Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States: Analysis of Current Threats, Confrontation Mechanisms, and Future Challenges 9811942455, 9789811942457

Citation preview

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States Analysis of Current Threats, Confrontation Mechanisms, and Future Challenges

Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States Analysis of Current Threats, Confrontation Mechanisms, and Future Challenges

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies “Derasat” Riffa, Bahrain

ISBN 978-981-19-4245-7 ISBN 978-981-19-4246-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

Thank God, as it is for His grace and blessings that I have accomplished this book. The book took a year and a half of hard working, depending on a huge number of references, as well as my own experience and expertise in the Arab Gulf region. Actually, this book was not to be accomplished in its current form and content without the support of reliable and trustworthy colleagues; first of them is my colleague, Amany Abdel Ghany, an M.A. researcher, Ain Shams University, Egypt. Once again, I express my appreciation and gratitude for her hard work and strenuous efforts. She did her best with sincerity and honesty to translate a large number of important foreign research papers that were essential for writing many parts in this book. Actually, this is the second time we work together on authoring a new book, after the first one on the Gulf and NATO, which was published by Springer Publishing House. Her meticulous follow-up of the content included in the papers which she has translated, her keenness on completion, and enthusiasm to provide all the possible support for me to accomplish the book, have facilitated the mission and enhanced the chance to finish the book in that professional form and content. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (Derasat) who have provided me with many sources and references in Arabic and in English, which were of a significant value for completing many parts of the book. Thanks are due to the staff of Springer Publishing House, Singapore branch, for their organized work and their great efforts exerted in judging, reviewing, auditing, and designing the book. I am proud to publish a second book with them, and I really appreciate this experience. Riffa, Bahrain May 2022

Ashraf Mohammed Keshk

v

Why This Book was Authored?

On May 12, 2019, four vessels, including two Saudi oil tankers, a Norwegian tanker and an Emirati cargo ship, were damaged due to sabotage acts, off Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz. On June 13, 2019 two oil tankers were sabotaged in the Sea of Oman due to another attack. On July 29, 2021, an oil tanker was attacked by a drone off the coast of Oman, killing two of its sailors. This is in addition to reports of hijacking attempts against ships. These attacks and others were a qualitative change in the threats targeting the security of the Arabian Gulf and maritime navigation in that region, in particular. They actually might bring to mind the scenario of the Iran-Iraq tanker war (1980–1988), in which each country was attacking the other party’s vessels; oil tankers, owned by non-belligerent parties and were heading to the Gulf States or using their ports, were not excluded from these attacks. Some of those vessels were sunk while others were severely damaged. However, the attacks against oil tankers during 2019 and 2021 are the worst and pose challenges to the maritime security for several reasons. First is the limited maritime capabilities of the Gulf States in spite of the rising maritime security threats which include the use of modern technology such as “drones”. Second, the strategic location of the Arab Gulf States makes them supervise vital waterways which serve not only their trade with other countries around the world, but also the global trade as a whole. In other words, any threats to these waterways mean an outbreak of confrontations from which the Arab Gulf States will not be far. Third, as the regional and international efforts have succeeded in eliminating terrorist groups on land, these groups might have found a new destination for their crimes in the seas, given the fact that they (seas) actually have high-value targets which could easily be reached. Fourth, in spite of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which was established as an international framework defining the maritime rights of States, the absence of an international force which can easily oblige countries to implement its contents, has made control over seas more dependent on the maritime capabilities of each country. Fifth, the area circling the most strategic waterways (“the Bab alMandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz”) is witnessing chronic crises, which, in turn, have increased the militarization of the regional and global competition near the international waterways, specifically, Bab al-Mandab. This, in fact, has, also, vii

viii

Why This Book was Authored?

created a new reality and gave rise to more threats concerning a possible closure of the other vital waterway, the Strait of Hormuz. Given these facts, several questions have leaped to my mind; will the Arabian Gulf region witness a “new ‘tanker war’”? What are the main threats facing maritime security? Do the Arab Gulf States have the necessary naval capabilities to confront these maritime security threats? What are the efforts that the Arab Gulf States might have made to maintain their maritime security, whether in terms of enhancing their own capabilities or through participating in alliances for this purpose? What are the regional frameworks through which the Arab Gulf States can address maritime security threats? Most importantly, what are the obstacles hindering the Arab Gulf States’ efforts to maintain maritime security? These and other questions motivated me to author this book which illustrates a viewpoint from the Arab Gulf region. It analyzes the Arab Gulf States’ efforts to confront the threats, endangering maritime security. Actually the fact that there is hardly any recent literature tackling the maritime security of the Arab Gulf States adds more significance to this book, on the one hand. On the other hand, the book aims at providing an integrated vision on maritime security and its concept, with regard to the historical and legal dimensions of the concept. It also arouses future issues such as employing technology in confronting maritime security threats, and the gap in maritime capabilities between the Arab Gulf States and Iran, as well as regional and global competitions near vital waterways. This is in addition to analyzing the international efforts to preserve maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf and to what extent they are effective. For the above clarified reasons, I see that maritime security threats have become the greatest challenge facing the Arab Gulf States. This is due to the fact that these States have been focusing for decades only on developing their land capabilities. There might have been some sort of interest, during the past few years, in developing maritime capabilities. However, as the pace of security threats accelerates, an inevitable question is raised: Do the efforts of developing maritime capabilities proceed with the same pace? This question is what this book mainly tackles, because answering it will not only determine the capabilities of the Arab Gulf States, but also the features of the regional balance of power and the nature of regional and international roles in facing maritime security threats which are not new. The Arab Gulf States have experienced the Iraqi-Iranian war. However, these recent attacks, especially those in which drones were used, have sparked controversy about the Gulf States’ power, in general and their naval capabilities in particular. This is actually, what this book attempts to tackle from a strategic perspective, through its four chapters.

About This Book

This book, authored by Dr. Ashraf Muhammad Keshk, tackles the issue of “Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States: An Analysis of Real Threats, Confrontation Strategies and Future Challenges”. Its significance emanates from the conspicuous increase in the maritime security threats, which have been targeting oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman through the years (2019–2021). Actually, the chronic hazards of these threats pushed the author to raise a question: Is the Arabian Gulf region witnessing a new tanker war, similar to the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, when the United States led an international coalition to protect the Gulf oil tankers? The chapters of this book constitute an attempt to answer this question through exposing several definitions of the maritime security concept along with illustrating the former theoretical contributions in this regard. Then, an analysis of the international legal regulations of strategic waterways in the Arabian Gulf region, namely “the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab”, is followed. After that, the author proposes another analysis of the most major threats to maritime security in that region, including targeting tankers. The next part also clarifies the relationship between maritime security and regional security; that is to be explained in light of the fact that the regional conflicts’ parties use maritime security within regional crises. It also identifies the conventional mechanisms, established by the Arab Gulf States, individually and collectively, to confront these threats, as well as the regional and international partnerships in which the Gulf States are parties for this purpose. The book also analyzes the most prominent obstacles facing the Arab Gulf States, which despite paying the issue of maritime security great importance, they face several impediments to crystalize that importance into actions, such as establishing the international alliance, needed for this purpose. This is in addition to the gap in naval capabilities between Iran and the six Gulf Cooperation Council States; Iran is still superior to the GCCS. Most importantly here are the challenges which hinder the Gulf States’ endeavors to employ technology in enhancing their maritime capabilities. finally, the book sheds light on the conflicts in the Horn of Africa region and its implications on addressing the maritime security threats. The book comprises a mixture of theoretical frameworks and practical aspects which are based on the author’s actual experience. The author has been working on ix

x

About This Book

security and defense issues in the Arabian Gulf region for more than 25 years. Hence, the book is a comprehensive and balanced viewpoint of a researcher and an expert from the region.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime Security in the Arab Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Maritime Security in Strategies of Small States: A Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Concept of Small States and Their Security Dilemma . . . . . . . 2.4 Small States and the Dilemma of Achieving Balance of Power . . . 2.5 The Foreign Policies of Small Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Defence Options for Small States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Significance of the Theoretical Framework to the Four Chapters of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 Literature Review on Maritime Security in the Arab Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 Maritime Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 Maritime Security and its Relation to Energy Security and Economic Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11 The Current and the Anticipated Efforts to Maintain Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.12 The Author’s Own Comments on the Afore-Illustrated Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States: The Concept and Its Historical and Legal Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Maritime Security Concept in Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 The Sea State Theory and the Arab Gulf States . . . . . . . . . .

1 7 7 8 8 9 11 12 13 14 14 16 17 19 19 21 21 22 26

xi

xii

Contents

3.3

The History of Maritime Security Threats to the Arab Gulf States: the “Tanker War” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The Role of Geography in Conflicts, “Seas as a Case Study” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 The Tanker War… A New Course for the Iran-Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Illustration of the Western Intervention to Protect Oil Tankers: “Operation Earnest Will” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Position of the Arab Gulf States During the Tanker War . . . . . 3.4.1 Lessons Learned from the Tanker War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region: (Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 The Legal Status of International Navigation Passage in the Strait of Hormuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 The Legal Status of International Navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 The Relationship Between Maritime Security and Regional Security of the Arabian Gulf Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 The Impact of Maritime Security on the Concept of Gulf Regional Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2 Maritime Security is Cause of Establishing Military Coalitions in the Arabian Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.3 Employing Regional Conflicts to Threaten Maritime Security and Intensifying International Rivalry Near Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Targeting Oil Tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 The First Attack May 12, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 The Second Attack June 13, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 The Third Attack; Against the Tanker Mercer Street (July 29, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Iranian Threats and the Strait of Hormuz Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Maritime Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Maritime Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Illegal Smuggling, Human Trafficking and Weapons . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28 28 29 31 35 37 38 38 44 46 46 49

50 51 55 55 56 56 57 58 63 68 68 74 74 77

Contents

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 The Gulf Collective Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 At the Level of Separate Arabian Gulf Countries . . . . . . . . 5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats to Maritime Security at the Regional Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Role of Djibouti Code of Conduct in Countering Maritime Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 The Council of the Arab and African Countries Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 The Naval Military Coalition for Maritime Security in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian Gulf Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Difficulties Facing the Military Coalition for Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Building Naval Capabilities and the Gap Between the Gulf Countries and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Challenges of Employing Technology in Maritime Security . . . . . 6.5 Conflict and Rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Its Impact on the Security of Maritime Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

81 81 82 83 87 92 92 98 103 103 107 113 117 117 118 125 131 137 141

Book Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Strategic Conclusions of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

About the Author

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk is a research fellow and the director of the Strategic and International Studies Program at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies “Derasat” since 2012. He is also the editor-in-chief of “Derasat” journal, a semi-annual publication comprising analyses and studies on strategic, political, international, economic, security, and energy issues, with a special focus on Gulf and Arab affairs. Dr. Keshk holds a Ph.D. degree, with an excellent grade, in Political Science, Cairo University. His thesis was nominated by Cairo University as the best Ph.D. thesis in Political Science in 2009. For more than twenty-five years, Dr. Keshk has been specializing in regional security issues of the Arabian Gulf, as well as defense issues, especially the regional and international alliances. He worked as an academic mentor at the NATO Defense College in Rome, as part of the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) which was conducted from 2009 till 2018, and gave several lectures to the College students. Keshk holds also a Defence Studies diploma from NATO Defense College, which he accomplished during a four-month scholarship, He is the author of four books: Gulf Regional Security Development since 2003: A Study of the Impact of NATO’s Strategy, Western Policies towards the Security of the Arabian Gulf, and Egypt’s Water Policy towards the Nile Basin Countries in 1990s, NATO and the Gulf Countries: An Analysis of the Fifteen Year Strategic Partnership. Keshk has published dozens of papers in reputable regional and international journals which are issued in Arabic, English, and Italian. He participated, as well, in a lot of international conferences on security of the Arabian Gulf and NATO policies, including the Gulf Research Center’s annual Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), at the University of Cambridge, and many other conferences which were held in Europe. Moreover, he gave many lectures and conducted several training courses on Crisis and Disaster Management; he has taught, for instance, Bahrain’s crisis and disaster management strategy to the MA students at the Royal Police Academy in Bahrain. He writes a weekly article in Akhbar Al-Khaleej, a Bahraini newspaper.

xv

Chapter 1

Introduction

Although the security threats to countries are numerous, threats to maritime security have become the most dangerous ones, and they are increasing day after day. Unlike the land, the seas are vast and open areas that cannot be easily controlled. In spite of the existence of international agreements that oblige countries to respect maritime rights of each other, most notably the 1982 United Nations Convention on to the Law of the Sea, the matter is ultimately subject to the power of countries and their ability to extend their control over the seas. This issue has been of interest to many researchers for decades. They have linked the power of countries with the extent of their maritime influence. Nonetheless, as much as maritime countries have advantages, the more threats they face than landlocked countries. These threats increase if the geostrategic regions surrounding the maritime countries are witnessing chronic conflicts. Such conflicts are directly reflected on maritime security, as terrorist groups consider the seas a new arena for conflicts. With a cheap boat that can be remotely detonated, a ship loaded with thousands of tons of oil worth millions of dollars can be destroyed. The biggest challenge is not the increase in threats to sea security. Rather, some countries do not have sufficient maritime capabilities to counter these threats. Even, some countries seek to employ modern technology to target commercial shipping carriers, and this is a qualitative development in the area of maritime security threats. Based on what is reviewed above, this book discusses the maritime security threats to the Arabian Gulf countries from a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond addressing traditional threats and ways to counter them. The book goes further by going back to history to analyze the role of the Arabian Gulf countries in addressing maritime security crises and how they dealt with them. In other words, the book links the past to the present and tackle the future and the challenges it poses for the Arabian Gulf countries in their efforts to safeguard maritime security. Within this general framework, the book is divided into a preamble clarifying the theoretical framework in view of which the policies of small states can be well explained; their acts and procedures in turbulent regional environment, where maritime security threats are predominantly present and common, would also be illustrated. The book includes a three-part literature review on previous studies which have tackled the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_1

1

2

1 Introduction

issue of maritime security in the Arabian Gulf. The first part highlights the maritime security threats, the second clarifies how maritime security is linked to other security areas such as economic security. The last part highlights the current efforts as well as those which are anticipated to maintain maritime security on both the regional and the international levels. This book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with the concept and dimensions of maritime security, as well as the historical and legal dimensions. At the conceptual level, it is noted that there is interest in the concept of maritime security. However, this was only during the past few decades, and that concept differs not only in different schools of thought, but also in view of the different interests of the countries themselves. With multiplicity of stances, there are five areas that can be addressed about the concept of maritime security. They are the security of the seas themselves, the management of the oceans, the protection of maritime borders, military operations at sea, and security measures to regulate maritime transport. There have been many definitions of maritime security, and some researchers have even linked the concept of maritime security and the state’s maritime power by defining criteria by which countries can be classified as being maritime or not. These criteria apply to a large extent to the Arabian Gulf countries. In this respect, it should be taken into consideration that as much as maritime countries enjoy comparative advantages, compared to landlocked countries, they face dangers at the same time. The first chapter also analyzes the events of the 1980–1988 Iraq-Iran war, which included the ‘tanker war’, involving the two countries targeting tankers that leave and go to ports of the Gulf countries as well as ports of the two parties to the war. Although the Arabian Gulf countries were not a party to that war, they had to be within its confrontations. The State of Kuwait announced flying flags of Western countries on its tankers to protect them from attacks during that war. This prompted then US President Donald Reagan to announce initiation of what is known as Operation Serious Will, which is a naval coalition for those who wish to join it from Western countries to protect Gulf oil tankers against these attacks. These confrontations raised legal and security problems at the time, especially regarding the foundations of initiation of such operation and challenges to it, including the mine war. Many lessons learned from the tanker war are useful these days, given the repeated Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea in 2019 and 2021. This chapter also deals with the legal regulation of the sea routes in the Arabian Gulf region (the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab). Despite the fact that they are international shipping routes subject to rules of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the dilemma does not lie in the text of this agreement, but in the extent of countries’ compliance with it. Controversy was raised also over the concept of the territorial sea and the right of navigating in sea routes and attempts by some countries to circumvent the text of that convention, and others problems, such as non-ratification of the convention by some countries, and attempts to differentiate between merchant ships and warships, regarding the eligibility and timing of navigating in these straits. In addition, reflection of regional conflicts on the safety and security of maritime navigation in these two straits, and attempts by some parties to employ the waterways as bargaining chips within their regional and international conflicts, mean that the dilemma does not lie in the international legal

1 Introduction

3

rules regulating work at sea, but rather in the absence of an international mandatory authority to obligate countries to abide by them. This largely applies to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. As for the second chapter, it deals with the traditional and new maritime security threats to the Arabian Gulf countries. The chapter begins with analyzing the targeting of oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019 and 2021, reviewing these attacks and trying to explain their timing and implications for the maritime security of the Gulf countries and regional security in general, and their impact on oil prices and insurance fees for ships destined for the Arabian Gulf region, and most importantly, the global reaction in general and the US reaction in particular. Such reaction involved the United States’ announcement of increasing deterrence mechanisms in the Arabian Gulf region. The second chapter addresses also the future paths as a result of this qualitative development regarding maritime security threats, whether the possibility of emergence of a new tanker war in the Arabian Gulf again, similar to the scenario of the eighties, or the occurrence of limited confrontations in this region. Regardless of the occurrence of either of the two scenarios, the most important result in the context of these developments is that rules of the game in the regional tension in the Arabian Gulf region have changed. This involved, as a whole, employing technology in these conflicts in a way that affects vital facilities as well as carriers of commercial shipments. This is a major challenge, in addition to the possibility of obstruction of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, without a complete closure of it. Such challenge has an impact on vital interests of some parties that have vital interests with that region. Although Iran’s threat to close the strait is not new, the author wanted to put this issue into an academic discussion based on proofs and evidence regarding two perspectives. The first perspective regards Iran’s closure of the Strait as possible. Under the second perspective, it is believed that it is not possible for Iran to declare closure of the strait because it represents a red line in the context of the regional conflict equation, and given its impact on the security of the entire world as well. Given the military superiority of the United States over Iran, the outcome of military confrontation is well known. It is also important to discuss the impact of obstructing navigation in that vital sea route on interests of many parties, including China, India and the European Union, an issue addressed by author in some detail. China relies heavily on oil imports from Iran. This is true also regarding India, which imported 24 million tons of oil from Iran at the end of 2020, and the European Union member states that depend on the Arabian Gulf oil, as well as trade exchanges with these countries. Turkey also has important commercial exchanges with some Arabian Gulf countries. The second chapter also deals with dangers of maritime piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal smuggling and arms trafficking, by analyzing dangers of this phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. The total expenditures to confront the phenomenon of piracy in that region in 2008 amounted to about $7 billion, compared to $10 billion in all other regions of the world. Despite the decline of piracy since 2011, it still represents a threat to the maritime security of the Arabian Gulf countries, especially in light of continuation of regional crises in the geostrategic range of vital waterways and the continuation of proxy wars. The second chapter addresses also maritime terrorism with reference to some examples,

4

1 Introduction

including documents that Al-Qaeda was targeting naval targets in the Arabian Gulf region. Addressed also is Illegal smuggling operations, especially smuggling drugs, which is a huge threat to the Gulf countries given their proximity to areas of drug production and trade. During the period 2016–2018, some 407 information sharing operations were carried out among the Arabian Gulf countries, resulting in the seizure of 20 million narcotic tablets and 100 kg of narcotic substances. The sea ports are the most dangerous in this respect. Threats of human trafficking are also addressed in the second chapter, as the Horn of Africa is considered a source of waves of illegal immigration heading to the Arabian Gulf countries in search of better living opportunities. In 2018 and 2019, the number of illegal immigrants from the Horn of Africa region to Yemen, on their way to the Arabian Gulf countries, was estimated at 300,000. Addressed as well is illegal fishing and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. The third chapter deals with the mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf countries to safeguard maritime security, which vary between self-mechanisms and cooperation at the regional level, in addition to cooperation at the international level. The Arabian Gulf countries have realized the growing threats to maritime security, which requires working in parallel tracks, given the existence of interests of regional and international parties in safeguarding maritime security. At the level of self-mechanisms, the Unified Maritime Duty Force (81) of the Gulf countries was established in 2014 within the military part of the Peninsula Shield Forces. The Unified Maritime Operations Center for the Gulf countries was also established in 2016, which is an important coordination mechanism, not only between the Arabian Gulf countries, but also with similar bodies related to maritime security, including the Maritime Security Center in Singapore, the Emergency and Piracy Center in Malaysia. This is in addition to cooperation among the Gulf countries by signing some contracts for the production of some naval weapons, as well as increasing the pace of joint naval drills, which include simulating potential maritime confrontations. The targeting of oil tankers in 2019 and 2021 has also led to decisions by some Gulf countries to send ships to international waters to secure maritime navigation. At the level of each Gulf country separately, strengthening naval capabilities has become a priority within armaments procurement in general. At the regional level, the Gulf countries have been keen to participate in mechanism aimed at confronting threats to maritime security, including the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which was established in 2009 by 17 countries, including two of the Arabian Gulf countries. This code is based on rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and seeks military and maritime cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation. In 2017, member states of the Code of Conduct called for expanding its framework of action to include transnational maritime crimes. The Council of the Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which was initiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2020, is another regional mechanism. Set up at an initiative by Saudi Arabia in 2020, goals of the council include safeguarding maritime security in the Red Sea. It comprises, along with Saudi Arabia, seven countries. There is no doubt that this council achieves at the same time the balance of power in this region of the world.

1 Introduction

5

At the level of international partnerships, and in the wake of the attacks that targeted oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019, the US administration of the former president Trump announced the establishment of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf Region in November 2019, comprising 6 countries, including 3 Gulf countries namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. This coalition is for defensive purposes only. It does not aim to launch attacks against any party in the region. It is based on the experience of the United States and its partners from the Arabian Gulf countries in safeguarding the security of maritime navigation in that region. The third chapter tackles also the France-led European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, establishment of which was announced in 2020. This mission is headquartered in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates and is called the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, and includes eight countries. The work of this mission complements the work of the US-led coalition for the same purpose. As for the fourth chapter, it deals with obstacles to achieving maritime security for the Arabian Gulf countries. Despite the efforts and mechanisms that the Gulf countries established or participated to safeguard maritime security, they still face challenges. The first of these challenges involves the difficulties facing the work of the Naval Military Coalition for Maritime Security in the Gulf led by the United States, including the capabilities necessary for the work of this coalition, as the United States does not want to bear any additional military burdens. This is in addition to the fact that the coalition comprises only 6 countries. This low number of member states means that countries have different approaches to the mechanism of countering maritime threats. There is also the controversy over the legal reference for that coalition. It may be better for countries of the world to start their efforts in this respect depending on the international task forces operating in the Arabian Gulf region, which includes 33 countries and operates in vast maritime areas and has cumulative experiences on ways to counter maritime security threats. The second challenge addressed by the fourth chapter is capacity-building and the gap between Iran and the Gulf countries in the field of naval armament. Although the Arabian Gulf countries have superiority in military spending according to the relevant international reports, Iran still has a clear advantage in the number of watercrafts. Iran has 398 watercrafts, compared to 375 watercrafts in the six Gulf countries. Perhaps the important thing is that building naval capabilities is a strategic necessity for the Gulf countries that obtain their vital supplies of food and medicine by sea transport. The third challenge is related to challenges to employing technology to counter maritime security threats, including countering cyber-attacks that can disrupt the work of major ports for several days, resulting in heavy economic losses, in addition to the challenge of the ability of modern devices to detect smuggling operations to ensure, at the same time, regular loading and unloading of goods. There is also the controversy regarding thinking about the possibility of returning to the fixed radar system used during the Second World War, to avoid attempts of terrorist groups to penetrate the communication network of modern radar devices, to mislead the course of ships at sea and to easily take control of them. Another challenge in this regard is related to increasing the

6

1 Introduction

efficiency of personnel working in the maritime field. The Final challenge addressed by this chapter is the conflict and rivalry in the Horn of Africa. Despite international efforts to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa, it led to militarization of that region with many countries at the regional and global levels engaging in building military bases in it. Although the powers present in this region have not declared hostility to each other so far, it is noted that the pace of building these bases, which is not limited to Western countries only, but includes European and Asian parties, means the possibility of a state of polarization prevailing in that region between blocs that are getting formed. This matter may portend confrontations in the future. Such confrontations will not be a challenge to maritime security only, but also to the regional balance of power, imposing challenges and burdens to regional organizations in this region.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime Security in the Arab Gulf Region

2.1 Introduction It is possible to examine the policies of the Arab Gulf states to maintain their maritime security in view of the security policies of the small states, the chronic dilemma of which lies in being heavily concerned with security. This part of the book comprises a set of definitions for what is meant by a “small state” according to the international criteria and the previous research contributions in this regard. It also proposes an analysis of the small states’ security dilemma, especially those which are located in a region with imbalance of power, while the balance of power is the main prerequisite to achieve and maintain regional security. In fact, smaller states often seek to create some sort of balance of power, with other regional parties, through a number of various strategies, such as attaining self-security, establishing regional and international alliances, and adopting a policy of neutrality. However, the success of either of these strategies, or all of them, depends on both the regional and the international environments. To further clarify, in spite of the opportunities offered by these environments, they also impose restrictions on the behavior of the small states. To this extent, it is worthy to illustrate the fact that the imbalance of power in the Arabian Gulf region is highly complex. The Gulf States themselves are not the same; there are small states, medium states, and large ones. There is even a lack of balance between the Gulf States on the one hand, and their neighboring countries on the other hand. A third imbalance exists between the Gulf region and the whole world. Therefore, any strategies to achieve a balance of power must be based on this awfully complicated equation. This part also presents the most significant previous studies which have tackled the issue of maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf region. The studies can be divided or classified into three groups or categories: the first category illustrates the various threats to maritime security, as embodied in the Iranian policies which align with its broader strategy to dominate and get leverage over the Arab Gulf region, utilizing its geographical position astride the strategic maritime chokepoints. For this reason, Iran’s major threats have to do with imperiling navigation in the Strait © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_2

7

8

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

of Hormuz and supporting Yemen’s Houthi group which is threatening navigation in Bab al-Mandab strait. The growth of the naval arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Gard Corps, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) which is responsible for maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, is also well noticed. At the same time, maritime piracy is one of the most prominent threats to maritime security; it causes hikes in insurance costs and maritime transportation through the afore-mentioned maritime routes. The second group of studies clarifies how maritime security is closely linked to energy security and economic security. Actually, the policies and initiatives of numerous countries can be well-illustrated within this framework, including the efforts of some Asian countries to secure their access to energy from the Gulf region. China, for instance, has launched the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, and is exerting enthusiastic efforts to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa region. The third group of studies sheds more light on the various efforts to maintain maritime security, whether through the fast-paced armament of the Gulf States or through the international efforts, including the European Union role towards maritime security in the Gulf region. This is in addition to the roles played by the Asian countries, such as India which has various economic interests with the Arab Gulf states.

2.2 Maritime Security in Strategies of Small States: A Theoretical Framework Safeguarding maritime security of the Arabian Gulf countries can be regarded as part of strategies of small states of which some of the Arabian Gulf countries are classified, to defend themselves, as the main chronic dilemma of small countries is security one. This dilemma is escalating for the Arabian Gulf countries, given growing threats to maritime security. These threats are considered qualitative threats, and perpetuate the status of imbalance in the regional balance of power, which causes enormous challenges to the Arabian Gulf countries.

2.3 The Concept of Small States and Their Security Dilemma The emergence of small states increased after World War II. This, in turn, increased academic interest in small states, in attempts to define them and define their security dilemma. Intellectual contributions in this respect have included Robert Stein’s definition of the small state as “a small power that believes that it cannot achieve security by using its own capabilities, and therefore must rely on the support and assistance of other countries or international organisations”. As for R. D. Cohen, he believes that

2.4 Small States and the Dilemma …

9

a small state is “a state whose leaders believe that it will not have an impact in the international order if it acts individually or even within a group of other small states”. There are other intellectual stances adopted by Patricia Holgmart Bilberg, Zharbert and Cornich, who defined criteria for the concept of small states in terms of the number of populations. Their estimates ranged for the size of small states as having a population ranging from 300,000 to one million people. Others add other criteria such as legal status, national product and land area. As for the United Nations, it has developed a more general and comprehensive definition: “Small states are very small entities in terms of area, population, human and economic resources, and act now as independent states”. Regardless of the divergent visions about the concept of small states, there is an intellectual consensus regarding the security dilemma of small states, especially if they are located within a region whose military capabilities vary, causing them not only security concern, but also a survival complex, as these states may be a permanent target for a militarily stronger neighbour. Even, Developments in the entire international system have a greater impact on small states than others countries, as they are unable to control developments of events in regions where they are located, given escalating modern security threats.1

2.4 Small States and the Dilemma of Achieving Balance of Power The solution to the security dilemma of small states is linked to achieving the concept of balance of power, which is a basis for regional security. The balance of power, which is based on the balance of interests, has been used in Europe since 1701. Later, this concept has been bolstered, especially after World War I, when major countries sought to find areas of influence to enhance their strength. This has led to formulating theories of power and the realist theories in the post-World War I era.2 The balance of power in international relations is achieved when a country or group of countries in a particular region does not possess sufficient power to dominate and force other countries in that region to submit to its or their will. Some countries may not seek to achieve balance of power. Instead, they seek hegemony. Small states resort to compensating the power gap with a dominant regional state by allying with a larger power, rather than seeking to achieve balance of power. However, this is not the prevailing pattern in all regions (it may be limited to the Gulf region). The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, two regional frameworks that reflect a new balance of power, have been approved in other regions. In sum, the existence of a strong and effective balance of power 1

Keshk Ashraf mohammed. 2015. The Evolution of Gulf Regional Security since 2003: A Study of NATO Strategy. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. 2 Desert, Encyclopedia of a Fighter from the. n.d. The Foundations of the Balance of Power. Accessed April 22, 2022. http://www.moqatil.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia21/Tawazo nKiw/sec03.doc_cvt.htm.

10

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

could be the main guarantee for achieving mutual deterrence and perhaps peace. However, this is rebutted by the fact that the presence of two powers at the helm of the international system during the Cold War era did not prevent outbreak of a large number of proxy wars.3 The realist school pays great attention to the concept of balance of power. For example, Hans Morgenthau believes that there are at least four cases in which the term balance of power is used. The first case involves a policy through which states seek a certain status for themselves. The second involves achievement of a specific situation among states. The third involves achieving a target approximate distribution of power. The final case involves equal distribution of power between countries. According to the proponents of this school, states always seek to increase their power and safeguard their national security by achieving the goal of making the balance of power in their favour, or at least not against them. To achieve this, states follow three paths, which are increasing their power quantitatively and qualitatively, adopting the policy of alliances, as well as the establishment of a buffer state between two states.4 However, the issue of the balance of power itself is not only related to the structure of a region, but also to practices of its parties in light of the imbalance of power in some regions. These parties include three types of powers. The first is the dominant state or the one that aspires to dominate the regional system, depending on its numerical superiority, military capabilities, or geographical location, especially if it is a maritime state (such as Iran). The second involves the bargaining or opposing states, which are countries that have a power that allows them to bargain so that they make exercising the influence of hegemonic powers very expensive (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an example against the example of Iran). The third type of states in this respect involves balancing states (as represented in the six Arabian Gulf countries). They are parties whose policy is neutral and play a balancing role between the two parties and are a target for both parties in terms of the desire to ally themselves with them. The extent of the power of the balancing party is the main guarantor for keeping regional conflicts within their reasonable limits without reaching the point of war. However, this also has not been achieved in the Arabian Gulf region (as reflected in the Iraqi-Iranian war in the 1980s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990).5 Despite the importance of this theoretical framework that reflects the interactions of three regional parties, namely Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Gulf countries, the United States being the leader of the international coalition to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991 marked the transformation of the ‘triangle of conflict’ into what Dr Mohamed Al-Saeed Idris An Egyptian academic specializing in regional systems called a “tension rectangle”. In this respect, he says, “talking about the triangle of conflict in the Gulf, which used to mean the struggle for regional hegemony in the Gulf between 3

Robinson, Paul. 2009. Dictionary of International Security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 4 Al-Masry, Khaled Musa. 2014. Introduction to International Relations Theory. Damascus. Damascus: Nineveh House for Publishing and Distribution. 5 Idris, Mohamed Al-Saeed. 2001. Analysis of Regional Systems: A Study in the Origins of Regional International Relations. Cairo: Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.

2.5 The Foreign Policies of Small …

11

Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, is no longer meaningful. It is replaced by another, more reasonable concept, the (tension rectangle) in the Gulf, which reflect the current state of Gulf regional relations between four main parties; namely Iran, Iraq, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the United States of America, where the inter-relations as a whole have become conflict relations, except for the relations between the United States and the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which are cooperative”.6

2.5 The Foreign Policies of Small Countries There are many intellectual contributions that dealt with the impact of the size of a state on its foreign policy, but these contributions, even if their pioneers agreed about the inevitability of that impact, disagree on the factors through which that impact can be measured and its extent. There are those who believe that there is an inevitable relationship between the size of a state and its foreign policy, and that small countries should always adopt rational decisions in the situations they face in their foreign policy. The explanation for this is that these countries do not have the ability to influence contents of international policies, especially in their early stages. Therefore, small countries should be keen to employ international partnerships with major powers within their international behaviour to reduce any cost that may result from taking decisions away from these alliances. The mechanism of small countries in this framework is to take initiatives that benefit them, define their goals within these initiatives and to adhere to their contents. The goal is to maximize the impact and reduce risks.7 According to those of another trend, small states can regard patterns in international politics as a given reality within the extent in which they can make sacrifices within the international alliances, given they are significantly affected by the structure of the international system more than other countries. However, this does not mean non-existence of other options for the small states at the regional level, by means of alliance between smaller states with each other. Nonetheless, the international alliances of the small states remain an important guarantee, not only in terms of security, but also regarding paving the way for other unofficial, and possibly secret, alliances that bring small countries many tangible benefits.8 Those of a third trend address the impact of regional and international environments on the external behaviour of small states, given that the international environment always has an impact on choices of small countries in their regional environment, a matter that constitutes a substantial element in foreign policies of small countries. However, this 6

Newspaper, Al Bayan. 2001. Three options for achieving Gulf security. 15 July. Accessed April 22, 2022. https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/2001-07-25-1.1175576. 7 East, Maurice A. 1973. “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models.” World politics 559–562. 8 O. Keohane, Robert. 1971. “The Big influence of Small Allies.” Foreign policy 162–168.

12

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

matter is not always true, the eastern European countries, for example, took different paths after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in order to reach an integrated explanation for behaviour of small states, the nature of their political systems as well as the transformations of the international environment must be taken into account.9 As for those of the fourth trend, they provide a more comprehensive explanation for behaviour of small states, by identifying elements of change and continuity in such behaviour. In addition to taking into consideration the impact of the international system on behaviour of small states, as well as the regional security environment, the role of the ruling elite in small states, their orientations and political convictions, in addition to the impact of the element of identity, must be taken into account. All these are factors that help understand the behaviours of small states, which are not always similar. For example, there has been differences between policies of Georgia and Azerbaijan during the post-Soviet Union era. It has been realized that Georgia has been more loyal to the Soviet Union than Azerbaijan. All these elements are helpful for understanding behaviours of small states. Nonetheless, existence of these elements does not mean that behaviours of these states, even those that are similar in size and geographic location, must be similar.10

2.6 Defence Options for Small States Given the challenge of the balance of power is the main dilemma for the small states, this raises a question about the options of the small states to defend themselves, whether against security threats in general or threats to maritime security in particular. They are four options. The first is mobilizing the state. This means that a small state seeks to make up for its small population by purchasing the most modern weapons and developing the combat capabilities of its forces. It may succeed in this vertical expansion (buying weapons), but it cannot establish a strong national army, as the population remains a constraint on its efforts in this regard. The second option is regional alliances, but the establishment of these alliances requires existence of common interests and goals. The third option is military neutrality, under which small states facing a continuous security impasse believe that the adoption of that option represents a moral constraint on regional parties to prevent their attacks. The fourth option is international alliances, an option that has not been limited to small countries only, but was adopted by middle-sized and even major powers during different historical stages of developments of the world order. However, it is not certain that alliances provide small states with a security guarantee, because the other international powers in the alliance may not believe in the need to protect small states if they face internal disturbances, for example. In addition, small states 9

Elman, Miriam Fenduis. 1995. “The foreign policies Of Small States.” British Journal of Political Science 217. 10 Giorgi Gvalia, David Siroky.Bidzina Lebanidze and Zurab Lashvili. 2013. Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Froing Policies Of Small States. Berlin: Routledge.

2.7 Significance of the Theoretical Framework …

13

may find themselves involved in conflicts in which they do not have direct interests. Consequently, small states may find themselves in a situation in which they have to choose from two bitter options. These options are either “being ignored” or being trapped. The more states depend on alliances, the greater the risk they being trapped.11 In spite of the importance of these options, the problem is that the state of imbalance in the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf region is represented in three overlapping circles. The first is the imbalance between the Gulf countries themselves, as there are major, medium and small countries. The second circled is the imbalance between the six Gulf states, and Iraq in the past, and Iran at the present time. The final circle involves the imbalance between the Gulf region as a whole and the major powers that have a strong presence in the region, such as the United States of America. This means that any balance of power will be based on this equation that is characterized with complexity and severe overlap. Applying the four options mentioned above to the security policies of the Arabian Gulf countries, the regional alliances are represented in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which does not include Iraq and Iran. The international alliances are with the United States of America. In addition, four of these countries joined a strategic partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); namely the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Regarding the adoption of the option of neutrality, historical experience confirmed that this option is beset with difficulties. With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the Arabian Gulf countries could not be neutral, as the policy of neutrality lasts only if the regional parties desire to respect it, but with the continuation of the war, both Iraq and Iran began to attack oil tankers that go in and out of the Gulf ports. This forced the Gulf countries not only to be a party to these confrontations, but they also engaged international parties in this war by flying flags of Western countries on the Gulf oil tankers, to protect them, under the US-led Coalition of the Willing.

2.7 Significance of the Theoretical Framework to the Four Chapters of the Book The theoretical framework involves a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the Arabian Gulf countries, as small states that have oil wealth, and a strategic location of increasing importance, surrounded by neighbouring countries different from them in terms of political systems, interests and goals. This makes regional tension and instability characteristics for this region for decades and so far. Maritime security threats are considered the most prominent security developments that the book deals with in an entire chapter with a historical overview of the tanker war during the 1980s. The threats to maritime security are also the latest example to a realistic comparison

11

Abdulsalam, Mohamed. n.d. “The problems of defending small states in the Arabic Gulf.” Alseyassa Al-Dawleiya (International Politics), 192.

14

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

of the state of the balance of power that reflects the Iranian naval superiority in quantity and quality over the Arabian Gulf countries together. This perpetuates a state of imbalance of power, which the Gulf countries have sought to address with various options reflected in their policies to safeguard maritime security. These options have included accelerating their efforts to develop their naval forces and joining regional frameworks, which goals include achieving maritime security, and joining international alliances established for the same purpose. Despite the importance of these policies, which have been addressed at the theoretical and practical levels, they do not mean a sure guarantee of countering threats to maritime security, which is still linked to constantly changing regional and international equations. This means that it is inevitable that the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf turn into a real balancing force to ensure sustainable security on both sides of the Arabian Gulf.

2.8 Literature Review on Maritime Security in the Arab Gulf Region There is a hefty number of previous studies which have tackled the issue of maritime security in the Arab Gulf region, from which the author of this book has chosen ten papers only. Being various and different in their topics and authors, the ten studies included in this review, can be classified into three categories; the first category comprises studies which deal with ‘maritime security threats’, the second one illustrates to what extent maritime security is linked to other security areas, such as energy security and economic security; the last one clarifies the current efforts as well as those expected in the future, to maintain maritime security. The three categories can be briefly presented as follows:

2.9 Maritime Security Threats Iran is the most prominent threat to maritime security, whether due to the fact that it seeks to develop nuclear programs for non-peaceful purposes, or for its fervent endeavors to take control of vital maritime chokepoints and maritime transits of oil. Actually, these efforts are not new; Iran has a long history of animosity with its neighbours. It used to claim territorial waters and raise legal issues that have to do with defining territorial waters. Moreover, it makes use of its being a maritime state, possessing a number of strategic islands at the entrance of the Arabian Gulf, as these islands lie near the route that all vessels have to navigate. This affords Iran warfighting advantages by allowing Tehran to threaten international navigation,

2.9 Maritime Security Threats

15

including the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz.12 The same viewpoint is included in another study which perceives that the Iranian threats do not only lie in using their naval capabilities to threaten navigation, but are also fully shaped in their support for non-state groups, including the Houthis in Yemen. This, in turns, means the possible threatening of navigation in Bab al-Mandab strait as well as the Strait of Hormuz. This is closely linked to Iran’s strategic goal of strengthening its hegemony over the Arab Gulf region as part of its efforts to restore a sense of imperial greatness. This goal is divided into four pillars: continuity of clerical rule, addressing internal and external threats, stabilizing regional influence, and attaining economic prosperity, even if there were attempts by major powers to diminish that influence, they are mostly temporarily and cannot be perceived as a continuous curb of Iranian ambition.13 A third study points out how the Iranian revolutionary naval forces, based on the so-called “bold martyrdom culture,” have embarked on a fast-paced rearmament and reequipment program during the past two decades, which aimed at offsetting the U.S. Navy’s military presence in the Arabian Gulf region, and defending the Iranian interests. The study is divided into three parts, the first part includes an illustration of the military geography of Iran’s maritime zones; the second presents a historical background of the Iranian naval forces, its involvement in the Tanker War against Iraq in 1980s, and the impacts of that war on the development of the naval forces. The third part clarifies Iran’s naval forces’ operational capabilities and intentions, and exposes, in details, the naval arsenal, such as ships, submarines, and naval mines,14 The fourth study adopted a broader perspective on maritime security threats; it views that those threats do not only emanate from Iran, but more broadly from the regional instability and the weak naval capabilities of the Middle East and North Africa region where the most important sea lanes lie. The study considers that the most vulnerable of these lanes are the Suez Canal, the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, due to the severe conditions that these three regions have experienced, causing a new surge of threats to maritime security. Security conditions in Somalia, for instance, have led to the development of piracy enterprises that target commercial traffic in the Gulf and broader Indian Ocean.15 The fifth study mainly focuses on the impact of maritime piracy crimes through the Strait of Hormuz, the most important chokepoint, on energy exports from the 12

Bahgat, Gawdat. 2002. Maritime Security in the Persian Gulf. 4 February. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/mepo.12457. 13 Sothern, Cameron. 2021. IRANIAN MARITIME THREATS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. NAVY. 18 November. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://cimsec.org/iranian-maritime-threats-anopportunity-for-the-u-s-navy/. 14 Nadimi, Farzin. 2020. Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities in the Persian Gulf. 24 April. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.washingtoninsti tute.org/policy-analysis/irans-evolving-approach-asymmetric-naval-warfare-strategy-and-capabi lities-persian. 15 II, Robert M. Shelala. 2014. MARITIME SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT. 6 February. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/ 140206_maritime_security_shelala_report.pdf. Anthony H. Cordesman.

16

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

Arab Gulf States which collectively constitute the largest source of fuels to the whole world. what probably distinguishes this study is its focus on what is called a ‘two-stage least squares regression’ to first estimate the impact of piracy attacks on tanker traffic through the Strait, and then estimate the risk that the restriction would pose to energy exports. The analysis reveals, among other results, that tanker transit declines two years after piracy attacks. It also indicates that only refined petroleum exports from Bahrain and Kuwait are significantly impacted. The study is useful in identifying the impact of piracy on the oil-market structures as well as the vessel-level transit through vital sea lanes.16

2.10 Maritime Security and its Relation to Energy Security and Economic Security The second group of studies included in this literature review deals with the relationship between maritime security and energy security, with a special focus on the concerns of the Asian countries which have two challenges: the search for partners and new sources of energy, and the geopolitical concerns associated with transit of these resources. These concerns are heavily present with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). while, all three states have some energy security concerns in common, they are not able to reach a common ground concerning the possible solutions to these concerns; China advocates a viewpoint which is different to that of the two other countries. This, in turns, makes it impossible to find ‘multilateral’ solutions to those concerns and to achieve energy security for the Asian countries. The study concludes that Chinese concerns have often placed them at odds with other regional actors in finding solutions. This is one reason why joint ventures on sea-lanes and energy security have typically failed and energy security in Asia is highly competitive and almost always zero-sum.17 The second study in this group perceives that maritime security could be maintained through supporting economic partnerships. It refers, in this regard, to the announcement of Chinese President, Xi Jinping, concerning a “New Maritime Silk Road” in conjunction with China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” project or “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) initiative which aligns with a larger Chinese maritime strategy to expand China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and Middle East for economic, political, and security reasons. The study sheds light on the growing Chinese maritime presence in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea to combat piracy’. This, might bode well for a larger footprint in Djibouti and into the Arabian

16

Shepard, Jun U. 2020. Maritime piracy in the Strait of Hormuz and implications of energy export security. May. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S03 0142152030135X#!. 17 Tim Niblock, Talmiz Ahmad and Degang Sun (Editores). 2018. The Gulf States, Asia and the Indian Ocean: Ensuring the Security of the Sea Lanes. Gerlach Press: Berlin.

2.11 The Current and the Anticipated Efforts …

17

Peninsula, where the Middle East and the Arabic Gulf region has become increasingly a focal point for China’s “far sea” strategy, as part of China’s larger maritime silk route and “1 + 2 + 3 strategy”. Most importantly is the impact of this growing role of China on the regional security in general, and the maritime security, in particular, not only in the Arabian Gulf region, but extending to the wider Indian Ocean region.18

2.11 The Current and the Anticipated Efforts to Maintain Maritime Security As maritime security faces threats which might jeopardize regional and international parties, a number of studies have paid more attention and importance to the efforts, aimed at confronting these threats. One of these studies notices that there are regional states, including the Arab Gulf States, which have been able to increasingly develop maritime capabilities in order to maintain maritime security. The Chinese and Indian navies are playing a greater regional role, while Russia is returning to the Middle East; these developments are transforming MENA’s maritime security environment. Moreover, the growing Arab naval capabilities, according to this study, would constitute the geopolitical entrance fee for military operations far removed from coastal waters and littoral regions, through building bases outside the international maritime boundary. However, these capabilities require more armament, and bilateral and multilateral exercises, especially in search-and-rescue plus interdiction operations, all of which are areas that enhance the efficiency of interoperability of forces.19 Another second study examines the role that India can play towards maritime security in the Gulf region, which holds immense strategic importance for India for two main reasons: first, the majority of India’s burgeoning energy requirements are sourced from this region; and second, because the region is home to more than 6.5 million Indians, who contribute over $35 billion in remittances annually. In 2018, India’s bilateral trade with the GCC countries exceeded $103 billion. The study also sheds more light on the history and characteristic of the Indo-Gulf relations which are characterized by stability and strength, granting India a chance to be an important player in the efforts to maintain maritime security. However, he rising Chinese influence in the region is already presenting India with fresh and significant challenges. Pakistan’s growing relations with the region pose another challenge to India competition. However, the increase in high-level political visits between India and the GCC States, the improving bilateral US-India relations and the invitation to 18

GRESH, Geoffrey F. 2018. A Vital Maritime Pinch Point: China, the Bab alMandeb, and the Middle East. 17 July. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/257 65949.2017.12023324?needAccess=true. 19 Vaughan, Theodore Karasik and Jeremy. 2017. Middle East Maritime Security: The Growing Role of Regional and Extra regional Navies. 14 September. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/middle-east-maritime-security-gro wing-role-regional-and-extraregional-navies.

