Liberia under Samuel Doe, 1980–1985: The Politics of Personal Rule 1793617872, 9781793617873

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Liberia under Samuel Doe, 1980–1985

Liberia under Samuel Doe, 1980–1985 The Politics of Personal Rule Yekutiel Gershoni

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE, United Kingdom Copyright © 2022 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN 978-1-7936-1787-3 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-7936-1788-0 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To my dearest Ruti, beloved sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren

In Memory of Professor Yekutiel Gershoni

This book is not only the outcome of fourteen years of academic research focused on shedding light on one of the darkest eras in the history of Liberia, but is also a testament to the strength of the mind and its ability to overcome physical disabilities that at first seem unsurmountable. Professor Yekutiel Gershoni (1943–2021), an Israeli professor of African history, was severely injured while dismantling a bomb during his military service; both his hands had to be amputated, and he was left with severely impaired vision and hearing. These challenging conditions notwithstanding, he started his academic studies at Tel Aviv University. Prof. Gershoni’s life and this book are proof that the mind is stronger than the body, and a clear manifestation of what can be achieved with the right mindset, dedication, perseverance, and support. His achievements included, amongst others, a doctorate cum laude from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and visiting scholarships to Stanford University, Boston University,and Indiana University. Prof. Gershoni was head of the Department of African Studies and of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University and received an honorary doctorate from Beer Sheva University. He was also president of the International Association of Liberian Studies (2001–2002). He published several books and was a lecturer and a mentor and inspiration to all of his students. Many contributed to the success of Professor Gershoni, as he himself often acknowledged. They included his supportive family, first and foremost his wife and children; his colleagues; and his friends; as well as many scholars from the Liberian Studies Association (LSA), who treated him as a colleague, with affection and respect. The trials and challenges faced by one who was so severely disabled physically teach us about courage and freedom, and about how strength of mind liberates the spirit. May his life story be an inspiration to us all. vii

Contents

Introduction xi PART 1: HOLDING ON FOR DEAR LIFE Chapter 1: In the Cause of the People Chapter 2: Sacrifice and Survival



1



3



Chapter 3: Getting Foreign Aid

21



39

PART 2: THE BEGINNING OF PERSONAL RULE



Chapter 4: From Primus Inter Pares to the Head of the Pyramid Chapter 5: Travels Abroad, Austerity at Home Chapter 6: Tightening Control Chapter 7: Bungles





71 101



125



147

Chapter 8: Completion of the Draft Constitution PART 3: A FAÇADE OF DEMOCRACY Chapter 9: Circumventing Con Com



161



173



Chapter 10: Pressing Forward and Holding Back Chapter 11: A Terrible Betrayal

69

175

189



207

PART 4: THE BATTLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY Chapter 12: Clearing Obstacles to the Presidency Chapter 13: The Persecution and Ouster of Sawyer ix





227 229



253

x

Contents

Chapter 14: Assault on the Rival Parties



Chapter 15: Constrained Campaigning and Rigged Elections Conclusion



291

317

Bibliography Index

269

319

359

About the Author



377

Introduction

I first became aware of the parallel nature of the founding of Liberia by freed American slaves and the founding of Israel by diaspora Jews shortly after beginning my undergraduate studies in African History at Tel Aviv University. Both peoples were exiled from their homelands and both suffered centuries of persecution. Movements advocating for the return of these exiled peoples to their homelands led to both the founding of Liberia and the development of Zionism, which would later issue to the establishment of Israel. These similarities were what motivated me to focus my academic research on the Black Republic. In 1979, I visited Liberia as part of my field research for my dissertation. Shortly after my departure, the April 1980 coup erupted. I closely observed the coup and its outcome. This book presents my observations and conclusions. Liberia underwent two watershed moments in the twentieth century: the inauguration of President William V. S. Tubman in 1944 and the military coup in 1980. The two are inextricably connected, as the events of 1944 set in motion processes that inevitably led to the coup of 1980. The term of the nineteenth president of Liberia, Tubman (1944–1971), was a turning point in the history of Liberia. It was characterized by radical policies, which were enacted to close the political, economic, and social gaps between the ruling elite comprised of the Americo-Liberian minority and the African Liberian majority, which had existed for the previous ninety-seven years since Liberia’s foundation in 1847. Tubman’s sudden and radical changes are evident in his two reform policies. The first, known as the “unification policy,” was designed to integrate indigenous groups into Liberian society. It aimed to extend to the tribespeople, men and women alike, full civil rights and political agency, and greatly encouraged the study of tribal cultural practices. Whereas his unification policy sought to engender social and political unity, his “open door” policy (as Tubman termed it) sought to bridge the economic gap by opening Liberia’s interior, which was rich in natural resources, to domestic and foreign investment and entrepreneurship, and by xi

xii

Introduction

bringing much-needed modernization to the country’s antiquated agricultural practices. As part of the policy, domestic infrastructure, such as schools, roads, medical clinics, and employment opportunities, began to be developed throughout the interior. The main impact of the policy was to enable more African Liberians to receive a Western education and to become part of the money economy. Due to the success of the policy, Tubman’s tenure was often referred to as Liberia’s “golden age.” The changes Tubman made to his predecessors’ domestic policies were motivated by both personal and external factors. On a personal level, he sought to reduce the political power of the ruling True Whig Party (TWP), which had consistently acted to undermine the president’s authority over the government. The external factor was the urgent need to position Liberia advantageously to best partake of the decolonization process that was sweeping the rest of the continent. At the same time, Tubman and the Americo-Liberian leadership took steps to ensure that their social, political, and economic reforms did not result in the end of Americo-Liberian hegemony. In order to preserve Americo-Liberian rule, Tubman established a patronage system through which the government remained dominated by the ruling TWP, and ensured that any expression of political opposition to the TWP was silenced by his network of informants. Over the long term, Tubman’s silent war on the opposition only delayed the inevitable. During the tenure of Tubman’s successor, William R. Tolbert Jr. (1971–1980), popular dissatisfaction and bitterness became increasingly strong and widespread and attained political expression, with catastrophic consequences that permanently changed the largely static political order. Upon his ascension to the presidency, Tolbert, like Tubman before him, had attempted to attain greater agency and political control over the government. To that end he began to develop his own power base, consisting of young, educated African Liberians and Americo-Liberians. He also began to present himself as a more progressive leader than his predecessor. His first step to that end was to modify some of Tubman’s policies. He abolished Tubman’s patronage network, expanded his “open door” policy, and ended the one-party system by allowing another party to register as a political opposition group. Tolbert’s policies were doomed from the beginning. Given the worldwide economic crises of the 1970s, he could do little if anything to improve the poor state of Liberia’s economy. Most young politicians, who were eager for a multiparty electoral system, were underwhelmed by his transition to a two-party system. The “old guard” of the TWP disapproved of his courting of the younger politicians, whom they perceived as a threat to the status quo. In the latter years of the 1970s, he was unable to effectively liaise between the “old guard” and the new generation of politicians, as a result of which he could implement neither his political nor economic policies.

Introduction

xiii

Three events between April 1979 and January 1980 highlighted Tolbert’s unpopularity and the weakness of his administration. The first was the mass protest in response to a sharp increase in the price of rice, Liberia’s main food staple. On April 14, for the first time in Liberian history, over 10,000 angry young Liberians descended on Monrovia to protest the government’s increase in the price of rice from $25 to $30 per hundred-pound bag. Unprepared to handle the protest, which would later become known as the “rice riots,” Tolbert authorized the police to use live ammunition against the protesters. The army units that were sent to support the police in the dispersion of the mob, however, refused to use live ammunition—a remarkable occurrence. Unable to restore order, he sought assistance from abroad: he asked President Ahmed Sékou Touré of neighboring Guinea for help, which he provided. The restoration of order came at the cost of over one hundred fatalities and over five hundred wounded in the course of a single night.1 The rice riots were the first case of tangible opposition to the TWP’s dominance in the economic sphere. The next two threats, both of them challenges to the government’s legitimacy, were in the political sphere. One was led by an NGO called the “Movement for Justice in Africa” (MOJA), a socialist oriented Pan-African organization that taught the poor, indigenous population how to organize, fight for social justice, and advocate for themselves directly to the government. One of MOJA’s most prominent members, Dr. Amos Sawyer—an associate professor of political science at the University of Liberia—ran against TWP candidate Francis “Choo-Choo” Horton in Monrovia’s November 1979 mayoral election. Sawyer ran a successful campaign and enjoyed widespread support. Soon enough, the TWP began to regard Sawyer as a threat. Fearing that they would lose to the young upstart, the TWP postponed the mayoral election to the following summer.2 The second challenge to the TWP’s supremacy came two months later, in January 1980: the founding of an independent political NGO, the “Progressive Alliance of Liberia.” Headed by Gabriel Baccus Matthews, the NGO registered as a full-fledged political party, termed the “People’s Progressive Party” (PPP). As head of the party, Matthews adopted radical tactics to bring about political changes. On March 7, 1980, he led Liberians on a march on the Executive Mansion and demanded an audience with Tolbert. The next day, when this audience was refused, Matthews called for a general strike to compel Tolbert to resign from the presidency.3 Together, the unmitigated political unrest and Tolbert’s weak leadership set the stage for political upheaval. Rumors began to circulate that a right-wing coup, masterminded by conservative elements in the “old guard,”4 was to take place when Tolbert was on a diplomatic trip to Zimbabwe on June 1, 1980. However, the inevitable upheaval was not brought about by the “old guard,”

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or even by the political opposition, but rather by a small group of Liberian soldiers.5 On April 12, 1980, seventeen poorly educated privates and noncommissioned officers (NCO) of tribal origin, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, carried out a coup d’état, assassinating Tolbert and putting an end to 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule. The coupists then established the “People’s Redemption Council” (PRC) as the chief executive body of Liberia and appointed Samuel Doe to the offices of chairman and head of state. This overnight political reversal marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Liberia. Compared to earlier coups in sub-Saharan Africa, the April 12 coup was characterized by two distinct features. Although it was the third military coup to topple a civilian regime carried out by noncommissioned officers (the previous two being in Togo and Tanzania nearly twenty years earlier), it was the first in which soldiers, neophytes in state administration, did not turn over power to a civilian government. Though this coup seemed to lack promise, over the course of five years (1980–1985), the PRC, under the leadership of Samuel Doe, succeeded in dominating the state in the form of a military junta. Several academic papers and books have been published on the aftermath of the 1980 coup in Liberia. Yet, to my knowledge, no comprehensive research has focused on the unprecedented phenomenon of soldiers, inexperienced in the workings of a state, managing to establish and maintain military rule over the medium to long term. This book aims to fill in the gap in the academic literature in order to understand how such a peculiarity has occurred. This information is essential to understanding the brutal, fourteen-year-long civil war that erupted in 1990. The resulting instability was not limited to Liberia, as the violent chaos originating in Liberia spread throughout West Africa and put an end to two decades of a relatively peaceful and stable political order. This book should be of interest not only to scholars on Africa and Liberia, but also to scholars and students of a variety of academic disciplines: political science, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and others. Its research methodology is what is known as the “historical critical” method, which is based largely on archival research and other primary sources. I consulted primary sources in various academic, civil, and governmental institutions, including the Indiana University collections, the U.S. Department of State and Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. An invaluable source of primary material was in-depth interviews with major figures in the reported events. Face-to-face, telephone, and e-mail interviews were conducted with Liberians in Liberia and the Liberian diaspora in the United States. For secondary material, I availed myself of the resources of Stanford University, the Center for Research Libraries‒Chicago, and the Ministere Des Affaires

Introduction

xv

Etrangeres Archives Diplomatique. The authenticity of the documents and the reliability and veracity of the witnesses have been carefully checked. I was fortunate to receive direct testimony from so many persons that I am unable to thank each of them individually. I extend my deepest gratitude to them all collectively. With this, I want to particularly thank George Boley, Augustus Caine, Elwood Dunn, Reverend Thomas Hayden, Gabriel Baccus Matthews, Amos Sawyer, Patrick Seyon, Verlon Stone, Byron Tarr, and Judith Padmore for their indispensable assistance. I also extend my thanks to my research assistants, who helped identify relevant resources from the internet, libraries and other sources. I would also like to thank this book’s editor, Toby Mostysser, who has done excellent work. Last but not least, I am grateful to Lexington Books’ acquisitions editors Trevor F. Crowell and Shelby Russell, who were attentive to me along the way and replied to any query with great professionalism. Without their commitment and help, this book would not be complete. NOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia: Background to Revolt,” No. F-2006– 05089, Doc No. C18604117, confidential, August 12, 1980, 20–21, Department of State Records. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 3 (1979): 106. 2. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia: Background,” 19. 3. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia: Background,” 21. 4. Harold D. Nelson, editor, Liberia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: American University, 1985): 68. 5. Amos Sawyer (educator and politician), in interview with the author, October 15, 2005, transcript, private archives.

PART 1

Holding on for Dear Life

1

Chapter 1

In the Cause of the People

The April 12, 1980, military coup that toppled Liberia’s Americo-Liberian minority regime initially seemed to be part of a general surge toward political liberalization in the Third World. Beginning in 1979, five Latin American states under military dictatorships—Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay—witnessed a return to democratic rule. In Africa, three of the continent’s most notorious dictators—Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, and Francisco Macías Nguema of Equatorial Guinea—were ousted from office with the hope of the establishment of a liberal democratic regime. In Ghana, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings overthrew the country’s military junta on June 4 and handed the government over to an elected president in September of the same year. Just one month earlier, in August, with the active facilitation of General Olusegun Obasanjo’s military junta, an elected civilian government headed by President Shehu Shagari took over in Nigeria, ending thirteen years of military rule. Like these military governments, the new Liberian regime came to power holding out the promise of civil rights and democratic governance. Immediately upon taking power, the coupists formed the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). This body, with its grandiose and ambitious title, was the chief governing body of the new military regime. The PRC consisted of the seventeen noncommissioned officers and privates who had carried out the coup and the eight enlisted army men who were appointed comembers. Within hours of the coup, the new head of state, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, appointed a cabinet of eleven civilian ministers to handle the everyday functions of the government. Among them were five activists from the two main opposition groups: the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the Progressive People’s Party (PPP). These activists were Dr. Togba Nah Tipoteh, minister of planning and economic Affairs, and Dr. Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., minister of education from MOJA; as well as Gabriel Baccus Matthews, minister of foreign affairs; Chea Cheapoo Sr., minister of justice, tourism, and broadcasting; and Oscar Jaryee Quiah, minister of local 3

4

Chapter 1

government, urban reconstruction, and rural development from the PPP. In addition, there were three members from President William Richard Tolbert Jr.’s cabinet (Gabriel Johnson Tucker, ex-President Tubman’s son-in-law, as minister of public works; Kate Bryant as minister of health; and Luseni Donzo as minister of action for development and progress). The first meeting of the postcoup government took place at the Executive Mansion on April 16, 1980.1 The new government promised not only democracy, but also a wide-ranging social, political, and economic revolution. It was a promise for the removal of an oppressive and discriminatory one-party regime, a total transformation of Liberia as it had been for the past 133 years. A new era with justice restored and the nation’s resources distributed equally among all. In his first broadcast speech to the nation, two days after the coup, Doe poured out a host of promises for civil and social reform: As we now face our people throughout our nation, we seek to build a new society in which there is justice, human dignity, equal opportunities, and fair treatment for all before the law. As we stand here dedicated to real change, our government will actively encourage the wise participation of the people for all parts of the country in the making of decisions that affect them.

He further vowed that “this government shall undertake to bring about equal economic and social opportunities for all,” and assured the nation that there would be no persecution, or “witch hunting,” of the supporters of the former regime.2 In an interview with reporters on the same day, he went on to promise that the PRC would soon “set up a broad-based committee to find out ways to reduce the overall cost of living, especially in the areas of food, health care, education, transportation and housing,” and that it would subsidize rent for government employees and provide free rent for persons living in government housing estates.3 Within days of the coup, the prices of food staples and rent were frozen. The hated hut tax—a fixed charge of $20 per hut, which fell entirely on African-Liberians and consumed about half their cash assets—was abolished. Salaries for army personnel were raised from $70 to $250 a month and for low-ranking government employees to $200 a month, leapfrogging sectors that had been at the bottom of the salary scale to the top.4 Government ministers pledged equality before the law, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of organization. Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo Sr. gathered together justice system officials and county and territorial attorneys to instruct them on their new manner of operation: “We want you, county and territorial attorneys to dispense justice with efficiency, integrity, and fairness,” which, he added, had been missing in the old regime.5

In the Cause of the People

5

Gabriel Nimely, the new civilian minister of information, cultural affairs, tourism, and broadcasting, declared in a meeting with news editors and journalists that the days of false praise and misrepresentation of facts were over. From now on, he said, “the press must present the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in a straightforward and objective manner.” He offered his ministry’s cooperation with a free press and urged reporters and editors to forge close ties with the ministry. Local Government Minister Oscar Jaryee Quiah encouraged workers to speak out when they encountered injustice, telling them that the government believed in appropriate criticism rather than flowery statements of support.6 The establishment of the “new society” promised by the leadership necessitated the destruction of the old ways and led to a total rupture with the past. The process began with the assassination of Tolbert on the night of the coup, and the arrests of hundreds of persons identified with the ruling True Whig Party (TWP) the day after. In tandem, the institutions and symbols of the Americo-Liberian state have been eradicated. The 1847 constitution was abolished. The TWP was outlawed and the property of its leaders confiscated. The Masonic Order, a key symbol of Americo-Liberian rule, was outlawed as well. As the Liberian army had been termed since 1962, the National Guard was dismantled, and most members of the old officer corps were imprisoned, and the regular members were ordered to ignore the commands of their superiors.7 The various security agencies were dissolved, with the exception of police and immigration, which were combined and placed under military command. Similarly, the two main trade unions, the Labor Congress of Liberia and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, were abolished and replaced with the Liberian Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) under PRC control. Celebrations, including national holidays associated with the Americo-Liberian regime were forbidden, and the architectural remains of the old regime attacked. The TWP headquarters in Monrovia was turned over to the redefined National Police Force; the Temple of the Masonic Order left to be looted and, later, turned into a shelter for the homeless;8 and statues and monuments commemorating leaders of the previous regime were smashed. Whatever could not be destroyed, dismantled, or abandoned was renamed with sobriquets betokening the new regime’s revolutionary aims. The “Executive Branch” became the “People’s Redemption Council Government”; the legislative building the “People’s Capitol Building”; the National Supreme Court the “People’s Supreme Tribunal”; and the civilian courts “People’s Tribunals.” To emphasize the revolutionary nature of the coup, all PRC announcements began and ended with the clenched fist salute and slogan: “In the cause of the people the struggle continues.” The same slogan was also appended to all government publications.9 The destruction

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reached its peak ten days after the coup, on April 22, with the public execution by firing squad of thirteen leaders of the TWP on a Monrovian beach, to the jubilation of a jeering mob.10 The new government was greeted enthusiastically by the press. Just a few days after the coup, a front-page editorial of the independent daily Express Special screamed “Never Again!” and went on to exude: Never again will such tyranny rule [sic] exist in our country. With the emergence of the “People’s Government” . . . the caring for the people of this country is ensured. The people are expressing it now, and their hearts are filled with joy . . . Liberians, we have every right to rejoice; rejoice because the prayers of all have been answered for the better.11

Broad swaths of the society threw their support behind the new government. Representatives of the Grebo people from Maryland County and of the Gio and Mano peoples from Nimba County met with Doe and expressed their confidence in the PRC’s ability to usher in “peaceful changes by restructuring the socioeconomic policies that would be in the interest of the masses.”12 The Claratown Youth Development Association congratulated Doe for bringing the Liberian people out of captivity, and leaders of the Rally Time Market Women Association emphasized their satisfaction with the reorganization of the country’s courts, which they believed would afford more justice for the poor.13 Workers assured the new government of their commitment. Workers of the Liberian American Swedish Mineral Company (LAMCO) Mine Workers’ Union marched through the streets of Monrovia carrying placards reading “Workers Support PRC,” “No More Who Know You,” and “No More Monkey Work Baboon Draw.” Workers from the Firestone plantation praised the PRC for bringing freedom and independence to the Liberian people.14 Liberia’s students also lined up behind the PRC. On May 5, 1980, 3,000 members of the Liberian Student Union (LINSU) marched in the streets of Monrovia. At the event’s end, LINSU leaders presented Doe with a statement congratulating the men and women in arms for putting an end to long years of tyranny and for working to establish a new society.15 Full of faith and anticipation of the long-desired changes, Liberians were unperturbed by the fact that their new leaders were military men who had grabbed power from a civilian government. In toppling the Tolbert regime, the soldiers did what all African-Liberians and liberal-minded Americo-Liberians very much wanted, but no one else had managed to accomplish. The coupists’ initial popularity was typical of the first stage of military takeovers. The popularity of such displacements, as Samuel E. Finer explains, stems mainly from the fact that “no change is otherwise possible and the situation is such that people have come to believe that any change is for the better.” As Finer

In the Cause of the People

7

points out, they are popular even though the junta’s character is unknown at that stage.16 If the Express Special editorial cited above can be taken as an accurate measure of public opinion, most Liberians did not view the military nature of the leadership as an impediment to eventual political liberalization. Nor was it necessarily so. As the scholar Juan J. Linz points out: “it would be a great mistake to assume that military establishments necessarily are hostile to democratic and party politics.”17 The peaceful transitions from military to civilian power that took place in Nigeria and Ghana only a few months before the April 12 coup corroborated Linz’s assertion at the time. The original intentions of the coupists may well have been honest. Persons associated with the regime tell of an exchange between Doe and his fellow tribesman Professor Peter Johnson, which seems to attest that they were. Johnson was one of the few educated Krahn (Doe’s ethnic group) in Liberia and a well-respected figure, who had served in the Liberian Foreign Service under Tolbert, including as ambassador to Cameroon and Haiti. Shortly after the coup, Doe, with barely a high school education to his name and fresh from the lower cadres of the army, met with Johnson and asked his advice on how to proceed. Johnson advised him to go to school, and Doe, not one to pretend to have knowledge he did not, seems to have at least briefly considered the counsel. He replied that this was what he was thinking of doing anyway and even reached an agreement with fellow conspirator Thomas Gankama Quiwonkpa, the recently appointed Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia, that the two of them would get an education and return to politics as educated civilians. Doe also asked Johnson to contact his colleagues, educated and experienced persons like himself, with the aim of finding a responsible group of political leaders who would be able to carry on the work of the state.18 Assuming that Doe spoke and acted in good faith at this stage, which he would not do later, these events suggest that creating a long-term military dictatorship was not on Doe’s mind in the early days after the coup. Whatever their long-term intentions, the coupists proceeded to secure their power, much like other military regimes before and after. Like these, they promptly imposed martial law, outlawed political parties and activities, took control of the army and security services, and concentrated governing power in their own hands. They designed the PRC to function as both executive and legislative, and made it of an entirely military body, with no civilian members. They also built into their government a mechanism consisting of nineteen standing committees, each headed by a PRC member and staffed by other PRC members, to oversee the whole of the government’s operations. This mechanism, which had not existed in previous administrations, constituted a kind of autonomous supra-government—in the hands of the PRC—that

8

Chapter 1

controlled the nominal one. J. Mills Jones termed it a “supervisory committee system”;19 Gus J. Liebenow referred to it as “a shadow cabinet.”20 This built-in superstructure gave the PRC a tight grip over both the civil service and the cabinet, which ensured that neither would be able to exercise power or influence independently. The coupists also severely limited the jurisdiction of the civilian judiciary by establishing what they termed the “Supreme Military Court,” where the judges were soldiers. Neither representation nor appeal were permitted, and the PRC itself decided whom would be tried. This court had jurisdiction not only in military matters but also in matters of state. Moreover, the coupists showed themselves reluctant to commit to a clear election date. In his April 22 news conference, Doe promised that the soldiers would return to the barracks “when things have calmed down.”21 On May 20, 1980, in an article titled, “Why Elections so Soon?,” The Redeemer quoted PRC member Captain Henry S. Zuo Jr. saying that elections were “not important.” Zuo asked, “Why should people be concerned about the government returning to civilian rule so soon? . . . We will return to the barracks when we are convinced that the civilians are ready to fight against corruption and the state of affairs of this country returns to normality.”22 At the end of July, under American pressure, Doe promised that, all being well, elections would be held in 1983 (the preset date at which they would have been held under the TWP).23 However, in all of these pronouncements, even the last, the timing of the elections was vague and carefully hedged. Linz and Stepan point out that an interim government’s setting down preconditions to democratic elections “can set in motion a dangerous dynamic in which the democratic transition is put at peril.”24 In and of themselves, however, neither the coupists’ reinforcement of their power in the wake of their takeover nor their deferment of elections until things “calmed down” necessarily meant that they were planning to establish a long-term military dictatorship. Liberia in the aftermath of the coup was beset by chaos that would have made it virtually impossible to hold fair elections or even to consider elections in the immediate future. The chief source of the chaos was the coupists’ dismantling of the army and security agencies immediately upon taking power. The commanding echelons of both the National Guard and of the various security agencies were in the hands of Americo-Liberians, who were closely identified with the Americo-Liberian regime. There is little doubt that had the coupists left these bodies intact, and not replaced their command structure with people of their own, they would not have lasted in office for very long. The outcome, however, was a rapid descent into lawlessness. The masses of soldiers and security personnel were freed not only from the humiliation and oppression of their past Americo-Liberian masters, but also from all discipline. Emboldened by a sense of empowerment stemming from their

In the Cause of the People

9

class affiliation with the coupists, they turned against the society they were supposed to protect. Looting, robbery and intimidation became the order of the day. Armed soldiers set up improvised barricades and demanded payment in money or goods to let people pass. They strode into shops and took what they wanted, confiscated cars, broke into homes and carried out valuables or, sometimes, expelled the owner and took over the home for themselves. Even mass raping of women was reported. By the nature of things, their grabbing was directed mainly at what they considered affluent people; Americo-Liberians, Lebanese, and foreigners. However, in the anarchical situation created by these rampages, even ordinary citizens were harassed.25 In this situation, the steps the coupists took to secure their power and their deferring the issue of elections could be legitimately viewed as temporary measures that were essential to enable them to restore order and ensure stability as prerequisites to making good on their promises of a more just and egalitarian society. Indeed, the soldiers claimed as much, and the three years that Doe projected for elections was precisely the amount of time it had taken Nigerian military leader Olusegun Obasanjo to hold the elections that brought Shehu Shagari to the presidency in 1979. What boded ill was that the coupists, like other military leaders in Africa, very soon succumbed to an appetite for power: not power to improve the lives of the Liberian masses, as they had promised, but power to improve their own lives.26 Up until their takeover, the coupists were low-ranking soldiers earning about $70 a month and living in deplorable conditions.27 It took very little time before they discovered that their control of the government opened up before them what must have been scarcely imaginable wealth, influence, and status. Like other countries with weak public institutions, Liberia was a place where private appetites and desires had long been determinants of political and administrative behavior. One of the key justifications the junta repeatedly gave for the coup was the deeply entrenched corruption of the Tolbert regime. As Doe explained in his first public speech, the coup was necessary, among other reasons, because: “There has been uncontrolled corruption that we can see all around us in the form of conflict of interest, the selling of influence, the use of official positions for private gain, and other forms of corruption, which take from the people those things that are rightfully theirs.”28 Yet within weeks of coming into office, the coupists matched or outdid their predecessors. Before May was out, Commanding General of the Armed Forces Thomas Quiwonkpa cautioned his fellow PRC members to desist from living in hotels and other public buildings that were intended for revenue-generating purposes, and Doe warned that PRC members who committed corrupt, discourteous, or undisciplined acts would “face the firing squad.” In the middle of June, designate Minister of Education Dr. Henry

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Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr. testified at his confirmation hearing that most PRC members provided “letters of recommendation” to relatives and friends seeking jobs in government administration or public corporations. In addition, they confiscated for themselves houses, apartments, and cars that had belonged to the Americo-Liberian ruling class and gave themselves free access to gasoline, electricity, hotel rooms, and a host of other services and facilities. Furthermore, they surrounded themselves with bodyguards who had nothing to do but intimidate innocent citizens.29 At his own confirmation hearings, designate Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Baccus Matthews demanded that the military members of the government be required to declare their assets, just as the civilian ministers were.30 Within the PRC, the members of the junta fought for power and status among themselves. At the top, the PRC’s two leaders, Doe and Thomas Weh Syen, his second, were at each other’s throats from the very night of the coup. Weh Syen, who saw himself as the best-suited candidate for head of state, accused Doe of being a coward who had been afraid to join the coupists who attacked the Executive Mansion. But because Doe was of higher rank, it was he who was awarded the top place, while Weh Syen had to be content with the titles of vice head of state and PRC cochairman. In the absence of rules and regulations, or even custom or tradition, to guide the division of power and responsibility, the two set out to one-up each other. Weh Syen took whatever opportunity he could to show his contempt for Doe. At PRC meetings, he would point his finger so close to Doe’s face that they practically came to blows. He would try to make Doe look ridiculous by flouting his authority and acting as though Doe was not the person in charge. For example, Doe would make an appointment to speak to someone, and Weh Syen would go to Doe’s office at the Executive Mansion and sit at his side. Each tried to pull the rug from under the other’s feet. With no view to the consequences to the state, each appointed his own people to state jobs irrespective of their qualifications. Doe lost no time in filling public offices, especially the police and newly formed security services, with members of his tribe, the Krahn. Weh Syen fired Doe’s appointees and replaced them with his own.31 Whatever measures or policies Doe favored, Weh Syen positioned himself at the opposite pole. Doe was open to consulting with Americo-Liberians and appointing them to government positions. Weh Syen advocated full indigenization, and led much of the destruction of the sculptural heritage of the TWP regime. Doe pursued good relations with the United States. Weh Syen threw his weight behind neutrality and better ties with Libya, America’s bête noire. The rivalry at the top filtered down to the rest of the PRC. There was a Weh Syen camp, consisting of Harris Johnson, Henry Zuo, Nelson Toe, and Robert Sumo, and a Doe camp, consisting of Thomas Quiwonkpa, J. Nicholas Podier

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Jr., and Harrison Taffan Pennue. Alongside and overlapping with these were small rival groups that acted independently, mainly to achieve personal gain. Equally and if not more portentous, the coupists projected themselves as military men and continued to vaunt their military identity. Previously privates and noncommissioned officers, they immediately promoted themselves and their fellow PRC members to military ranks ranging from first lieutenant to colonel and even general. Only Doe retained his lowly rank, master sergeant, as a calculated move to cultivate his image as the true representative of the Liberian masses, and that only for about a year, until the image no longer suited him. For a short while after taking power, the coupists appeared at all public functions bearing small arms, and for over a year they appeared dressed in military uniform. Monrovia was plastered with poster portraits of them thus attired. In early May, Weh Syen paid an official visit to Côte d’Ivoire dressed in combat gear and carrying his water canteen.32 Toward the end of the month, Doe, apparently unmoved by the consternation that Weh Syen’s attire produced in his hosts, appeared at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) summit in Togo dressed in camouflage fatigues and carrying two pistols.33 Something of the exalted military image that the coupists wished to convey of themselves, and which much of the public seemed to accept at first, can be seen in a somewhat muddled statement in the May 7 issue of The Redeemer, which compared the coming of Doe, with his lowly origins in the military, to the coming of Christ: Just as the world expected its Redeemer, the Christ Child to come like a King with all the grandiose that befits a king, so the Liberian people looked for their liberator from the rank and file of the Ministers of Defense, the Army Generals and Colonels. Just as the redeemer came from a lowly place, so came the liberator of the Liberian people from a low rank in the armed forces.34

In aggrandizing their military identity, the coupists fell back on the only identity they knew. Not only were they mainly unschooled and had no prior political experience or even experience of military command, they did not even have anything that could be called an ideology. What drove and united them was largely their hatred of the Americo-Liberians. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose would soon tell the Congress that the coupists had grievances, but no “particular ideological orientations” prior to the coup.35 The revolutionary-sounding rhetoric that ran through Doe’s speeches and that served to justify the coup did not stem from his own vision, but reflected the ideology of the civilian minister Gabriel Baccus Matthews, the new regime’s minister of foreign affairs, who doubled as Doe’s speechwriter. What we hear in these speeches is largely Matthews’s

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concept of African socialism and his aspirations for a more egalitarian society, which Doe simply echoed.36 Their military identity served the soldiers in the PRC to distinguish themselves from the elitist civilian regime they had replaced, to mask their ideological vacuity and lack of know-how of all that was relevant to running a state, and, above all, to justify their rule. In effect, the junta made their military identity the ideology that would underpin and justify their hold on power. An early indication of this appears in the same address in which Henry S. Zuo Jr. called elections “not important.” In this address, Zuo Jr. drew a stark dichotomy between the military and civilians, on two counts. The first was that civilians were corrupt, the military clean: Thus, the only explanation this PRC member could see for the concern of “some civilians” about when the army would return to the barracks was their venality. “Should we say they want a civilian government so they will be corrupt again because they are not used to military rule that is against rampant corruption?” he asked. The second count was that it was the military, not cowardly civilians, who had toppled the Tolbert regime. “Suppose the coup had failed,” Zuo Jr. challenged his civilian audience, “would you have been brave to tell the Tolbert government to step down?”37 These stark contrasts would be chimed again and again in the course of the PRC’s rule. It did not seem to matter that when Zuo Jr. drew his dichotomies in mid-May, the PRC was already mired in its own corruption, that soldiers at all echelons, from the PRC downward, were lining their pockets as best they could, and that over the months and years matters would go from bad to worse. Nor would it matter that the promises of the revolution would be rapidly eroded, to the point of eradication. The self-serving argument that the contrasts furthered was that the soldiers, not the civilians, were the ones who could clean up the corruption in Liberia, the ones who could bring the revolution to fruition, and the ones who had the right to rule. The coupists appointed civilian ministers and advisors not because they wanted them, but because they needed them, for two reasons. Like most military juntas that take power by force, they needed civilians to confer legitimacy on their regime. The coupists’ enormous popularity in the early days of their regime was partly based on the presence of the civilian ministers, five of whom had been fighters for reform under the Tolbert regime. Their presence in the government bolstered the soldiers’ democratic credentials and gave credence to their promises that they would return to the barracks. John N. Anene points out that civilian membership in the cabinet widens the base of support for the military by facilitating connection with the people, for this reason, it is central to the success or failure of military regimes.38 More essentially, the soldiers who made up the PRC desperately needed their civilian partners to manage the country. John N. Anene observes that

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civilians often fill the vacuum in military regimes stemming from the lack of political skills in the military.39 Liberia’s new military leaders lacked much more. Doe stood out as a shrewd, in-the-bones politician, quick and eager to learn, yet he was unfamiliar with the most basic political concepts. Anecdotes of his lack of familiarity abound. A short time after seizing power, Doe summoned Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who had been minister of finance in the defunct Tolbert government, and screamed, “I want some money now!” On another occasion, Perry G. Zulu, the minister of finance, exasperated by Doe’s failure to comprehend his explanation of the need to raise gasoline prices, finally blurted out: “No sign this paper, country go blooey.”40 Sirleaf Robert P. Smith, former U.S. ambassador to Liberia, who visited the country after the coup, noted that Doe openly discussed his limitations during their meetings and “does not pretend to be something that he is not.”41 Baccus Matthews would tell: “If we wanted [Doe] to say that Liberia was a socialist state, he would have said so.”42 The other coupists were equally ignorant and few were as sharp. Once they had torn down the visible edifice of Americo-Liberian power, they had little idea how to proceed. Moreover, having decimated the officer corps, the coupists had little suitable military manpower to draw upon. The ministers and the soldiers viewed their partnership very differently. For the most part, the ministers saw the soldiers as providing them with the opportunity to promote reforms that they had long hoped to see. They viewed themselves as the rightful leaders in the partnership, who would guide the untutored members of the junta in the right direction. At least initially, they expected that the soldiers’ low ranks and poor education would make them amenable to their influence. Indeed, before the executions, one of the Cabinet ministers maintained that the soldiers on the council “are willing to hear us and we are trying to influence them more and more.” He added that it was “because they have so little education that we are able to influence them at all.”43 The soldiers, for their part, were saddled with partners they had not chosen freely and for whom they had no prior affinity or regard. They had appointed the five PPP and MOJA ministers for their celebrity status as activists in the opposition to the TWP, and the three TWP ministers as liberal‐minded officials of the former regime whose experience could be useful to them. They exercised more choice in the appointment of the remaining four civilian ministers, Dr. George S. Boley and Dr. Willie P. Nebo (both Krahn), Gabriel Nimely (Grebo) and Moses Duopu (Gio). Even so, the very presence of the civilian ministers—all of them cultured, well educated, and experienced in government, administration, or politics—shed a harsh light on the soldiers’ inadequacies and could only have chafed. More seriously, the soldiers, aware of their limitations and insecure in their control, viewed the ministers as a threat. It was no secret that the civilian ministers regarded the military government as a temporary phenomenon and

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strongly advocated the transfer of the government to their own hands. The ministers’ clear sense of superiority and presumption of leadership challenged the soldiers’ claims to leadership as did the efforts of some of the ministers to temper their excesses. For example, six of the civilian ministers opposed the PRC decision to execute the Tolbert thirteen; Matthews went so far as to condemn the executions as contrary to his conception of human rights.44 Matthews and Fahnbulleh Jr. publicly condemned the PRC’s corruption. The sense of threat was further exacerbated by the fact that the five MOJA and PPP activists in the cabinet had been identified with the fight for democracy under the Tolbert regime and were highly respected and popular with the public. Despite the veto the junta retained over all ministerial decisions and actions, this must have made these ministers and the rest of the cabinet seem especially dangerous. Liberia’s civil society was also posing challenges to the military regime. Already in May, the Redeemer printed letters to the editor by citizens protesting PRC members riding about in vehicles of the former administration, and complaining about the “visible luxury” of the Krahn whom Doe was appointing in large numbers to lucrative government posts.45 The clergy raised their voices against the “killings” and other human rights abuses.46 Liberia’s student union, LINSU, handed Doe, along with their congratulations for the coup, a list of demands and criticisms, which included, among others, demands for free education, land redistribution, a date for transferring power to civilians, and criticisms of the disproportionate number of Krahn in the PRC and of PRC members riding about in the former government’s luxury limousines.47 People in the street grumbled that “new Liberia” was the “same taxi, different driver.”48 On both fronts, the junta responded to the challenges by insisting on their own authority and reinforcing their hegemony. In the government, they minimized the ministers’ role in the decision-making process and ignored their input when it did not suit them. As Matthews told a Jeune Afrique correspondent in June 1980, the PRC makes the decisions and “as a minister, I merely submit alternatives.”49 In November, Amos Sawyer, a scholar and well-known opponent of the TWP, referred to the civilian ministers as “technicians” whom the military had brought in “to assist them in getting the job done.”50 For the ministers’ culture and education, the soldiers expressed open contempt, epitomized in Doe’s scoffing jibe, “And you say you know book,” followed by the reminder that “M16, not PhD, brought about the regime change.”51 In civil society, the junta treated the expressions of dissatisfaction, minor though they were, with a heavy hand. The arrests of members of the Tolbert regime immediately after the coup were followed in the coming weeks by further political detentions. In early May, the editor of The Redeemer, Rufus

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Darpoh, was arrested and interrogated for ten hours for publishing a letter complaining about the luxury of the Krahn.52 Shortly afterward, Doe, probably in response to international pressure, recounted receiving reports of “arbitrary arrests of innocent citizens” and ordered the Ministry of Justice to investigate the matter.53 Nevertheless, the arrests continued. In early June, there were over five hundred people who had been detained by the PRC. The London-based weekly West Africa reported that people were “afraid to defy the government publicly” and of being pointed to as “counter–revolutionary” or as belonging to “the corrupt Tolbert government.”54 The PRC leadership was fearful and suspicious of the normal efforts to influence decisions that characterize democratic rule. Already in mid-June, PRC Speaker General J. Nicholas Podier Jr., a Doe ally, was warning against allowing politics to impede the progress of the revolution. Without directly quoting him, the June 14 Weekend Express reported that he relayed that “certain people . . . regarded the PRC as a body in which they could run politics” and declared that “the Council would not allow themselves to be led into accepting proposals from those who . . . ‘were eager for political power.’” He dubbed attempts to influence PRC decisions: “politicking,” “political maneuvering,” and “political intrigue”; and those who expressed their opinions, or attempted to affect matters, he termed “anti-revolutionary.”55 These and similar epithets soon became standard tags applied to all who voiced criticism or dissent. Podier does not name names, but it is of note that his statements were published on the same day as the criticisms of PRC corruption by Matthews and Fahnbulleh Jr. Doe, in June, was still occupied with gaining acceptance for the postcoup government from the United States and Liberia’s West African neighbors. To that end he was wary of offending the democratic and human rights sensibilities of President Carter and President Shagari of Nigeria, and was trying to present himself as a liberal-minded leader. But at the end of August, after he gained their acceptance, he issued his own warnings, with an even stronger rejection of the notion of democratic opposition. In a broadcast to the nation on August 30, 1980, he bitterly criticized those who opposed the ideas of the revolution and ordered their immediate arrest. He pointed out that “some ministers, directors and deputy ministers have been fond of holding certain meetings at certain times” and forbade any minister “to issue any statement against the government.” He also warned church leaders and religious groups to desist from “pressurizing Government to consider the release of political prisoners” and declared that the PRC will not allow “any group of people to publish any paper against the Government.”56 Two days later, on September 1, in an address at Bassa High School in Buchanan, he went further, declaring that any “anti-revolutionary element” caught undermining the progress of the Liberian “revolution” would be immediately executed.57 The threat,

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unprecedented in the previous regime, would not be carried out, as the risk of alienating the United States and jeopardizing the economic aid it provided was too great—but it well conveyed the determination of Doe and other PRC members to suppress all challenges to their military rule. Over the next few months, the military-civilian tension would increase, with ever harsher statements and measures coming from Doe. To win over his West African neighbors and to ensure the flow of economic aid from the United States, Doe put on a liberal face. He freed political prisoners a few at a time, promised elections in three years, and, in his Christmas message to the nation, announced that the PRC would soon appoint a committee to draft a new constitution. At the same time, however, he would tighten the reins yet further as dissent increased in the wake of the severe economic crisis that beset the country. NOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “IIM Outline Part III B. Political: 1. The Head—of State, The People’s Redemption Council and—The Cabinet,” No. F-2014–11720, Doc No. C05962141, confidential, September 4, 1980, Department of State Records. 2. “We Seek to Build a New Society,” New Liberian, April 17, 1980, 5. 3. “Special Rent Committee Set Up,” Liberian Inaugural, April 17, 1980, 3. 4. U.S. Department of State, “IIM Outline Part III Economic: 3. Problems of— Competing Expectations,” Case No. F-2014–11720 Doc No. C05962149, confidential, September 4, 1980, 2, Department of State Records. 5. “Dispense Justice with Fair Play,” Liberian Inaugural, May 21, 1980, 4. 6. “Cape Mountainians Appeal to Gov’t,” Redeemer, May 6, 1980, 6. “Press Freedom at Last!,” Focus, April 20–26, 1980, 1–2. 7. Nelson, Liberia: A Country Study, 250, 268–69. Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1992), 293. 8. Jos-Blaise Alima, “Révolution ou ?,” Jeune Afrique, April 8, 1981, 36–40. 9. Jos-Blaise Alima, “Victoire des modérés?,” Jeune Afrique, April 15, 1981, 58–60. 10. Associated Press, “Four Executed in Liberia,” April 17, 1980, Nexis Uni. 11. “Never Again!,” Express Special, April 15, 1980, 1, 3. 12. M-SGT. Doe, “No Room for Laziness,” Redeemer, May 23, 1980, 1. “Liberians Must Work Together to Defend Their Rights,” Redeemer, May 6, 1980, 2, 8. 13. “Rally Time Market Association Pledge Support,” Liberian Inaugural, May 28, 1980, 8. 14. “Labor Force Pledge Support,” Focus, May 11–17, 1980, 1. “‘PRC Is for Equal Rights’—Minister Blay,” Redeemer, May 20, 1980, 3.

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15. Napolean A. Teage, “LINSU Calls for 7 Commissions to Reflect Change,” Redeemer, May 6, 1980, 8. 16. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 106. 17. Juan J. Linz, “Transitions to Democracy,” Washington Quarterly 13, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 155. 18. Sawyer, interview. Harry Yuan (former managing director of Liberia Electricity), in an interview with the author, January 12, 1997, transcript, private archives. 19. J. Mills Jones, “Development Planning, Politics and the Bureaucracy: The Liberian Experience,” Liberian Studies Journal 11, no. 1 (1986): 14. 20. J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 272. 21. Associated Press, “Thirteen Former Top Officials Shot on Monrovia Beach?,” April 22, 1980, Nexis Uni. 22. Napolean A. Teage, “Why Civilian Govt. So Soon?,” Redeemer, May 20, 1980, 8. 23. “Doe Orders Release of Three Political Prisoners,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 2, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report 5, no. 151 (August 1980): T2. 24. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 71. 25. “Situation in Liberia, Spring 1980—Update: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,” 96th Congress, second session, April 29, 1980. 26. Samuel Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 18–19. 27. Gregory Jaynes, “Liberia’s Young Sergeant Still Learning How to Rule,” New York Times, January 20, 1981, 8, Nexis Uni. S. Henry Cordor, Liberia under Military Rule: An Introductory Study of Liberia before and after the Coup (Monrovia: Liberian Studies, 1980), 37. 28. “We Seek to Build a New Society,” 5. 29. “Corrupt PRC Members to Face Firing Squad,” Weekend News, May 31, 1980, 1, 4. “‘The People Are Asking . . . Where Are We Going?’. . . Dr. Fahnbulleh,” Weekend News, June 14, 1980, 1, 7. 30. “Confirmation Hearings . . . ‘I Protest,’ Says Matthews ‘I Own $20,000’ Says Quiah,” Weekend News, June 14, 1980, 1–2. 31. Government member, (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, May 26, 1997, transcript, private archives. Ezekiel Pajibo (president of LINSU), in an interview with the author, May 26, 1997, transcript, private archives. 32. Israeli investor (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, March 18, 1982, transcript, private archives.

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33. “African Conference Bars Liberia,” Washington Post, May 28, 1980. 34. G. William Walters, “Tempering Justice with Mercy,” Redeemer, May 20, 1980, 4. 35. U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981, Statement of Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for 1981: Part 6, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 19, 1980, 119. 36. U.S. Department of State. “IIM Outline Part III A: The Military: 3. AFL— Needs and Expectations,” Case No. F-2014–11720, Doc No. C05962140, confidential, September 4, 1980, Department of State Records. 37. Teage, “Why Civilian Govt. So Soon?,” 8. 38. John N Anene, “Military Administrative Behavior and Democratization: Civilian Cabinet Appointments in Military Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Public Policy 17, no. 1 (1997): 63–80. Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 102–3. 39. Anene, “Military Administrative Behavior and Democratization,” 63–80. 40. Eddie Momoh, “Presidential Prudence,” West Africa, August 11, 1986, 1669. Jaynes, “Liberia’s Young Sergeant,” 8. 41. U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981, Statement of Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for 1981: Part 6, 138. 42. James Butty, “Leadership Stakes,” West Africa, August 27–September 2, 1990, 2356–373. 43. Leon Dash, “Liberia’s Sergeants Take Turn Toward Authoritarian Rule; Liberia’s Young Military Leaders Demonstrating Authoritarian Style,” Washington Post, April 27, 1980, Nexis Uni. 44. Dash, “Liberia’s Sergeants Take Turn Toward Authoritarian Rule.” 45. Editorial, “Naive Criticism,” Redeemer, May 6, 1980, 2. “Liberia: Editor Interrogated,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 855. 46. “Liberia: Week of Prayer Ends,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 855. “Appeals to Liberia for Clemency in Trials,” Monrovia Home Service, April 25, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 28, 1980, Nexis Uni. 47. “Liberia: Students Call for PRC Action,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 854. 48. “Liberian Revolution Founders,” West Africa, June 9, 1980, 1009. 49. “Foreign Minister Sees ‘More Pragmatic’ Government Policies,” Jeune Afrique, June 18, 1980, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report 5, no. 126, June 27, 1980, 5. 50. “Sawyer, Amos: ‘A Century-Old Alienation is Broken,’” Africa News, November 3, 1980, 9. 51. C. E. Zamba Liberty, “Report from Musradu (Letter to an American Friend): Reflections on the Liberian Crisis,” Liberian Studies Journal 11 (1986): 42–81.

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52. “Liberia: Editor Interrogated,” 855. 53. “Doe Concerned over Arrests,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 854. 54. “Liberian Revolution Founders,” 1005–9. 55. “Don’t Be Eager for Political Power,” Weekend News, June 14, 1980, 1, 3. 56. “Doe Warns against Counterrevolutionary Activities,” New Liberian, September 1, 1980, Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2298, September 29, 1980, 12. 57. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Executions Reinstituted in Liberia,” September 2, 1980, Nexis Uni.

Chapter 2

Sacrifice and Survival

Doe would set out on a road that would eventually lead to his becoming a dictator. His new government utterly failed to address the nation’s most pressing domestic problem: the severe economic crisis with which the new regime was confronted as soon as they took office. Despite the obvious importance of a healthy economy to the well-being of the citizens and, more specifically, to the promised revolution, the failure was much of their own making. While the professional echelon set about trying to deal with the crisis, the PRC, Doe among them, set out on a race for wealth and power. Very soon, it became apparent to them that the measures they would have to take for economic recovery conflicted with these interests. Without much ado, they sacrificed the economy. Although the junta would still retain its popularity for some time to come, dissent mounted; and as this happened, the PRC would resort more and more to a mix of coercion, intimidation, and political manipulation aimed at warding off public opposition, while Doe would manage to exploit the situation to increase his own personal power within the PRC. SACRIFICING THE ECONOMY The economic crisis stemmed from an international recession in the iron ore and rubber industries at the end of the 1970s and from the gross overspending of the Tolbert regime. Reduced demand for iron ore in Europe and the United States, a slowdown in the U.S. automobile industry, and rising prices on petroleum products all played a part in the global downturn in these sectors. As a result, two ore-mining companies in Liberia were forced to close, reducing government revenues by almost 40 percent. A brief improvement between 1979 and 1981 did not cover the heavy losses.1 The decreased rubber demand contributed to a steep slide in Liberia’s income from rubber exports: from $102.2 million for 165.3 million pounds in 1980 to $86.7 million for 168.7 million pounds in 1981.2 21

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The coupists were also unfortunate in inheriting from the former regime a massive debt. The defunct Tolbert government owed $700 million to foreign governments and overseas financial institutions and more than $20 million to the National Bank of Liberia. In addition, various public corporations owed $80 million in foreign debt. Most of the debt stemmed from the Tolbert government’s heavy borrowing, at interest of between 10 percent to 20 percent, to construct roads, facilities, and luxury services for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit held in Monrovia in June 1979.3 The financial reserves left by the Tolbert government were insufficient for the new regime to cover either its growing debt payments or its current expenditures. The coup itself exacerbated the crisis. The assassination of Tolbert and the public firing squad execution of the thirteen TWP leaders created an atmosphere of violence and fear, which was further augmented by the widespread looting, robbing, and intimidation on the streets. The anarchy and danger drove away investors and provoked a run of currency abroad. Lebanese businessmen, who dominated the retail trade, and Americo-Liberians, who were the backbone of the financial and commercial establishment, moved their savings and deposits out of the country, creating a capital flight of some $35 million by the end of 1980.4 Foreign investors stayed away or withdrew. The outcome was a severe liquidity problem in the banks and further enlargement of the budget deficit. Similarly, severe economic crises beset most of the countries of subSaharan Africa at this time. For Liberia’s postcoup government, taking power at this particular moment with promises to improve the standard of living of the masses, the crisis was especially critical. In its revolutionary zeal, before grasping the depth of the crisis, the new government had frozen the prices of food staples and rents, abolished the hut tax, and raised the salaries of lowlevel soldiers and civil servants. With the coffers empty, it soon became clear that the salary raises could not be extended to other workers, that development spending would have to be stripped to a bare minimum, and that the government would not be able to meet the expectations it had created. It faced a situation that would have posed a formidable challenge to far more seasoned politicians and which took it completely by surprise. Minister of Finance Major Perry Zulu, formerly a “financial officer” in the Liberian National Guard, upon learning that only $5 million remained in the Treasury, put it plainly: “We had thought that all those people riding around and living richly had money. . . . Instead it turned out they were living on credit, it was all debts.”5 In view of its urgency, the professional level quickly proceeded to try to address the crisis, with actions aimed at encouraging business and investment, at setting the foundations of an efficient bureaucracy, and, most pressing, at increasing the foreign aid on which Liberia traditionally relied.6

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Before April was out, the government published a General Economic Policy Statement aimed at alleviating anxieties that the coup heralded a radical Marxist or socialist revolution, such as had occurred in Ethiopia and Libya. The statement emphasized the government’s intention to honor all the treaties and obligations of the defunct Americo-Liberian regime and its commitment to “the free enterprise system of economic pursuit.” It promised that the government would protect private property “and the fruits of hard and honest labor” and firmly rejected the “nationalization of private business interests in Liberia.”7 Among other things, it was hoped that these assurances would encourage business and bring back investors, especially foreign investors but also Liberian. In keeping with the policy statement, in early June, Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs Togba Nah Tipoteh announced that Liberia would retain the U.S. dollar as its currency, as it had been under the previous regime, and lifted the restrictions on transactions in foreign currency that had been imposed on the banks immediately after the military takeover.8 In May 1980 Liberia began efforts to attain economic aid from other states and international financial institutions, with applications for assistance to the United States, the World Bank, and the IMF, from which it also requested guidance. As Minister of Finance Perry Zulu reports, the government asked the IMF “to come and work with us in restructuring the economy” and made a further request to this effect in July. On May 23, the Minister of Public Works Gabriel Johnson Tucker departed on an “urgent mission” to meet with World Bank officials and representatives of the European Economic Community.9 In the first week of June, Togba Nah Tipoteh led a delegation of ministers and technocrats to the United States to reassure American political and business leaders that there had been no serious departure in Liberia’s economic policies and to allay apprehensions regarding the country’s financial future.10 While in the United States, Togba Nah Tipoteh also appealed to Liberian ex–patriots with basic qualifications to return and contribute their share to the reconstruction programs. The immediate purpose of the appeal was to try to repair some of the damage done to Liberia’s already weak and irresponsible civil service by the departure of thousands of Americo-Liberians, upon whom the public administration had relied. More broadly, the appeal was a step in his efforts to create a professional, merit-based bureaucracy. Back in Liberia, he convinced the PRC to establish a cabinet committee to draw up a list of competent managers, “based on education and experience.”11 The battle for economic recovery was lost from the beginning, however. It is not only that the external factors which caused the crisis—the reduced global demand for iron ore and rubber (Liberia’s key exports) and soaring oil prices—were beyond the government’s control. More importantly, the battle was lost because the government was too divided and self-interested and Doe too weak and self-interested to take the steps that were needed. As Stephan

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Haggard and Steven B. Webb point out, in “low income countries in particular, increasing the decision making and administrative capacity of the government constitutes a crucial precondition for initiating coherent programs.”12 In Liberia, the soldiers in the PRC feared and distrusted the civilians in the cabinet, and had little respect for the civilians they had appointed to advise them. The PRC was impossibly fragmented, consisting, as a Senegalese reporter would later describe it, of “a seedbed of mini-leaders in uniform, each one having a little group of followers and a small area of authority.”13 The PPP and MOJA members of the cabinet had very different ideologies, and competed with one another for political power and influence within the PRC. Doe, at this stage, was no more than the first among equals. Council members could even dismiss government officials they did not like without his approval.14 He had to maneuver among foes and to constantly look over his shoulder lest Weh Syen and others in the PRC try to depose him. Under these circumstances, there was no way that the ambitious, multipronged course laid out by the professionals could have been properly pursued. As Samuel Decalo put it, “Fundamental societal and external limitations may well stultify efforts of reformist juntas, but officers seizing power consequent to intramilitary competitions or personal considerations may not even be concerned with socioeconomic ameliorations.”15 Among the three goals implicit in the professionals’ early actions, the only one that the government pursued with any vigor and with a measure of success was that of attaining more foreign aid. Already in May 1980, at the request of the Ministry of Finance, the IMF sent a six-person delegation to Monrovia to assess Liberia’s economic situation and to formulate a program that could qualify Liberia for IMF support.16 The World Bank sent a two-man team, which met with a cross section of ministers and acting managers of public corporations.17 In early June, a three-man U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose paid a visit in which the teams’ promise of economic aid served as a means of improving ties with the post coup government. This was followed by another visit in July.18 By early June 1980, the IMF had approved a Liberian government request to borrow on Liberia’s drawing rights and granted it a $4 million loan.19 On July 28, it agreed to lend the new government $30 million. In September, it signed two agreements with the government: a standby agreement, which provided Liberia with $85 million for debt repayments and budgetary support over a two-year period, and a special drawing rights agreement, which allowed the Liberian government to acquire immediate operational material over the next two years to the sum of $65 million worth of purchases.20 The United States also answered the call. In August, Congress passed an over $10.5 million aid package. By the end of December, the American

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government had committed some $23 million in grants and loans, the World Bank $9 million, and the IMF $85 million. Small grants from other countries and aid organizations brought the end-of-year total to almost $150 million.21 Further aid followed in 1981. In the course of the 1981–1982 fiscal year, Liberia received $211.65 million in foreign aid, of which $84 million was in grants and $127.65 million in loans. Foreign aid alone, however, no matter what the sums, can never be more than a stopgap. Although the postcoup government managed to extract more foreign aid than had ever been given to the Tolbert regime, economic recovery became ever more elusive, as this government consistently refused to take key steps that might have improved the economic situation, even if only partially. As much as the professionals worked toward economic recovery, most of the government gave this rather low priority in comparison to their personal and political interests and, wherever there was a conflict, opted for their own interests rather than the nation’s. To begin with, the government barely implemented any of the conditions that were attached to the IMF assistance. IMF assistance invariably comes with conditions aimed at helping the receiving nation tackle the underlying causes of the economic problems for which the assistance is given. The September IMF standby agreement came bundled with a stabilization program that stipulated that measures had to be taken to reduce government expenditures, increase government revenues, control the expenditures of public corporations, and restructure the country’s public enterprises. In principle, though not entirely in practice, both the IMF loans and U.S. government assistance were contingent on Liberia’s government meeting these conditions.22 In declaration, the postcoup government not only accepted the conditions but welcomed them. In his September speech announcing the austerity measures that would have to be taken, Minister of Finance Perry Zulu referred to the IMF stipulations as the “program” that the government itself had requested to “enable us to attain our [economic] goals and objectives.”23 In actuality, the government was most reluctant to implement the reforms. Neither the PRC nor the cabinet were prepared at this point to retract the hasty April pay raises, unfreeze the prices of food staples, reinstate the hut tax or impose equivalent levies, as such measures would have undermined the entire justification for the coup and the new government’s declared raison d’être. Not even Togba Nah Tipoteh, the only person in the government who fully grasped the dimensions of the economic crisis from the beginning, supported such actions. The government’s initial response was thus to proceed with half-measures dragged out over a period of several weeks. The first package of austerity measures was announced by Minister of Finance Perry Zulu at the end of

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September 1980. These included taxes on imported commodities, selected duty-free imports, and air travel; increases in miscellaneous fees and licenses; a freeze on government salaries and vacancies; and a hike in income tax rates which Minister of Finance Perry Zulu termed “more than progressive.”24 Information is not available, however, about the amounts or rates of any of these levies, how much revenue they yielded, and whether they were actually implemented. It took another three weeks for Doe to respond to the IMF demand to cut government expenditures. On October 21 he directed all government ministries and agencies to desist from requesting additional funding.25 This directive fell short of a clear freeze on salaries and hiring; and here, too, we may wonder whether the directive was actually implemented or simply issued to placate the IMF. It was only in mid-November 1980 that the government took a substantive measure with clear evidence of implementation. By this time, its finances were so depleted that, without assistance, it would not have been able to pay salaries right before Christmas, and would have had to default on the next payment of its petroleum debt to Saudi Arabia.26 The United States was apparently making its assistance in these matters contingent on more serious revenue-raising measures than those taken up until then. Thus, on November 17, a few days after a one-day visit by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose, the Liberian government announced a compulsory one-year national savings bond scheme for salaried employees, to take effect on January 1, 1981. The scheme, billed as a means of reducing Liberia’s $50 million budget deficit, was a draconian tax that reduced the salaries of lowerpaid workers by a quarter and of higher-paid workers by half for the first third of the year. To sweeten the pill, the scheme was presented as a loan which would be repaid with interest beginning in five to eight years.27 This is about the only concrete measure that the government took. Its most significant yield was another visit by Moose in early December, with funds for the Christmas salaries and, later in the month, the agreement of three New York commercial banks to pay part of Liberia’s petroleum debt to Saudi Arabia.28 Although Doe would hail the scheme as a success, it did nothing to reduce the 1981 budget deficit, which stood at $50 million.29 The government did even less to cut expenditures, and, in fact, increased them. Recurrent expenditures rose from $179.7 million in 1980 to $237.8 million in 1981. Likewise, during the same period, transfers of grants and subsidies rose from $15 million to $23.5 million.30 Moreover, even as the treasury was empty, the government spent prodigiously on itself: Members of the PRC were allotted up to twelve cars each for their personal use from government fleets. Persons traveling on government business could claim $400 a day in expenses even if another government or foreign institution paid the tab. Although only $800,000 had been

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allocated for trips abroad in the 1980–1981 budget, government members spent $2 million on excursions in the second half of 1980 alone.31 A two-week trip to the United States by a delegation headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Baccus Matthews cost the government over $90,000.32 Doe, for his part, allocated monies to pet projects and his personal prestige. As an aficionado of soccer, he ordered the allocation of salaries, housing and cars to all members of the Liberian national soccer team. He kept the Boeing 737 presidential jet he had inherited from the Tolbert government, which bore an annual debt payment of $2.2 million and could have been sold for a profit of $7 million.33 In advance of the first anniversary of the revolution, when it was clear that there would be no money for development projects for the following year, Doe placed a $41,000 monument of a soldier holding a bayonet at the entrance to the Executive Mansion.34 The government neither undertook the administrative reforms stipulated by the stabilization program nor enabled the narrower, but related reform of the civil service, propounded by Togba Nah Tipoteh. The IMF stipulations were directed primarily at trimming the personnel and expenditures of Liberia’s wasteful and grossly overblown public corporations (these, according to Togba Nah Tipoteh, enjoyed government subsidies amounting to some $20 million).35 Togba Nah Tipoteh’s reforms were aimed at developing an honest and efficient civil service, which was essential to the proper management of the economy and of the entire government, yet both initiatives fell foul of political interests. For many in the government, as for their predecessors in the Tolbert regime, the state-run corporations and the civil service were sources of patronage, power, and wealth. To the thick layer of political appointees inherited from the Tolbert regime, Doe, Weh Syen, and other PRC members added their own, as they used their positions to find jobs for relatives, tribesmen, and followers without regard to their training or competence. (The number of public service employees jumped from 18,000 in 1979 to 56,000 in 1983.)36 Any serious reform of the public administration would prevent them from doing this. Moreover, the PRC viewed a competent, independent bureaucracy as a threat to its control, as well as to the wealth that went with it. Concurrently, Togba Nah Tipoteh’s modest efforts to create a merit-based civil service were quashed. In December, the cabinet committee that had been appointed to draw up a list of qualified managers presented its recommendations. Doe, at the advice of civilian advisors who benefited from the status quo, simply ignored it.37 The result was a further weakening of Liberia’s already weak, incompetent, and corrupt bureaucracy. Investment, especially foreign investment, had particular importance in the endeavors of the professional economists. As they well understood, investment was the only means of lifting Liberia out of its traditional dependency

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on foreign aid. It meant jobs for the masses and revenue for the cash-strapped government. It was the essential foundation for economic growth and development and the sine qua non of economic recovery. Verbally, the entire government, the PRC included, supported the professional efforts to encourage business and investment. Thus, in the early months of the new regime, Doe repeatedly spoke of Liberia’s need for foreign investors. In May, he even met with members of Liberia’s Lebanese community to encourage them to open up new businesses, repeating the assurances of the General Economic Policy Statement that the government had no intention of nationalizing their businesses or of preventing them from operating freely. Others in the government and administration followed suit. In his September 17 economic statement to the nation, Minister of Finance Perry Zulu repeated these promises and went on to draw a picture of Liberia’s supposedly improved investment climate, claiming that “we can proudly say that the investment climate of the country is more favorable than ever. The red tape and delays that resulted in the past because of the corrupt practices and selfish interests of certain government officials have been removed.”38 As it happened, Zulu’s statement was overly optimistic as foreign investors were slow to come. The youth, inexperience and boorishness of the junta as well as tensions between the military and civilians in the government, made “persuading foreign investors about the salubriousness of Liberia’s climate”39 much more difficult. So did the massive lawlessness that emanated from the top. In ousting the regime of Americo-Liberians, the coupists had cashiered the traditions and restraints, rudimentary as they were, that enabled a measure of public order. The balkanized postcoup government had neither the ability nor the will to impose new boundaries. The result was that there were no rules of behavior and no lines that couldn’t be crossed by persons in power. Members of the PRC availed themselves of private and public funds as they pleased, stealing money from individuals, banks, and the public coffers alike. Doe joined in on the robbery. An early example is the $600,000 “loan” he took in July 1980 from the International Trust Company of Liberia to build a mansion in the village of his birth.40 In June, in a one-off move touted as a means of setting an example and proving that the new government held standards of honesty unknown to the defunct Tolbert regime, the PRC issued an order requiring all government officials (the ministers, their deputies, and their assistants and ministry directors) to declare their assets in open public hearings prior to the confirmation of their appointments. However, they conveniently exempted themselves and their military colleagues in the cabinet, so the decree applied only to civilians. The lawlessness went well beyond “white collar” and property offenses. Citizens and foreigners alike were subjected to arbitrary arrest without due

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process, and could be physically attacked by PRC members and their bodyguards.41 The harassment extended to business and industry as well. Togba Nah Tipoteh provides a telling example: It became a normal state of affairs for members of the military junta to conduct raids into the operational areas of iron ore mining companies, terrorizing both Liberians and foreigners. The junta members issued orders related to employment, dismissals and detentions. Furthermore, junta members engaged in the confiscation of properties and funds, some of which took the form of regular “protection” money.42

This happened even though reviving investments in the iron ore sector was especially important in the drive for economic recovery. Recourse was impossible. The judicial system under Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo Sr. looked on helplessly and worse, as judges who ruled against PRC members, their cronies, or their interests were harassed and intimidated. Things would become so bad that in September 1981, the People’s Supreme Tribunal, the highest court in Liberia, would suspend hearings indefinitely, following the arrest of the acting presiding judge and the looting of his home and of the court building at the instigation of PRC officials.43 In its efforts to establish its control over the country, the government took some measures to restore order on the streets and to curb low-level corruption. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed. Some well-publicized punishments, including some executions in front of TV cameras, were meted out to soldiers who were caught looting or molesting citizens. Thomas Quiwonkpa, as commanding general of the army, personally traveled to army bases and outposts, admonishing soldiers against undisciplined behavior and threatening them with harsh punishment should they be caught.44 Some soldiers and government clerks were arrested for taking or giving bribes; and some midlevel government officials were suspended for appropriating state funds.45 Virtually nothing was done to curb the corruption or the other forms of lawlessness at the top, however. Members of the government, especially PPP and MOJA ministers, repeatedly objected to the untoward behavior of the PRC and to some of their own colleagues in the cabinet. Doe, as merely the first among equals, was in too precarious a position to try to restrain the excesses. He did not have the requisite power over the soldiers in the PRC. He had no party or organization to fall back on, and it would be some time before he would be able to rely on Liberia’s recently reconstructed army, which was still ill trained and ill equipped, to secure his tenure. To ensure his continued role as head of state, his first order of priorities, thus, had to be to build a power base for himself.

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This he set about doing in much the same way as had always been done in Liberia, as in the rest of Africa: through the liberal use of patronage. The problem was that simply placing persons in high positions with good salaries was not enough to guarantee their loyalty, which was contingent on the material benefits they could extract from their positions. Hence Doe not only allowed but also enabled his supporters in the Executive Mansion to take advantage of their positions for personal gain. A key example is his close associate George Boley. The Liberian journalist Edward Wonkeryor writes that, according to an audited report, Boley embezzled over $70,000 in cash, vouchers, and gasoline in the ten months that he served as minister of state for presidential affairs. Other examples abound.46 Even more than it had been under the TWP, Liberia under Doe thus became a state that could be compared, in the words of George Kieh, in his book Political Violence and Corruption in Africa, “to a warehouse in which each member of the ruling class collects his or her share of the loot.”47 Having no effective action that he could take without risk to his position, Doe resorted to bluster. At the end of cabinet meetings in which one or another minister complained of the government’s inefficiency, corruption or overspending, he would routinely threaten to execute the offenders. In May 1980, for example, he warned PRC members that they would “face the firing squad” if they committed corrupt, discourteous, or undisciplined acts. In August, he extended the threat of execution to corrupt government officials.48 When the pressure became too intense, he turned on the messenger. Thus, when Togba Nah Tipoteh told the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) that the regime’s lawlessness and human rights violations were crucial factors hampering economic recovery, Doe publicly threatened to execute him and any other persons making such statements.49 The continued lawlessness at the top created what PRC Speaker Nicholas Podier would describe as a “bleak image” of Liberia that kept investors away for a long time.50 The only “investment” that returned to its pre–coup level was Liberia’s shipping registration business, as some American shipping companies renewed their registration under Liberia’s flag of convenience after having canceled it following the coup.51 By the end of the new government’s first year in office, Liberia’s entire economic situation had gone from bad to worse. No dent had been made in the $50 million budget deficit. External debts rose from $443.2 million in 1979 to $596.4 million in 1980 and to $685.4 million in 1981. The growth rate, which had averaged 0.6 percent per annum under Tolbert, plummeted to -9.2 in 1980 and to an average of -3.65 thereafter. The consumer price index, which the government had promised to reduce, rose by some 16 percent.52 Bank deposits were not back at their pre–coup level and credit was still very tight. As a result, the 1981–1982 budgets had to be what Doe called a

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“survival budget,” stripped down to expenditures that were “necessary for the existence of the nation.”53 TRICKERY, COERCION, AND INTIMIDATION Doe would endeavor to increase his power in light of the steady deterioration of the Liberian economy and the inevitable hardships that this imposed on Liberians of all social strata. In principle, one would think that power would be built on success. Here it was the opposite. In the course of the year, the promises of the revolution receded. The promises of a higher standard of living for the masses evaporated under the reality of the economic crisis. The promises of clean government, equality before the law, freedom of expression and others were shunted aside due to the junta’s determination to hold on to its privilege and power. In its response to the economic crisis, the junta demonstrated its unwillingness to make any sacrifice of its power or luxurious lifestyle and showed its apathy and indifference toward the masses it claimed to have redeemed. As the months passed, it became an ever more elitist group, increasingly distant and cut off from the people. Even though the junta remained enormously popular during its first year in office, disillusion had begun to set in, and open dissatisfaction was increasingly expressed by civil society groups and the more idealistic cabinet ministers. So how did Doe accrue power to himself with a failing economy and the rising dissatisfaction with his leadership? The answer is twofold: First, he ignored the economic crisis. That is, he avoided taking the economic, administrative, or political measures that were essential for economic recovery, but that would have jeopardized his position. Then, he adopted a combination of political maneuvering and augmented coercion and intimidation to deal with the discontent that ensued and to ward off challenges to the junta’s authority. The brew of trickery, coercion, and intimidation is evident in a succession of actions from the end of December through mid-February. The first was a political maneuver carried out in conjunction with the rest of the PRC. In his Christmas address to the nation on December 24, 1980, Doe announced a PRC pledge to appoint a National Constitution Commission to draft a new constitution as part of preparations to return the country to civilian rule.54 The pledge was the product of consultations among individuals from diverse groups, including the PRC’s civilian advisors, people from MOJA and PPP, and officials at the American embassy. For all intents and purposes, it was a response to the growing demands for a transfer of power to civilians in the face of the inadequacy and corruption of the military government. As Amos Sawyer, who would soon be appointed to head the commission, pointed out: “The rumblings of the people required that some

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indication be given them that the current circumstance was not a permanent condition.”55 Although Doe would keep his promise and set up the commission, the pledge was not the liberalizing move it seemed, but a calculated maneuver aimed at containing the mounting discontent by giving the impression of responsiveness to the public’s demands. There was little risk that the establishment of the committee would lead to a speedy transfer of power, as no timetable was set for this. Furthermore, since the regime had repeatedly made holding elections dependent on solving the social and economic problems that had led to the coup, they had a ready excuse to fall back on should the need arise. In the meantime, the work of drafting and approving the constitution would buy the military government time and credit while lending legitimacy to its continued rule. The pledge had the added advantage of winning the approval of the United States, Liberia’s chief source of foreign aid, which promised to underwrite the cost of the project.56 An instance of coercion and another of attempted intimidation followed this maneuver. The first came at the end of January 1981, when the Monrovia dockworkers struck in protest of the compulsory savings bond scheme, which had taken effect on the first of the month. In July of the previous year, the PRC had outlawed strikes and walkouts, following a series of work stoppages by employees pressing to obtain the same salary increases that had been given the lower-ranking soldiers and civil servants. The dockworkers’ strike, at Liberia’s largest port, not only threatened to cause further economic disruption at a time when the economy was already tottering, it was an overt act of political defiance, which the junta hurried to repress with whatever force was required. In the event, 2000 striking workers were dismissed and replaced with new recruits.57 The second instance was the specific threat that Doe issued, at about the same time, against the MOJA and PPP. Speaking publicly, he warned that persons who were trying to introduce values or ideologies that were foreign to the Liberian people’s way of life would be dealt with in accord with military discipline, and pointedly reminded everyone that the government was run by the PRC, not by the political parties MOJA and PPP, whose activities had been suspended.58 There was, of course, nothing new in Doe’s affirmation of the military nature of the regime, in his attempt to discredit its critics, nor in his threats. But his previous threats had been rather general, directed toward so-called opponents of the revolution. In this threat, Doe named his target: Liberia’s most popular political movements which, despite having been outlawed, still had their infrastructures and adherents with the desire to shape the political landscape. His targeting them shows his determination to prevent them from doing so and to warn off any who might think of joining them in the effort.

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Finally, in mid-February 1981, in the face of continued protests from various quarters and pressure from within the PRC led by Weh Syen, Doe undertook another political maneuver; he reshuffled the PRC and the cabinet, and replaced three managing directors and boards of public corporations.59 Addressing the nation on the first anniversary of the coup, Doe would explain the reshuffles as “measures to encourage efficiency and expediency in government” and to “reflect greater geographical balance.”60 They were nothing of the sort. The reshuffle of the PRC was cosmetic, amounting mainly to horizontal changes that had no significance to the public. One soldier was moved from the PRC to the Executive Mansion guard, and some officers in high positions in the newly formed Liberian army were moved to the PRC. In all likelihood, the “musical chairs” had something to do with the power struggle between Doe and Weh Syen. It is difficult to see how the changes were an answer to the public’s complaints. The reshuffle of the cabinet was a brilliant sleight of hand. On the surface, it seemed to address two key complaints. One was the lack of progress on the economic front. Thus, Minister of Finance Perry Zulu was dismissed; and a separate Ministry of Labor was carved out of the former Ministry of Youth, Sport and Labor. The other complaint concerned the excess of Krahn in influential positions in the government. This was a point of contention both with the citizenry in general and with non–Krahn members of the PRC, especially Weh Syen. Thus, the Krahn George Boley, one of Doe’s closest associates, was demoted from the influential position of minister of state for presidential affairs to the less-prestigious position of minister of postal affairs; and another Krahn, Dr. Willie P. Nebo, who served as minister of lands and mines, was removed from the cabinet altogether. Since Nebo’s cabinet post was essentially an economic one, his dismissal, like Minister of Finance Perry Zulu’s, could also be framed as a step to appoint more qualified persons to handle the economy. In fact, the cabinet reshuffle genuinely addressed neither of these complaints. Perry Zulu, as minister of finance, was a convenient scapegoat for the economic debacle and the unpopular national savings bond scheme. The newly created Ministry of Labor could be billed as a body to deal with the country’s growing unemployment and the grievances of its labor force. In practice, the creation of a new ministry, with the addition of a minister, staff, and yet more opportunities for patronage, amounted to yet a further financial burden on the already stretched government as well as another avenue of potential corruption. Krahn continued to occupy influential posts. George Boley remained in the cabinet, and his replacement, Harry Nouyon, was also a Krahn. Nebo’s replacement was a technocrat; but another Krahn, Albert Karpeh, joined the cabinet as minister of national defense, replacing Samuel Pearson, the Americo-Liberian who had held the position until then.

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Yet another change, the replacement of Gabriel Nimely by Lt. Col. Gray D. Allison as minister of information, culture and tourism, did not address these complaints either.61 Rather it brought into the cabinet a competent minister who would remain assiduous in Doe’s service until the end of the military regime. The reshuffles did not bring about any improvement in the functioning or composition of the government (or, for that matter, in the functioning of the public corporations whose managers and boards had been replaced). Adapting the regime’s line, a U.S. Senate committee would later report that Doe had replaced “several of the most disreputable members of the PRC and the cabinet. . . with better qualified—and more loyal—people.”62 Whether or not the replacements were more qualified and loyal is difficult to ascertain. It is clear, however, that some of the more disreputable members of the government remained in their posts: Colonel Harrison Pennue, who had been seen personally beating a taxi driver for allegedly running into his car, remained in the PRC. Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo Sr., who presided over a failed justice system and whose police bodyguards would accuse him of having had them stripped and whipped for refusing to eject a family from a house he claimed was his, remained in the cabinet.63 The major outcome of the reshuffles was the strengthening of Doe’s hand. The reshuffles were not of Doe’s initiative, but forced on him by the public discontent and pressures from within the PRC. In them, he was compelled to sacrifice his closest Krahn supporters. Nonetheless, he managed to turn the situation to his advantage. That is, he turned a step that was aimed, on one level, at deflecting public discontent and, at another level, at strengthening his rivals, into an action that put him in a better position than that in which he had previously been. All of the new ministers were either fellow Krahn or technocrats. In fact, there were more Krahn in the government after the reshuffle than before it. Moreover, those Krahn who were sacrificed were compensated: Boley was made minister of postal affairs and Nebo was made vice president of the largest economic cartel in Liberia, the Mesurado Group of companies—thereby assuring their continued loyalty to Doe. The technocrats were gray figures who would have no power base from which to stand up to Doe in the event of a disagreement. In good measure, the pattern of force, intimidation, and manipulation that developed and that would serve as a blueprint for Doe’s modus operandi in the future grew out of the constraints under which Doe had to operate. In the face of these constraints, Doe showed consummate political savvy and great ability to maneuver in a narrow space and hostile environment. In the months and years to come, Doe would come up with one trick after another, whether to deflect public dissatisfaction and criticism without taking inconvenient

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actions or to overcome his rivals. Where these did not achieve their aim, there was always force, both threatened and actual. Important as the pattern was to his survival and accretion of power, on its own it would not have allowed Doe to become a dictator or even to stay in office had it not been for the steady stream of funding he wrestled from the United States. As the economy floundered, the mainstay of the PRC government became foreign aid, especially American aid, which he proved remarkably adept at obtaining. This aid paid for the rice that was the basis of the masses’ diet, for the petroleum that fueled Liberia’s modern economic activity, and for the salaries of government workers. In the course of a single year, he managed to obtain the military aid necessary to create an army that could serve the PRC as an instrument of coercion, in place of the National Guard that it had disbanded. That this aid would be given at all and in ever-increasing quantities was not a foregone conclusion. The next chapter will show how the postcoup government succeeded in exploiting the rivalries of the cold war in order to obtain it. NOTES 1. “A Policy Statement by Sergeant Doe on the State of the Economy November 23, 1980,” Liberia IX, no. 31 (Winter 1980–1981): 2–3. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 6 (1981): 143. 2. World Bank, Report No. 4178-LBR: Liberia Recent Economic Developments and Medium-Term Prospects (December 1982), 6, http://documents1.worldbank.org/ curated/pt/893331468053101816/pdf/multi-page.pdf 3. Nelson, Liberia: A Country Study, 149 “How Goes the Revolution?,” West Africa, February 2, 1981, 208–12. “Liberia—Request for Stand-By Arrangement,” August 28, 2020, 206880, EBS/80/191, IMF Archives. 4. Leon Dash, “U.S. Envoy Visits Liberia on 2nd Trip in 3 Weeks,” Washington Post, December 1, 1980, A1 U.S. Department of State, “IIM Outline Part III: C. Economic: 1. Fiscal—Crisis,” Case No. F-2014–11720, Doc No. C05962148, confidential, September 4, 1980 3, Department of State Records. 5. “How Goes the Revolution?,” 208. 6. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 8. 7. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, “General Economic Policy Statement by the Government of the People’s Redemption Council, Republic of Liberia,” The Situation in Liberia,

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Spring 1980—Update: Hearing before The Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 29, 1980, 23–24. 8. “Liberia Will Continue to Use the Dollar,” Weekend News, June 7, 1980, 1–2. 9. “Minister’s ‘Urgent’ Mission to the EEC and World Bank,” Monrovia Home Service, May 23, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 30, 1980, Nexis Uni. 10. “Top Govt. Officials Continue Talks in U.S,” Express Special, June 11, 1980, 1, 4. 11. Togba-Nah Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy 1980–85: The Role of Endogenous Variables,” Liberian Studies Journal 11, no. 2 (1986): 137. 12. Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, eds., Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1994), 13–4. 13. “Letter From Liberia: Where Is Sergeant Doe Going?,” Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2383, March 27, 1981, 36, Nexis Uni. 14. Edward Lama Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship: A Fiasco ‘Revolution’ (Chicago: Strugglers’ Community Press, 1985), 38. 15. Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 17. 16. “IMF Team Here for Talks,” Liberian Inaugural, May 21, 1980, 3. 17. “IMF, World Bank Teams in Monrovia for Consultations,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1980): T3. 18. “PRC Looks Outward as Economy Worsens,” Africa News, August 4, 1980, 3. 19. “Liberia Will Continue to Use the Dollar,” 1–2. 20. “Liberia—Request for a Waiver and Modification of Performance Criteria Under Stand-By Arrangement,” November 28, 1980, 205766, EBS/80/258, 1, IMF Archives. “Finance Minister’s 17th September Statement,” Monrovia Home Service, September 17, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 30, 1980, Nexis Uni. 21. Republic of Liberia Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Annual Report of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs to the People’s Redemption Council for the Period April 12–December 31, 1980 (1981), 8. “Liberia; IMF Drawing Rights,” Monrovia Home Service, September 24, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 7, 1980, Nexis Uni. 22. J. Mills Jones, “Economic Adjustment Programs Under Stand-By Agreements with the International Monetary Fund: Liberia’s Experience 1980–85,” Liberian Studies Journal 13, no. 2 (1988): 164–65. 23. “Finance Minister’s 17th September Statement.” 24. “Finance Minister’s 17th September Statement.” 25. “No Extra Budget Funds,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 22, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 4, 1980, Nexis Uni. 26. Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “U.S. Financial Aid for Liberia,” May 20, 1981, Nexis Uni.

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27. “EBM/80/181–December 12, 1980,” December 12, 1980, 205602, EBM/80/181, 5, IMF Archives. “Liberian Head of State’s Announcement of Austerity Measures,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 19, 1980, Nexis Uni. 28. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “U.S. Provides Aid to Liberia,” December 3, 1980, Nexis Uni. Leon Dash, “U.S. to Grant Liberia Emergency Assistance Worth $10 Million,” Washington Post, December 2, 1980 A20. 29. Pewu Subah, “Liberia,” Mining Annual Review (June 1981): 513, Nexis Uni. 30. Report of the Committee to Review the Present Economic Situation in Liberia, submitted to Head of State Samuel K. Doe and the People’s Redemption Council (Monrovia, 1981), 30. 31. Leon Dash, “Corruption, Austerity Coexist in Liberia; Military Leader Remains Popular despite New Taxes, More Graft,” Washington Post, August 18, 1981, A13, Nexis Uni. 32. “Tightening Belts in Liberia,” West Africa, 1980, 2406. 33. “Military Leader Remains Popular Despite New Taxes, More Graft.” “Tightening Belts in Liberia,” 2406. 34. James Youboty, Liberian Civil War: A Graphic Account (Philadelphia: Parkside Impressions Enterprises, 1993), 66. “$41,000 Heroes Monument,” Daily Observer, April 15, 1981, 3. 35. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 128. 36. D. Elwood Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 166. 37. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 137. 38. “Finance Minister’s 17th September Statement.”; “PRC Assures Lebanese Here of Protection,” The Redeemer, May 23, 1980, 1. 39. “Disillusionment Setting In,” West Africa, April 12, 1982, 969. 40. Amos Sawyer, Effective Immediately; Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980–1986: A Personal Perspective (Bremen: Liberia Working Group, 1987), 19. 41. “Doe Warns ‘Bodyguards’ against Harassing Citizens,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 7, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1981): T2. U.S. Department of State. “Assessment of Current Situation in Liberia,” Case No. F-2014–11720, Doc No. C05962139, confidential, September 4, 1980, Department of State Records. 42. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 134. 43. “High Court Suspends Hearings Indefinitely,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 10, 1981, transcribed by Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2496 (October 1981):16. 44. Joe K. Roberts, “Commanding Visits Border Posts,” Redeemer, May 20, 1980, 8; “Four Executed in Liberia.” 45. “Two Maryland Agric. Officials Suspended,” Express Special, June 11, 1980, 3. George S. Khoryama, “Soldiers Arrested for Receiving $5,000 Bribe,” Redeemer, June 3, 1980, 3, 12. 46. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 171.

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47. George Klay Kieh, Jr., Political Corruption and Violence in Africa, State of Corruption, State of Chaos: The Terror of Political Malfeasance (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 147. 48. Jimmy D. Kandeh, “What Does the ‘Militariat’ Do When It Rules? Military Regimes: The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia,” Review of African Political Economy 69 (1996): 387–404; “Corrupt PRC Members to Face Firing Squad,” 1, 4. 49. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 137. 50. “Podier Upholds Press Freedom; Frowns on Muffling the Press,” Daily Observer, October 1, 1981, 1, 10. 51. Rodney Carlisle, “Liberia’s Flag of Convenience: Rough Water Ahead,” Orbis 24 (Winter 1981): 881–91. 52. Subah, “Liberia,” 513. James Guseh, “Government Size, Political Freedom, and Economic Growth, the Case of Liberia: A Comparison of Three Presidential Regimes,” Liberian Studies Journal 29, no. 2 (2004): 64. 53. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Government Stops Rice Import Subsidy,” July 18, 1981, Nexis Uni. 54. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” (1981): 142. 55. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 19. 56. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 19. 57. Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1980–1981 (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), B531; U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 4 (1980): 148. 58. “Doe Discusses Political Ideology,” West Africa, February 16, 1981, in SubSaharan Africa Report 2371, March 5, 1981, 48. 59. “A Common Man Is Not Enough,” Economist, March 7, 1981, Nexis Uni. George Boley, telephone conversation with author, May 26, 2005. 60. “M/Sgt Doe’s Speech on First Anniversary of PRC Government,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 12, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 14, 1981. Nexis Uni. 61. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B258. 62. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Liberia and GhanaPolicy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1982, 6. 63. “A Common Man Is Not Enough.” “Liberian Revolution Founders,” 1005.

