Lexicon of Argead Macedonia 3732904059, 9783732904051, 9783732996018

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Lexicon of Argead Makedonia Waldemar Heckel / Johannes Heinrichs /  Sabine Müller / Frances Pownall (eds.)

Waldemar Heckel / Johannes Heinrichs / Sabine Müller / Frances Pownall (eds.) Lexicon of Argead Makedonia

Lexicon of Argead Makedonia (LexAM) edited by Waldemar Heckel, Johannes Heinrichs, Sabine Müller and Frances Pownall with the collaboration of Michelle Simon

Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Cover illustration: Philip II, tetradrachm, type 1 (ca. 357/6-349/8), Amphipolis, Le Rider 40-68, 14.28g: Olympian Zeus; Philip on horseback, fully clad and wearing the kausia, sitting on a saddle cloth, raising his right hand in salutation (of his troops, outside the coin?), ΦΙΛΙΠ-ΠΟΥ (Photo: U. Klöppel, Aarbergen)

ISBN 978-3-7329-0405-1 ISBN E-Book 978-3-7329-9601-8 © Frank & Timme GmbH  Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur Berlin 2020. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Herstellung durch Frank & Timme GmbH, Wittelsbacherstraße 27a, 10707 Berlin. Printed in Germany. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. www.frank-timme.de



Contents

Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Frequently cited literature ������������������������������������������������������������������������������11 Abbreviations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 Argead rulers ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 List of contributors �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27

Lexicon of Argead Makedonia (LexAM) ������������������������������������������� 29

Appendix �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������531 Plate 1: Makedonian rider ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 533 Plate 2: Archelaos, Dynastic series �������������������������������������������������������������������� 534 Plate 3: Images of the entries by Olga Palagia �������������������������������������������������� 535

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Introduction Argead Makedonia under its most famous rulers, Philip II and Alexander III, is still in the focus of the international historical, archaeological, and philological research—as well as in the public eye. However, their predecessors, as well as its history and structure before its rise in the 4th c. BC, have always received less attention. But in order to get a complete picture of Makedonia’s rise and also to understand the actions of Alexander’s generals in the early years after his death, it is important to examine the political structures, ruling traditions, royal spaces of action, and forms of representation established before the Argeads’ rise to supremacy and the events they were then involved in. While many lexica of the ancient world exist, specifically of the Greek and Roman worlds and Hellenistic period, so far, there was no lexicon focusing exclusively on central aspects of the history of Makedonia from its beginning to the death of the last Argead ruler, an omission that reflects the current state of the scholarly debate. The editors wish to fill this scholarly gap and thus emphasize the importance of Argead Makedonia. Although Argead Makedonia was a late bloomer, it played a certain role in Mediterranean history prior to its rise to supremacy in the second half of the 4th c. Predominantly approaching Argead Makedonia from a historian’s angle, the lexicon addresses scholars as well as students of (Ancient) History and Classics. Its 247 entries treat the following matters: • the Argead rulers, other prominent members of their house and representatives of their leading circles, chosen allies and opponents; • aspects of Makedonia’s topography, geography, and geostrategy; • politics and representation, legitimization and dynastic image, economy and trade, army and war, court and social hierarchies, cult and religion, literature and art; • the main sources (literary, epigraphic, archaeological, and numismatic); • aspects of reception.

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Introduction

The lexicon makes no claims to completeness but aims at an overview of the most relevant matters of the history of Argead Makedonia and its major political actors. Due to the loss of Makedonian historiography, our literary sources are written from a Greek or Roman perspective, thus often (mis)judging the Makedonians in accordance with their own cultural norms. Thus, as one central aim, the lexicon intends to deconstruct traditional clichés about Argead Makedonia, its rulers and inhabitants, rooted in Greek or Roman expectations or prejudices. Because of its specific focus, the entries that concern for example Greek poleis such as Thebes will not provide any general overviews on Thebes and its situation in Greece, but will exclusively concentrate on political actors and events connected with Makedonia and the Argeads. The size of the entries is chosen in accordance with their relevance for Argead Makedonia. This means that for example the entries on individual Diadochoi concern only their career under the Argeads and as far as their relationship with them is of relevance, not their career after the extinction of the dynasty. As for the time range, the lexicon begins with the mythic foundation of the Argead Empire, to be dated roughly to the middle of the 7th c. BC, and ends with the death of Alexander IV around 310 BC, for he was the last male reigning Argead, at least formally. Although after the death of Alexander III, the last factually reigning Argead, times of transformations and upheavals had already occurred, the illusion of an Argead power structure was maintained until Alexander IV was eliminated by one of Kassandros’ henchmen. As for names, the transliterated Greek form has been adopted, except for names most commonly known in the English form, namely Aegean, Alexander, Aristotle, Arrian, Lucian, Philip, Pindar, Pliny, Plutarch, Ptolemy, and Thucydides. Likewise, we have decided to keep the English form of Athens, Carthage, Chersonese, Cretans/Crete, Cretopolis, Crocus Field, Danube, Delphi, Hellespont, Peloponnese, Sicily, Thebes, Thessaly, Thrace/Thracians, and Tyre. For reasons of practicability, Plutarch’s Lives are quoted following the numeration in Perrin’s Loeb texts, not that in Ziegler’s critical edition. Arrian’s fragmentary Events after Alexander (Succ.) is quoted in accordance with the edition by Roos and Wirth, Didymos in accordance with the edition by Harding, Synkellos in accordance with the edition by Mosshammer. Besides the editors, 40 international experts of Argead Makedonia were invited to write entries. As the lexicon intends to mirror the current state of the scholarly debate on Argead Makedonia in its diversity, different positions and 8

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Introduction

arguments will occur within different entries. This is intended. The editors did not mean to strive for an artificial unity regarding the state of the debate but to demonstrate also the range of different approaches and theories. Contradictions of some entries with others are a logical result and intended to illustrate the wide range of current discussions. Thus, the contents of some entries mirror the scholarly opinion of the authors, not the opinion of the editors. Due to the problematic source situation on Argead Makedonia with often meagre contemporary evidence, questions must be left open and problems unsolved. For the editors it was more important that problems caused by the lack of evidence emerge than to create the illusion of a (false) security. Working in the field of Argead Makedonia is shown as it is: a rough, interesting, and challenging experience where often only speculation is possible, as we are missing sources to arrive at answers that in many cases will be illusionary. However, we also hope to give an insight into how instructive and fascinating research on Argead Makedonia can be. Editorial remark: If not indicated otherwise, all dates are BC. Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Anneli Purchase for her help. Waldemar Heckel, Johannes Heinrichs, Sabine Müller, and Frances Pownall

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= Borza, E.N., In the Shadow of Olympus. The Emergence of Macedon, 1990 = Borza, E.N./Palagia, O., The Chronology of the Macedonian Royal Tombs at Vergina, JDAI (A) 122 (2007), 81-125 = Bosworth, A.B., Philip II and Upper Macedonia, CQ 21 (1971), 93-105 = Bosworth, A.B., A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, I, 1980 = Bosworth, A.B., Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great, 1988 = Bosworth, A.B., A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander, II, 1995 = Bosworth, A.B., The Legacy of Alexander the Great, 2002 = Bosworth, A.B./Baynham, E. (eds.), Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction, 2000 = Bowden, H., The Argeads and Greek Sanctuaries, in: Müller et al. 2017, 163-81 = Briant, P., Histoire de l’empire perse de Cyrus à Alexandre, 1996 (engl. trans.: From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire, 2002) = Briant, P., Alexander the Great and his Empire, 2010 = Buckler, J., Philip II and the Sacred War, 1989 = Bucciantini, V., Studio su Nearco di Creta, 2015 = Carney, E.D., Women and Monarchy in Macedonia, 2000 = Carney, E.D., Elite Education and High Culture in Macedonia, in: Heckel, W./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), Crossroads of History, 2003, 47-63 = Carney, E.D., Olympias, Mother of Alexander the Great, 2006

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= Carney, E.D., King and Court in Ancient Macedonia: Rivalry, Treason, and Conspiracy, 2015 = Carney, E.D., The Argead Marriage Policy, in: Müller et al. 2017, 139-50 = Carney, E.D., Eurydice and the Birth of Macedonian Power, 2019 = Carney, E.D./Ogden, D. (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives, 2010 = D’Agostini, M. et al. (eds.), Affective Relations and Personal Bonds in Hellenistic Antiquity, 2021 (forthcoming) = Faraguna, M., Aspetti amministrativi e financiari della monarchia macedone tra IV e III secolo a.c., Athenaeum 86 (1998), 349-95 = Fraser, P.M., Cities of Alexander the Great, 1996 = Gaebler, H., Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia 2, 1935 = Geyer, F., Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II., 1930 = Greenwalt, W.S., Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia, Arethusa 22 (1989), 19-43 = Hammond, N.G.L., The Macedonian State, 1989 = Hammond, N.G.L./Griffith, G.T., A History of Macedonia, I, 1972 = Hammond, N.G.L./Griffith, G.T., A History of Macedonia, II, 1979 = Hammond, N.G.L./Walbank, F.W., A History of Macedonia, III, 1988 = Hansen, M.H./Nielsen, T.H. (eds.), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, 2004

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= Harris, E.M., Aischines and Athenian Politics, 1995 = Hatzopoulos, M.B., La Béotie et la Macé­ doine à l’époque de l’hégémonie thébaine, in: Argoud, G./Roesch, P. (eds.), La Béotie antique, 1985, 247-56 = Hatzopoulos, M.B., Cultes et rites de passage en Macédoine, Athens = Hatzopoulos, M.B., Macedonian Institutions under the Kings, I-II, 1996 = Hatzopoulos, M.B./Paschidis, P., Makedonia, in: Hansen/Nielsen 2004, 794-809 = Heckel, W., Who’s Who in the Age of Alexan­der the Great, 2006 = Heckel, W., The Conquests of Alexander the Great, 2008 = Heckel, W., Alexander’s Marshals. A Study of the Makedonian Aristocracy and the Politics of Military Leadership, 2016 = Heckel, W., Geography and Politics in Argead Makedonia, in: Müller et al. 2017, 67-78 = Heckel, W. et al. (eds.), The Many Faces of War in the Ancient World, 2015 = Heckel, W./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), Alexander the Great. A New History, 2009 = Heinrichs, J., ‘Asiens König’. Die Inschriften des Kyrosgrabs und das achaimenidische Reichsverständnis, in: Will, W./Heinrichs, J. (eds.), Zu Alexander d. Gr., I, 1987, 487-540 = Heinrichs, J., Münzen als Krisensymptome? Zur makedonischen Silberprägung unter Amyntas III. und Perdikkas III. (ca. 393-359), ZPE 181 (2012), 117-39 = Heinrichs, J., Coins and Constructions. Origins and Developments of Argead Coinage under Alexander I, in: Müller et al. 2017, 79-98

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= Heinrichs, J./Müller, S., Ein persisches Statussymbol auf Münzen Alexanders I. von Makedonien, ZPE 167, 283-309 = Holt, F.L., Alexander the Great and Bactria, 1988 = Jacobs, B., Die Satrapienverwaltung im Perserreich zur Zeit Dareios’ III., 1994 = Kent, R.G., Old Persian, 1953² = Kottaridi, A./Walker, S. (eds.), Heracles to Alexander the Great. Treasures from the Royal Capital of Macedon, 2011 = Koulakiotis, E., The Hellenic Impact on Macedonia, in: Müller et al. 2017, 199-213 = Kraay, C.M., Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, 1976 = Landucci Gattinoni, F., L’arte del potere. Vita e opere di Cassandro di Macedonia, 2003 = Lane Fox, R.J. (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon, 2011 = LeRider, G., Le monnayage d’argent et d’or de Philippe II frappé en Macédoine de 359 à 294, 1977 = Lorber, C.C., Coins of the Ptolemaic Empire, I 1 and 2, 2018 = MacDowell, D.M., Demosthenes. On the False Embassy, 2000 = Mack, E., Die Goldvorkommen in Griechisch-Makedonien, Erzmetall 17 (1964), 9-18 = March, D.A., The Kings of Macedon: 399369, Historia 54 (1995), 257-82 = Mari, M., Al di là dell’Olimpo. Macedoni e grandi santuari della Grecia dall’età arcaica al primo ellenismo, 2002 = Mari, M., Archaic and Classical Macedonia, in: Lane Fox 2011, 79-92

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= Moore, K.R. (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Alexander the Great, 2018 = Mørkholm, O., Early Hellenistic Coinage from the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.), 1991 = Müller, S., Das symbolische Kapital von Argeadinnen and Frauen der Diadochen, in: Kunst, C. (ed.), Matronage. Handlungs­ strategien und soziale Netzwerke antiker Herrscherfrauen, 2013, 295-310 = Müller, S., Alexander, Makedonien und Persien, 2014 = Müller, S., A History of Misunderstandings? Macedonian Politics and Persian Prototypes in Greek Polis-Centered Perspective, in: Rollinger, R./van Dongen, E. (eds.), Mesopotamia in the Ancient World, 2015, 459-80 = Müller, S., Die Argeaden. Geschichte Makedoniens bis zum Zeitalter Alexanders des Großen, 2016 = Müller, S., Perdikkas II.—Retter Makedoniens, 2017 = Müller, S., Hephaistion—A Re-Assessment of his Career, in: Howe, T./Pownall, F. (eds.), Ancient Macedonians in the Greek and Roman Sources, 2018, 77-102 = Müller, S., Alexander der Große—Erobe­ rungen, Politik, Rezeption, 2019 = Müller, S. et al. (eds.), The History of the Argeads—New Perspectives, 2017 = Natoli, A.F., The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II, 2004 = Ogden, D., Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death. The Hellenistic Dynasties, 1999 = Olbrycht, M.J., Alexander Wielki i swiat iranski, 2004

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= Olbrycht, M.J., Macedonia and Persia, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 342-69 = Olbrycht, M.J., Parthia, Bactria and India, in: Antonetti, C./Biagi, P. (eds.), With Alexander in India and Central Asia, 2017, 194-209 = O’Sullivan, L., Court Intrigue and the Death of Callisthenes, GRBS 59 (2019), 596-620 = Palagia, O., Hephaestion’s Pyre and the Royal Hunt of Alexander, in: Bosworth/ Baynham 2000, 167-206 = Palagia, O., Hellenistic Art, in: Lane Fox 2011, 477-93 = Pearson, L., The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great, 1960 = Pownall, F., Lessons from the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth Century Prose, 2004 = Pownall, F., The Rhetoric of Theopompus, CÉA 42 (2005), 255-78 = Pownall, F., The Decadence of the Thessalians, in: Wheatley, P./Hannah, R. (eds.), Alexander and his Successors, 2009, 237-60 = Pownall, F., The Symposia of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 55-65 = Pownall, F., Callisthenes in Africa: The Historian’s Role at Siwa and in the Proskynesis Controversy, in: Bosman, P. (ed.), Alexander in Africa, 2014, 56-71 = Pownall, F., The Role of Greek Literature in Intellectual Macedonian Circles, in: Müller et al. 2017, 215-29 = Pownall, F., Was Kallisthenes the Tutor of Alexander’s Royal Pages?, in: Howe, T./ Pownall, F. (eds.), Ancient Macedonians in the Greek and Roman Sources, 2018, 59-76

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= Price, M.J., The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus, 1991 = Psoma, S., Monnaies de poids réduit d’Alexandre I et de Perdiccas II de Macédoine, ZPE 128 (1999), 273-83 = Psoma, S., Athens and the Macedonian Kingdom from Perdikkas II to Philip II, REA 116 (2014), 133-44 = Raymond, D., Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C., 1953 = Road Editions, with the cooperation of the Hellenic Army Geographical Service, 1:250.000, 1: Thrace, 2: Macedonia, 3: Epeiros/ Thessaly, 4: Central Greece, 1995 Roisman, J. (ed.), Brill’s Companion to Alexan­der the Great, 2003 = Roisman, J., Classical Macedonia to Perdiccas III, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 145-65 = Roisman, J./Worthington, I. (eds.), Blackwell’s Companion to Ancient Macedonia, 2010 = Ruzicka, S., The ‘Pixodarus Affair’ reconsi­ dered again, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 3-11 = Seibert, J., Die Eroberung des Perserreiches durch Alexander den Großen auf kartographischer Grundlage, 1-2, 1985 = Sprawski, S., The Early Temenid Kings to Alexander I, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 127-44 = Squillace, G., Filippo il Macedone, 2009 = Stoneman, R., Alexander the Great. A Life in Legend, 2008 = Strootman, R., Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires, 2014

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= Tritle, L.A., A New History of the Peloponnesian War, 2010 = Troxell, H.A., Studies in the Macedonian Coinage of Alexander the Great, 1997 = Wartenberg, U., Philotas?, A New Coinage From Macedonia, in: Burnett, A. (ed.), Coins of Macedonia and Rome: Essays in Honour of C. Hersh, 1998, 13-7 = Westermark, U., Remarks on the Regal Macedonian Coinage, ca. 413-359 B.C., in: LeRider, G. et al. (eds.), Essays Kraay—Mørkholm, 1989, 301-15 = Wirth, G., Philipp II., 1985 = Wirth, G., Der Brand von Persepolis, 1993 = Worthington, I., Philip II of Macedon, 2008 = Worthington, I., Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece, 2013 Xydopoulos, I., Macedonians and Southern Greeks. Sameness and Otherness from the Classical Period to the Roman Conquest, in: Stefanidis, I.D. et al. (eds.), Macedonian Identities Through Time, 2010, 53-74 = Xydopoulos, I.K., Anthemus and Hippias: The Policy of Amyntas I, ICS 37 (2012), 21-37 = Yardley, J.C./Heckel, W., Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Books 11-12, 1997 = Zahrnt, M., Olynth und die Chalkidier, 1971 = Zahrnt, M., Die Entwicklung des makedonischen Reiches bis zu den Perserkriegen, Chiron 14 (1984), 325-68 = Zambrini, A., The Historians of Alexander the Great, in: Marincola, J. (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, I, 2007, 210-20

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Abbreviations = Austin, C./Bastianini, G., Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia, 2002 AD = Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Baby­lonia, ed. by Sachs, A.J./Hunger, H., vol. 1: 652262 BC, 1988 AM = Ancient Macedonia ATL = The Athenian Tribute Lists, vol. 2, ed. by Meritt, B.D./Wade-Gery, H.T./McGregor, M.F., 1949 Austin = Austin, M.M., The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest, 2006² BE = Bulletin Épigraphique (in REG) BNJ = Brill’s New Jacoby Bringmann/v. Steuben = Bringmann, K./v. Steuben, H. (eds.), Schenkungen hellenistischer Herrscher an griechische Städte und Heiligtümer, I, 1995 CCG = Catalogue général des antiquités egyptiennes du Musée de Caire CEG = Carmina Epigraphica Graeca, ed. by Hansen, P.A., vol. 2: 4th c. BC, 1989 CH = Coin Hoards CT = Clarysse, W./Thompson, D.J., Counting the People in Hellenistic Egypt, vol. 1: Population Registers; vol. 2: Historical Studies, 2006 DK = Diels, H./Kranz, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: I 19516, II 19526 DNP = Der Neue Pauly EKM = ΕΠΙΓΡΑΦΕΣ ΚΑΤΩ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ FGrH = Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, ed. by Jacoby, F. Gaebler = Gaebler, H., Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia 2, 1935 Heidel. Epit. = Heidelberg Epitome AB

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Abbreviations

Hoover

= Hoover, O.D., The Handbook of Greek Coinage Series, vol. 3.1: Handbook of Coins of Macedon and Its Neighbors, 1 (6th-1st c. BC), 2016; vol. 4: Handbook of Coins of Northern and Central Greece (6th-1st c. BC), 2014 IG = Inscriptiones Graecae IGBulg = Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria Repertae IGCH = An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards, ed. by Thompson, M./Mørkholm, O./Kraay, C.M., 1973 ISE = Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche, ed. by Moretti, L., vols. 1-2, 1967, 1976 Kent 1953 = Kent, R.G., Old Persian. Grammar, Texts, Lexicon, 19532 Kraay = Kraay, C.M., Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, 1976 LCL = Loeb Classical Library LM = Liber de Morte testamentoque Alexandri Magni LSJ = Liddell, H.G./Scott, R./Jones, H.S., A Greek-English Lexicon, 19409 ME = Metz Epitome ML = Meiggs, R./Lewis, D., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 1969 OGIS = Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, ed. by Dittenberger, W., 1-2, 1903, 1905 PCG = Poetae Comici Graeci, ed. by Kassel, R./Austin, C. Pf. = Pfeiffer, R., Callimachus, vols. 1-2, 1949, 1953 PW = Parke, H.W./Wormell, D.E.W., The Delphic Oracle II: The Oracular Responses, 1956 RC = Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period, ed. by Welles, C.B., 1934 RO = Rhodes, P.J./Osborne, R., Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC, 2003 Schmitt = Schmitt, R., Die altpersischen Inschriften der Achaimeniden, 2009 SEG = Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum

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Abbreviations

SH

= Supplementum Hellenisticum, ed. by Lloyd-Jones, H./Parsons, P., 1983 SNG Alpha Bank = Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Alpha Bank Collection, Macedonia, vol. 1: Alexander I-Perseus, 2000 SNG ANS = Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum. Collection of the American Numismatic Society, vol. 7: Macedonia I: Cities, Thraco-Macedonian Tribes, Paeonian Kings, 1987; vol. 8: Macedonia II: Alexander I-Philip II, 1994 STV = Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, vol. 2: 700-338 v. Chr., bearb. v. Bengtson, H./Werner, R., 19752 Syll.³ = Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum3, ed. Dittenberger, W., vols. 1-4, 1915-1924 Tod = Tod, M.N., Greek Historical Inscriptions, vol. 2, 1948

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Argead rulers Proto-historical Argead rulers according to Herodotos’ rulers’ list (8.139) Perdikkas I Argaios Philip I Aëropos I Alketas Historically attested Argead rulers Amyntas I Alexander I Perdikkas II Archelaos (Orestes Aëropos II Amyntas II Pausanias Amyntas III Alexander II (Ptolemy of Aloros Perdikkas III Philip II Alexander III Philip III Arrhidaios Alexander IV

second half of the 6th c. (?) – ca. 500/498/95 ca. 500/498/95 – ca. 454/50 ca. 454/50 – 413 413 – 399 probably did not rule; killed in 399) 399 – 396/5 395/4 394/3 394/3 – 370/69 370/69 – 368 epitropos on behalf of Perdikkas III: 368 – 365) 365 – 360/59 360/59 – 336 336 – 323 323 – 317 323 – 310

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List of contributors Alonso Troncoso, Victor Angiò, Francesca Anson, Edward M. Archibald, Zosia H. Asirvatham, Sulochana R. Baynham, Elizabeth J. Billows, Richard Bowden, Hugh Bucciantini, Veronica Burstein, Stanley M. Carney, Elizabeth D. Christodoulou, Panos Cooper, Craig R. Heckel, Waldemar Heinrichs, Johannes Jacobs, Bruno Kegerreis, Christopher Koulakiotis, Elias Landucci Gattinoni, Franca Liampi, Katerini Mari, Manuela Millender, Ellen G. Müller, Sabine Ogden, Daniel Olbrycht, Marek Jan Pal, Sarina Palagia, Olga Paschidis, Paschalis Pownall, Frances Psoma, Selene Roisman, Joseph

University of La Coruña Velletri, Roma University of Arkansas at Little Rock University of Liverpool Montclair State University, New Jersey University of Newcastle Columbia University, New York King’s College, London University of Firenze California State University, Los Angeles Clemson University Université de Paris/European University of Cyprus University of Lethbridge University of Calgary Universität zu Köln Universität Basel University of California, Santa Barbara University of Ioannina Catholic University of Milano University of Ioannina University of Bari Reed College, Portland, OR Philipps-Universität, Marburg University of Exeter University of Rzeszów Philipps-Universität, Marburg National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Institute for Greek and Roman Antiquities of the National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens University of Alberta, Edmonton National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Colby College, Waterville

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List of contributors

Ruzicka, Stephen Sekunda, Nicholas Sprawski, Slawomir Squillace, Giuseppe Stoneman, Richard Strootman, Rolf Trampedach, Kai Tritle, Lawrence A. Truschnegg, Brigitte Wheatley, Pat V. Wirth, Gerhard Worthington, Ian Xydopoulos, Ioannis

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University of North Carolina at Greenboro Gdánsk University Jagellonian University, Kraków University of Calabria, Rende, Cosenza University of Exeter University of Utrecht Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles Leopold-Franzens-Universität, Innsbruck University of Otago, Dunedin Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn Macquarie University, Sydney Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

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Lexicon of Argead Makedonia (LexAM)

Acclamation

Acclamation An acclamation in the sense of an act of formal acknowledgment of a new Argead ruler by a representative group of assembled Makedonians is not attested explicitly before → Philip II. Trogus-Justin (7.5.10) refers to a formal act of a. by an assembly of the Makedonians when in 360/59, in view of the endangered situation of Makedonia, Philip II “was compelled by the people to take the rule (conpulsus a populo regnum suscepit)” instead of his nephew → Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas III. However, the passage has its flaws. Trogus-Justin’s story that Philip served as a guardian for Amyntas for some time does not deserve credence (cf. Diod. 16.1.3). Nothing more is known about the nature and procedure of Philip’s a. The same is true for the accession of → Alexander III. Diodoros mentions that he won over the Makedonians by a tactful speech assuring them that the ruler only changed in name (17.1.2). If this speech is authentic, it may have formed part of Alexander’s a. and was delivered after his confirmation as the new ruler. Referring to the same incident, Trogus-Justin (11.1.8) speaks of a contio in which Alexander encouraged the vulgus. While Plutarch’s unique claim that after → Gaugamela in 331, Alexander was proclaimed “King of Asia” (Alex. 34.1), is sometimes thought to refer to an a., its authenticity is doubtful. There is no evidence that Alexander ever used such a title; it was no Achaimenid title and it did not refer to the full extent of his empire. Furthermore, there was no need to legitimize the Makedonian expansion achieved by military victories by any a. The first a. of an Argead explicitly described was that of Alexander’s half-brother → Arrhidaios. He was acclaimed in → Babylon in 323, after Alexander’s death (Just. 13.3.1-2; Curt. 10.7.13-15; Diod. 18.2.4). According to Justin, this a. was initiated by the infantrymen who felt outmaneuvered by the cavalrymen who had voted for the unborn baby by Alexander and → Rhoxane but chose to re­ concile with them (13.3.2-4.5). Thus, consensus was reached that Arrhidaios only formed part of a regency team together with the future → Alexander IV. Curtius whose report is coloured by Roman ideas indicates that there was only one mass meeting that chose by a. Arrhidaios who was brought before the assembled Makedonians and adorned with Alexander III’s robe. The phalanx then clashed their spears against their shields as a signal of their protection of him (10.7.15) but it is uncertain whether this was a traditional act forming part of a Makedonian a. It is supposed that on the occasion of an a., an oath of loyalty or allegiance was sworn by the Makedonians to their new ruler (Curt. 10.7.9; Diod. 18.2.4).

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However, its exact nature is unclear. In sum, due to the scarce evidence and lack of contemporary testimonies, the exact procedure of the Argead a. as a ritual of dynastic ideology remains uncertain. In any case, the a. served to legitimize the new ruler’s reign by at least creating the illusion of a collective approval and participation in the decision on the succession. In Argead Makedonia, there was no fixed succession process; what actually mattered was personal qualification, networks and support by the court factions.   S. Müller Cf. Anson 2009; Atkinson, J.E., A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni. Book 10, 2009, 190-4; Hammond 1989, 65-6; Yardley, J.C. et al., Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Books 13-15, 2011, 75-80.

Achaimenids Around 513, the Persian king Dareios I conquered the Thracian Pontos coast up to the Danube including the river’s northern approaches. To secure the river’s lower section (Hdt. 4.93)—while waiting for the king’s return, the Persian fleet might well have gained control some way upstream—and the hinterland of the Greek sea ports, several route corridors from the Danubian plain south to the north Aegean had to be secured. A major role was played by the big Thracian rivers: Hebros, Nestos, Strymon and—already in → Makedonia—Axios; the next big river, the Haliakmon, is the first to enter Makedonia from the west. So the Persian strategic concept must have encompassed the mouth of the Axios and its western approaches, with Makedonia as the newly projected western border zone of the Persian Empire. Near the mouths of two of these → rivers, the Persian general in charge, Megabazos, placed military governors, at the Hebros (Doriskos, a military fort: Hdt. 7.59.1) and the Strymon (Eïon, a fortified trade post). Concerning the other two river zones, he had to find solutions that respected political frames: at the Nestos mouth, he developed a special relationship with Abdera (Hdt. 6.46-48; 8.120), a re-foundation of Ionian Teos (soon after 546, Hdt. 1.168) and therefore in contact with Persian Asia Minor. Concerning the Axios zone (→ Therme), he had to come to terms with the Makedonian ruler → Amyntas I. Following the general Persian practice (cf. Hdt. 3.15.2), he made him the offer of retaining his rule under Persian suzerainty, in the position of a Persian head of a district (Makedonōn hyparchos: Hdt. 5.20.4). 32

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As chief of a Persian hyparchia he exchanged his homeland reign for a Persian function ranking below the satrap (whose function could however be expressed by the same term, e.g. Hdt. 4.166.1; 9.113.2). In Makedonian eyes, he could have kept his former authority, but hardly as a king; also for this reason we cannot call him one. On the northern Aegean coast, it was the fourth such position, controlling the west, besides those at Sestos (Hdt. 7.33: Thracian Chersonese), Doriskos (Hdt. 7.105-6: east), and Eïon (Hdt. 7.106-107: centre). To obtain it, Amyntas had to submit Makedonia as a whole to Persian rule by a formal act— handing over earth and water (Hdt. 5.17.1-18.1); by it, the land became a district of the Persian Empire. The control of further regions until that point outside Makedonia, most probably in the northern Chalkidike, might have been included in the bargain as an incentive. Moreover, Amyntas’ position within Makedonia was thus consolidated, with Persian support against internal opponents and enemies beyond the boundaries. In turn, the Persians gained with Makedonia a stronghold near unruly Thracian groups such as the Paionians, then in the middle Strymon Valley (Hdt. 5.98), and the Brygoi, then in some district near the Makedonian heartland—whence they attacked Mardonios’ troops in 493 (Hdt. 6.45—their classification as Thracians points to some eastern region, maybe in the middle Axios Valley). The fiction of the elimination of the Persian envoys just after they had received Amyntas’ submission (Hdt. 5.17-20) was devised probably during the Ionian Revolt when Paionians transferred by the Persians a decade earlier to Hellespontine Phrygia (Hdt. 5.13.1) returned to the Strymon with the insurgents’ help and cut off Makedonia (Hdt. 5.98). → Alexan­ der I who followed his father in these very years may well have attempted to style himself as an enemy to Persian rule. Allegedly to bribe another Persian commission sent to shed light on the whereabouts of the preceding one, Alexander pretended to have paid much money, and even to have given his sister Gygaia in marriage to the head of the new commission, the high-ranking Persian Boubares, Megabazos’ son (Hdt. 5.21, cf. 7.22.2). However, the marriage cannot have been arranged soon after the first commission had allegedly disappeared—indeed it had returned safely—but only around 500, after the death of Amyntas who as long as he lived was responsible for his daughter. So Gygaia was not married under pressure, but in keeping with Argead family strategy (Just. 7.3.74.2). If her husband Boubares was in charge of the strategically important Athos canal project from ca. 483 (Hdt. 7.22.2) this may indicate some affiliation with the royal Achaimenid house (as in the case of another head of the project: Hdt.

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7.117.1), albeit the couple’s son was called after his Makedonian grandfather Amyntas (Hdt. 8.136. 1), not after the Persian family branch; this does however not allow conclusions regarding rank since there might have been further children, amongst them a firstborn son named Megabazos. The Persian king alloted to Amyntas the revenues of the “important Phrygian city Alabanda” (Hdt. 8.136.1, actually located in Karia, cf. Hdt. 7.195). By his sister’s marriage, Alexan­ der became related to the Persian aristocracy which in 492 helped him to get Mardonios’ pardon for his policy during the Ionian Revolt. Makedonia’s status as a Persian hyparchia was restored then—not initiated, as Herodotos erro­ neously states (6.44.1). The former friendship will have suffered, however, causing some strain in the following years. So we may rule out that soon afterwards the Makedonian ruler was rewarded with “all the land between Mts. → Olympos and Haimos (Rhodope, not Balkan) that Xerxes submitted to his command” (Just. 7.4.1). His friendship with → Athens qualified him for the post of Xerxes’ diplomat in chief in Greece, even though his family’s origin from Peloponnesian → Argos had not yet been invented; yet it is very probable that he was at the head of a Persian delegation there in 481 (Hdt. 7.150). Negotiations and further work done in preparation of Xerxes’ invasion will have earned him his golden → akinakes, awarded by the Persian king, that he proudly shows on his early tetrobols (minted from ca. 483: Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 306, figs. 1.1-1.4 cf. pl. 1.1). Another outstanding honour for him was in 480 the Persian court’s sojourn “in Pieria for some while” (Hdt. 7.131), indeed in Alexander’s residence at → Aigai—a first-rate opportunity to build up networks with members of the Achaimenid high aristocracy. But in the night preceding the battle of Plataiai (autumn 479) he secretly changed sides by giving the Greek high command military information (Hdt. 9.44-45). He could defect openly only in 476, after Eïon had fallen (Hdt. 7.107). Kimon’s further campaign to conquer the Persian strongholds in → Thrace up to the Hellespont cut off Makedonia once more from Achaimenid Asia. Alexander had to choose now between an arrangement with the Greeks, by breaking with the A., or exile in the Persian Empire where his sister’s family would have given him a warm welcome. He decided for the Greek option, allowing him to maintain the Argead dynasty in Makedonia. After 35 years, the land ceased to be a part of the Persian Empire. It did not even border on it until → Philip II advanced to the Hellespont and the Bosporos in the late 340s: From 342/1, he controlled the Thracian Chersonese with Sestos, the Hellespontine bridgehead to Asia (Diod. 16.71.1-2); in 341/40 he besieged Perinthos 34

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and Byzantion that controlled the Bosporos with the northern land route (Diod. 16.74.2-76; Arr. An. 2.14.5). Artaxerxes III, allegedly in alliance with Philip (so Dareios III just after Issos, in a letter of dubious authenticity: Arr. An. 2.14.2) must have been alarmed, the more so after → Memnon and Artabazos, pre­ viously exiles in → Pella, had returned to Persian service around 345 (Diod. 16.52.3-4): they provided first hand information on power structures at Philip’s → court. At the same time, Philip made contacts to open bridgeheads to western → Asia Minor: reportedly in 342/1 with Hermeias, the tyrant of Atarneus and Assos, in southern Troad facing the isle of Lesbos ([Dem.] 10.32 with scholia, Didym. On Dem. 8.28-32; 6.39-43; → Aristotle may have brought them into touch: Diog. Laert. 5.4), and in 337/6 with Pixodaros, the Hekatomnid satrap of → Karia (Plut. Alex. 10.1-2). The Great King got rid of both of them (Diod. 16.52.5-6; Strab. 14.2.17), and in 340 he ordered the coastal satraps to support Perinthos and Byzantion (Diod. 16.75.1-2; Arr. An. 2.14. 5): Philip’s control of the western bridgeheads on either strait threatened the opposite coasts of Asia. Only in 337 did Philip announce officially to the delegates of the → Korinthian League that he was going to conquer Achaimenid Asia, allegedly in retaliation for Xerxes’ campaign 150 years ago (Diod. 16.89.2, cf. Just. 9.5.5; Curt. 3.10.8-9). In preparation, he sent in 336 a Makedonian advance force under the joint command of → Attalos and → Parmenion (and Amyntas) beyond the Hellespont (Diod. 16.91.2; Just. 9.5.8); it proceeded as far south as Miletos before it was repulsed to Abydos, the Asiatic bridgehead on the Hellespont. The city could be retained to allow for the Makedonian crossing from Sestos, in the spring of 334, under Parmenion and Philip’s son and successor → Alexander III. Also on the Persian throne a change had occurred. The new king Dareios III was going to be Alexander’s counterpart, both on the military and diplomatic fields, for the next four years up to the Persian king’s assassination; afterwards, the Makedonian-Persian dialogue shifted to a series of Alexander’s initiatives towards Persian nobles. The first battle of the campaign was fought at the → Granikos (334), without Dareios’ personal participation. Still nearly all western satraps fought there, moreover Memnon, soon afterwards appointed “commander-­inchief of the whole navy (…) and all the coast” (Arr. An. 2.1.1), and some high ranking Persian generals; at hand were cavalry contingents from eastern satrapies such as Hyrkania and Baktria, also from Persis. So at the Granikos was massed not a reinforced satrap’s force but an imperial army. Its defeat was due not to Dareios’ underrating the threat but to tactical mistakes of the Persian

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commanders. The Makedonian progress to Kilikia, the gateway to Mesopotamia, then required a substantially stronger Persian response, under Dareios’ personal command. The subsequent Persian defeat in the → Issos plain (333), once more the consequence of a severe tactical mistake, was the more serious as the king’s family fell in Alexander’s hands and could not be ransomed. Though Alexan­der treated them respectfully according to their royal rank they were indeed his hostages (Arr. An. 2.12.3-5; Diod. 17.37.3-4; Curt. 3.8.12; 11.24-25; Plut. Alex. 21.1; Just. 11.9.12). This shifted the basis of negotiations fundamentally. There is much debate on this since our sources differ as to number, time, and content of Dareios’ offers. With the royal family in hand, Alexander could reject it. A new offer in 331, just before the battle at → Gaugamela, allegedly included “the territory west of the Euphrates (…) and one of (Dareios’) daughters as (Alexander’s) wife (…) and the legal status of a son sharing the whole kingdom” (Diod. 17.54.2, cf. Fr. Sabbaiticum, BNJ 151 F 1.5). If so much was really offered (but there are substantial doubts), precedence went to the Makedonian side: The eastern part that Dareios controlled then would have been second to the west with its access to Makedonian soldiers and Greek merce­naries, the more so as there were substantial problems in the east: a weakened Achaimenid torso empire would have been confronted with separatist activities; to crush them, Makedonian support would have been indispensible. As a result, Dareios (and his successors) would have played the role of junior partners. Yet Alexander had moved too far to accept a two-monarchs-model based on a fair balance of power of A. and Argeads. He aimed at absolute superiority (Arr. An. 2.14.7-9; Diod. 17.54.6) that was not acceptable for the Persian side. Yet Alexan­der needed Persian support to upkeep effective structures, both on the administrative and military plane. Moreover he needed the legal Achaimenid king’s standing and authority that had grown for centuries, combining substantial elements of Max Weber’s categories of “traditional / charismatic government” and amassing what Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic capital”. Since he would not let Dareios have real political or military competence in return, his concept was bound to fail. As after Dareios’ assassination and the execution of → Bessos—possibly himself an Achaimenid—Alexander as a foreigner was the sole monarch, the cohesion of the Achaimenid monarchy faded away though he tried to implement political continuity by paying honour to ‘good’ Achaimenid kings and by appointing high officials from the east. But these felt free from both the old monarchy that had ceased to exist, and from the new Makedonian master who had not yet sketched, 36

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let alone consolidated, new structures when he was away in the east for years. On his return, in 324 at → Sousa, he married two royal women (Arr. An. 7.4.4, cf. Diod. 17.107.6). This aimed at dynastic legitimation and at entering family networks of the Persian nobility. But the Achaimenid dynasty finally fell when → Perdikkas did away with the Achaimenid brides in 323, to secure the rights of Alexander’s unborn child with → Rhoxane (Plut. Alex. 77.4). Without the Achaimenid royal house at Alexander’s side, his initiatives were misunderstood as further examples of his increasing orientalism. After 150 years of panhellenic propaganda (→ panhellenism), he alone could not establish the balance which a cooperation of the A. and the Argead monarchs, if only on a reasonable basis, might have achieved.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Borza 1990, 98-131; Bosworth 1980, 229-30; Briant, P., Darius dans l’ombre d’ Alexan­ dre, 2003, 191-247 (engl. trans.: Darius in the Shadow of Alexander, 2015, 155-201); Müller 2019, 84-202; Olbrycht 2010.

Achilles Through his mother, → Olympias, → Alexander III traced his lineage back to the hero Achilles. The Molossian royal family of → Epeiros claimed Aiakid ancestry through the union of A.’s son Neoptolemos (also known as Pyrrhos) with Andromache, Hektor’s widow (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 335 = Pyrandros, BNJ2 504 F 1a; Eratosth., BNJ2 241 F 42; Paus. 1.11.1-2; Plut. Alex. 2.1; Plut. Pyrrh. 1.2; Just. 12.15.3). According to the later sources, Alexander prided himself on his matrilineal connection to the greatest warrior of the Trojan War at least as much as his patrilineal descent from Herakles (Diod. 17.1.5; Strab. 13.1.2 7; Vell. Pat. 1.6.5; Curt. 8.4.26; Arr. An. 4.11.6; Paus. 1.9.10). While Alexander’s Aiakid ancestry and his deliberate framing of his expedition in Homeric terms as an epic struggle between east and west that had begun with the Trojan War are well attested, the ubiquitous portrayal of Alexander as a deliberate emulator of A. must be treated with caution. The roots of this persistent tradition lie in Alexander’s exaggerated reaction to the loss of his beloved companion → Hephaistion, which along with his own premature death naturally evoked the legendary friendship of A. and Patroklos. The parallel with A. was subsequently elaborated by the source tradition and retrojected into Alexander’s campaign

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from the very moment of his arrival on Asian soil, when he is supposed to have placed a garland on the tomb of A. at Troy while Hephaistion did the same for Patroklos (Arr. An. 1.12.1; Ail. VH 12.7; cf. Plut. Alex. 15.4). Alexander’s imitation of A. is therefore an enduring literary fabrication.   F. Pownall Cf. Ameling, W., Alexander und Achilles, in: Will, W./Heinrichs, J. (eds.), Zu Alexander d. Gr., I, 1987, 657-92; Carney, 2006, 5-6; Funke, S., Aiakidenmythos und epeirotisches Königtum, 2000; Heckel, W., Alexander, Achilles, and Heracles, in: Baynham, E./Wheatley, P. (eds.), East and West in the World Empire of Alexander, 2016, 21-33.

Aegean Makedonia first could realistically show interest in the Aegean Sea when → Philip II expanded his realm to the Hellespontic sphere. In 342, he subjugated Athens’ ally Kersobleptes in eastern → Thrace. In 340, Philip moved on to besiege Perinthos and Byzantion (Diod. 16.74.2-76.4, 77.2-3; Just. 9.1.2-6; Dem. 18.87-93; Polyain. 4.2.21). Thereby, he stirred up a hornets’ nest: Artaxerxes III, Chios, Kos, Rhodos and the Athenian fleet under the mercenary general Chares came to the aid of the besieged. As the Makedonian → fleet was too small to cut off supplies for the cities, Philip drew back (but managed to capture the Athenian grain fleet). Having established Makedonian dominion over Greece in 338, he adopted the propagandistic claim to aim at “freeing” the Ionian Greeks from the Persian dominion reestablished by the King’s Peace 387/6. Thus, the new Makedonian hegemon of Greece challenged the balance of power between Greece and Persia in the A. Obviously, Philip aimed at controlling → Asia Minor to have a constant source of income for financing future wars necessary to preserve the Makedonian hegemony. In the A., as a hegemonic force following in the footsteps of → Athens, → Sparta, and → Thebes, Makedonia was at a naval disadvantage though: Philip was the first Argead to build a (small) Makedonian fleet. His predecessors had lacked the finances and opportunity to maintain a fleet, being shut off the coast by the Athenians. In 337, after the → Korinthian League’s declaration of war against Persia, a Makedonian advance force under → Parmenion and → Attalos secured strongpoints at the coast of Asia Minor to prepare the army’s crossing (Diod. 17.24.1). Probably about the same time, Philip tried to get access to the crucial stronghold of Halikarnassos by negotiating a 38

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marital bond uniting his house and that of → Karia’s satrap Pixodaros. However, the plan was dropped. Plutarch, the only source, spins an incredible yarn about Alexander sabotaging it (Alex. 10.1-3). Apparently, the Persian king intervened by sending one of his loyal officials, Orontobates, to watch over Pixo­daros, marry the satrap’s daughter, and take over the rule when Pixodaros disappeared from the records soon after (Arr. An. 1.23.6-8; Strab. 14.2.17). The Makedonian advance force substituted regimes favourable to the Persians, such as in Chios and Ephesos, but these initial successes were reversed by → Memnon of Rhodos, Dareios III’s éminence grise in Asia Minor. He kept the Makedonians confined to a small beachhead at Abydos that, however, sufficed to ensure the army’s safe landing in 334. The reason why the superior Persian fleet failed in preventing the Makedonian crossing of the Hellespont is debated. Some scholars think that the Persian contingents had not yet returned from defeating a revolt in Egypt. Others argue that the Makedonians did not give them much chance to intervene. According to the ancient sources (Diod. 17.17.2-4; Arr. An. 1.12.810), no naval battle was planned. The satraps and commanders of the affected regions such as Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia and Memnon were ordered to intercept the Makedonians after their landing, but failed at → Granikos (334). Perhaps Chares, who formally submitted to Alexander before Ilion (Arr. An. 1.12.1) was meant to secure this area for the Persians but was caught off guard when the Makedonians approached so swiftly. Apparently, Chares was based at his refuge at Sigeion, perhaps already having the 2000 mercenaries at his disposal with whom he garrisoned Mytilene for the Persians shortly after. After the battle of Granikos, Asia Minor’s rich satrapies fell into Makedonian hands. Memnon escaped and initiated the Persian counterattack, having a fleet of about 300 ships at his disposal. As a result, the Makedonian fleet, disbanded after Miletos’ fall for financial reasons (Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. An. 2.20.1), had to be reconstituted. While the Makedonians tried to avoid sea battles and neutralize the Persian fleet by conquering its naval bases and ships, the Persians reversed the Makedonian successes in the A. again (Curt. 3.1.19; Arr. An. 3.2.6). In spring 333, Memnon, commander-in-chief in the A. (Arr. An. 2.1.1), seized Chios. The rumor that he wanted to invade Greece to kindle revolts and involve the Makedonians in a war on two fronts (Diod. 17.29.3-4) may have been a piece of psychological warfare that at least worked on → Antipatros who hurried to secure Euboia’s coasts (Curt. 3.1.19-20). In early summer of 333, Memnon died unexpectedly while besieging Mytilene. Dareios transferred the command to Memnon’s nephew

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Pharnabazos (Curt. 3.3.1, 13.14; Arr. An. 2.1.3). Together with Autophradates, probably from an old satrapal family connected with Pharnabazos’ father, he held on to crucial bases in the A. and Western Anatolia, subsidized the Spartan revolt planned by Agis III (Arr. An. 2.13.5), and tried to cut the Makedonian communication lines in the A. It is debated whether Miletos also came shortly under Persian control again. The defeat at Issos did not stop the Persian commanders. Their strategy remained unchanged. Halikarnassos, only partially under Makedonian control, was restored for a certain time. Makedonian news that after Issos, the captive Barsine, Memnon’s widow who was also Pharnabazos’ sister, was taken by Alexander as his mistress (Plut. Alex. 21.4), may be a piece of Makedonian psychological warfare intended to demoralize Pharnabazos and his relatives, all staunch supporters of Dareios. But they carried on resisting. The fate of the Persian counterattack in the A. was sealed when → Tyre fell after 7 months of fierce resistance. Tyre’s local king Azemilkos had formed part of Auto­phradates’ camp (Arr. An. 2.15.7). Thereafter, Hegelochos and Amphoteros, the Makedonian naval commanders, re-established Makedonian control in the A. (Arr. An. 3.2.4-7). Halikarnassos was conquered, Autophradates vanished, Pharnabazos was captured at Chios, but escaped (Arr. An. 3.2.7), and reappeared in the Wars of the Diadochoi commanding a cavalry unit for → Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 7.1), his brother-in-law since the mass marriages in Sousa (324). While the Persian counteroffensive in the A. failed, it marked a crucial stage of the war and illustrated the widespread Persian networks, particularly the links to Athenian politicians and strategoi. Athens formed part of the Korinthian League and sent contingents, but individual Athenians supported the Persian side: the generals Ephialtes and Thrasyboulos assisted Memnon at Halikarnassos, Chares garrisoned Mytilene, the mercenary leader Charidemos served as Dareios’ military adviser, and until before Issos, → Demosthenes and his faction were in contact with Dareios hoping for his victory (Aischin. 3.164). The A. had not ceased to be a platform of Athens’ networks. Her former supremacy provided her with this advantage. The Makedonians had to cut these connections and establish new ones in the A.   S. Müller Cf. Anson, E.M., The Persian Fleet in 334, CP 84 (1989), 44-9; Briant 1996, 718-20, 802-3, 810-1, 817-9, 845-9; Müller, S., Argead Macedonia and the Aegean Sea, RicEll 1 (2019), 9-20; Panovski, S./Sarakinski, V., Memnon the Strategist, Macedonian Historical Review 2 (2011), 7-26; Ruzicka, S., War in the Aegean, 333-331 B.C., Phoenix 42 (1988), 131-51.

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Aëropos II

Aëropos II Aëropos II took the Argead rule after → Archelaos’ death in 399 taking advantage of his position as an → epitropos (guardian) of Archelaos’ minor son → Orestes whom he killed (Diod. 14.37.6-7). As rule in Makedonia was linked to the Argeads, A.’s role as an epitropos may indicate that he was an Argead. Alternatively, for onomastic reasons, he is taken for a member of → Lynkestis’ leading house. However, as a scholiast calls Archelaos’ younger brother A. (Schol. ad Aristeid. 46.120.2); he might have been identical with A. II. According to the Makedonian ruler lists, Orestes reigned formally for about 3-4 years (Euseb. Chron. I 229; Synk. 482.27-28 Mosshammer) while predominantly A. is thought to have deposed him immediately. A.’s silver → coinage bearing the legend ΑΕΡΟΠΟ succeeded that of Archelaos and adopted parts of his iconographic program. Next to nothing is known about A.’s reign except for a quarrel with the Spartan king Agesilaos II. On the way back from his raiding campaign in Asia Minor (396-4), his request to lead his troops through Makedonia was received in a hostile way but in the end A. had to give in to him (Polyain. 2.1.17; 4.4.3; Plut. Ages. 16.2). The brief anecdotal reports make any conclusion difficult. The speculations that A. may have been involved in the Athenian and Boiotian alliances against Sparta or had links to Artaxerxes II cannot be validated. In any case, A.’s unfavourable attitude towards Sparta resembled that of the Thracian Trallians (Diod. 14.82.3; Plut. Ages. 16.1) and the Thessalians, particularly of Larisa (with whom the Argeads traditionally had close ties); at that time (Xen. Ages. 2.2). A. seems to have died of natural causes in about 395/4. While Diodoros (14.84.6) calls A.’s son → Pausanias his successor, the ruler lists name a certain → Amyntas II (Euseb. Chron. I 227; Synk. 495.12-13 Mosshammer), perhaps ruling at the same time as his rival.   S. Müller Cf. Borza 1990, 178; Geyer 1930, 107-8; Müller 2016, 195-8.

Agriculture   see Makedonia; Rivers and lakes

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Aigai

Aigai The city of Aigai was the ancient capital of the Argead kingdom. It is now identified with the modern village of Vergina, where excavations have revealed a royal palace, a theatre, a sanctuary with royal dedications, a fortified akropolis and over 2500 tombs, some with astonishing grave goods, others decorated with fine wall-paintings. Just. 7.1-2 names → Karanos as the legendary founder of A. and recounts an old superstition that the royal line would die out if the Argead kings ceased to be buried at A. The existence of royal burials at A. is documented by Plut. Pyrrh. 26.6, narrating how the Celtic mercenaries of → Pyrrhos plundered the royal tombs in 274/3. It is assumed that → Philip II was buried at A. in 336 because he was assassinated there (Diod. 16.92-94), but no ancient source mentions the location of his → burial. Alexander III was initially going to be buried at A. (Paus. 1.6.3) before his body was snatched by Ptolemy and carried to Egypt. → Philip III Arrhidaios and his wife Adea Eurydike were given a royal burial (complete with funeral games) at A. by → Kassandros in 316 (Diod. 19.52.5; Athen. 4.155A). We do not know where the last Argead, → Alexander IV, was buried, but Tomb III of the Great Tumulus at Vergina is attributed to him. No archaeological remains can be associated with the Argeads until the reign of → Alexander I. Two rich burials of the early 5th c. very likely belonged to royal → women: one contained 26 life-size clay heads that were originally carried on poles and then placed in the tomb. Another burial (of the so-called Lady of A.) contained 12 bronze and one gilded silver phialai (libation bowls), the latter inscribed ΠΕΠΕΡΙΑΣΙ, bronze and iron vessels and clay busts of Persephone. She was bedecked with gold jewellery; her garments were decorated with gold attachments and she wore a cloth diadem covered with a gold sheet embossed with scenes of Greek myths. A cluster of four chamber tombs, three so-called Makedonian tombs (covered with a barrel vault and approached by a dromos) and a cist tomb accompanied by an overground naiskos (comparable to similar assemblages in Aiane and → Pella) were covered with a large tumulus (so-called Great Tumulus of Vergina) which contained debris from the local cemetery, notably grave stelai. Two of the Makedonian tombs, Vergina II and III, were found intact, containing gold and silver jewellery and vessels, gold caskets, gold and ivory weapons and furniture, iron and bronze arms and armour, all of exquisite quality, as well as fine wall-paintings. The cist tomb, Vergina I, is decorated with a high-quality fresco of the rape of Persephone (pl. 3, fig. 4). 42

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Tomb IV and the overground naiskos are very heavily damaged. Because the tumulus was clearly an afterthought, it has been suggested that the tombs belonged to the royal family, were partly plundered by Pyrrhos’ mercenaries and later covered by Antigonos Gonatas. Tomb III contained the cremated remains of a 13-14 year old boy, accompanied by a dazzling array of burial goods and gilded weapons, as well as a painted frieze of funeral games (a chariot race); it has therefore been plausibly attributed to Alexander IV. His presence under the Great Tumulus entails a dynastic burial ground. The tombs under the Great Tumulus have been dated to the period 350-10. There is great controversy on the precise dating of Tombs I and II and various attributions to Argead kings and queens have been proposed without a consensus. The situation is compounded by the skeletal remains: 7 individuals in Tomb I and a couple in Tomb II. The man’s remains in Tomb II have been attributed either to Philip II or to his son, Philip III Arrhidaios, who died in their 40s. The anthropologists’ estimate of the age of the woman buried in the antechamber of Tomb II ranges from 20 to 32 which might rule out both Philip II’s last wife and Philip III’s wife who should have been buried alongside them. Even more problematic is the date of the socalled Tomb of Eurydike, excavated near the royal palace but never properly published. The palace of A. seems to have been the prototype of subsequent royal palaces. It consists of a large courtyard with banquet halls and a circular cult space opening all around it. A magnificent two-storey façade overlooked the east side, with Doric columns on the ground floor topped by engaged Ionic columns. A propylon in the centre of the facade contained false windows on the upper storey. Recent investigations of the palace foundations date it to the reign of Philip II. Part of the palace complex is the theatre, also probably dated to the same period. Only the front row of stone seats survives. The theatre is remarkable for its exceptionally large orchestra which would have been used for celebrations as well as theatrical performances. The banquet offered by Philip II for his daughter’s wedding must have been located in the palace, while his assassination took place in the theatre (Diod. 16.92-94). The sanctuary of Eukleia below the theatre is associated with the Argeads on account of two statue bases inscribed with a dedication to Eukleia by Philip II’s mother, Eurydike. They are dated to the reign of Philip II. She is defined as the daughter of Sirras, with no mention of her husband’s name (Amyntas III). The use of patronymic rather than husband’s name is also attested in a dedication of Laodike, Perseus’ queen, in the same sanctuary. One of the two bases dedicated by Eurydike seems to

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have carried an over-life-size peplos figure in Pentelic marble (pl. 3, fig. 1) with a separately made head, also of Pentelic marble. The statuary type suggests that this is a divine image, not a portrait of Eurydike. That a portrait of Eurydike stood somewhere at A. is attested by a statue base carrying her name and found reused in an early Christian basilica in the nearby village of Palatitsia. Parts of the fortification walls of A. may date from the period of the Argeads though they were extensively refurbished by Kassandros.   O. Palagia Cf. Andronikos 1984; Kottaridi/Walker 2011; Lane Fox 2011, 243-56, 271-333; Palagia, O., Archaeological Evidence, in: Müller et al. 2017, 151-61; Palagia, O., The Royal Court in Ancient Macedonia: The Evidence from Tombs, in: Erskine, A. et al. (eds.), The Hellenistic Court, 2017, 409-17.

Aischines Aischines (ca. 391/0-ca. 322) is an Athenian politician best known for his bitter rivalry with → Demosthenes over the direction of Athenian policy towards Makedonia in the 340s and the 330s. The specific details of A.’s political career and the policies that he advocated in response to → Philip II’s increasingly aggressive expansion into mainland Greece are difficult to ascertain, as most of our knowledge is derived from two sets of mutually contradictory and deliberately obfuscating speeches delivered by A. and Demosthenes, in which each orator defends his own stance against Philip and vilifies his opponent (Aischin. 2-3; Dem. 18-19). The occasion of A.’s political début was Philip’s destruction of → Olynthos in 348, which brought to a head nearly a decade of hostile relations between Makedonia and → Athens. Since Philip’s accession in 360/59, his rapid expansion beyond the traditional borders of Makedonia collided with Athenian interests in the north, culminating in a declaration of outright war in 357 when Philip seized the former Athenian possession of → Amphipolis and refused to return it (Isok. 5.2; Aischin. 2.70). Weakened by the Social War (357-55), the Athenians were unable to mount an effective resistance against Philip’s encroachment upon the northwest Aegean or to provide timely military assistance to their allies: either the Phokians during the → Third Sacred War (despite Athenian success in blocking Philip’s passage south in 352) or the Chalkidic League, resulting in the fall of Olynthos, its most powerful city, in 348. 44

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In the wake of Philip’s sacking of Olynthos (during which he took captive some Athenian citizens), A. addressed the Council and the Assembly, advocating a change in direction of Athenian foreign policy, suggesting that they lay aside their current inertia to take an active role against the threat posed by Philip (Dem. 19.10, 303). On the proposal of → Euboulos, A. was one of a number of envoys sent to appeal to the other Greek cities for combined military assistance against Philip (Dem. 19.303-304; Diod. 16.54.1); he went to Arkadia (Aischin. 2.79, 157; Dem. 19.11, 304-307). This attempt to foment a panhellenic coalition against Makedonia failed, however, and A. pragmatically counseled his fellow Athenians that in the absence of aid from the other Greeks it was prudent to make peace with Philip (Aischin. 2.79). On the motion of Philokrates, whose view of the situation was similar to A.’s (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 164), the Athenians voted to send 10 ambassadors to enter into peace negotiations with Philip; both A. and Demosthenes were chosen (Aischin. 2.18-20; 3.63; Dem. 19.12). The embassy, with Philokrates as the chief negotiator for the peace treaty that later bore his name, departed for Makedonia in early 346. There, the ambassadors seem unanimously to have acquiesced in the peace terms proposed by Philip, a bilateral agreement between Philip and Athens and its allies in the Second Athenian Sea League, which notably included the Athenian renunciation of any claim to Amphipolis (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 166). The Athenians ratified the peace terms upon the ambassadors’ return to the city, and they duly were sent back to → Pella to await Philip’s ratification of the treaty (Dem. 19.17, 150). But Philip delayed meeting with the ambassadors to swear the oaths to seal the peace treaty while he completed his conquest of → Thrace and gained control of the pass at Thermopylai, allowing him to settle the Third Sacred War on his own terms, including the punishment of the sacrilegious Phokians. A. attempted to ameliorate the changed circumstances in Athens’ favour by urging Philip to mitigate the strong position of → Thebes (Athens’ inveterate enemy and the Phokians’ chief opponent in the Third Sacred War) by freeing the cities of → Boiotia from Theban control (Dem. 19.20-22), a position violently opposed by Demosthenes on the grounds that it would bring Philip perilously close to the borders of Attika. Relations between the two orators seemed to have soured over the question of future Athenian policy towards Makedonia, and soon after the embassy’s return to Athens Demosthenes began actively to dissociate himself from the peace agreement, joining forces with his ally Timarchos to embark on a prosecution of A. for allegedly receiving bribes from Philip. A. was able to

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head off this prosecution temporarily by countering it with his own (successful) prosecution of Timarchos on the grounds of sexual misconduct (Aischin. 1). But, thanks largely to Demosthenes’ vigorous campaign to undermine the peace in Athens, Philokrates fled Athens in 343 to avoid prosecution himself, and Demosthenes brought formal charges against A. for accepting bribes from Philip to broker the now-discredited → Peace of Philokrates (Aischin. 2; Dem. 19). A. was narrowly acquitted, by a margin of 30 votes (Idomeneus of Lampsakos, BNJ 338 F 10). He seems to have suffered a loss of reputation and reappears in public life only in 340/39, when Athens was once again in a state of open war with Philip, as one of Athens’ representatives to the → Delphic Amphiktyony (Aischin. 3.115; Dem. 3.149). On this occasion, A.’s vigorous defense of Athens against a charge of impiety by the Lokrians (instigated by the Thebans) resulted in the outbreak of new hostilities in central Greece, the so-called Fourth Sacred War. Although Demosthenes later accused A. of devising a pretext for Philip to march south with his army (Dem. 18.151-152, 156), the upshot of the renewal of war was to drive a wedge between Philip’s allies, the Thebans and the Thessalians, allowing Demosthenes to manipulate the Thebans into an unexpected alliance with Athens (not a result that Philip had foreseen or intended). Nevertheless, Philip prevailed, defeating the combined forces of the Athenians and Thebans along with a coalition of Greek poleis decisively at the Battle of → Chaironeia in 338. A. was chosen along with Phokion and Demades to negotiate for terms with Philip after the battle (Aischin. 3.227; Dem. 18.282). Subsequently, he appears in public life only to initiate a prosecution against Ktesiphon for making an illegal proposal to honour Demosthenes with a stephanos for his service to Athens. Forestalled by the shocking news of Philip’s assassination in 336, which appeared to vindicate his rival’s policies, A. bided his time until 330 when the failure of Agis’ revolt against Makedonia and Alexander’s conquest of Persia in his view made conditions right for the success of a prosecution attacking Demosthenes’ record of opposition to Philip (Aischin. 3; Dem. 18). Nevertheless, A. did not succeed in obtaining even a fifth of the votes, and went into exile thereafter; the ancient biographers provide differing versions of his activities after 330, none of which are reliable. It is too facile to state that A. was “pro-Makedonian” while Demosthenes was “anti-Makedonian,” as both politicians were attempting to defend Athens and its possessions against the expansionist activities of Philip, and clashed only on what kind of foreign policy would be most effective; there is no reason to consider Demosthenes’ accusation that A. advocated the 46

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acceptance of peace terms from Philip because he had been bribed as anything more than a courtroom slander. In the end, they both fatally underestimated the diplomatic and military abilities of Philip, as A. himself concedes (Aischin. 2.118).   F. Pownall Cf. Buckler, J., Demosthenes and Aeschines, in: Worthington, I. (ed.), Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, 2000, 114-58; Harris 1995; Worthington 2013.

akinakes A heritage from the time when the Persians still were a nomadic group in NW Iran, the akinakes was a short cavalry sword in a scabbard with special fastening ties; it was part of king → Kyros II’s weapons in his tomb (Arr. An. 6.29.6; Curt. 10.1.31). Along with the woolen cap of the tiara it later played a major role in the Persian court costume, as displayed on reliefs at → Persepolis. Within this sphere, it adopted the character of an elite distinction, worn by the king (Curt. 3.3.18) and high officials (Hdt. 3.118.2, 128.5; 9.107.2). Golden (handle, scabbard), richly ornamented specimens were awarded by the king, comparable to a golden medal of merit, to outstanding persons for substantial services, also to non-Persians such as the Kilikian vice-king in 401 (Xen. An. 1.2.27, cf. Hdt. 7.54.2). Another case was → Alexander I of Makedonia. His decoration, mentioned in no written source, appears on his earliest coins, minted soon before 480 (pl. 1.1). It emphasizes his rank within the Persian hierarchy, and his position: according to → Herodotos, he repeatedly acted as the Persian diplomat-in-chief in 480/79. After Xerxes’ defeat the detail disappeared when Alexander, no longer a commissioned Persian commander, adopted the new image of a Philhellen. Mardonios, the Persian chief of staff, related to Xerxes and one of his principal advisors, must have been amongst the rather few men in Xerxes’ staff who, as Alexander, were entitled to wear a golden a. He fell in the initial phase of the battle at Plataiai, killed by a Spartan hoplite (Hdt. 9.64.2). For this reason it is not probable that his golden a. went to → Athens, to Athena’s treasury, as was later claimed (Dem. 24.129); the gold in it, restricted to ornaments on the handle and scabbard, allegedly weighed 300 dareikoi (2.5 kg!).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 292-4, 299-302, and plates; Heinrichs 2017, 80.

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Aleuads

Aleuads The relationship between the Aleuads, who were based in Larisa and one of the most influential clans of → Thessaly in the classical period, and the Argeads was close. It can be traced back to the early 5th c. In 480/79 both were on Xerxes’ side (Hdt. 7.6.2, 172-173; 9.44.1). Therefore, after its defeat, the Persian army withdrew without any hindrance from the Thessalians and Makedonians (Hdt. 9.89.4). Also, the coins of Alexander’s western series and those from Larisa have similar images which indicate a certain degree of connection. In contrast, Plutarch’s account of the hostility between the Thessalians and Makedonians (Mor. 868E) seems unlikely and is not documented in contemporary sources. For the rule of → Perdikkas II, a solid political xenia with the A. is documented. Due to Perdikkas’ influence (Thuc. 4.78.2), his friend Nikonidas, probably one of the A., escorted Perdikkas’ ally Brasidas through Thessaly in 424 (Thuc. 4.78.679.1). Later, as an ally of Athens, Perdikkas prevented Spartan reinforcements for Brasidas from entering Thessaly (Thuc. 4.132). The suggestion that → Archelaos helped Aristippos, an A., in the matter of an internal conflict, is primarily based on Peri Politeias (6), additionally on a fragment of Thrasymachos (DK 85 B2) and a brief reference in Aristotle (Pol. 1311B). Archelaos reinstated the A. to their leading position, installed a garrison in Larisa and was granted with the citizenship of Larisa and control over Perrhaibia. 10 hostages, among them Hellanokrates from Larisa (Arist. Pol. 1311B), were sent to his → court (Peri Pol. 6, 16-18, 29, 33). Due to its unknown authorship, date of origin and rhetorical character, Peri Politeias must be treated with caution. Archelaos likely helped the A., but the details are hard to assess. Whether Hellanokrates, possibly an A., was a hostage or a guest at Archelaos’ court cannot be clarified. There are no sources that document the connection of his successor → Aëropos to the A., but Plutarch hints that both were hostile to the Spartan king Agesilaos II (Ages. 16.1-3). The nature of the relationship between → Amyntas II, → Pausanias, and the A. remains unclear. However, after → Amyntas III had been expelled from Makedonia at the beginning of his rule, he was aided and restored by the Thessalians (Diod. 14.92.3), among them very likely the A. They, in turn, later asked → Alexander II for help with their internal strife with Alexander of Pherai. Alexander II led his troops to Thessaly and took Larisa. Contrary to his agreement with the A., he did not restore the polis, but installed a garrison there (Diod. 15.61.3-5). He withdrew from Thessaly when the Theban general 48

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Pelopidas, summoned by some Thessalians, took Larisa (Diod. 15.67.4). There is no evidence for any connection between → Ptolemy of Aloros or → Perdikkas III and the A. Philip II’s first intervention in Thessaly is usually dated to 358. He is generally thought to have intervened in favour of the A. in their conflict with the tyrants of Pherai (Diod. 16.14.1-2; Dem. 18.295). After solving this conflict, he married Philinna of Larisa, probably an A. (Athen. 13.557C). The dating is a matter of debate. In 354/3, conflicts between Lykophron of Pherai and the Thessalians arose. The A. were likely involved and appealed to Philip (Diod. 16.35.1; Just. 8.2.1-2). After two defeats in 353/2 against Onomarchos and Phokis, Lykophron’s allies, Philip returned and defeated Onomarchos, aided by the Thessalians (Diod. 16.35.2-5, 38.1; Just. 8.2.1; Polyain. 2.38.2). It is mostly thought that after his victory, he was elected archon by the Thessalian League, probably with the support of the A. (Polyain. 4.2.19; Dem. 1.22; 2.7; 18.47-48; 19.318; Just. 8.2.1; 7.6.8, 8.3.1-5; 11.3.1-3). However, the dating and even the existence of the election is debated. In 349, according to Demosthenes (1.22), Philip suppressed the Thessalians and they opposed him. Even if his remark is trustworthy, it is uncertain whether Demosthenes misunderstood the privileges of Philip as an archon and if the Thessalians as a whole, including the A., were affected or only Pherai. At the end of the → Third Sacred War in 346, Philip managed to expand his influence in Central Greece significantly. After he had restored the Thessalians to their position in the → Delphic Amphiktyony, he gained, probably with the help of the A., the Phokian votes. Hence, together with his influence on the Thessalians and their votes, he dominated the council (Diod. 16.60.1-2). In 344/3, Philip intervened again in Larisa, due to political unrest (Diod. 16.69.8; Dem. 6.22; 19.260). Initially, the A. were likely engaged in internal strife. His intervention triggered a conflict between him and the A. As a result, several of them and their leader Simos were expelled from Larisa (Dem. 18.47-48; Arist. Pol. 1306A; Polyain. 4.2.11, 2.19). Some scholars think that thereupon Philip broke his ties with the A. Considering the presence of influential A. at Alexander III’s court, this might not apply for all A. Thessalians, among them possibly A., took part in the battle of → Chaironeia (Diod. 16.86.16; Just. 9.3.4-10; Polyain. 4.2.2, 2.7). At the beginning of Alexander III’s reign, he had to overcome Thessalian resistance. Reportedly by evoking their common ancestors, but presumably in fact by military threat, he convinced the Thessalians, among them probably A., to elect him as archon (Diod. 17.4.1; Just. 11.3.1-2). As a member of the → Korinthian League, the Thessalian contingent, among them

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A., fought along with the Makedonian army in Asia (Curt. 6.6.35; Plut. Alex. 24.1; Arr. Ind. 18.7). Some A. were important and influential hetairoi at Alexander’s court such as Medeios and Polykleitos of Larisa. They accompanied him on his campaign (Arr. An. 7.24.4; Diod. 17.117.1; Strab. 15.3.2). Medeios may have been a commander of the Thessalian cavalry. He was appointed one of the honourary trierarchs of the Hydaspes fleet (Arr. Ind. 18.7). Polykleitos was sent to Sousa to examine the royal treasury (Athen. 5.206D-E). After Alexander’s death, during the formal reign of Philip III, the Thessalians joined the Greek forces in the Lamian War. It is uncertain if A. participated. Through his mother Philinna, Philip III may have had connections to the A. It is also possible that he and Alexander IV were elected as archons of the Thessalian League. The relationship between the Argeads and the A. changed from a xenia to a hegemony, so that the Argeads were able to secure their southern border, and gained access to the Thessalian cavalry and the strategically important harbour of Pagasai.   S. Pal Cf. Graninger, D., Macedonia and Thessaly, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 306-25; Heckel 2006, 158, 208, 225; Müller 2016, 21-2, 153, 155, 184-6, 202-4, 219-22, 252-4; Sordi, M., La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro, 1958; Sprawski, S., Philip II and the Freedom of the Thessalians, Electrum 9 (2003), 55-66.

Alexander historiographers It is a curious accident of history that although many of his contemporaries wrote histories of Alexander, none of them survive (apart from short fragments cited by later sources), and the earliest extant continuous historical narrative of his campaign dates from almost three centuries after his death. The first historical accounts of A.’s expedition were almost certainly composed at the request of the king himself, who was well aware of the need to legitimize his campaign to the Greeks to ensure their continued co-operation, particularly as he moved farther away from the coast of → Asia Minor. → Kallisthenes of → Olynthos (BNJ 124), whose family had a longstanding association with the Argead → court (he was a relative of → Aristotle), and who had previously proved willing to adopt a suitably pro-Makedonian agenda in his Hellenika, was the obvious candidate for A. to commission as his official court historian (explicit at Just. 12.6.17; implied at Arr. An. 4.10.1-2). The extant fragments from Kallisthenes’ Deeds of Alexan­ 50

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der suggest that the work had a deliberately Homeric and Hellenizing tenor, portraying A.’s expedition as a re-enactment of the Trojan War. Kallisthenes’ condemnation and death in the wake of the ‘Pages’ Conspiracy in 327, however, entail that his history was left incomplete and did not include the final years of A.’s campaign (it is not clear why some manuscripts credit him with the authorship of the romanticizing treatment of episodes from A.’s life known as the Greek Alexander Romance). Like Kallisthenes, Anaximenes of Lampsakos benefitted from Philip’s → patronage at the Makedonian → court and followed up his eulogistic history of Philip’s reign with an account of A.’s expedition; unfortunately the only fragments extant from it (on the number of A.’s troops) are singularly uninformative (BNJ 72 F 29a-b). → Marsyas of Pella accompanied A. until he marched back into Syria in 331, where he remained with his elder half-brother → Antigonos. Marsyas covered A.’s campaign in his history of Makedonia through his departure from → Egypt (BNJ 135-136 T 1); the extant fragments indicate that he too was concerned to justify Philip’s unification of Makedonia and military expansion against the Greek poleis, which suggests that his narrative of A. was likewise written with an eye to legitimizing his conquests to a Greek readership. In addition to Kallisthenes, Marsyas, and Anaximenes, a number of highly-placed military officers and administrators at A.’s traveling court wrote first-hand accounts of his expedition, published in in the years after his death: → Chares of Mytilene (BNJ 125), A.’s royal chamberlain; → Nearchos of Crete (BNJ 133), A.’s admiral; → Onesikritos of Astypalaia (BNJ 134), the head steersman of A.’s fleet; → Aristoboulos of Kassandreia (BNJ 139), who accompanied A.’s expedition, and held no known military commands but performed a series of civil commissions; → Ephippos of Olynthos (BNJ 126), who served as A.’s inspector in Egypt (BNJ 126 T 2); and Polykleitos of Larisa (BNJ 128), a member of A.’s Thessalian cavalry. A few other members of A.’s entourage are attested to have written literary works—Nikoboule (BNJ 127), Medeios of Larisa (BNJ 129), Kyrsilos of Pharsalos (BNJ 130), and Antigenes (BNJ 141), but there is simply too little extant to determine if they wrote historical accounts of A.’s expedition or some other genre of literature altogether. Although little remains from the historical works of A.’s contemporaries, the extant fragments generally indicate a eulogizing and romanticizing tendency (even those of Ephip­ pos, whose work is often considered to be a hostile pamphlet, contain no explicitly negative judgments of A.). Furthermore, most of these writers followed Kallisthenes’ lead, in response presumably to A.’s own instructions, in recasting

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specific episodes from A.’s campaign in explicitly Homeric terms. In the subsequent historiographical tradition, which relied on the works of these contemporary sources, this episodic tendency results in the reduction of A.’s career to a series of highly stylized anecdotes and rhetorical set-pieces, which could be manipulated accorded to the writer’s own particular agenda. On the other hand, the fragments of the history of A.’s expedition by → Ptolemy, son of Lagos (BNJ 138), one of the most important of A.’s commanders, suggest that its focus was more military and less romantic than the works of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, it too evinces an apologetic tendency towards its subject, and exaggerates Ptolemy’s own military contributions, not surprisingly as his purpose in writing was to establish the legitimacy of his dynasty in Egypt (which also suggests that he is the least likely of those who served with A. to have begun composing his history before the king’s death). Although until recently he also was thought to have accompanied A. on his expedition, → Kleitarchos of Alexandreia (BNJ 137) almost certainly wrote his history of A. decades afterwards, as is indicated by a fragmentary papyrus in which he is named as the tutor of the future Ptolemy IV Philopator (P.Oxy. 4808 = BNJ 137 T 1a), who was not born until ca. 244. Therefore, unlike his predecessors, he does not offer an eyewitness account of A.’s campaign. Despite his reliance on secondary sources and notorious reputation for unreliability (BNJ 137 T 6, T 8), Kleitarchos’ history was extremely influential upon the subsequent historiographical tradition on A. Extending to at least 12 books (BNJ 137 F 6), it offered a sensationalistic narrative of A.’s expedition, abounding in vivid descriptions and prone to rhetorical embellishment. Due in large part to its highly entertaining narrative, Kleitarchos’ history was enormously popular in the Roman period (especially when issues of autocratic rule took on an importance beyond the strictly theoretical), and forms the base of the so-called vulgate or popular tradition on A. The earliest extant full narrative of A.’s reign occurs in Book 17 of the universal history of Diodoros of Sicily, written in the mid-first c. BC. The dramatic and often-lurid vignettes of Kleitarchos’ history were appealing to Diodoros, who found fertile material in it for graphic illustrations of the moral and didactic lessons he wished to impart in his narrative of A.’s campaign. Nevertheless, in comparison with the later vulgate authors, Diodoros’ A. is generally presented in idealizing terms and any criticism of his character tends to be muted. Pompeius Trogus, a Romanized Gaul writing during the rule of Augustus, devoted books 7-12 of his universal history in 44 books to A., using Kleitarchos as his primary source. Trogus’ Philippic History is now 52

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lost, surviving only in an epitome by Justin, composed sometime between the 2nd and the 4th c.s AD; the material on A. is in books 11-12. Trogus-Justin offers the first extant historical treatment of A. in Latin. Perhaps reflecting its Roman context, the portrait of A. in Trogus-Justin is far more hostile than any of its Greek predecessors, although it is based on the same source tradition. Trogus-Justin’s A. is portrayed as a stereotypical tyrant; despite his undeniable military success, he is not a figure to be admired because his lack of self-restraint has transformed him into a cruel and bloodthirsty despot over the course of his campaign. Quintus Curtius Rufus offers the first surviving stand-alone historio­ graphical treatment of A., written in Latin in the first c. AD, probably during the reign of Vespasian. Curtius’ Histories of Alexander the Great was a work of 10 books (of which the first two are lost, and portions of the other are lacunose), ultimately based on Kleitarchos, although there is evidence for his use of other sources as well. Like Trogus-Justin, a major theme in Curtius’ overtly rhetorical and heavily embroidered narrative is the degeneration of A.’s character after his conquest of Persia, when he succumbs to oriental luxury and becomes a despot, complete with the stereotypical tyrannical attributes of irrational violence, para­ noid behaviour, misuse of power, and divine pretensions (A. may represent for Curtius a stand-in for offering implicit and therefore safe political commentary on imperial Rome). The latest surviving representative of the vulgate tradition is the → Metz Epitome (compiled most likely during the 4th or 5th c. AD), a narrative account in Latin of A.’s expedition from the death of Dareios III to his Indian campaign. The Metz Epitome adopts the sensationalism and the dramatic depiction of certain selected anecdotes familiar from the other narratives based on Kleitarchos, but privileges the military achievements of A. over his putative descent into oriental despotism. Thus, although all the historiographers of the vulgate tradition use a common source, the way that they shape this shared body of material results in very different kinds of narratives on A., depending on the individual writer’s intellectual context and political agenda. The Greek writers of the high Roman Empire, writing during a period of political stability, relative intellectual freedom, and philhellenic emperors, when literary resistance to autocratic rule had all but ceased, revert to a largely idealizing portrayal of A. In his Life of Alexander (composed late first/early 2nd c. AD), Plutarch of Chaironeia appears to have used all the sources available to him to construct a generally apologetic portrayal of A. as a powerful symbol of civilizing virtue and the promotion of Hellenic ethical norms among the barbarians. The Life of

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Alexander (paired with Julius Caesar) is a moralizing biography, and as Plutarch himself famously concedes in its introduction (Alex. 1), his aim is not to provide an exhaustive historical account of his subject, but to emphasize the actions that best illustrate his character. Nevertheless, based on his thorough canvassing of the earlier sources (most of which no longer survive) Plutarch does provide his own take on all the episodes from A.’s campaign that had become standard by his time, and is the only extant source to include material on A.’s early life prior to his accession (Alex. 2-10); therefore his Life is one of the most valuable and influential treatments of A. in the ancient historiographical tradition. Like Plutarch, his slightly younger contemporary in the Second Sophistic cultural movement, Lucius Flavius Arrianus (Arrian) returned to a more idealizing portrayal in his narrative of A.’s expedition, the Anabasis of Alexander. Shaped perhaps by the military and political prominence he attained under the Roman emperors Trajan and Hadrian, Arrian rejected the marvelous, the romantic, and the gossipy elements that the mainstream of Alexander historiography represented by the 2nd c. AD, choosing instead to base his narrative chiefly on A.’s contemporaries, Ptolemy and Aristoboulos (Arr. An. praef. 1-2; 7.5.16). Arrian justifies his choice of two relatively obscure sources (by his own time, at least) by claiming that he considered Ptolemy and Aristoboulos reliable authorities because they campaigned with A. and wrote after his death, when no compulsion or incentive would lead them to write anything other than what actually happened; furthermore, it is likely that he found their apologetic and eulogistic portrayals particularly congenial to his own idealizing vision of A. Although Arrian’s Anabasis gives the impression of providing a sober and factual account of A.’s expedition (and for that reason has often been privileged as the accurate historical source by modern scholars, despite its composition nearly 500 years after A.’s death), he too (no less than his predecessors) shapes his narrative and is deliberately selective in his treatment of material in order to portray A. as an ideal ruler (a concern shared by his historiographical model, Xenophon, to whom Arrian pays homage with the title of his work on A.). Thus, even by the time his own contemporaries began to compose the earliest historiographical narratives of A., he had already become a larger than life figure, whose brilliant military career and stunning conquest of the Achaimenid Persian Empire were reduced to a series of topoi, which could be employed as either positive or (eventually) negative exempla depending on the writer’s intellectual milieu and political agenda. Already by the time of Augustus, the geographer Strabon (11.6.4) 54

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comments that it is not easy to believe the accounts of most of those who have written on A. because they play fast and loose with the facts. Thus, even in antiquity, the problematic nature of the historiographical tradition on A. was recognized.   F. Pownall Cf. Baynham, E., The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great, in: Roisman 2003, 3-29; Bosworth, A.B., From Arrian to Alexander, 1988, 1-15; Müller 2019, 18-33; Pearson 1960; Zambrini 2007.

Alexander I When was Alexander I born? His father → Amyntas I adresses him, around 512/1, as neos: ‘young man’, lacking experience (Hdt. 5.19.1). In a possible model, another father, Dareios I, characterizes his son: ‘neos’ eōn ‘nea’ phronei—being a ‘young man’ he plots ‘new matters’, lacking brain (Aisch. Pe. 782). The young man is king Xerxes, just after Salamis, then on the Persian throne for 6 years. So we cannot conclude from the term neos alone to actual age. Nor may we take A.’s running the stadion during some Olympic Games after 480 (Hdt. 5.22.2, cf. Just. 7.2.14) as a hint to his age. He simply cannot have qualified for the stadion then, due to his advanced years: if he could stand in officially for his father in ca. 512/1, he had exceeded his early years then. If we consider for him an age of 16 (that of → Alexander III when he was → Philip II’s deputy in 340: Plut. Alex. 9.1), he would have been born before 525; so during the earliest Olym­piad possible (476—two decades earlier he had not yet been eager for being regarded as a Greek) he was beyond 50—too old for the stadion. Regarding the years of his accession and his death we are not on firmer ground. According to common opinion, he followed Amyntas around 500, at about 30, and died ca. 454/0, at about 75, being beyond his mid-40s during Xerxes’ invasion in 480. If he really gave his sister Gygaia in marriage to the high-ranking Persian Boubares (Hdt. 5.21.2), he did so after his father’s death: before that, Amyntas himself had been responsible for his daughter. So she cannot have played a role in appeasing a Persian investigation team soon after ca. 512/1. Persian pressure on him was devised at a time when the marriage of a Makedonian royal woman to a Persian noble turned critical for A., as it did during the Ionian Revolt (500492), due to developments in Thracian → Bisaltia, then just east of the Make-

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donian border: with Ionian help, a group of Paionian nobles, deported from there by the Persians to Hellespontine Phrygia a decade earlier, had returned (Hdt. 5.13-15) and cut Makedonia off the Empire. Enemies to the Persian king, they must have regarded Amyntas and A.—who just then succeeded his father— as traitors. Amyntas had submitted Makedonia to the Great King and in turn been put in charge of this region and probably adjoining areas as a hyparchos (Hdt. 5.20.4, cf. 7.106.1). This implied Persian support against leading men in Upper Makedonia and Thracian neighbours. It ended with the Paionians’ return that must have caused problems for A. (Hdt. 5.98). As a reaction he probably invented the story of an eliminated Persian delegation (Hdt. 5.19-20) that aimed at qualifying him as anti-Persian, and added his own version of Gygaia’s marriage to excuse his family’s connection to highly esteemed Persian nobles (Hdt. 4.143.2-3). That helped him to survive until 492 when Mardonios turned up to crush the Revolt in the far west (Hdt. 6.43.4-45). A. must have received Persian pardon then—he would not if he had sided with the Thracians up to his conviction, but it is likewise improbable that Xerxes granted him territories at the northern periphery of his realm only some years later (Just. 7.4.1). → Herodotos with his strong bias for A. passes over all this in silence. Nor does he explicitly mention A.’s preparations of Xerxes’ invasion which can however be concluded from Persian directives to other subjects, Greek cities in → Thrace: They had to prepare routes for the Persian army in their regions and to supply Xerxes’ troops (Hdt. 6.118-120). A. must have drawn the same assignments. He probably participated in digging the Athos canal (Hdt. 7.22-24), and doubtlessly had to construct and repair roads, bridges, harbours, and store houses in Lower Makedonia. Moreover, he had to equip and supply his Makedonian contingent during Xerxes’ campaign in Greece and probably assist Artabazos’ sieges of Poteidaia and → Olynthos in 480/79 (Hdt. 8.126.2-128.1). Finally fell to him the care for sick and injured Persian troops (Hdt. 8.115.3), and the accomodation of Xerxes and his court in his own residence at → Aigai (Hdt. 7.131). The total costs must have been immense. But much money had come into A.’s coffers just then, from the Athenians who had decided to enlarge their fleet substantially, from the first fruits of a rich silver vein in the Laureion district (Hdt. 7.144). Their new wealth bought Makedonian → timber for triremes and poles for rudders. Not a word on all that by Herodotos whose perspective was determined by A.’s new image after 479. It was excellent then at → Athens and Delphi whence the historiographer drew much information. But A.’s efforts as a Persian hyp­ 56

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archos remain in the dark. Some evidence comes from his early → coinage. It started in the years that preceded Xerxes’ invasion, as to conclude from the reverse die of the tetrobol minted then (pl. 1.1). Such coins were paid to A.’s men working on preparations of Xerxes’ campaign. The denomination covered the costs of a man’s daily living (siteresion). Outside Makedonia, grain and further provisions were offered on local markets: at sites as e.g. the Athos canal zone (Hdt. 7.22-24) the supply was largely left to regional retail sellers. To pay them, coins were needed in small denominations since larger coins would have resulted to a lack of change. A.’s initial obverse gives expression to the image he then intended of himself: that of a Persian commander. Before the military background of the time, he portrays himself as a mounted cavalryman, with the common form of the Makedonian hat (petasos). The → rider thus is identified as a Makedonian—the Old Persian term for the ethnic is Yaunā takabarā: ‘Greeks wearing shields’ (with a central bulge, scil. on their heads: actually a petasos in side-view). He holds an equestrian → sarissa, also the handle of a short sword. In all probability, this is a Persian → akinakes, a weapon awarded by the Persian king as a special gift of honour to high ranking persons (and cities) who had rendered him outstanding services. By the distinctive akinakes, the rider is introduced as A. himself going to war. A monarch was without precedent on Greek coins, but common on those from Persian Sardeis: its then up-to-date type displays the idealized Great King in kneeling stance, wearing a crenelated crown and a courtly costume, holding weapons (Kraay 1976, pl. 4.82). A. styled himself after this model, except for the crown which is substituted by the petasos. He could well do so because Makedonia was then part of the Persian Empire. He even proudly presents his akinakes that identifies him as a member of the imperial aristocracy with close connections to the Great King. It is just what the Greek tradition following A.’s new self-representation since 479 cuts off. A. was the first to dissimulate his former allegiance to the Persian king: when he hurried up to style himself as Philhellen, ‘friend of the Greeks’, after Xerxes’ defeat in 479, the akinakes turned into a strain. As one consequence, the cavalryman was changed into a hunter holding two javelins, and the spot of the former akinakes was filled with an innocent triangular fold falling down from the rider’s chiton (Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 306, fig. 2, cf. pl. 1.2). As he had done already in the beginning of the Ionian Revolt and at its end, A. changed his image once more. Suitably he also re-interpreted his conduct during Xerxes’ campaign and the years preceding it. He then had supported the Persian side by diplomatic activi­

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ties, to win over Greek poleis near the Persian lines of approach to Athens. So the preparations of the invasion must have included negotiations to make sure for neutrality or even co-operation. For diplomatic missions, Xerxes needed men well acquainted with Greek politics; as the most prominent, A. became his diplomat-in-chief. In advance, he settled things in → Boiotia (Hdt. 8.34) and later, while the Persian army had some rest in Makedonia, he won important Thessalians for changing sides—until then a majority had favoured the Greek cause (Hdt. 7.172). In 479, he even made similar advances to the Athenians who declined but did not renounce their profitable friendship with the Makedonian ruler (Hdt. 8.140); also in the future, they needed his timber. Moreover, he influenced military decisions of the Greek allies, first rather to Xerxes’ advantage, then with respect to his own interests foreseeing, as did many (cf. Hdt. 9.16.3-5, 41.2-3, 66), that the final battle on Greek soil was going to be lost for the Persian side. Two of his messages to the Greek high command were most important, albeit Herodotos, lacking military expertise, understood neither of them. He however reports how the Greeks reacted, allowing for conclusions on A.’s messages. The historiographer speculates about some details: at Tempe Valley, by way of annotation (7.173.4), he considers that A. might have hinted to bypasses west of Mt. → Olympos. But the Greeks must have known about these trails and also a bypass above Tempe to Gonnoi, after specific interviews with Thessalian messengers at the Isthmos (Hdt. 7.172). Doubtlessly they had taken precautions as they would do little later on the trail west of Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.214-18). Had such defences been impossible west of Mt. Olympos, the Thessalian call for help would have been rejected from the start. So A.’s message must have contained some other news that the Greek commanders could not yet have known. Since the Greek contingents reacted immediately by retiring to their ships in the Malian Gulf, the security of their backward communication including the supply of those in the valley must have been at stake. To bring about that, Thessalian cities must have changed sides just before. Pertaining information conveyed by A. was substantial enough; it would account for his esteem in Greece after 479. However, it must have been A. himself who first persuaded the Thessalians and then informed the Greeks, intending to clear Tempe Valley for Xerxes’ army. A.’ s second message, at Plataiai, must have contained details about a regrouping of Persian contingents, as can be concluded from the rochade of Greek troops that Pausanias immediately made (Hdt. 9.46-47); later the scene was dramatized, and the message distorted by Herodotos’ Athenian sources. The two messages, re-­ 58

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interpreted by the Makedonian ruler after the war, and the goodwill of the Athenians eventually saved A.’s head. He succeeded to style himself as the man who repeatedly had saved the Greeks, proving his sympathy and wishing victory for their cause (Hdt. 9.45.2). It paid off: whereas Makedonia’s neighbours to the south, the Thessalians, were punished by the Spartans (cf. Hdt. 6.72.1) for their co-operation with Xerxes, and the Thracian districts to the east had to suffer from Athenian strikes against Persian strongholds and their hinterland (Plut. Kim. 7-8), there are no hints to Greek military action against Makedonia. The land even might have been cleared by A. himself who thus became an active part in the Greek strategy. Maybe in this context, he got a free hand in conquering western Bisaltia where he secured for himself a prolific silver mine (Hdt. 5.17.2), but hardly the hill of → Amphipolis (so Speus. Phil. 7-8 Natoli). According to common opinion, he did so in the 460s, but this would have been remembered at Athens then engaged herself in the region. His silver was the basis of a rich ‘regal’ Makedonian coinage (Kraay 1976, pl. 27-8). Maybe it also paid for some of the military reforms that Anaximenes ascribes to some Alexander before the mid 4th c. (BNJ 72 F 4). Since the reign of → Alexander II is too short and troublesome for such a project, most probably A. I is credited with it, but not rightly so: rather Anaximenes summarizes a sequence of reforms and ascribes them to one single ruler. Towards the end of A.’s rule, both the weight and metal of his small coin denominations (photos: Psoma 1999, 281-82) had to be reduced, and larger ones probably ceased altogether. But before that, A. spent much money on his image in Greece. He consecrated a gilded statue of himself at Delphi, just opposite the entrance to Apollon’s temple (Hdt. 8.121; [Dem.] 12.21), next to the Greek victory dedications for Salamis and Plataiai; also these—three stars atop a bronze ship’s mast (Hdt. 8.122), a tripod set on the bronze Serpents’ Column (Hdt. 9.81.1)—were golden. This falls not much short of a record on the Column itself (ML 27) underlining his claim that he had contributed to the Greek victory; the background and even authenticity of a further golden dedication at Elis/Olympia (Solin. 9.13) are debated. Already in the 490s, during the interval of the Ionian Revolt, he had won over Bakchylides to praise him (F 20B Campbell [LCL, Greek Lyric IV, p. 277-9), and fragments survive of another enkomion, by Pindar (F 120-1 Race [LCL vol. II, p. 348-49]). The literary praise by two outstanding poets of his time shows that he already then styled himself as a cultivated monarch, aiming pre-eminently at → Thessaly. After 479, he deviced a Hellenic origin of his family (Hdt. 9.45.2) at → Argos, by his → foun-

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dation myth, and confirmed by his admission to the Olympic Games that were reserved to Greeks. Maybe on this foil he interfered in Peloponnesian politics when, in the 460s, he granted asylum to fugitives from → Mykenai (Paus. 7.25.6) that had been enslaved by Argos (Diod. 11.65.2-5). Possibly this was meant as a gesture of help for Argos signalling that Makedonia was willing to become a member of the Greek community. A. had 5 sons, amongst them three bearing names that occur in Herodotos’ list of the first Makedonian rulers (8.139, doubtful). One of his sons, → Perdikkas II, succeeded him.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Badian 1994; Brunt, P., Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon, JHS 96 (1976), 151-3; Heinrichs 2017; Müller 2017, 76-83, 209-11, 229; Pownall 2017, 215-8.

Alexander II Alexander II, the eldest son of → Amyntas III and Eurydike, brother of → Perdikkas III and → Philip II (Diod. 16.2.2), succeeded his father in 370/69 at the age of about 20 (Diod. 15.60.3). In an Athenian treaty of alliance with Amyntas (370s), A. was already associated with his father (IG II³ 157; Tod no. 129, ll. 2, 21). His reign was only short-term. Trogus-Justin’s claim that at the beginning, buying peace from the Illyrians, A. had to give his young brother Philip to them as a hostage only to hand him over to the Thebans shortly after (7.5.1-2) deserves no credence. Right from the start, A. sought to consolidate his position and win the favour of the Makedonian leading circles by an initial expansion. It would have provided him with the glory of a capable commander and generous distributor of booty, both central aspects of Argead → legitimization and crucial to a ruler’s standing in his leading circles. Internal problems in → Thessaly provided A. with a war venue. When Alexander of Pherai took over the Pheraian tyranny, the Argeads’ long-standing Aleuad allies from Pherai’s rival city Larisa asked A. to assist them in overthrowing Pherai’s dominion. A. was quick to take the chance. Diodoros mentions that refugees from Larisa accompanied him on his march to Thessaly (15.61.4). A.’s Thessalian allies obviously expected A. and his troops to act as their auxiliary force against Pherai. Despite being admitted into Larisa with his army, however, A. pursued his own agenda in the interests of Makedonian expansion, took control of the city, conquered the citadel, and garrisoned it. He pulled the same stunt again at Krannon in central Thessaly, 60

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disappointing the hopes of the local politicians who had also asked for his help: A. established Argead control over Krannon and garrisoned it (Diod. 15.61.5). The evidence suggests that the duped Thessalian allies were completely taken by surprise by this outcome. Prior to their power moves in Thessaly, A. and his advisers will have claimed that they would respect the Thessalian interests. However, the politicians in Larisa and Krannon must have been aware of the risk of opening their gates to another army. It seems naive to ignore the potential threat posed by a newly acclaimed ruler who needed to distinguish himself militarily and was invited to lead his troops into troubled neighbouring territory. For A., it must have looked as if he was handed his first accomplishment on a silver platter. But he was stopped by the intervention of → Thebes, Greece’s new hegemonic power since Leuktra (371). Other Thessalian factions had turned to the Thebans asking them for military support against Pherai. Interested in establishing Theban control over strategically important Thessaly, Pelopidas, Thebes’ leading politician besides Epameinondas, arrived with an army, according to Diodoros instructed “to arrange Thessalian affairs in the interests of the Boiotians” (15.67.3). Accordingly, A. was forced to surrender, disband his garrisons, and return to Makedonia. The fact that he came away empty-handed must have been a serious blow that damaged his standing in his leading circles. The gain in influence was lost. Even worse, A. was forced to accept Thebes’ superiority in the Thessalian matter. Already battered as he was, subsequent Theban interference will have been the decisive blow leading to A.’s death. It happened when A.’s brother-in-law → Ptolemy of Aloros, apparently taking advantage of A.’s failure, offered himself as an alternative to A. and found sufficient approval of Makedonian influential → factions to challenge A.’s rule. Makedonia appears to have been divided by this feud. Plutarch mentions that A. and Ptolemy waged war against each other and exiles fled from Makedonia (Pelop. 26.2-3). In this situation, both parties had the bad idea to turn to Thebes for mediation. The Thebans did not miss the chance to get a hand in Makedonian politics and make sure that Makedonia was firmly controlled and too weak to interfere in Thessaly again. In 369/8, Pelopidas was sent to Makedonia. He reconciled the opponents, restored the exiles, and made A. conclude a symmachia with Thebes. Furthermore, A. had to hand 30 sons of the influential Makedonian families and his own brother Philip as hostages over to him (Diod. 15.67.4; Just. 7.5.2; Plut. Pelop. 26.4; Plut. Mor. 178C). Unfortunately, we have no information about Pelopidas’ dealings with Ptolemy. However, judging from the fact that Ptolemy

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took the rule shortly after (as an → epitropos), it is likely that Pelopidas did not affect Ptolemy’s standing substantially. On the contrary, it was in the interests of Thebes to keep Makedonia weak, disunited, and troubled by the rivalry of the two factions. Unfortunately, it is unknown to which faction the exiles Pelopidas called back to Makedonia belonged. Perhaps, they were Ptolemy’s supporters supposed to further limit A.’s influence. In any case, Pelopidas did not back A. up but rather gave him the kiss of death. A. had to accept the Theban hand in Makedonian politics, sealed by the hostages and pledges. It may have cost him the support of some of their families. Surely, this loss of face paved the way for A.’s assassination in 369/8, obviously engineered by Ptolemy (Diod. 15.71.1; Plut. Pelop. 27.2; Dem. 19.194-195). According to → Marsyas of Pella, A. was assassinated while watching Ptolemy’s men performing a Makedonian weapon dance (τελεσίας) that became lethal for him (BNJ 135-136, F 11), apparently at a banquet. In the case that the information is valid and thus more than a colourful tale perhaps spread in courtly circles, it hints at the problem of approaching an Argead ruler while being armed. Usually, he will have been protected by his bodyguards and unless one of them was the murderer, it was an issue how to eliminate him. Performers of a weapon dance, however, were supposed to be armed, thus unlikely to raise the suspicion of A. and his protectors. The tale that A.’s mother Eurydike instigated his assassination to bring her lover on the throne (Just. 7.5.4-5) is biased by Greek and Roman prejudices against royal → women in the political sphere and deserves no credence. The suggestion in scholarship that Ptolemy saved Argead Makedonia from an overambitious young ruler threatening to throw Makedonia into turmoil by his expansionist policy cannot be substantiated. We are not informed about A.’s further designs. In addition, he was no sole actor but supported by a considerable part of the Makedonian leading circles. Otherwise he would not have been able to succeed his father and rule for roughly a year at all. Regarding the Thessalian campaign, A. and his advisers showed exactly the reckless political calculation necessary to bring the threatened, unstable Makedonia forward. In the case of success, A. would have firmly consolidated his position. Moreover, it is unknown whether Ptolemy’s rivalry with A. was caused by the unfortunate Thessalian expedition or whether Ptolemy just used this failure to justify his already existing ambitions. In the end, Ptolemy was not able to pacify Makedonia. He could neither prevent the ongoing conflicts with the members of A.’s former faction nor the Theban interference and had to give even more high-ranking hostages to Thebes than 62

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A. (Plut. Pelop. 27.4: 50 → hetairoi and his own son). In the ongoing debate on a fragment by Anaximenes of Lampsakos crediting a ruler called Alexander with military reforms regarding cavalry and infantry (BNJ 72 F 4; Harpokration s.v. pezhetairoi), some scholars identify A. as this reformer. However, this is uncertain.    S. Müller Cf. Carney 2019, 53-8; Müller 2016, 217-24; Roisman 2010, 161-2.

Alexander III Alexander III, son of → Philip II and → Olympias, was born in 356. Involved in dynastic representation early on, in 346, A. sang and played the kithara for the Athenian envoys at Pella (Aischin. 1.167-168). Stories about the young A.’s taming of → Boukephalos and questioning of Persian ambassadors (Plut. Alex. 5.1; 6) are fictitious depictions of his predestination to conquer and rule. From 343 to 340, A. was educated by → Aristotle in → Mieza (Plut. Alex. 7.2-3), certainly an element of Philip’s Greek policy. In contrast with general belief, our knowledge about the lessons is limited; the relationship between A. and Aristotle became the subject of myth-making. Supporting A. as his heir apparent, in 340, during his absence, Philip entrusted the regency to the teenager. Under the supervision of → Antipatros, A. officially subjected the rebellious Maidians and founded Alexandroupolis (Plut. Alex. 9.1). In 338, at → Chaironeia, (with Philip’s experienced generals by his side) A. is said to have destroyed the famous Theban Sacred Band (Diod. 16.86.1-4). The accounts about the deterioration of A.’s relationship with Philip because of his 7th marriage in 337 are distorted by the retrospective perspective of the authors who construct a causal relationship with Philip’s assassination (Plut. Alex. 9.3-5; Athen. 13.557D-E). It is unlikely that A., raised at a polygamous court, saw his rights to the throne challenged by another of Philip’s matrimonies—that produced a daughter, no future rival brother (Athen. 13.557E). Philip did not cease to support A.’s future succession: he included statues of A. and Olympias in the → Philippeion’s family group symbolizing dynastic unity and strengthened A.’s position by giving A.’s full sister → Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander the Molossian (336). If Olympias went to → Epeiros and Alexander to → Illyria in 337 (Just. 9.7.5; Plut. Alex. 9.5), their sojourns do not need to be self-imposed exiles: Philip perhaps asked Olympias to arrange Kleo-

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patra’s marriage and sent Alexander on a diplomatic mission. Plutarch’s unique story that an insecure A. interfered with Philip’s plan to marry his son → Arrhi­ daios to the Karian satrap Pixodaros’ daughter (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3) has its flaws. Due to his intellectual disability, Arrhidaios posed no threat to A. (who did not eliminate him after his accession). Preparing his Persian war, Philip likely tried to ally with Pixodaros who controlled the important port of Halikarnassos. But it came to naught because the Great King intervened and sent his own man Orontobates to watch over → Karia (Strab. 14.2.17). When Philip was murdered before A.’s eyes in 336, A. was deprived of his primary source of legitimization. While his role is subject to ancient and modern speculation, the case against him cannot be proved. The weakness of his position militates against his involvement. A. owed his acclamation to the advocacy of Antipatros and → Parmenion. Next, unrest triggered by Philip’s death was neutralized. As a result of military threat and diplomacy, A. was elected archon of Thessaly and hegemon of the → Korinthian League (Diod. 17.4.1, 9; still without → Sparta). In 335, ethnic groups dwelling at the Danube and the Illyrians were subjugated (Arr. An. 1.1.4-6.11). Encouraged by rumors of A.’s death, → Thebes revolted but was quickly captured. By an official decision of a council of A.’s Greek allies, Thebes was razed, and the survivors enslaved. In 334, Philip’s Persian war, styled as a panhellenic campaign, inherited by A., was continued. During the first years, it was in fact organized by Parmenion and → Philotas. The army swiftly crossed the → Hellespont, comprising about 32.000 infantry (under Parmenion) and 5100 cavalry (Diod. 17.17.3-4; the Companion Cavalry under Philotas). In order to supply them, the empty Makedonian coffers needed to be filled with booty. The superior Persian fleet failed to intervene—it is debated if it was preoccupied with trouble in Egypt. Dareios III’s satraps and generals of → Asia Minor were sent to intercept the invaders but were defeated at the river → Granikos (334). The Makedonian victory cleared the path for the conquest of the rich satrapies of the Aegean coast. Claiming to “liberate the Greeks,” the Makedonian regime toppled oligarchies or tyrannies (e.g., at Eresos) and installed loyal democracies (Arr. An. 1.17.9-11, 18.2; Tod II no. 191)—a political move, no general statement in favour of demo­ cracy. The tax exemption for the Ionian cities (Arr. An. 1.18.2) was likely only temporary. In order to neutralize the Persian fleet dominating the eastern → Aegean, the Makedonians captured its naval bases. After the brutal seizure of Miletos, A.’s costly → fleet—a weak point of Makedonian warfare—was disbanded (Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. An. 1.20.1)—but soon reconstituted when the Persian fleet 64

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struck back. At Halikarnassos, → Memnon of Rhodos and Orontobates led a fierce defense. The Makedonian conquest of the city was only partial. A.’s alliance with Pixodaros’ aged sister Ada, sealed with his political adoption by her (Arr. An. 1.23.8), brought the Karian hinterland under Makedonian control but not Halikarnassos. Ada’s dynastic status was acknowledged, but she was not appointed Karia’s satrap: as usual, the military and financial governance was bestowed on Makedonians. In 334/3, Lykia and Pamphylia were taken. In early 333, Memnon started the Aegean counter-offensive but died in the summer. Pharnabazos and Autophradates took over and recaptured crucial bases. Entering Kilikia, A. fell seriously ill and needed time to recover (Arr. An. 2.4.7-9). Dareios left the northern Mesopotamian plains where he had gathered a large army, and tried to place himself astride A.’s lines of communication. In the coastal plain south of → Issos, A., now recovered, and his army defeated the Persians (333). Dareios escaped and summoned levies from the Upper Satrapies. Parmenion captured Dareios’ camp at Damaskos, and the royal treasures and families of the Persian elite fell into Makedonian hands. Courting the Persians, A. treated Dareios’ family honourably (Arr. An. 2.12.5; 4.19.6; Diod. 17.38.1-3)—but refused to ransom the valuable hostages. → Demosthenes and his faction had hoped for a Makedonian defeat but after Issos ceased to be in contact with the Persian court (Aischin. 3.164). Since the Persian fleet was still superior, A. and his generals secured the Levantine coast before pursuing Dareios. The Phoinikian cities surrendered except for → Tyre. Control over it was a necessity for cutting off the Persians from their Egyptian naval bases. On the march to → Egypt, A.’s army had to be supplied from the sea; an unconquered Tyre was an obstacle. After a siege of 7 months, Tyre fell (332), sealed by the defection of the Phoinikian and Kyprian fleet to A. (Curt. 4.2-4; Arr. An. 2.16-24). This was also the end of the Persian counteroffensive in the Aegean. Next, Gaza, the gateway to Egypt, was conquered. The story that Alexander visited Jerusalem (Jos. Ant. 11.317-320, 329-339) is surely fictitious. In 332/1, Egypt was taken without any bloodshed: the Persian governor Mazakes’ troops had not returned from Issos (Arr. An. 3.1.2-3). Just as the Persian kings had done before, A. played the role of traditional pharaoh as a means of appeasement (but perhaps not to the point of being crowned in Memphis). He accepted the pharaonic titles including “son of Amun”: a part of the protocol, no claim to divine descent/divinity and no rejection of Philip. Either before or after the trip to → Siwa—part of an expedition to gain control of Kyrenaika and the Libyan caravan routes—A. founded → Alexandreia. In 331, he returned to Meso­

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potamia and defeated Dareios at → Gaugamela but failed again to capture him. Heading east to reorganize resistance, Dareios abandoned his rich capitals: → Babylon, Sousa, → Persepolis, and Pasargadai fell into A.’s hands. While A. honoured → Kyros II at Pasargadai, and sat on the Achaimenid throne in Sousa (Plut. Alex. 37.4), he deliberately burnt the parts of the palace of Persepolis that were identifiable (by inscriptions) as Xerxes’ constructions (330). The carefully arranged conflagration likely marked the accomplishment of the “panhellenic” mission; shortly after, the allied troops were dismissed. Perhaps the burning also served to intimidate Dareios’ supporters. In Greece, Antipatros suppressed the revolt of Agis III of Sparta, a recipient of Persian subsidies. On his retreat, Dareios was murdered on the instigation of the Baktrian satrap → Bessos who continued resistance and declared himself king (Arr. An. 3.21, 25.3). In reaction, many staunch supporters of Dareios submitted to A. who pardoned them. The ideology of the war changed: by burying Dareios honourably, and chasing and executing Bessos as a regicide (329), A. posed as Dareios’ avenger and legitimate successor (Arr. An. 3.22.1, 30.1-5). From the start of the war, as a political necessity, the Makedonian regime had adopted the Achaimenid administrative system, respected the local customs and cults, and cooperated with the elites willing to surrender. When A. styled himself as Dareios’ successor, he intensified this policy of cooperation. Subsequently, he adopted elements of Achaimenid court protocol (such as → proskynesis) and representation (parts of the royal costume). He integrated Persians into court, administration, and army. However, this new regal style with its autocratic overtones contradicted the traditional ideal of the Argead ruler as → primus inter pares. Some of A.’s Makedonian and Greek elite regarded his policy as an offensive demotion and objected to the implied loss of their political influence. The → conspiracies of Dimnos (330) and Hermolaos (327) and the eliminations of → Kleitos (328) and → Kallisthenes (327) are generally believed to be associated with this disagreement about A.’s new definition of political hierarchies. A crucial marker of A.’s changed role was the elimination of Philotas and Parmenion (autumn 330). It cleared the way to the promotion of A.’s own confidants such as → Ptolemy or → Hephaistion. In 329-28, the fierce → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt continued, apparently fuelled by the rigid Makedonian policy of conquest. The murder of the focal leader Spitamenes by his own allies and A.’s political marriage to → Rhoxane, the daughter of a Baktrian rebel, paved the way to the establishment of Makedonian control (Arr. An. 4.19.4-5). But the area remained unruly. In spring 327, A. invaded → India (the 66

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regions east of the Indos) in order to conquer the Achaimenid Empire to its easternmost parts; Indian regional dynasts had responded to Dareios’ call for help against A. (Diod. 17.59.4; Arr. An. 3.8.3, 11.5-6). In 326, the three dynasts beyond the Indos were tied into alliances by the use of either diplomacy (Taxiles and Abisares surrendered) or weapons (Poros was defeated at the battle of → Hydaspes). A. confirmed their rule. The Hyphasis River marked the easternmost limits of the Persian Empire and the end of the campaign. A. set up altars for the 12 Olympian gods, an act mirroring his erection of altars (to Zeus, Athena and Herakles) at the start of his campaign in Europe and Asia Minor (Arr. An. 1.11.78; 5.29.1-2). On the return, the conquest of the Indos valley involved considerable bloodshed. In 325, A. nearly lost his life in the town of the → Malloi (Arr. An. 6.9.5-11.2) but faced the next hardship soon after his recovery. In order to supply and protect the → Indos fleet (with the spoils), A. had to march along the coastal line of the → Gedrosian desert (Arr. An. 6.21.3, 23.1); the bulk of the infantry and the invalids took the less rigorous route through Arachosia. Though precautions were taken, the desert took its toll, in particular because the neighbouring satraps ignored A.’s demands for provision, probably hoping that he would perish. However, it was likely not the army but the camp followers who suffered most and casualties were mainly due to attacks of the Oreitai (Diod. 17.105.8). Soon after A. had left India, Makedonian control faded away; informally connected with the → Achaimenids previously, these regions were difficult to rule directly. Since A.’s long absence had triggered unrest and malfeasance in Asia and Europe (Arr. An. 7.4.2-3; Plut. Alex. 68.2-3), after his return, he took measures to restore order (such as the → Exiles’ Decree). The claim that A. ordered his own deification and forced the Greeks to venerate him (Ail. VH 2.18) cannot be substantiated; it forms part of the hostile traditions depicting A. as a tyrant (e.g., Curt. 4.7.30; 6.6.2-3). At Sousa (324), in order to integrate himself and his elite into Persian family networks, A. took two Achaimenid brides (Stareira and Parysatis), gave his generals Persian wives, and registered the liaisons of his soldiers with Asian women (Arr. An. 7.4.4-8; Diod. 17.107.6). At → Opis, for the first time, A. was faced with a mutiny: after being dismissed, some 10.000 Makedonian → veterans protested, apparently against being exchanged, as the receivers of rich booty, with the newly integrated Persians (Arr. An. 7.8.1-3). A. executed the ringleaders and calmed the rest down with rich gifts. In 324/3, he led his last campaign against the Kossaians (in the area connecting Babylon and Sousa to Ekbatana) (Diod. 17.111.4-5). His plan of an Arabian campaign (Arr. An. 7.19.6-

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20.3) was prevented by his death in the summer of 323. A. died of illness in Babylon: he never spared himself; his exhausted, often injured body took its toll (Plut. Alex. 66). He left no designated heir; his son → Alexander IV was yet unborn. His swiftly conquered, insufficiently consolidated empire was susceptible to unrest.   S. Müller Cf. Anson 2013; Bosworth 1988; Bowden, H., Alexander the Great, 2014; Heckel 2008; Wirth 1993.

Alexander III, medieval reception The ultimate source of Alexander’s medieval reception in the East and West was the 3rd-c. AD Greek Alexander Romance by → Pseudo-Kallisthenes in its different recensions. In the West, the Latin translations of Julius Valerius (4th c. AD) and Leo of Naples (10th c. AD) were known. As the Greek A. Romance was mostly fictitious, the medieval images of A. have little to do with the historical A. He emerged as a conqueror and explorer checking out limits in search of marvels in an imaginary alter orbis at the periphery of civilization where a hero could be brave. Major themes were A.’s fights against fearsome, fantastic creatures, discovery of enormous treasures, and encounters of sages, or beautiful, sometimes warlike women. In the West, the most popular tales were A.’s attempts to explore the edges of heaven in a chariot, borne by huge white birds (Ps.-Kall. 2.41.8-13) later interpreted as gryphons, and his undersea expedition in a diving bell (Ps.Kall. 2.38.7). These corresponding episodes—both times a higher force stopped A.—became prominent examples of superbia. Images of A.’s celestial journey also appeared in western sacral art. A.’s reception both in the East and the West was ambiguous: he was glorified as an iconic prototype of a commander, conqueror, warrior, king, kosmokrator, or civilizer, or criticized as a megalomaniacal, cruel, arrogant, and immoderate tyrant. For example, in his Shahnameh (late 10th/ early 11th c.), Ferdowsi depicted A. as a legitimate member of the Achaimenids and destroyer of their empire and the Zoroastrian scriptures. Theories that A.’s negative or positive depiction in the West depends on either the place or time of the texts’ composition or the author’s approach (theological or courtly) are too schematic and cannot be verified. Often, the romances show both negative and positive aspects. In the West, another source was Curtius. Gautier of Châtillon’s 68

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12thc. Latin epic Alexandreis, dedicated to the archbishop of Reims, is based on Curtius. Gautier’s attitude to Curtius’ bias is debated. Recently, the Alexandreis has been interpreted as neither a glorification nor a criticism of Alexander but an example of medieval literary reception of ancient texts. Gautier echoed Curtius’ reproaches of A.’s superbia, luxuria, loss of morals (especially in Babylon: 5.1-36), and greed for power (10.171-199) while, writing in the age of the crusades, he styled A. as a divinely chosen crusader king defeating the East. Gautier suppressed Curtius’ slanders about A.’s affairs with other males and depicted his court as a heterosexual knightly sphere. Glossators commented on his omissions: in a codex from Vienna (13th c.), he is accused of covering up A.’s practice of the vicium sodomiticum. In the East and West, the pagan A. was integrated into the religious world. In the West, the apocryphal stories about A.’s conversion to God on his way to Jerusalem and the enclosure of the 22 unclean peoples at the Kaspian Gate (in the ε- and γ-recension of the A. Romance) were the main vehicles for his insertion into the Christian salvation history as a divine tool. The major source of A.’s visit to Jerusalem and its temple where he discovered his own fate in the Book of Daniel (written ca. 200 years later) was Josephus in Latin translation (AJ 11.329-337; cf. Ps.-Kall. 2.24). Medieval Christian writers such as Rudolf of Ems (13th c.) saw the story as proof that A. acted in the name of God (Alexander 9737-9802). As for A.’s wall, the unclean peoples came to be perceived as the apocalyptic monsters Gog and Magog, successively identified with diverse peoples seen as dangerous outsiders of the societas christiana. Showing A. as a key figure in salvation history, the wall and other locations of his wars appeared on the Ebstorf Map (ca. 1300), a mappa mundi centred on Jerusalem. A.’s wall was also mentioned by the Persian poet Nizami. In his Iskandarnameh (12th c.), he depicted Iskandar (the Persian name for A.) as a superior warrior king developing into a sage. In medieval texts, A.’s generals and friends play no significant role. In his Alexanderroman (ca. 1440), at least, Johann Hartlieb integrates Ptolemy into the German landscape by letting him establish his dynasty in Saxonia. In medieval A. romances, prominence is given to A.’s parents. Triggered by Pseudo-Kallisthenes’ claim that A. was the illegitimate son of the Egyptian sorcerer-king Nektanebos II who sired him in the disguise of → Ammon (1.4-7), the question of A.’s father was central. As paternity was at the core of genealogical legitimization, the allegation that A. was not Philip’s biological son was a crucial matter. In the East, according to the so-called Persian variant, A. was Dareios III’s half-brother, thus his legitimate successor. For example, this is stated in Tarsusi’s Darabnamah (12th c.), whereas

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Nizami affirmed Philip’s paternity. In the West, the majority of the French A. Romances of the 12th c. as well as Pfaffe Lamprecht’s German Song of Alexan­ der (12th c.) strongly advocated Philip’s paternity. Alternatively, Rudolf of Ems depicted A. as a role model for European princes without denying his descent from Nektanebos. The French author Aimon de Varennes (12th c.) even reinvented A.’s genealogy introducing Florimont, an adventurous conqueror, as A.’s paternal grandfather. Also → Aristotle, one of the major authorities of medieval intellectuals, was prominent as a father figure and wise adviser. New traditions about him and A. were created. Famously, in the Secreta secretorum (originally in Arabic, translated into Latin in the 12th c.), he advises A. to keep away from a gift by the Indian queen: the poisonous girl whose kiss is lethal. A.’s first wife, the Baktrian → Rhoxane, however, due to erroneous information on her descent in Ps.-Kall. 2.20.4-9 incorrectly called Dareios III’s daughter, was also prominent. While in eastern romances, A. was permitted polygamy and love affairs, in the West, according to Christian moral codes, he practiced monogamy. Often, he appeared as a knightly cavalier and gallant invader, a symbol for magnanimity and clemency, particularly in courtly texts with Minne (romantic courtly love) as an integral aspect. Hartlieb is unique in charging Rhoxane with adultery during A.’s absence, blaming her for A.’s failure in ensuring a safe succession: the Makedonians were unable to distinguish the illegitimate from the legitimate children she had born. Ulrich of Etzenbach stated that Rhoxane tried to avenge Dareios’ death by letting go the chain of A.’s diving bell during his undersea expedition (24258-24269). A.’s horse → Boukephalos was also prominent in medieval texts. A.’s taming of the man-eating beast (Ps.-Kall. 1.17.1-4) and Boukephalos’ love for his master were popular themes. The ambiguous medieval reception of A. produced various artificial images, formed by the authors’ respective backgrounds. A. became a symbol of heroic virtues (courage, clemency, generosity, magnanimity, courtesy) or vices (pride, arrogance, greed for power, immoderation), a role model for political actors and gallants, a religious figure, and an example of the justification and explanation of the present by reinventing the past.   S. Müller Cf. Harf-Lancner, L. et al. (ed.), Alexandre le Grand dans les littératures occidentales et proche-orientales, 1999; Nawotka, K., Syriac and Persian Versions of the Alexander Romance, in: Moore 2018, 525-42; Southgate, M.S., Portrait of Alexander in Persian Alexander-­Romances of the Islamic Era, JAOS 97 (1977), 278-84; Stoneman 2008; Zuwiyya, Z.D. (ed.) A Companion to Alexander Literature in the Middle Ages, 2011.

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Alexander IV Alexander IV, the son of → Alexander III and his Baktrian wife → Rhoxane, was born some months after his father’s death in 323. Even before his birth, A. became a political plaything in the quarrels about the succession at Baby­ lon (Curt. 10.6.9-22). Reportedly, some Makedonian circles objected to the prospect of a half-Baktrian ruler (Curt. 10.6.13-14). Finally, consensus was reached that Alexander III’s half-brother → Arrhidaios (acclaimed under the throne name Philip) was recognized as ruler and the baby (if male) as his co-regent (Arr. Succ. F 1.1; Curt. 10.10.1; Just. 13.4.3; Heidel. Epit., FGrH 155 F 1.1). This shared rule, an exception in Argead Makedonia, was only formal: A. and Arrhidaios who had an intellectual disability were the puppets of the influential generals who acted as their guardians and pursued their own political aims. First, → Perdikkas took charge of Rhoxane and had Alexander’s two other widows with their much higher Achaimenid status eliminated (Plut. Alex. 77.4, apparently mistaking Drypetis for Parysatis). It is unknown if one of them was also pregnant. In any case, Perdikkas neutralized the threat for Rhoxane and A. In 321/0, after his death, the new guardian → Antipatros took them to Makedonia. After Antipatros’ death (319), on the instigation of A.’s next guardian → Polyperchon, A.’s grandmother → Olympias returned to Makedonia to support A.’s faction (Diod. 19.35.5; Just. 14.5.1-3). Perhaps at this time, in order to increase A.’s and Rhoxane’s prestige, dedications to Athena Polias were made in Rhoxane’s name (IG II² 1492a 45-57). When Olympias’ faction lost the war against → Kassandros in 316, he had her eliminated and Rhoxane and A. captured. For the rest of their lives, they were kept under guard in → Amphipolis. In 310, teenage A. was murdered together with his mother by Kassandros’ henchman Glaukias (Diod. 19.105.2; Just. 15.2.5).    S. Müller Cf. Carney 2006, 60-87; Heckel 2006, 18-9; Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 125-33.

Alexander Romance, Greek   see Pseudo-Kallisthenes

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Alexandreia Alexandreia by → Egypt was the first of many cities founded by → Alexander III, though the total number given in the ancient sources varies widely. Probably it was founded (officially on 7 April 331) on the return journey from the → oracle at → Siwa (Diod. 17.52.1-6; Curt. 4.8.1-2, 5-6; Just. 11.11.3); it is likely that Alexan­ der had visited the oracle in part to obtain sanction for the foundation, and this is made explicit in the Alexander Romance (1.30). However, Arrian (An. 3.1-2) says that it was founded directly after Alexander’s arrival in Memphis and before the visit to Siwa. The city was laid out by Deinokrates of Rhodos in the shape of a Makedonian military cloak (chlamys), on an axial grid system. The most detailed account of the topography is that of Strabon (17.1.6-10). The Romance (1.31-33) also gives a wealth of detail about the layout of the city, which appears to be based on local knowledge. It was said that Alexander marked out the line of the city walls with barley meal; when birds flew down and ate the meal, it was interpreted as an omen that the city would feed many people (Arr. An. 3.2.1-2). Most of the city lies underneath the modern city of Alexandria, which still preserves the grid plan of the streets, but the “royal quarter” is now submerged beneath the harbour and has only been explored in recent years. After Alexander’s death, → Ptolemy hijacked the cavalcade bringing the king’s body to Makedonia and brought it instead to Memphis. Later the body was relocated—either by Ptolemy I or by Ptolemy II—to A., where it was placed in the enclosure known as the Soma in the royal quarter. Ptolemy I made A. the seat of his kingdom, though the city was always “by Egypt”, not “in” it. The cult of Sarapis was instituted by Ptolemy I as a god for both Greeks and Egyptians (though the Romance 1.33 presents the god as already established before Alexander’s arrival), and royal ideology effectively blended Greek and Egyptian elements, as well as emphasizing the Ptolemies’ Argead ancestry. There was also a quarter designated for the Jewish inhabitants. Ptolemy IV moved Alexander’s body to a new location known as the Sema, also in the royal quarter (Strab. 17.1.8), so that the Soma became a cenotaph. There were several shrines of Alexander in A., since a certain Jason wrote a book On the sanctuaries of Alexander in A. The first high priest of Alexander is attested in 295-90. Alexander’s body became an object of pilgrimage or tourism for several centuries and could still be visited in AD 390 (Lib. Or. 14.11-12). Many locations for the tomb have been proposed in the modern city, but if it was in the royal quarter, it must now be under the sea. A. became one of the most important cities 72

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of the ancient world, and retained its importance into modern times. It is thus one of the most enduring pieces of Alexander’s legacy.   R. Stoneman Cf. Empereur, J.-Y., Alexandria Rediscovered, 1998; Fraser, P.M., Ptolemaic Alexandria, I-III, 1972; Fraser 1996; Goddio, F./Clauss, M., Egypt’s Sunken Treasures, 2006; Saunders, N.J., Alexander’s Tomb, 2006.

Amazons The amazons were fictitious Greek counter-figures regarding gender roles: a mythical ethnic of female warriors associated with the → Skythians (Hdt. 4.110117) and located around the river Thermodon in north-eastern → Asia Minor (Just. 2.4.1-11). → Alexander III’s ancestors Herakles and → Achilles were known to have met a. Several → Alexander historiographers claimed that in Hyrkania, in 330, also Alexander encountered a. According to the major tradition, the a.’s queen Thalestris (or Minythyia: Just. 2.4.32; 12.3.5), accompanied by 300 of her women, came to Alexander to conceive a child by him (Curt. 6.5.2432; Diod. 17.77.1-3; Strab. 11.5.4; Plut. Alex. 46.1-2; Just. 12.3.5-7; 42.3.7). He granted her 13 nights (without any result: Just. 2.4.33). For the Roman authors, this was another marker of Alexander’s depravation: in war time, he wasted time to please a female ‘barbarian’ and undermined his army’s discipline. In the Greek Alexander Romance, a chaste Alexander subjected the a. by exchanging letters (Ps.-Kall. 3.25.1-28.1). Already in antiquity, the tale’s authenticity was doubted. In a way characteristic of a → Second Sophistic writer, Arrian (An. 7.13.3-6) argues that in Alexander’s time, the a. had ceased to exist since Xenophon did not mention them. Arrian also accounts that the Median satrap Atropates tried to send a bunch of 100 fake a. to Alexander. The hypothesis that the a. formed part of Alexander’s own propaganda is weakened by the fact that → Ptolemy and → Aristoboulos who usually follow the official version did not tell the tale. It was likely a posthumous fiction.   S. Müller Cf. Baynham, E., Alexander and the Amazons, CQ 51 (2001), 115-26; Bosworth 1995, 102-3; Hardwick, L., Ancient Amazons—Heroes, Outsiders or Women, G&R 37 (1990), 14-36; Roisman, J., Alexander and the Amazonian Queen, in: Ruffell, I./Hau, L.J. (eds.), Truth and History in the Ancient World, 2017, 250-66.

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Ammon, Zeus-Ammon Ammon is the Greek name of Amun-Re, the god syncretistically equated with Zeus by Greeks and Makedonians. In 331, during the Egyptian campaign under → Alexander III, the Makedonians came into contact with the cult of A. in the temple of Aghurmi at the → Siwa Oasis in the Libyan Desert, probably installed there by Amun’s main priesthood at Egyptian Thebes. Siwa was a strategically important way station in the desert’s caravan trading network connecting the rich Kyrenaika at the coast with → Egypt and Nubia. In order to controll this economic space, the Makedonians had to march to Siwa. The visit of Alexander and parts of his entourage to the → oracle of A. was not the main purpose of the trip, forming part of the diplomatic exchange after the submission of Siwa’s autonomous local rulers who were also A.’s high priests. As a result of Siwa’s connection to the Greek apoikia Kyrene (founded by Thera in the 7th c.), A.’s cult was already known in the Greek world (Hdt. 2.32.1). In Kyrene, from the late 6th c. onward, a portrait of A., the head of an anthropomorphic deity with ram’s horns, appeared on coins and in the 5th c., a temple of A. was built. A. was mentioned by Pindar (4.28; cf. Paus. 9.16.1) and → Herodotos (1.46.3), his ora­ cle reportedly consulted by Kimon, Alkibiades, and Lysandros (Paus. 8.11.11; Plut. Nik. 13.1; Diod. 14.13.5-8). In Chalkidian Aphytis, a youthful A. appears on coins in the 5th c., perhaps due to trade with Kyrene, and a temple of A. (first construction phase dated in the 4th c.) was excavated. It is debated whether it was built by Alexander and whether the Chalkidian → Kallisthenes thought of this familiar A. when writing about Siwa. Kallisthenes appears to have triggered (surely unintentionally) the misinterpretation of the Siwa episode as Alexander’s ultimate hybris in claiming divine parentage or even divinity. Kallisthenes tried to glorify and dramatize a campaign that lacked battles and served economic policies that did not interest him. Thus, he focused on the trip to Siwa, gave it a Hellenic colour, claimed that Alexander imitated Herakles and Perseus (Arr. An. 3.3.2), styled him as a counter-image of Herodotos’ Kambyses II (3.17.1, 25.3, 26), and mentioned divine help on the allegedly dangerous desert trip (being silent on the frequented caravan routes). As Alexander kept secret what he was told by the oracle (Arr. An. 3.4.5), Kallisthenes furthered his narrative agenda by transforming the high priest’s greeting into the oracle’s response. Acknowledging Alexander as Siwa’s new superior, he had greeted him formally as “son of Amun,” one of the pharaoh’s 5 traditional titles. Conforming with his normal 74

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practice, Kallisthenes styled Alexander as an epic hero, traditionally provided with a close relationship to the gods and divine relatives. Surely, neither he nor Alexander (who must have overseen the publication) intended to claim that this conventional literary image was proof of Alexander’s divinity. The Siwa incident had nothing to do with any search for divine roots, deification, or rejection of Philip’s paternity. There is no sign that Alexander posed as “son of A.” afterwards. This image only became prominent after his death, particularly in hostile traditions, used as a marker of his hybris. The image of Alexander with a ram’s horn peeping out from under the elephant scalp appears after his death on the obverse of → Ptolemy’s early tetradrachms pointing to the importance of his satrapy and Alexander as his token of legitimacy. It was adapted by → Lysimachos when he married a daughter of Ptolemy.   S. Müller Cf. Bosch-Puche, F., The Egyptian Royal Titulary of Alexander the Great I, JEA 99 (2013), 131-54; Caneva, S., D’Hérodote à Alexandre, in: Bonnet, C. et al. (eds.), Les representations des dieux et autres, 2011, 193-219; Müller 2019, 222-6; O’Sullivan, L., Callisthenes and Alexander the Invincible God, in: Wheatley, P./Baynham, E. (eds.), East and West in the World Empire of Alexander, 2015, 35-52; Pownall 2014, 59, 67-8.

Amphipolis A “city (with something) on both sides,” Amphipolis with the Strymon to its north and west was situated on a SW foothill of Mt. → Pangaion (Thuc. 4.102.3). Its plateau was separated from the massif in the east by a saddle that secured a connection between the Strymon Estuary (with Eïon) in the south and the Strymon Plain in the NW (→ Bisaltia). Beneath the city hill, Bisaltia plain was marshy (Thuc. 5.7.4) “over a large space (ἐπὶ πολύ) up to a vast lake of the Strymon” (Thuc. 4.108.1). Lake Kerkinitis at the northern end of Bisaltia is too far off, even for → Thucydides’ wording; more probable is → Herodotos’ Lake Prasias (5.15-17), though there is some dispute on this point (see Barrington Atlas, maps 50 and 51). In the west, the city hill is intersected by a deep valley with the river’s outlet to the sea; on the hillside beyond was located Kerdylion, a small settlement belonging to Argilos (Thuc. 5.6.3; 8.1). The river was navigable for triremes (Thuc. 4.108.1), from its mouth near Eïon, a fortified emporion (trading post) and the seat of a Persian hyparchos until 476, some way upstream

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to the bridge that led to one of the city’s gates in the valley; near to it, Brasidas had built triremes “on the Strymon” (Thuc. 4.108.6) soon after 424, probably profitting from Athenian dockyards and personnel experienced in shipbuilding, an indiction of a major Athenian naval installation at A.—without it, Brasidas could not have even thought of producing war ships there. The regional population was heterogeneous. Whereas on the shore of the Strymonic Gulf Greek cities were the rule—in the SW belonging to the Chalkidike (Argilos, Stageira, Akanthos etc.), in the east to the Thasian mainland zone (Galepsos, Apollonia, Oisyme etc.)—inside Bisaltia the population was for the most part Thracian, including groups such as the Edones, the Odomantoi, and the Satrai (Hdt. 7.112). Both the ethnic and geo-political situation had some impact on the city’s history. It started in 476 when Kimon conquered the city’s hill, some 4.5 km off the sea, from the Thracian Edones who were still loyal to the Persians (Plut. Kim. 7.2), but not from → Alexander I, as suggested by Speusippos (Phil. 7 Natoli) and [Dem.] (12.21, 23). The first Athenian initiative to found the city failed in 465/4 when a Thracian coalition defeated 10.000 Athenian troops advancing to Drabeskos (Thuc. 1.100.3), a site probably located on the route that ran from the plateau of future A. ca. 7 km northwards to a junction with the route from Siris/ Serres to the Nestos Valley. Evidently the A.-project had aimed also at the control of this most important west-east corridor into → Thrace. The site of the Athenian defeat was not far from a settlement that is generally regarded as the predecessor of A. and must be sought in its neighbourhood: Ennea Hodoi (“Nine Ways”). The telling toponym indicates an intersection of routes. The site had great significance for traffic since it controlled both the coastal route—the large estuary of the Strymon had to be by-passed northwards—and the communications from inland. A. was founded by the Athenian Hagnon in 437/6. Its plateau on the hill was so vast that the number of settlers → Athens could muster did not suffice, so non-Athenians were invited, both from Greek cities and Thracians in the neighbourhood (Thuc. 4.106.1), with consequences for the city’s loyalty towards her metropolis. Argead Makedonia was considerably affected by A.’s foundation. Since the Athenians dominated the Makedonian and Chalkidian coast, by adding A. as another stronghold they now virtually surrounded the Argead realm. Even worse, A. was located uncomfortably close to → Perdikkas II’s own estates in Mygdonia at Lake Bolbe. In addition, A. provided Athens with an access to Thracian timber for ship-building and control of its flotation down the Strymon (Thuc. 4.108.1). Athens was the main customer of Makedonian → 76

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timber controlled by the Argead ruler. Thus, her control of another timber-producing area must have affected the Argead timber trade, although it is uncertain to what extent. While no reaction of Perdikkas II is reported, according to general belief, due to its geopolitical and economic consequences, at the Argead court the establishment of A. was not received well and caused a diplomatic ice age in the—probably already tense—relations to Athens. Perhaps, the end of the alliance between her and Perdikkas and the start of open hostilities in 433 (Thuc. 1.57.3) marked the climax of the deterioration that began with A.’s foundation. In the following years, Perdikkas tried to create a stable network of alliances to counter Athenian expansion and keep Athens at bay. In winter 424/3, the Spartan commander Brasidas convinced the majority of the inhabitants to defect, allowing the Athenians within the walls to withdraw with their families and their property, if they chose—but to stay would not have been a good idea (Thuc. 4.105.2-106). At this time allied with → Sparta, Perdikkas assisted Brasidas. On their march to A., he hosted him and his soldiers in his land at Lake Bolbe (Thuc. 4.103.1). Thucydides mentions that followers of Perdikkas were among those Amphipolitans willing to defect (4.104.3). After the coup, Perdikkas helped Brasidas to secure A.’s territory (Thuc. 4.107.3). To judge from its ethnic structure and the exodos of Athenian inhabitants, A. ceased to be an Athenian city, as was officially expressed by removing Hagnon’s heroon and erecting a grave monument at the market place for Brasidas instead; he had died in 422 while fighting against the Athenians under Kleon who had attempted to retake the city by force (Thuc. 5.6-11). But Brasidas was not regarded as a new founder, as illustrated by civic obols from the early 4th c. which—following a regional pattern—display the local founder hero as a youth. His identity is indicated on the reverse, by a fish—standing for water—and the letters Α-Μ-Φ-Ι around it (Lorber 1990, pl. 31.67-78, cf. pl. 15.73-75): a personification of the River Strymon styled as a foundation hero. This is intelligible when one considers the city’s name (see above): it owed its existence to the river. When A. repeatedly refused to return to Athenian rule (Thuc. 5.21.2) this resulted in the actual loss of the city. But for Athens A. remained a first rate priority, so in the Peace of → Nikias (421) it was stipulated, opening the list of Athenian demands, that the city had to be returned (Thuc. 5.18.5). But Sparta was not efficient (or prefered not to be) “to control the city and to deliver it up” (Thuc. 5.35.5). With A. Athens lost control of the most important land route to her allies in Thrace as far as the → Hellespont. It was open now to the Peloponnesians, but Brasidas failed to get support from

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Sparta, for political considerations. Also the Athenians, after the hard blow in 422 (600 casualities) had other priorities during the following years. After all, A.’s significance persisted, as did Athenian claims to her refractory apoikia (cf. Thuc. 5.11): the city was associated with an increasingly unreal notion of past imperial glory. Ironically, the last act known of Perdikkas II’s reign is his support for Athens’ (unsuccessful) attempt to regain A. (Thuc. 7.9.1). A. continued to play an important role in Argead-Athenian relations. Depending on their own political strength and temporary alternatives to an alliance to Athens, Argead rulers either assisted or blocked her in her fruitless efforts to subjugate A. The rise to power of the → Chalkidians, in particular → Olynthos, involved them as another factor in the ongoing struggle about A.’s status and as a rival to Athens’ claims. From an Argead perspective, an autonomous A. was preferable to an A. under Athenian or Chalkidian influence. However, according to → Aischines, at a symmachia of Sparta and the other Greeks (dated in the 370s), → Amyntas III voted through his delegate to help Athens to regain A. as her possession (2.32-33). This unique information, reportedly based on public records, is much debated. It is uncertain if this was a special clause of a common peace agreement, an arbitrary Athenian interpretation, or just wishful thinking. In 368/7, Iphikrates, the Athenian strategos before A., aided Amyntas III’s widow Eurydike to save the throne for her minor sons by expelling the pretender Pausanias from Makedonia (Aischin. 2.25-29). Since this help was surely also in the interests of the regent → Ptolemy of Aloros, Athens seems to have expected his support in the matter of A. But Ptolemy “continually worked against Athens in the interests of A.” (Aischin. 2.29) and even allied himself with the Thebans (during their short-lived supremacy when they put Makedonia under considerable pressure). Initially continuing the policy to keep Athens at bay, → Perdikkas III (who took the rule in 365) fought against her, for A., until a defeat forced him to make a truce with Athens (Aischin. 2.29-30). The evidence on his involvement in Athens’ struggles to regain A. is scanty and inconsistent. According to the picture that emerges, comparable with Perdikkas II, he allied himself with Athens only when no other option was at hand but basically tried to fight the return of Athenian influence in the north. Since Diodoros states that in 359 Perdikkas’ brother and successor → Philip II withdrew from A. and made it autonomous (16.3.3-4; cf. Polyain. 4.2.17), it is generally believed that previously Perdikkas III had installed a Makedonian garrison in the city. It is debated when this did happen and whether it took the form of a garrison, but there must 78

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have been some Makedonian control of A. since in 359. Argaios, one of the → pretenders challenging Philip’s rule, received the Athenians’ support in return for his promise to restore A. to them (Diod. 16.3.3). Faced with the threat by Argaios, Philip recalled the Makedonian soldiers from A. and declared its autonomy. This does not imply that he recognized Athens’ claims to it. But the Athenians may have interpreted it in this way, and as a clever politician, he will have done nothing to correct them. As a result, they dropped Argaios and concluded a treaty with Philip. However, when Athens failed to secure A., the fight for it was on again. In fear of a Makedonian attack, two citizens of A., Stratokles and Hierax, came to ask the Athenians for help (Dem. 1.8, 12-13; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 42). It is unknown whether this was an official embassy or a factional initiative. In any case, Athens did not react. In summer 357, Philip captured A. (Polyain. 4.2.17), exiled his critics but treated the rest mildly (Diod. 16.8.2). The banishment of hostile politicians is confirmed by an inscription, the decree enacted by the Amphipolitans condemning Philokles and Stratokles and their children to exile while their property was confiscated (Hatzopoulos 1996, II, no. 40). The decree also attests that the assembly of A. was still allowed to function. Much later, in 349, rallying the Athenian demos against Philip, → Demosthenes (2.6) claimed that Philip, as usual depicted as a liar and crook, had deceived the Athenians in the matter of A. when in a secret treaty, he had promised to give it to them in exchange for → Pydna but then had seized both. This alleged secret pact contradicts Athenian democratic practice of concluding a treaty. It is certainly a rhetorical device in accordance with the usual exaggeration and diabole. Athens declared war over A. against Philip (Aischin. 2.21, 70; 3.54) but failed to intervene. Negotiating the → Peace of Philokrates that ended the war in 346, the Athenian envoys, among them Aischines and Demosthenes, tried to secure Athens’ claim to A. (Aischin. 2.21, 27-33) but it was a lost cause. Athens had to recognize Philip’s possession of A. (Dem. 5.25; [Dem.] 7.23-26). In about 343, when Philip offered the Athenians to amend the peace unpopular with them, Demosthenes and Hegesippos rebuffed him by unrealistic demands for A.’s restoration ([Dem.] 7.24-29). At the same time, in his Letter to Philip, Speusippos praised the historiographer Antipatros of Magnesia who could prove the rightful nature of Philip’s claim to A. as he had inherited it from his ancestors Hera­ kles and Alexander I. For allegedly, according to a Makedonian logos, Alexander conquered the parts of Edonian territory where A. was founded later on (Speus. Phil. 5-8; cf. [Dem.] 11.16; 12.21. 23). Amphipolitan deeds of sale (Hat­zopoulos

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1996, II, no. 84-91) indicate that in the 350s A. adopted the Makedonian → calendar and the most important local magistrate, the epistates. The onomastic material shows that additional Makedonians were settled in A. Philip established there his major mint. When he did so and under which circumstances is disputed. The much later tradition that there existed a cult for Philip in A. before 357 (Ael. Arist. 9.14) is open to doubt. → Kassandros kept → Rho­xane and → Alexander IV under arrest in A. and had them killed there in 310 (Diod. 19.105.2; Just. 15.2.5).    J. Heinrichs/S. Müller Cf. Lorber, C.C., Amphipolis. The Civic Coinage in Silver and in Gold, 1990, 57-61; Jehne, M., Die Anerkennung der athenischen Besitzansprüche auf Amphipolis…, Historia 41 (1992), 272-82; Mari, M., Amphipolis between Athens and Sparta, MediterrAnt 15 (2012), 327-53; Mari, M., Macedonian Cities under the Kings, in: Kalaitzi, M. et al. (eds.), Βορειοελλαδικά, 2018, 179-97; Müller, S., Historische Rückprojektionen: Amphipolis, Athen, Philipp II. und seine progonoi, Anabasis 7 (2017), 19-41.

Amyntas I Amyntas I is the first Argead ruler we can recognize as a historical person. Information on him is scanty though. No epigraphic evidence and no numismatic material exist (since the beginning of Argead → coinage is dated to A.’s son → Alexander I). → Herodotos is the main source. Trogus-Justin follows him and adds comments on A.’s character favourably calling him distinguished (clarus) for his own virtus and his particularly gifted son Alexander I (7.2.13-14). This points at a crucial issue regarding A.’s treatment: most of the information on A. is less concerned with him but with Alexander I who may have initiated these traditions. Trogus’ flattering depiction of A. may also be a literary device. Since for him the degree of a ruler’s moderatio was central, he perhaps wanted to contrast the “good beginnings” with the (alleged) loss of morals of the Argead rulers of the dynasty’s last decades, → Philip II and → Alexander III, portrayed by Trogus as a vicious tyrant and his even worse son. According to Herodotos’ ruler list (8.139), A. succeeded his father Alketas who is hardly more than a name to us except for Aristos of Salamis’ stereotypical, untrustworthy comment that he was a heavy drinker (BNJ 143 F 3). Diodoros’ list has Alketas rule for 18 years and A. for 49 years (7 F 15.2) but the credibility of these numbers is unclear. The start 80

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of A.’s reign is usually dated to the 2nd half of the 6th c. A. makes his appearance in history and historiography in the context of Persian politics. In 513, Dareios I and his army crossed the Bosporos trying (with little success) to subject the so-called European → Skythians north of the Danube. In 512/1, the Persians subdued Thracian peoples, and expelled the Paionians from the Strymon region (Hdt. 5.1-2). Argead Makedonia was the next in the Persian path. The sources do not mention any military force against the Argead realm. Obviously, the Persian moves were only diplomatic. About 510, Dareios’ general Megabazos sent envoys to demand a formal surrender of the Argead ruler. Herodotos reports that they asked for earth and water and A. obeyed (5.18.1-2; cf. Just. 7.3.1-3). Thus, he had accepted the Persian dominion over his realm. Given Persian control over the neighbouring Thracian regions, A. hardly had any other choice. However, since establishing ties to the foremost power on the political stage had its advantages for a local dynast and → primus inter pares such as A., it is often assumed that he was eager to establish these friendly relations. The colourful story that at the banquet following A.’s submission, the Persian envoys behaved like brutal conquerors and were eliminated on the instigation of A.’s son Alexander (Hdt. 5.18-21; Just. 7.3.2-9) is likely Makedonian post-war propaganda (after 479/8) deserving no credence. A.’s acceptance of the Persian dominion was a watershed in Argead history. Apart from a short interruption (499-92), Argead Makedonia was under Persian dominion for about roughly three decades that certainly had an impact. The Argeads profited from being connected with the most powerful monarch in the Aegean world. This link distinguished them from the other influential Makedonian families and increased their status inside and outside of Makedonia. They could also learn from the → Achaimenids about dynastic representation and court politics. A.’s daughter Gygaia married Megabazos’ son (Hdt. 7.22.2) Boubares (Hdt. 5.21.2; 8.36.1; Just. 7.3.9). The date is debated since Herodotos places it in the aftermath of A.’s submission while stating that Alexan­der gave his sister to Boubares. Since this would have been the task of A. as her father, it implies that the marriage occurred after A.’s death in Alexander’s early reign. It is puzzling that a high-ranking Persian such as Boubares married into the family of a peripheral, local dynast of little importance. Perhaps a date during the rule of Alexander who was much more influential than A. is more plausible. According to Herodotos, a son resulting from this marriage was called Amyntas, after his grandfather—probably not the first-born who must have born a Persian name—, and later entrusted with the government of Alaban-

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da/Alabastra by Xerxes (8.136.1). A. was one Persian hyparchos along with others at Eïon, Doriskos, and Sestos; so he was an integral part of the Achaimenid administrative system. While Herodotos calls A. Μακεδόνων ὕπαρχος, hyparchos of the Makedonians (5.20.4), this term is not used exclusively for a → satrap but for any dependent governor and local dynast. A. was not a satrap but a dependent local dynast who had accepted the Great King as his overlord, had to pay him tribute (Hdt. 7.108.2) and send troops, if necessary. The Persian dominion over Makedonia, located at the Achaimenid Empire’s periphery, is mostly regarded as light. There is no evidence for any Persian interference in Makedonia’s political structure, administration, or trade. The short-lived secession from Achaimenid control during the Ionian revolt was probably triggered by the secession of neighbouring → Thrace that may have put Makedonia under pressure. Since the date of A.’s death is unknown, it is uncertain whether this secession occurred under him or Alexander I. Dareios’ general Mardonios restored Persian authority in Thrace and Makedonia in 492 (Hdt. 7.108.1). Only one other political act is attested for A.: sometime after Hippias, the Peisistratid tyrant of → Athens, had been expelled (510), A. offered Anthemous to him (Hdt. 5.94.1: Ἱππίῃ δὲ ἐνθεῦτεν ἀπελαυνομένῳ ἐδίδου μὲν Ἀμύντης ὁ Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς Ἀνθεμοῦντα). The precise meaning of this offer is a matter of debate. On the one hand, it is thought that A. did not control Anthemous and invited Hippias to a shared conquest. On the other hand, the offer is seen as a proof that A. controlled Anthemous and granted him a → dorea (gift) or (permanent or temporary) shelter. The latter may be more plausible. However, Hippias rejected the offer and went via Sigeion and Lampsakos to the court of Dareios I (Hdt. 5.94.1; Thuc. 6.59.4). Since by this offer A. took a stand for the expelled Hippias, it is sometimes thought that there existed friendly relations between the Argeads and the → Peisistratids (such as a xenia) previously. However, there is no such evidence. While Hippias’ father Peisistratos had operated in the Thracian area (→ Thermaic Gulf and → Pangaion) before his 3rd return to → Athens in 546 (Ath. Pol. 15.2; Hdt. 1.64.1; Steph. Byz. s.v. Rhakelos Billerbeck/Neumann-H.), there is no hint at any links to the Argeads. Hence, A.’s offer to Hippias is perhaps better interpreted as a sign of loyalty to the Persian king. A. and Hippias had their relations to Persia in common. Dareios granted Hippias refuge (and reportedly support for his wish to be re-installed in Athens: Hdt. 5.96; 6.102, 107.2-3, 121; Thuc. 6.59.4). Hippias’ Persian ties may have been the reason for A.’s offer. The exact date of 82

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his death, that seems to have been natural, is uncertain. Trogus-Justin’s comment that A. died soon after Boubares departed from Makedonia (7.4.1) raises more questions than answers. The acclamation of A.’s successor Alexander I is dated variously to 500, 498 or 495.   S. Müller Cf. Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 289-90; Müller 2017, 66-75; Olbrycht 2010, 343-4; Vasilev, M.I., The Policy of Darius I and Xerxes Towards Thrace and Macedonia, 2015, 109-17; Xydopoulos 2012.

