called ostensive, the other leading to the impossible. The first is per se and directly required for a science, and in it one proceeds from causes to effects, and from a thingr’s essence to the passions that are to be demonstrated, for we are speaking of science a priori and propter quid, since science that is a posteriori is resolved, not into the principles we are now discussing, but experience. The second genus of demonstration is not per se necessary but is sometimes added on account of human defect, ignorance, or willfulness, and it is useful for proving and producing conviction in, not only conclusions, but also first principles, which cannot be done in the former way, since first principles, being immediate, do not have an a priori middle term through which they might be proved. Nevertheless, their truth can be shown, and the intellect convinced to assent to them, by deduction to the impossible. In fact, in every genus of demonstration—however much the principles demonstrate the conclusion a priori and are knownn per se—the strength of the inference is virtually founded on a deduction to the impossible, because, namely, it cannot happen that the same thing at the same time is and is not, or that two contradictories are true at the same time. For this reason Averroes says, Metaph. II, ch. 1, that without that principle laid down by Aristotle no one can philosophize, dispute, or reason.71 70. See Aristotle, Cat., ch. 10. 71. Suárez’s discussion of the PNC echoes Fonseca’s in many respects, and Fonseca makes the same remark about Averroes, although he refers his reader to Averroes’ commen-

The two genera of demonstration and their properties.

62

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

Quis sit modus demonstrandi a priori in hac scientia.

7. Dicendum ergo est in primis, ad demonstrandum a priori passiones entis de ente prima principia sumenda esse vel ex ratione ipsius entis, vel ex prima passione eius ad demonstrandas posteriores: & hoc convincit discursus in principio factus. Et confirmatur, nam quoad hoc eadem est ratio de hac scientia, quae de aliis: nam cum proprietates entis suo modo sint passiones eius: ex eius intrinseca ratione & essentia oriri necesse est: quia hoc est de intrinseca ratione propriae passionis: poterunt ergo per ipsam essentialem rationem entis demonstrari: sive hoc sit per distinctionem ipsarum rerum inter se, sive in ordine ad conceptus, & discursus nostros, ita ut unum vere sit ratio alterius, quod ad scientiam humanam, & demonstrationem sufficit. Unde si passiones entis sunt ita inter se connexae, ut una ex altera oriatur, illa, quae fuerit prima, constituet unum principium ad demonstrandas alias: si vero (quod fieri interdum potest) plures passiones cum ratione entis immediate connectantur, solum per ipsam rationem entis poterunt de ente demonstrari: quomodo autem id fiat, postea in discursu scientiae constabit. In hoc ergo ordine primum principium erit illud, in quo ratio vel essentia entis distincte concepta de ipso ente praedicatur.

Quod 30 sit primum principium deductionis ad impossibile.

8. Secundo dicendum est, in alio genere seu modo demonstrandi per deductionem ad impossibile, primum principium, in quo totus ille modus demonstrandi nititur, esse, Impossibile est idem esse, & non esse. Hoc per se notum est, quia omnis deductio ad im⟨114a⟩possibile in hoc tandem sistit, quod sequatur, idem simul esse, & non esse: & quandiu ad hoc non deducitur, non est satis demonstrata impossibilitas: postquam vero ad hoc deductum est, ibi sistitur, tanquam in ultimo termino resolutionis, & notissimo principio. Et, quanvis interdum possit deduci impossibile ad aliud incommodum, quod duae contradictoriae sint simul falsae, seu ut idem neque sit, neque non sit, tamen hoc ipsum in tantum est impossibile, in quantum virtute includit aliud, 30

30. Reading “Quod” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following have “Quid” instead: Vivès and V5.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 63



7. Therefore, it must be said, first, that in order to demonstrate being’s passions a priori of being, first principles should be taken either from the naturer of being itself or, where the aim is to demonstrate the subsequent passions of being, from being’s first passion. And the argument made at the beginning proves this. And it is confirmed, for on this issue the accountr is the same for this science as it is for others, for since the properties of being are in their own way passions of it, it is necessary that they arise from its intrinsic naturer and essence, since this pertains to the intrinsic naturer of a proper passion. Therefore, they will admit of being demonstrated through the same essential naturer of being, whether this be through a distinction of thingsr themselves from each other, or through a distinction in relation to our concepts and reasonings in such a way that one [extreme of the distinction] truly is the groundr of the other, which suffices for human science and demonstration. For this reason, if the passions of being are connected to each other in such a way that one arises from the other, the one that is first will constitute a single principle72 for demonstrating the others, but if (as can sometimes happen) several passions are immediately connected to the naturer of being, they will admit of being demonstrated of being only through the very naturer of being. But in what way this is done will become clear later during the course of the science. In this order, therefore, the first principle will be that in which the naturer or essence of being, distinctly conceived, is predicated of being itself. 8. It must be said, in the second place, that in the other genus or mode of demonstrating, by deduction to the impossible, the first principle on which that entire mode of demonstration relies is: “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” This is knownn per se, since every deduction to the impossible finally comes to a halt at this, that it follows that the same thing at the same time is and is not, and as long as this is not deduced, the impossibility has not been sufficiently demonstrated. But after the deduction arrives there, it stops there as at tary on Metaph. IV, ch. 3. See Pedro da Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), col. 852, and Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8, fol. 75C (commenting on Metaph. IV, ch. 3, 1005b19–22). 72. In his notes on the Latin text of the Vivès edition, Charles Berton suggests that the Latin “unum principium” (here translated “a single principle”) should instead read “primum principium” (“the first principle”), noting that a numeral (i.e., “1”) may have provided an occasion for error. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b.

What the mode of demonstrating a priori in this science is.

What the first principle of a deduction to the impossible is.

64

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

scilicet, quod simul de aliquo negetur aliquid & non negetur, quod est affirmare & negare idem de eodem.

Quod sit humanae scientiae principium absolute primum.

9. Tertio dicendum est, hinc fieri, ut illud principium: Impossibile est, idem simul esse & non esse: sit simpliciter primum in humana scientia, & praesertim in Metaphysica. Ratio est, nam illud principium recte vocatur primum, a quo sumit firmitatem tota humana scientia: sed huiusmodi est praedictum principium, quia ex illo non solum conclusiones, sed prima etiam principia demonstrantur. Imo addit Fonseca lib. 4. Metaph. cap. 3. quaest. 1. sect. 3. per illud principium confirmari a priori prima principia. Sed non video, cur deductionem ad impossibile vocet a priori, cum non sit ex causa, sed per extrinsecum medium. Nisi fortasse intelligat per huiusmodi principium demonstrari a priori, non quidem veritatem aliorum principiorum, quod fieri non potest: sed impossibilitatem, ac repugnantiam, quae ex opposito sequitur: ultima enim resolutio omnis repugnantiae fit ad contradictionem, ad quam per illud principium fit deductio. Hoc vero satis est, ut illud principium dicatur simpliciter primum: nam cum ingenium humanum non statim comprehendat caetera principia prima, prout [83b] in se sunt, multum iuvatur, & confirmatur in eorum assensu, deducendo ad impossibile, quod in caeteris fieri potest per illud primum: ipsum autem nullo modo ostendi potest etiam deductione ad impossibile, quia nullum aliud impossibilius inferri potest, quam sit illud, quod in eo pronuntiatur: quod est signum illud esse maxime notum, & primum. Dixi autem, usum huius principii esse maxime necessarium in hac scientia, quia, cum ens simplicissimum sit, vix potest definiri, & ratio eius distinctius explicari, & applicari ad veras demonstrationes efficiendas, ita ut propositiones assumptae identicae non censeantur. ⟨114b⟩



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 65



a final term of resolution and the most knownn principle. And although sometimes something impossible can be led to the other absurdity that two contradictories are false at the same time, or that the same thing neither is nor is not, nevertheless, this same thing is impossible insofar as it virtually includes the other, namely, that something is at the same time denied and not denied of something, which is to affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing. 9. It must be said, third, that as a consequence this principle, “It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be,” is without qualification the first in human science, and especially in metaphysics. The reason is that that principle is rightly called first from which all of human science takes its stability. But of this sort is the mentioned principle, since not only conclusions, but also first principles, are demonstrated from it. In fact, Fonseca adds, Metaph. IV, ch. 3, q. 1, sect. 3, that by this principle first principles are confirmed a priori.73 But I do not see why he calls deduction to the impossible a priori, since it is not from a cause but through an extrinsic middle term. Unless perhaps he thinks that what is demonstrated a priori through such a principle is not indeed the truth of other principles, which cannot be done, but the impossibility and absurdity which follows from their opposite. For the final resolution of every absurdity is to a contradiction, to which a deduction is made through that principle. But this is enough for that principle to be called first without qualification, for, since the human mind does not immediately comprehend other first principles as they are in themselves, it is greatly helped and strengthened in its assent to them by deducing to the impossible, which in the case of other principles can be done through that first one. But it itself can in no way be shown through a deduction to the impossible as well, for nothing else can be inferred that is more impossible than what is pronounced in it, which is a sign that it is most knownn and first. But I said that the use of this principle is most necessary in this science for the following reason: since being is most simple, it is scarcely possible to define it, explain its naturer quite distinctly, and employ it in the production of true demonstrations in such a way that the assumed propositions are not judged identical. 73. Pedro da Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), col. 851.

What the absolutely first principle of human science is.

66

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum. Solvuntur rationes oppositae.

10. Ad rationem ergo dubitandi in principio positam quoad priorem partem iam explicatum est, Aristotelem non vocare illud principium primum, quia illo utatur Metaphysica ad suas proprias & directas demonstrationes: nam potius idem Aristot. 1. Poster. cap. 8. text. 26. dicit, non solere illud principium formaliter ingredi demonstrationem. Dicitur ergo primum principium aliis rationibus iam explicatis: est enim quasi universale fundamentum, cuius virtute31 omnes demonstrationes nituntur: & alia principia possunt, saltem quoad nos, declarari ac confirmari: quanquam id semper fiat adiuncto aliquo alio principio, vel concesso, vel per se noto. Ad primam confirmationem respondetur, veritatem illius principii proprie non fundari in unitate, sed in oppositione & repugnantia contradictoriorum: unde non recte probabitur, quod est, non posse simul non esse, quia, quod est, unum tantum est: tum quia, ut infra dicam, ens quatenus unum, non proprie dividitur a non ente, sed ab alio ente: quia a non ente potius dividitur quatenus ens: tum etiam, quia haec ipsa divisio entis a non ente fundatur in eo quod non potest idem simul esse & non esse propter repugnantiam formalem horum terminorum. Ad ultimam confirmationem dicitur primo, fieri quidem posse, ut aliqua affirmativa propositio, quatenus simplicior est quam negativa, prior sit quam illa ordine generationis, seu compositionis, & tamen quod in ratione veritatis per se notae non sit tam manifesta, neque aeque prima: & ita dici potest de illo principio: nam, licet tota veritas eius fundetur in natura ipsius esse, quod per se excludit non esse, tamen hoc ipsum per illud principium, quanvis negativum, explicatur, &32 evidentissime, & aptissime ad fundandas demonstrationes deducentes ad impossibile.

31. Reading “virtute” with C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. The following read “virtuti” instead: M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , and V3. 32. Reading “&” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following omit “&”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 67

The opposing arguments are met.

10. To the reason for doubt set forth at the beginning: with respect to its first part, it has already been explained that Aristotle does not call that principle first because metaphysics uses it for its proper and direct demonstrations. For it is rather the case that the same Aristotle, Post. An. I, ch. 8, text 26, says that that principle does not normally enter formally into a demonstration.74 It is called the first principle, then, for the other reasons already explained. For it is, as it were, a universal foundation on the strength of which all demonstrations depend, and by means of which other principles can, at least in relation to us, be made clear and confirmed, although this is always done by the addition of some other principle, either conceded or knownn per se. To the first confirmation,75 I reply that the truth of this principle is properly not founded on unity, but on the opposition or incompatibility of contradictories, for which reason it will not rightly be proved that what is cannot at the same time not be on the grounds that what is is only one—both because, as I shall say below,76 being insofar as it is one is not properly divided from n ­ on-being, but from another being, since it is instead divided from ­non-being insofar as it is being, and also because this very division of being from ­non-being is founded on the fact that the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be, on account of the formal incompatibility of these terms. To the final confirmation,77 it is said, first, that it can indeed happen that some affirmative proposition, inasmuch as it is simpler than a negative one, is prior to the latter in the order of generation or composition, but that, nevertheless, in its characterr as a truth knownn per se, it is not as manifest, nor equally primary. And this can be said of the principle in question, for although its entire truth is founded on the nature of beinge—which per se excludes not beinge—nevertheless, it is through this principle, even though negative, that this very thing is explained most evidently and most suitably in order to found demonstrations leading to the impossible. 74. Aristotle, Post. An. I, ch. 11, 77a10–12. 75. See DM 3.3.1. 76. See DM 4.1.18. 77. See, again, DM 3.3.1.

68

In genere moris quod primum principium, & collatio cum primo in genere naturae.

Sect. III. Quod sit principium omnium primum.

11. Atque hinc facile solvuntur multa argumenta, quae fieri solent contra sententiam Aristotelis de hoc primo principio, ut quod constet multis vocibus neque universalissimis, neque admodum notis, ut sunt simul, idem, quae relationes significant, quae sunt posteriores absolutis. Item quod sit propositio modalis, quae supponit priorem de inesse. Ad haec enim & similia dicitur eis ad summum probari, hanc non esse primam propositionem, seu complexionem quam intellectus for⟨115a⟩mat, non tamen, quod non sit primum principium, [84a] quia ad hoc non est necesse, ut sit prima propositio, sed solum, quod ex illo quodammodo pendeat omnium aliarum veritatum scientia, ipsum vero ita sit verum, notum, & indemonstrabile, ut ab alio non pendeat: haec autem conveniunt illi principio, ut ostensum est. Posset autem principium illud ad simpliciores terminos reduci dicendo, Nullum ens est & non est: sic enim conficitur ex simplicibus terminis, & ex universalissimis ac primis, quod necessarium est in primo principio, ut possit omnibus scientiis esse commune, ut notavit D. Tho. 1. 2. quaest. 94. art. 2. Ubi advertit, hoc principium esse primum in speculabilibus: nam in practicis seu moralibus datur aliud primum, scilicet, Omne bonum est faciendum, & malum vitandum: nam, quia omnes actiones morales circa bonum & malum versantur, ideo primum principium morale ex illis terminis constare debuit: tamen, quia practica in speculativis33 fundantur, ideo, quod in speculativis est primum principium, simpliciter, & absolute est primum. An vero hoc principium ita sit notum, ut a nemine possit mente negari, quanvis voce contendere videatur: item, quibus modis suadendum sit contra eum, qui proterve illud negaret, vel eum ex concessis redarguendo, vel ad inconvenientia sensibus repugnantia eum deducendo, tractat late Arist. 4. Metaphys. cap. 3. 4. & 5. quibus locis videri possunt expositores, quia non est, quod in hac re amplius immoremur. 33. Reading “speculativis” with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “speculativa”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 3: What the first of all principles is. 69



11. And thus does one easily resolve the many arguments that are usually made against Aristotle’s opinion regarding that first principle, for instance, that it is composed of many words that are neither most universal nor completely knownn, such as “at the same time” and “the same,” which signify relations, which are posterior to absolute things. Further, that it is a modal proposition, which presupposes a prior assertoric one. For to these and the like it is said that by means of these it is proved, at most, that this is not the first proposition or combination [of terms] that the intellect forms, but not that it is not the first principle, since for the latter it is not necessary that it be the first proposition, but only that knowledge of all other truths in some way depend on it, and that it be so true, knownn, and indemonstrable that it does not depend on another principle. And these characteristics agree with this principle, as has been shown. And this principle could be reduced to simpler terms, by saying “No being is and is not,” for in this way it is made from terms that are simple, most universal, and primary, which is necessary in the case of the first principle, in order that it might be able to be common to all the sciences, as St. Thomas notes, ST I­ -II, q. 94, art. 2.78 And here he notes that this principle is first in the speculative sciences, for in the practical and moral ones there is another first principle, namely, “All good is to be done and all evil avoided,” for since all moral actions have to do with good and evil, the first moral principle must be composed from those terms. Nevertheless, since a practical science is founded on the speculative sciences, that which is the first principle in the speculative sciences is first without qualification and absolutely. But whether this principle is so knownn that it can be denied in thought by nobody, even though in speech one might seem to dispute it; or again, in what ways it is to be argued for against him who obstinately denies it, whether by refuting him on the basis of the things granted by him, or by leading him to absurdities incompatible with the senses—all this Aristotle discusses at length in Metaph. IV, chs. 3, 4, and 5, regarding which texts his interpreters can be consulted, since there is nothing in this matter that need detain us any longer. 78. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 7 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1892), pp. 169b–170a.

What the first principle in the moral sphere is, and a comparison of it with the first principle in the natural sphere.

[84a] ⟨115a⟩

DISPUTATIO IIII. DE UNITATE TR ANSCENDENTALI IN COM MUNI. Series tractationis.

Primum de unitate tractandum est, quia cum entitate maxime est coniuncta, & caeteris passionibus quodammodo supponitur: quia reliquae in quadam rerum distinctarum comparatione seu habitudine consistunt, quae sine unitate intelligi non potest. Et hunc ordinem servavit Aristotel. 4. Metaph. cap. 3. unum statim cum ente coniungens. Quoniam vero unum multitudini opponitur: & oppositorum eadem est ratio seu scientia, ideo consequenter dicendum erit de multitudine. Ac denique quia multitudo ex distinctione, seu divisione causatur, quam unitas negat, tractandum etiam erit de variis distinctionum generibus: atque in hunc modum omnia genera ⟨115b⟩ unitatum, distinctionum, & multitudinum explicata relinquemus.

70

DISPUTATION IV. ON TR ANSCENDENTAL UNIT Y IN GENER AL. Unity must be dealt with first, since it is most closely joined to entity and is in a certain way presupposed by the other passions,79 for the others consist in a certain comparison or relation of distinct thingsr, and this comparison or relation cannot be understood without unity. And Aristotle observes this order in Metaph. IV, ch. 3, joining one immediately to being.80 Moreover, since one is opposed to multitude, and the accountr or knowledge of opposites is the same, multitude will consequently need to be discussed. And finally, since a multitude is caused by distinction or division, which denies unity, we shall have to deal also with the various genera of distinctions. And in this way we shall leave all the genera of unity, distinction, and multitude explained.81

79. Transcendental truth and goodness, the remaining passions of being, are discussed in DM 8 and 10 (respectively). 80. In Metaph. IV, Aristotle’s discussion of unity and its relation to being is to be found in ch. 2, beginning at 1003b22, and not in ch. 3. 81. DM 5 deals with individual unity, DM 6 with formal and universal unity, and DM 7 with the various genera of distinctions.

71

Order of treatment.

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti. SEC TIO I. Utrum unitas tr anscendentalis addat enti r ationem aliqua m positiva m, vel tantum privativa m. Prima opinio. Avicenna.

Scotus. Ant. An.

1. Prima sententia est, unum addere supra ens accidens quoddam positivum, ex natura rei distinctum ab ente, per se tamen consequens & concomitans omne ens. Ita sensit Avicen. lib. 3. suae Metaph. cap. 2. & lib. 7. cap. 1. nam priori loco vocat unum accidens, & quid comitans [84b] essentiam, posteriori autem loco dicit non esse absolute idem cum ente. Et hanc sententiam videtur secutus Scotus 4. Metaph. q. 2. & in 2. d. 3. q. 2. Anton. And. 4. Metaph. q. 3. qui docent,34 unum addere supra ens aliquid positivum ex natura rei distinctum ab ente. Sed haec sententia, quantum ad distinctionem ex natura rei inter ens, & id, quod unum addit supra ens, reiecta sufficienter est praecedente disputatione, & plane repugnat Arist. 4. Metaph. c. 2. & 5. & amplius ex sequentibus confutabitur.

34. Reading “docent” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following read “docet” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.

72

Section 1: What one adds to being.

Section 1 Whether Tr anscendental Unit y Adds Some Positive Char acter r to Being, or Only a Privative Char acter r . 1. The first opinion is that one adds a certain positive accident to being which is distinct ex natura rei from being but per se follows and accompanies every being. This is what Avicenna holds, bk. III of his Metaphysics, ch. 2, and bk. VII, ch. 1, for in the former place he calls one an accident and something that accompanies essence, while in the latter he says that it is not absolutely the same as being.82 And Scotus, Metaph. IV, q. 2, and Sent. II, d. 3, q. 2,83 seems to have followed this opinion, and also Antonius Andreas, Metaph. IV, q. 3,84 both of whom teach that one adds to being something positive and distinct ex natura rei from being. But this opinion, with respect to the distinction ex natura rei between being and what one adds to being, was sufficiently undermined in the last disputation,85 and it is plainly incompatible with Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2 and ch. 5,86 and it will further be refuted on the basis of what follows.

First opinion. Avicenna.

Scotus. Antonius Andreas.

82. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, sive scientia divina I–IV, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain & Leiden: Peeters & Brill, 1977), p. 117, and Liber de philosophia prima, sive scientia divina V–X, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain & Leiden: Peeters & Brill, 1980), p. 349. 83. John Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica, vol. 3 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), pp. 338–60 (ns. 77–160), and Scotus, Opera Omnia, vol. 7 (Vaticana), pp. 410–17 (ns. 43–58). 84. Antonius Andreas, Questiones super xii libros metaphysice, fols. 17va–19ra. 85. See DM 3.1. 86. See n. 80 above. Aristotle does not discuss unity in Metaph. IV, ch. 5. It is possible that something has been omitted from the text, and that Suárez means to refer here to the discussion of unity in Metaph. V, ch. 6.

73

74

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti. Proponitur sententia, quod ratio unius positiva sit.

D. Bonav.

Alens. Soto.

2. Unde esse potest secunda sententia, unum addere supra ens proprietatem quandam positivam, non realiter, vel ex natura rei, sed sola ratione ab ente distinctam, ad eum modum quo sapientia, vel iustitia dicitur addere aliquid Deo, & esse attributum positivum eius sola ratione distinctum ab illo. Hanc opinionem videtur tenere S. Bonaven. in 1. d. 23. ar. 1. q. 1. ubi dicit, unum in Deo dicere aliquid positivum, in creatura vero interdum dicere35 privativum, interdum vero positivum. Unde ait, quanvis modus significandi, vel explicandi unitatem sit per modum negationis, quia simplicia non nisi per negationes a nobis concipiuntur & explicantur, tamen quoad rem significatam & intellectam esse quid positivum. Hoc idem significat Alex. Alens. 1. p. q. 13. memb. 1. & 2. Soto in logica cap. de Propr. q. 2. ad 2. Potestque suaderi primo, quia ex omnium sententia unum addit indivisionem supra ens: sed indivisio, licet per modum negationis significetur, tamen re vera non est negatio, sed positiva ratio, ergo. Maior patet ex ipsa vocis expositione: dicitur enim unum, quod in se est indivisum. Item ex opposito suo, scilicet, multi⟨116a⟩tudine: multa enim dicuntur, quae inter se divisa sunt: ergo unum dicitur, quod indivisum est in se. Item patet ex proportione ad unitatem quantitativam: nam illae quantitates plures dicuntur, quae divisae sunt: illa vero una, quae non est divisa: sicut ergo quantitas est una per indivisionem quantitatis, ita entitas est una per indivisionem entitatis. Minor probatur primo, quia divisio est negatio: ergo indivisio, licet habeat formam negationis, tamen in re non est negatio, sed affirmatio potius. Consequentia probatur, quia duae negationes (ut aiunt) affirmant: & quia in re ipsa nunquam negatio destruitur immediate per negationem: nulla enim talis oppositio invenitur in rebus: tollitur ergo per positivam formam oppositam. Antecedens autem, scilicet, divisionem dicere negationem, est D. Thomae quaest. 9. de Poten. art. 7. dicentis, multitudinem includere negationem, scilicet divisionem unius ab alio. Et 1. p. q. 11. art. 2. ad 4. dicit, in tantum nos apprehendere divisionem, inquantum apprehendimus, hoc ens non esse illud: & idem 35. Reading “dicere” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following omit this word: V5 and Vivès.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 75

The opinion is presented that the naturer of the unit is positive.

2. There can, then, be a second opinion: that one adds to being some positive property that is distinct, not really or ex natura rei, but only rationally, from being, in the way wisdom or justice is said to add something to God and to be a positive attribute of his, distinct only rationally from him. St. Bonaventure seems to hold this opinion, Sent. I, d. 23, art. 1, q. 1, when he says that in the case of God one signifiesd something positive, but in the case of a creature it sometimes signifiesd something privative and sometimes something positive.87 For this reason, he says, although the mode of signifying or explaining unity is by way of a negation, since simple things are not conceived and explained by us except by means of negations, nevertheless, with respect to the thingr signified and understood, it is something positive. Alexander of Hales indicates the same thing, Summa I, q. 13, members 1 and 2,88 as does Soto in his Logic, the chapter on properties, q. 2, ad 2.89 And it can be argued for, in the first place, because all agree in holding that one adds indivision to being. But indivision, although it is signified in the manner of a negation, is nevertheless not really a negation, but a positive naturer. Therefore. The major is clear from the very explanation of the word, for that which is in itself undivided is called one. Likewise, by appeal to its opposite, namely, multitude, for those things are called several which are divided from one another. Therefore, what is undivided in itself is called one. Likewise, it is clear by proportion to quantitative unity, for those quantities which have been divided are called several, while that which is not divided is called one. Therefore, just as a quantity is one through the indivision of quantity, so is an entity one through the indivision of entity. The minor is proved, in the first place, because division is a negation. Therefore, indivision, although it has the form of a negation, is nevertheless not in reality a negation, but rather 87. Suárez actually has in mind d. 24, art. 1, q. 1, of Bonaventure’s commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences. See Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Ad Claras Aquas: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882), p. 421a–b. 88. Alexander of Hales, Universae Theologiae Summa (Venetiis: apud Franciscum Franciscium, Senensem, 1576), fols. 28rb–29rb. 89. Domingo de Soto, In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii, fol. 29va.

Bonaventure.

Alexander of Hales. Soto.

76

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

dicit Soncin. 10. Metaph. q. 4. Neque aliter nos concipere possumus divisionem.

3. Secundo potest hoc ita explicari ratione, quia in illis rebus, quae sunt unae per compositionem: unitas consurgit per unionem plurium, quae unio est quid positivum in ipsis, ut postea videbimus: e contrario vero res plures hoc ipso sunt multae & non una, quod unione carent: divisio ergo formaliter solum dicit [85a] carentiam unionis: consistit ergo in negatione: e contrario vero indivisio dicit carentiam divisionis, quod est negare carentiam unionis: hoc autem est ponere unionem, quae quid positivum est. Et consequenter in his rebus, quae non sunt unae per unionem plurium, sed per simplices entitates, unitas dicet positivam perfectionem consistentem in quadam rei integritate, quae est altior & eminentior perfectio, quam unio, quanvis a nobis propter suam simplicitatem per negationem explicetur. Unde sumitur duplex confirmatio. Prima, quia negatio ut sic, non suscipit magis nec minus: unum vero, seu unitas recipit magis & minus: nam magis unum est quod per simplicem entitatem est unum, quam quod per compositionem plurium, & tanto magis ab unitate receditur, quanto compositio maior est, seu minor unio: ergo signum est, unitatem addere aliquid positivum. Secunda confirmatio est, quia negatio nullam perfectionem dicit: unitas vero dicit perfectionem: ⟨116b⟩ nam in Deo ad maximam eius perfectionem spectat quod sit unus tantum: & quod sit maxime unus: & quod in eo omnia quae opposita non sunt, unum omnino sint. Et in angelis ad perfectionem eorum pertinere censetur, ut in unaquaque specie sit unus tantum: & modus unitatis eorum, scilicet, per talem simplicitatem, pertinet etiam ad perfectionem eorum: & idem est proportionate in reliquis entibus.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 77



an affirmation. The consequence is proved because two negations (as they say) affirm, and because in reality a negation is never immediately destroyed by a negation, since no such opposition is found in reality. A negation, therefore, is removed by the opposed positive form. But the antecedent, namely, that division signifiesd a negation, is the view of St. Thomas, On the Power of God, q. 9, art. 7, who says that multitude involves a negation, namely, the division of one thing from another.90 And in ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4, he says that we grasp division insofar as we grasp that this being is not that one.91 And Soncinas says the same thing, Metaph. X, q. 4.92 Nor can we otherwise conceive division. 3. Second, this can be explained by argument as follows: because in those thingsr which are one by composition, unity arises by means of a union of several things, and this union is something positive in them, as we shall later see. And conversely, several thingsr are many and not one by virtue of the fact that they lack a union. Therefore, division formally signifiesd only a lack of union. It therefore consists in a negation. And conversely, indivision signifiesd a lack of division, which is to deny a lack of union, and this is to posit a union, which is something positive. And consequently in those thingsr which are not one through a union of several things, but by virtue of their simple entities, unity will signifyd a positive perfection consisting in a sort of integrity of the thingr which is a higher and more eminent perfection than a union, although on account of its simplicity it is explained by us by means of a negation. And hence is derived a twofold confirmation. First, because a negation as such does not admit of more or less. But one, or unity, admits of more or less, for what is one by simple entity is more one than what is one through the composition of several things, and it falls further short of unity to the extent that its composition is greater or its union less. This is a sign, therefore, that unity adds something positive. The second confirmation is the following: because a negation signifiesd no perfection. But unity signifiesd a perfection, for in God it pertains to his greatest perfection that he is only one, that he is one to the greatest degree, and that in him all things which are not opposed are altogether 90. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, 9th ed., vol. 2 (Taurini & Romae: Marietti, 1953), p. 243a. 91. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b. 92. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 235a.

78

Aristot.

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

4. Tertio, id colligi potest ex speciebus, seu modis unitatis: omnes enim sunt positivi: ergo signum est, ipsam etiam unitatem ut sic addere aliquid positivum. Antecedens patet primum in unitate quantitativa, quae dicitur una continuatione ab Arist. 5. Metaph. cap. 6. continuitas autem non est negatio, sed positivum, cum in hoc consistat, quod partes habeant terminum communem: illa ergo integritas, quae ex continuatione resultat, est unitas quantitatis continuae, & illa positivum quid est. Alia est unitas compositionis, v. g. ex materia & forma, quomodo humanitas vocatur una: de qua iam ostendimus in positiva ratione consistere: unde & generatio, quae ad hanc unionem tendit, positiva actio est: e contrario vero corruptio, quae illam dissolvit, formaliter in privatione consistit. Alia unitas est individualis, specifica, & generica: & hae omnes positivae sunt, quia & genus positive contrahitur ad speciem, & species ad individuum, & conformitas illa, vel convenientia, quae est in specie, vel genere positiva est.

5. Quarto, argumentari possumus ex effectibus seu proprietatibus, quae unitati tribuuntur: una est, quod fundet relationem identitatis seu similitudinis, 5. Metaph. c. 15.36 Relatio autem realis non fundatur in negatione, sed in positivo. Alia est, quod unum est prima mensura multitudinis: quod non potest convenire negationi, cum nihil sit. Unde Aristoteles 10. Metaph. cap. 9. tex. 21. ponit oppositionem relativam inter unum & multa in ratione mensurae & mensurati. Tandem unum ut sic componit multitudinem, nam multitudo formaliter ex unitatibus formaliter constat: unde & in numero quantitativo ultima unitas dicitur esse forma eius: sicut ergo numerus formaliter est aliquid positivum, ita & unitas. [85b]

36. Reading “15.” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. The following read instead “c.1.15.”: P1 and P2. The following leave a blank space in lieu of “15.”: S , V1 , and V2.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 79



one. And in the angels, it is thought to pertain to their perfection that in each species there is only one angel, and the mode of their unity— namely, through a kind of simplicity—also pertains to their perfection. And the same is proportionately true in the case of other beings. 4. Third, this can be inferred from the species, or modes, of unity. For they are all positive. Therefore, this is a sign that unity itself, as such, also adds something positive. The antecedent is clear, first, in the case of quantitative unity, which Aristotle calls one by continuation, Metaph. V, ch. 6.93 But continuity is not a negation, but rather something positive, since it consists in this, that parts have a common terminus. Therefore, that integrity which results from continuation is the unity of continuous quantity, and it is something positive. Another is the unity of composition, for example, from matter and form, in the way humanity is called one, concerning which unity we have already shown that it consists in a positive naturer, for which reason generation also, which is directed to this union, is a positive action, while to the contrary, corruption, which dissolves this union, formally consists in a privation. Other unities are individual, specific, and generic. And all of these are positive, since the genus is positively contracted to the species, and the species to the individual, and that conformity or agreement which is in the species or genus is positive. 5. Fourth, we can argue from the effects or properties that are attributed to unity. One property is that it founds the relation of identity or similarity, Metaph. V, ch. 15.94 But a real relation is not founded on a negation, but on something positive. Another property is that the unit is the first measure of a multitude, which is something that cannot agree with a negation, since a negation is nothing. For this reason, Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 9, text 21, places the relative opposition between the one and the many in the classr of the measure and measured.95 Finally, the unit as such composes a multitude, for a multitude is formally composed of unities. For this reason also in quantitative number the final unity is said to be its form. Therefore, just as number is formally something positive, so also is unity. 93. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1015b36–1016a17. 94. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 15, 1021a8–14. 95. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 6, 1056b32–33.

Aristotle.

80

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti. Vera sententia.

D. Thom. Caiet. Capreol. Durand. Gabriel. Gregor. Henric. Soncin. Iavell. Iandun. Fonsec. Commentat. Aristot.

6. Dicendum est primo, unum nihil positivum addere supra ens, nec rationis, nec reale, ⟨117a⟩ neque ex natura rei, neque sola ratione ab ente distinctum. Est sententia D. Thom. 4. Metaph. lect. 2. & in 1. par. quaest. 11. art. 1. ubi Caiet. Scholastici in 1. dist. 24. ubi Capreol. quaest. 1. art. 1. Durand. quaest. 1. & 2. Gabr. quaest. 1. art. 3. dub. 3. Greg. quaest. 1. art. 1. Henric. quodlib. 1. quaest. 1. Soncin. 4. Metaph. quaest. 4. Iavell. q. 5. & 8. Iandun. q. 4. Fonsec. c. 2. q. 5. Et fuit etiam sententia Commen. 4. Metaph. comm. 3. tex. 3. & lib. 10. comm. 8. Et sumitur ex Arist. 5. Metaph. cap. 6. tex. 11. & lib. 10. cap. 1. ubi rationem unius explicat per indivisionem, & indivisionem, per negationem divisionis. & 4. Metaph. cap. 2. hac ratione dicit, unum & ens esse unam ac eandem naturam, quia nimirum nullam rationem positivam dicit, praeter rationem entis.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 81

The true opinion.

6. It must be said, first, that one adds nothing positive to being, whether rational or real, whether distinct ex natura rei from being or only rationally distinct from it. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, Metaph. IV, lect. 2,96 and ST I, q. 11, art. 1,97 in which place Cajetan also affirms it,98 and it is also the opinion of the schoolmen, Sent. I, d. 24, where it is affirmed by Capreolus, q. 1, art. 1,99 Durandus, q. 1 & q. 2,100 Gabriel, q. 1, art. 3, doubt 3,101 Gregory, q. 1, art. 1,102 and it is also the view of Henry, Quodlibet 1, q. 1,103 Soncinas, Metaph. IV, q. 4,104 Javelli, q. 5 & q. 8,105 Jandun, q. 4,106 and Fonseca, ch. 2, q. 5.107 And it was also the opinion of the Commentator, Metaph. IV, comment 3, text 3, and bk. X, comment 8.108 And it is taken from Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, text 11, and bk. X, ch. 1, where he explains the naturer of the unit by indivision and indivision by the negation of division.109 And in Metaph. IV, ch. 2, he says for this reason that one and being are one and

96. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio (Turin & Rome: Marietti, 1950), p. 156a (n. 560). 97. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 107a. 98. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108a–109b. 99. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2 (Turonibus: Sumptibus Alfred Cattier, Bibliopolae Editoris, 1900), pp. 187b–188a, 199a–b, 206a–b. 100. Durandus of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII (Venetiis: Ex Officina Gasparis Bindoni, 1586), fols. 71vb–73rb. 101. Gabriel Biel, Commentarius in Primum Librum Sententiarum Magistri Gabrielis Biel (Brixiae: Apud Petrum Bozolam, 1574), pp. 245b–246a. 102. Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, t. 3 (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), pp. 11–27. 103. Henry of Ghent, Opera Omnia, vol. 5 (Leuven & Leiden: Leuven University Press & E. J. Brill, 1979), p. 4. 104. In Soncinas’s ­question-commentary, q. 4 on Metaph. IV is devoted to the question “Whether being is predicated univocally.” Suárez more likely means to refer to q. 23 of Metaph. IV, “Whether one adds a negation to being.” See Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, pp. 36a–37a. 105. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 738a and p. 741a. 106. John of Jandun, Acutissimae Quaestiones in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scottum, 1560), cols. 241–47. 107. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 772–77. 108. Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8, fols. 66K–67I, fol. 257D–K. 109. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1016a32–b17, Metaph. X, ch. 1, 1052a15–b18.

St. Thomas. Cajetan. Capreolus. Durandus. Gabriel. Gregory. Henry. Soncinas. Javelli. Jandun. Fonseca. The Commentator. Aristotle.

82

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

7. Et quidem de ente rationis per modum positivi (de quo est sermo in prima parte conclusionis) res est satis certa & extra controversiam: quia nullum hactenus excogitatum est ens rationis quasi positivum, quod unum de formali dicat, & addat enti: quia, aut illud est per modum relationis: & hoc non, quia nomen unius omnino absolutum est, ut supra vidimus, & constat ex ipsa voce, & ex communi modo concipiendi: aut est per modum alicuius praedicati absoluti, & positivi: hoc dici non potest, etiam si fingendi fiat copia. Dicere quis forte posset, unum addere relationem identitatis ad se ipsum. Sed hoc est plane falsum, nam esse unum, & esse idem, sunt praedicata valde diversa: & primum est suo modo reale praedicatum conveniens enti sine fictione intellectus: secundum vero est praedicatum rationis conveniens per operationem intellectus: unde primum est fundamentum secundi, eo modo quo relatio rationis potest in re habere fundamentum.

8. Itaque, hac parte omissa, altera de ratione reali positiva, quae praecipue est intenta, solet hac maxime ratione probari, quia, si unum addit enti positivam realem rationem, ergo necesse est ut in illa includatur ens: ergo & unum: ergo illi addenda erit alia ratio positiva, per quam sit unum: ergo ita procedetur in infinitum, nisi in aliqua ratione reali sistamus, quae ita sit per se ens & unum, ut esse sic unam, nihil addat supra entitatem eius: ergo eadem ratione sistendum erit in ipsamet ratione entis. Sed ad hoc argumentum respondet Scotus, illam rationem unius, ita esse positivam, ut tamen ens non sit. Sed hoc satis est in superioribus improbatum. Et ⟨117b⟩ praeterea negari non potest, quod ad praesens spectat, quin ille modus realis, vel quidquid illud sit, quod unum addit enti, sit unum quid eo modo quo est [ens],37 nam unumquodque ens habet huiusmodi modum unum tantum, & 37. No edition that I’ve consulted reads “ens,” here, but the sense is greatly improved by the addition of this word. Compare DM 4.3.19, where Suárez says that entitative unity is found “in omni ente, eo modo, quo ens est.”



Section 1: What one adds to being. 83



the same nature,110 doubtless because one signifiesd no positive naturer aside from the naturer of being. 7. And indeed, as regards a being of reason conceived in the manner of something positive (which is what’s at issue in the first part of the conclusion) the matter is certain enough and beyond dispute, since no ­quasi-positive being of reason that one formally signifiesd and adds to being has up till now been devised. For either that ­quasi-positive being of reason is [conceived] in the manner of a relation, and this is not the case, since the name “one” is altogether absolute, as we saw above, and this is clear from the word itself and from the common manner of conceiving. Or it is [conceived] in the manner of an absolute and positive predicate, and this cannot be said, even with an abundance of feigning. Someone could perhaps say that one adds a relation of identity that a thing bears to itself. But this is clearly false, for to be one and to be the same are very different predicates. And the first is in its own way a real predicate that agrees with a being without a fiction on the part of the intellect, but the second is a predicate of reason that agrees with a being through an operation of the intellect. For this reason, the first is the foundation of the second, in the way that a relation of reason can have a foundation in reality. 8. And so, leaving this part to one side, the other part, regarding a real positive naturer (which is the thesis principally intended), is usually proved mainly by means of the following argument: because if one adds to being a positive real naturer, then it is necessary that being be included in this naturer. Therefore, it is also one. Therefore, another positive naturer will have to be added to it, through which it is one. Therefore, there will be a progression to infinity, unless we come to a stop at some real naturer which is per se a being and one in such a way that to be one in this way adds nothing to its entity. Therefore, for the same reason, we should stop at the naturer of being itself.111 To this argument, however, Scotus replies that this naturer of the unit is positive in such a way that it is nonetheless not a being.112 But this was sufficiently disproved above.113 And moreover, it cannot be denied, as 110. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–1004a2. 111. Cf. Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8, fol. 67G. 112. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, vol. 3 (Vaticana), pp. 81, 83–85 (ns. 131, 134–36). 113. See DM 3.1.3 and DM 2.5.

84

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

non plures, & habet illum distinctum a modo seu unitate alterius entis, in se autem indivisum: recte ergo inquiritur, an ille modus sit unus se ipso, & sine ulla additione positiva, quae suae entitati fiat: vel cum additione: nam, si cum additione, procedetur ulterius in infinitum, si absque additione positiva per solam negationem, cur non idem dicetur de quolibet ente ut sic? [86a]

Evasio confutatur.

9. Dicunt aliqui ipsum modum unius cum sit id, quo ens est unum, posse se ipso etiam esse unum, quod non ita dici potest de ratione entis, quia ipsum formaliter non est ratio unius, seu unitas ut quo: id enim quod in aliquo genere est quo, quando est simplex & ultimum, se ipso potest esse quod, hoc vero non tribuitur ei quod nullo modo rationem illam formaliter participat. Exemplum commune est in quantitate, per quam substantia quanta est: & ideo potest per se ipsam esse quanta, quod non potest substantia. Quae evasio habet speciem quandam subtilitatis, sed in praesente nulla est necessitas fingendi illud quo, & quod, nam illa ratio unitatis non intelligitur esse una propter aliquam rationem positivam, quam in se habeat, & veluti exerceat circa se ipsam: sicut quantitas est quanta, quia est extensa, & per se apta ad38 occupandum locum: sed per solam negationem pluralitatis seu divisionis intelligitur esse una: ergo eodem modo intelligi potest in ratione entis, neque oportet fingere aliquid positivum, quod ei sit ratio ut quo essendi unum.

Respondetur replicae.

10. Dici tandem potest hoc argumentum recte procedere contra Scotum & alios, qui ponunt modum illum unius ex natura rei distinctum ab ente: non tamen ita urgere, si dicamus illum modum esse 38. Reading “ad” here with all the earlier editions. Vivès omits this word.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 85



far as the present matter is concerned, that that real mode, or whatever it is that one adds to being, is something one in that way in which it is a [being], for each being has only one such mode, and not more, and it has it distinct from the mode or unity of another being, and undivided in itself. It is therefore rightly asked whether that mode is one by itself and without any positive addition which is made to its entity, or is rather one by virtue of an addition. For if by virtue of an addition, there will be a progression further to infinity, and if not by virtue of a positive addition, and only through a negation, why will the same not be said of any being as such? 9. Some say that this same mode of the unit, since it is that by which a being is one, can be one by itself, which cannot likewise be said of the naturer of being, since it is not itself formally the naturer of the unit or the unity “by which” [something is one]. For that which in some genus is that “by which” [something is A], when it is simple and ultimate, can be “that which” by virtue of itself [i.e., can be A by virtue of itself, rather than being A by virtue of something else], but this [i.e., a thing’s being A by virtue of itself, and not by virtue of something else] is not attributed to that which in no way formally participates in that naturer. The common example is the quantity through which a substance is quantified: and so it can be quantified per se, which a substance cannot be.114 This evasion has a certain appearance of subtlety, but in the present case there is no necessity to fashion a “by which” and a “that which,” for that naturer of unity is not understood to be one on account of some positive naturer which it has in itself and which it exercises with respect to itself, as it were, just as quantity is quantified because it is extended and per se suited to occupying a place. Rather, it is understood to be one through the negation of plurality or division alone. Therefore, [unity] can be understood in the same way in the case of the naturer of being, nor is it necessary to fashion some positive thing that is for being the naturer “by which” it is one. 10. Finally, it can be said that this argument does indeed succeed against Scotus and others who posit that mode of the unit as distinct 114. According to Suárez, a material substance is not quantified per se—that is, by or through itself—but per aliud—that is, by virtue of something other than itself that inheres in it, namely, the accident of continuous quantity.

