Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia 9789814376143

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I5EA5 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees on which are representatives from the National University of Singapore, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 1982 GENERAL ELECTION IN INDONESIA

by

leo Suryadinata

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 36 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 1982

Published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored In a retrieval system, or transmitted In any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1982 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISSN 0129-8828 ISBN 9971-902-50-8

CONTENTS

Page LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

iv

PREFACE

vi

I

INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE 1971 GENERAL ELECTION

II

EMERGENCE OF GOLKAR AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

1

12

III THE 1982 ELECTION: PREPARATION, CAMPAIGN AND PANCASILA

36

IV THE 1982 ELECTION: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

56

FORTHCOMING PRESIDENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

66

V

APPENDICES 1. 2. 3. 4.

Results of the Parliamentary Election, 1955 The 1971, 1977, and 1982 Parliamentary Elections Provincial Vote Shifts, 1977-82 Municipalities and Their Provinces, 1982 iii

74 76 77 79

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia -- Indonesian Armed Forces

BAPILU

Badan Pengendali Pemilihan Umum -Body for Managing the General Election

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

DATI I

Daerah Tingkat I -- province

DATI II

Daerah Tingkat II -- regency

Dewan Pembina

11

DPR

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat -- People•s Representative Council, that is, Indonesian Parliament

DPRD

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Regional People•s Representative Council, that is, Regional Indonesian Parliament

GOLKAR

Golongan Karya -- Functional Group

HANKAM

Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan Ministry of Security and Defence

Council of Mentors

iv

11

of GOLKAR

Kino

Kesatuan Induk Organisasi -- Parental Organization Unit, basic units of GOLKAR before the 1971 election

KORKARMENDAGRI

Korps Karyawan Departemen Dalam Negri -- Karyawan Corps of the Ministry of Home Affairs

KORPRI

Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republ ik Indonesia -- Civil Servants' Corps of the Republic of Indonesia

MASYUMI

Modern Islamic Party

MPR

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat People's Consultative Body or the Indonesian Congress

NU

Nahdatul Party

PARMUSI

Partai Muslimin Indonesia

POI

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Indonesian Democratic Party, a fusion of Indonesian nationalist and Christian parties, formed in 1973

PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia -- Indonesian Communist Party

PNI

Partai Nasional Indonesia Indonesian Nationalist Party

ppp

Pembanguan Partai Persatuan Development Unity Party, a fusion of four Indonesian Islamic parties, formed in 1973

Trikarya

the term refers to the three Kino in GOLKAR, that is, KOSGORO, SOKSI and MKGR

Ulama -- Muslim Scholars'

v

PREFACE

In May 1982 the Suharto government held its third general election and GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, the ruling government party) again emerged as the victor after winning more than 64 per cent of the votes. This paper attempts to examine Indonesian political parties, their problems and prospects with reference to the 1982 election. It is not an election study per se, although one of the foci is the 1982 election. Also, the period of this study extends to the pre-1982 election in order to throw light on the subject. Perhaps it is too soon to conduct this kind of study, but there is definitely a demand for such a study. The author is fully aware that the subject that he is dealing with is broad and as the information available is limited, and his treatment is still far from comprehensive, he feels that this paper should be considered as an interim report rather than a finished product. Hopefully, a more comprehensive study can be done when more information is available.

September 1982

Leo Suryadinata

vi

1

INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE 1971 GENERAL ELECTION

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. This diversity has also been reflected in Indonesian political parties. During the first general election in 1955~ there were more than thirty parties of which only four performed well: the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) won 22.3 per cent of the votes~ MASYUMI (Modern Islamic Party) obtained 20.9 per cent~ Nahdatul Ulama (NU~ the Traditional Islamic Party) won 18.4 per cent while the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) won 16.4 per cent.1 The influential intellectual party, Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) which won only 2.0 per cent of the votes, clearly showed that it had no grass-roots support. The election results indicated that the PNI, NU, and PKI were largely Java-based (especially in Central and East Java where most of the Javanese live), while MASYUMI was an Outer Islands-based party. Political parties often represent certain classes or ethnic groups. Can the parties of 1955 be said to have represented specific groups or classes in Indonesia? The PNI was basically a Javanese priyayi party. It had the support of Indonesian civil servants, especially those of the priyayi (member of official class) and of the abangan (Javanese nominal 1

Muslim) belief. The PKI also drew its support from Java, but among the 1esser priyayi and abangan peasants. The two Muslim parties received their support from devout Muslims. The NU support came from the Javanese santri s (Javanese strict Muslims) and commercial elements in small towns in both Central and East Java, while MASYUMI drew its support from the Muslims in the Outer Islands: they were landlords, traders, and modern Islamic intellectuals.2 It is certainly true that the followers of these parties had ethnic and class elements, but they could not be explained solely in class terms. Indonesian political parties, in Soedjatmoko•s view, were political representatives of cultural solidarity groups.3 Clifford Geertz also maintained that they represented various aliran (currents), or main cultural traditions.4 Examining political parties prior to the Suharto era, one finds that none of them represented the military 11 tradition 11 which began to emerge during the Libera 1 Democracy Period ( 1949-58). Basically the Liberal Democracy Period was characterized by the competition of various political parties for power, but their diversified interests made their co-operation short-lived. The military (read: the army) was outside the parliamentary system, and its interests were not looked after under the system; Sukarno was a figure-head president; and the PKI was excluded from the Cabinet. These three political forces found they were not benefiting from the system. Not surprisingly, therefore, President Sukarno, supported by the army, played a major role in weakening the constitutional democracy system. He was dissatisfied with the political parties and intended to dissolve them all; however, because of persistent resistance from the parties, he could only reduce their number, not dissolve them completely. By 1961, he had managed to reduce the parties to ten (PNI, NU, 2