18

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

India, in March, to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are all developments, in view of which India seems fairly well placed to improve its strategic ties with the GCC countries.20 The third study tackles the role of the European Union in addressing maritime security threats in the Arab Gulf region, being closely linked to the comprehensive EU security strategy, in the wake of the attacks on oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf in 2019 and 2020. The study illustrates the current maritime security strategy of the EU at the beginning of the twenty-first century and the relevant policies and actions of EU and its core member towards the Gulf maritime security affairs through two documents related to its maritime security strategy of the EU, and the European Maritime Surveillance Mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH). As the Gulf region does not belong to Europe’s traditional definition of ‘two oceans and four seas,’ so EU’s measures are mainly a crisis response to the tension in the Gulf region. However, some EU member states, such as France, are actively promoting the EU to expand the EU role concerning marine security mission in the Gulf. This is because the EU role, according to the study, is still relatively limited, in previous maritime security strategies, within the issues of illegal immigration, protection of the marine environment, energy security and cross-border crimes, compared to an active role towards issues such as wars and military confrontation, as the European Union seeks to be a provider of maritime security in the Arab Gulf region.21 Referring to one of the studies included in this review, which highlights the Iranian threats to maritime navigation, an analysis of regional and international perceptions to confront these threats can be concluded. As the United States believes that it has achieved selfsufficiency in energy and is no longer dependent on the region, Washington views that its role could be confined to help establish a naval coalition, wherein the United States would provide coordinating ships and lead surveillance efforts, Iran argues that the Arabian Gulf security relates to the countries of the region, which have common interests, and not to the United States. Iran, instead, seeks to promote the notion of a “Regional Dialogue Forum” advocating inclusiveness (the participation of all regional powers on equal terms. However, this plan was not widely approved by the GCCs for geopolitical and historical dynamics that have shaped relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Russia, on the other hand, calls for the creation of a security and cooperation organization in the Arabic Gulf (PGSCO) that would include, in addition to the Gulf countries, Russia, China, the United States, the EU, India and other stakeholders as observers or associated members. This is to be framed within a certain set of mechanisms to be implemented. However, this plan looks more like a set of public-relations principles than a real program. It does not talk about any mechanism to pursue the broad objectives it lists.22 20

Upadhyaya, shishir. 2019. India’s maritime security relations with the gulf cooperation council countries—Prospects amid rising Chinese influence. June. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.tan dfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09733159.2019.1625224. 21 Yu, Zhen. 2022. Gulf Region and EU’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Expanding ‘Blue Border’? 8 April. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/25765949. 2022.2056383. 22 Bahgat, Gawdat. 2002. Maritime Security in the Persian Gulf. 4 February. Accessed May 9, 2022. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/mepo.12457.

References

19

2.12 The Author’s Own Comments on the Afore-Illustrated Literature With the importance of the previously illustrated studies which tackle the issue of maritime security in the Arab Gulf region, there are five notices that should be clarified concerning them. First: The studies included in the literature review did not pay much attention defining maritime security, except few of them. It is worthy to note, in this regard that the importance of definitions lies in the fact that they determine the course of the research paper itself. If the Arab Gulf States are meant by the definition of maritime security, then, the research will focus on the Gulf vision only. Second: the studies are devoid of analyzing the legal status of the strategic sea straits in the region, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Actually, this analysis is important for evaluating the Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, for instance. Third: The studies did not draw any link between threats to maritime security and regional instability in general. It was noticed to what extent Iran sought to employ maritime security in its conflict with the United States on regional issues, including Yemen. Fourth: Despite what was included in many of those studies about the visions and strategies of the Asian and European powers on how to confront threats to maritime security, which is very important, but they did not shed light on the idea of international alliances to secure maritime navigation, whether in the past or today. Fifth: They did not shed light on the real Gulf naval capabilities and their adequacy to confront the increasing threats to maritime security. Nevertheless, the afore-mentioned remarks do not negate the importance of these studies and their significance as valuable research contributions which have rather lighted significant aspects. The author has actually benefited from these studies in identifying the accumulation of knowledge on this issue. This book is a humble attempt by the author to shed light on these un-tackled aspects. It is an integral part of previous studies the aim of which is to present an accumulated knowledge on this issue, through research efforts which will go on, whether on the part of the author or of all those who are concerned with this strategic issue.

References Al-Masry, Khaled Musa. 2014. Introduction to international relations theory. Damascus: Nineveh House for Publishing and Distribution. Abdulsalam, Mohamed. n.d. The problems of defending small states in the Arabic Gulf. Al-seyassa Al-Dawleiya (International Politics) 192. Bahgat, Gawdat. 2002. Maritime Security in the Persian Gulf. 4 February. https://doi.org/10.1111/ mepo.12457. Accessed 9 May 2022.

20

2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Maritime …

Desert, Encyclopedia of a Fighter from the. n.d. The Foundations of the Balance of Power. Accessed April 22, 2022. http://www.moqatil.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia21/TawazonKiw/sec03.doc_ cvt.htm. East, Maurice A. 1973. Size and foreign policy behavior: A test of two models. World Politics 559–562. Elman, Miriam Fenduis. 1995. The foreign policies of small states. British Journal of Political Science 217. Gvalia, Giorgi, David Siroky, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Zurab Lashvili. 2013. Thinking outside the bloc: Explaining the froing policies of small states XE small states. Berlin: Routledge. GRESH, Geoffrey F. 2018. A vital maritime pinch point: China, the Bab al Mandab, and the Middle East. 17 July. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023324?needAccess=true. Accessed 9 May 2022 Idris, Mohamed Al-Saeed. 2001. Analysis of regional systems: A study in the origins of regional international relations. Cairo: Centre for Political and Strategic Studies Karasik, Theodore and Vaughan Jeremy. 2017. Middle east maritime security: The growing role of regional and extra regional navies. 14 September. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-ana lysis/middle-east-maritime-security-growing-role-regional-and-extraregional-navies. Accessed 9 May 2022. Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2015. The evolution of Gulf regional security since 2003: A study of NATO strategy. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. Keohane, Robert O. 1971. The big influence of small allies. Foreign policy 162–168. Nadimi, Farzin. 2020. Iran’s evolving approach to asymmetric naval warfare: Strategy and capabilities in the Persian Gulf. 24 April. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ irans-evolving-approach-asymmetric-naval-warfare-strategy-and-capabilities-persian. Accessed 9 May 2022 Newspaper, Al Bayan. 2001. Three options for achieving Gulf security. 15 July. https://www.alb ayan.ae/one-world/2001-07-25-1.1175576. Accessed 22 Apr 2022. Niblock, Tim, Talmiz Ahmad, Degang Sun, and Editores. 2018. The Gulf states, Asia and the Indian ocean: Ensuring the security of the sea lanes. Berlin: Gerlach Press. Robinson, Paul. 2009. Dictionary of international security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Sothern, Cameron. 2021. Iranian maritime threats: An opportunity for the U.S. Navy. 18 November. https://cimsec.org/iranian-maritime-threats-an-opportunity-for-the-u-s-navy/. Accessed 9 May 2022. Shelala II, Robert M. 2014. Maritime security in the middle East and North Africa: A strategic assessment. 6 February. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/ files/publication/140206_maritime_security_shelala_report.pdf. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Shepard, Jun U. 2020. Maritime piracy in the Strait of Hormuz and implications of energy export security. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030142152030135X!. Accessed 9 May 2022. Upadhyaya, shishir. 2019. India’s maritime security relations with the gulf cooperation council countries—Prospects amid rising Chinese influence. June. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2019.1625224. Accessed 9 May 2022. Yu, Zhen. 2022. Gulf region and EU’s maritime security strategy: The expanding ‘blue border’? 8 April. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2056383. Accessed 9 May 2022

Chapter 3

Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States: The Concept and Its Historical and Legal Dimensions

3.1 Introduction This chapter tackles the content and the development of maritime security as a concept, in addition to the historical and legal dimensions of that concept in the Arab Gulf region. The chapter encompasses four topics. The first topic has to do with the content and development of the maritime security concept which has not received much attention except in 1990s. However, its definitions do still vary; some perceive this concept as being limited to the uses of the marine environment, while others view that a country’s maritime force, and the strategic advantages of its maritime geographical location, are an integral part of its (country) power. Maritime security conjures up different definitions depending upon the national interests of each country. This concept was not far from the interest of international relations theorists. The proponents of the realist theory saw that maritime security reflects the state of competition between major powers, while the supporters of liberalism saw that it reflects the state of collective cooperation. On the other hand, political science scholars were much more interested in drawing a link, through concrete studies, between the countries’ geographical locations and their maritime security status. Among these studies are those which have been authored by the American naval officer, Alfred Mahan. They have defined certain criteria for classifying countries and determining whether they are maritime or not. Actually these criteria are mostly true to Arab Gulf States. Though this gives the Gulf States a strategic privilege, it does not, at the same time, prevent them the maritime security threats which they suffer. The second topic tackles the history of maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf region in light of the tanker war which was part of the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988). Both countries believed that targeting the other party’s ships might be a pretext for implicating other parties in that protracted war of ‘neither victorious nor defeated’ as it was described. As the threats increased and the number of sabotaged ships, whether belonging to the two belligerent parties or to other Gulf States and countries, surged, Kuwait announced reflagging its ships after asking for the US protection. This, in turn, prompted the United States to announce © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_3

21

22

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

the establishment of what was known as the “Operation Earnest Will” to protect oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf. The Soviet Union also sent ships to escort the European ships laden with weapons for Iraq, whereas the European countries sent ships to protect navigation in the Arabian Gulf. The most prominent point in that war was the fact that Iran did not close the Strait of Hormuz. The war also clarified the deficiencies in addressing threats endangering maritime navigation, which should be considered as lessons for the future. The third topic entails the legal guidelines of sea lanes in the Arabian Gulf through clarifying the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz, which has gained great importance as 17 million barrels of crude oil, 20% of the total global oil supplies, pass daily through it. Although the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (UNCLOS) are true to that Strait, Iran still refuses the contents of that Convention. The third topic explains, as well, the legal status of Bab Al Mandab, whereto the provisions of the UNCLOS apply. Actually, there is no concensus among the bordering countries of Bab al-Mandab on regulating maritime navigation in that Strait which is considered as extremely important for having 21,000 marine containers, 57 tankers per day, or 10% of the total world trade, pass annually through it, The fourth topic is the relationship between maritime security and regional security of the Arabian Gulf countries.

3.2 The Maritime Security Concept in Theory and Practice Although maritime security is more comprehensive than the maritime State concept, it did not receive much attention until the mid of 1990s, when Geoffrey Till, a British naval historian and emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, wrote that there was “a particular need to be clear about what is necessary for future maritime security and prosperity”. He acknowledged, however, that “This is a far from easy task since the phrase ‘maritime security’ comprehends so much”. On the one hand, maritime security could be seen simply as another dimension of security, although the security studies’ literature does not reflect this. On the other hand, each dimension of security, already discussed, may also be applied on the maritime environment, with each arguably possessing maritime elements. Similarly, each of the alternative security system “concepts” may also be applied to the maritime sphere. It is thus possible to speak, for example, of “marine environmental security,” “comprehensive maritime security” or “cooperative maritime security,” and so on. To this end, Till places his analysis of the concept of maritime security within the organizing concept of “good order at sea” whereby the sea as a resource, as a medium for trade and information exchange, and as an environment, faces “risks and threats to the good order on which their continued contribution to human development depends”. A Dalhousie University study has defined maritime security as “a process of maintaining stability in the international system on, over, under and from the sea.” Despite the importance of this definition, it remains too vague to be of much utility. The Canadian study also identified four “basic principles which govern the use of the oceans” similar in substance to Till’s

3.2 The Maritime Security Concept in Theory and Practice

23

conception: a recognition of the oceans as a “source of wealth,” as a “life support system”, a medium for trade and communications, and a “tradition … that those who use the oceans should do so in peace and security.” Actually, the concept of maritime security has various interpretations according to each country’s vision. The United States, for example, increasingly uses the term “Maritime Security Operations” to describe maritime enforcement operations, especially those which involve its current maritime security preoccupations with combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new US maritime strategy perceives the concept of maritime security within a set of terms which are consistent with the ideas and efforts to combat terrorism as is stipulated in the US National Maritime Security Strategy, in which “The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.” The views of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO), an independent, global body established to “foster critical reflection on the many aspects of the current situation of the oceans from an integrated and multidisciplinary perspective”, are also worthy to consider. The IWCO report is steeped in concerns with ocean governance and the “concept” of “peaceful uses” of the sea. Generally speaking, there are five prisms through which “maritime security”, in a non-traditional sense, is often viewed. These perspectives are arbitrary and non-exclusive: they are interrelated and overlap and, to a certain degree, represent different aspects of the same problem. Actually the practical policy and operational responses by countries to their maritime security needs usually incorporate aspects of more than one of these approaches. The five perspectives are: Security of the sea itself, ocean governance, maritime border protection, military activities at sea and security regulation of the maritime transportation system.1 The concept of maritime security has also received great attention from thinkers of international relations theories, who attempted to develop a theoretical framework for sea security, based on realism or traditional liberalism. According to the realist interpretation, the seas can be defined as an arena on which superpower or regional power rivalry takes place. Recent discussions have focused on the rise of China as a naval power and the US Asian ‘pivot’, the investments in naval capabilities of emerging powers, or resource competition in the Arctic. The liberal interpretation of sea security emphasizes an idea which was laid prior to the current world order; that is, the marine environment is increasingly subject to a form of collective public order and legal regulation. Liberal perspectives have been advanced, in particular, in the work of maritime legal scholars such as James Kraska (a professor in the School of Justice Studies), and Raul Pedrozo (the Howard S. Levie 1

Rahman, Chris. 2009. Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for Good Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46063248_Concepts_of_Maritime_Sec urity_A_Strategic_Perspective_on_Alternative_Visions_for_Good_Order_and_Security_at_Sea_ with_Policy_Implications_for_New_Zealand.

24

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

Professor of the Law of Armed Conflict and professor of International Law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College), who suggest that in recent years international law has ‘evolved from a set of rules designed to avoid naval warfare by keeping maritime powers apart, toward a new global framework designed to facilitate maritime security cooperation by bringing countries together to reach common goals”. Though international interest in studying the seas has considerably lagged behind developments in other related security issues such as terrorism, organized crime and environmental degradation, the modern strategic documents have identified four main domains for the contemporary maritime security complex: The first is “national security”; it involves the development and application of the naval power. This includes the projection of military power and homeland defenses at the sea, as well as the use of warships to protect maritime trade routes and commerce through functions including deterrence, surveillance and interdiction. These concerns remain of latent or extant importance in many parts of the world, most notably in regions of current geopolitical rivalry, such as the South China Sea. The second domain addresses the “marine environment”; it incorporates a diverse range of issues such as marine pollution, vessel safety and regulation, maritime search and rescue, the state of ocean health, pollution and the impacts of climate change. The marine environment is a similarly long-established concern in the maritime sphere, with its genesis present in international efforts to regulate shipping and other activities at the sea through intergovernmental organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or other coordination bodies such as the UN-Oceans. The third domain is economic development, or the so-called blue economy. Actually the concerns related to this domain constitute the bulk of the maritime security agenda. About 90% of the world trade passes through the seas; the sea resources such as fisheries or offshore oil are important economic assets. That is why piracy, crime and other forms of maritime turbulences pose perilous threats to the world trade. However, protection and development of marine resources are still of vital importance and priority only for coastal states. Regarding the last field, it tackles issues of human security, that is, all what disrupts human beings’ security as they are suffered by individuals and local communities. It also highlights the issues which affect countries in this regard. Human security issues actually constitute a large part of the maritime security agenda. That is because protecting and maintaining the sustainability of fisheries, for example, supports the livelihood of millions of individuals who are living in coastal areas, as they are the most vulnerable to the various impacts of climate change or marine pollution. These concerns do not only affect security of individuals or communities in coastal areas, but also reflect the role which human insecurity could play in facilitating activities such as piracy or crime, being alternative sources for earning living in areas which are plagued with weakness or economic collapse.2 2

EDMUNDS, CHRISTIAN BUEGER AND TIMOTHY. 2017. Beyond sea blindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/def ault/files/publications/ia/INTA93_5_02_StokesWaterman.pdf.

3.2 The Maritime Security Concept in Theory and Practice

25

In light of this growing interest in maritime security, many definitions have emerged to clarify what is meant by that concept. Some have used the term to refer to maritime risks and have exclusively identified them, including, for example, the Maritime Security Center of the Omani Ministry of Defense which has defined, on its website, maritime risks as follows: Illegal immigration, organized crime, illegal trade and smuggling activities, maritime piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, overfishing, pollution of the marine environment, crises and military conflicts, climate change, obstruction of international shipping routes.3 US Admiral Ernest R. Riutta, Assistant Commandant for Operations and Senior Intelligence Officer has defined maritime security through elements of its threats in the traditional military sense. According to Riutta, maritime security “is to protect the homeland and its economy from conventional naval and military attacks, and from any hostile forces at the sea, whether they are military forces, pirates, or terrorist groups.” Maritime security, for Riutta, also includes saving the sea natural environment. From a broader national security perspective, maritime security encompasses the protection of all the maritime interests of the countries”.4 Some observers have perceived the concept of maritime security as a reflection of a country’s maritime power and a measure of its strength in trade, in general, and maritime trade exchange, in particular. Maritime security is also an indicator of a country’s control over ocean resources; it also reflects a State’s ability to send a naval force to or from the sea; that is, maritime security has to do with what is beyond the military issue. Throughout history, naval power has been the basis for prosperity in peacetime, and a source of a country’s power to win war. Owning naval power enables a country to protect its trade and communications; it can also target its enemies from the sea with effective strikes. In other words, the significance of naval power lies in the country’s ability to use the sea in serving and protecting its interests, on the one hand, and in depriving the enemy of that ability, on the other hand. Since the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, naval operations shifted its focus from protecting lines of communication to what is known as “coastal war” during which naval forces are placed near the coast of the enemies in order to be able to launch attacks on their (the enemies) territories using cruise missiles, aircraft and helicopters which are laid on aircraft carriers. At the same time, naval forces can be used to practice nuclear deterrence.5

3

Defense, Sultanate of Oman Ministry of. n.d. Maritime Security Center. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.mod.gov.om/ar-OM/MSC/Pages/desert.aspx. 4 Burke, Paul. 2011 The Terrorist Threat to Maritime Security of the United Arab Emirates Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.ecssr.ae/wp-content/themes/ecssr-child/split/ELS_AR_1411_Preview.pdf. 5 Robinson, Paul. 2009. Dictionary of International Security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

26

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

3.2.1 The Sea State Theory and the Arab Gulf States The theory of the Sea State was originated in response to similar theories which aimed to promote the concept of the land power. The US Navy officer, Alfred Mahan (1840–1914) is the most prominent among those who have made contributions in exploring the relation and connection between the geographical nature of a State and its naval strength. According to Mahan, having a Sea power is to have a military force which could be transferred by sea to a certain place; it is not just owning a navy. In other words, having control over the sea is conditioned by controlling military land bases in strategic locations through which it could be possible to control maritime transport as well as the naval bases which are protected by both the nature of coasts and their deep background. Mahan believes that establishing a naval force in a country is conditioned by six factors: 1. The geographical location of the country: overlooking a sea or more, in addition to the navigability of those seas and the ease of their inter-connection, as well as their connection to high oceans are all elements which affect the country’s military activity. 2. The nature of the country’s coasts: The length of the coasts is not the most significant factor; it is rather their quality and suitability for establishing ports which make a difference. 3. Characteristics of the coastal back: that is the lands extending behind the coast line; if these lands are vast with natural resources suffice to meet the needs of a population, they will be attractive for them. However, if the coastal back has poor resources, it will be a factor for pushing population away from the coast towards the sea. 4. The area of the country and its population: The larger the area of the country and its population, the more it will be able to build, use and maintain fleets. 5. National characteristics of the population: the people of a country should have the desire and the potential to work in the sea; this is an important factor in building a naval power. 6. Orientation of the ruling authority: if the ruling authority has the desire to give more attention to seas, the aforementioned factors would be taken into consideration and a naval power would be built.6 In light of some of the previous factors, not necessarily all of them, the Arab Gulf States are classified as strategically important maritime States. That is because the Arab Gulf region is one of the most vital regions in the world, having a distinguished location among the continents of the old world, Asia, Africa and Europe. This is in addition to overlooking three of the most important waterways, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. Actually, this location has granted the Arab Gulf States a strategic importance in terms of sea, land and air transportation, as well as the global and regional trade. Moreover, the Gulf States have enormous 6

n.d. Strategic Theories of State Power. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://fdsp.univ-guelma.dz/sites/ default/files/4_20.pdf.

3.2 The Maritime Security Concept in Theory and Practice

27

natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. The six Arab Gulf States have an ares of 5.25 million square kilometers, about 30.3% of the Middle East’s total area. They also have many militarily important islands which are close to the coast. They (Gulf States) are also privileged by having seas and gulfs, including the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, specifically, is overlooking the 1900-km Red Sea which is linked to the Indian Ocean, in the south, through Bab al-Mandab Strait, and extends north to the Suez Canal. As for the Strait of Hormuz, it separates the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, passing through Iran in the north and the Sultanate of Oman in the south. Bab al-Mandab Strait, also, separates the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It also separates Asia, as a continent, from Africa. This means that the maritime strategic importance of the Arab Gulf States stems from their geographic existence in the middle of the world, and their having control over many waterways of strategic importance to the whole world; this, in turn, enhances their maritime importance.7 Actually, the geographic location had a significant impact on some Arab Gulf States’ foreign policies. A noteworthy study by an Omani researcher has illustrated that “the Sultanate of Oman’s distinguished location at the entrance of the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as well as its control over the western part of the Strait of Hormuz had an impact on the Sultanate’s adoption of an international political and security discourse. The location had also imposed on the Gulf State (Oman) a specific foreign policy, in terms of respecting its neighboring countries, not getting involved in conflicts, being impartial, and not rushing to ill-considered decisions. The priority for Oman is protecting the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, even if unilateral decisions would have to be taken as long as they are consistent with the interests of the Arab nation”.8 Perhaps there is a need to draw a link between the geographical nature of a country, and this nature’s impact on the country’s national security, in general, and its maritime security, in particular. Robert Kaplan, an American author, has highlighted this point, emphasizing that where Saudi Arabia is truly vulnerable and where its shatter zone is most acute, is in highly populous Yemen to the south. Although it has only a quarter of Saudi Arabia’s land area, Yemen’s population is approximately equal to the population of Saudi Arabia. That is why the most important demographic core of the Arabian Peninsula is crammed into its mountainous southwest corner, where mountains cover most of the densely populated land and people can easily obtain weapons to the extent that a US military expert described this as saying, “Terrorism is an entrepreneurial activity, and in Yemen you’ve got over 20 million aggressive, commercial minded, and well-armed people, all extremely hard-working compared with the Saudis next door. It’s the future, and it terrifies the hell out of the government in Riyadh”. If these facts were added to the reports which refer to a possible depletion 7

Ismail, Muhammad Sadiq. 2010. Cooperation Council in the Balance. Cairo: Dar Al Uloom for publishing and distribution. 8 Al-Wahib, Hammoud bin Abdullah bin Hammoud. n.d. The impact of the Geographical location on the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman 1970–2011. https://meu.edu.jo/libraryTheses/586 a060c1e081_1.pdf.

28

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

of freshwater resources in Yemen, the threats to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would without doubt geographically intensify.9

3.3 The History of Maritime Security Threats to the Arab Gulf States: the “Tanker War” 3.3.1 The Role of Geography in Conflicts, “Seas as a Case Study” The attacks on oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019 were not the first maritime threat to the Arab Gulf States; they had actually experienced similar threats during the so-called ‘Tanker War’, which has permeated the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988). The Tanker War was the starting point for the Western military intervention, generally, and the direct US military intervention, particularly, in the Arab Gulf region. Before tackling that war and its impacts on the maritime security of the Arab Gulf States and the interests of the Western countries, it should be emphasized that the Iran-Iraq war was the result of a tactical use of the geographical determinants, along with the regional balance of power to implicate regional and international parties in that war. When talking about the impact of geography on maritime conflicts, the strategic importance of seas as a barrier separating lands should be considered, as they have a defensive role which could be added to a country’s power. However, seas at the same time, could be an entrance to invading the same country. Therefore, building ships is the vital objective of countries when setting a strategy for a maritime war which might include offensive and defensive battles, as well as, naval blockade. Despite the importance of seas for a country’s power, they are, however, a reflection of the asymmetric power. In other words, countries, in land wars, can compensate the numerical shortage by resorting to mountains, forests, trench warfare, blockade and other techniques and strategies. However, these tactics do not apply to the asymmetric maritime space except in case of port blockades. In fact, combat ships can pass through sea lanes of other non-belligerent countries without being perceived as a pretext for waging a war. This is on contrary to other forces’ movement whether through penetrating the airspace of a country or sending land forces to a place which is likely to be an arena for a confrontation. There have been many historical experiences which highlight the use of seas in conflicts, including the French-British wars (1689–1825), during which the capabilities of naval fleets were tested on an unprecedented scale. The Korean War (1950–1953), also provides a clear example for such a case; during that war the Soviet Union was denied any access to the open seas, and a naval power, in general, was an asset for the Western countries during the Cold War 9

Kaplan, Robert. 2012. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate. NEW YORK: RANDOM HOUSE.

3.3 The History of Maritime Security Threats to the Arab Gulf States …

29

era. Technological progress, as well, has empowered the United States, since 1950s, to control the seas, with the development of the nuclear attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear aircraft carrier.10 Nevertheless, the maritime nature of a country is not suffice for promoting its strength; it is, rather, the functioning of that nature during conflicts which makes a difference through tactical decisions that could change the course of those conflicts. Actually, this is true to the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988); Iran was keen to avoid war in Shatt al-Arab region which is very close to the oil refineries in Abadan, and is located within the range of the Iraqi artillery. Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, chose the war in that area because he intended to bomb those Iranian refineries, as well as the nearby oil areas, with the aim of paralyzing the Iranian economy and then overthrowing the Iranian government. This was rather clear as the Western countries have also promoted the same vision of Iraq and considered that the Iranian government could be overthrown in two weeks. Moreover, they believed, that the whole matter would not be but only a “military picnic”.11 This, perhaps, has encouraged Iraq to misuse the importance of the Arabian Gulf, for Iran, in that war. Although Iran has very long sea coasts, not only on the eastern shore of the Gulf, but also along the shores of the Indian Ocean, extending to its borders with Pakistan, most of Iran’s important economic resources, mainly oil, lie in the southern parts of Iran and in the waters of the Arabian Gulf, either within the many offshore fields scattered there or those which are near to it (the Arabian Gulf). Therefore, most or all of the oil export ports are located either on and around the Arabian Gulf, the most important of which is the oil export port of the Khark Island, north of the Arabian Gulf, and which has been a permanent target for the Iraqi Air Forces during the eight-year war with Iran.12

3.3.2 The Tanker War… A New Course for the Iran-Iraq War Based on the foregoing, the tanker war could be described as one of the “brink of the abyss” crises, which resulted in implicating regional and international parties which were not directly involved in the Iran-Iraq war. Depending on their manageability or their solvability, there are three types of international crises: first, the crises of manipulation wherein each party seeks to force the other party into making concessions; second, the crises of implication, in which there are common interests with changing patterns of alliances; this type is characterized by serious and soaring threats; third, the ‘brink of the abyss’ crises which are characterized by high threats with no mutual 10

Joseph Henrotin, Olivier Schmidt, Stefan Tayat (translated by Ayman Samir). 2019. War and Strategy: Approaches and Concepts, Part Two. Kuwait: National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters. 11 Majid, Kamal. 1997. Oil and the Kurds: A Study of Iraqi Iranian-Kuwaiti Relations. London: Dar Al Hekma. 12 Khammas, Alaa Eddin Hussein Mekki. 2018. The Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf 1980–1988. Amman: Dar Al-Rimal for Publishing and Distribution.

30

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

interests to be shared by parties of the crisis; these crises are unmanageable with each party having the intent to wage a militarized conflict.13 The third type, in fact, has to do with the tanker war which had erupted between Iraq and Iran as a result of Iraq’s failure to defeat Iran early in war. Tensions remained until 1984. Then, decision makers in Iraq believed that the ramifications of the Iranian revolution along with the internal instability prevailing the country might be a suitable opportunity for achieving victory over Iran with the least possible losses. At the same time, the supreme religious leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, seemed to regard the conflict with Iraq as a God-given opportunity to solidify the revolution and defeat his political opponents in Tehran. However, miscalculations on both sides have created early in the war a “no winner no loser” result. This has led to a shift in the course of the war, and a turn to sea targets either these which belong to both countries or to the neutral parties.14 The Arab Gulf became a theater for war when Iraqi planes attacked ships which were on their way to Iran; this prompted Tehran, as a retaliatory response, to destroy oil tankers heading to Iraq and its Arab Gulf States allies, including Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, provoked Kuwait into requesting the United States to register the Kuwaiti ships under the American flag, in an attempt to protect them from the Iranian attacks. It was ironic that in spite of the United States’ neutrality early in that war, the first loss which it suffered came from the Iraqi side; on May 17, 1987, the American ship USS Stark was hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles. Some observers have given some explanations concerning that incident saying that attacking the USS Stark came in response to the Iran-Contra Affair, or perhaps the incident was unrelated. However, regardless of whether these explanations are true or not, the attack has implicated the United States. It has as well prompted Washington to proceed in the conflict and forced it to seek an end to the war, as other incidents which could have caused a direct confrontation between the United States and Iran occurred, including attacks against American- reflagged ships with Iranian missiles; this is in addition to targeting US ships with Iranian mines. As a retaliatory response, US has sunk half of the Iranian navy, then destroyed an Iranian civilian plane by an American cruiser.15 Most interestingly, as the war between Iran and Iraq intensely peaked, it was noticed that Tehran was keen not to get involved in a decision of obstructing navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, realizing its vital importance as a major vein for world trade. In other words, Tehran tried not to make a decision which could bring it in a confrontation with the entire world. It was noted, as well, that when Iran sought to block the passage of oil tankers as they sail to and from the Arab countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, it (Iran) started by attacking navigation in the western part of the Gulf near Shatt al-Arab and planted mines in that region, as well as in the territorial 13

Encyclopedia, Moqatel. n.d. Patterns of international crises. Accessed April 23, 2022. http:// www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Ektesad8/azamat/sec05.doc_cvt.htm. 14 Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday with Mounir Elkhamri. 2009. Kevin Saddam’s War: An Iraq Military Perspective of the Iran –Iraq War. Accessed April 23, 2022. https:// ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/saddams-war.pdf. 15 Stansfield, Gareth. 2009. Iraq: People, History, and Politics. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

3.3 The History of Maritime Security Threats to the Arab Gulf States …

31

waters of the United Arab Emirates in limited and not large scale. Iran’s activities were confined to the Strait and the area circling it; the Iranian navy personnel were forcibly boarding ships to inspect the shipments destined to Iraq. In addition to that, the Revolutionary Guard Corps navy used at night to shoot with small arms ships which were attacked the day before. In the last years of the war, Iran has installed anti-ship cruise missile batteries in several points of the Strait, but it has not fired ships on their traffic through the area even after the US cruiser inadvertently shot down an Iranian plane in 1988.16 Some estimates indicate that the mutual attacks on ships by both parties, Iraq and Iran, from 1984 till 1987, soared to 309 attacks, including 187 attacks by Iraq and 122 others by Iran; one of the ramifications was the loss of 82 ships.17 Other estimates indicate that 411 ships were attacked during those confrontations, including 239 oil tankers, of which 55 were sunk or extremely damaged so as not to be repaired. It became clear that sinking oil tankers is more difficult than sinking cargo ships and freighters.18 Whether either of these two estimates is valid, the figures illustrated that there was a tanker war, in the Arabian Gulf region, which was not confined to Iraq and Iran, but required an international intervention. It was also noticed that Iraq’s objective behind expanding the scope of the war to the maritime arena in order to undermine the Iranian oil exports, has not achieved but little success. By 1983, the Iranian oil sector got recovered and production rose to about 1.71 million barrels per day. However, as Iraq intensified its attacks in 1987, another challenge was dominating the scene because crude oil prices declined by 42% during the period from 1986 to 1987. On the other hand, Iran’s strategy of escalating attacks against Gulf oil tankers which aimed at intensifying pressure on the Arab Gulf States in order to force them to stop their support to Iraq, did not also succeed. It rather was the main reason behind Kuwait’s resorting to the United States for protection; and this was the beginning of the Western military presence in the Arab Gulf region.19

3.3.3 Illustration of the Western Intervention to Protect Oil Tankers: “Operation Earnest Will” Navigation in the Arabian Gulf is not only vital for Iraq and Iran, but also for global security. That is why the tanker war itself or how to deal with it was not a challenge 16

Talmag, Caitlin. 2009. Closing Time: Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 17 Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. 18 Mills, Robin. 2016. Perilous Roads: Transit of Energy in the Middle East. 1 April. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/en-energy-transit-security-mil ls.pd. 19 Kelley, Stephen Andrew. 2007. BETTER LUCKY THAN GOOD: OPERATION EARNEST. June. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3463/07Jun_Kel ley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

32

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

to the United States and the Western countries, simply because the US was already superior in naval forces. The quandary, however, lied in the impact of that war on the flow of oil to the importing Western countries. The Arab Gulf region contains 63% of the world’s oil reserves, and exports 25% of the total global oil trade. About 30% of the oil consumed by Western European countries, 60% of Japan’s needs and 17% of all European countries’ oil consumption, pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, any threat against Kuwait’s oil, at that time, meant a direct threat to the interests of the Western countries, because Kuwait contains oil reserves equating those of both Iraq and Iran together; Kuwait had more than one hundred billion barrels of oil reserves, that is, 13% of oil reserves in the world, compared to only 3.9% owned by the United States. In addition, Kuwait had in Western countries, at that time, over 100 billion dollars investments. Despite these aspects, there are other reasons explaining why the United States agreed to register Kuwaiti ships under the American flag. These reason can be illustrated in light of the strategic importance of the Arabian Gulf as an arena for the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, at the time. First, Kuwait has agreed on the participation of the Soviet Union in that mission, by raising its flag on seven Kuwaiti ships, while the United States raised its flags on the other six. Second, the United States has realized that it should enhance its leverage in the Arab Gulf region after the fall of the Shah’s regime; that is supporting the Arab Gulf States with armament in an attempt to eliminate the effects of Iran-Contra affair. Third, Iran has begun deploying Silkworm missiles in the Arabian Gulf region within the process of constructing a new sub-navy for the Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy. Fourth, the US’ intention was preventing Iran from attacking tankers under the flags of major powers and show Tehran that it does not have the ability to challenge the US Navy. The US Department of Defense has announced it had already put in place a contingency plan to strike Iran’s Silkworm missile bases, but it did not have a plan to manage all the threats which the United States might face when it starts escorting oil vessels in the Arabian Gulf.20 Iranian attacks on non-belligerent oil tankers have witnessed a significant escalation. Statistics indicate that by the end of the war with Iraq, Iran had attacked 190 ships belonging to 31 countries, killing, at least 63 sailors. Though this, actually justifies the American-Western intervention for protecting oil tankers, yet, the US involvement has sparked wide controversy within the US decision-making circles. Richard Murphy, the, then, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, for instance, who, advocated the US decision of intervention in the crisis, believed that constructing expanded alliances with the Arab Gulf States and the European countries is a prerequisite for any interference; that is the US should not take a unilateral action to protect Kuwait. Most remarkably, perhaps, is that the robust opposition came from the US Navy itself, refusing to divide its resources and project them to areas far from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. James Webb, the US Secretary of the Navy, at the time, questioned the feasibility of deploying the American ships in the Arabian Gulf. However, despite the early opposition, the navy

20

Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988.

3.3 The History of Maritime Security Threats to the Arab Gulf States …

33

approved, later, the mission, which was named “Operation Earnest Will”. The operation fell to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which planned a conventional escort operation based upon deterrence. A key planning assumption was that, with the wide gap of capabilities between Iran and the US, Tehran would not risk war by directly challenging the escort operations; that is Iran would not attack the ships under the US escort. The U.S. intelligence community predicted Iran’s response to ‘Operation Earnest Will’ in order of probability: (1) increased attacks on unescorted shipping, (2) harassment mining, (3) increased terrorism against potential U.S. and Kuwaiti targets in the region, (4) attacks on escorted ships, and (5) attacks on U.S. warships. Actually, Iran was able to place mines. Despite the depth and the speed of water in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran managed to lay mines in the shallowest area through which convoys pass in the Arabian Gulf. American and Soviet ships have hit those mines; that is the deterrence strategy assumed by the United States has failed.21 Within the controversy among the US administration officials, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, presented a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on June 16, 1987 to explain the US administration’s decision of reflagging eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to protect them, stressing that this decision stems from the basic US interests in the Arabian Gulf region, which are as follows: 1. The unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz which is vital and critical to the economic health of the Western world, in line with keeping sea lanes open. 2. The security, stability, and cooperation of the moderate States of the Arabian Gulf area; this means helping them deal with the threats emanating from Iran. 3. Limiting the Soviet Union’s influence and presence in the gulf. According to the statement by Armacost, this is to be accomplished following a two-track policy. First, galvanizing greater international pressure to persuade the belligerents to negotiate an end to the conflict. Second, protecting the US interests and help protect the security of moderate, friendly Arab States and their interests. The American official has also outlined three developments which caused the US concerns: First, the number of attacks on vessels doubled in 1986. Second, in late 1986, Iran acquired Chinese-origin “silkworm” anti-ship missiles; their deployment sites were constructed along the Strait of Hormuz. These missiles were equipped with warheads which are three times greater than the capacity of other Iranian weapons and can range the Strait of Hormuz and severely damage ships or obstruct tankers. Third: the increase in Iranian hostile activities in the Gulf States in parallel with targeting ships under the Kuwaiti flag and ships heading to or coming from Kuwait. Those activities included the bombing of the US embassy in Kuwait in December 1983 and the assassinating attempt on the Emir of Kuwait in 1984. All these were policies which aimed at intimidating Kuwait to force it to quit supporting Iraq with financial subventions and permitting goods bound for Iraq to be offloaded at a Kuwaiti port. 21

Crist, David B. 2009. Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulf-conflict-his tory-us-iranian-confrontation-sea.

34

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

Iran’s longer term objective was to apply the same policies of intimidation against other gulf states to change their policies and set the stage for gaining hegemony over the entire area.22 Estimates indicate that until September 20th, 1987, the volume of international naval forces present in or on the way to the Arabian Gulf region was as follows: The United States (the Middle East Force, consisting of a command ship, two cruisers, a destroyer, five frigates, an auxiliary transport ship, and Landing ship. This is in addition to temporary mission items consisting of two cruisers, destroyer, two Frigates, ammunition ship, supply ship. The Missouri battle group consisting of battleship, two cruisers, one destroyer, a frigate, a support ship, five mine sweepers, 2 mine towing ship). As for France, it had (an aircraft carrier, two destroyers, three frigates, three mine sweepers, an auxiliary ship, oil tanker, support ship, mine ship), Britain (destroyer, 3 frigate, 4 mine sweepers, repair ship, support ship, Nimrod ship). Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands had (three frigates, six minesweepers, two supply ships, another ship asscociated with ship repair workshop). It is worth mentioning that the Soviet Union sent a missile frigate to escort Soviet ships which were carrying weapons to Iraq, starting from the Kuwaiti straits; it was the second warship to enter the Arabian Gulf since 1982. The following are some notes on the ‘Operation Earnest Will’: 1. That operation which started on July 21, 198, when Kuwait’s oil tankers were reflagged and the US Navy began guarding convoys of oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf, was named ‘Operation Earnest Will’. This means it is an alliance of those who want to ally; that is, it is open for any major powers that want to voluntarily join and participate in protecting the vital interests in the Arabian Gulf region. 2. There was a profound division in Europe over joining that operation. Though the Western European countries have discussed in a conference which was held in August, 1987, a united European role for dealing with attacks, they did not reach a consensus. Nevertheless, the European countries called for freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf. Whereas Germany refused to take any practical action, Italy believed that the United Nations should play a role. Britain, France, Belgium and Netherlands began sending naval assets to the Arabian Gulf in order to protect oil tankers. 3. One of the weakness points in the US planning for that Operation was the absence of defense tactics for mine warfare. There were only 21 minesweepers, which were 30 years old, in the US Navy, while Iran had a large supply of mines. There were no naval nor air bases wherein the US Navy can operate.23 4. A legal issue was raised regarding the work of the US Navy. After the United States agreed to protect eleven Kuwaiti tankers, the vessels needed to be American owned, so Kuwait established an American front company, ‘Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.’, headquartered in Delaware, to serve as its American “owner” 22

Armacost, Michael H. 1987. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA496911.pdf. 23 Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988.

3.4 The Position of the Arab Gulf States During the Tanker War

35

for the tankers. The first tanker was reregistered by the end of June: the 400,000-ton al-Rekkah, now renamed the Bridgeton.24

3.4 The Position of the Arab Gulf States During the Tanker War If the Iraq-Iran war posed a durable challenge for the Arab Gulf States, given the imbalance of power between the six Arab Gulf States, on the one hand, and both Iraq and Iran, on the other hand, the most perilous development in the war was targeting oil tankers. That is because it led to the internationalization of that war, as the targeted oil tankers were not owned only by the two warring parties; there were oil tankers and vessels belonging to other countries. Therefore Iraq’s blockade of the main port for exporting Iranian oil in “Kharg” Island, and then escalating attacks on oil tankers, aimed at forcing the owner countries (of those tankers) to stop trade with Iran. At the same time, Iran started to intensify its attacks on all oil tankers by targeting Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers.25 That is why the war was a huge challenge to the security of the Arab Gulf states. Despite the conflicting information regarding which party has been responsible, Iraq or Iran, for the attacks on the Gulf-owned tankers, the author of this book believes that testimonies of high-ranking military officials who participated in that war would be a better basis. Actually, according to some of them, Iran had, in May 1984, attacked a Saudi oil tanker, as well as Kuwaiti vessels, near the coast of Bahrain. These attacks were among the first Iranian attacks against maritime merchant vessels since the commence of the war with Iraq. In March of the same year, the tanker “Uhud,” a giant Saudi oil tanker, was hit after it sailed from the port of “Kharg” and a huge fire broke out in it; part of its cargo was saved, but the tanker was exceedingly destroyed and put out of service. On April 25, 1984, Iraq fired a missile from a Super Entendard aircraft that hit a giant Saudi-flagged oil tanker “Safina Al Arab” which was registered in Liberia. The 360-m tanker was laden with 357,000 tons of crude oil on its way to France. Fire broke out in the ship and severely damaged it. Then, the ship was towed to Taiwan and the oil, loaded on it, was transferred to another tanker.26 The marine environment in the Arabian Gulf was not immune from the scourge of that war. In 1983, Iraq’s missile attacks hit Iran’s marine exploration facilities in Nowruz, causing the leakage of 20 million barrels of oil in the Arabian Gulf.

24

Crist, David B. 2009. Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulf-conflict-his tory-us-iranian-confrontation-sea. 25 Al-Ghafeer, Islam Muhammad Abd Rabbo. 2016. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Gaza: University of Gaza. 26 Khammas, Alaa Eddin Hussein Mekki. 2018. The Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf 1980-1988. Amman: Dar Al-Rimal for Publishing and Distribution.

36

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

An oil spot, equal to the size of Belgium due to the leak, caused enduring environmental damage which was huge enough to threaten the desalination plants in Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, but strong winds had dispersed it. Fish imports of the UAE have stopped for nine months due to oil pollution in the fishing areas. There was another source of marine pollution which resulted from Iran’s ships’ losses or from seizing them during mine laying acts. It is noted that the UN Security Council did not directly address environmental issues during the tanker war except by issuing a set of non-binding resolutions such as calling on the belligerent parties to respect international humanitarian law, though it was possible to prevent environmental degradation if the Law of Armed Conflict was applied. It was also possible to resort to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 552 (1984) which emphasizes the right to freedom of navigation; it could, if applied, provide protection for the marine environment in the Arabian Gulf region.27 As the crisis got intensified that way, Kuwait signed an agreement with the United States on April 2nd, 1987, the aim of which was protecting the Gulf state’s oil tankers. However, Kuwait was keen not to sign any other security arrangements with the United States, while emphasizing, at the same time, that it had leased Soviet tankers for two reasons. First, Kuwait aimed at showing that the issue is an actual international concern to all the world countries. The second reason has to do with Kuwait’s endeavours to avoid any consequent regional problems after that decision (leasing tankers), which Iran has considered a “dangerous position” claiming that the Arab Gulf region might turn into “another Afghanistan.” However, Iran believed that it could not engage in a confrontation with the fleets of the Western countries and those of the Soviet Union at the time. Therefore, the alternative was to wage a naval guerrilla war. On October 16, 1987, Iran fired a missile against a US-flagged Kuwaiti oil tanker which was seven nautical miles east Mina Al-Ahmadi Port. In retaliation, the United States bombed an Iranian oil platform, in the southern Gulf region, and set it on fire. A special naval force has, also, destroyed another platform in order to deter Iran and force it to retreat from similar attacks. Surprisingly, it is noticed that the Arab Gulf States did not grant the United States any military bases during that war; their support was confined to providing military facilities. Kuwait, for instance, hosted a small military contingent to clear mines and allowed the US aircrafts to operate from Kuwait in 17 cases. Though Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were ready to support the US efforts, they reject to grant the United States any military bases. Therefore, the compromise solution was for Kuwait to approve sending two gigantic vessels to be stationed in the Arabian Gulf within the “Operation Earnest Will”, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain provide the logistics needed for both vessels, and thus the United States would be able to deter any attack, manage reconnaissance operations, and station electronic warfare equipment 20-nautical mile far from “Farsi” island, in Iran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia agreed to expand the activity of four Saudi minesweepers which had a role in discovering a number of mines, but without getting involved in protecting navigation to Kuwait, fearing Iranian threats. The kingdom of 27

Walker (Editor), George K. n.d. THE TANKER WAR AND THE MARITIME. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1445&context=ils.

3.4 The Position of the Arab Gulf States During the Tanker War

37

Saudi Arabia has also agreed to supply the US Navy with fuel and allowed emergency docking, while Bahrain agreed to lease some docks and allowed the use of its oil platforms as small bases for operations.28 In spite of the significant role which the Western countries has played for securing oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war, the crisis demonstrated the defensive capabilities of the Arab Gulf states. After publicly announcing the establishment of their own rapid deployment force, called the “Peninsula Shield Force, headquartered in Saudi Arabia. Washington tried to augment the new force with a Gulf-wide integrated air defense system. Early warning radars around the Gulf were linked with Hawk surface-to-air missiles in Kuwait and the UAE, and with Saudi Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and F-15 fighters. Commenting on that development, Richard Armitage, the then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, said later, “The idea then and now, was to create a GCC with some teeth in it”. In response to Iranian air attacks, Saudi Arabia established an air defense zone, which was known as the “Fahd Line” over their offshore oil facilities in the northern Gulf. On June 5, 1984, a U.S. AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia detected an Iranian F-4 fighter crossing the Fahd Line. Two Saudi F-15 aircrafts intercepted and shot down the Iranian aircraft with a “Sidewinder” missile. Both sides scrambled nearly a dozen additional aircrafts, and it looked as though a major dogfight was about to ensue over the Gulf. However, Iran recalled its aircrafts, avoiding a major confrontation. This displayed the Saudi fortitude which was pivotal in forcing Iran to halt its air threat in the north and to never use, again, its fixed-wing aircrafts to attack shipping near Saudi Arabia.29

3.4.1 Lessons Learned from the Tanker War One of the most outstanding studies has summarized the lessons and issues raised by the ‘Tanker War’ during the Iran-Iraq war, as follows: 1. The Tanker War displayed how seas are used in war. Nevertheless, during the Tanker War oil supplies were not cut off and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was not stopped, even at the peak of the mutual attacks between Iran and Iraq. 2. in spite of the role which the United States and its Western allies have played, along with the support of the Arab Gulf States, in order to protect oil tankers, Iran’s ability to lay mines in separate areas has clarified the dangers of unconventional wars, and to how extent it poses serious threats to maritime security. The Tanker War has also emphasized the need to provide special capabilities to mine warfare, in case similar future crises took place. 28

Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Crist, David B. 2009. Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3423.