Chapter 3

Getting Foreign Aid

In its quest for foreign aid, the postcoup government turned first and foremost to the United States, which was the natural and most obvious address for assistance. Since its inception, Liberia had depended on the United States’ economic and diplomatic assistance. For all their socialist-sounding promises of equality and redistribution of wealth, their Marxist-sounding talk of “the Liberian masses,” and their hatred of the Americo-Liberians and the United States supported former True Whig Party (TWP) government, neither the conspirators of the coups nor the civilian ministers they appointed showed any anti-Americanism. Doe and Quiwonkpa had received military training from U.S. Army personnel in Liberia, and most of the civilian ministers had graduated from American colleges or universities. In their first days in office, when the coup leaders, like coup leaders throughout Africa, made the rounds of foreign embassies and extended the hand of friendship to all, the United States was included with the rest. On the day they took power, the ambassador was away and so they met with U.S. Charge d’Affaires Julius Walker, assuring him they would “pursue a policy of friendship toward the United States” and live up to existing agreements.1 Three days later, Foreign Minister Baccus Matthews repeated the assurance in another meeting with Walker.2 When the new government found Liberia in an economic crunch, it was to the American-controlled IMF and World Bank, not to the Soviet Union or to a country in the anti-Western bloc, that it addressed its first appeals for economic assistance. Washington was as interested in continuing the historic relationship, as was the new Liberian regime. Liberia’s new leaders were an unknown entity and, for all their assurances of friendship, their radical rhetoric raised anxiety. Because after every change in government in Africa, the Soviet Union and the so-called radical states, Ethiopia and Libya, stood alert to seize any opportunity that might open up. Along with the United States, Libya was the first country to extend formal recognition to the PRC government, even though it did not have an embassy in Liberia. At the time of the coup, Libya 39

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was supporting Muslim rebels in northern Chad with its oil money and Soviet arms and encouraging anti-government forces elsewhere in Africa through promises of financial aid or covert assistance to dissidents.3 Should the new Liberian regime join the radical camp, it could be expected to follow in the footsteps of Muammar Gaddafi and Mengistu Haile Mariam, who, upon coming to power, had shut down America’s military bases in their countries, turned their countries into centers of Soviet influence, and set out on a deliberate course of fomenting unrest wherever they could. The United States had too much to lose in such an eventuality, forcing its hand to do whatever it could. It had important strategic installations in Liberia (a “Voice of America” transmitter that broadcast to all of Africa, the Middle East, and the southwestern part of the Soviet Union; a telecommunications relay station that transmitted diplomatic traffic between Washington and almost all the American embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and an OMEGA navigation station, which enabled ships and aircraft to continuously calculate their exact positions). It had about $500 million in private investment, concentrated in the rubber, mining, and banking industries.4 Above all, until the coup it had held a secure hegemony in the region. West Africa, with its rich mineral resources and Nigeria’s oil fields, was traditionally in the Western camp. Should Liberia align itself with the radical states, this would give antiAmerican interests a foothold in a resource-rich region that until then had been closed to them. TOWARDS A MUTUALLY DESIRED PACT Before a mutually desired pact could be established, however, the postcoup regime would have to provide the Carter administration with a way of circumventing an inconvenient hurdle: the violent image created by the coupists’ conduct during and in the immediate wake of their takeover. The Liberian coup was a particularly bloody affair. It is not only that President Tolbert was murdered in the course of the coup, along with twenty-six residents of the Executive Mansion. The next day, soldiers proceeded to round up hundreds of persons associated with the former regime and, driven by hatred, paraded them through the streets in their underwear and beat them before cheering crowds, before torturing them in jail.5 On April 14, the Military Tribunal established by the PRC began the trial of 14 former government officials and TWP leaders, without the benefit of counsel or the presence of journalists. Thirteen of the accused were found guilty of high treason, rampant corruption, and misuse of public office and, over the objections of at least six civilian ministers, were sentenced to death by firing squad.6 On April 22, the sentence was carried out despite pleas for clemency by the

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American embassy, the OAU, and a variety of international organizations. The sentenced men were stripped to their underpants, tied to posts, and shot on a Monrovian beach as the crowds cheered. For Washington, the visible brutality was awkward in view of President Carter’s widely touted commitment to human rights. When he assumed office in 1976, Carter had pledged that his regime would defend human rights worldwide. Elaborating on the pledge in early 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance named civil and political liberties, including the freedom from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture, as rights to be defended. He avowed that the defense of such rights would go beyond behind-the-scenes diplomacy to include economic and military sanctions if need be. It soon became evident that the commitment was selective: applied to Argentina, for example, but not to China, South Korea, the Philippines, or the Soviet Union, where U.S. security interests were an issue. So was the case in Liberia. Initially, the United States extended a polite welcome to the new regime. The U.S. embassy protested the assassination of President Tolbert, as did Liberia’s West African neighbors; but then went on to return the new government’s overtures of friendship. However, the grisly public executions, carried out in the face of the pleas for clemency, were one too many brutalities to let pass. In an expression of disapproval, the Carter administration halted a Pentagon training mission that had been scheduled to arrive in Liberia on May 1, and held in abeyance a $6 million economic aid program as well as a $1.4 million military credit sales program that had been promised to the TWP government. U.S. ambassador to Liberia Robert Smith advised American citizens to leave the country until the situation stabilized.7 As a new regime facing economic disaster, the PRC could ill afford to alienate the United States, and even less so as it was facing isolation in Africa. It so happened that at the time of the executions the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers was meeting in Lagos to prepare for the OAU Economic Summit due to open on April 28. The day after the executions, on April 23, the Council issued an appeal for clemency for the remaining persons on trial, as did other groups.8 On April 24, Nigeria’s government refused Matthews and his delegation landing rights in Lagos, which prevented them from taking the Liberian seat at the meeting.9 On April 28, the Economic Summit, with the exception of Ethiopia and Libya, voted unanimously to prevent the Liberian delegation from participating in the forum.10 In all its history, the OAU had denied participation only to one military regime, in Togo, and that had been seventeen years earlier, in 1963, when a group of noncoms and privates murdered elected President Sylvanus Olympio. Its policy of recognizing states, not governments, had allowed mass murderers like Idi Amin to participate in OAU events and even to chair the organization when their turn came round. The current rebuff was driven

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by the fact that Tolbert was serving as sitting chairman of the OAU when he was murdered, and the awkwardness of admitting those responsible for his murder so soon after the event. It was probably intended as a slap on the wrist, but this could not be known at the time. If it turned out to be a long-term exclusion, it would mean that the postcoup government would be denied the recognition it needed to establish its legitimacy in Africa and to draw on the OAU resources available to member states. Between the American response and the OAU rebuff, the postcoup government faced what could potentially develop into a threat to its existence. Initially, in the immediate wake of the executions, the PRC hardened its position as it consolidated its rule. The executions were followed on April 25 by the suspension of habeas corpus, the announcement that 126 former officials were still to be tried, and the inclusion of some 20 foreign managers of state-run corporations in the military tribunal proceedings.11 On April 29, however, under the dual pressure of the United States and the African states, Doe pledged that there would be no more executions. The pledge came as a relief in Washington and enabled the Carter administration to go ahead and try to establish a working relationship with Liberia’s new rulers. On May 7, an unannounced White House meeting of senior members of the National Security Council decided to send the Pentagon training mission that had been put on hold and to move in other ways to patch up bilateral ties.12 In May as well, the IMF and the World Bank apparently received the green light to respond positively to Liberia’s requests for assistance. In the middle of the month, a six-person IMF delegation arrived in Liberia and stayed for over a week, assessing the situation and formulating a program to qualify Liberia for IMF support.13 A two-person World Bank delegation arrived at the same time. Later in the month, Liberia’s Minister of Public Works, Gabriel Johnson Tucker, visited Europe and the United States. for talks with the European Economic Community and the World Bank.14 In the wake of the May 7 meeting, Washington also decided to send a high-ranking delegation to Liberia to seek means of improving relations with the postcoup government. The delegation consisted of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose, Jerry Funk of the National Security Council and was chaired by Rep. William H. Gray III, a member of the congressional black caucus.15 Its multiple aims included relaying the dual message that the postcoup government would not have to go to the radical states for economic assistance and that it would have to clean up its human rights act.16 Although the delegation was billed as an “exploratory” or “fact-finding” mission to determine whether the regime was “stable enough or responsible enough to establish a close long-term relationship with Washington,” the alacrity with which Washington was already moving

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toward Liberia’s new government suggest that the delegates would be most eager to find it a fit and responsible partner.17 Washington’s determination to shore up its relations with the postcoup government was given further impetus by what looked like an augmented threat of Liberian radicalization in the course of May. Following the OAU rebuff, the radical states and the Soviet Union stepped up their courting. The day after the rebuff, Ethiopia’s ambassador assured Matthews of his government’s wish for close ties and strong relations between “black Africa’s two oldest countries that have striven over the years to eradicate colonialism and imperialism from the African continent.”18 Shortly afterward, an Ethiopian emissary arrived in Monrovia, and Libya sent a special envoy, Ambassador Ahmad al-Hudayr, with a message that the Libyan government “has pledged its solidarity with the People’s Redemption Council and has promised to work along with the people of Liberia in their struggle for freedom and social justice.”19 The Soviet media accused the West of trying to undermine the new government and Washington of plotting to overthrow the PRC.20 Liberia’s new leadership did not respond to these overtures with any special fervor. Along with seeking American aid, the focus of its endeavors was to reconcile with its West African neighbors. Such reconciliation was vital to it on both economic and political grounds. Economically, the new government could not afford to lose the benefits Liberia enjoyed as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and as a partner in the Mano River Union (MRU) (which made for common tariffs and the free flow of people with Sierra Leone), nor its lucrative commercial relations with Guinea. Politically, the West African states held the key to African recognition of the postcoup government’s rule. The government’s endeavors targeted Liberia’s next-door neighbors, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, as well as Nigeria, the most influential country in the region. The leaders of these countries, Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, regarded the coupists as boorish and dangerous upstarts and viewed them with fear and antipathy.21 Like the United States, they were apprehensive that the coupists, with their talk of revolution, would bring Liberia into the radical camp, which would put the region in a Libyan vise, with Chad on the northeast and Liberia on the southwest. They also feared that Tolbert’s violent overthrow would serve as a model for disgruntled soldiers in their own countries. Houphouet-Boigny, Siaka Stevens, and Sekou Toure were all aging, autocratic rulers of one-party states, who were holding on to power in the face of increasing opposition in their countries. They all used to have warm personal relations with William Tolbert. Nigeria’s President Shehu Shagari, the only democratically elected

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leader of the four, had been in office for only half a year when the Liberian coup took place and feared for Nigeria’s fledgling democracy. The immediate aim of the government’s endeavors was to ensure the acceptance of a Liberian delegation at the ECOWAS heads of state summit that was to be held in Lome, Togo, on May 27, 1980, and to the OAU summit scheduled for July 1 of the same year, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Within a week of the OAU rebuff, Matthews called on Sekou Toure and, then, along with Weh Syen, flew to Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone to explain the motives and aims of the Liberian revolution and to urge recognition of the new regime.22 The visits apparently went well. In the course of the month, the postcoup leaders received a personal invitation to the ECOWAS summit from its host, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo; Nigeria’s President Shagari declared his willingness to receive a Liberian delegation, and on May 17, Matthews visited Lagos. President Sekou Toure invited Doe for a one-day state visit to Guinea. In the course of the visit, on May 23, he invited Doe to join him in his plane to the ECOWAS summit, presumably to avert a repetition of the OAU snub.23 All was set for the attendance of the Liberian delegation at the ECOWAS summit when the leadership’s lack of political sophistication resulted in a second exclusion. Accepting an invitation by the Ethiopian government, on May 21, Matthews arrived in Addis Ababa for an official two-day visit. His statements effused revolutionary zeal and solidarity. In his talk with his Ethiopian counterpart, Foreign Minister Feleke Gedle-Giorgis, he declared that Liberia and Ethiopia “would stand shoulder to shoulder in their struggles for the total independence of Africa”; suggested that the Liberian people emulate Ethiopians’ “fundamental transformations undertaken to secure and preserve the revolution of the broad masses”; and asserted that his delegation had come to Ethiopia “to acquire first-hand information on its revolutionary experiences and gains, with the main purpose of applying these revolutionary experiences in the struggles of the Liberian broad masses for a just and democratic system.” In his meeting with Mengistu Haile Mariam, he expressed the hope that he would learn from Ethiopia’s experience and that relations between their two countries would be further strengthened.24 Matthews saw no contradiction between his pronouncements in Ethiopia and either the regime’s pursuit of American aid or its efforts to conciliate its West African neighbors. His vision was of a social revolution in Liberia, not a political revolution that would undermine other regimes. For the West African leaders, alarm bells must have gone off as they heard him speaking of revolution, transformation, and standing shoulder to shoulder with the radical state. The next day, when Doe stepped off Sekou Toure’s plane in Lome dressed in camouflage fatigues and carrying a pistol (or two, depending on the source) in his belt, they recoiled.25 For the Liberian

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coupists, Doe’s military get up was standard dress, which expressed their identity as military men and visibly distinguished them from the elitist civilian regime that they had replaced. To the conservative West African leaders in their suits and ties, the military attire, coming as it did on the heels of Matthews’s alarming pronouncements in Ethiopia, was a danger signal and rekindled their fears that Liberia would become a conduit of instability and revolution in the region. After some deliberation, Doe was barred from attending the sessions.26 The ECOWAS exclusion came as a shock to the new government after all the efforts it had made to mollify the West African leaders. It was also an affront to the sovereignty of the state and a humiliation to its head, as Doe himself had been denied entrance. It thus met with a sharp response both by the government and the media. The government’s response was announced by Matthews on his May 29 radio and television broadcast to the nation. Matthews explained the affront to Liberia’s honor and sovereignty, threatened retaliation against any state that interfered with Liberia’s rights in an international forum, and announced a series of reprisals against the offending countries. Liberia’s ambassadors to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, and the Liberian representative to the Manu River Union were recalled. Nigeria’s diplomatic representation in Liberia was reduced from nine persons to two. In addition, Liberia’s obligations to ECOWAS were suspended “until her rights are restored.”27 A few days later, Weh Syen blasted the countries behind the rebuff for using the OAU and ECOWAS as fronts to sabotage the Liberian revolution and directly accused Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire of ignoring the welfare of the Liberian masses.28 The press responded to the expulsion with vigorous and concerted indignation. For days afterward, the expulsion made front-page news in Liberia’s papers, and was the subject of angry articles, editorials, and letters to the editor. Following Matthews’s lead, these insisted on Liberia’s right to make its own decisions, protested the affront to Liberia’s sovereignty, called for retaliation against the offending countries, and poured scorn on the West African presidents who led the expulsion. For all the grumbling that could already be heard about the PRC’s misconduct, there was a closing of the ranks, in which the soldiers and civilians in the government and the Liberian people, as represented by the media, came together in a spontaneous outpouring of solidarity. In short, on the eve of Moose’s, Funk’s, and Gray’s visit, the new Liberian regime was even more at odds with its African neighbors than it had been before, while the Soviet Union and radical states were eagerly courting its friendship. With the Liberians hungry for change and galvanized behind their government by the ECOWAS exclusion, the danger that the regime would shift its alliances must have seemed all the greater. Thus, while the ECOWAS nations reacted with anger and sanctions to Matthews’s effusions in Ethiopia

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and Doe’s military attire, the United States responded with heightened determination to tip the new Liberian government into its own sphere and to get the West African states on board in the endeavor. AMERICA’S ENGAGEMENT, LIBERIA’S GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT America’s decision to engage kicked off the first phase of what can be described as a three-stage process in which the United States sought to draw Liberia’s wayward regime into Western orbit, while Liberia’s new government gradually came to toe with the American line in exchange for everlarger amounts of economic and military aid. The First Phase: Declaration of Genuine Non-Alignment During the first phase, which ran through August 1980, the Carter administration backed the postcoup government, even as the new leadership stridently declared an independent foreign policy that raised questions about its place in the Western camp. The policy, which Foreign Minister Matthews dubbed “Genuine NonAlignment,” was initially declared in response to the ECOWAS expulsion and directed primarily against the excluding nations. The first formal statement of the policy appeared in the opening sentence of Matthews’s May 29 TV and radio broadcast: “since the Liberian revolution of April 12, 1980, the Government and people of Liberia [have] consistently pursued a foreign policy of good neighborliness, peace and concord toward all states and peace-loving people of Africa. . .aided by the principle of Genuine Non-Alignment.”29 A week later, on June 5, Matthews repeated the policy statement before an audience of faculty and students at the University of Liberia.30 On neither occasion did he specifically elaborate on what Genuine Non-Alignment meant. This and other statements on both occasions indicate that he conceived of it as part of a broader policy, which included expanding Liberia’s relations with all “peace loving countries” and upholding Liberian membership and obligations in the African and international organizations. The purpose of the statements was to insist on Liberia’s right to shape its own identity and foreign policy, and to befriend whichever states it wished while being a full-fledged member of the international community. Tolbert had been active in the Non-Aligned Movement and repeatedly declared Liberia’s commitment to non-alignment, while in fact being closely aligned with the West. The addition of the word “genuine” was aimed at distinguishing the postcoup government’s foreign policy from Tolbert’s and intimated

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that the new Liberia could no longer be counted on to align itself firmly with the West. With this, Matthews made sure to temper the threat with the affirmation of the government’s intentions to honor previous agreements and its desire to remain a full-fledged member of the international community. At this stage, Genuine Non-Alignment was not directed at the United States. Washington had effectively made its decision to engage with Liberia’s postcoup government before Matthews announced the policy. Consistent with the policy, Matthews rejected a U.S. bid to boycott the Moscow Olympics and criticized the American decision to do so; and in mid-July Doe accepted President Brezhnev’s invitation to visit the USSR, which neither Tolbert nor any of his TWP predecessors had ever done.31 However, the original statement of the policy did not mention the United States; and in the university lecture, Matthews clearly indicated that although he himself was a socialist, Liberia would not conduct its international relations on ideological lines because of its national interests in terms of security and development.32 It took the media to spell out the policy’s implications vis-à-vis the United States. On June 7, two days after the Moose delegation’s departure, the Weekend News published an editorial entitled “The U.S. Visit: “The Devil We Know.’’ While the editorial expressed satisfaction with the Moose delegation and a preference for friendship with the United States over an alliance with new, less-familiar devils (such as the Soviet Union and the radical states), it described the friendship between America and Liberia as based on “interests.” The editorial bluntly stated that if the United States wanted the friendship to continue, it would have to meet Liberia’s interests: “The United States must realize that with the coming of the Revolution, it has a new breed of Liberians with whom to deal. No longer will Liberia be complacent with tokens or satisfied with a measure of our needs. If Liberia is to serve a permanent interest economically, strategically or otherwise, she will seek and expect a full measure of equal benefit for the growth and development of our country and people.”33 The declaration echoes Matthews’s statement about Liberia’s interests at the University. However, while Matthews’s assertion intimated that Liberia would seek good relations with the West, where its security and development interests lie, the message of the editorial was that the PRC government was not bound or beholden to the United States. It was more by coincidence than design that Baccus Matthews’s declarations of “Genuine Non-Alignment” coincided with the Moose, Funk, and Gray delegation’s visit to Liberia, which arrived on June 1 and left on June 5, 1980. It took very little time for the mission to decide that a working relationship could be established with the PRC government. Delivering the Carter administration’s two-pronged message, the delegates told the Liberians that the mission would examine what the United States could do to promote faster social and economic development in Liberia, while letting it be known that

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it was disturbed when leaders failed to live up to its expectations of peaceful change and the rule of law.34 The mission ended with the American embassy promising increased U.S. economic and military aid, and the IMF granting Liberia a $4 million loan.35 After the delegation’s departure, the two sides continued to build the new relationship, cemented by America’s economic assistance to the new regime. Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs Togba Nah Tipoteh led a delegation of ministers and technocrats to the United States to continue the talks. Minister of Finance Perry Zulu asked the IMF to send a second mission to Liberia.36 Moose paid a second visit to Monrovia on July 28, accompanied by U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Donald McHenry, an African American renowned for his skill in personal diplomacy. He came bearing a promise of $10.7 million in assistance for development programs and budgetary support and a $30 million IMF loan agreement for Doe to sign. The IMF mission arrived in early July, when it set in motion the standby and drawing rights agreements that were signed in September.37 In tandem, fearful that an isolated Liberia would become radicalized, the United States pressed for a resolution of the West-African standoff. The West African states were divided between those that favored isolating the troublesome Liberian regime and those that favored trying to tame it and bringing it into the African fold. On the way home from Liberia, Moose stopped off at Nigeria and Côte D’Ivoire, the leaders of the isolationist camp, to provide what he would later term “a U.S. lead on the situation.”38 Whether independently or persuaded by Moose, Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Shagari of Nigeria came to realize that isolating Liberia’s postcoup regime would lead to precisely the radicalization and instability they feared. Before it adjourned, the ECOWAS summit had established a supervisory commission consisting of the then-ECOWAS chair, Togo’s President Eyadema, and Presidents Houphouet-Boigny, Siaka Stevens, and Sekou Toure to lay down terms for the inclusion of a Liberian delegation in the upcoming OAU summit. The negotiations went doggedly ahead despite Liberian actions that could easily have derailed them had any member of the commission so desired. On June 14, Liberian security forces dragged the slain president’s eldest son, Adolphus B. Tolbert—who was married to Daisy Delafosse, the adopted daughter of Houphouet-Boigny—out of his hiding place in the French embassy and arrested him. This was two days before the commission was scheduled to meet with Doe at HouphouetBoigny’s presidential palace in Yamoussoukro.39 The arrest did not result in the cancellation of the meeting, as might have been expected from the harsh ECOWAS response that had been triggered by Matthews’s rhetoric and Doe’s attire. Even Houphouet-Boigny, who had known where Adolphus was hidden and had personal cause for anger, as his adopted daughter was married to

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Adolphus, attended as scheduled. For all the awkwardness of the situation, the presidents set a second meeting, in Monrovia for the 26th of the month, only a few days in advance of the OAU summit.40 The second meeting also went ahead, even though the PRC refused to meet the commission’s demands to release Adolphus. In an expression of chagrin, Houphouet-Boigny announced that he could not arrive in Monrovia on June 26 (Liberia’s Independence Day) and the meeting was postponed to the 27th.41 The only concession the PRC had made to the supervisory commission was to release a small number of political prisoners: seven army officers arrested shortly after the coup, four officials of the ousted Tolbert government, and eight persons suspected of having helped to hide Adolphus.42 Matthews, however, was already at the OAU foreign ministers’ meeting in Freetown ahead of the summit. On the 29th, the PRC government reassumed Liberia’s obligations to ECOWAS and agreed to normalize relations with all its member states, and Matthews, still in Freetown, met with his Nigerian counterpart, Professor Ishaya Audu, and declared that the two countries would normalize diplomatic relations.43 A.B.’s continued imprisonment notwithstanding, on July 1 Matthews was received at the OAU summit as the head of the Liberian delegation. In early September, the Nigerian ambassador returned to Monrovia, and the Nigerian embassy resumed operating at full staff.44 The first phase culminated in mid-August with the formal articulation of U.S. policy on Liberia. The policy was articulated by Moose and supported by Smith in the August 19 hearings of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. As outlined in the written statement that Moose read to the subcommittee, the policy amounted to propping up the new government with economic and military aid, while pressing for a return to civilian rule and for human and political rights. Yet although the Moose statement dwells at some length on the promotion of political and civil liberties and human rights in Liberia, it ultimately subordinates them to the military needs of the new regime and the Libyan threat to American interests. The document explains away the regime’s human rights abuses and links their amelioration to providing for the needs of the army and addressing the regime’s security concerns. Urging the subcommittee to approve the administration’s military aid requests, Moose explained: This military help is intended not only to give evidence of support but to respond especially to the government’s insecurity about its ability to handle a possible countercoup, which has caused it to hesitate in adjudicating the case of political detainees. We hope that once the troops are better equipped there will be further progress in the human rights areas.45

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Moreover, although both Moose and Smith described the postcoup government as desirous of friendship with the United States, they waived the radical threat. Moose declared that “willingness to help on the military side will also counter the temptation to accept the reported offers of military assistance by such countries as Ethiopia, Libya and the Soviet Union.”46 Smith admitted that there was no substantial evidence of the radical states supporting the PRC, but argued that if the United States and other Western states “were not forthcoming,” he could “not rule out that as a possibility.” Despite objections, notably by Congressman C.W. Bill Young of Florida, Moose’s and Smith’s arguments won the day. Before the month was out, Congress had approved $5.5 million for development assistance: $5 million to support the national budget, and $200,000 for medical supplies. In addition, the administration requested the Congress’ approval of transferring a modest military aid package consisting mainly of communications equipment, military vehicles and a small quantity of weapons.47 In order to take more immediate action, President Carter took advantage of his special authority for foreign assistance, and ordered the shipment of numerous U.S. Army trucks, totaling two hundred by early 1981.48 Here, too, Liberia’s rulers made very few concessions for the benefits they received. In advance of the subcommittee hearings, Doe promised that, all being well, elections would be held in three years time (when elections were in any case supposed to be held) and ordered the release of three political prisoners, one of them a TWP local leader; and the PRC repeated the regime’s oft made commitment to do all it could to protect and encourage foreign investors.49 The promise of elections was carefully hedged and several years away; and more than one hundred officials who served under Tolbert were still being held without trial.50 The Second Phase: Application of Genuine Non-Alignment to the United States The second phase stretched from the end of August through the first few months of Ronald Reagan’s presidency in 1981. This phase was distinguished by the application of Genuine Non-Alignment to the United States. Its onset was triggered by the postcoup government’s crisis. The August aid package fell far short of both its economic and military needs. The economic aid was not nearly sufficient to meet the country’s current needs, to say nothing of fulfilling the promises of the revolution. The military aid was nowhere near enough to protect the junta from armed challenges, in a region where coups were frequently followed by countercoups. After the coup, the Liberian army, which had been poorly trained and ill equipped under Tolbert, was in disarray, as soldiers were instructed not to obey their Americo-Liberian officers.

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This left the junta in constant fear of being overthrown, whether by supporters of the former regime or by low-ranking soldiers like themselves, whose appetite for power the coup had awakened. Although Moose’s statement to the House subcommittee had duly noted the military government’s anxieties and given ample attention to its military needs, the administration’s actual request for military assistance was quite modest. Moreover, while Congress had promptly approved the administration’s requests for economic, development, and humanitarian aid, approval of the military aid was still pending.51 In practice, the application of the policy meant that Liberia would seek assistance from both sides, with two purposes: to pressure the United States to increase its aid and to obtain needed resources from other countries. Since Liberia was economically dependent on Washington, the government had to be careful not to alienate it. Thus it both played on Washington’s apprehensions that its acceptance of aid from the Soviet Union and its African surrogates would lead Liberia into their camp and offered reassurances that it would not. The explicit application of the policy was incremental. It began with the postcoup government’s efforts to leverage its appeals for American assistance by threatening to seek help elsewhere. The threat, which was voiced in early September, was preceded and reinforced by Doe’s and Matthews’s visit to Ethiopia on August 28. This visit raised the level of contact with the Soviet-backed radical state from that of a civilian minister to that of the military head of state. The communiqué that was issued at the end of the visit, along with its declarations of mutual friendship between Liberia and Ethiopia, took a barely disguised aim at America’s support for the Somali government, which was making irredentist claims on Ethiopian territory. As Somali guerrillas were attacking Ethiopia, the communiqué called for “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries” and deplored “the attempts by expansionist anti-people forces and international reaction to slow down the progress of normalization of relations and to perpetuate tension in the area.”52 On September 9, less than a week and a half later, Doe moved from veiled criticism of America to open threat. Complaining that Liberia’s “traditional friends”—read: The United States—had not gone beyond “token assistance” in meeting the country’s pressing financial needs. While he appreciated the efforts of Liberia’s traditional friends, he indicated dissatisfaction over the level of assistance thus far received by “many who call themselves our friends.” In line with the principle of Genuine Non-Alignment, he made it clear that if more serious efforts are not made to increase the level of assistance from allies, most especially military equipment, Liberia would have no alternative but to seek aid from other sources that are prepared to help.53 It is worth mentioning that the threat, which placed special emphasis on military

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aid, was strategically timed when Congress was considering the approval of $1 million in military credit and additional economic aid. The threat was soon followed by reassurances, offered by Matthews when he was in New York for a UN General Assembly meeting. In a New York Times interview published on September 19, 1980, Matthews took pains to dispel the impression of ingratitude Doe’s words must have left and to reassure the United States with respect to Liberia’s friendship. He praised the resumption of American aid as “a reaffirmation of confidence” that would encourage other nations to become friendlier. Distancing the PRC regime from the radical states and the Soviet Union, he explained Doe’s visit to Ethiopia as an expression of “African solidarity”; pointed out that no date had been set for Doe to visit Moscow; and denied (with dubious veracity) that either he or Doe had ever met with Soviet or Cuban diplomats. He took the trouble to deny (also with dubious veracity) that the government had threatened to seek aid from radical Arab and African states or the Soviet Union in order to pressure the United States to give it what it wanted.54 The reassurance was strategically timed as Matthews was about to go to Washington to lobby for the bill. Whether or not they were actually impelled by the threat, within a few weeks, the IMF signed the standby agreement that it had arranged in June, giving Liberia special drawing rights of $85 million over a two-year period; the Export Import Bank gave Liberia’s government well over $11 million to expand and improve its radio broadcasting and another $5 million in budget for its bankrupt ministries; and, in mid-November, Congress approved the military credit it had been considering.55 The first application of Genuine Non-Alignment to the United States was verbal. The next application, in November, was substantive. By mid-November, Liberia faced a year-end cash-flow gap of more than $50 million. The government was unable to pay pre-Christmas salaries and was in danger of defaulting on its more than $11 million petroleum debt to Saudi Arabia, due on November 29. In the face of these exigencies, Doe proceeded to make good on his earlier threat to “seek aid from other sources.” In September he had not named the other sources. Now he turned to oil-rich Libya, America’s bête noire. A Libyan delegation visited Monrovia to find out whether a Libyan People’s Bureau, as Libya termed its embassies, could be opened in Monrovia; and Doe accepted Libya’s invitation to Tripoli, set for November 30, to discuss Libya’s offer of crude oil or a large infusion of monetary aid.56 This concrete application of Genuine Non-Alignment occurred when Libya’s intrusion in Chad had become so severe that the OAU would soon censure it and demand the immediate removal of Libya’s troops. It brought a swift U.S. response, consisting of carrot and stick. Both were borne by Moose

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in a one-day visit to Monrovia in mid-November. The carrot consisted of U.S. promises of $14 million in military and economic assistance and of help with commercial banks on Liberia’s debt refinancing.57 The stick was pressure on Liberia’s rulers to take real measures toward economic recovery in return for the administration’s making good on those promises. Thus, on November 17, Doe made a speech to the nation acknowledging that Liberia was on the brink of economic ruin, and announcing the national savings bond scheme and a string of austerity measures that he was required to make under the terms of the IMF agreement.58 In reward, on November 20, the International Development Association, a World Bank affiliate, approved credits of $4 million to develop agriculture and small businesses, and three New York commercial banks (Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Bankers Trust), persuaded by the U.S. government, paid $5 million of the petroleum debt to Saudi Arabia.59 Doe canceled his visit to Libya, undoubtedly under U.S. advisement. On December 1, 1980, the day after Doe was supposed to be in Tripoli, Moose returned to Liberia, on his second jaunt in three weeks, bearing a $10 million grant in emergency assistance atop the $14 million promised in November. This aid, too, came with not so subtle, but also not so overt, U.S. pressure. Exactly what transpired during the Moose visit is beyond our knowledge. Two details of Moose’s intentions, however, are available. One is his report that in his hour-long meeting with Doe, he said that he “wanted him to understand it was not necessary for them to obligate themselves to Libya out of financial concerns.” The other is that he defined the aim of his visit as ensuring that Liberia’s military government was “serious” about the austerity measures that Doe had promised would be taken before the United States approved further aid.60 Putting these details together, we can deduce that Moose let Doe know that if he chose to be friends with Libya, the United States could withhold further assistance and also make it difficult for the PRC to exercise its IMF drawing rights. Doe’s cancellation of his visit to Libya was a pragmatic concession, made in recognition that it was in the PRC’s best interests to remain in America’s good graces. It was not an abandonment of Genuine Non-Alignment, only a lowering of profile. A week later, Matthews and the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Togba Nah Tipoteh, visited Tripoli on their own and signed an agreement for Libya to buy cocoa and coffee from Liberia. They also delivered Doe’s effusive letter of apology, which spoke of a “postponement” of his visit, not a cancellation, and kept the door open to further dealings in the future. Matthews once again offered reassurances. In a communication with the American embassy, he described the visit to Libya as a purely economic matter, with no political implications.61 Speaking to the Washington Post after his return from Libya, he admitted that “radicalizing the circumstances” in

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Liberia would not only alienate the country’s “traditional” foreign donors, but also open it up “to exploitation from those who would be considered our new friends.”62 This time, however, the reassurances came with a barb and veiled warning: Matthews let it be known that while Western aid was needed and appreciated, “we believe here that the United States government could have done more.”63 Toward the end of the second phase, the Liberian government was in a bind. It needed much more aid than the Carter administration would (or could) give it, and the aid came with conditions of fiscal responsibility and human and civil rights. In any case, Carter had lost the November presidential elections and was on the way out. At the same time, the Liberian government was concerned by Libya’s expansionism. Matthews’s above-quoted statements to the Washington Post allude to the concern. The apprehensions are well conveyed in a December 22 editorial in the government-owned New Liberian. Along with urging members of the OAU to seek means to get Libya to withdraw its troops from Chad, the editorial observes that “the presence of Libyan troops in Chad constitutes not only a security risk to neighboring countries but also a precedent that may be repeated in other states.”64 The application of Genuine Non-Alignment was thus a balancing act, in which Liberia’s new rulers sought aid from both sides while aligning themselves with neither side completely. At no point did they want to give up on the beneficial relations with the United States, but they could not afford to give up on aid from other sources either. The Third Phase: Alliance with the United States It was only in the third phase that Doe would finally renounce Genuine NonAlignment. This phase began with Ronald Reagan’s assumption of the U.S. presidency in January 1981 and ended in May, when Doe unequivocally threw his lot in with the United States. Reagan’s election, along with the election of a Republican majority to the Senate for the first time in twenty-five years, brought about a change in U.S. foreign policy. Already as he campaigned, Reagan lambasted the policy of détente adopted by Carter and his predecessors as an expression of weakness that provoked Soviet imperialism, and branded Carter’s human rights conditions a hypocritical and harmful imposition on the sovereignty of America’s friends. Urging a firmer foreign policy, he blamed what he termed Carter’s inconsistency and vacillation for fostering Soviet expansion in Africa and elsewhere. In his inaugural address, on January 20, 1981, he promised to strengthen America’s “historic ties” with its friends and allies. Assuring them of America’s “support and firm commitment,” he went on to declare: “We will match loyalty with loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial

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relations. We will not use our friendship to impose on their sovereignty. . .,” and in a rousing crescendo addressed to America’s enemies, he declared that the United States would “not surrender. . .now or ever.”65 With respect to Liberia, the change came with the promise of more open-handed aid with fewer reservations, but also less tolerance of an independent foreign policy than under the Carter administration. It took some time before the postcoup regime grasped the importance of the change. For the first few weeks after Reagan took office, it continued to operate as before. In February 1981, Finance Minister Major Perry Zulu visited Libya, probably to discuss the cocoa and coffee deal made in December, and a group of Liberian students were sent to Ethiopia for training in conducting literacy campaigns.66 On March 6, Matthews announced that, in accordance with the Genuine Non-Alignment policy, the government of Liberia had given Libya permission to open a People’s Bureau in Monrovia. The permission was given as a quid pro quo for the coffee and cocoa deal, and in anticipation of further economic benefits.67 It brought relations with Libya to a new level. Liberia had long had unofficial (economic) relations with Libya under the TWP. The establishment of a People’s Bureau, however, would give the relations a visibility and legitimacy they had not previously enjoyed, and bestow on Libyan government personnel legal status and diplomatic immunity in the country. The permission was given when U.S. relations with Libya were particularly strained as a result of Libya’s announcement, on January 6, 1981, of its planned merger with Chad.68 In reaction to this announcement, in the weeks before and after the opening of the People’s Bureau, U.S. officials, senators, and the media came out with harsh, and somewhat frenzied, statements against Libya’s conduct. Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr., issued repeated condemnations of Libya as a Soviet surrogate and a state that supported terrorism. Fears were rife that Libya would buy nuclear weapons and technology on the open market.69 The permission to open the People’s Bureau undoubtedly provoked strong protest by the U.S. embassy. This time, the reassurances were offered by Thomas Quiwonkpa, commanding general of the Liberian army and Doe’s closest ally in the PRC. On March 10, in anticipation of the first visit by the new deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Lannon Walker, Quiwonkpa called a press conference in which he expressed effusive appreciation of America’s assistance and tried to convey a sense of shared views and values with the Reagan administration by swiping at its rivals. He praised the United States for being the only country “to come to the rescue of the Liberian people since the revolution” and compared its aid favorably with that of the communist and socialist countries, which, he said, were “more interested in supplying arms and ammunitions to African countries and were

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quick to take advantage of military takeovers and other national disturbances.” He also condemned as enemies of the revolution “foreign elements along with their Liberian sympathizers who are trying to introduce socialist or communist ideologies into Liberia.”70 His statements, made in Doe’s name, were for American ears. If nothing else, like the other members of the junta, he is unlikely to have been content with America’s food aid and certainly would have wanted the arms and ammunition that the United States had been withholding, but his references to Libya were indirect and he made no reference at all to its People’s Bureau. Thus far, the pattern was similar to that in the previous stage, with threats followed by efforts to mollify the Americans without reversing or backtracking on the policy act. However, it departed from those scenarios in what happened later on. The new deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Lannon Walker, arrived in Monrovia on March 11, 1981. Like Moose had done in his last two visits, Walker arrived shortly after Liberia’s government had made a move toward Libya. Like Moose, he came bearing emergency aid, this time of another $12 million. The following day, on March 12, the U.S. administration announced that the Pentagon had sent a six-member military training team to Liberia. Carter had already been sending training teams, much as his predecessors had done since the 1930s.71 On all three counts, however—Walker’s visit, the economic aid, and the military aid—the actions of the Reagan administration differed in crucial respects from those of the Carter administration. Walker’s visit, his first to Liberia in his official capacity, was preplanned. Undoubtedly, the Libyan embassy was a major concern during this visit, but the visit itself was not prompted by Liberian threats, as the Moose visits had been, but rather were part and parcel of Reagan’s determination to create an anti-communist front. The emergency aid, Walker indicated, was a temporary measure to tide the Liberian government over while the administration reviewed its economic program so as to decide on a more permanent, noncrisis assistance package. This information signaled a change in policy from a crisis management approach to a focus on longer term and more comprehensive assistance. The change in economic policy carried with it what Walker would tell the House was “a much deeper and more coherent commitment over time” than what the Carter administration could make in the time left to it after the coup. The main component in the long-term assistance program was an incremental increase of the level of the annual economic aid from about $20 million allocated to Liberia in the 1979 fiscal year, to $80 million from 1982 onwards.72 The military aid was much more extensive than that which had been provided till then and different in kind. In addition to the military training and light equipment supplied to Liberia by the Carter administration and its predecessors, the Reagan administration sent engineering units, strengthened

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training to include the development of command and control procedures, and indicated its readiness to provide direct military support for the PRC. Shortly after the visit, it was announced that America would be sending a missile-firing destroyer and 100 Green Berets to help secure the upcoming Redemption Day celebrations of the first anniversary of the coup.73 The military aid also included funds for military housing, which the Carter administration had never provided. The sorry state of army accommodations was a major sticking point for the junta, which regarded improving army housing as important to retaining the loyalty of the low-ranking soldiers. The matter was so pressing that within a few days of the coup Doe ordered that apartments on a private housing estate be confiscated and turned over to soldiers. Then, when the Moose delegation arrived in June, Doe himself took them to see the soldiers’ deplorable living conditions. Nonetheless, Moose’s August statement to the House made no mention of military housing, and the August aid package made no provision for it. By November, the lack of housing assistance had become a matter of contention. Doe requested $30 to $40 million to rebuild army barracks. Military figures in Liberia intimated that progress toward improving the soldiers’ miserable living conditions and matériel would be essential to restoring civilian rule. The Carter administration was unwilling to supply additional help until Doe set a timetable for a return to civilian government. The Reagan administration quickly exited the loop. On April 8, Walker told the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations that the administration had committed $40 million over a three- or four-year period to the rebuilding of military housing.74 Thus, on both the economic and military fronts, the Reagan administration proceeded very quickly to give the PRC what it wanted but had not received from the Carter administration, and with less insistence (for what it was worth) on fiscal responsibility and human and civil rights. Moreover, the greatly increased support was not a direct response to the opening of the Libyan embassy. At most, the opening may have brought up the announcement of the support and perhaps accelerated its delivery. The measures were the logical expression of Reagan’s “loyalty for loyalty” policy, unhampered by the inhibitions that had constrained the Carter administration. The realization that he would be able to get much of what he wanted from Reagan evidently clinched the matter for Doe. On March 12, Quiwonkpa issued a second statement, this time in an interview with the Agence France-Presse (AFP). Naming names, he stated flatly that he opposed the opening of a Libyan embassy in Monrovia and accused Libya of wanting to establish its People’s Bureau in order to continue its expansionist activities in Africa. Repeating his fulsome praise of the United States for sending food (rice) and helping the PRC, he declared that the Libyans, the Soviets,

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and the Cubans do not give Liberia the same help. In effect, Quiwonkpa, Doe’s ally and spokesman, came out in favor of preferential relations with the United States. Matthews, who had remained mum until then, held his ground. In an AFP statement counter to Quiwonkpa’s, he reiterated Liberia’s commitment to true non-alignment. While offering America the usual reassurances, he vigorously defended the decision to open the People’s Bureau. He argued that it was in the interest of both Liberia and the United States that Liberia have diplomatic relations with Libya, and pointed out that Sierra Leone had Libyan and Cuban embassies, but that nobody thought it was turning eastward. Referring to a routine and meaningless procedure, he assured the Americans that Liberia had promised that its diplomats would observe the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).75 Quiwonkpa’s post facto statement of opposition to the opening of the People’s Bureau was not yet a full renunciation of the Genuine NonAlignment policy. Doe was not yet ready to put his authority and prestige behind the renunciation and Quiwonkpa was a convenient proxy. The full renunciation was made only after the Reagan administration proved its worth with actions as well as words. On April 8, Walker appeared before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations to obtain funding for the promised economic and military aid. The American destroyer and 100 Green Berets arrived for thirty days around April, and watched over the Redemption Day ceremonies. This provided the regime with a visible show of America’s support such as had never been given to a Liberian government in the past. All this helped Doe to rally support in the fractured PRC for a change in Liberia’s foreign policy. A month later, on May 11, Liberia’s government closed the Libyan People’s Bureau and expelled two diplomats of the Soviet embassy.76 These measures were the manifestations of the “loyalty” that the Reagan administration clearly expected in return for the comprehensive, long-term economic and military aid it had extended. They amounted to the abandonment of Genuine Non-Alignment and of Liberia’s independence in foreign policy. The postcoup government placed itself unequivocally in the Western camp. One day after the closure of the People’s Bureau had been announced, Matthews criticized the abandonment of Genuine Non-Alignment as “not in the interest of the government, as Liberia would be considered the errand boy of the US.”77 Doe, unconcerned with Liberia’s image, retorted a few days later with the legalistic (and unlikely) excuse that the Libyan embassy was closed because it had been opened without the authorization of the PRC and head of state.78 No real explanation of the closure was given to the Liberian public. In his handling of the Genuine Non-Alignment policy, Doe demonstrated his ability to extract maximal advantages from an adverse situation that had

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characterized his reshuffle of the cabinet in February 1981. As Matthews enunciated it, Genuine Non-Alignment was to be the principle guiding Liberia’s foreign policy. Doe turned it to practical purposes in extorting from the Carter administration more aid than the United States had ever given to any of the TWP regimes. So long as Carter was in office and doling out assistance in small increments, Doe partnered with Matthews in applying the policy to pressure the administration to increase its aid. In September 1980 he issued the threat, Matthews the reassurance. In December he conceded to American demands, while Matthews and Tipoteh traveled to Libya on his behalf. In early March 1981, before Lannon Walker arrived with Reagan’s tidings, Matthews announced the opening of the People’s Bureau, and Doe sent his proxy, Quiwonkpa, to make a statement of friendship. After the first two occasions, the United States came forth with increased aid. The military credit that was finally approved by Congress in November 1981 may well have been approved without Doe’s threat in September, as a belated part of the August aid package. The aid packages in November and December, however, were clearly responses to the concrete applications of the threat: in the Libyan delegation’s visit to Monrovia and Doe’s planned visit and Matthews’s and Tipoteh’s actual visits to Tripoli. Doe touted and exploited the Genuine Non–Alignment policy up through the first few months of the Reagan administration. Despite his disclaimers, there is little doubt that he and the PRC had agreed to the opening of the Libyan People’s Bureau. Matthews, the father of the policy, stuck to it on ideological grounds even after its practical utility was thrown into question by the Reagan administration’s sweeping changes in U.S. policy and practices toward Liberia, as towards other countries in the Third World. Doe abandoned the policy when he realized the benefits of the secure long-term economic and military support to be gained from doing so and the risks—of losing that support—he faced in not doing so. Initially, in the immediate aftermath of Lannon Walker’s visit, he distanced himself from the General NonAlignment policy, sending Quiwonkpa, his proxy, to condemn the opening of the Libyan embassy and to swipe at the activities of America’s adversaries in Africa. When Reagan made good on his promises, he dropped the policy altogether and without sentiment. Like the February reshuffle, Doe’s readiness to abandon Genuine NonAlignment when this served his purposes strengthened his position in the PRC. The aid provided by the Reagan administration, especially the military aid, addressed the PRC’s most basic and essential concern: its own survivability. The visible display of American military might at the Redemption Day celebrations came to assuage the junta’s fear that the first anniversary of its seizure of power would serve as an occasion for a countercoup. Doe, in fact, reported that Quiwonkpa had to forgo the celebrations as he was out on

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patrol following rumors that “enemies of the revolution” would attempt an attack.79 The Reagan administration’s outlays for army housing would help the junta to retain the loyalty of the low-ranking soldiers. With the increase in its military training programs and assistance in developing command and control procedures, it would rebuild the shattered Liberian army so that it could serve as a force to protect the regime and strengthen its hold over the country. As the head of state, it was Doe who negotiated these benefits with the United States. The credit he thus reaped for obtaining them enabled him to garner the majority vote in the PRC and government that was needed to close the Libyan People’s Bureau, which effectively ended Liberia’s non-alignment. To get this majority, Doe mustered the support not only of his own camp, but also that of independent members of the PRC. His ability to rally a majority of the fractured and fractious body to his position was yet another sign of his growing political skill and changed the balance of power between himself and his archrival, Weh Syen. In February, Weh Syen had been able to force Doe to reshuffle the PRC and cabinet. Only three months later, he was unable to prevent Doe from chalking up a significant success in the PRC. In his pique, he mounted his first public attack on Doe’s leadership. About a week after the closure of the People’s Bureau was announced, he called a press conference in which he lambasted the decision. Echoing Matthews’s charge, but without Matthews’s ideological conviction, he averred that the abandonment of Genuine Non-Alignment would reduce the stature of Liberia’s leaders and went on to warn the PRC of “sheep [sic] in wolf skin” and to urge them “to stop listening to dictatorial advice.”80 It was an impotent attack by a man who had been bested by his chief rival and did not even dare to criticize him and his supporters directly, but only their “advisors.” The benefits to the junta of America’s assistance were not matched by benefits to the Liberian people. On the contrary, America’s economic and military support shored up the PRC that demonstrated indifference to the masses it claimed to represent, that drew on the public coffer to finance luxurious lifestyles for themselves, and that swelled the government offices and stateowned corporations with political appointees so as to build up their personal power and wealth. It strengthened a military leadership that responded to criticism and dissent with threats and, in some cases, violence, and that was already stifling political expression. The first anniversary of the coup roughly coincided with the Reagan administration’s first bounties. At this point, it could not yet be said for sure that Liberia would become the dictatorship that it did. Many signs that it would can be identified in retrospect—the government’s indifference to the public and focus on its own power and wealth being only one of them. The PRC identified itself as a military government, with the right to impose its

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will as it saw fit and to deny the right of opposition. The forces that could contain or countervail its power had been abrogated or appropriated into itself, some immediately after the coup, others over the course of the year. The constitution was abolished; the state’s powers of coercion, especially the army and police, were placed in the hands of the PRC and the civilian courts were placed under the control of the Supreme Military Court. What was left of the civilian justice system collapsed, undermined by the soldiers’ meddling, leaving Liberia’s citizens without protection from arbitrary treatment. Civil society bodies were forbidden to express themselves freely. The civilian ministers had no real power from the beginning. In addition, there were signs of the junta’s reluctance to transfer power to civilians. An anonymously written article titled “The Back to the Barracks Question: Both Sides of the Coin,” published in a special newsletter put out by the PRC to mark the first anniversary of the coup, essentially presents the case for the soldiers not going back just yet. It reports Doe telling that they would return as soon as the PRC completed its overhaul of the political system; quotes Weh Syen telling that they first “have to be convinced that the stability and full citizen participation in the development process in Liberia is ensured”; and quotes Speaker Podier stating that “our concern should not only be when the army is returning to the barracks but what we together can do to reconstruct a better Liberia.” Much like the statements of Captain Henry Suomie Zuo, Jr. some eleven months earlier, these statements by the PRC leadership still conditioned the junta’s return to the barracks on the attainment of some vaguely envisioned goal, whether public order or the aims of the revolution. The arguments on the other side were mentioned only briefly and quickly dismissed. On the other hand, the coupists’ shortcomings could not yet be unequivocally identified as indicators of bad faith. A year was not long enough to transform the society or to solve its severe problems. It was still possible to focus on the efforts of the regime. Those educated Liberians who identified with the revolution could, and did, excuse the soldiers’ conduct by attributing it to their military backgrounds and lack of education and experience. In February 1981, Amos Sawyer, widely admired for having challenged the TWP candidates in the November 1979 election, still saw the soldiers as maturing on the job: reining in their foreign travel, curtailing the stampede for government jobs, and exerting enough financial discipline to obtain foreign assistance.81 There was still the possibility that they would keep their promises to transfer power to civilians. The argument that conditions for elections had yet to be established had not yet entirely lost its validity. Moreover, Doe took advantage of the Redemption Day ceremonies to announce what must have seemed as an important step toward the desired end: the formation of the National Constitution Commission, known as “Con Com,” that he had

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promised to establish in his end-of-year address in December 1980. The members of the commission represented Liberia’s various ethnic groups and regions and included the veteran advocates of democracy: Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Sr., Albert Porte, lawyer-journalist Tuan Wreh, and, at its head, the respected Amos Sawyer. According to Doe, the commission would not be guided by the PRC, but rather “would be left to work on the new constitution independently.” Namely, freedom to subpoena testimony and consultants from all quarters.82 Notwithstanding the growing dissatisfaction, the coupists had not yet exhausted their credit with the public. The deprivation and exclusion under Americo-Liberian rule were still fresh in the consciousness of the African Liberians, so that, for all its shortcomings, the junta still retained its legitimacy. Nor were there signs that Doe would go down the road to personal dictatorship. For all his reliance on force, threats, and trickery, he could still be seen as an energetic and devoted leader trying to cope as best he could with a difficult and complex situation without the benefit of education and experience and without the cooperation of his colleagues in the PRC. His consolidation of power in the course of the year could be viewed as an effort to acquire the ability to affect the promised reforms rather than as a manifestation of naked ambition. His shift from Genuine Non-Alignment to a clearly pro-American foreign policy too was perceived as positive because the unprecedented assistance offered by the Reagan administration was crucial to meeting the conditions set for an eventual return to civilian rule, economic healing and stability. However, in retrospect, it is clear that America’s support of the PRC abetted the development of a military dictatorship. Doe quickly learned that, given the dynamics of the cold war, the aid would continue to flow even if his government members would prioritize their own narrow personal interests over the urgently needed national reforms. In addition, the massive military aid the United States dispensed provided the junta with a disciplined and loyal army that it would turn into its chief source of support and means of coercion. NOTES 1. Fred Coleman, Lynn James, and Steven Strasser, “A Sergeant’s Revolt Topples a U.S. Ally,” Newsweek, April 21, 1980, Nexis Uni. 2. “U.S., Others Re–affirm Solidarity with Liberians,” Liberian Inaugural, April 17, 1980, 8. 3. Juan de Onis, “Africans Disturbed by Libyan Advance,” New York Times, December 18, 1980, A15.

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4. “Appointment Request for the President: Samuel K. Doe, Head of State of the Republic of Liberia,” March 5, 1982, confidential, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (10/14/1981–06/30/1982)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. Associated Press, “Sergeant’s Regime Starts Trials of Former Officials,” April 14, 1980, Nexis Uni. 5. “U.S., Others Re–affirm Solidarity with Liberians,” 8. 6. J. Chaudhuri, “Liberia under Military Rule (1980–1985),” in Liberia: Underdevelopment and Political Rule in a Peripheral Society, R. Kappel, W. Korte, and F. Mascher, eds. (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1986), 50. 7. Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Seeks Closer Ties with Liberia’s New Rulers,” Washington Post, May 31, 1980, Nexis Uni. “Ambassador Presents Credentials,” sensitive, August 31, 488–90, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (03/23/1981–10/13/1981)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 8. “Appeals to Liberia for Clemency in Trials.” 9. “The OAU and Liberia,” Salisbury Radio, April 24, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 28, 1980, Nexis Uni. 10. U.S. Department of State, “IIM Outline Part III B. Political: 6. Acceptance—of the Regime by Other African States,” Case No. F-2014-11720, Doc No. C05962147, confidential, September 4, 1980 3, Department of State Records. 11. Dash, “Liberia’s Sergeants Take Turn Toward Authoritarian Rule.” 12. Oberdorfer, “U.S. Seeks Closer Ties.” 13. “IMF Team Here for Talks,” 3. 14. “Minister’s ‘Urgent’ Mission to the EEC and World Bank.” 15. Oberdorfer, “U.S. Seeks Closer Ties.” 16. Graham Hovey, “U.S. Is Sending First Mission to Liberia Since Coup,” New York Times, June 1, 1980, 17, Nexis Uni. 17. Oberdorfer, “U.S. Seeks Closer Ties.” George S. Khoryama, “U.S. Mission Begins Talks Here,” Redeemer, January 1980, 1, 11. 18. “Ethiopia’s Support for New Liberian Government,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 29, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 1, 1980, Nexis Uni. 19. “Libya-Liberia Relations,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 2, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 3, 1980, Nexis Uni. Oberdorfer, “U.S. Seeks Closer Ties.” 20. “Tass Accuses U.S.,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 855. 21. Lagos Domestic Service, “Shagari Condemns ‘Wanton’ Executions in Liberia,” 28 May 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1980): T3. “Liberia Retaliates to ECOWAS Denial of Our Sovereignty,” Weekend News, May 31, 1980, 1, 4. 22. Joseph Holloway, Liberian Diplomacy in Africa: A Study of Inter-African Relations (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), 166.

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23. AFP, “Liberian Foreign Minister’s Visits to Nigeria and Ethiopia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 20, 1980. “Doe in Lome for ECOWAS Summit,” Redeemer, May 27, 1980, 1. 24. “Liberian Foreign Minister’s Visit to Ethiopia,” Addis Ababa Home Service, May 22, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 23, 1980, Nexis Uni. 25. “African Conference Bars Liberia.” 26. AFP, “Liberia’s Doe Barred from ECOWAS Summit Opening Session,” May 27, 1980, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1980): Q2–Q3. 27. “Liberia’s Response to ECOWAS Summit Decision,” Monrovia Home Service, May 29, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 31, 1980, Nexis Uni. 28. “Syen Condemns W.A. Nations,” Redeemer, June 3, 1980, 1, 11. 29. “Liberia’s Response to ECOWAS Summit Decision.” 30. “Liberia’s Foreign Policy,” Weekend News, June 7, 1980, 1–2. 31. “Liberian Leader’s Acceptance of Invitation to Visit the U.S.S.R.,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 1980, Nexis Uni. 32. “Liberia’s Foreign Policy,” 1–2. 33. “The U.S. Visit ‘The Devil We Know,’” Weekend News, June 7, 1980, 2. 34. Khoryama, “U.S. Mission Begins Talks Here,” 1, 11. 35. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “United States to Increase Aid to Liberia,” June 6, 1980, Nexis Uni. “Liberia Will Continue to Use the Dollar,” 1–2. 36. “Top Govt. Officials Continue Talks in U.S.,” 1, 4. “Finance Minister’s 17th September Statement.” 37. “PRC Looks Outward as Economy Worsens,” 3. “Liberia—Request for Stand-By Arrangement,” 17. 38. U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981, Statement of Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for 1981: Part 6, 141–42. 39. Associated Press, “Liberian Leader Seeks Acceptance,” June 16, 1980, Nexis Uni. 40. “Four West African Leaders to Visit Liberia 26 June,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 17, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1980): T1. 41. “Monrovia Minisummit Rescheduled for 27 June,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 26, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report 5, no. 126 (June 1980): T2. 42. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Imprisoned Officers, Officials Released in Liberia,” June 26, 1980, Nexis Uni. “Release of Four Tolbert Officials,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 25, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 27, 1980, Nexis Uni.

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“Detainees Connected with Tolbert Case Released,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 26, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1980): T1. 43. “Liberia’s Relations with W. African Neighbours,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 29, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 2, 1980, Nexis Uni. 44. AFP, “Foreign Ministry Reports Relations with Nigeria Normalized,” September 8, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1980): T1. 45. Richard M. Moose, “U.S. Policy Toward Liberia,” Department of State Bulletin 80, no. 2045 (December 1980): 28. 46. Richard M. Moose, “U.S. Policy Toward Liberia,” 28. 47. Richard M. Moose, “U.S. Policy Toward Liberia,” 27–28. Thomas A. Johnson, “Liberian Sees Political Benefit From New U.S. Aid,” New York Times, September 21, 1980, 19. 48. Nicholas Proffitt, “Liberia: The Sergeant-Dictator,” Newsweek, January 12, 1981, AF Press Clips. 49. “Doe Orders Release of Three Political Prisoners,” T2. “Doe Promises to Encourage, Protect Foreign Investors,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 6, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1980): T1. 50. Robin Knight, “Any Role Left for U.S. in Chaotic Liberia?,” U.S. News & World Report, November 24, 1980, 35, Nexis Uni. 51. Johnson, “Liberian Sees Political Benefit From New U.S. Aid.” 52. “Ethiopian-Liberian Communique’s Call for Peace in the Horn of Africa,” Addis Ababa Home Service, August 30, 1980, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 1, 1980, Nexis Uni. 53. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia: MSGT Doe Announced There Have Been No Executions,” Case No. F-2014-11720, Doc No. C05962153, confidential, September 8, 1980, 2–3, Department of State Records. 54. Johnson, “Liberian Sees Political Benefit From New U.S. Aid.” 55. “Liberia; IMF Drawing Rights.”. Robert S. Graettinger, “Recent Agreements by International Lending and Financial Institutions Based in Washington,” Washington Post, September 22, 1980. 56. Liberian minister (interviewee has been anonymized), telephone conversation with author, December 7, 2006. Dash, “U.S. Envoy Visits Liberia on 2nd Trip in 3 Weeks.” 57. Onis, “Africans Disturbed by Libyan Advance,” A15. 58. “Liberian Head of State’s Announcement of Austerity Measures.” 59. “Cameroon, Liberia Loans,” New York Times, November 21, 1980. “U.S. Provides Aid to Liberia.” 60. Dash, “U.S. to Grant Liberia Emergency Assistance Worth $10 Million,” A20. 61. Liberian minister, telephone conversation. 62. Dash, “Liberian Revolt Preserves Old Structure.” 63. Leon Dash, “Liberia Struggles to Avoid Economic Collapse.

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Soldiers Who Ousted Tolbert Find He Left a Dismal Legacy,” Washington Post, December 16, 1980, A17, Nexis Uni. 64. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Paper Calls for Withdrawal of Libyan Troops from Chad,” December 23, 1980, Nexis Uni. 65. Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981,” The American Presidency Project, accessed September 12, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=43130. 66. Liberian minister, telephone conversation. “Conclusion of Liberians’ Education Course in Ethiopia,” Addis Ababa Home Service, March 4, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 7, 1981, Nexis Uni. 67. “Libyan People’s Bureau in Liberia,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 6, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 9, 1981, Nexis Uni.. Liberian minister, telephone conversation. 68. Associated Press, “U.S. Concerned about Proposed Libya-Chad Merger,” January 9, 1981, Nexis Uni. 69. Blaine Harden, “Terrorism; Are the Reasons for It as Simple as Ronald Reagan, Alexander Haig and Claire Sterling Would Have Us Believe?,” Washington Post, March 15, 1981, 14, Nexis Uni. Judith Miller, “Cranston Sees Iraq as Nuclear Power by ’82,” New York Times, March 17, 1981, 3, Nexis Uni. 70. “Armed Forces Commander Praises Ties with U.S.,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 10, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1981): T3–T4. U.S. Department of State, “Commanding General Quiwonkpa Speaks on Current Political Scene,” Case No. F-2014-11720, Doc No. C05962160, confidential, September 24, 1980, Department of State Records. 71. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “U.S. Aid to Liberia,” March 13, 1981, Nexis Uni. Judith Miller, “15 U.S. Green Berets to Aid Salvadorans,” New York Times, March 14, 1981, 1, Nexis Uni. 72. “U.S. Ambassador Explains; Why U.S. giving Liberia Much Military Aid,” Daily Observer, November 26, 1981, 1, 6. 73. “U.S. Calls Maneuvers with Liberia a Move to Stabilize Its Regime,” New York Times, April 5, 1981, 1, Nexis Uni. 74. US House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee, Liberia Reprogramming Department of State Agency for International Development, April 8, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 131–32. 75. AFP, “General, Foreign Minister Differ on Libya Ties,” March 13, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1981): T3–T4. 76. U.S. Department of State, “Report on the Situation in sub-Saharan Africa,” Doc. No. 81STATE254690, September 23, 1981, Department of State Records. 77. “Foreign Minister Comments,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 12, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1981): T2.

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78. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Leader on Reduction of Soviet Embassy Staff, Closure of Libyan Bureau,” May 17, 1981, Nexis Uni. 79. United Press International, “Head of State Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe Said. . .,” April 14, 1981, Nexis Uni. 80. “Weh Syen Warns Adviser Against Giving Bad Advice” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 18, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1981): T2. 81. Gregory Jaynes, “Governing Liberia by Trial and Error,” New York Times, February 8, 1981, 4, Nexis Uni. 82. “Doe Appoints Constitutional Commission,” Daily Observer, April 13, 1981, 2, 13. United Press International, [No headline in original], April 14, 1981, Nexis Uni.

PART 2

The Beginning of Personal Rule

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From Primus Inter Pares to the Head of the Pyramid

Early into his second year in office, Doe was already in a more powerful position than he had been when he first became head of state. On the international front, he had secured America’s commitment to his regime, which manifested itself in the form of substantial economic and military support. At home, he had fortified his position in the PRC by outmaneuvering the Weh Syen camp in the February 1981 reshuffle and by bringing in American aid. Yet, as noted in the last chapter, whether he would move toward dictatorship or democracy could not yet be determined. In the course of the second year, he undertook a steady stream of actions aimed at silencing his rivals and critics and at securing personal control of the government and state. The means he used included the same brew of intimidation, force, and manipulation that had served him so well the year before, but which became in the course of his second year of rule increasingly sophisticated, methodical, and proactive. However, the thrust of his actions never became really clear, for at each stage of the process he successfully cloaked his intentions under the pretense that the actions were being taken for the good of the country and that he was preparing to return Liberia to civilian rule. He started the twofold process when he still had credit with the masses, but against the background of rising discontent and incipient political activity. The February reshuffles of the cabinet and of the PRC brought a brief respite from the public criticism they had endured. The discontent soon flared up again with intensity, when it became clear that the personnel changes would not bring any change in the regime’s conduct. The first hints of the renewed flare-up were sounded at the Redemption Day celebrations held in honor of the first anniversary of the coup. The celebrations, continuing for three days, were a festive affair, with ample signs of enthusiasm and hope. Delegations of the country’s ethnic groups and organizations marched through the capital 71

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dressed in colorful attire shouting the slogans of the revolution: “In the cause of the people, the struggle continues!” and “Long live the PRC!” The leading independent paper, Daily Observer, noted that the turnout was the largest ever on such an occasion, comparable only to that which had gathered in the streets when the news of the coup first broke.1 The crowning event of the ceremonies, the establishment of Con Com, seemed to be the first concrete step in the soldiers’ return to the barracks. For some, the celebrations also served as an occasion to take stock and to criticize the course that the postcoup government was taking. The keynote speaker, Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Sr., who had served prison time for challenging the TWP’s corruption and one party rule, delivered guarded admonitions wrapped in praise of the revolution. He described the overthrow of the TWP as “the most important event since the nation was founded” and enthused about it having created “the possibility of a truly democratic society in the future.” But he also warned the military leaders that “from now the Liberian people will only accept a Government of the People by the People and for the People”; admonished them with generalizations like “leaders must be honest with those they lead or face the harsh judgement [sic] of history” and “social, political and economic relations must from now on be built on trust, justice and solidarity,” and cautioned them not to repeat the mistakes of the TWP. Methodist bishop Arthur Flomo Kulah was more direct and went further. In a sermon presciently entitled, “Arms That Liberated Must Not Enslave Us,” he reminded the Council members that “the gun can win a war, but it cannot build a nation” and, in a resounding finale, warned pessimistically that “the weapons that were meant to protect the Liberian people . . . must never be used to enslave and destroy the Liberian people” and prayed that the revolution “will never get to a place where the masses will regret that it ever took place.”2 These critiques were soon followed by challenges from both government officials and students, which coalesced around the closure of the Libyan People’s Bureau in early May 1981. As already noted, the closure was criticized publicly first by Foreign Minister Gabriel Baccus Matthews on ideological grounds, and then by PRC cochairman Weh Syen, in copycat fashion, to discomfort Doe. Students added their objection to the closure. According to a security information briefing dated May 19, 1981, activists from LINSU (Liberian National Students Union) and SUP (Student Unification Party) at the University of Liberia were planning to write a position paper denouncing the closure of the People’s Bureau and the reduction of the staff of the Soviet Embassy.3 The challenge posed by the students went beyond foreign affairs to domestic matters. The same security information briefing reported that SUP activists had set up a number of committees with rather portentous-sounding

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titles: Information and Propaganda, Militant Wing, Workers Relations [sic], Mobilization and Recruitment, and Programs. The writers of the briefing interpreted the committees as early efforts to establish a political pressure group and warned that the students’ activities were signs of “student disturbances” to come.4 At this stage, Doe’s responses to the challenges were largely verbal, consisting of many of the same warnings and threats that he and his spokesmen had been issuing since shortly after the coup. Although Kulah’s speech had an electrifying effect on the populace and encouraged other clerics to speak out, Doe’s response, a week later, was merely to urge the clergy to “preach about Christ and lead their flock to the Throne of Grace rather than engage in politics.”5 In May, Doe responded to the objections to the closure of the Libyan embassy and the staff reduction at the Soviet Embassy by offering vacuous explanations. His reliable spokesman Thomas Quiwonkpa lashed out at the challengers both in the government and among the students. At a May 14 meeting with citizens in Nimba County, he declared that the PRC government would not tolerate any government official who devoted work time to the promotion of his future political objectives and called on all students to desist from political activities and concentrate on their studies.6 Very soon Doe would add actions to words as he confronted his critics and rivals. THE CONFRONTATION BEGINS The first actions consisted largely of ad hoc efforts to tighten discipline in the army, intimidate Liberia’s civil society, curb student dissent and increase Doe’s power in the PRC. The confrontation was ushered in by two concurrent developments: a perceived, readily foiled coup attempt and public criticism of the regime by two Con Com appointees. On May 28, 1981, fifteen low-ranking soldiers, ten of them in the Executive Mansion Guard, were arrested for plotting to assassinate Doe and overthrow the government. The accused had apparently timed their move for when Doe was out of the country attending his first ECOWAS summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and some three weeks after the American Green Berets, who had been sent to secure Doe during the Redemption Day ceremonies, had departed at the end of a month of joint maneuvers with the Liberian army. Accounts differ as to the motives of the accused. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Lannon Walker cited grievances by the Gio people (seven of the plotters were Gio) that they had not benefited from the coup equally with the Krahn.7 The New York Times named personal jealousy as a primary motive.8

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The discovery of the presumed plot intensified the sense of threat that had plagued the junta since their seizure of power. Despite the great popularity of the coup, the junta had cause for apprehension that its violent takeover would serve as an example to others and that their own rule would end in the same way as the TWP’s. In living memory, military governments that had toppled civilian regimes in neighboring Nigeria and Sierra Leone had themselves been overthrown, and the succession of juntas that replaced them overthrown in turn. Over the next few years the pattern would be repeated in Burkina Faso and Guinea. By May 1981 at least two previous coup attempts had been claimed. The first, some two weeks after the junta took power, was reportedly planned by a group of thirty soldiers headed by Major William Jerbo, who were said to have attacked a military installation in Balata, Bong County, and to have killed PRC member Isaac Jurway. The second was claimed in January 1981, when nine senior officers were accused of plotting a coup against the PRC.9 The Americans treated the junta’s concerns with skepticism. The Carter administration provided military aid reluctantly and belatedly; the Reagan administration was more forthcoming. Both were motivated more by concern that the postcoup regime would turn to Libya for assistance than by fear that it would be overthrown. There were other expressions of skepticism as well. West Africa stated that no coup attempt had taken place and that Jerbo had been targeted because he was a well-trained and popular soldier who had always been considered a potential leader of a possible coup.10 The officers who were accused of plotting a coup in January were acquitted. After Doe ordered the arrest of the chairman of the military court that tried them, General Frank Senkpeni, a well-informed analyst was quoted as saying: “There was no coup attempt, the PRC is just getting paranoid.”11 No doubts had been voiced about the plot discovered in May, however, and its discovery vindicated all of the junta’s apprehensions. The junta prepared to respond to the military threat. Within days of the discovery of the plot, measures were taken to tighten discipline in the army so as to make it harder for soldiers to threaten or challenge the regime in the future. On June 1, the armed forces’ logistics commander Col. John Nuahn ordered all military personnel who possessed more than one firearm to turn in their weapons immediately or face serious penalties.12 On June 4, twelve soldiers were dishonorably discharged for what the ministry of defense described as “acts incompatible with the rules and regulations of the Liberian army.”13 On June 5, Minister of Defense Albert Karpeh warned all army officers against holding unauthorized press conferences and making pronouncements without passing through the proper channels.14 On the same day, thirteen of the fifteen plotters were sentenced to death by military tribunal and executed by firing squad.

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The regime took a harsh stance against civilians it perceived as being involved in undesired political activity. A few days after the arrest of the plotters, Patrick Seyon, at the time vice president of administration at the University of Liberia, and two other civilians, J. C. N. Howard, a former member of the Tolbert parliament, and Samuel Butler, former editor of the Liberian Inaugural, were arrested under the pretext that they were involved in the coup attempt. The three arrestees represented elements of society that the junta wanted to silence—academics, the press, and political classes—and whose treatment could serve as an example and warning to others. They were jailed for nine days and beaten and tortured before being released for lack of evidence. On the day of their release, Doe issued another of his warnings cum threats. Anyone caught indulging in political activities, he declared, would be sent to the military tribunal for trial.15 For all of the similar warnings in the past, this is the first time that Doe threatened to drag civilian dissenters before a military tribunal. Coming in the wake of the arrest and torture of innocent civilians, his message—that the same would happen to other critics of the regime—could not have been clearer or more frightening. With this message in his armory, Doe turned his attention to the challenges posed by Liberia’s students. Of all of the civil society groups, Doe singled out the students as the most threatening to his regime. Well before the coup, Liberia’s students were a force with which to be reckoned. Their campus parties were well integrated into the political parties that had opposed the TWP, and many students were active in both. In the heady days immediately after the coup, the students, like most of the rest of the population, welcomed the coupists with fervor. Three thousand students marched in a LINSU-organized parade to welcome the soldiers. However, they also presented the newly formed PRC with a detailed set of recommendations that conveyed their expectations that they would be an active and integral part of the reform that the coupists had promised. As the promised reforms failed to be implemented, the students became the regime’s most outspoken and active critics, as is often the case in many African countries.16 Individual pastors preached against the abuses, but the clergy did not act together to mount protests. The independent press, with the notable exception of the Daily Observer, had been intimidated out of existence. In contrast, the students persisted in speaking out on political issues and pointing out the junta’s failure to deliver on its promises. Up until this point, Doe had acted in concert with the PRC in responding to the coup attempt and to civilian criticisms. Now he proceeded on his own, setting out on a bungled move aimed both at quelling the student unrest and at asserting his authority vis-à-vis the other members of the Council. He began by punishing Wesseh, the current president of LINSU and appointee of Con Com. On June 18, at Doe’s instigation, Wesseh was accused of

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violating Decree No. 1, which prohibited political activity. He was dismissed from Con Com, to which he had been appointed by Doe, fired from his job at the state-owned Electricity Corporation, which Doe had secured him, and banned from leaving the country, speaking to the press, interacting with other citizens, and making public statements.17 The punishment of Wesseh was the first of several miscalculations on Doe’s part. It was predicated on two erroneous assumptions: One was that the students, intimidated by the recent torture of Seyon, Howard, and Butler, would accept the ban without protest. The other was that if they did not, Doe would be able to rely on his sympathizer Kwame Clement, Wesseh’s rival, to curb any expressions of outrage. Doe’s assumptions were not borne out. Instead of quietly acquiescing to the punishment, a group of nine University of Liberia students, calling themselves the “Young Militant Brigade,” distributed leaflets on campus describing the ban as an “act of unprecedented aggression against the students of Liberia.”18 Doe also made the mistake of trying to use the student unrest as a means of asserting his hegemony in the PRC. Instead of requesting the PRC’s authorization for the actions against Wesseh, he simply notified Weh Syen of his intentions and carried them out without waiting for his agreement. By circumventing the PRC, Doe was asserting his right to make decisions on his own. This act too was predicated on an erroneous assumption: that the Council, being as eager as he was to put a lid on the student agitation, would go along with his actions. As it turns out, this was not the case. One day after Wesseh’s banning, five PRC members, three of them Weh Syen supporters, wrote a confidential letter to Weh Syen complaining that the decision to punish Wesseh had not been brought before the Council for approval, demanding Wesseh’s return to Con Com, and, with an uncharacteristic concern for civil rights, calling upon the PRC to allow freedom of speech.19 Plowing ahead, Doe ignored the objections in the PRC and continued to try to force the students into submission. On June 22, just before leaving for an OAU summit in Nairobi, he had Wesseh arrested and ordered the closure of Liberia’s only remaining independent newspaper, the Daily Observer. He also arrested its editor, Kenneth Best, as well as its six members of staff for reporting on Wesseh’s punishment and for publishing three readers’ letters criticizing it.20 In the PRC, the students’ open defiance left Doe vulnerable to the machinations of Weh Syen, though there was little actual damage that Weh Syen could do to Doe by this point. The army was loyal to Doe, and both it and the security services were in the hands of Doe’s fellow Krahn. Moreover, wary as usual, Doe had taken the precaution of not transferring control of the army or security services to Weh Syen, although protocol stipulated that this is what he did when abroad.21 Without the power to do substantive harm to Doe, Weh

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Syen took advantage of his absence to embarrass him. On June 25, while Doe was at the OAU meeting in Nairobi, Weh Syen summoned the PRC and cabinet and ordered the release of the six Daily Observer journalists whose arrest Doe had ordered the day before. He did not, however, go so far as to release Wesseh and Best, the chief targets of Doe’s vendetta. Like the news conference that he had called after the closure of the Libyan embassy, his release of the six was also a gesture of impotence, but nonetheless irritating.22 When Doe returned from the OAU summit, the students were still not subdued, and his rivals in the PRC were still defiant. Nonetheless, he suddenly seemed to abandon his assault. On July 2 he led a high-powered delegation to the UL campus. After assuring the students that education was a high priority for the PRC and yet again warning them to desist from political activity, he announced the immediate release of Best and Wesseh.23 Their release served as a truce offering to the students and a rescission of his overstepping in the PRC. His apparent about-face did not mean that Doe had decided to accept defeat and end his assault on his challengers. His backtracking was a tactical measure taken to enable him to deal undisturbed with a more urgent task. Under pressure from the Americans and the IMF, Doe would soon have to declare severe austerity measures aimed at reducing by a quarter the government’s $100 million deficit of the previous year. The measures would include an end to the subsidy on rice, Liberia’s staple food, and the imposition of additional taxes on income and gasoline. Although these taxes would create substantial hardships for the masses, Doe had no choice but to impose them, as they were conditions for the continuation of the military and economic aid that sustained his regime. Without these taxes, the IMF would not grant Liberia further drawing rights, and the United States would not release the second half of a $25 million economic support grant.24 Doe could not afford to be ambushed by Weh Syen and his supporters in the PRC or risk that the abovementioned measures unleash violent protests. The 1979 rice riots, which had paved the way for the junta’s takeover, had been sparked by just such a hike in the price of rice that Doe would now have to announce. Liberia’s students had been active in those riots, and Doe was anxious to avoid a repeat scenario, hence the truce offerings. In his announcement of the measures on July 17, Doe took a further precaution to reduce the risk of protests by the masses. To promote their acceptance of the measures, he took out of the drawer the four-year economic plan that Minister of Planning Togba Nah Tipoteh and his ministry had begun drafting soon after the coup. As Tipoteh would later describe it, this plan was designed to steer Liberia away from dependency on foreign investors to a self-sufficient economy by encouraging productive investment; increasing efficiency in the private and public sectors, encouraging the social and

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economic activities of communities and the self-employed; and prioritizing export activities.25 Without crediting Tipoteh, Doe spoke in glowing terms of the “economic and social development program which will provide a useful direction for national economy.” He told of plans for investment, local participation, and improved technology, and positively gushed about plans to build roads, develop energy sources, encourage small and mediumsized businesses, and a host of other measures that would raise production and income.26 His tactic worked. The PRC supported the measures, as did the cabinet. There is no record of student disturbances or of demonstrations by the masses. The Washington Post quoted Patrick Seyon saying that people were complaining that the new taxes fell too heavily on wage earners and joking that workers might as well change their jobs for small-time trading, but no criticism beyond that. 27 In reward for enacting the austerity measures, Doe received a $3 million technical grant for military training facilities and the construction of military housing received from the American government, and also a new standby agreement of $55 million from the IMF.28 Politically, however, he was no nearer to his goals than he had been on his return from the OAU. The students were unsubdued and his rivals in the PRC still defiant. Now, with the demands of the Americans and the IMF met and the foreign lifeline of his regime extended for yet another while, he was free to resume his attack on his rivals and critics in these areas. THE TWIN PURGES The temporary truce seems to have given Doe a breather in which to reassess his failed approach. Judging by his next moves, it appears that he had come to realize both that his ad hoc responses to specific and imminent challenges would not bring the desired results and also that he could not deal adequately with the PRC and the students at the same time. With the announcement of the austerity measures behind him, he adopted both a more proactive and more focused approach. Avoiding battle on two fronts, he left the students and the rest of civil society for a later date and set out first to concentrate government power entirely in his own hands by vitiating the PRC and the cabinet. Beginning in July, he initiated a methodical purge first of the PRC and then of the cabinet, all the while presenting his actions as being carried out for the good of the nation and himself as a responsible and liberal head of state, addressing Liberia’s economic problems and leading the country to democracy.