Partai Kathol ik, Park indo, Partai Murba, PSII, IPKI, PKI, PARMUSI, and PERT!), after banning MASYUMI and the PSI. (The latter two were involved in the regional rebellion of 1958 which was crushed by the pro-Sukarno army.) Prior to this, Sukarno, backed by the army, had introduced his 11 Gui ded Democracy system" aimed at further undermining the strength of political parties, and had assumed a bigger political role for himself. He also intended to bring the PKI into the Cabinet since it had been excluded from all coalition governments prior to the Guided Democracy period. The PKI cant i nued to grow after the 1955 elect ion and by the 1957 by-election it had become the strongest party in terms of its electoral support. Thus, Sukarno, the army, and the PKI were the three major actors in this political phase. Sukarno used his skills to pley a balancing game between the PKI on the one hand and the ariT!Y on the other. However, he was unable to solve the basic problems in Indonesian society and politics. Ethnic division, ideological conflict, and economic difficulty remained serious. Sukarno•s balancing game only prolonged the showdown between the army and the PKI. When the 1965 coup occurred, the power configuration also changed. The coup resulted in the fall of Sukarno, the liquidation of the PKI, and the triumph of the army. This was the beginning of the Suharto era, or more commonly known at that time as the era of the 11 New Order ... Once

the

army

came

to

power,

it

wanted

to

1egitimi ze its presence through constitution a 1 means

in order to prevent the creation of a 11 parliament in the street 11 • General Suharto and his associates decided to use the MPR (Assembly} and the DP~ (Parliament) as legitimizers of his government. Efforts were made to control the MPR and DPR, and a general election was planned for 1968. Although there was agreement to preserve the MPR and DPR and to hold 3

a general election, there was no consensus in the army as to the nature of the political system and the implementation of the election. One group -- the moderates -- was represented by General Suharto and his associates who were more responsive in their approach towards the existing political parties, although his eventual goal was still to weaken them. The other group -- the militants -- was represented by General Nasution, Kemal ldris, and Dharsono, who wanted ii!ITlediate restructuring of the political parties. They worked together with many 11 New Order" civilians who disliked the existing political parties and desired to introduce the two-group system. The two-group (or two-party) system was based on a "programme" rather than on "political ideology".6 This militant group called for an end to the multi-party system, but encountered strong opposition from political party leaders. The struggle between the moderate and militant groups was further manifested in the debate on the election bill. The army wanted to hold an election to legitimize its power and a new election law was needed for this purpose. On 24 November 1966, the government submitted an election bill (that is, the Bill on the Election Relating to Members of the MPR and DPR) together with two other re 1evant bills to be debated in the OPR, namely: the Bill on the Structure and Position of the MPR, the OPR and the DPRO; and the Parties, Mass Organizations and Golongan Karya Bill.7 The party bi 11 was discussed for more than a month without any result. Obviously, the government, which was dominated by the mil it ants, intended to introduce the restructuring of political parties by limiting their membership and by grouping them into fewer clusters in accordance with the suggestion of the 1966 Army Seminar in Bandung.8 The opposition from the political parties was so intense that the OPR 4

eventually decided to concentrate on the other two bi 11 s. Disagreements also existed on the election bill, especially with regard to matters relating to the election system, the proportion of representatives from Java and the Outer Islands, and the number of appointed members in the DPR and the OPRD (regional parliament). The government was at first in favour of the 11 Single member constituency .. (or district) rather than the 11 proport ion a 1 11 system. Under a district system, small parties would not be able to survive but people could elect their own new leaders instead of being represented by established political party leaders.9 According to this system, a residential requirement for a candidate would be imposed, in accordance with the recommendation of the 1966 army 11 seminar. New Order 11 militants and intellectuals (especially those affiliated with various action fronts) were major supporters of the district system. To discuss the bills, a Committee called the Pan it i a Chusus 3 RUU was established on 30 January 1967. The Committee consisted of forty-five members, six of which were from ABRI, eleven from the Karya Pembangunan faction A/8/C, while the rest (twentyeight members) were political party representatives.10 However, the political parties objected to the district system and the Suharto government eventually backed down. The Karya Pembangunan faction was persuaded to go along with the government. By July 1967, it was reported that a general consensus between Parliament and the government had been reached that a proportional system was to be adopted. In addition, both sides agreed that one-third of the MPR members would be appointed from both the ABRI and non-ABRI, while the DPR would consist of 460 members, of which 360 would be elected. The rest (100) would be appointed. 5

General Nasution did not agree to the election system, nor did the .. New Order .. mi 1itants within and outside Parliament.11 Up to January 1968 the election bill was still not ratified by Parliament. There were rumours that various action fronts had exerted pressure to postpone the rat ifi cat ion. Suharto was impatient and exercised pressure. Tension arose, but by then it was clear that the election could not be held in time and acting President Suharto expressed his intention to postpone the election. In March 1968, the MPR held its session and appointed Suharto President, indicating that Suharto had consolidated his power. At the meeting it was decided to postpone the election until 5 July 1971. Cruci al points.. in the There were several above-mentioned election bill which impeded its smooth approval in the DPR. Most of these points were related to the number of appointed members from the ABRI, non-ABRI and political parties in the three institutions (MPR, DPR, and DPRD).12 There were also clauses which gave the President, Minister of Home Affairs, and Governor sole power to appoint those members. The election bill, which was supposed to have been settled, was therefore discussed again, in particular Article 34, which allowed only the QXisting parties and Golongan Karya to participate in the election. In other words, parties banned during the Sukarno era would not be permitted to contest the election.13 11

The debate on the two bi 11 s dragged on and by October 1969 there was still no concrete result. President Suharto then intervened. He met party leaders and representatives separately; major political parties formed a group while minor parties, ABRI, and the Karya Pembangunan faction (that is, the civilian GOLKAR in Parliament) formed another group As a which supported the government•s position. compromise, it was decided to accept the PNI •s 6

proposal that appointed members for the DPRD at two levels (province and regency) would not exceed 20 per cent.l4 Meanwhile, the Karya Pembangunan faction proposed that Article 34 of the election bill be reviewed; this motion, however, was rejected by the Committee (Panitia Chusus 3 RUU}. Apparently, the ABRI faction in Parliament came to a compromise with the political parties in order to have the election bi 11 passed, at the expense of the "New Order" militants, many of whom were civilians. It is also interesting to -read the memorandum of the Karya Pembangunan faction which noted that the faction did not want to withdraw its proposal but admitted that it was defeated by the "existing reality")5 It can be easily recognized that Indonesian politics under the "New Order" differs from both the Constitutional and Guided Democracy periods in many respects. The most important one is, of course, the ascendancy of the Indonesian military, especially the army. This was shown in the process of the debate on the election bill as well as the content of the bill itself. The grip on Indonesian politics by the militarydominated government can be seen in the composition of the DPR and the MPR. The national DPR consisted of 460 members, 360 of which were elected, while 100 were appointed {25 civilians and 75 military) by the government (President). The structure clearly favoured the government. More conspicuous was the composition of the MPR which had 920 members, 460 of which came from the DPR, one-third were appointed from the military by the President, and the rest were local representatives. If we include the appointed members in the DPR, appointed members in the MPR in reality constituted more than one-third. Because of this political structure, many argued that the government and the military were bound to control the state legislative and executive branch. 7