29

38

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

3. The United States could never have been successful without help from its local and West European allies. It is suffice to mention that at the peak of the Western intervention in the Gulf there were 40 Belgian, British, French, Italian, and Netherlands ships present. The British “Armilla” Patrol alone participated in a total of 1,026 transits after it started actively protecting ships in the Gulf in 1987. In addition, the multifarious support from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman has significantly augmented the US efforts. The Gulf States’ support is hard to actually estimate given the secret aspects of such cooperation during wars, in general.30

3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region: (Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab) As with other international agreements and conventions, those which regulate activities at seas are still controversial. This, in part, is due to their Articles. However, most of the dilemma has to do with the absence of an actual international authority that could obligate countries to respect the contents of the agreements. In violation of what is stipulated in those agreements, some countries intend to expand their territorial waters, claiming control over allegedly-owned maritime areas. Others threaten to close international sea lanes over which they have an actual control, if any conflict with regional or international parties took place. Actually the aim of this part of the book is not to provoke a sterile legal debate—which was and still is raised—about the legal adaptation of sea lanes in the Arabian Gulf region. It, rather, attempts to identify the gap between what is stipulated in international conventions and what is actually practiced in reality, simply, because it is one of the most important aspects of maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region. This part will tackle, also, the legal status of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab Strait as follows:

3.5.1 The Legal Status of International Navigation Passage in the Strait of Hormuz Before discussing the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz, it should be emphasized that conflict and competition over straits and sea lanes was the basic trait of world powers’ relations throughout history for two reasons. First, the economic importance of these passages makes them like artieries for maritime transport, being a cheap means compared to other means of transport; currently, about 62% of the world’s oil and gas cargos are transported through the straits. Second, and probably the 30

Cordesman, Anthony H. 1990. THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT. 5 October. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf.

3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region …

39

most significant, the strategic importance of those straits made controlling them an ambitious and vital goal for all the world’s major powers.31 Geographically, the Strait of Hormuz is the only link between the Arabian Gulf and the open waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait is a semiclosed sea but constitutes the only vent for a number of the Arab Gulf States (Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar) along with Iraq. These countries depend mostly on the Strait and cannot communicate with the outside world except through it. On the contrary, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,the Sultanate of Oman and Iran have sea ports outside the waters of the Arabian Gulf32 ; Saudi Arabia has ports in the Red Sea while Oman has its main ports in the Gulf of Oman; the United Arab Emirates has also established both “Khorfakkan” and “Fujairah” ports in the Gulf of Oman to be passages for its exports. The Strait of Hormuz is 104 mile long, and is located between Iran and Oman. At its entrance, there are a number of islands with an important strategic location; that is why whoever controls these islands can easily control navigation in the strait. The islands include Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which are occupied by Iran. Maritime navigation in the strait occur through two lines; the first line lies in the east, heading to the Arabian Gulf; the second line lies in the west, extending outside the Arabian Gulf. Actually, the Strait of Hormuz has acquired an excessive importance due to the transit of commercial ships carrying basic commodities to ports of the Arab Gulf States. In addition, 17 million barrels of oil per day, 20% of the total global oil supply, pass through the Strait.33 Legal adaptation of the strait is based on the geographical concept, meaning that the Strait is a narrow body of water which connects two larger bodies of water. several conditions must be met in the sea lane so that it can be described as a “strait”; it must be part of the high seas; its course must be natural and not artificially formed, it must have limited width; that is, it should not exceed twice as the area of the country’s territorial sea or that of the bordering countries. Finally the strait must separate two land areas and connects two water bodies. International straits have been the main focus of many international law conventions of seas, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), wherein it is stated, in Article 37, Section 2 of Part 3 regarding the definition of international straits, that “This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and

31

Abboud, Amer Majid Al-Ajmi and Rana. 2019. “Transit System in International Straits.” Journal of Sharia and Law Sciences 64–79. 32 Baraa, Ahmed Hazem Baraa. 2020. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications on security in the Arab Gulf Region. January. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://meu. edu.jo/libraryTheses/. 33 Saeed Salem Khalifa Salem Almazrouei, Hendun Abd Rahman Shah, Nor FadhilahMohamed Ali & Mualimin Mochammad Sahid. 2021. “Facing Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in light of the provisions of international law.” International journal for Academic research 46–47.

40

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone”, meaning the transit passage regime in this type of international sea lanes.34 Hence, transit passage through international straits is governed by customary rules and other binding legal ones. There has been an established international custom which necessitates respecting freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and its supplementing passage among the islands. This was, actually, codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (UNCLOS), which stipulated the right to transit passage in international straits. The Convention defines that right in Article 38, paragraph 2, as follows: “Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State”. The Articles from 39 to 44 include the duties of ships and planes during transit, as well as the rights and duties of riparian countries. The aim, here, is to make a balance between the rights of transiting ships and planes as long as their passage is rapid, continuous and constant, on the one hand, and those of the riparian countries which have sovereignty and rights over the Strait’s water, being part of their territorial waters, on the other hand. This is to be applied without reversing the rules of transit passage or the Articles of international law.35 However, it has been noticed that the same convention stipulates in Article 45 which tackles the innocent passage, that “The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II, Section 3, shall apply in straits which are used for international navigation: (a) excluded from the application of the regime of transit passage under article 38, paragraph 1; or (b) between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State. 2. There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits”.36 Applying this on the Strait of Hormuz, it is noticed that it separates two countries, namely the Sultanate of Oman and Iran, it is 20–30 nautical miles wide. Therefore, its water constitutes a territorial sea for both Oman and Iran, which, both, exercise their sovereignty on the side adjacent to its territory. In addition, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. Thus, it considered as one of the straits connecting two high seas (namely the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean), and the Arabian Gulf which is bordered, on the west by the Gulf States, on the north by Iraq, and on the east by Iran. Legally, the Strait of Hormuz is classified as one of the international straits which connect two parts of the high seas or between

34

Nations, United. n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf. 35 Abboud, Amer Majid Al-Ajmi and Rana. 2019. “Transit System in International Straits.” Journal of Sharia and Law Sciences 65. 36 Nations, United. n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf.

3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region …

41

two exclusive economic zones. For this reason, It is subject to the transit regime stipulated in the United Nations Convention, not to the innocent passage regime.37 In fact the dilemma does not lie in the legal issues which clearly state that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway whereto the rules of international laws regulating international sea lanes apply; it rather stems from Iran’s vision of those rules on the one hand, and its practices towards freedom of navigation in that strait on the other hand. Though Iran has signed The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, the Iranian parliament did not ratify it. Therefore, the documents of accession to the Convention were not officially delivered to the secretariat of the convention nor to the United Nations. In other words, the Convention does not pose any legal accountability on Iran nor any obligations in terms of human rights, and, in turn, Iran is not committed to the Convention. Nevertheless, Iran’s commitment to 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and its various provisions concerning straits obliged Iran to respect the right of safe passage. However, it is noticed that Iran invokes conditions it has approved in 1935 on foreign ships which enter its territorial waters, whereon the law of safe navigation is applied. One of these conditions states that entering or stopping warships within the safe passage system requires a prior approval from Iran, eight days, at least, before these ships can enter. According to Iran, warships can navigate in the Iranian territorial waters under the safe passage system, except submarines which must navigate above the surface of the water only. If warships are owned by an enemy country, Iran will apply the country- specific laws and procedures as well as the international laws which have to do with war and neutral countries. Despite the clarity of these Articles, Iran occasionally shows it can cause turmoils and tensions in the Strait. In 2016, for instance, Iran detained a number of American marines in the strait; it has also seized, in the same year, a merchant vessel claiming that it has illegally entered the Strait. Before that, Iran detained, in 2009, five British sailors and alleged they had broken into its territorial waters.38 It should be highlighted that Iran’s practices do not only contradict with the international conventions which regulate navigation and seas, but also violate them. Previous rulings by the International Court of Justice can, actually, be taken as a guideline for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. In a dispute which inflamed between Britain and Albania over the Strait of Corfu in 1949, the Court confirmed and emphasized freedom of navigation in the Strait without a prior authorization from the coastal States in peacetime. At the same time, the coastal States have not to prevent transit passage through the Strait, especially if it was innocent or optionl, depending on the geographical criterion of the Strait. Actually, all these considerations are true to the Strait of Hormuz, whether with regard to its geographical description or the definition laid by the International Court of Justice, which, at the same time, grants the Strait’s riparian countries the capability of getting an access to ships’ monitoring 37

Okla, Wissam El Din El. 319–320. “The Legal System of the International Strait: An Applied Study on the Strait of Hormuz in Light of the Provisions of International Law.” Damascus Journal of Economic and Legal Sciences. 38 Mountazeran, Jaweed. 2018. Studying the legal status of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran under international law. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.bayancenter.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/88668687979.pdf.

42

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

and traffic controlling if a war, which might threaten their national security, broke out; thus, they could take the apt measures to safeguard their countries.39 It should be noticed that Iran has rejected, in the 1958 and 1960 Geneva conferences, the fourth paragraph of Article 16 of Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which stipulated that “There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State” though this text does not differentiate between merchant ships and warships, and the concept of violation, here, means that the coastal State can stop the non-innocent passage and has discretion in this regard. This is in addition to the fact that, the Strait of Hormuz is considered one of the international navigation straits, connecting parts of high seas and a number of exclusive economic zones, as is clarified in the content of the UNCLOS (1982). The Strait of Hormuz used to be a main passage for all ships without hindrance. That is why an international custom was established in terms of applying the concept of innocent passage to navigation in the Strait. Actually, this was not only a main characteristic of that strait; in 1949, the general concept of free passage through straits of the same type was highlighted in the verdict of the International Court of Justice regarding the Corfu Strait case, as it ruled that States have, in peacetime, the right to pass through the straits which connect parts of the seas and are used for international navigation without prior permission from the straits’ States, especially if it is an innocent passage; the strait States are not to prevent this passage in peacetime unless otherwise was agreed upon. Then, Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone emphasized that rule, which was stipulated in Article 16/4, stipulating that there should be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between parts of the high seas and another part of the high seas.40 In spite of the clear content of the UNCLOS (1982), Iran’s perception of the Convention is the cause of the crisis. Though circa 90% of world trade is transported by the sea, the restrictions posed on freedom of navigation are still an issue of growing concern. Therefore, it was too difficult to codify, for the laws of the seas, a unified legal framework, for several reasons including the challenge of balancing the competing interests of the different countries. The aforementioned Convention is an imperative international framework for regulating navigation at the sea; it came after the longest negotiations in the modern era concerning the countries’ maritime rights. Yet, the interpretation of its Articles and Provisions is the mainstream till now. In fact, international law itself does not regulate the reactions of States towards any sanctions imposed on them. It, rather, protect the international straits, in accordance with that Convention, because they constitute vital arteries for the world maritime movement. 39

Baraa, Ahmed Hazem Baraa. 2020. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications on security in the Arab Gulf Region. January. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://meu. edu.jo/libraryTheses/. 40 Saeed Salem Khalifa Salem Almazrouei, Hendun Abd Rahman Shah, Nor FadhilahMohamed Ali & Mualimin Mohammad Sahid. 2021. “Facing Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in light of the provisions of international law.” International journal for Academic research 46–48.

3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region …

43

Under the above-clarified Convention, all ships shall enjoy the right of transit passage through international straits without any delay, but they should also refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial sovereignty or integrity. On the other hand, the coastal States bordering the straits shall not, under the Convention, hamper the traffic; they have, also, to declare and clarify any potential threats to navigation in the straits. The coastal States have the right of enacting laws and rules regulating the transit passage, whereas the foreign ships must comply with them as long as they are not discriminatory nor infringe the right of transit passage. However, the legal dispute between Iran and the United States has to do with the scope of enacting the rights of international maritime navigation. Atcually, this was one of the controversial issues during the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). If the Convention stipulates that the territorial waters are 12 nautical miles, then, the Strait of Hormuz becomes entirely within the territorial waters of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman. During the signing of the Convention in 1982, Iran submitted an interpretative declaration, which clarified its legal understanding of certain provisions concerning straits. Two parts of the declaration are relevant to the Strait of Hormuz: First, from the Iranian perspective, the right of transit passage through international straits is only a right “quid pro quo.” Only States that have signed UNCLOS are entitled to benefit from the contractual rights it created. Second, Iran perceives that the right of a coastal State to adopt laws and regulations for safeguarding its security interests can also include the requirements of prior authorization for warships before allowing them to pass through the Strait. To this extent, it becomes clear that Iran views the convention as a comprehensive deal through which a balance should be made between the liberal rights of freedom of navigation for the whole world, on the one hand, and granting coastal States a preferential privilege of access to resources on the seabed, on the other hand. In contrast to Iran’s viewpoint, the United States believes that the sea straits are international waterways and, therefore, navigation through them cannot be hampered or suspended. Actually, this was made clear, in 2012, through numerous diplomatic speeches which emphasized that no coastal State should request prior permission from foreign ships as a prerequisite for granting them the right of transit passage. The International Court of Justice has also announced in 1949 that it is not obligatory for ships to obtain prior permission. However, the UNCLOS included the provision of obtaining prior permission when engaging in exploration activities during transit. In the US viewpoint, the right of transit passage must be unrestricted in order to undermine conflicts; otherwise the coastal States will become more like “gatekeepers”, governed by prejudices and political tendencies. Although the Strait of Hormuz is deeper on the side of Oman than on the Iranian side, a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz for belligerent vessels in an armed conflict would only be covered by international law in the case of an alliance between Iran and Oman. Regardless, the right of transit passage could not be annulled for vessels from

44

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

States which are neutral in the conflict.41 The aforetackled means that the issue is not governed by the rules of the international law which regulate passage in international sea lanes, but rather by the States’ interpretation of those rules; this is actually more dependent on the maritime capabilities of each country at the same time.

3.5.2 The Legal Status of International Navigation in the Bab al-Mandab Strait Bab al-Mandab Strait has gained a great strategic importance due to its location, being the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the circle connecting it to the Gulf of Aden, then to the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and finally to Southeast and East Asia on the Pacific Ocean. It is the sea lane which connects the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the southern entrance of the Red Sea. Its importance is increasing as it controls the world trade routes through which oil tankers pass. In other words, this Strait connects a number of seas, gulfs and oceans in important areas of the world.42 its importance has, in fact, heightened to the extent that a Yemeni military official has said, “if we called the Strait of Hormuz “the strait of energy,” then Bab al-Mandab Strait is “the strait of global economy.43 Bab al-Mandeb Strait provides the world trade a short sea corridor. Sailing from London, for instance, to the port of Obaidan in Iran through the Cape of Good Hope requires 21,000 km, while the same distance through Bab al-Mandab is 12,000 km only. In the middle of the Strait there is a volcanic island called “Perim”, which separates it into two shipping lanes. The first is located off the Yemeni coast towards the island and is called the ‘Iskandar Canal’; It is three-nautical mile wide and 16-nautical fathom deep, and is, thus, apt to marine navigation. The Second is the Grand Canal, which lies between the western coast of Perim Island and the African shores; the navigable canal is 10-nautical mile long, 9.25–10.5-nautical mile wide, and 100-fathom deep at its coasts. Bab al-Mandab is the second most important strait in the world economically and strategically, after the Starit of Hormuz. About 21 thousand container annually, 57 containers per day, pass through Bab al-Mandab. Trade through the strait represents 10% of the whole volume of world trade.44

41

Wählisch, Martin. 2012. The Iran-U.S. Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz. May. Accessed April 2022. http://www.peacemediation.de/uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/o-37-waehlisch-the-iran-u. s.-dispute_1_.pdf. 42 Attabi., Abdel-Zahra Shalash. 2008. The Political Geography of Bab al-Mandab Strait. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.iasj.net/iasj/download/ed1fe9bd2e508206. 43 Taghrib, News agency. 2012. Who ever controls Bab al-Mandeb Strait controls the Fate of Europe’s Energy. 18 April. Accessed April 23, 2022. http://www.taghribnews.com/ar/interview/ 91162. 44 Asmar, Khaled Ahmed Al. 2019. Geopolitics of the Straits and their Impact on Conflict in the Arab Mashreq: A Case Study of the Future of Energy Supplies in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab 2003–2008. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://democraticac.de.

3.5 The Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region …

45

In fact, three factor have heightened the importance of Bab al Mandab Strait. First, it is an important trade corridor for a number of major powers. Most of the trade between the European Union, on the one hand, and China, Japan, India and the rest of Asia, on the other hand, passes through that strait. Second, Bab al-Mandab is a major passageway for more than 30% of the world oil traffic, especially from the Arabian Gulf region and Iran. Third, it is considered another alternative passageway in South Africa, but it is not preferable for international trade due to reasons which have to do with distance and financial costs.45 As there is no binding convention among the coastal States bordering Bab alMandeb in order to regulat traffic in this Strait, its legal adaptation becomes subject to the provisions of international law and the UNCLOS (1982). According to these provisions, the strait with a width not exceeding 12 nautical miles and is entirely located within the territory of a country, is considered part of its region or part of the surrounding States which if not reached an agreement on this regard, the baseline becomes the midpoint. Given the fact that Bab al Mandab Strait does not exceed 12 nautical miles wide, it is partly located in the international waters, because Yemen has specified its territorial sea at 12 nautical miles. This means that the international law grants Yemen the right to excerise its control over the Strait and the exclusive economic zone surrounding it, because they are placed within the territorial waters of Yemen. Yemen also has the largest continental shelf in the region, but it does not have, in normal circumstances, the right to suspend the passage of ships on the high seas, and it is not entitled to stop maritime traffic in its territorial waters. However, Yemen, still, can practice that right if war broke out, because Bab al-Mandab will be one of the open gates for the enemy to attack its territories.46 In spite of the clarity of the international legal rules of maritime navigation in both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab Strait, these rules are not governing navigation; it is, rather, the balance of power. Therefore, navigation in these two sea lanes remains permanently subject to threats. This means that a surge in perilous maritime security threats targeting the Arab Gulf States is probable, in spite of the presence of many international forces, including NATO ships, EU forces, and other regional forces, off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa since 2009 till now to confront maritime piracy threats. It is noticed that Iran always seeks to use the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb Strait in its struggle with major powers over its nuclear program, so as to squeeze the Gulf States between two hard crises, threats at Hormuz in the north and other threats at Bab al-Mandab, in the south.

45

Heli, Abdul Qader Al. 2019. Bab al-Mandab Strait between Strategic Importance and Escalating Security Threats. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticle/232/11/3/ 96338. 46 Salama, Ayman. 2018. The Rules of International law Governing Navigation in the Straits: Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab as a Model. 18 February. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4387:2018-02-15-12-3137&catid=3681&Itemid=172.

46

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

3.6 The Relationship Between Maritime Security and Regional Security of the Arabian Gulf Countries Maritime security is closely related to regional security of the Arabian Gulf countries, given the strategic importance of the location of these countries in one of the most vital regions in the world. They have a distinguished geographical location, in the middle of the three old world continents (Asia, Africa and Europe). In addition, the Gulf countries are located on coasts of three of the most important waterways (the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Arabian Gulf). This enhances their importance to maritime transport routes within the regional and international trade.47 Nonetheless, this location, while giving the Arabian Gulf countries a strategic advantage that made them the focus of the attention of major world powers, in terms of forging distinguished partnerships, such location caused the Gulf countries burdens and challenges, due to the imbalance in the regional balance of power. This is the main dilemma to the Arabian Gulf countries, which are located within a region with an imbalance of power (formerly because of Iraq and currently because of Iran). The balance of power is achieved in international relations when a region does not have a country or group of countries that has sufficient power to dominate and compel other countries in that region to submit to its will. The balance of power may be simple, i.e., between two countries only, or complex, i.e., between three or more countries. Proponents of the realist theory believe that countries act, consciously or unconsciously, in a way that leads to achieving balance of power, and if the strength of one of these countries outweighs the strength of the other countries, they join forces in opposition to this, to restore the balance.48 What is addressed above means that in light of the chronic conflicts in the Arabian Gulf region, the waterways are employed in these conflicts in a way that shows the superiority of some parties, by having vast areas of sea coasts or by possessing distinct naval capabilities. This is reflected in the case of Iran, which is engaged in an extended conflict with the Arabian Gulf countries, to the extent that it can be said that threats to maritime security have become the first challenge to the security of the Arabian Gulf and regional security in general. This can be clarified with the following three points:

3.6.1 The Impact of Maritime Security on the Concept of Gulf Regional Order Thinkers have agreed that the Gulf regional order consists of eight units, which are the countries located on the coast of the Arabian Gulf, namely the Kingdom of Saudi 47

Ismail, Mohammed Sadiq. 2010. The Gulf Cooperation Council in the Balance. Cairo: Dar Al Uloom for publishing and distribution. 48 Robinson, Paul. 2009. Dictionary of International Security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

3.6 The Relationship Between Maritime Security …

47

Arabia, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Iraq and Iran. Regarding the geographical element as a basic determinant to describe the regional order, some thinkers, defined a region as comprising several geographically contiguous countries, and that the volume of interactions and links between the countries of that region are higher and more intense than those with other neighbouring regions.49 Despite the importance of this, and taking into account that the intensity of interactions is always between the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but varies with Iraq and Iran, threats to maritime security, which are the most prominent developments and threats at the regional level, have made the six Arabian Gulf countries more interactive with the broader regional framework. Therefore, they have a presence in both the eastern Mediterranean as well as the Horn of Africa. This is because of opportunities in these two regions for cooperation as well as threats that the Gulf countries felt that it was necessary to engage in cooperative frameworks to confront them. In the Mediterranean region, for example, new oil discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean have had an impact on the economic and geopolitical reality of the countries of that region. This is in addition to the increase in maritime border disputes among these countries, which prompted them to enhance their maritime capabilities, in recognition of the possibility of threats such as a possible terrorist attack or large-scale military attack on any of the maritime facilities. This hypothesis is reinforced by the presence of a history of extended conflicts, which means that preparing for naval confrontations has become a priority for the parties to conflicts in that region.50 This explains the strategic measures adopted by some countries in that region, including Egypt, which announced the inauguration of the July 3 naval base on the northwest coast of the country in 2021, with an area of 10 million square meters. The goal of setting up such base is to “secure sea transport lines and protect maritime security by using combat groups including surface units, submarines and aviation effort”. These developments were a reason to make the Arabian Gulf countries part of the eastern Mediterranean interactions, according to a statement by the Egyptian presidency spokesperson.51 Therefore, regional security framework shifted from being related to the concept of “neighbouring countries” to being related to “neighbours of the neighbouring countries”. This has been evident in three developments: First, the United Arab Emirates joined the Egypt-hosted Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as an observer in December 2020. Second, some Gulf countries, namely the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, joined the Philia Friendship Forum, which was established in the Greek capital in February 2021, comprising also Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and France. Such 49

Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2015. The Evolution of the Gulf Regional Order since 2003: A Study of the Impact of NATO Strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. 50 Thompson, Sarah Vogler and Eric V. 2015. Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Regional Maritime Security. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://www.jstor.org/sta ble/pdf/resrep18906.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5d37a92921fbabfbceb14d5052b69e8a&ab_seg ments=&origin=. 51 Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021. An Egyptian naval base on the Mediterranean… A strategic vision. 12 July. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1258186.

48

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

forum seeks to strengthen cooperation among its member states to consolidate peace, stability and security in the region, and to underline rejection of foreign interference in affairs of countries of the region. Third, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates participated in a joint military exercise with Greece and Egypt on September 22, 2021. According to a statement issued in this regard, this exercise aimed to “strengthen joint cooperation between brotherly and friendly countries, and to share experiences and concepts, and to raise the level of combat readiness to address regional challenges in the region”.52 There has been also great Gulf interaction with developments in the Horn of Africa, which is the most important pillar of global energy security, because Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the most important routes when it comes to the global economy, is located in it. Closing such strait means preventing arrival of the Arabian Gulf oil to the Suez Canal or the Sumed Pipeline, which is an oil pipeline that extends from Ain Sukhna port, Egypt, on the Gulf of Suez, to Sidi Kerir port on the Mediterranean coast in Alexandria. This pipeline is an alternative to the Suez Canal for transporting oil from the Arabian Gulf region to the Mediterranean coast.53 Maritime security threats have led to two results for regional security in its broadest sense: The first result is the intensity of the military presence near Bab al-Mandeb. Fears of regional powers and the world regarding to the security of navigation in this strait, have led to strong military presence in that region. There are 16 countries that operate 19 military bases in the Horn of Africa. Although there is cooperation between some of these countries regarding combating maritime threats in that region, a degree of disagreement remains. This military presence means militarization of security in that region. The second result is the intensification of international rivalry near the Horn of Africa, including the arrival of the American destroyer USS Winston Churchill on March 1, 2021 to the Sudanese port of Port Sudan on the Red Sea. It was the second after the docking of the USS Carson City, a US fast transport ship. The arrival of the two vessels coincided with the arrival of the Russian frigate, Admiral Grigorovich, which is the first Russian ship to enter Port Sudan, against the backdrop of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of approval of establishment of a Russian naval base in Sudan, which could accommodate nuclear-powered ships. Although Sudan has not yet announced approval of the establishment of this base, there are indicators that underline the role of sea routes in fuelling Western-Russian rivalry. Given the geostrategic relationship between the security of the Arabian Gulf countries and the security of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf countries have realized the inevitability of interacting with these developments through an integrated strategy with security, military and political dimensions. At the security level, the Arabian Gulf countries contribute to international efforts to secure navigation in that region. Militarily, some Arabian Gulf countries have been keen to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa. This reflects their interaction with the state of rivalry that prevails 52

Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021. The Arabian Gulf Countries and Supporting Libya’s Stability. 11 October. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1270006. 53 Al-Taweel, Amani. 2021. The transformations of the Horn of Africa. 15 July. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://idsc.gov.eg/DocumentLibrary/View/4831.

3.6 The Relationship Between Maritime Security …

49

in that region and the ability to influence its paths. Politically, some Gulf countries have played a mediating role to end internal conflicts in some countries of the Horn of Africa. The Arabian Gulf countries have also realized that maritime disasters could harm marine environment, and that this makes regional-global cooperation to confront accidents of this kind necessary.54

3.6.2 Maritime Security is Cause of Establishing Military Coalitions in the Arabian Gulf Region Given that the Arabian Gulf countries are classified as small states, with the exception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that is one of the regional powers, their dilemma is always a security dilemma. The experience of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is a clear example regarding this dilemma. Therefore, the options of small states to protect their security include the establishment of international coalitions, an option even followed by medium and large countries to safeguard their security. It has been noted that the majority of coalitions in the Arabian Gulf region were the result of threats to maritime security, including the announcement by the US Navy of the start of guarding convoys of oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf during the Iraqi-Iranian war in the eighties under Operation Earnest Will, which was announced by then US President Reagan. In addition, the US-led Coalition Task Force (CTC) Sentinel was formed in November 2019 to secure navigation in the Arabian Gulf. Six countries, namely the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Australia and Albania, has joined such coalition. This coalition has been called “building international water security”, and it is practically called Sentinel. It covers a maritime range extending from the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to the Sea of Oman and Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.55 Maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf have also caused France to announce a French-led mission to monitor navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. It began in January 2020 and has the support of eight countries, namely Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. According to a statement by the French Foreign Ministry, this mission came to being “because the situation of threats has affected freedom of navigation and the security of European and foreign ships and crews for months, and could also affect trade and energy supplies, the matter that could have economic repercussions throughout the world.”56

54

Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021. Horn of Africa: Between Regional Contact and International Rivalry. 31 May. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1248471. 55 Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2019. “International Rivalry for International Waterway: the US-led Coalition Task Force (CTC) Sentinel as a Model.” Derasat (Studies) Journal 69. 56 Newspaper, Website of the Arabic version of the Independent. 2020. France launch a European naval mission to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. 31 January. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/90731.

50

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

On April 13, 2022, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, announced that the United States of America is in the process of “forming a new naval military force to counter the Houthi attacks on countries of the region, and combat drug and arms dealers and human trafficking gangs.” Explaining the scope of this force’s operations, Cooper said that it will counter arms smuggling in the waters surrounding Yemen, and that it will start its work as of April 17, 2022 in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf Aden. “This new force will consist of around two through eight ships, and is part of the joint naval forces that belong to 34 countries and comprises three task forces and aim to address threats to maritime navigation in that region,” he added.57

3.6.3 Employing Regional Conflicts to Threaten Maritime Security and Intensifying International Rivalry Near Waterways The regional security environment of the Arabian Gulf countries is witnessing a state of chronic turmoil, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which created an imbalance in the regional security equation, by strengthening Iran’s regional influence and role. However, Iran does not engage in direct military confrontations with the Arabian Gulf countries. Instead, Iran pursues proxy-war strategies, by supporting non-state groups, including the Houthi group in Yemen, in addition to targeting oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf region. There are many indicators that reflect how regional conflicts are employed to threaten maritime security, including the threat to maritime navigation in the Red Sea. “A total of 207 naval mines were randomly planted by the Houthis in the Red Sea. These mines are a serious threat to maritime navigation and global trade,” reads a statement by the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen in November 2021.58 In addition, Iran uses its advantages as a maritime state to threaten maritime navigation and regional security. This is reflected in statements by Iranians officials, including a statement by Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian Chief of Staff, who said, “We have given up our nuclear power and are making up for it now by building a naval force that will give us more value, a military fleet in the Sea of Oman and another fleet in the Indian Ocean, building naval bases on coasts or islands of both Yemen and Syria, and developing our military intelligence capacity through drones in our extensions”.59

57

Keshk Ashraf mohammed. 2022. A new multinational naval force. 18 April. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1292518. 58 Newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 2021. Destruction of a naval mine planted by the Houthis in the southern Red Sea. 18 November. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/330 4161. 59 Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2017. Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge to the Security of the Arabian Gulf. 22 July. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1082020.

References

51

Regarding the Arabian Gulf countries, maritime security has been one of the determinants of their security policies. The Kingdom of Bahrain, for example, is hosting the American Fifth Fleet, under whose umbrella three task forces operate, namely “150, 151, 152” task forces, which are under the command of the Fifth Fleet, and are also concerned with countering threats to maritime navigation, and to the security of the Arabian Gulf and regional security. The Kingdom of Bahrain was also the launching place for international initiatives to protect maritime navigation, including hosting the regional meeting on maritime security during the period 21–22 October 2019. This event aimed to discuss the extent of willingness of international powers to contribute to protecting the security of maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf. This meeting coincided with the IMX 19 huge naval drill in which several countries participated, under the auspices of the US Central Command.60 As for the UAE, it has given great attention to securing maritime navigation to the extent that some have called this attention “straits diplomacy”. The UAE has pursued three parallel paths. This included joining the US-led Coalition Task Force (CTC) Sentinel in 2019. In addition, the European Mission to Monitor Maritime Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, led by France, is headquartered in the United Arab Emirates. This is in addition the fact that the UAE has an indirect military presence on two Yemeni islands, namely Perim Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island off the coast of Somalia.61 What is reviewed above means that the security of navigation is closely related to the extent of regional stability, as Iran believe that shifting the confrontation to the seas is a tactical policy involving that high-value commercial tankers can be targeted with cheap boats that do not have a large cost. This has included attacks against oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf during the years 2019, 2020 and 2021, given there are large areas of water that cannot be controlled and monitored continuously, whether through regional or international efforts.

References Abboud, Amer Majid Al-Ajmi and Rana. 2019a. Transit system in international straits. Journal of Sharia and Law Sciences 64–79. Abboud, Amer Majid Al-Ajmi and Rana. 2019b. Transit system in international straits. Journal of Sharia and Law Sciences 65. Al-Ghafeer, Islam Muhammad, and Abd Rabbo. 2016. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Gaza: University of Gaza. Al-Taweel, Amani. 2021. The transformations of the Horn of Africa. 15 July. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://idsc.gov.eg/DocumentLibrary/View/4831. 60

Henderson, Simon. 2019. Bahrain hosts the Regional Maritime Security Meeting. 21 October. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/albhryn-tstdyf-ala jtma-alaqlymy-llamn-albhry. 61 Media, Website of the Emirates Center for Studies and. 2021. UAE foreign policy: Tactical amendments to protect influence. 31 October. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://www.emasc-uae.com/ news/view/21764.

52

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

Al-Wahib, Hammoud bin Abdullah bin Hammoud. n.d. The impact of the Geographical location on the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman 1970–2011. https://meu.edu.jo/libraryTheses/ 586a060c1e081_1.pdf. Armacost, Michael H. 1987. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging. https://apps. dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA496911.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Asmar, Khaled Ahmed Al. 2019. Geopolitics of the straits and their impact on conflict in the Arab Mashreq: A case study of the future of energy supplies in the straits of hormuz and bab al-Mandab 2003–2008. https://democraticac.de. Accessed Apr 2022. Attabi, Abdel-Zahra Shalash. 2008. The political geography of Bab al-Mandab Strait. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. https://www.iasj.net/iasj/download/ed1fe9bd2e508206. Baraa, Ahmed Hazem Baraa. 2020. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications on security in the Arab Gulf Region. January. https://meu.edu.jo/libraryTheses/. Accessed 23 Apr 23, 2022. Baraa, Ahmed Hazem Baraa. 2020. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications on security in the Arab Gulf Region. January. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://meu.edu. jo/libraryTheses/. Burke, Paul. 2011 The terrorist threat to maritime security of the United Arab Emirates. https:// www.ecssr.ae/wp-content/themes/ecssr-child/split/ELS_AR_141-1_Preview.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1990. THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT. 5 October. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/ files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Crist, David B. 2009. Gulf of conflict: A history of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulf-conflict-history-us-iranian-confro ntation-sea. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Crist, David B. 2009a. Gulf of conflict: A history of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gulf-conflict-history-us-iranian-confro ntation-sea. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Crist, David B. 2009b. Gulf of conflict: A history of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. July 1. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3423. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Defense, Sultanate of Oman Ministry of. n.d. Maritime Security Center. https://www.mod.gov.om/ ar-OM/MSC/Pages/desert.aspx. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. EDMUNDS, CHRISTIAN BUEGER AND TIMOTHY. 2017. Beyond sea blindness: A new agenda for maritime security studies. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ INTA93_5_02_StokesWaterman.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Encyclopedia, Moqatel. n.d. Patterns of international crises. http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/ Behoth/Ektesad8/azamat/sec05.doc_cvt.htm. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Ghazala, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu. n.d. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988. Heli, Abdul Qader Al. 2019. Bab al-Mandab Strait between strategic importance and escalating security threats. https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticle/232/11/3/96338. Accessed April 23, 2022. Henderson, Simon. 2019. Bahrain hosts the Regional Maritime Security Meeting. 21 October. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/albhryn-tstdyf-alajtma-alaqlymyllamn-albhry. Accessed May 4, 2022. Joseph, Henrotin, Olivier Schmidt, and Stefan Tayat (translated by Ayman Samir). 2019. War and strategy: Approaches and concepts, part two. Kuwait: National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters. Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2019. International rivalry for international waterway: the US-led coalition task force (CTC) sentinel as a model.

References

53

Ismail, Muhammad Sadiq. 2010a. Cooperation Council in the Balance. Cairo: Dar Al Uloom for publishing and distribution. Ismail, Mohammed Sadiq. 2010b. The Gulf Cooperation Council in the Balance. Cairo: Dar Al Uloom for publishing and distribution. Kaplan, Robert. 2012. The revenge of geography: What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate. New York: Random House. Kelley, Stephen Andrew. 2007. Better lucky than good: Operation earnest. June. https://calhoun. nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3463/07Jun_Kelley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Keshk Ashraf mohammed. 2022. A new multinational naval force. 18 April. Accessed May 4, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1292518. Keshk, and Ashraf Mohamed. 2015. The evolution of the Gulf regional order since 2003: A study of the impact of NATO strategy. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2017. Maritime Trrorism: a new challenge to the security of the Arabian Gulf. 22 July. http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1082020. Accessed 4 May 2022. Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021a. An Egyptian naval base on the Mediterranean... A strategic vision. 12 July. Accessed May 4, 2022.http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1258186. Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021b. The Arabian Gulf countries and supporting libya’s stability. 11 October. Accessed 4 May, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1270006. Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2021c. Horn of Africa: Between regional contact and international rivalry. 31 May. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1248471. Accessed 4 May 2022. Khammas, Alaa Eddin Hussein Mekki. 2018. The Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf 1980-1988. Amman: Dar Al-Rimal for Publishing and Distribution. Khammas, Alaa Eddin Hussein Mekki. 2018. The Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf 1980-1988. Amman: Dar Al-Rimal for Publishing and Distribution. Majid, Kamal. 1997. Oil and the Kurds: A study of Iraqi Iranian-Kuwaiti relations. London: Dar Al Hekma. Media, Website of the Emirates Center for Studies and. 2021. UAE foreign policy: Tactical amendments to protect influence. 31 October. https://www.emasc-uae.com/news/view/21764. Accessed 4 May 2022. Mills, Robin. 2016. Perilous roads: Transit of energy in the Middle East. 1 April. https://www.bro okings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/en-energy-transit-security-mills.pd. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Mountazeran, Jaweed. 2018. Studying the legal status of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran under international law. https://www.bayancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/886686 87979.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. n.d. Strategic Theories of State Power. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://fdsp.univ-guelma.dz/sites/ default/files/4_20.pdf. Nations, United. n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. https://www.un.org/depts/ los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Nations, United. n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. https://www.un.org/depts/ los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 2021. Destruction of a naval mine planted by the Houthis in the southern Red Sea. 18 November. Accessed May 4, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/330 4161. Newspaper, Website of the Arabic version of the Independent. 2020. France launch a European naval mission to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. 31 January. https://www. independentarabia.com/node/90731. Accessed 4 May 2022. Okla, Wissam El Din El. 319–320. The legal system of the International Strait: An applied study on the Strait of Hormuz in light of the provisions of international law. Damascus Journal of Economic and Legal Sciences.

54

3 Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States …

Rahman, Chris. 2009. Concepts of maritime security: A strategic perspective on alternative visions for good order and security at Sea, with policy implications for New Zealand. https://www. researchgate.net/publication/46063248_Concepts_of_Maritime_Security_A_Strategic_Perspe ctive_on_Alternative_Visions_for_Good_Order_and_Security_at_Sea_with_Policy_Implicati ons_for_New_Zealand. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Robinson, Paul. 2009a. Dictionary of international security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Robinson, Paul. 2009b. Dictionary of international security. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Saeed Salem Khalifa Salem Almazrouei, Hendun Abd Rahman Shah, Nor FadhilahMohamed Ali, and Mualimin Mochammad Sahid. 2021a. Facing Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in light of the provisions of international law. International Journal for Academic Research 46–47. Saeed Salem Khalifa Salem Almazrouei, Hendun Abd Rahman Shah, Nor FadhilahMohamed Ali, and Mualimin Mohammad Sahid. 2021b. Facing Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in light of the provisions of international law. International Journal for Academic Research 46–48. Salama, Ayman. 2018. The rules of international law governing navigation in the Straits: Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab as a Model. 18 February. https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=4387:2018-02-15-12-31-37&catid=3681&Itemid=172. Accessed April 23, 2022. Stansfield, Gareth. 2009. Iraq: People, history, and politics. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Taghrib, News agency. 2012. Who ever controls Bab al-Mandeb Strait controls the Fate of Europe’s Energy. 18 April. http://www.taghribnews.com/ar/interview/91162. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Talmag, Caitlin. 2009. Closing time: Iran’s threat to the Strait of Hormuz. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Walker (Editor), George K. n.d. THE TANKER WAR AND THE MARITIME. https://digital-com mons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1445&context=ils. Accessed 23 Apr 2022. Thompson, Sarah Vogler and Eric V. 2015. Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Regional Maritime Security. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep18906. pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5d37a92921fbabfbceb14d5052b69e8a&ab_segments=&origin=. Accessed 4 May 2022. Wählisch, Martin. 2012. The Iran-U.S. dispute, the Strait of Hormuz. May. http://www.peacemedi ation.de/uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/o-37-waehlisch-the-iran-u.s.-dispute_1_.pdf. Accessed Apr 2022. Woods, Kevin M., Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday with Mounir Elkhamri. 2009. Kevin Saddam’s War: An Iraq military perspective of the Iran–Iraq War. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Por tals/68/Documents/Books/saddams-war.pdf. Accessed 23 Apr 2022.

Chapter 4

Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

4.1 Introduction This chapter discusses the maritime security threats endangering the Arab Gulf States. It is divided into three topics: the first tackles attacks against oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, analyzing the assaults which targeted those tankers from 2019 to 2021. Despite the severity of those attacks, they did not provoke any decisive international reaction, either from the part of the Security Council or from major powers. They (attacks) had perilous impacts on security as they were an actual practice of the asymmetric warfare. They had also many economic repercussions, including the slight rise in oil prices. In addition, some insurance companies have announced an increase in fees imposed on ships, causing an increase in the cost of maritime transportation through which about 60% of the world’s oil is carried to various spots around the world. Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that these attacks were a real test of the Gulf-Western partnership, as it was noticed that the United States did not activate the principles of the Carter Doctrine (1980) which stated that the United States would use force when necessary in order to protect its interests in the Arab Gulf region. Moreover, the attacks impelled the Arab Gulf States to diversify their defense options and to enhance their own security, trying to make their partnership with the United States transcend the traditional equation of “oil for security”. The second topic sheds light on Iran’s hostile threatening that it would close the Strait of Hormuz or hamper maritime navigation in it, analyzing two points of view; the first viewpoint perceives that Iran cannot close the Strait, given its geographical nature; this is in addition to the major powers’ possible reaction if a closure took place as with what had happened during the tanker war in 1980s. This is in addition to the negative impacts of closing the Strait on the economy of Iran, which is still suffering the implications of the sanctions, posed due to its nuclear programs. The second viewpoint believes that Iran can close the Strait, given the massive naval capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards Corps and its actual control over the Strait. Iran can, at least, according to this viewpoint, lay large quantities of mines in order to impede navigation, posing a hard challenge before the United © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_4

55

56

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

States and its allies from the Arab Gulf States. This topic illustrates the impacts of closing the Strait on the economies of a number of Asian powers, namely China and India, as well as the European Union countries and Turkey. It also clarifies how these powers were able to establish strategic partnerships with Iran In order to avoid any future disturbances in the Arabian Gulf region. The third topic tackles piracy, organized crime and maritime terrorism. It includes definitions of piracy and its security and economic effects and menaces. Actually though maritime piracy has dropped since 2010, the incessant regional crises and weaknesses of the coastal States bordering Bab al-Mandab these threats always present. This topic also illustrates the dangers of maritime terrorism, especially with Iran’s support for non-state groups, mainly the Houthis, in Yemen, who have laid many mines in the Red Sea to threaten maritime navigation. It discusses, also, the illegitimate trading, especially drugs, as many reports illustrated that 40% of the drugs produced in Afghanistan pass through Iran. The third topic highlights, as well, the other major maritime security threats, including overfishing, human trafficking and weapons of mass destruction smuggling.

4.2 Targeting Oil Tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman During the period from 2019 to 2021, oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman were the targets of several attacks, which sparked controversy about a possible new tanker war in the Arabian Gulf region. These attacks were as follows:

4.2.1 The First Attack May 12, 2019 On May 12, 2019, four vessels (two Saudi oil tankers, a Norwegian oil tanker and an Emirati cargo ship) were damaged due to sabotage operations off the Emirate of Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Norway submitted to the United Nations Security Council the results of a joint investigation which did not include an evidence of Iran’s involvement. According to the afore-mentioned countries’ joint statement, “the attacks were highly complex; their type shows that they were likely carried out by state agencies which have strong operational capabilities.”1 The incident raised questions about the extent to which the attacks might be classified, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (UNCLOS), as a violation of the United Arab Emirates’ rights. It should be emphasized that the UAE issued its maritime law in 1993 after ratifying the UNCLOS and specified 1

France-Presse. 2019. UAE: a “state” behind the sabotage of ships in the Gulf, the preliminary investigation results. https://www.france24.com/ar/20190607.

4.2 Targeting Oil Tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman

57

in its maritime law that the territorial sea is twelve nautical miles, and decided that warships which want to pass through its territorial waters should obtain prior permission from the authorities concerned. Therefore, the occurrence of these attacks in the 200-nautical mile economic zone over which the UAE has sovereignty, as is conferred by the aforementioned United Nations Convention, grants the UAE an absolute regional jurisdiction over the crimes committed within the territorial waters of the coastal State, including those which are committed in the artificial islands or facilities established by the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone. Among these crimes are drug smuggling and human trafficking. Hence, the UAE’s turning to the organizations concerned with such incidents, requesting their participation in conducting transparent investigations is a right decision to be taken.2

4.2.2 The Second Attack June 13, 2019 On June 13th, 2019, two oil tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. The Marshall Islands-flagged Front Altair and Panama-flagged Kokuka Courageous were both sailing in the Sea of Oman when they were rocked by explosions. A torpedo caused one of the two ships to be caught in fire before saving its 24-sailor crew.3 In the aftermath of this attack, the Security Council held a public session under the chairmanship of the State of Kuwait, at the time. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, said during his speech, “I strongly condemn any attack against civilian vessels”. He added, “Facts must be established and responsibilities clarified,”. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who participated in that session, said that “maintaining security of the Arab region is a pivotal condition for maintaining global security.” What was most noticed was the other countries’ different positions and divisions over who is responsible for these attacks and how to confront them. while Jonathan Cohen, the then United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, stressed that Iran is still the most dangerous threat to regional peace and security, Vasily Nebenzya, the representative of Russia to the United Nations, said that the main cause of Middle East’s problems is the external interference in its countries’ internal affairs, and thus, “a regional security framework with the Gulf States should be established”. Francois Delattre, France’s ambassador to the United Nations, said “a progress should be made in terms of the gradual establishment of a regional dialogue, which would be the appropriate forum for discussing all sources of concern.”4

2

Salama, Ayman. 2019. International Law... Targeting Commercial Carriers. 14 May. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://al-ain.com/article/international-law-targeting-commercial-carriers. 3 Arabia, Sky News. 2019. New details about targeting two oil tankers in the Sea of Oman. 13 June. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1259079. 4 Brady, Ali. 2019. An emergency session of the Security Council ... Guterres warns of a matter "the world cannot afford https://aawsat.com/home/article/1766676.

58

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

4.2.3 The Third Attack; Against the Tanker Mercer Street (July 29, 2021) On July 29, 2021, the oil tanker Mercer Street was attacked by a “Drone” off the coast of Oman, killing two of its sailors, one is British and the other is Romanian. The Liberian flagged Japanese tanker was managed by an Israeli-owned company, “Zodiac Maritime”. On August 6th 2021, The UN Security Council held an open session to discuss the incident. The session was chaired by Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, as India was chairing the Security Council, that month. Other participants in the session include, Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. During that debate, Blinken called for holding Iran accountable as he said, “We are confident that Iran conducted this unjustifiable attack; this is part of attacks and provocative actions it used to adopt.” Ben Wallace, the UK Defense Secretary, has also confirmed that his country believes that Iran has carried out the attack against Mercer Street using a drone saying, “The UK condemns the unlawful and callous attack committed on a merchant vessel off the coast of Oman.” On the other hand, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin called for a strategy backed by UN member states and benefits from experience and cooperation of experts, civil society organizations and the private sector. He affirmed Russia’s commitment to combating sea crimes and their implications as a whole, saying that Mosco is doing its best to strengthen the rule of law in terms of maritime security”. In the close of the debate, the Security Council approved a statement proposed by India which emphasized the importance of boosting international and regional cooperation, including the exchange of information, so as to be able to confront maritime security threats. However, China refused to submit a periodic report to the UN SecretaryGeneral, on threats to maritime security. This is perhaps because the US Secretary of State has referred, in his speech, to “the threats facing navigation in the South China Sea” as being “provocative actions which threaten ships and maritime navigation” without referring to China. It is worth noting that one of the UN representative has, during that meeting, called on all countries to settle their disputes which have to do with maritime security.5 Reviewing the discussions during that session, it is found out that they reflected a wide scale of conflicting interests; this actually hinder any endeavors to establish an effective international mechanism for protecting maritime navigation. The words of the UN member States’ representatives were significantly conflicting, so a consensus on the mechanism, to be assumed, for protecting maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf region was not reached. To explain these attacks in light of the historical experience of the Arab Gulf States during the tanker war (1980s), it should be emphasized that the characteristics of tankers do not make them easy targets, but it is the political conditions that enable the application of more or less lethal weapons and tactics of various scales of destruction. The repercussions of these attacks can be determined as follows: 5

Newspaper, ASharq Al Awsat. 2021. Blinken urges the Security Council to hold Iran accountable. 10 August. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3123901.