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Purge of the PRC Of the two arms of the government, the PRC posed the greater obstacle to Doe’s hegemony. It had decision-making powers that the cabinet did not, and Weh Syen and his supporters constrained Doe’s freedom of action more than any of the ministers could. Doe’s first priority was thus to bring the PRC under his control by eliminating the Weh Syen camp. In contrast to his earlier, rather offhand attempt at asserting his authority, he now proceeded with caution and guile, carefully preparing the ground before delivering his coup de grâce. He started circumspectly, not with an attack on the PRC itself but with two measures that the Council members deemed in their interest and actively supported. Exploiting the consensus in the PRC that the power of the ministers had to be curtailed, Doe began by militarizing the cabinet and promoting himself to the highest rank in the army. On July 23, 1981, Minister of Defense Albert Karpeh informed the cabinet members that they and their deputies would all be given military ranks and would be commissioned. The ministers would be given the rank of major and their deputies captain. Army uniforms were distributed for them to wear at the public commissioning ceremony to be held on July 27, the 134th anniversary of Liberia’s independence. Then, at the commissioning ceremony, PRC Speaker J. Nicholas Podier announced that the PRC had voted to make Doe a five-star general and to elevate him to the newly created position of commander in chief of the armed forces.29 This promotion represented a major change in Doe’s presentation of himself. Whereas his fellow soldiers in the PRC had quickly promoted themselves to senior officer ranks as soon as they took power, for more than a year, Doe steadfastly retained the lowly rank of master sergeant so as to emphasize his humble origins and his identity as a simple soldier and common man. The previous February, he had ostentatiously turned down a petition by the army and the minister of defense promoting him to the rank of general. Speaking on Armed Forces Day, he declared that he had declined the promotion “in strict obedience to my own sense of humility.”30 With his self-promotion, he abandoned his humble pose in favor of a more commanding image, which better fit the ambitions he had developed. How did these actions prepare for the assault he would soon make on the PRC? For one thing, the militarization of the cabinet reduced the ministers’ already limited freedom of action—and their freedom to object to any of Doe’s actions—by placing them under the same rules and regulations, including trial by military tribunal, that governed every other soldier. Leaving no doubt as to the meaning of the move, PRC Speaker Podier soon declared that from this point on the government would be run like the military: through a

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chain of command in which all ministers would be answerable to the minister of national defense.31 More significantly, Doe’s new rank and position placed him above the other members of the PRC. In voting for his promotion, the councilmen had bestowed on him the highest military rank in the country, along with complete control over the armed forces. They were probably motivated by the desire they shared with Doe to strengthen the military vis-à-vis the civilian cabinet ministers, but they overlooked or discounted the implications of the promotion for themselves. From his new position, Doe promptly set about to eliminate Weh Syen and his supporters. On August 9, security forces loyal to Doe arrested Weh Syen and his four key supporters in the PRC—Harris Johnson, Henry Zuo, Nelson Toe, and Robert Sumo—on charges of plotting to overthrow the PRC government and to murder Quiwonkpa, Podier, and Doe himself. As he did after the soldiers’ plot at the end of May, Doe included in his net a number of troublesome civilians. The best known was Minister of Local Government Oscar Quiah, who, like Weh Syen, was a member of the Sarpo ethnic group and had been the secretary-general of the PPP. Four days later, the five PRC members were sentenced to death by a closed-door military tribunal. They were executed the next morning. Four of the civilians, among them Oscar Quiah, were acquitted, the other two sentenced to ten years in prison.32 Togba Nah Tipoteh, who was out of the country on an official mission, was not yet named as a plotter, as he later would be. Even before the trial and execution, Doe began to tighten his grip on the PRC. One day after the arrests, he appointed his close supporter, PRC Speaker J. Nicholas Podier, as vice head of state and PRC cochairman, and filled the speaker slot vacated by Podier with another loyal supporter, Colonel Jeffery Gbatu.33 These prompt appointments prevented the formation of a power vacuum and placed the remaining councilmen under the watchful eyes of his trusted loyalists. With these moves, Doe radically shifted the power balance in the PRC in his own favor. In eliminating the Weh Syen camp, Doe took care to give the process an air of legitimacy, both for the Liberian public and his American backers. The official response to the end-of-May coup attempt had been low key. No details of the plot were revealed, and it took over a week before the plotters’ names and- postage stamp biographies were published. In his radio address to the nation after his return from the ECOWAS summit, the only hint that Doe gave of the plot was to thank Weh Syen and unnamed others for their “efforts in maintaining the stability of the state.”34 The arrest of Weh Syen and his followers, in contrast, was accompanied by a concerted show of transparency. Doe somberly announced the discovery of the plot on state radio. He allowed journalists to interview Weh Syen on

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his way to prison and to print his protestations of innocence. He made special efforts to persuade the power brokers in the country’s peripheral areas of Weh Syen’s perfidy. Three days after the arrests, he invited scores of traditional leaders, administrators, and superintendents of the country’s fourteen administrative subdivisions to the Executive Mansion. Presenting himself as an innocent victim of Weh Syen’s treachery, he asked them what one does “with people who want to kill their leaders.” Without exception, not even by the chiefs and elders of the Sarpo, Weh Syen’s ethnic group, unanimously threw their support behind Doe and pledged him their loyalty.35 It doubtless helped that they all depended on the state apparatus for the whole or part of their livelihoods. Doe’s purge of the PRC would not have been possible without the support of the leadership of the various bodies responsible for state security and of the Americans. From his earliest days in office, Doe made concerted efforts to make sure that the leadership of the bodies involved in state security would be loyal not only to the regime, but also to himself personally. In the army, he cultivated close relations with Thomas Quiwonkpa, who had assumed the position of commanding general of the army during the coup. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Quiwonkpa had strongly backed Doe’s claim to leadership of the PRC against Weh Syen, and, from then on, put himself faithfully and zealously at Doe’s service as head of state. Doe, in turn, made Quiwonkpa a major ally and spokesman, allowed him an unusual degree of free expression and placed persons from Quiwonkpa’s ethnic group, the Gio, in key positions in the bureaucracy. In the security forces, he appointed loyal Krahn to key positions: Lieutenant General Henry S. Dubar, as chief of staff, and Joe Y. Myers and his brother Gabriel Myers, to the respective posts of director and finance director of the National Police Force. In the February 1981 reshuffle, he successfully maneuvered to appoint yet another Krahn he could count on, Albert Karpeh, to the post of minister of defense. Doe also used his position as head of state to win favor with the army’s lower echelons. Following the dismantling of the TWP’s National Guard, the junta as a whole endeavored to construct a well-trained, well-equipped military force on which it could rely for its security and, in tandem, to rectify the poor service conditions of the low-ranked soldiers. But it was Doe who led the campaign to improve the soldiers’ housing and who put particular effort into raising their low social status. He billed them as the vanguard of the revolution and the symbol of the new Liberia. He publicly honored them by declaring an Armed Forces Day (on February 11) and by inaugurating (at the 1981 Redemption Day Ceremonies) a statue of a prototypical Liberian soldier outside the Executive Mansion. He emphasized his connection with the soldiers by keeping his master sergeant rank long after the other councilmen had promoted themselves to high-ranking officers. When he moved against

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Weh Syen and his followers, the lower ranks of the army had little reason to rally to his victims’ defense. The Americans had come to view Doe as a leader they could work with and who, with the right incentives, would continue Liberia’s pro-Western policies. Because he was buyable, they saw him as amenable to “guidance” (a word they frequently used with respect to him) and convinced themselves that if only he could establish his control over the wayward elements in the PRC and cabinet, he would be able to implement the reforms that were needed for economic recovery and to protect investors from the rampant lawlessness that impeded economic growth. Their assumption was that this is what Doe wanted to do. As stated in the U.S. Senate Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations that was written in the wake of the Weh Syen executions: “To Doe’s credit, it is generally acknowledged that he has learned a great deal in a short period of time and understands the need to strengthen the operations of the government and begin to restore business confidence.”36 Weh Syen, in contrast, they viewed as a dangerous extremist and a spoiler, whose rivalry with Doe posed a threat to the stability of the regime and whose strident opposition to the closure of the Libyan People’s Bureau marked him as a dangerous leftist. After Weh Syen’s apprehension and arrest, Doe took care to stoke America’s suspicions, fielding claims by security officials that Weh Syen had accepted $3 million from Libya to direct the plot.37 Washington’s response to the arrest and execution of Weh Syen and his followers was restricted to the conventional demand that the accused be given due process. When Doe ignored the demand and had the alleged plotters executed following a trial in a closed military tribunal, Washington’s response was a mixture of hand-wringing and relief. The above-quoted Senate Staff Report noted that the United States had no hard evidence of an organized coup plot and lamented that “the Americans were not able to prevail in a matter involving one of the most fundamental tenets of our value system.” In practically the same breath, though, it went on to state that “those executed were among the most inept and disliked members of the government,” and that “[t]heir deaths reportedly brought a generally favorable popular reaction.”38 By way of contrast, the Washington Post reported “a climate of fear” in Liberia in the wake of the executions.39 The acquiescence of the security services and of the Americans enabled Doe to eliminate his rivals in the PRC without consequences. It is highly unlikely that he would have undertaken such a bold move had he not been confident of their acquiescence to begin with. Samuel E. Finer points out in his classic book The Man on Horseback that in military regimes, authority can be exercised only after personal struggles behind the scenes have been resolved.40 Doe’s elimination of Weh Syen was the culmination of just such a struggle, and his first step in establishing

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himself as the single authority in postcoup Liberia. With his purge of the PRC, Doe not only eliminated his chief rival, but, more importantly, so weakened the body that it would not be able to fend off his eradication of all vestiges of its autonomy a few months later. In his book, Non–Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics, Paul Brooker argues that “a junta may be the only control device that protects a regime from being taken over internally by an individual military leader and transformed into a personalist-ruler type of military regime.”41 Brooker based his claim on analysis of other military regimes, but it applies well to Doe’s Liberia. Cabinet Purge Having wrested control of the PRC, Doe proceeded without pause to establish his control over the cabinet. He launched the cabinet purge only after he had eliminated his rivals in the PRC and no one was left to trip him up, as had occurred after he acted against Wesseh and the staff of the Daily Observer. Between mid-August, when he began the purge, and its completion in late November, Doe had eliminated all but one of the six political ministers affiliated with MOJA and the PPP and two ministers without political affiliation, and replaced them with appointees dependent solely on himself. He never actually declared a purge, but fired one minister at a time over the course of several months, so that the purge was barely perceptible until it was practically over. Above all, he carried it out in such a way as to make it look like its purpose was to improve the quality of the cabinet by replacing corrupt or incompetent ministers with more honest and able ones, who were better suited to tackle Liberia’s severe economic problems. The purge was carried out in three stages. During the first stage, which stretched from the arrest of the alleged plotters through September 1, three of the political ministers were replaced: Minister of Local Government Oscar J. Quiah (PPP), Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs Togba Nah Tipoteh (MOJA) and Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo Sr. (PPP). Quiah was not returned to the cabinet after his imprisonment. Although he was acquitted of complicity in Weh Syen’s alleged plot, the circumstances made it easy for Doe to get rid of Quiah in favor of his staunch supporter Edward Sackor, who had previously served under the TWP. Tipoteh, fearing for his life should he return to Liberia, requested political asylum in Côte d’Ivoire and, on August 29, tendered his resignation from the cabinet.42 Doe made arduous efforts to bring him to Liberia to prevent Tipoteh from acting against him. He sent a delegation to Abidjan to urge Tipoteh to return; and when that did not work, he requested Tipoteh’s extradition. When the extradition request was rejected, he issued a virulent press release describing Tipoteh as a “defector” who had fled Liberia following involvement in

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Weh Syen’s alleged coup attempt and in consequence of his failures in his ministerial tasks.43 In Tipoteh’s place, Doe appointed Dr. Byron Tarr, an American-educated economist who had served as deputy minister of finance for revenues and in other financial posts under the TWP. Of the three ministers, Chea Cheapoo Sr. was the only one whom Doe laid off overtly and the only one whose dismissal no one could have regretted. Officially dismissed “for behavior inconsistent with the administration of justice,” Cheapoo had been involved in numerous scandals and was widely regarded as erratic, unpredictable, and thoroughly unsuited to his position.44 A few days later, to provide concrete reasons for the dismissal, Cheapoo was accused of embezzlement and charged with accumulating a private arsenal and planning to arm members of the former PPP.45 He was replaced by Isaac Nyeplu, who had been assistant minister for legal affairs at the justice ministry and had the added advantage of being Podier’s uncle. Following these dismissals, Doe paused for a few weeks, during which time he took two measures to disguise his aims and advance his power grab. The first, on September 23, was to set up a ten-member committee to review the economic situation in Liberia. Chaired by Tipoteh’s replacement, Dr. Byron Tarr, its declared mandate was to examine a range of economic matters, including the rise in commodity prices, the onerous tax structure, and the financial arrangements between the government and the IMF. In actuality, the committee had several ulterior motives. These motives included enabling Doe to be able to show himself as a responsible leader dealing with the country’s economic ills; making it look like the cabinet replacements were aimed at getting technocrats rather than politicians to induce reforms, and, above all, torpedoing the recently extolled Tipoteh program. The last purpose was embodied in the directive that the committee “review the new four-year economic development plan with the view of ascertaining its relevance to the overall situation in the nation.”46 Doe had two reasons for wanting to torpedo the Tipoteh program. One was that implementing it could only bolster the power of the cabinet minister who came closest to being an alternative leader of Liberia. Tipoteh, with his outspokenness and reputation for competence and integrity, was one of the best-known and most popular cabinet ministers. The public’s faith in him was such that there were rumors that his MOJA supporters were urging him to take the lead in countering the direction of the government.47 There are no indications that Tipoteh picked up the gauntlet, if in fact it had been thrown down. Nonetheless, he must have appeared to Doe like a potential contender. The other reason was that two core provisions of the program, which Doe did not mention in his public address, were anathema to him. One was the establishment of an efficient civil service. Doe had already thwarted an earlier Tipoteh effort to establish an independent and effective civil service

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the previous December by quietly ignoring the list of qualified managers that Tipoteh had prepared. The other provision was to place all development projects under the sole supervision of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs so as to prevent the central authorities from arbitrarily interfering in them.48 This provision would not only have bestowed a huge amount of power on the ministry that Tipoteh headed, but entailed structural changes that would constrain Doe’s power and limit his access to wealth. The second measure, on September 29, was to expand the responsibilities of the Ministry of Information to include overseeing information coming from government offices. Minister of Information Lieutenant Colonel Gray D. Allison, whom Doe had appointed in the February reshuffle, summoned seventy-five journalists and public relations officials of various government ministries to announce that, with the approval of the Head of State, all releases and announcements from government ministries and agencies would have to be cleared with the Ministry of Information before being published. The purpose, he explained, was not to censor the ministries but to ensure that the government speaks with one voice. The difference is elusive. The decree was never implemented, as Podier balked at the inclusion of his own office in the supervision. Doe dropped the plan so as to avoid further conflict between two important supporters.49 Then through mid- and late October Doe resumed his purge, firing the two ministers without political affiliation. On October 19, he dismissed Minister of Agriculture Alfred Suah “for his failure to adequately pursue the agricultural programs of the PRC.” Suah was replaced by Alfred Fromoyan, who had been minister of agriculture under Tolbert and after the coup had served as Suah’s deputy. On October 29, Doe fired Minister of Finance George Dunye and Assistant Minister for Fiscal Affairs Lawrence Shartdy for implication in a check racket.50 Dunye’s replacement was Alvin J. Jones, a banker and former treasurer of the Episcopal Church of Liberia, who happened to be Doe’s cousin. These changes, which were billed as housecleaning measures, were preceded and followed by cost-cutting steps designed to convey the impression that they were aimed at reducing the government’s excesses. October 14 began a three-month freeze on foreign travel by government officials, which Doe had announced a month earlier.51 On November 7, Doe announced a series of measures to cut government expenditures. These included the sale of the Boeing 737 jet aircraft that he and the PRC had been using, along with freezes of various durations on government payments, foreign payments, and vehicle purchases, as well as the halving of allotments to government agencies. In addition, he announced the “urgent” establishment of two ministerial committees: one to consider reducing the number and cost of Liberia’s foreign missions, the other to review ways to improve the finances of major

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public corporations.52 However, the Boeing was not sold. The cost-cutting measures led to a reduction in public services and held up payment of government salaries.53 Government expenditures continued to rise, and those at the top continued to dip into state coffers to finance their luxurious lifestyles. Finally, in the third and last stage of the purge, on November 20, Doe fired Foreign Minister Gabriel Baccus Matthews, onetime head of the PPP. In all probability, Doe would have liked to get rid of Matthews with the other three political ministers in the first stage. This would have been awkward, though, as Matthews was due to depart for the United Nations to attend a General Assembly meeting and to present the secretary-general with a request for large-scale financial aid.54 Now Doe dismissed him under accusations of making anti-government remarks and of sometimes not acting in the interests of the government. Among Matthews’s purported offenses, Doe named his public campaign against the abolition of the rice subsidy and having threatened to resign the previous March (presumably after the decision to close the Libyan embassy).55 A few days later, Doe appointed Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., of MOJA, who until then had been minister of education, to Matthews’s post. Doe gave the post of minister of education to his close Krahn ally George Boley. In the February reshuffle, Doe had had to demote Boley to the lowly position of minister of posts and communication. The new appointment enabled Doe to reward his friend with a more prestigious post and to assure himself of a friend and ally in a position that was particularly sensitive in view of his own fraught relations with the students. Fahnbulleh Jr. was left as the only politically affiliated minister in the otherwise all-military cabinet. Like his father under Tubman, he had been a dedicated fighter for democracy under Tolbert and enjoyed a reputation for heroism and probity. Keeping him on helped Doe blur the fact that the reshuffle was essentially a means of depoliticizing and disempowering the cabinet. By the end of the purge, Doe had placed his own appointees at the head of five key ministries: finance, justice, education, local government, and economics and planning. The ministries of defense and presidential affairs were already occupied by loyal Krahns. Of the six new appointees, three had been senior officials in the Tolbert regime. Two were relatives; and two, Suah and Boley, were firm supporters. All of them had respectable academic credentials and administrative experience. Like the ministers they replaced, these appointees could manage the day-to-day affairs of the country. Unlike most of them, however, they were unencumbered by ideology, had no independent power base, and were entirely dependent on Doe for their standing and positions. Ten days after the completion of the purge, Tipoteh’s development plan was effectively scuttled. On November 30, the Tarr committee presented

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its report. The document, which sounded professional enough, identified the government’s uncontrolled expenditures and lack of comprehensive economic programs as two of Liberia’s primary economic problems, and made thirty-two recommendations. These included urgently establishing a high-powered committee to coordinate and rationalize the government’s fragmented economic decision-making, and reducing government expenditures by means such as the use of “appropriate machinery for dealing with payroll padding.” However, it was also a document that took political realities into consideration. Thus, it recommended that the hated hut tax not be reinstituted. It also recommended that “a clear definition of both agricultural and industrial development policy and strategy be established.”56 This recommendation meant that the Tipoteh plan would languish unimplemented while the definition was being established. There is no indication of any attempt to implement the plan. Like the purge of the PRC, the cabinet purge too was carried out with the complicity of the Americans. The Americans chose to accept Doe’s pretense that the reshuffle was aimed at creating a cleaner and more competent governing body and that he himself was a fiscally responsible leader. In a speech before the Liberian Ship Owners’ Council in Houston, Texas, on October 28, 1981, after Quiah, Tipoteh, Cheapoo, and Dunye had been dismissed, U.S. Ambassador William Lacy Swing (1981–1985) praised the “positive” trend in Doe’s actions and called the new appointments “an important step forward.”57 Republican Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa, who had initially urged Carter not to recognize the postcoup regime, extended high praise for Doe after visiting Liberia in the summer of 1982. Since he came to office, Hayakawa commented: “Doe has made dramatic progress in his own personal development and has successfully moved to consolidate his power base. He has eliminated or neutralized the most inept, corrupt, and ideologically extreme members of the government; he has given responsibility to the moderates and technocrats.”58 Consistent with the perceptions of the Reagan administration, Hayakawa apparently considered Tipoteh and Matthews extremists—Tipoteh because of his socialist ideology, though he never acted on it as minister of planning, and Matthews because of his support for Genuine Non-Alignment. Alongside neutralizing the PRC and cabinet, Doe took a variety of liberalizing steps and conciliatory actions, whether in his own name or that of the purged PRC. He officially inducted Con Com on July 26, 1981, a day before the ministers’ conscription ceremony. A month later, on August 31, soon after his attack on Tipoteh, Monrovia Radio announced that the PRC had granted certain privileges and immunities to Con Com and issued the terms of reference for its work. In an accompanying letter to Con Com head Amos Sawyer, Doe declared that the commission must see to the application of its mandate without fear or favor.59

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On the same day, the Daily Observer printed a long, practically incendiary article by the human rights advocate, Albert Porte, calling upon Liberians to urge the PRC to honor its commitments to human rights and civil liberties, but incurred no negative repercussions.60 On September 1 and 2, coinciding with the dismissal of Chea Cheapoo Sr. and the appointment of Byron Tarr in Tipoteh’s place, Doe once again released political prisoners. Later in the month, the PRC lifted the ban on former political detainees traveling abroad, though they were still required to obtain the PRC’s permission to leave. According to Doe’s spin, the action was “consistent with the government’s determination to create a greater atmosphere of freedom and justice for all Liberians.”61 Doe also played labor arbitrator. In early September, he intervened on behalf of striking teachers of the Monrovia Consolidated School System after Fahnbulleh Jr., who was still minister of education, had fired the teachers who refused to return to work. Responding to a petition sent to PRC Speaker Brigadier General Jeffery Gbatu, Doe met with hundreds of teachers, had the fired teachers reinstated, and ordered the Ministry of Education to immediately release the teachers’ August salary checks.62 In early October, he personally met with striking public hospital nurses and paramedics and promised to appoint a committee to look into their grievances. His playing labor arbitrator was rather ironic, as the teachers’ strike was instigated due to the failure of his cash-strapped government to pay wages on time, and the nurses’ and paramedics’ strikes were instigated due to its refusal to implement promised salary increases.63 Hollow as they were, these various liberalizing and conciliatory behaviors enabled Doe to present himself not only as an economically responsible leader, but also as a liberal and caring head of state laying the foundations for civilian rule, at the very time that he was determinedly concentrating government power in his own hands. This served both to bolster his legitimacy at home and abroad and to avert conflict that could interfere with his purges. For maximum PR value, the actions were all announced on public radio. When the pose ceased to be in his interests, Doe readily abandoned it— much as he had abandoned the Genuine Non-Alignment policy when that was no longer to his advantage. Focused on his own needs, Doe readily dropped the pose on at least two occasions during this period. The first instance was on September 29, in the interval between the first and second stages of the cabinet purge. Six hundred employees of LAMCO (the Liberian American Swedish Mineral Company) walked off the job over the company’s refusal to pay a year’s worth of retroactive wages. Instead of playing labor arbitrator, Doe personally warned that those who did not return to work by the day’s end would be replaced—and kept his word.64 LAMCO, the largest iron ore mining

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company in Liberia, had been sustaining steady losses for the previous three years. As the company was a vital source of foreign currency for his regime, Doe could not afford to jeopardize its continued operation. Thus, when the dismissed workers later petitioned him to reinstate them, he referred their appeal to PRC member Lt. Col. Albert S. Toe, who refused and declared that the ban on strikes would continue to be enforced.65 The second instance was on November 4, when the cabinet purge was nearing completion. Doe ordered the closure of the Daily Observer for publishing a front page article reporting a call by Guinean exiles for an immediate end to one-party rule in their country. In a letter to the paper’s editor, Kenneth Best, Doe cited as his reason “the Guinea-Liberia relationship to which I attach great importance.”66 Sekou Toure was Doe’s only real friend among the West African leaders, who continued to view him with suspicion and distaste even after his acceptance into ECOWAS and the OAU. Wary of alienating the Guinean leader, Doe hurried to punish the paper lest he be held responsible for its conduct. The twin purges, carried out methodically and carefully and wrapped in well-constructed illusions, were a resounding success. With almost surgical efficiency, Doe rid himself of his irksome rivals in the PRC and the irritating independent voices in the cabinet. He put the remaining councilmen under the watchful eyes of his close associates, and he filled the emptied cabinet slots with technocrats and dependents. Far from satisfying him, however, these actions proved to be only the start of Doe’s extension of his personal control. Christmas Tidings: Taking Control of the PRC With the twin purges, Doe eliminated his rivals and critics in the government. He had not yet, however, taken full control of the PRC or put an end to the “politicking” that he so dreaded. He would address both of these issues within the following weeks through two decrees in his Christmas message of December 23, 1981. To complete his control of the PRC, he decreed the abolition of all but one of the nineteen committees that had supervised the government ministries. The exception was the Executive Committee, which was retained due to its status as the highest executive body, above both the PRC and cabinet. The abolition of the committees, which were thoroughly disliked by all and sundry, was presented as a means of bringing badly needed order into the workings of the state apparatus. Thus, an editorial in the government-owned New Liberian commended the move as promoting “smoother bureaucratic operations and better, saner decision-making.”67 It was also seen as such abroad. The U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Africa noted that the IMF was positive about measures taken to tighten administrative

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practices, to cut down on waste and corruption, and to restore the confidence of foreign investors and commercial interests.68 China’s Xinhua news agency described it as one of several steps the regime took to eliminate chaos after the coup.69 The widely acclaimed measure did not, in fact, result in a better-run state apparatus. Its impacts, like its aims, were political. With the abolition of the committees, Doe deprived the councilmen of their main source of patronage and wealth, of their executive functions, and of the vast power they had accumulated over the government ministries. To make sure that their power was thoroughly vitiated, at the same time that he abolished the committees, Doe forbade the Council members from interfering in the work of the ministries. The next day, in a demonstration of the new power relations between himself and the other members of the Council, Doe suspended Albert Toe (whom he had recently sent to deal with the LAMCO strikers) for four months, citing Toe’s unauthorized absence from the Council as the reason.70 Toe was not the first councilman Doe suspended. In September of the previous year, Capt. Jerry Gban had been expelled from the PRC, dishonorably discharged from the army, and sentenced to a year and a half in the Post Stockade in Monrovia. Gban, however, had been dismissed for beating up two doctors at the John F. Kennedy Medical Center, thereby tarnishing the image of the PRC.71 Toe was suspended for flouting Doe. Moreover, with the abolition of the committees, all of the control that the Council members had held over the state apparatus became available to Doe—and to Doe only. Whether obtaining exclusive control over the state apparatus was a byproduct of Doe’s abolition of the committees or one of its main purposes is impossible to know. The other decree was aimed at neutralizing the students as a political force and at putting a stop, once and for all, to their political activity. In all likelihood, Doe would have issued this decree sooner or later in any event. He issued it at this time due to being under pressure from the vigorous activities of Con Com, which heightened his apprehensions of the development of independent political expression and activity. Doe had inaugurated Con Com in the expectation or hope that Con Com would deflect the mounting pressures for reform into the time-consuming process of planning and drafting the new constitution. He facilitated its operations to bolster his liberal image and to distract attention from his purges. Contrary to his expectations, Con Com proceeded to carry out its mandate quickly and purposefully. By November, it had completed its planning phase and launched a massive education campaign aimed at raising public awareness and involving the populace in the constitutional process. It distributed pamphlets and tape recordings in the various Liberian languages, informing the public of the issues the constitution would address and announcing that countrywide public hearings would be held to attain public input. The

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hearings started in late November 1981 with the students at the University of Liberia and at Cuttington College, and from there went on to the counties and villages, NGOs, workers, and others. By late December, the hearings were in full swing to an enthusiastic public response. Hundreds of letters were sent to the constitution commission by members of the public, along with position papers presented by students and professional groups.72 Doe had cause for concern that these activities would result in even more adverse “politicking.” Already in June, Seyon’s and Wesseh’s excoriating public criticisms of the regime had made it clear that membership in Con Com did not constrain persons from speaking their minds and rallying others to their cause. In mid-December, Con Com head Amos Sawyer, acting on the immunity Doe had granted him to carry out his mandate without fear or favor, encouraged more active citizen oversight of government and greater government responsiveness. In a commencement address delivered at the W. Harris Episcopal School in Monrovia on December 13 and reported on at length in the Daily Observer the next day, Sawyer argued that to establish a democracy, Liberians would have to abandon their habits of mass acquiescence and submission to their leaders. They would have to keep assessing the functioning of their government and not allow it to operate as it wished, while the leaders would have to learn to accept criticism or opposition and even confrontation.73 In what looks like a swift reaction, three days later, Doe appealed to an audience of workers, youths, and other citizens of Nimba County in an attempt to prevent them from participating in political activities and labor unrest.74 In his Christmas decree, Doe did more than appeal. He announced the abolition of all student parties and the prohibition of political activities in schools. The only room he left for student expression was through representatives selected by the faculties to help them coordinate student activities.75 These restrictions on campus political activities had wide-ranging implications. Not only did they deprive the students of the organizational framework for their dissent, but perniciously closed the single legal loophole that enabled politicians to circumvent the ban on political activity in Decree No. 1 by using the student parties as cover. That this was among Doe’s intentions is indicated in the statement justifying the ban that he made a few weeks later. “Political pressure groups and self politicians,” he declared, “have the tendency of extending their own ambitions through student organizations.”76 Like the purges of the PRC and cabinet, the ban on student political activity was accompanied by measures that were designed to appeal to the public and to polish Doe’s image as a liberal leader, bringing his country ever closer to democratic rule. In the economic sphere, Doe announced cuts in the reconstruction tax and promised to review Liberia’s tax policy so as to alleviate the people’s hardships. In the political sphere, he announced a formal

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reconciliation policy with those who had been regarded as enemies of the revolution and set a date for the transfer of authority to civilians. In the framework of the reconciliation policy, he granted a general amnesty to all the remaining political prisoners in Liberia and to all the Liberians who had fled abroad. Those in Liberian prisons were to be released and have their civil rights and property restored. The expatriates were “forgiven” whatever wrongs they had done and invited to take advantage of the protection of human rights in Liberia to return home immediately. The list of wanted Liberians in exile was almost entirely abolished. Like the cabinet purge, the reconciliation policy was well regarded. The UPI would report that Doe “was winning high marks from diplomats and Liberians alike for his moderation and spirit of conciliation” and that diplomats believed that the policy “appears to be working.”77 Essentially, though, it was a carefully calibrated show of largesse at no political cost, which did not so much introduce new measures as formalize and put a label on actions that Doe had already taken when it suited him in the past. This was not the first time that he had released political prisoners (in gestures to the United States and his West African neighbors) or the first time that he had urged the exiles to return and promised that they would not be harmed. To take only one example, on Armed Forces Day on February 11, 1981, he promised full protection of all Liberian citizens who returned from their self-imposed exile abroad. The release of the remaining political prisoners enabled Doe to declare that Liberia “may be the only country in Africa and one of the few nations in the world without political prisoners.” Conveniently, A. B. Tolbert, son of the former president, around whom an opposition may conceivably have rallied, had disappeared some time earlier—for which Doe blamed Weh Syen, who was no longer around to say otherwise. Two former Liberian leaders who kept expressing their opposition to the postcoup government from abroad, namely former Vice President Bennie Warner and former head of the TWP and Minister of Justice Clarence Simpson, remained on the wanted list of Liberians in exile. It was under these circumstances, for which he bore no small share of responsibility, that Doe marched steadily to his personalist rule with very little opposition. He was able to do this by simultaneously disguising his march to power and proceeding methodically and with care, in such a way that each increment of power created the conditions that enabled the next one. In effect, he proceeded on two parallel paths: the real path, in which he progressively deepened and expanded his control, and a virtual path, in which he created a double illusion: that he was doing his best to promote economic recovery and that he was a tolerant, liberal leader steering Liberia toward civilian rule. His steps on the virtual path, loudly trumpeted and highly visible, effectively obscured the import of his actions on the real path. Of all his moves, two

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were by far the most important in veiling his purposeful march to power. One was his allowing Con Com, staffed by reputable and well-respected members, to proceed with its work—its educational campaign, its public hearings, and, beginning in March, its preparations for writing the draft constitution—without interference. The other, related move was his announcement of a specific date for transferring the government to civilian rule. Together, these moves created the impression that Doe’s was indeed heading a transitional government, which, whatever its failings, would soon leave the stage. The date set for the transfer of power to civilians was April 12, 1985, the fifth anniversary of the coup—some two years later than the date Doe had given the Americans in July 1980. Doe announced the date after grandly assuring his listeners that the junta had not taken power to perpetuate their reign and that they had no desire to outlive their usefulness. Presenting the pledge as part of his plan to “return this country to constitutional rule,” he offered the hope that the space for political action that had just been choked off with the ban on student parties and political activity was temporary and that the time would soon come when Liberians would be able to freely engage in politics. At the very same time, he used the pledge to justify the ban on political activity, whether by students or anyone else. In twisted reasoning, he presented the prohibition as essential to enabling the transfer of power to civilians. Just as he and others in his regime had done in the past, he linked the return to civilian rule to improvement in the country’s economy and the citizens’ well-being: as a consequence of our plan to return this country to constitutional rule, giving consideration to national development as well as creating a constitutional and a stable political atmosphere for such transition, we hereby pledge to hand over authority to a civilian government on April 12th, 1985, the fifth anniversary of our revolution. We feel that during the next three years we could have become sufficiently convinced that a government by the people, of the people and for the people should emerge. It is now the responsibility of all true Liberians to suppress their political motive until the PRC removes the ban on political activities to pave the way for a new civilian government.78

As Doe presented it in this sequence, the three-year interval before the transfer of power was to be a time when the improvements would take place. The necessary improvements, he implied, could be made only in the absence of political activity. Doe actually had little choice but to set a clear and not-too-distant date for a return to civilian rule, just as he had had little choice but to establish Con Com and facilitate its workings. Both were measures he had to take to meet

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expectations at home and abroad and to preserve his credibility as a leader and the image of his regime as a transitional government. Doe turned the need to set an election date into a means of gagging the opposition and of creating conditions in which he would be the only player of any weight in the political arena for the next three years. Doe’s December decrees were received very differently by the Council members and the students. The Council members, without the Weh Syen camp and held in tight rein by Podier and Gbatu, the PRC cochairman and speaker respectively, acquiesced to the slashing of their powers with barely a murmur. Rumors were reported that some Council members, including Podier, were involved in a plot to overthrow the government, but these were quickly dispelled.79 The students, however, were no readier to be silenced than they had been after the banning and arrest of Wesseh. On January 19, 1982, six students, leaders of LINSU and other student organizations, circulated a statement opposing the ban on campus political activities. In response, the neutered PRC ordered their arrest, charged them with violating Decree No. 1, and, true to the threat that Doe had made in June, brought them before the supreme military tribunal, where five of them were found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.80 The death sentence was totally out of proportion to the students’ offense. It was probably meant to frighten them into submission where less draconian measures had failed. Like Doe’s earlier measures against the students, this too was a mistake. Rather than cow them, it sparked two days of heated protests: on the day of the trial (which only journalists from government media outlets were permitted to cover) and on the day of the verdict and sentencing. These were larger and more disruptive than any since the overthrow of the TWP. As hundreds of angry students marched through the streets, traffic was snarled and shops in the market section of Monrovia shut down early. On the second day, students marched toward the American embassy to protest what they believed was the U.S. government’s unseen hand in the abolition of politics on campus. Demonstrators resisted the soldiers who were sent to disperse them.81 Unyielding, Podier warned that the PRC would not hesitate to carry out any sentence that was handed down against students who engaged in politics. The next day, however, before the execution order was to be carried out, Doe appeared on national radio to grant the convicted students executive clemency and to order their release from detention with no more than a warning. In retrospect, it is questionable whether Doe ever intended the sentence to be carried out. He had too fine a sense of how far he could push the Americans—which even the Reagan administration, which had accepted the execution of soldiers, would have had difficulty countenancing. In all

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likelihood, he had expected the terrified and humbled students to beg for clemency in exchange for desisting from political activity in the future. The disruptive demonstrations turned his calculations on their head and forced him to rescind the death sentence without a quid pro quo. In an effort to simultaneously justify the sentence and explain the unconditional pardon, Doe jumped in his clemency speech between threats and sycophancy. In some sentences, he condemned the students’ defiance, warned yet again against political activities on campus, and threatened that those who disobeyed in the future would, in fact, be sent to the military tribunal and their sentences carried out. In others, he attributed the students’ actions to youthful indiscipline and outside instigators and vaunted the students’ contribution to the revolution and their potential as future leaders of the country.82 Later in the day, to blunt his backtracking, he had Minister of Defense Karpeh issue yet another warning. The clemency, Karpeh declared, should not be taken to mean that the students had won the political battle. Those who defied the ban in the future “shall not live to tell the story.”83 The release of their fellows was something of a victory for the students and their other supporters, celebrated by hundreds of Liberians as they assembled in Monrovia’s main streets, dancing, shouting “we want justice,” and carrying the freed students on their shoulders.84 The next day, to shift public attention away from the students and to polish up his image, Doe gave the University of Liberia a gift of the late William Tolbert Jr.’s estate in Bensonville, outside Monrovia.85 The more significant victory was Doe’s, however. Neither the demonstrations nor any loss of face he may have suffered brought him to rescind the ban on campus political activities. The student parties vanished and, with them, the last remaining locus for legal political activity. With his Christmas decrees, Doe divested the PRC of much of its independence and influence, wrested exclusive authority over the state bureaucracy, and abolished the campus parties that had served as the only remaining convoy for legal political activity in Liberia. With these accomplishments, he attained all of the aims—and more—that he had apparently set for himself when he first decided to neutralize his rivals and critics. Yet he would continue to deepen and extend his power still further, with no evident desire and perhaps with no ability to stop. In their book Personal Rule in Black Africa, Jackson and Rosberg point out that a ruler who is insecure in his post “must assert and reassert himself” because he “rules not by institutional right but by personal domination, intelligence, energy, and fortune.”86 Doe was such a ruler. As an unelected military leader, by definition, he lacked the legitimacy that would enable him to feel secure in his post. Although he had successfully tackled the previous challenges to his rule, he could not be sure that further challenges would not follow. Samuel Decalo observed in his book Coups & Army Rule

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in Africa that “clamping the political lid is a precondition for political survival” for military rulers in Africa.87 Doe kept clamping the political lid. In the months to come, building on his attainments thus far, he would proceed to extend his control to yet other parts of the state apparatus. NOTES 1. “Thousands Turn Out to Celebrate R-Day,” Daily Observer, April 15, 1981, 1. 2. Liebenow, Liberia, 229. 3. “White House Situation Room,” March 17, 1981, 2, secret, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (02/20/1981–03/22/1981)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. “Foreign Minister Comments,” T2. “Weh Syen Warns Adviser against Giving Bad Advice,” T2. 4. Wonkeryor, Liberia Militaary Dictatorship, 70–71. 5. Liebenow, Liberia, 229–30. 6. “Commander Warns Officials against Personal Ambition,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 15, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1981): T2. 7. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee of Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance to Africa, Part 3. 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981, 115–38. 8. “Around the World; Liberia Sentences 13 Soldiers to Death as Plotters,” New York Times, June 7, 1981, 4, Nexis Uni. 9. “Big Search for Major Jerbo,” West Africa, April 28, 1980, 763. Proffitt, “The Sergeant-Dictator.” 10. “Liberian Revolution Founders,” 1005–9. 11. Proffitt, “The Sergeant-Dictator.” 12. “Soldiers Ordered to Turn in All Extra Firearms,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 2, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1981): T3. 13. “12 Dismissed from Military for Violating Rules,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 5, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1981): T1. 14. “Minister Warns Officers against Press Statements,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 6, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report 5, no. 109 (June 1981): T1. 15. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Civilians Suspect of Involvement in Coup Plot Released in Liberia,” June 11, 1981, Nexis Uni. 16. Ali A. Mazrui, “The Polity and the University: An African Perspective,” in The Significance of the Human Factor in African Economic Development, ed. Senyo B-S. K Adjibolosoo (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 166.

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17. “Constitutional Draft Commission Member Dismissed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 18, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 19, 1981): T1–T2. “U.S. Technical Grant to Armed Forces Disclosed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 20, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1981): T6. 18. “Student Leader’s Arrest in Liberia,” West Africa, July 6, 1981, 1529. 19. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 72–76. 20. AFP, “Staff of Independent Newspaper Interrogated,” June 23, 1981, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1981): T2–T3. 21. Boley, interview. 22. Mike T. James, “We Are Back,” Daily Observer, July 13, 1981, 10. 23. “Doe Warns Students; Orders Leader Released,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 2, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 6, 1981, T2, Nexis Uni. 24. “Military Leader Remains Popular Despite New Taxes, More Graft.” 25. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 129. 26. “Liberian Leader’s 17th July Address on the State of the Economy,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 17, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1981, Nexis Uni. 27. “Military Leader Remains Popular Despite New Taxes, More Graft.” 28. “Liberia—Use of Fund Resources—Compensatory Financing Facility,” May 28, 1982, 243130, EBS/82/88, 12, IMF Archives. “U.S. Technical Grant to Armed Forces Disclosed,” T6. “Africa’s Struggle to Meet the Fund’s Demands,” Financial Times, April 1, 1982, 4, Nexis Uni. 29. “Doe Named Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 27, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1981): T5. 30. “Liberian Head of State’s Armed Forces Day Message,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 11, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 14, 1981, Nexis Uni. 31. “Officer-Ministers to Report to Defense Minister,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 29, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1981): T2–T3. 32. Associated Press, “Five Senior Officials Sentenced to Death,” August 13, 1981, Nexis Uni. 33. “Who Are the New Appointments in Government?,” Daily Observer, August 11, 1981, 1–2. 34. “Liberian Leader’s Statement on the ECOWAS and Mano River Union Meetings,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 1, 1981, transcribed by Daily Report (June 1981): T3, Nexis Uni. 35. “‘I Don’t Know Why People Want to Kill Me,’” Daily Observer, August 13, 1981, 1, 10. 36. Liberia and Ghana-Policy Challenges in West Africa, 1–9.

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37. “Five Senior Officials Sentenced to Death.” 38. Liberia and Ghana-Policy Challenges in West Africa, 5. 39. “Doe’s Harsh Rule Daunts Liberians,” Washington Post, August 25, 1981. 40. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 149. 41. Brooker, Non–Democratic Regimes, 124. 42. “Tipoteh Resigns, Chooses Exile,” Africa News, September 7, 1981, 6. 43. “Tipoteh Defected,” Daily Observer, August 28, 1981, 1, 10. 44. “A Common Man Is Not Enough.”; Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 142. 45. AFP, “Sacked Minister Accused of Building Arsenal,” September 4, 1981, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1981): T1. 46. “Committee to Review the Economy in Liberia,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 28, 1981, Nexis Uni. 47. “Tipoteh Resigns, Chooses Exile,” 6. 48. Tipoteh, “Crisis in the Liberian Economy,” 128–29. 49. “Podier Upholds Press Freedom,” 1, 10. 50. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Cabinet Reshuffle in Liberia,” October 31, 1981, Nexis Uni. 51. “Liberian Restriction on Officials’ Overseas Travel,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 13, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 15, 1981, Nexis Uni. 52. “EBM/80/142—September 15, 1980,” September 15, 1980, 206678, EBM/80/142, 5, IMF Archives. “Liberia; Financial Measures,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 7, 1981, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 17, 1981, Nexis Uni. 53. “Appointment Request for the President.” 54. “I Shall Return, Says Baccus Matthews,” Daily Observer, August 31, 1981, 1. 55. “Baccus Matthews is Tight-Lipped,” Daily Observer, November 23, 1981, 1, 10. 56. Report of the Committee to Review the Present Economic Situation in Liberia, 3–6, 16. 57. William Swing, “Liberia: The Road to Recovery,” Department of State Bulletin 82, no. 2058 (January 1982): 20. 58. S. I. Hayakawa, Africa Revisited, Report prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1982, Committee Print 1–4. 59. “Terms Set for Constitutional Commission’s Work,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 31, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1981): T2. 60. Albert Porte, “A Promise to Keep,” Daily Observer, August 31, 1981, 1, 9. 61. “Travel Ban on Former Political Detainees Lifted,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 21, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1981): T1. 62. “Teachers Strike Ends as Doe Intervenes, 9 Sep,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 9, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1981): T1. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” (1981): 141.

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63. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Medical Personnel Ends Strike,” October 7, 1981, Nexis Uni. 64. “Workers Dismissed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 5, 1981, transcribed in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2503 (October 1981): 16. 65. “Colonel Toe Stresses PRC’s Commitment to Enforce Strike Ban,” New Liberian, November 6, 1981 in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2536, December 10, 1981, 7. 66. AFP, “Doe Shuts Down Paper for Second Time This Year,” November 4, 1981, Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2527, November 24, 1981, 34. 67. “The Dynamics of a Political Transition,” New Liberian, December 24, 1981, 6. 68. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee of Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Economic and Security Assistance Programs in Africa, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1982, 21. 69. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Round Up: Liberia’s Achievements under Military Regime,” April 30, 1982, Nexis Uni. 70. “Head of State Suspends PRC Member for 4 Months,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 24, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1981): T2. 71. “Dismissal and Imprisonment of Liberia PRC Member,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 15, 1980, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1980), Nexis Uni. 72. “Constitutional Commission Completes First Stage of Task,” Daily Observer, March 9, 1982, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2600, April 6, 1982, 18–19. 73. “Sawyer Notes ‘Shortcomings’ in Nation’s Political Culture,” Daily Observer, December 14, 1981, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2555, January 22, 1982, 5–6. 74. “Doe Urges Nimba Workers, Youths to Avoid Political Activities,” New Liberian, December 18, 1981, 1, 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2555 (January 1982): 7. 75. “Doe Grants Amnesty, Lifts Curfew for Holidays,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 23, 1981, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1981): 247. 76. “Ban on Student Politics Remains,” Daily Observer, January 19, 1982, 1, 10. 77. Barry James, “Liberia Observes Two-Year Rule by ‘Country People’ April 14,” United Press International, April 10, 1982, Nexis Uni. 78. “Doe Grants Amnesty, Lifts Curfew for Holidays,” 247. 79. “Podier Reaffirms His Loyalty,” Daily Observer, January 19, 1982, 1, 10. 80. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 7 (1982): 171. “Six Students Sentenced to Firing Squad,” Daily Observer, January 28, 1982, 1, 10. 81. Rufus M. Darpoh, “Monrovia Yesterday,” Daily Observer, January 28, 1982, 1, 10. 82. “Liberian Student Agitation: Doe’s Clemency Speech and ‘Last Warning,’” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 30, 1982, Nexis Uni. 83. Westmore Dahn, “Doe’s Clemency Spares 6 Student Leaders’ Lives,” Daily Observer, January 29, 1982, 10.

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84. “Thousands Jubilate,” Daily Observer, January 29, 1982, 1, 10. 85. “Head of State Gives Tolbert Estate to University,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 29, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1982): T5. 86. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 27. 87. Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 133.

Chapter 5

Travels Abroad, Austerity at Home

Doe’s overseas travels were aimed at enabling him to present himself as a fitting candidate to be Liberia’s first postcoup elected president. In addition, the ability to control the electoral process remained essential to Doe. To these ends, Doe proceeded to accelerate and expand the power-building processes he had set in motion earlier, focusing on the various state bodies charged with security on the one hand, and on a variety of bodies and persons in civil society on the other. In addition, he began to explore the possibility of bolstering his position with the aid of Israel. The bulk of his endeavors, and the most methodically planned, centered on the various security forces: the army, the police, and the non-uniformed security services. His actions in the realm of security aimed to avoid or quell opposition from within the armed forces, at reinforcing his personal security at this sensitive juncture in his rule, and at molding loyal and effective bodies that he would be able to use to hobble rival candidates who might choose to run against him. To effect the needed changes in the security forces, he made personnel changes, not only in the bodies in question but in several cabinet posts as well. In civil society, he once again tried to intimidate Liberia’s civil court judges to ensure their compliance with his needs. Under the ruse of a renewed anti-corruption drive, Doe extended his control over yet more parastatals to increase his access to potential sources of patronage, influence, and finance. His overtures toward Israel represented an expansion of his endeavors abroad. Considered separately, the steps Doe took, with the sole exception of the overtures to Israel, were continuations of processes he had started earlier, and he pursued them with much the same craft he had employed all along. Now, however, with the draft constitution soon to be completed, he broadened their scope and pursued his aggregation of power with even greater vigor and intensity. His actions in the security forces amounted to a major reorganization. He attempted to intimidate not only the civil court judges, as he had done the previous year, but other legal professionals as well. The parastatals 101

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to which he extended his control included two important banks headed by well-connected Americo-Liberians who fought against their dismissals. Moreover, to ensure PRC support for his planned candidacy, he reappointed three councilmen whom he had previously dismissed. Setting a frenetic pace, Doe pursued actions in several fields at once. Congesting these changes around the time of his overseas tours, he laid the foundations for the changes in the security forces before his first trip, moved rapidly ahead with the changes in the interval between the tours, and completed the changes within some two months after the second trip, during which time he also pushed forward with his changes in civil society. By early November 1982, Doe had completed yet another reshuffle of the cabinet and also made a slew of new appointments in several government and quasi-governmental bodies. Shortly thereafter, he took the first concrete steps to negotiate terms with Israel. He did all this while preparing for his overseas tours and announcing his first set of economic measures for the 1982–1983 fiscal year. Together, the scope and pace of his power-building activities testify to his intentions to do everything possible to continue as head of state, despite his many promises that the soldiers would return to their barracks. CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DOE’S FIRST OVERSEAS TOUR In the period surrounding his Asia-Africa tour, Doe concentrated his efforts on the army, the police force, and the non-uniformed security services. The Army In his first two years in office, Doe, along with Quiwonkpa and the chiefs of staff, had started rebuilding the army from scratch after the dismantlement of the National Guard. For the new AFL, most of the National Guard’s Americo-Liberian officers were replaced with African Liberian NCOs. Efforts were made to instill discipline in the army and, with the help of American equipment and strengthened training, to improve its performance. Large salary increases were enacted and improved accommodations strenuously sought so as to secure the loyalty of the troops to the postcoup regime. In addition, Doe was personally active in raising the reputation of the army, whose soldiers under the TWP had served largely as the politicians’ errand boys. These moves to create a viable and loyal army were a significant departure from the practices of the TWP—a civilian regime which feared a strong military and deliberately kept its National Guard weak and socially

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peripheral. The junta’s investment in the AFL reflected both the affinity of soldiers for soldiers, and its view of the army as essential to its rule. By definition, however, the power inherent in the army made it a Damoclean sword. With elections in the pipelines, Doe now had to consider possible opposition from the army to his upcoming moves. Three sources of opposition could be envisaged. One was from newly empowered officers who feared losing their privileges and prerogatives and were wary of being placed on trial by a civilian government. Active military opposition fueled by such anxieties was not uncommon in other countries where military rulers were due to transfer power to civilians. Doe, however, was not actually planning to transfer power and would soon announce his candidacy. More likely were the two other scenarios, one of which consisted of another ambitious army officer who, similarly to Weh Syen, regarding himself as being better suited than Doe to be Liberia’s new head of state, would try to depose him and take his place. The other, of a different nature, was that portions of the army that supported the transfer of power to civilians would act to thwart his ambition to stay in office. In particular, Quiwonkpa showed worrisome signs that he would balk. In discussions with Con Com on the draft constitution, Quiwonkpa had strongly urged the commission to incorporate the principle of the army’s subordination to civilian politicians. Military personnel who wanted to enter politics, he maintained, should be required to undergo some kind of retirement process.1 At this point, Quiwonkpa was still loyal to Doe, to whom he believed he owed obedience as the legitimate head of state. He was a man of principle and integrity who, unlike his fellow PRC members, had not been corrupted by his sudden rise to power. Doe’s reneging on his promise to go back to the barracks would make him lose his legitimacy in Quiwonkpa’s eyes, and Quiwonkpa would thus feel free to act on his principles against Doe. Quiwonkpa was a potentially formidable opponent. As one of the original coupists, he did not owe his position to Doe and had shown himself ready to speak out against the abuses of the regime and that he was able to do so with impunity. As commanding general of the army, he was in an ideal position, should he see fit, to lead an opposition. Moreover, the advantage of his position was compounded by the advantage of his exceptional popularity among both soldiers and civilians.2 A July 1982 Frankfurter Allgemeine article called Quiwonkpa “the new folk hero. . . the strong man in the army” and observed that “if Quiwonkpa were to organize a coup, he would definitely have the support of the army and a large part of the population behind him.”3 Before announcing his candidacy, Doe had to do what he could to make sure that the army, no matter what opposition might arise, would come down on his side; that it would back him when he made the announcement and support him through the election process. Thus, at the same time that he prepared

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for his visit to the United States, he began what would be an ongoing process of upgrading and reorganizing the army toward these ends. The first moves in the process were made on May 26, 1982, when three appointments and one demotion were announced by the Ministry of Defense. Two appointments were actually reappointments of officers who had served in the TWP’s National Guard. Major A. Tuabe Myers, reputedly Liberia’s best Reserve Officers’ Training Corps instructor, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and assigned to the Tubman Military Academy in Todee. His appointment was aimed at improving the training of new recruits, whose instruction until then had been notoriously substandard. The other reappointment was of the African-Liberian pilot Col. Arthur Bedell to the AFL’s so-called Aviation Unit, which he had briefly headed after the coup until he was jailed for alleged involvement in another attempted coup against the PRC. This appointment was made in preparation for Doe’s visit to the United States, where he would ask Washington to create an “air capacity” for the AFL. At the time, the Aviation Unit had some light reconnaissance and light cargo planes left from the National Guard’s Air Reconnaissance Unit, but no real combat capacity. Doe’s aspiration was apparently to create a unit that could mimic the air force, which in his eyes was an integral part of the military of every modern country and a sign of power. Bedell’s appointment could show the United States that there was a qualified professional to head it. Beyond raising the caliber of the army and expanding its capacities, the appointments of experienced, professional officers represented a continuation of Doe’s ongoing efforts to prove his commitment to the army and to bind it closer to him. These were measures that could further boost the pride and morale of the soldiers, assuage their anxieties about the transfer of power, and reassure them that their position, prerogatives, and protection from prosecution would not be undermined by Doe’s candidacy and election as a civilian president. The third appointment, of a somewhat different order, was of Brigadier General Emmanuel Sayon, Doe’s former aide-de-camp, to replace Jerry Friday Jorwley as Commander of the Executive Mansion Guard. Jorwley had been appointed to the post in the first reshuffle of the army and government in February 1981, when Doe was still one of several key players in the junta. Jorwley’s appointment was a compromise, subject to the approval of Weh Syen and his camp. Sayon was a commander of Doe’s own choosing.4 Sayon’s appointment had two related aims, both of them stemming from the potential threat inherent in the army. As much as the army was the coercive force that underpinned the postcoup regime, its powers made it a perpetual threat. For all Doe’s efforts to bind the army to him by enhancing its professionalism, status, and morale, there was always the possibility that these efforts would not protect him. One aim of Sayon’s appointment was to .

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provide Doe with added protection in the case of a coup attempt. Throughout Africa at the time, the executive complex (along with the port and radio station) was the first place that would be targeted by coupists. Doe and his fellow coupists had themselves overthrown the TWP by taking control of the Executive Mansion. The Executive Mansion Guard, as the force responsible for the security of the presidential complex and the safety of everyone in it, was the main line of defense in case of a coup attempt. With Sayon’s appointment, Doe now had a man he knew and trusted at the head of this critical body. The other aim was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a parallel force to guard against the dangers of the army’s power. Such counter forces were common in both military and civilian regimes in Africa. Two features of the Executive Mansion Guard made it particularly suited to this role. One was that it was responsible for Doe’s safety rather than for the security of the regime. This meant that no transfer of loyalty would be required in order for it to serve Doe’s purposes rather than the purposes of the state or, for that matter, of a political rival. The other was that it was not quite an integral part of the army. Although it was formally part of the army, it was a separate unit, not under direct control of the army hierarchy. Its apartness would enable Doe to circumvent the army command and afford him considerable room for maneuver. Under Sayon’s directorship, the Executive Mansion Guard would soon become an elite unit, trained by foreign experts and provided with the best weaponry available. The demotion was of AFL logistics commander Col. John Nuahn for giving an unauthorized interview to the Daily Observer. In his interview, printed on the first page of the paper, Nuahn had warned the government of the risk of employing Liberians holding U.S. citizenship—code for the Americo-Liberians Doe was appointing to government posts—and called for a halt of the misuse of government vehicles.5 Both were popular sentiments, giving the interview more than a whiff of political opportunism. More fundamentally, by expressing his views publicly, Nuahn was in essence asserting the right of soldiers to a say in government policy—a divisive and dangerous prerogative under any circumstances and all the more so as Doe was setting out to run for the presidency. To discourage further such expressions, Nuahn was demoted to the rank of major for three months and confined for one month.6 The day following the demotion, Chief of Staff Dubar issued, in the government owned New Liberian, a warning to military personnel to refrain from politics, adding that anyone granting unauthorized press interviews would be court-martialed and punished in accordance with the military code.7 Nuahn’s demotion and confinement and Dubar’s warning were part of an ongoing effort to prevent criticism by army personnel, driven both by the junta’s visceral dislike of criticism from any quarter and by the liberties

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of expression apparently taken by the newly appointed, newly empowered officers in the wake of its own rule. As Welch points out, one of the consequences of a coup is the undermining of behaviors embodied in the notion of an “apolitical, professional army,” whose soldiers provide the coercive support necessary to preserve the government, while accepting its supremacy and carrying out its directives.8 That this was the case in postcoup Liberia can be gleaned from the warnings against army officers holding unauthorized press conferences issued the previous May by Minister of Defense Albert Karpeh.9 Overall, what Doe and his close supporters were trying to do was to turn the AFL into a well-trained, depoliticized, professional force with expanded capacities, whose soldiers would neither express nor act on their political opinions, and which, if it were to be tested, would be more loyal to Doe than to Liberia. To blur his personal interest in the changes, Doe had the Ministry of Defense serve as their front and the Chief of Staff issue the warning against political expression. Significantly, Quiwonkpa, commanding general of the army, was excluded from the process, although he is likely to have supported it. The Police Force and Security Services To advance to the presidency, Doe would have to be able to neutralize his political rivals. This task is unsuited to an army, whose involvement in domestic affairs is generally restricted to quelling large-scale disturbances. To neutralize opposing candidates, Doe would have to rely on bodies that handled internal security, namely the police and the country’s various specialized, non-uniformed security services. Following the coup, however, the police force, under the venal and incompetent leadership of the Krahn loyalists Doe had appointed, had so deteriorated that it stopped functioning as a law enforcement agency.10 The security services, also led by loyal Krahn, were not only corrupt, but had the additional disadvantage of being dispersed among a variety of government agencies, which limited their efficiency as well as Doe ability to observe them. In order to turn these bodies to fulfill his purposes, Doe embarked on a radical restructuring endeavor, in which he replaced his Krahn appointees with experienced professionals who had proved themselves in the service of the TWP, and furthermore centralized the security services under his own control. The restructuring proceeded in stages: The first stage, undertaken as part of the same anti-corruption drive by which Doe secured control of the Port Authority and intimidated the civil court judges, was carried out before the second Redemption Day. In the security services, Doe began with the Special Security Service (SSS), the body responsible for his personal safety in Liberia (outside the Executive Mansion) and abroad.11 On March 20, Gbeku T.

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Wright, a Krahn appointed after the coup, was dismissed as head of the SSS, charged with having embezzled over $91,666.12 In addition, as the first step toward centralizing the security services under his control, Doe created a new post with the important-sounding title of deputy minister of state in charge of national security, and six days later he appointed Patrick Minikon to fill it. Minikon had rich experience in managing the security services under the TWP and, after the coup, had joined the military government as Doe’s advisor on national security, in which position he was still serving when he received the appointment. In this new capacity, Minikon would be responsible for supervising the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA, created by Tolbert in 1974, was Liberia’s chief intelligence agency, with subpoena and law enforcement powers. Its mandate was to gather and analyze information regarding internal security, as well as to coordinate intelligence gathered by other agencies. In addition to supervising the agency, Minikon’s responsibilities included reporting directly to the head of state. Within a few months, Minikon would become a full-fledged minister in a newly created Ministry of National Security.13 In the Police Force, Doe took the first steps in a carefully orchestrated scheme to replace its top directors—Police Director Joe Myers and Deputy Police Director Sam Massaquoi, both of them Krahn loyalists, among other corrupt officers. Up until this point, Doe had actively protected his loyalists. For example, when in March 1981, a PRC committee charged Police Finance Director Gabriel Myers (Joe Myers’ brother) and his deputy John Youboty with corruption and recommended Youboty’s dismissal, Doe hastened to overturn their decision and, in addition, fined them for their “wrongful” and “willful” act.14 Now, less than a year later, in January 1982, Sam Massaquoi was charged, along with six other police officers, with receiving a $6,000 bribe to free a detained suspect allegedly involved in a gas coupon scam.15 Then, toward the end of March, Quiwonkpa issued a statement accusing the Police’s Criminal Investigation Department of cooperating with criminals in smuggling marijuana and in counterfeiting, and ordered the creation of a joint committee of army and police to investigate its operations.16 The second stage of the restructuring was carried out in the interval between Doe’s two tours. As before, the reorganization of the police force and of the security services would proceed in tandem. The director and deputy director of the Police Force would be dismissed, and a body known as the Joint Security Force would be removed from the Ministry of Justice, under whose auspices it had operated until then, and be made an independent agency more accessible to Doe’s control. In addition, while he was at it, Doe took the opportunity to dismiss Justice Minister Isaac Nyeplu, for reasons that had less to do with corruption than with Doe’s personal interests.

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The carefully planned process was set in motion after Doe left for his Asia-Africa tour. On May 3, 1982, Vice Head of State Podier, ever at Doe’s bidding, called two meetings to set the stage for the upcoming reorganization. In the first meeting, Podier effectively dressed down Myers and Nyeplu in the presence of Commander General of the army Thomas Quiwonkpa, chief of the immigration authority (which was part of the security apparatus) Edwin Tay, and members of the PRC. Addressing the police director and justice minister without naming them, he warned that he would not hesitate to take drastic measures against any member of the “joint security offices” for negligence of duty. The second meeting was with a cross section of the security and national police headquarters in Monrovia. Here, Podier warned that he would not hesitate to imprison any officer and have him dishonorably dismissed for “failing to honestly discharge his daily duties.”17 These rebukes, announced on radio and made in the presence of the PRC and key members of the security establishment, served to raise the corruption of the police force and security services to a matter of national importance and to lend justification to the subsequent dismissals, while once again obscuring Doe’s role in the actions. The actual dismissals were carried out about two months later, ordered by Doe and accomplished by means of a trick.18 On June 29, 1982, the Special Military Tribunal found Sam Massaquoi, along with his fellow officer Lt. Col Sam Kamara and the civilian who had offered the payoff, Abraham Swaray, guilty of bribery and sentenced them to death by firing squad. Doe used the predictable verdict to get rid of Myers and Nyeplu, while avoiding the bad press of executing white-collar offenders. He instructed Nyeplu to go through with the execution only if he could find three police officers to constitute the firing squad who could honestly swear that they had never engaged in corruption.19 Predictably, Nyeplu could not meet the demand. On July 2, Doe reprieved the three men facing execution and dismissed Nyeplu, along with Police Director Joe Y. Myers, loftily declaring that it was a disgrace to the PRC and the entire Liberian citizenry that there was not a single police officer who could clear himself of corruption. At the same time, Doe removed the Joint Security Force from the Ministry of Justice and made it a separate agency. Explaining the move, he stated that he was relieving the Ministry of Justice of responsibility for the Joint Security Force so as to enable the new justice minister to concentrate on the taxing responsibility involved in his work. In all three offices, the ousted official was replaced by a more competent, more professional, and more credible person. Wilfred Clarke, who had gained substantial experience in police and security matters as deputy minister of national security under the TWP and as head of Tolbert’s bodyguard unit, was appointed the new police director. He was regarded by Western diplomats as a

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solid, relatively nonpolitical professional.20 In the Ministry of Justice, Nyeplu, an undistinguished lawyer who owed his office to his being Podier’s uncle, was replaced by Winston Tubman, the eminent nephew of the late President William Tubman and an experienced attorney and public servant in his own right.21 Edward Massaquoi, who had served as director of the special security services under the TWP, was appointed head of the Joint Security Force.22 However, cleaning up and professionalizing the involved bodies, important as this was to Doe’s aspirations for permanency, was not the only purpose of the changes. Several other ends can be identified in Doe’s machinations involving the Joint Security Force and the Ministry of Justice. The removal of the Joint Security Force from the Ministry of Justice was another step, after the earlier appointment of Minikon to the newly created post of deputy minister of state in charge of national security, toward centralizing of the security services under Doe’s personal control. Placing the Joint Security Force under his control, and under the management of a competent professional, was important to Doe because this body was the one investigating suspected attempts to undermine the regime. This move reflected Doe’s heightened concern with his personal safety, as evident too in his appointment of his former aide-de-camp Emmanuel Sayon as Commander of the Executive Mansion Guard. Nyeplu’s removal from the Ministry of Justice seems anomalous. There was no need to dismiss Nyeplu in order to remove the Joint Security Force from the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, one would think that being Podier’s uncle should have assured Nyeplu’s tenure in office, at least as long as Podier was Doe’s second in command. Nevertheless, the exact opposite happened. The choice of Tubman to replace Nyeplu seems even more anomalous. Tubman was a respected lawyer who had represented Liberia at the United Nations and, at the time of the appointment, was serving as Con Com’s director of research and legal affairs. Given his stature and position, he certainly could not have been expected to approve Doe’s presidential candidacy or, later, to weigh the judiciary in on Doe’s side in any electoral dispute. The purpose of the appointment was to deflect attention from Doe’s manipulations. Tubman’s appointment lent stature to the Ministry of Justice, while enabling Doe to take control of the National Security Force without arousing suspicion. Significantly, Tubman’s tenure would end a good half year before Doe announced his intention to run for president. The overhaul of the upper echelon of the police force and the above-described changes in the security services were completed a few days before Doe’s announcement of the July 8, 1982 economic measures. Along with his AsiaAfrica tour in April–May that year, Doe took several steps to centralize his rule: his announcement of restrictions on the spending of the PRC and cabinet

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ministers in July, the upgrading and attempted politicization of the army, the apparent efforts to clean up the Police Force and security services, the abrogation of the death sentence for the offenders convicted of corruption, and the appointment of a well-respected attorney as minister of justice. These efforts all combined to reinforce the image Doe aspired to create as a responsible and compassionate leader attuned to the needs of his country and dedicated to ameliorating its problems and to hide his plans to stay in office. After the Second Tour: September–November In the months preceding his second overseas tour, Doe had focused his efforts on the army, the police force, and the non-uniformed security services, with the aim of improving their capabilities while turning them into bodies that would serve his political aspirations. Upon his return from the United States, he extended his efforts to the civil and foreign fields of government. Once again hoisting the banner of fighting corruption, and adding to it the banner of efficiency, he signaled to the civil court judges that their interests lay with supporting his needs. He saw to the dismissal of persons in public corporations, including in two banks, and carried out a wide-ranging reshuffle that would include, along with cabinet ministers, local government officials and public corporation employees. Before proceeding with these activities, however, he had to bring to a conclusion an inconvenient student strike that broke out shortly before his return from the United States. Ending the Student Strike The student strike erupted on September 1, after twenty-five new Hondas purchased for government officials were provocatively parked in front of the UL campus, at the same time that the government was claiming to not have the budget to buy new buses for the students to commute between the university’s two campuses.23 On September 2, UL students blocked the entrance to the Monrovia campus and issued a release urging their fellow students not to desist until the UL administration agreed to provide adequate transport, cut textbook prices by 50 percent, and reinstate a canceled scholarship plan. In an effort to bring the strike to an end before Doe’s return, Vice Head of State Podier and Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Harry Faber Nayou went personally to the UL campus to discuss the students’ demands. Rebuffing them, the students shouted insults and forced the two men to leave without a meeting. After consulting with the university administration, Podier closed the university pending the students’ apology.24 The strike confronted Doe with a dilemma. On the one hand, his wrangle with the students in the summer of 1981 made him reluctant to become

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embroiled in another violent confrontation with them, especially in view of the image of a liberal-minded civilian leader that he was working so hard to construct. On the other hand, he could not allow the strike to go on indefinitely. Superficially, the strike was not political, since it came to bolster demands for instrumental improvements. However, the matter of government vehicles, which prompted the UL students to raise their demands, was a highly contentious issue for the public as a whole. These vehicles were hugely resented as they symbolized the government’s extravagance and served as the focus for much of the criticism directed against the government by other dissenters. Thus, in essence the strike was a political act that constituted a violation of the ban on student political activities decreed the previous December. Allowing the strike to go on would undermine the deterrent power of this ban. Moreover, notwithstanding the ban, the students were still an influential force and there was the risk that the unrest would spread beyond the campus. A further consideration was that Doe needed to end the strike in order to preserve a political climate favorable to the realization of his ambitions for the future. The previous summer, he had made the mistake of trying to assert his authority over the PRC at the same time that he acted to suppress student dissent. The result—that Weh Syen took advantage of his dispute with the students to embarrass him—had taught him that it was unwise to take on more than one contender at a time. Therefore, initially, Doe kept his distance, while relying on the university authorities to settle matters. On September 6, UL President Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown-Sherman ordered all resident students, about four hundred, to evacuate the university dormitories by the following day. However, her action only caused the resistance to spread to Cuttington College, where students circulated leaflets expressing their solidarity with the demands of their UL compeers, who continued to strike.25 Eight more days passed before Doe responded with force. On September 14, soldiers entered the Cuttington College campus and conducted a dormitory search for the students responsible for printing and disseminating the leaflets. Eight students were arrested for interrogation and Kpedee Woiwor was dismissed as student leader and suspended for six weeks by the Cuttington College administration for “gross insubordination to authority.”26 Confronted with the military action and the determined opposition of their university administrations, the students gave up their struggle and, according to the New Liberian, asked UL President Brown-Sherman to intervene with the government on their behalf, which she did.27 At this point, Doe showed himself gracious in victory. On September 22, he agreed to reopen the university and to meet the students’ transportation demands when the buses promised by China and South Korea arrived, which would happen some ten months later.28 The students’ acquiescence freed Doe to proceed with his program to prepare the grounds for controlling the electoral process. The ensuing

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months saw a swell of activity, which encompassed not only the army and security services, but also the courts, the banks and other public corporations, in addition to the PRC, the cabinet, and other government agencies. THE SEPTEMBER RUSH In mid-September, Doe resumed his efforts to lay down the foundations for control of the electoral process, extending his endeavors from the armed forces to the civil and government sectors. He began with two actions on September 16, two days after soldiers had raided the UL dormitories. One, following the earlier appointment of A. Tuabe Myers to the Tubman Military Academy at Todee, consisted of the dismissal of three senior officers and the assignment of eighteen others to different positions in the Training Command at Camp Todee and the Barclay Training Center in Monrovia. An official statement called the action, which amounted to a continuation of efforts to improve new recruit training, the “first major reshuffle” in the Armed Forces and explained it as a “pre–requisite to the re–organization of the Armed Forces of Liberia to ensure smooth operation and speedy accomplishment of assigned missions.”29 The other action was a radio speech in which Doe accused the country’s civil judges and lawyers of prolonging cases for personal gain. Playing on popular frustration with the long delays in adjudicating disputes, Doe charged the judges of harassing the public and depriving the citizens of justice while causing suffering to banks and businesses. He warned that if things did not change, he would have no choice but to overhaul the entire judicial system and remove those who were not serving the best interests of the country and its people.30 The diatribe remained verbal and Doe refrained from dismissing anyone at this point. However, the warning, issued under the guise of protecting banks and businesses, was an act of intimidation, much as had been his dismissal of the People’s Special Theft Court judges the year before.31 This diatribe, which essentially accused the judges and lawyers of bribe-taking, was the first sign of Doe’s resumption of the bogus anticorruption campaign he had dropped in March. It conveniently dovetailed with a spate of reports in Liberian newspapers of yet further embezzling, racketeering and misappropriation of government and public funds, and with comments by foreign observers that if the corruption were allowed to grow unchecked, it would hamper the government’s efforts to develop the country.32 However, like his actions in the security forces, Doe’s efforts to intimidate the courts and legal profession were born of self-interest and were anticipatory of the election period. Once the draft of the constitution was accepted and preparations for the elections under way, as Doe knew that they soon

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would be, the legal authority to make decisions on crucial matters that could affect the election’s outcome would reside in the civil courts, not in the government or in the military courts which the junta controlled. It would be the civil courts that would hear appeals concerning the registration process, election procedures, and election outcomes. In trying to intimidate the courts, Doe acted much like other dictatorial leaders in “competitive authoritarian regimes,” who, as Levitsky and Way put it, “routinely attempt to subordinate the judiciary.”33 The attack against the courts and legal profession was followed on September 22, the day Doe agreed to reopen the University of Liberia, by further so-called anti-corruption measures. The main one was the firing of three highly positioned bankers on corruption charges. Hilary Dennis, governor of the National Housing and Savings Bank, was dismissed for allegedly embezzling $2.9 million; Adolph Yancy, managing director of the Agricultural Development Bank, and his operations manager J. S. B. Zayzay were fired for failing to account for nearly $200,000.34 Dennis and Yancy were well-connected bankers from influential Americo-Liberian families, and “not in Doe’s camp.”35 Their dismissals enabled Doe to close his grip on Liberia’s government banks. Doe had already taken control of the Central Bank of Liberia soon after the coup, when he replaced the TWP-appointed governor, Charles Greene, with his own appointee, Thomas Hanson—a Krahn. With the dismissals of Dennis and Yancy, Doe now also took control of the other two government banks: The National Housing and Savings Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank. Dennis and Yancy were replaced respectively by William Diggs and Wilson Tarpeh, of African-Liberian origin. Although the two were professional bankers, their freedom of action was diminished by the threat of dismissal and prosecution that now hung over the heads of all bankers whose power or independence worried or irked the head of state. In dismissing the bankers, Doe made sure to hide his self-interest, much as he had in the changes in the security forces. First of all, the dismissals were framed as part of the general campaign against corruption. The dismissals of Dennis and Yancy were announced on the same day as the dismissal of two lesser figures for comparatively small offenses: Herman Greene and Elaine Youlo. Greene, the managing director of the Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation, was suspected of involvement in a $10,000 plastic pipe racket, and Youlo was suspected of allegedly using corporation-owned plastic pipes at a value of $4,000 for private purposes.36 By yoking Dennis’s and Yancy’s dismissals to theirs, Doe sought to avert the impression that the bankers were being singled out for personal reasons. Moreover, although it was Doe who made the announcement, the dismissals were presented as the outcome of investigations by the Auditor General, J. Seyon Browne, a hitherto low-level

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clerk whom Doe had raised to the position of auditor general due to shared ethnic affinity of the Krahn group. Doe pursued the bankers with particular zeal. Following its own investigation, the Justice Ministry reached the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute them. Nonetheless, Browne insisted on going ahead with the prosecution, despite the strong objections of Justice Minister Winston Tubman. In April 1983, Browne lashed out at Tubman in an article published in the government-owned New Liberian accusing him of intending “to sabotage the economy by letting criminals go free” and threatening to prosecute him on criminal charges. Not frightened, Tubman responded with an interview in the Daily Observer declaring that he would not be intimidated, vowing that he would do his work as it should be done, and presenting in considerable detail the arguments for the bankers’ innocence.37 Nonetheless, the prosecution of the bankers continued. Ultimately, Dennis was acquitted by the Special Theft Court where he was tried, as Browne failed to convince either the jury or the judges of his guilt. Neither Yancy nor Zayzay were ever formally charged, and in September 1984 Doe himself would clear them, sending identical letters to each stating that an independent audit revealed that they had committed no crime.38 By that time, Tubman, dismissed in yet another cabinet reshuffle in May 1983, was no longer minister of justice.39 On the same day that he dismissed the bankers and corporation heads, Doe reinstated the PRC members he had suspended in May and June 1982, Larry Borteh and Stanley Tarwo, as well as former PRC member Jerry Gban, who had been dismissed in 1980 for beating up two medical doctors. Doe explained that he had forgiven them because they had “fully paid the penalty for their misconducts.”40 Doe’s leniency toward the thuggish councilmen contrasted his severity toward the errant corporation heads and accused bankers. His motives in reinstating the councilmen were probably a mixture of fear and the knowledge that he would need supporters in the PRC. After his dismissal in June, Borteh, facing the loss of both his position and his income together with other problems that came with this, paid a renowned medicine man from Sierra Leone $1,000 to perform rituals that would make Doe reinstate him, and promised to pay the medicine man $25,000 upon success. Barring that, he arranged to have Doe killed or made insane. His plan was soon discovered, and he was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison.41 Doe probably believed that he was in genuine danger. Witchcraft was taken seriously throughout Africa and, like other African leaders, Doe carried with him magical objects to protect himself from its effects. Borteh’s determined efforts to get back into the Council apparently led Doe to decide that he would be safer with the troublesome councilmen in the PRC, with their positions and perks restored, than with the angry and vindictive men on the outside. It

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probably also gave him grounds to expect that, having been chastened, the returned councilmen would throw their support behind him in a contest for the presidency in exchange for the benefits of their office. THE GRAND RESHUFFLE AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE SECURITY FORCES UNDER DOE’S CONTROL The reorganization of the security services and the supposed fight against corruption were briefly put on hold when, on October 6, an iron ore mine in the northern town of Nye Nye collapsed in the wake of three days of pounding rain. Scores of miners were killed or injured, resulting in the displacement of some three hundred families. Declaring the collapse a “national disaster,” Doe left for the scene, announced two days of national mourning, canceled all government meetings and his participation in the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa, Zaire, and personally arranged the rescue and rehabilitation mission.42 At the end of October, Doe began to prepare the public for his next power concentrating measure: a wide-ranging reshuffle that would include six cabinet ministers, two local government officials, and some half dozen public corporation employees. To foster the sense that the reshuffle was needed, Doe issued a public statement criticizing “glaring irregularities in Ministries and agencies” and attacking “payroll padding, misappropriation of government funds and equipment, nepotism, indiscipline, conflicts of interest and bureaucratic red tape.”43 He ordered that a list of persons who had been convicted for embezzling or misappropriating government funds be given to the PRC to facilitate their transfer to Camp Belle Yalla in the Lofa County, Liberia’s maximum security prison.44 This move amounted to him unilaterally increasing the severity of the sentences imposed by the courts and it was soon followed by the transfer of nine previously convicted government officials and private citizens to the Camp.45 Doe explained it as a “warning to people, particularly businessmen who offer or accept bribes.”46 The reshuffle itself was announced on November 2. It had two main foci: economic and military. Three of the six cabinet changes were in ministries indirectly involved with economic matters: the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Transportation, and the Ministry of Labor.47 None of these ministries were particularly important and the substitutions, mostly by people who had been in other government positions, seem to have been a case in point of Doe’s inclination for moving people around in order to prevent the development of alternative centers of power. The more important change was in the Ministry of Defense, where Albert Karpeh was replaced by Col. Gray D. Allison, until then minister of

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information. The switch, for which no official explanation was given, was probably related to the arrest of Albert Karpeh’s brother, Reuben Karpeh, a captain in the AFL, on charges of participating in planning a countercoup.48 There is no indication that Albert Karpeh was involved in the plot, if indeed there was one, or even suspected of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, ever apprehensive of being overthrown, Doe took the precaution of removing him from the sensitive post. This action was similar to Doe’s removal of Oscar Quiah from his post as minister of local government after the May 1981 soldiers’ plot because he belonged to the same ethnic group as Weh Syen, and much as he had removed Nyeplu from the Ministry of Justice because of his family ties to Podier. To compensate Karpeh, Doe appointed him to the prestigious and potentially lucrative position of general service manager of the National Iron Ore Company, which owned the mine that had collapsed the previous month. In addition to enabling Doe to remove Karpeh from the Ministry of Defense without alienating him, this appointment had the added advantage of reinforcing Doe’s hold on yet another public corporation.49 Doe explained the reshuffle much as he had the September changes in the army, as “necessary to infuse new dynamism in the government and improve general efficiency in the national affairs.” To publicize his supposed efforts to fight corruption, he directed Vice Head of State Nicholas Podier to undertake a nationwide tour to acquaint the people with the government’s determination to fight corruption in Liberian society. In tandem, he told the minister of information to arrange a one-day seminar on the topic of “minimizing corruption in our society” for government and public corporation officials.50 Along with the reshuffle, Doe completed the process he had started earlier of centralizing the security services under his control. As well as announcing the reshuffle, he pronounced the creation, or more accurately the re–establishment, of the Ministry of National Security, with Patrick Minikon at its head.51 This Ministry was originally established by Tolbert after the April 1979 rice riots, to monitor, guide, and coordinate the intelligence gathering and operational activities of the various security services and to prepare security briefs with information and recommendations for the president.52 In essence, the new ministry brought some of the separate security agencies under one administrative roof, enabling Doe to oversee bodies he viewed as vital to realizing his ambitions for the presidency. In the years to come, he would use the security briefs provided by the Ministry to spy on his political rivals. With the appointments of Allison and Minikon, Doe had loyal and competent persons whom he trusted in important security positions, who could look after his interests. Minikon, as described earlier in this chapter, had solid professional credentials and experience along with a history of loyal service to the postcoup regime. Allison had served Doe loyally in his capacity as minister of information and had a solid military background. He had

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studied at military academies in the United States and the UK. Under the TWP, he had been a lieutenant in the National Guard, a commanding officer in the Signal Corps, and later a liaison officer of the Liberian contingent to the UN forces in the Congo. Gray D. Allison was replaced in the Ministry of Information by Peter Naigow, who had served as director general of the Liberian Broadcasting System. The Ministry of Information would also be important to Doe’s political plans as the body that would have to justify his candidacy. Although Allison had served Doe loyally as minister of information, Naigow’s professional background was more suited to Doe’s needs. NEGOTIATIONS TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ISRAEL Finally, before the calendar year was out, the military government began to negotiate the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel. Along with most other African states, Liberia had severed diplomatic ties in the wake to the October 1973 War, when, pressured by its Arab members, the OAU passed a resolution to boycott Israel. In the following years, Israel strove to reduce its isolation on the African continent and managed to maintain “Interests Office” in Zaire, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Ghana and Togo, and informal military and economic ties with other countries.53 The signing of the Israel-Egypt peace accords in 1978 provided Israel with the long-sought opportunity to pursue formal ties. In May 1982, Zaire became the first sub-Saharan state to renew the diplomatic relationship. In exchange, Israel supplied Zaire with military and financial assistance and lobbied on its behalf in the United States.54 As they were gearing up for the presidential race, Doe and his advisors sought similar benefits and were equally willing to pay for them in the coin of diplomatic ties.55 They sought military assistance both for national defense and for Doe’s own personal security. On the national level, the PRC government deeply feared Libyan aggression and meddling. For the past five years, Libya had been actively supporting anti-government rebels in Chad, and in 1980 and 1981 sent its soldiers to fight on their side. The intervention led twenty African states to sever relations with Libya or to expel Libyan diplomats. The result was Libyan efforts to undermine some of their regimes.56 The PRC government feared that Libya was planning to avenge the closure of its People’s Bureau and its anti-Libyan stand in the OAU by encouraging opposition to itself.57 Doe believed that Israel could provide him with intelligence as to Libya’s intentions.58 With respect to his personal security, Israel was well known for the quality of its security services, and he expected that it would help him bring to fruition his plans to turn the Executive Mansion Guard into

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a parallel security force that would be loyal to him and serve as a counterforce to the power of the army. Doe also saw in Israel a potential source of economic benefits on both the national and personal levels. Prior to the severance of diplomatic relations, Israel had provided a great deal of valued development assistance to Liberia and other African states. In many countries it continued to do so even after formal ties were cut. Doe and his advisors hoped that such assistance would enable him to further present himself as working to advance Liberia’s economy and to improve the lot of its people. They also believed that Israel could help them to obtain investment from American Jews, as it had Zaire (Congo).59 On the personal plane, Doe and his advisors were well aware that his bid for the presidency, after years of incompetent rule and in violation of repeated promises to return to the barracks, would be unpopular and require substantial funds to cover the cost of favors and patronage. Mid-1983 would see Doe scrambling for sources of extra–budgetary finance for his upcoming campaign. In May 1983, he would announce that the Liberian government was prepared to privatize the Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC) and the Liberia Timber and Plywood Corporation (LTPC). In justification, he would tell of his long dissatisfaction with the performance of the country’s public corporations.60 In fact he was following in the footsteps of other African rulers who privatized state corporations in exchange for kickbacks.61 The privatizations never went through, but in June Doe would add yet another public corporation, the Forestry Development Authority (FDA), to those that were already supplying him with cash. The FDA has been termed “alternative Ministry of Finance,” which, along with the Governor of the Central Bank, was already relaying bags of cash to Doe.62 Moreover, Doe believed that Israel could help him get personal financial assistance from the American Jewish community. A promising start may have been “a gift” of a large sum of money which, according to Foreign Minister Fahnbulleh Jr., was given to Doe by a Jewish businessman when he started his diplomatic approach to Israel.63 Israel was an attractive source of assistance for yet another reason. Although, at the time, Liberia’s military government was receiving ample support from the United States, it could not be ruled out that Congress would block aid once Doe’s political ambitions became clear. Unlike the United States, Israel did not pretend to care about the type of regime and would not pressure Doe to put on a show of democratic rule. These various advantages would outweigh the risks that restored relations with Israel might entail. Although the OAU, where Doe was playing the role of African leader, had not censured President Mobuto of Zaire for restoring relations, Saudi Arabia, Liberia’s chief petroleum supplier, had shown its

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disapproval by severing relations with Zaire. The danger that renewing ties with Israel could jeopardize Liberia’s oil supply and the aid given to it by the Arab states, however, was tempered by the fact that the aid that Liberia received from Arab states was paltry. Arab aid to Liberia was only about a fifth of that received from the United States and other developed countries, and if Saudi Arabia were to stop selling Liberia oil, the United States could be relied on to stand as surety.64 Coinciding with Doe’s financial and military needs was the desire to maintain the support of the Reagan administration, which was actively encouraging African states to restore relations with Israel. Jeune Afrique would later claim that Doe’s reason for renewing ties with Israel was basically “the all-powerful American influence in Monrovia.”65 Two channels of negotiation were opened up. On August 1, Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison and Chief of Staff Henry Dubar arrived in Israel to secretly negotiate conditions for the renewal of diplomatic relations.66 A close aide of the commanding general of the army, Thomas Quiwonkpa, was discreetly sent to tell Benad Avital, head of the Israeli Interests Office in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, that Liberia was ready to renew the diplomatic relationship with Israel. Following that encounter, Avital made several visits to Liberia to meet with a high-ranking official in the PRC hierarchy.67 By early November 1982, Doe had secured his grip over the security forces, sent intimidating messages to judges and bankers, further extended his hold on Liberia’s public corporations, including two major banks, and increased the number of PRC members on whose support he would be able to count in the upcoming presidential race. At around the same time, he was taking the first steps in renewing relations with Israel. Yet none of the steps Doe took to prepare the ground for his presidential candidacy raised alarm bells, either in Liberia or abroad. On the contrary, even as Doe steadily tightened his grip, he continued to be viewed as a concerned and caring leader. His stay of execution for Joe Myers, Sam Kamara, and Abraham Swaray won him praise for clemency and compassion. One Liberian paper went so far as to enthusiastically declare that Doe “had been inspired by God and the Wisdom of Jesus Christ.” West Africa praised his appointment of former TWP officials as “healing wounds.”68 The AFP construed his reinstatement of the three ruffian councilmen as an act of “rehabilitation,” which, together with his reopening of the University of Liberia, “offset his “crackdown” on the bankers.69 In terms of the metaphor of the two paths employed toward the end of chapter 4, the steps Doe took on the virtual path continued to obscure his steps toward permanency on the real path, much as they had obscured his aggregation of power until this point. Ever the master of illusion, Doe managed to present his power-building moves as actions that promoted national interest. He billed the moves as directed toward fighting corruption,

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increasing efficiency, or fostering reconciliation—all worthy aims well within the national consensus and consistent with the desiderata of the United States and its European allies. The appointment of reputable and qualified persons, whether in new positions or as replacements of venal and incompetent Krahn appointees, blurred his political motives and the political nature of the changes. So did the care Doe took to carry out his moves through and in concert with other government officials and bodies and to pause to handle unexpected emergencies, like the mine flood. His feelers toward Israel were secret and, even had they not been, there was nothing obvious to connect them with his aspirations for the presidency. Moreover, now as then, Doe took care to nurture the belief that he planned to step down. Having set an election date in his 1981 Christmas message, he subsequently repeatedly promised to return the soldiers to the barracks and to transfer the government to civilians. He repeated the promise on a number of occasions. Firstly, he repeated it during his tour of the United States and elaborated on it in his Christmas message of December 24, 1982, when he announced that preliminary work was underway for the national referendum on the constitution.70 As he had not yet done anything that clearly showed his intentions, most observers, with the notable exception of New York City’s Mayor Edward Koch, were lulled by the assurances that the transfer of power they so wanted to see would indeed happen. NOTES 1. Sawyer, interview. 2. Alima, “Révolution ou ?,” 36–40. 3. “Gen Quiwonkpa Emerges as Folk Hero,” Frankfurter Allgemeine, July 2, 1982, 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2672 (August 1982): 36. 4. “Defense Ministry Announces Changes in AFL Leadership,” Daily Observer, May 27, 1982, 1, 10, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2647 (June 1982): 32–33. 5. “Americans in Our Gov’t?,” Daily Observer, May 21, 1982, 1. 6. “Defense Ministry Announces Changes,” 32–33. 7. “Chief of Staff Warns Military to Refrain from Politics,” New Liberian, May 28, 1982, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2647 (June 1982): 39. 8. Claude E. Welch Jr., “The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa,” African Studies Review 17, no. 1 (April 1974): 214. 9. “Minister Warns Officers against Press Statements,” T1. 10. “Quiwonkpa Warns Criminals,” Daily Observer, March 25, 1982, 1. 11. Bill Berkeley, Liberia: A Promise Betrayed—A Report on Human Rights (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1987), 39.

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12. “Security Director Dismissed for Embezzlement,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 21, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1982): T3. 13. “Doe Announces Major Changes in Government,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 2, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1982): T1. 14. AFP, “Doe Fines Council Members for Improper Dismissal,” March 16, 1981, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1981): T4. 15. AFP, “Police Official, Others Face Corruption Charges,” March 30, 1982, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1982): T2–T3. 16. “Quiwonkpa Warns Criminals,” 1. 17. “Podier Expresses ‘Disgust’ with Security Forces,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 5, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1982): T3–T4. 18. “Police Officials Sentenced to Death for Bribery,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 29, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T2. 19. “Doe Sets Conditions for Death Sentences,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 30, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T2. 20. “Justice Minister, Police Chief Dismissed,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 2, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T4. 21. “Replacements Appointed,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 5, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T4. 22. Berkeley, Liberia: A Promise Betrayed, 38. 23. Patrick Seyon (vice president of administration at the University of Liberia), in an interview with the author, June 4, 1997, transcript, private archives. 24. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 50. “Students Boycott Classes for Second Day,” Monrovia Domestic Service, September 2, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T5. 25. “Students Told to Vacate University Premises,” Monrovia Domestic Service, September 6, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T1. 26. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 52. 27. “Prospects for Early Resolution of UL Closure ‘High,’” New Liberian, September 16, 1982, 1, 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2706 (October 1982): 28–29. 28. AFP, “Heads of Three Government Corporations Fired,” September 23, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T3. 29. “Eighteen AFL Officers Receive New Assignments, Three Relieved,” New Liberian, September 17, 1982, 1, 3, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2706 (October 1982): 25–26.

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30. “Doe ‘Severely’ Criticizes Legal Profession,” Monrovia Domestic Services, September 16, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T1. 31. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1983): 202. 32. AFP, “Observers Say Corruption again Chronic,” September 28, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T1. 33. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 56. 34. “Liberia: Doe ‘Clears’ Yancy and Zayzay,” West Africa, October 15, 1984, 2104–5. “Liberia: Sliding Back to the Old Ways,” West Africa, June 6, 1983, 1334. 35. Liberian Action Party activist (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, May 15, 2009, transcript, personal archives, Monrovia, Liberia. 36. “Heads of Three Government Corporations Fired,” T3. 37. Winston Tubman, “I Will Not Be Intimidated,” Daily Observer, April 4, 1983, 1, 10. 38. “Doe Clears Yancy and Zayzay,” Daily Observer, September 18, 1984, 1, 10. 39. AFP, “Observers Speculate Doe May Run for President,” May 14, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T2. 40. “Heads of Three Government Corporations Fired,” T3. 41. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B497. “Borteh Jailed for Using a Witch Doctor against Doe,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 13, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T2. 42. “Doe Declares Mourning Period, Cancels Zaire Trip,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 6, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1982): T3. United Press International, A.M. cycle, October 6, 1982, Nexis Uni. 43. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B487. 44. “Council Given List of Convicted Embezzlers,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 1, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1982): T1. 45. Eddie Momoh, “Doe Reshuffles His Men,” West Africa, November 15, 1982, 2951–952. 46. “Council Given List of Convicted Embezzlers,” T1. 47. “Doe Announces Major Changes in Government,” T1. 48. Liberian Action Party activist (interviewee has been anonymized), email correspondence with author, June 15, 2009. 49. “Doe Announces Major Changes in Government,” T1. 50. “Doe Announces Major Changes in Government,” T1. “Seminar on Corruption,” New Liberian, November 2, 1982, 1, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report 2731 (November 1982): 22. 51. Momoh, “Doe Reshuffles His Men,” 2951–952.

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52. D. Elwood Dunn, email correspondence with author, April 13, 2009, transcript, private archives. 53. Arye Oded, “Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy—Expectations and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects,” Israel Studies 15 no. 3 (2010): 136. 54. Najib J. Hakim and Richard P. Stevens, “Zaire and Israel: An American Connection,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12, no. 3 (1983): 41–53. 55. Lawrence P. Frank, “Israel and Africa: The Era of Tachlis,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26 (1988): 154. 56. Ronald Bruce St. John, “The Libyan Debacle in Sub–Saharan Africa 1969– 1987,” in The Green and the Black Quadafi’s Policies in Africa, ed. Rene Lemarchand (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 131–32. 57. David K. Shipler, “Liberian Visits Israel Amid Concern Over Libya,” New York Times, August 23, 1983, 3, Nexis Uni. 58. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Liberian president’s visit in Israel [in Hebrew],” September 1983, secret, 2, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel. 59. Arye Oded, Africa and Israel: African Attitudes Toward Resumption of Diplomatic Relations (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute Policy Studies, 1986), 14, 16. 60. “Privatization of Public Corporations,” Monrovia Home Service, May 18, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 31, 1983, Nexis Uni. 61. Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 178–79. 62. Liberian Action Party activist, interview. 63. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr., Across the Landscape—Selected Political Writings and Speeches on Liberia 1978‒2001 (Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2004), 141. 64. Oded, Africa and Israel: African Attitudes Toward Resumption of Diplomatic Relations, 17. George Klay Kieh, Jr., “An Analysis of Israeli Repenetration of Liberia,” Liberian Studies Journal 14, no. 2 (1989): 125. 65. Francois Soudan, “Un Africain a Jerusalem,” Jeune Afrique, August 31, 1983, 30. 66. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Visit of the Liberian president, Samuel Doe, in Israel—A summary and assessment [in Hebrew],” August 26, 1983, secret, 2, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 163. 67. Israeli diplomat (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, June 14, 2009, transcript, private archives, Jerusalem, Israel. 68. “Doe Said to Have Done Good Work in Last 2 Years,” 13–15. “Dr. Doe Heals the Wounds,” West Africa, August 2, 1982, 1978. 69. “Heads of Three Government Corporations Fired,” T3. 70. “Doe Orders 14 Prisoners Freed from Bella Yella,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 24, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1982): T2.