Amyntas II Amyntas II is a mysterious figure. His one-year-long-or-less reign (probably in 395/4) took place between those of → Aëropos II and his son → Pausanias, towards the end of the succession struggles that resulted in the ascension of → Amyntas III. A. is not mentioned by Diodoros in his list of kings from this period (14.84.6) but appears in the Byzantine chronographers Eusebios (Chron., vol. 1, 229.17 Schoene; Chron. Hier. p. 117.10 Helm; Chron. arm. p. 108.34 Karst) and Synkellos (p. 313.12, 317.6-9 Mosshammer), who may have drawn on → Theopompos. A.’s existence is verified by → coinage. We know of silver staters (pentadrachms) with AMYNTA on the rev. (SNG ANS 82; Hoover 2016, no. 816) and silver trihemiobols with the same male head, on the rev. the protome of a wolf with no inscription, currently ascribed to A. (SNG ANS 82, Hoover 2016, no. 817). There are several small bronze fractions (reduced half-units) (described and illustrated by Westermark 1989, pl. 69, nos. 21-23 and Hoover 2016, nos. 818-20). It is possible that Pausanias did indeed rule directly after Aëropos, as Diodoros has it (7.15.2 [= Euseb. Chron. 1, p. 227]), and that A. interrupted Pausanias’ reign as a pretender to the → throne. A. may also be identical with Amyntas ‘The Little’ (Ὁ Μικρὸς), who → Aristotle tells us was the son of Archelaos, killed by Derdas (perhaps a member of the Elimeiote royal house) whom he had taunted for his youth (Arist. Pol. 1311B).   S.R. Asirvatham Cf. Gatzolis, C., Royal and Civic Bronze Coinage: Monetary Circulation between the Macedonian Kingdom and the Chalcidic Peninsula, BCH Suppl. 53 (2010), 185-98; March 1995; Müller 2016, 198-9, 315, 320.

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Amyntas III Amyntas III, son of Arrhidaios, bore the name of his grandfather Amyntas, one of the brothers of → Perdikkas II. A.’s father and grandfather did not make it to the throne. A. was the first of his family to take the rule. His line reigned until the end of Argead Makedonia. A. succeeded the short-time ruler → Pausanias whom he eliminated in 394/3 (Diod. 14.89.2). He came to power when Makedonia was in an unstable state, troubled by civil war-like circumstances. With a short interruption, A. ruled for 24 years (Diod. 14.92.3). His long reign implies that he managed to preserve the loyalty of his leading circles and a wide consensus within his realm. In consequence, the traditional view that A.’s reign offered little stability and was a constant and dull struggle, has rightly been challenged by Zahrnt and Heinrichs. Numismatic evidence in particular shows that after a turbulent start, A. subsequently overcame the previous turmoil and managed to consolidate his realm in the long run. For the first time after Archelaos’ death, some stability returned: A. was able to reverse the debased status of Pausanias’ silver → coinage. Towards the end of A.’s reign, he could even afford to debase his own silver coins without losing face or authority. He left a secured realm to his sons. The reason for A.’s traditional wallflower image in scholarship and lack of prominence in the sources may be that he was overshadowed by his son → Philip II and grandson → Alexander III under whose reigns Makedonia rose to a hegemonic force. Given the scarcity of evidence, it is difficult to reconstruct the course of events of A.’s rule. He had a rough start when in 393/2, he was expelled from his realm by the invading Illyrian neighbours, a traditional threat to Argead Makedonia (Diod. 14.92.3). Briefly before, A. had apparently concluded a mutual defensive alliance with the Chalkidian koinon dominated by expanding → Olynthos (Syll.³ 135; RO no. 12). Probably in order to receive support in return, he ceded the → Chalkidians some of his eastern frontier land bordering on their territory. Certainly, A. did not give away his ruling rights by this → dorea but granted the Chalkidians the land’s revenues (cf. Diod. 15.19.2), perhaps only for the time of the alliance’s validity (50 years). Diodoros does not name the region. It is believed to be either Mygdonia or Anthemous. When A. was able to return shortly afterwards, he was aided by the Thessalians, not the Chalkidians (Diod. 14.92.3). Nevertheless, they kept the territory and its revenues. Perhaps, A. did not only use military, but also financial means against the Illyrians (Diod. 16.2.2), paying them off. The backside of the stele from Olynthos preserving A.’s alliance 84

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with the Chalkidians (Syll.³ 135b; RO no. 12 back) records another treaty between them, mostly dated to 391, when A. had returned. The text used to be taken for another section of the same treaty on the frontside (Syll.³ 135a; RO no. 12 front) before it was pointed out recently that the stele preserved two different treaties. The fragment is concerned with terms of trade: the Chalkidians were allowed to import and re-export pitch and timber for building and shipbuilding without paying dues. The exception is silver fir. In his troubled early reign, A. followed in the footsteps of Pausanias minting debased silver coins mirroring his political problems. However, soon after his return, he increased the silver standard. According to a variant of uncertain credibility, during his exile, A. was replaced by the shadowy pretender Argaios who ruled for two years (Diod. 14.92.3). The Argead ruler lists date him to the 380s. Some scholars take him for an Illyrian or Chalkidian puppet. Nothing is further known about this Argaios and it is unclear if he ruled at all. No coins minted in his name are known. He is never heard of again. Dated to 383/2, Diodoros has a second very similar account about invading Illyrians expelling A. who granted some frontier land to the Chalkidians (15.19.2). In scholarship, there are three interpretations: (a) the same scenario did in fact happen twice, (b) A. was expelled for a second time, but instead either by the Chalkidians or Makedonian factions, (c) it was a doublet (or literary reminder) of the first Illyrian invasion in 393/2 that was the only one (which seems most probable). In the late 380s, A. had consolidated his position sufficiently to reclaim the territory—or rather its revenues—he had ceded to the Chalkidians without apparently having received any help against the Illyrians in return. However, since the Chalkidians dominated by Olynthos profited considerably from its income, they refused to give it back (Diod. 15.19.2). Hostilities erupted. A. gathered an army and turned to → Sparta, the hegemonic force of Greece at that time (Diod. 15.19.3). Xenophon reports the speech of an envoy from Chalkidian Akanthos (at odds with Olynthos because of its threatening rise) who in 382 complained in Sparta about the Olynthians’ expansionist policy: they had taken several Makedonian cities including → Pella and nearly expelled Amyntas (Hell. 5.2.12-13). The possible degree of exaggeration is debated. Dominated by the faction of Agesilaos II pursuing an expansionist policy (Diod. 15.19.4) and aware of the problem of a growing Olynthos contacting → Athens and → Thebes, the Spartans sent first a vanguard under Eudamidas, then 10.000 men under Agesilaos’ brother Teleutias north to join A. and his forces (Xen. Hell. 5.2.15-37). Thus started the Olynthian War (382-79). Obviously well informed about Makedonia’s

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political structures, Teleutias is said to have advised A. to make the autonomous Upper Makedonian rulers his allies by subsidies and to have separately persuaded Derdas of → Elimeia to join the campaign by warning him that his realm would be next on Olynthos’ list (Xen. Hell. 5.2.38). While A.’s troops fought with the Spartans, first under Teleutias and after his death in battle in 381 under Agesipolis, Xenophon only praises the warrior skills and contributions of Derdas and his cavalry (Xen. Hell. 5.2.40-43, 3.1-2. 9). In 379, the starving Olynthians surrendered. A. will have reestablished Argead control over his borderlands, probably without further help from the Spartans who were concerned with their own agenda. At an uncertain date, reportedly, A. adopted the Athenian Iphikrates, one of the most renowned mercenary generals of his time (Aischin. 2.28). Such an adoption of a high-ranking adult by another prestigious person served to establish kinship ties for the sake of family prestige and political profit. In the case of Iphikrates, it may have played a role that he was the son-in-law of the influential Thracian ruler Kotys. The numismatic evidence shows that by the late 370s, Argead Makedonia was in a stable condition. In this period, mostly dated in about 375-73, A. concluded a fragmentarily recorded treaty with Athens (IG II³ 157; Tod no. 129). The decree mentions the election of Athenian representatives responsible for administering the oath to A. and his son → Alexander II (l. 2). The youth’s association with his father in this diplomatic matter is generally seen as a proof that Alexander was marked out at A.’s court. The background of the treaty is uncertain. It is usually associated with the Second Athenian Confederacy and the return of Athenian naval power in the northern Aegean. Makedonia was the chief source of Athenian shipbuilding → timber (Xen. Hell. 6.1.11). Probably, Athens and A. expected a mutual profit from this treaty. Some scholars suggest that in this time, the port of Pella became particularly important and A., not Archelaos, transferred the Argead capital from Aigai to Pella; however, it remains uncertain. Another piece of information points to the importance of Makedonian timber for A.’s relations with the Athenians. In 373, when the Athenian strate­ gos Timotheos operated in the northern Aegean, A. established friendly relations with him by giving him timber as a gift ([Dem.] 49.36). Any travel or transportation costs were not included. In 343, → Aischines recalls that it was publicly recorded that at a panhellenic congress, A.’s delegate voted to help Athens to win back → Amphipolis (2.32-33). The information’s validity is debated. Scholars taking it for granted date the congress in the late 370s. Since an Athenian Amphipolis was hardly in A.’s interest, it is suggested that out of diplomacy, he only 86

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paid lip service to this vote. If he had a seat at the congress, it would show that the Athenians chose to accept the Argead claim to Greek descent exactly in the situation when it was useful to them. An inscription from Roman Imperial times shows A. as a mediator in the case of some frontier matters between Thessalian Perrhaibia and Elimeia, dated to the 370s. It is difficult to assess what degree of influence he might have exercised in this region. Diodoros records that A. concluded a symmachia with the tyrant Jason of Pherai, elected as tagos of → Thessaly in 375 (15.60.2). In his last years, A. obviously ruled over a consolidated Makedonia integrated into a solid network of political ties. He also took care of his succession. A. apparently practiced polygamy and fathered three sons, Archelaos, Arrhidaios and Menelaos, from his wife Gygaia and, perhaps concurrently, a daughter, Eurynoë, and another three sons, Alexander, Perdikkas, and Philip (who all made it to the throne), from his other wife Eurydike (Just. 7.4.5). The marriage to Eurydike, who was of illustrious lineage and likely of Illyrian and Lynkestian descent (Plut. Mor. 14B; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler; Strab. 7.7.8), is mostly dated to about 390, after A. had overcome the Illyrian threat. The wedding may have served to seal the peace and establish friendly relations. Trogus-Justin’s tales about Eurydike as a vicious, murderous, scheming monster to whom a reprehensibly trustful, even naïve A. is completely devoted (7.4.75.10) deserve no credence. Young → Aristotle spent some time at A.’s court since his father Nikomachos was A.’s physician (Diog. Laert. 5.1). Late evidence records a temple (ἱερόν/νεώς) dedicated by the people of → Pydna in honour of A. (Schol. ad Dem. 1.5; Ael. Arist. 9.14 Behr). It is implied that the temple existed when Philip II took Pydna in 357. Suggestions that A. resettled or refounded Pydna and therefore received cultic honours there are mere speculations. The credibility of the information itself is questionable. A. died in 369 and was succeeded by his son Alexander II. In about 337, Philip II commemorated his father by commissioning a dynastic group showing A. and his wife Eurydike, Philip himself, his wife Olympias and their son Alexander III together as the family’s core in the → Philippeion, a votive offering to Zeus at Olympia (Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9-10).   S. Müller Cf. Bearzot, C., Aminta III di Macedonia in Diodoro, in: Bearzot, C./Landucci, F. (eds.), Diodoro e l’altra Grecia, 2005, 17-41; Heinrichs 2012; Müller 2016, 200-16; Zahrnt, M., Amyntas III., Fall und Aufstieg eines Makedonenkönigs, Hermes 134 (2006), 127-41; Zahrnt, M., Amyntas III. und die griechischen Mächte, AM 7 (2007), 239-51.

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Amyntas, son of Perdikkas III Amyntas, the only known son of → Perdikkas III, from an anonymous mother, was a child when his father fell against the Illyrians in 360/59. In this threatening situation, A.’s uncle → Philip II was the obvious successor (Diod. 16.1.3). It is incredible that he served as regent and guardian for A. (Just. 7.5.9-10). No coins identify A. as ruler. He was spared as an Argead in reserve, grew up at Philip’s → court, and was tied closer to the family core by being married to Philip’s daughter Kynnane (Arr. Succ. F 1.22) who bore him Adea. As endogamy usually serves to strengthen an inner family circle blocking claims from the outside, obviously, Philip saw A. as a support, not as a threat to his reign or his nurturing of → Alexander III. However, after Alexander’s accession in 336 (Just. 12.6.14; Curt. 6.9.17), A. was eliminated, in any case before the spring of 335 when Kynnane was offered as a bride to the Illyrian Langaros (Arr. An. 1.5.4): polygamy is only recorded for male Argeads. Apparently, A. was favoured by some → factions in 336 (Plut. Mor. 327C) but perhaps through no fault of his own. The thesis that a lost inscription from Boiotian Lebadeia (RO no. 75) believed to call A. basileus of the Makedonians offers proof of a plot of A. against the Argead ruler (partly dated in Philip’s reign), is problematic, let alone the suggestion that Boiotia’s centre → Thebes supported A. and paid for it in 335 (when Thebes was razed). The inscription’s date and accuracy of transcription and reconstruction are unclear. Being no official Argead title in A.’s time, → basileus was likely added by the Lebadeians. Some scholars think that basileus referred to A.’s father Perdikkas or to Amyntas III. A. seems to have been loyal to Philip. Perhaps, he had to die because others wanted him as a ruler.   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2016, 287-9; Prandi, L., A Few Remarks on the Amyntas ‘Conspiracy’, in: Will, W. (ed.), Alexander der Große, 1998, 91-101; Wirth, G., Der Kampfverband des Proteas, 1989, 136-7.

Animal scalps on coins On coins, Herakles regularly wears the scalp of the Nemean → lion covering the back of his head, his face peeping out of the animal’s mouth. From ca. 530, the image comes up in Ionian Erythrai (elektron) and Thracian Dikaia (silver), 88

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showing the hero bearded (Kraay 1976, pl. 32.562-565). Soon before 400, he makes his entry as the Argead ancestor on → Archelaos’ fractional coins, both bearded and as a youth with smooth cheeks (pl. 2.3-5). Under → Amyntas III and his two elder sons the motif is common, only → Philip II steps back after his initial years, but retains it on e.g. his gold fractions (Le Rider 1977, pl. 8385). → Alexander III makes use of the image of young Herakles for his early → eagle series in silver and bronze (Troxell 1997, pl. 7-9) and, from 333/2 on, for his imperial silver → coinage (Troxell 1997, pl. 18)—doubtlessly not a portrait of himself, but increasingly suggestive: on the so-called Alexander sarcophagus the mounted ruler wears a lion’s scalp. The motif was minted lavishly in Makedonia and parts of the former Persian Empire, from the silver in the Achaimenid treasuries. Largely used to pay mercenaries and → veterans, the coins became a standard currency in the later 4th c. Due to their quality they were highly esteemed and continued beyond Alexander’s death, first in his name, then in that of → Philip III, finally in the names of the diadochoi until they introduced their own types. This is illustrated by the early Egyptian coinage of → Ptolemy I. The obverse of Alexander’s imperial type, retained in the beginning, changed around 320 when Herakles’ head was replaced by that of Alexander, the face still similar to young Herakles’, but identified now by → Ammon’s horns, then also Zeus’ aigis around the neck and Dionysos’ mitra on the forehead, all set within an elephant’s scalp that stands for Alexander’s victories in → India—where Ptolemy had played some role.    J. Heinrichs Cf. Mørkholm 1991, 63-70 with pl. 6.

Anthemous   see Amyntas I; Makedonia Antigonos Monophthalmos Antigonos “the One-Eyed” (ca. 383-01), son of Philip, was born to an aristocratic family of → Pella. An almost exact co-eval of king → Philip II, A. was perhaps a syntrophos of Philip growing up, as his half-brother → Marsyas of Pella was to be of → Alexander III. Certainly, A. was a hetairos (companion) of Philip throughout his reign (Just. 17.1.12). When Philip became king in 360/59, A.

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served in the new army Philip developed, learning his new military system and style of command, and rising to be one of the foremost senior officers in the kingdom. In 340 at the siege of Perinthos he was struck in the eye by a catapult bolt, giving him his nickname Monophthalmos (Plut. Alex. 70.3-4). Also about 340 A. married Stratonike, his brother Demetrios’ widow, and had by her two sons: → Demetrios Poliorketes (“the Besieger”) and Philip (Plut. Demetr. 2.1). When Alexander invaded Asia in 334 at the head of Philip’s great army, A. commanded the 7000 allied infantry from the southern Greek poleis. After winning the Battle of the → Granikos and gaining control over Anatolia west of the River Halys, Alexander left A. in command of the central satrapy of Phrygia to consolidate Makedonian control (Arr. An. 1.29.3). After the Battle of → Issos in 333, A. faced a Persian counter-attack in Anatolia, which he defeated in three sharp battles (Curt. 4.1.34-35). After Alexander’s death in 323, during the reigns of → Philip III and → Alexander IV, A. was a protagonist in the Wars of the Succession: he won control over the Asian part of the Makedonian realm; he founded over 20 new Greek cities in western Asia, which spread Greek culture there; and he was the first non-Argead leader to take the title basileus after the death of the last Argead ruler Alexander IV in 310.   R. Billows Cf. Billows 1990; Briant, P., Antigone le Borgne, 1973; Champion, J., Antigonus the OneEyed, Greatest of the Successors, 2014.

Antipatros Son of Iolaos, from Paliura. Born in 399/8 (Suda s.v. Antipatros α 2704 Adler; cf. [Luc.] Makrob. 11; Marm. Par. = FGrH 239 B 12). He fathered at least 10 children: four daughters and 6 sons. → Kassandros, named for Antipatros’ brother (Schol. ad Theokr. 17.61), is by far the most important, but three daughters, Phila, Nikaia and Eurydike all played important roles in sealing political alliances in the 320s. Already militarily active—and possibly influential at court—during the reign of → Perdikkas III, A. belonged to the most powerful of Philip’s → hetairoi (Plut. Mor. 179B; Athen. 10.435D). He and → Parmenion were involved in the peace negotiations in the spring of 346 (Dem. 19.69; Aischin. 3.72; Dein. 1.28). Around this time he made the acquaintance of Isokrates; his friendship with Phokion may belong to the period after → Chai90

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roneia (Plut. Phok. 26.3-4; 30.1-2). In the summer of 342, A. represented Philip II as theoros at the Pythian Games (Dem. 9.32) and as regent of Makedonia in the King’s absence (Isok. Ep. 4). In 340, when his services were needed in → Thrace, A. turned over the affairs of the state to Alexander, now 16 (Plut. Alex. 9.1), and campaigned at Perinthos (Diod. 16.76.3; Frontin. 1.4.13) and, later, against the Tetrachoritai (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 217). After Chaironeia (338), he was sent to → Athens to negotiate a peace and awarded a → proxeny (Just. 9.4.5; Harp. s.v. Alkimachos = Hyp. F 19.2). A. appears to have supported—perhaps even engineered—Alexander’s accession in 336, and he acted as regent whenever he was absent from Makedonia. When Alexander set out for Asia in 334, he left A. firmly in charge of European affairs (Arr. An. 1.11.3; Curt. 4.1.39; Just. 11.7.1; Diod. 18.12.1) with 12.000 infantry and 1500 horse. A.’s resources were, however, significantly depleted by the flow of reinforcements to Alexander in Asia. The threat from → Memnon of Rhodos required A. to commission a → fleet, which defeated that of Datames at Siphnos (Arr. An. 2.2.4-5). In 331 Agis rallied the Peloponnesians and easily defeated A.’s general, Korrhagos. Agis then besieged Megalopolis (Aischin. 3.165) with a force of 20.000 infantry—to which we might add as many as 8000 mercenaries who had escaped from → Issos (Curt. 6.1.39; Diod. 17.48.1-2)—and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 17.62.7). A. received news of the uprising just as he was dealing with the rebellion in Thrace (Diod. 17.62.5-7). Concluding hostilities as best he could under the circumstances, A. gathered a force of 40.000 (Diod. 17.63.1)—greatly augmented by his Greek allies—and invaded the Peloponnese, where he defeated Agis at Megalopolis. The Spartan king was killed in the engagement (Diod. 17.63.4; Curt. 6.1.1-15; Just. 12.1.6-11). Order was restored to Greece in consultation with the → Korinthian League (Curt. 6.1.19-20). The Spartans, for their part, were forced to send ambassadors to Alexander to beg his forgiveness (Aischin. 3.133; Diod. 17.73.5-6; Curt. 6.1.20), and it is clear that A. was not prepared to make a decision on their future without Alexander’s approval. A. faced a greater threat after the proclamation of Alexander’s → ‘Exiles’ Decree,’ which played no small part in kindling the Lamian War. Alexander’s disparagement of Megalopolis as “a battle of mice” (Plut. Ages. 15.4) is an early sign of tension between the King and his regent. There were claims that A. had regal aspirations (Curt. 10.10.14; cf. Plut. Mor. 180E), that he negotiated in secret with the Aitolians (Plut. Alex. 49.8) and that he quarreled with → Olympias (Plut. Alex. 39.7; Plut. Mor. 180D; Diod. 17.118.1; cf. 19.11.9). Alexander’s decision to replace him as regent of Makedo-

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nia with → Krateros (Arr. An. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9) aroused the suspicions of both ancient and modern writers (Curt. 10.10.15). And, not surprisingly, stories circulated that A. and his sons conspired with several of the king’s hetairoi to murder him. After Alexander’s death, A. was recognized as strategos autokrator of Makedonia and Greece (Just. 13.4.5; Diod. 18.3.2); the lands of the Thracians, Illyrians, → Triballians and Agrianes, as well as → Epeiros, were added to his sphere (Arr. Succ. F 1.7; Dexipp., BNJ 100 F 8 §3). → Lysimachos, the strategos of Thrace, was clearly subject to A.’s authority. In Greece, news of Alexander’s death ignited the Hellenic (‘Lamian’) War in which the Athenians defrayed the mercenary costs of their strategos Leosthenes with Harpalos’ money and allied themselves also with the Aitolians (Diod. 18.9.4-5). A. summoned Krateros and → Leonnatos to Europe (Diod. 18.12.1 reads “Philotas”; Diod. 18.16.4), but he engaged the Greek enemy before the arrival of reinforcements. Leaving Sippas in charge of Makedonia, he moved into Thessaly with 13.000 Makedonians and 600 cavalry. A. also had a fleet of 110 ships, which had conveyed monies from Asia to Makedonia (Diod. 18.12.2). The desertion of the Thessalians to the Greek cause (Diod. 18.12.3) proved to be a major setback, and A. was forced to take refuge in Lamia and await reinforcements from Asia (Diod. 18.12.4; Plut. Dem. 27.1; Plut. Phok. 23.4). Leosthenes invested the city (Diod. 18.13.1-3), but at one point was killed (Diod. 18.13.5; Just. 13.5.12). Τhe Athenians abandoned the siege of Lamia upon Leonnatos’ approach (Diod. 18.14.4-5; cf. Plut. Eum. 3.3), moving against him before the two Makedonian armies could combine their forces (Diod. 18.15.1). In the ensuing battle, Leonnatos was killed (Diod. 18.15.3); Antiphilos replaced him. Nevertheless, A. chose to avoid giving battle on the plain, owing to his inferiority in cavalry; instead he withdrew towards the Peneios, awaiting the arrival of Krateros, bringing the entire Makedonian force to 48.000 (Diod. 18.16.5). The two leaders confronted the Greeks near Krannon (Diod. 18.17; Plut. Phok. 26.1) on 5 August, 322 (Plut. Cam. 19.5; Plut. Dem. 28.1). A. led the phalanx forward and drove the enemy infantry to the high ground. The Greek cavalry disengaged, conceding victory to the Makedonians. Menon and Antiphilos now sued for peace, but A. refused to deal with the Greeks collectively, demanding instead separate peace terms with each state. The Thessalian towns were taken and offered easy peace terms (Diod. 18.17.7; cf. [Plut.] Mor. 846E, for the capture of Pharsalos), leaving the Athenians and Aitolians to face Makedonia alone. In the Peloponnese, A. installed pro-Makedonian oligarchies, often headed by personal friends and supported by garrisons (Diod. 92

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18.18.8, 55.2, 57.1, 69.3). Athens, in consternation, sent a deputation led by Phokion and Demades to A. (Diod. 18.18; Plut. Phok. 26.3). Mindful of Leosthenes’ hard line at Lamia, A. demanded the unconditional surrender of the city (Diod. 18.18.1-3), but treated the Athenians with leniency, though he insisted on establishing a garrison on Mounychia (Plut. Phok. 27.3, 28, 30.4; Plut. Dem. 28.1; Diod. 18.18.5). The leading anti-Makedonian politicians were hunted down by Archias of Thourioi and put to death (Arr. Succ. F 1.14; Plut. Phok. 27.3, 29.1; Plut. Dem. 28-29). Making peace with Athens, A. and Krateros turned on the Aitolians (Diod. 18.24-25), only to be forced by the situation in Asia to come to terms with them (Diod. 18. 25. 5; cf. Arr. Succ. F 1.24; Just. 13.6.9 wrongly speaks of peace with the Athenians). A.’s decision was hastened by the arrival of Anti­ gonos and news of Perdikkas’ duplicity (Diod. 18.23.4-24.1, 25.3; Arr. Succ. F 1.21, 24; cf. Just. 13.6.5-6). Advancing to the Thracian Chersonese, A. sent envoys to secure the defection of White Kleitos and his own safe crossing of the Hellespont (Arr. Succ. F 1.26). Friendship with Ptolemy in Egypt was renewed (Diod. 18.14.2, 25.4). Leaving Krateros to deal with → Eumenes, A. moved in the direction of Kilikia (Diod. 18.29.6; Plut. Eum. 6.3), where he learned of Krateros’ defeat from the survivors of his army (Arr. Succ. F 1.28; Diod. 18.33.1). In Kilikia, he learned also of Perdikkas’ defeat in Egypt, and advanced to Tripara­ deisos in northern Syria. There A. met the defeated and leaderless troops of Perdikkas, now led by Peithon and Arrhidaios. These men were embroiled in a bitter dispute with the queen, Adea-Eurydike, who had usurped the prerogatives of her mentally deficient husband and was supported by the troops, who demanded their pay (Arr. Succ. F 1.31-32; cf. Diod. 18.39.1-2). Hence A. was greeted, on his arrival, by an angry mob, which might have lynched him, had it not been for the efforts of Seleukos and Antigonos (Arr. Succ. F 1.33; cf. Polyain. 4.6.4; Diod. 18.39.3-4). But A. frightened Eurydike into submission (Diod. 18.39.4) and, as prostates, reassigned the satrapies (App. Syr. 52.263; Diod. 18.39.5-7) and entrusted the war against the Perdikkans to Antigonos, with whom he left the ‘Kings,’ Philip III and Alexander IV (Arr. Succ. F 1.34-38), some 8000 additional infantry (Diod. 19.29.3), and Kassandros as “→ chiliarchos of the cavalry” (Arr. Succ. F 1.38; Diod. 18.39.7). Before A. could march back to Makedonia, Kassandros fell out with Antigonos, whom he suspected of harboring designs on a grander scale. Thus A. decided to take the ‘Kings’ back to Europe (Arr. Succ. F 1.42-44). Nevertheless, by making Antigonos strategos of Asia, A. had all but recognized him as an equal partner. A. died of illness in autumn 319

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(Diod. 18.48), assigning European affairs to Polyperchon and appointing Kas­ sandros chiliarchos. Demades’ embassy, requesting the removal of Menyllos’ garrison from Mounychia, helps to date A.’s death. The old man was mortally ill when Demades reached him, but the latter did not leave Athens before the end of June 319 (as is clear from IG II2 383b; cf. Plut. Phok. 30.4-6; Plut. Dem. 31.34). News of his death reached Antigonos in the vicinity of Cretopolis (Diod. 18.47.4).   W. Heckel Cf. Berve 1926, II, 46-51, no. 94; Heckel 2016, 33-43; Kaerst, J., Antipatros (12), RE 1.2 (1894), 2508-9; Kanatsulis, D., Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann in der Zeit Philipps und Alexanders des Großen, Hellenika 16 (1958/59), 14-64; Kanatsulis, D., Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann nach dem Tode Alexanders des Großen, Makedonika 8 (1968), 121-84.

Apollon   see Coinage, Argead; Crocus Field, battle of; Deities; Third Sacred War Archelaos Succeeding → Perdikkas II, Archelaos ruled Makedonia from 413 to 399. The evidence for A.’s → succession is murky. According to a speaker in → Platon (Gorg. 471A-D; cf. Ail. VH 12.43), A. was Perdikkas’ (presumably eldest) son by a slave woman, and usurped the → throne by murdering not only the rightful successor, Perdikkas’ brother Alketas, but also Alketas’ son as well as Perdikkas’ legitimate son and heir, a boy of 7. Some (or even all) of the details of Platon’s sensationalized account may have their origins in Athenian anti-A. propaganda, along with a willful misunderstanding of the Argead practice of polygamy. It is worth noting that “Archelaos the son of Perdikkas” is mentioned immediately after Perdikkas (the reigning king) and Alketas in a treaty between the Makedonians and Athenians (IG I3 89.60), which suggests that he was in the line of rightful succession. On the other hand, however, there is nothing inherently implausible in yet another instance of dynastic intrigue in the Argead court. In whatever circumstances he may have acceded to the throne, A. proved to be an effective ruler. To a certain extent, he was fortunate; unlike his predecessor, Perdikkas II, who successfully preserved the integrity of his kingdom through 94

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a combination of astute diplomacy and calculated aggression (portrayed by the hostile Greek sources as duplicity and opportunism), A.’s Makedonia was largely (if temporarily) free from external threats following the Spartan loss of interest in the region after Brasidas’ death in 422 and the disastrous Athenian naval defeat in Sicily in 413. This period of relative breathing room allowed A. to make substantial and far-reaching improvements to Makedonia’s infrastructure and to reorganize the army. Although → Thucydides’ description is vague and brief (2.100.2), he informs us that A. constructed many fortresses and “cut straight roads, and in other respects got the kingdom ready for war in terms of the caval­ ry, the infantry, and the rest of the military equipment more successfully than any of the 8 kings who had preceded him.” Whatever military reforms we can infer from Thucydides’ brief notice, A. was clearly concerned with the defense of his kingdom, especially the frontiers, where tribal enemies such as the Illyrians, Thracians, and Dardanians perennially lurked just outside poised for incursion at the slightest sign of weakness or instability. He also inherited the ongoing struggle for independence from Argead authority waged by the rulers of the cantons of Upper Makedonia, particularly the recurrent trouble spot on the western frontier, where the Lynkestians strengthened their attempt to revolt by allying with Illyrians. A. gained his own ally in his conflict with the Lynkestian/Illyrian coalition by marrying his daughter to the ruler of the Upper Makedonian canton of → Elimeia (Arist. Pol. 1311B). A.’s policy in turning to diplomacy when it served his purposes, while showing himself willing to go to war when necessary, prefigures that of → Philip II. Some of A.’s road-building activi­ ty may have been to protect the centre of the Argead kingdom, the great allu­vial plain. Furthermore, roads would also have been needed to connect newly-­ constructed fortresses on the periphery with the Argead heartland. In addition to the consolidation and defense of his kingdom, A. was concerned to extend his influence (perhaps with his newly reorganized army) into the coastal regions to the east. Taking advantage of the current Athenian weakness in the region, with their loss of → Amphipolis (which remained independent although it had nominally been returned to → Athens in the Peace of → Nikias) and reliance upon Makedonian → timber for the rebuilding of their fleet, A. strove to develop a relationship with Athens that was more advantageous to Makedonia. As early as 411, A. offered the Athenian orator Andokides, with whom he had a longstanding family connection, the right to cut and export Makedonian timber, with which he supplied oars at cost to the democratic fleet at Samos during the

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rule of the Four Hundred (Andok. 2.11). In 410, A. besieged the coastal settlement of → Pydna (bordering the Greek city of → Methone, a member of the Athenian Empire), which had recently revolted from Makedonia. When he ran into difficulties, he received timely reinforcements from an Athenian fleet under the command of Theramenes. With Athenian help, A. successfully regained control of Pydna and transferred its inhabitants a few kilometres inland (Diod. 13.49.1-2), thereby securing control of the coast. The Athenian assistance to A. explains why he was willing to provide Theramenes with funding for the Athenian war effort shortly afterwards (Xen. Hell. 1.1.12). A fragmentary Athenian decree of 407/6 suggests that A. continued to service Athens’ ongoing need for timber in a more formalized way in the final years of the Peloponnesian War. A. and his sons are honoured as benefactors for supplying oars to Athens and providing facilities in Makedonia (and presumably timber as well) for shipbuilding (IG I3 117). The language of this decree is far more conciliatory than an earlier agreement with A.’s predecessor in which the Athenians required Perdikkas to export oars exclusively to Athens (IG I3 89). Concern with the defense of the north-east frontier may explain A.’s transfer of the royal residence from the old ancestral seat at → Aigai (which continued to be a major festival site as well as the burial ground of Argead royalty) to → Pella, located on the far side of the central plain, which offered better access to the coast and a closer geographical connection to the wider Greek world (the evidence for the move to Pella under A. is not definitive, however, and it could have taken place under → Amyntas III). A. continued to exploit opportunities to build bridges with the Greek cities throughout his reign, especially when there was the possibility of tangible bene­ fits for Makedonia. In his last known act of foreign policy (ca. 400), he was invited to send troops to intervene in factional strife in the Thessalian city of Larisa, and was duly rewarded by his Thessalian friends with territory in Perrhaibia, strategically located controlling the passes into Makedonia. Although A.’s intervention in → Thessaly remains obscure, for our only source is a rhetorical pamphlet attributed to Herodes Atticus, there is a glancing reference in a contemporary speech by the sophist Thrasymachos (DK 85 B 2 = Laks/Most D 18 [Early Greek Philosophy VIII, 2016 (LCL), p. 498-9). A.’s extensive cultural policies were oriented deliberately and very publicly towards the Greek world. Nevertheless, he had to tread carefully between affirming his own Hellenic credentials to gain influence with the Greek poleis beyond his borders, and constructing and legitimizing his monarchical image for a domestic audience. A.’s 96

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foundation of his own Olympic festival was likely motivated by his desire to showcase the power and piety of the Argead monarchy not only to the Makedonian elite, but to an international audience as well. At → Dion, at the foot of Mt. → Olympos, he instituted a festival in honour of Zeus and the Muses, with athletic, musical, and dramatic contests (Diod. 17.16.3; cf. Arr. An. 1.11.1, who erroneously places the festival at Aigai). A. also enhanced his personal prestige and added to the cultural capital of the Argead monarchy by inviting to his court a veritable who’s who of Greek artists and literary figures to benefit from his very generous → patronage. The artist Zeuxis of Ephesos, renowned for his introduction of realistic illusion into painting, oversaw the decoration of the palace at Pella, of which the showpiece were spectacular large-scale panel paintings (Ail. VH 14.17; cf. Plin. NH 35.63). Ailianos (VH 14.17) claims that A.’s palace was so splendid that people flocked to Makedonia from all over to see it for themselves, although he undercuts this praise with the comment that no one was interested in visiting the king himself, unless he bribed them. A fragmentary funerary epigram found at Vergina reveals that A. also hosted the famous Korinthian sculptor Kallimachos, who is credited with the invention of the Korinthian capital. Luminaries of Greek literature who are attested to have spent time at the court of A. include the epic poet Choirilos of Samos (Istros, BNJ 334 F 61; Suda s.v. Choirilos χ 594 Adler), the tragic poet Agathon (Plut. Mor. 177A-B; Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4; cf. Plat. Symp. 172C), and the citharode and dithyrambic poet Timotheus of Miletos (Plut. Mor. 177B-C; 334B; Steph. Byz. s.v. Μίλητος). A late (and unreliable) Vita attributed to Marcellinus claims that → Thucydides also spent time at A.’s court (30-31); in light of Thucydides’ northern connections along with his positive portrayal of A. (2.100.2, mentioned above) the tradition is plausible if circumstantial. The most famous recipient of A.’s patronage, however, remains → Euripides. Although most of the more colourful details of the biographical tradition cannot be accepted, Euripides’ sojourn at the court of A. was considered an accepted fact in antiquity (Arist. Pol. 1311B; Plut. Mor. 177A; 531D-E; Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4). The specific Makedonian references of Euripides’ Bakchai suggest that he wrote the tragedy at A.’s court, and possibly its first performance was in Makedonia. A. appears to have commissioned a play highlighting the solidly Hellenic credentials and civilizing mission of his mythical ancestor, A. (a figure only now attested for the first time), who in obedience to the Delphic → oracle followed a goat and founded the city of Aigai where it settled (thereby providing an aitiology for the name of the original Argead cap-

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ital). It is likely that Euripides’ lost Archelaos was the concluding play to a trilogy that reworked the foundation legend of the Argeads, inventing a new founder figure descended from the Heraklid Temenos not just to support A.’s claim to Greek ethnicity, but more importantly perhaps to legitimize A.’s claim to the throne to a local Makedonian audience for, as we have seen, his accession was contested. Similarly, A.’s → coinage reflects his desire to demonstrate his power and prestige both within Makedonia and to the wider Greek world. In order to stimulate foreign trade, A. began to issue coinage with a higher silver content and of a quality demonstrably superior to the coins of Perdikkas, designed for international circulation; he is also the first Argead monarch to issue bronze coins, intended to be circulated domestically. Notably, all coin issues now included his name. Furthermore, his coinage displayed images of his mythical homonym, as well as his Temenid ancestor Herakles, clear references to the newly reworked foundation legend of the Argeads (→ Archelaos, the founder-figure, moreover pl. 2, fig. 1-5). A.’s orientation towards the Greek world does not seem, however, to have achieved their recognition of his status as a powerful and enlightened monarch or his claim to Greekness. The sophist Thrasymachos, in a speech on behalf of the people of Larisa in Thessaly (and therefore the context is almost certainly A.’s intervention in Thessaly), ironically poses the question (parodying a line from Euripides’ lost Telephos): “Shall we, who are Greeks, be slaves to Archelaos, who is a barbarian?” (DK 85 B 2 = Laks/Most D 18). Furthermore, the sarcastic tone that Polos adopts in his list of A.’s alleged crimes in Platon’s Gorgias (471A-D) suggests that this terrain was a familiar one to an Athenian readership. The Platonic tradition vilifying him as the archetypal evil king who attempted to conceal his violence with a veneer of civility may have arisen, at least in part, to provide a contrast with the virtuous Sokrates, who is said to have refused A.’s invitation to his court (Arist. Rhet. 2.1398; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Dio Chrys. Or. 13.30). It is not surprising, perhaps, that the traditions on A.’s death, in 399 (the very same year that Sokrates was executed by the Athenian democracy) are both contradictory and sensationalistic. → Aristotle (Pol. 1311B) states that A. was assassinated by a cabal, whose members (including a former lover) had private grievances against him. The tradition that a lover was behind the conspiracy was pervasive ([Plat.] Alk. 2.141D; Plut. Mor. 768F; Ail. VH 8.9), although Dio­ doros (14.37.5) claims that it was a hunting accident. The emphasis on the homo­ erotic element is suspect as a topos of the narrative of tyrannicides, and recurs in the tradition on the death of Philip II. Although A.’s premature death ushered in 98

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a new period of chaos and turmoil, his consolidation of his kingdom and extension of Argead control outside the traditional boundaries of Makedonia paved the way for the spectacular success of Philip II.   F. Pownall Cf. Borza 1990, 161-79; Greenwalt, W.S., Archelaus the Philhellene, AncW 34 (2003), 131-53; Müller 2016, 164-92; Pownall 2017, 219-21; Roisman 2010, 154-8.

Archelaos, founder hero In a newer version of the Argead → foundation myth, introduced under → Arche­ laos, A. is the founder hero of → Aigai. This version is probably connected to → Euripides’ lost homonymic tragedy, staged in Makedonia around 407. It might well have been official in its character, meant to promote a new founder hero bearing the ruler’s own name—but much is obscure. On Archelaos’ coins the hero’s portrait appears on the stater of a dynastic series that on fractions displays the → eagle of Zeus, the Argead dynasty’s founder, two portraits of its ancestor Herakles, in his young and his ripe years, and the wolf protome of → Argos, whence the mythic A. departed for Makedonia (pl. 2). He is styled as a youth wearing in his short hair a diagonal band (taenia). He has some similarity with Apollon who however has no dynastic relevance for the Argeads and on their coins only occurs since Philip II, for contemporary political reasons. Moreover, Apollon with few exceptions is displayed with a laurel wreath resulting from his victory over the dragon of Pytho and therefore standing for the god’s claim to his Delphian sanctuary. In turn, a taenia is generally characteristic for founder heroes, so on Chalkidian coins of Skione and Aineia, preceding those of Archelaos. Obviously they were iconographic models for A. The hero recurs on Argead coins under Aëropos, Amyntas II, Pausanias, Alexander II, Philip II, Alexander III, Philip III, and Alexander IV (cf. Gaebler 1935, pl. 29-32). With the dynasty’s end, A. disappears, but his taenia might have inspired the → diadema, taken from Alexander’s → kausia diadematophoros and introduced as a royal crown by Ptolemy I, worn openly as formerly had been the taenia.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Harder, A., Euripides’ Kresphontes and Archelaos, 1985, 125-37; Heinrichs, J., Athen und Argos in der Mitte des 5. Jhs., ZPE 177 (2011), 23-5; Kremydi, S., Coinage and Finance, in: Lane Fox 2011, 163; Müller 2016, 93-100; Price 1991, 32.

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Argeads, proto-historical Herodotos traces → Alexander I’s Argead lineage back to Peloponnesian → Argos with Temenos, whose descendant → Perdikkas I had come to rule over Makedonia (Hdt. 5.22.1-2; 8.137-138). Reigning after Perdikkas were Argaios, Philip (I), Aëropos (I), and Alketas (I), whom modern scholarship considers to be mythical figures (like Perdikkas), followed by the historical → Amyntas I, father of → Alexander I (Hdt. 8.139.1). Thucydides’ → genealogy lines up with → Herodotos’, as he refers to → Archelaos as the 9th Makedonian king (2.100.2). A Diodoros fragment (7 F 15) preserved by Eusebios (Chron. 1.227) presents the same list as Herodotos but also includes the putative duration of each king’s reign up until Alexander I. Another version of the lineage is found in Justin’s Epitome of Pompeius Trogus (7.1-2), which makes → Karanos the founding father of the Argeads (and omits Alketas I). Justin comments on the kings’ characters and fates: Karanos’ heir Perdikkas had a distinguished life; Argaios was a moderate and beloved ruler; and Philip I had an untimely death and made the infant Aëropos his heir. Aëropos receives embellishment. The Illyrians, sensing the young king’s vulnerability, attack the Makedonians; threatened with defeat, the Makedonians bring the baby to the battlefield in his cradle to keep themselves continually aware of what is at stake, and prevail in the end. Perdikkas’ heir Argaios is also the subject of an anecdote in the 2nd c. AD Polyainos: attacked by the Taulantians, Argaios compensates for his dearth of warriors by sending the young Makedonian women down Mt. Ereboia in droves brandishing thyrsi (an image that references the stereotype of Makedonian women as bacchants: → Mimallones). Believing these women are men, the enemy retreats in fear (4.1).   S.R. Asirvatham Cf. Borza 1990, 81, 98, 259; Müller 2016, 107.

Argeads, terminology (Argeadai, Heraklidai, Temenidai) Living in vicinity of Illyrians, Paionians, and Thracians, the Makedonians were regarded as non-Greek. They were dependent temporarily on the Persian Great King, permanently on their own ruler, foreign in Greek eyes. Moreover their dialect played a distinctive role in this perception although their proximity to 100

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the Greek cities of the Chalkidike will explain some Hellenization, at least in the upper classes. But the Makedonians are widely absent from Greek mythology, and altogether from the Catalogue of Ships in Ilias 2, the Great Charter of Greek identity. → Alexander I could well do without Greek identity before Xerxes’ invasion because his influence among the Persian Empire’s nobility made him a well respected person also in Greece (Hdt. 8.136.1, 143.3). This changed with the Persian defeat in 479. The Makedonian ruler had been prominently engaged on the losing side which made him suspicious in a period of increasing → panhellenism, and for a while even implied the danger of Greek retaliation. So by changing his allegiance he styled himself as a friend of the Greeks (Philhellen) pretending to have secretly supported and repeatedly even saved them (cf. Hdt. 7.173.3; 9.44-45). To support his argument, he constructed a Greek origin for his family, whereas all other Makedonians continued to be looked upon as ‘barbarians’; also Argead rulers were at times abused this way, for political reasons, so → Perdikkas II (Dem. 3.24) and → Philip II (Dem. 9.31). But Alexander’s claim was officially approved by those in charge of the Olympic Games, open to Greeks only, by admitting him (Hdt. 5.22.1; Just. 7.2.14). Moreover, an inscribed “price tripod (…) of Argive Hera” (SEG 29.652, ca. 460/20), excavated at → Aigai/Vergina, betokens the participation of someone in the dynasty also in her games. The kings of the Greek past had traced back their origins to Zeus and his son Herakles. Alexander adopted this model: by claiming descent from Herakles he gave his dynasty the status of Heraklidai. Since the hero’s home was → Argos, descent from the hero implied origin from this city. So both Perdikkas II (Thuc. 5.80.2) and → Alexander III (Arr. An. 2.5.9) are said to have claimed origin from the Peloponnesian polis, and it is alleged to be the patris of → Philip II (Isok. 5.32); the reference is not to the homonymic town in the → Orestis (so App. Syr. 10.63) which had no connection with Herakles. The Argive kingdom the hero had been entitled to was after three generations reconquered by his three great-grandsons on their return to the Peloponnese. One of them, Temenos, won the kingdom of Argos by lot. From him descended the Argive royal family of the Temenidai (Hdt. 8.137.1). Three brothers of this family had—according to Alexander’s → foundation myth (Hdt. 8.137-139)—fled from Argos to (future) Aigai, the origin of the Makedonian realm, and founded the dynasty of the Argeadai, ‘those with an origin from Argos’. Around 400, Alexander’s grandson Archelaos was the first Makedonian ruler to mint coins with dynastic motifs: the → eagle of Zeus, Herakles, and the traditional wolf at bay of the Argive

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coinage (pl. 2). The stater of the series displays the mythic → Archelaos who under the homonymic ruler was introduced as a new founder hero. The three terms occur at different times: Temenidai, most common, is already used by → Herodotos (8.138.2) and → Thucydides (2.99.3), Herakleidai in the late 340s by Speusippos (Phil. 5-6 Natoli), Argeadai in the early 3rd c. by Poseidippos (31.3 AB).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Müller 2016, 28-30, 85-7, 104; Müller 2017, 208-11; Natoli 2004, 117; Preller, L./ Robert, C., Griechische Mythologie 2.2, 19214, 665-71.

Argos, Peloponnese Argos was the legendary ancestral home of the Argeads. In the different variants of their → foundation myth, the founder (→ Perdikkas I, → Archelaos or → Karanos) descended from A.’s Heraklid king Temenos and was expelled from A. (Hdt. 8.137.1; Thuc. 2.99.3; Hyg. Fab. 219; Diod. F 7.16). Scholars mostly view the Argeads’ claim to Argive ancestry as a propagandistic fiction. Appian’s statement that the Argeads came from Argos in → Orestis (Syr. 63) is doubtful. → Herodotos (5.22.2) reports that at the Olympic Games, → Alexander I—likely the instigator of the claim to Argive descent—called himself Argaios, an Argive. The claim’s confirmation by A.’s representatives hints at Alexander’s Argive kinship connections (and a diplomatic pre-arrangement). It is unknown whether this Argead link to A. did exist before. When during the 460s, Alexander received refugees from → Mykenai (Paus. 7.25.6) fleeing from the Argives, it did not seem to have troubled Argead relations to A. Alexander’s successor → Perdikkas II is said to have cultivated the claim to Argive descent (Thuc. 5.80.2): in 418/7, he joined a short-lived alliance of A. and → Sparta that ended in 416. A bronzen tripod from tomb II in Vergina (→ Aigai), identified by its inscription (παρ hέρας Ἀργείας ἐμι τõν ἀϝέθλον: I am from the Games of Argive Hera: SEG 29.652) as a prize won at the panhellenic Argive Games, apparently attests to the Argead ties to A. The tripod is dated to about 460-10 and presumed to be won by Alexander I, Perdikkas II, or → Archelaos, and held in honour as a part of the family heritage. → Philip II tried to back A. up against Sparta. In 344, he offered supplies and troops to A. and Messene to go against Sparta (Dem. 6.15). In 338, A. did not support the Greek alliance against the Makedonians at → Chaironeia. 102

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After the Makedonian victory, A. became a member of the → Korinthian League. Against the traditional belief that Philip gave A. the Thyreatis (the northern part of the Kynouria-valley), formerly a source of conflict between A. and Sparta (Paus. 2.38.5), it has been argued that A. annexed the territory before (about 370) and was either not able to keep it or given the east Parnon seaboard by Philip. However, A.’s policy towards Makedonia was inconsistent. After Philip’s death (336), A. formed part of the unrest against the Makedonian hegemony in the Peloponnese. The new Makedonian regime quickly neutralized the threat, either by diplomacy, threat, or force (Diod. 17.3.5-6, without specifying by which means A. was silenced). When in 335, the Thebans revolted against Makedonia and searched for Greek allies, A. sent no help (Diod. 17.8.5, 10.1-2). A. was also absent from the revolt of Agis III of Sparta against Makedonia. During the Asian campaign under → Alexander III, in 334, a contingent of A. was detached for garrison duty at Sardeis (Arr. An. 1.17.8). Because of A.’s meaning for his family, Alexander is said to have treated the citizens of A.’s apoikia Mallos in Asia Minor mildly remitting the tribute paid to the Persians (Arr. An. 2.5.5), maybe a piece of his panhellenic propaganda. After his death (323), A. joined the Greek alliance against the Makedonian hegemony in the unsuccessful Lamian War. In 319, → Polyperchon made A. side with him against → Kassandros who forced A. to join him in 316 (Diod. 18.57.1; 19.63.1-2).   S. Müller Cf. Kelly, T., A History of Argos, 1976; Kralli, I., The Hellenistic Peloponnese: Interstate Relations, 2017, 49-84; Shipley, D.G., The Early Hellenistic Peloponnese: Politics, Economies, and Networks, 2018, 97-107.

Aristoboulos Aristoboulos (BNJ 139) is one of the most important contemporary historio­ graphers of Alexander, although his account does not survive. A. the son of Aristoboulos (BNJ 139 T 2, T 6; his father is otherwise unknown) is attested to have come from Kassandreia (T 2; F 6; F 47), the former Greek city of Poteideia. But Kassandreia was not founded until 316, and so it must have been where he resided later in life, and cannot have been his native city. A. accompanied → Alexander III on his campaign (T 6), and the detailed geo­ graphical and ethnographical information in the extant fragments as well

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as the anecdote of his reading aloud to Alexander on the Hydaspes (T 4) suggest that his research was already well underway during the expedition itself. Nevertheless, he did not publish it in its final form until he was an old man (T 3), probably not until after the death of → Kassandros, whose hostility to Alexander’s memory was notorious. Arrian identifies A., along with Ptolemy, as the principal sources for his history of Alexander (Arr. An. praef. 1-2, BNJ 139 T 6); he considers their accounts reliable because they campaigned with Alexander and wrote after his death. While Arrian’s statement absolves A. from attempting to curry favour with Alexander when he was alive, we should not infer that his work was entirely free from apology or eulogy. What it does suggest is that it was written in a sober and factual tone (at least in comparison with the sensationalist narratives of the so-called Vulgate tradition), and offered a generally favourable portrayal of Alexander that coincided with Arrian’s own idealizing vision. Unlike Ptolemy, A. held no major military commands, and does not seem to have been part of Alexander’s inner circle. Although it is often assumed that his role in the expedition was to provide technical expertise, his only known commissions were to restore the plundered tomb of → Kyros II (BNJ 139 F 51) and an unspecified mission in → India (F 35), neither of which necessarily involved any specific engineering or architectural skills. Furthermore, the extant fragments demonstrate a wide range of interests, including detailed treatment of subjects as diverse as omens, local traditions, botany, zoology, climate, and topography. The title of his account of Alexander’s expedition has not been recorded, nor do we have any information on its scope, size, or the internal distribution of its material. On the whole, A. (like his contemporary Ptolemy) offers an apologetic treatment of Alexander, playing down his responsibility in the deaths of → Philotas (F 22), → Kleitos (F 29), and → Kallisthenes (F 31), and defending him from the charge of excessive drinking (F 30, 59, 62). Nevertheless, in certain places he offers a less sanitized account of Alexander’s actions (e.g., F 26, 27, 51), where he appears to deviate from the official version endorsed by Alexander himself. Moreover, he explicitly states that Alexander’s appetite for conquest was insatiable (F 55) and that his motivation for continued campaigning was a desire to achieve recognition of his superhuman status (F 56), comments that seem incompatible with his reputation in later antiquity as a flatterer of Alexander (T 4-5). Unlike Ptolemy, whose narrative of Alexander was intended to legitimize his own rule, A. may not have had a personal 104

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agenda requiring him to put a positive spin on every event in Alexander’s campaign.   F. Pownall Cf. Pownall, F., Aristoboulos of Kassandreia (139), BNJ online (http://referenceworks. brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/aristoboulos-of-kassandreia-139-a139); Squillace, G., Alexander after Alexander, in: Moore 2018, 119-39; Zambrini 2007, 489-91.

Aristotle One of the most famous Greek philosophers, Aristotle (384-322), was the son of Nikomachos, a physician at the court of → Amyntas III, Philip II’s father (Diog. Laert. 5.1). Born in the little town of → Stageira on the Chalkidike, young A. likely lived at the Makedonian → court together with his father. In 367, he became Platon’s student at Athens. When his teacher died in 347 and Speusippos became the new head of the → Platonic Academy, Aristotle went together with Xenokrates to Asia Minor, invited by Hermeias, the tyrant of Atarneus and Assos. A. married Pythias, Hermeias’ daughter or niece (Strab. 13.1.57; Diog. Laert. 5.4). In 343, he accepted Philip’s invitation to Pella to become the teacher of young → Alexander III. For about three years, he educated Alexander in the Nymphaion of → Mieza (Plut. Alex. 7-8; Plut. Mor. 327E; 604D; Plin. NH 8.44; Quint. Inst. 1.1.23; Dio Chrys. Or. 49.4; Athen. 9.398E; Ail. VH 4.19; Diog. Laert. 5.3). When Philip had conquered the Chalkidike in 348, he had destroyed Olynthos along with many cities of the peninsula, including Stageira (Diod. 16.52.9). Therefore, A. asked Philip to restore his native town. Reportedly, Philip agreed (Plut. Alex. 7.2; Plut. Mor. 1097B, 1126F; Dio Chrys. Or. 2.79; 47.9) while other sources give the credit to Alexander (Val. Max. 5.6.ext. 5; Plin. NH 7.109; Diog. Laert. 5.4; Ail. VH 3.17; 12.54; Tzetz. Chil. 7.140.433-437). Supposedly, the relationship between A. and Alexander was very close: Alexander supported his preceptor by collecting data on plants and animals in Asia for him (Plin. NH 8.44). Moreover, he financed A.’s research on animals with 800 talents (Athen. 9.398E; according to Ail. VH 4.19, Philip did so). A. provided for Alexander an edition of the → Ilias, which his former pupil took with him to Asia (known as the “Casket Copy”: Onesikrit., BNJ 134 F 38; Plut. Alex. 26.1; Strab. 13.1.27; Plin. NH 8.108). A. also stirred Alexander’s interest in medicine and other natural sciences, in poetry, rhetoric, and philosophy (Plut. Alex. 8;

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Plin. NH 8.44). After A.’s relative Kallisthenes had been executed by Alexander in 327, the relationship between the philosopher and the king reportedly deteriorated (Diog. Laert. 5.4-5). A. became a close friend of Antipatros (Plut. Alex. 74; Paus. 6.4.8; Diog. Laert. 5.11). According to one tradition on Alexander’s death, A. approved of Antipatros’ plan to send his son Kassandros to Babylon to poison the king (Plut. Alex. 77.2; Arr. An. 7.27.1). Likely in 334, A. opened his Athenian school known as the Lykaion or Peripatetic School. He left the city in 323. One year later, he committed suicide in Chalkis at the age of 70 (Diog. Laert. 5.6), or according to a variant tradition died there of natural causes at the age of 63 (Diog. Laert. 5.10). In 322, Theophrastos succeeded A. as the head of the Peripatetic School and inherited A.’s library (Strab. 13.1.54, 2.4). He left it to Neleus, another pupil of A. (Strab. 13.1.54). Some years later, Neleus sold it to Ptolemy II Philadelphos, who incorporated it into the great library of → Alexandreia (Athen. 1.3A-B; a different version of the library’s fate is recorded by Strab. 13.1.54).   G. Squillace Cf. Berve 1926, II, 135; Chroust, A.H., Was Aristotle actually the Preceptor of Alexander the Great?, CF 18 (1964), 26-33; Düring, I., Aristoteles, 1966; Heckel 2006, 51; Merlan, P., Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great, Historia 3 (1954), 60-81.

Army Assembly While it has been and continues to be argued that Makedonia had a tradition of constitutional army or popular assemblies with the power to elect kings and to hear cases of treason, such assemblies only came into existence as a result of the unusual circumstances that followed the death of → Alexander III and lasted for less than a decade. By tradition the Makedonian king was theoretically an autocrat, but one whose power was limited by a lack of bureaucracy and a → court with little organization. The king was readily accessible to his subjects, with the Makedonians believing that he could be approached directly. The king shared his rule with his → hetairoi, his companions, mostly members of the landed Makedonian aristocracy, who controlled directly much of the population. Their relationship with the king was personal, not institutional. Paradoxically, it was during the reign of Alexander III that as the king’s autocracy grew so did the importance of his most important constituency, the army. After Alexander’s 106

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victory at → Gaugamela and the subsequent death of the Persian king Dareios III, Alexander’s stated mission changed from one of revenge on the Persians for their interference in Greek affairs to one of conquest without apparent end. After Dareios’ death, before proceeding, Alexander had to sell his new war of conquest to an increasingly skeptical military audience. This was now an army that had been years on campaign far from home. Their loyalty to their homeland and king was now tempered by increasing self-interest. Alexander had to test his authority before exercising his power. Moreover, with Alexander’s increasingly autocratic behavior, → conspiracies among his more traditionally minded hetairoi and officers began to appear. Where these conspiracies concerned popular and/or prominent commanders, Alexander began to involve the army in show trials (Arr. An. 3.26; Curt. 6.9-11; Diod. 17.79-80; Plut. Alex. 48-49). What the king had the right to do was not always the same as what he was able to do. The monarch was free to render judgment, but his decisions could upset his increasingly professional army. Less popular or important individuals were summarily executed. As he prepared to move further into → India, sensing the reluctance of his army, Alexander summoned them to an assembly where he attempted to sell them again on the march eastward, but the troops remained silent and their obvious reluctance to continue deeper into India convinced him not to order them to do so (Arr. An. 5.25-28; Curt. 9.2.10-3.19; Plut. Alex. 62). Any thought of campaigning to the Ganges and beyond was abandoned. After sailing and fighting their way down the Indos the army returned ultimately to Babylon. Where in India Alexander was faced with silence by his disgruntled soldiers, two years later as he approached Babylon, his assembled soldiers jeered at him (Arr. An. 7.8-11). While Alexander redeemed the situation and the more serious troublemakers were summarily executed, this was not the army that had departed Makedonia a decade ago. The evidence of the sources is that Alexander ultimately made all political and judicial decisions. It was with Alexander’s death that the brief period of decision-taking Makedonian assemblies began. Unfortunately, the → succession following Alexander’s death is the only detailed description of a royal selection from the Argead period and has led many to assume that this was normal (Curt. 10.6-10.1; Just. 13.1-4; Diod. 18.2). Alexander’s chief hetairoi and generals assumed they would decide the empire’s fate, since Alexander had not designated an heir. There were in fact few Argead candidates available, no one of whom was capable of ruling on his own. Philip and Alexander had effectively culled the ranks of the formerly populous clan. At the death

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of the Conqueror, there were Alexander’s half-brother, → Arrhidaios, who was mentally deficient; a three or four-year old son, → Herakles, the result of an informal liaison, and the king’s as yet unborn child by his Baktrian wife → Rho­ xane. As a result whichever was chosen, there would be the need for a regency. A sign of the amorphous nature of the situation was the suggestion that against all tradition instead of a king a council of these prominent individuals would run the empire (Curt. 10.6.15). While the leaders of the army assembled behind closed doors, the curious soldiers emboldened by their years of service burst in. The closed meeting now became the first true Makedonian decision-taking assembly not because these troops were asserting a constitutional right, but rather as the result of circumstances. The army forced its officers to accept Alexander’s brother who became King Philip III. Later, with the birth of Alexander’s son the monarchy was expanded to include both the son and brother as kings. There was now a dual monarchy under a single regent. The Makedonian → veterans had become a player in this new world created by the Conqueror. In addition to the selection of Alexander’s heirs, they would also twice officially select new regents for Alexander’s heirs. In 320, after the regent chosen in Babylon was assassinated by a group of his officers, a new dual regency proposed by the assassins was formally presented and approved by the assembled troops (Diod. 18.36). The calling of an assembly was simply a way of associating the army in these decisions. The threat of the army challenging their officers’ decisions was real enough. Shortly after this selection, the army revolted against their new leaders who then resigned and the army accepted another nominee (Diod. 18.39; Arr. Succ. F 1.30). One result of the revolt was that the new regent, → Antipatros, who was Alexander’s former lieutenant in Makedonia, took the bulk of these old veterans with him back to Makedonia. What remained of independent soldier authority now was confined to Alexander’s old infantry guard, the 3000 Argyraspids. This unit operated as a corporate entity with its own officers, but with major decisions often made collectively. With the break-up of this unit in 316, the age of powerful Makedonian army assemblies was at an end. While in subsequent years mercenary units often changed sides through collective action, they did so through no sense of constitutional prerogative. The last extant reference to a constitutional assembly in the Argead period occurred in 315 in Makedonia. During the many conflicts over power that broke out after Alexander’s death, one of the contenders successfully invaded Makedonia and called an assembly of “Makedonians” to hear charges against → Olympias, the mother of Alexander 108

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the Great. She had briefly held power in Makedonia and was responsible for the deaths of King Philip III and many other prominent Makedonians. The new de facto ruler of Makedonia’s authority rested on his success on the battlefield. Executing the mother of Alexander on his own authority could be dangerous. He made sure that those who hated Olympias would be present to accuse her, but none to defend her. The assembly voted for death, but fearing that the Makedonians might change their minds → Kassandros had her killed (Diod. 19.51.1-6; Just. 14.6.1-13). The period of assembly power had been brief. With the break-up of the empire into a number of stable kingdoms and with the dispersal of the Makedonian veterans throughout these new polities, the independent power of assemblies disappeared.   E.M. Anson Cf. Anson, E.M., Macedonian Judicial Assemblies, CP 103 (2008), 135-49; Errington, R.M., The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy, Chiron 8 (1978), 77-133.

Army organization Before → Philip II, the aristocratic cavalry (i.e., the → hetairoi who formed the King’s comitatus) were the backbone of the Makedonian army; they were supplemented by mercenary infantry and skirmishers. Some attempt to establish pay for a Makedonian army may have been instituted by → Archelaos; Philip introduced the heavy infantry, armed with the 16-to-18-foot pike (→ sarissa). Nevertheless, the cavalry remained the striking force par excellence, and in Philip’s victory at → Chaironeia it was → Alexander III and the cavalry on the left that destroyed the Theban Sacred Band (Plut. Alex. 9.2). In Alexander’s expeditionary force the “Companion Cavalry” (designated as οἱ ἑταῖροι, ἡ ἵππος ἡ ἑταιρική, or οἱ ἱππεῖς οἱ ἑταῖροι) comprised 7 regionally recruited ilai and the ile basilike, which formed the King’s cavalry guard (Arr. An. 3.11.8). Diod. 17.17.4 says the number of Companions accompanying the King was 1800. Hence, the nominal strength of the ile appears to have been 225 riders (8 x 225 = 1800). But it is generally thought that the size of the ilai varied, and that the ile basilike was larger. Fuller estimates that each ile numbered from 200 to 300 horsemen armed with the xyston. This weapon was a thrusting spear, clearly distinct from the cavalry sarissa, since there would be no point in mentioning cavalry sarissophoroi as separate units. To the Companions were added four ilai

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of scouts (prodromoi) and one ile of Paionians; Plutarch (Alex. 16.2-3) speaks of Alexander “plunging into the river [→ Granikos] with thirteen ilai” (cf. Diod. 17.17.4 for prodromoi and Paionians). If the prodromoi were included in the 1800 Makedonian cavalry, then the number of men per ile would have been closer to 150 (but it is unclear whether the 900 cavalrymen mentioned by Diod. 17.17.4, a corrupt passage, are part of or additional to the 1800 Companions). Cavalry reinforcements numbered 300 at Gordion in 333 (Arr. An. 1.29.4) and 500 near Sittakene in 331 (Curt. 5.1.40-41; Diod. 17.65.1), and these more than made up for casualties. When in 331, Alexander created two lochoi in each ile (Arr. An. 3.16.11), the number of horsemen in each ile increased. The lochoi were subdivided into two tetrarchies (four per squadron; cf. Arr. An. 3.18.5). Reinforcements brought the total number of Companions and the prodromoi to about 3500-3600, an increase of roughly 30%. In Baktria-Sogdiana—or in the Indian campaign at the latest—the cavalry comprised larger units, called hipparchies, possibly as large as 1000, as the reference to → Hephaistion’s Chiliarchy (Arr. An. 7.14.10) suggests. Most of the new hipparchs were former commanders of pezhetairoi. Alexander’s army included 9000 sarissa-bearing Makedonians, 6 battalions of 1500 men recruited on a regional basis. These were known as pezhe­ tairoi (or pezetairoi), “foot-companions”, a title that had originally been given to the elite troops of Philip II, who were now renamed hypaspistai (“shield-bearers”). The majority of the pezhetairoi appear to have come from Upper Makedonia, from the mountain cantons that ringed the lower Makedonian plain. Their commanders were drawn from the leading aristocratic families, in accordance with Makedonian practice. Indeed, members of the same family succeeded each other in command, as was the case with the Tymphaian brothers Amyntas, Simmias and Attalos; cf. → Perdikkas and Alketas of Orestis. Amongst the pezhetairoi we find troops designated as asthetairoi, the meaning of which is unclear. Hammond suggested that they were astoi-hetairoi (“city companions”), whereas Griffith regarded asth- as an abbreviation of aristoi (hence “best companions”). The designation may refer to their equipment: Anson believes the name comes from the star (aster) that decorated the shield; Heckel suggests that they were the units who fought closest to the King in the battle line. In the last case, asthetairoi would have been a temporary designation. On the other hand, an explanation that involves equipment rather than kinship or honour makes it easier to explain Alexander’s creation of Persian asthetairoi. At some point in the campaign, a 7th phalanx battalion was added. If the strength of each unit 110

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remained the same, the total strength of the heavy infantry grew to 16.500 men. 3000 elite infantrymen, known as hypaspists, formed multi-purpose, crack troops, armed in the style of Greek hoplites. Unlike the regional levies, these were selected based on physique and valor and were the articulating force between heavy infantry and cavalry. More flexible and mobile than the sarissa bearers, they proved their worth in sieges, pursuits and mountain warfare; they also served as the guard and military police. The regular hypaspists were originally known as pezhetairoi, whom → Theopompos (BNJ 115 F 348) described as ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλούντο πεζέταιροι (“the tallest and strongest chosen from all Makedonians served as the king’s guards and were called pezhetairoi”). The pezhetairoi of Philip II took the name hypaspists when the name pezhetairoi was applied to the Makedonian heavy infantry. Divided into chiliarchiai (units of a thousand, i.e. 1028) and sub­divided into pentakosiarchiai (groups of 512), their commanders, like their men were selected on the basis of merit. Curtius (5.2.3-5) gives a list of 9 individuals selected in a contest of valor in Sittakene (331), of whom three were certainly appointed chiliarchs; the remainder were presumably given the subordinate rank of pentakosiarch; for a unit of 3000 would require three chiliarchs and 6 pentakosiarchs. The supreme commanders of the hypaspists, the archihypaspistai (first Nikanor and then Neoptolemos), were noblemen appointed by Alexander himself. The so-called Royal Hypaspists (hypaspistai basi­ likoi or sometimes somatophylakes basilikoi) were young noblemen directly under the King’s supervision and commanded, in the final years of the campaign, by → Seleukos son of Antiochos. The transformation of the hypaspists into ar­ gyraspids (“Silver-Shields”) appears to have occurred in → India, when new suits of armor were brought to Alexander as he returned to the → Hydaspes from the → Hyphasis (Diod. 17.95.4; Curt. 9.3.21; cf. Just. 12.7.4-5). The transformation of the hypaspists into argyraspids may represent a recognition of their service and the expectation that they would soon be demobilized. Certainly, when → Krateros left India in 325 and returned to Karmania via the Bolan Pass, he took Antigenes (and presumably his men) with him. Alexander must have prepared for this by creating new hypaspists, who accompanied him on the Gedrosian march. When → Perdikkas inherited the Royal Army in 323, he had with him a corps of hypaspists, distinct from the argyraspids (who had gone to Kilikia with Krateros); this must have been the unit formed in India to replace the → veterans. Although they saw service in the last years of Alexander’s campaigns, they

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attained fame (or infamy) in the age of the Successors. The psiloi or light-armed troops (slingers, archers, peltasts, javelin-men) were drawn from the lowest socio-­economic class of eligible fighters. They played an essential role as skirmishers in the opening stage of battle and in the fights that took place on rough terrain or against specialized opponents. Berve rightly notes that Makedonia must have produced psiloi from the earliest times and continued to supply them during Alexander’s reign. With the notable exception of the Makedonian archers (Arr. An. 3.12.2), few units are specifically identified as Makedonian, but it is virtually certain that Alexander did not rely entirely on foreign troops to supply slingers and javelin-men. Alexander often assigned Makedonian commanders to light-armed troops, but this does not reflect the ethnic composition of their forces. We find an Attalos commanding the Agrianes, a Ptolemy leading the Thracians, just as Erigyios commanded the mercenary horse and Kalas and Alexander Lynkestes were placed over the Thessalian cavalry. Diodoros (17.17.34) speaks of only 12.000 Makedonian pezoi, and these must be the 9000 pezhe­ tairoi and 3000 hypaspists. The Agrianes and the archers, according to the same account numbered only 1000. Hence, the remainder appear to be psiloi of mixed origins. Four types of non-Makedonians served in Alexander’s army: allies from the regions within the Makedonian political orbit; members of the → Korinthian League; the ubiquitous mercenaries; and, finally, Persian contingents. The terms of service of the first were dictated, to a great extent, by Alexander himself, those of the second group by the League’s official recognition of the war against Persia. The Thessalian cavalry, who, like the Companions, numbered 1800, were routinely stationed on the left wing and under the general command of → Parme­ nion. These were subdivided in much the same way as the Companions. Diodo­ ros (17.21.4 and 17.60.8) speaks of Thessalian ilai (eilai) without indicating how many such squadrons there were: we may assume they comprised 8 ilai, one of which formed Parmenion’s guard (and was commanded by Polydamas). Apart from Polydamas, no other Thessalian ilarch is known by name, with the possible exception of Ariston of Pharsalos. 200 additional Thessalians joined Alexander at Gordion. All Thessalians units were dismissed in 330 at Ekbatana and escorted to the Aegean coast without their horses (Arr. An. 3.19.5-6); later, many of them fought against Makedonia in the Lamian War. The remainder of the League allies supplied 600 horsemen, according to Diodoros (17.17.4). Their normal position in the battle line was to the left of Krateros’ battalion of pezhetairoi and to the right of the Thessalians. The men themselves came primarily from the 112

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Peloponnese, although we hear of 150 Eleians, joined Alexander at Gordion in 333 (Arr. An. 1.29.4), as well as Lokrians, Malians, Phokians (Diod. 17.57.3; Curt. 4.13.29), and a group of Boiotians from Orchomenos (IG VII, 3206). Thracian horsemen, who were not members of the League, also served. Even if we ignore the corrupt passage in Diod. 17.17.4, there is evidence of Thracian cavalrymen on the march from Ephesos to Miletos (Arr. An. 1.18.3), presumably those commanded by Agathon son of Tyrimmas. 500 additional Thracian cavalry joined Alexander in → Egypt in 331 (Arr. An. 3.5.1). We cannot be sure of the origins of the mercenary cavalry. Diodoros mentions only mercenary infantry, but Arrian (An. 1.23.6) tells us that Ptolemy (probably the son of Philippos) was left in → Karia with 3000 mercenary infantry and 200 cavalry (the latter, as the structure of the Greek sentence implies, also mercenaries). 400 mercenaries arrived in → Egypt (331) under the command of Menoitas son of Hegesandros. If Menoitas is a scribal error for Menidas, then these 400 may be identical with the mercenary cavalry at → Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.12.3); the other mercenary horse under Andromachos son of Hieron (Arr. An. 3.12.5) may be what remained of the squadrons that crossed the → Hellespont in 334. Non-Greek horsemen became increasingly important in the campaigns of Central Asia, and they account for the swelling of troops numbers in India (Curt. 8.5.4 says “120.000 armed men,” it’s doubtless an exaggeration). The hippakontistai (mounted javelin-men) are first attested in Hyrkania (Arr. An. 3.24.1) and appear to be of non-Greek origin: Satibarzanes’ slaughtering of 40 hippakonistai with Anaxippos may seem surprising but it probably says more about their loyalties than their origins. The hippotoxotai (mounted archers) were certainly non-European troops and comprised about 1000 horsemen of Skythian origin (Arr. An. 5.16.4). Whereas other units were used in combination with Makedonian troops as early as the campaign in the Upper Satrapies, the epigonoi are a different breed, not yet integrated into the army and envisioned by Alexander, who allegedly had become disillusioned with his Makedonians, as a counterweight (an antitagma) to them (Just. 12.4.2-11 mistakenly regards them as children born and raised in the camps). These were 30.000 young men of “Persian” origin, recruited and trained in different parts of the empire in the Makedonian fashion. Diodoros (17.108.1-3) claims that Alexander wished to form such a counter-unit after his experience at the → Hyphasis (wrongly “the crossing of the Ganges”), but this occurred too late to affect Alexander’s decision about the formation of the unit, though it may have reinforced the need for such an antitagma. Other non-Greek troops were

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trained for service in the army, for example, the basileioi paides, 6000 young men trained in Egypt. This may have been the origin of the paides found serving in → Eumenes’ army (Plut. Eum. 3.5; Diod. 19.28.3), although they must have been integrated into the Makedonian army before Alexander’s death, since → Ptolemy I would not have released such troops from his satrapy to be used by his political enemies.   W. Heckel Cf. Berve 1926, I, 103-217; Fuller, J.F.C., The Generalship of Alexander the Great, 1960, 39-54; Heckel 2016, 260-80; Heckel, W., The Three Thousand: Alexander’s Infantry Guard, in: Campbell, B./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, 2013, 162-78; Olbrycht, M., The Epigonoi—The Iranian Phalanx of Alexander the Great, in: Heckel et al. 2015, 196-212.

Arrhidaios (Philip III) Arrhidaios was the son of → Philip II and his—likely → Aleuad—wife Philinna from Larisa (Athen. 13.557C; Just. 13.2.11). Claims that she was a lowborn concubine and A. illegitimate (Plut. Alex. 77.5; Just. 9.8.2) are erroneous by-products of the Greek and Roman misunderstanding of polygamous marriage politics. While the sources attest A.’s intellectual disability (Diod. 18.2.2; Heidel. Epit., FGrH 155 F 1.2), the descriptions are too imprecise to know about its nature (syndromic or non-syndromic). Plutarch mentions A.’s infant-like behaviour (Mor. 337 D-E). Otherwise, A. is described as gentle (Just. 13.2.8), able to perform a public role’s basic functions when being instructed and guided (Curt. 10.7.7-8.20, 9.16-19), but also as impulsive and in need of control (Plut. Phok. 33.5-6). The tale that A. was a healthy child until → Olympias gave him mind-­ destroying drugs (Plut. Alex. 77.5) is a hostile retrospective fiction. A. was treated as a part of the dynasty. Preparing his Persian campaign, in 337, Philip apparently tried to connect with Pixodaros, satrap of → Karia, by a marital bond between A. and the latter’s daughter Ada. The report that A.’s (perhaps slightly younger) half-brother → Alexander III sabotaged the plan by telling Pixodaros that A. was illegitimate and lacked sense will be a retrospective distortion (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3). The plan likely came to naught because of the Great King’s intervention (Strab. 14.2.17). When Philip died (336), apparently, nobody advocated A.’s succession. Alexander and his faction probably saw A. as too harmless to 114

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be killed but as too much exposed to exploitation by others to be uncontrolled. Thus, regarding the uncertainty whether A. accompanied Alexander to Asia in 334 or was summoned there later, the former is more likely. Alexander took care that A. did not marry, produce children (potential rivals), and got his own faction. Curtius mentions that A. acted as Alexander’s “associate in sacrifices and ceremonies” (10.7.2). After Alexander’s death (323), the conflicts about the → succession were settled by the consensus that A. who had been acclaimed under the name Philip (stressing his descent) at → Babylon was recognized as king (Curt. 10.7.7), together with Alexander’s presumed son by the pregnant → Rhoxane (Curt. 10.10.1; Just. 13.4.3; Arr. Succ. F 1.1; Heidel. Epit., FGrH 155 F 1.1). There were coins and dedications (such as on Samothrake) in A.’s name but his rule was formal. The throne name, for which there existed no Argead tradition hints at his lack of standing. According to the Babylon settlement, Krateros (who was not present) became A.’s prostates (guardian), but in fact → Perdikkas had A. in his custody. In 322/1, Kynnane, A.’s half-sister, came to Asia to arrange the marriage of her daughter Adea to A. When Perdikkas tried to prevent it by having Kynnane murdered, the infuriated Makedonian troops supported the marriage. Subsequently, the couple was dragged along by A.’s alternating guardians using him as a puppet and acting in his name: Perdikkas († 321/20), Antipatros († 319) who took them to Makedonia and → Polyperchon (Diod. 18.48.4). The latter exhibited A. on Alexander’s → throne to receive Greek envoys (Plut. Phok. 33.5-7). When Polyperchon instigated Olympias’ return to Makedonia (318), Adea (and with her A.) turned to Kassandros (Just. 14.5.1-4). At the battle of Euia (317), the couple was deserted by the army and afterwards eliminated in A.’s 7th regnal year (Diod. 19.11.5; Just. 14.5.10). Using them for being associated with the Argeads and Philip II’s heritage, Kassandros buried them honourably at → Aigai (Athen. 4.155A).   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 2002, 34-50; Carney, E.D., The Trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus, AHB 15 (2001), 63-89; Heckel 2006, 52-3.

Art, Makedonian There is no record of native Makedonian artists in the Argead kingdom; their visual culture was developed by artists attracted from other regions, notably →

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Athens and Sikyon. The trend was set by → Archelaos, who hired the famous painter Zeuxis, active in Athens in the late 5th c. It is remarkable that he did not commission him to decorate a temple as would have been expected but his house (Ail. VH 14.17). In this he may have followed in the footsteps of Alkibiades, who forced Agatharchos to paint his house in Athens, thus causing a scandal (Andok. 4.17; Plut. Alk. 16.4). The Argead kings dedicated their portraits in panhellenic sanctuaries, beginning with → Alexander I, who set up his golden image at Delphi, probably in the aftermath of the → Persian Wars of 480/79 (Hdt. 8.121). The artist’s name is unknown but other Argead dynastic portraits were commissioned from famous Greek sculptors. → Philip II dedicated a family group by the Athenian sculptor Leochares in the → Philippeion at Olympia (Paus. 5.20.910), while → Alexander III commissioned from the Sikyonian sculptor Lysippos a bronze group of himself and his Companions who fell at the battle of the → Granikos River to be set up in the sanctuary of Zeus at → Dion (Plin. NH 34.64; Plut. Alex. 16.8). In addition, he dedicated his portrait with the thunderbolt of Zeus, painted by Apelles of Ephesos, in the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesos (Plin. NH 35.92; Plut. Alex. 4.1). Such portraits are not, properly speaking, Makedonian art. Extant art in Makedonia of the Argeads is not found in public spaces but comes mainly from funerary and domestic contexts with a few exceptions. Among the earliest examples of sculpture produced for the Argeads are the 26 life-size clay heads of men and women from a queen’s → burial in Vergina/ → Aigai. They date from around 480 and belong to the Severe Style. All female heads are identical, while the male heads reproduce two distinct types. They have been interpreted as underworld deities but may well be idealized repre­ sentations of the deceased and her relatives by comparison with the custom of offering images of the deceased and his/her friends recorded in the case of → Hephaistion’s funeral pyre in Babylon (Diod. 17.115.1; Arr. An. 7.14.9). Marble grave reliefs of the late 5th c. from the cemeteries of → Pella and Vergina show warriors or children and exhibit affinities with either Thessalian or Athenian prototypes. In the 4th-c. grave reliefs from the two capitals of Makedonia are strongly Atticizing and may be attributed to itinerant Athenian artists. Some take the form of funerary naiskoi with side panels in relief, in imitation of Attic examples. A votive relief from Pella dedicated by a certain Diogenes to the heroized Hephaistion (pl. 3, fig. 3) follows the usual formula of the hero leading his horse and preparing for a libation, with a (nameless) heroine holding a box of incense and pouring wine into his phiale. There is no attempt at portraiture 116

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which is understandable since the sculptor of the relief had probably never seen Hephaistion. The relief is nevertheless evidence of a cult of Hephaistion founded in Pella on Alexander’s orders. Other 4th-c. sculptures from a sacred context come from the sanctuary of Eukleia in Vergina, which is associated with the Argeads by means of two inscribed statue bases set up by Eurydike, wife of Amyntas III. Three monumental sculptures in Pentelic marble, perhaps dating from the reign of Philip II, were found in a sacred deposit in the sanctuary. An over-life-size goddess wearing a peplos (pl. 3, fig. 1) and reminiscent of Kephi­ sodotos’ cult statue of Eirene and Ploutos in the Athenian Agora exhibits Athenian influence and is possibly of Athenian manufacture. A head of a youthful goddess with a lampadion hairstyle is akin to images of Artemis on votive reliefs from Brauron, while the head of a youthful god or hero is also of Attic style. That Eukleia was not the only deity worshipped in the sanctuary is attested by a dedi­ cation of queen Laodike to an unnamed male god. The most significant artworks from the Argead kingdom are the funerary wall-paintings found in three underground tombs covered by the Great Tumulus of Vergina, Tombs I, II and III. Tomb I was looted but Tombs II and III were found intact with a wealth of burial goods suggesting royal ownership. The tombs are dated to the second half of the 4th c. and associated with the Argead dynasty though the identity of their owners is a matter of controversy. Vergina Tomb I or the Tomb of Persephone, is the earliest painted tomb in Makedonia known so far. It is a cist tomb, its three walls decorated with the rape of Persephone (pl. 3, fig. 4), her mother Demeter and the three Moirai. The introduction of a religious theme in funerary art is an innovation and the descent of Persephone into the Underworld suggests that the tomb owner was an initiate of Demeter’s mystery cult. Hades is shown carrying Persephone on a four-horse chariot. Her companion crouches in amazement behind the chariot, while Hermes leads the way to the Underworld. Zeus’ thunderbolt crashes ahead of him, indicating divine approval. The painter has used the four-colour palette of red, black, yellow and white, mixed in a very effective way. He has outlined his composition on the wet plaster, marking his work with incisions and hatching. The impressionistic style, expert composition and accomplished pictorial technique, which anticipates the al fresco technique, point to an artist from Greece, invited to execute a special commission. Because Roman versions of this painting survived in Rome and elsewhere, it has been suggested that it drew on a religious painting in Athens, which was later removed to Rome. The prototype is attributed to the painter Nikomachos (who is known

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to have painted a panel with the Rape of Persephone) and the Vergina fresco to one of his assistants. Vergina Tomb II belongs to the category of Makedonian tombs, being covered with a barrel-vault. It was built later than Tomb I and is dated between 336 and 316 depending on the identification of its owner. Philip II or his son Philip III Arrhidaios are the two main candidates. The façade carries a painted hunting frieze (pl. 3, fig. 2) executed in an egg-tempera technique, again by an accomplished artist who came from one of the artistic centres of Greece. Even though damaged, the frieze is a masterpiece of Greek art. The painter used a variety of pigments, including green and blue, to great effect. We do not know if this wall-painting was based on a monumental panel painting like the Rape of Persephone in Tomb I. It is at any rate a secular rather than a religious artwork and its topic may be properly described as Makedonian. The theme of the multi-quarry mounted → hunt was developed in the funerary monuments of the satrapal courts of Asia Minor from the 6th c. on. The Vergina hunt introduces the theme to this side of the Aegean and is generally thought to illustrate a scene or scenes from the court of the Argeads; it is therefore a historical painting. The question of portraiture does not arise as the figures are idealized; there have nevertheless been attempts to recognize historical figures based on sartorial differentiations. The youthful horseman wearing a short purple chiton on the axis of the painting, crowned with laurel and thrusting his javelin at a distant → lion, is commonly identified with Alexander III, while the only bearded hunter, about to spear the lion at close quarters, is thought to be the king buried in the tomb. The hunt was obviously of special significance to the deceased as it also decorated his gold and ivory funerary couch found in the main chamber of Tomb II. The composition of the hunting frieze involves 10 hunters, three on horseback, 6 beasts and 9 dogs. It takes place in a rocky landscape dotted with trees and consists of episodes centred on different animals. From left to right we see two naked youths hunting a pair of deer, followed by a pair of youths hunting a boar with javelins in a sacred grove. The central episode is a lion hunt involving four hunters, while two more hunters pursue two bears at the extreme right. The beasts hunted here could only be found together in the game parks of the Persian Empire. Polybios (31.29) records a game park in Makedonia in the 2nd c. but we do not know if this was introduced after Alexan­ der’s conquest of Asia and whether it contained lions. A Persian game park would suggest a hunt taking place during Alexander’s Asian campaign. Or the frieze may be interpreted as a compendium of isolated episodes taking place in differ118

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ent countries at different times of the year and probably illustrating different hunting expeditions in the life of the deceased. The boar hunt set in a sacred grove recalls the coming-of-age ritual recorded by Athenaios (1.18A): Makedonian males did not reach adulthood until they had killed a boar. As Persian game parks were secular, the sacred space of the boar hunt points to a Makedonian locale. Lion and bear hunts are not attested in Makedonia; these two episodes may therefore be set in Asia. If Vergina Tomb II belonged to Philip II, it would be difficult to account for the lion and bear hunts and the presence of his son Alexander III on the axis of the painting could only be attributed to the fact that he commissioned the painting. If, on the other hand, the tomb belongs to Philip III Arrhidaios, the painting could be one of the many artworks commissioned by Alexander’s Successors in commemoration of their participation in his Asian campaign. Alexander’s image in the centre may well reflect heroization and his youthful age would be typical of his posthumous portraiture. The adjacent Vergina Tomb III, also a Makedonian tomb crowned with a barrel vault, housed the cremated remains of a teenage boy. The wealth of the burial goods has prompted the attribution to → Alexander IV; it is therefore dated around 309. The façade was decorated with a frieze painted on a wooden panel which has now been lost. We may assume that it was a high-quality work, perhaps painted elsewhere and shipped to Vergina. The antechamber contained a wall-painting of a chariot frieze, no doubt a record of funeral games. A sculptured chariot frieze, also showing two-horse chariots, formed part of a now lost funerary monument in Vergina. The pebble mosaics of Vergina and Pella probably date from the last years of the dynasty. Their high quality ranks them among the finest mosaics of the early Hellenistic period. Their compositions are light on dark, with figures outlined in lead or clay strips and eyes inlaid in semi-precious stones (now lost). The figures step on ground lines with no other landscape elements. The elaborate floral decoration of a mosaic in the palace of Vergina, another in the sanctuary of Darron in Pella and in the border of a stag hunt mosaic in a mansion in Pella are all reminiscent of a mosaic floor in Sikyon and may draw on the floral patterns of Pausias of Sikyon, a famous flower painter (Plin. NH 35.123). The Pella mosaic of Helen’s abduction by Theseus, on the other hand, can be attributed to an Athenian artist, judging by the choice of myth. The figures are named: Theseus carries Helen to a four-horse chariot driven by Phorbas, in a scene familiar from classical Attic vase-paintings illustrating weddings. The stag hunt mosaic from Pella is signed by Gnosis, a rare artist’s signature in Argead Make-

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donia and the earliest signature in mosaic. An unsigned lion hunt by two men on foot may evoke one of Alexander’s lion hunts in Asia. Even though the figures are highly idealized, the hunter wearing a petasos on the left is usually identified with Alexander though the lion looks the other way. A very fine mosaic of Dionysos riding a panther (pl. 3, fig. 5) from the same house in Pella shows the god naked but for a crown of vine leaves and an anklet. The panther leaps forward, about to reach its goal. The mosaic may be a mythical allusion to Alexander’s conquest of → India, following in the footsteps of Dionysos.   O. Palagia Cf. Borza/Palagia 2007; Damaskos, D., The Sculpture of Macedonia, in: Palagia, O. (ed.), Handbook of Greek Sculpture, 2019, 503-35; Kottaridi/Walker 2011; Palagia 2011; Palagia, O., Visualising the Gods in Macedonia: from Philip II to Perseus, in: Iossif, P.P./ van de Put, W. (eds.), Greek Iconographies: Identities and Media in Context, Pharos 22 (2016), 73-98.

Asia Minor Asia Minor was a region that had twofold importance for the Argeads, real and symbolic. The position of this peninsula between the Black Sea, the → Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean made it the natural bridge to inner Asia beyond the mountains of Tauros, the upper valley of Euphrates and the mountains of Armenia. A. M.’s fragmented geography made it not easy to control and its demographic diversity made it a mosaic of peoples and civilizations, some of them with a millenary history already under the Argeads. Under the Achaimenids, A. M. represented 5 out of 20 satrapies with a contribution of more than 2500 talents to the royal treasury (Hdt. 3.90-94) based in Sardeis, which was the end of the royal road from Sousa. During the late 5th and 4th c. this city was a strong post of the Achaimenid administration, the seat of a karanos, probably the highest Persian officer in Western A. M. (held also by Kyros the Younger). → Philip II, in his ambition to extend his control over the Northern Aegean and eventually the coast of A. M. was confronted with Achaimenid interests in the NW of A. M. In his quest for extension to the east, the Greek cities of the Aegean coast of A. M. could be useful allies. Local civic communities, like Ephesos, Miletos, and Priene, as well as local dynasts (e.g., Pixodaros and Ada in → Karia), were possible allies against the Persian king, however the loyalty of these communi120

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ties and persons to Persian rule was still strong. That is why Philip II tried via → Aristotle to strengthen his relation to Hermeias, tyrant of Atarneus/Assos, in the Aiolis, in order to create a foothold for an eventual intervention in the broader region of Troas. This region was the closest to the European coast of the → Hellespont and therefore the ideal place for a debarkation. It was also the place of the Homeric heroes and the reminiscence of the Trojan War in nearby Ilion could facilitate Philip’s propaganda of a Panhellenic crusade against the ancestral enemy, and eventually his styling himself as a new Agamemnon. This project was realized by → Alexander III. The “liberation” of the Greeks in A. M. became the central part of his propaganda, in the name of the revenge for Persian atrocities of the last 15 decades, especially during the → Persian Wars (Diod. 16.89.1). For Alexan­der, crossing the Hellespont as a new Protesilaos, represented a heroic past. “Conquered by spear”, this land became eventually the symbol of all Asia and the future sovereignty over the conquered territory. The other key gesture was solving the → Gordian knot which would guarantee supremacy over Asia. Gordion, in the centre of the Anatolian plateau, was considered the homeland of Midas, the king—synonymous with wealth. Midas was present in the → foundation myth of the Argead dynasty, and his name represented the fertility and abundance of a territory, a notion also important to Hellenistic royal ideology. In the spring of 334, the military machine that Philip had built, strengthened by troops of Greek cities, assembled at Sestos on the north coast of Hellespont. The transportation of approximately 30.000 soldiers and 5000 horse to Abydos on the opposite coast was effected relatively easily, while the piety shown by Alexander towards Poseidon aimed at the propitiation of the Hellespont and the portrayal of himself as an anti-Xerxes. For the young king an opportunity for a pilgrimage to Ilion, the land of his mythical ancestor, → Achilles, was a kind of evocation of the past. Dareios’ satraps deployed their forces at the river → Granikos, despite → Memnon of Rhodos’ objections; he was the supreme commander of the Persian navy and wanted to implement a scorched earth tactic, that is, to tolerate the greatest possible penetration of the Greco-Makedonian forces into the mainland of A. M., at the same time destroying any possible source of supplies in the interior of the land, and also cutting off their supply from Makedonia and Greece with his powerful navy. The east bank of the river was relatively steep and lent itself to deploying their forces so as to stop any Makedonian advance. However, the superiority of the Makedonian army against the relatively inexperienced mercenary army of the Persians resulted in the decimation of the latter, while the Greek mercenaries of

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the satraps were surrounded and slaughtered. Those who survived, about 2000, were taken prisoner and would become a means for Alexander to put pressure on the Greek cities. The first act of “revenge” for the hybris of the Persians against the Greeks was successful, as expressed by the famous inscription for the offering of 300 Persian panoplies to the Akropolis of → Athens. The way for the conquest of the remainder of A. M. was open. On the sea, however, Memnon’s presence was very strong. He had at least 300 ships at his disposal, manned by experienced crews from Ionia, Kypros, and Phoinikia, while the ships of the Makedonian → fleet were less than half that number. Evaluating this state of affairs, and knowing that he would never risk a naval battle, Alexander decided to focus his efforts on land, and he dismantled his fleet, keeping only a few ships for transportation. This move was strategically controversial, because the Aegean was essentially left to the Persian navy. Alexander moved towards the south coast of A. M., after he had conquered Lydia and Sardeis, Ephesos, Miletos, and almost all Greek cities of the west coast except for Halikarnassos, the siege of which was cut short. In the areas and cities he conquered, he mostly adopted the existing system of administration, readjusted the tribute, and replaced the officials with persons he trusted (Arr. An. 1.18.2). In any case, it was impossible to effect dramatic structural changes, since his first priority was the progress of the campaign. Oracles such as at Xanthos, and prodigies like that at the Pamphylian Sea, sealed his victory (probably ex eventu), and indicated that the local priesthoods as well as local elites were keen to collaborate with the new strongman. After securing the southwestern coasts, in the winter of 334/33 he marched towards the centre of A. M., in order to control its heartland, Phrygia. Such a course would temporarily lead him away from his strategic aim, which was a clash with Dareios himself, and it shows that he probably wanted to follow in part the footsteps of the Ten Thousand. The incident at Gordion, where Alexander is said to have cut the knot of the chariot, sought to emphasize his claim over the whole continent. After reaching Kilikia in the summer of 333, Alexander learned that Dareios was assembling an army in order to stop him when he entered Syria. On the Aegean front, the sudden death of Memnon removed a serious destabilizing factor for the conquered territories. His successor was Pharnabazos who had to send forces to Dareios who was preparing for the great battle. Pharnabazos carried on the counterattack. In August of the same year, the most elite forces of the central satrapies headed for the gulf of → Issos, the southeastern frontier of A. M. By that time, a great part of northern (Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Sinope), central 122

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(Lykia), and eastern (Pontos) A. M. remained practically unconquered and Kappadokia became the centre of Persian resistance. Only under the Diodochs was it fully subdued.   E. Koulakiotis Cf. Bosworth 1988; Briant 1996; Marek, C., In the Land of a Thousand Gods, 2016; Sartre, M., L’Anatolie hellénistique, 2003.

asthetairoi   see Army organization ateleia Like all state structures, Argead Makedonia depended for its functioning on the raising of taxes to fund the process of governance. Besides local and civic taxes, taxes were raised by the kings to fund the central government and the army: most important were a 10 percent tax on the produce of royal land, and import and export taxes. As royal taxes, the king also had the right to grant exemptions; and a., exemption from taxation, was one of the most important privileges the king might grant. After the Battle of the → Granikos in 334, → Alexander III awarded a. with respect to the phoros (tribute on produce of the land) and all other property taxes to the widows and children of the Makedonians who had died in the battle (Arr. An. 1.16.5). The granting of such a. to widows and orphans of war dead may have been the norm in Argead Makedonia: Alexander seems to imply in his speech at → Opis that the same award was made with respect to all Makedonians who had died in the campaigns (Arr. An. 7.10.14). At times a., especially with respect to import and export taxes, might be granted to favoured individuals: inscriptions preserve several cases of such awards during or immediately after the reigns of Philip II, Alexander III, Philip III, and Alexander IV (Syll.³ 332; SEG 47.893; 940). The first of these documents associates a. with the awarding of estates (→ dorea). Such awards seem to have been rare, however: most dorea we know of continued to owe the royal taxes.   R. Billows Cf. Hatzopoulos 1996, I, 436-40; Rubinstein, L., Ateleia Grants and their Enforcement in the Classical and Early Hellenistic Periods, in: Mitchell, L./Rubinstein, L. (eds.), Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honor of P.J. Rhodes, 2009, 115-43.

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Athena   see Deities Athens Located between Athens and the source of her grain supply in the Black Sea region, and endowed with rich natural resources that included minerals as well as → timber, a vital resource for the construction of ships, Makedonia could not be ignored by the Athenians, setting the stage for eventual conflict between the two powers. The first contact between Athens and Makedonia possibly occurred in the mid-6th c., during the second exile of the tyrant Peisistratos, when he founded a settlement at Rhaikelos in the eastern → Thermaic Gulf ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2; Hdt. 1.64.1). Although it is unclear if the reigning Argead king co-­ operated or at least acquiesced in this foundation, the details of which are obscure, the events of the next generation suggest that the Argeads and the → Peisistra­tids may have been linked through xenia, as was standard among elite families in Archaic Greece. Makedonia became a client kingdom of Persia after ca. 513, and it is probably at this time that the Argeads expanded their territory to the Strymon river (Thuc. 2.99.3-4). It was in his capacity as a Persian hyparchos (Hdt. 5.20.4) that → Amyntas I offered to give Hippias, Peisistratos’ son and heir, who had taken refuge in Persia after his expulsion from Athens in 511/0, the district of Anthemous (Hdt. 5.94.1), in the Chalkidike near Rhaikelos, an area clearly under Makedonian control by this point (Hippias declined the offer in order to settle in Sigeion, closer to his base of support in Persia). The cordial relationship between the Argeads and Athens survived the expulsion of Hippias (and the subsequent Persian attempt to reinstate him), for Themistokles, who may have had a personal connection of his own with the Argeads (as implied by Thuc. 1.137.1-2; Plut. Them. 25.2), capitalized on it to acquire the timber required for the construction of the Athenian fleet that ultimately played a crucial role in the defeat of the Persians at Salamis. The Persian commander Mardonios sent Amyntas’ successor → Alexander I to negotiate with Athens shortly thereafter on the grounds that he was both proxenos and euergetes (benefactor) of the Athenians (Hdt. 8.136.1). Although → Herodotos emphasizes his alleged (but necessarily secret) loyalty to his fellow Hellenes in general and the Athenians in particular during the → Persian Wars (almost certainly reflecting Alexander’s own subsequent propaganda), he remained a faithful ally of the Persians, for 124

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Herodotos has the Spartan ambassadors to Athens in 479 describe him as “a tyrant collaborating with a tyrant” (8.142.4-5), a view no doubt shared by many contemporary Athenians. In the aftermath of the Persian Wars, Athens’ increasingly imperialistic ambitions (and need for timber) led to a stronger presence in the northern Aegean, leading to tension as the Athenians began to compete with the Argeads for control of the region’s rich resources (and perhaps not coincidentally Themistokles suffered a decline in influence at Athens, resulting eventually in his ostracism and exile). In the mid-470s, on the pretext of expelling the Persians, the Athenian commander Kimon seized control of Eïon (Thuc. 1.98.1; Hdt. 7.107), strategically located at the mouth of the Strymon river, and repopulated it with Athenian settlers (Plut. Kim. 7.3). The following decade, during their nearly three-year siege of Thasos, the Athenians sent 10.000 settlers to Ennea Hodoi (near the future site of → Amphipolis), an easily defensible location upstream from Eïon, but the enterprise failed disastrously when the settlers attempted to advance into the interior and were massacred by the Thracians (Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.2-3). Although Kimon was successful in his reduction of Thasos, and gained control of the markets and lucrative mines on the Thracian coast (Thuc. 1.101.3; Plut. Kim. 14.2), he was (unsuccessfully) prosecuted by his political rivals upon his return to Athens for accepting bribes from Alexander for failing to invade Makedonia (Plut. Kim. 14.2-3). This allegation of “Makedonian gold” marks the first appearance on the political scene in Athens of what came to be a stereotypical way to score points against rival politicians in the age of → Demosthenes and → Aischines. By the final years of the reign of Alexander I, the Athenians became distracted from their empire-building efforts in the northern Aegean by the outbreak of hostilities against the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies on mainland Greece, as well as simultaneous naval campaigns against the Persians in Egypt and → Kypros. This large-scale naval activity required timber and pitch for the maintenance of the fleet, and it is likely that Makedonia continued to supply the Athenians with the forest products that were necessary. Alexander died in the late 450s, and his son, → Perdikkas II, experienced what seems to have been a prolonged accession crisis. During this period of weakness the Athenians made further inroads into Makedonia’s sphere of influence, incorporating cities on the → Thermaic Gulf and the Chalkidike into the Delian League, establishing settlements in the Strymon valley, and possibly even settling Euboian refugees in Makedonia itself (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 387), although it is possible that Perdikkas considered his hostile Thracian neighbours

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to be more of an immediate threat, and acquiesced in the Athenian presence as a counterweight in the region. The amicable relationship of the early years of Perdikkas’ reign (at least from Athens’ perspective: Thuc. 1.57.3) changed by the 430s, when the Athenians became concerned with controlling access to timber and other ship-building materials in preparation for the imminent war with → Sparta. They founded Amphipolis in 437/6 which offered them a foothold into the hinterland of the Strymon (Thuc. 4.102), and then made an alliance with Perdikkas’ domestic rivals (Thuc. 1.57.2-3), who could also supply them with timber. Alarmed by these aggressive Athenian actions threatening his own security, Perdikkas struck back by fomenting rebellion against the Athenians in the northern Aegean, and encouraging the smaller coastal cities in the Chalkidike to join together and form a strong centre at → Olynthos (Thuc. 1.58.2), laying the foundations for the future Chalkidian League to become an effective anti-Athenian bulwark in the region. In response, the Athenians sent a force north, forcing Perdikkas into a hasty agreement and alliance, which did not stop them from immediately attacking Makedonian towns and co-operating with Perdikkas’ domestic foes (Thuc. 1.61.3-4); it is not surprising that Perdikkas immediately renounced this alliance (Thuc. 1.62.1-2). This rapid switching of allegiance sets the tone for Perdikkas’ relations with Athens during the → Peloponnesian War, as he struggled to maintain the integrity of his kingdom through a combination of astute diplomacy and calculated aggression, though his efforts were portrayed by the Greek sources as duplicitous and opportunistic. Most notably, Perdikkas initiated negotiations with the Spartans (Thuc. 4.79.1-3; 4.82), culminating in Brasidas’ successful (and permanent, as it turned out) detachment of Amphipolis from Athens. The loss of Amphipolis not only changed the course of the war, but also deprived the Athenians of a significant source of timber, forcing them once again to rely upon Perdikkas, as is documented by a fragmentary Athenian decree (IG I3 89) recording (yet another) alliance and requiring him to export oars exclusively to Athens. It is probably around this time that the comic poet Hermippos quips that Perdikkas exported to Athens ships full of lies (PCG 5 F 63.8). Perdikkas’ successor → Archelaos enjoyed a more positive image, not least because his own interests aligned much more closely with those of the Athenians, particularly in the aftermath of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, when the Athenians had to rebuild their fleet. In 411, Archelaos offered the Athenian orator Andokides, with whom he had a longstanding connection of xenia, the right to cut and export Makedonian timber, 126

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from which he supplied oars at cost to the democratic fleet at Samos (Andok. 2.11). The following year, an Athenian fleet under the command of Theramenes provided reinforcements to Archelaos during his siege of → Pydna (Diod. 13.49.1-2). This military assistance, as well as the ongoing Athenian need for timber during their extensive naval campaigns in the final years of the Peloponnesian War, explains the conciliatory tone of a fragmentary Athenian decree of 407/6, in which Archelaos and his sons are honoured as benefactors for supplying oars and providing facilities in Makedonia (and presumably timber as well) for shipbuilding (IG I3 117). Makedonia was unable to benefit fully from Archelaos’ consolidation of his kingdom and careful cultivation of the Athenians, however, because he died suddenly ca. 399, plunging Makedonia into internal chaos. When → Amyntas III finally secured his hold on the → throne, he (like Perdikkas) allied himself with whichever Greek power best served his immediate interests, including the adoption of the capable Athenian mercenary commander Iphikrates (Aischin. 2.28). By the early 370s, renewed Athenian naval strength (along with the need for timber) after the foundation of the Second Athenian Sea League meant that Athenian and Makedonian interests coincided once again. Amyntas signed an alliance with Athens (IG II2 102), which presumably included formalization of the sale of Makedonian timber to Athens (Xen. Hell. 6.1.11); Amyntas is also recorded to have supplied timber (possibly as a private arrangement) to the Athenian commander Timotheos ([Dem.] 49.26). During the dynastic intrigues that followed the death of Amyntas, Iphikrates hoped to take advantage of his ties with Makedonia to regain Amphipolis for Athens, but was ultimately unsuccessful (Aischin. 2.27-30), and not even Timo­ theos, who extended Athenian influence throughout the northern Aegean in the late 360s, was able to take the city. After the accession of → Philip II, his rapid expansion in the northern Aegean collided with Athenian interests in the region, culminating in outright war in 357 when Philip seized Amphipolis and refused to return it (Isok. 5.2; Aischin. 2.70), despite having previously claimed that he was not interested in the city (Diod. 16.4.1; Dem. 2.6-7; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 30, who alleged that he secretly promised it to Athens). Embroiled in the Social War (357-55), the Athenians were unable to prevent him from gaining control over the rest of the Thermaic Gulf or to intervene effectively on behalf of their Phokian allies when Philip entered the → Third Sacred War, apart from preventing him and his army from proceeding south through Thermopylai in 352 (Dem. 19.84, 319; Diod. 16.38.1-2; Just. 8.2.8-12). Similarly, when Philip invaded

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the Chalkidike in 349/8 and 348, the Athenians offered only lackluster assistance to Olynthos; Philip sacked the city and dissolved the Chalkidic League, depriving the Athenians of their only potential ally against Makedonia in the north. It was too little too late when the Athenians subsequently attempted to foment a panhellenic coalition against Makedonia, and they were unable to gain support from the other poleis. In 346, an Athenian embassy that included both → Aischines and → Demosthenes negotiated with Philip for peace terms, resulting in the → Peace of Philokrates, in which the Athenians agreed to renounce any claim to Amphipolis (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 166). It did not take long for the Athenians to regret the peace, not least due to the anti-Makedonia agitation of Demosthenes, and they rejected all of Philip’s subsequent attempts to amend the peace terms. In the meantime, Philip’s campaigns in → Thrace and the → Hellespont, particularly his sieges of Perinthos and Byzantion, brought him into open conflict with the Athenians once again, who were concerned for their grain supply, culminating in his seizure of an Athenian grain fleet in 340 (Dem. 18.73, 139; Theopomp., BNJ F 115 F 292; Philoch., BNJ 328 F 162; Diod. 16.77.2). Philip soon took advantage of the outbreak of a new conflict in Greece, the Fourth Sacred War, to march south with his army, which allowed Demosthenes to galvanize both Athens and → Thebes against Makedonia (Plut. Dem. 17.4-18.4), culminating in Philip’s decisive defeat of the coalition of Greek poleis at → Chaironeia in 338 (Diod. 16.85.3-86; Plut. Alex. 9.2). In need of the Athenian fleet for his upcoming campaign against Persia, Philip treated the Athenians mildly (Diod. 16.87.3; Just. 9.4.4-5), although he did require them to disband their (already virtually defunct) naval confederacy (Paus. 1.25.3) and like the other Greek poleis (with the exception of Sparta) they were forced to join the → Korinthian League, which despite its panhellenic symbolism operated as an instrument of Makedonian hege­ mony. As Pausanias comments (1.25.3), the Athenians remained passive throughout the reigns of Philip and Alexander, revolting only after the sudden death of Alexander. Despite the bias of the Greek sources, who portray the Argead kings as duplicitous and aggressive, outright conflict between Athens and Makedonia can generally be traced instead to the Athenian desire to control the abundant natural resources of the north Aegean, particularly timber.   F. Pownall Cf. Borza 1990; Mari 2011; Müller 2016; Psoma 2014; Xydopoulos 2012.

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Attalos Attalos, a Makedonian general under → Philip II, was → Parmenion’s son-inlaw (Curt. 6.9.18), thus a member of a leading Makedonian faction. In 337, Philip took Kleopatra, A.’s niece and ward, as his 7th and last wife (Diod. 16.93.9). While the sources speak of love (Athen. 13.557D; Plut. Alex. 9.4), it was a political marriage serving to ensure that Parmenion’s clan would be loyal to Philip’s war plans. A. and Parmenion commanded the advance force sent out in 336 to secure Asia Minor’s coast (Diod. 16.91.2, 93.9; 17.2.4; Just. 9.5.9). The anecdote that at his ward’s wedding, A. insulted → Alexander III by uttering that the marriage might produce a “legitimate” Makedonian heir (Plut. Alex. 9.4-5; Athen. 13.557D-E; Just. 9.7.3-5), is likely apocryphal and biased by Greek → topoi regarding uncivilized Makedonian symposia. However, the tie to the Argeads increased A.’s rank who may have had high hopes for his ward’s future sons. Allegedly, A. engineered the gang rape of → Pausanias of Orestis that made him kill Philip for leaving A. unpunished (Just. 9.6.1-8; Diod. 16.93.7-8). The value of the story is doubtful. In → Asia Minor, A. and Parmenion were initially successful in securing strongpoints until → Memnon of Rhodos drove them back to a small beachhead at Abydos. Apparently, in 336, A. did not favour Alexander’s succession. However, it is unclear whether the reports about his rebellious contacts with → Athens (Diod. 17.3.2, 5.1; cf. Plut. Dem. 23.2) were true or fabricated in order to justify A.’s murder ordered by Alexander (Diod. 17.2.3-5, 5.2). A. was perceived as a threat: he commanded a substantial force he was reportedly popular with, and surely minded the murder of Kleopatra and her baby daughter (Just. 9.7.12). Parmenion agreed to A.’s elimination (Curt. 7.1.4; 8.7.5-6), increasing his own influence by dropping him.   S. Müller Cf. Berve 1926, II, 94; Heckel 2006, 62; Heckel 2016, 7-12; Müller, S., Philip II, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 179-80.

Babylon The formal surrender of Babylon to → Alexander III ensued shortly after the battle of → Gaugamela (October 1, 331) by the Persian Mazaios, the former satrap of Kilikia and outstanding commander. Alexander and his army entered

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B. in closed battle order (Curt. 5.1.19-23; Arr. An. 3.16.3; AD 1.330, rev. 11). Alexa­nder stayed at B. for 34 days and demonstrated his respect for the local cults and habits. He assumed the title of “king of the world” (AD 1.330, rev. 11), like Dareios III (AD 1.330, obv. 15). In some texts, Alexander is called “king from the land of the Ḫanî” (AD 1.328, L.E. 1). Classical authors ascribe to Alexan­der the restoration of Marduk’s sanctuary (Esagil) and its ziqqurat (Diod. 17.112.3; Strab. 16.1.5; Arr. An. 3.16.4; 7.17.1-4; Jos. Ap. 1.192). Cuneiform docu­ments partly corroborate this. In 330-23, royal documents were dated to the reign of Alexander, the count of his regnal years beginning in 336. Mazaios was appointed satrap of Babylonia, thus heralding Alexander’s policy of reconciliation with the Persian nobility (Arr. An. 3.16.4; Curt. 5.1.44). His successor was an Iranian called Stamenes, followed by the Makedonian Archon (Diod. 18.3.3; Just. 13.4.23). Alexander left an occupying force and a citadel garrison at B. Some financial authority was given to Asklepiodoros (Arr. An. 3.16.4). An­other high-ranking financial official who resided at B. was Antimenes of Rhodos ([Arist.] Oik. 2.2.34). At B., Alexander established a new mint, issuing mostly tetradrachms. Mazaios was allowed to issue silver coins in his own name with Aramaic legends. After his death (328), the series continued to around 280, but without any issuer’s name. In addition, a series of gold coins was struck (until → Seleukos I). B. was the chief seat of Harpalos, who supervised Alexander’s financial system and the treasures captured in Achaimenid capitals. After he had embezzled large sums to live comfortably (Diod. 17.108.4-5; Athen. 13.595A-F; Plut. Alex. 35.8; Plut. Mor. 648C-D; Theophr. HP. 4.4.1), Harpalos fled to Athens (324). Alexander arrived again in B. in spring 323 (Arr. An. 7.16.5-17.6; Diod. 17.112.1-6, 19.55.8; Just. 12.13.3-6; Plut. Alex. 73.1-2). B. became a centre of the empire and a base for the planned Arab war with a newly built harbor (Arr. An. 7.19.4-6). Alexander received several foreign envoys at B. (Arr. An. 7.15.4, Diod. 17.113.2; Just. 12.13.1). He spent the last days of his life at B. and died there on June 11, 323 (Diod. 18.1.4; Arr. An. 7.25-26; Plut. Alex. 75-77; Plut. Mor. 623E; Ail. VH 3.23; AD 1.322B, obv. 8). The power-holders granted the royal title jointly to Alexander’s disabled half-brother → Arrhidaios, called Philip III, and the still unborn child of Alexander and Rhoxane, the future → Alexander IV. Philip was murdered in 317, but documents were still dated under his name until November 316 (8 regnal years). The following years were initially dated under the name of Alexander IV (316/5 as year 1), and under the name of → Antigonos Monophtalmos, “commander-in-chief of the army” (317/6 as year 1, texts 130

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actually attested for 315-11). Alexander IV served as a titular king in 316/4-311/0 and was murdered in 310/9. Babylonia was given to Seleukos at Triparadeisos in 320. → Eumenes’ and Antigonos’ armies operated in Babylonia in 318-16, whereupon Seleukos took flight to Egypt; then he succeeded in reconquering the satrapy in 311 (App. Syr. 54.273-274; Euseb. Chron. II p. 116 Schoene; Synk. 506-507 Mosshammer).   M.J. Olbrycht Cf. Boiy, T., Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon, 2004; Heller, A., Das Babylonien der Spätzeit, 2011; Schober, L., Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien, 1983.

Baktrian-Sogdian revolt Modern historiography speaks of a Baktrian-Sogdian revolt in 329-27, although it was not just a rebellion but rather a war of the peoples of Central Asia against → Alexander III’s invasion. Baktria and Sogdiana (northern Afghanistan and Transoxania, at present Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) were a crucial component of the Achaimenid Empire and had multiple links with the world of the nomadic Dahai, Massagetai, and Sakai beyond the Iaxartes/Syr Darya. When Alexander entered the southern regions of the vast satrapy of Baktria-Sogdiana (in spring 329), his goal was to conquer the country and eliminate the powerful satrap and then claimant → Bessos Artaxerxes (related by blood to the → Achaimenids: Arr. An. 3.21.5, 30.4; Diod. 17.74.1). The Makedonian hunt for Bessos Artaxer­ xes initially did not incur active resistance by local peoples against the Makedonian army. Bessos gave up his position in Baktria and withdrew to Nautaka in S. Alexan­der appointed the Persian magnate Artabazos satrap of Baktria-Sogdiana. Alexander’s army crossed the Oxos/Amu Darya (between Shortepa and Kampyr­tepa) and entered Transoxania (329). Bessos, whose failure became evident, was arrested by his followers Spitamenes and Dataphernes and handed over to Alexander to be mutilated and executed. Spitamenes and Dataphernes did not surrender to Alexander. In the meantime, the latter destroyed the city of the → Branchidai in the Kashka Darya valley. After eliminating Bessos, Alexander marched to Marakanda, the capital of Sogdiana (at present Samarkand, with the ruins of the ancient city called Afrasiab). During the march, the Makedonians were attacked by Sogdians. Alexander himself was shot through

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the leg with an arrow, but his forces reduced a mountain fortress (Arr. An. 3.30.10-11; Curt. 7.6.1-10). The Makedonian army occupied Marakanda and its vicinity, destroying a number of villages (Arr. An. 4.1.4; Curt. 7.6.10). The resistance continued on the march from Marakanda to the Iaxartes. On the Iaxartes, Alexander built a city called Alexandreia Eschate (Arr. An. 4.1.3, 7.1; Curt. 7.6.13). It is now identified either as Nurtepa or Khojend. Alexander summoned Iranian leaders from Transoxania to a conference at Baktra. Spitamenes and his ally Katanes had spread the word that Alexander was planning to murder the entire cavalry of the Baktrians (Curt. 7.6.13-15; Arr. An. 4.1.5). While on the Iaxartes, Alexander was informed about a revolt of cities “near the river” (Arr. An. 4.1.4) which coincided with an offensive led by Spitamenes and his S. and B. forces. The Makedonian king miscalculated the readiness of Central Asians to cooperate and resorted to massive terror to quell the resistance. A major centre on the Iaxartes, Kyroupolis (identified as Uratube or Kurkath), a foundation of → Kyros II, was, like several other cities, captured and destroyed. In the meantime, Alexander’s garrison at Marakanda was besieged by Spitamenes. Therefore, the king sent a division under Pharnouches to relieve the siege of Marakanda’s citadel. However, in the Polytimetos (Zaravshan) Valley, the forces of Spitamenes destroyed the corps of Pharnouches (Arr. An. 4.5.4-9, 6.1-2; Curt. 7.7.31-39). After his overwhelming victory, Spitamenes returned to Marakanda, but then withdrew to the Chorasmians and Apasiakai (Strab. 11.8.8). In the S. campaign of 329, Alexander’s army killed at least 120.000 men, chiefly in the Polytimetos Valley (Diod. 17, arg. κγ’; Arr. An. 4.6.5). Evidently, Alexander suffered disastrous losses in his campaign of 329 and urgently demanded new reinforcements from the west. This explains the arrival of a huge number of fresh soldiers in Baktra in 328. Triggered by the uprising in S., the Sakai appeared on the right bank of the Iaxartes (329). In a battle (Curt. 7.7.1, 8-9; Arr. An. 4.3.6, 4.2-4.4.9), Alexander’s army fended off a Sakan attack. Alexander was visited by envoys of Central Asian nomads for peace talks. In addition, Pharasmenes, King of Chorasmia, visited Alexander in Baktra (Arr. An. 4.15.4; Curt. 8.1.8). In the spring of 328, Alexander left Baktra and went to Transoxania to subjugate pockets of resistance. Spitamenes forcibly expelled a Makedonian garrison (under Attinas) and plundered the city of Baktra. While retreating, his units came across a Makedonian division under → Krateros and suffered losses, but withdrew into safe areas. At Marakanda, Alexander’s army was divided into three divisions (Arr. An. 4.16.3; Curt. 8.1.1). One of them, led by Koinos and 132

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the satrap Artabazos, was to attack the → “Skythians” aiding Spitamenes (Arr. An. 4.16.3). The thrust ended in failure, following which Artabazos resigned the office of satrap, which was first given to → Kleitos and then to Amyntas. The killing of Kleitos by Alexander at Marakanda was connected with the king’s growing frustration with the exhausting war. Spitamenes’ forces again attacked Sogdiana. Koinos’ units, which included a large number of Iranian cavalry (Arr. An. 4.17.3), repelled the attack. The disgruntled Baktrians and Sogdians in Spitamenes’ army surrendered to Koinos (Arr. An. 4.17.4-7). After his defeat, Spitamenes stayed with some Dahai and was murdered there (Curt. 8.3.1-15; ME 20-23; Strab. 11.11.6; Arr. An. 4.17.7). Spitamenes and his followers were not the only ones to put up a fierce fight in Sogdiana. So did local princes in the so-called Rocks, inaccessible mountain fortresses. Prominent among them was the S. Rock, ruled by Ariamazes, and the Rock of Sisimithres. Ariamazes’ Rock was besieged and although the Sogdians surrendered, Ariamazes and his closest relatives were crucified. The defenders of the Rock of Sisimithres capitulated, but the prince was pardoned and reinstated in his dominions. Alexander also made a compromise treaty with the powerful prince Oxyartes (328). The policy of terror proved ineffectual and Alexander increasingly attempted diplomatic action. In the spring of 327, he married → Rhoxane, daughter of Oxyartes. It was an act of great political magnitude, designed to bring about peace and closer ties between the Makedonians and Iranians (Curt. 8.4.25; Plut. Alex. 47.4). Moreover, many of Alexander’s Makedonian hetairoi married Iranian aristocratic women at that time (Diod. 17, arg. λ’; ME 31). Some years later (324), Spitamenes’ daughter Apame married → Seleukos and thus became the mother of a long dynastic line. In the spring of 327, Alexander went to Baktra and left in Sogdiana a corps under Krateros that defeated the army of the S. commanders Katanes and Austanes. Krateros then marched to Baktra as well. The whole satrapy received a powerful garrison of 3500 horse and 10.000 infantry (Arr. An. 4.22.3). When Alexander set off to conquer India in late spring 327, Transoxania was still not fully incorporated into Alexander’s empire. The pillars of Alexander’s sovereignty were members of the local elites (like Oxyartes and Sisimithres), city foundations, and forts with mixed garrisons. Recent decades of research demonstrate how such fortified centres (including Kampyrtepa or Uzundara) functioned. Greek mercenaries played a large role in the occupying forces; however, they became a problem for Alexander as (potential) mutineers,

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which was dramatically demonstrated in the 325 and 323 revolts of the Greeks in Baktria.   M.J. Olbrycht Cf. Holt 1988; Olbrycht 2004; Olbrycht, M.J., Alexander the Great versus the Iranians, Folia Orientalia 42/3 (2007), 159-72; Olbrycht 2017; Rtveladze, E.V., Alessandro in Battriana e Sogdiana, Parthica 9 (2007), 153-204.

barbaroi Dwelling on the periphery of the Greek world, the ancient Makedonians were perceived by their neighbours to the south as “barbarians” (barbaroi), that is, as non-Greeks. The polarity between Hellene and ‘barbarian’ was fundamental to the development of Greek identity, sharpening in the wake of the → Persian Wars, when the Persians provided a prototype for the typology of the alien ‘other’, representing all the negative qualities that the Greeks believed were the antitheses to their own (superior) culture: luxury, decadence, licentiousness, excess, tyranny, and slavery. The early Argeads constructed a legendary → genealogy going back to the quintessentially Greek hero Herakles (esp. Hdt. 8.137-139; cf. 5.22; 9.45.2; Thuc. 2.99.3; cf. 5.80.2). These Hellenic credentials permitted the Argeads to establish their legitimacy over any dynastic rivals in Makedonia, and also solidified their claim to membership in the international aristocracy of the wider Greek world. While the Hellenic ethnicity of the Argead rulers was (grudgingly) recognized by the Greeks (e.g., → Alexander I’s participation in the Olympic Games: Hdt. 5.22), their Makedonian subjects were considered b. (Thuc. 2.80.5-7; 4.126.3; Isok. 5.108; Arist. Pol. 1324B). As long as Makedonia remained politically unstable and the Argead rulers were largely uninvolved in events beyond their borders, this tenuous distinction endured. But when the Athenian demand for → timber and their expansionist activity in the north intensified during the 5th c., → Perdikkas II had no choice but to intervene directly in the Peloponnesian War to maintain the integrity of his kingdom. Not surprisingly, his efforts were viewed by the Athenians in particular as duplicitous, and he himself was portrayed as a b. (Dem. 3.24), with all the negative baggage that the term by now implied. His successor → Archelaos’ attempts to orient himself more firmly to the Greek world were no more successful, and he too was labelled not only a “barbarian” (Thrasymachos DK 85 B 2 = Laks/Most D 18 [Early Greek Philosophy VIII (LCL), 2016, p. 498134

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99], but a stereotypical evil despot (Plat. Gorg. 471A-D), whose violent and un­ civilized behaviour was reminiscent of the Persian kings. Resistance to the Argead self-definition as true Hellenes increased dramatically when it became clear that → Philip II had ambitions beyond the borders of Makedonia. His most virulent opponent, → Demosthenes, famously dismissed Philip as “not a Greek or even related to the Greeks, but not even a barbarian from somewhere that is reputable” (Dem. 3.31; cf. 19.308). Demosthenes and the other Greek sources reduce Philip to a caricature of a ‘barbarian’ king, who attracts to his court a band of flatterers whose savage, self-indulgent, effeminate, degenerate, and dissolute natures reflect his own (e.g., Dem. 2.18-19; Theopomp., BNJ 115 esp. F 224-225). In the wake of his conquest of Persia, → Alexander III’s adoption of selected elements of Achaimenid court ceremonial added fuel to the fire of the tendency of the Greek sources to portray the Argead kings with all the stereotypical attributes of b. Ironically, in view of Philip’s and Alexander’s own efforts to justify the expedition against Persia in explicitly panhellenic terms, the Makedonians by now had replaced the Persians as the ‘barbarians’ par excellence in Greek eyes.   F. Pownall Cf. Asirvatham 2010; Hall, J., Contested Ethnicities: Perceptions of Macedonia within Evolving Definitions of Greek Identity, in: Malkin, I. (ed.), Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity, 2001, 159-86; Müller 2016, 41-84; Xydopoulos 2010.

basileus, basilissa The royal title is conferred on Argead rulers by ancient authors and modern scholars. But since only → Alexander III might have adopted it for himself, it will be wiser to do without it for him and his predecessors, even though their position came close to that of kings. → Herodotos introduces Makedonian monarchs by their personal names only, following their own practice on their coins, and the Athenian diplomacy of his time, e.g. IG I3 89 (→ Perdikkas II) and 117 (→ Archelaos). At most, he adds a patronymic and/or the ethnic. Basileus he restricts to one single instance (9.44.1), introducing the ruler as “Alexander, son of Amyntas, strategos and b. of the Makedonians”—wrongfully so: he himself closes his message as “Alexander, the Makedonian” (45.3). For Herodotos, the initial Makedonian tyrannis (8.137.1), meaning non-dynastic rule, gradually turned into a monarchia since → Perdikkas I, the mythic founder figure, left his reign to 6 descendants up

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to → Alexander I (Hdt. 8.139). He was free to assume the royal title when Persian rule over Makedonia ceased in 479/6. But widely associated with the Persian kingship over mostly non-Greeks, it had to Greek ears a ring of despotism and ‘barbarism’ discrediting rulers who held it. However, after 479/6, Alexander I and his successors endeavoured after a positive image in Greece. Moreover, in the Upper Makedonian principalities some leading men were not ready to tolerate an Argead b. above them. Yet they seem to have held the title themselves, if conferred correctly by the Athenians (IG I3 89, 35.39.69). But their title applied to a region only, whereas adopted by Argeads it would have been understood to pertain to the whole realm. Still → Philip II set his sole name on his coins, and just so the Athenians referred to him officially (IG II3 322, 388). Only Alexander III could style himself as b.—if he really did so during his lifetime—after the conquest of the Achaimenid Empire and with a view primarily to it. Members of the Makedonian elite would not have tolerated his royal status already during the conquest. So the royal title in an inscription quoting Alexander’s letter to Chios from 334 (RO no. 84) is added by those responsible for the local stele, as it is in a consecration at Bahariya Oasis (SEG 59.1764). It cannot be dated, nor can dedications at → Priene (RO no. 86A, cf. B), Rhodos (quoted literally in the Anagraphe of Lindos: BNJ 532.38), and Xanthos (SEG 30.1533), all by βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος. Therefore they are mostly dated after 329, but there is no reliable evidence that Alexander adopted the royal title in this year, after → Bessos’ execution. Alexander’s Athenian dedication after → Granikos (334) seems authentic: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks …” (Arr. An. 1.16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.8); it matches the inscription of the Azara herm, the original likely by the contemporary sculptor Lysippos: ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ Μ̣ΑΚ ̣ Ε ̣ Δ ̣ [̣ …]. A decade later, the royal title opening the → Exiles’ Decree (Diod. 18.8.4) may well be a later addition but is supported by Alexander’s coins: they display the royal title from ca. 323. Soon after, Alexanders widow → Rhoxane introduced herself as βασιλέως Ἀλεξάνδρου γυνή (IG II2 1492A, l.46-7). The female technical form basilissa occurs from the early Hellenistic era on, first for Demetrios’ wife Phila (Syll.3 333, after 306), whereas → Theopompos’ remark on Harpalos’ mistress Glykera (Athen. 13.595D) is very doubtful.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Arena, E., L’introduzione della leggenda ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ nella monetazione di Alessandro Magno, RBN 157 (2011), 135-70; Aymard, A., Études d’histoire ancienne, 1967, 73-135; Carney 2019, 12; Müller, S., Das hellenistische Königspaar in der medialen Repräsentation, 2009, 76-81; Troxell 1997, 92-3 (but cf. 98).

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basilikoi paides The basilikoi paides (often translated as ‘Pages’) were one of the central institutions of the Argead → court. Although nominally the duties of the b. p. centred around serving the king in various capacities, in effect the institution functioned as a rite of passage into elite Makedonian society. Its origins are obscure, largely because the b. p. are seldom mentioned by the literary sources apart from the very fraught context of the so-called Pages’ Conspiracy against Alexander (Arr. An. 4.12.7-14.4; Curt. 8.6.1-8.23; Plut. Alex. 55). According to Arrian (An. 4.13.1), “since the time of Philip it had been customary for the sons of Makedonian officers who had reached adolescence to be enlisted into the service of the king.” Nevertheless, Arrian’s statement does not necessarily imply that the b. p. originated with Philip II, and indeed other sources suggest that they were a longstanding tradition at the Argead court (Val. Max. 3.3. ext. 1; cf. Curt. 8.6.23), possibly through the influence of the → Achaimenids (cf. Xen. An. 1.9.3-4). Philip, however, is likely to have reorganized an existing practice as part of his wide-ranging reforms intended to stabilize the Argead monarchy and solidify his control over the Makedonian elite. The b. p. were the sons of the Makedonian → nobility (Arr. An. 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.2; Ail. VH 14.48; Liv. 45.6; cf. Diod. 17.65.1; Just. 12.7.2), sent to be educated at court and serve as personal attendants to the king. Thus, the institution guaranteed the continued loyalty of the Makedonian elite, whose sons in effect were hostages at the Argead court. Philip’s ongoing efforts to centralize Argead authority and his incorporation of the nobility of Upper Makedonia into the ranks of the Companions suggest that he regularized the institution of the b. p. and transformed it into a mandatory rite of passage for the Makedonian aristocracy kingdom-wide. This initiatory function may have been symbolized by the wearing of a distinctive chlamys (military cloak), although the only evidence is iconographical (but cf. Plut. Mor. 760B). The sources are vague as to the precise age parameters of the b. p., and the length of time for which they served. Arrian (An. 4.13.1) suggests that the sons of the elite were enlisted into this institution from puberty until they reached full adulthood (at least in military terms), probably around the age of 18. The language employed by the ancient sources implies that the b. p. were in their late teens, and their duties included the defense of the king, a responsibility unlikely to be entrusted to children. Similarly, the sources do not specify how many b. p. there were at the Argead court, how many years they served in this

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capacity, or if their number fluctuated over time. There were at least 50, for this is the number recruited from Makedonia during Alexander’s campaign (Diod. 17.65.1; Curt. 5.1.42) to take the place of the b. p. who had ‘graduated.’ Nor is it clear whether every adolescent male of the Makedonian elite served in the b. p. or if membership in the institution was considerably more select. Although the sources describe the institution as a training school for future generals and governors (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.4.2), it seems unlikely that every ‘graduate’ immediately moved into the upper echelons of military command or civic administration, although most scholars assume that they joined the ranks of the Companions at the very least (again, it is not clear whether all the Companions were drawn from the b. p.). By contrast, the duties of the b. p. are well attested (Curt. 8.6.3-5; cf. 5.1.42; Arr. An. 4.13.1; cf. Diod. 17.36.5). In essence, their primary function was to attend to all of the king’s personal needs. They prepared the king’s meals and his baths, and ensured that his quarters were well lit. They waited upon the king at symposia, and escorted him to his bedchamber afterward. They served as his personal assistants during the → hunt and accompanied him to battle (although there is no evidence that the b. p. actually participated in battle themselves), bringing him his horses and helping him to mount (presumably a ceremonial custom rather than a practical necessity). The b. p. enjoyed unparalleled access to the king. They were permitted to sit and dine with the king, a mark of particular honour (Curt. 8.6.5). They guarded his bedchamber at night, in shifts on a regular weekly rotation (Curt. 8.6.15). According to Curtius (8.6.3), the b. p. were also entrusted with the duty of surreptitiously bringing women to the king. Given the intimate nature of their duties and the special personal connection fostered between the b. p. and the king (as well as his inner circle), it is not surprising that some are said to have developed erotic relationships with the Argead kings and older members of the court, as well as with one another. The inevitable sexual tension arising from these relationships, however, occasionally resulted in unfortunate consequences such as conspiracy and regicide. Despite the prominent social status of the b. p. as the sons of the Makedonian elite, the duties which they were regularly assigned were menial and bordering even upon servile; Curtius (8.6.3) observes that they differed little from those of slaves. The servile nature of their duties is corroborated by the harsh and humiliating nature of the punishment inflicted upon them for infractions—flogging, a punishment normally reserved for children and slaves. Nevertheless, only the king had the authority to flog the b. p. (Curt. 8.6.5). The b. p. received a thorough grounding 138

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in military training (Ail. VH 14.48) as well as the day-to-day workings of the Argead court, preparing them eventually to take their place as adults in the upper ranks of the army and administration. They were also broadly educated in the liberal arts (Curt. 8.6.4), preparing them equally to participate fully in the cultural and intellectual life of the Makedonian elite. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the venues with which the b. p. are the most closely associated are symposia and the hunt, institutions that traditionally served as fundamental → initiation rites into Makedonian elite society. More importantly, perhaps, symposia and the hunt provided the king with an arena where he could display his superiority and largesse, and his inner circle with an opportunity to compete with their rivals in order to advance their own positions at court. The important integrative functions of the symposia and the hunt at the Argead court confirm the theory that the institution of the b. p. was likewise intended to bind the Makedonian elite more firmly to the Argead king.   F. Pownall Cf. Carney, E.D., The Role of the Basilikoi Paides at the Argead Court, in: Howe, T./ Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2008, 145-64 = Carney 2015, 207-23; Hammond, N.G.L., Royal Pages, Personal Pages and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy, Historia 39 (1990), 261-90; Heckel 2016, 24652; Koulakiotis, E., Domination et résistance à la cour d’Alexandre: Le cas des basilikoi paides, in: Anastasiadis, V.I./Doukellis, P.N. (eds.), Esclavage antique et discriminations socio-culturelles, 2005, 167-82; Sawada, N., Social Customs and Institutions: Aspects of Macedonian Elite Society, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 403-6.

Beards, beardlessness From the beginning, Argead iconography depicted shaved and unshaved faces. The Makedonian → rider of royal → coinage from → Alexander I onwards seems to feature a beardless man, probably an ephebe in the role of a hunter and warrior. His mythic parallels, on subsequent Makedonian coins, are to be found in the unbearded types of Apollon and occasionally Herakles, eternally young sons of Zeus. However, as the reigning Argeads almost certainly featured as bearded figures, according to the Greek (and Persian) fashion, it is logical to conclude that the golden statue of Alexander I dedicated at Delphi (Hdt. 8.121) showed the king unshaven. The facial hair replicated the model of father Zeus

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and expressed the natural difference of age and status between a mature man and a young man, between the progenitor and his son, and in some cases between the king and his successor. The dichotomy can be seen on the Vergina Fresco (Tomb II), where the main hunter sports a b. as opposed to his son and heir apparent, the second mounted hunter, who appears beardless. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the sculptural group in the → Philippeion at Olympia (Paus. 5.20.10) repeated the same contrast with the monarch Philip II and → Amyntas III wearing a b. and the heir apparent depicted as younger, smaller and beardless. Shaving the b. came into fashion a little later, under Alexander III, who introduced it (Athen. 13.565A). The royal portraiture of the Hellenistic age clearly illustrates this novelty. On the contrary, Philip III Arrhidaios appears bearded on the Alexander Sarcophagus, imitating his progenitor, a contrast not without political significance.   V. Alonso Troncoso. Cf. Müller 2014, 32, 228-9; Tripodi, B., Cacce reali macedoni: tra Alessandro I e Filippo V, 1998, 20-1, 30, n. 74; Troncoso, V. Alonso, The Bearded King and the Beardless Hero: From Philip II to Alexander the Great, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 13-24.

Bematists The bematists were distance-measurers on → Alexander III’s Asian campaign. Their extant measurements begin after Alexander’s seizure of the Achaimenid capitals (Strab. 2.1.7-8, 1.23; 11.8.9; Plin. NH 6.44-45, 61-65). Ancient sources call their respective publications stathmoi (Athen. 2.67A; 10.442B; 11.500D; 13.529E; 12.514F; Plin. NH 6.45. Strab. 15.2.8.). Little is known of the individual b. with the exception of Philonides, a Cretan distance runner (Plin. NH 2.181; 7.84). He had a statue and accompanying inscription at Olympia (Syll.3 303; IvO 276-277; Paus. 6.16.5). The inscription refers to Philonides as a day-runner (courier) of Alexander (βασιλέως Ἀλεξάνδρου ἡμεροδρόμος) and b. of Asia (βηματιστὴς τῆς Ἀσίας). While scholars have suggested that the b. used a primitive hodometer or measuring lines, their running background and other evidence indicates a pace-based measure. The term b. is built upon the Greek word for step, bêma. Hesychios (5th c. AD) says the associated verb means “to measure with/by feet” (βηματίζειν – τὸ τοῖς ποσὶ μετρεῖν). Moreover, the roughly five percent error of their measurements is the margin of error established in modern military pace 140

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Bessos (Artaxerxes V)

measuring. The timeline and impetus for the development of the b. is unclear, though an Achaimenid influence is likely considering the late start of the extant measurements. Strabon also refers to specialists who helped Alexander collect geographical information at an Achaimenid style treasury in → Babylon (Strab. 2.1.6).   C. Kegerreis Cf. Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 1978, 68-9, 157-8; Fraser 1996, 78; Hannah, R./McPhail, C., The Cartographers of the Taurus Line: the Bematists, Dicaearchus and Eratosthenes, GA 20-21 (2011-12), 163-77; Tzifopoulos, Y., ‘Hemerodromoi’ and Cretan ‘Dromeis’: Athletes or Military Personnel? The Case of the Cretan Philonides, Nikephoros 11 (1998), 137-70.

Bessos (Artaxerxes V) Bessos was the → satrap of Baktria (modern Northern Afghanistan) under Dareios III. Forming part of the so-called Upper Satrapies in the eastern Achaimenid Empire, Baktria was a large and prosperous satrapy reputed for its manpower and cavalry in particular (Curt. 4.6.2-3; 5.10.3). Arrian stresses the importance of B.’s relationship to Dareios regarding B.’s status (An. 3.21.5). Probably, as B.’s later career might show, he was an Achaimenid himself from another branch of the royal family. When Dareios escaped after the defeat at → Issos in 333 and carried on his efforts to organize resistance to the Makedonian invaders, he summoned B. who came to his aid with other potentates from Baktria and neighbouring Sogdiana. At → Gaugamela, B. commanded the renowned Baktrian cavalry on the Persian left. After the defeat, B. escaped with reportedly 3300 cavalry joining Dareios in flight to Media. While they headed east, however, conflicts in the leading circles accompanying Dareios occurred. He was still supported by officials such as the members of Artabazos’ family from the coast of → Asia Minor but apparently the potentates of the eastern satrapies had lost their faith in his capability to turn the tables. In this context, without understanding its proper implication, Curtius might have preserved the tradition that Nabarzanes and B. proposed a substitute king ritual to Dareios to save the empire: he was asked to hand over the rule to B. as a substitute king until the Makedonian danger was neutralized and Dareios could be restored. However, Dareios rejected this plan that he took

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for treason (Curt. 5.9.3-10.) Some scholars argue that this comes from a Greek mercenary in Persian service whose report survived in a Seleukid archive and ended up in a Roman library as a result of Pompey’s eastern campaign. But this is controversial. In July 330, together with Nabarzanes and other influential Persians, B. had Dareios assassinated and left his corpse on the road (Curt. 5.10.1-12.20, 13.15-22). According to Arrian, B. acclaimed himself, put on the tiara orthe as the distinctive royal headdress, adopted the throne name Artaxerxes (“Having a kingdom of justice”) and called himself “King of Asia” (Arr. An. 3.25.3). This title is surely an interpretatio Graeca far from credibility. For according to Achaimenid ideology, in theory, the Persian king was a universal ruler. The limitation to Asia was a Greek idea. Recently discovered Aramaic administrative sources from Baktria from 353-24, the Khalili documents, probably from Baktra’s satrapal archive, testify to B.’s adoption of the programmatic throne name (C1 [Khalili I A 21]). It referred to the successful times of Artaxerxes III when the empire bloomed, the Makedonian conquest of Perinthos and Byzantion was prevented, and the deeds of Philip’s advance guard in Asia Minor were reversed. If B. was in fact an Achaimenid, the throne name also underlined his genealogic prestige. The geographical extension of B.’s regal claims are debated. The suggestion that his plans were limited to the unconquered Upper Satrapies contradicts the → Achaimenids’ ruling tradition he evoked. In consequence, he probably claimed at least also the central satrapies of Media and Persis. It can be assumed that competing with B. was one of the multiple factors motivating Alexander’s adoption of parts of the Persian royal etiquette. For B. will have been the legitimate king in the eyes of many Persians. When the Makedonians pursued him to Baktria, B. managed to win over Satibarzanes, the satrap of Areia previously confirmed by the Makedonians. His revolt forced them to return and subdue him (Arr. An. 3.25.4-8). Artabazos, Dareios’ loyal follower who abandoned the camp when the king’s downfall became inevitable, proved again to be B.’s adversary by distinguishing himself in Satibarzanes’ defeat. When the Makedonian army approached, B. left Baktria. His allies assisted him in crossing the Oxos River and burnt the boats to stop or delay the pursuit of the Makedonians (Curt. 7.4.21). But they succeeded in crossing the river by employing the ancient eastern method of inflated bladders. B. proceeded towards the Jaxartes but, pressed hard by the Makedonians, failed to preserve the loyalty of his entourage. Again, comparable to the case of Dareios, B. was not hunted down by 142

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the Makedonians but abandoned by his former allies. In the summer of 329, Spitamenes, Dataphernes, Katanes, and their supporters arrested and surrendered him (Diod. 17.83.7-9; Curt. 7.5.19-26; Arr. An. 3.29.6-7). Probably they expected a reward or at least mild treatment. However, being confronted with a rigid Makedonian policy of conquest in their regions, they chose to carry on the resistance. According to → Ptolemy (whose version differs from that of → Aristoboulos), he played a central role in B.’s capture (Arr. An. 3.29.730.5). Though it was probably a piece of his propaganda in order to glorify his importance as Alexander’s right hand man, his attempt to link himself with B.’s capture testifies to the dimension of the threat B. had posed to the Makedonian conquest. Apparently, Alexander used the arrest of B. in order to legitimize his self-fashioning as Dareios’ true heir who hunted down and punished his murderer. Reportedly, he rode in a chariot like the Great King when he confronted B. who was placed on the roadside naked, bound, and wearing a wooden collar (Arr. An. 3.29.3-4). The execution that took place in Ekbatana was inflicted upon B. by members of Dareios’ inner circle (Arr. An. 4.7.3-4; Curt. 7.5.40, 10.10-11). Due to differing ancient reports, it is unclear how B. was put to death, either crucified (Just. 12.5.11), additionally mutilated and shot by arrows (Curt. 6.3.14; 7.5.40-41, apparently combining different traditions), cut to pieces (Diod. 17.83.9), torn apart by recoiling trees (Plut. Alex. 43.6, obviously associating Alexander with Theseus punishing the robber Sinis), or mutilated by cutting off his nose and ears before his execution (Arr. An. 4.7.4-5). The mutilation is sometimes assumed to be authentic and genuinely Persian, echoing the punishment of two of the rebels against Dareios I’s accession in 522/1 mentioned in the Behistun inscription (DB III §§ 32-33). But it is uncertain whether this was a real or merely a symbolical punishment, and thus speculative. In → Alexander historiography, B.’s portrait is biased by stereotypes of an eastern scheming, treacherous, and cowardly villain. It is probably influenced by Alexander’s contemporary propaganda that he did justice to Dareios by punishing his evil assassin. In fact, B. carried on and revived the resistance against the Makedonian intruders started by Dareios and tried to preserve the Achaimenid political tradition. B. was the last indigenous Persian king and the last alternative to the Makedonian usurper. This alternative was welcomed at least by some circles of the eastern satrapies for a certain span of time. However, B. was a problematic figure, not widely accepted by the leading circles throughout the empire. The reputation

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Bisaltia

of being responsible for Dareios’ assassination probably was a burdensome legacy.   S. Müller Cf. Briant 2010, 15, 55-8; Heckel 2008, 92-7; Holt 1988, 45-50, 52-7, 69-71; Jacobs, B., Der Tod des Bessos, APA 24 (1992), 177-86; Naveh, J./Shaked, S., Aramaic Documents from Ancient Bactria (4th c. BCE), 2012, 177-85.

Bisaltia Bisaltia is the banning above Argilos (Hdt. 7.115.1), later “above → Amphipolis (…) up to the city of Herakleia (Sintike), (…) in a fertile valley divided in two by the Strymon” (Strab. 7 F 36 Jones = F 16a Radt). It touches modern Mt. Kerkini in the north, in the east the foothills of Mts. Orbelos (a part of Rhodope) and → Pangaion, in the west Mts. Dysoron and (modern) Kerdylion, down to Berge, Tragilos, and Argilos (Barrington Atlas, maps 50 and 51). → Herodotos’ location of Mt. Dysoron is clear enough: “From Lake Prasias (from below Siris/Serres down to Ennea Hodoi, cf. Thuc. 4.108.1—drained early) the way to Makedonia is short. After the lake first comes (→ Alexander I’s) mine (…) then (…) Mt. Dysoron. Just after crossing it, one arrives in Makedonia” (5.17.2). The route was taken by the Persians who ca. 512/1 had conquered the Paionians of Lake Prasias—still in 334, → Alexander III took this route from → Pella “past Lake Kerkinitis via Amphipolis” to the Hellespont (Arr. An. 1.11.3—as already in 335: 1.1.5). But an inscription from → Philippoi (SEG 34.664 = Faraguna 1998, 369-70, from 335) seems to challenge it, by seemingly moving Mt. Dysoron eastward: banning the sale of “the timber (growing) in Dy[sor?]on” (τὴν δὲ [ὕλ]ην τὴν ἐν Δυ[σώρ?]ωι: B 10) for the people of Philippoi, it alleges that Dysoron was in the territory of Philippoi and therefore, as is argued, must be located near to it; in fact, the inscription mentions some place with a damaged, hence uncertain name in the then tree covered plain (cf. Theophr. CP 5.14.5-6). So, following Herodotos, the hills bordering on Makedonia in 512/1, must be dismissed, as must modern Mt. Menikio: in 335, Philippoi had a dispute with Thracian groups in its neighbourhood and was hindered to use its agricultural resources in the nearby plain, let alone wooded hills some 70 km away in the NW. So we can rule out that Mt. Dysoron was located near Philippoi. Vice versa B., 144

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touching Mt. Dysoron, cannot have reached so far east. Around 512/1 B. had belonged to Paionian groups (Hdt. 5.15.3). In the wake of Xerxes’ invasion, → Alexander I conquered its western part, the hills and a section of the plain below, whereas the region east of the Strymon remained in Thracian hands (cf. Thuc. 2.99.4): when in 465/4 confederate Thracians defended it at Drabeskos (Thuc. 1.100.3), Makedonian troops are not mentioned; so the district was not under Makedonian control then. When Alexander conquered the western part of B. is uncertain. According to common opinion it was lost again in the 460s, after only one decade, to conclude from a shortage of silver in Alexander’s later → coinage (and that of → Perdikkas II). But there is a more probable explanation: accusations against Kimon “not to have invaded Makedonia taking a good deal of it” (obviously B.: Plut. Kim. 14.2) are generally connected with Kimon’s Thasian command (465-63). His mission then had however been to crush the revolt—therefore confined to the island and the strongly fortified city. But no parts of B. were in Thasian hands when a strong Athenian force was operating then at Drabeskos. Responsibility lay with these troops, not with Kimon, so an accusation against him would not have had any point in 463 when he had to account for his Thasian strategy (Plut. Kim. 14.2-4; Plut. Per. 10.5). A better occasion arose during the demo­ cratic propaganda against him preceding his ostrakismos in 461. Just then also earlier events could be brought forward, so his command in 476: after taking Eïon (Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1) he had cleared its northern neighbourhood—including the hill of future Amphipolis and maybe also Ennea Hodoi and Myrkinos—from the Thracian Edones still loyal to the Persians (Plut. Kim. 7.2); possibly to this region were sent later 1000 Athenians “to live with the Bisaltians” (Plut. Per. 11.5, hardly at Brea). After putting an end to Persian rule in southern B., he had turned eastward against further Persian strongholds, thus renouncing on the conquest of the central and northern sections of B. Since the fall of Eïon they were free from Persian supervision and would seemingly have been had for the taking. It was Alexander I who took them, in particular the section bordering on Makedonian Krestonia. He would not have dared if Kimon had claimed B. for Athens, then not yet interested in B. The omission was turned against him in 461. In the western part of B., Alexander I “later” owned a silver mine, probably in the foothills of Mt. Dysoron, just west of Lake Kerkinitis (and nearby Lake Prasias); in the light of this historical situation, Alexander’s conquest of B. can be dated

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to around 475; this would account for his oktodrachm in the Asyut Hoard put down ca. 472 (Price/Waggoner 1975, pl. 8.152). We do not know when the exploit attained one talent of silver a day (Hdt. 5.17.2) and how long this peak lasted—probably for a short while. To judge from his numerous series of tetra- and oktodrachms, Alexander must temporarily have commanded plenty of silver. He started minting it by adopting the Bisaltian iconography showing a youth wearing a petasos and holding two javelins, standing behind a horse. Some coins bear—in rather recent letter forms—the retrograde legend ΝŌΚ-Ι-Τ-ΛΑ-Σ-Ι-Β: ‘(coin) of the Bisaltians’, or similar—beta sometimes written as Ɔ, open to the left (Gaebler 1935, pl. 12.4-5), is a Bisal­ tian peculiarity whereas open to the right it occurs in archaic alphabets of north Aegean islands including Thasos (see Gaebler 1935, pl. 12.1-11; Fried 1987, pl. 1.1-4). Many others are anepigraphic. Some of these possibly can be attributed to Alexander who at times added his name: ΑΛΕ-ΞΑ-ΝΔ-ΡŌ: ‘(coin) of Alexan­der’ (Gaebler 1935, pl. 28.1-2). Oktobols of the same type bear on the rev. the Thracian name ΜΟΣΣΕΩ: ‘(coin) of Mosses’ (Gaebler 1935, pl. 27.37-42); close parallels name Alexander instead (Gaebler 1935, pl. 28.2). We do not know Mosses, but there must have been some cooperation. Alexander later turned to the iconography of the Makedonian → rider. Several oktodrachm series were distinguished by marks: a dog in different positions, a bird, a frog etc. Since each mark stands for a series, such heavy coins must have been minted in large numbers. Under this form, Bisaltian silver reached Egypt, the Levant, and Asia Minor. Most coins were melted down there, but some have survived in hoards. An example is the so-called Dekadrachm Hoard, detected near Lykian Elmali. It contained 68 Bisaltian oktodrachms of the period ca. 480/75-60 (all epigraphic, as it seems: some photos in Fried 1987, 9), but no matches with Alexander’s name. This does however not permit the conclusion that Alexander had not yet opened his mine then or even that the Makedonian conquest started only later. Drachms and their fractions were minted for use in Makedonia proper that so far had not known its own coinage (except for fractions paid during Xerxes’ invasion: pl. 1.1); this accounts for the large extent of Alexander’s earlier emissions. Later, the numbers decreased significantly, the metal deteriorated and the weight was reduced so that the denominations had to be abbreviated on the reverses by their initial letters (photos: Psoma 1999, 281-82). Most probably, Alexander in his later years had run out of silver and could no longer keep 146

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up the former standards. Complete control of B. was attained only by → Philip II; → Thucydides (2.99.6) is too vague.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Faraguna 1998, esp. 367-78; Flensted-Jensen, P., Thrace from Axios to Strymon, in: Hansen/Nielsen 2004, 810, 819-21; Fried, S., The Decadrachm Hoard, in: Carradice, I. (ed.), Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires, 1987, 1-10; Price, M./Waggoner, N., Archaic Greek Coinage. The Asyut Hoard, 1975, 38-9; Psoma 1999.