4.2 Targeting Oil Tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman

59

1. Strategically speaking, non-state threats are generally considered to be relatively unimportant. Obviously, they may create certain obstacles, such as increasing costs of economic exchange and forcing governments to divert resources and find safer routes. 2. As for their characteristics, tankers, due to their size, lack of defenses and cargo, appear to be easy targets. As the world became more dependent on maritime transportation, ships have increased in size, and so their vulnerability to attacks. Because ships have increased in size, the impact of sinking modern-day merchant ships would be significantly greater than in the Second World War. Moreover, increases in both size and speed are not protective features of modern ships. Their large size means that there is a greater loss of cargo if the ship is severely damaged or sunk. Greater speed can be a feature that helps to identify it as a desirable target. On the other hand, the quality of oil influences the result of the attack. In the Second World War, oil produced in Borneo was pure enough to be sent directly to the tankers. It made it easier to set on fire than processed oil. Hence, a torpedo could start an uncontrollable fire, bringing the same result as sinking. However, the evidence does not support this claim. Analysis of submarines attacks in the Pacific theatre during World War 2 already told us that tankers were not easy to sink. Tankers were “well compartmented, able to close off areas hit by torpedoes and (if empty) flood compensating compartments to keep from capsizing. Some could sustain from 5 to 10 direct torpedo hits. This is corroborated by the experience of the Tanker War. As shown above, only 21% of Iraqi attacks and 10% of Iranian attacks led to a ship sinking. 3. Economically speaking, the Tanker War did not affect the oil market much. The main reason was that only between 1 and 2% of tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz came under attack. Furthermore, figures for the total tonnage of damaged shipping are misleading as many of these strikes inflicted only minor (or at least repairable) damage on large tankers. The solution for the paradox lies in the number of weapons and tactics used to engage a tanker in attack. These are derivatives of the current state of the global international system— namely whether it remains at peace or is at war. In other words, whether powers are engaged in large-scale, probably global, non-nuclear conflict, or not. Less damage is observed in conflicts that involve less powerful actors. Although still harmful, they do not make the global oil market dysfunctional. Significantly, more damage was inflicted during both full-scale World Wars. The relatively low level of damage during the Tanker War is related to the fact that the adversaries were not major powers. Iranian patterns of attack during the Tanker War were called “unconventional war”, carried out by low-grade revolutionary forces equipped with small boats. Iraq’s tactics also exemplified a lack of first-class military capabilities. Firstly, it did not mass sufficient aircrafts, so the damage done was only limited. Secondly, lack of persistence and regularity was observable. When tankers were attacked in 2019, none was sunk. Even if they had been, it would not have made any impact on the global oil market. In contrast, during both World Wars, the global oil market stopped functioning and tankers were willingly attacked. Germany, as well as the US, which used submarine warfare, were the

60

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

major actors, who massed enough combat platforms to seriously undermine the war effort of their adversaries. Hence, the characteristics of tankers do not make them easy targets but political conditions that enable application of more or less lethal weapons and tactics of various scales of destruction. Although the context of attacks in 2019 appears to be different from the tanker war which had broken out in 1980s, increasing international tensions suggest that freedom of navigation should no longer be taken for granted. With 60% of oil transported by sea, any major conflict will disrupt the global oil market and ripple through the world economy, bringing dramatic consequences to modern energy dependent societies.6 In spite of the importance of the afore-highlighted repercussions, another issue has been raised by the attacks which were carried out in 2019; that is the US’ reaction in light of its strategic partnership with the Arab Gulf States and the commitment which all successive US administrations have, whether Republicans or Democrats, to ensure the security of the Arab Gulf. Although Iran appears to have played a direct or indirect role in two attacks against oil tankers (May/June 2019) and the attacks against the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in that same year, the former US president, Donald Trump administration has not followed the guidelines of the 1980 Carter Doctrine, which states that Washington would use military force—if necessary— to protect its interests in the Gulf. The US president suggested at one point that ultimate responsibility in dealing with the attacks rested with Saudi Arabia, saying, on September 16, “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them.” The outlines of that help became clear within a week. Rather than ordering the US military to carry out a direct attack on Iran, Trump opted for a strategy of deterrence. He approved a deployment of an additional 3,000 US troops to the Gulf, along with a modest beefing up of Saudi air defenses. This prompted Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser to give voice to Saudi frustrations over the intensity of the response. “An absence of international resolve to take concrete action may embolden the attackers and indeed put the world’s energy security at greater risk,” Nasser said on October 9. The minimal US reaction can be explained within the extent of its dependence on Gulf oil, as it has decreased compared to the growing dependence on the emerging economies in Asia. It was noted that while the US remains the world’s largest consumer of oil, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest overall energy consumer in 2009. As 75% of Middle East’s oil exports are directed to Asia, most forecasters expect future oil and energy demand growth to be concentrated in emerging economies of that region. On the other hand, the United States has leaped up the ranks of oil and gas producers to become No. 1 in both. Increased shale production has allowed the US to become a growing net exporter of natural gas, and to approach self-sufficiency, on a net basis, in oil. Third, intensifying change in the earth’s climate is perturbing energy markets. Climate change is starting to incentivize individuals, companies, and governments to reduce use of fossil fuels or substitute them with 6

Hacaga, Maciej. 2019. An easy target: Types of attack on oil tankers by state actors. 9 July. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://securityanddefence.pl/An-easy-target-nTypes-of-attack-on-oil-tan kers-by-state-actors,118147,0,2.html.

4.2 Targeting Oil Tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman

61

alternate forms of energy. Despite this unprecedented reduction in import dependence, the United States remains the chief security provider for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies. This incongruity has fostered concern in the Gulf capitals about Washington’s long-term commitment to the Carter Doctrine. The modest US response to the attacks on Saudi’s oil infrastructure reinforces these concerns, as have high-profile calls from American scholars to scale back the US deployment in the Gulf. These developments pushed Gulf monarchies to respond in at least three ways: First, Gulf policymakers have sought to diversify security relations beyond the United States by seeking regional defense partnerships with importing powers in East and South Asia. Second, there is a gathering push for military and security self-reliance among some of the larger countries in the region. Third, the regimes appear to be seeking non-oil rationales to retain US strategic interest. One is emerging via the development of civil nuclear programs such as that in the United Arab Emirates. Nuclear programs could provide a “strategic hedge” since they raise the risk of nuclear materials falling into hostile hands and thereby create new impetus for American with the Arab Gulf States. The afore-discussed issues mean that while Middle East producers will remain cornerstones of the global oil market for decades, current trends look likely to reduce the strategic importance of these major petro-states in the eyes of the US, which will force them to seek alternate sources of revenue as well as military protection.7 In spite of the above clarified, while there are significant vulnerabilities to Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure, it would be difficult for Iran to cause strategic damage to most of these systems without escalating the conflict into a broader war that would risk Tehran’s own critical infrastructure. This means that Iran is still adopting a considered approach through irregular attacks on the infrastructure. Iran will likely rely on irregular means and actors, such as cyber operations and the use of partners like the Houthis in Yemen, to conduct attacks and hamper oil tankers. Actually, Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national petroleum and natural gas Company, has made considerable progress in protecting its infrastructure. But the Iranian threat remains serious. That is why the United States should focus on deterring escalatory Iranian strikes against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners by continuing to harden possible Iranian targets, as well as threatening and—if appropriate—conducting proportionate offensive actions in response to Iranian aggression. It should be emphasized that US support for Saudi Arabia, in specific, has many justifications. First, Iran and Saudi Arabia are major competitors for regional influence. Second, Iran is more likely to see Saudi Arabia as a strategic target because of the Saudi Arabia’s geographic position on the Red Sea, its historic willingness to play a leadership role in regional politics. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has the second largest proven crude oil reserves in

7

Jim Krane, Mark Finley. 2019. The US Response to Attacks on Persian Gulf Oil Infrastructure and Strategic Implications for Petro-States. 29 October. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.bak erinstitute.org/media/files/files/956c104f/bi-brief-102919-ces-persiangulf.pdf.

62

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

the world, behind only Venezuela; Saudi Arabia is also the world’s largest exporter of oil. As Iran persists to adopt a policy of indirect hostility towards the US interests through targeting the oil infrastructure in the Arab Gulf States, Washington must support the security and defense capabilities of the Arab Gulf States. As long as the attacks against oil tankers continue, it would be a strategic mistake to decrease the current US military presence in the Middle East. Washington should, rather, convey messages to Iran through which it would be known and apprehended that the United States would take punitive actions if Iran carried out any attacks against the vital infrastructure in Saudi Arabia or any other facilities in the Arab Gulf States, which may cause severe damage to oil and gas facilities, water desalination facilities, and electricity networks.8 As attacks against oil tankers persist and conflict between the United States and Iran, in general, continues. There might be three scenarios for the US-Iran conflict: First Scenario Increasing US-Iran tensions that ultimately lead to a new “Tanker War” scenario similar to the conflict of the 1980s, in which Iran attacks potentially hundreds of ships in the Arabic Gulf and the Gulf of Oman over a prolonged period while also launching missiles at Gulf oil infrastructure. The possible implications of this scenario might include long-term increased US deployment of naval, missile defense, intelligence, and surveillance assets to the Gulf. The impact of this scenario on oil supply would be small, short-term fluctuations. As for prices, there will be immediate, limited spikes due to sentimental reactions to small, short term supply fluctuations. Actually this scenario has already started at a low scale. The Second Scenario Escalation of tensions between Iran and the United States leads Iran to significantly increase the scope and severity of missile attacks directed at major oil and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This scenario would result in the implications of the previous scenario plus significant damage at Fujairah Port and Abqaiq stabilization facility, requiring one to two years to return to full capacity. As for supply impact, oil production would suffer 12–24 months loss, phasing down over time to zero. The prices, in turn, would spike immediately. This scenario is Less likely than the first scenario but certainly plausible given the current trajectory. The Third Scenario A major conflict between Iran and the United States that includes damage to Gulf oil infrastructure and a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This scenario would be the same like the previous one plus a limited two-four week conflict in which the 8

Seth G. Jones, Danika New lee, Nicholas Harrington, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. 2019. Iran’s Threat to Saudi Critical Infrastructure: The Implications of The Implications of U.S.-Iranian Escalation. 5 August. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-threat-saudi-criticalinfrastructure-implications-us-iranian-escalation.

4.3 Iranian Threats and the Strait of Hormuz Closure

63

United States destroys Iran’s naval capability but Iran mines the Strait and uses other weapons to limit access to it (Strait). This scenario would have the same implications of the previous scenario plus 4–10 weeks of no passage of tankers through the strait. As for its impact on supply, there would be 4- to 10-week loss. Consequently, Prices would spike immediately. This scenario is relatively unlikely, unless we experience a major escalatory event or miscalculation. The good news is that it would take a serious conflict to dramatically affect oil prices over a substantial period of time. Even a conflict similar in scope to the 1980s Tanker War would have only a marginal impact on global oil prices. If, however, in the most extreme scenario, Iran and the United States were to engage in a major military conflict, effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and causing significant damage to oil infrastructure in the Gulf, the impacts on oil would be more significant whether with regard to production or prices. In spite of the positive estimates, in these scenarios, which affirm that both Iran and the United States do not want war or any form of direct military confrontation, the attacks against Aramco facilities in 2019, was a strategic game changer and shows that the biggest risk is a prolonged, low-intensity military conflict. The fact that Iran was willing to conduct such an attack was a surprise to most analysts and to the US government and its Gulf partners. The level of accuracy it showed in the strike demonstrated a technical proficiency the US government and outside analysts did not believe Iran had.9

4.3 Iranian Threats and the Strait of Hormuz Closure Many questions are raised concerning Iran’s ability to fully close the Strait of Hormuz, and the implications of closure on the maritime security of the Arab Gulf States. Answers to these question are sought in light of the historical experience regarding straits’ closure or maritime navigation obstruction in similar regions of the world. The answers are also sought through analyzing to what extent Iran can actually close the Strait and the expected international reactions if a closure took place. First of all, it is noticed that Iran’s threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz is closely linked to the course of the Iran-US relations. In other words, whenever there is tension in their bilateral relations, Iran starts threatening to close the Strait or, at least, obstruct maritime navigation in it. Actually various institutions and governmental bodies in Iran are concerned with this issue, to the extent that the parliament drafted a law for closing the Strait. On July31, 2012, more than half of the Iranian parliament members backed and approved that bill.

9

Ilan Goldenberg, Jessica Schwed, and Kaleigh Thomas. 2019. Ilan Goldenberg, Jessica Schwed, and Kaleigh Thomas of US-Iran Tensions for the Global Oil Market. November. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/SOH,%20F INAL,%2011.19.19.pdf.

64

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

Although the Iranian assembly has little say in defense and foreign policy, that law would lend political support to any decision to close the Strait10 ; that is, the Iranian government has an obligation to implement that law if necessary. Actually, this depends not on Iran’s desire, but on its ability to carry out the closure. In this context, that there are two viewpoints. The first perceives Iran as not having the ability or capability to close the Strait, given it’s (the strait) geographical nature, as it is about 35 km in its narrowest point. Therefore all that Iran can do is to threaten navigation in the Strait, as has been done during the Iraq-Iran war in 19980s. Yet, the major countries that the Gulf States have asked to protect their oil tankers considered the Iranian behavior a hostile act which requires intervention; that is international intervention would remain possible if Iran obstructs maritime navigation in the Gulf. The second viewpoint sees that Iran can actually close the strait and turn threats into real acts, having suitable logistics; the Iranian Revolutionary Guard owns 700 sites, ports, marinas and islands on various points along the eastern bank of the Gulf. This means Iran could obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and lay mines in its floor.11 The issue cannot be evaluated according to statements and the counterstatements, which are many and various. When official statements are issued by Iran about a possible closure of the Strait, counter statements from the US department confirm that the United States would respond to any Iranian action. To assess this issue, several considerations must be taken into account: First, how many times similar straits have witnessed previous closures; second, the Iranian naval capabilities; third, the forms of navigation obstruction in the Gulf; fourth: the ramifications of the closure, and fifth, the expected international reaction. As for the similar precedents, in 1950, the United States imposed a naval blockade in the Taiwan Strait. In 1956 and 1967, Egypt imposed a blockade on Israeli ships in the Strait of Tiran, sparking legal controversy. In 1993, based on several Security Council resolutions, NATO and the European Union imposed a joint naval blockade on the Adriatic Sea, including the Strait of Otranto; other countries, such as Tukey, have also indorsed, in 1994, regulations to temporarily close that strait. These regulations were approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the grounds that the closure was not intended to violate the rights of any vessels using straits. In 1997, Italy imposed a naval blockade on the Strait of Otranto during the Albanian uprising, though the blockade was controversial in light of the international law. However, the afore-mentioned closures were not taken in a context of imposing sanctions.12 According to a Western academic, Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran before others. This is because it will not only deprive Tehran of 10

Newspaper, Al Joumhoria. 2021. The majority of the Iranian parliament approves the law to close the Strait of Hormuz Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.aljoumhouria.com/ar/news/19300. 11 Al-Aqra, Abdel Qader Mahmoud Mohammed. 2016. “The Iranian Threat to Block the Strait of Hormuz and Its Legality in Light of International Law.” Egyptian Journal of International Law 256-257. 12 Wählisch, Martin. 2012. The Iran-U.S. Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz. May. Accessed April 2022. http://www.peacemediation.de/uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/o-37-waehlisch-the-iran-u. s.-dispute_1_pdf.

4.3 Iranian Threats and the Strait of Hormuz Closure

65

vital oil revenues, but will also be a reasonable pretext for major powers militarily intervention to control Iran. Actually the tanker war between Iran and Iraq in 1980s provides an important lesson in this regard. When Iran attacked the oil tankers of the Arab Gulf States, the United States established an international coalition to deter Iran, which was called the “Coalition of the Willing.” However, as there is no specific expectations regarding the course of the current Iran-US conflict, if the United States or Israel attacked Iran, restraint would be out of controversy. Though the scenario of full closure will also remain doubtable, Iran can take advantage of its military facilities and capabilities, as well as the geography of the Strait to obstruct the flow of oil; this would depend on Iran’s ability to lay mines in the Strait, similar to what Turkey and Germany did in 1915, in the Dardanelles Strait, Britain. In 1950 North Korea amphibiously forced an American landing in Wonsan by laying only 3,000 mines across an area of 50 square miles. Hence, Iran can target the forces whose task is clearing coastal areas from mines. However, the United States can overcome that trap by using two capabilities which were not available in the Dardanelles Strait, namely, advanced surface defenses and the offensive force against hostile fire sites on the Iranian coast. Though statistics indicate that Iran has a sufficient stockpile of mines and multiple platforms to lay them, the problem is not in the quantity of mines, but in those which could be laid before they are discovered. Another challenge before the United States is the fact that the Strait of Hormuz may not be sufficient for resuming full traffic if mines were laid and then cleared. In other words, it would be hard to fully restore the flow of oil. It would be also difficult to estimate, in light of previous cases, how long this process will take. Moreover, Iran might attack surface ships and aircrafts, participating in that demining operations. Despite the importance of this analysis, it remains subject to change, given the uncertainty concerning the military capabilities of Iran, in general and its navy capabilities in particular. Truly, it is important to admit the fact of the US military superiority over Iran, which is not doubtable or controversial. However, a mine warfare would most probably break out within Iran’s borders, which means that even if the United States is able to clear these mines and restore traffic in the Strait, it may take weeks or more to complete that process. The United States ability to reopen the Strait will depend on two sets of capabilities, namely the demining capabilities and the capabilities to defeat the Iranian air defenses. Most importantly is to early detect any minelaying operation by Iran in the Gulf waters, especially monitoring Iranian submarine activity closely.13 It is noteworthy that after the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran directed massive investments to develop a navy with asymmetric capabilities. Iran has also plans of asymmetric warfare. This means that if a military strike was launched against Iran by any party, Tehran would not only obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but would also target ports, facilities, tankers, oil terminals and other strategic facilities of the countries which would either participate in attacks or would back them. Iran might target US military installations in Bahrain and Qatar, as well as oil and gas facilities, especially those shared by Iran with Qatar. In 1987, the US estimated that 13

Caitlin Talmadge. 2009. Closing Time: The Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

66

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz for a maximum of one or two weeks. It is noteworthy, in this context, to highlight the fact that Iran has doubled its capabilities throughout the years following that war, especially its ability to intercept traffic in the Strait. Yet, Iran might not resort to the scenario of full closure of the Strait; it may rather attempt to impose a certain level of control over it by obstructing the passage of oil tankers belonging to the countries which would support attacks against Iran in spite of the consequent escalation which might follow such act. Regardless of Iran’s ability to target the naval facilities of the Gulf States, escalation against targets in the waters of the Arabian Gulf will be sufficient to cause panic in the oil markets and increase ships’ insurance fees.14 However, there is another view believing that unless Iran can convince the world that closing the strait was an act essential for self-defense, closure would inflame opinion widely against them. Closing the Strait would be seen not only as a serious violation of international norms but, worse yet, one that directly and significantly touched the interests of most States. Even States which are ready to accept Iran’s right to retaliate against some offense would find it hard to forgive such a response. Under these circumstances, Iran would not only be left impoverished through a loss of oil revenues, but would also suffer massive destruction of critical infrastructure and perhaps its naval and air defenses. U.S. forces would probably seek to seize the Iranian-held islands, near the shipping lanes, east of the strait, and they would not likely be returned. These islands are geographically isolated from the rest of Iran, but are located near the Strait. In short, If Iran closed the Strait, it would find itself essentially in the same position as Iraq after the war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991, if not worse. On the other hand, comparing what happened in the Dardanelles and Wonsan cases to the Strait of Hormuz is irrelevant. This is because the Dardanelles case, nearly a century ago, and the Wonsan case, more than fifty years ago, involved dense fields in narrow waters. The Iranians, on the contrary, would be attempting to lay mines in broad waters which are not under their control, but presumably under constant active surveillance by the U.S. forces. Assuming that Iran will try to lay mines, at least eight separate sorties would be required of just two submarines, and it could not take less than a week. How this could be done when the nearby U.S. forces remain aware? According to the afore-mentioned viewpoint, the mine laying occurs at night, but darkness would provide little shielding against modern surveillance systems. The surface craft may be observed by radar or infrared systems day or night. Even assuming that almost all of the mines would have to be cleared before the normal flow of shipping could resume, is a fallacy; all that is required is adequately clear channels. In fact, to pose a meaningful missile threat, Iran must first maintain surveillance of the area. The only surveillance scheme likely to produce effective results involves the use of radars able to cover the target area. The location requirements of the surveillance radar are strict. To see ships well, the radar must view them against the horizon or against a background separated from the ship by 14

Haghshenass, Fariborz. 2008. Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare. September. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3446.

4.3 Iranian Threats and the Strait of Hormuz Closure

67

a distance that is large relative. To this end, it might be concluded that the limited choices of good sites, combined with the ease of detecting radar emissions, make this option less effective.15 Without preferring one to the other, the two previously-illustrated viewpoints seem complementary in that both agree on the fact that the scenario of complete closure is very difficult; the military superiority of the United States vis a vis Iran is indisputable, and crises of this type will create undesirable implications to all parties, the same as what happened during the tanker war. Therefore, the United States and Iran will avoid reaching the brink of the abyss in this regard. Yet, even if Iran had the capabilities to obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, this would have severe ramifications to many global and regional powers. The security of the Strait of Hormuz is highly important to China. For this reason, China has undertaken the construction of the port of ‘Gwadar’ in Pakistan, which is 70 km far from the Iranian borders and 400 km east the Strait; that is, it has a strategic location on the main oil supply route. Furthermore, China has been developing broad and deeply comprehensive strategic partnerships with many Gulf countries. The partnership between Iran and China is predominantly composed of energy trade. While China sees Iran as an excellent energy supplier, Iran sees China as a powerful balancer to the West. In this context, If Iran hampered navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, China will probably avoid a major conflict in the Arabian Gulf. However, this will have a devastating impact on Beijing’s energy security and investment projects. India, also, won’t be far from ramifications of navigation disruption. Iran is the third largest oil supplier for India, after Iraq and Saudi Arabia. India imported 24 m tons of crude oil from Iran at the end of the fiscal year 2020. Actually, India’s relations with Iran could be perceived in light of India’s effective policies to become a global power, one of which is the policy of getting an access to Central Asia in order to increase its commercial activities. In this way, India undertook the developing and restructuring of the “Chabahar” Port of Iran. It is worthy to notice that while India is trying to increase trade with Central Asia, it attempts to break the increasing influence of Pakistan in the region. India also seeks to maintain good relations with Iran which provides most of India’s energy needs. It is notable, as well, that India’s oil imports from the Gulf States account for 42% of the total oil imports. Any disruption in this energy imports from the Gulf will have serious impacts on India’s economic growth. The EU is a third player that can suffer the most damage in the Strait’s possible closure. The EU is one of Iran’s main trading partners in both imports and exports. Most of the product groups imported by the EU from Iran are energy, mostly petroleum) products. Iran’s imports from the EU are mostly machinery, equipment, chemicals, automotive and food products. To the EU, the six member States of the GCC represent an important region for trade. In 2017, the EU-GCC’s total exports of goods amounted to e143.7 billion, while the EU’s exports to the GCC surged to e99.8 billion and the EU’s imports from GCC increased to e43.8 billion. While 15

William D. O’Neil, Caitlin Talmadge. 2009. Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Accessed April 24, 2022. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/57443/O%27N eil-2009-Costs%20and%.

68

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

the EU exports mainly industrial products, machinery, transportation equipment and chemicals to the GCC countries, it imports mineral fuels, mining products, and chemicals from the GCC countries. Almost all the EU trade with Iran and the GCC States is provided through the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, the security of the Strait has a great importance to the EU. For this reason, the EU acts to maintain moderate relations with Iran and pursues a balanced policy regarding Iran’s nuclear program, in order to maintain good relations with Iran, on the one hand, and to evade tensions with the US, on the other hand. Regionally, Turkey would be affected by any tensions or disruptions in the Strait. Although Turkey has halted oil purchases from Iran, in accordance with the US sanctions, TUPRAS imported, in April 2019, about 100,000 tons of crude oil from Iran. Turkey announced that it would continue purchasing natural gas from Iran through the BOTAS. Actually, Turkey would seem to be a less harmed regional actor, in the event of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, when compared to the other countries. That is because Turkey shares a border with Iran and this made it easier to import crude oil and natural gas. In addition to that, Turkey meets its crude oil needs mainly from Iraq and Iran using the pipelines. Throughout the previous years, it was noticed that Turkey’s exports to Iran have been increasing during sanctions. This is due to the fact that pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs are not covered by sanctions. However, In the event of a military confrontation following the closure of the Strait, Turkey’s political intervention will be inevitable in order to solve problems. This is because Qatar, a Gulf State, had a huge trade volume with Turkey in recent years; Turkey does not want to lose this trade partner.16 To conclude, if navigation in the Strait of Hormuz got obstructed, many countries would be harmed, and this would prompt them to adopt a tough stance towards any aggressive Iranian behavior.

4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking 4.4.1 Maritime Piracy Maritime piracy is categorized as a terroristic crime, yet, what distinguishes it is mainly its place, victims, and aim. It does not take place except in the sea; hence, it is perceived as a form of maritime terrorism. The victims of this crime are those who use the seas, whether for fishing, traveling or any others purposes. In addition, the aim of maritime piracy crimes is robbery and plundering.17 16

Kiliç, Faith. 2020. The Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s International Relations. February. Accessed April 25,2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339145706_The_Strait_of_Hor muz_and_Iran’s_International_Relations. 17 Sciences, Naif Arab University for Security. n.d. Terrorism and Maritime Piracy. Riyadh: Naif University for Security Sciences.

4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking

69

The hazards of this type of crimes do not only threaten the national security of a certain country or even a number of countries, but also terrorize the global security as a whole, especially if crimes took place in a sea lane which is vital to global trade. Actually international law was much concerned with these crimes, as is clarified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (UNCLOS), which consists of 320 Articles and nine appendices. Seven Articles in the convention are concerned with piracy; the Articles from 100 to 107 define piracy and what should countries do to eliminate this phenomenon. Article (100), for instance stipulates that: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State”, whereas Article (101) states that: “Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). The Articles (102–107), itemize provisions of seizing ships or aircraft owned by others.18 The afore-mentioned means that under the UNCLOS, four criteria must be met in order for an act to be considered piracy; they are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

It must be committed on the high seas It must be violent It must include at least two ships It must be committed for private purposes only.

Despite the importance of the Convention, it does not include all the possible violence crimes which might be committed, in the sea, on board ships. This fact was confirmed by the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. On October 7, 1985, four heavily armed men hijacked the Italian ship, kidnapped and killed an American passenger. The crime was committed in the Egyptian waters, but the United States and other countries pursued the attackers without an authority to do so, but the UNCLOS and its provision granted them the right to take such initiative. This has prompted the international community to seek an international legal framework 18

Nations, United. n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf.

70

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

which could ensure that appropriate action is taken against unlawful acts which are committed against ships when these acts are not included within the contents of the UNCLOS. For this reason, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, was adopted and came into force in 2010 after being ratified in 2005. Under that Convention, the countries whose nationals have been detained or being threatening or killed, have the right to apply their jurisdiction over those acts. It is noted that there are two differences between this Convention and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. First, it includes all acts in regional waters and not only those which are committed in high seas. Second: it makes the practice of jurisdiction mandatory in some circumstances.19 Maritime security has two principal dimensions. The first is the intrinsic dimension, which is concerned with the natural integrity of all elements that form the basic and essential features of the maritime domain, such as the pristine quality of the waters and the quantity of fish and other marine resources. The second one is the extrinsic dimension which covers the safety of all ‘foreign’ objects that do not form part of the basic and essential features of the marine ecosystem but exist or make use of the maritime domain. Actually, both international and territorial waterways provide a suitable environment for piracy, and sea piracy crimes are possible and present along almost all waterways, whether in the advanced countries or in the developing ones. However, the degree of their manifestations in a particular location is usually a function of the nature of measures adopted to achieve maritime security. Therefore, the state of maritime security and piracy are interfacial and integrally related.20 The Horn of Africa region, the entrance to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, witnesses the most prominent crimes of piracy. Actually, this is one of the most prominent threats facing maritime security there. The coast of Somalia, the longest coast in African (about 3,700 km long), is one of the most dangerous areas, where piracy crimes are heavily committed. This region witnessed hundreds of piracy crimes as estimates indicate that there are five gangs, with an estimated number of more than 2,000 people in this region. These gangs are practicing piracy, and are divided into three subdivisions: local fishermen, militia members and technical experts.21 Piracy crimes have risen from 276 in 2005 to 445 in 2010. There were 142 attacks between January and March in 2011, about 97 of them took place off the coast of Somalia, about 35 attacks more than the number of these crimes through the same period in 2010, marking the highest rise ever in all the previous years. Starting from 19

Organization, Asian African Legal Consultative. 2012. Law of the Sea: Responses to Piracy: International Legal Challenges https://www.aalco.int/userfiles/File/ArabicLawoftheSea-S2-2012. pdf. 20 Ezirim, Freedom C. Onuoha and Gerald E. 2020. Sea piracy and maritime security: The problem of foreign naval intervention in the suppression of piracy off the Horn of Africa. December. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268575501_Sea_piracy_and_ maritime_security_The_problem_of_foreign_naval_intervention_in_the_suppression_of_piracy_ off_the_Horn_of_Africa. 21 Hassan, Yasser Abu. 2018. “Maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and its security implications.” The Arab Journal for Security Studies 325.

4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking

71

2007, pirate attacks increased off the coast of Somalia, especially in the Gulf of Aden, where attacks increased by 200%. Dozens of attacks not only in the Gulf of Aden but also in the Indian Ocean itself, took place in 2009. Approximately 12% of the world’s oil passes through the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa. The region of the Horn of Africa encompasses Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, covering an area of about 2,000,000 km, and is inhabited by about 90.2 million people. Its waters are strategically important for maritime transportation, especially for the oil-based trade, given its proximity to the rich Arabian Gulf region which contains half of the world’s oil. Generally speaking, Africa was rated the highest in terms of piracy crimes, about 264 crimes, followed by South Asia, 45 crimes, then the Indian subcontinent, 39 crimes. America and the Far East Asia witnessed 37 and 23 crimes, respectively, and 8 other crimes were monitored in the rest of the world. Regardless of these figures, in 2009 there was a significant shift in the area of attacks, off the coast of Somalia; while attacks in 2008 were predominantly focused on the Gulf of Aden, more vessels were targeted in 2009 along the waters off the eastern and the southern coastline of Somalia, including the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, Strait of Bab El Mandeb, off the east coast of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Many of these attacks have occurred at distances of approximately 1000 nautical miles off Mogadishu.22 One of the most recent studies has pointed out that maritime piracy is one of the major threats in the coast of Somalia, which extends along the ships’ passageway from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, one of the most vulnerable areas to the risks of piracy. Actually, Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa; it borders the Gulf of Aden with about 1,200-km long coastline, as well as the Indian Ocean with a 2,200-km long coast. Pirate attacks reached their peak in 2008, when 42 ships were seized, and pirates received circa $30 million ransom for the seized ships.23 Actually, piracy crimes in that region pose perilous threats not only on maritime security, but also on regional and global security alike. That is because the Gulf of Aden serves as a link connecting the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, thus serving as a key transit point for East–West cargo traveling to or from the Suez Canal. As a waterway, the Gulf of Aden is situated between Yemen’s coast in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia and Djibouti in the eastern coast of Africa. That is why a large proportion of oil exports pass daily through this it. Actually, this marine environment which is full of piracy crimes, was found out to be an outcome of the poor economic and political conditions of the States bordering the Gulf of Aden, especially Somalia, the poorest country per capita bordering the Indian Ocean. are the main reason be a risk to maritime security in the surrounding waters and the broader Indian Ocean, the same as Yemen which suffers the same challenges, albeit to a 22

Ezirim, Freedom C. Onuoha and Gerald E. 2020. Sea piracy and maritime security: The problem of foreign naval intervention in the suppression of piracy off the Horn of Africa. December. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268575501_Sea_piracy_and_ maritime_security_The_problem_of_foreign_naval_intervention_in_the_suppression_of_piracy_ off_the_Horn_of_Africa. 23 Khafaji, Rania Hussain. 2021. “Gulf Policy towards the Horn of Africa.” Derasat periodical 126.

72

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

degree Less.24 In other words, piracy as a threat is just a symptom of a more chronic crisis, and a normal ramification of the regional conflicts which have weakened the countries bordering the vital sea lanes and caused their maritime capabilities to be too limited to confront maritime security threats. In Yemen, for instance, the security forces’ inability to widely monitor the territorial waters has reinforced the presence of illegitimate smuggling networks, illegal weapons trafficking and piracy. It has also enhanced Iran’s ability to support the Houthis with money and weapons. Perhaps the most prominent example, here, is when the US destroyer “USS Nitze” fired, on October 13, 2016, Tomahawk missiles against radar sites, controlled by the Houthi group in Yemen, in retaliation for a missile attack against the US destroyer ‘Mason’ while it was sailing in the Red Sea near Bab al-Mandab. On the other hand, the consequent collapse of Somalia due to the civil war in 1960s, and the demobilization of the Somali navy after the fall of the government, caused an absence of any official institution that could patrol and guard the territorial waters. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of piracy, smuggling and toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia. Within the same context, the increase in maritime crimes caused devastating losses to the fishermen who turned to illegal activities after losing their works; they chose to engage in piracy, given the fact that Somalia is located near a major sea lane serving East and South Africa. In 2008, piracy gangs off the coast of Somalia had enormous capabilities which enabled them to hijack ships, forming a major threat. Without doubt, the Somali case is a clear embodiment of how internal political turmoil could affect the security of maritime navigation. The collapse of security institutions in a coastal State and the rise of non-state actors in conflicting areas are all serious threats which could ruin maritime navigation in international waterways. Bab al-Mandab strait, actually, displays the implications of regional conflicts on the security of vital waterways, and how countries, at the same time, use sea lanes in their conflicts.25 Actually, piracy has many economic and security impacts on the maritime security of countries. Economically, the total cost of confronting piracy off the coast of Somalia amounted to about 7 billion dollars in 2012 compared to 10 billion dollars in 2010 worldwide. This reflects the dangers of this phenomenon, off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean. Governments have spent 1.3 billion dollars, about 20% of the total military expenditures, on anti-piracy military activities, whereas the private sector endures about 5.4 billion dollars, 80% of them were allotted for enhancing the speed of ships as a means of avoiding hijack (2.7 billion dollars), acquiring new security devices (1.1 billion dollars), and affording the insurance costs which have also increased to 0.6 billion dollars. This is in addition to the need to using new lines to evade piracy, which might cost 0.6 billion dollar. Ransom payments to hackers rose to 0.2 billion dollars. Actually, these costs do not reflect all the listed measures; 24

II, Robert M. Shelala. 2014. Maritime Security in the Middle East and North Africa: a strategic assessment. 6 February. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140206_maritime_security_shelala_report.pdf. 25 Payne, Jeffrey. 2017. Open Seas: Implications of Regional Conflicts on the Security of Sea Lanes https://futureuae.com/ar/Release/ReleaseArticle/248.

4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking

73

private companies and governments continued spending on anti-piracy efforts in 2012 and through the following years, and thus costs continued to surge. This is besides the additional costs of other goods.26 In fact, there are many cases which clearly reflect the economic losses that various countries have suffered due to paying ransoms for releasing hijacked ships. In November 2008, Somali pirates seized the giant Saudi oil tanker “Sirius Star” which was released in January 2009 following a ransom payment of $3million. At the end of November 2009, pirates seized a giant Greek oil tanker carrying about two million barrels of crude oil; it was released in mid-January 2010 for a ransom payment 5.5 -7 million dollars. It is worth noting that in May 2017, Somali pirates seized a small Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden, but it was free of any oil shipment or cargos.27 The economic impacts of these threats are not limited to piracy crimes. Indeed attacks against oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Arabian Gulf, during 2019, posed enormous challenges to international shipping companies. Though these companies announced that they will go on work in the Arabian Gulf region after these attacks, Maersk Line, the largest shipping company, decided to impose 42 $ additional fee on each 20-foot container for shipments destined to some ports in the six Arab Gulf States, besides Iraq. The ‘Mediterranean Shipping Company’ has also informed its customers, in the wake of those attacks, that it will increase the prices of its services.28 As for security, it is too difficult to economically calculate the security cost of piracy, because there is no publicized data about the cost of security services such as guarding ships. This is due to the fact that terrorist groups can take advantage of these information when planning their operations, and take advantage of some security gaps, if there is any. Commercial entities such as private companies that own Ships or manage ports, believe that announcing the costs might provide commercial advantages when competing with other companies. Even if an entity decided to publicly announce the security expenditures or the economic costs of terroristic acts, it would inevitably introduce exaggerated numbers in order to seek adequate support from local bodies or obtain compensation from a third party.29

26

Ubaydli, Omar. 2019. “Omar Ubaydli. 2019. “Economic Implications of Maritime Security Threats in the Arabian Gulf.” Studies Derasat 177. 27 Newspaper, Al-Wasat. 2017. Somali pirates seize a Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. 12 May. Accessed April 25, 2022. http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/376279.htm. 28 Newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat. 2019. Global shipping companies between the trade war and tensions in the Gulf region. 8 July. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/180 2316. 29 Ubaydli, Omar. 2019. “Omar Ubaydli. 2019. “Economic Implications of Maritime Security Threats in the Arabian Gulf.” Studies Derasat 120.

74

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

4.4.2 Maritime Terrorism Maritime terrorism has gained wide international attention in the aftermath of September11, attacks. In October 2000, this attention was multiplied after al-Qaeda had attacked the US destroyer “USS Cole” at the Port of Aden, using a booby-trapped boat, killing 17 of its crew while 39 others were wounded. Some of the documents which were found after killing Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda in May 2011, revealed that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates planned to carry out attacks against ships and navigation. Maritime terrorism can be defined as “the systematic use or threat to use acts of violence against international shipping and maritime services by an individual or group to induce fear and intimidation in a civilian population in order to achieve political ambitions or objectives”. Depending on the maritime domain and the choice of objectives, maritime terrorism can be divided into four categories: First, the use of the maritime domain as a means for attacking land targets; second, hijacking vessels and taking hostages; third, terrorist attacks against valuable naval targets, such as the attack on the US destroyer “USS Cole”, as well as targeting a French oil tanker near “Shihr” port in Yemen, in October 2002, which has led to an environmental crisis due to the leakage of 100,000 tons of crude oil in the Gulf of Aden; fourth, attacking warships, such as the attack which al-Qaeda has carried out, in September 2014, against the frigate of the Pakistani Navy at Karachi naval base, in the Indian Subcontinent, the aim of which was attacking American warships docked nearby. In that attack Al-Qaeda used eight C-802 antiship missiles. In the Arabian Gulf region, there were many maritime terrorism crimes, including the Houthis attack against an Emirati ship, in October 2016, with an antiship cruise missile, off the western coast of Yemen. In the same month, the American destroyer ‘USS Mason’ was vulnerable to an attack. However, the US forces intercepted it. The Houthis used booby-trapped boats, in January 2017, to target a Saudi Navy frigate, killing two Saudi sailors. In addition to that, the Houthi attempted to target an Aramco oil distribution platform at the Saudi coast in the Red Sea, using a speedboat loaded with explosives.30 Those are just some of many attempts which have been carried out as regional crises continue, including the Yemeni crisis. The continuation of theses crises along with the increase of intense confrontations encourage terrorist groups find their goals in the maritime domain where targets are easy to get and the consequent losses are too huge to manage.

4.4.3 Illegal Smuggling, Human Trafficking and Weapons Given the vast areas of seas and the inability to control them, there are many threats, besides piracy, endangering maritime security, including the following: 30

Website, European Eye on Radicalization. 2019. Naval Terrorism: A Growing Threat from alQaeda and Iranian Proxies. https://eeradicalization.com/ar.

4.4 Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Illegal Smuggling and Arms Trafficking

75

1. Drug smuggling: The Arab Gulf States are located near the source of opium production “Afghanistan”. In addition, Iran is the transit of drug trade across the Arabian Gulf and, through land, to Europe, Turkey and Russia. According to The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), about 40% of the drugs produced in Afghanistan pass through Iran. On the other hand, the Indian Ocean region represents another dangerous destination for drug smuggling, which might be smuggled through the unregulated vessel traffic, the seaborne trade in containers, and the shipping operations which are carried out using the “flag of convenience”, a business practice whereby a ship’s owner registers a merchant ship in a ship register of a country other than that of the ship’s owner, and the ship flies the civil ensign of that country, flag state; the practice has led to an increase in drug smuggling which passes through the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan). Through money laundering practices, arms are also smuggled. 31 Drug smuggling is one of the hardest security challenges facing the Arab Gulf States. the Kingdom of Bahrain held a conference entitled “Community Partnership to Combat Drugs” in September 2019, where a number of security officials from the Arab Gulf States have participated, including Brigadier General, Saeed bin Abdullah Al-Suwaidi, Director General of the Federal Drug Control Department, the United Arab Emirates, who said, “There is great cooperation and coordination between the Arab Gulf States in terms of exchanging information to combat drug smuggling.“ He added, “During the period from 2016 to 2018 there were 140 exchanges of information which resulted in the seizure of more than 20 million narcotic tablets, and more than 100 kg of cannabis, in addition to other narcotics. Bahrain has also provided the UAE with information about 70 international cell phones whose owners are involved in drug smuggling across the world and are targeting, in specific, the Arab Gulf region.32 Although drugs are smuggled to the Arab Gulf States through land, air and sea ports, the largest quantities of smuggled shipments are seized in sea ports. The Mixed Duty Force (150), a multinational unit, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the USA, France, Britain, Germany, Holland, New Zealand, Pakistan, Canada, Australia, Italy, Denmark and Spain, has intercepted many smuggling operations. The Force (150) which was commanded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2020, seized a drug shipment of 900 kg on an unidentified sailing boat in the international waters of the Arabian Sea; that was the largest operation carried out by the International Maritime Force in that area. However, it was not the first time drugs were seized in that area. In October, drugs weighting 450 kg were seized, and in May a large amount of cannabis was 31

Singhal, Captain Deepak. n.d. COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS To ADDRESS NONTRADITIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/themes/indiannavy/images/ pdf/resources/article_15.pdf. 32 Akhbar Al Khalij, Newspaper. 2019. In the first session of the Anti-Drug Community Partnership Conference: The absence of security control in some countries in the region has resulted in new areas for drug smuggling. September 24. Accessed April 25, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej. com/news/article/1184007.

76

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

seized.33 On June 26, 2021, Saudi Arabia’s General Directorate has thwarted an attempt of smuggling 14.4 million amphetamine tablets coming from Lebanon through the port of Jeddah, as they were secretly hidden inside a shipment of iron plates.34 2. Human trafficking: There are illegal networks for human trafficking, especially women who came from poor areas to the Arab Gulf States. These practices involve high risks, as the ships used by smugglers are unsuitable for sailing. This is in addition to the bad treatment that the victims receive from their smugglers. The Horn of Africa is actually a source of waves of illegal immigration heading to the Arab Gulf States in order to search for better living opportunities. In the years 2018 and 2019, the number of illegal immigrants from the Horn of Africa region to the Arab Gulf States, through Yemen, surged to 300,000 people.35 3. Illegal fishing: It is one of the most perilous threats to maritime security, as it violates the laws regulating the territorial waters of countries. There are many forms of illegal fishing, such as fishing out of the fishing season, fishing unauthorized species, or using wrong equipment which cause harm to the marine environment. 4. Trafficking in weapons of mass destruction: Trafficking in weapons of mass destruction is a major maritime security as it was identified by the UN secretary. It is complicated issue due to the dual use of materials. The trafficking of arms is lawful depending on the recipient of the shipment. For example, since there is no prohibition on Yemen taking arms from North Korea, it is therefore, allowed for vessels to transfer shipments.However, the legal avenues available to respond to illicit trafficking in WMD at sea are similar to those available to respond to maritime terrorism. Thus, the ISPS Code, the WCO framework of Standard, the Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LIRT) Regulations, and the Revised Seafarers Identification Convention, all support state efforts to assess what is being shipped where and by whom.36 However, most of these measures faces two fundamental legal challenges. Firstly, opportunities to stop, board and search ships without permission are limited by the Law of the Sea. Secondly, materials for illicit WMD purposes cannot easily be seized nor getting traffickers prosecuted because their transport is not an international criminal offence.37

33

Website, Al Khalij Online. 2020. Thwart the smuggling of 900 kilograms of drugs in the Arabian Sea. 8 December. Accessed 2022 25, 2022. https://alkhaleejonline.ne. 34 Website, ASharq Al Awsat Newspaper. 2021. Saudi Arabia: A huge drug shipment seized from Lebanon. 27 June. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3049266. 35 Khafaji, Rania Hussain. 2021. “Gulf Policy towards the Horn of Africa.” Derasat periodical 126. 36 Marzoq, Sameer A. 2013. Northern Arabian Gulf a critical area for maritime safety and security. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context= all_dissertations. 37 Singhal, Captain Deepak. n.d. COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS To ADDRESS NONTRADITIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/themes/indiannavy/images/ pdf/resources/article_15.pdf.

References

77

It should be emphasized that if maritime security threats represent a challenge to all countries, they are more acute for the Arab Gulf States for several reasons, including the success of those countries in confronting terrorism. This has led terrorist organizations to attack maritime targets which are easy to destroy with lower expenses. A military expert from the Gulf region believes that while the Arab Gulf States are increasingly dependent on strategic sea lanes to export oil and gas abroad, ships, offshore platforms, strategic straits, territorial waters and seaports are all targets for terrorist groups through piracy, armed robbery, and illicit trafficking in humans and goods. The dilemma lies in the fact that it is too difficult to identify pirates because they can switch from fishermen to groups equipped with boats and weapons. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the number of ships that pirates can hold. At the same time, securing a narrow sea lane requires at least 60 warships; this means massive expenses.38 The afore-illustrated means that although attacks on oil tankers are seen as the peak of maritime security risks, there are other threats which necessitate concerted efforts to confront them, in light of the growing reliance on the seas as a cheap means of transportation. What exacerbate the problem is the absence of an international authority which could oblige the countries to abide by the contents of international conventions that regulate the seas in general and their vital lanes, in particular.