Chapter 6

Tightening Control

Having become the undisputed leader of Liberia, unchallenged by rivals and unfettered by the PRC, Doe now turned his efforts to securing a long-term hold on the country. In his 1982 Redemption Day speech, he had restated his commitment to constitutional rule and his support for the National Constitutional Commission. He told his audience that Con Com had completed the first two stages of its work and was moving on to the third: the drafting of the new constitution. He told of the national referendum that would be held on the draft and of the need it created for an overhaul of the political and electoral system in preparation for democratic elections.1 His speech sounded convincing, and one could not tell from it that genuinely democratic elections were, in fact, not on his agenda. But as the draft constitution was being written and the 1985 elections eagerly awaited, Doe set out to perpetuate his rule by becoming the head of the promised civilian government. Although only a few anticipated it at the time, in retrospect it is clear that he was already planning to run in and win the elections. He would use much of his third year in office to prepare the ground, through three intertwined strands of activity. He would make a concerted effort to create a new image of himself, by means of overseas travel, as a worthy civilian leader, without giving up his military status or ceasing to remind his countrymen that they were living under a military government. He would make strenuous efforts to secure foreign aid from new and old sources alike, so as to keep his faltering regime afloat while impressing his countrymen with his efforts on their behalf, without doing what had to be done to actually ameliorate Liberia’s dire economic situation. And he would act to yet further secure his power, taking care not to undermine the image of the liberal-minded ruler that he was trying to create. With the exception of his overseas travels, none of these activities were new. Doe had already demonstrated his determination and ability to build his power step by step, while obtaining American funding and backing for his regime and creating an image of himself as a liberal and responsible leader. 125

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However, with a date set for the elections, Con Com preparing the draft constitution, and his eye on the presidency, his endeavors took on special urgency and momentum. Before 1982 was out, he would take two multicountry overseas tours in pursuit of a new image for himself and increased funding for his regime, announce two sets of economic measures, and upgrade and reorganize Liberia’s security forces and extend his control of the state apparatus. This part will deal with his overseas travels and economic measures, the next part with his changes in the security forces and tightening control. CREATING A PRESIDENTIAL IMAGE THROUGH OVERSEAS TRAVEL For Doe’s first two years in power, his military identity, first as a common soldier and then as a five-star general and commander in chief of the armed forces of Liberia (AFL), had served him in good stead. It gave him a claim to being a man of the people along with the authority of the supreme leader of Liberia’s military government. Now, however, with the revolution having come to naught and the glamour initially attendant on the postcoup military government thoroughly worn off, his military identity could be foreseen as an obstacle to attaining elected office as the head of a civilian government. So could his glaring deficiencies in education, culture, and experience, especially in a country like Liberia which had been accustomed to almost a century and a half of rule by a class that possessed these qualities. RATIONALE FOR AND PURPOSE OF DOE’S OVERSEAS TRAVELS To enter the race as a fitting candidate, Doe needed to be able to present himself as a civilian leader worthy of heading a civilian government. He had to show, more convincingly than he had thus far, that he had the will and capacity to act to ameliorate the problems besetting his people. He had to show, as well, that he had more to offer than just a mediocre command of the English language. And he had to do it all within a short period of time, as the writing of the draft constitution, whose completion would set the election process in motion, was proceeding at a rapid pace. The means he chose were overseas travel. In his first two years in office, he had focused his efforts in the international arena on gaining acceptance in Africa and aid from the United States—two essentials to placing the postcoup government on firm footing. He relied heavily on his foreign ministers, first Matthews and then Fahnbulleh Jr., to conduct Liberia’s diplomacy and rarely

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ventured abroad himself. His foreign visits were few, short, and confined almost exclusively to West Africa. In the first few weeks after the coup, he traveled to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire to push for admittance to ECOWAS. Once that was granted, most of his brief trips abroad were to attend the annual OAU and ECOWAS summits, and the meetings of the Mano River Union (MRU). His only trips beyond West Africa were to Ethiopia, to an OAU summit in Kenya, and the funeral of Egypt’s President Anwar el-Sadat. The only personal visits he made were to President Sekou Toure of Guinea, who served him as a kind of big brother and advisor. Now, with his enemies eliminated, his critics sidelined and enfeebled, key positions held by his loyalists, and his personalist rule established, he could venture further abroad and for longer periods of time without worrying that his power might be compromised in his absence.2 Between April and September 1982, he took two overseas tours: the first to five countries in Asia and the Middle East, the second to the United States, France, and Morocco. The tours’ declared purpose was to increase the amount and sources of economic aid to Liberia. As Doe had stated in his second Redemption Day speech some two weeks before he left on his first journey: “While maintaining our commitments to our traditional friends, we will have to pursue. . .new avenues of financial help as the task of reconstruction is most urgent.”3 Their overarching purpose was to improve his image at home and abroad in preparation for vying to become the first civilian head of postcoup Liberia. Doe traveled overseas to improve his image because his options at home, both in Liberia and West Africa, were limited. To upgrade his image from within Liberia he would have had to show progress in solving the country’s economic problems, to introduce good governance, and to allow more freedom of expression than he was willing to do. To upgrade his image from within West Africa, he would have had to overcome the implacable hostility of his neighbors. Although he had been formally accepted into the OAU and ECOWAS within a few months of the coup, this was due largely to American pressure; the hostility and suspicion that had led to his exclusion in the first place had never really abated. Two years later, Sekou Toure of Guinea was still the only West African leader with whom Doe enjoyed a warm relationship. Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone continued to regard him as the master sergeant who had murdered Tolbert and viewed him with unconcealed aversion. Traveling to distant countries provided opportunities that were unavailable at home. Going abroad in pursuit of foreign aid would enable Doe to present himself as doing everything possible to meet Liberia’s most crucial needs. The conventions of diplomatic travel, with its shows of hospitality and respect, meetings with heads of state and high officials, and issuance of

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important-sounding public statements, would help him to construct himself as a head of state familiar with the world, adept in its ways, and accepted as an equal by heads of state in Africa and beyond. The First Tour The first tour, from April 30 to May 17, was to Egypt, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.4 From all but Saudi Arabia, Doe obtained goods, whether tangible or intangible, that he would later use to bolster his image. From China and Korea, Doe obtained the economic assistance he needed to show his countrymen that he had the tenacity to pursue and bring home even more foreign aid. China came through with a combination of grants, loans, and investments whose total value exceeded the sums that Liberia received from Europe and came second only to those from the United States.5 China’s commitments included $44 million toward the construction of a lavish sports complex in Monrovia, a $13 million loan for the rehabilitation of sugar factories in Harper, Maryland County, as well as a team of experts to guide the endeavor; and support for the construction of a 311-mile‑long highway to link up Nimba, Grand Gedeh, and Maryland counties at an estimated cost of $56 million.6 To these commitments were added a gift of twenty military jeeps, four 80-seater buses and two limousines, along with spare parts and a technical team to train Liberians to repair the vehicles, as well as promises of medical aid and scholarships.7 From Korea, he obtained an agreement on bilateral economic cooperation, including a Korean delegation to be dispatched to Liberia to share experience in economic development and to step up joint ventures in agriculture, fisheries, and other areas.8 Korea also donated fifteen military transport trucks for the Liberian army and six large buses, four of them earmarked for the University of Liberia.9 Together, the two countries served him as new sources of economic aid, which had the added advantage of being free of the onerous IMF conditions that accompanied American and European assistance. In addition, Doe’s visit to Korea provided two additional means to bolster his image. One was an honorary doctorate from the University of Seoul, which would enable him to claim equal status, if only symbolic, with the educated contenders who were likely to campaign in the upcoming race for the presidency. The other was the opportunity to voice his views on matters of international concern. Thus, in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the tour, Doe, echoing the position of the South Korean government and the United States, voiced full Liberian support for the reunification of Korea by peaceful means. This would be the first of many empty but authoritativesounding pronouncements that Doe would make on the affairs of countries far

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from Africa in geography, history, and culture, in his endeavors to convey the impression that he knew and understood a great deal more than he did about matters all over the world and that he was as competent as the leader of any other nation to sound his views on them. His visits to Egypt and Algeria were aimed at circumventing the hostility of his West African neighbors by constructing himself as an active and important participant in the OAU and a respected player in continental affairs. Egypt had enormous political influence on the continent and was one of the leading members of the OAU.10 Algeria’s conflict with Morocco over the Western Sahara at the time had split the OAU. Morocco had annexed two thirds of the territory in 1975, after Spain had retreated under pressure from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), and annexed the remaining third in 1979. To counter Morocco’s move, Algeria stepped in with substantial military and strategic support for POLISARIO as it continued its fight for Saharan independence.11 Following the lead of the United States, Doe had already lined up on the Moroccan side of the dispute. In February 1982 he had joined with Morocco and eighteen other Western-oriented African states to denounce the OAU’s decision to admit the POLISARIO and pledged to boycott all meetings in which the POLISARIO delegation participated. In practice, the visit to Algeria did nothing to change Doe’s position. On June 1, 1982, he announced that Liberia would not attend the forthcoming OAU summit to be held in Tripoli if the POLISARIO were admitted.12 Later in the month he repulsed a Libyan effort to convince him to change his mind and joined with the eighteen African states who withdrew their delegations. On the surface, the visit to Algeria seemed to contrast with Doe’s foreign policy. In fact, the visit occurred entirely under U.S. direction; Doe was sent to see whether Algeria might be persuaded to abandon its support for the POLISARIO.13 All in all, the tour enabled Doe to present himself in two new roles. One was as a bold and dedicated political leader who took it upon himself to travel the world to rescue his country from the economic strangulation it faced. His economic outreach met with some public approval. A letter to the editor in the Daily Observer thanked Doe and the PRC for an “even handed diplomatic policy” and agreed that the time had come to “borrow from both east and west to enhance our development.”14 The other role was as a man of the world and a head of state who was received with honor and respect by well-established world leaders and who had something to contribute to international discourse. The First Homecoming On his return to Liberia, Doe used his homecoming speech to promulgate his new image. Vaunting his initiative for the tour, he took personal credit for

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“the usefulness of our policy of personally embarking upon special missions abroad.”15 Itemizing the aid received from China, he presented it as a sign of the Chinese regime’s friendship not only toward Liberia, but toward his government in particular and as a “consequence of my visit.”16 Expatiating on his visit to Korea, he told not only of the aid he received, but also of the “new avenues of diplomatic and commercial transactions” he had opened up, as well as of the honorary doctorate he was awarded.17 Reviewing his visit country by country, he effused about how warmly he was received by heads of state and other senior officials, and presented himself as a statesman who held meaningful talks on important matters with them. To further project himself as an urbane and sophisticated man of the world, he told in an abundance of detail of the hotels he stayed in, the routes he traveled, and the sights he saw, whether conventional tourist attractions or military installations as if each experience raised his cultural credentials by a notch. Moreover, he repeatedly told of what he had learned from his visits, how his knowledge was deepened and his horizons broadened. Using the royal plural, he boasted that “[w]e have returned home with a greater understanding of the problems before us” and promised that “[w]e shall endeavor to incorporate in our revolution the lessons of success we have learned.”18 The message was that whatever deficiencies his leadership might have had before, they would now be more than rectified by the understanding and knowledge he had gained in his travels. The speech was accompanied by actions to blur his military image. Immediately upon his return, Doe lifted the more than two-year long curfew that had been in effect since the coup.19 He adopted a new title and donned new clothes. The year before, he had abandoned the rank of master sergeant in favor of that of five-star general and required that the title of commander in chief be appended to it. Now, on his return from his tour, he exchanged the army uniform in which he had hitherto appeared before the Liberian people, for a three-piece suit and required that the title of Dr. be appended to “commander in chief.” In May, Deputy Minister of Public Affairs Willie Givens dispatched a letter to the government-owned New Liberian instructing that Doe henceforth be addressed as “Dr.” In addition, he sent a special studio photo of Doe in a three-piece suit to accompany all stories about him and ordered that all photos of Doe prior to the April 12, 1980 coup—which per force showed him in his uniform—be dropped. Similar directives were apparently sent to other papers too, as photos of Doe in tailored three-piece suits began showing up in the independent Daily Observer.20

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Preparations for the U.S. Visit Of the three countries Doe would visit in the autumn of 1982, the United States was the most important. Doe had already asked to meet with Reagan several times to no avail. The visit was finally arranged after Fahnbulleh Jr. had managed to persuade U.S. Ambassador Swing that another rebuff would do irreparable harm to U.S.-Liberian relations, and Swing, in turn, persuaded the State Department that Doe’s presence in the United States would be in America’s interests.21 In view of its importance, Doe preceded his visit to the United States with unprecedented intense preparations, the likes of which were not seen in his Asia-Africa tour. His regime’s dependence on the United States meant that he would have to continue to foster the illusion that he was doing his best to meet American demands for liberal rule and economic responsibility. Although U.S. President Reagan, at this stage, remained firmly behind his loyalty‑for-loyalty policy, Congress conditioned the continuation of aid on the postcoup government’s progress towards civilian rule, a new constitution, and improved human rights, and the administration linked continued aid to compliance with IMF demands to raise revenues, cut government expenditures, and root out corruption.22 The steps that Doe took to meet these demands, like the steps he had taken the previous year in his efforts to create the double illusion that he was a liberal-minded and economically responsible leader, were largely virtual. Fostering the Impression of Liberal Leadership The care Doe had taken to allow Con Com to proceed in its work with very little interference and his repeated declarations of support for its efforts provided apparent indication of his commitment to civilian rule and a new constitution. Further indication was conveniently provided by Amos Sawyer, who announced on June 24 that the first draft of the constitution was ready for Con-Com to review before being presented to the PRC.23 More actively, Doe took two steps that seemingly extended citizens’ rights. The first was the dismissal of two PRC members: Col. Larry Borteh in May for “repeated misrepresentations on a number of issues” and Maj. Stanley Tarwo in June for ordering the beating of the principal of a Monrovian school. After both dismissals, Doe assumed the role of a disciplinarian bringing needed order into the unruly body and constraining its members’ abuse of power. Following Borteh’s dismissal, Doe vowed to instill discipline and tranquility in the Council even if he had to reduce its numbers to “two men” and warned PRC members to refrain from lying, abusing their power, making arbitrary arrests, and molesting people, or bear the consequences. After

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Tarwo’s dismissal, he reiterated that other council members who took the law into their own hands would be similarly dismissed.24 The second step was an apparent show of respect for private property. Seeming to take the reconciliation policy announced the previous December a step further, in early July Doe ordered that the confiscated assets of former TWP officials be returned to them. The government-owned New Liberian reported that observers viewed the measure as a demonstration of “respect for and guarantee of the right to the ownership of private properties in the country” that would heal wounds and “engender the spirit of unity, peace and stability.”25 None of these actions were quite what they seemed. Doe refrained from interfering with Con Com’s production of the draft constitution, but when the draft was completed at the end of January 1983, he would stall for another two months before agreeing to receive it and then do what he could to get a draft more to his liking.26 The dismissal of the councilmen and the declarations that followed them fostered the image of civil and lawful rule that Doe was trying to create, but they were also a show of Doe’s authority and, in any case, both councilmen would be reinstated in a few months. The announcement of the return of confiscated properties explicitly excluded the assets of the late President Tolbert, of the thirteen officials who had been executed shortly after the coup, and of the self-exiled former Vice President Bennie Warner and TWP Justice Minister Clarence Simpson. Around half of the confiscated properties that were to be returned belonged to these men.27 Fostering the Impression of Economic Responsibility The measures that Doe took to foster the impression of economic responsibility were of two kinds. The first, announced on June 23, was a developmental measure: the establishment of a task force for agricultural production to increase farm productivity. The task force was to be chaired by Thomas Quiwonkpa and Gabriel Baccus Matthews and its mandate included defining the government’s agricultural policy, promoting the mechanization of agriculture, and identifying “ways and means by which the productive but latent manpower of the military could be utilized to enhance the agricultural output in the country.”28 The agricultural task force addressed a vital economic need in Liberia: the development of the rural economy. Its central feature, the inclusion of the army in the country’s development efforts, was a creative innovation. It was also one of the few measures that Doe announced that had real followthrough. In July, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Henry Dubar traveled to South Korea for the stated purpose of acquainting himself with agricultural development there.29 In January 1983, Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison announced the

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creation of a six-hundred-man agricultural battalion, comprised of soldiers selected from various units of the armed forces, with the stated purpose of reducing Liberia’s dependence on imported food.30 Although the battalion was duly established, its stated aim does not seem to have been pursued with much commitment or vigor. Most of those who were appointed to lead or follow through on the work of the task force had no background in development. Among the very few exceptions was Alfred Suah, former minister of agriculture, who had been dismissed the previous October for “his failure to adequately pursue the government’s agricultural programs.”31 Moreover, the project got off to a very slow start. Announcing the creation of the battalion, Allison said that the government allocated 10,000 acres of land in Camp Todee for the battalion, but the date he cited for beginning to clear the land was a year away, the next February. In 1983, the battalion cultivated only two hundred acres of rice, a paltry amount of the country’s chief agricultural staple.32 If substantially increased agricultural production was not the real purpose of the agricultural task force and battalion, what was? Two purposes can be suggested: One was to keep American funding flowing, especially, though not only, for the large, well-trained army that Doe was creating. In the absence of external enemies to occupy the army, putting soldiers to agricultural work could show the Americans, who funded the AFL, that the army was not a burden on Liberia but contributing to its development. It could also enhance the poor image of the army and of the military junta in Liberia itself, at a time when soldiers were still making a nuisance of themselves and harassing civilians. The second type of measure consisted mainly of directives to cut or control excessive government expenditures. Doe announced the first of these directives in his July 8 statement on the budget, at the start of the 1982–1983 fiscal year. Explaining that the government expenditures would have to be cut to close the anticipated $42.4 million budget deficit, Doe instructed the director of the budget to reduce the allowances provided to himself and the members of the PRC and cabinet; declared that it would be necessary to cut personnel costs of all ministries, government agencies, and public corporations by 15 percent; and froze new car purchases for government officials for the upcoming fiscal year.33 The next day, he announced the establishment of a five-man Economic and Financial Management Committee chaired by Minister of Finance G. Alvin Jones, with exclusive authority over foreign borrowing and budgetary control.34 Later in the month, he limited Liberia’s usually lavish Independence Day celebrations to a reception by Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr. and his wife.35 Finally, on August 2, he announced that no new duty-free privileges would be allotted until otherwise

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ordered, and directed the Ministry of Finance to review all existing government agreements with foreign companies.36 The cost-cutting measures Doe announced were aimed at showing that he was taking responsibility and doing his share before asking the United States for the massive assistance he would request. Yet, although they purported to show his willingness to make personal sacrifices and to impose austerity on his government, they were in fact empty gestures. There was little likelihood that any of the announced cuts would actually be made, as similar restrictions on government spending had been consistently circumvented in the past. This circumvention was described by acting Minister of Finance John Bestman in an interview with the New Liberian. Bestman used as his example the proliferation of new government cars despite the ban imposed in November 1981 on vehicle purchases by government ministries and agencies. Although vendors were forbidden to deliver goods without a signed purchase order from the General Services Agency, the GSA rubber-stamped the orders after the cars were received. Unapologetic, Bestman explained that his ministry could only make recommendations but not compel adherence to them.37 The Economic and Financial Management Committee was yet another ineffectual committee that Doe established to deal with the country’s failing economy. The downsizing of the Independence Day celebrations was no more than a symbolic gesture. The declared halt of new duty-free privileges and the review of existing ones looked like a revenue-raising measure, but could hardly be expected to be applied while Liberia was assiduously seeking foreign investment. In fact, during his visit to the United States, Doe would try to attract investors with the claim that the Liberian investment incentive code was one of the most attainable on the west coast of Africa.38 So far was Doe’s mind from expenditure control that even as he put on his show of economic responsibility, he was fielding extravagant military and development projects that had no bearing on Liberia’s real needs. On May 26, Doe appointed Col. Arthur Bedell¸ an African Liberian pilot, as assistant chief of staff for the aviation unit of the AFL. This was a somewhat strange appointment in view of Bedell’s arrest in May 1980 for alleged participation in a coup attempt. However, at the time of his arrest he had been serving as Commander of the army’s Aviation Unit, and, as would soon emerge, Doe was planning to ask for American help in creating airborne military capabilities for the AFL. Then, on June 25, two days after he established the agricultural task force, he announced that the PRC and cabinet had unanimously approved the building of a new capital city in the interior and placed Gabriel Baccus Mathews at the head of a committee to draw up proposals.39 Playing on Washington’s eagerness for civilian rule, he presented the outlandishly extravagant undertaking as the foundation on which a civilian government would be able to build “a more organized and dynamic city” and listed a slew

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of reasons that made the transfer of the capital imperative. The motive behind the proposal was to obtain more funding from Washington.40 This explanation was exemplified by Doe’s instructions to the committee to establish official contact with friendly nations such as France, West Germany, Italy and the United States aimed at securing technical assistance in planning the new city.41 As always, Doe continued to prioritize his political interests over Liberia’s economic health. Only two days before announcing the agricultural task force, Doe had summarily dismissed his minister of planning and economic development, Byron Tarr, for unspecified “administrative reasons” and replaced him with his more compliant deputy Emmanuel Gardiner.42 The opaque explanation for the dismissal suggests that Doe could not accuse Tarr of corruption, incompetence, or acting against the PRC or the masses, as he had other ministers, and lends credence to Tarr’s claim that he was dismissed because some advisors to Doe suggested that he had been too powerful.43 All in all, both the creation of the agricultural task force and the cost-controlling directives were designed to give the appearance of economic responsibility while avoiding the inevitable pain that genuine economic measures invariably cause. The agricultural task force was a development initiative, like the cost-controlling decrees which were directed at the government. Both measures carefully refrained from taxing or otherwise depriving the Liberian population—which, in a worst-case scenario, could have provoked embarrassing public dissatisfaction just before Doe’s trip to the United States. Neither measure constrained the extravagances of the governing elite nor Doe’s own ability to channel funds in the amounts he saw fit. The Second Tour The second tour to the United States, France, and Morocco took place in 1982, between August 14 and September 2. The United States In the United States, Doe continued his double charade of leading Liberia to civilian rule and of complying with Washington’s economic demands. In both matters, his pretense was met with some skepticism, but he was nonetheless able to provide the Reagan administration with what it needed to be able to extend the aid that the administration wanted to give and Doe wanted to receive. Doe’s first stop was in New York City, where he met with Mayor Edward Koch. Doe assured Koch that he would stand by his word and return Liberia to civilian rule come 1985, and that the soldiers would return to the barracks

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and have nothing more to do with politics. When Koch asked him whether he would like to run for president in the elections, Doe answered, “No, I don’t think I will.” In evidence of his good intentions, Doe spoke of Con Com and the democratic constitution that would be available, and told Koch that there were no political prisoners in the country, that all confiscated property taken from the former TWP leaders had been returned to legal ownership, and that the Americo-Liberians who had left the country fearing retaliation were coming back. The next day, in Washington, he once again underscored the aim of returning Liberia to democratic rule by April 1985.44 On the economic front, Doe made some effort, probably under pressure, to convince Washington that the expenditure cutting measures he had announced in July would actually be implemented and also to show that he was reducing some other government expenditures.45 On August 23, after his meetings in Washington, he issued Executive Order Number One, instituting a series of “expenditure control measures” to prevent government agencies from exceeding their allotted budgets. No government ministry or agency would be given additional funds to those that had been appropriated for the fiscal year. No government accountant or bookkeeper would pass any payroll vouchers for either the recurrent or development budget in the absence of an appropriation. Every government agency and ministry would keep adequate records of accounts, expenditures and balance allotments as well as appropriations.46 The executive order was followed by two measures when he returned home. On September 6, Doe sold his Boeing 737 presidential jet to Zaire for $3 million. This jet had been a source of contention both at home and with Washington since the coup. The following day, the PRC approved “in principle” a car ownership scheme under which government employees with assigned cars would buy them.47 Koch was unconvinced by Doe’s assurance that he had no intention of running for the presidency. When Doe made his disclaimer, Koch pointed to a framed and signed photograph of himself that Doe had given him and said, “you look very presidential. I think you will be president.”48 The expenditure control measures would be thwarted by the same lack of enforcement stemming from the absence of an independent and competent civil service that had thwarted every other move to keep government expenditures in check. The Boeing 737 would be replaced by a long-range jet costing $5.1 million, $2.1 million more than it had been sold for.49 There is no indication that the car ownership scheme was ever implemented. Nonetheless, the measures Doe had taken enabled the Reagan administration to tell itself and its critics that Liberia was moving toward civilian rule and complying with IMF demands, and to continue to fund the postcoup regime—if not quite to the amounts that it requested. Congress authorized some $72 million in economic and military aid for the 1983 U.S. fiscal year,

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including $15 million in foreign military sales credits, most of it for military housing.50 Despite budget austerity in the United States, this sum was similar to the previous year’s sum, a fact which reflects the importance the administration attached to its relations with Liberia.51 In addition, the Administration agreed to Doe’s request for help in creating an air force for the AFL, even though, having no foreign enemies, Liberia no more needed such a capacity than it did the million dollars’ worth sports complex provided by China.52 A senior administration official explained the expanded support for Liberia despite the U.S. budgetary crunch, as “an effort to back a government which is doing evidently so much to help itself.”53 Further assistance followed from Washington and its European allies after Doe returned home. In early October, the IMF authorized special drawing rights for $82.7 million which had been in negotiation prior to Doe’s visit.54 In October, the American administration authorized an additional $15 million in food assistance under the “Food for Peace” Program, and signed an agreement on the consolidation and rescheduling of certain Liberian debts owed to, or guaranteed by, the U.S. Government and its agencies.55 Later in the month, an agreement with the U.K. followed that included rescheduling Liberia’s debt repayment to British commercial banks and financial institutions.56 In November, West Germany agreed to provide over $9.3 million to finance projects in the areas of agriculture, forestry and water distribution.57 France and Morocco Doe’s visits to France and Morocco were extensions of his earlier Asia-Africa tour, aimed, as his visits to Egypt and Algeria had been, at improving his position in Africa. As the result of Doe’s visit, France provided some scholarships for Liberian students, and Morocco contributed a six-month training program for the Liberian national soccer team.58 Doe’s visit to France and Morocco benefited him on the African stage. Following his visit to France, Doe received an invitation to the annual Franco-African Summit to be held in Zaire in October 1982, thus ending the last vestige of Liberia’s postcoup exclusion from African organizations. Doe’s visit to Morocco balanced out his earlier visit to Algeria, while yet further emphasizing his commitment to the Moroccan-American side of the dispute over the Western Sahara. Back in Liberia, Doe once again crafted his homecoming speech to portray himself as a leader worthy of being the country’s first postcoup civilian president. Once again, he emphasized his initiative in seeking foreign assistance, framing both tours as the fulfillment of his pledge to “undertake personally missions abroad whenever necessary in order to seek assistance from our traditional allies and other friendly countries.”59 He logged his attainments,

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going back to some of the projects (and their costs) pledged by China and proceeding to some of the American aid he was promised. He told grandly of his meetings with businessmen and investors and of his efforts to extract pledges for increased assistance from Washington. He went so far as to recount his requests for the funding of two gargantuan projects that were never actually funded and were very unlikely to ever be funded. One was a hydroelectric project at a cost of $632 million, some nine times the congressional allocation for the entire fiscal year. The other was an impressive-sounding but unidentifiable “public investment programme [sic] of our national socio-economic development plan,” at a cost of $371 million, five times the congressional allocation.60 Once again, Doe tried to draw himself as a man of the world and as an important and well-respected head of state. He named the cities he visited, the sights he saw, the routes he drove along, and the hotels at which he stayed. He told of receiving the keys of the cities of New York, Washington, and Los Angeles. He boasted of the fine receptions he received by President Reagan, François Mitterrand, and King Hassan II of Morocco and of the “meaningful” and “fruitful” discussions he held with them on “important issues”; and he dropped the names of a host of other officials he spoke or dined with as well.61 The one difference from his previous homecoming speech was that he no longer drew himself as a learner, but tried to project a sense of confidence, maturity, and readiness to take on the responsibilities of civilian leadership. DECEMBER AUSTERITY MEASURES The economic and military aid Doe obtained from the United States and its allies did not free him from the need to continue to show the Americans that he was fulfilling his commitments to reduce expenditures and raise revenues. Thus, at the beginning of December, he mounted the second act in the charade of economic responsibility that he had started in the interval between his first and second tours. In contrast to the mostly bogus July measures ostensibly directed at developing the rural economy and reducing government expenditures, the key measures he announced in his December 1 radio appearance were aimed at raising revenue from the public. Whether or not the December measures, which seem to complement the July ones, were planned together with them as the second part of a single package is beyond our knowledge. What is clear is that, in view of the growing budget deficit and his obligations to the IMF, Doe had no choice now but to impose measures that had some bite—whatever the public response to them might be. The December measures consisted of a deep cut in the salaries of government and public corporation employees, an undefined local tax to be used

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for rural development, and what Doe presented as vigorous pursuit of tax collection from the private sector. Of the three, the reduction of public-sector salaries, to take effect January 1, 1983, was the harshest and with immediate consequences. The salaries of employees were cut by 16.66 percent for those who earned up to $749, and up to 25 percent for those who earned $1,500 and above. Euphemistically terming the cuts a “new national salary readjustment scheme,” Doe billed them as aimed at enabling the government to pay its salaries on time and to save jobs. If he did not institute them, he implied, he would have to take the advice of “some international financial institutions” and cut the government workforce by 30 percent. The local rural development tax was a new and rather creative tax, as was Doe’s unlikely justification: namely, that the government had received petitions from rural inhabitants expressing their willingness to contribute to the nation’s development effort. In addition, Doe instructed the Ministry of Finance to vigorously pursue tax collection, and the Ministry of Justice to prosecute corporations and individuals who evaded the payment of taxes.62 He explained these moves as having been necessitated by the sharp decline in revenue collection in the previous fiscal year, due in large measure to “tax evasion, excessive dishonesty and inadequacies in the tax collection system.”63 To balance the hardships imposed on the workers, the revenue-raising measures were accompanied by two expenditure-reduction measures that applied to senior government officials. One was a reduction in the amount of gasoline allotted to government vehicles, the other further restrictions on foreign travel, which for the first time included a severe limitation on travelers’ per diem rates.64 Finally, as he had done in the past, Doe announced a number of sweeteners to ameliorate the pain that the measures could be expected to cause. These included a thorough review of the government pension scheme to ensure that all persons aged sixty-five and over could retire in dignity, business loans for government employees who wished to retire to enter business or farming, and the biweekly publication of an updated price index for all essential consumer goods.65 It was a mosaic of measures designed to give the impression that all different sectors of society—public sector and state corporation employees, businesses and wealthy individuals, and senior government officials—were being enlisted in the effort to rescue the country from its economic woes and that ordinary citizens were not required to bear the burden alone. The announcement of the measures was followed by some apparent efforts at enforcement. The next day, Director General of the National Social Security Welfare Corporation George Bolo, stated at a press briefing that business establishments in Monrovia indebted to the Corporation would soon refund $890,000 or be turned over to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution.66 Monrovia was

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divided into five separate zones, and senior officials in the Ministry would participate in tax collection. At the end of December, Minister of Finance G. Alvin Jones announced a vigorous tax collection campaign that would start in the capital and be extended to the rest of the country. Businesses that failed to pay their taxes would be closed down and reopened only upon the full payment of their taxes. Revenue collection would also be reinforced at all of the country’s ports of entry.67 At the end of April 1983, the government would order the banks to freeze the accounts of corporations that had not paid their taxes.68 The only measure that was truly enforceable, however, was the salary reduction, since the designated percentages could be deducted at their source. Vigorous tax collection, like enforcing restrictions on the travel costs of government officials, required a competent and independent civil service. Without it, there were no grounds to expect that the endemic tax evasion and dishonesty would be checked, that the inadequacies of the tax collection system would be corrected, or, for that matter, that government officials would consume less gasoline or reduce their travel costs. Indeed, in his 1983 Redemption Day address, Doe would confess that revenue collection “was still very short of projected figures.”69 In his speech on the 1983–1984 budget, he would admit that the restrictions on foreign travel were circumvented by “extra–budgetary expenditure” and that government ministries and agencies were hiring personnel without the required approval of the Economic and Financial Management Committee.70 In contrast to the July measures, the December measures were met with some protest, albeit indirect. On December 7, Assistant Information Minister for Public Affairs J. Ninsel Warner, speaking at the Kakata Rural Teachers Institute, wondered why Liberia’s miserably paid teachers could not afford three decent meals a day, “while the rascals in Monrovia ride flashy cars, drink milk in the morning, and make trips abroad,” and urged the teachers to implore the government to improve their conditions.71 In a similar vein, on December 8, Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., addressing the commencement exercises of the Monrovia Consolidated School System, criticized government officials riding in cars with tinted windows, and described big cars, luxurious houses and opulent lifestyles as some of the “corrupt values which continues to breed in our society.”72 These critiques of the high standard of living of the PRC members and government officials served to point out the growing disparity between the standard of living enjoyed by those at the center of power and the deprivations suffered by the ordinary Liberian. Coming so soon after the announcement of the austerity measures, they can be understood as indirect criticisms of the uneven burden the measures would place on a substantial portion of the country’s wage earners, notwithstanding Doe’s efforts to disguise it. Although

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Warner had been careful not to urge the teachers to strike or to take any but the mildest action to better their conditions and although Fahnbulleh Jr., the last remaining independent minister, was the only cabinet member who raised his voice, Doe moved quickly to silence them—and to discourage others from following their example. Within hours of Fahnbulleh Jr.’s speech, he appeared on national radio to defend the government’s conduct. He unabashedly declared that the aspiration for better standards of living was the “very essence of the capitalistic system,” blamed Fahnbulleh Jr. and other civilian ministers for unrealistically raising the hopes of the population, and warned that if the “civilian individuals” brought into the government continued to criticize the administration, he “would have no choice but to remove them.”73 Two days later, on December 10, he fired Warner, accusing him of acting “contrary to the aims and aspirations of our people.”74 Moreover, to make it clear that criticism would not be tolerated, he reinstated the ban on political activity that had been in place since the coup and ordered the security agencies to arrest anyone who violated it.75 Doe’s image-building and charade of economic responsibility provided him with no more than a thin veneer of respectability. For all of his efforts to draw himself as a debonair and sophisticated head of state suited to being the elected president of a civilian government, Doe continued to behave like the “village boy” that his detractors called him. The touristy details and self-aggrandizing accounts of his fine receptions and warm welcomes that filled his homecoming speeches were rarely if ever heard in the speeches of more cultivated leaders. They showed him to be inexperienced with the world, carried away by wonder and amazement at new sights and experiences, and eager to impress his audience with the same things that impressed him. His behavior in the United States, where he was highly exposed to the media and the public, was unstatesmanlike to the point of boorishness. As the Economist described him: “He was uncomfortable, couldn’t handle criticism, etc. . . . He showed himself to be touchy, and sometimes walked away from events, leaving his entourage to answer questions. When an article in the Washington Post displeased him, he began to cancel many of the engagements on his schedule. . . . The pleadings of his aides that he have the widest possible contacts did no good; Mr. Doe spent a fair amount of his time in Washington in his hotel suite.”76 Neither the many meetings he had in his travels, the honorary doctorate that he received from Korea, nor did his opportunistic declarations on international affairs raise him to the level of a well-respected head of state. Ronald Reagan’s inadvertent reference to him as “Chairman Moe” when Doe was in Washington and the fact that no one in Washington troubled to apologize for the slip testify to his utter unimportance as an international figure.77

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His bogus economic measures made a good impression on his international audience. West Africa presented the “national salary readjustment scheme” as “consistent with the government’s ability to pay its employees monthly and on time”—though it never did—and noted, without questioning its feasibility, Doe’s directive to the Ministry of Finance to “vigorously pursue revenue collection” to reduce the budget deficit.78 The U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker, told the House of Representative’s Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa that Liberia’s two and a half year record of compliance with the IMF standby program was “one of the best records in Africa.”79 The USAID official stationed in Monrovia confirmed that Liberia had satisfied USAID requirements and fulfilled IMF conditions, and commended the “courageous steps” that Doe and his government had taken.80 These and similar assessments helped to keep the flow of aid going. Yet, for all the foreign aid Doe mustered, Liberia’s debts continued to climb, necessitating further debt rescheduling, and its GDP continued to fall.81 In his 1983 Redemption Day speech, Doe himself would point to Liberia’s “bleak economic outlook,” though he would blame it on the world economic crisis and the high cost of borrowing.82 But none of this—neither the economic quagmire into which Liberia had become enmired nor Doe’s boorishness and glaring deficiencies as a statesman—mattered. Doe’s overseas tours accomplished what they were meant to accomplish. They enabled him to claim credit for the economic assistance Liberia received, even though it probably would have received most of it, especially that from the United States and its allies, in any event. They enabled him to peel off his military garb, both literally and figuratively, and to don the clothes of a civilian leader, without undergoing any concomitant internal transformation. They enabled him to add “Dr.” to his titles and to claim the learning and status that the degree implied without undergoing the requisite formal education. They enabled him to claim international legitimacy, acceptance, and even influence. In Africa, his overseas travels enabled him to become a more active participant in the OAU than he had previously been and gained him admittance to the last of the continental organizations to which Liberia had belonged before the coup but to which the PRC had not been invited. In his 1983 Redemption day address, he would go so far as to boast that Liberia was the “leading figure” in the protest against the admission of the POLISARIO to the OAU, although this was not the case at all. Moreover, his overseas travels gave him the self-confidence to continue posing as an able and respected leader. In March 1983, he would give a speech about world affairs at the Summit of the Non-Alignment Movement and, in his Redemption Day address the next month, describe the meeting as “an excellent opportunity for Liberia’s voice to be heard.”83 The following September, he would address the United Nations General Assembly. Above

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all, his overseas tours would enable him to present himself as a fitting candidate for the presidency of the planned civilian government, in defiance of his long-standing promise that soldiers, including himself, would return to the barracks and of prohibition in the draft constitution against soldiers running for office. NOTES 1. “Liberia: Samuel Doe’s Redemption Day Anniversary Address,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 15, 1982, Nexis Uni. 2. Willie A. Givens, ed., Liberia: The Road to Democracy Under the Leadership of Samuel Kanyon Doe (Bourne End, Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1986), 386. Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, 23. 3. “Liberia: Samuel Doe’s Redemption Day Anniversary Address.” 4. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 386. 5. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B492. 6. “Loan Agreement with PRC Signed 23 July,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 23, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T5–T6. 7. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B497. 8. “Liberian Head of State’s Visit to S. Korea,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 13, 1982, Nexis Uni. 9. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 393–94. 10. Chuka Onwumechili, African Democratization and Military Coups (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 102. 11. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Conflict and Conflict Management in the Western Sahara: Is the Endgame Near?,” Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 595. 12. “Doe Not to Attend Libya Summit over SDAR Issue,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 1, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T2. 13. Liberian diplomat and scholar (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, 14 May, 2009, transcript, personal archives. 14. “Visit to the East,” Daily Observer, May 26, 1982, 5. 15. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 392. 16. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 391. 17. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 292–93. 18. “Doe Message on Independence Anniversary,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 26, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T1. 19. “Doe Returns 17 May, Announces End of Curfew,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 17, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1982): T1.

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20. Tom Kamara, “The Liberian Press under Dictatorship 1980–90, A Comment,” Liberia Forum, 5, no. 9 (1989): 65. “Doe Tells PRC Revolution Meant to Raise Peoples’ Standard of Living,” Daily Observer, May 28, 1982, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2647, June 28, 1982: 28. 21. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 147. “Doe Requests Meeting with President and Secretary,” February 17, 1982, confidential, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (10/14/1981–06/30/1982)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 22. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Economic and Security Assistance Programs in Africa, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1982, 20–21. 23. “Constitution Ready,” Daily Observer, June 25, 1982, 1. 24. “PRC Member Suspended for Beating Educator,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 21, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T4. “Doe Tells PRC Revolution Meant to Raise Peoples’ Standard of Living,” 28. 25. “Doe Said to Have Done Good Work in Last 2 Years,” West Africa, August 2, 1982, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2679, August 24, 1982: 13–15. 26. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21. 27. “Doe Said to Have Done Good Work in Last 2 Years,” 13–15. 28. “Head of State Appoints Agricultural Task Force,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 23, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T2. 29. “Chief of Staff Dubar Returns from ROK Visit,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 23, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T6. 30. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Agriculture Battalion Formed in Liberia,” January 8, 1983, in Dateline, January 29, 1983. 31. “Cabinet Reshuffle in Liberia.” 32. “Agriculture Battalion Formed in Liberia.” “Chinese Govt. Gives $60,000 to Agric. Battalion,” New Liberian, April 19, 1985, 1, 6. 33. “Doe’s Statement on 1982–83 Budget,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1982, Nexis Uni. 34. “Financial Management Committee Established,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 13, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1982): T4. 35. “Doe Message on Independence Anniversary,” T2. 36. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberia Suspends Privileges Enjoyed by Foreign Companies,” August 3, 1982, Nexis Uni. 37. “Minister Notes Failure of Ministries to Cut Expenditures,” New Liberian, May 27, 1982, 1, 8, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 2647, June 28, 1982, 37. 38. “Doe’s Appeal for Easier US Credit and Reassurances to Ship-owners,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 7, 1982, Nexis Uni.

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39. “Doe Announces Plans to Build New Capital,” Monrovia Domestic Service, June 25, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T3. 40. Liberian diplomat and scholar, interview. 41. “Doe Announces Plans to Build New Capital,” T3. 42. “Planning Minister Dismissed, Replaced by Deputy,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 21, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1982): T4. 43. Liberian Action Party activist (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with author, May 15, 2009, private archives. 44. Norman D. Sandler, “U.S.-Liberian Friendship Reaffirmed,” United Press International, August 17, 1982, Nexis Uni. 45. “Das Lyman Meeting with the Head of State,” December 27, 1982, confidential, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (07/01/1982–04/29/1983)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 46. “Government Issues Expenditure Control Measures,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 24, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1982): T1–T2. 47. AFP, “Presidential Jet Sold to Settle Debts,” September 7, 1982, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1982): T2. 48. “I Shall Stand by My Word in 1985—Doe Tells New York Mayor Koch,” Daily Observer August 17, 1982, 1, 10. 49. “Presidential Jet Sold to Settle Debts,” T2. 50. “CIC Doe’s Speech on Return to Liberia from U.S.A. and European Tour,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 7, 1982, Nexis Uni. 51. Sandler, “U.S.-Liberian Friendship Reaffirmed.” 52. “CIC Doe’s Speech on Return to Liberia from U.S.A. and European Tour.” 53. Sandler, “U.S.-Liberian Friendship Reaffirmed.” 54. Graettinger, “Recent Agreements by International Lending and Financial Institutions Based in Washington.” U.S. Department of State, “Ivorian Media Reaction Report: Houphouet-Boigny’s State Visit and US Reaffirmation of Africa Ties,” Case No. F-2017–00020, Doc No. C06246097, October 27, 1983, 3, Department of State Records. 55. United Press International, “Washington News,” October 14, 1982, Nexis Uni. “Treaties,” Department of State Bulletin 83, no. 2071 (February 1983): 85. 56. “Liberian Debts Rescheduled with UK Creditors,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 9, 1982, Nexis Uni. 57. “West German Aid,” Monrovia Home Service, November 3, 1982, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 16, 1982, Nexis Uni. 58. “CIC Doe’s Speech on Return to Liberia from U.S.A. and European Tour.” 59. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 386–96. 60. “CIC Doe’s Speech on Return to Liberia from U.S.A. and European Tour.” 61. “CIC Doe’s Speech on Return to Liberia from U.S.A. and European Tour.”

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62. Samuel K. Doe, “Address to the Nation: On the State of the Liberian Economy,” Ministry of Information, Unity Conference Center, Virginia Montserrado County, Liberia, December 1, 1982, 12. 63. “Salary Cuts and Other Measures,” Monrovia Home Service, December 1, 1982, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 14, 1982, Nexis Uni. 64. Doe, “Address to the Nation,” 12. 65. Doe, “Address to the Nation,” 10–12. 66. “Businesses to Pay Taxes or Face Prosecution,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 2, 1982, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1982): T1. 67. Max T. Teah, “Finance on Rigid Tax Collection Campaign,” Daily Observer, January 3, 1983, 1, 11. 68. “Accounts of Ten Public Corporations Frozen,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 28, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T5. 69. “Doe Addresses Nation on Redemption Day 11 Apr,” Monrovia Domestic Service, April 11, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1983): T1–T8. 70. PanaPress, “Government Travel, Employment Restricted,” July 26, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T3. 71. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 57. 72. AFP, “Assistant Minister Fired for Criticizing Doe,” December 10, 1982, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1982): T3. 73. “Doe’s Criticism of the Liberian Foreign Minister,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 10, 1982, Nexis Uni. 74. “Assistant Minister Fired for Criticizing Doe,” T3. 75. “Arrest Anyone,” Daily Observer, December 13, 1982, 1, 10. 76. “African Relations; Moe for Doe,” Economist, August 28, 1982, Nexis Uni. 77. Liberian diplomat and scholar, interview. 78. Eddie Momoh, “Make-ups and Shake-ups,” West Africa, January 10, 1983, 69. 79. U.S. Congress, House of Representative, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Statement of Chester A. Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,” FY 1984 Assistance Requests for Africa, 1983, in Department of State Bulletin 83, no. 2074 (May 1983): 25. 80. Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill, “U.S. Aid in Liberia,” West Africa, April 4, 1983, 823–25. 81. Leon Dash, “Liberia Moves toward Civilian Rule 3 Years after Military Took Power,” Washington Post, April 17, 1983, Nexis Uni. 82. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address to the Nation,” Monrovia Home Service, April 11, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 13, 1983, Nexis Uni. 83. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address to the Nation.”

Chapter 7

Bungles

The most important events in the first quarter of 1983 were Con Com’s completion of the draft constitution and Doe’s relay of it to the PRC. In the two months that separated these seminal events in the long-awaited transition to civilian rule, a succession of bungles occurred: Doe’s gratuitous quarrels with two of his West African neighbors, a petroleum scandal, and a nurse and paramedic strike. Although different in their contents and severity, each stemmed from the deficiencies of Doe’s character and leadership and exposed his utter unsuitability to serve as the head of the upcoming civilian government. QUARRELS WITH HIS NEIGHBORS Doe’s entanglements with his West African neighbors were avoidable quarrels, rooted in the combination of his pride and his lack of diplomatic skill. This combination led to his very poor handling of the deep-seated animosity shown toward him by Shehu Shegari and Siaka Stevens, the presidents of Nigeria and Sierra Leone. An interview published in the magazine Africa Now in November 1982 triggered a quarrel with Shagari. In it, Shagari, unimpressed by Doe’s new title, contemptuously described “Sgt. Doe” as a “bloodthirsty” leader who “had massacred the leaders of Liberia” and explained that the OAU had initially rebuffed the PRC government out of concern that “leaders who had done despicable acts to the embarrassment of Africa just after washing their bloody hands would walk into the OAU meeting and sit and dine with other leaders of Africa.”1 Doe bided his time for some three months before responding to the insult, though it had clearly struck a nerve. His opportunity to get revenge came in January 1983, when Nigeria decided to expel several thousand illegal Ghanaian immigrants. On January 22, Doe joined with his Mano River Union (MRU) partners, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, 147

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to send a message to Shagari appealing for an end to their repatriation, on the grounds that the expulsion “violated the principle of free movement of people, which was a basic part of the treaty of the ECOWAS.”2 Then, Doe went beyond this diplomatically phrased joint protest to launch a tit-for-tat personal attack. On February 2, Doe sent a lengthy telegram to Shagari, condemning the expulsion as a “serious act against humanity” that would hurt not only those who were expelled but also millions of displaced Africans, while undermining the foundations of the OAU and ECOWAS. Doe questioned Shagari’s “conscience” and called Nigeria’s example a “disappointment.”3 Two days later, Foreign Minister Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr. presented a check of $20,000 to the charge d’affaires at the Ghanaian Embassy to help resettle the Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria.4 That Nigeria’s expulsion of the refugees was an excuse for Doe’s attack, not its reason, is evident from the same telegram, where Doe asked Shagari how, in the Africa Now interview, Shagari had called him “an embarrassment to Africa” and had suggested that Doe be expelled from the OAU.5 Doe’s high-minded stance did not keep the Liberian authorities themselves from rounding up many illegal aliens in the country and extracting from some of them $1,000 for permission to stay in the country.6 The quarrel with Siaka Stevens was also triggered by an insulting publication. A February 19 article in the independent Sierra Leonean tabloid the Progress charged that Doe had murdered his wife after learning that she was an accomplice in an abortive attempt to poison him and overthrow his government.7 The false accusation was not made by Stevens, but like the Shagari accusation, it was profoundly insulting and, although false, depicted Doe as an uncivilized murderer not fit to be a head of state and similarly made him a figure of ridicule and contempt. Doubly stung, Doe turned the insult into a casus belli. On February 22, he ordered the immediate deployment of 2,000 troops to the Sierra Leone border; banned air, land, and sea travel to and from Sierra Leone; and recalled the Liberian ambassador for immediate consultation. The measures, Doe declared, would stay in place until the government of Sierra Leone made clear its position “in a satisfactory manner” or disclosed the sources of the article.8 What Doe evidently wanted was an apology for the affront, which would show him the respect owed to a head of state. But Stevens’s response fell short of this. He informed Doe that he was equally astonished at the paper’s grave allegation and that he recognized that the freedom of expression in his nation’s constitution had been abused; but he did not apologize. Doe replied that the explanation was insufficient and declared that the border, which Stevens had urged him to reopen, would remain closed until his government and his people were convinced that the Sierra Leone government sincerely regretted the incident.9

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Doe continued to demand an apology even as the pressure on him to settle the dispute mounted. He accepted Sekou Toure’s invitation to discuss the conflict at a meeting of the members of the Mano River Union on March 1 in Conakry, Guinea. Stevens, however, outmaneuvered him and opted out of the meeting at the last minute, charging Doe with escalating the conflict over the newspaper article by laying claim to territory in Sierra Leone.10 The charge was a distortion of an ineptly phrased statement that Doe, in his inexperience, had made in his February 22 communiqué. It had a convincing ring, however, as in the 19th century the territory mentioned in the communiqué had been claimed by Liberia.11 Its impact was to raise the bogey of irredentism among other African heads of state, thereby putting Doe in the wrong by turning the local dispute into an all-Africa matter. Doe found himself on the defensive, with no way out other than to deny the charge and to yet further entrench himself in his demand for the apology he would not get. In Conakry, Sekou Toure appealed to Doe to unilaterally cancel the restrictions against Sierra Leone and, in tandem, promised to use his good offices to try to persuade the Sierra Leonean government to make the official apology that Doe wanted.12 But on March 3, when no apology had arrived, the Liberian government refused to reopen the border, while Doe once again denied making territorial claims and “assured” Sekou Toure that the PRC would consider normalization “when the government of Sierra Leone recognizes the magnitude of the act against Liberia and makes appropriate apologies.”13 Underlying both quarrels was the abiding contempt and hostility of Doe’s neighbors, expressed directly by Shagari and indirectly by Stevens, who did not brook criticism of his own regime but apparently did of Doe.14 However, the press depictions of Doe as a murderer, offensive as they were, posed no danger to either Liberia or himself and easily could have been ignored or protested through diplomatic channels. That Doe reacted to them in the impulsive, pugnacious way he did reflected the same lack of statesmanship and inability to handle criticism that he had demonstrated during his tour of the United States. It also brought him into a trap that threatened his position in Africa. PRESSURED AT THE SEVENTH SUMMIT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT The quarrel with Stevens followed Doe to the seventh summit of the NonAligned Movement, held in New Delhi from March 7–12, 1983. The Summit was a talking forum, with no executive power and no possibility of providing meaningful economic assistance. Nonetheless, the summit was the largest and

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most significant international gathering in which Doe would thus far participate. Moreover, the summit was the first international conference to which Doe was invited after he had missed two continental assemblies: the OAU summit scheduled for July and rescheduled for November, which he had boycotted along with the rest of Africa’s pro-American bloc, and the meeting of the Franco-Africa Congress held in October, which he did not attend because of the mining disaster in Nye Nye. Having missed these opportunities for image building, Doe could only have valued the timely and fortuitous chance that the Non-Aligned Summit provided him to sound his voice at an international gathering. The gathering was attended, as he would tell at the Redemption Day ceremonies the next month, “by nearly 100 heads of government including kings, presidents, chairmen, prime ministers, crown princes, and foreign and social ministers from every corner of the globe.”15 However, Stevens had outmaneuvered Doe in more ways than one. Not only had Stevens shifted the focus of their dispute from the libelous and offensive newspaper article to a loaded territorial matter of import well beyond Sierra Leone, he also shifted the venue of its resolution to one that was more amenable to himself and less friendly to Doe. On the same day that the Liberian government announced that the border with Sierra Leone would remain closed, it was announced that Siaka Stevens had offered to discuss the row with Doe when they both attended the Non-Aligned summit in New Delhi.16 In Conakry, Doe could have relied on Sekou Toure, his mentor and friend, to understand his side in the dispute and to believe him when he said that he had no aspirations to Sierra Leonean territory. At the Non-Aligned Summit, Stevens could expect more support for his position from African leaders, who were staunchly opposed to any border changes. Already before he set out for the summit, Doe must have had an inkling of what would await him there. On short notice, he arranged to stop en route in Sudan for a two-day working visit with President Ja’far Numayri, aimed at forging a bond with him and obtaining his support at the summit. Doe had grounds for optimism that he would find in Numayri a sympathetic ear and a possible backer. Like himself—and his West African neighbors—Numayri had aligned his country with the United States in exchange for massive American aid; was highly apprehensive that Libya, which was actively aiding Chadian rebels, would act to undermine his regime as well; and was wary of Ethiopia, which supported Libya’s adventures. In contrast to his West African neighbors, however, Numayri, as a former colonel who himself had taken power in a coup (1969), was free of the antipathy and snobbism of the West African leaders and did not feel threatened, as they did, by the example of Doe’s coup. Moreover, having recently embarked on the much-opposed forced Islamization of southern Sudan, Numayri needed Doe, a Christian leader who could lend legitimacy to the process, as much as Doe needed him.

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At the summit, as during his 1982 tours, Doe did what he could to reinforce his image as a worthy leader. In the speech he delivered in New Delhi, he methodically touched on all the issues on the current Non-Aligned agenda. He threw Liberia’s support behind any measures that would be taken to destroy South Africa’s “inhuman system of apartheid” and rejected tying the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. He declared his government’s belief that Israel should withdraw from all occupied Arab land and called for the withdrawal of “all foreign troops” from Lebanon, even though he was in the process of negotiating a renewal of diplomatic ties with Israel. He called for “an effective resolution to the situation in Kampuchea” and for the unification of the two Koreas. He upheld the “sovereignty,” “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” of all the states in Latin America.17 The image he sought to project in this speech was of a knowledgeable leader, familiar with world affairs, and far from the bloodthirsty sergeant major who massacred his predecessors in office and shot his wife after she had tried to poison him. Yet even as he obtained a respected international audience for his self-aggrandizing oration, Doe was called to account on the dispute with Stevens. As he would tell in his homecoming address, he was approached by several “statesmen of Africa,” including the current OAU chairman, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, and Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Milton Obote of Uganda, Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, and Seyni Kountche of Niger, who apparently pressured him to end the dispute.18 Most of the homecoming speech, like his speeches following his two overseas tours in 1982, was devoted to constructing his image as a worthy civilian leader. Yet again, he drew himself as a head of state respected by leaders around the world and proactive in his search for foreign aid. He told of “very useful bilateral discussions” and warm welcomes. He dwelled inordinately on promises of “assistance” and “cooperation” from India, Pakistan, and Argentina, even though these states had little material assistance to offer. He mentioned his visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on his way home; and proudly told of the high-powered Liberian delegation that would shortly leave for Kuwait to hold talks to promote exchange and cooperation between the two states.19 He also announced the end to the dispute with Sierra Leone, taking care to prettify the pressure that was placed on him and to present himself in a flattering light. After rehashing the details of the affront for the umpteenth time and once again declaring that he had no claims to Sierra Leonean territory, Doe announced the reopening of the border in phrasing aimed at conveying that he had risen above narrow interests and conceded in the spirit of cooperation with the other African states and for the sake of higher values. “In view of our consultations with African leaders in New Delhi and in keeping with the spirit

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of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Charter of the OAU and the Mano River Union declaration,” he told, he had ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the border and the renewal of air, land, and sea traffic.20 He did not reiterate his demands for an apology. The dispute with Stevens had threatened to undermine Doe’s intention to present himself as an internationally accepted leader with a special role in Africa. In the 1983 Redemption Day ceremonies, Doe reasserted his dubious claim to the position. He yet again reviewed his “meaningful” state visits abroad; his talks with other heads of state at the venerable Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and his resolution of his standoff with Stevens.21 To perpetuate the fiction that he was held in esteem in Africa he invited Presidents Ja’far Numayri of Sudan and João Bernardo (Nino) Vieira of Guinea-Bissau to attend the ceremonies as guests of honor.22 As could be expected, these leaders’ arrivals, attendance, and departures were covered with a good deal of fanfare in the Liberian media, and press conferences were held to solicit their praise of the postcoup regime.23 In fact, the spat with Stevens would not be resolved for several months. In the second half of May, when violent, politically motivated clashes started in the villages of Falore and Malema in South East Sierra Leone, waves of fleeing refugees crossed the Liberian border some eight miles away. Their presence was a drain on Liberia’s scant resources and a potential source of instability, so they were not wanted, and Doe’s ultimate purpose was to get them back across the border as soon as possible. In spite of this, their misery provided Doe with a convenient means of portraying his government as caring and humane while settling accounts with Siaka Stevens. As soon as reports of their arrival reached the PRC government, Doe ordered that the refugees be provided with tents, food, and medical aid, and sent joint security teams headed by army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Henry Dubar to look into their situation.24 He also sent a dispatch to Stevens reporting that the refugees were being taken care of, and on May 21, he sent Foreign Minister Fahnbulleh Jr. to Freetown to reinforce the message.25 In his reply to Doe’s letter, Stevens coolly noted the emergency aid, but went on to deny both the political violence and the population flight.26 Since news of the steady flow of refugees into towns and villages along the border with Sierra Leone was being broadcast in Liberia, Doe was able to use Stevens’s obvious stalling to make himself look good. In a self-serving press release on May 24, he lambasted Stevens for being unaware of what was happening with his own people and incapable of quelling the violence. He cast himself and his government as humanitarian saviors of “the men, women, and children” who would otherwise “die of starvation and health conditions.” To advertise his rescue efforts and pressure Stevens to repatriate the refugees, he invited

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foreign journalists “to assess the situation” and “confirm” the refugees’ presence.27 The standoff ended only in July, shortly after Libya’s military incursion into Chad in June, as pragmatism temporarily took precedence over mutual dislike. In mid-July arrangements were made for Doe and Stevens to meet to work out their differences.28 The meeting that took place in Sierra Leone on September 4 ended with a joint communiqué which, among other things, condemned Libya’s expansionism, expressed the two leaders’ commitment to the MRU, and put their “misunderstanding” to rest.29 TROUBLES AT HOME: PETROLEUM SCANDAL AND THE NURSE AND PARAMEDIC STRIKE Although Doe managed to control the damage that his quarrel with Stevens did to his image as a leader respected in Africa, whatever gains he might have made through his attendance at the Non-Aligned Summit were threatened by two events that greeted him on his return to Monrovia. The main one was the eruption of a petroleum scandal which underscored his poor handling of the economy and the ineffectiveness of his anti-corruption campaign. The second, of lesser importance but nonetheless an embarrassment, was a nurse and paramedic strike, similarly rooted in his economic policies. The petroleum scandal broke out against the background of the postcoup government’s chronic problems in paying its foreign debts, especially its oil debts. As a non-oil-producing country, Liberia, like many developing countries, was a victim of the worldwide oil shortage following the 1973 petroleum crises created by OPEC’s decision to use oil as a political weapon. The sharp rise in oil prices that ensued, coupled with the decline in the prices of rubber and iron ore, Liberia’s chief exports, made it difficult for Liberia to pay its oil bills and resulted in perpetual shortages. The PRC government was constantly on the verge of defaulting on its monthly oil bill of some $13 million.30 On several occasions, it managed to meet the payment deadline only with the help of an emergency infusion of funds from the United States. This situation led Doe and his government to invest a great deal of publicly touted effort into securing a less expensive and less precarious flow of oil. His efforts included visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on his way home from the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, and, more fundamentally, ongoing endeavors to search for oil and gas with the help of American companies. Finally, in January 1983 Liberia’s debt to its oil suppliers reached a record high of $17 million, and its creditors, a consortium of twenty-four European banks, stopped the supply.31 The impact of the stoppage was exacerbated by the worn equipment and severe maintenance problems that beset Liberia’s oil

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refineries. In December, one of the major refineries belonging to the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC)—the main oil refining company in the country—was shut down due to advanced age and corrosion of its installations, forcing the government to import diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel.32 In early February, while Doe was sparring with Shagari and Stevens, the acting general manager of LPRC, P.J.R. Seston, publicly pointed to the limited amount of gasoline that remained in the country.33 The problem was especially acute, as petroleum was used not only in gasoline but also to generate much of Liberia’s electricity supply. For upper- and middle-class city dwellers, the situation had become desperate, as air conditioners and refrigerators stopped working, lights went out, and long gasoline lines formed.34 According to Seston, the shortage was even worse in the countryside. By the time Doe returned from the Non-Aligned Summit, the situation was critical. Not only would the oil that remained in the country soon be used up, but also the gross mismanagement and corruption, in which the government too was implicated, that caused the crisis would be revealed. Reporting the oil shortage, Seston attributed it to the failure of LPRC’s customers to pay their debts—which implies the failure of the company to collect them.35 As later came to light, intensifying the shortage was that it was exploited for personal gain both by LPRC security personnel, who connived to steal and sell refinery petroleum products, and by high-ranking government officials, who sent their cronies to “buy” petroleum for which they had no intention of paying.36 Doe returned home to a scandal which threatened to show him up as an indifferent and incompetent leader, and to undermine the image he had so arduously cultivated through his trips abroad and his so-called anti-corruption activities. Thus, immediately on his return, he stepped in personally and vigorously to salvage whatever he could of his image. In his homecoming speech, delivered on the day he returned from the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, he not only boasted of his accomplishments there, he went out of his way to assure the nation that he would personally investigate the root causes of the gasoline problem and effect changes where necessary.37 In a display of determination, before returning to the Executive Mansion, Doe took journalists to see a cache of stolen gasoline. Doe had also personally arrested some of the offenders. Over the next few days, he showed himself tackling, hands-on, the corruption that led to the crisis. He went to the company, ordered the dismissal of all sixty-five members of LPRC’s security force, and temporarily replaced them with a contingent from the government’s Joint Security Force. He ordered all those indebted to LPRC to pay up within one week, on pain of the immediate confiscation of their properties, and decreed that companies listed as indebted (some thirty-four state-owned and private corporations) not be allowed to obtain products from the LPRC until they settled their accounts. Turning to the government, he directed councilmen, cabinet members, and government

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officials to stop referring people to the refinery to obtain free gasoline and instructed the managing director of LPRC and the minister of justice to submit to his office the names of anyone who violated the order.38 On March 21, he dismissed his closest and most important minister, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Dr. Harry Faber Nayou, for his role in the gasoline racket.39 The next day, on March 22, he accused the boards of directors of LPRC and of the Liberian Electric Corporation (LEC), a major fuel consumer, of allowing the situation to deteriorate to a critical state and dissolved them, declaring that he himself would take charge of all decisions until suitable replacements were found.40 Finally, at the end of the month, on March 28, he replaced Nayou with his deputy, John Rancy, another loyal Krahn.41 Consistent with his previous conduct, Doe sloughed off all personal responsibility for the crisis. In firing the LPRC and LEC boards, he denied, against all odds, that he knew about the oil shortage when he left for the Non-Aligned Summit and blamed it on the companies’ directors, whom he called “enemies of the revolution who are seeking to sabotage efforts by the PRC to move the nation ahead.”42 His knowledge of LPRC’s failure to collect its debts can be traced back at least to December 1982, when, in justifying the harsh austerity measures, he had called on LPRC to immediately collect its outstanding bill of more than $43 million and to introduce cost-efficient management to promote profitability.43 Moreover, it is difficult to see how he wouldn’t have known of the consortium’s January decision to cut off oil supplies. The scapegoating and denial of personal responsibility that marked his conduct here were similar to his previous behaviors, such as his repeated attribution of Liberia’s continuing economic crisis to exogenous factors and his accusation of civilian ministers who criticized his policies of not living up to their commitment to the revolution.44 Consistent with his other exhibitions of fighting corruption, Doe handled the petroleum crisis with maximum fanfare to best extract from it as much personal benefit as he could. The petroleum crisis was the outcome of Liberia’s steadily deteriorating economy, its widespread corruption, and the lack of an independent and competent civil service that could supervise the government and state apparatus. Neither the fusillade of unenforceable directives Doe issued nor his dismissals of Nayou and of the LPRC and LEC boards, as incompetent and corrupt as they may have been, touched the core problems that led to the crisis. His display of outrage and action was aimed at presenting himself as the vigorous, caring, and effective leader that he wanted to be seen as and at mitigating the possibly negative impression of his being out of the country while the crisis was simmering. Not surprisingly, no improvements were made in the functioning or management of either corporation. Doe ignored the World Bank recommendation

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that part of the LPRC’s profits from the sale of petroleum be earmarked for maintenance of the facilities and, instead, channeled the money to his own pocket.45 He kept the LEC managing director, Samuel N. Burnette Jr., as head of the corporation throughout the entirety of his own tenure in office. He sought to address the instability of Liberia’s petroleum supply by soliciting foreign funding to rehabilitate LPRC and LEC, but all the while power outages continued.46 The nurses and paramedics strike was also an outcome of Doe’s consistent sacrifice of the economy for his political needs. The strike broke out on March 18, about a week after Doe’s return from the Non-Aligned Summit and while he was still scurrying to control the damage of the petroleum scandal. A belated protest against the salary reductions that had gone into effect in January and the imposition of a compulsory group insurance policy that yet further reduced salaries, brought all medical services in the capital to a standstill for ten days before it ended on March 27.47 Although less monumental than the petroleum scandal, it too was an embarrassment, as, in addition to halting vital medical services in the capital, it was a violation of the recently reaffirmed PRC decree against striking. Nonetheless, Doe found himself with his hands tied. To begin with and to avoid battling on multiple fronts, Doe had to wait until he had the oil scandal under control before he acted. It was not until March 24, two days after he took over LPRC and LEC, that he issued an ultimatum ordering the strikers to return to work immediately on pain of dismissal. This was almost a week after the strike had erupted. Then, the strikers defied the ultimatum. The nurses continued their strike, while the doctors at the public hospitals issued a statement expressing their “total and unqualified support” for them. Doe was rescued from the standoff only by the church leaders, who came up with a compromise by which the nurses would return to work in exchange for compensation for their salary reductions.48 This was essentially a forced acquiescence. How much it angered and upset Doe can be gleaned from the lengthy diatribe he launched against the nurses in his 1983 Redemption Day address. In it, he once again resorted to scapegoating, as well as to issuing threats; he called them “the most errant participants in institutional unrest in our society,” accused them of causing the death of many patients, and warned that “this is the last time government will allow any group to strike.“49 The tangles described above should have made it eminently clear just how unsuited Doe was for the presidency and the damage he would wreak in pursuing it. Doe’s eminently avoidable wrangle with Stevens amply showed how far he was from being a statesman and the predicaments into which his impulsiveness could lead him. The petroleum scandal highlighted the havoc wrecked by Doe’s deliberate neglect of the economy, his refusal to allow a competent and independent civil service, and his phony anti-corruption drive.

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The nurses and paramedics strike stemmed from Doe’s distorted austerity measures, which fell heavily on wage earners without giving them hope for a better economic future. Certainly, there was no reason to believe that Doe’s performance would be any better in the future. Yet for Doe and his coterie, the embarrassments and faux pas that arose in close succession in the first quarter of 1983 were mere mishaps that had to be fixed. Like an athlete in a fixed game, Doe was able to get out of his self-created bungles through a combination of his own dexterity and help from his friends. Not committed to any policies or principles, he readily made tactical changes: He gave up his demand for an apology from Stevens when he saw that he would not get the support of the other leaders in Africa for this. He compromised with the nurses and paramedics when the continuation of their strike threatened to mar his image as an effective and caring leader. He fired people, no matter how close to him when keeping them on became inconvenient. Unleashing a flood of words for every occasion, he lied to evade responsibility and blamed others for his and the country’s problems. Doe was thus able to extricate himself from the consequences of his impulsiveness, mismanagement, and poor judgment. While bowing to the pressure of the African leaders, Doe managed to save face in the quarrel with Stevens. The petroleum scandal did not change the credit that the international community still extended to him. As far as is known, no one questioned the veracity of Doe’s claim of ignorance regarding the oil shortage or asked why he did not take action to make sure that LPRC collected its debts so that it could pay its creditors. At the end of March, when the petroleum scandal and the nurses and paramedics strike was barely over, an AFP reporter stated that “the Liberian Government is putting public finances to rights. It is fighting corruption and gathering in overdue taxes.”50 None of the tangles were critical to Doe’s political aspirations. The completion of the draft constitution was. NOTES 1. “Shagari: The Man Behind the Image,” Africa Now, November 2, 1982, 61. 2. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Nigerian Leader Urged to End Expulsion of West Africans,” January 24, 1983, Nexis Uni. 3. “Doe Requests 2 More Weeks for Expellees,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 3, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T2. Gary-Tounkara Daouda, “A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 9, no. 1 (2015): 26–38, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1788010552?accountid=14765.

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4. “Governments Give $20,000 in Aid to Ghana,” Monrovia Domestic Service, February 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T4. 5. “Doe Requests 2 More Weeks for Expellees,” T2. 6. “Government Reportedly Rounding Up Illegal Aliens,” Accra Domestic Service, February 8, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T2. 7. “Liberia: 2,000 Troops on Border Alert,” West Africa, February 28, 1983, 580. Eddie Momoh, “The Family Quarrel,” West Africa, March 7, 1983, 598. 8. AFP, “Troops Sent to Border,” February 22, 1983, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T1–T2. 9. “Monrovia: Doe Unsatisfied with Stevens Message,” Monrovia Domestic Service, February 22, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T2. 10. AFP, “Liberia-Sierra Leone Mediation Efforts Reported: Stevens Not Going to Conakry,” March 1, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T1–T2. 11. “Border Closed, Troops Deployed,” Monrovia Domestic Service, February 22, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T2. 12. Conakry Domestic Service, “Communique on Doe Visit,” March 1, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T2–T3. 13. “PRC Decides to Keep Sierra Leone Border Closed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 3, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T3–T4. 14. “Liberia and Sierra Leone: Scoop,” Economist, March 12, 1983, 51, Nexis Uni. 15. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address to the Nation.” 16. “Doe, Stevens May Discuss Dispute in India,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 3, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T3. 17. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 408–12. 18. “Reopening of Liberia-Sierra Leone Border,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 17, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 19, 1983, Nexis Uni. 19. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 412–16. 20. “Reopening of Liberia-Sierra Leone Border.” 21. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address to the Nation.” 22. Joshua Forrest, “Guinea-Bissau Since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles,” Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 1 (1987): 105–106. Peter K. Bechtold, “Military Rule in Sudan: The First Five Years of Ja’Far Numayri,” Middle East Journal 29, no. 1 (Winter 1975): 17–8. 23. “Leaders Depart,” Monrovia Domestic Service, April 13, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1983): T3.

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24. “Sierra Leone Refugees Fleeing Across Border,” Monrovia Domestic Service, May 20, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T2. 25. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Sierra Leonean Refugees Cross Border into Liberia,” May 21, 1983, Nexis Uni. 26. “Denial of Unrest in Sierra Leone: Exchange of Messages with Liberia,” Monrovia Home Service, May 24, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 26, 1983, Nexis Uni. 27. “Doe Comments on Refugees; Number Put at 2,000,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 24, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T1–T2. 28. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberia, Sierra Leone to Seek Compromise,” July 19, 1983, Nexis Uni. 29. “Liberian President’s Visit to Sierra Leone,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 7, 1983, Nexis Uni. 30. Leon Dash, “A Self-Confident Liberia Emerges from 2-Year ‘Rule of the Gun,’” Washington Post, June 17, 1982, A20. 31. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B480. 32. “Liberian Gov’t Panel Urges Closure of Monrovia Topping Plant,” Platt’s Oilgram News, May 3, 1983, Nexis Uni. 33. “Refinery Reports Limited Amount of Gasoline,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 5, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T5. 34. Peter Blackburn, “Liberia,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1983, Nexis Uni. 35. “Refinery Reports Limited Amount of Gasoline,” T5. 36. “Doe Fires LPRC Security Force in Oil Scandal,” Monrovia Domestic Service, March 18, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T4–T5. 37. “Doe to Probe Personally Causes of Prolonged Petroleum Shortage,” Daily Observer, March 8, 1983, 1, 11. 38. “Doe Fires LPRC Security Force,” T4–T5. 39. “Retires Presidential Affairs Minister,” Monrovia Domestic Service, March 21, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T5. 40. “Doe Disbands Energy Boards, Takes Control,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 22, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T4. 41. “Retires Presidential Affairs Minister,” T5. 42. “Doe Disbands Energy Boards,” T4. 43. “Salary Cuts and Other Measures.” 44. “Doe’s Criticism of the Liberian Foreign Minister,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 9, 1982, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 10, 1982, Nexis Uni.

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45. James Guseh (former assistant minister of justice for economic affairs in the ministry of justice [1983–1987]), in an interview with the author, April 8, 2006, transcript, private archives, Charleston, SC. 46. “Doe Addresses Nation,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T1–T3. Mary H. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 51. 47. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B475. 48. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Medical Personnel End Strike,” March 28, 1983, Nexis Uni. Liberian physician (interviewee has been anonymized), telephone conversation with author, August 8, 2009, transcript, private archives. 49. “Doe Addresses Nation on Redemption Day 11 Apr,” T1–T8. 50. AFP, Patrick van Roekeghem, “AFP Analyzes ‘Difficult Economic Situation,’” March 28, 1983, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1983): T4–T5.

Chapter 8

Completion of the Draft Constitution

The completion of the draft constitution marked the beginning of a steadily escalating conflict between Con Com, as it struggled to put into effect the democratization process, and Doe, who would seek, with ever-greater determination, to mold the process to his aspirations for permanency. CON COM’S COMPLETION OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION When Doe announced in his 1982 Christmas speech that the draft constitution would be completed in six weeks’ time and that preparations were underway for the elections, he was making a public relations statement designed to reinforce the perception of him as a transitional ruler. With the completion of the draft, he faced the problem of how to bridge the chasm between his determination to be the first president of the Second Liberian Republic and both the expectations of democratic elections he had fostered and the processes he had set in motion to accomplish them. Beyond several clauses in the draft constitution that directly threatened to derail his political ambitions, Doe faced the problem of Con Com’s dominant role in the process. Con Com’s mandate, under its terms of reference of April 12 and August 31, 1981, went well beyond writing the new constitution.1 The mandate also included recommending procedures for reviewing and modifying the draft constitution and ratifying it through a popular referendum, creating the electoral machinery for the registration of voters, and establishing an independent election commission to conduct the general election and to establish its procedures and time table.2 Although all the steps on the way to the elections would have to be approved by the PRC, it was Con Com that had laid out the procedure. By 161

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virtue of its energy, its fierce commitment to the transitional process, and the esteem in which it was held, Con Com retained a potentially determining say in how the democratization process would be carried out. This shifted control of the country’s political agenda to Con Com and reduced the role of the PRC from initiator of the process to its caretaker. From this point on, Doe would make concerted and varied efforts to reclaim the limelight, retake the helm, and bend the process to his will. Doe began in early 1983 by trying to convince head of Con Com, Amos Sawyer, to modify the selection process for the fifty-nine members of the Constitutional Advisory Assembly (CAA) that was to be established to review its draft constitution and the PRC’s comments. At Con Com’s insistence, the CAA was to be independently elected, without PRC supervision, by a series of electoral colleges from all nine counties and six administrative districts in the country. Doe was concerned that the independently selected members would not revise Con Com’s draft to accommodate his political needs and that political aspirants would use these local elections to advance their own agendas, as in fact happened. Doe thus tried to convince Sawyer to abandon the stipulation that the members of the CAA be independently selected. He argued that “elections”—as he termed the process—would violate the ban on political activities which was still in force, that they would further complicate the democratization process, and that those elected to the CAA would begin to see themselves as legislators. Con Com would have none of it. It maintained that an independent body reflecting views other than its own and the government’s was needed to fine tune the constitution and to reinforce its links to the people and, moreover, that the selection of CAA members by electoral colleges did not constitute full-fledged elections.3 The dispute was still unresolved when on January 30, 1983, Con Com publicly announced that it had completed the draft constitution for presentation to the PRC. Although he could not have been surprised by the announcement, Doe was stultified. The PRC’s receipt of the draft would inaugurate the concrete start of the democratization process. As per Con Com’s stipulations, the CAA would be established, new electoral districts would be demarcated and new voter registration lists drawn up, and the independent election commission would be established and begin working.4 Doe had invested considerable energy in upgrading his image in preparation for presenting himself as a suitable presidential candidate. Doe had gone a long way toward building a loyal and efficient security apparatus to protect him from potential coup attempts and to undermine his political rivals. Apparently, Doe had given little thought to how he would handle the inevitable completion of the draft constitution and all it implied.

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Up until this point, Doe had interfered minimally in Con Com’s work, little as he might have liked its educational campaign or key provisions of the constitution it was writing, as revealed in its working drafts. Now, with the draft completed, the hands-off approach that had cloaked Doe’s ambitions would no longer do. Up until then, when persons or bodies threatened his prerogatives, Doe usually managed to get his way by co–opting, silencing, sidelining, or getting rid of them, yet he could not use these methods to subjugate Con Com. Nor could Doe dismiss Con Com members, as he had Patrick Seyon and Daniel Commany Wesseh in the summer of 1981. The situation had greatly changed in the two and a half years since then, and Con Com had garnered considerable respect and stature. Doe had repeatedly boasted, both at home and abroad, of his promise of full independence in its work and immunity from prosecution that he and the PRC had granted to Con Com and its members—without, of course, revealing how thoroughly hedged that immunity was.5 The United States and other countries had become increasingly involved in the transition process. In the summer of 1982, constitutional experts in the United States, the United Kingdom and Nigeria received a working draft of the constitution for review and comment.6 After all of this, there was no way that Doe could dismiss Sawyer or reshuffle Con Com, as he had his cabinet, or unilaterally make the drastic changes in the draft constitution that would be needed for him to realize his political ambitions. Doe even had to be careful not to openly pressure the commission.7 Doe’s first response to Con Com’s announcement was to summon Sawyer and repeatedly ask him if more time was not needed for the commission to undertake an internal revision of its work. This attempt at manipulation, like Doe’s efforts to persuade Con Com to change the means of selecting the CAA members, was rebuffed. In response, Doe did the only thing that was left to do—he stalled. Doe stalled for two months until he could stall no longer and had no choice but to accept the draft. Transfer of the Draft Constitution Sawyer repeatedly tried to meet with Doe to give him the draft. The public was growing suspicious of the delay.8 The United States and its allies were encouraging the process. Washington, which had already given Liberia $131,000 for the hearings conducted by Con Com and $100,000 for the operations of the soon-to-be established Constitutional Advisory Assembly, now promised $1.7 million to complete the transition to democracy.9 Sir John Boynton, the British electoral commissioner in the 1980 Zimbabwe elections, arrived in Liberia to advise on the planned return to civilian rule.10 Finally, Con Com threatened that if Doe did not find time to meet, it would send the draft by courier.

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Cornered, Doe received the draft constitution on March 30, 1983. Hiding his consternation, Doe played the role of the transitional ruler supporting the work of Con Com. Doe received the draft at a grand ceremony in the parlor of the Executive Mansion, attended by the PRC and cabinet members, the high military command, clergymen, and members of the diplomatic corps, along with twenty-five Con Com members headed by Amos Sawyer. As befitting the occasion, Doe made room on the stage for Sawyer, who delivered one of the two keynote speeches.11 In his address, Sawyer yet again repeated the call he had made at the end of 1981 for more active citizen oversight of the government.12 Doe, in his speech, highlighted the landmark significance of the event and lavished effusive praise on Sawyer and the other members of Con Com. To boost his credit, he emphasized his and the PRC’s support for the democratization process and compliance with Con Com’s program, including the selection of members for the CAA.13 Moreover, in compliance with another one of Con Com’s stipulations, Doe ordered that free copies of the draft be distributed to the populace, printed in the newspapers, and read on radio so that people could review and comment on it.14 With this, Doe chose his words to take possession of the process. Speaking in outsize terms and in the first person plural, Doe declared that “we”—meaning himself and the PRC— “are . . . undertaking a noble act of redemption of the Liberian people.”15 Doe let it be known that it was “we” who had established Con Com, appointed its high-caliber members, placed Sawyer at their head, gave the commission its mandate, allocated funding for its work, and magnanimously granted it a free hand and immunity from prosecution. The impression that Doe sought to create was that it was he and the PRC who had initiated the return to civilian rule and he and the PRC who would see it through. Doe also tried to sabotage the process, as its implementation would require him to relinquish control of the political agenda and to give up his aspirations for the presidency. Doe thus reverted to his two-pronged solution: On the surface, Doe accepted Con Com’s stipulations and harnessed himself and the PRC to its goals. In reality, Doe endeavored to wrench back control of the political agenda and to bend the designated election procedure to fit his needs. Crawford Young described this approach as adopting the formalities of a liberalized polity, while restricting their application to assure retention of power.16 Before ending his speech at the ceremony, Doe announced an ultimatum: Persons in the government and public corporations who were planning to run for office in 1985 were to make their positions clear within thirty days by resigning their posts, on pain of being barred from running when the ban on political activity was lifted. Doe’s explanation was that “excessive ambition for political office” could lead to “a conflict of interest” that would undermine

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the official’s “will to work actively for the progress of our government.”17 Issued in anticipation of a surge in political activity once the draft constitution was accepted, the decree aimed at hobbling potential rivals (especially former MOJA and PPP members) by depriving them of their government salaries and perks and stripping them of whatever powers and influence they had at a time when political activity was still illegal. The decree was poorly thought out and resulted in yet another tangle that Doe would have to wriggle his way out of. Immediately after the ceremony, Oscar Jaryee Quiah, former secretary-general of the PPP and minister of local government who had been purged with the other political ministers in Doe’s first cabinet and was currently serving as managing director of the National Housing Authority, sarcastically asked whether, in view of the continued ban on political activity, those who resigned were “eligible to shake hands, or should they sit down and fold their hands in their bedrooms?” A reporter asked what those who resigned would do in the interim.18 Doe replied in a garbled interview with the Daily Observer, in which he tried to make the forced resignation seem advantageous to prospective candidates. Those who resigned, Doe explained, would be able to use the time to improve their relationship with the people until the ban on politics was lifted. After which date, he continued, there would not be enough time to mount a successful campaign or to undergo the audit that he suddenly decided all candidates for office would have to have in order to prove their probity. He did not explain how candidates would be able to improve their relationship with the public when campaigning was forbidden or why insufficient time would be made available in the first place.19 Not surprisingly, the explanation did not assuage the concerns that the ultimatum produced or convince anyone to resign. Its effect was rather to unleash a flood of political speculation.20 Would Doe be a candidate? Would Doe be steered away from his commitment to democratic elections by the beneficiaries of his military government? Some Liberians saw the decree for exactly what it was: an attempt to interfere in the future lineup of candidates.21 Such questions and doubts, arising just as Doe was trying to present himself as supporting the democratic transition to civilian rule, must have been the last thing that he wanted. Another effort at damage control was made toward the end of the month, as the time to comply with the ultimatum was drawing to a close. Keeping a low profile, Doe mobilized Peter Naigow, the minister of information appointed in the November 1982 reshuffle, to present his position. In a press conference on April 26, Naigow avowed that the ultimatum was not intended to entrap or harass future politicians, reasserted the PRC’s commitment to transfer power through a democratic process, and repeated Doe’s justifications for the

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ultimatum.22 His repetition was no more convincing than Doe’s explanations at the beginning of the month. By the April 30 deadline, only five resignations had been tendered. The first two, by Gabriel W. Kpolleh, a teacher at the Roland Payne Night School in Monrovia and president of the Monrovia Consolidated School System (MCSS) Teachers Association, on April 26, and E. Wade Appleton, Counselor of the Defense Counsel of the Special Military Tribunal, on April 29, were low-ranking civil servants who posed no serious competition to Doe.23 However, news of Kpolleh’s resignation “took the country by storm,” as the Daily Observer noted. To dampen the discussion and the political speculation it engendered, once again Naigow stepped in. The ultimatum, he clarified, referred only to cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, managing directors and deputy managing directors—not to teachers.24 The other three resignations, made on April 30, were by high-ranking government officials: Gabriel Baccus Matthews from his post as director general of the cabinet, Oscar Jaryee Quiah, from his post as managing director of the National Housing Authority and Marcus Dan from his post as the Housing Authority’s deputy managing director. These officials, all of them at one time activists in the defunct PPP, with political know-how, experience, and supporters, were potentially formidable rivals and precisely the sort of government workers that the ultimatum had actually been aimed at. However, they were the only three high-ranking officials who tendered their resignations. The undeclared others who may have had political aspirations were deterred by a mixture of fear—that they would be labeled disloyal and harassed—and the impossibility of campaigning, which made resigning pointless.25 In view of the poor showing, on May 1, Doe rescinded the ultimatum, now claiming that it had been a test of loyalty and declaring that the “patient, dedicated and willing individuals” who had “envisioned a political future” but chose not to resign would be able to run for elected office.26 Two days later, Podier repeated Doe’s statements in an address to representatives of the Ministries of State, Finance, Information, Defense, Planning and Economic Affairs, and the National Bank.27 Marcus Dan bitterly condemned those politicians who did not resign as “lions in sheepskin.”28 Their fears were well founded. Those who resigned were not reinstated and got only grief for their compliance. Doe warned them to observe the ban on political activity, disparaged them as not loyal to the government and too ambitious for political positions, and informed Quiah that the General Auditing Office had been authorized to audit the National Housing Authority during his tenure as managing director.29 The ill-conceived ultimatum continued to make trouble for Doe even after it was rescinded. An article in the May 2 edition of West Africa called the ultimatum “very strange because if political activity remained banned

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indefinitely, why should any official declare his ambitions two years early, even if threatened with exclusion from contesting elections ‘when the appropriate time comes?’” In addition, it caustically pointed out the obvious: that Doe’s aim had been “to ban anybody now in office from standing for elections simply because in April 1983 they did not declare themselves.”30 A Daily Observer editorial aptly entitled “Why. . .?” questioned the motives and sense of Doe’s “reversal,” which, it claimed “flabbergasted” both those politicians who had declared their intentions and those who had not. It wondered whether, in view of the reversal, Naigow would still stand by his assertion that the ultimatum was “not a trap” and pointed out that such a rapid reversal of policy “may adversely affect the people’s readiness to believe their government’s pronouncements or lead them to wonder how seriously to take them.”31 Doe hurried to rebuff the criticism, as he had the criticism of the ultimatum itself, with equally nonsensical arguments. In a May 4 radio broadcast, Doe claimed that the policy change was not a reversal, but a necessary act “favoring” those who did not resign for the sake of running for political office. Since the three politicians who resigned could not run a government by themselves, he said, others had to be invited to enter the political race when the ban was lifted, “because a government was run by a majority and not a minority.”32 On the same day, Doe carried out yet another government reshuffle. The target was Minister of Justice Winston Tubman. Tubman’s appointment to the post in July 1982, made to enable Doe to take control of the National Security Force without arousing suspicion, was never meant to be long term. In his bid for the presidency, Doe would need a justice minister on whom he could rely to do his bidding and who would deliver a pliant justice system. Tubman was too principled and too resistant to bribes and bullying to play the part. His public clash in early April with Auditor General, J. Seyon Browne over the prosecution of the bankers Hilary Dennis and Adolph Yancy must have rankled. Moreover, as far as Doe was concerned, Tubman was a potential rival. Although Tubman denied that he had any intention of contesting the election, he was viewed by some Liberians as a person with good prospects of winning it. Tubman was replaced by his deputy Jenkins Scott, who was not only more pliable, but also known for his loyalty to Doe. Rumors in Monrovia had it that Doe would tell his cabinet ministers, “Why don’t you try to be like Jenkins Scott? This man likes me so much.”33 In addition to Tubman, several other replacements were made. The main one was of Matthews, who had resigned his post as director general of the cabinet within the framework of the ultimatum, by yet another TWP functionary: one Wilton G. S. Sankawulo, an African Liberian author and English professor at the University of Liberia (UL), who had served as assistant minister of state for presidential affairs under Tolbert. The remaining replacements

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were of some lower-level functionaries in the Ministries of Justice and of Commerce. Doe’s friction with Con Com and his feckless ultimatum presaged the destruction of the democratization process as, intent on the presidency, undisturbed by his deficiencies, and supported by his advisors, Doe placed his own interests above the good of the country. Nonetheless, at the end of his third year in office, Doe managed to keep his pursuit of permanency more or less under wraps, New York City’s Mayor Koch’s skepticism notwithstanding. There is no indication that anyone saw the political motives behind Doe’s foreign travels and reorganization of the security apparatus—or any reason that they should have. Improving Liberia’s bilateral ties and increasing its foreign aid were good enough reasons for his travels. Creating a more efficient, less corrupt security apparatus was not only a worthy aim in of itself; it also fit in with Doe’s apparent drive to raise the probity and increase the efficiency of the government and the state apparatus. Doe’s ill-conceived ultimatum drew some criticism in the Liberian and international press, but did not set off alarm bells in Washington. Chester A. Crocker, assistant secretary for African affairs, stated before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations’ Committee on Appropriations that “Liberia represents the best prospect in Africa, and one of the best in the world, for rapid movement toward democracy. . . .We believe Liberia provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of a policy of promoting the evolution of democratic institutions in a developing country.”34 There was no official criticism of the ultimatum, and U.S. Ambassador William Swing, rebutting doubts that the United States was adequately pressing Doe to hand over all authority to a civilian government, declared that “The United States government . . . is encouraged by the progress made here to date.”35 In both the economic and political spheres, it still suited the Reagan administration’s strategic interests to present Doe’s regime in a positive light, and Doe was careful to provide the wherewithal. In the economic sphere Doe’s technical compliance with IMF demands—his announcing measures to reduce government expenditures and raise revenues and taking what looked like steps to fight corruption—provided Washington and its Western European allies and the aid agencies they funded with the “evidence” they needed to proceed as though the conditions they imposed would eventually lead to more efficient and less corrupt economic behavior. In the political sphere, Doe continued to provide Washington with the currency it needed for its Cold War battles. Notwithstanding his participation in the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, he identified openly with the United States and its policies. Following America’s lead, he came down on the Moroccan side of the POLISARIO dispute and roundly condemned

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Libyan intervention in Chad. More substantively, in February 1983, the postcoup government signed an agreement with the United States, formalizing Liberian permission for American use of the Roberts International Airport for its military needs.36 The agreement enabled the United States to provide the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels with weapons and equipment to overthrow the Marxist government there, despite legislation that forbade aiding private military or paramilitary groups, by creating the fiction that the goods were coming from another country.37 Most of all, Washington, like the Liberian people, clung to hopes for a transition to democracy. As pointed out by Thomas A. O’Brien, the role of the transitional leader is to ensure a smooth transition to democracy.38 As long as Doe seemed to be making the transition, Washington was willing to brook his failings and to look the other way, as were most Liberians. For all the questions that had begun to surface, Doe still kept this illusion alive. Doe accepted the draft of the constitution and ordered it disseminated throughout the country. Doe acceded to Con Com’s terms for the election of the CAA members. At the 1983 Redemption Day ceremonies, Doe strategically shared the stage with Sawyer, whom he invited to present that year’s keynote address. Doe boasted that the draft constitution was “being circulated throughout the nation,” promised the PRC’s full support for the commission “in the performance of this great task,” and committed the PRC to conducting a national population census in February 1984 so as to enable the demarcation of electoral districts which would accurately reflect the number and composition of the residents.39 NOTES 1. “Terms Set for Constitutional Commission’s Work,” T2. 2. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 66–69. D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (Metuchen, NJ and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1988), 101–2, 109. 3. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 22. 4. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 101–2, 109. 5. “A Selection of the Decrees of the People’s Redemption Council 1980–1984,” Liberia Forum 2, no. 2 (1986): 93–94. 6. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 103. 7. Amos Sawyer, “The Making of the 1984 Liberian Constitution: Major Issues and Dynamic Forces,” Liberian Studies Journal 12, no. 1 (1987): 13. 8. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21. 9. Leon Dash, “Liberians Question Whether Doe Will Return Power to Civilian,” Washington Post, April 30, 1983, A2, Nexis Uni.