Once the Suharto group consolidated its position, it became more concerned with political legitimacy. Apart from improving the economic situation which was disastrous, the 1eadership was becoming more serious about holding a general election. To participate in the election, there had to be a political party which could represent the interests of the ••New Order••, but the existing political parties, i ncl udi ng the newly created PARMUSI {Partai Musl imi n Indonesia), which was dominated by the moderate Muhammadiyah group, did not represent the interests of the New Order .. elite, especially the military elite. It is therefore understandable that the Suharto group wanted to have its own political vehicle to contest the election. Hence SEKBER GOLKAR was revitalized. 11

Prior to the revitalization of GOLKAR, that is, during the period of uncertainty {1966-68), many observers argued that the military intended to have a partnership with the PNI and PARMUSI in the election, because the 1eadership of the former party was of the abangan/priyayi background -- which was also the background of many generals -- while the latter consisted of Muhammadiyah elements who were more co-operative with the new authorities than other Muslim factions. It is certainly true that the new authority even intervened in the internal affairs of some po 1it i ca 1 parties in order to make them more responsive to the demands of the military, but this did not mean that the army went into partnership with these parties. In retrospect, it appears that co-operating with some political parties was more a tactic than a genuine effort on the part of the military. It is clear that the civilian parties did not represent the interests of the military, nor were they controlled by the military group. The latter point was shown in the case of a new PNI leader Hadisubeno who was cultivated 8

by the military but who subsequently challenged the new military authority.16 In fact, there was indication that the Suharto group had chosen GOLKAR as a major political vehicle when he came to power. As early as July 1966, General Suharto as chairman of the Cabinet Presidium gave a written statement during the 11 Choaching week of GOLKAR 11 saying that GOLKAR should possess 11 a sense of mission 11 .17 And again on 5 September 1966, as Defence Minister, General Suharto issued an instruction to the four Chiefs of Staff to provide all possible facilities for the development of SEKBER GOLKAR and the completion of its duties, both at the national and subnational levels.18 On 24 November 1966 the government submitted the Parties, Mass Organizations and Golongan Karya Bill. The fact that GOLKAR (Golongan Karya) was listed in the bill was an indication that the Suharto government intended to use this vehicle in the election. One could argue then that the revitalization of SEKBER GOLKAR (GOLKAR's name before the 1971 elect ion) had begun. But the revitalization process was slow due to divisive forces within the organization. Suharto was able to intervene directly only after the consolidation of his power and the rescheduling of the general election. At this point, it was not yet clear whether or not the Suharto group wanted to develop SEKBER GOLKAR into a full-fledged political party. What was clear was that it intended to make SEKBER GOLKAR a viable electoral machine to guarantee as well as legitimize the dominant position of the military. NOTES

See Appendix 1 for the 1955 election results. 2

On the nature of S.

Lev,

Indonesian political parties, see Daniel "Political Parties In Indonesia", Journal of

9

Southeast Asian History 8, no. 1 (March 1967):54-57.

3

Soedjatrooko, 11The Role of Political Parties In Indonesia", In Nat I ona II sm and PrOQress In Free As I a, edIted by Ph I II p Thayer (Baltlroore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp.128-40.

w. 4

The concept of abangan-santrl-priyayl was treated in a detailed manner In his classic, The Rei iglon of Java (New York: Free Press, 1959). His argument on the relationships between the concept and allran can be found In his The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1965), especially pp.127-29.

5

For a discussion on this topic, see Herbert Fieth, 1'5uharto In Search of Pol itlcal Format", Indonesia 8 (October 1968):85-105.

6

Ibid.; Harold Crouch, 11The Army, the Parties and Elections", Indonesia, No. 11 (April 1971>:117-18. Initially General Dharsono wanted to d I sso I ve the exIstIng partIes and rep I ace them with two parties (dwlpartal), but upon strong opposition from the government (Suharto group) and the political parties, he rood If I ed hIs proposa I, that Is, to form a two-group system based on the existing parties; see Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel I University Press, 1978), p.252.

7

Bustarnan,

Undang-Undang

Pemll I han

Umum

dan

...;;S....;;u....;;s....;;u.;.;.na""n"---'d;.;a;.;.n;._..;.K....;;e....;;d.;;;;ud.;.u.;.k....;;a;;.;n;._..;.M;.;.PR.;..;L,_.;;;;DPR;....;..;..--'d;;.;;a;.;.n;._....;;D.;..PR~D

Undang-Undang (Jakarta: Centra

Publishing Company, 1969), p.11. 8

In August 1966, the Armed Forces held an Important seminar in Bandung to decide on the socio-economic and political role of the military (especially the army) In the post-1965 coup Indonesia. It decided that the dual function of the Indonesian military should become a feature of Indonesian political lite. The seminar was dominated by "mi lltant" army officers and PSI-type Intellectuals, who proposed various changes, Including a restructuring of the pol I tical system. However, most of these suggestions were later either modified or dropped.

10

9

For an Interpretation of this system In Indonesia, see Dachlan Ranum I hardjo, 11 Usaha Semu Untuk Mempertahankan Pancaslla & UUD '45", Rahasla Perjuangan Orde Baru (Bandung: Penerblt Yayasan, 28 October 1981), pp.48-52.

10 Bustaman, op.clt., pp.15-17. 11

Ikatan Pers Mahaslswa I ndonesl a, Pemlll han Unum 1971 (Jakarta: Lembaga Pendldlkan dan Konsultasl Pers, 1972), pp.37-38.

12 Bustaman, op.clt., pp.18-19. 13

lkatan Pers Mahaslswa Indonesia, op.clt., p.45.

14

Ibid., p.50.

15 Bustaman, op.clt., p.37. 16 Brian May reported that Hadlsubeno made the following statement during the election campaign: 11Ten Suhartos, ten Nasutlons and a cart load of generals do not add up to one Sukarno"; see The Indonesian Tragedy (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1978), p.262. 17

lkatan Pers Mahaslswa Indonesia, op.clt., p.14.

18

I bid., pp.14-15.