Boar, wild boar   see Art, Makedonian; Hunt; Initiation rites; symposion Boiotia The first recorded contact between Boiotia and the Argeads is → Alexander I’s dispatch of Makedonians to the medizing Boiotian cities in 480 (Hdt. 8.34). It is not clear whether these Makedonians were intended to act as garrisons or to ensure the cities’ preservation as Xerxes led the main forces of the Persian army through B. towards Athens (the latter would imply prior contact between Alexan­der and the Boiotians). In any case, both the Boiotians and the Makedonians (whatever Alexander may have claimed later) remained loyal to Persia throughout Xerxes’ invasion, and fought on the Persian side in the Battle of Plataiai (Hdt. 9.31). Afterwards, there is little evidence of contact between B. and the Argeads until the 360s, when the Theban extension of their military supremacy beyond B. coincided with a period of dynastic chaos in Makedonia after the death of → Amyntas III. The Theban commander Pelopidas was invited to intervene in Makedonia by both → Alexander II and his rival, → Ptolemy of Aloros (Plut. Pelop. 26.3). Whatever the precise content of the reconciliation that Pelopidas mediated, it cost Alexander his standing in Makedonia, for he was murdered shortly afterwards and Ptolemy was left ruling Makedonia as regent (Aischin. 2.29; Plut. Pelop. 27.2-3; cf. Diod. 15.71.1, 77.5). In spite of (or perhaps because) the Theban support of his rule, Ptolemy soon had to contend with a new rival, Pausanias, who was possibly an Argead himself (Diod. 16.2.6). Amyntas’ widow, Eurydike, effected the intervention of the Athenian commander Iphikrates (Aischin. 2.27-29; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler; cf. Nep. 11.3.2), who was in the

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region hoping to recover → Amphipolis as well as to gain an advantage over the Boiotians in the competition for Makedonian → timber. After the removal of Pausanias, however, Ptolemy renewed Makedonian ties with B., an alliance that mostly survived Ptolemy’s death and the accession of Amyntas’ second son → Perdikkas III, because (unlike the Athenians) the Boiotians were not interested in Amphipolis. The death of the Theban commander Epameinondas at the Battle of Mantineia in 362 spelled the end of B. naval ambitions and hence their desire for Makedonian timber. The interests of B. and the Argeads aligned once again in the reign of Perdikkas’ younger brother, → Philip II. The Boiotians instigated the → Third Sacred War against the Phokians in 356, but lacked the military strength to bring a decisive end to the grueling decade-long conflict, appealing to their ally Philip in 346 (who had intervened previously on behalf of his Thessalian allies). But Philip proceeded to settle the war in his own interests, effectively replacing the Boiotians as the masters of central Greece through his domination of the → Delphic Amphiktyony. The cooling of relations between B. and Philip culminated in the Theban expulsion of the Makedonian garrison from Nikaia, which controlled the pass of Thermopylai (Philoch., BNJ 328 F 56B). Philip’s sudden appearance on the borders of B. when he brought his army south in the Fourth Sacred War, as well as → Demosthenes’ persuasive oratory, galvanized the Boiotians into joining the coalition of Greek cities who opposed Philip at → Chaironeia in 338. The relatively harsh peace terms that Philip offered the Boiotians (Just. 9.4.7-8), including the imposition of a Makedonian garrison on the Theban Kadmeia (Diod. 16.87.3; Arr. An. 1.7.4; Paus. 9.1.8, 6.5), set in motion the Theban revolt in 335, resulting in → Alexander III’s utter destruction of the city (Arr. An. 1.7-9; Diod. 17.8-14).   F. Pownall Cf. Hatzopoulos 1985; Kelly, D.H., Philip II of Macedon and the Boeotian Alliance, Antichthon 14 (1980), 64-83; Sprawski 2010, 138-9.

Boukephalos → Alexander III’s horse, a superb black or brown stallion from Thessaly (Plut. Alex. 6.1), a region renowned for horse breeding, is mentioned in the lost, early tradition by Chares (BNJ 125 F 18) and Onesikritos (BNJ 134 F 20). He is also prominent in the Alexander Romance (Ps.-Kall. 1.13.7-8, 15, 17.1-4), as well as 148

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iconography if the horses associated with Alexander are meant to depict him. B.’s name derived either from the shape of his head, said to be like a bull’s (Gell. NA 5.2.1), his brand mark, or a star on his forehead, shaped like an ox-head (Arr. An. 5.19.5). In several sources (cf. Diod. 17.76.6; Gell. NA 5.2.1) → Philip II was presented with B. as a gift; however perhaps the best known is that the king was offered B. by Philoneikos (Plut. Alex. 6.1; cf. Plin. NH 8.154) for the huge sum of 13 talents. Given Philip’s wealth and his interest in cavalry and horse racing, neither the amount nor his readiness to pay need be suspect. As a boy, Alexander famously tamed B., and his devotion is strongly attested (Arr. An. 5.19.6; Curt. 6.5.18-19; Plut. Alex. 6; 61.1; Diod. 17.76.5-8); likewise sources claim that B. would only allow Alexander to ride him when caparisoned with regalia (Gell. NA 5.2.1-5; Diod. 17.76.6; cf. Plin. NH 8.154). When B. was stolen by either the Mardoi (Curt. 6.5.11; Just. 12.3.4-7; cf. Plut. Alex. 44.2-3) or the Ouxians (Arr. An. 5.19.6), the king threatened to destroy the territory and its people unless B. were returned. The sources also diverge on B.’s death in 326—either from old age (Plut. Alex. 61; Arr. An. 6.19.4) or wounds sustained in the battle against Poros (so Chares, BNJ 125 F 18). A city named after B. was founded on the banks of the Hydaspes.   E.J. Baynham Cf. Anderson, J.K., Bucephalus and his Legend, AJP 51 (1930), 1-21, Baynham, E.J., Who put the ‘Romance’ in the Alexander Romance? AHB 9 (1995), 1-13; Bosworth 1995, 314; Greenwalt, W., Bucephalas the Hero, in: Powers, D.A. et al. (eds.), Hetairideia, 2016, 2941; Ogden, D., The Theft of Bucephalas, in: D’Agostini et al. 2021 (forthcoming).

Branchidai The so-called Branchidai were inhabitants of a Sogdian town the Makedonians under → Alexander III destroyed in 329. The context was the Makedonian fight against the → Baktrian-Sogdian resistance. The original source was → Kallisthenes (BNJ 124 F 14a), cited by Strabon (17.1.43). As Kallisthenes was eliminated in 327, this fragment will have been one of his last contributions to the official report on Alexander’s deeds. Assumedly, the event was also mentioned by → Kleitarchos whose version was used by Curtius (7.5.28-35) and Plutarch (Mor. 557B). Currently, the event is predominantly regarded as authentic. The B. voluntarily submitted and surrendered their town to the Makedonians but

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received no mercy: on Alexander’s order, they were massacred. Their town was pillaged and razed to the ground. Arrian with his idealized image of Alexander is silent about the incident. Curtius (7.5.33) and Plutarch (Mor. 557B) criticize the cruelty of the act. Set against the political background, the massacre was certainly an example of shock and awe meant to intimidate and demoralize the Baktrian and Sogdian rebels showing them who was in charge. However, granted that, the move was likely counterproductive: assumedly, news about the brutal incident made the leaders of the revolt (who had arrested and delivered their former fellow combattant → Bessos to the Makedonians) distrustful, annoyed, and unwilling to cooperate. The treatment of the B. may have been one of the reasons why the resistance to the Makedonians went on (cf. Curt. 7.6.15; 8.6.14-15). Given the brutality and failed effect, Kallisthenes had to do a good job to present Alexander’s action in a glorious light. As usual depicting him as a panhellenic avenger (still at this time although the alleged panhellenic phase of the war had ended in 330), Kallisthenes styles the victims of the massacre as descendants of immigrants from Miletos: evil-doers who had handed over the temple of Apollon at Didyma to Xerxes for plunder and in turn had been resettled by him in Sogdiana on his return from Greece. This panhellenic story, obviously an apology, has its flaws. It is not supported by → Herodotos, the main source for the → Persian Wars: he states that the temple of Apollon was plundered and burnt by the Persians (without any betrayal on the Milesian side) during Miletos’ fall in 494 (6.19.1-3). Thus, it happened under Dareios I, not Xerxes. Kallisthenes was surely not ignorant about the circumstances of Miletos’ fall, as a fragment of his Praxeis Alexandrou may indicate (BNJ 124 F 30 = Strab. 14.1.7). He deliberately distorted the facts in order to create a panhellenic scenario portraying Alexander as the avenger, the B. as the evil collaborators, and Xerxes as the usual suspect regarding sacrileges in Greek eyes. He was probably exchanged for his father Dareios since due to Xerxes’ Greek campaign and invasion of → Athens, in a panhellenic scenario, he was the more obvious choice for the role of the “villain”. It is doubtful that Milesians were transplanted so far east into Sogdiana at all. The “B.” will in fact have been local population.   S. Müller Cf. Hammond, N.G.L., The Branchidae at Didyma and in Sogdiana, CQ 48 (1998), 33944; Heckel 2008, 95-7; Holt 1988, 74-5; Müller 2019, 95-6; Parke, H.W., The Massacre of the Branchidae, JHS 105 (1985), 51-68.

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Burial Makedonian power emerged and developed thanks to → Philip II, king of Makedonia after 360/59. Amidst the wreckage of contemporary Hellenistic historio­ graphy, only Books 16-20 of Diodoros’ Library provide the widest and oldest historical continuum on the years between 360/59 and 302. In his account of the events, Diodoros sometimes mentions customs typical of the Makedonian tradition, with some references also to the official burial ceremonies for the deceased sovereigns. As correctly pointed out by Manuela Mari, Diodoros’ descriptions confirm that “the attention devoted to the funeral of the deceased sovereign was an important step in the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the new king and, therefore, it was an essential part of the complex nomos which regulated the relations between the two fundamental bodies of the Makedonian state (king and people).” These references became particularly significant in the last decades of the 20th c. due to the archaeological discoveries of Manolis Andronikos at Vergina (→ Aigai), where, in the excavations of the so-called Great Tumulus, came to light an impressive number of ancient structures: three underground tombs and a surface monument, identified as a heroon, i.e., a sacred building dedicated to the worship of one or more dead people buried in close proximity. On the basis of typological and functional analyses of these exceptional finds, generally datable between the second quarter and the end of the 4th c., it is now accepted in scholarship that the Great Tumulus was the burial place of the contemporary Makedonian kings. There has been much debate, however, over the precise identity of the buried bodies: what is certain is that → Alexander III’s is definitely not among them, since, as known to tradition, about two years after his death in → Babylon in June 323, his corpse was conveyed to → Alexandreia in → Egypt where it was laid to rest by the will of → Ptolemy I. The findings at Vergina are well-known, but a brief description of the three tombs can still be useful. Tomb I, the closest to the heroon, at the edge of the Great Tumulus, is an underground cist tomb consisting of a single burial chamber, 3.50 m by 2.10 m, and 3 m high. Pillaged in ancient times, it still displays marvelous paintings on three of its four walls (→ art, Makedonian). Tomb II, preserved intact at the centre of the Great Tumulus, is a typical barrel-vaulted Makedonian tomb consisting of a main room and an antechamber, with a striking façade topped by a large Doric frieze, 5.56 m long and 1.16 m high, representing a hunting scene, which is still readable despite the ravages of time. The interpretation of the

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frieze has always been heavily dependent on the identification of the ruler aged about 50 whose ashes were in a golden urn found in the main room; another golden urn with the ashes of a young woman aged about 20 was in the antechamber. Tomb III, preserved intact and situated immediately north of Tomb II, is also a typical barrel-vaulted Makedonian tomb, consisting of a main room and an antechamber, with a façade with no semicolumns and surmounted by a frieze that is now unreadable; the antechamber of the tomb was empty, while in the main room was found a silver hydria containing the ashes of a teenager known as the ‘Young Prince’. While the identity of the latter is undisputed—all scholars agree that the young prince must be identified as the posthumous son of Alexander III, → Alexander IV, murdered in 310 when he was about 13 years old (both the young ‘prince’ and his uncle → Philip III Arrhidaios were Alexan­der III’s heirs)—with regard to the identification of the remains in Tomb II scholars are divided into two bitterly-hostile factions. Some scholars, loyal to Andronikos’ hypothesis, believe that therein were buried Philip II and his last wife Kleopatra in 336. Other scholars, however, believe Tomb II to be the burial site of king Philip III and his wife Eurydike. As narrated by Diodoros (19.11.19), the two kings were murdered in October 317, during the Second Diadoch War, by Alexan­der’s mother, → Olympias, to favour her grandson Alexander IV. Diodoros (19.52.5) also reports that, about two years later → Kassandros, after taking control of Makedonia, buried with full honours the remains of Philip III and Eurydike, and condemned to death Olympias. Sic stantibus rebus, however, the identity of the person in Tomb I, whose importance—despite the lack of grave goods, plundered before the construction of the Great Tumulus— is attested by the marvelous frescoes still visible on three of the four walls of the underground chamber, is still unclear. Interestingly, the frescoes in Tomb I were described in detail by Andronikos, who, besides presenting them as true masterpieces, attributed the best preserved, the Rape of Persephone by Hades, to the painter Nikomachos. According to Pliny (NH 35.108), Nikomachos was the author of a painting with the same subject that, in the 1st c. AD, was on the Capitolium in Rome. Since Nikomachos was active between 360 and 320, the link between him and the paintings in Tomb I authorizes the hypothesis that identifies the person therein inhumed as Philip II; this hypothesis is obviously contested by those who identify the male buried in Tomb II as Philip II. As a confirmation of the fame that surrounded the deceased buried in Tomb I could also be read the fact that only this tomb, among those of the Great Tumulus, 152

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was pillaged around 274 by the Gallic mercenaries of → Pyrrhos, king of → Epeiros, who, according to Plutarch (Pyrrh. 26.6), after taking control of Aigai, let his men outrage the nearby royal tombs. In effect, the Vergina excavations have proven that after plundering Tomb I the Gauls, even if eager for treasure, did not even try to look for other tombs, which were indeed in close proximity, as if they were certain of having grasped most of the wealth stored in loco. This certainty had to derive from the belief that they already had raided the tomb of the greatest of the Makedonian rulers buried in the royal cemetery at Aigai, that of Philip II. However, we must admit that devotion to funeral ceremonies and cult of the dead were characteristics typical not only of the royal family, but of all the Makedonian aristocracy, as is suggested by several monumental tombs, besides those at the Great Tumulus, discovered in Makedonian territory during the 20th c. and dated between the end of the 4th to the end of the 3rd c. Given the widespread presence of these monumental tombs, we can argue that in a society organized in an aristocratic structure governed by kinship, the elite developed an indestructible faith in life after death and in the maintenance of its rank after death. Such faith was made visible and understandable through the building of monumental tombs; to this belief, these tombs’ magnificent architecture and spectacular wall paintings have impressively born testament over the centuries.   F. Landucci Gattinoni Cf. Andronikos 1984; Arena, E., Alessandro IV e la tomba III del “grande tumulo” di Vergina: per un riesame storico, Athenaeum 101 (2013), 71-101; Borza/Palagia 2007; Landucci Gattinoni, F., Royal Tombs and Cult of the Dead Kings in Early Hellenistic Macedonia, in: Howe, T. et al. (eds.), Ancient Historiography on War and Empire, 2016, 125-34; Mari M., The Ruler Cult in Macedonia, in: Virgilio, B. (ed.), Studi ellenistici 20, 2008, 219-68.

Calendar, Makedonian The Makedonian calendar is known completely because it was adopted in most Hellenistic empires. Since in the course of time the beginnings of months shifted they had to be readjusted occasionally. That is why dates based on Greek calendars are often debated. (Arabic figures within brackets refer to modern months: 1-12 = Jan.-Dec.; corresponding Attic months with their (dotted) succession

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numbers in square brackets): I Dios (10/11 [Pyanopsion: 4.]), II Apellaios (11/12 [Maimakterion: 5.]), III Audnaios (12/1 [Posideon: 6.]), IV Peritios (1/2 [Gameli­ on: 7.]), V Dystros (2/3 [Anthesterion: 8.]), VI Xandikos (3/4 [Elaphebolion: 9.]), VII Artemisios (4/5 [Mounychion: 10.]), VIII Daisios (5/6 [Thargelion: 11.]), IX Panemos/Panamos (6/7 [Skirophorion: 12.]), X Lo(ï)os (7/8 [Hekatombaion: 1.]), XI Gorpiaios (8/9 [Metageitnion: 2.]), XII Hyperberetaios (9/10 [Boedromion: 3.]). Sources refer mostly to the Attic c., to the Makedonian c. on special occasions only (e.g., Arr. Ind. 21.1; Plut. Alex. 3.3, 16.2, 75.4-76.1). The names of the Makedonian months are not adopted from the south but belong to the oldest Greek substratum which was imported by Indo-European groups immigrating from the NW into the central and southern parts of Greece from the late 3rd millennium BC. Also the Proto-Makedonians arrived then, but remaining in the north and influenced by non-Greek neighbours they developed differently. As one would expect, linguistic and religious connections as reflected by the names of months and feasts are closest to the Thessalians and Boiotians. The underlying gods are Olympic; principal is Zeus who confers his name on the opening month Dios beginning with the autumn equinox.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Kalléris, J.N., Les anciens Macédoniens 2.1, 1976, 554-72; Nilsson, P.M., Die Entstehung und religiöse Bedeutung des griechischen Kalenders, 19622, 61-2; Trümpy, C., Untersuchungen zu den altgriechischen Monatsnamen und Monatsfolgen, 1997, 262-5.

Chaironeia, battle of In 339, the → Delphic Amphiktyony declared the Fourth Sacred War against Amphissa conferring command on → Philip II who then was in a formal state of war with → Athens (Diod. 16.77.2). In the autumn he entered Doris. To bar the route into Boiotia and to Athens, the allied Greek contingents assembled in the valley of the river Kephisos near Parapotamoi and sent a division to the Gravia pass on the route over Parnassos to Amphissa. Philip stationed part of his troops at Kytinion (near modern Gravia) and moved the bulk to Elateia opposite Parapotamoi (Barrington Atlas, map 55; Road Editions 4: Central Greece). During the next months, he negotiated to avoid battle that would cost part of the veteran troops he needed for his Persian campaign. But → Demo­ 154

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sthenes had won over the Boiotians for the Athenian side (Hyp. Diond. 4, 15-16 Horváth; Dem. 18.143-247; Diod. 16.85.1-4). Starting punitive action against Amphissa Philip fooled the garrison at the pass (Polyain. 4.2.8) and took the city in the spring of 338, thus gaining control of the routes south of Parnassos into the rear of the Greek position. The allies retreated to Chaironeia to block the Kephisos valley, three kilometres wide from the western hills to a swamp at the river. In August 338 Philip prepared for attack, with 30.000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 16.85.5; Greek numerical superiority: Just. 9.3.9). The Greeks, looking northward, placed the Athenians on the left at the foot of the hills, the Boiotians on the right—with the Theban Sacred Band at the swamp, and Athens’ allies (Dem. 18.237, cf. Aischin. 3.97) in the centre. Philip took his stand at his right wing opposite the Athenians and entrusted → Alexander, then 18 years old but supported by the most experienced generals, with the cavalry on the left facing the Boiotians. Since the Greek phalanx could not be pierced by frontal attacks nor could its wings be bypassed, Philip devised a strategem to throw it into disorder and rip it open (Polyain. 4.2.2): his own right wing, moved up in the obliquely arranged Makedonian phalanx (see fig. 2 in Heckel 2008, 19), retreated slowly to the right in full order, evidently with reserves to step into the opening interval towards his centre. The Athenians, taking this for a flight, advanced in relaxed order, losing connection to their neighbours and compelling them to move up to the left. Philip then stopped his retreat and fully attacked the Athenians who suffered high losses—1000 fallen and 2000 captured (Diod. 16.86.5; Lyk. 1.142). Aischines (3.187, cf. Dem. 18.245; Dein. 1.12) intimates that Demosthenes was among those who fled, but just he was chosen to deliver the epitaphios for the fallen Athenians (Dem. 18.285); Lysikles, one of the Athenian generals, was condemned to death (Diod. 16.88.1). Athenian flight opened the Greek phalanx on its left for Philip’s hoplites to thrust into the rear of the Greek centre. On the opposite wing, the Greek move to the left had produced a weakened zone between the Boiotian wing and the Sacred Band that kept its stand at the swamp so as not to clear ground for the Makedonian cavalry. Alexander broke through and attacked the Boiotian wing from the rear before turning against the isolated Sacred Band of 300: 254 skeletons in 7 rows were excavated at the Theban Lion Monument (cf. Plut. Alex. 9.3; Paus. 9.40.10; Strab. 9.2.37). The Makedonian dead were burnt on one pyre at the swamp and covered with a large mound of a common grave (polyandrion). To conclude from the extension and thickness

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of its ground layer of burnt, calcinated bone material, Makedonian losses were high.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Hammond/Griffith 1979, 589-603 (Griffith); Hammond 1989, 116-9; Heckel 2008, 17-20; Horváth, L., Der ‘Neue Hypereides’, 2014; Worthington 2008, 147-51.

Chalkidians Evidence for a confederacy of Greek cities in parts of the Chalkidike before 421 is not unequivocal. The official name on its coins, Χ-Α-Λ-ΚΙΔ-ΕΩΝ: (coin) “of the Chalkidians” (Kraay 1976, pl. 26.477-79), is clear, but their alleged starting point in 432 depends on the postulated beginning of the confederacy during the Athenian siege of Poteidaia and might well imply circular argument. The term is not distinguished from an informal collective noun for some temporary coalition of cities around Poteidaia. → Thucydides’ recurrent specification “the Thrace-wards C.” (οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδῆς—the Athenian inscription IG II2 36 = Tod 119, 2-3 is supplemented to fit with it) sounds official but actually expresses the Athenian perspective distinguishing the C. in Thrace from those on nearby Euboia. At the moment, 432 is generally favoured as the starting point of the Confederacy: in the conflict between → Athens and Poteidaia the latter’s regional neighbours, some of them members of the Athenian Naval League (cf. ATL II no. 22 II 34-75, from 433/2), were suspected for siding with Poteidaia by the Athenians who then were at war also with → Perdikkas II of Makedonia. He summoned “the Thrace-wards C. and the Bottikeans” (Thuc. 1.57.5) to coordinated warfare against Athens: they should abandon their cities and move partly to → Olynthos “making this one city strong”, but the rest to his own land in eastern Mygdonia, near Lake Bolbe, thus blocking the middle land route from the Strymonian to the → Thermaic Gulf “for the course of the war” (Thuc. 1.58.2). Olynthos, strongly walled and located just above the western and middle fingers of the peninsula controlled access to Chalkidic cities to its south and to the Bottikeans in its north—and further on to Makedonia. In its firm position on a hill, some way inland not assailable from the sea, it commanded a well suited plain for cavalry. The Persian general Artabazos who must have passed by with Xerxes in spring 480 (Hdt. 7.122-24) conquered the city some months later from the Bottikeans and handed it over to “the Chalkidic people” (τῷ 156

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Χαλκιδικῷ γένει: Hdt. 8.127). With a view to the city’s strategic significance, Perdikkas’ initiative in 432 can be the better understood. Moreover, from Olynthos the Athenians could be held in check from the rear when they besieged nearby Poteidaia—which capitulated only in 430/29. So the temporary anoikis­ mos of Olynthos, in a situation of emergency in the Pallene, did not aim at a formal confederacy or result to it. But it prepared the ground for future political and military integration. Makedonian rulers were only temporarily interested in a strong Chalkidic union in their eastern periphery; so Perdikkas’ initiative must be judged before the background of his current military stress with Athens. After it had ceased, the ruler would return to a policy of disintegration of Chalkidic alliances that rather met Athenian interests. This accounts for permanent changes of alliances, and makes the political and military relations between the C. and Makedonian rulers up to 348 so complex. The years that preceded the → Peloponnesian War saw growing strain between Perdikkas II and Athens: her apoikia → Amphipolis, founded in 437/6, reduced her dependence on Makedonian timber. It also held in check Makedonia, from the Strymon, as did Athens’ new military base at Brea, probably from the west coast of the Chalkidike (cf. Thuc. 1.61.4: ‘Beroia’, probably misspelt for ‘Brea’), a constant menace for the Makedonian sea ports of → Therme and → Pydna, with nearby → Methone as Athens’ ally. In their war against Perdikkas, the Athenians supported his brother Philip who claimed the throne. Probably in reaction to their defeat by the C. and their Bottikean allies at Spartolos in the summer of 429, the Athenians asked the allied Thracian (Odrysian) king Sitalkes to support them against Perdikkas and the C. So he did in the following winter, by invading Makedonia first—with Philip’s son in his company—to retreat soon, after an agreement with Perdikkas and lacking the help against the C. promised him by the Athenians (Thuc. 2.100101). So Athens’ strategy in the north failed, but with Poteidaia as the key to the Pallene peninsula in hand since 430/29—Athens sent there her own epoikoi/ settlers (Thuc. 2.70.4; Diod. 12.46.7; ML 66)—Chalkidic integration was blocked; and Perdikkas was weak, having secured his throne only with pains against the Thracians. So the Athenians could turn to other theatres of war. In 424, the conflict in the north was kindled anew, and once more Perdikkas played an important role. His enmity with Arrhabaios, the ruler of Upper Makedonian → Lynkestis, prompted him to ask for help in → Sparta. Athens’ opponent had just suffered a major setback at Pylos that prevented her from further invasions into Attika. So the war shifted to other parts. In this situation, Perdikkas’ initiative

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opened new options. A formation of freed helots and Peloponnesian mercenaries under Brasidas, a Spartiate commander outside regular army structures, went to the north to fight along with Perdikkas who took on himself half of the supplies for the foreign army. Brasidas’ calculated that once Perdikkas’ aims in Lynkestis were attained he himself would be free to win over Athens’ allies in Chalkidike and then, with Perdikkas’ support, to turn to Amphipolis. But when campaigning, Chalkidic envoys warned him not to eliminate Perdikkas’ plight to keep him inclined to take up their own cause (Thuc. 4.83.3). If authentic, this illustrates the ambivalence of the Chalkidian-Makedonian relationship. With Chalkidic help, Brasidas persuaded Akanthos and Stageira on the east coast of Chalkidike before he marched against Amphipolis, supported by the city’s neighbours and by Perdikkas. Amphipolis opened its gates, “won over partly by Perdikkas, partly by the C.” (Thuc. 4.103.3). Thucydides, then the Athenian strategos responsible for → Thrace, arrived too late. He held the emporion Eïon, but towns to the north and east changed sides (Thuc. 4.107.3). Though Athens’ position in western Thrace was decisively weakened now, the C. must have realized that to maintain their independence they needed some common structure both on the military and political fields. The Peace of → Nikias (421) limited interference from outside and decreed the possible scope: “Argilos, Stageiros, Akanthos, Skolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos (…) shall not be allied to (…) the Athenians or the Lakedaimonians (…) . And those from Mekyberna, Sane, and Singos shall dwell in cities of their own (οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν), as do the Olynthians and Akanthians” (Thuc. 5.18.5-6). Important cities declared autonomous did however not preclude coordinated action: still in the same year, “the Thrace-wards C.”—not further specified—joined alliance with Argos, Elis, and Korinthos (Thuc. 5.31.6). A group of Chalkidian cities had for the first time (as far as we know) taken initiative as a political body of an unknown degree of integration. Athens remained a regional factor, with → Archelaos of Makedonia as her ally; she controlled several cities of the Chalkidike: Poteidaia, Skione, Torone, and Sermylia (Thuc. 5.18.8), though her attempts to regain Amphipolis failed utterly. Her influence only ended in 405/4 with her defeat in the Peloponnesian War. This opened new options for the C., the more as Archelaos was followed by weak Makedonian rulers with ephemeral reigns, up to 394/93. Then → Amyntas III acceded to the throne and retained it, with one interruption (or two), until 370/69. Since his position was weak in his beginnings, owing to an Illyrian invasion that even drove him out of his realm for some time (Diod. 14.92.3-4), he 158

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saw himself prompted to concessions to his eastern neighbours. He then concluded with “the C.” a defensive alliance for 50 years (Syll3 135a; RO no. 12, front, from Olynthos). In a further contract he allowed “the koinon” to export timber; since formal friendship with Akanthos, Mende, Amphipolis, and the Bottikeans was forbidden unless concluded by both sides, all these cannot have belonged to the Confederacy then (Syll.3 135b; RO no. 12, back). Moreover, Amyntas ceded to the C. a common border zone (Diod. 14.92.3: Anthemous?, Mygdonia?), certainly not as a gift but under the form of a → dorea, at free but revocable disposal, not in full ownership. When in 383 he felt strong enough to reclaim it (Diod. 15.19.2-3), the C. reacted by “freeing from Amyntas’ reign the Makedonian cities” as far west as the capital → Pella (Xen. Hell. 5.2.13). According to Diodoros (15.19.3), the ruler turned to Sparta for help, whereas Xenophon credits with the initiative Akanthos and Apollonia, important cities that were eager to retain their autonomy against Chalkidic expansionism; they had not yet joined “the Olynthians”, as Xenophon calls the Confederacy contrary to the numismatic evidence—this term gradually superseded the former “the C.”, indicating that the Olynthians played an ever increasing role; but officially—so on coins—the elder term was retained. In their long speech at Sparta (Hell. 5.2.11-19) Xenophon’s Akanthians analyse the rapidly growing “Olynthian” confederacy and its inner organization: its members had common citizenship and the right to marry (epigamia) and acquire land and houses (enktesis) beyond the limits of their home cities. But it is a committed speech invented by Xenophon, so we must be cautious with such details. We may however believe that in 383 in the Chalkidike existed an expansionist confederacy that under Olynthian hegemony threatened its neighbours’ autonomy, including parts of Makedonia. Olynthos is styled as a further case of the new type of aggressive hegemonial protagonists such as → Thebes at the head of the Boiotian League or Iason (and Alexander) of Pherai in → Thessaly (Xen. Hell. 6.1.4-16). So the developments in the north fit the situation in the early 4th c. elsewhere. As guarantor of the King’s Peace (387/6) Sparta was obliged to secure autonomy for all Greek cities—and had her own interest to preclude new confederacies that could jeopardize her claim to all Hellenic hegemony. So in 382, she organized a strong army against Olynthos and the C. suspected to plan expansion up into Elimeia (Xen. Hell. 5.2.38). The Spartans arrived with troops of their own and those who had sworn to the King’s Peace. Amyntas contributed a moderate cavalry contingent (Xen. Hell. 5.2.40, 43; 5.3.9) but probably paid for riders of the Elimeian ruler Derdas. Olynthos

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surrendered in 379 and entered the Peloponnesian League (Xen. Hell. 5.3.26; Diod. 15.23.3); along with further cities in Thrace belonging to the 10th meros (Diod. 15.31.2) it joined Sparta’s invasions into Boiotia (Xen. Hell. 5.4.54). If the Confederacy really disbanded then completely, a new confederacy soon after 377 acceded the Second Athenian League—as a body: [Χαλκι]δῆς | ἀπὸ [Θράικης] (RO no. 22.100-101; cf. IG II2 36.2-3, probably from the same year). But Athens’ interest in her apoikia Amphipolis caused new tensions. Located on the C.’s eastern border, the city with its harbour sufficient for triremes was a menace also to the Chalkidic coastal cities. So the C. supported Amphipolis against Athens, as at times did the Makedonians for similar reasons. But → Ptolemy of Aloros who governed Makedonia under Theban influence did so before the background of Athens’ tensions with Boiotia (Aischin. 2.29). → Perdikkas III in 364 cooperated with the Athenian general Timotheos who was sent to conquer Amphipolis and first had turned against the C. (Dem. 2.14; Isok. 15.113; Dein. 1.14) to curb their support for the city. Under uncertain circumstances Perdikkas then got a hand on Amphipolis (Aischin. 2.29: probably he installed a garrison), to conclude from the fact that → Philip II just afterwards, in his troublesome beginnings, restored the city’s autonomy (Diod. 16.3.3; Poly­ ain. 4.2.17). His initiative was meant to appease both the Athenians (who refrained from military action after Timotheos’ mission had failed in 360) and the Olynthians who were content to keep Athens out. Philip soon settled the desperate situation in which he had taken over the → throne. The C. had not supported → pretenders, as had the Athenians and Thracians, but were as well increasingly uneasy when the Makedonian ruler consolidated his power—it was the old problem. Allegedly, Philip had promised to reconquer Amphipolis for the Athenians (Dem. 2.6-7; Diod. 16.4.1; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 30). This must however be doubted since his practical policy then aimed at friendly terms with the Olynthians/C.; he even handed over to them Poteidaia that he had conquered in 357/6 (Diod. 16.8.5) bringing to a close Athenian presence in the Chalkidike proper. But by taking Amphipolis in 357 (Dem. 1.5) and keeping it, Philip duped also the Olynthians/C. who now were threatened by him from the NE. While he campaigned in Thrace, the Olynthians/C. concluded an alliance with Athens and supported Philip’s half brothers Arrhidaios and Menelaos, then rivals for the throne. After his return, Philip opened war against the Olynthians/C. in 349. Their alliance with Athens could not prevent his military success in Chalkidike though Demosthenes in his Olynthiacs did his best to mobilize effective Athe160

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nian help. In 348, Philip razed Olynthos and sold those who had survived into slavery (Diod. 16.53.3; Dem. 9.26). He then dissolved the Confederacy of the C.—or Olynthos’ hegemony respectively—for good and integrated the entire Chalkidike within Makedonia. His well known gold staters replaced those of the C.    J. Heinrichs Cf. Müller 2017, 125-239; Psoma, S., The Kingdom of Macedonia and the Chalcidean League, in: Lane Fox 2011, 113-26; Psoma, S., The League of the Chalkideis, in: Beck, H. et al. (eds.), Ethnos and Koinon, 2019, 321-38; Zahrnt 1971; Zahrnt, M., The Chalkidike and the Chalkidians, in: Beck, H./Funke, P. (eds.), Federalism in Greek Antiquity, 2015, 341-57.

Chares of Mytilene Chares from the wealthy port Mytilene on the east coast of Lesbos was one of the primary → Alexander historiographers who accompanied the campaign, perhaps from the beginning. There is nothing known about C.’s descent, family, or socio-political background, and when and in which function he came to the Makedonian → court. If it was the case that he had connections to his fellow-Mytileneans in → Alexander III’s entourage, the brothers Erigyios and Laomedon might have recommended him. C. did not seem to have any military office. He is the only person at the Makedonian court known by name as εἰσαγγελεύς. The date of his appointment and duties as “one who announces” are uncertain. It is usually assumed that εἰσαγγελεύς was a Persian office (cf. Hdt. 3.84.2) adopted by Alexander along with other elements of Achaimenid court ceremonial in 330/29 and that C. maintained court order on formal occasions such as audiences, special symposia, or festivals, and managed official receptions. Perhaps, he was also involved in the business of the royal chancellery as his statement on Alexander’s change in his form of address regarding his letters after his conquests might indicate (BNJ 125 F 10). C. wrote a History of Alexander of at least 10 books, composed at an uncertain date, but generally thought to have been one of the earliest. C. might have started to write it during the campaign or after Alexander’s death. C.’s further career and date of death are obscure. The fragments of his History of Alexander concern court, royal etiquette, and ceremonial matters (F 1, 2, 4, 10, 13, 14a-b), military matters (F 15) including

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descriptions of fighting (F 6, 7), leisure activities (F 9), Persian “folklore” (F 5: the love story of Odatis and Zariadres), etymology (F 11), information on amber (T 3b; F 8) and pearls (F 3), and ethnography (F 17, 19a). C. is one of the earliest ancient authors referring to pearls and pearl production when he writes about the oysters in the Indian Ocean, Persian and Arabian Gulf, and the Black Sea from which pearls were extracted and used for jewelry (F 3). C. is widely regarded as an eyewitness to Alexander’s attempt to introduce → proskynesis also for the Greeks and Makedonians at his court at a → symposion at Baktra in 327 (F 13, 14a-b) and to the mass marriages Alexander arranged in Sousa in 324. He describes the festivities that took place in a splendid tent apparently echoing elements of Achaimenid architecture and were accompanied by performances of Greek artists (F 4). However, in general, C.’s information has to be treated with caution. He depicted an idealized portrait of Alexander, mostly in line with the official version. For example, C. described a single combat between Alexander and Dareios III at → Issos, claiming that Alexander received a sword-wound by him in the thigh (F 6). The scene could not have occurred at all because Dareios escaped from the battlefield before Alexander could attack him (Arr. An. 2.11.47; Plut. Alex. 20.5-6; Diod. 17.34.2-7; Curt. 3.11.11-12). C. apparently tried to conceal this failure, glorify Alexander, and dramatize his first direct encounter with Dareios. He might have been inspired by Alexander’s real wound in the thigh (Arr. An. 2.12.1; Plut. Alex. 20.5; Plut. Mor. 341C; Diod. 17.34.5; Curt. 3.11.10) and → Kallisthenes’ report that he wished for such a duel (BNJ 124 F 35). C.’s heroization of Alexander is also mirrored by his report of how a brave Alexander selflessly saved his stubborn old tutor Lysimachos from a rabble of “barbarians” at Mt. Antilibanos (F 7). C.’s narrative is apologetic, blaming → Kleitos and Kallisthenes for their downfalls (F 13, 14a-b) and portraying in particular Kallisthenes as an unwise, impudent brute who failed to treat the ruler with respect. According to C., proskynesis was not forced tyrannically upon the Makedonians (F 13, 14a-b). It was more of an experiment. While the ἑστία, the fireplace, that is mentioned in connection with proskynesis is sometimes taken for a Persian fire altar and associated with cultic honours, it is uncertain that this translation is correct, and that the ἑστία had any connections with the fire cult or formed part of C.’s original text at all. Certainly, C. cannot be blamed for the misinterpretation of Alexander’s motives by later hostile sources that accused him of the demand for the recognition of his own divinity. Particularly as an official responsible for courtly matters, C. will have known that the Per162

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sian proskynesis did not implicate cultic veneration and that Alexander did not mean to include his deification. As for the Greek topos that Makedonians always drank their wine unmixed, talking about the snow in → India (F 16) preserved for the symposion, C. might indicate that it was not only used for cooling but also for mixing the wine. C. also attributed the deaths of the participants of the drinking-contests in India to the violent cold setting in (F 19a-b). Additionally, C. repeated traditional Greek → topoi regarding the Persian Empire and its inhabitants, who were “barbarians” to him, as stereotypically fearsome (F 7) while Indians in particular were addicted to alcohol (F 17, 19a). Likewise, C.’s accounts that Alexander tamed the wild horse → Boukephalos (F 18) and threatened the “barbarians” with fire like wild beasts (F 7) were metaphors of his alleged civilizing the wilderness. In accordance with Greek images of the Persian king’s tryphe, C. mentions the famous golden vine. This artefact, mostly mentioned in connection with the equally famous golden plane tree (Xen. Hell. 7.1.38), is said to have been given to Dareios I as a gift by the wealthy Lydian Pythios (Hdt. 7.27)—in Greek eyes the representative of a region known for its luxury. The vine might well have been a Greek literary fiction. However, C. reports that this jewel-studded golden artefact sheltered the royal bed in the king’s bedchamber (F 2). Obviously, he thought that his audience expected such a reference to a well-known item of imagined Achaimenid luxury. However, Diodoros (19.48.6-7) credits → Antigonos with the discovery of the golden vine in Sousa’s treasury. C. might have had some knowledge of the furnishing of the royal bedroom but chose traditional Greek stereotypes over first-hand experience. Obviously, he also tried to paint the Libyan → Ammon with Greek colours by associating him with Phaëton (F 8). In sum, despite his status as a member of Alexander’s court, C.’s tendency to apologize and idealize Alexander while using Greek stereotypes regarding the East makes him a problematic, often unreliable author despite his participation in the campaign. His status as an eyewitness should not be over­ estimated. Probably, his glorification of Alexander also served to upgrade his own role as the loyal follower of this brave civilizer.   S. Müller Cf. Böhme, M., Das Perserbild in den Fragmenten der Alexanderhistoriker, in: Rathmann, M. (ed.), Studien zur antiken Geschichtsschreibung, 2009, 161-86, esp. 168-70; Fischer, F., Charès de Mytilène, in: Lenfant, D. (ed.), Les Perses vus par les Grecs, 2011, 88-91; Heckel 2006, 83; Müller 2014, 71-7; Pearson 1960, 50-61.

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chiliarchos Literally the “commander of a 1000,” the Greek term chiliarchos either means the office of a Persian military commander of a 1000-strong unit (Hdt. 7.81.; Xen. Kyr. 4.1.4) or of a military district (Xen. Kyr. 8.6.1), or the title of a Persian court official, hazarapatiš, who brought messages and introduced petitioners to the Great King (Plut. Them. 27.2-7; Ail. VH 1.21). → Alexander III introduced the title c. into Makedonian administrative structures at an uncertain date, probably after adopting elements of the Achaimenid ruling tradition in 330 or the hipparchy’s reorganization in 330-28. The first Makedonian appointed as c. was → Hephaistion. After his death in 324, → Perdikkas succeeded, then → Seleukos (Diod. 18.3.4). In 319, → Antipatros appointed → Kassandros as c. who was not content with it. The competence of a Makedonian c. is unclear. While sounding Persian-inspired, there is no evidence that it involved any courtly duties comparable to those of the hazarapatiš. Arrian and Diodoros characterize it as a military office linked with the Companion Cavalry. Diodoros’ claim that it meant “second-in-command” (18.48.4-5, referring to Kassandros) may be exaggerated for the time of the Diadochoi, but even more so under Alexander whose position after 330 was distanced from his elite. Probably citing → Ptolemy, Arrian writes that as a c., Hephaistion (one of the hipparchs) commanded a unit (chiliarchy) that formed part of the Companion Cavalry and kept his name and standard after his death (An. 7.14.9-10). It is assumed that this was a particular elite group of 1000 cavalrymen consisting of Makedonians and Persians from prominent families, called the Euakai (Arr. An. 7.6.3) who were newly enrolled in 324, forming a new hipparchy. The office of c. did not survive in the Hellenistic empires.   S. Müller Cf. Briant 1996, 234-5, 352-3; Collins, A., Alexander and the Persian Court Chiliarchy, Historia 61 (2012), 159-67; Heckel 2008, 140.

chora basilike Makedonia was, according to our sources, a realm created by conquest. As → Thucydides has it (2.99), the early Makedonians spread out from an original homeland of Pieria under Mt. → Olympos, to incorporate the neighbouring 164

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territories Eordaia, Almopia, Bottiaia, Mygdonia, and the Amphaxitis; and closer to his own day they added Anthemous, Krestonia, and → Bisaltia, and established suzerainty over most of “Upper” Makedonia. That process continued after Thucydides’ time, so that by the middle of → Philip II’s reign Makedonia included the whole Chalkidike, the lands between the Strymon and Nestos → rivers, and territories previously Illyrian around modern Lake Ohrid. By Makedonian tradition, it was the king who determined what should be done with conquered land, and much of it became a royal domain called the chora basilike (royal land), not owned by the king as a person, but controlled by him in his capacity as king, under the principle of “spear-won land” (→ doriktetos chora). That does not mean that the previous inhabitants were removed from the land: there was little point to land standing uninhabited and wasted. Rather, the inhabitants became subjects of the king, often with a status similar to medieval serfs. The royal land they now lived and worked on was subject to a tribute payment, known as the phoros, which formed an important source of the royal revenue: evidence for the phoros is found in the “Mnesimachos inscription” (Sardis VII.1, no. 1), recording a land grant made ca. 316, and in → Alexander III’s decree on land-use by the Philippians (Hatzopoulos 1996, II, no. 6) though the actual term phoros in it is unfortunately restored. It appears that the phoros was set at one tenth of annual produce: Ps.-Aristotle Oikonomika 2, of late 4th c. date, in a discussion of royal revenues describes the phoros as a dekate or tax of one tenth; and a mid 3rd c. Seleukid inscription (OGIS 229) refers to lands granted to soldier-settlers as adekateutoi, or not subject to the one tenth tax. Besides being an important source of royal revenue, the c. b. was also used as the basis of a system of reward to soldiers and officers/officials, and an inducement to ongoing loyalty. Estates of royal land were granted, with their indigenous inhabitants to work them, to important supporters of the kings on a hereditary yet revocable basis (→ dorea): the condition for retaining possession of such valuable estates was ongoing loyal service to the king. Each new king reviewed the c. b. and determined whether or not to confirm the estates of royal land previously granted: see → Kassandros’ confirmation, as king after 305, of land grants made by Philip II and Alexander III (Hatzopoulos 1996, II, no. 20). This means that careful records were kept of the royal lands, their boundaries, and which parcels of it had been granted to what recipients (see also OGIS 221; Hatzopoulos 1996, II, no. 22). While the grantees held possession of such estates and drew substantial revenues from them, the royal phoros continued to be owed and paid, as the “Mnesimachos inscription” attests. In addition to large

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estates granted to important supporters, smaller allotments (kleroi) of royal land were granted to soldier-settlers as a reward for military service. An example is a kleros near Gambreion in western Asia Minor granted to one Aristomenes by a local official named Krateuas under Alexander III (Syll.3 302). The large estate granted to Mnesimachos (Sardis VII.1 no. 1) also included two kleroi, and the amount of phoros owed by the various parts of the estate gives an indication of relative scale: three villages making up the bulk of the estate together owed 110 gold staters and 3 gold obols per year, while the two kleroi owed respectively 3 gold staters and 3 staters, 4 obols. Soldiers rewarded and settled by the king thus received small farms of royal land, while important supporters received large estates. In each case, the award required ongoing service, not just by the grantee but by his heirs: in the case of the soldiers settled on royal land this meant that their heirs, in order to continue inheriting and holding their farms, would be liable to military service at the call of the king. The royal land was thus an important prop of royal power both financially and in terms of loyal service, especially military service. In addition to vast tracts of agricultural land with villages of indigenous “serfs” working the land and paying the phoros, the c. b. also included vast tracts of woodlands from which the kings could extract → timber, and → mines from which gold, silver, copper and iron were obtained. Silver mines around Mt. Dysoron at the head waters of the Echedoros river (modern Gallikos) yielded to → Alexander I an income of one talent per day (Hdt. 5.17), for example; and Philip II reportedly drew an income of 1000 talents per year from gold and silver mines in the Mt.→ Pangaion region (Diod. 16.8.6). Timber was an enormously important resource for the Makedonian kings: much of it was exported at great profit to the southern Greek poleis, especially → Athens, and it could also be used as a means of expressing royal favour. So the Athenian aristocrat Andokides was permitted to extract timber from Makedonia by king → Archelaos for the Athenian fleet at Samos in 411 (Andok. 2.11); and → Amyntas III sent timber to Athens as a favour to the Athenian general Timotheos ([Dem.] 49.36). In sum, the c. b., constantly expanding with the conquests of the Makedonian kings, was a crucial element of the Makedonian royal system and economy, a vital prop to the finances and power of the Makedonian kings.   R. Billows Cf. Billows 1995, 5-11, 111-82; Borza 1987; Borza, E., The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia, in: Tomas, C. (ed.), Makedonika: Essays by E.N. Borza, 1995, 37-56; Hatzopoulos 1996, I, 349-59; Mileta, C., Der König und sein Land, 2008.

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City-foundations Argead cities can be classified into three categories:1. ancient cities that were traditionally very important for all Makedonians, such as → Aigai or → Pella, 2. Greek cities (from a cultural and economic standpoint) that were conquered and integrated into the kingdom, such as → Pydna, → Methone, and → Amphipolis, 3. newly founded royal cities such as → Philippoi, Thessalonike, and Kassandreia. Pella is first mentioned by → Herodotos in his description of Xerxes’ Greek campaign (7.123) and later by → Thucydides (2.99.4, 100.4): it is a small coastal town of the → Thermaic Gulf, replaced Aigai as the capital of Argead Makedonia from the time of → Archelaos and became one of the most important political, economic, and cultural centres of Makedonia. Most Argead cities were founded by → Alexander III (according to Plut. Mor. 328E more than 70 cities, even if Plutarch’s number is hyperbolic; cf. Steph. Byz. 70.8: 18 cities called Alexandreia). Literary evidence lends support to the view that most of the settlements founded by Alexander had ceased to exist as active centres of Greco-Makedonian civic life before the imperial period. Strabon (11.11.4) states that Alexander founded 8 cities in Baktria and modern Afghanistan and they ceased to exist by his time. Therefore the cities named Alexandreia recorded in our sources depend on two main traditions: on the one hand the Alexander Romance, and texts which derive from it (we find cities called Alexandreia also in Sasanian sources), on the other hand the Alexander historiographers and geographers, whose sources are also → bematists (distance-measurers) and writers of stathmoi (stages). To summarize the many c.-f. of Alexander a chronological order could be useful: Alexandroupolis 340 (according to Plut. Alex. 9.1, Alexander founded this city at the age of 16-17); → Alexandreia in Egypt (Arr. An. 3.1.3-5) Spring 331; Alexandreia in Areia (Plin. NH 6.61) 330; Alexandreia ad Caucasum (Arr. An. 3.28.4) 329/28; Alexan­ dreia Eschate 329 (Arr. An. 4.1.3); Nikaia and Alexandreia-Bukephala (Arr. An. 5.19.4) and an unnamed city at the junction of the Akesines and Indos (Arr. An. 5.29.3) summer 326; Alexandreia at the junction of the Akesines and Indos (Arr. An. 6.15.2) spring 325; synoikismos of walled cities at the mouth of the Indos (Arr. An. 6.15.4) summer 325; Patala at the mouth of the Indos (Arr. An. 6.18.1-20.1) autumn 325; Alexandreia Rhambakia (Arr. An. 6.21.5) winter 325/4; Alexandreia in Sousiana (Plin. NH 6.138) 324; Alexandreia at the mouth of the Euphrates (Arr. An. 7.21.7) winter 324/3. After Alexander’s

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death, → Kassandros married Thessalonike (in 316), a daughter of Philip II and half-sister of Alexander, secured a direct link to the Argeads and founded one of the major cities of the period of the Successors: Kassandreia on the site of Poteidaia (Diod. 19.52.1). One year later Kassandros founded also Thessalonike, on the western Chalkidike at the head of a bay on the Thermaic Gulf, combining the old city of Therme with 26 minor settlements.   V. Bucciantini Cf. Boehm, R., City and Empire in the Age of the Successors: Urbanization and Social Response in the Making of the Hellenistic Kingdoms, 2018, 34-80; Borza 1990, 90-7; Fraser 1996, 65-74; Engels, J., Macedonians and Greeks, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 81-98; Hatzopoulos/Paschidis 2004, 805-6.

Coin hoards Thanks to his control over silver → mines, → Alexander I was the first to strike silver coins on the so-called Thraco-Makedonian standard which was adopted by subsequent rulers. Oktodrachms, rarely tetradrachms, occur in c. h. throughout → Asia Minor, → Egypt, and the East. These coexist with coins of the Thraco-Makedonian peoples, the cities of the northern Aegean, the Southern Greeks, and those of the West. Also common in these c. h. is the presence of jewelry and silver ingots indicating that they were meant for savings or emergencies. The coins arrived in the East, either as tribute to the Persians, or, according to the most widely accepted theory, through trade and mercenaries. Fractional issues of the Makedonian kings were found in tombs and c. h. in Makedonia. In the dire period of → Perdikkas II’s reign, his full-weight and light tetrobols and fractions are included in graves and in emergency hoards, along with coins of cities, as well as of → Archelaos and → Amyntas III. These c. h. were concealed within the kingdom and in neighbouring Greek cities, during times of war and also in debris from → Olynthos, after it was razed by → Philip II. Under the rule of Archelaos light staters were produced which, together with tetrobols, are found in emergency c. h. within the kingdom or in neighbouring regions, after 399, in the difficult period which followed his death. They have been discovered together with coins of cities and the kings Alexander I, Perdikkas II, → Aëropos, → Pausanias, Amyntas III and Philip II. The political turmoil and the wars waged by 168

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subsequent kings caused a decrease in the quality of silver coins during the reigns of Pausanias and Amyntas III, who at times even produced silver plated coins. Amyntas would later return to high-quality staters which, together with plated specimens and fractions, entered emergency hoards together with emissions of cities or staters of previous kings, but also coins of → Perdikkas III. A few bronzes of Amyntas III and Perdikkas III were included in savings, emergency and grave pot hoards within the kingdom, together with coins of Philip II and → Alexander III. The reign of Philip II was a watershed in the circulation of coins, as, thanks to his possession of mines, he was able to strike silver on the Thraco-Makedonian and gold on the Attic standard. His gold and silver coins, the vast majority of which are posthumous, have been found in dozens of c. h. in Makedonia, southern Greece, the Balkans, Asia Minor, the East, and rarely in the West. Tetradrachms are rarely found in Makedonia itself, as hoard evidence indicates that they were used to fund external trade, in addition to covering military expenses. Lifetime bronzes have been found in Makedonia, in savings and grave hoards, while numerous posthumous specimens have been found in c. h. in the Balkans, due to the military operations of Alexander III onwards. He struck silver and gold coins on the Attic standard at many mints. During his lifetime and up to the end of the 4th c., the c. h. followed the route of his campaigns: Makedonia, the Balkans, southern Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, Central Asia. Up to the early 3rd c., silver hoards in Greece became more numerous, due to returning soldiers. From then onwards, up to the 1st c., coins of Alexander’s types minted by cities and the Dia­ dochoi entered c. h. in Greece, the Balkans, but mostly in the East, the theater of the wars of the Diadochoi. Lifetime and early posthumous bronzes, which were used for everyday exchanges or for the rations of soldiers, were hidden in c. h. in Makedonia, the Balkans, Asia Minor, → Kypros, and the East up to the end of the 4th c. → Philip III struck gold and silver coins of Alexander’s types but bearing his own name. They were hidden in a small number of c. h. in Makedonia, southern Greece, Asia Minor, and the East, often along with issues of Philip II and Alexander.   K. Liampi Cf. CH I-X, 1975-2010; IGCH 1973; LeRider 1977, 255-319; Price 1991, 46-66; Touratsoglou, Y.P., A Contribution to the Economic History of the Kingdom of Ancient Macedonia (6th -3rd c. BC), KERMA 2 (2010), 56-73, 102-6, 138-56.

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Coin hoards (bronze) from Eastern Makedonia: “Drama” (DH) and “East Makedonia” (EMH) The so called DH (IGCH 404), allegedly one local find of some 750 bronze coins, was acquired from a dealer at Drama in two portions, in 1931 and shortly before 1964 (photos: Bellinger 1964, pl. 7-11; SNG ANS 8, pl. 30-34). The first portion of at least 185 coins was far better preserved; the second, identical in composition and similar in corrosion, is probably a negative selection retained in 1931. But the coins might go back to more than one findplace; in this case, the most recent sorts (untypically few for a hoard) could belong to a slightly younger context. Provenance from the Drama region is confirmed by the hoard’s composition: 167 civic coins from → Philippoi, 358 of the common type of → Philip II (including 7 minted by → Lysimachos for → Philip III), 229 of the common type of → Alexander III (including at least 7 from mints in Asia Minor and → Kypros), and two civic coins from Asia Minor. The EMH (CH 3.23) contains 6 small silver denominations—Philippoi (3), Philip II (2), Larisa (1)—and 320 of bronze: Philippoi (106), Philip II (66), Alexander III (148). Comparable hoards from the same region are listed in CH, e.g. 9.95, 10.41 and 83 (= Liampi 1998). Their composition points to the northern Plain of Philippoi where the corridor between Mt. Rhodope and the Lekani hills (Sapaike) runs to the Nestos Valley (Barrington Atlas, map 51; modern Drama just west of ancient Hadrianopolis, cf. Road Editions 1: Thrace). In Philip’s and Alexander’s day, it was the main connection from → Thrace into Makedonia since the Nestos Delta, covered with marshes and dead branches, was next to impassable. When controlling Philippoi (from 356) and its eastern approaches up to the Nestos, Philip built forts in the Lekani corridor and on the eastern bank of the Nestos—16 are indicated, arranged in groups of three—to block the corridor to the west and the Nestos Valley to the north. Some of these forts, still used in Byzantine times, might have been built after Philip, but others go clearly back to him. They were permanently manned with garrisons paid to a large proportion in bronze coins, as was the rule in the 4th c. These coins went west to the Drama region to buy provisions and daily essentials, as the civic Philippoi bronzes probably used by civilian workers in the mining district east of Philippoi went north. Both sorts met at shops along the route. The need for bronzes indicating military effective strength in the forts was highest from the middle of Philip’s reign until the later years of Alexander’s, before Lysimachos actually pacified Thrace by fighting indigenous groups in the 170

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east and north. On a numismatic plane, Alexander’s bronzes of the → eagle type (Bellinger 1964, pl. 11 A; Liampi 1998, pl. 54.1-11) are missing in the DH, and are scarce in EMH (23 ex.; 11 ex. in CH 10.83), combined there with a drachm from Thessalian Larisa which might hint at the provenance of these bronze eagle coins: troops from SW Upper Makedonia might have carried them to the east. Indicative for their origin are also elder half units of identical iconography, bearing the legend ΦΙΛΩ(Τ͞Α: Wartenberg 1998, pl. 3), tentatively ascribed to → Parmenion’s father. Some were detected in → Thessaly, but the type is clearly Makedonian in character. Also Alexander’s bronze equivalents might hint at the Makedonian-Thessalian frontier zone.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Bellinger, A.R., Philippi in Macedonia, ANS MN 11 (1964), 37-52; Liampi, K., A Hoard of Bronze Coins of Alexander the Great, in: Ashton, R. et al. (eds.), Studies Price, 1998, 247-53; Price 1991, 31-2, 116-30; SNG ANS 8 (Troxell), on nos. 830-996 and 9971002; Wartenberg 1998.

Coinage, Argead Argead coinage from → Alexander I (starting around 483) through → Philip III and → Alexander IV (assassinated in 317 and 310 resp.) has been studied ever since Gaebler’s synthesis (1935, 148-72, with pl. 28-31: fully illustrated). An ajournement was recently submitted by Hoover (2016, 275-367, fully illustrated, for a wider audience). Sectoral catalogues deal with the coins of → Alexander I and → Perdikkas II (until 413: Raymond 1953) and → Archelaos through → Perdikkas III (Westermark 1989). Corpora exist for → Philip II (Le Rider 1977, incl. Philip III, precious metals only) and → Alexander III (Price 1991, incl. Alexander IV). Important collections are made accessible by SNG Alpha Bank (Alexander I-Perseus, 2000) and SNG ANS 8 (Alexander I-Philip II, 1994). Without access to rich silver deposits, Makedonian rulers before Alexander I had not produced coins of their own, though minting started early in neighbouring regions, in Greek cities on the Chalkidike (Kraay 1976, pl. 25-6) and in tribal districts of western → Thrace (ib. pl. 26-27). Only the Makedonian capital → Aigai might have preceded the rulers, with civic fractional coinage for local use (Gaebler 1935, pl. 27.9-11). Alexander I later adopted the local goat’s protome on the rev. of some tetradrachms (ib., pl. 28.18-21), not to be confused

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with common Thraco-Makedonian issues showing a (complete) goat, formerly attributed to Aigai (SNG ANS 7, pl. 3.58-65, but cf. 66). When work on Xerxes’ Athos canal started in ca. 483 (Hdt. 7.22.1), Alexander had to pay his workers their daily living (siteresion) instead of supplying them with food, so far the rule. Fractional coinage opened them local markets where small change was needed. So Alexander minted tetrobols in the Chalkidian standard (2.45g; actual coins up to 2.38g, whereas following series are in his Makedonian standard of 2.18g), probably at nearby Akanthos. On the obverse appears a mounted cavalryman identified by his equestrian → sarissa and his hat as a Makedonian, moreover by a highly prestigious Persian sword (→ akinakes) that is emphasized by its central position and the rider’s fist on its handle (pl. 1.1). The golden weapon, an exclusive gift of honour by the Persian king, permits to identify the → rider as the ruler himself. After Xerxes’ defeat, the Persian distinction was dissimulated immediately (Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 306, figs. 2, 3 and 5) and the cavalryman turned into a hunter holding two javelins (pl. 1.2). Under Alexander’s son Perdikkas II, the standard reverse shows a → lion’s protome, indicative for Herakles (generally represented wearing a lion’s scalp) and thus referring to the Argead dynasty (Gaebler 1935, pl. 29.1-8). The traditional iconography was retained until the later years of → Archelaos who around 400 was the first Makedonian ruler to emit also AE coins. At the same time, he introduced new images, in a dynastic silver series of 5 denominations (pl. 2), their weights supporting the classification of the stater as a pentedrachm. The denomi­nations show the dynasty’s mythical founder hero wearing a tainia (Perdikkas or—more probably—the mythical → Archelaos), Herakles with a lion’s scalp, as a ripe, bearded man or a beardless youth, Zeus’ → eagle, the head of the Nemean lion, and the protome of the wolf of → Argos (Gaebler 1935, pl. 29.11-19; Westermark 1989, pl. 69, 2. 5-8). These motifs pertain to the iconographic semantics of dynastic → legitimization, during the following decades in ever changing combinations. Only Philip II went beyond the program; he was also the first to give his name (in the gen.: ‘of Philip’) in the Attic form in -ou, whereas before him occur the NW Greek forms: Alexandrō, Perdikkā (‘of A., of P.’) etc. The icono­ graphy of Philip’s larger coins that also went abroad aimed at self-­representation in the Greek world. Some years after razing → Olynthos (348) he resumed the League’s gold staters, in the Attic standard (two drachms: 8.6g, near to the Persian daric of 8.35g, then the standard gold coin). From his model he adopted the obverse, a youthful, wreathed head of Apollon (also on gold obols), where172

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as the god’s kithara on the Chalkidian reverse is replaced by a biga that follows Sicilian silver issues (Kraay 1976, pl. 28.11, cf. pl. 47-49). Referring in a general way to success in the great Panhellenic games they underline that the emitters, though living at the periphery, were integral parts of the Greek world. The same message comes from Philip’s coins displaying his Olympian victory with a chariot (Plut. Alex. 4.5; Just. 12.16.6). Apollon, so far no theme on Makedonian coins, stands for Philip’s military victories, foremost that in 348 over the Olynthians, but also those over the Phokians in 352 and 346. Featuring the god, Philip claimed for himself the role of a protector of Apollon’s Delphic sanctuary. The same idea is propagated by the reverse of Philip’s younger tetradrachm type (from 348/7) showing a mounted jockey crowned with an olive wreath and holding a palm of victory, in heroic nudity (pl. 1.4); since a chiton was then prescribed at Olympia, he is not an individual winner, though Philip’s single race horses were successful there (Plut. Alex. 3.5, in 356). The older type (on the cover, from 360/59) displays a ripe, bearded rider fully clad, wearing the Makedonian → kausia, doubtlessly Philip himself; the iconography follows some well known staters from Thessalian Pharsalos (Kraay 1976, pl. 21, 390) continued with variants since the late 5th c. This takes up the self representation of Alexander I on his earliest tetrobols. In either case, the obverse shows the head of Olympian Zeus. Further series (AE, fractional silver, and gold) add the well known images of the preceding dynastic program. Alexander III started his coinage with the traditional eagle motif (Gaebler 1935, pl. 31.19-23, Price 1991, pl. 143-44, Troxell 1997, pl. 7-8), on his early bronze coins and small silver denominations, from drachms down to obols (tetradrachms of the type belong to a Hellenistic context: Gaebler 1935, pl. 31.18, Price 1991, pl. 143. 142a/b). From the very start, Alexander adopted the Attic standard also for his silver issues. Around 333/2, after his victory near → Issos, he introduced his imperial coinage, from bullion seized from the Persians. On the silver coins, Herakles’ head remains on the obverse whereas on the reverse appears Zeus on a throne, leaning on a sceptre and holding an eagle. Doubtlessly this image quotes the contemporary silver staters of (nearby) Tarsos (Kraay 1976, pl. 60.1044), but for Greek eyes it reminded of Pheidias’ cult statue of Zeus Olympios, another reference to Olympia, moreover of Zeus Lykaios as displayed on old Arkadian triobols for decades (Kraay 1976, pl. 16.288-93—Arkadians were most prominent among Greek mercenaries). Completely new was the iconography of Alexander’s gold staters. On their obverse appears Athena’s head wearing a Korinthian helmet. It

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might well allude to the → Korinthian League, albeit it was the common form then. The large crest identifies her as commander. The reverse shows a standing Nike, holding in her outstretched right hand a wreath, and with her left a stylis, a three pointed ship’s pole reminding of Poseidon’s trident; it stands for victory on sea. This is generally understood as an indication of an actual naval success, e.g., the crossing of the → Hellespont or the conquest of Tyre. But rather the message is more general: as victory on land is symbolized by Athena, so on sea by Nike holding the stylis. Alexander’s imperial coins were minted both in Asia and Makedonia, from gold and silver seized in Persian war chests and capitals, in huge numbers to pay mercenaries arrears and give Greeks and Makedonians their share of the booty. This resulted to a close sequence of series distinguished by local marks and monograms. The coins often went into hoards, laid down in the restless early Hellenistic period along with era dated civic coins; so it is possible to assess exact closing dates. Hoard evidence reveals that coins with the royal title (basileōs Alexandrou) were minted first in 324/3, maybe after Alexan­ der’s death—consequently Alexander might not have adopted the royal title during his lifetime. Minting the imperial types continued long after Alexander’s death, partly in the name of his successors Philip III and Alexander IV, well into the Hellenistic and, in some cities and regions, the Roman Republican period. But also Philip’s types were continued for a while. In the case of his silver issues this can be explained by their Thraco-Makedonian (Chalkidian) standard that was retained for some while in parts of northern Greece. But Philip’s gold issues had followed the same Attic standard as did Alexander’s. Maybe it had been explicitly stipulated in some cases that credits had to be repaid with the same Philip-staters in which they had been given on credit. But the great popularity of the older coins must have played some role as well. They were widely accepted in Greece and far beyond, in regions of the Balkans, the Danube, and NW Europe, in the homes of Celtic mercenaries. Soon Philip’s gold and silver types were imitated there, first in Danubian regions and then in the western Celtic world up to France and Britain. Some technical addenda: Argead minting started—irrespective the episode at Akanthos—in the civic mint of Aigai. Next comes some place in → Bisaltia, conquered by Alexander I around 475; a regional mine temporarily yielded large amounts of silver (Hdt. 5.17.2) that was minted both for use in Makedonia and export (oktodrachms). Whereas coins produced in Bisaltia are tribal in character, those from Aigai are keeping up to contemporary Greek style. When the court moved to → Pella around 400, a new 174

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mint was opened there. Under Philip II, further ateliers were added at → Amphipolis (from 357/6) and temporarily → Philippoi (from 356). Both produced the bulk of ‘regal ’ coinage. After 348, Philip seems to have operated at least one further mint in the Chalkidike, maybe at Akanthos. Under Alexander, many mints in Asia Minor, the Levant, Kypros, Egypt, and inner Asia up to Ekbatana were active for him, starting with Tarsos immediately after 333. Finally, a note on the changing standards in Makedonia. The country belongs to the zone of the so called Thraco-Makedonian standard, actually a group of three different standards partly used in the same place at the same time. So the oktodrachm of Alexander I follows a norm of 29.5g, his tetradrachm of 13.1g. Since weights were kept less exactly and repeatedly reduced due to shortages of silver, some confusion occurs, with classifications such as ‘Phoinikian’ or even ‘Persian’ standard. But much is simply due to deteriorating economic contexts. In the 450s, already Alexander I had reduced the weight standard of his coins. Heavy denominations seem to have ceased altogether and fractions decreased in weight and metal. To avoid confusion, this was indicated on their reverses by the initial letters of the denominations (photos: Psoma 1999, 281-82). The practice was adopted by his son Perdikkas II (and the Olynthians). Except for a short while when the Athenian fleet lost at Syrakousai in 413 was rebuilt with Makedonian timber, the rulers’ access to silver was limited. Clearly indicative are different types of silver tetrobols under Alexander I and Perdikkas II, distinguished by their iconography: the ‘heavy’ group made of good silver is distinguished by a rider, the ‘light’ one of lesser metal by a sole horse (Kraay 1976, pl. 28.288-93). The first group clearly predominates the coins excavated at Olynthos; evidently it was meant for commerce with Greek cities in the Chalkidike and Thessaly, whereas the lesser coins circulated in Makedonia proper. At the end of Archelaos’ reign, the stater fell to somewhat short of 11g, then being a pentedrachm (the term still in Polyain. 3.10.14—the weight was later constantly reduced), until Philip II early in his reign adopted the Chalkidian silver standard of 14.4g to the stater, a tetradrachm again. Alexander introduced the Attic standard early, with a silver stater (tetradrachm) of 17.2g, but at the same time evidently held on to Philip’s norms and iconography, in a separate series, as did his successors by minting posthumous Philip types. The change of norms resulted to a change of denominations. Archelaos’ new system (stater = 5 drachms, 1/5 st. = 1 dr., 1/10 st. = 3 obols, 1/20 st.= 1.5 ob., 1/30 st. = 1 ob.; calculated from coin weights) was retained up to Perdikkas III and—partly—Philip II. (1/5, 1/10, 1/20 stater,

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being a tetradrachm now). But Philip also issued coins of 2 drachms, 1 dr., and 1/2 dr., the two systems side by side. Alexander’s early Makedonian eagle series consists of four denominations: 1 drachm, 1/2 dr. (= 3 ob.), 2 ob., 1 ob., his imperial silver coins, far most tetradrachms, locally comprise rare multiples (10 drachms at ‘Babylon’) and scarce fractions. After Archelaos, the process of deterioration proceeded dramatically, due to the dynasty’s crisis. At times, even fourée coins were emitted, evidently by official mints (Heinrichs 2012, 123, figs. 3.3-4), but the rulers’ authority guaranteed for them. Only Philip II, after getting control of the vast silver trade from the North via the Nestos Valley (also the mines east of → Philippoi and probably also of mining districts in the mountains south of Philippoupolis/Plovdiv), reformed the Makedonian silver coinage and kept it at a high level. Under him and his successors, Makedonian coins were highly esteemed—and minting became an additional source of regal income.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2012; Heinrichs/Müller 2008; Psoma, S., Τὰς παλαιὰς πεντεδραχμίας … RΝ 155 (2000), 123-36; Robinson, D.M./Clement, P.A., Excavations at Olynthus 9: The Chalcidic Mint and the Excavation Coins …, 1938, 320-33 with pl. 31.

Comedy, Greek The references to Makedonians in Greek comedy in which Greek matters were the focus mirrors the way in which Makedonian policy became involved with the interests of Greek poleis and interfered with them. Thus, their appearances on the comic stage shed light on contemporary political events and the perception of Makedonians by circles of the Greeks. Consequently, Makedonians became more prominent in Greek c. by the time of → Philip II, when Argead Makedonia developed into a new power the Greeks could not ignore. Initially, Makedonians began to appear in Greek c. when conflicts of Greek poleis with the Argeads brought them into the public eye making them widely known enough to be mentioned. The first Argead ruler that seems to have been ridiculed on stage was → Perdikkas II. His struggles to preserve his realm’s autonomy during the time when the Athenians established their control over Northern Greece was mockingly interpreted in purely Athenian terms. Probably in the turbulent 420s, in his Phormophoroi (F 63), Hermippos jokes that Perdikkas exported lies 176

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by the shipload (ap. Athen. 1.27E-28A: καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ πολλαῖς), apparently enough to fill a fleet. In the Birds, performed first in 414, Aristophanes seems to have reinforced this image of Perdikkas as an out-andout liar. Obviously making a pun on the ruler’s (characteristically Makedonian) name, he jokes about the treacherous way to “escape like a perdix (partridge)” (ἐκπερδικίσαι: Av. 766-768). Thus, the punchline of this neologism will be the implicit meaning of “doing the Perdikkas,” either in the sense of cheating and betraying or of collaborating or sympathizing with him and his policy, comparable to the later term of philippizein. The comic author Strattis wrote a play titled Makedonians or Pausanias that is lost. While his protagonist’s identity is unclear, he is sometimes taken for Pausanias of Kerameis, the life partner of the Athenian poet Agathon who spent his last years with him at → Archelaos’ court. According to this interpretation, as a fragment depicts an Athenian talking to a non-Athenian, perhaps a Makedonian, who speaks a strange, uncouth dialect (F 29), it is suggested that Strattis created comic effects by describing a kind of cultural clash when an Athenian comes to the Argead court and meets the Makedonian hillbillies there. The subject of Strattis’ speakers’ conversation is their different terms for a fish. Generally, fish is a central element in Greek comic references to the Makedonian court. As eating of fish was considered expensive and widely restricted to the upper classes, opsophagia (love of eating fish) is associated with extravagant behaviour, degenerate habits, corruption (Dem. 19.229), and unlimited greed in the political sense of imperialism and tyranny. In a fragment of Ephippos of Athens’ Geryones, dated to various decades of the 4th c., a huge fish is prepared for an unnamed king, perhaps the protagonist himself, in an immense cooking pot that may be the → Aegean Sea. The kitchen maids are the neighbouring peoples, among them the Mygdonians who are probably to be identified as the Makedonians. Just as the Lykians and Celts, they belong to the ethnics nearly spoiling the dish by letting it burn. It might be a pun on the “barbarians” who are only able to devour fine food but do not know how to prepare and handle it. In his Philippos, written shortly after 346, Mnesimachos may have targeted Philip II and the Athenian ambassadors including → Demo­sthenes negotiating the → Peace of Philokrates. A fragment mocks the stereotype image of the uncouthness, warlikeness, and boastfulness of the Makedonians, describing one of them showing off by claiming that they are so warlike that they eat weapons, drink fire, sleep on weapons, and wear catapults on their heads (F 7). Moloney suggests that the boastful speaker was meant to be a parody of Philip

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himself. Another fragment of the Philippos (F 8) depicts Philip’s Pharsalian allies as cruel mirror-images of their rude Makedonian master: They eat an Achaian town roasted, a reference to the Makedonian conquest of Halos in 346 by Philip who gave it to their enemies, the Pharsalians, who enslaved the population (Dem. 19.36-39). In contemporary Greek c., there were also several puns about the affair of the island of Halonnesos off the Thessalian coast conquered by Philip in 346 (Aischin. 3.83; [Dem.] 7.6). When he later on offered it to the Athenians, some politicians protested that Philip could not give it to them (didomi), but only give it back (apodidomi). Comic poets such as Alexis made fun of this obviously (in)famous quip (cf. Adelphoi F 7). Another target of Greek comic poets was the luxurious lifestyle and debauchery of certain members of the Argead court. Exemplarily, Philip’s courtier Dorion, a flute player and gourmand whom → Theopompos depicts as one of the ruler’s toadies (BNJ 115 F 236), was ridiculed because of his notorious love of fish (Athen. 8.337F-338A). Mnesimachos (F 10) calls him a “dish-blower” (λοπαδοφυσητής), apparently one who is eating and playing the flute simultaneously (F 10). As fish can be associated with sexual overtones and often with courtesans, there might also be implicit an indecent pun on Dorion’s dissolute behavior at Philip’s den of vice. Another Makedonian mentioned by Greek comic poets was Alexander’s Elimeian treasurer → Harpalos. Imaginations of the latter’s pretentious dolce vita with his hetairai Pythionike and Glykera at Babylon and Tarsos were created by Philemon in The Babylonian or Python (either of Byzantion or Katane: Athen. 13.595E) in Agen. A fragment of the latter play depicts the invocation of the ghost of the deceased Pythionike at her tomb by Magoi, an ironic reference to Aischylos’ Persai in which the worried queen Atossa lets the spirit of her dead husband Dareios I be invoked (ap. Athen. 13.595F-596A). Harpalos was in the public Athenian eye because of the corruption affair he triggered in the context of his flight from Asia to Athens. The Athenian politicians involved in this scandal were also ridiculed on stage, such as in Timokles’ Delos making fun of Demosthenes and → Hypereides as receivers of Harpalos’ bribes: the latter is said to have wasted all of his bribes on fish, making the seagulls look like choirboys (F 4). Another theme related to Alexan­der’s court was the fashion of being cleanshaven. Men without beards were ridiculed by Greek comic poets as effeminate, indecent, and suspicious regarding their sexual role (Athen. 13.565B; Axionikos, Phileuripides F 4). Despite their exaggerated character due to the genre of c., the images of the Makedonians as uncouth brutes and their Argead rulers as deceitful liars 178

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and dissolute scroundels surrounded by gluttons, effeminates, and corrupted lecherous party animals, resulting from the fragments of Greek c., seem to have had a traceable impact on their depiction in Greek oratory and historiography. Exemplarily, there are parallels to the image of Philip and his leading Makedonians in Theopompos and Demosthenes showing how Greek political discourse, oratory, historiography, and c. influenced each other.   S. Müller Cf. Moloney, E., Philippus in acie tutior quam in theatro fuit, in: Csapo, E. et al. (eds.), Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century BC, 2014, 231-48; Müller 2016, 57-60; Orth, C., Strattis: Die Fragmente, 2009, 145-64; Papachrysostomou, A., Six Comic Poets, 2008, 210-20.

Conspiracies, against Argeads Conspiracies were a frequent phenomenon of Argead history. Often regarded as a by-product of monarchy, a number of Argead rulers fell victim to c.: (probably) → Archelaos, → Amyntas II, → Pausanias, → Alexander II and → Philip II. Archelaos’ heir apparent (who probably never ruled) → Orestes, → Ptolemy of Aloros (ruled as → epitropos) and → Alexander IV were also murdered. C. are interpreted as expressions of political dissent, rival factions, and changes in the way a ruler’s person or actions were perceived. In all known cases, the conspirators formed part of the higher courtly ranks and enjoyed a certain closeness to their victim. Some successful instigators of c. against Argead rulers belonged to the dynasty itself. The conspirators’ identity underlines the difficulty in having access to the ruler and getting close enough, armed with any kind of weapon, to be able to kill him. We are lacking information on how the Argeads protected themselves prior to Philip II and → Alexander III, who surrounded themselves with bodyguards accompanying them at → court, in battle, and on the → hunt. We are told that in his sleep, Alexander was protected by the → basilikoi paides who guarded the entrance of his bedroom (from the outside), according to Curtius in shifts on a regular weekly rotation (8.6.15). It was not possible to approach the ruler at court while carrying a weapon. His bodyguards sheltered him (or protected him occasionally from his own rash actions: on the climax of Alexander’s quarrel with → Kleitos at a → symposion, reportedly the guards had wisely deprived Alexander of his weapon: Plut. Alex. 51.4; cf. Arr. An. 4.8.8; Curt.

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8.1.47). For Alexander, the office of a royal taster (edeatros) is attested (Athen. 4.171C). This person tasted the royal food in advance in order to ensure that it was not poisoned. It is unclear whether Alexander borrowed the office from Achaimenid court ceremonial or preserved an already existing Argead court office; his predecessors may not have eaten their food without any check. All the precautions mentioned reduced opportunities to kill an Argead ruler. The attested conspirators were either family members, bodyguards, or belonged to the ruler’s courtly inner circles. The list of all known cases of c. against Argeads refutes the suggestion that in particular Argead polygamy (causing “amphimetric strife” = rivalries between mother-son-groups) led to c. and regicide: this was only an occasional factor. Nevertheless, for the sake of his safety, a Makedonian ruler had to be on his guard against rival relatives and employ a policy of distrust towards his own family. A telling anecdote from the times of the Successors illustrates this attitude: once, when → Antigonos Monophthalmos received an embassy, his son and co-regent → Demetrios Poliorketes came home from hunting, went up to him, kissed him, and sat down by his side, still carrying his weapons. This was perceived as an exceptional proof of mutual trust; Antigonos wanted to demonstrate that nothing could come between him and his son (Plut. Demetr. 3.1-3). Examining Argead history, the speculation that → Alexander I was assassinated rests upon a unique claim by Curtius (6.11.26), who in this problematic passage (an invented speech) may in fact refer to Alexander II. Alexander I died as an old man, most likely of a natural death. Allegedly, Archelaos usurped the rule by drowning his young half-brother and telling the victim’s mother that the child had fallen into a well while chasing a goose (Plat. Gorg. 471A-D). The bizarre story forms part of → Platon’s depiction of the speaker, Gorgias’ pupil Polos, as an unreliable orator, and is likely slander. Archelaos himself was killed in 399. The examination of the event’s background is difficult: there are different versions and the reports are influenced by topoi of the tyrannicide with Harmodios (who was allegedly sexually harassed by the tyrant) and Aristogeiton as role models. Aristotle (Pol. 1311B) accuses Archelaos of sexual hybris, Ailianos (VH 8.9) frankly calls him a tyrant. Suspiciously, just as in the tradition on Philip II’s assassination (apparently seen as a parallel by Aristotle and other writers), a disappointed eromenos of the ruler was involved. Krataios (variants: Krateuas, Krateros) is named either as the single perpetrator (Diod. 14.37.6; [Plat.] Alk. II 141D-E; Ail. VH 8.9) or as one of three plotters (Arist. Pol. 1311B). Since the erotic motif is characteristic of narratives of tyrant-slayers, 180

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one has to be cautious of taking it at face value. Aristotle’s information that one conspirator was the Thessalian exile Hellanokrates of Larisa may indicate that Archelaos’ policy towards Thessaly somehow played a role, but this is speculation. According to the other versions, the assassin aimed at taking the rule himself (which is problematic; it was only possible for an Argead). Diodoros’ version provides us with another possibility for an armed person (of the privileged circles) to get within close range of the ruler without raising suspicions: the murder happened during the hunt. We have no details on the assassination of Orestes, Archelaos’ underage son, in about 399/8 by Aëropos II (Diod. 14.37.6), of Amyntas II in 395/4 (Diod. 14.82.2)—perhaps identical with Amyntas ὁ μικρός (killed by a certain Derdas (from Elimeia?) because he made fun of his youth—whatever this meant: Arist. Pol. 1311B)—and of Pausanias by his successor → Amyntas III in 394/3 (Diod. 14.89.2). Alexander II’s assassination in 369/8 was engineered by Ptolemy of Aloros and his accomplices (Diod. 15.71.1; Plut. Pelop. 27.2; Dem. 19.195). → Marsyas of Pella states that he was killed while watching Ptolemy’s men performing a Makedonian weapon dance (BNJ 135-136 F 11). If the story is valid, the conspirators were inventive: performers of a weapon dance (whose armory raised no suspicion) in a symposiastic context will have been an exception to the rule that no armed person was able to approach the monarch apart from his bodyguards. Apparently, Ptolemy dominated the scene: in order to keep the situation under control after the murder, he must have been sure that the majority of guests were on his side. In 365, he was killed himself by Perdikkas III (Diod. 15.77.5; 16.2.4; no further details). In 336, during the celebration of his daughter’s wedding at Aigai, Philip II was stabbed by → Pausanias from Orestis, one of his guards, at the entrance of the theatre at → Aigai in full view of the assembled guests (Diod. 16.94.3-4; Just. 9.6.3-5). On his flight to the gates, Pausanias was killed on the spot by Philip’s bodyguards. Aristotle’s statement that Pausanias acted on his own initiative (Pol. 1311B) is much debated. According to the official version, he did not act alone: Heromenes and Arrhabaios of → Lynkestis (in the neighbourhood of Pausanias’ homeland Orestis), the sons of Aëropos, were accused of complicity and executed (Arr. An. 1.25.1-2; Plut. Mor. 327C; Just. 11.2.2). However, even today, speculations continue, in particular about the possible involvement of → Olympias and Alexander III. His insecure position immediately after Philip’s death militates against his or his mother’s complicity. However, due to our limited knowledge, it will remain a matter of debate. From the beginning of his reign, Alexander was a frequent target of c.

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There is speculation about a conspiracy of his cousin → Amyntas Perdikkou in 336. However, while Amyntas was apparently preferred by some courtly factions (Plut. Mor. 327C), there is no valid evidence that he made any efforts to challenge his cousin’s rule. He was probably eliminated because of his potential, not his actions (Arr. An. 1.5.4). It is unclear whether the next attested c. of generals against Alexander are real plots or inflated slanders. Reportedly, → Attalos negotiated treacherously with Athens (Diod. 17.3.2, 5.1), Alexander Lynkestes with Dareios III (Arr. An. 1.25.3). Both were eliminated. The accusation against Alexan­der’s physician Philip of Akarnania of being bribed by Dareios to kill the ruler is rhetorical flourish (Curt. 3.6.4-11; Plut. Alex. 19.3). In 330, a plot to murder Alexander involving the hetairos Dimnos (variant: Limnos) was divulged. Dimnos did not survive his arrest. His accomplices were tried and executed, among them the bodyguard Demetrios (Arr. An. 3.27.5; Curt. 6.7.15). The event was most crucial since → Philotas was charged with complicity, tried, and executed (Arr. An. 3.26.1-3; Diod. 17.79-80; Curt. 6.7.1-11.40; Just. 12.5.18; Plut. Alex. 48-49). Reportedly, the plot had been confided to him and he had failed to inform Alexander. Philotas’ father → Parmenion was involved in ab­ sentia in the trial and murdered in Ekbatana (Arr. An. 3.26.3-4; Curt. 7.2.11-34; Diod. 17.80.1; Plut. Alex. 49.7). There is no scholarly consensus regarding the much-debated question whether Philotas was innocent, had silent sympathy for the plotters, fell victim to a conspiracy himself, or formed part of a plot against Alexander. The motives of Dimnos and his accomplices are unclear; perhaps they did not think far beyond getting rid of the ruler who had become unpopular with them. If Philotas had known about the plot and kept his silence, it was treason, but we are not in a position to know what went on in the camp, particularly behind the scenes. According to the official version, represented by Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, there was no doubt about Philotas’ guilt (Arr. An. 3.26.2-3). However, the elimination of the two foremost Makedonian generals who had engineered the preceding victories against the Persians demanded a thorough justification. It is unclear to what extent this justification was a propa­ gandistic pretext or a reflection of the real progression of events. Ptolemy’s testimony has to be treated with caution: he profited from the affair and received Demetrios’ (accused as Philotas’ accomplice) important office as one of the 7 elite somatophylakes (Arr. An. 3.27.5). In 327, Hermolaos, one of the basilikoi paides, and between 5 (Arr. An. 4.13.3-4) and 7 of his fellow paides (Curt. 8.6.910) conspired to kill Alexander—hence the (anachronistic) modern term: ‘Pages’ 182

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conspiracy. They planned to do it during their night watch in his tent when he slept (Arr. An. 4.13.3-4; Curt. 8.6.7-11). Reportedly, the trigger was Hermolaos’ harsh punishment of being flogged and deprived of his horse (his symbol of social and political rank) for having anticipated Alexander by killing a wild boar during a hunt (Arr. An. 4.13.1-3; Curt. 8.6.7). If the story is valid, the youths may have regarded their comrade’s humiliation as symptomatic of the political change they objected to: Alexander’s new regal style (Arr. An. 4.14.2). They were tried by the → army assembly and executed (Arr. An. 4.14.3; Curt. 8.6.28-8.21; Plut. Alex. 55.3-4; cf. Just. 12.7.2). Alexander’s court historiographer → Kallisthenes was accused of complicity, arrested, and either secretly eliminated or kept in arrest until he died (Arr. An. 4.14.3; Plut. Alex. 55.4-5; Diog. Laert. 5.5). The different contemporary versions indicate that his fate was thought to trigger controversial reactions; thus, the circumstances were blurred. Pownall has shown that the common belief that Kallisthenes was the tutor of the paides is a myth stemming from the apologetic primary Alexander historiographers, who justified his end by emphasizing his alleged close connections with the paides. The tradition that he inspired Hermolaos by references to tyrannicides (Plut. Alex. 55.2-3; or Philotas: Arr. An. 4.10.3-4) is another example of the contamination of our reports by stock motifs of the narratives of tyrannicides. In the ancient reception, Kallisthenes was frequently perceived as a free-minded philosopher who fell victim to a plot of a tyrant and his evil band of flatterers (e.g. Plut. Alex. 55.2). According to Arrian, most of his sources (except for Aristoboulos and Ptolemy) had no doubt that Kallisthenes was innocent and only implicated in the conspiracy because he had made himself unpopular with Alexan­der who wanted to get rid of him (Arr. An. 4.14.1-2; cf. Curt. 8.8.21; Just. 12.7.2-3; Plut. Alex. 55.3). According to Arrian (An. 7.24.3), Alexander was suspicious of a conspiracy during his last stay in Babylon when a stranger wearing his royal robe suddenly sat on his throne. Alexander had him executed (Diod. 17.116.2-4; Plut. Alex. 73.3-4). The enigmatic event is usually interpreted as an example of the Mesopotamian Substitute King ritual to the end of taking away misfortune from the king by killing his temporary double. The theory that it was in fact a plot of the Chaldaians who wanted to keep the revenues of the temple of Marduk for themselves (in accordance with Alexander’s suspicions: Arr. An. 7.17.1-4) has not received much support. After his death in 323, Alexan­ der was rumored to have been poisoned at the instigation of → Antipatros conspiring with his sons Kassandros and Iolaos, the latter’s lover Medeios of

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Larisa, and according to one tradition also Aristotle (Arr. An. 7.27.1-2; Just. 15.2.4-5; Plut. Alex. 77.3). But this claim is likely propagandistic fiction of the wars of the Successors.   S. Müller Cf. Badian, E., Conspiracies, in: Bosworth/Baynham 2000, 50-95; Carney 2015, 127-90; Heckel, W., In the Path of the Conqueror: Military and Political Resistance to Alexander the Great, 2020; Pownall 2018.

Court While the Hellenistic courts have been studied intensely, due to the lack of sources the Argead court has received less attention. Given the extremely poor evidence, it is most difficult to analyze its characteristics. There are only scattered glimpses, mostly concerning Argead → patronage of Greek artists and intellectuals at the c. before the reign of → Philip II and → Alexander III (Bakchyl. F 20 B; Solin. 9.14; Plut. Mor. 177A-B; 531D-E; Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4; Suda s.v. Choi­ rilos χ 594 Adler; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Arist. Pol. 1311B; Athen. 8.345D; 11.506F, 508E). Since they both initiated decisive changes in the courtly structure, it is even more difficult to explore the nature of the Argead c. before those changes. As for the theoretical framework, following sociological definitions of c. adapted in the field of ancient history, the Argead c. is generally defined as the extended household of the ruler and his family, including his leading circles and staff. The c. is not a static place or synonym of the ruler’s palace but in a much broader view a social and spatial phenomenon in the sense of the political, administrative, cultural, and social centre of the realm. It includes the ruler’s internal and external political ties, economic relations, and topographically the places, buildings, rooms, or tents in which he lived and performed his royal duties. Thereby, people belonging to the inner c.—the ruler, his family, and the persons surrounding him regularly or permanently, including the servants—are distinguished from the people forming part of the outer c.: transitory visitors, envoys, guests, or short-term officials. Besides its political and administrative function, the c. was a stage of representation and visualization of status, a point of contact between the ruler and his leading circles, and a platform for monarchical representation, royal display of wealth, power, and benefactions. Argead patronage of Greek artists, writers, philosophers, or scientists served to demonstrate the 184

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dynasty’s proclaimed (alleged) Greek descent, participation in Greek culture, generosity, the wide span of its networks, and sophisticated nature. In addition, for the courtiers, the c. was a platform of competition for status and closeness to the ruler as a factor of status. Thereby, the → symposion and banquets were particular platforms of exchange between the ruler, his elite and high-ranking guests, while royal audiences allowed the ruler to communicate with wider circles of his population and representatives from foreign cities or countries. The traditional position of the Argead ruler as a → primus inter pares (first among equals) required that he be found accessible. Philip II paved the way for breaking away from this limitation, and this development was furthered by Alexander III who used the courtly etiquette to visualize his newly distanced position. In the course of these changes, the ruler’s accessibility did not cease. Rather, access to him was revalued, provided under new ceremonial rules and thus the object of stricter regulations stressing his elevated position. For example, Alexander introduced the Achaimenid ushers in 330 (Diod. 17.77.4-7) that underlined the special atmosphere surrounding the ruler on formal occasions. It was a sign of the change. Greek authors (and Romans following them) tend to depict Makedonian symposia stereotypically as drunken debauches revealing the alleged uncivilized and rude nature of the Makedonians and their alcoholic ruler (for example Ephipp., BNJ 126 F 1, F 3; Nikoboule, BNJ 127 F 1-2; Polykleitos of Larisa, BNJ 128 F 1; Curt. 8.1.22-52). These are traditional counter-images of the “civilized” Greek symposia that serve to confirm the writers’ own cultural identity and thus must be viewed critically. Dining and drinking together was intended to intensify and establish bonds of loyalty and create ideas of solidarity and team spirit. Furthermore, apparently, at least under Alexander III (and after the transformation of his c. by the adaption of Achaimenid courtly elements), rank was mirrored by the seating arrangements at such symposia. Sitting close to Alexander—either in his proximity, or on the kline next to him or even sharing a couch with him—was an indicator of highest prestige (Plut. Alex. 54.4). The seating order at this important platform of communication and interaction will likely have been a criterion constituting rank and status at the Argead c. previously. In a certainly fictional banquet story, → Herodotos mentions that Argead → women did not attend courtly symposia (5.18-20; cf. Just. 7.3.3). This would be in accordance with the Greek view that symposia were no place for any respectable women, let alone female members of the elite. However, it is assumed that Argead women might have been occasionally present, or banqueted

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separately. The Argead c. was not restricted to any capital but located where the ruler and his leading circles happened to be. In times of war, it was a travelling c. The ruler’s headquarters in his military camp with his own tent as the centre were the c. where political decisions were made, communication took place, and the Argead → dynastic image was represented. In Greek sources, the Makedonian (Argead and Hellenistic) c. is called oikos, oikia, basileion, basileia or aule. The courtiers are called “those around” a specific ruler or a c. The members of the courtly elite are called → philoi in the sense of political friends aiming at a mutual profit. These philoi formed a heterogenous group of military and political officials, artists, philosophers, guest-friends, and scientists. They were of differing ethnic origins, but mostly Makedonian and Greek. The inner circle of the Argead ruler, his most influential generals, were called → hetairoi, companions, accompanying the ruler in war and peace. However, the term stresses the focus on war in Makedonian society and Argead ideology. It depended on the influence of the respective Argead ruler to which degree his favour determined the officials’ status and presence at his c. Mostly, in Argead history, the influence of the Makedonian clans will have determined their members’ rank at c. Greek authors influenced by the civic ideals of their poleis tend to condemn the philoi of Argead rulers stereotypically as kolakes (flatterers) who shamelessly tried to please the monarch in order to enjoy the pleasures of a courtly life. However, this is a biased view that has to be treated with caution. Philip II’s contemporary, the Greek historiographer → Theopompos of Chios, exaggerates the traditional image of the corrupting effects of c. life under a “barbarian” ruler by slandering Philip’s whole leading circle as a decadent bunch of male prostitutes selling their body habitually to each other all day long—besides telling lies and murdering people (BNJ 115 F 225B). As for the development of the Argead c., it was probably inspired by the Achaimenid example as an obvious role model. In the days of the Persian sovereignty over Makedonia, → Alexander I may have initiated major steps to form a c., not at least as a platform of dynastic representation, inspired by the c. of his Achaimenid master. However, due to the lack of sources, it is only a suggestion. Other sources of inspiration may have been the courts of neighbouring rulers in → Thrace or Illyria. We have no information on royal housing, how space or private quarters were allotted and whether the wives and children of those Argeads who practiced polygamy all lived together or had separate households. There is also a lack of information whether the officials and their families lived in the palace area or in its vicinity. As for the 186

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organization of the Argead c., there is no evidence of any aulic office with prescribed duties or court titles before Alexander III. One exception may be the office of secretary, (archi)grammateus, responsible for the royal chancellery. While there is no precise information on this office the secretary probably looked after written correspondence and its preservation in archives, and the royal diary. Alexander’s archigrammateus → Eumenes of Kardia had previously been Philip’s secretary (Athen. 10.434B; Plut. Eum. 1.2; Arr. An. 5.24.6-7). The other courtly office known for the Argead c. before Alexander initiated major changes in 330 after the victories in Asia was that of the royal treasurer. Harpalos of Elimeia, one of Alexander’s longstanding philoi, was appointed his treasurer during the campaign in early 331 (Arr. An. 3.6.4-5). All the other information on courtly offices, structures, and ceremonials dates to the time after Alexander had begun to transform the Argead c. in 330. The result was meant to suit his changed role as a ruler over Europe and Persia. Therefore, he combined Makedonian and Achaimenid elements. → Chares of Mytilene was appointed as εἰσαγγελεύς (BNJ 125 T 2; F 12), literally “one who announces,” thus the master of ceremony. This was likely no Makedonian tradition but a Persian c. office adopted by Alexander among other selected elements of Achaimenid c. ceremonial. While there is no exact information on Chares’ duties, he likely maintained order on formal occasions such as audiences and managed official receptions. He wrote a (lost) history of Alexander, and the fragments are mostly concerned with matters of the c. However, they do not provide us with a complete picture. His description of the festivities accompanying the mass marriages in Sousa in 324 mirrors again Alexander’s efforts to please and impress a Persian, Greek, and Makedonian audience (BNJ 125 F 4). The celebration took place in a splendid tent that paralleled Achaimenid elements of palace architecture. By performances of Greek artists, the wedding feasts were given a Greek and Makedonian touch. The edeatros, a royal taster, may have been another adoption from the Achaimenid c. Athenaios probably mistakes another Ptolemy to whom the office was assigned with → Ptolemy, son of Lagos, adding the latter’s later epithet Soter (4.171C = BNJ 125 F 1). Another measure combining Makedonian and Persian courtly elements in order to create a multicultural c. compatible with the various recipients was Alexander’s attempt to unite the different customs regarding the greeting of the ruler. In 327, he tried to introduce → proskynesis, the Persian greeting rite, also for the Makedonians and Greeks. The experiment failed as this rite distanced him considerably from his leading circles. The Make-

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donian elite objected to proskynesis: it violated their ideal of the traditional Argead primus inter pares, and was seen as an obligation to humiliate themselves in public—and to make things worse, in the same position as the defeated Persians. Alexander learned his lesson and did not insist on a united greeting cere­ mony. However, the c., its composition, the extent of its ceremony, and the ideological message concerning the status of the Argead ruler had ultimately changed.   S. Müller Cf. Hatzopoulos 1996, I, 37-42; Pownall 2017; Spawforth, A., The Court of Alexander the Great between Europe and Asia, in: Spawforth, A. (ed.), The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies, 2007, 82-120; Strootman 2014, 31-41; Weber, G., The Court of Alexander the Great as Social System, in: Heckel/Tritle 2009, 83-98.

Crocus Field, battle of The so-called Battle of the Crocus Field (Krokion Pedion) in 352 marks a new stage in → Philip II’s policy towards the Greeks. The battle took place during the → Third Sacred War (356-46), a conflict that broke out initially when the Thebans used their influence on the → Delphic Amphiktyony to bring charges against the Phokians, who responded by seizing the sanctuary of Apollon at Delphi and plundering its treasures to hire mercenary armies, escalating a minor squabble into a decade-long interstate conflict. Philip became involved in only in 354/3, almost by chance. At the invitation of his allies, the → Aleuads of Larisa, Philip brought his army into → Thessaly to intervene in their ongoing struggle with Lykophron of Pherai, who was allied with the Phokians (Diod. 16.35.1; Poly­ain. 4.2.19). Although Philip won a preliminary battle, the Phokian commander Onomarchos marched to Thessaly in 353/2 with his entire army of mercenaries and defeated Philip in two engagements, forcing him to retreat to Makedonia (Diod. 16.35.1-2; Polyain. 2.38.2). The following spring, no longer underestimating his Phokian opponents, Philip returned to Thessaly with a larger army. After taking the port city of Pagasai (Diod. 16.31.6; Dem. 1.9 and 12), Philip stationed his troops on the coastal plain, probably at the C. F. between Phthiotic Thebes and Halos, and awaited the arrival of Onomarchos, who had failed to follow up his victories the previous year in order to strike a blow against the Thebans in Boiotia and now had to rush back to Thessaly (Diod. 16.35.3; 188

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Ephoros, BNJ 70 F 94; Arist. Eth. Nik. 3.1116B). The succeeding battle was both bloody and conclusive. Philip won a resounding victory over the Phokian army, the Thessalian cavalry proving the decisive factor in the battle (Diod. 16.35.5). The Phokians suffered more than 6000 casualties, many of whom, including Onomarchos, were slaughtered as they stripped off their armour in a futile attempt to swim out to the Athenian general Chares who, after failing to prevent Philip’s capture of Pagasai (Dem. 4.35), was now standing by with a fleet in the Gulf of Pagasai; at least 3000 Phokian soldiers were also taken prisoner (Diod. 16.35.5-6). Philip hanged (Diod. 16.35.6) or crucified (Diod. 16.61.2) Onomarchos’ corpse (the variant versions of his death are intrinsically unlikely: Paus. 10.2.5 or Philon ap. Euseb. PE 8.14.33), and threw the rest into the sea as temple-robbers. On a military level, his victory in the Battle of the C. F. served as a stepping stone for Philip’s immediate consolidation of his control of Thessaly. On an ideological level, the battle marks the point at which Philip seems to have realized the extent to which he could capitalize on his newfound role as the defender of Apollon. According to Justin (8.2.3), Philip ordered his troops to march into the battle wearing laurel wreaths in order to highlight the sacrilege of his opponents. Because Philip had not been involved in the outbreak of the Third Sacred War, his intervention in the conflict at this late date ostentatiously on the side of Apollon not only allowed him to ingratiate himself with the poleis of central Greece, who for the most part were aligned against Phokis, but also provided him with a legitimate entrance into mainstream Greek affairs. Philip deliberately did not bring a decisive end to the Third Sacred War until 346, at which point he easily established his position as the major power in a central Greece that had been severely weakened by the debilitating 10-year length of the conflict.   F. Pownall Cf. Buckler 1989, 69-84; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 259-81; Müller 2016, 252-4; Sánchez, P., L’amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes, 2001, 195-97; Worthington 2008, 57-64.

Deities The Greek notion of the dodekatheon was known to the Argead Makedonians as the central part of their religious representations. The procession of → Philip II during the marriage of his daughter → Kleopatra at the theatre of → Aigai

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that included the statues of the 12 gods and his own self-presentation as the 13th hints at a perception of the Olympian gods as limited to 12 (Diod. 16.92.5). However, we do not know exactly which gods were part of it and, even more, how exactly the Makedonian pantheon of this period was perceived. In this, the dichotomy between Olympian versus chthonian, panhellenic versus local, as well as Makedonian versus foreign must have played a role. Geographical or notional determination (as shown by cultic epithets) was always important in perceiving a deity, especially for an empire that was expanding from the 7th to the 4th c., from an older ethnic core to the annexation of Greek poleis. The same applies to civic and royal cults, as well as to cults for poleis or ethne. Here, it will be a presentation through the specific political and social role of each known deity in relation to the dynasty and its members as well as to certain communities. Zeus (probably Olympios; see Diod. 18.4.7) represents the ancestral father, since Makedon was his mythical son and since the Argeads considered themselves Heraklids ([Hes.] Cat. F 7; see also Plut. Alex. 2.1). That makes this god a legitimizing authority for domestic and foreign audiences. The head of Zeus featured on Makedonian → coinage, from Philip II onwards. → Archelaos instituted the most important sanctuary of this deity at → Dion, where he established the annual Olympia, a festival in honour of Zeus and the Muses, with sacrifices and competitions. At Zeus’ sanctuary in Olympia, Philip II dedicated a → Philippeion, a showcase of the continuity of the dynasty, and in 324, Alexander III chose the occasion of the Olympic Games to announce the → Exiles’ Decree. In his cult as Zeus-→ Ammon, Zeus is promoted to the direct father of Alexander III and elements of this god’s iconography (see the ram horns) have influenced Alexander’s post­ humous iconography. Athena’s cult was known in Thasos and → Amphipolis, as well as at → Pella. Her head, with a Korinthian helmet featured on → Alexan­ der’s gold staters, probably expressed the Makedonians’ participation in the panhellenic world (just as Apollon on Philip’s staters). Dedications to Athena’s sanctuary at the Athenian Akropolis as well as to → Priene are addressed by Alexander III, whereas a temple was meant to be built at Kyrnos (Diod. 18.4.5). This probably hints at her cult in Pella as Alkidemos, a military deity, specially worshipped by the kings. On the other hand, in Makedonian cities the goddess symbolized autonomy from the central power. Apollon on coins of Philip II probably was addressed to the Greek world. His sanctuaries and oracles, in Delphi, Didyma, and Xanthos played an important role in the foundation of the kingdom (Hyg. Fab. 219), in Makedonian interventions in Greek politics, and 190

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to legitimize Makedonian interventions in Greek politics, particularly under Philip II and Alexander III. Artemis, the goddess of crossing the boundaries was evoked in order to facilitate the going beyond traditional boundaries. Already in Amphipolis, before the landing in Asia in 334, Artemis Tauropolos sealed this conquest for the new Agamemnon. That is why a new temple was to be constructed there in her honour, as well as financial aid to be given for the reno­vation of the Artemision in Ephesos (Strab. 14.1.22). Demeter, in her quality as Thesmophoros was known in Lete, Galepsos, Pella, and Thasos, whereas her sanctuary in Amphipolis was outside the city; she also shared a sanctuary with Aphrodite in Dion. Aphrodite’s cult was linked also to that of the Mother of the Gods whose cult grew during the Successors. Apart from these gods, a number of Zeus’ sons with mortal women were also of importance: Dionysos’ cult was mainly practiced in the countryside and related to viniculture and agriculture. However, in his role as Pseudanor (sham man, → Mimallones), he seems to have had an important part as tutelary deity of the dynasty (Polyain. 4.1) whose role was to ensure the safety of the kingdom. Besides, “Bacchic ceremonies” were a relevant part of the ancestral rites under the personal care of the king (Athen. 14.659F-660A). Later, Dionysos was mostly related to the campaign of Alexander in Asia. It is not certain whether Alexander himself promoted such an affinity. It is more probable that this association was elaborated after his death, during the first decades of the Successors. Gradually, the conquest of the East became the common denominator of the mythical past on the one hand, exemplified by Dionysos and his thiasos, and of the heroic presence on the other, embodied by Alexander and his generals. Dionysos is also the god of male bonding and strengthening collective identities through consummation of wine during the aristocratic symposia. Yet, Dionysos is also the avenger of autocratic rulers, such as the allegedly orientalized Alexander, inter alia destroyer of the god’s natal city, → Thebes. Apart from that, in the cities of the kingdom, in his role as a god related to transitions, together with Artemis and Demeter, also kourotrophoi, Dionysos presides over rituals of altering social status, such as coming of age and perhaps the emancipation of slaves. Dionysos in particular, seems to have played an important role in death and afterlife representations. In Makedonia, Herakles was not only Zeus’ son and a Panhellenic hero, but also a god. The Makedonian kings regarded him as their “ancestor” (Propator: Arr. An. 6.3.2 or Patroos: SEG 46.829, Vergina). His cult was known in Thasos, Beroia, and Pella. In his quality as protector of the → hunt, he was worshipped as Kynagidas. His head featured

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on the coins of a number of kings, including Alexander III, for whom Herakles, in terms of his tasks and his eventual divinization, was a role model. Two other divine sons, the Dioskouroi, were also venerated. Medicine and care for the body were linked to the cult of Asklepios, which was strengthened by Philip II when he conceded eponymy to the priests of this god in some cities of his realm (Kalindoia, Amphipolis, and → Mieza). It is not certain if the healing daimon Darron (in Aigai) was related to Asklepios’ cult. It seems that Alexander’s concern for Asklepios was related to the king’s interest in healing, as seen by a dedication to him (Paus. 8.28.1). Fame was important for the aristocratic society of Argead Makedonia. The sanctuary of Eukleia in Pella, recipient of a dedication by Eurydike, Alexander’s grandmother, hints at that. Chthonic deities, such as Zeus Meilichios, and more significantly Hades, or the couple Demeter-Persephone frequently appear on the painted walls of the tombs. Orpheus’ tomb in Leibethra suggests that Makedonians shared Orphic beliefs in the afterlife and related “initiatory rites,” in which the main role was played by Dionysos, while Persephone acted as a mediator between the dead and the god. In this context, magical practices are also to be taken into consideration. In a polytheistic system of representations, newcomers were inevitable: Such is the case of → Hephaistion, Alexander’s Companion, who, upon the king’s request, was upgraded to a hero (SEG 40.547).   E. Koulakiotis Cf. Bowden 2017; Christensen, P./Murray, S., Macedonian Religion, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 428-45; Hatzopoulos 1994; Mari, M., Traditional Cults and Beliefs, in: Lane Fox 2011, 453-65; Piniatoglou, S., Divinités, cultes et sanctuaires, in: Descamps-Lequime, S. (ed.), Au royaume d’Alexandre le Grand, 2011, 494-9.

Delphic Amphiktyony The Delphic Amphiktyony was primarily a religious organization, although it came to play a significant political role in the mid-4th c., particularly through its role in → Philip II’s expansion into Greece. The D. A. originated as a group of neighbouring ethne (the literal meaning of amphiktyones is “dwellers around”) who administered the temple of Demeter at Anthela (near Thermopylai); as the oracular sanctuary of Delphi grew in wealth and importance in the early 6th c., the organization extended its control to include Delphi as well. The D. A. held twice-yearly meetings to conduct the official business of the sanctuary to 192

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which the 12 member ethne (mostly from central Greece) provided two delegates, each of which could cast one vote; the earliest lists of members, which are unlikely to have remained static, date from the period of the organization’s political importance in the mid-4th c. (Aischin. 2.116; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 63). The D. A. likely began to exercise greater political importance in the period of Theban hegemony after their defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra in 371; by virtue of their alliance-making efforts in central Greece in the wake of their victory over Alexander of Pherai at the Battle of Kynoskephalai in 364, the Thebans came to control 22 of the 24 votes. It was the Thebans, with their clear majority in the D. A., who were responsible for the outbreak of the so-called → Third Sacred War in 356. Taking advantage of the Spartans’ current military weakness and the Athenians’ embroilment in the Social War (357-55), the Thebans and their Thessalian allies settled a longstanding grudge against the Phokians, in whose territory the sanctuary at Delphi was located, by lodging a formal charge of sacrilege before the D. A., resulting in the imposition of a heavy fine (Diod. 16.23.2-3; Just. 8.1.4-6; Paus. 10.2.1, 15.1). Unable to pay the fine, the Phokians, isolated and backed into a corner, resorted to seizing control of the sanctuary; the D. A. responded with a formal declaration of war (Diod. 16.28.4). The Phokians’ precipitous action, probably to the surprise of all parties involved, caused the conflict to escalate from a minor local squabble to the decade-long interstate conflict which is now known as the Third Sacred War (356-46). Despite the contemporary military predominance of the Thebans and the Thessalians, they were unable to dislodge the Phokians, who were borrowing (on an eventually unprecedented scale) from the considerable resources of the sanctuary to hire a mercenary army to defend themselves. After several seasons of indecisive campaigns, Philip entered the war on behalf of his Thessalian allies, and after a preliminary defeat he won a major victory over the Phokians at the Battle of the → Crocus Field. At this point, Philip began to capitalize on the symbolic value of his defeat of the sacrilegious Phokians, and began to portray himself explicitly as the defender of Apollon (Diod. 16.35.6; Just. 8.2.3), providing him with a legitimate entrance to the mainstream of Greek politics. Although Philip’s attempt to march south after the Battle of the Crocus Field was blocked at Thermopylai in 352 by an Athenian army (Dem. 19.84, 319; Diod. 16.38.1-2; Just. 8.2.8-12), pragmatic as always he simply bided his time and in 346 brought a decisive end to the conflict without a battle (Diod. 16.59.4). The Phokians were expelled from the

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D. A., and their two votes were given to Philip himself and not the Makedonian people (Diod. 16.60.1), this awarding of votes to an individual rather than an ethnos representing a clear break from previous tradition. Nevertheless, Philip’s control over the D. A. and presidency over the panhellenic Pythian Games did not result in any immediate military advantage for him; it is possible that from his northern Greek perspective he over-estimated the degree to which leadership of the D. A. could provide traction for his entrance into the south. Nevertheless, Philip did accomplish the rebuilding of the temple of Apollon, which was finally completed under his supervision after it had been destroyed in a fire in 373, allowing him to showcase his power and piety at one of the most important sanctuaries in the Greek world. After the conclusion of the Third Sacred War, Philip turned his attention to securing the eastern borders of his kingdom, with campaigns against → Thrace and Skythia. It was while he was occupied in the northeast that a new conflict involving the D. A. broke out in 340/39, the so-called Fourth Sacred War. At the regular meeting of the D. A., the Athenian representative, the orator → Aischines, deflected a fine of 50 talents proposed against Athens by the Lokrians of Amphissa (instigated by the Thebans) by pointing out that the Amphissians themselves were guilty of cultivating sacred land (Aischin. 3.116-22). After Aischines’ denunciation of the Amphissians the D. A., once again proving remarkably ineffective against their opponents (Aischin. 3.122-124, 128-29; Dem. 18.151-52), invited Philip, who at that time was on campaign in Skythia (Aischin. 3.129), to come south with his powerful Makedonian army. Although clearly Philip had not foreseen the sudden outbreak of this new Amphiktyonic conflict, the upshot of which was to drive a wedge between two of his strongest allies, the Thebans and the Thessalians, he quickly seized the opportunity to campaign in central Greece nominally on behalf of Apollon. This time, however, Philip did not make the same mistake of failing to capitalize militarily on his intervention. Accepting the invitation to act as commander-in-chief of the Amphiktyonic forces, Philip led his army south but instead of heading to Amphissa, he suddenly switched directions and occupied Elateia, strategically located on the border between Phokis and → Boiotia (Aischin. 3.140; Dem. 18.153; Philoch., BNJ 328 F 56; Diod. 16.84.2; Plut. Dem. 18.1). This unexpected development suggested that Philip was poised to invade Boiotia (sparking fears in Athens that Attika was next), and frightened the Thebans into accepting → Demosthenes’ proposal to join their inveterate enemy Athens in the coalition of Greek poleis deter194

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mined to resist Philip. The result was the decisive defeat of the coalition of Greek forces by Philip, along with the young Alexander, at → Chaironeia in Boiotia in 338 (Diod. 16.85.3-86; Plut. Alex. 9.2). At that point, Philip seems to have realized that the D. A. ultimately would not work alone as a means of unifying the Greeks under his control. Using some of the organizational structures of the D. A. as a model, he developed a new organization for this purpose, the → Korinthian League. Nevertheless, control of the wealthy and influential sanctuary at Delphi remained a major desideratum, and so the D. A. remained an instrument of Makedonian control until it entered a period of Aitolian domination during the wars of Alexander’s Successors.   F. Pownall Cf. Bowden 2017; Hornblower, S., Did the Delphic Amphictyony Play a Political Role in the Classical Period?, in: Malkin, I. et al. (eds.), Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean, 2009, 39-56; Lefèvre, F., L’Amphictionie pyléo-delphique, 1998; Londey, P., Philip II and the Delphic Amphictyony, MedArch 7 (1994), 25-34; Sánchez, P., L’Amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes, 2001.

Demetrios Poliorketes Demetrios the Besieger was the first ‘Hellenistic’ king, and the first of the Antigonid dynasty to rule Makedonia (294-88), after murdering Alexander V, the last member of the Antipatrid dynasty. His main association with Argead Makedonia is through his father’s espousal of → Alexander IV at the Assembly in Tyre in 315, in order to prevent → Kassandros from establishing a new royal line (Diod. 19.61.1-2). The battle lines for the Third Diadoch War were drawn here, during which D. held the Levant, while his father campaigned in Anatolia and attempted to subvert Kassandros in Europe. In 309 D. campaigned against → Ptolemy I in Lykia and Karia (Plut. Demetr. 7.3; Diod. 20.27.1-2), and probably tried to hinder Ptolemy’s overtures to → Alexander III’s sister, → Kleopatra, in Sardeis. He was unsuccessful, forcing → Antigonos to order her death in 308 (Diod. 20.37.3-6), thus exterminating the Argead dynasty. D. was a fervent emulator of the Argead kings, as is demonstrated by his spectacular siege of Rhodos in 305/4 (Diod 20.91-100), which resonated with Alexander’s siege of → Tyre in 332 (Arr. An. 2.18.3-24.6; Curt. 4.2.84.18). Additionally, he planned to mount a new Anabasis in 290/89 with an

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enormous military and naval buildup (Plut. Demetr. 43.3-4; Plut. Pyrrh. 10.3). Antigonid → coinage was also profoundly influenced by Alexander’s issues, with Alexander-type tetradrachms bearing the head of Herakles/seated Zeus. These continued during D.’s reign as a backdrop to his own portrait coinage and naval-victory themed designs, with Zeus replaced by Poseidon, and Alexander’s name replaced by D.’s own. The link with the Argeads was thus prominently manifest in the primary evidence, though Plutarch hints that D. only copied Alexander superficially, like an actor on a stage (Plut. Demetr. 41.3).   P.V. Wheatley Cf. Billows 1990; Wehrli, C., Antigone et Démétrios, 1968; Wheatley, P./Dunn, C., Deme­ trius the Besieger, 2020.

Demochares The Athenian orator and democratic politician Demochares (ca. 355/50-before 271/0), son of Laches and nephew of → Demosthenes, is associated with late Argead Makedonia. He wrote Histories (BNJ 75) about Greek events from at least about the time of his uncle’s death (322) to 289. Doubts exist about the claim that he started his political career as early as in 322, when after the Lamian War, he reportedly tried to protect the Athenian figureheads of the resistance to Makedonian rule from → Antipatros ([Plut]. X Orat. Vit. 847D). Even more suspicious is the anecdote that while serving as an Athenian ambassador, D. (nick-named Parrhesiastes: outspoken person) answered → Philip II’s question which favour he could do for the Athenians with the rude proposal: “Hang yourself!” (Sen. De ira 3.23.2-3). Chronologically, it is impossible that Demosthenes’ nephew D. could have been sent to Philip II as an ambassador as he was too young during Philip’s reign. Thus, either the rude ambassador was a namesake or the story is apocryphal, invented from the retrospective transferring of D.’s later criticism of Athenian supporters of other Makedonians, namely → Kassandros (BNJ 75 F 4) and → Demetrios Poliorketes (BNJ 75 F 8-9; Plut. Demetr. 24.5), into his famous uncle’s prime time. The reason is clear: According to his self-fashioning, D. tried to follow in Demosthenes’ footsteps, choosing his uncle’s stand against Philip II’s expansion as his role model. Therefore, D. re-evaluated Demosthenes’ memory ([Plut.] X Orat. Vit. 196

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847D, 850F-851C; Plut. Demosth. 30.5). Hence, his relationship with the Argeads was more of a mental retrospective nature.   S. Müller Cf. Cooper, C., (Re)Making Demosthenes: Demochares and Demetrius of Phalerum on Demosthenes, in: Wheatley, P./Hannah, R. (eds.), Alexander & his Successors, 2009, 310-22; Marasco, G., Democare di Leuconoe, 1984; Paschidis, P., Between City and King, 2008, 153-9.

Demosthenes Demosthenes was born in Paiania in either 385 or 384. His father (Demosthenes senior) moved to → Athens, where he made a successful living from owning a “factory” that made knives and couches or beds. He died in 376, entrusting care of his son D. (then about 7) and his daughter (probably 5) to selected guardians. They, however, squandered the family fortune, leaving an estate of only one talent by the time D. turned 18 (the age of majority). After serving as an ephebe for two years, he successfully prosecuted them, though he never recouped the money. There is a belief that the orator Isaios wrote these prosecution speeches; still, D.’s success in court allowed him to embark on a lucrative career as a logo­ graphos. His earliest forensic speeches dealt with family and property disputes, no doubt because of his cases against his guardians. Soon he was writing speeches for different private and public cases. By the 350s he had begun to involve himself in political life, and delivered a series of speeches in the Assembly on fiscal and foreign policy matters. The first symbouleutic speech that we know of was in 354, when he was about 30 years old; titled On the Symmories (navy boards), it dealt with a reform of the trierarchy as well as urging the Athenians to abandon the notion of invading Persia. The people were not persuaded by D.’s financial proposals, though the idea of attacking Persia was abandoned. D.’s failure was arguably due to his poor speaking style. He had had a sickly youth and also suffered a speech impediment. Then he met the comic actor Satyros, who taught him the importance of delivery. From then on, D. put himself through a harsh regimen to improve his delivery; among other things, he was said to have practiced speaking with pebbles in his mouth to overcome his lisp (Plut. Dem. 11.1; [Plut.] Mor. 844F). Nevertheless, D.’s next political speeches, On Behalf of the Megalopolitans (353), the first Philippic (351), On the

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Freedom of the Rhodians (351), and On Organization (350) were also failures, as were several high-profile forensic speeches that still dealt with foreign and financial issues: Against Androtion (355), Against the Law of Leptines (355), and Against Aristokrates (352). Then the tide changed thanks to the actions of → Philip II, King of Makedonia. When Philip came to power, Makedonia was a weak kingdom on the periphery of the Greek world, disunited, with a conscript army, prey to incursions by neighbouring tribes of Illyrians and Paionians, and victim to Greek cities such as Athens and → Thebes meddling in its internal affairs. Philip changed all that. In a dizzying display of speed, diplomacy, and deceit, setting the pattern for the rest of his reign, he defeated the neighbouring tribes to secure his borders; united the kingdom as never before; introduced a strong economic policy; and undertook military reforms that created a new, formidable professional army. By the time he died in 336 he had tripled the population and extent of Makedonia as far as Byzantion on the → Hellespont and the Greek mainland. Yet astonishingly it was not until 8 years after Philip became king—and 6 years after he and Athens went to war—that an Athenian speech focused on him, D.’s first Philippic; even then, it was but one of a series of failed Demosthenic speeches on foreign policy. Then in 349/8 Philip invaded the Chalkidike, prompting → Olynthos, the principal city, to appeal for help to Athens. D. delivered three Olynthiac orations, calling on the Athenians to send help to Olynthos; the first one failed, but the people accepted his case in the other two and deployed troops to the city. Ultimately, these were to no avail and the Chalkidike fell to Philip, but finally D. was on his way to political ascendancy in Athens. D. had already clashed with the influential → Euboulos, whose pacifist policy to rebuild Athenian finances had to an extent enabled Philip to extend his reach into Greece. But in 346 we find D. playing more of a role than Euboulos in the peace negotiations that ended the war with Philip. During the embassies to Philip, another orator whose star was on the rise, → Aischines, incurred D.’s enmity, and the two became antagonists over the right policy to adopt towards Philip. In 343 D. prosecuted Aischines for treachery, but in the resulting trial (commonly called the False Embassy trial after the titles of their surviving speeches) Aischines was acquitted. D. may have helped broker peace with Philip in 346, but his attitude towards the king remained defiant. Only weeks later, he delivered his On the Peace, in which he saw the Peace as a breathing space before hostilities resumed against Philip, and he began to work towards an alliance with Athens’ traditional opponent Thebes. 198

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When Philip proposed changes to the Peace in 344, D. spoke against them in his second Philippic, introducing a more aggressive anti-Makedonian policy to thwart Philip’s continued diplomacy. The trial of Philokrates (the architect of the → Peace of Philokrates) in 343 and his condemnation illustrate Athens’ attitude to the king; it is noteworthy that D. distanced himself from Philokrates and offered him no support. Philip’s annexation of → Thrace in 342 jeopardized the Athenian grain route from the Black Sea, and Athens was dependent on imported grain for survival. The Athenians sent troops under Diopeithes to the Chersonese to protect their interests, and their activities against towns that were now Philip’s allies caused him to demand Diopeithes’ removal in 341. D. countered Philip’s insistence in three fiery speeches, On the Chersonese, and the third and fourth Philippics, persuading the Athenians not to recall Diopeithes but to send even more troops to the area. The power of D.’s rhetoric was admired even by Philip, who called his speeches “soldiers because of their warlike power” ([Plut.] Mor. 845D). With Athens and Philip on a collision course, the king seized the Athenians’ grain convoy in 340; they immediately declared war on him. A year later, in 339, D. finally persuaded the Athenians to make a formal alliance with Thebes, arguably his greatest diplomatic coup. The coalition army faced Philip at → Chaironeia (Boiotia) in 338. Philip—ably assisted by his 18-year-old son and heir, Alexander (the future “Great”)—defeated it and imposed Makedonian hegemony on Greece. D. fought in the battle; he survived it, and prudently withdrew from Athens ostensibly to procure grain in case Philip besieged it. The king, however, treated the people leniently (in contrast to Thebes), not even demanding the surrender of anti-Makedonian politicians like D. However, it would not have been lost on him that the Athenians chose D. to deliver the funeral oration (epitaphios) honouring their dead at Chaironeia. Two years later, in 336, Philip was assassinated. D.’s 10-year-old daughter had just died, but when news of the assassination broke, D. abandoned the traditional one-month mourning period and put on festival clothes to celebrate—a clear sign of his hatred of the king. Philip’s son → Alexander III succeeded him, and in 334 invaded Asia. He never returned to Greece, dying at Babylon in June 323. During Alexander’s reign, D. kept a low profile for several reasons. First, he may have suffered some trauma by narrowly escaping being handed over to Alexander when that king besieged Thebes (a revolt D. initially supported) and razed it to the ground in 335. Second, he may have realized the futility of resisting Makedonia: when Alexander first crossed to Asia, D.

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wrote to Persian generals urging them to defeat Alexander, and hoped that he would be “trampled under the hoofs of the Persian cavalry” (Aischin. 3.164). Neither happened, and Alexander’s defeats of Dareios III at → Issos in 333 and → Gaugamela in 331 gave him the Persian Empire. Finally, unlike in the days of Philip, Athenian public life did not revolve around what to do about Makedonia; Greece was cowed, so there was not much, if anything, for D. to speak about in the Assembly. It is possible that in this period D. resumed his former career of logography as several of his private speeches were written in the 320s (e.g. Against Phormion, Against Dionysodoros, and the two speeches Against Aristogeiton). He also may have revised some of his earlier speeches for circulation, including the 55 prooimia or rhetorical openings of political speeches that have survived in his corpus (the prooimia were perhaps “set” openings which other orators might also use). In all, D. was a prolific writer, being credited with either 65 or 71 speeches ([Plut.] Mor. 847E). We know of three occasions when D. was again in the public spotlight. The first time was in 331, when Agis III of Sparta encouraged the Greek cities to rebel against Makedonia. The Athenian Assembly debated Agis’ call to arms. D. initially may have supported Agis (if the speech On the Treaty with Alexander in his corpus is by him), but then seems to have had a change of heart and persuaded the people to disregard Agis’ appeal. It was just as well. → Antipatros (regent of Makedonia in Alexan­ der’s absence) defeated and killed Agis in 330 and fined Sparta’s allies heavily. D.’s advice may well have stemmed from recognizing the new normal of Makedonian rule. The second time was in 330, the famous Crown Trial. 6 years earlier, in 336, a certain Ktesiphon had proposed that D. be awarded a gold crown. Aischines at the time rightfully charged Ktesiphon with making an illegal proposal (D. as a serving official could not be crowned until he passed an audit and Ktesiphon had submitted his proposal to the wrong body), but let the case drop. In 330 he returned to the attack. He had the law on his side, but it was on Ktesiphon’s reason for honouring D.—“because he consistently speaks and acts in the best interests of the people” (Aischin. 3.49)—that Aischines principally based his case. He saw D.’s actions and advice as anything but in the city’s best interests as his anti-Makedonian policy had led to Chaironeia and the end of Greek freedom. Aischines as prosecutor spoke first. Then came Ktesi­ phon, who gave only a short defense speech, before handing over to D. We have the speeches of Aischines (Against Ktesiphon) and D. (On the Crown). At the end, the jurors voted overwhelmingly to acquit D., vindicating his entire policy. 200

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They did so because he did not try to distance himself from his stance, but justified it on the basis that while it failed, it was the right and only one as the people fought for their most cherished ideals of eleutheria (freedom) and autonomia (autonomy). Losing at Chaironeia was better than not standing up to Philip, for the Athenians matched their ancestors in the → Persian Wars, who likewise fought for freedom. Aischines, whose case was all doom and gloom, did not even win one-fifth of the votes, and subsequently left Athens. The third and final time D. was in the public glare was in 324/3, the so-called Harpalos affair. In 324, → Harpalos, Alexander’s corrupt imperial treasurer, had fled to Athens with a substantial sum of money, hoping to trigger a revolt against the king. D. gave a speech urging the people not to admit him, but he still made his way into the city. D. then had him imprisoned and his money confiscated and stored for safekeeping on the Akropolis. When Harpalos fled and apparently only about half his money was found, D. and others were accused of taking bribes to arrange his flight. They were put on trial in 323, even though there was no evidence against them; almost all were acquitted, but D. was found guilty of taking 20 talents from Harpalos, and fined the huge sum of 50 talents. Unable to pay it, he moved into exile. Whether D. was guilty cannot be fully determined, but the fact that with no evidence against the accused all should have been acquitted or condemned yet D. was singled out points to a show trial. It is plausible that the Athenians declared against him to win Alexander’s favour, given that they (and the other Greeks) were appealing his → Exiles Decree. D. remained in exile until after Alexander’s death in 323, when many Greeks revolted again from Makedonian rule in the so-called Lamian War. He visited several cities encouraging them to unite under Athens, for which he was recalled to the city; when he landed at the Peiraieus “every archon and priest was present and the entire citizen body gathered to watch his arrival and give him an enthusiastic welcome” (Plut. Dem. 27.7). His triumphant return was soon dashed. In 322 Antipatros defeated a Greek army at Krannon (Thessaly) to restore Makedonian hegemony. He followed up his victory by punishing Athens, and demanding the anti-Makedonian politicians. D. had already fled to Kalauria (Poros), where, to prevent capture by Antipatros’ men, he committed suicide. D. as a politician can be viewed as a patriot or an opportunist exploiting the threat from Philip for his own political advancement after a series of failed speeches: the truth is probably a combination of the two. Certainly the Harpalos affair hampered his posthumous reputation, but it is

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also worth noting that 40 years after his death his nephew → Demochares successfully proposed a statue for him (280/79), his decree baldly stating that of all D.’s contemporaries “he performed the best public actions in the cause of liberty and democracy” ([Plut.] Mor. 850F). Less controversial is D. the orator: he is universally regarded as Greece’s greatest orator, with his speech On The Crown considered his masterpiece.   I. Worthington Cf. MacDowell, D.M., Demosthenes the Orator, 2009; Roisman, J./Worthington, I., trans. R. Waterfield, Lives of the Attic Orators: Pseudo-Plutarch, Photius and the Suda, 2015; Worthington 2008; Worthington 2013; Worthington, I., By the Spear: Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire, 2014.

diadema The diadema, a textile band, was tied around a man’s headgear with its ends falling down to the shoulders. The Persians adopted it from the Assyrians as an indication of the king’s ‘kin’ (syngeneis: a court title), signifying that they came from leading families or held high positions (Xen. Kyr. 8.3.13). Being within their circle, the Persian king could also wear it, but he very rarely did: it did not pertain to those royal insignia that were restricted to himself and his successor, in particular the tiara orthé, whereas the d. was open to a group. → Alexander III must have known this when just after the death of Dareios III he fastened a d. to his Makedonian → kausia (Diod. 17.77.5; Curt. 6.6.4; Just. 12.3.8) as the Achaimenid nobles did to their Persian tiara. He thus signalized that he would respect their position because he needed them for the administration of the empire. However he did not intend to create a royal crown, just as the royal title → basileus was added on his official coins later in 323, on probably posthumous emissions. Only when Alexander’s kausia diadematophoros—as a mint mark it appears on coins of → Philip III (Le Rider 1977, pl. 44.29-45.4)—was bestowed on his successor Philip III, it assumed royal character. In 306, → Antigonos and his son → Demetrios adopted both the royal title and the d. (Diod. 20.53.2; Plut. Demetr. 18.1), apparently under the form that Alexander and Philip III had used. Only in 304/3, → Ptolemy I, on his accession to the throne, untied the d. from the kausia and wore it openly in his hair (Lorber 2018, I 1, pl. 7.91), possibly influenced by the taenia of the Argead founder → Archelaos (Gaebler 1935, pl. 202

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29.11-3). When others followed him soon on their own accessions, it became the signature of Hellenistic kingship.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs, J., Das hellenistische Diadem (forthcoming); Nieswandt, H.-H., Stoffbinden im achaimenidischen Reich, in: Lichtenberger, A. et al. (eds.), Das Diadem der hellenistischen Herrscher, 2012, 63-159.

Dion Dion was a small city in the Pierian coastal plain, in southern Makedonia, at the foot of Mt. → Olympos. The city-ethnic is known in different forms (Διέστης, Διάστης, Δεῖος, Διεύς). The toponym was connected to the name of Zeus, the main deity of the city and its sanctuary. D. was the main religious centre of pre-Roman Makedonia. A festival called Olympia, devoted to Zeus and the Muses, was celebrated here every year in the month of Dios (October). It lasted 9 days, the number of the Muses, and hosted sports, theatrical and musical competitions. It was founded (or reorganized) by → Archelaos, a patron of the arts (the Athenian poets → Euripides and Agathon, among others, sojourned at his court). The sanctuary and the festival enjoyed a “federal” role, comparable to that of Dodona for the Epeirotes or Thermos for the Aitolians. During the Olympia the king usually met representatives from the cities and foreign ambassadors. The sanctuary was the place of display for royal dedications and documents of pan-Makedonian relevance. → Alexander III dedicated here a bronze sculptural monument, by Lysippos, to his 25 Companions who fell in the → Granikos battle, and he possibly planned to build (or rebuild) a magnificent temple of Zeus at D. The pantheon venerated in D. included Aphrodite, Artemis, Asklepios, Athena, Demeter, Dionysos and also the Egyptian gods Isis, Sarapis, and Anubis. All the sanctuaries are located in an open plain to the south of the walled town. Two small temples of Demeter and Kore-­ Persephone, adjacent to each other, can be dated to the late 6th c. and are among the earliest relics of monumental sacred architecture in Makedonia. The sanctuary of Zeus was a temenos surrounded by a peribolos and included a monumental altar. The presence of a temple (naos) is suggested by epigraphic sources. Excavations have also brought to light a stadion and two theaters. The town was entirely located on flat land and had no akropolis. The building of the walls and a reorganization of the urban layout occurred in the late 4th c., probably under → Kassandros, as a

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Dionysios I and Dionysios II of Syrakousai

consequence of the growing importance of the sanctuary. Inscriptions inform us on some institutions and magistrates of Hellenistic D.: a board of archontes and at least two tamiai are attested, along with the epistates (the main civic officer of Makedonian cities); the members of the civic council bore the Makedonian name of peliganes; the civic festivals included Dionysia.   M. Mari Cf. Hatzopoulos, M., Was Dion Macedonia’s Religious Centre?, in: Funke, P./Haake, M. (eds.), Greek Federal States and their Sanctuaries, 2013, 163-71; Mari 2002, 29-31, 49-60, 171-2, 179, 201-2, 249-63, 304-5; Pandermalis, D., Δίον. Η ανακάλυψη, 1999; Pandermalis, D. (ed.), Gods and Mortals at Olympus. Ancient Dion, City of Zeus, 2016.

Dionysios I and Dionysios II of Syrakousai As autocrats on the periphery of the Greek world, the Dionysioi and the Argeads were often paired together in negative stereotypes on dissipated tyrants by the Greek sources; cf. → Theopompos’ denunciation of → Philip II and D. I for the moral corruption of their associates (BNJ 115 F 134, 225a-b) and his labelling of Philip II and D. II as dissolute sots (BNJ 115 F 282, 283a-b). Nevertheless, behind these moralizing → topoi we can discern traces of a profound influence upon Philip II and → Alexander III. As the first Greek ruler of a large and multi-ethnic empire, D. I in particular offered a useful blueprint to the Argeads for justifying their extensive campaigns and creating a new ruling ideology. D. I played upon the Sicilian fear of the Carthaginians, successfully employing panhellenic rhetoric and liberation propaganda to seize sole power at Syrakousai in 406 (Diod. 13.91-96). This self-proclaimed role as the guardian of Greek freedom against the “bar­ barians” continued to be effective for D. I throughout the rest of his rule, not only in the extension of his military control over the Greek and the non-Greek populations of Sicily, but also in his ambitious territorial aspirations abroad. D. I is therefore an important precursor to both Philip and Alexander on how to employ successfully on a grand scale the twin themes of the freedom of the Greeks and revenge against a dangerous “barbarian” foe. Furthermore, D. I flirted with adaptations of Achaimenid court ceremonial (carefully modified with Greek theatrical traditions) in his royal self-fashioning in ways that are very reminiscent of Philip and Alexander’s later practices, including the wearing of purple and the donning of a diadem (Baton of Sinope, BNJ 268 F 4) and the garbing himself in ornate festal 204

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garments in contexts of theatrical pageantry (Douris of Samos, BNJ 76 F 14; cf. Philip’s attire at the fateful wedding of his daughter → Kleopatra: Diod. 16.93.1). Even D. I’s own well-attested artistic and performative aspirations designed to display his superiority over the members of his elite have their counterpart in the Argead courts of Philip and Alexander, where dramatic competitions at royal symposia offered the king a venue to outdo his fellow symposiasts and thereby legitimize his authority (cf. Nikoboule, BNJ 127 F 2). Evidence in the anecdotal tradition confirms that Philip and Alexander’s innovations were inspired by D. I. It is chronologically unlikely Philip ever met D. I face to face, for he died in 367, almost a decade before Philip’s accession. Both Plutarch (Tim. 15.7) and Ailianos (VH 12.60), however, plausibly record a conversation between Philip and D. II in Korinthos, where the latter withdrew after his defeat by Timoleon in 345/4, on the topic of D. I’s spectacular political and military success. It is also telling that Alexander, in his famous book order from Harpalos (Plut. Alex. 8.2-3), requested the Sicilian history of Philistos (BNJ 556), which detailed from an insider’s perspective D. I’s creation and administration of the largest overseas empire of his time. The negative image of D. I in antiquity as a stereotypical tyrant, thanks to the character assassination of Platon and the Platonic Academy as well as the subsequent Sicilian historiographical tradition, has ensured that the Dionysioi have largely gone unrecognized as prototypes for the remodeling of the traditional Argead monarchy by Philip and Alexander.   F. Pownall Cf. Caven, B., Dionysius I, 1990; Muccioli, F., Dionisio II, 1999; Pownall, F., Dionysius I and the Creation of a New-Style Macedonian Monarchy, AHB 31 (2017), 21-38; Pownall, F., Liberation Propaganda as a Legitimizing Principle in Warfare, in: Ruffing, K. et al. (eds.), Societies at War, 2020 (forthcoming).

Dionysos   see Deities dorea One of the ways in which the Argead kings sought to bolster the loyalty of their → hetairoi was by granting estates of royal land: dorea. The practice is alluded to in literary sources, but is best known from a number of inscriptions, the most

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important being Syll.3 332, a grant by king → Kassandros ca. 305 which confirmed the rights of Perdikkas son of Koinos to three d., two of which had originally been granted by → Philip II and the other by → Alexander III. These d. lay in the southern Chalkidike near → Olynthos, lands which Philip conquered and added to Makedonia in the 340s. We learn that Philip had granted two parcels of land to Perdikkas’ grandfather Polemokrates, and another to his father Koinos; and that Alexander had granted an estate to a Ptolemy, whose son Ptolemy had sold it to Perdikkas. The precise terms of the grants are specified: the estates were given ἐμ πατρικοῖς καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ ἐκγόνοις κυρίοις οὖσι κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀλλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι—“as hereditary goods to them and to their descendants having full authority to hold them in their possession and to exchange and to sell them”. That these were standard Argead Makedonian terms of grant is suggested by another land grant in the Chalkidike, by king → Lysimachos in the 280s using a formula of grant with almost identical wording (SEG 38.619). In accordance with these terms of gift, Perdikkas had inherited two of the estates from his grandfather and father and held them in his possession; and the third estate had been inherited by the younger Ptolemy from his father, and then sold to Perdikkas. It might appear then that such d. were granted in full and complete ownership; yet the inscription records that Kassandros, as king (i.e. after 305), gave these estates to Perdikkas on exactly the same terms as they had originally been given by Philip and Alexander. By implication, in agreeing to give the estates to Perdikkas, Kassandros could have decided against granting them: but how so if Perdikkas was the outright owner? Apparently, what was granted ἐμ πατρικοῖς was not outright ownership but hereditary possession which needed to be confirmed by future kings and which could be revoked. This is confirmed by another key inscription (Sardis VII.1 no. 1) recording an estate in the Sardeian plain granted to Mnesimachos by → Antigonos as general of Asia under the kings Philip III and Alexander IV (319-10). Mnesimachos conveyed the estate to the Temple of Artemis at Sardeis in settlement of a loan; the estate was his hereditary possession, as he and his descendants guaranteed Artemis’ possession of it; yet it is envisaged that the king might recover possession of the estate because of Mnesimachos. The estate was thus, like those of Perdikkas, a hereditary possession which might be conveyed (given or sold) to someone else, yet of which the king retained ultimate ownership with the right to repossess it. The Argead system of granting d. was thus the granting of hereditary possession with right to hold or alienate, but with retention of ultimate royal ownership. The point was that in order to retain possession the 206

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grantees had to show continuing loyalty to the kings. The estate grants were not just a reward for previous service, but a strong inducement to ongoing loyalty. Though we have only a few documents recording estate grants, the practice of granting d. was clearly a very widespread one, at least during the reigns of Philip II and those who came after him, when the conquests of Philip and Alexander provided a great deal of royal land that could be granted. → Theopompos tells us (BNJ 115 F 225b) that Philip “equipped” (παρεσκεύαζεν) his hetairoi for a rich lifestyle, and that his 800 hetairoi lived from the cultivation of as much productive earth as the 10.000 wealthiest land owners of all the rest of Greece put together. Many of these hetairoi were Makedonian aristocrats who owned large estates of their own, but who clearly received possession of additional estates of royal land; but many of Philip’s hetairoi were, as Theopompos and others inform us, men drawn to Philip’s service from all the rest of Greece, whose rewards of royal d. formed the bulk of their wealth. Notable examples were → Eumenes of Kardia, the Thessalian Agathokles, and the father of → Nearchos the Cretan. When Alexan­der was ready to invade Asia to fight the Persians, he distributed most of the remaining royal land (τὰ βασιλικά) to his hetairoi: fields, villages, settlements, and harbors were granted to all companions who were willing to accept his largesse (Plut. Alex. 15.2-3). Most of the lands held by Alexander were distributed in this way. It was vital to Alexander to firm up the loyalty to him of his hetairoi when setting out on the labors and dangers of the great Persian campaigns. Thus we see that most hetairoi of Philip and Alexander benefitted from the granting of estates of royal land. The Makedonian conquest of the Persian Empire provided vast new territories of “spear-won” (→ doriktetos) royal land, and the system of granting d. as a reward for and inducement to loyal service thus continued in Asia. The estate in the Sardeian plain granted to Mnesimachos and his descendants by the royal general Antigonos the One-Eyed, mentioned above, is the best known example of this. The estates granted by king Lysimachos to a certain Limnaios son of Harpalos in the 280s are also relevant, in that the formula of grant was the same as that used by Philip and Alexander showing that Lysimachos was still following the Argead practice. Limnaios received three parcels of land, each delimited by reference to neighbouring estates. The first parcel was adjoined by estates belonging to Lysimachos’ son Agathokles and to his well known courtier Bithys son of Kleon, showing that these two had, unsurprisingly, already themselves been the recipients of d. from Lysimachos. The neighbours of the other two parcels of land—Gouras son of Annythes, Chionides, Eualkes son of

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Demetrios, Menon son of Sosikles, and Pylon son of Epiteles—are unknown, but can plausibly be conjectured to be previous recipients of royal d. like Agathokles and Bithys. The inscription would thus preserve record of 8 separate land grants, three by Lysimachos but at least some of the others perhaps by previous (Argead?) kings. One further crucial point is established here: there existed land records where the estates granted were listed, with names of recipients and grantees, no doubt record of subsequent confirmations, and some account of boundaries. This is made clear by the mention of the estates neighbouring Limnaios’ grants. It is further attested by a Seleukid inscription (OGIS 221) recording the intention of king Antiochos I to grant land in the Troad to one Aristodikides: he ordered the local governor to check in the record office whether the land had already been granted. It turned out that some of it had, to a certain Athenaios. Since it was evidently not Antiochos who had made the grant to Athenaios, it seems that Athenaios had received his land from an earlier ruler, perhaps already in Argead times (i.e. under Alexander III, Philip III, or Alexander IV). It is clear that records of royal lands and of grants of it will have been crucial to the d. system.   R. Billows Cf. Billows 1995, 111-45; Hatzopoulos, M., Une donation du Roi Lysimaque, 1988; Hatzo­ poulos 1996, I, 169-216; Mileta, C., Der König und sein Land, 2008.

doriktetos Doriktetos (acquired by the spear) was an important concept in the martial culture of Argead Makedonia and of ancient Greece generally. The earliest known reference is in the → Ilias (9.343) where Achilles calls Briseis his “spear-won” prize. Anything won by conquest could thus be called d., but it was most commonly used to refer to conquered land. In Greek legal theory, title to land could be acquired in any of four ways: by inheritance, by purchase, by gift, or by conquest with the spear (e.g. ICret. III.4 no. 9). The Successors of → Alexander III frequently used the concept of “spear-won land” to justify their power over their territories (e.g. Diod. 18.39.5, 43.1; 19.85.3, 105.5), and they no doubt relied on Argead precedent in their use of this concept. According to the very scanty sources we have, the early history of the Makedonians was a history of conquest. The Ps.-Hesiodic Catalogue of Women tells us (F 7) that the home of the eponymous ancestor “Makedon” was “around Pieria and Olympos”; and → 208

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Thucydides 2.99 tells of a process of conquest from there, by which Almopians were displaced from Almopia, Bottiaioi from Bottiaia, Paionians from the Amphaxitis, Edonians from Mygdonia, and Eordiaioi from Eordaia. Later, he indicates, the “lower” Makedonians also conquered Anthemous, Krestonia, → Bisaltia, and much of Upper Makedonia. Under Alexander and his Successors, lands conquered by the Makedonians were considered to belong to the ruler: they were his “spear-won land”, and he had the right of disposing of them, and of the income drawn from them, as he saw fit. Of course, it was expected that some of these conquered lands would be settled with soldier-colonists, or granted as estates (→ dorea) to leading officers and officials, but the king decided such matters. Most likely this was traditional Argead policy, and from at least the time of the expansionist conquests of → Alexander I the Argead kings controlled a great deal of d. chora. Thus, king → Perdikkas II was able, in 432, to offer to grant to the → Chalkidians a large parcel of “his own land” in Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe (Thuc. 1.58.2). Alexander III was able, early in his reign, to grant to the Philippians the right to work uncultivated nearby lands so long as they paid the royal tribute (Hatzopoulos 1996, II, no. 6). There is plentiful evidence of Alexander’s interest in using d. in his propaganda. When he first crossed the → Hellespont to invade Asia, Alexander stood in the prow of the lead ship and symbolically cast a spear into Asia (Diod. 17.17.2). He also issued coins depicting himself attacking with leveled spear the Indian ruler Poros, seated on an elephant (→ “Poros” Coinage). The famous Alexander Mosaic, likely based on a late 4th c. original painting commissioned by → Kassandros, depicted Alexan­der charging with leveled spear at the bodyguard of the fleeing king Dareios; the Alexander Sarcophagus, commissioned for the ruler Alexander placed in charge of Sidon, showed Alexander in the same pose, charging the enemy with his spear. Most interesting of all is a painting from a villa at Boscoreale, now in the Naples Museum and most likely a copy of a late 4th/early 3rd c. original, depicting the personifications of Makedonia and Asia seated on opposite sides of the Hellespont, with Makedonia’s spear stretched across the water and planted in the territory of Asia: a vivid depiction of spear-won land.   R. Billows Cf. Hatzopoulos 1996; Mehl, A., Doriktetos Chora: kritische Bemerkungen zum ‘Speererwerb’, AncSoc 11-12 (1980-81), 173-212; Mileta, C., Der König und sein Land, 2008; Smith, R.R.R., Spear-won Land at Boscoreale: on the Royal Paintings of a Roman Villa, JRA 7 (1994), 100-28.

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Douris of Samos Douris served as autocratic ruler of his native Samos at the beginning of the 3rd c. (D. of Samos, BNJ 76 T 2), and wrote a history of Makedonia from 370/69 (BNJ 76 T 2) until at least the death of → Lysimachos at Koroupedion in 281 (F 55). D. likely chose the death of → Amyntas III as the starting point of his history because it set into motion the chain of events culminating in the political domination of the Greeks. Because D.’s history survives only in short snippets or paraphrases cited by later writers, often obscured by a sensationalizing or moralizing overlay, it is difficult to discern his view of the Argeads. Although there is anecdotal evidence that D. and his family moved in high circles, we cannot assume that he offered a positive portrayal of any individual ruler, or even of the Makedonians in general, especially in light of the collapse of the once-prevalent assumption that he was a student at the pro-Makedonian Lykeion (which rests on a 19th c. emendation of the text of Athenaios 4.128A = T 1). In fact, an examination of the extant fragments of D.’s history demonstrates that he offered a blanket condemnation of all the Makedonian rulers, beginning with → Philip II, who was responsible for the conquest of Greece. D. observes that Philip habitually slept with a gold drinking-goblet (Athen. 4.155D = F 37b; 6.231B-C = F 37a); it is hard not to see this comment as a criticism of the excessive drinking and extravagance of the court symposia of the Argeads that is a topos in the Greek sources, especially when Pliny (NH 33.50) explicitly refers to this anecdote as an example of luxury. Furthermore, an anecdote in which D. (F 3) refers to the flatterers of Philip suggests that he, like → Theopompos (who is cited in the same passage = BNJ 115 F 280) and → Demosthenes (2.18-19), viewed him as surrounding himself with a circle of fawning “yes men”, attracted by the depravity of his → court. Similarly, D. emphasizes the alleged luxury and extravagance of Alexander’s symposia, commenting upon a particularly extravagant feast in which he seated 6000 guests on silver seats and couches covered with purple cloaks (F 49). This comment is likely in reference to the mass marriages of the Makedonian elite with Persian → women celebrated at Sousa in 324, the opulence and splendour of which is highlighted in the source tradition, often in connection with descriptions of the opposition of Alexander’s → veterans to his alleged orientalism (→ Chares of Mytilene, BNJ 125 F 5; Diod. 17.107.6-108.3; Curt. 10.2.8-4.3; Plut. Alex. 70-71; cf. Arr. An. 7.6.2-5). It is therefore not surprising that D. (F 14) comments upon Alexander’s adoption 210

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of Persian attire (symbolic to the Greeks of luxury and ‘barbarism’) in a context emphasizing the extravagance and theatricality of → Demetrios Poliorketes’ festal garments (also a fusion of Persian and Makedonian elements). Thus, it seems that D.’s moral criticism of Philip and Alexander sets the tone for his ensuing blanket denunciation of all the Makedonian Successors, transforming their magnificent displays of power and prestige into symbols of their decadence and corruption.   F. Pownall Cf. Kebric, R.B., In the Shadow of Macedon, 1977; Landucci Gattinoni, F., Duride di Samo, 1997; Naas, V./Simon, M. (eds.), De Samos à Rome, 2015; Pownall, F., Duris of Samos and the Diadochi, in: Alonso Troncoso/Anson 2013, 43-56.