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Rushworth M. Kidder, “‘Project Democracy’: Reagan Tries to Export the U.S. Way of Governing,” Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1983, 3, Nexis Uni. 10. “Liberia: Civilian Rule,” West Africa, March 28, 1983, 812. 11. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21. 12. “Sawyer Notes ‘Shortcomings,’” 5–6. 13. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 66–9. 14. “The Liberian Draft Constitution,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 30, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 1, 1983, Nexis Uni. 15. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 66–9. 16. Crawford Young, The Post-Colonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 28. ProQuest Ebook Central. 17. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 66–9. 18. “PRC Not Ready to Extend Time,” Daily Observer, April 1, 1983, 1. 19. “PRC Not Ready to Extend Time,” 1. 20. “Tubman Reacts to Resignation Issue,” Daily Observer, April 4, 1983, 1, 10. 21. Dash, “Liberia Moves Toward Civilian Rule.” 22. “Doe’s Statement Was Not a Trap,” Daily Observer, April 27, 1983. 23. “First Government Employee Resigned ‘I Want to Be President’ Says Night School Teacher,” Daily Observer, April 29, 1983. “Major Appleton Resigns . . . to Organize ‘Democratic Party,’” Daily Observer, May 4, 1983. 24. “Doe Reverses Policy,” Daily Observer, May 3, 1983. 25. Dash, “Liberia Moves Toward Civilian Rule.” 26. “Quiah Resigns to Meet Political Activity Ban,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 2, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T3. 27. “‘Doe’s Move Was a Strategy,’” Daily Observer, May 5, 1983, 10. 28. “Dan Criticizes Certain Fellow Politicians,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T1. 29. “Observers Speculate Doe May Run for President,” T2. “Quiah Resigns,” T3. 30. “Liberia: Nothing Changes,” West Africa, May 2, 1983, 1055. 31. “Why. . .?,” Daily Observer, May 3, 1983. 32. “Angola: In Brief; Liberian Leader’s Press Conference: Appointments,” Monrovia Home Service, May 6, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 9, 1983, Nexis Uni. 33. Guseh, interview. 34. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, “Africa and Sahel: Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,” 98th Cong., 1983. 35. Dash, “Liberians Question.”

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36. “Monrovia Reports U.S. Military to Use Airport,” Monrovia Domestic Service, February 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1983): T4. “Appointment Request for the President.” 37. James Ciment, Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa (New York: Facts on File Inc, 1997), 3. Martin W. James, III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974–1990 (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publications, 1992), 154. 38. Thomas A. O’Brien, “The Role of the Transitional Leader: A Comparative Analysis of Adolfo Suárez and Boris Yeltsin,” Leadership 3 (2007): 419, 422–23. 39. “Doe Addresses Nation on Redemption Day 11 Apr,” T1–T8.

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Circumventing Con Com

The transfer of the draft constitution to the PRC at the end of March 1983 ushered in a surge of political enthusiasm. The draft was translated into the sixteen languages of Liberia’s major ethnic groups and made available on tape cassettes.1 Thousands of copies were distributed free in high schools and elsewhere. Con Com members toured the country to speak about the document. Lively discussions were held in the newspapers, radio, television, and other forums. According to the anthropologist Mary H. Moran, who was in Liberia at the time, both the printed and cassette versions of the draft were eagerly “sought” and “it was clear that people were sincerely interested in the process of constitutional reform.”2 Foreign Minister Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., in an interview with West Africa, exuded: “It has been a fantastic transformation, never before in the history of our country have the Liberian people [been] given the opportunity of debating political and constitutional issues . . . But for the first time, our people are debating issues that affect their lives.”3 As Liberians looked forward to the elections that would rid them of the junta, Doe and his circle set their sights on perpetuating their rule. Much of the junta’s fourth year in office was devoted to removing the real and imagined obstacles to Doe’s participation in the elections and to readying the public to accept it. In addition, as part of his election strategy, Doe completed the renewal of ties with Israel, which he had begun in December 1982. The first and major obstacle was Con Com, guardian of the transitional process. Although Doe had lost the first round in his battle with Sawyer over the selection of the Constitutional Advisory Assembly (CAA) members, he persisted in his struggle to see to it that the revised constitution would suit his aspirations for the presidency. He began by trying to persuade Sawyer to make desired changes, then, when that failed, proceeded first to circumvent Con Com, then to marginalize it, and finally to prematurely dissolve it.

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FAILURES OF PERSUASION AND THE CIRCUMVENTION OF CON COM Doe made his first efforts to change inconvenient clauses in the draft constitution while he waited for potential competitors to resign their government positions. Proceeding with his usual wiliness, he summoned Sawyer to a meeting on April 15, 1983. As Sawyer tells it, Doe pressured him to lower the thirty-five-year minimum age requirement for the president, claiming that it prevented young and talented Liberians from running. In addition, Doe urged him to extend the planned four-year term to seven (which would give him more time to entrench his regime), and was “emphatically disagreeable to a multiparty political system, stressing that multiparty politics was the source of trouble all around the world.”4 Of the three issues, the minimum age requirement was the most immediate concern. Doe would turn thirty-one on the coming June 6, which would leave him two years short of the minimum when the elections were held in 1985. As with the selection of the CAA members, these efforts at manipulation, too, fell flat, leading Doe to find other ways of making the desired adjustments. To address the crucial issue of his age, Doe began with a press conference on May 6, when he would be thirty years old. It was two days after he had fired his principled minister of justice, Winston Tubman. Held in the Executive Mansion and attended by fifty reporters from Liberia and abroad, the press conference was an ingeniously orchestrated affair, in which Doe raised his age by two years.5 Doubtless upon instruction, Assistant Information Minister Weade Kobbah stated that there were four different dates given for Doe’s birthday and asked Doe to clarify the exact one. Complying, Doe dramatically pointed to Director General of the Liberian Broadcasting System Alhaji G.V. Kromah, and accused him of responsibility for the confusion. He said that Kromah, who had been an Information Ministry official in 1980, was the first person to interview him after the coup and that, although he had told Kromah that he was born on May 6, 1950, as written on his ID card, he learned from the newspapers the date was mistakenly recorded as May 6, 1952.6 The press conference served two other functions as well. One was to hint that Doe and other members of the junta would be entitled to run for office. In the wake of his repeated declarations that the members of the junta would return to the barracks, the general assumption was that the 1985 elections would see the end of the military in politics. Doe shifted the ground on this assumption. In the same breath as he assured his hearers that all military personnel would go back to the barracks, he totally reversed the meaning of the promise. Going back to the barracks, he explained, meant becoming a civilian, who is free to decide how to act. “If I am a civilian, I can do anything

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I want to do,” Doe put it. As for the soldiers turned civilians, “I would have no power over any of them, and I won’t be able to tell him what to do,” he declared. The other function was to serve as a stage for covert campaigning. Almost as if he were already a candidate, Doe denigrated the PPP and MOJA, the two civilian organizations which had actively led the opposition to the TWP and, which, with their infrastructures and popularity intact despite their years underground, constituted, for the time being, his most serious rivals. Harking back to arguments made in the first year of the junta’s rule by PRC members reluctant to relinquish their newly won powers, Doe reminded his hearers that it was soldiers, not politicians, who had wrought the revolution. “The People’s Redemption Council did not come to power as a result of its affiliation with any political movements that operated in the country at the time,” he declared. He went so far as to blame the PPP for the loss of innocent lives in the 1979 rice riots it had organized.7 Not surprisingly, the reporters picked up the political implications of his statements and asked about them. As Doe was not yet ready to reveal his political intentions, his answers were cagey. In reply to the question of whether he would be a presidential candidate in 1985, he said, “That is not important for this conference.” To the question “Do you have or are you thinking of any political ambition for 1985?” he replied: “How can I be thinking about it? I am already in politics.” He was also evasive about the timetable for the transition to civilian rule, which had been submitted to the PRC along with the draft constitution. When asked about it, he replied that the PRC was considering the timetable Con Com had submitted and that it would be announced to the public when it was approved.8 According to the Daily Observer journalist who reported these statements, “with such replies Doe . . . let it be known that despite his youth he already possesses the inclination of all good politicians—to avoid saying too much too soon.”9 The May 6 press conference introduced a new phase in Doe’s pursuit of the presidency. He had begun to circumvent the draft constitution’s minimum age clause and hinted that the current military leaders would be able to transform themselves into civilian candidates for office. WORKING WITHIN THE RULES A great deal, however, was still left to do. Undesirable clauses in the constitution had to be changed so as to enable Doe’s election (e.g., soldiers had to be permitted to vote) and to enhance the power of the executive, under the assumption that Doe would become president. Since the changes would have

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to be made before the referendum on the constitution, which was scheduled for January 1984, it became imperative to slow down the timetable. To change the timetable, Doe once again began by trying to win over Sawyer. At a meeting early in June, he claimed there was not enough money in the budget to finance the $3 million needed to implement the timetable. As such, Doe asked Sawyer to publicly recommend that the return to civilian rule be postponed until the economic picture improved, explaining that the public would be less suspicious of such a recommendation coming from the chairman of the constitutional commission than from the minister of finance. The effort fell flat. Sawyer suggested making up the financial shortfall by asking the public to voluntarily contribute to a specially allotted elections fund.10 Ignoring the unwelcome suggestion, Doe tried to impose his will by fiat. On June 17, he sent Sawyer a letter, also broadcast on radio and television, stating that because of a lack of funding, the PRC—which was responsible for implementing the timetable—would prefer to implement it item by item, depending on the availability of funds. To give the impression that the real problem was indeed financial, not lack of will, Doe, making a promise he would soon break, reassured Con Com that the government would support its efforts to solicit external assistance.11 Assuming he had solved the problem, Doe departed the next day for a simple medical checkup in Germany. In presenting the problem as a financial one, however, he had inadvertently led the public to mobilize around Con Com. On June 19, Edward Slanger, an administrative assistant for the PRC, went on TV and radio to present Con Com with $500 in cash, as his contribution toward a fund for civilian rule in 1985, and called on his fellow citizens to contribute.12 On June 20, the Daily Observer published an editorial entitled “Let the People Pay,” urging Liberians to raise the $3 million needed to implement the timetable.13 Encouraged by this support, on June 29, Con Com opened a bank account for donations at the Chase Manhattan bank under the title “The Return to Civilian Rule 1985 Account.”14 Doe was furious. If the money were to be raised, he would lose his excuse for postponing the elections. On June 6, a few days after his return from his medical examination, he called a meeting of the PRC, the cabinet, and Con Com to discuss the bank account. According to Sawyer, the bank account became a “center of confrontation.” Even though the idea of opening a bank account had been raised several months earlier without any objections, Doe now called it an “ambush” and, backed by the PRC and cabinet, caused it to be abandoned. In its stead, an ad hoc committee was appointed to revise the timetable.15 The committee never met. Someone must have realized that the public power struggle with Con Com was counterproductive and, moreover, that any

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change in the timetable made by a PRC appointed committee would be seen as a junta maneuver to delay the return to civilian rule. Clearly, a different approach was needed, both to changing the inconvenient clauses and to slowing down the timetable. The approach adopted was to push Con Com out of the transitional process without arousing suspicion of foul play. This was done by more or less working within the rules, with only seemingly unimportant exceptions, through the two bodies that Con Com itself had created to see through the transition: The Special Elections Commission (SECOM) and the Constitutional Advisory Assembly (CAA). SECOM, whose mandate was to formulate the rules and regulations for the election process, would be mobilized to slow the process down. The CAA, whose mandate was to review the draft constitution and recommend adjustments, would be used to make the changes in the constitution. Things seemed to proceed as they should. On July 21, the PRC published Decree No. 75 establishing SECOM and transferred $1.3 million for its work, while Doe appealed to “the Liberian people, foreign friends and businessmen” for financial contributions to support Con Com’s work. Within a week, all the SECOM members were appointed.16 To all appearances, they were highly respected and experienced individuals. The chairman, Emmett Harmon, had a long and distinguished record of public service. General Albert T. White, his deputy, and Gen. Benyah Kesselly had served as chiefs of staff of the Liberian army under the TWP. Isaac Nyeplu had served as minister of justice in the PRC government, and Charles S. G. Boayue Sr. had been a supervisor of schools and member of the House of Representatives from Nimba County under the TWP.17 On July 26, Liberia’s 136th Independence Day, Doe announced the PRC’s endorsement of Con Com’s timetable for the return to civilian rule and directed Sawyer to release the details to the public, which he did.18 The timetable, whose release had been awaited since May, was both tight and precise. The CAA would begin to review the draft constitution on August 10, and submit its final report to the PRC on September 30. SECOM would present the draft of the Elections Law to the PRC on September 1. On October 1, it would present its proposals for the delineation of electoral constituencies and the registration of voters, and the PRC would issue a decree on the Elections Law. On November 1, the PRC would issue decrees on the registration of voters and the delineation of electoral constituencies, and preparations for voter registration would begin immediately. The nationwide referendum on the constitution was scheduled for January 1984. The four-year-old ban on political activities would be lifted on April 12 of that year and political parties would be able to register with SECOM. Two months, November 19, 1984 through January 18, 1985, would be allotted for election campaigning. The general elections would be held on January 20, 1985, and the new civilian

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government would be sworn in on April 12, 1985, five years to the day after the military had seized power.19 The publication of the timetable probably provided some assurance that the transition would be made as planned. On August 5, Con Com met with the newly appointed SECOM members and transferred to them documents to assist them with the preparations for the referendum. These included a breakdown of the country’s electoral constituencies and their estimated populations, which they needed in order to draw up new electoral districts and prepare a new electoral registry that would replace the one created by the defunct TWP.20 They also included studies and recommendations of two election experts from the United States and the United Kingdom, to guide them in formulating the new Elections Law and other rules and regulations.21 Con Com also issued a check to SECOM for the sum of $125,000 for the “smooth implementation of [its] works.”22 The fifty-nine CAA members were sworn in on August 12 in Gbarnga, in the interior of the country. To allay concern that lack of funding might once again be used as an excuse to slow down the timetable’s implementation, Minister of Finance G. Alvin Jones informed U.S. Ambassador Swing and USAID Director Ms. Lois Richards that the Liberian government had given Con Com $250,000 out of the total of $1.3 million in the 1983–1984 budget.23 Appearances aside, Doe used his legal powers and a handful of tricks to influence the work of both bodies. With SECOM, he took advantage of the prerogative Con Com had given him as head of state to select the members, and changed the rules as he did so. Con Com had stipulated that all five members of the committee be selected from a list that it itself had compiled. Doe appointed only two of the committee’s five members from the list: General Albert T. White and Charles S. G. Boayue Sr. His other three appointees, Emmett Harmon, Gen. Benyah Kesselly, and Isaac Nyeplu, were not on the list.24 Sawyer described Harmon, whom Doe appointed SECOM’s chairman, as a man “whose entire public service career had been spent creating illusions of grandeur and chasing the spotlight.”25 Benyah Kesselly was in his late seventies, receiving an army pension, and suffering from failing health. Nyeplu, Podier’s uncle, was an old ally of proven loyalty. These three appointees constituted the majority of the committee, ensuring that, whatever the issue, reliable Doe supporters would be able to outvote the members vetted by Con Com. In principle, the CAA was a more independent body. Its members were selected through a pyramid of electoral colleges in each of Liberia’s nine counties, in a procedure that was designed to give local leadership a role in the electoral process.26 The only member of the assembly Doe was permitted to appoint was its chairman, whom he had to choose from among the persons selected by the electoral colleges. Closely watched by the Americans, Doe appointed Dr. Edward Kesselly, an African Liberian with a PhD in political

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science from the University of Manchester, who had served under the TWP as a minister in a number of posts and in several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like most of Doe’s appointees, Dr. Kesselly was a qualified individual with the requisite education and experience. Nonetheless, there are indications that Doe and his close circle did what they could to influence both the selection and conduct of the CAA members. The CAA members turned out to be a collection of former TWP activists and local officials, businessmen, and paramount chiefs. By virtue of their backgrounds they were largely conservative individuals with a stake in the old order and comfortable with it. There were no MOJA or PPP members.27 By Sawyer’s later admission, this composition, which would prove so convenient for Doe, was largely the unforeseen outcome of the selection procedure designed by Con Com.28 Unable to know the outcome in advance, though, and unwilling to leave the CAA’s composition to chance, Doe sent members of his staff led by fellow Krahn Bai Gbala and John Rancy to influence the electoral colleges’ selections.29 With respect to their conduct, concerted efforts were made both to discourage the CAA members from engaging in independent political activity, which could rival Doe’s, and to disconnect them from Con Com. According to Mary H. Moran, “technical advisors” were dispatched to the counties and districts during the selection process to inform the contenders that, with the sole exception of the proceedings at the conventions themselves, the ban on political activities was still in effect and to warn them that election to the CAA “should not be considered a ‘stepping-stone’ to future political office.”30 Doe personally repeated the warnings at the CAA’s swearing-in ceremony, telling the CAA members that even though they had been elected, their job “must be seen as a civic responsibility and not as a political opportunity.”31 Marginalizing Con Com In its desire to preserve the independence of the CAA, Con Com had disqualified its members from serving in it.32 Nonetheless, the understanding was that alterations to the constitution would be made solely on the basis of consensus between Con Com and the CAA.33 To forestall such a consensus from developing, Doe and his supporters removed Con Com from the revision process. At the swearing-in ceremony, Doe told the assembled members that their “responsibility is to examine the draft, article by article, propose amendments, and honestly advise the PRC on whether the document should be accepted or rejected.”34 These directives pointedly avoided all mention of Con Com. Their message was that the CAA had sole authority to amend the draft constitution and need not consult with Con Com. In addition, Doe instructed the members to ignore the September 1 deadline set by Con-Com

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and to take as long they needed to complete their work.35 This directive belittled Con Com and signaled that, as far as Doe was concerned, the Assembly members could freely disregard it. Doe’s next step was to thwart any attempt that Con Com itself might make to play its advisory role. In an August 16 Executive Mansion release, Doe warned that any Con-Com member found “interfering” in the CAA’s work would be arrested. “Interfering,” he made it plain, referred to any “interaction” with CAA members. The prohibition apparently followed reports that members of the two bodies were meeting. He further declared that the offering of “unsolicited views” by CAA members “would not be tolerated.” Thus, Doe effectively transformed the conception of Con Com from that of a valued partner in constitutional revision into a source of illegitimate influence and interference. The only input he allowed was from Sawyer, as the chairman of Con Com, to answer administrative questions at the invitation of Assembly members.36 On August 18, Con Com protested Doe’s edict in an open letter to the PRC, arguing that consultation was essential for the CAA to provide the critical review of the draft constitution that it was mandated to do.37 The protest was ignored. With this, Doe took scrupulous care not to be seen as interfering in the CAA’s decisions or protracting its deliberations. Major A. N. Cassell, superintendent of Bong County, where the CAA was meeting, sent Doe a letter informing him that Edward Kesselly, along with other assembly members, were holding secret political meetings and demanding that they be dismissed. Doe decided to dismiss instead the superintendent, claiming that the Assembly was an independent body and that he had “no power to dismiss anybody because they were elected by the people.”38 As a matter of fact, Doe’s reply was nothing more than a pretense. Kesselly at that time was working hand in hand with Doe and was offered the position of Doe’s running mate in the coming elections. Thus, he and other assembly members were laying the foundation for the establishment of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) which Doe ultimately would lead.39 On September 22, eight days before the deadline for the completion of the revision, Kesselly asked for an additional thirty-two days and another $62,000 to finish the work. He explained that the extension was required to debate a number of articles that involved “very sensitive issues that needed careful handling” and promised that the delay would not result in a waste of time and money. The extension suited Doe; he appointed an eight-man committee to investigate the request before he granted it on the committee’s recommendation.40 Two days later, on September 24, he departed on a twelve-day official visit to New York and Paris, leaving the Assembly to complete the revisions on its own. The apprehensions that the CAA would be swayed by Con Com never materialized. In fact, the edict that forbade the members of the two bodies

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meeting proved superfluous. As Sawyer elaborated in a subsequent account, “the Assembly chose to work in isolation from the commission. At no point did the Assembly feel constrained to request clarification of issues, the rationale behind provisions, or a review of the reports of public debates held by the commission even though the commission had made its technical staff available to the Assembly.”41 Con Com member Abraham L. James provides a similar account and adds that “the Assembly adopted an adversarial posture toward the Commission. Some of the members took the view that they had been ‘elected’ and that their activities would supersede everything the Commission had done or would do.”42 Both emphasized the common interests and good relations between Doe and the CAA. The Assembly completed its work on October 18, fourteen days ahead of the revised schedule.43 Con Com had expected the CAA to “fine tune” its draft.44 The CAA did much more. In line with the American model, it retained the tripartite division of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. It also strengthened the executive and scrapped the provisions that Con Com had crafted to limit its power and to ensure the probity and competence of public servants. Thus, the revised draft increased the presidential term from four to six years. This was a year short of what Doe had pressed Sawyer for in their April 15, 1983 meeting and two years short of the eight-year presidential term under the TWP, but further extension was to be permitted. It also removed key provisions that had been carefully designed to mitigate abuses that had characterized the TWP and that had reached massive proportions under the junta. The most creative provisions were for the establishment of four bodies designed to constrain the president’s power to make appointments and to supervise the appointees afterward. There was to be a commission of county leaders, commission which would provide lists from which county superintendents were to be appointed, assess the appointees, report on the performance of county officials, and, where deemed necessary, recommend the dismissal of superintendents. In effect, this commission would deprive the president of the total control he hitherto had over the appointment and tenure of county superintendents and, with this, over the country’s internal affairs. A judicial service commission, with the majority of its members being persons recommended by the Bar Association, was to be established in order to recommend candidates for political appointments, select judges, and monitor the performance of judicial officials. This commission was aimed at preserving the independence of the judiciary and at preventing the president from making political appointments at will. A public service commission was to be established to supervise an open and merit-based system of public services. The CAA eliminated all these commissions, as well as the ombudsman

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commission that was to be set up to investigate public complaints.45 It also lowered the rank, from colonel to lieutenant, from which the president could appoint army officers, a change which would give the executive more control over the appointment of army officers. The CAA also struck directly at two provisions aimed at controlling corruption: the provision stipulating that senior government officials would have to declare their assets before taking office and the provision giving the auditor general protected tenure and legislative, rather than presidential, oversight. Most of the CAA’s changes suited Doe and his close supporters, as well as those CAA members who envisioned a political future for themselves, whether with Doe or in opposition to him. A strong executive, a weak civil service, and an army personally loyal to the president were in the interests of both the CAA members who would become active in other political parties. Among them: Walter Wisner, who would become secretary-general of the Unity Party, and Wilmot A. McCritty, who would become active in the Liberian Action Party, and of at least twenty of the CAA’s fifty-nine members who would be appointed to government positions in the coming years, or would be elected to the legislature on Doe’s ticket. Also suiting both groups was the addition of a ten-year residency requirement for presidential candidates.46 This would exclude from the presidential race not only the TWP members who fled after the coup, but popular MOJA and PPP activists, such as Togba Nah Tipoteh, who fled Liberia in 1981, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was out of the country working for the World Bank, and Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., who temporarily left Liberia in July 1983 after being dismissed as foreign minister, as well. Kesselly later defended the requirement with the argument that it would be unfair for those who had been away to return and take the presidency while those who were in the country were deprived of this privilege.47 Its more obvious aim was to make it easier for both Doe and any CAA aspirants to the presidency to win. The other change was the extension of legislative terms: of senators from seven to nine years and of representatives from four to six, making them longer even than the four-year terms under the TWP. This change would allow those who were elected to the legislature, from whatever party, to enjoy the spoils of office for longer. The one change that better met Doe’s political needs than those of his future rivals was the removal of the clause barring soldiers and police—Doe’s natural constituency—from voting. This clause, which would have deprived a fair sector of the population of an essential democratic right, was aimed at preserving civilian supremacy.48

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Disbanding Con Com to Take Control of the Constitutional Revisions The public ceremony marking the submission of the revisions was held on October 28, 1983, two days after Doe’s return from Liberia’s first United Nations round-table donor’s conference in Bern, Switzerland. For the Liberian public, the completion of the revisions, not long after the originally stipulated date, was an indication that the transitional process was proceeding in good time. Further supporting this impression was that a few days earlier, on October 26, SECOM representatives had begun touring the country to identify registration and polling centers. The ceremony was aimed at further encouraging the perception of good order. Held at the Unity Conference Center near Monrovia, it was yet another grand event, attended by PRC and government members, high-ranking officials, and the diplomatic corps, as well as by chiefs, elders, county superintendents and citizens from all over the country. The participants were invited as part of Doe’s recently initiated efforts to gain the support of the country’s traditional leaders, which will be discussed further along. CAA Chairman Edward Kesselly opened the ceremony with lavish praise for the work of the Assembly and the PRC’s efforts to bring the country to democratic rule, and rousingly declared that the document should “serve as basic law of the land from which all other laws emanate.”49 Doe, speaking after Kesselly, hailed the submission of the revisions as “yet another historic milestone” in the short reign of the PRC. He effusively thanked Kesselly and the CAA members for “working so arduously to complete this very important assignment within a reasonable period of time,” and assured his hearers that the PRC would turn its attention to the document as soon as possible.50 These effusive outpourings were the wrappings of a pernicious package. Doe could not resist the opportunity to jab at his potential opponents, much as he had done in his May press conference. This time he directed his campaigning against those Liberians “who seem to be interested in nothing but Civilian Rule,” declaring in his warped and self-serving way of looking at things: “They have done nothing to help us in a military government and their actions prove they cannot help us in a civilian government.”51 More substantively, he used the occasion to disband Con Com. According to its terms of reference, Con Com was to continue to operate until after the revised draft was reviewed by the PRC and ratified in the national referendum. For Doe and his clique, the prospect that Con Com would be able to vet the PRC’s decisions and raise objections to favorable CAA changes was totally unacceptable. Thus, in yet another of his sleight of hand moves, he announced that since the occasion marked the completion of the work of drafting the constitution, Con Com was to be dissolved “effective immediately.”52

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In disbanding Con Com, Doe left the crucial final stage of the constitution’s revision entirely to the PRC, whom he could count on not to tamper with the favorable clauses. He thereby removed the only significant obstacle to the approval of a constitution that met his needs. Furthermore, he refrained from disseminating the revised constitution. This prevented the close scrutiny and public discussion that had followed upon the dissemination of Con Com’s original draft, as well as comparison of the two versions, which could draw attention to the new version’s concentration of powers in the executive branch. The Daily Observer criticized both actions. Con Com, it pointed out, was still properly involved in the constitutional process and according to Decree No. 49, which had established it, was to be dissolved only after the constitution was ratified by the Liberian people.53 An editorial the following week lamented that the failure to distribute the draft had spawned rumors and suspicion about what the CAA had and had not done; complained that since the CAA had held its deliberations in secret, the non-dissemination prevented people from comparing the two drafts and debating the changes; and summed up with a call to release the draft in the name of the public and the national interest.54 However, the Daily Observer seems to have been a lone voice. Sawyer, who could have been expected to protest Doe’s violation of Con Com’s terms of reference, waited until after he left Liberia at the beginning of 1986 to do so.55 He probably feared that the immunity he had received as a member of Con Com would no longer protect him once the body was dissolved. The chiefs and elders who were at the ceremony where Con Com was dissolved joined Doe in commending Con Com’s performance and made no mention of its premature demise. They were concerned at the time about the quarrel between Doe and Quiwonkpa, which was a less abstract matter and a more immediate worry for them. However, international news agencies made absolutely no mention of the dissolution and non-dissemination either. Apparently, the import of these actions was not apparent to them. The elimination of Com Con was only one-step in a series of exercises aimed at providing Doe with the means of achieving his political aspirations. NOTES 1. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B468. 2. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy, 110–11. 3. Eddie Momoh, “Fahnbulleh Speaks Out,” West Africa, June 27, 1983, 1492. 4. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21. Sawyer, interview.

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5. “‘I’m Already in Politics,’” Daily Observer, May 10, 1983, 1, 10–11. 6. “Doe Addresses Age Issue,” Daily Observer, May 10, 1983, 3. 7. “‘I‘m Already in Politics,’” Daily Observer, May 10, 1983, 1, 10–11. 8. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Doe Explains Steps in Returning Liberia to Civilian Rule in 1985,” May 7, 1983, Nexis Uni. 9. “‘I’m Already in Politics,’” 1, 10–11. 10. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21. 11. “Bank Account Opened for ‘Civilian Rule 1985,’” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 30, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T2. 12. “Civilian Rule Account Opened at Chase,” Daily Observer, June 30, 1983, 1. 13. “Editorial,” Daily Observer, June 20, 1983, 2. 14. “Bank Account Opened for ‘Civilian Rule 1985,’” T2. 15. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21–22. 16. Liberia Elections Law, PRC Decree No. 75. “Doe Urges More Support for Con Com,” Daily Observer, July 28, 1983, 1, 10. 17. “Special Elections Commission (SECOM),” Liberia Alert (January 1986): 9. 18. “PRC Endorses Return to Civilian Rule Timetable,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 26, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1. 19. “Decree No. 75 by the People’s Redemption Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Liberia Repealing Title 12, Chapter 2, Liberia Code of Laws and Elections,” Daily Observer, July 25, 1983, 9. 20. “Con Com Meets SECOM,” Daily Observer, August 5, 1983, 1, 10. “Con Com Gives Documents to SECOM,” Daily Observer, August 15, 1983, 3, 10. 21. “Con Com Gives Documents to SECOM,” 3, 10. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberia Sets Up Special Election Commission,” July 22, 1983, Nexis Uno. 22. “Con Com Gives Documents to SECOM,” 3, 10. 23. “Final $6M. in U.S. Grant Aid,” West Africa, September 5, 1983, 2089. 24. “Special Elections Commission (SECOM),” 9. 25. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 25. 26. “P.R.C. Approves Election for Constitutional Assembly,” Mirror, February 5, 1983, 1, 8. 27. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 100, 115. 28. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 22. 29. Liberian Action Party activist, email correspondence. 30. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy, 113. 31. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 74. 32. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 106. 33. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 21–22. 34. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 74. 35. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 106.

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36. “Doe Issues Warning on Draft Constitution,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 17, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1983): T1. Sawyer, “The Making of the 1984 Liberian Constitution,” 14–15. 37. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 111. 38. “Ayun Cassell Dismissed,” Daily Observer, September 7, 1983. 39. General Prince Yomi Johnson, The Rise & Fall of President Samuel K Doe, A Time to Heal and Rebuild Liberia, ed. D. Wa HNE, Jr. (Lagos: Pax Cornwell Publishers Ltd., 1991), 23. 40. “Committee to Review Education Campaign Extension,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 21, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1984): T1–T3. 41. Sawyer, “The Making of the 1984 Liberian Constitution,” 15. 42. Abraham L. James, “Lingering Liberian Constitutional Issues,” The Perspective, March 29, 2005, accessed July 26, 2011, http://www.theperspective.org/2005/mar/ constititutionalissues.html. 43. “Assembly Officially Endorses Draft Constitution,” Monrovia Domestic Service, October 19, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T2. Chaudhuri, “Liberia under Military Rule (1980–1985),” 61. 44. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 22. 45. Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Towards Democratic Governance in Liberia (London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2005), 103–5. 46. Dunn and Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition, 115. 47. Fahnbulleh, Jr., Across the Landscape, 115. 48. A member of the Constitutional Advisory Assembly, in an interview with the author, June 1, 1997, transcript, private archives, Boston, MA. 49. “Assembly Wants Freedom, Stability, Unity Says Dr. Edward Kesselly,” Daily Observer, October 30, 1983, 10. 50. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 75–77. 51. “Constitution Commission Dissolved,” Daily Observer, October 30, 1983, 10. 52. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 75. 53. “Constitution Commission Dissolved,” 10. 54. Editorial, “Continuing the Spirit of Openness,” Daily Observer, November 7, 1983, 4. 55. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 24.

Chapter 10

Pressing Forward and Holding Back

The circumvention and dissolution of Con Com ensured Doe and his cohorts of a constitution that served their political needs. Over roughly the same period, they continued two processes and introduced a third, which, like the elimination of Con Com, were aimed at smoothing Doe’s way to the presidency. They pursued and completed the renewal of ties with Israel, which, as pointed out in chapter 5, they saw both as a means of pleasing the United States and as a hedge against the possible loss of American support in response to Doe’s running. They launched yet another wave of political intimidation to discourage political activity by potential rivals and began to put in place an organized means of recruiting votes. RENEWING TIES WITH ISRAEL In April or May, at about the same time as he moved up his birth date and first hinted that soldiers would be allowed to don civilian garb and run in the elections, Doe personally entered the negotiations to renew ties with Israel, meeting in secret with Benad Avital, head of the Israeli Interests Office in Côte d’Ivoire.1 His entry into the negotiations, which had until then been conducted by his aides, reflected his eagerness to expedite the process. In all likelihood, this was done for two reasons: the first was to win favor with Washington, which sought to end the African boycott of Israel. The second, and perhaps the most important, was to advance his own political ambitions. Before actually renewing ties, Doe took steps to ensure that the process would go smoothly. The first was to examine whether the renewal would encounter opposition in the OAU and among Arab states. Though the OAU had not censured Zaire’s Mobuto the year before, the Arab states could be expected to object to Liberia’s action. Furthermore, Egypt, though it itself 189

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had restored diplomatic relations in 1979, was not encouraging other African states to follow its lead. The OAU summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on June 7–10, 1983, provided a convenient venue to test the temper of the African states. To reduce the risk of opposition, Doe embedded his feeler in calls for unity—a major concern of the member states as the organization was in danger of breaking up as a result of deep divisions over Libya’s expansionism. Doe had participated in the boycotts of both the August and November OAU summits the previous year, and even boasted in his April 1983 Redemption Day address that he had actively encouraged them.2 With anxiety mounting about the organization’s future, and the member states eager to resolve the stalemate, unity became a key issue. Thus, prior to the summit, on May 23, Doe issued a statement urging all OAU member states to participate without preconditions, so as “to preserve the unity of our cherished organization.”3 During the summit, which convened after compromises were reached on the divisive issues, he called on African leaders to redirect their energies, toward greater unity and friendship in the OAU, to remain true and committed to the unity and solidarity of the African continent, and to “make great sacrifices for the preservation of our organization.”4 As he played the savior of the OAU, Doe urged African leaders to “adopt a new and more constructive attitude to Israel.”5 Wrapping this exhortation in emphatic and repeated calls for African unity made the issue of Israel seem like a minor, almost incidental matter, while enabling him to present himself, at home and abroad, as a continental leader deeply concerned about an issue of burning importance to all Africans. Encouraged by the fact that his argument for a new OAU attitude towards Israel raised no substantial objections, Doe decided on June 19 that he would bring the matter to the PRC. Characteristically, the announcement was marked by camouflage. Masking his motives, as well as the prior negotiations with Israel and the Israeli commitments received by then, he painted himself as a peacemaker seeking PRC agreement to “open talks” with Israel so as “to determine the role Liberia could play in helping to establish genuine peace in the Middle East.” Doe proclaimed Liberia’s commitment to the Arab cause, and assured his listeners that Liberia could play a constructive role in resolving the issues in dispute. Doe noted, as he had in Addis Ababa, that the severance of diplomatic relations had not brought the sides any closer to resolving their conflict.6 Much like his calls for African unity, his pose as a peacemaker endowed his entirely self-interested policy with a higher motive and enabled him to paint himself as a leader with vision and principles. From this point on, this spurious justification for breaking the OAU boycott would be restated whenever the normalization of ties might be criticized. With the decision to renew ties effectively taken, it became imperative for Doe to dismiss his foreign minister, Henry Boimah Fahnbulleh Jr., who

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openly opposed the renewal of ties and was convinced that Liberia should not act against an OAU decision.7 Fahnbulleh Jr. understood that Doe wanted to use the Israeli connection to get the Americans to support his eventual bid for the presidency, and his strong visceral dislike of Israel, which he viewed as a major supporter of South Africa’s apartheid.8 Needless to say, Doe’s efforts to temper Fahnbulleh Jr.’s objections—by claiming that he was renewing ties because of American pressure—fell flat. Given Fahnbulleh Jr.’s views and his open animosity toward Israel, he would not have been able to perform the tasks required of a foreign minister to a friendly country. Before dismissing Fahnbulleh Jr., Doe marginalized him (as he was doing to Con Com) by pointedly excluding him from his consultations with his advisors prior to the announcement that he would bring the matter to the PRC. Thus, Fahnbulleh Jr. heard of this decision only from the public announcement on June 19. Wasting no time, he attacked the decision in the presence of journalists the following day, when Doe was departing for his flight to Germany.9 Then, while Doe was abroad, Fahnbulleh Jr. submitted a long letter to the PRC detailing his objections.10 Doe took advantage of Fahnbulleh Jr.’s impolitic reaction, and dismissed him upon his return to Liberia on July 2.11 In firing Fahnbulleh Jr., Doe rid himself of the last independent minister in his cabinet. On July 9, Fahnbulleh Jr. was replaced by Ernest Eastman, an Americo-Liberian who had served in various positions in the Liberian Foreign Ministry under Tubman and Tolbert and was currently secretary of the Mano River Union (MRU). Similarly to the other Americo-Liberians Doe had appointed, Eastman was a well-qualified official who could be relied upon to implement the policies of whatever government employed him and to serve as a faithful spokesman for the head of state. If the May decision to expedite the renewal of ties was prompted by Doe’s presidential aspirations, the normalization took place against the background of rising concern about Libya. At the end of June, Chadian insurgents trained by Libya and backed by Libyan troops and air support launched an offensive with the declared purpose of overthrowing Chadian President Hissene Habre’s government. The two sides faced off throughout July and August. On July 20, Doe issued an Executive Mansion release criticizing Ethiopia, the current OAU chair, for partiality in the Chadian conflict after it had condemned America’s support for Habre.12 On August 8, as Libyan planes bombed Faya-Largeau, the administrative capital of northern Chad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a long statement expressing concern about the intensification of Libya’s intervention in Chad and calling it a “gross violation” of Chad’s territorial integrity.13 Doe was apprehensive about Libyan aggression, and turned to Israel for help. On August 7, Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison headed a three-man

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delegation to Israel to finalize matters. The visit was apparently preceded by Liberia’s request that Israel provide information about Libya’s intentions and by Israeli insistence on full diplomatic relations before it acquiesced.14 Once these preconditions were met, Liberia received Israel’s intelligence assessment on Libya.15 On August 13, Eastman publicly announced the normalization of diplomatic relations, while on the same day Doe issued a press release calling for an extraordinary session of the OAU in order to discuss the Chadian conflict.16 A week later, Doe, accompanied by a fifteen-member delegation, became the first African leader since the 1973 boycott decision to pay an official visit to Israel. The visit, between August 22–26, was attended by a great deal of fanfare and media coverage in Israel, and was seen as a means of encouraging other African states to end their diplomatic embargo. For Doe it was a working visit to negotiate the desired economic and security assistance and to promote the junta’s image in Israel. He also seems to have used it to promote his electoral interests. Three of the delegates, PRC members Col. Larry Borteh, Assistant Secretary-General of the PRC Col. Joseph K. Sampson, and Major John Nyumah, had no obvious tasks to fulfill in Israel.17 Their inclusion seems to have been a prerequisite in exchange for their support for Doe’s planned bid for the presidency. Borteh’s demonstrated readiness to employ witchcraft and Sampson’s position in the PRC made them potentially threatening adversaries and invaluable to have as allies. Overall, Doe obtained the military and economic benefits for which he had normalized relations. The joint communiqué issued at the end of Doe’s visit made only vague mention of the possibility of defense cooperation, and both Israeli and Liberian officials denied having reached any agreement on military assistance.18 However, in a secret document, Israel agreed to provide military equipment and advisers to counter the presumed Libyan subversion and to provide the junta with intelligence about Libyan activities in Africa.19 It also sent the Mossad agent Doe had earlier requested.20 In addition, it agreed to train Liberia’s security forces and to train and equip the Executive Mansion Guard, which was responsible for Doe’s personal security. In a goodwill gesture pandering to Doe’s dreams of an air force, it provided an Arava 201 aircraft of military configuration and three of civilian configuration.21 The economic benefits were of two kinds. One consisted of financial and development aid from the United States in what looked like a reward for Doe’s falling into line with American policy. On the eve of Eastman’s announcement of the renewal of diplomatic ties, the U.S. government gave Liberia a $6 million grant to pay its external debts. During Doe’s visit in Israel, it announced that it would give Liberia more than $8 million, half of it as a grant, for the construction of military housing and the purchase of U.S. arms.22 At the end of August, it gave the Liberian government an additional

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$15 million for the purchase of rice and for agricultural development, health, and education.23 In September, the IMF approved $55 million in special drawing rights credit for the consecutive twelve months.24 The other, embedded in the joint communiqué, consisted of Israel’s commitments to an extensive package of development aid, featuring technical assistance and cooperation in agriculture, roadbuilding, shipping, air services, medicine, fishing, telecommunications, and banking, as well as the promise to encourage economic groups from third countries to invest in Liberia’s economic development.25 In principle, the commitments were to benefit the Liberian people. Little of the promised assistance reached them, however. Most of it was provided through or in conjunction with private companies, or quangos, which were rich sources of funds for corrupt leaders throughout Africa. Few of the planned projects got off the ground. Within a few years, there would be reports that Doe received bribes from two Israeli companies, Hefziba and Yona International, which had been awarded lucrative contracts in Liberia.26 Moreover, following renewed ties with Israel, Doe now had what he saw as an insurance policy, in case the United States reduced or curtailed its aid in anger at his participation in the elections. His expectations were that Israel would provide assistance without the strings attached by the United States. Most African states accepted the renewal of ties. Some of them soon reestablished their own relations with Israel: Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon in 1986, Togo in 1987, and Kenya in 1988. Egypt, no less eager than Liberia to check Gaddafi’s advances, not only declared its understanding of Doe’s position but also gave it its “blessing.”27 Ethiopia, which had benefited from Israel’s intervention on its behalf with the Pentagon and CIA following Zaire’s renewal of diplomatic ties, told Doe to “do what you judge is best for the interests of your country.”28 Nigeria, where for some years leading politicians had been calling for a return to dialogue with Israel, sent similar advice.29 The only countries that took punitive measures were some of the Arab states. The Gulf Co–operation Council severed its aid program. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait folded their respective bilateral economic assistance programs. The OPEC Arab countries that had arrangements allowing Liberia to purchase oil on favorable terms canceled them. The aid from the Arab Development Bank and other Arab financial institutions dried up. The punitive measures were easy to disregard. None of the angry Arab states went so far as to sever relations with Liberia. The aid from the Arab sources was a pittance in comparison to that from the United States: only $52.2 million between 1978 and 1982.30 Arab aid, as pointed out by Foreign Minister Eastman, came in the form of repayable loans.31 Only a little over a year later, in December 1984, the Arab Bank for Development joined with the African Development Bank and the German KFW Group to provide

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Liberia, through the ECOWAS Fund, with $2.5 million to finance the Monrovia-Freetown Highway.32 The only effect that the displeasure of the Arab states seems to have had is that their threat to ban all ships under the Liberian flag from sailing the Arabian Gulf dissuaded Liberia from opening its embassy in Jerusalem, as Eastman had promised. They did not want to risk losing the Liberian flag’s use as “flag of convenience” for oil tankers and the income that came with it.33 The only apparent disappointment concerned the hopes of Doe and his clique that the renewal of diplomatic ties would serve them in good stead once Doe revealed his plans to run for president. It did not. In September, when Doe was in New York to address the U.N. General Assembly, President Reagan met with him and praised the PRC for its improvement of Liberia’s human rights conditions, while he pledged continued American political and economic support for the PRC government.34 Secretary of State George P. Shultz publicly commended Liberia’s decision to renew diplomatic ties with Israel.35 However, once Doe revealed his candidacy, his renewal of ties did nothing to mitigate the resulting strains in U.S. relations. FURTHER POLITICAL INTIMIDATION The new wave of political intimidation was focused on a new target group: high school students, their teachers, principals, school administrators, and even parents. The impetus was the outbreak of disturbances at two boarding schools. On July 1, while Doe was in West Germany for his medical checkup, a riot, in which three people were injured, broke out at the Booker Washington Institute in Kakata, Margibi County. Then on July 4, two days after Doe’s return, students at the Saniquellie Central High School in Nimba County blockaded the main highway in Saniquellie, demolished both the campus and private residences of the school principal and set his personal effects on fire, and later clashed with a contingent of soldiers sent to restore order. Six soldiers and five students were injured.36 The underlying cause of the riots was the ongoing neglect of the country’s schools by the postcoup government. The rioting students at both high schools were angry about the poor dormitory facilities and food, the lack of proper classroom furnishings and insufficient textbooks. However, with neither the means nor the will to rectify the situation, the government’s main concern was that the riots not spread to other schools that suffered the same deprivations. In response to the riot at the Booker Washington Institute, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Maj. Gen. John Rancy ordered the school closed and the students confined to their dormitories for three days. He then

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set up a committee, chaired by Commanding General of the army Thomas Quiwonkpa and Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison, to investigate the causes of the riot.37 Following the committee’s recommendations, the school principal, Daniel Jappah, was replaced and an unknown number of students were expelled. The school remained closed for six months. The first response to the Saniquellie school riots was similarly to shut the school and to set up a committee to look into the riot’s causes.38 Then, on July 8, after a two-day investigation, the Saniquellie Committee, headed by Deputy Education Minister for Instruction Dr. Rosalitta Roberts, accused Vice Principal Edwin G. Gbusseh and Social Committee Chairman John Karwianye of inciting Saniquellie students to riot. The two were arrested and barred from seeking employment at any public education institution for the next five years.39 The responses to both riots were more severe than the school closures, faculty dismissals, and student suspensions that had followed less-destructive disturbances in three schools the previous year, but they were consistent with the escalated level of the violence in these instances and with the apparent instigation of the Saniquellie riots by school personnel. They were directed at finding out the causes of the riots, punishing the offenders, and deterring recurrence. Logically, the measures should have ended there. The disturbances at the two high schools had ceased, the perpetrators had been punished, and no new disturbances had as of yet begun. However, the measures did not stop and eventually developed into a full-fledged assault on Liberia’s students and teachers. Two factors were behind the escalation. One was a general sense of disorder and loss of control prompted by an outbreak of ritual murders, one of them taking place in New Kru Town, where a little girl named Mary Lewis was murdered.40 Body parts obtained through ritual murder were traditionally viewed in Liberia as sources of “medicines” able to confer wealth and power, making ritual murders a regular antecedent of elections.41 The current murders occurred during the selection of the CAA members and ended when the process was completed. In the meantime, they generated widespread panic, which in some counties bordered upon rioting.42 Doe’s response, on July 4, was to publicly order the army and security services to launch a major offensive against the ritual killings and to threaten the suspects with trial before the military tribunal and due punishment if found guilty.43 For all the bluster, however, the ritual killers, working individually and anonymously, were unlikely to be found, and the insecurity they generated persisted. The more immediate factor was the political activity behind the Saniquellie riots. The Saniquellie riots were instigated by politicians from MOJA and the PPP. Gearing up for elections and vying with one another for public attention,

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figures in these movements saw in high school students an important source of future votes. In their attempt to recruit the students to their sides, MOJA and PPP activists legitimized their grievances and told them that they had a right to freedom of expression and were entitled to protest.44 The PRC government had neither the inclination nor the means to address the dire state of the education system. The riots underscored for Doe and his circle the fact that the students’ genuine deprivation made them susceptible to future recruitment by Doe’s political rivals.45 The purpose of the assault was to instill terror and to keep the schools from becoming political arenas for Doe’s potential political rivals. It progressed in spurts but with deliberation, each move taking into account a variety of factors and building on and intensifying the previous one. It was launched with twin speeches: Doe’s budget speech on July 25 and Minister of Defense Allison’s address in front of AFL soldiers in Monrovia the next day. Both speeches referred to the student riots together with the ritual killings, as if to associate the high-schoolers’ misbehavior, essentially a minor breach, to the horror and magnitude of the ritual murders. Yet while yoking the two types of violence, both speeches also treated them differently: the ritual killings were treated as a threat to the public order, while the school disturbances were treated as political dangers that had to be averted at all costs. Doe’s speech set in motion more punitive actions; Allison introduced an ideological bugaboo that Doe would later pick up.46 The budget speech was an incongruous occasion for addressing the violence. It was probably chosen so as not to spoil the impact of Doe’s announcement, in his annual Independence Day speech the following day, of the release of the timetable for the transition to civilian rule. As if in justification, Doe made the dubious claim that if the ritual killings and school riots were not checked, they could contribute to further “deterioration of our economic situation.”47 Along with reiterating his July 4 threats regarding the ritual killings, Doe warned that the PRC government would not tolerate “vandalism, rudeness, disorderliness and destruction” by students or hesitate to “close down any school” where law and order could not be maintained. Students who engaged in violent actions, he let it be known, would be “arrested, detained, tried,” and, if found guilty, would bear the penalty in the same manner as any adult. Those charged with property damage would be held in custody until their parents paid for the damage in full, he declared.48 Supplementing these threats, Doe set up the Ministry of Education to take concrete action on a large scale. Avoiding clear mention of the conditions in the schools that gave rise to the riots, he declared that most of the problems at the schools stemmed from the inability of the teachers and principals to manage them. He then accused the Ministry of Education of “sitting supinely”

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while problems were brewing, and went on to state that the Ministry of Education “could help prevent some of the problems if it would systematically monitor schools to assess problems and find solutions to them.”49 The accusation, consistent with Doe’s pattern of blaming others for the failings of his leadership and regime, was a not so veiled directive to the Ministry to act on the “problem.” The Ministry of Education at the time was headed by Doe’s good friend and loyal supporter George Boley. In previous years, Boley had accepted with equanimity his demotion from the prestigious and powerful position of minister of state for presidential affairs to the relatively lowly position of minister of postal affairs and then his appointment to the sensitive post of minister of education. Doe knew that he could rely on Boley not to take offense, not to protest the aspersion, and to do exactly what he wanted him to. Allison, playing bad cop to Doe’s good, ratcheted up Doe’s threats and provided a somewhat veiled explanation for the assault on the students. In addition to recommending that the government “immediately shoot by firing squad” anyone convicted of ritual killing, he railed against persons “poisoning our political and social atmosphere with foreign ideologies” and pointed a finger at “so-called intellectuals with foreign ideologies who are in the habit of inciting nurses, doctors, teachers and students to violently strike, and damage lives and properties.”50 His attack on “foreign ideologies” points to the political concerns behind the impending assault. It introduced an ideological weapon that Doe and his cohorts would use to act not only against rioting students, but against all students and school personnel who seemed to pose a political threat. In the following months, the assault on the students and teachers continued with greater intensity and scope. On August 10, the publicly reprimanded Ministry of Education took the unprecedented step of banning over nine hundred students from Saniquellie Central High School from admission to any school in Liberia for the rest of the 1983 academic year, and twenty-four alleged ringleaders for two years. It circulated the students’ names nationwide so as “to protect the institutions” and warned schools that they would be shut down immediately if they admitted any of them.51 On September 18, Doe publicly announced the dismissal, effective at the start of the new academic year (February 1984), of more than three hundred teachers suspected of “having socialist and communist tendencies.” Making good on his earlier threat, he added that the pupils’ parents would be required to sign a pledge of good behavior for their children before the start of the next school year.52 The ascription of socialist and communist tendencies to the teachers was designed to give the irresponsible and politically motivated dismissals, at a time when Liberia was suffering an acute teacher shortage, an aura of legitimacy at home, and to curry favor with the Reagan administration before

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Doe’s trip to the United States. The dismissals were announced less than a week before Doe left for his appearance before the U.N. General Assembly and his scheduled meeting with President Reagan in New York. Given Reagan’s well-known view of communism as an unmitigated evil that had to be “vigilantly resisted at every opportunity,” Doe and his advisors hoped that waving the red flag would enable them to continue to suppress potential opposition without jeopardizing the support of the Reagan administration.53 In effect, Doe had purged the education system of undesirable students and teachers and gave the purge an ideological justification. Moreover, he did it with virtually no internal protest, thanks to the good relations he had cultivated with the National Union of Liberian Teachers (NULT) and its president, Saa Philip-Joe. Earlier in the year, when the nurses and paramedics had struck to protest their salary reductions, NULT had kept the teachers, abysmally paid as they were, in their classrooms. Now, NULT raised no objections to the purge. In fact, in an interview with the government newspaper, New Liberian, on September 21, NULT president, Philip-Joe praised the removal of the three hundred “socialist-oriented teachers” as “long overdue.”54 Doe resumed his ideological rampage on his return from New York and Paris. In his October 5 homecoming speech, along with crooning about his meeting with Reagan and appearance at the U.N., he mentioned again and again the student disturbances and political activity at home. He publicly adopted Allison’s terminology and assailed “ideologies alien to the Liberian way of life.” Accusations that the schools inculcated socialist, Marxist, and communist teachings ran through his speech like a mantra, as did warnings that parents, school authorities, and the Ministry of Education would be held responsible—whether for the objectionable teachings or future disturbances—and dealt with accordingly.55 Moreover, although the speech did not announce any new punitive measures, it widened the sweep of the assault to include university students and staff along with the high school ones. In mid-July, after the two high school riots, he, along with Allison and four others, paid an official visit to Cuttington University College to present the students with two eighty-seater buses, which he had promised them the previous September.56 Now, as he reiterated his warning that the PRC would hold school administrators and parents responsible for any further disruptions, he emphasized that university officials would be watched especially closely.57 Several factors may have contributed to the broadening and intensification of the campaign at this point. One was the eruption of yet another student riot on September 29, as ninth and 12th graders at Paynesville Community School attacked teachers after being informed that most of them would not be permitted to sit for an exam for which they had paid a $5 registration fee.58 This may have fed the fear that the student riots would spread out of control

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if not taken in hand. Another factor may have been the Reagan administration’s apparently uncritical acceptance of the earlier suspensions and firings. Not only did Reagan meet with Doe at the United Nations; he also praised the regime’s human rights record. Liberia’s rulers may have interpreted the praise as a signal that raising the communist bugaboo would allow them to continue oppressing their detractors. However, the weightiest factor was probably the unabated fear that students and teachers were a force that could scuttle the realization of Doe’s political ambitions. Indications of this concern may be found in Doe’s homecoming speech after his General Assembly appearance, where he stated indignantly that some persons “even continue to defy” the ban on political activity and insist on organizing “cadet fans movements.”59 In principle, there was little new about the campaign of intimidation. It was yet another instance of the same persecution of individuals and groups who could get in the way of his accrual of power that had characterized Doe’s conduct from the beginning and that would continue, with accelerated pace, up through the 1985 elections. However, in targeting high school children, their teachers, and their parents, Doe and his coterie brought into their range of fire persons with no political agenda or organization. THE BEGINNING OF ORGANIZED RECRUITMENT Up until October 1983, Doe had “campaigned” by trying to project the image of an able and respectable leader through foreign travel, by promoting himself in the course of other activities, and by denigrating potential rivals. Between June and September 1983, he took his last two image-building trips abroad: the first, between June 20 and July 2, to West Germany for a comprehensive medical examination at a military hospital, the second to New York and Paris. The medical examination in West Germany, hardly necessary for a man of Doe’s age, provided him with official certification of his physical fitness, which was duly reported at home.60 In New York, Doe spoke at the 38th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Like his previous perorations at international gatherings, his speech, on September 26, was filled with platitudes meant to show off his concern with foreign affairs and to ingratiate himself with the United States.61 Banalities aside, his appearance enabled him to lay claim to the stature that rubbed off from the mere fact that he had addressed the most prestigious international body in the world. In Paris, Doe’s attendance at the annual Franco-African Summit closed the one remaining gap in his participation in the important African bodies. Moreover, both his checkup in West Germany and his address before the General Assembly put him in the company of Liberia’s last two presidents. Despite the indigenous population’s general hatred of the TWP, they still held William Tubman in

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high regard, and he had initiated the practice of going abroad for medical checkups. Both Tubman and Tolbert had addressed the General Assembly. His conduct in the renewal of ties with Israel provides ready and relevant examples of his self-promotion in the course of other activities. As recalled, he used his calls for African unity and his portrayal of renewed ties as an opportunity for peace in the Middle East not only to cloak his motives, but also to pose as a continental leader and as a man of vision and principles. In his homecoming speech, he took credit for the extensive developmental aid promised by Israel, even though little of it would actually reach the Liberian people.62 An example of his denigration of potential rivals in the MOJA and the PPP can be found in his speech on his return from the United States and France. In the speech, he claimed that the “so-called revolutionary leaders” who were appointed to positions of responsibility following the coup had turned out to be “disappointments” and that some of them had proven to be inefficient and corrupt.63 Doe’s image-building was aimed at enabling him to claim the respect and regard accorded to his potential rivals from the erstwhile PPP, MOJA, and TWP. However, Doe also had to match the political support they enjoyed. When the time came, they would be able to call upon well-known and well-regarded persons to campaign for them, while Doe would not. Although like other African leaders, he would be able to count on the political support of his Krahn ethic group, they only constituted 4.7 percent of Liberia’s population and had comparatively few votes to cast for him, leaving him in desperate need of more. Thus, in mid-October, Doe embarked on a focused endeavor to recruit to his side Liberia’s traditional leaders, the chiefs and elders in its various counties, who have been described by Joel Migdal as “implementors.” Without their support, state leaders do not have a chance at enforcing their rules.64 Many Liberians held the chiefs and elders in respect and accepted their authority. Once the ban on political activity was lifted, Doe would be able to use the traditional leaders to lend legitimacy to his candidacy and to have them act as vote contractors, a task for which their influence and authority made them eminently suitable. Although the chiefs were subject to the authority of the government-appointed county superintendents and depended on the government for their salaries and the wherewithal to develop their areas, Doe could not count on their support as a matter of course. Being elected by the people in their areas, they had a legitimacy that Doe did not and could act with a measure of independence. Along with most of the Liberian population, they felt alienated and excluded, as the postcoup regime had done very little to build up the rural areas or to rectify their neglect under TWP rule. The only ethnic group that conspicuously benefited from the coup was the Krahn, whose members were

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appointed in large numbers to government and military posts. Thus, to win over the traditional leaders, Doe set out to energetically court them. The courting was conducted without any overt bid for support. It was crafted to show Doe as a personable and caring leader, connected with the people and attentive to their needs. In the course of his rule, Doe frequently sought to win favor by promising or boasting of foreign funded development projects channeled to this or that county, and he would continue to do so. However, at this stage two more means were added. One was the granting of county status to small territories, which would give their leaders access to development funds and administrative posts. For instance, he promised to make Bomi Territory, with its paltry area of 782.1 square miles and tiny population of under 70,000 persons, a county.65 The other means was the initiation of development gatherings, attended by chiefs, county officials, and local residents. Doe would appear personally, interact with the leaders, and deliver a resounding speech promising development assistance and addressing key concerns of the county residents. Since the gatherings were publicized, they also provided platforms from which Doe could rally the nation at large. The pattern first appears in the development gatherings in Lofa and Maryland counties, held respectively on October 12 and November 29, 1983. Lofa County was the largest county in Liberia and home of the Loma people, the largest ethnic group in the army. The venue thus allowed Doe not only to reach a large number of people, but also to try to gather support in the AFL, where his Krahn constituted only a very small proportion of the soldiers. His concern with his support among the Loma soldiers is indicated by his dismissal in March 1983 of the superintendent of Lofa County, Maj. Jonah Akoei, who some of his Krahn advisors suspected was trying to undermine Doe’s authority.66 In his speech, Doe promised that his government would provide matching funds for the county’s self-help development projects and, equally if not more important, that he would include the traditional leaders (whom he had largely ignored) in his decision-making. To further ingratiate himself, he brought along the PRC’s secretary-general, Brigadier General Abraham D. Kollie, a Loma, to serve as his liaison.67 In Maryland County, there was strong opposition to Doe’s continued rule. His visit was aimed at tempering it. In his speech, he promised that the government would do all it could to support the development efforts of Maryland’s citizens and addressed the contentious issue of his regime’s reemployment of former TWP officials. His explanation that they were rehired in the spirit of “reunifying the Liberian people for greater prosperity” and to help guide the nation on an “even keel” was couched both to please the supporters of the former TWP and to placate the many African Liberians whom the rehiring rankled.68 As in Lofa, Doe also made special efforts to ingratiate himself.

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He listened with uncharacteristic tolerance as a Glebo chief harshly criticized his government’s land policies as threatening the Glebos’ economic base. He spoke in the local language, and he arranged the development rally to take place during the birthday celebrations of the late President William Tubman, Maryland’s favorite son. His visit on Tubman’s birthday showed him paying tribute to Tubman and, like his medical checkup in West Germany, portrayed him as following in Tubman’s footsteps. Neither of the visits was a resounding success. In Lofa, Chief Tamba Taylor firmly resisted Doe’s efforts to obtain his support. In Maryland County, the soldiers who accompanied Doe harassed and intimidated the local people.69 Perhaps to rectify the bad impression this left, he revisited Maryland County in April, bearing $250,000 for development projects and two $6,000 checks for student scholarships.70 In the months to come, Doe would continue in his efforts to win over traditional leaders with funds and perks. The efforts by Doe and his cohorts to create favorable conditions for his presidential candidacy were not limited to the renewal of ties with Israel or the intimidation of high school students and their teachers and parents. Nor were they limited to the organized approach to traditional leaders. Also included was an orchestrated attack on Doe’s erstwhile friend and ally, commanding general of the army Thomas Quiwonkpa, who rebuffed Doe’s ambitions. NOTES 1. Israeli diplomat, interview. 2. “Doe Addresses Nation on Redemption Day 11 Apr,” T1–T8. 3. “Doe Statement Urges OAU Summit Attendance,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 20, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1983): T2. 4. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Head of State Stresses OAU Unity,” June 11, 1983, Nexis Uni. 5. Oded, Africa and Israel: African Attitudes Toward Resumption of Diplomatic Relations, 23. 6. “Doe Sees the Need for Negotiations with Israel,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 20, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1983): T3. 7. Fahnbulleh, Jr., Across the Landscape, 141. 8. Fahnbulleh, Jr., Across the Landscape, 134. 9. Israeli diplomat, interview. 10. “Liberia: From Jerusalem to Nimba County,” West Africa, January 16, 1984, 110. 11. Israeli diplomat, interview.

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12. “Doe Regrets Mengistu Statement on Chad,” Monrovia Domestic Services, July 20, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1. 13. “Liberian Government Issues Statement on Chad,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 9, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1983): T1. 14. Israeli diplomat, interview. 15. Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship (London: The British Academic Press, 1992), 128. 16. Mlanju Reeves, “Decision on Israel Was Independent,” Daily Observer, August 15, 1983, 1, 10. “Liberia’s Call for Extraordinary OAU Summit,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 15, 1983, Nexis Uni. 17. “Peace, Dev. High on Agenda,” Daily Observer, August 22, 1983, 1, 10. 18. “Joint communique on Doe visit to Israel [in Hebrew],” August 25, 1983, T1-T2, Israel State Archives, Library 103.1, Jerusalem, Israel. 19. Ephraim Avidi, “Une amitié qui n’a pas de prix,” Jeune Afrique, September 14, 1983, 44–45. Oye Ogunbadejo, “Qaddafi and Africa’s International Relations,” Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 60. 20. Israeli diplomat, interview. 21. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 165. 22. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “U.S., Liberia Sign Aid Agreements,” August 30, 1983, Nexis Uni. 23. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B481. 24. “Liberia—Stand-By Arrangement,” September 15, 1983, 306280, PR/83/58, IMF Archives. 25. “Joint Communique on Doe Visit to Israel,” T1–T2. 26. Kieh, Jr., “An Analysis of Israeli Repenetration of Liberia,” 125–26. 27. Avidi, “Une amitié qui n’a pas de prix,” 44–45. 28. Hakim and Stevens, “Zaire and Israel: An American Connection,” 41–53. 29. Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Israel and Black Africa: A Rapprochement?,” Journal of Modern African Studies 19, no. 2 (June 1981): 183–219. Avidi, “Une amitié qui n’a pas de prix,” 44–45. 30. Kieh, Jr., “An Analysis of Israeli Repenetration of Liberia,” 125. 31. “Foreign Minister on Withdrawal of Arab Aid,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 3, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1983): T2. 32. “ECOWAS Offers Liberia $2.5 Million Loan,” Daily Observer, December 14, 1984, 1, 10. 33. Peters, Israel and Africa, 131. 34. Givens, Liberia: The Road to Democracy, 441. 35. “Reagan Says U.S. Backs U.N.,” New York Times, September 26, 1983, 14, Nexis Uni.

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36. “Thirteen Wounded in Saniquellie Student Riot,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1. 37. “Government Closes Institutes after Students Riot,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 2, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T2. 38. “Thirteen Wounded in Saniquellie Student Riot,” T1. 39. “School Officials Dismissed after Investigation,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 10, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T2. 40. S. Vaanii Paasewe, “1983—A Year of Ups and Downs,” Sunday Observer, January 1, 1984, 9. 41. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 8 (1983): 200. 42. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy, 106–7, 114–15. 43. “Doe Warns against ‘Ritualistic Killings,’” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1. 44. Liberian diplomat and scholar, interview. 45. Erwin J. Tiah, “Urgent Renovation Needed,” Daily Observer, November 22, 1984, 5. 46. AFP, “Defense Minister Denounces Killings,” July 26, 1983, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T2. “Kill the Killers, Say Allison,” Daily Observer, July 27, 1983, 1. 47. PanaPress, “Doe Condemns Student Unrest, Ritual Killing,” July 26, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1–T2. 48. PanaPress, “Doe Condemns Student Unrest, Ritual Killing,” T1-T2. 49. PanaPress, “Doe Condemns Student Unrest, Ritual Killing,” T1-T2. 50. “Defense Minister Denounces Killings,” T2. “Kill the Killers, Say Allison,” 1. 51. “Liberia: Nearly 1,000 Students Banned,” West Africa, September 5, 1983, 2089. 52. AFP, “Doe Announces Dismissal of ‘Communist’ Teachers,” September 18, 1983, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1983): T2. 53. David Mervin, “Ronald Reagan’s Place in History,” Journal of American Studies 23, no. 2 (August 1989): 283. 54. “Teachers Union President Supports Dismissals,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 21, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1983): T3. 55. “Doe Returns, Decries Teaching of Socialism,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 5, 1983 transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T1. 56. “CIC Presents Buses to Cuttington Univ.,” Mirror, July 16, 1983, 1. 57. “Doe Returns, Decries Teaching of Socialism,” T1. 58. “Principal Fails to Register Students—Violence Occurs at P.C.S.,” Daily Observer, October 1, 1983, 8.

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59. “Doe Returns, Decries Teaching of Socialism,” T1. 60. “Doe Declared ‘Fit’ after Checkup in FRG,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 30, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1983): T1–T2. 61. United Nations General Assembly, “Statement by Commander-in-Chief Dr. Samuel Kanyon Doe, Head of State and Chairman of the People’s Redemption Council of the Republic of Liberia,” the Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, U.S., Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations, September 26, 1983. 62. “Liberian Head of State’s Address on Return from Israel,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 26, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 29, 1983, Nexis Uni. 63. “Doe Returns, Decries Teaching of Socialism,” T1. 64. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1988), 238–39. 65. Statoid, “Counties of Liberia,” accessed July 31, 2011, http://www.statoids. com/ulr.html. 66. U.S. Department of State, “Ethnic Groups in the Liberian Army and the New Regime,” No. F-2006–05089, Doc No. C18604116, May 6, 1980, confidential, Department of State Records. Yehudit Padmore, email correspondence with author, July 23, 2009. 67. “Doe Pledge to Consult with Elders,” Monrovia Domestic Service, October 12, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T1. 68. “PRC Committed to National Development,” Daily Observer, November 30, 1983, 1, 9. “Liberia: Doe’s Illusions,” Africa Confidential, June 20, 1984, 3. 69. “Liberia: Doe Versus Democracy,” Africa Confidential, November 14, 1984, 5. Moran, Liberia: The Violence of Democracy, 50–1. 70. “Liberia: Doe’s Illusions,” 3.

Chapter 11

A Terrible Betrayal

Doe’s assault on his most loyal associate, Commanding General of the AFL Thomas Quiwonkpa, was triggered by his apprehensions that the senior officer would get in the way of his presidential ambitions. Although he consistently showed his support for Doe and his domestic and foreign policies, Quiwonkpa was deeply committed to the democratization process and to the army’s subordination to civilian authority after the elections. Quiwonkpa’s commitment to these anticipated developments raised fears that he would object to Doe’s candidacy. Quiwonkpa’s possible objection was worrisome because his popularity gave him influence and authority both in and outside of the army. Unlike the other coupists, Quiwonkpa had not yielded to the temptations of office. He continued to wear his army uniform, to live in the barracks with the soldiers, and to drive an army jeep. His continued identification with the simple soldier was winning him increasing popularity in the army just as Doe’s was waning. His enforcement of discipline among soldiers and officers, his public opposition to the confiscation of civilian property, his criticism of the excesses of his fellow coupists, and his own resistance to the greed and arrogance that marked their conduct won him the confidence, admiration and respect of many in Liberia and abroad.1 Thus, Doe feared that Quiwonkpa would act on his objections, and would thereby take the support of much of the army personnel and civilian population with him. As Abel Escriba-Folch points out, “rival factions within the army may become the major threat to military dictators, as factional groups also have access to military equipment and weapons.”2 The antidote was to remove and distance Quiwonkpa from the army. Unlike the many ministers and other officials whom Doe had routinely dismissed, Quiwonkpa was too highly regarded to simply remove him from his post and too powerful to risk antagonizing. Thus, Doe instead chose to plant rumors in the army to compel Quiwonkpa to agree to a change of post. The first rumors were spread in May 1983, the same month in which Doe added two years to his age and began to hint that PRC members might be able to 207

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run in the elections after all. The planter, so to speak, was Colonel Edward W. Smith, the Krahn commander of the Sixth Battalion in Bomi Hills. This was considered one of the two best fighting units in the army, and Smith’s assignment to command it, as well as his subsequent promotion to the post of Commander of the Executive Mansion Guard, testified to the trust that Doe had in him.3 The initial rumors were that Quiwonkpa was plotting against the government. The purpose of the rumors was to make the army so uncomfortable a place for Quiwonkpa that he would leave of his own accord. In conversations with Quiwonkpa, Doe pretended to be on his commander’s side and expressed incredulity and dismay at the rumors and dismissed them as the work of enemies. For several months, the rumors continued to circulate and Doe continued to dismiss them, until, pressured by Quiwonkpa, he promised to investigate and to punish those responsible. Finally, on October 15, four days before the CAA announced the completion of its revisions, amid Quiwonkpa’s phoning to complain yet again about the continuing rumors, Doe seized the opportunity to suggest to his commanding officer that he resign as commanding general of the army and accept the position of secretary-general of the PRC instead. To make this reassignment attractive, Doe told Quiwonkpa that he was needed to impose discipline in the council, since its cochairman, Nicholas Podier, and secretary-general, Abraham D. Kollie, were too weak to do so. To Quiwonkpa, Doe’s explanation was presumably convincing and flattering, in that the acting military commander agreed to the change.4 The change was accompanied by yet another reorganization of the PRC. As with previous reorganizations, it was made to meet Doe’s political needs. General Morris T. Zaza, until then Quiwonkpa’s deputy, replaced his former superior as commanding general. A new position, deputy vice head of state, was created for Kollie, whom Quiwonkpa was to replace as the PRC’s secretary-general.5 It was no coincidence that both of the men who were subsequently assigned to the high command of the military were of the Loma tribe, the largest ethnic group in the army, whose loyalty Doe sought to win for himself. To implicate Quiwonkpa himself in his reassignment and to endow it with extra authority, the reorganization was carried out in conjunction with the PRC’s Executive Committee. The only PRC supervisory panel that had not been dissolved in December 1981, the Executive Committee consisted of the five highest-ranking members of the council: the head of state, vice head of state, deputy vice head of state, commanding general of the armed forces, and the secretary-general. At the time of Quiwonkpa’s reassignment these senior officials were, respectively, Doe, Podier, Kollie, Gbatu, and Quiwonkpa. On the day of the reappointment, Doe—to make sure that Quiwonkpa would be quickly divested of the symbols of army identity—wrote to the director

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general of the general service agency (GSA). In his letter, he requested that the new secretary-general of the PRC be provided with a new and furnished home as well as a luxurious car, assets that would enhance his lifestyle similarly to those of other members of the junta, whose lavish habits brought them into disrepute in the eyes of and alienated them from much of the populace.6 Accordingly, Doe manipulated Quiwonkpa. The former took advantage of the latter’s almost childlike credulity and unwavering loyalty. In Doe and his advisors’ single-minded determination to push Quiwonkpa aside, they did not conceive of the possibility that he would find out about their scheme or consider, that if he did, how their realpolitik would impact a man of his principled character. Inevitably, the scheme was uncovered. The very next day, October 17, at a gathering at the Executive Mansion to celebrate Kollie’s and his own new positions, Quiwonkpa was disabused of Doe’s motives by two close friends: G. Moses Duopu, former minister of labor and PRC advisor, and Harry Yuan, then managing director of the Liberian Electricity Corporation.7 Doe’s scheme against Quiwonkpa was a terrible betrayal. Quiwonkpa convinced the coupists to accept Doe as the head of state, supported the Liberian leader in his clash with Weh Syen, confirmed Doe’s appointments to the military, and, even as the rumors against him were circulating in the army, played a central role in furthering Doe’s decision to renew diplomatic ties with Israel. For Quiwonkpa, the realization of what Doe did to him was shattering. Doe’s efforts to sideline him caused Quiwonkpa to lose trust in the Liberian leader. For Doe, the misguided chicanery embroiled him in an open rift with Quiwonkpa and his supporters (which he had sought to avoid), sidelined his efforts to gain the support of the country’s traditional leaders, and led to increasingly frenetic actions with long-term consequences for himself and the Liberian population. Doe’s clash with Quiwonkpa can be analyzed in three phases: attempts at persuasion, striving for public support, and pursuit and persecution. ATTEMPTS AT PERSUASION In the first phase, which lasted until the end of October, Quiwonkpa mounted demands aimed at preserving and reinforcing his power and position in the army, while Doe and his clique desperately struggled to bring the dispute to a quiet and swift closure without acquiescing to any of the military commander’s appeals. On October 18, two days after his reassignment, Quiwonkpa demanded that, in exchange for taking up the new position, he continue to wear a military uniform and live in the barracks, a full investigation be conducted into the rumors that he was plotting against the government, and he receive assurance that Liberia would return to civilian rule by April 12,

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1985. For Doe, accepting these conditions was out of the question, as doing so would render Quiwonkpa a popular figure closely associated with the army and reveal his role as initiator of the rumors. At the same time, an open rift with the revered Quiwonkpa was not desirable either. After all, this is precisely what the underhanded maneuvers to edge the commanding general out of the army by agreement were designed to prevent. Thus, for the next few days, Doe and his inner circle attempted to persuade Quiwonkpa to retract his conditions and take up his new post. Doe spoke with the commanding general by phone, summoned him to the Executive Mansion for talks, and cobbled together a committee of seven high-ranking government officials— five of whom were from Nimba, Quiwonkpa’s home county, and two from Grand Gedeh, Doe’s own home county—to convince Quiwonkpa to change his mind.8 Quiwonkpa, for his part, had no reason to accept the proffered demotion. His reluctancy to do so won him a great deal of public support.9 Consequently, Quiwonkpa resisted playing into Doe’s plot. Barricading himself in his army quarters, the commanding general boycotted two public ceremonies that required the presence of the PRC secretary-general and made new demands.10 He ordered that he retain his position as commanding general of the army, be promoted to the rank of major general with Zaza as his deputy, and the army be upgraded from its current battalion structure to a divisional one.11 Quiwonkpa’s new demands were even less acceptable to Doe than his previous ones, as meeting them would increase the commanding general’s power in the army at the expense of his own. For example, the promotion to major general, the highest rank in the army and PRC after Doe’s, would place Quiwonkpa on par with the chief of staff, Henry S. Dubar, and the vice head of state, Nicholas Podier, both of whom were firm Doe loyalists. Additionally, a divisional structure would necessitate adding battalions. Since the coup, Doe used his authority as commander in chief of the army to appoint Krahn officers to head the more strategically important field units. Adding battalions would enable Quiwonkpa to claim a say in who headed them. Proposed on October 20, Quiwonkpa’s demands also came at a particularly inconvenient time, two days before Doe was scheduled to fly to Bern, Switzerland, to participate in Liberia’s first United Nations roundtable donors’ conference. If Quiwonkpa was planning a coup, Doe’s temporary absence from Liberia would provide the commanding general with an ideal opportunity to carry it out. Since the donor conference was a major United Nations event organized in response to the PRC government’s incessant requests for financial assistance, Doe could not renege on his commitment to attend it. In an effort to settle the matter in the very short time before he left the country, as well as to remove Quiwonkpa from the country while he himself was gone, Doe invited the commanding general to join him on his

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trip to Bern, during which the two adversaries could hopefully find a mutually acceptable solution. Quiwonkpa turned Doe’s offer down.12 The commanding general’s rejection forced Doe’s hand. Quiwonkpa had to be divested of his powers, even if this was to transpire without his consent; avoiding a rift and keeping the dispute out of the public eye now became secondary. To cloak his role in Quiwonkpa’s ouster and to temper the likely public criticism, Doe convened PRC members for an emergency session. All members, except for Quiwonkpa, who were dependent on Doe for their wealth and status, voted to dismiss the commanding general from both the PRC and the army, and, in an act of spite, to strip him of his retirement benefits. In the letter of dismissal that they composed and presented to Doe, the PRC members loyal to the Liberian leader cited Quiwonkpa’s adamant refusal to accept his new assignment until “certain concerns” were addressed as the cause of his ouster. With sanctimonious cant, they described his behavior as “an act of gross disrespect to the office of the head of state, the PRC, and the entire Liberian nation.” Moreover, they averred that “[to] allow it to stand would be to establish a precedent that would most certainly lead to widespread indiscipline, disregard, and disobedience to constituted authority, an eventuality that would endanger the continuity of the state.”13 Quiwonkpa’s removal from the centers of power marked the end of the first phase of the saga. STRIVING FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT The second phase, in which Doe worked to win public support for Quiwonkpa’s dismissal, began immediately after the commanding general’s removal. Without a word of protest, Quiwonkpa left his residence at the Barclay Training Center and moved with his wife, Tarloh, to his uncle’s residence on Center Street in Monrovia.14 Although Quiwonkpa himself was reticent, replying “no comment” when a few days later a Daily Observer correspondent asked him for his reaction, his dismissal evoked an unprecedented wave of public support.15 While Doe was in Bern, foreign diplomats, government officials, and military personnel visited the commanding general daily at his temporary residence, and the development was widely discussed and written about.16 A Daily Observer editorial published on October 24 praised Quiwonkpa for retaining his “common touch” and “genuine concern for the common man” and appealed to the PRC to reconsider its decision to strip him of his benefits. More provocatively, it stated that the public was wondering what “concerns” Quiwonkpa had expressed about his reassignment as PRC secretary-general and inquired about the cause of his reluctancy to obey directives, in stark contrast to his training and usual practice.17

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In Bern, Doe made his pitch for $1 billion of international aid to the representatives of some twenty-nine countries. Aside from a statement of “general support,” he came away empty-handed, without pledges or commitments.18 Upon his return to Liberia, Doe, to try to reverse the tide of public support for Quiwonkpa, brought the feud into the public arena by using the same October 28 ceremony that marked the CAA’s presentation of its constitutional revisions and saw the disbanding of Con Com. After he finished his prepared speech, Doe tried to convince the attendees, as well as his nationwide radio audience, that Quiwonkpa himself was responsible for his dismissal. By repeatedly refusing to accept his reassignment as secretary-general of the PRC, Doe maintained, Quiwonkpa violated the “first law in the army . . . to obey; and if anybody violates this law, it poses a danger to the survival of the state.”19 Doe made special efforts to lure the country’s traditional leaders to his side in the dispute. He invited them to participate in the ceremony as a commitment to his promise of consultation and inclusion that he made to them in Lofa County some two weeks earlier; presumably their presence was intended to make them feel part of the process. Pressed by the quarrel with Quiwonkpa, Doe abandoned the notion of consultation and tweaked the meaning of inclusion from participation in decision making to joining his side. In his post–ceremony meeting with the chiefs and elders of Liberia’s various districts, Doe tried to entice them. He assured the leaders from Nimba County that no one would be dismissed from their position because of the dispute, and, as noted in the previous chapter, that the tiny Bomi Territory would become its own county.20 Doe’s bid for the support of the county’s chiefs and elders was an attempted rerun of his successful effort to gain their backing for the execution of Weh Syen and his supporters in May 1981. At that time, even those from Weh Syen’s ethnic group (Sarpo) had rallied behind Doe. This time, however, the traditional leaders were not suborned. Led by Paramount Chief Galaway Zamba of Grand Bassa County, they appealed to Doe to forgive Quiwonkpa and to reassign him to his positions in the PRC and the army. Doe equally loathed to forgive Quiwonkpa and to alienate the chiefs and elders, whose electoral support he would need. Thus, he retorted that he had merely approved the PRC’s recommendations and, in a show of conciliation, offered to allow Quiwonkpa back into the government if he wrote a letter of apology admitting his mistakes—one of Doe’s typical cynical maneuvers. If Quiwonkpa apologized, he would irrevocably undermine the credibility on which his popularity was based. If he refused to express remorse, Doe could maintain that the commanding general did not meet the conditions so generously set for his readmission to the government.