An evasion is refuted.

Response to a rejoinder.

86

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

quidem positivum & realem: sola tamen ratione ab ente distinctum: quia tunc dicetur, illum modum, quanvis sit ens, non tamen esse in re distinctum ab ipsomet ente, & ideo esse unum eadem unitate, qua ipsum ens, & praecise ac secundum rationem non considerari ut unum, sed tantum ut rationem unius: realiter vero esse unum se ipso, sicut ipsum ens. Sed contra hanc responsionem obiicitur: quia inde sequuntur alia incommoda. Primum, rationem unius esse positivam, & pas⟨118a⟩sionem entis, & quidditative includere ipsum ens: quod repugnat propriae passioni. Secundum, quod ille modus sit de quidditate ipsius entis, sicut attributa divina sunt de quidditate Dei, quia, licet ratione distinguantur, in re dicunt rationes positivas, quae ex natura rei non distinguuntur a Deo: consequens autem est falsum: tum quia alias unum non esset passio entis, sed essentia, tum etiam quia alias nulla res creata posset quidditative distincte concipi, nisi formaliter conciperetur ut una. Quae incommoda sunt quidem probabilia, forte tamen aliquis non existimaret inconveniens illa concedere in transcendentibus, quae simplicissima sunt.

11. Aliter ergo prosequendo priorem39 discursum, ostendo, eodem modo concludere non esse ponendum hunc modum positivum ratione distinctum, nam praeciso per intellectum illo modo positivo in reliquo conceptu entis intelligitur quidquid necessarium est ad unitatem: ergo signum est nihil positivum, etiam per rationem praescindi ab ente, quo illud unum sit. Quod ut intelligatur, loquamur de aliquo ente in particulari, v. g. Deo40 quatenus unus est: si ergo in illo unitas est attributum positivum ratione distinctum a Deo: ergo potest mente praescindi Deus ab unitate eius: in Deo autem sic concepto absque additione alicuius positivi etiam secundum rationem, potest concipi negatio divisionis seu partitionis, quam in se habeat, & divisio etiam, seu sufficiens fundamentum divisionis ab omnibus aliis: sed [86b] hoc ipso 39. Reading “priorem” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , V4 , and V5. Vivès omits this word. 40. Reading “in particulari, v. g. Deo” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read instead “in particulari, ut, v. g. Deo”: V5 and Vivès.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 87



ex natura rei from being, but that it is not so persuasive if we say that that mode is indeed something positive and real, but only rationally distinct from being. For then it will be said that that mode, although it is a being, is nevertheless not really distinct from being itself, and that it is therefore one by the same unity by which being is one, and that precisely and according to reason it is not conceived as one, but only as the naturer of the unit, but that really it is one by itself, just as being is. But against this reply it is objected that various difficulties follow from it. First, that the naturer of the unit is positive, and a passion of being, and quidditatively includes being itself, which is incompatible with its being a proper passion. Second, that that mode belongs to the quiddity of being just as divine attributes belong to the quiddity of God, for although they are rationally distinguished, in reality they signifyd positive naturesr which are not distinguished ex natura rei from God. But the consequent is false, both because otherwise one would not be a passion of being, but the essence,115 and also because otherwise no created thingr could be distinctly conceived quidditatively unless it was formally conceived as one. And these difficulties are indeed weighty, but perhaps someone would not judge it problematic to concede them in the case of transcendentals, which are most simple. 11. Otherwise pursuing the earlier argument, then, I show that in the same way it concludes that this positive, rationally distinct mode should not be posited, for when that positive mode is prescinded by the intellect, whatever is necessary for unity is understood in the concept of being that remains. This, therefore, is a sign that there is nothing positive, even rationally prescinded from being, by virtue of which it is one. In order that this might be understood, let us speak of some being in particular, for example, God, insofar as he is one. If in God, then, unity is a positive attribute rationally distinct from him, God can be prescinded by the mind from his unity. But in God so conceived without the addition of something positive, even according to reason, a negation of division or partition that he has in himself can be conceived, and also a division, or a sufficient foundation of division, from all other things. But by virtue of this he is sufficiently conceived to be 115. Cf. DM 3.1.12.

88

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

sufficienter concipitur unus: ergo quidquid positivum postea additur, etiam secundum rationem, est superflue fictum, neque explicari potest quid, vel ad quid sit: & idem argumentum fieri potest in quolibet41 alio ente uno, & consequenter in ente in communi. Secundo id declaro in entibus compositis retorquendo argumenta priora: nam in huiusmodi ente, quod per compositionem fit, quidquid positivum physicum considerari potest, pertinet ad rationem entis, ut tale ens est, etiam si ratione praescindatur a conceptu unius, ut in humanitate unio animae & corporis est de ratione essentiali talis entis, ut tale ens est specificative, & in re ipsa: & similiter in linea unio partium in puncto est de ratione eius42 ut est in tali specie quantitatis continuae: ergo omnis etiam ratio positiva metaphysica quae in tali unione physica fundatur, pertinet formaliter & secundum rationem ad rationem talis entis, non quatenus concipitur ut ⟨118b⟩ unum, sed quatenus formaliter contractum seu determinatum in ratione talis entis: ergo ratio unius nihil positivum addere potest, etiam ratione distinctum. Tertio id explicatur in entibus simplicibus, in quibus perfectior videtur esse unitas, imo ipsa simplicitas videtur esse maxima unitas: sed simplicitas de formali non dicit rationem positivam, etiam sola ratione distinctam ab ente simplici, & a perfectione, quae in ratione entis, seu talis entis43 in eo concipitur: adeo ut etiam in Deo iuxta probabiliorem Theologorum sententiam simplicitas ut sic nihil addat Deo perfectionis etiam secundum rationem, supra perfectionem summae actualitatis eius, in qua negatio illa fundatur, quam simplicitas exprimit: ergo multo minus unitas ut sic potest dicere rationem positivam. Et haec conclusio amplius patebit ex sequentibus, & ex solutionibus argumentorum.

41. Reading “quolibet” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following read “aliquo” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 42. Reading “eius” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following read instead “entis” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 43. Reading “entis” here with S , V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 89



one. Therefore, whatever positive thing is thereafter added, even rationally, is superfluously fashioned, nor can what it is, or what it is for, be explained. And the same argument can be made in the case of any other single being, and consequently in the case of being in general. Second, I explain this in the case of composite beings, turning the earlier arguments to opposite effect: for in the case of such a being (which is produced by composition), any positive physical thing that can be conceived in it pertains to the naturer of the being insofar as it is a being of a particular sort, even if it is rationally prescinded from the concept of the unit. For example, in the case of humanity, the union of soul and body pertains to the essential naturer of such a being insofar as it is such a being specificatively and in reality. And similarly, in the case of a line, the union of parts in a point pertains to its naturer insofar as it is in a particular species of continuous quantity. Therefore also, every positive metaphysical naturer that is founded on such a physical union pertains formally and according to reason to the naturer of such a being, not insofar as it is conceived as one, but insofar as it is formally contracted or determined in the naturer of such a being. Therefore, the naturer of the unit can add nothing positive which is even rationally distinct from it. Third, this is explained in the case of simple beings, in which unity seems to be more perfect—in fact, simplicity itself seems to be the greatest unity. But simplicity does not formally signifyd a positive naturer, even one distinct only rationally from the simple being and from the perfection that is conceived in it in its characterr as a being, or in its characterr as such a being. So much so that even in the case of God, according to the more probable opinion of the theologians, simplicity as such adds no perfection to God, even rationally, over and above the perfection of his supreme actuality, on which is founded that negation which simplicity expresses. Much less, therefore, can unity as such signifyd a positive naturer. And this conclusion will be clearer in the sequel and from the solutions of the arguments.

90 Unum supra ens privationem addit.

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

12. Dico secundo, unum addere supra ens negationem aliquam per modum privationis. Ita docent citati autores, & sequitur ex praecedente assertione: nam constat unum aliquo modo distingui ab ente: quia & est passio eius, & illa nomina non sunt synonyma, sed diversi conceptus formales & obiectivi illis in mente respondent: ergo aliquid dicit unum praeter ens: sed non dicit aliquid omnino fictum per rationem, ut per se constat, quia esse unum rebus ipsis vere convenit: neque etiam dicit aliquam habitudinem rationis, ut ostensum est: nihil ergo superest, quod addere possit praeter negationem seu privationem.

Qualis sit negatio, quam unum addit enti. 13. Duo tamen supersunt hic explicanda. Primum est, quae sit haec negatio, & quotuplex. Secundum, quomodo haec negatio dicatur esse per modum privationis. Circa primum omnes conveniunt unum dicere negationem divisionis in ipsomet ente, quam significavit Aristot. dicens, unum esse ens indivisum in se, ut patet ex citatis locis, & ex 10. Metaph. capite 5. Et ratione patet, quia per divisionem intelligimus, unum ens fieri plura: ergo nulla alia ratione melius concipitur ens esse unum, quam negatione divisionis: & in hoc [87a] omnes conveniunt. Sunt tamen praedicta verba attente consideranda: aliud est enim [unum]44 dicere negationem divisionis in ipso, aliud vero dicere negationem divisionis a se ipso: quanvis enim utraque negatio possit enti attribui, tamen prior est, ⟨119a⟩ quae pertinet ad rationem unius, nam posterior non sufficit, ut recte notavit Soncin. 4. Metaph. quaest. 23. ad primum. Et patet, tum quia illa non est propria negatio, quae in re addatur enti; sed quae per solam reflexionem rationis consideretur: tum maxime quia non dividi a se aeque convenit enti per se & per accidens, seu multitudini, acervus enim lapidum tam non est divisus a se, quam homo, vel angelus: tamen quia in se non est indivisus, non est proprie 44. All the editions that I’ve consulted read “ens” here, but it seems clear that Suárez meant to write “unum” instead, since he denies that being and one are synonymous, and he has just made a point of saying that unum signifies (dicit) a negation of division within the thing called one.



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12. I say, second, that one adds to being some negation in the manner of a privation. This is what the cited authors teach, and it follows from the preceding assertion. For it is clear that one is in some way distinguished from being, since one is a passion of being and those names are not synonymous, but rather diverse formal and objective concepts in the mind correspond to them. Therefore, one signifiesd something aside from being, but it does not signifyd something altogether fashioned by reason, as is per se clear, since to be one truly agrees with thingsr. Nor also does it signifyd some relation of reason, as has been shown. There remains, therefore, nothing else that it can add except a negation or privation.

Of what sort is the negation that one adds to being. 13. There remain, however, two things that must be explained here. The first is what this negation is, and how manifold. Second, in what way this negation is said to be in the manner of a privation. Regarding the first, all agree that one signifiesd a negation of division in a being itself, which is what Aristotle indicates, saying that the unit is “a being undivided in itself,” as is clear from the cited passages, and from Metaph. X, ch. 5.116 And it is clear by argument, since we understand that one being is made several by division. Therefore, for no other reason is a being better conceived to be one than because of a negation of division. And in this all agree. But the mentioned words are to be considered carefully, for that one signifiesd the negation of internal division is one thing, but that it signifiesd the negation of [a thing’s] division from itself is another, for although both negations can be attributed to a being, nevertheless, the first is that which pertains to the naturer of the unit, for the second is not sufficient, as Soncinas rightly notes, Metaph. IV, q. 23, ad 1.117 And this is clear, both because the latter is not a proper negation that is in reality added to being, but a negation which is conceived only through a reflection of reason, and also most 116. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a23. 117. Suárez seems to be referring to something that Soncinas says in the respondeo, not in answer to the first objection. See Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 36a–b.

One adds a privation to being.

92

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

unum ens: negatio ergo divisionis in se, est quae constituit [unum],45 non negatio divisionis a se.

Fonseca. Aegidius. Hervaeus.

14. Dubitant tamen ulterius autores an in ratione unius aliqua alia negatio includatur. Multi enim definiunt unum esse, quod est indivisum in se, & divisum a quolibet alio, & ideo praeter indivisionem in se dicunt unum dicere negationem unionis cum alio, quae negatio explicatur nomine divisionis seu distinctionis ab alio. Ita opinantur Capreol. Gabr. & Soncin. locis citatis: quia, sicut de ratione unius est, ut in se non sit divisum: ita ut non sit aliud a se: alterum enim ex his duobus, scilicet, esse aliud a se, vel non esse aliud a se, necesse est in ratione unius includi: quia, cum contradictorie opponantur, immediate repugnant: sed esse aliud a se non est de ratione unius, ut constat: ergo erit de ratione unius, ut non sit aliud a se. Quin potius addunt aliqui, negationem divisionis ab alio prius secundum rationem convenire enti, quam indivisionem in se, quia prius convenit enti esse divisum a non ente, quam esse in se indivisum: ergo utraque negatio requiritur ad rationem unius. Unde etiam D. Thom. 1. par. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 4. dicit conceptum divisionis ab alio secundum rationem esse priorem conceptu unitatis. Alii vero negant divisionem ab alio esse de ratione unius, sed solam indivisionem in se. Ita Fonseca supra, citans Aegid. 4. Metaph. quaest. 6. & Hervaeum quodlib. 4. q. 2. & 3. Ratio eius est, quia esse divisum ab alio non requiritur ut ens sit absolute unum, sed solum ut sit unum ex multis: & ideo sufficienter concipitur res ut una, quando intelligitur indivisa, etiam si non concipiatur ut divisa ab aliis. Et confirmatur, quia res est absolute una, quanvis non sint alia, a quibus distinguatur.

45. Again, all the editions that I’ve consulted read “ens” here, but it seems clear that Suárez meant to write “unum” instead, since it is the unit, and not being, that is constituted by the negation of internal division, on his view.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 93



especially because not to be divided from oneself agrees equally with a per se being and a per accidens being or multitude. For a heap of stones is as undivided from itself as a human being or angel is, but since it is not undivided in itself, it is not properly one being. Therefore, it is the negation of internal division that constitutes the unit, not the negation of division from oneself. 14. Nevertheless, authors further doubt whether some other negation is included in the naturer of the unit. For many define the unit to be what is undivided in itself and divided from any other thing, and therefore they say that one signifiesd, in addition to internal indivision, the negation of union with another, which negation is explained by the expression “division” or “distinction from another.” So think Capreolus,118 Gabriel,119 and Soncinas120 in the cited passages. For, just as it pertains to the naturer of the unit that it not be divided in itself, so also does it pertain to it that it not be other than itself. For one of these two—namely, to be other than oneself, and not to be other than oneself—is necessarily included in the naturer of the unit, for since they are contradictorily opposed, they are immediately incompatible with each other. But to be other than itself does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, as is clear. Therefore, not to be other than itself will pertain to the naturer of the unit.121 What’s more, some add that the negation consisting in division from another agrees with being in a way that is rationally prior to the way internal indivision does, since to be divided from ­non-being agrees with being before to be internally undivided does. Therefore, both negations are required for the naturer of the unit. For this reason also St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4,122 says that the concept of division from another is rationally prior to the concept of unity. But others deny that division from another pertains to the naturer of the unit, but only internal indivision. Thus Fonseca above,123 118. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2, pp. 187b–188a, 199a–b, 206a–b. 119. Gabriel Biel, Commentarius in Primum Librum Sententiarum Magistri Gabrielis Biel, pp. 245b–246a. 120. See Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 36b and p. 40a–b. 121. Cf. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 40b (Metaph. IV, q. 27). 122. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b. 123. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), col. 773. Note that the references to Giles and Hervaeus mentioned by Suárez

Fonseca.

94

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

Unius nomen aequivocationem pati potest.

15. Sed circa hoc advertendum est, posse, in nomine tam unius, quam divisionis ab alio committi aequivocationem. Nam in⟨119b⟩ terdum communi & vulgari usu unum significare solet quod est solitarium & unicum, quomodo dicimus esse unum Deum, unum Solem: & hoc modo unum dicit negationem multitudinis, & non tam dicit divisionem ab alio, quam negat consortium alterius. Sed hoc modo esse unum non est passio entis, ut per se constat: neque ea significatio est propria unius, nec rigorosa, sed solum ex accommodatione usus interdum ad hoc extenditur: nam in rigore verum est dicere hic esse unum hominem, quanvis sint plures: & ideo in rigorosa significatione ad negandum esse plures, additur exclusiva esse tantum unum: igitur negatio multitudinis seu plurium in hoc sensu non intrat rationem forma[87b]lem unius transcendentis.

Relatio realis divisionis ab alio extra rationem unius.

16. Rursus esse divisum ab alio concipi potest per modum relationis realis, seu ad terminum realem & existentem. Et hoc modo certum est divisionem ab alio non esse de ratione unius, tum quia est quid posterius illo: ideo enim hoc est divisum ab illo, quia in se tale est, & unum quid: tum etiam, quia unum de se est prius multitudine & independens ab illa: sic autem esse divisum ab alio, requirit multitudinem: imo inde consurgit multitudo, quia sunt plura una, quorum unum non est aliud. Denique hac ratione supra dicebamus, aliquid, quatenus dicit huiusmodi negationem, vel relationem alietatis a termino reali & existente, non esse passionem entis: quia per se non convenit omni enti, sed per accidens ex coexistentia aliorum: multo ergo minus potest esse hoc de ratione unius. Unde, antequam creaturae existerent, Deus erat perfecte & complete unus absque hac relatione seu negatione. Quin potius



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citing Giles of Rome, Metaph. IV, q. 6,124 and Hervaeus, Quodlibet IV, q. 2 & q. 3.125 And his reason is: because to be divided from another is not required in order for a being to be one absolutely, but only for it to be one of many, and therefore a thingr is sufficiently conceived as one when it is understood to be undivided, even if it is not conceived as divided from other things. And this is confirmed, since a thing is one absolutely even if there are not other things from which it might be distinguished. 15. But regarding this, it must be noted that equivocation is possible both in the case of the word “one” and in the case of “division from another.” For in ordinary and common use “one” is sometimes wont to signify what is alone and single, in the way we say that there is one God or one Sun. And in this sense one signifiesd a negation of multiplicity, and it does not so much signifyd division from another as it denies the company of another. But to be one in this way is not a passion of being, as is clear per se, and this is not the proper signification of one, nor is it strict, but only by an adjustment of its use is it sometimes extended to this [signification]. For strictly it is true to say that here is one human being, even though there are several, and therefore, in its strict signification, in order to deny that there are several, we add an excluding word [and say] that there is only one. Therefore, the negation of multiplicity or plurality in this sense does not enter into the formal characterr of the transcendental unit. 16. Moreover, to be divided from another can be conceived in the manner of a real relation, that is, [as a relation borne] to a real and existent term. And in this way it is certain that division from another does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, both because division from another is something posterior to it, for this is divided from that because it is in itself of a particular sort and something one, and also are omitted from the Cologne 1615 edition. They are included in the margin of the Rome edition of 1577. See Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum Petri Fonsecae D. Theologi Societatis Iesu In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Tomus primus (Romae: apud Franciscum Zanettum, & Bartholomaeum Tosium socios, 1577), p. 603. 124. Giles of Rome, Metaphysicales Quaestiones Aureae (Venetiis: apud Octavianum Scotum D. Ama Dei, 1552), fol. 27rE–vF. I cannot find in this question the view here attributed to Giles. But see fol. 28vA. 125. Hervaeus Natalis, Quolibeta (Venetiis: Impensis heredum Octaviani Scoti, 1513) [Reprint: Ridegwood, N.J.: Gregg Press Inc., 1966], fols. 88va–90vb.

Giles. Hervaeus.

The word “one” can be equivocal.

The real relation of division from another is outside the naturer of the unit.

96

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

etiam si per impossibile nullae aliae res essent possibiles extra Deum, ipse esset vere ac perfecte unus, hoc ipso quod esset in se indivisus in essentia: etiam si non posset esse divisus ab aliis, eo quod alia esse non possent. Tamen, quia de facto, & quodammodo ex intrinseca ratione entis, secundum totam suam latitudinem considerati, cum quolibet ente possibilis est existentia alterius: ideo ad omne ens consequitur ut possit esse distinctum ab alio: quod re vera unicuique convenit ex eo quod in se unum est. Et hoc modo esse distinctum ab alio, aptitudine & fundamentaliter potest dici convenire omni enti, qua unum est: tamen hoc ipsum non intrat formaliter rationem unius, sed ⟨120a⟩ consequitur illam: sicut consequitur ad quantitatem ut sit fundamentum aequalitatis, vel inaequalitatis.

Esse ab alio divisum qualiter sit necessario coniunctum uni.

17. Tandem esse divisum ab alio concipi potest solum per modum negationis. Quae comparari etiam potest, vel ad terminum positivum existentem: & hoc modo eadem est ratio de illa, quae de relatione: vel ad terminum positivum absolute sumptum, sive existentem, sive possibilem: & hoc modo esse divisum ab alio convenit omni enti, quatenus unum est: quia, sicut non potest uni enti convenire ut sit aliud, ita necessario convenit ut non sit aliud: nam haec sunt contradicentia, & ideo si alterum eorum necessario separatur ab uno, scilicet esse aliud a se: alterum necessario convenit uni, scilicet, non esse aliud a se, quod est esse distinctum ab alio. Quae quidem ratio non probat, hanc negationem primario ac formalissime intrare rationem unius, sed convenire illi necessario, sive per se primo, sive consequenter: & hoc posterius



Section 1: What one adds to being. 97



because one is of itself prior to multitude and independent of it, and to be in this way divided from another requires a multitude—in fact, a multitude arises because there are several units and one of these is not another. Finally, for this reason we said above that something, insofar as it signifiesd a negation of this sort, or a relation of otherness from a real and existent term, is not a passion of being, since it does not agree per se with every being, but rather agrees per accidens by virtue of the coexistence of other things.126 Much less, therefore, can this pertain to the naturer of the unit. For this reason, before creatures existed, God was perfectly and completely one without this relation or negation. What’s more, even if, per impossibile, no other thingsr were possible aside from God, he himself would be truly and perfectly one by virtue of the fact that he is in himself undivided in his essence, even if he could not be divided from other things because other things could not existe. Nevertheless, since, in point of fact, and in a certain way by virtue of the intrinsic naturer of being, considered127 according to its entire extension, the existence of another thing is possible for any being, it is consequent on every being that it can be distinct from another thing. And this really agrees with every thing by virtue of the fact that it is in itself one. And thus it can be said that to be distinct from another thing agrees aptitudinally and fundamentally with every being insofar as it is one. But this itself does not enter formally into the naturer of the unit, but is rather consequent on it, just as it is consequent on quantity that it is the foundation of equality or inequality. 17. Finally, to be divided from another can be conceived merely in the manner of a negation, which negation can also be referred either to a positive and existent term—and in this way there is the same accountr of it as there is of the relation—or to a positive term taken absolutely, whether existent or possible—and in the latter way to be divided from another agrees with every being insofar as it is one. For just as it cannot agree with one being that it be another thing, so does it agree with it necessarily that it not be another thing, for these are contradicting, and therefore if one of them is necessarily separated from the unit—namely, to be other than itself—then the other necessarily agrees with the 126. See DM 3.2.6. 127. The word “considered” here qualifies “being.”

How to be divided from another thing is necessarily conjoined to the unit.

98

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

verius videtur: quod intendunt autores secundae opinionis, & fortasse non negant autores primae. Possunt itaque conciliari, nam, quod hi negant formaliter ac per se primo: illi affirmant consequenter ac per se secundo. Et ita explicuit diserte Soncin. 4. Metaph. quaest. 23. & 27. & hoc solum probant rationes adductae.

18. Denique, si haec negatio seu divisio unius entis non comparetur ad terminum positivum; sed ad negativum & contradictorium: sic etiam omni enti hoc ipso quod unum ens est, convenit quod sit divisum a non ente, seu ut non sit non ens: tamen haec negatio solum est quasi per reflexionem intellectus, nam prout obiective intelligitur [88a] antecedere in ente, potius est affirmatio, nam affirmatio non dividitur a negatione per aliam negationem. Id enim est impossibile, quia procederetur in infinitum: dividitur ergo per se ipsam: sic ergo ens dividitur a non ente, non per negationem aliam, sed per se, sicut e contrario non ens dividitur ab ente, non per aliam negationem, vel affirmationem, sed per se ipsum: itaque formalissime dividi a non ente nihil aliud est, quam esse ens. Hac ergo consideratione talis negatio nec pertinet ad rationem unius, neque est passio entis, cum re vera nulla sit: quatenus vero per intellectum excogitari potest, est solum extrinseca denominatio, seu relatio rationis: & ideo intrinsece etiam non spectat ad rationem unius, quan⟨120b⟩vis oppositum videatur sentire Caietan. 1. par. quaest. 11. artic. 4. in fine, de quo plura dicemus in solutionibus argumentorum.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 99



unit—namely, not to be other than itself, which is to be distinct from another. And indeed, this argument does not prove that this negation primarily and formally enters into the naturer of the unit, but rather proves that it agrees with it necessarily, whether per se in the first mode or consequently. And this latter seems to be truer. This is what the authors of the second opinion intend, and perhaps the authors of the first do not deny it. They can, therefore, be reconciled, for what the former deny formally and per se in the first mode, the latter affirm consequently and per se in the second mode. And thus does Soncinas clearly explain it, Metaph. IV, q. 23 and q. 27,128 and the arguments presented prove only this. 18. Moreover, if this negation or division of one being is not referred to a positive term, but to a negative and contradictory one, then in this way also it agrees with every being, by virtue of the fact that it is one being, that it is divided from n ­ on-being, or that it is not a n ­ on-being. Nevertheless, this negation is present only through a reflection of the intellect, as it were, for insofar as it is objectively understood to be present beforehand in a being, it is rather an affirmation, for an affirmation is not divided from a negation by another negation. For that is impossible, since there would be a progression to infinity. It is there­ on-being, not by fore divided per se. Therefore, being is divided from n another negation, but per se, just as, conversely, ­non-being is divided from being, not by another negation or affirmation, but per se. Thus, most formally, to be divided from ­non-being is nothing other than to be a being. On this conception of it, therefore, such a negation does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, nor is it a passion of being, since it is in reality nothing. But insofar as it can be fashioned by the intellect, it is only an extrinsic denomination, or relation of reason. And therefore intrinsically also it does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, although Cajetan seems to think the opposite, ST I, q. 11, art. 4, near the end,129 regarding which we will say more in the solutions of the arguments.

128. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 36b, p. 40a–b. 129. I suspect an error in the citation here, and that Suárez means to refer to Cajetan’s discussion of ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), pp. 110b–111b.

100

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti. Negatio quam dicit unum sitne privatio.

19. Secundum dubium erat, quomodo unum dicat hanc negationem per modum privationis: & ratio dubitandi est, quia privatio dicit negationem in subiecto apto nato: indivisio autem, quam addit unum supra ens, saepe dicit negationem divisionis in ente incapaci illius, ut in Deo, esse unum negat divisionem essentiae divinae, quae dividi nequit: & simile est in aliis rebus praesertim simplicibus, vel incorruptibilibus: imo & in omnibus entibus, quatenus unumquodque est inseparabile a se ipso: nullum enim ens a se ipso dividi potest: haec autem sola indivisio est de ratione unius transcendentalis. Respondetur, difficultatem solum consistere in explicatione conclusionis, cur scilicet haec negatio, quam dicit unum, dicatur esse per modum privationis. Nam quia non negat formam, cuius sit capax subiectum seu ens, quod unum dicitur: ideo non dixi hanc negationem esse privationem: nam ad hoc oporteret ut negaret formam in subiecto apto nato, ut argumentum probat. Sed dixi esse ad modum privationis, quia in aliquo imitatur privationem, & recedit a mera negatione. Nam, sicut privatio dicit negationem non quomodocunque, sed quasi adhaerentem subiecto reali, ita unum dicit hanc negationem, quasi addendo illam enti reali, quod connotat: & ideo non ens, seu nihil, quatenus tale est, neque unum nec plura dicitur, quanvis negatio divisionis absolute sumptae illi possit attribui: quia non ens indivisum est. Entia autem rationis seu ficta in tantum aequivoce dicuntur unum, vel multa, in quantum aequivoce etiam sunt entia, vel potius ut entia concipiuntur. Unum ergo dicit negationem divisionis in ente, & quoad hoc esse dicitur ad modum privationis, sive tale ens sit capax divisionis, sive non. Addit Fonseca supra, divisionem, quam negat unum, absolute possibilem esse, esto non sit possibilis ei enti, quod unum denominatur, ut Deus dicitur unus, quia indivisus in essentia, quae divisio est possibilis in creatura, quanvis sit impossibilis Deo: & ita illa divisio non est impossibilis enti ut ens est: & hoc modo dici potest privatio, ratione capacitatis saltem in conceptu communi: ad eum modum, [88b] quo talpa caecus dicitur, quia ut animal est capax visus, quanvis non ut tale animal. Quod in prae⟨121a⟩sente dicitur minus proprie propter analogiam entis.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 101

Whether the negation that one signifiesd is a privation.

19. The second doubt was, how one signifiesd this negation in the manner of a privation. And the reason for doubt is: because a privation signifiesd a negation in a subject by nature apt [to have the opposed form].130 But the indivision that one adds to being often signifiesd a negation of division in a being incapable of it. For example, in the case of God, to be one denies the division of the divine essence, which is incapable of being divided, and similarly in the case of other thingsr, especially simple or incorruptible ones—and in fact in the case of all beings insofar as each is inseparable from itself. For no being can be divided from itself, and only this indivisibility131 pertains to the naturer of the transcendental unit. I reply that the difficulty only concerns the explanation of the conclusion, namely, why this negation which one signifiesd is said to be in the manner of a privation. For since it does not deny a form which the subject or being called one has the capacity for, I did not say that this negation is a privation, because for this it would have to deny a form in a subject naturally apt to have it, as the argument proves. But I said that it is in the manner of a privation, since in some respect it imitates a privation and departs from a mere negation. For, just as a privation signifiesd a negation not in any way, but as inhering in a real subject, so also does one signifyd this negation by (as it were) adding it to real being, which it connotes. And therefore ­non-being or nothing, insofar as it is such, is called neither one nor several, although the negation of division, taken absolutely, can be attributed to it, since ­non-being is undivided. And beings of reason or fictitious beings are equivocally called one or many insofar as they are also equivocally beings, or rather, are conceived as beings. One, therefore, signifiesd a negation of division in a being, and to this extent is said to be in the manner of a privation, whether such a being is capable of division or not. Fonseca adds, moreover, that the division which one denies is possible 130. See Aristotle, Cat., ch. 10, 12a26–a34. 131. The Latin word here rendered “indivisibility” is “indivisio,” which can mean either indivision or indivisibility and is elsewhere in this translation rendered “indivision.” But here it seems necessary to render it as “indivisibility,” since the claim seems to be that internal indivisibility does not pertain to the nature of the unit (since many things possessed of unity admit of internal division), but only a given thing’s indivisibility from itself.

102

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

Argumentorum solutiones. 20. Ad primum argumentum contrariae sententiae, prima, & communis responsio est, concedendo divisionem consistere in negatione, & consequenter indivisionem esse negationem negationis. Ita concedit D. Tho. in 1. distin. 24. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad primum. Unde in solutione ad 2. concedit, secundum rem magis se habere ad positivum unitatem, quam multitudinem: quia negatio unius rei ab alia, quam dicit multitudo, est in re ipsa: negatio vero negationis, quam dicit unitas, est mere per rationem. Quam doctrinam amplectitur Soncin. lib. 10. Metaphys. q. 4. Ad argumentum ergo, scilicet, quia negatio negationis est affirmatio, respondendum est iuxta hanc sententiam, formaliter & secundum rationem non ita esse: quia ratio potest super unam negationem reflecti, & negare illam, & per hanc negationem explicare aliquod positivum simplex, quod prout in se est, declarare non potest. Secundum rem autem & aequivalenter illud esse verum: tamen illud positivum quod illis negationibus circunscribitur, nihil esse praeter entitatem ipsius rei, quae una dicitur. Haec responsio probabilis est, & facile defendi potest: tamen videtur supponere, negationem, quam dicit unum, esse aut negationem divisionis huius entis ab alio ente, vel negationem divisionis huius entis a se ipso, quae re vera sunt negationes rationis: tamen prior non pertinet ad rationem unius, ut dictum est:46 sed ad illam consequitur. Posterior autem negatio non est propria unius, sed communis multitudini. Igitur negatio divisionis in se ipso est proprie de ratione 46. Reading “dictum est:” here with V1 and V2. S reads “dictum: est” instead. The following have “dictum est,”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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absolutely, even if it is not possible for that being which is denominated one.132 For example, God is called one, since he is undivided in essence, and this division is possible in a creature, even though it is impossible for God. And thus that division is not impossible for being insofar as it is being. And in this way it can be called a privation by virtue of the capacity in the common concept at least. And it is in this way that a mole is called blind, because as an animal it is capable of vision, although not as an animal of this particular sort. But this is said less properly in the present case, on account of the analogy of being.

Solutions of the arguments. 20. To the first argument for the contrary opinion,133 the first and common reply is to concede that division consists in a negation and consequently that indivision is the negation of a negation. St. Thomas concedes this in Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, ad 1.134 For this reason, in his reply to the second argument, he concedes that in reality unity is more related to the positive than multitude is, since the negation of one thing in respect of another which multitude signifiesd obtains in reality, whereas the negation of a negation which unity signifiesd obtains merely through reason.135 Soncinas embraces this doctrine, Metaph. X, q. 4.136 To the argument, therefore—namely, that the negation of a negation is an affirmation—it must be replied, in accordance with this opinion, that formally and according to reason this is not the case, because reason can be reflected on one negation and negate it, and by means of this negation explain some positive, simple thing which, as it is in itself, it cannot make clear; but that in reality and to an equal extent it is true, although that positive thing which is circumscribed by those negations is nothing other than the entity of the thingr itself that is called one. And this reply is plausible and can easily be defended. Still, it seems to suppose that the negation which one signifiesd is either 132. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 774–75. 133. See DM 4.1.2 above. 134. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66b–c. 135. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66c. 136. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 235a.

104

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

unius: haec autem nullam negationem realem videtur supponere in re ipsa, quae secundum rationem negetur per indivisionem.

21. Secundo ergo respondetur concedendo, unum dicere indivisionem, seu negationem divisionis, & negando hanc esse negationem negationis. Nam in divisione, quam unum negat, duo possunt considerari: primum, quod entia inter se divisa sunt quasi in se completa & terminata suis entitatibus: secundum est, quod unum non est aliud. Hoc posterius solum dicit negationem, ut per se constat: primum vero dicit positivum, quod est fundamentum illius negationis, quod tamen in re nihil est praeter entitates ipsas, ut explicari ⟨121b⟩ potest in quantitate discreta: nam lineas esse plures dicit unamquamque esse propriis terminis terminatam: unde sequitur negatio, scilicet, quod non habeant terminum communem. Indivisio ergo, quam dicit unum, negat divisionem ratione positivi, quod in rebus divisis invenitur, non ratione negationis, quam includit divisio unius ab alio: sicut e contrario, negatio, quam dicit divisio, non negat aliam negationem, sed positivam unionem vel identitatem unius cum alio.

Respondetur obiectioni.

22. Dices; Hinc sequitur, negationem quam dicit unum esse negationem multitudinis, quod tamen supra videmur negasse. Et patet esse falsum, quia unum est prius multitudine; negatio autem est posterior forma quam negat. Respondetur dupliciter posse intel[89a]ligi unum negare multitudinem. Uno modo simpliciter, seu in rerum natura; & hoc modo negavimus supra unum dicere negationem multitudinis: neque oppositum sequitur ex dicta solutione, ut per se notum est. Alio modo ut neget multitudinem in ipsa re quae dicitur una, id est, quod in se non est plures; hoc autem sensu non est in superioribus negatum a nobis unum dicere negationem multitudinis. Id autem negat Fonseca



Section 1: What one adds to being. 105



the negation of this being’s division from another being or the negation of this being’s division from itself, which really are negations of reason. However, the former does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, as has been said; rather, it is consequent on it. And the latter negation is not proper to the unit, but is common to multitude also. Therefore, the negation of internal division properly pertains to the naturer of the unit, and this seems to presuppose no real negation in the thingr itself that is rationally negated by indivision. 21. In the second place, therefore, I reply by conceding that one signifiesd indivision, or the negation of division, and by denying that this is the negation of a negation. For in the division that one negates two things can be considered. The first is that beings which are divided from each other are, as it were, complete in themselves and terminated by their entities. The second is that one is not another. The latter signifiesd only a negation, as is clear per se. However, the first signifiesd something positive which is the foundation of that negation, which foundation is, however, nothing in reality other than the entities themselves, as can be made clear in the case of discrete quantity. For that there are several lines signifiesd that each is terminated by its own termini, whence a negation follows, namely, that they do not have a common terminus. The indivision that one signifiesd, therefore, negates a division by reason of the positive element that is found in divided thingsr, not by reason of the negation which the division of one thing from another involves—just as, conversely, the negation which division signifiesd does not negate another negation, but a positive union or identity of one thing with other. 22. You will say: it follows from this that the negation which one signifiesd is the negation of multitude, which, however, we seem to have denied above. And it is clear that this is false, since one is prior to multitude, but a negation is posterior to the form that it denies. I reply that one can be understood to deny multitude in two ways. In one way, without qualification, or in the nature of thingsr.137 And above we denied that one signifiesd the negation of multitude in this way,138 nor 137. To deny or negate multitude in this way is to deny that there are many things in rerum natura. 138. DM 4.1.15.

Reply to an objection.

106

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

dicta quaest. 5. sect. 5. & est sententia D. Thom. 1. p. quaest. 30. art. 3. ad 3. & opusc. 42. cap. 2. ubi adducit rationem, qua etiam Fonseca utitur, scilicet, quia unum est prius multitudine. Quae ratio, si esset efficax, eadem fieri posset de divisione, nam unum etiam est natura sua divisione prius, ut infra dicam.

23. Concedunt ergo alii indivisionem unius dicere negationem multitudinis in ente, sub ea ratione, qua unum est; quod docuit AEgid. 4. metap. quaest. 8. & favet D. Thom. in 1. d. 24. quaest. 1. art. 3. dicens, divisionem, secundum quam aliquid ab aliquo distinguitur, esse in affirmatione, & negatione, & ideo multitudinem in ratione sua includere negationem; secundum quod multa sunt, quorum unum non est alterum. Et huiusmodi (inquit) divisionis hoc modo acceptae 47 in ratione multitudinis negatio importatur in ratione unius. Et in solut. ad 4. ait, Unum non est privatio illius multitudinis, quam constituit, sed multitudinis, quae negatur esse in ipso, quod dicitur unum. Et licet D. Th. ibi loquatur de multitudine quoad negationem in ea inclusam, ut dictum est, tamen melius forte dicitur, unum negare multitudinem, ut in ea sunt plura positive. Cui etiam favet, quod idem D. ⟨122a⟩ Thom. 1. part. q. 11. art. 2.48 dicit, unum opponi multitudini per modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso, quod etiam ait Arist. lib. 10. Metaph. tex. 9. Et haec sententia mihi videtur valde probabilis: intelligenda est autem de multitudine, ut multitudo est, seu ratione pluralitatis, non quatenus ipsa multitudo potest alia ratione considerari ut quid unum: de quo infra dicetur. Vel certe dici potest, unum dicere negationem divisionis, non ut dicit formaliter negationem; sed ut dicit fundamentum illius negationis, quod aliquid positivum est, ut declaravi; &, quia multitudo 47. Reading “divisionis hoc modo acceptae” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read instead “divisione hoc modo accepta”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 48. Reading “2.” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “1.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 107



does the opposite follow from the mentioned solution, as is knownn per se. In the other way, so that it denies multitude in the very thingr which is called one, that is, that in itself it is not several things. But it was not denied by us above that one signifiesd the negation of multitude in this sense. However, Fonseca denies this in the mentioned question 5, section 5,139 and this is the opinion of St. Thomas, ST I, q. 30. art. 3, ad 3,140 and Opusc. 42, ch. 2,141 where he adduces an argument that Fonseca uses as well, namely: because one is prior to multitude. This argument, if it were effective, could also be made about division, for one is also by its nature prior to division, as I shall say below.142 23. Others therefore concede that one’s indivision signifiesd the negation of multitude in a being under that descriptionr in accordance with which it is one. Giles teaches this, Metaph. IV, q. 8,143 and St. Thomas favors it, Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, when he says that the division according to which something is distinguished from something is in affirmation and negation, and therefore that multitude includes a negation in its naturer insofar as there are many things one of which is not the other. And, he says, “included in the naturer of the unit is the negation of such division taken in this way in the naturer of the multitude.”144 And in the reply to the fourth argument he says, “One is not the privation of that multitude which it constitutes, but the privation of the multitude which is denied in the thing called one.”145 And although St. Thomas is there speaking of multitude as regards the negation included in it, as has been said, nevertheless, it is perhaps better said that one negates multitude insofar as there are several things in it positively. This is also favored by what St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 11, art. 2: that “one is opposed to multitude in the manner of a privation, as the undivided is opposed to the divided.”146 Aristotle also says this in 139. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 772–73. 140. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 340b. 141. This work is De natura generis, now commonly attributed to Thomas Sutton. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 17 (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1864), p. 9a–b. 142. See DM 4.7.2–4. 143. Giles of Rome, Metaphysicales Quaestiones Aureae, fol. 28rb–28va. 144. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66b. 145. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66c. 146. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109b.

108

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

absolute includit formalem negationem, ideo quoad hoc unum non omnino dicit negationem multitudinis.

Unum ens qualiter magis unum quam aliud.

Unum an & quomodo dicat perfectionem.

24. Ad secundum, concedo in primis, unionem qua partes coniunguntur ad componendum unum, esse quid positivum: concedo etiam in rebus simplicibus totam entitatem seu integritatem rei esse positivam. Nego tamen inde sequi unum addere rationem positivam supra ens, quia totum illud positivum pertinet ad entitatem rei, non ad unitatem, ut supra declaravi: sed oportet adiungere negationem divisionis, ut tale ens sive simplex, sive compositum, unum esse intelligatur. Ad primam confirmationem respondetur, negationem seu privationem totalem formaliter, & secundum se non suscipere magis & minus, posse tamen ratione sui fundamenti; & ita unum ens esse magis unum quam aliud, ratione fundamenti quatenus est magis, vel minus compositum. An vero in ipsamet negatione possit etiam magis & minus considerari, ita ut non semper sit illa negatio simpliciter, seu totalis, sed interdum tantum secundum quid & ex parte, dicetur infra sect. 4. [89b]

25. Ad secundam confirmationem similiter dicitur, cum D. Thom. 1. p. q. 6.49 art. 3. ad 1. & Caiet. ibi, unum ratione negationis, nullam addere perfectionem enti, sed ratione fundamenti supponere aliquam perfectionem. Nam, si unum proprie sumatur, ut solum dicit esse in se indivisum, supponit rei entitatem, & unionem partium, si res composita sit, quae dicunt perfectionem in ipsa re. Si tamen sumatur unum, ut excludit aliud, & dicit esse unicum seu solitarium, sic clarum est, talem negationem per se non dicere perfectionem, imo nec semper requirere 49. Reading “6” here with C1 , C2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. G2 reads “4” instead. V5 reads “6.6” instead. Vivès reads “66” instead.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 109



Metaph. X, text 9.147 And this opinion seems to me to be very plausible. But it must be understood of a multitude insofar as it is a multitude, or by virtue of its plurality, not insofar as a multitude itself can be considered under another conceptr as something that is one. Of this I shall speak below.148 Or at any rate it can be said that one signifiesd the negation of division, not insofar as it formally signifiesd the negation, but insofar as it signifiesd the foundation of that negation, which is something positive, as I have made clear. And since multitude absolutely includes the formal negation, to this extent one does not completely signifyd the negation of multitude. 24. To the second argument,149 I concede, in the first place, that the union by which parts are conjoined in order to compose one thing is something positive. I also concede that in simple thingsr the entire entity or integrity of the thingr is positive. Nevertheless, I deny that from this it follows that one adds a positive naturer to being, since that entire positive thing pertains to the entity of the thingr, not to its unity, as I made clear above.150 But it must add a negation of division in order that such a being, whether simple or composite, be understood to be one. To the first confirmation,151 I reply that a total negation or privation formally and in itself does not admit of more or less, but it can by reason of its foundation, and it is in this way that one being is more one than another, by reason of the foundation, insofar as it is more or less composite. But whether more or less can be observed in the negation itself as well, so that there is not always that unqualified or total negation, but sometimes only a qualified and partial one—of this we shall speak below in section 4.152 25. To the second confirmation,153 I likewise say, with St. Thomas, ST I, q. 6, art. 3, ad 1,154 and with Cajetan in that place,155 that one, by 147. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a20–29. 148. Suárez discusses what is one per accidens (which is without qualification a multitude) beginning at DM 4.3. 149. See DM 4.1.3. 150. See DM 4.1.10 & 11. 151. See DM 4.1.3. 152. See DM 4.4.6. 153. See DM 4.1.3. 154. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 68b. 155. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 69b.