Dynastic Image The Argead monarchy was the domination of a clan. All of its members, male and female, were its representatives contributing to its dynastic image. There were several options to propagate the ideological values of Argead rule: coin images, commissioned artworks (such as the → Philippeion in Olympia: Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9-10), architecture, public appearances such as at festivals, agonistic games, performance of cultic duties, weddings, or → burials. Perhaps the large veranda of the palace of → Aigai was constructed as a place for the clan to be seen on certain occasions. Weddings and burials of Argeads were splendid festivals intended to mirror the family’s wealth and influence. Furthermore, burials allowed the successor to show himself as the legitimate heir conducting the funeral. Further elements of political self-fashioning were dedications, benefactions (such as gifts to allies, kin, the needy, or deserving officials), and → patronage of artists, writers, or scientists. The patronage of (court) historio­ graphers was a development of the 4th c., in particular under → Alexander III. He invited → Kallisthenes of → Olynthos to commemorate the war against Persia idealizing Alexander as a god-sent panhellenic avenger. In the 5th c., an Argead construction of the family’s rise to power and prestigious → genealogy was already created (in all likelihood by → Alexander I): the → foundation myth (Hdt. 8.137-139). It is a matter of debate whether Argead rulers wore a distinguishing headdress (→ diadema) before Alexander III who is credited with the introduction of a royal costume after → Gaugamela (330). However,

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due to diverging descriptions (Plut. Alex. 45.2; Plut. Mor. 329F-330A; Diod. 17.77.5; Just. 12.3.9-10; Curt. 6.6.7-8; Arr. An. 4.7.4-5; Athen. 12.537E-F), its appearance is uncertain. It is also debated whether Alexander adopted the title → basileus after his conquests or whether it was ascribed to him posthumously. His predecessors (and their female relatives) did not use a title. Names could serve as a dynastic “trademark”, carry political messages (such as → Archelaos: “ruler over a people/military division”) or commemorate achievements: Philip II called one of his daughters Thessalonike, “victory over the Thessalians/in Thessaly”. Apparently, Argead children came into the public eye at an early age to represent their house. This may be the subtext of the otherwise untrustworthy tale about the proto-historical ruler Argaios (7th c.): as a baby, he was carried in his cradle to the battlefield. The sight of the infant encouraged the Makedonians while fighting the Illyrians (Just. 7.2.6-12). → Philip II involved his young son Alexander in his diplomatic affairs. The child played the kithara for the Athenian ambassadors in 346, as attested by the eyewitness → Aischines (1.167-168), and is said to have been present when Persian envoys arrived (Plut. Alex. 5.1). The main features of the Argead d. i. were the Heraklid lineage, Greek royal descent from → Argos, divine predestination to rule, protection by Zeus, and military skills and success. In Argead → coinage reflecting the d. i., references to Hera­ kles and Zeus were prominent. The coin image of the so-called Makedonian → rider symbolizes the divinely chosen protective warrior-ruler. This may also be implied by the Argead coins showing a horse and a helmet. War, military deeds, and warrior skills were the most central aspects of the Argead d. i. The focus on war probably mirrored the expectations of the Makedonians as well as the practical requirements of Argead rule.   S. Müller Cf. Carney 2017; Carney 2019, 8-13; Hammond 1989, 21-6; Koulakiotis 2017; Müller, S., The Symbolic Capital of the Argeads, in: Müller et al. 2017, 183-98.

Eagle, on coins Zeus’ bird makes its entry on Argead coins in a dynastic series of → Archelaos, along with the Argead founder-hero, the wolf protome of → Argos, Herakles and the Nemean → lion (pl. 2). In this context, the eagle stands for the origin of the Argead family. Under → Amyntas III, an e. killing a serpent (Gaebler 212

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1935, pl. 30.7) might give expression to the ruler’s hope for triumph over his enemies. But on coins from Elis/Olympia, Chalkis and—thence—→ Olynthos (SNG ANS 7, nos. 464-7) a flying e. carrying a snake as a prey (Kraay 1976, pl. 15.265; pl. 18.323-5) is an illustration of the well known e. omen in Il. 12.200209, a warning to the Troians not to overrate their own forces—the fighting of the two animals ends contrary to expectation. As a rule, Makedonian coins do without the snake, they just display the bird of the Argead ancestor god. → Alexan­der III’s early e.-series of silver fractions (Price 1991, pl. 143-4) and bronze half-units (SNG Alpha Bank, nos. 696-709) are inspired by models both from Makedonia (Amyntas III and → Perdikkas III: photos: Heinrichs 2012, 119-21) and → Thessaly (Müller 2016, 314, fig. 10). On his drachms, the e. hold in its talons oblong objects (indicating series): a kerykeion, a thyrsos, a club, a torch, but mostly a thunderbolt. Significantly earlier bronze half-units with the thunderbolt iconography are attributed by their legend to some ΦΙΛΩ(Τ͞Α) who is tentatively identified with → Parmenion’s father in Upper Makedonia (photos: Wartenberg 1998, pl. 3). Their iconography matches that of Alexander’s bronzes and the most common variant of his drachms. From → Ptolemy I (photo: Lorber 2018, I 1, pl. 10, 128) it developed into a standard reverse type in Ptolemaic Egypt, the Ptolemaic ruler on the obverse wearing Zeus’ aigis: also this dynasty traced its origin back to the god (through Dionysos and Herakles: Theokr. 17.26; Satyr., BNJ 631 F 1; OGIS 54, l. 5-6).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2012; Lorber 2018, I 1, 275-8; Wartenberg 1998.

Education, Makedonian Little direct evidence has been preserved on the education of the Argeads and the Makedonian elite, apart from Plutarch’s (almost certainly idealized) description of the e. of → Alexander III (Alex. 5-8) and passing commentary by the ancient sources on the → basilikoi paides, who are mentioned only in the politically-fraught context of the so-called Pages’ Conspiracy against Alexander (Arr. An. 4.12.7-14.4; Curt. 8.6.1-8.23; Plut. Alex. 55). The lack of evidence therefore makes it very difficult to determine which elements of an elite Makedonian e. are distinctly Makedonian and which represent general Hellenic paideia. According to Plutarch (Alex. 5.4-5), the young Alexander had a number of tutors

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and teachers, but the most important in his early years were Leonidas of → Epeiros, who inculcated an austere discipline on the Spartan model, and Lysimachos of Akarnania, who introduced him to the works of Homer, whose epics served as the base of a traditional Hellenic literary and moral e. Plutarch (Alex. 7.1) states that as a youth Alexander received the standard elementary e. in literacy, arithmetic, and musical training, followed by instruction in the liberal arts (which conventionally included grammar, rhetoric, music, and geometry); cf. the lists of Alexander’s teachers in → Pseudo-Kallisthenes (1.13) and Julius Valerius (1.7), as well as Justin’s comment (12.16.7) that as a boy Alexander received an intense e. in literature. The Athenian orator → Aischines (1.168) offers contemporary corroboration for Plutarch’s testimony by describing a symposion in 346 during which the young Alexander entertained a visiting Athenian delegation by playing the kithara, performing a recitation, and engaging in a debate with another boy, all components of a traditional Hellenic e. When Alexander reached adolescence in 343/2, Philip summoned → Aristotle, whose family had a connection with the Argead → court, to instruct Alexander (likely along with other youths of the Makedonian elite) at → Mieza (Plut. Alex. 7.1-3 and Mor. 327E-328A; Just. 12.16.8; Quint. 1.1.23; Diog. Laert. 5.1.10; Dio Chrys. Or. 49.3; Ps.-Kall. 1.13; Jul. Val. 1.7). Although the contents of Aristotle’s instruction cannot be confirmed, Plutarch (Alex. 7-8) asserts that Aristotle taught Alexander not only philosophy, but also political and ethical theory as well as medicine, and encouraged him in his love of the Homeric epics and other great works of Greek literature (especially the three great Attic tragedians). → Euripides appears to have been a particular favourite (perhaps not surprisingly in light of the tragedian’s role in legitimizing the rule of → Archelaos), and the sources frequently show Alexander citing lines from the playwright verbatim (Plut. Alex. 10.4; 53.2-3; Arr. An. 7.16.5), and even performing a whole scene from the Andromeda from memory at his final banquet (Nikoboule, BNJ 127 F 2). Although Philip’s intention was to ensure that Alexander received the sort of e. befitting a future ruler of Makedonia, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the Makedonian elite were educated in a similar way. Since the time of → Alexander I, Greek intellectuals and literary figures had benefitted from the generous → patronage of the Argead rulers, and found ready audiences among the upper echelons of the Makedonian court. For example, Platon’s associate Euphraios is said to have restricted the dining table of → Perdikkas III to those who could converse on geometry and philosophy (Athen. 12.508D-E), which 214

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presupposes that members of the king’s inner circle could in fact do so. Similarly, the Makedonian elite was familiar enough with Greek literature that they were able to match the Argeads in the verbatim citation of lines from tragedies, as is most famously illustrated in → Kleitos the Black’s quotation of a line from Euripides’ Andromache at the height of his fatal quarrel with Alexander III (Curt. 8.1.28; Plut. Alex. 51.5). Plutarch (Mor. 331C) mentions Alexander’s inner circle comparing favourite lines from the Homeric epics during leisure hours or at symposia, as well as a competition of tragic actors in which his most renowned generals served as judges (Mor. 333D-E). The high level of their e. is attested by the authorship of historical works by highly-placed members of the Makedonian elite, including → Antipatros (BNJ 114), → Ptolemy I (BNJ 138), and → Marsyas of Pella (BNJ 135-36), the half-brother of → Antigonos Monophthalmos. The basilikoi paides at Alexander’s court received a broad e. in the liberal arts (Curt. 8.6.4), which indicates that traditional Hellenic paideia was considered a crucial component of their preparation for future military command or imperial administration. Nevertheless, specifically Makedonian practices are mentioned also in descriptions of Makedonian elite e. Alexander’s celebrated taming of his horse → Boukephalos while still a boy (Plut. Alex. 6; Plin. NH 8.154) suggests that from an early age Alexander was taught to ride, and presumably also to wield weapons and to hunt (an institution that not only provided hands-on training in warfare but also served as a fundamental rite of passage into elite Makedonian society). According to Plutarch (Mor. 334D), Alexander himself is said to have been more concerned with military predominance than with artistic or literary excellence. The same focus on military training and the → hunt is attested also in the e. of the basilikoi paides (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.3-5; Arr. An. 4.13.1; Ail. VH 14.48), equipping them with the necessary skills to take their place as adults in the ranks of the Companion Cavalry. By the time Alexander was 16, Philip entrusted him with the regency of Makedonia, which provided him with direct experience in the administration of the kingdom and in military leadership, for while Philip was away on campaign against Perinthos and Byzantion Alexander successfully defeated the aggressive Maidoi, who had revolted (Plut. Alex. 9.1). At the age of 18, Alexander was placed in command of the Companion Cavalry at → Chaironeia, where he played a decisive role in Philip’s defeat of the Greek cities (Plut. Alex. 9.2; Diod. 16.86.3-4). Similarly, the basilikoi paides were thoroughly grounded in the quotidian life of the king (centred particularly on the stereotypically Makedonian institutions of

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the hunt and the symposion), preparing them eventually to play an important administrative role at the Argead court as well as a military one. Thus, in addition to the traditional Hellenic e. in the liberal arts, the Argead rulers and the Makedonian elite received intensive training in warfare, weaponry, and horsemanship, and were provided the equivalent of apprenticeships in the practical aspects of cavalry command and the administration of both the army and the kingdom. Justin’s comment (11.11.12) that Alexander’s graciousness was based upon Greek literature and Makedonian institutions neatly encapsulates the dichotomous nature of Makedonian e. Although it adopted carefully selected elements of Hellenic paideia, it subordinated them to direct training in hunting and warfare, which would ultimately prepare the youth of the Makedonian elite to play their appropriate roles in the militarily focused and intensely agonistic atmosphere of the Argead court.   F. Pownall Cf. Carney 2003, 47-63 = Carney 2015, 191-223; Müller 2016, 33-4; Pownall 2017; Psoma, S., Entre l’armée et l’oikos: l’éducation dans le royaume de Macédoine, in: Guimier-Sorbets, A.-M. et al. (eds.), Rois, cités, necropoles, 2006, 285-99.

Egypt Argead rule in Egypt was brief, extending from late 332 to 310 and covering the reigns of Alexander III, Philip III, and Alexander IV. The transition from Persian to Argead rule was smooth. E. was surrendered to Alexander by the → satrap Mazakes, whose predecessor had fallen at the Battle of → Issos. Although Alexander’s stay in E. lasted less than 6 months, its tone was set at Memphis, where he celebrated Greek games and sacrificed to both Greek and E. gods including Ptah, the chief god of Memphis, and his living incarnation, the Apis bull. In this way, he avoided the sort of disrespect of E. tradition the Persians supposedly displayed, while simultaneously highlighting the prominence of Greek culture in his plans for E. That Alexander underwent an E. coronation at Memphis as claimed by the Alexander Romance (→ Ps.-Kalli­ sthenes 1.34) is, however, controversial with the evidence suggesting that E. priests formulated his titulary after his departure from E. to ensure his legitimacy as Pharaoh. The sources mention only four actions done by Alexander while he was in E.: a reconnaissance cruise up the Nile to Upper Egypt, the 216

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consultation of the oracle of Zeus → Ammon in the oasis of → Siwa, the foundation of → Alexandreia, and the organization of the E. government (Arr. An. 3.5.2-6), the last two of which would be of lasting importance to the future of Makedonian rule in E. Alexandreia was founded in April 331 as a Greek polis, but with a multi-ethnic population. Memphis remained, however, the seat of government for almost two decades. With regard to the administration of E., Alexander made few changes in the existing Persian organization of the country. Local administration and control of the temples remained in Egyptian hands, while military and civilian authority of E. as a whole was divided. Makedonians controlled the military. Civilian authority was assigned to two native—one Egyptian, one Iranian—satraps, one for Lower and one for Upper E. Security against internal and external threats was provided by 4000 Makedonian troops plus mercenaries stationed at Pelousion, Memphis, and Elephantine and a small → fleet. The system proved unworkable, however, and the two native satraps quickly disappeared. By 327 at the latest, → Kleomenes of Naukratis, to whom Alexander had already assigned responsibility for E.’s finances and the construction of Alexandreia, had emerged as sole satrap, although whether by usurpation or appointment is not clear. In the absence of Alexander, Kleomenes was responsible for all governmental decisions in E. including export of grain and, probably, temple construction. The effectiveness of his governance is clear from the fact → Ptolemy I could make Alexandreia the capital of E. sometime before 311 and that E.’s treasury contained the remarkable sum of 8000 talents in 323. Although Kleomenes’ administrative efficiency brought him into conflict with E.’s priestly elite, the ability of men such as Petosiris, chief priest of Thoth at Hermopolis, personally to fund construction in temples and build rich tombs indicates that they maintained their wealth and influence, understandably so since they were indispensable to the administration of E. in Alexander’s organization of the country. Conditions in E. remained officially unchanged during the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV. Although E.’s priests devised royal titularies for both kings to ensure their legitimacy as they had done for Alexander III, neither was formally crowned or resided in E., so that the country continued to be governed in the name of absent kings by a satrap, Ptolemy, who had been assigned E. at → Babylon in the summer of 323. The reality was different, however. Unlike Kleomenes, whom he assassinated shortly after arriving in E., Ptolemy rejected the authority of the kings’ regent → Perdikkas. His insubordination

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was manifested soon after his arrival in E. by his intercepting Alexander’s → funeral carriage and bringing his body to E. for → burial and his minting of coins in the name of Alexander III instead of his successors. In effect, Ptolemy ruled E. virtually as an uncrowned king. His anomalous position was also clearly recognized by his Egyptian subjects as is clear in the Satrap Stela in which the priests of Horus and Edjo of Buto described the government of E. in 311 as follows: “His majesty [Alexander IV] is in the midst of the Asiatics, while a Great Prince is in Egypt, whose name is Ptolemy” (trans. R. Ritner). The Mediterranean focus of the 18th and 19th books of Diodoros means that foreign affairs during the first decade of Ptolemy’s reign are better documented than the internal history of E. Until recently, historians interpreted Ptolemy’s foreign policy as defensive instead of imperialistic, but this is misleading. With only the Makedonian garrison and mercenaries Ptolemy found in E., when he succeeded Kleomenes, supplemented by native Egyptian troops and the additional mercenaries he hired with the 8000 talents Kleomenes had accumulated, Ptolemy had little choice except to pursue a cautious course in foreign affairs during his first years as satrap, defeating an attempted invasion of E. by Perdikkas in 320 and → Antigonos’ son → Demetrios Poliorketes at Gaza in 312, and only winning recognition of his control of E. in the treaty of 311 between Antigonos and Ptolemy’s allies, Kassandros and Lysimachos. Caution, however, was not policy, and Ptolemy did not hesitate to extend his territory when given the opportunity, occupying Kyrenaika in 322 and → Kypros in 312 and Koile Syria briefly after the death of Antipatros in 319/8 before his forces were expelled by Antigonos in 315. Evidence for the government of E. during the first decade of Ptolemy’s rule is poor, but one action stands out for its impact on the later history of Ptolemaic E.: the movement of the capital from Memphis to Alexandreia. Like his predecessors, Ptolemy sought to build Egyptian support, funding temple construction and sacrificing to the Apis bull and other native gods and incorporating native troops into his army. He also appointed elite Egyptian collaborators such as the general Nektanebos, to whom he may also have married one of his daughters, to key government positions. With the increase in immigration of Greeks and other non-Egyptians including Jews and the settlement in E. of captured Makedonian troops (Diod. 19.85.4), however, Ptolemy was able to decrease his reliance on E.’s officials and troops, as indicated by the transfer of the centre of government to the more Hellenic environment of Alexandreia. The subsequent foundation 218

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of institutions such as the mouseion and Library at Alexandreia and the city of Ptolemais in Upper E. as a rival to Thebes highlight a trend that would strengthen under his successors.   S.M. Burstein Cf. Burstein, S.M., Pharaoh Alexander: A Scholarly Myth?, AS 22 (1991), 139-45; Burstein, S.M., Alexander’s Organization of Egypt: A Note on the Career of Cleomenes of Naucratis, in: Howe, T./Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2009, 183-94; Howe, T. (ed.), Ptolemy I Soter: A Self-Made Man, 2018; Huß, W., Das Haus des Nektanebis und das Haus des Ptolemaios, AncSoc 25 (1994), 111-7; Meeus, A., The Territorial Ambitions of Ptolemy I, in: Hauben H./Meeus, A. (eds.), The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms, 2014, 263-306.

Elephant, war elephant Elephants burst into Greek military history at → Gaugamela, as a part of Dareios III’s army. Alexander showed a growing interest in these animals after the invasion of → India, not simply as instruments of war, but also as emblems of prestige and royalty. Time, however, was required to adapt to them. At the battle of the → Hydaspes, in spite of having between 100 and 150 e.s at his disposal, the Argead was either unable or unwilling to deploy them against Poros (Curt. 9.2.19-21). Back in Sousa, Alexander’s feasting and audience tent included—together with his units from Makedonia and Persia—a well-equipped e. corps (agema) forming the first circle of guards (Phylarch., BNJ 81 F 41). This is very much in line with the iconographic program designed to decorate the monarch’s famous → funeral carriage. One of its four painted tablets depicted a group of e.s arrayed for war, carrying their mahouts alongside two or three Makedonian soldiers (Diod. 18.27.1). Their representation made clear that they had won a place in the new imperial army, side by side with the infantry, cavalry, and → fleet. In spite of these concessions to the emblematic animal of India, the e. could not compete with the horse, → lion, and → eagle in the Argead zoology of kingship. Execution by e.s would be applied in Babylon in the presence of Philip III Arrhidaios (Curt. 10.9.18), the behemoth being repeatedly used in the wars of the Successors. As for Makedonia, an e. corps arrived there in 319, for the first time forming part of Antipatros’ troops (Arr. Succ. F 1.43). The same unit later served under the command of the two re-

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gents, Polyperchon (Diod. 18.62.3, 70-71) and Kassandros (Diod. 19.35.7), as well as Olympias (Diod. 19.49.2-3).   V. Alonso Troncoso. Cf. Scullard, H.H., The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, 1974, 64-98; Troncoso, V. Alonso, The Diadochi and the Zoology of Kingship: The Elephants, in: Alonso Troncoso/Anson 2013, 254-70.

Elimeia Elimeia or Elimeiotis was an Upper Makedonian region south of → Orestis and Eordaia. E.’s local dynasts ruled autonomously pursuing their own agenda, often in opposition to the Argeads. Information on E. is few and scattered; the record on its relations with the Argeads is sporadic. The sources mention E.’s strong cavalry force. In 433/2, a certain Derdas (a popular name of E.’s dynasts) and his brothers were allied with → Athens and → Perdikkas II’s rebellious brother Philip against Perdikkas (Thuc. 1.57.3). The credibility of a scholiast’s note that Derdas was the Argead brothers’ cousin is uncertain. A peace treaty between Perdikkas, Athens, and Arrhabaios of → Lynkestis, probably from 423/2, lists Derdas of E. (called → basileus) as one of the signatories (IG I³ 89, l. 69), either the same as Perdikkas’ enemy or an offspring. According to → Aristotle (Pol. 1311B), → Archelaos married his daughter to an unnamed ruler of E. (to counter a Lynkestian-Illyrian alliance) and another Derdas killed Amyntas ὁ μικρός, perhaps identical with → Amyntas II (395/4). In 382, a Derdas of E. joined Sparta, allied with → Amyntas III, in attacking → Olynthos, certainly sharing the interest in limiting Olynthos’ expansion (Xen. Hell. 5.2.38). Xenophon praises Derdas’ warrior skills and his cavalry (Hell. 5.2.42, 3.1-2). This Derdas will have minted his own bronze coins, probably in the capital Aiane, bearing the legend ΔΕΡΔΑ. The images shown comprised a rider, heads of Herakles and Apollon, and club and spearhead. → Philip II annexed E. in 358. His bride Phila, the sister of Derdas and Machatas, likely came from E.’s ruling house (Athen. 13.557C). Her brother may have been the same Derdas who was captured fighting for Philip before Olynthos in 348 (Athen. 10.436C) when E.’s cavalry served the Argeads.   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 1971, 100-1; Liampi, K., The Coinage of King Derdas and the History of the Elimiote Dynasty, in: Burnett, A. et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of C. Hersh, 1998, 5-11.

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Eordaia   see Makedonia Epeiros Epeiros, roughly the northwestern part of the Greek peninsula, was not as urbanized as central or southern Greece (or Makedonia). The climate was continental, with abundant rainfall and snow. Forests, mountains, and swift-flowing streams, difficult to cross even in summer, marked the region. Herding rather than agriculture predominated. Despite its comparative remoteness, at Dodona (near modern Ioannina) was the oldest of Greek oracles, this one dedicated to Zeus. 14 tribal peoples inhabited Epeiros; the Molossoi, through their kings, gradually became the dominant people of the region. Molossia was initially an inland, largely mountainous region, mostly cut off from the coast, accessible from southern Greece during the summer via several mountain passes and also reachable from western Makedonia. The Aiakid dynasty ruled Molossia until c. 232 and dominated the Molossian confederation. The Aiakids claimed descent from Achilles’ son, Neoptolemos, and also, eventually, from Priamos and Andromache as well. Under the leadership of the Dardanian Bardylis, the Illyrians mounted increasingly serious invasions of the kingdoms of Makedonia and Molossia that threatened the continued existence of both monarchies. Arrhybbas of Molossia (360) and Philip II (359-8) were both ultimately able to repel the Illyrians and defeat Bardylis. Nonetheless, the Illyrian threat led to a marriage alliance c. 358 between the two kingdoms (Philip II married → Olympias, daughter of the earlier Aiakid king Neoptolemos and niece of Arrhybbas), one that began an enduring entanglement between the two northern Greek regions, outlasted the Argead dynasty and Molossian monarchy, and ended only with Roman conquest of both regions in 168/7. During this two century long relationship, Makedonia was usually but not always the dominant power, but the relationship was complicated by the intermarriage of the Aiakid and Argead (and later Antigonid) dynasties, a complication that divided loyalties and identities within the ruling dynasties and within the general population as well. Olympias and Philip had a son, the future Alexander III (the Great), and a daughter, → Kleopatra. Philip brought Olympias’ brother Alexander I of Molossia to Makedonia in the early 350s. In 342/1 Philip forced Arrhybbas off the throne and put his son-in-law Alexander I in his place (Diod. 16.72.1; Just. 9.6.4-8), also increasing his territory (Dem. 7.32). When the

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Makedonian Alexander believed that the guardian of his father’s 7th bride had insulted Alexander’s legitimacy (possibly a slur aimed at his ethnicity), Alexander and Olympias left Makedonia for Molossia. Philip tried to resolve this awkward situation by arranging the marriage of Alexander of Molossia to Philip’s and Olympias’ daughter Kleopatra, but was assassinated in the course of the wedding celebrations (Diod. 16.91.4-93.2; Just. 9.6.1-3). Alexander of Molossia, having invaded Italy c. 334, about the time his brother-in-law invaded the Persian Empire, died there in 331 (Liv. 8.24.5-13). His son by Kleopatra, Neoptolemos, was too young to rule; Kleopatra seems to have functioned like a regent and guardian for her son: she served as thearodoch (SEG 23.189.11) and arranged grain shipments from Kyrene in a time of shortage (SEG 9.2). She also sold grain to Korinthos (Lyk. 1.26). Olympias returned to Molossia, having failed to dominate in a dispute with → Antipatros, the man Alexander had left in charge of Makedonian and Greek affairs. She asserted to the Athenians c. 330 that Molossia belonged to her (Hyp. 4.25). Plutarch (Alex. 68.3) claims that Olympias and Kleopatra formed a faction against Antipatros, and that Olympias took control of Molossia and Kleopatra of Makedonia. Who formally ruled in Molossia after the death of Alexander I of Molossia but before the death of Alexander III is less than clear. (Meyer, down-dating a group of inscriptions from Dodona from the 4th to the 3rd c., has recently challenged the view that a basic change in governance, to the Epeirote Alliance, happened after Alexander I’s death and instead places it after the end of the Aiakid dynasty.) After Alexander III’s death, Arrhybbas may have briefly returned to rule Molossia, siding first against the Makedonians, but then favouring them (Diod. 18.11.1). His son Aiakides became king, probably co-ruling with young Neoptolemos II, the son of Alexander and Kleopatra. In 317, Polyperchon and Aiakides led an army into Makedonia, in order to “restore” Olympias and her young grandson Alexander IV to basileia (rule) (Diod. 19.11.1-2). This attempt succeeded and Olympias had Philip Arrhidaios and Adea Eurydike killed, but → Kassandros, who had been allied with the royal pair and was the son of Olympias’ enemy Antipatros, invaded and attacked Olympias at → Pydna. Aiakides had betrothed (or actually married) his daughter Deidameia to Alexander IV (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.2) and she had accompanied Olympias to Pydna (Diod. 19.35.5). Aiakides tried to come to Olympias’ aid with Molossian troops, but most of them refused to go; the returnees led a revolt against Aiakides; he and his family went into exile and Kassandros dispatched a lieutenant to rule Molossia (Diod. 19.36.25; Paus. 1.11.4; Just. 13.3.16-18). Kassandros defeated and killed Olympias and, 222

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ultimately, her grandson Alexander IV (Diod. 19.51.1-6); another grandson (the son of Kleopatra) and other Aiakids would rule Molossia for several generations after the Argeads were gone, though Makedonian interference in Molossian affairs continued. Aiakid and Argead monarchy resembled each other in a number of respects, but important differences also existed and persisted, so one should not simply assume similarity in the absence of evidence. As both Alexander I’s campaigning in Italy and 3rd century events and alliances suggest, Molossia was more concerned with events to the west than Makedonia, though the regions shared concerns about enemies to the north. Argead struggles for the → throne frequently led to internecine violence; child kings did not survive. Aiakids often struggled for the throne (e.g. Arrhybbas forced his brother Neoptolemos from rule), but they, if not with great enthusiasm, sometimes shared power, as ultimately happened in the case of Arrhybbas and Neoptolemos (Paus. 1.11.4). This albeit sometimes grudging power sharing seems to have extended to female members of the dynasty and may explain the role of Olympias and Kleopatra in Molossia, their apparent activism in Makedonian affairs, and Aiakides’ unflinching support for Olympias. Aiakid intermarriages may have contributed to this dynastic loyalty: Arrhybbas married his niece Troas (Just. 7.6.11); Alexander I married his niece Kleopatra (Diod. 16.91.4-93.2; Just. 9.6.1-3); and Aiakides’ daughter Deidameia was engaged to or married Olympias’ grandson Alexander IV (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.2). In the 3rd c. there is even a half-sibling marriage: Olympias II married Alexander II and served as regent for her sons after her husband’s death (Just. 28.1.1-3).   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney 2006, 5-14, 52-3, 104-8; Greenwalt, W.S., Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 279-305; Hammond, N.G.L., Epirus, 1967; Meyer, E.A. The Inscriptions of Dodona and a New History of Molossia, 2013.

Ephemerides → Eumenes of Kardia is recorded in conjunction with Diodotos of Erythrai as the author of the Ephemerides, a journal describing → Alexander III’s daily activities. The fragments (Arr. An. 7.25.1-26.3; Plut. Alex. 76; Athen. 10.434B) primarily concern Alexander’s activities in the days shortly before his death beginning with an extended drinking bout, which led to a fever and his subsequent death. Only

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Ailianos (VH 3.23) cites the E. for events in a different chronological context (probably the winter of 324), but again there is an emphasis on drinking. The E. have been claimed as an accurate daily record of Alexander’s campaign, but also as a work of later propaganda. Despite the disparity in modern views, it was accepted as genuine by our ancient sources. However, it is likely that the E. actually used by Arrian, Plutarch, and others, were not the actual record of the king’s daily activities, but were themselves an extract from the original work. The institution of this practice of recording the king’s daily activities was likely part of the Persianization of royal practice introduced by Alexander. It is very improbable that an archival journal would have listed an author. While Eumenes’ name as head of Alexander’s chancellery gives the document a measure of authenticity which any forger would have appreciated, a similar argument cannot be made for Diodotos. There have been a number of attempts to identify this individual, but none that is compelling. It is more likely that Diodotos was the editor who associated his abridgement of the E. with the by then dead Eumenes to give the work more prestige. Diodotos may have been a subsequent royal secretary.   E.M. Anson Cf. Anson, E.M., The ‘Ephemerides’ of Alexander the Great, Historia 45 (1996), 501-4; Chugg, A., The Journal of Alexander the Great, AHB 19 (2005), 155-75.

Ephippos of Olynthos Ephippos of → Olynthos (BNJ 126) wrote a contemporary treatise entitled On the Deaths/Burials of Alexander and Hephaistion. Only 5 fragments survive, focusing on court life during the last stage of → Alexander III’s reign (Athen. 3.120E; 4.146C-D; 10.434A-B; 12.537D. 537E-538B). E. criticizes Alexander’s tryphe stating that he held council on a golden → throne (F 4), encouraged lavishness and bombastic flattery (F 5) and spent huge sums to host his → philoi (F 2), a theme common to the biased images of the Persian kings’ luxurious lifestyle in Greek Persika. The manuscript tradition reports the otherwise unattested name Satrabates for the Median → satrap (F 5). It may either be a mistake for Atropates or a pseudo-Persian name (not uncommon to Greek Persika), composed of the Greek word satrapes and an ending that sounded Persian. The scene in which Alexander, described as murderous, melancholic, and unbearable, makes his intimidated courtiers keep silence while myrrh and other herbs were burnt (F 5), may be a 224

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distorted image of an Persian-style audience with the ruler, including a reference to ushers, an element adopted from Achaimenid ceremonial practices (Diod. 17.77.47). E.’s work was coloured by Greek negative → topoi regarding the Makedonian drinking manners, traditionally portrayed in Greek literature as exemplifying lack of moderation and uncivilized behaviour. Portraying the Makedonians as uncouth brutes, E. claims that they did not know how to drink appropriately (εὐτάκτως), but were drunk already during the first courses of the symposion (F 1). Alexander’s naval commander Proteas appears as a notorious drunkard who allegedly defeated Alexander in the latter’s last drinking contest by consuming about 13 liters of wine. E. characterizes Alexander’s death, which he attributes to alcohol abuse, as a divine punishment inflicted on him by Dionysos in retaliation for the destruction of his home city → Thebes under Alexander in 335 (F 3). Perhaps → Hephaistion’s death scene in Plutarch (Alex. 72.1), when he dies after emptying a large wine cooler (a vessel that the Greeks considered unsuitable for drinking) for breakfast even though he was already ill, may originate from E. His claim that Alexander appeared in public disguised as Herakles, → Ammon, Hermes, or even Artemis wearing a Persian stola and driving a chariot (F 5)—evoking the image of an effeminate, megalomaniac cross-dresser—is an incredible climax of bias. E.’s description of Alexander’s new royal costume (purple chlamys, purple chiton shot with white, the → kausia with the → diadema) is mostly regarded as authentic, though it looks like a Makedonian version (without the trousers, tiara orthe, and kandys) of the Median robe → Kyros II adopts in Xenophon’s → Kyroupaideia (8.3.13). As Kyros played a role in Alexander’s self-fashioning, E. may perhaps have ridiculed this feature of his representation. The theme of Dionysos’ wrath causing Alexander’s death may hint at the bias of E.’s treatise. Pearson regards him as a “disgruntled Olynthian” whose resentment against the Makedonians rooted in the destruction of his polis under → Philip II in 348. Probably writing during the uprising of the Lamian War, E. may have felt inspired to take at least intellectual vengeance by linking the Olynthians’ fate to that of the Thebans who lost their polis under Alexander, addressing them as fellow victims and thereby perhaps also trying to justify his stay at Alexander’s court.   S. Müller Cf. Böhme, M., Das Perserbild in den Fragmenten der Alexanderhistoriker, in: Rathmann, M. (ed.), Studien zur antiken Geschichtsschreibung, 2009, 161-86, at 170-1; Müller 2014, 98-105; Pearson 1960, 64; Prandi, L., Ephippos of Olynthos (126), BNJ online (http:// referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/ephippos-of-olynthos-126-a126).

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epitropos An epitropos according to LSJ s.v. epitropos is “one to whom a charge is entrusted, a trustee, administrator, a governor, viceroy, guardian.” With respect to Argead Makedonia the term applies to the office of guardian. Our late Roman sources continually use the term interchangeably with prostates and epimeletes to refer to the regent for an underage or incompetent ruler. The evidence suggests that prostates was the usual title of a Makedonian regent. The difficulty for our late narrative sources was in correctly interpreting the nature of the Makedonian monarchy and hence the role of king as guardian during the Argead period. There were not many rules regarding the selection of a new king, but one is clear: The king had to be an Argead. It then would be possible for someone to be both king and guardian, combining both the dynastic aspect of kingship with the family responsibilities associated with the preservation of Argead exclusivity to rule or more particularly that of a particular branch of the Argead clan. The king would possess full power, but he could also be seen as acting as an e. in the interests of his potential heirs. A true regent, then, in the sense of a place-holder as opposed to a king and guardian, would typically only emerge when someone outside of the Argead family seized power, otherwise, given the very nature of kingship in this period, the particular adult Argead would be king. In 318, after the creation of the dual monarchy of Alexander’s incompetent brother, → Philip III, and infant son → Alexander IV, → Olympias was invited by → Polyperchon, the epimeletes of the kings and “general” for Makedonia (Diod. 18.48.4, 55.1), to come to Makedonia and become the epimeletes of the child Alexander IV and the royal prostates of Makedonia (Diod. 18.49.4).   E.M. Anson Cf. Anson 2009.

Euboulos Euboulos was a leading Athenian politician in the 350s-40s, the time of Makedonia’s rise under → Philip II. Particularly associated with the improvement of → Athens’ exhausted finances after the Social War (357-55), E.’s faction prioritized Athens’ inner stabilization and military strength (Dein. 1.96; Aischin. 3.25) aiming successfully at increasing revenues while reducing costly military intervention 226

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abroad, especially in northern Greece where Athens had lost her grip. The scarcity and partisanship of the evidence hamper the assessment of E.’s agenda regarding Makedonia. The major source, → Demosthenes, tends to exaggerate E.’s restraint on that matter claiming that Athenian passivity caused Philip’s rise. The image of E.’s opposition to Demosthenes’ policy (Dem. 19.290; Aischin. 2.8) is likely more of a rhetorical device. Obviously, E. did not underestimate the danger of the Makedonian expansion and supported campaigns in crucial situations. So in 352, Athens secured the Thermopylai against Philip (Diod. 16.38.1-2; Just. 8.2.8). E. also tried to safeguard Euboia. When three Athenian expeditions had failed in preventing the fall of → Olynthos (348), E. advertised the plan to unite with different Greek poleis in war against Philip (Dem. 19.290, 304). However, in 346, he supported the → Peace of Philokrates with Philip (Dem. 18.21). When in 343, Demosthenes prosecuted E.’s supporter Aischines for his role in negotiating the peace, E. spoke on his behalf (Aischin. 2.184). This was perhaps one reason for Aischines’ acquittal, indicating that E. was still influential. Demosthenes (18.75) says that E. was involved in Athens’ declaration of war against Philip that led to → Chaironeia (338). The claim that the policy of E. was responsible for Makedonia’s rise to hegemony is not tenable.   S. Müller Cf. Cawkwell, G.L., Eubulus, JHS 83 (1963), 47-67; Harris 1995, 38-9, 42, 50, 118, 125-6, 152; Worthington 2013, 89-91.

Eumenes of Kardia Eumenes (361-15) was a Greek from the city of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese who became first → Philip II’s and then → Alexander III’s royal secretary and head of the royal chancellery. He was one of the few Greeks associated with Alexander’s → court to contend for power after the Conqueror’s death, and, due to his familial relationship with the major contemporary historian of the early Hellenistic Age, Hieronymos of Kardia, a central figure in our surviving sources. In his position of royal secretary, E. joined Alexander in his invasion of the Persian Empire in 334, but was later promoted to the position of cavalry commander of one division of the elite Makedonian Companion Cavalry. After Alexander’s death, E. became the → satrap of Kappadokia and Paphlagonia and the confidant of → Perdikkas, the regent acting for Alexander’s heirs. In the

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struggle for power that began in 320, E. commanded a sizable force and defeated two distinguished Makedonian commanders, but Perdikkas’ death during a campaign against → Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt, led to E.’s betrayal by one of his own commanders and his subsequent defeat at the hands of → Antigonos Monophthalmos. After a year under siege in the small fortress of Nora, E. came to terms with Antigonos becoming officially his subordinate. But in 318 he broke with Antigonos and with the support of a new coalition of satraps and generals, he renewed his war against his former opponent. Both armies withdrew to the east. After two indecisive battles at Paraitakene and Gabene in late 316, E. was betrayed by his own troops, the infamous Argyraspids, to his former superior Antigonos, who had the Kardian executed early in 315.   E.M. Anson Cf. Anson, E.M., Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians, 2015²; Schäfer, C., Eumenes von Kardia und der Kampf um die Macht im Alexanderreich, 2002.

Euripides The Athenian tragedian Euripides’ close association with Argead Makedonia is a prominent feature of the ancient biographical tradition. Although the widely-­ held tradition of E.’s self-imposed exile at the → court of → Archelaos has been called into question, it is hard to deny the references to specific Makedonian locations in the Bakchai (409-411, 565-575), the prominence of Dionysos (a particularly important god in Makedonia), and the tragedy’s primeval atmosphere evoking the stereotypical Greek conception of Makedonia. Furthermore, Archelaos commissioned E. to write a Makedonian trilogy, whose concluding play Archelaos reworked the foundation legend of the Argeads, in which E. provided his royal patron with solidly Hellenic credentials. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the tradition that E. was one of the most prominent Greek literary figures whom Archelaos invited to Makedonia to add cultural capital to his glittering court. E. continued to play an important role in the performance culture of subsequent Argead rulers, and by the time of → Alexander III appears to have been the only one of the tragedians whose lines were cited verbatim, not just by the king himself (who is attested on one occasion to have performed a whole scene from the Andromeda from memory: Nikoboule, BNJ 127 F 2), but by the Makedonian elite as well (Curt. 8.1.28; Plut. Alex. 51.5). The Argeads’ appropri228

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ation of E. played a crucial role not only in their self-fashioning as legitimate monarchs with Hellenic pedigrees, but ultimately in the reception of E. in later antiquity as a classic representative of Greek tragedy.   F. Pownall Cf. Hanink, J., Literary Politics and the Euripidean Vita, CCJ 54 (2008), 115-35; Müller 2016, 96-100, 173-81; Pownall 2017, 220-1; Revermann, M., Euripides, Tragedy, and Macedonia: Some Conditions of Reception, ICS 24-25 (1999-2000), 451-67; Scullion, S., Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the Frogs, CQ 53 (2003), 389-400.

Eurydike, wife of Amyntas III   see Aigai; Amyntas III; Marriage

policy; Perdikkas III; Ptolemy of Aloros; Women, royal Argead

Exiles’ Decree → Alexander III returned to Babylon from his eastern anabasis facing some critical issues of governance: uniting a diverse population—Greeks, Makedonians, Persians—comprising his vast empire; controlling the fractious poleis of old Greece. Of particular concern was the mass of exiled Greeks, including many unemployed soldiers of his former Persian enemies now subjects. While some now served him, others, stateless and desperate, were a potential source of discord and conflict. Many of these were reportedly assembling at Cape Tainaron at the southernmost tip of the Peloponnese. Alexander addressed this danger unilaterally: he issued an edict (diagramma) obliging the Greek cities to allow home those citizens previously exiled (omitted by Arrian, reported by Diod. 17.109; 18.8.6). Its autocratic pronouncement reflects the divine persona Alexan­ der now affected. In a subsequent statement to → Athens, facing the loss of Samos as its exiled population could now reclaim their lands—uprooting the Athenian colonists who had forced them out decades before—Alexander told the Athenians that he would not have given them the island, as had Philip, his so-called father (Plut. Alex. 28.1). The Olympic Games of July/August 324 provided the occasion for the announcement of Alexander’s decree in Greece. 20.000 exiles assembled to hear his representative Nikanor of Stageira read out the decree, learning who would be excluded; the sacrilegious and murderers, the King’s enemies, namely the Thebans exiled earlier ([Plut.] Mor. 221A), and

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others proscribed by → Antipatros, Alexander’s regent. Alexander’s premature death complicated the decree’s impact, implementation of which would have been a lawyer’s delight (details in RO no. 101: a decree from Tegea attesting, e.g., the legal wrangling over property the act incited). The Decree galvanized Greek resistance to Alexander’s intervention into their affairs. Hieronymos of Kardia, a well-placed contemporary, attributes the outbreak of the Lamian War (323-22), sometimes characterized as the last gasp of Greek freedom, to the E. D. (Diod. 18.8.6). The long suffering Samians waited another 5 years before Alexan­der’s “successor” → Perdikkas facilitated their homeward return upon Athens’ defeat in that war. Some scholars have suggested that Alexander exceeded his authority as hegemon of the → Korinthian League, but this obscures larger issues and perceptions, namely, that Alexander had championed his campaign as winning the “freedom of the Greeks” (Arr. An. 7.12.4). This cry had rallied support in the early stages of his campaign and is consonant with the structure of the Korinthian League, established by Philip whereby the smaller states of Greece received some protection from the larger—Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Korinthos—which had long bullied them. The E. D. may appear to deviate from the constitutionalism of Philip’s political settlement. But in effect the edict differs little amid the changed circumstances of the new world order following Alexan­der’s conquests. Like Philip, Alexander desired political calm to facilitate his rule. He recognized the vulnerabilities of the weaker states of Greece, like Samos, and how he might benefit as posing as their defender against the power of the stronger, like Athens. The E. D. enabled his rule.   L.A. Tritle Cf. Badian, E., Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia, in: Badian, E. (ed.), Ancient Society and Institutions, 1966, 37-69; Hammond/Walbank 1988, 37-69; Poddighe, E., Alexander and the Greeks, in: Heckel/Tritle 2009, 99-120.

Factions In scholarship on Argead Makedonia, the modern term “factions” is applied to the groups of followers, adherents, and supporters from the leading circles clustering around influential Makedonian individuals. These individuals could have been members of the Argead family or members of other high-ranking Makedonian clans playing a crucial role in politics. The followers from the 230

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elite were tied to the persons they supported by personal bonds on an informal level. In the Greek sources, the members of such f. are mostly called → philoi (friends). While friendship was used as an image for these factional alliances, in this context, the term philoi described political friends. According to → Aristotle’s categorization of friendship, this kind of political philia applies to the type of “advantage friendship” in the sense of mutually profitable relations (Eth. Nik. 1156A, 1161 B; Eth. Eud. 1242B-1243B; Pol. 1295B). Thus, the members of f. helped the persons they followed to pursue their political course while expecting to share in their influence, wealth, and prestige. It was a reciprocal relationship. Alternatively, the Greek sources call the members of f. “those around” a specific person. While longstanding family and kinship relations could occasionally count (exactly when it seemed to be politically opportune), basically, belonging to a faction was no matter of emotions, feeling attached, and intimacy. It was a matter of calculation of how to profit the most. Such philia relationships were competing elements within the Makedonian leading circles. Therefore, the persons belonging to f. fluctuated constantly in accordance with the political situation. Such shifts in loyalties were the usual by-products of court politics. Although philoi were the most visible part of the court society, we have only scattered information on the composition of f. and the way of building f. at the Makedonian → court. Most of our evidence on f. dates to the 4th c., in particular to the reigns of → Philip II and → Alexander III. However, the picture is fragmented and scattered. We cannot estimate how many different f. existed under their rule. F. become mostly visible when a conflict arose that divided the court, thereby shedding light on personal networks and individual ties. For example, under the reign of → Alexander II, as a consequence of his failed conquest in → Thessaly in 369/8 due to Theban pressure, the court was divided into f. still loyal to him and f. supporting → Ptolemy of Aloros as an alternative, causing civil war-like circumstances (Plut. Pelop. 26.2-3). From the retrospective, Aischines attests that Eurydike and her sons were betrayed by those who had seemed to be their philoi (2.2627), perhaps referring to such a shift in loyalty of members of their former faction. This case also illustrates the potential of f. to develop own political dynamics: the f. of both rivals asked Thebes for a mediation. Again, in about 367, after Ptolemy of Aloros had managed to get rid of Alexander II, the latter’s former philoi (now obviously forming part of the faction of Alexander’s mother, Eurydike, and his minor brothers) called for Theban intervention

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(Plut. Pelop. 27.2). Personal bonds were also brought to light when → Philotas, the son of the influential general Parmenion, was charged with treason and executed in 330. His fall triggered reactions by persons belonging to his and his father’s faction: reportedly, philoi of Philotas fled the camp in fear of their life (Curt. 7.1.10-14). Additionally, a shift in loyalty became visible: Parmenion’s son-in-law Koinos had deserted the faction of his in-law family earlier (Curt. 6.9.30-31). However, marriages are also an indicator of personal connections. It is instructive to explore with which families the Argeads and their leading circles established marital bonds—if the poor evidence provides us with the necessary information. For example, → Antipatros, éminence grise under Philip II and Alexander III, gave one of his daughters to Alexander Lynkestes from the formerly autonomous local dynasty of Lynkestis (Curt. 7.1.7; Just. 11.7.1). Antipatros also pushed the career of his son-in-law and protected him from being executed when being charged with the instigation of Philip’s assassination in 336 (Arr. An. 1.25.2; Just. 11.2.1-2). Predominantly, we have information on f. supporting one particular Argead, often in the matter of → succession. For example, when Philip II was assassinated in 336, there seems to have been a faction that advocated the succession, not of Alexander, but of → Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas III, thus his faction (Plut. Mor. 327C). However, the outcome was apparently determined by the advocacy of the leading f. headed by Parmenion and Antipatros in favour of Alexander. Forming part of a faction was not restricted to persons who were constantly among the entourage of the person they supported. Such relations could be established across the borders of Makedonia. For example, we learn that → Perdikkas II had followers in Thessaly and in Amphipolis (Thuc. 1.62.2; 4.78.2, 103.3) and Alexander II in Larisa and Krannon (Diod. 15.61.4-5). F. were no homogenous social groups but clusters of political actors of various origin, rank, and background. As far as we can tell from the evidence for f. under Philip and Alexander, when Makedonia had become united, there was also no strict division between f., including persons from Upper Makedonia and from Lower Makedonia, but a mixture. The sons and potential successors of Argead rulers grew up building their own f. at the court, a necessary step in order to secure their future. To be able to take the throne and keep it, an Argead candidate depended on the support of the most influential courtly f. In this respect, also the f. of his mother could become an important factor. Argead mothers and their sons usually formed political units and their f. were mostly connected. 232

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As for the nature of f. in Argead Makedonia, nothing was fixed or institutionalized, the connections were established as reactions to the situational power constellations and political developments.   S. Müller Cf. Carney 2019, 72-3; Heckel, W., Factions and Macedonian Politics in the Reign of Alexander the Great, AM 4 (1986), 293-305; Heckel 2017; Strootman 2014, 35, 95-6, 117-21.

Fleet Philip II was the first Argead to build up a fleet (Dem. 4.22). While his predecessors had access to the finest → timber for ships growing in the Makedonian forests (Theophr. HP 4.5.5), they lacked both the finances to maintain a costly f. and the chance to use it. Before Makedonia’s rise under → Philip, for the Argeads, naval warfare played no role. Mostly shut off from the navigable coastlines that were under Athenian influence, they exported timber and ships to the Greek naval powers, in particular → Athens. While the early Argeads had some ships (of an unknown number) at their disposal, these were probably merchant vessels. The information that → Alexander I aided Themistokles on his flight from Athens to Persia by providing one of his ships for him is only given by epistolary fiction (Ps.-Them. Ep. 5.6, 20.15). According to the contemporary → Methone Decrees, → Perdikkas II tried to force the Methonians at the Makedonian coast to accept his patronage by preventing them from “using the sea” (IG I³ 61 = ML 65). Lacking his own f., Perdikkas could only block Methone’s trade and port by hiring an auxiliary naval force (often labelled ‘pirates’ in such a context) or cooperating with allies who had a f. In a biased way in accordance with the genre of comedy, the contemporary comic poet Hermippos testifies to merchant vessels Perdikkas possessed by joking that the ruler exported lies on many ships (ap. Athen. 1.27E-F). Hermippos surely refers to ships transporting Makedonian timber to customers such as the Athenians. The establishment of a Makedonian f. first made sense when Philip conquered the Makedonian coast, then the Chalkidian. When he expanded to the Hellespontine sphere and reached out for → Asia Minor, naval strength became necessary. As for the date of the f.’s establishment, → Demosthenes testifies to its existence in about 351 (4.22). Polyainos hints at an earlier date in about 353 describing that Philip ravaged the territory of Abdera and Maroneia with many ships and on the return tricked the Athenian strategos

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Chares at Neapolis who commanded 20 triremes (4.2.22). Probably, Philip started to construct the f. after he had neutralized the threats at the start of his reign and when his conquests at the Makedonian coast permitted the use of a f. In about 342, the progress of his naval policy is mirrored by a contemporary warning that Philip claimed to be a maritime power, built triremes and dockyards, and was ready to send out a f. ([Dem.] 7.14-16). While the number is uncertain, his f. seems to have been small. Advising the creation of a strike force against Philip in about 351, Demosthenes proposed an Athenian naval unit of only 10 triremes (4.22). While he is surely mindful of → Euboulos’ policy of cutbacks, the small number implies that Philip’s opposing force was not considerably large. It is assumed that the construction of the Makedonian f. as an effective siege unit involved the placement of artillery and siege machinery on its decks. As naval commanders, presumably, Philip appointed persons skilled in seafaring from the conquered coasts or his Greek philoi from islands or ports. The limits of Makedonian naval power became obvious when Philip besieged the Propontine coastal cities of Perinthos and Byzantion in 340. His f. was too small to cut the besieged off denying them outside help (Diod. 16.74.4-5, 75.2). Philip could not risk a sea battle when the superior Athenian, Persian, Chian, and Rhodian warships came to the aid of the attacked. As the Makedonians failed in damaging the walls and taking the towns before their allies could rush by, Philip had to withdraw. In the absence of the Athenian warships cruising before Byzantion, he seized the unprotected Athenian grain f. coming from the Black Sea (Dem. 18.87, 139; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 292). However, according to Philochoros (BNJ 328 F 162), he failed in taking the merchant ships with his warships and therefore shipped soldiers over to Hieron who captured the vessels from land. In sum, in Philip’s reign and Alexander’s early years, Makedonia was no sea power. Focusing on the superiority of their land army, modern siege equipment, and rapidity of action, the Makedonians avoided sea battles. In 334, Alexander’s f. that crossed the → Hellespont consisted of about 160 ships, partly drawn from the Greek allies of the → Korinthian League. Athens had to send only 20. However, in Against Diondas, → Hypereides mentions that Alexander annoyed the Athenians by demanding twice as much triremes as Philip. It is unclear whether Philip wanted only 10 or Alexander demanded an additional 20 ships. In the beginning of the Persian war, the Makedonians tried to avoid sea battles against the numerically and tactically superior Persian f. They aimed at neutralizing it by taking its naval bases and contingents. In 334, they were able to conquer Miletos by closing the harbour, 234

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thus cutting the Milesians off while avoiding a naval battle against the Persians who were coming to Miletos’ aid. Thereafter, the f., always a costly matter, was disbanded to save money (Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. An. 2.20.1). It had to be reconstituted soon after when the Persian side launched an effective counteroffensive in the → Aegean (333-32). Initially commanded by → Memnon of Rhodos, after his death in summer 333 by Pharnabazos and Autophradates, the Persians reconquered crucial Aegean and Western Anatolian bases. The Makedonian Aegean f. was commanded by the Makedonians Hegelochos and Amphoteros. Its numerical strength is uncertain. Also, on → Antipatros’ order, Euboia was secured by warships under Proteas’ command: Allegedly, the Persian f. planned to carry the war to Greece. The Persian counterattack was doomed to fail when the Kypriote (120 ships) and Phoinikian contingents (80 ships) of the Persian f. defected, Tyre fell (summer 332) and the Tyrian ships were included in the Makedonian f. Hegelochos and Amphoteros, the short-time admirals, secured the Makedonian control over the Aegean. Before Tyre, assisted by the defected naval forces, the Makedonians won their first sea battle. Perhaps, the image of Nike holding a stylis on the reverse of Alexander’s gold staters, maybe first minted in Tyre shortly after its fall, hints at this unusual type of a Makedonian victory. However, the decisive victories under Alexander that followed were no sea battles. In 326, Alexander’s → Indos f. was composed, partly newly built, partly provided by the local population. The numeral strength mentioned by → Nearchos, its nauarchos, and → Ptolemy, who both tend to exaggerate when it comes to numbers, is suspiciously high: a total of either 800 (BNJ 133 F 1) or nearly 2000 ships (BNJ 138 F 24). At least, Ptolemy’s information that it comprised 80 triremes sounds trustworthy. Nearchos was meant to be the admiral of Alexander’s Arabian f. that began to take shape at → Babylon during his last time but the plan died with the ruler’s death in 323. However, the f. had become an integral part of Makedonian warfare. Among the Successors, → Demetrios Poliorketes, able to command both land forces and a f., pointed out his naval mastery by showing Poseidon on the reverse of his tetradrachms.   S. Müller Cf. Hauben, H., Philippe II, fondateur de la marine macédonienne, Antichthon 26 (1975), 30-41; Hauben, H., The Expansion of Macedonian Sea-Power under Alexander the Great, AncSoc 7 (1976), 79-105; LeRider, G., Alexandre le Grand. Monnaie, finances et politique, 2003, 183-4; Murray, W.M., The Development of a Naval Siege Unit under Philip II and Alexander III, in: Howe, T./Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2008, 31-55.

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Foundation myth There exist foundation myths about → Makedonia and the Makedonians as well as specifically about the Argead realm and the rise of its ruling house. Regarding Makedonia, the Catalogue of Women attributed to Hesiod (but variously dated to the 7th/6th c.), reflects an attempt to create an etymology by referring to Makedonia’s eponymous ancestor Makedon (F 7.3; cf. Marsyas, BNJ 135-136, F 13). He and his brother Magnes, the eponymous ancestor of Magnesia in → Thessaly, were sons of Zeus. The two brothers, who delighted in horses, found their home around Pieria and Mt. → Olympos. In the 5th c., in his The Priest­ esses of Hera at Argos, Hellanikos presents a Makedon as the son of Aiolos, the mythical ancestor of the Aiolians (BNJ 4 F 74). In contrast, the Argead f. m. in its variants is an ascent story serving to justify the family’s exclusive privilege to rule. As a kind of dynastic identity card, containing the key elements of the Argead public profile, the f. m. explained the Argeads’ leading position, thus the political present, by the use of the past. This past emerges as a constructed history of their predestined rise with the help of divine wonderworking. The f. m. uses elements of common folktale and mythical motifs. It can be assumed that its earliest attested version (Hdt. 8.137-138) was based on a Makedonian logos initially circulated by → Alexander I. After he had loyally supported Xer­ xes on his Greek campaign against → Athens and her allies and experienced the Persian defeat and withdrawal, he had to save face and his realm from the reprisals by the victors. Therefore, his claim to Greek descent was a central feature of the f. m. It was also directed to Makedonian recipients; it will have stressed the distinguished nature of the Argeads, marking them out from other influential Makedonian families. The founding act that the f. m. describes cannot be dated exactly. On the base of the number of Alexander I’s 6 predecessors named in the list of → Herodotos (8.139), it is generally dated to the middle of the 7th c. According to the f. m., → Perdikkas I, the founder of the Argead house, descended from the Heraklid Temenos, king of Peloponnesian → Argos. Initially, Perdikkas and his two elder brothers Gauanes and Aëropos had to flee from Argos. The reasons are untold. They came via Illyria to Upper Makedonian Lebaia (often identified with the village of Alebia in → Elimeia) and were hired as shepherds of the local → basileus. While his brothers tended horses and oxen, Perdikkas tended the smaller stock, sheep and goats. A common motif in ascent stories, a shepherd was a prefiguring job that foreshadowed the duties of a ruler. 236

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Furthermore, since goats were of particular relevance for the Makedonian stock breeding, it is thought that they served as an element of authenticity hinting at the pastoral life in early days. Significantly, a protome or head of a goat appears on coins minted by Alexander I, likely the creator of this f. m. It will have been relevant that the goat could be associated with Zeus, the bearer of the goatskin (shield) (aigis). Also in the later variants of the f. m., goats played a role, depicted as guiding animals (a common motif in foundation myths) that led the respective founder to the place where he founded the old Argead capital → Aigai (modern Vergina). According to an etymology (that is, however, not undisputed), Aigai was named after goats (Greek: aiges), thus “city of goats” (Just. 7.1.10). Thus, in a complex way, the goat on Argead coins (and those of Aigai) will have alluded to the shepherd-metaphor, Aigai as the first Argead capital, and the divine element in the stories about its foundation. An initial divine sign marked Perdikkas out as the predestined ruler. At the basileus’ oikos, whenever the latter’s wife baked bread, Perdikkas’ loaf swelled to double in size. 5th c. recipients of the f. m. will have recalled the symbolic double portion that distinguished Homeric heroes and Spartan kings. Alarmed, the basileus wanted to dismiss the brothers who asked for their wages. When a higher force deprived him of his senses, he told them to take the sunlight shining down the smoke vent onto his oikos’ floor. There is consensus that the sunrays symbolized ruling power signifying the divine grace blessing the chosen one. Divinely tricked, the basileus gave away the sovereign rights over his realm as emblematized by his oikos, the ruling centre with the hearth as its core. While his brothers were dumbfounded, Perdikkas displayed his own cleverness and quick-wittedness (like a good ruler). He accepted, surrounded the sunbeams on the floor with his knife and shoved them into his cloak three times. Being mindful of his brothers as his supporters, he thus gave a dynastic dimension to his act of acceptance. When advisers told the basileus what he had done, he ordered the brothers to be killed. During their flight, a suddenly rising river (likely the Haliakmon) stopped their pursuers. The brothers came to another part of Makedonia (Lower Makedonia), proceeded into the regions by the rose-growing so-called gardens of Midas at Mt. Bermion, settled down in there and extended the realm. Herodotos cites a Makedonian logos (7.73) stating that the Phrygians, Midas’ people, formerly lived in Makedonia and were called Bryges before the Makedonians expelled them. It is suggested that this tradition about a confrontation between Phrygians and Makedonians in the remote past was part of the Makedonian self-fashioning: a

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confrontation between a “barbarian” other now living in Asia Minor perhaps served to equate the early Argeads with the Homeric heroes. However, this is uncertain. Furthermore, since Midas symbolized wealth, the reference to him may also have been a metaphor of the proclaimed fertility and self-efficiency of the land where the Temenids settled—a part of Argead propaganda (rather than reality). The f. m. presents the creation of Argead Makedonia as the result of one predestined ruler’s actions showing him as a kind of charismatic leader. Therefore, suggestions that the three brothers were equals and reflected three ethnic or clan groups, or local dynasts settling in different parts of Makedonia (Gauanes in Elimeia, Aëropos in → Lynkestis, Perdikkas in Central Makedonia) is not convincing. The f. m. justified the Argead political structures, Argead rule was a monarchy, and the autonomy of the Upper Makedonian local dynasts was a thorn in the flesh of the Argeads. Perdikkas’ divine protector and wonder-­ worker whose name Herodotos did not mention was certainly Zeus, known to install rulers (Il. 2.205-206; 6.159; 9.38). As a sun god and weather god, responsible also for the harvest (and as such connectable with bread), he made the bread swell, directed the rays of sun, and flooded the river. Argead → coinage that specifically reflected the dynastic representation, patrons, and ideology, had references to Zeus as the dynasty’s protector, such as his → eagle. Referring to a crucial problem → Philip II was the first to overcome, the f. m. contains the Argead claim to sovereign rights over Lower Makedonia where the brothers settled and Upper Makedonia where the basileus gave away his ruling rights. Thus, the central elements of this version of the f. m. are the Argeads’ Greek, Heraklid, and royal origin, divine preference by Zeus, personal skills, and → legitimization to rule both Upper and Lower Makedonia. The historical value of the f. m. in its variants is a matter of debate. Formerly neglected as a source on early Makedonian history, it has been revaluated. Despite the degree of its artifice, it is believed that the f. m. provides authentic reflections on early Makedonia with respect to the life and practice of transhumant pastoralism, the itinerary of the settlers, and steps of their conquests. It is assumed that the f. m. mirrors what Makedonians of the 5th c. believed were the marks of their earlier life. In scholarship, the Argead claim to Greek descent is mainly seen as a propagandistic fiction. It is uncertain where the Argeads originated from. Appian’s claim that they came from Argos in Upper Makedonian → Orestis (Syr. 63) cannot be proven and has to be treated with caution. Herodotos (5.22.1) and → Thucydides (2.99.3) accepted the claims to Greek origin of the Makedonian 238

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ruling house. The historiographers gave credence to this because Alexander I was allowed by the hellanodikai to take part in the Olympic Games (Hdt. 5.22.1-2). Since this was a privilege of free Greeks, his participation was regarded as clear proof of his Greek descent. Idealizing the conquest, the f. m. is silent on the violence against the local population: the destruction, killing, and forced migration that consequently accompanied the annexation of land. However, in another passage, Herodotos mentions that the Makedonians expelled the Bottiaians who were forced to flee to the → Thermaic Gulf (8.127.1). Thucydides (2.99.3-5) reports that the Makedonians fought against and drove out the inhabitants of Pieria, expelled the Bottiaians, annexed a part of → Paionia, expelled the Edonians from Mygdonia, and then the Eordaians, who were mostly killed, the Almopians, and other ethnic groups. Necessarily being a flexible narrative, a f. m. needs to be adjusted to changes of times, structures, political, and ideological requirements. In about 408/7, under → Archelaos, → Euripi­des wrote the (lost) tragedy Archelaos bringing the Argead f. m. onto the stage. He introduced Temenos’ son Archelaos—named for Euripides’ Argead patron—as the founder and made his brothers his enemies who expelled him from Argos. Like Herodotean Perdikkas, Archelaos was credited with homelessness, poverty, nobility, cleverness, and skillfulness. Similarly, he was the loyal servant of an unjust master: king Kisseus. In only one battle, Archelaos defeated Kisseus’ enemies for him. Kisseus had promised him his realm and his daughter’s hand but instead of keeping his word, he tried to kill him. Archelaos turned the tables and killed Kisseus instead, perhaps a reference to Augeias’ assassination by Hera­kles. Subsequently, led by a goat, Archelaos founded the Argead capital Aigai, in accordance with an order by the Delphic oracle (Hyg. Fab. 219). Despite the revisions, Euripides’ version preserves the central elements of Herodotos’ variant: Argive, royal, and Heraklid descent, divine election, personal arete, and the goat as a metaphor for rulership and reference to pastoralism. The background of the tragedy’s composition is unknown. It is assumed that Archelaos needed to stress his legitimacy by an eye-catching association with the new founder figure as his namesake. However, his reasons are not certain. A 4th-c. revision of the f. m. introduced a new founder figure with the speaking name → Karanos (“military leader,” “lord over an army”). This revision in its different versions was a prequel treating the gap between Temenos and Perdikkas I. It extended the history of Argead Makedonia to the past. Karanos was presented as the son of the legendary Argive tyrant Pheidon associated with Heraklid

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power and the invention of Greek coinage (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 393; Diod. 7 F 17). Different versions on Karanos and his deeds emerged. He is either the immediate predecessor of Perdikkas I (Just. 7.2.1) or was succeeded by two other rulers, Koinos and Tyrimmas, before Perdikkas’ appearance (Satyr., BNJ 631 F 1; Diod. 7 F 15; cf. Marsyas, BNJ 135-136 F 14, naming at least Koinos). According to Diodoros (7 F 15), he and his forces marched from the Peloponnese to Makedonia. He received half of the land of the ruler of Orestis when he successfully aided him against the Eordaians. As for the foundation of Aigai, Karanos either took the city Emessa and renamed it Aigai (Just. 7.1.7-11) or founded Aigai, guided by snow-white goats as foretold by the Delphic oracle (Diod. 7 F 17). Karanos is also credited with the expulsion of Midas from Makedonia (Just. 7.1.11-12). It is unclear by whose order and to which end the revision was circulated. The thesis that it was a product of the inner-dynastic struggles after Archelaos’ death when the rivals of → Perdikkas II’s descendants tried to diminish their dynastic prestige by depriving the founder figure of the very name Perdikkas is not convincing. Karanos became the predecessor of Perdikkas and the ancestor of all of the historical rulers including Perdikkas II and his branch. Hence, this revision did not diminish their status. More plausible (but also uncertain) is the suggestion that Philip II initiated the revision, either to stress his legitimacy at the rough start of his reign or, more likely, to emphasize his Greek and Heraklid descent by a refreshment of the story that may have particularly been aimed at Greek recipients. Also the other key elements—divine election and personal arete—are preserved in the stories about Karanos. In Roman times, Karanos seems to have been the predominant Argead founder figure (Liv. 45.9.3; Just. 7.1.7-12; Vell. Pat. 1.6.5; Plut. Alex. 2.1). As for images, it is suggested that the head of the unbearded youth wearing a taenia in his hair appearing on the obverse of some dynastic series starting with Archelaos is not Apollon (as often thought) but an ideal portrait of the respective Argead founder figure.   S. Müller Cf. Hatzopoulos, M.B., Herodotus (8.137-8), the Manumissions from Leukopetra, and the Topography of the Middle Haliakmon Valley, in: Derow, P./Parker, R. (eds.), Hero­ dotus and his World, 2003, 203-18; Koulakiotis 2017, 203-9; Müller, S., The Symbolic Capital of the Argeads, in: Müller et al. 2017, 183-98, esp. 184-92; Sprawski 2010, 129-34; Vasilev, M.I., Herodotus VIII 137-139 and the Foundation of Argead Macedonia, ŽAnt 62 (2012), 37-47.

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Funeral carriage, of Alexander III

Funeral carriage, of Alexander III The source tradition unanimously informs us that the funeral carriage of → Alexander III carried the body of the deceased sovereign from → Babylon to → Egypt two years after his death. According to Diodoros (18.3.5; 28.2-3) the transfer of Alexander’s body to Egypt was ordered by the regent → Perdikkas; according to other sources (Arr. Succ. F 1.25; Strab. 17.1.8; Paus. 1.6.3; Ail. VH 12.64) → Ptolemy seized Alexander’s body, against Perdikkas’ will, to bury him in Egypt. Only Diodoros (18.26-27) describes Alexander’s f. c., and 25 years ago Andrew Stewart summarized Diodoros’ description effectively: “the hearse was a small Ionic temple on wheels, but the colonnade supported a barrel vault made of golden scales instead of a pitched roof. Alexander’s mummified body, encased in a golden anthropoid sarcophagus, was further concealed from profane eyes by a golden net hung from the interior of this vault (…) Within the colonnade and against the net were hung four large paintings extending across its full width and down its length, so that they touched at the corners. Finally, the wheels and harness system were of Persian design, and no fewer than 64 mules were needed for traction (…) The hearse thus included Asian, Greek, Persian and Makedonian elements in artful and varied combination.”   F. Landucci Gattinoni Cf. Landucci Gattinoni, F., Diodoro Siculo. Biblioteca storica. Libro XVIII. Commento storico, 2008, 129-38; Mariotta, G., La cerimonia del trasporto in Egitto del corpo di Alessandro: il carro funebre del re (Diod. 18.26-8), in: Heimann, H.D. et al. (eds.), Ceremoniales, ritos y representación del poder, 2004, 89-108; Melville-Jones, J.R., Alexander’s Funeral Carriage, in: Hillard, T.W. et al. (eds.), Ancient History in a Modern University, 1998, 156-9; Miller, S.G., Alexander’s Funeral Cart, AM 4 (1986), 401-15; Stewart, A., Faces of Power. Alexander’s Image and Hellenistic Politics, 1993, 214-25.

Games, Panhellenic Being admitted to the Panhellenic sanctuaries was one of the elements which defined “Greekness” (Hellenikon: Hdt. 8.144). The Makedonian royal family’s interest in the games of the periodos (Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian) started with → Alexander I, who participated in the stadion race at Olympia around 500 and thus gained official recognition of the Greek origin

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of his family from the Olympic judges (Hdt. 5.22). → Archelaos instituted the Makedonian Olympia held at → Dion. The interpretation of these g. as “counter-Olympics” which would indirectly suggest a permanent exclusion of the Makedonians from the “true” Olympics has not been proven; on the contrary, a late source claims that Archelaos won horse races both at Delphi and at Olympia (Solin. 9.14-16). Finally, → Philip II won the horse races at Olympia, apparently on different occasions, and celebrated his victories on his coins, as these successes were a crucial element of his Panhellenic propa­ ganda. At Delphi no participation of Philip in the Pythian g. is attested, but he, after being admitted into the → Delphic Amphiktyony, presided over the g. in 346 and possibly again in 342. → Alexander III was less interested in participating in (or attending) Panhellenic g., but he used the festivals for political purposes (as earlier Argeads had done before): in 324 Alexander’s envoy Nikanor of → Stageira brought to Olympia a royal letter announcing a diagramma on the recall of the exiles to Greek cities (→ Exiles’ Decree). Plutarch’s insistence on Alexander’s supposed dislike for sports and athletes seems unhistorical, as abundant evidence shows that in Makedonia sport training was very important in the military → education of youth. Alexander himself frequently organized g. before and during the Asian expedition. Makedonian “non-royal” competitors in Panhellenic g. are recorded at a rela­ tively late date. This aspects fits in well with all we know of the general evolution of the “non-royal” Makedonian presence in the Panhellenic sanctuaries before the reign of Philip II: Makedonia is represented in the Epidaurian list of the theorodokoi of 360/59 exclusively by the king → Perdikkas III, and the extant remaining references to Makedonians in the great sanctuaries concern exclusively private activities. As for participation in g., “common” Makedonians are not attested as Olympionikai before the age of Alexander III: a Kleiton, recorded simply as Makedon, won the stadion in 328, and was followed some years later by two athletes from → Amphipolis and → Philippoi respectively. A companion of Alexander, Archon of → Pella, won horse races at both the Pythian and Isthmian g. some time before 333/2. Epigraphic documents from the end of the 4th c. (a list of theorodokoi from Nemea, a list of offerings from → Argos, and the addenda to the list of theorodokoi from Epidauros, all of which mention Makedonian cities) confirm that the age of Alexander marked a real change in the relationship between the Makedonians (other than the members of the royal family) and the great sanctuaries of southern 242

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Greece. The emergence of “common” Makedonians among the Olympionikai in this same period can thus be seen as a part of a more general and consistent development.   M. Mari Cf. Mari 2002, 31-6, 49-60, 80-2, 93-8, 118-22, 232-8, 298-9, 306, 308, 310, 324, 328-9; Mari, M., Macedonian poleis and ethnē in the Greek Sanctuaries before the Age of Philip II, AM 7 (2007), 31-49; Moretti, L., Olympionikai, 1957, nos. 434, 439, 445, 463, 473, 498.

Gaugamela, battle of The high esteem Dareios III held for the Makedonian army after → Issos made him submit very substantial offers (of debated authenticity) to avoid further battles. The western empire was now controlled by → Alexander III and his own levies and taxes from there almost ceased. Yet he made military preparations during the two years of Alexander’s conquests of Phoinikia and → Egypt. In 331, he summoned strong cavalry units from the eastern satrapies and marched to a place he had prepared as a battle ground, a plain near the “large village” Gaugamela (Arr. An. 6.11.6), ca. 65 km NW of Arbela, ideal for cavalry attacks (Bosworth 1988, 77, map 5). Alexander arrived there in September 331 and pitched a camp near the Persian position. After carefully reconnoitering the area and the Persian formation, he deployed his troops, partly following his general pattern—he himself with the Companion Cavalry (→ hetairoi) on the right and → Parmenion with the Thessalian (and other) horsemen on the left wing, the heavy infantry in the centre—, partly reacting to the Persian formation. Details are known from a Persian document captured after the battle that was viewed by → Aristoboulos (BNJ 139 F 17 = Arr. An. 3.11.3-7). He confronts it with specific Makedonian data. For the first and only time we get a detailed plan of a major battle at its outset (see fig. 6 in Heckel 2008, 76), but for what followed our sources (Arr. An. 3.8-15; Diod. 17.56-61; Curt. 4.12-16; Plut. Alex. 32-33; Just. 11.13.1-14.8) are episodic and inconsistent: even for an eyewitness it was impossible to get an overall view at each stage. Only a general idea can be obtained: Alexander’s right wing moved to the right extending the Persian left wing to avoid being outflanked. When the Persian left wing reacted to the move, its cohesion with the own centre was interrupted. Alexander at the head of the Companion Cavalry in a wedge formation thrust into the gap at an angle,

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followed by the heavy infantry that widened the break on either side. When the Companions drew left towards the centre, Dareios in his chariot fled, as he had done at Issos. Allegedly this was the signal for further Persian units to give way. But on Parmenion’s left wing the fighting against the elite corps of the Persian horse continued, with heavy losses of the Thessalian cavalry. That Parmenion in his distress begged Alexander for help is an outright impossibility—and one more example of the general tendency of the → Alexander historiographers to belittle Parmenion’s (and → Philotas’) efforts and criticize his counsel as unsound. Indeed the old general once more contributed substantially to the victory. Alexander’s Companion unit pursued Dareios up to Arbela but could not catch him; after all, his war treasure fell into their hands. Losses on either side were heavy. So for the moment, Alexander renounced pursuing Dareios on his flight to the eastern satrapies but turned south towards the Persian capitals in Mesopotamia and the Persis.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Bosworth 1988, 76-85; Briant 1996, 858-9; Devine, A.M., Alexander’s Propaganda Machine: Callisthenes as the Ultimate Source for Arrian, in: Worthington, I. (ed.), Ventures into Greek History, 1994, 89-102, esp. 96-9; Heckel 2008, 75-80, 159-60; Müller 2019, 130-4.

Gedrosian Desert In summer 325, Alexander and his army reached the estuary of the Indos and the city of Pattala. Some weeks before, a corps under → Krateros had been detached to march from the Indos valley to Karmania via Arachosia and Drangiana. The core of the army, under Alexander’s command, was to march westwards via Gedrosia (Arr. An. 6.21.3; Curt. 9.10.4; Diod. 17.104.4; Just. 12.10.7), while the fleet under → Nearchos was to move along the coast to the Persian Gulf (Arr. Ind.; Nearchos, BNJ 133). After crossing the Arabis (the Hab or Purali River), Alexander subjugated the Arabitai and the Oreitai (Arr. An. 6.21.3-5; Curt. 9.10.6-7; Diod. 17.104.4-105.2; Plut. Alex. 66.2). Apollophanes, appointed satrap of the region, was killed by rebels. Alexander left a contingent under → Leonnatos in the territory of the Oreitai (which quelled the rebellion) and entered Gedrosia, which extended between the Oreitai and Karmania (Arr. An. 6.22-26). The route of Alexander’s army was through desert areas. Lack of water, heat, and sandstorms caused diseases and led to the death of many people (Arr. 244

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An. 6.24.4-26.5; Curt. 9.10.8-16; Diod. 17.105.6-8; Plut. Alex. 66.2-3). The actual losses reached several thousands of people, mainly non-combatants. The army was able to resupply resources at the coastal town of (modern) Pasni and after a march of 8 days reached the “Persian Road,” on which the Gedrosian capital Poura was located. The march from Ora to Poura took 60 days. Then, after a respite, the Makedonians marched on to Karmania, to which provisions and food were brought from northern Iran (Arr. An. 6.27.3, 6; Curt. 9.10.17, 22; Diod. 17.105.7-8). Krateros and his corps joined Alexander. The march of the reunited army through Karmania resembled a festive procession with lavish supplies (Arr. An. 6.28.1-2; Curt. 9.10.24-28; Diod. 17.106.1; Plut. Alex. 67).   M.J. Olbrycht Cf. Bucciantini 2015; Eggermont, P.H.L, Alexander’s Campaign in Sind and Baluchistan, 1975; Hamilton, J.R., Alexander among the Oreitae, Historia 21 (1972), 603-8; Stein, A., On Alexander’s Route into Gedrosia, GJ 102 (1943), 193-227; Strasburger, H., Alexanders Zug durch die gedrosische Wüste, Hermes 80 (1952), 456-93.

Genealogy, Argead Different versions of Argead genealogy emerge in the literary sources. The earliest list was preserved by → Herodotos in the 5th c. (8.139), and appears to reflect an official Makedonian tradition circulated by → Alexander I. Herodotos lists 7 rulers starting with the realm’s founder until the time of Xerxes’ Greek campaign, in each case a son succeeding his father: → Perdikkas I, Argaios, Philip I, Aëropos I, Alketas, → Amyntas I, Alexander I. The list combines 5 proto-historical and two historical rulers. Perdikkas I is a legendary figure. Next to nothing is known about Argaios (fictitious?), Philip, Aëropos, and Alketas (→ Argeads, proto-historical). Amyntas I is the first of them whom we can situate in a historical context. While → Thucydides does not name the predecessors of Alexander I, his statement that 8 rulers reigned before → Archelaos (2.100.2) is generally seen as an agreement with Herodotos’ list. This g. will have been based on Makedonian → oral tradition. Presumably, the Makedonians had no written record of their rulers before the 4th c. when Makedonian literary, especially historiographical, activities emerged as a by-product of Philip II’s conquests. Due to the lack of reliable information on the early history, chronological problems can be assumed to have occurred in 4th-c.

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historiography on Makedonia, such as significantly diverging information on → Perdikkas II’s regnal years (Athen. 5.217D-E: ranging from 41 to 23 years). The Argead g. was extended in the course of history. The most influential revision was the introduction of → Karanos as the dynasty’s new founder figure in the 4th c. As a prequel, Karanos’ insertion extended the Argead lineage to the mythical past and filled the gap between Temenos and Perdikkas I. The earliest source is a fragment by → Theopompos cited by Diodoros (7 F 17) listing the following rulers: Herakles, Hyllos, Kleodaios, Aristomachos, Temenos, Kissios, Thestios, Merops, Aristodamis, Pheidon, Karanos. Another version names Temenos, Lachares, Deballos, Eurybiades, Kleodaios, Kroisos, Poias, Karanos (Diod. 7 F 17). There are two variants of the list of rulers after Karanos: he is either succeeded by Perdikkas I, who is presented as his son (Just. 7.2.1), or by Koinos, Tyrimmas, and Perdikkas I (Diod. 7 F 15; cf. Satyr., BNJ 631 F 1). Diodoros’ list contains also the number of the rulers’ regnal years but its credibility is uncertain. Apart from the insertion of Karanos, Trogus-Justin echoes Herodotos’ list in his narrative of early Makedonian history (7.1-2). For the Argeads, their g. was an element of their symbolic capital providing them with prestige, politically useful kinship ties, the claim to Greek, Hera­ klid, and royal descent, and distinguished uniqueness among the influential Makedonian families. → Names of past rulers continued to be given to sons of Argeads in order to stress political continuity and dynastic prestige. The g. formed part of the Argead propagandistic self-fashioning, → legitimization, and representation policy. For example, Herakles, the Argead progenitor, and his emblems are frequently shown on Argead → coinage. The revisions of the g. imply its use as an ideological and political device that had to be made compatible with contemporary requirements.   S. Müller Cf. Borza 1990, 80-97; Engels, J., Macedonians and Greeks, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 81-98, esp. 89-91; Gambetti, S., Satyros of Alexandria (631), BNJ online (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/satyros-of-alexandria-631-a631); Geyer 1930, 35-41; Sprawski 2010, 129-34.

Goat   see Coinage, Argead; Foundation Myth; Karanos; Perdikkas I

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Gordion knot Still a metaphor for an unorthodox solution of an intractable problem, ‘cutting the Gordion knot’ was brought up by the → Alexander historiographers. In 333, the Makedonians took Phrygian Gordion, known as king Midas’ seat. As usual when local elites cooperated, → Alexander III made a goodwill gesture: he offered sacrifices in the temple of the local main deity, called Zeus Basileus by the Greek writers. This is the historical core. For the legend built on it, → Kallisthenes is the most likely source: Alexander was shown the local attraction, Gordios’ wagon dedicated by his son Midas to Zeus Basileus. It was special for the utterly tangled knot of the yoke impossible to undo. According to a local legend, anyone who undid it was destined to rule Asia (Arr. An. 2.3.6-7; Curt. 3.1.16; Just. 11.7.5; cf. Plut. Alex. 18.1-2: the oikoumene). The famous variant has Alexander struggling a bit, then cutting the knot with his sword (Curt. 3.1.16-18; Just. 11.7.15-16, stressing his violence). The (perhaps original?) version told by → Aristoboulos shows a clever Alexander choosing an intellectual approach by removing the pin around which the knot was tied (BNJ 139 F 7a-b). Perhaps, the tale aimed to link the conquest of Phrygia with Makedonian → oral tradition cited by → Herodotos: called Briges, the Phrygians once settled in Makedonia and Midas’ Makedonian gardens were later taken by → Perdikkas I (7.73; 8.139.2-3). In the 4th c., his ancestor → Karanos was credited with Midas’ expulsion from Makedonia (Just. 7.1.2-4). The linguistic thesis that the Paleo-Phrygian evidence supports Makedonian links is debated, the migration story’s validity is uncertain. The legend of the G. k. was an artifice of the Alexan­ der historiographers.   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 1980, 184-8; Mederer, E., Die Alexanderlegenden bei den ältesten Alexanderhistorikern, 1936, 9-14; Munn, M., Alexander, the Gordian Knot, and the Kingship of Midas, in: Howe, T./Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2008, 107-44.

Granikos, battle of In 334, from the → Hellespont, → Alexander III turned east towards the satrapal seat of Daskyleion, for three reasons: the sustenance that he carried in his baggage train (or that the 70 talents in his coffers could buy on markets) would

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feed his army only for 30 days (Plut. Alex. 15.1). But to live off the land would have been a bad start, whereas the satrapal funds plus booty would solve his problem at that stage. Moreover, he must have known that strong cavalry units from different parts of the Persian Empire had been massed (see Seibert 1985, 2, map 3) which would threaten his back if he turned south without neutralizing them. Finally, an early victory would open to him many cities that he otherwise would have had to besiege, giving the Persians opportunity to organize resistance. They disposed of strong cavalry forces from satrapies as far east as Baktria and Hyrkania, commanded by western satraps (Arr. An. 1.12.8, 16.3; Diod. 17.19.4): Arsites from Hellespontine Phrygia, Atizyes from Greater Phrygia (Arr. An. 2.11.8, cf. 1.25.3), Spithridates from Lydia and Ionia, Arsames from Kilikia, and Mithrobouzanes from Kappadokia, as well as several high ranking generals, amongst them → Memnon and Rheomitres. Though the Great King was not there, the army was imperial, and the regional satrap Arsites was not free to decide whether to fight or not. So Memnon’s proposal in the Persian council at Zeleia to retreat after burning crops and settlements (Arr. An. 1.12.9) is fictional. It was decided to fight from the eastern bank of the river G. The battle reports (Diod. 17.18-31; Arr. An. 1.13-16; Plut. Alex. 16) differ substantially from each other, but some basics do emerge (see fig. 1-3 in Heckel 2008, 47-49): the Persian cavalry on the elevated east bank was deployed in front of the infantry body of Greek mercenaries. This should turn out as a mistake, for the riders had no space to move up in speed and break through the Greek line; essentially immobile, they could do little more than hurl their javelins. Once Alexander’s riders had crossed the river, a close up combat similar to an infantry engagement started, the room available for the Persian riders being restricted by the infantry close in their rear. But the Makedonians profited from the narrow battle ground since they were better trained and disposed of more solid (and longer) cornel spears (Arr. An. 1.15.5). So after the initial clash, when the Greek cavalry had won their stand on the eastern bank, the battle turned into carnage. The sources concentrate on the aristeia of Alexander—indeed → Philotas’ Companion Cavalry had cleared the way for him across the river. Allegedly Alexander fought like a Homeric hero— according to → Kallisthenes and → Ptolemy. One critical moment occurred when → Kleitos (the Black) saved Alexander’s life by killing Spithridates. The Persian cavalry, once penetrated, quickly gave way falling back on the mercenary infantry. Its offer to surrender failed: the greater part was massacred, allegedly 2000 taken prisoner and brought in chains to Makedonia, to hard labour on 248

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fields and in → mines: this compensated for the manpower taken out of the country to war. From the booty, Alexander set up at → Dion 25 bronzen statues of Companions fallen in the first shock (Arr. An. 1.16.4, by Lysippos) and sent to Athens 300 panoplies with the famous inscription: “Alexander, son of Philip, and all the Greeks except the Lakedaimonians from the barbarians who dwell in Asia” (1.16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.8). The Athenians would have preferred to get back their citizens captured amongst the Greek mercenaries (Arr. An. 1.29.6; Curt. 3.1.9), but Alexander kept them as hostages, as he somewhat later retained the Athenian ships (Diod. 17.22.5).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Badian, E., The Battle of the Granicus, AM 2 (1977), 271-93; Bosworth 1988, 38-44; Briant 1996, 843; Heckel 2008, 47-51, 159; Müller 2019, 85-8.

Harpalos A Makedonian nobleman, whose year of birth is not known, Harpalos was one of Alexander the Great’s boyhood friends and served with him in his Asian campaign. Because of some physical disability, usually thought to have been a limp, he was precluded from active service; instead, he served in an administrative role, eventually becoming imperial treasurer with his headquarters at → Babylon. H.’s father was a man named Machatas from Elimeiotis in Upper Makedonia, who at some point in the reign of → Philip II had gone to live in → Pella. The move would explain how H. and Alexander became friends, and H. was likely a royal page. In 337 Alexander inexplicably defied his father’s plan of marrying his eldest son (Arrhidaios) to the daughter of Pixodaros, satrap of → Karia, and put himself forward. A furious Philip took no action against Alexander, but he did exile 5 of his closest friends, including H., → Ptolemy, and → Nearchos, perhaps because they had supported Alexander’s decision or at least had not stopped him. Where they went is unknown but they were obviously back in Pella by the time Alexander left for Asia in 334. Alexander rewarded H. for his loyalty to him by putting him in charge of finances. But at some point before the battle of → Issos in 333, H. fled to the Megarid region of Greece. One explanation is that he had become disenchanted with the Makedonian invasion and was anxious that the numerically larger Persian army would defeat Alexander at Issos. More likely is that he was caught embezzling money as he ran away with a disreputable man

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named Tauriskos, perhaps his partner in crime. Nonetheless, by 331 Alexander had forgiven him enough to recall him, and to tap him for his newly-created post of imperial treasurer. H. was first based at Ekbatana (where he oversaw the massive sum of 180.000 talents of gold) but eventually moved to Babylon. H. lived a debauched life at Babylon, keeping two expensive Athenian mistresses, and amassing great wealth by exploiting the people. He maintained contact with Alexander, sending him books at times, and also arranging delivery of 2500 new panoplies for the men after the mutiny on the → Hyphasis River in 326. Perhaps not expecting Alexander to return from → India, H. had gone so far as to mint his own coinage and refer to one of his mistresses, Glykera, as his queen. Alexander would not have forgiven these actions, which were compounded by H.’s wealth and political connections—with, for example, Koinos, who defied Alexander at the Hyphasis River and was the voice of the mutiny. When news broke of the king’s impending return, H. had no choice but to flee once more. He went to Athens, where he intended to trigger a revolt against Alexander to try to save his own skin; to this end, he took with him 6000 mercenaries, 5000 talents of stolen money, and 30 warships. → Athens was a logical choice for its history of opposing Makedonia, and he had been made an Athenian citizen for a gift of grain during a recent famine. However, the Athenians, on → Demosthenes’ bidding, refused him entry. How much support Demosthenes had is not known, but we must imagine some in Athens, especially the hawkish → Hypereides, might have opposed him. H. went to Tainaron (in Lakonia), which had become something of a mercenary centre, where he left most of his force, and returned to Athens as a suppliant. This time he was admitted (end of June 324); and so began the infamous H. affair. The Athenians were in a quandary. On Demosthenes’ advice they imprisoned H., took his money (700 talents, so he said: Hyp. 5.9-10 and [Plut.] Mor. 846B) for safekeeping to the Akropolis, and sent an embassy to Alexander to enquire what he would like them to do with him. At the same time, embassies came from other Makedonians, including → Antipatros and → Olympias, demanding his surrender. Then, not long after Demosthenes returned from Olympia where he had discussed Alexander’s → Exiles Decree with the royal messenger Nikanor, H. suddenly escaped. When the Athenians counted his money, they found only about half the amount he had said he had brought with him, causing the people to suspect Demosthenes and others of taking bribes to permit H.’s flight. Despite the lack of evidence, they were formally accused of this treachery; Demosthenes was put on trial in 323, 250

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found guilty of taking 20 talents from H., and forced to escape into exile when he was unable to pay a huge fine of 50 talents. H. bolted first to Tainaron, picking up some of his men there, and thence to Crete, where a Spartan mercenary commander named Thibron murdered him. Thibron then took H.’s mercenaries to Kyrene (by Shahhat in eastern Libya), then the scene of a civil war between democratic and oligarchic groups, and used them to help seize power. As for the money H. left behind in Athens, the hawkish Hypereides, who had come to the fore in public life after the fall of Demosthenes, arranged for the general Leosthenes to have some of it and to hire mercenaries. On Alexander’s death in 323, Athens spearheaded a revolt against the Makedonian hegemony: H.’s money thus ended up being used for what he intended (Diod. 18.9.4); he just did not live to see it. H. is a colourful character, albeit a shady one. While he was an important member of Alexander’s staff, the affairs that his flight from Babylon spawned is arguably more important. It brought about the political demise of Demosthenes (the affair haunts his posthumous reputation), and it, together with the diplomatic response to the Exiles Decree, sheds light on the Greek attitude to the Makedonian hegemony. The Athenians in the age of Philip would have welcomed H. with open arms, but Greece under Makedonian hegemony was a very different place.   I. Worthington Cf. Badian, E., Harpalus, JHS 81 (1961), 16-43; Blackwell, C.W., In the Absence of Alexander. Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority, 1998; Worthington, I., The First Flight of Harpalus Reconsidered, G&R 31 (1984), 161-9; Worthington, I., A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus, 1992, esp. 44-71; Worthington 2013.

Hellespont In sailing from the → Aegean to the Pontos two straits are passed, in the south the Hellespont and in the north the Bosporos, with the Propontis in between. Both also command crossings of land routes connecting → Thrace and → Asia Minor. Whereas the Bosporos played an economic role, in the H. military aspects prevailed: depending on Pontic grain the Athenians had an essential interest in controlling the H.’s western bank on the Thracian Chersonese. Since their defeat in the → Peloponnesian War (405/4) they courted Thracian kings and Phrygian satraps. In turn, the Persians watched the European coast to pre-

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vent military action against Asia Minor. As a new player in the region, → Philip II was increasingly active in controlling his eastern approaches. In 353/52, he opened hostilities against Athens’ ally Kersobleptes, whose east Thracian kingdom included the Chersonese, and took away his arche a decade later (Diod. 16.71.1-2; Just. 8.3.13-14), causing a rapprochement between the Athenians and the Persian king (cf. Arr. An. 2.14.1-2). When he besieged Perinthos and Byzantion in 340, support for the attacked cities by Persia, Athens, and others forced him to retreat, not without seizing an Athenian grain fleet (Dem. 18.73; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 292). Two years later, as the hegemon of the new → Korinthian League, he could enforce allegiance of the Greek poleis, → Athens included, for the project of an (alleged panhellenic) war against the Persian Empire. After the League had declared war on the Persian king in 337, Philip sent an advance corps under → Parmenion and → Attalos beyond the H. in 336 to prepare the Makedonian invasion (Diod. 16.91.2; 17.2.4); it proceeded as far south as Miletos, but then was forced back to the H. where it still held the bridgehead at Abydos. → Alexander III who had succeeded Philip in 336 opened the campaign against the Persians early in 334 covering the distance from → Pella to Sestos facing Abydos in only 20 days. → Parmenion awaiting him there organized the crossing with 160 triremes plus merchant ships. Taking 60 triremes, Alexander at the head of a substantial corps crossed from Elaious to the coast near Ilion (map: Bosworth 1988, 36-7). The historiographical tradition concentrates on Alexander’s pilgrimage to Troy, his sacrifices and honours for heroes of the Troian War. But beyond propaganda his crossing south of the main bridgehead at Abydos secured Parmenion’s southern approaches. Due to a lacuna in Arrian (An. 1.12.1) we are not informed about the role of the Athenian Chares, who was then just south of Alexander at nearby Sigeion. Since he was an important mercenary commander on the Persian side, Alexander’s crossing may have aimed at neutralizing him. Nor do we know why Persian warships were not at hand to prevent the two crossings; maybe the Persian commanders had underestimated Alexander’s velocity. Until 332 when the Phoinikian-Persian fleet disbanded, the Persian strategy had aimed at cutting Alexander’s lines of communication with Makedonia and Greece from where fresh troops were constantly summoned and others sent back to their homes, also via the H. which remained most crucial; at Lampsakos and Abydos (and Sestos?) Alexander opened mints to provide medium value coins for their journey. The production continued beyond Alexander’s death 252

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in 323 when the (at first western) H. and Thrace became the responsibility of → Lysimachos (Diod. 18.3.2).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Badian, E., Philip II and Thrace, Pulpudeva 4 (1983), 51-71; Briant 1996, 837-43; Kholod, M., The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor, Klio 100 (2018), 40746; Thompson, M., Alexander’s Drachm mints II: Lampsacus and Abydus, 1991.

Hephaistion Hephaistion, son of Amyntor, from → Pella (Arr. An. 6.28.4) had a remarkable career as cavalry officer under → Alexander III. The tradition that he was of the same age as Alexander, and raised and educated together with him, is only found in Curtius (3.12.15-16). As he used H. as a literary device styling him as a mirror image of Alexander who experienced the identical loss of morals Curtius ascribes to Alexander, the information that they shared the same paideia served Curtius’ purpose and is to be treated with scepticism. Also, a letter by → Aristotle to H. mentioned by the unreliable Diogenes Laertios (5.27) is no proof of their lifelong friendship. The problematic tradition that H. was Alexander’s lover first appears in Roman imperial times (Just. 12.12.11; Curt. 7.9.19) in a morally biased narration of decadence. Arrian also hints at their alleged love affair, however, in a favourable way by associating H. with Patroklos and Alexander with → Achilles (An. 1.12.1; 7.14.4), an erotic paradigm in Arrian’s circles (cf. Arr. Per. 23.4). Probably, Arrian had Hadrian and his beloved Antinoos in mind. In all, H. as Alexander’s boyfriend is not testified by any primary → Alexander historiographer and must be regarded as later fiction. Despite H.’s origin from Pella it is uncertain whether he grew up there. If H.’s father Amyntor can be identified with his namesake who, along with his offspring, was granted Athenian politeia on Demades’ initiative in 334 (IG II² 405), H. might have spent his early years in → Athens. This would explain why he carried a name that is highly unusual for a Makedonian, indeed unique in contemporary Makedonia, while there were several namesakes of H. in contemporary Athens where the cult of Hephaistos was important. After → Issos, → Demosthenes supported the Persian wish to negotiate a reconciliation with Alexander and addressed H. as an intermediary (Marsyas of Pella, BNJ 135136 F 2). This may point at an existing connection between the orator and H.’s

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family, whom he might have known from Athens. One of H.’s earliest missions is the supervision of the 20 Athenian triremes transporting the siege engines to Gaza in 332 (Curt. 4.5.10). The story that after Issos, he visited the tent of the captured Achaimenid women together with Alexander (Diod. 17.37.5-38.2, 114.2; Curt. 3.12.15-26), is certainly fictitious (Arr. An. 2.12.5-6). Obviously, → Ptolemy who worked closely together with H. and seems to have been his close friend, tried to commemorate H. in a favourable way portraying him as competent and loyal. Every time something went wrong or could be regarded as a potential problem, according to Ptolemy, he himself and H. were suspiciously absent. H.’s rise started after Alexander had got rid of → Parmenion and → Philotas in 330. Together with → Kleitos, H. was appointed hipparch of the Companion Cavalry replacing Philotas (Arr. An. 3.27.4). Probably, this important office was split because Alexander did not want anyone to accumulate the power Philotas had had. Also, he probably wanted to avoid any potential issues for H. with wielding authority, for H. lacked experience in high command. At an unknown date, H. was appointed somatophylax of Alexander (Arr. An. 6.28.4; Diod. 17.61.3) and → chiliarchos, a newly introduced office linked with the Companion Cavalry (Arr. An. 7.14.9-10). Its precise duties are unknown. H.’s cavalry unit, the chiliarchy, still carried his name after his death, and kept his standard. Plutarch is the only source for the allegation that, as a secret organizer, H. helped to prepare Alexander’s → proskynesis experiment and slandered → Kallisthenes after its failure. The authenticity of this information is doubtful. Plutarch portrays H. in an unfavourable light as bearing part of the blame for Kallisthenes’ death (Alex. 55.1; cf. Mor. 65C-D). This is unlikely to go back to → Chares. Furthermore, Plutarch’s H. seems to be a nasty version of Pheraulas, → Kyros II’s intimate in Xenophon’s → Kyroupaideia who helped him to introduce proskynesis (Xen. Kyr. 8.3.2, 5-14). Thus, probably the only credible element of the story is the hint that according to the seating arrangements, H. was next to Alexander (Plut. Alex. 54.4) reflecting his high rank. Most of the evidence on H.’s missions during the campaign concerns organization and logistics. H. was particularly prominent in the Indian campaign. After the return, he was among the generals honoured by a golden stephanos (Arr. An. 7.5.6). In 324, at the mass marriages in Sousa, H. married Drypetis, the sister of Alexander’s own Achaimenid wife Stateira (Curt. 9.10.6; Arr. An. 7.4.5; Diod. 17.107.6). Whether H. regarded this as an honour or an obligation, it distinguished him from the other bridegrooms. H. had proven to be capable and loyal to his ruler 254

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even in hard times and was rewarded by this token of closeness to the royal house. Alexander’s alleged saying that he wanted their children to be first cousins, uniquely reported by Arrian (An. 7.4.5), is fictitious romanticized embroidery, probably invented by Arrian himself who styled them as the Makedonian Achilles and Patroklos, who were also said to be cousins ([Hes.] Catal. F 61). In autumn 324, in Ekbatana, H. fell ill and died of fever (Arr. An. 7.14.1; Plut. Alex. 72.1-2; Diod. 17.110.7-8). It may have happened during the Dionysia. Thus, hostile voices, probably such as that of → Ephippos of Olynthos, alleged that H. drank himself to death. Plutarch mirrors this bias reporting that H. ignored the prescripts of his physician Glaukias, emptied a huge cooler of wine (psykter, no drinking vessel) for breakfast and died soon after (Plut. Alex. 72.1-2). This account is coloured by the topos about the alleged “barbarian” immoderation of the Makedonian drinking habits. The nature of H.’s lethal disease is unknown. After his death, probably to the end of encouraging others to follow his example of loyalty, Alexander installed a heroic cult for H. (Arr. An. 7.23.6; Plut. Alex. 75.2-3; Plut. Pelop. 34.2). Diod. 17.115.6 and Just. 12.12.12 wrongly refer to divine honours. Unfortunately, there is only scarce evidence on H.’s heroic honours: a votive inscription from late 4th c. Pella (Διογένης Ἡφαιστίωνι ἥρωι, BE 1992, no. 309) including a relief (pl. 3, fig. 3). Αn alleged letter by Alexander instructed → Kleomenes in → Egypt to establish the cult there (Arr. An. 7.23.68). There is also a polemic comment by → Hypereides during the Lamian War who complained that “these people” (the Makedonians) forced the Athenians to honour their house-slaves (oiketai) as heroes (Hyp. 6.21). Because H.’s and Alexander’s deaths were paralleled (cf. Arr. An. 7.18.2-3; Ail. VH 7.8), it is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction as already noted by Arrian (An. 7.14.2). The reports about posthumous semi-royal honours for H. such as Alexander’s alleged order to quench the Persian fire as if the Great King had died (Diod. 17.114.4-5) are dubious. In this phase, Alexander ruled autocratically. There was nobody equal to his rank. Additionally, it is uncertain that quenching the fire was an Achaimenid custom at all. As Alexander was quickly turned into an artificial figure, so it happened to H.   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2016, 75-100, 294-7; Müller, S., In Abhängigkeit von Alexander? Hephaist­ ion bei den Alexanderhistoriographen, Gymnasium 118 (2011), 429-56; Müller 2018; Reames, J., The Cult of Hephaistion, in: Cartledge, P./Greenland, F. (eds.), Responses to Oliver Stone’s Alexander, 2010, 183-217.

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Herakles, (alleged) son of Alexander III

Herakles   see Animal scalps on coins; Coinage, Argead; Deities Herakles, (alleged) son of Alexander III Herakles is the alleged son of → Alexander III and his lover Barsine, never acknowledged as legitimate by his father. The ancient sources on the Successors mention this son of Alexander, born around 327, who lived with his mother in Pergamon until 309 (Diod. 20.20.1). It was only in 309, in the context of the Diadoch Wars, that the 17-years old H. was taken to Greece and introduced by → Polyperchon as the legitimate heir of the deceased sovereign. Polyperchon wanted to use him as a weapon against → Kassandros, who had gained control of Makedonia a few years previously and had recently eliminated young → Alexander IV, who was previously the official heir of his father (Diod. 19.105.24). Kassandros, however, convinced Polyperchon to join his side and kill H. (Diod. 20.28.1-3; Plut. Mor. 530C) in order to present himself as the last of the Argeads, thanks to his marriage with Thessalonike, → Philip II’s daughter. In the wake of a well known paper of W.W. Tarn, some modern scholars consider that H. was an ordinary pretender and that a son of Alexander and Barsine never existed, even denying the existence of a relationship between the two. Others, on the contrary, accept the story of Alexander’s relationship with Barsine: they do not deny the possibility that the two had a son, but do not consider that it is possible to identify with certainty this son with the young man who appeared on the scene in 309. However, some sources on Alexander also mention a son that he had with Barsine: Trogus-Justin (11.10. 2-3) speaks of this child, referring to the beginning of the relationship between the two in 333. Curtius (10.6.10-12), instead, highlights that, after Alexander’s death (323), → Nearchos’ suggestion to take Barsine’s son into consideration as a successor was not taken seriously.   F. Landucci Gattinoni Cf. Brunt, P.A., Alexander, Barsine and Heracles, RFIC 103 (1975), 22-34; Heckel 2006, 138; Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 126-39; Tarn, W.W., Heracles Son of Barsine, JHS 41 (1921), 18-28.

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Herodotos Reporting on Makedonia, Herodotos sticks to his practice to introduce minor ethnic groups from their first contact with the Persian Empire (5.17.2); details preceding this moment may however be mentioned to shed light on later events and structures. So the (older) Makedonian → foundation myth (8.137-138)— devised after 479, to prove the Makedonian dynasty’s Greek origin (5.22)—and the ruler list (8.139) served to illustrate the family background of → Alexander I. Compared to him, his father → Amyntas I is a secondary figure mentioned in a short note on Hippias (5.94.1) and an outline of Alexander’s efforts (8.1720), but mostly reduced to a mere patronymic (e.g., 7.173.3). Alexander’s son → Perdikkas II is not mentioned at all though H. (died around 425) visited → Makedonia probably under this ruler—autopsy can be concluded from e.g., 5.17.2; 7.23.4-24, 128.1; but the Histories end in the winter of 479/8. So H.’s focus is on Alexander. He is one of his heroes, though short of idealization. H. admires him for his cunning, a parallel of Themistokles, both of whom are styled after the model of polymētis Odysseus (‘who knows many schemes’), an archetype in Greek civilization. So H.’s audience would be equally impressed by Alexander (and Themistokles) as many generations had been by the eponymous hero of the Odyssey. But beyond literary styling, Alexander was of first-rate historical importance for Xerxes’ invasion of Greece (480/79: books 7-9). A general difficulty resulted from Alexander’s diplomatic activities on the Persian side. Confidential by their very nature, they concerned only small circles of leading men whom H. could not ask anymore when he collected information. Most important, two military decisions of the Greek high command had been directly influenced by Alexander’s messages. In either case, H. knew how the Greeks had reacted, but he could not know what the Makedonian ruler had actually told the Greek commanders. In inventing details of the messages H. restricts himself to issues that the Greeks must have known themselves: at the Tempe Valley Alexander’s basic argument is the irresistable strength of Xerxes’ army and fleet (7.173.3-4)—this must already have been reported by Greek spies sent to Sardeis (7.146); what follows by way of annotation (7.173.4), a hint to bypasses west of Mt. → Olympos, evidently is added by H. himself: “However it seems to me that they were panic-stricken when they learned (…)”. But the Greeks must have known about the existence of the passes (and a bypass above Tempe to Gonnoi) after specific interviews with Thessalian messengers at the Isthmos

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(7.172), and taken precautions as they would do a little later on the trail west of Thermopylai (7.214-18). If this would have proved impossible they would have rejected the Thessalian call for help altogether. So Alexander’s message must have contained decisive news that the Greek commanders did not know yet. Since the Greek contingent retired immediately to their ships in the Malian Gulf, the security of the route (and the supply for those in the valley) must have been at stake then, after Thessalian cities had just changed sides (cf. Hdt. 7.6.2, 130.3, 172.1; Speus. Phil. 3 Natoli: “the treachery of Aleuas and the Thessalians”; more generally Diod. 11.2.6). Information on this was substantial indeed, and would well account for Alexander’s authority in Greece after 479. His second message, at Plataiai, was conveyed even under great personal danger, as Alexander himself underlines emphatically (9.44-5). This aside, what remains is that Mardonios, troubled by supply shortages, was going to attack the next morning. This cannot have come as a surprise. The leading Athenian commanders and the Spartan commander-in-chief Pausanias to whom the message was explicitly restricted were no military amateurs and doubtless had taken precautions. Once more, there must have been important additional information that H. could not know when he devised Alexander’s message. The nature of this additional detail can be concluded from the re-arrangement of the Greek troops that Pausanias immediately enacted, misunderstood by H. and later distorted by his Athenian sources. To make the attack a double surprise, the Persian side must under cover of the night have moved central units to different positions. Pausanias reacted to just that. Without actual pertinent information from Alexander he could not have done so. H. was no military expert and lacked a sense of tactics. This prevented him from adding seemingly authentic details that he had devised himself. In this respect, he is far less problematic than → Thucydides with his wider experience both on the military and political fields. But H. has faults of his own, starting with his bias in favour of or against some protagonists, as the Athenians on the one side and the Korinthians on the other—the Histories were prepared and written in the years that preceded the Peloponnesian War. Alexander is another case of positive bias in the Histories. Critical aspects such as his loyalty to the Persian side are widely omitted. H. makes clear that he knew them when he puts in the Lakedaimonian envoys’ mouth the famous judgement on Alexander: “A man like him cannot act another way, for being a tyrant himself he must of course cooperate with a tyrant” (i.e. the Persian king: 8.142.5). The very wording is aggressive, giving the Athenians opportunity to answer Alexander clearly. But 258

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they remain polite, pointing out their long connection with him as their friend and proxenos (8.143.3). This makes up for the Spartan reproach, and gives a hint to one special background of H.’s benevolence: Alexander’s significance for → Athens. The Makedonian ruler controlled the → timber the Athenians urgently needed for their ships, vessels for grain and commerce as well as triremes. Their fleet had been substantially reinforced around 483, in all probability with Makedonian timber, and would have permanent need of it also in the future. In turn, Alexander depended on the goodwill of the Athenians in his attempt to avoid Greek retaliation against Makedonia in 478, and in his struggle to be regarded as a full member of the Greek community after leaving the Persian Empire in 476 at latest. Both partners depended on each other. In the wake of the Persian defeat in 479, Alexander had even got a free hand in conquering the western part of → Bisaltia. His image in Athens must have been positive influencing H.’s view on him. Another source of information H. makes ample use of is Delphi. What he could learn here about the Makedonian ruler must have confirmed his image at Athens. We may conclude this from Alexander’s golden statue of himself (8.121), beside the Greek victory dedication for Salamis and the Serpents Column that listed the Greeks who had fought at Plataiai; this context strongly suggested that Alexander had been on the victorious Greek side. Even more, the three dedications were set most prominently just opposite the entrance to Apollon’s temple. Since this had been officially decided by the ‘trustees’ of the sanctuary, Alexander must have had excellent connections there, resulting in an altogether positive image. It was constantly transmitted by local guides to visitors, amongst them H. Finally may be added Olympia where Alexander had been admitted to the Games (5.22). What H. doubtlessly had already heard in Makedonia would on his request be confirmed in Athens and both sanctuaries.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Badian 1994; Müller 2016, 105-40; Scaife, R., Alexander I and the Histories of Herodotos, Hermes 117 (1989), 129-37.

hetairoi The Argead kings’ power was tempered by the particularism of leading nobles and through interaction with a larger group of hetairoi. In the formative years of the kingdom, these men functioned as the king’s comitatus which from the

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origin of Makedonian monarchy belonged to its essential institutions. Prevalent throughout the Eurasian world, it had by historical times lost some of its more severe aspects, such as requiring the companions of the king to accompany their dead master into the afterlife. In effect, the h. (or → philoi, as they were called in the Hellenistic period and even by some of the extant → Alexander historiographers; amici and also purpurati) were the aristocracy of Makedonia, the owners of great estates who were able to ride into battle with the king. Hence, the Makedonian cavalry as a whole came to be known as the ‘Companions,’ with an elite squadron called the ile basilike. But the h. were more than just a military force: they (or at least the most prominent of them) formed the king’s council, dined and drank with him, and formed a pool of candidates for military and administrative positions. Over time there emerged a core of powerful men and a network of political alliances whose interests the king ignored at his peril. To the Lower Makedonian aristocracy were added the first families of the Upper Makedonian cantons whose allegiance Philip had secured through diplomacy and military might. The pastoral society at the beginning of the Makedonian Empire had not known a traditional → nobility. When the Argeads came to rule, it seems that they were the only aristocrats separate from the common Makedonians. If this is so, then the ‘nobility’ must have developed very quickly out of those who attended the king and whose service was rewarded with lands and other distinctions. For the receipt of lands there is ample epigraphic evidence, to which we may add Plut. Alex.15.3-7. But the h. also helped to defray the expenses of the expedition, as in the case of the trierarchs at the Hydaspes River (Arr. Ind. 18). Some 60 h. are attested with certainty, but the number must have been considerably larger. Indeed, as Makedonian power expanded, foreign xenoi (e.g. Demaratos of Korinthos) and members of royal houses which had submitted to Makedonian authority (e.g. Abdalonymos of Sidon, Nithaphon of → Kypros) were enrolled in the ranks of the h. How the members of this group were subdivided and on what basis those who formed the king’s consilium were selected is unknown, although the king’s ‘favour,’ as well as the military and diplomatic skills of the individual, must have played a deciding role. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to equate personal friends (more commonly designated as philoi) with official h.; terminology of friendship is at times adopted for clearly hierarchical relations between people of different social station. Individuals could be both personal and court friends—men such as → Hephaistion—but there is also a common misconception that the h. of → Alexander III who were banished in 260

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337/6 were his boyhood friends (cf. the h. of → Demetrios Poliorketes: Diod. 19.69.1). The honour of companionship with the king was a powerful motivating force, and → Philip II introduced an elite infantry unit which he designated as “foot companions”: pez(h)etairoi in order to instill pride in what essentially was his infantry guard. Later the term was given to the larger group of Makedonian infantry, recruited on a regional basis and commanded by local aristocrats who belonged to the highest ranks of the h. A further distinction followed, with those troops closest to the king being designated “the king’s own” (basilikoi). Members of the aristocracy served in the Companion Cavalry and their sons were, in many cases, educated at the king’s → court as → paides basilikoi or pueri regii. The influence of the remaining h., now distinguished primarily by their service in the Makedonian cavalry, declined accordingly. Less formidable than the foremost generals, they nevertheless retained a measure of respect and could not be taken lightly.   W. Heckel Cf. Beckwith, C., Empires of the Steppes, 2009, 12-28; Hammond 1989, 53-8; Hatzopoulos 1996, I, 334-6; Heckel, W., The Boyhood Friends of Alexander the Great, Emerita 53 (1985), 285-89; Heckel 2016, 245-59.

hipparch, hipparchy   see Army organization Histiaia In about 446/5, after northern Euboian Histiaia formed part of the secession of Euboian members from the Attic Naval League, the Histiaians were expelled by the Athenians who annexed their territory (Thuc. 1.114.3; 7.57.2; 8.95.7; Diod. 12.7.1; Plut. Per. 23.4). According to → Theopompos (BNJ 115 F 387), due to a ὁμολογία, the Histiaians emigrated to → Makedonia. It is unclear where exactly they were settled and whether this ὁμολογία involved the Makedonians or just → Athens and Euboia. The migration of the Histiaians is the first political act known from the reign of → Perdikkas II. It is debated if at this time he was Athens’ ally, thus acting according to a mutual agreement, he was forced by Athens’ superior power, or he offered the Histiaian victims of Athens refuge on his own behalf, thereby signaling his resentment against Athenian imperialism

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(since the Athenian expansion in Northern Greece severely limited the Argead sphere of action in this era).    S. Müller Cf. Geyer 1930, 53; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 121; Lasagni, C., Histiaia-Oreos e l’insediamento ateniese, ASAtene 88 (2010), 372-90; McGregor, M.F., Athens and Hestiaia, Hesperia Suppl. 19 (1982), 101-11; Müller 2017, 121-3.

Historiography, Greek Despite the considerable cultural interchange between the Greeks and Makedonians in the 4th and 5th centuries, the Greek historiographical tradition has preserved a portrayal of the Makedonians that is not only uninformed (and often deliberately so), but also biased and distorted. The problem is compounded by the fact that no historiographical work written by a Makedonian survives, except in short fragments cited by later writers, effectively rendering them one of the “silent peoples” of the ancient world. Consequently, the Makedonians are mentioned only in passing in general histories of the Greek world written by outsiders or, worse yet, in tendentious and often hostile contexts in order to further a specific agenda of the writer. In the Greek historiographical tradition of the 5th c., the Argeads’ attempt to gain legitimacy as true Hellenes was not yet the politically-fraught topic that it would become in the 4th c. when the Athenians in particular, under the influence of → Demosthenes, had an equally vested interest, due to → Philip II’s territorial aspirations, in portraying the Makedonians as ‘barbarians’. Nevertheless, the fact that → Alexander I was required to prove his Argive ancestry in order to be permitted to compete in the Olympic Games (Hdt. 5.22) demonstrates that the issue of ethnicity was already a matter of controversy in the early 5th c. Not surprisingly, it looms large in the earliest references to the Makedonians in Greek historiography. In his pioneering chrono­graphic work, Priestesses of Hera at Argos, Hellanikos (BNJ 4 F 74) provides Makedon, the eponymous ancestor of the Makedonians, with a bona fide Hellenic lineage, as the son of Aiolos and the grandson of Hellen himself, the eponymous ancestor of the Hellenes. In → Herodotos, however, who probably reflects Alexander I’s own legitimizing propaganda, Greek ethnicity is restricted to the Argeads through their alleged descent from Herakles (8.137-139; cf. 5.22; 9.45.2), and this became the party line in the subsequent Greek historiograph262

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ical tradition (cf. Thuc. 2.99.3; 5.80.2). Similarly, Alexander I’s prominence in Herodotos’ narrative of the → Persian Wars as a supporter of his fellow Hellenes in general and the Athenians in particular (but whose loyalty necessarily had to remain secret because Makedonia was formally under Persian control) is almost certainly based on his exculpatory propaganda circulated following the Greek victory (5.19-21; 7.173; 8.136-144; 9.44-45). As Athenian expansionist activities in the north intensified in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, Makedonian → timber (crucial for shipbuilding) was recognized as a valuable resource, and the Argeads increasingly found themselves under threat, particularly after the outbreak of intra-Greek hostilities in the → Peloponnesian War (431-404). Predictably, the efforts of → Perdikkas II to ensure the integrity of his kingdom were represented by Thucydides as duplicitous and opportunistic (e.g., 1.62.2; 4.79.2, 132.1; 5.80.2, 83.4). Conversely, however, the philhellenic policies of Perdikkas’ successor → Archelaos, which included a more conciliatory relationship with → Athens, whose need for timber became even more acute in the disastrous aftermath of the Athenian expedition to Sicily (415-13), are reflected in Thucydides’ explicitly favourable judgment of him as the most successful of the Argead rulers (2.100.2); a late source even attributes to Thucydides a sojourn at Archelaos’ court (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 30-31). In the interval between the Peloponnesian War and the accession of Philip II, the Greek historiographical tradition evinces little interest in the Makedonians, a reflection no doubt of the internal chaos prevailing in Makedonia. In the only episode of Xenophon’s Hellenika that features the Makedonians, → Amyntas III is represented as a weak monarch induced into an alliance with the increasingly imperialistic Spartans by the threat of the impending loss of his kingdom to → Olynthos and the → Chalkidians (5.2.11-41). With the accession of Philip II, however, and his extensive territorial acquisitions that ultimately resulted in his conquest of Greece, the Makedonians could no longer be ignored, and henceforth Makedonia took on an unprecedented importance in the Greek historiographical tradition. It is surely in recognition of Philip’s epochal significance, for example, that Ephoros of Kyme concluded his universal history (which began with the return to the Peloponnese of the Heraklids, the putative ancestors of the Argeads) with his siege of Perin­ thos in 341/0 (BNJ 70 T 10), the incident that brought about open war with Athens. Ephoros also intended to compose a monograph on the → Third Sacred War, the conflict that offered Philip the opportunity to intervene directly in central Greece; it was eventually completed by his son Demophilos (Ephoros,

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BNJ T 9). This new focus on Makedonia gives rise to two opposing but complementary directions in the Greek historiographical tradition. The first is a newly pro-Makedonian tendency, sparked by Philip’s desire to celebrate his own and his Argead predecessors’ political and military achievements, justify his conquest of Greece, and legitimize his planned campaign against Persia. It is not surprising that this tendency appears to have originated at Philip’s → court, where he broadened the longstanding Argead → patronage of Greek artists and literary figures to include historiographers. The fragments extant from the Hellenika of → Kallisthenes of Olynthos, whose family had a strong association with the Argead court (he was a younger relative of → Aristotle), suggest the work was intended as a justification of Philip’s foreign policy, beginning with the Persian-imposed King’s Peace of 387/6 and concluding with the outbreak of the Third Sacred War in 357/6 (BNJ 124 T 27). Subsequently, Kallisthenes continued his pro-Makedonian stance with a separate monograph devoted to the Sacred War, with a similar political agenda of legitimizing Philip’s direct intervention in Greek affairs by appealing to mythological precedents, as the only fragment extant from this work demonstrates (BNJ 124 F 1). So too Anaximenes of Lampsakos, who probably also composed his historical works at the Argead court, followed up his universal history, in which he laid the groundwork for Philip’s hegemony of Greece (BNJ 72 T 6 and 14), with a work focused on Philip himself (Philippika), emphasizing his reorganization of the Makedonian state and his extraordinary military success (BNJ 72 F 4-14). Another beneficiary of Philip’s lavish patronage was Antipatros of Magnesia, who in return composed a pro-Makedonian Hellenic Affairs (῾Ελληνικαὶ Πράξεις) in which he, like Kallisthenes, appears to have used the legendary past to justify Philip’s conquest of Greece (BNJ 69 F 1-2). The shadowy figure of Nikomedes of Akanthos may belong also in this group of Greek historiographers associated with the court of Philip II who offered a positive portrayal of the Makedonians. He is attested to have written a history of Makedonia (→ Makedonika) from its legendary beginnings at least until the reign of Perdikkas II (Nikomedes, BNJ 772 F 1-2), and is thus the earliest representative of what became a separate genre of historio­graphy in the Hellenistic period, reflecting the political and military dominance of the Makedonian Successor kingdoms. Nevertheless, not every Greek historiographer who enjoyed Philip’s lavish hospitality at the Argead court portrayed the Makedonians in a positive light. Although → Theopompos of Chios chose to structure his massive and meandering magnum opus around the life and times 264

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of Philip II (BNJ 115 T 17), his Philippika (unlike that of Anaximenes) offers a very hostile narrative of its central figure, condemning Philip on moral grounds with an often startling degree of vitriol. He denounces Philip for moral vices embodying the stereotypical tropes of tyrants and ‘barbarians’ (e.g., F 27 and 224), such as sexual incontinence, luxury, gluttony, impiety, extravagance, treachery, and drunkenness (including the un-Hellenic practice of consuming unmixed wine). According to Theopompos, not only was Philip himself debauched and insatiable, but he corrupted all those whom he attracted to his court or with whom he formed alliances (e.g. F 225). In this way, Theopompos denies Philip any credit for diplomatic or strategic skill, and instead attributes all of his spectacular political and military success to sheer good fortune (F 237a). Although Theopompos’ moral condemnation of Philip and the Makedonians appears exaggerated and sensationalistic, it reflects the portrayal of Philip as a dissolute ‘barbarian’ and lightening rod for the corruption of others that was circulated in Athens by anti-Makedonian orators such as Demosthenes when conflict with Philip began to sharpen in the northern Aegean (e.g., Dem. 2.1819; cf. 9.31); Demosthenes also attributes, at least implicitly, Philip’s victory over the Greeks at → Chaironeia to good luck (18.252-254). A similar dichotomy exists in the Greek historiographical tradition on Philip’s son and successor, → Alexander III. There are a number of contemporary (or near-contemporary) accounts of his expedition, many composed by actual participants, who offer an idealizing and apologetic portrayal of Alexander, likely reflecting his own official propaganda: these include Kallisthenes (BNJ 124), Alexander’s official historian (at least until he incurred the enmity of the king over the → proskynesis affair in 327), Anaximenes of Lampsakos (BNJ 72 F 29), → Chares of Mytilene (BNJ 125), → Nearchos of Crete (BNJ 133), → Onesikritos of Astypalaia (BNJ 134), → Aristoboulos of Kassandreia (BNJ 139), and possibly → Kleitarchos of Alexan­dreia (BNJ 137), although he may be writing later in service to a Ptolemaic agenda. Other contemporary historiographers, however, appear to highlight instead Alexander’s alleged corruption into Persian-style luxury and dissipation: e.g., → Ephippos of Olynthos (BNJ 126), Nikoboule (BNJ 127), and Polykleitos of Larisa (BNJ 128). Alexander’s own adoption of carefully-selected elements of Achaimenid court ceremonial after his conquest of Persia added fuel to the fire, and in the later Greek historiographical tradition Alexander was depicted as an archetypal luxury-loving tyrant on the Persian model; see e.g. the sensationalistic narratives of Phylarchos (BNJ 81 F 41) and → Douris of Samos

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(BNJ 76 F 14 and 49), whose Makedonika did not offer a positive view of Makedonians. A similar anti-Makedonian agenda can also be detected in Diyllos of Athens (BNJ 73), who composed his universal history during a period when Athens chafed under Makedonian rule. His concern seems to have been to trace the origin of Makedonian hegemony over the Greeks, beginning with Philip II’s intervention in the Third Sacred War, the event that paved the way for his conquest of Greece, and concluding with the death of → Kassandros’ son Philip IV in 297/6, an event that plunged Makedonia back into dynastic chaos facilitating the intervention of → Demetrios Poliorketes, with ultimately unfortunate consequences for Athens. By the time that the Romans had conquered the Hellenistic world and began flirting with the idea of monarchy themselves, there was an upswing of interest in the contemporary historiographical tradition in Philip and Alexander in particular, but once again they could function as either negative or positive models for rule, depending upon the agenda of the source. Dio­ doros of Sicily, a contemporary of Julius Caesar, offered a relatively favourable (if imperfectly welded) portrayal of both Philip and Alexander in his universal history. But his near contemporary, Pompeius Trogus, writing at the time of Augustus, chose instead to evoke Theopompos’ Philippika both in the name of his own universal history (Historiae Philippicae) and his unrelentingly harsh treatment of both Philip and Alexander (as is clear from Justin’s later epitome of his work, which does not survive). Similarly, Curtius Rufus, writing in the aftermath of the Julio-Claudians, depicted Alexander as a stereotypical eastern despot as an implicit commentary upon the dangers of autocratic power. It is only during the renaissance of Greek culture at the time of the → Second Sophistic, under the philhellenic Antonines that Greek intellectuals, particularly Plutarch and Arrian, offer largely idealizing portrayals of Alexander in order to employ him as a symbol of Hellenic greatness. The pendulum swings again during the Severan period, when Cassius Dio reverts to the use of Alexander as a negative exemplum, whose illegitimate rule should not be considered an appropriate model for contemporary emperors. Before the mid 4th c. BC, when the increasing tension between Philip II and the Greeks resulted in a sudden intensification of interest in their northern neighbour, the Greek historiographers evinced little interest in Makedonia (generally ignoring it as a regional backwater) and mentioned Makedonians only sporadically in their narratives. When the Greeks became Makedonian subjects in the wake of Philip II’s conquest of Greece, however, Makedonians necessarily became central figures in the Greek 266

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historiographical tradition, although whether they received favourable or hostile treatment depended entirely on the agenda of the writer.   F. Pownall Cf. Asirvatham 2010; Borza 1990; Müller 2015; Müller 2016, 41-84; Rhodes, P.J., The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 23-40.

Hunt Under the Argead monarchy, hunting was a traditional elite activity, as testified by several literary sources, the fresco of Tomb II at → Aigai/Vergina (4th c.) (pl. 3, fig. 2), two 4th c. mosaics from → Pella (featuring a → lion h. and a deer h.), a mosaic from Palermo which reproduces a Makedonian painting from the late 4th or early 3rd c., and several Argead coins with h. scenes. Argead monarchy is first connected with h. when → Archelaos perished during a h. in 399 (Diod. 14.37.6). Some years before (406), reportedly, → Euripides had died during a h., lacerated by Archelaos’ Molossian dogs (Satyr. Vit. Eur. 39.20.25-35, 21.1-37 Arrighetti; but see also Vit. Eur. 4.4.12-22 Schwartz). Polybios states that the Makedonian kings were extremely devoted to hunting and set aside parks reserved for game (31.29.3): When hunting, → Philip II and his son Alexander were accompanied by the → basilikoi paides (Arr. An. 4.13.1-2; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.2-8) and other members of their entourage (→ somatophylakes and → philoi). On the fresco of Tomb II at Vergina, the h. takes place in a forest, perhaps a royal hunting ground. The hunters, on foot or horse, are accompanied by Molossian dogs. Wild boars, deer, bears, bulls, and lions appear as prey. The centrality of the h. in the Makedonian tradition is confirmed by one of the scenes on the funeral pyre Alexander commissioned in honour of → Hephaistion (324). It showed several animals followed by hunters (Diod. 17.115.3). Alexander often hunted in Persia together with friends (philoi) and basilikoi paides (Curt. 8.1.13-18, 6.7). According to Curtius, in 328, he organized a grand h. in a large park in Sogdiana, where the Persians kept wild animals. The king and his companions killed 4000 animals (Curt. 8.1.11-19; cf. Xen. Kyr. 8.6.12 for the Persian paradeisoi). A lion h. is shown on a monument at Delphi commissioned by the younger Krateros in honour of his father who had died in 321 (ISE II no. 73). According to Plutarch, the elder → Krateros dedicated a bronze h. scene made by Lysippos and Leo-

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chares that showed Krateros assisting Alexander in fighting a lion, accompanied by hunting dogs (Plut. Alex. 40.4; cf. Plin. NH 34.63). Pliny mentions two other images of the hunts of Alexander: a sculpture by Euthykrates at Thespiai (34.66), and a painting by Antiphilos of Alexandreia (35.138).   G. Squillace Cf. Andronikos 1984, 106-19, with pl. 58-71; Briant, P., Chasse royale macédonienne et chasse royale perse, DHA 17 (1991), 211-55; Palagia, O., Alexander the Great as Lion Hunter, Minerva 9 (1998), 25-8; Salzmann, D., Untersuchungen zu den antiken Kieselmosaiken, 1982, Taf. 30, Kat. 98; Taf. 29, Kat. 103; Tripodi, B., Cacce reali macedoni: tra Alessandro I e Filippo V, 1998.

Hydaspes, battle of On the far bank of the Hydaspes (Jhelum, see Bosworth 1988, 124, map 9), an eastern tributary of the Indos, Alexander in the spring of 326 was victorious in a fierce battle (Diod. 17.87-89.3; Curt. 8.13.2-14.46; Frontin. 1.4.9; Plut. Alex. 60; Polyain. 4.3.9, 22; Arr. An. 5.8.3-19.3; fanciful: Just. 12.8.1-7 ; ME 56-62) against the Indian king Poros, who ruled a large and fertile district beyond the river, allegedly containing 300 cities (Strab. 15.1.29). By a strategem Alexander diverted Poros’ attention and crossed the river with various units at different times and places. Poros had marshalled his troops with his cavalry on either wing. In the extended centre 200 war → elephants were stationed at regular intervals of roughly 15 m filled with infantry (Heckel 2008, 117, fig. 1), chariots in the front; the operational state was restricted due to slippery ground after heavy monsoon rain. Alexander’s Companion Cavalry thrust against Poros’ left wing, and special infantry units, split up in groups, attacked the elephants with arrows and javelins. Badly wounded some broke out of the formation and trampled on Makedonians and Indians alike, causing confusion and breaks in the formation that were immediately exploited by the phalanx. Poros on his elephant, wounded by longrange weapons, finally ceased fighting. Different versions of his short dialogue with Alexander are invented to illustrate Poros’ noble mind and Alexan­der’s magnanimity. Alexander held on to Poros as a client king and even augmented his land (Arr. An. 5.20.4): he needed a strong kingdom on his own borders. At the ‘site of the victory’ Alexander founded a city with the telling name ‘Nikaia’. The battle is also reflected by the iconography of coins: → Poros coinage (Mørkholm 268

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Hypereides

1991, fig. 44) and tetradrachms of → Ptolemy I featuring Alexander wearing an elephant’s scalp (Mørkholm 1991, figs. 90-95).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Bosworth 1988, 125-30; Heckel 2008, 115-20, 160-2; Müller 2019, 184-5.

Hypaspists   see Army organization Hypereides Hypereides, son of Glaukippos of the deme Kollytes, was born in 389/80 and died in 322. Throughout his political career, he was an unwavering opponent of Makedonia. In 343, H. brought an impeachment suit against Philokrates for accepting bribes from → Philip II (Hyp. 4.29-30; Dem. 19.116). Philokrates, who sponsored both the decree that authorized envoys to negotiate peace and the decree to accept Philip’s terms (Aischin. 2.18; 3.63; Dem. 19.47-49, 121), did not await trial but went into exile (Aischin. 2.6). In 341, H. was sent as an envoy to Rhodos and Chios to secure an alliance against Philip (Dem. 9.71). In the spring of 340 he helped raise a fleet of 40 triremes, contributing two ships himself, for an expedition to Euboia against Philip ([Plut]. X Orat. Vit. 849E), and in 340/39 he served as trierarch on his own ship against Philip’s failed siege of Byzantion ([Plut]. X Orat. Vit. 848E). In the aftermath of the Greek defeat at → Chaironeia in 338, H. was sent as an envoy to garner support from smaller cities in the Peloponnese and Kyklades (Lyk. 1.42). He also proposed a series of emergency measures in the Assembly that involved evacuating women and children to the Peiraieus, arming the Boule of 500, restoring all exiles and disenfranchised citizens, granting citizenship to metics, and freeing and arming slaves for a possible attack on → Athens (Hyp. F 27-39a; Lyk. 1.16, 36-37, 41); although the proposal was approved, it was never implemented given Philip’s conciliatory attitude towards Athens. Still H. was later indicted by Aristogeiton for introducing an illegal decree, but successfully defended himself, arguing that Makedonian arms obstructed the words of the laws prohibiting his proposal. In 337, H. prosecuted Demades for proposing to make Euthykrates an Athenian proxenos, even though he had betrayed his native city → Olynthos to Philip (Hyp. F 76-80), and in the same period he prosecuted Philippides

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for proposing an illegal decree honouring certain Makedonians, including Alexander (Hyp. 2). According to some accounts (Plut. Phok. 17.2; Arr. An. 1.10.4) he was among the Athenian politicians demanded by Alexander for their role in the Theban revolt in 335. Even though there were rumors that H. had been bribed by Harpalos (324), he was one of 10 prosecutors selected to prosecute → Demosthenes and several other politicians (Hyp. 5) over the Harpalos affair. After Alexander’s death in 323, and Antipatros’ appointment as commander over Greece, H. played a key role in promoting the Lamian War, by recruiting allies throughout the Peloponnese (Just. 13.5.10), pushing the Boule to fund mercenaries under Leosthenes (Diod. 17.111.3; 18.9.2; [Plut]. X Orat. Vit. 849E), persuading the Assembly against the opposition of Phokion to go to war (Plut. Phok. 23.1-2), and by delivering the funeral oration over the fallen dead (Hyp. 6). After the Athenian defeat at the battle of Krannon (322), H. along with Demosthenes and others, was forced to flee Athens. He was hunted down by Archias, “the Exile-hunter” either to the sanctuary of Aiakos on Aigina or temple of Poseidon at Hermione. As he clung to a statue he was hauled off to → Antipatros either in Korinthos or at Kleonai, where he was executed. While being tortured, he either bit off his tongue to prevent himself from betraying Athens or had his tongue cut out ([Plut]. X Orat. Vit. 449B-C; Plut. Dem. 28.4).   C.R. Cooper Cf. Cooper, C., Hyperides, in: Worthington, I. et al. (trans.), Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus: The Oratory of Classical Greece, 2001, 61-151; Engels, J., Studien zur politischen Biographie des Hypereides, 1993².

Hyphasis Event In autumn 326, → Alexander III and his army turned back at the river Hyphasis (Beas) in → India. The return and its implications have become a major scholarly issue. According to the traditional view, Alexander experienced his first major defeat when his own soldiers refused to march further. Their spokesman Koinos stressed their exhausted and weary condition. The H. e. was interpreted as a failure of leadership due to the increasing tension between Alexander and his army. However, while generally maintained, this traditional view has come more and more into question. The appropriateness of the term 270

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“mutiny” has been doubted. Since the sources describe a desperate plea of a tearful army rather than a challenging stand, and, in contrast to the → Opis mutiny, nobody was punished, the H. e. was alternatively labelled “discontent” or “unpleasantness.” Second, the authenticity of the speeches put into Koinos’ and Alexander’s mouths (Arr. An. 5.27.1-9; Curt. 9.3.3-15) is doubted. Third, the artificial nature of Alexander’s portrayal is criticized as formed by stereotypes of the megalomaniac world conqueror retrospectively, embroidered by the unflattering tale about his sulkiness in his tent like a would-be-→Achilles (Arr. An. 5.28.3-4; Curt. 9.3.18-19). Fourth, as for geopolitics, it has been noted that at the Hyphasis, Alexander had already arrived at the boundary of Achaimenid authority in India. Thus, according to a recent view, Alexander did not plan to advance further. He wanted to establish Makedonian rule over the most eastern parts of Achaimenid influence, gain control of the Punjab and Indos Valley and return at the Hyphasis as his stopping point—exactly as he did. The importance of taking over Achaimenid power connections with Indian dynasts must have been obvious ever since → Gaugamela when Indian troops had come to Dareios III’s aid (Diod. 17.59.4; Arr. An. 3.8.3, 11.5-6, 15.1). Alexander commemorated the arrival at the Hyphasis by holding games and erecting altars dedicated to the Olympian gods (Arr. An. 5.29.1-2; Arr. Ind. 18.11-12; Curt. 9.3.19; Diod. 17.104.7), a parallel to the games held at → Dion, and altars erected on both sides of the → Hellespont at the conquest’s start in 334 (Arr. An. 1.11.1, 7-8). The reports that Alexander ordered a camp of superhuman proportions to be constructed to trick posterity into believing that the Makedonians were giants (Diod. 17.95.1-2; Plut. Alex. 62.3-4; Curt. 9.3.19; Just. 12.8.16-17) are fictitious fancies. The geostrategic and geopolitical aspects speak clearly in favour of the view that Alexander saw his mission as accomplished at the Hyphasis. However, the sources unanimously tell another story: that of the over-ambitious world conqueror and his whining soldiers (Plut. Alex. 62.3; Arr. An. 5.25.2-29.2; Diod. 17.94-95; Curt. 9.2.10-34). To explain this discrepancy, it has been suggested that Alexander staged the H. e. in order to lay the responsibility for the (intended) return on his troops. Alternatively, it is argued that the H. e. is a construction of the later literary sources that attributed to Alexander a fictitious longing to reach Okeanos and dramatized reports about the army’s weariness, blowing them up into a “mutiny” and forced return. Any suspicion that Koinos’ death occurring soon afterwards was engineered by Alexander who resented him as the troops’

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spokesman is without substance. Given the problematic nature of our sources, their interpretation of the events will remain a matter of debate.   S. Müller Cf. Briant 2010, 37-8; Carney 2015, 27-59; Heckel 2008, 120-5; Holt, F., The Hyphasis ‘Mutiny’: A Source Study, AncW 5 (1982), 33-59; Müller 2019, 187-9.

Ilias, impact on Makedonia The Ilias was known and appreciated, especially by aristocratic and royal families. Values expressed in this epic were shared by the Makedonian elite and underlined its belonging to the Greek world. The epic must have played an important role, both in its oral and written form, since it was part of the social and educational practices. Thus, it shaped the collective identity and offered role models for prominent Makedonians. The heroic paradigm, especially that of Agamemnon and → Achilles, offered examples of panhellenic leadership and military excellence, but also piety, friendship, and reciprocity. In several aspects, Makedonians were familiar with Iliadic perceptions of social rank and honour, gender, afterlife representations, and burial customs. Until the 4th c., due to the lack of textual evidence, it is hard to pin down I.’s influence; it is detectable mostly through the Homeric reception by poems commissioned by → Alexander I, performed in a sympotic or festival context (see Pind. F 120-121 and Bakch. F 20B), where the association between the king and Paris-­ Alexander helps the Argead to appeal to an internal and external audience after the Persian Wars. For Demades, Philip after his victory in Chaironeia had to imitate Agamemnon, not Thersites (Diod. 16.87.1-2). For Demosthenes, Alexander III was only a Margites (another Homeric anti-hero) and not at all an Achilles. The latter became for Alexander the most influential model, as the I. was the young king’s favourite work of literature. Alexander’s ancestor via → Olympias became apparently a source of inspiration evoked through symbolic gestures (visit to Achilles’ tomb in Ilion and Protesilaos’ in Elaious): a model for self-portraiture and agent of collective acceptance (Plut. Alex. 2.1; 5.8).   E. Koulakiotis Cf. Müller, S., Alexander der Große als Neuer Achilles, in: Jaeger, S./Petersen, C. (eds.), Zeichen des Krieges in Literatur, Film und den Medien, 2006, 263-94; Pownall 2017.

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Illyria The earliest reports on the Illyrians are found in Hekataios (BNJ 1 F 98-101) and → Herodotos (1.196; 4.49.5). They lived northwest of the Greek peninsula, covering the area from northern → Epeiros up to modern Bosnia. The most important peoples were the Dardanians, the Taulantians, and the Grabaioi. The earliest royal dynasties (of Bardylis, Grabos, Kleitos, Glaukias) are known from their conflicts with the Makedonians, especially after their invasion of Makedonia in 393. There is no information regarding their former relations but later, in general, the Illyrians were enemies of Makedonia. Under Bardylis (c. 400-358), son of Sirrhas, the Illyrians became a powerful region, with Dardania (modern Kosovo) being its nucleus. Bardylis began raiding Molossia and Makedonia. Around 393/2 the Illyrians conquered Lower Makedonia as far as the → Thermaic Gulf, while → Amyntas III was expelled (Diod. 14.92.3). A puppet-king, Argaios, was named king of Makedonia for two years, before Amyntas was reinstated with the help of the Thessalians. Still, in 383/2 the Illyrians invaded Makedonia once more, but Amyntas took his kingdom back (Diod. 15.19.2; Isok. 6.46). However, he paid tribute to Bardylis (Diod. 16.2.2), who gave his sister Eurydike as a wife to the Makedonian king; with her he had three sons: → Alexander II, → Perdikkas III and → Philip II. When Amyntas III died in 370/69, Makedonia was weak, mainly due to continuous Illyrian raids (Frontin. 2.5.10), and striving for survival. One should be critical of the information that his heir to the → throne, Alexander II, paid heavy tribute to the Illyrians and sent his younger brother Philip II as hostage to them until c. 368 (Just. 7.5.1). The fact that the Illyrians did not profit from the rivalries for the Makedonian throne is probably an indirect indication of their weakness at that period. Only in 360, under Bardylis, did they invade Epeiros and extend their kingdom up to the Makedonian borders (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 286; Kallisth., BNJ 124 F 27). Early in 359 a fierce battle took place between Bardylis and Perdikkas III; the Makedonian ruler fell in battle along with 4000 Makedonians (Diod. 16.2.4-5) and the Illyrian raids now occurred on a larger scale in the western part of the realm. Makedonia was in crisis and about to collapse. Bardylis acted immediately by gathering his forces for a new invasion as he was preparing to conquer the whole kingdom; he finally hesitated to proceed, thus not taking advantage of the turbulent situation in Makedonia after Perdikkas’ death. Philip II succeeded Perdikkas as king of the Makedonians and immediately started to practice his

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diplomatic skills. He bought peace with Bardylis, although the sources are silent regarding the cost of that peace. After his victory over the Paionians in 358, Philip challenged Bardylis by invading his territory with a strong force. The Illyrian king offered peace under the condition that he would keep his possessions in Makedonia. Philip turned down the offer, asking in return for all Makedonian cities under Illyrian control. In the battle that followed, Philip fought against Bardylis in → Lynkestis and defeated the Illyrians who left 7000 dead on the field (Diod. 16.4.5-7; Frontin. 2.3.2). Bardylis made peace with Philip, ceded to him all the territories he possessed in Makedonia, those in the Upper Makedonian cantons included, and sealed the peace by giving to the Makedonian king his (grand-?) daughter Audata, as a bride (Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557C), with whom Philip had a daughter, Kynnane. Whether the Illyrians were compelled to pay an annual tribute or not, this was a stunning victory for the Makedonians, since Philip had now under his rule “all people up to Lake Lychnitis” (modern Lake Ohrid: Diod. 16.8.1) and a year later his power was even greater (τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν κρατήσας μείζω δύναμιν ἐκτήσατο: Polyain. 4.2.17). He created new Makedonian settlements in “I.”, i.e., the area inhabited by Illyrian populations between Makedonia and Epeiros, in order to secure his northwestern borders (Dem. 4.48). However, Philip found himself engaged in a war against another Illyrian group, probably that of Grabos, in 356 (Plut. Alex. 3.5). The Makedonian general → Parmenion won a decisive victory over Grabos’ army and secured the area. It was only in 345/44 that Philip solved the Illyrian problem for the next 8 years. He invaded the land of the Dardanians with major forces, “ravaged the land, conquered many cities and brought back booty” (Diod. 16.69.7). As a result, Philip was acknowledged as overlord of the Dardanian king Kleitos, son of Bardylis. Isokrates describes Philip as “ruler of most of the Illyrians—all save those who dwell along the Adriatic” (5.21). It is possible that during the same campaign Philip also subdued the Illyrian Ardiaioi and their king, Pleuratos, after a campaign (Didym. On Dem. 12.64-65). Having dealt with the Illyrian problem, Philip was now free to turn to mainland Greece. The Illyrians had been a difficult opponent and an omni-present danger for Makedonia for a few decades (even Demosthenes used them when he was trying to form a coalition against Philip, by sending Athenian embassies to them, probably in 341: Aischin. 3.256); so, when Philip was assassinated in 336, the Dardanians and Taulantians invaded northwestern Makedonia once again, under their commanders Kleitos and Glaukias respectively. → Alexander III, now king of Makedonia, defeated 274

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them near Pelion, in Dassaretis (south of Lake Lychnitis), in 335 (Arr. An. 1.6.1011) and the two Illyrian leaders made their submission. It was made clear that things had changed for good: Makedonia was not the weak, unstable realm it had been 50 years earlier. Alexander left the Illyrian royal houses unharmed as he needed the Illyrian troops for his Asian campaign: in 334 he crossed the → Hellespont with 7000 Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians by his side (Diod. 17.17.4). During his absence, the regent of Makedonia, → Antipatros, must have exercised control over the Illyrians, otherwise he could not have sent 3000 Illyrian infantry to Alexander in 327 (Curt. 6.6.35). After Alexander’s death in 323 Antipatros and → Krateros had Makedonia and all the neighbouring peoples under their command (Arr. Succ. F 1.7). Still, the Illyrians were always ready to dismiss their Makedonian overlords: they promised to support the Athenians when the latter sent envoys to I. in that same year, in order to persuade the local peoples to join the anti-Makedonian coalition, a promise that eventually had no tangible result. Despite his defeat by Alexander in 335, Glaukias was ruler of the Taulantians for more than a generation. In 317, when Makedonia was under → Kassandros, Glaukias provoked him by offering asylum to the young Molossian ‘prince’ → Pyrrhos. Kassandros, who wanted to control Epeiros, offered 200 talents to Glaukias to hand over the baby to the Makedonian ruler. Glaukias refused the offer and three years later, Kassandros attacked the Taulantians, defeated their army and took Epidamnos and Apollonia. Glaukias signed a treaty which put a temporary end to the Illyrian-Makedonian conflicts.   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Hammond/Griffith 1979, 172-80; 304-08; 469-74; Hammond/Walbank 1988, 39-55; Müller, S., Philip II, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 166-85; Müller 2016, 200-42; Wilkes, J., The Illyrians, 1992.