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This phase ended in a stalemate. Indeed, Quiwonkpa refused to sign the dishonest and self-incriminating apology that the Executive Mansion prepared for him, but, as before, he remained aloof and avoided confrontation. When the Daily Observer asked his opinion of the proceedings at the Unity Conference Center, the commanding general once again replied “no comment.”21 The chiefs and elders continued their efforts at mediation, gingerly steering clear of overtly taking sides. PURSUIT AND PERSECUTION Realizing that divesting Quiwonkpa of his formal powers did not diminish his informal authority and influence, Doe and his circle changed tactics yet again. In the third phase, they set about to eliminate the commanding general altogether. This process began with a ban aimed at isolating Quiwonkpa from those who could protect him, proceeded to attempts on his life, and ended with the construction of a legal case charging him with having planned a coup attempt. As Quiwonkpa fled for his life, Doe, galled by his many supporters and determined to get rid of his opponent, pursued Quiwonkpa in a chase that continued even after he escaped to the United States. The ban was announced on November 4. Doe asked that the mediation efforts cease and forbade government officials and foreign diplomats from visiting Quiwonkpa. Any government official caught visiting the commanding general would face three years in prison; foreign diplomats who violated this ban would be considered in breach of their diplomatic immunity. In addition, Doe ordered for the arrests of any paramilitary or military personnel in the area of Quiwonkpa’s temporary residence. Although Doe declared that Quiwonkpa was not under house arrest and that his freedom of movement and rights to visitations were not limited, the ban had these effects.22 With the majority of his supporters kept at a distance from him, Quiwonkpa was left vulnerable. The ban was a game-changing move. Until its implementation, Quiwonkpa could have launched a coup to replace Doe as the head of state had he wished to do so. In fact, during the time preceding the restriction, residents of Monrovia expected a breakout of civil war; accordingly, they were in an ongoing state of tension and businesses were shut down. However, the pressures and incentives Quiwonkpa faced not to take up arms were stronger. Unlike the junta’s rapid and unopposed overthrow of the TWP in 1980, any attempt to dislodge Doe by force of arms at this point would be met with a heavy response and, as such, risked unleashing a very bloody civil war. Potential coupists would have to overcome the generally organized, well-equipped, and professional security apparatus that Doe had

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built up in his three years in office. The AFL, on which Quiwonkpa would have to rely if he had launched an overthrow, was not a cohesive body and may not have rallied behind its commander. Krahn soldiers were likely to remain loyal to Doe.23 Presumably because of these factors, Quiwonkpa decided to avoid bloodshed. Quiwonkpa’s decision to refrain from initiating an uprising reflected the sentiments of most of the Liberian people. As long as the transitional process seemed to be more or less on track, as it did, the end of the junta could be expected in another two years. Thus, to most Liberians, it hardly seemed worth a war to move up the event. Accordingly, alongside the voices urging Quiwonkpa to overthrow Doe were those that urged forbearance. Among them were those of the Liberian churchmen, who asked Quiwonkpa to exercise restraint in order to avoid bloodshed.24 Liberia’s religious leaders, prominent individuals, and chiefs and elders all made efforts to mediate the conflict.25 The media’s support for Quiwonkpa was carefully hedged. The same Daily Observer editorial that lavished praise of Quiwonkpa and challenged the government to reveal what caused his uncharacteristic disobedience accepted the PRC’s explanation that it had no alternative but to dismiss him, so as to “maintain discipline” in the army and society, and commended its “peaceful handling of the matter,” which avoided plunging the nation into “unnecessary turmoil.”26 Similarly, the Reagan administration discouraged Quiwonkpa from moving against Doe. On October 19, shortly after his falling-out with the Liberian leader, Quiwonkpa consulted with U.S. Ambassador William Swing about his country’s position on the dispute. Swing advised him to refrain both from taking drastic measures and from resisting should Doe try to arrest him. Still, Swing assured the commanding general that “the U.S. government was reviewing and following up on the whole matter with interest.”27 The ambassador’s caution and rather weak assurance, alongside the general national sentiment and his own reservations, served as a stop sign for Quiwonkpa. Quiwonkpa’s considerations aside, his isolation now rendered any conceivable attempt to overthrow Doe impossible. On the contrary, Quiwonkpa’s new seclusion made him vulnerable to Doe’s successive attempts on his life. The first attempt was evidently planned along with the ban. Quiwonkpa eluded it only with the warning of Paramount Chief Woto Mongrue, a fellow Gio from Nimba County. Mongrue provided Quiwonkpa with information confirming that he was in imminent danger and urged him to leave Monrovia at once. Not having anticipated the need to flee, Quiwonkpa found himself with no prepared safe house or escape route. Under the cover of darkness, he hastily left—without luggage and dressed in a summer shirt, jeans, and a hat—his uncle’s house, and went by cab in search of safety. After being turned away by the Ghanaian chargé d’affaires, who denied the commanding general an

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overnight stay at his official residence, Quiwonkpa left for his parents’ farm in his hometown of Zuolay, Nimba County, where he was joined by his wife and a handful of friends and relatives. Relieved that Quiwonkpa was far off at his parents’ farm, the Doe regime made efforts to prevent his escape. To keep him from enlisting the assistance of the local authorities, Brigadier General Joseph Farngalo, a personal friend of Quiwonkpa’s, was dismissed from his position as county superintendent, discharged from the AFL, and ordered to report to the Liberian police. With the aim of apprehending Quiwonkpa should he try to flee, military check posts were placed on the main roads linking Nimba County and Monrovia.28 On November 17, Doe made a personal visit to the First Infantry Battalion at Camp Schieffelin, supposedly to speak to the soldiers about the country’s economic situation.29 In fact, the purpose of his visit was to order for the blockage of the way to the airport; the camp, which was headed by Doe’s relative and ally Colonel Moses Wright, is on the main road to Roberts International Airport. Wih Quiwonkpa isolated, Doe sought to seize the opportunity to have his adversary eliminated. Thus, on the night of November 19, a death squad— sent by the Liberian leader—consisting of Joe Saye Cooper and Robert Saye arrived at Quiwonkpa’s parents’ farm. The commanding general’s assassination was thwarted by his cousin, who, standing guard, shot at the approaching figures, killing Robert Saye.30 Undeterred, Doe dispatched several AFL units to the area with orders to shoot Quiwonkpa and whoever was with him.31 Quiwonkpa again escaped from Doe’s plot to kill him. On November 20, he and his wife left for Monrovia, while those who accompanied the couple on the farm fled to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.32 Farngalo had already fled to Côte d’Ivoire, Quiwonkpa and Tarloh were driven to Monrovia by Farngalo’s driver in the county superintendent’s government car.33 Although Quiwonkpa was recognized at several checkpoints, the car was not stopped nor reported. Arriving at their destination, the commanding general and his spouse disappeared, out of the reach of Doe. Until this point, the efforts to capture and kill Quiwonkpa were clandestine; Doe carefully avoided showing his hand in them, let alone revealing that they were taking place. Now that Quiwonkpa had escaped unharmed yet again, Doe called for more aggressive and less discreet measures to apprehend him. To justify the augmented pursuit, a public case was concocted against him, much as had been done against Weh Syen. The case was built methodically. On November 21, Doe delivered a radio speech apprising the public of “activities designed to subvert and overthrow the government of the PRC” that were brought to the attention of the government a week earlier in an inquiry by Captain Johnny S. Herring. The Liberian leader relayed the names of twelve army personnel, civilians, and public

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officials who were allegedly involved in the plot and expressed that a “foreign mission” promised to provide these supposed enemies of the state with arms, money, and drugs.34 Doe failed to mention that the National Security Agency already determined that Herring’s report did not indicate a plot.35 Moreover, Doe proceeded to recount a break-in and shootings that occurred that same day in Yekepa, Nimba County, Quiwonkpa’s county of origin. In the early hours of the morning, Doe stated dramatically, “a group of armed elements opened fire on unarmed people, killing more than five persons, including children.”36 At this point, Doe seemed to have been wary of showing himself unjustly persecuting Quiwonkpa. While the Liberian leader did not associate Quiwonkpa with the alleged plot to overthrow the government nor the break-in and shootings, Doe’s announcement provided justification for pursuing Quiwonkpa and his supporters more forcefully. Following his statement on the break-in and shootings, Doe announced that troops were being deployed to Nimba County to “restore law and order.”37 Shortly thereafter, some 2,000 AFL soldiers and security personnel were sent there and proceeded to terrorize the inhabitants.38 Doe’s speech was also followed by the arrests of Quiwonkpa’s mother, aunt, uncle, Farngalo’s driver, and those associated with the Yekepa shootings.39 On November 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated on the fictitious plot with the anomalous declaration that the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Oulanov, and the Ghanaian chargé d’affaires, Peter Sackey, were “personae non grata” on the grounds that they had engaged in “activities incompatible with their diplomatic status.”40 Under the rule of Jerry Rawlings, Ghana had positioned itself in the radical camp. Thus, the accusation was intended to tar Quiwonkpa with an allegation that he was tied to Soviet radicalism and to present Doe, not Quiwonkpa, as America’s reliable Cold War ally. The nature of those “incompatible activities” was not stated. In reality, both foreign diplomats rebuffed Quiwonkpa. On October 20, the day after Quiwonkpa met with Swing, the commanding general’s associates met with Oulanov in order to get an idea of the Soviet Union’s likely response in the event of the eruption of an open conflict between Quiwonkpa and Doe. Oulanov stated that Moscow would not interfere in Liberia’s internal affairs. Sackey, for his part, denied Quiwonkpa refuge in Ghana at one point—presumably out of fear that hosting the commanding general could get him into trouble. The specter of foreign interference was raised to inflate the dimensions of the fabricated coup and to win America’s support in the quarrel by playing on its Cold War anxieties. Notwithstanding its preference for restraint at this point, Washington’s position on the matter was distinctly unfriendly to Doe. Quiwonkpa was a genuine aficionado of the United States and the only

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person on the PRC’s Executive Committee who unequivocally supported an end to military rule. Following Quiwonkpa’s October 19 meeting with Swing, Doe reportedly telephoned the American ambassador to protest his discussion with the commanding general without first seeking the Liberian leader’s permission and inquired into the matters that were covered in their meeting. Swing informed Doe that Quiwonkpa was welcome at the embassy, as any other government official would be, and that the contents of his conversation with him were privileged.41 On November 23, Doe finally named Quiwonkpa as the leader of the plot and tied it to the event in Yekepa. The Liberian leader based his allegation on statements by one of the alleged plotters, Private Paul Toweh, who was arrested and interrogated. According to the announcement issued by the Executive Mansion, Toweh told Doe that Quiwonkpa and his followers planned to launch a coup on November 20, the night of the Yekepa break-in and shootings. Toweh also informed Doe that the coup was intended to start simultaneously in Monrovia and Nimba County, but due to a lack of ammunition commenced solely in Nimba. Toweh’s self-serving testimony turned the Yekepa shootings into the first stage of the supposed coup and connected Quiwonkpa with both the actual criminal acts at Yekepa as well as the plan to topple the government that was fictitiously attributed to him. To prevent Quiwonkpa from leaving the country, Doe, following his announcement, publicly ordered the joint security forces at all of Liberia’s borders to stop anyone who had not undergone a thorough search from leaving the country.42 The precaution was ineffective. As the case was being built, Quiwonkpa and Tarloh were hiding in Monrovia. Upon their arrival to the capital city on November 20, they were sheltered at the home of Archbishop Michael Kpakala Francis, who knew Quiwonkpa, himself a Catholic, from childhood. The next day, the couple transferred to Father Tichwoll’s home, where they hid until being smuggled out of the country dressed as a Catholic priest and nun. The disguised husband and wife first crossed the Mano River into Sierra Leone and from there flew to the United States.43 Quiwonkpa’s escape was possible through the joint efforts of the U.S. government and the Vatican. Washington viewed Quiwonkpa as a reliable and popular figure whom they could use to keep Doe in line and, if need be, to replace him at a later date.44 As Doe’s pursuit of Quiwonkpa became increasingly intense and the danger to his life more acute, the American government teamed up with the Vatican to provide the commanding general and his wife with a safe house in Monrovia and then to smuggle them across the border to Sierra Leone and then to the United States.

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PREPARATIONS FOR THE TRIAL Quiwonkpa’s escape did not prevent Doe and his circle from going ahead with the preparations for the trial and the trial itself. The thrust of the preparations was not simply to collect evidence to build a convincing case. Rather, it entailed three additional elements: information, assurance, and deterrence. The most salient aspect was to feed a skeptical public information that would lend credence to the fabrication of the planned coup while creating an impression of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.45 Arrests were conducted and publicized, “suspects” interrogated, and names published. Detailed scenarios of the supposed coup plans were obtained from detainees who hoped that their false confessions would buy them clemency. Among the “witnesses” was Joe Saye Cooper, who was sent to kill Quiwonkpa at his parents’ farm, but, turning state witness, described how Quiwonkpa and others had planned the raid on Yekepa as a necessary prelude to a coup.46 As part of the show, on several occasions journalists were allowed to visit detainees, but not permitted to ask questions. They used the detainees’ statements to convey skepticism about the charges and criticism of the regime. Following their visit to a Monrovia detention facility on November 24, they duly reported that the prisoners said that they testified of their own will and that the investigations were being conducted professionally.47 However, they also reported denials by several detainees that they had been involved in a coup plot, as well as Herring’s assertion that he had not linked the accused to a plot to overthrow the government but had simply said that they had visited Quiwonkpa at his parents’ farm.48 Following their visit on December 5, the journalists reported Major Kalago Luo’s “admission” that he and others had met with Quiwonkpa in a forest in Nimba to discuss the plot, but also his assertion that there was no specific plan or date for implementing it.49 The members of the press used another visit with Luo, on December 10, to report his—and presumably their own—doubts about Doe’s intentions to go through with the transition to civilian rule as well as criticism of the junta’s abuses and failings. Along with reporting Luo’s statements that the plotters planned to execute three top government officials if their coup succeeded, the journalists also relayed the major’s explanation that Quiwonkpa’s motives were to immediately return the country to civilian rule. They planned “to try Doe and other top PRC members on charges of nepotism, tribalism, cuts and delay of government salaries, secret killings and mismanagement of the economy.”50 If the uses to which the media put the confessions embarrassed the junta, the show nonetheless kept the supposed coup plans in the public consciousness and fomented a sense of threat and urgency.

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The second element was to assure the public that the junta would not use the turmoil as an excuse to scrap the transition to civilian rule. In a two-page press release, Doe announced that the attempted coup would not impede the transition to civilian rule and that the PRC would soon complete its deliberations on the constitution and submit the document to the Liberian people for a referendum.51 It turned out that the referendum, due to be held in January, would be delayed for several months. The third feature was to deter the country’s traditional leaders, who showed sympathy for Quiwonkpa, from hindering the planned trial and punishment. Thus, Doe summoned the country’s chiefs and county superintendents to the Unity Conference Center once again. The Liberian leader provided his distinguished guests with “first-hand information” about the planned coup before informing them, in a display of both firmness and fairness, that those accused of involvement in the plot would be turned over to the special military tribunal for a free and fair trial. In an act of civility, Doe announced that fourteen individuals detained for their alleged involvement in the coup would be released due to insufficient evidence.52 Furthermore, he assured Liberia’s traditional leaders that they were not called to the meeting to recommend a course of action regarding the fate of the coup plotters, but rather to be included as part of the “system.” This rather contradictory message was formulated by Doe to deter the chiefs and elders from acting or speaking on Quiwonkpa’s behalf and, at the same time, to pull them into an alliance with himself and his regime. Despite its pretense of their inclusion in the “system,” the takeaway message of this gathering was that they would not have an impact on the outcome of the trial. So as to leave no doubts, Doe restated that those found guilty “would bear the consequences [sic] of their action.”53 As an inducement to the chiefs and elders, Doe paid lip service to their economic and social concerns. He told them that financial experts were mandated to draw up a satisfactory blueprint aimed at stimulating and accelerating Liberia’s economic growth.54 Addressing their widespread criticism of the Krahn domination of the PRC, government, army, and state bodies, Doe denied the charges of tribalism leveled against his regime and insisted that the PRC had always consisted of a cross section of Liberia’s main ethnic groups.55 The Trial and Pardon In its original conception, the trial was supposed to display Quiwonkpa’s purported treachery before the nation. By the end of December, however, Quiwonkpa still had not been found. Unsure whether he was planning to leave or had already left Liberia, the security forces combed the border with Côte d’Ivoire. At the same time, Doe tried to meet with Reagan so as to

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personally persuade him to send Quiwonkpa back to Liberia from wherever he was located. Washington evasively postponed the first Doe-Reagan meeting, set for January 5, by a week, and then canceled the meeting scheduled for the newly planned date.56 Although the trial would have little value for Doe without Quiwonkpa, the Liberian leader nonetheless had to proceed with it to save face and vindicate his arduous persecution. The trial, conducted with a show of due process, continued the charade that characterized its preparation. The nineteen defendants were represented by a defense counselor. The Special Military Tribunal approved the defense attorney’s request to postpone the proceedings to give him time to study the cases.57 Therefore, the trial began in early January, rather than December, 1985. After the first week of hearings, most sessions were open to the press. Broadcasts of Colonel John Nuahn’s denial of involvement in a coup plot and of Major Kalago Luo’s retraction of his earlier confession promulgated the fiction of fairness.58 The trial was unfair for four main reasons. First, the postponement of the trial afforded the security services more time to search for Quiwonkpa. Second, a single defense counselor was hard pressed with the assignment of defending nineteen alleged plotters. Third, the Daily Observer, Liberia’s only independent paper, was shut down by government order at the end of January, thus preventing it from covering the travesty. Fourth, and most seriously, the prosecution made its case against Quiwonkpa by means of the fabricated testimony of three state witnesses. One of them, Joe Saye Cooper, provided detailed fictitious testimony; he told of plotting the coup at Quiwonkpa’s mother’s farm in Nimba County and of plans and actions in Yekepa taken to implement them, and named about a dozen of the accused.59 Doe, for the most part, avoided projecting any personal interest in the trial. As the Special Military Tribunal prosecuted his opponents, the Liberian leader proceeded with business as usual. He traveled around the country dedicating development projects, attending meetings, and trying to repair relations with the Nimbaians, who constituted most of the accused.60 He also traveled abroad to Guinea, where he visited President Sekou Toure on his deathbed and then attended his funeral, and Belgium, where he encouraged investment in his home country. Furthermore, Doe, during this period, dismissed the minister of commerce for ineffectiveness and Liberian diplomats in Guinea for “telling lies” about the republic abroad.61 The Liberian leader hosted Israeli President Chaim Herzog and once again reassured his countrymen and women, during his guest’s visit, that the “coup plot would not affect the intention to return Liberia to civilian rule in 1985.”62 He received the PRC’s review of the draft constitution and dealt with apparent snags in the transitional process. There was only one indication of his interest in the trial during this time. Amid his visit to Guinea, Doe received, on behalf of

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President Sekou Toure, three persons captured by Guinea’s security forces who were wanted in connection with the Yekepa shootings.63 In apparent vindication of the coup charges, the trial concluded on April 5, 1984, with the expected guilty verdict for thirteen of the nineteen accused. The other six who stood trial, including the three state witnesses, were acquitted for lack of evidence. Those found guilty were sentenced to execution by firing squad, which was to be carried out the next day, pending the approval of the head of state.64 While the vindication enabled Doe to pose as having averted a grave danger to the stability of the country, it also created a new problem for him, since few believed the veracity of the charges. If Doe implemented the death sentence, he would bring down on himself the outrage not only of most Liberians, but also of Washington. According to Emmanuel Bowier, who served in the Liberian embassy in Washington at the time, the Reagan administration advised the Doe regime to refrain from carrying out the executions, as doing so would jeopardize passage of the aid package that Congress was currently deliberating.65 Doe resolved the problem by commuting the death sentence, just as he had two years earlier when the Special Military Tribunal called for the execution of five students. On April 7, 1984, he issued the pardon of ten of the accused on national radio; of those found guilty, these ten individuals were those who were not involved in the Yekepa shootings.66 Thousands of elated Liberians rushed to the military barracks to witness their release and paraded behind them to the Executive Mansion shouting “We want Doe!” and similar slogans. Doe welcomed them, waving from the veranda.67 In his Redemption Day speech, Doe followed up this collective pardon with an offer of “unconditional clemency to my friend and brother, former commanding general Thomas Quiwonkpa” and invited him to return to Liberia, “where his safety will be assured.”68 According to Africa Confidential, a newsletter published in London, this offer to absolve of wrongdoing was a component in Doe’s efforts to obtain political support from Nimba, where most of the sentenced persons lived.69 It may have also been an attempt to lure Quiwonkpa back to Liberia, where it would have been much easier for Doe to eliminate him. Doe’s abortive efforts, first to marginalize and then to eliminate Quiwonkpa, stand alongside his previous bungles as another disaster of his own making. These moves constituted great blunders that were built on seemingly faultless logic and bad judgment. In their overcautious approach and zeal for control, Doe and his clique turned Quiwonkpa into an adversary, even though he may not have become one otherwise. Despite his continued insistence on the withdrawal of the military from the political sphere as well as his respect for the office of the head of state that had made him Doe’s obedient servant in

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the past, Quiwonkpa—perhaps as a result of these factors—refrained from openly opposing Doe’s bid for the presidency. Furthermore, by refusing to speak to the media during his feud with the Liberian leader, the commanding general avoided doing anything to rouse the masses against Doe and missed his opportunity to defend and explain himself before the public. In the course of the pursuit of Quiwonkpa, Doe embroiled himself with the Soviet Union, Ghana, and the United States. The Soviet Union expelled the Liberian ambassador to Moscow, Christopher Ricks, in retaliation for the expulsion of its own ambassador to Liberia. The Ghanaian government condemned the dismissal of its chargé d’affaires to Monrovia as a “ridiculous attempt to associate Ghana with the USSR in a blatantly false conspiracy to destabilize an African country.”70 The United States, already disturbed by Doe’s efforts to postpone the elections, distanced itself from Doe’s attempts to sideline Quiwonkpa and thwarted the Liberian leader’s efforts to retrieve the commanding general. Even more, the United States gained a popular and trustworthy figure who, two years later, would lead a mission to try to topple Doe. Doe also entangled himself in disputes with the Gio and Mano. The brutality of the security forces in Nimba County, where both groups lived, engendered lasting enemies of them. In March and April 1984, Doe sought reconciliation with these minority groups. He personally visited the county, provided a budget for development projects, and attempted to restore normal life there by appointing a new superintendent who lifted the county ban on the sale of firearms and shooting (this restriction was imposed in the aftermath of the Yekepa shootings).71 During his visits, Doe was accompanied by prominent Nimbaians, including: PRC Secretary-General Brigadier General David T. M. Kimeh; Minister of Health and Social Welfare Martha S. Belleh; and Advisor to the Head of State on National and International Affairs Jackson F. Doe (unrelated to Samuel Doe).72 Despite Doe’s reapproachment efforts, the Nimbaians joined Quiwonkpa’s campaign to overthrow the Liberian leader two years later and became key supporters of Charles Taylor’s rebellion five years later. Furthermore, Doe’s need to rally the nation behind his persecution and ouster of Quiwonkpa undermined his efforts to recruit Liberia’s traditional leaders. The Liberian leader’s play for their support against Quiwonkpa at the October 28 meeting put them in an awkward and uncomfortable position. They were unwilling to support Doe in sidelining or harming Quiwonkpa. Nonetheless, the traditional leaders were afraid of being caught between the strong forces of these two camps. As Chief Zamba put it when explaining to Doe the chiefs’ and elders’ plea for forgiveness: “When two elephants fight, it is the grass who suffers.”73

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Overall, Doe’s efforts to marginalize and subsequently eliminate Quiwonkpa marked the beginning of the end for the Liberian leader. In the same month that he laid the foundation for his presidential candidacy by fiddling with his birth date and by hinting that soldiers would be able to don civilian garb and run in the elections, Doe also laid the foundation for his political and personal demise. To the distortions of the transitional process and the persecution of Quiwonkpa, the responses of both the media and the public were rather muted. The presentation of the detailed timetable and the CAA’s submission of its constitutional revisions made it possible to believe that the transition to civilian rule was proceeding on course. This façade muted the protest against the disbanding of Con Com and the non–distribution of the CAA’s revisions, and also undermined the support for radical measures to remove Doe. The public and media seem to have been paralyzed, caught in a vise between the threat of reprisals if they protested and the hope that the elections would end the military’s tenure. The crusade against the country’s high school students and their teachers that was transpiring concurrently further highlighted the risks and dangers faced by those who dared to protest the regime—so did the persecution of Quiwonkpa that was occurring at the same time. NOTES 1. Yuan, interview. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 146. Eddie Momoh, “Civilian Rule Politics (2),” West Africa, August 27, 1984, 1668. 2. Abel Escriba-Folch, “Group Strength, Accountability and Growth under Dictatorship,” International Political Science Review 32, no. 1 (January 2011): 9–10. 3. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 91. Berkeley, Liberia: A Promise Betrayed, 34. 4. Paul B. W. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?” (unpublished manuscript, 1994), 100–102. 5. “PRC Reshuffles Cabinet; Kollie Named Deputy Head,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 17, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T1–T2. 6. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 83–4. 7. Yarl, Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?, 103. 8. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 108–10. 9. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 89. 10. “Archives Named for Sekou Toure Dedicated,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 19, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T2.

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11. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 109. 12. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 89–90. 13. “PRC Secretary General Removed from Office,” Monrovia Domestic Service, October 21, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T1–T2. 14. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 100. 15. “Quiwonkpa Dismissed from PRC, Army,” Daily Observer, October 23, 1983. 16. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 110. 17. “Lessons to Be Learnt,” Daily Observer, October 24, 1983, 4. 18. “Doe Commends People for ‘Determination,’” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 25, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1983): T3. Associated Press, “President Asks $1 Billion Aid Package,” October 24, 1983, Nexis Uni. Sam Kesselly, “Donor Confab Yields ‘General Support,’” Daily Observer, November 7, 1983, 1, 10. 19. “Chiefs, Elders Beg for Quiwonkpa,” Daily Observer, October 30, 1983, 10. 20. “Bomi Gets County Status,” Daily Observer, October 30, 1983, 1. 21. “Chiefs, Elders Beg,” 10. 22. “Further on Doe Order,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 4, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T4. 23. American Roman Catholic priest (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, January 23, 1997, transcript, private archives, Boston, MA. 24. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 88, 90. 25. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 108–10. 26. “Lessons to Be Learnt,” 4. 27. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 88. 28. American Roman Catholic priest, interview. 29. “Doe Explains Economic Situation to Soldiers,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 17, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T4. 30. American Roman Catholic priest, interview. 31. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 114. 32. American Roman Catholic priest, interview. 33. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 111–14. 34. “Doe Statement on Plot to ‘Overthrow’ Government,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 21, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T1–T2. “12 Named in ‘Plot,’” Daily Observer, November 22, 1983, 1, 10. 35. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 103–6. 36. “Doe Statement on Plot to ‘Overthrow’ Government,” T1–T2. 37. “12 Named in ‘Plot,’” 1, 10. 38. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 125. 39. “Five Persons Released,” Daily Observer, December 7, 1983, 1, 10.

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40. United Press International, [No headline in original], November 22, 1983, Nexis Uni. 41. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 89. 42. “Monrovia Reports New Developments in Coup Plot,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 23, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T3–T4. “Quiwonkpa Linked to Coup Plot,” Daily Observer, November 24, 1983, 1, 10. 43. American Roman Catholic priest, interview. 44. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 146, 157. 45. Yarl, “Liberia: Circle of Blood, or Setting House in Order?,” 119. 46. “Major Coup Figure Reveals More on Plot,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 2, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T2. “Suspects Say General Quiwonkpa Ordered Raid,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 26, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T2. 47. “Journalists Visit Coup Plotters in Monrovia,” Monrovia Domestic Service, November 24, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T3. 48. “Herring Denied Naming Govt Officials in Plot,” Daily Observer, November 25, 1983, 1, 10. “Herring Talks to Journalists about Planned Coup,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 25, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1983): T2. 49. “Major Kalago Luo Admits Involvement in Coup Plot,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 5, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T1. 50. “Testimony of Suspected Coup Plotter in Liberia,” Monrovia Home Service, December 11, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 13, 1983, Nexis Uni. “Civilian Rule Was Motivation for Coup,” Daily Observer, December 12, 1983. 51. “Doe to Meet with Officials on Attempted Coup,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 12, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T1. PanaPress, “PRC Agrees to Return to Civilian Rule in 1985,” December 14, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T1. 52. “Doe Holds Meeting at Unity Conference Center: Coupists’ Military Trial Planned,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, December 16, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T3. 53. “Chiefs & Elders Will Not Decide,” Mirror, December 17, 1983. 54. “Economic Growth Sought,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 17, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T3. 55. “Dr. Doe Raps Plotters,” Mirror, December 17, 1983.

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56. Eddie Momoh, “Doe’s Secret Meeting in Guinea,” West Africa, January 23, 1984, 155. 57. “Accused Coup Plotters Appear before Tribunal,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 27, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1983): T2. “Another Plot Suspect Arrested,” Daily Observer, December 12, 1983. 58. “Defense Counsel Plea Denied in Coup Trial,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 2, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1984): T1. “Major Luo Says He Lied to Nation,” Mirror, March 7, 1984, 1, 7. 59. “First State Witness Testifies,” Daily Observer, January 13, 1984, 1, 10, 12. 60. “Doe Returns to Monrovia Today,” Daily Observer, January 6, 1984. “Liberia: Doe’s Illusions,” 3. 61. “Doe Dismisses Commerce, Industry Minister Dwanyen,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 11, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T2. Sam Kesselly, “Min. Dwanyen Fired,” Daily Observer, January 12, 1984, 1, 10. 62. “Israeli President to Visit Zaire, Liberia,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 13, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T1–T2. “Coup Plot Won’t Affect ’85—Doe,” Daily Observer, January 26, 1984, 1, 10. 63. Momoh, “Doe’s Secret Meeting in Guinea,” 155. 64. AFP, “Thirteen Accused Plotters to Be Executed,” April 5, 1984, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1984): T3. “Death Sentence Given 13,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 6, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1984): T3–T4. 65. Emmanuel Bowier (former minister of information), in an interview with author, April 2, 2005, transcript, private archives, Kalamazoo, MI. 66. “Death Sentence Given 13,” T3–T4. 67. Associated Press, “Doe Frees 10 Plotters Who Faced Execution,” April 7, 1984, Nexis Uni. 68. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address: Timetable for Civilian Rule,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 12, 1984, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 16, 1984, Nexis Uni. 69. “Liberia: Doe’s Illusions,” 3. 70. “Liberia’s Doe Questions Army Loyalty,” Africa News, December 12, 1983, 1–2, 11–12. 71. “Ban Lifted on Sale of Firearms in Nimba,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 20, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1984): T3. 72. “Doe for Nimba,” Mirror, March 7, 1984, 8. “Liberia: Doe’s Illusions,” 3. 73. “Chiefs, Elders Beg,” 1, 10.

PART 4

The Battle for the Presidency

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Clearing Obstacles to the Presidency

As the coup trial went ahead, two processes were set in motion to prepare the public for Doe’s announcement of his candidacy and the participation of soldiers in the elections. One was the signaling of the plan for former soldiers turned civilians to be entitled to run for office. Doe had already hinted in May 1983 that the PRC members would be able to slough off their army uniforms and run in the elections as civilians. However, he had been careful not to make, and did not allow his cohorts to make, any explicit statement of his intention. With the ban on politics soon to be lifted and with the party registration soon to begin, Doe took pains to plant the idea of his participation in the presidential race and the transformation of his military regime into a quasi-civilian one in the public’s consciousness. The other process was the deferral of the election date so that Doe himself would be able to meet the minimum age requirement to run for president. Despite the two years that Doe had added to his age the previous May, he was still three months short of the mandatory limit. In order to advance these processes smoothly, Doe initiated steps to muzzle voices that might criticize or oppose them. MUZZLING POTENTIAL CRITICS The voices that would be quieted were those of the diplomatic corps, potentially obstructive members of the PRC, and Liberia’s independent press. The task of intimidating the diplomatic corps was allotted to Foreign Minister Ernest Eastman. It began with Eastman’s reading of Doe’s 1984 New Year’s message, which, along with statements about Liberia’s faltering economy, announced the establishment of a national foreign policy commission “to achieve greater international cooperation and understanding.” A Daily Observer editorial praised the planned commission as meeting the 229

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West African country’s need for an integrative foreign policy.1 However, a few days later, Eastman followed up the announcement with a veiled threat that revealed its insidious intent. Specifically, the Liberian government, he told the media, was considering the possibility of reducing its number of embassies abroad so as to cut costs; to this point, Eastman announced his plans to visit and assess the activities of Liberia’s embassies in Europe.2 The embassies in Europe, rather than the more important embassy in Washington, may have been chosen as the destinations for Eastman’s visit of intimidation because of their closer geographic proximity, higher number (twelve rather than one), and the junta’s confidence in the loyalty of the ambassador to the United States, George Toe Washington, and uncertainty regarding the dependability of his counterparts in Europe. Eastman’s visit took place on January 6–19. In a Paris-based meeting, the foreign minister conveyed to the Liberian ambassadors what the regime viewed to be their responsibilities: to raise and save money for Liberia as well as to ensure the harmonious operation of their embassies. By implication, proper attention to these tasks excluded any involvement in political matters. The message was laced with threats. Eastman informed the ambassadors that the state of the Liberian economy made it necessary to use operational funds sparingly—implying that cutbacks were possible. Furthermore, in emphasizing before the ambassadors that they were tasked with the smooth operation of and coordination between the embassies, Eastman warned: “We are determined to weed out of the service all those contentious elements who are the causes of continuing disharmony.”3 Considering Doe’s immediate dismissals of Liberia’s ambassador to Guinea, David Konoe Wright, and of the Liberian deputy finance minister, Henrietta Koenig, for criticizing the government during a reception at the Liberian embassy in Conakry, this assurance seemed sincere.4 The tasks of controlling potentially obstructive voices in the PRC and of muzzling the independent press were assumed by Vice Head of State Nicholas Podier, who had amply shown his antipathy to free thought and expression in the past. Although the PRC had acted largely as a rubber stamp for some time now, Doe became increasingly concerned that there might be dissident voices in the regime. This was apparent in the Liberian leader’s January 9 mandate to Podier to dismiss any PRC member found investigating cases in which they had no jurisdiction. Following this instruction, Podier suspended Major Joseph V. Tubman and Colonel Larry Borteh indefinitely.5 There is no indication of which investigation, if any, the two had engaged in. However, Borteh was temporarily suspended in the past for utilizing witchcraft against Doe and must have been considered a troublemaker. The suspensions of Tubman and Borteh seem to have been implemented to prevent them from obstructing the projected steps to legitimize Doe’s candidacy.

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The only independent papers of any significance were the Daily Observer and the Sunday Observer. The closure of the Observer papers was to be a decisive step in the junta’s ongoing battle with the Liberian media. The Daily Observer had already been shut down twice before: first, in 1981, with the arrest of the editor and ten staff members, and again, on August 16, 1983, by order of Doe.6 The current efforts to close the paper came in addition to the dismissal, in November 1983, of the editor-in-chief and assistant editor of the government-owned New Liberian. The editors were fired for, among other reasons, publishing “editorial content incompatible with Government’s policy.”7 The closure of the Observer papers was unique in that it was supposed to be permanent. The closure, ironically coinciding with the show of transparency at the coup trial, was achieved only after two attempts. In the first, on January 17, Podier fined the management of the Daily Observer $1,500 for allegedly misreporting the reasons for Tubman’s and Borteh’s suspensions, and stipulated that the fine had to be paid by three o’clock that afternoon or else the paper would be closed.8 The expectation was evidently that the paper’s management would miss the deadline. They did not, necessitating a second try to close it. The second attempt was briefly delayed for the three-day state visit, taking place on January 23–25, 1984, of Israel’s President Chaim Herzog. The visit of the Israeli premier marked the first state visit to postcoup Liberia by a non-African president. Thus, it provided Doe with an invaluable opportunity to obtain legitimacy for his regime. Similarly, Israel received the Liberian president’s public justification for his recognition of the Jewish state—a declaration that was met with opposition in some circles. Considerable media emphasis was placed on the development aid that Israel was providing to Liberia as well as the two countries’ joint economic ventures.9 Closing an independent paper during Herzog’s visit would have marred the impression that Doe was trying to make. With Herzog’s departure, Podier once again moved to silence the two papers. On January 16, one day after the Israeli president left, he ordered them closed. To justify his mandate, Podier offered up a string of vituperative charges; he accused the Daily Observer of, among other allegations, “disparaging publications,” printing “scandalous articles patently intended to relegate officials of government and poor citizens. . . Dissimulating our institutions to create fraction, separatism and sectionalistic ideology,” and having done everything “humanly possible to dissuade potential investors from coming into the country.” To prevent the paper’s publisher, the Observer Corporation, from reopening the daily under a new name, the PRC directed Minister of Justice Jenkins Scott to file “revocation proceedings” to nullify its

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articles of incorporation.10 The Supreme Court did not accept Scott’s motion. Had it done so, it would have put a permanent end to the two papers.11 KICK-STARTING THE METAMORPHOSIS The metamorphosis was kick-started on January 27, one day after the closure of the Observer papers, with two statements by PRC Speaker Brigadier General Jeffery Gbatu. The brigadier general’s remarks, which were delivered at the Executive Mansion ceremony marking the PRC’s presentation of the final version of the constitution to Doe, were crafted to inject into the public consciousness possibilities that had not previously been stated overtly and thus to prime the Liberian people for Doe’s candidacy. Considering the setting, which was attended by government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, and top army brass, the content of these statements seemed to symbolize natural components of the transition to democratic rule. One statement announced the PRC’s “appeal to the head of state not to turn down any appeal from the citizens for him to stand for the presidency during the next elections.” Contrary to popular will, it conveyed that Doe might legitimately run in the elections by perpetuating the fiction that he was a popular leader who would be asked to run for president by an appreciative public and by implicitly discrediting the widely accepted notion that his military background should exclude him from running. The other statement pertained to the PRC. Gbatu informed his audience that the PRC had agreed that “Doe may dissolve the PRC when such a move becomes appropriate and warranted” in the course of the transitional process.12 This statement set the stage for the dissolution of the PRC in the following July, as well as the absorption of its members in a seemingly representative ‘civilian’ body, the Interim National Assembly (INA). The creation of the INA, to which PRC members—alongside civilians—would belong, was not part of Con Com’s map of the transitional process. It would be a major step in the civilianization of the military government ahead of the elections. Additionally, unknown to the PRC members who supported the move, it would dilute their power and make it easier for Doe to dispose of them so they would not be able to compete with or oppose him in the race. The first popular appeal for Doe to run was not long in coming. In early February, representatives of the Kru Coast and Sasstown territories delivered a message declaring they would seek Doe’s approval to carry his name on the Kru Coast territories’ ballot “as the only presidential candidate of our choice.”13 The call was probably a condition for benefits received. The benefits included two generators, which Doe and his wife presented as gifts to the territories at a development meeting on February 24, as well as a maternity

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center and a 120-bed hospital financed by the Japanese.14 More significantly, they also included the granting of county status (with its attendant perks), which the two territories had requested the previous November and which Doe awarded in his fourth Redemption Day address in April.15 On February 23, 1984, the PRC was “recessed,” marking the first concrete step in the regime’s dissolution. Since it would not suffice for it to appear as Doe ruling as a one-man dictator, the Executive Committee remained operational. Borteh and Tubman, having felt the consequences of making trouble (if that is what they had in mind), were reinstated to the recessed body where they could no longer do any harm. The explanation for the recess was to enable the members of the PRC to “prepare themselves for retirement.”16 Its actual purpose was to facilitate the transition of the PRC into a supposedly civilian body and of Doe into the leader of a seemingly civilian transitional government. DEFERRING THE ELECTION DATE The election date was postponed incrementally by intermediaries who, as usual, did the dirty work for Doe. SECOM officials, who were appointed by Doe, and CAA members, who had developed mutually beneficial working relations in the course of the constitutional revisions with Doe, served this role. The premature dissolution of Con Com, the only official body that might have objected to their maneuvers, enabled these bodies to pile delay upon delay without interference. The postponement process began very soon after the timetable was issued at the end of July 1983. Dragging its feet from the very beginning, SECOM did not submit the proposals for the delineation of electoral constituencies, which were due on October 1. The PRC, stalling as well, did not issue its decree on the Elections Law, which was due on the same date, nor any directives on the registration of voters and the delineation of electoral constituencies, which were to be submitted by November 1.17 Thus, although the referendum on the new constitution was to be held on January 9–19, 1984, none of the essential preparations were made. Conveniently waking up to the problem on the last day on which the referendum was to be held, SECOM Chairman Emmett Harmon explained that the government’s lapses made it impossible to hold the referendum on time and postponed the date it was to do so to March (on condition that the revised draft constitution, still under PRC review, was released before March).18 Then, although the revised draft constitution was issued on time, Harmon, on March 20, presented the PRC with a letter stating that because of delays

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in the receipt of voter registration forms and cards, the referendum would be further postponed to April 8–9.19 On the same day that Harmon announced the new date for the referendum, the CAA pitched in with a request for a ninety-day postponement to conduct an “educational campaign” for the stated purpose of ensuring that the Liberian people understood the revised document on which they would vote.20 The request echoed the highly popular educational campaign conducted by Con Com upon Doe’s acceptance of its constitutional draft a year earlier. On February 15, 1984, a CAA subcommittee had actually published a simplified version of the revised constitution, possibly for use in a future educational endeavor.21 However, the publication went unannounced and there is no indication that the simplified constitution was distributed or, in fact, that any educational activities were carried out during the assigned period. The CAA postponement was possible due to the involvement of the body’s chairman, Edward Kesselly. Although Kesselly began to grow apart from Doe in the time preceding the formation of his own political party, it was apparently still in his interest to cooperate with Doe and certainly not worth his while to provoke the Liberian leader’s enmity by frustrating his purposes or refusing his request. To obscure his role in the postponement, Doe convened the cabinet, the PRC Executive Committee, the CAA, and SECOM. Doe staged what could only have been a premeditated arrangement, in which he expressed displeasure with the requested postponement while Kesselly provided the necessary justifications for it. Doe voiced his concern that the PRC would be blamed for whatever it did. If it were to grant the postponement, doubt would be cast on the sincerity of its promises to lift the ban on politics by April 12, 1984; but if it lifted the ban before the referendum was held, it would be blamed for pushing the Liberians into politics before there was a constitution. Accordingly, Doe demanded to know why the CAA failed to request the extension at the time that it presented him with the revised constitution. Kesselly deftly replied that ninety days was the necessary time frame for the educational campaign to have an effect on the population and for the CAA members, who had to work in regular day jobs to support their families, to carry it out. The extension was not requested earlier, he explained, because the CAA members believed that their task had ended once the revised draft constitution was presented to the PRC.22 Surely arranged, Kesselly was backed by the cabinet ministers, who, moving the discussion from the educational campaign to the time table itself, expressed the view that a delay in the time frame was inevitable. By the end of the meeting, Doe let it be known that he believed that the timetable was unrealistic and designed to make the PRC look ridiculous.23 To further hide his footprints and give the postponement a veneer of legality, Doe proposed the formation of a committee to adjust the timetable. Just

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one day after the Liberian leader’s motion, the panel was assembled. The newly established committee of six persons—who were drawn from the cabinet, CAA, SECOM, and public—took two weeks to reach the expected decision.24 On April 2, 1984, it presented a new timetable, which deferred the elections by another 100 days or so. The national referendum was rescheduled for July 3, 1984. The ban on politics would be lifted and party registration would begin on July 26. The presidential and legislative elections would start on October 8, 1985.25 The new timetable removed the age barrier to Doe’s participation in the elections. With the Observer papers closed, the ban on politics still in force, and Liberians intimidated by the sweeping persecutions of the previous year and still hoping to get rid of the junta through elections, the postponement took place without much domestic resistance. The delay did, however, further strain relations with the United States, which were already tense due to the Quiwonkpa affair. The U.S. State Department summoned the Liberian ambassador, George Toe Washington, to question him about the deferral and to threaten to reduce American aid.26 Nonetheless, Washington was in a bind. Fearing that if he were cornered Doe would torpedo the transitional process altogether, the State Department was careful. Its criticism was weak and its threat to reduce aid was vague. Doe easily surmounted Washington’s objections. Still smoldering over the cancellation of his meetings with Reagan and frustrated over the rejection of his repeated requests to have Swing permanently recalled to Washington, for the latter’s surprise, Doe brazened out the objections.27 In his fourth Redemption Day speech, on April 12, 1984, the Liberian leader presented the postponement as a necessary and unavoidable decision made by the Special Committee (not himself) and pointed out that the transfer of power to civilians would still take place in 1985, as was promised. Thus, Doe framed Washington’s objections as “unacceptable interferences” in “a fundamental decision affecting the lives and future of our peoples.”28 Five days later, he followed up with the announcement that, in response to the American intervention, the Liberian government determined to return the $350,000 that the United States contributed toward the transition to civilian rule.29 Furthermore, the military regime directed the minister of finance, G. Alvin Jones, to refrain from further negotiations with countries that “impose conditions that may infringe upon the sovereignty of the state.”30 In effect, Doe threatened to remove Washington from the transition process and to deprive it of any input. However, the sum involved was piddling and it was unlikely that the PRC government would actually return or refuse to take money of any amount. Doe’s defiance proved successful. Anxious to keep the transition process on track despite the delay in the timetable, the United States downplayed the fracas.31 Neither the U.S. embassy nor the State Department agreed to

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comment on Doe’s threat. Still, according to Emmanuel Bowier, who at the time served in the Liberian embassy in Washington, the State Department pressured Doe not to return the money.32 By early May, the spat was effectively resolved. Minister of Finance Jones proceeded with a five-day tour of Washington, where he met U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs James Bishop and other State Department officials.33 By the end of the junta’s fourth year in power, it was rather obvious to most Liberians that Doe intended to run for president. This was evident from Doe’s statements in, among other instances, his May 6, 1983, press conference. It was further apparent by his abortive efforts to force would-be rivals to resign their government posts, struggle against the age limit, renewal of ties with Israel, marginalization and premature dissolution of Con Com, fierce pursuit and persecution of Quiwonkpa, reluctancy to issue the revised constitution, initiation of development meetings to garner support, and call to recess the PRC. In March 1984, even before the election date was postponed, African World declared that “There is no secret in Monrovia that Doe is vying for the presidency of Liberia and the election is a way of presenting a ‘new political package with his name on the label’ to the Liberians.” It quoted a Liberian journalist saying much the same, with the additional point that: “I think the whole exercise in civilian government is to throw dirt into the eyes of the western world and the Liberians.”34 Yet even as he prepared the Liberian public and the Americans for his presidential run, Doe could not afford to provoke opposition to his candidacy. Thus, he and his cohorts attempted to convince the public that free democratic elections would still be held. The timely establishment of SECOM and the CAA, the publication of the timetable, the completion of the constitutional revisions and their presentation to the PRC, SECOM’S start of the population census on February 1, 1984, in advance of the constitutional referendum, and the beginning of voter registration on May 2 were all calculated to reinforce this expectation. Doe’s apparent commitment to transition to civilian rule in spite of the deferral of the election date was presented by the Liberian leader, in his 1984 Redemption Day address, as being “consistent with the role and sociological imperatives to honor our pledge to our people.”35 The virtual reality created by the visible progression toward elections and Doe’s repeated promises that they would be held made it possible for some to believe that such plans would unfold accordingly. There was speculation in Monrovia that Doe would not win the presidential race or, that if he did, he would have to govern with more attention to the public good so as not to be voted out of office in subsequent elections.36 In any case, there was little that those who did not accept the incongruous notion of a civilian government made up of former soldiers could do about it. The population was cowed by the junta’s persecutions, the press was muzzled,

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and Doe’s violations of the rules were not perceived as dramatic enough to evoke mass protests. His violations of Con Com’s stipulations in the appointment of the SECOM members and his inappropriate removal of Con Com from the process of revising the constitution went largely unnoticed. The Americans were biding their time. They watched, occasionally remonstrated, and took the precaution of sheltering Quiwonkpa and keeping him in reserve to replace Doe in the future. However, they were not prepared for a confrontation. Their main concern was not for the transition to democracy, but rather for the safety of their strategic interests in Liberia—for which they needed the country to be stable. Pretending to accept Doe’s virtual reality, Washington backed down from a showdown over the postponement of the election date, and instead increased its financial support from $77 million for the 1984 fiscal year to $91.7 million for the 1985 fiscal year to shore up the military government.37 The fifth year of the military regime was the most challenging yet for Doe and his cohorts. With the lifting of the ban on political activity, Doe’s critics—chief among them Amos Sawyer—could publicly voice their opposition to the military regime. Furthermore, the repeal of the political activity restriction and the approaching promised elections created expectations that clashed with the regime’s adamant determination to hold onto power while pretending to be in the process of relinquishing it. As Liberians looked forward to a new era, Doe and his cohorts intensified the process of civilianization that they started as far back as 1982, when Doe exchanged his military garb for civilian attire and the title of Master Sergeant for that of Doctor of Philosophy. Civilianization is a two-sided process undertaken by military leaders to gain legitimacy. From the late 1960s through the 1980s, it was adopted by military leaders in, among other places, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Niger, Togo, Ghana, and Nigeria.38 As Paul Brooker points out, “more than a third of military regimes were not using a junta in the 1980s.”39 By examining their actions, we can identify common elements. They include the following: the head of state generally adopts a civilian title, forms a civilian parliament, and declares multiparty elections; electoral procedures, including a referendum, are usually put in place (at the same time, though, the civilianizing military rulers tend to establish their own party or work surreptitiously through a party nominally headed by someone else); coercive measures and harassment by state security forces are commonly applied; the regime’s endeavors tend to be funded by state coffers and edge over its rivals is usually the outcome of the electoral machinery; the ruling party’s power is usually used to get voters to cast their ballots for them and, in some cases, to rig the election. Paul Brooker notes that the dictator’s party is used as an instrument for implementing personal rule.40 Samuel Decalo observes that no junta, whether civilianizing or not, has “even been willing truly to share

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power with civilian groups within the political organs they have set up, and no military regime has been ousted from office except through a palace coup.”41 In Liberia, 1984 began on a seemingly promising note. On April 20, the PRC approved the Elections Law submitted by SECOM. All the electoral steps that were laid out were followed in due order and time with the apparent support of the government. Voter registration started according to plan on May 1, with SECOM officials urging everyone to register and voicing their anticipation of a large turnout.42 The voter registration process was completed on June 16. Ahead of the referendum on the constitution, scheduled for July 3, SECOM Chairman Emmett Harmon called on all patriotic Liberians to go to the polls to cast their votes.43 The government declared election day a national holiday and encouraged voters to exercise their constitutional right to vote.44 Although a two-thirds majority, which Harmon suddenly announced would be required for its ratification, was not obtained, Doe nonetheless signed the new constitution into law. Finally, on July 26, Liberia’s Independence Day, the more than four-year ban on political activity was lifted.45 These developments were met with praise both in Liberia and abroad. A letter to the editor of the reopened Daily Observer commended SECOM for the “successful results they released about the referendum held on the Constitution.”46 Liberian students in the United States wrote a letter to the minister of justice, enthusing that “for the first time in the history of our beloved country the will of the people was manifested in positive terms without governmental bureaucratic red tape and interference.”47 The Washington Post and New York Times commended the lifting of the ban as a step toward a return to constitutional rule.48 With the lifting of the ban, all Liberians were legally permitted to pursue their political ambitions for the first time since the establishment of the republic. In principle, the repeal should have opened up unprecedented opportunities for political organization and free expression. Within three weeks of the official “reactivation of political activity” (as the lifting of the ban was called in official parlance), eleven new political parties were formed. Their aims and policies were announced on the radio and in the newspapers. Some of their leaders spoke freely and voiced criticisms of government activities that previously they probably would have kept to themselves. The recently reopened Daily Observer described the time as “the dawn of a new awakening.”49 The electoral contest, however, was soon “contaminated”—to borrow Andreas Schedler’s apt description—by Doe’s decision to enter the race.50 On the same day that the ban on political activity was lifted, Doe announced his candidacy. Like other dictators, he viewed the elections not as an honest competition, but as a means of legitimizing his retention of power. It did not take much perspicacity for Doe and his cohorts to realize that they would not emerge victorious in a fair contest. After all, life for ordinary Liberians was

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palpably harder than it had been before the coup: their salaries bought less, as the prices of rice and other commodities rose; corruption had filtered from the top, where it had been concentrated under the TWP, down to every level of the government; and the postcoup regime—with its threats, harassment, and murder of civilians—was more brutal and oppressive than the TWP ever was. To win the race, Doe, with the help of his advisors, systematically emptied the promised resumption of political activity of all meaning. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PRC, CREATION OF THE INA, AND PROMULGATION OF DECREE 88 A On July 21, several days before the ban was lifted and the same day the results of the constitutional referendum were made public, Doe began to deplete the assured resurgence of political activity of all substance with a major step in the civilianization process: the dissolution of the PRC and the creation of the Interim National Assembly. The ground for this move was laid in January, when PRC Speaker Jeffery Gbatu announced that his committee members agreed that Doe could dissolve their body in the course of the transitional process. “Interim National Assembly” was an appropriate name for a body meant to facilitate the transition to civilian rule, as Doe presented its purpose in his July 26 radio speech to the nation. The newly formed body consisted of the former PRC members and some thirty-five civilians who were selected, Doe claimed, for their suitability to represent the country’s various districts. In this radio broadcast, Doe sought to convey the impression that the PRC, which was comprised of all military personnel, was being replaced by a more representative civilian body. The Liberian leader appointed Dr. Harry Fumba Moniba as vice president of the INA. Dr. Moniba, a soft-spoken diplomat from Lofa County, served as Liberia’s ambassador to Great Britain before his new appointment. To reinforce the notion that the INA was a step toward democratization, Doe promised that the assembly would assist the military government in returning Liberia to civilian rule. He repeated this assurance again five days later at his inauguration as INA president.51 For all practical purposes, though, the INA was no more a democratic body than the PRC. Its members were chosen by Doe, and many of them, who were former members of the CAA, would serve as leaders of his party’s branches in the counties.52 The assembly’s real aim was to facilitate Doe’s transition to the presidency in two ways. The first was to legitimize his candidacy by burnishing his civilian image. In assuming the leadership of the INA, Doe changed his title from chairman to president, co–opting the title that was supposed to be gained through elections. To forestall criticism, he sought to

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minimize the significance of this change by insisting that it was only semantic and did not mean that he was president of Liberia, and restated his promise to bring the country to civilian rule and to return to the barracks.53 Nonetheless, to reinforce the impression that he was now president of a civilian body, Doe had himself sworn in at the Centennial Memorial Pavilion, where past presidents of Liberia were sworn into office, and in accord with the protocol reserved for those inaugurations. He also recreated the position of presidential affairs minister—until then a symbol of the TWP. The second manner in which the INA enabled Doe’s transition to the presidency was to make it easier for him to pick off his rivals in and outside the government—in accordance with the coercive aspect of the civilianization process. In the years since the coup, many PRC members accumulated considerable wealth and power, which enabled them to compete with Doe for the presidency. As members of the newly created INA, the erstwhile PRC representatives retained their salaries and status. Without realizing so, however, their inclusion in the larger, partly civilian body diluted their power. In fact, Doe seized the opportunity of the creation of the INA to demote Nicholas Podier, his second in command, from PRC cochairman and vice head of state to the less powerful and prestigious position of INA speaker. Shortly thereafter, during the election campaign, the INA helped Doe to get rid of his opponents and to undermine rival political parties. Much of the foreign media seemed to believe Doe’s assertion that the INA was intended to facilitate the return to civilian rule. The UPI called it “another step toward restoring civilian rule.”54 The Associated Press headlined “Doe Dissolves Ruling Council in New Step toward Civilian Rule.”55 The Daily Nation, a Kenyan newspaper, was more reserved. It suggested that although the creation of the Interim National Assembly appears to be a step in the right direction, there still remained much room for improvement. Similar doubts were expressed by Africa Research Bulletin, a British academic journal, which reported: “There are some who believe that the new interim national assembly has not been truly representative because members have been hand-picked by the Liberian leader.”56 As far as can be discerned, however, there was little realization of the INA’s real purpose in the foreign press. The creation of the INA was soon followed by a step representing the coercive side of the civilianization process: the promulgation of Decree 88 A on July 23. Written by former Minister of Justice and INA councilman Isaac Nyeplu, this legislative order conferred on the security forces sweeping powers “to arrest and detain any person found spreading rumors, lies, and misinformation against any government official or individual either by word of mouth, writing or by public broadcast.”57 This extensive measure enabled the arrest without trial of anyone who said anything that Doe disliked. So as not to spoil the image of a leader committed to civil liberties that Doe was

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trying to project, Decree 88 A was kept in reserve and was not announced for another three weeks, when the ruling powers felt that it was needed.58 A similar two-sided process characterized the lifting of the ban on political activity and Doe’s announcement of his candidacy a few days after that. THE LIFTING OF THE BAN Doe announced the lifting of the ban with considerable flourish in his annual Independence Day speech on July 26. The announcement followed a lengthy prelude, in which the Liberian leader presented the repeal of the prohibition as a step in what he claimed to be the political transformation that began with the overthrow of the TWP government. Doe recalled the promise that the PRC would be a provisional government and that the transition to civilian rule would take place before the end of 1985. He also presented the replacement of the PRC with the INA as a commitment to this process. Finally, Doe declared the lifting of the ban to be “effective immediately” as yet another act of “good faith” that the government had shown in the transitional period. Even as he announced the repeal of the ban, however, Doe hedged this reform with warnings and threats so as to practically empty it of meaning. The warnings were extended to politicians, the chiefs and elders, everyday citizens, and students. He emphasized that government policy did not permit political activity on university or school campuses. Therefore, Doe threatened to hold school administrators responsible for violations of the policy and cautioned that “anyone caught engaging in politics, distributing leaflets, inciting unrest, or demonstrating on campus will be arrested and detained without trial.” To blur the menace of the threat, the Liberian leader preceded it with an assurance to the students that they would not be barred from exercising their political rights, though that is exactly what his prohibition amounted to.59 Doe’s warning to the students was followed by his announcement of several gestures of what he referred to as “reconciliation,” which were designed to project an impression of openness and liberalism but were essentially meaningless. As part of his seeming act of good faith, Doe released two political prisoners: David Konoe Wright, former ambassador to Guinea, who was jailed in February 1984 for “making derogatory remarks” about the government, and Counselor Toye Bernard, who was incarcerated in March 1984 for “interfering in government affairs.” Doe’s rationale for releasing them seems to have been that neither of them posed any threat to his ambitions. In another move of reconciliation, Doe invited Tolbert’s vice president, Bennie Warner, who was abroad since before the coup, to return to Liberia; it was obvious, surely to Doe, that Warner would not come back to his home country.60 The only practically significant gesture he is credited with is the reopening of the

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independent Daily Observer. The paper’s resumption, however, was not at Doe’s initiative, but mandated by the court.61 Moreover, it in no way indicated a letup in the regime’s harassment of the press. In the middle of June, Rufus Marmoh Darpoh, a former editor of New Liberia after being fired from his position the previous November, was jailed for having written what were deemed as “vile, derogatory, misleading, and unfounded articles. . .in foreign publications against the interest of the people and Government of Liberia.”62 Despite pleas from international organizations and the Archbishop of Monrovia, Darpoh was not released until November.63 Then, on August 1, the publisher and sports editor of Footprints Today, Momolu V. Sackor Sirleaf and Klon Hinneh respectively, were arrested without charges following their publication of two articles on corruption and malpractice in the Public Works Department.64 Footprints Today was an independent newspaper that was established earlier that year following the temporary closure of the Observer papers.65 In August, the regime’s bullying extended from the print press to the state-run broadcasting services. Large numbers of workers in the news department of the Liberia Broadcasting System (LBS) were suspended, some for a month, most of them indefinitely, without pay. Those suspended indefinitely included editor-in-chief of the LBS newsroom, Jeff Mutada, and the editor of the television news department, Kwame Clement. The LBC’s then recently appointed director, Peter L. Naigow, who formerly served as minister of information, stated that these suspensions were carried out to install discipline in the corporation. According to the Daily Observer, however, it was widely believed that they had to do with their reporting on recent political events.66 ANNOUNCEMENT OF CANDIDACY When he announced his candidacy on July 28, Doe accounted for the anticipated concerns regarding the legitimacy of this move (much as he did during the establishment of the INA) and projected strength, an inherent part of the civilianization process. Since his candidacy would constitute a reversal of his frequent promise not to run, Doe constructed his participation in the presidential race as a response to popular demand, and not as an expression of personal ambition. Therefore, in the lead-up to his announcement, Doe made great efforts to rally support for his candidacy from any groups he could. Thus, by the time he declared his candidacy, the Liberian leader was able to claim that he was running for president at the requests not only of the army, but also of three civilian groups: the residents of Grand Kru County, the

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women of the Marketing Association, and the country’s chiefs and elders. To garner the backing of all three of these groups, Doe turned to bribes. Doe had already obtained public support for his candidacy from Grand Kru County in February 1984, in exchange for a number of gifts to the area and for upgrading its status from a territory to a county. Women accounted for the majority of the Marketing Association, which, with about 300,000 members, was one of the largest organizations in Liberia. This demographic had enthusiastically supported the PRC after the 1980 coup. On July 25, one day before the lifting of the ban on political activity, Doe pledged $1.7 million for a new wing to the association’s building in Monrovia and committed to the construction of their other facilities as well. The women of the Marketing Association duly publicized their support for Doe the next day.67 The support of the chiefs and elders was obtained by a more personal bribe. Despite his previous efforts to woo the chiefs and elders by promising them development funds and influence in national affairs, Doe had not managed to win their support in his vendetta against Quiwonkpa. This time, Doe bribed them with a building in Monrovia for their exclusive use. On July 18, a few days before the referendum on the constitution, he invited the chiefs and elders from all over the country to the dedication ceremony of the so-called Chiefs’ Compound, an old building in Monrovia formerly owned by the TWP. During the ceremony, Doe informed the audience that the building was remodeled so as to provide them with modern amenities when they came to the capitol.68 On the day of their departure, he hosted a luncheon and dance at the Executive Pavilion. For the icing on the cake, their air and land transportation was paid for, and they were granted the sum of $20,000 as a token of his appreciation of their continuous support of the government. The bribe worked. At the end of their stay in the capital, the chiefs marched to the Executive Mansion shouting: “We want Doe! We want Doe!”69 The true extent of these groups’ support for Doe remained unclear. Still, it did not matter. After all, their public statements advanced the fiction that Doe was a popular leader who would be asked to run for president by an appreciative public. Yet along with his demonstration of civilian support, Doe made sure to let it be known that he stood behind the army and that it stood behind him. He announced his intention to run for president at a meeting with top commanders at Camp Schieffelin rather than in a radio speech, press conference, or public ceremony, which were not only the more usual podiums for his public announcements, but certainly more fitting for a transition to civilian rule.70 Doe deliberately chose the army as the selected audience for his important announcement for two reasons. One was to pay his dues. Announcing his candidacy before the senior commanders on their own turf was a way of showing the army respect and acknowledging that he understood and appreciated how

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essential their support was to him. It was aimed both at winning the soldiers’ votes and at averting their possible opposition to the electoral process. This setting for such a declaration intimated that they would retain their place in his civilian government, salaries, benefits, and say in the county’s management, and military positions. Such fears have been well-documented in the militaries of many countries on the way to civilian rule.71 The second reason was to let the public and his prospective rivals know that the army, the main power in the land, was behind him and therefore to send the message that he would not be easy to oust from the political race and that any objections to his candidacy would be met with force.72 To what was surely the mutual satisfaction of Doe and the army, former AFL chief of staff, Brigadier General Mansfied Yancy, the spokesman for military personnel at the meeting, declared that the army would continue to support and cooperate with Doe. The announcement of Doe’s candidacy was not welcomed by most Liberians. Yet despite the Liberian leader’s apprehensions, the announcement did not raise public protest. The declaration had long been expected and was met with a mixture of fatalism and the belief that his dismal record as a military ruler would dissuade prospective voters.73 While many Liberians probably considered the possibility that Doe would rig the vote, this fear was apparently pushed aside. RESTRICTING POTENTIAL RIVALS: SECOM’S ELECTION GUIDELINES The lifting of the ban on political activity brought to the fore experienced and respected politicians—including Gabriel Baccus Matthews, Amos Sawyer, and Jackson Doe (unrelated to Samuel Doe)—along with new personalities such as William Gabriel Kpolleh, Counselor Tuan Wreh, and Counselor Wade Appleton. Accordingly, within a very short time, Samuel Doe was no longer the only player in Liberian politics. For Doe and his clique, this was a displeasing development. Some of Doe’s rivals had significant advantages over him: they were more popular, had more political experience and large followings, and had a party structure behind them. Even the weaker candidates and parties “stole” part of his share of the vote. Thus, Doe and his advisors set out to hamper potential rivals and to keep the number of parties to a minimum. Doe began with two false starts: a decree that was quickly revoked and an ultimatum that had little impact. Decree 75 A (amendment to Decree No. 75, Liberia Elections Law), issued on June 7, empowered SECOM to deny the registration of candidates and parties that engaged at any point in activities or expressed ideological aims and objectives that were “converse” or “adverse” to Liberia’s “intrinsic values as a people” or to its “republican form

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of government.” After it was brought to Doe’s attention that the amendment could be used against him as well, it was swiftly repealed.74 The 1984 ultimatum was issued on August 1 when Doe announced to his cabinet that all government officials who wanted to form or be associated with a political party would have to resign within a week. Ministers, deputy ministers, and managers of government companies were singled out for mention.75 Doe’s cynical justification for this demand was that their resignation was necessary to avoid conflicts of interest.76 Equally cynical was his reference to the ordered resignations as a “privilege.” The ultimatum was similar to that of the one issued in April 1983, following the publication of the draft constitution, and also intended to deter potential rivals. They scared possible political opponents by warning them that if they ran, they would lose their source of income and other advantages of office. The 1983 ultimatum, issued while Doe still hid his political intentions, unleashed inconvenient criticism and speculation, but brought about only five resignations. The impact of the new order was not much different. Only three officials resigned in response: Counselor James Laveli Supuwood, solicitor general at the Justice ministry; Dr. Dusty Wolokolie, assistant planning and economic affairs minister; and Joseph Richards, acting minister of lands, mines, and energy.77 Sawyer, at the August 13 ceremony launching the Liberian People’s Party (LPP), publicly called on Doe to “take advantage of the privilege” he extended to officials of government desirous of linking themselves with political parties—that is, to resign from his own government positions.78 Much more effective than these false starts were obstacles to the registration of parties contained in SECOM’s “Guidelines for the Registration on [sic] Political Parties And/Or Independent Candidates for Election To Public Office Within the Republic of Liberia,” which was published on August 13. The guidelines consisted of about a dozen preconditions, later termed “preregistration requirements,” that would-be parties would have to fulfill. In principle, the guidelines were not dissimilar to those applied in democratic elections elsewhere. However, two sets of requirements, the signature and the financial ones, were formulated to serve Doe’s purposes. The signature requirements were listed in clauses 1 and 5. They stipulated that in order to register as a political party, an association had to have the signatures of five hundred members from at least six counties. In effect, these clauses rendered it impossible for ethnic groups, however large they were, to translate their numerical size into political power by joining together as a single party. These cautions were reasonable to prevent the dominance of a single ethnic group or region in a nation made up of a small number of large ethnic groups.79 Liberia, however, has sixteen ethnic groups, all of which are relatively small, so the chance of any one of them attaining dominance was and remains minimal. Thus, the signature requirements were a means to

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prevent Doe’s unfounded fear that some of these groups would band together against his tiny ethnic group, the Krahn. The financial requirements were set out in section 4 (d), known as the “Financial Clause.” On the face of it, this was a logical clause. Many democratic states impose financial requirements on political parties to ensure that the parties possess at least a minimum degree of financial stability. The financial requirements of section 4 (d) however were exorbitant. To register as a party, an association had to produce “a current financial statement of no less than $50,000 in cash and $100,000 in securities, bonds, etc.”80 Liberia’s poor economic situation made meeting these terms practically impossible for most aspiring parties. Thus, potential rival parties struggled to raise the enormous sums, all the while Doe was unaffected. As Liebenow notes, Doe, as head of state, controlled the country’s financial resources and could also pressure government employees to contribute to his party.81 Unsurprisingly, the party that Doe formed soon after he announced his candidacy, the NDPL, completed its preregistration four and a half months before any other party.82 The implications of the intensified civilianization process were not yet fully apparent. Decree 88 A was still languishing in a drawer. The real purpose of the INA was not yet discerned. The 1984 ultimatum did not have much effect. Decree 75 A was rescinded without having been acted on. The signature requirements, which would soon be used to obstruct the registration of parties, aroused little if any suspicion. The financial requirements, however, were met with vociferous objection. The proposed Liberian Action Party (LAP) questioned the need to impose so heavy a financial burden on those who sought to participate in the political process. The Daily Observer pointed out that the high financial requirements curtailed the right to partake in the political arena, much as the TWP’s notorious “property clause” had done.83 Nonetheless, the financial requirements did not prevent many would-be parties from trying to meet them. The enthusiasm raised by the lifting of the ban on political activity had not yet been quashed, and Doe’s adamant determination to become president at all costs was still cloaked in ambiguity. The atmosphere would soon change, however, as Doe undertook increasingly aggressive measures to assure his election. The switch began in August 1984, with his persecution of Amos Sawyer and others whom he feared could get in his way, and continued as he used all the means at his disposal to undermine the registration of parties that rivaled his own. NOTES 1. Mlanju Reeves, “Govt. to Set up Foreign Policy Commission,” Daily Observer, January 3, 1984, 1.

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“Timely and Laudable Move,” Daily Observer, January 6, 1984, 4. 2. “‘Possibility’ of Reducing Embassies Studied,” Monrovia Domestic Service, January 4, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T1. 3. “Foreign Service Renewed,” Daily Observer, January 12, 1984, 1, 10. 4. AFP, “Doe Dismisses Ambassador, Deputy Finance Minister,” February 15, 1984, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1984): T1. “Minister Sacked for Criticizing Regime,” West Africa, February 27, 1984, 477. 5. “PRC Member Tubman ‘Indefinitely Suspended,’” Monrovia Domestic Service, January 12, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T3. “Another PRC Member Suspended,” Daily Observer, January 17, 1984, 1, 10. 6. “Newspaper Banned for ‘Negative’ Reporting,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 16, 1983, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1983): T1. 7. “Dismissal of Journalists,” Monrovia Home Service, November 25, 1983, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 28, 1983, Nexis Uni. 8. “Gen Podier Fines Paper for ‘Misinforming’ People,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 17, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T1. 9. Peters, Israel and Africa, 130. 10. PanaPress, “Additional Details on Banning of Daily Observer,” January 27, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T2. 11. “Supreme Court Orders Reopening of Observer,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 19, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1984): T2. 12. “Draft Constitution Presented to Head of State Doe,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 27, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1984): T2. 13. “Candidates Bide Time until Lifting of Ban on Politics,” Africa Now, in SubSaharan Africa Report, May 16, 1984, 11. 14. “Dr. & Mrs. Doe Donate Generators,” Mirror, February 25, 1984. Tom Glaser, “Interview with CIC Dr. Samuel K. Doe, Head of State, Republic of Liberia,” Courier 87, September–October 1984, 12. 15. “Appeal for New County,” Daily Observer, November 9, 1983, 5. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address: Timetable for Civilian Rule.” 16. “Cabinet Reshuffle in Liberia,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 23, 1984, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 25, 1984, Nexis Uni. 17. “Liberia: Troubled Situation Generates Insecurity, Slows Timetable,” West Africa, December 12, 1983, 2860, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, January 20, 1984, 71–72. 18. “Timetable for Return to Civilian Rule in Liberia,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 18, 1984, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 20, 1984, Nexis Uni.

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19. U.S. Department of State, “AF Weekly Update Paris for Embassy and USOECD; USUN for SCOTT; USCENTCOM for POLAD,” Case No. F-2014–11190 Doc No. C05722781, secret, March 14, 1984, 3–4, Department of State Records. 20. “Ban on Politics to Be Lifted July 26, 1984 – Return to Civilian Rule Jan. 6, 1986,” Mirror, April 3, 1984, 1–2. 21. James N. Nagbe, Herry T. P. Nayou, J. Patrick K. Biddle, J. Edward Koenig, and Archibald F. Bernard, “The Simplified Version of the Approved Draft Constitution,” (Monrovia: Constitutional Advisory Assembly, February 1984). 22. “Dr. Doe Says PRC Could Be Blamed If Ban on Politics Not Lifted April 12,” Mirror, March 21, 1984, 1, 4. 23. “Referendum Rescheduled from 28 March to 8 April,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 21, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Daily Report (March 1984): T2. 24. “Dr. Doe Says PRC Could Be Blamed If Ban on Politics Not Lifted April 12,” 1. “Committee to Review Education Campaign Extension,” T2–T3. 25. “Special Committee Makes Report,” Mirror, April 3, 1984, 1–2. 26. “Doe Says U.S. Interfering in Internal Affairs,” Monrovia Domestic Service, April 17, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1984): T3. 27. “Liberia: Towards Electoral Farce,” Africa Confidential, February 13, 1985, 6. U.S. Department of State, “Meeting with Liberian Foreign Minister Eastman,” Case No. F-2011–00929, Doc No. C05183120, secret, December 10, 1984, Department of State Records. 28. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address: Timetable for Civilian Rule.” 29. “Update on Liberian Developments,” April 20, 1984, secret, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (01/01/1984–01/25/1985)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 30. “Doe Says U.S. Interfering in Internal Affairs,” T3. 31. Eddie Momoh, “Blowing Hot and Cold,” West Africa, May 21, 1984, 1061–62. 32. “Doe Says U.S. Interfering in Internal Affairs,” T3. Bowier, interview. 33. “Finance Minister Meets with U.S. Officials,” Monrovia Domestic Service, May 2, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1984): T3. 34. “Liberia Plans to Battle through the Ballot Box,” African World, March 5, 1984, 3, 13. 35. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address: Timetable for Civilian Rule.” 36. “Liberia Plans to Battle through the Ballot Box,” 3, 13. 37. Clifford D. May, “Liberia’s Limping Economy,” New York Times, June 11, 1984, 8, Nexis Uni. 38. Yomi Durotoye and Robert J. Griffiths, “Civilianizing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes of Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria,” African Studies Review 40, no. 3 (1997): 156.

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Habib Zafarullah and Muhammad Y. Akhter, “Military Rule, Civilianisation and Electoral Corruption: Pakistan and Bangladesh in Perspective,” Asian Studies Review 25, no. 1 (2001): 74–80. Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 30–31, 225, 227. 39. Brooker, Non–Democratic Regimes, 120. 40. Brooker, Non–Democratic Regimes, 131. 41. Decalo, Coups & Army Rule in Africa, 30–31. 42. “Timetable for Civilian Rule,” Africa News, May 14, 1984, 4. 43. AFP, “Liberian Civilian Rule Referendum Scheduled 3 Jul.,” July 2, 1984, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T1. “Citizens Urged to Vote on New Constitution,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, June 14, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (June 1984): T1. 44. “Doe Announces Draft Constitution Approved,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 20, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T2. 45. “The Political Tempo,” Footprints Today, August 29, 1984, 2. 46. S. Charles McCarthy, “Thanks, SECOM,” Daily Observer, August 22, 1984, 5. 47. “Peace Loving Liberian Writes Justice Minister,” Mirror, September 6, 1984, 6. 48. “Liberia Lifts Ban on Political Activity,” New York Times, July 27, 1984, 5, Nexis Uni. “Liberia Dissolves Council,” Washington Post, July 23, 1984, A21, Nexis Uni. “Political Ban Ends,” Washington Post, July 27, 1984, A18, Nexis Uni. 49. “Liberia Action Party Announced,” Daily Observer, August 16, 1984, 10. “To Rule or to Serve?,” Daily Observer, August 7, 1984, 4. 50. Andreas Schedler, “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” International Political Science Review 23, no. 1 (2002), 103. 51. Associated Press, “Doe Dissolves Ruling Council in New Step Toward Civilian Rule,” July 22, 1984, Nexis Uni. “Doe Addresses Nation,” T1–T3. 52. “Political Meeting in Bassa Today,” Daily Observer, August 8, 1984, 1, 10. 53. “Doe on PRC Determination to Return to Barracks,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 23, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T3. 54. United Press International, “Doe Installed as Interim President,” July 25, 1984, Nexis Uni. 55. “Doe Dissolves Ruling Council in New Step toward Civilian Rule.” 56. “Members Hand-Picked,” Africa Research Bulletin 21, no. 7 (August 1984): 7307. 57. “A Selection of the Decrees of the People’s Redemption Council 1980– 1984,” 95–96. 58. AFP, “Decree against ‘Spread of Rumors’ Released,” August 15, 1984, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T1. 59. “Liberia Lifts Ban on Political Activity.” 60. “Doe Addresses Nation,” T1–T3.

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61. “Supreme Court Orders Reopening of Observer,” T2. 62. “Rufus Darpoh, Liberian Journalist Detained,” Mirror, June 19, 1984, 1. 63. “Darpoh Detention Continues,” West Africa, August 13, 1984, 1658. “Rufus Darpoh Released,” Sunday Observer, November 18, 1984, 1, 12. 64. “Businessmen to Petition for Release of Sirleaf, Henneh,” Daily Observer, August 6, 1984, 1, 10. 65. Nelson, Liberia: A Country Study, 234. K. Rogers Momo Sr., “The Liberian Press under Military Rule,” Liberian Studies Journal 21, no. 1 (1997): 17–20. 66. Gabriel Williams, “LBS Sets ‘Equal Time’ for Politicians,” Daily Observer, September 6, 1984, 12. 67. Liebenow, Liberia, 267. 68. “Head of State Warns ‘Crucial Times’ Ahead,” New Liberian, July 19, 1984, 1, 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, September 6, 1984, 58–9. 69. “CIC Doe Gives $20,000 to Chiefs,” Mirror, July 28, 1984, 1, 3. “Chiefs Chant ‘We Want Doe,’” Mirror, July 28, 1984, 3, 8. 70. “Announces New Party,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 1, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T1. 71. Jimmy K. Tindigarukayo, “Uganda, 1979–85: Leadership in Transition,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26, no. 4 (December 1988), 609. 72. Durotoye and Griffiths, “Civilianizing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes of Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria,” 135. 73. AFP, James Dorbor, “Doe to Run for Presidency in October 1985,” July 29, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T1. 74. “Decree Issued Reactivating Political Parties,” Monrovia Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1984): T3. 75. “Ministers & Gov’t Officials One Week to Resign urges Doe,” Mirror, August 2, 1984, 1, 6. 76. “Resigning? Cabinet Ministers, Other Officials to Decide Which Way,” The Express, August 3, 1984, 1, 6. 77. “Officials Resign for Political Affiliations,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 7, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T2–T3. “Doe 011 Reason for Resignation Offer to Ministers,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 8, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T8. 78. “All Must Resign Says Dr. Sawyer,” Footprints Today, August 15, 1984, 1, 2. 79. Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, “The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism and the Dilemma of Constructing a Developmental State in Nigeria,” International Political Science Review 30, no. 3 (2009): 259. 80. “Guidelines for Political Parties Registration,” Daily Observer, August 14, 1984, 4. 81. Liebenow, Liberia, 285.

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82. Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill, “Liberia in 1984: Hard Times, Hard Politics,” West Africa, January 14, 1985, 48. 83. “Interpreting the Guidelines,” Daily Observer, August 17, 1984, 4.