References Al-Aqra, Abdel Qader Mahmoud Mohammed. 2016. The Iranian threat to block the strait of Hormuz and its legality in light of international law. Egyptian Journal of International Law: 256–257. Al Khalij Online Website. 2020. Thwart the smuggling of 900 kilograms of drugs in the Arabian Sea. https://alkhaleejonline.ne. Accessed 25 April 2022. ASharq Al Awsat Newspaper. 2021. Blinken urges the security council to hold Iran accountable. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3123901. Accessed 24 April, 2022 Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper. 2019. Global shipping companies between the trade war and tensions in the Gulf region. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1802316. Accessed 25 April 2022. ASharq Al Awsat Newspaper Website. 2021. Saudi Arabia: A huge drug shipment seized from Lebanon. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3049266. Accessed 25 April 2022. Al Joumhoria Newspaper. 2021. The majority of the Iranian parliament approves the law to close the Strait of Hormuz. https://www.aljoumhouria.com/ar/news/19300. Accessed 24 April 2022. Al-Wasat Newspaper. 2017. Somali pirates seize a Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. http://www. alwasatnews.com/news/376279.htm. Accessed 25 April 2022. Akhbar Al Khalij Newspaper. 2019. In the first session of the anti-drug community partnership conference: The absence of security control in some countries in the region has resulted in new areas for drug smuggling. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1184007. Accessed 25 April 2022. Asian African Legal Consultative Organization. 2012. Law of the sea: Responses to piracy. International Legal Challenges. https://www.aalco.int/userfiles/File/ArabicLawoftheSea-S2-201 2.pd

38

Malaeb, Dean Moqaddam Nagy. 2020. Maritime security is a growing strategic issue for countries. 19 April. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://sdarabia.com/2020/04/.

78

4 Maritime Security Threats and the Arabian Gulf States

Brady, Ali. 2019. An emergency session of the Security Council ... Guterres warns of a matter the world cannot afford. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1766676 European Eye on Radicalization Website. 2019. Naval terrorism: A growing threat from al-Qaeda and Iranian Proxies. https://eeradicalization.com/ar Ezirim, Freedom C. Onuoha, and E. Gerald. 2020b. Sea piracy and maritime security: The problem of foreign naval intervention in the suppression of piracy off the Horn of Africa. https://www.res earchgate.net/publication/268575501_Sea_piracy_and_maritime_security_The_problem_of_f oreign_naval_intervention_in_the_suppression_of_piracy_off_the_Horn_of_Africa. Accessed 25 April 2022. France-Presse. 2019. UAE: A “state” behind the sabotage of ships in the Gulf, the preliminary investigation results. https://www.france24.com/ar/20190607 Goldenberg, Ilan, Jessica Schwed, and Kaleigh Thomas. 2019. US-Iran tensions for the global oil market. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/SOH,%20FINA L,%2011.19.19.pdf. Accessed April 2022. Hacaga, Maciej. 2019. An easy target: Types of attack on oil tankers by state actors. https://sec urityanddefence.pl/An-easy-target-nTypes-of-attack-on-oil-tankers-by-state-actors,118147,0,2. html. Accessed 24 April 2022. Haghshenass, Fariborz. 2008. Iran’s asymmetric naval warfare. https://www.washingtoninstitute. org/media/3446. Accessed 24 April 2022. Hassan, Yasser Abu. 2018. Maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and its security implications. The Arab Journal for Security Studies 325. Jones, Seth G., Danika New Lee, Nicholas Harrington, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. 2019. Iran’s threat to Saudi critical infrastructure: The implications of the implications of U.S.Iranian escalation. https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-threat-saudi-critical-infrastructure-implic ations-us-iranian-escalation. Accessed 24 April 2022. Khafaji, Rania Hussain. 2021. Gulf Policy towards the Horn of Africa. Derasat periodical 126. Kiliç, Faith. 2020. The strait of Hormuz and Iran’s international relations. https://www.researchg ate.net/publication/339145706_The_Strait_of_Hormuz_and_Iran’s_International_Relations. Accessed 25 April 2022. Krane, Jim, and Mark Finley. 2019. The US response to attacks on Persian gulf oil infrastructure and strategic implications for Petro-states. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/956c104f/ bi-brief-102919-ces-persiangulf.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2022. Malaeb, Dean Moqaddam Nagy. 2020. Maritime security is a growing strategic issue for countries. https://sdarabia.com/2020/04/. Accessed 25 April 2022. Marzoq, Sameer A. 2013. Northern Arabian Gulf a critical area for maritime safety and security. https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=all_dissertations. Accessed 25 April 2022. Naif Arab University for Security Sciences. n.d. Terrorism and Maritime Piracy. Riyadh: Naif University for Security Sciences. O’Neil, William D., Caitlin Talmadge. 2009. Costs and difficulties of blocking the strait of Hormuz. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/57443/O%27Neil-2009-Cost% 20and%. Accessed 24 April 2022. Payne, Jeffrey. 2017. Open seas: Implications of regional conflicts on the security of sea lanes. https://futureuae.com/ar/Release/ReleaseArticle/248 Salama, Ayman. 2019. International Law... Targeting Commercial Carriers. https://al-ain.com/art icle/international-law-targeting-commercial-carriers. Accessed 24 April 2022. Shelala, Robert M. 2014. Maritime security in the Middle East and North Africa: A strategic assessment. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/ publication/140206_maritime_security_shelala_report.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2022. Singhal, Captain Deepak. n.d. Cooperative mechanisms to address non-traditional maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/themes/ind iannavy/images/pdf/resources/article_15.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2022.

References

79

Sky News Arabia. 2019. New details about targeting two oil tankers in the Sea of Oman. https:// www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1259079. Accessed 24 April 2022. Talmadge, Caitlin. 2009. Closing time: The Iranian threat to the strait of Hormuz. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Ubaydli, Omar. 2019. Economic implications of maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf. Studies Derasat 177. United Nations, n.d. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accessed April 23, 2022. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_a.pdf Wählisch, Martin. 2012. The Iran-U.S. dispute, the strait of Hormuz. http://www.peacemediation.de/ uploads/7/3/9/1/73911539/o-37-waehlisch-the-iran-u.s.-dispute_1_.pdf. Accessed April 2022.

Chapter 5

Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

5.1 Introduction This chapter deals with mechanisms established, or participated in, by the Arabian Gulf countries to counter threats to maritime security. The chapter consists of three parts. The first part is on mechanisms at the collective Gulf level and the separate state level. At the collective level, the Gulf countries agreed to set up the Unified Maritime Duty Force 81 in 2014, which is a maritime complement to the Peninsula Shield forces. The number of the personnel of such force is contingent upon the level of the external threats to maritime security. The Gulf countries also set up the Bahrain-based Unified Maritime Operations Center in 2016, which is a practical mechanism for the Gulf countries to counter maritime security threats. There has been also other collective Gulf cooperation in the area of maritime security. This involved projects in naval military manufacturing, and joint naval drills that increased significantly during the years 2019–2021. This involved, as well, the attention granted by the Gulf countries to enhancing their naval capabilities with concluding contracts with some international companies specialized in maritime industries such contracts have provided for manufacturing some naval weapons in the Gulf countries. The second part of the chapter deals with the mechanisms in which the Gulf countries participated, or established, to counter threats to maritime security. The most prominent and important two mechanisms in this respect include Djibouti Code of Conduct for countering maritime security threats, which was adopted in 2009 by 21 countries, including Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman. The Charter of the Code comprises 17 articles on ways to counter maritime security threats. Formulating Djibouti Code Conduct was based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and United Nations resolutions related to countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Since its lunch, the work of the Djibouti Code of Conduct has witnessed substantial cooperation, especially after expanding its range of work. Despite the challenges it faces, both in terms of difference in capabilities of its member states, and perhaps the different interests of these countries, the Djibouti Code Conduct © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_5

81

82

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

remains an important regional framework, not only to ensure maritime security, but also to achieve regional balance. The second mechanism in this regard was setting up the Council of the Arab and African Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In 2020, Saudi Arabia took the initiative to establish and launch this council, comprising it and seven other countries. Goals of the council include securing maritime navigation in the Red Sea. Despite the difference in interests of the countries that joined this council, it is an important regional mechanism within efforts of the Gulf countries to counter threats to maritime security. The third part of the chapter deals with the Gulf countries and international partnerships for maritime security, involving two mechanisms. The first is the Naval Military Coalition for Security of Maritime Navigation in the Gulf, launched by the United States in 2019, comprising it and six countries, including three Gulf counties, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. There are important factors regarding the work of that coalition, including the experience of the United States in the areas of maritime security and leadership of coalitions, and the experience gained by the Gulf naval forces to operate at sea. As for the second mechanism, France announced, in January 2020, the creation of a France-led European mission to monitor navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. It is called the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, and is supported by eight European countries. Tasks of such mission include monitoring navigation, meaning that it acts as a navigation observatory with which intelligence related to navigation is gathered. The work of this mission is complementary to the work of the military coalition led by the United States for the same purpose.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level Before addressing the Gulf mechanisms to safeguard maritime security, it should be underlined that the Gulf elites are convinced that maritime security is a central part of the security of the Arabian Gulf. In his speech during a panel organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Manama in May 2013, the then SecretaryGeneral of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Dr. Abdul Latif Al-Zayani said, “Maritime security is the key to security in the Arabian Gulf. It is of paramount importance not only to peoples of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, but also to peoples of the whole world”. “The free shipping of energy supplies through the waterways in the Arabian Gulf is an essential factor in avoiding economic and industrial collapse in many countries that depend on energy supplies from the Gulf countries,” he added.1 Based on this perspective, the Arabian Gulf countries have established several Gulf mechanisms, at the collective and separate state levels, to safeguard maritime security, as addressed below.

1

Website, Al-Eqtesadiya Newspaper. 2013. Maritime security is the key to security in the Arabian Gulf. 29 May. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.aleqt.com/2013/05/29/article_759342.html.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level

83

5.2.1 The Gulf Collective Level 5.2.1.1

The Unified Maritime Duty Force 81

Although the Peninsula Shield forces, which were created in 1982, include ground, air and naval forces, the Arabian Gulf countries have been keen to develop their naval forces. In the thirty-fifth session of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which was held in Doha, Qatar, on December 9, 2014, the leaders of the GCC countries approved “Recommendations of the Joint Defense Council at its thirteenth session to establish the Unified Maritime Task Force 81”.2 There were no details about the nature of that force, in terms of its size, how to be formed or its tasks. Nonetheless, Ahmed Al-Mulla, advisor to the Minister of Defense in the State of Kuwait, said in press statements on October 15, 2014, two months before the Gulf Summit, that “The Arabian Gulf countries have begun to establish a maritime force aimed at safeguarding maritime security, as a complementary force to the Peninsula Shield forces, in the maritime area”. “Developments in the region have necessitated intensification of security cooperation to counter security challenges on the one hand, and to protect natural resources on the other,” he added. “The process of strengthening marine capabilities and their numbers under the Gulf command is unlimited and is contingent to the level of external threat to Gulf maritime security,” he elaborated.3 This step has been an important development. The Arabian Gulf countries had previously cooperated militarily during the ‘tanker war’, and the war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991. This means that they have cumulative experiences in the area of countering threats to regional security in general, and maritime security in particular. The success of the Gulf counties in developing self-defense capabilities is necessary to achieve balance of power, which is a key requirement for regional security.

5.2.1.2

The GCC Unified Maritime Operations Center for the Gulf Countries

In March 2016, the building of the GCC Unified Maritime Operations Center was inaugurated in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The idea of this center dates back to a proposal submitted by the Kingdom of Bahrain to the 30th session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Kuwait in 2009. This proposal went through several stages. In November 2010, Ministers of Defense agreed to set up the Joint Maritime Coordination Center, and agreed that it be based in the Kingdom of Bahrain. In 2014, the 35th Summit of leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council decided 2

Gulf, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the. 2014. The Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Fifth Session. 9 December. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.gcc-sg.org/ar. 3 Al-Suhaimi, Reem Al-Maia and Obaid. 2014. Formation of a joint Gulf maritime force to counter external threats. 16 October. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/202376.

84

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

that the Joint Maritime Coordination Center be transformed into the Unified Maritime Operations Center. It was set up according to the highest and advanced administrative standards and systems. This involved equipping the center with advanced equipment, installation and operation of an encrypted network and linking it to the secured military communications network of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to enable the center to link with the operations center.4 The Unified Maritime Operations Center is the mechanism of cooperation among the Arabian Gulf countries in countering maritime security threats, namely maritime piracy, armed robbery, smuggling, illegal immigration and operations that threaten international navigation, maritime pollution and rescue operations. The center also coordinates with international bodies and organizations concerned with safety of maritime navigation, including Singapore Maritime Security Center, the Maritime Emergency and Piracy Center in Malaysia, the International Maritime Organization and the forces of the Maritime Coalition in the Arabian Gulf region.5

5.2.1.3

The Collective Gulf Cooperation in Maritime Security

Despite dependence by the Gulf countries on major countries for armaments in general, including the naval armaments, it has been noticed that they had begun an attempt to cooperate in the production and development of naval equipment. This included, for example, the project of manufacturing ships and landing boats concluded between the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, represented by the Naval Force, and Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company, under a contract between the two countries, signed on November 30, 2015. The manufacturing of the ships for the State of Kuwait by the UAE Company was completed on April 5, 2018. These ships were equipped with the latest devices, equipment and modern marine technology, enabling them to carry out tasks and duties assigned to them with high efficiency.6 The Arabian Gulf countries have also paid attention to naval drills, whether among themselves or in partnership with regional and international powers. The most important of such drills was the US-led anti-mine drill that took place from 4 through 26 April 2016, with participation by more than 30 countries from six continents. Such drill took place between the Suez Canal, the Arabian Gulf and Bab al-Mandab. It was considered an opportunity to build capabilities and test the latest technologies available to ensure the security of global waterways. According to statements by one of the trainers in this drill to Bahraini newspapers, three things distinguished it. First, it was the first time to test modern devices to detect mines and modern explosives, 4

Newspaper, AkhbarAl-khaleej. 2016. The importance of inaugurating the headquarters of the GCC Unified Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain. 10 March. Accessed April 25, 2022. http://www. akhbar-alkhaleej.com/13866/article/10720.htm. 5 Newspaper, Al-Ayam. 2013. A media report by the Joint Maritime Coordination Center. 4 December. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.alayam.com/online/local/88220/News.htm. 6 Newspaper, Kuwait’s Al-Anbaa. 2018. Chief of the General Staff of the Army Lieutenant-General Mohamed Al-Khidr: The ships and boats project is a qualitative addition to the Navy. 5 April. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/official/823697/05-04-2018.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level

85

some of which have a range of up to 300 m deep in water. This involved underwater boats equipped with sonar devices. Second, this drill involved training in first aid at sea, and involved American forces’ being subject to accidents that required providing them with such first aid, quick surgeries, and transporting them to the nearest country. It was a drill for dealing with all scenarios that could occur during sailing and how to make decisions regarding them. Third, the rules used in maritime coordination during the drill have taken the approach followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its basis. This means consolidating the ability to work together, which is the most important challenge for countering maritime security threats.7 The incidents of targeting tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman also increased the interest of the Gulf naval forces to work in international waters and to cooperate with all international efforts to safeguard maritime security. This is confirmed by three indicators: First, on the nineteenth of May 2019, The US Fifth Fleet announced, in a statement, that the GCC countries “have started intensive security patrols in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf, and that the GCC countries are increasing communications and coordination with each other to strengthen regional maritime cooperation and maritime security operations in the Arabian Gulf”.8 This was about six days after four ships (Two Saudi oil tankers, a Norwegian oil tanker and an UAE cargo ship) were exposed to damages due to sabotage operations off the Emirate of Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz. Second, reactions of the Gulf countries—after the attack against the oil tanker Mercer Street on August 10, 2021, by a drone off the coast of Oman, which led to killing two of its sailors, a Briton and a Romanian—included readiness to support international efforts to safeguard maritime navigation and starting practical measures in this respect. In a session by the UN Security Council on August 6, 2021, to discuss that attack, the United Arab Emirates submitted a statement, declaring its commitment to regional and international efforts to counter threats to navigation, the marine environment and global trade. The statement also underlined the pivotal role that maritime transport plays in the global economy, and those effects of these maritime attacks go beyond borders of the region, as one-third of the world’s energy resources are transported by ships through the Strait of Hormuz. The statement stressed that it is in the interest of all UN member states to work to counter threats to maritime shipping routes, and that maritime security and environmental sustainability are two sides of the same coin. The statement recommended strengthening cooperation and coordination mechanisms with the International Maritime Organization to secure better protection, prevent and deter

7

Safi, Tammam Abu. 2016. Al-Ayam newspaper watches the largest naval drill in the world. Military commanders: Terrorism, piracy and narcotics are the most prominent challenges to maritime security. 14 April. Accessed April 25, 2022. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/first/572660/News. html. 8 Website, Reuters. 2021. The US Fifth Fleet: The Gulf Cooperation Council countries begin intensive naval patrols. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-patrols-ea2-idARAKCN1SP0IO.

86

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

attacks in the strategic and important shipping routes, to keep them open to international navigation. The statement urged member states to support freedom of navigation as it is one of the main basic principles of international law, and to work to build confidence and initiate ways of communication at sea to avoid miscalculation. The importance of increased reporting by the United Nations Secretary-General on maritime security risks was also underlined in the statement.9 As for Kuwait’s Cabinet, it issued a statement on the eleventh of August, “Expressing concern about the serious consequences of threatening the security and safety of maritime navigation in the waters leading to the Arabian Gulf and the areas surrounding the Sea of Oman and the Arabian Sea”. The statement also underlined “Kuwait’s supports for the statement of the UN Security Council on maritime security, and the importance of absolute commitment to all relevant international covenants, including the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”. The Cabinet also stated that “Kuwait looks forward to cooperating with the international community to achieve the security and safety of navigation routes and the continuation of the flow of global trade”.10 Third, some countries have started practical measures to protect maritime navigation in the Gulf of Oman. On August 4, 2021, the Sultanate of Oman announced the deployment of several ships to help secure international waters in the region. According to the Omani Maritime Security Center, the Sultanate is committed to contributing threats to securing maritime navigation with security centers in the region. This was after the British Maritime Security Agency’s announcing that the tanker Asphalt Princess was hijacked, and that the hijackers released it off the coast of the United Arab Emirates after boarding it. It was not clear who was responsible for the attack, which came five days after an attack targeting an oil tanker off the coast of Oman.11 The Royal Saudi Naval Forces also engaged in the joint exercise, Indian Ocean, with the Indian Navy. It was the first of its kind and aimed at safeguarding maritime security. Such exercise could establish a new military partnership with India to exchange maritime expertise between the two countries, develop the process of command, control, communications, and standardizing procedures and concepts of joint military action. In this context, Ajayi Koshar, commander of the Indian Navy,

9

Newspaper, Al-Ittihad. 2021. The UAE renews its commitment to protecting regional and global maritime security. 11 August. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://www.alittihad.ae/news. 10 Agency, Kuna News. 2021. The Kuwaiti Cabinet expresses deep concern over the serious consequences of threatening the security and safety of maritime navigation in the waters leading to the Arabian Gulf and the areas surrounding the Sea of Oman. 11 August. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2993015&language=ar#. 11 Newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 2021. The Omani Navy operates ships to contribute to securing international waters in the region. 4 August. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/art icle/3125636.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level

87

said, “There are many common challenges, and we are working with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect the safety of the seas and reduce risks of piracy”.12

5.2.2 At the Level of Separate Arabian Gulf Countries It has been noticed that mechanisms used separately by each Gulf country to counter threats to maritime security involved development of its armament capabilities in the area of maritime security. This has increased in pace during the past three years (2019–2021), with maritime security becoming a priority within the armament capabilities of each Gulf country, as reviewed in the following:

5.2.2.1

State of Kuwait

Speaking to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa on February 23, 2021, Rear Admiral Hazza Mutlaq Al-Alati, Commander of the Naval Force in the State of Kuwait, said that there is interest in developing the Kuwaiti Naval forces, which possesses strike missile boats, coastal patrol boats, many landing ships and marine survey vessels. He underlined also the interest in continuing training on combating mines, by exercises with a number of countries at the regional and global levels, in addition to training on some expected scenarios in the territorial waters. He added that the training of the naval force is divided into three sections. The first section is individual training where the individual is trained on the device or equipment he will use. The second section is collective training, where the ship’s crew is fully trained on the tasks to be carries out. The third section is joint training, in which the ship’s crew is trained with the various ranks of the Kuwaiti army’s forces.13

12

Hilal, Iman Al-Khattab and Muhammad. 2021. The Commander of the Indian Navy to Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper: We are working with Saudi Arabia to protect the safety of the seas. 11 August. Accessed April 26. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3125636/. 13 Al-Ajami, Abdul Hadi. 2021. The commander of the Naval Force said that its main tasks are to protect the sea transport routes and the navigation route of all Kuwaiti oil tankers. 23 February. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3114841/%D8%A7%D9% 84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8F% D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%91%D8% B1-%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3% D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%85%D9% 8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84% D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9% 86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9.

88

5.2.2.2

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

The United Arab Emirates

On the fifty-third anniversary of founding the UAE Naval forces, the Emirati newspapers published a report on the modernization witnessed by such forces. The report stated that these forces were provided with boats, sea planes and highly efficient armament systems, including the Shojaa boat of the Vital Facilities and Coasts Protection Authority, which was manufactured by the national company, Al-Bawadi Damen, with a length of 50 m and a speed of 22 nautical knots. The other equipment in this respect included Al Saadiyat multi-task ship, which is manufactured by the UAE Al Fattannational Corporation, and has a length of 71 m and a width of 14 m, and Al Hiliboat, which is a national product that has a length of 72 m. Regarding Hamim boat, it is a product of cooperation between Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company and one of the world’s most reputable companies in the area of military shipbuilding. In addition, simulations of underwater war exercises were carried out by means of setting up a center for this purpose in Al Taweelah area. There is also the Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum Naval College, which seeks to prepare and qualify national staff for work in the maritime area.14

5.2.2.3

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has attached great importance to modernizing its naval capabilities. In this respect, the Saudi Military Industries Company concluded a contract worth 900 million Euros, for a period of five years from 2019 to 2023, with the Spanish company Sami Navita Maritime Industries, to build five ships for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces. This project creates about 6000 Jobs and transfer about 60% of its technical capabilities into Saudi Arabia. This is in line with the2030Saudi Vision. These ships are multi-task ones and are specially designed for maritime surveillance, control, search and rescue, and provision of support to other ships.15 On its part, the Royal Saudi Naval Forces signed an agreement with the French company CMN to manufacture 39 speed boats, equipped with latest military technologies in the areas of attack and interception, and of the fastest boats in the world. The first and second boats were delivered to the kingdom on July 24, 2019 and the third boat was delivered on January 23, 2020. The agreement states that part of these boats will be manufactured in the Kingdom and the other part in France.16 On December 24, 2020, the Saudi Naval Forces announced that modern combat helicopters joined it. They are helicopters that have the most modern technologies 14

Newspaper, The UAE Al-Kaleej. 2021. On its 53rd founding anniversary: Our naval forces are witnessing rapid development. 2 May. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://www.alkhaleej.ae/202105-02. 15 Newspaper, Al-sharq Al-Awsat. 2019. A Saudi-Spanish project to build warships. 3 October. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1929266/. 16 Al-Suhaimi, Obaid. 2020. Saudi Arabia enhances security in the Arabian Gulf with the fastest combat boats and aircraft. 25 January. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/ 2096976.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level

89

and systems for combat against surface and subsurface targets, and are considered the most advanced in the world, according to their manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft, owned by the American company Lockheed Martin.17

5.2.2.4

The Kingdom of Bahrain

The Bahraini government announced the delivery of three new guard boats to the Coast Guard in October 2019, as part of 6 boats worth $30 million. This amount was paid by the US government within the State Department program to build capabilities of partner countries. Such boats have the latest technologies for operating at sea.18 In February 2021, Field Marshal Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force, announced that eight new ships, namely, Al Zubarah, Al Areen, Mashhour, Al Dibel, Askar, Jaw, Al Hidd, and Teghailb, joined the Royal Bahrain Naval Force. During the celebration to mark this event, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force said, “The Royal Bahraini Naval Force, thanks to directives of King Hamad bin Isa, has become a naval force based on the latest military foundations, methods and systems, and is equipped with various weapons, equipment and advanced systems, and now has the ability to defend the homeland and secure the necessary protection for all its islands, lands and territorial waters.19 It is worth noting that the Bahraini Shura Council discussed, in its session on February 20, 2021, articles of Decree No. 8 of 1993 regarding the territorial sea of Bahrain and the adjacent area. All members agreed to define the phrase ‘Bahraini waters’ mentioned in Article Two of the draft law, regarding which no definition had been previously made. Bahraini waters were defined as “the internal waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf”. The goal was to remove any ambiguity in the concept of Bahraini waters.20 The Kingdom of Bahrain has been also keen to use modern technologies to secure maritime borders. During the joint naval exercise of the Bahraini Coast Guard Command, which was conducted in December 2020, Lieutenant-General Sheikh 17

Newspaper, Al-sharqAlawsat. 2020. The Saudi Navy enhances its capabilities with combat helicopters. 24 December. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2700376/%C2% AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%C2%BB-%D8% A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9% D8%B2%D8%B2-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-% D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8% AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9. 18 Newspaper, Bahrain’s Al-Watan. 2021. The Coast Guard receives 3 new US guard boats. 8 October. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://alwatannews.net/article/849078/Bahrain. 19 Newspaper, Akhbaar Al-Khaleej. 2021. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force inaugurates the Al Zubara ship and a number of ships of the Royal Bahraini Naval Force. 9 February. Accessed April 26, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1237478. 20 Newspaper, Akhbar Al-Khaleej. 2021. Adding the definition of the ‘Bahraini waters’ to the Maritime Law. 29 August. Accessed April 26, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/art icle/1239059.

90

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

Abdullah bin Rashid Al Khalifa, the Bahraini Minister of Interior, said, “We are in an exceptional situation that requires strengthening self-power and using modern technologies, to secure the maritime borders and build an integrated system to secure the coasts and seas”.21 In addition, there have been the attention paid by Bahrain Defense Force to organizing training courses to increase competence of officers working in maritime security, including the first English language course and the radar operators’ course in the Maritime Training Wing, with participation by a number of Coast Guard Command officers. Such courses were organized on September 12, 2021 under the auspices of Rear Admiral Alaa Abdullah Siyadi, the then Commander of the Coast Guard. During the opening of the works of these two courses, Brigadier General Muhammad Jassim Al Ghatam, Deputy Commander of the Coast Guard, noted that goals of the courses come within the approved qualification path for officers to raise their competence. The English language course was held for four weeks in cooperation with the Royal Police Academy. It included training on basic skills in the English language. As for the radar operators’ course, it also was for four weeks and was divided into two phases. The first was a theoretical two-week period, and included the basic and advanced principles of the radar system and the security fence system. The practical phase was for two weeks and included practical application of the security fence system at the Center of Naval Operations.22 The Kingdom of Bahrain has also granted great attention to the issue of maritime security at the academic level. The Royal Police Academy, in cooperation with the Coast Guard Command, announced initiation of an applied diploma in naval sciences for students in the Academy’s graduate program for the academic year 2021, to raise awareness of naval sciences, including maritime security threats.23

5.2.2.5

Qatar

Qatar has a naval force of 3,000 people, and there are plans to increase them to 7,000 people by 2025. The country has concluded several deals that have had an impact in achieving qualitative progress in armaments, especially naval armaments. It is expected that Qatar will be the first Gulf country to operate naval submarines and an aircraft carrier. The Qatari Navy is scheduled to purchase, by means of a deal with the Italian defense company, Fincantieri, warships and advanced submarines at a value of five billion euros. The deal involves also establishing a naval base. Under 21

Akhbar Al-Khaleej website. 2020. The Minister of Interior watches the conclusion of the joint naval exercise of the Coast Guard Command. December 31. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/ news/article/123244. 22 Agency, Bahrain News. 2021. Opening of the English language and radar operators’ courses for Coast Guard Command officers. 12 September. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://www.bna.bh/.asp x?cms. 23 Newspaper, Al-Ayam. 2021. Continuation of the partnership between the Coast Guard Command and the Royal Police Academy to initiate the “Applied Diploma Program for Naval Sciences. 10 January. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/local/888404/News.html.

5.2 The Gulf Collective and Separate State Level

91

that deal, Qatar will get a large helicopter carrier, four warships, an amphibious ship, and two support vessels, in addition to support and maintenance services for 15 years after delivery. This last clause means that the Qatari Navy will have the opportunity to make up the technology gap between current operational capabilities and advanced future deals for a period of 15 years. Qatar also purchased a number of fast interceptor boats from the Turkish company YungaUnic, with a value of 41 million euros. In December 2017, the Qatari Coast Guard received the 11th ship out of 17 Turkish-made ships that Qatar purchased in 2014. The Qatari Navy will also obtain a number of fast-storming boats, including armaments, from the English Zodiac company, at a value of $20 million. The Qatari Navy has also signed an agreement with the German defense company, Rheinmetall, under which it will get protection equipment for the vital infrastructure of various facilities, and military and economic sites in the country. Such equipment include integrated security and control systems. In addition, an agreement with the British company, Kinetic, will provide the Qatari Emiri Navy with advice on the best strategies and practices in the oceans and other activities. In 2019, Qatar also opened a naval base specialized in border security and guarding ports and oil installations. Al Daayen base is located in the center of the eastern coast of Qatar, about 30 km north of Doha, opposite Iran which is about 230 km away from Qatar. The base’s area is about 639,800 m2 , and it includes a port with a depth of 6 m. Qatar is also working in partnership with Turkey to establish a second naval base in the north of the country. It will be dedicated to naval special operations, and will include a training and preparation center for patrols and training naval operation.24

5.2.2.6

Sultanate of Oman

The total of the Omani naval forces exceeds 10,000 personnel, and the Omani coast is 3,165 km long. The country has many naval bases along the coasts, the most important, largest and most famous of which is the Saeed bin Sultan Naval Base. The Sultanate of Oman attaches great importance to modernization of the naval forces. In April 2012, Oman signed the contract of Orchid project; to build the second Shabab Oman ship, which was officially launched in the Netherlands, on April 8, 2014. There has been also the Sea of Oman project; to build two ships for defensive support, rapid deployment of forces, transporting supplies and carrying out search and rescue operations. In March 2015, the Omani Navy received the ships Shinas and Al-Seeb from Singapore, to be included in the Ofuk (Horizon) project. In September 2016, it was announced that the ship Al-Nasser had been received, as the last marine pieces within the Sea of Oman project, which the Sultanate, represented by the Ministry of Defense, 24

Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper. 2021. The Qatari Navy… a rising power over the Gulf waters. 10 May. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://thenewkhalij.news/article/191409.

92

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

signed with the Australian company, Austal, to build the two ships, Al Mubashir and Al Nasser, for support and rapid transport. The Sultanate of Oman is also keen to strengthen its naval forces by signing international agreements, the latest of which was the signing of a military agreement with Pakistan on October 20, 2020. The Sultanate also signed a joint defense agreement with the United Kingdom in February 2019. This agreement allows the United Kingdom to maintain its presence in the region. This agreement also builds on the United Kingdom’s commitment to freedom of navigation and economic stability in the Gulf region, and to the security of the region. It is worth noting that the UK opened the joint logistic support base in the port of Duqm in 2018, and is committed to modernizing the port, as part of its defense commitment to the region.25

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats to Maritime Security at the Regional Level 5.3.1 Role of Djibouti Code of Conduct in Countering Maritime Security Threats To begin with, the code of conduct is defined as a non-binding agreement between a group of countries to counter a threat. This mechanism has been used by many countries in general, and in maritime conflicts in particular. This includes the agreement between China and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on June 7, 2021, on the importance of agreeing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea by means of a second review of a draft code of conduct.26 Within previous maritime security efforts, the international Maritime Organization held a meeting in Djibouti during the period from January 26–29, 2009. This was after increased threats to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa, including the hijacking of the Saudi oil tanker, Sirius Star, of the Saudi Aramco company in November 2008, and releasing it after two months of negotiations and payment of three million dollars. Delegations from 17 countries, Ethiopia, Jordan, Comoros, Tanzania, South Africa, Djibouti, Sudan, Seychelles, Somalia, Sultanate of Oman, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Egypt. Maldives, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, participated in the event. The observers who participated in the meeting, which aimed to help counter piracy and armed robbery in the western region of Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, were from several countries at the regional and global levels, including Iran, India and the United States, and representatives of the United Nations, its bodies and programs. Other observers were from a number of regional and international 25

Website, Al-Khaleej Online. 2021. The Royal Navy of Oman…a trained force reinforced by military agreements. 25 October. Accessed April 26, 2022. https://alkhaleejonline.net. 26 Agency, The Chinese News. 2021. China and ASEAN countries seek early agreement on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 7 June. Accessed April 26, 2022. http://arabic.news.cn/ 2021-06/07/c_139994314.htm.

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats …

93

organizations concerned with maritime security in the Horn of Africa, in addition to observers from NGOs. Djibouti Code of Conduct comprised 17 articles, on definitions of piracy, the purpose of that code of conduct and the framework of enforcing it, and measures that must be taken by countries for cooperation to protect ships, suppress piracy and armed robbery, and to protect sailing officials. Articles of the Code of Conduct addresses also coordination and sharing information, incident reporting, and mutual assistance between participants. Other issues addressed are related to national legislation, consultations and how to claim damages. Djibouti Code of Conduct was signed by nine countries and signatory countries increased at the 2017 Jeddah meeting to 21 countries, as Eritrea, Mozambique, Mauritius, and the United Arab Emirates joined the Code of Conduct at that time. According to minutes of the first founding meeting, Djibouti Code of Conduct is based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines the legal framework that applies to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. It is based also on Resolution of the International Maritime Organization Number (25) 1002A of November 27, 2007, regarding piracy and armed robbery targeting ships off the coast of Somalia. Such resolution called upon governments of the region to conclude, as soon as possible and in cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, a regional agreement aimed at preventing piracy and armed robbery. The code of conduct is based also on Resolution 63/111 of United Nations General Assembly, adopted on 5 December 2008, on oceans and the law of the sea, which called for regional and international cooperation to combat dangers to maritime security, and the importance of prompt reporting of accidents for it to be possible to conduct assessment of these dangers and urging countries to cooperate with the UN to combat Piracy. Djibouti Code of Conduct is based as well on the 2008 resolutions of the UN Security Council on combating piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, namely resolutions Number 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851.27 The Charter of the Djibouti Code of Conduct affirms that national legislation is the basis for ensuring effective protection of the marine environment. The charter also urges signatory states to cooperate effectively in combating transnational organized crime, including terrorism in the maritime areas, and to adopt security policies to protect maritime trade from illegal activities, ensure the safe operation of port facilities and to stop illegal maritime activities, including illegal fishing. The Code’s charter also calls upon member states to develop a national strategy to modernize the maritime sector and the sustainable ‘blue economy’ as a source of national income on the one hand, and to achieve regional stability on the other. Member states are also urged to enhance training in managing the maritime environment, and to enhance effectiveness in prosecuting persons involved in piracy and armed robbery against ships on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. Djibouti Code of Conduct is considered a regional maritime security cooperation agreement introduced by the International Maritime Organization 27

N.d. Undated minutes of the meeting of Djibouti Code of Conduct. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/DCoC%20Arabic.pdf.

94

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

and focused primarily on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the western region of Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea region. The signatories agreed to cooperate in stopping and seizing suspicious ships as well as contributing to joint operations with navies of countries outside the region and seek to enhance implementation of relevant aspects of the UN Security Council resolutions on piracy off the coast of Somalia, taking into account United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/111 on transnational organized crime at sea, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, and threats to maritime safety and security.28 Since 2009 and until 2017, the countries that signed the Djibouti Code of Conduct have been able to cooperate with each other in countering piracy in this region, but Somali pirates have resorted to other crimes that can be regarded as transnational organized crimes, including arms and migrants smuggling, and drug and human trafficking, illegal fishing and polluting the sea environment and theft of oil. This prompted the International Maritime Organization, in cooperation with the countries that are party to the Djibouti Code of conduct, to expand the functional framework of that code to include combating transnational organized crimes. This was achieved in a conference held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on January 12, 2017, based on mechanisms of action in the 2009 code. These mechanisms include information exchange centers in Sana’a, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and the national coordination bodies in the countries that are parties to that code, the Maritime Training Center in Djibouti and a liaison unit at the headquarters of the International Maritime Organization in the UK. Under this development, Ships subject to threats shall inform any of the information exchange centers in the closest geographical point to that area.29 During this conference, Lieutenant-General Awad bin Eid Al-Balawi, Director-General of the Saudi Arabian Border Guards, warned about “The impact of terrorist organizations, armed militias, and the security and political conditions witnessed by some countries in the region on maritime security and the threat to the safety of international transportation and navigation.” He underlined the role played by Saudi Arabia in combating piracy and armed robbery in the western region of Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and called for “initiation of a legal framework for combating maritime crimes, smuggling of weapons, explosives and narcotics, and illegal fishing”.30 What is reviewed above means that the cooperation framework between Djibouti Code member states was based on two mechanisms. The first mechanism is military and naval cooperation within common frameworks, as well as intelligence cooperation on countering piracy. The Code provided for the possibility of cooperation with countries outside the Red Sea region, and approved the establishment of a number of communication and information sharing platforms in Sana’a, Mombasa, Kenya, 28

Mazhar, Mamoon. 2020. India joins the Jeddah Amendment. 18 September. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://newsonair.com/arabic/2020/09/18/. 29 Al-Zahab, Ali. 2018. Djibouti Code of Conduct… Security necessities and conflicts of interest. 18 January. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/. 30 Newspaper, Al-Watan. 2017. 19 countries discuss maritime crimes at the Djibouti Code of Conduct Conference in Jeddah. 10 January. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://www.almowaten. net/2017/01.

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats …

95

and Dar Al-Salam in Tanzania. The second mechanism is relief efforts for those who have already been exposed to piracy operations, including rescuing ships, people and property subject to piracy and providing health care for these individuals, as well as protecting fishermen and returning those who were robbed by pirates to their original places. Given the increase in threat rates and development of organized crimes, and according to the Jeddah meeting of January 2017 that was mentioned above, it was agreed to expand the framework of the Code’s work to extend to transnational organized crimes across the seas. In this respect, a maritime training center was added in Djibouti and a liaison unit with the International Maritime Organization in the UK. This is in addition to the procedures that were agreed upon before, regarding the necessity of having national contact bodies with each member state of the Code.31 It is noticed that the countries concerned with maritime security near Bab alMandab interacted with the need to enforce the mechanism of Djibouti Code of Conduct. In this respect, Bassam Solaiman, Undersecretary of the Yemeni Ministry of Transport, called for including Bab al-Mandab in protection within the Djibouti Code of Conduct. This was during a conference organized in January 2017 by Naif Academy for Security Sciences in Saudi Arabia, to discuss maritime security threats, in which the Djibouti Code of Conduct member states and the International Maritime Organization participated. He also called upon member states to support and expand the activity of the Code, and added that Yemen is one of the first signatories to the code, underlining Yemen’s attempt to include smuggling and illegal immigration within the powers and goals of the Code, given the current conditions in Yemen involving smuggling weapons to the Houthis. He noted also to “dangers of terrorist organizations and armed militias, in light of the security and political conditions experienced by some countries in the region, which affect maritime security and threaten the safety of sea transportation and navigation”. He noted also to “the role of the Djibouti Code of Conduct in combating piracy and armed robbery in the western region of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and the importance of a legal framework to combat maritime crimes, smuggling of weapons, explosives, narcotics and illegal fishing”.32 Despite the importance of Djibouti Code of Conduct as a mechanism to counter threats to maritime security, as its member states includes countries that maritime security threats represent a huge challenge to each of them, it has several drawbacks that can be realized in the following points: 1. There is no criterion that can be relied upon in the definition of signatory parties to this code. Is it a geographical or interest-based standard? The parties of the code include ones from outside the region. 2. Long time passed between the initiation of the Code and amending it (between 2009 and 2017), though threats to maritime security off the Horn of Africa in general were drastically intensifying. This might be due to the differing views of 31

Al-Taweel, Amani. 2021. The transformations of the Horn of Africa. 15 July. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://idsc.gov.eg/DocumentLibrary/View/4831. 32 Al-Juhani, Ali Al-Harbi and Rayan. 2017. The Djibouti Code of Conduct stops arms smuggling to the Houthis. 11 January. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/328515.

96

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

parties of the Code regarding its significance for countering threats to maritime security. 3. Another shortcoming in Djibouti Code of Conduct is its non-binding nature, as its provisions are like customary rules and not binding under international law. 4. Egyptian objections at the beginning of formulation of the code was justified. Such objections were reviewed by Ambassador Wajih Hanafi, the Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister for Legal Affairs and Treaties, who headed the Egyptian delegation in negotiations of drafting the code. These objections include the following: A. The memorandum of understanding defining the legal framework for combating piracy, drawn up by the International Maritime Organization and discussed in Dar es Salaam, Sana’a and Muscat, was not subjected to sufficient discussion. B. The Egyptian delegation demanded that the legal basis for the Djibouti Code of Conduct be the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This demand was approved because there were attempts to confuse the phenomenon of piracy with other phenomena such as combating terrorism. C. Egypt demanded that the Red Sea be away from any arrangements related to combating piracy, because it was free from this phenomenon. This demand was made because there were attempts to include the Red Sea under the Code. D. There were a proposal by the Egyptian delegation to name the memorandum a code of conduct, given that it does not amount to binding agreements, and to reconsider the matter and sign a binding agreement after two years. 5. The Egyptian delegation insisted on discussing how to track pirates, because there were attempts by some major countries to include many details that could allow them some loopholes to enter the territorial waters of some countries without permission.33 In addition to the importance of Djibouti Code as a regional mechanism for countering maritime security threats, the geographical location of Djibouti and its distinguished relations with the Arabian Gulf countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is another dimension that supports the work of this Code. Djibouti enjoys a unique geographical location on the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab alMandab, making it a pivotal country in the efforts to safeguard security and stability in that region in general, in coordination with regional and global powers. Djibouti’s hosting of a number of military bases for regional and international powers also contributes to combating maritime piracy and protecting international navigation. Within this context, relations of the Arabian Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, with Djibouti, are distinguished. Such relations are not limited to the multiplicity of its fields at the present time, but rather extends to before the independence of Djibouti. 33

Newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm. 2009. Egypt studies the memorandum of the International Maritime Organization on combating Somali piracy before signing it. 6 February. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/8502.

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats …

97

Djibouti’s stances towards regional security issues have had an impact on strengthening these relations to a greater degree. Such stances include Djibouti’s position in support of the Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen. Djibouti is also a member of the Islamic Military Coalition to Fight Terrorism, which was established on December 15, 2015 under the leadership of the Saudi Arabia. The country also severed diplomatic relations with Iran after the latter attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad. The strategic importance of Djibouti has increased after the country modernized a number of important sea ports. It has three ports, one for containers, the second for oil, and the third for multi-purposes. This makes Djibouti an important ally in efforts to combat maritime security threats and safeguard security of navigation in general in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.34 Defining security challenges in a clear way and taking interests of all countries into consideration is another dimension that ensure success of any regional security arrangements. In this respect, the Djibouti Code has taken this approach. Members states of the Code agreed, in Jeddah in 2017, to expand the framework of maritime crimes addressed by it. This means that there is a need to adopt a common set of principles or interests, and to prioritize coordination to avoid competing agendas and conflicting initiatives. Absence of a common definition or assessment of threats leads to divergence in stances and policies. In this regard, for example, a question on priorities was raised during formulating Yaoundé Code of Conduct in Central and West Africa. The problem that was facing the coastal states at that time was ways to counter the threat of piracy, and at the same time to preserve the local fisheries and livelihoods of the local population. In other words, the goal of safeguarding maritime security must be consistent with requirements of safeguarding national security of each state at the same time.35 Expanding the Code’s membership, even if at the level of observer status, is a third dimension that ensures more success, as this enhance its role in protecting maritime security. In this respect, India joined the Code as an observer. The country’s decision to join the Code cannot be separated from China’s efforts to expand its military influence in the Indian Ocean region. The Defense White Paper issued in China in 2015 changed the country’s approach from the defense of the near seas to the protection of the far seas. China has recognized the global strategic importance of the western areas of Indian Ocean and has strengthened the capability of its Djiboutian naval base to anchor an aircraft carrier, to be able to intervene militarily across the Indian Ocean. Therefore, India’s decision to join the Djibouti Code of Conduct as an observer provides the country with an opportunity to cooperate with the countries of the Middle East and East Africa in maritime security, while preserving its own interests. According to the 2009 Indian Naval Operations Principles, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea has become an area of primary importance for the Indian Navy and 34

Bakhrama, Dheyauddin Saeed. 2018. The role of Djibouti in protecting international security in the Red Sea. 5 June. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1290401. 35 Rahman, Hamdi Abdel. 2020. Differing Visions: The Red Sea alliance and revival of the Concept of Afro-Afro-Arabia. 12 January. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://futureuae.com/ar/Mainpage/ Item/5195/.

98

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

India pays great attention to developing its relations at the main entry points to the western region of Indian Ocean. This prompted India to have a regional presence in that region.36

5.3.2 The Council of the Arab and African Countries Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden The strategic importance of the Red Sea lies in it being an important sea route for export of energy from the Arabian Gulf countries to global consumers. The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf are a strategic extension of the sea routes linking Asia, Africa and Europe. This starts from the Arabian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, then the Indian Ocean, passing through the Gulf of Aden and then Bab al-Mandab Strait into the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and finally the Mediterranean Sea. The Arab coasts on the Red Sea reach 90.2% of its total coasts. The Red Sea has turned into a scene for regional and global rivalry, in addition to the crises witnessed by some countries bordering it, as well as threats to maritime navigation from terrorism and piracy. This is a threat to security of the Arabian Gulf countries, which possess 65% of the world’s oil reserves and about 40% of gas reserves. The Arabian Gulf countries also supply the European Union with 60% of its energy needs.37 The Red Sea is of great importance, not only because it contains natural resources, but because it is the most important international shipping route. Around 15–20 thousand commercial, tourist and military ships navigate through the Red Sea annually, and through it, 30% of the world’s oil needs are imported, as well as raw materials for the United States, European countries and the Western countries in general. Nonetheless, there is no comprehensive security system for the security of the Red Sea. Rather, policies of countries at the regional and global levels, towards that region involved either intense military presence or trade and investment exchanges, or interfering in crises in the geostrategic range of that region through supporting non-state groups to prolong these crises.38 The Yemeni crisis is one of the crises that reflected dangers of weakness of the countries bordering the Red Sea and its impact on the security of maritime navigation. There are many dangers that this crisis posed to maritime navigation, but the most important of them involved that the Houthi group randomly planted 205 sea mines in the Red Sea between 2015 and 2021, posing a threat to security of maritime navigation in that strategic region of the world.39 36

Mazhar, Mamoon. 2020. India joins the Jeddah Amendment. 18 September. Accessed April 27, 2022. https://newsonair.com/arabic/2020/09/189. 37 Diab, Khattar Abu. 2016. “Khattar Abu Diab. 2016. The Red Sea in the Gulf and Arab security equation.” The Red Arab Security and Defense Journal, September 37–38. 38 Al-Ghubari, Mohammed. 2020. “The imperative of establishing the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Al Siyassa Al Dawliya (International Politics) 201. 39 Newspaper, Asharq Alawsat. 2021. Destruction of a naval mine planted by the Houthis in the southern Red Sea. 24 May. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2990231.

