Malaysia's 1986 General Election: The Urban-Rural Dichotomy 9789814376822

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Occasi onal Paper No . 83

Malaysia's 1986 General Election The Urban-Rural Dichotomy

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

Malaysia's 1986 General Election The Urban-Rural Dichotomy

Sankaran Ramanathan and Mohd. Hamdan Adnan MARA Institute of Technology

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Cataloguing in Publication Data Ramanathan, Sankaran Malaysia's 1986 general election: the urban-rural dichotomy I Sankaran Ramanathan and Mohd. Hamdan Haji Adnan. (Occasional paper I Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; no. 83) 1. Elections-Malaysia. 2. Malaysia. Parlimen. Dewan Rakyat-Elections, 1986. I. Mohd. Hamdan Haji Adnan. II. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. III. Title. IV. Series. DS501 I59 no. 83 1988 ISBN 981-3035-12-9 ISSN 0073-9731

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ©

1988 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters. Typeset by The Fototype Business Printed in Singapore by Kim Hup Lee Printing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Contents List of Tables Preface I Introduction Scope and Limitations Studies on the Electoral Process Review of Previous Elections in Malaysia Origins of the Alliance Election of 1955 Election of 1959 Election of 1964 Election of 1969 Election of 1974 Election of 1978 Election of 1982 I I Run-up to the 1986 General Election Political Developments Economic Developments Revisions of Electoral Boundaries and Constituencies Campaign Issues and Strategies I I I Election Results How the Various Parties Fared Why the DAP Won in the Urban Areas The PAS Defeat in the 1986 General Election Why PAS Lost Loc.ally Why PAS Lost Nationally IV Post-Election Developments The New Cabinet {Until May 1987) UMNO's Triennial Elections Latest Cabinet (Since May 1987) V Summary and Conclusions Glossary of Abbreviations and Bahasa Malaysia Terms Selected Bibliography The Authors

v1 vn 1 2 3 4 4 5 7 10 11 14 15 17 22 22 34 43 46 50 50 56 59

62 64 68 68 69 14 78 80 85 88

List of Tables 1. Votes and Seats Won by Government Coalition in Peninsular Malaysian Parliamentary Elections, 1955-86 2. Results of the Federal (Parliamentary) Election 3. Results of State Elections 4. Votes Obtained by Various Parties Contesting in the 1986 Parliamentary Election 5. Jelutong Constituency Results 6. Bayan Baru Constituency Results 7. Reasons for PAS's Local Defeat (in Kelantan and Terengganu) in the 1986 General Election 8. Reasons for PAS's National Defeat in the 1986 General Election 9. Results of the UMNO Triennial Elections (24 April 1987) lO. Composition of the Cabinet (May 1987)

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51 52 54 57 57 63 64 72 75

Preface This paper is the outco me o f o ur proposal submit ted to th e Institut e of Southeast Asian Studi es (I SEAS) in Dece mbe r 1986 while we we re compiling th e final repo rt o f o ur resea rch projec t fo r th e New Stra its Times Press (NSTP, Ma lays ia ). We pro posed to writ e a pa per foc using on what we perceive to be th e urb a n-rura l di cho to my in th e Ma lays ia n political scene. While the paper repo rts th e 1986 Malays ia n genera l electi o n results, it is largely interpreti ve in na ture, see king to a na lyse th e elec ti o n results against the backdrop of the political, eco no mi c, and soc ia l eve nts antecedent to the election. As such, we have made every e ffort to review previ o us studi es o n the Malaysian electoral process and rela te so me of their findin gs to o ur study. We have also relied upon data and anal yses a bout previo us elec tion results from a number of sources, which have been listed in th e selected bibliography. While we make no pretence that th e conclusions sta ted in this paper are definitive, we stand by the opinions and analyses expressed herein . We thank ISEAS and in particular Prof. K.S. Sandhu for giving us this opportunity to reach a wider audience. Our gratitude also goes to Tua n Hj . Dr Samad Ismail, formerly Editorial Ad viser, and Mr P.C. Shivadas, formerly Group Editor of NSTP, not only for permission to use o ur Report as a reference source, but also for having initiated the research project and for having supported it. We also wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement given by the Director of the MARA Institute o f Technology, Dr Hj . Mohd . Mansor Hj. Salleh. We are also grateful to Ms Triena Ong and Ms Susan Lopez-Nerney, both of ISEAS, who provided unflagging assistance and advice in the editing of the manuscript. Finally, we wish to acknowledge the assistance of Ms Zalita Cader, Secretary of the School o f Mass Communication, MARA Institute of Technology, who patiently typed the drafts of the manuscript. The responsibility for any errors, inaccuracies, or omissions rests solely with us. Shah Alam 1 August 1988

Sankaran Ramanathan Mohd. Hamdan Hj. Adnan

I Introduction Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states, the nucleus of which has been the eleven states of the Federation of Malaya, established on 31 August 1957. These eleven states comprise former British colonies, that is, the Straits Settlement s of Penang and Melaka and the nine protected Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Johor, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak , Kedah, and Perlis, which had earlier become unified as the Federated Malay States in 1948. Subsequently, the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak which had also been former British colonies, joined the eleven states of the Federation of Malaya together with the former British colony of Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. However, Singapore left the Federation after less than two years (in mid-1965) and Malaysia today has thirteen states - eleven in Peninsular Malaysia and the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysia has a written constitutio n which is the supreme law of the country. 1 Apart from the Federal Constitutio n, each state also possesses it s own constitutio n, which contains essential provisions to ensure the supremacy of the federal governmen t. The head of state is the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, who is elected for a five-year term from among the hereditary rulers of the nine Malay states. The power of governmen t is however vested with the Prime Minister who is the leader of the party with the most number of seats in the Dewan Rak yat (House of Representa ti ves), for which periodic elections are held every four to fi ve years. At the state level, the power o f governmen t vests with elected C hief Ministers (in the states of Sabah, Sarawak, Melaka, and Penang) and Menteri Besar (in the nine Malay states). Thu s, Malaysia is regarded as a constitutio nal democracy, wherein general elections are held at both state and federal levels at periodic intervals. There have been six general elections held in Malaysia since it s forma tion on 16 August 1963, that is, in 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, and 1986. Since elections constitute a vital element in the democratic process, each of the above elections has been the subject of a major study. These studies have largely been based on analyses of the election result s and how the various parties fared at the state and federal levels. The 1986 general election was different from the previous elections for a number of reasons. Firstly, the contest was for a greater number of seats (177 as opposed to 154 previously), based on revisions of electoral

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MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

boundaries and constituencies. Secondly, it had been widely speculated that the supremacy of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) component partie~ would be strongly challenged, particularly by the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). 2 Thirdly, as with most developing countries, there was an increasingly greater number of franchised people, mostly younger voters, many exercising their vote for the first time. Fourthly, the BN had been wracked by internal strife as the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dato Musa Hitam, had resigned from the Cabinet just six months before the election. 3 Fifthly, the country's economy was in the throes of a bad recession, with no prospects of immediate recovery. Because of these factors, there was much interest, both within and outside the country, in the outcome of the 1986 general election. In the event, the results were unexpected for many quarters, particularly PAS, which suffered a debacle, and the DAP, which won a significantl y large number of seats, particularly in the urban constituenc ies. BN component parties therefore experienced mixed fortunes, with the United Malays National Organisatio n (UMNO) trouncing PAS in practically every rural constituency, while the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) lost many urban constituenc ies to the DAP. This paper seeks to analyse the 1986 Malaysian general election in the light of the urban-rural dichotomy (in the context of Peninsular Malaysia), whereby the urban electorate tended to vote for opposition parties, primarily the DAP, while the rural electorate convincingly voted in the BN component parties, particularly UMNO. Both phenomena are explained based on a backdrop of analyses of the election resulrs as well as a survey of 1,000 respondents in Kelantan and Terengganu to find out the reasons why people voted the way they did and the major issues influencing the people's choices. 4

Scope and Limitations Apart from focusing on the urban-rural di chotomy, this paper also examines (a) how the various parties fared in the elections; and (b) the significance of the revision of electoral boundaries and constituenc ies. As both writers are communica tions teachers and not political scientists by training, they realize that the slant in this paper wilJ be more towards explaining voting phenomena in terms of issues influencing the electorate, as seen by and reported in the mass media. There will also be an emphasis on Malay politics, as we feel that this is the predominan t arena of importance in determining the present and future trends in Malaysian politics, based upon the fact that Malays

INTRODUCTION

3

hold the political power in Malaysia, as evidenced by the dominant role exercised by UMNO with respect to BN matters and decisions. Finally, although election results for Sarawak and Sabah are reported, the focus will be on analysing election results for Peninsular Malaysia. As has been pointed out by a number of scholars, the differences in the size and proportion of the urban and rural populations in Sarawak and Sabah, the vagaries of local political loyalties, and the cultural, religious, social, and political differences prevalent among the ethnic groups in these two states make any reference to the urban-rural dichotomy inappropriate in any context other than that of the Peninsular Malaysian states. Hence, it must be stressed that the urban-rural dichotomy exists only in Peninsular Malaysia.

Studies on the Electoral Process As periodic elections constitute a vital ingredient in the practice of all democracies, the electoral process is a subject of study in all those countries which subscribe to the democratic tradition. Jennings and Ziegler have, for example, emphasized the importance of ethnic politics, the influence of the mass media, and orher issues influencing the results of congressional elections in the United States. 5 In presenting a framework for analysing citizen voting behaviour, Asher has discussed party identification, issues and candidates, mass media campaigns, financing of campaigns, and other issues affecting the outcome of presidential elections in the United States from 1964 to 1976. 6 The close relationship between coalition strategies and citizen choice in determining the outcome of elections has been emphasized by Kessel, who criticizes electoral studies which rely completely on voting data and do not undertake voter surveys to gauge the perceptions and attitudes of voters. 7 According to him, the level of citizens' knowledge about candidates and issues, influence of the mass media, and party identification are important variables in determining the outcome of elections. Perhaps the classic study of voter perceptions and attitudes influencing his choice was undertaken by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet who surveyed 3,000 respondents in Erie County, Ohio in 1944. The respondents were purposively selected in order to represent as closely as possible the population of the United States as a whole.s Although the authors had initially set out to deternune the role of the mass media, they found that there was a great deal of person-to-person interaction, particularly during the critical campaign momhs. They found that the personal influence of opinion leaders was important in helping the people to make up their minds during campaign periods. ln addition, local issues were as equally

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MALAYSIA 'S 1986 G ENERAL ELECTION

important as national issues and the characteristics of the candidates contesting the elections. In studying the British general election of 1983, Butler and Kavanagh found that party share of news for the Conservative and Labour parties was almost equal while the newspaper coverage reflected the "familiar tripartite division", that is, working-class tabloids, social tabloids, and quality papers.9 They concluded that: Each of the three main parties could take consolation in some positive aspects of the campaign. The conservatives won in spite of the unemployment figures and in spite of the availability of a new non-Labour electoral alternative. Labour ... still managed, despite its poor campaign, to hold off the Alliance and to gain 8 Y2 million votes. The Alliance . .. steadily improved its popular standing on the major issues .. . . The scant reward in seats dramatised the distortions of the first-past-the-post electoral system. (p. 272).

From the brief review of selected studies in Britain and the United States discussed above, it can be seen that it is important, not only to comment about election results, but also to find out why people voted the way they did, particularly in instances where the election results were contrary to those generally expected or forecast.

Review of Previous Elections in Malaysia

Origins of the Alliance During the first municipal elections in Kuala Lumpur in 1952, the MCA combined with UMNO to win the elections. The alliance between the Selangor state branch of the MCA and the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO was supposed to be purely a temporary expedient and was done without the prior knowledge of either UMNO or MCA leaders. It was for the sole purpose of jointly contesting the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections against the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), which was seen as a serious threat by both the MCA and UMNO. The pact, even though a local decision, was not openly objected to by the national headquarters of UMNO and the MCA. In January 1952, UMNO and the MCA made a joint statement announcing the pact and stating each would field 6 joint UMNO-MCA candidates. This ad hoc alliance resulted in UMNO-MCA winning 9 of the 12 seats. The IMP, the preelection favourite, won only 2 seats, with the remaining seat going to an independent. The great success of the ad hoc alliance spurred the national leadership of UMNO and the MCA to use the idea in the subsequent elections.

INTRODUCTION

5

Even though the national leaders of the two parties had not originated the idea or the pact, they were quick to realize its potential. The viability of the Alliance was further proven in subsequent municipal and local elections in which it achieved a high degree of success. Thus, despite tensions arising from the Immigration Control Bill in 1952 and the Education Ordinance and Licensing and Regulation of Business Ordinance in 1953, the UMNO-MCA election alliance was maintained. It "was based on the full understanding that disagreements on issues between them would not destroy the political advantage both secured through the common front presented during the elections". 10 Based on the 1952 Kuala Lumpur electoral victory and the successes of the municipal and local elections following it, the national leadership of UMNO and the MCA began holding round-table conferences to work out agreements which would link the two political parties at the national level on a more permanent basis. At their March 1953 conference, UMNO and the MCA made a definite agreement to establish a National Alliance Organization. This was formally announced on 23 August 1953. Tunku Abdul Rahman, UMNO's president, was named "Leader of the Alliance". The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) became a part of the Alliance on 17 October 1954 after a keenly-contested vote in the MIC Executive Committee. Earlier the MIC was on its own and seeking political allies, with its members not in agreement as to which allies they wanted. They approached both the Alliance and Party Negara. The Alliance agreed to party affiliation, while Party Negara would only accept direct members. Also, the Alliance offered the MIC two candidates for the first federal elections in 1955. Confident prophecies were made that this inter-communal alliance would not last. It lasted and, in fact, inter-communal alliance has become a standard feature in Malaysian politics, whilst parties participating in such alliances have over the years proven to be winners in elections.

Election of 1955 The electoral system adopted in the first general election in Malaya in 1955 was the same as the British "first past the post" system, by which the candidate with the highest number of votes in each constituency is elected. There were no provisions for 'communal rolls' by which there would have been internal competition in each ethnic group, but the groups would have been sheltered from competition with each other. It was precisely because of the lack of such provisions that the Alliance problem of allocating seats among its different racial components arose. 11

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MALAYSIA 'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

The Alliance National Council met for the first time on 10 April 1955 to work out arrangem ents for the federal Legislative Council Elections, elections which would make the Alliance the dominan t political force in the country. However, the legal status of the Alliance at that time was obscure. Nevertheless, the election authoritie s approved its symbol and considered it a political party. Further, the Alliance, which by 1955 included the UMNO, MCA, and MIC, showed at a number of local elections that it had enough support from all the different communi ties to qualify as the prospective government when the British left. In 1955, the registered electorate was about 84 per cent Malays, 11 per cent Chinese, 4 per cent Indians, and 1 per cent others. Hence, it was natural that any political initiative to unite the Malayan people must come from the leading Malay party. Hence, UMNO was considere d the leading party in the Alliance and subseque ntly in its successor, the Barisan Nasional (BN). Initially, the Alliance faced a crisis over seat allocation s. The UMNO rank and file had demanded 90 per cent Malay candidate s at its June 1955 General Assembly. Tunku Abdul Rahman was sensitive to MCA-MI C dissatisfaction. He opposed the proposal and got his way after threatenin g to resign. The Alliance then shared the 52 constitue ncies with 35 UMNO, 15 MCA, and 2 MIC candidates. The seat allocation, putting 17 non-Mala y candidate s, all but 2 of whom would contest in Malay-do minated constituencies, was regarded by many political observers then as an inordinat e gamble. However, it was also realized that the seat allocation s solidified the Alliance. The Alliance election manifesto called for Independe nce in four years, Malayanization of the civil service, increased economic developme nt and social services, and education policies to promote Malay as the national language. It had required lengthy negotiatio ns to reach agreement on the issue of citizenship (the Alliance avoided it during the campaign) . In reality, the issue of Independe nce completely overshado wed all other subjects, and, although the other parties also sought Independe nce, it was the Alliance which successfully captured the image and was identified as the Independe nce Party. 12

Hence, not unexpectedly, the Alliance won the 1955 general election with a landslide victory. This overwhelming victory was attributed principally to the large number of votes cast for UMNO. The Alliance won 79.6 per cent of the votes, compared with 7.6 per cent for Party Negara and 3.9 per cent for the religiously-oriented Pan-Mala yan Islamic Party (PMIP). None of the other political parties won more than 2 per cent of the total vote. The Alliance won 51 out of the 52 seats, with 1 going to the PMIP. It was also significan t that Chinese and Indian Alliance candidate s were

INTRO DU CTION

7

returned even in constituencies where the Malays were a majority. At least for this election, the ind ependence iss ue, with which the Alliance was identified, dwarfed any communal considerations. Further, the Alliance's strongest contender, the Part y Negara, which had previously been strong in the legislative and executive governments, lost its appeal among people eager for independence. The Alliance white-wash of its opposition was generally attributed to its organization, its independence image and stand, and its past electoral successes. Too few non-Malays were eligible to vote for it to be regarded as a test of non-Malay support. However, it did provide a test for UMNO discipline and support and the Alliance concept: enough Malays voted for Alliance non-Malays, often competing against Malay candidates, for all 17 non-Malays to win, the Malays voted for the Alliance because UMNO told them to do so. 13

According to Tunku Abdul Rahman: I had complete faith in victories for our C hinese and Indian candidates, who were in the strongest UMNO areas. Frankly, we dared not put them anywhere else . .. . 14

Based on the election victory, UMNO could claim almost total unified Malay support. As a result of the election, the credibility of the MCA and MIC within their respective communities also increased.