India India became directly known to the Greek world as a result of the expedition of → Alexander III, whose campaign in I. lasted from early 326 to November of that year, when the army turned back and embarked on a return voyage down the Indos, reaching its mouth in spring 325. The I. that Alexander traversed thus consisted of the Punjab and Sind, and he scarcely went beyond the borders of present-day Pakistan. The reasons for Alexander’s extension of his campaign

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into I. are not clear. Baktria is included in the list of satrapies ruled by Dareios I in his Behistun inscription (DB 1.6) and Herodotos (7.65, 70) includes Indians in the muster of Xerxes’ troops, but Persian rule is unlikely to have extended beyond Sind. There are Achaimenid levels at Taxila, but no evidence for Persian presence in north-western I. later than the reign of Xerxes. Alexander may never­theless have regarded the region as part of the Persian Empire, requiring a mopping-up operation following the defeat of Persia. Later sources, including Athenaios (9.398E) and Pliny (NH 8.17.44) claimed that Alexander provided funds and scientific information to support → Aristotle’s work; the king was so impressed by the oxen of Arigaion that he sent a quantity back to Makedonia, and by the beauty of the peacock that he made it a crime to kill one. This does not mean that Alexander’s campaign was also a deliberate voyage of scientific discovery, though he was endlessly curious. Nonetheless, the botanical information assembled by Alexander’s staff writers, including → Aristoboulos and (probably) Androsthenes was used by Theophrastos in his Inquiry into Plants. Alexander also claimed a Makedonian right to the possession of I. on the grounds of the Indian connections of his “ancestors”, the gods Dionysos and Herakles. Alexander began to deploy Herakles as an element of propaganda after his conquest of the Rock of Aornos, putting it about that even Herakles had been unable to capture this rock. Arrian (An. 4.28.2) and Strabon (15.1.9), following Eratosthenes, are sure that the story about Herakles was a fabrication, by Alexander himself or his flatterers. The sources refer to various incidences of what they regarded as worship of Herakles by Indian peoples, including the Siboi or Sibai of northern Punjab and the Surasenoi in the region of Methora (modern Mathura). In the latter case the Makedonians seem to have been identifying Herakles with the god Krishna, who was born at Mathura and carried out some similar exploits including monster-slaying and successful intercourse with many women in a single night. The story current among the Surasenoi that Herakles had been the ancestor of the people of Pandaia by having intercourse with his own daughter Pandaia at the age of 7 is first recounted by Megasthenes (Arr. Ind. 9), in the generation after Alexander, and need not have been known to Alexander’s men. The name of Herakles may have been attached to this hero by Megasthenes himself, perhaps in an attempt to make a story about Manu, the first man, more immediate to a Greek readership. Dionysos, though an important god in Makedonia, was not originally an ancestor of the Argead house, but his adoption took place in Alexander’s reign and was fully established by the 276

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time of the Grand Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphos. The legend that Dionysos had conquered I. made Alexander eager to find echoes of his passage and to take these as confirmation of the affinity of Greeks and Indians. The first opportunity came at Nysa, near Jalalabad, since Dionysos had been born in a place of that name. The vines and ivy that grew there strengthened the association; the expedition named the location Mt. Meros, probably because they here heard the name of the Indian holy mountain, Meru, and associated it with the birth of Dionysos from Zeus’ thigh (meros). Later in the expedition the army encountered peoples—the Oxydrakai near the junction of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Akesines (Chenab), and the Sabarkai (in the region of Multan)—who, as the Makedonians understood them, referred to their ancestral connections with Dionysos. Many scholars have supposed that Dionysos is to be identified with a particular Indian god, such as Shiva. But Shiva had not emerged as a god in the 4th c. Alternatively, Diodoros’ account of the Indian Dionysos might be taken as reflecting the culture-hero of the Aryans, Indra, the bringer of agriculture, who was also honoured in the north-west in the Indrakun festival, which involved drunkenness and dancers dressed as goats. If the Makedonians encountered this festival, they will have felt as if they had arrived in a Bacchic revel. The course of the campaign in north-west I. is recounted in similar terms in the main sources: Arr. An. 5-6, Diod. 17.84-105.4 (the beginning of the Indian campaign is lost in a lacuna), and Curt. 8.9-9.9. Names are variously reported and some of Arrian’s topographical indications do not make sense, suggesting that he had no access to a map (rather than that he was losing interest in the campaign). The Makedonians quickly came in contact with polities of varying kinds; the gana-­ sanghas or oligarchies, one of which seems to have been Nysa which Alexander left ruled by a council of 300, the kingdoms such as Taxila and the realm of Poros, and the tribal societies which were broadly democratic. Brahmanical, Vedic culture was dominant in the north-west but Buddhism, originating in Magadha (the Middle Ganges) was making inroads in the region. Following the conquest of the Assakenoi who had retreated to the Rock of Aornos, Alexander advanced via Peukelaotis (Charsadda) which had been subdued by → Hephaist­ ion. He then advanced to the Indos, capturing an abandoned herd of → elephants on the way. He crossed the river on a bridge of boats (Curt. 8.10.3), and arrived in the kingdom of Taxila, ruled by a man the Greeks called Omphis (?*Ambhi). Omphis welcomed Alexander and gave him a quantity of argentum signatum (Curt. 8.12.15), presumably punch-marked coinage. A neighbouring

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king, Abisares, also offered “submission”. But Poros (his dynastic name derives from his tribe, the Purus), who ruled the lands between the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Akesines (Chenab), prepared for battle. The last major battle of Alexander’s campaign was fought on the River → Hydaspes at the beginning of the monsoon season. After Poros surrendered, Alexander restored him to his kingdom with additional territory, which may even have extended to Delhi, according to medieval tradition. Poros remained loyal to Alexander’s government until his assassination in 317. Poros was also reconciled with his enemy Taxiles through Alexander’s efforts; the latter sent a series of envoys, the last of whom was called Meroes (Arr. An. 5.18.7-19.1). This man is probably Chandragupta Maurya, called here by his dynastic name, who Plutarch (Alex. 62) says met Alexander in Taxila; Jain tradition makes Chandragupta a student in Taxila at this time (Hemacandra, Lives of the Jain Elders 8.298-312). Alexander now advanced towards Prasiake, Sanskrit Pracyaka, the eastern region. He pursued a breakaway leader of the Purus, the “bad Poros”, who retreated among the Gandaridai (Diod. 17.91.1), probably to be located on the upper reaches of the Yamuna. Alexander next reached the Kathaioi of Sangala, crossing the Akesines (Chenab), which Arrian erroneously calls the Hydraotes (Ravi). This people, an “autonomous” people or gana-sangha, may be the Katthis of Kathiawar; → Onesikritos here first observed the custom of widow-burning (BNJ 134 F 21). Despite receiving support from “bad” Poros, their city was stormed and 17.000 Indians were killed. Strabon and Diodoros place an encounter with King Sopeithes (?*Saubhuti) next. He ruled in the region of the Salt Range, west of the Hydaspes (Jhelum), which according to Arrian Alexander had already crossed: Arrian must be mistaken here. Diodoros, probably following Onesikritos, describes an “ideal” society in which physical qualities are admired, marriages are contracted on the basis of beauty alone, and inadequate infants are put to death. Sopeithes gave Alexander a friendly welcome, as did Phegeus, ruling probably in what is now Phagwara, east of the → Hyphasis (Beas). Phegeus gave him information about the route to the Ganges, which → Krateros claimed actually to have seen (BNJ 153 F2). The sources imply that Alexander never crossed the Hyphasis, so perhaps Krateros went on a scouting party and brought the news from Phegeus. By the time they reached the Hyphasis the troops were “exhausted with their constant campaigns”, their arms and armour were wearing out and damaged by the damp, and their Greek clothing was all gone (Diod. 17.94.1, Arr. An. 5.25.2). Despite a rousing speech by Alexander, the men refused to go further. They really had 278

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reached the confines of what had been the Achaimenid Empire, and did not share Alexander’s desire to see the end of the world. Alexander sacrificed with a view to crossing the Hyphasis, but the omens were so unfavourable that he proclaimed a retreat. He erected 12 altars on the west bank of the Hyphasis as a marker of the extent of his conquests, and embarked in his → fleet down the Hydaspes. It was November 326. Beyond the junction of the Hydaspes and the Akesines the Agalasseis drew up a large army against them. Alexander massacred most of them, enslaved others, and drove the rear guard into the city where he burned them alive. This was the first act of what became a reign of terror by the retreating army. It must have had to range further from the river in search of provisions, as the country along the Indos became increasingly desert-like, but this hardly explains the ferocity of such raiding expeditions. Bosworth has proposed that any people that did not show signs of “submission” was ferociously punished. Further down the Akesines, the army marched 90 km to attack the city of the → Malloi. In the siege, Alexander received a serious wound in the chest, which probably permanently weakened him and contributed to his early death. Diodoros and Curtius placed this episode among the Oxydrakai (Kshudrakas), but Arrian says that the “nomarchs” of this people offered gifts to Alexander (Arr. An. 6.14.2). Further peoples surrendered before he stopped at the confluence with the Indos and founded a city there, probably Uch (known to the Pali Mahavamsa “Great Chronicle” as “Alexandria of the Yonas [Greeks]”). He was welcomed by Musikanos (king of the *Mushikas? *Moghasis?), whose kingdom was described as another utopia by Onesikritos. Two further kings, Oxikanos and Sambos, submitted after military action. The Brahmanes, dwelling in the city of Harmatelia (presumably Brahmanabad), defended their city fiercely and were joined by Musikanos; the city was subdued and the leaders of the resistance were hanged. The fleet now continued to Patala (Hyderabad), reaching the mouth of the Indos in July 325. Here Alexander left I. Nehru considered that Alexander’s incursion was just a local border raid without permanent results. However, Greeks remained in north-west I. for the next two centuries. Makedonian elements in the culture of the Baktrian Greeks and Indo-Greeks are limited to the prominence of the gods Herakles and Dionysos in the art of Mathura (2nd c. BC onwards) and Gandhara (from the first c. AD). Dionysiac themes and vine-décor abound in both traditions, and Herakles became the model for the Buddha’s companion Vajrapani. The information that came back with Alexander’s companions, however, made a great impact on the classical

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world. Two aspects of Onesikritos’ book on the Indian expedition had a long resonance. First, he was sent by Alexander to interview the naked philosophers (gymnosophists) whom the army encountered at Taxila. Onesikritos’ description of these ascetics became the source of a long literary tradition, in which Alexan­ der is brought face to face with their leader, Dandamis; the encounter thus represents an ideal opposition of the active and contemplative lives. These philo­ sophers later acquired the name of ‘Brahmans’ in Greek writing, apparently because Plutarch (Alex. 64) confused them with the rebellious Brahmans of Harmatelia. De Bragmanibus of Palladius (5th c. AD) may incorporate the monograph that Arrian (An. 6.16.5) promised to write about the ‘Brahmans’, but which has not survived. One of the Taxila ascetics, Kalanos, who was at odds with the others, accompanied Alexander for the rest of the expedition until he took his own life by self-immolation at Pasargadai. Onesikritos also wrote about the Kathaioi, and the kingdom of Musikanos, in terms that presented them as ideal societies in respect of customs and ethics. Add to this the benign climate and fruitful soil of I., as well as Indian traditions about a Golden Age and the happy land of Uttarakuru, and these societies, as well as that of the vegetarian and quietist gymnosophists, provided the raw material for several Hellenistic utopian fantasies, by Theophrastos, Euhemeros, and Iambulos. Another intellectual who accompanied Alexander was Pyrrhon. The Sceptic philosopher seems to have learnt something about Buddhism, and acquired the practice of meditation (Diog. Laert. 9.64), while in I. Thus a powerful strand in Greek philosophy may originate with Alexander’s expedition. That expedition, combined with the account in Megasthenes’ Indika a generation later, defined the western perception of I. well into the Middle Ages.   R. Stoneman Cf. Bosworth, A.B., Alexander and the East, 1996; McCrindle, J.W., Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian, 1926; Stoneman, R., The Greek Experience of India, 2019; Woodcock, G., The Greeks in India, 1966.

Indos fleet In 326, → Alexander III ordered the Indos fleet to be composed at the river Hydaspes, in parts newly built, in parts provided by the local population. The total number of ships given by → Ptolemy (nearly 2000: BNJ 138 F 24) and → 280

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Nearchos (800: BNJ 133 F 1) looks like an example of their usual exaggeration concerning numbers. But Ptolemy’s statement that the I. f. comprised 80 triremes may be correct. Nearchos, Alexander’s long standing philos from Crete, was given the supreme command as the nauarchos (Arr. Ind. 18.10). Another Greek, → Onesikritos, was designated archikybernetes (chief steersman/helmsman of the flagship). Due to their rival claims to rank, they quarrelled during the voyage (Arr. Ind. 32.9-13). They both wrote about their mission but their eyewitness reports have survived only as fragments. Arrian’s Indike is largely based on Nearchos’ report. Glorifying himself, the nauarchos likens himself to Odysseus, exaggerates his importance for Alexander, and depicts himself as a fearless hero blackmailing uncivilized ‘barbarians’ to provide his starving crew with corn. The Makedonian army’s return from → India followed different routes: starting in autumn 326, the I. f. sailed from Patala (in the Indos Delta) transformed into a large harbor complex with shipyards, into the Persian Gulf and up the Tigris to Persia. Besides transporting a contingent and the booty, the voyage also served to explore the coast, its inhabitants, anchorages, water supplies, natural products, fertile areas, and the sea routes to Persia. Additionally, information on distances, geography, hydrography, winds, plants, and animals such as whales and parrots were gathered. Alexander and his forces used the coastal route through the → Gedrosian (Makran) desert and Karmania in order to provide the I. f. with food and fresh water and protect it from attacks (Arr. An. 6.24.4). Alexander appointed a number of trierarchs of the I. f. (Arr. Ind. 18.3-9). However, the title is regarded as honourific for the list includes his most influential officials such as Ptolemy, → Hephaistion, or → Krateros who marched by land. The crew of the I. f. suffered from the attacks of the local population and from malnutrition, for the land troops lost contact to the I. f. while the neighbouring satraps ignored or protracted Alexander’s demands for provisions. A Gedrosian guide finally led the crew to Karmania, where it rejoined Alexander and the land forces. Then, the I. f. sailed to the mouth of the Euphrates and up to the Pasitigris to Sousa to rejoin Alexander in March 324. Afterwards, Nearchos conducted the I. f. to → Babylon.   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 1988, 139-46; Bucciantini, V., Misurazioni e distanze marittime nel Periplo di Nearco, in: Geus, K./Rathmann, M. (eds.), Vermessung der Oikumene, 2013, 65-76; Bucciantini 2015; Bucciantini, V., From the Indus to the Pasitigris, in: Antonetti, C./ Biagi, P. (eds.), With Alexander in India and Central Asia, 2017, 279-92; Heckel 2008, 131-4, 162.

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Initiation Rites Little is known about Argead Makedonian initiation rites, meaning formal acts marking transition from one stage of life or social group resp. to another. The crucial problem is the lack of contemporary Makedonian documents. All the scarce literary material comes from Greek or Roman authors. While there is epi­ graphic evidence from Hellenistic and Roman Makedonia referring to the trans­ itional stages of youth such as the gymnasiarchic law of Beroia (SEG 55.677, 2nd c. BC) and ephebic law of Amphipolis (SEG 34.602, 1st c. BC), given the missing material from Argead times, any analogies cannot be verified. The i. r. attested for Argead Makedonia are mostly associated with military life, thus specialized initiations aiming at feelings of group identity. According to → Aristotle, an insider of the 4th c. Makedonian → court, there once was a Makedonian nomos that a man who had never killed a foe must wear his halter instead of a belt (Pol. 1324B). Its authenticity is debated. Adding to the chronological vagueness, suspiciously, the passage mirrors contemporary Greek clichés regarding the Makedonians’ extremely warlike, uncouth nature. Perhaps, Aristotle’s example was a rhetorical image. Hegesandros (ca. 2nd c. BC) mentions a ritual admission to adulthood combined with the demonstration of hunting skills (often associated with warrior talents): a young Makedonian was not permitted to recline at dinner unless he had speared a wild boar (perceived as highly dangerous: Xen. Kyneg. 10.1-9) without a net (ap. Athen. 1.18A): therefore, → Kassandros remained seated at his father’s dinner parties at the age of 35. In contrast to Kassandros’ depiction as an unmanly loser lacking Makedonian elite skills that sounds like propagandistic slander spread by his enemies, the custom itself is mainly regarded as authentic (although its age is unclear), not least because the wild boar appears in the iconographic program of Argead → coinage, the hunting frieze of tomb II in Vergina (→ Aigai, pl. 3, fig. 2) and a Roman mosaic from Algeria based on a Hellenistic painting showing → Ptolemy I as Meleagros spearing the Kalydonian boar. Also, granted that the tale about Kassandros was a piece of contemporary propaganda, there must have been some historical substance to be effective. Curtius (10.9.12) refers to a traditional Makedonian rite in order to purify the army by letting it march between two halves of a dog. While a lustration involving animals’ halves is attested in the Near East and in the bible (Gen. 15.9-10, 17.18), it is unclear whether it was in fact a custom in Argead Makedonia. Curtius will have known it from a much later Antigonid context (Liv. 40.6.1-6, probably based on Polyb. 282

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23.10.17, obviously linked to the festival of Xanthos in the month of Xandikos (March, cf. Hesychios s.v. Xanthika). It is uncertain whether Curtius also played with Herodotos’ account of Xerxes ordering to cut a young high-ranking Lydian in half and letting his army march between his parts (7.38-39). It is also difficult to assess the hypothesis that the tale about the proto-historical ruler Argaios (7th c.) who tricked his Illyrian enemies into believing that he had a much larger army by including Makedonian girls, devotees of Dionysos, later known as → Mimallones, disguised as men (Polyain. 4.1; cf. Kallim. F 503 Pf.), points at the cultic role of female travesty as a part of i. r. for Makedonian adolescent girls. In sum, there are mainly uncertainties and suggestions. Perhaps, at least, there is some truth to the claim that the wild boar as a prey formed part of the i. r. for the elite male Makedonian youth.   S. Müller Cf. Angiò, F., Callimaco Fr. 503 Pf., Posidippo e le Mimallones, PLup 27 (2018), 7-16; Carney 2015, 195-7; Hatzopoulos 1994.

Inscriptions Makedonia was not a region where the epigraphic habit caught on early. The overwhelming majority of early (7th-5th c.) epigraphic texts from the wider region that had gradually become → Makedonia by the end of the Temenid period comes not from places inhabited and controlled by Makedonians at the time, but from southern Greek apoikiai (on the coast of Pieria and the Thermaic Gulf, in Chalkidike, and on the coast further east) and their hinterland. The number of inscriptions from the region rises in the 4th c., but most public documents (civic or royal) of historical importance belong to the Hellenistic and Roman times, with the exception of the two royal capitals, → Aigai and → Pella. From the Eretrian apoikia of → Methone come some of the earliest Greek alphabetic inscriptions, dated to the late 8th-early 7th c.; they include 6 simple owners’ inscriptions and an owner’s inscription followed by a curse against potential thieves (SEG 62.424); all are written in Euboian dialect and alphabet. Simple inscriptions on pottery or metal form the bulk of early material both from other colonial cities of the region and from Makedonia proper (e.g. SEG 49.671: Ἄπαϙος, early 6th c., from → Elimeia, possibly the oldest name epi­ graphically attested in Makedonian core areas). The first inscriptions on stone

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appear in the wider region during the late 6th c. (e.g. SEG 57.592, 58.556, 43.400). The earliest civic decree (SEG 51.797, honourific decree of the Thasian apoikia of Berge in the Strymon valley) is slightly later (ca. 470-60); from the same period (470s?) dates a public epigram from Eïon, near by the future → Amphipolis (CEG 1.155). A variety of alphabets (Korinthian, Euboian, Andrian, Parian) was originally used in the apoikiai of the coast and in Chalkidike, echoing the origin and the cultural ties of the original inhabitants, but the East Ionic alphabet was also common in the area. In areas inhabited and controlled by the Makedonians, the picture is inconclusive. In Upper Makedonia, a local alphabet, perhaps influenced by the neighbouring Thessalian one, seems to have been originally in use, especially in Elimeia and Eordaia (e.g. SEG 54.614: Μαχάτα, a characteristic Makedonian name, late 6th c.), but, again, the East Ionic alphabet was also used (e.g. SEG 59.668, 5th c.: from Orestis). The latter prevailed in Pieria (e.g. SEG 61.490), and Pella (ΕΚΜ ΙΙ 517), and became the alphabet that was adopted by → Alexander I for his → coinage; by the end of the 5th c., it had replaced all other alphabets in the whole area from the Pindos range to the Strymon valley and beyond. As far as official dialect use is concerned, the Attic koine became the official idiom of the kingdom’s administration by the reign of Philip II; this is evident already in the earliest official document emanating from the Makedonian royal chancellery which is of sufficient length to allow us to draw conclusions on dialect (SEG 40.542, a boundary settlement regarding western Mygdonia, dated to the first decade of Philip’s rule). The Attic koine was henceforth used without exception in all official royal and civic documents. Use of the Makedonian dialect was restricted only to a few private documents, such as the famous curse tablet of Pella (SEG 43.434, dated to roughly the same period) and is otherwise reflected in the epigraphic evidence only in personal and geographical names. Inscriptions of historical importance for the Temenid kingdom are rare, and often do not originate in the kingdom itself; the first epigraphically attested treaty in which a Makedonian king is one of the contracting parties, for example, survives in an Attic inscription (IG I3 89, treaty between → Perdikkas II and → Athens). Few historically significant documents before the mid-4th c. come from Makedonia itself. Some are tantalizingly fragmentary: a small fragment of what appears to be a treaty between king → Aëropos and the Spartans, from Aigai (ΕΚΜ ΙΙ 6, ca. 394) is probably the earliest public document of the Makedonian chancellery discovered in Makedonia itself. The importance of others lies in 284

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the reference to a personality known by the literary sources, such as the internationally renowned architect Kallimachos, whose funerary epigram testifies to the sophistication of Archelaos’ court (EKM II 54, late 5th-early 4th c.). The other early official documents come from territories technically outside the kingdom at the time of their promulgation. A treaty for a defensive and offensive alliance between Amyntas III and the Chalkidic League, discovered in Olynthos, illustrates, among other things, the importance of Makedonian → timber: the League is allowed to trade on Makedonian pitch and timber for building and shipbuilding on rather favourable terms (Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 1, ca. 393/2). A large stele containing 5 decrees and an oath documents the attempts to settle civil strife in the Eretrian apoikia of Dikaia in the Thermaic Gulf, with Perdikkas III as the guarantor of internal peace in the city (SEG 57.576, ca. 364/3). A → proxeny decree of Poteidaia honouring perhaps a Makedonian, is a testimony to the brief period of peace between Athens and Makedonia, early in Philip II’s reign (SEG 38.662, ca. 359-57). A decree of Amphipolis issued at the time of the city’s conquest by Philip II in 357 and condemning to lifelong exile and confiscation of their property the leaders of the anti-Makedonian political faction gives a clear picture of how political opponents in a city conquered by Philip II were dealt with (Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 40). Two more treaties of the Chalkidic League, one with the Illyrian king Grabos (STV II 307) and one, immediately afterwards, with Philip II in 357 bear evidence to the ever changing alliances in the New Lands a decade before the final conquest of Chalkidike by the Makedonians (Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 2). A royal letter pertaining to a war in Illyria and written by a king Philip (IG X 2.2, 1) has been dated by some scholars in the reign of Philip II, but by most others in the reign of Philip V. From the second part of the 4th c., even fewer documents pertaining to the ruling house stand out for their historical significance. The public role of royal → women is well illustrated by two dedications of Eurydike, mother of Philip II, at the sanctuary of Eukleia in Aigai, and the inscription bearing her name in part of a statuary complex in the same city (EKM II 8, 9, 14). Alexander III, despite having spent almost his entire reign outside the kingdom, figures in two documents. The first is a royal settlement regarding the use of land in the territory of → Philippoi (Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 6) and provides valuable information on the strained relationship between the city and the Thracians in its territory, on the efforts of both Philip II and Alexander to come up with a reconciliatory solution serving the interests of

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both sides, on the status of royal land, on taxation and, perhaps (if the restoration [ἐκ Πε]ρσίδ[ος] in l. I 1 is accepted), on the fact that Alexander had not yet fully decided in 330 to continue his eastwards march in Asia, since the return of the army from Persis could still be considered as an eventuality. The second document (Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 62) is a dedication to Asklepios by a local priest at Kalindoia in Mygdonia, followed by a list of 30 priests who served annually “after king Alexander gave to the Makedonians Kalindoia and the villages around Kalindoia, Thamiskia, Kamakaia and Tripoatis” in 334, in other words after the king had refounded the city as a Makedonian polis with Makedonian settlers and attributed to it villages forming its territory. As is made clear by the names in the list (many of them characteristically Makedonian), the new settlers formed the elite of the “new” polis. Documents emanating from civic authorities of Makedonian cities are extremely rare in the Temenid period; their number only rose in the Hellenistic period. From Dion come two documents, a fiscal law dated to the reign of Philip II or Alexander III and a decree dated before the end of the century (Hatzopoulos 1996: II nos. 56-57). A poorly preserved lex sacra from Amphipolis after its conquest by the Makedonians has survived (SEG 44.505, 4th c., second half). A late 4th c. list of sales from Philippoi, probably of public nature, includes a record of parcels of land reserved for the oikist cult of Philip II by the Philippians (SEG 38.658). Finally, a dedication by the polis of Beroia under her epistates in the 2nd half of the 4th c. (EKM I 29) is a useful reminder that poleis the institutional apparel of which is only attested in detail in the late Antigonid period (as is the case with Beroia) need not have been devoid of proper civic institutions earlier. Private documents can also be historically significant. A large number of deeds of sales from several cities of the Chalkidic League and further east (Amphi­ polis, Argilos) provide an insight into civic institutions, private law and the economy both before and after the Makedonian takeover (texts in Game 2008). Funerary inscriptions, the most common epigraphic material, are valuable sources for prosopography, onomastics, and dialect, especially when studied within their precise geographical and chronological contexts. For example, the large number of funerary steles used as debris during the construction of the Great Tumulus at Aigai (EKM II 15-50, 52, 55-57, dated to the 4th and early 3rd c.) offer us rich evidence for Makedonian onomastics and dialect, at a time when almost no primary sources regarding either were available. Similarly, the study of the classical funerary inscriptions from Pella highlights the distinct cosmo286

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politan nature of the city, as attested in the Ionic influences in its onomastics, and in the presence of several foreigners, even before it became the second capital of the kingdom.   P. Paschidis Cf. Game, J., Actes de vente dans le monde grec, 2018; Hatzopoulos 1996, II; Martín González, E./Paschidis, P., The Epigraphic Harvest from Macedonia in the 21st century, AR 63 (2017), 181-200; Panayotou, A., Dialectal Inscriptions from Chalcidice, Macedonia and Amphipolis, in: Επιγραφές της Μακεδονίας. 3rd Internat. Symp. on Macedonia, 1996, 124-63.

Isokrates   see Panhellenism Kallisthenes of Olynthos Kallisthenes (BNJ 124) was the son of Demotimos of Olynthos (Suda s.v. Kalli­ sthenes κ 240 Adler= T 1), and Hero, → Aristotle’s niece (Plut. Alex. 55.5 = T 2). Despite his familial association with Aristotle, however, there is no evidence that K. was ever his student (as some sources allege: e.g. Arr. An. 4.10.1 = T 8; Val. Max. 7.2.11; cf. Just. 12.6.18 = T 9), much less that he was one of the teachers of Alexander III (T 11a and b, T 13), or even that he ever practiced philosophy of any kind (as some sources claim: Plut. Arr. 52.2 = T 7 and Arr. An. 4.13.2 = T 8). Nevertheless, like Aristotle, K. had a close connection with the → court of → Philip II and is attested to have resided there along with his great-uncle (Plut. Alex. 55.4-5 = T 2). It may have been through Philip’s commission that K. composed Hellenika narrating events in Greece between the King’s Peace of 387/6 and the outbreak of the → Third Sacred War in 357/6, for the fragments extant from this work suggest that its political stance (pro-Theban and anti-Spartan) was consistent with Philip’s foreign policy (F 15-27). K.’s willingness to propagate a pro-Makedonian version of events seems to have led to Philip’s commissioning of a second work, picking up where his Hellenika had left off (T 25), a monograph on the Third Sacred War, the conflict which offered Philip the opportunity to intervene militarily in Greece on behalf of his Thessalian allies when the Phokians seized the sanctuary of Apollon at Delphi. The sole surviving fragment from this work (F 1) indicates that its agenda was to legitimize Philip’s expansion into

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central Greece by appealing to mythological precedents. Furthermore, K. is almost certainly responsible for giving the title of “Sacred War” to a conflict that the Athenian orators had previously referred to as the “Phokian War” (cf. Aischin. 3.148), thereby emphasizing Philip’s role as the defender of Apollon against the sacrilegious Phokians. K.’s knowledge of the early history of Delphi evinced in this monograph (F 1) as well as Philip’s new influence at the sanctuary as leader of the → Delphic Amphiktyony after he brought an end to the Third Sacred War led to a new commission, the first known catalogue of victors in and organizers of the Pythian Games. Although this Pythionikai is generally attributed to Aristotle alone by the ancient tradition (F 615-17 Rose), an inscription at Delphi honours both K. and Aristotle (RO no. 80 = T 23) for their composition of the catalogue. Moreover, the reference in this inscription to the office of treasurer (tamias), which was instituted only after 337/6, suggests that it was K. who was originally commissioned to compose the catalogue but had to leave Aristotle to complete the work when he departed to accompany → Alexander III on his campaign in 334. K.’s previous readiness to align his historical narrative in accordance with Philip’s wishes and his close association with the Makedonian court made him a logical choice to serve as Alexander’s official court historio­ grapher (explicit at Just. 12.6.17 = T 9; implied at Arr. An. 4.10.1-2 = T 8 and by the reference to K. as Alexander’s “secretary” in a library catalogue from a gym­ nasion in Tauromenion = T 23 bis). Embedded in Alexander’s expedition as a member of his inner circle, K. was perfectly positioned to shape the narrative of the campaign in order to legitimize it to Alexander’s Greek subjects to ensure their continued co-operation, particularly as he advanced away from the coast of Asia Minor and farther into the heartland of the Persian Empire. It is generally agreed that Alexander personally endorsed K.’s history, which was sent back to the Greek world in installments (probably at the conclusion of every campaigning season). The Homeric resonances that can be detected in K.’s Deeds of Alexander suggest that he portrayed the campaign as a re-enactment of the Trojan War, in keeping with Philip and Alexander’s own professed panhellenic aim (→ panhellenism) of revenge for the Persian invasions of the 5th c., which the Greeks themselves interpreted as a continuation of the epic struggle between east and west. There is no evidence, however, that K. portrayed Alexander as a modern → Achilles; the parallels between Alexander and Achilles, including the special bond with his friend → Hephaistion (equated with Homer’s Patroklos), became evident only after the premature deaths of both Hephaistion 288

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and Alexander, and were embroidered by → Alexander historiographers and retrojected later into the source tradition. At first, the relations between K. and Alexander appear to have been cordial. K.’s literary construction of Alexander as an epic hero can be seen most explicitly in his account of Alexander’s visit to the oracle of → Ammon at → Siwa. Although Alexander’s journey to Siwa was part of a larger expedition intended to gain control of Kyrenaika and the lucrative caravan routes through the desert, K.’s highly influential narrative of the Siwa episode focuses on Alexan­der’s consultation of the oracle in keeping with his general tendency of mythologizing Alexander. According to K. (preserved by Strab. 17.1.43 = T 14a), the oracle proclaimed Alexander to be the son of Zeus, a divine filiation confirmed by other oracular centres at Didyma and Erythrai, as well as the divine assistance that Alexander received during his arduous march through the desert. K. also claims that Alexander’s motivation in making the pilgrimage to the oracle was to emulate his heroic ancestors, Perseus and Herakles. As there is no other evidence associating either Perseus or Herakles with Siwa, it is likely that K. invented both traditions, to serve as heroic precedents for Alexander’s own journey to the oracle, to bolster his claims to divine parentage as both Perseus and Hera­kles were sons of Zeus, and perhaps with an eye to legitimizing his future conquest of Persia (which K. claims in this passage the oracle of Apollon at Didyma foretold to Alexander while he was in Egypt), for Perseus was not only an ancestor of Herakles (the legendary founder of the Argead dynasty) but also the eponymous ancestor of the Persians. According to K. (F 31), even the sea paid homage to Alexander by making a ritual gesture of obeisance (→ proskynesis) to him as he crossed the boundaries of the Persian Empire (a passage clearly composed before K.’s notorious opposition to Alexander’s later attempt to foist this custom of Persian court ceremonial upon his Greek and Makedonian subjects). This legitimizing goal is probably why K. returns to the image of Alexander as the epic hero who was “Zeus-descended” in his narrative of the prelude to his final and decisive confrontation with Dareios at → Gaugamela (Plut. Alex. 33.1 = F 36), the last episode extant from his Deeds of Alexander. The eulogistic and propagandistic tenor of the work (for which K. is criticized by Polyb. 12.12b = T 20) is not surprising, in light of K.’s mandate from Alexander of spinning the expedition at first as a panhellenic mission of revenge and later of portraying him as a legitimate Achaimenid king. In addition to this overall mandate, K. proved himself equally willing to propagate Alexander’s ongoing specific propaganda needs that evolved as

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the campaign progressed. Perhaps the most obvious of these is his blackening of the reputation of → Parmenion, presumably to justify Alexander’s subsequent elimination of his most senior commander, which can be seen in K.’s criticism of Parmenion’s slowness and ineptness at Gaugamela (which he attributes either to old age or to envy of Alexander’s power), due to which Dareios was able to flee from the battlefield (Plut. Alex. 33.6-7 = F 37); K. may also be responsible for the ubiquitous topos in the Alexander historiographers where Parmenion offers Alexander advice (usually cautionary in nature), which is summarily rejected. After Alexander’s conquest of Persia, however, there was a cooling of relations between K. and Alexander, prompted (in part, at least) by K.’s vocal opposition to Alexander’s attempt to create a new style of kingship incorporating elements of Persian royal insignia and court ceremonial. Although the sources probably exaggerate the degree to which there was previous hostility between K. and Alexander (e.g., Plut. Alex. 52.4 = T 7; Arr. An. 4.14.1 = T 8) and blame K. for causing his own downfall through his tactless outspokenness and offensive behavior (e.g. Plut. Alex. 53.2-5; Arr. An. 4.12.6-7; Curt. 8.5.13), presumably as part of the exculpatory propaganda later circulated by Alexander’s inner circle (e.g., Chares of Mytilene, BNJ 125 F 14), the incident that sparked the rift with Alexander is agreed to have been K.’s virulent objections to Alexander’s attempt to introduce the Persian ceremonial custom of proskynesis to his Greek and Makedonian courtiers in early 327. K. pointedly refused to perform the ritual to Alexander at a symposion where the rest of the Makedonian elite complied (Plut. Alex. 54.2-4; Arr. An. 14.12.3-5), thus embarrassing the king. More importantly, however, K.’s brilliant opposition to Alexander’s attempt to impose proskynesis by insinuating (falsely) that this servile foreign custom was tantamount to divinization of the king was shockingly effective (Arr. An. 4.11.2-9; Curt. 8.5.14-20), forcing Alexander to abandon this initiative abruptly. Although the proskynesis incident certainly created discord between K. and Alexan­der, it is likely that the machinations of his rivals at court fanned the flames of Alexan­ der’s animosity towards K. in order to eliminate a competitor. The sources record a number of incidents involving conflict between K. and the other intellectuals in Alexander’s entourage, who resented his growing influence at court (Plut. Alex. 53.1); Plutarch (Mor. 65C-D) identifies a group of Alexander’s “flatterers” who orchestrated a campaign against K. (cf. Plut. Alex. 55.1-2; Arr. An. 4.12). Eventually, K.’s rivals colluded to implicate him in the so-called Pages’ Conspiracy against Alexander in Baktria in 327, on the grounds that he used his influ290

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ence over the → basilikoi paides to incite them to regicide. The basilikoi paides denied under torture that K. had any connection with the plot (Plut. Alex. 55.2; cf. Curt. 8.6.24), and K.’s association with the paides, particularly the ringleader of the plot Hermolaos, has been exaggerated by contemporary apologetic sources in order to exculpate Alexander. Furthermore, the pervasive assumption that K. served as the official tutor of the basilikoi paides has no basis in the ancient evi­ dence, and stems from the Roman-era sources’ construction of the figure of K. as a teacher and philosopher in order to forge a closer parallel with Nero’s elimination of Seneca, allowing them to offer implicit (and therefore safe) commentary on contemporary autocracy. In any case, K. was arrested on the grounds of involvement in the conspiracy and condemned as a traitor (Plut. Alex. 55.2-4; cf. Arr. An. 4.14.1-3; Curt. 8.6.24 and 27). The sources diverge on the circumstances of K.’s death. According to Ptolemy (Arr. An. 4.14.3 = BNJ 138 F 17; cf. Plut. Alex. 55.5), K. was tortured (cf. Curt. 8.8.21) and crucified (a form of execution normally reserved for rebels and usurpers), whereas Aristoboulos (Arr. An. 4.14.3 = BNJ 139 F 133; cf. Plut. Alex. 55.5), claims that K. was paraded around in chains with the army until he died of natural causes. A third contemporary account, that of → Chares of Mytilene (Plut. Alex. 55.5 = BNJ 125 F 15), alleges that K. was imprisoned for 7 months until he could be tried by the → Korinthian League, but died of obesity and lice while Alexander was still in India (as time went on, later sources added even more unlikely embellishments to K.’s death, usefully collated at BNJ 124 T 18). These versions are all apologetic, emphasizing the legality of K.’s condemnation and intended to absolve Alexander of responsibility for the death of his erstwhile court historiographer. Nevertheless, K.’s fate was remembered in the later tradition as one of the canonical crimes of Alexan­ der (e.g. Curt. 8.8.22; Val. Max. 9.3. ext. 1). In the Roman imperial period, the figure of K. was reshaped and embellished as an embodiment of the impossibility of philosophical parrhesia in an autocracy, and to illustrate the futility (and the danger) of intellectual resistance to a tyrant. K. is not, however, the author of the Greek Alexander Romance, a highly romanticized and sensationalistic account of Alexander’s expedition of the 3rd century AD that has been transmitted in the manuscript tradition under his name.   F. Pownall Cf. Heckel, W., Creating Alexander: The “Official” History of Kallisthenes of Olynthos, in: Faber, R.A. (ed.), Celebrity, Fame, and Infamy in the Hellenistic World, 2020, 199-216; O’Sullivan 2019; Pownall 2014; Pownall 2018; Prandi, L., Callistene, 1985.

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Karanos Karanos appeared in the 4th c. as the new founder of Argead Makedonia who united and consolidated it (Diod. 7 F 15.3). Literally the “lord over an army” or “military leader” (Xen. Hell. 1.4.3-4) of the initial conquest under Argead command, K. is earliest attested by → Theopompos (BNJ 115 F 393). As his predecessor, K. did not substitute → Perdikkas I, the Argead founding father in → Herodotos (8.137-139), but formed another part of Perdikkas’ lineage preparing his way. K. was either Perdikkas’ father (Just. 7.2.1) or great-grandfather (Diod. 7 F 15.1). K. was made a relative of the legendary Temenid tyrant Pheidon of → Argos associated with Heraklid power and the invention of Greek coinage. According to Theopompos, K. was his son. K.’s story emerges in variants. As for → Aigai’s beginnings, K. either founded the city (Diod. F 7.17: after aiding → Orestis’ ruler against Eordaia and being given half of the realm) or took and renamed it (Just. 7.1.7-11), guided by goats as foretold by the Delphic oracle. Pausanias (9.40.7-9) tells the tale that the Makedonians never set up any tropaion because after his initial victory against the ruler Kisseus, when K. did so in accordance with Argive traditions, a → lion descended from Mt. → Olympos and destroyed it. It is unclear by whose order and to which end K. was introduced into the Argead → foundation myth. He is either seen as a product of inner-­dynastic strife after → Archelaos’ death (which is less convincing) or of → Philip II’s political self-fashioning, whether to the end of outdoing his inner-­ dynastic rivals or, more plausibly, to emphasize the claim of his Heraklid descent. Accordingly, the crucial elements of the Heraklid descent, divine election, and personal arete are preserved in the myth about K. He became the predominant Argead founder figure in the literature of Roman times (Liv. 45.9.3; Just. 7.1.712; Plut. Alex. 2.1).   S. Müller Cf. Müller 2016, 100-4; Sprawski 2010, 128-9; Yardley/Heckel 1997, 83, 98.

Karanos, fictitious son of Philip II Only Trogus-Justin mentions a son of → Philip II called Karanos whom → Alexander III allegedly had murdered as a rival for the → throne after his accession in 336 (11.2.3-4). Trogus-Justin states that K.’s mother was a stepmother 292

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(noverca) of Alexander, without telling her name. Nothing else is known about K. In his list of Philip’s wives and children that is generally regarded as trustworthy, Satyros does not mention any K. among Philip’s sons (ap. Athen. 13.577B-E). In scholarship, there is speculation that K. may have been born to Philip either by Phila or his last wife Kleopatra. However, the latter suggestion is chronologically problematic. For in her short-term matrimony from 337 to their deaths in 336, Kleopatra only had time to bear a daughter (Paus. 8.7.7; Just. 9.7.12; Athen. 13.557E). Usually, K. is regarded as fictitious. Either Trogus or his source may have become confused: K. is the name of the Argead founder figure in a variant of the founding myth that became predominant in the 4th c., perhaps under Philip. Additionally, the bias of Trogus-Justin’s negative portrait of Alexander III raises further doubts about K.’s story. By using generalization and exaggeration, in the Philippic History the young Alexander is depicted as a murderous tyrant in the making: Trogus-Justin claims that after his accession, Alexander killed all of Kleopatra’s high-ranking relatives (11.5.1)—while in fact it was only → Attalos—and murdered his brothers (12.6.14-15), obviously redoubling K. This accusation is clearly untrue. According to all other evidence, Philip only had two sons, Alexander and → Arrhidaios, who accompanied and survived his half-brother. Alexander did not kill any brother. In all probability, K. never existed but is a literary phantom.   S. Müller Cf. Heckel, W., Philip, Kleopatra and Karanos, RFIC 107 (1979), 385-93; Müller 2019, 54; Yardley/Heckel 1997, 82-3.

Karia Karia, the southwestern corner of Anatolia, was a Persian satrapy governed in the 4th c. by members of the native Hekatomnid dynastic family—Hekatomnos and his sons Maussolos, Hidrieos, and Pixodaros. Maussolos and Hidrieos married their sisters, Artemisia and Ada respectively, and these performed satrapal functions after their brother-husbands’ death. During Maussolos’ rule as dynast and satrap (377-53), Halikarnassos, much enlarged and featuring great harbor facilities, newly built palace citadels, and Maussolos’ great tomb monument (whose sculptural portraits of Hekatomnid family members may have been the precedent for depictions of Argead family members in the →

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Philippeion at Olympia), became the Hekatomnid capital. Pixodaros displaced his sister Ada and took over sole rule in ca. 341. In 340, he probably dispatched ships and perhaps mercenaries to the → Hellespont in response to Artaxerxes III’s order that coastal satraps use all their resources to repel → Philip II’s attack on Perinthos. Failing at Perinthos, Philip turned to Byzantion in late 340. Chios, Kos, and Rhodos—cities whose links to the Hekatomnids suggest Pixodaros’ involvement—participated in the successful defense of Byzantion (Diod. 16.75.1-77.2). In 337, while Philip was preparing his Persian campaign at the time of Persian instability following the murder of Artaxerxes III, Pixo­ daros entered into negotiations with Philip aimed at a marriage between → Arrhidaios and Pixodaros’ daughter Ada. Learning of these, → Alexander III independently offered himself as marriage partner (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3). Nothing came of this, and Pixodaros married his daughter to a Persian official, Orontobates (Strab. 14.2.17; Arr. An. 1.23.8). Pixodaros died soon after this, and Orontobates assumed sole satrapal power in K. In 334 after the → Granikos River battle, Alexander advanced southward into K. to confront surviving Persian forces under Orontobates at Halikarnassos. Ada, Pixodaros sister, residing at Alinda in northwest K. since 341, met Alexander and offered to adopt him as her son (Plut. Alex. 22.4) in hope of regaining power in K. with his backing. Alexander accepted, recognizing her as queen and thereby awarding himself royal status in K. According to Strabon, Karian cities now declared for Alexander (Diod. 17.24.2-4; Arr. An. 1.23.8). Ada may have renamed Alinda Alexandreia in gratitude (Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀλεξάνδρεια). Meeting great resistance in his siege of Halikarnassos, Alexander moved on with his main force, naming Ada satrap and directing her along with a Makedonian commander, Ptolemy, to complete the assault on Persian citadels in Halikarnassos. Persian defenders subsequently withdrew to Kos, but in late summer 333, Persian forces under Orontobates moved into inland K. from the south, taking Kaunos and then Kallipolis and Thera before being defeated by Ptolemy and Asandros, Makedonian governor of Lydia (Arr. An. 2.5.7). Orontobates survived and was able to retake Halikarnassos late in 333, after which it served as the main Persian naval base in the → Aegean until Alexander’s advance through eastern Mediterranean territories in 332 led to the breakup of the Persian fleet (Arr. An. 2.13.4, 20.2-7; Diod. 17.24.4, 27.4). K. thus came fully into Alexander’s and Ada’s possession only in 332. After Ada died (date unknown) a Makedonian, Philoxenos, became satrap of K., but after Alexander’s death, Asandros, 294

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previously satrap of Lydia, held the Karian satrapy ([Arist.] Oik. 1351B; Arr. An. 7.23.1, 24; Diod. 18.3.4).   S. Ruzicka Cf. Ruzicka, S., Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century BC, 1992, 120-55; Ruzicka 2010; Sears, M., Alexander and Ada Reconsidered, CP 109 (2014) 211-21.

Kassandros Kassandros, son of → Antipatros, was born before 353 (Athen. 1.18A), but only after his father’s Settlement at Triparadeisos in 320 did he become one of the protagonists in the history of the Successors. In 334 K. remained in Europe with Antipatros, and was sent by his father in 324 to → Alexander III in → Babylon. He was however mistreated by the king, which caused lifelong hatred (Plut. Alex. 74): as a matter of fact, a few years after Alexander’s death, K. (with his father and his brother Iolaos) was accused of poisoning the king by the circle around → Olympias, Alexander’s mother. K. returned to Makedonia with Antipatros after the Triparadeisos Settlement. In 319, after his father’s death, he had to flee and took part in the Second Diadoch War. In 316 he returned to Makedonia as a winner and married Thessalonike, Philip II’s daughter: thanks to this marriage, K. considered himself a member of the Argead dynasty. K. took part in the Third Diadoch War as an ally of → Lysimachos, → Ptolemy, and → Seleukos, against → Antigonos and his son → Demetrios. In 311, at the end of this war, K. was finally in control of Makedonia and issued the order to murder the young → Alexander IV, last legitimate descendant of Alexander III (Diod. 19.105.2-4). K. then proceeded to introduce himself as the heir of the Argeads and in 306 assumed the title of “king” (→ basileus), like Ptolemy, Seleukos, and Lysimachos, thus imitating Antigonos and Demetrios the previous year. In alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukos, and Lysimachos, in spring 301, K. defeated Antigonos and Demetrios in the battle of Ipsos. K. died in 297, perhaps of consumption, and was succeeded by his son Philip (Just. 15.4.24; Plut. Demetr. 36.1).   F. Landucci Gattinoni Cf. Heckel 2006, 79-81; Heckel 2016, 33-43; Landucci Gattinoni 2003; Landucci Gattinoni, F., Cassander and the Argeads, in: Müller et al. 2017, 269-79.

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kausia From → Thessaly and → Makedonia to → Thrace, the older petasos is a man’s hat, worn to keep off the sun, also used in the Makedonian cavalry. Slightly bent in its middle, it has a broad brim round a raised centre. The younger kausia is a beret-like man’s hat with a central tassel on top. Argead coins display Makedonian riders with the p. from → Alexander I through → Amyntas III (pl. 2.1-3), with the k. in the early tetradrachm series of → Philip II. Already in Achaimenid inscriptions the Makedonians are labeled as ‘shield-bearing Greeks’ (Yaunā taka­ barā, e.g., DNa 29 = Kent 1953, 137, debated), evidently after the p. on their heads which from some distance resembled a round military shield (pelta) with its boss. During → Alexander III’s conquest of the east, the younger k. became indicative of the Makedonians. Soon after the death of Dareios III, Alexander attached to his k. a → diadema, a textile band indicating the status of a king’s syngenes (‘relative’, as a court title). By doing so, he adopted the practice of high Persian officials who wore the diadema round their ‘national’ headgear, the tiara. By fastening a diadema to his Makedonian k. he signalled that he entered into their circle and would respect their privileged status—indeed they had become indispensable for the empire’s administration. But the k. diadematophoros was not yet a royal crown, since Alexander himself seems not to have adopted the title → basileus. Only then did his composite hat become royal in character. On coins of → Philip III it appears as the distinctive mark of a series (Le Rider 1977, pl. 44.29-35), understood easily as a royal crown.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2017, 81-94; Kent 1953, 185; Olbrycht 2010, 343-4; Prestianni Giallombardo, A.M., Un copricapo del equipagiamento militare macedonico: la kausia, NAC 22 (1993), 61-90, esp. 87-9, with pl. 1-3; Schmitt, R., Wörterbuch der altpersischen Königs­ inschriften, 2014, 250.

Kleitarchos Kleitarchos of Alexandreia (BNJ 137), son of D(e)inon (Plin. NH 10.136 = BNJ 137 T 2), wrote a history of Persia. K., a well known Greek writer (celebratus auctor, so Pliny), composed a history of → Alexander III in at least 12 volumes as we know from the various citations by other ancient authors; there are some 296

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37 attributed fragments of his work. We do not know how K. composed his history and whether he was able to talk to → veterans of Alexander’s campaigns, or whether he relied on earlier histories already in circulation. These questions depend on when he wrote his own account, which is likewise unknown and controversial. Most scholars favour a date in the late 4th c.; Pliny (NH 3.57-58) placed him after → Theopompos and before Theophrastos which suggests he was writing around 312-10, and under the regime of → Ptolemy I Soter. But a papyrus fragment (P.Oxy. LXXI 4808) mentions K. among several Hellenistic historians including → Onesikritos, → Chares, Hieronymos of Kardia and Polybios. The papyrus confirms K.’s association with → Alexandreia and the Ptolemaic court, describing him as an archivist and tutor of Ptolemy Soter’s great grandson, Ptolemy IV Philopator (born ca. 244), which means that K. was likely to have been active in the 2nd half of the 3rd c. He would also have had access to the best library collection of his day. However, as the lines concerning K. are incomplete in the text of the papyrus, both its information and its accuracy are uncertain. There is also some evidence—which admittedly is not conclusive—that K. wrote before Ptolemy Soter had published his own memoir of Alexander. K. erroneously claimed that Ptolemy was at the fortress of the → Malloi in → India where Alexander sustained a near fatal wound in 326 whereas Ptolemy explicitly stated that he was not there (Curt. 9.5.21; cf. Arr. An. 6.11.8). Elsewhere, K.’s promotion of the Athenian courtesan Thaïs’ role in the burning of the royal palace of → Persepolis (BNJ 137 F 11; cf. Plut. Alex. 38.3-5; Curt. 5.7.3-5; Diod. 17.72), suggests a time contemporaneous with Ptolemy’s clash with → Kassandros over mastery of the Greek poleis (ca. 309/8) when it could well have been politically advantageous for K. to promote → panhellenism. Regardless of when K. wrote, it is unlikely that he took part in Alexander’s campaigns (but cf. Diod. 2.7.3). The nature of K.’s work is difficult to discern; moreover, even when extant ancient writers apparently cite a lost writer directly, we often cannot prove first hand consultation. K.’s popularity among the literati in the Roman world is well attested, although opinion of his worth is mixed. Cicero seems to have held a poor view of K.; he is critical of L. Cornelius Sisenna for using K. as his only Greek source (BNJ 137 T 13). Cicero also deplores K.’s theatricality (BNJ 137 F 34). Quintilian (BNJ 137 T 6) claimed that although K.’s stylistic talent was admired, his accuracy was doubted. K. was also cited by Strabon, Plutarch, Athenaios, Ailianos, Diogenes Laertios, and many other ancient writers including scholiasts. Many of the

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attested direct references to K.’s work contain ethnographical, botanical, geographical, and zoological information, much of it relating to → Babylon and India, and often colourful, if not sensational. But most importantly K. seems to have been the main source for Diodoros’ Book 17, Quintus Curtius Rufus, Justin 11-12, and the Metz Epitome, the so-called Alexander “Vulgate”. The accounts of Curtius and Diodoros are particularly close, sometimes running parallel both in content and sequence. Curtius refers to K. twice (9.5.21, 8.5); although Diodoros does not name K. as an authority for Book 17 on Alexander, he cited K. on the length of Semiramis’ wall around Babylon (BNJ 137 T 5). K.’s tradition often seems to have provided additional and/or different information from Ptolemy and → Aristoboulos (the so-called “court tradition”), who were used as main sources by Arrian (An. 1.1), and to a lesser extent by Plutarch. For example, in the aftermath of the siege of → Tyre (332) Curtius (4.4.17) and Diodoros (17.46.4; cf. Just. 18.3.17) claim that Alexander crucified 2000 male survivors; this detail is omitted by Arrian, and although the casualty figures vary between the sources, Curtius’ combined total of those killed in the battle and those executed afterwards is the same as Arrian’s (8000: An. 2.24.4). Although K. is not named, he is likely to have been the source for the story. There is some evidence that K. seems to have shown interest in individuals who were personally close to Alexander. The visit of the Amazon queen Thalestris in 330 to Alexander in order to conceive a child by him is directly attributed to K. along with Onesikritos and others (BNJ 137 F 15; cf. F 16 = Strab. 11.5.4; Curt. 6.5.23-25: Diod. 17.77.1-3, Just. 12.3.5-7). Although Thalestris almost certainly is a fabrication, other powerful court figures who were also intimate with Alexander like his closest friend, → Hephaistion, and the Persian eunuch Bagoas clearly were not. Most of our information about these men comes from the “Vulgate” sources. K. also most likely offered more detail on politically complex and darker episodes in Alexander’s reign such as the execution of the commander of the Companion Cavalry, → Philotas and his powerful father, → Parmenion, in 330—an incident which Arrian dismisses with a single chapter (An. 3.26), whereas Curtius (6.7-14; 7.1-2), Diodoros (17.79-81) and Plutarch (Alex. 48-49) devote more attention to it. Arrian probably did not use K.; for example, he cites Aristos and Asklepiades for the logos that a Roman embassy visited Alexander in 323 (An. 7.15.5) even though K. also recorded the story (BNJ 137 F 31). However, given Arrian’s own extensive research and erudition, it seems unlikely that he did not know of 298

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K.’s work. K.’s importance to → Alexander historiographers should be without dispute; yet, despite tantalizing flashes of an author whose original work may have offered a more balanced and nuanced portrayal of Alexander, K. remains elusive.   E.J. Baynham Cf. Müller 2018; Parker, V., Source Critical Reflections on Cleitarchus’ Work, in: Wheatley, P. et al. (eds.), Alexander and his Successors, 2009, 28-55; Pearson 1960, 212-42; Prandi, L., New Evidence for the Dating of Cleitarchus (POxy LXXI.4808), Histos 6 (2012) 15-26; Zambrini 2011.

Kleitos the Black Kleitos “the Black” (Diod. 17.20.7, 57.1: ὁ μέλας, to distinguish him from Kleitos the White), son of Dropidas, was a general under Philip II and → Alexander III. The honourable selection of his sister (Hel)Lanike as Alexander III’s nurse hints at the influence of K.’s family (Arr. An. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.1.21, 2.8-9). K.’s nephew Proteas was likely the admiral involved in fighting the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean (334-32) (Arr. An. 2.2.4-5, 20.2). In the Persian campaign, K. is said to have saved Alexander’s life at → Granikos (334) (Plut. Alex. 16.5; Diod. 17.20.7; Arr. An. 1.15.8). K. seems to have stand by Alexander when → Parmenion and → Philotas were eliminated in 330: he profited by being chosen to share Philotas’ former command of the → hetairoi with → Hephaistion (Arr. An. 3.27.4). In 328, after the → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt, K. was appointed satrap there (Curt. 8.1.19), a difficult task in a still unruly area. Perhaps affected by the recent struggles and reportedly incensed by Alexander’s new, elevated position that excluded the rise of officials like K. to Parmenion’s or Philotas’ former degree of influence, K.’s loyalty seems to have faded. K. died in Marakanda in 328. According to the sources, he was killed by Alexander with a spear in a drunken rage after an equally drunken K. had publicly criticized his new regal style at a degenerated → symposion (Arr. An. 4.8.1-9.1; Curt. 8.1.30-52; Plut. Alex. 50-51). Allegedly, Alexander made the → army assembly ratify K.’s murder afterwards by emotional blackmail (Curt. 8.2.10-12). Some authors blame K. for his impudence, others Alexander for his savagery. PTSD on both sides is only one scholarly guess regarding the background of K.’s death. Perhaps he was eliminated secretly and this story spread afterwards among his troops. Due to

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the layers of reworking, artifice, and bias in our sources, we cannot know what really happened.   S. Müller Cf. Carney 2015, 141-54; Heckel 2008, 100-4; Heckel 2016, 60-6; Tritle, L.A., Alexander and the Killing of Cleitus the Black, in: Heckel, W./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), Crossroads of History, 2003, 127-46.

Kleomenes of Naukratis When in 332/1, → Egypt was conquered under → Alexander III, Kleomenes from Greek Naukratis was appointed governor of Egypt’s Arabian district around Pi­ thom east of the Delta (Arr. An. 3.5.4) with instructions to collect taxes in Egypt and Libya (Curt. 4.8.5) and, supposedly, also from the Red Sea trade. Nothing is known about his previous life. K.’s association with → Alexandreia’s foundation (Just. 12.4.11) is doubtful. The claim that under Alexander, K. became Egypt’s → satrap ([Arist.] Oik. 1352A; Paus. 1.6.3), either by appointment or by self-proclamation, is debated. Reportedly, K. accumulated revenues by blackmailing Egyptian priests and by grain speculation ([Arist.] Oik. 1352A-B; [Dem.] 56.7). Only Arrian reports that in a letter Alexander promised K. to overlook his past and future crimes, provided that he established → Hephaistion’s posthumous heroic cult in Egypt (An. 7.23.6-7). The letter’s authenticity is debated. Arrian accepts it at face value for it treats a theme important to him, the commemoration of Hephaistion, whom he associates with Patroklos while probably hinting at Antinoos. In 323, K. was assigned at → Babylon as hyparchos to Egypt’s new satrap → Ptolemy (Arr. Succ. F 1.5) who reportedly found the huge sum of 8000 talents in the treasury (Diod. 18.14.1). K. carried on his financial task but soon after Ptolemy had him killed, suspecting him to be → Perdikkas’ agent (Paus. 1.6.3). Arrian’s characterization of K. as a villain (An. 7.23.6: kakos aner) is thought to mirror Egyptian complaints about high taxes or reflect Ptolemy’s blackening of K.’s reputation to justify his elimination. In his job, K. seems to have been effective.   S. Müller Cf. Baynham, E.J., Cleomenes of Naucratis, in: Howe, T. et al. (eds.), Greece, Macedon and Persia, 2015, 127-34; Burstein, S.M., Alexander’s Organisation of Egypt, in: Howe, T./Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2008, 183-94; Collins, A., Cleomenes of Naucratis, ZPE 180 (2012), 237-42.

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Kleopatra, daughter of Philip II

Kleopatra, daughter of Philip II Kleopatra (ca. 354-08), daughter of → Philip II and → Olympias and the only full sister of → Alexander III, played an important public role during her brother’s reign and, after his death, she had the potential, via marriage to one of the Successors, to combine the Argead dynasty with one of the newly developing ones, but this eventuality never came to pass. In 336 she married her maternal uncle, Alexander of Molossia, a marriage meant to publicize Philip’s wealth and power as well as the end of the quarrel between him, Alexander and his mother; instead it furnished the opportunity for Philip’s assassination (Diod. 16.91.4-6; Just. 9.6.1-2). K. had two children, Kadmeia and Neoptolemos (Plut. Pyrrh. 5.5) by Alexander of Molossia. He departed for an Italian campaign in 334, but died on campaign in 331 (Liv. 8.24.5-13) and K. was left a young widow. She remained in Molossia until about 324. The Athenians sent her an embassy conveying condolences (Aischin. 3.242). K. received religious ambassadors (SEG 23.198, l. 11), sold grain to Korinthos (Lyk. 1.26), and was given (or bought) grain from Kyrene in a time of shortage, probably for the sake of Molossia (SEG 9.2). Her grain activities, like those of her mother (who also received grain from Kyrene), probably had a political context, possibly one related to Alexander’s policies. Dionysios, tyrant of Herakleia (a city on the Black Sea), having irritated Alexander, believed, apparently correctly, that K. could intercede successfully with her brother on his behalf (Memnon, BNJ 434 F 4.37), confirming that she was able to play the role of intercessor with the king. Alexander sent her, as well as his mother, plunder from his campaigns (Plut. Alex. 25.4). Although no ancient source says so, K. seems to have functioned as guardian and regent for her son. Olympias, having quarreled with Antipatros, returned to Molossia and may have shared the regency with K. Plutarch (Alex. 68.3) asserts that ca. 324 upheaval and desire for change was everywhere present and that Olympias and K. formed a faction against Antipatros, and that Olympias took control of Molossia whereas K. took Makedonia. Diodoros (20.37.4-6) asserted that, after the death of Alexander, Kassandros, Lysimachos, Antigonos, and Ptolemy, but really all the Successors, wanted to marry K. because of the distinction of her family. Each, he said, hoping that the Makedonians would follow the lead of this marriage, was reaching out to the Argead house in order to encompass rule of the whole realm. Evidence exists for three specific projected marriages: to → Leonnatos (Plut. Eum. 3.5), to → Perdikkas (Arr. Succ. F 1.21; Just. 13.6.4), and to → Ptolemy (Diod. 20.37.3-6).

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K. or her mother initiated some of these proposed marriages, often in competition with a rival bride from the house of → Antipatros. K. left Makedonia for Sardeis ca. 322 to marry Perdikkas, but stayed on there, eventually under a kind of house arrest controlled by Antigonos, who had her murdered ca. 308 to prevent her marriage to Ptolemy. Some of these marriage plans failed by chance, but after the death of Perdikkas, the Successors seemed more concerned to prevent others from marrying her than to do so themselves.   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney 2000, 75-6, 89-90; Meeus, A., Kleopatra and the Diadochoi, in: van Nuffelen, P. (ed.), Faces of Hellenism, 2009, 63-92; Meyer, E.A., The Inscriptions of Dodona and a New History of Molossia, 2013, 120-4; Müller 2013, 35-7; Whitehorne, J., Cleopatras, 1994, 57-69.

kolakeia, kolakes Even as his campaign progressed farther into the heartland of the Achaimenid Empire, Alexander III continued the practice of his Argead predecessors of commissioning prominent Greek intellectuals and literary figures to shape Makedonian high culture and to contribute to the continuous remodeling of his royal image. For the Greek intelligentsia in Alexander’s entourage, the potential benefits of royal → patronage included not only financial support (along with the often-­ lavish gifts that Alexander bestowed upon those who gained his favour), but perhaps more importantly the opportunity to enhance their personal prestige and gain advancement at court. Like for his father Philip II before him, Alexander’s main concern at his royal symposia was to cement the loyalty of his courtiers, and one way in which this could be achieved was to foster an atmosphere of intense rivalry among the intellectuals and literary figures competing for his approval. The acrimonious relationship between the intellectuals at Philip’s court (as attested by, e.g., the letter of Speusippos; cf. Theopomp., BNJ 115 T 7 and Antipatros of Magnesia, BNJ 69 T 1) grew more acute after Alexander’s conquest of Persia as his rule began to shade into autocracy; the stakes of gaining or losing his favour therefore were correspondingly higher (as is perhaps illustrated most vividly by the fate of → Kleitos). Flattery (kolakeia) was a particularly effective tool to achieve personal advancement on two levels. On the one hand, it offered the ability to ingratiate oneself with the ruler. On the other hand, by dismissing 302

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one’s rivals as “flatterers” (kolakes), one could simultaneously undermine the standing of one’s competitors as insincere sycophants and legitimize one’s own position as the “true friend” of the king. Plutarch’s narrative of the well-attested rivalry between → Kallisthenes and Anaxarchos in comforting Alexander after the murder of Kleitos can be read through the lens of this topos, wherein Ana­ xarchos successfully supplanted Kallisthenes in Alexander’s favour through his frank speech exposing the soothing words of his rival as flattery (Plut. Alex. 52.2-4; cf. Just. 12.6.17; Arr. An. 4.9.7-8; Plut. Mor. 781A-B). The artificiality of this construct is demonstrated by Plutarch’s narrative elsewhere of Alexander’s super-flatterers orchestrating a smear campaign against Kallisthenes based upon his frankness (parrhesia is the polar opposite of k.) that ultimately resulted in his rift with Alexander and condemnation (Plut. Mor. 69C-D; cf. Plut. Alex. 55.1-2; Arr. An. 4.12). Thus, the ubiquitous topos of flattery obscures the pervasive behind-the-scene machinations to eliminate real or potential competitors in the cut-throat atmosphere of Alexander’s court. Furthermore, the issue is clouded by contemporary responses to autocracy in our Roman-era sources, for whom it was a truism that flattery exercised a deleterious effect on monarchy. Interestingly, Arrian (An. 4.8.3 and 29.1) employs this truism in order to excuse Alexander for his autocratic excesses with the claim that he was corrupted by his flatterers, whereas for the Roman Curtius (8.5.6-7) the blame for “pernicious flattery, the perpetual evil of kings” (perniciosa adulatio, perpetuum malum regum) is laid squarely at the feet of Alexander’s Greek intelligentsia.   F. Pownall Cf. Asirvatham, S., Flattery, History, and the Πεπαιδευμένος, in: Howe, T. et al. (eds.), Ancient Historiography on War & Empire, 2017, 262-74; O’Sullivan 2019; Pownall, F., Sophists and Flatterers: Greek Intellectuals at Alexander’s Court, in: D’Agostini et al. 2021 (forthcoming); Roisman, J., Honor in Alexander’s Campaign, in: Roisman 2003, 279-321.

Korinthian League In 481 at Korinthos, the Greeks organized a Hellenic confederation directed against the Persians (Hdt. 7.145). For the Argeads, Korinthos became a “symbolic city” in 337, when, after his victory at → Chaironea, → Philip II founded a new Hellenic confederation which proclaimed common peace (koine eirene) and autonomy for all of the Greek poleis. The K. L., constituted of autonomous Greek poleis (without

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→ Sparta), had a common council (koinon synedrion) at Korinthos, attended by representatives of all of the members. The supreme command (hegemonia) of the war against the Persians was conferred upon Philip as strategos autokrator (Diod. 16.89, 91.2; Arr. An. 1.1.2; Polyb. 9.33; IG II2 236; RO no. 76). Appropriating the ideological theme used by Athens in the 5th and 4th c., Philip proposed to lead a crusade against the Persians to punish them for offences to Greece during Xerxes’ invasion and to wage war in the name of Greek freedom (Diod. 16.89.2, 91.2; Polyb. 3.6.13). After Philip’s death in 336, → Alexander III renewed the pact with the Greeks and was confirmed as the hegemon and strategos autokrator of the war against the Persians. Based on this position, Alexander secured Makedonian control over Greece and started the expedition against Persia. Adopting his father’s slogan, he styled himself as the protagonist of a fight for Hellenic freedom and the avenger of Persian injustices (Diod. 17.2.2, 4.2, 4.9, 24.1; Arr. An. 1.1.1-3; Plut. Alex. 14.1; Just. 11.2.5, 5.6; but also IG II2 329; [Dem.] 17). In 302, during the Isthmia at Korinthos, → Demetrios Poliorketes proclaimed the re-foundation of the K. L.—only theoretically a continuation of the Hellenic League under Philip and Alexander. There existed a council of representatives of all of its members including → Antigonos, Demetrios, and their descendants. The League was based on a common peace and alliance (ISE no. 44.1 (B); STV III 446). According to Plutarch (Demetr. 25.3), at Korinthos, the Greeks elected Demetrios the leader (hegemon) of Greece. In the context of the continuous wars between the Diadochs, the re-foundation was merely a propagandistic act intended to style Demetrios and his father Antigonos as legitimate heirs of Philip and Alexander.   G. Squillace Cf. Perlman, S., Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon, Historia 34 (1985), 153-74; Poddighe, E., Alexander and the Greeks, in: Heckel/Tritle 2009, 99-120; Squillace, G., Βασιλεῖς ἢ τύραννοι. Filippo II e Alessandro Magno tra opposizione e consenso, 2004, 60-71; Squillace 2009, 70-72; Squillace, G., Consensus Strategies under Philip and Alexander: The Revenge Theme, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 69-80, esp. 76-80.

Krateros Krateros, son of Alexander, from → Orestis (Arr. Ind. 18.5), made a military career under → Alexander III. At → Granikos, → Issos, and → Gaugamela, subordinate to → Parmenion, he was an infantry commander on the left wing 304

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(Arr. An. 1.14.3; 2.8.4; 3.11.9; Curt. 3.9.8; 4.13.29). At Tyre (332), he participated in the naval assault. His first independent command was the pursuit of the Ouxians (331). Often entrusted with matters of security, K. was in charge of the camp during the attack of the Persian Gates and helped Parmenion to secure the treasures in → Persepolis. Curtius claims that, being jealous of → Philotas’ influence, K. was a driving force behind his (and Parmenion’s) fall in 330 (6.8.2-10, 17; cf. Plut. Alex. 48.5). This biased image of K. as a devious schemer even supervising Philotas’ humiliating torture (strangely after the trial: Curt. 6.11.10-19), has to be viewed critically: it is a literary device stressing Alexander’s transformation into an ‘eastern’ tyrant who trusts in sycophants and kills his deserving men. K. profited from the change in the personnel structure, but so did others. As one of the leading generals in the → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt, K. besieged Kyroupolis and campaigned against the Massagetai (Arr. An. 4.2.2-4, 3.3, 17.1-2; Curt. 7.6.19). He quenched Sogdian unrest and participated in the Indian campaign. At the river → Hydaspes (326), he held the enemy’s attention while other troops crossed and won the battle (Arr. An. 5.11.3-12.1, 18.1). Anecdotes that K.’s rivalry with → Hephaistion for the favour of Alexander (who reportedly called Hephaistion philalexandros and K. philobasileus: fond of his royalty, a chancer), climaxed in a non-professional attack upon each other in → India (Plut. Alex. 47.5-7), are dubious. Their separation when they led their troops back on the opposite banks of the Indos (Arr. An. 6.2.2, 4.1; Diod. 17.96.1) likely served practical and logistic matters. K. garrisoned the ruler Mousikanos’ capital (Arr. An. 6.15.7) and marched through Arachosia and Drangiana. In 324, at Sousa, he married Dareios III’s niece Amastris whom he divorced in 323 (Arr. An. 7.4.5; Memnon, BNJ 434 F 1.4.4). At Opis, K. was ordered to take some 10.000 Makedonian → veterans home, replace → Antipatros as a strategos of Europe and send him with reinforcements to → Babylon (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.4.1; Arr. An. 7.12.3-4). K. was ill (Arr. An. 7.12.4) and may have wished to go home. After Alexander’s death, K. remained in Kilikia, apparently awaiting the political development. Controlling the veterans, he was a powerful person. The generals in Babylon designated him prostates of → Arrhidaios (Arr. Succ. F 1.3; Dexipp., BNJ 100 F 8.4: κηδεμονία). When Antipatros asked for K.’s help in the Lamian War, K. deferred to him with his army. After their victory, Antipatros cemented their bond by marrying his daughter Phila to K. (Diod. 18.12.1, 16.4-5, 17.7, 18.7). A (lost) monumental bronze group at Delphi showed K. coming to the aid of Alexander in a → lion hunt (Plut. Alex. 40.5; ISE II no. 73), stressing their closeness and K.’s valor in

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hunting a royal animal. K. commissioned it, perhaps in 321/0, but the date of the completion and dedication is uncertain. When → Antigonos joined K. and Antipatros in Aitolia with warnings against → Perdikkas’ ambitions, they both went to Asia Minor to fight Perdikkas on whose behalf → Eumenes coordinated the defense. In 321/0, K. died in the ensuing battle (Diod. 18.29.6, 37.1). Claims that K. gave himself royal airs and was luxurious (Ail. VH 9.3; Suda s.v. Krateros κ 2335 Adler; Demetr. Eloc. 289; Athen. 13.539C) are likely slanders. K. seems to have been a straightforward, deserving general.   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 2002, 6-13, 31-4, 51-3, 58-63, 84-6; Dunn, C./Wheatley, P., Craterus and the Dedication Date of the Delphi Lion Monument, AHB 26 (2012), 39-48; Heckel 2016, 122-52; Palagia 2000, 183-5, 203-6.

Kypros During the archaic and classical periods Makedonia and Kypros were governed by kings. Despite the affinities of their monarchical institutions, their engagement in the military and political affairs of the Greek world, as well as their activity in the panhellenic sanctuaries, there is no indirect or direct evidence of any kind of political or cultural interactions and exchanges between the Argeads and the Kypriot kings before the incorporation of K. in the kingdom of Alexander III (332). The local kings, who from ca. 525 were vassal rulers of the Great King, voluntarily surrendered to Alexander after Issos and their naval forces played a crucial role in the capture of Tyre (Arr. An. 2.20.3, 24.1-2). Under Alexander’s authority, the Kypriot kingdoms preserved their independence as sovereign states. However, the unusual privileges granted by the most prominent of the Argeads to the king of Salamis, Pnytagoras (Arr. An. 2.20.6; Athen. 4.167C), indicate his intervention in the internal affairs of the local cities. Furthermore, Alexander probably acknowledged the fact that the Teukrides, the Salaminian royal house, were related to the Argeads through a prestigious ancestral line; they were both Aiakides, descendants of the divine Aiakos, son of Zeus. Following Alexander’s return from Egypt to Phoinikia, Kypriot kings served as choregoi for the dramatic competitions organized at Gaza (Plut. Alex. 29.1-2), while the powerful Kypriot fleet participated in naval operations in the → Aegean (Arr. An. 3.6.3). Princes from Salamis and Soloi followed Alexander in his expeditions to Asia 306

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Kyros II, as a reference

and two of them were amongst the 30 trierarchs who led the Makedonian → fleet during the exploration of the Indos (Arr. Ind. 18.8). Skillful seafarers, Kypriots equipped Alexander’s naval forces (Arr. Ind. 18.1) and nautical engineers and technicians were involved in his immense shipbuilding program at Thapsakos (Strab. 16.1.11; Curt. 10.1.19). Quite exceptional was the career of Stasanor from Soloi. He became a companion of Alexander and in 327 was appointed → satrap of Areia-Drangiana (Arr. An. 4.18.1) while another Kypriot, Stasandros, replaced Stasanor when the latter was entrusted with the command of the satrapies of Baktria and Sogdiana during the settlement of Triparadeisos (Diod. 18.39.6). After Alexander’s death, K. became the apple of discord amongst the Successors. It is noteworthy that no mention is made of the island during the first agreement of the Successors in Babylon or during the settlement of Triparadeisos. It is probable that Kypriot cities preserved their ‘autonomy.’ However, the Successors immediately acknowledged the great advantages of controlling K. as a valuable base from which they could dominate the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the Kypriot kingdoms were actively involved in the fierce struggles between → Perdikkas, → Ptolemy, and → Antigonos (321/0). The important military operations in and around K. during the years 316-13 had irreversible consequences for the local kings. Ptolemy eliminated those who sided with Antigonos (ca. 313) and placed the island under the control of Nikokreon, king of Salamis (Diod. 19.79.5). After the latter’s death (311/0), the royal house of the Teukrides ceased to exist and the local cities were governed by the central Makedonian authority. The proclamation of the Successors as basileis coincides not only roughly with the end of the Argeads, but also with the abolition of Kypriot kingship and the island’s incorporation into Ptolemy’s kingdom.   P. Christodoulou Cf. Christodoulou, P., Nicokréon, le dernier roi de Salamine de Chypre: discours idéologique et pouvoir politique, CCEC 39 (2009), 235-58.

Kyros II, as a reference Like the mythic Babylonian queen Semiramis, the Persian king Kyros II (ca. 559-30) is one of the great conquerors in the ancient Near East, praised as a just ruler in the Babylonian K.-Cylinder and the OT books Esra and Isaiah (esp. 45.1-6). Also in Greek sources such as Aischylos (Pe. 768-772) and

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→ Herodotos (1.75-90, 108-130) his image is positive, and in the mid 4th c., Xeno­phon in the → Kyroupaideia styles him as an ideal ruler. In the memoirs of → Alexander III’s companions he is a positive reference for Alexander, just as Xerxes is a negative. Thus in 330, Alexander burns Xerxes’ buildings at → Persepolis, avenging the Greeks of 480, but in 324 he restores K.’s pillaged tomb at Pasargadai (Strab. 15.3.7-8; Arr. An. 6.29.4-11; but cf. Curt. 10.1.31 and Plut. Alex. 69.3-5). Wordings of its epitaph are invented by the → Alexander historiographers, though an inscription as such may be real, probably on the lintel of the (not preserved) gate leading into the tomb’s garden; further short texts referring to K. have survived. They were however added only by Dareios I (522/1-486), for dynastic reasons: K., in his cylinder from Babylon, introduces himself as a Teispid (Schaudig 2018, 557-61, § 21) whereas at Pasargadai he is called an Achaimenid, thus entering Dareios’ own family branch. Another short text of such a kind, now lost, may have given occasion for the versions reported by → Aristoboulos (BNJ 139 F 51a/b = Arr. An. 6.29.8; Strab. 15.3.7) and → Onesikritos (BNJ 134 F 34 = Strab. 15.3.7), and mentioned by Aristos (FGrH 143 F 1 = Strab. 15.3.8). The introduction of K. as ‘founder of the Persian Empire’ and ‘king of Asia’ reflects contemporary Greek concepts. But it is improbable that Alexander who apparently refrained from the royal title initiated the Greek versions of the inscription as a reference to himself. K. occurs on further occasions: proceeding to Baktria in 330, Alexander touched a people originally called Ari(m)aspai, subsequently by K. Euergetai (‘Benefactors’) because they had saved his army from starvation. Learning this, Alexander allegedly honoured them (Arr. An. 3.27.4-5; Diod. 17.81.1-2; Curt. 7.3.1-3) thus presenting himself as committed to K.’s policy. In 329, he destroyed the Sogdian town of Kyroupolis, regarded as K.’s foundation (Arr. An. 4.3.1) in the NE periphery of his empire; at first, admiration for K. had allegedly prompted him to spare it (Curt. 7.6.2021; Strab. 11.11.4). In the same region, on the Jaxartes (Amu Darya: see Seibert 1985, map 15), he established Alexandreia Eschate (‘at the limits’) replacing K.’s name by his own. Pliny (NH 6.49) reports that altars had been erected nearby as records of farthest advance by Dionysos and Herakles, Semiramis, and K., then Alexander. So, beyond admiration, emulation of gods and conquerors appears as a motif. When Alexander in 325 returned from the Indos to Persis through the → Gedrosian Desert, according to → Nearchos he tried to surpass Semiramis and K. who allegedly had achieved this passage but lost their armies (BNJ 133 F 3a/b = Arr. An. 6.24.3; Strab. 15.1.5; Arrian’s fundamental doubts: Ind. 9.10; 5.7). 308

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But K.’s image was not altogether unblemished in Greek eyes: When Alexander, after Dareios III’s death in 330, increasingly adopted the part of the Persian souvereign and in 327 demanded from the Makedonians the → proskynesis, Kallisthenes—differing from → Chares’ version—allegedly reproached him for following K. who had introduced “such humilation” (Arr. An. 4.11.9, cf. Curt. 8.5.12-20).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 1987; Kuhrt, A., Der ‘gute’ und der ‘schlechte’ König—Kyros und Dareios, in: Binder, C. et al. (eds.), Diwan. FS J. Wiesehöfer, 2016, 127-32; Schaudig, H., The Text of the Cyrus Cylinder, in: Shayegan, M.R. (ed.), Cyrus the Great, 2018, 16-25.

Kyroupaideia It is often assumed by ancient and modern scholars alike that Xenophon must have exercised a significant impact on → Alexander III. Two works are singled out in particular: the Anabasis as a manual of how to invade Persia, and perhaps more importantly the Kyroupaideia, a romanticized account of the education of → Kyros II (a “Mirror of Princes”), as a model of how to command armies and successfully acquire and maintain control over a large multi-ethnic empire. In fact, the 4th c. sophist Eunapios of Sardeis even went so far as to claim (VS 1.453): “Alexander the Great would not have become great, if there had been no Xenophon.” But there is no evidence that Alexander ever read Xenophon, let alone that Xenophon had any influence either on his campaign or on his transformation of the ideology of Makedonian kingship. That said, the K. undoubtedly exerted a considerable impact on the → Alexander historiographers as a literary model for Alexander, particularly in hindsight, and they reworked and elaborated the parallels between the idealized Kyros of Xenophon’s K. and their own idealizing portrayals of Alexander. In addition to generalized parallels between Kyros and Alexander as models of ideal commanders and wise rulers, specific echoes from the K. can be detected even in Alexander’s earliest historiographers, who participated in his expedition. For example, the topos of Alexander’s sexual restraint and clemency towards the female relatives of a conquered enemy appears in the eyewitness accounts of → Ptolemy (BNJ 139 F 7) and → Aristoboulos (BNJ 138 F 2, F 10), and may ultimately go back to → Kallisthenes. Arrian (An. 2.12.3-5) states that his main sources (Ptolemy

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and Aristoboulos) reported that after → Issos, Alexander heard the lamenting of Dareios’ family and sent → Leonnatos to assure them that Dareios was alive and that they would be treated with due honour and respect (cf. Plut. Alex. 21.1-4). The similarity between this topos in the Alexander historiographers and Xenophon’s narrative of Kyros’ chaste treatment of Pantheia in the K. (esp. 4.6.11; 5.1.1-17) is striking, and was remarked upon even in antiquity (Plut. Mor. 1093C). It was probably in order to strengthen this parallel that the later tradition embroidered upon this episode, adding a personal visit of Alexander to the women’s tent and Dareios’ mother’s confusion of → Hephaistion for Alexander: Arr. An. 2.12.6-8 (who does not vouch for the accuracy of the anecdote); Diod. 17.37.3-38.6; Curt. 3.12.13-26; Just. 11.9.12-16 (who does not include the anecdote of mistaken identity). Another element manufactured from the K. by the earliest Alexander historiographers is the tradition that he, like Kyros, was descended from Perseus (1.2.1; cf. Hdt. 7.150.2), the legendary founder of the Persians. This descent appears in Kallisthenes (BNJ 124 F 14a) and Aristoboulos (BNJ 139 F 13), but is not a feature of the Argead foundation legends before Alexander. The attribution of a common ancestor to Alexander and Kyros of course serves to reinforce the legitimacy of Alexander’s conquest. Thus, although there is no evidence that Alexander used the K. as a model, the Alexander historiographers borrowed from it extensively to enhance their idealizing portrayals of Alexander.   F. Pownall Cf. Due, B., Alexander’s Inspiration and Ideas, in: Carlsen, J. et al. (eds.), Alexander the Great. Reality and Myth, 19972, 53-60; Kegerreis, C., Xenophon’s Cyropaedia among Alexan­der’s Lost Historians, AncW 46 (2015), 134-61; McGroarty, K., Did Alexander the Great read Xenophon?, Hermathena 181 (2006), 105-24; Müller, S., Xenophon’s Kyrou­ paideia and the Alexander Historiographers, in: Jacobs, B. (ed.), Ancient Information on Persia Re-Assessed: The Impact of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 2020, 261-82 (forthcoming).

Lamian War   see Antipatros; Krateros; Polyperchon Language, Makedonian   see Calendar; Inscriptions; Names, Makedonian and Argead

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Legitimization

Legitimization Argead legitimacy depended on situational, changeable power constellations. Throughout the history of Argead Makedonia, the Argeads were able to preserve the majority consensus within the population of their realm that rule rested exclusively with them. Even in the roughest times, this Argead privilege remained untouched. In order to safeguard their leading position and the loyalty of the Makedonians, particularly that of the influential families, the dynasty had to keep the belief alive that they were the only family fit for rule. Given the importance of religious cults in ancient societies, three fundamental points often serving as a knockout argument were divine election, divine predestination to rule, and divine protection of the dynasty. According to this image, the Argeads were exclusively chosen to maintain divine order in their realm. Consequently, given the Argeads’ claim of a special and close connection to the divine sphere, the ruler was presumably also the highest priest of the realm (Curt. 10.7.2). The central practical cornerstone of Argead l. was military success. As Makedonia was most of the time pressed hard, war played such a prominent role in Makedonian society that female Argeads also were represented as war-like. For example, → Philip II’s daughter Kynnane is said to have received a military education and to have joined her father on an Illyrian campaign (Polyain. 8.60). Kynnane’s daughter Adea appeared in the—perhaps symbolic—role of a military leader at the battle­ field of Euia against → Olympias in 317 (Diod. 19.11.1-9, cf. Just. 14.5.9-10). In order to convince the Makedonian leading circles of his regal qualities, every Argead ruler had to prove himself a good warrior. He had to demonstrate that he was able to profit from war. By the possession of material goods, he could also distinguish himself from other influential Makedonians. In addition, his officials expected him to use the fruits of his expansionist deeds to practice distribution policy. This reciprocal gift-giving served to ensure loyalty between the dynasty and its leading circles, and other social groups. Such gifts (→ dorea) could be fields, lands, revenues of cities, lakes or pastures, agricultural products, cattle, fish, horses, and looted treasures like jewelry, adorned weapons, or armor. Dedications to sanctuaries and benefactions to allies were another central strategy to profit from booty. Besides the ruler, other female and male Argeads could appear as dedicators and euergetai (benefactors). Since they all were representatives of their dynasty, they could publicly present its generosity or its piety to the gods. For example, the Makedonian conquests in the East enabled → Alexander

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III to fund his sister → Kleopatra’s and mother Olympias’ benefactions in the name of the Argead house: he sent parts of his booty to them (Plut. Alex. 16.8; 25.4; 39.7). During a time of shortage in Greece, they gave Kyrenaian grain to Greek poleis (SEG 9.2; Lyk. 1.26), probably selling it for a lower price than the expensive famine price. After → Gaugamela, Olympias ordered a dedication of crowns to Delphic Apollon to be paid with 190 dareikoi, the Persian gold coins, obviously a part of Alexander’s booty (Syll.³ 252). Sons of the ruler, hence future successors, could achieve wider prominence (and support) by dedications. Given all this, after his → acclamation, an Argead usually sought to wage war in order to respond to expectations regarding gift-giving and thus increase his personal base of power. Besides this practical aspect, in matters of ideology, military success was a proof of a ruler’s l. since it illustrated divine approval and protection. Historically, the privilege of the ruling position of the Argead family will have resulted from military leadership during the initial settlement in Makedonian regions (Hdt. 8.137-139; Thuc. 2.99). Another cornerstone of Argead l. was the prestige of the dynasty’s → genealogy. The Argeads claimed descent from Temenos, the Heraklid king of → Argos. It was a threefold claim to Greek, Heraklid, and royal lineage. Herakles’ role as a progenitor implied that his father Zeus was also associated with Argead genealogy. One of the earliest indicators of how Argead rule was legitimized was the dynasty’s → foundation myth as preserved by → Herodotos (8.137-139). Likely a Makedonian logos initiated by → Alexander I, the tradition hints at Zeus as the Argeads’ divine protector who made Argead Makedonia’s foundation possible. In consequence, their continuous rulership is justified by the reference to their divine l. They were chosen by the highest Olympian god who was responsible for appointing rulers on earth. The iconography of Argead → coinage mirrors the claim to divine election and genealogic prestige. Frequent images are the head of Herakles, his symbols such as bow, club, or → lion, and Zeus’ symbols such as the → eagle. Zeus’ portrait appeared on the obverse of Philip II’s tetradrachms. The earliest known image on Argead coins, minted by Alexander I, the so-called Makedonian → rider, may also illustrate the major cornerstones of Argead l. instructively. This rider is an armed cavalryman wearing a Makedonian hat. Probably, he embodied the military skills of the Argead ruler as a conqueror and protector of his land and people. The Persian short sword (→ akinakes) that appeared in his hand on the earliest series of the coins (pl. 1.1) may point specifically at Alexander I’s connection to the → Achaimenids. In general, the sword may indicate the 312

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Leonnatos

Argeads’ skills in forming alliances for the sake of their land. If recipients were expected to identify the rider with a portrait of Alexander I, the image may hint at his individual virtues, however again as a representative of his dynasty. The legitimizing principles of Argead wars echo the usual propagandistic themes in warfare. These are claims to aid your kin (→ Perdikkas II joining an alliance with Argos: Thuc. 5.80.2) or allies (e.g., → Archelaos and → Alexander II in → Thessaly: [Herodes] Peri politeias §16; Diod. 15.61.4), take revenge for misdeeds (e.g., Philip II in the → Third Sacred War: Just. 8.2.3; Diod. 16.35.3-6; Alexander III against → Bessos: Arr. An. 4.7.3-4; Curt. 7.5.43), fight for your right (such as Argead → pretenders), liberate others (such as allegedly the Ionian Greeks in the Persian war: Polyb. 3.6.3-14; Diod. 16.89.3; 17.4.9), or being divinely predestined to establish Makedonian rule (Plut. Alex. 17.2 on Alexander III in Asia). In short, the central elements of Argead l. were divine election, genealogic prestige (Argive royal and Heraklid descent), military success, and personal virtues. Minor facets (however important in terms of Realpolitik) were material wealth and political connections. In order to spread the message that the Argeads were the only ones able to ensure prosperity, security, expansion, and divine goodwill for Makedonia, different means were used such as coin images, public performances, festivals, military processions, dedications, benefactions, gifts, commissions of art or architecture, or courtly → patronage.   S. Müller Cf. Carney, E.D., Women and basileia. Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Mace­ donia, CJ 90 (1995), 367-91; King, C.J., Macedonian Kingship and other Political Institutions, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 373-91, esp. 375-79; Müller, S., The Symbolic Capital of the Argeads, in: Müller et al. 2017, 183-98; Pownall, F., Liberation Propaganda as a Legitimizing Principle in Warfare, in: Ruffing, K. et al. (eds.), Societies at War, 2020 (forthcoming).

Leonnatos Son of Anteas, L. was related to Eurydike, mother of Philip II (Arr. Succ. F 1.12; cf. Curt. 10.7.8), hence member of the Lynkestian royal house. A syntrophos of Alexander, he was raised at the → court (Arr. An. 6.28.4; Arr. Ind. 18.3); in 336 he was one of the Royal Hypaspists who pursued and killed Philip II’s assassin → Pausanias of Orestis (Diod. 16.94.4). In 332/1, L. was appointed somatophylax

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(Arr. An. 3.5.5). He acted as a member of the king’s council in 330 at the time of the Philotas affair (Curt. 6.8.17; cf. Arr. An. 1.25.4) and attempted to restrain Alexander during the Kleitos affair (Curt. 8.1.46). L. and → Ptolemy brought the conspiracy of the ‘pages’ to the king’s attention (thus Curt. 8.6.22, but Arr. An. 4.13.7 mentions only Ptolemy’s role). L.’s first military command came in 328/7: he conducted the night-time operations of the siege of the Rock of Chorienes in rotation with his fellow- → somatophylakes, Perdikkas and Ptolemy (Arr. An. 4.21.4). At the → Hydaspes, L. appears as an infantry commander (Curt. 8.14.15). We may assume that, as somatophylax, L. remained close to Alexander and fought among the troops directly under Alexander’s control (Arr. An. 5.16; Curt. 8.14.15). He was one of about 30 trierarchs of the Hydaspes fleet (Arr. Ind. 18.3-10). At the town of the → Malloi, L. and Peukestas were foremost in protecting the seriously wounded king from certain death (Arr. An. 6.8.4-13.5). At Patala, L. led a force of 1000 cavalry and 8000 hoplites and lightly armed troops along the shore of the Indos delta while Alexander took the fleet to the ocean (Arr. An. 6.18.3). On the return march to the west, L. was sent ahead to dig wells along the route that the army was to follow (Curt. 9.10.2); he then (in late summer 324) awaited Alexander at the borders of the land of the Oreitai, where he remained when the main force marched on. The Alexandreia founded by L. (Onesikrit., BNJ 134 F 28) is apparently there. L. won an impressive victory over the Oreitai, killing 6000 of them, and all their leaders (Nearchos, BNJ 133 F 1; cf. Curt. 9.10.19). L. provided provisions for → Nearchos’ ocean voyage and exchanged troops with him (Arr. Ind. 23.8). He then reestablished order among the Oreitai and set out for Gedrosia by land, rejoining Alexander, perhaps in Karmania, but possibly only at Sousa. Here (324), L. was awarded a golden crown (Arr. An. 7.5.5-6; Arr. Ind. 23.6, 42.9). Presumably he took a Persian bride in the mass marriage ceremony, though we have no record of her name. At the time of Alexander’s death (323) L. was one of the leading men of the succession crisis: at first, it was decided that L. share with → Perdikkas the guardianship of → Rhoxane’s as-yet-unborn child, on the grounds that both were of royal stock (Curt. 10.7.8; cf. Just. 13.2.13-14). But the common soldiery declared for the feeble → Arrhidaios, whom they hailed as King under the name Philip III. L. had to be content with the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. Succ. F 1.6; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.4.16). But he intrigued against Perdikkas, accepting a marriage offer from → Kleopatra, Alexander’s sister. Such a union would give him a serious—possibly ‘legitimate’—claim to the throne (Plut. Eum. 314

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Lion, lion hunt

3.5). L. crossed into Europe with his satrapal army (322), which he augmented in Makedonia before pushing south towards Lamia with a force of more than 20.000 foot and 1500 cavalry. The Athenian general Antiphilos engaged him before he could reach Lamia. L., with less than half the enemy’s number of cavalry, found himself cut off in a marshy region where he died (Diod. 18.15.3; Just. 13.5.14).   W. Heckel Cf. Berve 1926, II, 232-5, no. 466; Heckel 2016, 107-21.

Liber de morte testamentoque Alexandri Magni   see Metz Epitome Lion, lion hunt The presence of lions in Makedonia is problematic. → Herodotos (7.125-126) states that lions attacked the camels of Xerxes’ army in 480 when he was marching from Abdera in → Thrace to → Therme. This information is repeated by → Aristotle (Hist. an. 6.31) and Pausanias (6.5.5), who additionally states that stray lions could appear on Mt. → Olympos in the late 5th c. Xenophon (Kyn. 11) insists that lions could be hunted only in foreign countries, i.e. Thrace, Syria, and Anatolia. A l. crunching a broken spear appears on the reverse of coins of → Amyntas III in the early 4th c. The obverse type of a → rider with spear is sometimes read together with the reverse to signify a royal → hunt but there is no evidence that the rider represents the king. → Alexander III is known to have hunted lions in Persian game parks during his Asian campaign, including Syria in 332 (Plut. Alex. 40.3-4) and Bazeira in Sogdiana in 328 (Curt. 8.1.1419). He also kept lions in his game park in → Babylon (Plut. Alex. 73.3). We have no evidence that Alexander had himself represented hunting lions in his lifetime, but after his death the Successors commemorated their participation in his hunts in order to advertise their right to share in his empire. → Krateros commissioned from Lysippos and Leochares a bronze l. hunt group in Delphi ca. 321 with himself coming to Alexander’s aid in memory of the hunt in Syria (Plut. Alex. 40.4). Alexander hunting a l. with Abdalonymos, king of Sidon, → Hephaistion, and Makedonian and Phoinikian hunters, is shown on Abdalonymos’ sarcophagus (“Alexander Sarcophagus”) now in the Istanbul Museum. A

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mosaic from the late-4th-c. House of Dionysos in Pella depicts two Makedonians on foot hunting a l. with spear and sword. Even though no portraiture is intended, one of the hunters is usually identified with Alexander. More problematic is the wall-painting of a multiple-quarry hunt on the façade of Tomb II in Vergina (→ Aigai) (pl. 3, fig. 2). The idealised features of the hunters have prompted the suggestion that it is a mythological hunt but l. hunts in Makedonian → art almost certainly commemorate historical events. The proposed dates for Vergina Tomb II range from 336 to 316, so it has been attributed to either Philip II or Philip III Arrhidaios though some scholars do not regard it as a royal tomb. The date of the tomb should determine whether the l. hunt is set in Makedonia or Asia. A young horseman on the axis of the scene, usually identified with Alexander, is thrusting his spear from some distance at a l. which is surrounded by three other hunters, one of whom is the deceased. If the tomb post-dates Alexander III’s reign, we may assume that the deceased wished to commemorate his connection to the conqueror.   O. Palagia Cf. Borza/Palagia 2007; Carney 2015, 265-28; Franks, H.M., Hunters, Heroes, Kings. The Frieze of the Tomb II at Vergina, 2012; Palagia 2000; Paspalas, S., The Taurophonos Leon and Krateros’ Monument at Delphi, in: Tsetskhladze, G.R. et al. (eds.), Periplous, 2000, 211-9.

Lucian of Samosata In the context of his main theme, the relationship of truth and truthfulness with lie and hypocrisy, the Syrian satirist Lucian of Samosata (ca. 120-180 AD) uses the Argeads as indicators and correctives of contemporary shortcoming of intellectuals, in particular regarding → Second Sophistic historiography and rhetoric. L. is neither critical of the historical Argeads as such, nor of the Greek classical authors who mentioned them. He rather ridicules the flaws of their reception in his own time pointing at issues in the field of paideia. In particular, he ridicules the pretentions of contemporary pseudo-intellectuals misusing the past in order to glorify their own present status. Thus, by references to the Argeads, L. mocks phenomena such as the use of an artificial (hyper)atticist language (Laps. 8), flattery, and exaggerated praise, as well as negative bias in historiography (Hist. Conscr. 12; 40; Calumn. 17), or falsely 316

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chosen historical exempla (Dom. 1; Hdt. siv. Aet. 4-6). Thereby, as always, L. is the enigmatic distant observer, vanishing behind various masks. He omits the Argead founder-figures and proto-historical rulers, probably no special points of reference in the literature of his times. → Perdikkas II is mentioned when L. refers to the fictitious tale about the ruler’s lovesickness cured by the famous physician Hippokrates of Kos (Hist. Conscr. 35). → Archelaos pops up when L. mockingly portrays → Euripides as one of his flatterers (Par. 35). → Amyntas III is only present in → Philip II’s patronymic (DM 14.1). It is unclear if L. refers to → Perdikkas III when he tells the ironic tale that the statue of a Perdikkas formed part of the collection of ruler portraits carried around by → Pyrrhos in order to prove his likeness to → Alexander III though in fact he looked like a Thessalian cook nicknamed “little frog” (Ind. 21). Not surprisingly, the Argeads L. mentions most frequently are the most prominent Makedonians in the Second Sophistic: Alexander III in the first place (Peregrin. 25; Par. 35-36; Herm. 4; De Domo 1; Hist. Conscr. 12; 38; 40; VH II 9; Laps. 8-9; Pr. Im. 9; Hdt. Siv. Aet. 5-6; DM 12-14; Calumn. 17-18; Ind. 21; Gall. 25; Rh. Pr. 5; Alex. 1; 6; 7; 16; 41; Nav. 28) and Philip II (Ind. 21; Fug. 25; Rh. Pr. 10; Hist. Conscr. 3; 38; J. Trag. 14; Par. 42; DM 14; Nav. 28; Alex. 1; VH II 9; Nec. 17; DM 14). Mockingly reversing the traditional image of Alexander surpassing his father, in a posthumous conversation in the underworld, a clearly dominant Philip gives his disturbed son a severe reprimand (DM 14). Depicting two famous conquerors as an angry father scolding his naughty son who weepily craves his paternal affection, L. deconstructs their iconic status ridiculing the exaggerated images of them in contemporary literature. Obviously, L. reacted to his contemporary Arrian: writing about the false prophet Alexander, L. literally alludes to Arrian’s self-representation in the Anabasis (1.12.1-5) while claiming that Arrian himself wrote a biography on a robber Tilliboros terrorizing Asia (Alex. 2). This book is not attested elsewhere and will be nothing but L.’s ironical allusion to Arrian’s Anabasis.   S. Müller Cf. Asirvatham, S., His Son’s Father? Philip II in the Second Sophistic, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 193-204; Müller, S., Trügerische Bilder? Lukians Umgang mit Tyrannen- und Orienttopoi in seinen Hadesszenen, Gymnasium 120 (2013), 169-92; Müller, S., Icons, Images, Interpretations: Arrian, Lukian, Their Relationship, and Alexander at the Kydnos, Karanos 1 (2018), 67-86.

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Lynkestis

Lynkestis Lynkestis (or Lynkos), was the northernmost of the mountainous Upper Makedonian regions, bordering on → Orestis to its south. L. had pastures and timberland. It is difficult to determine the border between L. and Pelagonia to its north. Some scholars think that Pelagonia was controlled by L. during the 4th c. but this assumption is based on a controversial interpretation: in an Athenian decree of 362 (Tod II no. 143, l. 7) a certain Menelaos, son of Arrhabaios, is called “the Pela­gonian” and it is suggested that he was the ruler of L. However, this suggestion rests only with his patronymic (Arrhabaios may or may not refer to a ruler of L.). There is no evidence that any Argead was able to conquer L. before → Philip II in 358. Prior to this, L. appears as an autonomous region ruled by a local dynasty that claimed Heraklid descent from the Bakchidai of Korinthos (Strab. 7.7.8). Recognizing L.’s autonomy in the time of → Perdikkas II, → Thucydides terms the regional dynast the “basileus of the Makedonian Lynkestians” (4.83.1): he was not a subject of the Argeads. Although it was rather small, L. was strategically important: situated east of the passes from Illyria, L. controlled a route into Central Makedonia that made it a corridor of Illyrian invasions into the Argead realm. Therefore, L. was a constant threat to the Argeads, and its subjugation must have been amongst their major aims. While evidence for L. during the rule of the Argeads is scarce, the few existing snippets indicate that its rulers were well connected with the Illyrians and frequently hostile to the Argeads. The first ruler of L. to appear in our sources is Arrhabaios, son of Bromeros, who entered into conflict with Perdikkas II (Thuc. 4.83.1). Arrhabaios bore a characteristically (Upper) Makedonian name that seems to have been popular in L.’s dynasty (while it is uncertain whether this was its prerogative). It is unknown when and why the conflict between Arrhabaios and Perdikkas broke out and which side started the hostilities. In 424, during the → Peloponnesian War, Perdikkas allied himself with → Sparta. The agreement included that the Spartan commander Brasidas support Perdikkas’ plan to conquer L. (Thuc. 4.83.4-5). But upon his arrival, Brasidas betrayed Perdikkas by mediating a reconciliation between the two opponents, thereby acknowledging Arrhabaios’ autonomy. As a result of this betrayal, Perdikkas reduced his subsidies for Brasidas’ army (Thuc. 4.83.26). But since he carried on to aid him against Athens, in 423, Brasidas joined his forces with Perdikkas’ army and invaded L. After an initial victory against Arrhabaios, the campaign had to be abandoned (Thuc. 4.124.1-128.3) since the 318

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Illyrian mercenaries Perdikkas had hired chose to join Arrhabaios—either because of his Illyrian connections or because he paid better. The Makedonian and Spartan troops retreated separately; Brasidas’ army was attacked by the Illyrians on Arrhabaios’ pay-roll (Thuc. 4.127.1-128.2). These, however, did not risk invading Perdikkas’ realm (Thuc. 4.128.3). A fragmentary treaty between → Athens and Perdikkas, probably the peace of 423/2, includes a reconciliation with him and Arrhabaios, whose autonomy is recognized (IG I³ 89). It is unclear who initiated this reconciliation and who were Arrhabaios’ symmachoi mentioned in the text. The next Argead reported to have been in conflict with L. was → Archelaos. Aristotle (Pol. 1311B) mentions that Archelaos was troubled by an alliance of Arrhabaios of L.—either held for Perdikkas’ enemy, the latter’s son, or his grandson—and Arrhabaios’ Illyrian brother-in-law Sirrhas. In order to counterbalance this threat and prevent Elimeia from joining L., Archelaos married his daughter to the Elimeian ruler. Sirrhas is the name of the father of Eurydike (SEG 36.556), → Amyntas III’s wife who is variously credited with Lynkestian or Illyrian descent (Strab. 7.7.8; Just. 7.4.4-5; Plut. Mor. 14B; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler). Hence her father is usually identified with Archelaos’ opponent. In this case, Eurydike had a Lynkestian and Illyrian family background. This ancestry would explain why Amyntas III had an interest in marrying her in about 390. He was plagued by the Illyrian threat that even briefly drove him out of his realm in 393/2. While nothing is known about any Lynkestian involvement in this event, L. was the corridor of the Illyrians. By marrying Eurydike Amyntas may have killed two birds with one stone by establishing ties to the Illyrian and Lynkestian elite. Nothing is heard of L. anymore during the following decades. In 360/59, → Perdikkas III lost his life and a considerable part of his army in a crushing defeat against the invading Illyrians, who occupied Upper Makedonia including L. (Diod. 16.2.4-5, 4.4). It is unknown if Lynkestian troops were involved in this war and if so, on which side. In 358, Philip II struck back and expelled the Illyrians. Standing with his army in Upper Makedonia, he did not miss the chance to annex L. and the other Upper Makedonian regions and put an end to their autonomy (Diod. 16.4.3-7, 8.1). The leading families had to send their sons to his court where they grew up as—however privileged—hostages to guarantee their families’ loyalty to Philip (→ basilikoi paides). In 336, he was murdered by one of his guards, → Pausanias of Orestis (Diod. 16.94.3-4; Just. 9.6.3-5). Two Lynkestians, Heromenes and Arrhabaios, sons of Aëropos, were executed on charge of complicity (Arr. An. 1.25.1; Just. 11.2.2). Their brother

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Alexander Lynkestes was pardoned because he was protected by his influential father-in-law → Antipatros and quickly acknowledged Alexander III as the new ruler (Just. 11.2.2-3). The fact that Antipatros regarded Alexander Lynkestes as dignified enough to marry into his clan (Curt. 7.1.7; Just. 11.7.1; 12.14.1) hints at the latter’s significance. It is controversial whether Aëropos’ sons were affiliates or members of L.’s ruling house—thus maybe related to Eurydike—and whether they posed any threat to Alexander’s succession. The suggestion that Philip was killed by an Upper Makedonian faction from Orestis and L. is tempting but cannot be substantiated. Since, for example, Alexander’s influential generals Perdikkas and Krateros also came from Orestis, it is problematic to think in terms of a dichotomy of Upper and Lower Makedonian factions at this time. While there must have been some elements that made the Lynkestian brothers plausible suspects, it is unclear whether they were in fact Pausanias’ collaborators or instigators. If the commander, Aëropos, whom Philip reportedly banished (Polyain. 4.2.3, obviously biased: the reason sounds awkward), was their father, his fate may have motivated them to plot against Philip, but the identification is uncertain. In any case, thanks to Antipatros’ influence, the surviving brother Alexander Lynkestes was appointed strategos of Thrace, a strategically important position. In 334, when the Makedonian army departed on the Persian campaign, he received the command of the Thessalian cavalry (Arr. An. 1.25.2). In about 333, on the instigation of his superior → Parmenion, Alexander Lynkestes was charged of treacherous negotiations with Dareios III (Arr. An. 1.25.3), deposed, arrested, and tried and executed in 330 in the aftermath of → Philotas’ trial (Curt. 7.1.5-9; Diod. 17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1). It is unclear whether he was guilty of the charges. With his death, the last prominent Lynkestian disappears from the records.   S. Müller Cf. Bosworth 1971; Carney 2015, 127-39; Habicht, C., Zwei Angehörige des lynkestischen Königshauses, AM 2 (1977), 511-6; Hammond 1989, 78-9, 84-5, 96-7; Heckel 2017.

Lysimachos Lysimachos was the son of Agathokles (Arr. An. 6.28.4; 8.18.3-4), a former officer of → Philip II. He was born between 355 and 351. We know nothing of L.’s youth and his participation to → Alexander III’s expedition is attested only after 320

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autumn 328, when, according to Curtius (8.1.46), together with other officers, L. tried to prevent Alexander from killing → Kleitos the Black. In 325, according to Arrian (An. 6.28.4), L. was one of Alexander’s 7 bodyguards (→ somatophylakes). When Alexander died in → Babylon in June 323, L. was present, like the other bodyguards. In the subsequent division of power between the officers of the deceased king, L. obtained the satrapy of → Thrace (Diod. 18.3.2; Curt. 10.10.4; Arr. Succ. F 1.7). After having taken possession of his satrapy, he allied with → Antipatros, a former general of Philip II, who had been left in charge of Europe by Alexander in 334, an appointment confirmed by → Perdikkas in 323. After Antipatros’ death in 319, L. became an ally of his son and heir → Kassandros. The two dynasts remained allied until Kassandros’ death in 297. It is quite probable, even if the sources are silent, that in 311 he shared Kassandros’ decision to murder → Alexander IV, the last legitimate heir of the Argead dynasty. In 285, after many difficulties, L. became king of Makedonia. He died in February 281 in the battle of Koroupedion, killed by → Seleukos, when, according to Appian (Syr. 64.339), he was 70 years old, while, according to Trogus-Justin (17.1.10), he was 74 years old.   F. Landucci Gattinoni Cf. Heckel 2006, 153-5; Landucci Gattinoni, F., Lisimaco di Tracia nella prospettiva del primo Ellenismo, 1992; Landucci, F., Il testamento di Alessandro, 2014; Lund, H.S., Lysimachus. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship, 1992.

Makedones (as a term) The term can have both an ethnic and political-military meaning and does not always coincide with the dwellers of Makedonia. As an ethnic term, it is synony­ mous with Makednoi and Maketai. The etymology, just as for the words Make­ donia and Makedonis, derives most probably from makos and makros, meaning “distant” or “high/upper” rather than “tall”. Therefore, this designation has more of a geographical or topographical determination, suggesting an external viewpoint. It may allude to the transhumant way of life of the people living in the mountains between the Pindos, the Haliakmon Valley and Pieria (Hdt. 1.56; 8.137-139). In antiquity, → names shape collective identity, and → genealogy is a strong argument for exerting control over a territory and forging alliances. However, it is not always clear whether the territory determines the name for the

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inhabitants or vice versa. According to Stephanos Byzantios (s.v. Makedonia), it was Makedon, the son of Zeus ([Hes.] Cat. F 7) or Aiolos (Hellanikos, BNJ 4 F 74), grandson of Hellen, who gave the name to the land and consequently the land to the M., just as his brother Magnes with whom Makedon shares the same root in his name, is the ancestor of the Magnetes. For → Herodotos (8.43), M. were Dorians. The term is used as a political entity, in the form → “basileus of M.”, by → Thucydides (1.57.2; 2.29.7), Xenophon (Hell. 5.2.12), Isokrates (4.126), and → Demosthenes (18.39), even as “tyrant of M.” (Plat. Alk. Min. 141D), meaning the citizen/subject (see also IG VII 3055, l. 7-8). It can also designate an Argead king’s army and soldiery (Xen. Hell. 5.2.40; Diod. 17.70.4-5). A political-cultural connotation may be seen in Isokr. 5.107-108, where the term M. is juxtaposed to both Greeks and non-Greeks.    E. Koulakiotis Cf. Asirvatham 2010; Hatzopoulos, M., Macedonia and Macedonians, in: Lane Fox 2011, 43-50.

Makedonia Makedonia in the royal period is most accurately described as the land of the Makedonians. In other words, the geographical term evolved to reflect the gradual expansion of the M. kingdom and the incorporation of conquered areas into its political structures, by means of control by the M. army, colonization by Makedonians, the (re)foundation of cities as M. ones, and the expulsion or political assimilation of indigenous populations. We can thus trace the geographical extent of M. only through the history of Makedonian conquests, bearing in mind that, in any given point in that history, Makedonian kings could firmly control vast areas which cannot be described as part of M. in any meaningful way, the extreme example being → Philip II, who controlled all of → Thessaly to the south, a great portion of → Paionia to the north, and → Thrace even beyond the Nestos to the east. According to the genealogical myth of the Temenid dynasty (Hdt. 8.137-138), the history of the kingdom began when → Perdikkas I descended from Upper M.—the mostly mountainous region between the Pindos range and the Kambounian, Pierian, Bermion, and Barnous mountains—to Lower M., the fertile Central M. Plain, and founded a kingdom at the foothills of the Pierian and Bermion mountains with → Aigai as its cap322

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ital, probably before the mid-7th c. According to the only available narrative of early M. expansion until 429 (Thuc. 2.99), the Temenids soon conquered Pieria to the south and Bottiaia to the north (expelling the Thracian Pierians and the Bottiaians, of unclear ethnic affiliation). Then they conquered the “narrow strip of land” between the Loudias and the Axios, a coastal area at the time (since the → Thermaic Gulf extended far inland into the present-day plain); this strategically important area, dominated by → Pella and Ichnai, was labelled as part of Paionia by Thucydides, but as part of the land of the Bottiaians by Herodotos (7.123, 127.1). The date of the expansion beyond the Loudias is controversial and partly depends on an archaeological crux. If the 6th c. funerary cultures attested in sites on both banks of the Axios and especially at modern Archontiko, near Pella, are considered as differing significantly from the contemporary evidence at Aigai, as some archaeologists claim, the date of Makedonian expansion in northern Bottiaia cannot be earlier than the prequel of the → Persian Wars and should be dated ca. 510, when the Persians had advanced to this area, crushed the Paionians, and made → Amyntas I their vassal; according to the opposite view, all sites from Aigai to beyond the Axios form a cultural continuum, and thus the M. expansion should be dated early in the 6th c. This first phase of expansion was concluded by the conquest of the fertile plain of Almopia to the north and of Eordaia, one of the cantons of Upper M., to the west. The rest of the Upper M. cantons—from south to north: Tymphaia, → Elimeia, → Ores­ tis, Lynkos (→ Lynkestis), Derriopos—were culturally and ethnically M. (despite the contacts with → Epeiros and the western Greek world emphasized in the genealogical myths of the Orestans), but originally maintained their distinct states and their kings were—often uneasy—allies of the Temenids until the final incorporation of Upper M. into the Temenid kingdom in the 4th c., and especially during the reign of → Philip II. Equally controversial is the expansion east of the Axios river. Thuc. 2.99 places the conquest of Mygdonia—the strategically important land corridor between the Axios and the Strymon valleys on either side of the lakes north of Chalkidike—at an early date and claims that by 429 the Makedonians also possessed Anthemous, Krestonia and → Bisaltia, to the SW, NW and NE of Mygdonia respectively; “and all this is called M.”, he concludes, putting the border of M. at the Strymon river. Amyntas I may, indeed, have had some control over Anthemous by ca. 505 (Hdt. 5.94.1), and there is no doubt that → Alexander I later controlled the mines of Mt. Dysoron (modern Mt. Menoikion?) on the east bank of the Strymon (Hdt. 5.17.2) and that →

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Perdikkas II had as his possession parts of Mygdonia (Thuc. 1.58.2). Lack of evidence, however, allows no certainty over the nature of that control. Until the late classical period, there is no evidence from these areas for any expulsion of regional populations (with the exception of the Thracian Edones from Mygdonia), colonization by Makedonians, foundation of M. cities (according to the model later explicitly attested e.g. for Kalindoia: SEG 36.626) or the use of the M. → calendar. We should therefore perhaps refrain from taking for granted the full incorporation of these ‘New Lands’ east of the Axios into the political structures of the kingdom prior to the reigns of Philip II and Alexander III. Moreover, the history of these areas as dominions of the M. kings was in no way uninterrupted: in fact, the struggle for control over the lands between Axios and Strymon and their valuable natural resources was the central theme in the history of M. during the classical period. From all territories east of the Axios, Philip II at his accession to the throne in 360/59 controlled only western Mygdonia. The final addition to the geographical puzzle of Temenid M. was a large colonial area, Chalkidike; it was finally conquered by Philip II who crushed and dissolved the powerful Chalkidic League in 348. Its territory was integrated into the kingdom during his and his son’s reign. The status of Pieris, the narrow stretch of land between Mt. Pangaion and the sea, as well as the left bank of the Strymon, is more difficult to establish: both areas were probably only gradually incorporated into M. proper during the Hellenistic period. This is why the Strymon river could still be considered by some writers the frontier of M. even shortly after the death of Alexander III (Polyain. 8.60), with → Amphipolis being the easternmost M. city. Further to the east, the royal foundation of → Philippoi with its extended fertile basin remained outside the kingdom in the political sense outlined above until at least the last few years of its independence, as its calendar, ethnicity, onomastics, and institutions seem to indicate, although later writers considered the whole region up to the Nestos river a part of M. in the geographical sense. Similarly, Pelagonia and Paionia to the northwest and to the north were under the control of the M. kings through their generals of Paionia since the late classical period, but their incorporation into the districts of M. after the Roman conquest is explicitly mentioned as a Roman innovation (Liv. 45.29). By the end of the Temenid period, therefore, the geographical borders of M. are not very controversial: to the northwest, Derriopos, west of Lake Lychnitis (modern Ohrid); to the west and southwest, the massive Pindos range separating Epeiros from the rest of the Greek mainland; to the south, the edge of the Pierian plain 324

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by the sea north of Mt. Olympos and the Peneios river; to the north, the long string of high mountains separating the main Greek peninsula from the northern Balkans; to the east, most probably the Strymon river. M.’s location was pivotal both on a north-south and on a west-east axis. It was well connected to the outside world, not only by sea, but also by land, despite the seemingly impenetrable wall of mountains to its west, north and south. The Tempe pass in south Pieria and the Sarantaporo pass in Elimeia were the two most important land routes connecting M. with → Thessaly and the southern Greek mainland; the Axios valley was an important channel of communication with the northern Balkans since prehistory; Lynkos controlled an important passage between the Adriatic Sea and the southern Balkans; Mygdonia offered relatively unimpeded access from → Thrace to the Axios. These major natural passageways, along with several minor mountain passes within M., were complemented across the land by several man-made roads, to which the central authorities always paid particular attention (cf. for the reign of → Archelaos Thuc. 2.100.2). Geographically, M. forms a transitional zone between the southern Greek mainland and the northern Balkans and this is reflected in its climate, a mixture of the Mediterranean variety near the coastline and the Continental one further inland, with local variations depending on latitude, altitude and proximity to the sea. Temperatures range from very low during winter in the mountains to unbearably high in the plains during summer. The general feel of the landscape is rather different from the one typical in southern Greece, and the sheer size of geological features in M. is of a considerably higher order: within or at its borders lie the largest plain, three out of the five highest mountain tops, and all 8 largest lakes of the Greek peninsula (not including the extensive marshlands of the Loudias river or of the territory of Philippoi (the latter was drained and reclaimed as arable land under Philip II: Theophr. CP 5.14.5-6), while three out of the five longest → rivers of the southern Balkans flow out into its seas. The many different local landscapes within M. are essential for an understanding of the classical kingdom’s political economy, history, and diplomacy. Upper M. consists of two strings of mountain massifs (interspersed with big lakes) with two land corridors in between: the western one, formed by the Upper Haliakmon basin, was controlled by Orestis and Tymphaia, and formed a transition zone towards Epeiros; the eastern one started at Lynkos in the north, passed through Eordaia, and ended at the Lower Haliakmon basin, controlled by Elimeia, in the south. The high plateaus of Upper M. allowed agriculture, but this was mostly a land

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favouring transhumant pastoralism, an essential feature of the early M. way of life, reflected not only in the genealogical myth of the ruling dynasty but also in the relative scarcity of major urban centres throughout this part of M. The same foundation myths of the kingdom also reflect the passage from transhumant pastoralism in the mountains to sedentary life in the urban centres overlooking the fertile M. Plain, formed by the alluvial deposits of the Haliakmon, Loudias and Axios rivers. This passage also allowed early access to the sea, through the harbours of Pydna (and, after its conquest by Philip II, → Methone) in Pieria, Pella on the right bank of the Axios, and → Therme east of the Axios, later one of the towns merged into Thessalonike. Maritime connectivity was further facilitated by the incorporation of ports further east, as far as the important harbor of Amphipolis, Alexander’s main naval base. The Old Kingdom, Upper and Lower M. taken together, continued to be considered the core of M. and its most homogeneous area. The New Lands from the Axios to the Strymon valleys, on the other hand, included several micro-regions, and remained diverse ethnically, economically, and politically until the demise of the kingdom and beyond. They comprised small fertile plains (in Krestonia on the left bank of the Axios, in the lake district of Mygdonia, and in Anthemous and Krousis along the east coast of the Thermaic Gulf); densely forested hills and mountains; the coastal colonial area, intricately connected with the Aegean world before and after the M. takeover; finally, to the east, the rich Strymon valley, with the regions of Edonis, Bisaltia, Odomantike, and Sintike. The geographical diversity of eastern M. was also reflected in the diversity of its political organization. The whole coast, all the way to Amphipolis and Pieria, comprised a large number of southern Greek-type poleis. Places further inland, on the other hand, comprised a number of villages, sometimes merged into sympolities, and were mostly populated by Thracians, even long after the colonization of the area by M. settlers. Equally diverse were the natural resources of the entire area, so rich that myth placed the gardens of Midas on Mt. Bermion (Hdt. 8.138). Green pastures, fertile plains, and extended wetlands boosted animal husbandry (goats, sheep, cattle, horses) and agriculture (with a large variety of crops: cereals, vegetable, and fruit—Makedonian wine was available in large quantity and good quality), while lakes, perennial rivers, and the sea provided huge quantities of fish (Hdt. 5.16.4). Two royal monopolies, in particular, were the economic foundation of the strength of the M. monarchy: forests and → mines. Forests were primarily important as a source for → timber. M. timber was widely considered to be the 326

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best in the Greek world (Theophr. HP 4.5.5; 5.2.1), especially for ship building and oars, and was available in large quantities, contrary to southern Greece, which chronically suffered from deforestation. The importance of timber for the royal economy and diplomacy cannot be overemphasized: it is no accident that the early treaties of M. kings involve or at least mention its trade (IG I3 89; 117; Hatzopoulos 1996: II no. 1). Minerals were also plentiful: copper, iron, and especially gold and silver, indispensable for → coinage; silver, in particular, was available in extraordinary quantities to some M. kings (Hdt. 5.17; Diod. 16.8.67) in the East, on Mt. Dysoron, on the mountains of northern and eastern Chalkidike and on Mt. Pangaion.   P. Paschidis Cf. Borza 1990, 23-57; Faraguna 1998; Kottaridi, A., Παλιές προκαταλήψεις και νέα ευρήματα: Μακεδόνες ή Βοττιαίοι, in: Ἠχάδιν, τιμητικός τόμος για τη Στέλλα Δρούγου, 2016, 612-39; Saripanidi, V., Constructing Continuities with a ‘Heroic’ Past: Death, Feasting and Political Ideology in the Archaic Macedonian Kingdom, in: Tsingarida, A./Lemos, I.S. (eds.), Constructing Social Identities in Early Iron Age and Archaic Greece, 2017, 73-135; Thomas, C.G., The Physical Kingdom, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 65-80.

Makedonika Makedonika (historiographical works focusing on Makedonian affairs) are a literary genre analogous to Hellenika or Sikelika. The earliest known representative is the M. attributed to Nikomedes of Akanthos (BNJ 772), who was probably one of the prominent intellectuals whom → Philip II attracted to his court in order to advertise his cultural capital to the wider Greek world. His M. covered the history of Makedonia from its legendary beginnings at least until the reign of → Perdikkas II, and his focus on the → genealogy of the Makedonian and Molossian royal houses suggests that it was intended to showcase the glorious and impeccably Hellenic credentials of both Philip himself and his wife → Olympias, the mother of his heir → Alexander III. The M. attributed to → Marsyas of Pella (BNJ 135), the half-brother of → Antigonos Monophthalmos, appear to have had a similar agenda. Although the scope of his M. went all the way from the first king of Makedonia to Alexander’s departure from Egypt in 331, the bulk of the work treated Philip’s unification of Makedonia and his relations with the Greek poleis; this suggests that Marsyas was especially concerned

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with legitimizing Philip’s conquest of Greece. The shadowy figure of Marsyas of → Philippoi (BNJ 136), designated in the historiographical tradition as the younger Marsyas, also wrote M. Unlike his homonym, his M. were not a work of political and military history, but instead appear to have highlighted mythological and legendary aspects; his ideological stance, however, is likely to have been similar. In the early Hellenistic period, once the fallout from Alexander’s campaigns and premature death made it clear that Makedonian rule was going to be a permanent feature of the Greek political landscape, there was necessarily a new focus on Makedonia in works of contemporary historiography, but one that was not necessarily positive. Thus, unlike Nikomedes or either Marsyas, → Douris of Samos (BNJ 76) was highly critical of the Makedonians, condemning Philip II, Alexander III, and the Successors as stereotypical tyrants, corrupted by power and luxury. Although the title of Douris’ work is variously given by the ancient sources as either M. or Histories, its contents suggest a heavy emphasis upon Makedonian history from Philip’s conquest of Greece until the defeat of → Lysimachos at Koroupedion in 281, when it became clear that no ruler would succeed in gaining control over the whole of Alexander’s empire. The M. attributed to Douris’ contemporary (or near contemporary) Balagros (BNJ 773) seem to have treated political and military affairs; as a Makedonian he may have offered a rather more positive portrayal. The emphasis in the extant fragments of the M. of Theagenes (BNJ 774) on the foundation legends of Lower Makedonia suggests that the work focused on the early history of Makedonia and implies a legitimizing agenda, which in turn suggests a Hellenistic date, although nothing can be determined with certainty. There was once again a spurt of interest in Makedonia in the early Roman imperial period, possibly in the wake of the Roman conquest of the east, explaining perhaps the emphasis on geography and ethnography in the Makedonike periegesis of Antigonos (BNJ 775), On the Empire of the Makedonians of Kriton (BNJ 277), and perhaps the M. of Appian. Thus, M. originated as an instrument of Philip II’s legitimizing propaganda, but proved to be a flexible enough genre to serve the differing agendas (both Makedonian and non-Makedonian) of the later historiographical tradition.   F. Pownall Cf. Engels, J., Theagenes (774), BNJ online (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/theagenes-774-a774); Heckel 1980; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 31-9; Müller 2016, 50-6; 31-9; Zahrnt 1984, 326-30.

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Malloi The campaign against the autonomous Indian ethnic of the Malloi took place in October/November 326 during → Alexander III’s Indian campaign on the way back from the → Hyphasis. The Malloi were enemies of Alexander’s new ally Poros, and united against the approaching intruders. During the Mallian campaign, the siege of a town where the surviving Malloi had taken refuge, nearly cost Alexander his life (Arr. An. 6.9.1-11). He led the troops who were scaling the walls and then found himself inside the stronghold with only a few personal guards. The infantrymen had been too slow to advance and the ladders broke under them. Alexander was seriously wounded in the chest with an arrow. Peukestas, the royal hypaspist, came to his aid protecting him with his hoplite shield. He later received an exceptional promotion to the 8th member of traditionally only 7 elite → somatophylakes (Arr. An. 6.28.4). The Malloi were slaughtered ruthlessly by the Makedonians. It is odd that → both Hephaistion and → Ptolemy led strong units just before and after the siege, but according to Ptolemy, were absent during the siege itself. Ptolemy claims in vague terms that he was on another mission in order to chase other ‘barbarians’ (Arr. An. 6.11.8; Curt. 9.5.21). Compared to Ptolemy’s usual style, it is strange that for once he did not exactly name his units and field of operation. This unusual obscurity on his part raises the suspicion that he wanted to cover up that indeed he had been present and in a high command. Perhaps, he did not want to be associated with the failure to protect his ruler. For Ptolemy and Hephaistion were both Alexander’s somatophylakes and thus responsible for his safety. It is also suspicious that in Arrian (here probably drawing on Ptolemy), Ptolemy’s enemy → Perdikkas appears as the one to blame for the sloppiness (An. 6.6.4-6, 9.1-2).   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2008, 128-9; Pearson 1960, 191, 208; Worthington 2016, 62.

manteis Seers were employed by states throughout the ancient Mediterranean world, above all in military contexts. On campaign their role was to establish the attitude of the gods to the plans of the commanders. Xenophon’s Anabasis provides numerous examples of seers performing this function as part of a military ex-

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pedition, as well as revealing something about attitudes to seers in the 4th c. The basic tasks of a mantis were to interpret the entrails of sacrificed animals, and to read the flight of birds, but they might also be called upon to interpret other omens. It was normal for m. not to be citizens of the states that they served, and certain cities, and within them certain families, for example the Iamidai in Elis, had a lasting reputation for producing skilled m. Successful m. could receive high honours from their hosts—and success in these circumstances meant not only predicting correctly, but also being on the winning side. This implies that m. were considered to have the power to influence the outcomes they predicted. All the evidence about m. in Argead Makedonia relates to → Alexander III, but there is no reason to doubt that they were employed by all his predecessors. The m. who is most mentioned by the Alexander historians is Aristandros of Telmessos, another city with a reputation for producing m. (Arr. An. 2.3.3-4), although it is not clear whether this was Telmessos in → Karia or in Lykia. Plutarch (Alex. 2.3) describes him interpreting a dream of → Philip II before the birth of Alexander, while references to his activities stop after 328, suggesting that he may have died around them. He is mentioned most frequently by Arrian in his Anabasis, who depicts him as accurately using a wide range of skills, including the interpretation of omens such as sweating statues (1.11.2), the flight of birds (1.25.6-8), dreams (2.18.1-2), astrological signs (3.7.6-7), and entrails (4.4.3). Arrian’s presentation of Aristandros is extremely positive, as is Plutarch’s. Curtius, who shares a widespread Roman disdain for non-Roman forms of divination, is more sceptical about some of the omens interpreted by Aristandros (e.g. 4.15.26-27) but does not depict occasions when he is actually in error. In the period after 328 a number of other m. are named as serving Alexander, including Demophon (Arr. An. 7.26.2; Curt. 9.4.27-29; Diod. 17.98.3-4) and Peithagoras (Arr. An. 7.18.1-5) or Pythagoras (Plut. Alex. 73.2). Alexander also made use of non-Greek diviners. As is clear from the Babylonian documentary record as well as the Alexander historians, he relied on the guidance of Babylonian diviners while he was in → Babylon (Arr. An. 3.16.5; Curt. 5.1.22; Diod. 17.112.1-4; Plut. Alex. 74.1), and he also used the services of Magoi in Persis (Arr. An. 7.11.8); but we also have references to the use of Egyptian diviners in Mesopotamia (Curt. 4.13.15), and Babylonians in → India (Plut. Alex. 57.3-5). Stories about m., like stories about divination more generally, cannot always be taken at face value, as the unexpected fulfilment of prophecies is a crucial narrative device, used by historians from → Herodotos onwards. Similarly, suggestions that Alexander abandoned divina330

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tion as ‘superstition’ for a while in favour of rational philosophy (Curt. 7.7.8-9; Diod. 17.112.5) may reflect the preoccupations of later authors: divination was so basic a part of statecraft in the time of Alexander and his predecessors that it is inconceivable that they would not have continued to consult m.   H. Bowden Cf. Bowden, H., The Eagle has Landed: Divination in the Alexander Historians, in: Howe, T. et al. (eds.), Ancient Historiography on War & Empire, 2016, 149-68; Flower, M., The Seer in Ancient Greece, 2008.

Marriage policy Despite the limited nature of extant evidence, it is possible to make some generalizations about Argead marriage patterns over several centuries. One can, on the basis of available evidence, discern apparent marriage policy as well, in respect to the marriages of the kings themselves, their daughters, and their sons. These patterns and policies, however, were not the same for the children of the kings as for the kings themselves. Moreover, the marriages of royal daughters suggest a different pattern and a different policy from those arranged for kings’ sons. → Philip II and → Alexander III certainly practiced polygamy (Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557B-E; Arr. An. 4.19.5; Curt. 8.4.24-26; Diod. 17.36.2; Plut. Alex. 77.4); → Amyntas III probably did (Just. 7.4.5), and many earlier kings may have as well, possibly inspired by Achaimenid practice. Alternatively, the dangers and disorders of the kingdom may have encouraged royal polygamy, though poly­ gamy nearly institutionalized dynastic strife since it often produced many heirs; mothers of prospective heirs consequently tended to become advocates for the succession of their sons (Aischin. 2.26-29; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler). Neither royal sons (until they were kings themselves) nor daughters, however, practiced polygamy, so far as we know. Before Philip II, it is not certain whether any king’s bride was a non-Makedonian (Eurydike, Philip’s mother, however, may well have been Illyrian or partly Illyrian; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler; Plut. Mor. 14C) and some brides were Argeads themselves or the widows of other Argeads. The projected (but never accomplished) marriage of the daughter of Pixodaros, satrap of → Karia, to → Arrhidaios would have been the first to involve a king’s son and a foreign bride (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3), whereas about half of the marriages of kings’ daughters involved foreign grooms (Hdt. 5.21, 8.136;

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Thuc. 2.101.6; Diod. 16.91.4-93.2; Just. 9.6.1-3; Arr. An. 1.5.4-5), though there were certainly also marriages (or intended marriages) to Makedonians, even other Argeads (Arist. Pol. 1311B; Arr. Succ. F 1.22; Polyain. 8.60). The marriage patterns just described changed in the reigns of Philip and Alexander. Philip practiced polygamy on an unprecedented scale; significantly 5 of his 7 wives were non-Makedonian (Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557B-E); Alexander had only three wives but all were Asian and none Makedonian (Arr. An. 4.19.5, 7.4.4-6; Plut. Alex. 47.4, 70.2; Plut. Mor. 329E; 332C; 338D-E; Curt. 8.4.24-26; 10.3.11-12; Aristob., BNJ 139, F 52; Just. 12.10.9-10; Diod. 17.107.6). This marked increase in marriages to foreign brides mirrors the expansionist nature of Makedonian power during these two reigns. Perhaps not coincidentally, Philip’s last marriage, to a Makedonian woman named Kleopatra, precipitated conflict within the dynasty (Plut. Alex. 9.3-6; Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557D-E) and kingdom and threatened the → succession of Alexander, whose mother was the non-Makedonian → Olympias (a daughter of the Aiakid king of Molossia: Plut. Alex. 2.2-4; Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557C). After the death of Alexander, however, royal marriage patterns seemed to turn inward instead of further expanding: Philip III Arrhi­ daios married another Argead, his niece Adea Eurydike (Arr. Succ. F 1.23; Polyain. 8.60) and all of the projected marriages of Alexander’s sister → Kleopatra were to members of the Makedonian elite, some of them already related to the royal house (Diod. 20.37.4). Alexander’s half-sister Thessalonike married → Kassandros, the son of → Antipatros (Diod. 19.52.1-2; Just. 14.6.13; Heidel. Epit., FGrH 155 F 2.4) and → Alexander IV may have been engaged to an Aiakid, Olympias’ great niece (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.3). At this stage, however, granted the intermarriage and political interconnections of the Argeads and Aiakids, it is problematic to categorize this engagement as a foreign marriage since it was consolidationist, functioning in nearly the same way as marriage to another Argead. That none of the Successors married Kleopatra, Alexander’s full sister, despite her association with Alexander’s empire, is suggestive of the priorities of the Successors. Chance played a role in her failure to remarry, but so did an initial preference, albeit short term, for the daughters of Antipatros; indeed, it was not chance that, in the end, descendants of Antipatros, not those of Philip and Alexander, ruled in Makedonia. While the patterns of Argead marriages seem comparatively clear, whether these patterns arose from specific policy or not is more difficult to say and harder to prove. One reason for this difficulty is the nature of surviving evidence. Rarely are royal → women, prior to Philip’s mother Eurydike, named, 332

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given a patronymic, or any kind of indication of ethnicity. When ancient sources do provide evidence about royal marriages that very information often appears because something atypical has happened. We know, for instance, that Pixo­ daros, the Karian satrap, was involved with Philip in negotiations for the marriage of his daughter only because Alexander tried to replace his half-brother Arrhidaios as groom (Plut. Alex. 10.2-3). Had Arrhidaios actually married her and Alexander not tried to intervene, we might not know. But the real problem is the issue of motivation. Ancient sources, often of Roman date, sometimes impute motives to historical characters, but no good reason exists to believe that they have any evidence for this supposed motivation; moreover, even if we possessed, for instance, Philip’s possible public statements about the reasons for one of the marriages he arranged, we would have only his official reason. Still, some things seem obvious. Any ancient marriage was intended to produce children, especially male children. Ruling Argeads rarely died at home; many died in battle and more were murdered. For instance, all 6 of Amyntas III’s sons were murdered (Just. 7.5.4-8; 8.3.10; 9.6.3-7.9; Diod. 15.71.1; 16.2.4; Athen. 14.629D; Plut. Pelop. 27.1-3; Dem. 19.195-196; Schol. ad Aischin. 2.29; Diod. 16.2.4-5). Thus, the Argeads needed more children, especially male children, than the ordinary elite family. As we have observed, polygamy clearly prized multiple heirs over stability yet, despite that, one must note that the dynasty ultimately died out because of the absence of viable adult males. Though writers like Plutarch sometimes claimed kings married for love (Plut. Alex. 2.1; 47.4; Plut. Mor. 33C; 338D; Curt. 8.4.24-26; Arr. An. 4.19.5), the marriages, foreign and domestic, about which we have information seemed to function as marriage alliances and that seems to be the dominant assumption about their motivation in our sources. → Herodotos, for instance, claims that → Alexander I prevented Persian displeasure with his actions by offering his sister (and some money) to an important Persian official (5.21; 8.136). Aristotle tells us that → Archelaos offered two of his daughters in marriage, one to deal with an internal threat, the other with an external one (Pol. 1311B). Diodoros connected marriage to Alexan­der’s sister Kleopatra to rule of his empire (20.37.4). Thus it seems reasonable to term these marriages “marriage alliances” because they so often happened in the context of the formation of an alliance or the end of a war. Philip II tried to alleviate his problems with the Molossian dynasty (caused by a perceived insult to Olympias and her son) by marrying his daughter to the king of Molossia (Diod. 16.91.4-93.2); conversely, → Perdikkas’ determination to reject

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the daughter of Antipatros in favour of Kleopatra was read as a political act that precipitated a war and, ultimately, his murder (Diod. 18.23.3, 25.3, 33.1-36.5; Just. 13.6.4-8; Arr. Succ. F 1.28; Plut. Eum. 5-7). What is harder to know is whether kings arranged these marriages with long term goals in mind or whether the brides were simply party favours. In practice, some of such alliances proved ephemeral (for instance, Philip II’s marriage to Meda, daughter of Kothelas, king of the Getai), whereas others endured (his marriage to Olympias, daughter of a Molossian king: it began generations of entanglements and sometimes alliance between the two northern kingdoms). Generalizations about whether the initiator of marriage negotiations or the one initially approached was in a more powerful position are dubious. Typically royal fathers arranged marriages for sons, as was the case of the planned marriage of Arrhidaios to Pixodaros’ daughter (Plut. Alex. 10.1) or Archelaos’ son (Arist. Pol. 1311B). Alexander’s insertion of himself into the negotiations with Pixodaros while his father was still alive was shocking and incurred his father’s wrath and serious punishment (Plut. Alex. 10.2-3). If a royal father had died, his son, now king, might arrange marriages for his sister, as did Alexander I (Hdt. 5.21; 8.136) and Alexander III planned to do for his half-sister Kynnane (Arr. An. 1.5.4-5). While fathers or brothers typically arranged marriages for the women of the dynasty, this was not always the case. Kynnane, daughter of Philip II, supposedly did not want to marry again after she had been widowed and the groom Alexander had found for her died unexpectedly (Polyain. 8.60), but she herself did plan to marry her daughter to Philip III Arrhidaios (Arr. Succ. F 1.22). After the death of Alexander, his sister Kleopatra sometimes sought out possible grooms herself, initiating negotiations with → Leonnatos (Plut. Eum. 3.5) and → Ptolemy (Diod. 20.37.3-6). Olympias seems to have had a role in these marriage negotiations as well (Arr. Succ. F 1.21; Just. 13.6.4). In some cases a marriage alliance may have been forced upon a royal woman. → Kassandros, for instance, married Thessalonike immediately after he had won the siege of → Pydna (Diod. 19.52.1-2; Heidel. Epit., FGrH 155 F 2.4) and → Antigonos’ claim that Kassandros had forced the marriage (Diod. 19.61.2) is plausible. We do not know if Eurydike, widow of Amyntas III, actually did marry → Ptolemy of Aloros (the sole evidence is the scholiast for Aischin. 2.29) and we also do not know if it was a forced marriage or one of her own choosing or that of her eldest son → Alexander II or even that of the Theban leader Pelopidas. Brides in marriage alliances were not necessarily passive pawns, though some probably were. Marriages, after all, were understood to 334

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establish or confirm philia; philia relationships were always seen as reciprocal. Wives probably brought with them an entourage of sorts, though some women would have had a much larger and stronger support group than others (and the absence of such a group could limit the power of a royal wife, as in the case of → Rhoxane, the first of Alexander III’s wives). These wives seem to have continued to represent their families of birth in the courts of their husbands. Connections between royal wives and the dynasty of their birth could remain powerful. Olympias twice withdrew to her native Molossia when she considered the situation in Makedonia too hostile and twice returned (Plut. Alex. 9.4-5; Just. 9.7.5-7; Diod. 18.49.4; Plut. Mor. 179C; Diod. 18.49.4, 57.2, 65.1; 19.11.1-9). The current Molossian king (her nephew) twice aided her military efforts, at great risk to his own career (Diod.19.11.2-4, 36.2-5; Paus. 1.11.4; Just. 13.3.16-18). Kassandros had Olympias murdered and forbid her → burial (Diod. 17.118.2; 19.51.2-6; Paus. 9.7.2; Just. 14.6.6-12), but Aiakids ultimately arranged her burial and celebrated her and their common ancestry. That a generation or two later, a second “Olympias” ruled in Molossia and allied herself with the king of Makedonia is proof of the endurance of the connection to this royal wife’s birth family (Just. 28.1.1-4, 3.1-3). Philip II turned his daughter Kleopatra’s wedding into an international event. He wanted to publicize to the international Greek world the end of his quarrels with Alexander and Olympias and to flaunt his wealth, magnificence, culture, and godlike power by the splendor of the wedding celebrations. Hellenistic kings would follow his model and expand upon it, one that certainly confirms an understanding of these royal marriages as alliances (Diod. 18.92.1-93.2). These grand weddings also connected the general populace to the dynasty by tying dynastic events to the life of the people. The same applies to the funerals of royal wives. Whoever the woman buried in the antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina, she was buried with splendor, a burial that paralleled that of the man in the main tomb, one that apparently recognized the distinctive nature of the culture that had produced her by including assorted military items in her burial. Other rich burials at Vergina of women, likely royal wives, confirm their lasting importance: marriage alliances lasted till death, though some certainly proved more important than others.   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney, E.D., Commemoration of a royal woman as a Warrior: The Burial in the Antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina, SyllClass 27 (2016), 109-49; Carney 2017; Greenwalt 1989; Müller 2013; Ogden 1999.

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Marsyas of Pella

Marsyas of Pella According to the Suda (s.v. Marsyas Periandrou Pellaios μ 227 Adler = Marsyas, BNJ 135-136 T 1), Marsyas was the son of Periandros, a Makedonian from → Pella. The Suda also claims that M. was a half-brother of → Antigonos Monophthalmos (confirmed by Plut. Mor. 182C); because they do not have the same father, M. is likely the offspring of a subsequent marriage by their shared mother. Although M. appears to have played a military role in → Alexander III’s expedition to Asia, he is best known as the author of a historiographical work on Makedonia (Makedonika) in 10 books. Although the scope of his Makedonika extended from the earliest times to Alexander’s departure from → Egypt in 331, the bulk of the work focused upon events of the 4th c., especially → Philip II’s unification of Makedonia and his relations with the Greek poleis. The Suda identifies M. as a syntrophos of Alexander, and the emphasis in his Makedonika on contemporary or near contemporary material suggests that he was at least a coeval of Alexander, although the degree of intimacy between the two may have been exaggerated later to legitimize Antigonid claims. Nor is there any credible evidence that M. wrote either an Education of Alexander (Suda) or a work devoted to Alexander himself (Harpokration s.v. Ἀριστίων = Marsyas, BNJ 135-136 F 2), apart from the last two books of his Makedonika. The bulk of the Makedonika concerned events of the 4th c., with an apparent agenda of legitimizing Philip’s conquest of Greece, and M. is less reliable for early periods (e.g., his figure for the length of the regnal years of Perdikkas II seems to be incorrect; F 15). The Suda tells us that the Makedonika covered Alexander’s campaign until he marched into Syria after completing his conquest of Egypt. He seems to have been particularly well informed about diplomatic matters at Alexander’s court (F 2 and F 3), which indicates that he was a member of Alexander’s inner circle. The terminal date of 331 suggests that M. at that point joined his half-brother Antigonos, who was serving as → satrap of Phrygia (cf. Plut. Mor. 182C), and could no longer offer an eyewitness account of Alexander’s campaign. M. is attested later as a navarch for his nephew → Demetrios Poliorketes in his important victory over the fleet of → Ptolemy I in the Battle of Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.4 = Marsyas, BNJ 135-136 T 3). M.’s continuing association with the Antigonids and focus in the Makedonika upon Philip’s consolidation of Makedonia and conquest of Greece suggest that the work was composed in service to an Antigonid agenda, possibly to validate Demetrios’ own claims to both Greece and Makedonia. It is 336

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particularly lamentable that M.’s Makedonika has not survived, as it would have provided a valuable perspective on the reigns of both Philip and Alexander from a contemporary member of the Makedonian elite, who was closely connected with the Argead court and appears to have narrated events from an Antigonid perspective.   F. Pownall Cf. Bucciantini 2015, 152-3; Heckel, W., Marsyas of Pella, Historian of Macedon, Hermes 108 (1980), 444-62; Howe, T., Marsyas of Pella (135-136), BNJ online (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/marsyas-of-pella-135-136-a135-136); Howe, T., Kings Don’t Lie, in: Howe, T. (ed.), Ptolemy I Soter: A Self-Made Man, 2018, 155-84, esp. 174-5; Kegerreis, C., The Cyropaedia among Alexander’s Lost Historians, AncW 46 (2015) 134-61.

Memnon of Rhodos Memnon, a famous Rhodian mercenary general in the 2nd half of the 4th c., was a key figure in a political network of Persian-Greek, particularly Athenian, bonds in the → Aegean. From 336-33, he was a central commander of the Persian defense against the Makedonian invasion of the Achaimenid Empire. As for his family background, M. and his brother Mentor, an equally renowned mercenary general, formed part of the high-ranking house of Artaxerxes II’s grandson Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia, who had married M.’s sister. When Artabazos fell from grace with Artaxerxes III, and after a poorly attested revolt lost his fight for his satrapy in 356/55, M. accompanied his brother-in-law with his family to the → court of → Philip II where they found refuge (Diod. 16.52.3-4). Staying in → Pella until about the mid-340s, M. will have gained some inside knowledge of the Makedonian power structures that will have been useful to him when he met the Makedonians again, this time as their enemy. After Artabazos had been allowed to return to Persia with his family—but without being restored his former satrapy—M. continued to build his career as one of the most influential agents in → Asia Minor, particularly in the Troad where perhaps his estates given to him by the Great King were located, though it is uncertain. Artabazos tied M. even closer to his house by giving him his daughter (thus M.’s niece) Barsine, Mentor’s widow, in marriage. When the Makedonian invasion of Persia began, M. was Dareios III’s trusted

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right-hand man. Under M.’s command, the initial successes of Philip’s advance force under → Parmenion and → Attalos in 336/35, namely the establishment of dependent “democracies” in cities of Asia Minor such as Ephesos, were reversed. M. overthrew the new regimes, defeated the Makedonians at Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros (Polyain. 5.44.3), forced them to give up besieging Pitane (Diod. 17.7.9), and kept them confined to a small beachhead at Abydos. When the Makedonians invaded under → Alexander III in 334, M. was among the generals and satraps of Asia Minor ordered by Dareios III to intercept the intruders after their landing and beat them back, supported by troops from other parts of the empire. The Greek tradition that allegedly, at Zeleia, M. advocated a scorched-earth policy that was rejected by his Persian combatants who worried for their land and population (Diod. 17.18.2-3; Arr. An. 1.12.8-9), is untrustworthy. Suspicions that the Persian officials distrusted M. because of his Greek origin are likely Greek bias. When the Persian side failed to stop the Makedonians at → Granikos (334), M., who had fought together with his two sons, escaped and carried on the defense (Arr. An. 1.15.2; Diod. 17.19.4). Miletos fell but the Milesian resistance kept the Makedonians busy, allowing M. to come to the aid of the Karian satrap Orontobates, who fiercely defended the strategically most important naval base of Halikarnassos against the intruders. During this stage of the war, the Persian-Athenian connections were of special importance. At Halikarnassos, M. was supported by the Athenian generals Ephialtes, politically connected with → Demosthenes (Dein. 1.32-33), and Thrasyboulos (Diod. 17.25.6). There were more old Greek acquaintances of M. who sided with the Persians against the Makedonians: the mercenary generals Charidemos and Chares who had both taken refuge in the Achaimenid Empire. When Halikarnassos was partly conquered by the Makedonians, M. escaped to Kos, leaving Orontobates behind to defend the parts of the city the Persians still held. After the fall of Miletos, the Makedonians had disbanded their expensive → fleet (Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. An. 1.20.1). Dareios appointed M. commander-in-chief in the Aegean (Arr. An. 2.1.1), responsible for taking a chance on Persian naval superiority by leading a counterattack with a fleet of about 300 ships and money to hire mercenaries (Diod. 16.29.2, 31.3). Faced with this fierce Persian resistance, the Makedonians had to reconstitute their fleet. Rumours spread that M. planned to sail to Euboia to turn the war on Greece and force the Makedonians to return (Diod. 17.29.3-4; Arr. An. 2.1.1). An alarmed → Antipatros secured the Euboian border (Curt. 3.1.19-20). How338

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ever, there is no sign that M. in fact wanted to attack Greece. The rumours may have been a piece of his psychological warfare. He succeeded in keeping the Makedonian troops in Greece occupied. In spring 333, embarking from Kos, M. seized Chios and several towns on Lesbos, but died unexpectedly of illness in the summer while besieging Mytilene (Arr. An. 2.1.3). The sources tend to exaggerate the impact of his death. Diodoros’ claim that Dareios’ cause was shattered (17.29.4) is dramatized and untrue. M.’s nephew and brother-in-law Pharnabazos, perhaps militarily educated and trained by him, succeeded M. in his position, together with his naval colleague Autophradates, confirmed by Dareios (Arr. An. 2.1.3, 2.1). They carried on M.’s mission that failed only in 332 after the fall of Tyre. M.’s widow Barsine and their newborn baby son, whom M. had sent to Dareios’ camp to keep them safe, were taken captive by the Makedonians after → Issos. While the son suspiciously disappeared from the records, news was spread that Alexander took Barsine as his mistress (Plut. Alex. 21.4; Diod. 17.23.5). At a time when her brother Pharnabazos held on to crucial Aegean and Western Anatolian bases, and her other relatives helped Dareios to levy new forces, this looks like a piece of Makedonian psychological warfare intended to demoralize the commanders of the counterattack—albeit in vain. In contemporary → Athens, the Athenians’ memories of M. and his family were good, probably for their role in resisting the Makedonians: an Athenian honourific decree from 327/6 honours a member of M.’s family (IG II² 356; RO no. 98), currently identified with M.’s nephew Thymondas, best known for commanding the Greek mercenaries against the Makedonians at Issos (Curt. 3.9.2).   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2006, 162; Kholod, M., The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor (336-335 BC), Klio 100 (2018), 407-46; Lambert, S., Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees in the Age of Demosthenes, 2018, 141-43, 404; Müller, S., Argead Macedonia and the Aegean Sea, RicEll 1 (2019), 9-20; Panovski, S./Sarakinski, V., Memnon the Strategist, Macedonian Historical Review 2 (2011), 7-26.

Methone Methone, a Greek city on the coast of Pieria, was an Eretrian foundation. These Eretrians were expelled from Korkyra by the Korinthians, failed to return to Ere­

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tria and then sailed to → Thrace c. 730 (Plut. Mor. 293A-B). Recent excavations support this date. M. was an immediate neighbour of the Makedonian kingdom bordering on the chora of → Pydna in the south and Aloros in the northwest. M. became a member of the Delian League after 431, formed part of the Thracian district and paid three talents of tribute between 430/29 and 415/14. A series of Attic → (M.-) decrees were voted concerning M. between 430/29 and 424/3 (IG I3 61). In these decrees Athens tried to keep M. loyal by asking the city to pay only Athena’s share (1/60) of the current assessment and also by promising special treatment for money owed by M. to the state treasury, as long as the city remained a faithful ally. The first decree mentioned also → Perdikkas II, who had to be asked not to interfere with M.’s trade and not to cross with his troops M.’s territories without M.’s permission. In the second decree M. was given special permission to import grain from Byzantion and was also exempted from military support. (Ps.-)Aristotle wrote a Methonaion politeia (F 551-552 Rose) that mentions parasitoi: two for each archon, and one for each polemarch. M. issued bronze coins with reverse types shared with → Perdikkas III. These might date to the beginning of his reign before the arrival of Timotheos. M. became an ally of Timotheos in 363 (Dein. 1.14). Athenian forces were stationed there at the date of Kallistratos’ escape (Dem. 50.46, 48). The city is mentioned as polis hellenis by Ps.-Skylax (66). Of contemporary date—during the reign of Perdikkas III—is the visit of theoroi from Epidauros (IG IV2 1, 94B8). It is very plausible that the Athenian forces of Mantias together with the pretender Argaios arrived through M. (Diod. 16.2.6). → Philip II besieged and destroyed M. in 354 (Dem. 4.4; Diod. 16.31.4, 34.4-5; Dem. 1.9; Polyain. 4.2.15). It was during this siege that he lost his eye (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 52). The few survivors formed a kome of Pydna.   S. Psoma Cf. Strauss-Clay, J. et al., Panhellenes at Methone. Graphê in Geometric and Protoarchaic Methone, Macedonia (700 BCE), 2017; Hatzopoulos, M.B. et al., Deux sites pour Méthone en Macédoine, BCH 114 (1990), 639-68.