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats …

99

In view of these and other dangers, Saudi Arabia, which has vital interests in the Red Sea, has called for the establishment of the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Council includes, along with Saudi Arabia, 7 other countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. The idea of setting up this Council goes back to a meeting by these countries in Riyadh in December 2018, in which an agreement was reached on the nature and goals of the council. On January 6, 2020, the charter for establishing the council was signed in Riyadh, which became the council’s headquarters. According to statements by Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, the council seeks—among its goals— to “Strengthen efforts to achieve security, political and investment interests, secure maritime navigation in this international waterway, and coordinate and consult on that vital route, which is of great importance to the entire global economy, given that the Red Sea is the main transport route for global trade between East Asian countries and Europe”.40 The timing of the establishment of the council has great importance, as it coincided with the increase in severity of threats to maritime navigation in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf region, in the absence of practical institutional regional mechanisms that include all the countries bordering the sea to counter them. There are also development plans and ambitious projects for some countries, including Saudi Arabia, and it is difficult to implement them in absence of security. For Saudi Arabia, the call for establishing this council, which goals include ensuring maritime security, came as a reflection of the Kingdom’s efforts to modernize its naval fleet by means of several programs during the past years. In this respect, the Kingdom’s ranking, according to the Index of Naval Forces produced by Global Firepower, is the fiftieth in the world. The Kingdom has also exerted efforts to modernize the logistics sector by directing huge investments to this sector, especially modernization of ports and economic zones in the Kingdom and abroad. This included the Kingdom’s participation in modernization of the oil city in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, with Saudi investments estimated at about $10 billion. This project would reduce the time it takes to transport Saudi oil to China to become 7 days instead of 40 days. There is also the NEOM project in the northwest of the Kingdom, which includes lands from both Egypt and Jordan with a total area of 26.5 thousand square kilometers. This area is located in an important strategic location on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. The first phase of the project is expected to be completed by 2025. It should be underlined also that Saudi Arabia is the country that has the longest coasts on the Red Sea and the owner of the largest number of islands in the sea. In 2019, there

40

Al-Zaid, Saleh. 2020. Establishment of a council of countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. 7 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2070156/%D8% AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9% 84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84% D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1-% D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%84%D9% 8A%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86.

100

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

were also oil and gas discoveries for Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Red Sea region. This means that there is a need to ensure maritime security in that region.41 The establishment of the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as an institutional entity can go beyond the geographical range of the Red Sea to be a new pillar of Arab and African national security, given the nature of its member states and goals. There can be complementarity between the work of this council and other regional organizations, for it to include vital areas related to joint development of maritime resources of the Red Sea, especially those related to the numerous tourism activities, and the natural resources sectors of many member states, in addition to industries that can be established. The council will also bring about a change in the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, which importance is due to the fact that it represents the intersection of continents of the ancient world as well as a crossroads of vital global roads. While this region has witnessed growing dangers that obstructed development opportunities, some regional and international powers, instead of cooperating to counter them, sought to fill that gap by supporting non-state groups in the countries bordering the Horn of Africa, as well as seeking to establish military bases. Therefore, the establishment of this council is a preemptive step that involves establishment of a political entity with strategic objectives for all its member states, which can develop in the future into a regional security entity. It is worth mentioning that there were attempts by countries from outside the Red Sea region to establish a similar entity. This has included talks on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meetings in September, 2018, on part of Germany. A proposed meeting on this respect did not take place due to a dispute over the identification of the participating parties, and the right of Western countries to participate in or call for such a meeting.42 The support received by the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden enhances its role towards maritime security. This includes the support of the African Union, by its high-level executive committee headed by Tabumbeki, which is concerned with reinforcing regional integration. The African Union has sought to unify African stances to create an equal and balanced environment among the actors in the council. This support was made also by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which established a working group aimed at conducting a series of talks with the council’s member states to develop a unified stance regarding priorities for action in the region. The IGAD issued a statement urging the African countries bordering the Red Sea to set common goals and develop a unified stance regarding priorities of action in the Red Sea.43 In fact, the establishment of this council has strategic goals, as most international powers have been convinced for more than a century and a half that the Red Sea is a natural extension of the Suez Canal, which is a waterway of global importance. 41

Arafa, Khadija. 2019. “The Saudi Initiative for the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Derasat, 28–29. 42 Halima, Salah. 2021. Goals and importance of the Council of the Countries bordering the Red Sea. 4 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://gate.ahram.org.eg/daily/News/203620/4/792355. 43 Khafaji, Rania Hussain. 2021. “Gulf Policy towards the Horn of Africa.” Derasat periodical. 127.

5.3 Mechanisms of the Gulf Countries to Counter Threats …

101

Although the areas around that strait witnessed many disturbances, the Canal was closed only twice; the first during the Suez crisis in 1956, and the second during the Six-Day War in 1967 after which the Suez Canal remained closed for six years. The Council also has security significance. While piracy rates in Bab al-Mandab Strait declined, because of international efforts and according to international reports, the state of instability in Yemen represents a real threat to freedom of navigation in light of reports confirming that the Houthis have planted mines along the Yemeni coast and used explosive boats and anti-ship missiles to attack ships, including the attack on a Saudi oil tanker in April 2018. It is worth noting also that successful maritime arrangements in other parts of the world have started on a smaller scale but have developed over time, in terms of membership or framework of action. This was with the development of trust among its member states, and framework of its action and identification of common challenges and mechanisms to counter them.44 The Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is important, not only to ensure maritime security but also regional security in that region. Nonetheless, the different political, economic and cultural systems of the countries bordering the Red Sea, whether from the countries of the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Gulf, North Africa and the Levant, represent a challenge to achieving greater coordination among them. This challenge is due to the traditional definitions of Africa and the Middle East, where the Red Sea was used as a dividing line between regions and countries instead of dealing with the sea as a unifying geographical feature for these regions. In addition to the economic imbalance, there is a significant imbalance in the sizes of the coastal countries bordering the Red Sea. In one side, there are oil-producing countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the other side includes countries with economies that face severe and long-term crises, such as Sudan. This imbalance leads to an imbalance of power among these countries, or between them and the major countries that seek to be present in Red Sea region. The region extending from Suez to Aden is characterized with existence of dominant regional powers as well as global powers. Consequently, the countries located on the African side of the Red Sea are often marginalized in most frameworks, with the exception of being sites for geopolitical investment or instability. These factors limit the effectiveness of some coastal states that are less dominant on the Red Sea in terms of maritime affairs. This is an impediment to any efforts aimed at achieving cooperation on the basis of equal opportunities. There is also a number of emerging dynamics in the Red Sea region that impede cooperation between the countries bordering this sea. These dynamics include internal developments in the countries of the Horn of Africa, expansion of Gulf rivalry to the Horn of Africa and the presence of other global powers in the Red Sea. Regarding threats to maritime navigation in this strategic region of the world, a recent guidance memorandum produced by the International Maritime Organization noted to some of these threats, the most important of which are anti-ship missiles, naval mines and waterborne explosive devices. The memorandum also warns that while military ships that are part of the 44

Rahman, Hamdi Abdel. 2020. Differing visions: The Red Sea alliance and revival of the concept of Afrabia. 12 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://futureuae.com/ar/Mainpage/Item/5195/.

102

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

military war efforts of Saudi Arabia are the likely target of these practices, the possibility of an error in determining the identity of the target and the resulting damage to the movement of commercial ships means that the maritime domain of the Red Sea is a complex geopolitical environment characterized with geographical weakness. Although there are several organizations that take upon themselves the task of protecting the Red Sea, they face challenges, including the lack of agreement among them when it comes to the Red Sea or maritime security, in addition to them being restricted by certain geographical borders. The establishment of maritime governance mechanisms in other similarly complex environments provides potential lessons for the Red Sea. Chief among these are the need to limit mistrust and rivalry, define clear areas of cooperation, especially with Russia and China looking to consolidate their presence in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region in particular. Another important point in this respect is the vision of the United States to this new rivalry situation and its impact on security of maritime navigation in that region, especially in light of emergence of regional mechanisms to counter maritime security threats.45 In spite of the challenges facing the work of the council, it will support efforts of the Gulf countries to achieve regional balance of power. There is an urgent need for five necessary steps to activate the work of this regional Council. The first is the need for the charter of council to be sufficiently flexible, whether for the work of this regional organization or the sovereign right of its member states, including the issue of withdrawal from the council. In this respect, withdrawal of the UK from the European Union did not lead to the collapse of that union. The second step is related to development of the council. Despite the importance of the charter on setting up the Council, this should not prevent member state from using and approving a strategic security concept every few years, similar to the strategic concepts issued by NATO. In addition, it should be allowed that new member states join the council as observers. Establishing a collective military mechanism for the council, along the lines of the African Union, should be allowed also. The third step involves the necessity to benefit from mechanisms of work of similar regional organizations, especially regarding their organizational structure, which ensures continued existence of these organizations. It is true that security remains a product of its regional environment, but there are specific rules that govern the work of regional security organizations in general. The fourth step is related to defining strategic goals and setting priorities for their achievement, but most importantly identifying resources and contributions by member states. The final step involves necessity of agreeing on sources of regional threats and defining clear mechanisms to counter them. The establishment of that Council absolutely came in the context of developments in regional security that led to continuing regional conflicts and the establishment of coalitions, some of which were characterized with the temporary nature for being linked to a specific mission. What is important is that the existence of a regional entity 45

Mahmood, Omar S. 2019. Competition, cooperation, and security in the Red Sea. 10 September. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/competition-cooperationand-security-in-the-red-sea.

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security

103

with a binding charter, a clear structure and a common will, marks the increase in the presence of the concept of regional security again within the approach to the current regional threats and the potential of countering them within a specific time frame, and this is the strategic goal of establishing regional security organizations in general.46 There is no doubt that similar experiences have examples with which the work of council can be developed, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security 5.4.1 The Naval Military Coalition for Maritime Security in the Gulf Given the increased threats to maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf in 2019, the United States announced the establishment of a naval military coalition to protect navigation in the Arabian Gulf region. Goals of this mission, called ‘Sentinel’, is to monitor navigation routes and waterways and protect commercial ships and oil tankers against any aggression. The area covered by the coalition’s operations extends from the Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman to Bab al-Mandab Strait. The start of the work of that coalition was announced from Bahrain on November 7, 2019 in a ceremony with the participation of the Deputy Central Command of the US Forces, the Bahraini Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Saudi Naval Forces. In addition to the United States, membership of the coalition includes six countries, namely the Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the UK, Australia and Albania. The idea of that alliance dates back to the ninth of July of the same year. At this time, General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the United States had sought to form that coalition. Bahrain joined the coalition in August of the same year, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined it in September of the same year. During the announcement of the start of the coalition’s work, Jim Malloy, commander of the Central Command of the US Naval Forces in the Middle East, said, “The goal is to work together to come up with a joint international naval response to attacks against ships”. He added that “The goal is purely defensive, and the operational structure is based on the principle of dealing with threats and not to threaten” and that “Ships will be used in patrols in sea waters”. He stressed that “There are no offensive plans within the work of the coalition except for the obligation to defend each other in case we are attacked”.47 46

Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2020. Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden: A new mechanism to counter regional security threat. 13 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. http:// www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1196674. 47 Al-Suhaim, Obaid. 2019. The international coalition begins protecting maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf. 8 November. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/198168 6/%D8.

104

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

Regional stances regarding that coalition varied, as the Iraqi government announced its refusal to join it. On the nineteenth of September 2019, the Iraqi government’s spokesman, Ahmed Al-Sahhaf, said, “Iraq refuses to join this coalition that complicates the political and security scene.” He added that “The vision of The Iraqi Foreign Ministry is summed up in the fact that the formation of any force to protect the waterways in the Gulf will make the region more complex, in addition to the fact that the escalation between the United States and Iran will take multiple paths, and Iraq is neutral regarding this escalation and looks for forward the need to maintain a safe, balanced and stable region”. He elaborated that “Iraq will not join any military axis to secure water navigation in the Gulf, because its security is the responsibility of the countries bordering it. Iraq looks at its interests and the calculations of the nature of the region and developments in the situation in it”.48 The Iranian stance involved warning by the Iranian First Vice President Ishaq Jehangirman that “The military coalition led by the United States and the UK, claiming to secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, will make the region unsafe”. He added that “The alliance to be established will increase the foreign military presence in the region; and this will lead to an increase in turmoil in it”. He elaborated that “resolving tensions in the region requires dialogue and not a military coalition”, and voiced his country’s complete rejection of the idea of establishing this coalition, and noted that “achieving security in the Strait of Hormuz is linked to ending the pressures put on Iran and entering into logical talks with it”.49 Despite the international efforts to establish this coalition, only 6 countries joined it. These efforts included the international conference hosted by Bahrain over two days, October 21–22 of the same year, in which 60 countries participated. It aimed to consult between the countries of the world to find ways to deter any threats to security and freedom of navigation in the Gulf region. However, it has been noticed that this conference was not directly concerned with the issue of maritime navigation. This is according to its title, which was “Promoting a future for peace and security in the Middle East: Meeting of the Working Group on Maritime and Air Navigation Security of the Warsaw Process”. What is meant the Warsaw Process a group of Arab and Western countries, in addition to Israel, which participated in a meeting in the Polish capital Warsaw in February of the same year, to discuss Iranian threats to regional security.50 Despite the importance of that coalition also, it has been noticed that the number of countries participating in it were limited. Although US officials communicated with their counterparts in 62 countries to urge them to participate in the coalition, only 6 countries joined it. Even, the meeting of the US Secretary of Defense with his counterparts in NATO in June of the same year did not bring about any firm 48

Website, Arabi 21. 2019. Iraq criticizes the marine navigation coalition and refuses to join it. 19 September. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://arabi21.com/story/1209042. 49 Website, Al-Khaleej Online. 2019. Iran announces its position to the establishment of a coalition to secure navigation in the Gulf. 23 July. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D8. 50 Website, France 24. 2019. Bahrain: an international conference with the participation of Israel to discuss Gulf security in light of the tension with Iran. 21 October. Accessed April 29, 2022. https:// www.france24.com/ar/20191021.

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security

105

commitments from NATO member states to participate in global efforts to secure international waterways. Despite the importance of what is reviewed above, the main question raised is how to divide responsibilities among the coalition’s member states. According to some sources and to the American plan, the United States takes command of large-scale maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations, with the provision of warships for command and control missions. In return, the other coalition member states provide the mission with ships to conduct patrols near the American command ships. The third part of the mission involves member states of the coalition safeguarding their country’s commercial ships and oil tankers carrying their flags across the region.51 The potential of success of this coalition in maintaining security of maritime navigation can depend on several elements, as reviewed below: 1. The United States is experienced in leading international coalitions in general, as it led three coalitions, namely, the International Coalition to Liberate the State of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion in 1991. Such coalition consisted of 34 countries, and the confrontation was the largest since World War II. The second was the International Coalition for the War against Terrorism in 2001. This involved putting several countries and organizations on the list of terrorism. This began with attacking Taliban movement in Afghanistan, with the participation of 13 countries under the title “Operation Enduring Freedom.” The third coalition was the International Coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, with the participation of a number of European and Arab countries. This participation involved various contributions, whether diplomatic, intelligence or combating recruitment and funding networks of the organization. The number of member states of this coalition reached 83 by 2021.52 2. The US maritime security strategies have become interested in security of navigation in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf. The US issued a strategy on this subject in 2007. In 2015, the US Department of the Navy announced issuing an updated version of this strategy making it entitling “A Collaborative Strategy for Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century”. It included four sections, namely description of the global security environment, partnership with different regions of the world, the role of the navy in supporting the US national security, and building naval forces in the future. The partnerships included in this strategy comprises the Middle East region, which strategic importance to the United States was underlined by the strategy. Therefore, The US Navy is seeking to increase its presence in that region to counter terrorist networks as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to deter potential adversaries from threatening energy transport in the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, by supporting capabilities of key partners, especially the Arabian Gulf countries.53

51

Newspaper, Al-Watan. 2019. The UAE joins the International Maritime Security Coalition. 19 September. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://alwatannews.net/article/846319/Gulf/. 52 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military Alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 53 Mabus, Ray. 2015. A Collaborative strategy for naval power in the Twenty-first Century. 1 March. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://docplayer.ae/116261617.

106

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

3. The naval forces of the Arabian Gulf countries have gained experiences, with the Gulf countries participating in the multinational naval forces led by the United States in the region, which consists of three joint task forces. They include Force 150, which undertakes counter-terrorism tasks in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman. The Second is Force 151, which is responsible for deterring and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea in the vast regions of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The third is Force 152 that undertakes maritime security tasks in broader theaters in the Gulf region. It has been noticed that the leadership of the joint task forces has always been confined to the Western military forces and international partners. However, from 2017 until writing this book, members of the Saudi Naval Forces, the Kuwaiti Coast Guard and some other Gulf countries have begun to command these forces. Commodore Steve Dinton, a Royal Navy officer and the Deputy Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain and Commander of the British Naval Component Command (UKMCC), commented on this in three points: First, he noted that the Gulf countries’ naval forces assuming the command position of international forces, including the Kuwaiti Coast Guard, means that safeguarding maritime security has become a priority for the Gulf countries. This is an important development because it reflects the relationship between the Navy, the Coast Guard and the international bodies that aim to implement maritime laws in a manner that reflects the obligatory aspect of maintaining maritime security. An incident that take place in the territorial waters of a state or even on the shore requires a strong link with the ministries of interior, the coast guard, police forces and customs authorities. Second, he said that in 2018, operations of the three joint forces continued for three months and were led by the naval forces of the Arabian Gulf countries. This means that the regional countries are currently more capable and ready to lead these tasks, and this is a real addition and gain for maritime security. Finally, Commodore Steve Dinton asserted that participation of the Gulf naval forces in commanding the international forces would improve their capabilities and develop advanced integration processes, as the main objective of establishing the three forces, after September 11, 2001 terrorist incidents, was to persevere in capacity-building and build operational harmony to reach the current level of cooperation. Naval officers of the Gulf countries have become able to approach maritime security from a regional perspective, and even have the desire to continue to develop this level of cooperation. This will be reflected at the same time on the work of the same regional forces to work together in bilateral and multinational deployments outside the structure of the international joint forces. Rear Admiral Mohammed Al-Zaatari, Commander of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard and Chief of Staff of the Force 152, commented on this matter in two points: First, he noted that regional maritime security has become a source of concern and a major challenge for governmental and non-governmental agencies, as there are many threats to maritime security, including weapons, drugs and human smuggling, all of which represent a threat to regional stability. Therefore, the Kuwaiti Coast Guard commanding of one of the joint forces gives it expertise that would contribute to enhancing the security and stability of the maritime

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security

107

environment. Second, he added that the Arabian Gulf is the backyard of the Gulf naval forces, and therefore guarding them is the responsibility of those forces, especially the Coast Guard, which has knowledge and awareness of the maritime environment and how to work in it. This would result in the development of capabilities necessary to counter maritime threats.54 4. The experience and capability of the US Fifth Fleet is itself a deterrent against Iranian threats to maritime security. In this context, Commander Joshua Frey, a spokesman for the Fifth Fleet, said that “The fleet is ready to counter any threats and is closely monitoring developments in the region and, in coordination with Bahrain, the host country of the fleet, has great defense capabilities”. He added that “The Fifth Fleet, as the naval component of the US Central Command, possesses a strong arsenal of military capabilities and works with regional allies and other allies and partners to support and enhance maritime security and ensure the free flow of trade”.55

5.4.2 European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz 2020 The importance of maritime security for the European Union The maintenance of maritime security in general is of great importance for European countries. This was reflected in the first Maritime Security Strategy of the European Union and its operational Action Plan, in 2014. This strategy is based on a comprehensive approach to global maritime security that brings together all relevant maritime sectors (maritime safety, protection of maritime environment, fisheries control, customs and border control, law enforcement, defense, research and development, etc.) and all relevant EU policies, strategies and tools in one strategic approach. This innovative approach promotes better civil-military cooperation and coordination between internal and external security actors such as police and defense. The goal of this joint approach to maritime security is to make the EU policy in this field more coherent, effective and cost-effective. It should be emphasized that maritime transport is the main route for the movement of EU exports and imports to and from all countries of the world. Ninety per cent of the EU’s external trade and forty per cent of its internal trade is transported by sea. Therefore, the security and safety of the sea is a strategic issue for the European Union. There are 23 coastal countries out of 27 countries, which are the total number of European Union countries. The EU member states collectively own more than 1,200 commercial ports; more than 8,100 ships carrying the European flag; 4,300 registered offshore companies; 764 54

Website, Defaa (Defense) journal. 2021. Integration at sea: The Gulf Cooperation Council navies give priority in the field of cooperation with the joint naval forces. 21 February. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://defence21.com/ar. 55 Newspaper, Akhbar Al Khalej. 2020. The Fifth Fleet is ready to counter any threat. 6 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1195951.

108

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

major ports and more than 3800 other ports. This means that the European Union has not only interests, but also responsibilities in the area of global maritime security. This explains also reasons of the effective contribution of the European Union to achieving the security of the seas and oceans in different parts of the world. The EU strategy in this respect is based on four guiding principles: (1) Adopting a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach; (2) Pursuing functional integrity (3) Ensuring maritime multilateralism through effective cooperation with partner states and organizations; (4) Respecting rules and principles. The European Union aims that its strategy be feasible, and in order to achieve this, its Action Plan, which was adopted by the European Council on December 16, 2014, has identified more than 130 measures to translate these contents into practical reality. This plan has five main pillars: (1) External action; (2) Maritime awareness, surveillance and information exchange; (3) Capacity development; (4) Risk management, protection of vital naval infrastructure, and crisis response (5) Research and innovation in the area of maritime security, education and training. The implementation mechanisms of this plan take into account four things. The first is not to add additional costs for countering maritime security threats. The second is the correlation between the two civil and military components within this countering. The third is continuous training on addressing maritime security crises. The fourth thing strengthening joint work with relevant international parties.56 What is reviewed above means that the European Union has a real interest in safeguarding maritime navigation in strategic waterways, including The Arabian Gulf region, in which the European Union has fundamental interests at the oil, economic and commercial levels. Goals of the European Mission to monitor navigation in Strait of Hormuz On January 31, 2020, France announced the start of a European naval mission to monitor the Strait of Hormuz. The goal of the mission, entitled European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, is ensuring freedom of navigation. According to the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, the frigate Courbet has begun to carry out patrols in the Strait of Hormuz, with a Dutch frigate following it within two weeks. Eight European countries, namely Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal announced political support to this mission, according to a statement issued by the French Foreign Ministry. According to the same statement, “these countries justified their decision to support the mission with lack of stability in an area essential to world peace, a matter that affects freedom of navigation and the security of ships, and affects as well trade exchanges and energy supplies, and has economic repercussions throughout the world”. The statement stated that the European maritime monitoring mission shall provide greater monitoring of maritime conditions through deployment of additional maritime monitoring means in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and by securing appropriate coordination

56

Union, European. 2021. The EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan. 20 October. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritimesecurity-information-toolkit_en.pdf.

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security

109

and mechanisms for sharing information between all parties in that region. The statement also stressed that this shall be within the framework of respect for international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the statement of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, four of these countries, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Portugal, shall provide operational support, while the other three countries shall support the European mission politically.57 Although the goal of the European mission is the same as that of the US-led military coalition, which is to secure maritime navigation, there is a difference between the nature of the work of the two mechanisms. The task of the European mission is monitoring navigation as a navigational observatory with which intelligence information about the movement of suspicious military convoys, ships and boats can be recorded. Unlike the military coalition, It is not similar to military forces that have combat or offensive characteristics. Perhaps this is due to the French policy in particular, and the European policy in general, which does not seek escalation with Iran, given that the vital interests of European countries include regional stability in the Arabian Gulf region. In addition, the Strait of Hormuz is a small water area. Therefore, any uncalculated escalation in that region could lead to confrontations whose results are unknown.58 In February 2021, Yusuf bin Alawi, the then Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, warned against this before the Munich Security Conference, saying, “There are a lot of warships in the Hormuz area, and our concern is that a mistake could occur, making the region the most dangerous flashpoint in the Gulf”.59 Despite the importance of the European Naval Mission to monitor the Strait of Hormuz, it has been noticed that it is not representative of the European Union itself as a regional organization. Instead, it is a French initiative with the support of some EU countries. In addition, while the Netherlands sent a naval frigate as a kind of practical support for the work of that mission, it is not clear what kind of support other European countries will provide for the work of the mission. This modest European support to the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf region is due to difference in priorities of the European countries towards the Middle East issues. Such priorities 57

Website, The Independent of Arabia. 2020. France begins a European naval mission to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. 31 January. Accessed April 30, 2022. https:// www.independentarabia.com/node/90731/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8% D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%AA% D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD% D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8% A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9% 8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81% D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2. 58 Agency, Website of Sputnik Russian news. 2020. A European mission to the Gulf… Nature, tasks, and their impact on the region. 24 January. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://arabic.sputni knews.com/20200124/. 59 Agency, Reuters News. 2020. Sultanate of Oman: The risk of confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz is greater than anywhere else in the Gulf. 16 February. Accessed April 30, 2022. https:// www.reuters.com/article/oman-gulf-mn2-idARAKBN20A0EU.

110

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

are not only different from that of the American policy, but also different among the European countries themselves. Such countries also have capabilities different from that of the US policy. There is also lack of political will in the European countries to engage in security operations outside territories of their countries, and they regard such operations as fraught with risks, especially when they are outside the mandate of the United Nations. Nonetheless, maritime security threats can represent an opportunity for European countries to renew their partnership with the United States in President Biden’s era, after the transatlantic relationship was fractured under his predecessor Donald Trump. The European countries can propose closer coordination between current maritime security initiatives, for them to start from the United States, but also extends to Japan, India and Australia. In other words, Europe must have greater political space and incentive to push towards a comprehensive regional dialogue on maritime security, especially in light of emergence of initiatives from major countries regarding the security of the Arabian Gulf, especially by Russia and China. Given maritime security is separate from the nuclear issue, this may represent a strong starting point for rebuilding confidence between European countries and the United States and a number of governments in the Middle East.60 while recognizing that there is always a European approach that differs from its American counterpart for countering global security threats, France’s leadership of this mission stems mainly from an extended role by the country towards the security of the Arabian Gulf. Such role is linked to previous times, when the French Navy patrolled waters of the Arabian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, as part of providing Iraq with support, alongside the Arab and Western countries. France was also a member of the International Coalition to Liberate the State of Kuwait from the Iraqi Invasion in 1991. In addition, the 2009 amended security agreement between France and the United Arab Emirates, according to a statement by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, states that “The two countries shall jointly decide specific and ad hoc responses, including military responses, in the event of a threat to the UAE’s security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence”. It is worth noting that the UAE hosts the only French military base in the region since 2009. France’s National Security Strategy of 2017, which is an updated version of the 2013 White Paper, states that France has an obligation to deploy its armed forces to serve its security, and to deal with crises in many regions of the world outside Europe, including the Middle East. This was embodied in France’s announcement of the country commanding the European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. France, as well, assumed the maritime part of operations of the International Coalition against ISIS in March 2021, by sending the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to waters of the Arabian Gulf. France has also deployed fast interception ships—as part of a Saudi agreement with the French company CMN to manufacture a number of HSI32 interceptor boats—and an advanced radar system on the eastern coast of 60

Thibaut, Charles. 2021. European strategic independency in the Middle East does not need theory but practice. 6 January. Accessed August 19, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policyanalysis/alastqlalyt-alastratyjyt-alawrwbyt-fy-alshrq-alawst-lyst-bhajt-aly-nzryat-bl-aly.

5.4 Gulf Countries and International Partnerships for Maritime Security

111

Saudi Arabia to support its air defense after attacks on the Kingdom, targeting Oil installations in January 2020. It is worth noting also that a large part of France’s foreign trade is with Asian countries, especially China, which is the second largest source of French imports in the world. This gives international trade routes passing through the Arabian Gulf region great importance to France. Therefore, there is a strategic necessity to secure such routes against any dangers.61 In spite of the modesty of the European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, there have been previous efforts that have enhanced the potential of developing the role of this mission in the future, in a way that contributes to achieving maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region. These efforts included the maritime operation known as IRINI, carried out by the European Union and aimed at combating human trafficking off the Libyan coast in various locations in the Mediterranean. Another effort was the European Union’s participation in the international efforts to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa, which began in 2008 in what was known as the Atlanta Mission. There was also the European Union’s decision to establish a rapid response force in December 2016 to work outside European territories.62 It has been noticed that Operation IRINI, which was carried out by the European Union and aimed to implement the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations, relying on European naval, air and satellite assets mainly provided by Italy, France, Greece and Germany, depended on a strong mandate from the United Nations, which allowed Europe to inspect ships suspected of being carrying banned substances. This operation has achieved tangible results and revealed violations by some regional countries of the embargo. These maritime measures have been strengthened by imposing new European sanctions in September 2020, targeting companies supplying weapons to armed factions in eastern and western Libya.63 The capabilities and advantages of the European Union in general represent an effective value for regional security and stability in general, and maritime security in particular, as reflected in three things: First, the low-level security position of the European Union may add an advantage to the union; though the lack of a strong European army in the region may be seen as a major defect that make the EU unable to reinforce security interests in the region. When it comes to promoting multilateral cooperation or addressing functional issues, the absence of a strong military presence is a diplomatic asset. In view of the accelerating strategic rivalry between the United States and China, and the negative impact of this on the regional security environment, Europe appears to be a reliable partner to all parties and a neutral destination for providing security. Second, the European Union possesses the technical capabilities that enable it to address functional maritime security issues, based on the 61

Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2021. “France and the security of the Arabian Gulf: Objectives and elements of an expanded security partnership.” Derasat 145-146-149-152-167. 62 Keshk Ashraf Mohammed. 2019. Europe and the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf: Basic Notes. 19 August. Accessed August 19, 2021. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/117 9442. 63 Thibaut, Charles. 2021. European strategic independency in the Middle East does not need theory but practice. 6 January. Accessed August 19, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policyanalysis/alastqlalyt-alastratyjyt-alawrwbyt-fy-alshrq-alawst-lyst-bhajt-aly-nzryat-bl-aly.

112

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

development of unique operational expertise, institutional capabilities and human resources to manage complex maritime challenges in a multilateral environment. The EU has gained a broad range of skills that could prove effective in addressing many of Asia’s everyday maritime security concerns, from tackling transnational crime to disaster response. These skills were gained either by enhancing maritime awareness, cooperation and coordination between navies, law enforcement agencies and non-state actors, or by promoting a comprehensive approach to maritime crisis management including the EU’s efforts in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Third, the EU’s reputation as a standardization power is one of its most significant assets that make it in a good position. This means that if Europe continues to be determined to become a provider of maritime security and formulates a pragmatic and realistic approach in this context, this may have an impact on consolidating its security influence at the global level. In other words, if the EU manages to combine all the naval assets of the member states, it will have one of the largest naval forces in the world. The two naval missions deployed by the European Union so far - Atlanta anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and Sofia search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean are important, within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy, proving effectiveness towards the tasks for which they were designed. Nonetheless, these examples can hardly be regarded as convincing when it comes to the importance of the EU as a global naval power that can provide a security umbrella in the traditional sense, because Operation Sophia cannot use any naval assets due to opposition by the Italian government, and Operation Atlanta currently operates only two frigates.64 Despite the opposition of most European countries to joining the naval military coalition led by the United States to ensure the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf, there was general agreement in Brussels on the need to ensure a kind of military presence in the territorial waters through the deployment of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) in November 2019. This mission is not only an opportunity to redefine the European role away from just reflecting soft power or a conciliatory approach, but also confirms that Europe has the ability to defend its strategic interests in the world, especially regarding the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, as a strategic sea route for the European imports of oil, which remains vulnerable to Iranian threats, that could result in security and economic repercussions at the same time, not least the rise in oil prices as well as insurance fees for ships. This is in addition to the strategic dimensions involving Asian countries deploying their naval assets in the Arabian Gulf region after the 2019 attacks, and coalitions that could result from these developments. China, Russia and Iran were described as the ‘new triangle of power’ after the first naval trilateral drills carried out by the three countries in the Gulf of Oman in the end of December 2019. These drills showed the desire of these countries to balance the potential strategic gap left by the United States in the Middle East. The joint naval exercise, the Sea 64

Pejsova, Eva. 2019. The EU as a Maritime Security Provider. 16 December. Accessed October 20, 2021. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-maritime-security-provider.

References

113

Guardians 2020, with Pakistan, which was carried out at the beginning of January and lasted for nine days, is another indication of the maturation of China-Pakistan defense relations and the emergence of China’s military influence in the western region of Indian Ocean. This means that The European Initiative for the Security of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is of strategic importance. The matter, as the British historian and writer, Timothy Garton Ash, explains, simply requires that a group of countries, with common strategic interests, develop a coordinated policy and work together towards a common goal by whatever means possible. If the EU wants to become a reliable provider of maritime security, as it has done by means of the Maritime Security Strategy, its traditional rhetoric must be accompanied with more concrete measures. In this regard, the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) is not only be a timely step, but could also inspire similar initiatives in the future.65

References n.d. Undated minutes of the meeting of Djibouti Code of Conduct. https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localr esources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/DCoC%20Arabic.pdf. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Agency, Bahrain News. 2021. Opening of the English language and radar operators’ courses for Coast Guard Command officers, 12 September. https://www.bna.bh/.aspx?cms. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Agency, Kuna News. 2021. The Kuwaiti Cabinet expresses deep concern over the serious consequences of threatening the security and safety of maritime navigation in the waters leading to the Arabian Gulf and the areas surrounding the Sea of Oman, 11 August. https://www.kuna.net. kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2993015&language=ar. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Agency, Reuters News. 2020. Sultanate of Oman: The risk of confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz is greater than anywhere else in the Gulf, 16 February. https://www.reuters.com/article/omangulf-mn2-idARAKBN20A0EU. Accessed 30 Apr 2022. Agency, The Chinese News. 2021. China and ASEAN countries seek early agreement on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, 7 June. http://arabic.news.cn/2021b-06/07/c_139994314. htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Agency, Website of Sputnik Russian News. 2020. A European mission to the Gulf... Nature, tasks, and their impact on the region, 24 January. https://arabic.sputniknews.com/20200124/. Accessed 30 Apr 2022. Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper. 2021. The Qatari Navy... a rising power over the Gulf waters, 10 May. https://thenewkhalij.news/article/191409. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Akhbar Al-Khaleej Website. 2020. The Minister of Interior watches the conclusion of the joint naval exercise of the Coast Guard Command, December 31. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/ news/article/123244. Accessed 26 Apr 2022.

65

Pejsova, Eva. 2020. What the European maritime initiative in the Strait of Hormuz tells us about Brussel’s security ambitions. 27 March. Accessed October 20, 2021. https://www.europeanleaders hipnetwork.org/commentary/what-the-european-maritime-initiative-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-tellsus-about-brussels-ambition-and-capacity-as-a-security-actor/.

114

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

Al-Ajami, Abdul Hadi. 2021. The commander of the Naval Force said that its main tasks are to protect the sea transport routes and the navigation route of all Kuwaiti oil tankers, 23 February. https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/555608/03-05-2015-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8% B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8% AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9% 86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%84%D8% A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8% A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A% D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-% D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%88% D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF% D9%8A%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8% A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9% 84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9% 84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A9/. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Al-Ghubari, Mohammed. 2020. The imperative of establishing the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Al Siyassa Al Dawliya (International Politics) 201. Al-Juhani, Ali Al-Harbi and Rayan. 2017. The Djibouti Code of Conduct stops arms smuggling to the Houthis, 11 January. https://www.alwatan.com.sa/article/328515. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Al-Suhaim, Obaid. 2019. The international coalition begins protecting maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf, 8 November. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1981686/%D8. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Al-Suhaimi, Obaid. 2020. Saudi Arabia enhances security in the Arabian Gulf with the fastest combat boats and aircraft, 25 January. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2096976. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Al-Suhaimi, Reem Al-Maia and Obaid. 2014. Formation of a joint Gulf maritime force to counter external threats, 16 October. https://aawsat.com/home/article/202376. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Al-Taweel, Amani. 2021. The transformations of the Horn of Africa, 15 July. https://idsc.gov.eg/ DocumentLibrary/View/4831. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Al-Zahab, Ali. 2018. Djibouti Code of Conduct… Security necessities and conflicts of interest, 18 January. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Al-Zaid, Saleh. 2020. Establishment of a council of countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, 7 January. Accessed April 29, 2022. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2070156/%D8% AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9% 84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9% 84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8% B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AE%D9% 84%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Arafa, Khadija. 2019. The Saudi Initiative for the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Derasat 28–29. Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. Bakhrama, Dheyauddin Saeed. 2018. The role of Djibouti in protecting international security in the Red Sea, 5 June. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1290401. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Diab, Khattar Abu. 2016. Khattar Abu Diab. 2016. The Red Sea in the Gulf and Arab security equation. The Red Arab Security and Defense Journal, September 37–38. Gulf, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the. 2014. The Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Fifth Session, 9 December. https://www.gcc-sg.org/ar. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Halima, Salah. 2021. Goals and importance of the Council of the Countries bordering the Red Sea, 4 January. https://gate.ahram.org.eg/daily/News/203620/4/792355. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Hilal, Iman Al-Khattab and Muhammad. 2021. The Commander of the Indian Navy to Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper: We are working with Saudi Arabia to protect the safety of the seas, 11 August. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3125636. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2021. France and the security of the Arabian Gulf: Objectives and elements of an expanded security partnership. Derasat 145-146-149-152-167.

References

115

Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2019. Europe and the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf: Basic Notes, 19 August. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1179442. Accessed 19 Aug 2021. Keshk, Ashraf Mohamed. 2020. Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden: A new mechanism to counter regional security threat, 13 January. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej. com/news/article/1196674. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Khafaji, Rania Hussain. 2021. Gulf Policy towards the Horn of Africa. Derasat Periodical 127. Mabus, Ray. 2015. A collaborative strategy for naval power in the Twenty-first Century, 1 March. https://docplayer.ae/116261617. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Mahmood, Omar S. 2019. Competition, cooperation, and security in the Red Sea, 10 September. https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/competition-cooperation-and-sec urity-in-the-red-sea. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Mazhar, Mamoon. 2020. India joins the Jeddah Amendment, 18 September. https://newsonair.com/ arabic/2020/09/18/. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Asharq Alawsat. 2021. Destruction of a naval mine planted by the Houthis in the southern Red Sea, 24 May. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2990231. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Akhbaar Al-Khaleej. 2021. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force inaugurates the Al Zubara ship and a number of ships of the Royal Bahraini Naval Force, 9 February. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1237478. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Akhbar Al Khalej. 2020. The Fifth Fleet is ready to counter any threat, 6 January. http:// www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1195951. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Akhbar Al-Khaleej. 2021. Adding the definition of the ‘Bahraini waters’ to the Maritime Law, 29 August. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1239059. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, AkhbarAl-khaleej. 2016. The importance of inaugurating the headquarters of the GCC Unified Maritime Operations Center in Bahrain, 10 March. http://www.akhbar-alkhaleej.com/ 13866/article/10720.htm. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Ayam. 2013. A media report by the Joint Maritime Coordination Center, 4 December. https://www.alayam.com/online/local/88220/News.htm. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Ayam. 2021. Continuation of the partnership between the Coast Guard Command and the Royal Police Academy to initiate the “Applied Diploma Program for Naval Sciences”, 10 January. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/local/888404/News.html. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Ittihad. 2021. The UAE renews its commitment to protecting regional and global maritime security, 11 August. https://www.alittihad.ae/news. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm. 2009. Egypt studies the memorandum of the International Maritime Organization on combating Somali piracy before signing it, 6 February. https://www. almasryalyoum.com/news/details/8502. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 2021. The Omani Navy operates ships to contribute to securing international waters in the region, 4 August. https://aawsat.com/home/article/3125636. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-sharq Al-Awsat. 2019. A Saudi-Spanish project to build warships, 3 October. https:// aawsat.com/home/article/1929266/. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-sharqAlawsat. 2020. The Saudi Navy enhances its capabilities with combat helicopters, 24 December. https://aawsat.com/home/article/2700376/%C2%AB%D8%A7% D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%C2%BB-%D8%A7%D9%84% D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2% D8%B2-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8% D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%AA% D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Watan. 2017. 19 countries discuss maritime crimes at the Djibouti Code of Conduct Conference in Jeddah, 10 January. https://www.almowaten.net/2017/01. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Al-Watan. 2019. The UAE joins the International Maritime Security Coalition, 19 September. https://alwatannews.net/article/846319/Gulf/. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Newspaper, Bahrain’s Al-Watan. 2021. The Coast Guard receives 3 new US guard boats, 8 October. https://alwatannews.net/article/849078/Bahrain. Accessed 26 Apr 2022.

116

5 Mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf Countries to Safeguard Maritime Security

Newspaper, Kuwait’s Al-Anbaa. 2018. Chief of the General Staff of the Army Lieutenant-General Mohamed Al-Khidr: The ships and boats project is a qualitative addition to the Navy, 5 April. https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/official/823697/05-04-2018. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Newspaper, The UAE Al-Kaleej. 2021. On its 53rd founding anniversary: Our naval forces are witnessing rapid development, 2 May. https://www.alkhaleej.ae/2021-05-02. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Pejsova, Eva. 2019. The EU as a maritime security provider, 16 December. https://www.iss.europa. eu/content/eu-maritime-security-provider. Accessed 20 Oct 2021. Pejsova, Eva. 2020. What the European maritime initiative in the Strait of Hormuz tells us about Brussel’s security ambitions, 27 March. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commen tary/what-the-european-maritime-initiative-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-tells-us-about-brusselsambition-and-capacity-as-a-security-actor/. Accessed 20 Oct 2021. Rahman, Hamdi Abdel. 2020. Differing visions: The Red Sea alliance and revival of the concept of Afro-Afro-Arabia, 12 January. https://futureuae.com/ar/Mainpage/Item/5195/. Accessed 27 Apr 2022. Safi, Tammam Abu. 2016. Al-Ayam newspaper watches the largest naval drill in the world. Military commanders: Terrorism, piracy and narcotics are the most prominent challenges to maritime security, 14 April. https://www.alayam.com/alayam/first/572660/News.html. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Thibaut, Charles. 2021. European strategic independency in the Middle East does not need theory but practice, 6 January. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/alastqlalyt-ala stratyjyt-alawrwbyt-fy-alshrq-alawst-lyst-bhajt-aly-nzryat-bl-aly. Accessed 19 Aug 2021. Union, European. 2021. The EU maritime security strategy and action plan, 20 October. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-informationtoolkit_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Website, Arabi 21. 2019. Iraq criticizes the marine navigation coalition and refuses to join it, 19 September. https://arabi21.com/story/1209042. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Website, Al-Khaleej Online. 2019. Iran announces its position to the establishment of a coalition to secure navigation in the Gulf, 23 July. https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D8. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Website, Al-Khaleej Online. 2021. The Royal Navy of Oman…a trained force reinforced by military agreements, 25 October. https://alkhaleejonline.net. Accessed 26 Apr 2022. Website, Al-Eqtesadiya Newspaper. 2013. Maritime security is the key to security in the Arabian Gulf, 29 May. https://www.aleqt.com/2013/05/29/article_759342.html. Accessed 25 Apr 2022. Website, Defaa (Defense) Journal. 2021. Integration at sea: The Gulf Cooperation Council navies give priority in the field of cooperation with the joint naval forces, 21 February. https://defenc e21.com/ar. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Website, France 24. 2019. Bahrain: An international conference with the participation of Israel to discuss Gulf security in light of the tension with Iran, 21 October. https://www.france24.com/ ar/20191021. Accessed 29 Apr 2022. Website, Reuters. 2021. The US Fifth Fleet: The Gulf Cooperation Council countries begin intensive naval patrols. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-patrols-ea2-idARAKCN1SP0IO. Website, The Independent of Arabia. 2020. France begins a European naval mission to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, 31 January. https://www.independentarabia. com/node/90731/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/% D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88% D8%B3%D8%B7/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A8% D8%AF%D8%A3-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1% D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-% D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A% D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81% D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2. Accessed 30 Apr 2022.

Chapter 6

Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian Gulf Countries

6.1 Introduction This chapter deals with obstacles to achievement of maritime security for the Arabian Gulf countries. The first part of the chapter deals with difficulties facing the work of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf. These difficulties are related to the required naval capabilities, the divergent stances of international powers regarding joining that coalition, and the different visions of countries to working through coalitions, as well as the financial requirements necessary for the work of the coalition. Other challenges include the location of ships that can carry out the task of protecting Gulf oil tankers within the logistical support required in this regard and the legal basis for the work of the coalition. The second part of the chapter deals with the challenge of the gap between Iran and the Gulf countries in maritime capabilities. While Iran owns 398 watercrafts, the six Gulf countries have 375 watercrafts. The Gulf countries also lack platforms for mine warfare and have shortage of sailors and the number of ships. This means, for example, that the Arabian Gulf countries cannot exercise maritime deterrence alone against Iranian threats to maritime navigation. This in turn requires that these countries work according to two parallel tracks, namely developing their own maritime capabilities, and the continuation of coalitions with major powers to ensure the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf. As for the third part of the chapter, it deals with challenges to employing technology, especially artificial intelligence, in maritime security, as the absolute traditional military superiority is no longer the criterion of military force, but rather qualitative armament, which witnesses a clear reflection of the technological revolution. In this respect, there is interest in smart ships; given cybersecurity risks can paralyze the movement of entire ports for several days. In addition, terrorist groups have become able to infiltrate the work of radars of ship defense systems, and this requires the development of high-tech maritime radar systems. Arguments were raised also on the possibility of some countries returning to using wireless technology that was in use during the Second World War. There is, as well, the challenge of education in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4_6

117

118

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

the maritime area to enhance qualifications of human resources working in this field. The fourth part of the chapter addresses the conflict in the Horn of Africa and its impact on the security of maritime navigation. There has been awareness by regional and global powers of the dangers of maritime security threats, which have intensified due to continuation of crises in the countries bordering Bab al-Mandab Strait. Therefore, they have accelerated establishing a number of bases for their military forces in the Horn of Africa. Although these forces have not engaged in clashes with each other, in the long run, and in light of the militarization of the Horn of Africa, these bases may become a cause of instability in that region. This will not only threaten the security of maritime navigation but also regional security in the Horn of Africa. However, what is mentioned above does not mean that the impact of these bases will always be negative. Instead, experiences confirmed the importance of some of these bases during crises. In 2015, about 815 people were evacuated from Yemen, including 225 nationals of Western countries, on board a frigate of China’s People’s Liberation Army that sailed from the coast of Somalia, an experience that reflects the importance of these bases during crises.

6.2 Difficulties Facing the Military Coalition for Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf In spite of the importance of establishing the Naval Military Coalition for Protection of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf “Operation Sentinel 2019”, it faces difficulties. The first of such difficulties is related to the required capabilities for this task. The international naval force that is supposed to undertake the protection of convoys of commercial ships and oil tankers navigating near the Iranian coast or through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab need more watercrafts, and more naval and air monitoring and control capabilities. More combat capabilities and sea minesweepers are also needed for this purpose. The United States may face difficulty in carrying out its operations with assistance by a number of Arabian Gulf countries, as the Yemeni crisis, for example, has drained many of the naval capabilities of some of the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, given the continuous monitoring operations in the Red Sea to prevent the arrival of military supplies through Yemeni ports to the Houthis. Therefore, the United States searches for other partners from outside the Arabian Gulf region. This leads to the second difficulty, which is the divergence of international stances towards the establishment of that coalition. It has been noted that there was no European enthusiasm to participate with the United States in this coalition, for two reasons. The first is the growing European desire to establish European own mechanisms to contribute to regional and global security. In this respect, France has already announced the establishment of the European Mission to monitor navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, based in Abu Dhabi in 2020. The second reason is that the European Union member states have reservations about the military moves led by the United States because they

6.2 Difficulties Facing the Military Coalition for Security …

119

could be part of the maximum pressure campaign that could result in Iran adopting policies to end the nuclear deal. The European countries are keen to maintain such deal as it is the basis for future negotiations, whether to ensure Iran’s commitment to the terms of that deal or in the event of concluding a new deal. The European stances have been clear in this regard, including that of the German government, which announced unwillingness to join that coalition. This is in addition to stances of other non-European international powers.1 What is mentioned above means that the European countries are insisting not to participate in that process under the American umbrella. The launch of a parallel European operation for the same purpose means Europe’s desire to achieve a degree of military independence on the one hand, and to adopt stances different from that of the US towards Iran on the other. In other words, Europe has sought to achieve a difficult balance between yielding to US pressure on Iran on the one hand, and to achieve requirements of European security and economic interests on the other. In addition, China and Russia have adopted stances in support of Iran, reflecting characteristics of a new international order that is taking shape in the direction of pluralism in major powers. Indicators regarding this order has appeared in the controversy and stances regarding the establishment of this maritime coalition. This means that the United States no longer has a monopoly on decisions regarding the Arabian Gulf region and the Middle East, including the start of major powers such as China to operate ships to protect their commercial tankers and not expressing a desire to join such coalition. Japan as well has not contributed ships to this coalition.2 The third difficulty is related to the different visions of the countries themselves in the mechanism of action during coalitions in general. This was indicated by General Wesley Clark, the former commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the Conference of Military Coalitions in the Middle East, which was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain over the period 16–17 October 2017. How international forces work within coalitions is a problem that even NATO faces. Although the alliance has a political committee by means of which information is shared among member states, each country remains with its national policies, which determine the extent of its contribution and work within the alliance. This reflects the different priorities between countries, as described by Wesley Clark, who said that the forces of some countries may not want to work at night and others want to work in defensive positions, while some forces prefer to work in offensive positions, and that each country keeps its secrets. Therefore, there is a need for trust in order to exchange information, and this is related to national sovereignty and interests that vary in light of the different interests as well as the national laws of countries.3 The fourth difficulty is represented in the financial requirements necessary for the work of that coalition. The United States avoids bearing additional military costs and seeks 1

Darawshah, Ahmed. 2019. The International Maritime Force in the Gulf… The start is faltering. 18 August. Accessed August 18, 2022. https://www.arab48.com/%D8. 2 Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2019. “International rivalry over international waterways: The US-led Naval Military Coalition for navigation in the Gulf as a model.” Derasat 75–76. 3 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military Alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies.