Election of 1959 The electoral system adopted in 1959 was the same as in 1956, that is, similar to the British 'first past the post ' system, by which, in each constituency, the candidate with a pluraliJy of the votes is elected . However, the political situation in the country had changed considerably during the interregnum. First, in August 1957, independence was granted, thus eliminating an issue which had united large segments of all the communities and which had especially benefited the Alliance in 1955. Second, the percentage of non-Malay voters had significantly increased, resulting from the citizenship provisions of the 1957 Constitution. The Chinese now comprised about 36 per cent of the electorate and the Indians, 7 per cent. Third, the MCA in March 1958 had a change in leadership with the new group wanting to alter the political balance of the Alliance by challenging UMNO's supremacy. The new MCA leadership was prepared to insist on a larger seat allocation and they wanted revisions in language and education policies.

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MALAYSIA 'S 1986 G ENERAL ELEC TION

The MIC, during the UMNO-M CA crisis, though generally sympathetic to MCA demands, preferred silence and made no stand on either seat allocations or on the language and education issues. The 1959 federal election was preceded by the staggered state legislative elections. Even though the Alliance did well overall, winning 207 of the 282 seats in the contested states, it lost majority control of the state legislatures of Kelantan and Terengganu to the PMIP. The main reason given as to why UMNO lost control of these state legislatures was that the two states were predomin antly Malay, traditiona l, and under-developed. Also, the two states were less accessible as compared with the other states. Thus, even though Kedah and Perlis were also tradition- bound and heavily Malay-populated states, the PMIP, despite showing strength in state elections, was unable to win any federal seats from the Alliance because these two states were reasonably more exposed to the other states as compared with Kelantan and Terengganu. It was believed that the Alliance losses in Kelantan and Terengganu led to the crisis between UMNO and the MCA. The MCA leaders feared that UMNO's defeat in these two states would lead them to counter the PMIP strength by more openly adopting a Malay communa l stand. This would adversely affect MCA support. Also, there were rumours in the Chinese community that the MCA would be given only enough candidate s so that whatever happened the Malays (UMNO and PMIP) would have the two-thirds majority in Parliament required to amend the Constitut ion. In this frame of mind, the new MCA leadershi p demande d a larger seat allocation and revisions in language and education al policies. On the other hand, UMNO, shocked by the loss of the two states and facing a party intent on replacing it as the representative of the Malays, was not in a conciliatory mood when challenged in early 1959 by the new MCA leaders for a better deal in the Alliance. The Tunku, as leader of the Alliance, told the MCA through the press that it had stabbed him in the back . He also listed the following condition s under which the MCA could remain in the Alliance: (a) a complete withdrawal of all MCA demands; (b) a purge of certain radicals; and (c) complete authority for himself to allocate personally all seats and select all candidates for the federal election. The MCA Central Committe e meeting on 12 July 1959, a month before the general election, voted 80-60 to accept the Thnku's terms. This resulted in an exodus of "new blood" from the MCA and its president, Lim Chong Eu, quitting the MCA. Lim later formed Gerakan, which would subsequently become a BN compone nt party. Lim himself would become only the second non-Mala y Chief Minister in the state of Penang, and the only non-Mala y Chief Minister to have served four full terms since 1969. The crisis in the Alliance demonstr ated its natural stresses. In 1959, the crisis was exacerbated when UMNO moved to protect its flank by

INTRODUCTION

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pronouncements and promises which catered more to Malay opinion in order to outbid PAS. "However, the PAS challenge was not nation-wide, and it was not considered a serious enough attack on Malay unity for UMNO either to abandon or greatly undermine its partners." 15 The troubled Alliance patched up whatever differences it had in order to strongly contest the 1959 federal election. It fielded 69 UMNO, 31 MCA, and 4 MIC candidates. The Alliance manifesto was published just a week before polling. It was delayed because of the UMNO-MCA crisis. Nevertheless, the Alliance campaigned on its record of communal accord and as the party which had won independence. For the Alliance, the outcomes of the 1959 federal election were not as favourable as the 1955 results where it lost only 1 seat and its percentage of the vote, 80 per cent, was more than ten times as great as that of its nearest rival, Parti Negara. In the 1959 election, the Alliance proportion of votes decreased from 79.6 per cent to 51.8 per cent. It only won 74 of the 104 seats contested, with UMNO winning 52 seats, the MCA 19, and the MIC 3. The Alliance won 70 per cent of the parliamentary seats but only just over 50 per cent of the votes. Losses for the Alliance occurred both in mainly Malay and in mainly non-Malay areas. In Kelantan and Terengganu all the opposition members elected were PMIP, with the exception of one Parti Negara member. Parti Negara achieved this distinction in Terengganu through the sheer personality of the candidate, Dato Onn, and also because the PMIP did not contest the seat. In the 1959 federal election, the PMIP not only won more parliamentary seats than the Alliance in Kelantan and Terengganu, but in the preceding state elections they gained control of the Terengganu and Kelantan state legislatures. The Alliance lost support and seats in certain areas where there was a large non-Malay vote, mostly in the big towns. In Penang and Selangor, the Alliance seats in the urban centres of George Town and Kuala Lumpur went to the Socialist Front. -Similarly, 4 of the 5 seats the Alliance lost in Perak were in or near the town of lpoh. These seats fell to the People's Progressive Party (PPP), while the fifth went to an independent. The same situation occurred in Negeri Sembilan, where the MCA lost two seats to independents, both in the town of Seremban. In Malacca, the seat lost by the MCA was also an urban one. "Not surprisingly, the MCA fared the worst. It did best in constituencies with a large Malay vote and worst in heavily Chinese urban areas and New Villages." 16 In the 1959 election, it is clear that the Alliance's performance was bad in the urban seats, fair in the quasi-urban seats, and best in the rural seats. Other than the geographical distribution of support for the parties as an important factor, the racial factor must also be considered. In 1959,

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MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

Malays constituted about 56 per cent of the voters, Chinese 36 per cent, and Indians and others, 8 per cent. Political parties, especially the opposition or independents with insufficient funds and manpower, tended to select areas to contest based on the racial composition of the constituencies. For example, in 1959, Chinese independents chose to run in urban centres and a majority of them won . PMIP concentrated its efforts in the Malay constituencies and benefited greatly from this strategy. All in all, the main features of the 1959 federal election were the lack of opposition unity or even minimal electoral pacts, the MCA's debacle, and the sharp decline of the Alliance percentage of the popular vote. Election of 1964

Conducted against the backdrop of confrontation with Indonesia over the formation of Malaysia, this election favoured the ruling parties. Using the Confrontation as its main theme and appealing to the citizens for loyalty and patriotism at a time of crisis, the Alliance left the opposition with almost nothing to campaign on . The PAS appeal was suspect for it s kn own Indonesian sympathies and its initial opposition to Malaysia. The no n-Malay communities were solidly against the Indonesian position and the other o pposition parties by and large echoed the Alliance stand on Co nfrontation and accepted Malaysia as a 'fait accompli '. 17

Hence, despite economic dislocation arising from the Confrontation, economic issues took a back seat. Apart from the Confrontation, another very significant aspect of the 1964 election was the unexpected challenge by Singapore's ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP). It triggered an Intense Alliance-PAP conflict that resulted in the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia fifteen months later. Even though the PAP's participation in the election was limited (only eleven candidates) the bitterness it created exceeded the strength of its challenge. The PAP intrusion not only caused internal dissension with the MCA but also caused pressure within UMNO. The nature and the style of the PAP attack and strategy precipitated the trouble. It was unwilling to work quietly towards changes and compromises. The PAP instead took its case directly to the people and along the way was certain to inflame ethnic passions in Malaysia. Inevitably, the contrasting styles hurt the trust and goodwill between the opposing leaders, making it almost impossible to compromise even on the smallest of inconsequential matters. Further, when the PAP realized the futility of replacing the MCA, it tried to persuade the Thnku to accept a PAP-Alliance coalition. When

INTRODUCTION

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this failed, PAP leaders began criticizing the Alliance government, the concept of the Alliance, and the terms for joining Malaysia. Its offer of an alternative nation-building formula based on its "Malaysian Malaysia" concept intensified racial feelings which culminated in the Singapore race riots of mid-1964. Despite the problems caused by the PAP, the 1964 election reaped a better return for the Alliance, which won 89 of 104 parliamentary seats with 58.3 per cent of the popular vote. UMNO candidates won 59 of their 68 seats, the MCA 27 of 33, and the MIC, all 3. Opposition victories were PAS winning 9, Socialist Front (SF) 2, the PPP 2, United Democratic Party (UDP) I, and the PAP I (the constituency of Bangsar, which was won by Devan Nair).

Election of 1969 The 1969 general election was not a happy one in Malaysia for it culminated in the May Thirteen riots. Prior to that event, the ending of Confrontation in 1966 had made the appeal for loyalty and patriotism unattractive. Instead, the period from I966 to I969 became one of unprecedented ethnic political militancy in Malaysia. The cumulative effect of the PAP challenge was that politics had become intensified, many new controversial issues had been raised, and the political system had become over-loaded with seemingly irreconciliable demands. 18

Thus, the 1969 election campaign was conducted in an atmosphere of ethnic distrust and hostility. All sides gave vent to unbridled appeals to ethnic emotions. This situation arose partly because of the persistent articulation of the PAP's slogan "Malaysian Malaysia" and partly because one of the pro-Malay parts of the "bargain" had become due: the National Language Bill of I967 . There were few legal checks against calculated incitement of the ethnic groups. Dr Mahathir wrote that: ... realizing that the Malay and Chinese opposition were gaining support through racialist appeal, the Alliance party candidates also resorted to racial politics towards the end of the election campaign. The result was explosive. Responsibility disappeared to be replaced by unlimited licence to appeal to grossest sentiments in the name of democracy. 19

Further, the Alliance was insensitive to the changed mood of the non-Malay electorate, and their assessment of their chances in the elections was based on wrong assumptions. They rated their prospects, as before, on the multiplicity of the opposition parties and the existing differences among them on a personal and policy level.

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MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

In the past two general elections, in 1959 and 1964, the Alliance had been successful not because of its own strong positive appeal among the voters but because of the disunity of the opposition, on its being the party which had brought independence to the country and on its position as the party in power with a monopoly over the distribution of patronage and favour.20 The Alliance failed to realize that instead of the opposition parties going to the non-Malay voters to secure their votes, in their new mood it would be the electorate which would seek out the opposition to give their vote. Further, this time around, three of the opposition parties DAP, PPP, and Gerakan - had established a three-way electoral arrangement. They allocated both the parliamentary and state constituencies among themselves on the basis of their organization and an estimate of electoral support in the constituency. When the election results for the Peninsular Malaysian states were announced, it was clear that the Alliance had won easily, but also that it had suffered a substantial setback. R.K. Vasil wrote: The results of the elections had an immediate electrifying impact, not so much in terms of the actual number of seats wrested by the opposition parties from the Alliance as in the psychological dimension of the opposition's victory. The results were seen by the Malays as the beginning of the end of the 'quid pro quo' arrangement which had ensured their supremacy in the politics, administration and government of the country since independence. To the Chinese and Indians it was a great step forward in the direction of establishing a Malaysian Malaysia. 21 In the state elections, the Alliance won only 162 out of a total of 282 seats and 47.95 per cent of the votes. It however failed to regain Kelantan from PAS, nearly lost Terengganu, lost Penang, and did not have a majority in either Perak (19 out of 40 seats) or Selangor (14 out of 28 seats). The Malays were not worried about losing Penang because they generally viewed it as a "Chinese" centre. Nevertheless, the prospect of UMNO and the Alliance not controlling either Perak or Selangor, and the spectre of a non-Malay Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) in the two states, greatly worried the Malays. In the parliamentary election, the Alliance captured 66 of 104 seats, with 48.5 per cent of the popular votes. UMNO had won 51 of 67 seats it contested, the MCA 13 of 83, and the MIC 2 of 3 seats. The opposition DAP won 13 seats, PAS 12, Gerakan 8, and the PPP 4. Therefore, the Alliance lost not only what it had gained in 1964, but compared with the 1959 election its majorities were reduced in both state and parliamentary elections. Also, the Alliance lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Hence, it could not amend the Constitution without support from some of the opposition members.

INTRODUCTION

13

As for the relationship between the election results and the racial composition of the electorate, it is interesting to note that for UMNO in the predominantly-Malay states (Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu) its victories against the PMIP were mostly in constituencies where Malay voters were less than 90 per cent of the total, and its defeat to the PMIP were generally in constituencies where the Malay electorate exceeded 90 per cent of the total. In states where there were no candid'ates from the non-Malay opposition parties, the non-Malay voter tended to favour the Alliance and, unless the non- Malays comprised at least 10 per cent of the electorate, the UMNO candidates were likely to lose to the PMIP. On the other hand, in predominantly-Malay constituencies, without the presence of a sizeable non-Malay electorate, PMIP candidates tended to succeed on the basis of their communal appeal among Malay voters. Similarly, in states not predominantly Malay and where non-Malays comprised a majority or near majority, UMNO had to compete chiefly against the non-Malay opposition parties. Strangely enough, it is here that the UMNO candidates were successful, that is, only in those constituencies where Malays made up at least 45 per cent of the voters. On the other hand, wherever Malays comprised less than 45 per cent of the voters, opposition parties with a special appeal to non-Malays generally defeated the UMNO candidates. The same pattern occurred in the case of the MCA, for its candidates tended to be successful only in constituencies where at least 25 per cent of the electorate was Malay. Here, unless this Malay vote was divided by PMIP candidates, the MCA candidates were victorious despite a split caused in the Chinese vote by the presence of candidates of the non-Malay opposition parties. In areas with a large number of Chinese voters and an insignificant number of Malay voters, MCA candidates tended to be defeated by non-Malay opposition candidates. In the 1969 elections there was such great disenchantment with the MCA that even in those constituencies where at least 25 OJo of the electorate was Malay, many MCA candidates failed to win. 21

Hence, there was a great deal of tension among the Malays, Chinese, and Indians, which was heightened by the "victory celebrations" of the opposition parties, particularly in Kuala Lumpur in the period after the announcement of the election results in the late hours of 10 May (the election date) and the early hours of 11 May. The heightened tension finally resulted in race riots known as the May Thirteen Incident, wherein about 600 people died. 23 The May Thirteen Incident resulted in a declaration of a state of Emergency, the suspension of Parliament, and the imposition of rule under a National Operations Council (NOC) headed by Tun Abdul Razak,

14

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

the former Deputy Prime Minister. It also marked the exit from active politics of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister. During the NOC period, laws were also enacted to curb the excesses of uncontrolled political competition, including amendments to the Sedition Act and the Internal Security Act. Subsequently, Parliament was convened in 1971, after nearly two years, with a new formula for political rule revolving around the establishment of the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN). Under this concept, the original Alliance was enlarged to include other component parties, notably the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), which had made a strong showing in Penang and Perak in the 1969 election. With the Gerakan and the other minor parties in its fold, the BN was able to regain its two-thirds majority not only in the federal parliament but also in a number of states. The main concession made was to allow Gerakan to rule Penang through the nomination of its leader, Lim Chong Eu, as Chief Minister and the appointment of State Executive Councillors from its ranks. Another new party in the BN fold was the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP), which controlled Kelantan and was strong in Terengganu. Thus, from 1971 to 1974, the BN was able to initiate a series of moves aimed at increasing the understanding among the three races and in prompting a political compromise acceptable to all component parties. Chief among these were the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the establishment of a Department of National Unity. These and other related measures resulted in 1he ret urn of political stability and a reduction of overt racial tension in the country.