11

II

EMERGENCE OF GOLKAR AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

SEKBER GOLKAR was first established in 1964 by the military and anti-PKI civilians within the National Front.l Its original aim was to rally anti-communist forces to counterbalance the growing influence of the PKI. General A.H. Nasution and Chairul Saleh (Murba) were two promoters of this outfit but they were supported by the 1eaders of the NU and PNI who were strongly anti-communist. SEKBER GOLKAR was a 1oose federation of a few hundred "functional" and anti-PKI organizations, of which the most important were SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia [Central Organization for Indonesian Socialist Karyawan]), KOSGORO (Koperasi Serba Usaha Gotong Royong [Co-operative for Mutual Assistance Efforts]) and MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong [Family Mutual Help Association]), all of which were headed by mi 1it ar y men -- Suhard i man, Mas I sman and Su ghand i respectively. Before the establishment of the "New Order .. , SEKBER GOLKAR did not deve 1op into an effective political arm of the army. It was not until Suharto had made the decision to hold a general election that a serious effort to make SEKBER GOLKAR a viable electoral machine took place. The revitalization

of SEKBER GOLKAR was slow

12

because many "Old Order" generals were still influential in the organization. They resisted the restructuring programme and attempted to maintain their separate identities and hence their own power base. The Suharto group was impatient. Suharto's men in HANKAM (Ministry of Security and Defence) such as General Darjatmo and his aide Amir Murtono intervened and a deadline for the restructuring of GOLKAR was set. Only in October 1969 were the 201 organizations in SEKBER GOLKAR grouped into seven Kino (clusters); the SOKSI, KOSGORO and MKGR remained as three clusters in the new set-up. These three clusters 1ater became known as the Trikarya. A new cluster was also created during the restructuring process -- this was the Kino Karya Pembangunan headed by Drs Sumiskum,2 a university graduate who was close to Ali Murtopo, an influential private assistant of President Suharto. In it i a11 y some Kino wanted to take part in the general election as separate units but the authorities did not accept this idea.3 The Kino were forced to contest under the banner of SEKBER GOLKAR, abbreviated to GOLKAR. It now became clear that GOLKAR was dominated by HANK AM, the A1i Murtopo group and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The old Trikarya found themselves out of favour and no longer playing significant roles in the organization because they had been replaced by the above-mentioned new "actors". Although the leaders of many Kino were included in the leadership of the "new" GOLKAR, they did not participate actively in the campaigning. Some observers even maintained that the Trikarya dissociated themselves from the GOLKAR election campaign. HANKAM and the Ali Murtopo group appeared to have handled the election strategy. The campaign was conducted by a new organization established within SEKBER GOLKAR ca 11 ed BAPILU (Bad an Pemil ihan Umum) which ran parallel to SEKBER GOLKAR in the sense that 13

it had its central committee at the national level as well as sub-committees at provincial and regency The person in charge of BAPILU was Ali levels. Murtopo himself although formally, the General Chairman of BAPILU was Colonel Sapardjo and Drs Moerdopo, both identified as Ali Murtopo's men. There were also other Murtopo men who were involved in The military, intellectuals, intelligence BAPILU. officers (Opsus) and cukongs (Chinese businessmen who collaborate with the power elite) were major A daily newspapaer, Suara components of BAPILU. Karya, was also created by the Ali Murtopo group before the election to serve as the organ of SEKBER GOLKAR. BAPILU was active in the 1971 election, but it was not the sole actor. There were two other major actors during the 1971 e1ect ion: KOKARMENDAGRI (Korps Karyawan Kementeri an Dalam Negeri [Karyawan Corps of the Ministry of Home Affairs]) and local military commanders. Prior to the general election, SEKBER GOLKAR began to organize Korps Karyawan in government departments (ministries} (It seems that the Ali Murtopo and institutions. group was behind this effort.) The purpose was to rally support for GOLKAR during the election. Long before the formation of these Karyawan Corps, however, a strong KOKARMENDAGRI was already in existence. There was no doubt that KOKARMENDAGRI made a major contribution to the victory of SEKBER GOLKAR in the 1971 election. KOKARMENDAGRI was headed by the Minister of Home Affairs, General Amir Machmud, and its members consisted of employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1969 the Minister issued the Ministerial Instruction No. 12 (Permen No. 12) stipulating that civil servants party as part of the could not join any political attempt of the so-called 11 depoliticization .. of the 11 New Order". In addition, he issued the Governmental Regulation No. 6 {PP No. 6/1970) stipulating that civil servants could only have "monoloyalty 11 .4 They 14

were required to cut off all ties with political parties. During the election, they were instructed to vote for GOLKAR. Apparently KOKARMENDAGRI was a component of SEKBER GOLKAR but it was independent of the Mu rtopo group. There was competition between the two groups to gain control of civil servants but eventually Amir Machmud won the battle as shown in the formation of KORPRI (Karyawan Pegawai Republik Indonesia [Indonesian Civil Servants Corps]) in 1971, a few months after the general election. Amir Machmud was appointed the chairman of the Mentors• Council of this new organization, the membership of which went beyond the civil servants of the Ministry of Home Affairs·! Local military officers and village headmen were also mobilized to ensure that villagers would vote for SEKBER GOLKAR. The military officers were often known as ~embina (mentors), an influential position in GOLK R. Officially, these military officers did not form part of the structure of GOLKAR but they were instrumental in ensuring its success in the rural areas. Despite the existence of these various "power centres" SEKBER GOLKAR worked together as a group towards winning the election. SEKBER GOLKAR was able to raise a lot of funds to support its campaign. Some said that it obtained funds from Pertamina (the state oil company) and Chinese businessmen and hence had much more than any political party.S Opposition parties even accused GOLKAR in general and BAPILU in particular of using the money to buy over some religious leaders. Before the election, GUPPI (Gabungan Usaha-usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam [Union of Efforts to Improve Islamic Education]) was revived by BAPILU to woo the Islamic segment of the Indonesian popu 1at ion. Despite these measures, SEKBER GOLKAR leaders when interviewed expressed their doubt that they would obtain a 1ands 1ide victory. Drs Moerdopo, then the treasurer 15

of SEKBER GOLKAR, stated in March 1971 that GOLKAR only hoped to win 50 per cent plus one.6 General Sokowati, the General Chairman of GOLKAR, also mentioned that SEKBER GOLKAR would become one of the Big Three (that is, NU, PNI and SEKBER GOLKAR).7 Although the major political parties, such as the NU and PNI, camp 1ai ned that SEKBER GOLKAR was not playing a fair game before the election, they were quite optimistic. The PNI still expected to win at least 78 out of the 360 contested seats.8 Hadisubeno, the chairman of the PNI, even foresaw that Presiden~ Suharto would include PNI leaders in the new The NU had 100 seats as its target while Cabinet. PARMUSI was expecting to get 50 established the newly did not have any targets. parties Other seats.lO could not compete with the they that knew they Perhaps SEKBER GOLKAR. The small and parties major political to participate in the enthusiastic least were parties elect ion. The 1971 election results came as a surprise to some party leaders. SEKBER GOLKAR won 62.8 per cent of votes (227 seats) while the NU won 18 per cent (58 seats) and the PNI only 6.93 per cent {20 seats). Most of the political parties, except the NU, The PNI, for instance, which performed very badly. obtained 22.3 per cent of the votes (54 seats) in 1955, received less than 7 per cent. The reason was obvious: the civil servants who had voted for the PNI in the past cast their votes in favour of GOLKAR in the 1971 election due largely to pressure. This was crucial because the number of civil servants was large and they were influential in determining the voting behaviour of the villagers. The PNI was able to gain a 1arge number of voters in the past because it was identified as a civil servants 1 party. The NU could maintain its 1955 percentage mainly because of the fact that as an ulama party its support came from the religious community and it did not rely on civil servants. 16