How one being is more one than another.

110

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

illam, aut provenire ex illa, nam in Deo ⟨122b⟩ esse unum tantum in essentia provenit ex perfectione, tamen quod in eo sit una tantum persona, non pertinet ad perfectionem, sed potius personarum distinctio ibi est ex summa perfectione.

Quaedam attributa unius quid sint & quomodo illi conveniant, explicatur.

26. Ad tertium respondetur illis omnibus exemplis solum probari, negationem, quam dicit unum, non esse puram negationem, sed fundatam in ente, quod, si compositum sit, includit aliquam compositionem seu positivam unionem in qua fundetur talis negatio; si autem sit simplex, in simplici entitate fundatur; quod quomodo conveniat singulis unitatibus ibi numeratis, praesertim genericae & specificae, infra tractabitur. 27. Ad quartum respondetur, ea omnia, quae unitati attribuuntur, quatenus aliquid positivum includunt, convenire unitati ratione fundamenti, non ratione eius quod addit supra ens; & ita relatio identitatis, si intelligatur de identitate numerica seu reali, cum sit relatio rationis, non est inconveniens, quod in negatione fundetur: si vero intelligatur de identitate specifica, seu similitudine unius rei ad aliam (supposito quod talis relatio aliquid reale sit in fundamento ex natura rei distinctum ab illo) non fundatur in unitate ratione indivisionis negativae, sed ratione illius positivae entitatis, & rationis formalis, quam habet fundamentum: de quo latius infra suo loco. Similiter unum dicitur mensura multitudinis, partim ratione positivi, partim ratione negationis: nam multitudo etiam & positivum aliquid, & negativum includit, ut postea videbimus: debet enim mensura esse & nota & certa, ut sit nota, oportet ut entitatem habeat, ut vero sit certa, oportet ut in indivisibili consistat; & quoad hoc nos utimur unitate ut est quid indivisum, tanquam principio certo ad mensurandam multitudinem. Atque eodem modo unum componit multitudinem ratione positivae entitatis, quatenus multitudo



Section 1: What one adds to being. 111



reason of its negation, adds no perfection to being, but by reason of its foundation presupposes some perfection. For, if one is taken properly insofar as it signifiesd only to be internally undivided, it presupposes the entity of the thingr and a union of parts (if it is a composite thingr), which signifyd perfection in the thingr itself. But if one is taken insofar as it excludes something else and signifiesd being unique or solitary, in this way it is clear that such a negation per se does not signifyd a perfection. In fact, it does not always require it, or proceed from it, for in the case of God to be only one in respect of essence proceeds from perfection, but that there should be in him only one person does not pertain to perfection. Rather, in his case the distinction of persons is due to his supreme perfection. 26. To the third argument,156 I reply that by means of all those examples it is only proved that the negation which one signifiesd is not a pure negation, but a negation founded on a being, which, if composite, includes some composition or positive union on which such a negation is founded. But if it is simple, it is founded on the simple entity. How this agrees with each of the unities there enumerated, especially the generic and specific, will be discussed below.157 27. To the fourth argument,158 I reply that, insofar as they include something positive, all those things which are attributed to unity agree with unity by reason of its foundation, and not by reason of that which it adds to being. And so it is not problematic for the relation of identity, if it is understood as numerical or real identity, to be founded on a negation, since this is a relation of reason, whereas if it is understood as specific identity, or the similarity of one thingr to another (granting that such a relation is something real in the foundation and is distinct ex natura rei from it), then it is not founded on unity by reason of the negative indivision, but by reason of that positive entity and formal characterr that the foundation has—about which we shall speak more fully below in its place.159 Likewise, one is called the measure of multitude, partly by reason of something positive, partly by reason of a negation, 156. See DM 4.1.4. 157. See DM 4.9.14. 158. See DM 4.1.5. 159. See DM 6.4.12.

Whether and how one signifiesd perfection.

Explaining what certain attributes of the unit are, and how they agree with it.

112 D. Thom.

Sect. I. Quid unum addat enti.

ipsa positiva est, ut docet D. Thom. 1. p. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 2. quatenus vero includit negationem, potest aliquo modo fundare negationem, quae in multitudine includitur, ut infra videbimus.



Section 1: What one adds to being. 113



for multitude also includes both something positive and something negative, as we shall see later.160 For a measure must be both knownn and fixed, and in order for it to be knownn, it must have entity, and in order for it to be fixed, it must consist in something indivisible. And with respect to the latter, we use a unity, insofar as it is something undivided, as a fixed principle for measuring a multitude. And in the same way a unit composes a multitude by reason of positive entity, insofar as a multitude is itself positive, as St. Thomas teaches, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 2.161 But insofar as it includes a negation, it can in some way found the negation which is included in multitude, as we shall see below.162

160. See DM 4.6.2. 161. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110a. 162. See DM 4.6.3.

St. Thomas.

Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione. SEC TIO II. Utrum unum de for mali dic at sol a m negationem, qua m addit supr a ens, vel aliquid aliud. 1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia ex dictis sect. praecedente videtur plane sequi, unum ⟨123a⟩ dicere de formali solam negationem, quia id dicit de formali, in quo distinguitur ab ente; [90a] sed distinguitur tantum in negatione quam addit; ergo illam solum dicit de formali. Secundo, quia unaquaeque proprietas seu passio id dicit de formali, quod addit suo subiecto: sed unum est passio entis: ergo de formali dicit id solum quod addit supra ens: sed addit solum negationem: ergo. Tertio, quia, si ultra negationem dicit aliquid, vel illud est ens, vel quippiam aliud: hoc secundum cogitari non potest: nam si illud est aliud a negatione, positivum esse debet; non potest autem esse positivum rationis, ut supra ostensum est: oportet ergo, ut sit positivum reale; & consequenter ut includat ens, iuxta superius dicta contra Scotum. Si autem dicatur primum, scilicet, id quod unum dicit de formali, includere reale ens, sequuntur omnia incommoda, & argumenta supra facta contra opinionem asserentem unum addere positivum supra ens, scilicet ens quidditative includi in passione sua, quod est contra rationem subiecti, & passionis. Item sequitur processus in infinitum supra illatus; quia id quod de formali significat unum, etiam erit unum, &c. Denique sequitur, formale significatum unius esse omnino idem cum adaequato significato, ut etiam includit materiale. Ac denique sequitur, passionem unius includere totam perfectionem entis formaliter: & consequenter passionem esse aequalis perfectionis cum subiecto suo.

114

Section 2: The nature of the unit.

Section 2 Whether One For mally Signifies d Only the Negation That It Adds to Being, or Something Else. 1. The reason for doubt is: because it seems clearly to follow from the things said in the last section that one formally signifiesd only a negation. For it formally signifiesd that by which it is distinguished from being. But it is distinguished only by the negation that it adds. Therefore, it formally signifiesd only that negation. Second, because each property or passion formally signifiesd what it adds to its subject. But one is a passion of being. Therefore, it formally signifiesd only what it adds to being. But it adds only a negation. Therefore. Third, because if it signifiesd something beyond the negation, then that something is either a being or something else. But the second cannot be thought, for if that thing is other than a negation, it must be something positive; but it cannot be something positive pertaining to reason, as was shown above.163 It must, therefore, be something positive that is real, and consequently it must include being, according to the things that were said above against Scotus.164 But if it signifiesd the first—that is, if that which one formally signifiesd includes real being—there follow all those problems and arguments which were made above against the opinion asserting that one adds something positive to being, namely: that being is quidditatively included in its passion, which is contrary to the naturesr of a subject and a passion.165 Further, the progression to infinity inferred above follows, since what one formally signifies will also be one, etc.166 Further, it follows that the formal significate of one 163. See DM 4.1.7. 164. See DM 2.5. 165. See DM 3.1.1. 166. See DM 4.1.8.

115

116

Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

Variae sententiae. Prior. Caiet. Fonseca.

Posterior sententia. Soncinas. Iavellus. Fland. Iandun. Capreol.

Soto.

2. In hac re duae sunt opiniones. Prima affirmat, unum de formali dicere solam negationem superius explicatam. Hanc sententiam insinuat Caietanus 1. part. quaest. 11. art. 1. ad 2. Scoti, dum ait, unum formaliter non esse magis extra nihil, quam alia privativa, seu negativa. Latius & clarius eam docet Fonseca d. quaest. 5. sect. 5. & favet D. Thomas 1. part. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 1. quatenus dicit, unum non importare rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum. Fundamenta huius sententiae sunt in principio posita, quibus concludi videtur, unum in suo significato formali non includere ens, sed tantum connotare illud: & consequenter de formali dicere solam indivisionem seu negationem.

3. Secunda sententia est, unum de formali non dicere negationem solam, sed entitatem ipsam sub negatione, ⟨123b⟩ quae est communior sententia scribentium hoc loco 4. Metaph. Soncinas quaest. 20. & 23. Iavellus, quaest. 5. & 8. Flandria quaest. 3. art. 8. Iandun. quaest. 4. tenet etiam Capreol. in 1. d. 24. quaest. 1. ubi circa primam conclusionem adducit Avicennam. 3. Metap. c. 2.50 dicentem: Unitas est esse, quod non dividitur: ita quod esse est de essentia unitatis, & non subiectum ei: unitas enim substantialiter est ipsum esse, quod non dividitur. Et significat Soto in Log. cap. de prop. q. 2. ad 2. Favet D. Thom. in 1. distinct. 19. quaest. 4. art. 1. ad 2. dicens, quod ipsa essentia entis creati secundum quod est indivisa in se, & distincta ab aliis, est unitas eius, & d. 24. q. 1. art. 3. ubi dicit, unum claudere in intellectu suo ens commune, & addere rationem privationis; & de Potentia, quaest. 9. art. 7. ubi ait, unum non significare indivisionem tantum, sed ens cum ipsa. Sed his duobus locis postremis aperte loquitur [90b] D. Thom. de adaequato significa50. Reading “c. 2.” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following have “c. 3.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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is altogether the same as its adequate significate insofar as it also includes its material significate. And finally, it follows that the passion, one, formally includes the entire perfection of being, and consequently, that the passion is equal in perfection to its subject.

Various opinions. 2. On this matter, there are two opinions. The first affirms that one formally signifiesd only the negation explained above. Cajetan implies this opinion at ST I, q. 11, art. 1, in his response to Scotus’s second argument, when he says that formally the unit is not more outside of nothing than other privative or negative things.167 Fonseca, in the mentioned q. 5, sec. 5, teaches it at greater length and more clearly,168 and St. Thomas, ST I, q. 6, art. 3, ad 1, favors it insofar as he says that one does not imply the characterr of perfection, but only the characterr of indivision.169 The foundations of this opinion were set out at the beginning, by means of which it seems to have been shown that one does not include being in its formal significate, but only connotes it, and consequently formally signifiesd only indivision or a negation. 3. The second opinion is that one does not formally signifyd only a negation, but entity itself under a negation, and this is the more common opinion among those writing about this passage in Metaph. IV: Soncinas, q. 20 and q. 23,170 Javelli, q. 5 and q. 8,171 Flanders, q. 3, art. 8,172 Jandun, q. 4.173 Capreolus also holds it, Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1,174 where, with regard to the first conclusion, he adduces Avicenna, Meta167. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108b. 168. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 772–77. 169. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 68b. 170. In Soncinas’s q ­ uestion-commentary, q. 20 on Metaph. IV asks “Whether a genus is predicated per se of its differentia.” Suárez would seem to have in mind q. 21 instead: “Whether being is really the same as its passions.” See Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, pp. 32b–34a, pp. 36a–37a. 171. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 738a, p. 741a. 172. Dominic of Flanders, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis (Coloniae Agrippinae: Typis Arnoldi Kempensis, 1621), p. 182a. 173. John of Jandun, Acutissimae Quaestiones in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae, col. 244. 174. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2, pp. 186b–187a.

The first opinion. Cajetan.

Fonseca.

The second opinion.

Soncinas. Javelli. Flanders. Jandun. Capreolus.

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Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

to unius, non de formali, ut Fonseca exponit: primus tamen locus non videtur admittere hanc expositionem.

4. Fundatur haec opinio primo, quia, si unum de formali diceret solam51 indivisionem, esset terminus privativus: consequens est falsum, quia omnis terminus privativus dicit aliquam imperfectionem in re cui tribuitur, quod non potest dici de uno, alias non posset Deo attribui: ergo. Sed haec ratio non est magni momenti: non enim necesse est, privativum terminum imperfectionem importare, si forma, quam negat, ad perfectionem simpliciter non pertineat, ut patet in his terminis, infinitum, immateriale, qui, licet sumantur omnino privative, nullam imperfectionem dicunt: idem ergo esse poterit de uno, quia divisio, quam negat, non dicit perfectionem simpliciter. Imo eadem ratio procederet, si esset efficax, etiam si unum de formali dicat ens cum indivisione: nam si privatio pure sumpta dicit imperfectionem, etiam si aliquid ei adiungatur, eandem dicet imperfectionem,52 adiunctam perfectioni. 51. Reading “solam” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following have “solum”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 52. Reading “nam si privatio pure sumpta dicit imperfectionem, etiam si aliquid ei adiungatur, eandem dicet imperfectionem” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read instead “nam si privatio pure sumpta dicet imperfectionem, etiam si aliquid ei adiungatur, eandem dicet imperfectionem”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , V3 , V4 , and V5. The following reads instead “nam si privatio pure sumpta diceret imperfectionem, etiam si aliquid ei adiungatur, eandem diceret imperfectionem”: P2. The following reads instead: “nam si privatio pure sumpta diceret imperfectionem, etiam si aliquid ei adiungatur, eandem dicet imperfectionem”: Vivès.



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physics, book 3, ch. 2, as saying: “Unity is beinge that is not divided, and so beinge pertains to the essence of unity, and is not its subject; for unity is substantially beinge itself which is not divided.”175 And Soto in his Logic, the chapter on properties, q. 2, ad 2, indicates this view.176 St. Thomas favors it at Sent. I, d. 19, q. 4, art. 1, ad 2, saying “that the very essence of a created being according as it is undivided in itself and distinct from other things is its unity.”177 And at Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, where he says that one includes in its notion being in general and adds the characterr of a privation.178 And at On the Power of God, q. 9, art. 7, where he says that one does not signify indivision alone, but being together with indivision.179 But in these last two passages St. Thomas is clearly speaking about the adequate significate of one, not about its formal significate, as Fonseca explains,180 although the first passage seems not to admit of being explained in this way. 4. This opinion is founded, in the first place, because if one formally signifiedd indivision alone, it would be a privative term. But this consequent is false, since every privative term signifiesd some imperfection in the thingr to which it is attributed, which cannot be said of one, otherwise it could not be attributed to God. Therefore. But this argument does not carry great weight, for it is not necessary that a privative term entail imperfection if the form which it denies does not befit unqualified perfection, as is clear in the case of the terms “infinite” and “immaterial,” which, though taken altogether privatively, signifyd no imperfection. The same thing, therefore, will be able to be the case with one, since the division which it denies does not signifyd unqualified perfection. In fact, the same argument, if it were effective, would work even if one formally signifiedd being with indivision. For if a privation 175. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, sive scientia divina I–IV, pp. 119–20. Both Capreolus and Suárez incorrectly cite bk. 3, ch. 2, of Avicenna’s Metaphysics in quoting this passage. In fact, Avicenna makes the mentioned claim in bk. 3, ch. 3. See Avicenna, Avicenne perhypatetici philosophi: ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta (Venetiis: Impensis heredum Octaviani Scoti, 1508), fol. 79rbD. 176. Domingo de Soto, In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii, fol. 29va. 177. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 54b. 178. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66b. 179. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, p. 243a. 180. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), col. 776.

Soto.

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Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

5. Aliter probari solet haec opinio, quia, teste Aristotele, 4. Metaph. ens & unum eandem naturam significant; sed si unum diceret de formali puram negationem, non posset significare eandem naturam, quam ens, quia ens non dicit negationem, sed positivam naturam. Sed haec ratio etiam non convincit, nam, si unum, significando solam negationem de formali, esset alterius naturae ab ente, propter ⟨124a⟩ distinctionem, quae est inter privationem, & positivum: eadem ratione, quanvis de formali diceret ens cum indivisione, dicendum esset alterius naturae ab ente, saltem eo modo, quo totum compositum distinguitur a materia, vel subiecto; vel sicut distinguuntur caecus, & Petrus. Aristoteles ergo dicit, unum & ens dicere eandem naturam quantum ad totum positivum, quod utrumque dicit; & recte etiam exponitur negative, scilicet, unum non dicere aliam naturam (utique positivam) ab ente. Sicut idem Aristoteles. 1. Physic. c. 7. dixit, materiam & privationem esse idem, scilicet negative, quia privatio non dicit rem a materia distinctam: sic ergo in praesente dici facile potest.

Quaestionis resolutio. 6. Existimo sane, diversitatem inter has sententias magis esse de modo loquendi, quam de re. Quia in re omnes conveniunt, unum in toto & adaequato suo significato nihil aliud dicere, quam ens indivisum; & indivisionem nihil addere enti, nisi negationem divisionis; & consequenter necesse est ut omnes fateantur, in uno nihil esse extra rationem entis ut sic, praeter negationem solam, quia totum, quod est ens, praeter id quod ei additur, est de essentiali ratione eius; sed sola negatio est, quae ei additur: ergo illa sola est extra rationem eius. Unde fit ulterius, ut unum solum possit dici passio entis ratione negationis quam superaddit enti, quia solum est passio secundum quod dicit ali­ quid extra rationem entis. His autem in re positis reliqua quaestio de



Section 2: The nature of the unit. 121



taken on its own signifiesd imperfection, then even if something is conjoined with it, it will signifyd the same imperfection, conjoined with perfection. 5. This opinion is normally proved in another way, for, as Aristotle attests, Metaph. IV, being and one signify the same nature.181 But if one formally signifiedd a pure negation, it could not signify the same nature that being does, since being does not signifyd a negation, but a positive nature. However, this argument also is not convincing, for if, by formally signifying only a negation, one were of a different nature from being because of the distinction there is between a privation and something positive, then for the same reason, even if it formally signifiedd being together with indivision, it would have to be said to be of a different nature from being, at least in the way an entire composite is distinguished from the matter or subject, or as the blind man and Peter are distinguished. Therefore, Aristotle says that one and being signifyd the same nature as regards the positive whole that each signifiesd, and it is also rightly expounded negatively as follows: one does not signifyd a nature (a positive nature, surely) different from being. Therefore, just as the same Aristotle says, at Phys. I, ch. 7, that matter and privation are the same—namely, negatively—because privation does not signifyd a thingr distinct from matter,182 so can this be readily said in the present case.

Resolution of the question. 6. I think, truly, that the difference between these opinions has more to do with the manner of speaking than the reality. For as regards the reality all agree that, when it comes to its total and adequate significate, one signifiesd nothing other than undivided being, and that indivision adds nothing to being except the negation of division. And consequently it is necessary that everyone grant that in the unit there is nothing outside the naturer of being as such except the negation alone, since the whole which is a being, aside from that which is added to it, pertains to its essential characterr. But it is a negation alone that is 181. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–24. 182. Aristotle, Phys. I, ch. 7, 190b35–191a3.

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Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

significato formali,53 videtur solum esse de impositione nominis. In qua utraque opinio citata probabilis [91a] est, fundaturque in probabili modo concipiendi significatum huius vocis unum: Nam quidam concipiunt supposito ente reali, sola negatione divisionis illi superaddita, constitui unum; & ideo dicunt, unum de formali solum dicere praedictam negationem. Alii vero concipiunt unitatem non esse veluti quandam privationem adiunctam enti, sed esse ipsam rei naturam seu entitatem, quae, ut est entitas54 vel essentia, constituit ens, ut vero est entitas indivisa, constituit unum ens.

Posterior sententia eligitur.

7. Et hic modus concipiendi videtur mihi similior vero, ideoque posteriorem sententiam simpliciter probandam censeo. Primo propter rationem nunc tactam, & insinuatam a D. Thoma. in 1. loco supra citato, quia unum de formali dicit ⟨124b⟩ unitatem realem: sed unitas realis non est sola negatio: ergo est entitas ipsa sub negatione. Minor patet inductione: nam Deus dicitur unus ab unitate Dei, quae consistit in essentia indivisa: & similiter Petrus dicitur unus numero, quia habet unam numero naturam: unde unitas eius non consistit in sola negatione. Ac denique ex ipsis terminis constare videtur, unitatem realem plus dicere, quam negationem. Secundo, quia unum non dicitur univoce de ente rationis, & reali, ut per se notum est; & tamen, si praecise consideres negationem, aeque potest attribui, & denominare ens rationis, sicut reale: ergo signum est, unum non dicere de formali solam negationem: alias denominatio unius aeque posset cadere in ens rationis, & reale: quia significatio vocis potissimum attendenda est ex significato formali. Sicut nomina artefactorum censentur non significare solam figuram in significato formali, quia non aeque neque univoce dicuntur 53. Reading “de significato formali” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. The following instead read “de significato non formali” here: V1 and V2. S reads: “de signifi- [line break] non formali”. 54. Reading “quae, ut est entitas” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read instead “quae entitas”: V5 and Vivès.



Section 2: The nature of the unit. 123



added to it. Therefore, that alone is outside its naturer. For this reason it results, furthermore, that one can only be called a passion of being by reason of the negation that it adds to being, since it is a passion only insofar as it signifiesd something outside the naturer of being. With these things posited about the reality, the remaining question regarding the formal significate seems only to concern the imposition of the name. And as regards this, each of the mentioned opinions is plausible and founded on a plausible way of conceiving the significate of this word “one.” For some conceive that a unit is constituted when a real being is presupposed and the negation of division alone is added to it. And therefore they say that one formally signifiesd only the mentioned negation. Others, however, conceive unity not to be, as it were, a certain privation joined to being, but to be a thingr’s very nature or entity, which, insofar as it is an entity or essence, constitutes a being, but insofar as it is an undivided entity, constitutes one being. 7. And this latter way of conceiving seems to me nearer the truth, and therefore I think that the second view is to be approved without qualification. In the first place, because of the argument now touched on and suggested by St. Thomas in the first passage cited above:183 because one formally signifiesd real unity. But real unity is not only a negation. Therefore, it is the entity itself under the negation. The minor is clear by induction, for God is called one from the unity of God, which consists in an undivided essence. And similarly, Peter is called numerically one because he has numerically one nature. Thus his unity does not consists in a negation alone. And finally, from the terms themselves it seems to be established that real unity signifiesd more than a negation. Second, because one is not predicated univocally of a being of reason and a real being, as is knownn per se. And yet, if you consider the negation precisely, it can equally be attributed to, and denominate, a being of reason and a real being. This is a sign, therefore, that one does not formally signifyd the negation alone, otherwise the denomination, one, could agree equally with a being of reason and a real being, since the signification of a word is to be gathered especially from its formal significate. Therefore, just as the names of artifacts are 183. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), pp. 107–8.

The second opinion is chosen.

124 Exemplum totam rem illustrans.

Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

de rebus habentibus eandem figuram in diversis materiis, ut serra non dicitur univoce de ferrea, & cerea: sic ergo neque unum significabit solam negationem de formali, cum non aeque dicatur de omnibus quibus aeque potest convenire talis negatio: dicit ergo de formali ipsam entitatem indivisam. Atque hinc sumi potest tertium argumentum, quia unum prout est transcendens non dicit de formali aliquid supponens ens, & quasi adiacens, & adveniens illi, sicut album dicit de formali albedinem: non enim sic intelligitur res esse una, sicut alba: est enim una intime per suammet entitatem; alba vero est per formam supervenientem alteri entitati: ergo signum est, unum non dicere de formali solam negationem, quasi superadditam entitati: sed ipsam intrinsecam entitatem indivisam. Ultimo ex infra dicendis constabit, ad hunc modum fere necessario esse sentiendum de aliis transcendentibus, bono, & vero, quae non possunt de formali dicere solas relationes rationis, sed entitatem ipsam cum aliqua relatione, vel denominatione huiusmodi: ergo idem sentiendum est de uno, nam, si argumenta, quae de ipso in contrarium fiunt, quicquam probarent, eadem procederent de aliis transcendentibus.

Respondetur ad argumenta. 8. Ad primum respondetur, unum distingui ab ente radicaliter quidem (ut sic dicam) ratione negationis, quam superaddit enti: ⟨125a⟩ formaliter vero non distingui per negationem tan[91b]quam per formam unius, sed per entitatem indivisam: itaque ens de formali dicit entitatem ut sic, unum vero dicit de formali eandem entitatem ut indivisam. 9. Ad secundum respondetur, assumptum illud esse verum de55 proprietatibus realibus propriissime sumptis, & addentibus subiectis aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ab illis: in his enim verum est, nomina significantia tales proprietates solere de formali significare praecise id 55. Reading “de” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “in”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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thought not to signify only the figure in their formal significate, since they are not equally or univocally said of thingsr having the same figure in different matters (as saw is not said univocally of an iron saw and a wax one), so neither will one formally signify only the negation, since it is not said equally of all the things to which such a negation can equally belong. Therefore, it formally signifiesd the undivided entity itself. And from this a third argument can be taken: because one, insofar as it is transcendental, does not formally signifyd something presupposing being and, as it were, adjectival on it and advening on it, as white formally signifiesd whiteness, since a thingr is not understood to be one in the way it is white, since it is one inwardly through its very entity, but white through a form that supervenes on another entity. This is a sign, therefore, that one does not formally signifyd only a negation added, as it were, to entity, but rather the intrinsic, undivided entity itself. Finally, from the things to be said below it will be established that nearly the same must necessarily be thought about the other transcendentals, good and true, which cannot formally signifyd only relations of reason, but rather the entity itself with some such relation or denomination. Therefore, the same is to be thought about one, for if the arguments to the contrary made about it proved anything, they would likewise succeed in the case of the other transcendentals.

The arguments are answered. 8. To the first argument,184 I reply that at root (so to speak) one is indeed distinguished from being by reason of the negation which it adds to being, but it is not distinguished formally by the negation as by the form of the unit, but rather by undivided entity. And so being formally signifiesd entity as such, while one formally signifiesd the same entity as undivided. 9. To the second, I reply that the assumption is true in the case of real properties taken most strictly, and adding to subjects something that is distinct ex natura rei from them. For in their case it is true that normally the names signifying such properties formally signify pre184. For the arguments to which Suárez replies here and in the next two paragraphs, see DM 4.2.1.

Example illuminating the entire matter.

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Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

quod proprietas addit subiecto: in his autem proprietatibus transcendentalibus, quae non addunt aliquid reale, non oportet id observare: nam ut non sint negationes tantum, vel omnino entia rationis, sed aliquo modo proprietatem realem significent, necesse est ut aliquo modo in formali suo significato includant entitatem ipsam. 10. Ad tertium respondetur, unum in concreto dicere ipsum ens ut indivisum: unitatem vero in abstracto, dicere entitatem etiam in abstracto ut indivisam; & huiusmodi entitatem56 significari formaliter per passionem unius. Neque ex hoc sequitur aliquod incommodum; nam quod ens in concreto sumptum praedicetur quidditative de suis passionibus etiam in concreto sumptis, nullum est inconveniens, sic enim bonum est ens, & verum similiter. Neque in his oportet servari ea omnia, quae proprietatibus realibus & propriissimis conveniunt: ibi enim subiectum omnino praescindit a proprietate, & e contrario, quia ex natura rei distinguuntur: hic autem nulla est talis distinctio, sed sola additio alicuius negationis, vel denominationis; & ideo ens in eo quidem quod addit unum, non includitur, ut supra dictum est, in ipso vero uno necesse est intime includi. Neque inde sequitur processus in infinitum, quia ens, & unum quoad positivum quod includit, omnino idem sunt, tum re, tum etiam ratione, nisi ob negationem adiunctam. Quod si loquamur in abstracto de unitate; illa non tam proprie dicetur includere ens quidditative, quam entitatem seu essentiam; debet enim in his servari proportio; & quoad hoc saltem in modo significandi, non est idem significatum formale unius, & adaequatum eiusdem. Dico autem, quoad modum significandi, quia in his simplicissimis res significata per abstractum & concretum eadem est, & ita idem sunt entitas & ens, unitas & unum, solumque differunt ratione & modo concipiendi & significandi. Quocirca nullus est processus in infini⟨125b⟩tum, quia sicut ens sua entitate est ens, entitas vero se ipsa est entitas, & quo ens est ens; ut sic vero non concipitur tanquam id quod est, quanquam re ipsa formalissime sit ipsum ens: ita eadem proportione loquendum est de uno, & unitate, nam quoad rem positivam idem significant, solumque differunt, quia unum significat ens seu entitatem sub indivisione. 56. Reading “entitatem” here in accordance with a suggestion of Charles Berton. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b. All the editions that I’ve consulted read “unitatem” here.



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cisely what the property adds to the subject. But in the case of these transcendental properties, which do not add something real, this is not necessary. For in order that they not be only negations, or entirely beings of reason, but in some way signify a real property, it is necessary that they in some way include entity itself in their formal significate. 10. To the third, I reply that in the concrete one signifiesd being itself as undivided, but that unity in the abstract signifiesd entity, also in the abstract, as undivided, and that such entity is formally signified by the passion one. Nor does any problem follow from this, since it is not problematic for being taken concretely to be predicated quidditatively of its passions likewise taken concretely, for in this way the good is a being and the true likewise. Nor in regard to these is it necessary to observe all those features which agree with real properties in the strictest sense. For in such a case the subject prescinds altogether from the property, and conversely, since they are distinguished ex natura rei. But here there is no such distinction, but only the addition of some negation or denomination. And therefore being, to be sure, is not included in what one adds, as was said above, but it is necessarily intimately included in one itself. Nor does a progression to infinity result from this, for being and one (as regards the positive element that it includes) are altogether the same, both really and rationally, except on account of the added negation. But if we are speaking abstractly of unity, it is not as properly said to include being quidditatively as it is said to include entity or essence quidditatively, for when it comes to these a proportion must be observed. And as regards this, at least when it comes to the mode of signifying, one’s formal significate is not the same as its adequate significate. And I say “with respect to the mode of signifying” because in the case of these most simple things, the thingr signified by the abstract name is the same as that signified by the concrete name, and so entity and being are the same, as are unity and the unit, and they only differ in relation to reason and in mode of conceiving and signifying. Therefore, there is no progression to infinity, since just as a being is a being by its entity, whereas an entity is an entity by itself and is that by which a being is a being, but as such is not conceived as that which is, even though really it is most formally the being itself, so must we speak with the same proportion of the unit and unity. For as regards

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Sect. II. An ratio unius sit in sola negatione.

Tandem hoc modo nullum est inconveniens, quod unum in re dicat totam perfectionem, quam dicit ens, quanvis illam non dicat sub eodem omnino conceptu, seu formali ratione: quia non dicit illam praecise ut est perfectio, vel entitas, sed ut est sub indivisione. [92a]



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the positive thingr, they185 signify the same and differ only because one signifies being or entity under indivision. Finally, in this way it is not problematic that one really signifiesd the whole perfection that being signifiesd, although it does not signifyd it under altogether the same concept or formal aspectr, for it does not signifyd it precisely insofar as it is perfection or entity, but insofar as it is under indivision. 185. Namely, being and one.

Sect. III. De divisione unius in per se, & per accidens. SEC TIO III. Quotuplex sit in rebus unitas.

Variae unius divisiones.

1. De hac re disputat Arist. 5. Metap. cap. 6. Est autem hoc loco necessario praemittenda, ut explicare possimus, quaenam unitas sit entis passio. Distinguit ergo Aristoteles varios modos unius. Et prima divisio eius est, unum quoddam esse per accidens, aliud per se. Et merito hanc divisionem primo loco ponit, quia & videtur esse valde analoga: nam unum per se est simpliciter unum: per accidens vero tantum secundum quid, & per quandam proportionem ad unum per se. Non explicat autem Aristoteles rationes unius per accidens, & per se, per proprias eorum definitiones, sed solum variis exemplis, quibus simul proponit varios modos unitatis per accidens, & per se. Unum enim per accidens esse dicit subiectum accidente affectum,57 ut Petrus musicus. Item duo accidentia eidem58 subiecto inhaerentia unum per accidens sunt, seu constituunt, ut album dulce. Hanc vero unitatem per accidens in ordine ad praedicationes variis modis explicare possumus, vel per incomplexos terminos, vel per complexos, vel praedicando accidens de subiecto, vel subiectum de accidente, vel accidens de accidente,59 aut in communi, aut in singulari. Et iuxta haec distinguit Aristoteles varias rationes huius unitatis, quae magis ad dialecticas praedicationes, quam ad rem metaphysicam spectant. Similiter explicat Aristoteles unum per se variis exemplis, seu subdistinguendo illud in varios modos. Nam quaedam (inquit) sunt unum continuatione, ut linea, aqua, quaedam colligatione, ut domus, & alia, quae arte fiunt; alia ratione 57. Reading “affectum” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V5 , and Vivès. The following instead read “effectum”: S , V1 , V2 , and V4. 58. Reading “eidem” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following have “eodem” instead: M4 , V5 , Vives. The following read “eadem” instead: M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , V3 , and V4. 59. Reading “praedicando accidens de subiecto, vel subiectum de accidente, vel accidens de accidente” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read: “praedicando accidens de accidente” instead: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.

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Section 3 How Numerous the Unities in Things r Are. 1. Aristotle discusses this matter in Metaph. V, ch. 6. And it is necessary to address it here first, so that we can explain which unity is a passion of being. Aristotle, then, distinguishes various modes of the unit. The first division of it is into the one per accidens and the one per se. And he rightly presents this division first, since it seems also to be very analogical, for the one per se is one without qualification, whereas the one per accidens is one only in a certain respect and by a kind of proportion to the one per se. Aristotle, however, does not explain the naturesr of the one per accidens and the one per se through their proper definitions, but only by means of various examples, by means of which he simultaneously presents various modes of per accidens and per se unity. For he says that a subject affected by an accident, such as musical Peter, is one per accidens.186 Further, two accidents inhering in the same subject are, or constitute, something one per accidens, such as the white sweet thing.187 But we can explain this per accidens unity in various ways by reference to predications, either by means of incomplex terms, or by means of complex ones, or by predicating an accident of a subject, a subject of an accident, or an accident of an accident, either in general or in the singular. And in accordance with these Aristotle distinguishes various kindsr of this unity which have more to do with dialectical predications than they do with metaphysics. Aristotle similarly explains the one per se by means of various examples, or by subdistinguishing it into various modes. For some things (he says) are one by continuity, such as a line or water, and some by assembly, such as a house and other things made by art; others are one by reason of a 186. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1015b17–19. 187. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1015b21–22. Note that in the Latin original there is no word corresponding to “thing” in “white sweet thing” (“album dulce”).

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Various divisions of the unit.

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formae unius; alia ratione materiae, vel proximae, vel remotae, ut liquores (inquit) dicuntur unum. Rursus ⟨126a⟩ (ait) quoddam est unum numero, aliud specie, aliud genere, &c. quae ibi prosequitur. Ex quibus omnibus difficile est colligere, in quo consistat ratio unius per se, & per accidens: nam in membris, quae posteriori loco60 Aristoteles numerat, multa videntur esse unum tantum per accidens, ut domus; & artificialia. Item ibidem ait, plura interdum dici unum, eo quod aliquid unum, aut agunt, aut patiuntur, aut habent, aut ad aliquid unum sunt. Haec autem omnia videntur tantum per accidens esse unum, vel denominatione potius, quam re. Rursus inter unitates quas ibi ponit, aliqua est realis ut numerica, alia rationis tantum ut generica, & specifica: est ergo difficile, hanc Aristotelis doctrinam, ad certam aliquam rationem, ac methodum revocare.

Explicatur divisio entis & unius in per se, & per accidens. 2. Ut ergo rem hanc declaremus, quoniam unum consequitur ens, ut intelligatur, quid sit unum per se, & unum per accidens, simul explicandum est, quid sit ens per se, & per accidens, sic enim etiam ens dividitur ab eodem Arist. eodem lib. 5. cap. 7. quae divisio propria est entis realis: nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes recipiunt: Ens autem reale dupli[92b]ci modo potest per se, aut per accidens appellari: uno modo in ratione entis; alio modo in ratione effectus. Hoc posteriori modo dicitur per se id quod ex virtute, & intentione agentis fit; per accidens vero dicitur id quod praeter intentionem agentis casu & fortuna evenit; de qua ait Arist. 6. Metap. cap. 2. esse extra scientiae considerationem, quatenus scilicet, in singulari exercetur, & per accidens evenit61: nam ut sic non habet necessitatem, sed contingentiam. At vero ipsa commu60. Reading “posteriori loco” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following read “posteriori in loco”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 61. Reading “evenit” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following omit this word: V5 and Vivès.



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single form, others by reason of matter, whether proximate or remote, as liquids (he says) are called one.188 Further (he says) a certain thing is one in number, another one in species, yet another one in genus, etc., which points he there pursues.189 From all of this it is difficult to gather in what the naturer of the one per se and the naturer of the one per accidens consist. For, among the members that he enumerates in the latter passage, many seem to be one only per accidens, such as a house and products of art. Moreover, in the same place he says that various things are sometimes called one “because they do, or suffer, or have, or are related to, something that is one.”190 But all these things seem to be one only per accidens, or by denomination, rather than really. Again, among the unities that he posits there, some are real, like the numerical, others only rational, such as the generic and the specific. It is, therefore, difficult to reduce this teaching of Aristotle’s to some definite accountr and method.

The division of being, and of the one, into per se and per accidens is explained. 2. In order to explain this matter, then: since one is consequent on being, in order to understand what the one per se and the one per accidens are, we must at the same time explain what a per se being and a per accidens being are, for being is also thus divided by Aristotle in chapter 7 of the same Book V.191 And this division is proper to real being, for just as beings of reason are beings only equivocally, so also do they receive these denominations only equivocally. But a real being can be called per se or per accidens in two ways: in one way in its characterr as a being, in the other in its characterr as an effect. In this second way, that is called per se which comes to be by the power and intention of the agent, but that is called per accidens which comes to be by chance and fortune beyond the intention of the agent—and the latter, Aristotle says in Metaph. VI, ch. 2, falls outside the consideration of a science, insofar as it is exercised, that is to say, in a singular and comes about 188. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1015b36–1016a24. 189. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1016a24–b6. 190. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1016b6–8. 191. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 7, 1017a7–30.

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nis ratio causae, vel effectus per accidens sub scientiam cadit; sic enim disputatur de casu & fortuna, & contingentia effectuum: sed tamen ens per se, & per accidens sub hac consideratione nihil ad praesens institutum pertinet.

Quale indicet Arist. per se unum, quale per accidens.

3. Priori ergo modo ens in ratione entis dicitur per se, aut per accidens, in ordine ad unitatem quam habet, seu ratione talis unitatis, ut v. g. quia constat una natura unius praedicamenti, aut naturis diversorum praedicamentorum: sic enim Arist. dict. lib. 5. tex. 13. & 14. entia per accidens vocat, quae constant ex subiecto & ⟨126b⟩ accidente, vel quando multa accidentia in eodem subiecto coniunguntur: ens autem per se dicit esse, quod dividitur in decem categorias. Idemque Arist. 7. Metap. tex. 43. & clarius lib. 8. tex. 15. & lib. 2. de Anima tex. 7. illud significat esse ens per se unum, quod vel simplex est, vel ex potentia substantiali, & proprio actu componitur. Unde e contrario, per accidens erit, quod neque est simplex, nec praedictam compositionem habet; sed alio imperfectiori modo ex diversis rebus constat. Ex quibus intelligere licet, illud appellari in ratione entis ens per se, quod est per se unum, illud autem per accidens, quod tantum per accidens unum est. Non enim vocatur hic per se & per accidens ratione modi essendi per se, vel in alio; quomodo sola substantia est ens per se, reliqua vero dici possunt per accidens, seu potius accidentalia: sed sumitur, per se, & per accidens in ordine ad unitatem; quae autem sit unitas per se, aut per accidens in entibus, non satis declaratum est ex dictis, nec eodem modo ab omnibus explicatur.

4. Quidam ergo aiunt, illam unitatem seu unionem esse per se; ex qua resultat unum & idem esse; illam vero esse per accidens, in qua entia, quae uniuntur, habent plura esse, ut sunt substantia & accidens, vel duo accidentia diversorum generum. Tamen haec explicatio, aut supponit aliquid falsum, aut rem obscuram per aliam aeque obscuram



Section 3: On the one per se and the one per accidens. 135



per accidens.192 For as such it does not have necessity, but rather contingency. However, the common naturer of the per accidens cause or per accidens effect does fall under science, for thus does one dispute regarding chance and fortune, and the contingency of effects.193 Nevertheless, per se being and per accidens being, so conceived, have nothing to do with our present purpose. 3. In the first way, then—that is, in its characterr as a being—a being is called per se or per accidens in reference to the unity that it has, or by reason of such unity, for example, because it consists in a single nature belonging to a single category or consists in several natures belonging to different categories. For thus does Aristotle, in texts 13 and 14 of the mentioned bk. V, call per accidens beings those which are composed from a subject and an accident, or those which result when many accidents are joined together in the same subject. But that being which is divided into the ten categories is said to be per se.194 And the same Aristotle, in Metaph. VII, text 43, and more clearly in Metaph. VIII, text 15, and De anima II, text 7, indicates that that thing is a being that is per se one which is either simple or composed from a substantial potency and its proper act.195 For this reason, conversely, that thing will be per accidens which neither is simple, nor has the aforementioned composition, but is constituted in another, less perfect way from diverse thingsr. From these points one can understand that in its characterr as a being that thing is called a per se being which is one per se, and a thing is called a per accidens being when it is one only per accidens. For it is not here called per se or per accidens by reason of the mode of existinge per se or in something else, in which way substance alone is a per se being, while the rest can be called per accidens, or rather accidental. It is, rather, taken as per se and per accidens in relation to unity. But what per se or per accidens unity is in beings is not made sufficiently clear by the foregoing, nor is it explained in the same way by all. 4. Some people say, then, that that unity or union is per se from 192. Aristotle, Metaph. VI, ch. 2, 1026b2–24. 193. See Aristotle, Metaph. VI, chs. 2–3, 1026b24–1027b16, and Phys. II, chs. 4–6. 194. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 7, 1017a7–30. 195. Aristotle, Metaph. VII, ch. 12, 1037b27–1038a35, Metaph. VIII, ch. 6, 1045a7–35, De anima II, ch. 1, 412b4–9.

What sort of thing Aristotle calls one per se, and what sort of thing he calls one per accidens.

136

Simplex existentia non est de ratione unius per se.

Ex duobus entibus in actu quomodo fiat unum per accidens, ex uno autem in potentia & alio in actu qualiter per se.

Sect. III. De divisione unius in per se, & per accidens.

explicat: nam vel sermo est de uno esse62 simplici absque compositione, quae63 in ipso sit, quanvis ex compositione resultet; quomodo multi dicunt, ex materia & forma unitis resultare unum esse; & hic sensus supponit falsum: nam, ut ens sit per se unum, non est necesse ut habeat huiusmodi esse simplex: infra enim ostendam, entia composita ex materia & forma non habere esse simplex, sed compositum. Vel sermo est de uno esse composito & resultante ex unione plurium partialium existentiarum; & hoc quidem verum est, sed de ipso esse inquirendum restat, quando ex compositione resultet unum per se: nam etiam accidens, v. g. albedo adveniens substantiae affert secum suum esse, quod respectu compositi albi, potest dici partiale; & ex illo & ex esse corporis seu subiecti potest dici componi unum esse totius albi, & tamen [93a] illud nihilominus dicitur esse ens per accidens. ⟨127a⟩

5. Alio ergo modo dici frequenter solet, ens per accidens esse quod constat pluribus entibus in actu; illud vero esse per se, quod constat ente in potentia, & eius actu: nam ex pluribus entibus in potentia nihil constare potest; & ideo necesse non est illud membrum adiungere. Sed haec etiam doctrina, esto vera sit, expositione indiget: nam male intellecta potest esse occasio errandi in multis. Interrogandum est enim, quid per ens in actu, & in potentia intelligatur. Intelligi enim potest per ens in actu illud quod ex se habet actualem entitatem, seu existentiam; per ens autem in potentia illud quod nullam habet talem actualitatem seu existentiam. Et hoc modo falsum est, ens per se non posse componi ex actualibus entitatibus partialibus; aut requiri ad ens per se, ut com62. Reading “esse” here with S , V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 63. Reading “quae” here in accordance with a suggestion of Charles Berton’s. See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 368b. All the earlier editions that I’ve consulted read “quod” instead.