Election of 1974 The 1974 general election was viewed as a crucial test for the then newlyformed BN of its support among Malaysians. Tun Abdul Razak, the new UMNO president and BN chairman, announced that he wanted a national government drawn from all the communities, and not a Malay government ; but in order to have a truly representative government it was up to the voters to elect Chinese and Indian candidates from BN. He made it dear that he would 1101 bring into the government any non-Malays from outside the BN, and it thl:' non-Malays did not vote for the Chinese and Indian candidates of the BN, there would be a Malay government. 24 The tempo of the 1974 general election wa~ re~trained a~ compared to previous elections. As expected, in this first post-riot general ek~:tton the mood of the voters was cautious. Also, the restraint was attributed tu the restrictions imposed by the amended Sedition Act. Further, the 11)74 election focused primarily on personalities and on the state of the economy.

INTRODUCTION

15

The main thrust of the BN in its campaign was the theme of a vote of confidence in Tun Razak. However, each of its component parties also campaigned individually and stressed the issues most appealing to each of their constituents. Gerakan, for example, concentrated its campaign mostly in Penang, where it emphasized the state's economic revival, federal pledges for future assistance, and the spectre of depressed economic situations in the state if the opposition gained power. Expectedly,. PAS stressed the merits and value of Malay unity. The PPP played up Tun Razak's visit to China. As for the opposition, the DAP promised to look into the problems of corruption in government, landless squatters, low-cost housing, and recognition of overseas university degrees. During the campaign it also promoted itself as the champion of Chinese language, education, and culture and accused the government of seeking political surrender and moving towards a one-party state. Pekemas (a splinter group from Gerakan), failing in its attempts to form an opposition front, conducted a low-key campaign stressing the party's stand on principles of democratic socialism. The Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PRSM), stirring some alarm for BN because of its concentration in Terengganu, adopted several separate manifestos for different states with emphasis on a better deal for rural peasants through extensive socialist measures. 25 Several newly-formed minor parties, consisting mostly of disgruntled members of BN component parties not chosen to contest, also fielded candidates in the 1974 election. The BN won a landslide victory in its first attempt. It captured 135 of 154 parliamentary seats (104 in Peninsular Malaysia, 16 in Sabah, 15 in Sarawak) totalling about 87 per cent of the seats, and 59 per cent of the popular vote. The rest went to the DAP (9), Pekemas (1), and Sarawak National Peoples' Party (SNAP) (9). In the state elections, the BN won convincingly in every state. The Malay community gave solid support to the BN. Both UMNO and PAS won all their parliamentary contests (61 and 14 seats, respectively), and only 4 BN Malay state candidates lost (all to independents). There were now no Malays in the opposition benches of Parliament. Also, although there were pockets of urban Chinese in the Peninsula and lbans and Chinese in Sarawak and Sabah who remained opposed, the 1974 general election results showed that the BN had obtained a clear mandate from the people. Election of 1978 The 1978 general election was held almost immediately after the March 1978 Kelantan state elections in which the BN-Berjasa coalition managed

16

MALAYSI A'S 1986 GE NERAL ELECTION

to overthrow PAS (formerly the PMIP) after nineteen yea rs of PAS rule. Earlier, PAS had left the BN because of basic disagreements and its return to the opposition meant that UMNO again faced the challenge of a Malay nationalist and Islamic part y in competition with it for the Malay vote. UMNO campaigned on the proven record of the government in providing ethnic peace and stability and economic development. It criti cized PAS for "misinterpretations" of the Qur'an and warned the Malays not to be misled by false teachings. It also critici zed the so-call ed "unhol y alliance" between PAS and the DAP. Thi s criticism seemed credible as large numbers of PAS and DAP candidates were co nt es ting the same seats. The strategy was based on the belief that PAS co uld attract Malay votes in a non-Malay constituency contested by the DAP against a BN non-Malay part y, thereby depri ving the BN of Malay votes it would otherwise gain if there were no Malay ca ndidates and vice-versa, wit h the DAP helping PAS by capturing so me of the non -Malay vote in PASUMNO fights. As for PAS, though it was still smarting from th e recent loss of Kelantan , nomination day revealed it was seeking a new sta te base with Kedah being the target. Al so, durin g t he campaign it became evident that PAS had changed the emphasis of its op posi tion challenge. PAS was now more determinedl y promoting Islam a nd a tt empting to link up with the growing Islamic resurgence move ment beginning to sweep the country instead of co ncentrating on traditional Mala y nationali t issues. For example, PAS called for promoting Islamic Ia" in Kedah . Three former Angkatan Belia Islam Malays ia (AB l M or the Malay ian Islamic Youth Movement) offic ials contested in Kedah as PAS candidate~. and ABIM members were reported to be openly campaigning for PAS .'~ The non-Malay BN parties like the MC A, Gerakan, the MlC, and the PPP all campaigned on the broad BN plat form tres ing the government's solid achievements in terms of ethnic harmony and political stability, and the government 's performance and plan s for economic development. They also reminded vo ters that only by being strong! _ supported co uld the BN adequatel y defend th e interests of the non -Malay community inside the government. H owever, in the 1978 election the MCA ~lightly transgressed the BN 's official position by s upporting the idea that the government should allow the e~tablishment of pri vately-funded institutions of higher learning and promisi ng to use its infl uence to seek change in the Industrial Co-ordination Act (I CA) if the Chinese business ommunity believed it was being ad ve rsely affected. For the non-Malay campaign, the main issues focused on included the grievances of the non -Malay community over urban unemployment, university admissions, employment quotas, some aspects of the NEP, and the ICA implementation. Hence, not surprisingly, the OAP ampaigm

INTRODUCTION

17

included the call for reviSIOn in the NEP, repeal of the ICA, and the formation of a private Chinese-medium Merdeka University. Also, the DAP continued to advocate its "Malaysian Malaysia" theme. The election results gave the BN 131 of 154 parliamentary seats with 57.6 per cent of the total valid votes, and 239 of 275 state seats, giving it control of all state governments. In Peninsular Malaysia, the BN won 94 of 114 parliamentary seats Y Also, in the Peninsula, among BN partners, UMNO lost 5 seats to PAS, while the MCA, the MIC, GerHkan, and the PPP lost a total of 15 seats, all to the DAP. In the 1978 election, PAS, back in opposition, fared badly in terms of seats won. Only 5 PAS candidates won out of the 87 contesting for the parliamentary seats, that is, down from 14 in 1974. Twenty-seven of them lost their deposits. At the state level, PAS also performed very poorly. It won only 9 out of 203 state seats co ntested . In Kedah, its target state, it ca ptured only 7 of the 26 seats, thus failing miserably to achieve its declared objective of forming the state government. Nevertheless, in terms o f votes, PAS remained a srrong co ntender for the Malay votes. In the heavily Malay populated northern states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, where PAS is stro ngest, the party received 40.29 per cent of the total valid votes in parliamentary seats co ntested. This meant that the PAS showing was strong in Malay majority constituencies. The DAP gained 7 new parliamentary seats, to emerge with 15 in Peninsular Malaysia, plus I more in Sabah. It also increased its percentage of votes in seats contested to over 39 per cent . However, at the state level, DAP showing fell short of party expectations. It sec ured only 25 state seats out of the 126 it had contested . The 1978 elections confirmed, however, the ·axiom' that the DAP was nearl y unbeatable in the large urban constituencies with a high percentage of non-Malay electorates. Nevertheless, the BN's 1978 election victory showed that the BN concept obtained multi-ethnic support, that coalition strains and rivalries, however counter-productive, were manageable and within acceptable limits. Abo, it proved that the departure of PAS had not fatally undermined the whole coalition concept and strategy. What had changed was that the goal of minimizing "politicking" was threatened although tough legal prohibitions on campaigning remained intact, and the associated goal of maimaining Malay unit y had collapsed. The opposition was now effectively polarized between PAS on the Malay side and the DAP on the non-Malay side, each seeking tOlally incompatible ethnic demands. ~ 8

Election of 1982 The general election of 1982 was held more than a year before the term of the Parliament elected in 1978 was due to expire. Two major reasons

18

MALAYSIA'S !986 GENERAL ELECTION

attributed to the early election were (1) to provide a mandate for Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad who succeeded Datuk Hussein Onn as Prime Minister in mid-1981 and (2) to conduct the election at a more favourable time in the light of the deteriorating state of the economy (the Malaysian economy being heavily dependent on international trade and investment was increasingly being threatened by the world recession) . In his analysis of the 1982 general election, Crouch found that: The election was also a test for the non-Malay, especially Chinese, parties in the government. In the past, support for UMNO from the Malay com munit y had always been stronger than support for the MCA and the Gerakan from the Chinese community. The influence of the non-Malay parties in the government depends in part on their capacit y to demon strate their electoral strength against their main challengers. the opposition DAP. 29

The victory of the BN in the 1982 election was never doubted . As the ruling party it had at its disposal all of the resources of government, superior organization and finances, an enviable record of political and economic achievements, and a dynamic administration. Moreover, the opposition parties this time around were paralyzed by infighting, defections, lack of finances, organization, and manpower as well as poor media exposure. This was reflected during their campaigns which seemed disorganized, negative, and offering no alternative policy proposals. They were not even able to generate issues which could attract voters. It should also be noted that for the 1982 election once again a ban was imposed on rallies. Instead, campaigns could be conducted through ceramahs (indoor campaigning), door-to-door visits, massive poster and banner display , newspaper advertisements, and limited radio and television appeals. Also, for the first time, polling was scheduled for a Thursday instead of the traditional Saturday. The DAP protested , as this could reduce the urban non-Malay voter turnout. However, the government replied that Thursday polling was much more convenient for the five states which use Friday, the Muslim holy day, as their holiday. The Malay parties, pitting UMNO and Berjasa against PAS, mostl y campaigned for Islamic advancement and on the successful nature of BN development strategies. In 1982, UMNO could do this because its credentials as a Malay party committed to advancing Islamic goals were authentic and in good order. The "coup de grace" in polishing up U MNO's Islamic image came on the eve of Nomination Day when Anwar Ibrahim, a highly popular personality in the Muslim movement, quit as president of ABIM, joined UMNO, and contested a parliamentary seat. Also, UMNO took great pains to defend its development strategies against PAS accusations, pointing out that development did not mean Westernization and

INTRODUCTION

19

that economic progress needed to be matched by spiritual advancement and moral strength. Among the non-Malays, key issues exploited included protection and defence of non-Malay interests in such areas as primary education, employment, and university enrolment quotas. Concerns revolving around the question of the economic and political position of the non-Malays vis-a-vis the Malays were also raised. As expected, the BN had a grand victory. It won 139 of the 154 parliamentary seats with 60.4 per cent of the popular vote, and 280 of 311 state seats, which also gave it control of all state assemblies. The Malay vote was convincingly won by UMNO, which succeeded in 70 of the 73 parliamentary seats it contested and 196 of the 205 state seats, winning the majority of the Malay votes plus a substantial portion of non-Malay votes. UMNO's success in mobilizing Malay support was partly due to its ability to present itself as the only effective defender of Malay interests in a communally-divided society as well as to its wellentrenched party machine at the grass roots level which was geared towards offering patronage and material benefits to its supporters. UMNO's opponents did not have these advantages. Nevertheless, PAS proved that it could still win the support of almost half of the Malay votes in the four states where Malays comprised more than 70 per cent of the voters. The 1982 election also saw the BN recording its best performance in the Chinese-majority constituencies since the 1964 election. Of the 15 parliamentary areas in which Chinese voters totalled 60 per cent or more, the BN in 1982 won 9 compared to only 2 in 1978. Overall, the DAP lost lO of the parliamentary seats that it captured in 1978, held 5, and wrested 1 from the BN. At state level, it lost 17 seats, held 12, and won 4 from the BN (l each in Penang, Perak, Selangor, and Pahang). However, despite its heavy loss of seats, the DAP's total share of votes was not drastically reduced. It obtained 20.3 per cent compared with 21.5 per cent of the Peninsular Malaysia parliamentary votes. This was because of the smaller number of independents and small-party candidates, causing their share of the total vote to decline from 3.7 per cent to 2.0 per cent. This would seem to have contributed to the 4.2 per cent increase in the government's share of the total Peninsular Malaysia votes, which may have been vital in some closely contested seats. Nevertheless, the 1982 election showed the DAP losing support in its traditional stronghold constituencies while gaining in some nontraditional areas. The decrease in the DAP's votes in its stronghold areas was partly due to the changing racial composition of the Chinese-majority urban centres. The implementation of the NEP saw rural Malays migrating to these urban centres, thus reducing the Chinese majority there. However,

20

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

according to Crouch, this factor was not crucial in the 1982 election. The DAP's losses were due primarily to a swing of Chinese urban voters to the BN. Also, it could reflect the increasing urban prosperity during the past four years which had helped more and more Malaysians , including Chinese, to climb the social ladder by moving to new housing estates and acquiring attributes of middle-class people. It might also be due to the feeling that opposition members of Parliament , however well-intenti oned, can do little to seek redress and obtain basic social amenities required by urban dwellers. This is especially so when the governmen t actively discriminates against constituenc ies returning opposition candidates. Also, according to Crouch, for the educated, middle-clas s voters, the Mahathir-M usa governmen t's emphasis on suppressing corruption and improving bureaucratic efficiency may have had some appeal. Another important factor was the support given by the Chinese education movement to the governmen t through the Gerakan, although only one of its two candidates was successful. The DAP also made a tactical error by switching established sitting members to new constituenc ies and there appears to have been factional trouble in Perak. 30 Despite the DAP's heavy loss of seats in the Peninsula in the 1982 election, a closer examinatio n of voting figures suggests that the DAP probably got more Chinese votes than the MCA. Hence, the DAP will still be a force to be reckoned with in the Chinese-m ajority areas, especially when the Chinese parties in the BN are seen as ineffective in representin g the Chinese interests. Finally, the 1982 election showed the resilence of PAS in its stronghold constituencies. PAS won about half the Malay votes in Kelantan and substantial support in Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis.

