Latomus and Luther: The Debate: Is every Good Deed a Sin? [1 ed.] 9783666552519, 9783525552513

Citation preview

Anna Vind

Latomus and Luther The Debate: Is every Good Deed a Sin? Academic Studies

26

Refo500 Academic Studies Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis In co-operation with Christopher B. Brown (Boston), Günter Frank (Bretten), Bruce Gordon (New Haven), Barbara Mahlmann-Bauer (Bern), Tarald Rasmussen (Oslo), Violet Soen (Leuven), Zsombor Tjth (Budapest), Günther Wassilowsky (Frankfurt), Siegrid Westphal (Osnabrück).

Volume 26

Anna Vind

Latomus and Luther The Debate: Is every Good Deed a Sin?

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek: The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: https://dnb.de.  2019, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Gçttingen All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting: 3w+p, Rimpar Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage j www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2197-0165 ISBN 978-3-666-55251-9

Contents

1. Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pr8cis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3. Historical Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The debate between Maarten Dorp and Erasmus and Erasmus’ first years in Leuven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Erasmus’ answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Maarten Dorp’s answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Dorp’s recantation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 The end of the dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.5 The foundation of the Collegium Trilingue . . . . . . . . . 3.1.6 Trouble brewing 1518–1519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.7 Briard’s critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.8 Jacob Latomus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Dialogue on the Issue of the Three Languages and the Study of Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 The method of theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Latomus’ theory of knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 The foundation of theology : The spiritual authority . . . . 3.2.4 The outer authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5 The reaction to Latomus’ Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6 The linking of Erasmus with Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The history of the condemnations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Erasmus’ letter to Albrecht of Brandenburg . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Putting together the condemnation in Leuven . . . . . . . 3.3.4 The content of the two condemnation texts and Adrian’s letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 24 26 28 30 31 33 34 35 36 37 38 41 43 44 47 49 51 53 57 57 58

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Contents

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60 63 65 66 66 69 70 74

4. Latomus’ treatise against Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 The rejoinder to the recriminations against the condemners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Condemnation sine ratione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 Commentaries on four of the condemned Luther passages 4.1.4 Erasmus as a hidden opponent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.5 A sketch of the principles of Latomus’ theology . . . . . . 4.2 The refutation of Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Latomus own argumentation: The logical contradicitions . 4.2.2 Proof from the New Testament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Arguments from the old tradition: The three long Augustine quotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 The refutation of Luther’s Scripture proof: Isaiah 64:6 . . 4.2.5 Ecclesiastes 7:21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.6 The Epistle to the Romans 7:14ff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The relation between sin and good deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Rationality and will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Concupiscence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 The struggle between sin and righteousness . . . . . . . . 4.4 Latomus and Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Does opus indifferens exist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 The rational in Latomus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 The parable of the prodigal son as an image of the relation between man and God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8.1 Latomus on fides in article 2 of the Exposition . . . . . . . 4.8.2 The relationship between fides propria and fides ecclesiae .

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3.3.5 Leuven’s condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.6 Cologne’s condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.7 Adrian’s letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Luther’s rejoinder to the condemnations . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Criticism of the method of the condemnations . . . 3.4.2 Using philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Sin and good deeds, indulgences and the sacraments 3.5 The reactions to the condemnations and Luther’s rejoinder

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81 86 87 89 90 93 95 96 99 103 108 111 113 114 117 121 123 124 132 133 135 139 142 145 146 150

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154 156 158 160 163

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5. Luther’s Pamphlet Against Latomus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The introductory letter to Justus Jonas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The rejoinder to Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam . . 5.2.1 On the right to dispute and true authority . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The commentary to the four sentences . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Isaiah 64:6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The Holy Spirit as the sender of Scripture . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 On the simple and singular meaning of Scripture . . . . . 5.3.3 Judgment and mercy, wrath and grace . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Law and Gospel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Ecclesiastes 7:21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 The general exegetical rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 What is a good deed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The conclusion of Ecclesiastes 7:21 – introduction to Romans: What is sin? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 On understanding the meaning of words . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 Sin in literal and figurative sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Breaking with classical rhetoric and radicalizing the Christian tradition of interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.4 Christ as the centre of Scripture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.5 Interpretation of Scripture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 On sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 Rhetoric instead of philosophy as the point of departure . 5.6.2 Ruling and ruled sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3 What happens in baptism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.4 Effective justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.5 The paradoxicality of justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 The Epistle to the Romans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.1 The treatment of sin according to the Law and the Gospel. 5.7.2 Mysterium Christi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7.3 Excursus: Other interpretations of gratia and donum: Rudolf Hermann, Regin Prenter and Tuomo Mannermaa . 5.7.4 The life of a Christian: The two fortresses (Romans 8:1) .

169 170 171 174 176 183 185 188 194 200 204 205 209

4.9 The Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.1 The Episcopal office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.2 The importance of the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Latomus’ relation to Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.1 Latomus’ use of Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10.2 Augustine as a source of inspiration for both Latomus and Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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216 217 221 237 247 250 255 256 258 260 262 265 269 270 280 289 301

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5.7.5 The exegesis of the Epistle to the Romans 7:14–8:1 . . . . 5.7.6 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.

Preface

This book was defended as a PhD dissertation in 2002 at the Department for Church History, University of Copenhagen. In that year it was published in Danish and it was reprinted in 2007. Some years ago international colleagues encouraged me to have the work translated into English in order to make it accessible to a wider readership, since the topic might be of interest beyond the borders of Denmark. Shortly thereafter it was accepted for publication in the Refo500 Academic Series by Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. I have elected to publish the book in the original version, since an update of it to the present time would result in a quite different piece of work. What is offered to the reader here is therefore a slightly revised 2002 edition rendered into English. Only a few changes have been made, correcting the more evident errors which found their way into the first edition. All translations from Latin here are my own. The existing translations of Erasmus, Augustine and Luther are of various standards, and no translation of Latomus exists. To cut my way short it seems best to present my own version of all of them. Thereby I also allow my own interpretations of the texts cited to become apparent. With few exceptions no extensive Latin quotations are allowed in the running text, all longer quotations being relegated to the footnotes. German, however, is accepted. I want to thank the former dean at The Faculty of Theology in Copenhagen, Professor Dr.theol. Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, for encouraging and supporting the translation of my work. I also want to express thanks to my supervisor Professor Dr.theol. Lauge Olaf Nielsen, who took over after the death of my first mentor Professor Dr.theol. Leif Grane in the year 2000 and helped me get things back on track. Finally I would like to thank David Robert Seton and Jan Masorsky for their indispensable help with the editing and proofreading of the present book. Copenhagen 2019, Anna Vind

2.

Introduction

Luther’s work Rationis Latomianae pro incendiariis Louaniensis Scholae sophistis redditae, Lutheriana Confutatio (“The Lutheran Refutation of Latomus’ Exposition in Defence of the Arsonist-sophists at the University in Leuven”) (1521) has often been interpreted in researches devoted to Luther. In 1930 Rudolf Hermann made a careful analysis of the text in his book Luthers These “Gerecht und Sünder zugleich”. Eine systematische Untersuchung, and this reading influenced a number of scholars after him. Notable among these are the Dane Regin Prenter and his book Spiritus Creator (1944) and the article “Luthers Lehre von der Heiligung” (1958), and also the articles written by Heinrich Bornkamm (1979), Erwin Iserloh (1970), Erik Kyndal (1961), Walter Matthias (1957) and Joachim Rogge (1970). Rudolf Hermann’s own later article “Zur Kontroverse zwischen Luther und Latomus” (1961) also deserves mention here. In the 1980s and 1990s Luther’s text was explicitly commented by Knut Alfsv,g (1987), Jörg Baur (1989), Pierre Bühler (1981), Gerhard Ebeling (1995), Asger Chr. Højlund (1992), Tuomo Mannermaa (1990), Ernstpeter Maurer (1996), Simo Peura (1994), Joachim Ringleben (1997), and Hellmut Zschoch (1993). At the international Congress for Luther Research held at Lund in 1977, Leif Grane and others held a seminar on Latomus and Luther. The intention was to publish the results of the seminar, a project which unfortunately was never realized. Latomus’ work against Luther, the Articulorum doctrinae fratris Martini Lutheri per theologos lovanienses damnatorum ratio ex sacris literis et veteribus tractatoribus (“Exposition on the basis of the Holy Scripture and the ancient authorities of the articles in brother Martin Luther’s doctrine which have been condemned by the theologians of Leuven”), was however not the object of much profound scholarly investigation before 2002. Joseph E. Vercruysse wrote three shorter articles about Latomus, one introductory and two thematic articles treating respectively of his relation to Augustine and his ecclesiology. Latomus is also mentioned in books on Leuven at the time of the Reformation, and in works dealing with Erasmus’ doings in the same period. Instead of giving here a general survey of the secondary literature relevant to

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Introduction

the present study, the important material – except for the examples of three core interpretations on gratia and donum (Hermann, Prenter and Mannermaa) – is referred to in the text or the notes where appropriate. The reason for this is that in relation to Latomus so little had been written before 2002 that no real scholarly discussion existed, whereas the contrary is the case when it comes to Luther. In the case of Luther, when his Antilatomus has been referred to explicitly in the secondary literary contexts, his text has often been split up and used for the purpose of more thematic discussions, such as that of the use of metaphor in his theology, or the understanding of grace and the gift as the basis of forensic and/ or effective justification. These thematic articles are drawn in and commented along the road whenever relevant. Furthermore the present interpretation of Luther’s text has in many cases necessitated reference to, or recourse to, other relevant interpretations of Luther, which do not deal explicitly with the text treated here, but with themes and questions raised by the text. In the case of Latomus the need to relate his thinking to the world of scholastic theology and the different schools represented there is evident. Here I have been forced to choose between, and draw in, a limited number of studies on such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas and Augustine. The present investigation cannot pretend to be able to contribute to the scholarly discussion concerning those great theologians. On the contrary the need to simplify and minimize the shelves of literature, and not be overwhelmed by the possibilities and questions raised by the source material, is clearly displayed in these pages. Much more could be done in this respect, and the attempt made here to point out Latomus’ relationship to the tradition should be seen for what it is: a provisional attempt. Two major works of secondary literature concerning the discussion between Latomus and Luther have appeared since 2002. The first one is Ragnar Skottene’s work Grace and Gift. An Analysis of a Central Motif in Martin Luther’s Rationis Latomianae Confutatio (2008). Skottene refers to and is in many ways dependant upon my work. Rather than giving a full description of the Latomus-Luther discussion, he focuses on Luther’s contribution and on the central motif ‘grace and gift’. Thus he in some ways expands the scope of my investigation, and in other ways limits himself to a more narrow topic. The second book I want to mention is Hannegreth Grundmann’s Gratia Christi. Die theologische Begründung des Ablasses durch Jacobus Latomus in der Kontroverse mit Martin Luther (2012). Grundmann treats the historical setting of the discussion and gives a detailed analysis of Latomus’ tract against Luther. Her reading of Latomus is in many ways different from mine, and the differences between the two readings thus deserve a brief mention. I will not comment more explicitly on her results directly, but the following are in my opinion the major divergences:

Introduction

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1) Hannegreth Grundmann says that she is the first to deal with Latomus’ ‘Ratio’ in its full length and she says of my book, that it ”stellt hauptsächlich den Antilatomus Luthers hervor und interpretiert ihn. Die Ratio behandelt sie nur punktuell” (6). It naturally follows that ‘Über die Theologie des Latomus gibt es bisher keine Untersuchungen” (6). The English edition of my book will give the reader a second chance to form a judgement as to the justice of that claim. 2) This being said, the fact that Grundmann works her way more minutely through the second part of Latomus’ treatise gives the reader a different and more literal picture of this part of his ‘Ratio’. In this way she clearly amplifies my work by unfolding in greater detail and accuracy how Latomus understood the sacrament of penance, purgatory and indulgences. 3) Grundmann does not set out Latomus’ prehistory (the time in Leuven and his Dialogue) before the reader : instead she chooses to go through the events and writings connected to the dispute with Luther on indulgences of 1517–1521. Each account, hers and mine, gives a completely different opening, and thus prepares and informs the reader in a very different way. 4) Her overall interpretation makes Latomus a scotist and not a thomist. On this point we have come to opposing results. In my interpretation I see him as primarily a thomistically inspired scholastic. There is no doubt that it is a delicate question to answer what kind of a theologian he was, since it can be difficult to analyse the dependency of 16th century scholastics on one or another theological school. Not infrequently they were rather eclectic than strictly thomist, scotist or nominalist. Furthermore the ability to point out exactly what influenced Latomus demands a very broad and fundamental knowledge of scholastic theology and tradition, a breadth and depth of which I cannot boast. So my attempt to define the scholarly lines along which he structured his thinking in the greater context is no more than what I call it: an attempt, which can and doubtless will be adjusted. 5) In her book Grundmann does not seem to investigate Latomus’ use of the church fathers in depth, nor yet his employment of Augustine, by comparing Latomus’ use of them with the original context of the texts that he quotes. 6) And finally concerning Luther, who is present in her book but whose answer to Latomus is not treated, Grundmann finally seems to subscribe to a plainly forensic interpretation of Luther’s teaching of justification and to refuse all talk of an effective aspect. With this I can only disagree, as will be evident from the reading of my work, and this point of divergence also has a remarkable influence upon the overall conclusion concerning the fundamental differences between Latomus and Luther. Methodologically the present study may seem quite simple, since it does not employ any specific explicitly theoretical approaches. The bases of this work

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Introduction

build upon the reading of the selected texts in their historical context, and with a strong focus on their theological content. This entails a classical hermeneutical and historical-genetic reflection, which nevertheless is only implicitly present in these pages. This study seeks a balance between the necessary account of the historical context, and striking similarities of thought in the 16th century on the one hand, and the attempt to understand and account for the theological content of the texts as accurately as possible on the other. This balancing act does not indicate a struggle between these lines of direction, but shows awareness of the inherent alienation of the historical material as well as alertness to the contemporaneity in the meeting between the text and the reader. A second remark on methodology is in order. The present work descends from the Danish tradition of Luther research as represented by scholars such as my teachers, the Copenhagen church historians Leif Grane and Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen. My awareness of this dependency was somewhat less acute 17 years ago than it is today, and was therefore not as explicitly acknowledged in the Danish introduction as I feel it necessary to formulate it now.

Précis Who was Jacob Latomus? What did he write in the series of lectures to which Luther penned an answer in 1521, an answer which is now so central to many interpretations of the great reformer? And how is the reading of that answer affected when it is preceded by an interpretation of what Latomus wrote? These are the fundamental questions asked in the present study. The task I have undertaken is to give a theological and historical account of the dispute between the two men in 1521, with the emphasis on Luther. Some of the historical preconditions for the dispute, and especially a reading of Latomus’ work, forms the background for an interpretation of Luther’s Antilatomus. The first part of the book gives a survey of a series of events in Leuven between 1514 and 1521. The aim here is to point to some of the factors of fundamental importance for the anti-lutheran reaction at the University of Leuven. At the end of the 15th century a tension grew in Leuven – as in many other places – between the conservative scholastic theologians and the strong advocates of humanistic learning. The “old-school” theologians feared that the humanists were threatening the traditional subjects and schools. Not the least cause of tension was Erasmus’ presence in Leuven between 1517 and 1521. For a long time he had spoken out for reform of learned studies and the situation of the clergy, and was therefore far from popular among the conservative scholastics. As soon as he gave them occasion, they attacked him with a view to discrediting his ideas. One example of this was the De Trium Linguarum

Précis

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et Studii Theologici ratione Dialogus (“Dialogue concerning the Background for the three Languages and the Study of Theology”) written by Jacob Latomus. When the first edition of Luther’s works came to town in 1518, the Leuven theologians saw a chance to rid themselves of their humanist opponents. If they could stigmatize Luther, who had already been suspected of heresy in Rome, as a heretic and at the same time link Erasmus’ and Luther’s cause, they would kill two birds with one stone. In 1520 Luther wrote an answer to the doctrinal condemnations issued in 1519 at Leuven and Cologne. This answer, which chastised the two universities for not giving reasons for their condemnations, and thus for exercising unfounded authority, was the occasion of Latomus’ efforts on behalf of his university. During the summer of 1520 he lectured on the questions raised by the condemnations: and it was against this background that he issued a manuscript, which was printed the following year. This rounds off the narrative of events. The second part of our study goes through the most important parts of Latomus’ treatise against Luther. The aim here is to identify Latomus’ theological convictions and thus to pin down who and what Luther was up against. It is possible already, on the strength of the treatment of Latomus’ Dialogue in the first part, to make some general remarks about his theology. It is based on aristotelian-augustinian semantics, where things are always the same and always appear to the human intellect, that is to the soul, in the same way, in the shape of inner and eternal concepts, conceptus. The words are outer, temporal expressions of these inner eternal concepts, and thus the importance of language and languages is relative. Languages are not necessary as means of cognition, only as remedies for the expression and communication of the cognition of the soul. Latomus works with a hierarchy of cognition, moving from the practical sciences via the lower speculative sciences to the similarly speculative theological science. Whereas the practical and the lower sciences rest upon a natural, that is empirically-founded bodily as well as mental cognition by virtue of a lumen naturale, theology rests on a cognition in need of divine light from a lumen supernaturale worked by the Holy Spirit. This theory of cognition seems to be inspired in a higher degree by Thomist than by Augustinian thinking, since the divine light is necessary only for theology. Latomus calls this supernatural theological cognition variously lex Christi mentalis, veritas evangelica, evangelium scriptum in corde, fides divinitus inspirata and depositum fidei. It is the truth revealed to faith, which was announced to the prophets as well as to the first disciples, and which continues to be given to chosen Christians. It is not a mystical feeling or emotion, but is a concrete content of faith, which builds upon and supplies reason. It is concretized as verbal expressions in Scripture as well as in the ecclesiastical tradition, but is

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Introduction

passed down independently thereof since it shares the nature of conceptus and is mental, eternal and superior to all linguistic utterance. This does not mean that Latomus espouses a spiritualistic notion of authority. The inner authority, the gospel in the heart, is closely connected to the outer authority, the ecclesiastical office. Only here, in the spiritual teaching office of the church discharged by those chosen Christians who have received the divinely inspired faith, can we be sure that the inner authority is to be found, preserved and handed down. This happens when the performer of the office in his attempt to maintain the true doctrine lets the living faith, Scripture and the ecclesiastical tradition mutually test and rectify each other. In the treatise against Luther, which for convenience we shall call the “Exposition”, these general principles in Latomus’ theology, which came to the surface in the Dialogue, recur for example in the letter of dedication to Rodolphus of Monckedam, the theological licenciate and vice pastor in Gouda. And at the end of the interpretation of the Exposition it becomes clear how important the visible church, with the Episcopal (meaning Papal) office at its head, is to Latomus. Again his words on faith, especially the ecclesiologial sermon in article 6 of the Exposition, place Latomus’ theology squarely under the key signature of the Roman Church. Even though the disposition of the treatise is determined by the argumentation in Luther’s writings, so that the Exposition has a somewhat unsystematic character, it is possible to find and sketch out the fundamental features of Latomus’ theology on the basis of it. He refers in the Exposition to Augustine as his principal theological authority, and a comparison between Augustine’s words and his use of them brings his own theology into the light. It appears, then, that Latomus’ anthropology has a rationalistic or intellectualistic rather than a voluntarist character ; that his concept of original sin is determined by the notion of the loss of iustitia originalis; that he understands the struggle between flesh and spirit not as something which comes into being at the Fall of man, but as a part of man’s creation, which by the loss of the original justice is resuscitated with flesh as the dominant force; that he has a notion of a fundamental goodness in man, the law in the heart, and speaks about a secondary good deed (the opus indifferens, in his terminology) as well as a primary good deed in a hierarchy of virtues, and goes on to grade the grace of God in agreement with this, so that it constitutes God’s help for man before, in and after justification; that his view of the relationship between man and God, between nature and grace can be compared with the Thomist view of the relation between nature and supernature; and finally that his talk of human freedom and facere quod in se est corresponds more closely to a Thomist world of ideas than to a Scotist or a nominalist. The result is – and this is in accord with the reading of the Dialogue – that

Précis

17

Latomus for the most part can be said to be inspired by Thomism. Even though he treats topics which belong to a later period of time, such as is the case in the question of opus indifferens/actus medius, he treats them in a way which is still compatible with Thomist thinking. The comparison between Latomus and Augustine shows that at times Latomus refers justly to Augustine and at other times he does not. As far as can be concluded on the basis of the texts from Augustine cited in the Exposition, Augustine’s theology contains no notion of a neutrally good deed with indirect importance for the relationship to God such as we find in Latomus. This is so because the concept of original sin is much more radical in Augustine than in Latomus. According to Augustine no man can do any good in relation to God without that divine grace which leads him to God. Desire, concupiscentia, inherent in the fallen man, is for Augustine identical with original sin and an absolute hindrance to the proper good. On the other hand Augustine thinks that through baptism a change happens to concupiscence, that its depth is removed. After baptism concupiscentia is no longer identical to original sin, but is reduced to being only a result of, or a punishment for, the Fall of Man. Now this is something with which Latomus can go along. Both he and Augustine promote a horizontal doctrine of justification with a sanative mark. After the infusion of baptismal grace man is sanctified and from here – unless he slips and commits unforgivable deadly sin – his righteousness grows, to be completed in death, when he is translated from an incomplete righteous life in faith to a complete righteous life in full view. The more he struggles against and resists the temptations of desire in this life, the more he advances on his way towards completion. And thus great importance is attached to his deeds. Through the comparison between Augustine and Latomus we sense some of the differences between Latomus and Luther. Those things in Augustine which do not attract Latomus, are exactly the things to which Luther connects: the idea of concupiscence as identical with original sin, and the notion of fallen man’s incapacity to do good in relation to God. Conversely the things which Latomus likes in Augustine are what Luther rejects: concupiscence in the justified understood as punishment alone, and the importance of the deeds of the righteous for his way towards salvation. The third part of the book is a reading of Luther’s pamphlet against Latomus, with the historical context and inner coherence of the text taken into account. Parallels are drawn with Latomus’ theology in order to facilitate as much as possible an appreciation of the differences between the two. Luther first and foremost sticks to the fact that concupiscence in the justified is entirely sinful, and that the justified can do nothing of importance for his salvation. This is the pivotal point in the discussion with Latomus. The question

18

Introduction

is then how he sees the reality of justification, when he does not, like Latomus, mean, that by the infusion of grace a change happens in the fallen man, which obviates original sin and leaves only inconsequential desire behind. Luther disagrees with Latomus in his fundamental point of departure. To him, Latomus’ Aristotle-Augustine-inspired semantics, and his Thomist epistemology, are false when applied to theology. They are both results of logical-philosophical speculations on the relation between language, reality and human cognition, and thus they miss the object of theology, which cannot be adapted to systems of this kind. Instead, Luther refers to the ability of God’s word to “create what it names”: the word of God institutes its own semantics and epistemology. What the word mentions, exists as it is spoken, and what is said, is heard by him to whom the Spirit grants ears to hear. Literally God’s word is autonomous and can never be caught in a logical-philosophical system. Not even he, who has heard it, can judge and control it: on the contrary, the word always and repeatedly judges and controls him, who hears it. The word calls man out of his own reality, away from himself and into a new reality, turned towards something different and alien. The word destroys everything old belonging to man, and reinstates him in his original determination as God’s creature. In comparison to Latomus, Luther thus reverses the relation between words and concepts in theology. The word of God comes first and determines the human conception of it. The theological philosopher must therefore always refer to and be determined by the word of God, not vice versa. This may be the reason for Luther’s greater fascination with rhetoric as an auxiliary science to theology than with philosophy. This can clearly be seen in the Antilatomus, where references to classical rhetoric play a crucial role in Luther’s interpretation of Scripture, and where we find an outspoken critique of the prevalent use of philosophy in theology. What fascinates Luther in rhetoric is that here language is treated as the human access to reality, so that the words themselves and their context must be studied in order to fathom the meaning. The rhetorician leaves the words as they are. He lets them say what they say without trying to master and control them by fitting them into an overall conceptual philosophical system. But great as Luther’s enthusiasm for classical rhetoric may be, this text also shows that his own point of view differs substantially from it. In rhetoric, language – and especially figurative language – is regarded as an innovatory discourse about reality revealing its meaning in an ever-renewed perspective on the given: a fulfilment. Luther goes on to distinguish between human words and the word of God, and God’s word – also primarily understood as figurative speech – is, as Luther understands it in the setting of the testimony of Scripture, not just an immanent fulfillment like human figural speech, but is a transcendent irruption into and alteration of the given: a new creation.