Section 3: On the one per se and the one per accidens. 137



which there results one and the same existencee, while that is per accidens in which the beings that are united have several existencese, as a substance and an accident do, or as two accidents belonging to different genera do. But this explanation either presupposes something false or explains an obscure matter through another that is equally obscure. For either the discussion is about one simple existencee without a composition that is in itself, even though it results from composition, in the way many say that from matter and form united there results a single existencee—and in this sense it assumes something false, since, in order that a being be one per se, it is not necessary that it have such a simple existencee, for I will show below that beings composed from matter and form do not have a simple existencee, but a composite one.196 Or the discussion concerns one composite existencee resulting from the union of several partial existences—and this is indeed true, but regarding this existencee it remains to be inquired when one per se results from composition. For even an accident—whiteness, for example—in coming to a substance, brings its own existencee with it, and this existencee can be called partial in relation to the white composite, and the one existencee of the white whole can be said to be composed from this existencee and the existencee of the body or subject, and yet this whole is nonetheless said to be a per accidens being. 5. In another way, then, it is frequently wont to be said that a per accidens being is one which consists in several beings in act, whereas a per se being is one which consists in a being in potency and its act. (For from various beings in potency nothing can be composed, and therefore it is not necessary to consider this member.) But this doctrine also, even if it is true, requires clarification, for, poorly understood, it can be an occasion for error on many points. For it must be asked: what is understood by a being in act and by a being in potency? For by a being in act one can understand that which of itself has actual entity or existence, while by a being in potency one can understand that which has no such actuality or existence. And in this sense it is false that a per se being cannot be composed from partial actual entities, or that it is required for a per se being that it be composed from such an 196. See DM 31.11.

Simple existence does not pertain to the naturer of the one per se.

How something that is one per accidens comes to be from two beings in act, and how something one per se comes to be from something in potency and something in act.

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ponatur ex huiusmodi actu, & potentia illi opposita: nam hoc perinde est, ac si diceretur, ens per se componi ex ente & nihilo, seu ex ente in actu, & ente in potentia obiectiva: quae est repugnantia in ipsis terminis, ut ex inferius dicendis constabit. Aliter ergo intelligi potest per ens in actu ens constans ex aliquo actu formali, & potentia receptiva64 illius. Et hoc modo non contingit aliquid componi ex duobus entibus in actu, ita ut utrumque sit praedicto modo compositum, nisi aut per aggregationem, & tunc satis clarum est consurgere ens per accidens, quanvis ratio illius nondum satis sit explicata: aut aliquo artificioso modo; & tunc Aristoteles videtur tale ens vocare per se unum: unde consequitur esse etiam ens per se & non per accidens. Et in composito physico & heterogeneo multi putant dari partialia composita diversarum rationum, & formarum; ex quorum coniunctione unum per se coalescit. Ac deinde restat explicandum, si huiusmodi enti adiungatur aliud non similiter compositum, nec per modum continuationis, aut colligationis; sed simplex per modum formae, aut actus vere ac physice uniti, cur non resultet ex utroque ens per se unum. Aut, si interdum resultat, interdum non, unde sumenda sit ratio. Ubi variae quaestiones insinuantur, quae hinc pendent: scilicet cur subsistentia adveniente naturae iam integrae, ex utraque unum per se resultet, non autem adveniente quantitate, aut alia simili forma. Item cur forma substantialis unum per se faciat cum materia nuda; non possit ⟨127b⟩ autem facere per se unum cum materia iam informata substantiali forma; & similes.

Ratio entis & unius per se. 6. In hac igitur re dicendum videtur, rationem entis per se, in hoc consistere, quod praecise habeat ea quae ad essentiam, integritatem, vel 64. Reading “& potentia receptiva” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “& receptivo” instead: P2 and Vivès. The following read “receptivo” instead: C1 , C2 , and G2. The following read “& receptiva” instead: M3 , M4 , and P1. The following read “receptiva” instead: M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , and V5.



Section 3: On the one per se and the one per accidens. 139



act and the potency opposed to it. For this would be the same as saying that a per se being is composed from a being and nothing, or from a being in act and a being in objective potency, which is a contradiction in terms, as will be clear from the things to be said below.197 Therefore, one can otherwise understand a being in act as a being which consists in some formal act and the potency receptive of it. And in this way it does not happen that something is composed from two beings in act in such a way that each is composite in the mentioned way, except either through aggregation—and then it is sufficiently clear that a per accidens being results, although its naturer has not yet been sufficiently explained—or in some artistic way—and then Aristotle seems to call such a being one per se, from which it follows that it is also a per se being and not a per accidens being. And many think that in a physical and heterogeneous composite there are partial composites with different naturesr and forms, from the conjunction of which something one per se emerges. And further, it remains to be explained: if to such a being one joins another—not one similarly composed, either by continuation or by assembly, but rather something simple in the manner of a form or act united truly and physically—why does there not result from both a being that is per se one? Or, if such a being does sometimes result, and sometimes not, what is the reason? Here, various questions are implicated, which depend on this one, namely, why, when subsistence advenes on a nature that is already whole, something one per se results from both, but not when a quantity or another similar form advenes?198 Further, why does a substantial form make something one per se with bare matter, although it cannot make something one per se with matter that is already informed by a substantial form?—and similar questions.

The naturer of the per se being and of the one per se. 6. In this matter, then, it seems that we should say that the naturer of a per se being consists in this, that it has precisely those things which are per se and intrinsically required for the essence, wholeness, or 197. Regarding objective potency, see DM 31.3.2–4. 198. Regarding the mode of subsistence, which the supposit adds to the substantial nature, see DM 34.1–7.

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complementum talis entis in suo genere per se & intrinsece requiruntur. Hoc insinuavit Aristoteles priori loco citato. Et ex terminis ipsis videtur clarum: haec enim communissima & simplicissima vix possunt aliter probari, quam explicatis terminorum rationibus. Cum ergo ens dicatur illud quod entitatem seu essentiam habet, illud erit ens per se proprie & in rigore, quod unam essentiam, vel entitatem habet: illa autem essentia seu entitas, una propriissime erit, quae in suo genere habet quicquid ad eius intrinsecam rationem, [93b] seu consummationem spectat: ergo illud ens, quod huiusmodi est, sub ea ratione erit proprie ac per se ens: omne autem illud quod ab hac unitate defecerit, dicetur ens per accidens. 7. Potest autem hoc amplius explicari, si ens per se dividamus in simplex & compositum, quae divisio etiam de uno per se dari potest; eamque insinuavit Arist. 10. Metaph. cap. 6. dicens, unum quoddam esse [in]divisibile,65 aliud indivisum. Nam, ut notavit D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 6. art. 3. & q. 11. art. 1 unum per se, aliud est indivisum actu & potentia, aliud vero tantum actu: prius est ens simplex, posterius vero compositum. Igitur de simplici nulla est difficultas: omne enim simplex est ens per se, ac per se unum: quia, & per se indivisum est, & ut sic non habet admistionem alicuius extranei, ut possit ens per accidens appellari; & hoc modo quodlibet accidens in abstracto sumptum ea consideratione est ens per se, & anima in ratione substantiae est ens per se, licet incompletum; quatenus vero constat pluribus potentiis, habitibus, vel actibus, iam declinat in ens per accidens.

8. De ente autem composito certum in primis est, posse vere ac proprie esse ens per se, ac unum per se, ut omnes Philosophi docent de natura substantiali quatenus, materia & forma constat; & de supposito, quatenus ex natura & subsistentia suo modo componitur. Cum 65. Vivès and all the early editions that I’ve consulted read “divisibile” here. However, the context makes it clear that Suárez has in mind the distinction between the simple or indivisible, on the one hand, and the composite but divisible, on the other. In the very next sentence, moreover, Suárez cites Thomas Aquinas’s claim that of things that are one per se, some are undivided in act and in potency (i.e., simple), but others are undivided only in act (i.e., composite). See also DM 4.3.15, where Suárez says that Aristotle distinguishes or divides the unit into the “indivisibile, & indivisum tantum”—i.e., into the indivisible and the merely undivided.



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completeness of such a being in its own genus. Aristotle implies this in a passage cited earlier.199 And this seems clear on the basis of the terms themselves, for these most common and simple things can hardly be proved otherwise than by the explained meaningsr of the terms. Since, therefore, that which has entity or essence is called a being, that which has one essence or entity will be a per se being properly and strictly, and that essence or entity will be most properly one which in its genus has whatever pertains to its intrinsic characterr or completion. Therefore, a being of this sort, under that notionr, will be a being properly and per se. But everything that falls short of this unity will be called a per accidens being. 7. But this can be explained further if we divide per se being into simple and composite, and this division can also be given for what is one per se. Aristotle introduces this division in Metaph. X, ch. 6, saying that one type of unit is [in]divisible, another undivided.200 For, as St. Thomas notes, ST I, q. 6, art. 3, & q. 11, art. 1, of things that are one per se, some are undivided in act and in potency, but others are undivided only in act.201 The former are simple beings, while the latter are composite. Therefore, concerning a simple being, there is no difficulty, for every simple being is a per se being and per se one, since it is per se undivided and as such does not have an admixture of something foreign so that it might be called a per accidens being. And in this way any accident taken in the abstract is a per se being according to this consideration, and the soul in its characterr as a substance is a per se being, albeit an incomplete one, although insofar as it consists of various potencies, habits or acts, it leans in the direction of a per accidens being. 8. As regards a composite being, it is certain, first of all, that it can truly and properly be a per se being and per se one, as all philosophers teach regarding a substantial nature insofar as it is composed from matter and form, and regarding the supposit insofar as it is composed in its own way from a nature and subsistence. For since neither matter nor form is per se a complete or whole being in its own genus, but each is 199. Perhaps: Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 7, 1017a22–27. 200. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a23. 201. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 68b (see ad 1), p. 107a.

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enim neque materia, neque forma per se sint entia completa & integra in suo genere, sed ad illud componendum natura sua institutae sint, merito illud, quod ex eis proxime ⟨128a⟩ componitur, essentia & natura per se una dicitur, & est. Atque eadem ratione, quia illa essentia non habet intrinsecum complementum in suo genere, nisi per se sit intrinsece & substantialiter terminata; ideo illa etiam cum sua subsistentia ens per se unum constituit. Igitur haec unitas per se in hoc consistit, quod resultet66 ex rebus constituentibus completum ens in aliquo genere, intercedente unione eorum inter se, ad tale ens constituendum accommodata, quae in compositione unius naturae est per modum actus & potentiae substantialis: in compositione vero unius personae, est per modum naturae integrae, & termini eius. Atque haec ratio accommodari etiam potest ad entia ut composita ex genere & differentia per se contrahente illud intra proprium67 praedicamentum: nam etiam genus & differentia comparantur ut potentia & actus per se ordinata ad constituendum unum in suo genere completum & integrum, quanquam haec compositio magis est rationis,68 quam realis; & ideo minus impedire potest realem ac per se unitatem entis. 9. Est autem praeter hos alius modus compositionis in entibus, qui dicitur ex partibus integrantibus, qui primo cernitur in quantitate, per eam vero intelligitur etiam esse in substantiis materialibus, & accidentibus; & haec etiam non tollit unitatem per se, quando est per veram, & naturalem continuationem. Sic enim quantitas continua est in suo genere proprie ac per se una, partes autem quibus constat non dicuntur esse simpliciter plura in actu, sed in potentia, ut loquitur saepe Arist. 3. Phys.69 ca. 6. & 5. Metap. c. 13. Ubi ait, numerum proprie non esse, nisi ubi partes non copulantur termino communi. Et idem dicit Averr. 3. de [94a] Anima, text. 23. Et ratio est, quia quantitas natura sua postulat hanc extensionem & compositionem, quae tota ordinatur ad complementum eius in suo genere; & ideo intra illud habet pro66. Reading “resultet” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following instead read “resultat”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 67. Reading “proprium” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “proximum”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 68. Reading “rationis” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following instead read “rationalis”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 69. Reading “Phys.” here with S , V1 , and V2. The following instead read “Metaph.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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by its nature ordained to the composition of such a being, that which is proximately composed from them is rightly called—and is—an essence and nature that is per se one. And for the same reason, since that essence does not have an intrinsic completeness in its own genus unless it is per se terminated intrinsically and substantially, that essence also, together with its subsistence, constitutes a being that is per se one. Therefore, this per se unity consists in this, that there results from the constituent thingsr a complete being in some genus when a union obtains among things that are suited to constituting such a being, a union which, in the composition of a single nature, is by way of a substantial act and potency, but, in the composition of a single person, is by way of a whole nature and its terminus. And this accountr can also be adapted to beings insofar as they are composed from a genus and a difference that per se contracts that genus within its proper category. For a genus and a difference are also related as a potency and an act that are per se ordained to the constitution of one complete and whole thing in its own genus, although this composition is more rational than real, and therefore is less able to prevent the real and per se unity of a being. 9. But there is besides these another mode of composition in beings, which is called composition from integral parts, and which is first discerned in quantity, although through quantity it is also understood to be in material substances and accidents. And this also does not undermine per se unity when it is by means of a true and natural continuity. For it is in this way that a continuous quantity is properly and per se one in its own genus, and the parts of which it is composed are not without qualification said to be several things actually, but potentially, as Aristotle often says in Phys. III, ch. 6,202 and Metaph. V, ch. 13, where he says that number does not properly existe except where parts are not joined by a common terminus.203 And Averroes says the same thing, in De anima III, text 23.204 And the reason is because quantity by its nature requires this extension and composition, which is wholly ordered 202. In Suárez’s day, Phys. III, ch. 6 stretches from 206a7 (“ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ. . .”) to 206b33 (“. . .ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμόν.”). Here, Aristotle specifies a sense in which a potential infinite exists. 203. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 13, 1020a8–11. 204. Averroes, Aristotelis De Anima Libri Tres cum Averrois Commentariis (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), fol. 167D–E, commenting on De anima III, ch. 6, 430b6–14.

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prios terminos, quibus partes eius copulari, ac terminari possint; est ergo tota illa compositio & unio per se & natura sua ordinata ad componendum unum ens intra idem genus. Quanvis autem hoc per se primo conveniat quantitati secundum se sumptae; tamen etiam convenit substantiae materiali, quae quantitati subest, ut cernitur in primis in substantia homogenea: ignis enim, aqua, & similia unum per se sunt, etiam si in quavis magnitudine sumantur, dummodo continua sint; alioqui nunquam huiusmodi sub⟨128b⟩stantia posset esse una per se; quia nunquam potest non constare ex his partibus, etiam si in minima quantitate sumatur, quod est contra omnes philosophos, & contra communem modum sentiendi & loquendi; & contra rationem supra factam; quia haec entia natura sua postulant huiusmodi genus unionis & compositionis ad suum complementum & integritatem in suo genere: ergo talis compositio non tollit unitatem per se in huiusmodi entibus.

10. Oportet tamen (quanvis id latius infra tractandum sit) hic breviter animadvertere, quid habeat substantia a quantitate in hoc genere compositionis, quid vero habeat ipsa substantia ex propria substantiali entitate, quanvis sub quantitate: nam priori modo ex substantia & quantitate simpliciter non fit unum per se, ut nunc loquimur, quia quantitas non est de complemento substantiae intra rationem & latitudinem sui generis; & ideo integritas quantitativa, ut substantiae adiungitur, & facit unum cum illa, non constituit ens neque unum per se. Habet autem ipsa substantia materialis sub quantitate suam substantialem entitatem, in qua etiam habet partes entitativas componentes, & integrantes substantialem ipsam entitatem, habentesque inter se suam unionem substantialem; & hoc modo dicimus substantiam sic compositam esse per se unam. 11. Hoc autem difficultatem nonnullam habet in substantiis heterogeneis, quia earum partes non videntur ita intrinsece uniri, & continuari; sed solum veluti quibusdam vinculis colligari. Sed nihilominus haec etiam substantia ut sic composita est unum ens per se. Quis enim neget, hominem esse unum per se ens? Et a posteriori id declarari potest: nam omnes huiusmodi partes sibi invicem deserviunt, & per



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to its completeness in its own genus. And therefore within that205 it has proper termini by which its parts can be joined together and terminated. Therefore, that entire composition and union is per se and by its nature ordained to the composition of one being within the same genus. And although this agrees per se in the first mode with quantity taken in itself, nevertheless, it also agrees with the material substance that underlies quantity, as is seen first of all in a homogeneous substance, for fire, water, and the like are per se one, in whatever magnitude they are taken, provided that they are continuous. Otherwise such a substance could never be per se one, since it can never fail to be composed from these parts, even if it is taken in the smallest quantity, which is contrary to the view of all philosophers and contrary to the common manner of thinking and speaking. And it is contrary to the accountr given earlier, since these beings by their nature require such a genus of union and composition for their completeness and wholeness in their genus. Therefore, such a composition does not remove per se unity in such beings. 10. Nevertheless, it must briefly be noticed here (although we shall deal with this below at greater length206) what a substance has from quantity in this genus of composition, and what the same substance has from its proper substantial entity, although under quantity. For in the former way, from a substance and a quantity without qualification something per se one does not come to be as we are speaking now, since quantity does not pertain to the completeness of a substance within the naturer and scope of its genus. And therefore quantitative wholeness, insofar as it is joined to a substance and makes one thing with it, does not constitute a per se being or something per se one. But the same material substance has, under quantity, its own substantial entity, in which it also has entitative parts composing and making up the substantial entity itself and having among themselves their own substantial union. And in this sense we say that a substance thus composed is per se one. 11. But this involves some difficulty in the case of heterogeneous 205. The referent of this demonstrative pronoun is not obvious. Its neuter gender suggests that it refers back either to the ­just-mentioned genus or to the ­just-mentioned completeness. But see DM 4.3.12 just below, where Suárez speaks of how the parts of a single whiteness “are so related to each other that within their genus [intra suum genus] they are joined together and united in a way proportioned to themselves.” 206. See DM 4.3.19 and DM 4.9.1–11.

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se separatae, aut nullo modo, aut non diu possunt conservari: signum ergo est, illas omnes in suo genere esse incompleta entia, & per se ordinari ad componendum ens aliquod: ergo illud ut sic compositum est per se ens, & unum per se. Unde ad hoc satis est, quod partes illae habeant naturaliter aliquam coniunctionem, & copulationem, quaecunque illa sit: nam illa sufficit, ut omnes possint eadem forma informari, & convenire ad constituendum cum illa unum ens habens unum esse simpliciter. Adde, quod licet haec membra heterogenea non sint omni ex parte continua inter se immediate, semper tamen habent aliqua ex parte continuationem, sal⟨129a⟩tem in aliquo tertio, ut in nervo, aut alia parte simili, de quo alias.

12. Ex his ergo veluti inductione facta satis constat, quomodo in omnibus substantiis ens per se [94b] unum in ratione a nobis explicata consistat. Potest autem fere eadem inductio applicari ad accidentia: nam de quantitate iam dictum est; alia vero, si omnino simplicia sint secundum rem, constat per se habere unitatem, & indivisionem; si autem sint composita, ut faciant per se unum, imitari debent aliquo modo quantitatem. Duplex enim tantum potest intelligi haec compositio. Una est per modum extensionis; quomodo est una albedo, quae in superficie unius corporis extensa est; & haec compositio facit per se unum ad modum totius integralis. Nam ita se habent partes illius albedinis, ut intra suum genus sint colligatae, & unitae modo sibi proportionato; & constituant unum ens completum & integrum in sua specie; quam compositionem & unionem habent partes illae sub quantitate seu in quantitate; non tamen habent eam intrinsece & formaliter per quantitatem ipsam; sed per suas entitates partiales inter se unitas proprio vinculo, & unione sui generis. Quod hac ratione explicari potest: nam, si in superficie continua eiusdem corporis, v. g. parietis,



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substances, since their parts do not seem to be so intrinsically united and continuous, but seem only to be bound together, as it were, by certain chains. Nevertheless, this substance also, as thus composed, is one per se being. For who is such as to deny that the human being is one per se being? And this can be made clear a posteriori, for all such parts serve each other and, when per se separated, can be preserved either not at all or for only a short time. This, therefore, is a sign that they are all incomplete beings in their own genus and are per se ordained to the composition of some being. Therefore this being, as thus composed, is a per se being and per se one. Thus, for this it is enough that those parts naturally have some conjunction and connection, of whatever sort it might be, since this is sufficient for all of them to be informed by the same form, and for all of them to come together in order to constitute, together with that form, a single being having an existencee that is one without qualification. What’s more, although these heterogeneous members are not in every respect immediately continuous among themselves, nevertheless, they always have continuity in some respect, at least in some third thing, for instance in the nerve, or in some other similar part—concerning which, more elsewhere. 12. From these things it is sufficiently clear, as though by induction, how in the case of all substances a being that is per se one consists in the naturer explained by us. Almost the same induction can be applied to accidents, for quantity has already been discussed, and as regards the others, if they are altogether simple in reality, it is per se clear that they have unity and indivision, but if they are composite, they must in some way imitate quantity in order to make something that is per se one. For this composition can only be understood in two ways. One is by means of extension, in the way there is one whiteness that is extended over the surface of a single body, and this composition makes something per se one in the manner of an integral whole. For the parts of that whiteness are so related to each other that within their genus they are joined together and united in a way proportioned to themselves and constitute one complete and whole being in their species, which composition and union those parts have under a quantity or in a quantity. Yet they do not have it intrinsically and formally through the quantity itself, but through their own partial entities united among themselves

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dimidia pars alba sit, & dimidia nigra, habent quidem albedo, & nigredo continuitatem quandam ex parte subiecti; quia & superficies, in qua inhaerent,70 continua est, & nihil potest in ea signari, quantumvis indivisibile, quod albedine vel nigredine affectum non sit; & nihilominus albedo & nigredo inter se non habent intrinsecam unionem, & coniunctionem, quam haberent71 duae partiales albedines inter se; & ideo ex illis non fit per se ac proprie unum, sicut fieret ex partibus albedinis; quod idem suo modo probabile est posse accidere in substantiis, si contingat sub eadem quantitate continua esse formas substantiales diversarum specierum, sub diversis partibus quantitatis; ut notavit D. Thom. 5. Metaph. tex. 7. lect. 7. litera D. Alia compositio in accidentibus esse potest per modum intensionis, supposito, quod gradus intensionis aliquo modo in re distinguantur, de quo alias. Et haec compositio, quanvis non fiat, per se loquendo, in quantitate, aut per quantitatem; tamen per proportionem ad illam intelligenda, & explicanda est. Unde ex tali compositione etiam resultat per se unum, quia omnes illi gradus sunt veluti entia partialia & incompleta intra suum genus, & na⟨129b⟩ tura sua ordinantur ad complendum unum intra idem genus: & habent inter se naturalem unionem, & proprios terminos, quibus copulentur, seu terminentur. Igitur etiam in accidentibus ratio entis, seu unius per se in praedicta ratione a nobis explicata consistit. Quod si fortasse in accidentibus invenitur alius modus conficiendi unum ex multis entibus praeter dictos, ut in numero quantitativo; aut iuxta aliquorum opinionem in habitu scientiae, qui ex collectione multarum specierum, vel habituum consurgit, illa non sunt censenda entia per se, sed per accidens, in propria & vera ratione entis, ut bene docuit Fonseca lib. 5. Metap. cap. 7. quaest. 5. sect. 2. quia illa non habent inter se veram aliquam, & realem unionem per quam unum per se efficiant: quidquid sit an sub aliqua ratione praedicamentali possint censeri per se, de quo infra explicando singula praedicamenta. [95a]

70. Reading “in qua inhaerent” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit “in”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 71. Reading “haberent” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “habent” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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by means of their own chain and union that is sui generis. And this can be made clear by the following argument: for if, in the continuous surface of the same body—a wall, for example—a half part is white, and half black, the whiteness and blackness do indeed have a kind of continuity by virtue of the subject, since the surface in which they inhere is also continuous, and nothing can be designated in it, however indivisible, which is not affected by whiteness or blackness. But nevertheless, the whiteness and the blackness do not have the intrinsic union and conjunction with each other that two partial whitenesses would have with each other. And therefore from them something per se and properly one does not come to be, as would happen with the parts of a whiteness. And it is probable that the same thing can happen in its own way with substances, if it should happen that under the same continuous quantity there are substantial forms of different species under different parts of the quantity, as St. Thomas notes at D in lesson 7, text 7, Metaph. V.207 There can be a second composition in accidents by way of intension, supposing that the degrees of intension are in some way really distinguished—concerning which, more later.208 And this composition, although it does not come about, speaking per se, in quantity or through quantity, is nevertheless to be understood and explained by proportion to quantity. For this reason, from such a composition there also results something that is one per se, since all those degrees are like partial and incomplete beings within their own genus, and they are ordained by their nature to perfecting one thing within the same genus. And they have among themselves a natural union and their own termini by which they are joined or terminated. Therefore, in the case of accidents also, the naturer of a per se being or of what is per se one consists in the mentioned naturer that was explained by us. But if by chance, aside from the mentioned ones, another way of making one thing from many beings is found in accidents—for example, in quantitative number or (in keeping with some people’s opinion) in a scientific habit arising from a collection of many species or habits—then those things are not to be judged per se beings, but rather per accidens beings, 207. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 232a (n. 859). 208. See DM 46.1.

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Ratio entis, & unius per accidens. 13. Ex his quae dicta sunt de ente & uno per se, colligere licet, quid sit dicendum de ente & uno per accidens, quod ab illo distinguitur; nam in primis omne id, quod ex rebus distinctis constat absque physica & reali unione earum inter se, est in rigore ens per accidens, & non per se. Probatur, tum ex dictis, quia in tali ente non potest reperiri ratio entis per se a nobis explicata: tum etiam, quia illud unum non potest habere unam realem essentiam: non enim potest intelligi una essentia, nisi, vel quia simplex sit, vel quia per realem unionem plurium consurgat: in praedicto autem casu neutrum horum reperitur. Deinde omne ens, quod ita est unum, ut constet ex rebus distinctis, quarum altera in aliquo genere completum ens sit, & per adiunctionem alterius perfectione diversi generis afficiatur, tale etiam ens in rigore est unum per accidens: quia non convenit illi ratio entis per se a nobis explicata; nec potest in tali ente una vera essentia reperiri. Item, quia hoc ipso, quod unum ens in suo genere est completum & integrum, quod ei adiungitur, accidentaliter advenit: & ideo unum per accidens cum illo componere dicitur; atque hac ratione vere dicitur id, quod constat ex rebus diversorum praedicamentorum, & ex natura rei diversis, unum per accidens esse. Quin potius, etiam in rebus eiusdem praedicamenti, id verum habet; si sint diversi generis, vel speciei; & una accidat alteri in sua ratione & specie iam completae72; & ⟨130a⟩ hoc modo ex potentia & habitu, vel actu, fit unum per accidens; & similiter vas argenteum deauratum est ens per accidens; & sic de caeteris. 72. Reading “completae” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “completa”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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in respect of the true and proper naturer of being, as Fonseca rightly teaches, Metaph. V, ch. 7, q. 5. sec. 2.209 For they do not have some true and real union with each other by means of which they might compose something per se one—regardless of whether they can be considered per se under some predicamental notionr, about which we shall speak below, while explaining the individual categories.210

The naturer of the per accidens being and of the one per accidens. 13. From the things that have been said about that which is a per se being and one per se, we can infer what should be said about that which is a per accidens being and one per accidens, which is distinguished from the former. For in the first place everything that is constituted from distinct thingsr without a physical and real union of them with one another is, strictly, a per accidens being and not a per se being. This is proved both from what has been said—because in such a being that naturer of the per se being which has been explained by us cannot be found—and also because that single thing cannot have one real essence, for an essence cannot be understood to be one except because it is simple or because it arises through a real union of several things, and in the present case neither of these is found. Moreover, every being which is one in such a way that it is composed from distinct thingsr, one of which is a complete being in some genus and is affected by the perfection of a different genus by virtue of being joined to another thing— such a being as well is strictly one per accidens, because that naturer of the per se being which has been explained by us does not agree with it, nor can one true essence be found in such a being. Further, because: by virtue of the fact that one being is complete and whole in its genus, that which is joined to it comes to it accidentally and therefore is said to compose with it something that is one per accidens. And for this reason 209. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 2 (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615), col. 456. 210. Regarding quantitative number (or discrete quantity), see DM 41.1 (“Whether discrete quantity is a proper species of quantity”). Regarding the unity of a scientific habit, see DM 44.11 (“Of what sort is the extensive increase of a habit, and what unity corresponds to it”).

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14. Secundo ex dictis colligitur in ente uno per accidens esse varietatem; & in ea esse magis, vel minus. Quoddam enim est ens omnino per aggregationem, in quo multa entia per se integra, & perfecta sine ulla unione, & sine ullo ordine congeruntur, & hoc videtur esse maxime per accidens, quia omni ex parte opponitur enti per se proprie sumpto; & huiusmodi est acervus tritici, aut lapidum. Aliud vero est ens per accidens constans quidem ex integris entibus per se, non habentibus inter se physicam unionem; habentibus autem inter se aliquem ordinem, ut est exercitus, respublica, domus, & alia similia artificialia, in quibus tanta potest esse varietas, tantaque differentia secundum magis & minus, quanta potest esse maior, vel minor unio inter entia per se, ex quibus constat: & hoc modo videtur magis una arbor, cui ramus alterius speciei est insitus, quam domus; & domus magis quam exercitus; & sic de aliis. Et in hoc ordine collocandi sunt liquores misti ex simplicibus imperfecte alteratis compositi, ut vinum lymphatum, oximel, &c. Quo etiam fit, ut, licet haec simpliciter & absolute sint entia per accidens, tamen respective, id est comparatione illius entis, quod est unum per meram aggregationem, soleant haec interdum vocari entia per se. Nam, quia media participant aliquid de extremis, comparatione illorum solent diversis nominibus appellari: huiusmodi autem entia conveniunt aliquo modo cum entibus per se, quatenus in aliqua forma, vel habitudine uniuntur, & ideo ita aliquando no[95b]minantur. Quomodo videtur locutus Arist. in cit. loco 5. Metaph. Tamen hac consideratione, & comparatione ens compositum ex substantia, & accidente sibi inhaerente multo magis videtur posse vocari ens per se: hoc enim est tertium genus entium per accidens, quod magis videtur recedere ab illo primo, & infimo ente per aggregationem, magisque accedere ad unum per se; quia & ea, quibus constat, non distinguuntur supposito,



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it is truly said that what is composed from thingsr belonging to different categories and diverse ex natura rei is one per accidens. What’s more, it is also true of thingsr in the same category, if they belong to diverse genera or species, and one of them happens to be joined to the other, and the latter is already complete in its own naturer and species. And in this way, from a potency and a habit or act, something one per accidens comes to be. And similarly a silver vessel that is adorned with gold is a per accidens being, and likewise in other cases. 14. Second, from the things that have been said it is inferred that there is variety among beings that are one per accidens, and that this variety is in respect of degree. For one sort is a being entirely by aggregation, in which many beings that are per se whole and perfect are heaped up without any union and without any order, and this sort seems to be most of all per accidens, since in every respect it is opposed to a per se being taken properly, and of this type is a pile of wheat or stones. But another kind is a per accidens being that is composed of complete per se beings which lack a physical union with one another, but which have some order among themselves, as for example an army, a republic, a house, and other similar products of art, in which there can be as much variety, and as much difference in terms of more or less, as there can be a greater or lesser union among the per se beings from which it is constituted. And in this way it seems that a tree onto which the spray of another species has been grafted is more one than a house, and a house is more one than an army, and so on in other cases. And in this order are to be placed mixed liquids composed of simple, imperfectly altered ones, such as wine diluted with water, oxymel, etc. And so it also results that, although these are without qualification and absolutely per accidens beings, nevertheless, relatively, that is, in comparison with that being which is one only by aggregation, they are sometimes wont to be called per se beings. For since intermediates share in the character of their extremes, by comparison with them they are wont to be called by different names. And such beings agree in some way with per se beings, insofar as they are united in some form or relation, and are therefore so named sometimes. It is in this way that Aristotle seems to have spoken in the mentioned passage of Metaph. V.211 But in accordance with this 211. See Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1015b36–1016a24.

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sicut in aliis; & habent inter se maiorem physicam unionem; & unum re vera est in potentia ad aliud, quanvis accidentali; & alterum natura sua est ordinatum ad aliud; & in unione ad illud habet suam perfectionem connaturalem; in quibus omnibus huiusmodi ⟨130b⟩ ens imitatur illud quod est proprie ac per se unum: quanvis simpliciter, & absolute unum per accidens sit.

De uno simpliciter & secundum quid. 15. Tertio ex dictis explicantur facile aliae divisiones unius. Quoddam enim dici potest unum simpliciter, aliud secundum quid. Unum simpliciter proprie & in rigore dicitur id, quod est unum per se: reliqua vero omnia possunt dici unum secundum quid; quod ex ipsis terminis videtur manifestum, ideo enim ens per se unum ita appellatur, quia habet unitatem simpliciter, & absolute: reliqua vero, quia ab hac unitate recedunt, dicuntur per accidens. Patet etiam hoc ex definitione unius: est enim ens indivisum in se: illud ergo quod est indivisum simpliciter, erit unum simpliciter: quod vero est simpliciter divisum in se, & solum habet aliquam indivisionem in ordine ad aliquem finem, vel ad aliquam formam, erit tantum unum secundum quid, & ita contingit in his, quae solum per accidens sunt unum, ut ex dictis patet. Aliter Greg. in 1. distinct. 24. quaest. 1. & ibi alii Nominales dicunt, solum ens simplex esse unum simpliciter, quia ut sit unum simpliciter, necesse est, ut nihil sit in ipso, quod non sit ipsum; sed haec definitio gratis est ab ipsis conficta, & iuxta illam solus Deus esset unum simpliciter. Item repugnat Arist. 10. metap. loco cit. distinguenti unum in indivisibile, & indivisum tantum. Pugnat etiam73 cum communi modo concipiendi, 73. Reading “etiam” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , V1 , V2 , and S. The following read “enim”: M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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consideration and comparison a being composed from a substance and an accident inhering in it seems much more capable of being called a per se being, for this is a third genus of per accidens being, which seems to depart to a greater degree from that first and lowest one, the being by aggregation, and to approach to a greater degree what is per se one. For the things of which it is composed are not distinguished in respect of supposit, as they are in the other cases, and they have a greater physical union with one another, and the one is really in potency to the other, albeit by an accidental potency, and the one by its nature is ordained to the other and in its union with it has its connatural perfection—in all of which respects such a being imitates that which is properly and per se one, although without qualification and absolutely it is one per accidens.

On what is one without qualification and what is one in a certain respect. 15. Third, from the things that have been said other divisions of the one are easily explained. For a certain sort of thing can be called one without qualification, while another is so called in a certain respect. That which is one per se is properly and strictly called one without qualification, whereas all the rest can be called one in a certain respect, which seems evident from the terms themselves. For a per se being is called one in this way because it has unity without qualification and absolutely, while the others are called one per accidens because they fall short of this unity. This is also clear from the definition of the unit, for it is a being undivided in itself. Therefore, what is without qualification undivided will be one without qualification, but what is without qualification divided in itself and only has some indivision in relation to some end or some form will be one only in a certain respect, and so it happens in these things which are one only per accidens, as is clear from what has been said. Gregory of Rimini, Sent. I, dist. 24, q. 1,212 and other nominalists in the same place think otherwise, saying that only a simple being is one without qualification, because, in order for it to be one without qualification, it is necessary that there be nothing in it which is not it itself. However, 212. Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, t. 3, pp. 13–20.

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& loquendi: nam ens quanvis compositum, ens74 per se & simpliciter dicitur: cur ergo non dicetur75 etiam simpliciter unum? Item tale ens non est multa simpliciter: ergo erit unum simpliciter, quia haec duo immediate opponuntur, & quasi contradictorie. Denique hac ratione docent Theologi Christum ut compositum ex Deo & humanitate esse unum simpliciter.

16. Hic tamen duo videntur observanda; primum, aliud esse dicere, rem aliquam esse unam simpliciter, vel secundum quid; aliud vero duas res esse unum, ad eum modum quo anima & corpus dicuntur esse una humanitas; vel plures homines unus. Nos hic priori modo loquimur: nam ille est proprius & absolutus, id est, secundum absolutam considerationem entis & unius; secundum quam rationem unum est passio entis, & non secundum comparationem, vel respectum unius rei ad aliam: imo nec secundum comparationem rationis eiusdem rei ad se ipsam: quia, ut su⟨131a⟩pra dicebam, haec relatio rationis identitatis non est de ratione unius, [96a] quae absoluta est. Posterior autem loquendi modus, ut sit verus, non tam formalis, quam causalis esse debet, ut patet in dictis exemplis: nam materia & forma proprie ac formaliter re vera non sunt unum, sed componunt unum; & similiter plures homines, non tam sunt populus, quam componunt unum populum; & sic de aliis; atque ita illa unitas, quae in multis reperitur, qualiscunque illa sit, supponit prius secundum rationem ens aliquod ex illis constitutum, quod proxime & immediate unum denominetur; & hoc sensu intelligendum est, quod dici solet, plura simpliciter esse unum secundum quid, ut iterum attingemus sectione sequente.

74. Reading “ens” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 75. Reading “dicetur” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “diceretur” instead: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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this definition is invented pointlessly by these people, and according to it only God would be one without qualification. Further, it is in conflict with Aristotle, Metaph. X, in the passage cited, when he distinguishes the one into the indivisible and the merely undivided.213 It is also opposed to the common manner of conceiving and speaking, since a being, even if composite, is called a being per se and without qualification. Why, then, will it not also be called one without qualification? Further, such a being is not many without qualification. Therefore, it will be one without qualification, since these two are immediately and (as it were) contradictorily opposed. Finally, for this reason theologians teach that Christ, as composed from God and humanity, is without qualification one. 16. Here, however, it seems that two things should be noted. First, it is one thing to say that some thingr is one without qualification or in a certain respect, but it is another to say that two thingsr are one in the way that the soul and the body are said to be one humanity, or in the way that several human beings are said to be one. We are speaking here in the first way, for that way is proper and absolute, that is, in accordance with the absolute consideration of being and one, according to which conceptr one is a passion of being, and not in accordance with the comparison or relation of one thingr to another. (In fact, neither are we speaking in accordance with reason’s comparison of the same thingr to itself, since, as I said above,214 this rational relation of identity does not pertain to the naturer of the unit, which naturer is absolute.) But the latter way of speaking, in order for it to be true, must be not so much formal as causal, as is clear in the mentioned examples. For matter and form properly and formally are not one in reality, but rather they compose one thing. And similarly, various human beings are not so much a people as they compose one people, and similarly in other cases. And so that unity which is found in many things, of whatever sort it is, presupposes beforehand, with a priority of reason, some being constituted from them, which is denominated one proximately and immediately. And it is in this sense that one should understand what is normally said, that what is without qualification several is one in a certain respect, as we shall touch on again in the next section. 213. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a23. 214. See DM 4.1.7.

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17. Secundo observandum est, hic esse sermonem de unitate rei, non76 de unitate rationis: nam unitas rationis (cum non sit in rebus, sed ab intellectu) proprie non comprehenditur in77 divisione posita: si tamen quis velit hanc unitatem ad dictam divisionem revocare, haec erit unitas maxime secundum quid, & huiusmodi est unitas generis, speciei, &c. quatenus per mentis comparationem & denominationem efficitur; quae etiam potest esse maior, vel minor in suo ordine, prout maiorem, vel minorem indivisionem secundum rationem includit, seu prout fundatur in maiori, vel minori convenientia in rebus illis inventa. An vero hoc fundamentum, quod in rebus antecedit, nomen unitatis mereatur, dicemus postea. 18. Et hinc ulterius explicati manent alii termini, quibus aliqui utuntur, ut videre est in Fonseca dict. quaest. 5. sect. 6. scilicet, quod unum interdum dicitur de aliquo absolute; interdum comparate, ut quod est unum secum, vel unum cum Petro in ratione hominis, vel animalis, &c. Item quod interdum aliquid dicitur esse78 unum in se, & secundum propriam rationem, ut Petrus dicitur unus numero; interdum vero dicitur aliquid unum in superiori, vel inferiori ratione, ut animal in ratione viventis, vel in homine. Sed haec re vera impropria sunt; nam unum proprie absolute tantum dicitur; illa vero comparata unitas non est unitas secundum rem, sed vel identitas secundum rationem, vel similitudo, fundata in aliqua unitate; vel certe est tantum79 unitas secundum rationem. Et similiter, nullum ens dicitur unum proprie, nisi secundum propriam rationem suam: nam secundum superiorem, aut inferiorem rationem non dicitur ⟨131b⟩ aliquid unum, nisi fortasse secundario, & ratione alterius. 19. Ultimo vero adnotare oportet, aliquam unitatem posse considerari in rebus, quae conveniat enti ratione suae entitatis, seu in illa 76. Reading “rei, non” with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “rei, et non”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 77. Reading “in” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following omit “in”: M4 , V5 , and Vivès. 78. Reading “esse” here with P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 79. Reading “tantum” here with S , V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 3: On the one per se and the one per accidens. 159



17. Second, it must be observed that the discussion here concerns real unity, not unity of reason. For rational unity (since it is not in thingsr, but from the intellect) is properly not contained in the division laid down. If, however, someone should want to reduce this unity to the mentioned division, it will be that unity which is most of all in a certain respect, and of this sort is the unity of the genus, the unity of the species, etc., insofar as it is produced by the mind’s comparison and denomination. And it too can be greater or lesser in its own order insofar as it involves a greater or lesser indivision according to reason, or insofar as it is founded on a greater or lesser agreement discovered among those thingsr. But we shall say later whether this foundation which is present in thingsr beforehand merits the name of unity.215 18. And thus does one further explain other terms used by some people, as can be seen in Fonseca, in the mentioned question 5, sec. 6,216 namely, that one is sometimes said of something absolutely, sometimes comparatively, as for example what is one with itself, or one with Peter, in the naturer of the human being or animal, etc. Further, that sometimes something is said to be one in itself and in respect of its proper conceptr, as Peter is called numerically one, but sometimes something is called one in respect of a superior or inferior conceptr, for instance, animal in respect of the conceptr of the living thing, or in respect of the human being. But these are really improper, for properly one is said only absolutely, whereas that comparative unity is not unity in reality but either identity according to reason or a similarity founded on some unity. Or at any rate it is only unity according to reason. And similarly, no being is properly called one except in respect of its own proper conceptr, for something is not called one in respect of a superior or inferior conceptr, except perhaps secondarily and by reason of something else. 19. Finally, it should be noted that there can be observed in things a unity that agrees with a being by reason of its entity, that is, a unity belonging to its entity considered precisely. But another unity can also be understood, a unity which agrees with one being by reason of 215. See DM 6.1. Note that when Suárez speaks of a foundation present in things beforehand (quod in rebus antecedit), he means a foundation that precedes any operation or consideration of the intellect. 216. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 1 (Coloniae), cols. 777–81.

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praecise considerata; alia vero unitas intelligi potest conveniens uni enti per aliud ens sibi adiunctum, ut, v. g. in materia (ut supra dicebamus) intelligimus unitatem entitativam, convenientem illi in sua entitate, & ex vi eius, etiam si praecise consideretur, & mente separetur a quantitate, & quolibet alio accidente, alia vero unitas intelligitur in materia ratione quantitatis, a qua dicitur una quantitative, seu numeraliter; & idem considerari potest in albedine, & in aliis entibus corporeis: nam in immaterialibus tantum prior modus unitatis reperitur. Unitas ergo immediate conveniens entitati per se ipsam dici potest unitas per se, non in sensu, quo supra locuti sumus de ente, & uno per se, sed ut [96b] per se distinguitur contra per aliud, qui modus unitatis in omni ente, eo modo, quo ens est, reperitur, ita ut etiam ens per accidens eo modo quo unum est per se, & non per aliud, habeat eam unitatem; & ideo haec unitas est, quae per se convenit enti, ut ens est; & ad tollendam aequivocationem posset dici unitas intrinseca, seu entitativa: alia enim unitas quae per aliud convenit, accidentaria est, & quasi extrinseca, seu denominativa, de qua plura in sect. 5.



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another being joined to it. For example, in matter (as we said above) we understand an entitative unity that agrees with it in its entity, and by virtue of its entity, even if it is considered precisely and is separated by the mind from quantity and from whatever other accident. But another unity is understood in matter by reason of its quantity, by virtue of which it is called quantitatively or numerically one. And the same thing can be observed in whiteness and in other corporeal beings, for in immaterial things only the former mode of unity is found. Therefore, the unity which agrees immediately with an entity per se can be called per se unity, not in the sense in which we have spoken above of what is a per se being and per se one, but insofar as per se is distinguished from per aliud,217 and this mode of unity is found in every being in that way in which it is a being, so that a per accidens being as well, in that way in which it is one, has this unity per se and not per aliud. And therefore it is this unity that agrees per se with a being insofar as it is a being. And in order to avoid equivocation it could be called intrinsic or entitative unity, for the other unity, which agrees with something per aliud, is accidental and, as it were, extrinsic or denominative. Of the latter we shall say more in section 5.218 217. “Per aliud” = “through something else” or “by virtue of something else.” Thus, a corporeal substance has quantitative unity, not per se or by virtue of itself, but per aliud or by virtue of something else, namely, the continuous quantity that inheres in it. 218. In fact, the discussion to which Suárez refers here is to be found in section 9.