With regard to the victory of GOLKAR in the 1971 election, there were many interpretations . Ali Murtopo argued that the avai 1abi 1 ity of funds, the support of officers, especially from ABRI, the formation of KORPRI within various ministries, institutions and firms, and various forms of intimidation contributed to the victory, but 11 it is certain that the primary factor was the belief and the hope of people in this young socio-political force, which has never had an historical stigma 1ike other political partiesu.11 Many observers agreed with Murtopo•s views on the success of GOLKAR but they did not attribute the absence of stigma in GOLKAR as the primary factor. The opposition parties attempted to emphasize the government•s intimidation as a major reason for the success of GOLKAR. Nono Makarim•s analysis prior to the election explained the possibility of GOLKAR 1 s success in the 1971 election. In one of the seminars on the election held at the University of Indonesia, Makarim, who was then the editor-in-chief of Hari an Kami, commented on a new reality in the Indonesian socio-political map which would have tremendous implications in the election.12 He maintained that after the 1965 coup, an important process had been taking place in every aspect of Indonesian soc i a 1 1if e. This was a process of supplanting civilians with military personnel. The positions occupied by the dual functionaries (read: the military) included most of the positions which directly affected the people: governorship, district officership and village headship. Makarim also argued that the military had a hierarchical link from the provinces to the districts. They were military officers who were known by the 1oca 1 communities as pembina (mentors). The military, by law, was not supposed to contest the election, but by virtue of their power they could order people to vote for a particular party or organization. Makarim suggested it would be important to know which party the military 17

leaders at the regional level wanted the people to vote for: GOLKAR or the PNJ.13 Although Makarim did not provide the answer at the time, it is clear that the military chose GOLKAR. GOLKAR was an electoral machine, but it also represented the interests of the military, especially the abangan generals in Java. The aspirations of the abangan, the priyayi and the intellectuals could be accommodated in this new political organization if it was developed into a full-fledged political party. Thus, by the end of the 1971 election, a 11 new aliran" had emerged -- that is, GOLKAR, which represented the military-abangan-priyali culture -- but this aliran was not yet fully deve oped. Apart from the emergence of a 11 new aliran", the 1971 election also gave a clear indication of future Indonesian political trends: GOLKAR would remain as the dominant political force in future general elections and the votes it would gain would not be much fewer than what it had secured in the 1971 election. This was to maintain the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the Indonesian people.

The Restructuring of Political Parties

Once GOLKAR had won a decisive victory, the government immediately consolidated the organization by improving its structure so that its control over GOLKAR became institutionalized. President Suharto was consulted on the reorganization (restructuring) through General Oarjatmo {who was head of the kekaryaan section in the Ministry of Defence and Security) who in turn passed Suharto's instruction on to GOLKAR.14 The reorganization was finalized in July 1971, but the more formal structure only came into being in 1973 when GOLKAR held its first congress. 18

The new structure consisted of the National Congress which was to be the decision-making body; under it was the Central Committee (DPP) at the national level, the Provincial Cormnittee {DPP DATI I) at the provincial level and the Regency Committee (DPP DATI I I) at the regency 1evel. Each committee had a counterpart "Mentors• Council", which was to be 11 advisory 11 in nature. The Provincial Committee was headed by the military. As late as September 1978 it was reported that the regional mi 1itary commander was still automatically the chairman of the local Mentors' Counci 1.15 Although GOLKAR consists of national and local committees and councils, the power lies in the hands of the national bodies. It is also illuminating to note that the chairmen of the Provincial Conmittees are recommended, if not determined, by the GOLKAR Central Committee. Thus, the structure and functions of GOLKAR showed the concentration of power in the hands of the people in the Central Committee. The decisions were made at the national level while regional committees only implemented those decisions. Not surprisingly then, GOLKAR critics often accused it of practising the "Command System 11 • The 1973 congress also introduced a 11 Structural change" in GOLKAR. Brigadier General Sapardjo, the secretary-genera 1 of GOLKAR, argued that prior to the congress, the Mentors • Council had existed only in name and was not part of the structure. During the 1973 congress, it was decided to have the Council incorporated as an 11 infrastructural part of GOLKAR 11 .16 This was to make GOLKAR more effective. Sapardjo explained that GOLKAR consisted of three important components: ABRI; civil servants; and civilians who were neither members of the armed forces nor civil servants. It is known that both the armed forces and 19

civil servants take orders only from their superiors. In order to avoid "insubordination", the congress requested President Suharto, the Chief Mentor (Pembina Utama), to select members of the Mentors 1 Council so that high-ranking military officers and government servants would be appointed. Sapardjo pointed out that the Mentors 1 Council would undertake "cultivation, control and direction" of GOLKAR as well as serve as "the basic pol icy-maker ".17 However, because high offices were held by members of the Counci 1, they were to work through the Central Corrmittees which would carry out work on behalf of GOLKAR.18 Sapardjo's explanation revealed the nature of GOLKAR, the role of President Suharto and the importance of the Mentors' Council. It is clear that the Mentors' Council was the actual decision-making body, although according to the constitution, the Central Committee served as a policy-making body as well as an executive body. A civilian leader of GOLKAR who was not in the Mentors' Council in 1978 stated that "in the past, the DPP (Central Committee) was used as a body to approve a pol icy which had been made somewhere el se".l9 He did not state where the pol icy was made. However, one could easily guess that -the Executive Branch and Suharto's men in HANKAM were the real decision-makers. The former was represented by President Suharto and his advisors who were to limit, if not control, the influence of HANKAM. These people were in the Mentors' Council. The chairmen of various Kino were further undermined in terms of their strength. However, the most significant development in the political field after the 1971 election was the restructuring of political parties by reducing their number. In retrospect, the restructuring of political parties did not begin during the Suharto period. 20