Précis

19

The word of God, which Luther calls Verbum – as distinct from verba, human words – is Christ, God who became man. The incarnation is the coming of God’s word to man. The key to the divine use of language is thus what characterizes the person and deed of Christ: communicatio idiomatum in a christological and soteriological perspective. This means the exchange of properties between the divine and the human nature of Christ (the person of Christ, the christological perspective) and between Christ and the human being (the deed of Christ, the soteriological perspective). Everything which can and must be said theologically about God and the relationship between God and man, must take its point of departure in the person and deed of Christ. In this sense Christology is the centre of Luther’s theology. How important this is, and altogether what Christ is, is unknown to Latomus and his kindred spirits, says Luther. The proclamation of Christ (the person of Christ) through the spirit leads to the new creation just mentioned (the deed of Christ) of the human being who hears the word. This is what Luther tries to explain to Latomus when going through the three scriptural passages Isaiah 64:6, Ecclesiastes 7:21 and Romans 7:14ff. Especially in relation to the Epistle to the Romans does Luther’s understanding of this become clear, and thus how differently from Latomus he sees the reality of justification. Luther’s thought on justification may at first seem similar to that of Latomus. Luther maintains that a change occurs in baptism by infusion of virtus dei infusa, where the power of sin is broken so that it can no longer rule. Sin is still real sin (and here Latomus disagrees), but it is now a ruled sin, which is no longer damnabilis. Seemingly this is very similar to Latomus’ words on the love of God as a virtus infusa causing the forgiveness of guilt so that concupiscentia after baptism is no longer real sin, but only a punishment for original sin and an occasion of forgivable sin. Luther like Latomus also talks about an effective justification, which means that in a progressive perspective – or to put it with a formulation like the one used in relation to Latomus and Augustine – in a horizontal sanative perspective, a change happens to man in baptism, by which sin (by Latomus called the “insignificant desire”) is swept out more and more before death, until it is quite removed in death. Finally Luther says that man himself is active in this sweeping-out of sin, by not consenting to it and by expelling it with his own fist. This may seem very similar to Latomus’ discourse on the liberum arbitrium of man, which enables him to select – or refuse – cooperation with God. But after all Luther’s talk of the justification of man is of a quite different nature from that of Latomus. In Luther the effective side of justification is indissolubly connected to the forensic side. Not in a harmonious relationship, where the forensic, that is the instant forgiveness and removal of sin when it

20

Introduction

comes to ruling, comes first, to be followed by the effective perspective, that is the progressive removal of sin according to its existence. When the human being hears and receives Christ, the word of God, and thus is made righteous, he or she is confronted by one divine reality with two sides present at the same time in a paradoxical relationship. And this paradoxical quality is totally incomprehensible and unacceptable to Latomus. According to Luther, man is at a stroke wholly righteous when God regards him so, even though at the same time he is wholly a sinner (the forensic perspective) and at the same time he becomes more and more righteous, when he is more and more free from sin in a sweepingout movement towards death (the effective perspective). In other words we are looking at 1) an instant and total new creation of the whole human being when he receives Christ in faith, 2) a simultaneous maintenance of the existence of sin and thus of the whole character of being a sinner until death, and 3) finally a progressive partial growth in righteousness which is parallel to the sweeping-out of sin fulfilled in death. This means that the divine reality given to man in Christ is characterized by a “typological” structure: the timeless eternal (the total, forensic perspective) simultaneously and continually comes into existence in a forward-looking temporal movement (the partial, effective perspective). This is a structure which, seen logically and philosophically, is not in the least transparent: on the contrary, it represents a logical-philosophical absurdity. It is a proclaimed fact which does not satisfy the natural human intellect, but only makes sense or – in other words – becomes real in faith to him who hears the sermon of Christ. Therefore, Luther also calls this the divine reality of the mysterium Christi. Luther emphasizes that when man hears the sermon of Christ, the word of God, and receives faith, Christ and man are united in the sense that Christ inhabits man and man is transformed into Christ, is “raptured into Him”. This happens when Christ in faith gives his own righteousness to man and takes man’s sin upon Himself. And this takes place in an instant total as well as a progressive partial perspective. This being united is the same as when the properties of Christ become one in His person, so that the same thing can be said about Christ’s human and his divine nature. Christ is one person, but two natures. Thus in the union there is both a unity and an essential difference. This means that in the unio between God and man in Christ, we are not to suppose that man becomes God or God becomes man, but that man in Christ belongs to God and God belongs to man. In this unio, says Luther, Christ is the only acting figure. He is the one who gives and takes and thus the one who works everything. He is the virtus infusa, who is given to man in baptism, breaking down the power of sin so that it will no longer condemn him. His is the righteousness accounted to man under which man can hide like a chicken under the wings of the hen. He is the one who

Précis

21

occasions the sweeping-out of sin towards death. The only thing man does in relation to Him is to confess his sin and receive faith in Him given by the Spirit. When Luther speaks of man’s cooperation in the removal of sin – of how man must sweep out sin with his own fist – he is speaking about the true service to God in the shape of the confession of sin and reception of Christ as God’s word of forgiveness. Every other plain thing done by the man who does this, is good, and counts as good deeds. Luther finishes his pamphlet by declaring everything Latomus stands for to be harmful for theology. The comparison between the two theologians shows that they speak completely different languages and that their viewpoints do not square at all. Even though their thoughts may seem similar on the surface, the difference between them is in fact insuperable. Basically their ways depart in their understanding of God’s word and how it is communicated to man. This generates two ways of perceiving the matter of theology, and of speaking theologically – and prevents mutual understanding. Latomus cannot understand, let alone accept, Luther’s view of the autonomy of God’s word and the special character of proclamation, and hence a theology which is incompatible with natural reason. Even though he accepts a division between a natural and a supernatural rationality, and thus admits that natural reason has a limit, he grants the very same natural reason an important role in the ascent of cognition towards revelation. Everything else – such as Luther’s theology – is a dehumanization of the human being. Luther, on the other hand, regards Latomus’ theology as a result of the impulse in sinful man towards ruling and controlling the word of God with his own inadequate natural abilities. In Luther’s eyes that proclamation of Christ, which in the shape of a human being comes to man in contradiction of everything human, here disappears in the twinkling of an eye. Even though Latomus replied to Luther at a later date, nothing more happened. Luther never again dealt comprehensively with his opponent from Leuven except in a few table-talks. In his table-talks he declared his respect for Jacobus Latomus, but he still criticized him fundamentally for not having understood “the nature of sin and grace”. Doubtless he meant that he had said enough on this matter, so that after writing the Antilatomus he had turned towards other and more urgent affairs.

3.

Historical Introduction

The dispute between Jacob Latomus and Martin Luther may be said to have begun in the autumn of 1518, when the first printed edition of Luther’s works came to Leuven. However, in the previous years several things had happened of decisive importance for the reception of Luther’s works.1 Humanism, in Boehm’s definition a “Bildungsbewegung im Sinne einer neuen reflektierten anthropozentrischen Kulturhaltung, als literarisch-ästhetische Rückwendung zu den Autoren der Antike und deren Sprachlichkeit mit darin vermittelten sittlichen Normen – in bewusster Absetzung gegen das ‘gotische’, ‘barbarische’ Medium aevum, sein ‘Küchenlatein’ und sein scholastisches Lehrsystem” (Boehm: 1978, 317), had gradually found a foothold in Leuven in the course of the last half of the 15th century, first and foremost at the faculty of arts. In 1444, a chair in rhetoric had been established, and 34 years later a chair in poetics (connected to the Faculty of Law), and in 1474 the art of printing had come to the town, making it easier to get hold of both ancient and contemporary humanist texts. Gradually the teaching of artes was both changed and improved, which was clearly manifest from 1500. In that period Johannes Depauterius succeeded in gathering together a series of previous attempts at writing a new and humanistically improved version of Alexander de Villa’s Medieval Latin grammar, the Doctrinale. Joost Vroye, in his work of systematizing Greek grammar, prepared the way well for his pupil Adrian Amerot, who in 1520 had his Compendium graecae grammatices published by the Leuven printer Dirk Martens. Maarten Dorp improved the teaching of Latin literature by following the Italian humanist model of going through classical dramas and performing them with his pupils, and Adrian Barlandus initiated the production of serviceable text editions of classical and contemporary humanist authors. 1 In the following I have chosen to deal with the Leuven background of the event instead of the Roman process against Luther, since the latter has been described in depth before, see for example Müller : 1903, and Selge’s more recent extensive production, cf. Selge: 1968; 1969; 1971; 1973; 1975; 1976.

24

Historical Introduction

From the end of the 15th century in Leuven, as in many other places in Northern Europe, tension was growing between conservative scholastic theologians and those who supported humanistic learning. The theologians feared that humanism’s attempt to renew the old values of learning would threaten the traditional subjects and schools. This was the smouldering disagreement which was to initiate the dispute between Latomus and Luther, a dispute which in the beginning was centred on Maarten Dorp, student and later professor of theology.

3.1

The debate between Maarten Dorp and Erasmus and Erasmus’ first years in Leuven

In the beginning of his studies, Maarten Dorp had been deeply interested in the development of the artes-studies in a humanist direction. Between 1504 and 1509 he taught Latin and philosophy at the arts faculty, and in that period put so much energy into improving the teaching of Latin that about 1509 he was regarded as one of the leading humanists at Leuven. At that time he was offered the chair of poetics after the Frisian Balthasar Hockema, but although it fitted perfectly with what he had hitherto worked on, he refused the post. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that some of the leading scholastic theologians in town, among them Jan Briard, urged Dorp to dampen his interest in the new tenets and seriously lend himself to his theological studies, either because they regarded it as important to have the gifted young man trained as a theologian, or, more likely, because they were unhappy that a coming theologian was famed for being a poet and humanist and might end up cultivating humanism in favour of theology (Bietenholz: 1985, 399; De Vocht: 1934, 133–134). The pressure they exerted on him consisted not only in the offer of their favour, but also in an offer of economic advantages, upon which Dorp, having accepted them, came to depend until he had finished his studies and became a doctor and professor in 1515. Maarten Dorp was a good friend of Erasmus. They had met in 1502–1504, when Erasmus first stayed at Leuven, and again in July–August 1514 when he passed through Leuven on his way from England to Basel. During this latter visit, although it was brief, Erasmus had expressly asked to see Dorp. His sympathy for and trust in the young theologian was expressed in his asking Dorp to see to it that Dirk Martens printed a book he had just prepared for publication, a number of ethical writings by Cato and Mimus Publianus, his revision of Septem Sapientes, as well as his own Institutum Christiani Hominis (De Vocht: 1934, 138). It was therefore not to be expected that Dorp would write a letter to Erasmus such as he wrote in 1514. Dorp introduces the letter by stressing his veneration

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25

for Erasmus, referring to it as his very reason for writing to him. His purpose is to warn Erasmus against the animosity that has risen against him in Leuven. The work Encomium Moriae (“The Praise of Folly”), of 1511, has not been well received in the town as have so many other of Erasmus’ works. It has aroused animosity because it contains a severe criticism of the scholastic theologians (Augustijn: 1991, 62ff). Dorp writes: What good has it done, so vigorously to attack this row of theologians for whom it is so important not to be despised by the people, or, indeed, how much harm will it truly cause? […] Sharp witticisms – especially where much truth is found in them – leave a bitter memory. Everyone used to admire you, read you eagerly, and the most outstanding theologians and jurists longed to have you near, but see, suddenly this unfortunate “Folly” like Davus disturbs everything. The style, the composition and the sharpness they approve of, but the insults they do not approve of, not even the cultivated among them.2

Dorp therefore exhorts Erasmus to write a praise of wisdom which can counterbalance the book under attack. It does not pay to fall out with people in this way. He then thanks Erasmus for his work with publishing Saint Jerome, but then questions his coming work on a critical edition of the New Testament. Dorp does not understand Erasmus’ wish to revise the Vulgate with the help of Greek manuscripts. In his eyes this can only sow doubt as to the truth of the Vulgate text, for which there is no call, since it has been the authorized text of the Church for so long that traditional usage guarantees its content. It will be outrageous to suppose that for so long the Church could have used a flawed text, and it is dangerous for the faith if people begin discussing and doubting the integrity of Scripture. One may work critically with the text, but only to clarify the meaning which is already there, not to correct it. Dorp finally calls on Erasmus to consider the criticism and answer it. It is evident that Maarten Dorp does not here write on his own behalf. He may partly agree in the matter, but he explicitly writes on behalf of “the others” around him who have expressed disapprobation of parts of Erasmus’ work. What is behind it is probably that for the second time he is under pressure from

2 Ep. 304,24–27.50–55, in Erasmus: 1910, 12; 13: “Iam vero theologorum ordinem, quem tantopere expedit non contemni a plebe, quid profuit, immo vero quantum oberit, tam acriter suggilasse? […] Aspere facetiae, eciam ubi multum est veri admixtum, acrem sui relinquunt memoriam. Pridem mirabantur te omnes, tua legebant auide, praesentem expetebant summi theologorum ac iureconsultorum, et ecce repente infausta Moria quasi Dauus interturbat omnia. Stilem quidem et inuentionem acumenque probant, irrisiones non probant, ne litterati quidem.”

26

Historical Introduction

the group of leading theologians, first and foremost Jan Briard, and perhaps also Adrian of Utrecht. Addressing Erasmus through Dorp may even be their idea.3 The sudden animosity against Erasmus at Leuven and the wish to make it known to him was closely connected with the Reuchlin dispute, which at this time was almost at its height.4 The theological faculty in Leuven had pronounced on the case already in 1513. The case was dear to the majority of the influential theologians, alarmed as they were by the growing humanist influence at their own arts faculty, and it afforded them an excellent occasion to declare their resistance to the new ideals of learning. In support of the Dominican Jacob Hochstraaten at Cologne and the Cologne faculty’s investigation of Reuchlin’s Augenspiegel (1511), printed on August 16th 1513, they issued a statement against Reuchlin on July 28th 1513, Sententia Lovaniensis Facultatis Theologiae contra Speculum Oculare, which declared Reuchlin’s apology suspect and unfit to be read by the common people (De Vocht; 1951, 301, note 1, and De Vocht: 1934, 141, note 2). When the bishop of Speyer, at the instigation of the Pope, pronounced in favour of Reuchlin in March 1514, and Jacob Hochstraaten immediately appealed to the Holy See, Adrian of Utrecht wrote a letter to cardinal Carjaval on April 21st 1514, in which he called attention to the gravity of the matter and asked Carjaval to try to influence the Pope’s decision (De Vocht: 1934, 141). This was the position of the parties when Erasmus, who until now had not taken part in the dispute, on his way to Basel at the end of July 1514 came across a copy of Augenspiegel and read it (De Vocht: 1934, 141ff, see Ep. 300, in Erasmus: 1910, 4); and at the end of August or the beginning of September the news that Erasmus wholeheartedly endorsed Reuchlin reached Leuven. Naturally this could not but alarm the theologians. Knowing the sharp criticism of scholastic theology and method in Encomium Moriae and Erasmus’ weighty defence of the new language and textual studies, exemplified in his work on the edition of the New Testament, the theologians feared that Erasmus might develop into an opponent of Reuchlin’s calibre. And by virtue of his reputation and large following, Erasmus would have even greater effect than him.

3.1.1 Erasmus’ answer Erasmus answered Dorp one year later. The letter from Dorp may have got lost on its way to him, and not until May 1515 did Erasmus receive a copy from a 3 This is suggested by Erasmus in his answering letter and in a later letter to Reuchlin: Ep. 337, in Erasmus: 1910, 90–114; Ep. 713, in Erasmus: 1913, 143. Likewise Thomas More in his letter to Dorp, cf. De Vocht: 1934, 144. 4 Erasmus himself connects his enthusiasm for Reuchlin’s case with Dorp’s letter in a later letter to Reuchlin: Ep. 713, in Erasmus: 1913, 143.

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27

friend in Antwerp. The original answer to Dorp, which no longer exists, was shorter than the later revised version printed in August 1515. In the letter Erasmus first declares that he is not angry with Dorp for his approach, and then proceeds to try to explain that although The Praise of Folly was clumsily executed, an error of the kind anyone might commit, it had no ill intent (Ep. 337,123–124, in Erasmus: 1910, 94). It was intended like Enchiridion militis christiani to call attention to Christian life, but instead of choosing the same style as in Enchiridion, Erasmus had devised Encomium Moriae as a kind of amusing fable. Erasmus finds that men who cannot bear with an error of that kind and who are not willing to understand the intent of such a work must be certain modern theologians, namely those who attend more to Aristotle and human questions than on the Scriptures, and who enter into endless and futile disputes, pass judgement, issue condemnations and declarations and think there is nothing at all they do not know. “I ask you”, writes Erasmus, “what has Christ to do with Aristotle? What do sophistic subtleties have to do with the mysteries of eternal wisdom?”5 These men conspire most eagerly against bonae litterae. They long for recognition in the community of theologians, and they fear that if humanist studies are revitalized and the world comes to its senses, they themselves, who formerly generally seemed to know everything, will come to seem ignorant.6

Erasmus himself has had previous experience of them. When he had begun working on his edition of Jerome, for example, influential men and highly regarded theologians contacted his printer and asked him neither to print Greek or Hebrew, because they regarded both languages as harmful. In answer to Dorp’s comments on the edition of the New Testament, Erasmus rejects his idea that ecclesiastical tradition and authority in some sense guarantee the verity of the Vulgate text. According to Erasmus it makes no sense, considering that several Church Fathers often quote another text than the conventional Vulgate text, and when the Vulgate itself is found in several versions with different wordings. And what about all the errors translators and scribes have made in the course of time? It is no danger for Christianity, as Dorp imagines, if misunderstandings in the text are discovered; on the contrary. The best way for a Christian to work is exactly to labour to extend, correct and pass on his knowledge. Erasmus wishes that the 5 Ep. 337,413–414, in Erasmus: 1910, 101: “Quaeso, quid commercii Christo et Aristoteli? Quid sophisticis captiunculis cum aeternae sapientiae mysteriis?” 6 Ep. 337,326–332, in Erasmus: 1910, 99: “Hii magno studio conspirant in bonas litteras. Ambiunt in senatu theologorum aliquid esse, et verentur ne, si renascentur bonae litterae et resipiscat mundus, videantur nihil scisse, qui antehac vulgo nihil nescire videbantur.”

28

Historical Introduction

Pope would appoint a committee tasked with making accurate, trustworthy text editions, but he emphasizes that under no circumstances may any of the modern theologians mentioned sit on such a committee. The point is that, according to them, only what they themselves have learned has value, and fearing that it will look as if there was something they did not know, they will have nothing to do with the corrections: “They are afraid of the humanist studies, and they fear for their own absolute power.”7 Erasmus emphasizes that he has nothing against the theological profession as such, only against a certain part of it, and he knows that the men behind Dorp are of the despicable kind. In conclusion, he hints that he is quite certain that Dorp is under pressure from people of that sort, and he urges him to listen to his advice rather than theirs and to try to defuse the situation. Although the letter maintains a kindly note, as far as Dorp is concerned, it will be seen that in his answer Erasmus makes no attempt to hide his contempt for those he thinks are behind Dorp and who represent the kind of scholastic theologians who fear, hate and want to demolish all initiatives to renew scholarship. What is notable in Erasmus’ letter in this connection is that the uncompromising attitude it displays and the phrasing employed leave no doubt as to why, a few years later, the scholastics identified Erasmus’ and Luther’s causes and regarded them as one: Erasmus’ way of expressing himself on, say, the scholastic use of Aristotle is hardly distinguishable from the critique that plays such an important role in Luther’s showdown with scholastic theology, and to which he for example gives expression in his answer to the condemnation from Leuven.

3.1.2 Maarten Dorp’s answer When Dorp received Erasmus’ answer he was not yet ready to retreat from his aggressive position. At that time, in 1515, the faculty was more than ever occupied with the Reuchlin case. After Hochstraaten’s appeal to the Pope, more and more voices had been raised in Reuchlin’s favour. In 1514 two publications came out, Clarorum Epistolae Virorum, a collection of letters to Reuchlin from learned men who supported his cause, and the pamphlet Triumphus Doc. Reuchlini, which lampooned scholastic clerics and monks (De Vocht: 1934, 150, note 2). That development, and the apparent lack of support for Hoogstraten in Rome, spurred the theologians at Leuven into taking action once more and sending a letter to the Pope in which they protested against the decision at Speyer and against Reuchlin’s books. Also Adrian of Utrecht once again, in a letter of 7 Ep. 337,669–670, in Erasmus: 1910, 109: “Bonas litteras metuunt et suae timent tyrannidi.”

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May 16th, personally asked the cardinal to take measures against the Hebraists and help Hochstraaten. In addition Erasmus had had the second edition of Encomium Moriae printed towards the end of 1514, which did nothing to reconcile the parties. The Leuven theologians still hoped to influence Erasmus to change track and become less hostile to their position, and Dorp was still entirely dependent on them, since he was finishing his studies in this very period. The letter to Erasmus is signed August 27th, and Dorp was promoted to doctor on the 30th. Accordingly, there are no mitigating expressions in Dorp’s second letter, rather the opposite. He is still playing the game of his superiors, but is not quite as friendly and apologetic towards Erasmus as in his first letter. Surprised, he asks what Erasmus might have thought if someone in similar manner directed an attack on school teachers, poets, writers and others who practised humanistic studies, saying that everything they dealt with was superfluous and ridiculous. Would that not annoy him? And yet he allows himself to behave thus towards the theologians […] whose authority it is most important to preserve untainted, as they feed the Lord’s flock with nourishment solely derived from God’s law. Unless you think that poets or only those who also know Greek are to lead the flock?8

In Dorp’s opinion, Erasmus must understand the scope of his own intentions. Theologians have many other important things to see to than getting to know the exact wording of the Bible. For example they also have to administer the sacraments, upon which man’s salvation depends, and that work may take much more strength and time than learning a long passage of the Bible by heart. So unless Erasmus’ critique of the theologians also extends to the manner in which they administer the sacraments, Dorp urges him to be more lenient. He cannot understand Erasmus’ intentions. Is it better to be taught by humanist heathens than by scholastic Christians? Are the grammarians to rule over the other disciplines at the university? Are they to develop a new theology? Are the grammar schools in Zwolle and Deventer all-sufficient, so that the universities can entirely be done away with, as once suggested by Jan Hus? As Dorp sees it, this could be the consequence of Erasmus’ views. He adduces a number of quotations from Saint Augustine as proof that grammar for the sake of grammar is despicable, and that dialectics and logic, and consequently the dispute as a form, constitute the best aids to the understanding of the Scriptures. He emphasizes once again that it is important for the purity of the faith that the 8 Ep. 347,44–46, in Erasmus: 1910, 127: “[…] quos plurimum refert integrae esse authoritatis, quippe qui gregem Dominicum legis Dei pabulo soli pascunt, nisi tu censeas poetas aut eos solum qui Graece quoque sciant illi praefitiendos.”

30

Historical Introduction

meaning of the Vulgate is maintained and not corrected, but that work may be done to improve the meaning that is already present in the text. He regards it as probable that […] of all translations this one has been handed down to us by the Church of God and the Church Fathers because it is the most trustworthy. What fate would otherwise leave us this particular one out of so many?9

Dorp finally asks if Erasmus’ attack is motivated by his fear that he is not nearly so adept at logical argumentation as are the scholastics. He finds it hard to figure out what might otherwise be the cause of his animosity. In conclusion he emphasizes his goodwill and his friendship for Erasmus, and that he has now told him what people say about him, so that in future he may take their objections into consideration.