Methone Decrees The so-called Methone Decrees (IG I³ 61; Syll.³ 75 = ML 65) are four fragmentary inscriptional Athenian decrees preserved on marble stelai discovered in → 340

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Methone Decrees

Athens’ theatre of Dionysos. The M. D. attest to the struggle of → Perdikkas II to counter Athenian influence at the Makedonian coast and preserve his political freedom of action. In about 434/31, → Methone joined the Delian League, thus further limiting Makedonian access to the sea. Additionally, being under Athenian control, the coastal city of Methone threatened to become an open gate to intruders into the Argead core with its capital → Aigai. For strategic reasons and in order to protect his realm and the centre of his rule, Perdikkas tried to establish Argead control over the Methonians. His methods to this end are reflected by the contemporary M. D. The inscriptions mention the complaints of the ambassadors from Methone who came to Athens to ask for her support against Makedonian pressure. The dates of the M. D. are partly debated. The most recent one is from 424/3, while the earlier decrees date from either 430/29 or 426. As for the dating of the first decree, a crucial passage contains the statement that the Athenians would be favourable to Perdikkas in case that their soldiers at Poteidaia would praise him (ε[ἰ]π̣ε͂ν δὲ [Π]ερδίκκαι ℎότι ἐὰν ℎοι στρατι[ôται] [ℎοι] ἐμ Ποτειδ[ά]αι ἐπαινôσι γνόμας ἀγαθὰς ℎέ[χσοσι] [περὶ] αὐτô Ἀθε[ν]αῖοι) (ll. 27-29). The reference to Athenian soldiers in Poteidaia may point to a date of either 430/29 or 426. According to the measurements decreed by the Athenians in favour of the Methonians, Perdikkas tried to block the Methonian trade and port and to intimidate the inhabitants by letting Makedonian troops march by (ll. 28-32). It is unclear how he was able to sabotage any sea trade routes without possessing his own → fleet. He will have had some merchant vessels at his disposal but the first Argead who was able to build a fleet was → Philip II. It is assumed that Perdikkas could have hired ‘pirates’—whatever this complex negative label might mean in this specific context—or cooperated with other allies owning a fleet. In any case, the Makedonian actions successfully cut the Methonians off their corn provision and seriously shortened their income. The Athenians reacted by postponing the Methonians’ payment of tribute and granting them a grain supply from their own source in the Black Sea region (l. 35). The M. D. solely attest to the Athenian grain officials called hellespontophylakes, Guards of the Hellespont, in Byzantion, who were instructed to let ships bearing grain to Methone pass. This special treatment intensified the Athenian-Methonian bond. In consequence, the Makedonian attempts to restore the control over Methone failed. Still in Perdikkas’ reign, this proved to be most unfortunate: in 416/5, the Athenians used the Methonian port to channel a raiding patrol consisting of

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341

Metz Epitome; Liber de morte testamentoque Alexandri Magni

Makedonian exiles and Athenian soldiers into Central Makedonia ravaging the territory and so putting Perdikkas under pressure (Thuc. 6.7.3). Methone came under Argead control in 354 when it was conquered by Philip II who thereby lost his right eye (Diod. 16.34.5).   S. Müller Cf. Mattingly, H.B., The Methone Decrees, CQ 11 (1961), 154-65; Müller 2017, 164-7; Rubel, A., Hellespontophylakes—Zöllner am Bosporos?, Klio 83 (2001), 39-51.

Metz Epitome; Liber de morte testamentoque Alexandri Magni The Metz Epitome (ME) and Liber de morte ... (LM) are two late (ca. 4th or 5th c. AD) Latin texts of dubious credibility on the last stages of → Alexander III’s reign. The Medieval codex in Metz (MS Mettensis 500) preserving them was destroyed in WW II but copies survived. In the ms, the LM (87-123) was appended to the ME (1-86); the chapters were numbered consecutively. It is debated whether both texts were compiled by the same anonymous epitomator. The ME is a breviary of a report on Alexander’s campaigns between Hyrkania and South → India treating the → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt, Alexander’s marriage to → Rhoxane, the crossing of the Indos, the battle against Poros, → Boukephalos’ death, the arrival at the → Hyphasis, and Alexander’s (fictitious) battle of wits with the Indian philosophers. The original sources are unknown. Due to some similarities to Curtius, → Kleitarchos is considered an option. The ME’s focus is on Alexander’s military deeds. He is characterized as the successor of Dionysos and Herakles, the first conquerors of the East (ME 34). Episodes likely to blacken his portrait (→ Kleitos’ murder, → Kallisthenes’ downfall, Alexander’s alleged affair with the Amazon queen) are omitted. The text is vague regarding chronology, geography, and topography, often anecdotal and contains inaccuracies such as the claim that Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persis who died during his satrapy’s defense in 330, assisted → Bessos in murdering Dareios III and fled to India (ME 3-4). Similar to the LM, Alexander’s relationship to Rhoxane is idealized as one of love, tenderness, and romance. Her depiction as a faithful caring wife and the unique claim that she lost a baby by him (miscarriage: LM 101; dead son: ME 70) at the Hyphasis or back at the Euphrates implying she accompanied him, may be a propagandistic invention originating from → Perdikkas’ or → Olympias’ efforts to improve 342

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Mieza

Rhoxane’s public standing after 323 and stress → Alexander IV’s legitimacy. The LM on Alexander’s last days and (fictitious) will with its semi-fabulous tone opens with Olympias’ advice to Alexander to remove → Antipatros as a regent in Makedonia (LM 87). Alarmed, Antipatros arranges Alexander’s death by poison with the help of his sons Iollas and → Kassandros (LM 88-89, 96-99). The dying Alexander distributes his empire to his generals, arranges marriages for Rhoxane (with Perdikkas: LM 118) and his sisters, makes the Rhodians the keepers of his testament and caretakers of his beloved mother (while in fact, they revolted after his death), and instructs → Ptolemy to bury his body in → Egypt (LM 107). The LM bears some resemblance to the Greek Alexander Romance but there are also differences such as Rhoxane’s correct identification as the daughter of Oxyartes (118), not Dareios III. The LM is thought to contain genuine propaganda from the wars of the Diadochoi, either in support of Perdikkas against Antipatros (dated in ca. 321) or → Polyperchon against Kassandros and → Antigonos (dated in 317) or Ptolemy on his Greek campaign in 308. The bias against Antipatros’ house is clear. Perdikkas is distinguished, and Ptolemy depicted as the crucial one burying the dead ruler, usually his successor’s task. Ptolemy also had connections to prominently occurring Rhodos where he received cultic honours (OGIS 16). Perhaps, not only one piece of propaganda but different propagandistic claims from different times were encapsulated in the LM.   S. Müller Cf. Baynham, E., An Introduction to the Metz Epitome, Antichthon 29 (1995), 60-77; Bosworth, A.B., Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander, in: Bosworth/Baynham 2000, 20741; Heckel, W., The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great, 1988; Thomas, P.H. (ed.), Epitoma rerum gestarum Alexandri et Liber de morte eius, 1960.

Midas   see Foundation Myth; Gordion knot; Oral tradition Mieza Mieza was a neighbour of Beroia. Two local magistracies of the Hellenistic period, the priest of Asklepios as eponymous archon of the city and the epistates might go back to the reign of → Philip II. More securely dated to Philip’s reign

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Mimallones

is the school that → Aristotle founded at M. (Plut. Alex. 7.4). It has been identified with the building complex at Isvoria, southwest of the city, with three caves, niches, peripatoi, staircases, and stoas. The cults of Asklepios (SEG 24.524), the Nymphs (Plut. Alex. 7.4), Artemis (SEG 24.525, 526), Herakles Kallinikos, and the local river Olganos go certainly back to the Argead period.   S. Psoma Cf. Hatzopoulos/Paschidis 2004.

Milan Papyrus   see Poseidippos of Pella Mimallones Mimallones is a rare name of Makedonian origin for the Bacchants in Kallim. F 503 Pf. Not surprisingly, Kallimachos is the first to use it in poetry in the context of a Makedonian story about the Bacchants, probably in the Aitia: he was a court poet in Ptolemaic → Alexandreia, and the Ptolemies boasted of their Makedonian ancestry from → Alexander III to legitimate their power. We cannot know Kallimachos’ exact treatment of the story, but a reference to Dionysos’ devotees would be well-received at Alexandreia where he was worshipped as the Ptolemies’ divine ancestor. Significantly, in Ptolemy II’s Great Procession, the Makedonian M. are included in the Dionysiac parade (Athen. 5.198E). Polyainos’ tale (4.1) about Argaios, an Argead → proto-historical ruler, may have a Makedonian origin. The victory Argaios gained without fighting over the Illyrian Taulantii occupying his territory was with Dionysos’ support: the M., armed with their thyrsos alone, deceived Argaios’ foes who fled, convinced that the parthenoi were soldiers. As a thanksgiving, Argaios erected an altar to Dionysos Pseudanor (“feigning man”) and ordered the parthenoi, formerly called Klodones by the Makedonians, to be called M. for having imitated men. Possibly, the “sham man” (woman in male garb)/“sham warrior” in Dionysos’ cult inspired the Makedonian tradition of the M. as “sham men” (pseudanores), winning the war without victims. The evocation of Argaios and mention of Dionysos Pseudanor’s cult subsequent to his M.’s decisive action were of propaganda value for Argaios’ descendants. The tale may hint at the Ptolemaic queens whose important role in political and military matters is comparable with the 344

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Mines; mining

Argead royal → women who could perhaps be recognized behind the disguise as Bacchants.   F. Angiò Cf. Hatzopoulos 1994; Stephens, S., Battle of the Books, in: Gutzwiller, K.J. (ed.), The New Posidippus, 2005, 229-48; Voutiras, E., From Macedonia to Ptolemaic Alexandria: The Cult of Dionysos Pseudanor, in: Zerefos, C.S./Vardinoyannis, M.V. (eds.), Hellenistic Alexandria, 2018, 130-5.

Mines; mining Greek sources are interested in the mining of silver and gold but neglect non-precious metals and stone. Silver deposits play some role in numismatic and metallurgic research, with hardly more than initial results as yet. West of the Axios, evidence of ancient m. is missing, except for the silver m. of Damastion (Strab. 7.7.8, NE of modern Ohrid?—the region conquered by → Philip II). East of the Axios, mineralogical surveys have detected numerous deposits of gold, often consisting of alluvial particles accumulated in (former) watercourses. Such gold was easy to collect (cf. Strab. 7 F 34 Jones = F 16.28 Radt) leaving no permanent signs of exploitation. It occurs north of Thessaloniki, in the Strymon region and, above all, in and around Mt. → Pangaion. This zone plays a major role in the ancient tradition. Early m. of silver in the region can be concluded from vast Thraco-Makedonian coin-emissions, but geological data and analyses of local ores are widely missing. When Mt. Pangaion came under Makedonian influence in 357/6, most deposits were largely exhausted, also in the old mining district east of → Philippoi around modern Nea Kavala and Lekani (Skapte Hyle) where galleries and slag heaps are found in many places. In 360, the Thasians tried to re-establish their former mining district in the southern part, but the exploit was hardly so profitable as suggested by Diodoros’ source (16.8.6-7: Theopompos?). Both the Thasian and the Thracian parts of the district became Philip’s personal property in 356/5 (Strab. 7.7.4). Which of the more western m. were controlled by Makedonian rulers before Philip is hard to decide. One of them was located in the hinterland of Stageira. Both precious metals were exploited there, but short of exhaustion, since modern mining activities are still rewarding. There is no information when mining in this small district was conducted by the polis and when by Makedonian rulers who rather early controlled the road

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Mykenai

corridor passing by near Lake Bolbe (cf. Thuc. 1.58.2). This might also be the case for much of the inner Chalkidike down to its three fingers where further m. can be expected feeding the prolific minting at Akanthos and → Olynthos, also civic emissions in many Greek cities of the Chalkidike. West of the Strymon, → Bisaltia was acquired around 476 by → Alexander I who possessed there a temporarily profitable silver mine (Hdt. 5.17.2). Its yields enabled him to mint a large amount of → coinage. But the mine seems to have ceased early since his heavy coins stopped and even the fractions deteriorated, obviously because he lacked the bullion to keep the former standards. Mack’s survey (1964, map, p. 11) does not identify silver in Bisaltia, but lead ores and remains from m. exist in three places just west of Lake Kerkini, near modern Pontekerasia (map: Road Editions 2: Macedonia). Since silver is contained in lead ores, this might be an indication of Alexander’s mine. To the west are strong concentrations of gold deposits in Krestonia, limited to the range between Mt. Dysoron in the north and modern Kilkis (north of Thessaloniki) in the south. The zone belonged early to Makedonia (cf. Hdt. 5.17.2). To judge from his coinage, Philip II commanded plenty of silver early. Much of it originated from Thracian Mt. Rhodope (map: Archibald 1998, 23, fig. 9) since he controlled the Nestos Valley from around 355.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Gale, N.H. et al., Mineralogical and Geographical Silver Sources of Archaic Greek Coinage, in: Metcalf, D.M./Oddy, W.A. (eds.), Metallurgy in Numismatics I, 1980, 3-49; Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, C., ΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΘΑΣΙΑΚΗΣ ΠΕΡΑΙΑΣ, in: ΜΝΗΜΗ Lazaridis, 1990, 493-515; Mack 1964; Unger, H.J., Das Pangaion. Ein altes Bergbauzentrum in Ostmakedonien, PZ 62 (1987), 87-112.

Mykenai Under → Alexander I, at a debated date ca. 468, 466/5, or 460, an uncertain number of refugees from Mykenai located in the Argolis (north of → Argos) fled to Argead Makedonia (Paus. 7.25.6). They were survivors of the destruction and enslavement of M. by Argos as it expanded (Diod. 11.65.2-5). Alternative shelters were Kleonai and Keryneia. It is unclear whether the majority fled to Alexander and to which end he received them. It is partly assumed that he acted in accordance with Argos because of his alleged Argive descent. During his rehabil346

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Names, Makedonian and Argead

itation campaign after having supported his ally Xerxes in the → Persian Wars, Alexander had to prove his status as a free Greek to the Olympian hellano­dikai in order to be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games and claimed to be Argaios because of his family’s descent from the Argive king Temenos. Argos’ representatives confirmed this piece of propaganda (Hdt. 5.22.2; Just. 7.2.14), certainly after a diplomatic arrangement probably including bribery. Alternatively, Alexander is thought to have posed as a Greek benefactor in general in order to stress his claim of descent from Greece’s mythical benefactor Herakles. Or, also to cover up his alliance with Xerxes, he may have styled himself as a “philhellenic” champion welcoming refugees from M. as the Mykenaians had supported the Hellenic League at Thermopylai and Plataiai (Hdt. 7.202; 9.28; ML no. 27). In any case, there is no evidence that Alexander’s reception of the refugees from M. caused any problems with the Argives with whom his successor → Perdikkas II was still on friendly terms (Thuc. 5.80.2).   S. Müller Cf. Geyer 1930, 48; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 103; Müller 2016, 137; Müller 2017, 93-5, 207-11.

Names, Makedonian and Argead Research on Makedonian onomastics is related to the debate on the Makedonian language. However, the dearth of sources imposes serious limits on its identification. In the current controversy, it is mostly seen as a Northwestern Greek dialect with ties to Doric and distinctive phonetic peculiarities (rather than as a separate Indo-European language related to Greek). Hatzopoulos divides the Makedonian onomastic material into four categories: epichoric n. with a clear Greek etymology (e.g., Agerros); panhellenic n. (e.g., Amyntas); identifiable non-Greek n. (e.g., Amadokos); n. without a clear Greek etymo­ logy and not identifiable as non-Greek (e.g., Bordinos). A typical Makedonian name was Perdikkas or Arrhidaios. Highly popular was the name Pausanias. Some n. were Makedonian phonetic variants of Greek n. such as Stadmeas for Stathmeas/Stathmias or Berenike for Pherenike. The latter mirrors a phonetic characteristic mentioned by Plutarch (Mor. 292E): he stated that the Makedonians pronounced β instead of φ, so Philip as Bilip. The earliest epigraphic source (an Attic inscription, however) listing about 80 partly fragmentary

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Names, Makedonian and Argead

Upper and Lower Makedonian and Argead n. is the treaty between → Perdikkas II, → Athens, and Arrhabaios of → Lynkestis, usually dated to 423/2 (IG I³ 89). N. have symbolic value, the potential to trigger associations, and deliver messages. Accordingly, the Argeads used their children’s n. as another platform for the display of their political program, genealogical prestige, and dynasty’s accomplishments. Male Argeads bore the n. either of their close relatives (e.g., → Perdikkas III named his son Amyntas after his father and → Philip II his son Alexander after his brother), ancestors (such as Perdikkas, the name of the dynasty’s founder (Hdt. 8.137.1) that probably was thought to have reflected on its bearer) or mythological figures (Menelaos, Orestes). Speaking n. hinted at political power or military success. → Alexander I called his daughter Stratonike, aiming at military victory (Thuc. 2.101.6). Perdikkas II named his son → Archelaos, ruler of a people. A daughter of Philip II bore the name Thessalonike, victory in Thessaly. → Alexander III’s sister → Kleopatra honoured his defeat of the Theban revolt (that had begun by attacking the Makedonian garrison on the Kadmeia) by calling her baby daughter Kadmeia (Plut. Pyrrh. 5.5). Often, the first son was named after his paternal grandfather (this was also normal Greek practice). Throne names were not an Argead practice. It was only in the turbulent times of change after Alexander III’s death that his half-brother → Arrhidaios’ prestige was increased by the change of his name to Philip after his famous father on the occasion of his acclamation (Curt. 10.7.7; Diod. 18.2.4; Arr. Succ. F 1.1). Similarly, Arrhi­ daios’ wife Adea was renamed Eurydike as a reference to Philip’s mother and the Argead past (Arr. Succ. F 1.23). Another change of a female name mirrors the public status of royal women in a similar way: Philip II’s Epeirote wife Polyxena or Myrtale was renamed → Olympias after her marriage (Plut. Mor. 401A-B), either to commemorate his Olympic victory or stress his piety to the Olympian Gods. Reportedly, later on, for a short time, she was called Strato­ nike (perhaps a reference to her faction’s victory at Euia in 317?)—a name as a statement again.   S. Müller Cf. Carney, E.D., What’s in a Name?, in: Pomeroy, S.B. (ed.), Women’s History and Ancient History, 1991, 157-72; Hatzopoulos, M.B., ‘L’histoire par les noms’ in Macedonia, in: Hornblower, S./Matthews, E. (eds.), Greek Personal Names, 2000, 99-117; Masson, O., Quelques noms macédoniens dans le traité IG I², 71 = IG I³, 89, ZPE 123 (1998), 117-20; Psoma, S., Naming the Argeads, Ktèma 40 (2015), 15-26.

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Naqš-i Rustam

Naqš-i Rustam Naqš-i Rustam was the burial site established by the Achaimenid dynasty’s founder Dareios I located a few km away from the terrace of the palace of → Persepolis. Of the four monumental rock-cut tombs with a cross-shaped facade, only Dareios’ grave can be identified by its trilingual cuneiform inscription (DNa-b). The other tombs are attributed to his successors Xerxes, Artaxerxes I, and Dareios II. The rock-cut tombs of similar shape at Persepolis are believed to be those of the later → Achaimenids. Only → Onesikritos mentions Dareios I’s epitaph citing a Greek translation: “I was a friend to my friends, I was the first of horsemen and archers, I excelled as hunter, I could do everything” (BNJ 134, F 35 ap. Strab. 15.3.8). It is a short version of the authentic Old Persian text of DNb summarizing its essentials, the Great King’s justice and military virtues (such as: “I am a good bowman both afoot and on horseback”: DNb §8h), thus it came from a reliable informant. Indirectly, Onesikritos testifies to a visit to the necropolis. Perhaps also → Alexander III and other members of his → court were shown around at N. during their prolonged stay in Persepolis in 330. If so, this trip was not widely known. Visiting the tomb of Dareios, in Greek eyes the instigator of the → Persian Wars, and even worse, that of his son Xerxes as the ultimate Persian bogeyman next to it, contradicted Makedonian panhellenic war propaganda (→ panhellenism) and the → Alexander historiographers’ panhellenic colouring. Only the Greek Alexander Romance (Ps.-Kall. 2.18) mentions that Alexander came across Xerxes’ tomb, in a literary fantasy stereotypically associated with cruelly mutilated Greek captives he saved (according to Curt. 5.5.3-7; Diod. 17.69.2-4 and Just. 11.14.11-12 he met them on his way to Persepolis, not at Xerxes’ tomb).   S. Müller Cf. Briant 1996, 182-4, 194-5; Kent 1953, 137-41; Müller, S., Onesikritos und das Achaimenidenreich, Anabasis 2 (2012), 45-66, esp. 62-3.

Nearchos Nearchos, son of Androtimos, is called Cretan by many sources (Ps.-Kall. 3.31.8; Diod. 19.69.1; Plut. Eum. 18.3; Polyain. 5.35.1). In Arrian’s Indike (18.4, 10) there are two references to his Cretan origin with the specification that he lived in →

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Nearchos

Amphipolis: ipso facto he was assimilated to the Makedonians. Similarly, in the detailed list of participants of the naval expedition (Ind. 18.4) N., Laomedon of Mytilene and Androsthenes of Thasos are counted as Makedonians and not as Greeks (Ind. 18.7: οὗτοι μὲν οἱ σύμπαντες Μακεδόνες: all these were Makedonians). According to Arrian (An. 3.6.5), N. was exiled with → Harpalos, → Ptolemy son of Lagos, Laomedon and his brother Erygios: on one hand, it has been assumed that N. was the same age as → Alexander III but, on the other hand, it is possible that N. was a little older, because the → hetairoi were counselors of the young ‘prince’ and, at the same time, syntrophoi, who lived and were educated at → court. In the absence of information on the dates of birth and death of N., it is only possible to suppose that his father Androtimos arrived in Makedonia from Crete, probably attracted by the distribution of lands by → Philip II after the conquest of Amphipolis in 357, and also by the commercial potential of Amphipolis, a thriving city on the Strymon river. N.’s exile could be linked to the help offered by his friends to Alexander (between 337 and 336): according to Plutarch (Alex. 10.1-3), the young ‘prince’ interfered with the plans of Pixodaros, satrap of → Karia, who wanted to give his daughter in marriage to → Arrhidaios. Moreover, the reasons for the exile are also linked to the problems arisen between son and father following Philip’s marriage to Kleopatra. Due to the open conflict between Philip and Alexander at the wedding, Alexander left Pella with a few friends and his mother. It is difficult to understand the real motivation of the exile: the ancient sources nevertheless link the problem between Philip and Alexander to the marriage and, implicitly, to the question of → succession. N. did not return to the court together with Alexander, according to Plutarch (Alex. 9), but only immediately after the death of Philip, who considered his son’s friendships at least as dangerous as Alexander considered them important. According to Arrian (An. 3.6.5-6), as soon as N. returned from exile, he was appointed satrap of Lykia, but this chronology cannot be correct because the assignment seems to be related to Alexander’s later conquest of the Western satrapies. As the satrap of Lykia, N. remained there from autumn 334-30, and in the winter of 329/8 he followed Alexander and met him at Zariaspa in Baktria (BNJ 133 T5). During the invasion of → India (327), N. was with Antiochos, the chiliarchos of the hypaspists, an elite troop of infantry (cf. Arr. An. 4.30.5). When Alexander decided to return to Babylonia and ordered the construction of a large → fleet, N. was appointed the admiral (nauarchos): in September 325, after descending for 8 months to the mouth of the Indos, N. sailed along the 350

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Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Euphrates and then arrived at Sousa in March 324. In the spring of 323, Alexander was getting ready for a new naval expedition to the Arabian coast. Plutarch (Alex. 75.3) informs us that the king gave a splendid entertainment to N. and intended to give him supreme command over the fleet. Alexander’s death changed the plans. N. participated in the discussions about the organization of Alexander’s empire (Curt. 10.6.10-16) and sided with those who argued in favour of the succession of → Herakles, son of Alexander and Barsine and N.’s brother-in-law. After Alexander’s death, we know only (BNJ 133 T 13a; T13c) that N. was in the service of → Antigonos and placed by him alongside his son → Demetrios. N.’s periplous is preserved largely by Arrian’s Indike, which contains in the second part (17.9-42.10) the description of the voyage of 6 months, of which no more than four were of actual navigation (i.e., on the water): the expedition aimed not only at discovering a new route, which would allow the maritime return of the army to Sousa but also at the first exploration of the coastline from the mouth of the Indos to the Euphrates, including Karmania, the region of the Ichthyophagoi, Persia, and Sousiana, resulting in a detailed description. N.’s navigation has three main sections: the descent of the great Indian rivers up to the mouth of the Indos (kataplous), coastal navigation up to the mouth of the Euphrates (paraplous/periplous), and ascent towards Sousa (anaplous). The purpose of this journey is explained by Arrian who attributes to Alexander the pothos to “reconnoiter the coasts that lay on the line of the voyage and the roadsteads and islets, to explore thoroughly every bay which they found, to learn about all the cities on the sea-coast, and to discover which land was fruitful and which desert” (Ind. 32.11). The Indike has a rather elaborate literary form, available through and despite the filter of Arrian, and it is possible to discern glimpses of N.’s literary work of which the title is not mentioned by our sources. As for the title, there exist different hypotheses such as, e.g., paraplous or periplous, which is, in my opinion, not satisfactory, because it refers only to a report on the expedition, whereas there are also descriptions beyond the navigation, which expand the boundaries of the work. In fact, N.’s description, which comes down to us only in fragments, shows that it is a special report of navigation with epic tones. The behavior of the nauarchos is evocative of that of the Homeric heroes: it is no longer only a periplous, intended as a guidebook for future navigation, but a kind of Alexandergeschichte. N. styled himself as a great protagonist with aspects even of self-glorification: the emphasis on his “return”—as a kind of nostos—was very important to highlight his role in an

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expedition of epic magnitude. If on one hand, Alexander is the new → Achilles, fighting in a foreign land, on the other hand, N. returning from afar by sea, recalls the adventures of Odysseus: both ancient heroes were celebrated by the Homeric epics. This is a central aspect of Arrian’s modus narrandi: he wanted to inspire the emperor Hadrian just as the Homeric epics did for Alexander. To N., son of Androtimos, is also a dedication at Delphi (Syll.3 266): the nauarchos was identified not only with the patronymic but also with the provenance (of Crete) and received for himself and his descendants the proxenia, promanteia, proedria, prodikia, asylia, and → ateleia. The inscription is difficult to date, because the last part of the stone is broken at the bottom: on one hand, it could be linked to Alexander’s visit to Delphi (between 336 and 335) that correlated also to N.’s exile, on the other hand it could be related to honours for N. and his family for the success of the naval expedition from India to Sousa and dates therefore between ca. 314 until a date around 292, when N.’s literary work should have been widely known.   V. Bucciantini Cf. Albaladejo Vivero, M., La India en la literatura griega: un estudio etnográfico, 2005, 97-130; Badian, E., Nearchus the Cretan, YClS 24 (1975), 147-70; Bucciantini 2015, 9-85; Wirth, G., Nearchos der Flottenchef, Acta Conventus XI Eirene, 1971, 615-39.

Nikias Nikias, son of Nikeratos (ca. 470-13), was an Athenian strategos in the → Pelo­ ponnesian War. N. crossed the path of → Perdikkas II when he was sent to Northern Greece to cope with the rebellious allies of → Athens’ First Naval League. In 423/2, when N. operated before Mende and Skione (Diod. 12.72.7), Perdikkas contacted him in order to negotiate a peace with Athens. Portraying Perdikkas as a deceiving, unreliable crook, → Thucydides claims that the cautious N. demanded proof of Perdikkas’ trustworthiness first (4.132.2). Maybe Perdikkas improved his standing with N. by using his Thessalian connections in order to block the passage of a Spartan reinforcement (Thuc. 4.132.2). The peace was decreed. However, according to Thucydides, Perdikkas failed to send troops when N. wanted to campaign against the Thracian → Chalkidians and → Amphipolis (5.83.4). It is debated whether N.’s demand dated to 417/6 (when Athens declared war against Perdikkas) or to 422 when he still operated in the 352

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Chalkidike. In any case, in order to justify his failure in Athens, N. seems to have put the blame entirely on Perdikkas. In 422, the Athenian strategos Kleon also asked for Makedonian troops to support his fight for Amphipolis. Nothing is heard of any Makedonian participation in the battle that cost Kleon and his Spartan opponent Brasidas their lives. In 421, N. engineered the Peace of N. between Athens and → Sparta, a 50-year treaty granting Athens control over her rebellious allies and Amphipolis which she, however, failed to regain. The peace collapsed after 7 years; the war went on. From an Argead perspective, an autonomous Amphipolis was preferable while Athens’ disaster in the Sicilian expedition, inevitably associated with N., loosened the Athenian grip on Makedonia.   S. Müller Cf. Geske, N., Nikias und das Volk von Athen im Archidamischen Krieg, 2005, 153-61; Müller 2017, 196-201; Roisman 2010, 153; Tritle 2010.

Nobility There exists no ancient synonymous term for ‘nobility’; its modern usage is often associated with anachronistic ideas of medieval or early modern n. Used in scholarly literature on the Argeads, n. basically means the leading families in Makedonia, which descend from its gentile associations (clans). There is no written evidence on this group of landowners and mounted warriors before → Philip II. Noble families by then had to send their sons to the Makedonian → court as → basilikoi paides. They were educated together with the heir apparent (e.g., strategic, military, political lessons) in order to create a strong bond with the ruling house and to the end of preparing them for a career in the army or administration. In their adult years some of the n.—this was no fixed procedure—followed the ruler in war as → hetairoi (mounted elite companions) or occasionally served him as → somatophylakes (bodyguards). The Argead ruler supported and promoted the n. in order to achieve his political (and military) goals. The Makedonian n. was a group of high-ranking political agents serving the Argead rulers in the fields of administration, army, court, and diplomacy. They were often distinguished by royal gifts of land (→ dorea). It is generally believed that when an Argead ruler was acclaimed by the → Makedonian army assembly the members of the n. were those who directed the votes. However,

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the extent of the actual decision-making power of this assembly is debated and probably depended on the power of the king. The n. regarded their king as a → primus inter pares, but its freedom of action ultimately depended on the ruler’s power. The court, in the sense of a great oikos, served the Argead ruler as a political instrument to control the leading families and tie them to him. The courtly symposia provided the framework for communication among these elites and the display of their status. Less visible are the Makedonian → wo­ men, although they seem to have played a role similar to aristocratic women in the archaic period of Greece. Most of our information is on royal women, and the lived reality of Makedonian women outside this social group is much less visible. Elite Makedonian women are involved in marriage alliances with other high-ranking families in and outside Makedonia and with the royal family, an essential component of social capital, and to ensure the transmission of power from generation to generation. Due to the military successes of Philip II, the ancestral leading classes increasingly found themselves facing a group of “new men” chosen as friends (→ philoi) and confidants by the rulers at the Argead court in order to curb the influence of the “old elite”. For example, the conspiracy of Hermolaos is generally thought to have reflected conflicts between the “conservative” Makedonian elite and the supporters of Alexander’s new regal style who built their careers after the elimination of → Philotas and → Parmenion in 330. Increasing urbanization in the late 4th c. tied the leading families at the same time to the urban centres and created a scope of action beyond the court and the person of the Makedonian king.   B. Truschnegg Cf. Carney, E.D., Macedonian Women, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 409-27, esp. 409-18; Müller 2016, 24-40; Strootman 2014, 1-42; Hammond 1989, 49-64; Sawada, N., Social Customs and Institutions: Aspects of Macedonian Elite Society, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 409-27.

Olympias Olympias (ca. 373-16), the daughter of Neoptolemos, king of Molossia, married → Philip II of Makedonia. They had two children, → Alexander III (the Great) and → Kleopatra. O.’s dynasty, the Aiakids, claimed descent from Neoptolemos, son of → Achilles, and from the family of Priamos (Pind. Nem. 4.51-53, 7.38-39; 354

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Eur. Andr. 1246-1249). Women in Molossia functioned more independently than in many other places in the Greek peninsula. O.’s father Neoptolemos had three children: the future Alexander I of Molossia, O., and Troas. At first he ruled alone, but later shared rule with his brother Arrhybbas (Paus. 1.11.3). After Neoptolemos died, Arrhybbas was sole ruler and married Troas, by whom he had a son Aiakides. Arrhybbas also served as guardian for O. and her brother. Illyrians under Bardylis invaded Molossia c. 360, but Arrhybbas defeated them (Frontin. 2.5.19). Bardylis next invaded Makedonia, killing → Perdikkas III and 4000 others. Philip II succeeded his brother and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Illyrians. Philip met with Arrhybbas and became betrothed to O. on the island of Samothrake (where all three became initiates); the betrothal could have happened earlier, but the marriage took place c. 357. Plutarch (Alex. 2.1) to the contrary, this was a marriage alliance, uniting these two northern kingdoms against their common enemy. O. thus became Philip’s 4th or perhaps 5th wife (Satyros ap. Ath. 13.557C-E). Philip’s newest wife may not yet have been known as “O.” since Plutarch (Mor. 401B; see also Just. 12.7.13) says that Polyxena, Myrtale, and Stratonike were all names she was known by and that “O.” was not her earliest name. At least three other Aiakids probably accompanied (or soon after followed) O. to Makedonia: Leonidas, her son Alexander’s tutor (Plut. Alex. 5.4), Arrhybbas, a royal bodyguard (Arr. An. 3.5.5), and another Neoptolemos (Arr. An. 2.27.6). There were probably female Molossians at court as well. Though Molossia and Makedonia seemed relatively equal powers at the time of O.’s marriage, Makedonia soon overshadowed Molossia. O.’s brother Alexander also arrived in the Makedonian → court, possibly serving as one of the → basilikoi paides; perhaps Arrhybbas (who had sons of his own), hoped to get his nephew out of Molossia, but Philip seems to have managed to win the young Aiakid’s confidence (though not necessarily by sexual means as Just. 8.6.4-8 claims) and in the end Philip drove Arrhybbas out and put young Alexander on the Molossian throne c. 342 (Just. 8.6.7-8; 17.3.14-15; Trog. Prol. 8; Diod. 16.72.1). Philip’s championship of O.’s brother doubtless derived from policy, though it must also have increased O.’s prestige. Long before that, the birth of her son (356) and daughter (ca. 355 or 354) did even more to increase her prestige, particularly once it became clear that Philip’s only other son → Arrhidaios (later Philip III) had some sort of mental difficulties (Plut. Alex. 77.5 likely falsely attributes it to O.’s use of drugs or magic). During most of Philip’s reign we hear little of O. She is said to be fond of Dionysiac rites (including sponsoring a women’s festival)

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and generally things involving snakes (Plut. Alex. 2.3-6) and apparently was responsible for ritual involving not only Dionysiac but Argead rites (Athen. 13.560F; 14.659F). Plutarch (Alex. 9.3-10.4) pictures her as close, perhaps too close to her son when he was young, but granted Philip’s many absences on campaign and the rivalry with other wives and their children, this is likely enough to be true. O.’s son and thus O. seemed to be dominant at court by the time he had reached his teens, but soon after Philip’s great victory in 338 at → Chaironeia (in which Alexander had played a prominent part: Plut. Alex. 9.2), Alexander and O. left Makedonia for Molossia (though Alexander traveled on) because of an insult offered to Alexander during the drinking after Philip’s 7th wedding (to a Makedonian girl named Kleopatra, whose guardian was her uncle → Attalos). Attalos seemed to question publicly Alexander’s legitimacy (whether literal, ethnic, or simply in comparison to a potential child of Kleopatra is unclear) and Philip either tolerated the insult or actually supported it and threatened his son (Plut. Alex. 9.3-5; Satyros ap. Athen. 13.557D-E, 560C; Just. 9.7.5-7). At this time or later, at the urging of Alexander’s friends and mother, he interjected himself into marriage negotiations between the daughter of the satrap of → Karia and Arrhidaios, Alexander’s half-brother; Philip was furious and sent several of Alexander’s philoi into exile (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3). A public reconciliation between father and son was, however, affected and both Alexander and O. returned, and Philip almost certainly arranged the marriage between Kleopatra, his daughter by O., and O.’s brother, the king of Molossia, in order to publicize to the entire Greek world their reconciliation, just prior to his planned departure for the Asian campaign (Diod. 16.91.4-92.5; Plut. Alex. 9.6). During the wedding celebrations, c. 336, however, a bodyguard of Philip and former lover, named → Pausanias, assassinated the king because he believed that Philip had failed to give him redress for a gang rape Attalos and his niece had organized to punish Pausanias for perceived wrong to an associate of theirs (Plut. Alex. 10.4; Paus. 7.7.5; Just. 69.6.1-7.14; Diod. 16.93.1-94.4). Not surprisingly, many suspected that Alexander and/or O. had supported Pausanias’ actions and O. seems to have had Kleopatra (and probably a baby she had) killed comparatively soon after Philip’s murder. Their involvement in Philip’s death is possible but hardly certain. Alexander quickly dealt with various internal and external threats with convincing violence, was recognized as the leader of the → Korinthian League, and departed for Asia in 334 at the head of a Greco-Makedonian force. On his departure, Alexander entrusted Greek and Makedonian matters to → 356

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Antipatros, the distinguished general and diplomat (Arr. An. 1.11.3; Diod. 17.118.1; 18.12.1). O. remained in Makedonia. Alexander sent her plunder; perhaps from this wealth O. made a rich dedication at Delphi and to the goddess Hygieia at Athens, perhaps on behalf of her son (Plut. Alex. 25.4; Syll.³ 252N 5-8; Hyp. 4.19). Literary tradition refers to a voluminous correspondence between mother and son. In it, O. apparently attacked a number of people she considered dangerous to her son’s interest, and Alexander kept her letters secret from all except → Hephaistion (Curt. 7. 1.36-40; Diod. 17.32.1-2, 114.3; Plut. Alex. 39.5; Plut. Mor. 180D; 333A; 340A). Many of O.’s complaints were about → Antipatros. Plutarch (Alex. 39.7) claims that Alexander did not allow O. to engage in public affairs or in campaigns and that he simply put up with her difficult behavior, but he also says that Antipatros’ long list of complaints against her mattered less than one of her tears. As the years of Alexander’s absence lengthened, relations between O. and Antipatros deteriorated and at some point (c. 331/30: Liv. 8.24.17; Hyp. 4.25) O. left Makedonia for Molossia where her now widowed daughter Kleopatra apparently served as guardian/regent for her very young son. Diodoros (18.49.4) claimed that O. fled Makedonia because she had quarreled with Antipatros, and Pausanias (1.11.3) stated that she left out of fear of Antipatros. She was probably not in actual danger, but did appear to have less influence than Antipatros. The nature of the dispute between O. and Antipatros is not clear, though Arrian (An. 7.12.6-7) suggests that O. (apparently in Antipatros’ view) displayed a number of “unfeminine” traits (stubbornness, officiousness) and that she considered Antipatros immoderate, too conscious of his rank, and forgetful about who had appointed him. Other incidents suggest that she challenged Antipatros’ authority within the Greek world (Diod. 17.32.1, 108.7; Curt. 7.1.36-40). → Hypereides links O. and the Makedonians (4.20), indicating a perceived connection. In Molossia, O. and Kleopatra apparently came to share power and authority. In a time of grain scarcity, both (O. twice) received grain from Kyrene (probably enabling others to avoid famine priced grain) and both appear on the list like heads of state, though whether for Molossia or Makedonia is not clear (SEG 9.2). O. unequivocally told the Athenians that Molossia belonged to her (Hyp. 4.25). At some point, Kleopatra left Molossia for Makedonia but O. remained. Plutarch (Alex. 68.3) says that, late in Alexander’s reign, restlessness and desire for change had developed, O. and Kleopatra raised a faction against Antipatros, divided Alexander’s kingdom, and that O. took → Epeiros and Kleopatra Makedonia. The literal truth of Plutarch’s assertion remains unclear. In

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324, Alexander called Antipatros to Babylon, planning to replace him with → Krateros (Arr. An. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9), but at the time of Alexander’s death, Antipatros remained in Makedonia. O.’s tears, as well as other factors, had done their work. When Alexander died suddenly in Babylon, many suspected Antipatros and his sons; we know that O. later did and probably did from the start (Diod. 19.11.8; Plut. Alex. 77.1). Without Alexander’s protection, O. and Kleopatra now sought a husband for the widow (Plut. Eum. 3.5; Arr. Succ. F 1.21; Just. 13.6.4). Soon Kleopatra left Makedonia and spent the rest of her life in Asia, much of it in captivity. O. long remained in Molossia where her uncle Arrhybbas may briefly have returned as king (Diod. 18.11.1), long enough to change sides and support the Makedonians in the Lamian War (though Diod. 16.72.1 says he was dead at some point in the 340s; cf. Just. 7.6.12). In any event, his son Aiakides, O.’s nephew, became king, probably co-ruling with O.’s young grandson Neoptolemos II. O. may well have invited Aiakides to take this position in return for military support. So matters remained until Antipatros, who had become the guardian of the Makedonian co-kings → Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhi­ daios, and brought them to Greece, died in 319. → Polyperchon became the new guardian of the kings; he soon invited O. to return to Makedonia and take over responsibility for her grandson Alexander IV and to assume some sort of public role, epimeleia, in terms of her grandson (Diod. 18.49.4), but O. refused his offer at least once and probably twice before she finally agreed. She now feared → Kassandros whom she blamed for Alexander’s death and who wanted to overthrow Polyperchon, and she distrusted almost all the Successors (Diod. 18.49.4, 57.2, 58.3-4). O. finally decided to go back to Makedonia in fall of 317, in the forefront of an army (possibly dressed as a Bacchant; Douris ap. Athen. 13.560F) made up of Molossian and Makedonian troops led by Aiakides and Polyperchon (Diod. 19.11.2-9; Just. 14.5.1-10). Probably she thought, if there were any hope for her grandson to live to rule in fact, the other co-king Philip III Arrhidaios and his Argead wife Adea Eurydike had to be eliminated, especially since Adea Eurydike had recently allied herself with Kassandros (Just. 14.5.1-2). When the home Makedonian army saw O., wife of Philip and mother of Alexander, they deserted the other royal pair and went over to O.’s forces. Granted that Argeads had, for generations, been killing each other off in the course of struggles for the throne, the Makedonian probably expected O. to kill Philip III Arrhidaios and Adea Eurydike, but not for O. to wall them up first, as she apparently did; popular opinion condemned this and so O. soon compelled their deaths (Diod. 358

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19.11.4-7; Just. 14.5.10). Apparently trying to wipe out Kassandros’ faction, she killed one of his brothers, dishonoured the grave of the brother supposedly responsible for Alexander’s death, and had a large number of Kassandros’ followers killed (Diod. 19.11.8-9; Just. 14.6.1; Plut. Alex. 77.1; Paus. 1.11.3-4). O.’s actions cost her some support (though males had done much the same), but her real loss of support came when Kassandros (who had been in the Peloponnese) returned with an army in 317 or 316 and consistently out-generaled Polyperchon and his allies, thus causing other supporters to fade away. O. ensconced herself in → Pydna and was besieged. Aristonous, a bodyguard of Alexander, did little to support her and himself withdrew to → Amphipolis. → Eumenes, an ally of O., died in Asia and though Aiakides once more tried to march the Molossians to O.’s aid, his troops revolted, exiled Aiakides, and allied themselves with Kassandros, either out of hatred of O. or of Aiakides’ opposition to Kassandros, the likely victor (Diod. 19.35.2.-3, 36.2-5, 50.1-8; Just. 13.3.16-18). O. was forced to surrender; Kassandros supposedly promised that she would not be killed, but had judicial proceeding in which O., who was not allowed to speak, was condemned. Soldiers, however, refused to kill her and it was relatives of O.’s victims who actually killed her, though at the urging of Kassandros (Diod. 19.50.1-51.6; Just. 14.6.1-13; Paus. 9.7.2). O. had a heroic death, worthy of her distinguished male kin. Kassandros cast her out unburied (Diod. 17.118.2), though inscriptions demonstrate that she was later interred. Kassandros imprisoned and later killed Alexander IV. O., as violent, vengeful, and brave as her male kin, was the first woman to play a major role in Greek political history.   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney 2006; Edson, C., The Tomb of Olympias, Hesperia 18 (1949), 84-95; Greenwalt, W., Philip II and Olympias on Samothrace, in: Howe, T./Reames, J. (eds.), Macedonian Legacies, 2008, 79-106; Ruzicka 2010.

Olympos, Mt. The massif of (High) Olympos extends some 23 km from north to south and slightly less from east to west, its highest summit (Mytikas, 2917 m) is the peak of Greece. Further mountain masses make up the O.-range in a wider sense, including the ‘Lower O.’ which drops steeply to the Tempe Valley in the south as a divider from Mt. Ossa. The northern and central ranges were early regarded as Makedo-

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nian: the eponym Makedon “dwelt mansions around Pieria and O.” ([Hes.] Cat. F 7). Just below, at → Dion, was Makedonia’s most important sanctuary, of Zeus Olympios who, as the Greeks believed, resided along with the Olympian gods on the inaccessible mountaintops (e.g., Il. 1.18; Od. 6.42-46). Bypasses into → Thessaly are available: up the Haliakmon via the Volustana Pass; from modern Katerini via the Petra Pass, then south, west of the massif via Olosson/Elassona into the Thessalian plain (map: Road Editions 3: Epeiros/Thessaly); the standard route in the Tempe Valley which could be bypassed by trails, the principal one running up the hills somewhat north of the eastern gate, across the highland above the valley, thence steeply down to Gonnoi near the western gate (cf. Helly 1973, carte 2). Only mules opened the fertile region above Tempe, a vineyard zone today and probably also in antiquity. It had some economical value, unlike the central massif of Mt. O. proper: its meagre, not very spacious pastures between timberline and abrupt cliffs were hard to reach from the coastal plain, passing through an extended zone of undergrowth full of predators. So the high region, with its unfavourable climate, was not attractive for flocks. There is no evidence for mining in the district which seems not to have been a source of → timber for shipbuilding. The southern part was regarded as Thessalian (Hdt. 7.128.1) until the reign of → Philip II when control of Upper Makedonia turned all of the massif into a part of Makedonia. Until then O. proper, economically worthless and never described in antiquity, had hardly been of interest to its neighbours. It is assigned to Thessaly probably with a view to the coastal plain below it, the southernmost part of which seems to have been controlled for a long time by Thessalian Larisa. Situated near the western gate of Tempe the city must have been interested also in the eastern approaches of the valley. Less important were the two western bypasses though they had some strategic significance: occasionally they were used by the Romans—who ran into trouble there—but never by Philip II and → Alexander III. In Argead times, the key situation occurred in 480 when Xerxes, advancing with his vast army from the east, had to bypass the massif. Most probably the Persian military staff controlled all gateways into Thessaly, including the trails above Tempe certainly held by Persian rangers against Greek counterattacks. Along the two western routes regional troops were probably collected to enforce the loyalty of their home regions. Here limited mounted units who could cover the toilsome paths without large provisions would do. Their mission took not much time which was a decisive factor in the Persian campaign. For large infantry 360

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divisions advancing slowly with their baggage trains, the western passes were impractical, and time-consuming, pace → Herodotos (7.128-131, 172-173). The route in the coastal plain where ships could be used in logistics (but how to supply Xerxes’ main force in the mountains?) was the only realistic option after → Alexander I had cleared Tempe by convincing the Greeks on guard there to withdraw.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2017, 91-5; Helly, B., Gonnoi I. La cité et son histoire, 1973; Oberhummer, E., Olympos 1A, RE 18.1 (1939), 258-72.

Olynthos According to → Herodotos (8.127), Olynthos was a city of the Bottiaians, in the Bottike, the area where the Bottiaians moved after their expulsion from their native Bottiaia. After a revolt (against the Persians under Xerxes whom they had supplied: Hdt. 7.122; 8.127), O. was delivered in 479 by Artabazos to the → Chalkidians, former Euboians that occupied small cities on the coast of Sithonia down to this date. O. became a member of the Delian League and paid the phoros together with Skabala and Assera in 454/3. With this payment may be associated tetrobols of Attic-Euboian weight with the rev. (eagle with snake) referring to the mother city, Chalkis of Euboia. O. and most of the cities of the western part of the Chalkidike together with Poteidaia revolted and did not pay the tribute of the year 432. → Thucydides blamed → Perdikkas II for the Poteidaiatika (1.57.2-6), but Thucydides’ narrative as well as an Attic decree (IG I3 46) reveal instead that the revolt was the result of continuous Athenian aggression in the north and especially the Athenian decision to send a colony to Brea, a coastal city of Krou­ sis, west of the territories of the Chalkidians, and opposite → Pydna, the main port of the Makedonian kingdom. Following the advice of the king, the Chalkidians abandoned some of their small cities on the coast (Mekyberna, Singos, and Gale) and moved to O. This was the initial step for the creation of the Chalkidic League. The Makedonian king offered them also territories in the area of Lake Bolbe, where they most probably founded Apollonia and Arethousa (Thuc. 1.58.2). The administrative centre of the League remained O. It received part of the population of Poteidaia in 429 (Thuc. 2.70.4). After their defeat in the battle of Spartolos, the Athenians asked their Odrysian ally, Sitalkes, for help against

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O. and the Makedonian king. The invasion of the area by the Odrysians came to an end as a result of the diplomatic skills of Perdikkas II (Thuc. 2.101.5). Fears of a better-organized Athenian intervention in the Chalkidic peninsula after the Sphakteria episode brought the Spartan commander Brasidas north with some Peloponnesian forces, mainly helots and mercenaries. Their siteresia and misthoi were supposed to be paid by the Makedonian king and the Chalkidians (Thuc. 4.80, 81; 83.5-6). Silver tetrobols of good silver were part of many hoards buried at O. and the Chalkidic peninsula, while the Chalkidians minted their silver coinage on the same weight standard as the Makedonian king and with types referring to their colonial origin (Chalkis)—Apollon and his attributes—from the beginning of the → Peloponnesian War. The Chalkidians supported Brasidas continuously and received also the women and children of Skione and Mende, whom Brasidas moved to O. for security reasons (Thuc. 4.123.4). After the death of Brasidas, the Peace of → Nikias granted O. autonomy and the obligation to pay the phoros (Thuc. 5.18.5). The aim was to dissolve the Chalkidic League but the Chalkidians resisted and → Athens did not recover → Amphipolis. All Athenian efforts to regain control of O. and the Chalkidians failed down to the end of the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.10.5). Although the new king of Makedonia, → Archelaos, was a friend of Athens, there is no evidence for Athenian successful intervention in the area during his reign. Of all the allies of Athens that revolted, it was only O. and the Chalkidians that never surrendered. After → Amyntas III became king, he ceded to the Chalkidians territories, most probably the valley of Anthemous, and significant privileges regarding the exploitation of the → timber resources of his kingdom (Diod. 15.19.2). O. gained power and attacked Makedonia. After various difficulties, the king regained the → throne and his kingdom, and made an appeal to → Sparta (Diod. 15.19.2-4; Isok. 4.126). Akanthos and Apollonia also sent ambassadors to Sparta to ask for help against the increasing power of O. (Xen. Hell. 5.2.12-19). Sparta sent forces under Eudamidas, Teleutias, Agesipolis, and Polybiadas. The war lasted three years and ended with the capitulation of O. and an alliance with Sparta (Xen. Hell. 5.2.24, 38; 5.3.8-9, 18-20, 26). O. lost territories but the League was not dissolved. The Chalkidians became members of the Second Athenian Naval League in 375 (IG II2 43 B col. Ι, ΙΙ ll. 5-6; 36 ll. 2-3). When Athenian plans for the north were revealed in the early 360s, O. changed sides and supported Amphipolis. During this same period, Makedonian intervention in Larisa/→ Thessaly brought Pelopidas to the north; he sided with → Ptolemy of Aloros, the regent, against Athenian plans for Amphipolis. All the efforts of 362

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Iphikrates to capture Amphipolis failed. Although → Perdikkas III became his ally and delivered to him the Amphipolitan hostages, Iphikrates did not manage to bring them to Athens and was replaced by Timotheos. Perdikkas III together with Timotheos aimed to stop Olynthian support for Amphipolis, and for this reason invaded the Chalkidike, gained Torone and Poteidaia, and besieged O. But the king abandoned Timotheos, when the Athenian general gained Pydna and → Methone as allies (Dem. 23.149-150; Polyain. 3.10.1, 10.4, 10.15; [Arist.] Oik. 1350A; Diod. 15.81.6; Dein. 14.4-6; 17.7; Isok. 15.113). Timotheos then turned to Menelaos of Pelagonia (IG II2 110); the king joined Amphipolis and sent a garrison to protect the city from Athenian attacks (Aischin. 2.29). Fear of the Olynthians caused Poteidaia to ask for the establishment of an Athenian cleruchy, and → Dion to ask for Athenian protection (IG II2 114, 115). A stasis at Dikaia might be related to Athenian military presence in the Chalkidike, and efforts to resist O.’s influence (SEG 57.576). Athenian forces were present in the north down to 360 but all the Athenian plans for the area were cancelled as a result of the joint action of O., Amphipolis, and Perdikkas III. O. made a treaty with the Illyrian Grabos after the accession of → Philip II, but soon abandoned him because the new Makedonian king, who had already captured Amphi­polis, offered an alliance, territories and the promise to deliver Poteidaia to the Olynthians (Diod. 16.8.3-6; Dem. 2.6-7; 6.20; 8.62; 23.107-109; Lib. Hypoth. Dem. 1.2). Thus O. was able to further extend its territories. As Philip’s power increased, O. turned to Athens in 352 but was forced to abandon this plan under military pressure by Philip in the following spring. Two years later O. was the only power­ ful city in the north that could harbor the king’s two half-brothers, and gave him the pretext to invade her territories in summer 349. Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to send help to O. but the city was captured by treachery, and was completely destroyed to intimidate the king’s enemies and allies. The League was dissolved and the territories of O. became royal land that was later distributed to → hetairoi of the king (f.e. Dem. 1.4-6; 18.48; 19.146, 192-194, 196-197, 263267, 305-306, 309-310; 23.107-109, 149-150; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler). When → Kassandros founded Kassandreia, he was accused by → Antigonos of re-founding O. (Diod. 19.61.1). But unlike → Stageira (Plut. Alex. 7.2), O. was never re-founded.   S. Psoma Cf. Psoma, S., The League of the Chalkideis, in: Beck, H./Buraselis, K., Ethnos and Koinon, 2019, 321-38; Psoma, S., Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace, 2001; Zahrnt 1971.

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Onesikritos The Greek Onesikritos was a naval officer of → Alexander III’s → Indos fleet and a primary → Alexander historiographer (BNJ 134), likely one of the earliest. However, the assumption that O. started writing during Alexander’s lifetime solely depends on a mocking anecdote (Luc. Hist. Conscr. 40 = T 7), by all probability a metaphorical fiction. According to Arrian’s supposedly trustworthy information, O. came from Astypalaia (Ind. 18.9 = T 4). Diogenes Laertios (6.84 = T 1) adds that some say O. came from Aigina. The erudite O. was known to have heard the Kynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (Strab. 15.1.65 = T 2). The claim that he was his pupil (Plut. Mor. 331E = T 5a; Diog. Laert. 6.75-76 = T 1) is surely exaggerated. The Kynic ascetic ideal and rejection of social and political norms did not suit O.’s career at a monarch’s → court. As Alexander’s official, O. first became visible as archikybernetes (chief helmsman) serving with the fleet expedition down the Indos in 326-25 and on to Mesopotamia in 32524. His whereabouts before are uncertain. He is usually believed to have joined the Makedonian campaign from the start (334), either serving with the → fleet or the scientific staff. O.’s reference to the epitaph of Dareios I (BNJ 134 F 35) may hint at his presence at Alexander’s camp at → Persepolis in 330. In 326, O. was sent to the so-called naked philosophers (gymnosophists) at Taxila in the Punjab. In order to get information about their doctrines, he had to use three translators (BNJ 134 F 17a-b). As in the end, the doctrines O. established remarkably resembled the Kynic teachings, it is debated whether he reflected his own intellectual background or genuine Indian philosophy. During the ocean voyage of the Indos fleet, O. came into conflict with his superior → Nearchos, the nau­ archos commanding the whole fleet (Arr. An. 7.20.9-10; Arr. Ind. 32.9-13). After 323, being both active as historiographers, they continued to fight each other: Nearchos omitted that in 324, O. was also honoured with a golden ste­phanos (Arr. Ind. 47.9; cf. Arr. An. 7.5.6) and O. seems to have claimed that he was the nauarchos (Arr. An. 6.2.3). It is unclear what became of O. after 323. Plutarch places him at → Lysimachos’ court (Alex. 46.4), but the anecdote’s authenticity is dubious. O.’s Πῶς ᾿Αλέξανδρος ἤχθη (How Alexander was educated), referring to an educational regime with a military touch and learning as a lifelong process, is said to have been modelled on Xenophon’s → Kyroupaideia (Diog. Laert. 6.87). Probably, O. adopted formulaic scenes and motifs concerning personal virtues, treatment of friends, soldiers, and captured women and presented Alexander as 364

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an ideal warrior-ruler and civilizer (BNJ 134 F 5). O. also treated Indian hydro­ graphy, ethnography, topography, fauna, plants, and natural resources. Criticized as a flatterer and fabulist already in antiquity (Strab. 2.1.9; 15.1.28), the source value of O.’s work was underestimated until its recent reassessment. Doubtlessly, O. idealized Alexander and responded to his audience’s expectations regarding an imaginary East (→ Amazons: BNJ 134 F 1) and Indian marvels (huge animals, strange peoples, lots of gold). But O. also showed interest in Indian social structures and Persian sepulchral culture as the authentic elements of his Greek short version of Dareios’ epitaph and one variant of → Kyros II’s epitaph illustrate. The reception of O.’s work focusing on the tales about the marvels of → India creates a perhaps unrepresentative impression.   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2006, 183-4; Müller, S., Onesikritos und das Achaimenidenreich, Anabasis 2 (2012), 45-66; Müller 2014, 58-65; Pearson 1960, 84-7; Winiarczyk, M., Das Werk Die Erziehung Alexanders des Onesikritos von Astypalaia, Eos 94 (2007), 197-250.

Opis mutiny Five ancient sources (Arr. An. 7.8.1-12.4; Diod. 17.108.3, 109.1-3; Plut. Alex. 71.15; Just. 12.11.5-12.10; Curt. 10.2.8-4.2) refer to an incident in 324 in which → Alexander III’s troops disobeyed his commands and rejected his plans. Though only Arrian locates this event at O., he has generally been accepted as correct. It has traditionally been called a ‘mutiny,’ often understood as the second of its kind (the first being a somewhat similar upset on the → Hyphasis river in 326). While extant sources on the Hyphasis incident agree on the cause of troop dissatisfaction (the rigors of the campaign and Alexander’s determination to press further on), accounts of the O. mutiny vary widely on the motivation of these events; they imply that the dismissal of some of Alexander’s veteran troops was at least a precipitant (often linked to the arrival of the Epigonoi, young Asian or half Asian troops Alexander had trained in Makedonian methods). In Arrian, the troops resent the dismissal because they feel the → veterans have been insulted and object to his imitation of Persian customs as well as his conviction that he was the son of → Ammon. Alexander, along with a number of officers, arrests and executes ringleaders and gives a reproachful speech; he withdraws and begins to assign Persians to commands and into the ranks. The troops then relent; 10.000 veterans

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are sent home. Many of the grievances mentioned, however, were of long-standing and duplicated grievances expressed at Sousa. Diodoros says that when the troops hear that some veterans are to be sent home, they all demand to go until the threat of being replaced by Persians leads to reconciliation. In Plutarch, the Epigonoi are central but the confrontation is muted; no arrests are made and Persian replacement of Makedonians goes unmentioned. Justin’s troops are angry because they all want to go back and there is no real explanation for the subsequent reconciliation. Curtius’ account (which has a lacuna) says that all the troops want to go home and bring Alexander with them, but as in Arrian, Alexander gives a speech and executes some rebellious troops. Comparison of the two ‘mutinies’ illuminates: the causation of the first event was essentially situational whereas at O. the troops objected to the changes Alexander had made in kingship, changes that altered the relationship between king and army and were understood as Asian; on the Hyphasis Alexander got little to no support from the elite, at O. many in the elite supported him, but not all; no one was punished on the Hyphasis but at O. a much angrier Alexander ordered executions; at the Hyphasis, Alexander had to relent whereas at O. the army did. Indeed, the success of the army in getting its way on the Hyphasis may have facilitated the second clash. Whereas Roman military experience colours accounts of both events, the speech attributed by some sources to Alexander at O., however authentic or inauthentic, is critical to understanding the narration of the event in a way that the speech attributed to him at the Hyphasis is not. Understanding the O. mutiny as a crisis precipitated by demobilization is helpful. Categorizing the troubles at Hyphasis and O. as incidents of unrest rather than mutinies helps us to understand their dynamic.   E.D. Carney Cf. Brice, L., Military Unrest in the Age of Philip and Alexander of Macedon: Defining the Terms of the Debate, in: Howe, T. et al. (eds.), Greece, Macedon and Persia, 2015, 69-76; Carney, E.D., Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander and Afterword, in: Carney 2015, 27-59; Rose, E., The Anatomy of Mutiny, Armed Forces and Society 8 (1982), 361-74.

Opis speech In the wake of the Makedonian revolt at → Opis in 324, → Alexander III had its ringleaders arrested and directed a harangue towards his troops. The historicity 366

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of the delivery of the speech is indisputable, given its wide attestation (Diod. 17.109.2; Curt. 10.2.15-29; Plut. Alex. 71.1-4; Arr. An. 7.9-10; Just. 12.11.5). More controversial is the historicity of its content. The two versions we possess, from Curtius and Arrian, seem to have at least one source in common. Both mention Philip II—Arrian makes the controversial claim that Philip was responsible for civilizing the Makedonians—and say that Alexander started his campaign with no more than 60 talents and was left with 500 talents of debt by his father. Both speeches contain a laundry list of Alexander’s achievements and emphasize his generosity towards his men. In both, Alexander complains of the Makedonians’ betrayal, noting that he was now left to the protection of the → barbaroi. These commonalities, however, do not tell us what Alexander actually said nor reveal the degree to which the speeches’ rhetoric belongs to the 4th c. or is, rather, substantially Roman. Most commentators have focused on Arrian’s version. Some believe it essentially preserves Alexander’s words, e.g., as coming directly from → Ptolemy or as based on the → Ephemerides using Arrian’s own “diction and selection”. Some argue that the speech preserves the gist of what Alexander said, which was influenced by 4th c. Greek thought and Philip II’s own propaganda. Others, on the other hand, call Arrian’s speech an “epideictic display”, while another opinion emphasizes its Xenophontean influences and signs of authorial self-borrowing (cf. An. 5.25.3-26.8; Ind. 7.2-7).   S.R. Asirvatham C.f. Bosworth 1988, 101-13; Brunt, P.A., Arrian: Anabasis Alexandri and Indica, 1983, 532-3; Hammond, N.G.L., Sources for Alexander the Great, 1993, 288; Nagle, D.B., The Cultural Context of Alexander’s Speech at Opis, TAPA 126 (1996), 151-72; Tarn, W.W., Alexander the Great, 1950, 286, 290-6.

Oracle The consultation of oracles by states and individuals was a part of Greek life from at least the 7th c. BC until Late Antiquity. There are stories of consultations by the earliest Argead kings, but reliable information about the practice begins only with the reign of → Philip II. Some Greek oracular sanctuaries had other important aspects to them, for example the sanctuary of Apollon at Delphi was the site of the Pythian games, and one of the meeting places of the → Delphic Amphiktyony, as well as the home of the o., so it should not be assumed that

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all contact between kings and sanctuaries would have involved oracular consultations. Temenos, ancestor of the Argead dynasty, is said to have consulted the o. of Zeus at Dodona about his wish for children (Eur. F K 228a), while → Perdikkas I or → Karanos are said to have settled in Makedonia on the advice of the Delphic o. (Diod. 7.16, cf. PW no. 225-7). These narratives have no historical value but show how o. stories tended to be incorporated into traditions about state formation. → Alexander I dedicated a golden statue at Delphi (Hdt. 8.121.2), according to [Dem.] 12.21 funded from the sale of Persian captives. This does not imply that he had consulted the o. at any point, although this cannot be ruled out, given his engagement with Greek cities and sanctuaries. The earliest firm evidence for the consultation of an o. by an Argead ruler comes in an inscription of 357/6, recording an alliance concluded between → Philip II and the → Chalkidians, led by → Olynthos (RO no. 50). The inscription was found near Olynthos and records the words of the oracular response: “The God responded to the Chalkidians and Philip: It is preferable and better to become friends and allies in accordance with the agreement.” This is followed by a list of gods to whom the allies should sacrifice and pray. The form of the consultation is normal for this period, but no other example is known of Delphi being asked about an alliance. After the → Third Sacred War of 356-46, Philip was recognized as the dominant figure in the Delphic Amphiktyony, allowing → Demosthenes to warn the Athenians against consulting Delphi on the grounds that the Pythia had “philippized” (Aischin. 3.130, cf. Cic. Div. 2.118). This was an accusation of bribery, similar to that made against the Alkmaionidai in the late 6th c., when they too had established themselves as benefactors of the sanctuary (Hdt. 5.62.3-63.2). In the period just before the campaign that ended at → Chaironeia, Philip sent an embassy to → Thebes, to discourage the Boiotians from allying with the Athenians (Plut. Dem. 18.2). A member of this delegation was named → Amyntas, and was probably Philip’s nephew, the son of Perdikkas. An inscription from Lebadeia records that Amyntas, son of Perdikkas, consulted the o. of Trophonios (IG VII 3055.7-10), and he is also honoured in an inscription from Oropos (IG VII 4251 = RO no. 75A), where there was an o. of Amphiaraos. It is not unlikely that Amyntas consulted these o.s on Philip’s behalf while a member of the embassy. There are a number of unhistorical stories about Philip consulting Delphi. Plutarch says that he consulted the o. after seeing a snake lying next to → Olympias, and was told that he should honour → Ammon, but would lose an eye (Plut. Alex. 3.1). Diodoros (16.91.2-3, cf. 368

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Paus. 8.7.6) says that Philip consulted Delphi before launching his expedition into Asia Minor, and was given the ambiguous response, “the bull is wreathed, the end is at hand, the sacrificer is present”, which he took to foretell his success, but which turned out to be a prediction of his death. This episode fits the pattern of many o. stories, including the prophecy given to Kroisos of Lydia before he launched an attack on the Persian Empire (Hdt. 1.53), and cannot be taken as historical. An equally unhistorical story is told about Alexander, who is said to have visited Delphi on a day when the o. was not functioning, and to have attempted to drag the Pythia to the temple. When she responded to this by saying “you are invincible (anikētos)”, Alexander took this as an oracular response (Plut. Alex. 14.4). A version of this story is also told of Philomelos of Phokis (Diod. 16.25.3-27.1). Another unhistorical story says that a Delphic o. delivered while Alexander was a child prophesied that he would be led by a wolf (lykos)—a prophecy fulfilled when he was led through the Zagros mountains by a Lykian guide (Plut. Alex. 37.1). Trogus-Justin (12.2.3) mentions that Alexander was warned by Delphi about treachery in Makedonia, but gives no context or details. We have no other evidence of Alexander consulting any o.s in the Greek mainland. The o. of Apollon at Didyma near Miletos had ceased to function after the city was sacked by the Persians in 494, and it was revived after Alexander brought an end to Persian control there in 334, with prophecies being sent from there to Alexander when he was in → Egypt, according to → Kallisthenes (BNJ 124 F14 = Strab. 17.1.43). The oracular sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona was regularly consulted by Greek communities and individuals, and the site became a cause of contention between the Athenians and Olympias during Alexander’s reign. When the Athenians decorated the statue of Dione at Dodona, on the instructions of the o., Olympias objected, arguing that because the sanctuary was in Molossia, which belonged to her, they had no right to meddle in it (Hyp. 4.24-25). Potentially, therefore, Olympias might have limited access to the o., although there is no evidence that she did. The one o. Alexander is known to have consulted himself is that of Amun/Ammon at → Siwa in Libya, an event described in detail by the Alexander historians (Arr. An. 3.3.1-4.5; Curt. 4.7.5-32; Diod. 17.49.2-51.4; Just. 11.11; Plut. Alex. 26.6-27.6; Strab. 17.1.43). The o. had been consulted by Greeks since at least the early 5th c., and the cult of Amun (Hellenized as Ammon) was important for Kyrene and the other Greek cities in Libya (e.g. Pind. Pyth. 4.16). Meeting envoys from these cities may have been part of the reason for Alexander’s jour-

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ney (Curt. 4.7.9; Diod. 17.49.2). Although the excavators of the site propose that Alexander might have spoken to the god inside the temple in the manner of a Greek o., the evidence indicates that answers were given by the movements of the cult statue carried in procession by priests in a barque (Curt. 4.7.23-4; Diod. 17.50.6). It is not clear from the ancient narratives what Alexander asked the o. (neither Kallisthenes in Strabon nor Arrian give details). It is suggested that the visit led him to believe that he was the son of Amun (Curt. 4.7.30; Diod. 17.51.1-2, cf. Plut. Alex. 27.6), but this was a title he received in any case as Pharaoh. Alexander later sent envoys to Siwa to enquire about honours for the dead → Hephaistion (Arr. An. 7.23.6; Diod. 17.115.6). On his return to Babylon in 323, Alexander was met by embassies from across his empire, and he gave priority to those from sanctuaries in order of importance, the list beginning with the Eleians (from Olympia), the Ammonians and the Delphians (Diod. 17.113.3), indicating the importance he continued to attach to oracular sanctuaries. Alexan­der’s ‘last plans’ supposedly included building new temples at Delphi and Dodona (Diod. 18.4.5).   H. Bowden Cf. Bowden 2017; Kuhlmann, K.P., Das Ammoneion, 1988; Mari 2002; Pfeiffer, S., Alexander der Große in Ägypten, in: Grieb, V. et al. (eds.), Alexander the Great and Egypt: History, Art, Tradition, 2014, 89-106.

Oral tradition When dealing with periods preceding their own lifetime, writers generally rely on oral tradition. It is the only source of information for regions without broad historical documentation of their own—a major problem e.g., for authors writing on early stages of Persian history. → Herodotos encountered similar problems when he collected evidence for early Makedonia. He did so probably under → Perdikkas II. At that point, he could get information reaching back two or three generations, but for what preceded the rule of → Alexander I he only had access to o. t. that increasingly had become sketchy and contaminated with mythic and folklore elements. He made use of such tradition rather rarely, restricted to items he could hardly do without, e.g., the early version of the Argead → foundation myth (8.137-39) and Alexander’s alleged elimination of a Persian embassy (5.17-20). Both episodes, invented in the Argead interest, were 370

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essential for the self-projection of the Makedonian dynasty and in this sense have some value as a source. Connected to them but seemingly not an integral part follows a reference to the rose gardens of the legendary Phrygian king Midas, near Mt. Bermion, in the heartland of the Argead realm (Hdt. 8.138.2-3) which is characterized as a pleasant place well within the reach of an eastern king: looking eastward, but separated from the west by “snow-covered, impregnable mountains”, Argead Makedonia (before Alexander I) is implicitly characterized as belonging to the east. However, with a view beyond the → Persian Wars, Herodotos makes no point of this formerly essential detail but plays it down as an oral folklore tale.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Müller 2016, 90; Olson, D.R./Torrance, N. (eds.), Literacy and Orality, 1991; Vansina, J., Oral Tradition. A Study in Historical Methodology, 1961; Vansina, J., Oral Tradition as History, 1985; Vassileva, M., King Midas and the Early History of Macedonia, AM 7 (2007), 773-9.

Orestes, son of Archelaos Orestes, son of → Archelaos (Synk. 500.4-5 Mosshammer), was born in a later stage of his father’s reign for when Archelaos died in 399, O. was still a minor of uncertain age. Diodoros (14.37.6) uses the vague term “child” (παῖς). Probably, O.’s mother was Kleopatra (cf. Arist. Pol. 1311B: without naming the son). It is uncertain whether she was identical with Archelaos’ stepmother Kleopatra, wife of → Perdikkas II. While O.’s name is unusual for an Argead, it seems to have been not uncommon in contemporary → Makedonia and → Thessaly. Perhaps, it was also meant to programmatically reflect Archelaos’ cultural → patronage of Greek artists such as → Euripides. His tragedy on the mythical namesake of O. was first performed in 408, shortly before Arche­ laos began to sponsor Euripides. The coincidence might hint at this source of inspiration for naming the boy. In 399, instead of O., an → epitropos named → Aëropos took the rule. Ruling Makedonia was traditionally linked to the Argeads, hence the office implied that he was a relative of O. According to a scholiast, the name of Archelaos’ younger brother (allegedly killed by him in his childhood: Plat. Gorg. 471A-D) was Aëropos (Schol. ad Aristeid. 46.120.2); he might have been identical with the former epitropos, Aëropos II, who ruled

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for 6 years before he died (Diod. 14.37.6; Euseb. Chron. I 227). Although O. is attested as a reigning Argead for about three or four years (Euseb. Chron. I 229; Synk. 482.27-28 Mosshammer) and is on the Makedonian rulers’ lists, in scholarship, it is usually suggested that O. did not rule, not even formally, but was immediately deposed (and killed) by Aëropos. No coins minted in O.’s name are known. The → coinage of Archelaos is succeeded by that of Aëropos. Probably, O. was never acclaimed as a ruler.   S. Müller Cf. Anson 2013, 23-4; Müller 2016, 195-6; Westermark 1989, 304-5, 310-1.

Orestis Orestis, one of the mountainous regions of Upper Makedonia, rich in summer pastures, was situated south of → Lynkestis. It had close ties to Epeirote Molossia. It is uncertain whether any Argead ever controlled O. before → Philip II’s occupation of Upper Makedonia. The suggestion that → Alexander I held O. for some time cannot be validated. → Thucydides attests that under Alexan­ der’s successor → Perdikkas II, at least since the 430s when he first mentions him, O. was autonomous (4.83.1). However, a 4th-c. variant of the Argead → foundation myth has the founder figure → Karanos establishing his initial power base in O. Coming from Peloponnesian → Argos, he helped O.’s ruler to fight Eordaia and pacify O. and was given half of O. (Diod. 7 F 17). Perhaps this tradition somehow created the unreliable claim that the Argeads came from Argos in O. (App. Syr. 63). There is little information on O.’s political history and relationship with the Argeads. In 429, during the → Peloponnesian War, O.’s local dynast Antiochos (a name apparently popular in O.) aided → Sparta by sending 1000 men to support the (unsuccessful) attempt of Sparta’s general Knemos to conquer Stratos in pro-Athenian Akarnania (Thuc. 2.80.6). While Perdikkas II also sent 1000 men to help Sparta (Thuc. 2.80.7), it is no proof that at this time O. was under Argead control. Rather, the episode illustrates O.’s ties to the Molossians with whose army the Orestians marched, and neighbouring Parauaians to whose ruler Oroidos Antiochos even conceded the command. Philip II’s assassin → Pausanias came from O. (Diod. 16.93.3). Therefore, in scholarship, it is sometimes suspected that he may have conspired with the three sons of Aëropos from neighbouring Lynkestis who were held responsible 372

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for the murder (Arr. An. 1.25.1-2; Plut. Mor. 327C; Just. 11.2.2). Among the generals of → Alexander III, → Perdikkas and the brothers → Krateros and Amphoteros came from O.   S. Müller Cf. Borza 1990, 146; Bosworth 1971; Hammond 1989, 16, 38, 44.

Paionia Paionia (Παιονία) was situated to the north of the Makedonian kingdom, cover­ ing mainly the areas on both sides of the Axios River and reaching up to the Strymon River in the east (Hdt. 5.1; Thuc. 2.98.2; Strab. 7.5.1; 7 F 4 Jones = 3 Radt). Strabon informs us that it reached up to Pelagonia and Pieria (7 F 38, 41 Jones = 17a Radt). The ethnic group (Paionians-Παίονες) is mentioned already in the → Ilias as allies of the Trojans (2.848-50), their major city being Amydon, on the Axios River. Amydon was destroyed by the Argeads (Strab. 7 F 20 Jones = 12b Radt), a result of the Makedonian advance to Lower Makedonia by the second half of the 7th c. ([Hes.] Cat. F 7), and the Paionians were forced to leave their ancestral lands. It was perhaps this pressure from the Makedonians that forced them to withdraw to the hinterland of Mt. Rhodope and sometime before 510 to attack the city of Perinthos (Hdt. 5.1). Around 514-13, during Dareios I’s Skythian campaign, a Persian army under Megabazos was sent to → Thrace in order to extend the frontiers of the Persian Empire to the west, including Makedonia. During that expedition, the Paionians living between the Nestos and Strymon Rivers withdrew to the north, while those living east of Lake Prasias were defeated by the Persians and deported to → Asia Minor (Hdt. 5.15-16). Makedonia became a client kingdom to Persia and king → Amyntas I must have taken advantage of the circumstances favourable to him: he gave his daughter, Gygaia, as wife to the Persian Boubares (Hdt. 5.21; 8.136.1), while he was defending Persian interests by safeguarding the Axios passage near the city of Ichnai and by intercepting attacks from the Paionians of the north. Indirect evidence confirms Makedonian relief from the Paionians who were ravaging the country in the Thracian area between Makedonia and P., thus being a constant danger for Makedonia: when → Herodotos (5.17) mentions Lake Prasias and Mt. Dysoron, i.e., areas where the Paionians used to live, he says that these are the places from which later the son of Amyntas, → Alexander I, had a talent of

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silver as an income, on a daily basis. After the Persians left Thrace in 476, there is no mention of the Paionians in the sources. Probably, the pressure of the Makedonians to the west and the Thracians to the east forced those Paionians living east of the Strymon to stay in the hinterland. It is only in the early years of the → Peloponnesian War (429) when we hear of autonomous Paionians again, as allies of the Thracian king Sitalkes during his expedition against Makedonia and → Perdikkas II (Thuc. 2.96.3). From that time until → Philip II’s accession to the Makedonian → throne in 360/59, the Paionians are absent from our sources. After the disaster Makedonia suffered in 360/59 from the Illyrians and the chaos that followed, the Paionians began to raid Makedonian territories. However, their king, Agis, died soon afterwards and Philip invaded P. in 358. The Paionians were defeated and obliged to submit to the Makedonians (Diod. 16.1.5, 2.6.1-5). Despite coming close to becoming a danger for Philip, they remained subjects of Makedonia (Dem. 1.23; Isok. 5.21) and some 200 of them served under → Alexander III in Asia as light cavalry and scouts (Arr. An. 1.14.1; 2.7.5). After Alexander’s death, they became independent from Makedonia, since there is no mention of them among the peoples under → Antipatros’ rule (Dexipp., BNJ 100, F 8.3), but they were on good terms with the Antipatrids, as → Kassandros helped the Paionian king Audoleon in 310/9 against the Autariatai (Diod. 20.19.1).   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Errington, M., Paiones, Paionia, DNP 9 (2000), 153-4; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 57-9; Merker, I., The Ancient Kingdom of Paionia, Balkan Studies 6.1 (1965), 35-54.

Pangaion, Mt. Pangaion (scil. oros: ‘Mt.’, hence a neuter) is an isolated massif in SW → Thrace, between → Bisaltia with the lower Strymon in the west and the Plain of → Philippoi in the east, separated from the Aegean Sea by a valley and the Symbolon hills, in the north by the narrow Daton Plain from the Rhodope-chain (Mt. Orbelos). It expands ca. 25 km from west to east and 16 km from north to south, its highest peak (Koutra) attains 1956 m (map: Road Editions 2: Macedonia). From the 7th c., rich resources of gold and silver were exploited in the massif itself and its surroundings (cf. Strab. 7 F 34 Jones = 16.25 Radt), silver (and electron) being used later for vast regional minting initiated by the Persians 374

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from the late 6th c. One archaic series with a floral pattern is labeled ‘Rose of P.’ (Tzamalis 1997, pl. 3.24-35), though without a clear provenance (→ Stageira?), maybe with a view to (later) growing special roses in eastern valleys (Theophr. HP 6.6.4 = Athen. 15.682B). P. was touched by several ‘kingless’ Thracian groups the names of which do not concur. Principal were the Edones, the Odomantoi, and the Satrai (Hdt. 7.112), some more (Derrhones, Orrheskioi, Bisaltai) are known from coin legends only. Mining allegedly started with Kadmos (Strab. 14.28; Plin. NH 7.197) who is also credited with opening the Thasian → mines just before. So Thasian know-how might well have played some role, although the Thasians were kept out of the massif. Peisistratos of Athens ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2) and Histiaios of Miletos (Hdt. 5.11, 124.2) established private enterprises in the region. Around 475, → Alexander I gained control of the western part of Bisaltia (Hdt. 5.17.2), but short of Mt. P. The Athenians, eager to get access, did not shrink from military conflict with Thracian groups. After an abortive attempt in 465/4 they founded → Amphipolis in 437/6, on a SW foothill, “because the place was useful for getting timber for ships and revenues in money” (Thuc. 4.108.1)—no mention of mines on Mt. P. The city, independent since 424, was conquered in 357 by → Philip II. It then became the principal Makedonian mint. → Alexander III sent large amounts of Persian gold and silver to be minted there; it kept its pre-eminence well into Roman times, but most of the metal very likely came in from outside the P. region (from Rhodope and the Balkans). In 356, Philip proceeded east into the Thasian mainland zone which had run into trouble with neighbouring Thracians. Having cleared the Lekani hills NE of modern Kavala, he controlled the land up to the lower Nestos, including the Plain of Philippoi. He then placed strongholds also east of the massif. This gave him control of the routes passing by from west to east: in the south from Galepsos to Neapolis/Kavala, and in the north from Siris/Serres to the Nestos (along the track of the modern railway line: Road Editions 1: Thrace). He was free to intervene in the inner P. massif but evidently refrained from doing so. The exploits from mining seem to have been modest in his days—Xen. Hell. 5.2.17 is a recollection of past glory. So Philip and his successors cannot have had much interest in Mt. P. itself, though the routes bypassing it in the south and the north were of first-rate strategic and economic significance.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Mack 1964; Spitzlberger, G., Das Pangaion und sein Bergbau im Altertum, in: Kalcyk, H. et al. (eds.), Studien zur Alten Geschichte 3, 1986, 875-901; Tzamalis, A., Uncertain

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Thraco-Macedonian Coins, NomChron 16 (1997), 13-20; Unger, H.J./Schütz, E., Pangaion. Ein Gebirge und sein Bergbau, 19802; Unger, H.J., Das Pangaion. Ein altes Bergbauzentrum in Ostmakedonien, PZ 62 (1987), 87-112.

Panhellenism The concept of a common cultural and linguistic identity of all Greeks (pantes Hellenes) as separated from the non-Greeks (→ barbaroi) probably originates from supra-regional sanctuaries such as Olympia. The term appears early, in Hesiodos (Op. 528) and Archilochos (F 102 W). During Xerxes’ invasion of Greece it assumed a distinctly political content (Hdt. 7.145.2; Aisch. Pe. 353432) but in turn was restricted to the Persians and their subject peoples styled as enemies that had to be conquered by the superior Greeks, in retaliation of the harm the European Greeks had put up with. This provided the propagandistic basis of the Athenian Empire “taking vengeance for what (the ‘Hellenes’) had suffered by ravaging the king’s land” (Thuc. 1.96.1); in reality, permanent ‘Greek’ contributions to the common war chest were needed to finance the Athenian fleet. Consequently the Spartans, just before and during the → Peloponnesian War (431-04), demanded autonomy for the ‘Hellenes’ (Thuc. 1.139.3) being → Athens’ allies. During the second phase of the war, from 412, also the concept of the eastern ‘barbarians’ was undermined when first the Peloponnesians and then also the Athenians were eager to get the Great King’s money to conquer their Greek opponents, thus reversing the idea of p.—to the profit of the Persian king. Before this background, the traditional concept was revitalized by Greek intellectuals: if the European Greeks’ internal war had given the Great King such strength, it was necessary to unite the Greek energies and turn them against the ‘barbarians’. So, an all Hellenic war was regarded as a remedy to stop inner Greek conflicts that had done so much damage. In his Olympian oration held during the Olympic Games of 408, Gorgias appealed in this sense to an all Greek audience (DK 86 A1 = Philostr. V.S. 1.9.4), followed up by Lysias (Or. 33). This modified concept of p. was further extended in the aftermath of the war, for several reasons: Athens’ economical basis was severely shaken, thousands of mercenaries had lost their livelihood, and the Spartans had established their hegemony by a fragmentation of Greece with the political tool of ‘common peace’ (koine eirene) that was guaranteed by the Persian king. So opposition to → Sparta 376

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met the old enmity to the eastern ‘barbarians’: a panhellenic war would conquer territories to supply impoverished Greeks. The concept gained clear imperialist overtones, namely in Isokrates. He intended the leadership of such a ‘Hellenic’ war first for Athens (Or. 4), then Sparta and others, and finally offered it to → Philip II (Or. 5; Epist. 3). The Makedonian ruler did not need such ideas, but they served his propaganda for an anti-Persian war. In reality, however, the ‘liberated’ Greek cities in → Asia Minor were to pay contributions that would permanently cover his army costs. It was a return to the old Athenian concept of the 5th c. In 338/7, at Korinthos, Philip proclaimed his plans (Diod. 16.89.3) that were continued by → Alexander III. While operating beyond the → Aegean, he was eager to send reports on his panhellenic war by → Kallisthenes to Greece, and dedicated spoils from the → Granikos battle on the central panhellenic site of the Athenian akropolis (Arr. An. 1.16.7; Plut. Alex. 16.8). The panhellenic stage of his campaign ended in 330 when, on the terrace of → Persepolis, he set fire to buildings attributed to Xerxes, in retaliation of 480 when the Persian king had burnt down the Athenian akropolis.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Flower, M.A., The Panhellenism of Philip and Alexander, AM 6.1 (1999), 419-29; Flower, M.A., From Simonides to Isocrates. The 5th c. Origins of 4th c. Panhellenism, ClAnt 19 (2000), 65-101; Heinrichs, J., Ionien nach Salamis, 1989, 162-76; Zahrnt, M., Hellas unter persischem Druck?, AKG 65 (1983), 249-306.

Parmenion Parmenion, son of Philotas (Arr. An. 3.11.10), was the most influential general of → Philip II and the early → Alexander III. Still by the time of his violent death ordered by Alexander in 330, he was one of the foremost Makedonian officers. In his literary afterlife, obviously, P.’s contributions to the military successes of the Makedonians were obscured. The attempts to marginalize him may also explain the lack of important information such as on his descent. It is suggested that his family came from Upper Makedonia because he and his son Philotas had friends and commanded troops from there; however, this is uncertain. Simi­ larly, the thesis that a series of bronze coins showing a head of Herakles (obv.), an → eagle on thunderbolt and the legend ΦΙΛΩ (rev.) was perhaps issued by P.’s father Philotas, allegedly a local dynast of Pelagonia, cannot be validated. P.’s

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career run parallel to that of Philip II. Probably from the beginning, P. had major commands and thus was able to spread his influence in the Makedonian army, cultivate his personal ties, establish a solid base of networks, and promote his kin. Philip’s saying that the Athenians were happy to elect 10 strategoi every year while he had found only one strategos in many years, P. (Plut. Mor. 177C), is likely apocryphal. Nevertheless, it illustrates P.’s status in the Makedonian army. One of P.’s earliest major successes was the defeat of the Illyrians under Grabos in 356 (Plut. Alex. 3.5) who had planned a joint action against Philip together with the Thracians and Paionians (Diod. 16.22.3). In 346, P. and → Antipatros, the other éminence grise under Philip, went as his ambassadors to → Athens in the matter of the → Peace of Philokrates (Dem. 19.69). This important mission indicated their high rank. Before, P. had commanded the siege of the Thessalian seaport Halos (Dem. 19.163). Excluded from the peace treaty, Halos fell soon after. The storyteller Karystios of Pergamon claims that P. arrested and killed Platon’s student Euphraios in Oreios (343/2) because he was on bad terms with Philip (ap. Athen. 11.508E). However, the contemporary → Demosthenes (9.59-62) states that Euphraios was driven to suicide by his treacherous fellow countrymen who were bribed by Philip (one of Demosthenes’ most frequent reproaches). In 337, P.’s son-in-law → Attalos (Curt. 6.9.18) gave his ward Kleopatra in marriage to Philip (Athen. 13.557D; Diod. 16.93.9). His clan’s close bond to the ruler increased P.’s rank and prestige as the head of the family. Like Philip’s 6 previous marriages, this last one was of a political nature: it served to tighten the links to the two generals he needed for the preparation of the war he had declared against Persia in 337. In 336, he sent P. and Attalos as the leaders of his advance force to → Asia Minor to secure strongholds (Diod. 16.91.2; 17.2.4; Just. 9.5.8). Initially, they toppled some regimes and installed cooperating politicians labelled as “democrats” such as in Ephesos, Chios, and some cities of Lesbos. P. also took Grynion in the Aiolis and improved the war finances by selling the inhabitants into slavery (Diod. 17.7.9). However, on Dareios III’s order, → Memnon of Rhodos overthrew the new regimes, defeated the Makedonians at Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros (Polyain. 5.44.3), forced them to give up besieging Pitane in the Aiolid (Diod. 17.7.9-10), and kept them confined to one beachhead at Abydos. Pressed hard by Memnon, also the news about Philip’s assassination in 336 may have troubled P. Despite his absence from Makedonia at this crucial moment, P.’s decision in favour of Alexander III as the successor was likely one of the factors determining the outcome. Assumedly, his opinion 378

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was advocated by his son Philotas and other members of his clan. When Attalos made trouble by objecting to Alexander’s succession, reportedly negotiating a joint action with Athens, and an order came from → Pella to neutralize him, P. accepted his son-in-law’s elimination (Diod. 17.2.3-6, 5.1-2; Curt. 7.1.3). Getting rid of Attalos increased his own space of action as a commander in Asia. In winter 335/4, P. returned to Europe. According to Diodoros, (17.16.2), he and Antipatros tried to make Alexander marry into one of their clans, but he refused. In spring 334, P. led the bulk of the invading Makedonian army from Sestos to Abydos (Arr. An. 1.11.6). His three attested sons were with him: Philotas, the commander of the elite Companion Cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4, 57.1; Curt. 6.9; Arr. An. 1.14.1), Nikanor, the commander of the hypaspistai, the infantry’s elite (Diod. 17.57.2), who died of illness in 330 (Arr. An. 3.25.4), and Hektor, probably the youngest. No military office is recorded for him. Their mother is unknown. P. commanded the infantry (12.000 Makedonians, 7000 allies, 5000 mercenaries: Diod. 17.17.3-4), but much more than a general, he was the dominant person in the army staff. Together with Philotas, he will initially have led the campaign and directed the politics involved—of course, officially in the name of Alexander. P.’s and Philotas’ efforts will likely have enabled the victories at → Granikos, → Issos, and → Gaugamela where P. always commanded the forces on the left wing. He was responsible for the defense and secured the attack led by Alexander and Philotas on the right. P.’s command included the distinguished Thessalian cavalry that contributed significantly to the victories (Arr. An. 1.14.1; 2.11.2; 3.15.3; Diod. 17.19.6, 33.2, 60.8). However, focusing on Alexander, the primary sources provide little information on P.’s actions on the battlefield. After Granikos, P. took Daskyleion, the wealthy residence of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and conquered the southern coast of Asia Minor (Arr. An. 1.17.2, 24.3-4). Coming from Sardeis, he rejoined Alexander at Gordion in spring 333. Entering Kilikia, P. may have saved Tarsos for the Makedonians (Curt. 3.4.1415), soon to become one of Alexander’s earliest eastern mints. Arrian’s silence on P.’s contribution to Tarsos’ capture (An. 2.4.5-6) may be due to P.’s partly marginalization in his literary afterlife. P. was involved in the arrest of Antipatros’ son-in-law and protégé Alexander Lynkestes dated either to winter 334/3 or autumn 333 (Arr. An. 1.25.3-4; Curt. 7.1.5-6; Diod. 17.32.1-2). He was accused of treacherous contacts with Dareios III. P. may have been motivated by more than competitiveness: in 334, Alexander Lynkestes had received the command of the Thessalian cavalry (Arr. An. 1.25.2) that fought under P.’s supreme com-

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mand. He could not afford a safety risk on his wing such as a commander of a crucial unit who was suspected of being able to desert to the enemy. Ironically, Alexander Lynkestes was executed in 330 in the same span as P. (Curt. 7.1.5-9; Diod. 17.80.2). After Issos, P. captured Dareios’ camp at Damaskos with the treasures, Achaimenid and other high-ranking Persian officials’ families, and envoys from Athens, → Sparta, and → Thebes who had obviously hoped for a Persian victory (Curt. 3.13.3-17; Arr. An. 2.15.1-3). P. may have used two female captives for a strategy of psychological warfare directed against Pharnabazos and Autophradates, the leaders of the Persian counterattack in the → Aegean, who did not lose heart after the news about Issos. It became known that Alexan­ der had taken Pharnabazos’ sister Barsine as mistress (likely a disgrace for her family) while Philotas took the Makedonian Antigona, part of Autophradates’ “booty” (Plut. Alex. 48.3-4; Plut. Mor. 339D-F), thus a gesture of humiliation. However, the Persian commanders kept on resisting until 332. Temporarily, P. acted as the military supervisor of Koile-Syria, before he joined Alexander before the siege of → Tyre (Polyain. 4.3.4) or Gaza. The army marched to Egypt (332/1), where P.’s son Hektor died (Curt. 4.8.7-8). The Makedonians returned in 331, marched on via Damaskos and Aleppo, crossed the Euphrates and Tigris and defeated Dareios and his army at Gaugamela in October 331. Plutarch’s report that P. was sluggish and inefficient because of old age or envy and prevented Alexander from capturing Dareios by an untimely request for help (Alex. 33.67), is surely slander. Plutarch names → Kallisthenes as his source (BNJ 124 F 37). However, in scholarship, it is partly suggested that the unflattering report did not genuinely form part of Kallisthenes’ text but was a later interpolation. In any case, these slanders will not have circulated before P.’s elimination. Simi­ larly, the tradition depicting P. as an unwise and rejected advisor of Alexander who always knows better (Plut. Alex. 16.23; 19.3-4; 29.4; Arr. An. 1.13.2-5, 18.69; 2.4.10-11; 3.10.1-3; Diod. 17.54.4-5), likely formed part of the posthumous blackening of P.’s portrait. According to the more plausible version of the events at Gaugamela, P.’s left wing was pressed hard by Mazaios and his cavalry, thus had to counter the main attack of the Persians. P. sent horsemen to Alexander for aid who failed to reach him in the turmoil (Diod. 17.60.7-8). P., with the Thessalian cavalry, managed to fight the enemy back, joined the pursuit of Dareios and captured his camp—while Alexander took a rest (Arr. An. 3.15.4-7). From Sousa to → Persepolis, P. led the slower troops and baggage train. In 330, he stayed in Ekbatana (modern Hamadan) in Media, while Philotas accompa380

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nied Alexander on his pursuit of Dareios into the Eastern satrapies. Assumedly, P. was to rejoin them later when the heavy infantry was needed again. While Alexander appointed the Persian Oxydates as Media’s → satrap (Arr. An. 3.20.3; Curt. 6.2.11), P. was obviously the supreme official in Media, one of the most important satrapies, critical for its junction of highways leading to Persis, Meso­ potamia, and Baktria. Ekbatana was one of the empire’s administrative cores, a hub in terms of trade routes and communication lines. At this strategically crucial place, P. commanded 6000 infantry, cavalry and a few light troops to guard the immense treasure (reportedly 180.000 talents: Diod. 17.80.3). Besides, for a Kadousian and Hyrkanian campaign (that was never begun), he had at his disposal a considerable additional force of mercenaries, Thracians, and cavalry (Arr. An. 3.19.7). P.’s power of control over troops, finances, and crucial routes shows that he was still a dominant person. It is unlikely that P. did not agree to his stationing in Ekbatana. As there was unrest in Media in about 327-24, it is suggested that also P. had to suppress local resistance but that the primary sources were silent on his deeds; however, this is uncertain. An enigmatic tradition blames P. for having destroyed “temples to Jason” in Media (Just. 42.3.5; cf. Strab. 11.14.12 = Medeios of Larisa, BNJ 129 F 1; Casaubon’s emendation Abdera is equally problematic). Trogus’ explanation that P. wanted to venerate Alexander instead is absurd. It is assumed that a Greek writer turned *āyazana, a Median form of the Old Persian term for places of worship, *āyadana, into Iasoneia. It is either seen as another hostile reference to P. (by Medeios of Larisa), alternatively as an attempt to blame P. for the misdeeds of his murderers Kleandros and Sitalkes in Media who were later accused of violations against the local population (Curt. 10.1.1-5). In 330, after the execution of Philotas in Baktrian Phrada, Alexander had P. killed swiftly before he could learn about his son’s fate and react (Arr. An. 3.26.3-4; Diod. 17.80.3; Curt. 7.2.11-34). These incidents belong to the major issues in the scholarship on Alexander. It is debated whether Philotas was the innocent victim of the schemes of Alexander and his confidants or silently sympathizing with the plotters against Alexander, thus guilty of treason. The truth is inevitably lost, hidden behind Alexander’s attempts to justify himself and the bias of the → Alexander historiographers who either apologized or criticized him. However, as for P. who was absent during the affair, ancient authors and modern scholars tend to see him as a non-participating victim whose elimination was murder serving Alexander’s wish to free himself from P.’s influence. Probably, Alexander could not dare to

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get rid of him without any legal pretext. P. was perhaps condemned in absentia as Philotas’ accomplice by the assembled Makedonian troops (Diod. 17.80.1). Depicting Alexander as a tyrant unjustly murdering his most deserving general, Curtius praises P. in an eulogy (7.11.33): “a man illustrious in war and peace. He had achieved many successes without the king, the king had done no great deed without him.” The degree of Alexander’s safeguarding of his position when his foremost generals fell is striking. The sources attest to some unrest in the army afterwards (Arr. An. 3.27.1-2; Curt. 6.11.20) but Alexander and his confidants kept the situation stable. Reportedly, Alexander gathered all of the critics in one unit and separated them from the rest (Diod. 17.80.4: Company of the Undisciplined; Curt. 7.2.35-37). Kin of P. such as P.’s son-in-law Koinos (Curt 6.8.17, 9.30-31, 11.11-12) was on Alexander’s side, likely tempted by the prospective of a career boost; Alexander tried to play safe though taking a risk. Under him, while he promoted his confidants, no one achieved such a position as P. had held.   S. Müller Cf. Bearzot, C., La tradizione su Parmenione negli storici di Alessandro, Aevum 61 (1987), 89-104; Heckel 2006, 190-2; Heckel 2016, 44-51; Hylands, J.O., Alexander’s Satraps of Media, JAH 1 (2013), 119-44, at 122-23; Jacobs 1994, 71-2.

Pastoralism   see Foundation myth; Makedonia Patronage, royal Beginning with → Alexander I, successive Argead rulers commissioned leading Greek intellectuals, artists, and literary figures not only as part of their own self-fashioning, but to affirm their Hellenic credentials and to display their high culture both within Makedonia and to the wider Greek world. For the Greek literati at the Argead → court, the potential rewards of royal patronage went far beyond the mere material, although the financial support of the king (along with the often-lavish gifts bestowed upon those who won his approval) was undoubtedly a major factor. Perhaps even more importantly, however, gaining the favour of the king could translate not only into tangible political and economic benefits for their home poleis, but also into an opportunity to 382

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advance their careers and enhance their personal prestige. Nevertheless, royal p. did have its drawbacks, as it left the Greek literary and cultural figures open to charges of flattery and deprived them of true intellectual autonomy. Alexander I is the first of the Argeads for whom direct p. of Greek literary figures is attested, not least because he plays a prominent role in → Herodotos. Alexander’s desire to justify his activities during the → Persian Wars and reaffirm his orientation towards Greece, including the invention of a → foundation myth for the Argeads tracing their descent back to the Heraklid Temenos, the legendary king of Argos (8.137-139), perhaps explains his commissioning of an epinician ode from Pindar to celebrate his Olympic victory (F 121 Maehler). According to a late source (Solin. 9.13), Pindar was one of many poets whom Alexander maintained at the Argead court with lavish gifts. Another was Bakchylides, a fragment of whose encomion of Alexan­der reflects the sumptuous atmosphere of an imagined → symposion (Bakchyl. F 20B Maehler), providing a tantalizing glimpse into Alexander’s own self-fashioning. Despite the fact that Alexander’s successor, → Perdikkas II, had to spend much of his reign attempting to preserve the integrity of his kingdom, there is some evidence for his continued p. of Greek intellectuals and literary figures. Although the anecdote that Perdikkas was cured of love-sickness by Hippokrates is almost certainly apocryphal, his association with the Argead court could well be historical. Perdikkas is also attested to have been the patron of the dithyrambic poet Melanippides (Suda s.v. Melanippides μ 454 Adler), whose innovations to the traditional dithyramb were highly influential upon the revolutionary “New Music” associated with the democracy of late 5th c. → Athens. With the Greek poleis’ embroilment in the final phase of the → Peloponnesian War, → Archelaos was much better positioned than his predecessor to legitimize his personal authority and showcase the power and cultural supremacy of the Argead court. According to the anecdotal tradition (e.g., Istros, BNJ 334 F 61; Plut. Mor. 177A; 531D-E), he was an especially generous patron, which likely explains his success in attracting the most illustrious Greek artists and literary figures of his day to the Argead court. The renowned artist Zeuxis of Ephesos oversaw the decoration of the palace at → Pella, of which the large-scale panel paintings were said to be so spectacular that they attracted hordes of visitors (Ail. VH 14.17; cf. Plin. NH 35.63). Illustrious Greek literary figures attested at the court of Archelaos include the epic poet Choirilos of Samos (Istros, BNJ 334 F 61; Suda s.v. Choiri­

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los χ 594 Adler), the tragic poet Agathon (Plut. Mor. 177A-B; Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4; cf. Plat. Symp. 172C), and the citharode and dithyrambic poet Timo­theos of Miletos (Plut. Mor. 177B-C; 334B; Steph. Byz. s.v. Μίλητος), all of whom were responsible for significant innovations in their respective genres. → Thucydides, whose influence on the subsequent historiographical tradition was profound, is also said to have spent time at the Argead court (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 30-31), although this statement may simply be an inference from his positive portrayal of Archelaos (Thuc. 2.100.2). The tradition that Sokrates refused to accept Archelaos’ invitation is probably a later invention (Arist. Rhet. 2.1398; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Dio Chrys. 13.30), representing an attempt to dissociate the Platonic school from the Argead court, as is suggested by the Platonic Socrates’ decisive claim that he had never even met the man (Gorg. 470D-E). The tragedian → Euripides is perhaps the most famous of the Greek literati at Archelaos’ court. Although most of the more colourful details of the biographical tradition cannot be accepted, Archelaos’ p. of Euripides is widely attested (e.g., Arist. Pol. 1311B; Plut. Mor. 177A; 531D-E; Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4). The specifically Makedonian references in Euripides’ Bakchai, its focus on Dionysos (a particularly prominent god in Makedonia), and the portrayal of Makedonia as an exotic and primeval wilderness (conforming to contemporary Greek perceptions) suggest that the tragedy was composed at the Argead court. Furthermore, the fragments extant from Euripides’ lost Archelaos suggest that he was commissioned to rework the foundation legend of the Argeads, establishing a new genealogy according to which Archelaos’ ancestor and homonym triumphed over evil and, in obedience to the Delphic → oracle, followed a she-goat to → Aigai where he founded the future Argead capital. Euripides’ invention of a new founder figure named after his patron was intended not only to provide further genealogical ammunition to the Argeads’ claim to Heraklid lineage, reaffirming Archelaos’ claim to Hellenic ethnicity to his Greek neighbours, but also to legitimize his claim to the throne to his domestic rivals (his → succession was contested). Although Archelaos’ death ushered in a period of renewed turmoil in Makedonia, there is some evidence for continued Argead p. of Greek intellectuals. → Aristotle’s father, Nikomachos, served as the personal physician of → Amyntas III (Diog. Laert. 5.1). Euphraios of Oreos, a member of the Platonic school, is said to have been an influential political adviser to → Perdikkas III, at whose court he served as a sort of intellectual gatekeeper, permitting only those with at least a basic 384

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knowledge of geometry and philosophy to dine with the king ([Plat.] Ep. 5.321C-E; Athen. 11.506F; 508E). Nevertheless, → Philip II appears to have been the first Argead ruler to make a systematic effort to ground his rule in contemporary intellectual discourse. To this end, in addition to the glittering array of Greek artists, poets, and playwrights who illuminated the courts of his predecessors, Philip famously commissioned the services of Aristotle (whose family already had a connection with the Argead court) to educate his son Alexander. Philip also invited Aristotle’s relative, → Kallisthenes of Olynthos (BNJ 124), whose Hellenika offered a pro-Makedonian perspective on events in Greece between the King’s Peace of 387/6 and the outbreak of the → Third Sacred War in 357/6, to write a monograph on the Sacred War, which legitimized Philip’s role in the conflict that offered him the opportunity to intervene directly in central Greece, ultimately leading to his hegemony over the Greek poleis. Similarly, the historiographer and rhetorician Anaximenes of Lampsakos (BNJ 72) followed up his equally pro-Makedonian universal history of Greece with a history of Philip (Philippika), in which he focused upon his reorganization of Makedonia and provided a lengthy account of his military campaigns in at least 8 books. The tradition that Anaximenes taught Alexander rhetoric as well as his well-attested personal association with both Philip and Alexander strongly suggest that he composed his historiographical works at the Makedonian court (BNJ 72 T 1, 6, 8, 9). A third historiographer, → Theopompos of Chios (BNJ 115), also turned to the composition of a work on Philip after completing his Hellenika, a continuation of Thucydides that covered events in Greece until 394. His Philippika, likely composed at the invitation of the king himself, was a lengthy and digressive account of Philip’s life and times in 58 books. Although Theopompos accepted Philip’s lavish p. (BNJ 115 T 7; cf. T 5c), relations between the two eventually soured, perhaps through the efforts of Theopompos’ competitors to eliminate a rival in the cut-throat atmosphere of the Argead court. In any case, Theopompos’ Philip­ pika became renowned for vehemence of his denunciations of Philip and his supporters, and the work does not seem to have been published until after Philip’s death. Antipatros of Magnesia (BNJ 69), who was probably a student at the → Platonic Academy under Speusippos, wrote a Hellenic Affairs in which he, like Kallisthenes, justified Philip’s conquest of Greece by appealing to historical precedents. The sheer number of well-connected and influential Greek intellectuals who are attested to have composed either accounts of Philip’s

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reign or more general historiographical works highlighting the role of Philip and his predecessors in 4th-century Greece demonstrates that he quickly recognized the potential of circulating such works in order to legitimize his military and diplomatic interventions in mainland Greece and justify his future plans of expansion. Besides the p. of prominent intellectuals, another innovation that Philip brought to the Argead court was his transplantation of theatrical performance from its traditional (public) festival context into his (private) royal symposia. In so doing, he transformed the institutional gift-giving associated with liturgies in the Greek poleis as a way of binding the community together into a fundamentally one-way relationship of the king and the subject of his p. Furthermore, one of the main objects in Philip’s hosting of royal symposia was to cement the loyalty of his courtiers, and to this end he appears to have deliberately fostered an atmosphere of intense rivalry among the intellectuals and literary figures who were vying for his favour. This encouragement of often acrimonious competition intensified under Alexander, who continued Philip’s practice of marking military victories, weddings, and other events with extravagant dramatic and musical competitions, adapting these spectacles as necessary to suit the ongoing needs of his traveling court. It contained a large entourage of artists from all over the Greek world (cf. Chares of Mytilene, BNJ 125 F 4), testifying to the lucrative profit they hoped to gain. Like Philip, Alexander was well aware of the need to legitimize his rule among the Greek poleis to ensure their continued co-operation in his campaign. Kallisthenes (BNJ 124), whose family had a longstanding association with the Argead court and who had previously shown himself willing to adopt a suitably pro-Makedonian agenda, was the obvious candidate to serve as Alexan­der’s court historian. The extant fragments from Kallisthenes’ Deeds of Alexander reveal that he portrayed the campaign as a re-enactment of the Trojan War, highlighting Alexander’s panhellenic aspirations as well as his pious and moral leadership. Although Kallisthenes filled the role of official court historian at least until his condemnation in 327, he may have had competition for this position from other intellectuals accompanying Alexander, who were vying for financial benefits and personal advancement, such as → Marsyas of Pella, whose Makedonika largely focusing upon Philip also covered the early part of Alexander’s campaign (BNJ 135-136 T 1), or Anaximenes, who followed up his Philippika with an apparently eyewitness account of Alexan­der’s expedition (cf. BNJ 72 T 1, 9a, 27). Alexander’s entourage also 386

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included poets whom he commissioned to tell the tale of his exploits in verse. Although the information that survives is tantalizingly scanty, the poets at Alexander’s court appear (like Kallisthenes) to have portrayed his campaign as a re-enactment of the Trojan War, gratifying the king by glorifying his deeds in epic terms. The presence of philosophers such as Aristotle, Anaxarchos of Abdera, and Pyrrhon of Elis not just at Alexander’s court but in his innermost circle indicates that he was interested in going beyond Philip’s p. of leading intellectuals simply to legitimize his rule. The personal and exclusive relationships that Alexander carefully developed with his court literati suggests that he was attempting to foster an intellectual bond with them analogous to the military bond that he was in the process of creating with his army. Furthermore, he also wanted to establish his court as an intellectual centre for philo­ sophers that would rival and compete with the renowned contemporary philo­ sophical schools in Athens. Not surprisingly, in the intensively combative atmosphere of the Makedonian court, pre-existing rivalries between individual intellectuals, particularly those hailing from different schools, crystallized into outright hostility and collusion to eliminate a competitor. After Alexander, naturally, these rivalries extended into the Hellenistic courts, as the Successors contended to attract the leading intellectuals to glorify and legitimize their own rule at the expense of their competitors.   F. Pownall Cf. Carney 2003 = Carney 2015, 191-205; Pownall 2017; Pownall, F., Sophists and Flatterers: Greek Intellectuals at Alexander’s Court, in: D’Agostini, M. et al. 2021 (forthcoming); Strootman 2014, 145-64; Tritle, L.A., Alexander and the Greeks: Artists and Soldiers, Friends and Enemies, in: Heckel/Tritle 2009, 121-40.

Pausanias, ruler Pausanias, the son of → Aëropos II, ruled in c. 394/3. Diodoros (16.84.6-7) who seems to use → Theopompos, states that P. succeeded his father while the Makedonian lists of rulers name a certain → Amyntas II (Euseb. Chron. I 227; Synk. 495.14-15 Mosshammer) whose identity is not clear. He may have ruled as P.’s rival simultaneously or preceded him for a short time before being assassinated. The speculation that Amyntas II was identical with the equally shadowy Amyntas ὁ μικρός who was murdered by a certain Derdas (Arist.

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Pol. 1311B) and that the latter, perhaps from → Elimeia (where the name ran in the ruling family), was P.’s agent, cannot be validated. Next to nothing is known about P.’s reign that only lasted for one year. The numismatic evidence reveals that P. had financial problems. At first, he preserved the standards of Argead silver coins established by → Archelaos from whom P. also borrowed parts of his iconography. However, during the later stage of his short-lived reign, standards deteriorated: many of P.’s silver coins were even plated, a consequence of P.’s urgent need to mint coins on a large scale in order to finance his struggle to keep his rule. The dynastic conflict put P. under pressure. After an obviously stormy rule, P. was eliminated and succeeded by → Amyntas III (Diod. 14.89.2).   S. Müller Cf. Gaebler 1935, 158-9; Heinrichs 2012, 117, 123, n. 30, 134; March 1995; Westermark 1989, 306.

Pausanias, assassin Pausanias, son of Kerastos from → Orestis, was a member of → Philip II’s royal guard (Diod. 16.93.3: probably the hypaspistai basilikoi, not the elite 7 → soma­ tophylakes). In 336, P. stabbed Philip at the entrance of the theatre at → Aigai and was killed on the spot by Philip’s bodyguards (Diod. 16.94.3-4; Just. 9.6.3-5). While there is ancient and modern speculation on the possible complicity of → Olympias, → Alexander III, the sons of the Lynkestian Aëropos, or the Great King, → Aristotle, a contemporary, states that P. acted on his own account (Pol. 1311B). According to a story of doubtful validity, the trigger of the murder was Philip’s unwillingness to punish his general → Attalos who had P. gang raped at a dinner (Diod. 16.93.3-9; Just. 9.6.5-7; cf. Plut. Alex. 10.4). Depicting P. as a tyrannicide, Trogus-Justin portrays Philip as an unjust judge in this matter (9.6.8) and Attalos and his circle as shameless rakes who personally raped P. (9.6.6; Diod. 16.93.7 blames Attalos’ muleteers). This looks like sensationalism. As usual in the case of an Argead’s assassination, P. likely acted out of political reasons. It is debated whether P.’s descent from Orestis played a role. Orestis had lost its autonomy to Philip just as the neighbouring Lynkestis where Aëropos’ sons came from. Two of them were executed on the charge of being P.’s accomplices (Arr. An. 1.25.1-2; Plut. Mor. 327C; Just. 11.2.2). It is debated whether P.’s 388

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corpse was crucified (Anonym., BNJ 148 F 1). The appalling tale that Olympias crowned P.’s body and buried his ashes above Philip’s tomb (Just. 9.7.10-11) is fiction. Aischines’ claim that → Demosthenes caused a shrine to be dedicated to P. is also likely slander (3.160).   S. Müller Cf. Hatzopoulos, M.B., The Reliability of Diodorus’ Account of Philip II’s Assassination, in: Bearzot, C./Landucci, F. (eds.), Diodoro e l’altra Grecia, 2005, 43-65; Hatzopoulos, M.B., La mort de Philippe, 2018; Heckel 2006, 193-4; Müller 2019, 62-6.

Peace of Philokrates Signed in 346, the Peace of Philokrates ended the war over → Amphipolis → Athens had declared against → Philip II upon the Makedonian annexation of Amphipolis in 357 (Aischin. 2.21, 70; 3.54). However, busy with and financially exhausted by the Social War against rebellious members of their Second Naval League, the Athenians had been unable to intervene. In the meantime, the unstoppable Makedonian expansion went on extinguishing Athenian influence from the Makedonian and Chalkidian coast and ended the Chalkidian koinon. Philokrates, the p.’s namegiver, proposed negotiations with Philip in which he took part as an Athenian envoy in 346, and promoted the results before Athens’ demos. While not attested epigraphically, the p.’s terms were implied by the contemporary speeches of → Demosthenes and → Aischines. Both were among the 10 Athenian ambassadors sent to → Pella in 346 to negotiate the treaty. It included peace and symmachia between Philip and his allies and Athens and her allies (Dem. 19.48; [Dem.] 12.22-23) and confirmed the sta­ tus quo of the territorial possessions of the parties involved at the time of the ratification ([Dem.] 7.18). Thus, despite the instructions given to the envoys and their obvious attempts to secure Athens’ claim to Amphipolis (Aischin. 2.21, 27-33), which had been lost to her ever since 424/3, they were faced with political reality and had to recognize Philip’s conquests, including Amphipolis (Dem. 5.25; [Dem.] 7.23-26). This admission was a bitter reminder that Athens had lost control over Northern Greece. The p.’s terms mirrored the change of the political situation showing that an expanded Makedonia had the upper hand. Amphipolis, the war’s original issue, was but a lost cause for Athens. There were other pressing problems. The p. excluded Phokis, Thessalian Halos,

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and the eastern Thracian ruler Kersobleptes, Athens’ ally (Dem. 19.159, 174). With these parties, Philip was actively at war. Their exclusion was crucial and turned out to be a major disadvantage to the Athenians. They had to worry about the security of their grain fleet from the Black Sea when Philip conquered Kersobleptes’ realm. They also had to fear for Attika’s safety when he gained control of Thermopylai while fighting Phokis (Dem. 19.152-153). These Athenian fears came true shortly after. However, realistically, the Athenian envoys could do nothing more than deliver their speeches and face the facts: in no position to dictate the terms, Athens was without any realistic alternative to the acceptance of Philip’s proposals. The envoys cannot be blamed. The p.’s terms were a question of political power, not of rhetorical skills. Philip promised to spare the Athenians’ zones of influence in the Chersonese while they were deliberating the p. (Aischin. 2.82). The embassy returned to Athens and informed the demos, which voted to accept the terms. The Athenians and their allies’ representatives ratified the p. in the presence of Philip’s ambassadors, → Antipatros and → Parmenion (Dem. 19.69), significantly the highest-ranking of his generals. The 10 Athenian envoys were reappointed to return to Pella and obtain Philip’s and his allies’ oath to the p. However, in the meantime, Philip improved his strategical situation even more. He defeated Kersoblep­ tes and annexed his realm (Dem. 18.30; 19.155-156; Aischin. 2.90), thereby endangering the Chersonese (Dem. 19.78-79). When the second Athenian embassy arrived at Pella, its members had to wait for Philip while he was still campaigning in → Thrace. Furthermore, the oaths of Philip’s allies were delayed until he and his army had marched from Pella to → Pherai, close to Thermopylai, the gate to central Greece (Dem. 18.32; 19.34). Demosthenes blamed his colleagues for this negligence, but they could not do much to push on the procedure. When Philip captured Thermopylai during his campaign against Phokis, for the Athenians their worst fears came true. Their hopes that the p. would help to humble → Thebes were crushed. Instead, the Makedonians threatened the Chersonese, controlled Thermopylai, and endangered Attika. Consequently, the Athenian attitude towards the p. quickly changed. Fragile and unpopular, it was rapidly undermined by Athenian hostility, almost immediately after Philip’s allies had sworn their oath: when Philip asked his new Athenian symmachoi for military help against the Phokians, the demos, influenced by Demosthenes who distanced himself from the p. (“discreditable and unworthy of Athens”: 19.150), refused to assist him (Aischin. 2.137-138). 390

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In 343, → Hypereides charged Philokrates with treacherous conduct as Philip’s bribed agent (Dem. 19.116). The trial’s outcome—Philokrates was sentenced to death—mirrors the widespread dissatisfaction with the p. and the search for scapegoats. Philokrates had wisely fled into exile before. Shortly after, Aischines was charged with misconduct on the second embassy. He turned the tables against his first accuser, Demosthenes’ political ally Timarchos, and won a trial against him that drove Timarchos from the political stage (Aischin. 1; Dem. 19.284-286). Demosthenes then prosecuted Aischines. Though his charges could not be substantiated, he accused Aischines of having sold the polis and its interests to Philip (Dem. 19.110-111, 118-120, 178, 201). However, supported by → Euboulos and Phokion, Aischines was acquitted. Realistically, there was no need for Philip to bribe any Athenian envoy, for the political situation provided him with the upper hand in the negotiations anyway. In about 343, Philip tried to appease the Athenians by offering to amend the p., sending the orator Python of Byzantion as his envoy to Athens. Regardless that Makedonia was in an even stronger position than in 346, Athenian politicians such as Demosthenes and Hegesippos boycotted Philip’s attempt by the utopian demand for the restoration of Amphipolis, still evoked as a symbol of collective Athenian identity ([Dem.] 7.24-29). Furthermore, Philip’s appeasing offer to give them the island of Halonnesos (off the Thessalian coast) he had captured from “pirates” and garrisoned in 346, was rejected. Demosthenes and his supporters took offense, criticizing it on the grounds that Philip used the wrong terminology and deliberately blurred Athens’ claims: Philip could not give (didomi) Halonnesos to the Athenians, but only give it back (apodidomi) as their rightful possession ([Dem.] 7.6; Aischin. 3.83). Greek comic poets such as Alexis made fun of this quibbling about phraseology. While the p. remained formally intact, Athenian hostilities continued. In 342, operating in the Chersonese, the Athenian general Diopeithes attacked Philip’s ally Kardia, disturbed other Makedonian zones of influence, and reportedly held captive and tortured the Makedonian ambassador Amphilochos ([Dem.] 12.3). Demosthenes took a stand for Diopeithes (8.17-18). Thus, the Makedonians may have felt that the Athenians were the ones who had broken the p. However, the Athenians claimed that it was Philip. While Demosthenes states that the p. was broken by Philip when he seized the Athenian grain fleet in 340 after his unsuccessful sieges of Perinthos and Byzantion (18.73), according to an alternative tradition, the Athenians declared war in particular because of these

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sieges (Philoch., BNJ 328 F 162; Diod. 16.77.2). In any case, they put an end to the fragile and strongly undermined p.   S. Müller Cf. Buckler, J., Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC, 2003, 442-86; MacDowell 2000; Roisman, J., The Rhetoric of Manhood. Masculinity in the Attic Orators, 2005, 118-32; Wirth 1985, 75-101; Worthington 2008, 89-99, 112-6.

Peisistratids Two notes illustrate that Makedonian rulers had some connection to Athenian tyrants during the 6th c. Expelled from Athens for the second time in the 550s, Peisistratos participated in settling the chōrion (“place, spot, district”: LSJ, 1) Rhaikelos ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2) on the → Thermaic Gulf, probably on the NW coast of the Chalkidike not far south of → Therme and next to Aineia (Barrington Atlas, map 50). At the moment there is even a tendency to identify the place with the Greek city, but in this case, it would not have been under Makedonian control. Otherwise, Peisistratos as one leader of the project must have had some arrangement with the Makedonian ruler of the time, but his identity is open, as are his motives. Thence the tyrant engaged in some business in the → Pangaion and Strymon region, most probably in trading → timber or silver and/or gold; but that he himself operated a mine is improbable since the Thracian owners of the Pangaion massif and the Strymon plain are not likely to have allowed him to do so. The silver of the Athenian coins under the Peisistratids, the so-called Wappenmünzen (‘heraldic coins’, minted ca. 54510: Kraay 1976, pl. 9), does not go back to the Laureion district—but that is all we can say. The Pangaion region is often regarded as a provenance, and the Athenaion Politeia seems to hint at it, but this is not more than a hypothesis. As well the metal could have come from Peisistratos’ supporters, collected from different sources. But also his proceeds in the Strymon/Pangaion district will have contributed to financing his return in force to Attika where in 546 he established tyranny for good and henceforward paid mercenary troops to control the polis. In the following years the provenance of the silver minted by him and his son Hippias may have changed more than once. When Hippias was expelled in 510, two seats of exile were at hand for him: the Thessalians offered Iolkos, the Makedonian ruler → Amyntas I Anthemous (the 392

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region?) in NW Chalkidike (Hdt. 5.94.1), not far from the Rhaikelos district. But Hippias turned to Sigeion in the Troad (Hdt. 5.65.3), near Lampsakos on the → Hellespont where his relatives, “most influential on the Persian great king Dareios” (Thuc. 6.59.3, concerning Lampsakos), held local tyrannies. Supported by their networks he won over the Persian satrap Artaphrenes to help him in his return to → Athens. This was more than the Thessalians or the Makedonian ruler could offer. Both were his friends, but we get no clue as to why. Two centuries later, another Argead ruler allegedly was concerned with the Peisistratid heritage. In 331, → Alexander III is said to have come upon the statues of the Athenian tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton in the Persian residence at Sousa. In 514 they had slain Hippias’ brother Hipparchos, for personal reasons (Thuc. 6.53.3-54.4, 56-58; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 18), but in Athenian aristocratic tradition (skolia nos. 893-96, Campbell: Greek Lyric V [LCL]) in an attempt to overthrow tyranny (Hdt. 5.55-6, cf. 6.109.3, 123.2); later this became formative also for democratic identity. They are said to have been honoured by statues with their features soon after 510, which is a patent impossibility. Allegedly, Xerxes took away this monument of freedom, and Alexander restored it as an avenger (Arr. An. 3.16.7-8, cf. 7.19.1-2)—another facet of his legend.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Cole, J.W., Peisistratus on the Strymon, G&R 1975, 42-4; Lavelle, B.M., The Pisistratids and the Mines of Thrace, GRBS 33 (1992), 5-23; Müller 2019, 140-1; Nicolet-Pierre, H. et al., Monnaies archaiques d’Athènes sous Pisistrate et les Pisistratides (c. 545-510), II: Recherches sur la composition métallique des Wappenmünzen, RN 27 (1985), 23-44; Xydopoulos 2012.

Pella Pella, in the area of Bottiaia, near the modern village of Nea P., was first mentioned by → Herodotos together with Ichnai (7.123.3). P. was a Paionian settlement (Thuc. 2.99.4) named Βούνομος/Βουνόμεια (Steph. Byz. s.v. Πέλλα) that received Ionian influence from the Bottiaians during the archaic period and together with her chora became part of the territories of the Makedonian kingdom before the late 6th c. It was either → Archelaos or → Amyntas III who moved the capital of the kingdom from → Aigai to P. This initiative turned P.

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into a Makedonian city as onomastics and archaeological remains reveal. There was a lake named Loudia near the city which had access to the sea through a 120 stadia canal of River Loudias (Strab. 7 F 20, 22 Jones = 7 F 11b and c Radt). P. was captured by the → Chalkidians of → Thrace before 383, and was considered as the most significant city of Makedonia at that time (Xen. Hell. 5.2.13). Amyntas III recaptured the city and later asked for Spartan help against → Olynthos. P. is mentioned as a polis in the urban sense also by Ps.-Skylax (66), who mentioned the royal palace (basileion). → Philip II was born at P. and embellished the city (Strab. 7 F 20, 23 Jones = 7 F 11a-c Radt; 16.2.10; Dem. 7.7; 18.68). His mother, Eurydike, is mentioned as a citizen (politis) of P. (Plut. Mor. 14B). Under Philip there was a gymnasion with bath facilities at P. (Poly­ ain. 4.2.6). P. continued to be the capital of the kingdom under → Alexander III, who was born at P. (Strab. 16.2.10), and the last Temenid kings. Alexander was planning a royal wedding of his half-sister Kynna(ne) with Langaros of the Autariatai at P. (Arr. An. 1.5.4). P. was the place → Kleopatra, Alexander’s full sister, was supposed to marry → Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 3.10). Monimos, the guardian of the city, delivered P. to → Kassandros, when news about the surrender of → Pydna and → Olympias to Kassandros reached him (Diod. 19.50.4, 7). This was also the place where Thessalonike gave birth to her three sons; most probably she was assassinated there by her second son Antipatros. → Seleukos I was also from P. (Pausanias of Antiocheia, BNJ 854 F 10.10) and he gave the name of P. to a city founded in the East (App. Syr. 57). There is epigraphic evidence for a Pellaian thearodokos from Nemea (SEG 36.331 B 23-24). Athena Alkidemos was the patron deity of the city (Liv. 42.51.2). There were also cults of Apollon, Artemis, Asklepios, Darron, Demeter, Dionysos, Herakles Kynagidas and Phylakos, the Mother of the Gods, the Muses, Pan, and Zeus during the Hellenistic period but they go certainly back to earlier times.   S. Psoma Cf. Papakonstantinou-Diamantourou, D., Πέλλα, I. Ἱστορικὴ ἐπισκόπησις καὶ μαρτυρίαι, 1971; Hatzopoulos, M.B./Loukopoulou, L.D., Two Studies in Ancient Macedonian Topography, 1987; Akamatis, I., Pella, in: Lane Fox 2011, 393-408.

Pelopidas   see Boiotia; Alexander II; Ptolemy of Aloros; Thebes

394

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Peloponnesian War Under → Perdikkas II, Argead Makedonia became involved in the Peloponnesian War (431-04) between → Athens and → Sparta and their respective allies. Athens’ spheres of influence in northern Greece—namely in the Thracian and Chalkidian areas—became a war zone. In these turbulent times, Perdikkas made great efforts to save his realm’s autonomy and interests, in particular against the threatening influence of Athens; in the end, he was successful. He tried either to establish a counter-alliance against Athens’ superior power or, in the case that no such coalition was possible, to come to terms with the Athenians temporarily without sacrificing his realm’s autonomy. Hostilities between Athens and Argead Makedonia preceded the outbreak of the P. W. and contributed to Perdikkas’ involvement. On the eve of the P. W., in 433, the Athenians chose to interfere in Argead inner-dynastic affairs: they supported Perdikkas’ brother Philip and the latter’s ally Derdas (probably the local ruler of → Elimeia) in their revolt against Athens’ actual ally Perdikkas. Our main source, the Athenian → Thucydides, is silent on Athens’ reason for this shift in policy (1.57.1). It is usually assumed that the Athenian foundation of → Amphipolis at the mouth of the Strymon (437/6), close to Perdikkas’ domains in Mygdonia, caused a diplomatic ice age. Due to the spread of Athens’ influence in the north, particularly based on her control of the Delian League, the Argead realm was surrounded by Athenian allies and strongholds, an uncomfortable situation. The foundation of Amphipolis was likely also a thorn in Perdikkas’ side since its geostrategical situation provided the Athenians—in fact the main customer of Makedonian → timber exploited and exported under Argead control—with access to Thracian timber for their fleet. Athens’ decision to back Philip against Perdikkas may have been a consequence of the deterioration of their relationship. In reaction, Perdikkas attacked Athens’ sphere of influence in the Chalkidian area and encouraged Korinthos’ apoikia Poteidaia, a member of the Delian League, to free itself from Athens. While Thucydides blames essentially Perdikkas for the wave of unrest in the Chalkidian area that preceded the P. W. (1.56.2-57.5), his portrayal of the Argead ruler is biased. The political situation leading to the turmoil in Athens’ northern zone of influence was much more complicated. For Perdikkas, the revolt of Poteidaia was intertwined with his war against his brother: after a short-lived peace with Athens in 432 (Thuc. 1.61.3), Perdikkas returned to support Poteidaia. One reason was likely that the Athenians showed no interest

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in ending their alliance with his hostile brother: they used his and his ally’s cavalry before Poteidaia (Thuc. 1.62.2) (which finally fell in 429). To create a counter-block against Athens’ influence cutting his freedom of action, Perdikkas encouraged the members of the Delian League on the Chalkidian coast and in the Bottike who were rising up against Athens to give up their home and move further inland (Thuc. 1.57.5). Depriving Athens of her direct grip on this region Perdikkas strengthened the city of → Olynthos and temporarily granted the settlers territory in his own land around Lake Bolbe in Mygdonia (Thuc. 1.58.2). In 431, the Odrysian ruler Sitalkes mediated a peace between Athens and Perdikkas (Thuc. 2.95.2). However, it did not last long. In the summer of 429, Perdikkas supported a Spartan attack on pro-Athenian Akarnania (Thuc. 2.80.7, who provides no information on the background of this shift of policy). Although the campaign failed, Perdikkas’ role will have been one of the reasons why the Athenians initially encouraged Sitalkes’ invasion of the Argead realm in the winter of 429. They also wanted to use his manpower against the rebellious → Chalkidians. However, they disappointed the Odrysian by failing to send the promised military support. Perdikkas managed to end the invasion by negotiating an alliance with the Odrysian house, cemented by a marital bond involving his sister and Sitalkes’ nephew (Thuc. 2.100-101). In 424, Sparta sent an army under her commander Brasidas to the war zone in northern Greece in order to undermine the shaky Athenian zone of influence. Sparta’s new ally Perdikkas rolled out the red carpet and used his connections to members of the Thessalian elite in order to grant Brasidas and his troops an undisturbed passage through → Thessaly (Thuc. 4.78.2-79.1). It was a reciprocal agreement: Perdikkas promised to support Brasidas’ policy against Athens (apparently propagated as “liberation from Athenian enslavement”: Thuc. 4.86.1, 87.6) and provide half of the supplies for his army while the Spartan joined Perdikkas in his war of conquest against Upper Makedonian → Lynkestis (Thuc. 4.83.4-5). Again, the dynamics of the P. W. were entangled with the Argead agenda: Perdikkas did his best to use the turmoils of war to the advantage of his realm. Sparta appeared to be his obvious ally and with Perdikkas’ help, in 424/3, Brasidas shocked Athens—and Thucydides (who was on a Athenian mission before Thasos and came too late)—by depriving her of Amphipolis, a benefaction also for Makedonia (Thuc. 4.103.3108.1). However, in the matter of Lynkestis, the Spartan-Makedonian alliance did not meet expectations. First, Brasidas negotiated an unwanted reconciliation (Thuc. 4.83.2-6) and when the joint invasion in Lynkestis (423) turned out to 396

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be a failure (Thuc. 4.124.1-128.3) Perdikkas had to decide against Sparta and in favour of a peace with Athens in 423/2. A fragmentary inscription may document the treaty: it includes a reconciliation with Perdikkas and Arrhabaios (whose autonomy is recognized) and obliges Perdikkas to export oars exclusively to Athens (IG I³ 89). Thucydides blames Perdikkas for having neglected his duties as an ally by failing to support the Athenian general → Nikias’ plan of a Chalkidian campaign (either dated to 422 or 417/6) (5.83.4). The Peace of Nikias (421) between Athens and Sparta, a 50-year treaty granting Athens the control over her rebellious allies (and theoretically Amphipolis) collapsed after 7 years. In 418/7, Perdikkas, still Athens’ ally, joined a Spartan-Argive alliance (Thuc. 5.80.2) and was promptly punished: in 417/6, Athens declared war on him. A troop of Athenian cavalry and exiled Makedonians were brought into Central Makedonia via → Methone to raid the country (Thuc. 6.7.3). Some time at the end of his reign, Perdikkas once again concluded an alliance with Athens. Obviously, he saw no chance to form any other counter-alliance. In 414, he supported Athens’ unsuccessful attempt to reestablish control over Amphipolis (Thuc. 7.9.1). For Argead Makedonia, an autonomous Amphipolis was preferable anyway. Athens’ Sicilian disaster and loss of her fleet took a lot of pressure off Makedonia. Its new ruler → Archelaos had more freedom of action to pursue the Argead agenda. He maintained a technical neutrality to the end of the P. W. However, by using his control of Makedonian timber resources, he helped the Athenians to rebuild their fleet after its destruction in the Sicilian expedition. Thereby, he made himself so popular that he was honoured as proxenos and euergetes of the Athenian demos (IG I³ 117). The P. W. was intertwined with Argead policy; thanks to the tireless diplomatic efforts of Perdikkas (and his leading circles), Argead Makedonia kept its autonomy.   S. Müller Cf. Kallet-Marx, L., Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1-5.24, 1993; Müller 2017; Psoma 2014; Roisman 2010, 146-54; Tritle 2010.

Perdikkas I Perdikkas I was the legendary founder of Argead Makedonia according to the earliest known literary version of the → foundation myth preserved by → Hero­ dotos in the 5th c. (8.137-138). It is generally believed that Herodotos cited a

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Makedonian logos: a dynastic legitimizing tradition created and circulated by → Alexander I and preserved by his son → Perdikkas II. This Argead myth served to claim a Greek, royal, and Heraklid descent from the Argive ruler Temenos. The founder figure P. bore a typical Makedonian name Alexander I also gave to one of his sons (who became the most famous of them: Perdikkas II). P. is a proto-historical, mythical figure. He is only attested in the Argead foundation myth in its variants and lists of Makedonian rulers. The story of P.’s rise from a homeless refugee to a conqueror and ruler, reported by Herodotos, is embroidered by common motifs of ascent stories in accordance with the narrative pattern Otto Rank categorized, in 1909, as “the myth of the birth of the hero.” According to this type of tale, the protagonist is of noble (often royal) lineage. Prevented from being raised in accordance with his social status (often by infant exposure) by an evil pursuer (usually a close relative), he is saved by divine intervention, trained to do a job foreshadowing the duties of a ruler (such as a shepherd), and finally given ruling power by divine help. P.’s story contains all of these elements, although they are partly reworked and varied in accordance with the storyline and setting. Thus, infant exposure is substituted by P.’s expulsion from his hometown in his youth. The evil pursuer is no relative but P.’s employer when he works as a shepherd in Makedonia. The story goes that P. descended from the Heraklid Temenos, legendary ruler of → Argos in the Peloponnese. P. and his two elder brothers, Gauanes and Aëropos, were expelled from Argos and wandered through → Illyria to Upper Makedonia where they were hired as shepherds (the prefiguring element) of the → basileus at Lebaia. P. tended the lesser flocks (sheep and goats). A sign marked P. out as the foremost member of the round table at the basileus’ oikos: when the latter’s wife baked bread, the loaf for P. always rose twice as high as the others’ loaves. This miracle pointed at his predestination to rule by triggering associations of the double portion of brave Homeric heroes and Spartan kings at banquets. The worried basileus discharged the brothers. When they asked to be paid, divine intervention disturbed his mind and he ordered them to take the patch of sunlight shining through the smoke-hole in the roof: this was the wage they deserved. The older brothers were startled, while P. accepted, drew a line around sunlight on the floor with his knife, and shoved it into the fold of his cloak three times. His swiftness and cleverness marked him out among the brothers as the predestined leader. The element that the youngest of the brothers was the cleverest was another topos that could be found in other ascent stories (cf. Hdt. 4.5). There is consensus that 398

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the sunrays were connected with ruling power and symbolized the divine grace blessing the chosen one. Thus, the scene described P.’s takeover of the sovereign rights the divinely manipulated basileus gave to him. Despite the dynastic dimension to P.’s act of acceptance when he took a triple portion, he is clearly depicted as main protagonist and his brothers as his supporters. After they had departed, the basileus was warned by his advisers and gave the order to kill the brothers. But they were saved by a suddenly rising river, usually identified with the Haliakmon, that stopped his henchmen and allowed the brothers’ advance to Lower Makedonia. Coming into the so-called gardens of Midas, they settled down and extended the realm. P.’s divine protector and wonder-worker in his favour is sometimes identified with Dionysos. However, it will in fact have been Zeus, the highest god and father of the Argead progenitor Herakles. As a sun god and weather god, responsible also for the harvest, he was connectable with the miraculous growth of the bread and likely to direct rays of sun or flood a river by sending heavy rain. Zeus was P.’s patron in the foundation myth. This may be confirmed by a later variant of the myth about the realm’s creation in which P. is told by the Delphic oracle that aigis-bearing Zeus will give wealthy land to him (Diod. 7 F 16). While the later variants of the Argead ascent story introduced new founder figures (→ Archelaos; → Karanos), P. did not cease to be of importance. With the insertion of Karanos as founder figure in the 4th c., P. became either his son (Just. 7.2.1) or fourth in the list of rulers (Satyr., BNJ 631 F 1: Karanos, Koinos, Tyrimmas, P.). In these later versions, P. was not the founder of Argead Makedonia but responsible for its expansion (Diod. 7 F 16). According to one variant, he was also the founder of the capital → Aigai. Again, divine protection is central to the story: When P. wished to expand his realm, he consulted the oracle of Delphi and was told to go to Bottiaia and raise the city on the spot where the white-horned, snow-white goats (aiges) rested (Diod. 7 F 16). The association of this founding act with the blessings of Zeus, the bearer of the goatskin (aigis, as additionally mentioned in the oracle), is manifest. According to the version given by Trogus-Justin, P. established the → burial place of his dynasty at Aigai (Just. 7.2.1-5). The list of rulers preserved by Diodoros (7 F 15) attributes a reign of 48 years to P. before he was succeeded by his son Argaios.   S. Müller Cf. Asirvatham 2017, 282-8; Kleinknecht, H., Herodot und die makedonische Ur­ geschichte, Hermes 94 (1966), 134-46; Müller 2016, 85-105; Müller 2017, 118-21; Rank, O., Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden, 1909 (The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, 2004).

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Perdikkas II Perdikkas II was the son and successor of → Alexander I. The name of his mother is unknown. A sister (Stratonike) and four brothers (Alketas, Amyntas, Menelaos, and Philip) are attested. Bearing a typically Makedonian name, P. was apparently named after the dynasty’s founder according to its → foundation myth (Hdt. 8.137-138). Since it was likely circulated by Alexander I, he intended to advertise his dynastic propaganda by his son’s name. Scholars date P.’s accession to about 454 or 450. His regnal years were controversial in antiquity. Nikomedes of Akanthos (BNJ 772 F 2) speaks of 41 years, → Theopompos of Chios of 33 (BNJ 115 F 279), Anaximenes of Lampsakos of 40 (BNJ 72 F 27), Hieronymos of Kardia of 38 (BNJ 154 F 1), → Marsyas of Pella (BNJ 135-136 F 15) and Philochoros of Athens (BNJ 328 F 126) both of 23. P.’s son → Archelaos succeeded him in about 413; thus P. reigned for about 41, at least 37 years. The diverging information—even the insiders of the Argead court Theopompos and Marsyas fail to provide reliable numbers—is generally explained with the lack of Makedonian written record of Argead rulers before the 4th c. The older thesis that Alexander I’s realm was divided among his sons P., Alketas, and Philip and that P. deprived them of their parts is invalid. It is based on the debatable interpretation of (1) Polos’ dubious claim that P. stole the ἀρχή from Alketas (Plat. Gorg. 471D), obviously the sole rule, and (2) → Thucydides’ reference to an Eastern Makedonian ἀρχή of the rebellious Philip (2.100.3), perhaps his base of operations where the majority of his followers lived. Philip’s (and later on his son’s) claims to the basileia (Thuc. 2.95.2-3; Diod. 12.54.4, 6) will have been to the whole Argead realm. Any division contradicted the traditional Argead monarchical practice of rule; P. will have succeeded his father as the sole ruler. Only he minted coins; he appeared as Alexander I’s successor in Argead ruler lists (Diod. 7 F 15.2; indirectly confirmed by Thuc. 2.100.2: Archelaos as the 9th ruler, thus after P. and his 7 predecessors listed by Hdt. 8.139). We do not know if P.’s accession triggered any rivalries. Thucydides mentions Philip as a troublemaker only in 433; it is unknown when the conflict began. No ambitions of Amyntas and Menelaos to challenge P. are attested. Menelaos, Alketas and two of his sons appear as Argead signatories of a treaty between → Athens and P. (IG I³ 89, probably in 423/2), thus as Argead representatives supporting P. Crucial to his reign were his successful struggles to save Makedonia’s autonomy against the superior 400

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Athenian influence and to prevent his realm from becoming a plaything of the powerful protagonists of the → Peloponnesian War. As for his first known political act, he granted refuge to Histiaians expelled by Athens in about 446/5 (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 387). It is unknown whether P. was forced by Athens as her ally to welcome the settlers or opened the gates on his own account. In 437/6, Athens founded her apoikia → Amphipolis on the lower Strymon, uncomfortably close to P.’s own estates in Mygdonia. Since Athens dominated the Makedonian and Chalkidian coast, riddled with members of her Delian League, the Argead realm was now virtually surrounded by her zones of influence. In addition, Amphipolis provided Athens—the main customer of Makedonian → timber exported by the Argead ruler—with access to Thracian timber (Thuc. 4.108.1). However, the extent to which this harmed the Argead economy is debated. No reaction of P. to Amphipolis’ foundation is reported. According to general belief, it caused a deterioration of his (probably already strained) relations with Athens. Thucydides reports that a philia kai symmachia between her and P. ended in 433 when she chose to support the revolt of Philip and his ally Derdas, likely → Elimeia’s local dynast (1.57.3). If this philia— its date of conclusion is unknown—preceded Amphipolis’ foundation, a disapproving Argead reaction may have been one reason why the Athenians chose to weaken P. by interfering in his family business. They surely did not plan to make great efforts to install Philip on the throne but tried to keep P. too busy to interfere in their zones of influence. The result was the opposite: P. struck back, supported the secessionist tendencies of Athens’ Chalkidian allies, namely Poteidaia, and contacted → Sparta (Thuc. 1.56.2-57.5). To establish a buffer zone and counter-block against Athens, P. encouraged the coastal → Chalkidians and Bottikeans to move further inland (Thuc. 1.57.5), settle at → Olynthos and in his own land around Lake Bolbe where he granted them temporary territory (Thuc. 1.58.2). Thucydides blames P. for these secessionist movements in 432 (1.56.2-57.5) but he only exploited pre-existing political tensions and was successful: unable to lead a war on two fronts, the Athenians chose to focus on the subjugation of Poteidaia and concluded a peace with P. The reasons it was only short-lived (Thuc. 1.61.3) are debated, due to Thuc. 1.61.4: withdrawing from Makedonia and hurrying to Poteidaia, the Athenians may have attacked one of P.’s cities, Beroia—unless ‘Beroia’ was misspelt for ‘Brea’. Be that as it may, a certain reason for P. to rejoin Poteidaia was the fact that the Athenians did not end their alliance with his hostile brother since they

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wanted to use his cavalry against Poteidaia (Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.3). In 431, Athens concluded a peace with P., mediated by the Odrysian ruler Sitalkes (Thuc. 2.95.2). Athenian-Makedonian relations must have deteriorated soon again: in the summer of 429, Perdikkas supported Sparta’s (unsuccessful) attack on pro-Athenian Akarnania (Thuc. 2.80.7). Thucydides is silent on P.’s reasons and accuses him of duplicity. However, shortly before (winter 430/29), Potei­ daia had fallen (Thuc. 2.70.1-4), followed by the arrival of Athenian settlers on its territory. This event may have raised P.’s fears of an Athenian upper hand in the Chalkidian area and motivated his approach to Athens’ enemy. Surely as a reaction to P.’s move, the Athenians supported Sitalkes’ invasion of P.’s realm with a large army (winter 429); in return, Sitalkes had to help them against the Chalkidians. As for Sitalkes’ grievances, Thucydides (2.95.2) blames P. for having failed to keep some promises to him but their existence (or at least their content) is debated. Sitalkes was accompanied by Amyntas, the son of (the likely deceased) Philip, and tried in vain to install him on the Argead throne (Thuc. 2.95.1-2, 100.3; Diod. 12.50.4-6); P.’s standing in Makedonia was unshattered. The Makedonians kept off in fortified places, P. played cool and negotiated a peace, sealed by the marriage of his sister to Sitalkes’ nephew Seuthes (Thuc. 2.101.5-6). Amyntas disappeared from the records. A new stage of P.’s involvement in the Peloponnesian War began in 424, when Brasidas, a commander of P.’s new ally Sparta, arrived in the north. Thanks to P.’s friendly relations with high-ranking Thessalians, Brasidas and his troops were granted passage through → Thessaly (Thuc. 4.78.2-79.1). Initially, P. must have thought the alliance to be a major coup. He had promised to support Brasidas’ efforts to deprive Athens of its allies and to provide half of the supplies for his army; Sparta had agreed to a help him conquer → Lynkestis under its local dynast Arrhabaios (Thuc. 4.83.4-5). However, hardly arrived, Brasidas already betrayed the agreement by negotiating a reconciliation between P. and Arrhabaios and acknowledging the Lynkestian’s autonomy in order to get his hands free to pursue the Spartan agenda (Thuc. 4.83.2-6). As a warning, P. reduced his subsidies for Brasidas’ army to one-third (Thuc. 4.83.2-6) but stayed loyal. In the winter of 424/3, with his assistance, Brasidas engineered Amphipolis’ defection from Athens, a major blow to her (Thuc. 4.105.2-106): Brasidas and his troops were hosted in P.’s Mygdonian estates; they could rely on P.’s followers in the city and on his support in securing its territory (Thuc. 4.103.1, 104.3, 107.3). Thucydides’ own involvement as an Athenian strategos who failed to 402

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save Amphipolis (4.103.3-108.1) and had to go into exile could have played at least a minor role regarding his unflattering view of P. In 423, P.’s alliance with Sparta ended when their combined attack on the Lynkestis failed. After an initial victory against Arrhabaios’ troops, P. and Brasidas had to retreat; the Illyrian mercenaries P. had hired (surely because of their knowledge of the place) deserted to Arrhabaios. The armies departed separately; Brasidas’ troops had to counter the Illyrian attacks (Thuc. 4.124.1-128.3). In a biased account that has its flaws, Thucydides depicts P. as an incapable, unreliable commander losing his grip on his undisciplined army predestined to panic—the counter-­ images of Brasidas (who appears, however, also as someone who puts on airs and graces: 4.125.1) and his tough men. The truth about the events and reason for the separate retreat (probably due to strategic reasons) is inevitably lost. Now that Sparta was no longer an option, P. had little choice than to come to terms with Athens (Thuc. 4.132.2). Perhaps he improved his standing with → Nikias by using his Thessalian connections in order to block the passage through Thessaly for Brasidas’ reinforcement (Thuc. 4.132.2). A severely fragmented inscription may have recorded the peace treaty of 423/2 between P. and Athens (IG I³ 89). P. promised to share Athens’ friends and foes and to export oars exclusively to her. Athens promised to refrain from attacks on his cities. The treaty includes a reconciliation of P. and Arrhabaios whose auto­ nomy is again recognized. 80 Makedonian signatories are listed, among them P.’s son Archelaos and some Upper Makedonian local dynasts whose autonomy is indicated by the term → basileus. Evidence on P.’s following years is scanty. Thucydides (5.83.4) blames him for his failure to support Nikias’ plan of a Chalkidian campaign (either dated to 422 or 417/6). In 422, the Athenian strategos Kleon requested Makedonian troops for his fight for Amphipolis but no Makedo­nian participation is recorded in the ensuing battle in which he and his opponent Brasidas perished. To gain some influence at the coast and block an open gate to Central Makedonia, P. tried to put Athens’ ally → Methone under pressure. According to the → Methone Decrees (ML 65, dating from 430/29 or 426 and 424/3), he cut off the city’s corn provision, sabotaged its trade (apparently with the help of allies with a fleet) and let Makedonian troops march by. However, Methone became even more attached to Athens. In 418/7, while officially still Athens’ ally, P. joined a Spartan-Argive alliance (that ended already in 416), reportedly justifying his move with his family’s Argive descent (Thuc. 5.80.2). A bronzen tripod from tomb II in Vergina, won

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at → Argos’ panhellenic Heraia (SEG 29.652) and dated to about 460-10, probably an Argead family heritage, may have been won by him and confirms diplomatic connections. In 417/6, Athens declared war on P. and blocked up his realm (Thuc. 5.83.4). In 416/5, Athens even channeled a raiding patrol of cavalrists and exiled Makedonians via Methone into Central Makedonia (Thuc. 6.7.3). At some time thereafter, P. had no other options than another alliance with Athens. He supported her (unsuccessful) efforts to regain Amphipolis in the summer of 414 (Thuc. 7.9.1). This is his last recorded act. He died shortly after; his successor Archelaos is first mentioned as a ruler in 411/0 (Diod. 13.49.1-2) while his accession is generally dated to 413. P.’s continuous struggles against Athens left their traces in Greek → comedy. From an Athenian point of view, Hermippos joked that P.’s characteristic articles of trade were “many ships full of lies” (ap. Athen. 1.27E-28A) and Aristophanes used the neologism ἐκπερδικίσαι (Av. 766-768), “escaping like a partridge” (known to fool its hunter under false pretences). Probably pronounced as ἐκπερδικ-κίσαι reminding of P.’s name, it is mostly seen as a pun on him as an unreliable ally. P. had at least two wives, Archelaos’ mother Simiche (Ail. VH 7.2) and his younger son’s (Aëropos?) mother Kleopatra. Based on the homonymy of her and Archelaos’ wife (Plat. Gorg. 471A-D; Diod. 14.37.6), some scholars believe that Archelaos married his step-mother as a transmitter of legitimacy, but this is uncertain. The late tradition that the famous physician Hippokrates of Kos visited P.’s court to find him emaciated and lovesick due to his secret crush on his father’s mistress/widow Phila (Sor. Vit. Hipp. 5; cf. Luc. Hist. conscr. 35) is surely fictitious. As for his → coinage, P. mainly continued the later practice of his father. He issued heavy silver tetrobols circulating primarily in the Chalkidian area and showing a → rider with two spears (obv.) and a lion protome (rev.), and primarily for Makedonia proper light ones showing a sole horse (obv.) and a helmet (rev.). Some of his coins bear his abbreviated name: Π or ΠΕΡ or ΠΕΡΔΙΚ. P.’s reign was a crucial era in Argead history. While hard pressed, he and his leading circles were able to preserve Argead Makedonia’s autonomy and counter multiple threats, in particular Athens’ ambitions, by effectively employing diplomatic and military means.   S. Müller Cf. Borza 1990, 132-60; Hatzopoulos, M.B./Loukopoulou, L.D., Two Studies in Ancient Macedonian Topography, 1987, 56-7; Müller 2017; Psoma 2014; Roisman 2010, 146-54.