Sect. IIII. An unum convertatur cum ente. SEC TIO IIII. Utrum unitas sit adaequata passio entis: & de divisione entis in unum & multa . 1. Hactenus solum declaravimus rationem unius, & varios modos eius: quia vero tota haec disputatio eo tendit, ut ostendamus, hanc passionem enti convenire, duo agenda supersunt. Primo, ut declaremus, quomodo haec proprietas convertatur cum ente, & sit adaequata passio eius. Secundo, ut declaremus, cuinam unitati hoc conveniat, quod praestabimus sect. seq. 2. Circa primum ratio dubitandi est, quia ens dividitur per unum, & multa, ut constat ex Arist. 10. Metaph. cap. 1. & ex D. Thom. 1. p. quaest. 11. imo multi contendunt, hanc esse primam divisionem entis, ut late Soncin. 10 Metap. quaest. 1. sed membrum dividens non potest converti cum diviso: ergo neque unum cum ente: ergo non est passio eius. Et confirmatur, nam unum ⟨132a⟩ & multa opponuntur, teste Arist. supra: ergo non possunt eidem convenire: ergo ens, quod est multa, non est unum: ergo unum non est adaequata passio entis.

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Section 4: Whether one is converted with being.

Section 4 Whether Unit y Is an Adequate Passion of Being, and Regarding the Division of Being into One and M any. 1. To this point we have only explained the naturer of the unit and its various modes, but since this entire disputation is aimed at showing that this passion agrees with being, two things remain to be done. First, we must explain how this property is converted with being and is an adequate passion of it. Second, we must show with which unity this agrees, and this we shall do in the following section.219 2. As regards the first, there is reason for doubt, because being is divided by one and many, as is clear from Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 1,220 and from St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11.221 In fact, many argue that this is the first division of being, as Soncinas does at length, Metaph. X, q. 1.222 But a dividing member cannot be converted with what is divided. Therefore, neither can one be converted with being. Therefore, one is not a 219. In fact, this last discussion would seem to occur in section 9 (“Whether Transcendental Unity Is Numerical Unity, or Which Unity It Is”). 220. In Suárez’s day, Metaph. X, ch. 1, extends from the beginning of our Metaph. X, ch. 1, to 1052b18. At no point in this portion of Metaph. X is the many (τὰ πολλά) even mentioned. In fact, although Metaph. X, chs. 1 & 2 (chs. 1–4 by Suárez’s count) discuss the one (τὸ ἕν) at length, before ch. 3, multitude (πλῆθος) is mentioned exactly once, at 1053a30, when Aristotle states that “number is multitude of units” (ὁ δ’ ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος μονάδων), and the many is likewise mentioned exactly once, at 1053b19, in the context of the expression “a one apart from the many” (ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ). Suárez likely means to refer here to what he calls ch. 5, which coincides with our ch. 3. (See the entry for Metaph. X, ch. 5, in Suárez’s Index Locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, at: Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 25 [Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1861], p. LVI. For an English version of this text, see Francisco Suárez, A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. John P. Doyle [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004], p. 191.) Note also that at no point in Metaph. X does Aristotle explicitly affirm that being is divided into one and many. 221. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108a. 222. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, pp. 229a–230b.

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Sect. IIII. An unum convertatur cum ente.

3. In hoc dubio breviter dicendum est, unitatem seu unum esse adaequatam passionem entis. Ita sumitur ex Arist. 4. Metap. cap. 2. tex. 3. dicente, ens & unum se invicem sequi. Idem docuit Plato in Parmenide dicens, Neque ens uni, neque unum enti deest: sed duo haec potius per omnia coaequantur. Idem D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 11. art. 1. & 2. & omnes Philosophi. Et ratione patet primo, quia inter passiones entis primo loco ponitur unum, ut supra vidimus: ergo oportet ut convertatur cum ente, quia de ratione passionis proprie dictae est, ut sit adaequata subiecto suo; & ideo unum inter transcendentia ponitur, sicut ipsum ens. Secundo ex re ipsa ita80 declaratur, quia unitas vera, & realis supponit, vel includit entitatem, ut supra visum est: nam, quod nihil est, neque unum dici potest, nisi aequivoce & per denominationem extrinsecam, sed ad omnem entitatem, ut entitas est, consequitur, seu necessario coniungitur indivisio in se: nam si sit actu divisa, quatenus talis est, non est entitas, sed entitates: ergo ratio unius adaequate currit cum ente. Tertio, quia omne ens est simplex aut compositum; simplex, non solum indivisum est, sed indivisibile, quatenus simplex est; compositum vero, ut tale est, etiam est indivisum: nam si actu divisum sit, non erit compositum: ergo omne ens tam simplex, quam compositum, unum est; quod autem nec simplex, nec compositum est, ens non est; sed, vel nihil erit, vel plura entia. [97a]

80. Reading “ita” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 4: Whether one is converted with being. 165



passion of being. And this is confirmed, for one and many are opposed, as Aristotle attests above. Therefore, they cannot agree with the same thing. Therefore, being which is many is not one. Therefore, one is not an adequate passion of being. 3. Regarding this doubt, it must briefly be said that unity or one is an adequate passion of being. This can be gathered from Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, text 3, where he says that being and one follow each other.223 Plato teaches the same thing in Parmenides, saying: “It is neither the case that being wants for one, nor that one wants for being, but these two are rather equal in all respects.”224 The same thing is taught by St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 1 & art. 2,225 and by all philosophers. And it is clear by argument, first, because one is first among the passions of being, as we saw above. Therefore, it must be converted with being, since it pertains to the naturer of a passion properly ­so-called that it be adequate to its subject, and therefore one is placed among the transcendentals, just as being itself is. Second, it is made clear by the thingr itself in the following way: because true and real unity presupposes or includes entity, as was seen above.226 For what is nothing cannot be called one except equivocally and by extrinsic denomination, but internal indivision is consequent on, or is necessarily conjoined with, every entity insofar as it is an entity. For if it is actually divided, insofar as it is such it is not an entity, but entities. Therefore, the naturer of the unit adequately tracks being. Third, because every being is simple or composite, and the simple is not only undivided, but indivisible, insofar as it is simple, whereas the composite, insofar as it is such, is also undivided, for if it were actually divided, it would not be composite. Therefore, every being, both simple and composite, is one, and what is neither simple nor composite is not a being, but either nothing or several beings.

223. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b22–24. 224. Plato, Parmenides, 144e1–3. 225. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), pp. 107a–110b. 226. DM 4.2.

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4. Ad rationem ergo dubitandi positam respondet D. Tho. 1. p. q. 11. ar. 1. ad 2. id, quod est uno modo indivisum, alio modo posse esse divisum; & quod sub una ratione est multa, sub alia esse posse unum. Et hac ratione (inquit) ens dividitur per unum & multa, tanquam per unum simpliciter & multa secundum quid: nam & ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi contineretur aliquo modo sub uno. Affertque Dio­ nys. ult. cap. de divin. nomin. dicentem, non esse multitudinem; quae non participet aliquo modo unitatem: nam, quae sunt multa partibus, sunt unum toto, & quae sunt multa accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto, &c. Ex qua responsione intelligitur primo, for⟨132b⟩maliter & proprie loquendo, ens non dividi in multa ut multa sunt actu & formaliter, quia huiusmodi multa, quatenus talia sunt, re vera non sunt ens, sed entia.

5. Duplici ergo modo potest multitudo poni in divisione entis, primo, si non intelligatur de multitudine actuali, id est, actu divisa, quae sola proprie est multitudo, ut constat ex 5. metaph. ca. 13. tex. 18. sed de multitudine in potentia tantum, quomodo in continuo dicitur esse multitudo partium integrantium, aut punctorum; & in natura humana multitudo partium essentialium. Et hoc modo videtur intellexisse D. Tho. divisionem, cum dicit ens dividi per unum, & multa, tanquam per unum simpliciter, & multa secundum quid; nam illud est unum simpliciter, in quo non sunt multa actu divisa: & e converso, illa dicuntur multa secundum quid, quae in re non sunt actu divisa, seu disiuncta, sed potentia tantum. Unde in hoc sensu membra haec, per se loquendo, non est necesse re distingui, sed ratione tantum: idem namque ens, quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid, seu in potentia, ut in exemplis positis constat; nisi velimus ea membra cum praecisione, seu exclusione intelligere, hoc modo, aliquod ens ita esse unum, ut nullo modo sit multa, neque actu, neque potentia; aliud vero ita esse unum, ut sit etiam multa secundum quid, seu potentia, aut accidentaliter: quo sensu coincidet illa divisio cum divisione entis seu unius in simplex & compositum. Et iuxta hanc interpretandi rationem facile



Section 4: Whether one is converted with being. 167

The division of being into one and many is explained.

4. To the mentioned reason for doubt, St. Thomas replies, ST I, q. 11, art. 1, ad 2, that what is undivided in one way can be divided in another, and that what is many under one descriptionr can be one under another descriptionr. “And for this reason,” he says, “being is divided by the one and the many as by the one without qualification and the many in a certain respect, for a multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it was in some way contained under one.” And he cites Dionysius, in the final chapter of On the Divine Names, as saying that “there is no multitude that does not in some way participate in unity, for those things which are many in respect of parts are one as a whole, and those things that are many in respect of accidents are one in respect of subject,” etc.227 And from this reply it is understood, first, that formally and properly speaking being is not divided into the many insofar as they are actually and formally many, since the many of this sort, insofar as they are such, are really not a being, but beings. 5. Multitude, therefore, can figure in the division of being in two ways: first, when it is understood not to be an actual multitude, that is, actually divided—and this alone is properly a multitude, as is clear from Metaph. V, ch. 13, text 18228—but a multitude in potency only, in the way there is said to be a multitude of integral parts or points in something continuous and a multitude of essential parts in human nature. And St. Thomas seems to have understood the division in this way when he says that being is divided by one and many as by what is one without qualification and many in a certain respect. For that is without qualification one in which there are not many things actually divided, and conversely, that is called many in a certain respect which is not really and actually divided or separated, but only potentially. For this reason, in this sense, these members, speaking per se, are not necessarily distinguished in reality, but only rationally. For the same being that is one without qualification is many in a certain respect or 227. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108a–b. Cf. ­Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, Corpus Dionysiacum, vol. 1 (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), p. 227 (980A). 228. Text 18 of Metaph. V just is ch. 13 of that book.

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constat, divisionem hanc nihil obstare adaequationi entis & unius: nam illa multitudo non excludit unitatem simpliciter. Denique in hoc sensu potest intelligi in ea divisione dividi ens, non ut commune est ad ens per se, & per accidens, sed ipsum ens per se: quia inter entia per se dantur aliqua, quae, licet sint unum actu, possunt tamen esse multa potestate.

6. Alio vero modo potest illa divisio exponi de multitudine simpliciter ac proprie, quomodo videtur intellexisse Caietan. cum ait, illa verba D. Tho. dict. solut. ad 2. ens dividi per unum & multa, tanquam per unum simpliciter, & multa secundum quid, ita esse intelligenda, ut simpliciter, &, secundum quid non cadant super unum, &, multa, sed super verbum, dividitur, id est, ita dividitur ens per unum & multa, ut unum simpliciter sit ens, multa vero solum81 secundum quid. Atque hoc modo e contrario dicendum est, multitudinem poni ⟨133a⟩ in divisione entis, quatenus contingit, ea, quae sunt multa simpliciter, esse unum secundum quid. Unde [97b] aliud membrum intelligitur de uno simpliciter & absolute: atque hoc sensu membra illa non ratione tantum, sed re ipsa semper distinguuntur, quia includunt oppositionem contradictoriam seu privativam ex parte divisionis: nam multa simpliciter sunt, quae in se sunt actu divisa, unum vero, quod non est in se actu divisum. Et iuxta hunc etiam sensum coincidit haec divisio cum illa, qua dividitur ens in unum simpliciter, & unum secundum quid: nam multa simpliciter non dividunt ens, nisi quatenus sunt unum secundum quid. Quo etiam fit, ut divisum in hac divisione sic explicata non sit ens per se, sed quod dividitur in ens per se, & per accidens, nam omne ens per se est unum simpliciter; multa autem non dicuntur unum 81. Reading “solum” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following omit this word: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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in potency, as is clear in the given examples—unless we should wish to understand those members with a precision or exclusion in the following way, that some being is one in such a way that it is in no way many, neither actually nor potentially, while another being is one in such a way that it is also many in a certain respect, that is, either potentially or accidentally—in which sense that division will coincide with the division of being or of the unit into the simple and the composite. And in accordance with this interpretation it is easily established that this division in no way prevents the adequation of being and one, for that multitude does not exclude unqualified unity. Finally, in this sense, being can be understood to be divided in that division not insofar as it is common to per se being and per accidens being, but insofar as it is just per se being, since among per se beings there are some which, although they are actually one, can nonetheless also be many in potency. 6. But that division can be explained in a different way as having to do with multitude without qualification and properly, in the way Cajetan seems to have understood it when he says that these words of St. Thomas in the reply to the second argument, “that being is divided by the one without qualification and the many in a certain respect,” are to be understood in such a way that “without qualification” and “in a certain respect” do not qualify “one” and “many,” but the words “is divided”229—that is to say: being is divided by the one and the many in such a way that the one is without qualification a being, whereas the many is a being only in a certain respect. And in this way, to the contrary, it must be said that multitude is put in the division of being insofar as it happens that those things which are many without qualification are one in a certain respect. For this reason, the other member is understood to be what is one without qualification and absolutely. And in this sense those members are always distinguished not only rationally, but really, since they involve a contradictory or privative opposition on the part of the division. For those things are without qualification many which are actually divided in themselves, while what is not actually divided in itself is one. And in accordance with this sense, moreover, this division coincides with that by which being is divided into what is one 229. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109b.

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secundum quid, nisi quatenus ens aliquod per accidens constituunt; & ita non possunt in divisione entis poni, nisi saltem sub ratione entis per accidens: ergo divisum in ea divisione non potest esse ens per se, nam repugnaret uni membro &82 converteretur cum alio, debet ergo esse ens abstrahens a per se & per accidens. Atque ita tandem intelligitur, quomodo praedicta divisio non repugnet adaequationi unius & entis: nam ad eam spectat, ut ita unumquodque sit unum, sicut est ens; ita ut, si fuerit ens per se, sit etiam unum per se; si vero ens sit per accidens; sit etiam unum per accidens; & sicut ens potest abstracte83 significari, ita & unum; & ideo, sicut ens in hoc sensu dividitur in unum & multa, ita & ipsum unum posset eodem modo dividi; nam, ut dixi, perinde est, ac si dividatur in unum simpliciter, & unum secundum quid. 82. Reading “&” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “ut” instead: M4 , V5 , and Vivès. 83. Reading “potest abstracte significari” with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read: “abstracte significari”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , V3 , V4 , and V5. The following instead read “abstracte potest significari”: P2 and Vivès.



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without qualification and what is one in a certain respect. For those things which are many without qualification do not divide being except insofar as they are one in a certain respect. And from this it results that what is divided in this division, thus explained, is not per se being, but that which is divided into per se being and per accidens being, for every per se being is one without qualification, but many things are not called one in a certain respect except insofar as they constitute some per accidens being, and so they cannot be put in the division of being except under the descriptionr “per accidens being.” Therefore, what is divided in that division cannot be per se being, since it would be incompatible with one member and converted with the other. What is divided, therefore, must be being that abstracts from per se being and per accidens being. And in this way, finally, it is understood how the mentioned division is not incompatible with the adequation of one and being. For it pertains to this [adequation] that, as each thing is one, so is it a being, so that, if it is a per se being, it is also one per se, whereas if it is a per accidens being, it is also one per accidens. And just as being can be abstractly signified, so also can one. And therefore, just as being in this sense is divided into one and many, so also could one itself be divided in the same way. For, as I have said, it is just as if it were divided into the one without qualification and the one in a certain respect.

Sect. V. De divisione entis in unum & multa. SEC TIO V. An divisio entis in unum & multa sit analoga . 1. Ex his, quae dicta sunt, facile possunt definiri nonnulla dubia, quae de hac divisione tractari solent ab autoribus. Primum est, an haec divisio sit analoga, vel univoca. 2. Respondetur, si intelligatur in posteriori sensu, esse analogam, & fere aequivocam, quia divisio entis in ens per se, & ens per accidens, cui praedicta divisio aequivalet in illo sensu, ut dictum est, analoga est analogia quadam proportionalitatis, ita ut enti sic sumpto non respondeat unus communis conceptus: quia ens per accidens ut sic re vera ⟨133b⟩ non est ens, sed entia: solumque appellatur ens propter quandam proportionem, vel imitationem entis per se. Probatur haec sententia in primis ex Arist. li. 4. Met. c. 2. in fine, ubi aperte docet hic intervenire analogiam. Deinde ratione, quia quae sunt multa simpliciter, non sunt unum simpliciter: nam haec duo prorsus opponuntur: ergo neque sunt ens simpliciter: nam ens & unum, si eadem proportione sumantur, convertuntur: ergo ens non dividitur univoce in unum, & multa, sed analogice. Et hoc significavit D. Th. 1. p. q. 11. a. 1. ad 2. iuxta expositionem Caiet. supra adductam, & declaratam. Deinde, quod haec analogia tanta sit, ut diximus, declaratur in hunc modum: quia esse indivisum, est de ratione unius: sed haec indivisio non reperitur in huiusmodi uno per accidens, nisi valde analogice, & fere aequivoce, quia in eo reperiuntur multa actu divisa, & indivisio solum est secundum quandam apprehensionem, vel habitudinem: ergo ratio unius non convenit tali multitudini, nisi per quandam proportionalitatem, seu [98a] imitationem: ergo &84 ratio entis eodem modo illi convenit: quia, ut dictum est, 84. Reading “&” here with M1 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 ,

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Section 5 Whether the Division of Being into One and M any Is Analogic al . 1. On the basis of what has been said certain doubts that authors are wont to discuss regarding this division can easily be decided. The first is whether this division is analogical or univocal. 2. I reply that if it is understood in the second sense, it is analogical, and nearly equivocal, since the division of being into per se being and per accidens being, to which the mentioned division is equivalent in this sense (as has been said), is analogical by a certain analogy of proportionality, so that to being thus understood there does not correspond a single common concept, for a per accidens being, as such, is not really a being, but beings, and it is only called a being on account of a certain proportion to, or imitation of, per se being. This opinion is proved, in the first place, by appeal to Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, at the end, where he plainly teaches that analogy is present here.230 Next, by argument, because those things which are many without qualification are not one without qualification, for these two are directly opposed. Therefore, neither are they without qualification a being, for being and one, if they are taken with the same proportion, are converted. Therefore, being is not divided univocally into one and many, but analogically. And St. Thomas indicates this, ST I, q. 11, art. 1, ad 2, according to the exposition of Cajetan that was adduced and explained above.231 Next, that this analogy is as great as we have said is made clear in the following way: because to be undivided pertains to the naturer of the 230. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003a33–b15 and 1003b33–34. 231. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), pp. 108a–b, 109b.

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ens & unum sibi invicem cum proportione respondent. Item, quia ens dicitur ab essentia, vel ab existentia, in illa autem multitudine non est essentia, neque existentia, sed potius essentiae & existentiae.

3. Dices, hoc ad summum procedere de his, quae ita sunt multa simpliciter, ut nullo modo sint unum, nisi per aggregationem, ut in acervo lapidum, &c. quia ibi re vera non est unitas, sed propinquitas quaedam, quae non nisi per quandam proportionalitatem potest vocari unitas, ut recte declaratum est. Tamen in aliis entibus per accidens, quae habent aliquam unionem, vel coordinationem partium, ratione cuius possunt aliquo modo dici unum per se, ut supra diximus, non videtur procedere ratio facta, nec intercedere tanta analogia: nam haec videntur comprehendi sub uno conceptu unius transcendentaliter sumpti: nam habent unitatem aliquam realem, & indivisionem, quae in ipsis rebus fundatur. 4. Respondetur, hoc quidem esse probabile, praesertim quando intercedit physica & realis unio, ut est inter substantiam, & accidens ipsi intrinsece inhaerens: nam in tali composito, sicut est vera & physica unio, ita est aliqualis unitas realis, quae, licet non sit tanta, quanta est in substantiali composito, habet tamen cum illa realem convenientiam, qualis est ⟨134a⟩ etiam inter illas uniones: illa ergo sufficiet, saltem ad unitatem conceptus; esto illa unitas85 sit cum aliqua analogia, quod pendet ex infra dicendis de analogia entis. De aliis vero entibus artificialibus res est magis dubia: quia non intercedit ibi unio realis & physica, & consequenter nec indivisio realis: ergo nec convenientia realis in unitate, quae sufficiat ad unitatem conceptus in ratione entis, vel unius. C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 85. Reading “unitas” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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unit. But this indivision is not found in such a per accidens unit, except very analogically and nearly equivocally, since many actually divided things are found in it, and its indivision is only according to a certain apprehension or relation. Therefore, the naturer of the unit does not agree with such a multitude except by a certain proportionality or imitation. Therefore, the naturer of being as well agrees with it in the same way, since, as has been said, being and one proportionately correspond to each other. Further: a being is so called from essence, or from existence, but in such a multitude there is not an essence, nor an existence, but rather essences and existences. 3. You will say: this argument at most succeeds with respect to those things which are many without qualification in such a way that they are in no way one except by aggregation, as for instance a pile of stones, etc. For here there really is not unity, but a kind of proximity, which cannot be called unity except by a certain proportionality, as has rightly been explained. Nevertheless, in the case of other per accidens beings that have some union or coordination of parts, by reason of which they can in some way be called one per se, as we said above, the argument that was made seems not to succeed, nor does so great an analogy obtain. For these seem to be contained under a single concept of the unit taken transcendentally, since they have some real unity and indivision that is founded on thingsr themselves. 4. I reply that this is indeed plausible, especially when a physical and real union obtains, as one does between a substance and an accident that intrinsically inheres in it. For in such a composite, just as there is a true and physical union, so also is there some sort of real unity which, though not as great as the unity in a substantial composite, yet has a real agreement with it, an agreement of the sort that existse also between those unions. That agreement, therefore, will suffice, at least for the unity of the concept, even if that unity involves some analogy (which claim depends on things to be said below regarding the analogy of being232). But regarding other, artificial beings the matter is more doubtful, since in their case a real and physical union does not obtain, nor, consequently, a real indivision. Nor, therefore, does 232. See DM 28.3 and 32.2.

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Nihilominus tamen oppositum potest facile defendi, quia illamet compositio cum aliqua coniunctione, vel coordinatione, est aliqualis unio, quae sufficit, ut haec entia concipiantur ut aliquo modo per se una, propter quod supra diximus, probabile esse sub ea ratione directe contineri sub obiecto Metaphysicae; & de illis ut sic posse esse scientiam: hoc ergo etiam satis erit ut sub uno conceptu transcendentali unius concipi possint.

5. Atque hinc a fortiori sequitur, si divisio illa intelligatur in priori sensu supra explicato, ita ut divisum sit ens per se rigorose dictum, in unum quod nullo modo est multa; & unum, quod est multa in potentia; sic multo magis dividi unum secundum communem quendam conceptum unius per se, seu simpliciter: quia esse multa illo modo, scilicet in potentia, non excludit unitatem simpliciter, ut dictum est: non tamen videtur excludenda omnis analogia ab illo conceptu, quia Deus, qui in illo continetur, sicut non est univoce ens, ita nec videtur univoce unus cum caeteris creaturis. 6. Posset autem probabiliter dici, quanvis unum, quoad positivum, quod includit, vel connotat, non dicatur univoce de Deo, & creaturis, tamen quantum ad negationem inclusam, non repugnare, quod dicatur univoce, quia alia praedicata negativa possunt univoce dici de Deo, & creaturis. Ut v. g. esse immateriale, ut praecise dicit negationem & carentiam materiae primae, aeque convenit angelis, ac Deo, quanvis positivum fundamentum illius carentiae non sit in eis uni[98b]vocum: sic ergo videtur dici posse de negatione divisionis, quam dicit unum. Dices, hoc ad summum procedere de rebus indivisibilibus ut sic, v. g. de angelo. Sed contra primo, quia si semel conceditur, unum transcendens dici univoce de angelo & Deo, inde sumitur argumentum, dici etiam univoce de homine, v. g. quia, licet homo non sit tam perfecte unus sicut angelus, tamen est univoce unus: ergo si angelus est unus ⟨134b⟩ univoce cum Deo, etiam homo erit univoce unus cum utroque. Secundo ratione a priori id patet, quia unum praecise dicit negationem



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a real agreement in respect of unity that suffices for the unity of the concept in the case of the naturer of being or the naturer of the unit. But nevertheless, the opposite can easily be defended, since the same composition with some conjunction or coordination is some sort of union that is sufficient for these beings to be conceived as per se one in some way. And for this reason we said earlier that it is probable that under that descriptionr they are directly contained under the object of metaphysics, and that there can be science of them as such.233 This, therefore, will also be enough for them to admit of being conceived under a single concept of the transcendental unit. 5. And hence it follows a fortiori that if that division is understood in the first sense explained above, so that per se being strictly so called is divided into the one that is in no way many and the one that is potentially many, then much more so will the unit be divided according to a certain common concept of the one per se or one without qualification. For to be many in that way—namely, potentially—does not exclude unqualified unity, as has been said. Nevertheless, it does not seem that all analogy is to be excluded from that concept, for God, who is contained in it, does not seem to be one univocally with creatures, just as he is not a being univocally with them. 6. It could plausibly be said, however, that although as regards the positive element that it includes or connotes, one is not said univocally of God and creatures, nevertheless, as regards the included negation, it is not inconsistent that it should be said univocally, since other negative predicates can be said univocally of God and creatures. For example, to be immaterial, insofar as it precisely signifiesd a negation and lack of prime matter, agrees equally with angels and God, although the positive foundation of that lack is not univocal in them. It seems, therefore, that one can speak in the same way of the negation of division that one signifiesd. You will say: this works, at best, in the case of indivisible thingsr as such, for example, the angel. But to the contrary, first, because if it is once conceded that transcendentally one is said univocally of God and the angel, from here an argument can be derived that it is 233. See DM 1.1.5.

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actualis divisionis: sed haec negatio integre & perfecte reperitur in ente propriissime & per se uno, etiam si compositum sit. Quod autem in substantia indivisibili aliquid amplius praeter illam negationem reperiatur, pertinet quidem ad maiorem quandam perfectionem entitatis, vel unitatis, non tamen sufficit ad analogiam in ratione unius. Unde, cum alias respectu huius negationis non sit propria dependentia vel causalitas nisi ratione fundamenti, nulla videtur esse in ea sufficiens ratio analogiae. Tertio idem confirmatur, quia alias materia prima, v. g. esset perfectius unum, quam substantia composita, & idem argumentum fieri potest de anima: imo & de quolibet accidente simplici respectu substantiae compositae, & de puncto respectu quantitatis, nam respectu omnium sequitur unum esse analogum, & per prius dici de simplici, quanvis imperfectissimo ente.

7. Sed, licet haec probabiliter dicta sint, nihilominus simpliciter dicendum est, unum trascendens analogice dici de Deo, & creaturis; & de his omnibus, de quibus ens analogice dicitur: quia (quicquid sit de negatione) unum non dicit de formali solam negationem, ut supra visum est, sed entitatem, seu essentiam indivisam: & ideo ubi essentia univoce non est, nec realis unitas potest esse univoca. Item, quia, ut Arist. dixit. 4. Meta. tex. 2. quod ad rem attinet, idem est dicere unum, & ens unum: ergo, quod non est simpliciter ens, non potest esse simpliciter unum: ergo, quod fuerit analogice ens, erit etiam analogice unum. Hoc autem maxime habet verum in Deo, in quo, non solum essentia ut sic est alterius ordinis, sed etiam ut fundat negationem unius, habet perfectionem quandam alterius rationis & ordinis. In illis autem entibus, in quibus, licet essentia sit imperfectior, tamen ut fundat negationem divisionis, habet quendam excessum simplicitatis, seu indivisibilitatis, aliquo



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also said univocally of the human being (for example), for although the human being is not as perfectly one as an angel, nonetheless, she is univocally one [with an angel]. Therefore, if the angel is univocally one with God, the human being as well will be univocally one with both. Second, it is clear by means of an a priori argument, for one precisely signifiesd the negation of actual division. But this negation is wholly and perfectly found in a being that is most properly and per se one, even if it is composite. And as for the fact that in an indivisible substance something else in addition to that negation is found, this pertains indeed to a certain greater perfection of entity or unity, but it does not suffice for an analogy in the case of the naturer of the unit. For this reason, since otherwise in respect of this negation there is not a proper dependence or causality except by reason of the foundation, it seems that there is not in its case a sufficient basisr for analogy. Third, the same thing is confirmed, because otherwise prime matter, for example, would be more perfectly one than a composite substance, and the same argument can be made about the soul. In fact, it can also be made about any simple accident in comparison with a composite substance, and about the point in comparison with quantity, for in relation to all things it follows that one is analogical and is said in a prior way of a simple, albeit most imperfect, being. 7. However, although these things are plausibly said, nevertheless, it must be said without qualification that transcendentally one is said analogically of God and creatures, and of all those things that being is said analogically of. For (whatever the case regarding the negation) one does not formally signifyd only the negation, as we saw above, but undivided entity or essence.234 And therefore, where essence is not present univocally, neither can real unity be univocal. Further, since, as Aristotle says in Metaph. IV, text 2, there is no difference, as far as the reality is concerned, between saying one and saying one being, what is not without qualification a being cannot be without qualification one.235 Therefore, what is analogically a being will also be analogically one. And this is most of all true in the case of God, in whom, not only is the 234. See DM 4.2.6–7. 235. The pronouncement to which Suárez refers here is found in Metaph. IV, text 3, not text 2. See Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1003b26–32.

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modo dici potest esse perfectior ratio unius quoad negationem, non vero simpliciter propter rationem dictam. Et hinc rursus confirmatur, quod supra dictum est, unum non dicere de formali solam negationem, sed entitatem sub negatione. ⟨135a⟩



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essence as such of another order, but it also has a certain perfection of another naturer and order insofar as it founds the negation included in one. And in those beings in which the essence, though less perfect, nevertheless has a certain excess of simplicity or indivisibility insofar as it founds the negation of division, the naturer of the unit can in some way be said to be more perfect as regards the negation, but not without qualification, because of the mentioned argument. And hence what was said above is again confirmed, namely, that one does not formally signifyd only a negation, but entity under a negation.

Sect. VI. Quomodo unum & multa opponantur. SEC TIO VI. Quomodo unum & multa opponantur . 1. In hac re Aristot. lib. 4. Met. c. 2. unum & multa significat privative opponi. At vero lib. 10. c. 1. sentit neque opponi relative, quia unum non dicitur ad aliud; nec contradictorie, quia neutrum est mera negatio, neutrum enim vere dici potest tam de his, quae non sunt, quam de his, quae sunt; nec mere privative, quia neutrum consistit in sola privatione, sed aliquid dicit positivum; nec denique mere contrarie, quia includunt formaliter ali[99a]quam negationem: unde concludit, opponi quodammodo contrarie, & quodammodo privative. D. Thom. autem 1. p. q. 11. art. 2. sentit, hanc oppositionem magis accedere ad privativam: quia unum (inquit) opponitur multis, sicut indivisum diviso.

2. Ut hoc tamen amplius explicetur, considerandum est, multa dupliciter posse comparari ad unum; primo, ut multa sunt, secundo ut sunt aliquo modo unum; quomodo diximus, multitudinem esse membrum dividens ens in ea partitione qua dividitur in unum, & multa. Quapropter, formaliter loquendo de multitudine ut est membrum illius divisionis, differt ab uno simpliciter dicto tanquam imperfectum a perfecto; & ita sunt tanquam duae rationes disparatae & distinctae. Sicut, si consideremus numerum sub ratione unius quantitatis discretae, vel ponamus, illum habere unam rationem formalem, ut sic distinguetur ab unitate tanquam quaedam ratio formalis distincta a ratione formali unius; sicut solent distingui duae naturae, vel species disparatae, vel sicut distinguitur linea a puncto. At vero considerando multitudinem, ut multitudo est, & mera aggregatio plurium, sic considerare possumus, vel illud tantum quod positivum est in unitate, & multitudine, & ita se habent ad modum totius & partis, quia multitudo ex unitatibus

182

Section 6: How one and many are opposed.

Section 6 How One and M any Are Opposed. 1. On this issue, Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, indicates that one and many are privatively opposed.236 However, in bk. X, ch. 1, he asserts that they are opposed neither relatively, since one is not said in relation to something else, nor contradictorily, since neither is a pure negation (for neither can truly be said as much of those things which are not as of those things which are), nor purely privatively, since neither consists in a privation alone but rather signifiesd something positive, nor, finally, purely contrarily, since they formally include some negation. And thus he concludes that they are opposed in a certain way contrarily and in a certain way privatively.237 But St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, thinks that this opposition approaches more to the privative, since one (he says) is opposed to many as the undivided is opposed to the divided.238 2. In order to explain this further, however, it must be observed that the many can be compared to the one in two ways: first, insofar as they are many, and second, insofar as they are in some way one. And in the latter way, we have said that multitude is a member dividing being in that partition by which it is divided into one and many. For this reason, formally speaking of multitude insofar as it is a member of that division, it differs from the one spoken of without qualification as the imperfect differs from the perfect, and in this way they are like two disparate and distinct naturesr. In the same way, if we consider number 236. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1004a9–16. 237. In Suárez’s day, the discussion to which he refers here was found in Metaph. X, ch. 5, and not in Metaph. X, ch. 1. See, again, the entry for Metaph. X, ch. 5, in Suárez’s Index Locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, at: Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 25 (1861), p. LVI. For an English version of this text, see Francisco Suárez, A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 191. Suárez’s Metaph. X, ch. 5, coincides with our Metaph. X, ch. 3. See 1054a23–26. 238. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia. t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109b.

183

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hoc modo resultat; vel considerare possumus negationem inclusam, & sic utrumque includit negationem aliquam: multitudo enim, multa positiva entia dicendo, includit hanc negationem, quod unum non sit aliud, quae dici potest negatio identitatis: unum vero dicit negationem divisionis. Et ita videntur mutuo opponi privative secundum diversas rationes: nam unum includit negationem divisionis, quae est de ratione multitudinis: multitudo vero includit ⟨135b⟩ negationem identitatis, seu realis coniunctionis, quae est de ratione unitatis. Tamen, quia multitudo includit unitatem, & requirit indivisionem in singulis unitatibus, quibus ipsa multitudo constat; unum vero e contrario non includit multitudinem, nec divisionem quae est de ratione multitudinis, sed potius removet illam, ideo simpliciter dicitur unum opponi multitudini per modum privationis potius, quam e converso.

3. Unde licet D. Tho. supra ad 2. dicat, unitates componere multitudinem, secundum id, quod habent de entitate, non secundum id, quod habent de indivisione, quod aliis locis repetit, ut q. 9. de potent. art. 7. ad 10. & 14. hoc tamen intelligendum videtur cum proportione, scilicet, de multitudine, quatenus positivum quid est. At si considerentur omnia, quae includit multitudo; aliter dicendum videtur; nam, ut idem D. Tho. ait 1. p. q. 11. a. 2. ad 4. & d. q. de pot. art. 7. ad 15. In intellectu multitudinis includitur ens divisum ab alio, & quod utrumque ipsorum in se sit unum. Quantumcunque enim (ait) aliqua intelligantur divisa, non intelligetur multitudo, nisi quodlibet divisorum intelligatur esse unum, & consequenter indivisum: sequitur ergo, unum componere multitudinem quoad omnia, quae sunt de ratione eius, non solum



Section 6: How one and many are opposed. 185



under the notionr of the one of discrete quantity, or suppose that it has a single formal characterr, then as such it will be distinguished from unity as a certain formal characterr distinct from the formal characterr of the unit, just as two disparate natures or species are wont to be distinguished, or just as the line is distinguished from the point. But considering multitude insofar as it is a multitude and a mere aggregation of several things, in this way we can either consider only what is positive in unity and multitude, and in this way they are related in the manner of whole and part, since multitude results in this way from unities; or we can consider the included negation, and in this way each includes some negation, for multitude, in signifyingd many positive beings, includes the negation that one is not another, which can be called the negation of identity, whereas one signifiesd the negation of division. And in this way they seem to be mutually opposed privatively according to diverse conceptsr, for one includes the negation of division, which pertains to the naturer of multitude, whereas multitude includes the negation of identity, or the negation of real conjunction, which pertains to the naturer of unity. Nevertheless, since a multitude involves unity and requires indivision in each of the unities from which the same multitude is constituted, whereas one, to the contrary, does not include multitude, nor the division which pertains to the naturer of multitude, but rather denies it, one is therefore said without qualification to be opposed to multitude in the manner of a privation, rather than the other way around. 3. For this reason, although St. Thomas, in the mentioned response to the second argument,239 says that unities compose a multitude according to what they have of entity, not according to what they have of indivision—which he repeats in other places, such as On the Power of God, q. 9, art. 7, ad 10 and ad 14240—this, it seems, must nevertheless be understood proportionately, namely, as true of multitude insofar as it is something positive. But if all the things that multitude involves are considered, it seems that we must speak otherwise, for, as the same St. Thomas says, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4,241 and the mentioned question 239. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110a. 240. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, p. 244a. 241. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b.

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ratione positivi, sed etiam ratione negationis, quam dicit unum: quia non solum est de ratione multitudinis, quod una res non sit alia, sed etiam quod singulae in se indivisae sint: quia alioqui non componerent certam, & determinatam multitudinem. Neque satis intelligo, quid [99b] sibi velit Caietanus circa praedictam solutionem ad secundum D. Thomae dicens, multitudinem formaliter ex unitatibus formaliter consurgere, & consequenter ex negationibus, & nihilominus indivisionem unitatis non concurrere ad componendam multitudinem, in quantum exercet privationem divisionis, sed in quantum habet entis rationem. Quid est enim privationem habere entis rationem? Si enim hoc dicatur solum ratione entitatis, in qua fundatur, repugnat priori dicto eius, & rationi a nobis factae: si autem negatio dicatur habere rationem entis, quatenus potest per modum entis concipi, sic est impertinens divisio: quia hoc solum habet per denominationem extrinsecam, & sic negatio potius est ens rationis tantum, quam habeat rationem entis realis, de quo Caiet. loquitur.

4. Denique comparari possunt unum & ⟨136a⟩ multa in ratione mensurae, & mensurati; & hoc modo habere possunt oppositionem relativam, sive illa sit relatio realis, sive rationis, quod magis videtur: quia haec ratio mensurae solum videtur consistere in quadam extrinseca denominatione, magisque fundari in nostra apprehensione & usu ac modo cognoscendi, quam in aliqua relatione, vel habitudine, quae in re sit. Unde D. Tho. dict. art. 2. hanc oppositionem mensurae & mensurati tribuit unitati quantitativae respectu numeri, qui est in quantitate, non vero unitati, & multitudini transcendentali, quod non video, cur dici potuerit, nisi in ordine ad usum humanum, seu secundum quandam denominationem inde resultantem: nam, si res ipsae secundum



Section 6: How one and many are opposed. 187



from On the Power of God, art. 7, ad 15, “Included in the understanding of the multitude is a being that is divided from another being,” and each of these two is in itself one. “For however much some things are understood to be divided,” he says, “a multitude will not be understood unless each of the divided things is understood to be one” and consequently undivided.242 It follows, therefore, that the unit composes a multitude by virtue of everything that belong to its naturer, not only by virtue of its positive element, but also by virtue of the negation that one signifiesd. For it pertains to the naturer of the multitude not only that one thingr is not another, but also that each is in itself undivided, since otherwise they would not compose a fixed and determinate multitude. Nor do I sufficiently understand what Cajetan means when he says of St. Thomas’s mentioned reply to the second argument that multitude formally arises from unities formally, and consequently from negations, and that nonetheless the indivision of unity does not concur in the composition of a multitude insofar as it exercises the privation of division, but insofar as it has the naturer of being.243 For what is a privation’s having the naturer of being? For if this is said only by reason of the entity on which it is founded, it is inconsistent with his earlier assertion, and with the argument made by us. But if the negation is said to have the naturer of being insofar as it can be conceived in the manner of a being, the division is in this way irrelevant, for it has this only by extrinsic denomination, and in this way the negation, rather than having the naturer of real being, about which Cajetan is speaking, is only a being of reason. 4. Finally, one and many can be compared as measure and thing measured. And in this way they can have a relative opposition, whether this be a real relation or a relation of reason. And the latter seems rather to be the case, for the naturer of a measure seems only to consist in a certain extrinsic denomination, and to be founded on our apprehension and use and mode of cognizing rather than on some relation or respect that existse in reality. For this reason, St. Thomas, in the mentioned article 2, attributes this opposition of the measure and thing measured to quantitative unity in relation to the number which is in 242. See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, p. 244b. 243. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b.

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se considerentur, eandem proportionem servat unum transcendens ad suam multitudinem, quam unum numerale, seu quantitatis ad suum numerum, quia &86 est principium eius, & illam componit, unde & per illud etiam mensurari potest. 86. Reading “quia & est” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following instead read “quia est”: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 6: How one and many are opposed. 189



quantity, and not to transcendental unity and multitude.244 And I do not see what purpose he could have had in saying this if it was not in reference to human use, or according to a certain denomination resulting therefrom. For if the thingsr are considered in themselves, the transcendental unit observes the same proportion to its multitude that the numerical unit, or the one of quantity, does to its number, since the transcendental unit both is its principle and composes it, for which reason transcendental multitude can also be measured by it. 244. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109a–b.

Sect. VII. An divisio sit prior indivisione. SEC TIO VII. An unum sit prius qua m multa, & indivisio qua m divisio. 1. Thomistae in hac re diverso modo loquuntur de unitate, & multitudine, divisione, & indivisione. Aiunt enim, unitatem natura sua esse priorem multitudine, quod est certum, & per se manifestum, tum quia per se loquendo unum est independens a multitudine in omni genere; non enim unum pendet a multis, sed multa ab uno, neque unum definitur per multa, multitudo autem definitur per unitatem: tum etiam, quia unum est principium, & componit multitudinem; unde etiam quoad subsistendi consequentiam non convertuntur; nam, si est multitudo, necesse est ut sit unitas; non vero e converso. 2. De divisione autem & indivisione aliqui dicunt, divisionem esse natura sua priorem indivisione, & unitate. Ita docet Soncin. lib. 4. Metaph. q. 23. ad 6. & 10. Metap. q. 4. & Iavell. ibi q. 6. Caiet. autem 1. p. q. 11. a. 2. circa ad 4. utitur distinctione vix intelligibili: ait enim quod divisio est prior unitate simpliciter secundum se, in esse tamen intelligibili; & quod est posterior unitate simpliciter, id est secundum esse simpliciter, quod est esse in rerum natura. Priorem partem probat, quia affirmatio est prior negatione: sed esse unum est esse hoc, & non esse non hoc: ergo divi⟨136b⟩sio inter illa [100a] extrema contradictoria praecedit naturaliter unitatem: secundum autem probat; quia negatio unius entis ab alio, quae est negatio realis, est posterior unitate. Ex quibus rationibus intelligitur sensus prioris distinctionis a Caietano propositae: nam per negationem in esse intelligibili videtur intelligere divisionem entis a non ente; & uniuscuiusque entis a tali non ente, quam alii vocant negationem rationis tantum: per negationem autem secundum esse rei intelligit divisionem unius entis ab alio, quae vocari

190

Section 7: Whether division is prior to indivision.

Section 7 Whether One Is Prior to M any, and Indivision to Division. 1. On this issue, Thomists speak in different ways of unity and multitude, division and indivision. For they say that unity is by its nature prior to multitude, which is certain and per se evident, both because, speaking per se, the unit is independent of multitude in every genus— for the unit does not depend on the many, but the many on the unit, nor is the unit defined by appeal to the many, but rather multitude is defined by appeal to unity—and also because the unit is a principle and composes a multitude, for which reason they are not converted by an inference of subsistence, for if there is a multitude, it is necessary that there be a unity, but not vice versa. 2. But regarding division and indivision, some say that division is by its nature prior to indivision and unity. Soncinas teaches this, Metaph. IV, q. 23, ad 6, and Metaph. X, q. 4,245 and also Javelli, in that book, q. 6.246 But Cajetan, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, in connection with the reply to the fourth argument, employs a distinction that is hardly intelligible.247 For he says that division is prior to unity without qualification in itself, but in intelligible beinge, and also that it is posterior to unity without qualification, that is, according to unqualified beinge, which is beinge in the nature of thingsr. He proves the first part because affirmation is prior to negation. But to be one is to be this and not to be not this. Therefore, the division between those contradictory extremes naturally precedes unity. And he proves the second because the negation of one being in respect of another, which is a real negation, is posterior to unity. 245. Paulus Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 37a, p. 235a. 246. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, pp. 853b–854a. 247. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), pp. 110b–111b.