3.1.3 Dorp’s recantation The theologians at Leuven were highly satisfied with Dorp’s answer. Favours rained on him in the period immediately after its composition (De Vocht: 1934, 150–179). When the professor of theology Lucas Walters died on September 4th 1515, the management of the College of the Holy Spirit was entrusted to him, and he also took over Walters’ prebend in the church of Saint Peter. On September 30th he was made a professor regens, which meant that in addition to his status as legens, which implied ordinary teaching duties, he was given administrative powers and superior influence, and came to be one of the roughly eight members of the collegium strictum, which was the supreme governing body of the faculty. Erasmus, who was in Basel seeing the printer Froben from August 1514 to May 1516, working on the publication of his New Testament, did not answer the letter. He first mentioned it in June 1516 in a letter to Thomas More, who had meanwhile joined the dispute by rebuking Dorp in writing in October 1515. Here Erasmus writes that he wonders what has come over the man, but that that kind of theology creates that kind of man (Ep. 412,49–50, in Erasmus: 1910, 243). That was as far as he had time to attend to it before he heard it said that Dorp had changed signals. In Brussels, where he was staying in July 1516, Erasmus met his friend Johannes Paludanus from Leuven, who could tell him that on July 6th Dorp had introduced a series of summer lectures on the letters of Saint Paul with a 9 Ep. 347,218–220, in Erasmus: 1910, 132: “[…] ex omnibus translationibus hanc unam ab ecclesia Dei et a sanctis patribus ad nos esse transmissam, quod fidelior sit. Alioqui qua sorte haec una superesset e tam multis?”

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speech which amounted to a full retraction of the content of his letters to Erasmus. Dorp had complained that so much of the students’ time was spent on studies of Aristotle, while the study of Saint Paul was given so little attention, and he had praised rhetoric and the study of Greek and Hebrew as ideal tools in the study of the Bible. He had called attention to how great theologians from Saint Jerome to Adrian of Utrecht had often found the Vulgate text less correct than the Greek and Hebrew manuscripts, which necessitated research into the true reading, and in conclusion he regretted that he himself knew no Greek, referring to the works of LefHvre d’Ptaples, Valla and especially Erasmus, which helped him to remedy his insufficient abilities. Presumably it was More’s letter, as well as his own acquaintance with Erasmus’ Novum Testamentum (published in February 1516), that had made such a great impression on Dorp that it had caused him to recant. It is also possible that the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum, of which the first were published in October 1515, had alarmed him and made him wish that he himself should not become the butt of a smear campaign (De Vocht: 1934, 162). At least he now sent entirely different signals, which pleased Erasmus when he heard about it, so that he wrote an enthusiastic letter to Dorp, which Paludanus took back with him when he returned to Leuven (Ep. 438, in Erasmus: 1910, 277f). But Dorp’s friends, the theologians in Leuven, unlike Erasmus, must have been shocked at finding themselves stabbed in the back by a man they had so far counted an undoubted support. Indeed, their reaction was not long in coming: when Dorp’s status as regens was to be renewed, which customarily took place every year on September 30th, the faculty turned him down.

3.1.4 The end of the dispute The final dispute took place in the spring of 1516. The letters make it clear that it concerned the critique Dorp had levelled at parts of Erasmus’ New Testament. It is not entirely clear what happened, but it is probable that when Dorp to his surprise did not have his status of regens professor renewed on September 30th, he presented his work on Saint Paul’s letters as proof of his independence of and critical attitude to Erasmus.10 We may presume that while preparing his summer lectures on Saint Paul he used Erasmus’ edition of the New Testament, and disagreed with Erasmus about the textual criticism in several instances, but up to 10 De Vocht: 1934, 167–168. See also Bietenholz: 1985, 398–404. Bietenholz does not think a new change of mind has happened to Dorp. More likely it was Erasmus’ friends, such as Alard of Amsterdam, who continuously added fuel to the fire, until Dorp himself wrote to Erasmus in November asking him to confirm their friendship. Nor does Sowards adopt De Vocht’s interpretation, cf. Erasmus: 1993, XIX.

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this point without elevating this disagreement into opposition to the book. But now, facing an angry and unsympathetic faculty, it is possible that Dorp, in his desperation at being rejected, denounced Erasmus’ work. Erasmus soon got the news that Dorp had again turned against him, and was very angry. In a letter dated October 6th to his friend Andrea Ammonius in England he writes, naming no names, about this Leuven theologian who has caused a tragedy. He was flattering when Erasmus was present, and stabs him in the back when he is not; promised to be a friend and proves to be an enemy. In all haste he wrote to Dorp, but receiving only an offending answer, he replied by emphasizing that he would no longer waste his time on this sort of quibbling. In a letter to his friend Peter Giles in Antwerp he complained: “I will soon be telling you of the Dorpian antics. Never have I seen a more hostile friend.”11 This last, acerbic letter from Erasmus again made Dorp change his mind. In November, Erasmus makes it known in letters to Peter Giles and Thomas More that Dorp has once again come to his senses and has declared that he hopes he will no longer be accused of spreading malicious rumours and creating animosity, and expresses his wish to remove all hindrances to his friendship with Erasmus (De Vocht: 1934, 170–171). Why Dorp allowed himself to swing back again so soon and ask for Erasmus’ friendship is a matter for conjecture, but it is probable that he was again afraid of being entangled in a dispute like the one being waged by the theologians at Cologne against Reuchlin and considerable sections of the learned world at the same time (De Vocht: 1934, 173). Apparently Dorp had succeeded in winning over his colleagues at Leuven to the idea of re-establishing the friendship with Erasmus, because they feared for the reputation of the faculty. At any rate, Erasmus was invited to meet the leading theologians in Leuven, among them Jan Briard, in January 1517. He accepted this offer, especially after having heard rumours that the Leuven theologians had considered joining Cologne in investigating and possibly censuring his work (Ep. 505,9–12, in Erasmus: 1910, 424). Knowing what he did about the Leuven theologians’ hostility to him, and about the Cologne theologians’ embittered hatred of and struggle against Reuchlin, he was naturally alarmed at the thought that they might fall on him, though he expected that nothing would come of it. Between January 1st and 13th Erasmus visited Leuven to meet with Briard and several others, and on this occasion peace was made. In the time that followed, the tone between Erasmus and the theologians in Leuven was most cordial. On March 11th Erasmus writes to Ammonius that the theologians are doing everything they can to make him settle in the town. On May 30th he tells Moore that he is considering staying in the town over the 11 Ep. 477,11–12, in Erasmus: 1910, 248: “Dorpianas nugas propediem impartiam tibi. Nunquam vidi hominem inimicius amicum.”

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summer, and in July he travels there, deciding immediately on his arrival to accept the theologians’ offer of friendship, and let bygones be bygones for now (De Vocht: 1934, 179, note 7). Erasmus’ first year in Leuven was very quiet. He first stayed for a while with his friend Johannes Paludanus, and moved from there into the College of the Lily. In September he was made a member of the Theological Faculty, although without special authority (Ep. 637,9–10, in Erasmus: 1913, 59; see also Erasmus: 1979, 637, 11–12, note 12). His relationship to the theologians remained sunny throughout the year, as described by Erasmus in a letter to Pierre Barbier in March 1518: With the theologians there is peace, nay, there is even a wondrous intimacy. They openly thank me for Saint Jerome, of my New Testament there are no complaints, and indeed the leading theologians approve it heartily.12

Most of Erasmus’ time up to his journey to Basel around May 1st 1518 was spent preparing the second edition of his Novum Testamentum. Before leaving to see Froben to complete the edition he asked the theologians of Leuven for an opinion, and Briard, Latomus and Dorp answered that they had no objections, and in September 1518 he also made sure that he had Pope Leo X’s approval of the second edition (Blockx: 1958, XXII). When he took time off from this work, he relaxed by making paraphrases of the New Testament texts and wrote Ratio Verae Theologiae, an extended version of the preface to the first edition of Novum Testamentum, which was not printed until later (the Autumn of 1518), first separately and then as a preface to the second edition.

3.1.5 The foundation of the Collegium Trilingue “After everything had thus been relatively quiet for a time, the Collegium Trilingue came into being.”13 On August 27th 1517 the wealthy and humanisticallyminded Jerime de Busleyden died, leaving a sum of money in his testament to be used for the establishment of a college for the teaching of Latin, Greek and Hebrew, the so-called Collegium Trilingue. Erasmus and Busleyden had known each other for many years, from the very turn of the century, and had last seen each other just before Busleyden’s death. On that occasion they had consolidated their friendship and common interests, and Erasmus had discussed Busleyden’s 12 Ep. 794,32–34, in Erasmus: 1913, 248: “Cum theologis alcedonia sunt, imo mira familiaritas. Pro Hieronymo palam agunt gratias; de Nouo Testamento nihil queruntur, imo priores huius ordinis ingenue comprobant.” 13 Ep. 1225,31f, to Pierre Barbier, August 13th 1521, in Erasmus: 1922, 555: “Ita rebus aliquamdiu satis tranquillis ortum est Trilingue Collegium.”

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will with him. When Busleyden added executors to his will on the day he died, he at the same time expressed a wish that Erasmus’ support for the realization of his last will and testament should be solicited. Erasmus did not have to be asked twice. In a letter dated as early as October 19th 1517 to Gilles de Busleyden, JÞrome’s brother, and the principal executor, he suggested that Matthaeus Adrianus, who had a good knowledge of Hebrew, should be hired as a teacher at the college (Ep. 686 in Erasmus: 1913, 108–110). Erasmus was fully determined to act as soon as possible, fearing that as time went by he might encounter growing opposition. In a letter to Pierre Barbier on November 2nd 1517 he writes, “Certain theologians oppose it in a devious fashion”,14 and to Jan Robinjs on March 25th 1518: I think the posts should be filled at once, so that the matter will not cool in the meantime, and to keep a malicious soul from creating disorder in a business that is so useful to everyone.15

It is clear that the theologians who previously, through Dorp, had criticized Erasmus’ attempt at reforming the work with the New Testament text, and who were also opponents of Reuchlin’s attempt to maintain the relevance of the Hebrew texts for studies of the Bible, were not exactly happy. They could now expect that one of the first schools for concentrated teaching in the languages, and hence a strong incentive for a humanist reform of the foundation of the studies, was to be situated in their own university town. It took no less than a year to establish the new college. In the summer of 1518 it was clear that because of the opposition to the establishment in the arts faculty, which did not take kindly to a competitor and therefore dragged out the matter, the college had perforce to be established as an institution independent of the university. But once its adherents had realized this, it did not take long to set things in train. The teaching of Hebrew, Greek and Latin began in September 1518.

3.1.6 Trouble brewing 1518–1519 In the time immediately after, there were no direct reactions to the establishment of the Collegium Trilingue, but the peace did not last long. A couple of events in the autumn of 1518 brought things to a head. In August 1518 Peter Mosellan, a great admirer of Erasmus’, introduced his 14 Ep. 695,7–8, in Erasmus: 1913, 112: “Ficte obnituntur theologi quidam […].” 15 Ep. 805,27–29, in Erasmus: 1913, 260: “Ego professiones statim censeo ineundas, ne res interim frigescat, aut ne quis malus genius rem salutarem omnibus interturbet.”

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teaching of Greek at the university of Leipzig with the address Oratio de Variarum Linguarum Cognitione Paranda, in which he formulated a markedly humanistic reform programme for the study of Greek, Latin and Hebrew. The address was probably brought to Leuven in the course of the autumn by the booksellers who returned from the book fair in Frankfurt. At all events there were no reactions to it until February 1519. The other event which, like Mosellan’s address, seemed provocative was the publication of Erasmus’ Ratio Verae Theologiae in November 1518. In it Erasmus advocated the study of the three languages, the publication of accurate critical editions, also of the Bible, and rhetorical, literary, aesthetic, arithmetical and other studies to support the interpretation of any text, even the biblical. On top of this he expressed his contempt for stubborn and argumentative dialecticians and their syllogisms and lack of linguistic knowledge (De Vocht; 1951, 304–305). After the publication of the work there were no immediate reactions. The content of course was not new, since Erasmus had made no secret of his call for a renewal of the study of theology. But when Mosellan’s address landed on their desks alongside the Ratio, it was too much for the conservative scholastics.

3.1.7 Briard’s critique The first to react was Jan Briard. In February 1519 he expressed indirect disapproval of Erasmus’ Encomium Matrimonii in an oration given at the bestowal of the degree of licentiate to the Carmelite Johannes Robyns. He mentioned neither Erasmus nor his work directly, but no one could be in doubt about the reference. He deplored the elevation of marriage above celibacy, thus inviting both monks and theologians to challenge Erasmus. Erasmus was in the audience and immediately replied, and seconded by Maarten Dorp and others he was able to convince Briard that he had misunderstood the intention of the piece. Briard admitted that he himself had not read it, but had only had it summarized, and at once retracted his words and acknowledged his mistake. But because the attack had been made in public, Erasmus wrote a short and level-headed Apologia pro Declamatione Matrimonii, dated March 1st 1519, and published by Froben in May. Briard’s intention was quite clearly to hamper Erasmus’ work and lessen his popularity. He had throughout been the leader of the conservative scholastic theologians against Erasmus, as became obvious in the dispute between Dorp and Erasmus, and he apparently still was, though he had appealed to Erasmus for a truce in 1517. In the autumn of 1519 Erasmus had also realized that this was the case. At this time, on October 2nd, he wrote to Cuthbert Tunstall:

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It was Briard alone, it is said, who both previously encited Dorp against me, and caused this whole tragedy. It was already suspected at the time and now you must know it for a fact.16

Jan Briard’s critique was retracted, but that of Jacob Latomus was not. He, too, had become alarmed in the course of 1518, and in March 1519 he published his De Trium Linguarum et Studii Theologici ratione Dialogus (“A Dialogue on the Issue of the Three Languages and the Study of Theology”). In a letter to Mosellan from April 1519, Erasmus writes the following comment: Recently the public here saw the publication of a dialogue by the theologian Jacob Latomus, a man who earlier on was not entirely an enemy of humanistic learning, and who was quite an upright friend. I am not really able to guess what may have suddenly turned the man’s mind. There are several who suspect that the greater part of the first book is directed against your oration in which you speak for the languages. But by far the greater part is implicitly directed against me.17

3.1.8 Jacob Latomus With his dialogue Jacob Latomus, or Jacques Masson, made his first public statement. He was born about 1475 in Cambron in Belgian Hennegau, and had taken his master’s degree in Paris where he lived in the Montaigu College which was led by Johannes Standonck of Mechelen. When Standonck founded a college for poor students in Leuven around 1500, he appointed Latomus to lead it. After having filled this position for a number of years Latomus remained in Leuven, studying theology, and at the same time making a living as a lecturer at the faculty of arts in Paedagogicum Porci. On August 16th 1519 the title of doctor of theology was conferred upon him, and he entered the collegium strictum as a professor regens et legens. At this time he was also the tutor of Robert and Charles de Croy, who subsequently became powerful clerics, and his patrons. Latomus remained professor at the theological faculty till his death on May 29th 1544. In 1520, 1526 and 1529 he was head of faculty. Between 1529 and 1535 Latomus often resided at Cambrai, where he had acquired a prebend through Robert de Croy. In 1535 he followed Driedo as professor with a prebend 16 Ep. 1029,2–5, in Erasmus: 1922, 91: “Solus, ut ferunt, Noxus ille fuit, qui et olim instigauit Dorpium et hanc totam tragoediam excitauit: id iam pridem suspicione collectum iam plane comperi.” 17 Ep. 948,36–41, in Erasmus: 1913, 542: “Exiit nuper in vulgus et apud nos dialogus Iacobi Latomi theologi, viri pridem nec admodum iniqui melioribus literis, et amici satis candidi: nec satis coniectare queo quae res hominis ingenium subito verterit. Sunt qui suspicientur bonam partem prioris libri oppositam orationi tuae qua linguas praedicas: sed multo maximam partem oblique tortam in me.”

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attached, in Saint Peter of Leuven, and in 1537 he was for a while the vice chancellor of the University of Leuven. Throughout these years he regularly functioned as a theological advisor to the Inquisition, for example in the cases against Jacobus Praepositus (1522) and William Tyndale (1535–1536).

3.2

The Dialogue on the Issue of the Three Languages and the Study of Theology

The dialogue De Trium Linguarum et Studii Theologici ratione Dialogus was written at the time when Latomus was preparing his doctoral thesis. The work in fact consists of two dialogues. In both of them two characters take part, Johannes, an adherent of traditional scholastic theology, and Albertus, a student who has yet to make up his mind about the matter before starting his theological studies. In the first of the dialogues we also meet the character Petrus, an adherent of the study of language and literature. The two dialogues are rather different, a circumstance that is probably due to the parts having been differently motivated. The second, the tone of which is more subdued, and which contains the clearest and frankest presentation, and in which only Johannes and Albertus appear, was probably written first as a reaction to the publication of Erasmus’ Ratio. The first is less elegant in its style and was added later as a reaction to Mosellan’s oration, as the content makes abundantly clear. In this context the dialogue cannot to be dealt with in any detail, but some central features which may contribute to our understanding of Latomus’ way of thinking should perhaps be highlighted.18 These concern the pronouncements made by the scholastic Johannes, and below it will be supposed that his opinions are identical with those of Latomus himself. Most of what Johannes has to say in the second part of the dialogue he has learned from an unnamed old scholar, a senex doctus, whom he admires, and whose authority he accepts. It is possible that the senex is a reference to Briard, whom Latomus and a group of other students enthusiastically supported (De Vocht: 1951, 32, note 2), and for whom he undoubtedly would have wanted to express his admiration. As suggested by the title, the dialogue is about the theoretical basis of theological work, and therefore also about the method and foundation of theology. In a letter of dedication to the cardinal, Guillaume de Croy, Latomus writes that in fact he is not against language studies as such, and is glad to see artes liberales flourish at the University of Leuven. Yet what he hopes to accomplish with his Dialogue is to 18 This analysis is based primarily on Guelluy : 1941, secondarily on Gielis: 1994, De Vocht: 1951, and Ptienne: 1956. The original text has only been sporadically consulted. For a more detailed analysis of the Dialogue, see Rummel: 1989a, 63–93.

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place matters in their right perspective so that no one will believe that language studies can take the place of the traditional disciplines. He therefore wants to reestablish the balance of things and make new students of theology aware of the value of the scholastic-theological approach (Rummel: 1989a, 67). In the comparisons at the end of each of the paragraphs below, between the viewpoints in the Dialogue and the views expressed in the Apology that Latomus later wrote in answer to Erasmus’ rejoinder,19 a tentative attempt is made at showing that Latomus’ viewpoints in the two works are the same, and therefore consistent, so that it truly is Latomus’ own points of view we find expressed by Johannes in the dialogue. In the later Apology, Latomus in addition sets up his points vis-/-vis those of Erasmus, so that there it will become evident how he thinks his own and Erasmus’ opinions differ.

3.2.1 The method of theology In the beginning of the second part of the dialogue Johannes, alias Latomus,20 lists some general principles, referring to the senex mentioned above (De Vocht: 1951, 329–334). He emphasizes that a fellow-creature must always be treated leniently, even though his errors are exposed, that no branch of scholarship must be rejected, and that the truth in all its manifestations must be loved. Even poetry must not be despised as long as it does not question Christian piety and morals. Nor are the languages an evil, but yet they are not necessary. To support his assessment of the importance of the languages, Latomus explains his view of the relationship between reality, knowledge and language (Guelluy : 1941, 58 ff).21 He says: So that no one will attach too much importance to the languages, it must repeatedly be understood that the concepts (conceptus) come before the words (voces), and therefore it does not necessarily follow that he who does not know the words does not know the matter.22

The recognition of concepts is brought about by the contact between the soul and the things, he explains, and the concepts consequently exist before the words that express them. They are the natural knowledge of things through the naturale 19 When exactly this Apology was written we do not know, and in all probability it was not printed till after Latomus’ death, in his Opera Omnia from 1550. 20 In the following simply termed Latomus. 21 Latomus here expounds an entirely Medieval semantics which goes back to Aristotle, was represented by Augustine, and preserved and passed on by Boethius, cf. Gielis: 1994, 20–25. 22 Guelluy : 1941, 58, note 3/Latomus: 1905, 61–62: “Tamen ne linguis nimium tribuat aliquis altius repetens dicebat, conceptus esse vocibus priores, et propterea non sequi quod necessario rem ignoret qui vocem nesciat […].”

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lumen intellectus which everybody possesses, and they are therefore identical for everyone and can be expressed in all languages. The only possible way they can be absent is if the thing itself has not yet been presented properly to a person’s emotions or intellect.23 Latomus emphasizes that this is also true in relation to divine matters, although in that case natural knowledge needs a lumen superadditum, a so-called divine “illumination” or a puff of divine breath.24 This theory, that one understands things independently of their name, Latomus goes on, is of course of importance for scholarly work. It means that dialectics, mathematics, philosophy and metaphysics, which all deal with abstraction and the formation of concepts, are more important as ancillary subjects for theology than are grammar and rhetoric. The man who masters the speculative artes is doctus, learned, whereas he who gives himself to the practical artes is only eruditus, educated.25 According to them the best form of learning is seen when the new theologian, the novice (once he has strongly and faithfully accepted what is imparted to him), after gaining reasonable knowledge of grammar occupies himself with the dogmas of the Christian religion, not superficially but, as one says, vividly in a true dialectic, gains knowledge of the generalities of natural philosophy, touches upon the mathematical disciplines, particularly arithmetics because of the numbers, deals diligently with moral philosophy, works zealously with metaphysics, which is closest to theology – and then throws himself carefully into the subtleties of speculative theology. However, from the very beginning of the theological studies (if it is possible) he must still daily spend considerable time on the biblical text […] and if he then doubts it he must consult the doctors and the glosses rather than torment himself with translations and languages.26

In this context Latomus distinguishes between two different ways of working with theology, “[…] a crude, all but carnal, ordinary and popular way, and a subtle spiritual way only for the few and wise”.27 Of the first way, the crude carnal way, he says, 23 24 25 26

Guelluy : 1941, 59 and note 3/Latomus: 1905, 62. Guelluy : 1941, 59 and note 3/Latomus: 1905, 62–63. Guelluy : 1941, 59 and note 2. Guelluy : 1941, 60 and note 2/Latomus: 1905, 69: “censent doctrinae formam esse optimam si nouitius theologus, creditis primum firmiter et fideliter acceptis, christianae religionis dogmatibus post mediocrem grammaticae noticiam non perfunctorie, sed ut dicitur ad viuum in vera dialectica versetur, generalia degustet philosophiae naturalis, Mathematicas attingat disciplinas, maxime Arithmeticam propter numeros, diligenter excutiat moralem philosophiam, Metaphisicae quae proxima Theologiae est, gnauiter intendat, Deinde in subtilibus speculatiuae Theologiae diligenter incumbat, Interim tamen ab initio studij Theologici, singulis diebus (si fieri potest) in textu Bibliae aliquamdiu versetur […], In quo si dubitet, videat doctores et glossas potius, quam se in translationibus, et linguis torqueat […].” 27 Guelluy : 1941, 60 and note 3/Latomus: 1905, 67: “Dicebat duplicem esse theologiam, vel potius unam duobus modis tractari, Verum doctrinae gratia quasi de duabus loquebatur,

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[…] Because those who regard theology in its cruder, more carnal form, of course think that nothing is more advantageous for the future theologian – after grammar and a fairly moderate knowledge of the languages – than having a fling with the poets and the speeches. […] And following this lawful recipe the future evangelical preacher is prepared as someone who speaks in a popular way about virtues and vices, who preaches about faith and edifies with all his heart, who, being rather indifferent to knowing what faith is, regards it as irrelevant which subject it belongs to, whether its object is true or false, God or man, who impresses charity on people without bothering about from whom and to whom, how far it goes, what the order of it is, or who does not care if there is any order in it at all, but simply struggles with all the might of his speech and his mind to see that the listeners are devout and lovers of the faith – that, they think, is the perfect theologian.28

The crude form is not, however, “the perfect theology”, whether its professors think so or not. But its opposite is, though: the subtle spiritual way, also called by Latomus theologia speculativa or theologia scholastica. First and foremost it tries to gain better and more subtle insight into the divine mysteries, and about that theology he speaks much more positively and enthusiastically. In Christ God gave His theology […] the truly subtle and spiritual one, particularly to His disciples, to whom it was granted to know the mystery of the kingdom, gradually leading them too, away from the flesh, until by the flame of the Holy Spirit, purged of all rust and dross, they could fully understand this fluid and spiritual theology, with no need of corporal aids, but beholding the divine glory of Christ with unveiled face.29

As we have said, Latomus’ statements in the later Apologia correspond precisely with the viewpoints from the dialogue recounted here. In it Latomus once again

unam crassam ac veluti corporalem, communem ac popularem, alteram subtilem, spiritualem, paucorum et sapientium tantum.” 28 Guelluy : 1941, 60–61/Latomus: 1905, 68–69: “[Deinde supradictam duplicis theologiae rationem, duplex forma tractandi, vel duplex institutio sequitur in studentibus,] Nam qui theologiam iuxta crassiorem et corporalem suam faciem intuentur, consequenter censent futuro theologo post grammaticam, et mediocrem linguarum noticiam, nihil esse conducibilius quam in poetis, et oratoribus versari […], Et hac legitima forma praeparatur futurus euangelicus concionator, qui de virtutibus et vicijs populariter disserat, qui fidem praedicet, et astruat toto pectore, interim scire paruipendens, quid sit fides, in quo subiecto, cuius obiecti veri ne an falsi, dei an hominis, nihil ad rem pertinere putet, charitatem hominibus inculcet, nec curet cuius subiecti vel obiecti, quousque tendatur, quis eius ordo, aut an aliquis sit eius ordo paruipendat, tantum summis orationis et animi viribus agat, ut auditores sint pij, fidi amantes, hoc demum censent consummatum esse theologum.” 29 Guelluy : 1941, 60/Latomus: 1905, 67: “[…] subtilem vero et spiritualem seorsum discipulis, quibus datum erat nosse misterium regni, succesiue et illos a carne abducens donec igne spiritus sancti, rubigine ac grossitie deposita, liquidam illam et spiritualem pleno haustu caperent theologiam, non iam carneis adminiculis indigentes, sed reuelata facie diuinam christi gloriam speculantes […].”