Chapter 13

The Persecution and Ouster of Sawyer

In his determination to be elected president, Doe did more than just place hurdles in the way of prospective parties and candidates. He also determinedly crushed all of those who stood in his way. They included not only rivals for office, but also his fellow coupists who now sat in the INA, as well as Amos Sawyer and other senior members of the LPP. In the short time since the lifting of the ban on political activity, Doe’s hegemony was challenged in unprecedented ways. Would-be parties were formed, individuals declared their candidacy for political office, and criticism that had previously been muted were voiced from many directions. Doe was no longer the main focus of attention, but shared the limelight with rival contenders. One after another, the media reported the formation of the new political parties, named their leaders, and announced their platforms. Doe focused his animus on Amos Sawyer, chief organizer of the LPP. On the same day that his own party, the NDPL, completed its registration with SECOM, Doe took his first overt step to oust Sawyer from the political arena. Much of Doe’s impetus for targeting Sawyer was probably personal. Like Quiwonkpa, Sawyer was a very popular figure whose modesty and integrity won him widespread regard and respect that Doe could only hope to match. He was widely admired by Liberians as the guardian of the democratic process. In January 1984, he was named man of the year by the Sunday Observer.1 Moreover, Sawyer proved himself to be impervious to repeated attempts at manipulation—and Doe probably resented him for this. With unwavering consistency, Sawyer refused to make any of the concessions Doe had demanded; the former did not cave in on the minimum age requirement, presidential term length, pace of the return to civilian rule, or method of electing the CAA members. Although Doe eventually succeeded in sidelining him, Sawyer remained a thorn in Doe’s side for a long time. 253

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The fear, with the lifting of the ban on political activity and expression, that Sawyer would exploit these newly permitted freedoms to once again oppose Doe was the immediate motive for the persecution. Initially, Doe tried to neutralize Sawyer, while he simultaneously attempted to benefit from the LPP head’s popularity by inviting him to be his running mate. Sawyer rejected the offer, stating that he had no political ambitions and that he wanted to continue his academic career.2 This disclaimer, which Sawyer continued to repeat thereafter, however, did not mean that he was not an immediate threat to Doe. Whether Sawyer actually chose to run for office or not, he could potentially cause trouble for Doe and his associates.3 At this stage, the various prospective presidential candidates kept a low profile since their would-be parties still had to get through the obstacles of the new registration process. They ultimately announced the formation of their parties and made statements about their positions, but avoided direct criticism of Doe and his policies. Before forming his own party, Gabriel Baccus Matthews, head of the United People’s Party (UPP), served in Doe’s government. Edward Kesselly, head of the Unity Party, previously worked cooperatively with Doe as director of the CAA. Tuan Wreh, chairman of the Liberian Action Party (LAP), was more outspoken. On the day that the LAP was established, Wreh condemned Decree 88 A, which had just been made public, charging that it was designed “to entomb people in jail and take away their precious liberty” and criticized the harsh financial burden on would-be political parties that the SECOM guidelines imposed. Still, he refrained from criticizing Doe and his candidacy.4 Sawyer was the only political figure who had the audacity to raise objections to Doe’s candidacy. Shortly before Doe revealed publicly that he was running for president, Sawyer tried to dissuade him from doing so. As the LPP head recounts, he met with Doe and, in the presence of two of Doe’s close aides, lectured him on the reasons not to contend. Sawyer assured Doe that his place in Liberian history would be best secured if he were remembered as the leader who steered the country to democracy and multiparty elections, and advised that—if he was intent on a political career—Doe should first complete his education and return to politics later. According to Sawyer, rather than reply to his recommendations, Doe asked “Is that all you have to say?” When Sawyer answered in the affirmative, Doe said, “You are free to go.”5 Sawyer continued to voice his objections after Doe announced his candidacy. On August 2, MOJA announced its plans to form a political party, with Sawyer serving as the head of its organizing committee.6 Shortly thereafter, Sawyer told the Daily Observer that although he had no personal political ambitions, he felt “obligated as a citizen to contribute to the building of democratic structures and the creation of complementary political culture that is conducive to the growth of democracy in Liberia.”7 He also indicated that

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he would not be averse to organizing and promoting a “broad-based coalition of like-minded candidates. . . Anything that can advance and enhance democracy will be attempted. We do not want to see one candidate at the polls.”8 On August 13, when Sawyer officially announced the formation of the Liberian People’s Party (LPP), he called on “all other political groupings in the country to join forces with the Liberian People’s Party to a dialogue in order to reach a common commitment to ensure that the organizing process is not aborted.”9 Although Sawyer did not mention Doe by name, his statement leaves little doubt that he intended to do all that he could to thwart a Doe takeover of the electoral process. For Doe and his allies, Sawyer had to be removed from the political arena. In principle, Decree 88 A could have been utilized for this purpose. However, this directive was aimed at individuals, and Doe wanted to eliminate more of his opponents than just Sawyer. Doe’s long list of rivals included the other members of the LPP as well as those who partook in the coup with him, whom he now saw as threats to his centrality in the public eye. To spread the wide net that he needed, Doe once again concocted a fake coup, this time with Sawyer as its leader. It was the same disastrous ploy that Doe applied when Quiwonkpa had evaded his control. Apparently, Doe and his advisors had learned little from the Quiwonkpa debacle. Tactically, the plot was carefully planned. On August 11, so as to distance himself from the expected allegations, Doe left Liberia for a medical checkup in West Germany and state visits in Austria and Romania. Eight days later, after information about the plot was leaked and hundreds of anonymous leaflets were circulated in Monrovia claiming that a “fake coup” was imminent, he cut his trip short to return to Monrovia, reportedly to “attend to some important state matters.”10 The first arrests were announced before he even boarded the plane. Among those detained were Sawyer, George Klay Kieh Jr. (a fellow LPP activist and lecturer at the University of Liberia), Larry Borteh, and Jerry Jorwley (both were members of the military government who Doe had long wanted to be rid of).11 Moreover, while Doe was still in Europe, Isaac Nyeplu, then a SECOM member and former minister of justice, was ordered to immediately report to the police.12 No reason for the order was provided. After six days, Nyeplu turned himself in before the authorities and was arrested, by the directive of Justice Minister Jenkins Scott, for being the uncle of INA speaker and vice head of state, Nicholas Podier.13 Nyeplu would later be made to implicate Podier as one of the “plotters.” Doe had two reasons to detain Podier. First, along with Doe, Podier was among those who overthrew the TWP in the 1980 coup. Over the past four years or so, Podier had served Doe loyally in a variety of roles. Now that he was running for president, however, Doe set out to be the sole PRC member credited with ending the rule of the TWP. To this end, he intended to purge

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the original wealthy and powerful PRC members. Accordingly, Podier was removed as he was among the few initial comrades still in the PRC. Second, next to Doe himself, Podier was the most powerful member of the junta and, as such, Doe viewed him as a personal threat. Also caught in the net were two other LPP activists, Harry Yuan and Tom Kamara. Yuan was managing director of the Liberia Electricity Corporation, and had been arrested and released only a few months earlier in connection with the Quiwonkpa coup charges. Kamara was a reporter who had the temerity to publish articles “incompatible with the aims and objectives of the government.”14 Following his return to Monrovia, Doe presented before the Interim National Assembly (INA) the details of the fictitious coup in dramatic fashion. The Liberian leader declared that Sawyer and his supporters planned to create chaos that would pressure him to resign, enable them to overthrow the government, subsequently make mass arrests, and finally install a socialist government with the aid of three African states. Doe further outlined a three-part strategy supposedly formulated by Sawyer and his group. According to the Liberian leader’s version of it, the first two steps were aimed at creating discord while he was out of the country. The third step entailed blowing up buildings and bridges, setting Monrovia on fire with the help of trained foreign saboteurs, and destroying the country’s electricity facilities. Doe feigned disappointment and surprise that “such an innocent professor” was implicated in such an attack on the state. Posing as a liberal and generous head of state, Doe assured that “Sawyer and his collaborators will be given a speedy and fair trial in spite of People’s Redemption Council Decree 88 A under which they could be detained until civilian rule is established.”15 Notwithstanding its tactical planning, Doe’s ploy was a fiasco from the beginning. The first mishap occurred while Doe was still in West Germany. During this time, the preparations for the fabricated overthrow were apparently leaked, possibly in an attempt to prevent it from going any further; hundreds of anonymous leaflets claiming that a “fake coup” was imminent were circulated in Monrovia.16 Still, in the grand scheme of events, this was only a minor blip. Minister of Presidential Affairs and Cabinet Chairman J. Bernard Blamo, who was responsible for managing national developments in Doe’s absence, quickly referred to these leaflets as containing “false and malicious” information “aimed at creating fear among the Liberian people.”17 The next day, August 15, Decree 88 A, which acted against “the spread of rumors, lies and disinformation,” was implemented.18 The more significant blunder was the decision to arrest Sawyer. Few Liberians believed that the preposterous accusations against him were true. Thus, his detention provoked unprecedented protests in Liberia and abroad. The primary goals of the charges against Sawyer—to remove him from the

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political arena and to destroy the LPP—were not achieved. Instead, the main effect of them was to devastate Doe’s carefully cultivated image as a responsible and internationally respected head of state who set his country on the path to democracy. Furthermore, Doe and his clique failed to adequately account for the ire that the false charges would elicit. Until this point, Doe’s many obstructions of the electoral process and his violent pursuit of Quiwonkpa had not galvanized even low-key organized opposition. However, the arrest of Sawyer, the acclaimed guardian of the democratic process, produced outrage amongst many Liberians. This is likely due to the fact that they expected more freedoms since the lifting of the ban on political activity. The organized protest was led by three groups: the LPP, the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC), which was the umbrella organization for the country’s six largest churches, and University of Liberia students and administration. The LPP protest took the form of a mass meeting attended by nearly 200 persons. Dusty Wolokolie, who was elected as the acting chairman of the party’s organizing committee in Sawyer’s absence, read a statement denouncing his predecessor’s arrest as politically motivated. He also announced a rally, planned for August 24, to demonstrate solidarity with the detained and to raise funds for their legal expenses.19 The LCC, which had maintained a quietist approach toward Doe’s regime since the 1980 coup, issued a letter that can be perceived to be a protest against the national leadership in the aftermath of the arrests. On August 22, its representatives handed Doe a forcefully worded letter which was subsequently read in churches across the country. The letter reminded Doe that the lifting of the ban on political activities should have guaranteed the basic freedoms necessary for democracy and a “smooth transition” to civilian rule, and indicated that it had not. It urged the government to repeal Decree 88 A and to stop “arbitrary arrests, mysterious disappearances and extra judicial trials.” Moreover, the letter written by the LCC also noted that the lack of an explanation as to why Nyeplu was wanted by the security forces created “fear, distrust, and confusion among the citizenry.”20 Most Liberians resonated with these points but did not declare so due to their fear of reprisals. Thus, although a mere written communication, the letter and its reading during Sunday services were extraordinary actions given the churches’ long history of noninvolvement in politics. The protest led by UL students, who were victims of previous political arrests, was the most active and head-on of all the challenges. The students at both of the university’s Monrovia campuses spontaneously boycotted classes and marched in the streets. They chanted slogans such as “No Sawyer, no school!” Some carried placards that read “Doe, Go in Peace” and “Rescind

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Decree 88 A”; and others carried a coffin labeled “Liberia’s rights and liberties.”21 The UL administration, which sided with Doe during the student strike of 1982, now rallied behind the protesting students. President Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown-Sherman, on behalf of the University Senate and Council, presented Doe with a written statement condemning the arrests of Sawyer and Kieh and demanding their immediate release.22 As a strong and independent body whose protest had been relatively quiet, the LPP could withstand Doe’s obstacles. The rally planned by the LPP was canceled, according to Dusty Wolokolie, not because of government pressure, but rather because of the LPP’s inability to ensure the safety of the expected participants.23 Since Doe struggled to ban the LPP as a whole, he instead targeted its prominent members. Accordingly, Wolokolie and Anthony Kesselly (the latter a member of the LPP’s organizing committee who signed the letter) were charged with violating Decree 88 A.24 Wolokolie was arrested on August 28; Kesselly evaded arrest and disappeared. Doe’s response to the UL protest got out of hand. Initially, the government tried to stem the protest with warnings. Doe met with Dr. Sherman to warn her that the university staff would be held responsible for any disturbance caused by their students and that any disruption could lead to the closure of the university.25 The Liberian leader’s warning had no effect. The demonstrations continued. Doe’s reaction was ballistic. The immediate reason was the fear that the August 24 demonstration announced by the LPP would spiral out of control if the students would join in it. Beyond this, Doe must have regarded the UL as an active threat to his presidential ambitions. The NDPL had very little support there, while MOJA, which served as the basis for Sawyer’s LPP, was well entrenched.26 Doe called the UL “MOJA camp.”27 Moreover, Doe held a long account with the UL students, as he did with Sawyer. Over the years of skirmishes with them, he had not been able to bend them to his will. Their continued defiance seems to have aroused in him much the same fury as had Sawyer’s intrepid opposition. Finally, the fact that Doe was encountering numerous sources of opposition simultaneously for the first time in his years at the helm seems to have engendered a determination to regain control at apparently any cost. On August 22, Doe convened the INA. Without even the pretense of discussion, he ordered that soldiers immediately remove the students from the UL campus, the university be closed, and its entire administration and faculty be dismissed. Soldiers entered the campus shooting into the air, sending the students, faculty, administrators, and market women who sold their wares there running in all directions. The soldiers proceeded to chase, beat, and even rape students.28

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The soldiers’ violence cleared the students from the campus but it also sent Doe and his aides scrambling to try to control the damage. Lacking the knowledge and tools to handle this crisis, they resorted to a combination of intimidation and concealment. The day after the raid, the Ministry of Defense ordered the public flogging of anyone caught distributing leaflets. Presumably to conceal the soldiers’ brutality, the campus was sealed off for five days. Requests to survey the scene filed by journalists and foreign diplomats were rejected and telephone communication between Liberia and abroad was disrupted.29 Doe and his clique also continued to advance the coup cover story. On August 23, Nyeplu, who was finally in the hands of the security services, was hauled before reporters assembled at the Ministry of Defense, where the newly detained former justice minister delivered a statement implicating Nicholas Podier, alongside the other wanted suspects in the coup. This tactic, specifically according to which a succession of testimonies by detainees held on false charges was to constitute proof of guilt, was similar to that employed against Quiwonkpa. In the case of Nyeplu, the former justice minister, who emphasized that he approached the security services on his own accord, testified that—shortly after Doe left for West Germany—his nephew, Maj. Gen. J. Nicholas Podier, told him that Sawyer, Kieh, Borteh and Jorwley came to his home to request that he join them in staging a coup.30 The hunts for suspects, arrests, brutal attack on the university, and new hostility toward the press succeeded to cow much of the population. The sole opposition came from high school students in the Monrovia Consolidated School System (MCSS). Inspired by the UL students, on August 24, they boycotted classes “in sympathy for our wounded brothers and sisters at the nation’s university.” Although five high school students were arrested, a larger number of these youngsters demonstrated yet again just one week later; they heeded the calls of a pamphlet to boycott classes in “a day of mourning” for the “massacre” at the university.31 The high school protest did not stop until troops were deployed to quell it. The media response to the UL crackdown was cautious. A Daily Observer editorial called on the government to establish a commission to investigate why a warning that troublemakers were on the UL campus went unheeded and to establish rules of conduct to be followed in the future.32 An article in the same newspaper suggested that Liberia would become a democracy despite the doubts raised by recent events.33 A Sunday Observer article vividly described the gloom and fear that descended on the nation since the announcement of the coup plot, but gave credence to Doe’s repeated promises that the democratization of the country would continue and urged the newly formed political parties to press ahead with their campaigns.34

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This cautious reaction testifies to the intimidating effect of the regime’s attack on the press. On August 1, the same day that the Observer papers started to publish again after being forcibly closed half a year prior, two journalists from the independent daily Footprints Today (which had opened earlier in the year) were arrested and held without charges at the Post Stockade in Monrovia. In the preceding weeks, there were mass suspensions of workers in the News Department of the Liberia Broadcasting System—some for a month without pay, most indefinitely. The letters of suspension stated that in the present political situation “all news and radio personnel would have to carry out their assignments with vigilance and dedication.”35 The many protests from abroad, however, could not be stemmed with threats and violence. The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) organized parallel “sieges” of the Liberian embassy in Washington and of the Liberian Mission to the United Nations and the Liberian Consulate-General in New York. The ULAA protesters demanded the immediate resignation of Doe and release of Sawyer, in addition to other political prisoners.36 In Europe, the protests were organized mainly by political parties and human rights organizations. On August 27, 1984, the Labor Party in the Netherlands called for immediate action to protect civil rights in Liberia, and the Dutch Organization of Development Cooperation appealed to the European Parliament to use its influence to stop the turmoil and to facilitate a smooth and peaceful return to civilian rule in Liberia.37 In late September, the International Progress Organization (IPO), based in Brussels, condemned Doe for “waging a campaign of terror directed at crushing his principal opposition” and demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners, the reopening of the University of Liberia, and the reinstatement of the university’s staff members. Among the participants at the IPO meeting were Ramsey Clark, U.S. attorney general under Lyndon Johnson, and Dr. George Wald, Nobel Prize winner in biology, who called on the United States to immediately withdraw all “economic, financial and military support for the undemocratic Doe regime.”38 In Africa, on August 24, an ad hoc organization of professionals was led by prominent academics, members of the legal profession, and trade unionists—established the International Campaign for the Release of Amos Sawyer and All Other Political Prisoners in Liberia.39 On the diplomatic level, the ambassadors of the United States and France as well as the charge d’affaires of Britain and West Germany to Liberia demanded a clarification from the Doe government regarding what exactly ensued during the UL raid.40 This is the first time that countries friendly to Liberia joined to demand an explanation of the conduct of its military government. Most substantively, in September, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee denied the Reagan administration’s request for increased aid

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to Liberia. Instead, the committee decided to maintain the 1983 sums of $40 million in economic and $12 million in military assistance. Although these amounts were substantial, they were less than what the administration wanted. Furthermore, the legislative committee went out of its way to explain its refusal. In a section of their report devoted to the matter, committee lawmakers of both political parties emphasized their disapproval of recent events in Liberia and asked the Reagan administration to “convey our concern about the arrest of Dr. Sawyer in the strongest possible terms to the Liberian military council.”41 No previous Liberian government had ever faced such a volume and intensity of international protest. Still, Doe was not yet ready to release Sawyer, nor could he respond directly to the condemnations coming from abroad. Thus, he continued to create “evidence” of the planned coup and to bash the UL students and administration. As in the previous year, Defense Minister Gray D. Allison attended to Doe’s dirty work. In two separate statements on August 31, Allison offered far-fetched accounts of the alleged coup and the UL student protests. He attributed the purported coup as being the effort of sixty-six “saboteurs” who were trained abroad and intent on establishing a socialist government in Liberia. He called on Liberians to be wary of these adversaries. Furthermore, Allison revised the events surrounding the UL protests. According to him, the university faculty “incited and encouraged to riot or demonstrate” and staged “a fake wake . . . lasting until three o’clock in the morning, with a casket representing the remains of the head of state and other officials of government.” The university president, faculty, and students, he claimed, used UL buses to transport high school students, who converged on the university campus with rocks, sticks, and iron rods.42 At the same time that he enlisted Allison to put blame on his rivals, Doe tried to calm the situation. Yet the Liberian leader was not willing to make any real concessions to do so. First, Doe tried to propitiate the LCC due to its prominent standing in Liberia. Unlike the high school and university students, who represented a small sliver of the population, the churches played an active role in the everyday lives of many Liberians. Some 85 percent of Liberians were Christian and, as such, could be expected to follow the LCC’s lead should it oppose the actions of the regime. The task of appeasing the LCC was assigned to INA Vice President Harry Moniba, an educated professional who could easily relate to the churchmen. On August 30, Moniba invited LCC officials to a meeting with INA members. The discussion, which was focused on the manner in which to achieve a peaceful atmosphere in the country, was determinedly cordial. Based on Moniba’s statement to the media, the INA vice president offered the churches an inclusive role in societal affairs (much as Doe did earlier with the chiefs

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and elders to win their support in his pursuit of Quiwonkpa).43 The meeting apparently served its purpose, as the churches, by and large, reverted to their previous quietism. In another move toward calming the situation, the Doe government released official casualty figures for the UL raid. The release followed the claim by the Liberian Community Association in New York that over fifty students were killed and more than four hundred were injured in the attack.44 Shortly thereafter, Liberia’s Minister of Health Martha Sendolo Belleh announced that 102 students were wounded and admitted to one case of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Information Ministry declared that anyone claiming a missing relative during the “UL incident” should “freely and fearlessly” report the case to itself or the Justice Ministry. None of the government offices admitted to any deaths in the assault.45 In an indirect and rare critique of the government’s conduct, the president of the LCC, Archbishop George D. Brown, expressed concern that parents and guardians of presumed missing people from the UL attack were not coming forward to inform the authorities and wondered whether they were afraid to do so. Nonetheless, he praised the government’s disclosure of the number of injured persons in the university crisis.46 To restore a semblance of normalcy, in mid-September, Doe took the first step toward reopening the University of Liberia. Specifically, the Liberian leader appointed a new university president and two vice presidents. Doe’s choosing of these administrators gave him a degree of control, which he previously lacked, over the university decision makers. The new president was Dr. Joseph Morris, a career diplomat who formerly served as ambassador to Sierra Leone, assistant minister of foreign affairs, and deputy minister of education. To Doe, Dr. Morris’s main qualification for the post was likely that he had not made any waves in his government positions and was less likely to do so than a professional academic, who in principle would have been more suited for the job. About a week later, with a loyal university leadership in place, Doe’s soldiers left the UL campus.47 Although the military withdrew from its positions there, the university would not be open again until the end of November. Faculty members who were regarded as hostile to the regime were not reappointed.48 Many of those who were newly hired were either members of Doe’s ethnic group or sympathetic to the NDPL.49 According to Patrick Seyon, Doe’s appointees “were people that would not have said no to anything that Doe wanted to do.” The detainees were finally released in early October by an apparently reluctant Doe. Downplaying his backtracking, Doe declared the release in a studiously casual manner. That is, not as a forceful statement at the Executive Mansion, the symbol of executive power, but during a two-day visit to Careysburg District and Gibi Territory in the hinterlands, home to

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the “ordinary Liberians” to whom Doe claimed to belong. He delivered the announcement on October 6, in the town of Kakata in Gibi Territory.50 To justify his turnabout, he offered various and sundry explanations, including: that the release met Liberia’s need for peace and unity during the transition to general elections; that it was in commemoration of the second anniversary of a disastrous landslide in the northern mining town of Nye Nye; and that it came in response to the request of high school students who had not joined in the student protests.51 To further belittle the significance of his flip-flop, Doe announced it amid the discussion of other matters, including the petition of Gibo Territory for county status and the launching of development programs.52 Thousands of people arrived at Barclay Training Center to welcome their released friends, relatives, and leaders.53 Despite the celebrations, questions were being raised. The Daily Observer wondered, among other things, why nothing regarding the initial accusations and the findings surrounding the charges had been published.54 Despite his release of the political prisoners, Doe managed to get rid of many of the prominent individuals who he had initially tried to eradicate by way of the coup charges. Within a few days of their release, Podier was fired from the INA and retired from the military; Larry Borteh and Jerry Jorwley were cut from the army and the INA; and Harry Yuan left for the United States.55 Doe failed, however, to harm the LPP and to push Sawyer out of the political arena. The LPP detainees were kept behind bars for only about six weeks, and upon their release resumed their preparations for launching the party. Undaunted, Doe and his advisors remained determined to see the end of Sawyer. After letting the matter lie low for several weeks, they came up with new tactics. In December, the government ordered Auditor General J. Seyon Browne to audit the operations of the dissolved Constitution Commission, a committee which Sawyer headed.56 While Brown investigated, two attempts were made on Sawyer’s life. In January 1985, an unmarked car of the type associated with the security services nearly drove Sawyer off a cliff as he drove past a dangerous bend on the road to his home in Cargow. In the early hours of February 3, unidentified men set his house on fire. Sawyer and his neighbors extinguished the blaze with minimal damage.57 The audit yielded better results for Doe. On February 5, Brown instructed SECOM to suspend the processing of all documents Sawyer had submitted to register the LPP, pending the completion of the audit and the submission of a report to the government.58 On February 12, the INA’s Executive Committee barred Sawyer from all political activity. He was forbidden from holding meetings, giving interviews, delivering speeches of a political or constitutional nature with individuals or groups, until the audit was completed.59

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Doe and his coterie were largely able to get away with framing Sawyer in an audit that was obviously politically motivated. Other Liberians were powerless to stop him, and the Reagan administration was disinclined to do so. However, the independent daily, Talking Drums, sounded a rare note of protest, alongside one of caution: Dr Sawyer is only the first of opposition leaders likely to be banned by Gen. Doe in his ambition to convert his military rule into a civilian administration. . . let the political leaders not be frightened into submission otherwise they would have paved the way for Gen. Doe to circumvent the democratic process of winning, in the case, retaining power.60

The warning was prescient. NOTES 1. “Man of the Year: Dr. Amos Sawyer,” Sunday Observer, January 1, 1984, 1, 10. 2. Sawyer, interview. 3. Eddie Momoh, “Civilian Rule Politics (2),” West Africa, August 27, 1984, 1716. 4. “Action Party Questions Guidelines,” Daily Observer, August 16, 1984, 10. 5. Sawyer, interview. 6. “MOJA Forms Political Party,” Express, August 3, 1984, 1, 8. 7. “‘Resolutions Are Not Democratic’—Dr. Amos Sawyer,” Daily Observer, August 6, 1984, 1, 10. 8. “Politics in Full Swing,” Daily Observer, August 6, 1984, 1, 8. 9. “MOJA Launches Liberian People’s Party,” Daily Observer, August 14, 1984, 1, 10. 10. Associated Press, “Liberian Leader Cuts Short Foreign Trip after Coup Rumors,” August 18, 1984, Nexis Uni. 11. Associated Press, “Four Liberians Arrested for ‘Security Reasons,’” August 20, 1984, Nexis Uni. 12. “Liberia: In Brief; Order for the Arrest of Special Election Commissioner,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 17, 1984, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 20, 1984, Nexis Uni. 13. “Official Surrenders, Tells of ‘Coup Plot,’” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 23, 1984, Daily Report (August 1984): T8. 14. “Sawyer’s Party to Hold Rally,” Daily Observer, August 22, 1984, 1, 10. Tom Kamara, “Briefing: The Liberian Press under Dictatorship, 1980–1990: A Comment,” Liberia Forum 5, no. 9 (1989): 66–7. 15. “Sawyer Accused of Socialist Plot,” Daily Observer, August 21, 1984, 1, 10. “Doe Addresses Interim National Assembly 22 Aug,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 22, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T3–T5.

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16. “Liberian Leader Cuts Short Foreign Trip after Coup Rumors.” 17. “Blamo Dispels ‘Fake Coup’ Rumour,” Daily Observer, August 15, 1984, 1. 18. “Decree against ‘Spread of Rumors’ Released,” T1. 19. “LPP Issues Statement,” Daily Observer, August 21, 1984, 1, 10. “Sawyer’s Party to Hold Rally,” 1, 10. 20. “Church Leaders Express Concern,” Daily Observer, August 27, 1984, 10. 21. “Release Sawyer, Kieh, UL Urges,” Daily Observer, August 21, 1984, 1, 10. Liebenow, Liberia, 261. 22. “Student Protest at Arrests in Liberia and Doe’s Warning to the University,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 21, 1984, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 23, 1984, Nexis Uni. 23. “LPP Cancels Rally for Sawyer,” Daily Observer, August 27, 1984, 8. 24. “Profiles of Political Parties,” Liberia Alert (January 1986): 29–30. Sawyer, interview. 25. “Doe Orders University Closed. Entire Administration Sacked,” Daily Observer, August 23, 1984, 1, 10. “Student Protest at Arrests in Liberia and Doe’s Warning to the University.” 26. Seyon, interview. 27. “Liberia: University under Threat,” West Africa, November 26, 1984, 2383. 28. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 9 (1984): 183. “Students Clash with Police in Monrovia,” August 22, 1984, secret, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (01/01/1984–01/25/1985)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. “Soldiers Move onto UL Campus, Several Treated at Hospitals for Injuries,” Daily Observer, August 23, 1984, 1, 10. 29. “Doe Orders Flogging of Leaflet Distributors,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 24, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T8. Liebenow, Liberia, 261. 30. Associated Press, “Former Justice Minister Implicates Government’s No. 2 Man in Coup Plot,” August 23, 1984, Nexis Uni. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1984): 189. 31. “MCSS Schools Set up Committee—to Ease Tension on Campuses,” Daily Observer, August 29, 1984, 1. Leon Dash, “Liberian Students Boycott Classes in ‘Day of Mourning,’” Washington Post, September 1, 1984, A30, Nexis Uni. 32. “Special Inquiry Needed,” Daily Observer, August 27, 1984, 4. 33. S. Vaanii Paasewe II, “Building Democracy in Liberia,” Daily Observer, August 30, 1984, 4. 34. “Moving Along the Critical Path,” Sunday Observer, September 2, 1984, 4. 35. “Two Journalists Detained without Charges,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 6, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T3. “Public Works Ministry Reacts,” Daily Observer, August 7, 1984, 3.

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Williams, “LBS Sets ‘Equal Time’ for Politicians,” 12. 36. MOJA, Research and Information Committee, “Call for Urgent Action,” Facts, Position Statements, News Reports and Suggestions for Action, Monrovia: Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) (September 1984): 40–1. Marvine Howe, “50 Died in Protests, Liberian Group Charges,” New York Times, August 30, 1984, 7, Nexis Uni. 37. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 218. 38. “Liberia: Statement from Brussels,” West Africa, October 8, 1984, 2061. 39. Wonkeryor, Liberia Military Dictatorship, 212. 40. “Western Envoys Seek ‘Clarifications’ from Ministry,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 29, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T2. 41. “Liberia: U.S. Congress Concern for Sawyer,” West Africa, October 8, 1984, 2061. U.S. Department of State, “AF Update No. 7,” Case No. F-2017–00020, Doc No. C06246017, confidential, March 8, 1985, Department of State Records. 42. “Allison Names 66 ‘Saboteurs,’” Sunday Observer, September 2, 1984, 1, 10. “UL Authorities Incited Students, Says Min. Allison. But Former UL Prexy Denies Allegation,” Sunday Observer, September 2, 1984, 1, 10, 12. 43. “INA Members Meet with Church Council Officials,” Monrovia Domestic Service, August 30, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1984): T2–T3. 44. Howe, “50 Died in Protests, Liberian Group Charges.” 45. “Health Minister Belleh Reports: 102 Injured in UL Incident: Bullet Wounds, Sexual Abuse Confirmed,” Sunday Observer, September 2, 1984, 12. U.S. Department of State, “Africa in the U.S. Press, September 7, 1984,” Case No. F-2017–00020, Doc No. C06246068, September 7, 1984, 3, Department of State Records. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1984): 183. 46. “Church Leader Praises Government Disclosure,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 3, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1984): T3. 47. “Doe Appoints Former Ambassador as University Head,” Monrovia Domestic Service, September 9, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1984): T2. Gabriel Williams, “Remove Soldiers from UL Campus. Expatriate Staff Request in Meeting with UL Prexy,” Daily Observer, September 18, 1984, 1, 10. 48. Seyon, interview. 49. “Liberia: University under Threat,” 2383. 50. “Podier, Sawyer, Others Released,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 6, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1984): T1. 51. “Sawyer, Podier Others Released without Charge,” Daily Observer, October 8, 1984, 1, 10.

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“Further on Release,” Monrovia Domestic Service, October 7, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1984): T1. 52. “CIC Doe and Party Back to Capital,” Footprints Today, October 8, 1984, 1, 10. 53. “Further on Release,” T1. 54. “Unanswered Questions,” Daily Observer, October 8, 1984, 10. “Letter to the Editor: Explanations Needed,” Daily Observer, October 10, 1984, 5. “Letter to the Editor, Very Mad,” Daily Observer, October 11, 1984, 5. 55. “Liberia: Reasons for the Releases,” West Africa, October 22, 1984, 2112. “Podier Retired by Doe,” Daily Observer, October 10, 1984, 1, 10. “Liberia: A Question of Democracy,” West Africa, October 15, 1984, 2068. 56. “Suspension of LPP Document Processing Requested,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 5, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1985): T2. 57. Sawyer, interview. “Sawyer Asks for Protection,” Monrovia Domestic Service, February 4, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1985): T3. 58. “Suspension of LPP Document Processing Requested,” T2. 59. “Liberia: Sawyer Suspended from Politics,” West Africa, February 18, 1985, 337. 60. Ben Mensah, “Give General Doe a Good Fight,” Talking Drums, February 25, 1985, 11–12, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, March 21, 1985, 73–74.

Chapter 14

Assault on the Rival Parties

The rival political parties were of immense importance to Doe in that their existence exemplified his commitment to democratic elections. The de facto leader of Liberia could not dissolve them and run in a one-party race. To do so would risk the support of the United States and European allies. At the same time, the rival political parties were the chief obstacle to his permanency. To resolve the dilemma, Doe selected the parties that would be permitted to run against him, and actively worked to weaken them so that they could not prevent him and his allies from victory. Due to his natural reluctancy to share it with few (if any) people, it is unknown as to when exactly Doe reached this resolution. Still, the evidence of its existence emerges from the all-out war of attrition that Doe waged against the parties.1 The assault on the parties effectively began as soon as the ban on political activity was lifted and parties started to form. The financial and signature clauses of the SECOM guidelines, penned in August 1984, were designed to hinder the attainment of party status for the smaller and ethnically affiliated parties. Decree 75 A, which was drafted in June 1984 and shortly thereafter rescinded, enabled SECOM to refuse to register parties and candidates whose ideological activities or views departed from Liberia’s intrinsic values. The two ultimatums requiring high-ranking government officials planning to run in the elections to resign their posts, which were formulated in March 1983 and August 1984, were aimed at maintaining a low number of contenders. During the party registration period, roughly spanning from September 1984 to the beginning of September 1985, these sporadic preparatory actions ordered by Doe and the PRC gave way to a systemic assault executed primarily by SECOM, but also by the Supreme Court, county superintendents, and the security services. This coordinated attack included an inordinately protracted and complicated party registration process, various hurdles in the way of party canvassing and campaigning, the detainment of party activists, and the delegitimization of party leaderships. Since these blows were delivered 269

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within the same time frame, parties found themselves attacked from several directions at once and reeling from one wallop after another. With Doe kept in the background, ostensibly occupied solely with the affairs of his country and own party, the assault was led by SECOM chair, Emmett Harmon. The head of SECOM identified more with Doe’s presidential aspirations than with the public responsibilities of his office. In addition to his loyalty to Doe, Harmon brought a great deal of initiative, enthusiasm, and vigor to the assault. He used his position to constrain and interfere with parties’ campaigning, delay their registration, and otherwise hamstring their operations. Harmon had a significant influence on the party registration process, as SECOM was the first station that the parties had to pass through on the way to attaining legal status. OBSTACLES TO CANVASSING AND CAMPAIGNING Harmon laid the foundation for his interference with the parties’ campaigning in a press conference on September 2, 1984. He cautioned the prospective parties against campaigning before obtaining permission from SECOM.2 This warning, which had no basis in the SECOM guidelines, entailed serious implications for the aspiring parties. One consequence is that the edict made it difficult for them to gain the necessary financial and organizational backing. To begin the registration process, political parties needed to raise $50,000 in cash and $100,000 in security guaranties, as well as to win the support of 3,000 members (500 in each of Liberia’s six counties). Of the eleven party groupings that were formed, only four (excluding Doe’s NDPL) managed to meet these requirements: the United Party (UP), headed by Edward Kesselly; the Liberian Action Party (LAP), led by Tuan Wreh; the Liberian People’s Party (LPP), under the leadership of Amos Sawyer; and the United People’s Party (UPP), headed by Gabriel Baccus Matthews.3 The warning also gave SECOM the unprecedented power to determine when a given political party could campaign. This undermined the democratic principle of free political mobilization. No longer conceived as a natural right, campaigning became justification for arresting or harassing party activists. In November and December 1984, respectively, superintendents Colonel Gayflor Y. Johnson of Lofa County and Colonel John Gondah Walkie of Nimba County ordered for the arrests of UP and LAP representatives for illicitly canvassing for members. Thereafter, in a double game that allowed Doe to deceivingly pose as the guardian of the parties, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs J. B. Blamo released the detainees on the grounds that SECOM had issued the parties valid campaigning permits.4 Around the same time, SECOM sent a letter to eight superintendents informing them that the

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LPP had been authorized to conduct political activities in their counties.5 However, just about one month later, Sawyer complained that some LPP activists campaigning in these counties faced “provocations” and that others were detained or harassed by the orders of their respective county superintendents.6 Thus, although it did not explicitly call for any form of hindering political activity, the September 2 edict nonetheless facilitated the harassment and detention of some affiliates of the prospective rival parties. THE PARTY REGISTRATION PROCESS The party registration process was a via dolorosa for all parties besides Doe’s NDPL. As outlined in the SECOM guidelines, the procedure consisted of two phases: pregistration and probate. In the preregistration stage, the aspiring party had to provide proof that it met the financial and organizational backing requirements. If SECOM declared that these requirements were met, the prospective party advanced to the probate phase. In this stage, the aspiring party sought approval in the probate court, which once again reviewed the documents associated with the financial and organizational backing requirements. In both phases, applicants could submit complaints. Until these grievances were fully addressed, the prospective party could not proceed to the next stage or legal status. While rival parties faced many obstacles in the registration process, Doe’s NDPL breezed through it. The NDPL presented its financial documents before SECOM on September 11, 1984, and was promptly authorized to canvas for members. It completed its preregistration requirements on November 8, submitted its documents to the probate court on November 15, and was certified as a full-fledged party on November 19.7 The entire procedure took only one month and thirteen days, a small fraction of the time it would take for the other parties. The speedy registration process especially reserved for the NDPL was possible since SECOM and the probate court disregarded challenges to the party’s list. On October 4, 1984, Keikura Kpoto, chairman of the NDPL’s Organizing Committee, presented SECOM with the financial requirements and the names of 23,000 registered party members—over seven times the 3,000 required.8 This astonishing figure was attained by means of chicanery. Registering party members was a laborious process, as activists had to travel throughout the country to obtain signatures one by one. NDPL activists shortened this process by copying hundreds of names from the voting register held by SECOM. When people who never registered complained that they found their names on the party membership list, SECOM cochairman Albert T. White assigned blame on these individuals themselves and not on the NDPL.

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While White held the people whose names had been misused responsible, he defended Doe’s party by listing a series of reasons as to why these errors may have occurred. On November 7, the LAP filed an official complaint demanding cessation of the NDPL’s registration process pending an investigation and the publication of the findings. The next day, without leaving time for SECOM to respond, the NDPL applied to the probate court for legal recognition.9 SECOM ignored the LAP’s complaint, and the probate court granted the NDPL the status of a legal party. The two phases of the registration process provided Harmon and Doe with many opportunities to harass, exhaust, and enervate the rival parties. It seems that their aims were to entangle the parties in the registration process to such a degree that the smaller-sized ones would have little energy left for campaigning, and the two larger ones would be pushed out of the race or quit of their own accord. Their apparent goals spared Doe, at least for the time being, of the need to issue an executive order to remove his opposition. The harassment did not start smoothly. Initially, Doe encountered obstacles in both SECOM and in the probate court. SECOM began to process the UP’s registration without any obstruction. The UP presented its financial securities to the oversight committee on September 28. About one week later, SECOM declared the party’s preregistration payment in order and authorized it to campaign for the members it needed to register as a political party. In rapid succession, SECOM rejected Minister of Finance G. Alvin Jones’s complaint that the UP’s monetary sureties were invalid, published the UP’s membership list, rebuffed challenges by “concerned citizens” claiming fraud in the formation of the UP list, and granted the UP, on January 4, 1985, with the certification it needed to proceed to the probate court.10 The UP’s relatively easy passage through the preregistration phase can be attributed to two factors. One aspect is that, after the NDPL, the UP was the first party to present its documents to SECOM. The UP’s quick start to the pregistration process in mind, SECOM members may still not have fully grasped Doe’s wishes. The other component is that Edward Kesselly was the son of Benyah Kesselly, who was—until only a few months before UP received its license to continue to the probate court—a member of SECOM. Thus, the committee members may have had a soft spot for the younger Kesselly and his party.11 Doe was enraged that SECOM passed the UP through the preregistration phase relatively easily. In the days following the UP’s certification to proceed to the probate court, Doe dismissed all SECOM members, aside from Harmon, and replaced them with officials who would be willing to distort the registration process in his favor. He did so without the authorization of the INA, which was required by Decree 75. At least two of the newly appointed committee officials were registered members of Doe’s party; one of them,

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David Gbala, was the NDPL’s regional coordinator and brother of the party’s assistant deputy secretary-general.12 The replacement of the SECOM members made the registration processes of the other three parties much more difficult. LAP, headed by Tuan Wreh, submitted its documents to SECOM on October 24, 1984, about one month after the UP had done so. Again, baseless charges, this time against the LAP, were submitted. G. Alvin Jones filed the same objections to LAP’s financial sureties as he had submitted concerning the UP.13 When Jones’s complaints were rejected, two new complaints were filed: one by “elders, chiefs and people of Lower Grand Gedeh county,” and the other by Paramount Chief Tuazama from Nimba County. The majority of obstacles to both the registration and campaigning of the rival parties originated in Grand Gedeh and Nimba counties, both of whose superintendents were NDPL members. In both of these counties, complainants averred, albeit after the 21-day limit for filing objections had passed, that their names had been placed on the LAP’s membership list without their consent. In yet another double game, Doe, acting as though he had no connection to the filing of the complaints, called for their withdrawal. Unsurprisingly, his appeal went unheeded.14 The new SECOM accepted the late charges against the LAP. After the UP and LAP passed the SECOM stage, Doe made it more difficult for them by putting up obstacles in the probate phase. In doing so, the Liberian leader felt some pushback. Probate court Judge Luvenia Ash-Thompson rejected, on the grounds of “legal mischief,” complaints of irregularities in the UP’s membership list submitted by two residents of Grand Gedeh County. Judge Ash-Thompson also dismissed two objections, the first submitted by a committee from Lower Grand Gedeh headed by Isaac K. Doe and the second by Paramount Chief Tuazama from Nimba County, to the LAP’s membership list.15 In these two cases, the objectors insisted that their names were placed on the LAP’s list without their consent and demanded that they be removed. The accusations against the UP and LAP inevitably protracted their probate processes. However, Judge Ash-Thompson apparently dealt with them as expeditiously as possible, granting the UP probate in just under six weeks (February 18, 1985), and LAP in just under seven (March 1, 1985). Given the resistance of some involved with the probate stage, Doe erected a new hurdle: an appeal to the Supreme Court. Since it had not been included in SECOM’s original outline of the registration process, the Supreme Court became an additional body involved in the procedure. Although they were ultimately rejected, appeals made to the court nonetheless further protracted the registration process. Conveniently, the supreme court’s chief justice, Emmanuel Gbalazeh, was a Doe appointee. The outcomes of the Supreme Court appeals were rather felicitous for Doe. Gbalazeh played a sophisticated double game. In a show of legal propriety,

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he dismissed both the objection of the UP that Doe’s people submitted to the probate as well as a citizens’ petition accusing the LAP of electoral fraud (the petition’s signatories used false names and the lawyer who submitted it lacked the legal status to do so).16 Nonetheless, Justice Gbalazeh kept both parties embroiled in the proceedings by, among other strategies, allowing for appeals to his decisions, which are ordinarily not subject to review. The appeal of the UP decision was scheduled for late June, and that of the LAP ruling would not be heard until October. There was a fair likelihood that the latter would not take place before the elections on October 15. Whereas the UP and LAP were eventually granted legal status, albeit after several obstacles, the LPP and UPP, as more stable and established groups, were subjected to greater efforts to deny them from obtaining official party rank. In the preregistration phase, the LPP was delayed without ever being allowed to complete its registration. The UPP was permitted to get only to the beginning of the probate phase. Furthermore, the LPP and UPP were treated much more harshly than were the smaller parties. The registration processes of UP and LAP were drawn out by means of baseless challenges and appeals to the Supreme Court. Regarding the LPP and UPP, however, SECOM not only delayed their preregistrations, it tried to force them out of the race. SECOM employed two main tactics against the LPP. One was inordinate procrastination. The committee protracted the LPP’s certification to the extent that the party never reached the probate stage. Even before the process began, it took SECOM a full eleven weeks to publish the LPP’s membership list— longer than it took to do so for any other party.17 After it finally published the list, SECOM drew out the procedure of resolving what were inevitable setbacks for the LPP. The oversight committee began by announcing that five people asked that their names be removed from the party membership list. When the LPP collected five new signatures, SECOM did not simply accept the additional names. Instead, it republished the entire list. Thereafter, the committee opened the list up to an additional review, which it declared would take a full twenty-day period. Five days after the conclusion of this time span, SECOM raised yet another complaint and instituted an additional twenty-day review period. Following this further deferment, SECOM dangled the promise of certification before the LPP without ever keeping it. On July 8, 1984, the committee granted the prospective political party with verbal assurance that it would receive party status, then postponed the date that this was to happen on, first to the 10th and then to the 12th, before shortly thereafter banning the LPP altogether.18 The other tactic that SECOM used against the LPP was to obstruct the party’s appointment of a new leader. Since Sawyer’s arrest—which was in and of itself part of an assault on the LPP leadership—in August 1984, SECOM made it difficult for the party to assign a new and constant leader. Sawyer was

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briefly replaced by Dusty Wolokolie, who served as acting chair until August 28. Wolokolie’s leadership came to a quick halt since he was imprisoned and charged with having “injured the reputation of government officials.” Then, on December 3, eight LPP activists were arrested under the same charge. Finally, on February 13, 1985, Tom Kamara, chair of the LPP’s public affairs committee, was arrested (for a second time) as he was about to deliver party documents to SECOM.19 On March 1, the now leaderless LPP applied to SECOM to appoint John Karweaye as its acting chairman. SECOM rejected the application on the grounds that Karweaye had not been elected by a majority of the original LPP organizing committee who had signed the party’s articles of incorporation. This was another Catch-22: with Sawyer banned, and Wolokolie and Kamara in prison, three of the four original signatories had been made unavailable. Compounding the affront, SECOM refused to hold discussions with the LPP on party matters until a new chairperson was authorized. On March 11, SECOM authorized Karweaye’s appointment at last, but only after the LPP’s organizing committee changed its articles of incorporation.20 The two tactics employed by SECOM against the LPP were designed to dishearten and impede the operations of the party. Both maneuvers were galling to the LPP. The procrastination in certifying the party was so overt, ingenious, and much longer than that suffered by the other parties that it was greatly provocative to the LPP members. Similarly, the evident Catch-22 placed in the way of the party’s appointment of Karweaye, after the government itself had taken out the party’s first and second tier leadership, tremendously aggravated them. The LPP was careful to avoid sparring with SECOM so as not to provide a pretext for further punishment. Thus, in late May 1985, when SECOM announced the 20-day review period for the five replacement names, Karweaye responded with the following calculated statement: “we accept the rules as they are and we will wait until the twenty days expire after which we shall call for audience again.”21 The UPP, on the other hand, suffered mainly from not being permitted to canvass. This ban, enacted specifically on the UPP, likely sheds light on the party’s adequate funds and number of supporters—advantages that made them a target. Both of these strengths were evident when Gabriel Baccus Matthews presented SECOM with the party’s financial securities totaling $300,706.07, as hundreds of people from various parts of Liberia gathered and screamed their support for the UPP in front of SECOM’s offices.22 The prohibition on the UPP’s right to solicit was issued three days after SECOM granted the party with letters of clearance to canvass in all of the political subdivisions of Liberia. This was another instance—the previous ones occurred toward the end of 1984—in which permission to canvass was

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withdrawn immediately after it was accorded. After UPP activists presented the authorization letters to the office of the superintendent of Montserrado County, SECOM ceased processing the UPP’s documents and suspended the party from engaging in further political activity. These drastic measures taken by the electoral committee seem to have been prompted by the success of the information leaflets that the UPP previously distributed. According to Matthews’s figures, the party recruited some 12,500 members in the two days that it canvassed.23 Since SECOM had already authorized the UPP to campaign, Harmon had to come up with an inventive explanation for the turnabout, and he did. He argued that the UPP had circulated pamphlets in contravention of SECOM’s guidelines, which, he maintained, permitted campaigns to issue leaflets and pamphlets only after the party was probated. Despite Matthews’s protest that no such restriction existed, county superintendents enforced the ban. At the end of January 1985, UPP activists were arrested in Nimba County and in northern Liberia on charges of distributing campaign materials.24 Like its conduct toward the LPP, SECOM’s treatment of the UPP was intentionally provocative. After five weeks of appealing to Harmon to lift the suspension, the UPP finally issued a press release. In its statement, the UPP denounced the obstacles that SECOM was putting in the way of its registration efforts and charged that the committee made a mockery of the entire electoral process. This provided Harmon with a pretext to fine the party $600 and to humiliate it by demanding a letter of apology for its “contemptuous attitude.”25 Harmon’s tactic seems to have been to draw Matthews to refuse the humiliating demands, thereby enabling SECOM to refuse to certify the party. The UPP avoided the trap; it complied with Harmon’s demands.26 After the UPP finally received its party certification from SECOM, Doe skipped over the refractory probate court and turned directly to the more amenable Supreme Court. On the same day that the UPP applied to the probate court, several members of the NDPL, led by INA member John Bartuah, filed an objection to the party’s registration with the Supreme Court. They claimed that the UPP, as allegedly a “socialist-oriented group,” should be barred.27 In principle, this challenge harkened back to Decree 75 A, which forbade ideologically unacceptable parties from running. However, the decree had, by then, already been rescinded. Nonetheless, for the next two months, Doe’s lawyers kept the UPP busy with court proceedings. Other Means and Agents In addition to the distortions of the registration process, other means and agents were employed to torment rival candidates and parties: Edward Kesselly, head of the UP, was audited; the UPP’s secretary-general, Oscar Jaryee

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Quiah, was enticed into going over to Doe’s NDPL; unrealistic deadlines for the completion of the party registration process were suddenly announced; and the leaders of all the would-be parties were briefly imprisoned. The audit of Kesselly was an opportunistic piggyback on that of Sawyer. On December 4, 1984, around the time at which the audit of Sawyer was set in motion, Auditor General J. Seyon Browne informed Kesselly that the operations of the Constitutional Advisory Assembly, which Kesselly had headed the year before, would be audited. No reason for doing so was provided. In addition to serving as a means of harassing Kesselly, the audit was used to try to prevent the UP’s probate. When Brown informed Kesselly of the impending audit, the UP was still in the preregistration phase. The auditor general appealed to the probate court to reject the UP’s application for probate on the grounds that the party was being audited. Then, when Judge Ash-Thompson rejected the UP’s request, Doe ordered the probate court to cease the process it had begun. Although the court did not comply, the audit went on until June 19, 1985. It was not until October 3 of that same year, only three days before the elections, that Kesselly was finally cleared of any suspicion of wrongdoing, although only unofficially.28 The results of the audit were never published. Unlike Sawyer, Kesselly was permitted to campaign while he was being audited. However, throughout this period he was repeatedly asked for financial documents relating to his time as chairman of the CAA, and the threat surrounding the audit hung over his head like a Damocles’s sword. While SECOM was preventing the UPP from canvassing, the NDPL applied pressure on the UPP secretary-general, Oscar Jaryee Quiah, before enticing him into leaving the party in January. Quiah was vulnerable because he had been jailed for tax evasion in 1984 and released on condition that he pay his debt to the government. As he had not yet done so, he could be detained again. In fact, Doe had less interest in recruiting Quiah than in taking him away from the UPP. In late March 1985, about two months after he joined the NDPL, Quiah was among several persons who were briefly detained, and then expelled from the party—purportedly for defaulting on debts to the government.29 The preregistration deadlines were announced on February 9, when all the parties were stuck in one phase or another of the process (the UP was in probate, while the LAP, the LPP and the UPP were in preregistration), and none were close to completing it. Harmon announced that the preregistration requirements would have to be met by March 1, 1985. On March 8, Harmon added yet another deadline to the procedure; he declared that all proposed political parties whose documents were not probated by July 1 would not be allowed to partake in the ensuing general elections.30 It is unknown whether the deadlines, which would have left the NDPL to run in a one-party race, were coordinated with Doe or Harmon. Either way, they reflect an impatience

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with the labors of manipulating the registration procedure and the desire to be rid of the rival parties in one great swoop. The deadlines were never enforced. Doe needed parties to run against to lend a veneer of legitimacy to the victory he planned. Thus, on February 11, 1985, at an Armed Forces Day ceremony, he hastened to reaffirm that the government would continue the process of returning the country to civilian rule and denied rumors that he would declare himself lifelong president of Liberia. In early March 1985, Minister of Information Karpeh admitted to the West German News Agency (DPA) that mistakes had been made in the party registration process, but claimed that they were not done so intentionally and that SECOM had already cleared several parties to go to the probate court (in fact, it had cleared only the UP and the LAP).31 Having been duly ignored, the deadlines—probably still to Doe’s satisfaction—merely caused the aspiring parties even more consternation. Doe and his cohorts relentlessly found yet another way of tormenting the would-be parties: by arresting their leaders. To justify doing so, they devised the false charge of a planned coup. On April 1, Colonel Moses Flanzamaton, deputy commander of the Executive Mansion Guard Battalion, was accused of having tried to assassinate Doe by shooting at his car.32 The allegation was made against rumors of coup attempts that Doe and his people had been stoking since Sawyer’s banning. It followed charges in March that William Woodhouse, a former U.S. Marine, and Elmer Glee Johnson, a Liberian national, conspired to kill Doe and overthrow his government.33 On the same day that Flanzamaton’s arrest was ordered, April 4, 1985, Edward Kesselly, Tuan Wreh, Harry Greaves (the deputy of the LAP), and Gabriel Baccus Matthews were also detained for being accused of having offered Flanzamaton $1 million to kill Doe.34 The sole reason that Wolokolie and Kamara were not included in the roundup as well is that they were already behind bars. Since no evidence was found to incriminate them, the four party leaders were released about a week later. Tuan Wreh reported that he was held under degrading conditions, alleging that he was asked to pose for pictures in his underwear, placed in a cell next to rat-infested toilets, and robbed of money and other valuables at his office and home while in jail.35 BUILDING THE NDPL AND ATTAINING THE DESIRED CONSTELLATION OF ELECTORAL RIVALS While the rival parties were under assault from all directions and the larger parties’ campaigns were willfully disrupted, the NDPL actively recruited new members and campaigned with all the vigor it could muster. Simultaneously, Doe completed the selection of his electoral rivals.

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In December 1984, the NDPL organized a massive rally in Monrovia, in which participants called on Doe to become the party’s presidential candidate—a proposition he accepted.36 In January and February 1985, the NDPL organized shows of support, with streams of admirers from citizen groups and labor unions arriving at its headquarters and the Executive Mansion, publicly declaring their support for Doe and the party. Among these supporters were representatives of the Fullah community in Monrovia, residents of the Careysburg district in Montserrado, members of the Drivers Union, the National Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Liberia, and the National Federation of Cooperative Society.37 Most of this support was bought with government benefits. For example, in January 1984, the government had channeled $30,000 to Montserrado County for development projects. The NDPL also used this time to raise funds and organize. Several labor unions pledged financial contributions, in violation of section 7.1 of the Elections Law. Government employees were strong-armed into making “voluntary” contributions to the NDPL. In ministries headed by members of Doe’s close circle (Finance, Internal Affairs and Justice), persons who did not contribute were threatened with losing their posts. Women and young people, two large and generally neglected groups of voters, were given defined positions in the party. In February and April 1985, respectively, the party organized the Women Brigade and the Youth Wing.38 Between April and July 1985, the NDPL established branches in various places, among them Brewerville in Montserrado County and Virginia in Monrovia. In late July and early August, the NDPL held conventions in Grand Gedeh and Lofa. In both places, Doe was present and party members nominated their candidates for the Senate and House of Representatives.39 In late August, at a national convention which took place in the outskirts of Monrovia, the 260 party delegates present elected their national officers and named Doe as their presidential candidate and Harry Moniba as his running mate. Doe began to choose his electoral rivals in early May, before any of the other parties had obtained legal status. As noted above, Doe initially decided that LPP and UPP would not be permitted to run, while the UP and LAP would. However, he and his advisors apparently felt that two rival parties would not be sufficient to portray the image of free multiparty elections. Accordingly, they concluded that a race consisting of four parties would be more adequate toward this end. For the fourth party to participate in the electoral race, Doe and his advisors decided on the Liberian Unification Party, or the LUP, headed by Gabriel Kpolleh. The LUP seemed to them to be a worthy rival in that it was a party both solid enough to be taken seriously and still weak enough not to pose a threat to Doe. Moreover, Kpolleh had the virtue of being suitably compliant. He was among the few electoral candidates who, as a former teacher,

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had heeded the March 1983 ultimatum requiring government workers who intended to run for political office to resign their positions. Kpolleh was also the only politician to send a letter of commiseration after the purported attempt on Doe’s life by Colonel Flanzamaton.40 Surprisingly, on May 7, the LUP fulfilled its financial obligations.41 The registration itself was delayed by challenges to the LUP’s membership list, which probably stemmed from rumors that the LUP had received the money from Doe. Although Kpolleh insisted that he had been given the money by a “humanitarian lady,” SECOM had to go through the motions of investigating the complaints. In the course of its review, the oversight committee detained a UP leader, J. Winston Gee, after he filed an objection to the LUP’s certification, along with another member of the party who was involved in the filing.42 Shortly thereafter, on August 16, SECOM certified the LUP to proceed to the probate court. With his rivals selected, Doe’s final task was to get rid of the LPP and the UPP, the two parties he was determined to keep out of the race. The job was bestowed upon the INA, which was not involved in hounding rival parties thus far. On July 18, however, it banned the LPP and, on August 26, it did the same to the UPP.43 Both parties were still in the throes of the registration process; the LPP was waiting on SECOM’s assurances of certification and the UPP was trapped in the tentacles of the Supreme Court. Both forbiddances were accompanied by the arrest of the LPP leadership and the tarring of both parties with accusations of socialism. When the LPP was banned, the party’s entire leadership, nine persons in all, was thrown behind bars.44 On June 17, after forty weeks in prison, Wolokolie, having been acquitted of sedition by a unanimous verdict of the People’s Criminal Court A in Monrovia, had finally been released. Just about one month later, however, the INA, determined to continue to keep Wolokolie out of the political sphere, rearrested him for “security reasons.” The supposed threat to Liberia’s security was contained in a trenchant statement Wolokolie had read out at a press conference on July 15. Due to the seemingly intentional delay in SECOM delivering the promised certification of the LPP, Wolokolie voiced his suspicion as to the commission’s commitment to “accord equal treatment to all the political parties,” detailed the many hardships to which the LPP had been subjected since its inception, and expressed his view that there were forces working to subvert the electoral process.45 However irritating the statement must have been to SECOM, it was clearly more a pretext for the repeated incarceration of Wolokolie than the reason. SECOM, complying with the INA directive, dutifully refused to certify the party.46 The accusations of socialism were hurled to justify the banning of the LPP and to substantiate doing so before the Reagan administration. These allegations were preceded by the jettisoning of relations with Moscow in a bid to

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underscore the fact that the Doe regime shared Washington’s staunch anticommunist stance. On July 17, fourteen students, several of them LPP members who visited the Soviet embassy in Monrovia, were arrested by Liberia’s security services. The next day, the same day of the LPP’s banning, the Liberian government severed its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, cynically accusing Moscow of having received secret information from the students about military installations and defense capabilities in Liberia.47 The banning of the UPP was preceded by the vilification of Matthews by two Doe allies, army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Henry S. Dubar and Minister of Defense Gray D. Allison. On August 9, Dubar declared in a press conference that a plot was in the making to destabilize the state. Likewise, Allison repeated many of the same accusations that he had made the previous August; specifically, that detractors, enemies, and saboteurs trained in Ethiopia were working to produce chaos in the country. The only difference between this charge and his previous one was that this time Allison named the UPP and the outlawed LPP rather than MOJA and the PPP as the groups intent on bringing about turmoil.48 On the spurious grounds that their aims and objectives were “not only alien, but detrimental to the peace and stability of the nation,” these accusations paved the way for the INA, in an emergency session chaired by Doe, to ban the UPP and Matthews from further political activity.49 On the same day that the UPP was banned, the INA unanimously voted to instruct the probate and Supreme Court to reject all objections to the probate of the LAP and the LUP. According to the INA decision, the courts were to dismiss all challenges on the grounds that the parties had “shown no inclination to promote or preach ideologies alien or detrimental to our national existence.” Within a few days, the LAP and the LUP were granted full-fledged party status.50 By the beginning of September, Doe had his constellation of electoral rivals. It consisted of two strong parties, the UP and the LAP, that had been thoroughly enervated, and one weak party, the LUP, that did not have the power nor desire to contend with the Liberian ruler in the first place. Doe attained this configuration by exercising the same combination of dogged persistence and shameless mendacity that he had applied previously. He utilized these qualities during his persecution of Sawyer, his pursuit of Quiwonkpa, and his acquisition of power. So long as an opportunity presented itself, he availed himself of proxies—including Harmon, Brown, the county superintendents, the INA, the Supreme Court, civil groups and lone complainants—whom he mobilized to file challenges against the certification of the parties. Each of these individuals and groups had a task to perform. When he deemed it necessary, as he did in the dismissal of the SECOM members, Doe did not hesitate to show his hand.

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To the outrage of his critics, Doe exercised his abusive power in a variety of ways. Liberian newspapers reported the obstacles erected to campaigning, the tribulations of the aspiring parties as they tried to register, and the arrests of rival party leaders. Party heads complained publicly about the hardships created by the financial clause, the arbitrary and illegal dismissal of SECOM members, and the ban on the UPP’s campaigning. The conduct of the NDPL also came under criticism. Kesselly spoke up against the INA’s canvassing (presumably for Doe) and the pressure placed on persons to join the NDPL, including threats to their jobs and business opportunities. Liberian ex–patriots in the United States condemned, and European leaders occasionally raised questions about, these abuses.51 For all practical purposes, the criticism and concern had little impact on the Liberian leader. Doe’s course was that of a man who was confident that he could do whatever he wanted, if not in one way, then in another. His exceptional self-confidence was rooted in the power he had accrued in multiple roles—as head of state, commander in chief of the armed forces, and president of the INA. In these positions, Doe maintained power by effectively silencing outspoken critics and quelling organized protests. Whatever the criticism was against him, Doe had an answer for it. For example, when complaints that the UP was denied access to facilities in Lofa County arose, Doe attributed this discrimination to party officials’ lack of prior notice of their arrival. Thus, he explained away the criticism by advising party officials to inform the superintendents of their arrival time to facilities in their counties in advance—as if this, and not intentional obstruction, was the reason for their denied access.52 In the rare event that Doe did not have an explanation to offer, he instead resorted to strident accusations. For example, the Liberian leader presented his opponents as masterminds of a planned coup or assassination attempt, as well as dangerous communists and socialists. For his western critics, Doe and his allies put on a show of promoting the electoral process even as the former undermined it. For example, in March 1985, Doe sent Johnny Kpor, assistant minister of state for presidential affairs, to London to explain the democratization process in Liberia. Kpor boasted that this was “the first time” that Liberians would have the chance to “really choose” their leaders. The following month, NDPL chairperson Kekwa Kpoto reasserted the government’s commitment to a multiparty system.53 Doe did not encounter a force that was able or willing to take him to task. Indeed, the would-be political parties were largely occupied with their own survival. Before the registration process began, some of the prospective parties, urged on by Matthews, discussed merging or forming a coalition. Shortly thereafter, however, they dropped the idea. The possibility of political unity was ultimately discarded for two main reasons. First, since each party wanted to maintain its own leadership and identity. Second, because they feared that

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it would be easier for Doe to outlaw or otherwise eliminate a single rival party than several.54 Nonetheless, during the registration process, the five would-be parties briefly banded together to condemn the arson of Sawyer’s home, and three parties (the LAP, UP and LPP) issued a joint statement criticizing the arbitrary replacement of two SECOM members.55 However, these moments of unity are exceptions. The parties never joined together to protest or even constrain the arbitrary and ever more restrictive behavior of SECOM, the obstacles the party superintendents placed in the way of campaigning, or any of the many other abuses of the electoral process. In July 1985, the parties briefly came together for what was termed the All-Party Conference. The gathering, organized by Matthews, was yet another attempt to bring the parties together, if not in a political union then at least in a vision of what an electoral process should be. At the first session, on July 5, all five main parties—the LAP, UP, LPP, LUP, and NDPL—were in attendance. The second session, on July 12, was held without the NDPL, which pulled out after the other parties would not agree to have its delegates seated in a strategic position from which they would be able to dominate the conference. The efforts of the delegates at the conference produced an ineffective communiqué, which politely appealed to the government to: free all political prisoners, remove the barriers to the formation of political parties, accord all registered political parties equal access to public facilities and services, and refrain from firing workers or detaining persons on account of their political affiliation.56 None of the appeals were granted, and it is unlikely that the parties expected them to be. The conference, which took place very late in the registration process, was largely a public relations event. Soon after, the LPP and the UPP were banned, while the weak and pliable LUP was given party status. The great care that the rival parties took not to confront Doe head-on was far from the blunt “give and take” that characterizes politics in a healthy democracy. Given that the instruments of force were entirely in the hands of one man who brooked no opposition, as well as their lack of meaningful support from abroad, the rival parties’ nonconfrontational approach toward Doe was the best they could do without undo risk. The United States did not act as a restraining influence. Since shortly after the coup and onward, Washington, in principle, conditioned its aid to Liberia on the eventual holding of democratic, multiparty elections. In principle, too, the Doe regime’s almost total economic dependence on the United States gave Washington the ability to ensure a fair election process in Liberia. Nevertheless, the United States was no more willing to exert its leverage than it had been in the past. For all the mockery Doe was making of the electoral process, he had proved himself an unwaveringly loyal Cold War ally. If his

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regime were brought to economic collapse by the withholding of aid, there was no knowing what chaos would ensue. Thus, the United States preferred to convey the importance it attached to the democratic process through diplomatic channels. A case in point is Major General Vernon Walters’ closed-door visit with Doe in January 1985, shortly after the Liberian leader’s arbitrary replacement of the SECOM members.57 While the Reagan administration reserved its criticisms, Congress was more forthcoming. For example, in response to the dissatisfaction expressed by Liberian dissidents in the United States regarding the political reality in their native country, Congress invited Patrick Seyon, a vocal critic of Doe and former vice president of administration at the University of Liberia, to speak before the legislative body. Seyon accepted this invitation and delivered his address on March 7.58 In an effort to control the damage, Doe, in late May, sent a high-level delegation to the United States to counter what was described as various American organizations’ negative reporting on Liberia and attacks on the Liberian government. The dispatched delegates—Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernest Eastman, Information Minister Carlton Karpeh, and Defense Minister Gray D. Allison—met with their American counterparts and lobbied selected congressmen; they held discussions with the chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and members of the Black Caucus.59 The delegation was apparently successful, evident by the signing, in late June, of an agreement which consolidated and rescheduled Liberia’s debts to be guaranteed by the U.S. government and its agencies.60 Undeterred, Doe continued his repression. On July 18, Momolu V. Sackor Sirleaf and Klon Hinneh, respectively editor and head of sports column for Footprints Today, were jailed under the accusation that they tried to sabotage national security. The following day, fourteen students who had visited the Soviet Union Embassy in Monrovia, some of them registered LPP members, were arrested for allegedly transferring classified documents to Moscow. The United States only intervened with more than words in response to the vendetta that Doe pursued against LAP Vice Presidential Candidate Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Doe especially resented Sirleaf after her July 28 speech to the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas, in which she accused Doe of making meaningless promises, and the Liberian government of “nepotism, deceit and favoritism.” She stated that it was comprised of “idiots in whose hands our nation’s fate and progress have been placed.” The LAP vice presidential candidate’s statements were more outspoken, insulting, and tactless than those of any other candidate hitherto. On her return to Liberia in late July, Sirleaf was summoned to the Executive Mansion to be fiercely berated

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and ordered under house arrest. Shortly thereafter, she was charged with sedition, before being tried behind closed doors by a special military tribunal on August 20. Less than a month later, Sirleaf was convicted and sentenced to ten years in a prison camp.61 Although her arrest was not, in principle, very different from those of other Liberian political leaders (including Baccus Matthews, Tuan Wreh, Amos Sawyer, and Edward Kesselly), Sirleaf was the only prominent political figure to actually have been placed on trial, let alone in a closed military court. Her arrest following what was ordinary campaign behavior by American standards epitomized the many violations of political and human rights in Liberia. As a result, it drew strong reactions from the U.S. State Department and Congress. State Department Counselor Edward Derwinski was sent to Liberia to protest Sirleaf’s arrest.62 Although he did not meet with Doe, who hardly made himself available, Derwinski expressed his country’s worries regarding the election procedures as well as the arrest of politicians and journalists in Liberia.63 State Department spokesperson Charles E. Redman conveyed the U.S. government’s “strong concern” that Sirleaf and other arrestees “receive fair treatment including prompt due process of law” and about the holding of “free and fair elections” in the West African country.64 Of more immediate concern to the Liberian government, however, was the approval of a request by the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, while the Sirleaf trial was underway, to withhold $43 million of the $77 million aid that Liberia had requested for the 1985 fiscal year.65 While avoiding the release of Sirleaf, Doe resorted to all sorts of twists and turns to ward off the threatened funding cut. Finance Minister G. Alvin Jones accused the United States of excessive intervention in Liberia’s domestic affairs.66 Harmon, arguing that his committee was short of funds, warned of the potential need to delay elections. At the ceremony marking the certification of the LUP, Harmon declared that SECOM required an additional $2.5 million to complete preparations for the elections. Without these funds, Harmon cautioned, Liberia’s return to civilian rule, which was scheduled for January 1986, would be postponed.67 Soon after Harmon’s perceived threat, G. Alvin Jones and Foreign Minister Ernest Eastman hurried to deny an assertion, which appeared in the Washington Post, that Liberia’s government was backing off from its promise to lead the country to civilian rule. In an interview with the BBC, Jones assured that the registration of political parties was progressing as normal. He also used the opportunity to absolve Doe’s government of blame for the seemingly undemocratic developments in Liberia; he deftly assigned responsibility for the difficulties that some of the parties were having on the courts and intimated that Washington was trying to place its own candidate

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in the presidency.68 Doe, in shows of pique, rejected the State Department representative’s request for a meeting and denied the credentials of Edward Perkins, the new American ambassador.69 The Liberian Foreign Ministry provocatively announced that Eastman would travel to Libya to discuss the possibilities of closer relations between the two countries and a meeting between Doe and the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi.70 In the end, Eastman did not embark on this mission. In fact, none of Doe’s stratagems worked. On September 25, Doe, pressured by the United States, announced the release of Sirleaf and other political prisoners.71 In addition, during the month and a half that remained before the elections, he did not order any additional political arrests. Instead, Doe continued his pursuit of permanence by focusing on distortion of the campaigning, voting, and the vote counting processes. His goal was not merely to win the elections, but rather to win by a landslide. By achieving an overwhelming victory, Doe’s rivals would not gain control of the legislature. In this way, legislative decisions would not run counter to Doe’s interests. NOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “AF Update No. 7.” 2. “Elections Official: No Campaigning Before Registration,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 3, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1984): T3. 3. U.S. Department of State, “AF Update No. 7.” 4. “Release UP, LAP Representatives Now!” Sunday Observer, November 25, 1984, 6. 5. John M. Kamara, “Undesirable Trend,” Daily Observer, November 22, 1984, 5. “Sawyer’s Party Given Clearance to Canvass for Membership,” Sunday Observer, December 30, 1984. 6. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 30. 7. “NDPL Presents $169,893 for Registration,” Daily Observer, September 11, 1984, 1, 10. Abdullah M. Dukuly, “NDPL Gains Full Status,” Daily Observer, November 20, 1984, 1, 10. 8. “These Little Things . . . ” Daily Observer, November 21, 1984, 5. “NDPL Fulfills Financial, Membership Requirements,” Monrovia Domestic Service, October 4, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1984): T2. 9. “SECOM to Hear Challenges,” Daily Observer, October 24, 1984, 1, 10. “LIB. Action Party Challenges NDPL Roster,” Daily Observer, November 7, 1984, 1, 10.

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“NDPL Goes to Probate Court—Seeking to Acquire Legal Status,” Daily Observer, November 15, 1984, 1, 10. 10. Amos Bryant, “As Political Race Continues—NDPL, UP Meet Elections Comm. Requirement,” Daily Observer, October 5, 1984, 10. “SECOM Awards Registration Certificate to UP,” Monrovia Domestic Service, January 4, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (January 1985): T3. 11. “Gen. Kesselly Says Goodbye to SECOM,” Daily Observer, October 24, 1984, 1, 10. 12. “Liberia: Elections or ‘Farce?,’” West Africa, February 11, 1985, 249. 13. “UP, LAP Bonds Declared Invalid. Kesselly Hits Back,” Footprints Today, October 30, 1984, 1, 10. 14. “We Are Not Members of LAP—Grand Gedeans Declare,” New Liberian, January 17, 1985, P1, P6. “Bill Filed against LAP; Doe Appeals for Withdrawal,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 20, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1985): T2. 15. “Objection Filed against LAP’s Registration Papers,” Footprints Today, March 7, 1985, 1. 16. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 40–41. “LAP Requests Court: Dismiss Petition,” Footprints Today, May 2, 1985, 1, 6. 17. “Liberia: Doubts about Democracy,” West Africa, March 18, 1985, 506. 18. “Liberia: SECOM and the LPP,” West Africa, September 9, 1985, 1858. 19. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 29. “Where is Tom Kamara?” Footprints Today, March 19, 1985, 8. 20. “SECOM Recognizes New LPP Leader,” Footprints Today, March 20, 1985, 1. 21. “LPP Disappointed,” Footprints Today, May 22, 1985, 1, 6. 22. “UPP Fulfills Financial Registration Requirements,” Monrovia Domestic Service, December 20, 1984, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (December 1984): T1. “We Are Prepared to Fight,” Daily Observer, December 21, 1984, 1. “Hundreds Turn Out for UPP,” Daily Observer, December 21, 1984, 1, 10. 23. “SECOM Gives UPP Clearance to Canvas,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, January 15, 1985, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, February 3, 1985, 22. “Liberia: Doe and Democracy,” West Africa, January 28, 1985, 137. “UPP Comments,” Footprints Today, January 31, 1985, 1, 2. 24. “UPP Supporters Arrested in Nimba,” Mirror, January 30, 1985, 1, 2. 25. “UPP Complains About Registration Difficulties,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 21, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1985): T1. “UPP Fined, Suspension Still in Force,” Footprints Today, April 3, 1985, 1, 3. 26. “Election Commission Lifts Political Suspension,” Daily Report, April 18, 1985, T2. 27. AFP, “Doe ‘Prepared to Fight’ Foreign Ideology,” July 1, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1985): T2.

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28. AFP, “Election Commissioner on Party Registration,” February 9, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1985): T3. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 40–41. J. Nagbae Sloh, “Probe into Constitutional Accounts: Amos Sawyer Free?” Mirror, October 3, 1985, 1, 10. 29. “Liberia: Doe and Democracy,” 137. “Following release from prison Oscar Quiah Explains,” Daily Observer, September 21, 1984, 1. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 35. 30. “Election Commissioner on Party Registration,” T3. J.N. Elliott, “Deadline is July 1,” New Liberian, March 11, 1985, 1. 31. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberian Leader Pledges to Return Country to Civilian Rule,” February 12, 1985, Nexis Uni. “Liberia: Karpeh on Army Role . . . and Kpor Defends Doe,” West Africa, March 11, 1985, 496. 32. “Doe Escapes Death—Massive Search for Assassin,” Footprints Today, April 2, 1985, 1. 33. AFP, “Suspect Charged in November Plot to Kill Doe,” March 9, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1985): T1. 34. United Press International, 4 April, 1985, Nexis Uni. “UPP, LAP React,” Footprints Today, April 8, 1985, 1–2. 35. “West Africa: In Brief; Reports on Detentions of Liberian Politicians,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 22, 1985, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 18, 1985, Nexis Uni. 36. “‘We Stand for Freedom’—Doe Tells Supporters, as Hundreds Storm Headquarters,” Daily Observer, December 24, 1984, 1, 10. 37. Gus D. Jaeploe, “We Are for Doe—Fullahs Pledge Loyalty,” New Liberian, January 17, 1985, 1, 6. “Careysburg Goes 100 Percent for Dr. Doe,” New Liberian, February 8, 1985, 1, 6. “Cooperative Society Pledges Support for NDPL,” Footprints Today, January 31, 1985, 8. 38. “Liberia: 5 Years of Army Rule—Statesman or Dictator?,” West Africa, April 15, 1985, 733. “NDPL Women’s Brigade Elects Officers,” New Liberian, February 4, 1985, 1, 6. 39. “NDPL Installs Brewerville Officers,” Footprints Today, April 2, 1985, 6. “Virginia NDPL Officials Inducted,” Footprints Today, April 25, 1985, 6. Lawrence Thompson, “Some Party Leaders Could Face Trial,” Sun Times, August 5, 1985, 1, 10. 40. “Liberia: Kpolleh’s Denial,” West Africa, June 24, 1985, 1299. 41. “Unification Party [sic] Completes Registration Rules,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, May 7, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (May 1985): T2. 42. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 33. “Unity Party Executive Detained,” Footprints Today, August 8, 1985, 1, 2.

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“Political Situation in Liberia,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 7, 1985, transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 9, 1985, Nexis Uni. 43. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia,” Annual Human Rights Reports Submitted to Congress 10 (1985): 182. 44. “Government Confirms Arrest of LPP Officials,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 22, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1985): T4. 45. “Liberia: SECOM and the LPP,” 1858. Lawrence Thompson, “Wolokollie Detained; Karweaye Ordered Arrested,” Sun Times, July 19, 1985, 1, 2. 46. “SECOM Head on Political Situation,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 7, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T2–T3. “Liberia: LPP Denied Registration—Two More Arrests,” West Africa, August 12, 1985, 1676. 47. “Following Arrest of 14 Students UL Officials & Students Meet Today . . . Russians Kicked Out,” Sun Times, July 19, 1985, 1, 12. 48. “Plot to Kill Officials, U.S. Citizens Uncovered,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 9, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T1–T2. 49. AFP, “UPP Banned; Foreign Minister Invited to Libya,” August 26, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T3. 50. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 33. “Liberia: LAP, LUP to Probate Court,” West Africa, September 2, 1985, 1832. 51. “Interesting Reasons Why Sumo Jones Wants to Be President,” Mirror, September 6, 1984, 1, 8. Carl P. Burrowes, Ed., “History Will Judge,” Liberia Alert (January 1986): 46–48. “Dr. Kesselly says Give Liberians a Chance,” Footprints Today, March 28, 1985, 1, 2. 52. “Doe on Parties’ Equal Use of Public Facilities,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 14, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T2. 53. “Liberia: Karpeh on Army Role . . . and Kpor Defends Doe,” 496. “Commitment to Multiparty System Reaffirmed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 26, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1985): T4. 54. Sawyer, interview. “Five Political Parties Agree to Merge,” Sunday Observer, October 14, 1984, 1, 10. 55. “Party Leaders Condemn Violence,” Footprints Today, February 9, 1985, 1, 6. “Liberia: Elections or ‘Farce?,’” 249. 56. “All-Party Conference Ends; Communiqué Issued,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 15, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1985): T3. 57. “Dr. Doe Receives Special Envoy,” Mirror, February 2, 1985, 1. 58. Patrick Seyon, “‘Threats to Democracy,’” West Africa, April 8, 1985, 657.

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59. Eddie Momoh, “Doe Launches Counter-Attack,” West Africa, June 3, 1985, 1096. 60. U.S. Department of State, Official Record of U.S. Foreign Policy 85, no. 2101 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1985), 93. 61. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 121–27. 62. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Prospects for Democracy in Liberia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, 99th Congress, 1st Sess., 1985, 8. 63. Joe Ritchie, “U.S. Expresses Concern About Elections in Liberia,” Washington Post, August 16, 1985, A28, Nexis Uni. “Liberia: Latest Problems in US-Liberia Relations,” April 16, 1984, secret, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (01/01/1984–01/25/1985)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 64. Maureen Santini, “State Department Expresses Concern about Sedition Trial,” Associated Press, August 23, 1985, Nexis Uni. 65. Prospects for Democracy in Liberia, 25. 66. “Minister Criticizes U.S. Withholding Funds,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 22, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T3. 67. AFP, “Shortage of Funds Jeopardizes Elections,” August 17, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T1–T2. 68. “Officials Say Promise of Civilian Rule Kept,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, August 22, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T3. “Finance Minister Comments on U.S. Aid Terms,” BBC World Service, August 24, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (August 1985): T3. 69. “Liberia: Latest Problems in US-Liberia Relations.” 70. Prospects for Democracy in Liberia, 8. United Press International, [No headline in original], August 27, 1985, Nexis Uni. 71. “Liberia: Latest Problems in US-Liberia.”

Chapter 15

Constrained Campaigning and Rigged Elections

Although they handpicked their rivals and did everything in their power to exhaust them in the registration process, Doe and his clique could not by any means count on an honest victory at the polls. Five years of ever-increasing repression, massive corruption, a 50 percent unemployment rate, and the rising cost of living left Liberians disenchanted and eager for a regime change. Between February and August 1985, ahead of elections, Doe and his cohorts scrambled to create the impression that the government was addressing the country’s problems and that consequently the situation would soon be better. These measures included the establishment of a debt task force to collect unpaid debts to the state-owned banks, calls to introduce comprehensive reform of public enterprises, the release of plans to import and reduce the cost of rice, the declaration of a “structural adjustment program” to improve revenue collection, and the appointment of a five-member commission for the review and revitalization of the economy.1 All but two of these steps, specifically the creation of the debt task force and the commission to revitalize the economy, were declarative. For their success, these two reforms depended on a well-motivated and efficient bureaucracy, which did not exist in Liberia. In June of that same year, Doe publicly conceded that none of the measures listed above had brought any improvement.2 Nonetheless, in early October, on the eve of elections, the Liberian leader announced yet another face-saving declaration. This time, Doe revealed a string of development plans: construction of the port of Harper and Maryland County; the Botua palm oil venture; and the final phases of a Monrovia Market project with funding from the EEC.3 Only the Botua palm oil project was a new endeavor. The other plans had all failed in the past, and none of them addressed the acute deprivations from which most of the population was suffering. The weeks preceding the elections were fraught with labor unrest stemming from the government’s failure to pay salaries. In September, workers 291

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in the state-owned Mesurado Fishing Company kidnapped and held hostage the vice president of operations and the controller of the Mesurado Group of Companies.4 Hundreds of public school teachers across the country boycotted classes. Students marched in the streets chanting that if there were no teachers, there would be “no school and no elections.” On October 10, nurses and doctors at JFK Hospital in Monrovia embarked on a “go-slow,” to last until they received their August and September paychecks.5 Amid this grim reality, election campaigns were conducted. The rival political parties benefited from several significant advantages in the eyes of the voters. They could not be held responsible for the country’s miserable condition nor for the government’s violence and repressiveness. Furthermore, none of their members had a military background. Finally, their leaders, except for Gabriel Kpolleh, had all been victims of Doe’s dictatorship. With these advantages of their opponents in mind, Doe and his cohorts proceeded to do all they could to tilt the playing field in their own favor and to constrain their rivals’ ability to campaign. SECOM, which had held up the registration of the rival parties, now tampered with the electoral process stipulated in the constitution and imposed new constraints on the parties. County superintendents continued to harass representatives of rival parties who tried to organize and campaign in their counties. In his campaign speeches and actions, Doe presented himself as a liberal leader, all while he repeatedly threatened those who intended to vote for one of the other parties. SECOM’s Tampering and Constraints SECOM’s meddling with the electoral procedures began with its demarcation of the electoral districts in July 1985, several weeks before the party registration process was completed. According to Article 80 of the 1984 Constitution, SECOM was to reapportion Liberia’s constituencies, that is, its voting districts, with two stipulations aimed at ensuring equal representation for all voters. The first was that the constituencies be redistributed in accordance with the latest population figures obtained from a national census. The second was that the constituencies’ populations be as similar in size as possible.6 SECOM rode roughshod over both stipulations. In defiance of the first provision, it relied on the outdated 1974 census, rather than on that of 1984. This would exclude voters who had come of voting age in the current decade, under the apprehension that younger voters would be more prone than elder voters to vote for an opposition party. Furthermore, in disregard of the second obligation, SECOM demarcated the constituencies to give counties whose inhabitants were largely supportive of Doe proportionately more seats in the House of Representatives than counties comprised of those who tended

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to oppose the Liberian leader. Accordingly, Doe’s home county of Grand Gedeh—which contained only 5 percent of the population—received six seats, while LUP leader Gabriel Kpolleh’s home county of Bong County— which contained approximately 21 percent of the population—received a mere seven seats.7 In addition to opting for an antiquated census and gerrymandering the constituencies, Harmon also tweaked the voter registration process. On August 13, he announced a second stage of voter registration, which was set to begin that same day and to continue for fifteen days. At first glance, this move seemed likely to increase voter participation, especially among the same young people excluded from the electoral process as a result of the gerrymandering of the constituencies. According to the Elections Law, the voter registry was to contain only the names of the 689,929 persons who voted in the 1984 referendum on the constitution. This piece of legislation would not enable people who had reached voting age after June 31, 1984, the date in which the registry was published, to cast their ballots. At the end of that stage, Harmon predicted that 900,000 Liberians would vote in the October 15 elections—an anticipated increase of about 30 percent—and proudly boasted that the step was being taken despite its cost of an estimated $2.5 million. Nonetheless, these measures entailed a catch. Harmon concluded his announcement by stating that he could not know when the voters’ registry would be published. In the end, the enlarged registry was published only three days before the elections. This ninetieth-minute move rendered it impossible for the opposition parties to examine the list for fraud, as they were entitled to do.8 Yet another blow was delivered to the rival parties on September 3, when Harmon announced that they would have to provide SECOM with the names of all the candidates they planned to field within ten days. Like the arbitrary deadline for the completion of party registration that had been announced the previous February, this deadline also squeezed the parties into a stressful time vise. Unlike before, it was not quietly dropped. Its purpose was to prevent the parties—especially the LAP—from fielding the full number of candidates they were entitled to run. It attained the desired effect. All the parties succeeded in presenting SECOM with the names of their candidates for president and vice president. The LAP submitted the names of Jackson Doe (unrelated to Samuel Doe) for president and Emmanuel Koroma for vice president. The UP submitted the names of Edward Kesselly as its presidential candidate and Jabaru Carlon as his running mate. The LUP named Gabriel Kpolleh for president and Harold Ndama for vice president. The NDPL’s candidates were Samuel Doe and Harry Moniba. The damage was inflicted at the legislative level. According to the Elections Law, each party was entitled to run up to ninety candidates for the legislature.

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The process required holding internal party elections in every district. Other than the NDPL, no party was able to organize and hold the elections within the tight time frame. The LAP fielded seventy-three candidates, the LUP seventy-two, and the UP seventy-three. This left the NDPL candidates to contend with fewer than three rivals in some constituencies.9 Of all the parties, the LAP, the largest that had been permitted to run, was the most significant rival of the NDPL. Therefore, in all likelihood, it was the main target of SECOM’s maneuver. The deadline was announced less than a week after the LAP received full-fledged party status (August 29, 1985), following a long ordeal which saw the imprisonment of its party leaders, severe harassment of its supporters across various counties, and pressure to remove a major candidate, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, from its party list. One day following the announcement of the deadline, LAP head Tuan Wreh complained that his party was “severely handicapped” and therefore unprepared to stand for elections as scheduled. He asked that the election date be postponed from October 15 to November 19, which was still within the general timetable. His request was denied. Likewise, a petition that the LAP brought before the Supreme Court, which sought for the postponement of elections, was also rejected.10 Campaigning and Constraints The campaigning for the 1985 elections only superficially resembled campaigning in functioning democracies. In a bid to increase his popularity, Doe once again took steps to portray himself as a liberal and caring leader. On September 25, he announced the immediate release of the fourteen students who had been detained on the premises of the Soviet embassy, the eight LPP activists who had been arrested since the previous December, and the current LAP vice presidential candidate Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.11 The following day, at the end of his election tour in Margibi County, he announced the extension of clemency to two LUP activists, two members of the independent press, and six UL students. Furthermore, on September 29, Doe lifted the bans on two independent newspapers: The Daily Star, which had been closed earlier that month, and the Sun Times, which had been banned since August 26. Even as Doe tried to win over voters, though, he incongruously wove warnings and threats into his campaigning. For example, the day after he made $100,000 available for needy students at the University of Liberia, he warned the students who came to thank him that the government would not tolerate any lawlessness by students.12 In campaign speeches in Yekepa and Sanniquellie in Nimba County, he promised government employees that they would receive their salaries by election day, but he also told them that after the elections all government employees would have to be members of the NDPL, implying that any support for other parties was unacceptable.13

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There was little, if any, debate or exchange of ideas among the candidates. The NDPL, as well as the LUP, actually rejected the LAP Secretary-General Byron Tarr’s call for a debate on national issues. The rival parties generally spoke in sotto voce. Remarkably, for an election campaign, they hardly called out Doe and his government. Thereby the competing candidates largely refrained from blaming the NDPL leader for the repressiveness of his regime nor for the country’s dire economic situation. To some extent, their reticence may be attributed to the lack of a tradition of free campaigning in Liberia, but it was probably fostered as well by well-grounded fears of reprisal. The persecution of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was arrested and charged with treason after criticizing Doe’s government while she was in the United States, must have been an object lesson. Her own party, in fact, had tried to disassociate itself from her outspoken critique by claiming it was her “private” view. Some of the party leaders were so terrified by her audacity that they tried to suspend her from the LAP, until they were stopped by grassroots party activists.14 Instead of engaging in and permitting debate, Doe utilized the county superintendents to thwart the campaigning of the rival parties. This employment of these public officials resembled Doe’s previous use of them to harass the would-be parties before and during the registration process. The superintendents resorted to a wide array of measures against the candidates and supporters of rival parties, ranging from arbitrary restrictions and obstructions to physical violence. In Lofa County, Kesselly’s home county, the superintendent forbade the UP from holding its convention in his district and instructed the police to arrest twelve UP members for their affiliation with the party. In Totota, Bong County, soldiers destroyed tents erected for a UP party convention, and whipped a UP senatorial candidate who was campaigning there. In Margibi County, the superintendent ordered the cancellation of an LAP rally, and soldiers stationed there stormed the UP office in its capital city, Kakata.15 In West Point, Monrovia, on October 1, the NDPL’s youth wing, known as the Task Force, attacked LAP supporters who were hanging campaign posters. The next day, security forces dispersed the solidarity march the LAP had organized in response. The same treatment was meted out to fourteen other members of the party as well. In addition to the army units stationed in their counties, the superintendents availed themselves of the NDPL’s Task Force. This was a well-organized hierarchical body established in July 1985. While its ostensible purpose was to attract young people to the NDPL, its actual function was to physically attack the party’s rivals.16 Complaints submitted by the opposition parties before SECOM and the INA were ignored. For example, while SECOM agreed to investigate the detention of the UP members in Lofa County, there is no indication that it

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did so.17 The harassment ultimately took its toll. Six LAP legislative candidates from Grand Gedeh County withdrew from the race. One of them, Chea Cheapoo Sr., a former minister of justice, joined the NDPL. Both the foreign and independent Liberian press condemned the violence. Two editorials in Footprints Today gingerly warned of the damage caused. On October 2, the paper, without naming Doe or the NDPL, called the violent acts “unhealthy happenings which need to be checked immediately.” In its editorial the following day, it pointed out that political violence is “neither in the best interest of the parties, nor the country as a whole.”18 West Africa printed a statement by Jackson Doe that he “would like to see a Liberia governed by the rule of law and not by the whims of power-intoxicated individuals.”19 None of these criticisms nor calls for action had any effect. PREPARATIONS FOR RIGGING THE ELECTIONS Despite all that they had done to exhaust the rival parties in the run-up to the elections, Doe and his coterie still had good reason to fear that they would not come out the victors after all. Thus, in the middle of September, Harmon took the first step in preparation for rigging the elections. Sections 4.9 to 4.11 of chapter 4 of the 1984 Elections Law entitled every party to send representatives to watch the casting and counting of votes.20 Harmon effectively revoked these rights. On September 15, he informed representatives of all parties that SECOM had decided that they would not be permitted at the voting and vote counting. His justification, that the presence of party representatives would imply a lack of confidence in SECOM’s impartiality, was all too apt.21 The NDPL, being the sole beneficiary of this move, publicly sided with SECOM. The LUP, which owed its participation in the elections to Doe, initially adopted a neutral position. The LAP and the UP rejected it. Edward Kesselly, in a statement that was tantamount to a boycott threat, declared that full implementation of and adherence to the Elections Law was a nonnegotiable condition for the UP’s participation in the elections.22 Initially, the threat seemed to be effective. Justice Minister Jenkins Scott declared in a press conference that Chapter Three of Section 2.11 of the Elections Law would be implemented in order “to clear any doubts from the minds of future candidates.”23 Harmon, however, in what appeared to be a turf war, rapidly rescinded Scott’s concession as having been made without due authority or consultation. Neither side wanted a boycott. Doe was under heavy American pressure to proceed with the long promised multiparty democratic elections and could not afford for the NDPL to run in a one-party race. The opposition parties were loath to forgo the historic opportunity to take part in the creation of a

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democratic Liberia. For Jackson Doe and Edward Kesselly, boycotting the elections would mean waiving the possibility of leading the new Liberia. The way out of the conundrum was to compromise. The following weeks saw what can be described as a sequence dance, in which both sides played their expected parts. In the first round, each side made its opening move. On September 26, the three opposition parties appealed to the INA, SECOM, and the government to implement Chapter Four of the Elections Law and threatened to boycott the elections if this would not be done. Oscar Jaryee Quiah, speaking on behalf of the NDPL, countered that if the three parties went ahead with the boycott, the NDPL would assume power on its own.24 The second round took place on October 8, just under three weeks before the elections. Apparently, SECOM had reconsidered and agreed to allow party observers at the vote counting, though not at the voting itself. This round consisted of fierce bargaining regarding the issue of how close to the counting the observers would be permitted to stand. SECOM opened with twenty-five feet (7.5 meters), calling this a “reasonable distance.” The three rival parties rejected this proposal on the grounds that it did not enable them to effectively monitor the process.25 In the third round, which came shortly after the Supreme Court rejected the LAP’s appeal to postpone the election date, SECOM made a concession. It offered to allow party representatives to monitor the voting and vote-counting processes from fifteen feet (4.5 meters). How much could be seen from this distance remained open to question. Nonetheless, for lack of any prospects of a better one, the offer was accepted. Rigging the Elections Despite the intimidation and foul play in the lead-up to casting their ballots, Liberians still expected the elections to usher in a freely elected, democratic regime. For the first time in Liberia’s history, each and every citizen would be permitted to vote. They would be able to choose their president and vice president from among eight candidates and to select twenty-six senators and sixty-four members of the House of Representatives from among eighty-seven and 210 candidates, respectively. In their enthusiasm, Liberians turned out to vote in such large numbers that the polls had to remain open for more hours than scheduled.26 Foreign and domestic correspondents covered the elections, and also nine teams of U.S. observers who were sent to Liberia to monitor the voting. All of them reported a nonviolent start to election day.27 SECOM, however, saw to it that neither voting nor vote counting would be free and fair. To further bolster the odds in favor of Doe, the committee issued two last minute decrees

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without notifying the opposition parties in advance. The first decree established at least three new polling stations in addition to the 1,800 that were already in place. The fact that these stations were set up without prior notice meant that the rival parties could not send observers.28 Some of these additionally opened voting stations were situated at the Barclay Training Center and in Tubmanburg, where the process was observed by soldiers and aided by the NDPL Task Force personnel, wearing their party hats and T-shirts. The second decree permitted voters to choose the precinct in which to cast their ballots regardless of where they lived.29 This enabled the NDPL activists to send prospective voters to another station, where they would be able to vote in favor of their party. In addition, in some polling stations, local officials refused to admit observers from the rival parties and forced illiterate voters to call out their presidential choice in front of government officials.30 The opposition parties demanded that SECOM invalidate the ballots casted at the army barracks and polling stations where SECOM officials and county superintendents had allegedly intervened in the process. Harmon promised to review all complaints, but also stated that there was no need to cancel any of the votes casted at the military barracks, as the electoral process there had been conducted legally.31 In spite of these interferences, Doe and his political allies did not receive the results that they had expected. An unconfirmed leak from the fifty-person committee in charge of the vote counting revealed that Doe had been defeated in every county (including in his native Grand Gedeh) and that Jackson Doe, having garnered more than 60 percent of the votes, had been elected president. These reports were confirmed by the official tallies received by SECOM headquarters.32 The results are consistent with Cammack and O’Brien’s observation about dictatorships, that “even the most draconian repression cannot prevent the reemergence of substantial mobilization and opposition within the lifetimes of these regimes.”33 Unprepared to cede power but having no legitimate way of holding on to it, Doe yet again resorted to the trickery that was his trademark. This time his ruse was to take control of the vote counting, which he did in two stages. First, on October 16, SECOM ordered the poll workers to stop counting the votes and to send all the ballot boxes and tally sheets to the government’s Unity Conference Center in Monrovia. Conveniently, some of the boxes, especially from counties where the vote went heavily against Doe, were destroyed on the way. Second, on October 21, the government appointed, without providing prior explanation, a handpicked committee of fifty persons to take charge of the remainder of the counting. Most of its members were avid Doe supporters, while none were affiliated with the opposition parties or any public organization.34

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The LAP and the UP promptly protested that SECOM did not have the authority to appoint the committee and, consequently, declared that they would not accept this body’s count as legally binding.35 Justifications and threats were issued to try to contain the outcry. SECOM Commissioner Isaac Randolph averred that the decree according to which SECOM had been established clearly stipulated that it had the authority to make rules and regulations regarding the election process. In an attempt to turn the tables on their critics, Doe, the NDPL leadership and SECOM all claimed that the committee had been established as a result of irregularities during the vote counting, accused the LAP of trying to bribe SECOM employees, and cynically advised the opposition parties to address their complaints to SECOM.36 The spurious claims did not allay the protests. The LUP provided the U.S. embassy with a list of irregularities during the election process. Opposition leaders requested American intervention before the elections results would be published. The Liberian Business Caucus declared that SECOM’s actions contravened the Elections Law and raised serious questions about any results it announced.37 The fabricated vote count, which was published on October 29, provided Doe with a victory of 50.9 percent, the NDPL with twenty-one of the twentysix seats in the Senate, and fifty-one of the sixty-four seats in the House of Representatives.38 Doe’s declared victory margin was a modest outcome in comparison to those of 80 percent to 90 percent that were usually claimed by authoritarian regimes. The figure was chosen to give the cooked results an aura of authenticity, which would, it was probably hoped, deter both the rival parties and the United States from contesting the vote count. At the same time, Doe and his cohorts, wary of the angry reaction that the theft of the elections could provoke, took steps to protect themselves and their ill-gotten gains. Doe took refuge in the Executive Mansion, not daring to emerge for two days. Justice Minister Jenkins Scott forbade all street protests and public demonstrations. The military was placed on full alert, with foot soldiers and armored vehicles patrolling the streets of Monrovia.39 On November 6, Harmon left the country. These preventative measures were all too effective. The streets of Monrovia, which had pulsated with life on Election Day, were deserted. According to Levi Zangai, the then acting secretary-general of the LAP, people were ready to demonstrate against the rigged results. Due to their fear of bloodshed, however, the opposition parties did not call for their supporters to take to the streets in protest.40 To counter any form of challenge to the legitimacy of Doe’s victory, the NDPL organized a show of support for him. On October 31, thousands of people, mainly young men and women, marched through Monrovia to the

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Executive Mansion to applaud Doe’s victory. In the speech he delivered, Doe called on the opposition to accept the vote, declared that the NDPL was ready to cooperate with all other parties, promised to form a coalition government, and appealed to all parties to take their seats in the legislature. Characteristically, he also issued his customary threats, warning his listeners that fears created by “disgruntled elements” would result in a resolution “not to hold any more elections.”41 Alongside his draconian measures to deter public protests, Doe tried to entice his cheated opponents by giving them a stake in his upcoming government. Before the vote count was completed, he invited the rival parties to join the NDPL in a coalition. His offer had the effect of dividing the opposition parties among themselves. The LUP and LAP leaderships rejected the offer outright and declared that their parties’ representatives would not take their seats in the new legislature. However, the LUP party representative-elect James Kiahoun decided to take his seat, claiming that the law should be respected. In response, the LUP leadership expelled Kiahoun.42 The opposition parties’ attempt to coalesce, in order to block Doe’s theft of the elections, did not succeed. This resembled their failure to unite to fight his abuses of the party registration and campaign processes. The rival bloc was caught in a dilemma again. Accepting the coalition offer would have been tantamount to legitimizing the fraudulent vote count. However, rejecting it probably would have deprived them of any chance, however slim, they might have had of influencing the upcoming government from within. Similarly, the churches found themselves in a predicament of their own. Accepting the falsified elections results would amount to giving their moral backing to fraud, while rejecting them meant that they would bear moral responsibility for the violence they feared would ensue. Thus, in his November 3 sermon, LCC Chairman Bishop George Browne observed that “it seems strange that 49 percent of the Liberian people are said to have won only 16 percent of the legislature,” but nonetheless proceeded to encourage the opposition parties to take their seats in parliament “in the interest of national unity.” Reverend Peter Amos George of the Providence Baptist Church made a similar plea. He was later rewarded for his efforts, specifically when Doe became a member of his church.43 The rival parties’ rejection of the coalition proposal undercut any legitimacy that the new government might have gained through the elections. Doe and his cohorts were quick to react. On November 6, SECOM ordered the arrest of five members of the UP on the spurious grounds that they made offensive remarks to the NDPL and perpetrated irregularities in polling stations they presided over. On November 7, Minister of Justice Jenkins Scott announced delays in approving Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s request for a visa.44 A few days later, Doe warned that the accusations, according to which the

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elections results were rigged, were provoking confusion and violence, and threatened to punish party leaders who insulted SECOM.45 REBELLION AND ITS AFTERMATH The Carter administration was willing to back Doe and his regime so long as it saw him as able to protect American interests in Liberia and West Africa. Prioritization of American interests was behind both President Carter’s practical minded support for Doe, and Reagan’s less ambivalent friendship-forfriendship policy. This approach was almost identical to that which the United States maintained toward other longtime dictators, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Hissène Habré of Chad, and Moussa Traoré of Mali—to name only those in West Africa. One year prior, the administration’s support for Doe was met with significant resistance in Congress. In late September 1984, after Doe had falsely charged and arrested Sawyer and others with planning a coup, the U.S. Congressional House Appropriations Committee rejected the administration’s request for increased aid to Liberia, on the grounds that these detainments were likely motivated by political considerations.46 In March 1985, Doe claimed that Liberia would not be ready to hold elections in April, as originally planned, and asked that they be postponed until October. Congress conditioned U.S. economic aid to Liberia, which stood at over $379,500 from 1982–1984, on the holding of free and fair elections as well as return to civilian constitutional rule. In August 1985, following the house arrest of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and the surfacing of rumors that the October elections might be canceled, Congress voted to withhold the 1985–1986 economic aid unless Liberia improved its human rights performance.47 Despite this resistance, however, the Reagan administration, having expected to see Doe ousted in democratic elections and the power of his cohorts much reduced, maintained its support for the Doe regime. Now, it seemed that the great hope that the Liberian people had placed in the elections, the enthusiasm with which they had gone out to vote, and the strong showing of the opposition parties despite all the harassment and persecution they had endured were in vain. To make matters worse, the United States could no longer rely on Doe to ensure Liberia’s stability nor its own interests there.48 Although none of the power groups had yet taken any concrete steps to oppose Doe, the gross theft of the elections and refusal of many opposition members to take their seats in the new Congress risked destabilizing Liberia.