120

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

that each of the countries in the region and its European allies bear some of these burdens. This was noted in the American discourse calling upon the countries of the world that depend mainly on waterways in the region to join Operation Sentinel in the era of former President Donald Trump. After the launch of the operation officially, then US Defense Secretary Mark Esper said that the United States’ defensive role during this operation would be limited to US-flagged ships. This meant assertion by the United States that it could help with part, but not all, of the costs, and that this help could involve leadership, military equipment and technical coordination. This could be also a message addressed to the Americans, who still opposes American military interventions abroad, that the new military operation in the Arabian Gulf region is primarily defensive and aims to secure American ships and watercrafts in the first place.4 Even the countries described as the closest allies to the United States and that announced their accession to this collation, such as the UK, will remain committed to the nuclear agreement. This is in addition to the capabilities, as UK has less than 20 surface ships capable of conducting patrols in the Gulf. The fifth difficulty involves positioning the ships available from the naval forces supporting that mission, as well as the small size of the current naval capabilities compared to the past. Although sources indicate that the US Fifth Fleet deployed 23 ships in the wake of the 2019 attacks, this is still less than the number that was deployed during the ‘tankers war’ in the eighties, which totaled 37 ships at the time. The sixth difficulty is related to the conflicting interests of states within the coalition, in addition to the excessive secrecy of intelligence and restrictions on communication between navies, as well as language barriers, the extents of withstanding dangers, and management techniques.5 The final difficulty is the controversy over the international legal basis of this coalition. Although the threat to international maritime navigation is a threat to international peace and security, given factors separating the two levels coming to an end, the United Nations does not have an army to put its decisions into practice if decisions are taken to maintain international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN charter. It is true that the United States has undertaken this task (in the case of the war of liberation of the State of Kuwait in 1991) and NATO has done the same (in the Libyan crisis in 2011). Nonetheless, this does not enjoy the support of all the other major countries in the world (China, Russia). They at least obstruct UN resolutions on the crises in which their interests contradict with that of the United States. Despite the importance of this coalition, the issue of deterrence remains present regarding Iranian attacks on commercial ships. It has been noted that the United States, during periods of conflict with Iran, had its choice to send one of its aircraft carriers to deter Iran. However, nothing confirms that such measures 4

Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2019. “International rivalry over international waterways: The US-led Naval Military Coalition for navigation in the Gulf as a model.” Derasat 75–76. 5 Heller, Christian. 2019. One coalition? Challenges of establishing a maritime coalition in the Gulf. 6 August. Accessed August 14, 2021. https://agsiw.org/ar/party-of-one-maritime-coalition-challe nges-in-the-gulf-arabic.

6.2 Difficulties Facing the Military Coalition for Security …

121

have represented a deterrent factor for Iran. Since the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, the United States has maintained one aircraft carrier in the region, but it has not been used even once to respond to Iranian attacks, including the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and the numerous attacks launched by proIranian militias in Iraq from 2003 to 2021, including dozens of missile attacks on the American embassy and American military forces in Iraq. The attack on the oil tanker M Street off the coast of Oman at the end of July 2021 means that attacks can be launched against American military ships in the Arabian Gulf from a distance without Iran losing material or human losses. Therefore, the United States does not need to increase the size or capabilities of the forces deployed on the front lines of the conflict in the Arabian Gulf. Instead, the US need to increase the credibility of threats with deterrence, especially in light of indications of the growing interest by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, to confront China, at the expense of interest in the Middle East in general. This is in addition to the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and its repercussions. Therefore, the US must provide its partners in the Arabian Gulf with more guarantees, by adopting a strategy called the ‘grey zone’ between Iran and the United States. Such strategy involves activities carried out by one country that represent harm to another country, and are ostensibly considered acts of war, but from a legal point of view they are not. Hence, light combat aircraft carriers that can obstruct any hostile behavior of Iran can be deployed, and on the other hand, they represent a message of reassurance to the regional partners. These light combat aircraft carriers can be used in emergency response to any attack, with the possibility of a small military presence of American forces so that it has a role in strengthening non-military deterrence measures, in addition to the necessity of monitoring all hostilities through the radar network.6 It could be better for the countries of the world to start their efforts depending on the current joint international task forces, which includes 33 countries and is a sort of a maritime partnership and consists of three joint forces operating in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea and along the coast of Africa. In addition to these forces sharing sites with the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, they have two decades of coalition experience by undertaking tasks of combating terrorism, piracy and smuggling and promoting a secure sea environment. It has been noticed that major Asian countries such as China, which is one of the largest importers of Gulf oil, have hinted to the possibility of their participation in a multinational security mission, as the region has become accustomed to the presence of Chinese ships. China has sent more than 30 fleets to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa to escort civilian ships. China has also a military base in Djibouti. These fleets have escorted more than 6,600 ships since their launch in 2008. As for the Indian Navy, it has announced sending two ships and a naval reconnaissance plane to the Gulf. All these are indicators that reflect the possibility of forming a multinational maritime coalition. However, the biggest dilemma is the 6

Mihm, Michael Eisenstadt-Henry. 2021. Will aircraft carriers deter Iran? 6 August. Accessed August 20, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/hl-trd-hamlat-altayratayran.

122

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

shifting movement of diplomatic efforts between maritime security and the nuclear agreement. Nonetheless, the formation of this coalition is not possible without the United States, which gives distinct capabilities to military partnerships. This involves providing these partnerships with large number of units, a large group of aircraft, multiple and diverse intelligence gathering platforms, and advanced infrastructure for communications. The logistical support and ports that the United States provides are important factors for the long-term sustainability of operations of other participants. The important thing in this respect is that the security of the Arabian Gulf and maritime security have difficulties that increase if both the United States and its European partners wish to work away from each other.7 This difficulty increases in light of keenness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is the security umbrella for Western countries, to distance itself from supporting the United States in its efforts to counter maritime security threats. On June 26, 2019, during a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, the US Acting Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called for NATO’s support for a coalition that guarantees the security of international waterways. He also stressed that the United States does not want a war with Iran, but will not tolerate any incidents that may occur in the future. However, a diplomat in the NATO—whose name was not disclosed—told Agence France-Presse that “NATO was careful from the beginning to stay away from issues related to Iran,” and that “The alliance wants to have more calmness by both parties, but the matter should not be linked to NATO”.8 This does not mean that there is a state of rift between the two sides. The main NATO member states participated during the ‘tanker war’ in securing maritime traffic in the Arabian Gulf, but not under the umbrella of the alliance. Some NATO member states participated also in the war to liberate the State of Kuwait in 1991 under the American leadership. In addition, NATO could not engage in the task of securing civilians in Libya in 2011 without American support in the early days through AWACS planes. It should be underlined also that NATO condemned, in a statement by the alliance, the attack on the Israeli oil tanker in August 2021 off the Gulf of Oman. “We join our allies in strongly condemning the fatal attack on the M/T Mercer Street off the coast of Oman,” the statement stressed. The statement also underlined “the importance of freedom of navigation for all NATO allies”, adding that the UK and Romania concluded that “Iran was most likely responsible for the attack” and that “Allies are concerned about Iran’s actions destabilizing the region”, and “urge Tehran to respect its international obligations”.9 NATO also issued similar condemnations of the attacks on oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf region in 2019. 7

Heller, Christian. 2019. One coalition? Challenges of establishing a maritime coalition in the Gulf. 6 August. Accessed August 14, 2021. https://agsiw.org/ar/party-of-one-maritime-coalition-challe nges-in-the-gulf-arabic. 8 Newspaper, Al-sharq Al-Awsat. 2019. The United States requests NATO support for a coalition for security of international waterways. 28 June. Accessed August 2021. https://aawsat.com/home/ article/1788361. 9 Agency, Turkish News. 2021. NATO condemns the attack on an Israeli oil tanker off the Gulf of Oman. 4 August. Accessed November 16, 2021. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/.

6.2 Difficulties Facing the Military Coalition for Security …

123

Challenges are not related to nature of coalitions and requirements of their work only. Engagement by Asian powers in the Arabian Gulf region, and although the goal is to protect their maritime convoys, is another challenge. In the long run, they may oppose the traditional American role in the security of the Arabian Gulf. Such powers include, for example, Japan, which sent, on February 2, 2020, a warship with a crew of 200 sailors, in addition to two land patrol planes, to guard its oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf. Regarding this decision, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, “Ensuring the safety of ships related to Japan is one of the government’s important duties”. He added that “The Japanese government is ready to use force to protect endangered ships”. Although this step came within the framework of a unilateral action, without joining any of the coalitions mentioned above, the announcement of readiness to use force to protect maritime navigation is a controversial matter, especially since the Japanese constitution forbids the use of military force to settle disputes.10 India also has emerged as one of the potential players to maintain maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region, given the size of Indian interests in that region. The volume of trade exchange between the Gulf countries and India in 2018 and 2019 amounted to about 121.34 billion dollars. Remittances of Indian laborers from the Gulf region contribute a large proportion of India’s foreign currency, reaching 42 billion dollars in 2018. In addition, the Indian economy, which size is around three trillion dollars, is largely dependent on oil imports from the Arabian Gulf region. India has attached great importance to the issue of maritime security, as embodied in the Indian Strategy Document issued in 2015. Goals of such document include integration of operations, building regional capabilities, training and human security in the Indian Ocean and seeking to found a positive and favorable sea environment. India was also one of the first countries that began conducting anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden as early as October 2008. Since that time, an Indian warship has been stationed in the region, and Indian ships escort the ships that fly the Indian flag. The Indian Navy has also provided protection to ships of other countries. In terms of relations with the Gulf countries in the area of maritime security, there have been visits by Indian ships to the Gulf countries. According to annual reports from the Indian Ministry of Defense such visits included Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman in 2013, all the six Gulf countries in 2015, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman in 2016, the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia in 2017, and Qatar, UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia in 2018. In addition, India has signed several agreements with the Arabian Gulf countries. They include the strategic partnership agreement between India and the UAE in 2017, which includes cooperation in the field of maritime security. In 2016, India and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to enhance maritime security in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. India also signed memoranda of understanding on maritime security with Bahrain and Qatar, providing for visits by Indian ships to the two countries and carrying out joint exercises. As for the Sultanate of Oman, 10

Agency, Reuters News. 2020. A Japanese warship sails to the Gulf of Oman to guard oil tankers. 2 February. Accessed August 25, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-meast-as2-idARAK BN1ZW02Q.

124

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

under a logistic agreement signed in 2018, Oman provided the Indian Navy with access to the port of Duqm, which is one of the largest and most important deep ports with a strategic location for India in the Indian Ocean. In 2019, the Indian Navy deployed the long-range P-81 naval monitoring aircraft to carry out anti-piracy missions from Salalah in the Sultanate of Oman, to patrol the Gulf of Aden. There are other opportunities for maritime cooperation between India and the Arabian Gulf countries, especially in the area of “evacuation in non-combat activities”. The largest rescue operation carried out by the Indian Navy for expatriate workers was in May 2020 from many regions, including the Gulf countries. All this underlines India’s ability to carry out tasks based on cooperation.11 It is worth noting that the size of the current naval fleet of India is about 132 ships, 220 aircraft and 15 submarines. It seeks to reach about 200 ships, 500 aircraft and 24 attack submarines by 2027, as India attaches great importance to the security of navigation in the Indian Ocean, given its geo-strategic link with the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Gulf, and given that waters of the Indian Ocean include the most important maritime transport routes. This is in addition to the flow of 80% of the oil trade with maritime navigation along three straits located in the region, namely the Strait of Hormuz 40%, the Strait of Malacca 35% and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab 8%. The region also has 23 of the largest container ports in the world. It is worth noting that the container traffic has quadrupled between 2000 and 2017. This means increasing levels of possibility of exposure to dangers of piracy and maritime terrorism.12 The Gulf countries are aware of the nature of the geo-strategic link between the security of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region. In his speech in the Fourth Dialogue of the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which was organized by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in cooperation with the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, in October 2017, Dr. Anwar Gargash, the then UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, underlined the importance of “Promoting regional integration around maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean, capacity building, information sharing, and institutional cooperation in the areas of science and technology to counter these threats”. He noted also to “the need to strengthen regional structures and institutions, and to raise awareness of the maritime domain as a key factor influencing both present and future issues”. It is worth noting that the UAE assumed the position of Vice President of the Association for the period 2017–2019.13 Robert Kaplan, who attached great importance in his books to the influence of geography on politics, underlined the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean region in his book, The Monsoon Winds: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. The main conclusion of that book is that 11

Singh, Abhijit. 2020. The development of India’s maritime status in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf region. 1 August. Accessed August 14, 2021. https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/def ault-source/Publications/eda-insight-aug-2020-arb-abhijit.pdf?sfvrsn=6. 12 Janardhan, Narayanappa. 2020. “The Impact of cooperation and rivalry in the Indian Ocean region on the security of the Arabian Gulf.” Derasat 134–137. 13 Agency, Al-Ain News. 2017. The Indian Ocean Dialogue concluded it events in Abu Dhabi with strengthening maritime security and safety. 17 October. Accessed August 20, 2020. https://al-ain. com/article/conclusion-of-the-indian-ocean-dialogue.

6.3 Building Naval Capabilities and the Gap Between …

125

the great Indian Ocean, which extends from the Horn of Africa through the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and India to Indonesia, may constitute a map for the new century, making it the center of strategic and demographic significance for the twenty-first century in light of its vital ways of global energy, as through which power policies are drawn up.14 What is reviewed above means that although the establishment of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf is an important step for countering maritime security threats, the United States still has to seek to build an expanded maritime coalition that includes all countries that have vital interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This may require a UN resolution that will be an international pillar for the nature and purpose of these partnerships, so that the goal of securing maritime navigation and safeguarding interests of all countries at the same time be achieved.

6.3 Building Naval Capabilities and the Gap Between the Gulf Countries and Iran In spite of the importance of the steps taken by the Arabian Gulf countries to develop their defense capabilities in general, and their naval capabilities in particular, to counter threats to maritime security, there are still several obstacles facing these countries, in terms of capacity building, and the huge gap between the six Gulf countries and Iran. Iran has a clear superiority over the Gulf countries and Iraq, as Iran owns about 398 watercrafts, compared to about 375 watercrafts in the six Arabian Gulf countries. The Iranian watercrafts include six frigates, three cruisers, and 34 submarines. Iran also owns 88 patrol ships and 3 ships specialized in mines. Iran ranks fourth in the world, in terms of the number of watercrafts. It is followed regionally by Qatar, which has 80 watercrafts, most of which are patrol ships, and it also ranks 31st globally. In the third place regionally came the United Arab Emirates with about 75 various watercrafts, including 35 patrol ships and nine cruisers, in addition to two mine ships and ranked 33 globally. Iraq ranks fourth regionally, as it owns 60 watercrafts, including 25 patrol ships, and ranks 44th globally. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ranks in fifth place regionally, with 55 diverse watercrafts, including seven frigates and four cruisers, in addition to nine patrol ships and 3 ships specialized in mines and is ranked 50th globally. While Bahrain ranked sixth regionally with 39 watercrafts, including one frigate and 38 ships, it is ranked 61st globally. As for Kuwait, it owns 38 watercrafts and ranks the seventh regionally and 63rd globally.

14

Website, Forbes Middle East. 2013. Will the Indian Ocean become the center of the world again? 25 December. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/ar/leadership/entrep reneurship/.

126

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

The Sultanate of Oman is ranked eighth regionally, with about 16 watercrafts, and ranked in 88th place in the ranking of the world’s armies in terms of naval power.15 Generally speaking, the interest of the Arabian Gulf countries in modernizing their naval capabilities is to a lesser degree compared to the interest in modernizing the air and land forces. The naval forces were formed by the Gulf countries to participate in defensive coastal operations to counter or slow down any Iranian attack. Although Iran has a long history of laying anti-ship mines, the Gulf countries still lack mine warfare platforms. Even at the height level of escalation of the ‘tanker war’ during the Iran-Iraq war, the United States and its allies from the Gulf countries have operated 17 minesweepers in the region, of which only 12 are still operating today. All the Gulf countries have only 12 frigates. Given the shallow and limited waters of the Gulf, the ships of these waters offer an advantage to their users, and Iran has an advantage in these ships and operates large numbers of them compared to the Gulf countries. Although some Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have started to conclude contracts with international companies to enhance their maritime capabilities, by manufacturing boats and ships, this may not have an impact on the maritime balance of power with Iran, as the geography of the Gulf, which includes narrow seas, rugged coasts and isolated islands, provides an opportunity for the Revolutionary Guard boats, which are characterized with low signals and speed of movement, to carry out sabotage activities. In addition, the limited number of the population in the Gulf countries is reflected in the number of ships that can be equipped with a working crew. Consequently, the United Arab Emirates can send only half of its cruisers at a time to counter any maritime threat, due to shortage in the number of sailors. Given the great dependence by the Gulf countries on the United States to ensure the security of the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf navies do not have the capabilities to lead a complex and enduring mission like escorting international merchant ships to protect them from dangers of maritime security threats.16 The Military Balance Report for 2021 reflects the gap between the military capabilities of Iran and the Arabian Gulf countries. Iran’s defense budget in 2019 amounted to about 17.2 billion dollars and decreased in 2020 to about 14.1 billion dollars. The country’s total operating armed forces amounted to about 610 thousand soldiers (350,000 the number of the army, 190,000 the number of the Revolutionary Guards, and among the army personnel are about 18,000 affiliated with the navy). As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its defense spending amounted to 50 billion dollars in 2019 and decreased to 48 billion in 2020. The number of the country’s armed forces is 227 thousand soldiers, including 13,500 belonging to the naval fleet. As for the United Arab Emirates, its defense budget for 2019 amounted to about 19.3 billion dollars and rose to 19.8 billion dollars in 2020, and the number of the UAE 15

Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. “Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States: Threats and Capabilities.” Cambridge: Gulf Research Center. 16 Heller, Christian. 2019. One coalition? Challenges of establishing a maritime coalition in the Gulf. 6 August. Accessed August 14, 2021. https://agsiw.org/ar/party-of-one-maritime-coalitionchallenges-in-the-gulf-arabic.

6.3 Building Naval Capabilities and the Gap Between …

127

armed forces is 63 thousand soldiers, including 2,500 personnel of the naval forces. As for the Sultanate of Oman, its defense budget in 2019 amounted to about 7.53 billion dollars, and it decreased in 2020 to 7.4 billion dollars, and the number of the Omani armed forces is 42,000, including 4,200 naval forces. As for the Kingdom of Bahrain, its defense budget for 2019 reached about 1.41 billion dollars, and it remained at the same amount in 2020. The number of Bahraini armed forces is 8,200, including 700 naval forces. The defense budget of the State of Kuwait for 2019 amounted to about 7.86 billion dollars, and it decreased in 2020 to 7.76 billion. The number of the Kuwaiti armed forces is 17,500 personnel, of which 2,000 are the total of the naval forces. As for Qatar, the defense budget for 2019 amounted to about 6.40 billion dollars and rose in 2020 to 6.47 billion dollars. The total of the Qatari armed forces is 16,500 personnel, among them 2500 naval forces.17 Perhaps the paradox in this respect is that despite the combined superiority of the Gulf countries in military spending rates or in the number of personnel of the navy, Iran still has superiority in the number and quality of watercrafts. Consequently, the Arabian Gulf countries are unable to exercise deterrence against Iran in terms of safeguarding maritime security. Such deterrence will be a clear message for Iran to think carefully before targeting the commercial ships of the Arabian Gulf countries. Nonetheless, the success of the United States in assassinating Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, in January 2020, confirmed the use of American deterrence towards Iran once again. However, the Gulf countries must achieve a balance of power with Iran, which is the basis for achieving deterrence through investing in fleets and the naval forces, especially in light of the United States’ unwillingness to confront Iran militarily. Such unwillingness means abandoning the Carter Doctrine “which is based on the United States’ commitment to defend the oil fields in the Arabian Gulf against external threats”. This was evident during the era of former US President Donald Trump, as his administration may have wanted that American ships must not commit to this mission forever. This coincided with the US Navy reducing its shipbuilding budget even as it reached its goal of building 355 ships. This coincided also with the decline in American dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Even with the United States announcing the establishment of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf in 2019, which comprises three of the Gulf countries, it is not clear how successful is this mechanism in achieving the goal for which it was established. It is not clear also to what extent will the American commitment within that alliance continue. Therefore, the Arabian Gulf countries will suffer from any disturbances that prevent oil from reaching foreign markets, but the permanent dilemma is the question of who will protect the shipping routes in the region if the United States withdraws from it? It is unlikely that another external power will contribute with a large maritime deployment in the Gulf. Even with the United Kingdom, Japan, India and China sending ships to the Arabian Gulf region to protect their trade convoys, these countries may not have the ability or desire to engage more in securing maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf region. 17

Studies, The International Institute for Strategic. 2021. The military balance 2021. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

128

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

This means that the task of securing free and open waterways will fall largely on the shoulders of the Gulf countries themselves, which face a major well-armed adversary. Although the Arabian Gulf countries have begun to buy submarines to enable them to confront the power of Iran under the sea, the full armament is supposed to include cruisers, frigates and unmanned watercrafts. However, the Arabian Gulf countries still have a long way to go in this regard, as their combined naval forces must be sufficient to deter and prevent Iran from seizing commercial ships or attacking them in the Strait of Hormuz or in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. The Gulf countries could either buy the ships needed to protect the waterways or develop their own industries in the long term. The solution is to go in both directions. Developing naval capabilities to achieve deterrence against Iranian aggression is not an easy matter, especially since the Gulf countries have focused in the past decades on land wars. However, allowing Iran to continue to target commercial ships in the Arabian Gulf will be much more expensive.18 What is reviewed above does not mean that the Gulf countries did not seek to develop their military capabilities in general and their naval capabilities in particular. Rather, there has been emergence of diversity in partnerships of the Gulf countries, including with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as with Egypt, in an effort to achieve a degree of strategic independence as a continuous goal for them. This has been evident in locally manufacturing some weapons. Despite the fact that the US, the UK and France together account for more than two-thirds of the total military purchases of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, there is an increasing presence of other powers in these markets. Egypt is also the largest export market for the UAE defense industries. However, the question is: will the diversity of these partnerships lead to self-security? There is still also another obstacle represented in the number of population as well as the required military expertise. The ability of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to develop successful and sustainable local defense industries is still a controversial matter, given that many local defense companies are still funded by the government and are unable to compete internationally. There is also disparity in military capabilities between the Gulf countries.19 While the UAE has demonstrated strong military capabilities in recent years, other Gulf countries may not have had the capacity to fully defend themselves. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether true strategic independence in this sense is the actual goal of the Gulf countries. Actually, very few countries around the world are actually self-sufficient in terms of purchasing weapons and military capabilities. However, the Arabian Gulf countries pay great attention to spending on armaments. This is evident when comparing them with other countries. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ranks second in the world after India in this respect, accounting for 7% or $46 billion of global arms imports. The UAE ranks fourth with 4.6%, but the 18

Samet, Daniel J. 2020. To deter Iran, the Gulf states need stronger navies. 20 February. Accessed September 11, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-deter-iran-the-gulf-sta tes-need-stronger-navies/. 19 Soubrier, Emma. 2020. Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: Power Competition, Diversified Cooperation. 24 March. Accessed September 11, 2021. https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 03/Soubrier_Gulf-Security_Online-1.pdf.

6.3 Building Naval Capabilities and the Gap Between …

129

Kingdom’s 2030 Vision provides for increasing domestic defense manufacturing to between 30 and 50% by 2030. This raises many questions, given this limited and short period of time, compared the defense life cycles, which are normally long. As for the United Arab Emirates, it has begun tangible steps for the localization of industries, including the announcement in 2014 that it will merge the majority of its defense companies into a new company, called the Emirates Defense Industries Company, to diversify the economy and adapt the national defense industry to serve the UAE armed forces. Despite being new in the field of manufacturing, the UAE is perhaps taking more realistic approach to enhancing its defense industrial capabilities, as in 2015 10% of the UAE’s GDP came from the manufacturing sector.20 A report by Jane’s Defense Weekly disclosed that the Arabian Gulf countries spent seven billion dollars in 2015 on the purchase of naval equipment, among other armament programs.21 It should be emphasized that the continued ability of the Gulf countries to maintain imports of food, medicine and other vital supplies is limited because they come through the Red sea. As for Iran, it can transfer supplies to ports outside the Arabian Gulf away from the Strait of Hormuz or across land from the north. The Arabian Gulf countries have developed naval forces dedicated to the Coast Guard, instead of working in the open seas. Such forces can be used in general in interception or law enforcement operations. As for the task of securing maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf, it falls on the United States and Western countries. However, it is noticed that Iran will not be affected at the same degree like that the Gulf countries are exposed to if freedom of navigation is restricted, and it can lay mines at a cheap cost, but the cost of removing them is high. On their part, insurance companies impose higher premiums on ships to work in areas reported to have mines. This leads to raising the cost of vital imports and exports. Iran has also designed other asymmetric naval weapons to impede the work of large, expensive Western ships such as aircraft carriers. In addition, Iran has been able to make progress in tactics of attack with small boats, known as ‘bee attack’ by means of a group of small boats loaded with a large explosive shipment that can simultaneously intercept a larger ship from more than one direction with the aim of detonating and sinking it. According to some reports, Iran has also developed an experimental computer that can remotely operate a boat without any human being on board. This technology was used in the Houthi attack on a Saudi ship in January 2017. This means that Iranian weapons and tactics at sea do not focus on controlling the sea waterways, but rather depriving its opponents of control over the jamming operation in war, which is a less costly process and does

20

Stanley-Lockman, Florence Gaub and Zoe. 2017. Defense Industries in Arab States: Players and Strategies. March. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSF iles/CP_141_Arab_Defence.pdf. 21 Observatory, Strategic. 2016. Programs for developing naval forces in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries during the years 2015–2016. 8 November. Accessed September 10, 2021. https:// www.strategy-watch.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03.

130

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

not require manpower, compared to requirements of establishing hegemony at sea.22 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp’s focus on naval seizure process is based on four basic components, which are fast attack boats, small boats, anti-ship cruise missiles and mines. These components are reinforced with the doctrine of asymmetric warfare, in addition to rapid naval attack vehicles. The IRGC has the ability to harass commercial cargo ships as well as use smaller, faster ships to lay mines. Iran also has three submarines bought from Russia. Therefore, it is superior to the Arabian Gulf countries that do not possess these submarines. Iran is also working on the production of locally-made submarines, as well as coastal defense cruise missiles, drones, and anti-ship ballistic missiles.23 This means that Iran’s naval capabilities present a huge challenge to the Gulf countries. This means also that Iran poses a huge challenge to the Gulf countries, due to it being distinguished with diverse strength that includes small boats, fast attack vessels, and the capabilities of intercepting attacks. Iran has also developed its naval fleet by purchasing modern mines, anti-ship missiles, many small boats, fast attack aircraft and small submarines. The goal is to strengthen its naval influence in the Strait of Hormuz. However, it should not be exaggerated to say that Iran has become a global naval power. This stance is supported by retired Admiral John Miller, who said, “The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was specifically established for the primary purpose of protecting the regime. The watercrafts can be used to mobilize large boats, deploy small numbers of forces on the shore and at oil facilities, and can also be used to plant mines, patrol the Strait of Hormuz and harass Merchant ships”. Despite the relevance of this vision, the current goal of the Iranian naval forces is not limited to protecting the regime, but rather protecting Iranian interests in the Gulf at the same time, and to be present and be deployed sufficiently to restrict or prevent foreign powers from reaching to the Strait of Hormuz. This is within Iran’s making use of its status as a maritime state with strategic advantages, in contrast to the landlocked countries. In addition, Iran has been waging ‘proxy wars’ by supporting its arms in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Nonetheless, if Iran wants to remain a naval power that represents a threat in the region, it will have to modernize its naval arsenal. However, it is unlikely that Iran will develop a naval force that would allow it to operate in international waters, mainly because this requires high financial and technical capabilities. Iran still may be able to acquire high-speed drones and explosives-laden watercrafts backed by armed drones to hit farther targets, and may also have modern smart mines that can be secretly deployed and their whereabouts known only when the ship hits one of them. What is reviewed above means that the Iranian navy, despite the difficulties it may face in modernization due to the economic

22

Roche, David de. 2019. Between hegemony and destabilization: Absence of balance in Gulf security. 22 May. Accessed September 10, 2020. https://agsiw.org/ar/dominance-versus-disruptionasymmetry-in-gulf-security-arabic. 23 Intelligence, Office of Naval. 2017. A Tale of Two Navies. February. Accessed September 12, 2021. https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf.

6.4 Challenges of Employing Technology in Maritime Security

131

sanctions imposed on Iran, remains the most threatening naval force in the Arabian Gulf region.24 The Gulf countries have realized that challenges to maritime security are no longer the dangers of piracy, maritime terrorism and smuggling operations, but rather Iran’s pursuit to tighten its grip on sea routes, due to its realization of the strategic importance of these routes, not only for maritime navigation, but as part of achieving its regional hegemony and the desire to change the balance of regional power, not only by interfering in neighboring countries, but also across important sea straits and trying to transfer the conflict to the seas. The Arabian Gulf countries are well aware of this matter. During the twenty-sixth meeting of officials of the border and coast guards in the Gulf countries, held in the Kingdom of Bahrain over the period from February 28 through March 2, 2017, Major General Tariq Al-Hassan, Bahrain’s Chief of Public Security, confirmed that “the security of the maritime borders is a major challenge for the Gulf countries”.25

6.4 Challenges of Employing Technology in Maritime Security Technology between dangers and the inability to support maritime security In spite of the importance of efforts undertaken by the Arabian Gulf countries in cooperation with international partners to safeguard the security of maritime navigation in the Arabian Gulf, the extent of success of these efforts is no longer linked to traditional military power in general and maritime capabilities in particular. It is linked, instead, to the challenges of technology. Like other fields, as much as technology has opportunities, it includes at the same time enormous challenges. The maritime security of the Arabian Gulf countries faces technology dangers, including the possibility of Gulf ports being targeted. On June 27th, 2017, the delivery of goods and containers at Khalifa Bin Salman Port in the Kingdom of Bahrain was disrupted as IBM Terminals, which operates the port, was subject to electronic piracy attacks, that harmed the company’s information technology systems in some of its stations around the world in what was known as the Ransom Virus. This resulted in operating the port manually. Although there were no losses, the manual method is not at the required speed or accuracy. Accumulation of containers and goods in ports is a matter that harms traders and importers alike.26 24

Pieters, Mary Elise. 2020. Gulf Security in the Face of Iran’s Challenges. 10 January. Accessed April 30, 2022. http://www.sirjournal.org/blogs/2020/1/10/gulf-security-in-the-face-of-irans-challe nges. 25 Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. Strategies of Gulf countries for Confronting Maritime Security threats. 1 January. Accessed September 11, 2021. https://059927f5-49c6-47fa-92e9-3d499a0e6da2. filesusr.com/ugd/c28a64_4e8d3f01097c482fbbb3534c7298a9dd.pdf. 26 Nsour, Mazen. 2017. The Ransom virus disrupts the delivery of goods at Khalifa Port. 30 June. Accessed November 13, 2017. https://albiladpress.com/news/2017/3181/finance/434236.html.

132

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

In spite of the importance of employing technology in the area of maritime security, there are still security gaps in the work of seaports. While the security requirements set by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) for maritime facilities, commercial ships and port areas, resulted in safeguarding maritime security to great extent, there are still regulatory gaps that prevent the fulfillment of these requirements. The sources of continuing security concern lie in the inability of port and customs authorities of countries to obtain comprehensive basic information related to the commercial enterprise to which the incoming commercial ships belong, and related to the authorities responsible for managing ships, crew management, charterers, and freight brokers. This concern is particularly high when vessels are containers, large carriers, car carriers and other cargo ships, as potential hiding places for explosive chemical, biological and radio-active and nuclear weapons and their components are numerous. Maritime security gaps and the places of weaknesses that prevent maritime security from being achieved can be identified as the “areas that terrorists are likely to target, such as merchant ships, ports and their facilities, or what they can use and exploit such as ships, cargo or crew, to carry out a terrorist act directed at the infrastructure of an important port”. This means that the challenges associated with being able to check contents of the shipping container in a visual and transparent manner without experiencing commercial delays remain the biggest challenge when it comes to countering maritime security threats. In light of importing tens of thousands of vehicles from different countries on a daily basis, they are kept in shipping ports and once they are unloaded from ships after reaching their destinations, they are driven to their storing area and prepared for the next stage of the supply chain. During these stages, vehicles may be used to carry out illegal smuggling operations. Despite the presence of closed-circuit television and other monitoring devices on the surface of the goods to monitor the procedures for receiving ferries, there are great opportunities for individuals from the crews of ships or terrorists to manipulate these imported vehicles. Given the huge number of vehicles and the speed at which the loaders and unloaders move cars from the ship to the shore, the chance of visually detecting manipulation is very limited. Therefore, the challenge for technology is to bring about a process for detecting whether imported vehicles have been manipulated. This is in addition to the challenge of creating a system that operates synchronously to improve port officials’ ability to obtain adequate assurance that ships and cargo operators do not intend to use them as a weapon, and minimizing delays in port as well. The challenge for technicians is to make early receivers aware of dangerous materials containers and barrels, and other means of storing hazardous materials, as well as ensuring that workers and seafarers have no intention to inflect harms when on board or while in their work at the shore-side. What is reviewed above means that there is need to: (1) national and international standards to identify, assess and compare terrorism-related dangers at the port level; (2) continuation of development of port security technologies; (3) straightforward and ready solutions for port security, which address administrative

6.4 Challenges of Employing Technology in Maritime Security

133

and technology interoperability; (4) more application of port security technologies of leading and distinguished shipping companies.27 Maritime transport is still in dire need of technology, given it has become one of the most important pillars of the global economy, as ships and ports serve as important points of contact for other transport systems, including aircraft, railways, commercial vehicles, buses and cars, in addition to the dangers of cyber-attacks that could be considered maritime terrorism. This means that it is necessary that experts in cyber security be available in maritime institutions, and this is the biggest challenge, given the accelerating technological revolution. According to a report by Eyefortransport Ltd., only 35% of solution or service providers have a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), only 43% of shipping companies have an Information Security Officer, and only 21% of logistics companies believe in the need for this person. In addition, 55% of the employees do not know when a cyber-attack occurs or what to do regarding it. Given the continuous development of the global economy, this has created enormous pressures on the infrastructure related to seaports. Therefore, it has become of great importance to the transport authorities in major countries around the world to promote the construction of the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) through the digitization of transportation infrastructure.28 Technology employment opportunities in maritime security With a close look at the use of modern technology to support the naval forces, we always find that these forces in all countries of the world have reservations and are always wary of radical innovation in the design of ships. Instead, they adopt gradualism in this respect, due to the harsh marine nature, which does not allow many options in the event of sudden threats. In addition, the giant naval ships represent a huge financial investment that aims to achieve a service period ranging between two to three decades. Therefore, the naval forces pursue the gradual development of themselves. The Austal Australian Company for building ships using aluminum provides a clear model for that development. It has begun as a small company in 1988, and has been able, over the past decade, to develop a range of designs for assistance high-performance aluminum ships and guard boat that can be modified and designed to meet the specific needs of the end user, whether it is a naval force, defense force, coast guard or any other paramilitary body.29 In light of the development of dangers of anti-ship systems, it was also necessary for the radars of ship defense systems and maritime security to keep pace with these technological developments to enable them to confront these threats. This prompted specialized international companies, including Raytheon, Kelvin Hughes, Saab, Silex IS and Northrop Grumman to develop high-tech radar systems to equip ships that 27

Ferriere, Dale. n.d. Using technology to bridge maritime security gapssecurity gaps. Accessed April 30, 2022. http://aturing.umcs.maine.edu/~markov/FerrierePaperJan06.pdf. 28 Mary Etienne, Sajid Khan and Mahadev Eakambaram. n.d. Intelligent Maritime: Modern Ships and Ports. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.delltechnologies.com/asset/nl-nl/solutions/oemsolutions/briefs-summaries/intelligent-maritime-oem-ebook-interactive.pdf. 29 Company, Austell Shipbuilding. n.d. Advanced marine structures for coastal security. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.austal.com/sites/default/files/related-documents.

134

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

are not equipped with the Aegis weapon system with this critical ability to survive. These systems have the ability to monitor threats with a greater accuracy compared to other radar systems. The ability to search for targets with these levels of accuracy is achieved through programming updates that enable the radar to detect a larger group of missile flight maneuvers. The value of this type of radar is about $4.4 billion.30 It should be emphasized that one of the most prominent areas of technology employment in the field of maritime security is artificial intelligence. It is estimated that the artificial intelligence market will reach $15.7 trillion by 2035, led by China with 26.1%, followed by North America with 14.5%, and South America is in third place with 11.5%. By that time, the contribution of artificial intelligence to the economic sector will account for about 37%. Perhaps the most prominent development in this field is the second generation of this technology, which includes important developments in the security of maritime navigation, where there are programs characterized with speed and accuracy in determining responsibility, regarding, for example, monitoring the movement of ships at sea. There is a system in space that can determine the identity of ships and determine the possibilities of smuggling between ships or not. Drones that photograph ships from above can expedite the decision-making regarding ships suspected of carrying prohibited things. The second generation of artificial intelligence translates these photos and makes a decision. These procedures are carried out through a purely automated system. Modern systems can determine whether ships are going on the path specified for them or not. Consequently, complex artificial intelligence applications would attack automatically without referring to the human decision maker. This means that vertical systems are replaced by horizontal systems, and these programs are used against terrorist groups that threaten security of maritime navigation. This means also that the power of countries will be determined in the future with the extent of their ability to use artificial intelligence applications in general and in maritime security in particular.31 The use of technology appears in three systems used by sailors to navigate: the positioning system, the map display system, and the automaton identification system. Some estimates indicate that during the period from 2020 to 2030, we may see smart ships traveling at sea without a crew and being completely monitored from the shore. These ships can take two forms, either autonomous or unmanned. An autonomous ship is steered by automated control systems on board ships but by a remote operator at a shore control facility. An unmanned ship is a step beyond autonomous control. Carrying out maritime simulation models is also a very important step within the strategies to safeguard maritime security. These models show the real effects of the alternative conditions and work methods on ships. They also allow interaction in crowded waterways, narrow channels and heavy sea traffic as well as dealing with dangerous cargo. Under these programs, new roles are identified for officers on board, such roles go beyond the traditional role of the security officer to be familiar with 30

Al-Qanoon, Raed. 2016. Maritime security radar systems: A critical vessel survival capability. 25 October. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://sdarabia.com/2016/10. 31 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2022. Military technology in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies.

6.4 Challenges of Employing Technology in Maritime Security

135

electronic protection programs and Internet security. There are several requirements to implement effective simulation programs, including reviewing current maritime simulation to identify the equipment and systems to be used, then determining how to integrate these equipment and systems together, and then determine how to attack or destroy cyber threats. By means of training, awareness and education, sailors can thwart cyber intrusions. This does not mean that maritime security dangers, especially cyber ones, will come to an end. Instead, appropriate training and raising awareness among sailors through simulation programs means being prepared to take appropriate measures when necessary.32 Challenges to employing technology in maritime security In light of the increase in cyber threats to maritime security, it has been observed that many countries have started to think about returning to rely on alternative maritime navigation systems, which roots go back to wireless technology of the Second World War. It has been noted that ships, unlike aircrafts, lack alternative navigation systems. If the positioning system gets out of order, ships could potentially skew or collide with other ships. South Korea has already begun to develop an alternative system using ground-based technology. In the United States, GPS jamming disrupted operations at two ports in 2014 and 2015. This is in addition to a cyberattack that hit AB Muller Maersk company in June 2017. The problem with GPS and other global navigation satellite systems involve that their signals are weak, transmitting from 12,500 miles above the earth’s surface, consequently can be easily jammed. The system built during World War II, however, is difficult to be jammed, as the normal signal in it is about 1.3 million times stronger than the GPS signal, and jamming it requires a powerful transmitter, a huge antenna, and a large amount of electricity. All these things are easy to be detected. Despite the idea being raised in several countries, including the US House of Representatives approving a bill that provides for the Secretary of Transport to set up the ‘eLoran’ system, the issue did not receive more attention. The issue was also raised in Russia and a number of European countries, but it has not received more attention, because it either faced the cost obstacle for many countries or because these countries focus on competing in technological development regarding maritime security.33 Despite the importance of smart ships, education plays a major role in facing the challenges of the digital world in general. Maritime education is not excluded from this reality, which has become inevitable. The development of the so-called smart shipping in the near future will mean that investment in education and new skills will be as important as the technology itself, and perhaps even more important. Therefore, the educated shipping workers of the future should have the following key traits: Diversity, personal achievement, and a readiness to address challenges of 32

Mochen, Emile. 2018. Combating on Internet threats to maritime security. Accessed April 30, 2022. http://ar.marinelink.com/news/. 33 Sol, Jonathan. 2017. Cyber threats push the world of marine navigation back to the days of wireless devices. Accessed August 27, 2021. https://cn.reuters.com/article/navigation-threats-dr3idARAKBN1AN0WQ.

136

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

the future. The idea of fully smart ships is too risky, making it necessary to secure the possibility of human intervention through shore operator, as smart maritime action can amplify rather than reduce existing problems. It can even create new problems. Therefore, the focus should be only on remote-controlled ships, which differ in that they mix autonomous ship operation and propulsion or central artificial intelligence for some time, and operating ships by human intelligence for some other time. Fully autonomous commercial vessels without crew members on board for the entire voyage may not be the best and most effective solution, especially when it comes to ocean transportation. This is mainly due to the risks arising from external and internal factors that can damage or even paralyze ship operating system, including the risks of the radical changes that may accompany digitization of ships, and the possible new schemes for the composition of the ships’ crews. Therefore, the ideal smart cargo ships are the intermediate version of fully autonomous and fully manned ships. In other words, this version is a mixture of a manned and an autonomous ship, or what is called a semi-autonomous vessel.34 As the need for shipping continues to increase well beyond 2030, primarily driven by population growth and economic boom that entails increased demand for food, energy and water supplies, it continues to face challenges including growing concerns about climate change with the emergence of legislation restricting emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). This will require reducing energy consumption by water transport through measures including, for example, the use of cleaner fuels, such as liquefied natural gas, ship electricity, or the use of renewable energy sources and fuel cells. Monitoring emissions by ships is also required by coastal countries, for the sake of regulatory enforcement of regulations stipulated therein. Casualty free shipping, accident prevention standards, improved ship security measures, safety and security and pollution prevention are all very important elements of sea transportation. Nevertheless, the serious accidents that occur at sea do not show any signs of reconsidering these elements despite the large investments and the application of new technologies. This is in spite of consequences of serious sea accidents that result in loss of life, environmental pollution and loss of goods. Therefore, the development of the human resources and training are necessary to reduce these incidents as well as to manage the applications of new technologies as well, especially the interaction between humans and machines. In this respect, it is possible to benefit from strategies developed by some regional organizations to counter threats to maritime security, including the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), and the action plan associated to it. It is a comprehensive strategy to address all the challenges that emerge from the global maritime field and that may affect people, activities or infrastructure within the European Union,35 and some of its elements can be used to counter maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf region. 34

Alop, Anatoli. 2019. The Challenges of the Digital Technology Era for Maritime Education and Training. April. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333152469_ The_Challenges_of_the_Digital_Technology_Era_for_Maritime_Education_and_Training. 35 N.d. Smarter safer and greener for a sustainable European maritime sector. Accessed October 1, 2021. https://www.ecmar.eu/media/1813/ecmar-brochure-maritme-technology-challenges-2030. pdf.

6.5 Conflict and Rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Its Impact …

137

6.5 Conflict and Rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Its Impact on the Security of Maritime Navigation The Horn of Africa is of strategic importance to the Arabian Gulf countries and many regional countries as well as the major powers in the world. The Horn of Africa should not be viewed in a narrow geographical sense, which includes four countries: Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Instead, the geopolitical and economic dimensions must be added to that concept to include, in addition to the countries mentioned above, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Regardless of who is concerned, the region is of strategic importance as it borders the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab, and is geographically opposite to the oil wells in the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf and adjacent to the Great Lakes region in Central Africa, which is rich in diverse resources of minerals. Therefore, that region has been subject to regional and global rivalry for decades. In other words, the Horn of Africa is a strategic point of contact between two vital regions.36 There are two blocs in the Middle East that compete within the maritime countries of the Horn of Africa. In Eritrea and Somaliland, the UAE is militarily present, and the same interests are shared by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The other bloc involves Turkey that is allied with Qatar. This competition between the two blocs has led to creation of new dynamics within and between African countries. If we take into account that the Horn of Africa region is historically linked to the Ottoman Empire, it is of a special importance for Turkey, which seeks to expand its influence in Africa. As for the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, which imports foodstuffs through the Horn of Africa, the importance of this region has increased to them, especially after their participation in the war in Yemen that began in 2015; this is in addition to Qatar, which has close relations with Turkey. The reason for this is that the support of by countries of the Horn of Africa for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia guarantees cut off supplies to the Houthi group, which is loyal to Iran. In general, the Horn of Africa and the African coast on the Red Sea have a strategic geographical location, as they are near one of the most important maritime trade routes linking Europe and Asia. The increase in the number of maritime piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia in the first decade of the twenty-first century has led to an increase in the international military presence to protect shipping in that region.37 In spite of necessity to find a common framework to counter threats to the security of maritime navigation in the Horn of Africa, which includes the strategic Bab alMandab Strait, this did not find its way on the ground. Instead, the region witnessed a frantic rivalry between regional and global powers that resulted in the establishment of a series of military bases. In 2015, the UAE began to use the Eritrean port of Assab as a springboard against the Houthis in Yemen and then started building a 36

Mohammed, Hashem Ali Hamid. 2020. Transformations and Changes in the Horn of Africa. 19 November. Accessed June 16, 2021. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/169821. 37 Czerep, J˛ edrzej. 2018. Competition between Regional Powers on the Horn of Africa. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://pism.pl/publications/Competition_between_Regional_Powers_ on_the_Horn_of_Africa.