191

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solet negatio realis. Sed, ut ex supra dictis constat, divisio, quam negat unitas per se primo, neutra ex his est, sed est negatio divisionis realis ipsius entis in se ipso; & de hac divisione inquiritur, an sit prior, vel posterior indivisione.

3. Et mihi quidem videtur, huiusmodi divisionem nullo modo esse priorem secundum rem, quam unum, vel indivisionem in illo inclusam: nam, si haec duo generatim, & in tota sua latitudine comparemus, prius est ens aliquod esse in se indivisum, quam quod sit aliqua divisio unius entis ab alio, vel alicuius entis in se ipso; si vero illas comparemus in singulis entibus, unumquodque ex natura sua prius habet in se indivisionem, quam divisionem. Quae ergo divisio, aut in quo subiecto, dicitur aut est secundum se prior indivisione, seu unitate? Deinde, nulla est ratio, quae contrarium suadeat, quia, quanvis indivisio opponatur divisioni per modum privationis, non propterea necesse est, divisionem esse priorem: primo quidem quia, licet in his, quae proprie & in rigore privative opponuntur, habitus natura sua sit prior negatione, quia talis privatio solum est in subiecto apto nato, quod natura sua prius respicit habitum, quam privationem; in privatione autem late sumpta, & impropria, qualis est indivisio unius, ut explicatum est, non est necesse, ut habitus sit prior negatione: ut, licet immateriale privative sumptum, negationem dicat, simpliciter prius est esse immateriale in rebus, quam esse materiale, quia non dicit privationem proprie dictam, & in subiecto apto nato, quod ex se prius postulet esse materiale, quam immateriale; & in homine, v. g. prius est generationis ordine ut dentibus careat, quam quod illos habeat, quae carentia, licet pro tempore infantiae non habeat propriissimam privationis rationem, magis tamen ad illam accedit, quam negatio divisionis, quam dicit indivisio unius: ergo ⟨137a⟩ multo minus necesse est ut in praesenti divisio sit prior natura sua indivisione. Et ideo D. Tho. 1. p. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 4. recte docuit, divisionem esse priorem unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae apprehensionis.



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From these arguments the sense of the earlier distinction proposed by Cajetan is understood. For by a negation in intelligible beinge he seems to understand the division of being from ­non-being, and of each being from a particular ­non-being, which division others call a negation of reason only. But by a negation according to real beinge he understands a division of one being from another, which is usually called a real negation. But, as is clear from the things said above, the division that unity denies per se in the first mode is neither of these, but the negation of real division in a being itself. And it is regarding this division that one inquires whether it is prior or posterior to indivision. 3. And to me indeed it seems that such division is in no way really prior to the unit or to the indivision included in it. For if we compare these two generally and in their entire extension, that some being is in itself undivided is prior to there being some division of one being from another, or to there being some division of some being in itself. But if we compare them in each being, each being by virtue of its nature has indivision in itself before division. Which division, therefore, or division in which subject, is being called (or is) prior in itself to indivision or unity? Further, there is no argument urging us to the contrary, for, although indivision is opposed to division in the manner of a privation, it is not for this reason necessary that division be prior—first, indeed, because, although in the case of those things which are properly and strictly privatively opposed, the habit is by its nature prior to the negation, since such a privation is only in a subject that is by nature suited [to the habit], and this subject by its nature is related to the habit prior to its being related to the privation, nevertheless, in the case of a privation taken broadly and improperly—and the indivision of the unit is of this sort (as has been explained248)—it is not necessary that the habit be prior to the negation. For example, although immaterial, taken privatively, signifiesd a negation, immaterial beinge is without qualification prior in reality to material beinge, since it does not signifyd a privation properly s­ o-called, present in a subject by nature suited [to the opposed habit], a subject which of itself requires material beinge prior to immaterial beinge. And in the case of the human being, for example, in the order of generation lacking teeth is prior to having them, and although 248. See DM 4.1.19.

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Sect. VII. An divisio sit prior indivisione.

4. Comparando ergo haec duo secundum se, & ex natura sua, sicut unitas multitudine; ita indivisio est prior divisione: quoad nos vero dicitur prior divisio indivisione: quia, cum indivisio cognoscatur ut negatio, necesse est, ut prius apprehendatur id, cuius est negatio: quia semper quoad nos affirmatio antecedit negationem, hoc autem intelligendum erit de [in]divisione87 sumpta formaliter pro negatione, vel pro fundamento negationis iuxta varios modos explicandi indivisionem unius, quos88 supra tractavimus. Et eodem modo loquitur Arist. lib. 10. tex. 6. de uno seu indivisione eius respectu multitudinis, ait enim multitudi[100b]nem esse ratione priorem propter sensum; in quo ultimo verbo satis declarat, se loqui de prioritate quoad nos; & ita exposuit ibi D. Thom. lect. 4. Et declarat id intelligendum esse de multitudine ratione divisionis tantum: nam, si sumatur multitudo secundum totum id, quod est de ratione eius; sic etiam quoad nos multitudo est posterior; quia nihil aliud est (inquit) quam aggregatio unitatum. Unde, licet ea quae sunt divisa, multa sint, non habent tamen rationem multorum, nisi postquam huic & illi attribuitur quod sit unum.

87. All the earlier editions read “divisione” here, but Charles Berton emends—correctly, I think—to “indivisione.” See Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 364a. 88. Reading “quos” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “quod”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 7: Whether division is prior to indivision. 195



during infancy this lack does not have the most proper characterr of a privation, nonetheless, it more closely approaches this characterr than does the negation of division which one’s indivision signifiesd. Therefore, much less is it necessary in the present case that division be prior by its nature to indivision. And therefore, St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4, rightly teaches that division is prior to unity, not without qualification, but according to the naturer of our apprehension.249 4. Comparing these two, then, in themselves and according to their natures, indivision is prior to division just as unity is prior to multitude. But in relation to us, division is called prior to indivision, for since indivision is cognized as a negation, it is necessary that that of which it is the negation be apprehended first, since in relation to us affirmation is always prior to negation, and this will have to be understood of [in]division taken formally as a negation, or as the foundation of a negation, according to the various ways of explaining the indivision of the unit that we have dealt with above.250 And Aristotle, in bk. X, text 6, speaks in the same way of the unit or its indivision in relation to multitude, for he says that in accountr multitude is prior “because of sense”—and in this final word he makes it sufficiently clear that he is speaking of priority in relation to us.251 And St. Thomas expounds the passage in this way, lect. 4.252 And he makes it clear that this is to be understood of multitude only by reason of division. For if multitude is taken in accordance with everything that pertains to its naturer, in this way multitude is also posterior in relation to us. “For it is nothing else,” he says, “than an aggregation of unities.”253 “For this reason, although those things which are divided are many, still, they do not have the naturer of the many except after being a unit is attributed to this thing and that thing.”254

249. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b. 250. See DM 4.1.13–19. 251. Aristotle, Metaph. X, ch. 3, 1054a26–29. 252. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, pp. 475a–476a (ns. 1989–98). 253. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 476a (n. 1995). 254. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 476a (n. 1998).

Sect. VIII. De prima divisione entis. SEC TIO VIII. An divisio entis in unum & multa sit prima omnium. 1. Scotus in 1. d. 8. q. 3. & in quodl. q. 5. a. 1. negat, hanc esse primam divisionem entis, sed aliam, qua dividitur ens in finitum, & in infinitum: quia haec duo membra contrahunt formaliter ens in quantum ens; alia vero contrahunt ens in quantum unum: ergo prior est illa divisio, quam haec. Consequentia patet, quia, sicut prior est89 ratio entis, quam ratio unius, ita etiam prior est divisio, quae convenit enti ut ens est,90 quam quae convenit enti ut unum est; illa enim divisio, quasi per se primo convenit enti: haec vero per se secundo: sicut, si in homine esse possent varii modi rationalitatis & risibilitatis, prior esset divisio hominis per modos rationalitatis, quam per modos risibilitatis. Antecedens vero quoad primam partem de⟨137b⟩claratur, quia essentia est, quae constituit ens in quantum ens: ergo prima diversitas essentiarum ut sic, est etiam prima divisio entis in quantum ens est: sed una essentia ut essentia differt ab alia, quatenus illa est tantae perfectionis essentialis, alia vero maioris, vel minoris; & haec est prima ratio, qua posita, & praecisis omnibus aliis, manet diversitas essentiarum; & illa ablata, non manet: hoc autem genus diversitatis primo ac per se reperitur inter essentiam infinite perfectam, & omnes alias finitas: ergo prima divisio entis est illa in infinitum, & finitum.91 Altera vero pars antecedentis patet ex supra dictis, quia illa duo membra, scilicet unum, & multa; ut 89. Reading “est” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 90. Reading “quae convenit enti ut ens est” with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following instead read: “quae convenit enti ut ens”: M4 , V5 , and Vivès. 91. Reading “in infinitum, & finitum” with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “in finitum, et infinitum.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. The following read instead “infinitum et finitum”: M1 , P1 , and P2.

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Section 8 Whether the Division of Being into One and M any Is the First of All . 1. Scotus, Sent. I, d. 8, q. 3, and Quodlibet, q. 5, art. 1, denies that this is the first division of being, holding instead that another division is, namely, that by which being is divided into finite and infinite.255 For these two members formally contract being as being, whereas the others contract being insofar as it is one. Therefore, the division of being into finite and infinite is prior to the division of being into one and many. The consequence is clear, since, just as the naturer of being is prior to the naturer of the unit, so also is that division which agrees with being insofar as it is being prior to that which agrees with being insofar as it is one. For the former division agrees with being, as it were, per se in the first mode, whereas the latter agrees with it per se in the second mode—just as, if there could be various modes of rationality and risibility in the human being, the division of the human being by modes of rationality would be prior to the division by modes of risibility. The antecedent, with respect to its first part, is made clear because it is an essence that constitutes a being as a being. Therefore, the first diversity of essences as such is also the first division of being insofar as it is being. But one essence as an essence differs from another insofar as it has a given amount of essential perfection while the other has more 255. In neither of the texts cited here does Scotus mention the division of being into one and many. See John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, vol. 4, pp. 169–229 (ns. 39–156), and John Duns Scotus, Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, trans. Felix Alluntis (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1968), pp. 166–74. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli might be describing the situation more accurately when he states, in his Treatise on the Transcendentals (Opera, t. 1, p. 464b), that “the Scotists, basing themselves on the teaching of Scotus in Sentences I, d. 8, q. 3, and Quodlibet, q. 5, hold that this division [sc. into finite and infinite] is prior to that by which being is divided into one and many” (Scotistae autem fundantes se super doctrinam Scoti in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. & in quolibet. 5. tenent hanc divisionem priorem illa, qua dividatur ens per unum & multa).

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possint dividere ens, oportet, ut aequivaleant divisioni entis in unum simpliciter, & unum tantum secundum quid, vel in unum per se, & unum per accidens: sed haec divisio formaliter sumpta est divisio entis ut unum est; ergo. Quod si quis contendat, etiam ens ut ens posse dividi per illos duos modos unitatis, idem poterit redire argumentum: sic enim illa92 divisio erit quasi denominativa (ut sic dicam) nam erit divisio per proprietatem entis, cum tamen prior sit essentialis, seu per modos per se primo & essentialiter contrahentes ens.

2. At vero Thomistae contendunt, primam divisionem entis esse in unum & multa, seu in ens per se, & per accidens. Ita tenet Soncin. 10. metap. q. 1. qui hoc tribuit D. Thom. 1. p. q. 11. art. 2. ad 4. & in 1. d. 24. q. 1. art. 3. quoniam dicit, quod primo cadit in intellectu esse ens, secundo divisionem, tertio unum, quarto multitudinem. Fundamentum est, quia unum est prima passio adaequata entis ut ens est, conveniens illi, etiam ut abstrahit a finito, vel infinito: ergo prius convenit enti, quam finitum, vel infinitum. [101a] Sed in primis ex loco illo D. Thom. nihil potest colligi, quia ibi non tractat de comparatione divisionis entis in unum & multa ad alias divisiones entis; sed de modo & ordine quo a nobis concipiuntur unum, & multa. Ratio etiam illa nullius est momenti; quia, ut recte fiat comparatio, non est facienda inter unum, ut est adaequata passio entis; & modos contrahentes ens; sic enim non negaret Scotus, unum prius convenire enti, quam finitum, & infinitum, vel alios similes modos: sicut proprietas adaequata generi, & convertibilis cum illo prius ratione intelligitur ei convenire, quam differentiae inferiores contrahentes: quia talis proprietas ⟨138a⟩ illi secundum se, & 92. Reading “illa” with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , S, V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “ista” instead: V5 and Vivès.



Section 8: On the first division of being. 199



or less. And this is the primary groundr, since, when it is posited and all others are set aside, the diversity of essences remains, and when it is taken away, this diversity does not remain. But this genus of diversity is found primarily and per se between an infinitely perfect essence and all other, finite ones. Therefore, the first division of being is that one into infinite and finite. And the second part of the antecedent is clear from the things said above, since those two members (namely, one and many), if they are to divide being, must be equivalent to the division of being into what is one without qualification and what is one only in a certain respect, or into what is one per se and what is one per accidens. But this division, formally taken, is a division of being insofar as it is one. Therefore. But if someone should argue that being as being can also be divided by those two modes of unity, one can return to the same argument, for then that division will be ­quasi-denominative (so to speak), since it will be a division through a property of being, whereas a division that is essential, or through modes that contract being per se in the first mode and essentially, is prior. 2. But the Thomists argue that the first division of being is into one and many, or into per se being and per accidens being. This is what Soncinas holds, Metaph. X, q. 1,256 and he attributes this view to St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, ad 4,257 and Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3,258 since St. Thomas says that being is what first presents itself to the intellect, in the second place division, in the third the unit, and in the fourth multitude. The foundation of this opinion is: because one is the first adequate passion of being insofar as it is being, agreeing with it even insofar as it abstracts from the finite or infinite. Therefore, it agrees with being before the finite or infinite. However, to begin with, from that passage of St. Thomas nothing can be inferred, because he is not there comparing the division of being into one and many with other divisions of being, but is rather discussing the way and order in which one and many are conceived by us. That argument too carries no weight, since, in order for the comparison to be rightly drawn, it must not be 256. Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, pp. 229a–230b. 257. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 110b. 258. Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66c (see ad 2).

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praecise convenit, differentia vero contrahens convenit ratione inferioris. Imo etiam si modi contrahentes ens inter se oppositi disiunctim sumantur, & tribuantur enti per modum unius proprietatis complexae, scilicet, finitum vel infinitum, &c. adhuc unum ut est proprietas adaequata & incomplexa censenda erit ratione prior; vel hoc ipso, quod simplicior est, & secundum se magis adaequata, & minus pendens ex alterius conceptione. Eo vel maxime, quod, ut supra dixi, haec praedicata complexa, seu disiuncta re vera non sunt proprietates entis in quantum ens: quia essentialiter dividunt ipsum ens. Ut ergo proprie fiat comparatio, loqui oportet de uno secundum determinatos modos unius, & hoc modo non procedit ratio facta, ut per se constat.

3. Aliter ergo Iavel. Tract. 1. de transc. cap. 1. varias proponens divisiones entis, primam dicit esse in ens reale & rationis; secundam, entis realis, in unum per se, & per accidens; tertiam, in absolutum, & respectivum; quartam (quae est tertia entis realis) in unum & multa; quintam in quinque transcendentia; ultimam in finitum, & infinitum: quem ordinem divisionum nullis rationibus confirmat. Id vero, quod ad praesentem dissensionem spectat, scilicet, quod duas illas divisiones comparando, scilicet, in unum & multa, & finitum, & infinitum illa sit prior, hac apparenti ratione probat; quia ens non dividitur in finitum, & infinitum, nisi in quantum bonum; sed alia divisio, ut dictum est, datur de ente in quantum est unum: ergo haec est prior illa; sicut passio unius prior est passione boni. Maior patet, quia finitum, & infinitum dividunt ens, secundum varios gradus perfectionis, ergo dividunt illud ut perfectum: ergo ut bonum: nam perfectum & bonum idem sunt. Unde etiam Scotus, quoniam existimat esse posse aliquod ens reale, quod perfectionem non dicat formaliter, aliam divisionem praemittit dicens, ens primo dividi in quantum & non quantum, quantitate, scili-



Section 8: On the first division of being. 201



made between one, insofar as it is an adequate passion of being, and the modes which contract being, for Scotus would not deny that one agrees with being before finite and infinite (or other similar modes) do, just as a property adequate to a genus and convertible with it is understood to agree with it in a way that is rationally prior to the way inferior contracting differences do, since such a property agrees with it in itself and precisely, whereas a contracting difference agrees with it by reason of an inferior. In fact, even if the mutually opposed modes that contract being are taken disjunctively and are attributed to being in the manner of one complex property—namely, finite or infinite, etc.—even then, one, insofar as it is an adequate and incomplex property, would have to be judged rationally prior, either because it is simpler, and in itself more adequate, and less dependent on the conception of something else, or especially because, as I said above,259 these complex or disjunctive predicates are not really properties of being as being, since they essentially divide being itself. Therefore, in order for the comparison to be properly made, it is necessary to speak of the unit according to determinate modes of the unit, and in this way the argument advanced does not succeed, as is clear per se. 3. Taking a different approach, Javelli, in the first treatise of On the Transcendentals, ch. 1, while proposing various divisions of being, says that the first division is into real being and being of reason; the second (of real being) is into the one per se and the one per accidens; the third is into the absolute and the relative; the fourth (which is the third division of real being) is into the one and the many; the fifth is into the five transcendentals; and the last is into the finite and the infinite.260 He confirms this order of divisions with no arguments. But as regards the present disagreement, in comparing those two divisions—namely, into the one and the many, and into the finite and the infinite—he undertakes to prove that the former is prior by means of the following clear argument: because being is not divided into finite and infinite except insofar as it is good. But that other division, as has been said, is of being insofar as it is one. Therefore, the latter division is prior to 259. See DM 3.2.11. 260. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, pp. 460a–464b. Note that Javelli’s Tractatus de Transcendentibus is not in fact divided into several treatises, but only into six chapters.

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cet, perfectionis; & postea ens quantum dividit, in finitum, & in infinitum: ergo ex eius sententia dividitur hic ens ut quantum seu perfectum. In quo etiam significare videtur Scotus priorem esse divisionem illam in absolutum, & relativum, quia solum ens relativum vocatur ab ipso non quantum, quia relatio ut sic non dicit perfectionem. Unde consequenter fit, solum ens absolutum dividi in finitum & in infinitum, quod etiam Iavell. docet. ⟨138b⟩

4. In hac quaestione supponere oportet, sermonem esse de ente reali: nam ens rationis, ut in superioribus dictum est, non habet communem conceptum nec rea[101b]lem convenientiam cum ente reali; & ideo divisio entis in ens reale, & rationis non recte inter divisiones entis annumeratur93: quia illa magis est divisio nominis, quam rei: hic vero non agimus de variis significationibus eiusdem vocis, sed de diversis modis, quibus conceptus rei significatae per vocem re ipsa determinari, seu contrahi potest. Denique hic solum agimus de divisione entis, quod supra diximus esse proprium Metap. obiectum: hoc autem non est ens, ut abstrahit ab ente reali, & rationis, sed ens reale tantum.

5. Rursus eadem ratione asserendum est, huiusmodi divisiones non esse intelligendas respectu entis, ut dividitur in ens per se, & per accidens, sumendo ens per accidens stricte pro ente omnino per aggregationem: nam, ut supra etiam ostensum est, huiusmodi divisio non est alicuius communis conceptus, sed vocis tantum secundum analogiam imperfectam alicuius proportionalitatis. Propter quod diximus, non 93. Reading “annumeratur” with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “numeratur”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 8: On the first division of being. 203



the former, just as the passion one is prior to the passion good. The major is clear, since finite and infinite divide being according to various grades of perfection. Therefore, they divide it insofar it is perfect. Therefore, they divide it insofar as it is good, since perfect and good are the same.261 For this reason, Scotus as well, since he thinks that there can be some real being that does not formally signifyd perfection, puts another division first, saying that being is first divided into the quan­ on-quantified—i.e., with quantity of perfection—and tified and the n he thereafter divides quantified being into finite and infinite.262 Therefore, according to his opinion, being as quantified or perfect is divided here. In connection with this, Scotus seems also to indicate that the division into absolute and relative is prior, since only relative being is called ­non-quantified by him, since a relation as such does not signifyd perfection.263 For this reason, it consequently results that only absolute being is divided into finite and infinite, which is something that Javelli also teaches.264 4. As regards this question, it must be supposed that the discussion concerns real being, for a being of reason, as was said above, does not have a concept in common with, nor a real agreement with, real being. And therefore the division of being into real being and being of reason is not rightly numbered among the divisions of being, since that is more the division of a name than of a thingr. But here we are not dealing with various significations of the same word, but with diverse modes by which the concept of the thingr signified by the word can really be determined or contracted. Finally, we are dealing here only with the division of that being which, we said above, is the proper object of metaphysics,265 and this is not being insofar as it abstracts from real being and being of reason, but real being alone. 5. Further, for the same reason it must be affirmed that such divisions are not to be understood in relation to being insofar as it is divided into per se being and per accidens being, taking per accidens being strictly for what is a being wholly by aggregation. For, as was 261. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 464b. 262. See John Duns Scotus, Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, p. 200 (q. 5, art. 3, n. 58). 263. See John Duns Scotus, Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, pp. 171–74 (q. 5, art. 1, ns. 12–15). 264. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, p. 464a. 265. See DM 1.1.

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esse huiusmodi ens in illa latitudine acceptum adaequatum obiectum huius doctrinae, sed solum ens reale per se, eo modo, quo possit habere aliquam unitatem rationis seu conceptus in rebus fundatam, ratione cuius sit capax, & proprietatum, & divisionum realium. Atque hinc fit, si divisio illa entis in unum & multa, sumatur in eo sensu, in quo coincidit cum praedicta divisione entis in per se, & per accidens, sic quidem posse dici priorem divisione entis in finitum, & in infinitum, eo modo, quo divisio seu aequivocatio vocis in omni doctrina explicanda prius est, quam res ipsa dividatur, quo sensu etiam illa divisio in ens rationis, & rei, potest dici prima. Proprie tamen loquendo de divisionibus realibus contrahentibus, seu dividentibus obiectum adaequatum huius scientiae, illa non potest in hoc ordine computari, magis, quam divisio entis in reale, & rationis: quia in ea etiam vox tantum communis est, non autem conceptus, ut ostensum est.

6. Superest ergo, ut comparemus divisiones has, quatenus in eis dividi potest ens reale ac per se communissime sumptum. Possunt autem comparari hae divisiones, vel in universalitate: sic enim una divisio potest dici prior alia, quia est universalior, & altera aliquo modo sub illa continetur; vel in maiori ⟨139a⟩ diversitate, & distantia inter membra dividentia: sic enim illa divisio potest dici prior, in qua membra dividentia primario, magisque inter se distant; vel denique comparari possunt in habitudine membrorum dividentium ad ipsum divisum: sic enim illa divisio dicenda videtur prior, in qua membra dividentia magis per se ac formaliter contrahunt divisum secundum propriam rationem formalem eius, ut argumentando pro utraque sententia citata declaratum est, nec apparet, qua alia ratione possit una divisio dici alia prior.



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shown above,266 such a division is not the division of some common concept, but only the division of a word according to an imperfect analogy of some proportionality. For this reason, we said that such being, understood with that extension, is not the adequate object of this doctrine, but only real per se being, in which way it can have some unity of notionr or concept that is founded on thingsr, by virtue of which it is capable of real properties and divisions. And hence it results that, if that division of being into one and many is taken in the sense in which it coincides with the mentioned division of being into per se and per accidens, then it can indeed be called prior to the division of being into finite and infinite, in the same way the division or equivocation of a word in every doctrine is to be explained before the thingr itself is divided, in which sense also that division into being of reason and real being can be called first. But speaking properly of real divisions that contract or divide the adequate object of this science, that division cannot be counted in this order any more than the division of being into real being and being of reason can. For in this case, too, only the word is common, but not the concept, as has been shown. 6. It remains, therefore, for us to compare these divisions insofar as real and per se being, taken in the most common way, can be divided by them. These divisions can be compared either in respect of universality, for in this way one division can be called prior to another because it is more universal and the other is in some way contained under it. Or they can be compared in terms of a greater diversity and distance between the dividing members, and in this way that division can be called prior in which the dividing members differ primarily and to a greater degree from each other. Or finally, they can be compared with respect to the relation that the dividing members bear to the thing divided, for in this way it seems that that division is to be called prior in which, to a greater degree, the dividing members per se and formally contract the thing divided according to its proper formal characterr, as was made clear in arguing for each of the two mentioned opinions. And there appears to be no other reason why one division can be called prior to another. 266. See DM 4.5.1–4.

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Sect. VIII. De prima divisione entis.

7. Ex his ergo tria videntur posse probabiliter dici in hac dissensione; primum est, quoad universalitatem neutram harum divisionum esse priorem altera: utraque enim est adaequata enti, & ambit totam latitudinem eius: neque ullo modo una sub altera continetur, aut est subdivisio illius. Hoc per se notum est, quia utriusque divisum est unum & idem ut supponimus, & in utraque membra dividentia includunt contradictionem immediatam, qua exhauriunt divisum. Et hoc quidem manifestum est in divisione entis in unum, & multa. De divisione autem in ens finitum, & infinitum, iuxta opinionem [102a] Scoti non est res ita clara: nam ipse cum multis aliis inveniunt medium inter illa duo membra quorundam entium realium, quae nullam dicunt perfectionem, & ideo ipse Scotus, ut supra dicebam, aliam divisionem praemittendam putavit entis in quantum, & non quantum, ut solum ens quantum possit adaequate dividi in finitum, & in infinitum: unde consequenter fit, hanc divisionem sic explicatam esse minus universalem, quam sit alia in unum & multa: nam illud ens, quod dicitur non quantum, sicut est ens, ita & unum existit. Ego tamen suppono, contrariam doctrinam esse veriorem, nullumque ens reale esse, quod ex proprio ac formali conceptu quantum non sit; & consequenter, vel finitum, vel infinitum, aut simpliciter, aut in proprio genere: de quo infra dicemus, ostendendo omne ens dicere aliquam perfectionem.

8. Dico secundo in modo dicta divisione entis membra dividentia magis inter se distare, primarioque differre, quam in altera divisione entis in unum & multa: atque hoc modo praedictam divisionem esse priorem. Suppono enim, infinitum in ea divisione sumi pro infinito in perfectione entitativa & essentiali, praesertim, quia, ut alias constat, solum huiusmodi infinitum est in rerum natura, ⟨139b⟩ nam in rebus creatis nullum infinitum potest esse absolute loquendo, quod non potius simpliciter finitum sit. Intra Deum autem, quicquid in ipso est, simpliciter, & essentialiter est infinitum, quanvis secundum praecisos nostros inadaequatos conceptus possit aliquid praesertim relativum, concipi infinitum tantum in aliquo genere, non concepta in eo dis-



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7. On this basis, then, it seems that three things can plausibly be said about this disagreement. The first is that, as regards universality, neither of these divisions is prior to the other, for each is adequate to being and embraces its entire extension. Nor is one in any way contained under the other, or a subdivision of the other. This is knownn per se, since what is divided by each is one and the same thing, as we suppose, and in each division the dividing members stand in immediate contradiction, by which the thing divided is exhausted. And this is indeed evident as regards the division of being into one and many. But the matter is not as clear when it comes to the division into finite and infinite being, according to Scotus’s opinion, for he himself,267 along with many others,268 discerns between those two members a middle ground, consisting in certain real beings which signifyd no perfection, and therefore Scotus himself, as I said above, thinks that another division is to be made first, of being into quantified and ­non-quantified, in such a way that only quantified being can be adequately divided into finite and infinite. For this reason it consequently results that this division, thus explained, is less universal than the other division into one and many. For that being which is called ­non-quantified exists as one in the same way it is a being. I, however, suppose that the contrary teaching is truer, and that there is no real being which, in accordance with its proper and formal concept, is not quantified, and consequently, either finite or infinite, whether without qualification or in its proper genus. Of this we shall speak below, when we show that every being signifiesd some perfection.269 8. I say, second, that in the ­just-mentioned division of being the dividing members are more distant from each other, and differ primarily to a greater degree, than in the other division of being into one and many, and that in this way the mentioned division is prior. For I suppose that the infinite in that division is taken for what is infinite in entitative and essential perfection, especially since, as is otherwise clear, only an infinite thing of this sort existse in the nature of thingsr, 267. John Duns Scotus, Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, p. 200 (q. 5, art. 3, n. 58). 268. See, for example, Antonio Trombetta, Opus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Venetiis, 1504), fols. 2ra–4ra. 269. See DM 10.1.11 and DM 10.3.4–5.

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tincte infinitate simpliciter, quod nihil ad praesens refert. Hinc ergo patet assertio posita, quia prima divisio datur per primam diversitatem, quae est inter Deum, & creaturas; secunda autem non ita; nam sub uno membro illius continentur Deus & plures creaturae, quae simpliciter, & in toto rigore unum per se sunt, sub altero vero aliae tantum creaturae, quae illo modo non sunt per se entia: magis autem distant inter se Deus & creatura, quam distare possit quaelibet ratio entis creati ab alia ratione, etiam creata, vel saltem communi Deo & creaturis: nam illa infinite simpliciter distant: haec vero minime. Explicatur haec ratio in hunc modum, quia illa duo membra entis in unum, & multa, solum differunt iuxta maiorem, vel minorem unitatem ipsius entis, & quantum est ex vi illius divisionis non magis distant inter se illa duo membra, quam distet unitas exercitus v. g. ab unitate hominis: nam, licet alia entia possint per se magis distare in unitate; tamen ex vi illius divisionis illa maior diversitas non explicatur, sed praedicta sufficit: sed multo magis distant inter se ens finitum & infinitum, quam unitas per se & per accidens ut sic: ergo in hoc sensu illa divisio est prior, utpote declarans summam atque primariam entis diversitatem, seu distantiam.

9. Ex quo infero, idem iudicium ferendum esse de divisione entis in increatum, & creatum; & in ens per essentiam, & per participationem; vel in purum actum, & ens potentiale aliquo modo: omnes enim hae divisiones in re coincidunt, & sub diversis conceptibus negativis, seu connotativis, declarant eandem entis partitionem & diversitatem. Et eadem ratione existimo, hanc divisionem esse priorem divisione entis in substantiam & accidens, etiam si in94 universalitate sint aequales: 94. Reading “in” here with all the earlier editions. Vivès omits this word.



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for among created thingsr there can be no infinite thing, absolutely speaking, which is not rather finite without qualification. But in God, whatever is in him is without qualification and essentially infinite, although, in accordance with our inadequate prescinded concepts, something, especially something relative, can be conceived as infinite merely in some genus, the unqualified infinity in it not being distinctly conceived—which is not relevant to the present issue. For this reason, then, the proposed affirmation is clear, since the first division is given through the first diversity, which is between God and creatures. The second, however, is not, for one of its members contains under itself God and various creatures which without qualification and in all strictness are one per se, whereas the other member contains under itself only other creatures which are not in this way per se beings. But God and a creature are more distant from each other than any naturer of a created being can be from another naturer that is likewise created or even common to God and creatures. For the former are without qualification infinitely distant from each other, the latter not at all so. This argument is explained in the following way: because those two members of being, one and many, differ only according to the greater or lesser unity of being itself, and by virtue of that division, those two members are not more distant from each other than are the unity of an army (for example) and the unity of a human being. For although other beings can per se differ more with respect to unity, nevertheless, that greater diversity is not explained by appeal to this division; rather, the mentioned one suffices. But finite and infinite being differ far more from each other than do per se and per accidens unity as such. Therefore, in this sense that division is prior, inasmuch as it makes clear the supreme and primary diversity or distance of being. 9. From this I infer that the same judgment is to be made regarding the division of being into uncreated and created, into being by essence and being by participation, or into pure act and being that is in some way potential. For all these divisions coincide in reality and make clear the same division and diversity of being under diverse negative or connotative concepts. And for the same reason I hold that this division is prior to the division of being into substance and accident, even though they are equal in universality. For uncreated and created being differ more, and

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quia magis distat, & primo diversum est ens increatum a creato, quam accidens di[102b]stet a substantia ut sic, seu a substantia creata, quod perinde est. Et eadem vel maiori95 ratione prior est illa divisio, quam alia in absolutum & relativum, quia similiter priora duo membra magis distant ac diversa sunt: nam tota ⟨140a⟩ diversitas inter absolutum & relativum in creaturis salvatur absque infinita distantia: imo illae duae rationes formales conceptae, non sunt inter se ita diversae, quin possint in eandem simplicissimam rem coincidere, saltem in Deo: unde etiam illae duae rationes non solum non distant, ut ens creatum & increatum; verum etiam ex se neutra postulat, ut creata, vel increata sit, ut in materia de Trinitate Theologi docent. 10. Tertio dicendum est, si divisiones illae comparentur formaliter ad divisum, sic divisionem entis in infinitum & finitum, etiam esse priorem, respectu entis ut sic, quanvis altera sit prior respectu unius ut unum est. Hanc assertionem probat sufficienter fundamentum adductum in favorem Scoti, quia modi significati per finitum, & infinitum sunt per se ac formaliter determinantes rationem entis, seu essentiae ut sic: omnis enim essentia realis hoc ipso, quod realitatem essentialiter includit, intrinsece & essentialiter postulat, & perfectionem aliquam essentialem, & modum seu gradum talis perfectionis. Unde etiam Caiet. 1. part. quaest. 11. in principio, dubitans, cur prius egerit D. Tho. de perfectione, & infinitate Dei, quam de unitate, respondet, quia illa duo continentur intra latitudinem praedicatorum96 quidditativorum; unitas vero ad passiones entis spectat. Sicut ergo97 in Deo prius secundum rationem est, quod sit perfectus & infinitus in essentia, quam quod sit unus: quia illa duo nostro modo intelligendi significant formalissimam talis essentiae constitutionem; ita in ente creato talis ac tanta uniuscuiusque perfectio essentialis prior est, quam unitas eius: ergo in communi respectu entis formalior ac prior est divisio eius per modos essentiae primo & summe diversos, quales significantur illis vocibus, finitum & infinitum, quam divisio per modos unitatis. 95. Reading “maiori” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following read “maiore” instead: M4 , V5 , and Vivès. 96. Reading “praedicatorum” here with P1 , P2 , S , V1 , and V2. The following instead read “praedicamentorum”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 97. Reading “ergo” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit this word: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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in a more primary way, than accident differs from substance as such, or from created substance (which comes to the same thing). And for the same or a greater reason this division is prior to that other one into absolute and relative, since the former two members likewise differ more and are more diverse, for the entire difference between absolute and relative is preserved in creatures without infinite distance. In fact, those two conceived formal charactersr are not so different from each other that they cannot coincide in the same most simple thingr, at least in God. For this reason also not only do those two charactersr not differ as created and uncreated being, but also neither of itself requires that it be created or uncreated, as theologians teach on the subject of the Trinity. 10. Third, it must be said that if those divisions are formally compared to what is divided, in this way also the division of being into infinite and finite is prior in relation to being as such, although the other is prior in relation to the one insofar as it is one. The foundation adduced in favor of Scotus sufficiently proves this claim, since the modes signified by finite and infinite are per se and formally determinant of the naturer of being, or of the naturer of essence as such. For every real essence, by virtue of the fact that it essentially includes reality, intrinsically and essentially requires both some essential perfection and a mode or grade of such perfection. For this reason also Cajetan, ST I, q. 11, at the beginning, wondering why St. Thomas treats of the perfection and infinity of God before his unity, replies that it is because the former two are contained within the extension of quidditative predicates, whereas unity belongs among the passions of being.270 Therefore, just as in the case of God the fact that he is perfect and infinite in essence is rationally prior to the fact that he is one—since the former two, according to our mode of understanding, signify the most formal constitution of such an essence—so also in the case of created beings the particular kind and quantity of essential perfection that each creature has is prior to its unity. Therefore, with respect to being generally, the division of it by modes of essence that are primarily and supremely diverse—the likes of which are signified by those words, “finite” and “infinite”—is more formal than, and prior to, the division by modes of unity. 270. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 108a.

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11. Neque contra hoc obstat98 Iavelli ratio; negatur enim finitum aut infinitum dividere ens in quantum bonum, formaliter loquendo de bono, ut est passio entis; quia, ut infra videbimus, habere perfectionem aliquam ut sic non est passio entis realis, sed essentia: nomine enim essentialis perfectionis nihil aliud significatur, quam ipsamet rei essentia, quae, ut non sit ficta, sed realis, aliquid perfectionis formaliter esse debet: nam, si sit essentia infinita simpliciter, se ipsa est summa perfectio, si autem sit finita, est aliqualis participatio illius perfectionis. Quid autem addat ⟨140b⟩ ratio boni, ut est passio entis, supra perfectionem entis, dicemus postea. Quod vero divisio illa in unum & multa, eo modo quo explicata est, formalius sit divisio unius ut unum est, quam entis ut ens est, facile constat ex dictis: quia illa duo membra, ut possint dividere ens per se, ita sumi debent, ut significent diversos modos unitatis: sive per unum significetur id, quod ita est unum per se, ut nullo modo sit per accidens unum; per multa vero id, quod est simpliciter unum per accidens, licet aliqua ratione sit per se unum: sive per unum significetur id, quod ita est unum, ut in eo nulla sit multitudo, etiam in potentia; per multa vero omne ens, quod, licet sit per se unum, [103a] est aliquo modo multa, saltem in potentia: his enim omnibus rationibus solum describuntur diversi modi unitatis: constat autem varios unitatis modos formalius contrahere unum, quam ens.

12. His ergo modis comparari possunt praedictae divisiones; nec nunc occurrit alia ratio, vel causa ob quam una divisio entis possit dici prior alia. Unde etiam obiter constat, ordinem illum divisionum, quem Iavellus ponit, nulla ratione niti, aut fundari, & praesertim impropriissima est illa divisio, qua dividit ens in sex transcendentia (de aliis enim iam satis dictum est) cum enim transcendentia omnia aequalia sint inter se, & cum ente convertantur, non potest proprie illa dici divisio entis, sed est annumeratio quaedam, tum entis, tum eorum, quae ipsi enti per se, & adaequate insunt. 98. Reading “obstat” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following read “obstet” instead: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 8: On the first division of being. 213



11. Nor does Javelli’s argument stand in the way of this, since I deny that finite or infinite divides being insofar as it is good, speaking formally of the good insofar as it is a passion of being. For, as we shall see below, to have some perfection as such is not a passion of real being, but the essence.271 For by the name “essential perfection” nothing is signified other than the very essence of the thingr, which, in order that it not be fictitious, but real, must formally be some perfection, since if it is an essence that is without qualification infinite, it is by itself supreme perfection, but if it is finite, it is some sort of participation in that perfection. But we shall say later what the naturer of the good, insofar as it is a passion of being, adds to the perfection of a being.272 But that the division into one and many, in the way it has been explained, is more formally a division of the one insofar as it is one, than it is of being insofar as it is being, is easily established on the basis of what has been said. For those two members, if they are to divide per se being, must be taken in such a way that they signify diverse modes of unity, whether one signifies what is one per se in such a way that it is nowise one per accidens, while many signifies what is without qualification one per accidens, even though it is in some way one per se; or one signifies what is one in such a way that there is no multitude in it, not even in potency, while many signifies every being which, though one per se, is in some way many, at least in potency. For by means of all these notionsr it is only diverse modes of unity that are described. But it is clear that the various modes of unity more formally contract one than they do being. 12. The mentioned divisions, therefore, can be compared in these ways. Nor does any other reason or ground present itself here for calling one division of being prior to another. For this reason, it is also clear, incidentally, that that order of divisions which Javelli posits is supported by, or founded on, no basisr. And above all, that division by which he divides being into six transcendentals (for regarding the others enough has been said) is most improper, for since all transcendentals are equal to each other and are converted with being, it cannot properly be called a division of being. It is, rather, a certain enumera271. See DM 10.1.9–11. 272. See DM 10.1.12.

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13. Ultimo inquiri hic poterat, an multitudo, seu numerus ut sic dicat unam formalitatem realem, & an in hoc sit aliqua differentia inter multitudinem transcendentalem, & numerum qui ponitur species quantitatis, sed de hac re dicemus infra commodius de quantitate disputantes.



Section 8: On the first division of being. 215



tion, both of being and of those things which are per se and adequately in being itself. 13. Finally, it could be inquired here whether multitude or number as such signifiesd one real formality, and whether in this respect there is some difference between transcendental multitude and that number which is supposed a species of quantity. But it will be more convenient to speak of this matter below, while treating of quantity.273 273. See DM 41.1.

Sect. IX. Qualis sit unitas transcendentalis. SEC TIO IX. Utrum unitas tr anscendentalis sit unitas numeric a, vel quaena m ill a sit. 1. Duplici sensu tractari potest haec quaestio iuxta duplicem acceptionem unitatis numeralis, scilicet, vel pro unitate quantitativa, vel pro unitate singulari, sic enim dixit Arist. li. 3. Met. tex. 14. unum numero an singulare dicas nihil interest; etenim hoc modo singulare exponimus, quod numero est unum. Iuxta has ergo duas acceptiones, duae quaestiones vel opiniones tractandae sunt. ⟨141a⟩

Variae sententiae de unitate quantitativa. 2. Prima opinio fuit Avicennae, quam referunt D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 11. art. 1. & in 1. d. 24.99 quaest. 1. art. 3. & 4. Metap. lect. 2. & ibidem Comment. com. 3. qui asseruit unitatem, quae provenit entibus a quantitate, esse ipsam unitatem transcendentalem rerum: unde conclusit, unum addere supra ens quantitatem. Quae sententia sic universe sumpta plane falsa est, tum quia, vel oportebit dicere nulla esse entia, nisi quanta, vel unitatem non esse passionem entis adaequatam, sed propriam entium materialium; tum etiam quia in ipsismet materialibus, & quantis entibus existit propria unitas & integritas, quam unumquodque ens in se ipso habet, quae non est formaliter a quantitate, licet non sit sine quantitate, ut est sectione 3. tactum, & in disputatione sequente, & in disp. etiam de quantitate iterum atque iterum100 dicetur. 99. Reading “24.” here with S , V1 , and V2. The following instead read “14.”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 100. Reading “iterum atque iterum” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , P1 , P2 , S , V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4. The following instead read “iterum”: M4 , V5 , and Vivès.

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Section 9 Whether Tr anscendental Unit y Is Numeric al Unit y, or Which Unit y It Is. 1. This question can be dealt with in two senses according to the twofold acceptation of “numerical unity,” namely, either as quantitative unity or as singular unity, for Aristotle speaks in this way in Metaph. III, text 14: “It makes no difference whether you say one in number or singular, for we explain the singular in this way, as the one in number.”274 According to these two acceptations, then, two questions or opinions must be discussed.

Various opinions regarding quantitative unity. 2. The first opinion is Avicenna’s, which St. Thomas reports, ST I, q. 11, art. 1, and Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1, art. 3, and Metaph. IV, lect. 2,275 as does the Commentator, in the same place, comment 3,276 Avicenna asserting that the unity which comes to beings from quantity is the same as the transcendental unity of thingsr, for which reason he concludes that one adds quantity to being. And this opinion, thus universally taken, is clearly false, both because it will be necessary to say either that there are no beings except quantified ones, or that unity is not an adequate passion of being, but is rather proper to material beings, and also because in material and quantified beings themselves there exists a proper unity and integrity which each being has in itself, and which is not formally from quantity, although it does not existe without quantity, as 274. Aristotle, Metaph. III, ch. 4, 999b33–1000a1. 275. Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 107b; Thomas Aquinas, S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. Busa), p. 66a–b; Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, pp. 155b–156a (ns. 556–59). 276. Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. 8, fols. 67B–G.