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explains that he disagrees with Erasmus about which tools are adequate for the study of theology : Erasmus attaches more importance to rhetoric and knowledge of languages, whereas we regard the knowledge of dialectics, metaphysics and moral philosophy as more important not because of our own authority, but in accordance with Augustine who in De Doctrina Christiana greatly prefers the art of concluding, and the arts of defining, dividing or separation to the art of speaking well, also known as eloquentia […]. And he adds that being able to conclude, define and distinguish is of great importance in connection with understanding and investigating great questions. Eloquentia teaches us to perform the things we have understood, rather than understanding what is presented to us.30

3.2.2 Latomus’ theory of knowledge By virtue of what has been said here, it is possible to summarize the main points in Latomus’ theory of knowledge. Latomus, as we have seen, describes human understanding as twofold: natural and supernatural knowledge, enlightened respectively by a lumen naturale and a lumen superadditum. Yet it is clear that there is no rupture between the two forms of knowledge. They function in the same way and with the same components, except that in the supernatural context additional divine help is added (Latomus: 1905, 62–63). Marcel Gielis thinks that Latomus’ theory of knowledge is inspired by Aristotle (‘empirical knowledge’ in Gielis) and Augustine respectively (‘illumination’ in Gielis) (Gielis: 1994, 26). The two sides he describes may be compared with the two terms above, the natural and the supernatural knowledge. Regarding the question of when illumination is necessary, whether it is only when one faces the theological truth, or if it is already needed to understand the lower conceptual truths such as logic, mathematics and philosophy, Gielis is of the opinion that Latomus follows in Augustine’s footsteps and takes the latter position:31 ‘Selon 30 Guelluy : 1941, 67, note 3: “Erasmus plus tribuit rhetoricae et peritiae linguarum, nos autem magis necessariam dialecticam, metaphysicam et moralis philosophiae peritiam arbitramur, non nostra auctoritate, sed Augustinum secuti, qui, secundo de doctrina christiana, connexionum scientiam et definiendi, dividendi, sive partiendi scientiam, longe anteponit praeceptis uberioris disputationis, quae eloquentia nominatur […] et addit rationem connexionum, definitionum et divisionum magnam vim habere in intelligendis et disserendis magnis quaestionibus, addens de eloquentia, haec pars addiscitur magis ut proficiamus ea quae intellecta sunt, quam ut intelligamus adhibenda est.” 31 Gielis: 1994, 26, writes that according to Augustine the human soul cannot know the truth without divine illumination. But exegetically it is disputed whether this means that the knowledge of things is a priori, and that the illumination thus “only” means that the knowing of them becomes certain or whether the illumination causes things to appear at all. No matter what, Gielis writes, it is certain that the formal principles of human thinking (logic, ma-

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Latomus, l’homme a besoin de l’illumination divine pour avoir la connaissance des principes des sciences formelles, / savoir de la logique et de la math8matique, et aussi de la morale’ (Gielis: 1994, 26). But when compared with what was stated above about the two lumina, where lumen superadditum is only necessary for the understanding of the divine truths, Gielis’ conclusion seems not to be precise. Even though Latomus draws much on Augustine, both in the Dialogue – including in the passage where the theory of knowledge is most clearly expressed – and later in the treatise against Luther, it is not certain that the best description of his inspiration is that of being Augustinian. Speaking of two lights as he does suggests Thomas Aquinas rather than Augustine.32 And even if that should be correct, and Gielis’ description of Latomus’ theory of knowledge as AristotelianAugustinian thus is less precise, we do not have to overrule Gielis’ observation that Latomus speaks of a need for a light, or for ‘illumination’ in Gielis’ terms, to understand the conceptual, non-theological verities. On the contrary his observation may be put forward as another argument for placing Latomus in the Thomist universe. When Thomism speaks of two levels, the natural and the supernatural, it does not mean that one level is outside and the other inside divine influence. They are not two levels, a human and a divine, which complement each other. Both are part of the divine ordo. The natural level is lower than the supernatural, and the supernatural can be said to complete the natural, but God is behind and maintains both. Therefore it may be said that on the natural plan also divine help is needed, i. e. the divine help contained in the very fact of being created and on the right path: a help that is also a ‘light’ worked by God, but a ‘natural light’, be it remembered, contained in the work of creation itself. This is presumably what Gielis describes when he talks about ‘illumination’ at a lower level. Yet it is misleading to use the word ‘illumination’ to describe it, because ‘illumination’ is mostly used in connection with a theory of knowledge inspired by Neo-Platonism.33 That Latomus is supposed to be influenced by Thomism is also reflected in the fact that his thinking seems to bear the mark of rational thought. In Latomus there is no leap from the rational natural understanding of the speculative sciences to a mystic supernatural knowledge of the divine: rather we see a gradual increase in a rationally based knowledge from the carnal via the spiritual to the thematics, and moral philosophy) according to Augustine are products of divine illumination. 32 For an account of Thomas’ theory of knowledge in comparison to that of Augustine, cf. Chenu: 1954, 44–51, and Kretzmann/Kenny/Pinborg: 1982, 440–459. 33 It is uncertain whether Gielis’ choice of terms is connected with Latomus’ own, that is to say, whether Latomus uses the word illuminatio himself. If that is the case, it could be due to Latomus being influenced by Augustine’s choice of terms, which does not necessarily mean that he adopts Augustine’s theory of knowledge.

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divine. This is seen in his description of the student’s ascent, in terms of knowledge, in the hierarchy of subjects, as it is described in the Dialogue. Here we see clear signs of an ordo, which greatly resembles the Thomist thinking.

3.2.3 The foundation of theology: The spiritual authority Latomus’ answer to the question of what was needed to reach the right understanding of the biblical message, since it is not the wording of the biblical texts or the languages in which they are written that are decisive (Ptienne: 1956, 172–174; Guelluy : 1941, 62–65), follows naturally from what has been said above. In the Dialogue Latomus answers that understanding is dependent on the piety of the reader, i. e. the spirit in which Scripture is read. He points out that heathens and Jews can read the same Scripture without getting anything out of it at all, but if the right piety is present the matter shows itself to the reader in its true light, so that the reader perceives it with the help of the true concepts, and arrives at the eternal message of the Bible (Guelluy : 1941, 63 and note 1). As soon as the message is understood there is really no further need for the Bible. Latomus regards the Bible as a kind of storage box for the true faith, and explains that once the reader has received and understood that faith, the relevance of the Bible ceases, just as the relevance of scaffolding for a house ends when the house is finished. The Bible, in other words, is only a vehicle for achieving insight (Ptienne: 1956, 173/Latomus: 1905, 57–58), because at the end of the day it is neither the written nor the preached revelation, but the perception of truth imparted supernaturally by the Holy Spirit, by lumen supernaturale, which is decisive. This perception, as Latomus says, is a “spiritual” insight into “the mystery of the Kingdom”. It might appear from this that Latomus made a concentration around a religious feeling which implies a sacrificium intellectus, but that is not the case. Just as his talk of perceiving the divine “mysteries” does not make him a mystic but is simply a way of speaking about our knowledge of faith via the supernatural light, the piety which Latomus describes as necessary for the understanding is not an irrational religious feeling, but a rationally based knowledge through faith of the religious truth.34 It is to be found above natural reason in the sphere man can 34 Augustijn: 1991, 117, says: “Both Masson’s dialogue and Erasmus’ reply seem at the first sight to say the same thing: Masson too considered piety a prerequisite in the practice of theology. Yet there remains a difference. For Masson piety was an objective matter, it concerned a state that a person reached, that is, orthodoxy, a particular religious doctrine. For Erasmus, piety was warmth, inner conviction, and this he felt was an indispensable prerequisite in theology : ‘It appears to me, to say honestly what I think, untheological to speak of religion without feeling’; a theologian may not approach the Bible using his reason alone, he

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only reach through faith, but it builds on and supplements natural reason. Therefore it is more than simply a “right reason”: it is “rightful piety”. In the Dialogue he terms the spiritual revelation we see here lex Christi mentalis, i. e. a perfect understanding of lex Dei in corde and veritas evangelica (Gielis: 1994, 28–29). As we have said, it exists before and is elevated above the written and spoken revelation, just as concepts exist before and above both the written and spoken word, so that Latomus can say in conclusion that “the final solution to evangelical questions is to be found in the Gospel that is written in the hearts of the faithful” (“in evangelibus quaestionibus ultimam resolutionem esse ad evangelium scriptum in tabulis cordis fidelium”; Gielis: 1994, 31). It is as well to be aware that this perfect understanding is not accessible to everybody. In the section on the method of theology Latomus wrote that the “subtle and spiritual way” of working with theology was only intended for “the few and wise”. In other words it is not the case – as it may immediately seem from the above – that everyone who comes to the faith receives lumen superadditum and achieves the full knowledge of the divine mysteries.

3.2.4 The outer authority The salient critical question is whether the knowledge of the Gospel in our heart as the ultimate criterion for the revelation is not simply a reference to subjectivity. To answer it two things must be emphasized. Firstly we have seen that the perfect understanding is not man’s own achievement, but God’s gift through the Holy Spirit. The one who possesses it is therefore not himself master over it because it is indeed God who inspires it in him. Man’s job is simply to manage the insight. Secondly it was not without reason that Latomus named this particular spiritual theology theologia speculativa and theologia scholastica, because in that way he suggested its particular divine meaning: it also benefits everyone else, as it exists primarily to qualify the teaching aspect of the ecclesiastical vocation. By virtue, not of the inherent charisma of the bearer of the revelation, but of his divinely sanctioned management of his spiritual calling as interpreter and preacher in the Church – which is God’s visible manifestation of His invisible kingdom – is the Gospel defined and passed on to other, less gifted, believers. Only the common agreement about the content, which the ecclesiastical officebearers determine and present by the Spirit, can guarantee the true content, and must ‘feel, be deeply affected by what he reads in the divine Scriptures’.” Cf. Latomus: 1905, 69: “[…] creditis primum fideliter firmiter et fideliter acceptis […].” Here it is suggested that Latomus’ concept of faith is not a feeling, but a rational supposition or conviction.

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a subjection to the Church is therefore the only true road to correct understanding. Latomus says in the dialogue that: One cannot say that anyone reads the Gospel better than the catholic Church […] because the holy catholic Church does not adduce its own meaning to the gospel or decree it, but by reading the Gospel it passes on the meaning of the Gospel […].35

The Church and its task of maintaining and passing on veritas evangelica came into being when the perfect understanding of the doctrine of Christ through the Spirit was infused into the hearts of the disciples, lived on in time through the Apostles, was fixed in writing by the Church Fathers, side by side with an independent oral tradition, and developed to the system of learning which exists today (i. e. at Latomus’ own time) and which is guarded at the universities and in the scholastic teaching (Guelluy : 1941, 63). We here see how Latomus links the work of the teaching office and the universities. The development has led to an important part of teaching, viz. the work of defining and determining the content of the revelation, at his own time being performed by the professors of theology. They do not have the final authority of teaching, but function as the advisors of the highest authority in the Church, the Pope. Contemporaneously with this increasing formalization of the office of teaching, so that it not only takes place in the Church but resides just as much in the schools, the freedom of preaching has been gradually reduced because it has become increasingly necessary to fix and define the true doctrine. But just as the greater formalization of working with the true dogma is a boon, so is the loss of freedom, the fixation and formalization of dogma, because both in increasing measure help to secure the Christian dogma against heterodoxy (Guelluy : 1941, 64). The formalization of the office of teaching and the fixation of the dogma have come about naturally in connection with the work of passing on the testimony and refuting critics, and those who criticize scholastic theologians for having too much power, being too subtle, and philosophizing too much are to that extent mistaken. The scholastics’ ecclesiastically sanctioned exercise of duties only exists, and their philosophizing is only spreading because it is important to refine the doctrine, so that false ideas can be refuted and the education of the less gifted recipients can be extended, so that they get a more adequate understanding of God (Guelluy : 1941, 65). Even though the perfect spiritual understanding of the ecclesiastical theologians is strictly speaking the work of the Holy Spirit, it is not therefore a vague intangible entity. The fixation and communication of it is on the contrary 35 Guelluy : 1941, 63, note 1, cf. Latomus: 1905, 57: “[…] Neque dici potest aliquem melius legere euangelium, quam legat ecclesia catholica, […] nam sancta ecclesia catholica euangelio sensum suum non affert, nec imponit, sed euangelium legens euangelii sensum refert […].”

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identical with hard, concrete theological work with the sources of revelation, the Scripture and the ecclesiastical tradition. As was demonstrated by the Dialogue’s description of theological work, the young theologian must above all accept in faith the ecclesiastically defined dogma and work every day for some time with the text of the Bible and the ecclesiastical interpretation of it. Only with that preparation can he rise in the hierarchy of scholarship towards perfection. (This distribution of work, in which man contributes as much as he can to reach perfection, although it is for God to decide if he is ever to get there, is incidentally a good example of Latomus’ basic conception of the relationship between man and God). Again Latomus’ statement in the later Apologia corresponds with what has been outlined above (Guelluy : 1941, 66, note 4; 67, notes 1–3). Erasmus, Latomus says here, puts knowledge before faith when he is to define what best prepares us to read Scripture, while he himself prefers faith to knowledge. The first thing is to believe, and by believing one must come to an understanding of the Scripture. And not only by generally believing that the Scripture is true or divine, mind you, but particularly by believing the Articles contained in the symbol or symbols.

It is dangerous, indeed harmful, for the theological candidate who hesitates in relation to the authority of the Church and questions the dogmas of the Church, if he therefore reaches out to and wants to examine Scripture, since he does not want to believe these things unless he has been made certain through Scripture. Anyone who behaves like this precludes himself from the road to knowing, just like in the arts and sciences he who does not understand or poorly understands the basics, therefore never will become either a master of science or arts, but someone who errs and flounders about without certainties.36

Latomus is also of a wholly different opinion from Erasmus regarding theological method. Erasmus thinks it is acceptable if a young theologian himself, on the basis of the Holy Scripture, accepts the dogma of faith, hope, charity, of virtues, habits and sacraments, and approves if the young theologian only sets up rules found in the source itself, the divine Scripture, and not from all the minor streams made up of the scholars’ manifold interpretations. For his part, Latomus thinks it is better and safer if the young theologian is inspired by all the 36 Guelluy : 1941, 66, note 4: “Primo credendum et credendo ad scientiam scripturarum esse veniendum. Credendo (inquam) non solum generaliter Scripturas esse veras et divinas, sed particulariter credendo articulos in symbolo vel symbolis comprehendos […] theologiae candidatus haesitans de Ecclesiae auctoritate et in quaestionem vocans Ecclesiae dogmata, si propter hoc accedens ad Scripturam, ea examinare velit non illis crediturus nisi ex Scriptura certum reddatur […] Qui enim ejusmodi est, sibiipsi viam praecludit intelligentiae, sicut in artibus et scientiis, qui non accipit aut male accipit principia nunquam erit sciens vel artifex, sed errans et incerto opinionum fluctuans.”

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generally known rules of faith and Catholic doctrine, before he goes to the Scriptures to understand or investigate them (Guelluy : 1941, 67 note 1).

3.2.5 The reaction to Latomus’ Dialogue The oldest of the three professors at Collegium Trilingue, the professor of Hebrew, Matthaeus Adrianus, reacted promptly when Latomus’ dialogue was published. He interrupted his class one day, on March 21st, and made a speech exhorting his students to study the three languages. When Erasmus returned from a trip to Mechelen shortly afterwards, the faculty were up in arms. Erasmus quickly wrote an apology, dated March 28th 1519, which was not aimed directly at Latomus, but at those who inferred that Latomus’ Dialogue must be a shot at Erasmus. In that way he avoided an open dispute with Latomus. He mainly turned against “the old man’s” viewpoints, in that way rebutting not only Latomus indirectly, but also Briard. In 122 answers he goes through and carefully answers the viewpoints presented in the dialogue (De Vocht: 1951, 343– 346). He declares, for example, that he has never claimed that good stylistics are a necessity for good theology, but that a clear and precise explanation must always be better than a vague and obscure one. And he calls attention to the fact that he has never claimed that the languages were necessary for theology as such, but for the reading of Scripture. He emphasizes that it will always be better if you judge an expression or a text yourself, rather than letting someone else do it for you, and he recommends the study of the three languages, not as part of the study of theology, but as a prerequisite. Instead of thinking, like “the old man”, that theological method must be the same as ever and thus be defined by tradition rather than by the content, one must surely consider which among all methods is best, and then choose that without considering the past. When we read the apology it becomes clear that Erasmus is attempting to avoid direct and unequivocal comment on the elements in the Dialogue, which might otherwise become a source of great disagreement between Latomus and himself. As we saw in the presentation of Latomus’ treatise, there was no mistaking the insurmountable differences between the two, between the humanistic and scholastic-theological views of the method and foundation of theology. But Erasmus nimbly sidestepped them. How Erasmus’ apology was received, we do not know.37 When he writes in a letter to Lips from around this time that the apology “has been approved by Briard, and sells well”,38 it is probably not the apology against Latomus to which 37 Latomus, as mentioned later, reacted to it with his Pro Dialogo de Tribus Linguis Apologia. 38 Ep. 960,6, in Erasmus: 1913, 573: “imo probata est ab Atensis et venditur.”.

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he refers, but the apology for The Praise of Marriage which he wrote with Briard in mind on March 1st. Most likely the apology against Latomus’ Dialogue made little impact, perhaps because it was not trenchant enough. At least there is no sign that opinions about Erasmus changed among the conservative theologians at this time, rather the contrary. A growing tendency is detectable to speak against Erasmus and to link his cause with Luther’s. Erasmus himself mentions the misunderstanding, as he sees it, of making the connection between himself and Luther, in a letter to John Fisher dated April 2nd 1519, and sees it as a continuation of Latomus’ attack: A dialogue has been published by Jacob Latomus, a theologian at Leuven, in which he does not completely denounce the languages but, in his treatment, allows them as little space as possible. Furthermore he sets up some other principles against my principles in “Methodus”, though refraining from mentioning my name. Yet in this way he troubles me with a greater resentment, since the criticisms he levels at one or the other, indeed the criticism he directs at Luther, the ignorant reader may suppose to be aimed at me.39

The dispute with Latomus in other words stirred up controversy again after oil had been successfully poured upon the dispute with Briard in February. An additional cause may have been the publication of Erasmus’ second edition of the New Testament in March. In April Erasmus writes two letters, the one already mentioned to Mosellan, and another to Briard in which he complains of the new accusations and hostile behaviour.40 In his letter to Mosellan he explains how there is a theologian in Leuven41 who is normally regarded as a sensible man, but who after having fallen upon Luther’s cause and publicly declared it heretical, an expression of Antichrist and a danger to faith, has mixed it all up with the classical languages and humanist ideas, and has on several occasions declared that it is precisely in them, the said classical and humanist ideas, that the heresies have their source (Ep. 948,83–88, in: Erasmus: 1913, 543). In another letter Erasmus asks Briard to curb this man. He does not think that he has deserved accusations of heresy, or that there is any reason why these disagreements should flourish. He has tried to answer Latomus’ censure as gently and obligingly as possible and hopes that it will be possible to come to an understanding. He is even willing to suffer any unfavourable rumour, however ill-founded, as long as he avoids accusations of heresy (Ep. 946, in: Erasmus: 1913, 538f). 39 Ep. 936,36–41, in Erasmus: 1913, 523: “Prodiit dialogus quidam Iacobi Latomi, theologi Louaniensis, quo linguas non in totum damnat, sed ita tractat ut illis quam minimum tribui velit. Tum Methodi meae praeceptis opponit diuersa praecepta, sed interim e nomine meo temperans: etiamsi sic grauiore nos premit inuidia, dum quae in hunc aut illum, dum quae in Lutherum stringit, lector ignarus in me stringi suspicatur.” 40 It is not certain but probable that the letter was directed to Briard. 41 Who this was is not known.

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3.2.6 The linking of Erasmus with Luther The accusation of heresy was exactly what the theologians of Leuven hoped to get occasion, with the aid of the Luther case, to level at Erasmus. The question is whether we may not, on the basis of the events in the years up to 1518, conclude not only that the theologians’ reaction to Luther in 1518–19 was caused by the challenge of what he wrote, but that they were also to a great degree actuated by the hatred which had built up through many years for the whole humanist tendency, with Erasmus at its head. As will be seen in the analysis of their condemnation of Luther, they did little to criticize and refute his points of view in detail, but mainly devoted their efforts to having him condemned as a heretic. They had realized that it was difficult to get at Erasmus, because he was so highly estimated. He had even in several cases been able to obtain the Pope’s recognition, and as late as August 1518 had had papal endorsement of the second edition of the New Testament. But if they could succeed in linking Luther’s and Erasmus’ causes, and even accuse Erasmus of being behind several of Luther’s initiatives, they would get the better of Erasmus and with him the entire humanist movement. Erasmus himself believed that this was the case. In a letter to Luther’s Elector Frederick the Wise of April 14th 1519 (Ep. 939, in Erasmus: 1913, 527–532), he writes that he is delighted at the Elector’s will to support the development of humanist studies, and that he hopes more princes will follow his example, so that the power of the princes can back the humanist reform initiatives and become a considerable instrument against the enemies of humanism. The fact is that they are difficult to overcome, since they will stop short of nothing. The very latest means they have got their eye on, in their struggle against all things new, is Luther’s writings, which have already been under suspicion for heresy on the part of the Holy See, personified by Cardinal Cajetan (in Augsburg October 1518), and this is therefore “the best occasion, so they think themselves [i. e. the conservative theologians], to cause bonae litterae harm”.42 By linking the Luther case and humanist learning as if the humanist disciplines, as Erasmus also wrote in his letter to Mosellan, “were the sources heresy was born of”,43 they will try to strike at both at the same time. Before this time Erasmus had in fact had nothing to do with Luther. During 1518 he had written positively in some letters about his points of view and his Ninety-five Theses, but without mentioning his name.44 In a letter to Johann Lang of October 1518 he mentioned Luther directly for the first time, but did not 42 Ep. 939, 48–49, in Erasmus: 1913, : “occasionem, ut ipsis visum est, maxime oportunam esse datam delendi bonas litteras.” 43 Ep. 939, 57, in Erasmus 1913, 530: “[…] ex hisce fontibus haereses nascerentur”. 44 Ep. 785, in Erasmus: 1913, 238–240; Ep. 786, in Erasmus: 1913, 240–242; Ep. 858, in Erasmus: 1913, 361–377.