Sukarno was the one who first reduced the thirty-odd parties to ten during his "Guided Democracy" period. He even intended to dissolve all the political parties but did not succeed in doing this. When Sukarno fell from power, the "New Order" mil it ants intended to introduce a two-party system (1966-68}. Although at that time Suharto was in favour of restructuring the political parties, he appeared to have disagreed with the idea of the two-party system. Perhaps he thought that the two-party system would not accommodate the political aspirations of the elite. The fact that the idea was proposed by the "New Order" militants also contributed to his reservation of the idea. Perhaps most important was the timing -- he did not think that it was time for such a restructuring since he had not yet consolidated his power. The situation changed after 1968 when he became the President of Indonesia. He felt more secure in handling the restructuring problem and in early 1970 he officially suggested the simplification of political parties. The occasion was the meeting of the President with the leaders of the nine political parties which were to participate in the 1971 general election. Suharto suggested that the parties be consolidated into three groups: the Nationalist Group (Golongan Nasionalis), the Spiritual Group (Golongan Spiritual} and the Functional Group (Golongan Karya}. The PNI and IPKI responded to the suggestion positively, as did PARMUSI who favoured the idea because "this was in accordance with the Muslim Community Congress held in 1969".20 The leader of the NU, Subchan Z.E., also saw the advantages in simplifying the existing political system, so that alternatives for the peop 1 e caul d be narrowed down. However, some newspapers which were associ a ted with the existing political parties, such as Suara Marhaen (Nationalist) and Pedoman (the PSI newspaper which was pro-Islam), opposed the idea.

21

The strongest dissidents were from Parkindo and Partai Kathol ik. Both parties refused to join the Spiritual Group and preferred to be associated with the Nationalist Group because they were of the view that the Spiritual Group was introducing a pro~rallJile which was not "based on ideological motivation". 1 On 9 March 1970, a group called the Kelompok Nasionalis emerged. This group consisted of the PNI, IPKI, Parkindo, Partai Murba and Partai Katholik, which was later known as the Kelompok Demokrasi Pembangunan. However, its actual fusion only took place in January 1973, and became known as the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (POI). The POI consisted of five components and they operated independently even after the fusion. The leadership of the party at the national level was in the hands of the PNI, the largest element in the party. The post of Genera 1 Chairman was assumed by the PNI while deputy chairmen were chosen from each of the five parties. The composition of the POI leadership at the subnational levels were based on the number of party followers or votes won during the 1955 and 1971 elections.22 For instance, in West, Central and East Java and Jakarta where the PNI was strong, the chairman of the 1ocal POI was a PNI man, while in North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, East Nus a Tenggara, Maluku and Irian Jaya, where Protestants and Catholics were influential, the leadership of the local POI in those areas was in the hands of either Parkindo or the Partai Katholik. The reliance on the component parties caused the POI to have a weak identity. POI party cadres were almost non-existent. This was because they derived from the component parties rather than the POI party as such. Prior to the fusion, the five component parties of the POI took part in the election and their combined votes obtained was 10.09 per cent of the total. Not surprisingly, the POI was considered by 22

many observers as the weakest party. Apart from the diversified ideologies within the major segments of the PDI~ factional conflicts -- especially within the PNI -- further wea·~ened it. In January 1973, four Islamic parties, namely, the Nadahtul Ul ama (NU, conservative Muslim party), the PARMUSI (modernist Muslim party), the PSII {Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) and the PERT! (Islamic Educational Movement), were fused into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the Development Unity Party). The fusion of the Islamic parties was not without problems. In the past (1945), some Islamic parties had come together to form MASYUMI, but the fusion was short-lived. The PSII left MASYUMI in 1947 and it was followed by the NU in 1952. Apparently these Islamic parties had different cultures and traditions and their differences were so great that they could not work together. MASYUMI was banned during the Sukarno era because of its involvement in the regional rebel-1 ion. The Islamic inspiration was then represented by the NU, PSII and PERTI. When Suharto came to power, there was a desire to revive MASYUMI, but he endorsed the establishment of a new Islamic party which excluded the ex-MASYUMI leaders. By 1968 PARMUSI was formed, and Djarwani and Harun lukman (of Muhammadiyah) became respectively the chairman and deputy chairman of the new party. However, Djarwani and Harun lukman intended to hand over the party to the ex-MASYUMI leaders. This resulted in a COUp staged in 1970 by John Naro and Kadir.23 Naro formed a rival executive dissolved the original PARMUSI committee and committee. 11

Naro • s group was supporters but he gained of Defence and Security PNI. His new leadership

11

opposed by many PARMUSI the support of the Ministry (General Darjatmo) and the together with Mintaredja was 23

recognized and it was under Naro that PARMUSI, NU, the PSI! and PERT! were fused into the PPP. The composition of the PPP was jointly prepared by Mintaredja (PARMUSI) and Idham Chal id (NU). Idham became its president while Mintaredja served as its deputy, and Naro himself served as one of the vice-chairmen in the national PPP. Those PARMUSI men who 1ater became members of the PPP were known as "Mus 1imi n Indonesia 11 {MI). 24 The MI was different from the defunct MASYUMI in terms of the quality of the leadership. While MASYUMI leaders consisted of fundamentalist Muslims and were known for their religious knowledge and commitment, it is said that MI leaders were lacking in these respects. In addition, the MI was not supported by the ex-MASYUMI leaders and followers. It relied heavily on the government.25 The largest component of the PPP was the NU rather than the MI. The NU was first formed in 1926 as a religious organization and it only became a political party in 1952 after quarrelling with MASYUMI and leaving the organization. The NU is a political party of Javanese kiyai (religious teachers and landlords). They are respected in the rural areas in Java because of their wealth and religious knowledge. Conservative and traditional, the NU was known in the past to have co-operated with various governments. It has been very influential in Javanese society, especially in the rural areas. This can be attributed to the roles played by the kiyai and ulama in Indonesian society. This strength is also reflected in the composition of the PPP -- in almost every area, the leader of the PPP is an NU man.26 The NU and three other Islamic parties participated in the 1971 general election and together won 27.11 per cent of the tot a1 votes. The fusion of these Muslim parties did not weaken them however. On 24

the contrary, it promoted the Islamic party•s position vi s-a-vis the non-Muslim groups. The PPP was more cohesive than the PDI because of the presence of a common religion. Nevertheless, during the transition period, it was noticeable that the four streams in the PPP continued to exist. For instance, when a leader was absent or died, he had to be replaced by someone In their struggle against from the same party. 27 non-Muslims, however, the members were closely united.