Notes I. Wu Min Aun, An Introduction to the Malaysian Legal System (Kuala Lumpur : Heine-

mann , 1975), p. 53 . 2. Barisan Nasional (National Front), currently an alliance of eleven component parties, originated as the Alliance comprising three major parties in 1955 - the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) . While the number of BN component parties has changed over the years, the three original parties are regarded as the major ones. (See Origins of the Alliance, p. 4.) 3. Datuk Musa Hitam resigned as Deputy Prime Minister on 26 February 1986 cjting inter alia irreconcilable differences with the Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, as the reason. This was a big setback for the BN, and particularly UMNO, as the 2M leadership (Mahathir-Mu sa) had swept into power in 1982 based on the promise of a "Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy" government. Hence, it was speculated

INTRO DUCTI ON

21

that the split between the 2Ms would have serious repercus sions on the strength of UMNO in the 1986 election . 4. Sankara n Ramana than and Mohd. Hamdan Adnan, "Percep tions and Attitude s of Voters in the States of Kelanta n and Terengg anu Affectin g the Malaysi an General Election s of 1980", (Researc h Report submitt ed to New Straits Times Press [Malays ia], Kuala Lumpur, Decemb er 1986). This will hencefo rth be referred to as the NSTP Election s Report. 5. M. Kent Jenning s and L. Harmon Ziegler, The Electoral Process (Englew ood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice -Hall, 1966). 6. Herbert Asher, Presidential Elections and America n Politics, rev. ed. (Homew ood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1980). 7. John Kessel, Presidential Campaign Politics (Homew ood Ill. : The Dorsey Press, 1980). 8. Paul Lazarsfe ld, Bernard Berelson , and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, 3rd ed. (New York : Columb ia Univers ity Press, 1968). 9. David Butler and Dennis Kavanag h, The British General Election of 1983 (London : Macmil lan Co., 1984). 10. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London : Hodder and Stought on, 1976), p. 136. II. K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malaysian Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Kuala Lumpur : Pustaka llmu. 1967), p. 12. 12. Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan National: Coalition Govern ment in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur : Marican & Sons [Malays ia] Sdn. Bhd .. 1983), p. 25 . 13 . Ibid., p. 26. 14. Harry Miller, Prince and Premier (london : George C. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1959), p. 117. quoting Tunku Abdul Rahman . 15 . Mauzy, op. cit. , p. 30. 16. Ibid., p. 30. 17 . Ibid. 18. Means, op. cit., p. 348. 19. Mahath ir Moham ad, "Proble ms of Democr atic Nation-B uilding in Malaysi a", Solidarity 6, no. 10 (Octobe r 1971): 12. 20. R.K. Vasil, "The 1984 General Election s in Malaya, and Constitu ency Studies, Batu", in The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, edited by K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne (Singap ore: Pustaka Ilmu, 1967), pp. 242-65 . 21. R.K . Vasil, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 (Singap ore: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1972), p. 36. 22. Ibid., p. 39. 23 . There are at least three account s ~f the May Thirteen Incident , includin g the Report of the Nationa l Operati ons Council (NOC) and Tunku Abdul Rahman 's book . Casualt y figures vary, but 600 deaths may be taken as the upper limit. 24. Mauzy, op. cit., p. 87 . 25. Cbandra selcaran Pillay, The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia, A Post Mortem, Occasio nal Paper No. 25 (Singap ore: Institute of Southea st Asian Studies, 1974), p. 14. 26. New Straits Times , 4 Jul y 1978. '!.7 . See Diane K. Mauzy, "A Vote for Continu ity: The 1978 General Election s in Malaysi a", Asian Survey 19, no. 3 (March 1979): 281-296 . 28 . Mauty, Barisun Nusiona/: Coalition Govern ment in Malaysi a, op. cit., p. 124. 29. Harold Crouch, Malaysi a's /9/12 General Election, Researc h Notes and Discuss ion Paper No. 34 (Singap ore: Institute of Southea st Asian Studies, 1982), p. 3. 30. Ibid., p. 55 .

II

Run-up to the 1986 Geneml Election

In this section, we describe the background to the 1986 general election under the following headings: I. 2. 3. 4.

Political developments; Economic developments; Revisions of electoral boundaries and constituenc ies; and Campaign issues and strategies.

Political Developments The 2M leadership, which had convincingly swept to power in the 1982 election, appeared to be invincible, particularly since its slogan of a "Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy" (bersih, cekap dan amanah) governmen t had captured the attention of the electorate. This indeed seemed to be so as the 2Ms began to start sweeping clean with their new brooms. The first indication of things to come was the appointme nt of federal and state ministers. Even before the elections, it had been anticipated that the compositio n of the federal and state governmen ts would reflect the emphasis of the 2M slogan. 1 One former minister, Datuk Mohamed Rahmat, was excluded and appointed Ambassado r to Indonesia, although he still remained as a member of Parliament. This, together with vacancies caused by the non-nomin ation of three former ministers, saw the inclusion of four new faces in the twenty-fou r-member federal cabinet. The inclusion of two former Menteri Besar, Datuk Rais Yatim (formerly from Negeri Sembilan) and Adib Adam (formerly from Melaka), indicated the desire to appoint young administrat ors with proven track records. However, the retention of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, first as Finance Minister and later as Trade and Industry Minister, showed that Mahathir was still in the driver's seat. Further, the induction of Anwar Ibrahim first as Deputy Minister and later as Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports {after the incumbent Mokhtar Hashim was detained on murder charges in early 1983), was to have tremendous implication s for UMNO politics. Mahathir's retention of Tengku Razaleigh in the Cabinet continued to be a thorny problem in UMNO politics over the next four years and still has repercussions on the current political scene.

RUN -U P TO THE 1986 GE NERAL ELECTION

23

In terms of party composition, however, the balance remained unchanged, with UMNO holding 13 posts, MCA 4, and Gerakan, MIC, Berjasa, PBB, SUPP, SNAP, and Berjaya having 1 each. Crouch states that the MCA was disappointed with the announcement of the new Cabinet, for it believed that its excellent performance in the election, at least in terms of seats, merited not only an increase in Cabinet posts but also the appointment of MCA leaders to key departments. 2

At the state level, there were many more changes, notably the replacement of four Menteri Besar and one Chief Minister by young leaders such as Najib Tun Razak, Ajib Ahmad, and Mohd. Isa Abdul Samad (early thirties) and Abdul Rahim Thamby Chik (late thirties). 3 There were also changes in membership of state executive councils, whereby many new councillors were appointed. These sweeping changes tended to break up established relationships and reduce opportunities for corruption, while simultaneously promising to improve the quality of state-level administration. 4 The 1982 election also marked the entry into politics of Anwar Ibrahim, leader of the Muslim youth movement Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). The enrolment of Anwar into the UMNO fold in March 1982 took many by surprise and was considered one of Mahathir's political accomplishments. Anwar proved his popularity by convincingly winning his Permatang Pauh parliamentary seat (in Penang state) in the elections the following month. Within six months, he had defeated Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin by 10 votes (183 to 173) in the elections for the UMNO Youth leadership. Anwar's meteoric rise in the party ranks was and is a cause of discontent and concern among some UMNO leaders. Apart from endorsing Anwar as the youth leader, the UMNO General Assembly in September 1982 also called for a ban on government-run lotteries and the closure of the Genting Highlands casino. 5 Although nothing much came out of this resolution (except for preventing Muslims from visiting the casino), the issue of betting and lottery wins continues to be a subject of debate among Muslim intellectuals, especially between the fundamentalists and the conservatives. Initially, however, these strains were not evident in the 2M leadership, as both Mahathir and Musa shared many things in common. 6 They had both been labelled as outspoken ultras and Mahathir had been expelled from UMNO in 1969 by the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, for a letter he wrote challenging Tunku's leadership. Musa lost his post as assistant minister to the Deputy Prime Minister because of his "doubtful loyalty to the government". After a period of three years in the cold, they were reinstated and steadily rose to prominence. Further, both had risen

24

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

from humble backgrounds, to be united by fighting for the same causes. Hence, their leadership styles initially tended to complement each other, with Mahathir being more aggressive and Musa, diplomatic. With the landslide 1982 election victory behind them , the 2Ms began to push through new policies and action programmes initiated earlier (in 1981) when Mahathir became Prime Minister. Among the reformi st policies and programmes were: I. A generally more liberal attitude towards political detainees, foreign wives, and the mass media, as had been exemplified earlier by the release of twenty-one political detainees in August 1981, the relaxation of visa restrictions on foreign wives, and a more open approach towards t he mass media. These have generally been attributed to Musa's influence. 2. Changes in foreign policy directions, such as giving less priority to the Commonwealth, the "Buy British Last" policy and the "Look East" policy, including emulation of Japanese work ethics. These have ge nerally been identified with Mahathir's influence. 3. Establishing a more efficient administration through clock-in procedures, wearing of name tags, emphasis on increasing productivity, establishment of a Malaysian work ethic, and publicizing the "Malaysia Incorporated" concept. These also have been attributed to Mahathir. 4. Changes in economic policies and programmes, such as the establishment of sogososhas, expansion of heavy industries, development of Proton Saga, the national car, privatization, encouragement of J apanese and Korean investments, and participation in Malaysian vent ures. These changes are discussed in a later part of thi s section . 5. Changes aimed at greater Islamizatio n of the gove rnmen t, including the establishment of the Internationall slamic Universit y and the Islamic Bank and countering the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, particularl y among the younger generation. Thus, Anwar Ibrahim's recrui tment into UMNO was a big blow to PAS's hopes.

The strength of the 2M combination was tested in the constitutional amendment crisis in 1983, which saw the politicians pitting their strength against the Malay rulers. 7 At the heart of the crisis were two proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution which so ught to define the place and duties of Sultans and the Agong. The first change was with regard to Article 66 (5) of the Federal Constitution which referred to the period for assent from the Agong before a bill became law. Previously, the Constitution had been silent on this issue. In practice, no previous Agong had ever withheld assent to federal legislation, although some Sultans had withheld assent to bills from their own state legislatures for periods extending to twelve months.

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

25

Under the proposed amendment, the period of assent would be limited to fifteen days, that is, any bill would automatically become law fifteen days after it was presented to the Agong for signature. This amendment also affected the eighth schedule of the Constitution as it was felt by the Attorney-General's chambers that state laws must, in principle, comply with federal laws. Therefore, the eighth schedule was also amended to make it consistent with Article 66 (5). Consequently, the amendments would also limit the period of assent for the Sultans to fifteen days with regard to bills from the state legislatures presented for signature to them. The second proposed amendment was with regard to Article 150 of the Federal Constitution relating to the powers of the Agong to declare a state of emergency. Previously, the article had given the power of proclamation to the Agong. Under the proposed amendment, only the Prime Minister would have the power to proclaim a state of emergency. Initially, these proposed amendments were prepared quietly and with little public notice, that is, from July to August 1983. The government, quoting the Sedition Act of 1970 (which removed from public debate the position of the Agong and the rulers), succeeded in getting a local media blackout of the events, largely because the vast majority of editors were in favour of the proposed amendments. 8 Hence, the proposed amendments were passed through both houses of Parliament in a matter of days and with hardly any debate, leading Lim Kit Siang, DAP secretary-general, to comment that the Malaysian Parliament seemed to be staging a wayang ku/it, "where we see the shadows but not the substance" of the debate. 9 However, the rulers soon became aware of the full impact of the amendments and relations between them and the government quickly deteriorated (August-October). This, coupled with opposition from some UMNO veterans such as Tunku Abdul Rahman, Senu Abdul Rahman, Ghazali Shafie, and Tengku Razaleigh Harnzah, worsened the crisis to a point where the government had to organize pro-amendment rallies throughout the peninsula. Finally, a compromise was reached in December 1983 whereby: l. The amendment regarding the declaration of emergency was withdrawn;

2. The eighth schedule remained unamended; and 3. The fifteen-day assent period was extended to sixty days during which the Agong can return any piece of legislation to Parliament, giving reasons for his actions. If Parliament sends the bill back to him, he must sign it. While the constitutional amendment crisis has succeeded in curtailing the power of the Agong and the Sultans (increasingly making them

26

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

constitutional monarchs), it caused instability and uncertainty among the Malays in doing so. Former UMNO stalwarts saw this as a cause celebre, which could be used as a rallying point in their opposition to the 2M leadership. For the first time since independence , the Malays were forced to choose between their political leadership on one hand and their spiritual and religious leaders on the other hand. While the political leadership emerged victorious, this did not endear the leaders, particularly Mahathir, to the Sultans. The 2M leac;lership was also criticized for its authoritarian tendencies, particularly in seeking to rush through vital constitutional amendments affecting fundamental liberties such as the power to declare an emergency. Aliran, for example, has argued that the way in which the government sought to present and push through the amendments in Parliament has belittled the process of democracy. 10 Another effect of the constitutional crisis is that the compromise has produced consequences which were contrary to what the government had in mind . According to one commentator: The new legislation ironically gives the King powers which he did not have prior to the 1983 amendments. The King is now provided with the expressed [sic] power to return to parliament bills passed by both Houses, with recommendations for any changes he sees fit. It can thus be argued that Malaysia no longer has a true constitutional monarch. 11

Thus, by the beginning of 1984, the 2M combination started to show signs of cracking up in the face of mounting opposition to its radical and reformist pace. The first sign of the rift between Mahathir and Musa appeared in the UMNO triennial elections held in May 1984, when Musa was again challenged for the deputy presidency by Tengku Razaleigh. Although he defeated Razaleigh, Musa was involved in a more bitter and expensive campaign. Further, although Mahathir supported Musa, he did not accede to the latter's request that Tengku Razaleigh be dropped from the Cabinet. In the Cabinet reshuffle in July 1984, Mahathir retained Tengku Razaleigh, but this time as Trade and Industry Minister. He also brought in Daim Zainuddin as Finance Minister and retained Sanusi Junid in the National and Rural Development Ministry. 12 These appointments, together with other new appointments and the exclusion of veterans such as Ghazal1 Shafie and Manan Othman, indicated the following: I. "Mahathir" men had moved into key positions. 2. There was a balance among contending factions in UMNO. 3. There was hardly any change in the positions of the other BN component parties.

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GE NE RAL ELECTION

27

As has been observed earlier, the retention of Tengku Razaleigh led first to a rift between Mahathir and Musa and also to the continued presence of Tengku Razaleigh in Malaysian politics, thus enabling him to build up on his political support and eventually to challenge Mahathir for the top UMNO post. Das noted that: While there is no doubt that Mahathir has a very strong cabinet team with an impressive team of technocrats and an equally impressive team of powerful political figures, the worry is that jockeying for power will be more intense than ever. 13

This was certainly true as far as the subsequent events before the general election of 1986 were concerned. Three days before the announcement of the new Cabinet, Musa threatened to resign by July 1985 if Razaleigh was retained in the Cabinet. 14 Not only did Mahathir retain Razaleigh, he also appointed his close associates to key UMNO posts (Sanusi as secretary-general, Daim as treasurer, and Kamarulzaman Bahadon as executive secretary), effectively minimizing the Musa influence and consolidating his strength. Thus the 2M combination started breaking up soon afterwards. Although there was a temporary truce brought about after the UMNO general assembly in September 1985, the parting of ways soon began. The differences emerged in November 1985 over Musa's handling of the Memali incident, wherein four policemen and fourteen civilians died in a clash between the police and a group of Muslims led by Ibrahim Libya, a PAS member. Mahathir, who had been overseas at the time, felt that Musa was partly to blame for the bloodshed. 15 On 26 February 1986, Musa submitted a seven-page resignation letter (which became public with amazing speed) before leaving for London. This was followed by a heated UMNO supreme council meeting in March authorizing a delegation to leave for London to seek a compromise. Subsequently, the supreme council meeting in April 1986 accepted his resignation from the Cabinet but not as deputy president of·UMNO. The Mahathir-Musa rift has been seen by many as leading to a weaker UMNO just before the general election of 1986. Furthermore, the rise to prominence of Mahathir's men caused dissatisfaction among many UMNO stalwarts. 16 The other major BN component party, the MCA, also experienced many crises in the interregnum between the 1982 and 1986 elections. In the 1982 election it had done well, winning 24 of the 25 parliamentary seats contested, but by the end of the year, it had lost 1 seat to the DAP in a by-election. Its position was further eroded in early 1983 w.hen its