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write very enthusiastically about the man himself. He did, however, put forward a rebuke of Silvester Prierias’ answer to the Ninety-five Theses of July 1518, of Eck’s self-elected involvement in the case and of the power of the Holy See in general. But he did not encourage any direct attack on the Holy See. He regarded that as a matter for the Princes. Perhaps Erasmus had sensed that he must keep away from Luther if he did not want to endanger himself. This may be why he warned Froben, already before April 1519, not to print any more of Luther’s writings, which the Swiss printer had in fact been the first to do.45 In a letter addressed to Luther, dated May 30th 1519,46 he says directly that though he has done everything to make Luther’s opponents at Leuven give him a fair hearing, though several people of high rank both in England and Europe, among them the Bishop of Li8ge, regard Luther’s cause as sensible, and finally, though Erasmus knows very well that his words have great weight, and that if he wished he could pacify the combatants with his sharp pen, he says, “for my own part I stay disinterested as far as possible, so that I can help the new learning to flourish all the more”.47 But from April until July 1519, Luther often figures in Erasmus’ letters. The accusation against Erasmus of being in collusion with Luther had been made, and, as in the winter of 1516–17, rumours were circulating in Leuven that parts of Erasmus’ work would be subjected to censorship.48 Erasmus therefore now had to try to publish and emphasize his lack of knowledge of both Luther’s person and his writings, and at the same time take care not to end up siding with Luthers’ and his own enemies.

45 The warning may also have been given after April 1519, cf. Grane: 1994, 169. 46 Ep. 980, in Erasmus: 1913, 605–607, which was an answer to a letter from Luther, March 28th, 1519. 47 Ep. 980,37–38, in Erasmus: 1913, 606: “Ego me, quoad licet, integrum seruo, quo magis prosim bonis literis reflorescentibus.” 48 In a letter to Priccardus from July 1st, 1519 (Ep. 993, in Erasmus: 1922, 1–3), Erasmus flatly denies that the rumours of censorship of his works have any truth to them. Nevertheless there was a reason why the rumour was about (cf. Erasmus: 1987, X–XI). In a letter of 1521 Erasmus recalls that when Luther’s works had come to Leuven and two or three of the wellwritten prefaces were ascribed to Erasmus, the theological bachelors were given the task of collecting Erasmus’ errors (Ep. 1225,106–110, in Erasmus: 1922, 557). And in a letter of 1525 he relates that a list of the heresies had been sent to Adrian, who did not accept them as heresies, in contrast to what was the case with Luther and Reuchlin (Ep. 1581,484–490, in Erasmus: 1926, 99). Erasmus alludes to the case in January 1519 (Ep. 1053,31–36, in Erasmus: 1922, 140).

The history of the condemnations

3.3

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We have already mentioned that the first edition of Luther’s works was printed by the printer Johannes Froben in October 1518.49 It was a publication of the most important writings connected with the dispute on indulgences: The Resolutions to the Theses Against Indulgences, written in February 1518 and printed in August, including the prefatory letters to Johann Staupitz and Leo X respectively, the Sermon on Indulgences and Grace (March 1518), Sermon on Penance (spring 1518), on the Preparation for the Eucharist (Easter 1518) and on Excommunication (August 1518), an Easter sermon of 1518, the Ten Commandments interpreted for the People (July 1518), and finally his Answer to Sylvester Prieras’ Dialogue concerning the Power of the Pope (August 1518). In addition the book contained Prieras’ dialogue, Andreas Karlstadt’s Theses against Johann Eck of July 1518 and an anonymous preface written by Wolfgang Capito.50 This was the book which when it arrived in Leuven in the autumn of 1518 caused the conservative theologians51 to react and open the whole campaign against Luther and against everything he could pull down with him in his fall in the way of new humanistically inspired tendencies. Rumours circulated among the theologians that Erasmus had somehow been involved with the publishing of the book. For one thing it had been run off by “his” printer, and secondly the anonymous preface (which as stated in fact was written by Wolfgang Captio) was so eloquent that it might well have been written by Erasmus. 49 The condemnations, Adrian’s letter and Luther’s answers have been printed together in WA 6, 170–195. An important source for the history of the condemnations is Latomus’ letter of dedication in Articulorum doctrinae fratris, addressed to Rodolphus of Monckedam, December 1520. The letter is found in print in De Jongh: 1911, 69–80. In this context, however, reference is made to Latomi Ratio, 1521, 277–288/a2r-b3v, in the following referred to as LR. 50 1. Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, WA 1, 522–628,2; Sermo de Indulgentiis (translation of Sermon von Ablass und Gnade), WA 1, 239–246,3; Sermo de Poenitentia, WA 1, 317–324,4; Sermo de digna Praeparatione Cordis pro suscipiendo Sacramento Eucharistiae, WA 1, 325–334,5; Sermo de Virtute Excommunicationis, WA 1, 634–643,6; Quomodo Christi Passio sit consideranda, WA 1, 339–349,7; Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, WA 1, 394–521,8; Ad Dialogum Silvestri Prieratis de Potestate Papae Responsio, WA 1, 644–686. Originally the sermon on preparation for the Eucharist and the Easter sermon were not included in the book, but they were added in the course of the autumn of 1518. On the publishing of the book, cf. Blockx 1958, 5–12. 51 It was of course the professors who were both legentes et regentes and who had a seat in the collegium strictum who led the way in the process. In 1518–19 and 1519–20 the following professors were members: Jan Briard, Nicholas van Egmond (alias Baechem), Wilhelm van Vianen, Antoon Crabbe, Jan Driedo, Jan Lengherant, Maarten Dorp, Godschalk Rosemondt, Eustachius van Sichem, Jacob Remigii, Vincent Diercx (alias Theodorici), Jacob Latomus and Ruard Tapper. Cf. Blockx: 1958, XXII–XXV, in which Blockx also gives more detailed attention to the following: Briard, van Egmond, Driedo, Dorp, Van Sichem and Latomus.

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Luther in point of fact believed at the end of 1519 that he would avoid university evaluations of his texts. In 1519 Eck brought it about that the Universities of Erfurt and Paris were to give a votum on the Leipzig Disputation, but for various reasons it came to nothing. Erfurt made excuses, perhaps because of their close connection to Luther, and the Sorbonne demanded so much money to make a pronouncement that the demand was suspended and only realized later, in 1521. But in the course of 1519 the universities of Leuven and Cologne each worked up a censure of Luther’s works, which were printed together in February 1520. The initiative to the process came from Leuven (WA 6, 179,6–14). When the Froben edition arrived in the city the theologians of the university saw how dangerous its content was for their understanding of theology and for the Church (WA 6, 175,23–24), and how much it resembled the admonitions they already knew from the advocates of humanism, with Erasmus at their head. As we have seen, they conceived the idea that if they could manage to have Luther censured they might bring down Erasmus and his adherents into the bargain. Therefore they immediately tried to forbid the sale of the book (WA 6, 175,24– 25), but in vain. Luther’s works were decidedly popular and were soon widely read, so that stronger measures were called for if they were to avoid the book being read (WA 6, 175,25–30). In the winter of 1518–19 they extracted a number of sentences from Luther’s work which in their opinion were heretical, and in February/March sent the list to the University of Cologne to have their theological faculty pronounce on the matter. Cologne was in a sense the mother faculty for Leuven. The theological faculty of Leuven was founded in 1432 on the model of Cologne, and at the time most of the professors at Leuven had been recruited from there. In addition, in the Reuchlin case Cologne had headed the struggle against the new learning, and Leuven had supported them. There was therefore a good and natural contact, and clear theological agreement, between the two faculties. In Cologne the initial reaction was passive. In the university’s council protocols we can read that the investigation of Luther’s works demanded by Leuven had to be postponed until a copy of Froben’s edition of Luther had been acquired, and there was no expectation that this would happen soon. That same month this reaction came to be known in Leuven, because in the same council protocol, in a text of March 22nd, we can see that Froben’s edition had been brought to the theologians of Cologne by a bachelor from Leuven. Now a commission of four professors was set up at Cologne to decide in the matter. The next move in the case we learn from a letter from Martin Bucer to Beatus Rhenanus (Blockx: 1958, 65). According to this account representatives from both Cologne and Leuven went to Koblenz in May 1519 to present their results to

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Cardinal Cajetan, in which connection Cajetan stated that it was well to be wary of the stamp of heresy. They had to keep in mind that there was a difference between a thing being erroneous and the same thing being downright heretical. This warning apparently was not taken too seriously by the theologians at Cologne. After their return from Koblenz they immediately started drawing up a list of heretical sentences from Luther’s works, which formed the basis of the final doctrinal condemnation which they issued on August 30th 1519.

3.3.1 The excerpts The first document in the history of the condemnations, then, is the quotations that were produced on the basis of the Froben edition in Leuven in the winter of 1518/19, and which were sent to Cologne in February/March, presented to Cajetan in May, and along with the condemnation proper from Leuven, dated November 7th, sent to Adrian of Utrecht in Spain.52 The precise title of the work is Errores excerpti ex probationibus et declarationibus conclusionum Martini Lutheri, ordinis fratrum Heremitarum sancti Augustini (“Errors excerpted from the proofs and the explanations of the Augustinian brother Martin Luther’s conclusions”). It was found among Aleander’s papers in the archives of the Vatican and published as late as 1905 (Kalkoff: 1905, 188–203).53 The excerpts consist of a number of almost direct quotations from Luther’s works. After each quotation follows a theological qualification and an evaluation expressed in a language that shows that the document has been drafted for specialists’ eyes. The work consists of 23 articles, taken from the Resolutions to the Ninety-five Theses, Luther’s rejoinder to Prierias’ dialogue, from A Short Explanation of the Ten Commandments, and from the Sermon on the Preparation of the Heart for Receiving the Eucharist. Two additional quotations were found in Karlstadt’s Theses against Eck (articles 17 and 18). The first ten articles are from the Resolutions to the Ninety-five Theses and concern Luther’s criticism of the extent of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the right understanding of indulgences and purgatory, the understanding of repentance, the function of the sacraments and the possibility of doing good 52 It is much discussed precisely what part the excerpts played, see Blockx: 1958, 62–66. Moreau (1927, 415) thinks we have to do with parallel censorship, arguing that in 1546 Leuven issued two condemnations, one technical which was not meant for publication, and one prepared for the press. Against this Blockx argues that the differences between the excerpts and the final condemnation text are so great that we cannot be dealing with a differently formulated version of the same work. Nor is it certain that it was the excerpts that were brought to Cologne in the spring and presented to Cajetan in May. 53 For a detailed analysis of the excerpts, see Blockx: 1958, 39–66.

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deeds. The Leuven theologians decide against Luther’s emphasis that the Pope and the Church have no influence on divine law, meaning that they cannot stand as an indispensable guarantee of salvation, and that what they have power to remit is the canonical punishments that may be inflicted on an undisguised criminal in a public context. Nor are the Pope and the Church, in Luther’s eyes, indispensable guarantors that the sacrament will work the forgiveness of sins, just as neither genuine repentance nor good deeds are demanded of the Christian in order to be forgiven, since God bestows the gift of righteousness freely to those who believe in Him. Concerning purgatory, the theologians regard it as heretical of Luther to write that it must be a kind of intermediary place for those who are not yet perfect, who need to be augmented in love of and lessened in fear of God; and that in no way can it be the home of people who are perfect but who have not served the canonical sentences the Church may have imposed on them. Articles 11–16 are taken from Luther’s answer to Prierias. The subject here is again the understanding of the law, the deeds, the forgiveness of sins and the Pope’s role in that connection. Articles 17 and 18 from Karlstadt’s theses against Eck concern anthropology and the understanding of grace. Articles 19 to 21 are excerpts from the interpretation of the Ten Commandments, and deal with what it means to fulfil the first commandment and consequently the others. The last two articles are from the Sermon on the Preparation of the Heart for Receiving the Eucharist and challenge the traditional ecclesiastical understanding, according to which participation in the Eucharist demands purity and freedom from sin, and where, therefore, penance must be done and the heart cleansed before the Eucharist can be received. Luther points out that the Eucharist, on the contrary, is there for the sinner who knows that he has no pure heart to show God, and must therefore have recourse to God’s mercy. It is quite clear what the Leuven theologians regard as heretical, viz. Luther’s, as they think obvious, subversion of the papal Church which has its roots in his criticism of scholastic theology. The manner in which the sentences are quoted and at the same time taken out of their context betrays how little understanding they had of Luther’s statements and purpose. In several cases there is inconsistency between what is said in the excerpts, although they are often quoted directly, and what is said in the full context in Luther. The scholastics have not been willing or able to read what Luther wrote. The most glaring example of this is found in article 12, taken from the answer to Prierias. The article declares: In the same rejoinder [i. e. to Prierias] is found the following claim: when Christ says that you shall love your neighbour as yourself, he speaks of the perverted and distorted love in which man is only self-seeking. Therefore the meaning of the commandment,

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according to Luther, is that you must love your neighbour as yourself, i. e. you must love only yourself and perversely.54

If one consults Luther’s text it says nothing of the sort: Moreover, when Christ says (Matt 22:39) that you shall love your neighbour as yourself, the subject, in my opinion, is the perverted and distorted love which makes man selfseeking, the love that is not straightened out unless it stops seeking its own, and seeks that which is the other’s. It says in Paul, Phil 2:4, that you should look out not only for your own interests, but for the interests of others. And in 1 Cor 13:5 it says that love does not seek its own. With these words He clearly forbids the love of self; therefore the meaning of the command seems to be “you shall love your neighbour as yourself, i. e. you only love yourself and in a distorted way, but if you turned this love towards your neighbour you would love truly”. Here it is said that Christ does not demand that man must love himself, which he would have done in all circumstances, if self-love was a boon, but he finds his love of self and transfers it to another and thereby he makes it right.55

Luther in other words says the precise opposite of what the scholastics quote him as saying, and this misrepresentation they bring about by culling from his text and by changing a present indicative into a future tense. Whereas it said in the excerpt that Luther’s interpretation of the command was that “you shall love your neighbour as yourself, i. e. you must love (diliges) only yourself and perversely”, Luther originally wrote that the meaning of the command is that “you must love your neighbour as yourself, i. e. you love (diligis) yourself alone and in a distorted way, but if you turned this love towards your neighbour you would love truly.” If we compare the excerpts with the two existing condemnations it will be seen that several of the themes turn up in both of them. But whereas no direct relationship between the condemnation from Cologne and the excerpts can be seen, partly because the Cologne condemnation contains no direct quotations at all, there are several literal similarities between the excerpts and the con54 Kalkoff: 1905, 199: “In eisdem responsionibus habetur haec propositio: ‘Quando Christus dicit, proximum diligendum ad instar sui, de perverso et incurvo amore loquitur, quo homo querit non nisi quae sua sunt.’ ‘Ideo sensum precepti’ dicit esse: ‘Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, id est diliges te solum et perverse.’” 55 WA 1, 654,15–26: “Proinde quando Christus dicit, proximum diligendum ad instar sui, meo iuditio de perverso, et incurvo amore loquitur, quo homo quaerit non nisi quae sua sunt, qui amor non rectificatur, nisi omittat quaerere quae sua sunt et ea quae sunt alterius querat. Haec sententia est B. Pauli Philip ii. Non quae sua sunt consyderantes, sed quae aliorum, Et in i. Corin. Xiii charitas non quaerit quae sua sunt. His verbis manifeste prohibet amorem sui. Ideo sensus praecepti esse videtur ‘Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, id est diligis te solum et perverse. Si autem amorem eiusmodi in proximum tuum dirigeres, iam vere diligeres’ quod ex eo patet, quia non praecipit, ut homo diligat se, quod utique fecisset, si bonus esset sui amor, sed invenit amorem sui et alio transfert, et ita rectificat.”

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demnation from Leuven. Whether the excerpts have played a role, and if so, how important a role, in the drawing up of the final condemnation in Leuven is difficult to say. Article 2 in the excerpts might very well be a precursor of article 10 in the Leuven condemnation, as article 10 is a kind of pr8cis of the direct quotations found in article 2 of the excerpts. But beyond that we only find literal reminiscences in the condemnation, from articles 2, 7, 9 and 19. In addition, the Sermon on Penitence has not been used at all in the excerpts, but extensively in the condemnation, which may be an indication that the Leuven theologians were influenced by the Cologne text when setting up their final document. In other words, the differences between the two texts are too considerable for us to conclude that the excerpts were used extensively during the setting up of the final condemnation. It is possible that the Leuven theologians, influenced by Cajetan’s reaction to the excerpts in Koblenz and his exhortation to take greater care, carried out renewed studies in the texts of the Froben edition as a background for their condemnation (cf. Blockx: 1958, 115–117). The excerpts, however, took on considerable importance when they were used with the final versions from Leuven and Cologne in connection with the working out of the papal bull of excommunication, in 1520 (Blockx: 1958, 66 and note 181). We have mentioned that the Cologne theologians returned directly from their meeting with Cajetan and put together their condemnation text, dated August 30th 1519. This text was subsequently delivered in Leuven on October 12th by Jacob Hochstraaten (cf. Blockx: 1958, 80, note 57), who also brought a query from Cologne to Leuven, as to whether they wanted to accede to the criticism. He also carried with him a copy of the letter Erasmus had written to Luther on May 30th, in which Erasmus spoke positively of Luther’s cause and told him how many supporters he had, among them the bishop of Li8ge, Erard de la Marck.56 By publishing this letter in Leuven Hochstraaten revived the rumour connecting Erasmus and Luther,57 coloured by a rumour that the bishop in whose diocese Leuven fell was supposed to be pro-Luther. Hochstraaten in a word added fuel to the flames to get the theologians at Leuven up in arms, at which he succeeded.

56 Cf. Erasmus’ letter of Nov. 1519, Ep. 1038,15–16, in Erasmus: 1922, 112. 57 Erasmus had been reconciled with the Leuven theologians in September 1519 (Ep. 1022, in Erasmus: 1922, 85f), presumably on Briard’s initiative (cf. Erasmus, 1987, XI/Blockx: 1958, 30).

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3.3.2 Erasmus’ letter to Albrecht of Brandenburg Although Erasmus was a member of the theological faculty of Leuven, he was entirely ignorant of their working on the condemnations. He therefore did not know the true reason for Hochstraaten’s visit. But when he realized, and when the resentment against him at the same time flared up again and his being linked with Luther was again a reality, he retorted. On October 19th he wrote a letter to Albert of Brandenburg to plead Luther’s case, and hence indirectly his own.58 The choice of Albert was well made. He was the primate of the German Church, and known for supporting bonae literae. If Erasmus could win him for his views it would considerably hamper his opponents. In the letter Erasmus links Luther’s case and bonae literae to ensure Albrecht’s attention.59 In addition, he levels a strong lance at all the evils that in his opinion exist in the contemporary Church and theology : human traditions, scholastic theology, the tyranny of the mendicant orders, poor preachers, the dominance of ceremony, and so on. Nor does he spare the commercial aspect of the system of indulgences. But he takes great care not to involve the Pope in these animadversions, instead accusing a number of his subordinates, Cajetan, Prierias and others, of a want of moderation. Even though he is reluctant to praise Luther, the reader cannot doubt that he pleads that Luther should not be condemned. Thus even Luther, who was otherwise aware of the limits of Erasmus’ affection, was satisfied with the letter (no. 242, WA B 1, 619,14–17). It was the only one Erasmus wrote about Luther for a long time, but nevertheless it came to be one of the most important documents in the Luther case in the winter of 1519–1520. Erasmus had probably not wanted to have it printed, but Ulrich von Hutten, whom he asked to bring the letter to Albrecht, ensured that it was. It was brought out in several editions, including in German, and because of its content and large readership Erasmus now suddenly – and against his will – came to figure as one of the most considerable supporters of Luther for some time.

3.3.3 Putting together the condemnation in Leuven Immediately after Hochstraaten’s visit, the University of Leuven, fired with enthusiasm for a condemnation of Luther, sent a delegation of three masters to Li8ge to find out if the information about Erasmus’ letter to Luther of 58 In 1523 Erasmus admits that he wrote the letter to Albrecht “contra clamores theologorum lovaniensium in Lutherum”; cf. Grane: 1994, 171. 59 Grane: 1994, 171–172, briefly presents the letter.

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May 30th 1519 had any foundation in fact.60 To their query the bishop protested that he knew neither Luther’s person nor his theology, and at the same time offered his help in connection with the condemnation. He had previously taken part in the fight against heresy, for example in connection with the Reuchlin dispute, and he now emphasized in his answer to the Leuven theologians that the Reuchlin dispute had in a way been a success in the sense that a condemnation had been brought about from five universities, but that one thing had been lacking to make it really efficacious: the stamp of authority, i. e. a positive statement and backing from some strong ecclesiastical authority. He therefore advised the theologians to look to Adrian of Utrecht for support, since his was a weighty voice and he would of course furthermore be favourably disposed to his old faculty. After the meeting with Erard de la Marck, and after renewed and careful studies of the works of Luther in the Froben edition and meetings in which the case was debated, the Leuven theologians on November 7th 1519 produced a doctrinal denunciation of Luther’s works, sending both that and probably also the excerpts made that Spring to Adrian in Spain for his guidance and acceptance.61 On December 4th he gave the condemnation his unreserved support.

3.3.4 The content of the two condemnation texts and Adrian’s letter Both the condemnation from Cologne and the one from Leuven, as we have seen, rested on renewed scrutiny of the Froben edition, and in conclusion censured it and issued what the denunciators called a doctrinal condemnation (condemnatio doctrinalis) of Luther’s works. Here they urged that the works should be forbidden and burned, and that the author should retract them. The expression doctrinalis emphasized that the condemnations were proper to a scholarly, universitarian and not an ecclesiastical context (cf. Blockx: 1958, 119– 120). Formally, there is a considerable difference between the two condemnation texts. In both, the very elaborate form adopted for the excerpts, first quoting from Luther and then adducing a theological qualification and evaluation, had been discarded. The condemnation from Leuven still consisted of a number of 60 Latomus specifically comments on the visit to Erard de la Marck in his letter of dedication to Rodolphus of Monckedam (LR, 278/a2v,2–17). Blockx even suggests that Latomus may have taken part in the meeting with the bishop, since he gives such a detailed account of it, see Blockx: 1958, 96. 61 It is a matter of discussion whether the denunciation was passed by a unanimous collegium strictum, or whether Dorp kept out of it, perhaps to join his faculty later ; cf. De Jongh: 1911, 214–215; Grane: 1994, 194 and note 20.

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direct quotations from some of the works of Luther found in the Froben edition, whereas in Cologne they chose instead to enumerate in their own language Luther’s supposed heretical failings. Even though it is possible to explain the formal difference by reference to the fact that the exhortation in Adrian’s letter not to misquote Luther had only come to Leuven, this explanation is not likely to be correct, since the excerpts which originally came from Leuven also consisted of direct quotations, and they had been drawn up before the condemnation from Cologne was penned. Accordingly, we must presume that the differences in form between the documents were caused by the freedom that existed at the time to form this kind of text according to the authors’ taste and convictions. But although the form of the two texts differed, the methods were identical. In both it is emphasized that the university professors have a special duty to protect Christian doctrine, and that that is the task they here intend to undertake. This was entirely consistent with the general perception of the role of the theological faculties as contributory to discharging the teaching office of the church, which Latomus touched upon in the Dialogue. In the Leuven condemnation it is phrased thus: Though any Christian of course is bound to defend the faith and the holy doctrine for Christ, to whom they have given the name, and to whose sacrament they are bound, it is manifest that those who the profession of holy Theology is attached to in a more specific way are under greater obligation. They should be able in deed and speech, with the aid of the holy doctrine, to refute its opponents and stand like a wall around the house of Israel.62

It is important, however, to be aware of the fact that the university professors were only supposed to attend to a part of the teaching office. They had an advisory function only, not the final power to decide and determine the content of the revelation. The latter task fell to the leaders of the Church and preeminently the Pope. That is why the character of the university theologians’ denunciation is a doctrinal, doctrinalis, condemnation and a preliminary preparation for the Pope’s final condemnation, which is legal, judicalis.

62 WA 6, 175,16–19: “Quamvis omnes omnino Christiani ad fidei et sacrae doctrinae defensionem Christo, cui nomen dederunt et cuius sacramento ligantur, sint astricti, ad id tamen obligatiores esse constat, quos sacrae theologiae professio specialius stringit. Istos enim oportet esse potentes in opere et sermone, ut per sacram doctrinam contradicentes redarguant et pro domo Israel se murum opponant.”