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3. Si autem haec opinio solum assereret, unitatem quantitatis esse unam ex unitatibus transcendentalibus, haberet apparentem aliquam probabilitatem. Nam, sicut ens commune est quantitati, & caeteris praedicamentis, ita & unum transcendens commune est omnibus illis: unde, sicut ens determinatur ad singula praedicamenta per proprios modos entitatis; & ens transcendens ut inclusum in singulis praedicamentis, nihil aliud est, quam tale, vel tale ens: ita unum transcendens determinatur ad singula praedicamenta per tales modos unitatis: & unum transcendens ut inclusum in sin[103b]gulis praedicamentis nihil aliud erit, quam tale, vel tale unum. Ergo unitas transcendens in quantitate nihil aliud est, quam talis unitas, quam quantitas natura sua postulat. Ergo hoc modo videtur dici posse unitatem quantitativam non distingui a transcendentali, non quia cum illa convertatur, sed quia est pars quaedam subiectiva eius: ad eum modum, quo dici etiam potest quantitas non distingui ab ente. Et hoc modo docuit illam sententiam Durand. in 1. distinct. 24. quaest. 2. qui consequenter ait, in singulis praedicamentis posse distingui speciales modos unitatis, & multitudinis, non tamen esse peculiaria nomina imposita ad haec significanda, nisi in quantitate: quia ratio divisibilitatis, seu continui divisibilis ex cuius divisione resultat numerus, ut dicitur 3. Phys. cap. 7. peculiari modo reperitur in quantitate. 4. Atque haec sententia procedit distinguendo quantitatem a re quanta: nam qui putant ⟨141b⟩ quantitatem nihil addere substantiae, consequenter aiunt, unum transcendens, & quod est principium numeri, nihil inter se distingui, quod multis rationibus conatur defendere Greg. in 1. d. 24. q. 1. & 2. Non quod putet omne unum esse quantum, sed e converso quia putat, omne unum esse transcendens, & unum quantitativum nihil aliud esse, quam unum transcendens in substantia, vel accidentibus materialibus. Sed de distinctione quantitatis a re quanta alibi dicendum est: nunc supponimus quantitatem habere entitatem distinctam a reliquis. Quo supposito sententia Durandi hac ratione confirmari potest: nam ens, & unum transcendens convertuntur: ergo de quocunque unum dicitur, aliud etiam praedicatur: sed quantitas est



Section 9: What kind of unity transcendental unity is. 219



was touched on in section 3,277 and this will be said again and again in the following disputation, and also in the disputation on quantity.278 3. But if this opinion only asserted that the unity of quantity is one of the transcendental unities, it would have some clear plausibility. For just as being is common to quantity and the other categories, so also is the transcendental unit common to all of them. For this reason, just as being is determined to each of the categories by proper modes of entity, and transcendental being, insofar as it is included in each category, is nothing other than being of this or that sort, so also is the transcendental unit determined to each category by particular modes of unity, and the transcendental unit, insofar as it is included in each category, will be nothing other than this or that sort of unit. Therefore, transcendental unity in quantity is nothing other than unity of the sort that quantity by its nature requires. In this way, therefore, it seems that it can be said that quantitative unity is not distinguished from transcendental unity, not because it is converted with it, but because it is a certain subjective part of it, in the way quantity can also be said not to be distinguished from being. And in this way does Durandus teach this opinion in Sent. I, d. 24, q. 2, and he consequently says that special modes of unity and multitude can be distinguished in each of the categories, but that special names have not been imposed to signify them, except in the case of quantity.279 For, as is said in Phys. III, ch. 7, the naturer of divisibility, or the naturer of the divisible continuum from the division of which number results, is found in quantity in a special way.280 4. And this opinion proceeds by distinguishing quantity from the thingr quantified, for those who think that quantity adds nothing to substance consequently assert that the transcendental unit and the unit which is the principle of number are in no way distinguished from each other, which Gregory of Rimini, Sent. I, d. 24, q. 1 and q. 2, endeavors to defend by means of many arguments.281 Not because he thinks that 277. See DM 4.3.9–11 and DM 4.3.19. 278. See DM 5.3.9–17 and DM 41.2.4. 279. Durandus of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, fol. 72vb. 280. Aristotle, Phys. III, ch. 7, 207a33–b21. 281. Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, t. 3, pp. 10–58.

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ens: ergo est unum transcendens: non est autem unum transcendens nisi sua unitate quantitativa: ergo illa sub unitate transcendentali continetur. Alioqui oporteret fingere duas unitates in una quantitate; aliam transcendentalem, aliam quantitativam, quod supervacaneum est, & vix potest mente concipi.

5. Hanc vero Avicennae sententiam improbant Averr. supra & D. Tho. qui consequenter docent, unitatem quantitativam hoc differre a transcendentali, quod aliquid positivum & reale enti addit, quod non addit unitas transcendentalis. Ex quo aliqui eliciunt, unitatem quantitativam addere ipsi quantitati aliquid positivum, & hoc modo differre ab unitate transcendentali ipsiusmet quantitatis; & ratione illius positivi esse principium numeri, qui ponitur species quantitatis, cum tamen multitudo transcendentalis propriam & realem speciem entis conficere non censeatur. Ita sentit101 Iavel. 4. Met. q. 8. cum Capreol. in 1. d. 24. q. unica, ubi varia loca D. Tho. adducit; & potissime in hoc fundatur, quod si unitas quantitativa non esset aliquid positivum praeter indivisionem negativam quantitatis, nec numerus quantitativus esset certa aliqua species realis, nec esset ulla ratio constituendi illum numerum inter species rerum potius quam numerum quorumvis entium. Si autem quaeras, quidnam sit illud, quod addit unitas supra quantitatem; Respondere videtur Capreol. in explicatione primae conclusionis; in quantitate duo esse distinguenda, scilicet formam continuitatis & esse quod talis quantitas continua dat subiecto; & significat unitatem addere supra quantitatem hoc posterius esse. Quia ⟨142a⟩ forma (inquit) 101. Reading “sentit” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “tenet”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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every unit is quantified, but conversely, because he thinks that every unit is transcendental, and that the quantitative unit is nothing other than the transcendental unit in a material substance or in material accidents. But we must speak elsewhere of the distinction between quantity and the thingr quantified.282 For now, we suppose that quantity has an entity distinct from other things. Assuming this, the opinion of Durandus can be confirmed by means of the following argument. For being and the transcendental unit are converted. Therefore, whatever one of them is said of, the other is also predicated of. But quantity is a being. Therefore, it is a transcendental unit. But it is not a transcendental unit except by its quantitative unity. Therefore, quantitative unity is contained under transcendental unity. Otherwise, it would be necessary to imagine two unities in a single quantity, one transcendental and the other quantitative, which is superfluous and can hardly be conceived by the mind. 5. However, Averroes and St. Thomas, cited above, reject Avicenna’s opinion, and they consequently teach that quantitative unity differs from transcendental unity in this respect: quantitative unity adds to a being something real and positive, which transcendental unity does not add. And from this some infer that quantitative unity adds something positive to quantity itself and in this way differs from the transcendental unity of the same quantity, and that by reason of this positive element it is the principle of the number which is posited as a species of quantity, whereas transcendental multitude is not thought to compose a proper and real species of being. Javelli thinks this, Metaph. IV, q. 8,283 together with Capreolus, Sent. I, d. 24, the sole question,284 in which place he adduces various passages from St. Thomas. And this opinion is founded especially on the following: because if quantitative unity were not something positive aside from the negative indivision of quantity, neither would quantitative number be some determinate real species, nor would there be any reason to establish that number among the species of thingsr, preferably to the number of any old beings. And if you ask what that thing is which unity adds to quantity, Capreolus 282. See DM 40.2. 283. Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli, Opera, t. 1, pp. 741b–742a. 284. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2, p. 185b–187a.

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continuitatis est divisibilis in multa, & ideo non meretur dici unitas, de cuius ratione est indivisibilitas, sed esse, quod illa forma dat subiecto, dicitur unitas quia id nullo modo est divisibile: quia, si forma illa vel [104a] subiectum dividatur, esse primum non remanet, nec dividitur, sed quaelibet pars divisi habet novum esse; & non habet illud, quod prius. Citatque Avicen. 3. Metaph. cap. 2. dicentem, unitatem substantialiter esse ipsum esse, quod102 non dividitur. Unde significat Capreol. hoc positivum, quod addit unitas quantitativa supra quantitatem, esse ab illa realiter distinctum. AEgid. vero eadem d. quaest. 2. dub. 2. eandem tenens opinionem de additione positiva sentit, illud additum solum ratione distingui, hoc modo, quod quantitas quatenus extendit partes substantiae, dicatur quantitas continua, quatenus vero perficit substantiam nulla habita ratione partium, dicatur unitas. Alii vero dicunt, unitatem quantitativam addere supra quantitatem rationem mensurae ex D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 11. art. 2. & 4. Metaph. lect. 3.

6. Sed haec sententia falsa sine dubio est, ut Hervaeus, Thom. de Argent. Durand. Greg. & alii notarunt dicta dist. Nam distinctio illa, quam fingit Capreol. commentitia est, & plane inintelligibilis. Tum quia esse, quod dat quantitas (iuxta veriorem sententiam) non est res distincta ab ipsa quantitate actuali, & reali, ut infra generatim dicetur, tum etiam quia esto esset distinctum, non tamen in quantitate magis distingueretur,103 quam distinguatur in albedine forma albedinis ab esse quod dat subiecto, vel in forma lapidis ipsa forma ab esse, quod dat materiae: ergo vel haec distinctio non satis est, ut unitas quantitatis dicatur aliquid addere supra quantitatem, vel idem dicendum est de unitate albedinis, & cuiuscunque alterius formae creatae, tum praeterea, quia 102. Reading “ipsum esse, quod” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “ipsum quod”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 103. Reading “distingueretur” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “distinguetur”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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seems to reply in the explanation of the first conclusion that in quantity two things must be distinguished, namely, the form of continuity and the beinge which such continuous quantity gives to the subject, and he indicates that unity adds this latter beinge to quantity. “Because the form of continuity,” he says, “is divisible into many, and therefore does not deserve to be called unity, to the naturer of which indivisibility pertains, whereas the beinge that that form gives to the subject is called unity because it is in no way divisible, for if that form or the subject is divided, the first beinge does not remain, nor is it divided, but any part of the thing divided has a new beinge and does not have the one that it had before.”285 And he cites Avicenna, Metaphysics, book 3, ch. 2, as saying that unity is substantially beinge that is not divided.286 For this reason, Capreolus indicates that this positive thing which quantitative unity adds to quantity is really distinct from it. But Giles of Rome, in the same distinction, q. 2, doubt 2, holding the same opinion regarding a positive addition, thinks that that added element is only rationally distinguished, in this way: that quantity, insofar as it extends the parts of a substance, is called continuous quantity, but insofar as it perfects the substance without regard to its parts, it is called unity.287 But others say that quantitative unity adds to quantity the naturer of a measure, relying on St. Thomas, ST I, q. 11, art. 2, and Metaph. IV, lect. 3.288 6. But this opinion is undoubtedly false, as Hervaeus,289 Thomas de Argentina,290 Durandus,291 Gregory of Rimini,292 and others have 285. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2, p. 187a. 286. John Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 2, p. 187a. Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, sive scientia divina I–IV, pp. 119–20. (See also n. 175 above.) 287. Giles of Rome, In Primum Librum Sententiarum (Venetiis: 1521) [Reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H, 1968], fol. 130I. 288. See Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, t. 4 (Leonina), p. 109a–b, and Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 156a (n. 560). (The second reference should be to lect. 2, rather than lect. 3.) 289. Hervaeus Natalis, In quatuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum (Venetiis: Per Lazarum de Soardis, 1505), fols. 44vb–45ra. 290. Thomas de Argentina [Thomas of Strasbourg], Commentaria in IIII. Libros Sententiarum (Venetiis: Ex officina Stellae, Iordani Ziletti, 1564), fols. 82vb–83va. 291. Durandus of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, fols. 72vb–73rb. 292. Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, t. 3, pp. 30–32.

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admisso illo esse distincto a quantitate, sine fundamento fingitur esse indivisibilius ipsa quantitate: quis enim credat diviso ligno, in singulis partibus divisis manere eandem quantitatem, quae antea erat; & non manere idem esse quantitatis quod ipsa quantitas conferebat? Non est enim maior ratio corruptionis unius, quam alterius: imo omnes etiam, qui sentiunt esse distingui realiter a forma, a qua provenit, sentiunt, saltem naturaliter, & per potentiam ordinariam esse inseparabile ab illa, ipsa manente. Quod si fortasse Capreol. dicat, se non loqui de esse existentiae quanti⟨142b⟩tatis, sed de quodam alio distincto a quantitate & existentia eius: hoc sane nulla indiget refutatione: quia est merum commentum sine fundamento confictum. Et praeterea, quomodocunque explicetur illud esse, non potest esse indivisibilius ipsa quantitate: quia sicut tota quantitas dat esse toti subiecto, ita pars quantitatis parti subiecti; neque ex partiali quantitate, quae est in una parte subiecti, provenit aliquod104 esse, quod sit in aliis partibus subiecti, neque e converso: illud ergo esse debet necessario coextendi ipsi quantitati: nec potest esse indivisibile magis, quam ipsa. Praecipue cum materiale sit, & corporeum, & in subiecto divisibili. Nec verum est, quod Capreol. ait, formam continuitatis non posse dici unitatem, quia indivisibilitas est de ratione unitatis: in superioribus enim a nobis probatum est, non indivisibilitatem, sed indivisionem tantum esse de ratione unitatis; & ideo nihil repugnare ut forma unitatis, id est, in qua fundatur unitas, divisibilis sit, dummodo sit indivisa. Haec ergo Capreoli declaratio nulla ratione subsistit.

104. Reading “aliquod” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “aliquid”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



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noted in the mentioned distinction. For that distinction which Capreolus fashions is fictitious and clearly unintelligible, because the beinge which quantity gives (according to the truer opinion) is not a thingr distinct from the actual and real quantity itself, as will be said generally below.293 And also because even if it were distinct, nevertheless, it would not be more distinguished in the case of quantity than the form of whiteness is distinguished (in the case of whiteness) from the beinge that it gives to the subject, or than the form of a stone is distinguished (in the case of this form) from the beinge that it gives to matter. Therefore, either this distinction is not enough to say that the unity of quantity adds something to quantity, or the same must be said of the unity of whiteness, and of whatever other created form. And also because, granted that that beinge is distinct from quantity, it is without foundation imagined to be more indivisible than the same quantity. For who is there who believes that, when wood is divided, the same quantity that existede before remains in each of the divided parts, and that the same beinge of the quantity which the same quantity contributed does not remain? For there is no greater reason for the corruption of the one than there is for the corruption of the other. In fact, even all those who think that the beinge is really distinguished from the form from which it comes think that, at least naturally and by ordinary power, this beinge is inseparable from the form while the form remains. But if by chance Capreolus were to say that he is not speaking of the quantity’s beinge of existence, but of a certain other beinge distinct from quantity and its existence, this certainly requires no refutation, since it is a pure fiction devised without foundation. Moreover, in whatever way that beinge is explained, it cannot be more indivisible than the quantity itself, for just as the whole quantity gives beinge to the whole subject, so does part of the quantity give beinge to part of the subject, nor does there arise, from the partial quantity that is in one part of the subject, some beinge which is in other parts of the subject, or vice versa. Therefore, that beinge must necessarily be coextensive with the same quantity. Nor can it be more indivisible than the quantity. Especially since it is material and corporeal and in a divisible subject. Nor is what Capreolus says true, namely, 293. See DM 31.1 and DM 31.11.23–29, especially paragraphs 27 and 28.

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7. Alia etiam distinctio AEgidii nulla omnino est, [104b] nisi tantum in vocibus, tum quia quantitas non aliter perficit substantiam, quam extendendo illam in partes, tum etiam, quia est repugnantia dicere, quantitatem habere rationem unitatis numeralis, quatenus abstrahit a partibus, nam de intrinseca ratione huius unitatis est, ut sit in subiecto quanto & habente partes; & fere hoc solum addit supra unitatem transcendentalem. Alia denique expositio de ratione mensurae facile refellitur, tum quia ratio mensurae non pertinet per se primo ad unitatem, sed consequitur illam, ut recte D. Tho. docet lib. 4. Metaph. lect. 8. & lib. 10. lect. 2. Tum etiam quia haec ratio mensurae, si quoad aptitudinem, quae in re ipsa est, consideretur, eadem proportione reperitur in uno transcendentali respectu multitudinis, qua est in uno quantitativo respectu numeri quantitatis: si vero consideretur quoad usum hominum, id parum refert ad rationem unitatis prout in se existit. Denique contra totam hanc sententiam faciunt, tum Aristotelis testimonia, tum rationes omnes, quibus supra probatum est, rationem unius in negatione positam esse: illa enim omnia eadem proportione in unitate numerali, seu quantitativa procedunt, ut patet ex Arist. lib. 5. Metap. text. 11. & lib. 10. a principio; & ex ratione supra facta, ⟨143a⟩ quia postquam quis finxerit entitatem, seu rationem positivam, quam addat haec unitas supra quantitatem, si mente, vel re ipsa intelligat eam separari, & manere solam quantitatem indivisam, intelliget manere quantitatem unam: ergo, quicquid additur, superflue & sine fundamento additur.



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that the form of continuity cannot be called a unity because indivisibility pertains to the naturer of unity. For above it was proved by us that not indivisibility, but only indivision, pertains to the naturer of unity. And therefore it is not at all contradictory that the form of unity, that is, that on which unity is founded, should be divisible, provided that it is undivided. Therefore, this explanation of Capreolus’s is without basisr. 7. The other distinction, Giles’s, is also altogether worthless, unless it is merely verbal, both because quantity does not perfect a substance otherwise than by extending it into parts, and also because it is contradictory to say that quantity has the naturer of numerical unity insofar as it abstracts from parts, for it pertains to the intrinsic naturer of this unity that it be in a subject that is quantified and possessed of parts, and it is almost this alone that it adds to transcendental unity. Further, the other explanation concerning the naturer of measure is easily disproved, both because the naturer of measure does not pertain to unity per se in the first mode, but is rather consequent on it, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, Metaph. IV, lect. 8,294 and bk. X, lect. 2,295 and also because this naturer of measure, if conceived in terms of the aptitude that is in the thingr itself, is found with the same proportion both in the transcendental unit in relation to multitude and in the quantitative unit in relation to the number of quantity. But if it is conceived in relation to human use, it is of little importance to the naturer of unity as it exists in itself. Finally, standing against this whole opinion are both the testimonies of Aristotle and all the arguments by which it was proved above that the naturer of the unit consists in a negation. For they all succeed proportionately in the case of numerical or quantitative unity, as is clear by appeal to Aristotle, Metaph. V, text 11, and bk. X, at the beginning,296 and by appeal to the argument made above,297 since after someone imagines a positive entity or naturer which this unity adds to quantity, if she should conceive it to be separated either mentally or in 294. There is no mention of measure in lect. 8 of Thomas’s commentary on Metaph. IV. Suárez likely means to refer to lect. 2 on this book, where Aquinas asserts that the ratio of measure is a proper passion of quantity and is first found in unity. See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 156a (n. 560). 295. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 465a (n. 1937). 296. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1016a32–b17, and Metaph. X, ch. 1, 1052a19–29. 297. See DM 4.1.11.

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Vera ratio unitatis quantitativae declaratur. 8. Advertendum ergo est, ut tam res ipsa, quam sententia D. Thom. in hac parte intelligatur, quod supra in fine sect. 3. dicebamus, in substantia materiali posse considerari intrinsecam, & entitativam unitatem, & accidentariam denominative convenientem illi ex affectione quantitatis: unde fit, ut quantitas ipsa considerari possit105 vel ut in se una est, vel ut ratione illius redditur unum id, quod per ipsam afficitur. Quo supposito dicendum in primis quoad hanc partem est, unitatem transcendentalem non esse unitatem quantitativam, quae denominative, & accidentarie convenit substantiae materiali media quantitate. Hoc patet ex supra dictis, quia neque in aliis rebus unitas transcendentalis in hoc consistit, ut per se constat, neque in ipsamet substantia, vel quacunque alia forma materiali, ut ex dictis in sect. 3. constat. Nam transcendentalis unitas est maxime intrinseca unicuique enti, & convenit ex vi solius entitatis adiuncta negatione, ut ostensum est: unde remota quantitate intelligitur intrinseca unitas entitativa transcendentalis in substantia etiam materiali. Et confirmatur, quia substantia ut est una per quantitatem, simpliciter loquendo est una per accidens in genere entis, cum constet ex rebus diversorum praedicamentorum: substantia autem, ut est una transcendentaliter, non est una per accidens sed per se, alioqui substantia materialis non posset habere in proprio genere unitatem per se, quod est valde absurdum. Et hoc etiam probant recte argumenta, quae Gregorius in praedicto loco adducit. [105a]

105. Reading “possit” here with C1 , C2 , and G2 , in accordance with a suggestion of Charles Berton (see Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, vol. 27, p. 369a). The following read “posset” instead: M1  , M2  , M3  , M4  , P1  , P2  , S  , V1  , V2  , V3  , V4  , V5  , and Vivès.



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reality, with only undivided quantity remaining, she will understand that one quantity remains. Therefore, whatever is added is added superfluously and without foundation.

The true naturer of quantitative unity is explained. 8. In order to understand both the thingr itself and the opinion of St. Thomas on this issue, then, what we said above at the end of section 3 must be noted, that in a material substance one can observe an intrinsic and entitative unity and also an accidental unity that denominatively agrees with it in consequence of the affection of quantity. From this it results that quantity itself can be considered either insofar as it is one in itself, or insofar as that which is affected by the same quantity is rendered one because of it. With this supposed, it must in the first place be said, with respect to the latter, that transcendental unity is not the quantitative unity which denominatively and accidentally agrees with a material substance through the mediation of quantity. This is clear from the things that were said above, since transcendental unity consists in this neither in the case of other thingsr, as is per se clear, nor in the case of substance itself or any other material form, as is clear from the things said in section 3. For transcendental unity is most of all intrinsic to each being and agrees with it by virtue of its entity alone, with a negation added, as has been shown. For this reason, setting quantity aside, transcendental, entitative, and intrinsic unity is understood in a material substance as well. And this is confirmed, since substance, insofar as it is one through quantity, is, speaking without qualification, one per accidens in the genus of being, since it is composed of thingsr from different categories. But substance, insofar as it is transcendentally one, is not one per accidens, but one per se, otherwise material substance could not have per se unity in its own genus, which is quite absurd. And this is also rightly proved by the arguments that Gregory adduces in the mentioned passage.298

298. Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, t. 3, pp. 30–32.

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9. Deinde dicendum est, in quantitate ipsa unitatem, qua ipsa una est, non esse aliam a transcendentali applicata106 ad tale ens, scilicet, quantitatem: hoc etiam recte probant argumenta Dur. & quae adduximus inter referendam eius sententiam. Atque ex his sequitur primo unitatem numeralem seu quantitativam respectu quantitatis nihil addere praeter indivisionem, quae solum est negatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Ita tenent ⟨143b⟩ alii autores citati, & Sonci. lib. 10. Metaph. quaest. 2. Soto in Praedic. cap. de quant. q. 1. Et hoc probant rationes factae contra Capreolum & alios. Et patet etiam, quia haec unitas est transcendentalis respectu quantitatis: ergo est eiusdem rationis in illa, cuius est in aliis rebus: sicut ergo in aliis entibus unitas est uniuscuiusque entitas indivisa, ita in quantitate unitas eius est ipsamet quantitas, seu continuitas quantitatis ut indivisae. Dices, Divisa quantitate continua amittitur eius unitas quantitativa, & resultat numerus, ut dicitur tertio Physic. & tamen non amittitur unitas transcendentalis, quia, ut supra dicebamus, manet eadem entitas in singulis partibus divisis, quam in continuo habebant: ergo sunt diversae unitates. Respondetur, negando minorem: quia licet partes divisae retineant eandem entitatem, quam ut partialem habebant in continuo, tamen simpliciter entitas continui non erat posita in illis solis partibus, sed etiam in unione earum, & termino, quo copulabantur, vel potius in toto illo composito, quod ex his omnibus resultabat, cuius unitas tam quantitativa, quam transcendentalis consistebat in toto illo ut indiviso: unde illa unitas ideo per divisionem destruitur, quia non manet eadem indivisio quae antea erat: & quia totum illud in ratione cuiusdam totius dissolvitur.

10. Secundo infertur ex dictis, unitatem quantitativam seu numericam, quatenus substantiae denominative convenit, addere supra substantiam rem positivam sub negatione, scilicet quantitatem ipsam cum indivisione. Ita intelligendum puto D. Thom. idque recte annotavit Fonseca lib. 5. Metaph. ca. 13. quaest. 3. sect. 3. ex eodem D. Tho. 106. Reading “applicata” here with S, V1  , and V2. The following instead read “explicata”: C1  , C2  , G2  , M1  , M2  , M3  , M4  , P1  , P2  , V3  , V4  , V5  , and Vivès.



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9. Next, it must be said that in quantity itself the unity by virtue of which it itself is one is not other than transcendental unity applied to a being of a particular sort, namely, quantity. Durandus’s arguments, and the ones we adduced in reporting his view,299 rightly prove this also. And from these things it follows, first, that numerical or quantitative unity in relation to quantity adds nothing aside from indivision, which is only a certain negation, as was said above. This is what the other cited authors hold,300 as do Soncinas, Metaph. X, q. 2,301 and Soto, On the Categories, chapter on quantity, q. 1.302 And the arguments made against Capreolus and others prove this. And it is also clear, because this unity is transcendental in relation to quantity. Therefore, it has the same naturer in quantity that it has in other thingsr. Therefore, just as in the case of other beings unity is the undivided entity of each one, so in the case of quantity its unity is the quantity itself, or the continuity of the quantity as undivided. You will say: when continuous quantity is divided, its quantitative unity is lost and number results, as is said in Phys. III,303 and yet transcendental unity is not lost, since, as we said above,304 the same entity which the parts had in the continuum remains in the several divided parts. Therefore, they are different unities. I reply by denying the minor, for although the divided parts retain the same entity that they had as partial in the continuum, nevertheless, without qualification the entity of the continuum was not located in those parts alone, but also in their union and the terminus by which they were joined, or rather, in that whole composite which resulted from all of these, the unity of which, both quantitative and transcendental, was situated in that whole as undivided. For this reason, that unity is accordingly destroyed by the division, because the same indivision that existede before does not remain, and because that whole, in its characterr as a particular type of whole, is dissolved. 10. Second, it is inferred from the things that have been said that 299. See DM 4.9.3–4. 300. See notes 289–92 above. 301. Soncinas makes the claim that Suárez attributes to him here in q. 3 on Metaph. X, not in q. 2. See Paul Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales acutissimae, p. 233b. 302. Domingo de Soto, In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii, fol. 53ra. 303. Aristotle, Phys. III, ch. 7, 207b10–11. 304. See DM 4.9.6.

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4. Metaph. lect. 3. Et patet facile, quia, sicut substantia est quanta per quantitatem sibi adiunctam, ita etiam est una quantitative propter unam quantitatem, quam in se habet; item hinc saepe fit, ut substantiae, quae in suo genere non habent transcendentalem unitatem, aliquo modo dicantur unum quantitative ratione quantitatis, quomodo una virga dicitur, quae partim est viridis, partim sicca.

11. Tertio tandem constat ex dictis, quomodo se habeat unitas transcendens ad unitatem quantitativam: in nullo enim sensu sunt idem convertibiliter, ut evidenter probant supra adducta. Si tamen loquamur de unitate quantitativa secundum se, seu respectu quantitatis, sic se habent sicut inferius & superius: nam ostensum est, unitatem quan⟨144a⟩titativam esse quandam transcendentalem unitatem: quanvis non omnis unitas transcendentalis sit etiam quantitativa. Unde unum transcendens reperitur in omnibus praedicamentis: unitas vero quantitatis in solo uno praedicamento. Si vero loquamur de unitate quantitativa, ut accidentaliter, & denominative convenit substantiae, vel aliis materialibus accidentibus per quantitatem, sic differt ab unitate transcendentali: nam haec est intrinse[105b]ca, & per se comitans entitatem rei, illa vero est quasi extrinseca, quatenus adiuncta est per aliam entitatem. Quia vero etiam haec unitas numeralis respectu substantiae, realis est, ideo necesse est, ut aliquo modo sub transcendentali contineatur: continetur autem eo modo, quo substantia ut quanta sub ente continetur: sicut ergo substantia adiectione quantitatis accidentaliter quanta est, & ex utraque resultat ens quoddam per accidens compositum, ita accidentaliter etiam una est, & illa unitas, quae ex utraque resultat, est etiam per accidens, & proportionata tali composito, & respectu illius est transcendentalis, quanvis respectu substantiae accidentalis sit. Atque ex his etiam constat, eandem proportionem inter se servare numerum quantitativum, & multitudinem, quam servant unum numerale & transcendens. Quid vero dicendum sit de ratione numeri, an scilicet proprium genus & speciem entis constituat,



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quantitative or numerical unity, insofar as it agrees denominatively with a substance, adds to the substance a positive thingr under a negation, namely, the quantity itself with indivision. It is in this way, I think, that St. Thomas is to be understood, and Fonseca rightly notes this, Metaph. V, ch. 13, q. 3, sec. 3,305 by appeal to St. Thomas, Metaph. IV, lect. 3.306 And it is easily shown, since, just as a substance is quantified by a quantity joined to it, so also is it quantitatively one on account of the one quantity that it has in itself. Hence it often happens that substances which do not have transcendental unity in their genus are in some way called quantitatively one by reason of quantity, in the way a branch that is partly green and partly dry is called one. 11. In the third place, finally, from what has been said it is clear how transcendental unity is related to quantitative unity. For in no sense are they convertibly the same, as the points adduced above clearly prove. But if we are speaking of quantitative unity in itself, or in relation to quantity, then they are related as inferior and superior. For it has been shown that quantitative unity is a kind of transcendental unity, although not every transcendental unity is also quantitative. For this reason, transcendental unity is found in all the categories, but the unity of quantity is found only in one category. But if we are speaking of quantitative unity insofar as it accidentally and denominatively agrees with substance, or with other material accidents through quantity, then it differs from transcendental unity. For the latter unity is intrinsic and per se accompanies the entity of a thingr, whereas the former unity is, as it were, extrinsic insofar as it is added by another entity. However, since in relation to substance this numerical unity is also real, it is necessary that it be contained in some way under transcendental unity, but contained in the way substance, as quantified, is contained under being. Therefore, just as substance, by the addition of quantity, is accidentally quantified, and from both there results a certain composite per accidens being, so also is it accidentally one, and the unity which results from both is also per accidens and proportioned to such a composite, 305. Pedro Fonseca, Commentaria in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, vol. 2 (Coloniae), cols. 656–57. 306. In fact, Fonseca refers us to lect. 2 of Aquinas’s commentary on Metaph. IV. See Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, p. 156a (n. 560).

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& an in hoc differat a multitudine, dicendum inferius est de quantitate tractando.

Confertur unitas transcendentalis cum singulari. 12. Secunda sententia hoc loco examinanda est, quorundam dicentium, unitatem transcendentem esse unitatem individualem uniuscuiusque singularis entis, quae dici etiam solet unitas numeralis, diversa significatione ab ea, quae in praecedente opinione tractata est: ibi enim sumebatur unitas numeralis pro illa, quae est principium numeri quantitativi. Nam, quia cognitio nostra a sensu incipit, & per sensum solum numerare possumus ea, quae magnitudinem habent, ideo harum rerum multitudo specialiter numeri nomen accepit; & ideo hoc speciali modo dicitur unitas fundata in quantitate, unitas numerica. Hic vero latius sumitur unitas numerica prout distinguitur contra genericam, vel specificam, & reperitur in quolibet ente singulari; & dicitur numeralis, quatenus ex ea ⟨144b⟩ multitudo, seu numerus transcendentalis confici potest: individua vero vel singularis dicitur, quatenus ut talis est, incommunicabilis est inferioribus multis, in quo differt ab unitate formali, tam specifica, quam generica. Dicit ergo haec opinio, hanc unitatem singularem propriam, & realem esse passionem entis, seu unitatem transcendentalem. Fundamentum esse potest: quia unitas transcendentalis, quae est passio entis realis, esse debet unitas realis: sed in rebus nulla est unitas realis praeter unitatem numeralem, ac singularem: ergo illa sola est adaequata passio entis: ergo illa sola est unitas transcendens. Et confirmatur; nam haec unitas convertitur cum ente reali: nam omne id, quod hoc modo unum est, ens reale est. Quanvis enim ens rationis possit dici unum numero, & sic distinguantur a Dialecticis genera, species, & individua in ipsis entibus rationis: tamen illud est quasi aequivoce per solam extrinsecam



Section 9: What kind of unity transcendental unity is. 235



and in relation to this it is transcendental, although in relation to the substance it is accidental. And from these things it is also clear that quantitative number and multitude observe the same proportion to each other that the numerical unit and the transcendental unit observe to each other. But what should be said about the naturer of number— namely, whether it constitutes a proper genus and species of being, and whether in this respect it differs from multitude—of this we must speak below when treating of quantity.307

Transcendental unity is compared to singular unity. 12. The second opinion that must be examined in this place is that of certain people who say that transcendental unity is the individual unity of each singular being, which is also usually called numerical unity, but in a sense different from that which was discussed in connection with the previous opinion. For there numerical unity was taken for that unity which is the principle of quantitative number. For since our cognition begins with sense, and it is only by sense that we can count those things which have magnitude, the multitude of these thingsr especially receives the name “number.” And therefore, the unity founded on quantity is in this special way called numerical unity. But here numerical unity is taken more broadly insofar as it is distinguished from generic or specific unity and is found in any singular being. And it is called numerical insofar as from it a multitude, or transcendental number, can be composed. But it is called individual or singular insofar as it is, as such, incommunicable to many inferiors, in which respect it differs from formal unity, both specific and generic. This opinion, then, holds that this real and proper singular unity is the passion of being, or transcendental unity. Its foundation can be: because transcendental unity, which is a passion of real being, must be a real unity. But in thingsr there is no real unity other than numerical or singular unity. Therefore, it alone is the adequate passion of being. Therefore, it alone is transcendental unity. And this is confirmed, because this unity is converted with real being, for every thing that is in this way one is a real 307. See DM 41.1.

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denominationem: proprie tamen & in rigore loquendo, quicquid simpliciter unum numero est, ens reale est. Et e contrario omne etiam ens reale singulare est, & consequenter unum numero: quia non dicitur ens reale, nisi quod est in rebus, seu quod est capax realis esse; sed in rebus nihil est nisi sin[106a]gulare, neque aliquid est capax existentiae realis, nisi res individua: ergo ens reale, & unum numero, seu singulare, convertuntur: ergo praedicta unitas singularis est unitas transcendens, seu passio entis.

13. Haec vero sententia, si communem loquendi & concipiendi modum attendamus, difficilis, ac singularis videri potest. Nam in primis Aristot. 5. Metaph. c. 6. tex. 11. inter unitates entis non solum ponit unitatem singularem, sed etiam specificam, genericam, & analogam; & universaliter ait, Quaecunque non habent divisionem, in quantum non habent, sic unum dicuntur; Et lib. 4. tex. 6. hinc colligit ad metaphysicam pertinere de genere, & specie agere, quia haec insunt enti, scilicet, tanquam comprehensa inter passiones eius; non comprehenduntur autem, nisi quatenus sub unitate continentur. Praeterea adaequata passio alicuius communis obiecti non solum convenire debet inferioribus contentis sub tali obiecto, sed etiam ipsi communi obiecto secundum se & formaliter sumpto: ergo esse unum non tantum singulis entibus, sed etiam enti ut sic convenire debet: sed ut sic non est unum numero, sed solum analogice, & ratione formali: ergo. Simile ar⟨145a⟩gumentum est, quod de quocunque dicitur ens, dicitur unum transcendens: sed ens non solum dicitur de individuis, scilicet Petro, & Paulo, sed etiam de communibus rationibus praecise sumptis, ut de homine, equo &c. nam, licet fortasse in his universalitas sit per rationem, ut infra dicemus, tamen ipsae naturae universales reales sunt, & vera entia realia dicuntur; & ita Aristotel. lib. 1. Periher. ca. 5. distinguit, rerum alias universales esse, alias particulares: est ergo homo ut sic ens reale: ergo unus unitate transcendentali: & tamen non est unus unitate singulari, & numerica: ergo unitas transcendentalis latius patet, quam unitas individua, vel singularis.



Section 9: What kind of unity transcendental unity is. 237



being. For although a being of reason can be called numerically one, and dialecticians accordingly distinguish genera, species, and individuals among beings of reason, nevertheless, this is, as it were, equivocally through extrinsic denomination alone. But speaking properly and strictly, whatever is without qualification numerically one is a real being. And conversely, every real being is also singular and consequently numerically one, since only what existse in reality or is capable of real existencee is called a real being. But in reality there is nothing but the singular, nor is anything capable of real existence except an individual thingr. Therefore, real being and the numerical or singular unit are converted. Therefore, the mentioned singular unity is transcendental unity, or the passion of being. 13. But if we attend to the common manner of speaking and conceiving, this opinion can seem difficult and peculiar. For in the first place, Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, text 11, puts not only singular unity, but also specific, generic, and analogical unity, among the unities of being,308 and he says universally, “Whatever things do not have division, insofar as they do not have it, are in this way called one.”309 And in bk. IV, text 6, he infers from this that it pertains to metaphysics to deal with the genus and species, “since these are in being,” namely, inasmuch as they are included among its passions.310 But they are not included except insofar as they are contained under unity. What’s more, an adequate passion of some common object should agree not only with the inferiors contained under such an object, but also with the same common object taken in itself and formally. Therefore, to be one must agree not only with each being, but also with being as such. But as such it is not numerically one, but one only analogically and in respect of its formal characterr. Therefore. There is a similar argument: because whatever is called a being is called a transcendental unit. But being is said not only of individuals—of Peter and Paul, that is—but also of common naturesr taken precisely, such as human being, horse, etc., for, although in these universality is perhaps due to reason, as we 308. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6,1016a32–b6. 309. Aristotle, Metaph. V, ch. 6, 1016b3–5. 310. Aristotle, Metaph. IV, ch. 2, 1005a13–18.

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Quaestionis resolutio. 14. Haec difficultas multum pendet ex intelligentia illius difficilis quaestionis de unitate formali, & numerali,107 quomodo inter se108 differant, & an utraque sit vera unitas in rebus existens: & consequenter, an unitas etiam universalis in rebus sit. Sed quoniam haec ad exactam huius materiae explicationem sigillatim tractanda sunt, nunc breviter dicitur, unitatem transcendentalem, de qua nunc agimus, non esse limitandam ad unitatem singularem, vel universalem, materialem, vel109 formalem, sed comprehendere omnem unitatem, quae in aliquo ente reali, seu in ratione formali entis realis inveniri potest: Erit ergo unitas transcendentalis quaecunque ratio entis realis per se, quatenus indivisa est adaequate & secundum se. Dico entis per se eo modo, quo supra explicatum est a nobis esse obiectum Metaphysicae, nam, si latius sumatur, nullam habet unitatem, etiam formalem, ut dictum est. Dico etiam, ut indivisa, quia nec sola entis ratio, nec sola negatio facit unitatem; sed ratio entis indivisa, ut supra ostensum est. Denique dico, adaequate & secundum se, quia unitas in unaquaque re, seu conceptu obiectivo reali, secundum propriam eius rationem attendi debet, & non secundum aliquam superiorem, inferiorem, aut extraneam: nam haec aut sunt [106b] inadaequata, aut quodammodo per accidens, unitas vero uniuscuiusque est illi adaequata, & per se illi convenit. Unde 107. Reading “de unitate formali, et numerali” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “de unitate, et numerali”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , V3 , V4 , and V5. The following instead read “de unitate transcendente et numerali”: P2 and Vivès. 108. Reading “inter se” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following omit these words: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. 109. Reading “vel” here with S, V1 , and V2. The following instead read “et”: C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès.



Section 9: What kind of unity transcendental unity is. 239



shall say below,311 nevertheless, universal natures themselves are real and are called true real beings. And thus Aristotle, On Interpretation I, ch. 5, distinguishes among beings, saying that some are universal, others particular.312 Therefore, human being as such is a real being, and therefore one with transcendental unity, and yet it is not one with singular and numerical unity. Therefore, transcendental unity extends more widely than individual or singular unity.

Resolution of the question. 14. This difficulty depends to a great degree on an understanding of that difficult question regarding formal and numerical unity, how they differ from each other, and whether each is a true unity existing in thingsr, and consequently whether universal unity also existse in thingsr. But since, for an exact explanation of this matter, these things must be dealt with one by one, for now I say briefly that transcendental unity, which we are dealing with now, is not to be limited to singular or universal unity, material or formal unity, but that it comprehends every unity that can be found in some real being or in the formal characterr of a real being. Therefore, any naturer of a real per se being, insofar as it is adequately and in itself undivided, will be a transcendental unity. I mean “per se being” in the way it was explained by us above to be the object of metaphysics,313 for if it is taken more broadly, it has no unity, not even formal unity, as has been said. I say also “insofar as it is undivided,” because neither the naturer of a being alone, nor the negation alone, makes for unity, but the undivided naturer of a being, as was shown above. Finally, I say “adequately and in itself ” because the unity in each thingr or real objective concept must be considered according to its proper naturer, and not according to some superior, inferior, or extraneous naturer. For these are either inadequate or in some way per accidens, whereas the unity of each thing is adequate to it and per se agrees with it. For this reason, human being is called one essentially because according to its proper adequate naturer it is not divided in its 311. See DM 6.2. 312. Aristotle, De Int., ch. 7, 17a38–39. 313. See DM 4.5.4.

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homo dicitur unus essentialiter: quia secundum propriam adaequatam rationem suam, non est divisus in essentiali ratione, quanvis in individuis entitative dividatur: non dicetur autem homo simpliciter unus illo modo, eo quod sit indivisus in ratione animalis: ea enim indivisio non sufficeret ad praedictam unitatem, ⟨145b⟩ eo quod non conveniat homini adaequate & per se primo, sed ratione superioris. Ex his ergo satis explicata est ratio huius110 unitatis in communi sumpta: ut tamen distinctius & radicitus explicetur, oportet, ut de unitate individuali, formali, &111 universali, quae sunt propriae unitates metaphysicae, in particulari dicamus. 110. Reading “huius” here with S, V1 , and V2. All other editions omit this word. 111. Reading “&” here with C1 , C2 , G2 , M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , P1 , P2 , V3 , V4 , V5 , and Vivès. The following read “vel”: S, V1 , and V2.



Section 9: What kind of unity transcendental unity is. 241



essential characterr, even though it is entitatively divided in individuals. But human being will not be called one without qualification in the way it is undivided in the naturer of animal. For that indivision would not suffice for the mentioned unity because it does not agree with human being adequately and per se in the first mode, but by reason of a superior. This unity’s naturer, taken generally, is therefore sufficiently explained by these things. But in order that it might be explained completely and more distinctly, it is necessary that we speak in particular of individual, formal, and universal unity, which are proper metaphysical unities.

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Secondary Sources Aertsen, Jan. “«Res» as Transcendental: Its Introduction and Significance.” In Le problème des Transcendantaux du XIVe au XVIIe siècle. Edited by Graziella Federici Vescovini, 139–56. Paris: Vrin, 2002. ———. Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012. Courtine, Jean-François. Suarez et le système de la métaphysique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. Darge, Rolf. Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004. Ebbesen, Sten. “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Th ­ irteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as ‘Album’.” In Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg. Edited by Norman Kretzmann, 107–74. Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Gracia, Jorge J. E. “The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suárez and Kant.” In Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt. Edited by J. Aertsen and A. Speer, 213–25. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1998. Henninger, Mark G. Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Shields, Christopher. “Being Qua Being.” In The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Edited by Christopher Shields, 343–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Uscatescu Barrón, Jorge. “Acerca de la unidad: Un estudio sobre las Disputationes Metaphysicae (1596) de Francisco Suárez.” Éndoxa: Series Filosóficas 3 (1994): 195–223. Wolter, Allan. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946.