28

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

president, Lee San Choon, resigned from both his party and Cabinet posts amid rumours that he was involved in a financial scandal. 17 This was followed by another by-election loss to the DAP and culminated with the DAP victory in Seremban, the constituency which Lee San Choon had wrested from the DAP one year earlier. Thus, within a spate of a year, the MCA had lost 3 seats to the DAP. Apart from the loss of seats, the MCA was also faced with a leadership crisis when Lee San Choon's deputy, Neo Yee Pan, became acting president. Neo's opponents contended that since Neo was appointed deputy president, there should be an election to determine who should be MCA president. Further, Neo's appointment of Mak Hon Kam as deputy president was resented by a group of discontented members such as Ling Liong Sik and Lee Kim Sai who banded together under the leadership of Tan Koon Swan. This faction brought up issues such as that pertaining to "phantom members" in their efforts to unseat Neo. The intra-party squabbles intensified, with Neo expelling Tan and thirteen supporters in March 1984 and Tan's supporters countering by holding an "extra-ordinary general meeting" in May attended by 1,616 delegates who called for Neo's removal. These moves led to protracted legal battles between June and December 1984 and the appointment of Ghafar Baba as mediator. Finally, in mid-1985 the long-overdue MCA election was held, resulting in victory for Tan and his associates. Despite Tan's election, the MCA's troubles were far from over for Tan's financial problems also implicated Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPH), the MCA's investment arm. 18 Tan's problems first came to public light when, in January 1986, he was charged in a Singapore court on fifteen counts of criminal breach of trust, cheating, and stock market fraud, all connected with Pan-Electric Industries (Pan-El), a Singapore-based company. Earlier, he had tried to transfer some of Pan-El's debts to MPH, of which he had been managing director. 19 However, his efforts to rescue Pan-El failed partly because of opposition from other MPH directors, including Lee San Choon. Thus, he resigned as managing director of MPH in February, barely one month after he was charged in Singapore. From February to August 1986, the MCA president was preoccupied with his financial problems, particularly with having to make frequent appearances at the Singapore court in connection with the charges against him. This, coupled with the continuing losses being sustained by MPH, 20 contributed to the general feeling that the MCA was much weaker in facing the elections in 1986 than it had been four years earlier. Further, the party's internal struggle resulted in Mahathir having to sack Neo from the Cabinet and supporting Tan's faction. Thus, the Neo-Tan struggle not only caused the party to lose its credibility among the Chinese community, but also undermined its position vis-a-vis U MNO. 21

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

29

Gerakan, the other Chinese-based component party in the BN fold, was also faced with internal squabbles and problems, though not of the same magnitude as those confronting UMNO and the MCA. Gerakan's problems were primarily in Penang, where Lim Chong Eu had served as Chief Minister since 1969. Although Lim had stepped down as party president, he still remained Chief Minister of Penang. This meant that he had already served four terms. Further, he had been troubled by illhealth since 1984. Hence, there was jostling for power, particularly among would-be successors. The situation in Penang was further complicated in March 1986, when UMNO Penang called for the appointment of a Malay Chief Minister after Lim's term expired. This therefore resulted in Gerakan asking for more state and federal seats and threatening to withdraw from the coalition in July 1986 unless its demands were met. 22 Ironically, the BN component party which seemed most united was the MIC which in the past had been notorious for its many internal crises. Under the leadership of Samy Vellu, the party had consolidated its strength as the leading Indian party through moves such as the take-over of the Vanto Academy and the establishment of MAIKA Holdings. Samy Vellu's action in expelling his former protege Govinda Raj from the party for disloyalty also met with approval from his erstwhile critics. Although Govinda Raj formed the Democratic Malaysian Indian Party (DMIP) in 1986, it was not regarded as a serious threat to the MIC in the forthcoming election. Political troubles were not confined to BN component parties in Peninsular Malaysia alone. In Sabah, Berjaya, which had ousted the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) in 1976, found its nine-year supremacy being challenged by the fledgling Party Bersatu Sabah (PBS), which had been founded by Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a former Berjaya minister. In the election held on 22 April, the PBS secured 25 seats, USNO 16, Berjaya 6, and Pasok 1. However, before the full results came in, Mustapha Harun, leader of USNO, was sworn in as Chief Minister. Later in the day, he was dismissed by the Yang Di Pertua Negeri (Head of State) and Pairin was sworn in. Thus, Sabah had two Chief Ministers within a period of twenty-four hours. This was the beginning of a protracted crisis over the ensuing year. In February 1986, Pairin asked for the dissolution of the state assembly because of the cross-over of six assemblymen to USNO. Before the election could be held, there was a spate of violence wherein about thirty homemade bombs were exploded in Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan, and Tawau. On 19 March, a crowd burnt thirty-one cars and thirty shophouses in Kota Kinabalu and this led to a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Altogether, five people died and property worth millions of ringgit was destroyed. 23

30

MALAYSI A'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTIO N

Although there were mediation attempts by Mahathir and Anwar, these failed, as the PBS members were opposed to any compromise involving power sharing with USNO. Finally, on 15 April 1986, the Kota Kinabalu High Court dismissed Mustapha's suit challenging the legality of Pairin's chief ministership, following which Mustapha went overseas. Subsequently on 5 and 6 May, the state election was held and the PBS emerged with a clear majority. The Sabah crisis had two major implications for politics in Peninsular Malaysia and hence, for the 1986 general election. First, it was one of the causes for the Mahathir-Musa rift. Mahathir, who had supported Berjaya in the April 1985 Sabah election, was unhappy with the PBS victory and had subsequently supported USN0. 24 When the crisis escalated in March 1986, Musa, who was acting Prime Minister in Mahathir's absence, took firm action in quelling the violence and warning USNO leaders not to disrupt the peace. Musa's handling of the Sabah crisis earned him the respect of many but also the distrust of Mahathir. Second, it damaged the image of the Mahathir administration as "clean, efficient and trustworthy". Mahathir was seen to be clearly taking sides, first in rejecting the PBS application for admission to the BN in 1985, then in pressing Pairin for a PBS-USNO coalition, and finally in grudgingly having to admit the PBS into the BN on the eve of the 1986 general election. The admission of the PBS led to the withdrawal of Berjaya from the BN. Political infighting was not as bad in Sarawak as compared to Sabah, at least in 1986. Early in the year, Salleh Jafaruddin was sacked from Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) by his cousin Taib Mahmud , the Chief Minister, for allegedly attacking Taib's government. This brought into the open a so-called "proxy war" which had been going on between Taib and his uncle, Rahman Yaacob, a former Chief Minister and Head of State, whose protege Taib had been. However, in 1986 at least, Taib won the proxy war when his nominee Wan Madzihi (another cousin) defeated Salleh in the Oya constituency by-election in July, thus strengthening Taib's power and showing voter support for the BN .25 The Oya by-election was the last by-election before the August 1986 general election. The other BN component parties in Sarawak were relatively troublefree on the eve of the general election. With regard to opposition parties, the emergence of Lim Kit Siang as the undisputed leader of the DAP proved to be a decisive factor in the build-up to the 1986 general election. The DAP, which was formed in 1967, appeared to be split between the followers of Lim and Fan Yew Teng in the late seventies. The emergence of Lim and the subsequent resignation of Fan did little to unite the party's supporters. In November 1980, the DAP lost a by-election for a Penang state seat. T his led to criticism of Lim and the resignation of three DAP members of Parliament,

RU N -U P TO THE 1986 GE N E RA L ELECTION

31

who subsequently joined the MCA. 26 These, together with the cross-overs of state assemblymen in Penang and other states, led to a decline in the DAP's influence particularly in Penang. As a result, the DAP's representation in Parliament, reduced from 16 in 1978 to 13 in 1980 (due to the resignations), was further reduced to 10 after the 1982 election. In the state asemblies, its representation, which had already dropped from 25 to 18 in 1980 due to cross-overs, was further reduced to 6 after the 1982 election. Thus, the 1982 election resulted in the DAP's heavy loss of seats, both in Parliament as well as in the state assemblies. However, the DAP recovered from this setback and began to make plans to increase its strength in the 1986 election. Lim and the other remaining DAP stalwarts gained respect and admiration by being committed to their roles as members of the leading opposition party and by voicing their criticism on various issues such as the BMF affair, the Papan nuclear waste dump, Bukit Cina, economic mismanagement, and corruption in government. Lim was of course the most vocal and well-known critic and his speeches and books such as Time Bombs in Malaysia and Save Bukit Cina were widely read. Consequently, in the period between the 1982 and 1986 elections, the DAP managed to recapture the Seremban parliamentary constituency and win in two state constituencies. In early 1986, there were discussions of a coalition among the opposition parties, that is, the DAP, PAS, and three smaller parties - Nasma, Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM), and Sepakat Democratic Party (SOP). However, the DAP withdrew from the proposed alliance as PAS was not prepared to compromise on the question of an Islamic state. Further, since the other three parties were in direct competition with the DAP for the non-Malay votes, the DAP would have to give some of its constituencies to these parties to contest. 21 By mid-1986, therefore, the DAP decided to go it alone in the event of a general election. The other major opposition party, PAS, had been trying for some time to form an alliance o f opposition parties. Originally known as the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), PAS had always been a party of some strength, especially in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu from independence in 1957, right through the 1960s, and for most of the 1970s. It was only from 1978 that its political strength had been steadily sapped. For a brief period (1972- 78), PAS was a member of the BN. However, the differences between UMNO and PAS became more pronounced and PAS withdrew early in 1978, resulting in a by-election in the state of Kelantan, in which UMNO defeated PAS for the first time with the help of a PAS breakaway party, Berjasa. Razaleigh, whose political power base is in Kelantan, has been credited with having masterminded the PAS defeat in 1978 and again in the 1982 general election. Following PAS's 1982 defeat,

32

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTI ON

its leadership passed to a younger and more radical group of religious leaders (u/ama) such as Haji Hadi Awang, Ustaz Fadzil Noor, Subki Latif, and Mohd Nakhai e Hj. Ahmad . The older generat ion of leaders such as Asri Muda and Datuk Abu Bakar Omar were replaced, with the exception of Haji Yusof Rawa, who was retained as president. In additio n, they reorganized the party itself by setting up a Majlis Ulama (council of religious leaders) which was empowered to issue rulings on matters related to religion and was comple mentar y to the party's suprem e council. 28 The new leadership quickly injected a more fundam entalis t elemen t firstly by declaring the political goal of PAS to be the creatio n of an Islamic state and secondly by organizing regular ceramahs (politic al meetings) through out the country, particu larly in the predom inantly -Malay states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis. Further more, UMNO members and support ers were identifi ed as the greatest enemies of PAS, while UMNO members were condem ned as infidels (kafir), workin g handin-hand with the non-Muslims to destroy the country . Throug h their ceramahs, jatwa (religious rulings) , cassette tapes of speeches, and Friday sermons (such as those delivered by Hadi in Kampo ng Rusila, Terengganu), PAS was able to drum up suppor t, particu larly among the Muslim s in the four predominantly-Malay states. The Muslim fundamentalism exhibited by the rejuvenated PAS resulted in dividing the Malays into two camps. In many instances, the division was more than ideological. For example, many kampo ngs in Kelanta n and Terengganu were and still are deeply divided along political party affiliati on lines in terms of having different meeting places, coffee shops, restaurants, places of recreation, and places of worship. Particularly divisive was the kafir-mengkafir issue wherein PAS leaders issuedf atwa declaring UMNO membe rs to be infidels . This politici zation of Islam brough t PAS into direct confron tation with UMNO , particu larly in the kampongs where there was increasing tension and conflic t. For example, one person was killed after clashes betwee n UMNO and PAS support ers during the Padang Terap by-election in 1985. 2 ~ Matters came to a head with Mahath ir challenging PAS to a public televised debate in November 1984. The debate was called off at the last minute on the orders of the Agong. In order to counter the growing aggressiveness of PAS, the government in August 1984 banned all public gatheri ngs in Kedah and Perlis, states which PAS was trying to penetrate. A few months later, the ban was extended to Kelantan and Terengganu. Following this, the govern ment tabled a White Paper in Parliam ent on "The Threat to Muslim Unity and Nationa l Security", alleging that six extremist groups were plotting to overthrow the government in order to establish an Islamic state. The

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENE RAL ELECTION

33

White Paper also implied that PAS leaders were connected with these radical Islamic groups. In November 1985, the police moved in on a group of Muslims in the house of Ibrahim "Libya" Mahmood in Kampong Memali, near Baling in Kedah. Ibrahim Libya had been wanted by the police since 3eptember 1984, when a warrant for his arrest was issued under the Internal Security Act. In the ensuing clash between the police and the villagers, eighteen people including four policemen were killed and twenty-nine others injured. The Memali incident, while showing that the government meant business, did not significantly reduce the tension between the two Malay parties. In fact, PAS leaders ruled that Ibrahim was a syahid (Muslim martyr) and he was given a hero's burial, together with thirteen other supporters in a mass grave at Parit Panjang, a PAS stronghold. The Memali incident was later used as a political issue by PAS in the 1986 election. One other significant development was the decision in late 1985 by the PAS leadership to woo the non-Malay voters, particularly the Muslims. By 1985, PAS had formed a Chinese Consultative Committee (CCC), which would act as a bridge between PAS and the Chinese community. Although the CCC was not a political party, it openly supported the PAS in a number of ceramahs organized by PAS. Led by Chinese-Muslims such as Kamal Koh, it was headquartered in Perak. The basis of PAS-CCC co-operation was a fifty-seven-point memorandum of understanding encompassing eight areas such as the concept of an Islamic state, fundamental rights, education, cultures and languages, nature of elections, internal security, social justice and national solidarity, and economic justice and livelihood. 30 Another PAS attempt to woo the non-Malay voters was the muchpublicized statement of Hadi regarding the special rights of the Malays. Hadi , a fiery orator, surprised many Malaysians by his statement just before the election that Malays were not entitled to special rights in the Islamic state concept. This became an important campaign issue for both PAS and UMNO. One other aspect of the machinations and manoeuvres among the Malay-based political parties in the "East Coast" states of Kelantan and Terengganu needs to be highlighted here, particularly in the context of the perennial PAS-UMNO struggle for supremacy in these two states. In the 1982 election, former PAS supporters had formed Berjasa (Barisan Jemaah Islam SeMalaysia), a political party which could attract the votes of "moderate" Muslims particularly in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu. Berjasa, which was supported by BN leaders in Kelantan notably Te ngku Razaleigh Hamzah, was admitted into the BN fold and did creditably in the 1982 election, particularly in Kelantan state, where it won 5 seats. In 1986, however, another group of former PAS members

34

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

led by Datuk Hj Asri Muda (former PAS president) formed a splinter party, Hisbul Muslimin (Hamim), and applied to join the BN coalition. The application was strenuously objected to by Berjasa but the objection was ignored and Hamim was admitted as a BN component party in February 1986. Berjasa therefore immediately withdrew from the BN coalition to protest Hamim's admission . The withdrawal of Berjasa from the BN was seen by a number of observers as an addition to the growing factionalism among Malay-based political parties and impairing the BN's chances, particularly in Kelantan and Terengganu.

Economic Developments The interregnum between the two elections was also marked by the most severe economic recession that the country had experienced since the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. The effects of the recession were exacerbated by the following factors : I. Lack of anticipation in both the private and public sectors that the recession would become worse with each succeeding year; 2. Disclosure of a number of financial scandals, particularly the BMF affair; and 3. Policies which stressed priorities that were inappropriate to the existing economic situation.