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3.3.5 Leuven’s condemnation Having accused Luther’s works of being devoid of references to philosophical authority and of not referring to any theological authority within the last four hundred years (WA 6, 176,4–6), the theologians at Leuven enumerate examples of Luther’s heretical views in thirteen points, emphasizing at the end of the document that this is only a selection of the many heresies in his work.63 The first heretical view they adduce is that Luther insists that “opus bonum optime factum est peccatum veniale” (“every good deed well done is a forgivable sin”).64 The second is, that Luther in the same spirit challenges the accepted idea of thesaurus ecclesiae, concluding that because saints do less than they ought in any good deed, and because no saint has lived this life without sin, the merits of the saints are not present in a surplus which can accrue to others. Luther thus wants to make it clear that the merit of the saints is not such that it can be passed on to others, as was the idea in the medieval concept of “the treasure of the Church”. Luther even says that the saints also, in connection with their merits, need the forgiving mercy. And not only does he mean this when he says it, the Leuven theologians write, but he claims it in an assertive way, and declares himself willing to suffer both burning at the stake and execution to defend the truth of it.65 They furthermore denounce Luther’s way of speaking of indulgences, insofar as he says that indulgences are only a means of forgiveness for the punishments 63 WA 6, 175,11–178,23. Though this text could be dealt with in much greater depth, it is here done only briefly, as it only serves as a necessary introduction to the dispute between Latomus and Luther, and does not constitute the major part of this study. In the following, reference is made to the 13 points as they are found in the text of the denunciation, and not always identical with Luther’s actual views. The Luther text to which each of the points of the denunciation presumably refers is indicated in the note for reference. 64 Cf. WA 1, 608,4–16. The quotation is from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 58: “[Thezauri Ecclesiae, unde Papa dat indulgentias] Nec sunt merita Christi et sanctorum, quia semper sine Papa operantur gratiam hominis interioris et crucem, mortem infernumque exterioris” (“[The treasures of the church out of which the pope gives indulgences] are not merits of Christ or the Saints, for they always, without the Pope, work grace for the inner man, and cross, death and hell for the outer man”). 65 Cf. WA 1, 607,17–21, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 58, see previous note; WA 1, 623,8–10 from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 76: “Dicimus contra, quod veniae papales nec minimum venialium peccatorum tollere possint quo ad culpam” (“In contrast we think that papal forgiveness cannot remove even the least of the venial sins, as far as guilt is concerned”); WA 1, 515,24–32 from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 9th og 10th commandment: “Non concupisces domum proximi tui, nec desiderabis uxorem eius, non servum, non ancillam, non bovem, non asinum, nec omnia quae illius sunt” (“You shall not covet your neighbour’s house, nor covet your neighbour’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is your neighbour’s”).

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imposed by priests or by canon law. They find his statement in the explanation to the Ninety-five Theses very self-contradictory, because here, according to them, he on the one hand claims that the ecclesiastic office and canon law cannot be a go-between between God and man via indulgences, and on the other hand states, with reference to Matt 16:19, that the ecclesiastical office is necessary and indispensable.66 As a fourth point the theologians accuse Luther, in his doctrine of penitence, of holding the opinion that “without God’s grace, which first forgives the trespass, man cannot be given the promise that he can ask forgiveness either.”67 And as the fifth, that in connection with the receiving of the sacraments Luther refutes the scholastic idea that the sacraments work if the receiver refrains from “bolting the door”.68 Point number six is that Luther’s understanding of repentance is also quite incomprehensible to the scholastics. Here he advises the penitent to scrutinize his conscience and ask if he would have done penance and confessed his sins if the command of confession of sins had not existed. Because when he finds out that he would have done neither, he will realize that his desired penitence is not a result of his love of God, but only a result of habit or fear of the command.69 According to the Leuven theologians it is also heresy that Luther emphasizes that the only thing essential to the reception of the sacramental forgiveness in penitence is faith in Christ as God’s word, Him who said: “and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt 16:19). Luther emphasizes that “you have what you believe”, and thus declares that the effect of the sacrament depends neither on the receiver’s deeds, the quantity or quality of his repentance, nor on the priest, but only on the receiver’s belief in forgiveness.70 He 66 Cf. WA 1, 569,15–40, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 20: “Igitur Papa per remissionem plenariam omnium poenarum non simpliciter omnium intelligit, sed a seipso tantummodo positarum” (“Therefore, by total remission of all penalties the Pope does not understand all penalties as such, but only the ones he himself has imposed”). 67 WA 6, 176,21–23: “quod sine gratia dei primo remittente culpam, nec votum remissionis quaerendae homo habere potest.” Cf. WA 1, 540,4–7, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 7: “Nulli prorsus remittit deus culpam, quin simul eum subiiciat in omnibus humiliatum sacerdoti suo vicario” (“God forgives nobody his trespass without at the same time submitting him, humbled in every way, to his deputy the priest”). 68 Cf. WA 1, 544,33–41, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 7: see the previous note; WA 1, 324,8–11 from Sermo de Poenitentia. 69 Cf. WA 1, 321,7–15, from Sermo de Poenitentia. 70 Cf. WA 1, 323,23–26.32–34; 324,2–3, from Sermo de poenitentia; WA 1, 543,7–30, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 7: see above; WA 1, 594,37– 595,5 from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 38: “Remissio tamen et participatio Papae nullo modo est contemnenda, quia (ut dixi) est declaratio remissionis divinae” (“Nevertheless the Pope’s forgiveness and participation should in no way be despised, for it is (as I have said) an announcement of the divine forgiveness”).

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says the same in connection with the Eucharist,71 and as a consequence he rejects as absurd any idea, including all commands of canon law, of confessing every sin committed in order to be cleansed of all evil and become worthy of receiving the sacramental gift.72 What Luther claims – point nine of the denunciation – is that it is not necessary to enumerate all our sins, as it is impossible to know them all, and no one is commanded to do the impossible.73 In this context the Leuven theologians now add some examples from the Sermon on Penitence and the Ten Commandments Interpreted for the People, to show that Luther says that there are mortal sins, such as sloth and false witness, which it is not necessary to confess to the priest. To them such a statement is completely meaningless. Point ten is that the Leuven theologians understand that Luther speaks quite erroneously of the true satisfaction. He says that after God has given forgiveness for sin he metes out no punishment that can be either removed or lessened by a priest, because a punishment that the priest can change has no validity in relation to divine justice, and if there is a punishment which is valid in relation to divine justice, it cannot be removed by man, for that, says Luther, would be as if man could “change divine law”.74 The Leuven theologians go on in point eleven of the condemnation to attack Luther for saying, of the law, that God has commanded the impossible, since His command holds man to the fact that he must not have one jot of sin. But man does have a jot of sin all his life, and therefore man always sins and is an idolater. Because if man observed the command, Luther says, there would be no sin, only peace, joy and love, and that, of course, is not the case. Such a perfect life, in 71 Cf. WA 1, 331,5–17, from Sermo de digna praeparatione Cordis pro suscipiendo Sacramento Eucharistiae. 72 The Leuven theologians here mention two provisions in canon law with which Luther is at odds. 1. “Quem poeni.” derives from Decretum Gratiani (Friedberg: 1959, I, 1188) and says that the penitent must do penance in every way, cry in pain, lay open his life before God via the priest, and pre-empt God’s judgement through confession etc. 2. “Omnis utriusque sexus, de pe. et re.” is from Gregory IX’s decretals, (Friedberger II, p 887) and says that after their confirmation both sexes must go to confession with their own priest, endeavour to do penance for the penalties imposed on them, and at least at Easter participate in the Eucharist, and if those things are neglected it will lead to excommunication from the Church and a refusal of Christian burial. 73 Cf. WA 1, 322,22–323,9, from Sermo de Poenitentia; WA 1, 521,15–32 from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 9th and 10th commandments, see above; WA 1, 514,14– 36 from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 8th commandment: “Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium” (“You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour”). 74 WA 6, 177,21: “hoc esset mutare ius divinum”. Cf. WA 1, 536,17–25 from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 5: “Papa non vult nec potest remittere ullas poenas praeter eas, quas vel suo vel canonum arbitrio imposuit” (“The Pope neither can nor will remit any punishments beyond the ones he imposes in his own right or through canon law”).

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observation of the law, man cannot even hope for in this life, and thus he will remain a sinner and offender. He can only be saved by not ignoring or denying the trespass.75 The Leuven theologians regard it as reprehensible that Luther says that moral virtues and speculative sciences are sins and errors because they stem from an evil heart which has not yet been healed by grace.76 Finally, as the thirteenth point, they indict the understanding of purgatory in which Luther claims that the sinners in purgatory sin incessantly because they fear the punishments and covet peace.77 They conclude by stating that Luther distorts the Holy Scripture and tradition in his attempt to argue his case. On these grounds they find that his works are dangerous for the holy community of believers and are at variance from the true doctrine, doctrina, and therefore condemn them to be removed and burned, and their author to retract their content (WA 6, 178,4–12). It is not difficult to see what the theologians in Leuven fear. Even though the attack is formed a little differently from the excerpts, it tilts at the same targets: Luther’s undercutting of the papal church, in pursuit of his criticism of scholastic theology. It is quite impossible for them to understand Luther’s concepts of sin and righteousness and the consequences they must have for how the church is viewed. From their perspective his theology means a nullification of the difference between good and evil: a relativization of the seriousness of and commitment to the true and god-fearing human life, and of the role of the church in that connection, as the guardian of the true doctrine. In addition, the Leuven theologians, as also in relation to the humanists, are no doubt anxious that their own positions will be eroded – an inevitable consequence of Luther’s cause.

3.3.6 Cologne’s condemnation In Cologne, as we have mentioned, they chose to sum up a number of points on which Luther was regarded as heretical, instead of quoting directly from his own texts. As there is also great agreement with Leuven’s condemnation as regards 75 Cf. WA 1, 649,1–13, from Ad Dialogus Silvestrii; WA 1, 515,9–17 and 24–28 from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 9th and 10th commandments, see above; WA 1, 429,12–21 and 399,11 from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 1st commandment: “Non habebis deos alienos” (“You shall have no other gods before me”). 76 Cf. WA 1, 427,15–428,4, from Decem Praecepta witenbergensi Populo praedicata, the 1st commandment, see the previous note. 77 Cf. WA 1, 562,13–17, from Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute, art. 18: “Nec probatum videtur ullis aut rationibus aut scripturi, quod sunt extra statum meriti seu augendae charitatis” (“It does not seem to have been proved by anyone, either by reason or the Scriptures, that they are outside the state in which the merit or augmentation of love can take place”).

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the points denounced, a reading of the Cologne condemnation is an excellent way of summing up the accusations brought forward by the Leuven theologians. The theologians at Cologne state that Luther’s works contain various errors and many doctrines which are foreign to the Church Fathers (WA 6, 178,24– 180,30). They especially mention that Luther regards people’s meritorious deeds to be in jeopardy, as if they could not take place without sin, and that he perverts the Scriptures and the Church Fathers, that he annuls the sacrament of penitence, presents scandalous fallacies regarding repentance, understands the Creed quite differently than the church and the tradition, does away with the possibility of any kind of satisfaction for mortal guilt, since it is God in whose eyes, as Luther says, the sin is mortal and who therefore also always remits the punishment deserved. Furthermore they accuse Luther of – on an obscene basis – annulling the tax of indulgences, which is even decreed by the Fathers and by councils, for spreading false doctrine on the punishment in purgatory, and finally for refuting the Roman Church’s privilege and primacy over all the other churches in the world, and impudently lessening the power of the Pope, since Luther declares that he can only order canonical punishment and not punish according to divine law. In addition to all this, the Cologne theologians write, the Froben edition contains many more and much more scandalous things, and therefore it has been decided to censure and denounce Luther’s works as is due and proper. There is one central difference in content between the two condemnations. It is only in the Cologne condemnation that the threat against the Pope’s primacy is mentioned directly. We may ask if this is significant or not: did they support the Pope more in Cologne than in Leuven?78 In a letter to Zwingli, presumably written immediately after the Leuven condemnation, November 7th 1519, but not published until early in 1521, Wilhelm Nesen wrote explicitly that it had not offended the Leuven theologians so much that Luther did not praise the Holy See, because they did not think too highly of the Pope themselves (Blockx: 1958, 121 and note 108). And in the pamphlet Acta academiae Lovaniensis contra Lutherum of the autumn of 1520, which was presumably written by Erasmus against the threat of the bull of excommunication from Rome and against all Luther’s enemies, it is also said that the Leuven theologians refrain from denouncing Luther’s statement that the papal office is not divinely instituted, and 78 Cf. Blockx: 1958, 121–123. Blockx here mentions both Kalkoff (1905) and De Jongh (1911) which both take a stand in the matter. The former concludes on the strength of the pamphlet Acta academiae Lovaniensis contra Lutherum, that the non-ecclesiastical theologians who were most highly regarded at the faculty of Leuven had declared that nothing Luther wrote against the papacy was to be touched. De Jongh, on the contrary, maintains the contrary, believing that he can demonstrate that all the theologians in Leuven maintained the divine authority of the Holy See.

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that in that way they declare themselves in agreement with him in this matter (Blockx: 1958, 121 and note 109). However, it is likely that Leuven’s failure to denounce Luther’s criticism of the papacy is mentioned in the two lampoons more as a wish of smearing the Leuven faculty for holding pro-Lutheran views than to describe the case as it actually was. In a study of the dogma of the papacy’s primacy at Leuven in the 16th century (cf. Blockx: 1958, 121 and note 114; Leroi: 1949, 25) – to be more precise, a study of the views of three theologians (Driedo, van Sichem and Latomus, who all had seats in the collegium strictum of the faculty at the time of the condemnation) – it is shown that the dogma of the Pope’s divine authority was unequivocally maintained by them all. The difference between the two condemnations in this case therefore does not seem to have an essential but a formal cause. Because the Cologne faculty sums up instead of quoting directly, it is easier for them to write in so many words that Luther turns against the primacy of the papacy. If we look at what concrete example is given of Luther’s deprecation of the Pope, it is the same in the two condemnations: the declaration that he cannot “change divine law”.

3.3.7 Adrian’s letter The recommendation obtained by the theologians at Leuven from Adrian of Utrecht on December 4th was unreserved. His letter praises the masters for taking measures against such a blatantly heretical and erroneous doctrine and for proving its seductive falseness by issuing a condemnatory censure in accordance with Luke 11:23: “he who is not with me is against me.” He only exhorts them to make sure that they have quoted correctly from Luther’s works, and then points to a passage in the evaluation where he thinks a copying error must have occurred. Instead of “it would be the same as changing (mutare/ immutare) divine law” (cf. WA 6, 177,21), Luther’s text should probably have read “it would be the same as copying (imitare) divine law”, for as Adrian writes: If man, trusting to divine authority, were not to be able to remove the obligation which springs from divine or natural law, a dispensation in connection with promises, oaths and other obligations, whatever the cause of the remittance, could never be valid either, which is clearly erroneous and contrary to the whole constitution of the Church.79

79 WA 6, 174,32–175,4: “si homo ne divina quidem autoritate fretus tollere posset obligationem de iure divino et naturae ortam, nec unquam valeret dispensatio in votis, iuramentis et aliis ex quacunque causa relaxativa obligationis contractae. Quod manifeste falsum est et omni ecclesiae constitutioni contrarium.”

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In a subsequent letter to Spalatin of March 26th 1520 Luther writes that he did not read Adrian’s accompanying letter more carefully before he wrote his rejoinder to the condemnations, “because he, of everyone, writes in the most ungodly way that the divine and natural law are to be placed in the hands of men with divine authority”.80

3.4

Luther’s rejoinder to the condemnations

Before the Leuven theologians published their condemnation in Leuven, they sent a copy to Cologne in January 1520, and subsequently the condemnations from both universities and Adrian’s letter were printed and published in February.81 As early as March 19th Luther mentions them, and less than ten days after, on March 27th, he had produced a rejoinder, formed as a letter of dedication to the jurist and diocesan dean Christoffer Blank in Wittenberg.82 It was printed in an edition with the two condemnations and Adrian’s letter. Luther no doubt addressed the letter to the humanists, his allies in the fight against the scholastics. It is a very ironic and polemical, almost insolent text, but written in a beautiful and well-turned humanist Latin, and interspersed with references to classical writers.

3.4.1 Criticism of the method of the condemnations In his answer Luther deals with the masters’ concrete points of accusation only in the second part. All of the first part is a general accusation of the method used in the condemnation. Luther must have been very surprised that the theologians of Leuven and Cologne seemed not to have heard any of what had happened in the last couple of years before 1520. In spite of the fact that the most important subject since Luther’s fight against scholasticism began – the question of how and on what grounds to argue for and preserve the cause of theology – had most certainly been discussed and emphasized in the previous years, mainly because of the meetings with Cajetan and Eck, despite all that the theologians at Leuven and Cologne were clearly unaffected by them and acted as they always had. They judged and denounced by virtue of their understanding of the indisputable 80 WA B 2, 273,10–12 (9–14): “qui omnium Impiissime scribit ius divinum & naturale esse in manu hominis utentis diuina autoritate”. 81 About the printing history of the denunciations, cf. De Jongh: 1911, 221, and Blockx: 1958, 133. 82 Christoffer Blank from Ulm was a licentiate in both civil and canon law, and dean in the Allerheiligenstift. Cf. WA B 2, 73.

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authority of the magisterial university office, without producing reasons or arguments at all.83 Instead of reasoning based on argument and authorities, says Luther, they speak exclusively on the basis of their own ideas and opinions and of human laws (WA 6, 184,37ff). They simply proclaim: “We are the excellent masters and theologians of the nourishing university. Whatever we might declare is Gospel, and whatever we might denounce is heresy.”84 So the two universities have learned nothing from their failure in their process against Reuchlin (WA 6, 181,17–18), Luther says, and now they even try to rehabilitate their good reputation by attacking Luther with the same erroneous and ineffective method they used against him (WA 6, 184,1–7). Luther, who himself took such pains to argue properly with Eck, is so affected by seeing their work that indeed he would rather weep than write (WA 6, 182,12–14). Yet he feels duty bound to answer, because it constitutes a danger to the people that they are forced to have that kind of mentors through life (WA 6, 181,21–23; 182,31; 185,8–9). His task must primarily be to deprive the masters of their confidence in their own decisions, and show them what a sound foundation it takes to believe a man who is generally wrong in what he proclaims. In this respect he calls attention to the fact that in the course of time the universities and the masters have maintained quite a number of things that they have later retracted (WA 6, 182,31–183,2). To exemplify he enumerates a great many people, Ockham, Pico della Mirandola, Lorenzo Valla and Reuchlin, who have all been attacked by the universities, and some of whom after a while have been the object of new studies, and have sometimes even been accepted as orthodox Christians. Given this fact, Luther says, who can believe previous and present pronouncements and denunciations from these places and these men? They were in the wrong, too, when they persecuted for instance Hieronymus of Prague and Johan Hus, and when they today persecute LeFevre d’Etaples or Erasmus. They have obviously tried to create and abide by their own truth, and thus suppressed the real truth (WA 6, 183,9–11). In connection with the Reuchlin case Luther first thought that it was caused by human frailty, but now he is certain that something worse is afoot. It can only be the kingdom of Antichrist which, as a result of God’s wrath, so blatantly tries to rise against the truth and suppress God’s word (WA 6, 181,10–21; 182,2–9). Instead of the method they use in their condemnation, the theologians should either, in relation to Luther, have fulfilled the law of charity or the ordinary Christian disciplinary procedure. Had they followed the law of charity, they would simply have let people know that Luther’s works, as the human works they 83 Regarding their plea of authority, cf. WA 6, 189,5–17. 84 WA 6, 181,29f : “Nos sumus Magistri Nostri et almae universitatis Theologi; quicquid dixerimus, Euangelium est, quicquid damnaverimus, haeresis est.”

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are, contain dangerous and incomprehensible passages against which they must be on their guard. And had they chosen to follow ordinary Christian disciplinary law, as they did in the beginning against Reuchlin, they would have tried first to warn and chastise Luther in private letters to make him explain himself or give up his perversity. Only if this did not improve the situation could they allow themselves to take action (WA 6, 185,25–36; 186,24–29). But magistri nostri do neither. Apparently they want to set Luther right in the same way, says Luther, as the man who, when he wanted to pull his brother out of a quagmire, made him sink in deeper and suffocated him (WA 6, 187,1–2). As a counterbalance to the scholastics’ lack of argumentation, Luther in several instances mentions that proper argumentation rests on “scripturae auctoritas aut ratio probabilis” (WA 6, 184,37, and 194,38–39), on biblical authority and good argument.85 What this means will be evident when we consider how Luther himself argues in the text. He primarily cites the Bible as an authority. As an example can be mentioned the references to Ps 19:13 (“who knows the hidden things”),to Jer 17:9 (“The heart is deceitful above all things and beyond cure”), and Jer 10:23 (“it is not for man to direct his steps”), where he deals with the sinfulness of man and rejects the idea of confessing every sin committed (WA 6, 193,37ff). That Luther also argues with the aid of ratio probabilis, and that in this context it can be understood as what can be concluded according to ordinary common sense, and references to history, seems clear in the following examples from the text. He for example refers to common assumptions which are in accordance with common sense when he argues against the absurdity of scholastic usage. He accuses the scholastics of inventing an entirely new grammar which follows rules quite different from those found in generally accepted usage (WA 6, 191,38– 192,11). Their motivation, according to Luther, is that they want to follow only 85 Zur Mühlen: 1995b, 154–158: In Luther we find the traditional basic difference between on the one hand ratio = proof and cause, and on the other ratio = man’s ability to obtain knowledge. It is ratio in the first of the two senses Luther uses in this text: ratio as a rational discourse, with special reference to the distinction between auctoritas and ratio. Here, according to zur Mühlen, ratio covers both the dialectical method of demonstration and its premises, whereas auctoritas – from the period of the Leipzig disputation and on – is the Scriptures. The connection between the two, then, is that ratio is “ein sie [i. e. Scripture] interpretierendes Schlussverfahren” (157). A good example of this simultaneous division and connection is the text from the Diet of Worms on “testimoniis scripturarum aut ratione evidente”. “Ratio bedeutet in diesem Zusammenhang das klare, logische Schlussverfahren auf Grund von Sätzen der Hl. Schrift als Prämissen theologischer Argumentation” (158). But beyond that, ratio is sometimes allowed to play a greater role in relation to the authority, as actually happens in the above text. Zur Mühlen further says: “Über diese instrumentale Funktion der ratio hinaus kann Luther im Zusammenhang der Unterscheidung von Hl. Schrift und ratio letzterer noch eine die Schriftaussagen bestätigende Funktion einräumen” (158).

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their own idea of what is meaningful. If their personal interests do not harmonize with the generally accepted notion of what makes sense, they simply deny this general understanding and create their own sense with the help of a new language. One example is the Cologne theologians’ discourse on Luther’s heresy in connection with indulgences. In that connection they refer to indulgences having been defined in a council decision. But whereas the council maintains that indulgence exists, Luther is concerned with what it exists as, and therefore the Cologne theologians must break the rules of ordinary usage and exchange the expression “if something is” (si est) for the expression “what something is” (quid est) in order to be able to connect the information about the council with Luther (WA 6, 191,38–192,11). That Luther also argues with the help of history is seen in the attempt to call attention to the fallibility of his detractors, and consequently of their right to judge, by enumerating all the historical persons who have been ill-treated by the universities.

3.4.2 Using philosophy In Luther’s eyes one of the serious accusations against him is the accusation of lacking philosophical authority in his texts. He primarily claims to be immediately able to see straight through this accusation. The real reason why the theologians accuse him of this is that they fear the threat to the existence of their own faculty (WA 6, 187,26). But he then goes on to state that it is not him but his detractors who show a lack of philosophical authority (WA 6, 187,37–188,29). The truth of the matter is that when they talk about philosophy they in fact talk of something else. According to Luther philosophy is not a question of discussing things, like substance, movement, eternity, time, place and emptiness in a competitive way as it is in the scholastic world (WA 6, 188,19–20), but something which “helps and supports man’s understanding, feelings and common habits”.86 For their own purpose, Luther says, the scholastics therefore introduce something they call philosophy, which is not philosophy but daydreams and errors. As their philosophical authority they mostly refer to Aristotle in whom, according to Luther, there is little philosophy. And if there is any, the scholastics do not understand it but distort it to make it fit their own ideas. He emphasizes that he is wellequipped to accuse them of it, since, as everybody knows, he is educated in and familiar with their way of understanding things. The scholastic concept of 86 WA 6, 188,21–22: “talia [i. e. the scholastics’ concept of philosophy], quae nec intellectum, nec affectum nec communes hominum mores quicquam iuvent”.