The Political Parties and GOLKAR Bill It was after the emergence of the PDI and PPP that the Political Parties and GOLKAR Bill was discussed in Parliament. In fact, the Bill was first submitted in 1968 together with the Elections Bill (then called Political Parties, Mass Organizations and Golongan Karya Bi 11), but it failed to be debated because the political parties, which were quite influential in Parliament, felt that the political system was being restructured at their expense. Only after the landslide victory of GOLKAR in the 1971 election and the growing influence of the military, did the restructuring of the political parties become a reality. Although the government maintained that the restructuring of political parties was aimed at making them more effective and less diverse, both the "New Order" mi 1it ants and the army 1eaders before and after the election appeared to have the intention to restrict political-party activities. This restriction of political-party activities was later known as the "floating mass concept". As early as 27 July 1971, the chairman of the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), Nurcholis Madjid, made a 25

statement in favour of the concept of 11 floating mass". He said that political parties should be simplified and that political activities under DATI I and II should be restricted.28 On 31 August 1971, General Darjatmo who was the chief of the Karya section at HANKAM, made a speech in HANKAM saying, 11 We have to be cadre-oriented but not mass-oriented; our aim is to secure power among the floating masses, the majority of whom live in villagesu.29 In October 1971, Major General Widodo, the Commander of Brawijaya Division (East Java), also maintained that uno political parties should be active in villages during the acceleration of twenty-five year modernization, but they can only operate at the DATI I and II levels 11 .30 The purpose of the 11 floating mass 11 concept was to depoliticize the Indonesian population. It was argued that villagers were not sophisticated and should be freed from political agitation, so that they could concentrate on helping the government to implement development programmes. They could express their choice every five years during the general election. The architect of this concept was often said to be General Ali Murtopo. This concept, but not the term, was later incorporated into the Political Parties and GOLKAR Bi 11.31 The Political Parties and GOLKAR Bill was submitted to Parliament by the government on 6 December 1974,32 and it took more than eight months to obtain approval (14 August 1975). A few points in the bill were considered to be against the interests of the political parties. For example, civil servants could only join political parties (and GOLKAR) with the written permission of their superiors (Article 7, Clause 2); political parties and GOLKAR could only establish branches above the village level (Article 9, Clause 1); the supervision of the political parties 26

and GOLKAR would be undertaken by the Minister of Home Affairs upon the instruction of the President (Article 12); and the President would have the power to freeze political parties and GOLKAR (Article 13). The PPP and POI were critical of these articles, and a compromise was eventually reached between GOLKAR and the government on the one hand and the PPP and POI on the other. It was decided that civil servants could JOln political parties and GOLKAR but with the knowledge of their superiors. However, a number of 11 government servants holding certain positions .. would still require written permission to join the political parties or GOLKAR (Article 8, Clause 2). The Article clearly favoured GOLKAR rather than the political parties because it was more likely that the civil servants waul d be 1eaders or members of GOLKAR. As for 11 Civil servants holding certain positions 11 , it was later stipulated that the category included all functionaries in administrative units down to villagechief level, all senior and branch managers of state-owned corporations and banks, all HANKAM employees and all government schoolteachers.33 One can argue that if these civil servants wanted to join political groups at all, they would get permission to join GOLKAR since most, if not all, of their superiors were leaders of GOLKAR. Nonetheless, there was an article which gave some advantage to the political parties. It was decided that political parties and GOLKAR would be allowed to have a komisaris with a few assistants at the rural level (Article 10). Since most of the village headmen and officials were likely to be GOLKAR men, the appointment of a komisaris was particularly important to the political part1es because this would allow them to get in touch with the rural masses. In fact, there was another means for the PPP (but not for the POI) to get in touch with the rural masses -- through gatherings in the mosques, and the institutions of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools}. 27

Article 14, which granted rights to the Minister of Home Affairs to freeze political parties and GOLKAR upon the instruction of the President, was deleted, but the right of the President as the .. mandataries" of the MPR to freeze political parties and GOLKAR was retained (Article 14). The PPP, although eventually agreeing to ratify the bill, expressed its reservation in an accompanying memorandum on Article 14.34 It was revealed later that when the Political Parties and GOLKAR Bill was proposed, a senior politician, Mr Wilopo (PNI), suggested that at the rural level, a party sub-branch (pengurus ranting) should be permitted to be established. However, the government was worried that this might create instability. Mr Wilopo replied that he was concerned with stability but development and political life should also be considered. For this reason, he proposed that once a party sub-branch was all owed to be formed, all meetings held by the sub-branch Executive Committee members should be conducted behind closed doors because We need stability ... 22 11

The Suharto government has been obsessed with political stability and the Political Party and GOLKAR Bill was aimed at ensuring this stability. Reducing the number of political parties was also for the same purpose. By putting together different political parties, the government would undermine the parties • strength and hence could control them more easily. However, this might be true in the case of the POI but it is less true of the PPP. Although the components of the PPP were diversified, when they faced non-Islamic groups, they put aside their differences for a while and worked for the "Islamic cause". It is interesting to note that the colonial government in the past had tried to prevent Islamic organizations from getting together. For instance, it prohibited the Sarekat Islam from 28

registering as an entity but allowed it to have separate registrations on a chapter-by-chapter basis. The colonial government feared that the concentration of Islamic forces would present a threat to its rule. However, it appears that the 11 New Order 11 government did not learn from this historical lesson. Perhaps it had a different frame of reference, that is, the MASYUMI case. Islamic parties within MASYUMI quarrelled because of their fundamental differences which led to the departure of the PSII and NU. The fact is that the Is 1ami c parties remained fragmented in their theology and hence in their act ion. Perhaps the voting strength of the Islamic parties which remained 1ess than 30 per cent in the 1971, 1977 and 1982 elections, was evidence of the success of the government policy towards political Islam.