The government had dismissed signs of an economic slowdown in 1981 and 1982, declaring that while other countries may be affected, Malaysia had sufficient resources to overcome economic problems, which were viewed as temporary. Even as late as October 1984, Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin stated that the economy was strong and stable and proposed a three-pronged strategy to consolidate the budget which included, inter alia, the promotion of public sector growth, continued constraints on spending, and steps to reduce the current account deficit. 31 While the optimistic outlook was reflected in the growth statistics for 1984 whereby Gross Domestic Production (GOP) was 7.6 per cent, this did not last long. Nevertheless, the optimism prevailed through most of 1985 and early 1986. For example, even when the GOP for 1986 (originally forecast to be 6 per cent) was known by early 1986 to be just 2.8 per cent, the government still initially forecast the 1986 GOP to be 6 per cent. Thus, there were three official revisions of the GOP forecast for 1986 - in March, when it was reduced to 3.3 per cent; in May, when it was further reduced to 1.6-2 per cent; and in June, when it was put at 1 per centY Before the election, government leaders dismissed the possibility of zero

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

35

or negative growth for 1986, predicting a growth of between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent instead. What is surprising about these optimistic forecasts is that they were made in the face of falling commodity prices. Further, the competition from timber exporters in neighbouring countries had for some time led to falling demand for wood products. In addition, the collapse of the international tin market in 1985 had precipitated a crisis whereby the price of tin dropped considerably, to the extent that the metal is no longer traded in the London Metal Exchange (LME). Thus, not only was tin production reduced, but the country's revenue from tin declined considerably and there was widespread unemployment, particularly in the Kinta and Klang valleys. Apart from the problems of oversupply and declining demands faced by primary commodities, the economy was also affected by declining demand in the electronics industry and manufacturing industries such as cement, where production in 1986 was only at 50 per cent capacity due to the declining property market. The closure of several electronic factories in Penang in 1985-86 led to an increase in unemployment, the rate of which was officially declared to be 8 per cent but was unofficially estimated to be 10 per cent in 1986. The decline in prices and value of exports therefore affected other sectors of the economy, primarily goods and services, and the combined effects led to a recession, the chief features of which were the following: l. A decline in the value of the ringgit against practically all major curren-

cies. For example, the ringgit declined from about 1.07 to the Singapore dollar in 1982 to about 1.18 in 1986. 2. A decrease in government spending, starting from 1984 and becoming progressively greater, which depressed the economy further. This led to the suspension of many development projects. 3. A generally poor economic and business climate which affected the private sector. For example, banks and other financial institutions were adversely affected by the declining property market, while investors were affected by high interest rates and greater difficulty in obtaining credit. The stock market also reflected the sluggishness of the economy, with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange experiencing low share prices and poor turnover of trading from 1983 to 1986. 33 The government also had to deal with a number of financial scandals, most prominent of which was the BMF affair, which involved the loss of approximately 2.5 billion ringgit in loans made by Bumiputra Malaysia Finance, a subsidiary of Bank Bumiputra, to a group of Hong Kong-based companies connected with George Tan. The issue first came to light in late

36

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

1982, when a story on the collapse of the Hong Kong property market in the Asian Wall Street Journal named BMF as one of the institutions which had lent money to the Carrian group of companies headed by George Tan. 34 Initially, the governmen t denied BMF involvemen t with Tan, but his arrest in October 1982 led to the subsequent disclosure in the Hong Kong court that BMF had lent money to Carrian and Carrian-rel ated companies. By the end of the year the governmen t was forced to di sclose that the chairman and four senior officials of BMF were being investigated for having accepted consultancy fees from Carrian . By 1983, the BMF affair had become a major financial scandal, with allegations that senior governmen t leaders were involved, and with demands for a White Paper or for a Royal Commissio n of Inquiry. By the end of the year, the governmen t set up a parliament ary committee headed by Auditor-Ge neral, Ahmad Noordin, but with restricted powers and term of reference. However, it was only more than a year later (in 1984) that the committee's report was released to the public. after considerabl e hesitation on the governmen t's part and after a great deal of pressure. Meanwhile, the governmen t was also forced to utilize its financial resources to save the parent body, Bank Bumiputra Malay ia Berhad (BBMB), from financial collapse. Since the BBMB is the largest financial organizatio n in Malaysia, its collapse would have di srupted the entire banking system. In addition, since the 88MB's majority shareholde r is Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), which in turn is a sub sidiary of Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN), the national unit tru st whic h represent s 1.3 million Malay investors, the 88MB's collapse would also have had tremendous political implication s. By early 1983, the PNB had acquired 50 per ent of BBMB shares by injecting 600 million ringgit into the shareholde rs' fund . However, this measure only brought temporary relief and Petronas (the national oil company) had to rescue the BBMB in late 1984 by taking over it s debt . which by then had amounted to nearly 2 billion ringgit. The BMF crisis had several implication s:

1. It exposed basic weaknesses in the country's financial sy tern , panic ularly with regard to the failure of Bank Negara to supervi e, check , and monitor activities of financial institutions . Another weakne s expo ed was the lack of accountabil ity and financial control, especiall y with regard to the top managemen t. 2. It damaged bumiputra interest, not only financially, but also with regard to ethical and moral considerati ons. For example, many bumipulras were shocked to realize that five highly respected Malays would blatantly betray the trust placed in them by the community .

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

37

3. It has tarnished Malaysia's financial standing abroad, especially in Hong Kong, and has affected the country's creditworthiness. 4. It was widely seen to have affected the government's credibility. As noted by one writer: The government's failure to act decisively on the issue, its continued denial of any knowledge and its failure to recognise that this was an important public issue, served to confirm public suspicions that there was a cover-up . . . [and also] cast doubts as to whether the 2M administration could live up to its reputation of providing a "clean, efficient and trustworthy government". 35

Further, many people implicated in the affair are either politicians or closely identified with Malay political leaders, lending credence to charges of corruption in high places. Apart from the BMF affair, the other major scandals were the Pan-El crisis (mentioned earlier), the losses sustained by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), and the failure of the Malaysian sogososha, Malaysian Overseas Investment Corporation (MOIC). In May 1986, it was disclosed that the EPF had sustained losses of nearly 300 million ringgit in stock transactions over the preceding one-anda-half years. While part of the losses were attributed to poor stock market conditions due to the recession, it was also disclosed that the EPF sold shares allotted to it at discount prices to a government firm, Makuwasa Securities. The EPF-Makuwasa connection was criticized on two grounds: 1. Had the EPF sold the shares in the open market, it could have made

greater profits, which could then have been returned to EPF contributors by way of increased dividends. 2. It was implied that the government was using EPF funds for its own monetary gains and also to manipulate the stock market. With regard to sogososhas, the concept itself had been objected to not only by economists but also by political leaders including Musa Hitarn, who had expressed his scepticism about these giant trading companies. Criticism of sogososhas gained credence when the failure of the MOIC became public knowledge by early 1986. It therefore did not come as too much of a surprise when the head of the MOIC , Abdullah Ang, was charged with fraud and corruption later in the year. Abdullah's close connection with the political leadership supported the contention by many that corruption was rampant. Malaysia's economic misfortunes have been traced by many critics to policies inappropriate to the existing economic situation, chief among which is the New Economic Policy (NEP), formulated in 1971 as the long-term goal for the equitable distribution of the nation's wealth among

38

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

the three major races. The original aim of the NEP was not only to Malaysianize foreign-owned companies but also to ensure at least 30 per cent of their equity would be owned by bumiputras. The NEP target was that by 1990, bumiputras should own at least 30 per cent of the country's corporate wealth. However, in the restructuring process, Chinese and Indians would not be deprived of their share of the corporate wealth, which was planned to go up from 34 per cent in 1970 to 40 per cent in 1990. Only the foreigners' share would decline gradually from 62 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1990. The restructuring was planned against a backdrop of steady economic growth so that no community would lose in absolute terms. Simultaneously, the NEP also aimed to eliminate identification of race with economic function. 36 In the late seventies and early eighties, the NEP was implemented with zest, so that major plantation and trading companies were Malaysianized. In 1981, for example, the PNB acquired Guthrie Corporation after buying its shares worth nearly 1.4 billion ringgit in the open market. Other large companies were also asked to restructure their equity on a planned and guided basis. As a result of the NEP, bumiputra corporate wealth increased from 4 per cent in 1971 to 12.5 per cent in 1980 and 18.7 per cent in 1983. However, with the beginning of the recession in 1984, the government was forced to modify and relax the NEP. By 1985, export-oriented companies were allowed to be 51-100 per cent foreign-owned . Further, major companies were allowed to restructure so as to increase foreign participation, sometimes up to 50 per cent of the total equity. Among such companies were Nestle, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Unilever, and Imperial Chemical Industries. The change in the implementation of the NEP was first publicly disclosed by Mahathir in May 1986 when, in an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, he stated that the NEP would be held in abeyance except in areas where there was growth. This was because there was no growth in many sectors of the economy. In addition to less stringent restructuring, the relaxation of the NEP also meant that Malaysian firms could sell their shares to foreign companies. Thus, in mid-1986, 36 per cent of Guthrie shares were sold on the London Stock Exchange. Although the PNB made a profit of 500 mi!Jion ringgit and retained 64 per cent of the shares, the Guthrie sale has deprived other Malaysians from owning its shares. Hence, the following criticisms arose from the relaxation of the NEP : 1. The postponement of the 1990 deadline now seems inevitable, as it had been forecast in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) that bumiputras

RUN-UP TO TH E 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

39

can own only 22.2 per cent of the nation's corporate wealth by 1990. This postponement has been criticized by many as benefiting primarily the rich Malays and Chinese. Since much of the Malay corporate wealth is owned by institutions such as the PNB and Pernas, which utilize public money to obtain share acquisitions, it has been stated that these institutions should return them to Malaysians of all races in equitable proportions. The NEP had been criticized for having been of benefit to the rich Malays and Chinese. In particular, the Malaysian Chinese share of corporate wealth is said to have increased tremendously. For instance, it is estimated that Malaysian Chinese owned nearly 50 per cent of Malaysia's corporate wealth in 1985. The parallel objective of eradication of poverty irrespective of race has, according to many critics, never been seriously tackled. There are still many poor Malays and Indians particularly in the rural areas. Most of the bumiputras of Sarawak and Sabah have also remained poor over the fifteen years that the NEP has been implemented. It is alleged that there has been imbalanced development of corporate wealth in the implementation of the NEP. For example, it has been estimated that the bumiputra share of corporate wealth in banking is 75 per cent and in plantations, nearly 80 per cent. Some bumiputra critics interpreted the relaxation of the NEP as a concession to the non-Malays.

Because of all these criticisms, the NEP became an issue in the 1986 election. Another economic policy deemed inappropriate to the existing economic situation was the promotion of heavy industries by expanding the activities of the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HI COM) which was established in the late seventies. After the 1982 election, Mahathir embarked on an active heavy industrialization programme aimed to create a heavy industrial base which would reduce the Malaysian economy's dependence on fluctuating coll).modity prices and make Malaysia one of the newly industrialized countries like Taiwan and South Korea. The industrialization programme would also decrease the importance of agrobased and mineral activities. The HICOM agenda of activities included the establishment and development of a steel factory in Terengganu, cement factories in lpoh and Selangor, pulp and paper factories in Sarawak and Sabah, and the development of the petrochemical industry through the establishment of gas factories in Labuan and the Bintulu urea and gas projects in Sarawak. However, the most ambitious and capital intensive project was .Proton Saga, the national car, which was launched in 1983.

40

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

From the beginning itself, the national car project was criticized, particularly by some academicians. However, the critics were soon silenced and the factory was set up in Batu Tiga, Selangor as a joint-ventu re between HICOM and the Mitsubishi Corporatio n of Japan. The first few cars rolled off the assembly line in mid-1985. It was also envisaged that the heavy industrializ ation programme would be complemen tary to the NEP, as in the process of raising the capital investment required for projects. Thus, while foreign companies with proven expertise were invited to participate in projects, they did so as minority shareholders, with bumiputra companies as the majority shareholders. Another way in which the NEP objectives were promoted was in the awarding of contracts for ancillary services such as transportat ion, distribution, and marketing, which were awarded to bumiputra companies. Hence, the marketing and distribution of the Proton Saga was awarded to Edaran Otomobil Negara (EON). A third way in which heavy industrial development was linked with the NEP was to locate the projects in different parts of the country, particularly in the rural areas such as Terengganu, Labuan, and Bintulu. This, coupled with the development of new industrial zones and the increase in the number of free trade zones throughout the country, was expected to provide the impetus for rural developmen t. The heavy industrializ ation policy was therefore initially seen as a means of making Malaysia more self-reliant, while simultaneously complementing long-term policies such as the NEP. While this policy is laudable for its basic aims and philosophies, it was initiated at a most inappropria te time, that is, when the country was on the brink of a recession. Further, since the policy required considerable capital investment , it necessitated foreign borrowings, particularly from Japan. These borrowings became even more of a problem because of the appreciatio n of the yen and the decline of the ringgit. Thus, the HICOM reported heavy losses for the years 1985 and 1986. Mahathir's fondness for grandiose projects, principally the Dayabumi complex and the Penang Bridge had also been the subject of criticism. Although proposals for these projects had been made in the seventies, it was only after Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981 that they were implemented. The Dayabumi complex site, originally the North Good yard of Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM-Mal ayan railways), was handed over w the Urban Development Authority (UDA) as early as 1972.35 The initi al planning envisaged a three-stage developmen t, that is, constructio n o f a twenty-storey building for Bank Pertanian (inclusive of surroundin g commercial arcades), constructio n of a sixty-storey office tower, and construction of shops, parking bays, and lanes for vehicles. Approval for the Dayabumi building (the second stage) was given in June 1985, with the height limited to thirty-five storeys. Constructio n work on the project, which

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

41

was undertake n by the UDA in collaboration with a Japanese company, was completed in April 1986. The Penang Bridge had been the subject of controversy and debate since the idea was first mooted in 1969. A token allocation of 10 ringgit was allocated in the mid-term review of the Second Malaysia Plan (1970-75), published in mid-1973. By the mid- and late seventies, it had become a political issue, with the Penang Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu advocating it. Thus by 1975, a consortiu m company was established and by June 1978 the government had committed itself to the Penang Bridge project. According to the New Straits Times, ... the decision to implement the Penang Bridge project was made in stages and, in the middle of 1981, the government only continued its implementation as scheduled.38

While it is true that the Penang Bridge project had been actively considered since 1972, the final decision with regard to tenders and type of construct ion was made at a Cabinet meeting in July 1981. The tender was awarded at the price of 528 million ringgit to the Hyundai Construction Company of Korea. Subsequently, the Korea Development Company was also brought in and the revised tender involving ancillary construction works was approved in mid-1983. The final cost of the Penang Bridge was estimated to be between 800 million and 1,150 million ringgit. There were two main criticisms of the Dayaburni complex and Penang Bridge projects. First, they were prestigious projects which, while being big and visible, did not merit such high priority, especially when there were other projects which could have benefited many more people. Second, since they were capital-intensive, the commitment of so much capital was a waste of badly needed funds. Further, it would take a long time not only to recover the capital investment but also to make these ventures profitable. Unfortun ately for the government, its involvement in these projects became more controversial as the economic recession began to be felt from 1985 onwards. Thus, although the Dayabumi complex was ready for occupatio n in mid-1984, most of the office space remained unoccupied until Petronas moved its offices there in late 1985. Hence, the Mahathir administr ation's penchant for prestige projects became a campaign issue, not only in the 1986 general election, but also in the recently concluded UMNO elections of April 1987. Another controversial economic policy was the privatization concept, whereby certain public sector activities would be turned over to the private sector. This was also closely related to the Malaysia Incorporated concept, whereby there would be close co-operat ion between the public and private

42

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTIO N

sectors. The establishm ent in October 1983 of Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad (STMB, more popularly known as TV3) constitute d the vanguard of the governme nt's privatizat ion policy, which aimed at promotin g local 39 and foreign investments for the private sector. This was followed by privatizat ion of highway construct ion and maintena nce, principall y the Shah Alam-Po rt Klang Highway, the KL-Serem ban Highway, the SenaiJohor Bahru Highway, and the KL-Karak Highway. Plans were also made to privatize other activities through the establishm ent of joint ventures between bumiputra and foreign companie s, principall y Japanese and Korean ones. By 1984, the governme nt found it self forced to restrict foreign borrowings to finance public sector expenditu re. Thu s, pri vatization emerged more and more as the panacea for the governme nt's financial problems, particular ly in 1985 and 1986. The restructur ing of major companie s and the sale of Guthrie Corporati on shares in London (mentione d earlier) were also viewed as privatizat ion measures. Hence, pri vatization was not only a major departure from the policies of previous administr ations. it wa also "seen by many as a tacit admission that the public sector had been 40 inefficient and marked generally by poor performa nce". Another effect of the privatizat ion policy was the forseeable reduction in the number of public sector employees, a matter of concern to public secto r trade unions, particular ly the Confeder ation of Unions of Employee s in the Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) which, under the leader hip of Ahmad Nor, utilized the privatizat ion policy as one of the reasons for its vociferous criticism of the governme nt. CUEPAC S was concerne d that it members would lose their pensions and other benefits accorded to government employees if departme nts such as Telecoms were pri atized (Telecoms was privatized four months after the 1986 election, while pensions for new governme nt employees were abolished from October 1986 albeit later reinstated). Furthermore, government employees who opted to remain with privatized firms would not have guarantee d job security. Resentme nt of the privatizat ion policy was onJy a minor cause of disconten t among governme nt employees. In 1980, the governme nt agreed in principle to the revision of salaries and other condition s of ervice every five years. However, by 1985, the governme nt made it clear that public servants may have to tighten their belts, as it did not ha e money to pay for salary revisions. Thus, by 1986, there were many disconten ted civil servants who blamed the governme nt for mismana ging the economy. CUEPACS and other governme nt workers' unions organized many rallies and other protest measures througho ut the country in support of their claims but the governme nt remained firm and unyieldin g. Ahmad Nor resigned from governme nt service and contested in the election under a Socialist Democrat ic Party (SOP) ticket.