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Perdikkas III Perdikkas III was the second eldest son of → Amyntas III and Eurydike (Diod. 15.60.3; Aischin. 2.26). He was underage when in 369/8 his elder brother → Alexander II was murdered (Diod. 15.71.1; 16.2.4; Plut. Pelop. 27.2). The instigator, → Ptolemy of Aloros, ruled as an → epitropos for about three years on P.’s behalf (Diod. 15.71.1-2; Aischin. 2.29; Plut. Pelop. 27.2). In 368/7, P.’s future was threatened by the invasion of the impostor Pausanias, a likely Argead. P.’s mother Eurydike hired the Athenian mercenary general Iphikrates who expelled Pausanias (Aischin. 2.29). When they intervened, the Thebans, Greece’s hegemonic power, obliged Ptolemy to save the rule for P. (Plut. Pelop. 27.3-4). Nonetheless, P.’s succession was perhaps threatened by Ptolemy’s ambitions, even more so as he had a son, thus an option for dynastic plans. In 365, P. came of age and had Ptolemy killed (Diod. 15.77.5; 16.2.4). The Thebans did not react and may have agreed. Perhaps as one of his earliest acts, P. negotiated the release of his younger brother Philip, who was being held hostage at → Thebes (Diod. 16.2.4). The Thebans’ pressure on Makedonia vanished with the end of their supremacy (362). Throughout his reign, P. was faced with → Athens’ ambitions to regain → Amphipolis. He defended Argead interests in accordance with the limits defined by the political situation: either as Athens’ ally or, when alternatives were at hand, against her. The chronology of events is uncertain. According to Aischin. 2.29-30, P. initially joined Athens’ foes but was defeated by the strategos Kallisthenes and concluded a truce. When Athens’ strategos Timotheos captured Pydna, Methone (Dein. 1.14), Torone, and Poteidaia (Diod. 15.81.6), P. found his realm surrounded by Athens’ zones of influence and assisted her in besieging Amphipolis (Dem. 2.14). However, in a major coup, P. managed to install a Makedonian garrison in the city (Diod. 16.3.3), perhaps claiming to serve Athens’ interests while in fact opposing them. In contrast to Alexander II, P. minted silver coins. Their silver of good alloy and their high artistic quality likely aimed at creating an illusion of his realm’s stability. The Athenian exile Kallistratos of Aphidnai is said to have reformed P.’s harbor dues, doubling them ([Arist.] Oik. 1350A). P. is reported to have hosted the philosopher Euphraios recommended by Platon in a letter of debated authenticity (Ep. 5). Platon’s successor Speusippos is said to have claimed that Philip owed his rise to Platon because Euphraios persuaded P. to give Philip a chora to control where he maintained the troops upon which he built his career (ap. Athen. 11.508E). The information’s validity is

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doubtful. A(nother) philosophic fiction is the claim that P. let Euphraios install an admission test in geometry and philosophy for his dinners (Athen. 11.506EF). In 360/59, P. strove to counter the traditional Illyrian threat to the realm’s northwestern border: he marched out with a large army against Bardylis. → Antipatros may have participated as a young general, and wrote the lost Illyrian Deeds of P. (BNJ 114). P. was defeated in a disastrous battle. He and more than 4000 of his men are reported to have died in action. The survivors disbanded in shock, deeply traumatized (Diod. 16.2.4). The Illyrians, occupying Upper Makedonia, prepared for a further invasion, the Paionians came to pillage, two → pretenders, one backed by the Thracians, the other by Athens, appeared on the scene (Diod. 16.2.6). Makedonia was on the verge of collapse. P.’s son → Amyntas was still a minor. Philip II succeeded P. and inherited chaos, the worst legacy in Argead history.   S. Müller Cf. Geyer 1930, 134-9; Heinrichs 2012, 133-8; Heskel, J., The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C., 1997, 31-7; Müller 2016, 229-35; Roisman 2010, 163-4.

Perdikkas, son of Orontes Perdikkas was a member of the royal house of → Orestis and possibly even of Argead descent (Curt. 10.7.8), born c. 360. As a member of the Royal Hypaspists in 336, P. killed the regicide → Pausanias (Diod. 16.94.4). During Alexander’s reign, he commanded a phalanx battalion of the pezhetairoi in the Illyrian campaign of 335 and at → Thebes in the same year; at → Granikos in 334; at → Issos in 333; and at → Gaugamela in 331. He was prominent also in Alexander’s sieges in the west. It seems that by late 330, P. had been appointed one of the 7 → somatophylakes (Arr. An. 6.28.4). In 328, if not earlier, he was promoted to hipparches and took part in the subjugation of Sogdiana (Arr. An. 4.22.1). Together with → Hephaistion, P. took a portion of the army to the Indos. At the → Hydaspes battle, P. served directly under Alexander’s command (Arr. An. 5.12.2); later he played no small part in the Sangala campaign (Arr. An. 5.22.6). When the army returned to the west, P. was honoured with a golden crown (Arr. An. 7.5.6) and married to a daughter of the Median → satrap Atropates (Arr. An. 7.4.5). Later in 324 he conveyed Hephaistion’s corpse from Ekbatana to Babylon for → burial (Diod. 17.110.8) 406

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and received Hephaistion’s hipparchy or chiliarchy of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. An. 7.14.10, misleading). P. was thus the most influential of the marshals in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s death; indeed, it was reported that the king, on his death-bed, handed P. his → seal ring (Curt. 10.5.4, 6.4-5; Just. 12.15.12; Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4). Nevertheless, the problem of the → succession proved complex. A compromise saw → Krateros appointed prostates of the mentally deficient Philip Arrhidaios, while P. retained his rank of → chiliarchos, further restricted by the appointment of Meleagros as hyparchos (Arr. Succ. F 1.3). P., however, worked to eliminate his rival. In the name of the King, P. assigned some satrapies to the leading men in Babylon. He also arranged the murder of Stateira and her sister Drypetis (Plut. Alex. 77.4) in order to secure the interests of → Rhoxane’s unborn child. By 322/1, P. was epimeletes for Philip Arrhidaios, prostates (or guardian) for Alexander IV, and strategos of the imperial forces in Asia. A mercenary rebellion in Central Asia forced P. to appoint Peithon strategos of the Upper Satrapies (Diod. 18.4.8, 7.1-7), and his increased power was another threat to P.’s authority. In the west, P. defeated Ariarathes of Kappadokia before directing his attention to Pisidia (Diod. 18.22.1). But a number of Makedonian generals refused to take orders from P., among them → Antigonos, and even his own brother Alketas. With the kings securely in his possession P. was prepared to take two final steps to the kingship (or, at least, regency): union with → Kleopatra and the ceremonious return of Alexan­der’s body to Makedonia. The almost contemporaneous arrivals of Nikaia and Kleopatra and P.’s rejection of the former invited civil war. Antigonos fled to join Krateros and Antipatros. Furthermore, Ptolemy, who had long feared Perdikkan intervention in Egypt (Diod. 18.14.2, 25.4), made an alliance with the strategoi in Europe. Arrhi­ daios who had been entrusted with Alexander’s → funeral carriage ignored P.s instructions and took the body to Egypt. P. sent men to retrieve Alexander’s body, but without success. News of the hijacking forced P. to march on Egypt (Diod. 18.25.6; Just. 13.6.10-13). P.’s campaign, ineptly planned and executed, ended in disaster (Diod. 18.33-37). The foremost of his generals murdered him. He lacked, as Justin (13.8.2) noted, the ability to win the hearts of his own men.   W. Heckel Cf. Berve 1926, II, 313-6, no. 627; Heckel 2016, 153-84; Rathmann, M., Perdikkas zwi­ schen 323 und 320, 2005.

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Persepolis Persepolis was one of the Achaimenid capitals built by Dareios I in Persis (Pārsa), the Persian Empire’s core. Diodoros describes the palace area with its citadel and triple wall with bronze doors, terrace, royal graves in close vicinity, royal residences, and courtiers’ quarters (17.71.3-8). After → Gaugamela (331), when Dareios III fled to Media to gather new forces, he sacrificed P. and his other capitals. To clear the way to P., the Makedonians had to overcome the fierce resistance of Ariobarzanes, the → satrap of Persis, who blocked the Persian Gates. In early 330, P. was surrendered by the Persian official Tiridates. The Makedonian soldiers are reported to have been allowed to loot the houses of the town while sparing the palace (Curt. 5.6.1-10; Diod. 17.70.1-6). However, as the army stayed at P. for four months (January-May 330), this first pillage was perhaps limited or chronologically misplaced by the authors. → Onesikritos hints at a visit to the Achaimenid burial site nearby at → Naqš-i Rustam during the stay by citing a Greek short version of Dareios I’s epitaph (BNJ 134 F 35). Before leaving P., the palace area was plundered. After the removal of the valuable objects, parts of the palace that were connected with Xerxes, in particular the Apadana and Hadiš, were deliberately and systematically burnt. Separate controlled fires were set on purpose. The excavation report from the treasury shows that items the Makedonians had to leave behind such as vessels, sculptures (even of Greek provenience such as the so-called Penelope from P.) or seals, were burnt or smashed. The find of an iron saw blade may confirm Curtius’ report that the soldiers cut some of the objects into pieces to transport them (5.6.3-5). The literary tradition that the conflagration resulted from an escalating drinking-party is fiction originating with → Kleitarchos who described a panhellenic act of revenge embodied by the Athenian Thaïs inducing Alexander to burn Xerxes’ palace (Plut. Alex. 38.1-4; Curt. 5.7.10-12; Diod. 17.72.1-6). Significantly, this panhellenic heroine of Kleitarchos, who wrote in Ptolemaic Alexandreia, was Ptolemy I’s girlfriend, perhaps his wife. Moralists such as Curtius turned the tale into a symptom of Alexander’s loss of morals. But this tradition about a drunken act committed on impulse is clearly contradicted by the archaeological proofs for a deliberate burning. In scholarship, the inflagration’s intention is debated. Partly, it is seen as a sign to the Greeks marking the end of the panhellenic mission (→ panhellenism). The suggestion that it also aimed at luring away sympathizers from Agis III is speculative as the chronology of his revolt (thus the synchronism with the burning) is 408

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uncertain. Alternatively, the burning is thought to address the Persians, either to court their leading circles by signalling the return to the tradition of the Teispids, particularly → Kyros II whom Alexander honoured publicly, or to intimidate Dareios and his followers by destroying a visible symbol of Achaimenid rule. Perhaps the act had multiple motivations and addressed different recipients. It may well have simultaneously attempted to please the Greeks, announce the end of the alleged panhellenic war, threaten Dareios and his supporters, and destroy a place of Achaimenid legitimization. P. did not cease to be inhabitated and was still an administrative centre in the times of the early Diadochoi (Diod. 19.21.2, 22.1, 46.6).   S. Müller Cf. Briant 2010, 107-11; Heckel 2008, 80-4; Sancisi-Weerdenburg, H., Alexander and Persepolis, in: Carlsen, J. et al. (eds.), Alexander the Great. Reality and Myth, 1997², 17787; Schmidt, E.F., The Treasury of Persepolis and Other Discoveries in the Homeland of the Achaemenians, 1939; Wirth 1993, 173-251.

Persian Wars Little information on → Makedonia during the period of the Persian Wars before Xerxes’ invasion of Greece (480-79) has come down to us, but we can draw conclusions from notes on some neighbouring groups and regions. Soon after 513, the Makedonian ruler → Amyntas I had subjected to Persian rule (Hdt. 5.17-18) making his realm the westernmost outpost of the Persian Empire and changing his own position to that of a Persian regional head (hyparchos: Hdt. 2.20.4). Less cooperative had been his immediate neighbours to the east, at that time, the Bisaltian Paionians. To appease the middle Strymon Valley, the Persians had settled part of their elites in Hellespontine Phrygia (Hdt. 5.13-15). Next to that, a Persian commission had been sent from occupied → Bisaltia to Makedonia to demand submission and received it willingly, since it was to Amyntas’ profit: the Persians had just moved strong and probably dangerous groups from his eastern border and in turn needed his co-operation to control Bisaltia and the Axios Valley. Moreover, they would support him against leading men of the Upper Makedonian cantons who thus lost influence. This comfortable situation changed drastically in the opening phase of the Ionian Revolt. Soon after 500, the most influential insurgent, Aristagoras of Miletos, had organized the return

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of the Paionians to their homes (Hdt. 5.98) hoping that they would open a new theatre of war in the far west. If further districts in → Thrace would join in resistance to the Persians, Ionia had a chance to win back its former position at the periphery of the empire and to reduce Persian pressure. Effects on Makedonia can be easily imagined. After their return, the exiled Paionians cut off Amyntas’ lines of communication with the Great King who for some years had military priorities in western Asia Minor. Even worse: since Amyntas had co-operated with the Persians he must have been regarded as a traitor by his eastern neighbours and maybe even by some men in the western principalities. We do not know what actually happened, but it was perhaps not by chance that Amyntas’ rule ended around 500. His son → Alexander I followed him. The fiction of the Persian commission cleared out of the way in ca. 512/1 by his cunning and daring (Hdt. 5.19-20) was probably devised just then—not as late as 479 when his co-operation with the Persians could not be denied anyway—to qualify him as an enemy of the Persians. Indeed, Alexander’s initial years must have given him lessons in diplomacy. He urgently needed this experience in 492, when the Persian general Mardonios turned up in the west to crush the revolt. His priorities seem to have been outside Makedonia proper: the fact that he operated beyond Athos with the Persian fleet might indicate that he aimed at Greek coastal cities in the Chersonese. With (still Paionian) and possibly further districts of Thrace, his list of commitments must have been long enough, and Alexander could plead that he and his father had had no choice but yield to the pressure of stronger neighbours. Moreover, Alexander enjoyed excellent connections with the Persian aristocracy, having given his sister Gygaia in marriage to Boubares (Hdt. 8.136.1), a Persian noble who may well have belonged to the royal house of the → Achaimenids. So Alexander seems to have been pardoned, and we may assume that the Ionian Revolt had no negative consequences for the country. The decade that followed up to the preparations for Xerxes’ invasion of Greece largely remains obscure. Alexander held the position not only of a Persian hypar­ chos but also was an Athenian proxenos (Hdt. 8.143.3). Most of all, he controlled Makedonian → timber that was needed for building ships. He even would have been in a good position for diplomatic missions; if there were any, they failed in the late 480s: having quelled an Egyptian revolt, Xerxes got a free hand against the Athenians who “lived in open emnity with Persia” (Hdt. 5.96.2), though they had subjected themselves in 507 (Hdt. 5.73), a few years after Amyntas. But then they had supported the Ionian Revolt and even helped to burn down Sardeis; 410

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and in 490, they had successfully resisted a Persian punitive campaign at Mara­ thon. If unavenged, this would have been a precedent with fatal impact on the Greek cities on the western fringe of Asia Minor. So there was no alternative to another attempt against → Athens, aiming at the symbolic act of burning down Athena’s temple on the akropolis (though her new hekatompedon was in 480 still a building site) to atone for burning Kybebe’s temple at Sardeis. One must not underestimate the effect of such formal retaliation, especially in Near Eastern contexts. It was a demonstration that the Persian king was able to retaliate upon his enemies whenever he chose, as it was his duty according to identical charters by Dareios (on the facade of his rock tomb at → Naqš-i-Rustam: DNb 16-21) and Xerxes (on a plaque unearthed in the settlement of Persepolis: XPl §§ 4-5 = Schmitt 2009, 172-3, cf. 105). So Athens had to be punished. Since a rather limited naval operation had failed in 490, the route there had to be covered on land now, first through western parts of the empire including Thrace and Makedonia. But what followed were Greek lands: → Thessaly, Lokris, Phokis, Boiotia, with further Greek poleis near the lines of approach. So the preparations must have included negotiations with such poleis to ascertain their neutrality or even co-operation—possibly including Argos (Hdt. 7.150). For diplomatic missions, Xerxes needed men well acquainted with the Greek mentality and politics on a high level. Amongst them, Alexander was the most prominent. In advance, he settled things in Boiotia (cf. Hdt. 8.34), and later, while Xerxes’ army had some rest in Makedonia, he won over important Thessalians—until then, a majority had favoured the Greeks (Hdt. 7.172). In 479, he even made similar advances to the Athenians who however declined, without renouncing their most profitable friendship with the Makedonian ruler (Hdt. 8.140). They had good reasons: depending on grain from the Black Sea they needed timber and oars for transport vessels. Moreover, in their age-old conflict with their rival Aigina, they were strongly interested in new triremes. When they had in hand the necessary silver in 483, Alexander provided the timber. Since the purpose of the new warships was officially declared to be the war against Aigina, Alexander avoided restrictions from the Persian side—as also did Egyptian traders who supplied ropes of flax and sails of linen. The price was paid in Athenian silver coins minted just then, as occur in large amounts in the Asyut hoard. Also Alexander must have filled his coffers with Athenian silver. He needed it badly for preparing roads and bridges for Xerxes’ army, harbours for his fleet at → Therme and → Pydna/ → Methone, maybe also farther south, to enable Persian vessels to supply Xerxes’

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troops marching along the coast to the Tempe Valley. Further expense seems to have been caused by his cooperation in projects as the Athos canal (Hdt. 7.22.2) and by collecting supplies for the Persian army in store houses. Finally he had to receive Xerxes and his staff adequately in his capital Aigai, let alone equipping and supplying his own Makedonian troops—and bribing Greek politicians. Since the Persian general staff preferred double or even triple approaches to secure as much as possible of the land that was passed, the construction of new roads (and the repair of old ones) must have been expensive. The Makedonian section ran from (approximately) some distance west of the Strymon estuary to north of the Tempe Valley with large sections of the Chalkidike in between. Following → Herodotos (7.115), Xerxes himself marched from the Strymon down the eastern coast of the Chalkidike to Akanthos where he turned west, in the plain just above the three fingers, to the → Thermaic Gulf, and then followed its western coast north to Therme where he met his fleet. To impress the Chalkidian cities, it had sailed around the southern capes, and part of it will have contributed to supplying the Persian troops passing the northern intersections; much of this route may have been a responsibility of the Greek cities on the Chalkidike. Though Herodotos does not mention the track of the later Via Egnatia in its section between Argilos and Therme, this passage also must have been used. A third route ran from the Strymon bridge at Ennea Hodoi north through Bisaltia to Lake Kerkinitis, thence west through Parorbelia to the Axios Valley and down to Therme (Barrington Atlas, map 50); its western and southern sections must have been Alexander’s charge, but being the longest option and most remote from the sea its preparation needed less attention since the route was probably assigned to mounted units covering longer distances in less time yet keeping abreast of the infantry farther south. From Therme to the next resting place at Pydna/Methone (and Aigai), there was far less choice than modern maps suggest: the estuaries of the Makedonian rivers were much closer to the northern hills than they are today, and the land between them was covered with swamps and ponds. That is why the old Makedonian towns such as Edessa, Beroia, and Aigai are located up the hillsides bordering on the (modern) plain. A connecting road that must have existed there was certainly used by a Persian division, but an additional road in the plain near the coast had in all probability to be newly constructed, demanding numerous dams and bridges. From Pydna/ Methone the main route continued in the coastal plain south to the Tempe Valley; its southern parts seem at that time to have belonged to Thessaly (cf. Hdt. 412

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7.128.1), so the responsibility will have fallen here to Thessalian cities, Larisa and Gonnoi above all, so removing some obligations from Alexander. This comfortable option in the coastal plain was doubtlessly assigned to the bulk of the army that here could be supplied also from the sea. Further options existed west of Mt. → Olympos: the first up the Haliakmon, then turning south via the Volustana pass; the second from the coastal plain near modern Katerini west via the Petra pass, then south joining the route just described via Olosson/Elassona into the Thessalian plain (see modern maps: Road Editions 2: Macedonia, and 3: Epeiros/Thessaly). Both of these routes were difficult, impassable for large armies with their extensive baggage trains operated by many thousands of animals and accompanied by numerous groups of non-combattants. Water alone would have been a major problem, another one steep passages in the mountains, up and down. Supplying the army from the sea would not have been possible here while the land could not feed larger groups as it did in Thessaly and Boiotia. So Herodotos can only be credited with the fact that some mounted units used either of the two passes, on much longer and more difficult routes than in the coastal plain, to check possible salients for Greek counterattacks—also on trails above Tempe. Since such units advanced faster, they could cover their routes in slightly more time than required in the coastal plain by the main force, and join it west of the western gate of the Tempe Valley. This allowed the bulk of the army some days rest, though time was a most decisive factor: in order to arrive as far south as Athens with a large army, and return to the Hellespont before later autumn every day counted, while the Greek strategy aimed at delaying the Persian advance. Alexander was responsible as well for supplying Xerxes’ army during its orderly retreat to the → Hellespont in 480, taking care of sick troops left behind in Makedonia (Hdt. 8.115.3), housing parts of the Persian army that spent the winter in Thessaly and Makedonia (Hdt. 8.126.2), including the high command. The same he did for the troops under Artabazos that in 479 had left before the battle of Plataiai (Hdt. 9.89), and finally those who after the battle had escaped to the north in disorder. Since he himself had commanded the Makedonian contingent and had to lead back those who had survived, it is possible that he supported the Persian retreat and provisioned the troops on their way out—in silent agreement with the victorious Greeks who had an interest in getting rid of the Persians. Already in 480 he probably had supported Artabazos during his long siege of Poteidaia which had defected (Hdt. 8.126, 128-30), and his conquest of Olynthos (Hdt. 8.127). Moreover, he must have acted as an aide of Mardonios

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whom he knew since 492; so he should be credited with the advice to consult several Greek oracles (Hdt. 8.133) where not only up-to-date information on the Greek poleis was available but also, by way of bribing, some influence could be exercized on their policies. To sum up: Alexan­der must be regarded as one of the most important and influential persons in the Persian staff. Though he remained loyal until the eve of Plataiai (and in some aspects even beyond), he had also been useful to the confederate Greeks—or given them the impression that he had been. So he not only evaded punitive actions as befell the Thessalians (Hdt. 6.72.1) but successfully created his image as Philhellene.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2017; Heinrichs/Müller 2008; Müller 2017, 76-83; Olbrycht 2010, 342-69; Zahrnt 1984.

Petasos   see kausia pezhetairoi   see Army organization Pherai, inn The public inn (pandokeion) at Thessalian Pherai mentioned by → Demosthenes in his On the Embassy (19.158) forms part of a rhetorical argument contributing to his strategy to discredit his Athenian fellow ambassadors sent out to ratify the → Peace of Philokrates with → Philip II. Trying to convince the jury in the parapresbeia trial against → Aischines that the latter and his colleagues were acting as Philip’s agents, Demosthenes claims that they had been bribed to postpone the treaty’s ratification in order to enable Philip to maximize his expansions and threaten Central Greece by getting control of Thermopylai (19.152-158). Demosthenes states that in three months, while spending a 1000 drachmas travel expenses, they did not administer a single oath to Philip’s allies but waited until Philip was already marching against Athens. To emphasize the state of shameless corruption his undutiful colleagues were allegedly in, Demosthenes stresses that the oaths were sworn unsuitably at the inn at P.—according to him an infamous place everyone who has been to P. will know. His audience was surely familiar 414

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with the Greek topos that Thessalians were particularly decadent and dissolute, thus inevitably associated with Philip’s court life (Athen. 12.527A). By evoking the image of a shabby, indecent place where prostitution, debauchery and all kinds of lewd behavior flourished, Demosthenes puts in the jury’s mind that his fellow ambassadors unmasked their betrayal of Athens by accepting this location, disgraceful and discreditable to any decent Athenian citizen, and amusing themselves with Philip’s scoundrels. Additionally, Demosthenes points at their negligence of the Dioskouroi’s temple—right in front of the inn—that would have provided an appropriate place for a political act. He did not win the trial. Supported by Phokion and → Euboulos, Aischines was acquitted.   S. Müller Cf. MacDowell 2000, 269; Pownall 2009; Wirth 1985, 85-7.

Philip II Philip II was the youngest son of → Amyntas III and Eurydike and brother of → Alexander II and → Perdikkas III. Early involved in Argead politics, in ca. 368-65, teenaged P. had to live in → Thebes as a hostage (Diod. 15.67.4; Just. 7.5.2; Plut. Pelop. 26.4-5). The story that he was a hostage of the Illyrians earlier (Just. 7.5.1-2; Diod. 16.2.2) does not deserve credence. At Thebes, P. likely learnt a lot about Greek political structures and warfare; later he adopted Epameinondas’ oblique battle order. P. returned to Makedonia under Perdikkas III. It is unknown if P. participated in his brother’s Illyrian war (360/59) that ended with a crushing Makedonian defeat and plunged the realm into chaos. Perdikkas and about 4000 Makedonians fell, the rest of the army disintegrated (Diod. 16.2.4-6). Bardylis and his Illyrians occupied Upper Makedonia; the Paionians came to pillage; two → pretenders to the throne appeared: Pausanias was supported by the Thracians, Argaios by → Athens (Diod. 16.2.6). In this desolate situation, P. came to power (Diod. 16.2.4-5). The story that he initially served as → epitropos for Perdikkas’ minor son → Amyntas (Just. 7.5.9-10) is untrustworthy; the numismatic evidence shows that P.’s coins promptly succeeded Perdikkas’ coins. Amyntas was not treated as P.’s rival but was raised at his court and married to his daughter Kynnane. Initially, P. bought off the Paionians, negotiated a truce with the Illyrians, and persuaded the Thracian ruler by the use of gift-giving to drop Pausanias (Diod. 16.3.4). Since the Athenians supported Argaios (with

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3000 hoplites and a fleet) because they expected his assistance in recovering → Amphipolis, P. withdrew the Makedonian soldiers from the city (installed by Perdikkas) and declared it autonomous (Diod. 16.3.3-4.2). Athens came to terms with P. and dropped Argaios who was defeated by P. (Diod. 16.3.5-6). → Demo­ sthenes’ later claim that in a “secret treaty” P. had promised to deliver Amphi­ polis to the Athenians in return for → Pydna (2.6-7), is slander (diabole) in accordance with his image of P. as a crook. Perhaps P.’s rule was also challenged by his three half-brothers; one of them was executed (Just. 7.6.3). Right from the start, P. initiated military reforms, improved discipline, reorganized and modernized the army, its weaponry, drill, siege equipment, and strategy (Diod. 16.3.1). According to the traditional view, P. introduced the Makedonian → sarissa, but no ancient source explicitly says so. There may have existed a prototype that P. modernized. He was also the first Argead to build up a small → fleet (Dem. 4.22). But as a late bloomer regarding naval warfare, P. avoided sea battles. His military reforms will have been a long-term task but in 358, P.’s new army was sufficient to secure his realm’s western border. He defeated and subjugated the Paionians, expelled the Illyrians and incorporated Upper Makedonia, expanding his realm as far as Lake Lychnitis/Ohrid (Diod. 16.4.2-4, 8.1). For the first time the two parts of Makedonia were united under Argead control. In order to control Upper Makedonia’s elite, P. ordered them to send their sons to his court to be raised as → basilikoi paides. Polygamous → marriage policy on a wide scale was also characteristic of P.’s politics of consolidation: he took 7 wives in order to cement alliances, peace, or conquests. In this early stage of his reign, he married Bardylis’ relative Audata who bore him Kynnane, and Phila, likely from Elimeia’s ruling house (Athen. 13.557C). Having secured the western frontier, P. intervened in → Thessaly and took another political wife, Philinna from Larisa who bore him → Arrhidaios (Athen. 13.557C). In 357, an alliance with → Epeiros’ ruler Arrhybas was sealed by P.’s marriage to his niece, later known as → Olympias, the mother of Alexander and → Kleopatra (Athen. 13.557D). Still in 357, P. exploited the Athenian failure to recover Amphipolis and took the city (Diod. 16.8.2). An upset Athens declared war on him (Aischin. 2.21, 70, 72, 3.54) but was too troubled by the secessionist tendencies (357-55) within her Second Naval League to react. Taking the opportunity to eliminate Athens’ influence on the Makedonian coast, P. seized Pydna (357) and Poteidaia (356). Athenian help came too late (Dem. 4.35); P. released Poteidaia’s Athenian garrison, enslaved the rest of the population of the city, and appeased the → 416

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Chalkidians, his other rivals in the north, by giving them Poteidaia’s territory (Diod. 16.8.5-6). Still in 356, an alliance of Illyrians, Thracians and Paionians was defeated by → Parmenion, P.’s foremost general (Just. 12.16.6; Diod. 16.22.3) and P.’s chariot team won at Olympia (Plut. Alex. 3.4-5), confirming his claim that his family was of Greek descent. P. was invited to take on protectorship of the Thasian settlement Krenides against the Odrysian king (Diod. 16.8.6); after fortifying → Philippoi, he controlled the mining district that stretched eastward up to the Nestos; it however yielded far less gold than implied by the contemporaries (Diod. 16.8.6-7). In 354, P. extinguished Athens’ last stronghold at the Makedonian coast by taking → Methone. It cost him his right eye that was struck by an arrow. Athenian help for Methone came too late (Dem. 4.35). P. had secured the route to the sea. In 354/3, the → Aleuads of Larisa appealed for his help against their rivals for the hegemony over Thessaly, the tyrants of Pherai (Diod. 16.35.1-2). Since the latter were allied with the Phokians on whom the → Delphic Amphiktyony had declared the → Third Sacred War (356-46), P. became involved in this inner-Greek conflict and could claim to invade Thessa­ ly on behalf of Apollon. However, in 353/2, he was defeated twice by Onomarchos, the general of Phokis’ mercenaries, and had to retreat. It was his first major setback that caused a loss of discipline in his army (Diod. 16.35.2). P. returned in 352 with a larger, newly drilled army and took Pherai’s port Pagasai before defeating Onomarchos at the → Crocus Field, thereby posing as Apollon’s avenger: P.’s soldiers wore wreaths of laurel, the god’s emblem (Just. 8.2.1-4; Diod. 16.35.3-6). The Athenians sent a fleet under Chares who had earlier defeated some of P.’s mercenaries in Thrace (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 249) but came too late to save Pagasai (Diod. 16.35.5). Demosthenes blames the long-drawn-out procedure of making decisions on war in democratic Athens (4.35-36). P. established control over Pherai and the Thessalian League (Diod. 16.37.3-38.1; Poly­ ain. 4.2.19). Perhaps at this point, he was elected Thessaly’s new archon (implying influence on its Amphiktyonic votes) and given the command over its cavalry. To appease Pherai’s elite, P. married Nikesipolis, a relative of the expelled tyrants. She bore him Thessalonike, “victory in Thessaly” (Athen. 13.557C). Exploiting the strategical advantage, P. tried to march into central Greece on the pretext of carrying the war into Phokis. But when he approached Thermopylai, the alarmed Athenians blocked him and P. withdrew (Diod. 16.38.2; Just. 8.2.812). In 352-51, he subjugated Athens’ ally Kersobleptes who ruled the most eastern of the three Thracian kingdoms (formerly united under Kotys). His son

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ended up as a hostage in Pella (Aischin. 2.81), but he remained reluctant. In 349-48, P. eliminated the Chalkidian League, annexed its territory, razed its capital → Olynthos (that had harbored his half-brothers: Just. 8.3.10-11) and enslaved the inhabitants (Diod. 16.52.9-53.3). Athens had concluded a sym­ machia with Olynthos but her three expeditions failed (Philoch., BNJ 328 F 49-51; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 143, F 213). As a result, Makedonia controlled the north Aegean coast. Within a short span, P.’s realm had grown considerably: consolidated, embedded in a network of alliances, and equipped with the most modern, effective, and swiftest army. As a tribute to political reality, in 346, the → Peace of Philokrates (named after its Athenian engineer) between P. and Athens was negotiated. It ended their war over Amphipolis on the basis of the territorial status quo. Reluctantly, Athens acknowledged P.’s claims to the city (Dem. 5.25); in turn, P. acknowledged Athens’ claims to the Thracian Chersonese that controlled the grain route. These terms clearly favoured P. Thanks to the exclusion of Phokis, Halos, and Kersobleptes (P. was actively at war with them) from the peace, he was able to improve his situation by subjugating Kersoblep­ tes again and marching to Thermopylai before his allies had even sworn their oath on the treaty (Dem. 18.32; 19.34). Arriving there, P. convinced Phalaikos, the Phokian commander, to leave him in control in return for safe conduct (Diod. 16.59.2). Unhindered by the Athenians he entered central Greece. On the basis of the newly sworn peace and symmachia, he asked the Athenians to assist him in liquidating Phokian control from → Boiotia—but they refused (Aischin. 2.137-138). However, he continued to treat them favourably and patiently. After Phokis’ capitulation, he received its two seats in the Amphiktyony (Diod. 16.60.1). The Athenians cultivated their policy of hostile reluctance and boycotted the Pythian Games of 346 over which P. presided. In 343, they sabotaged his offers to amend the peace and sentenced Philokrates to death (Dem. 19.116). In 342, their strategos Diopeithes attacked P.’s ally Kardia and arrested a Makedonian envoy ([Dem.] 12.3). In the meantime, P. campaigned in → Illyria and Thrace (345-44), deposed Arrhybas in Epeiros and installed Olympias’ brother Alexander I (342) (Diod. 16.72.1). Turning east then, P. deprived the unruly Kersobleptes of his realm (Aischin. 2.90; Diod. 16.71.1-2). It was a stepping stone for extending his realm eastwards. By this he threatened the Persian-Greek balance of power in the Aegean and alarmed Artaxerxes III. While there is no record of any earlier tensions and Arrian even mentions an alliance between him and P. (An. 2.14.1-2), the conflict loomed ahead. Artaxerxes’ elim418

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ination of the tyrant Hermeias of Atarneus (ca. 342, Diod. 16.52.5-7), a patron of → Aristotle, with contacts to P., may have strained his relations with Persia. The two forces collided when in 340 P. besieged Perinthos, crucial for crossing the Bosporos: Artaxerxes forced P. to retreat (Diod. 16.74.2-76.4; Just. 9.1.2-6; Polyain. 4.2.21). After failing also before Byzantion, on their way back, the Makedonians seized Athens’ grain ships, unprotected by Chares when cruising before Byzantion (Diod. 16.77.2-3; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 292; Dem. 18.73, 87-88, 139). It was no naval success, however: the Makedonians attacked the crews ashore (Philoch., BNJ 328 F 162). Athens reacted by declaring war on P. (Dem. 18.73). On his way home, in 339, P. campaigned in the Danube region. On the pretext of being called for help by the Amphiktyony in the Fourth Sacred War against Amphissa, P. invaded central Greece. Demosthenes forged an alliance under Athens and Thebes that was defeated at → Chaironeia in 338 (Diod. 16.84.386.6; Plut. Dem. 17.4-5; Just. 9.3.4-10; Polyain. 4.2.2, 2.7). The victory under the leadership of P., who tricked the Athenian strategoi Chares and Lysikles, sealed the Makedonian hegemony over Greece. It was the beginning of a new era. The tradition that a drunken P. ridiculed the defeated (Diod. 16.87.1-2) is slander. P.’s mercurial ally Thebes was punished with a Makedonian garrison (Diod. 16.87.3). To hold it in check, P. supported its Boiotian enemies. Athens was treated mildly once more: P. did not invade Attika, did not touch the Athenian democracy, possessions abroad (apart from the Thracian Chersonese), or its fleet, and refrained from demanding the surrender of his critics. By the political instrument of the → “Korinthian League,” in 338, P. integrated the Greeks (apart from Sparta that refused to take part: Plut. Mor. 235B; Paus. 2.20.1) into a new order, a common peace (koine eirene) supervised by a synedrion of which he was elected hegemon. In 337, the League declared war on Persia with P. as strategos autokrator (Just. 9.5.1-7; Diod. 16.77.2, 89.2-3). The panhellenic message was mere propaganda. Apparently, P. wanted to make the Ionian cities his tributaries in order to secure a permanent income necessary for consolidating his conquests. His mild treatment of Athens may have been motivated by her connections in the Aegean rather than by the need of her fleet—she only had to send the small number of 20 triremes (Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. An. 1.20.1). In preparation for his Persian war, P. tried to gain control of the port of Halikarnassos by negotiating an alliance with → Karia’s satrap Pixodaros, sealed with a marital bond, but it came to naught (Plut. Alex. 10.1-3); the Persian king seems to have intervened (Strab. 14.2.17). In 336, an advance force led by Parmenion and his son-in-law → Attalos crossed over to

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Asia Minor. To keep their clan loyal, P. had taken Attalos’ ward Kleopatra as his 7th wife (Athen. 13.557D; Diod. 16.93.9). In the autumn of 336, P. was assassinated by → Pausanias, one of his guards, in Aigai during the wedding feast of his daughter Kleopatra and her uncle Alexan­der I of Epeiros (Just. 7.6.3-4; Diod. 16.2.5-3.1). The marriage aimed at strengthening the faction of Alexander whose future succession P. supported throughout his reign, eventually by consecrating the → Philippeion at Olympia. Speculations started already in antiquity if Pausanias formed part of a conspiracy (Plut. Alex. 9.4-6; Athen. 13.557D-E; Just. 9.7.310) or acted on his own (Arist. Pol. 1311B; cf. Diod. 16.93.1-94.1). The new regime held the three sons of Aëropos of → Lynkestis responsible and executed two of them (Curt. 7.1.6-7; Arr. An. 1.25.1-2). P. engineered Makedonia’s rise and laid the foundations for Alexander’s further conquests.   G. Wirth Cf. Cawkwell, G.L., Philip of Macedon, 1978; Heckel 2006, 208-11; Squillace 2009; Wirth 1985; Worthington 2008.

Philip III   see Arrhidaios Philippeion After → Philip II’s great victory at → Chaironeia in 338, a round, roofed structure was constructed within the Altis at Olympia, probably at the order of Philip; it contained 5 statues of members of the Argead house, created by Leochares, and placed on a high base. Pausanias (5.17.4) thought the statues were constructed of gold and ivory, but examination of the remaining statue bases demonstrate that they were actually made of marble. Three of the images were of males (Philip himself, Alexander his son, and Philip’s father → Amyntas III) and two were → women, → Olympias, wife of Philip II and mother of Alexander III, and a woman named Eurydike (Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9-10). Philip’s image stood in the centre, visible from the door, that of Alexander to his right and that of his father to his left. The two female statues were placed at the two ends of the base, likely with Olympias next to Alexander and Eurydike next to Amyntas. Several royal women were called “Eurydike” and the text of Pausanias 5.17.4 is lacunose, so uncertainty has arisen about which 420

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woman’s image was depicted. Philip had a wife usually referred to as Audata, but Photios’ summary of Arrian (Succ. F 1.22) calls her Eurydike. Philip and Audata’s granddaughter, initially called Adea, took the name Eurydike when she married Philip Arrhidaios (Arr. Succ. F 1.23). Philip II’s mother was named Eurydike. Philip was married for the 7th and last time to the ward of → Attalos, a woman usually called Kleopatra, but Arrian (An. 3.6.5) refers to her as “Eurydike.” Granted that the statue population of the Philippeion was determined soon after Chaironeia when Adea Eurydike was either unborn or an infant, the image is not of her and it is not likely that of Audata; the image must refer either to Philip’s mother or his last married wife. If the latter, then the monument would commemorate recent events, the current situation at the Makedonian court, highlighting two of Philip’s wives, effectively flaunting his polygamy. If the woman portrayed in one of these statues was Philip’s mother, then the monument commemorates a lineage: Philip, his father and mother, and his presumed heir and the presumed heir’s mother. At the time when the construction began, Kleopatra/Eurydike may not yet have married Philip and certainly had not yet had a child by him. If the marriage had not happened, the famous quarrel at Kleopatra/Eurydike’s wedding which led to the brief self-imposed exile of Alexander and considerable international upset had not yet happened either. It is more likely that the statue group was intended to picture Philip’s past, present and future to the Greek world. Moreover, the likely location of the Eurydike statue next to that of Amyntas is suggestive as is the past role of Philip’s mother in safeguarding the succession for him and his brother (Aischin. 2.26-29). The location of the building may allude to the divine and Heraklid origins of Philip’s family. This dynastic monument, like the palace at → Aigai/Vergina, exemplifies Philip’s royal statecraft and the theatricality that characterized not only his monuments, but also many Makedonian type tombs with their temple or palace like facades. Intriguingly, by Pausanias’ day, the two female statues had been removed from the Philippeion and placed in the nearby Heraion (7.17.4).   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney, E.D., The Philippeum, Women, and the Formation of a Dynastic Image and Afterword, in: Carney 2015, 61-90; Palagia, O., Philip’s Eurydice in the Philippeum at Olympia, in: Carney/Ogden 2010, 33-42; Schultz, P., Leochares’ Argead Portraits in the Philippeion, in: Schultz, P./von den Hoff, R. (eds.), Early Hellenistic Portraiture, 2007, 205-33.

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Philippoi Philippoi for Philippou scil. topoi: ‘Philip’s scil. places’. On coins from the middle of the 350s, the toponym occurs as Philippōn: ‘(coin) of P.’, replacing Thasiōn ēpeirō: ‘(coin) of (places on) the Thasians’ mainland’ (Gaebler 1935, pl. 20.19, from ca. 360). These ‘places’ were rather mine shafts than settlements for which one expects toponyms as indeed occur on the coast of the Thasian peraia. Around 360, the Thasians had started re-exploiting their old mining district of Skapte Hyle (‘Dug up Woodland’: Hdt. 6.46.3), some 5 km NE of modern Kavala, whereas their northern continuation, around modern Lekani (map: Road Editions 2: Macedonia), had possibly belonged to the Thracian family of → Thucydides’ wife (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 19, cf. Thuc. 4.105.1). The Thasian part of the mining district had been lost in 463 to the Athenians (Plut. Kim. 14.2) who in their turn had abandoned it in 405/4. Until the death of the Thracian king Kotys around 360, it had belonged to the western periphery of his Odrysian kingdom. After short instability it was reclaimed by his successor in the West. The ‘mainland Thasians’ then appealed to → Philip II for help giving him opportunity to intervene in → Thrace (cf. Steph. Byz. Φ 69). By clearing the whole district up to the Nestos, he acquired it as his personal possession (Strab. 7.7.4) thus getting control of the gold and silver trade up the upper Hebros (with newly founded Philippoupolis/Plovdiv: for mines in the Rhodope region see Archibald 1998, 23 map 9) and down the Nestos to Abdera. The Lekani region, later regarded as Makedonian (cf. Strab. 7.7.4, 7 F 33, 35 Jones = F 16.48, 15.20 Radt), was protected by forts in the road corridor east of modern Drama, some even beyond the Nestos (Barrington Atlas, map 51). To the south, the dispersed shafts (map: Mack 1964, 12) were doubtlessly of economic interest, though after 200 years of exploitation by Thasians, Athenians, and Thracians, the proceeds, grossly exaggerated in the ancient tradition (Diod. 16.8.6-7), must have been rather moderate by that time: Philip’s lifetime gold staters are rare, but his silver coins abundant, resulting from the control of the Nestos Valley. The workers of the shafts of the P. district needed supplies and protection. So a strongly fortified settlement with a market and a short-lived mint was established on the top of a precipitous hill towering above the P.-Plain (App. Civ. 4.105). There it was equipped with agricultural land (SEG 34.664 = Faraguna 1998, 369-70). The place just above the future Roman colony, facing Mt. → Pangaion beyond the plain which before Philip had been uncultivated, covered with trees and pools 422

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(ὕδατα: Theophr. CP 5.14.5-6, but not a lake: λίμνη), was situated on the connecting road from the sea port of Kavala up to the route north of Mt. Pangaion from Siris/Serres to the Nestos. Soon adopting the district’s name, P. was not identical with Krenides that in a weaker position had been exposed to Thracian attacks. A mere re-foundation would have kept its former name. So Krenides (‘Springs’) must be searched outside P. One option is modern Krenides at the hill’s SE foot, in a valley open to the plain and likely to have had springs. If it covers its ancient namesake, P. as an ongoing settlement—as asserted by ancient sources (Diod. 16.3.7; Strab. 7 F 34, 42(43) Jones = F 16.24, 17.16 Radt; Steph. Byz. Φ 69; with some confusion App. Civ. 4.105)—is but a simplification. With a much firmer place in its close neighbourhood, Krenides was abandoned.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Faraguna 1998, 367-78; Loukopoulou, L., Thrace from Strymon to Nestos, in: Hansen/ Nielsen 2004, 854-69; Mack 1964; Vavelidis, M. et al., Goldgrube in Palaea Kavala/Gr.: Entdeckung von Skaptehyle?, Erzmetall 49 (1996), 547-54.

philoi The term philia expresses a Greek moral concept of friendship that goes back to the archaic period: a bond between two persons of approximately equal social status who agree to pursue common goals and defend each other’s interests. The bond was highly ritualized and cemented through the exchange of gifts. Philia is closely connected to xenia (or philoxenia), ritualized guest friendship between two individuals or families of approximately equal status but from different social units, viz., poleis. In the Hellenistic kingdoms after → Alexander III, philos tou basileōs (friend of the king) became the mutatis mutandis formal term for courtier, because at least the Greeks among them were linked to the respective dynasties through philia and xenia bonds, and the accompanying gift exchange. The new terminology reflects the increasing reliance of Hellenistic kings on Greeks from the Aegean poleis, in addition to Makedonian nobles, who were traditionally known as → hetairoi. Attendance at court was by no means a prerequisite to be a philos of the king, as one could also act as the representative of a king—and have the title of royal friend—while remaining in one’s home city. In addition, philia in the Greek epigraphic record was used to indicate a bilateral alliance between a king and a city or between two cities. Literary

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sources sometimes mention philoi as members of the Argead → court as well, especially with reference to the reign of Alexander III. The inconsistent use of both philos and hetairos in later sources does not imply that philos was already a court title prior to the period of the Successors. Diodoros frequently uses philos as a synonym of hetairos (e.g. Diod. 17.16.1); this obviously is a mistake, echoing the later Hellenistic practice. Plutarch calls Alexander’s confidants, especially his → sōmatophylakes, philoi, but as a broad term indicating friendship in a more generic sense. But although it is unlikely that philos was a formal court title, it is clear that from the mid-5th c. Argead kings did maintain philia and xenia bonds with members of Greek elites. → Perdikkas II maintained xenia relations with Thessalian leaders (Thuc. 4.132.2; cf. 4.78.2), and → Amyntas III was a philos of the Athenians, a bond that his son, → Philip II, inherited (Aischin. 2.28). Xenia and philia networks enabled Argead kings to interact with Greek cities in order to negotiate alliances and influence local decision-making. Conversely, Greeks could become attached to the Argead court as commanders, officials, or artists. The Suda says that Hippokrates stayed at the Argead court as the philos of Perdikkas II; his son, Thessalos, later became the personal physician of Perdikkas’ son, → Archelaos (Suda s.v. Hippokrates ι 564 Adler; cf. Galen. Med. Phil. 3); → Aischines was a xenos and philos of Philip II (Dem. 18.109; 19.248). The number of Greeks in the Argead king’s entourage increased substantially under Philip II. The prominent presence of Greeks at court can be associated with the extension of Argead hegemony over the Greek poleis. These Greeks furthermore were useful allies in Philip’s struggle with the Makedonian → nobility, the hetairoi. Having established an infantry force directly answerable to himself, Philip promoted to important positions his followers and friends, whom he recruited not only among the Makedonian nobility but also among Greeks. Confusingly, the literary sources of the period call these new men hetairoi as well, and it is possible that non-Makedonians among Philip’s followers received the designation hetairos as an honourific title or to fit them into the existing court society (Berve lists a possible 13 Greeks out of 61 hetairoi of Alexander); if this is correct, it follows that Makedonian elite identity was not only inherited, but could also be assumed. → Theopompos claimed that Philip rewarded no less than 800 Greeks for their services with rich gifts of land (BNJ 115 F 225b; there is indeed some epigraphic evidence that Philip distributed landed estates among his Greek followers: Syll.³ 332). It is reasonable to assume that these Greeks were associated with Philip by means of philia rather than traditional Makedonian 424

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hetaireia. That there remained a difference is clear from the criticism that was notoriously raised against these new Companions by the historian Theopompos, a contemporary of Philip who may be expressing the viewpoint of the old nobility: “men rushed to his side from many quarters; some were from the land to which he himself belonged, others from Thessaly, still other from the rest of Greece, selected not for their supreme merit; on the contrary, nearly every man in the Greek or barbarian world of lecherous, loathsome or ruffianly character flocked to Makedonia and won the title of Philip’s hetairoi” (BNJ 115 F 225; cf. Polyb. 8.9.6-13). Athenaios (6.259F-260A) gives as a most shameful example the case of the “flatterer” Agathokles, allegedly the son of a Thessalian slave, who was given an army and sent to the kingdom’s northern marches with full administrative mandate. Because of his ‘otherness’, → Eumenes of Kardia, too, was accused of being of low birth (Plut. Eum. 1.1; Ail. VH 12.43). Promoting Greek favourites to high office had earlier been practiced by Philip’s predecessor, → Perdikkas III (Karystios FHG IV 357 ap. Athen. 11.508E). Philip’s successor, Alexander, continued the policy of maneuvering Greeks into crucial positions of power in an attempt to sideline the Makedonian nobility. Best known among Alexander’s court Greeks are Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 1.1; Nep. 13.1), who had previously served Philip, and → Nearchos, a Cretan (Diod. 19.69.1; Arr. Ind. 18.4). After Alexander’s death, his Successors developed courts of their own; the demand for capable administrators and commanders now became too great for the Makedonian nobility to meet, and notably Greeks moved in to fill the gap. As these Greeks were linked to the respective Successors by means of philia (and recruited through xenia networks), the transition was accompanied by the substitution of Companion of the King by Friend of the King as the preferred term to designate a courtier of high rank (though Companion remained in use as a title indicating aristocratic status and Makedonian identity under the Antigonids and Seleukids). However, the earliest attestation of philos as an official title is in an inscription postdating the Argead monarchy (RC 6 = OGIS 12 [c. 285 BC]), which contains a formulaic phrase in which the “Friends” of → Lysimachos are mentioned alongside himself, but not his “Companions”.    R. Strootman Cf. Anson, E.M., Discrimination and Eumenes of Kardia Revisited, in: Hauben, H./ Meeus, A. (eds.), The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms (323-276 B.C.), 2014, 540-58; Herman, G., Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City, 1987; Müller, S., Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der makedonischen

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Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen, 2003; Strootman 2014; Strootman, R., Eunuchs, Renegades and Concubines: The “Paradox of Power” and the Promotion of Favorites in the Hellenistic Empires, in: Erskine, A. et al. (eds.), The Hellenistic Court: Monarchic Power and Elite Society From Alexander to Cleopatra, 2017, 121-42.

Philotas, son of Parmenion Philotas was the son of the prominent Makedonian general → Parmenion and one of the most influential commanders himself. The scarcity of information on his duties and deeds during the wars of → Alexander III is misleading. P. was involved in crucial events up to his death in 330. In the primary sources, P. was apparently pushed into the background for the sake of glorifying Alexander, likely even more so after P.’s elimination that led to a blackening of his portrait. Plutarch (Alex. 10.2-3) hints at P.’s high position at → Philip II’s court already before the Asian campaign. This may be correct, given the rank of P.’s father, but the anecdote itself is spurious. When Philip was assassinated in 336, Parmenion’s support for Alexander’s succession was certainly crucial to the outcome. P. is first attested as a commander of cavalry in the Triballian campaign (335) that he may have actually led; he commanded the Upper Makedonian horsemen (Arr. An. 1.2.5). It has been suggested that P.’s family came from Upper Makedonia. An enigmatic series of bronze coins (obv.: head of a youthful Herakles wearing the lion’s scalp; rev.: → eagle on thunderbolt) bearing the legend ΦΙΛΩ is ascribed by some to P.’s grandfather Philotas believed to have been a local dynast of Pelagonia. However, this is speculation. It is uncertain where P.’s family came from, who minted these coins, and whether it was some Philo(tas) at all. From 334, together with his father and brothers Nikanor and Hektor (who both died during the campaign), P. took part in the Asian war. He had the elite command over the Companion Cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4: 1800 cavalrymen; 17.57.1; Curt. 6.9.21; Arr. An. 1.14.1). At the battles of → Granikos, → Issos, and → Gaugamela, P. fought on the right wing together with Alexander in the offensive (Arr. An. 1.19.7-8; 2.8.3; Diod. 17.66.7; Curt. 4.13.26). Presumably, P. coordinated and secured the attack. However, focusing on Alexander, glorified as the ideal commander, the primary sources provide little information on P.’s actions on the battlefields. During the first years, when Alexander’s own power base was still weak, P. and Parmenion will in fact have led the campaign and taken the 426

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political, strategic, and military decisions. While Alexander was in the public eye, particularly regarding representation politics, P. and Parmenion were likely the chief engineers of the victories against the Persians. Before Miletos, P. prevented the Persian fleet from disembarking and gathering supplies at Mykale (Arr. An. 1.19.7-8). He was in charge of the siege engines before Halikarnassos (Arr. An. 1.21.5). During the Persian counterattack in the Aegean, first led by → Memnon of Rhodos, then by Pharnabazos and Autophradates, Parmenion may have involved P. and Alexander in a strategy of psychological warfare: it became known that Alexander had taken Pharnabazos’ sister Barsine (simultaneously Memnon’s widow) and P. the Makedonian Antigona as mistress. Both women had been taken captive by Parmenion after Issos (333). Antigona was Autophradates’ “booty” captured by him earlier on Samothrake (Plut. Alex. 48.3-4; Plut. Mor. 339D-F). Taking away another warrior’s booty was a blatant gesture of humiliation (cf. Il. 1.130-356). However, the Persian commanders were not demoralized but kept on resisting until 332. Antigona is alleged to have been used by her acquaintance → Krateros in order to spy upon P. and reveal his secret slanders against Alexander (Plut. Alex. 48.4-5), allegedly for more than 7 years (Plut. Mor. 339E-F) which is chronologically impossible. Apparently, according to the official version justifying P.’s elimination, → Ptolemy and → Aristoboulos claim that P.’s conduct was treacherous already in the days of the Egyptian campaign (winter 332/1) but Alexander preferred to trust in him (Arr. An. 3.26.1). P. is reported to have been present when Alexander sat upon the Persian throne in Sousa (Diod. 17.66.7; Curt. 5.2.15). He played an important role in overcoming Ariobarzanes’ forces at the Persian Gates (Curt. 5.4.20, 30). In 330, the year of decisive changes, P. was eliminated in Baktrian Phrada. It is debated whether he fell victim to a conspiracy of Alexander and his confidants against him (Plut. Alex. 49.1) or got himself into trouble by being a silent sympathizer of a conspiracy against Alexander. A certain Dimnos (variant: Limnos: Plut. Alex. 49.2-4) formed part of a plot against Alexander. Dimnos’ confidant Nikomachos confessed to his brother Kebalinos who informed P. and expected him to report it to Alexander but P. repeatedly failed to do so (Diod. 17.79.1-6; Arr. An. 3.26.1-2; Curt. 6.7.1-8.22; Plut. Alex. 49.2-5). P.’s silence on the matter led to a charge of treason, his trial before the Makedonian → army assembly, conviction, and execution, either by being stoned (Curt. 6.11.38) or, more likely, shot with javelins (Arr. An. 3.26.3). Although during the trial P. was treated as the plotters’ accomplice (Arr. An. 3.26.3), the sources do not indicate that he

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actively belonged to them. It is not even clear whether he was guilty of hoping that Alexander would be killed. The truth is lost, for our sources are biased: Alexan­der either receives apologetic or unfavourable treatment. Curtius’ version is the most detailed (6.7.1-11.40) but unreliable: it is thoroughly coloured by his Roman background and portrayal of Alexander as an un-Roman, corrupt, “new” Persian tyrant incited by his scheming entourage to kill his deserving general. In particular, the cruel torture of P. that violated his status as a freeborn member of the elite is likely a dramatized fiction (Curt. 6.11.13-38). It seems strange that it should have occurred after the trial and sentence. Plutarch (Alex. 49.6) even adds a stereotypical cliché of the scheming eastern tyrant when claiming that Alexander listened to P.’s torture behind a tapestry. P.’s father Parmenion who then was stationed at Ekbatana was perhaps condemned in absentia as another (alleged) accomplice (Diod. 17.80.1). In any case, he was killed swiftly before he could learn about P.’s fate, and react (Arr. An. 3.26.3-4; Diod. 17.80.3; Curt. 7.2.11-34). In all likelihood, Alexander wanted to get rid of both and took the advantage of the opportunity. P.’s handling of the matter of the conspiracy may look clumsy but we cannot know what really happened. Nevertheless, the extent to which Alexander had carefully secured his position when his foremost generals fell is striking. The sources testify to some unrest in the army following the eliminations (Arr. An. 3.27.1-2; Curt. 6.11.20), but Alexander and his confidants were able to keep the situation stable. All of the critics are reported to have been gathered into one unit and separated from the main parts of the army (Diod. 17.80.4; Curt. 7.2.35-37). P.’s command of the → hetairoi was split among → Hephaistion and → Kleitos (Arr. An. 3.27.4). The latter had fought along with P. at Gaugamela (Curt. 4.13.26). Tales about P.’s arrogance, love of luxury, and haughtiness (Plut. Alex. 40.1; 48.2-3; 49.2; Plut. Mor. 339D-E) will have been posthumous slanders spread in order to justify his elimination. Similarly, P.’s alleged statements that the “kid” (meirakion, meaning Alexander) owed the rule over Makedonia and military victories to him and Parmenion alone (Plut. Alex. 48.4-5; Plut. Mor. 339E) will be apocryphal, although there is some undeniable truth to them. Since in the highest social circles to which P. belonged marriage policy was an important factor of influence, P. will have had a wife, presumably also children, but nothing is known about them.   S. Müller Cf. Carney 2015, 131-7; Heckel, W., The Conspiracy against Philotas, Phoenix 31 (1977), 9-21; Heckel 2016, 52-9; Wartenberg 1998; Wirth 1993, 311-6.

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Phokion   see Antipatros; Hypereides Platon In the oeuvre of Platon, the Athenian philosopher and head of the Academy in Athens, there are only a few sporadic references to the Argeads as elements of rhetorical arguments of P.’s speakers. In addition to the non-historiographical genre, the references’ respective context has to be taken into account critically in order to evaluate the source value that as a result seems to be dubious. → Perdikkas II is mentioned twice and portrayed unfavourably. In the Politeia, probably set against the background of the → Peloponnesian War, Sokrates makes metaphorical use of the contemporary Perdikkas when discussing the phenomenon of dikaiosyne with Polemarchos, a wealthy metic’s son who became a victim of the 30 (cf. Lys. 12.17, 22-25). He states that the saying “it seems to be just to help your friends and harm your enemies” (τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν) must come from Periandros of Korinthos, Perdikkas, Xerxes, the Theban Ismenias, or some other powerful rich man (Polit. 336A). Perdikkas is included in what Gifford calls a “gallery of illustrious rogues” perceived as untrustworthy tyrants by Athenian recipients, for P. does not count Periandros among the 7 Sages (Prot. 342E-343B), Xerxes was the bogeyman in Greek reception, and P.’s Ismenias a characteristic πλούσιος ἀνήρ associated with Persian gold (cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.1). P.’s Gorgias is the single source for the accusations that Perdikkas II stole the ἀρχή (obviously meaning the complete rule over Argead Makedonia) from his brother Alketas and that Perdikkas’ son and successor → Archelaos was Alketas’ slave who murdered him, his cousin Alexander, and young half-brother from Perdikkas’ wife Kleopatra in order to usurp the rule (471A-D). However, this is not the opinion of P. himself but put into the mouth of Gorgias’ student Polos who tries to argue against Sokrates’ theory of eudaimonia by proving that also a villain could be happy choosing Archelaos as an example. Apart from the fact that legally a slave was not able to rule, Polos’ story sounds strange, his rhetoric has severe flaws, and Sokrates does not agree at all (471D; 525D). P. portrays Polos as an unreliable orator, hence Polos’ image of Archelaos as a slave, liar, and criminal likely contradicted the general Athenian perception of him (cf. Thuc. 2.100.2; Andok. 2.10-16; IG I³ 117). An Athenian inscription, probably the peace treaty

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between Athens, Perdikkas II, and Arrhabaios of → Lynkestis in 423/2 (IG I³ 89), lists Archelaos as one of the Argead signatories confirming his legitimacy. Polos’ accusations will be a rhetorical exaggeration coloured by the Greek misunderstanding of polygamous structures. Perhaps, Archelaos also did not kill his half-brother who might be identical with → Aëropos II who took the rule after his death in 399 (Diod. 14.37.6). The Pseudo-Platonic Alkibiades mentions Archelaos’ assassination by his unnamed paidika. The claim that the assassin usurped the rule for three or four days before he fell victim to a conspiracy ([Plat.] Alk. II 141D-E) is scarcely authentic. In the Platonic Corpus, according to a letter in P.’s name of dubious authenticity, P. recommended his student Euphraios of Oreios to → Perdikkas III as an adviser ([Plat.] Ep. 5). Euphraios in fact stayed at the Argead court for some time under this ruler (Athen. 11.506F; 508E-F) confirming that connections existed between the Argeads and the → Platonic Academy.    S. Müller Cf. Dalfen, J., Platon: Gorgias, 2004, 275-7; Gifford, M., Dramatic Dialectic in Republic Book I, in: Sedley, D. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2001, 35-106, esp. 92-3; Müller 2017, 38-41, 111-15; Trampedach, K., Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik, 1994.

Platonic Academy Contacts between the Platonic Academy and the Argeads started under → Perdikkas III. In the 5th Letter (whose authenticity is doubted), allegedly a reply to Perdikkas III, → Platon recommends that the young Makedonian ruler exert the principles of monarchy with the help of a certain Euphraios of Oreos. The letter implies that Euphraios was a follower of Platon and already present at the Argead court ([Plat.] Ep. 5). An anti-Platonic passage of Athenaios’ Deipnosophistai (11.504C-509E) confirms this implication and expands on it, claiming that Euphraios “organized life within the king’s inner circle so pedantically that it was impossible to have a meal with them, unless you understood geometry and philosophy. When Philip II seized power, therefore, Parmenion arrested Euphraios in Oreos and put him to death” (11.508D-E = Karystios of Pergamon F2, FHG 4.357). The polemical context casts doubts on the reliability of the allegations. Besides, according to → Demosthenes 430

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(9.59-62) Euphraios committed suicide in 342 after a vain attempt to prevent a pro-Makedonian oligarchic revolution in his hometown Oreos. Despite the claim in Athenaios, the death of Euphraios seems unrelated to his activity at the Argead court ca. 20 years before. As a recipient of Argead patronage, Euphraios should probably be seen in a sequence that goes from Agathon and → Euripides to → Aristotle. His influence, however, may also have had important political consequences. The same polemical source relates that Euphraios convinced Perdikkas to give Philip control of a bit of territory where he kept a small force. This put him in a prime position to seize power when Perdikkas was killed by the Illyrians in 360/59 (Athen. 11.506E-F = Karystios F1). The text refers to an allusion by Speusippos, Platon’s successor as head of the A., in a letter to Philip in 343/2, stating that Platon had laid the basis of Philip’s rule during the reign of Perdikkas and had always been most concerned about uncivilized and unbrotherly occurrences at court (Letter to Philip §12 Natoli). Perhaps Euphraios and Platon had settled a conflict between the brothers in a way that later facilitated Philip’s succession to the throne. Philip, however, felt no gratitude. No contact between him and the A. is attested before Speusippos wrote his letter courting favour with the Makedonian king. Speusippos also used the opportunity to belittle Isokrates and attack → Theopompos who supposedly was slandering Platon (BNJ 115 T 7). He also recommended the (otherwise unknown) historian Antipatros of Magnesia (BNJ 69 T 1) to Philip. Antipatros is presented as a most competent propagandist, much more able to win the Greeks over to Philip than Isokrates. The mythical and historical arguments of Antipatros as presented by Speusippos consistently legitimize the Makedonian against the Athenian claims, especially regarding possession of → Amphipolis. Generally, Speusippos’ letter is a remarkable piece of evidence revealing the fierce competition of Greek intellectuals over recognition at Philip’s court. Xenokrates of Chalkedon, who in 339 succeeded Speusippos as head of the A., was also associated with the Argeads. He dedicated a treatise περὶ βασιλείας of unknown content and character to Alexander III. Supposedly, Alexander invited him to participate in the Asian campaign, which he of course refused. Moreover, Xenokrates apparently maintained relations to leading persons at the Makedonian court. Probably because of these contacts, the Athenians nominated the metic Xenokrates for the mission to negotiate the terms of capitulation with Antipatros at the end of the Lamian War (322). His dignified performance during and after the negotiations in Thebes was the

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subject of many anecdotes (e.g., Plut. Phok. 27.2-4) whose historical value is impossible to assess.   K. Trampedach Cf. Berve 1926, II, no. 576; Hammond/Griffith 1979, 203-8, 514-6; Natoli 2004; Trampedach, K., Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik, 1994, 93-7, 138-43, 147-8.

Polygamy   see Marriage Policy; Sexuality; Succession Polyperchon Polyperchon (in some sources Polysperchon), the son of Simmias (Arr. An. 2.12.2; 3.11.9), was from Tymphaia (Diod. 17.57.2; 20.28.1; cf. Curt. 4.13.28), an Epeirote region incorporated into Makedonia only at the time of → Philip II; he was possibly a member of the (former) ruling dynasty. He was one of → Alexander III’s oldest commanders (Diod. 18.48.4; Just. 12.12.8), which suggests that he was a contemporary of Philip II. P. is first attested during Alexander’s campaign, when he was appointed commander of the Tymphaian battalion after the death of his predecessor at → Issos (Ar. An. 2.12.2), a command that he retained at → Gaugamela (Ar. An. 3.11.9). After the battle, he operated regularly with → Krateros, presumably because the two worked well together. It is therefore not surprising that when Alexander dismissed 10.000 → veterans at Opis and sent them back to Makedonia in 324 under Krateros, who was to replace → Antipatros, P. was appointed as his second-in-command (Arr. An. 7.12.4; cf. Just. 12.12.8). After Alexander’s death, both P. and Krateros supported Antipatros in the Lamian War in 322 (Diod. 18.16.4). After their suppression of the Greek revolt, Krateros and Antipatros departed to confront → Perdikkas in Asia, leaving P. in charge of Makedonia (Diod. 18.38.6; Just. 13.6.9). On his deathbed in 319, Antipatros appointed P. as his successor to the guardianship of the kings (i.e., → Alexander IV and Philip → Arrhidaios) and command of Makedonia, instead of his own son → Kassandros, who resented his subordinate role and formed alliances with the rival Successors (Diod. 18.48-49, 54). P. attempted to gain support by offering → Olympias the guardianship of her grandson Alexander IV and by championing the political freedom of the Greeks (Diod. 18.49.4, 55-57; Plut. Phok. 32.1). In 317, Adea 432

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Eurydike, the ambitious wife of Philip Arrhidaios and an Argead herself, transferred the guardianship of her husband to Kassandros (Just. 14.5.1-3; Diod. 19.11.1), provoking P. and Olympias into invading Makedonia (Diod. 19.11.2; cf. Just. 14.5.9). But the troops of Philip Arrhidaios and Adea Eurydike refused to fight against Alexander III’s mother, the two were captured and executed by Olympias (Diod. 19.11.1-9; Just. 14.5.9-10; cf. Douris, BNJ 76 F 52; Poly­ ain. 8.60). Subsequently, P. was unable to prevent Kassandros from invading Makedonia and besieging Olympias and the remaining Argeads at → Pydna (Diod. 19.35.5; Just. 14.6.2-4), nor was he able to effect a rescue operation (Polyain. 4.11.3), resulting in Kassandros’ capture and execution of Olympias and imprisonment of Alexander IV (Diod. 19.51-52; Just. 14.6.5-13). P. fled to the Peloponnese, but returned to Makedonia in 308 after Kassandros’ secret assassination of Alexander IV became known, threatening to displace him with the illegitimate son of Alexander III (by Barsine), → Herakles (Diod. 20.20.1-3). But Kassandros forestalled P.’s final bid for power by persuading him to murder Herakles in return for the continuation of his command in the Peloponnese, where he spent the remainder of his life. Unlike most of the Successors, P. appears to have died naturally at a ripe old age. Although he is often dismissed as unintelligent and incompetent, his military acumen is demonstrated by the confidence that Alexander, Krateros, and Antipatros placed in him, as well as his remarkable longevity and ability to maintain control of the Peloponnese.   F. Pownall Cf. Carney, E.D., Successful Mediocrity: The Career of Polyperchon, SyllClass 25 (2014), 1-31; Heckel, W., Polyperchon as ‘Brigand’: Propaganda or Misunderstanding?, Mnemosyne 60 (2007), 123-6; Heckel 2016, 200-16; Wheatley, P., The Date of Polyperchon’s Invasion of Macedonia and Murder of Heracles, Antichthon 32 (1998), 12-23.

“Poros” Coinage The → India-related coin issues of → Alexander III, commonly known as the “Poros coinage”, include a group of dekadrachms and tetradrachms that depict an → elephant on one side. Most of these coins of Alexander come from a hoard discovered near → Babylon (Iraq) in the winter of 1972/3. The depictions of Indian war elephants imply that these coins commemorate Alexander’s victory

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over the Indian ruler P. at the → Hydaspes in 326. The elephant dekadrachms and tetradrachms were struck shortly after the Indian campaign, most probably at Babylon in 324-23. According to the most common view, the battle of the Hydaspes was decided exclusively by the Makedonians and Greeks, while the Iranian contribution remains ignored. However, the available sources imply that it was the Iranians, fighting as foot archers and cavalrymen, who played a key role in the battle, thus enabling a new interpretation. The dekadrachms’ obverse displays a battle scene between a mounted horseman identified as Alexan­der with an Indian war elephant mounted by a warrior (P.?) and a mahout. The reverse depicts a standing Alexander carrying the thunderbolt of Zeus in his extended hand. The coins feature monograms. There are 11 elephant deka­ drachms extant in numismatic collections, and most of them originate from the Babylon hoard. One specimen of this group was found in Baktria (now in the British Museum). At least 15 further dekadrachms (including one specimen in the Hirayama collection, Japan) are said to have been discovered in a hoard at Mihr Zakah in eastern Afghanistan. The dekadrachms were intended for top-rank Iranian commanders in Alexander’s army. Iranian units accompanied Alexander in Babylonia in the last years of his reign. After his death some of the Iranian dignitaries (including Alexander’s father-in-law Oxyartes) presumably took their dekadrachms home when they returned to their satrapies in Baktria and Paropamisadai (Afghanistan). The Babylon coin hoard revealed not only the elephant dekadrachms but also tetradrachms showing an elephant on one side; some of these specimens feature monograms. The tetradrachms comprise two variants, i.e., the archer/elephant and the chariot/elephant group. The obverse of the archer/elephant tetradrachms depicts a bowman. At present, at least 11 specimens of this type have been published. Two other specimens are recorded. The chariot/elephant coins (three specimens are known so far) depict an archer and a driver in a quadriga on the obverse. Motifs of a foot archer and an archer in a chariot on Alexander’s tetradrachms are often thought to refer to Indian martial arts. More likely, the foot archer and the horse quadriga with an archer represent Alexander’s victorious army, not the defeated Indians. India-related tetradrachms were special issues struck at Alexander’s orders upon his return from India in 324-23.    M.J. Olbrycht Cf. Holt, F.L., Alexander the Great and the Mystery of the Elephant Medallions, 2003; Messerschmidt, W., Alexander von Makedonien auf zeitgenössischen Münzen, in: Ditt-

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mann, R. et al. (eds.), Altertumswissenschaften im Dialog, 2003, 369-95; Olbrycht 2004; Olbrycht, M.J., On Some Coins of Alexander the Great (336-323 BC), Payam-e Bastanshenas 4/8 (2008), 19-24; Olbrycht 2017.

Poseidippos of Pella An interesting poetic mention of the Argeads was discovered in the Milan Papyrus P. Mil. Vogl. VIII 309 (late 3rd c. BC), a collection of epigrams, attributed by the editores principes, Bastianini and Gallazzi, to Poseidippos of Pella, active at the court of the Ptolemies. In 31 AB the correction ’Αργεάδαιϲ of the first editors from αργαδαϲ (pap. l. 3) is certain because of the following word βα̣[ϲιλε]ῦϲιν as well as the name of the Argead → Alexander III at l. 5. The epigram belongs to the thematic section of the Oionoskopika. At ll. 1-3, “An eagle swooping from the [clouds] and lightning at the same time / were auspicious victory omens in war / for the Argead kings”, the eagle and lightning are presented as favourable omens provided from the gods to the Argeads. The two common omens were particularly meaningful for the Ptolemies, who regarded them as symbols of the protection of Zeus, and featured them on Ptolemaic coins. To Alexander alone “as he was teeming with fire / against the countless armies of the Persians” (ll. 5-6) appeared another equally propitious omen for the victory: the moving statue of Athena, who “in front of her temple, / stirred her auspicious right foot from the lead clamp” (ll. 3-4). The uniqueness of this otherwise unattested omen underlines Alexander’s uniqueness, special protection by Athena and the importance of the victory over the Persians. Alexander, who was prominent among the Argead ancestors for his victory, is distinguished from the other kings of the dynasty thanks to the favour of Athena. Nothing in the text implies an identification of the Argead kings of l. 3 with the Ptolemies. If the contrast had been between the Ptolemies and the conqueror of the Persian Empire, indeed the eulogistic aim of the poet would have been less significant because of the excellence of the latter’s victories. Alexander is again mentioned in 35.3 AB, where a bird-portent, equally unattested, for his three victories over the Persians is the voice of a crow. Twice he is mentioned in the section of the statues (Andriantopoiika). In 65 AB, a lifelike statue of Alexander by Lysippos is praised. A comparison between cattle and a → lion (= Persians/Alexander) emphasizes the Persians’ defeat at ll. 3-4. In the fragmentary 70 AB, Alexander

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features again in an artistic context with a reference to Polykleitos and Lysippos. P. emphasizes Makedonian ethnicity in order to praise dynastic continuity as a legitimizing factor for the Ptolemies in some epigrams of the section of the Hippika: participation in the → Panhellenic Games was an important prestigious link with the Argead tradition. The Argeads as ancestors are alluded to in 88.4 AB: Ptolemy II, proud of the origin of his father, calls himself ’Εορδαία γέννα, from a Makedonian region. Similarly, the poet proudly claims his origin from the Makedonian city → Pella, Πελλαῖον γένοϲ ἀμόν (118.17 AB). In 82.3 and 87.2 AB female members of the royal family are called Makedonian in the context of their agonistic victories. In 78.14 the Makedonian poets (or the Makedonian women) are invited to sing for Berenike. Indirectly, Alexander could be at least evoked in 8 AB (Lithika) via the reference to a chariot of Dareios and in 36.8 AB (Anathematika), where a Makedonian girl, Hegeso, offers a linen cloth to the armed Arsinoë Philadelphos, perhaps to identify with Athena, another possible link with Alexander, as well as the “sweet sweat” of l. 3, a sign of divinity also attributed to the king.   F. Angiò Cf. Austin, C./Bastianini, G. (eds.), Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia, 2002; Bastianini, G./Gallazzi, C. (eds.), Posidippo di Pella. Epigrammi (P. Mil. Vogl. VIII 309), 2001.

Pretenders Pretenders in the sense of rivals to the reigning Argeads for the rule over Makedonia were not uncommon to Argead history. However, no general profile can be applied to them. Their respective political background has to be explored case by case. While some p. showed up in the usually fragile transitional stage of a → succession, this was not the rule. The treatment of the p. is further complicated by occasional chronological uncertainty, and partial lack of instructive evidence on the p.’s identity, followers, financial sources, power bases, strategies, and fate. Some of the p. were supported by foreign powers using them to their own political advantage as a means to interfere into Makedonian politics and weaken the reigning Argead. There is one common feature of the p. in Makedonia: the claim to Argead descent. This was necessary as ever since the beginning of Argead Makedonia, the Argeads maintained a common consensus that rule was associated exclusively with them. The first of the attested p. in 436

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Argead history was → Alexander I’s son Philip who challenged his brother → Perdikkas II. A certain Derdas, probably → Elimeia’s dynast, and the Athenians who had become a dominant power in northern Greece and profited from a Makedonia troubled by inner turmoil, supported Philip. It is unclear when, why, and how his agitation began. → Athens joined him and Derdas in 433 when the conflict was already in bloom (Thuc. 1.57.3). Suggestions that Philip did not want the throne (or at least not before allying with Athens) but just his restoration to his own realm in eastern Makedonia are problematic. They depend on the unproven assumption that after Alexander I’s death, three of his 5 sons got a part of his realm and Perdikkas annexed his brothers’ parts. Such an alleged division contradicts the Makedonian practice of the rule of one Argead and is unlikely. Philip’s eastern Makedonian ἀρχή (Thuc. 2.100.3) may have been his base of operations with his followers. The sources state that he, and later on his son Amyntas, tried for the basileia (Thuc. 2.95.2-3; Diod. 12.54.4, 6), certainly the rule over the whole Argead realm. Athens used the innerdynastic feud making Philip and his cavalry aid her against Poteidaia in 432 (Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.3). However, Philip failed in challenging his brother and may have died as an exile at the court of the Odrysian ruler Sitalkes. When Sitalkes, being in conflict with Perdikkas, invaded Makedonia in winter 429, he was accompanied by Philip’s son Amyntas who followed in his father’s footsteps by challenging Perdikkas’ rule (Thuc. 2.95.1-2, 100.3; Diod. 12.50.4-5). Diodoros states that “the Thracians” (Sitalkes and his men) bestowed the basileia on Amyntas (unfortunately, we do not learn where, how, by which legitimization, and if Makedonians were involved) and tried hard to win over the Makedonian poleis but the Makedonians ignored Sitalkes (12.50.6). This sounds like a complete failure of a would-be-ruler lacking Makedonian support. Sitalkes likely dropped him, Amyntas disappeared. After → Archelaos’ death (399), a period of instability began in which p. from different Argead branches appeared. → Aëropos II eliminated his ward, Archelaos’ son → Orestes, and ruled until he died in 395/4 (Diod. 14.37.6-7). His son and successor, → Pausanias (Diod. 14.84.6), was perhaps challenged by the shadowy → Amyntas II (Euseb. Chron. I 227; Synk. 495.12-13 Mosshammer) who may have ruled simultaneously. In 394/3, Pausanias was killed by → Amyntas III who succeeded him (Diod. 14.89.2). Reportedly, early in his reign (390s or 380s), the shadowy pretender Argaios ruled for two years while Amyntas, expelled by neighbouring forces, was in exile (Diod. 14.92.3: a legomenon). Mostly, the Illyrians or → Chalki­

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dians are seen as Argaios’ instigators. However, it is even uncertain whether Argaios (whose identity is unclear) did in fact rule. A successful pretender was → Ptolemy of Aloros. He challenged → Alexander II in 369, caused civil war-like circumstances (Plut. Pelop. 26.2-3) and had him killed shortly after. He succeeded him, probably officially as → Perdikkas III’s → epitropos (Diod. 15.71.1; 16.2.4; Plut. Pelop. 27.2). His authority and Perdikkas’ succession were threatened by the pretender Pausanias who invaded Makedonia in 368/67. He is described as an Argead (Diod. 16.2.5; Schol. ad Aischin. 2.27) who returned from exile in an unknown location with a Greek army, paved his way through the Chalkidike, had considerable support in Makedonia, and took Anthemous, Therme, and Strepsa (Aischin. 2.27). Suggestions that he was a son of Pausanias, Amyntas III’s predecessor and victim, are tempting but unprovable. The onomastic aspect is no clue: Pausanias was one of the most common Makedonian → names. When Makedonia threatened to be divided, Amyntas’ widow Eurydike hired the famous Athenian mercenary general Iphikrates who was operating before → Amphipolis. He expelled Pausanias (Aischin. 2.27-29; Nep. 11.3.2). After his accession in 360/59, Philip II had to fight more than one pretender at the same time. A certain Pausanias received Thracian support (Diod. 16.2.6). Philip bribed the Thracian ruler (Berisades or Kersobleptes) into letting Pausanias down (Diod. 16.3.4). Again, it is unclear if he was the expelled impostor or one of his relatives. The Athenians saw their chance to win Amphipolis back (garrisoned by Perdikkas III) by supporting the pretender Argaios who obviously made them promises in this respect (Diod. 16.3.3; cf. Dem. 23.121). It is unclear if he was the same pretender who had challenged Amyntas III. Athens sent her strategos Mantias to → Methone with a fleet and 3000 hoplites whom Argaios took to → Aigai. There he failed to gain accep­tance for his regal claims (Diod. 16.3.5-6). Athens also lost interest in him when Philip skilfully withdrew the Makedonian soldiers from Amphipolis. On their way back to Methone, Argaios and his troops were defeated by Philip and his army; Argaios was probably killed. It is suggested that at least one of Philip’s three half-brothers Archelaos, Menelaos, and Arrhi­daios may have challenged his rule and was therefore executed. The other two reappeared in 349/8 when Philip besieged → Olynthos that had given shelter to them (Just. 8.3.10). They will have perished when it fell. Alexander III was confronted with p. in the Achaimenid Empire after Dareios III’s death in 330. The Baktrian satrap → Bessos, probably an Achaimenid, proclaimed himself king under 438

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the throne name Artaxerxes (Arr. An. 3.25.3). Posing as Dareios’ avenger, Alexan­der pursued Bessos and had him executed in Ekbatana by high-ranking Persians (Arr. An. 4.7.3-4; Curt. 7.5.40, 10.10-11). During Alexan­der’s absence in → India, in about 327-24, the Mede Baryaxes stood up in Media. According to Arrian, he wore the kidaris upright and took the old title “King of the Persians and Medes” (An. 6.29.3). If the latter information is trustworthy (which is unclear), he may have created an artificial political link to Media’s past. The degree of his success is debated. Baryaxes and his followers were delivered to Alexander at Pasargadai by the Median satrap Atropates and executed (Arr. An. 6.29.3). Perhaps → Herakles who was reported to be the son of Alexander III and Barsine, can be regarded as the last of the p. He appeared in enbattled Makedonia in 310/9 as Polyperchon’s puppet (Diod. 20.20.1-2) who tried to use him against Kassandros.   S. Müller Cf. Heskel, J., Philip II and Argaios, in: Wallace, R.W./Harris, E.M. (eds.), Transitions to Empire, 1996, 37-56; Hylands, J.O., Alexander’s Satraps of Media, JAH 1 (2013), 119-44, esp. 129-33; Müller 2016, 145-7, 195-9, 207-8, 220-2, 224-9, 238-9, 294-6; Müller 2017, 103-10, 133-47, 155-6.

Priene, Alexander Inscriptions After defeating the Persian security forces of Anatolia at the Battle of the → Granikos in spring 334, → Alexander III took control of the Greek cities along the Aegean coast, including Priene (Arr. An. 1.18.1-2). Alexander’s influence at P. is attested by the dedicatory inscription of the new Temple of Athena Polias then being built: “King Alexander dedicated the temple to Athena Polias” (RO no. 86A). Further, a set of important documents were inscribed on the right anta and along the side wall of the cella of the temple, including a document preserving part of a rescript from A. (RO no. 86B). Sherwin-White showed that the inscription preserves only part of the original document sent by Alexander, and that it was inscribed decades after Alexander’s reign, together with two documents concerning the Diadoch ruler → Lysimachos; Thonemann corrected several readings/restorations in the text, improving our understanding of the document. Along with other documents inscribed later, the edict of P. preserved a record of decisions establishing the status and boundaries of P.: hence its importance. Like

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other Greek cities, the Prienians enjoyed freedom and self-governance conceded by Alexander, as did the Greek inhabitants of their port town Naulochon; they were exempted from royal taxation; and the boundaries of Prienian territory were set. Beyond lay territories and villages claimed by Alexander as “royal land”, whose inhabitants owed tribute to him. The inscription is thus important evidence of Alexander’s relations with Greek cities, and his exploitation of nonGreek lands and inhabitants.   R. Billows Cf. Sherwin-White, S., Ancient Archives: The Edict of Alexander to Priene, a Reappraisal, JHS 105 (1985), 69-89; Thonemann, P., Alexander, Priene, and Naulochon, in: Martzavou, P./Papazardakas, N. (eds.), Epigraphical Approaches to the Post-Classical Polis, 2012, 23-37.

primus inter pares In scholarship on Argead Makedonia, the term primus inter pares, “first among equals,” is used to describe the ruler’s traditional position in relation to his leading circles. It is generally viewed as an appropriate and helpful tool in order to illustrate the limited space of action of the Argead rulers and low hierarchies at their → court before Makedonia’s rise. In the last stage of his reign, based on his military deeds and expansion, Philip II paved the way for an elevated status of the ruler. Alexander III was able to break free from the former limitation, distancing himself structurally and visually from his leading officials. He stressed his elevated position in accordance with the increase in his political freedom of decision. Before this change, there was less difference in rank, as for example illustrated by the lack of the formal title → basileus for the ruler in Makedonian usage. Another factor was the extent of the ruler’s approachability in relation to the members of his leading circles. These influential Makedonians, called hoi protoi, “those first in rank,” or more specifically, his → hetairoi and his → philoi, were eager to preserve his status as a p. i. p. for it also defined their own political role and freedom of action. Notably, defining an Argead’s position as p. i. p. does not deny him his special status as commander-in-chief, protector of his people, religious and political head and representative of his realm, foremost landowner, and supervising owner of the Makedonian → timber trade and → mines. Neither does the concept of p. i. p. contradict an Argead’s distinguished nature due 440

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to his genealogical prestige, claim to personal excellence, predestination to rule, and divine protection.   S. Müller Cf. Hatzopoulos 1996, 267-71, 334-7, 490-1; Heinrichs/Müller 2008, 289-91; Palagia, O., The Royal Court in Ancient Macedonia: The Evidence for Royal Tombs, in: Erskine, A. et al. (eds.), The Hellenistic Court, 2017, 409-31.

proskynesis The Greek term proskynesis, literally throwing someone a kiss, refers to a ceremonial rite in order to greet the Persian king. Its exact form and symbolism are a matter of debate. The ancient literary Greek sources provide us with an external perspective, erroneously homogenizing a variety of forms under the one umbrella term, p. Probably differing depending on status, p. could include prostration, kneeling, inclining the upper part of the body, bowing and a hand gesture, and perhaps the blowing of a kiss towards the king, but this is speculative. It is generally assumed that persons of high status were supposed to perform the “light” version by bowing and those of low rank to prostrate themselves. It was a ritualized way to acknowledge the king’s superior political rank and emphasize his particular status as Ahuramazda’s chosen one on Earth, an intermediary between the spheres, hence distanced from the rest. However, the Persian king was not regarded as a god. Greeks were familiar with reports or autopsy of this rite because of diplomatic contacts and embassies to Persia. Given Makedonian relations to the Achaimenid Empire that had even been Makedonia’s sovereign in about 513-499 and 492-79, Makedonian leading circles will have known about the rite. However, in accordance with stereotypical images of the Persian king as a despot, Greek and Roman authors erroneously depicted p. as an act of worship and visible mark of the Persian servile nature. This was a cliché. The first Argead connected with p. was → Alexander III. After the victories in Asia, responding to the requirements of his expanded multicultural empire, Alexander tried to introduce p. into the protocol of his → court for all of the members of his empire, including Greeks and Makedonians. The setting was a → symposion at Baktra in 327, obviously restricted to a smaller group of high-ranking members of his entourage. Alexander probably required of the Makedonians and Greeks a slight bow

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followed by a kiss, not prostration. According to the Greek view, in the Persian culture, a kiss symbolized status and a royal kiss was an honour (Hdt. 1.134.1; Xen. Kyr. 1.4.27; cf. Arr. An. 7.11.1-2). Thus, perhaps, Alexander’s permission to kiss him as integral to the ceremony was meant to pacify potential critics. Plutarch’s statement that the participants of the rite directed their cheers to a ἑστία (hearth: Alex. 54.3-4), triggered speculations that it could be a Persian fire altar, thus an indicator of cultic associations. However, there is no proof for this. Greek sources do not associate the Persian fire with the term ἑστία (cf. Diod. 17.114.4: hieros pyr; Xen. Kyr. 8.3.12-13). Perhaps, the guests directed their toasts to an altar in order to honour Dionysos in the usual way. However, the implication of ἑστία is uncertain. There is no indication that by p. Alexander aimed at his deification. However, crucially, p. marked the difference in rank and status distancing him from his leading circles. Although the Makedonians and Greeks at his court will have been aware that p. did not mean deification, Alexander’s elaborated status might have been enough for some of them to object, for traditionally the Makedonian ruler had been a → primus inter pares. The performance of p. violated this idea of the elite’s “equality” and hence was seen as an obligation to humiliate themselves in public. In addition, they objected to occupying the same position as the vanquished Persians at court. Pragmatically, Alexander seems to have abandoned the idea of a unified greeting ceremonial after his experiment failed. In the aftermath, only the Persians still performed p. before him. The ancient evidence on the p. affair is problematic. The Greek and Roman authors misrepresented the nature of p. and Alexander’s political reasons for his attempt. As a result, he was misjudged as a megalomaniac tyrant who tried to enslave the Makedonians by forcing them to adopt a custom of the defeated that allegedly implied his veneration as a god. Alexander’s adoption of parts of Achaimenid attire is depicted as having triggered his attempted introduction of p. (Plut. Alex. 45.2; 65.3-4), while in fact, there were roughly three years between these two steps. Being Alexander’s “master of ceremony” (εἰσαγγελεύς), → Chares of Mytilene is widely regarded as an eyewitness of the incident. However, he cannot be blamed for having accused his ruler of tyranny, enslavement, and wishes for deification. The fragments of his work show that he idealized Alexander and dealt with him in an apologetic manner. Consequently, in his version of the p. scene, Chares did not depict Alexander as a strict despot but focused on the role of → Kallisthenes, whom he portrayed as a rude troublemaker. According 442

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to Chares (BNJ 125 F 14a-b), he tried to trick Alexander, sidestepped the p. but claimed a kiss. When he was uncovered, he even insulted Alexander with an impudent, tactless comment. Styling Kallisthenes as a subversive opponent to Alexander’s court policy, Chares seems to have followed the official version justifying why Kallisthenes was eliminated soon after. Arrian knows a variant in which Kallisthenes debated with his fellow philosopher Anaxarchos whether the introduction of p. as a Persian custom was appropriate at Alexander’s court (An. 4.10.5-11.9, cf. Curt. 8.5.6-20: Kleon of Sicily instead of Anaxarchos) arguing that it was unsuitable for Alexander, a descendant of Herakles. Greek clichés on Achaimenid despotism culminate in this episode, probably a later interpolation styling Kallisthenes as a philosophical martyr in the fight for freedom against tyranny. In fact, there must have been substantially more objection to the ceremonial innovation than just a disgruntled Kallisthenes to make Alexander abandon it. Ironically, Kallisthenes himself had hinted at the rite of p. in his Praxeis Alexandrou. He wrote that the sea at the Pamphylian coast took a bow to let Alexander pass by (BNJ 124 F 31), thereby borrowing the theme of the element of water acknowledging the future king of Persia by performing p. from Xenophon (An. 1.4.18: the Euphrates did p. before Kyros the Younger). According to Plutarch’s unique claim, → Hephaistion arranged the introduction of p. (Alex. 55.1-2). This might not have come from Chares. Perhaps Plutarch, whose Life of Alexander owed a lot to Xenophon’s → Kyrou­ paideia, gave his Alexander his own Pheraulas, Kyros’ trusted utility man who owed his career entirely to him (as Plutarch’s Hephaistion did to Alexander: Alex. 47.5-6; Mor. 337A) and helped him to introduce p. along with his new royal attire (Xen. Kyr. 8.3.1-14). However, Plutarch’s “Makedonian Pheraulas” seems to have been a depraved version who, in another unique scene, slandered Kallisthenes whom he blamed for the failure of the introduction of p. (Alex. 55.1). Apart from all literary artifice, Alexander wanted to introduce p. to unify the greeting ceremonial at his court, but met enough disapproval because of the implicated hierarchical downgrading of his elite that he dropped the plan.   S. Müller Cf. Bickerman, E., À propos d’un passage de Charès de Mytilène, PP 18 (1963), 241-55; Bowden, H., On Kissing and Making Up: Court Protocol and Historiography in Alexander the Great’s ‘Experiment with Proskynesis’, BICS 56 (2013), 55-77; Briant 2010, 123-6; Müller 2015; Strootman 2014, 193-4.

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proxenia proxenia was an institutionalized, reciprocal relationship in which mostly elite men hosted, helped, and rendered different services in their native land to foreign communities and their representatives. The connection could be hereditary and included an exchange of material and symbolic rewards. Often, a ruler or a state granted a foreigner the honour of p. in return of benefits, done or expected. The Argeads were recipients of such honours. → Athens made → Alexander I (Hdt. 8.136, 140b), → Archelaos (IG I3 117), and even the king of Makedonian Pelagonia (IG II2 190) its proxenoi, probably in return, or in anticipation of, military aid and Makedonian → timber. Other Greeks such as Delphi (e.g. Syll.3 267B), the Boiotian League (SEG 34.355) or Oropos (IG VII 4250), honoured individuals from different Makedonian localities as proxenoi and benefactors (a common honourary combination). We hear far less about Makedonians granting p. to others, but this could be due to deficient evidence and the Argead kings’ preference for guest-friendship (xenia) in creating foreign ties. Through a network of p., and even more guest-friends, Makedonians and Greeks enhanced their personal or collective interests at home and abroad. P. and xenia might include mutual affections and respect, but their quid pro quo aspect problematized the relationship. Foreign friendship gained the Makedonian king influence abroad, and his friends high social status and royal gifts that could be substantial. Rightly or wrongly, the benefits were presented as corrupting influence that ran counter to public interest. In democratic Athens, leaders were charged that their friendship with Alexander I (Plut. Kimon 14), or Philip II and Alexander III (Dem. 18.51-52; 19.139-142, 259-265) was motivated by greed and elitist attitudes and that they harmed their country for personal gains.   J. Roisman Cf. Mack, W., Proxeny and Polis, 2015; Marek, C., Die Proxenie, 1984; Tataki, A.B., Mace­ donians Abroad, 1998.

Pseudo-Kallisthenes The anonymous author of the late antique Greek Alexander Romance is called Pseudo-Kallisthenes since manuscripts erroneously attributed it to → Alexander III’s court historiographer → Kallisthenes. The 3rd-c. AD-Alexander Romance 444

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was written in Egypt, probably → Alexandreia. It is a colourful, mostly fictitious mixture of multiple genres (periplous, epistle, historiography, novel, biography, ethnography, philosophical dialogue, ekphrasis) from different times and traditions. Marking the peak of the fictionalization of Alexander, the adventure story includes features of a coming of age novel: the hero has to keep on travelling through the world, heroically fighting “barbarians” and marvellous creatures in an imaginary East until he refrains from striving for superhuman goals and immortality. In the end, a chastened Alexander is posthumously transported to the higher spheres. The Alexander Romance neglects chronology and geo­ graphy and includes several unhistorical “reinventions”: Alexander is the son of Nektanebos II, the last indigenous Egyptian pharaoh who seduces → Olympias in the disguise of Zeus-Ammon; → Rhoxane is Dareios III’s daughter; Alexander conquers Rome, Sicily, and Carthage and wants to free Makedonia from Persian phoros. Egypt appears as the centre of the mental landscape where the story begins (Ps.-Kall. 1.1-7: Nektanebos’ flight) and ends (Ps.-Kall. 1.34: Ptolemy will bring Alexander’s body to Egypt). Uniquely, the Alexander Romance mentions Alexan­ der’s Egyptian enthronement in Memphis (Ps.-Kall. 1.34.1-2). Its historicity is debated. Due to its numerous translations and different recensions (α, β and its variant λ, ε, γ, and probably the lost δ), the Alexander Romance became the most popular ancient tradition on Alexander in Medieval reception.   S. Müller Cf. Jouanno, C., Naissance et métamorphose du roman d’Alexandre, 2002; Koulakiotis, E., Genese und Metamorphosen des Alexandermythos …, 2006, 189-233; Nawotka, K., The Alexander Romance by Pseudo-Callisthenes, 2017; Stoneman 2008.

Ptolemy of Aloros Coming from the Lower Makedonian city Aloros, Ptolemy was called Alorites (Diod. 15.71.1). According to Trogus-Justin, P. married Eurynoë, the daughter of → Amyntas III and Eurydike (7.4.5, 7). Despite occasional doubts, this information is generally taken as valid. Granted this, P. enjoyed a remarkable closeness to the ruler defining his rank at the court. It is unknown whether P. was an Argead by birth but his later career as an → epitropos ruling Makedonia may indicate so: rule over Makedonia was traditionally linked with born Argeads, not with those by marriage. P. might have come from another Argead branch.

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While Diodoros calls him a “son of Amyntas” (15.71.1), the assumption that P.’s father was the shadowy → Amyntas II is speculative. Amyntou might refer to P.’s father-in-law Amyntas III or to a namesake. Amyntas was a common name in Makedonia. The same is true for the name P. Hence, the Makedonian envoy called Ptolemy appearing in the treaty of alliance between Amyntas III and → Athens dated in the 370s (IG³ 157; Tod no. 129, l. 7) may be P. or a namesake. P. did not seem to have challenged the succession of Amyntas’ eldest son → Alexander II in 370/69. However, shortly after, when the young ruler’s initially successful expansive campaign in → Thessaly was sabotaged by → Thebes, Greece’s new hegemonic power, that pursued its own interests in Thessaly and forced Alexander to come back empty-handed (Diod. 15.67.4), P. stood up as a rival to his authority. Taking advantage of the major setback that surely damaged Alexander’s standing in Makedonia, P. rallied his supporters against him and offered himself as an alternative. Divided by the feud, Makedonia suffered from civil war-like circumstances (Plut. Pelop. 26.2-3). Both parties had the bad idea to turn to the Thebans for mediation, who in turn sent Pelopidas. He took advantage of the inner-Makedonian conflicts and established Theban influence over Makedonia. While reconciling the brothers-in-law, he made sure that the settlement kept Makedonia internally weak. There is no report on his negotiations and arrangements with P., but the outcome apparently favoured the latter for Pelopidas did even more damage to Alexander II’s standing. Forced to become Thebes’ ally, as a pledge of his goodwill, Alexander had to hand over 30 sons from influential Makedonian families and his own teenage brother Philip as hostages that Pelopidas took to Thebes (Diod. 15.67.4; Just. 7.5.2; Plut. Pelop. 26.4). In 369/8, P. conspired against Alexander and arranged his assassination (Diod. 15.71.1; 16.2.4; Plut. Pelop. 27.2). According to → Marsyas of Pella, spectacularly, it took place during a weapon dance, telesias (BNJ 135-136 F 11), hence at a → symposion. → Demosthenes mentions that one of the men who committed the murder was a certain Apollophanes of Pydna (19.194-195). Thereafter, P. took the rule (Diod. 15.77.5), according to → Aischines (2.29) as an epitropos, thus on behalf of his victim’s minor brother → Perdikkas III (cf. Plut. Pelop. 27.2). No coins minted in his name are known. Biased reports claim that P.’s mother-inlaw Eurydike engineered P.’s usurpation and was his lover (Just. 7.5.4-5), or even married him (Schol. ad Aischin. 2.29). No other source apart from the scholiast mentions this alleged marriage. The information’s validity is debated. Referring to these events roughly 20 years later, the near-contemporary Aischines did not 446

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mention that Eurydike was P.’s wife. In addition, it is unclear what became of Eurynoë, P.’s actual wife. Also the claim that Eurydike had an affair with P., her own son-in-law, sounds like slander. The topos of the scheming lecherous royal widow meddling in dynastic policies and supporting her lover is a frequent theme in Greek and Roman sources and has to be viewed with great caution. Similarly, the accusation that Eurydike was responsible for her son Alexander’s assassination is incredible. On the contrary, she may have accepted P.’s takeover only for the sake of her surviving sons and their ruling rights. Perhaps, P. put her under pressure by threatening her sons’ security and future. Aischines retro­ spectively states that Eurydike and her sons “had been betrayed by those who professed to be their friends” (2.26-27), perhaps referring to P. and his faction. The loyalties of the members of the court may have been divided. At some point, Eurydike and her supporters perhaps even pursued their own agenda different from P.’s policy. When the impostor Pausanias invaded Makedonia in 368/67, she revived her dead husband’s connections to the Athenian mercenary general Iphi­ krates appealing to him for help (Aischin. 2.27-29; Nep. 11.3.2) while he tried to reestablish Athenian control over → Amphipolis (Dem. 23.149-150). At about the same time, P. was allied with Athens’ rival Thebes and opposed the Athenian efforts regarding Amphipolis (Aischin. 2.29). Iphikrates was hired, and expelled the pretender. While the evidence solely focuses on Eurydike’s interaction with Iphikrates, P. must have been informed and involved. He will have approved of this step or, at least, he did not interfere; Pausanias also threatened P.’s position, and the pretender’s expulsion suited his interests. However, if the Athenians had hoped that Iphikrates’ helping hand would increase Athens’ influence in Makedonia and change P.’s attitude towards Athens’ claims to Amphipolis, they were mistaken. On the contrary, comparable to the short reign of Alexander II, P.’s regency was overshadowed by the Theban supremacy. In about 367, Thebes used inner-Makedonian feuds between the former friends of Alexander II and P.’s supporters to interfere, putting P. under pressure. According to Plutarch (Pelop. 27.2), when P.’s opponents called for Theban help, Pelopidas marched into Makedonia and P. was able to bribe Pelopidas’ mercenaries into deserting him. However, P. did not use this advantage. Strongly biased by his admiration for his fellow Boiotian Pelopidas, Plutarch states that P. was in so much fear of Pelopidas’ name and reputation that he came to him as a supplicant—although he had lured Pelopidas’ mercenaries away from him before. However, given Thebes’ superiority, despite this minor success, P. had hardly any choice other

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than to accept an alliance, promise that he would save the rule for Alexander II’s brothers, and give his son Philoxenos along with 50 hetairoi as hostages to Pelopidas, who sent them to Thebes (Plut. Pelop. 27.3-4). Comparable to the lethal consequences of Thebes’ treatment of Alexander II, this time, it will have been a decisive blow to P.’s authority. The leading Makedonian families affected by the Theban demand for hostages will have taken appropriate steps. Obviously, there was a shift in loyalties again: decisive groups of influential Makedonians turned to the faction of Eurydike and her son Perdikkas III. In consequence, in 365, when Perdikkas came of age, he had P. murdered (Diod. 15.77.5; 16.2.4). As Perdikkas and his supporters will have justified this assassination as a necessity, P. was not remembered well in the collective Makedonian memory. In 343, when Aischines records what he said to Philip II in 346 when he was trying to win him over to the Athenian cause, his brief sketch of Argead history involving P. (2.2629) is thought to suit Philip’s own attitude. Judging from Aischines’ testimony, in his afterlife, P. was probably marginalized, obscured, and treated unfavourably. Nothing more is heard of his son Philoxenos.   S. Müller Cf. Carney 2000, 39-43; Carney 2019, 58-75; Georgiadou, A., Plutarch’s Pelopidas: A Historical and Philological Commentary, 1997, 197-8; Müller 2016, 224-9; Roisman 2010, 162-3.

Ptolemy, son of Lagos Ptolemy, son of Lagos, from Eordaia (Arr. An. 6.28.4; Arr. Ind. 18.5; Pos. Ep. 88 AB, l. 4), was a general of → Alexander III, member of his inner circle, and one of his elite bodyguards. P. founded the Ptolemaic Empire in → Egypt that survived the longest of all Hellenistic monarchies. P. was also the author of a history of Alexander’s wars. It is preserved only in fragments (BNJ 138), in particular cited by Arrian who regarded P. as a trustworthy source—however, premised upon the infamous statement that it would be dishonourable for a king to tell lies (An. pr. 1-2). Its title, length, and date of composition are unknown. Given its political value and propagandistic traits, it is discussed whether he wrote it early in his reign (in order to legitimize his position in the wars of the Diadochoi) or late in his life (in order to legitimize his successor’s position). The claim that P.’s mother Arsinoë was a member of a lesser branch of the Argeads, descending 448

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paternally from → Amyntas I (Satyr., BNJ 631 F 1: her great-grandfather) is later propaganda dating either to the wars of the Diadochoi or the reign of one of P.’s successors. The rumor that P. was an illegitimate son of → Philip II, thus Alexander’s half-brother (Paus. 1.6.2; Curt. 9.8.22.), is likewise propagandistic fiction. Forging a genealogical tie to the Argeads served to enhance the prestige of the Ptolemies. Since P. called himself “son of Lagos” (e.g., BNJ 138 T 1-2, F 2-3, F 11, F 13; I.Milet 244) and named his eldest son Lagos after his grandfather (Athen. 13.576E; a winner in the Lykaia, probably in 308, with a couple of horses: IG V 2, 550.8-9: ΣΥΝΩΡΙΔΙ ΛΑΓΟΣ ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΙΟΥ ΜΑΚΕΔΩΝ), it is mostly believed that the claim to be Philip’s son was invented after P.’s death. The Suda (s.v. Lagos λ 25 Adler) provides an embellished version that conforms with popular motifs of ascension stories: P. was exposed as a baby on a bronze shield (a sign of his predestination to be a tough warrior) by Lagos when he learned that he was not the biological father. The baby was miraculously saved by Zeus’ animal, an → eagle that sheltered P. from the rain and sun with its spread wings and fed it with the blood of quails. The legend implies that Zeus (the origin of kingdom) was P.’s foster-father; its date of composition is debated. P. is generally believed to have been Alexander’s coeval and boyhood friend, who grew up and was educated with him; the information by [Luc.] Makrob. 12 that P. was 10 years older than Alexander is mostly doubted. Plutarch names P. among Alexan­ der’s friends who were banished in 337 by Philip for their role as bad advisers in the so-called Pixodaros affair (Alex. 10.3). However, Plutarch is the only source for this alleged affair and his report is of dubious authenticity. Arrian, probably not drawing on P., mentions P.’s exile “because he was loyal to Alexander” (An. 3.6.5) but keeps the background (conflicts between father and son after Philip’s 7th marriage) to a minimum. Thus, it is difficult to assess what happened. In any case, P. seems to have been with Alexander in 335 when the newly acclaimed ruler led a campaign against the → Triballians and Illyrians and hurried to Greece to quench the Theban revolt. P. wrote about these wars, maybe with firsthand knowledge (BNJ 138 F 1-3). P. accompanied Alexander on the Persian campaign from its beginnings in 334. An inscription from Didyma lists personal names of dedicators, among them ΠΤΟΛΕΜΑΙΟΣ ΛΑ{Α}ΓΟΥ ΜΑΚΕΔΩΝ (Bringmann/v. Steuben no. 273, dated to 334). His girlfriend and perhaps later wife (Athen. 13.576E), the Athenian Thaïs, characterized as an hetaira by our sources, may have been with him. She bore him a daughter, Eirene, and two sons, Lagos and Leontiskos (“the little lion”). P. acknowledged the chil-

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dren. In 332/1, in all likelihood, P. participated in the Egyptian campaign and the march through the Libyan desert. In his historiography, he drew on → Kallisthenes depicting the march (in fact along the caravan road network) as a dangerous challenge only mastered with divine help (Strab. 17.1.43). While Kallisthenes portrayed two crows as guides to → Siwa, P. spoke of two snakes (BNJ 138, F 8). In scholarship, they are variously associated with the symbols of Upper and Lower Egypt, the uraeus snake, or Agathon daimon and Agathe tyche. P.’s version that the Makedonians took the direct route (through the oases) back to Memphis (F 9) may be confirmed by a dedication by Alexander in the Oasis Bahariya. Apparently, during the early stage of the Persian campaign (until 330) P. had only minor, dependent commands. Arrian’s report that in 331, at the Persian Gates, P. led some 3000 infantry to guard a route (An. 3.18.9) is not confirmed by other sources. Arrian likely cites P.’s own account in which he casts himself in the important role that was actually played by → Philotas. P. does not seem to have held any important command before the elimination of the foremost generals Philotas and → Parmenion in autumn 330 that initiated a major change in the personnel structure of the Makedonian army and enabled P.’s rise. As one of Alexander’s “new men,” he became increasingly visible as an independent commander. Philotas’ fall also involved the deposal of his philos Deme­ trios as one of the 7 elite → somatophylakes; P. was given his position (Arr. An. 3.27.5). The claim that P. was Alexander’s edeatros, the taster of the royal food (Chares, BNJ 126 F 1 ap. Athen. 4.171B-C), is not confirmed by the fragments of P.’s work and likely based on the erroneous addition ‘Soter’ by Athenaios or his intermediary source in order to identify the man → Chares only called Ptolemy (a common name in 4th c. Makedonia). P. was too important for Alexan­ der to be given this risky court office. According to his own account, in 329, P. played a major role in seizing → Bessos, the Baktrian satrap and counter-king who had been betrayed and delivered by former collaborators such as Spitamenes. P. claims that they changed their minds and he had to take Bessos by military pressure and diplomatic skills (BNJ 138, F 14; but cf. Aristob., BNJ 139 F 24; Curt. 7.5.19-26, 36-38; Diod. 17.83.7-9). However, the story is generally believed to be self-glorifying embellishment. P. was involved in the fight against the ongoing → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt under Spitamenes and his supporters in 328. P.’s career under Alexander intensified and seems to have reached its peak in the Indian campaign. According to a legend (not related by P. himself; likely a later Ptolemaic tradition), P. was wounded at Harmatelia, nearly died of the 450

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snake poison the enemies smeared on their weapons and was saved by Alexander who personally watched over him and dreamt of the antidote (Curt. 9.8.2228; Strab. 15.7.2). In Diodoros’ version (17.103.6-8), Alexander even acted as the wonder-working healer himself: an embodiment of the divinely inspired ruler who cares for his predestined successor. In 325, on the return from → India, P. likely accompanied Alexander on the march through the → Gedrosian desert. In 324 at Sousa, he was awarded a golden stephanos for his achievements, along with his fellow elite somatophylakes and other generals (Arr. An. 7.5.6). At the mass marriages, he was given a Persian bride, even of Achaimenid descent: Artakama, one of the daughters of Artabazos, the former satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. An. 7.4.6). It is uncertain what became of Artakama since nothing more is heard of her; there is no record that they had children. P. may have repudiated her after Alexander’s death (before he entered his satrapy Egypt where Persians were traditionally unpopular) or just kept her in the shadow. In 324/3, P. assisted Alexander in his winter campaign against the Kossaians (Arr. An. 7.15.1-3). When Alexander died in the summer of 323, P. was in an influential position and took a stand in the debate on Alexander’s legacy and the future of the empire. He is reported to have rejected the legitimacy of → Arrhidaios and Alexander’s “half-barbarian” offspring while proposing a regime of the leading generals (Just. 13.2.11-12; Curt. 10.6.13-16). However, his speech is of uncertain authenticity. In the end, Arrhidaios and → Alexander IV were acclaimed but their rule was only formal: the leading generals used them as their puppets. When the satrapies were distributed in → Babylon, P. was given Egypt, the adjoining portion of Arabia, and Libya (Curt. 10.10.1; Diod. 18.3.1; Just. 13.4.10). → Kleomenes of Naukratis was assigned as his hyparchos (Arr. Succ. F. 1.5) but soon after his arrival in Egypt, P. did away with him (Paus. 1.6.3). Probably he suspected him to be → Perdikkas’ agent. In 322/1, following Alexander’s example, P. took control over the fertile, rich Kyrenaika, a granary (Diod. 18.21.6-9; Austin 2006, no. 29). Later on (in 300), he entrusted the government of this geo-strategic key possession to his step-son Magas (Paus. 1.6.8, 7.1). In 322, as a major coup, in Syria, P. robbed Alexander’s mummy on its way to Aigai where Perdikkas intended to bury it (Diod. 18.28.2-3). By laying the corpse (an imperial key token) to rest in Egypt, P. adapted the duty of his legitimate successor and gave his satrapy the significance of being the ideological core of the Makedonian world. Temporarily, Alexander seems to have been buried in Memphis (Paus. 1.6.3; Curt. 10.10.20) and later on in → Alexandreia when the city was

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no building site anymore (Diod. 18.28.3-4; Strab. 17.1.6; P. moved to his new capital some time before 311: CCG 22182). Perdikkas reacted to P.’s provocation by invading Egypt but was outmaneuvered and defeated by a well prepared P. at Kamelon Teichos and due to his failure killed by his own men (Diod. 18.33-36; Just. 13.8.10). The new settlement made at Triparadeisos (321/20) confirmed P.’s territorial possessions (Arr. Succ. F 1.34; Diod. 18.39.5). Since → Antipatros had become the new regent, P. followed the trend among the Successors to ally with him: he married Antipatros’ daughter Eurydike who bore him at least four children, among them the later short-lived Makedonian king Ptolemy Keraunos. Eurydike’s relative Berenike accompanied her to Egypt. She also became P.’s wife and the mother of his successor Ptolemy II (and the latter’s sister-wife Arsinoë II). In the following wars of the Successors, P. mainly waged war against → Antigonos and → Demetrios, siding with their rivals. Aiming at expanding his (satrapal) realm when he saw the chance, P. was not content to rule only Egypt. He fought for Koile-Syria (Syria and Phoinikia), established spheres of influence in the Aegean, and led an unsuccessful Greek campaign in 308 (Diod. 20.37.1-2). The assassination of Alexander IV on the instigation of → Kassandros in 310 freed P. and the other Diadochoi from this Argead relict (Diod. 19.105.3-4) and enabled them to redefine their political roles and treatment of the Argead past. Alexander’s positive commemoration was crucial to P.’s legitimization, representation, and Alexandreia’s public image; there P. established a cult for Alexander who was also separately honoured as the city’s ktistes. Alexander’s portrait with the elephant scalp appeared on the obverse of early tetradrachms of P.’s satrapal coins. In his historiography, P. glorified Alexander as a god-sent (but not divine) ideal warrior king subjugating foreign people rather than imitating foreign traditions, thus strategically neglecting his adoption of Achaimenid traditions. Since P.’s participation in Alexander’s wars were at the heart of his → legitimization, he depicts himself as his most capable right-hand man, embellishing and exaggerating his own role, e.g. in informing Alexander about Hermolaos’ conspiracy (Arr. An. 4.13.7; cf. Curt. 8.6.22) or in taking the Aornos (Arr. An. 4.29.1-6). Another example of P.’s self-promotion is his account of his heroic single combat against an Indian hipparchos (Arr. An. 4.23.3-4). Curtius is right that P. did not tend to depreciate his own glory (9.5.21). However, he tends to depict → Lysimachos, Antigonos, and → Seleukos as nearly not present, and Perdikkas as incapable and insubordinate (Arr. An. 1.8.1, 21.1-3). Receiving special treatment, → Hephaistion, apparently a close friend of P.’s, was portrayed 452

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as competent and loyal (e.g. Arr. An. 4.22.7; 4.28.5; 5.3.5). In problematic situations, according to P.’s version, they both seem to have been absent, e.g. in the town of the → Malloi where Alexander nearly lost his life. P. blames Perdikkas for the disastrous siege (Arr. An. 6.6.4-6, 9.1-2) while denying his own participation (Arr. An. 6.11.8, in contradiction to other sources: Curt. 9.5.21). How­ever, while he may have been present but chose to conceal that in order to avoid the impression that he had failed to do his job as Alexander’s somatophylax, the tradition that he was called ‘Soter’ for protecting the wounded Alexander is false. P. received this epithet by the grateful Rhodians for his help in 305/4 against Demetrios Poliorketes (Diod. 20.100.3-4; Paus. 1.8.6). After P.’s death, “Soter” as his cult name rose to particular prominence, when Ptolemy II installed a cult for his parents as Theoi Soteres, Saviour Gods (Theokr. 17.121-29).   S. Müller Cf. Heckel 2016, 230-9; Lorber 2018, I 1, 24-59; Müller, S., Poseidippos, Ptolemy, and Alexander, in: Nawotka, K./Wojciechowska, A. (eds.), Alexander and the East, 2016, 179-92; Wirth, G., Ptolemaios I. Soter, RE 23.2 (1959), 1603-45, 2467-84; Worthington, I., Ptolemy I. King and Pharaoh of Egypt, 2016.

Pydna Pydna (originally Kydna, mod. Makriyalos) was a Makedonian city as archaeological evidence and → Thucydides’ description of the escape of Themistokles (1.132.1) reveal. P. was a neighbour of → Methone (to the north) and → Dion (to the south). The city was besieged unsuccessfully by the Athenians in 432; after making an agreement with → Perdikkas II, they crossed from there to Brea (Thuc. 1.61). Problems with → Archelaos led to a long siege by the king (Diod. 13.49.2), capitulation and transfer of the inhabitants a few kilometers inland (mod. Kitros?). The population went back to the old site early in the reign of → Amyntas III, who was worshipped as oikistes of the city (Schol. 1.41a ad Dem. 1.5: Amyntaion). P. provided help to the king during the Spartan/Olynthian War and issued bronze coins with his types and the city’s ethnic. In 363, P. was besieged and captured by Timotheos, who might have established an Athenian garrison, as numismatic evidence shows (Dein. 1.14; Diod. 15.81.6). Ps.-Skylax mentioned the city as polis hellenis (66). P. received theoroi of Asklepios during the reign of → Perdikkas III (IG IV2 1, 94 B 7) and was besieged and captured

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by → Philip II in 357 (Dem. 1.9; Diod. 16.8.3). It was at the local sanctuary of Athena that the treaty between → Athens and → Alexander III concerning participation in his campaigns was to be erected (IG II2 329 = II3 443 l.13). → Olympias was besieged in P. by → Kassandros, executed against the terms of capitulation in 317 (Diod. 19.51; Polyain. 4.11.3), and buried separately from the rest of the royal family at P. (SEG 32.644). Pydnaian ships were captured by → Demetrios’ general Medios in 313 (Diod. 19.69.3).   S. Psoma Cf. Hatzopoulos/Paschidis 2004.

Pyrrhos King of → Epeiros (306-272), son of Aiakides, and thus a kinsman of → Olympias and → Alexander III (Plut. Pyrrh. 1.4; cf. Just. 17.3.14). Born in 319/8, he narrowly escaped from Epeiros when his father was driven from power in 317/6; P. took refuge with Glaukias, king of the Illyrians (Just. 17.3.19-20), who helped restore P. to his ancestral throne in 306, despite an offer of 200 talents from → Kassandros to give the boy up (Plut. Pyrrh. 3.3; cf. Paus. 1.11.5). P. ruled Epeiros until 302/1, when the Epeirotes expelled him in favour of Neoptolemos II (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.1). P. attached himself to → Demetrios Poliorketes (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.2), and accompanied him to Ipsos (301), where he fought with distinction.   W. Heckel Cf. Champion, J., Pyrrhus of Epirus, 2009; Garoufalias, P., Pyrrhos, 1979.

Reception of the Argeads, in western art The Argeads’ reception in western Art from medieval to present times is focused on → Alexander III, the most famous ancient Makedonian, and selected members of his family, in particular → Olympias, → Philip II, and → Rhoxane. The major sources of the medieval and early modern r. were the Latin translation of the Greek Alexander Romance and Curtius’ History of Alexander. The illustrations of medieval western manuscripts of Alexander romances mirror the illustrators’ respective cultural and socio-political background. Alexander appears mostly as a king with his knights in a courtly setting where he could act gallantly regarding 454

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Minne (courtly love) or join his own Round Table. As for the prominent theme of Olympias’ conception of Alexander by the Egyptian trickster Nektanebos II in the disguise of Zeus-Ammon (Ps.-Kall. 1.2.4-1.7.7), the idea of a siring snake (drakon) was adopted and the snake sometimes transformed into a dragon. There are three different approaches to the subject in the medieval illustrations: Nektanebos is either portrayed in human or in serpent form, or a dragon perches at the foot of the bed where Olympias and the pharaoh embrace each other. Medieval illustrations of scenes from Alexander’s Asian campaign sometimes show bloody battle depictions and, in particular concerning the Indian campaign, fantastic creatures, fights of the Makedonians against dragons or other monsters, or war elephants, often carrying towers with warriors inside on their back. There were two major themes inspired by the Greek Alexander Romance in medieval art: Alexander’s aerial flight in a chariot, borne by huge birds (Ps.-Kall. 2.41.8-13) later on transformed into gryphons, and an undersea expedition in a diving bell (Ps.-Kall. 2.38.7). The latter gave some illustrators the chance to show their skills in drawing different kinds of fish. As a prominent moral example of superbia, images of the celestial journey also appeared in Western sacral art such as on a capital in the Basel Minster (12th c.). Forming part of the Nine Worthies, Alexander was also depicted among them (for example in the 14th c. sculpture in the Hansasaal of the Cologne town hall). Against the background of the wars against the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Time, Alexander became a symbol of the western triumph over the East and role model for European nobles fighting against the Turks. For example, Andrea del Verrocchio’s lost bronze reliefs of Alexander and Dareios III were said to have been commissioned by Lorenzo de Medici in about 1480 as gifts for Matthias I Corvinus of Hungary. The latter was engaged in fights against the Turks and reportedly compared to Alexander by his contemporaries. Another example of a reflection of the Turkish menace in depictions of Alexander’s battles against the Persians is provided by Albrecht Altdorfer’s Alexanderschlacht (1528-29) commissioned by the Bavarian duke Wilhelm IV. While the scene is identified as the battle of → Issos, the ancient event is transferred to a dimension of universal history and stylized as a war between East and West. The contemporary colouring is also provided by the clothing of the Persians and the tents in Dareios’ camp reflecting Turkish tents of Altdorfer’s time. Besides the aspect of defeating the East, the other central element of Alexander’s r. in Renaissance and Baroque art was his idealization as an example of clemency, modesty, and magnanimity in victory. His gentle

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and courtly attitude towards captured women is one of the crucial motifs in European art. The most illustrious example is Alexander’s noble treatment of the captured female family members of Dareios III based on the unhistorical scene of his and → Hephaistion’s visit to the tent of the Achaimenid family after Issos. Depictions focus on the iconic scene when Dareios’ mother Sisygambis mistook Hephaistion for Alexander, did obeisance to him and was generously forgiven by Alexander who acknowledged Hephaistion as his significant other stating that he also was Alexander (Curt. 3.12.12-17). For example, it was represented by Giovanni Antonio Bazzi called Il Sodoma (ca. 1516), Paolo Veronese (ca. 1570) or Charles LeBrun (ca. 1661/62), the premier peintre du Roi, Louis XIV, who chose Alexander as his heroic role model. Interestingly, Hephaistion as Alexander’s Second Self was mostly depicted as his lookalike, like his monozygotic twin. While according to the ancient sources, Sisygambis mistook Hephaistion for the ruler because he was taller (Curt. 3.12.16) or also more handsome than Alexander (Diod. 17.37.5), in any case more eye-catching, the European artists focused on the theme of the Second Self interpreting it as being his spitting image. The predominant Alexander type in European Renaissance and Baroque art showed him as a beardless youth with blonde corkscrew curls, soft facial features, and Korinthian helmet with a fluffy crest. Notably, it is rooted in a misunderstanding of how to interpret ancient coins. In fact, the image is based on the portrait of Athena on the obverse of Alexander’s gold staters with ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ, (coin) of Alexander, inscribed on the reverse. In accordance with their own visual habits, Renaissance intellectuals thought the portrait corresponded with the name, and thus mistook Athena for Alexander. It is suggested that the merchant and antiquarian Cyriacus of Ancona (15th c.), reputed to be an expert on antiquity, was responsible for the error. In 1719, in his Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture, the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Du Bos raised awareness of that error critically commenting on the feminine appearance of Charles LeBrun’s portrait of Alexander in The Family of Dareios before Alexander. However, the long-haired Alexander-Athena type continued to be an integral part of his r. in art. There were also attempts to play with his iconic heroic images. In the late 19th c., ridiculing the idealization of antiquity in his time, Honoré Daumier deconstructs the heroic status of several ancient celebrities in a lithographic series showing them as unheroic, fallible human beings. Exemplarily, one of his lithographs shows a fat, snobbish Alexander dressed in splendid rococo clothes looking stupid when meeting Diogenes (who smokes an anachronistic pipe, Daumier’s symbol of petty 456

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bourgeois idleness) and being confronted with the philosopher’s disregard of his royal position. Regarding public monuments, Alexander is often depicted in a heroic fashion with his horse → Boukephalos. For example, John Steell’s bronze sculpture in Edinburgh shows Alexander’s taming of Boukephalos (1883). Evangelos Moustakas’ statue in Thessaloniki depicts Alexander riding the horse while holding his sword (1974). In 1982, Andy Warhol created a serial portrait of Alexander for the exhibition The Search for Alexander. It formed part of his serial portraits of other celebrities from the past such as Friedrich II of Prussia or Lenin. Warhol chose a Hellenistic portrait of Alexander displaying attributes such as anastole, slightly twisted neck, and long curls as central elements of his artificial image(s) in the r., and reinforced the iconic character by duplicating it. In the end, nothing was left but the image—an appropriate summary of the phenomenon of Alexander’s r.   S. Müller Cf. Cohen, A., The Artist as Art Historian, in: Moore 2018, 754-94; Hadjinicolaou, N. (ed.), Alexander the Great in European Art, 1997; Müller, S., Andy Warhols Alexander the Great, in: Leonhard, K./Horstkotte, S. (eds.), Lesen ist wie Sehen, 2006, 101-18; Noll, T., Alexander der Große in der nachantiken bildenden Kunst, 2005; Schmidt, V.M., A Legend and its Image. The Aerial Flight of Alexander the Great in Medieval Art, 1995.

Rhoxane In 327, during the course of Alexander III’s effort to put down the → Baktrian-Sogdian revolt, he captured and then married Rhoxane, the daughter of Oxyartes, a Baktrian noble. Oxyartes surrendered. Though ancient sources claim Alexander married for love (Arr. An. 4.19.5; Plut. Alex. 47.4; Plut. Mor. 332C; 338D; Curt. 8.4.24-26), help in ending the rebellion was the more likely motivation. R. was in Babylon when Alexander died there in 323, 6 or 8 months pregnant (Curt. 10.6.9; Just. 13.2.5). → Perdikkas, who had succeeded in becoming regent, persuaded the Makedonians to make R.’s child co-king as → Alexander IV, with Philip → Arrhidaios. Plutarch (Alex. 77.4) asserts that R. had Alexander’s Achaimenid wife Stateira and her sister killed, out of jealousy. R. and her son were in the control of a series of regents; → Antipatros brought them to Makedonia (Diod. 18.39.7) and, after Antipatros’ death, the new regent → Polyperchon invited Olympias to take charge of the child king; Olympias thus eclipsed R.’s role. Thanks to the efforts of

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Polyperchon and Olympias, Alexander IV’s co-king and his wife were defeated and killed, making Alexander IV sole ruler (Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.8-10), but → Kassandros soon defeated and killed Olympias and imprisoned Alexander IV and R. ca. 316, though he waited until ca. 310 to kill them (Diod. 19.52.1-5, 105.2-4; Just. 15.2.5; Paus. 9.7.2).   E.D. Carney Cf. Harders, A.-C., Königinnen ohne König: Zur Rolle und Bedeutung der Witwen Alexan­ders im Zeitalter der Diadochen, in: Hauben, H./Meeus, A. (eds.), The Age of the Successors (323-276 B.C.), 2014, 345-77; Müller, S., Stories of the Persian Bride: Alexander and Roxane, in: Stoneman, R. et al. (eds.), The Alexander Romance in Persia and the East, 2012, 295-310; Müller 2013.

Rider, Makedonian, on coins The Makedonian rider makes his entry on the earliest Argead coins (tetrobols), minted by → Alexander I just before 480 (pl. 1.1). Their weight (ca. 2.3g of silver) repaid the contemporary cost of one man’s daily living (siteresion). Most of them went to Makedonian soldier-workers at the Athos canal dug in preparation of Xerxes’ campaign. For his new coins Alexander had to devise a completely new motif. The military context and those who received the coins account for his choice: a rider with the common Makedonian hat (petasos) holds a long lance (→ sarissa) in his fist that also covers the handle of a short sword hanging down from his hip. In all probability, this is a Persian → aki­ nakes, a weapon (rarely) awarded by the Persian king as a most distinct gift of honour. By his hat, the r. is identified as a Makedonian—the Old Persian term for these is Yaunā takabarā: ‘Greeks wearing shields’ (scil. on their heads—a petasos in side view: e.g., DNa 29 = Kent 1953, 185: debated), by his weapons and his chiton as a cavalryman, and by the akinakes as Alexander himself going to war. A monarch was without precedent on Greek coins, but mounted gods and heroes do occur: on emissions from neighbouring Poteidaia (Heinrichs 2017, 83, fig. 2: Poseidon Hippios, naked on horseback, holding his trident just as Alexander his sarissa), similarly from → Bisaltia (Gaebler 1935, pl. 12.1-11: a naked Thracian hero wearing a petasos and holding two javelins, dismounted, partly covered up by his horse). Such coins could serve as iconographic models, but for the notion of monarchy to be expressed on coins Alexander 458

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had to turn to Sardeis. Persian local emissions display the idealized Great King in kneeling stance, wearing a courtly costume and a crenelated crown, holding a bow and a lance (Kraay 1976, pl. 4.82). By combining both models Alexander created the Makedonian r.—who had no connection to the well known but actually younger Thracian r. Alexander could display himself on his coins because Makedonia then still belonged to the Persian Empire. But after Xerxes’ defeat in 479, Alexander hurried to present himself as Philhellen. As one consequence, the akinakes disappeared and the sarissa was replaced by two javelins: the cavalryman turned into a hunter (pl. 1.2). In the following decades this revised image became current on coins of Alexander I, → Perdikkas II, → Archelaos, and → Amyntas III (Gaebler 1935, pl. 28-30). After an interval, → Philip II revived the traditional image, under two new forms: his earlier tetradrachms display an elder, bearded r. wearing a hat (at that time the → kausia) and sandals, fully clad with a cloak fluttering from his shoulders, in some series from → Amphipolis sitting on a saddlecloth, his arm raised in salutation (maybe of the Makedonian army, to be imagined external to the coin on the cover). Thus styled, he is a real person, probably Philip himself. The more recent type shows a nude youth on a race horse, wearing a winner’s wreath and holding a palm (pl. 1.4). The revised image generally hints at victory, but not only that in 356 at Olympia (Plut. Alex. 3.5), where jockeys were required to wear a chiton. So Philip re-interprets the traditional motif for his propaganda—as had done Alexander I on his initial tetrobols. The motif is retained on AE denominations for → Philip III and → Alexander IV (pl. 1.5a/b; cf. Gaebler 1935, pl. 32.1-5: by → Lysimachos, and 17-20: by → Antipatros?).   J. Heinrichs Cf. Heinrichs 2017, 88-91; Müller 2017, 80-1; Olbrycht 2010, 343-4; Schmitt, R., Wörterbuch der altpersischen Königsinschriften, 2014, 250, s.v. takabarā.

Rivers and lakes The original nucleus of Makedonia (Pieria and Bottiaia, known as “Lower Makedonia”) is geographically defined by its two big rivers, the Haliakmon and Axios, together with their many tributaries. The Haliakmon springs from Mt. Boion and its route covers all the area westward of Pieria, while the Axios comes from

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the Sar Mts. in the Balkans, its main tributary being the Cerna (ancient Erigon). From Almopia, northeast of Edessa, comes another river, the Moglenitsas, which joins the Loudias. These systems also formed the plain of Central Makedonia by their alluvial deposits. Another two rivers define this nucleus: the Loudias, flowing between the Axios and the Haliakmon, while east of the Axios lies the smaller Echedoros (modern Gallikos), which flows into the → Thermaic Gulf, between the Axios and modern Thessalonike. All four rivers flow into the Thermaic Gulf, which has been formed many times over by the deposition of huge quantities of water and sediment, including a marshy area to the northwest of the Gulf with the mouth of the Loudias. Thus, when the Makedonians expanded from their original nucleus around Mt. Bermion and expelled the Pierians and the Bottiaians from their dwellings in a narrow strip around the Thermaic Gulf (Thuc. 2.99), they were in possession of four river systems. These rivers also defined the parameters for large, future settlements inhabited by people of Lower Makedonia who accepted the sovereignty of the Argeads. Finally, when the Makedonians moved to the → Bisaltia, they also gained the Strymon, which flows into the homo­nymous Gulf, northeast of the Chalkidike. The rivers’ waters created some lakes, by settling in basins: geographically peripheral to the original nucleus of Makedonia (from west to east) are Lakes Prespa and Little Prespa, Kastoria in → Orestis, Begorritis in Eordaia, Doirani and Kerkinitis in Amphaxitis, Koroneia and Bolbe to the north of the Chalkidike, and Prasias to the east. Loudias, another lake mentioned by Strabon (7 F 20, 23 Jones = 11a, b Radt), was generated later (since the sea reached up to Pella: Hdt. 7.123.3—until the mid-4th c.), by the alluvia from the Haliakmon, Loudias and Axios that closed the entrance to the Thermaic Gulf. Running between the mountain ranges that surround the plains of coastal Makedonia (Chalkidike excluded), all these rivers were also waterways for people travelling and carrying goods, interconnecting the hinterland of Makedonia with the coastal areas. The rivers irrigated these lands and this had a huge impact on the economy of the kingdom, shaped by crop production, pasturage of sheep and cattle and other activities. These rivers and lakes were the homes of abundant fish, used to feed not only people but also animals (Hdt. 5.16.4). However, there were also problems caused by these rivers that contained water all year round, such as flooding and malaria, especially in the marshlands around the Thermaic Gulf. In his early days as a king, → Philip II managed to drain the plain of Krenides/→ Philippoi (Theophr. CP 5.14.6), apparently an indirect indication of the severe situation the inhabitants of these 460

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saris(s)a

areas were in, not only due to the ever-changing coastline but also because of the diseases caused by the floods.   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Borza 1990, 28-50; Hammond/Griffith 1972, 3-5; Thomas, C.G., The Physical Kingdom, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 68-70.

Ruler lists, Argead   see Amyntas II; Argeads, protohistorical; Genealogy, Argead

saris(s)a The Makedonian adjective is of Homeric formation, as is (γυνὴ) βασίλ- ισσα: (woman) ‘connected with the βασιλ-εύς/king’, i.e. queen—another Makedonian neologism. Just the same way (λόγχη) σάρ-ισ(σ)α: (lance) ‘made from ...?’ probably goes back to the Makedonian term for the tree that supplied the shaft. So the (Greek) κράνεια (αἰχμή): cornel (spear) was made from the male cornel cherry growing up to max. 12 cubits (πηχύες—ca. 5.3 m), “the length of the longest Makedonian s.” (Theophr. HP 3.12.1-2). In Theophrastos’ day (ca. 370285) were used shorter sarissai—and long lances such as Dareios III introduced before → Gaugamela (Diod. 17.53.1). Such types, as on a fresco in a Makedonian chamber tomb at Ayios Athanasios (ca. 325/00: Heinrichs/Müller 2008, fig. 10.1), were often mistaken for sarissai (the shield suspended is that of a hoplite, not a phalangist equipped with the s.). Hellenistic sarissai of 14-16 cubits (ca. 6.2-7.1 m) were composed of two lengths held by iron sockets in the centre where the diameter attained 3-3.5 cm. An iron head of 0.4-0.5 m was firmly attached; an equally long butt spike served also as a counter weight. Irons come from the Makedonian polyandrion at → Chaironeia (cf. Plut. Alex. 9.2)—badly corroded, probably from cavalry sarissai—and from tombs at Vergina. Since the overall weight attained 5-6 kg (later more), opposing the levering effect demanded strength and training. The older, shorter cavalry s. (Arr. An. 1.14.1), used besides the more common cavalry lance or spear (xyston, dory: cf. Arr. An. 7.6.5), already appears on Makedonian coins from around 480 (pl. 1.1), then on the Poros-dekadrachm (Mørkholm 1991, fig. 44; a drawing in Briant 2010, 22, fig. 3; cf. Curt. 8.14.16: hastae praelongae; without assignment to riders: Diod.

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17.88.2). The newer infantry s., according to common opinion in use already under → Philip II (Polyain. 4.2.10), is however not mentioned in the context of his military reforms (Diod. 16.3.1-2) nor was any excavated at → Olynthos. Under → Alexander III, the phalanx was regularly equipped with long lances. Infantry sarissai could have been used at Gaugamela (Diod. 17.57.6, 58.3; Arr. An. 3.14.3), but would Alexan­der have taken such unwieldy weapons across the Tigris, the Hydaspes (Diod. 17.88.2), or the Danube (Arr. An. 1.4.1—dorata in 1.6.2-4), to be used on unreconnoitered ground? Other references, e.g. during the → Kleitos affair (Arr. An. 4.8.8-9.2, cf. 7.4.1 and Diod. 17.100.6), evidently go back to spears or lances; Arrian himself (An. 4.8.8) also uses the term λόγχη. Infantry sarissai had their heyday in Hellenistic times up to Pydna (168), when most battles were fought on level, dry ground. Such is a precondition for the s.-phalanx that in turn cannot be used against approximately circular dispositions. Polybios’ digression on the tactics of his day (18.29-30) sheds some light also on earlier periods: since the s.was held with both hands, a small shield (pelta) suspended from the neck had to cover a man’s left side. The older (up to) 12 cubit-sarissai (Polybios’ data are here converted) were levelled against the enemy in the first four ranks, behind them held slanting upwards to shelter troops ahead from missiles. Moreover men in the rear added momentum in thrusting forward since those in the front ranks, with continuous sarissai on either side, could not break away. The sarissai of the first rank projected 8 cubits (3.5 m) beyond the phalanx body; those following fell back two cubits (1.3 m) per rank, until the ranks moved up in the initial clash.   J. Heinrichs Cf. Anson, E.M., The Introduction of the “sarisa” in Macedonian Warfare, AncSoc 40 (2010), 51-68; Bosworth 1980, 62-3; Markle, M.M., The Macedonian sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor, AJA 81 (1977), 323-39; Markle, M.M., Use of the sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon, AJA 82 (1978), 483-97; Müller 2017, 128.

Satrap, satrapies During → Alexander III’s campaign through the Achaimenid Empire, the reports of the → Alexander historiographers, especially of Arrian, show time and time again that the king, from the Mediterranean to the Indos, either confirmed the governors previously active in the respective s.s or dismissed 462

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Satrap, satrapies

them, replacing them with men whom he trusted. The first of such measures was taken by Alexander after his victory at the → Granikos: he sent → Parmenion to Daskyleion to take over the city, appointed Kalas as successor to Arsites, who had previously been active there as s., and decreed that the same taxes were to be paid as under Dareios III (Arr. An. 1.17.1-2). Alexander took over personally the city of Sardeis and appointed Asandros as successor to the Persian Spithridates as s. of Lydia and associated territories (Arr. An. 1.17.7). We record these events in a list (for comments on the sources that underlie the following list, see Jacobs 1994): S.s

Last s.s under Achaimenid rule

First s.s installed by Alexander

(Most important text passages )

Lydia

Spithridates

Asandros

(Arr. An. 1.12.8, 17.7)

Hellespontine Phrygia

Arsites

Kalas

(Arr. An. 1.12.8, 17.1; Paus. 1.29.10)

Karia

Orontobates

Ada

(Arr. An. 1.23.7-8; Diod. 16.74.2; Plut. Alex. 22.4; Strab. 14.2.17)

Greater Phrygia

Atizyes

Antigonos

(Arr. An. 1.25.3, 29.3)

Kappadokia (beside-the-Tauros)

Ariakes

Sabiktas [Abistamenes])

(Arr. An. 2.4.2; 3.8.5; cf. Curt. 3.4.1)

Paphlagonia

Local ruler

Kalas

(Arr. An. 2.4.1-2; Curt. 3.1.24; 4.5.13)

(Lower) Egypt

Mazakes

Aischylos

(Arr. An. 3.1.2, 5.3; Curt. 4.7.4, 8.4)

Upper Egypt

unknown

Ephippos (?)

(Arr. An. 3.5.3)

Libya

unknown

Apollonios

(Arr. An. 3.5.4; Curt. 4.8.5)

Babylonia

Boupares

Mazaios

(Arr. An. 3.8.5, 16.4; 4.18.3; Curt. 5.1.43)

Assyria

Mazaios

Menes

(Arr. An. 3.8.6, 16.9)

Syria

Brochoubelos

Menon

(Arr. An. 2.13.7; Curt. 4.8.11; 5.13.11)

Kilikia

Arsames

Balakros

(Arr. An. 2.12.2; Curt. 3.4.3)

Persis

Ariobarzanes

Phrasaortes

(Arr. An. 3.18.2. 11)

Karmania

Astaspes

Sibyrtios

(Arr. An. 6.27.1; cf. Curt. 9.10.21. 29)

Sousiana

Aboulites

Aboulites

(Arr. An. 3.16.9; Curt. 5.2.8. 17; Diod. 17.65.5)

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Satrap, satrapies S.s

Last s.s under Achaimenid rule

First s.s installed by Alexander

(Most important text passages )

Uxiorum regio

Medates

Aboulites

(Curt. 5.3.4. 16; cf. Diod. 17.67.4)

Media

Atropates

Oxydates

(Arr. An. 3.8.4, 20.3; 4.18.3; Curt. 6.2.11)

(East-)Armenia

Orontes

Mithrenes

(Arr. An. 3.8.5, 16.5; Curt 5.1.44; Diod. 17.64.5)

West-Armenia

Mithraustes (?)

Neoptolemos (?)

(Arr. An. 3.8.5; Plut. Eum. 4.2-5.4)

Parthia

Phrataphernes

Amminapes [Minapis])

(Arr. An. 3.8.4, 22.1, 23.4.; Curt. 6.4.25)

Hyrkania

Autophradates [Phradates]

Amminapes [Minapis])

(Arr. An. 3.22.1; Curt. 6.4.23. 25)

Chorasmia

Pharasmanes

Pharasmanes

(Arr. An. 4.15.4)

Baktria

Bessos

Artabazos

(Arr. An. 3.8.3, 21.1, 29.1; Curt. 5.8.4; 7.5.1; Diod. 17.73.2, 74.1)

Sogdiana

Spitamenes (?)

Amyntas

(Arr. An. 3.28.9-10, 29.6; Curt. 7.5.19; 8.1.35, 2.14)

Areia

Satibarzanes

Satibarzanes

(Arr. An. 3.25.1; Curt. 6.6.20; cf. Diod. 17.78.1)

Paropamisos

unknown

Proexes

(Arr. An. 3.8.24)

Cis-Indos-s. (Gadārā)

Astis

Nikanor

(Arr. An. 4.22.8, 28.6)

Arachosia

Barzaentes

Menon

(Arr. An. 3.8.4, 21.1, 28.1; Curt. 7.3.5; cf. 9.10.20)

Drangiana

unknown

Arsames

(Curt. 7.3.1)

Gedrosia

unknown

Tiridates (?)

(Diod. 17.81.2)

India

Sambos (?)

Peithon

(Arr. An. 6.15.4, 16.3, 17.1; cf. Curt. 9.8.16)

Trans-Indos-s. (Ṯataguš)

Taxiles

Philippos

(Arr. An. 5.8.3; 6.14.3; Arr. Ind. 19.4; Curt. 10.1.20)

The list makes it clear that there is more information about Alexander’s actions in the west of the former Achaimenid Empire than in the east. The explanation is not that the western s.s were smaller in size, but because the classical sources traditionally pay more attention to the areas in the empire’s west, and because the western s.s were the starting point and the scene of the struggles for the succession of Alexander. For this reason, we frequently receive information here also 464

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about regions that ranked at lower levels within the nowadays well-documented hierarchical structure of the Achaimenid satrapal administration. In many cases, Alexander had to fill the posts a second time, either because the original incumbents had died, or because the king transferred them or suspended them from office. For example, when Menon, the s. of Arachosia, died, Alexander appointed Sibyrtios, the s. of Karmania, as his successor and handed over the office in Karmania to a certain Tlepolemos (Arr. An. 6.27.1; cf. Arr. Ind. 36.8). In Areia he replaced Satibarzanes, who had been originally confirmed in his position, with Arsakes (=Arsames, s. of Drangiana?), because Satibarzanes, as soon as Alexander had advanced further, had instigated an uprising to his rear (Arr. An. 3.25.1-7). That Alexander left the hierarchical structure of the satrapal system largely untouched is demonstrated by the case of the aforementioned Sibyrtios. Arrian’s account of his transfer from Karmania to Arachosia and the logic of such a process suggest that the appointment to Arachosia marked an ascent on the career ladder for Sibyrtios. Karmania—never mentioned in a list of s.s in Achaimenid inscriptions, but listed as an entity obliged to deliver material for the building of the palace at Sousa in DSf §9—was and consequently remained an administrative unit of subordinate rank. So the Achaimenid “job chart” was preserved, and all administrative units that were distributed in the division of empire at → Babylon (323: Diod. 18.3.1-2; Curt. 10.10.1-4; Dexippos ap. Phot. Bibl. 82, p. 64a-b; Just. 13.4.10-24; cf. Julius Valerius, Hist. Alex. Mag. [Rec. J1] 3.33 and at Triparadeisos (321: Arr. Succ. F 1.34; Diod. 18.39.5-7) can be found in the list compiled above (this essentially applies even to the late testimony at Oros. 3.23.7-13). Only in the course of the conflicts over Alexander’s succession did the old administrative structures and hierarchies in the West, especially in → Asia Minor, largely disintegrate. Alexander’s personnel policy measures were a means of accessing the administration and infrastructure developed by the → Achaimenids. Their utilisation made the conquest of the vast territory of the empire in so few years at all possible. The control of the administration ensured the exercise of power in the conquered territories. The infrastructure, roads and supply systems supported the necessary troop movements—particularly evident during the pursuit of the fleeing Dareios III (Arr. An. 3.19-21; Curt. 5.7.12, 13.1-25) and subsequently of → Bessos towards Baktra (Arr. An. 3.22-25; Curt. 6.2.12-6.23)—and the supply of the armed forces. For the latter, Alexander’s march through the → Gedrosian desert (Arr. An. 6.22-26) is a vivid example: The troops plagued by hunger while crossing the desert region could fall back

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Seal, signet ring

on stored products. Their existence was the result of complex logistics organized and maintained by the Achaimenid imperial administration. The quality of this coverage can be seen in the fact that the administrative borders of the conquered by the Makedonians, apart from the western fringes of the empire, were identical with the borders of the known world (Arr. An. 5.24.1-29.1; Curt. 9.2.2-17, 3.7-8; Diod. 17.93.2-3, 95.1-2; Just. 12.8.10-17; Plut. Alex. 62).   B. Jacobs Cf. Henkelman, W.F.M., Imperial Signature and Imperial Paradigm: Achaemenid Administrative Structure and System across and beyond the Iranian Plateau, in: Jacobs, B. et al. (eds.), Die Verwaltung im Achämenidenreich/Administration in the Achaemenid Empire, 2017, 45-256; Jacobs 1994; Seibert 1985.

Seal, signet ring In Argead Makedonia, letters and other documents were sealed by the king or royal officials (Curt. 7.2.16, 21-27, referring to → Alexander III’s time), who used either a seal (sphragis) or a signet ring (daktylion). Conceivably, → Philip II had a royal s.; Alexander was in charge of it when Philip temporarily left Makedonia in 340 (Plut. Alex. 9.1). By 330, Alexander was certainly using one single s. as king (Curt. 3.6.7, 7.11-15, for 333; Plut. Alex. 39.5; Plut. Mor. 180D; 332F-333A; 340A; Ps.-Kall. 1.8.4-7). Curtius (6.6.6) attributes the use of two s. from the year 330 to Alexander and states that “Alexander sealed letters to be sent to Europe with the bezel of his ancient ring, but on those he was to write to Asia the ring of Dareios was impressed.” The introduction of the principle of using two s. fits in perfectly with the reforms of Alexander in 330, which included the creation of a new Iranian → court. In the Near East, including the Achaimenid Empire, s. were attributes of royal power (see OT, Esther 8.2). Sources imply that in 325-23, Alexander used one s. (Arr. An. 6.23.4, 29.10). In all likelihood, he decided to use a new single s. around 327, when he married → Rhoxane and strengthened his pro-Iranian policies. The dying Alexander gave his signet ring to → Perdikkas. After the death of Alexander, Perdikkas presented the attributes of royal power, including the → throne, the → diadema, the robe, and the ring, before an assembly of soldiers (Nep. 18 2.1; Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4; Just. 12.15.12; Curt. 10.5.4, 6.4-5. 16). The signet ring of Alexander was probably offered to Philip → Arrhidaios.   M.J. Olbrycht 466

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Second Sophistic

Cf. Baldus, H.R., Die Siegel Alexanders des Großen, Chiron 17 (1987), 395-445; Hammond, N.G.L., Did Alexander use one or two Seals?, Chiron 25 (1995), 199-203; Müller 2019, 17-8; Olbrycht 2010, 355-7.