138

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

multi-use base. The UAE’s DP World also obtained a license in Berbera in 2016. An agreement was also signed between a UAE port company and the Puntland region in Somalia in 2017 to modernize a multi-use commercial port. In 2018, Qatar and Sudan signed an agreement to develop the largest container port on the Red Sea. In 2018 also, Qatar and Somalia signed a series of cooperation agreements, including the development of some ports. As for Turkey, it announced an agreement with Sudan in 2018 to develop Suakin Port. Turkey also opened a 2.5 km military training facility in Mogadishu in 2017 to train Somali soldiers. As for Saudi Arabia, it has started a series of negotiations to establish a Saudi military facility in Djibouti. China also opened a military base in Djibouti in 2017, with an area of 364,000 km2 . The United States rented Le Monnet Base of the French Foreign Legion from Djibouti in 2001. This base, which was renewed and expanded, is under the control of the American military command in Africa, and it is the only American military base in Africa. As for France, it established the 188 air base in Djibouti in 1946 and has developed it. Italy established a military base in Djibouti in 2013. Japan opened a military facility in Djibouti with an area of 121,000 km2 in 2011. It was agreed between Russia and Eritrea in 2018 to establish a Russian logistic base in one of the ports of Eritrea.38 What is reviewed above means an increase in the number and size of foreign military deployments in the Horn of Africa, especially after 2011. Two things are noted regarding these deployments. The first is entry of international powers, such as China and Japan, into the line of interaction in the Horn of Africa, by means of establishment of military bases in that region. This is a new development from countries that previously did not attach importance to military presence outside their territories. Second, There is not much direct hostility between the various foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa at the present time, as the motivation behind the mobilization of forces in the region is international cooperation and agreement on the need to respond to a range of unconventional threats, which include combating terrorism, piracy and other maritime crimes, evacuating citizens in emergency situations and providing humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, it can be said that joint efforts to enhance the regional security of the various countries in that region have been overshadowed by geopolitical, commercial and military rivalry, which will has negative effects on regional stability in the long run. For example, the Chinese government considers the military base as a means to support and protect Chinese economic interests in the Horn of Africa and a naval diplomatic tool. It has been noted also that the Chinese base has led to increasing tension with the United States since its opening, as the Chinese base members were accused of using lasers to blind American pilots, accusations that China denied. There is growing concern in the United States also that it may have to abandon its base in Djibouti as a result of China’s control of the port of Doraleh. Senior military officials in the United States also have expectations that the Djibouti base will be the first in a network of Chinese military bases. They consider it a part of the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, as part of an effort to build a network of military and commercial facilities within what is called the ‘Pearl 38

Vertin, Zach. 2019. The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the new geopolitics of the Red Sea, 8 August. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/ar/research.

6.5 Conflict and Rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Its Impact …

139

String Strategy’. As for the French base in Djibouti, it is of strategic importance as it enables France to send its nuclear attack submarines to the Indian Ocean. The value of renting French military installations in Djibouti is about 36 million dollars annually. India, as well, has sought to establish a network of military installations across the Indian Ocean to protect the waterways of its trade from piracy, as well as to counter the Chinese military presence in the region. India has announced plans to establish a network of 32 coastal radar monitoring stations to monitor the maritime regions in Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives and Sri Lanka. In 2015, India established a coastal radar system in Seychelles Islands. The military agreement signed between India and Seychelles provides for the development of a joint military facility on the island of Assumption, as well as cooperation between the two sides in maritime security, especially combating piracy and strengthening the control and monitoring of over-fishing, illegal fishing, drug and human-trafficking. The Japanese base in Djibouti is considered a part of Japan’s efforts to balance China’s growing influence in Africa. As for Russia, it is seeking to build a military base in Sudan, as Djibouti refused Russia’s request to build a military base on its soil for it not to be the seat of proxy wars. In general, there are four international military missions that include a number of foreign forces operating in the Horn of Africa since 2002, namely: Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atlanta, Operation Ocean Shield, and the EU Training Mission in Somalia.39 The steady increase in the number of countries with security engagements in the Horn of Africa has further militarized the region, as security developments in the Horn of Africa are being integrated into geopolitical and geo-economic agendas as part of much broader military networks across the Middle East, the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. The forces deployed in the area did not declare hostility to each other at the present time, which allowed the establishment of several bases in Djibouti in very close proximity to each other. However, there is intensification of rivalry beyond the Horn of Africa in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific region and its extension to the Horn of Africa, which has resulted in increased tension between external actors in the area of security. Consequently, it is likely that Asian and European armies will strengthen their presence in the Horn of Africa as well as in the neighboring areas of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean during the next decade. This is in addition to the forces already present in the region. Therefore, proxy conflicts and increased geopolitical tensions are possible, and also mean that the countries of the Horn of Africa will face an increasing challenge of pressure to align with or join a particular security group. In addition, the strategic rivalry between China and India, as well as the instability in Somalia due to extension of tensions in the Middle East and the Gulf, are developments that will have repercussions on the Horn of Africa as a whole, a region that still lacks a good adaptation to the new foreign security 39

Melvin, Neil John. 2019. The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region. April. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-background-papers/foreignmilitary-presence-horn-africa-region#:~:text=A%20wide%20variety%20of%20international,build% 2Dup%20of%20naval%20forces.

140

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

policies. Therefore, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will have to find Ways to manage military, naval and security issues within and across the continent and to manage the growing regional rivalry between the great powers. The other option is marginalization through resorting to alternative frameworks, security coalitions and bilateral relations.40 As for Russia, its interest in the Horn of Africa dates back to the seventies and the eighties of the last century, when the region was an arena for the Cold War with the United States. With the increasing dangers of piracy in that region in 2008, and what Russia saw as a threat to Russian commercial shipping navigating in the Bab alMandab Strait, Russia supported the role of the United Nations to combat piracy. In October 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia aims to “Stop hostilities of Somali pirates”. He also called upon the UN Security Council to issue a resolution to combat this phenomenon. Russia’s contribution to anti-piracy efforts in Somalia, which included the deployment of the warship Neustrashimy to guard the Gulf of Aden and coordination with the British Royal Navy ships (HMS Cumberland) on 12 November 2008 to combat piracy, was a rare opportunity for cooperation with The United States and Europe after the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West following the Georgia crisis in August 2008. However, Russia’s efforts to combat piracy in Somalia did not result in expanding its geopolitical presence in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, Russia presence in this respect was a symbolic presence. There are two goals that push Russia to pay special attention to the region. The first is related to Russia’s immediate security policy, and is represented in securing arms contracts. The second goal is related to Russian establishing itself as a vital investor in the development of defense infrastructure. Once Moscow’s presence as a great power in the Horn of Africa becomes more hidden, Russia will want to build a naval base there. This explains Russia’s efforts to increase its arms sales to countries in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia imported $71 million worth of Russian weapons in 2019, which is more than any country in East Africa. In January 2020, Russia announced that it would deliver two Ansat helicopters to Eritrea by the end of the year. In October 2019, Eritrea also expressed interest in purchasing Russian missile boats, helicopter aircraft and small-sized weapons. In April 2018, Russia signed a defense cooperation agreement with Ethiopia, comprising provisions for peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy training. In December 2019, the Ethiopian army sent 1,000 naval officers to Russia for training with the aim of enhancing their naval capabilities off the coast of Djibouti. Although Russia does not depend on the Bab al-Mandab Strait primarily for its commercial activities, its position alongside Saudi Arabia as de facto guarantors of the oil price, cause Moscow to have a constant concern about supply disruptions in relation to

40

Melvin, Neil John. 2019. The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-insights-peace-and-sec urity/new-external-security-politics-horn-africa-region.

References

141

this strategic commercial sea route through which 500,000–700,000 barrels of Saudi Arabia’s oil is transported daily.41 Although the multiplicity of military presence in the Horn of Africa is an obstacle to the existence of specific regional or global cooperation to counter threats to maritime security, this presence had positive aspects, especially during crises. For example, the opening of China’s military base in Djibouti played an important role in supporting anti-piracy operations by the multinational forces off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The 2015 evacuation of hundreds of Chinese and foreigners from Yemen on board a People’s Liberation Army frigate that sailed from the coast of Somalia has reflected the importance of China having a military logistics base in conflict areas, which can be employed during crises. The number of those who were evacuated reached 825 people from the port of Aden, including 225 foreign nationals from the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. The location of Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea is also of paramount importance for the maritime side of the Belt and Road Initiative, and as a result for China’s economic interests. According to the latest reports and statistics, the cost of projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative in Djibouti is estimated at $9.8 billion.42

References Agency, Al-Ain News. 2017. The Indian Ocean Dialogue concluded it events in Abu Dhabi with strengthening maritime security and safety, 17 October. https://al-ain.com/article/conclusionof-the-indian-ocean-dialogue. Accessed 20 Aug 2020. Agency, Reuters News. 2020. A Japanese warship sails to the Gulf of Oman to guard oil tankers, 2 February. https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-meast-as2-idARAKBN1ZW02Q. Accessed 25 Aug 2021. Agency, Turkish News. 2021. NATO condemns the attack on an Israeli oil tanker off the Gulf of Oman, 4 August. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/. Accessed 16 Nov 2021. Alop, Anatoli. 2019. The challenges of the digital technology era for maritime education and training, April. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333152469_The_Challenges_of_the_ Digital_Technology_Era_for_Maritime_Education_and_Training. Accessed 30 April 2022. Al-Qanoon, Raed. 2016. Maritime security radar systems: A critical vessel survival capability, 25 October. https://sdarabia.com/2016/10. Accessed 30 April 2022. Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2018. Military alliances in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. 2022. Military technology in the Middle East. Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies. Berg, Anca-Elena Ursu, and Willem van den. 2018. China and the EU in the Horn of Africa: Competition and cooperation? https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/PB_China_and_ the_EU_in_the_Horn_of_Africa.pdf. Accessed 30 April 2022. 41

Ramani, Samuel. 2020. Engaged opportunism Russia’s role in the Horn of Africa. 2 July. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/07/engaged-opportunism-russias-rolein-the-horn-of-africa/. 42 Berg, Anca-Elena Ursu and Willem van den. 2018. China and the EU in the Horn of Africa: competition and cooperation? Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/ files/2018-04/PB_China_and_the_EU_in_the_Horn_of_Africa.pdf.

142

6 Obstacles to Achieving Maritime Security for the Arabian …

Company, Austell Shipbuilding. n.d. Advanced marine structures for coastal security. https://www. austal.com/sites/default/files/related-documents. Accessed 30 April 2022. Czerep, J˛edrzej. 2018. Competition between regional powers on the Horn of Africa. https://pism.pl/ publications/Competition_between_Regional_Powers_on_the_Horn_of_Africa. Accessed 30 April 2022. Darawshah, Ahmed. 2019. The International Maritime Force in the Gulf... The start is faltering, 18 August. https://www.arab48.com/%D8. Accessed 18 Aug 2022. Ferriere, Dale. n.d. Using technology to bridge maritime security gaps. http://aturing.umcs.maine. edu/~markov/FerrierePaperJan06.pdf. Accessed 30 April 2022. Heller, Christian. 2019. One coalition? Challenges of establishing a maritime coalition in the Gulf, 6 August. https://agsiw.org/ar/party-of-one-maritime-coalition-challenges-in-the-gulfarabic. Accessed 14 Aug 2021. Intelligence, Office of Naval. 2017. A tale of two navies, February. https://www.oni.navy.mil/Por tals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf. Accessed 12 Sept 2021. Ishaq, Sally Khalifa. 2019. International rivalry over international waterways: The US-led Naval Military Coalition for navigation in the Gulf as a model. Derasat 75–76. Janardhan, Narayanappa. 2020. The impact of cooperation and rivalry in the Indian Ocean region on the security of the Arabian Gulf. Derasat 134–137. Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. Maritime security of the Arab Gulf States: Threats and capabilities. Cambridge: Gulf Research Center. Keshk, Ashraf Mohammed. 2021. Strategies of Gulf countries for confronting maritime security threats, 1 January. https://059927f5-49c6-47fa-92e9-3d499a0e6da2.filesusr.com/ugd/c28a64_ 4e8d3f01097c482fbbb3534c7298a9dd.pdf. Accessed 11 Sept 2021. Mary Etienne, Sajid Khan, and Mahadev Eakambaram. n.d. Intelligent maritime: Modern ships and ports. https://www.delltechnologies.com/asset/nl-nl/solutions/oem-solutions/briefssummaries/intelligent-maritime-oem-ebook-interactive.pdf. Accessed 30 April 2022. Melvin, Neil John. 2019a. The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa Region, April. https:// www.sipri.org/publications/2019a/sipri-background-papers/foreign-military-presence-horn-afr ica-region#:~:text=A%20wide%20variety%20of%20international,build%2Dup%20of%20n aval%20forces. Accessed 30 April 2022. Melvin, Neil John. 2019b. The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa Region. https:// www.sipri.org/publications/2019b/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/new-external-security-pol itics-horn-africa-region. Accessed 30 April 2022. Mihm, Michael Eisenstadt-Henry. 2021. Will aircraft carriers deter Iran? 6 August. https://www.was hingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/hl-trd-hamlat-altayrat-ayran. Accessed 20 Aug 2021. Mochen, Emile. 2018. Combating on Internet threats to maritime security. http://ar.marinelink.com/ news/. Accessed 30 April 2022. Mohammed, Hashem Ali Hamid. 2020. Transformations and changes in the Horn of Africa, 19 November. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/169821. Accessed 16 June 2021. N.d. Smarter safer and greener for a sustainable European maritime sector. https://www.ecmar.eu/ media/1813/ecmar-brochure-maritme-technology-challenges-2030.pdf. Accessed 1 Oct 2021. Newspaper, Al-sharq Al-Awsat. 2019. The United States requests NATO support for a coalition for security of international waterways, 28 June. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1788361. Accessed Aug 2021. Nsour, Mazen. 2017. The Ransom virus disrupts the delivery of goods at Khalifa Port, 30 June. https://albiladpress.com/news/2017/3181/finance/434236.html. Accessed 13 Nov 2017. Observatory, Strategic. 2016. Programs for developing naval forces in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries during the years 2015–2016, 8 November. https://www.strategy-watch.com/wp-con tent/uploads/2017/03. Accessed 10 Sept 2021. Pieters, Mary Elise. 2020. Gulf security in the face of Iran’s challenges, 10 January. http://www.sir journal.org/blogs/2020/1/10/gulf-security-in-the-face-of-irans-challenges. Accessed 30 April 2022.

References

143

Ramani, Samuel. 2020. Engaged opportunism Russia’s role in the Horn of Africa, 2 July. https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/07/engaged-opportunism-russias-role-in-the-horn-ofafrica/. Accessed 30 April 2022. Roche, David de. 2019. Between hegemony and destabilization: Absence of balance in Gulf security, 22 May. https://agsiw.org/ar/dominance-versus-disruption-asymmetry-in-gulf-security-arabic. Accessed 10 Sept 2020. Samet, Daniel J. 2020. To deter Iran, the Gulf states need stronger navies, 20 February. https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-deter-iran-the-gulf-states-need-stronger-nav ies/. Accessed 11 Sept 2021. Singh, Abhijit. 2020. The development of India’s maritime status in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf region, 1 August. https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/eda-ins ight-aug-2020-arb-abhijit.pdf. Accessed 14 Aug 2021. Sol, Jonathan. 2017. Cyber threats push the world of marine navigation back to the days of wireless devices. https://cn.reuters.com/article/navigation-threats-dr3-idARAKBN1AN0WQ. Accessed 27 Aug 2021. Soubrier, Emma. 2020. Gulf security in a multipolar world: Power competition, diversified cooperation, 24 March. https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Soubrier_Gulf-Security_Onl ine-1.pdf. Accessed 11 Sept 2021. Stanley-Lockman, Florence Gaub, and Zoe. 2017. Defense industries in Arab States: Players and strategies, March. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_141_Arab_D efence.pdf. Accessed 30 April 2022. Studies, The International Institute for Strategic. 2021. The military balance 2021. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Vertin, Zach. 2019. The Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the new geopolitics of the Red Sea, 8 August. https://www.brookings.edu/ar/research. Accessed 30 April 2022. Website, Forbes Middle East. 2013. Will the Indian Ocean become the center of the world again? 25 December. https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/ar/leadership/entrepreneurship/. Accessed 21 Aug 2021.

Book Summary

Although the security threats to countries are numerous, threats to maritime security have become the most dangerous ones, and they are increasing day after day. Unlike the land, the seas are vast and open areas that cannot be easily controlled. In spite of the existence of international agreements that oblige countries to respect maritime rights of each other, most notably the 1982 United Nations Convention on to the Law of the Sea, the matter is ultimately subject to the power of countries and their ability to extend their control over the seas. This issue has been of interest to many researchers for decades. They have linked the power of countries with the extent of their maritime influence. Nonetheless, as much as maritime countries have advantages, the more threats they face than landlocked countries. These threats increase if the geostrategic regions surrounding the maritime countries are witnessing chronic conflicts. Such conflicts are directly reflected on maritime security, as terrorist groups consider the seas a new arena for conflicts. With a cheap boat that can be remotely detonated, a ship loaded with thousands of tons of oil worth millions of dollars can be destroyed. The biggest challenge is not the increase in threats to sea security. Rather, some countries do not have sufficient maritime capabilities to counter these threats. Even, some countries seek to employ modern technology to target commercial shipping carriers, and this is a qualitative development in the area of maritime security threats. Based on what is reviewed above, this book discusses the maritime security threats to the Arabian Gulf countries from a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond addressing traditional threats and ways to counter them. The book goes further by going back to history to analyze the role of the Arabian Gulf countries in addressing maritime security crises and how they dealt with them. In other words, the book links the past to the present and tackle the future and the challenges it poses for the Arabian Gulf countries in their efforts to safeguard maritime security. Within this general framework, this book is divided into six chapters. The third chapter deals with the concept and dimensions of maritime security, as well as the historical and legal dimensions. At the conceptual level, it is noted that there is interest in the concept of maritime security. However, this was only during the past few decades,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4

145

146

Book Summary

and that concept differs not only in different schools of thought, but also in view of the different interests of the countries themselves. With multiplicity of stances, there are five areas that can be addressed about the concept of maritime security. They are the security of the seas themselves, the management of the oceans, the protection of maritime borders, military operations at sea, and security measures to regulate maritime transport. There have been many definitions of maritime security, and some researchers have even linked the concept of maritime security and the state’s maritime power by defining criteria by which countries can be classified as being maritime or not. These criteria apply to a large extent to the Arabian Gulf countries. In this respect, it should be taken into consideration that as much as maritime countries enjoy comparative advantages, compared to landlocked countries, they face dangers at the same time. The third chapter also analyzes the events of the 1980–1988 Iraq– Iran war, which included the ‘tanker war’, involving the two countries targeting tankers that leave and go to ports of the Gulf countries as well as ports of the two parties to the war. Although the Arabian Gulf countries were not a party to that war, they had to be within its confrontations. The State of Kuwait announced flying flags of Western countries on its tankers to protect them from attacks during that war. This prompted then US President Donald Reagan to announce initiation of what is known as Operation Serious Will, which is a naval coalition for those who wish to join it from Western countries to protect Gulf oil tankers against these attacks. These confrontations raised legal and security problems at the time, especially regarding the foundations of initiation of such operation and challenges to it, including the mine war. Many lessons learned from the tanker war are useful these days, given the repeated Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea in 2019 and 2021. This chapter also deals with the legal regulation of the sea routes in the Arabian Gulf region (the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab). Despite the fact that they are international shipping routes subject to rules of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the dilemma does not lie in the text of this agreement, but in the extent of countries’ compliance with it. Controversy was raised also over the concept of the territorial sea and the right of navigating in sea routes and attempts by some countries to circumvent the text of that convention, and others problems, such as non-ratification of the convention by some countries, and attempts to differentiate between merchant ships and warships, regarding the eligibility and timing of navigating in these straits. In addition, reflection of regional conflicts on the safety and security of maritime navigation in these two straits, and attempts by some parties to employ the waterways as bargaining chips within their regional and international conflicts, mean that the dilemma does not lie in the international legal rules regulating work at sea, but rather in the absence of an international mandatory authority to obligate countries to abide by them. This largely applies to the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. As for the fourth chapter, it deals with the traditional and new maritime security threats to the Arabian Gulf countries. The chapter begins with analyzing the targeting of oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019 and 2021, reviewing these attacks and trying to explain their timing and implications for the maritime security of the Gulf countries and regional security in general, and their impact on

Book Summary

147

oil prices and insurance fees for ships destined for the Arabian Gulf region, and most importantly, the global reaction in general and the US reaction in particular. Such reaction involved the United States’ announcement of increasing deterrence mechanisms in the Arabian Gulf region. The second chapter addresses also the future paths as a result of this qualitative development regarding maritime security threats, whether the possibility of emergence of a new tanker war in the Arabian Gulf again, similar to the scenario of the eighties, or the occurrence of limited confrontations in this region. Regardless of the occurrence of either of the two scenarios, the most important result in the context of these developments is that rules of the game in the regional tension in the Arabian Gulf region have changed. This involved, as a whole, employing technology in these conflicts in a way that affects vital facilities as well as carriers of commercial shipments. This is a major challenge, in addition to the possibility of obstruction of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, without a complete closure of it. Such challenge has an impact on vital interests of some parties that have vital interests with that region. Although Iran’s threat to close the strait is not new, the author wanted to put this issue into an academic discussion based on proofs and evidence regarding two perspectives. The first perspective regards Iran’s closure of the Strait as possible. Under the second perspective, it is believed that it is not possible for Iran to declare closure of the strait because it represents a red line in the context of the regional conflict equation, and given its impact on the security of the entire world as well. Given the military superiority of the United States over Iran, the outcome of military confrontation is well known. It is also important to discuss the impact of obstructing navigation in that vital sea route on interests of many parties, including China, India and the European Union, an issue addressed by author in some detail. China relies heavily on oil imports from Iran. This is true also regarding India, which imported 24 million tons of oil from Iran at the end of 2020, and the European Union member states that depend on the Arabian Gulf oil, as well as trade exchanges with these countries. Turkey also has important commercial exchanges with some Arabian Gulf countries. The second chapter also deals with dangers of maritime piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal smuggling and arms trafficking, by analyzing dangers of this phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. The total expenditures to confront the phenomenon of piracy in that region in 2008 amounted to about $7 billion, compared to $10 billion in all other regions of the world. Despite the decline of piracy since 2011, it still represents a threat to the maritime security of the Arabian Gulf countries, especially in light of continuation of regional crises in the geostrategic range of vital waterways and the continuation of proxy wars. The second chapter addresses also maritime terrorism with reference to some examples, including documents that Al-Qaeda was targeting naval targets in the Arabian Gulf region. Addressed also is Illegal smuggling operations, especially smuggling drugs, which is a huge threat to the Gulf countries given their proximity to areas of drug production and trade. During the period 2016-2018, some 407 information sharing operations were carried out among the Arabian Gulf countries, resulting in the seizure of 20 million narcotic tablets and 100kgs of narcotic substances. The sea ports are the most dangerous in this respect. Threats of human trafficking are also addressed in the second chapter, as the Horn of Africa is considered a source of waves of

148

Book Summary

illegal immigration heading to the Arabian Gulf countries in search of better living opportunities. In 2018 and 2019, the number of illegal immigrants from the Horn of Africa region to Yemen, on their way to the Arabian Gulf countries, was estimated at 300,000. Addressed as well is illegal fishing and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. The fifth chapter deals with the mechanisms of the Arabian Gulf countries to safeguard maritime security, which vary between self-mechanisms and cooperation at the regional level, in addition to cooperation at the international level. The Arabian Gulf countries have realized the growing threats to maritime security, which requires working in parallel tracks, given the existence of interests of regional and international parties in safeguarding maritime security. At the level of self-mechanisms, the Unified Maritime Duty Force (81) of the Gulf countries was established in 2014 within the military part of the Peninsula Shield Forces. The Unified Maritime Operations Center for the Gulf countries was also established in 2016, which is an important coordination mechanism, not only between the Arabian Gulf countries, but also with similar bodies related to maritime security, including the Maritime Security Center in Singapore, the Emergency and Piracy Center in Malaysia. This is in addition to cooperation among the Gulf countries by signing some contracts for the production of some naval weapons, as well as increasing the pace of joint naval drills, which include simulating potential maritime confrontations. The targeting of oil tankers in 2019 and 2021 has also led to decisions by some Gulf countries to send ships to international waters to secure maritime navigation. At the level of each Gulf country separately, strengthening naval capabilities has become a priority within armaments procurement in general. At the regional level, the Gulf countries have been keen to participate in mechanism aimed at confronting threats to maritime security, including the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which was established in 2009 by 17 countries, including two of the Arabian Gulf countries. This code is based on rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and seeks military and maritime cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation. In 2017, member states of the Code of Conduct called for expanding its framework of action to include transnational maritime crimes. The Council of the Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which was initiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2020, is another regional mechanism. Set up at an initiative by Saudi Arabia in 2020, goals of the council include safeguarding maritime security in the Red Sea. It comprises, along with Saudi Arabia, seven countries. There is no doubt that this council achieves at the same time the balance of power in this region of the world. At the level of international partnerships, and in the wake of the attacks that targeted oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019, the US administration of the former president Trump announced the establishment of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf Region in November 2019, comprising 6 countries, including 3 Gulf countries namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. This coalition is for defensive purposes only. It does not aim to launch attacks against any party in the region. It is based on the experience of the United States and its partners from the

Book Summary

149

Arabian Gulf countries in safeguarding the security of maritime navigation in that region. The third chapter tackles also the France-led European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, establishment of which was announced in 2020. This mission is headquartered in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates and is called the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, and includes eight countries. The work of this mission complements the work of the US-led coalition for the same purpose. As for the sixth chapter, it deals with obstacles to achieving maritime security for the Arabian Gulf countries. Despite the efforts and mechanisms that the Gulf countries established or participated to safeguard maritime security, they still face challenges. The first of these challenges involves the difficulties facing the work of the Naval Military Coalition for Maritime Security in the Gulf led by the United States, including the capabilities necessary for the work of this coalition, as the United States does not want to bear any additional military burdens. This is in addition to the fact that the coalition comprises only 6 countries. This low number of member states means that countries have different approaches to the mechanism of countering maritime threats. There is also the controversy over the legal reference for that coalition. It may be better for countries of the world to start their efforts in this respect depending on the international task forces operating in the Arabian Gulf region, which includes 33 countries and operates in vast maritime areas and has cumulative experiences on ways to counter maritime security threats. The second challenge addressed by the fourth chapter is capacity-building and the gap between Iran and the Gulf countries in the field of naval armament. Although the Arabian Gulf countries have superiority in military spending according to the relevant international reports, Iran still has a clear advantage in the number of watercrafts. Iran has 398 watercrafts, compared to 375 watercrafts in the six Gulf countries. Perhaps the important thing is that building naval capabilities is a strategic necessity for the Gulf countries that obtain their vital supplies of food and medicine by sea transport. The third challenge is related to challenges to employing technology to counter maritime security threats, including countering cyber-attacks that can disrupt the work of major ports for several days, resulting in heavy economic losses, in addition to the challenge of the ability of modern devices to detect smuggling operations to ensure, at the same time, regular loading and unloading of goods. There is also the controversy regarding thinking about the possibility of returning to the fixed radar system used during the Second World War, to avoid attempts of terrorist groups to penetrate the communication network of modern radar devices, to mislead the course of ships at sea and to easily take control of them. Another challenge in this regard is related to increasing the efficiency of personnel working in the maritime field. The Final challenge addressed by this chapter is the conflict and rivalry in the Horn of Africa. Despite international efforts to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa, it led to militarization of that region with many countries at the regional and global levels engaging in building military bases in it. Although the powers present in this region have not declared hostility to each other so far, it is noted that the pace of building these bases, which is not limited to Western countries only, but includes European and Asian parties, means the possibility of a state of polarization prevailing in that region between blocs

150

Book Summary

that are getting formed. This matter may portend confrontations in the future. Such confrontations will not be a challenge to maritime security only, but also to the regional balance of power, imposing challenges and burdens to regional organizations in this region.

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

In light of the six chapters of the book, its strategic conclusions can be reviewed as follows: Concluding remarks on the theoretical framework and the previous studies 1. Maritime security is not only one of the major threats, imperiling small states, but it is also deepening the perpetuating regional imbalance of power, especially if smaller states are located within a region lacking balance of power distribution. In this context, the Arab Gulf region provides a clear example, being surrounded by stronger neighbours either in terms of population or military capabilities. 2. Within their policies to create regional balance of power, the smaller states pursue various and different strategies which include self-security, regional and international alliances, and neutrality policy. However, each of these options imposes challenges on the small states, the same as it offers them opportunities to achieve that balance. 3. The dilemma of imbalance of power in the Arabian Gulf region lies in the fact that is it is a complex one. The Arab Gulf States as a whole are not the same in size nor in capabilities. There is also a lack of balance between the Gulf States, on the one hand, and the whole world, on the other hand. Hence, any strategies which might be called to create any sort of balance of power must take into account these overlapping and intertwining three circles of imbalance. 4. Analyzing regional conflicts in general, it is found out that they have to do with three parties: the dominant state or the state seeking for hegemony, the opposing state which sees that the policies of the dominant state pose an imbalance in the regional balance of power, and the balancing state, which plays a vital role in getting regional conflicts out of their familiar frames and gives rise to military confrontations. 5. The previous studies on maritime security in the Arab Gulf region focuses only on specifying the maritime security threats, from the Iranian threats to the perils of maritime piracy. These studies have unanimously agreed that maritime security © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4

151

152

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

is inseparable from the strategies of major countries to achieve economic security in general. 6. Maritime security threats have led to a change in the concept of regional security itself, which became no longer confined to the traditional geographical framework of the Gulf States, but extended to the Horn of Africa region and the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, maritime security hazards and Iran’s endeavors to utilize regional conflicts in threatening maritime security, were the actual reasons for establishing military alliances in the Arabian Gulf region. Conclusions of Chapter Three 1. Although threats to maritime security have become the most serious national security threats, not only to the Arabian Gulf countries, but also to all countries of the world, given the significant increase in dependence on maritime transport, there is no agreement on the concept of maritime security itself, whether at the intellectual or practical level. This absence of agreement restricts collective efforts to confront maritime security threats. 2. The experience of the Arabian Gulf countries during the ‘tanker war,’ within the Iran-Iraq war in the eighties (1980–1988), has showed that the Arabian Gulf countries cannot adopt a policy of neutrality regarding any expected military confrontations in the region, even if they are not a party to it. This means that the Gulf countries must have comprehensive plans that include outlining the precautionary measures to be taken as well as a mechanism for security crises management. 3. Given the importance of sea routes for all countries of the world as major routes for energy transport, any attempts to threaten the security of these routes, especially the continued targeting of oil tankers, may require the initiation of a multilateral formula to protect energy security in general. 4. According to the criteria for classifying countries, whether they are maritime or landlocked, the Arabian Gulf countries are considered maritime countries in view of their geographical location, which oversees vital water routes for global maritime transport. However, as much as this location provides them with advantages, it poses enormous challenges, represented in many threats to maritime security and acceleration of pace of such threats. 5. In spite of the importance of the rules regulating navigation at sea and defining the maritime rights of countries, which are enshrined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the dilemma is the absence of an authority to obligate states to abide by the Convention’s provisions. This creates loopholes that represent challenges to international efforts to confront threats to maritime security. Conclusions of Chapter Four 1. The attacks that targeted oil tankers in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in 2019 and 2021 are considered a qualitative change in the dynamics of the conflict between Iran and Western countries. This shift requires examining ways

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

2.

3.

4.

5.

153

to enhance deterrence against these threats, in addition to strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Gulf countries. Regardless of Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz or obstruct maritime navigation in it, the greatest danger is Iran’s ability to use its maritime influence to continue to attack oil tankers within its conflict with Western countries. This does not necessarily mean that the matter will develop into a comprehensive military confrontation. Despite the success of international efforts, in cooperation with regional powers, to counter the threat of piracy in the Horn of Africa and off the coast of Somalia, piracy, as underlined at the Manama Security Dialogue Conference (November 2021), was suppressed, but not eliminated. In other words, the turbulent regional security environment still allows this phenomenon to represent a formidable threat to maritime security once again in the near future. The continued instability in the countries surrounding Bab al-Mandab strait, whether Yemen or the countries of the Horn of Africa, poses enormous dangers in terms of human and arms smuggling. Countering these challenges is closely linked to finding ways to end crises in these countries. With the importance of the strategic location of the Arab Gulf countries, they face the challenge of drug smuggling because they are located near the areas of drug production and trafficking. It is noted that the majority of these drugs come from sea ports. This matter requires more cooperation, whether among the Gulf countries or with other parties, to counter this threat.

Conclusions of Chapter Five 1. The Arabian Gulf countries have realized the dangers posed by threats to maritime security long time ago. This prompted them to establish collective Gulf mechanisms to counter these threats. In Addition, each Gulf country has been keen to significantly enhance its maritime capabilities within efforts of self-armament in general. This is reflected in the reports related to armament during the years from 2019 to 2022. 2. Some Arabian Gulf countries were keen to participate in the mechanisms aimed at countering maritime security threats, including the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which was initiated in 2009 and aimed at achieving military and intelligence cooperation to counter maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa. There was also the 2020 initiative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to establish the Council of Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Comprising eight countries, goals of this council include countering threats to maritime security. 3. Energy security is central in the American commitment to protecting the security of the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, former US President Donald Trump announced the establishment of the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Maritime Navigation in the Arabian Gulf, which is a clear message that energy security is a red line. This coalition has characteristics that include the experience of the United States in leading Military coalitions, in addition to the contribution by three Gulf countries to the alliance, which has no offensive goals. Instead, the council has defensive goals.

154

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

4. the European countries have paid remarkable attention to countering maritime security threats in the Arabian Gulf region. In this respect, France led the European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz in 2020. The mission aims to enhance awareness of maritime security threats through the deployment of maritime monitoring mechanisms with the aim of sharing information. Although this mission does not have a military characteristics, it complements the work of the US-led naval military coalition and does not conflict with it. 5. In spite of the importance of the Gulf regional and international mechanisms reviewed above, which are aimed at countering maritime security threats, a question is raised about the potential of merging these efforts together within a multilateral framework in a way that prevents conflicting goals and achieves the goal of unifying efforts in light of the increase in maritime security threats to the extent with which it can be said that the seas are the next arenas for wars. Conclusions of Chapter Six a. In spite of the importance of establishing the Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Maritime Navigation in the Arabian Gulf, it is still beset with some difficulties regarding achieving its goals, including the necessary naval capabilities, given the United States’ unwillingness to increase military spending. Other difficulties are related to the limited number of the council’s member states, in addition to limiting its role to the defense area without it turning into a real deterrence mechanism. b. In spite of the importance of efforts of the Arabian Gulf countries to enhance their armament capabilities in general, and maritime security in particular, there is still a gap in these capabilities, compared with that of Iran, which has, for example, 398 naval watercrafts, compared to 375 watercrafts in the six Gulf countries. Even, Iran has the capability to employ its naval influence in launching an asymmetric attack targeting naval targets. c. Given the challenges created by the modern technological revolution, quantitative power is no longer the criterion for the power of countries. Instead, this power is represented in the capability to employ technology in armament so that countries can counter threats in this regard, including cybersecurity threats to seaports. Another challenge in this regard is how to employ technology in loading and unloading operations in ports in a way that ensures their continuity without delay, how to develop the capabilities of personnel working in the maritime field, in addition to employing artificial intelligence technology to counter maritime security threats. d. In spite of the importance of international and regional efforts to counter the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa, these efforts have resulted in many countries increasingly seeking to establish military bases for themselves in this region. Although there are no signs of conflict between these countries so far, with conflicting interests, the continuation of regional crises and emergence of signs of a cold war, a conflict between these countries is a possibility. Such conflict will not only threaten maritime security but also the

Strategic Conclusions of the Book

155

regional balance of power, and will result in emergence of new equations in that region, which is near vital waterways. 6. In light of the challenges facing the Gulf countries, as part of their efforts to counter threats to maritime security, these countries have to follow two parallel tracks. The first involves continuing to develop their maritime capabilities by employing military technology to build these capabilities. The second track is building regional and international partnerships through which these countries can counter threats to maritime security, which pose a threat not only to the Arabian Gulf countries, but also to the countries of the whole world, given their vital interests in the Arabian Gulf region and neighbors of this region.

Index

A Abdul Latif Al-Zayani, 82 Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company, 84, 88 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 140 African Union, 100, 102 Alfred Mahan, 21, 26 Al-Qaeda, 4, 74 Alternative maritime navigation systems, 135 Anthony Cordesman, 15, 38 Antonio Guterres, 57 Arab Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen, 97 Arab Gulf States, 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 21, 26–28, 30–32, 35–37, 39, 45, 55, 56, 58, 60–63, 65, 73, 75–77, 151 Arabian Peninsula, 17, 27, 71, 74, 125, 137 Arabian Sea, 2, 3, 5, 16, 27, 28, 39, 44, 55, 56, 71, 73, 75, 76, 85, 86, 98, 108, 128, 152 Arms trafficking, 3 Artificial intelligence applications, 134 Ashraf Mohmmed Keshk, 47, 48, 50 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 92 Asymmetric power, 28 Asymmetric warfare, 55, 65, 130 Atlanta anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, 112 Atlanta Mission, 111 Austal Australian Company for building ships, 133 Automaton identification system, 134 Ayatollah Khomeini, 30

B Bab al-Mandab Strait, 3, 8, 15, 27, 38, 44, 45, 48, 51, 72, 97, 98, 101, 103, 118, 137, 140, 153 Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies, 105, 119, 134 Bahrain Defense Force, 89, 90 Balance of power, 4, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 45, 46, 83, 100, 126, 127, 151 Belt and Road Initiative, 8, 141 British Maritime Security Agency, 86 British Naval Component Command (UKMCC), 106 Building naval capabilities, 5, 125

C Carter Doctrine 1980, 55, 60 China’s military influence, 113 Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, 138 Coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 105 Coalition of the Willing, 13, 65 Coastal countries, 101, 107, 136 Commercial ports, 107, 138 Commercial shipments, 3 Council of the Arab and African Countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, 82, 98 Crude oil, 22, 31, 35, 61, 67, 68, 73, 74 Cybersecurity risks, 117

D Djibouti Code of Conduct, 4, 81, 92–97, 153

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 A. M. Keshk, Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4246-4

157

158 Donald Reagan, 2 Drug smuggling, 57, 75, 153 E Emergency and Piracy Center in Malaysia, 4, 84 Energy supplies, 44, 49, 67, 82, 108 European Mission to Monitor Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH), 5, 82, 110, 111, 118, 154 European Union, 3, 8, 18, 45, 56, 64, 98, 102, 107–109, 111, 112, 118, 136 European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), 136 Exclusive economic zone, 39–42, 45, 57, 89 F France’s National Security Strategy, 110 Freedom of navigation, 23, 34, 36, 40–43, 49, 60, 86, 92, 101, 104, 108, 109, 122, 129 G Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 42 Geoffrey Till, 22 Global naval power, 112, 130 Global oil market, 59–61, 63 Global trade, 50, 69, 85, 86, 99 Grey zone, 121 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 18, 46, 47, 82–84, 107 Gulf of Aden, 4, 15, 27, 44, 70, 71, 73, 74, 92, 94, 95, 97–101, 106, 121, 123, 124, 137, 140, 141, 153 Gulf of Oman, 2, 3, 5, 27, 28, 39, 40, 55, 56, 62, 85, 86, 106, 112, 121, 122, 128, 152 Gulf oil, 2, 3, 13, 31, 48, 60–62, 117, 121 H Horn of Africa, 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 45, 47–49, 70, 71, 76, 81, 92, 93, 95, 100–102, 106, 111, 118, 121, 124, 125, 137–141, 152–154 Houthi group, 8, 50, 72, 98, 137 Human trafficking, 4, 50, 56, 57, 76, 94, 111 I Illegal fishing, 4, 25, 76, 93–95, 139

Index Illegal immigration, 4, 18, 25, 76, 84, 95 Illegal smuggling, 3, 4, 74 Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO), 23 India, 3, 8, 17, 18, 45, 56, 58, 67, 86, 92, 97, 98, 110, 123, 124, 127, 128, 139 Indian Navy, 86, 87, 97, 121, 123, 124 Indian Ocean, 15–17, 27, 29, 39, 40, 44, 50, 71, 72, 75, 76, 86, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 103, 106, 113, 123, 124, 139 Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), 133 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 100 International alliances, 7, 11–14, 19, 151 International and territorial waterways, 70 International Maritime Organization, 24, 64, 84, 85, 92–96, 101 International military presence, 137 International navigation, 14, 38–40, 42, 84, 86, 96 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), 132 Iran, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13–15, 18, 19, 22, 27, 29–37, 39–47, 50, 51, 55–58, 60–68, 72, 75, 91, 92, 97, 104, 109, 112, 117, 119, 121, 122, 125–131, 137, 152–154 Iranian naval capabilities, 64 Iranian naval forces, 15, 130 Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 64, 130 Iran- Iraq tanker war, 2, 21, 28, 29 Iran’s regional influence, 50 Iraq, 10, 11, 13, 15, 22, 29–35, 37, 39, 40, 46, 47, 50, 59, 65–68, 73, 104, 105, 110, 121, 125, 130 Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), 21, 28, 29 Islamic Military Coalition to Fight Terrorism, 97 J Jane’s Defense Weekly, 129 Japan, 16, 32, 45, 110, 119, 123, 127, 138, 139 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 123 John Miller, 130 Joseph Dunford, 103 K Khalifa Bin Salman Port, 131 Kingdom of Bahrain, 5, 47, 49, 51, 75, 82, 83, 89, 90, 103, 119, 127, 131

Index Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 4, 10, 27, 28, 30, 39, 47–49, 75, 82, 87, 88, 101, 125, 126, 128, 153 Kuwait, 2, 10, 16, 21, 29–34, 36–39, 47, 49, 57, 66, 83, 84, 86, 87, 105, 106, 110, 120–123, 125, 127 Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, 84 Kuwaiti Naval forces, 87

L Legal dimensions, 2, 21 Legal Regulation of Sea Lanes in the Arabian Gulf Region, 38 Libyan crisis in 2011, 120 Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LIRT), 76

M Maritime attacks, 85 Maritime crimes, 4, 72, 94, 95, 97, 138 Maritime education, 135, 136 Maritime geographical location, 21 Maritime navigation, 2, 4, 5, 8, 18, 19, 22, 39, 43, 45, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 63, 64, 70, 72, 82, 84–86, 98, 99, 101–105, 108, 109, 117, 118, 120, 123–125, 127, 129, 131, 134, 137, 153, 154 Maritime piracy, 3, 8, 15, 16, 25, 45, 56, 68, 70, 71, 84, 92, 96, 137, 151, 153 Maritime Security, 1–8, 12–19, 21–25, 27, 28, 37, 38, 45–51, 55, 56, 58, 63, 70–77, 81–87, 90, 92–97, 99–102, 105–108, 110–113, 117, 118, 122, 123, 125–127, 131–136, 139, 141, 151–155 Maritime Security Center of the Omani Ministry of Defense, 25 Maritime terrorism, 3, 25, 56, 68, 74, 76, 124, 131, 133 Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, 31, 32, 34, 37 Michael H. Armacost, 33, 34 Military Alliances in the Middle East, 105, 119 Military Balance Report 2021, 126 Military bases in the horn of Africa, 48 Military operations at sea, 2

N National security, 10, 24, 25, 27, 42, 69, 97, 100, 152

159 Naval armament, 5, 84, 90 Naval Military Coalition for the Security of Navigation in the Arabian Gulf Region, 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 9, 13, 45, 47, 64, 85, 102, 104, 105, 119, 120, 122 O Omani Maritime Security Center, 86 Omani naval forces, 91 Operation Earnest Will, 22, 31, 33, 34, 36, 49 Organized crime, 24, 25, 56, 95 P Peninsula Shield Forces, 4, 37, 81, 83 Piracy, 3, 6, 15, 16, 23, 24, 56, 69–74, 77, 81, 85, 87, 92–98, 101, 106, 111, 112, 121, 124, 131, 138–140, 153, 154 Piracy attacks, 16, 131 Port security technologies., 132, 133 Prince Faisal bin Farhan, 99 Proxy wars, 3, 10, 130, 139 Q Qatar, 36, 39, 47, 65, 68, 83, 90, 91, 123, 125, 127, 128, 137, 138 Qatari Emiri Navy, 91 R Ransom Virus, 131 Red Sea, 4, 26, 27, 39, 44, 46, 48–50, 56, 61, 70–72, 74, 82, 94, 96–103, 106, 118, 121, 129, 137, 138, 141, 153 Regional balance of power, 6, 8, 28, 46, 102, 151, 155 Regional conflicts, 2, 3, 10, 50, 72, 102, 151, 152 Regional crises, 3, 56, 74, 154 Robert Kaplan, 27, 124 Royal Bahrain Naval Force, 89 Royal Saudi Naval Forces, 86, 88 Royal Police Academy in Bahrain, 90 Russian commercial shipping navigating, 140 S Saddam Hussein, 29

160 Saudi Aramco, 60, 61, 92 Saudi oil tanker, 35, 56, 73, 85, 92, 101 Sea of Oman, 57, 86 Sea State theory, 26 Second generation of artificial intelligence, 134 Ship ballistic missiles, 130 Singapore Maritime Security Center, 84 Small states, 1, 7–9, 11–13, 49, 151 Smuggling, 4, 25, 50, 56, 72, 76, 84, 94, 95, 106, 121, 134, 153 Smuggling operations, 5, 75, 131, 132 Somali navy, 72 South China Sea, 24, 58, 92 Southern coastline of Somalia, 71 Soviet Union, 12, 22, 28, 32–34, 36 Strait of Hormuz, 3, 5, 8, 15, 16, 19, 22, 27, 30–33, 37–45, 49, 51, 55, 56, 59, 62–68, 85, 103–105, 107–109, 112, 113, 128–130, 153 Strategic advantages, 21, 46, 130 Strategic partnership, 13, 56, 60, 67, 123 Submarines, 15, 29, 41, 47, 59, 65, 66, 90, 124, 125, 128, 130, 139 Suez Canal, 15, 27, 48, 71, 84, 98, 100, 101, 105 Sultanate of Oman, 27, 39, 40, 43, 47, 81, 86, 91, 92, 109, 123, 124, 126, 127 T Tanker war, 2, 3, 13, 15, 28–31, 35–38, 55, 56, 58–60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 83, 122, 126, 152 Territorial Sea, 2, 39, 40, 42, 45, 57, 89 Territorial waters, 14, 31, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 57, 72, 76, 77, 87, 89, 96, 106, 112 Terrorist groups, 1, 5, 25, 73, 74, 77, 117, 134 Transnational Organized Crime, 86, 93–95 U UAE Naval forces, 88, 127 Unified Maritime Duty Force (81), 4, 81, 83

Index Unified Maritime Operations Center for the Gulf countries, 4, 83 United Arab Emirates, 5, 25, 31, 38, 39, 47–49, 51, 56, 61, 75, 82, 85, 86, 88, 93, 103, 110, 118, 125, 126, 129 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982(UNCLOS), 2, 4, 22, 39–41, 43, 56, 69, 81, 93, 96, 109, 152 UN Security Council, 36, 58, 85, 86, 93, 94, 140 US Central Command, 51, 107 US Fifth Fleet, 50, 85, 107, 120, 121 US National Maritime Security Strategy, 23 US national security, 105 US Navy, 26, 32, 34, 37, 49, 105, 127

V Venezuela, 62

W Watercrafts, 5, 117, 118, 120, 125–128, 130, 154 Wesley Clark, 119 West Africa, 97 Western allies, 37 Western countries, 2, 6, 13, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 98, 100, 104, 110, 118, 122, 129, 152, 153 Wireless technology, 117, 135 World trade, 22, 24, 30, 42, 44

Y Yemen, 4, 8, 15, 19, 27, 28, 45, 50, 56, 61, 71, 72, 74, 76, 92, 95, 99, 101, 118, 130, 137, 141, 153 Yusuf bin Alawi, 109

Z Zodiac Maritime, 58