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philosophy, according to him, must be corrected, and supposing it is understood in their sense, teaching it must certainly only aim at enabling people to communicate with the tyrants who use that way of thinking and expressing themselves. As a conclusion to the first part of his rejoinder to the condemnations, Luther again emphasizes how much arrogance it takes to simply get up and say “we condemn”, damnamus. The masters think they are like the sixty warriors in the Song of Solomon 3:7–8 (cf. the denunciation from Cologne, WA 6, 179,1–5), who, swords at their side, watch against the dangers of the night. They think it is their special task to maintain the true faith and wipe out errors, and armed for battle they look around greedily, and yet cannot say anything but “we denounce according to doctrine”, damnamus doctrinaliter. Are then, he asks, the sword at their side and the Holy Scripture identical with the words damnamus and doctrinaliter in Cologne and Leuven? That was the kind of magistri whom Eck wanted to evaluate the disputation in Leipzig, and of course Luther feared that, because he was well aware of their ignorance and impudence. He had realized who would benefit from an evaluation by such people, who had nothing in their mouth but “we condemn” (damnamus), instead of “we prove” (probamus) (WA 6, 189,38–42).

3.4.3 Sin and good deeds, indulgences and the sacraments Luther now proceeds to defend himself against some of the other accusations, but not all, because, as he says, he does not want to write a new explanation such as he wrote for the Ninety-five Theses. The next concrete accusation, after the one concerning philosophy and that of not citing theological authorities from the last four hundred years (WA 6, 190,17–25), concerns Luther’s understanding of sin and good deeds (WA 6, 190,26–191,16; cf. accusations nos. 1 and 2 in the Leuven condemnation). By denouncing Luther’s opinion in this instance, Luther says, the masters also stamp Isa 64:5ff as heretical,87 and it does not make very good sense, since the main argument of their accusation is that he distorts Scripture, while only they understand it in the right way.88 And when asked how they prove it, they only lift their hands and enjoin silence and say : “It is sufficient that we have expressed 87 This is one of the three scriptural passages which play a prominent role in the dispute between Latomus and Luther. 88 In the condemnation from Cologne, this accusation is directly connected with the accusation of distorting Scripture. In the condemnation from Leuven, however, the accusation of distorting the Scriptures is found at the end of the document and in that way relates to all the accusations.

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our opinion.”89 Of course Luther cannot at all accept this kind of argument, and he again emphasizes what the Leuven theologians stated in their condemnation, that he would expose himself to both death at the stake and execution for his understanding of sin and good deeds. He will also persist in maintaining that those who teach otherwise are heretical. He has never denied, as claimed by the Leuven theologians in point two, that one can be aided by the merits and prayers of the saints even though they are imperfect. His point in this context, however, is that these merits and prayers cannot be conveyed to man through man’s free will. They can only be so through the power of faith, hope and charity, the communion of saints, which can be bestowed by any priest or brother through the service of the word (WA 6, 191,10ff). As regards the rejection of his understanding of indulgence Luther, as mentioned above, states that even though the existence of indulgence had been determined by a council decision, it is nowhere written how we are to understand it (WA 6, 191,17–192, 22; cf. accusation no. 3 in the Leuven condemnation). The task, therefore, is to find out and define not that but what indulgence is, and that is what Luther has tried to do in his disputations on the matter. The misunderstanding that has to be cleared away is that of believing indulgence to be something that has an influence on eternal matters (WA 6, 192,10–13). Indulgence is not a remedy for the anxious conscience and to that extent a substitute for faith in Christ (WA 6, 191,31). According to Luther it only deals with earthly things, i. e. the punishments which have been defined by priests or canon law, and it has nothing to do with the question of redemption (WA 6, 191,18–19). Luther’s rejection of the doctrine that the promise of forgiveness can be received by man even if the forgiving grace has not yet been bestowed; his rejection of the scholastic way of speaking of “bolting the door” (ponere obicem), when taking part in the sacraments; and his rejection of the requirement to confess every sin committed to be cleansed and worthy of receiving the sacrament of forgiveness (cf. accusations nos. 4, 5, 6 and 8), his rejection of all three has to be seen as arising from his understanding of original sin and man’s lack of free will, i. e. his possibility of turning to God of his own accord. Luther stresses that since both he and the scholastics actually teach that everything is sin that happens without the presence of divine love, there really ought not to be any disagreement about these things. It makes any distinction regarding a “moving grace” and distinctions within the concept of caritas devoid of meaning. But unfortunately the scholastics do not seem to grasp this (WA 6, 193,13–20). Luther therefore characterizes both the “Thomists”, as he calls them, at Cologne and the “Scotists” at Leuven as Pelagians, because they hold on to their erro-

89 WA 6, 191,2: “Satis est, Diximus sentimentum nostrum.”

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neous doctrines, and he calls attention to the fact that they do not even agree with each other about the doctrine of sacraments (WA 1, 193,4–9). If there is any good reason why he specifically makes Cologne Thomist and Leuven Scotist, it can hardly be recovered definitively. In Cologne the via antiqua had always been dominant, and in the wake of the visits of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, especially Thomism, led by the Dominicans, was in a strong position. So even though in principle there had been freedom of teaching since 1434, for both the via antiqua and the via moderna, it is in some sense correct that Luther labels the Cologne faculty Thomist (cf. TRE, “Köln”). There are clear signs that the faculty at Leuven also had been influenced by the via antiqua (Van Eijl: 1977, 72, note 8; 1975, 227; Ptienne: 1956, 94–95; De Jongh: 1911, 81–82). Some of the first professors in the place, who went there after having studied in Paris, may have been Nominalists, but the most influential professors had been found in Cologne and presumably brought the affiliation with the via antiqua with them (Van Eijl: 1977, 72, note 8). University regulations can be found, that nobody was to teach the doctrines of Buridan, Marsilius of Padua or Ockham, and annually repeated decisions from the faculty of arts that Aristotle must be interpreted in a realistic, not in a nominalistic way (The University of Leuven: 1976, 136). The character of the teaching at the faculty of arts naturally had influence on which philosophical tendency dominated in the theological faculty. Since we hear nothing about disputes between nominalists and realists, it is also unlikely that teaching in nominalism would have taken place (Van Eijl: 1977, 72, note 8). But not all adherents of the via antiqua in Leuven were Scotists. There is some information that Scotism was taught at the faculty. In 1446 Heinrich de Zomeren, who was professor at the faculty of arts, appealed to Scotus’ authority “which it is not for the faculty of arts to criticize” (De Jongh: 1911, 81). And about the same time, Heimerich de Campo, who was originally from Cologne, wrote a Commentary on the Sentences secundum viam Scoti.90 Walter de Conitio also offered lectura extraordinaria Scoti, seu alia in the Franciscan monastery of the town in 1503, but in all probability it was only with the Minorites that “Scoti, doctoris subtilis, doctrina tradebatur et explicatur” (De Jongh: 1911, 82). At least it would appear that the theological faculty eventually forbade its students to follow those courses. De Jongh thinks that Thomism had pride of place at the faculty, under Dominican leadership (De Jongh: 1911, 82). Already at the beginning of the 16th century a theological doctor at Leuven, Petrus Piscatoris, earned the title of Doctor (S. 90 De Jongh: 1911, 81 and note 3. De Campo, however, was probably not a confirmed Scotist – in other works he was primarily occupied with the dispute between Albertists and Thomists – but simply engaged in disputing nominalism. De Jongh refers to Hermelink (1906, 141), who ascribes an important role in the battle against nominalism to the faculty in Leuven, and especially to De Campo.

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Thomas) sancti viae archicursor praestantissimus and sancti Doctoris doctrinae armarium refertissimum. And in 1516 another doctor, Vincent Theodorici, and a compatriot of his, published the third part of Summa Theologiae in Paris (De Jongh: 1911, 82). It is very likely that De Jongh is right, since it harmonizes with the fact that from the beginning it was professors recruited in Cologne who set the tone in the faculty. Luther’s remark about the “Thomists” of Cologne and “Scotists” of Leuven therefore in all probability is not a description of the actual conditions, but more of a generalization, meant to indicate that all scholastics without exception, no matter what scholastic tendency they might represent, were in error in the matter discussed. Lastly Luther complains that the theologians have not been able to read and quote his works properly, and refers to the admonition they had received from Adrian. He has never said that at confession we should not search our conscience. But he has said that an instruction to enumerate all our sins before we can receive God’s mercy will lead the Christian into the impossible and cause him rather to trust to his own confession than to God (WA 6, 194,10–19). In conclusion Luther says that it is not worth his trouble to waste more time and space on the theologians, or that the reader should read more refutations of their condemnations (WA 6, 194,20–22). He refers to Paul (Rom 14:2) saying that the weak person eats only vegetables, and asks them not to trouble themselves more with the questions he has raised, since they are not sufficiently schooled either in Aristotle or the Bible to take part in the discussion on an equal footing (WA 6, 192,31–36). But if they will not listen, and really want to discuss with him, they must stop referring to the tradition he is already familiar with, without arguing, and must instead convince him with the help of the Bible or good arguments. He is not interested in their well-worn doctrines, but in the basis they rest on (WA 6, 194,36–39; 195,2–3). By fighting Luther with the aid of what they accuse him of, i. e. by using assertive propositions which can only be made good with force and not with argument, they have truly revealed themselves, and in fact been beneficial to his cause rather than their own (WA 6, 190,10–13). They commit the error of petitio principii, which also their own Aristotle forbids, when they answer Luther with exactly what they purport to fight: the lack of argument (WA 6, 195,1–2). In his rejoinder Luther touches upon a number of decisive points. Not only the question of sin, free will and grace, but also the two introductory themes, one on what should be the basis of a valid discussion, Scripture and good argumentation, the other on the question of what is to be understood by philosophy, are themes quite central to the dispute with scholasticism, and also to the specific dispute with Latomus. For Luther however all these things had been said to the scholastics before, which may be why his answer is no more detailed than it

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is. He does not give a detailed explanation of the important themes which have been taken up during this analysis of the rejoinder.91

3.5

The reactions to the condemnations and Luther’s rejoinder

Luther’s rejoinder was well received by its target group, the allied humanists. Zwingli writes that he has never seen anything so grand and powerful from Luther’s hand (Grane: 1994, 194 and note 16), and Martin Bucer wonders why Leuven took three months more than Cologne to issue their condemnation, seeing that all they had to offer was snake poison (Grane: 1994, 194 and note 17). Shortly after the publication of the rejoinder the Wittenberg theologian Johannes Dölsch’s pamphlet against the condemnations was printed (cf. the analysis of the pamphlet in Grane: 1994, 11–16; 194–195). It was a solid defence of Luther’s views, and was in addition notable for linking Erasmus’ and Luther’s causes. Dölsch even says that on several matters the two think alike. And finally, on April 28th, Crotus Rubeanus wrote to Luther from Bamberg where he was celebrating Easter with Ulrich von Hutten. Here they had received the condemnations and Luther’s rejoinder, and as Crotus says, they had laughed a good deal, but had also been outraged. If the universities give no reasons for their condemnation, he continues, they will come to be seen like Reuchlin’s opponents, i. e. people who dare denounce a man in public, without a previous public investigation of the matter. And finally, he ends, if Cologne and Leuven are not at all able to give reasons for their action, Luther will have been condemned lovanialiter and not doctrinaliter. Erasmus too reacted to the condemnations. In a letter to Maarten Lips in February 1520, he declares that “the tragedy they [i. e. the theologians in Leuven] now set in motion as regards Luther is both foolish and dangerous. […] No matter what Luther has written, no wise man can find pleasure in such turmoil”.92 And in a letter to Melanchthon from the middle of July he writes that he has enjoyed Luther’s rejoinder to the condemnation by his enemies in Cologne and Leuven. It has at least made them a little ashamed of having written a judgement so hastily (Ep. 1113, postscript, in Erasmus: 1922, 287f). All in all, from April 1520 Erasmus now entered what Grane terms his “second Lutheran campaign” (Grane: 1998b, 111ff; 1994, 205ff). Several of the Leuven theologians were down on him again. Briard had died in January 1520, but Latomus and 91 Because the themes are only sketchily touched upon it is difficult to say more about them than has been done here, against the background of this text material. The questions are touched on later in this study, in connection with the texts central to our thesis. 92 Ep. 1070,3–6, in Erasmus: 1922, 193: “De Lutero mouent stultam ac perniciosam tragoediam. […] Vtcunque scripsit Lutherus, certe hic tumultus nulli cordato placet.”

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Egmondanus behaved in a more and more insufferable manner to him, “one weak-sighted, the other lame”, as Erasmus mockingly characterized them,93 and by now also the Englishman Edward Lee’s polemical treatment of the second edition of his New Testament had been published. Again Luther therefore takes up a great deal of space in his letters, and again Erasmus tries to sit between two stools. On the one hand he wants to avoid uniting with their common enemies, and on the other he wants to avoid being linked directly with Luther. There were, of course, reactions to Luther’s rejoinder to the condemnations from the opposite camp also (cf. Vercruysse: 1985, 13–14). Several theologians at Leuven felt duty bound to defend their faculty. Apart from Latomus, Jan Driedo and Eustachius of Sichem wrote against Luther. Driedo’s work, which according to Erasmus was written “docte et sine affectibus” (Ep. 1164,67, in Erasmus: 1922, 393), was turned down by the printer Dirk Martens and has been lost. But Eustachius of Sichem, like Latomus, at the end of May published the work Errorum Martini Lutheri brevis Confutatio – which Luther however never answered. In the year from the publication of Luther’s rejoinder to the enactment of the dispute between Latomus and Luther in May–June 1521, a great deal happened. Firstly, the Papal bull threatening excommunication, Exsurge Domini, was being composed from the spring of 1520 and was issued on July 15th (cf. Grane: 1994, 232–237). In some instances it was based on the condemnation texts and praised Cologne and Leuven for their “non minus docta quam vera ac sancta confutatio, reprobatio et damnatio” (Grane: 1994, 233, note 4). What is really supposed to be the governing idea of the bull is difficult to ascertain, but in fact that is not an essential point. The crux of the matter is the lack of argument of which, like the condemnations, it was guilty. Several of the reactions to it from Luther’s adherents called attention to this particular aspect. The jurist Bonifacius Amerbach, who was professionally interested in the procedure behind the threat of excommunication, declared that the method employed in the bull, in which authority won out over sense and power over Scripture, was absurd. It was simply below the standard of what must be expected in an academic investigation (cf. Grane: 1994, 238ff).94 Erasmus also reacted to the bull. On September 13th he sent two letters, one to Leo X, and one to the papal diplomat Francesco Chierigati. In them he remarked 93 Ep. 1088,12–14, in Erasmus: 1922, 233: “[…] sed odiosius agunt Egmondensis et Latomus, alter lippus, alter claudus”. In the letter to Melanchton mentioned above, Erasmus also says the following about Latomus: “a particular role in all this evil has been played by Jacobus Latomus; and he is still at it, seeing that he has decided to rule here” (Ep. 1113,12–14, in Erasmus: 1922, 287: “Precipua pars huius mali fuit Iacobus Latomus; et adhuc est, quoniam decreuit hic regnare”). 94 Grane also describes several other reactions.

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on the fatal results it might have if Luther were not treated properly. He regarded the instigators of the bull as identical with his scholastic adversaries and hoped to be able to ward off their attack on Luther and on humanistic learning in a direct appeal to the Pope. At the same time, however, he continued to emphasize his distance from Luther and scant knowledge of his works. The fact was that he had become aware that his own letter to Luther of May 30th 1519 had become known in Rome, and wanted to prevent its giving rise to a hostile reaction from the Pope. All the autumn of 1520 Erasmus worked to find a peaceful solution to the Luther affair. With the Dominican Johann Faber from Augsburg he devised a compromise proposition to have the kings of Germany, England and Hungary appoint unbiased scholars who were to study Luther’s works, question him and deliver judgement in the case on the evidence thus obtained. Faber and Erasmus met in Leuven at the beginning of October to plan their project, a meeting that took place at the same time that Charles V was in the town on his way to his coronation as Emperor at Aachen on October 22nd. Simultaneously Exsurge Domini was brought to the town by the Papal nuncio Aleander. In the course of eight days Aleander succeeded in gaining imperial support for the printing of the bull and implementation of its instructions to burn Luther’s books, and on October 8th, when Charles continued his journey, a public burning of Luther’s works was organized in the town. Erasmus reacted violently to Aleander’s success and for once resorted to a weapon he otherwise seldom used: the anonymous pamphlet Acta Academiae Lovaniensis contra Lutherum.95 After the coronation in Aachen the imperial court went to Cologne to meet the German princes. Erasmus and Faber also went there, with the special purpose of seeing Albrecht of Brandenburg and the Elector Frederick the Wise and discussing the compromise with them. Finally, Aleander also came to Cologne to get Frederick’s concurrence with the burning of Luther’s books and his authorization for the imprisonment of Luther or his extradition to Rome. Frederick asked Erasmus for advice as to what answer to give Aleander, and to aid him in that connection Erasmus composed the so-called Axiomata Erasmi Roterodami pro causa Martini Lutheri, a summary of Erasmus’ and Faber’s thoughts in 21 short points. The elector followed Erasmus’ advice and refused Aleander’s suggestion, and at the same time he secured Charles V’s acceptance of the suggestion that Luther be questioned at Worms before a possible condemnation for heresy. Erasmus had not intended that the Axiomata should be printed, but when it happened anyway towards the end of 1520, he was again seen publicly as Luther’s champion. 95 There is some doubt as to whether Erasmus was really the author, but today it is regarded as the most probable authorship. Cf. Grane: 1994, 257ff.

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Even though Erasmus’ and Faber’s compromise, which after the meeting in Cologne was set up and printed as Consilium cuiusdam ex Animo cupientis esse concultum & R. Pontificis dignitati & christianae Religionis tranquillitati (“Advice from one who with all his heart wants to support both the dignity of the Roman Pope and the peace of the Christian religion”; see Grane: 1994, 245ff for an analysis of the work) was well-intentioned and carefully thought through, it had no impact. Far too many violent things were happening even as they were working on it for it to have any future. Not least was Luther himself instrumental in worsening the situation in the autumn of 1520. Writing De Captivitate Babylonica did not bear witness to any great wish for reconciliation on his part. In his letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam of December 1520, which introduces Latomus’ treatise against Luther, Latomus explicitly mentions De Captivitate Babylonica as a work in which Luther in his opinion speaks plainly and in a wholly unacceptable way about the sacraments, human laws, religious vows, marriage and priesthood. In February 1520 Erasmus writes: “His De Captivitate Babylonica offends many and every day he proposes something more frightening.”96 It improved nothing when Luther burned the bull threatening excommunication and the canon law publicly outside the town gate of Wittenberg on December 10th 1520. In the letter of February 1520 cited above, Erasmus sums up Luther’s behaviour : “Luther destroys himself with his own weapons.”97 At this point Leo X had already approached Erasmus and urged him to take a stand soon, for the Church of Rome and against Luther (Ep. 1180,19–22, in Erasmus: 1922, 436). After the Diet and the Edict of Worms on May 25th, Erasmus gradually began to turn away from Luther (Ep. 1203,1–4, in Erasmus: 1922, 494). He had given up on him. At the same time several of Luther’s German supporters also stopped contacting Erasmus.98 The course of events had created a real rift between those who had until now agreed to promote Church reforms.

96 Ep. 1186,7–8, in Erasmus: 1922, 444: “Captiuitas Babylonica multos ab illo alienauit, et indies molitur atrociora.” 97 Ep. 1186,21–22, in Erasmus: 1922, 445: “Sed ipse seipsum suis telis conficit.” 98 Ep. 1225,280–284, in Erasmus: 1922, 562. Here Erasmus writes that for a whole year he has neither heard from nor been visited by Luther’s German supporters as he used to be. Furthermore, he has heard from his friends that the Germans sometimes accuse him in their lectures of being a Pelagian.

4.

Latomus’ treatise against Luther

After Luther’s answer in March 1520 Jacob Latomus, like the two others from Leuven, Jan Driedo and Eustachius of Sichem, made it his business to defend the university against the accusations that had been levelled at it from several quarters, among both Luther’s supporters and the humanists. In the summer of 1520 he gave a lectio vacantialis, i. e. a series of lectures over and beyond the usual teaching, in which he tried to invest the points in the condemnation with what was in his eyes a well-founded and authoritative argumentation. In the course of a year he developed the lectures into a manuscript, which was printed on May 8th 1521 by the printer Hillen in Antwerp. A letter of dedication of December 1520, to the theological licentiate and vice pastor in Gouda, Rodolphus of Monckedam, was printed as a foreword. The book was the first anti-Lutheran tract published in the Netherlands.1 It is called Articulorum doctrinae fratris Martini Lutheri per theologos lovanienses damnatorum ratio ex sacris literis et veteribus tractatoribus (“Exposition on the basis of the Holy Scripture and the ancient authorities of the articles in brother Martin Luther’s doctrine which have been condemned by the theologians of Leuven”). It consists of the letter of dedication to Rodolphus of Monckedam, a short preface to the reader, and six articles.2 Article 1, which makes up nearly half of the tract, deals with Luther’s claim that “any good deed is a sin” and refers to the first and second articles of the condemnation. Latomus then leaves out article three in the condemnation on indulgence, and in his second article comments on the view of penance and satisfaction (articles 4–10 in the condemnation) and article 4 concerning whether moral virtues and the 1 The book exists in two official versions: the one from 1521, and one which is part of the posthumous edition of 1550 of Latomus’ Opera Omnia, made on the initiative of his nephew. In addition it is found in an unpublished critical edition by Robert Fischer. References in this book are to the 1521-edition, both the online and the printed edition (referred to as LR) and furthermore once in a while references are made to Robert Fischers – unpublished – textcritical notes, then labelled “F/note”. 2 In Opera Omnia there are 7 articles, the article on free will having been counted separately.

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speculative sciences are sinful (article 12 of the condemnation). Lastly he writes at slightly greater length in article 5 on purgatory (article 13 of the condemnation) and in article 6 about indulgence (article 3 of the condemnation). In setting out his case he refers to both those works of Luther that were contained in the Froben edition of 1518 and which were the basis of the composition of the condemnation, and to Resolutiones Lutherianae super Propositionibus suis Lipsiae Disputatis of 15193 and Confitendi Ratio of 1520.

4.1

The letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam

In the letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam from December 1520 Latomus explains the background of his tract (LR 277–288/a2r–b3v).4 He starts by declaring that the “Exposition”, as we will call the tract from now on, has come into being at the instigation of both friends and foes. The latter, because they maintain that the faculties of Cologne and Leuven have denounced Luther without argument. And the former because they look for arguments to quote in support of those who reproach the denouncers with the following: that the sentences from Luther which are quoted in the condemnations either do not exist or have been misunderstood; or that they are indeed in agreement with traditional pious doctrine; that Luther has not been treated properly because he has neither been warned nor his views refuted; and that it is preposterous thus to treat a man who is so well-reputed and who simply wishes innocently to dispute about a number of matters (LR 277,1–19/a2r,1–19); that Luther himself has declared that he submits to the authority of the Papal See (LR 278,26–27/a2v,26– 27); and finally that he actually presents a much-needed criticism of the ecclesiastical abuses in Rome (LR 283,35–284,2/b1r,35–b1v,2). Thus even though it should not be necessary to write an exposition, because the denouncers’ action has already been approved by the Pope, Latomus for the above reasons – and because many are still bewitched by Luther and think he rests on Scripture and on tradition, whereas the denouncers are supported merely by the works of modern theologians (LR 277,22–24/a2r,22–24) – will here answer all accusations and misunderstandings with a complete account. With the aid of arguments and evidence from Scripture and from the old tradition (“rationes & testimonia ex scriptura & veteribus solis collegi”, LR 277,25–26/ a2r,25–26), he will show that Luther distorts both Scripture and tradition (LR 277,26–28/a2r).5 3 Henceforward this work will be designated the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation. 4 LR 277–288/a2r–b3v. As said before, the letter is also printed in De Jongh: 1911, 69–81. 5 Latomus here accuses Luther of the same thing he is accused of in the condemnations.