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To avert this risk, the United States initially sought a compromise. According to it, Doe would remain head of state with the opposition parties serving in a coalition government. Thus, on October 29, the State Department published a statement which noted “some irregularities,” yet nonetheless acknowledged that the vote was generally “well conducted with large and enthusiastic voter participation.” As a result, this document ultimately left it to the Liberian courts to assess the charges of misconduct in the vote count.49 On November 6, President Reagan signed a letter commending Doe and the Liberian people for “the completion of Liberia’s first national elections based on universal suffrage” and “their strong commitment to civilian, democratic rule.”50 However, the adamant refusal of most of the elected officials—specifically those of parties other than the NDPL—to take their seats in the legislature, forced the United States to reconsider its position. Withdrawing American economic support for Doe ran the risk of adding to the suffering of the Liberian people and therefore heightening their antagonism toward the United States. Furthermore, and essentially, it would likely propel Doe to seek support from the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, the Reagan administration reached the decision that Doe would have to be removed from power. From the time Doe took office, the United States had prepared to replace him should the need arise. As Elwood Dunn points out, alongside its public support for Doe, the American administration reserved the option of replacing him if he became more of a liability than a guardian of its interests. Its initial choice as replacement was Tolbert’s former vice president, Bennie Warner (who happened to be in the United States at the time). However, although Warner claimed to be Tolbert’s legal successor shortly after the 1980 coup, he never did anything to pursue his claim. Its next candidate was former deputy chief of the Executive Mansion Guard, Colonel Moses Flanzamaton, who was reportedly employed as a CIA agent.51 Flanzamaton, however, would be executed in April 1985 on charges of having tried to assassinate Doe. Finally, in 1983, after Thomas Quiwonkpa, former commanding general of the Liberian Armed Forces, had fallen out with Doe, Washington saw him as a potential replacement.52 Alongside being ardently pro-American, Quiwonkpa had the advantages of military knowledge, great popularity among the Liberian people, and sincere commitment to democracy in Liberia. Quiwonkpa and his wife, Tarloh, were smuggled to the United States following his falling-out with Doe in 1983. Upon their arrival, they settled in Baltimore, Maryland, where they led a quiet family life. The commander general studied at Baltimore Community College, and after graduation received a scholarship to attend Northern Illinois University. During his time in the Midwest, Quiwonkpa distanced

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himself, at least publicly, from political involvement, the press, and Liberian expatriate organizations. The U.S. government was rather circumspect regarding Quiwonkpa. It never officially acknowledged his presence in the United States and conducted all communication with him through the American-born Reverend Thomas Hayden, former head of the Catholic Mission in Liberia. When Quiwonkpa called the State Department to ask a question or request a meeting, he could not get through to anyone in authority. Accordingly, the State Department never turned to Quiwonkpa when it needed to verify information about him or his family. If Washington were to deem it necessary to oust Doe by force, it was prepared to do so. In early February 1983, while it seemed to watch passively as Doe placed one arbitrary hurdle after another in the way of the registration of the would-be political parties, the CIA provided Quiwonkpa with a fake Liberian passport and a sum of cash. That same month, Quiwonkpa—accompanied by a close aide, Harry Yuan, who had been a civilian member of Doe’s first government—left for West Africa.53 In June 1985, now closer to his native country, Quiwonkpa publicly warned Doe that he would not stand idly by should the de facto head of state fail to hold the promised elections. The warning came in his first published interview in West Africa. For all to read, Quiwonkpa stated that he would continue to struggle to free the Liberian people against his prediction that Doe would never relinquish power in an election.54 In addition to this warning, Quiwonkpa established a military force, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and a headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone. His supporters, who had been dispersed across the region, rallied around him. With the encouragement of the United States, the Sierra Leonean government—motivated by its long-standing antipathy to Doe—hosted Quiwonkpa lavishly, providing his NPFL with a military base, training, and ammunition. Plans were drawn up for a coup.55 Well warned of these schemes, Doe and his advisors designed plans to avert the threat. First, they tried to lure Quiwonkpa back to Liberia, where he could be silenced or eliminated. Thus, at a ceremony marking the fourth anniversary of the coup, Doe publicly announced that he pardoned “my friend and brother, former commanding general Thomas Quiwonkpa” and invited him to return to Liberia “where his safety will be assured.” Quiwonkpa, aware of Doe’s true nature, replied with his own condition for returning: an international guarantee of safety.56 Additionally, Doe tried to convince the Nimbaians, Quiwonkpa’s chief supporters, that he and his administration were doing a great deal to develop the county. While campaigning in Nimba County, he touted his numerous close relationships with government officials there and accused his political

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opponents of spreading lies to undermine the good relations he enjoyed with the Nimbaian people.57 This attempt to persuade fell short; no speech could erase the bitter memory of the 1983 massacre in Nimba County, in which government troops—in their search for Quiwonkpa, who was hiding there— killed hundreds of civilians. On the night of November 11, Sierra Leone’s government provided the NPFL with transportation and a police escort to its border with Liberia.58 During this time, Doe was trying in vain to persuade the rival parties to join him in a coalition government. With the support of the United States, the Sierra Leonean government and the Liberian masses, Quiwonkpa entered Monrovia with a force of approximately 100 well-trained and heavily armed fighters. Meeting no resistance, they took over the Barclay Training Center and the state radio station, made their way into the Executive Mansion, and arrested most of Doe’s cabinet members and the NDPL leaders. The public was thrilled. Immediately after Quiwonkpa’s premature radio announcement that Doe’s regime had been toppled, thousands of people poured into the streets to celebrate.59 Despite its initial success, however, Quiwonkpa’s venture was a dismal failure. In a matter of hours, Quiwonkpa’s loyalists were driven from Liberia, and he was killed. The inadequacies of Quiwonkpa’s preparations and execution made it easy for Doe to rebuff the assault. The NPFL had no clear plan for what to do once it entered the capital and Executive Mansion. It had not established a command post from which Quiwonkpa could control the various military operations. Quiwonkpa’s forces had not severed the communication lines between the Executive Mansion, where Doe was trapped, and the military bases loyal to Doe, enabling the de facto head of state to summon reinforcements.60 In addition, as a result of poor intelligence on the security apparatus around the Executive Mansion, only eighteen NPFL fighters were sent there to arrest Doe. In reality, during the attempted coup, the Executive Mansion was guarded, as it always had been, by a force of 350 trained soldiers. Moreover, contrary to the faulty intelligence Quiwonkpa had received, specifically that Doe was not in the mansion, the ruler of Liberia was in fact ensconced on the top floor—from which he could readily issue directives to the Executive Mansion guard and other soldiers.61 Preoccupied by the jubilant welcome he received and confident that the masses would follow his lead, the former commanding general did not bother to ensure his custody of the Executive Mansion before announcing his victory to the public.62 Nor did he make sure that a communications network was established between himself and his lieutenants. Consequently, his fighters were too frequently left without both orders and knowledge as to the whereabouts of their leader. Perhaps even more problematic, Quiwonkpa, being averse to bloodshed, refrained from executing Doe’s Krahn soldiers—who

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were instead held as captives in the Barclay Training Center. This enabled Doe’s forces to free the captured soldiers when they retook the training center and to subsequently utilize them on the ground. In contrast to Quiwonkpa’s relative unpreparedness, Doe, since his first days in office, had preparations in place to ward off a coup attempt. After having toppled Tolbert, Doe had taken measures to ensure that he himself would not know the same fate as his predecessor. In order to safeguard himself and his rule, Doe relied on various armed forces—most notably Special Anti–Terrorist Unit (SATU) and Battalion Number One. The Israeli-trained SATU was stationed in the Executive Mansion.63 The professional and well-armed Battalion Number One, consisting mostly of loyal Krahn soldiers and headed by Doe’s first cousin, Colonel Moses Wright, was stationed at Camp Schieffelin, a base strategically located between Monrovia and Roberts International Airport. During Quiwonkpa’s attempted overthrow, SATU fighters killed all of the NPFL militants who tried to enter the Executive Mansion, and Battalion Number One regained control of the Barclay Training Center and the radio station. Moreover, the latter killed Quiwonkpa, leading to Doe’s radio announcement that the attempted overthrow had failed and that he remained in control.64 Doe was well aware that the United States was behind the attempt to overthrow his regime. However, since he was unable to resist moves taken by the American government, he instead took punitive measures against the government of Sierra Leone. Doe closed Liberia’s border with Sierra Leone and recalled both the Liberian ambassador in Freetown, Francis Boye, and the Liberian secretary-general of the Mano River Union (MRU), Augustus Caine. It was only in July 1986 that relations between the two countries returned to normal and the border was reopened.65 The Liberian people’s jubilation in support of the coup brought Doe to take brutal measures against his political rivals and Nimbaians, and to deter any of his potentially rebellious subjects. The Gio were Quiwonkpa’s tribesmen; the Mano were Quiwonkpa’s strongest supporters. Immediately after the thwarted coup attempt, about two hundred Gio and Mano soldiers at the Barclay Training Center were executed and buried in a mass grave near Camp Schieffelin.66 About 80 percent of the soldiers there were Nimbaians, who were viewed as Quiwonkpa supporters. Moreover, a special force consisting of Krahn soldiers and headed by a Doe loyalist, Colonel Harrison Pennue, was sent to Nimba with orders to purge the county of all Quiwonkpa supporters. Five hundred Nimbaians were said to have been executed during the purge.67 The failed coup also provided Doe with a convenient justification to act against his critics and opponents, even those who did not have ties to the attempted overthrow. Reporters, journalists and students were rounded up

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and jailed in army bases, where most were subjected to harassment or torture—some of them were even killed. Leaders of the three opposition parties were arrested, intimidated, and humiliated in an effort to compel them to formally accept the rigged elections results. When they refused to do so, they were kept in jail for “security reasons and safeguarding.”68 Edward Kesselly, Amos Sawyer, Jackson Doe, and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf were all detained for durations ranging from several weeks to three months; Sirleaf for as long as eight months.69 In addition, preemptive measures had been taken to avert any demonstrations, unrest or criticism that may have erupted as a result of the crackdown. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed throughout the capital.70 A decree was published forbidding several vociferous bodies, namely the National Union of Liberian Teachers, the Liberian Business Caucus, the Press Union of Liberia, the Liberia National Student Union, and the Provisional Student Leadership Council of the University of Liberia, from holding “any and all meetings or gatherings.”71 The only major body not cited in the decree was the Liberian Council of Churches. Although the Council was generally a vocal critic of Doe, it enjoyed certain immunity in this situation due to its support for reconciliation following the publication of the elections results, and its public silence following the Gio and Mano massacres.72 Moreover, so as to prevent a repeat of the student demonstrations and clashes with police that had occurred in the wake of the 1984 arrest of Amos Sawyer, the University of Liberia campus was placed under military guard, and UL president, Dr. Joseph Morris, warned the students not to commit acts that would lead to the possible permanent closure of the university.73 At the end of his fifth year in power, on the eve of his swearing-in as the first president of the Second Republic of Liberia, Doe found himself in acute political and economic conundrums. Within Liberia, his reputation had reached a nadir. The public’s support for Quiwonkpa’s attempted coup was all too visible evidence of the general opposition to Doe’s rule, while his violent reaction yet further deepened the people’s animosity toward him. To top it off, the economy was at an all-time low and on the verge of collapse. The political and socioeconomic reality was not solid enough a foundation for the Second Republic to last long. DOE-MOCRACY On January 6, 1986, the Liberian Second Republic was established: Samuel Kanyon Doe was inaugurated as the first president of the Second Republic of Liberia. On the same day, the 1984 democratic constitution was implemented.

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It was the watershed between the years of military rule and what was supposed to be the dawn of a democratic era. For the Liberian people it would have been the fulfillment of their political dream in the last five years. However, in fact, the democracy they had hoped for turned out to be no more than an empty façade. Downfall of the Second Liberian Republic With the coming into effect of the democratic constitution, private individuals, political parties, and civil society as a whole participated in spontaneous acts of democracy. A few days after its implementation, Amos Sawyer (who had been under both political and travel bans since February 12, 1985) applied to the emigration office for obtaining an exit permit.74 In addition, five civil organizations that were banned from holding any meeting or gathering following Quiwonkpa’s failed coup—among them the Press Union of Liberia and the Liberian National Students’ Union—resumed their activities on the ground, claiming that “a new constitution has come into force, a constitution which automatically restores the union’s rights to carry out its normal activities.” These were followed by the decision of the banned United People’s Party (UPP) to resume their activities, and the decision of Kenneth Best, the editor of the independent paper Daily Observer, to resume publication.75 According to Adam Przeworski, the transition to democracy under dictatorial governance is not a certain process, as “some groups have a high degree of control over the situation in the sense that they are not forced to accept undesirable outcomes.”76 Doe and his cohorts perceived this increasingly democratic atmosphere in Liberia as a threat to their rule. However, after five years of military and dictatorial rule, they lacked the know-how, the intent and the means to mitigate it. Unsurprisingly, Doe’s regime confronted the situation with a two-pronged assault: he used the government’s political authority in order to firmly secure for himself the means, with which total control over Liberian politics and society could be guaranteed. Justice Minister Jenkins Scott announced that past military government decrees still constituted grounds for prosecution, at least until taken up by the legislature. Chief Justice James Nagbe stated that with the coming into force of the constitution, the decrees that were promulgated for “the safe conduct of the nation” could not automatically be repealed. He emphasized that any change to those decrees had to be brought before the Supreme Court.77 The second way in which Doe reacted was the employment of violent force intent on deterring those who would defy the standing decrees of the military government. The NDPL Special Task Force set ablaze the pressroom of the Daily Observer, on the same day of Kenneth Best’s decision to renew

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the paper’s publication78; the independent Footprints newspaper shut down its operations due to anonymous threats against them; and the head and spokesman of the opposition Liberian Action Party (LAP) were arrested and interrogated.79 Along with the unorganized democratic practices of the Liberian public, Doe also had to cope with the opposition parties. The three parties who lost the elections—the LAP, UPP, and LUP—saw Doe’s response in similar spirit to most of the public, claiming that the democratic constitution canceled all standing military government decrees. In March 1986 they decided to put their differences aside and unite in order to form an opposition coalition known as the Grand Coalition. Wasting no time, the Grand Coalition published a plan of action for reconciliation under the new democratic constitution. Its main features were the call for the release of all political prisoners and an open dialogue between equals concerning the NDPL and its own representatives. In addition, it called for the creation of a Provisional Council, which represented the political parties and the military, assigned with the main task of organizing and regulating democratic elections within one year.80 The demands for establishing the Provisional Council threatened Doe’s position and the legitimacy of his rule. Hence, Doe decided to abolish the Grand Coalition. To do so, as before, he used his loyal followers. The Elections Commission (ECOM), which replaced SECOM, had its chairman, Isaac Randolph, assert that the Grand Coalition was an illegal party, under the pretexts that it failed to officially register as a political body and that its political aim was “subversive and dangerous to the security of the state.” The justice minister also published a peculiar claim of his own about the Grand Coalition’s aim to “polarize our people to destroy or undermine the basic economic and political fabric and thereby frustrate all efforts to bring about a true democracy.”81 In tandem, Doe used his administrative power to hassle and coerce the members of the Grand Coalition. Jackson Doe, the first vice president of the Grand Coalition, was blacklisted not to travel outside Monrovia, and Gabriel Kpolleh, chairman of the Grand Coalition, was arrested on charge of sedition. The Grand Coalition responded by profusely objecting the arrest of Kpolleh and organized a demonstration of opposition supporters for his release.82 Two months after its establishment, it seemed as if the Second Republic was on course toward a severe political crisis. The Liberian Council of Churches responded by mediating between Doe and opposition leaders in a meeting of conciliation. However, the attempt was futile, as the two parties remained entrenched in their original positions. Additional attempts to

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reconcile the parties came up short as Doe stubbornly saw any compromise as a threat.83 Reverend Thomas Hayden referred to the situation as “a political quagmire,” which might finally lead to spontaneous violence. Looking toward the Second Republic’s imminent future, Hayden prescribed four eventualities: the first, “another internal army-led coup.” The second, an invasion of Liberian exiles backed by Libya. The third, a “Gio-led guerrilla war against the Krahndominated Liberian army.” And the last option, a peaceful settlement between Doe and the Grand Coalition.84 In his prognosis, Hayden foresaw Liberia as heavily predisposed toward conflict. And indeed, it so happened that his second prediction was the one to eventually materialize. Doe seemed to be undeterred by the political “quagmire.” His complacence stemmed from the total U.S support he had enjoyed so far. Indeed, he had grown to learn that Washington’s Cold War considerations would ensure its continued political and economic support for his regime (“loyalty for loyalty”), with little concern about what kind of regime it was, serving as a sort of safety net for its stability. However, with the end of the Cold War (1989–1991), Doe found himself without his main ally, stripped of its economic, military and political support. The ending of U.S support instigated a second turning point in the history of Liberia. Doe’s political rivals took advantage of his vulnerable position. The first among them was Charles Taylor, Doe’s former administrator. By the end of December 1989, with the support of Libya and Liberians from the diaspora, Taylor invaded Nimba County, the foremost center of opposition toward Doe. He was welcomed there by the Gio and Mano people, many of whom further bolstered his forces. He then marched on to Monrovia, fighting his way through AFL Krahn-composed units. Taylor’s insurrection instigated the organization of six more armed militias across the country, led by local warlords. Doe and his forces withdrew to his last stronghold in Monrovia. At this point in time, Liberia as a country ceased to exist while the state was divided into territories ruled by warlords. The civil war in Liberia alarmed its neighbors, who were daunted by the lasting consequences the shockwaves of such conflict might have on West Africa. On August 7, 1990, in an urgent meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it was decided that in order to put an end to the fighting, an intervention force—The Economic Community’s Military Observer Group (ECOMOG)—should be sent to Liberia. Three weeks later, units of ECOMOG led by General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana landed in Monrovia’s Free Port. Shortly after their landing, Doe decided to meet with the ECOMOG commander. On entering the headquarters, he was taken

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captive by one of the militia warlords, Prince Johnson. Under his captivity, Doe was hence tortured to his death. His brutal death put an end to his brutal regime, but the civil war, for which Doe was the main catalyst, would rage on intermittently until 2003. NOTES 1. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberia to Reform Public Enterprises,” March 7, 1985, Nexis Uni. “Govt. to Introduce New Policy Measure on Rice,” Footprints Today, March 7, 1985, 1, 10. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1985): 179. 2. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, “Liberia Moves to Democratic Constitutional rule, Says State Leader,” April 12, 1985, Nexis Uni. 3. “$14.4 Million Aid Accord Signed With EEC,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 24, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T2. 4. “Two Mesurado Officials Held Hostage,” Footprints Today, September 4, 1985, 1, 10. 5. “Deputy Education Minister on Teachers Strike,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 8, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T2. “At JFK Hospital Doctors, Nurses ‘Go Slow’. . . in Demand of Salaries,” Footprints Today, October 10, 1985, 1, 10. 6. The Republic of Liberia, Constitution, Article LXXX, 1984. 7. Patrick L. N. Seyon, “The Results of the 1985 Liberian Elections,” Liberian Studies Journal 13, no. 2 (1988): 222. 8. J. N. Elliot, “Harmon Forecasts 900,000 Voter Turnout,” New Liberian, September 24, 1985, 1, 6, in Sub-Saharan Africa Report, November 7, 1985, 72–73. 9. “Voting on Oct. 15,” Daily Star, September 19, 1985, 6. 10. “Can LAP, LUP Make It?,” Footprints Today, September 4, 1985, 1, 10. 11. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 30. Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great, 120. 12. “Doe Warns Students against ‘Lawlessness,’” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 13, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T2. 13. “After Elections All Govt. Workers Must Be NDPL Members—Dr. Doe,” Footprints Today, October 9, 1985, 1–2. 14. Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great, 133. 15. “SECOM to Investigate,” Footprints Today, September 11, 1985, 1. “Liberia: Candidate “Brutally Whipped,’” West Africa, October 21, 1985, 2234. “LAP Blocked,” Footprints Today, October 4, 1985, 1, 10. 16. “Liberia: Task Force to be Disbanded,” West Africa, October 20, 1986, 2231.

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Morten Bøås. “Liberia—the Hellbound Heart? Regime Breakdown and the Deconstruction of Society,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 22, no. 3 (July 1997): 372. 17. “Profiles of Political Parties,” 41. 18. “Fighting Is Unhealthy,” Footprints Today, October 2, 1985, 2. “Probe These Incidents,” Footprints Today, October 3, 1985, 1, 10. 19. “Liberia: ‘By law, not by force,’” West Africa, October 14, 1985, 2144. 20. Liberia Elections Law, chap. IV, § 4.9–4.11. 21. AFP, “SECOM-Parties Talks Collapse on Vote-Counting,” September 15, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T2. 22. AFP, “Unity Party on Representation at Polls,” September 18, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T2–T3. 23. “Justice Minister Says Parties to View Vote Count,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 19, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T3. 24. “Parties Issue Statement on Election Boycott,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, September 26, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (September 1985): T2. “NDPL Threatens to Assume Power,” West Africa, October 14, 1985, 2182. 25. AFP, “Doe Decrees Government Workers Must Join Party,” October 9, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T1–T2. “Parties Protest SECOM Ruling,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 11, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T3. 26. “Separate Booths Protested,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 16, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report 5, no. 200 (October 1985): T3. 27. Lyse Doucet, “The Voting Proceeds,” West Africa, October 21, 1985, 2192. 28. “Kpolleh Protests Elections Irregularities at BTC,” Daily Star, October 16, 1985, 1, 11. 29. Blaine Harden, “Candidate Doe Allows Election; U.S. Watches Liberian Test Of Coup Maker’s Intentions,” Washington Post, October 16, 1985, A25, Nexis Uni. 30. “LAP, UP Reject Votes Cast,” Daily Star, October 17, 1985, 12. Charles T. Powers, “Irregularities, Intimidation Cloud Voting in Liberia,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1985. 31. “Kpolleh Protests Elections Irregularities at BTC,” 1, 11. Blaine Harden, “Liberia Concedes ‘Errors’ in Voting; Opposition Party Apparently Leads in Election,” Washington Post, October 17, 1985, A36, Nexis Uni. 32. Sawyer, interview. “Africa,” American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1985 (1985): 923. 33. Paul Cammack and Philip O’Brien, “Conclusion: The Retreat of the Generals,” in Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America, ed. Paul Cammack and Philip O’Brien (Manchester, UK and Dover, NH: Manchester University Press, 1985), 193.

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34. Blaine Harden, “Candidate Cites Liberian Election Abuses; Pile of Smoldering Ballots Tops List of Irregularities,” Washington Post, October 23, 1985, A1, Nexis Uni. “Africa,” 923. 35. “LAP, UP on Elections,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 21, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T2–T3. 36. “Liberia: Doe Makes History,” West Africa, November 4, 1985, 2296–97. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1985): 184. 37. Harden, “Candidate Cites Liberian Election Abuses,” A1. “‘Enough is Enough’—Says Liberian Business Caucus,” Footprints Today, October 28, 1985, 1–2. 38. “SECOM Chairman Announces Election Results,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 29, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T2–T6. 39. “Minister Prohibits Elections-Related Rallies,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 29, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (October 1985): T2. Seyon, “The Results of the 1985 Liberian Elections,” 225. 40. Levi Zangai (former secretary-general of LAP), in an interview with the author, October 3, 1996, transcript, private archives, Boston, MA. 41. “Doe Urges Opposition to Close Ranks with NDPL,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, October 31, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T1. “Doe Urges Nation to Put Aside Differences,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 1, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T2. 42. “LUP Representative-Elect Defies Party, Takes Seat,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 7, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T2–T3. “LUP Expels Margibi Rep. Elect,” The Sun, November 10, 1985, 1, 10. 43. “LUP Chairman Cited,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 4, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T3. “Bishop Browne Blasts SECOM,” Footprints Today, November 4, 1985, 1, 10. Liebenow, Liberia, 299. 44. “Ellen Sirleaf Threatens to Sue Scott, Taye,” Footprints Today, November 8, 1985, 1, 10. 45. Associated Press, “Doe Says Opposition Parties Provoking Confusion and Violence,” November 11, 1985. 46. “Liberia: U.S. Congress Concern for Sawyer,” 2061. 47. “Expressing Sense of House Regarding Furnishing of Assistance for Republic of Libera,” Congressional Record 132, no. 14 (2/18/1986): H447–H449. H.Res.367 – A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives Regarding the Furnishing of Assistance for the Republic of Liberia, and for Other Purposes, 99th Congress, February 18, 1986, retrieved from: https://www.congress. gov/bill/99th-congress/house-resolution/367?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22li beria%22%5D%7D&s=6&r=1.

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48. “U.S. Concern over Liberia’s Announced Delay in Transition,” April 16, 1984, secret, Executive Secretariat collection, “Liberia (01/01/1984–01/25/1985)” folder, Rac Box 2, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. 49. IPS-Inter Press Service, “Liberia: U.S. Withholds Comment on Doe Election Victory,” October 29, 1985. 50. “President Reagan Commends H.O.S. Doe & Liberians,” Sun Times, November 6, 1985, 1. 51. “Liberia: Methodist Church Retires Bennie Warner,” West Africa, May 12, 1980, 854. Leon Dash, “New Liberian Leaders Maintain Relations with 3 Neighbors,” Washington Post, May 10, 1980, A17, Nexis Uni. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 144–54. 52. Director of Central Intelligence, “Liberia: Short-Term Prospects,” SNIE67–85, September 1, 1985, secret, 11, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. 53. American Roman Catholic priest, interview. Liberian diplomat and politician (interviewee has been anonymized), in an interview with the author, March 31, 2000, transcript, private archives, Dover, DE. 54. James Butty, “Quiwonkpa Breaks His Silence,” West Africa, June 17, 1985, 1202–4. 55. Eddie Momoh, “Treason Trial Begins,” West Africa, 24 March, 1986, 604. Boley, interview. Dunn, Liberia and the United States during the Cold War, 146. 56. “Liberian Leader’s Redemption Day Address: Timetable for Civilian Rule.” Butty, “Quiwonkpa Breaks His Silence,” 1202–4. 57. “Liberia: Doe’s Olive Leaf to Quiwonkpa,” West Africa, September 9, 1985, 1883. 58. Momoh, “Treason Trial Begins,” 604. Boley, interview. 59. Joseph Kappia (Reporter for Daily Observer), in an interview with the author, November 24, 1996, transcript, private archives, Washington, DC. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Statement of Hon. Chester A. Crocker,” Liberia and United States Policy: Hearing before the Subcommittee of African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 99th Cong., 1st Sess., December 10, 1985. 1–20. 60. Steven Akpan, “How the November Coup Failed,” West Africa, February 17, 1986, 336. Emmanuel Dolo, Democracy Versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa’s Oldest Republic—Liberia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 64. 61. Yuan, interview. 62. Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great, 139. 63. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting concerning Liberia 8–1–86” [in Hebrew], January 30, 1986, secret, 1, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, Israel. 64. “Liberia: Samuel Doe on Death of Quiwonkpa and LBS Editor,” transcribed by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1985, Nexis Uni.

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65. “Border Closed,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 18, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T6. “Doe Orders Border with Sierra Leone Reopened,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, July 12, 1986, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (July 1986): T4. 66. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting concerning Liberia,” 1. 67. “An Eyewitness Account,” West Africa, December 16, 1985, 2625. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1985): 175–76. 68. “Doe on Party Leaders,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 16, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T5. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1985): 177. 69. Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great, 151–52. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia” (1985): 178. 70. United Press International, T. K. Sannahs, “Liberia’s Doe Blames 400 in Coup Attempt,” November 16, 1985. 71. Eddie Momoh, “After the Abortive Coup,” West Africa, November 25, 1985, 2457. 72. Werner Korte, “Churches and Politics in Liberia, 1970–1985,” Liberia-Forum 4, no. 7 (1988): 82. 73. “University President Speaks,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, November 19, 1985, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (November 1985): T2. 74. Amos Sawyer, email correspondence with author, October 27, 2020. 75. “Press Union Said to Defy Ban, Resumes Operation,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 24, 1986, transcribed by BBC Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1986): T3. “Press Union to Resume Activities,” Sun Times, February 25, 1986, 1, 6. 76. Adam Przeworski, “Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986), 58. 77. “Scott Warns against Violating Any Decree,” Footprints Today, February 27, 1986, 1. “Chief Justice: Decrees Stay in Force Pending Review,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, February 5, 1986, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (February 1986): T2–T3. 78. United Press International, “Foreign News Briefs,” March 5, 1986, Nexis Uni. 79. AFP, “Independent Newspapers Resume Publication,” March 13, 1986, Daily Report (March 1986): T1. 80. “Opposition Coalition Calls for Reelections,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, March 21, 1986, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (March 1986): T2–T3.

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81. “Justice Minister Criticizes Opposition Coalition,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 4, 1986, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1986): T3. 82. “Demonstrators Arrested,” Monrovia Radio ELWA, April 29, 1986, transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (April 1986): T1. 83. “Peace Talks Collapse,” West Africa, July 14, 1986, 1458. 84. Thomas Hayden, editorial submitted to the New York Times, April 18, 1986, in Liebenow, Liberia, 315.

Conclusion

This book explains how seventeen privates and noncommissioned officers seized control of the government of Liberia and managed to remain in power for five years, an unprecedented phenomenon in the political history of subSaharan Africa. In comparison to other African juntas, the takeover by and subsequent rule of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC) was unique in two main ways. The first manner concerns the special makeup of the PRC, which was comprised of semiliterate low-ranking soldiers. The second distinction is the incredibly destructive effects the PRC had—both during and following its rule—on Liberia’s economy, civil society, and politics. One of these detrimental consequences is the PRC’s failure to facilitate a democratic transition of power. Even after he had officially completed his publicly stated goal of organizing “free and fair elections” meant to lead to the establishment of the Second Liberian Republic, Doe, the civilian president, maintained his brutal military rule under a façade of democracy. The authoritarian rule that Doe developed was especially pernicious. Americo-Liberian rule transformed Liberia’s state institutions into devices of personal control long before Doe seized power. However, under Doe’s rule, the extent of personal control became much greater. Doe eliminated any and all institutions or organizations capable of limiting or restraining his unchecked executive power. His determination to solely hold fast the reins of power did not originate in any ideology, idea, or set of values, but in his hubris and greed in the pursuit of authority and command. This rule was marked by a combination of personal dictatorship and the use of indiscriminate violence to attain political ends. Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe was a textbook example of a personalist ruler. Ronald Wintrobe describes this type of ruler as the most dangerous kind, mostly because such an authority is in a position to control a wide segment of the economy and society without being checked by interest groups or economic considerations.1 In fact, Doe amassed an enormous and 317

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unprecedented amount of power during his rule over Liberia. Amos Sawyer pointed out that: The greatest threat which the military dictatorship has posed to the Liberian society is not the abuse of human rights, as intensive and excruciating as these have been; neither is it the impoverishment of the Liberian people, as harsh and demeaning as their economic conditions are. The greatest threat posed by the military dictatorship to the Liberian society lies in the introduction of the military itself as a factor in Liberian political life in the future.2

Sawyer’s observations, made in 1987, would prove all too apt in the next sixteen years, during which Liberia was torn asunder by two civil wars, the first of which (1990–1997) was led by six warlords. In 1997, when the first civil war ended, Charles Taylor, who had been the chief warlord, was democratically elected president. Nevertheless, Taylor continued Doe’s legacy as a personal dictator. His dictatorial rule resulted in the second civil war (1999–2003), which—following intense regional and international pressure—concluded with his own ouster. The analysis of the five years of Doe’s personalist military dictatorship presented in this book should shed light on the reasons for the eruption and protracted continuation of the 1990 civil war in Liberia. NOTES 1. Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 342. 2. Sawyer, Effective Immediately, 19. U.S. Department of State, “Liberia: Transition to Democracy or Worsening Instability?” No. F-2006–05089 Doc No. C18604119, August 25, 1986, confidential, Department of State Record.

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Index

act against humanity, 148 AFL. See armed forces of Liberia African states, 193 African unity, 190 age requirements, 176 agricultural production, 132–35 air force, 137 Akoei, Jonah, 201 Allison, Gray D., 116–19, 132; Israel delegation with, 192; Matthews vilified by, 281; as Minister of Defense, 195–96; as Minister of Information, 34, 85; political rivals blame from, 261; in U.S. delegation, 284 All-Party Conference, 283 Americo-Liberians, xii; Masonic Order symbol of, 5; military coup toppling, 3; Nuahn warning about, 105 Amin, Idi, 3, 41 Anene, John N., 12 anti-revolutionary element, 15–16 apartheid, 151 Appleton, E. Wade, 166 Arab states, 189, 193–94 Arap Moi, Daniel, 151 armed forces: commander-in-chief of, 79; Doe, S., honoring, 81–82; recruit training by, 112

Armed Forces Day, 81, 92 armed forces of Liberia (AFL), 102, 106, 137, 214 the Army, 105–6; civilian politician subordination of, 103; Doe, S., audience of, 243–44; Doe, S., loyalty sought by, 14–15; Doe, S., opposition from, 103–4; Doe, S., power from, 244; Doe, S., reorganization of, 104; Quiwonkpa divesting identity of, 208–9, 211; rank promotion in, 79–80 army return to barracks quote, 61, 103, 120 arrest, arbitrary, 28–29 Ash-Thompson, Luvenia, 273 Asia-Africa tour, 101–2, 108 assassination: military junta threat to, 74; plotters executed for, 74; Quiwonkpa attempted, 214–15; Sawyer and attempted, 263; soldiers arrested for, 73; of Tolbert, W., 5, 22, 40 audit, of Kesselly, E., 277 Audu, Ishaya, 49 authoritarian regime, 113 Avital, Benad, 119, 189 ballots, 297 banks, 102, 114, 178 359

360

Barclay Training Center, 263, 298 Bartuah, John, 276 Battalion Number One, 305 Bedell, Arthur, 104, 134 Belleh, Martha S., 222, 262 Bernard, Toye, 241 Best, Kenneth, 76, 307–8 Bestman, John, 134 Bishop, James, 236 Black Republic, xi Blamo, J. Bernard, 256, 270 Boayue, Charles S. G., Sr., 179–80 Boeing 737 presidential jet, 136 Bokassa, Jean-Bédel, 3 Boley, George S., 13, 30, 33, 86, 197 Bolo, George, 139 Bomi Territory, 201 bond scheme, savings, 26, 32, 53 Booker Washington Institute, 195 Borteh, Larry, 233, 255; dismissal of, 131; Doe, S., reinstating, 114; Israel delegation with, 192; Podier suspending, 230 Bowier, Emmanuel, 221, 236 boycotting, of elections, 297 Boye, Francis, 305 Boynton, John, 163 bribe-taking, 112, 243 Brooker, Paul, 83, 237 Browne, George D., 262, 300 Browne, J. Seyon, 114, 167 Brown-Sherman, Mary Antoinette, 111 Bryant, Kate, 4 budget deficit, of Liberia, 30–31 Burnette, Samuel N., Jr., 156 Butler, Samuel, 75 CAA. See Constitutional Advisory Assembly cabinet: Doe, S., purge of, 83–89; Doe, S., replacements in, 34; Krahn people in, 33–34; militarization of, 79; reshuffle, 33, 71–72, 102, 115; of Tolbert, W., 4; U.S. complicit in purge of, 87 Caine, Augustus, 305

Index

campaigning: against corruption, 112–14, 157; Doe, S., threats concerning, 294–95; for education, 234; for elections, 179–80, 291–92; materials, 276; obstacles to, 270–71; of presidential candidates, 177 canvassing, 275–76 Carlon, Jabaru, 293 Carter, Jimmy, 40–42, 57, 301 Cassell, A. N., 182 celebrations, forbidden, 5 Cheapoo, Chea, Sr., 3–4, 29; dismissal from scandals of, 84; as Minister of Justice, 34; as PPP member, 83 chiefs and elders: Doe, S., bid for support from, 212; Doe, S., bribes to, 243; Doe, S., deterrence of, 219 China, 130 CIA, 303 civilian government, 125; Doe, S., illusion of, 92–93; former soldiers making up, 236–37; leaders of, 142; military government toppling, 74; military identity and, 126; ministers of, 12–14; power transfer to, 93 civilianization process, 237, 240, 246 civilian politicians, 12–13, 103 civilian rights, 131 civilian rule, 179, 278; democracy and transition to, 257; Doe, S., and PRC initiating, 164; draft constitution and transition to, 177; funds given for, 178; Liberian difficulties moving toward, 285–86; Liberia’s assurances of, 135–36; multi-party elections in, 237–38, 283, 297; Quiwonkpa demands and, 209–10; Quiwonkpa motives for, 218–19; Redemption Day commitment to, 236; transition to, 239; U.S. and transition delay to, 235–36 civilians, political activity by, 75 civil reforms, 4 civil societies, 14 civil war, xiv, 213–14, 309–10, 318

Index

Clark, Ramsey, 260 Clarke, Wilfred, 108 Clement, Kwame, 76, 242 clenched fist salute, 5–6 Cold War ally, 283–84 Cold War battles, 168 commander-in-chief, 79 commodity prices, 84 communism, 198, 281 Con Com. See National Constitution Commission constitution. See draft constitution Constitutional Advisory Assembly (CAA), 162–64, 175, 179–80; Doe, S., supporting, 184; educational campaign from, 234; independence of, 181–82; tripartite division of powers from, 183 constitutional rule, 93 Constitution Commission, 263 Cooper, Joe Saye, 215, 218 corruption: campaign against, 112–14, 157; in Liberia, 154; Podier fight against, 116; of PRC, 9–10, 12; Tolbert, W., government with, 9–10, 15 county status, 233 coup: Doe, S., preparations against, 305; Doe, S., presenting fictitious, 256; Doe, S., story advanced about, 259; evidence created for planned, 261; prices influenced by, 4; Quiwonkpa failed, 304; Quiwonkpa planning, 217–19; regime following, 40, 74, 87, 102–4, 136. See also military coup coupists: civilian ministers appointed by, 12; curfew imposed by, 29; debt inherited by, 22; ideology lacking of, 11–12; lawlessness of, 9, 28–29; military identity of, 11; PRC formed by, 3–4; scenario for plans of, 218– 19; violent image of, 40–41 Coups & Army Rule in Africa (Decalo), 95–96

361

Crocker, Chester A., 142, 168 curfew, 29, 130 Cuttington College, 111–12, 198 Daily Observer, 263; Doe, S., ordering closure of, 89; draft constitution editorial by, 186; financial requirements from, 246; Nuahn’s interview with, 105; Podier fining, 231; reopening, 238, 242, 307; revocation proceedings against, 231–32 Dan, Marcus, 166 Darpoh, Rufus, 14–15, 242 death sentence, 110, 221; for PRC members, 80; rescinded, 95; of students, 94–95. See also executions; firing squads debates, 295 debt, coupists inheriting, 22 Decalo, Samuel, 24, 95–96, 237 decolonization process, xii Decree 75 A, 244–46, 276 Decree 88 A, 240–41, 246, 255–58 Decree No. 1 violation, 75–76 Decree No. 49, 186 Decree No. 75, 175 Delafosse, Daisy, 48 democracy: civilian rule transition to, 257; dictatorship transition to, 307; Doe, S., circumventing, 264; draft constitution transition to, 163–64; Fahnbulleh fighting for, 86; Liberia’s prospects for, 168; multi-party elections in, 237–38, 283, 297; power transfer in, 165–66; PRC and, 15; Quiwonkpa’s commitment to, 303; Sawyer guardian of, 253 democratization process, 162, 207 Dennis, Hilary, 113, 167 Derwinski, Edward, 285 development aid, 193 development gatherings, 201 development plan, 86–87, 291–92

362

Index

dictatorships, 3, 298; democracy transition from, 307; Doe, S., on road to, 21, 62; military coup leading to, 318; Taylor, C., rule of, 318 Diggs, William, 113 diplomatic relations, 117–20, 192 dishonorable discharge, 74 Doe, Isaac K., 273 Doe, Jackson F., 222, 293; election boycotting and, 297; NDPL support for, 300; as president elect, 298 Doe, Samuel Kanyon: death of, 310; as head of state, 3; presidential inauguration of, 307. See also specific topics draft constitution: civilian rule transition and, 177; from Con Com, 161–63; Daily Observer editorial on, 186; democracy transition in, 163–64; Doe, S., receiving, 164; Doe, S., signing into law, 238; obstacles removed for, 186; political enthusiasm from, 175; PRC submission of, 234; revised, 233; undesirable clauses in, 177–78 Dubar, Henry S., 81, 119, 132, 152, 210, 281 due process, 220 Dunn, Elwood, 302 Dunye, George, 85 Duopu, G. Moses, 13, 209 duty-free privileges, 133–34 Eastman, Ernest, 191–92, 229, 284 ECOM. See Elections Commission ECOMOG. See Economic Community’s Military Observer Group economic aid: from China, 130; international, 212; from Israel, 118; Liberia receiving, 136–37; Liberia seeking, 23; Liberia’s sources of, 127; from U.S., 50–51, 53, 59, 192–93, 301; U.S. passing package for, 24–25

Economic and Financial Management Committee, 134 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 11, 43–46, 309–10 Economic Community’s Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), 310 economic crisis, 21–22, 142; Doe, S., ignoring, 31; Liberia’s recovery battle from, 23–26; Liberia’s situation of, 30–31; Liberia with, 306–7; military junta with, 31; Tipoteh grasping, 25 economic development, 77–78, 157 economic responsibility: charade of, 138, 141; impression fostered of, 132–35; national salary readjustment scheme in, 142 Economic Summit, 41 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States education, 7, 198 educational campaign, 234 Egypt, 117 elections: ballots in, 297; boycotting of, 297; campaigning for, 179–80, 291–92; candidates declare themselves for, 164–68; Con Com laying out procedure for, 161–62; date deferred for, 233–39; Doe, S., controlling vote counting in, 298–99; Doe, S., promises of, 8, 50; Doe, S., stealing victory in, 298–99; falsified results of, 300; free and fair, 285; irregularities in, 299; labor unrest before, 292; Liberian people’s hope in, 302; LUP providing irregularities in, 299; media coverage of, 298; military in politics and, 176–77; multi-party, 237–38, 283, 297; people running in, 164–65; postponement of, 235; rigging, 296–301 Elections Commission (ECOM), 308

Index

Elections Law, 179, 233, 279; from Con Com, 180; Scott implementing, 296–97; from SECOM, 238; vote counting observation from, 296; voter registration and, 293 electoral process: complaints concerning, 289; contamination of, 238–39; Doe, S., mockery of, 283–84; Doe, S., obstacles to, 257; Doe, S., trying to control, 112; local leadership in, 180–81; SECOM mockery of, 276; SECOM tampering with, 292–94; undermining while promoting, 282 emergency aid, 56, 152–53 Escriba-Folch, Abel, 207 Ethiopia, 51–52 ethnic groups: Gio, 305; Krahn, 7, 10, 14–15, 33–34, 73, 81, 86, 106–7, 200–201; in Liberia, 245– 46; Mano, 305 Europe, 230 executions, 6, 29, 82 executive branch, 186 executive clemency, 94 Executive Mansion Guard, 105, 118, 192, 208, 278 expenditures, 133–36 Export Import Bank, 52 Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, 301 Fahnbulleh, Henry Boimah, Jr., 3, 9–10; Doe, S., dismissing, 191; duty-free privileges and, 133–34; as fighter for democracy, 86; Ghanaian resettlement check from, 148; government conduct defended by, 140–41; large sum of money and, 118; Reagan and arrangements by, 131; residency requirements influencing, 184; TWP overthrow mentioned by, 72; West Africa interview by, 175 Fahnbulleh, Henry Boimah, Sr., 62 Farngalo, Joseph, 215

363

FDA. See Forestry Development Authority financial aid. See economic aid Financial Clause, 246 financial reforms, 27 financial securities, 275 Finer, Samuel E., 6–7, 82 firing squads, 40, 197 five-star-general, 79–80 Flanzamaton, Moses, 278, 280, 302 Food for Peace program, 137 Footprints Today, 242, 260, 284, 296 foreign aid: Doe, S., pursuit of, 127–28; Doe, S., speaking about, 28; investments for, 27–28; for Liberia, 24 foreign ideologies, 197 foreign ministers, 126 foreign policy: of Liberia, 229–30; of military junta, 46–47; pro-American, 62; of U.S., 54–55, 62 Forestry Development Authority (FDA), 118 France, 137–38 Francis, Michael Kpakala, 217 Franco-African Summit, 199 free enterprise system, 23 Fromoyan, Alfred, 85 Funk, Jerry, 42 Gaddafi, Muammar, 40, 286 Gardiner, Emmanuel, 135 Gbala, Bai, 181 Gbala, David, 273 Gbalazeh, Emmanuel, 273–74 Gban, Jerry, 90, 114 Gbatu, Jeffery, 80, 88, 232, 239 Gbusseh, Edwin G., 195 Gedle-Giorgis, Feleke, 44–45 Gee, J. Winston, 280 General Economic Policy Statement, 23, 28 general service agency (GSA), 209 Genuine Non-Alignment: abandonment of, 58–60; Doe, S., exploiting, 59; of Liberia, 46–50; Matthews

364

Index

and, 47–48; Matthews criticizing abandonment of, 58–60; phase one of, 46–50; phase three of, 54–62; phase two of, 50–54; with U.S., 47, 52 George, Peter Amos, 300 Germany, 178, 194 Ghanaian resettlement, 148 Gio ethnic group, 305 Givens, Willie, 130 Glebo chief, 202 golden age, of Liberia, xii government: Doe, S., reducing expenditures of, 85–86; expenditures controlled of, 133–36; Fahnbulleh defending conduct of, 140–41; Liberia’s salaries cut of, 138–39; after military coup, 42; military operation of, 79–80; pension scheme, 139; power concentrating in, 88; PRC as military, 60–61; PRC’s spending, 26–27; regime members in, 14–15; Tolbert, W., with corrupt, 9–10, 15; violent force supporting, 308. See also civilian government; military junta Grand Coalition, 308–9 Grand Kru County, 243 Gray, William H., III, 42 Greaves, Harry, 278 Greene, Charles, 113 Greene, Herman, 113 GSA. See general service agency guilty verdict, 221 Guinea, Doe’s visit to, 220–21 Habré, Hissène, 191, 301 Haggard, Stephan, 23–24 Haig, Alexander, Jr., 55 Hanson, Thomas, 113 Harmon, Emmett, 179–80, 233, 238; pre-registration requirements from, 277–78; SECOM assault led by, 270; UPP pamphlets and, 276; voter registration tweaked by, 293 Hassan II (king of Morocco), 138

Hayakawa, Samuel Ichiye, 87 Hayden, Thomas, 303, 309 Herring, Johnny S., 215 Herzog, Chaim, 220, 231 high school students, 259, 263 Hinneh, Klon, 242, 284 historical critical method, xiv homecoming speech, 129–30, 154 honorary doctorate, 128 Horton, Francis “Choo-Choo,” xiii Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 43, 48–49, 127 Howard, J. C. N., 75 al-Hudayr, Ahmad, 43 human rights, 41, 199, 285 hut tax, 4 hydroelectric project, 138 ideologies, 11–12, 24, 197 IMF, 23–27 INA. See Interim National Assembly Independence Day, 196 independent press, 230 Interim National Assembly (INA), 232; creation of, 239; Doe, S., choosing members of, 239–40; Doe, S., convening, 258; Doe, S., fictitious coup presented to, 256; Podier fired from, 263; political rivals eliminated by, 240 international aid, 212 International Progress Organization (IPO), 260 investments, 27–28 IPO. See International Progress Organization Israel: African states relations with, 193; African unity and, 190; delegation to, 192; development aid from, 193; diplomatic relations with, 117–20; Doe, S., renewing ties with, 175, 189–94; Doe, S., self-promotion to, 200; economic benefits from, 118; establishment of, xi; Liberia’s

Index

military assistance from, 192; Liberia’s oil supply and, 119 Israel-Egypt peace accords, 117 Jackson, Robert H., 95 James, Abraham L., 183 Jappah, Daniel, 195 Jerbo, William, 74 Johnson, Elmer Glee, 278, 284 Johnson, Gayflor Y., 270 Johnson, Harris, 10, 80 Johnson, Peter, 7 Johnson, Prince, 310 Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, 13, 184, 294–95, 301 Joint Security Force, 107–9 Jones, Alvin J., 85 Jones, G. Alvin, 133, 140, 180, 235, 272 Jones, J. Mills, 8 Jorwley, Jerry Friday, 104, 255 journalists, 77 judicial service commission, 183 judicial system, 112–13 Jurway, Isaac, 74 Kamara, Sam, 108, 119, 256, 275 Karpeh, Albert, 33, 74, 81, 106, 116, 278 Karpeh, Carlton, 284 Karpeh, Reuben, 116 Karweaye, John, 275 Karwianye, John, 195 Kerekou, Mathieu, 151 Kesselly, Anthony, 258 Kesselly, Benyah, 179–81 Kesselly, Edward, 182, 185, 234, 296; audit of, 277; detained, 278; election boycotting and, 297; as Unity Party head, 254 Kiahoun, James, 300 Kieh, George, 30, 255 Kimeh, David T. M., 222 Kobbah, Weade, 176 Koch, Edward, 135–36, 168 Koenig, Henrietta, 230 Kollie, Abraham D., 201 Kountche, Seyni, 151

365

Kpolleh, Gabriel W., 166, 244, 279– 80, 294, 308 Kpor, Johnny, 282 Kpoto, Keikura, 271 Kpoto, Kekwa, 282 Krahn ethnic group, 73, 86, 200–201; Doe, S., from, 7; in influential positions, 33–34, 81; police force leadership with, 106–7; security services with, 10; visible luxury of, 14–15 Kromah, Alhaji G. V., 176 Kulah, Arthur Flomo, 72 labor unrest, 292 LAMCO. See Liberian American Swedish Mineral Company LAP. See Liberian Action Party lawlessness, 8–9, 28–29 LBS. See Liberia Broadcasting System LCC. See Liberian Council of Churches leadership: of civilian government, 142; electoral process with local, 180–81; executions of TWP, 6; liberal-minded, 16, 111, 131–32; LPP’s detained, 280; police force, 106–7; political rivals arrest of, 306; in politics, 129; religious, 214; revolutionary, 200 LEC. See Liberian Electric Corporation legitimacy, 231 Lewis, Mary, 195 LFTU. See Liberian Federation of Trade Unions liberal-minded leader, 16, 111, 131–32 Liberia: budget deficit of, 30–31; Carter’s working relations with, 42; ceased to exist, 309; civilian rule assurances for, 135–36; civilian rule difficulties in, 285–86; civil war in, 309–10, 318; corruption in, 154; democratic prospects of, 168; Doe, S., homecoming speech in, 129–30, 154; economic aid authorized for, 136–37; economic aid sought for, 23; economic aid

366

Index

sources to, 127; economic collapse of, 306–7; economic recovery battle of, 23–26; economic situation of, 30–31; Economic Summit excluding, 41; election hope in, 302; ethnic groups in, 245–46; Europe with embassies of, 230; Export Import Bank loan to, 52; foreign aid for, 24; foreign policy of, 229–30; friendship overtures from, 41; Genuine NonAlignment of, 46–50; golden age of, xii; government salaries cut in, 138–39; gross mismanagement of, 154; human rights violations in, 285; Israel and oil supply to, 119; Israel’s diplomatic relations with, 117–20; Israel’s military assistance to, 192; Libyan embassy closed by, 73; Lofa County in, 201; as medicine source, 195; military coup in, xi–xii, 7, 318; next-door neighbors of, 43; oil prices rise in, 153; petroleum debt of, 26, 52, 153–54; power outages in, 155–56; Quiwonkpa’s return to, 220, 303–4; Reagan denying aid request for, 260–61; refugees fleeing to, 152; revenue-raising measures of, 139–40; Sawyer leaving, 186; Sawyer’s detention and protests in, 256–57; Sierra Leone border closed to, 148–49; South Korea cooperation with, 128; United Nations conference of, 210–11; U.S. and interests of, 47; U.S. development assistance to, 50; U.S. economic aid to, 50–51, 53, 59, 192–93, 301; U.S. military training team to, 56; U.S. policy on, 49, 51–52; U.S. receiving delegation from, 284; U.S. strategic interests in, 40; U.S. support ended to, 309; voting permitted in, 297–98; weak public institutions of, 9; West African solidarity with, 45, 52; Zionism and, xi

Liberia Broadcasting System (LBS), 242, 260 Liberian Action Party (LAP), 184, 254, 270, 281, 294 Liberian American Swedish Mineral Company (LAMCO), 6, 88, 90 Liberian Business Caucus, 299 Liberian Council of Churches (LCC), 257, 309 Liberian Electric Corporation (LEC), 155–56 Liberian Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), 5 Liberian National Students Union (LINSU), 72, 75 Liberian People’s Party (LPP), 255, 263, 270, 274–75, 280 Liberian Second Republic, 307–10 Liberian Student Union (LINSU), 6 Liberian Unification Party (LUP), 279, 299 Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation, 113–14 Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC), 154–57 Libya: Chad intervention by, 191; Doe, S., canceling visit to, 53; Liberia closing embassy of, 73; Matthews signing agreement with, 53; PRC fear of aggression by, 117–18; PRC recognized by, 39–40; Quiwonkpa opposing embassy of, 57–58; U.S. relations with, 55; Zulu’s visit to, 55 Liebenow, Gus J., 8 LINSU. See Liberian National Students Union; Liberian Student Union Linz, Juan J., 7–8 Lofa County, 201 loyalty for loyalty policy, 57–58 LPP. See Liberian People’s Party LPRC. See Liberia Petroleum Refining Company Luo, Kalago, 218, 220 LUP. See Liberian Unification Party

Index

Mano ethnic group, 305 The Man on Horseback (Finer), 82 Mano River Union (MRU), 43, 127, 147, 191 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 40, 44 Marketing Association, 243 martial law, 7–8 Maryland County, 201–2 Masonic Order, 5 Massaquoi, Edward, 109 Massaquoi, Sam, 107–8 Matthews, Gabriel Baccus, 3, 10, 13; detained, 278; Doe, S., firing, 86; financial securities presented by, 275; Gedle-Giorgis talks with, 44–45; Genuine Non-Alignment, 47–48; Genuine Non-Alignment abandonment and, 58–60; ideology of, 11–12; Libya signing agreement with, 53; as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27; OAU summit, 49; policy statement from, 46; PPP headed by, xiii; resignation of, 166–67; task force chaired by, 132–33; as UPP head, 254; vilification of, 281 Mbasogo, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, 301 McCritty, Wilmot A., 184 McHenry, Donald, 48 MCSS. See Monrovia Consolidated School System media: election coverage by, 298; independent press in, 230; journalist jailed, 306; journalists in, 77; military junta’s battle against, 231; student crackdown response of, 259 medical services, 156 medicine source, 195 Middle East, 200 Migdal, Joel, 200 militarization, of cabinet, 79 military: civilian government toppled by, 74; civil societies challenge to, 14; dictatorship, 318; Doe, S., reshuffle of, 115; government operating like, 79–80; Israel’s

367

assistance with, 192; martial law imposed by, 7–8; political elections with, 176–77; training facility, 78; training team, 56 military aid, 56–57 military coup: acceptance gained after, 15; Americo-Liberian regime toppled by, 3; arbitrary arrest and, 28–29; chaos resulting from, 8–9; curfew lifted after, 130; dictatorships from, 318; features of, xiv; government after, 42; in Liberia, xi–xii, 7, 318; personal gain from, 30; power secured from, 9; PRC formed from, 3–4; prices influenced by, 4. See also coupists military guard, 306 military identity: civilian government and, 126; of coupists, 11; of PRC, 12, 32, 60–61; Quiwonkpa divested of, 208–9, 211 military junta, xiv; assassination plot threat to, 74; civilian regimes toppled by, 74; Doe, S., attempted removal and, 213–14; Doe, S., clothing for, 44–45; Doe, S., securing control of, 71; with economic crisis, 31; with executions, 29; exploratory delegation sent for, 42–43; foreign policy of, 46–47; media battle of, 231; overthrow fears of, 51; powerbuilding process of, 101; power perpetuated by, 175; PRC as, 60–61, 177; soldier’s living conditions of, 57; Tipoteh on raids by, 29; U.S. supporting, 118–19 Military Tribunal, 40 Minikon, Patrick, 107, 116 mining companies, 21 ministerial committees, 85–86 Minister of Defense, 195–96 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 Minister of Information, 34, 85 Minister of Justice, 34 Ministry of Education, 196–97

368

Ministry of Finance, 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 216 Ministry of Information, 117 Ministry of Justice, 109, 116 Ministry of Labor, 33 Ministry of National Security, 116 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 85 missile-firing destroyer, 57 Mitterrand, François, 138 Mobutu Sese Seko, 119, 301 MOJA. See Movement for Justice in Africa Mongrue, Woto, 214 Moniba, Harry Fumba, 239, 261 Monrovia Consolidated School System (MCSS), 140, 259 Monrovia-Freetown Highway, 194 Moose, Richard, 11, 24, 26, 42, 49–50, 53 Moran, Mary H., 175, 181 Morocco, 137–38 Morris, Joseph, 262, 306 Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), xiii, 3, 13–14; political party formed by, 254–55; student support of, 258; Tipoteh member of, 83 MRU. See Mano River Union multi-party elections, 237–38, 283, 297 multiparty system, 176 Mutada, Jeff, 242 Myers, A. Tuabe, 104, 112 Myers, Gabriel, 81, 107 Myers, Joe Y., 81, 107–8, 119 Nagbe, James, 308 Naigow, Peter, 117, 165–67, 242 National Constitution Commission (Con Com), 31–32, 61, 76; bank account opened for, 178; committee members of, 180; Doe, S., can’t dismiss members of, 163; Doe, S., circumvention of, 176–77; Doe, S., disbanding, 185–86, 212; Doe, S., friction with, 168; Doe,

Index

S., inaugurating, 90–91; Doe, S., marginalizing, 181–84; draft constitution from, 161–63; Elections Law from, 180; elections procedure from, 161–62; interference from, 182–83; new constitution and, 125– 26; PRC granting privileges to, 87; transitional process guarded by, 175 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), 182; Doe, J., supported by, 300; establishment of, 278–86; Quiah with, 297; rally by, 279; rival parties in coalition with, 300; SECOM sided with, 296; speedy registration for, 271–72 National Guard, 102–3 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), 303–4 national salary readjustment scheme, 142 National Security Agency (NSA), 107, 216 National Security Council, 42 National Security Force, 109 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 169 National Union of Liberian Teachers (NULT), 198 Nayou, Harry Faber, 110, 155 NCO. See noncommissioned officers Ndama, Harold, 294 NDPL. See National Democratic Party of Liberia Nebo, Willie P., 13, 33–34 New Liberian, 231 Nguema, Francisco Macías, 3 Nimba County, 212, 222 Nimely, Gabriel, 5, 13, 34 Non-Alignment Movement, 46, 142, 149–54 noncommissioned officers (NCO), xiv Non–Democratic Regimes (Brooker), 83 Nouyon, Harry, 33

Index

NPFL. See National Patriotic Front of Liberia NSA. See National Security Agency Nuahn, John, 74, 105–6 NULT. See National Union of Liberian Teachers Numayri, Ja’far, 150–52 nurses strike, 156–57 Nyeplu, Isaac, 107, 179–80, 240, 255 Nyerere, Julius, 151 Nyumah, John, 192 OAU. See Organization for African Unity Obasanjo, Olusegun, 3, 9 Obote, Milton, 151 obstruction tactics, 274–76 oil prices, 153 Olympio, Sylvanus, 41 open door policy, xii Organization for African Unity (OAU), 22, 41–42, 48–49, 189–90 organized recruitment, 199–202 Oulanov, Anatoly, 216 overseas tour, 110, 126–27; Doe, S., self confidence in, 142–43; first tour, 128–29; France and Morocco in, 137–38; second tour, 135–38 paramedic strike, 156–57 patronage system, xii Paynesville Community School, 199 Pearson, Samuel, 33 Pennue, Harrison Taffan, 10, 34, 306 People’s Bureau, 55–56, 58, 72 People’s Progressive Party (PPP), xiii, 3, 83 People’s Redemption Council (PRC), xiv; civilian partners needed by, 12–13; civilian rule initiated by, 164; clenched fist salute of, 5–6; committees abolished by, 89–90; Con Com privileges granted by, 87; corrupt acts and, 9–10, 12; death sentences for members of, 80; Decree No. 75 published by, 175; democratic rule and, 15; dissolution

369

of, 232–33; Doe, S., as peacemaker to, 190; Doe, S., circumventing, 76; Doe, S., purge of, 78–83; Doe, S., reorganizing, 33; Doe, S., restraining excesses of, 29; Doe, S., tightening grip on, 80; draft constitution submitted to, 234; Gban, J., expelled from, 90; government spending of, 26–27; ideologies and, 24; Libyan aggression fear of, 117–18; Libya’s recognition of, 39–40; military coup forming, 3–4; as military government, 60–61; military identity of, 12, 32, 60–61; military junta as, 60–61, 177; Military Tribunal set up by, 40; power and status of, 10; Quiwonkpa appeal to, 211; reorganization of, 208; semi-literate low-ranking soldiers in, 317; strikes outlawed by, 32; U.S. enabling elimination of members of, 82; violent actions not tolerated by, 196; Weh Syen member of, 10–11 People’s Supreme Tribunal, 29 Perkins, Edward, 286 personal gain, 30 Personal Rule in Black Africa (Jackson and Rosberg), 95 personal security, 101 petroleum: crisis, 155; debt, 26, 52, 153–54; oil prices, 153; scandal, 153–56 Podier, J. Nicholas, Jr., 10, 30, 210, 259; army return to barracks quote of, 61, 103, 120; Borteh suspended by, 230; corruption fight tour of, 116; Daily Observer fined by, 231; Doe, S., as five-star-general, 79; Doe, S., detaining, 255–57; Doe, S., threatened by, 256; as Doe, S., ally, 15; INA firing of, 263; independent press muzzled by, 230; security service reorganization and, 108; University closed by, 110 Police Force, 106–7, 109–10

370

Index

POLISARIO. See Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro political activity: ban lifted on, 241–42, 244–45; ban on, 91–94, 179–81, 200, 269; by civilians, 75; Doe, S., depleting assurance of, 239; Doe, S., ultimatum on, 164–68; Quiah on, 165; Sawyer critic of ban on, 237; students arrested for, 257; students banned from, 91–92 political parties, 238; candidates declaring, 253; Doe, S., and survival of, 282–83; Doe, S., needing rival, 278; financial requirements for, 246; MOJA forming, 254–55; preregistration process for, 245–46, 272–78; registration process for, 269–76; SECOM registration denied of, 269–70; UPP granted status of, 281 political rivals: Allison putting blame on, 261; coalition rejected by, 301; decree hobbling, 165; Doe, S., and UP as, 281; Doe, S., choosing, 279; Doe, S., denigrating, 199; Doe, S., eliminating, 89, 101; Doe, S., restrictions on, 244–46; INA help in eliminating, 240; leader arrested of, 306; means and agents tormenting, 276–78; NDPL in coalition with, 300; restrictions and obstructions for, 295–96; SECOM receiving names of, 293–94 Political Violence and Corruption in Africa (Kieh), 30 politics: amnesty in, 92; clashes over, 152; Doe, S., intimidation with, 194–99; Doe, S., savvy in, 34–35; draft constitution creating enthusiasm in, 175; elections with military in, 176–77; leadership in, 129; prisoners because of, 88; Tipoteh seeking asylum in, 83–84; Tolbert, W., creating upheaval in, xiii–xiv

Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), 129 population census, 236 Port Authority, 106 Porte, Albert, 62, 88 post-coup regime, 40, 74, 87, 102–4, 136 power, 84; civilian regimes transfer of, 93; democratic process transfer of, 165–66; Doe, S., abusive, 282; Doe, S., and retention of, 238–39; Doe, S., centralizing, 109–10, 115; Doe, S., tactics retaining, 282; Doe, S., using army for, 244; of executive branch, 186; government concentration of, 88; military coup securing, 9; military junta perpetuating, 175; outages, 155–56; PRC status and, 10; process of building, 101; security forces conferred with, 240–41; tripartite division of, 183; with unchecked executive, 317–18 PPP. See People’s Progressive Party PRC. See People’s Redemption Council pre-registration requirements, 245–46, 272–78 presidency: Doe, J., elected to, 298; Doe, S., inauguration to, 307; Doe, S., transition to, 240 presidential candidates, 162; age requirements for, 176; covert campaigning of, 177; democratization process and, 207; Doe, S., announcing as, 242–44; Doe, S., as legitimate, 200–201; Doe, S., on ballot as, 232–33; forced resignation and, 165–66; LUP and LAP, 279; objections met with force, 244; political parties declaration by, 253; press conference and, 236; registration obstacles for, 254; residency requirement for, 184; Sawyer objections and, 254–55;

Index

SECOM denying registration of, 244–45 press conference, 176, 236 press release, 152 Press Union of Liberia (PUL), 30 prices, coup influencing, 4 private property, 132 Progressive Alliance of Liberia, xiii protests, 256–57, 299 Provisional Council, 308 Przeworski, Adam, 307 public institutions, 9 public service commission, 183 public service employees, 27 PUL. See Press Union of Liberia punishment, of Wesseh, 76 Quainoo, Arnold, 310 Quiah, Oscar Jaryee, 3, 276; acquittal of, 80; detainment of, 277; Doe, S., getting rid of, 83, 87, 116; NDPL with, 297; on political activity, 165; resignation of, 166 Quiwonkpa, Thomas Gankama, 7, 9–10; AFL reliance of, 214; army identity divested of, 208–9, 211; assassination attempt on, 214–15; CIA providing passport for, 303; civilian rule and demands of, 209–10; civilian rule motives of, 218–19; coup failed of, 304; coup planned by, 217–19; death of, 304; democracy commitment of, 303; diplomatic relations from, 119; Doe, S., assassination attempts on, 214–15; Doe, S., assault on, 202, 207, 211–13; Doe, S., coup attempt failed by, 304; Doe, S., coup preparations foiling, 305; Doe, S., cultivating relations with, 81; Doe, S., justifying pursuit of, 216; Doe, S., manipulating, 209; Doe, S., preventing escape of, 217; Doe, S., seeking return of, 219–20; family arrested of, 216; as

371

formidable opponent, 103; letter of apology required of, 212; Liberia return of, 220, 303–4; Libyan embassy opposed by, 57–58; military identity divested from, 208–9, 211; People’s Bureau opposition by, 58; as potential Doe, S., replacement, 302; PRC appeal from, 211; public support for, 210; Reagan discouraging, 214; rumors spread about, 207–8; soldiers behavior and, 29; task force chaired by, 132–33; trial and pardon of, 219–23; trial preparations for, 218–19; U.S. assured by, 55; U.S. escape of, 213, 217; U.S. relations with, 58, 216–17, 222; U.S. sheltering, 237 radical states, 39 radio speech, 112 Rancy, John, 155, 181, 195 Randolph, Isaac, 299, 308 Rawlings, Jerry, 3, 216 Reagan, Ronald, 50, 94; aid request denied by, 260–61; Chairman Moe comment by, 141; Doe, S., criticism reserved by, 284; Doe, S., meeting with, 194; Doe, S., removal decision by, 302; Fahnbulleh arrangements and, 131; loyalty for loyalty policy of, 57–58; military aid from, 56–57; post-coup regime fears of, 74; Quiwonkpa discouraged by, 214; U.S. ally relations from, 54–55 reconciliation policy, 92, 241–42 recruit training, 112 Redemption Day speeches, 58–60, 71, 73, 125; bleak economic outlook in, 142; civilian rule commitment in, 236; county status in, 233; election postponement presented in, 235; Sawyer sharing stage at, 169; state visits comments during, 152; unconditional clemency offer in, 221 Redman, Charles E., 285

372

Index

refugees, 152 registration process: All-Party Conference during, 283; Doe, S., hurdle in, 273; NDPL’s speedy, 271– 72; for political parties, 269–76; preregistration requirements in, 245–46, 272–78; presidential candidates obstacles in, 254; SECOM denying candidates to, 244–45; UP passed in, 272 religious leaders, 214 residency requirement, 184 resignations, forced, 165–66 revenue-raising measures, 139–40 revocation proceedings, 231–32 revolutionary leaders, 200 rice riots, xiii, 77 Richards, Joseph, 245 Richards, Lois, 180 Ricks, Christopher, 222 riots: as Booker Washington Institute, 195; rice, xiii, 77; by students, 194–96, 198–99 ritual murders, 195–97 Roberts, Rosalitta, 195 Rosberg, Carl G., 95 Sackey, Peter, 216 Sackor, Edward, 83 el-Sadat, Anwar, 127 Sampson, Joseph K., 192 Sankawulo, Wilton G. S., 167 SATU. See Special Anti–Terrorist Unit Saudi Arabia, 26, 52, 153–54 Sawyer, Amos, xiii, 14, 61–62; assassination attempts on, 263; Con Com input from, 182–83; constitution draft announced by, 131; as democratic guardian, 253; Doe, S., attempt to win over, 178; Doe, S., candidacy objections of, 254–55; Doe, S., framing, 264; Doe, S., neutralizing, 254; exit permit

sought by, 307; Liberia left by, 186; Liberian protests and, 256–57; LPP formed by, 255; military dictatorship from, 318; on National Constitution Commission, 31–32; persecution of, 246; as political activity ban critic, 237; popularity of, 253; Redemption Day stage shared with, 169 Sayon, Emmanuel, 104, 109 Schedler, Andreas, 238 Scott, Jenkins, 255, 301, 307; as Doe, S., loyalist, 167; Elections Law implemented by, 296–97; revocation proceedings by, 231–32; street protests forbade by, 299 SECOM. See Special Elections Commission security, 81, 101 security forces, 101, 109–10; Doe, S., with loyal trusted, 116–17, 119; with Krahn ethnic group, 10; in Nimba County, 222; Podier’s meetings on reorganization of, 108; powers conferred to, 240–41; restructuring stages of, 106–7; SSS as, 106 self confidence, 142–43 self-promotion, 200 Senkpeni, Frank, 74 Seston, P. J. R., 154 Seyon, Patrick, 75, 78, 163, 262, 284 Shagari, Shehu, 9, 43, 127, 147–49 Shartdy, Lawrence, 85 Shultz, George P., 194 Sierra Leone, 148–49, 151–52 signature requirements, 246 Simpson, Clarence, 92, 132 Sirleaf, Momolu V. Sackor, 242, 284–86 Slanger, Edward, 178 Smith, Edward, 208 Smith, Robert P., 13, 41 soccer team, 27 socialism, 198, 280–81 social reforms, 4 soldiers: assassination plot arrest of, 73; behavior, 29; brutality of, 259;

Index

civilian government with former, 236–37; college campus entered by, 111–12; dishonorable discharge of, 74; military junta living conditions of, 57; semi-literate law-ranking, 317 South Africa, 151 South Korea, 128–30 Soviet Union, 216, 222 Special Anti–Terrorist Unit (SATU), 305 Special Elections Commission (SECOM), 179, 233–34; candidate registration denied by, 244–45; ECOM replacing, 308; Elections Law from, 238; electoral process mockery by, 276; electoral process tampered with by, 292–94; harassment from, 296; Harmon leading assault on, 270; members replaced in, 273; NDPL sided with, 296; obstruction tactics of, 274–76; political party registration denied by, 269–70; political rivals names given to, 293–94; population census started by, 236; pre-registration requirements from, 245–46 Special Military Tribunal, 220 Special Security Service (SSS), 106 Special Theft Court, 114 SSS. See Special Security Service standard of living, 141 standby agreement, 25 state security, 81 statesmanship, 149 state visits, 152 Stepan, Alfred, 8 Stevens, Siaka, 43, 48, 127, 147; Doe, S., lambasting, 152–53; Doe, S., outmaneuvered by, 150; Doe, S., quarrel with, 148–50; violent political clashes and, 152 strikes, PRC outlawing, 32 structural adjustment program, 291 students: death sentence of, 94–95; Doe, S., announcing release of, 294; Doe, S., assault on, 197–98; Doe, S.,

373

executive clemency for, 94; Doe, S., forcing submission of, 76; Doe, S., threatened by, 75; Doe, S., warning to, 241–42; high school, 259, 263; jailed, 306; media response to, 259; MOJA support from, 258; political activity ban for, 91–92; political arrests of, 257; rice riots with, 77; riots by, 194–96, 198–99; strike ended of, 110–12 Student Unification Party (SUP), 72 Suah, Alfred, 85 Sumo, Robert, 10, 80 SUP. See Student Unification Party supervisory committee system, 8 Supreme Court, 273, 276 Supreme Military Court, 8, 61 Supuwood, James Laveli, 245 Swaray, Abraham, 108, 119 Swing, William Lacy, 87, 168, 214, 217 Talking Drums, 264 Tarpeh, Wilson, 113 Tarr, Byron, 135, 295 Tarwo, Stanley, 114, 131 task force, 132–35 tax collection, 140 Tay, Edwin, 108 Taylor, Charles, 222, 309, 318 Taylor, Tamba, 202 teachers, 88, 197–98 Tipoteh, Togba Nah, 3, 80, 184; development plan scuttled of, 86–87; Doe, S., torpedoing program of, 84–85; economic crisis grasped by, 25; economic plan of, 77–78; financial reforms by, 27; military junta raids from, 29; as MOJA member, 83; political asylum sought by, 83–84; in U.S., 23; U.S. economic assistance and, 48 Toe, Albert S., 89–90 Toe, Nelson, 10, 80 token assistance, 51 Tolbert, Adolphus B., 48–49, 92

374

Index

Tolbert, William R., 95; administration weakness of, xiii; Americo-Liberian rule ended by, xiv; assassination of, 5, 22, 40; cabinet of, 4; in NonAligned Movement, 46; open door policy of, xii; overspending of, 21; political upheaval from, xiii–xiv; regime members arrested of, 14–15; regime’s corruption of, 9–10, 15 Touré, Ahmed Sékou, xiii, 220–21; Doe, S., reliance on, 150; as Doe, S., friend, 89, 127; of Guinea, 43–44; OAU summit with, 48; Shagari message and, 147–49 Toweh, Paul, 217 transition process, 232; to civilian rule, 177, 235–36, 239, 257; Con Com guarding, 175; to democracy, 163– 64, 257, 307; from dictatorships, 307; Doe, S., presidency, 240; U.S. involvement in, 163 Traoré, Moussa, 301 trial: guilty verdict in, 221; pardon in, 219–23; preparations for, 218–19; unfairness of, 220 tribalism, 219 tripartite division of powers, 183 True Whig Party (TWP), xii–xiii, 5; executions of leaders of, 6; Fahnbulleh mentioning overthrow of, 72; officials re-employment of, 201–2; U.S. supporting, 39 Tubman, Joseph V., 230, 233 Tubman, William V. S., xi–xii, 109, 200, 202 Tubman, Winston, 109, 167, 176 Tucker, Gabriel Johnson, 4, 23, 42 two-party system, xii–xiii TWP. See True Whig Party ULAA. See Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas ultimatum, on political activity, 164–68 unconditional clemency, 221 unification policy, xi–xii

Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA), 260 UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations, 199, 210–11 United People’s Party (UPP), 270, 274–75, 307; court proceedings for, 276; Doe, S., elimination task of, 280; Matthews as head of, 254; party status granted to, 281 United States (U.S.): Allison in delegation to, 284; cabinet purge complicity of, 87; civilian rule transition delay and, 235–36; Doe, S., as Cold War ally, 283–84; Doe, S., behavior in, 141; Doe, S., identifying with, 168–69; Doe, S., negotiating benefits with, 60; Doe, S., pursuing relations with, 10, 199; Doe, S., threats to, 51–52; Doe, S., visit preparations to, 131; Doe, S., visit to, 135–37; Doe receiving funding from, 35; economic aid from, 50–51, 53, 59, 192–93, 301; economic aid package passed in, 24–25; election irregularities sent to, 299; emergency aid from, 153; exploratory delegation sent by, 42–43; Food for Peace program of, 137; foreign policy of, 54–55, 62; Genuine Non-Alignment with, 47, 52; Liberian development assistance from, 50; Liberian policy of, 49, 51–52; Liberia sending delegation to, 284; Liberia’s interests and, 47; Liberia’s support ended by, 309; Liberia with strategic interests of, 40; Libya’s relations with, 55; military junta supported by, 118–19; military training facility from, 78; military training team sent by, 56; PRC members elimination enabled by, 82; Quiwonkpa and relations with, 58, 216–17, 222; Quiwonkpa’s assurances to, 55;

Index

Quiwonkpa’s escape to, 213, 217; Quiwonkpa sheltered by, 237; Reagan on ally relations of, 54–55; Tipoteh and economic assistance from, 48; Tipoteh in, 23; transition process involvement of, 163; TWP supported by, 39; West African standoff with, 48 Unity Conference Center, 185 Unity Party (UP), 254, 270, 272, 274, 281 University of Liberia, 72; Korea’s vehicle donation to, 128; military guard for, 306; Podier closing, 110; raid casualty figures for, 262; raid of, 259–60; reopening, 262; Tolbert, W., and gift to, 95 UP. See Unity Party UPP. See United People’s Party U.S. See United States “The U.S. Visit: The Devil We Know” (editorial), 47 vice head of state, 10 Vieira, João Bernardo (Nino), 152 violence, 295; of coupists, 40–41; government supported by, 308; political clashes with, 152; PRC not tolerating, 196; Saniquellie student riots with, 195–96 voter registration, 179, 234, 238, 293 voting: Doe, S., controlling counting of, 298–99; Elections Law and counting of, 296; Liberia permitting, 297–98; stations for, 298 Wald, George, 260 Walker, Julius, 39, 58 Walker, Lannon, 55–56, 73 Walkie, John Gondah, 270 Walters, Vernon, 284 Warner, Bennie, 92, 132, 241–42, 302 Warner, J. Ninsel, 140–41 Washington, George Toe, 230, 235

375

Webb, Steven B., 24 Weh Syen, Thomas, 24, 33, 60, 72, 212; arrest of, 80–81; dangerous extremist view of, 82; Doe, S., conflict with, 76–77; Doe, S., goal of eliminating, 80; execution of, 82; journalists released by, 77; PRC with, 10–11 Wesseh, Daniel Commany, 75–76, 163 West Africa, 40; Doe, S., quarrels with, 147–49; Liberian solidarity with, 45, 52; U.S. standoff with, 48 West Africa, 175 West Germany, 255 White, Albert T., 179–80, 271 Wintrobe, Ronald, 317 Wisner, Walter, 184 witchcraft, 114–15, 230 Wolokolie, Dusty, 245, 257, 275, 280 Wonkeryor, Edward, 30 Woodhouse, William, 278 Wreh, Tuan, 62, 244, 254, 273, 278 Wright, David Konoe, 230, 241 Wright, Gbeku T., 106–7 Wright, Moses, 215 Yancy, Adolph, 113, 167 Yancy, Mansfied, 244 Youboty, John, 107 Youlo, Elaine, 113 Young, Crawford, 164 Young, C. W. Bill, 50 Young Militant Brigade, 76 Yuan, Harry, 209, 256, 303 Zangai, Levi, 300 Zayzay, J. S. B., 113 Zaza, Morris T., 208, 210 Zionism, xi Zulu, Perry G., 13, 22, 48; dismissal of, 33; IMF stipulations from, 25–26; Libya visit of, 55 Zuo, Henry S., Jr., 8, 10, 12, 61, 80

About the Author

Yekutiel Gershoni was a Professor Emeritus of African History at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University, Israel. His publications include three books on Liberian and African History: Black Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), Africans on African-Americans: The Creation and Uses of an African-American Myth (New York and London: New York University Press and Macmillan, 1997), and The Emergence of the New African States, Unit 1: Introduction to the History of Africa (Tel Aviv: The Open University of Israel, 2003).

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