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

43

It must also be remembe red that the "Buy British Last" policy and its substitute , the "Look East" policy, had significan t economic overtones and implicatio ns. The governme nt had become increasingly anti-Briti sh since 1981 because of the British governme nt's uncompro mising attitude and actions vis-a-vis a number of economic and business moves intended to make Malaysia less dependen t on Britain. Three such movl;!s were: 1. Sending more students to the United States and other countries because of the decision by the British governme nt to raise fees for overseas students. 2. The PNB's attempts to take over Guthrie Corporat ion in 1982 (mentioned earlier), which was delayed by various British organizat ions, resulting in the PNB having to pay much more for the share acquisitions. 3. The Maminco affair, whereby attempts by a Malaysian governmentowned company, Maminco, to gain control of tin trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME) were thwarted by British governme nt intervention, resulting in the suspensio n o f tin trading in the LME and in 41 heavy losses sustained by Maminco . While the Malaysia n governme nt 's battles to overcome dependency on Britain are praiseworthy, it was unfortuna te that these battles exacted a heavy price. In addition, since the substitute "Look East" policy was initiated and pursued against a backdrop of the rising value of the yen and the falling value of the ringgit, the anti-British stance was seen by many as having compoun ded Malaysia's economic problems.

Revision of Electoral Boundari es and Constitue ncies Crouch notes that: In the Malays ian context it is a foregone conclusion that the overwhelm ing majorit y of seats will be won by the BN ... the contest with the opposition . . . is not necessarily the most important aspect of the election .. . BNmembers who lose their seats usually do so not because they are beaten by the opposition in the election but because they fail to be renominat ed by the party. ~ 2

While the above observati ons may have been valid for the earlier elections, they were certainly inapplicable in the context of the 1986 election, primarily because the revision of electoral boundari es resulted in a substantia l increase in the number of federal seats contested , from 154 to 177 (a 20 per cent increase). This was in fact the first major revision of electoral boundari es since 1974, when the total number of federal seats was increased from 104 (in the 1964 and 1969 elections) to 154. Concurre ntly,

44

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

there was also a revision of electoral boundaries and constituencies for the state assemblies. A more valid observation with regard to ethnic representation and the electoral system has been made by Ratchagan, who lists the following major flaws in the system: (a) The inherent characteristic of the system to exaggerate the st rength of the larger parties; (b) The peculiarities of the enfranchiseme nt rules that obtain in the system; and (c) The procedure adopted in constituency apportionmen t and delineation.43 While having reservations about the second major naw mentioned by Ratchagan, we agree that the current revisions of electoral boundaries highlighted the other two flaw s. As Table I indicates, the disparit y between the percentage of votes won by the ruling coalition and the percentage of seats it obtained in the parliamentary elections continues to be evident for the 1982 and 1986 general elections. Further, as the subseq uent di cussion shows, the procedure adopted in constituency apportionmen t and delineation in 1982 and 1986 exacerbated the defects, namel y a greatly exaggerated Malay electoral strength and a diminished non-Malay electoral power. The current revisions were necessary because of the increase in th e number of registered voters, particularly in Sarawak and Sabah, the population increase in Selangor and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, and the creation of the Federal Territory of Labuan . They were prepared in early 1983 and submitted to the Agong for appro al in August 1983, together with the controversial amendment s relating to the monarchy. TABLE 1. VOTES AND SEATS WON BY GOVERNMEN T COALITIO N IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENT ARY ELECTIONS, 1955-86

Year

OJo Votes

Total Number of Seats

1955 1959 1964 1969 1974 1978 1982 1986

79 .6 51.8 58 .5 48 .6 61.5 57.1 61.3 55.8

52 104 104 104 114 114 114 133

Seats Woo 51 74 89

66 104 94 103 112

llJo Seats Woo

98 . 1 7 1.::! 85 .6 63 .5 91.3 82 .5 90 .4 73 .8

SOURCES : Sothi Ratchagan, op. cit., p. 228, for 1955- 78 figures; rouch, op. cit., p. 58, for 1982 figures; and various sources for 1986 figure .

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

45

Hence, they were approved only by the end of the year, when the constitutional amendment crisis was resolved. The difference in size between the constituencies, which has been a consistent feature of electoral boundaries, was retained in the 1983 revision as well. Crouch noted that Petaling in Selangor had more than four times as many voters as those in Kuala Krai in Kelantan and more than ten times as many as those in Jalau in Sarawak.44 In the 1983 revision, the Petaling seat was broken up, part of it constituting Petaling Jaya, a new constituency with 80,453 registered voters and another part being redelineated to constitute another new constituency, Pucong, with 81,005 voters. Jalau now had 12,181 voters, marginally bigger than the smallest constituency, the newly created Federal Territory of Labuan, with 12,171 voters. Thus, it can be seen that the latest revision of electoral boundaries slightly reduced the discrepancy in the size of constituencies (the biggest constituency being less than six times that of the smallest constituency). The increase in parliamentary constituencies also brought about a redelineation of old constituencies and changes in electoral boundaries. Thus, apart from Petaling, other constituencies redelineated were Georgetown (Penang), Menglembu (lpoh), and Damansara (Kuala Lumpur). Altogether 97 new parliamentary constituencies were created as a result of the redelineations and additions. For example, 5 of the 7 constituencies in the Federal Territory of Kuala lumpur had new names and/ or boundaries - Batu, Titiwangsa, Bukit Bintang, lembah Pantai, and Seputih while the remaining two, Sungai Besi and Kepong, remained more or less the same. With regard to state constituencies, the 1983 revision resulted in an increase of the total for the 11 Peninsular Malaysian states from 312 to 351. Of these, there were 114 new constituencies, which meant that the redelineation exercise affected every state. The greatest number of new constituencies was in Johore (19), followed by Selangor (17), Kelantan and Perak (16 each), Penang (12), Pahang (11), and Terengganu and Negeri Sembilan (19 each). There were also discrepancies in the number of voters in state constituencies. For example, constituencies in states such as Perlis generally had around 6,000 registered voters, while constituencies in states such as Selangor averaged about 10,000 to 25,000 voters. The biggest constituencies had a considerably greater number of voters. For example Paya Jaras, a new constituency, had 34,544 voters, a figure that was more than the number of voters in some federal constituencies in the predominantlyMalay states. The same was true of other big state constituencies such as Bukit Gasing (30,129 voters) and Kelang Bandar (30,333 voters), both in Selangor. Big state constituencies were also common in the more populous states such as Perak and Penang.

46

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

With regard to racial distribution of the constit uencies, Crouch noted that in 1982, the large constituencies were generally rural and Malay and that: Although Malays form only 54 percent of the peninsular population, they make up a majority of voters in 79 (69 percent) of the peninsular parliamentary constituencies and an even larger proportion of the 312 state constituencies. It is only in Penang that Malay-majority constituencies are a minority. 45

The situation changed slightly after the 1983 revision, which resulted in 92 Malay-majority parliamentary constituencies (70 per cent of peninsular constituencies), 26 Chinese-majo rit y constituencies (19 per cent), and 14 racially-mixed constituencies (II per cent). However, apart from Penang, Malay-majority constituencies were also a minority in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. In the racial distribution of state constituencies , 75 per cent were Malay-majority constituencies, 17 per cent Chinese-majo rity constituencies, and 8 per cent racially-mixed constituencies . It was only in Penang that there were more Chinese-majo rity than Malay-majori ty co nstit uencie . Hence, the predominant number of Malay-majori ty constituencies a compared to Chinese-majority and racially-mixed constit uencies ontinues to be a distinguishing feature of the delineation of electoral boundaries, both at the federal as well as state levels. With regard to the increases, there were 18 additional con tituencies in Peninsular Malaysia, raising the previous total of 114 to 132. Thi figure included the Federal Territory of Labuan. There were al o 5 additional constituencies in Sarawak and Sabah, raising the total from 40 to 45 . Thus the effects of the revision of electoral boundaries were: 1. An increase in the number of federal and state seat ; 2. A marginal increase in the number of Malay-majori t eat at both federal and state levels; and 3. Redelineation of old constituencies and creation of new federal and tate constituencies.

Campaigo Issues and Strategies

Although the BN was not constitutional ly obliged to hold election until September 1987, rumours of an election had been rife ince 1985, particularly after the election laws were amended to shorten the ampaign period to seven days instead of the previous fourteen . Many government departments such as the elections office and information and broadcasting services had been in a state of preparedne s since early 1985 and

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENE RAL ELECTION

47

it was apparent that the government wanted to hold elections as early as possible. However, the worsening economic situation and the BN's involvement in a number of problems in the first half of 1986 led to the general feeling that the government may serve out its full term of office. Apart from the worsening recession and rumours of corruption in high places, the more immediate problems faced by the BN on the eve of the elections were: 1. The resignation of Musa Hitam in February 1986, which put UMNO

in disarray; 2. Dissension and disunity within the MCA, particularly because of Tan Koon Swan's legal problems in the Singapore courts; 3. Conflict between Gerakan and UMNO, culminating in Gerakan's threat in July 1986 to withdraw from the BN if it did not obtain an equitable seat allocation; 4. The Sabah problem, whi ch led to the admission of the PBS into the BN and the consequent withdrawal of Berjaya; 5. The withdrawal of Berjasa from the BN due to the admission of Hamim in mid-1986; and 6. Dissatisfaction of public sector employees with the government because of it s negative response to their request fo r salary revisions. Hence, despite persistent rumours of an impending election for nearly a year, the announcement of Parliament's dissolution on 19 July 1986 caught many by surprise because of its timing and because the actual election date had been a closely guarded secret. Nomination day was fixed for 24 July and polling was on 2-3 August for Sarawak and Sabah and 3 August for the Peninsular Malaysian states. Consequently, the 1986 election campaign was the shortest in Malaysian political history, lasting only ten days. As public rallies were still banned in Malaysia, both the BN and opposition parties intensified their ceramahs, which had in fact been going on for the past two years. The BN strategy was based on a less aggressive approach as compared to 1982, when it had propagated the "Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy" slogan . It was generally believed that the mood towards the government was negative, as people felt that the co untry was moving in the wrong direction. According to a top Malaysian political scientist: There are too many issues that the government has not been able to resolve. This is not completely their fau lt , but partly due to the recession . .. . During an economic boom no one would have bothered, but they're all coming together now with the poor shape of the economy. 46

The BN strategy was therefore based on the possibility of having ro lose a number of seats in Kelantan and Terengganu to PAS and also of having

48

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

to lose a number of urban seats to the DAP. The MCA secretary-general had conceded that the opposition would do better in 1986 than in 1982.4' However, despite the confident prophecies of PAS and DAP leaders, Mahathir seemed unperturbed and quite sure of winning two-thirds or more seats in Parliament. The BN slogan "Tradisi Membela Rakyat" (the people's champion) was a reminder of the BN record of political service since independence. This, together with its thirteen-point manifesto and an "open letter" to the people of Malaysia written by Mahathir, stressed that the BN was the only political group capable of establishing a strong government that could provide peace and political stability in Malaysia. In his letter, Mahathir acknowledged that , while there was a serious recession, Malaysians had to face reality and utilize their intrinsic strength to overcome it. Blaming the developed nations for the fall in commodity prices, he pointed to remedial measures taken by the government such as reduction of government expenditures and external borrowings, broadening and strengthening of the country's industrial base, and reduction in the price of essential goods, and held out the hope that these and other measures would help Malaysia emerge from the recession as a stronger and more resilient nation .48

Notes I. Harold Crouch, Malaysia's 1982 General Election . Research Notes and Discussion Paper No. 34 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 63 . 2. Ibid ., p. 65 . 3. The elected heads of government in nine Malay states (Kedah, Perlis, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Johore, Pahang, Terengganu, and Kelantan) are known as Menteri Besar, while those in the four other states (Melaka, Penang, Sabah. and Sarawak) are known as Chief Ministers. 4. "Anwar's Vote, Mahathir's Victory", Asiaweek, 24 September 1982, p. 18. 5. Ibid ., p. 17 . 6 . "Rift at the Top", Asiaweek, 16 March 1984, pp. 31-40. 7. SeeK. Das and David Jenkins, "Holding the Royal Line", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 23 February 1984, pp. 10-11, and David Jenkin s, "Proud and Prickly Princes Finally Meet their Match", FEER, 23 February 1984, pp. 12-15. 8. See Jenkins, op. cit., p. 13. 9. Ibid ., p. 15 . 10. Ibid. II. "Rift at the Top", op. cit., p. 33. 12. Chung Kek Yoong, Mahathir Administration (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1987), pp. 29, 31. 13 . K. Das, "New Faces of 1984", FEER, 26 July 1984, p. 14. 14. Ibid. 15 . "Rift at the Top", op. cit., p. 31.

RUN-UP TO THE 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

49

Ibid., p. 40. K. Das, "Political Poltergeists", FEER, 8 March 1984, p. 14. "Deals: For Thn, More Questions", Asiaweek, I June 1986, pp. 47-48. "Elections: This Time, Tough Going", Asiaweek, 3 August 1986, pp. 44-45 . MPH made a record loss of M$192 million in 1985. Ibid., p. 45 . Chung, op. cit., p. 77. Ibid ., p. 80. "A Crime Against the People", Asiaweek, 30 March 1986, pp. 37-40. Chung, op. cit., p. 63 . Wan Madzihi was one of the state assemblymen who defected to Rahman's camp in March 1987, thus forcing Thib to dissolve the state assembly and hold elections in April 1987. 26. Crouch, op. cit., p. 18. 27. Chung, op. cit., p. 98. 28 . Zak ry Abadi, Satu Analisa Pilihanraya Umum '86 [An anal ysis of the '86 general election]. (Kuala Lumpur: Syarikat Grafikset Abadi , 1986), p. 24. 29. Chung, op. cit., p. 92. 30. Ibid . 31. "Economy: How Long Before The Upturn?", Asiaweek, 15 June 1986, p. 62. 32. Ibid. 33. "A Bull Run in Bear Country", A siaweek, 20 July 1986, p. 38. 34. Chung, op. cit., p. 32. 35 . Ibid., p. 35 . 36. "A Special Report : Time to Consider", Asiaweek, IS June 1986, p. 62. 37. "Trading Control For Capital", Asiaweek, 6 July 1986, p. 50. 38 . New Straits Times, 23 April 1987 , p. 3. 39. "Malaysia: The Struggle For Penang", Asiaweek, 18 January 1987, p. 26. 40. Sankaran Ramanathan, "Privatisation of the Mass Media in Malaysia", Sasaran (School of Mass Communication , MARA Institute of Technology, Shah Alam), Issue No. 5 (1984), p. 56. 41. Asiaweek, 15 June 1986, p. 62 . 42. Crouch, op. cit., p. 35 . 43 . Sothi Ratchagan, "Ethnic Representation and the Electoral System", in Ethnicity, Class and Development, Malaysia, edited by Syed Husin Ali (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1984), m.s. 127. 44. Crouch, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 45 . Ibid ., p. 37 . 46. "This Time, Tough Going ", Asiaweek , 3 Augu st 1986, p. 43 . 47 . "Malaysia : The Chinese Challenge", Asiaweek, 27 July 1986, p. 16. 48. Chung, op. cit., pp. 149- 154.

16. 17 . 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

III

Election Results

In this section, we discuss the 1986 election results in terms of how the various parties fared, why the DAP won in the urban areas, and why PAS lost in the rural areas.