Index

Index

I nde x

absolute (absolutum), xxx, xliii, lxxin85, 41, 69, 83, 157, 201–3, 211 absurdity (absurdus, incommodum, repugnantia), 21, 47, 65, 69 accident, xii, xiv–xv, xxx, xxxviiin45, xlvii, lvi–lvii, lx–lxiii, lxv–lxvi, lxix, lxxxi, 15, 21, 49, 57, 73, 85n114, 131, 135–37, 141–43, 147–49, 155, 161, 167, 179, 209–11, 221, 233; corporeal, 15; material, lxxxi, 221, 233; per se, xii, xxx, lxvi; simple, 179 act (actus), xix–xxi, xxiv, xxvi, xxxi, ln60, lxi, 17, 45, 135–43, 153, 209; pure, 209; substantial, 143 action, xlii, 69, 79 actuality, xliv, 89, 137 Aertsen, Jan, xiiin8, xivn9, xvin14, xxixn33 affirmation (affirmatio), xxn19, xxxiv, xlii, xlviii–xlix, lxx, lxxiv, 17, 53, 77, 99, 103, 107, 191, 195 aggregate or aggregation (aggregatio), liii, liiin65, lvn68, lxiv, lxix, lxxvi, 139, 153–55, 175, 185, 195, 203 Alexander of Hales, xli, 75 analogy, lix, lxviii, lxix–lxx, 103, 173–79, 205; of being, 103, 175; of intrinsic attribution, lxviii; of proportionality, lix, lxix, 173–75, 205 angel, xxxix, xl, xlvi, lxx, 79, 93, 177–79 animal, xi, xxin21, xxv, lix, lxii, 103, 159, 241 Antonius Andreae, 57, 73 appetite, xix, 31, 39; rational, xix Aristotle, xi, xiin2–5, xiv–xv, xvii, xxn20, xxxii–xxxiv, xxxvii–xxxix, xliin54, xlvi, lviin69, lix, lxi–lxii, lxvi–lxvii, lxx, lxxxi– lxxxii, lxxxiv, 5, 9–15, 23, 41, 49–51, 55–61, 67–73, 79, 91, 101n130, 107–9, 121, 131–35,

139–43, 153, 157, 163–65, 173, 179, 183, 195, 217, 219n280, 227, 231n303, 237–39 arithmetic, xxxviii, xl–xli army, lx, lxxvii, 153, 209 artifact, lviii, lxx, 123 assimilability, xxxi attribute, xvii–xviii, xxii–xxiii, xxx, xliii, xlvn56, 13–27, 33, 37, 75, 87, 111 Averroes (the Commentator), xliiin55, lviin69, 35, 61, 81, 83n111, 143, 217, 221 Aversa, Raffaele, li, lx Avicenna, xxix, xli, lviin69, lxvin76, lxxviii, 33, 73, 117, 217, 221–23 being (ens), xi–xxxii, xxxv–lxxi, lxxiii, lxxv– lxxxii, 3–11, 15–47, 51–53, 57, 63–111, 115–87, 191–93, 197–221, 229–39; by aggregation, lxxvi, 155; artificial, 175; chimerical, 45; complete, lxi, lxiii, 143, 151; composite, xliv, 89, 141, 157, 165, 179; corporeal, 161; created, 35, 119, 209–11; division of, lxvi–lxxi, lxxv–lxxvii, 3, 133, 163, 167–73, 183, 197–213; by essence, 209; fictitious (ens fictum), xviii, 15, 45–47, 101; finite or infinite, xxxi, lix, lxix, lxxv–lxxvii, 31, 45, 197–203, 207–11; forbidden (ens prohibitum), xxvii; imperfect, 179; incomplete, lxii–lxiii, 147–49; material, lxxviii, 217; mobile, xi, 57; nature, essence, quiddity or ratio of, xiii, xxiii, xxxi, xxxv–xxxvi, xlvii, lxix, lxxv, 9, 17, 23–29, 45, 51, 57, 63, 83–87, 97, 121–23, 151, 175–77, 187, 211; non-being (non ens), xviii, xx, xxv, xlv, xlviii, ln60, lxx, 7, 15, 37, 45, 53, 67, 93, 99–101, 193; in objective potency, 139; partial, lxiii, 149; by participation, 209; particular, 239;

249

250 Index being (ens) (cont.) per se or per accidens, xlvi, lix–lxv, lxix, lxxv–lxxvi, lxxxii, 93, 133–41, 145–57, 161, 169–77, 199, 203–5, 213, 233, 239; possible, xlviii, li, 39; quantified, lxxv, 203, 207, 217; real, xii, xvi, xx–xxi, xxv–xxvi, xxxviiin45, xli, lviii–lix, lxxv, lxxix, lxxxi–lxxxii, 7–9, 15, 21, 27, 33, 45, 101, 115, 123, 187, 201–7, 213, 235–39; of reason, xvi–xvii, xx, xxii, xxiv– xxvii, xxxi, xliii, xlviii–xlix, lviii–lix, lxxvi, lxxxi, 7, 15, 21–23, 47, 101, 123, 127, 133, 159, 187, 201–5, 237; simple, xliv, 89, 141, 155, 165, 179; singular, 235; spiritual, xxxviii–xl; transcendence of, 21; transcendental, 219; uncreated, 209–11; universal, 239 being (esse), 31, 43, 67, 119, 191–93, 223–25; corporeal, 225; material, 193, 225; immaterial, 193; intelligible (intelligibile), 191–93; of existence (existentiae) or actual existence (actualis existentiae), 31, 225; in the nature of things (in rerum natura), 191; that quantity confers, 223–25; real, 193; unqualified (simpliciter), 191 Berton, Charles, 16n11, 24n14, 36n23, 38n24, 40n25, 63n72, 126n56, 136n63, 194n87, 228n105 blackness, lxiii, lxxi, 149 blindness, xix, xxv, liii, lxxi, 17, 103, 121 body, xliv, lviii, lxii–lxiii, 89, 137, 147–49, 157 Bonaventure, xli, 75 branch, 233 bulk, corporeal (moles corporea), xl Cajetan, xvi, xviiin18, lxviii–lxix, lxxi, 13, 81, 99, 109, 117, 173, 187, 191–93, 211 capacity to laugh (risibilitas), xii. See also risibility (risibilitas) Castellote, Salvador, lxxxiii Categories (Aristotle’s), xvii, lviin69, 13, 231 category, xiii–xiv, xxi, xxxi, xxxvii, xxxviiin45, xl, lx, lxiii–lxiv, lxxxi, 13, 45, 135, 143, 151–53, 219, 229, 233 causality, xxxiii, xxxvi, 55, 179 cause, xviin16, xxiiin24, xxxiv, 3, 11, 45 (reason), 51, 55, 61, 65, 135, 213 (ground)

chance (casus), 133–35 chimera, xxn19, xxvii Christ, xxxviii, 157 coexistence, 17 Collegium Complutense Sancti Cyrilli, xxn21, xxxiiin39 Commentator, The. See Averroes composite, xviiin18, xlii, xliv, lv–lvi, lxi, lxiii, lxv, lxvii–lxix, lxxivn86, 21, 89, 109–11, 121, 137–41, 147, 157, 165, 169, 175, 179, 231–33; essence, 21; existence (esse), 137; heterogeneous, 139; of matter and substantial form, lxi; partial, 139; physical, 139 ; of subject and accident, lvi; of substance and accident, lxv, lxix, 175; substance, 179; substantial, lxix, 175; of a substantial nature and subsistence, lxi, 139–43 composition, xviii, xxxvii, xlii, lvi, lxi–lxiii, lxx, 67, 77–79, 89, 111, 135–37, 143–49, 177, 187; from integral parts, lxii–lxiii, 143, 147; of a person, 143; real vs. rational, 143; of several habits, lxiii; of several quantitative unities, lxiii; of a single nature, 143; of a single quantity, lxii; unity of, xlii, 77–79; by way of intension, lxiii, 149 concavity, xv concept (conceptus), xxv–xxvi, xxxv, xliv, lix, lxviii–lxx, lxxvi, 57, 63, 87–89, 93, 103, 129, 173–77, 203–9, 239; complex, xxv, 9n8, 37; confused, 57; distinct, 57; formal, 91, 207; objective, lix, lxviii–lxx, lxxvi, 91, 239; simple, xxv conjunction, lxiii, lxx, lxxii, 139, 147–49, 177, 185 contingency, 135 continuation (continuatio), 79, 139 continuity (continuatio, continuitas), xlii, lxii–lxiii, lxxix, 79, 131, 143, 147–49, 221– 23, 227; form of, lxxix, 221–23, 227, 231 continuum, 219, 231 contradiction (contradictio), xxxiv, lxxin85, 65, 207 contradictory (contradictorium, contradictoria), xxxv, xlviii, lxxin85, 53, 59–61, 65–67

Index 251

contrary, lxx, 33, 59 corruption, xlii, 79, 225 Coujou, Jean-Paul, xxiin23 Courtine, Jean-François, xxiin23 creation, xxx, lxxiii, 39 creator, xix, 17, 35 creature, xiii, xxix, xxxi, xlvii, lxx, lxxvii, 9n8, 19, 35, 43–45, 49, 75, 97, 103, 177–79, 209–11 Crowell, Trevor, ix Darge, Rolf, xxiin23, xxviin32, liin64, livn66, lviii darkness, xxv De anima (Aristotle’s), 135, 143 De Interpretatione (Aristotle’s), lxxxii, 239 deduction to the impossible, xxxiv–xxxvi, 61 definition, xiv–xv, xxin21, xxxiii, xxxvi, xlvi, xlviiin58, liii, lix–lx, lxxiii, lxxivn86, 5, 51, 57, 65, 93, 131, 155–57, 191; by addition (ἐκ προσθέσεωϛ), xiv–xv, 5 degree (gradus), lxiii, 149 demonstration, xi–xii, xiv, xvi, xxviii, xxxii–xxxvii, xxxviiin45, xl, lvii, 3–5, 9, 21, 25, 51–57, 61–67; a priori, 53–55, 65; direct, 67; leading to the impossible (deducens ad impossibile) vs. ostensive (ostensivum), xxxiv–xxxvii, 61; propter quid, xxxii, xxxv–xxxvi denomination (denominatio and its cognates), xviiin18, xix–xxi, xxiii–xxiv, xxvi, xxxii, xxxvii, lxii, lxv, lxxvii–lxxviii, lxxx– lxxxi, 17, 23–25, 39–41, 45, 49, 99, 103, 123–27, 133, 157–61, 165, 187–89, 199, 229, 233, 237; actual vs. aptitudinal, xix, 17; extrinsic, xix–xxi, xxiii–xxiv, xxvi, lxxxi, 17, 23, 39–41, 99, 187, 237; real, 25 dialectic, 55 dialectician, 59, 237 difference (differentia), xiv, xvi, lxvi, 11, 117n170, 143, 201; contracting, 201; ultimate, xvi distinction (distinctio and its cognates), xiii–xviii, xxn20, xxii–xxiv, xxvi, xxix– xxxi, xxxin34, xxxiii, xxxv, xxxviin43, xli,

xliii–xlvii, xlix, li, liii, lviii–lix, lxiii–lxv, lxvii, lxxi, lxxviii–lxxxi, 5–9, 13–27, 31–43, 59, 63, 71, 75, 81, 85–99, 107, 111, 115, 119–21, 125–27, 149–51, 155, 167–69, 183–85, 219–25, 235; ex natura rei, xiv–xvi, xxii–xxiv, xxxi, xli, xliii, lxiii, 5–9, 13–19, 23, 27, 43, 73–75, 81, 87, 111, 125–27; real, xxn20, xxxviin43, lxvii, lxxviii–lxxix, 15–17, 27, 63, 75, 87, 149, 167–69, 223–25; of reason, xvii–xviii, xxii–xxiii, xxvi, xxix, xxxin34, xxxiii, xxxv, xli, xliii–xliv, xlix, lxvii, lxxix, 13–15, 19, 25–27, 63, 75, 81, 87–89, 169, 223 division (divisio), xiii, xix, xxx–xxxi, xxxviii–xxxix, xxxixn48, xli–xlii, xliv– xlviii, xlix–lv, lvii, lix, lxv–lxx, lxxii– lxxvii, lxxxi, 3, 37–47, 53, 67, 71, 75–77, 81, 85–87, 91–109, 119–23, 131–215, 219, 223–25, 231, 237; analogical, lix, lxviii; from another (ab alio), xlvi–xlviii, l–lv, lxxii–lxxiii, 37–41, 47, 77, 87, 93–99, 105–7, 185, 191–95; of being into absolute and relative, 201–3, 211; of being into being by essence and being by participation, 209; of being into the finite and the infinite, xxxi, lxxv–lxxvi, 45, 197–215; of being into one and many, lxvi–lxx, lxxv–lxxvii, 163– 89, 197–215; of being into per se being and per accidens being, lxviii–lxix, 133–61, 169–77, 203–5; of being into pure act and being that is in some way potential, 209; of being into the quantified (quantum) and the unquantified (non quantum), lxxv, 203, 207; of being into real being and being of reason, 201–3; of being into substance and accident, 209; of being into uncreated and created, 209; of continuous quantity, xxxviii, xxxixn48, 219; criteria for the priority of one division of being relative to another such division, lxxvi–lxxvii, 205–9; formal, xxxixn48; internal (in se), xli–xlii, xliv– xlvi, lii, lvii–lviii, lxx, lxxii–lxxiv, lxxxi, 43, 87, 91–93, 101–5, 109, 119–23, 177–81, 185–87, 191–95; from non-being, xlix–l, 53, 67, 193; of the one per se into the

252 Index division (divisio) (cont.) simple and the composite, 169; of per se being into the simple and the composite, lxviii, 141, 169, 177–81; of theoretical science into metaphysics, physics and mathematics, xxxviii–xxxix, xli; of the unit or being into the one per se and the one per accidens, lix, lxv, 131–61; 201; of the unit or being into the one without qualification and the one in a certain respect, lxv, 155, 169–71, 199 Dominic of Flanders, 117 Dumont, Stephen, ix Durandus of St. Pourçain, lviin69, lxxviii, lxxx, 81, 219–23, 231 duration, xxix, xxxi, 29, 43 Ebbesen, Sten, lviin69 effect, xxin21, xxxii, xxxiv, xlii, lvi, 61, 79, 133–35; per accidens and per se, 133–35 entity, xviii–xix, xxi–xxiv, xli, xlvn56, l, liii, lvi–lviii, lx, lxii–lxiii, lxiiin74, lxv, lxx, lxxxvi, 15–17, 21–23, 27, 37, 75–77, 83–85, 103–5, 109–13, 117, 123–29, 137, 141, 145, 159–61, 165, 179–81, 185–87, 219–21, 227– 33; actual, 137; complete, liii; fictitious, 15; intrinsic, 21; is that by which a being is a being, lvii–lviii, 127; partial, lxiii, 137, 147, 231; positive, 111–13, 227; simple, 77, 111; substantial, lxii, 145; true, 21 equality, xvii, 13, 45, 97 equivocation (aequivocatio and its cognates), xx, lix, lxxxi, 35, 95, 101, 133, 161, 165, 173–75, 205, 237 essence, xii, xiv–xv, xvii, xxiiin24, xxix, xxxii–xxxv, xliii, xlviiin58, lv, lx–li, lxiv, lxix, lxxvii, lxxx, 5–9, 13, 17–19–21, 27–29, 33–35, 53, 61–63, 73, 87, 97, 101–3, 111, 119, 123, 127, 139–43, 151, 175, 179–81, 197–99, 209–13; fictitious, 213; of God, xxxii, xliii, 97, 101–3, 111, 123, 199, 211–13; mode of, 211; real, xxiiin24, 151, 213. See also quiddity etymology, xxix, xxxi, 35–37, 43 even (par), xxviii, 31 evil, xiii, xix, 17, 23n31, 33, 69

existence (esse), 137, 147, 237 existence (existentia), xxviii–xxxii, xlvii, lxix, lxxiii, lxxxi, 29–35, 43–45, 97, 137, 175, 225, 237 existent or existing (existens), xxix–xxx, xlvii–xlviii, 29, 33–35, 39, 49, 95–97, 239 experience (experientia), 61 extreme, xvii, xix, xxxv, lxiv, 13, 17, 63, 153, 191 eye, xxv–xxvi falsity, xiii, 23n31, 33, 61 finite, xxvii, xxxi, lix, lxix, lxxv–lxxvii, 31, 45, 197–213 Fonseca, Pedro da, xvi, xxxvn41, xlvii, liii– liv, lviin69, lviii, lxxn85, 13, 37, 61n71, 65, 81, 93, 101, 107, 117–19, 151, 159, 233 form (forma), xix, xxin21, xxiii, xlii, l, lvi, lviii, lxi, lxxix–lxxx, 77–79, 101, 105, 119, 125, 133, 137–41, 147–49, 153–57, 223–29; accidental, lvi; of continuity, lxxix, 223, 227; material, 229; substantial, lxi, 139, 149 fortune, 133–35 foundation, xxiv, xxxi, xliv, liii, lv–lvi, 9, 13, 17–21, 41, 47, 67, 83, 87, 97, 105, 109–11, 117, 159, 177–79, 195, 199, 211, 225, 229, 235 fruit, xxi Gabriel Biel, xxxixn47, 81, 93 generation, xxxvii, xlii, lxxiv, 67, 79, 193 genus, xi, xiv, xivn11, xxxiv, xxxvii–xxxviii, xl–xli, lx–lxv, lxxxi, 11, 55, 61–63, 71, 79, 85, 117n170, 133, 137, 141–55, 159, 191, 199–201, 207–9, 229, 233–37 Giles of Rome, lxxix–lxxx, 95, 107, 223, 227 God, xiii, xvii–xix, xxii, xxx, xxxii, xxxvii– xxxviii, xlii, xliv, xlvii, lvi, lxx, lxxiii, lxxvii, 9n8, 15–21, 25, 39–41, 75–77, 87–89, 95–97, 101–3, 111, 119, 123, 157, 177–9, 209–11 gold, xxii, 21, 153 good (bonum), xv–xvi, xix–xxiv, xxvii–xxviii, xxx–xxxii, xxxvi, lxxvi–lxxvii, 9, 19– 23, 29–31, 41–43, 49, 69, 125–27, 201–3, 213 goodness (bonitas), xiii, 27, 33, 41, 71n79

Index 253

Gracia, Jorge, xxviin32, 38n24 Gregory of Rimini, xxxixn47, 81, 155, 219, 223, 229 habit (habitus), liiin65, lxi, lxiii, lxxi–lxxiv, 141, 149, 151n210, 153, 193 health, xxx, 41 heat, lxiii Henninger, Mark, xxn20 Henry of Ghent, 81 Hervaeus Natalis, 95, 223 horse, 237 house, lix–lx, lxiv, lxix, 131–33, 153 human being (homo), xii, xx, xxxi, xxxiii, xliv, xlvi, lix, lxxiv–lxxv, lxxvii, 9, 17, 45–47, 93–95, 147, 157–59, 179, 193, 197, 209, 237–41 humanity, 79, 89, 157 identity, xxx, xlii–xliii, lxxii, 37, 41–47, 79, 83, 105, 111, 157–59, 185 immaterial(ity), xxxviii, lxx, lxxiv, 27, 119, 161, 177, 193 imposition, xxxi, 37, 43, 123, 219 (imposed) impossibility (impossibilitas), 47, 63, impossible (impossibile), xxvii–xxviii, xxxiii–xxxvii, 30, 51–53, 57–67, 97–99, 103 indivisibility or indivisible, lxiiin74, lxxix– lxxx, 17, 101, 113, 149, 157, 165, 177–81, 223–27 indivision (indivisio), xiii, xix, xli–xlii, xlv, xlix, li, liin64, lxix, lxxi–lxxiv, 39, 75–77, 81, 93, 101–7, 111, 117–21, 129, 147, 155, 159, 175, 185–87, 191–95, 221, 227, 231–33, 241; internal (in se), xix, xli, xlv, lxxiii–lxxiv, 39, 93, 165 inequality, xvii, 13, 47, 97 inference of subsistence (subsistendi consequentia), 191 infinite, xiii, xxviii, xxxi, xlvn56, lix, lxix, lxxv–lxxvii, 31, 45, 119, 197–213 instruction (disciplina), xxxiii intellect, xv, xvii, xix, xxii, xxiv–xxvii, xxx– xxxi, xliii, xlviii, lxxv–lxxvi, lxxx, 9, 15, 21, 31, 39, 43, 47, 61, 69, 83, 87, 99, 159, 199 intension of qualities, lxiii, 149

Javelli, Giovanni Crisostomo, lxxv–lxxvii, lxxix, 11, 39–41, 57, 81, 117, 191, 197n255, 201–3, 213 John Buridan, xxxivn40 John Capreolus, lxxix–lxxx, 81, 93, 117, 221–27, 231 John Duns Scotus, xiii, xv–xvi, xviiin18, xxii, xli, lxxv–lxxvii, 7–11, 73, 83–85, 115–17, 197, 201–3, 207, 211 John of Jandun, 81, 117 John Mair, xxxixn47 justice, 75 Kachergis, Anne, ix Karnes, Michelle, ix knowledge (scientia), 69–71. See also science (scientia) limit, xlii, liquid, lxiv, 153 local presence, xxviii, xxxi, 29, 43 magnitude, 145, 235 many (multa), xiv, xxxixn48, xlvii, ln60, lxvi–lxxiii, lxxivn86, lxxv–lxxvii, 77–79, 95, 101, 105n137, 107, 135, 149, 153, 157, 163–77, 183–87, 191, 195–201, 205–9, 213, 223 Marsilius of Inghen, xxxixn47 material, xxiii, xxxvii, xxxix, lvi, lviii, lxii, lxv, lxxiv, lxxvii–lxxviii, lxxxi–lxxxii, 117, 143–45, 193, 217, 221, 225, 229, 233, 239 mathematics, xxxix, xli matter (materia), xxxix, lxi, 79, 121, 125, 133, 137–41, 157, 161, 177–79, 225 measure (mensura), xxxixn48, xxxixn49, xlii, lxxii, lxxix–lxxx, 79, 111–13, 187, 223, 227 metaphysician, xvi, lxxxi metaphysics, xii, xiv–xvi, xxxiv–xxxvi, xxxviii, xli, xlviiin58, lxx, lxxvi, 9, 21, 53, 65–67, 131, 177, 203, 239. See also philosophy Metaphysics (Aristotle’s), xv, xviiin18, xxxiin36, xxxiii, xxxviii, xlvin57, lviin69, lix, lxiv, lxvi–lxvii, lxx, 5, 9–11, 15, 23, 37,

254 Index Metaphysics (Aristotle’s) (cont.) 41, 49n62, 51, 57–61, 69–73, 77–81, 91, 109, 121, 131–35, 141–43, 153, 157, 163–67, 173, 179, 183, 195, 227, 237 middle term (medium), xxxii–xxxvi, 61, 65; a priori, xxxii, 61; extrinsic, 65 Milton, John, xxi mind, xvii, xxii, xxxvi, lxv, lxxviii, lxxx, 19–21, 47, 65, 87, 91, 159–61, 221. See also intellect and understanding mobile being (ens mobile), xi, 57 mode, xvi, xviii, xxvi, xlii, xlvn56, xlviii, lvi, lviin69, lxin73, lxi, lxvii, lxxv, 5, 9–11, 15, 19, 45, 63, 75, 79, 85–87, 99, 127, 131, 135, 143–45, 161, 187, 193, 197–203, 211–13, 219, 227, 241; of cognizing (cognoscendi), 187; of composition, 143; of conceiving, lviin69, 15, 127; of demonstrating, 63; of entity, 219; of essence, 211; of existing (essendi), 135; intrinsic, xvi, 201, 211; of perseity or per se predication, xlviii, 5, 9, 99, 145, 193, 197–99, 227, 241; real, 11, 85; of signifying, xlvn56, 75, 127; of subsistence, lxi, 139n198; of understanding (intelligendi), 211; of unity or of the unit, xlii, lvi, lix, lxvii, 79, 131, 161–63, 199–201, 211–13, 219 mole, 103 multiplicity (multitudo), 95. See also multitude multitude (multitudo), xiii, xxxix–xlii, xlvi–xlvii, xlix, ln60, li, liii–lv, lxvi–lxvii, lxix, lxxin85, lxxi–lxxiii, lxxv–lxxvi, lxxix–lxxx, 33, 37, 71, 75–79, 93, 97, 103–13, 163n220, 167–69, 175, 183–91, 195, 199, 213–15, 219–21, 227, 235; actual, lxvii, 167; potential, 167; transcendental, xxxix, xli, lxxix, 189, 215, 221. See also multiplicity name (nomen, vox), xxin21, xxxi, xl, xlvn56, xlv, lvi, lviii, 43, 83, 91, 123–27, 153, 159, 203, 213, 219, 235 nature (natura), 9, 23–27, 43–45, 67, 83, 105–7, 121–23, 135, 139, 141–45, 149, 155, 167, 185, 191–95, 207, 219, 239 negation, xvi, xviii–xxv, xvii, xxvii–xxviii,

xxx–xxxi, xxxiv, xli–xlii, xliv–xlvi, xlviii– lviii, lxx–lxxii, lxxiv, lxxx–lxxxi, 11, 15–17, 23–27, 31, 37–47, 53, 75–81, 85–117, 121–27, 177–87, 191–95, 227–33, 239; absolute, xxn19; formal, lv, 109; partial, 109; pure, xx, lvi, 111, 121, 183; qualified (secundum quid), 109; real, xxiv, xlix, ln60, lii, 105, 191; of reason, xvi, xxiv, xxvii–xxviii, xxxi, xlix–l, lii, 11, 31, 45, 91, 103–5, 193; total, 109; unqualified (simpliciter), 109 nerve, 147 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle’s), xin1 nominalist, xxxvii, xxxixn47, 155 non-being (non ens), xviii, xx, xxv, xlv, xlviii–xlix, ln60, lxx, 7, 15, 37, 45, 53, 67, 93, 99–101, 193 nose, xv number (numerus), xxviii, xxxviin43, xxxviii–xl, lxii–lxiii, lxxix–lxxx, 31, 79, 143, 149, 183, 187–89, 215, 219–21, 227, 231, 235; of any old beings (quorumvis entium), xl, 221; quantitative, 79, 149, 221, 227, 235; transcendental, xxxix, 25, 235. See also quantity, discrete object, xi, xv, xxi, xxiv, xxxviii–xli, xlviiin58, lxx, lxxvi, lxxxii, 3, 9, 53, 177, 203–5, 237–39 odd (impar) or oddness, xv, xxviii, 31 one (unum), xv–xvi, xix, xxi–xxiv, xxvii– xxviii, xxx–xxxi, xxxv–xxxvii, xli–lxxviii, lxxx–lxxxii, 9, 19–23, 27–43, 47, 53, 67, 71–111, 115–213, 217, 229–41; by aggregation, lxiv, lxix, 153, 175; generically, 133; numerically, lxxxi, 123, 133, 159–61, 217, 237; per accidens, lix–lx, lxii, lxiv–lxv, lxviii–lxix, 131–37, 151–55, 171, 199–201, 213, 229, 233; per se, lix–lxv, lxviii–lxx, 131–51, 155, 161, 171, 175–79, 199–201, 209, 213, 229; quantitatively, 161, 229–31; rationally, lxix; specifically, 133; transcendentally one (unum transcendens), xix, xli, lxix, lxxxii, 177–79; without qualification (simpliciter) vs. in a certain respect (secundum quid), lxvii, 155–57, 167–73, 177–79, 183. See also unit

Index 255

opposite or opposed (oppositum, opponere), xxxixn48, lxvi, lxx, xlii, l, lxvi, lxx– lxxi, 33–37, 59–61, 65, 71, 75–77, 93, 99, 107, 139, 153, 157, 165, 173, 177, 183–85, 193, 201; contradictorily, xlvi, lxx, 35, 59, 93, 157, 183; contrarily, lxxi, 183; privatively, lxxi–lxxiii, lxxivn86, 35, 59, 107, 183–85, 193; relatively, 183 opposition, xlviii, lxx–lxxi, 67, 77–79, 169, 187; contradictory, xlviii, 67, 169; privative, 169; relative, 79, 187 organ, xxv oxymel, lxiv, 153 Parmenides (Plato’s), 165 part, xii, xv, xvii, xxvii, xlii, xxxvii, xliv, ln60, lv, lxi–lxiii, lxxi, lxxix–lxxx, 57, 79, 89, 109–11, 143–49, 167, 175, 185, 223–27, 231; entitative, lxii, 145; integral, lxi–lxiii, 143; subjective, xxxvii, 219 particular, 87, 239 passion (passio, πάθοϛ), xii–xiv, xvi–xvii, xxii–xxiii, xxviin32, xxviii–xxxvi, xxxviiin45, xliii, xlv, xlvii, lvi, lviii–lxix, lxvii, lxxvi–lxxviii, lxxxii, 3–13, 17, 21–25, 29–53, 61–63, 71, 87, 91, 95–99, 115–17, 123, 127, 131, 157, 163–65, 199–203, 211–13, 217, 227n294, 235–37; adequate, lxvii, lxxvi, lxxviii, lxxxii, 163–65, 199–201, 217, 235–37; first or primary (prima), xxix, xxxiii–xxxv, 35, 41, 51–53, 63, 165; positive, xvi, xxii, 11, 17; real, xvi–xvii, xxii, 7–13, 17, 25; ; simple, 31; transcendental, 53; true, xvii, xxii, 9, 13 people (populus), 157 per se accident (per se accidens, καθ᾿ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκόϛ), xii, xxx, lxvi per se affection (per se affectio, καθ᾿ αὑτὸ πάθημα), xii perfection, xvii–xviii, xxiii, xxv, xxx, xlii, xliv, lvi, lxiv–lxv, lxxv–lxxvii, 13–15, 19, 23–25, 43, 77–79, 89, 111, 117–21, 129, 151, 155, 181, 197, 203, 207, 211–13; of being, xxiii, xxx, 117; connatural, 155; divine, xvii, xliv, lvi, 13, 89, 111; entitative, 207; essential, 197, 207, 211–13; positive, xviii,

xxiii, 15, 23, 77; real, xviii, xxiii, 15, 19, 23; supreme (summa), 213; unqualified (simpliciter), xviiin18, 119 person, xxxviii, xli, lvi, 111, 143 philosopher, xxi, xxxix–xl, lviii, lxvi, lxxxvi, 141, 145, 165 philosophy, xxxiv, lxxvi, lxxxvi; first, xxxiv, lxxvi physics, xi, xxxviii, xli Physics (Aristotle’s), xliin54, 121, 135n193, 143, 219, 231 plant, xi, lxii Plato, xxn20, 165 plurality, xxxviii–xxxix, xli, liii, lvi, lxxix, 85, 95, 109 possession, lxx. See also habit Posterior Analytics (Aristotle’s), xin1, xiin4, xiin5, 5, 5n2, 51, 59, 67 potency (potentia), xxxi, ln60, lxi, lxv, 45, 135–43, 153–55, 167–69, 213; accidental, lxv, 155; objective, 139; substantial, 135, 143; visual, xxv precision (praecisio), 15, 169; of the intellect, 15 predicate (praedicatum), xi–xiv, xviii–xix, xxviii–xxix, xxxi–xxxii, xxxv, xliii, lxx, 13, 17, 29, 35–37, 45, 51, 83, 177, 201, 211; absolute, 83; complex, 201; disjunctive, xxviii, xxxi, 45, 201; essential, xxix, 29; negative, lxx, 177; positive, 83; quidditative, 35, 211; real (realis), xliii, 83; of reason (rationis), 83; transcendental, xiv, xxix; univocal, xiii, lxx predication, xii, xiv–xviii, xx, xxii–xxiii, xxvi, xxxiii, xlv–xlvi, xlviii, lviii–lix, lxviii, lxx, 5n4, 7n8, 9, 13, 21, 29, 33, 37, 51, 57, 63, 81n104, 117n170, 123, 127, 131, 221; analogical, xiv, lxviii, lxx; dialectical, 131; essential, xv–xvi, 9, 27; formal, 9; identical, xxvi, 33, 57; necessary, xii; per se, xlviii, 9, 117n170; in quid, 7n8; quidditative, 127; substantive, 37; univocal, lviii–lix, lxviii, lxx, 81n104, 123 premise, xi, xxxiii principle, xii, xxxii–xxxvii, xln50, lxxix, 3, 11, 51–69, 113, 189; of cognition, 3;

256 Index principle, (cont.) complex, 3; of excluded middle (PEM), xxxiv, xxxvii, 57–59; extrinsic, 53; first, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvi–xxxvii, 51–57, 61–69; immediate, 55; indemonstrable, 55; intrinsic, xxix, 35, 51; of a line, lxxivn86; metaphysical, 55; moral, 69; of multitude, 189–91; of non-contradiction (PNC), xxxiii–xxxvii, 51–53, 57–69; of number, xln50, lxxix, 219–21, 235; proper, xxxiii, 51; real, 3; of a science, xii, xxxii–xxxiv, xxxvi; universal, 53 privation, xiii, xix, xxiv–xxv, xxvii, xli–xlii, xlv, xlixn59, liii–lv, lxx–lxxiv, 11n17, 17, 23–25, 79, 91, 101–3, 107–9, 119–23, 183–87, 193–95; of reason, xxiv, xxvii privative(ly), xvii, xli, lxxii, 15, 35, 47, 59, 73–75, 117–19, 169, 183–85, 193 property (proprium, proprietas, ἴδιον), xi–xvii, xxii–xxiii, xxviin32, xxviii–xxxi, xxxv, xlii, xlvii–xlviii, lvi, lxvi–lxviii, lxxx, 5, 11–17, 21–33, 45, 53, 63, 75, 79, 115, 119, 125–27, 163, 199–201; adequate, lxvii, 201; complex, 201; disjunctive, xxxi, 45; incomplex, 201; positive, xv, 7, 75; real, xv–xvi, 5–9, 17, 125–27, 205; requirements for, xiv–xv, 5; transcendental, 127; true, 5 proposition, xi–xii, xxviii, xxxii–xxxiv, xxxvn41, xxxvi–xxxvii, 9, 55–57, 61, 65–67; affirmative, xxxvii, 67; assertoric (de inesse), 69; categorical, xi; demonstrable, xxviii; doctrinal (doctrinalis), xxxvii, 57; identical (identica), 57; immediate, xxxii, 55; mental, xxv; modal, 69; necessary, xxxiv; tautological (nugatoria), 57 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, 167 quality, xxi, lxiii, lxvii quantity, xvii, xxxvii–xli, xliv, lxii–lxiii, lxv, lxvii, lxxv, lxxvii–lxxxi, 13–15, 31, 45, 75, 79, 85, 89, 97, 105, 139, 143–49, 151n210, 161, 161n217, 179, 185, 189, 203, 211, 215–35; continuous, xxxviii, xliv, lxii, lxxix, 79, 89, 143, 149, 161n217, 223, 231; discrete, xxxviii–xli, lxiiin75, lxxix, 105, 151n210, 185; of perfection, lxxv, 203, 211

quiddity, xxix, xliii, 29, 35–37, 43, 87; non-real or fictitious, 35; real, xxix, 35, 43 Quinn, Amy, ix Rábade Romeo, Sergio, li, lxxxiii rationality, lxxv, 197 regress, infinite, xv, xliii, xlviii–xlix, 7, 27, 55, 83–85, 93, 99, 115, 123, 127 relation (habitudo, ordo, relatio, respectus), xvi, xx–xxi, xxiii–xxviii, xxx–xxxi, xliii, xlv–xlviii, xlv, xlixn59, ln60, lxix–lxx, lxxii, 11, 23–25, 31–33, 39–49, 69–71, 79, 83, 91, 95–99, 111, 125, 153, 157, 175, 187, 203; of identity, xlii–xliii, 41, 45, 79, 83, 111; psychological, xxi; real, xx–xxi, xlvii– xlviii, lxxii, 79, 95, 111, 187; of reason, xvi, xxiv–xxviii, xxxi, xliii, xlv, lxxii, 11, 31, 41, 45–47, 83, 91, 99, 111, 125, 157, 187; true, xxv, 47 relative, xxvi, xxx, xliii, lxx, 41, 201–3, 209–11 Renemann, Michael, lxxxiii republic, 153 risibility (risibilitas), lxxv, 197 Roach, Brian, ix Rubio, Antonio, xxxiii saw, lviii, 125 science (scientia, ἐπιστήμη), xi–xii, xiv–xvi, xxxii–xxxvi, xxxviiin45, xxxviii–xli, lxvi, 3–5, 9, 21–25, 35, 51–57, 61–65, 69, 133–35, 177, 205; a posteriori, 61; a priori, 61; propter quid, 61; real, 21; speculative or theoretical, xi, xiv–xv, xxxii–xxxiii, xxxviii, xli, 69. See also knowledge (scientia) sense, 69, 195, 235 Shields, Christopher, ix, xivn11 ship, lx sight, xxn19, liii, lxxi. See also vision sign (indicium, signum), xxxvi, lxii, 19, 33, 65, 77–79, 87, 123–25, 147 significate, lviii, 29, 115–17, 121, 127; adequate, lviii, 117–21, 127; formal, 29, 115–27; material, 117; total, 121 signification, xiii, xviii, xxii–xxiii, xxix– xxx, xliv, lvi–lviii, lxix–lxx, 15, 21–25, 29,

Index 257

35–37, 45–47, 77, 83, 89, 95, 109, 115–27, 179–81, 203; equivocal, 35; formal, xviii, xxii–xxiii, xxix–xxx, xliv, lvi–lviii, lxx, 15, 21–25, 29–31, 45, 77, 83, 89, 109, 115–27, 179–81, 203; primary, lvi silver, 153 similarity (similitudo), xxn20, xxxi–xxxii, 45–49, 79, 111, 159 simplicity, xviii, xliv, 9n8, 15, 77–79, 89, 181 singular, xiii, xln50, lxxvii–lxxviii, lxxxi– lxxxii, 131–33, 217, 235–39 snubness, xv something (aliquid), xxviii–xxx, 29, 33n36, 35–39, 43, 47, 97 Soncinas, Paul, xvi, xviiin18, ln60, lxxv– lxxvi, 11, 41, 77, 81, 91–93, 99, 103, 117, 163, 191, 199, 231 Soto, Domingo de, xvi, xli, 13, 75, 119, 231 soul, xliv, lxi, 89, 141, 157, 179 species, xi, xiv, xxxxviiin45, xxxixn48, xlii, xliv, lvi, lix, lxiiin75, lxiv–lxv, lxxix, lxxxi, 79, 89, 133, 147–49, 151n210, 153, 185, 215, 221, 235–37 stone, xxn19, xlvi, ln60, lxiv, lxix, 93, 153, 175, 225 subject, xi–xii, xiv, xvi–xvii, xix–xx, xxn20, xxin21, xxii, xxxii–xxxv, xlv, xlvii, lvi–lvii, lx, lxiiin74, lxxiv, lxxix, 3–7, 11–15, 21, 27, 51, 57, 101, 115–21, 125–27, 131, 135–37, 149, 165–67, 193, 223–27 subsistence (subsistentia), lxi, 139–43 substance, xxn19, xxxvii, xxxix, lviin69, lxi–lxii, lxv, lxix, lxxvii–lxxxi, 57, 85, 135–37, 141–49, 155, 161n217, 175, 179, 209–11, 219–23, 227–29, 233–35; composite, 179; corporeal, xxxix, lxii, 161n217; created, 211; heterogeneous, lxii, 145–47; homogeneous, lxii, 145; indivisible, 179; material, xxxvii, xxxix, lxii, lxv, lxxvii, lxxviii, lxxxi, 85, 143–45, 221, 229 supposit, 141, 155 synonym, xxviii–xxix, xln50, xlv, 9, 23, 33–37, 91 term or terminus (terminus), xxn20, xx, xxii, xxvi, xxix, xxxii–xxxvi, xlvii–xlviii,

lviin69, lx, lxii, 47, 55, 59–61, 65–69, 79, 95–97, 105, 119, 123, 139–45, 149, 155, 159, 231; abstract, lviin69; accidental, lviin69; complex, 131; concrete, lviin69; contradictory, xlviii, 99; existent, xlviii, 95–97; incomplex, 131; major, xxxv; middle, xxxii–xxxvi, 61, 65; minor, xxxv; negative, xlviii, 47, 99; positive, xlviii, 99; privative, 47, 119; real, 95–97 theologian, xvii, xliv, 13, 89, 157, 211 thing (res), xiv, xxviii–xxix, 29, 33–35, 43–47 Thomas Aquinas, xvi, xxn19, xxiv, xxviii– xxix, xxxviin43, xxxixn48, xlvi, xlix, liii– liv, lvn68, lviin69, lxvi–lxviii, lxxi–lxxii, lxxiv–lxxvi, lxxviii, lxxx–lxxxi, 11, 15–17, 23, 33, 37–41, 69, 77, 81, 93, 103, 107–9, 113, 117–19, 123, 141, 149, 163–69, 173, 183–87, 191, 195, 199, 211, 217, 221–23, 227–29, 233 Thomas de Argentina [Thomas de Strasbourg], 223 Thomist, xvi, xxii, li–lii, lxxiii, lxxv, 9, 191, 199 time (tempus), xix, 17, 29 tooth, lxxiv, 193 transcendence (transcendentia), 21 transcendental (transcendens), xiii–xiv, xvi, xxiii, xxviii, xxx, xliv, xliv, 11, 19, 29, 33, 39–43, 53, 87, 125, 165, 201, 213 tree, lxiv, 153 triangle, xii Trinity, xl, 211 Trombetta, Antonio, 207n268 true (verum), xv–xvi, xix–xxiv, xxvii–xxviii, xxx–xxxi, xxxvi, 9, 19–23, 29–33, 41–43, 47, 125–27 truth, xiii, xxx, xxxii, xxxvii, 23n31, 27, 33, 41, 49, 61, 65–69, 71n79 understanding (intellectus, intelligere, intelligentia, νοῦς), xii, 187, 211, 239. See also intellect and mind undivided (indivisum), xli, xlvi, lin63, lviii, lxix–lxxi, lxxiii, lxxviii, lxxxi–lxxxii, 31, 37, 75, 85, 91–97, 101–3, 107, 111–13, 119–27, 141, 155–57, 165–67, 173, 179, 183, 187, 193, 227–31, 239–41

258 Index union, xixn18, xlii, xliv, xlvi, lv, lxi–lxiv, lxix–lxx, 77–79, 89, 93, 105, 109–11, 135–37, 143–55, 175–77, 231; natural, 149; physical, lxix, 89, 151–55, 175; real, lxiii, 151, 175; substantial, lxii, 145; true, lxiii, lxix unit (unum), xxx, xliii, xlvi–liii, lvn68, lxix, lxxi, lxxin85, lxxii–lxxv, 37, 41, 75, 79–101, 105–7, 113, 117, 121–27, 131, 141, 155–57, 163– 65, 169, 175–81, 185–201, 219–21, 227, 235; numerical, lxxxi, 189, 235–37; per se vs. per accidens, lxix, 175; quantitative, lxxx, 221, 227; singular, lxxxi, 237; transcendental, xxx, lxxx, 95, 101, 177, 189, 219–21, 227, 235–37; the unit which is the principle of number, 219. See also one (unum) unity, xi, xiii, xxviin32, xxx–xxxii, xxxvii– xlii, xliv, xlixn59, li, liiin65, lv, lvn68, lvi–lvii, lix–lxvii, lxix–lxx, lxxii–lxxxii, 33, 39–49, 53, 67, 71–79, 87–89, 103, 109–13, 119, 127, 131–35, 141–47, 151n210, 155–69, 175–77, 185–95, 199, 205, 209–13, 217–41; accidental, 161, 229, 235; analogical, lxxxi, 237; of composition, 79; of continuous quantity, 79; denominative, lxv, 161; entitative, lxv, lxxvii–lxxix, 161, 229; extrinsic, lxv, 161, 233; formal, xiii, lxxviii, lxxxii, 235, 239–41; generic, lix, lxv, lxxxi, 79, 111, 133, 159, 235; individual, xiii, lxxvii, lxxxii, 79, 111, 235, 239–41; intrinsic, lxv, 161, 229; material, lxxxii, 239; metaphysical, 241; mode of, xlii, lxvii, 79, 161, 199, 211–13, 219; numerical, lxxvii, 133, 161, 217, 231– 39; per accidens, vs. per se, lix, lxi, lxvii, lxx, 131, 135, 143–45, 209, 229; per se vs. per aliud, lxv, 161; quantitative, xxxvii–xl,

xlii, lvi, lxii–lxiii, lxv, lxvii, lxxviii–lxxxi, 75, 79, 161, 187, 217–33; rational, lix, lxv, 133, 159; real, lix, lxv, lxxxi, 123, 133, 159, 165, 175, 179, 233–35; singular, xiii, lxxvii– lxxviii, lxxxi–lxxxii, 161, 217, 235–39; specific, lix, lxv, lxxxi, 79, 111, 133, 159, 235; transcendental, xiii, xxviin32, xxx, xxxvii, xl–xli, lxxvii–lxxxii, 71–73, 189, 217–21, 227–39; universal, lxxxii, 239–41 universal(ity), xiv, xxxiv, xxxvi, lxxvi–lxxvii, lxxxii, 11, 39, 53–57, 67–69, 71n81, 205–9, 237–41 univocity, xiii, lviii–lxix, lxviii, lxx, 7n8, 81n104, 123–25, 173, 177–79 Uscatescu Barrón, Jorge, xxviin32 Vio, Tommaso de. See Cajetan vision, xix–xxi, xxvi, 103. See also sight Walker, Theresa, ix wall, xix–xxi, xxvi, 17, 149 water, lxii, lxiv, 131, 153 wheat, lxiv, 153 whiteness, xxin21, xxii–xxiii, lvi, lviii, lxii–lxiii, lxxi, lxxx, 125, 131, 137, 145n205, 147–49, 161, 225 whole (totum), lxii, lxiv, lxxi, 57, 121, 137, 147, 167, 185, 231 will (voluntas), xix, xxx, 31, 35, 39, 43 William of Ockham, xxxixn47 wine, lxiv, 153 wisdom, xvii, 75 Wolter, Allan, xivn9 wood, lxxx, 225

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