The 1977 Election Like the previous election, the Islamic parties, which now formed the PPP, stressed primodial sentiments in their campaign to win votes whi 1e GOLKAR attempted to present itself as an Islamic party as well. Donations were given to mosques and some Islamic leaders were 11 CO-opted 11 into GOLKAR. In addition, GOLKAR had its own pesantren {Islamic boarding schools) to counterbalance the more established pesantren associated with the PPP. Clashes between PPP and GOLKAR supporters were reported. In many areas where the PPP was strong, GOLKAR, especially its youth organization, used bull dozer tactics to deter the PPP supporters. In a recent interview with Tern~, some GOLKAR youth leaders in Bandung revealed t at they had served as "bulldozer" for GOLKAR during the 1977 election campaign.36 Some of the GOLKAR leaders disapproved of 29

these tactics and Genera 1 Wi dodo, who 1ater became a critic of the Suharto government, also commented after the election that there was intimidation and force used during the election campaign which should not have been condoned. However, GOLKAR's victory in the election should be explained more in terms of the political structure rather than the means employed by some individual GOLKAR leaders. The fact that the government bureaucracy, KORPRI, was part of GOLKAR and that the military also sided with the .. functional group .. guaranteed victory for the organization in the 1977 election. In this election, GOLKAR obtained 62.11 per cent of the votes, 0.69 per cent less than in 1971. The PPP, however, won more votes in 1977 {29.29 per cent) than in 1971 (27.11 per cent), while the POI, as expected, continued to decline (from 10.09 per cent in 1971 to 8.60 per cent in 1977).37 In some large cities the PPP gained more votes than GOLKAR. In Jakarta and Banda Aceh, for example, the PPP defeated GOLKAR. Muslim support in Aceh was certainly the reason for the PPP victory, but in Jakarta one could argue that many protest votes as well as Muslim votes went to the Islamic party. It should be mentioned that before the 1977 election, the .. New Order .. elite had been divided over the issue of development policy and the role of the military. The 1974 riot, later known as the Malari Affair, which was triggered by the visit of the then Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, polarized the political public. Thus, it was argued that the politically conscious voters who were non-Islamic but who were discontented with GOLKAR gave their votes to the PPP, the only challenge to the huge electoral machine. The PPP was indeed influential as shown in the 30

votes gathered by the party during the two elections. There were also other indicators of its strength. Firstly, the draft of the 1973 marriage law intended to introduce civil registration for all marriages and to adopt the principle of monogamy was strongly opposed by the PPP, which was against the "secularization" of Indonesian marriages. It succeeded in having the draft revised. Secondly, the 1aw on the po 1 it i ca 1 parties and GOLKAR which originally prohibited political activities in the rural areas was also opposed by the PPP (supported by the POI), and the appointment of komisaris (commissioners) for political parties and GOLKAR was eventually included in the law. Thirdly, the PPP decided to use the Kaabah (black holy shrine in Mecca) for its election symbol (emblem). The Minister of Home Affairs was at first reluctant to accept the emblem, but the PPP threatened to boycott the election if the emblem was rejected. The PPP won the battle. In analysing GOLKAR 1 s performance in the 1977 election, General Amir Murtono, the General Chairman of GOLKAR, reported that GOLKAR 1 s votes increased in 11 provinces but declined in another 15 provinces. The decline in the following provinces was most noticeable: Aceh, Riau, South Sumatra, Lampung, West Java, Central Kalimantan~ South Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Irian Jaya • .,s Some observers suggested that the increase in the PPP • s votes might be due to the support of the young voters but Amir Murtono did not attribute this to the decline in GOLKAR 1 s votes.

The 1978 Presidential Election It should be mentioned that prior to the 1977 election, there were the "Sawito Affair .. which aimed at overthrowing the Suharto government and a Bul og 31

corruption scandal. Before that was the Pertamina debacle which revealed that the state oil company had incurred a US$10 billion debt. As a result, there was discontent among a segment of the Indonesian population. Apparently, the government policy had stimulated economic growth but did not improve the distribution of income. The political public also felt that the government had been rather repressive towards political Islam and other opposition groups. These led to student demonstrations supported by opposition groups against the Suharto government. Some groups even resorted to terrorism. However, the government was firm in handling the matter and student opposition was quelled. Consequently, the 1978 presidential election was held on time and Suharto was re-elected President of Indonesia for 1978-83 while Adam Malik was chosen as his deputy. The Suharto era thus continued.

NOTES Some materials In this chapter are derived from 11"1 forthcoming study on GOLKAR.

2

Drs Sumlskum later served as Deputy Speaker In Parliament, but he became critical of the government after he stepped down.

3

Dewan Plmplnan Pusat Golongan jawaban DPP GOLKAR Pada Munas pp.86-87.

4

Ken Ward, The 1971 Election In Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Monash University, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p.34.

32

Karya, Laporan PertanggungI GOLKAR (Surabaya: 1973),

5

Masashl Nishihara, GOLKAR and the Indonesian Elections of 1971 (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp.33-34.

6

Tempo, 20 March 1971, p.6.

7

Abad I, 29 August 1970.

8

Tempo, 12 June 1971, pp.7-8.

9

Tempo, 13 March 1971, pp.6-7.

10

Ibid.

11

All Murtopo, Strategi Poiltik Nasional (Jakarta: Centre Strategic and International Studies, 1974), pp.82-83.

12

For Nona Makarim's conwnents, see 11!-lasil-hasil Seminar Pemilihan Umum & Masalah-masalah Jang Dltlrrt>ulkannja 11 , mimeographed (Jakarta, 1970), pp.45-47

13

Ibid.

14

Petundjuk SEKBER GOLKAR (Jakarta, 1971), p.62a.

15

Tempo, 4 November 1978, p. 7.

16

Sepuiuh Tahun GOLKAR. 20 Oktober (Jakarta: Suara Karya, 1974) p.5.

17

Ibid.

18

I bl d.

19

Tempo, 4 November 1978, p. 7. Rachman Tolleng, an ex-GOLKAR leader, also made a similar pol nt. He wrote that "i""ortant decisions were nat made In GOLKAR, but roore often were made 11 GOLKAR outs ide GOLKAR 11 • See Rahman Tolleng, hanyalah perpanjangan struktur kekuasaan", Prlsma 8 (August 1979) :8.

33

1964-20

Oktober

for

1974,

20

Manue I Ka Is I epo, 11 0 II ema Part a I Demokras I IndonesIa: Per juangan Menear! ldentltas", Prlsma 12 (December 1981) :69-70.

21

I bid.

22

I bid.

23

Fachry All and lgbal Abdurrauf Salmlma, ,..,erosotnya Allran Prlsma 12 (December dalam Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 11 , 1981):26.

24

ibid., p.28.

25

I bid.

26

I bid., p.30.

27

Ibid., p.32.

28

Mahastswa Indonesia, 23 May 1971, p.3.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.

31

One can argue that the government endorsed the concept, not the term, as shown In the government-sponsored Political Parties and GOL.KAR Bi II which was aimed at depolltlclzing the rural areas. The B II I was eventua I I y amended to a II ow a komi sarIs (commissioner) to represent GOU