How the Various Parties Fared

Six of the BN candidates were returned unopposed on nomination day. This compared unfavourably with the 1982 election, when eight BN candidates were returned unopposed, and did not seem to augur well for the BN, considering the greater number of seats at stake in the 1986 election. Further, initial results announced in the late hours of 3 August pointed to a strong opposition showing. The first result, that of BN candidate Leo Maggie's victory in the Sarawak constituency of Kanowit, was announced over Radio-Television Malaysia (RTM) at 10:20 in the evening. 1 This was followed by announcements of results for constituencies in Sabah, which seemed to indicate an anti-BN trend, as the DAP won 4 of the 5 seats it contested. However, this trend was counterbalanced by the early results from Sarawak, where BN candidates were returned with large majorities. As the results for Peninsular Malaysia were announced in the early hours of 4 August, it appeared as though the BN would have a close fight with PAS in Kelantan and with DAP in Perak and Penang, despite a strong showing in Johore, Melaka, and Perlis. However, just before dawn (at about five in the morning), the BN had secured the crucial two-thirds majority and TV3, the private television channel, was playing the song "Barisan Telah Berjaya" (Barisan's victorious), a song which was to be repeated at least five times in the course of the morning as the BN swept to victory in state after state. By six-thirty that morning, it was clear that the BN had achieved an unexpected and unprecedented victory, particularly in the predominantly-Malay states, where PAS had been convincingly trounced . In the final tally, the BN won 148 seats, the DAP 24, independents 4, and PAS only I seat in the parliamentary election (see Table 2). Of all the BN component parties, UMNO performed best by winning 83 of the 84 seats contested (98.8 per cent). Although there ·were three

ELECTION RESULTS

51

TABLE 2. RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL (PARLIAMENTARY) ELECTION Namber of Par1y

Barisan National UMNO MCA MIC Oerabn

Hamim PBB PBDS SNAP SUPP us 0 PBS

Caadiclltes

84 32 6 9 2 8

83 17 6

.5 7

4 4 .5 10

98 .8 .53.1 100 .5.5 .6 .50 100 100 80 .57 . 1 83.3 71. 4

148

83 .6

I

1.0 37 . .5 0 0 0 0 0 0

s

6

14

ubtotal

Oppolition Parties P.

DAP DP

BerJ•

99 64 19 8

PSRM ma

4 4

MOMOOAM

2 2

PWS lndependenu

ubtota.l lbtaJ

.,,

SeaiJ Won No.

.5 1

s I

8

s

24

4

7.8

29

16.4

177

100

other panners wilh 100 per cent success rate , the number of eats contested by these parties was mall (MIC-6, PBB-8. and PBDS-S). The fact that UMNO by iueJf had nearly 47 per cent of the total eat point to the mqnltude of UMNO's achievement . Overall, the BN commanded 83.6 per cent of the seau, not lncludlna the lndependent • who constituted 2.3 per cent of tbe total. ln the lace electlo , tbe BN won all the seau In PerU , all but J In Johore and Pahana. and all but l in lbrenuanu. In Kcdah, Melaka, Neaeri SembUan, and Selanaor, It obtained 85 per cent or more of the

52

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTI O N

seats contested. It lost 10 seats to PAS in Kelantan, and 10 in Penang and 13 in Perak to the DAP. In spite of this , it had more than a two -third s majority in all these states (see Table 3). The BN won 299 of the 351 seats in all the state assemblies (85 .2 per cent). Again, the best performance came from UMNO. which won 228 of the 241 seats allocated to it (94 .6 per cent). The MI C al so performed creditably, winning 12 of the 13 seat s allocated (92 .3 per cent) . Thu s, at both federal and state levels, the BN component parties which perfo rm ed extremely well were UMNO and the MIC (there were no simultan eou s elections for the state assemblies in Sarawak and Sabah) . Apart fro m the PBB and PBDS in Sarawak , the other East Malaysian partie. whi c h performed creditably were USNO (83 .3 per ce nt success ), the SU PP (80 per cent), and the PBS (71.4 per cent) . The BN component parties which fared badl y (in compari o n with other partners) were the MCA and Gerakan which had 53.1 per ce nt anJ 55.6 per cent success rates respectivel y. The M C A suffered o ne of it most humiliating defeats, winning onl y 17 of the 34 parliamentary sca ts allocated and 44 of the 70 state seat s (62 .9 per cent). Gerakan, which lo t 4 of the 9 parliamentary seat s allocated , did lightl y better a t the stat e level, especially in Penang where it won 9 o f the 11 sea ts all ocated to it. The MCA and Gerakan defeat s were inflicted by the DAP, "h k h won a number of seats in previous MCA and Gerakan strongh o ld s uc h TABLE 3. RESULTS OF STATE ELEC TI ONS Seats Won Barisan No. c

State

Total Seats

Johore Kedah Kelantan Melaka Negeri Sembilan Pahang Penang Perak Perl is Selangor Terengganu

36 28 39 20 28 33 33 46 14 42 32

17 24 32 23 33 37 30

88. 1 93 .8

5 2

351

299

85 .2

52

Total

35 25 29

14

9 .2 89 . 3 74 .4 85 .0 85 . 97. 0 70 .0 7 1. 8 100

Opposition

No. 1

3 10 3 4 1 10 13 0

r,

..,

10.7 25 .6 15 .0 1-U 3.0 30.0 .., .., 0 11.9 6.2 14 .8

Note: The DAP won 37 and PAS 15 of the opposition seats. PAS's best sho~ ing was in Kelantan where it won 10 seats. The DAP woo all 10 opposition seats in Penang and all 13 in Perak .

ELECTION RESULTS

53

as Bukit Bendera and Tanjong in Penang and in the Klang valley. This led to criticism in the Chinese press that the DAP had become the representative of the Chinese. The Shin Min Daily News noted that: Among the 17 parliamentar y seat s sec ured by the MCA, only fo ur were C hinese-majority seats, 10 o f them had a clear Malay-majority, while the remaining three were mi xed co nstituen cies. 2

Hamim , the smallest a nd mo st recent BN component party, fielded only two candidates in the federal elections. However, its 50 per cent success at federal leve l was co unterbalanced by 100 per cent success in Kelantan, where both it s ca ndidates won . The BN's supremacy in seats was, however, not reflected in the percentage of the votes obtained . In 1982, the BN had obtained 60.4 per cent of the vo tes cas t, whereas it s percentage of votes fell to 55.82 in the 1986 election . Further, bo th the DAP a nd PA S improved on their share of the votes cast, with the DA P o btaining 20.4 per cent as compared to 19.5 7 per ce nt previ ously and PAS obtaining 15 .1 per cent (14.46 per cent in 1982) as Table 4 indicates. While these may be di smissed as marginal figures of little significance, they mu st be considered against a bac kdrop of a decline in voter turnout in 1986 as co mpared to 1982. In fact , voter t urn-o ut was the worst of all since the first election in 1959 , when 73.3 per cent of registered voters turned up. Voter turn- o ut for 1964 was 78. 9 per cent . In 1969 it was 73.6 per cent, in 1974 it was 75.1 per cent, in 1979 it was 75 .3 per cent, and in 1982 it was 74.4 per ce nt. For 1986, it had decreased to 69.9 per cent, despite the fact that there was clear weather on 2 and 3 August, which fell on a weekend (Saturday and Sunday), when most Malaysians do not have to work . 3 • There was also a sig ni fic antl y large number of spoiled votes (2.66 per cem), more than the number of votes obtained by the MIC. One further observation is that there were many narrow UMNO victories over PAS, particularly in Kelantan and Terengganu. Six of the twel ve parliamentary co nstituencies won by U MNO in K.elantan were won by majorities of less than 2,000, with slim majorities in Bachok (270) a nd Nilam Puri (552). In Terengganu , PAS stalwart Hadi Awang lost the Marang constituency by 639 votes. ln all three instances, the number of spoiled votes was greater than the majority obtained. The contest for state seats in K.elan tan was also dose, as PAS obtained 45 .9 per cent of the votes cast in the state elections. UMNO obtained 54.1 per cent of the votes and it can be assumed tha t this included almost all of the 6 per cent non -Muslim votes . Further, there were fifteen constituencies in whic h UMNO candidates won with majorities of less than 1,000 votes, including Peringat (136 votes) and Meranti (173 votes). Thus, while the UMNO victory over PAS in the Malay-majority states was clear-cut

54

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GE NERAL ELECT ION

TABLE 4. VOTES OBTA IN E D BY VARI OUS PART IES CONTES TING IN THE 1986 PARLI A ME NTA RY ELECT IO N Votes Obtained Party BN Parties UMNO MCA MIC Gerakan Hamim SNAP SUPP PBDS PBB PBS USNO Subtotal Oppositi on Part ies and Independ ents DAP PAS SOP Nasma PSRM PWS Berjaya MOMOG UM Independ ents Subtotal Total Spoiled Votes Grand Total

No.

CIJo

I ,474,063 589,289 104,70 1 149 ,644 29,943 34 ,22 1 93,0 18 24.822 48,367 73,786 27,409

3 1. 06 12.42 2.2 1 3. 15 0 .63 0 .72 1.96 0 .52 1. 02 U5 0 .58

2,649,263

55 .82

968,009 7 18,89 1 45,400 10,228 59, 156 967 20,360 584 146,903

20.39 15. 15 0 .96

1,970,498

41 .52

4,6 19,76 1

97.34

126,235

2.66

4 ,745 ,996

100.00

0.22

1.25 0 .02 0 .4 3 0 .0 1 3.09

SOURCE : Zakry Abadi , op. cit., p. 7.

in terms of the number of seats won, the contest was act ually much closer, particularly in Kelantan. O v.er the years, however, PAS's perform ance in Kelaman has declined . In 1978, PAS obtained 43.6 per cent of the votes in Kelan tan, giving it two federal seats. Although there was a slight increase in 1982, when it

ELECTION RESULTS

55

obtained 46.5 per cent of the votes and retained its two parliamentary seats, in 1986 it obtained 45.9 per ce nt of the votes and one parliamentary seat, namely its traditional stronghold of Pengkalan Cepa. In 1982, half of the state seats (18 out of 36) were decided by margins of less than 1,000 votes. Somewhat the same situation recurred in 1986, for 18 ~'including 3 won by PAS) of the 39 seats were decided by similar margins. While PAS's fortunes suffered in 1986 as compared to 1982, the DAP's fortunes revived, for it more than doubled the number of federal seats, from the previous 10 to 24, which gave it more seats than the MCA and Gerakan combined . The DAP's performance was its best ever in Malaysian elections history, for it obtained 20.39 per cent of the votes cast, a figure bettered only by UMNO. This, combined with the PAS debacle and the failure of other opposition parties to win any federal seat, has made the DAP virtually the sole opposition party in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives). Unlike PAS also, the DAP victor y in many constituencies was quite decisive. For example, Lim Kit Siang defeated Koh Tsu Koon in Tanjung by a majorit y of 11,690 votes, polling 63.4 per cent of the valid votes, while Lee Lam Thye won in Bukit Bintang with a 30,145-vote majority and Tan Seng Giaw won in Kepong with a majorit y of 16,513 votes. Further, virtual unknown s such as Tan Joo Liat defeated party leaders like Tan Gim H wa (president of Gerakan Penang) by wide margins, in this case by a majorit y of ~.499 votes in the state co nstituency of Batu Lancang. Penang Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu obtained a majority of 11 ,313 votes in Padang 1-.:ota, while state MCA leader Lee Jong Ki lost to Peter Paul Daso n in the Baya n Baru parliamentary constituency by 262 votes. The much-heralded contest for Tanjung, portrayed as Lim Kit Siang's Waterloo, became a personal triumph for Lim and vindicated his move to Penang. The 1986 election therefore resulted in a strong resurgence of the DAP. The other opposition parties fared badly, although PSRM leader Abdul Razak Ahmad ca me dose in Johor Bahru, where he lost by 2,235 votes to Shahrir Abdul Samad, an UMNO Minister. Among the SOP candidates, Ahmad Nor sec ured 6,112 votes in Lembah Pantai (formerly part of Damansara), but he was a distant third in a contest easily won by the BN candidate. Another SOP leader, Fan Yew Teng, suffered a worse fate, losing his deposits in both the parliamentary and state elections. Nasma fared badly in its first outing, as none of its candidates won at either state or federal level, and it obtained only 0.22 per cent of the vo tes cast. The bulk of the fifty-two independents who contested the elections stood for constituencies in Sarawak and Sabah (20 in Sabah and 28 in Sarawak). Three contested in constituencies in the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, while one stood in Johore. Four of them

56

MALAYSIA'S 1986 GENERAL ELECTION

won - two in Sarawak (in the constituencies of Serian and Rajang), one in Sabah (in Marudu), and one in Labuan. The victory of independent candidates in the Borneo territories was due to the vagaries of local politics. For example, the two successful independents in Sarawak were reported to be backed by opponents of the Chief Minister, while the victorious Sabah independent was said to have the backing of PBS. In the case of Labuan, local opposition to its conversion into a Federal Territory caused voters to support the independent candidate. Thus, the 1986 election resulted in the following:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

An impressive BN victory, spearheaded by UMNO: A vastly improved showing by the DAP: A debacle for PAS; Disaster for minor opposition parties: and Limited success for independents, especially in Sarawak and Sabah.

Why the DAP Won in the Urban

Area~

The DAP parliamentary victory was achieved in 19 Peninsular ~tala~~ian and 5 East Malaysian constituencies (4 in Sabah and I in Sara.,.. a!.. l. all of which were Chinese-majority seats. It won all6 Chine~e-majorit~ ~eat~ in Penang, all 4 in the Federal Territory of 1\:uala Lumpur, bL"~th ~eat~ in Negeri Sembilan, 4 out of 6 in Perak, 2 out of 3 in Selangor, and the ~ole Chinese-majority seat in Melaka . However, it lost in all 5 Chinese-majomy constituencies in Johore and the only Chinese-majorit~ con~tituen~.:~ in Pahang. Thus, the DAP won 19 of the 26 Chinese-majorit~ ~eat~. a ; 3 per cent success rate. Further, since the Chinese-majority ~eat~ in Pahang and Johore had large concentrations of rural Chinese, the DAP emerged "as the undisputed champion of Malaysia's urban Chim·~e"• However, while it can be assumed that the bulk of support for tht" DAP came from the urban Chinese, it can abo be inferred that there was significant support from urban Malays and Indians, particularl~ in Penang, where the DAP fielded two Indian candidates, the iras~..· ible but popular Karpal Singh and Peter Paul Dason. Taking the Jelutong constituency in Penang as an example, it can be seen that the large number of votes obtained by Karpal Singh (~5.93~ votes) could not all have come from the Chinese voters above, as this would mean that more than 85 per cent of the Chinese (30,317) had voted for the DAP. It would be more valid to assume that a significant number of non-Chinese voted for Karpal. Assuming that 70 per cent of the Chinese voted for Karpal (a fairly high figure), this would account for about 19,698 votes, leaving the balance of 5,934 votes from non-Chinese, who

ELECTION RESULTS

57

totalled 14,583. Giving some allowance for spoiled votes, this would mean that more than 40 per cent of the non-Chinese in Jelutong voted for the DAP (see Table 5). In Bayan Baru, where Dason won by a majority of 262 votes, it can be more strongly inferred that a decisive number of non-Chinese voted for the DAP candidate, particularly as the BN candidate Lee Jong Ki is Penang MCA chairman. Assuming that 60 per cent of the Chinese voted for the DAP (another high figure), this would account for about 17,200 votes, with the balance of about 2,400 votes coming from the non-Chinese (see Table 6). Hence, the non-Chinese votes were decisive in determining the outcome of the elections in Bayan Baru. These examples substantiat e the contention that the DAP won in the urban areas not only because of Chinese support but also because of the support it received from urban non-Chinese. Further, the rejection of TABLE 5. JELUTONG CONSTITU ENCY RESULTS

Candidate

Party

Votes Obtained

Lim Boon Chang Karpal Singh

BN DAP

15 ,833 25,932 958

Spoiled Votes

42,723

Total

Notes: The total number of registered voters was 59,890. Voter turn-out was 71.34 per cent. The racial breakdown of the registered voters was as follows : Chinese, 66.5 per cent; Malays, 24.3 per cent; Indians, 8.8 per cent; and Others, 0.4 per cent . TABLE 6. BAYAN BARU CONSTITU ENCY RESULTS

Candidate

Party

Votes Obtained

Lee Jong Ki Lim Kah Pin Peter Paul Dason

BN SDP DAP

19,348 1,075 19,610

Spoiled Votes Total

1,084 41 , 117

Notes: The total number of registered voters was 58,545. Voter turn-out was 70.23 per cent. The racial breakdown of the votes was as follows: Chinese, 66.2 per cent; Malays, 24.7 per cent; Indians, 8.8 per cent; and Others, 0.3 per cent.

58

MALAY ~ IA 'S 19116