Second Sophistic Some of our most significant early Alexander-texts, namely those of Plutarch and Arrian, were written during the Second Sophistic—the label often given to Greek imperial literature that is classicizing and vigorously rhetorical. Of the 30 kings named in classical/Hellenistic sources, from the mythical ancestor Temenos through Alexander IV, 16 appear in this period: Temenos, Karanos, Argaios I, → Alexander I, → Perdikkas II, → Archelaos, → Aëropos II, → Amyntas III, → Alexander II, the → epitropos → Ptolemy of Aloros, → Perdikkas III, → Amyntas Perdikkou (IV) (who was likely not acclaimed), → Philip II, → Alexander III, → Philip III Arrhidaios and → Alexander IV. Only Alexander III is deemed worthy of large-scale narratives. Philip II can be an important supporting role player in Alexander-narratives, but also often reprises his classic role as the Demosthenean “barbarian” (e.g. Dem. 3.24; 9.31; Ael. Aristid. Or. 38-39). Others appear minimally and often negatively, in ways that suggest rhetorical convenience rather than direct interest in the Argead dynasty. By the imperial period, most of the early kings drop from view, including the Argive → Perdikkas I, descendant of Temenos (Hdt. 8.137.1), whose acquisition of the “tyranny” over the Makedonians → Herodotos described in order to prove Alexander I’s Hellenic pedigree (8.137-138). Perdikkas I’s absence is explained by the period’s minimal interest in → Alexander I himself, whose most significant appearance is in Aristides (Or. 13.172-176) as a negative foil to the Athenians. Perdikkas I’s ancestor Temenos appears more frequently (Plut. Mor. 331C-332C; Paus. 2.6.7; 2.18.7; Polyain. 1.6; 1.9; 1.10)—not as an Argead ancestor, but as one of the Herakleidai. Plutarch uses → Karanos to link Alexander III to his heroic ancestor, Herakles, but without specific reference to the Argead line (Alex. 2.1). For the first time in the Roman period, we see the “Argead” label connecting the Makedonian royal house with Argos in Plutarch (Mor. 331F, cf. Paus. 7.8.7), but the emphasis is on the obsolesence of the Argead Empire rather than its glory. There are also two Argead kings whose original associations with Greek philosophy seem

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467

Seleukos

central to their appearances in Roman literature: Archelaos and Perdikkas III. Their use is largely negative. → Platon’s Gorgias (470D-471D) presents Archelaos, who murdered his uncle and cousin, as powerful yet miserable— proving, in the inverse, the Socratic principle that only a just man could live a good life. Aristides deliberately misses the point in order to subvert Platon’s privileging of philosophy over oratory, arguing that if Archelaos had known oratory, he would not have had to murder for the throne but could have used persuasion instead (Or. 45.55). In Diogenes Laertios, Perdikkas appears as an anti-philosophical foil for threatening Diogenes the Cynic with death if he did not come to him (6.2.44). Unsurprisingly, the later kings who receive the most mention belong to Philip II’s and Alexander III’s stories. But Amyntas III appears frequently in the phrase “Philip son of Amyntas”, and very infrequently beyond that. More interesting is Philip III Arrhidaios, the son of one of Philip II’s wives, and thus half-brother of Alexander. To the degree that Arrhidaios is often presented as a victim of Philip’s behavior (Pausanias, e.g., sees his alleged murder by Olympias as divine payback for Philip’s corruption: 8.7.7) or as a pawn of Diadochs like → Perdikkas and of the Makedonian soldiery after Alexander’s death (Paus. 1.6.3; App. Syr. 9.52), he embodies the general pattern we see in the imperial Greek conception of Argead history: all that is before or after Alexander III is corrupt.   S.R. Asirvatham Cf. Asirvatham 2017.

Seleukos Marshal of → Alexander III, the most successful of his Successors and ultimately king himself (ca. 358-281). The son of Antiochos of Europos-by-the-Axios, an officer of Philip II, S. was with Alexander’s expedition from the start, and eventually a companion. In 326 he commanded the Royal Hypaspists at the → Hydaspes before co-ordinating the entire infantry in the battle against Poros (Arr. An. 5.13, 16). At Sousa in 324 Alexander gave him Apama, daughter of the Baktrian Spitamenes, as bride (Plut. Demetr. 31.5; Arr. An. 7.4.6). Other actions attributed to S. under Alexander are fictional. At → Babylon in 323 → Perdikkas, regent for the new kings Philip III and Alexander IV, made him his deputy as hipparch of the Companion Cavalry (Diod. 18.3.4). Whether 468

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Sexuality

or not S. was amongst Perdikkas’ assassins after the fiasco at Memphis in 321/0 (Arr. Succ. F 1.28-35, Nep. 18.5.1), he thereafter stepped back from the central cause of the kings, taking the wealthy and strategic prize of the satrapy of Babylonia in the Triparadeisos settlement (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. Succ. F 1.33-35). Nonetheless, he initially aligned himself with → Antigonos, the new commander of the Royal Army, and helped in the defeat of Eumenes in 317 (Diod. 18.73.3-4; 19.12-14, 18, 27). The ungrateful Antigonos forced S. to flee Babylon in 316/5, whereupon he took up service with Ptolemy, building a grand alliance against Antigonos for him with Lysimachos and Kassandros, regent of Makedonia (Diod. 19.55-58; App. Syr. 267-270). After the battle of Gaza in 312 he was able to take Babylon back with a small expeditionary force (Diod. 19.81-85, 90-92, 100), this being the starting-point for his eventual reconstruction of an empire equivalent to Alexander’s, save for Egypt and some Indian provinces.   D. Ogden Cf. Capdetrey, L., Le pouvoir séleucide, 2007, 25-76; Grainger, J.D., Seleukos Nikator, 1990; Heckel 2006, 246-8; Mehl, A., Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich, 1986; Ogden, D., The Legend of Seleucus, 2017.

Semiramis   see Kyros II, as a reference Sexuality Unfortunately, due to the loss of the Makedonian literary sources, the evidence on sexual moral codes and norms in Argead Makedonia comes exclusively from Greek and Roman authors judging from the moral point of view of their own cultures. Therefore, their information on this matter has to be treated with caution. In ancient literature, s. was often used as a moral indicator. According to ancient Greek literary clichés adopted by Roman writers, a tyrant uncovers himself by his immoderation in every condition of life, thus also regarding his s. Consequently, charges on sexual excesses and violations of sexual roles, a frequent theme in Greek and Roman invective and forensic oratory, served to blacken someone’s portrait as an outsider threatening a society’s moral codes. Images of s. formed part of ancient constructions of ‘the other.’ The Makedonians and their ruling

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house were often styled as ‘the others’ by Greeks and s. was one device to stress their ‘otherness.’ Hence, it is necessary to distinguish between topos, bias, cultural misunderstanding (or prejudice), and authenticity. Thus, in the eyes of mono­ gamous Greeks, Argead polygamy, explicitly attested for Philip II and Alexander III but perhaps already practiced by their predecessors (since Alexander I?), was perceived as an indicator of difference (while not universally as a symptom of decadence). In fact, Argead polygamy served political ends, not hyper-s.: providing the dynasty with a sufficient pool of potential successors and using marital bonds to establish or cement alliances. In general, marriages of members of the Makedonian leading circles were a matter of politics, not of love and s. Literary claims that an Argead married because he fell in love serve either to illustrate moral flaws or political failures allegedly caused by this lack of sophrosyne (cf. Philip II and Kleopatra: Athen. 13.557D; Alexander and Rhoxane: Curt. 8.4.2330) or, on the contrary, to excuse a politically motivated wedding perceived as a mésalliance (again Alexander and Rhoxane: Plut. Alex. 47.4; Plut. Mor. 332E; 338D). S. of female Argeads is mostly mentioned in the context of hostile depictions of the alleged negative consequences of the influence of these women who are portrayed as lecherous, scheming, and vicious (Just. 7.5.4-5; 9.7.10-11). Thus, → Kleopatra, the sister of Alexander III, is accused by Plutarch (Mor. 818B-C) of hybris regarding her royal status because she had an affair with a handsome young man (likely after her husband’s death). As for relationships between male partners, at least in theory, according to Greek perceptions of pederasty, the passive part (eromenos) was preserved for prepubescent boys and the active role (erastes) played by the adult. For Argead Makedonia, in contrast, Greek and Roman writers mention liaisons between male adults as well as between boys of the same age group (Diod. 16.93.3-4; 17.79.1-2; Curt. 6.7.2-3; 7.9.19; 8.6.8; Arr. An. 4.13.3, 13.7; 7.27.1-2; Plut. Alex. 49.2). Notably, most of these examples occur in the context of plots against Argeads. Thus, the sexual aspect may perhaps be a literary device in order to depict the delinquents as tyrannicides in accordance with the virtuous role models of Harmodios (who was also molested by Hipparchos: Thuc. 6.54.2-4) and his lover Aristogeiton. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the validity of the tradition that → Archelaos and → Philip II were both assassinated by their former lovers (Diod. 14.37.6; 16.93.3-94.3; [Plat.] Alk. II 141D-E; Ail. VH 8.9). It seems to be recommended to be skeptical. Significantly, Aristotle mentions both assassinations in the same context as Harmodios and Aristogeiton’s killing of Hipparchos (Pol. 1311B). Anecdotes 470

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about Archelaos (Ail. VH 2.21; 13.4) that he was interested in the life-long love between the Athenian tragic poet Agathon and his erastes Pausanias and that he did not take offense when, at his symposion, the drunken → Euripides (over 70) kissed Agathon (over 40), reveal something about the peculiarities of the Greek tragic poets’ reception, not about Makedonian sexual norms. In addition, the latter story suits the biased depiction of Makedonian symposia as drunken debauches where even Greek guests were corrupted. Hence, in the absence of any Makedonian source confirming it, we cannot know whether the Makedonian moral code did indeed not conform to the Greek conventions of pederasty or whether this claim was another artificial by-product of Greek and Roman images of Makedonian ‘otherness.’ Notably, our sources are mostly concerned with matters of s. in Argead Makedonia when it comes to negative depictions, scenes of decadence, constructions of counter-images of the moral ideals of the respective author. Infamously, → Theopompos depicts Philip’s court as a kind of brothel and his → hetairoi as corrupt rakes acting in an “un-Greek” way by shaving their beards, adopting the passive sexual role, and selling themselves to each other as male prostitutes, andropornoi (Athen. 6.260E-261A). These polemics do not provide any insight into Makedonian social reality but illustrate the literary methods to construct ‘the other’ from a contemporary Greek view. Matters of Argead s. are also frequently treated in Roman times, particularly the s. of Alexander III in biased accounts on his alleged loss of morals. In Roman eyes, a passive sexual role was perceived as submission, associated with slaves, women, and prostitutes, thus a shame for a free-born Roman. Hence, when Roman authors use pederastic phraseology implying that → Hephaistion was Alexander’s toy boy (Just. 12.12.11; Curt. 7.9.19; cf. Ail. VH 12.7: eromenos), this alleged love affair is another symptom of decadence and should not be taken at face value. Similarly, the tale that Philip made his own brother-in-law, Alexander of → Epeiros, his sexual plaything just to turn him into his corrupted, dependent political tool on the Molossian throne (Just. 8.6.4-8), serves as a symptom of Philip’s political ruthlessness. These stereotypic narratives of moral decline give no insights into Makedonian sexual norms. Comparably, Alexander’s alleged sexual attraction by the eunuch Bagoas was an ultimate sign of his moral decline in the East and corruption by ‘oriental’ vices (Curt. 6.5.23; 10.1.25-37; Dikai­ archos ap. Athen. 13.603A; cf. Plut. Alex. 67.4). Recent doubts about Bagoas’ existence or at least his role at Alexander’s court, let alone in his bedroom may be substantial: Curtius’ Bagoas appears like an embodiment of Roman clichés

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about the evils of the ‘Orient’ associated with effemination, passivity, treason, schemes, and lecherousness. Additionally, in Greek and Roman perception, the name Bagoas (actually Artaxerxes III’s influential official who reportedly engineered Dareios’ III accession: Diod. 17.5.5; Curt. 6.3.12) became synonymous with Persian eunuchs (Plin. NH 13.41; Luc. Eun. 4-6; 13). Curtius also seems to have been the first to connect Persian courtly eunuchs with sexual services for the Great King as another marker of eastern decadence (6.6.8). At least, there is no such information in the fragments of the Greek Persika. S. furthermore occurs in the context of Makedonian war atrocities when captured women in conquered camps or cities were raped: a brutal, unscrupulous demonstration of victory and superiority (Curt. 3.11.21-22; Plut. Alex. 12.1).   S. Müller Cf. Müller 2016, 74, 175-81, 186-90; Pownall 2005, 258-61; Skinner, M., Sexuality in Greek and Roman Culture, 2005.

Siwa Oasis During the Makedonian annexation of → Egypt in 331, → Alexander III marched with some of his army to the Siwa Oasis in the Libyan Desert. S. was autonomously governed by local rulers who were simultaneously high priests of the oracle of Amun (Greek: → Ammon, equated with Zeus). A strategically important trading hub in the caravan trading network, often seen as an ancient precursor to the Trans-Saharan trade route, S. connected the Greek apoikia Kyrene, Kyrenaika’s commercial centre, with Egypt and Nubia from where luxury products and precious metals were exported. Contrary to widespread belief, the Makedonian march to S. was no isolated trip to the oracle but an act of economic policy aiming at the subjection of the Kyrenaika (a granary), and control over the desert’s caravan routes. S. was a central station the Makedonians sought to control, probably (unintentionally) following into the footsteps of Kambyses II who subjected the Kyrenaians and tried to invade S. in 526/5 (strongly biased: Hdt. 3.17.1, 25.3, 26). The Kyrenaians submitted to Alexander (Curt. 4.7.9-10; Diod. 17.49.2-3). Makedonian access to their grain is confirmed indirectly: a list of major recipients of grain from Kyrene in ca. 330 includes → Olympias and → Kleopatra (SEG 9.2). Surely on Alexan­ der’s orders, they acted as Argead benefactresses of the Greeks during a time 472

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of shortage. S.’s subjection was another step in expanding Makedonian control over the desert’s trade networks. S.’s local rulers acknowledged Alexander as Egypt’s pharaoh and their own new superior, greeting him according to the Egyptian protocol as “son of Amun,” a part of the pharaoh’s traditional 5-name titulary. In turn, Alexander and his entourage honoured their god by consulting his oracle and giving rich votives and gifts. Thus, visiting the oracle was a by-product of the march. Curtius (4.8.3) mentions that a plan to invade Nubia was dropped because of lack of time. Control over the routes the Nubian exports took probably sufficed. A Greek and hieroglyphic dedicatory inscription in Alexander’s name (according to the pharaoh’s titular protocol: Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξνδρος Ἄμμωνι τ[ῶ]ι πατρί: King Alexander for his father Ammon) in a temple in the Oasis Bahariya, another trade hub of the desert, shows a similar effort to ensure Makedonian influence. This sign of presence in Bahariya may confirm Ptolemy’s version that the Makedonians took the direct route (through the oases) back to Memphis (Arr. An. 3.3.5). As the campaign lacked heroic deeds (battles), → Kallisthenes considered alternatives to glorify Alexander. Omitting the economic background, he focused on S.’s oracle that the Greeks were familiar with (cf. Hdt. 1.46.3; Pind. 4.28). He turned the caravan road network into an impenetrable sand sea Alexander mastered with divine help and the priest’s greeting into the oracle’s response allegedly confirmed by the Erythraian Sybil and Didymean Apollon (Strab. 17.1.43). In fact, there is no sign that Libyan Amun became significant in Alexander’s representation. On his return from India, he is alleged to have sacrificed to other gods in accordance with Amun’s oracle (Arr. An. 6.19.4-5). The Ammoneion was consulted again in 324, when Alexander needed sympathetic priests to sanction the posthumous cult of → Hephaistion (Arr. An. 7.23.6). The claim that Alexander wanted to be buried in S. (Curt. 10.5.4) is surely apocryphal, perhaps propagated by Ptolemy to legitimize his seizure of Alexander’s corpse.   S. Müller Cf. Bosch-Puche, F., L’ “autel” du temple d’Alexandre le Grand à Bahariya retrouvé, BIFAO 108 (2008), 29-44; Kuhlmann, K.P., Das Ammoneion, 1988; Müller, S., Kambyses II., Alexander und Siwa, in: Binder, C. et al. (eds.), Diwan, 2016, 223-45; Müller 2019, 126-8; Pownall 2014, 57-60.

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Skythians Starting from the 6th c., the power of the Skythians who lived in the steppes of Ukraine began to be felt in the northern Balkans. The Persian expedition of Dareios I against the S. was chiefly aimed at establishing Persian rule in → Thrace and Makedonia (513). Under King Atheas (died in 339), the S. crossed the Danube (Strab. 7.3.18; Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.31 p. 240) and conquered Dobrudja which received the name “Little Skythia” (Strab. 7.4.5, 5.12). Atheas’ coins, which depict a bearded, long-haired bowman on horseback, were struck at Kallatis. Atheas threatened Byzantion (or Bizone) (Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.31.3) and clashed with the Triballoi (Polyain. 7.44.1; Frontin. 2.4.20). At first, relations between the S. and the Makedonians were friendly. Atheas used the people of Apollonia Pontika as intermediaries to request support from → Philip II against Histria and ostensibly offered to make Philip his heir (Just. 9.2.1-3.4). Following the death of the rex Histrianorum, Atheas revoked arrangements with Philip. The latter invaded Skythian territory and defeated the S.; Atheas fell in battle. During his return march, Philip was attacked by the Triballoi and lost the booty (mares, captives, and cattle: Just. 9.3.1-3.3; Aischin. 3.128; Oros. 3.13.4-8). In 335, → Alexander III defeated the Triballoi and Getai. While Alexander was in Asia, the Makedonian governor of Thrace, Zopyrion, attacked Olbia, but his army of 30.000 men was completely destroyed, chiefly by Skythian attacks (Just. 12.2.16-17; Makrob. Saturn. 1.11.33; Oros. 4.18.4; Just. 2.3.4; 37.3.2; Trog. Prol. 12; Curt. 10.1.43-45). In Central Asia, Alexander fought against the Sakai, Massagetai, and Dahai. All these peoples are often referred to as the S. or Sakai in general (see Hdt. 7.64.2). From 327, Alexander managed to gain military contingents from the Dahai and Massagetai. In Baktria (329), Alexander was visited by embassies from the Abioi S. in Asia, and from “European” S. (Arr. An. 4.1.1; Curt. 7.6.11-12; Itin. Alex. 81). Alexander sent his own envoys to these peoples; they returned in 328 (Curt. 8.1.7-10; Arr. An. 4.15.1-6). Alexander did not accept the offer to marry a daughter of the Skythian king (Plut. Alex. 46.2). There was another embassy from the “European S.” to Alexander in Babylon in 323 (Arr. An. 7.15.4). Alexander planned an expedition against the S. in the North Pontic region (Arr. An. 4.15.5-6). In the 4th and early 3rd c., artifacts that were produced in Makedonia and Thrace (including silver and bronze vessels interpreted as gifts and trade goods) diffused throughout the S.’s countries (at sites including Chertomlyk, Gaimanova 474

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somatophylakes

Mogila, and Ryzhanovka in Ukraine). The famous barrow at Karagodeuakhsh (Kuban region, southern Russia) yielded metal vessels and jewelry originating from Makedonia or Northern Greece. A Skythian bowcase discovered at Karagodeuakhsh features overlays manufactured in the same matrix as the bowcase from the antechamber of the royal Tomb II at Vergina. The Skythian influence on arms and warfare of the Getai and other Balkan peoples was significant (Thuc. 2.96). Under Philip II, the wedge formation (embolon) was borrowed from the S. (Arr. Tact. 16.6; Frontin. 2.8.14).   M.J. Olbrycht Cf. Olbrycht, M., Die Beziehungen der Steppennomaden Mittelasiens zu den helle­ nistischen Staaten, in: Funck, B. (ed.), Hellenismus, 1996, 147-69; Olbrycht, M.J., Remarks on the Presence of Iranian Peoples in Europe, in: Collectanea Celto-Asiatica, 2000, 101-40; Stolyarik, E., Scythians in the West Pontic Area, AJN 13 (2001), 21-34; Treister, M., Bronze and Silver Greek, Macedonian and Etruscan Vessels in Scythia, BA online 1 (2010), 9-26.

somatophylakes somatophylakes (bodyguards; sing. somatophylax) protected the Argead ruler at → court, in battle, or during the → hunt. While the term s. is used occasionally for the hypaspists (e.g., Arr. An. 1.6.5) and → paides (Diod. 17.65.1: somatophylakia), as an Argead court title, however, it referred to the members of the ruler’s elite bodyguard restricted to 7. Attested since → Philip II’s reign, it is unknown whether the s. existed before and followed a Persian example. Little is known about Philip’s s. → Alexander III “inherited” them but brought his own confidants into the 7, such as → Leonnatos (replacing the late Arybbas in 332/1: Arr. An. 3.5.5), → Ptolemy (replacing the condemned Demetrios in 330: Arr. An. 3.27.5), or → Hephaistion (Arr. An. 6.28.4, the date is uncertain). The s. came from the inner circle of Alexander’s → hetairoi. There were no Persians among his s. The implied proximity and accessibility to the ruler was a prestigious honour. Hence, as a historiographer, Ptolemy repeatedly mentioned his office. The special commands of Alexander’s s. ruled out his constant protection. The office, whose function perhaps originally was a mixture of honour and guarding, became mostly honourary. As a reward for saving Alexander in the Mallian campaign, Peukestas was even made an exceptional honourary

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8th member of the s. (Arr. An. 6.28.4; 7.5.4). In 321/0 at Triparadeisos, the generals appointed 4 s. for → Philip III (Arr. Succ. F 1.38) and surely, despite the fact that it is not mentioned explicitly, 3 or 4 for → Alexander IV. The title of the s. lived on at the Antigonid, Seleukid, and Arsakid courts. For an Argead, the office was a double-edged sword: a reward for his confidants’ loyalty obliging them to protect his life and also the risk of having high-ranked armed warriors within striking distance.   S. Müller Cf. Heckel, W., Somatophylakia: A Macedonian cursus honorum, Phoenix 40 (1986), 279-94; Heckel 2016, 245-59; Kienast, D., Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden, 1973, 255-68.

Sparta During their rule of Makedonia, the Argeads oscillated between hostility and accord toward Sparta, which the Argeads often exploited as a counterweight against → Athens in their search for security. → Herodotos, our earliest extant source on Spartan-Makedonian relations, briefly notes → Amyntas I’s offer of refuge to the Peisistratid Hippias following the Spartans’ failed attempt to reinstate him in Athens c. 505 (5.94.1). Amyntas’ son, → Alexander I, engaged far more with the Spartans during the Persian Wars, though again indirectly, first when his attempt to win over the Athenians prompted the Spartans to send envoys to Athens to ensure the continued health of their alliance against Persia (Hdt. 8.136-144). Later, Alexander had the Athenians transmit crucial information to the Spartan regent Pausanias concerning the Persian commander Mardonios’ situation (Hdt. 9.44-45; cf. 7.173.3, 175.1). Evidence on direct relations with S. becomes more copious in → Thucydides’ History, which notes → Perdikkas II’s encouragement of S. to go to war in 432 with Athens, a recent ally of his rebellious brother, Philip (1.57). Perdikkas played fast and loose with S. throughout the → Peloponnesian War, as in 424 when he aided the Spartan general Brasidas’ campaign in the Thrace-ward region but later withdrew much of his support after Brasidas failed to bolster Perdikkas’ ambitions in the Lynkestian area (Thuc. 4.83). In 423, after abandoning the Spartans to face a hostile force of Illyrians and Lynkestians, Perdikkas deemed Brasidas an enemy, prevented reinforcements from reaching him, and made peace with Athens out of hatred 476

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for the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 4.125-132). Although Perdikkas joined S.’s alliance with → Argos in 418 (Thuc. 5.80.2, 83.4; cf. 6.7.3-4), by 414 he was back on the side of the Athenians, with whom he then attacked Amphipolis (Thuc. 7.9). Perdikkas’ successor, → Archelaos, due to the decline of Athenian sea power and the capture of → Pydna in 410 (Diod. 13.49.1-2; cf. Xen. Hell. 1.1.12), gained a level of security that allowed him to maintain neutrality with both Athens and S. for the rest of the Peloponnesian War ([Herod.] Peri Politeias 19). The evidence on Spartan-Makedonian relations in the 4th c. remains sparse until → Philip II’s victory at → Chaironeia in 338 and the establishment in 337 of the → Korinthian League, to which all the major Greek poleis belonged except for S. After invading S. in winter 338/7, Philip II distributed long-contested portions of Spartan territory to the Lakedaimonians’ rivals in the Peloponnese: Argos, Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Elis—thus ensuring S.’s status as a second-rank Greek power (cf. Polyb. 9.33.8-12; 18.14; Tac. Ann. 4.43.1-3; Plut. Mor. 235A-B; Paus. 2.20.1, 38.5; 5.4.9; 7.11.2). Relations between Makedonia and S. remained quiet until 331, when the Spartan king Agis III, with Peloponnesian allies and Persian support, declared war against Makedonia, then under the regency of → Antipatros while → Alexander III was in Asia. The Battle of Megalopolis, which briefly marked S.’s return to hegemony over the smaller Peloponnesian poleis, ended in 330 with Antipatros’ victory and demand for 50 elite Spartan hostages, Agis’ death, and S.’s transformation into a negligible Peloponnesian community (Aischin. 3.165; Dein. 1.34; Diod. 17.62-63; Curt. 6.1; cf. Arr. An. 3.16.10; Plut. Ages. 15.4). S.’s recent losses and reduced state explains its absence from the Lamian War (323-22). S. likewise stayed out of the conflicts that embroiled much of the Peloponnese in the struggles of the Diadochoi after Antipatros’ death in 319.   E.G. Millender Cf. Cartledge, P., Sparta and Lakonia, 1979; Cartledge, P./Spawforth, A., Hellenistic and Roman Sparta, 20022, 3-27; Hammond/Griffith 1979; Kralli, I., The Hellenistic Peloponnese, 2017, 49-84; Shipley, D.G.J., The Early Hellenistic Peloponnese, 2018, 1-52.

Stageira Stageira was founded in the 7th c. by settlers from Andros (Thuc. 4.88.2; 5.6.1) on a strategic site controlling the western entrance to the Strymonic Gulf and the

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silver → mines of northeastern Chalkidike, which allowed early prosperity and the minting of coins already by the late 6th c. Walled since the archaic period, S. occupied a promontory consisting of two hills, with the agora between them; three sanctuaries, one of them dedicated to Demeter, have been identified. Briefly mentioned in the context of Xerxes’ march in 480 (Hdt. 7.115), S. was a member of the Delian League from 454/3 to 429/8, paying 1.000 drs. per year. In 424, the city revolted and joined the Spartans under Brasidas (Thuc. 4.88.2). Under the terms of the Peace of → Nikias in 421, S. became autonomous but tributary to → Athens (Thuc. 5.18.5). By the 380s, S. must have joined the Chalkidic League, but does not appear in our sources for the struggle between the League, → Sparta, Athens, and Makedonia for control over the area. In 349, a year before the destruction of → Olynthos and the dissolution of the League, Philip II razed S. (Diod. 16.52.9) and expelled or enslaved its citizens, who were allowed to return shortly later, as a personal favour to → Aristotle, S.’s most famous citizen and tutor of → Alexander III (Plut. Alex. 7.2). Numismatic and archaeological evidence suggests that a Makedonian garrison was installed on the akropolis under Philip and Alexander; thus, S. was probably not refounded as a Makedonian city, and may have lost its independent status already by the early Hellenistic period. By the time of Strabon (7 F 35 Jones = F 15 [47-48] Radt), it was already in ruins and uninhabited.   P. Paschidis Cf. Gatzolis, C./Psoma, S., Olynthos and Stageira: Bronze Coinage and Political History, in: Duyrat, F./Grandjean, C. (eds.), Les monnaies de fouille du monde grec (VIe-Ier s. a.C.), 2016, 83-96; Sismanidis, K., Ancient Stagira, 2003; Zahrnt 1971.

Succession In Argead Makedonia, only male Argeads succeeded but there was no fixed systematic succession process. It depended on the respective political situation. According to the earliest attested list of Argeads from Perdikkas I to Alexander I (Hdt. 8.139) and a later version of the extended proto-historical genealogy from Herakles to Karanos (Diod. 7 F 17), in each generation, the rule passed on from father to son. Also in the case of the historical rulers, most often sons succeeded their fathers: Alexander I, Perdikkas II, Archelaos, Pausanias, Alexander II, Alexan­der III, Alexander IV (formally, together with his uncle). However, 478

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no such principle as primogeniture seems to have existed. S. was a matter of situational power constellations at the → court and political circumstances in the realm, not of any fixed rules. In case that the successor was still a minor, an → epitropos (guardian) acted as a regent on his behalf until he had come of age. In all likelihood, as rule in Makedonia was exclusively linked with the Argeads, an epitropos had to be an Argead, too. However, it is uncertain how the epitropos was chosen and installed and when precisely a young Argead came of age. The regency of an epitropos seems to have carried the risk for the ward to be deposed or killed such as in the case of → Orestes, Archelaos’ underage heir (Diod. 14.37.6). In any case, an epitropos probably did not mint coins in his own name. At least, we do not know any coins issued in the name of Ptolemy of Aloros who reigned on behalf of Perdikkas III in 368-65. Brothers of the previous ruler are also prominent among the Argeads who made it to the top: Perdikkas III (after the interlude of his epitropos’ regency), Philip II, and Philip III (formally, together with his nephew). Two family branches dominated Argead history: the line of Alexander I and that of Amyntas III. Assumedly, the rule of Alexander I’s line lasted from about 500/498 to the death of Pausanias in 394/3 (granted that Pausanias’ predecessor and father Aëropos II was a son of Alexander I’s son Perdikkas II). After Pausanias’ elimination, Amyntas III succeeded. His line was in charge until the end of Argead rule marked by the assassination of Alexander IV, Amyntas’ great-grandson, in 310. In addition to the basic requirement of the Argead descent, the—however flexible and changeable—symbolic capital (immaterial elements of prestige constituting social status) or ‘market value’ of an Argead future successor consisted of the following factors: the prestige, political importance, and genealogy of his maternal and paternal families, degree of being marked out by the reigning ruler, own military and political experience and skills, and in particular the dimension of support by the influential Makedonian → factions. Polygamy was a strategy to secure a sufficient number of candidates for the s. In Argead Makedonia, polygamy was a uniquely royal prerogative distinguishing the Argeads from the leading circles. It is uncertain who introduced the practice to the Argead house. Philip II is the first Argead for whom a polygamous practice is explicitly attested (Athen. 13.557B-E). But it may have been practiced before (Just. 9.8.3). While polygamy increased the number of potential successors (besides serving to establish or intensify political alliances), it also contained the risk of innerdynastic strifes, rivalry at the court, and divided leading circles. Due to their monogamous view, Greek and Roman

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authors showed a lack of understanding of the polygamous structures of the Argead court that effected their comments on the Argeads. Since in Greek and Roman eyes there could only be one legal wife (γυνή) with legitimate (γνήσιος) children, not several of them, they made erroneous statements on the social and legal status of wives and offspring in the polygamous system of the Argead court. Thus, the authors depicted these wives as mere concubines (παλλακαί), mostly of lower rank, and their children as illegitimate (νόθοι). Accordingly, one of Philip’s 7 wives, Philinna, a high-ranking Thessalian, was called a dancing-girl (saltatrix) and prostitute (scortum) (Just. 9.8.2; 13.2.11) of low and obscure birth (Plut. Alex. 77.5). Being a child of a polygamous father, even Alexander III was associated with reproaches of being illegitimate—at least according to a sensationalist anecdote (Plut. Alex. 9.4; Athen. 13.557D-E). However, all of the → women the ruler had married were his acknowledged wives and all of their children he had acknowledged were legitimate. In consequence, all of these sons were potential candidates for the s. In a polygamous court, the mother’s status of the candidate as a distinguishing mark and her networks were of special importance. Thus, Argead mothers played a role as s. advocates. A female Argead’s (flexible) symbolic capital consisted of the political and ancestral prestige of her natal family, influence of her faction at court, ability to give birth to a potential successor, and personal ability to create useful personal connections. It depended on situational, changeable power constellations. For example, their marital bond could lose its former importance. An Argead ruler could try to pave the way for his most favoured heir but he could neither fix it nor be sure that his wish would be obeyed after his death. Apparently, a last will and testament was not common in Argead Makedonia. While there exist traditions on a last will of Alexander III (Ps.-Kall. 3.32.2-33.3; LM 107-108), they are preserved by late sources and of dubious credibility. The chaos after his death and debates over the s. illustrate that there were no precautions for Alexander’s s. In general, an Argead ruler could only try to secure the s. of his favourite by supporting him during his lifetime. He had several options to do that. For example, he could enable his chosen heir to receive a distinguished education, prove himself in military, administrative, diplomatic, and political matters, and build up a public profile (by dedications, benefactions, commissions, and public appearances). As for the aspect of being involved in important diplomatic tasks, for example, the name of Perdikkas II’s son (and later successor) Archelaos appears in a partially preserved list of Makedonian oath-takers in an Athenian inscription recording a peace treaty between 480

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Perdikkas, Athens, and Arrhabaios of Lynkestis, probably in 423/2 (IG I³ 89). Archelaos is listed behind his father and his uncle Alketas. However, the thesis that the order of names reflects the order of s. (that did not exist) is untenable. Most evidence on the various possibilities of an Argead ruler to promote his son is preserved for → Philip II. He made efforts to mark Alexander out as his future successor. He invited → Aristotle to educate his son (343-40; Plut. Alex. 7.1-2), bestowed the regency of Makedonia on the 16-year-old teenager during his own absence (Plut. Alex. 9.1), and gave Alexander the chance to participate in his campaign in the Chersonese (Just. 9.1.8-9) and fight in the decisive battle of → Chaironeia in 338 (Diod. 16.86.1-4). However, after Philip’s assassination in 336, the decisive factor of Alexander’s s. was the support by the leading Makedonian factions headed by → Parmenion and → Antipatros. Thus, the outcome of a s. in Argead Makedonia was determined by the respective constellation of power at the court. In the end, the support by the most influential Makedonian circles mattered the most.   S. Müller Cf. Anson 2009; Carney 2019, 9-13; Greenwalt 1989; Hatzopoulos, M.B., Succession and Regency in Classical Macedonia, AM 4 (1986), 272-92; Müller, S., The Symbolic Capital of the Argeads, in: Müller et al. 2017, 183-98, esp. 193-5.

symposion Makedonian symposia were distinctive, selective in their borrowing from Greek practices, and played a crucial role as venues for elite display and the manifestation of royal power at the Argead → court. Although there is abundant literary evidence, most of it originates from hostile Greek sources, who fail to recognize the fundamental integrative function of Makedonian court symposia and instead highlight their excessive, extravagant, and sometimes even violent aspects in order to portray the Argeads as stereotypical tyrants and → barbaroi. There is also abundant archaeological evidence demonstrating the importance of symposia to the Argeads, not only in the layout of the palace at → Aigai, the ground floor of which was almost entirely dedicated to spacious public banquet halls, but also in the sets of elaborate metal drinking vessels, decorated gold and ivory couches, and traces of gold and purple fabric that have been found in royal and elite tombs. In keeping with the personal nature of Argead rule and the absence

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of a formal constitutional apparatus, the s. offered an opportunity for inter­action between the king and the elite (analogous to hunting and warfare), giving the king a venue to display his superiority and largesse, and his elite an arena in which they could compete with their rivals in order to advance their own positions at court. Even at the time of the early Argeads, Makedonian banquets bore little resemblance to the highly ritualized, private, and largely politically marginalized symposia of the elite in Greece, where excessive extravagance and conspicuous consumption were considered markers of social and ideological deviancy. On the contrary, Makedonian symposia were a highly public event, designed to showcase the wealth and power of the Argead rulers and enshrine their status as primi inter pares. The extravagance and luxury of Argead symposia are attested as early as → Alexander I, particularly in the sumptuous atmo­ sphere of the imagined s. in the encomion composed in his honour by the poet Bakchylides (F 20B Maehler = Athen. 2.39E-F). It is surely no coincidence that Bakchylides’ ode is reminiscent of → Herodotos’ similarly fictional description of the magnificent banquet at which → Amyntas I entertained visiting Achaimenid ambassadors (5.18-21), where there is an uneasy blend of characteristically “Greek” features (such as the prohibition on the presence of women) and eastern “foreign” elements (excessive alcohol consumption, cross-dressing, and theatricality) that were crucial features of the (almost certainly) invented tradition that Alexander I organized the assassination of the Persians in order to stake his claim to philhellenism. The s. continued to play an important role for Alexander I’s successors, particularly → Archelaos, in the affirmation of their Greek credentials and display of their royal status. Freed from external threats, Archelaos was well positioned to use the s. as a mechanism to consolidate his personal authority and add lustre to the Argead dynasty on a level far beyond his predecessors. His generous → patronage attracted renowned and highly visible Greek intellectuals, artists and cultural figures (besides → Euripides, e.g. the epic poet Choirilos of Samos, the tragic poet Agathon, and the dithyrambic poet Timotheos of Miletos) to his palace, where the public spaces were lavishly decorated with impressive large-scale panel paintings by the most illustrious artist of his time, Zeuxis of Ephesos. Clearly, this display of wealth and cultural supremacy was directed not just at the Makedonian elite but the Greek world at large. → Philip II expanded the role of the s. at the Argead court to achieve a double aim: to cement the loyalty of the elite throughout his newly-consolidated realm, and to serve as an additional facet of his effective diplomacy intended 482

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to impress his Greek allies (and eventual subjects) with his wealth and power. Philip transplanted theatrical performances from their traditional festival context into the royal s., where they joined a diverse set of competitions and other forms of entertainment designed to celebrate his personal achievements and those of the Argead dynasty. Furthermore, he encouraged (often acrimonious) competition among the guests in various ways, including composition, literary and dramatic performances, and intellectual debates. → Alexander III carried on Philip’s sympotic innovations, adapting them to his travelling court. Furthermore, as part of the ongoing remodeling of his royal image in the wake of his conquest of Persia, he adopted certain aspects of Achaimenid court ceremonial, including the hosting of thousands at mass banquets of which the opulence and splendour became legendary (see, e.g., Chares of Mytilene, BNJ 125 F 5; Douris of Samos, BNJ 76 F 49; Plut. Alex. 70.2). Like the symposia of archaic Greece, the Argead s. likely originated as a male bonding ritual, an initiatory function that it retained to a much greater extent than its Greek counterparts as a useful mechanism of reinforcing the loyalty of the Makedonian elite. For this reason, the presence of underage youths was institutionalized at Argead symposia, where young boys were employed as cup-bearers (Diod. 17.118.1; Arr. An. 7.27.2), and the → basilikoi paides served as the king’s personal attendants (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.5). Furthermore, Argead royal → women appear to have been permitted to attend, although Makedonian symposia (like Greek ones) were otherwise restricted to men. Another peculiarly Makedonian rite of passage (→ Initiation Rites) was the prohibition on reclining at symposia until one had killed a boar without using a net (Athen. 1.18A). The practice of sitting at banquets, rather than reclining, seems to have persisted in Makedonia much later than in Greece, possibly until the time of Philip II or even Alexander, perhaps because it represented Homeric practice (as suggested by → Douris of Samos, BNJ 76 F 49). It is a commonplace in the source tradition that the Makedonians drank wine unmixed with water—to the Greek view, the hallmark of a barbarian. But most of the attested incidents took place on special occasions and do not necessarily indicate a habitual practice. Furthermore, the relative dearth of kraters in the archaeological record suggests wine was not generally served pre-mixed, but guests at Argead symposia were provided with smaller vessels of unmixed wine and water that they could mix themselves in individual cups. Perhaps more significant than these differences in specific sympotic practices, the Argead s. was a public occasion, where excess was a deliberate manifestation of the rul-

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er’s self-presentation, and elite competition to advance their political careers by gaining his favour could turn violent, and sometimes even deadly. It is perhaps not surprising that the Greek sources represented the Argead s. as a symbol of tryphe (a quality associated with tyrants and barbarians), emblematic of the stereotypically primitive “otherness” of Makedonia.   F. Pownall Cf. Borza, E.N., The Symposium at Alexander’s Court, AM 3, 1983, 45-55 = Thomas, C. (ed.), Makedonika, 1995, 159-71; Carney, E.D., Symposia and the Macedonian Elite, SyllClass 18 (2007), 129-80 = Carney 2015, 225-64; Kottaridi, A., The Royal Banquet: A Capital Institution, in: Kottaridi/Walker 2011, 167-80; Müller, S., “Mehr als König Alexander hast du getrunken,” in: Hoffstadt, C./Bernasconi R. (eds.), An den Grenzen der Sucht, 2009, 205-22; Pownall 2010.

Thebes Thebes, → Boiotia’s leading city, began to influence Argead politics during her short-lived supremacy in Greece (371-62). After the victory at Leuktra (371), succeeding Sparta as Greece’s hegemon, T. developed a rigid expansionist policy engineered by her major politicians and commanders, Epameinondas and Pelopidas. In 369 and 368, Pelopidas interfered in the Thessalian policy of → Alexander II who had garrisoned Larisa and Krannon. When Thessalian circles asked T. for help, Pelopidas expelled the Makedonians and established Theban influence over → Thessaly (Diod. 15.67.3-4). Afterwards, T. exploited internal Makedonian conflicts to interfere in Makedonia. Posing as a mediator, Pelopidas reconciled Alexander II and → Ptolemy of Aloros (Plut. Pelop. 26.2-3). However, Pelopidas’ demand that Alexander had to send 30 sons of the influential Makedonian families along with his own teenage brother Philip as hostages to T. (Diod. 15.67.4; Plut. Pelop. 26.4; Just. 7.5.2) seriously damaged Alexander’s standing and paved the way to his assassination in 368 (Athen. 14.629D; Diod. 15.71.1; Plut. Pelop. 27.2). Contrary to the tale that in T. Philip was educated together with the (in fact much older) Epameinondas in his house (Diod. 16.2.23), he will have stayed in the house of the general Pammenes (Plut. Pelop. 26.5). Later on, Pammenes may have mediated the flight of his short-time employer (Diod. 16.34.1-2), Artabazos, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to Philip’s court. As a hostage in T., the leading military force in contemporary Greece, 484

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teenaged Philip may have gathered knowledge about military tactics, strategy (the oblique advance), weaponry, and inner-Greek political structures. He will have profited from his insider knowledge later when Makedonian expansion extended to Greek zones of influence and the Greek mainland. In 367/6, while Philip and his elder brother Perdikkas were still minors and Ptolemy of Aloros ruled, probably as an → epitropos on Perdikkas’ behalf, T. used inner-Makedonian feuds to interfere again. Pelopidas marched in and put Ptolemy under pressure. It is unclear what happened as Plutarch states that Ptolemy lured Pelopidas’ (probably low-paid) mercenaries (likely Pharsalians) away but ended up being forced to send 50 Makedonian hetairoi along with his own son as hostages to T. (Plut. Pelop. 27.2-4). T. did not intervene when he was killed and succeeded by → Perdikkas III in 365. About this time, Philip may have returned to Makedonia. The Theban threat vanished when first Pelopidas (364), then Epameinondas died (362) and T.’s hegemony ended. Certainly on the basis of his networks established at T., as a ruler, Philip was mostly on good relations with T. However, at his reign’s end and in Alexander III’s early years, T. proved to be an unreliable ally. In 339/8, T. asked for Philip’s help in neutralizing the last Phokian strongholds, then changed sides and joined the Hellenic League (Just. 8.1.4-5; Plut. Dem. 17.45; Diod. 16.84.3-85.4). After → Chaironeia (338), where Alexander reportedly eliminated the famous Theban Sacred Band (Plut. Alex. 9.2), contrary to Philip’s clemency towards → Athens, T. was punished by a Makedonian garrison in her Kadmeia (Diod. 16.87.3; Arr. An. 1.7.1). T. became a member of the → Korinthian League, accepting Philip’s peace order imposed on Greece. But after his death (336), T. tried to overthrow the garrison and regain her autonomy (Diod. 17.3.4). The new Makedonian regime quickly appeared with an army before the Kadmeia and quenched the unrest with this threatening gesture (Diod. 17.4.45). In 335, again, triggered by rumors that Alexander had died on his Illyrian campaign, T. openly revolted against Makedonia. Spurred on by Theban exiles who had returned from Athens, the unrest was initiated by a programmatic attack on the Makedonian garrison (Diod. 17.8.3-4; Arr. An. 1.7.1-3). Philotas, the Makedonian phrourarchos of the Kadmeia (Diod. 17.8.7), is surely not identical with the famous → Philotas, son of Parmenion. It was the third time that T. broke her alliance with Makedonia in a short span. The Thebans are reported to have appealed to the other Greeks by propagating their desire to free Greece from the (Makedonian) tyrant and stressing their own good relations with Persia (Diod. 17.9.5-6). While → Demosthenes and his faction showed willingness to

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support T., Athens did not send any troops (Diod. 17.8.5-6; Just. 11.3.3-5; Plut. Dem. 23.2). In the end, T. stood alone against the Makedonians, who arrived quickly. T. rejected their attempt to settle the conflict diplomatically. The resurrection was brief; T. was captured. A Greek council consisting of Makedonia’s allies against T.—Phokis, Thespiai, Plataiai, and Orchomenos, former “victims” of T.’s policy—decided upon T.’s fate (Just. 11.3.8-11; Plut. Alex. 11.5-6; Arr. An. 1.9.9-10; Diod. 17.14.1-3). It was certainly a synedrion representing the Korinthian League or at least regarded as such by the Makedonians. However, they will have controlled the outcome. As a result, T. was razed to the ground, except for the Kadmeia where the Makedonian garrison was reinstalled (Diod. 17.13.3-4; Just. 11.4.7-9; Anonym., BNJ 148, F 1.2). The tradition that Alexander spared the house of Pindar who sang the praise of his ancestor → Alexander I (Ail. VH 13.7; Plut. Alex. 11.5-6; Arr. An. 1.9.10), is likely a product of myth-making. T.’s territory was given to Makedonia’s Greek allies. The Theban women and children who had survived the massacre were enslaved (Plut. Alex. 11.6; Diod. 17.14.1). Aischines likely voiced the thoughts of many Greeks stating that T.’s fate was brutal but just (dikaios: 3.133), a deserved punishment for her former political misbehavior in Greece. Besides intimidation and punishment, the Makedonian treatment of T. may also have been an attempt to gain sympathy, acceptance, and perhaps gratitude from Greeks who had suffered from T.’s politics. Philip had already played this card by supporting Orchomenos’ refounding after Chaironeia, and patronizing Plataiai and Thespiai (Paus. 4.27.10; 9.1.8, 37.8). However, in the course of reception the complex event was mostly reduced to the image of Alexander as T.’s destroyer (Polyb. 38.2.13-14; Just. 11.4.7; Plut. Mor. 342D). The hypothesis that Alexander wanted to punish T. because the city once had allegedly offered support to his cousin → Amyntas Perdikkou, against him cannot be substantiated. Regarding the fate of T., Alexander’s sister → Kleopatra and her husband Alexander the Molossian seem to have taken a public stand for him: they called their daughter, who might have been born shortly after T.’s fall, Kadmeia (Plut. Pyrrh. 5.5), probably in order to commemorate T.’s defeat. After the destruction, T.’s citizenship did not cease to exist. Many Thebans had fled to Athens. After → Issos (333), → Parmenion captured also two envoys from T. who were present at Dareios’ camp, Thessaliskos and Dionysodoros (Arr. An. 2.15.2-3). They will have tried to get help from Dareios. Thessaliskos’ ancestor Ismenias had received Persian subsidies in a comparable situation when, on the eve of the Korinthian War, T. wanted to get rid of Sparta as the new hegemonic 486

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power over Greece. Alexander released the Theban envoys. With their city, they had lost a solid base for any organization of resistance. → Kassandros reestablished T. in 316/5 (Diod. 19.54.1-3).   S. Müller Cf. Berman, D.W., Myth, Literature, and the Creation of the Topography of Thebes, 2015, 176-7; Hammond, N.G.L., What may Philip have learnt as a Hostage at Thebes, GRBS 38 (1997), 355-72; Hatzopoulos 1985; Müller, S., Alexander and Macedonian Relations with Thebes, Anabasis 9 (2019), 21-39; Rockwell, N., Thebes: A History, 2017, 129-40.

Theopompos of Chios Born in the late 5th c. (BNJ 115 T 1 and 3b), Theopompos was exiled along with his father, who had been convicted of laconism (T 2), probably in the wake of the Chians’ expulsion of their Spartan garrison following the Battle of Knidos in 394 (Diod. 14.84.3). T. travelled widely throughout the Greek world (F 25), including a widely-attested sojourn at Isokrates’ school of rhetoric in → Athens. After an illustrious career as an epideictic orator (T 21), he turned to the composition of historiographical works. Only four (lexicographical) fragments are extant from his Epitome of Herodotos in two books (F 1-4); it is not clear whether it represents an early work for his own use, or was composed later while he was at the Argead → court, in conjunction with → Philip II’s preparations for the campaign against Persia. His Hellenika in 12 books, however, was already published (at least, in part) by the time that T. was present at Philip’s court in 343/2 (T 7). The Hellenika continued the work of → Thucydides, covering events in Greece from the Battle of Kynossema in 411 (where Thucydides left off) to the Spartans’ defeat at the Battle of Knidos in 394 (T 13 and 14), spelling the end to → Sparta’s short-lived attempt at a naval empire; T.’s unusually effusive praise of Lysandros (F 20; cf. F 333) hints also at a pro-Spartan bias. The Hellenika endowed T. with sufficient gravitas as a historiographer to elicit the invitation to → Pella, where T. was one of a number of Greek intellectuals who jostled for position and favour from Philip in the cut-throat atmosphere of the Argead court (T 7; cf. T 5c). It is almost certainly there (and possibly at Philip’s own invitation) that T. began to collect material for his magnum opus, the Philippika, a massive and meandering work in 58 books loosely focused around the life and times of its namesake.

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Although T. claims in the preface that he decided to write the Philippika because “Europe had never before produced a man such as Philip, the son of Amyntas” (F 27), the extant fragments reveal that T. was vehemently critical of Philip throughout, condemning him with often sensationalistic vitriol for his dissolute behaviour, love of luxury, sexual deviance, extravagance, debauchery, and frequent intoxication (it should be noted, however, that all of these alleged vices derive from the stereotypical → topoi of invective against tyrants and ‘barbarians’). Despite this damning indictment of Philip’s character, T. was unable to deny his spectacular political and military success, which he attributed to his uncanny ability to corrupt others (F 224 and 225), the enervation of the contemporary Greeks that rendered them ineffectual opponents (F 85-100), and the role of luck (F 237a). The vehemence of T.’s denunciations of Philip, as well as the consistent references to him in the past tense, suggest that the Philippika were not published until after Philip’s death. T.’s relations with → Alexander III are equally inconsistent as with his father. On the one hand, T. is said to have been restored to Chios by Alexander (T 2), likely through the decree of 332 ordering the return of all Chian exiles (Syll.³ 283), where he reported to Alexander on his political rivals (F 252) and on the activities of Harpalos (F 253-254); he is also credited with an encomion of Alexander (F 244; cf. T 8 and 48). On the other hand, he is attested to have composed a Reproach of Alexander (T 8). After Alexander’s death, no longer welcome in the Greek world, T. is said to have fled to → Ptolemy’s court, where he did not obtain a warm reception either (T 2).   F. Pownall Cf. Flower, M.A., Theopompus of Chios, 1994; Natoli 2004, 56-9; Pownall 2004, 143-75; Pownall 2005; Shrimpton, G.S., Theopompus the Historian, 1991.

Thermaic Gulf Known as Θερμαῖος κόλπος, Thermaicus sinus, also Macedonicus sinus. The T. G., named after the city of → Therme, lies between the western coast of the Chalkidike, the southern coast of Bottiaia and the eastern coast of Pieria and → Thessaly. Ps.-Skylax (66) and Mela (2.2.35) put the western beginning of the Gulf at the mouth of the River Peneios. According to Strabon (2.1.40, 5.21; 7.7.4), the inner corner of the T. G., to the northeast, was used as an 488

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orientation point, for travellers inland followed a line to the northwest heading to Epidamnos and those travelling by sea southwards to Sounion. When the Makedonians expanded from their original nucleus around Mt. Bermion, expelled the Bottiaians from their dwellings around the T. G. (Thuc. 2.99) and reached the region, they were in possession of new lands as well as of four → rivers ending at the coast: Haliakmon, Loudias, Axios, and Echedoros (modern Gallikos). These rivers deposited huge quantities of water and sediment in the Gulf, enough to create marshland. Thus, the rivers not only were enriching the T. G. but also defined its shores and the parameters for large settlements to be founded, inhabited by people of the lowlands who accepted the sovereignty of the Argeads. The geographical and commercial importance of the T. G. was acknowledged already in antiquity, as it is the main entrance to inland → Makedonia by sea (where modern Thessalonike is situated) and the major connection with the Aegean Sea (Hdt. 7.121-123, following Hekataios, BNJ 1 F 146).   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Külzer, A., Thermaios Kolpos, DNP 12 (2002), 413; Oberhummer, E., Thermaeischer Golf, RE 5A (1934), 2377; Sprawski 2010, 131-3; Thomas, C.G., The Physical Kingdom, in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 68-70.

Therme Therme (Θέρμη) is first mentioned by Hekataios as a city on the coast of the → Thermaic Gulf, which took its name from this city, inhabited by “Greek Thracians” (BNJ 1 F 146 Ἑκαταῖος Εὐρώπῃ: “ἐν δ᾽αὐτῷ Θέρμη πόλις Ἑλλήνων Θρηίκων”), a phrase that led to the suggestion that T. was a non-Greek city. → Theopompos mentions it as a Thracian settlement (BNJ 115 F 140). However, it was probably a Greek colonial settlement (the term Θρηίκων being geographical) inhabited by a mixed population, and conquered by the Makedonians in an early phase of their expansion. It is believed that T. was located near modern Mikro Karabournaki, to the south of Thessalonike. There is no evidence that T. was a polis in the political sense; instead, it is mentioned as an urban settlement by Ps.-Skylax (66) and → Herodotos in his narrative on the → Persian Wars, where it seems that T. was the base for both the Persian army and navy (7.121, 124.1, 127.1, 179.1, 183). T. always belonged to the Makedonian kingdom except for the

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period 432/1, when it came under Athenian control (Thuc. 1.57-61.2). However, T. never became a member of the Delian League, as it is not mentioned in the “Thracian district” of the Tribute Lists of any year, and was soon returned to → Perdikkas II (Thuc. 2.29.6). It was taken by the pretender to the Makedonian throne Pausanias in 368 (Aischin. 2.27) and remained a Makedonian city until the foundation of Thessalonike in 316/15.   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Errington, M., Therme, DNP 12 (2002), 413; Flensted-Jensen, P., Thrace from Axios to Strymon, in: Hansen/Nielsen 2004, 810-53, esp. 18-9; Oberhummer, E., Therme, RE 5A (1934), 2391-2; Papazoglou, F., Les villes de Macédoine, 1988, 190-6.

Thessalonike   see City-Foundations; Kassandros; Marriage Policy Thessaly There is much to indicate that there was constant contact between the inhabitants of Makedonia and Thessaly. The two regions were connected by several routes. Similarities can be observed in the areas of language, cult, → calendar and some customs (e.g., the karpaia dance), although they are usually attested only for the post-Argead period. A tradition has survived which links the Makedonians to the Magnetes, their closest neighbours. In the (Ps.)-Hesiodic Cata­ logue of Women, dated to the 6th c., Makedon and Magnes were presented as brothers (F 7.3), “rejoicing in horses, who dwell round about Pieria and Olympos.” In another tradition (Hdt. 1.56.3) Makednon is located in T. between Mt. → Olympos and Mt. Ossa, but its connection to Makedon and the Makedones is not obvious. Apart from the genealogical tradition on the early relationship between the Thessalians and the Makedonians, only Plutarch’s comment has survived about them being “most bitter enemies” (Mor. 868E). Contrary to this opinion, the choice of political allies could have brought the Argeads and the Thessalians closer together, as illustrated by their relations with the → Peisistratids (Hdt. 5.94) and the Persian Empire. The → Aleuads of Larisa, who were attempting to achieve political domination in T. in the early 5th c., opened friendly relations with Xerxes against their compatriots and, in → Herodotos’ opinion (7.6, 130), together with the Peisistratids were to persuade him to attack Greece. 490

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On the eve of Xerxes’ attack, → Alexander I advised the Greeks not to attempt to defend the pass through the Valley of Tempe (7.173), which led to the collapse of the anti-Persian alliance in T. and consequently strengthened the political leadership of the Aleuads. During the invasion, Alexander I and the Aleuads were in the entourage of Xerxes and Mardonios, and their territories served the Persian army as bases and winter camps. Unfortunately, Herodotos is consistently silent about any relations between them. The victory of the anti-Persian coalition weakened the position of the Aleuads and internal rivalry allowed the Thessalians to play only a supporting role on the Greek political stage. Representatives of wealthy and influential families maintained personal contacts with leaders of other regions (including → Athens and → Sparta), looking after their own interests. They included the Argeads, which is confirmed by → Thucydides for the first time when he describes the circumstances of Brasidas’ army’s march to Makedonia in 424 (4.132.2), stating that → Perdikkas II “put in motion his friends in T., with whose chief men he always took care to have relations.” With their help, he was able to open or block the passage of foreign armies through T. Thucydides only names Nikonidas of Larisa, which may indicate that this city played a special role in the network of Makedonian contacts (4.78.2, 132.2). Hellanokrates, → Archelaos’ protégé, who was at his → court and had a hand in the king’s assassination in 399, came from this city (Arist. Pol. 1311B). Some believe that he was a hostage captured during a possible Makedonian military intervention in T. in the late 5th c., as indicated by testimonies that are difficult to interpret. Regardless of the historicity of this intervention, the Argeads kept some friends among the Thessalians and it was with their help that → Amyntas III was to restore his rule, which he had lost after the Illyrian invasion (Diod. 14.92.3). In the mid-370s, all of T. was united under the rule of Iason of Pherai, who developed a program, dangerous for his neighbours, of building a strong state capable of joining the rivalry for hegemony in the Greek world. Part of his program was to ensure permanent control over the perioikoi and to forge alliances with other neighbours, as well as to win the leading role for the Thessalians in the → Delphic Amphiktyony. Pursuing his plans, in 371 he formed an alliance with Amyntas, which weakened the position of the Aleuads of La­risa, his potential rivals and at the same time traditional allies of the Makedonian kings. The agreement may have involved deliveries of Makedonian → timber for expanding the fleet (Xen. Hell. 6.1.11; Diod. 15.60.2). It can be assumed that the price for the alliance was to give Amyntas control of the northern part of Per-

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rhaibia. Iason’s unexpected death in 370 ruined many of his plans, although his successors managed to keep the office of tagos and the dominant position in T. However, violence could not be avoided, as a result of which many Larisians were exiled (Xen. Hell. 6.4.33-34). When Iason’s nephew, Alexander of Pherai, succeeded in 369 after another assassination, the Aleuads of Larisa summoned → Alexander II for help (Diod. 15.61.3-5). Expecting an intervention, the tagos prepared an attack against Makedonia, but the king pre-empted his manoeuvre and unexpectedly entered T., accompanied by the exiles. He was let into Larisa through treason and then took this city’s citadel and the neighbouring city of Krannon. He stationed garrisons in both cities, which may have been necessary for defending them against Alexander of Pherai, or perhaps the king started to implement his own political plans. In 368, the Thebans answered the summons for an intervention in T. (which probably came from Pharsalos). Pelopidas led an army to Larisa and took over the city from the Makedonian garrison through an agreement. Then he attempted to forge an alliance between Alexander of Pherai and his Thessalian opponents. Summoned by Alexander II and → Ptolemy of Aloros, who were competing for power, Pelopidas also entered Makedonia, where he formed an alliance with Alexander II and took hostages, including the future king → Philip II (Diod. 15.67.3-4; Plut. Pelop. 26.1-4). The order Pelo­pidas established both in Makedonia and T. proved short-lived and required more interventions before Alexander’s rule could be restricted to the territory of Pherai in 364. However, the tyrant remained a dangerous opponent until his death, forcing the Thessalian League and Athens to forge an alliance against him in 361/0. In 358 Alexander of Pherai was murdered as a result of a plot organized by his wife and her brothers—Tisiphon, Lykophron and Peitholaos, Iason’s sons. The brothers took over control of Alexander’s mercenaries and returned to their father’s plans. The Aleuads of Larisa felt threatened enough to summon the new ruler of Makedonia, Philip II, for help (Diod. 16.14.1-2). The chronology of Philip’s interventions in T. is unclear. It is hypothesized that the first intervention took place in 358 and led to the reconciliation of the conflicting sides. It must have been important for Philip to secure support from the Thessalians and their excellent cavalry as well as to control the communication routes leading south (Dem. 18.146; Just. 7.6.8-9). However, he did not tie himself to one side of the conflict, but backed various cities, playing on their mutual animosities (Dem. 19.36; Polyain. 4.2.19). One element of this policy were his marriages—with Philinna of Larisa and with Nikesipolis, Iason of Pherai’s niece. The outbreak of 492

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the so-called → Third Sacred War in 356 forced Philip to become fully engaged in Thessalian affairs. The Thessalians, as members of the Amphiktyonic League, started a war with the Phokians, who occupied Delphi. The humiliating defeat of the Thessalian forces induced Iason’s sons to form an alliance with the Phokians, so that they could fight for the control of T. with their help. Unable to oppose the alliance, the Larisians summoned Philip again. In 353 the Phokian general Onomarchos joined forces with Lykophron of Pherai and defeated Philip twice. The unexpected defeats and large losses subverted the trust of the Makedonian soldiers and Thessalian allies in the Makedonian king. Philip got the situation under control with difficulty and decided to continue the war. In the next year he persuaded the Thessalians to undertake a joint operation against Lykophron, and he gathered over 20.000 foot soldiers and 3000 cavalrymen. To raise their spirits, he ordered his soldiers to wear laurel wreaths to show that they were fighting on Apollon’s side. This time, he won an undisputed victory in the Battle of the → Crocus Field in the region of Almyros against the army of Onomarchos, who had come to the Pheraians’ aid (Diod. 16.35). Despite routing his opponents, however, Philip did not decide to attack Phokis and bring the war to an end, reconciling himself to taking control of the situation in T. He captured Pagasai, the main Thessalian port belonging to the Pheraians and, as a result of a deal with Iason’s sons, also Pherai itself (Diod. 16.37.3, 38.1-2). The victory over the tyrants of Pherai and the Phokians, the Thessalians’ traditional enemies, brought Philip great popularity. He was seen as their friend, their benefactor, and their deliverer. He was trusted more than any Thessalian and was given the right to command the joint army and to collect trade and port fees for funding war operations. The Magnetes found themselves under his immediate control. He appointed his own steward for the Perrhaibians and the other Thessalian neighbours became his allies (Isok. 5.20-21; Dem. 1.22; 18.43; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 81; Philoch., BNJ 328 F 56). He found numerous followers who, with his support, held direct power in many cities in the region, which → Demosthenes (6.22) described as a rule of dekarchy. → Theopompos (BNJ 115 F 49) stated ironically that a shared affinity for sumptuous feasts made it easier for Philip to earn the Thessalians’ trust. The situation in T. was not stable, however. Conflicts broke out between and within cities, provoking Philip to station his garrisons there (Dem. 7.32; 8.59; 9.12; 19.260). He was forced to intervene in Pherai, which was opposed to him. The Thessalians openly demanded a continuation of the war against the Phokians and the restoration of their leadership in the Amphik-

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tyony, and rebelled when he dragged his feet about fulfilling his promises, while using the funds assigned to war activities (Dem. 1.22; 2.11; 5.23). In 346 Philip fulfilled the promises he had made, ended the war against the Phokians and enabled the Thessalians to take over the leadership of the Amphiktyony. With their support, he was also given a seat in its Council. In 339 the Amphiktyony under Thessalian leadership provoked the outbreak of war against Amphissa, and promptly entrusted Philip with conducting it (Aischin. 3.128; Dem. 18.151, 155). The aftermath of these events was his conflict with Athens and → Thebes and the Battle of → Chaironeia in 338. By working together with Philip, the Thessalians achieved political success which they would not have accomplished on their own. Some of them, especially the citizens of Pharsalos (such as Daochos), achieved great significance; some lost their positions (such as the sons of Iason in Pherai or the Aleuads in Larisa). For Philip’s fast-growing hegemony, wealthy T. was a source of additional income; he could probably use its famous cavalry and its cultural capital. However, he did not keep control of T. by integrating it closely with his kingdom. He used his position to strengthen the structures of the Thessalian League by appointing trusted people as tetrarchs who headed the four regions (tetrads) of T. (Dem. 9.26; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 208). The dominant opinion is that he was elected the formal leader of the Thessalian League, although no source attests it directly and we know very little about the position and its jurisdiction. The establishment of a new multi-sided alliance known as the → Korinthian League in 337 probably did not weaken the Thessalians’ position as Philip’s closest Greek allies. They entered the alliance as a separate political body, in a similar way as the much less numerous Perrhaibians. It can be deduced on the basis of a fragmentary inscription (RO no. 76) that they were given quite a large representation in the League’s council and it was mainly their votes that → Alexander III tried to win when he strove for hegemony over the League after his father’s death. On this occasion, he also stressed their shared blood ties through Herakles, who was also believed to be an ancestor of Thessalos and → Achilles (Diod. 17.4.1; Just. 11.3.1-2). During Alexander’s expedition to Asia, a contingent of 2000 Thessalian cavalrymen, accompanying him as far as Ekbatana, played a prominent role, as it contributed greatly to his military victories (Curt. 6.6.35). Some Thessalians, such as Medeios of Larisa, remained part of his closest entourage until the end of his days. Despite some unrest, T. remained loyal to the dynasty and → Antipatros until the outbreak of the Lamian War. In 323, however, the Thessalian cavalry abandoned the Make494

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donians for reasons that are unclear, and following in its footsteps, most of the country joined the Greek coalition. The Thessalian cavalry contributed greatly to the Greek defeat of → Leonnatos’ army, which was marching to help Antipatros. After the Battle of Krannon in 322, Antipatros, forcibly breaking the resistance of city after city, did actually conquer T. (Diod. 18.17.7), which permanently changed the nature of its relations with Makedonian rulers. The relations were no longer significantly influenced by the fact that there was Thessalian blood in the veins of the last of the Argeads: → Philip III Arrhidaios, son of Philinna of Larisa, and Thessalonike, daughter of Nikesipolis of Pherai and wife of → Kassandros.   S. Sprawski Cf. Graninger, D., Macedonia and Thessaly in: Roisman/Worthington 2010, 306-25; Müller 2016, 21-2, 153, 155, 184-6, 202-4, 219-22, 252-4 ; Sordi, M., Larissa e la dinastia Aleuade, Aevum 70 (1996), 47-54; Sprawski, S., Philip II and the Freedom of the Thessalians, Electrum 9 (2003), 55-66; Westlake, H.D., Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C., 1935.

Third Sacred War The Third Sacred War (it should be noted that the numbered series of Sacred Wars is a modern convention) was a prolonged struggle (356-46) between the Phokians and the → Delphic Amphiktyony for control of the wealthy and powerful sanctuary of Apollon. In 357/6, the Thebans took advantage of → Sparta’s current weakness, → Athens’ embroilment in the Social War, factional politics at Delphi, and civil strife in Phokis itself, to settle a longstanding grudge against the Phokians, indicting them before the Delphic Amphiktyony on a charge of cultivating sacred land (Diod. 16.23.3; Paus. 10.15.1; cf. Paus. 10.2.1; Just. 8.1.5). Unable to pay the large fine that was levied upon them, and faced with the threat of an Amphiktyonic judgement against them, the desperate Phokians followed the advice of Philomelos, a member of the Phokian elite, to seize the sanctuary of Apollon at Delphi, on the grounds that it was theirs by ancestral right (Il. 2.517519). Elected strategos autokrator, and receiving (secret) financial assistance from Sparta with which he hired a force of mercenaries, Philomelos proceeded to seize the sanctuary, although he guaranteed the safety of the sacred treasures (Diod. 16.24, 27; Paus. 10.2.3-4; Just. 8.1.8; cf. Polyain. 5.45). Following Philo-

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melos’ initial military successes (Diod. 16.24.3-5, 28.3-4), the Delphic Amphi­ ktyony formally declared war against the Phokians in 355, and hostilities began in earnest, prompting Philomelos to use the sanctuary’s considerable resources to recruit a still larger force of mercenaries, allowing him to defeat (in separate engagements) the Lokrians, Thebans, and Thessalians (Diod. 16.30). Philomelos’ string of military successes ran out at Neon, however, where he was heavily outnumbered by the Thebans, commanded by Pammenes (at whose home → Philip II had stayed as a hostage: Plut. Pelop. 26.4). In the ensuing rout, hemmed in against the slopes of Mt. Parnassos, Philomelos chose to commit suicide by leaping off a cliff rather than risk capture and torture as a temple-robber (Diod. 16.31.3-4; Paus. 10.2.4); he was succeeded as strategos autokrator by his second in command, Onomarchos (Diod. 16.31.5; Paus. 10.2.3). Onomarchos continued to plunder even more unscrupulously from the sacred treasures of the sanctuary, forging the bronze and iron into weapons and striking coinage from the silver and gold to hire still more mercenaries (Diod. 16.33.2). Having reinforced his army, Onomarchos overran Lokris and Doris, and entered → Boiotia (taking advantage of Pammenes’ absence in Asia Minor, where he was supporting the rebellious satrap Artabazos), capturing Orchomenos (Diod. 16.33.3-4). It is at this point that Philip II, who had previously been occupied with the siege of → Methone, entered the conflict for the first time at the invitation of his Thessalian allies, the → Aleuads of Larisa, who asked him to intervene in their ongoing struggle with Lykophron of Pherai, who was allied with the Phokians (Diod. 16.35.1; cf. 16.14.2; Polyain. 4.2.19). Onomarchos attempted to forestall the union of Philip’s troops with the Thessalians by dispatching his brother Phayllos to Pherai, but Philip defeated Phayllos’ preliminary force (Diod. 16.35.1), forcing Onomarchos to abandon his invasion of Boiotia (Diod. 15.33.4), and hasten to → Thessaly with the entire Phokian army (Diod. 16.35.2). There, he defeated Philip in two engagements, forcing him to retreat to Makedonia (Diod. 16.35.12; Polyain. 2.38.2). These unexpected losses rattled the Makedonian army, and some soldiers even deserted (Diod. 16.35.2). Onomarchos, on the other hand, encouraged by this success, failed to follow up on his victory in Thessaly, but returned to Boiotia and captured Koroneia (Diod. 16.35.2; Ephoros, BNJ 115 F 94a). At the beginning of the next spring (352), Philip returned to Thessaly with a larger army, and awaited the arrival of Onomarchos and his troops, summoned once again by Lykophron of Pherai, on the Krokion Pedion, from which the ensuing engagement derives its colourful modern name, the Battle 496

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of the → Crocus Field. Eager to instill morale into his discouraged troops and to remind them that they were nominally fighting on behalf of Apollon against the despoilers of the sanctuary, Philip had them don laurel wreaths as they marched into battle (Just. 8.2.3-4). He won a bloody and decisive victory over the Phokians, who suffered more than 6000 casualties, many of whom, including Onomarchos, were slaughtered as they attempted to swim out to the ships of the Athenian general Chares in the Gulf of Pagasai; at least 3000 were also taken prisoner (Diod. 16.35.5-6). Philip hanged (Diod. 16.35.6) or crucified (Diod. 16.61.2) Onomarchos’ corpse, and threw the rest into the sea as temple-robbers. Encouraged by his success in Thessaly, and perhaps realizing the extent to which he could capitalize on his newfound role as Apollon’s defender as a means of legitimizing his entrance into the mainstream of Greek political and military affairs, Philip prepared to extend his influence farther south. The Phokians, however, under the command of Onomarchos’ brother Phayllos, organized a defense at Thermopylai with the support of the Athenians, and successfully prevented Philip from advancing through the pass and gaining access to southern Greece (Diod. 16.38.1-2; Just. 8.2.8; Dem. 4.17; 18.32; 19.84, 318-319). This was the last decisive action in the war, which disintegrated into a tedious attrition marked by indecisive Phokian skirmishing, first under Phayllos and then under his successor Phalaikos (Diod. 16.38.6: son of Onomarchos; Paus. 10.2.7: son of Phayllos). In 347, Phalaikos was accused of stealing the sacred treasures for his own personal use, deposed from his command, and replaced by a board of three generals (Diod. 16.56.3; Paus. 10.2.7). By this time, the Thebans had exhausted their financial and military resources and appealed to Philip for assistance and an alliance (Diod. 16.58.2, 59.2; cf. Dem. 18.19). Philip seized the opportunity and advanced to Thermopylai; the Athenians and Spartans quickly sent troops to defend the pass (Aischin. 2.132-133; Diod. 16.59.1). But Phalaikos, who had somehow regained his position as Phokian commander, reached a secret agreement with Philip, dismissed the Athenian and Spartan troops, and handed over the pass to Philip (Diod. 16.59.2-3; cf. Aischin. 2.135; Dem. 19.58; Just. 8.4.12). Phalaikos negotiated safe conduct for himself and his mercenaries to the Peloponnese, leaving his fellow Phokians to surrender unconditionally to Philip (Diod. 16.59.3). Philip continued his role as the defender of Apollon by calling a council of the Delphic Amphiktyony to decide the fate of the Phokians, although he used his influence to ensure that their punishment was a relatively moderate one (Phokis was a useful counterweight to Theban ambitions in central Greece).

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The Phokian poleis were to be razed (their inhabitants scattered in villages), the Phokians themselves disarmed, and all their horses to be sold. They were to repay the funds that had been plundered from the sanctuary, and their membership in the Delphic Amphiktyony was revoked, with their two votes given to Philip (Diod. 16.60; Paus. 10.3.1-3; cf. Just. 8.5.5-6). Philip’s intervention in the T. S. W. resulted in his control of the Delphic Amphiktyony (through his own two votes and his sway over Thessaly), and legitimized the extension of his power to central Greece.   F. Pownall Cf. Buckler 1989; Londey, P., Philip II and the Delphic Amphictyony, MedArch 7 (1994), 25-34; Pownall, F., What Makes a War a Sacred War?, EMC/CV 17 (1998), 35-55; Sánchez, P., L’amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes, 2001, 173-219; Worthington 2008, 53-73, 84-104.

Thrace Modern perceptions of ancient relations between the regions of Thrace and Makedonia are driven largely by a comparatively small number of historical incidents involving the ruling dynasties of Odrysian T. and Argead Makedonia (notably the invasion of Chalkidike by King Sitalkes in 429: Thuc. 2.97-101; and the conquest of Odrysian T. by → Philip II in 342-40: Diod. 16.71.1). There is no reason to think that either inter-state or general cultural relations were, at other times, anything but well mannered. Sitalkes’ campaign ended in a dynastic marriage, between → Perdikkas II’s sister, Stratonike, and Sitalkes’ nephew and successor, Seuthes ((I): Thuc. 2.101). Philip II’s conquest of the Odrysian kingdom resulted in the acquisition of substantial territories by the Makedonians; but Odrysian Thracians were later serving in the armies of → Alexander III (Diod. 17.17.3), and taking up valuable positions as privileged settlers in Egypt, where they enjoyed the same status as Greeks or Makedonians such as the Thracians (identifiable by their names) in a settlement with a recognizably Thracian name— Maron (CT I, 143, 145; II, 26.110, 113, 189: Dizoulas, Spartakos, ?Teres). The outcomes, even from this small sample of encounters, show that the assumptions about mutual relations often made by modern scholars (whose experience is inadvertently shaped by categories based on nation states) underestimate the scope of neighbourly interaction. There was no collective Thracian polity, only 498

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many different communities, who were grouped into larger collectives at various times in classical antiquity, but whose political relationships are not recoverable. Thracians and Makedonians had various cultural features in common, including a prominent cavalry class, country pursuits (such as hunting), and some shared approaches to commemoration of the dead (funerary mounds, complex grave goods). Other aspects of cult, such as the prominence of Dionysos (see e.g. the oracular shrine of Dionysos among the Satrai, administered by the Bessoi: Hdt. 7.111.2), Hermes, and chthonic preoccupations, or the cult of the Samothrakian gods, similarly reflect common religious ideas. These common areas of mutual togetherness have been largely ignored in modern scholarship, although conference volumes that explore material culture, particularly ceramic repertories, and funerary fashions, acknowledge the links. The scholarly discussion about Makedonians and Thracians as distinct societies sometimes seems to imply a geographical boundary; but no such boundary existed. The different cultural groups that are defined in our written sources are hard to classify. How did the Paionians and Agrianians (usually located in the middle and lower valley of the River Axios), relate to the Bottiaians, or the Edonians (usually located in the neighbouring areas respectively west and east of the estuaries of the Rivers Axios and Strymon)? We cannot answer these kinds of questions in linguistic terms (because we lack the data to make such distinctions effective). Our ancient authors were interested in the particularities that made these groupings distinct from one another, as well as in key moments of military conflict between them. In cultural terms, however, these entities seem to have shared a great deal, and some of those shared practices are reflected in the responses of these communities to wider events. The most important event that shaped the perceptions and inter-community policies of peoples in the northern Aegean was the invasion of the coastal zone, as well as some districts away from the coast, by Persian armies. The first of these invasions took place ca. 512, when the troops led by Megabazos, one of King Dareios’ most trusted generals, penetrated along the north Aegean coastline as far as the valley of the River Strymon. → Herodotos’ lengthy description of the campaign of Megabazos against the Paionians is probably a fair reflection of the interest shown by Dareios, and subsequently by his son Xerxes, in the resources of the lower Strymon estuary, which included a range of valuable minerals (particularly silver and gold), as well as good quality → timber for ship building. There was a second period of occupation from 492-79, spearheaded by Megabazos’ effective successor in the region, Mardonios. By focusing two major campaigns on the

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estuary of the lower Strymon, and subjugating the Paionians, as well as a number of other lowland communities, Megabazos (and subsequently Mardonios) acquired a number of key resources, including access to the mining region of Mt. → Pangaion, as well as the establishment of a command centre that interrupted the flow of traffic and commodities along the Aegean coast (Hdt. 5.12-24, 98; 9.32.1). The precise details of Persian activities are hard to understand. The strategic importance of this region, as a junction of routes north-south, as well as west-east, is clear enough from the public works that local communities were obliged to supply (including manpower for the construction of the canal across the Athos peninsula, and the coastal road: Hdt. 7.22, 24). On the other hand, those communities that controlled mining operations in and around Mt. Pangaion (notably the Bistones, Sapaioi, Dersaioi, Edonoi, Satrai: Hdt. 7.110), tribes distributed between the Strymon and Nestos river valleys), as well as the Doberes, Agrianians, and Odomantoi, remained independent of any direct Persian control (Hdt. 5.16.1), perhaps in exchange for services, such as the supply of bar and coined metal. We know a little about these activities from the coins minted in the names of known tribes (such as the Edonoi, and their ruler, Getas); and the Zaielioi (largely unknown). Access to mineral resources was a considerable attraction for outsiders to this region, well-illustrated in the stories of Peisistratos, who made Rhaikelos in Chalkidike his base (Hdt. 1.64; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2; Steph. Byz. 543.2), and Histiaios of Miletos with ambitions at Myrkinos on the Strymon (Hdt. 5.11.2, 23). The Makedonian kings had several sources of precious metals, which may have been the target of Persian political acquisitiveness, including the silver mine near Mt. Dysoron, next to Lake Prasias, which subsequently provided → Alexander I of Makedon with a silver talent of income a day (Hdt. 5.17.2). This has not been located, and the position of Lake Prasias is uncertain. Both are more likely to have been positioned on the west bank of the River Strymon, rather than to the east. It was not until 356 that Philip II of Makedonia succeeded in establishing a controlling force in the mining area around Mt. Pangaion. Diodoros (16.3.7-8, 22.3) and Justin (8.3.14-15; 12.16.6; cf. also Plut. Alex. 3.5) focus primarily on the transformation of Krenides into the first of Philip’s extra-territorial foundations (→ Philippoi). Of much greater long-term significance was the ability of Philip and subsequent Makedonian kings to exercise control over the estuary of the River Strymon, and over the → mines, previously managed by a consortium of communities, who had expertise in the extraction and processing of the ores. The political and commercial transactions 500

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that resulted from Persian projects that monetized the mineral wealth and other resources of the region had long-term implications for the two kingdoms, the Argead and the Odrysian, which emerged in the aftermath of the Persian retreat as complex polities, composed of different communities, at least some of whom spoke different languages. During the Persian occupation of the coastline, Persian officials seem to have preferred to operate through local leaders, as they did in Asia Minor. This enabled the Argead monarchs Amyntas I and his son Alexander I to acquire a dominant role in the whole of the → Thermaic Gulf, as well as in the neighbouring upland regions of Makedonia. We can detect this in Herodotos’ lists of troops serving in the Persian forces of King Xerxes (Hdt. 7.185.2; 195) as well as in the title of hyparchos of the Makedonians attributed to Alexander I (Hdt. 5.20.4). After the Persian withdrawal, he successfully extended this personal power northwards and eastwards, to create a much-enlarged territorial unit, predicated on his capacity to provide a credible defence against any similar external power. The Odrysian rulers of T., beginning with Teres, the father of Sitalkes, seem to have benefited from a similar process, even though Thracian territories north of Rhodope had not suffered the same exactions as communities to the south. Nevertheless, Persian forces had advanced into Skythia along the western shores of the Black Sea in 512, an episode that is likely to have caused all communities of the whole Balkan region very severe anxieties. This would explain why it was not difficult for Teres and Sitalkes to unite large areas of the east Balkan region under their personal rule, and to be able to call up troops, if required, from many independent communities, as happened in 429 (Thuc. 2.96-101). The consequences of Persian occupation can be seen in the continuation of many of the communities around the Pangaion area to continue minting high value coins, into the 460s at least. There was a common weight standard and some of the silver issues of Thasos and different issuing communities in the Thasian peraia have been found at considerable distances further inland, at trading centres (notably at Pistiros, Krastevich, and numerous settlement sites in western Rhodope). The Odrysian kings minted silver and bronze coins in a limited way, not dissimilar from the Argeads during the 5th and 4th c., up until the 340s. One of the most striking aspects of the material culture of Odrysian T. is the strong inter-mingling of artistic styles and artefacts of different origin among the regional governing class. This is particularly apparent in burial goods. Horse gear decorated in a distinctive ‘Animal Style’ is often mixed with Attic imported kraters and cups, native greyware jugs and bowls, silverware with local and imported shapes and

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ornament (Greek metropolitan and Achaimenid Persian); metropolitan Greekstyle bronze bowls and lamps, as well as elaborate metal armour and weapons. This mixture of artistic idioms is also partly discernible in élite Makedonian burials. The liberal use of gold funerary ornaments reflects specific eschatological ideas, as well as a distinct aesthetic. Although the Argead and Odrysian monarchs exercised control over external affairs in analogous ways, the Odrysian kings seem to have been more interested in encouraging merchants to penetrate deep into their realms, perhaps because the local mineral and human resources (iron, silver, perhaps gold; slaves) that Greek merchants from the Chersonese, Parion (Xen. An. 7.3.16), Thasos, and a range of north Aegean and Black Sea coastal communities were interested in required personal selection or transportation. The extraordinary Pistiros inscription, found at Bona Mansio, a late Roman road station, can be connected with the emporion located at Adziyska Vodenitsa, near Vetren, at the western end of the Central Plain, and close to a mining area that offered all of these resources (SEG 43.486 [= IGBulg V. 5557 ter; Add. xliii-xliv]; 46.872*; 47.1101; 49.911). Arrian’s reference to traders opposing → Alexander III at the Haimos mountains during the latter’s invasion of T. in 335 reflects the threat to successful partnership that were already well developed, and continued in spite of military activities (An. 1.1.6).   Z.H. Archibald Cf. Archibald 1998; Archibald, Z.H., Ancient Economies of the northern Aegean, fifth to first centuries BC, 2013; Bingen, J., The Thracians in Ptolemaic Egypt, 2006, 83-93; Martinez, J.-L. et al. (eds.), L’Épopée des rois thraces, 2015; Vasilev, M.I., The Policy of Darius and Xerxes towards Thrace and Macedonia, 2015.

Throne There is no evidence for any Argead tradition of a ruler’s ritual enthronement, image of being enthroned, or t. as a symbol of rule or regalia. Some scholars regard the marble funerary thrones from Vergina as royal, but their significance and the tombs’ dates are still controversial. It is unclear whether Diodoros’ reference to → Philip II’s eidolon carried along as synthronos with the statues of the 12 Gods at → Aigai’s theatre on his death-day in 336 (16.92.5, 95.1) means an enthroned statue or symbolically Philip’s elaborated status after his conquests. The reconstruction of a fragmentary anonymous Alexander history mentions a 502

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t. in the context of Philip’s murder (BNJ 148 F 1, l. 4). But it is uncertain whether it refers to a t. of Philip in the theatre. If so, it was perhaps an honourary seat (prohedria). Thus, it cannot be proven that a t. existed as a sign of royalty prior to → Alexander III. After → Gaugamela in 331, he adopted the Persian t., a token of victory, along with the ushers (Diod. 17.77.4-7) and perhaps the canopy (Plut. Alex. 37.7). The sources state that Alexander sat on the t.s in Sousa (Plut. Alex. 37.4; Ages. 15.3; Curt. 5.2.13-14; Diod. 17.66.3-6) and Babylon (Ephipp., BNJ 126 F 4). These acts of legitimization and victorious appropriation probably did not entail any ritual enthronement. As the Great King’s golden t. and surroundings were familiar Greek clichés, the reports that Alexander’s t. and canopy were golden (Ephipp., BNJ 126 F 4; Ail. VH 9.2; Plut. Alex. 37.4) are likely biased and served to illustrate his tryphe. After Alexander’s death, his empty t. was an established symbol of his royalty: Perdikkas (in 323) and Eumenes (in 318) are reported to have used it to claim Alexander’s invisible presence and gain approval of their policy. Reportedly, → Philip III also sat on Alexander’s t. (Plut. Phok. 33.5).   S. Müller Cf. Palagia, O., Alexander the Great, the Royal Throne and the Funerary Thrones of Macedonia, Karanos 1 (2018), 23-34; Paspalas, S.A., Philip Arrhidaios at Court, Klio 87 (2005), 72-101.

Thucydides The Athenian historiographer Thucydides provides us with contemporary information on Argead Makedonia. He displays familiarity with Thracian and apparently also Makedonian topography: T. had links to → Thrace and access to Thracian gold mines (4.105.1). The validity of the ancient claim that he visited → Archelaos’ court (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 29-30) is uncertain though. T. treats Makedonia’s involvement in the → Peloponnesian War and is the main literary source for → Perdikkas II’s reign. However, T. views the events and Perdikkas’ policy from an Athenian perspective and mentions him only when he crossed → Athens’ path: in 433-31, 429, 424-22, 418-16 and 414. Mentioning Perdikkas’ → genealogy, T., like → Herodotos (8.137-139), accepts the claim that the Argeads descended from the Heraklid king Temenos of → Argos in the Peloponnese: T. calls them Temenidai (2.99.3). Although he distinguishes Lower

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Makedonia, Perdikkas’ realm, from Upper Makedonia where autonomous local dynasts ruled, T. explains that ethnically, they are all Makedonians (2.99.2-4). T. briefly outlines the history of early Argead expansion, stressing violence and expulsion as by-products (2.99.2-6). In accordance with the Athenian view from the outside, T. calls Perdikkas “→ basileus of the Makedonians” (1.57.1) while Perdikkas himself did not use the title, as is shown by his → coinage. The crossing of Athenian and Argead paths in northern Greece was inevitable after the Persians had left the area and the Athenians had become a dominant force there. They got a foothold in the Strymon Valley—via their apoikia → Amphipolis— and spread their influence through control over the Delian League along the Makedonian and Chalkidian coast, thus surrounding Argead Makedonia and limiting its access to the sea. T. is silent on Perdikkas’ reaction to Amphipolis’ foundation (437/6) close to his royal estates in Mygdonia. It is mostly thought to have caused a diplomatic ice age. T. introduces Perdikkas in the context of the revolt of Poteidaia, a member of the Delian League, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (433). T. creates the impression that Perdikkas contributed essentially to the preceding wave of unrest by instigating Korinthos to drive its apoikia Poteidaia into revolt and urging → Sparta to wage war against Athens (1.56.2-57.5). However, the parties involved had their own reasons to oppose Athens. T. reports that Perdikkas turned against his former ally Athens when the Athenians joined his rebellious brother Philip and Derdas (probably from → Elimeia) against him (1.57.1). We get neither information about the date of conclusion and political background of the alliance nor about Athens’ reasons to turn to her ally’s foes. In the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ northern area of influence became one of the war zones. Perdikkas tried to save Makedonia from becoming a plaything of Athens or Sparta and losing its autonomy. However, T.’s priorities were Athenian, not Makedonian, political needs. As a result, Perdikkas is portrayed as a nightmarish ally, flip-flopping treacherously from one alliance to another. T.’s silence on the background of some important incidents adds to this negative image of the untrustworthy Argead: we are not informed why in 432 Perdikkas, who had previously concluded a peace with Athens (1.61.3), chose to back Poteidaia against her (Thuc. 1.62.2). Due to a possible misspelling in the text (1.61.4), it is debated whether the Athenians provoked him by attacking Beroia in his realm, but alternatively they may simply have turned to Strepsa or Brea (cities that were not controlled Perdikkas). T. is also vague on the reasons of the Odrysian ruler Sitalkes to invade Makedonia in 429 and sup504

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port the → pretender Amyntas, Perdikkas’ nephew: according to T., Perdikkas failed to keep the promises he had made to Sitalkes in 431 when the Odrysian engineered Perdikkas’ reconciliation with Athens (2.95.2). Some scholars doubt that these promises were ever given. To end the invasion, Perdikkas negotiated a peace, sealed by marrying his sister Stratonike to Sitalkes’ nephew Seuthes (Thuc. 2.101.5-6). Characteristically of T.’s treatment of Perdikkas, he describes the marriage plan as Perdikkas’ secret bribery of Seuthes (another unreliable “barbarian”) causing Sitalkes to retreat and let Athens down (2.101.5). However, Sitalkes had been disappointed before when the Athenians had failed to send him promised support (Thuc. 2.101.1). Athens’ loss of Amphipolis in 424/3, an event important for both Athens and Makedonia, involved T. himself. On an Athenian mission, he operated with 7 ships off Thasos when he learned that Amphipolis was threatened by the Spartan commander Brasidas. At this time, Sparta was allied with Perdikkas who supported Brasidas (Thuc. 4.103.3, 107.3). Arriving too late, T. could only save Amphipolis’ port Eïon. The economically and strategically severe loss of their apoikia shocked the Athenians (Thuc. 4.108.1), cost T. his political career and drove him into exile (Thuc. 5.26.5; Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 55). T.’s eye-witness report of the incident bears the features of an apologia (4.104.4-107.2); his adversary Brasidas is depicted as exceptionally effective but demagogic and dishonest (4.108.5). In the following account of Perdikkas’ unsuccessful Lynkestian campaign, supported by Brasidas, T. portrays the Argead as an incapable, unreliable general with an undisciplined army (4.124.1-125.1). The theme of Perdikkas’ notorious unreliability remains a continuous element. T. claims that in 423/2, the Athenian general → Nikias even demanded a mark of confidence from Perdikkas when the ruler approached Athens again (4.132.2). However, later on, Perdikkas failed to support Nikias’ plan of a Chalkidian campaign (either dated to 422 or 417/6) (5.83.4). In 418/7, Perdikkas, still Athens’ ally, joined a Spartan-Argive alliance against her (5.80.2). T. explains this move as motivated by Perdikkas’ Argive kinship ties and double-dealing rather than power constellations. In 417/6, Athens declared war on Perdikkas (4.83.4) and organized a raid of Central Makedonia via → Methone (6.7.3). T.’s last reference to Perdikkas—again as Athens’ ally—mentions his support for her (unsuccessful) attempt to win back Amphipolis in 414 (7.9.1). We get no information on the date of conclusion or background of this alliance. T. is also silent on Perdikkas’ death (ca. 413) but praises his successor Archelaos (who aided Athens after the Sicilian disaster by providing → timber): T. claims that he essentially

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fortified Makedonia, improved the army, and created infrastructure (2.100.2). The impression that before Archelaos, Makedonia was in a backward state is contradicted by T.’s own reports that Sitalkes’ huge army could not overcome the Makedonian fortifications and that Perdikkas’ cavalry stood its ground against the Thracians (2.100.1, 5). Thus, T.’s appraisal of Archelaos cannot be taken at face value. It is a literary device: Archelaos appears as the “good Makedonian ruler” in contrast to Perdikkas, his counter-image. Both portraits have to be viewed critically in the light of their respective politics regarding Athens.   S. Müller Cf. Badian, E., From Plataea to Potidaea, 1993, 151-85, 239-44; Hornblower, S., A Commentary on Thucydides, I-III, 1991-2008; Müller 2017; Vasilev, M.I., Thucydides II.99 and the Early Expansion of the Argeadai, Eirene 47 (2011), 93-105; Zahrnt, M., Macedonia and Thrace in Thucydides, in: Rengakos, A./Tsakmakis, A. (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, II, 2006, 589-614.

Timber Makedonia was rich in forests providing valuable, renewable resources. Due to the rainy climate, Makedonia and parts of Thrace (particularly the Strymon area) produced the best ship-building timber in Europe (Theophr. HP 4.5.5; 5.1.6, 2.1). For constructing ships and oars, silver fir or fir were preferred (Theophr. HP 5.7.1-2). Evidence on the Makedonian t. trade is scarce and scattered but all information available points unanimously at a royal monopoly: in his realm, the Argead ruler controlled the forests and exploitation rights; the production and export of t. rested with him (cf. IG I³ 89; 117; RO no. 12; SEG 34.664). Argead t. business appears to be a controlled leasing system administered by the ruler. The sources attest that he could grant temporary and controlled exploitation and export rights to certain individuals, groups or poleis. → Archelaos allowed his Athenian guest-friend, the orator Andokides, to cut and export oars he sold to the Athenian fleet (Andok. 2.11). → Amyntas III gave the → Chalkidians temporary export rights for pitch and t. (except for silver fir) (RO no. 12 back). He also made the Athenian general Timotheos (who operated in Northern Greece) a gift of t.—however, the freight charges were not included ([Dem.] 49.26). Argead gifts of t. or at least reductions of the price served as a diplomatic instrument and established or intensified ties to other political actors or forces or formed part of an appeasement policy. This 506

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function left its traces in the sources: → Demo­sthenes names a certain Lasthenes as an example of corruption and bribery since he had his house roofed with t. sent as a gift from Makedonia (19.265). Theophrastos ridicules the privilege of the gift of Makedonian t. and the privileged persons in his Characters (23.4): his stereotypical bigmouth pretends that he was such an important person that he was granted the export of Makedonian t. to Athens and even rejected it. There is scarcely any evidence on the logging and export of trees. It is generally thought that t. was transported from the logging areas by flotation down the major Makedonian → rivers (Haliakmon, Loudias, Strymon) to the coast. → Therme was the only port under nearly constant Argead control; prior to → Philip II’s conquests; → Methone and → Pydna were temporarily in Argead hands, and → Pella was connected to the Lake Loudiake. With its limited access to the sea and ever-struggling position, prior to Philip II, Argead Makedonia could not use its t. to build up its own → fleet and only had a few (merchant?) ships at its disposal. Greece’s major naval power → Athens was Makedonia’s main customer. Another customer may have been → Thebes during her supremacy when the polis put Makedonia under pressure and was likely to exploit its t. resources for the sake of Epameinondas’ fleet-building program. Lacking her own t. resources, Athens was in constant need to acquire t. for maintaining her fleet as her central instrument of power. Due to the lack of any ancient remains of a trireme, estimations regarding the requirements of the Athenian fleet are based on a modern reconstruction as a model. It carried 200 oars (including spares). Each oar was made of a single tree, preferably from a young fir tree. Since oars were destroyed on a regular basis in naval battles, there was an urgent need for them. Thus, it is no surprise that evidence on Argead t. trade frequently concerns the export of oars (IG I³ 89; 117). The average life of a trireme is estimated at 20 years (based on Diod. 11.43.3). In the 5th c., after becoming a naval power, Athens maintained about 180-200 triremes, occasionally 300. It is thought that Athenian triremes were mainly built outside Athens in naupegia (shipyards) in the locations that supplied the timber (cf. IG I³ 117) and sent to Athens, perhaps as a complete set equipped with an anchor made of local stone (from the areas supplying the raw material). Since the supply of t. was a major concern of Athens, t. played a central role in the Argead-Athenian relations of the 5th and 4th c. These relations had their highs and lows. It is assumed that → Alexander I owed his status as Athens’ proxenos and euergetes (Hdt. 8.136.1) to his t. supplies which may have benefitted Themistokles’ ship-building program in the late 480s. The previous argument that at this time Makedonia was under Persian

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dominion and the Persian overlord would not have allowed Makedonian t. deliveries to Athens is outdated. Persia did not interfere in Argead trade; Alexan­der I was likely paid with Athenian silver for his t. and needed it to be able to finance his support of Xerxes’ Greek campaign and supplies for the Persian army and to host the Persian king when he passed through Makedonia on his march. Alexander’s son → Perdikkas II experienced mainly lows in his troubled relations with Athens during the supremacy of her Delian League. Athens tried to dictate the rules of the t. export and to take over the t. producing area of the Strymon region by founding her apoikia → Amphipolis as a stronghold there in 437/6. The strategically important foundation provided Athens with access to t. from the Thraco-Makedonian forests (Thuc. 4.108.1) and control of its water transport via the Strymon. During the Peloponnesian War, thanks to Spartan efforts, Athens lost Amphipolis (with Perdikkas’ help) and the successful Spartan commander Brasidas started to build ships on the Strymon (Thuc. 4.108.6). In a treaty between Perdikkas and Athens, difficult to date but presumably documenting the peace of 423/2, Perdikkas had to promise to export oars exclusively to the Athenians (IG I³ 89). The Athenians’ disastrous Sicilian Expedition in 413 cost them their fleet, caused a particular need of Makedonian t., and led to less strained, more friendly relations with Argead Makedonia under its new ruler Archelaos. Diplomacy substituted for pressure: in 407/6 (according to the predominant dating), Archelaos was honoured as Athens’ proxenos and euergetes for supplying oars and ships built in Makedonia for Athens (IG I³ 117). In the 370s, presumably towards the end of his long reign, Amyntas III concluded a treaty with Athens. While the contents have not survived, it is generally thought that t. for Athens played a major role (Tod no. 129). However, it is unclear which side initiated the alliance and played the t. card to its advantage. The Makedonian conquest of the Persian Empire opened new resource areas for t. for the European market such as Kilikia or Lebanon that → Alexander III and his Successors could exploit.   S. Müller Cf. Bissa, E.M.A., Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade in Archaic and Classical Greece, 2009, 107-9, 111-43, 149-51; Blackman, D.J., Triremes and Shipsheds, in: Tzalas, H. et al. (eds.), Tropis II. Second International Symposium on Ship Construction in Antiquity, 1990, 35-48; Borza 1987; Karathanansis, K., A Game of Timber Monopoly: Atheno-Macedonian Resources on the Eve of the Peloponnesian War, Hesperia 88 (2019) 707-26; Psoma, S., Athenian Owls and the Royal Macedonian Monopoly on Timber, MHR 30 (2015), 1-18.

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topoi, Greek Due to the lack of Makedonian literary voices, Argead Makedonia, its rulers, and their → court and their politics are viewed from the perspectives of Greek and Roman authors who often wrote much later. They applied their own cultural norms and values to Makedonian history and often tended to use it as a negative foil for their respective political or social ideals. Particularly the testimonies of Greek authors who wrote about contemporary conflicts between their poleis and Argead Makedonia tend to be biased by partisanship and view the events from a one-dimensional Greek perspective. Frequently, their information about Makedonia (adopted by Roman writers) is influenced by traditional Greek topoi. These t. originate mainly from three sources: the pejorative depictions of (1) ‘tyrants’ as ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ rulers, thus counter-images of Greek politicians, (2) ‘barbarians’ as negative foils for the ‘civilized’ Greeks, and (3) a decadent lifestyle as a violation of the ‘right’ moral conduct in accordance with the ideals of moderation and self-control. Thus, these t. are used to create counter-images and serve to confirm the identities of the writers and their audiences while condemning the politics and morals of the Argeads and Makedonians, depicted as the ‘others,’ as ‘wrong.’ Particularly in case of the Greek authors witnessing the Makedonian rise to supremacy under → Philip II and living under the Makedonian dominion, this negative view is inextricably connected with the perception that the Greeks were enslaved by non-Greeks: a shameful reversal of the ‘right’ order according to their understanding: Greeks had to rule over non-Greeks (Dem. 3.24). Since Greek literary images of ‘wrong’ rule (including the establishment of douleia and banishment of eleutheria) are traditionally associated with tyrants, particularly with stock images of Persian kings, Argead rulers received a similar treatment, enriched with t. offering a wide range of the symbolism of suppressive rule. According to general ancient belief, the typical tyrant lacks sophrosyne in every condition of life. Hence, too much of anything was seen as an indicator of tyrannical behavior. In addition, the stock tyrant was cruel, bloodthirsty, unjust, deceiving, luxurious, and driven by hybris and megalomania. He violated nomoi, committed sacrileges, employed a politics of distrust towards his most capable officials out of jealousy (cf. Ail. VH 12.16; 14.47a; Just. 12.14.3 on → Alexander III and his foremost generals), punished outspokenness (parrhesia) and criticism, had an excessive sex life, was fond of luxurious and extravagant banquets, and drank immoderately. The custom of drinking the wine unmixed (akraton) was

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associated with being a ‘barbarian’ (cf. Hdt. 6.84.1; Athen. 4.144A; 155E-F; Plat. Nom. 637E), decadent, uncivilized, and immoderate. The stock figure of the ‘barbarian’ is incapable of combining erga and logos, untrustworthy, deceiving, mercurial, rude, and uncontrolled. All of these t. occur in the literary Greek and Roman portraits of Argeads and Makedonians. They can not be taken at face value but have to be viewed critically: they are literary devices and pieces of contemporary Greek propaganda and political discourses. → Perdikkas II’s struggle against Athenian influence left its traces in contemporary Greek historiography and comedy: he is depicted as notoriously unreliable and mercurial, a crook, infamous for his lies and double-dealings, who deceived all of his allies (Thuc. 1.62.2; 2.95.2; 4.125.1-2; 5.80.2; Athen. 1.27E-28A). Philip II who established the Makedonian supremacy over Greece received similar treatment, in particular by → Demosthenes and → Theopompos (whom Trogus-Justin will have followed). The Argead ruler is portrayed as an out-and-out liar and crook (Dem. 19.109; Just. 8.4.11-5.6): he betrayed all of his allies (Dem. 2.7; 18.93-94; 19.53; Just. 8.3.1-4), gained power only by rapacity, crime, corruption, and bribery (Dem. 2.18; 18.19, 61, 247, 297-298; 19.265; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 224, 225; Just. 8.3.5-7; 9.1.1-2), broke promises and treaties (Dem. 2.6-7; 10.58; 18.71-72), and surrounded himself by the worst kind of criminals and libertines (Dem. 2.18-19; 18.61, 296; Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 81, F 162, F 225a-b). He enslaved the Greeks and established a tyranny (Dem. 3.22; 4.22; 9.26-27; 18.66; Just. 8.1.1-3), rode roughshod over Greek nomoi (Dem. 4.10, 15; 18.68), and did not even spare temples (Just. 8.3.4, 5.5-6). Lacking self-restraint, he married a young girl he fell in love with when he was past his prime (Plut. Alex. 9.4; Athen. 13.557D). Philip and Alexander III were both depicted as unjust judges who manipulated the law (Just. 8.3.15; 9.6.8; Plut. Alex. 42.2; for Alexander cf. Curt. 6.7.28-11.40), and immoderate drunkards (Just. 9.8.15; cf. Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 163; F 236, F 282 on Philip). Since under Alexander’s command, the Persian Empire was conquered, hostile traditions depicted him as a victim of the corruption by fortune and Persian riches and transformed him into the stock image of a Persian tyrant. He is associated with immoderation, luxury, cruelty, deception, sexual excesses (even with a eunuch as the ultimate marker of ‘oriental’ vices: Curt. 6.5.23; 10.1.25-37; Athen. 13.603A; Plut. Alex. 67.4), debauchery, depravity, and alcoholism on an unprecedented scale (Ail. VH 12.26: he drank more than any other man). In addition, as a symptom of his hybris, Alexander is said to have laid claims to divine descent or divinity (Curt. 4.7.30; 6.6.2-3; Just. 11.11.11-12; Ail. 510

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VH 2.19; 9.37; 12.64). His Makedonians were depicted as unrefined, immoderate parvenus losing their mind at the sight of the rich booty in Persia. For example, allegedly, at dinner, Alexander’s → philoi encased their dessert in gold they tore off and threw away with the rest of the waste (Athen. 4.155D). Significantly, the claim that Alexander’s courtier Hagnon became so decadent that he wore silver or golden nails in his shoes (Plut. Alex. 40.1; Athen. 12.539B-D; Ail. VH 9.3), hints at a distinguishing characteristic of a country bumpkin (Theophr. Char. 4.12). Stories like these served to emphasize that the Makedonians were unable to celebrate their conquests and new political position with style and moderation. In Greek eyes, they unmasked themselves as the wrong conquerors. Perhaps in order to create a proper image for the new phenomenon of Argead Makedonia rising quickly from relative insignificance to world dominion, the impression is created that the Makedonians surpassed the Greek tyrants with regard to their vices and shortcomings. A key factor of the description of the alleged decadence of the Makedonians was their drinking habits. Allegedly, Makedonian symposia were notoriously excessive and the rulers heavy drinkers. The underlying meta­ phoric political idea of this image is clear: the → symposion was considered an important socio-political institution where values, political and moral, public and private, were tested, particularly the ability to exercise sophrosyne and self-control (Plat. Rep. 571C-D; Plat. Nom. 649D). By implication, the symposiastic behaviour became a criterion for differentiation with regard to images of the ‘other’. According to Greek hostile voices, the Makedonians were drunkards, drank their wine extremely strong and unmixed, and consumed huge amounts of alcohol (Ephipp., BNJ 126 F 1). Alexander is said to have used enormous cups (Plut. Mor. 454D-E; 623 F; Athen. 10.434C-D; Curt. 9.10.26-27) and to have organized drinking contests: drinking the most constituted victory, even when the winner among other participants died of alcohol intoxication (Athen. 10.436F-437B; Plut. Alex. 70.1). Stereotypical t. were frequently applied to Argead → women. Most of these t. (e.g., cruelty, immoderation, bloodthirstiness, greed for power, wantonness) come again from the reservoir of t. of the tyrant. Combined with an alleged lack of logos (which Greek male writers usually ascribe to women), the female tyrant seems to be particularly evil, a counter-image of the ideal Greek female citizen. Eurydike, the wife of → Amyntas III, is depicted as a scheming, murderous adultress who made her own son-in-law → Ptolemy of Aloros her lover and tried to bring him to the throne by killing two of her sons, one even right before the eyes of his terrified son (Just. 7.4.7-5.10). →

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Olympias is presented as scheming, greedy of power, and bloodthirsty “in a manner more like a woman than a royal” (Just. 14.6.1). In addition, misunderstanding the position of wives and children in the polygamous system of the Argead court, the wives were styled as concubines (pallakai), mostly of lower rank, and their children as illegitimate (Just. 9.8.2; 13.2.11; Plut. Alex. 77.5). In general, the claim to be of humble descent (cf. Dem. 9.31) is another topos: Ailianos (VH 12.43) calls → Archelaos the son of a slave, Philip II’s grandfather a servant, → Polyperchon a bandit, and → Antigonos a peasant. Another topos is the failure of → ‘barbaroi’ and tyrants to handle matters of diplomacy appropriately. A drunken Philip is said to have ridiculed the fallen and captive Athenians after the battle of → Chaironeia (Diod. 16.87.1-2; Plut. Dem. 20.3), a shameful conduct of a victor over his alleged fellow Greeks. Alexander is accused of childish behavior when he received Athenian envoys after the fall of → Thebes in 335: he turned his back on them and threw the decree of the Athenians on the floor (Plut. Phok. 17.4). Writing rude letters to civilized Greeks (cf. Aischin. 3.238-239) is another element of this topos. → Demosthenes alleged that → Aischines had written a letter to the Athenians for Philip since the ruler was not competent to write a clever, polite letter (19.36, 39-40; cf. Aischin. 2.124-125). Styling Olympias as another manifestation of the evil Makedonian oppressors, according to → Hypereides (4.24-25), she wrote a rude letter to the Athenians ordering them to stop to interfere in the affairs of the → oracle of Dodona, situated in “her” land Molossia. After his Asian conquests, Alexander is said to have ceased to use the polite formula chairein in his letters except when writing to Phokion or → Antipatros (Chares, BNJ 125 F 10; Douris, BNJ 76 F 51; Ail. VH 1.25). All these t. served to style the Makedonians and their rulers as counter-­ images of the Greeks; they have to be viewed with scepticism.   S. Müller Cf. Asirvatham 2010; Müller 2016, 62-73; Pownall 2005; Pownall 2009; Xydopoulos 2010.

Triballians The Triballians (Τριβαλλοί) lived in the hinterland of the Balkan peninsula, between the Morava and Isker Rivers. They are mentioned as either an ethnic group of → Illyria (App. Ill. 2.1.; Steph. Byz. s.v. T.) or → Thrace (Strab. 7.3.13, 5.6, 5.11; Diod. 15.36.1; Paus. 10.19.7). The question of the ethnic origins of the T. 512

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remains open, even in recent studies, mainly on the basis of a passage in Aristo­ phanes (Av. 1520), where for some scholars the T. are characterized as Illyrians. However, Aristophanes does not apply to the T. an Illyrian origin and in our literary sources, they are specifically called Thracians. The earliest references to them come from → Herodotos (4.49) and → Thucydides (2.96) in the 2nd half of the 5th c., while in Athenian inscriptions of the late 5th and early 4th c. slaves are labelled as Τριβαλλός (IG I3, 1032, 115; II2, 1951, 23). Known for their warlike character, the T. were perceived as the archetype of savagery (Aristoph. Av. 1529; Isok. 12.227). When the Odrysian king Sitalkes invaded → Makedonia (in 429), the T. were his autonomous neighbours (Thuc. 2.96.4), probably because they were not his subjects. A few years later (424), Sitalkes went to war against them but his army was defeated and he was killed in battle (Thuc. 4.101.5). The T., trying to find their way out of the political chaos caused by the liquidation of Odrysian power in the 4th c., carried out raids against the neighbouring areas. The prosperous Greek cities on the Thracian coasts were fine targets, especially when famine (σιτοδεία) threatened the existence of the T.; the attack on Abdera in 376/5 is the best known episode (Diod. 15.36.1-4; Aen. Tact. 15.8-10). For the next decades, there is no information about them. When → Philip II conquered → Paionia (Diod. 16.1.5, 2.6.1-5), the T. became neighbours to Makedonia. It is only after 342 and the war between Philip and Kersobleptes, the Odrysian king, that they reappear in our sources. Kersobleptes’ kingdom came under Makedonian control. The T. recognized Philip’s sovereignty and kept their independence, until their subjugation to Makedonia after a fierce battle in 339, following Philip’s expedition to Skythia (Plut. Mor. 330E-331C). On the news of the latter’s death, the T. were the first to revolt. They were the main objective of → Alexander III’s campaign in the spring of 335 (Arr. An. 1.1.4), since he wanted to punish them for their uprising against his authority. He defeated their king, Syrmos, near the river Lyginos, killing at the battlefield 3000 enemies (Arr. An. 1.1.12-2.7). There is no reference in our sources indicating a troubled period 335-30, although the defeated ethnic groups of the region Philip had acquired (the former Odrysian kingdom) were treated as Argead subjects. Despite the silence in our sources about the degree of their subjugation to Makedonia, one should consider the T. as dependent from Makedonia after being defeated by Alexander and obliged to provide troops for his Asian campaign: T. are found in his army, fighting as cavalry along with the Makedonians (Diod. 17.17.4). They must have been considered as substantial manpower for Makedonia; therefore

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they were allocated to → Antipatros after Alexander’s death in 323 (Dexipp., BNJ 100 F 8.3).   I. Xydopoulos Cf. Archibald 1998, 237, 306; Cabanes, P., Triballi, DNP 12 (2002), 793-4; Hammond/ Walbank 1988, 32-9; Papazoglou, F., The Central Balkan Tribes in pre-Roman Times, 1978, 1-86; Polaschek, E., Triballi, RE 6 A2 (1937), 2392-401.

Tyre, siege of In 333, after → Issos, → Alexander III decided not to march against Dareios III. Since Persia was still supreme at sea, and the Phoinikian naval contingents under their respective kings were still in the west under the command of the Persian admiral Autophradates (Arr. An. 2.15.7), the Makedonians decided to neutralize their naval bases such as T. This principal Phoinikian city sent a delegation to Alexander including the son of King Azemilkos who was still with the Persian fleet at this time (Arr. An. 2.15.7). Diodoros (17.40.2-3) states that they were confident in the strength of their defences: The Tyrians wanted to gratify Dareios by involving Alexander in a lengthy siege giving him time to make the necessary military preparations. The siege began in February and ended in August 332. According to Diodoros (17.41.1), the Tyrians had 80 triremes. Probably king Azemilkos had sailed back to T. in the meantime. T. was built on an island, and Alexander, in order to attack T.’s walls, decided to build a mole, furnished with two towers (Diod. 17.40.4-5; Arr. An. 2.18.3). Remains of the mole survived. The situation changed when King Gerostratos of Arados, Enylos of Byblos and the Sidonian fleet of which the local commander is not known, some 80 Phoinikian ships in all, left Autophradates and joined Alexander, together with 120 Kypriote ships (Arr. An. 2.20.1-3). Alexander sailed against T., but the Tyrian fleet refused battle and blocked T.’s harbours with triremes. The siege was carried on from both the mole and the ships. Finally, Alexander launched an assault on the city from all directions, and succeeded in battering down the walls from a good distance. He then led his hypaspists into the breach. The main body of the Tyrians deserted the walls when they were breached, but offered resistance from the Shrine of Agenor. Others resisted from their rooftops. Some killed themselves, or sought sanctuary and were spared, including King Azemilkos. According to Arrian (An. 2.24.4-5), 8000 Tyrians were killed, and 30.000 inhabitants sold as 514

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Vergina, star of

slaves. According to Curtius (4.4.16-17), 6000 armed Tyrians were killed within the city, and Alexander crucified 2000 more. Diodoros (17.46.3-4) says that more than 7000 Tyrians were killed in the fighting, and Alexander crucified all the remaining men of military age, not less than 2000, and sold women and children into slavery. As for the military aspects, Alexander had used non-­ torsion stone-throwers at the siege of Halikarnassos before, but solely to repulse personnel. Stone-throwing catapults (now torsion-powered) were used against city-walls (Diod. 17.42.7, 45.2) for the first time ever, while bolt-throwers were used to clear the ramparts of defenders: therefore, the siege of T. was a watershed in Greek military history.   N. Sekunda Cf. Berve 1926, II, no. 25; Fuller, J.F.C., The Generalship of Alexander the Great, 1958, 206-16; Marsden, E.W., Greek and Roman Artillery. Historical Development, 1969, 61-2.

Vergina   see Aigai Vergina, star of Among the spectacular findings of the royal tombs at Vergina (→ Aigai) were two gold larnakes in Tomb II. The lid of the larger one, which contained a male skeleton, was embossed with a disc topped by a rosette and blue glass and radiated outward 16 long and short rays, alternately. The lid of the smaller larnax that contained a female skeleton had a less adorned disc with 12 alternating rays. It is unclear if the different number of rays is gender- or rank-related (although space considerations were probably not the issue, because 16-ray stars were found on much smaller objects.) The tomb also yielded small disks that were probably attached in origin to a fabric, and had the same pattern. M. Andronikos, who led the V. excavation, called the design interchangeably sun or star, and an emblem of the Makedonian monarchy. Among the arguments supporting this view is the provenance, which has been identified as the tomb of → Philip II (other scholars prefer → Philip III). Additionally, in one of the → foundation myths of the Temenid or Argead dynasty, sunlight presages and legitimizes the rule of its founder, → Perdikkas I, over Makedonia (Hdt. 8.137-139). Finally, the star or sunburst shows up on depictions of Makedonian shields and Makedo-

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nian coins, including Philip II’s. Scholars who question this interpretation argue that there is nothing remarkably Makedonian or royal about the motif. Similar stars or suns can be found already in Mykenaian times, and in Greek and nonGreek locals. They also appear in military, domestic, and many other contexts that have no association with Makedonian kingship. The V. star or sun was not simply decorative, but possibly resembled similar designs that symbolized the connections between solar deities, death, and burial. It survived on coins and other objects into Hellenistic and Roman times. In recent history, the “Star of V.” was at a centre of controversy over national symbols between Greece and Northern Makedonia that was resolved in 2018.   J. Roisman Cf. Adams, J.P., The Larnakes from Tomb II at Vergina, ArchN 12 (1983), 1-7; Andro­ nikos 1984; Müller, F.M., Der “Stern von Vergina”: Vom Emblem der makedonischen Königsdynastie zum nationalen Symbol Griechenlands?, in: Walde, E. (ed.), Bildmagie und Brunnensturz, 2009, 364-80.

Veterans Nothing is known of Makedonian veterans before → Philip II, and even his v., except for persons of rank, are often indistinguishable from others in → Alexan­der III’s army. We are best informed of Alexander’s v. They first appeared as a distinct group in 324 at → Opis, when they mutinied against Alexan­der’s plan to send home the old and the weak. They felt disrespected and resented his intention to replace them with Asian recruits and his distancing himself from Makedonia. Alexander crushed the revolt with the help of his commanders. He discharged 11.500 v. and kept their children from Asian women as future recruits. The remaining infantry v. exercised their greatest political influence after Alexander’s death (323), when they affected the choice of Alexander’s brother, Philip III → Arrhidaios, as his heir alongside the future → Alexander IV. Once the elite (temporarily) closed ranks under → Perdikkas’ regency, it regained control over the v. Here and elsewhere, the v. attained power when their generals were divided, but lost it when they reconciled. Perdikkas distributed v. among different governors, and kept their bulk in the royal army under his command. From now on the v. fought at wars among rulers known as Alexander’s Successors. Rather than describing these 516

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conflicts, the following summarizes common traits of the v.’s divergent histories. They were sought after because of their military experience and invincible reputation. They often demanded and rioted for pay, but they also cared about their prestige, common justice, and Makedonian identity. Their loyalty to a leader was impacted by his military strength vis-a-vis his opponent’s, his ability to provide for them and protect their baggage and camp families, his winning record, the influence of their immediate commanders, and their personal bonds to him. They cherished Alexander’s memory and respected leaders in the light of their standing with, and resemblance to, him. They were loyal to the Argead house and its representatives, though not uniformly, and were reluctant to fight fellow v. and other Makedonians, but overcame this inhibition more than once and no later than the battle of Orkynia (319). The most famous Makedonian v. were 3000 former hypaspists known as argy­ raspides, or Silver Shields. They served in the royal army and later in Kilikia, where in 318 they joined → Eumenes, who was appointed protector of the Argead kings against → Antigonos. The sources emphasized their senior age and martial prowess (Diod. 19.41.1-2; Plut. Eum. 16). They represented Philip’s and Alexander’s accomplishments and Makedonian identity that bestowed legitimacy on whomever led them. Eumenes’ financial resources, his royal appointment, and his close connections with the Silver Shields’ immediate commanders secured their loyalty to him in spite of attempts by his enemies and allies to draw them away from him. They also enjoyed prestige and power in his army far beyond their number. In the battles of Paraitakene and Gabene against Antigonos (317-16), they spearheaded Eumenes’ infantry and routed the enemy thanks to their skills and intimidating reputation. Their impact, however, was limited, because the first battle was indecisive and the second ended in defeat. The v.’s loyalty was tested and failed at Gabene, when Anti­ gonos captured their baggage and families. To regain them they surrendered themselves and Eumenes to Antigonos, who later sent them to Arachosia and on various guard duties. Indeed, the v.’s options were limited: military and garrison service, settlement in colonies, and returning home, with the last being the least popular.   J. Roisman Cf. Heckel, W., The Three Thousand Alexander’s Infantry Guard, in: Campbell, B./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, 2013, 163-78; Rois­ man, J., Alexander’s Veterans and the Early Wars of the Successors, 2013.

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War atrocities Violence goes hand in hand with warfare; victories and establishment of control are often accompanied by brutal expressions of power, dominance, and superiority involving all kinds of assaults. As for the references to w. a. in the sources on Argead history, it depends on the intention of the respective author, literary context of the events in question, and portrayal of the persons involved whether violent acts against the defeated, surrendered, captives, and civilians are perceived as usual by-products of warfare or cruelty. Committed against persons, w. a. could include slaughter, mutilation, rape, humiliation, and enslavement. Committed against objects—central elements of the opponents’ cultural property and symbols of ethnic identity (e.g. statues, buildings, or places of political decision-making)—, their destruction aimed at demoralization. Due to the scarcity of evidence on Argead warfare before → Philip II and → Alexander III, w. a. are primarily attested for their wars (but see Thuc. 4.128.4). While it is no rule and the moral point of view varies from author to author, usually the social status and ethnicity of victims of w. a. mark a difference: high-ranking and Greek victims tend to receive more attention and pity than non-elite and non-Greek victims. For example, Ptolemy obviously saw no problem in claiming that the Makedonians slaughtered so many Persians near → Issos that the Makedonian cavalry crossed a ravine on their bodies (ap. Arr. An. 2.11.8)—an act of disrespect for the dead. But the treatment of the non-Greek/-Makedonian defeated could also serve as a literary device to characterize an Argead commander. Thus, Arrian criticizes → Bessos’ mutilation ordered by Alexander as a “barbarian” custom a descendant of Herakles should not adopt (An. 4.7.4). In general, for ancient authors, w. a. were a useful literary device to glorify a commander or blacken his portrait: Dareios III is said to have cruelly mutilated the Makedonian wounded and sick he captured near Issos (Arr. An. 2.7.1; Curt. 3.8.14-16). The authors writing about Philip’s and Alexander’s campaigns knew and used pre-existing literary role models such as the ideal commander described by Xenophon as a blueprint: a moderate, merciful, and pitiful victor (Ages. 1.20; 7.3; 11.12; Kyr. 4.6.11; 5.1.2-17). As a crucial element of the counter-image of the cruel, immoderate commander, his assaults against the enemy are often explained by his uncontrolled emotions. Hence, reports depicting Alexander as flying into a rage when meeting re­sistance and/or receiving a wound and committing w. a. out 518

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of anger and fury (f. e. Curt. 4.6.24; 8.10.6; Diod. 17.76.4-7: threat of w. a.) are biased by Greek topoi on tyrants and cannot be taken at face value. A prime example is Hegesias of Magnesia’s untrustworthy tale (BNJ 142 F 5) that after the conquest of Gaza in 332, an infuriated, wounded Alexander took his anger out on the governor Batis by dragging the naked man to his death behind his chariot. Curtius adapted the story depicting Alexander as a cruel and even worse would-be-→ Achilles mistreating Hektor’s corpse (4.6.25-29; at least Hektor was already dead). Fury is a frequent literary motif (well known from the → Ilias), but is not a sufficient reason to explain why w. a. occur. In the context of Argead military practice, w. a. were motivated by strategical calculations such as shock and awe, psychological warfare, a pre-emptive measure against resistance. Destroying a city, killing the adult males and enslaving women and children (andrapodismos) formed part of contemporary military practice. Selling the captives into slavery meant also a financial gain. During her supremacy, → Athens did so to Melos and Skione (Thuc. 5.32.1, 116.4), → Thebes to Plataiai and Orchomenos (Arr. An. 1.9.7; Diod. 15.79.3-6; Dem. 16.4, 25), Philip II to Poteidaia and → Olynthos (Diod. 16.8.3-5, 53.2-3). Under Alexander III, a council representing the → Korinthian League (under Makedonian control) did so to rebellious Thebes (Aischin. 3.133; Diod. 17.13.314.1; Just. 11.4.7-9; Plut. Alex. 11.5-6). During Alexander’s campaign in Asia, the cities affected by w. a. were usually of particular strategical importance and put up fierce resistance, for example Miletos, Tyre, and Gaza. When → Persepolis with its additional ideological relevance was looted in 330 (Diod. 17.70.1-6), this was a controlled act. As an example of shock and awe aiming at demoralizing the participants in the → Baktrian-Sogdian-revolt, the so-called → Branchidai in Sogdiana were massacred, and their town was pillaged and destroyed (Strab. 17.1.43; Curt. 7.5.28-35; Plut. Mor. 557B). In this case, → Kallisthenes felt the need to justify the act by a (unhistorical) panhellenic explanation. Massacres also affected groups of persons considered unruly (such as the mountain peoples of the Ouxians and Kossaians) or troublesome (e. g., the Indian Brachmans: Diod. 17.102.7-103.3; Strab. 15.1.66; Plut. Alex. 64.1). Another example are the Greek mercenaries who fought for the Persians at → Granikos (reportedly 20.000: Diod. 17.21.6). The Makedonians refused a negotiated surrender and massacred them. Only 2000 survived and were sent to hard labor camps in Makedonia (Arr. An. 1.16.2, 16.5-6). However, as usual in ancient historiography, the figures of the enemies’ army and dead are

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largely inflated for propagandistic reasons and have to be viewed with caution. In the rare case of individuals affected by w. a., these were representatives of forces of resistance such as Bessos, the former figurehead of the uprising in the eastern satrapies and opponent to Alexander (Arr. An. 3.25.3). Alexander had him publicly humiliated, mutilated, and executed (Arr. An. 3.29.3-4; 4.7.4-5). In times of war, the most obvious victims were women and children. They could not expect to be spared from sexual abuse (often continuously) and enslavement, the common fate of the captured, often not only a sign of victory but an orchestrated policy in order to demoralize their families. The → Alexander historiographers mention en passant (not approvingly but as a relative routine consequence of war) that members of the Makedonian army enslaved, raped, violated, humiliated, or robbed women of the defeated (Thebes: Plut. Mor. 259E-260A; after Issos: Curt. 3.11.21-22; Diod. 17.35.636.4; in Persepolis: Diod. 17.70.6). The merciful treatment of female captives such as the Achaimenid women is depicted as an exception to the rule and a sign of Alexander’s clemency and magnanimity. Our sources stress unanimously that it was an honour that he did not touch them (Arr. An. 2.12.5; 4.19.6; Plut. Alex. 21.4-5; 22.2; 30.3; Plut. Mor. 522A; Diod. 17.38.1-3; Curt. 3.12.21-26; 4.10.18-19; Just. 11.9.15-16, 12.6-8). Occasional disapproval of or pity for the captives’ fate are rarely expressions of empathy in their own right. Thus, Demosthenes’ indignation about the misery of an Olynthian woman enslaved by the Makedonians in 348 served to style her as a symbol of Philip’s tyranny and his political opponents’ corruption since they (allegedly) sympathized with him and mistreated her during a banquet in Makedonia (19.196198).   S. Müller Cf. Anson, E.M., “Shock and Awe” à la Alexander the Great, in: Heckel et al. 2015, 213-32; Gaca, K.L., Girls, Women, and the Significance of Sexual Violence in ancient Warfare, in: Heineman, E. (ed.), Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, 2011, 73-88; Heckel, W./McLeod, J.L., Alexander the Great and the Fate of the Enemy: Quantifying, Qualifying, and Categorizing Atrocities, in: Heckel et al. 2015, 233-67; Tritle, L.A., From Melos to My Lai. War and Survival, 2000.

Warfare   see Army organization

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War traumata War brings battle, and with it come the grim realities of death, or, of surviving with gruesome, often disabling wounds; or, until the coming of modern science, dying ingloriously from sepsis, gangrene, or disease. Death claims the famous, like → Perdikkas III, killed perhaps by an Illyrian spear c. 360/59. More often it takes the obscure, such as the Theban soldier known only as Gamma 16, killed at → Chaironeia by a cavalryman’s sword—his face nearly sheared away. The wounds of war are many and fearsome, revealing not only horrific suffering but also the variety of weapons encountered on the battlefield: → Kleitos the Black famously severing the arm of the Persian Spithridates (or Rhoisakes) at the → Granikos, most likely with a kopis, a heavy one-edged sword favoured by cavalrymen; another Persian, Satibarzanes, speared through the neck, the weapon withdrawn, then thrust into his face, killing him (Curt. 7.4.36-37); Persian skythed chariots chopping up Makedonian soldiers at → Gaugamela as they tore through their ranks (Curt. 4.15.15-17; Diod. 16.58.5); multiple forms of death and injury suffered by the Makedonians (and Tyrians), as well as prisoners crucified on Alexander’s order after victory in the siege of Tyre (Curt. 4.2.9-4.17; Diod. 16.42-46). Details of Perdikkas III’s death are unknown, but many have survived telling of the wounds suffered by his brother and nephew, Philip II and Alexander III. Philip suffered a near fatal wound from an arrow or dart that took his right eye, his life perhaps saved by a Chalkidian helmet (Diod. 16.34.5). Facial wounds seem common, as other Makedonians suffered similar wounds. Among these was Philip’s contemporary → Antigonos, soldier, general and future king, earning him the nickname ‘One-Eyed,’ a nom de guerre evidently not to Philip’s liking (Demetr. eloc. 293). Another time, a serious spear wound to Philip’s leg, left him with a limp, probably limiting his future participation in battle (Didym. On Dem. 13.3-5). Alexander, famous as a commander leading from the front, suffered wounds on every part of his body, as he reminded his army when it balked at continuing the campaign into Asia (Arr. An. 7.9.2). Five serious wounds are recorded: three to the leg by dagger, artillery stone (Curt. 4.6.23), and arrow (Arr. An. 3.30.11), a catapult launched arrow wound to the shoulder (Arr. An. 2.27.2), and, finally, a near mortal arrow wound to the chest (Arr. An. 6.10.1-2). Alexander, not only as kings, but as elites and commanders throughout history, received the best medical care available, and 5 physicians attended him. This was a level of medical care unavailable to common soldiers. As in other times and places, wounded survivors of battle are

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well attested. Arrian speaks of apomachoi, men unfit for service, many of whom would have been disabled by battle trauma (An. 5.27.5). These would have suffered the variety of wounds noted above and in later testimonies from the Epidaurian miracle dedications (4th and 3rd c. BC) recording battlefield survivors. These, the walking wounded, lived with spearheads lodged in the jaw and arrowheads in the chest (IG IV2 1, 121-22, 1:12, 2:30 =121.12; 122.30), while others coped with psychological trauma, blindness, and paralysis. As philosopher and historian George Santayana said of wartime survivors in post-World War I Oxford, only the dead see the end to war.   L.A. Tritle Cf. Edelstein, E.J./Edelstein, L., Asclepius. Collection and Interpretation of the Testimonies, 1945/1998; Salazar, C.F., The Treatment of War Wounds in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, 2000; Tritle, L.A., Men at War, in: Campbell, B./Tritle, L.A. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, 2013, 281-93.

Women, Argead royal The nature of Argead monarchy shaped but did not entirely determine the role of the women of the dynasty; individual w.’s agency in response to events also contributed to the evolving role of royal w. Argead kings began to employ a title only toward the end of the dynasty; not surprisingly no evidence for the use of a female title exists until just after the deaths of the last Argead kings (Syll.³ 333.6-7), though it is just possible that, as with the kings, some royal w. also received a title in the last years of the dynasty, but that evidence for the practice has not survived. Terms like “queen” and “princess” or “dowager queen” should be avoided in discussions of Argead monarchy because they are embedded in institutions of monarchies distant in time and place, not to mention distant in political culture, from Makedonia. Argead males, until the reign of Alexander, appeared in documents with only personal names and (sometimes) patronymics. An Athenian inventory of dedications includes one by → Rhoxane, → Alexan­der III’s first married wife; in the inscription he is given the title → basileus (king) and she is simply listed as the gyne (wife) of Alexander (IG II2 1492A). Only a few other inscriptions relating to Argead w. survived, but in these the w. appear with personal names and patronymics, and without reference to a husband (SEG 9.2; Plut. Mor. 14B-C). Argead w., however, did sometimes bear personal → names with political significance, 522

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relating to the accomplishments of their husbands or fathers (→ Philip II’s daughters Thessalonike and Europa bore names commemorating their father’s victories; Athen. 13.557D; Steph. Byz. s.v. Thessalonike), or referring to earlier members of the dynasty (Philip II’s granddaughter, originally called “Adea”, took the name of her great-grandmother, Eurydike, upon marrying a king: Arr. Succ. F 1.23). → Olympias may have born as many as four different names or epithets, some probably related to her husband’s accomplishments (Plut. Mor. 401A-B; Just. 9.7.13). While the oldest son of the last Argead king had a better chance to rule than other male Argeads, kingship often changed hands, though, so far as we can tell, always within the royal dynasty, until there were no male Argeads left. Often Argead kingship was a career open to talent, if only to Argead talent. Somewhat similarly, no formal, institutionalized distinction between one royal wife and another existed; there was no official chief wife, contrary to practice in a number of other ancient monarchies. Functionally, however, no matter how many wives an Argead ruler had, one tended to gain dominance, though she might not retain it. It may well be that the situation was somewhat similar for royal daughters. Alexan­ der’s full sister, → Kleopatra, for instance, received more attention during her brother’s reign (and her father’s) than her two half-sisters (Diod. 16.91.4-6; Just. 9.6.1-2; Memnon, BNJ 434 F 1.4.1; Plut. Alex. 25.4). Olympias’ advocacy may have contributed to Kleopatra’s predominance (Plut. Alex. 68.3). A number of factors contributed to the ascendancy of a given wife: the production of children, especially male, the prestige and influence of the family of a woman’s birth, the presence of some sort of support group at the Argead → court (typically relatives and → philoi who arrived with the wife or came later); the woman’s ability to manipulate philia networks; her ability to advocate for her children; the ability of other wives and their families to compete; chance. A change in any of these factors could lose or at least threaten a woman’s dominance. Philip and Alexander practiced poly­ gamy; Philip’s father → Amyntas III almost certainly did and earlier kings may have as well. Thus most royal wives likely had to contest for dominance and re-contest throughout their marriages and perhaps even in widow­hood, particularly because royal polygamy tended to turn mothers (and full siblings) into → succession advocates for their sons. If a king died while his sons were still minors, this advocacy could continue for some years. It is not clear that Argead Makedonia ever had true regents, but close kin did sometimes become guardians of kings’ sons and sometimes these guardians married the widowed royal mother (Plat. Gorg. 471A-C; Ael. Arist. 45.55; Arist. Pol. 1311B), though how often is unclear.

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Adea Eurydike, the Argead (a granddaughter of Philip II) wife of a mentally limited king (→ Arrhidaios), toward the end of their lives, functioned like a regent for her husband (Diod. 19.11.1) or chose a new regent/guardian for him (Just. 14.5.2-3). The absences of kings on campaign probably contributed to the power of their wives and to their closer relationship to their children. Alexander’s prolonged absence on the Asian campaign gave increasing prominence to his mother and sister (Plut. Alex. 68.3) and, granted the scarcity of viable Argead males after his death (his half-brother Philip III Arrhidaios was somehow mentally disabled; his son → Alexander IV was born several months after his death and his illegitimate son → Herakles was ignored until after the murder of Alexander IV), the women of the dynasty (Kynnane, Olympias, Kleopatra, Adea Eurydike) became far more public and aggressive figures, a fact that explains why all of them were murdered. While early Argead w. may have done simple household tasks, by the 4th c. royal dwellings were large and complicated structures and servants, slaves, and court members did many tasks (Athen. 14.359F; Diod. 20.37.5; Paus. 1.44.6). Fine work with fabric, like that found wrapping the bones of the woman interred in Tomb II at Vergina/→ Aigai, may have been the sort of thing royal w. worked at, but images of Alexan­der’s female kin weaving all the fabric needed for the family are likely Roman fictions (Curt. 5.2.20). Alexander had a nurse (Lanike: Arr. An. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.2.8), but Olympias was close to him throughout his childhood and regularly corresponded with him after his departure for Asia, and Eurydike, wife of Amyntas III, played a role in her sons’ → education (Plut. Mor. 14B-C). Royal wives may also have been responsible for the carrying out of religious ritual, especially those connected to the dynasty (Athen. 14.659F). Argead w. somehow had income, most likely produced by lands they either managed or hired someone to manage, although Alexander, at least, sent his mother and sister plunder (Anonym., BNJ 151 F1; Plut. Alex. 25.4). Little evidence clarifies how accessible they were to court members and perhaps to petitioners, but the careers of Eurydike, Olympias and her daughter Kleopatra all indicate that these w. had dealings with males at court and by correspondence as well (e.g. Diod. 18.58.2-3). They participated in networks of philia and were internationally known; both Eurydike and Olympias were named in speeches in the Athenian assembly (Aischin. 2.26-29; Hyp. 4.20-21, 25). Olympias, Kynnane, and Adea Eurydike appeared in front of armies (Douris ap. Athen. 13.560F; Diod. 19.11.1-3; Arr. Succ. F 1.22-23, 30-33; Polyain. 8.60); Kynnane may have gone into combat and her daughter gave speeches to the troops in Asia on many occasions. These particular 524

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Women, Argead royal

w. were public figures, although royal women generally may most often have been seen participating in ritual—in other words their public profile may have been more limited. Eurydike made public dedications, one in association with the Muses and several more in the sanctuary of Eukleia (pl. 3, fig. 1). Olympias made dedications in → Athens and at Delphi (Hyp. 4.19; Syll.³ 252N 5-8). Olympias sponsored some sort of Dionysiac w.’s festival (Plut. Alex. 2.5-6) and had some sort of control over the shrine at Dodona in Molossia (Hyp. 4.24-26). She and her daughter both functioned as patrons of grain in a time of scarcity, perhaps aiding the populations of both Molossia and Makedonia (SEG 9.2). Eurydike’s dedication celebrated her acquisition of education comparatively late in life. Olympias’ family claimed descent from → Achilles through his son Neoptolemos (Theopomp., BNJ 115 F 355); whether or not she could herself read, she would have been familiar with Homeric epic, Pindar and with → Euripides, works that celebrated their supposed heritage (Pind. Nem. 4.51-53, 7.38-39; Eur. Andr. 1246-1249). The influence of the Homeric poems is apparent in many aspects of elite Makedonian life, particularly at court (the → hetairoi of the king, the “pages”, the funerary practices, the banqueting). It is likely that Argead w. were influenced by the behavior and fame of royal w. in Homer and particularly by the way those w. moved between public and private. Many of these w. were murdered and Homeric poems and tragedy may have provided the model for their conduct at the time of death. It is difficult to know what their personal relationships were with family members, but it seems reasonable to assume that Olympias was an intensely loyal if difficult mother to Alexander. She and her daughter acted together on several occasions after the death of Alexander and when young Alexan­der IV arrived in the Greek peninsula, she took responsibility for him and risked and lost her own life in an attempt to safeguard the → throne for him (Diod. 19.35.6, 49.4-6, 57.2). Fundamental to any kind of historical analysis is evidence, but when one discusses royal Argead w., discussion of evidence is particularly fraught, for several reasons. For one thing, little evidence survives and thus generalizations depend, often, on so small amount of material that even one new discovery can change our views. As always, scholarship is affected by the culture that produced it; the difference between treatments of royal w. in Macurdy and more recent scholarship is obvious, the result of development of w.’s and gender studies. But perhaps the most difficult aspect of the use of evidence about royal w. is the role of anecdote in important ancient sources. Anec­dotes about w. often serve gender norms and confirm gender stereotypes. One may doubt, for instance, that, whatever → Antipatros (the man

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who administered Makedonian interests in Greece in Alexander’s absence) thought about w. and rule, that we actually have preserved what he said on his deathbed (Diod. 19.11.5), whether or not he objected to their role. Plutarch and Justin, both heavy users of anecdotal material, are particularly untrustworthy in this regard. The hostile tradition about Eurydike, mother of Philip II, portrays her as a demonic and lustful murderess, intent on the elimination of her husband and all her sons so that she could place her lover (and son-in-law) on the throne (Just. 7.4.7, 5.4-8; Schol. ad Aischin. 2.29; Suda s.v. Karanos κ 356 Adler). Inscriptions paint a very different picture, as does a relatively contemporary speech (Aischin. 2.26-29; Plut. Mor. 14B-C). Hostile stereotypes about politically active w. are still with us and still powerful, but a distinctive but significant aspect of the hostile portraits of Eurydike and Olympias observable in our sources is the way in which these very portraits confirm their engagement in court and politics also depicted in more friendly ones. Both show Eurydike as the leader of a court faction. Makedonian kings were often violent, whether in battle or in politics, but so were royal w. Too often Eurydike or Olympias have been faulted because they were not “nice”, though niceness was not an obvious quality of their male kin and one rarely expected of them. One wonders if the greater age of Eurydike and Olympias contributes to their negative depictions. Younger royal w. tend to get a more sympathetic reading in both ancient and modern sources. Kleopatra, the last married wife of Philip II, likely a teenager at the time of her marriage, collaborated with her guardian → Attalos in the gang rape of a former lover of Philip’s (Plut. Alex. 10.4); that Olympias subsequently murdered her and her baby (Plut. Alex. 10.4; Just. 9.7.12; Paus. 8.7.5) does not make this less true. Adea Eurydike, also later killed by Olympias, tried to woo the Makedonian army in Asia away from the control of several of the guardians of the two non-competent kings; Antipatros was nearly killed by the angry soldiers. That the troops did not kill him was no thanks to Adea Eurydike, but was due to collective action by several other generals (Arr. Succ. F 1.30-33) or to Antipatros’ own speaking abilities (Diod. 18.39.1-4). Argead w. had agency and exercised it through violence, political maneuvering with other members of the elite, and through manipulation of the populace. Like many male Argeads and other members of the elite they sometimes took vengeance but were no more or less vengeful than their male kin and associates.   E.D. Carney Cf. Carney 2000; Carney 2019; Macurdy, G.H., Hellenistic Queens, 1932; Müller 2013; Ogden 1999.

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Women, Persian

Women, Persian The first contact between Makedonians and Persian women may have occurred in the context of the marriage and matrimony of → Amyntas I’s daughter Gygaia and the high-ranking Persian Boubares (Hdt. 5.21.2; 8.136.1). While we lack further information on their wedding and married life, Gygaia probably got acquainted with P. w. The next attested contact between Makedonians and daughters of a Persian official (and his Rhodian wife) dates to the 350s: when Artabazos, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, lost the fight for his satrapy against Artaxerxes III, he fled with his family including 10 daughters to Philip II’s court (Diod. 16.52.3-4). They stayed there until their return to Persia in about the mid-340s. In 337, Philip may have tried to marry his son Arrhidaios to Ada, the daughter of → Karia’s satrap Pixodaros, in order to get access to the strategically important naval base of Halikarnassos. But it came to nothing. When invading the Achaimenid Empire, Makedonian men became explicitly associated with P. w. The evidence on the relations between P. w. and the Makedonians concerns the Makedonian invasion of Persia under Alexander III’s rule and first time after his death: P. w. became involved in the dynamics of war and conquest. As a brutal routine and a consequence of war, enslavement, rape or other forms of physical violence were the common fate of captured girls and women. The → Alexander historiographers mention en passant that the Makedonian soldiers enslaved, raped, violated, or robbed P. w., for example after → Issos (Curt. 3.11.21-22; Diod. 17.35.6-36.1) or in → Persepolis (Diod. 17.70.6). Particularly female members of influential Persian houses became ideological symbols of Makedonian victory. In the lithika of the Milan Papyrus (→ Poseidippos of Pella), P. w. appear as former owners of precious jewelry taken as booty by the victorious Makedonians and obviously given to Greek or Makedonian ladies (Ep. 3-4 and 7 AB). When after Issos (333), at Damaskos, Dareios III’s camp was captured by Parmenion, the female relatives, young siblings, and children of the high-ranking Persian officials (who had actually sent them there to ensure their safety), among them Dareios’ mother, wife, and daughters, fell into Makedonian hands. Rejecting the great king’s attempts to ransom them, the Makedonian regime held them in pledge as valuable hostages and tokens of Alexander’s legitimization as the new would-be Persian king. Alexander treated them respectfully acknowledging their royal status and posing as their new protector. Comparing Alexander to Xenophon’s chaste and gentlemanlike → Kyros II who did not

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touch or even look at his captive, Pantheia, the most beautiful woman of Asia (Kyr. 4.6.11; 5.1.2-17; cf. Arr. An. 2.12.5; 4.19.6; Plut. Alex. 21.4-5; 22.2), the Alexander historiographers depict Alexander’s merciful treatment of the royal P. w. as an exception to the rule and sign of his clemency and magnanimity. In fact, it was a political step in order to appeal to the Persian leading circles trying to make them cooperate. It would have been unwise to repel them by violating the daughters and wife of the still ruling king belonging to the long-standing Achaimenid dynasty profoundly connected with the important families throughout the empire. According to another certainly fictitious anecdote, after their capture, the royal P. w. were consoled by Alexander and → Hephaistion whom Dareios’ mother Sisygambis mistook for the ruler (Diod. 17.37.5-6, 114.2; Curt. 3.12.15-25). One of Artabazos’ daughters, Barsine, widow of → Memnon of Rhodos and mother of his newly born son, was also captured at Damaskos together with at least two of her sisters. Reportedly, Alexander made her his mistress. As, suspiciously, this became known when Barsine’s brother Pharnabazos held on to crucial bases in the Aegean and Western Anatolia and her other male relatives helped Dareios to levy new forces to sustain the war, it may have been a piece of psychological warfare intended to demoralize the commanders of the counterattack. Reportedly, in about 327/6, Barsine bore Alexan­der an illegitimate son called → Herakles whose name was dropped in the generals’ debates after Alexander’s death (Curt. 10.6.10-13; Just. 13.2.7; 15.2.3; Diod. 20.20.1-2). Since Herakles appeared only late in the sources, some scholars take him for an impostor set up in 309 by → Polyperchon (or → Antigonos?) to counter → Kassandros’ claim to Makedonia. In 331, the captured P. w. were left behind at Sousa. Reportedly, the female → Achaimenids were given instruction in Greek (Diod. 17.67.1). Returning from the Indian campaign, in early 324, Alexander organized mass marriages in accordance with the Persian ritual. He gave his high-ranking generals Persian brides (Arr. An. 7.4.4-6; Plut. Alex. 70.2; Diod. 17.107.6). These weddings served to integrate the Makedonians into the Persian power structures and family networks, thus neutralizing the threats of Persian interfamily connections throughout the empire. Choosing Dareios’ daughter Stateira and Artaxerxes III’s daughter Parysatis while giving Stateira’s sister Drypetis to Hephaistion, Alexander left no loose ends for any potential pretender with high hopes of marrying into the Achaimenid house. → Ptolemy was given Barsine’s sister Artakama, → Eumenes her sister Artonis, and → Seleukos Apame, either another sister (Strab. 12.8.15) or the rebel Spitamenes’ daughter 528

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Zeus

(Arr. An. 7.4.6). → Nearchos married a daughter of Barsine and Mentor, → Perdikkas the Median satrap’s daughter, and → Krateros Dareios’ niece Amastris. The Makedonian need to consolidate the conquests increased the usefulness of the P. w. as legitimizing symbols of political continuity. However, it may have been in the eye of the beholder whether these marriages created this illusion. Moralists critical of Alexander’s Persian policy accused Alexander of forcing his officials to marry the defeated “barbarians” (Just. 12.4.2, 10.10). According to Arrian, also more than 10.000 Makedonians who had married Asian women were registered and Alexander took care for the military education of their children who lived in the camp (An. 7.4.8, 12.2; cf. Diod. 17.110.3; Plut. Alex. 71.5). The earlier hypothesis that except for Seleukos most of the other Makedonian bridegrooms hurried to get rid of their Persian brides after Alexander’s death is certainly exaggerated. Krateros abandoned his bride. Ptolemy may have done so since the Persians were widely perceived as archenemies in his satrapy Egypt. But most of the P. w. may have vanished from the records because the Greek and Roman authors were not interested in them. Significantly, there is a lot of confusion about the names even of the most influential Makedonians’ Persian brides. For the ancient authors, P. w. were primarily literary devices: elements of a “barbarian” eastern alter orbis, markers of Alexander’s moral development and Persian policy (either favourably or unfavourably). Under Alexander III, P. w. became visible as captives, victims of war, hostages, tokens of Makedonian victory, or symbols of political continuity. However, in political reality, as representatives of their houses and elements of their networks, the Persian consorts of the Makedonians were of a certain importance and must have had some impact, still after Alexander’s death.   S. Müller Cf. Brosius, M., Women in Ancient Persia (559-331 B.C.), 1996, 77-9; Brosius, M., Alexan­der and the Persians, in: Roisman 2003, 169-93; Carney, E.D., Women in Alexan­ der’s Court, in: Roisman 2003, 227-52; Müller, S., The Female Element of the Political Self-Fashioning of the Diadochi, in: Alonso Troncoso/Anson 2013, 199-214.

Zeus   see Coinage, Argead; Deities; Eagle, on coins; Foundation Myth

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Appendix

Plate 1: Makedonian rider

Plate 1: Makedonian rider (all but no. 5 silver; enlarged, not to scale)

Alexander I, tetrobol (2.38g) and oktodrachm (29.21g) 1  A. as a commander, with akinakes/sarissa 2  A. as a hunter, with two javelins

3  Perdikkas II, tetrobol (2.44g, petasos on neck)

4  Philip II, tetradrachm, type 2: naked jockey, with winner’s wreath and palm, 342/1-337/6 (many posthumous issues), 14.42g (for type 1 see cover)

5a  Philip III Arrhidaios, bronze unit (6.68g); 5b  Alexander IV, AE (6.15g) Rev. influenced by type 1 of Philip’s tetradrachms (on cover). The rider is styled here as a beardless and bareheaded young man representing, as it seems, either of the two young kings. The coins were formerly ascribed to Kassandros’ sons Philip IV (297) and Alexander V (297-4), moreover: (a) formerly to Philip V, (b) to Alexander III (posthumous, ca. 323-17, by Price 1991, I 32, no. 372).

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Plate 2: Archelaos, Dynastic series

Plate 2: Archelaos, Dynastic series (all silver, enlarged, out of scale)

6  Stater (Pentedrachm, 30 obols), 10.59g. Founder hero (Perdikkas I or Archelaos), ΑΡΧΕ-ΛΑŌ

7  Drachm (1/5 stater, 6 obols), 2.05g. Zeus’ eagle, [Α]ΡΧΕ-ΛΑ-Ō

8  Hemidrachm (1/10 stater, 3 obols), 1.00g. Herakles, bearded/Wolf of Argos, club, ΑΡ[ΧΕ]

9  Trihemiobol (1/20 stater, 1.5 obols), 0.46g. Herakles, unbearded/Wolf of Argos, club, ΑΡ-ΧΕ

10  Obol (1/30 stater, 1 obol), 0.34g. Herakles unbearded/Nemean Lion, club, ΑΡ

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Plate 3: Images of the entries by Olga Palagia

Plate 3: Images of the entries by Olga Palagia

1  (entry: Aigai): Fragment of an over-life-size peplos figure in Pentelic marble, sanctuary of Eukleia

2  (entry: Lion, lion hunt): Hunt on the façade of Tomb II in Vergina-Aigai

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Plate 3: Images of the entries by Olga Palagia

3  (entry: Art, Makedonian): Votive relief from Pella dedicated to the heroized Hephaistion (ΔΙΟΓΕΝΗΣ ΗΦΑΙΣΤΙΩΝΙ ΗΡΩΙ: Διογένης Ἡφαιστίωνι ἥρωι, EKM 2.2, 444)

4  (entry: Art, Makedonian): Rape of Persephone, Vergina, Tomb I (of Persephone)

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Plate 3: Images of the entries by Olga Palagia

5  (entry: Art, Makedonian): Mosaic of Dionysos holding a thyrsos, riding a panther, Pella

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Credits

Photos with friendly permission of CNG, Lancaster/PA and London (www.cngcoins.com), Leu Numismatik, Winterthur (www.leunumismatik.com), and Numismatik Naumann, Wien (www.numismatik-naumann.at) Cover Numismatik Naumann, Aukt. 24 (2014) 93 Plate 1 1 CNG, Auct. 60 (2002) 250 2 CNG, El. Auct. 366 (2016) 410 3 Photo: U. Klöppel, Aarbergen (from Müller 2017, cover) 4 CNG, El. Auct. 445 (2019) 57 5 a Numismatik Naumann, Aukt. 78 (2019) 103 b Numismatik Naumann, Aukt. 59 (2017) 61 Plate 2 6 Leu Numismatik, Web Auct. 1 (2017) 254 7 Leu Numismatik, Web Auct. 2 (2017) 98 8 Numismatik Naumann, Auct. 42 (2016) 120 9 CNG, Mail Bid Sale 84 (2010) 217 10 CNG, Triton 18 (2015) 441 Plate 3 1-5 Olga Palagia

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