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4.1.1 The rejoinder to the recriminations against the condemners Latomus does not wait for the beginning of the exposition proper to answer the recriminations listed. Already in his letter to Rodolphus he briefly mentions them and hints at how he thinks he will be able to refute them. First and foremost he sketches the events surrounding the composition of the condemnations, so that Rodolphus and whoever else might read the letter can confirm that everything was done properly and took place in a well-considered and unhurried way (LR 278,18–19/a2v,18–19). He describes how the Leuven theologians culled representative sentences from Luther’s works, and how, since they did not want to rely only on their own judgement, and also in order to put an end to the rumour that Bishop Erard de la Marck was pro-Lutheran, they went to see him to ask his advice, and finally how they found support from Adrian of Utrecht, at the bishop’s recommendation. Next Latomus declares that it is not Luther’s person which is under attack, but what he has written (LR 278,21–29/a2v,21–29). It is not he who is denounced, but his errors. And there would have been no call to warn him against the condemnations, since he had already had several warnings well before the work on the condemnations started. That Luther in certain passages claims that he submits to the authority of the Papal See6 Latomus cannot at all take seriously, as it is apparent to all that he has written his works with a hardened heart. Whatever he is like as a person, his works, and especially his rejoinder to the condemnations, quite clearly demonstrate that he possesses no whit of the evangelica modestia to which he otherwise lays claim in several other works (LR 278,35–279,1/a2v,35–a3r,1).7 Regarding Luther’s “only” wanting to dispute about things,8 Latomus writes

6 Regarding Luther’s reference to the Pope’s authority, cf. the introductory letter to Leo X in Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute (WA 1, 22–29), and the letters to Cajetan on October 17th and 18th 1518, WA B 1, 221,45–49: “Ideoque omni humilitate supplico, Reverendissimum Paternitas Tua dignetur ad sanctissimum Dominum nostrum Leonem decimum istam causam referre, ut per ecclesiam haec dubia determinata ad iustam vel revocationem vel credulitatem possit compelli. Nihil enim aliud cupio quam ecclesiam sequi.” WA B 1, 223,34–38: “Quare per Christi viscera et insignem tuam mihi exhibitam clementiam rogo, dignetur hanc meam oboedientiam hucusque praestitam et completam gratiose agnoscere et Sanctissimo Domino nostro Papae benigniter commendatum facere atque hanc meam ambitionem et appellationem pro mea necessitate et amicorum auctoritate paratam boni consulere.” Cf. F/note 14. 7 F/note 17: The concept of evangelica modestia, cf. e. g. the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation (WA 1, 392,15), was frequently used in the dispute between Eck and Luther and Karlstadt 1518–1519, beginning with Luther’s Asterisci Lutheri adversus obeliscos Eccii (WA 1, 281,23). 8 F/note 23: Luther on several occasions appealed to ius in publica schola disputandi, not only in

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at greater length. With reference to the letters of Leo the Great, he emphasizes that it is not permitted to question yet again matters of faith that are already settled, because in that way doubt will be raised about unquestionable and determined matters (LR 279,13–16/a3r,13–16). Therefore it is not necessarily an excuse to say that one “only” wants to dispute about a matter ; it depends on the theme of the disputation, and accordingly not everyone is allowed to dispute. Arius, Pelagius, Nestorius and Eutyches all said that they only wanted to dispute. But as their participation in the disputations was both fraudulent and obdurate, and they were not subject to faith and Scripture, which in Latomus’ context means ecclesiastical authority, and as it happened after the truth had already been brought to light and sufficiently defined by the Fathers, they were not given permission to dispute. Luther’s behaviour as a disputant, as can be seen in his works, especially the most recent such as the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, is in Latomus’ eyes exactly like that of the old heretics (LR 280,10–21/ a3v,10–21). Both parties endeavour to undermine the truths which have been handed down and determined by the Fathers, because they doubt them or disbelieve them (LR 281,4–7/a4r,4–7). When the scholastics dispute about central theological subjects such as whether God is one, whether the Holy Spirit emanates from the Father and/or the Son, or whether the world is eternal, it is a quite different matter (LR 280,26–34/ a3v,26–34). They do not seek to question the themes, but dispute for the sake of training or education, and to lay open the truth, and be able to solve what seems contradictory and can therefore become a hindrance for the less educated. Their point of departure is that they are believing defenders of theology, and that premise radically distinguishes them from the doubting disputants and makes their way of dealing with things quite different from theirs. As an example of how this is manifested, Latomus mentions that the heathen philosopher9 of course asks in one way about the unity of God, because he really doubts it or denies it, whereas Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus ask in a different way, because as firm believers they wish to defend it against deniers (LR 280,34–281,1/a3v,34–a4r,1). And for the same reason Arius had a different opinion from Augustine as to whether the Son is identical with or of the same nature as the Father (LR 281,1–3/ a4r,1–3). It is possible that in this question of disputation Latomus has been nettled by one of Luther’s statements in his answer to Prierias’ dialogue about papal power. Accused by Prierias of temerity, temeritas, in wishing to dispute about purgatory, Luther ripostes that here he is only accused of what both Prierias himself, connection with the indulgence dispute (to Leo X. May 1518; WA 1, 528,29), but also in 1520, cf. WA 6, 191,24–26. 9 F/note 32: It is not clear whether Latomus refers to heathen philosophy in general or specifically to Aristotle.

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and Thomas Aquinas to boot, are guilty of. And perhaps mostly Thomas, who in all his works hardly does anything but dispute, and indeed questions that which belongs to faith, when he turns faith into a “whether” (utrum).10 That the condemned sentences could in any way be in accordance with the orthodox tradition, for example Augustine and Cyprian, Latomus flatly denies. He thinks that it must be patent to all that Augustine and Cyprian say the diametrically opposite of Luther, and since they are not self-contradictory their views are also the opposite of Luther’s. Not even Luther himself can find any Church Fathers to quote as authority behind the sentence “omne opus bonum est peccatum”, because there quite simply is none (LR 281,7–21/a4r,7–21). Anyone who really wants to treat Luther leniently, Latomus says, should demonstrate that the matter is not without importance, and call attention to the errors. Because no lenience can be shown to such errors which, apart from being errors, are put forward as if they were quite crucial and were the basis of the whole Christian doctrine (doctrina). This is precisely how Augustine (who called attention to their errata) dealt with the books of the Arians, the Pelagians and other heretics, which otherwise contained much good. He knew they were not merely in error, but also persisted in their error with unremitting passion and tried to implant it in their readers’ minds under the pretence that it was the truth (LR 281,21–34/a4r,21–34). On the other hand this does not mean that the Fathers hide or cover up errors, the less freely and openly they argue against and denounce them. When now and again they cease to oppose some opponent, it is because they know that a little leaven will leaven the whole lump. An error, if it is serious enough, quite removes the authority of an author. For example Hilarius says of Tertullian somewhere in his commentary on Matthew where he touches on the heresy that made Tertullian deviate from the Church: “The man’s subsequent error removed the authority from his more praiseworthy works.”11 If therefore a man is in error once, persists in his error and thus refuses to submit to “faith and Scripture”, i. e. ecclesiastical authority, it may well be a waste of energy to oppose him. It must be known that a distinction has to be made between making an error and committing heresy (LR 282,8–283,9/a4v,8–b1r,9),12 states Latomus, refer-

10 WA 1, 661,(24)29–32(34): “Eiusdem criminis reus mecum es et tu et S. Thomas, immo Thomas omnium maxime, qui per omnia ferme sua scripta aliud nihil facit quam disputat et, quod grande est, etiam ea quae fidei sunt in questiones vocat et fidem vertit in ‘utrum’? ut nosti.” Cf. Leif Grane’s analysis of Luther’s answer to Latomus’ prologue, Grane: 1977. 11 LR,282/a4v,6–7: “Subsequens error hominis detraxit scriptis probabilibus auctoritatem”. Cf. F/note 42. 12 It was the same thing about which Cajetan warned the Leuven theologians in Koblenz in May 1519.

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ring to Augustine’s “I may be in error, but I will not be heretical”.13 It is excusable if one errs in matters that are still under discussion and are not yet determined, if, that is, the one who errs is ready to be corrected. That was the kind of error Cyprian made in the matter of re-christening those who had been baptized by heretics. In his book about baptism Augustine therefore also excuses Cyprian, but in no way excuses the Donatists, since they lived long after Cyprian at a time when the matter in which Cyprian had excusably erred had been settled definitively in a council decision. That there are thus pardonable errors which you can either bear with or refute, considering that their author has said much other that is good, is expressed, Latomus says, in the biblical expressions that the vines have to be pruned to be yet more fruitful (John 15:2), and that love covers over a multitude of sins (1 Peter 4:8). He therefore concludes that “because someone is stuck in the branches of the vine he has not left the root of unity”,14 but ends with the warning that these pardonable errors do not serve as an example for the future, but as a warning that no person, however wise, can trust himself in difficult matters, when also great seekers and lovers of truth have been wrong, and that one has to take care not to become obdurate, since obduracy, which is a refusal to accept ecclesiastical authority, is the only thing along with error that creates a heretic, whereas without it to err is pardonable (LR 283,3–5/b1r,3–5). Having advocated the burning of heretical works so that they will not harm readers, referring to Acts 19:19 (LR 283,11–15/b1r,11–15)15 and Leo I (LR 283,15–35/b1r,15–35), the measure against Luther’s work recommended in the condemnations, Latomus finally comes to the reproach from the critics of the condemnations that we should make allowances for Luther on the grounds that he brings forward a much-needed criticism of the abuses in Rome about which others are silent, or perhaps even ready to condone. Latomus admits that it may be correct that in Rome one finds neglect of religion, greed, ambition and a propensity for luxury, the sale of official duties, unjust reservations and regulations of the law and finally the promotion of young or unsuitable people to the highest offices. But he points out that these surely are errors also found among secular princes or prelates. The question is how to deal with that kind of abuse, whether to keep silent or to speak out. It is self-evident that by defending them or 13 LR 282,15/a4v,15: “Errare potero, haereticus non ero.” Cf. F/note 45: Luther quoted the same passage without a reference to Augustine in his Protestatio to Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute (WA 1, 530,10–12), and again later (1527, 1530, 1539) with references to Augustine. 14 LR 282,30–31/a4v,30–31: “Unde? nisi quia haerens in diffusione vitis radicem non deseruit unitatis.” 15 F/note 52: Luther also argues with Acts 19:19, when he explains why he burned the Pope’s books, among them the bull and the canon law, on December 10th 1520 at Wittenberg. (WA 7, 162,5–7(Acts 19:21)).

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accepting them one becomes an accomplice, but on the other hand it is not certain that we must rebuke them publicly, unless it is done in the right way. A sharp and excessive rebuke of princes and superiors by the common people often leads not to any improvement of either the superior or the inferior, but to deterioration. What may happen is that on the one hand the superior will feel offended by the character of the rebuke, and therefore deprecate it, while on the other hand the inferiors, also because of the character of the rebuke, become presumptuous because they all at once see themselves as better than their superiors, and therefore risk insubordination, irreligiosity and unbelief. Therefore it cannot be said that in such questions we must either keep silent or speak, but that it must be done in the appropriate way (LR 283,35–284,24/b1r,35–b1v,24). But as regards pronouncing on what the appropriate way is and how, in that light, we must relate concretely to the abuses in Rome, Latomus declines to comment on it, referring to “a wise man”, sapiens,16 who, he thinks, once said something wise about the matter (LR 284,24–285,30/b1v,24–b2r,30). He had pointed out that a good remedy for cleansing the Curia would be if those who were dissatisfied with what went on in Rome themselves stopped demanding unjust things or benefits from the Pope, or accepting them if they were offered unasked. By thus keeping free of sinfulness they could more confidently go to the Pope and implore him to administer his God-given principalship according to the divine laws and in earnest, and at all times, to ensure that canon law could regain its dignity and be preserved untainted and undiminished. Meanwhile, the individual must make sure of avoiding what he censured the Romans for, and pray earnestly to God to vouchsafe the Church and see to it that the Pope and his people be converted, enlightened and made perfect and persevering. If none of these things, the honest appeal to the Pope, the moral self-discipline or the prayer to God, were to help there would not, according to the “wise man”, be any other recourse than to arm oneself with patience in the assurance that the ways of the Lord are righteous and past understanding. “The wise man” did not think that appealing to an ordinary council would be any solution to the problem, Latomus goes on, even though it might seem to be the last remaining solution possible.17 Because who could call it against the will of the Pope? Who would come? And how could this gathering take place without leading to a serious schism in the Church? Once doubt had been sown, as to where the power should definitively be anchored, whether with the Pope or with the council, the power would in reality be placed in no man’s hand, and all the 16 It is uncertain who this sapiens was. Like the senex mentioned in the Dialogue he is not identified. 17 F/note 62: Cf. Luther’s appeal to a church council in Appellatio F. Martini Lutheri ad Concilium, November 28th, 1518 (WA 2, 34–40).

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power-greedy would be indirectly encouraged to busy themselves securing a bit of it. And finally, after the dissolution of the council, who would be the one to guard the laws according to which Christianity was to be reformed and to enforce them, if not the Pope?

4.1.2 Condemnation sine ratione Having commented on all the points of criticism for which Latomus’ friends had asked to be given arguments to answer, Latomus has arrived at answering the opponents, first and foremost Luther himself, who maintain that the Leuven theologians have denounced Luther’s sentences without proper argument. First of all he points out that his adversaries really have no occasion to raise this matter at all. It is not true that the one who does not give reasons for what he says and does speaks and acts without a reason, but rather that he conceals his reasons for some more weighty reason. We need only consider generals, doctors, architects or judges, who often give others orders without explaining why (LR 285,30–286,3/b2r,30–b2v,3). Latomus then explains that at no point has it been the wish of the Leuven theologians to arrogate an authority to themselves, by which they should be believed without argument (LR 287,20–34/b3r,20–34). The reason why they acted as they did in their condemnation was that if they were to argue their points of view in a real sense, there were two reasons why they would not have been able to make it brief, but would have had to write an entire volume. Firstly because they would not be able to explain themselves briefly to adversaries who do not acknowledge the Pope or the councils as authorities, but only, as they say, “the authentic and original meaning of Scripture”.18 And secondly because they would have to refute all their adversaries’ arguments one by one, since today no one cares which arguments, but only how many, are brought forward. So although it would be easy to find a Scripture text as counter-argument for each of Luther’s chapters, it would simply be ridiculed, however obvious the argument was, because this is one of the things that Luther prides himself on: that he has a great wealth of arguments, while his opponents have none or very few. As if, Latomus says, the naked truth was not to be preferred to the most strongly armoured untruths. The theologians at Leuven have taken pains to cite Luther’s works verbatim in the condemnations, so that both learned men and lay people might see at a glance that the books that contain such glaring untruths are not good, or so that if they were to be in doubt they could easily look them up in Luther’s works and 18 LR 287,34/b3r,24: “scripturae […] Germanum & nativum sensum”. Cf. F/note 81.

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verify whether they were correctly evaluated, or if they should have been treated otherwise. Add to this that all the sentences denounced are in opposition to the principles of the faith, or have been determined, settled and banned by Church Fathers of the past, and are matters of which certainly no priest can be ignorant, since they are contained in canon law (LR 286/b2v,3–12).

4.1.3 Commentaries on four of the condemned Luther passages In conclusion Latomus briefly mentions and comments on a series of the sentences contained in the catalogue of Luther’s heresies in the Leuven condemnation: that God has decreed the impossible, that sin is not washed away at baptism, that not every mortal sin must be confessed to the priest, and that every good deed is a sin (LR 286,12–287,14/b2v,12–b3r,14). He who condemns the man who says that God has decreed the impossible is right to do so, Latomus says,19 and it is not possible to excuse the one condemned by saying that he explains that “‘impossible’ means that it is difficult or goes beyond the powers of man outside of divine grace”.20 For the denounced man so unequivocally makes his views clear, both on the first commandment of the Decalogue, the two last commandments, and on wholehearted charity, that he reveals that he truly does not think that anyone in this life is transferred to such a state of grace that he is free of the trespass against these commandments, even though he does admit that there are some who are said not to have thus trespassed. That sin remains after baptism was denounced by Gregory the Great, Latomus remarks, bringing in a quotation from Gregory’s letters. Here Gregory says that if anyone says that sin is only superficially forgiven, what will that utterance mean to the infidels? It dissolves the sacrament of faith, to which the Gospels bear witness, for example where Christ says: “Whoever has bathed is entirely clean. He need not wash himself further, except for his feet” (John 13:10ff). He who has some sin left cannot be said to be entirely clean. But since the voice of truth says that “whoever has bathed is entirely clean”, and since no one can resist the voice of truth, no taint of sin remains on the one our Saviour declares entirely clean. “If there is any people”, Gregory ends, 19 Here Latomus refers indirectly to the treatment of this passage in the condemnations: WA 6, 177,22–30. It is Jerome who is supposed to have said, “Qui dixerit deus praecepisse impossibile anathema sit”, but the work the sentence is taken from, which in the Middle Ages was believed to be by Jerome, was originally written by Pelagius. 20 LR 286,14–15/b2v,14–15: “impossibile vocat id quod est difficile, aut hominis vires excedit seclusa divina gratia”.

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who in the christian name dare to preach, or silently in their own mind to maintain, the things we have declared to be substantial errors, there is no doubt that we both excommunicate and have excommunicated them.21

Who, says Latomus in conclusion, are we to believe here, Gregory or Luther? The thesis that it is not compulsory to confess every mortal sin to the priest has been denounced at various councils, exactly as was said in the text of the Leuven condemnation, and the authority of the Church Fathers should be sufficient for a Christian, so that he will not begin imagining that they have determined impossible or unwise things. The same, says Latomus, should apply to Luther’s views of satisfaction, remorse and purgatory, since all three views have been explicitly and expressly condemned by holy councils or popes, and one must undoubtingly choose to believe them instead of Luther. Finally Luther’s statement that the good deeds of the saints are sin, i. e. that the same deed is both good and evil, is so absurd that “nothing can be said in a more absurd way”.22 He points out that the statement is in direct contradiction of the words of the Athanasian Creed that “they that have done good shall go into life everlasting”.23 The good deed and the sinful deed are each the antithesis of the other, he declares, the former deserving praise and being acceptable to God, whereas the latter deserves censure and punishment. At the end Latomus says that he has inadvertently written far too lengthily to Rodolphus, because he likes so much to converse and discuss with him, but that he will nevertheless place his letter at the beginning of the Exposition, for the benefit of both the defence of the condemnations and for those who are moved by the letter in and of itself (LR 287,35–288,13/b3r,35–b3v,13). Soon there will be more pamphlets,24 Latomus says, turning against what Luther and others in his name have recently published, and which is even worse than what went before. As an example of what is worse he mentions De Captivitate Babylonica, where, as he says, Luther speaks openly and plainly, and where he in my opinion either deceives or is deceived in the most grave and dangerous way in the matter of the sacraments, religious vows, human laws, marriage and the priesthood.25

21 LR 286,31–34/b2v,31–34: “Si qui sunt igitur qui sub nomine Christiano haec quae diximus errorum capitula aut praedicare audent aut taciti apud semetipsos tenere, hos proculdubio & anathematizamus & anathematizavimus.” 22 LR 287,9–10/b3r,9–10: “ut nihil dici possit absurdius”. 23 LR 287,10–11/b3r,10–11: “Qui bona fecerunt ibunt in vitam aeternam.” 24 Here he presumably refers to the works of Jan Driedo og Eustachius of Sichem. 25 LR 288,7–13/b3v,7–13: “in quo apertissime loquitur nulla circuitione usus, & mea quidem sententia de sacramentis, de votis de religionibus, de humanis legis, & matrimoniis, atque sacerdotio gravissime & periculosissime aut fallit, aut fallitur.”

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4.1.4 Erasmus as a hidden opponent Latomus’ letter is of course directed at Luther and his adherents, but it is also obliquely directed against Erasmus. This becomes clear if we compare the statements in it with Erasmus’ letter to Albrecht of Brandenburg of October 1519.26 Most of the various reproaches Latomus lists in his letter can be regarded as answering the letter to Albrecht as well as Luther. Erasmus writes that some of the things that have been denounced have not been read or understood properly in Luther (Ep. 1033,86–88, in Erasmus: 1922, 102) and are at times in accordance with the tradition (Ep. 1033,82–84, in Erasmus: 1922, 102), that Luther is a well-respected man (Ep. 1033,42; 59–60; 90–91, in Erasmus: 1922, 100; 101; 102), who moreover only wants to dispute (Ep. 1033,112–115, in Erasmus: 1922, 102), and who therefore has not been treated properly by “simply” being condemned (Ep. 1033,90–91.112–115, in Erasmus: 1922, 102), and that he submits to the Pope’s authority (Ep. 1033,115–116, in Erasmus: 1922, 102). Erasmus also urges tolerance towards Luther and in that connection employs the same example as Latomus in his interpretation of the relation between error and heresy : the tolerance shown to Cyprian (Ep. 1033,42–45, in Erasmus: 1922, 100). And in Erasmus we find exactly the same distinction between error and heresy that Latomus employs, where it is obduracy, pertinacia, which together with error makes the difference (Ep. 1033,213–216, in Erasmus: 1922, 105). If we go on to look at the phrasing of these points in both letters, the connection between them becomes even clearer (and here the Latin text is quoted to visualize the similarities). Where Erasmus writes: “compertum est ab his damnata ut haeretica in libris Lutheri, quae in Bernhardi et Augustini libris ut orthodoxa, imo ut pia leguntur”; Latomus has: “dicentibus, a nobis ea damnata […] a sanctis patribus tradita essent tanquam pia & catholica”. Where Erasmus writes: “Primum non esse publice damnandum quod non esset lectum, imo, quod non expensum, non enim dicam non intellectum”; Latomus puts: “dicentibus, a nobis ea damnata, quae aut non lecta, aut non intellect”. On Luther as vir bonus Erasmus writes: “Et tamen si illi faverem ut viro bono, quod fatentur et hostes […]”; and correspondingly Latomus writes: “Quod autem vir bonus esse dicitur, nihil contra nos.” On tolerating Luther, Erasmus writes: “[…] nimirum ad multa conniventes”; and Latomus: “Non enim ad huiusmodi errata connivendum est […].” And on submitting to the Papal See Erasmus phrases it thus: “qui submittit se iudicio Apostolicae Sedis”; and Latomus thus: “Licet enim sedi Apostolicae sua scripta initio verbotenus submitteret […].” Finally Erasmus writes about the obduracy that makes heretics of those who have erred, “cum 26 Cf. Rummel: 1989b, 8–9.

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ipsi fateantur nullum esse neque veterum neque recentium scriptorum, in quo non reperiantur errores, etiam haereticum facturi si quis defendat pertinaciter […]”; and Latomus: “[…] ac sic fugiat pertinaciam, quae sola errori addita haereticum facit, & sine qua excusabiliter erratur”. Thus the letter to Rodolphus is a sign that Latomus constantly regarded both Erasmus and Luther as his opponents. There is one thing, however, about which Erasmus and Latomus write in almost identical terms, and that is the Pope. The criticism of the Roman Church, which Latomus admits is well deserved, and the way in which he thinks one should relate to it, with reference to the anonymous “wise man”, as well as his view of the Pope’s role as the Church’s sanctioned superior and as the guardian of orthodox doctrine, are all very similar to Erasmus’ utterances on these matters. Erasmus too describes the Pope as the supreme preacher of evangelical doctrine and the superior of the other bishops, and he mentions the abuse of power which goes on among his subordinates. Nor does he think that unrighteous boons should be demanded of the Pope, and like Latomus he advocates backing him up by personally living a morally pure life (Ep 1033, 161–179, in Erasmus: 1922, 104). And yet Latomus and Erasmus only speak about the Pope in almost the same way. There is a small difference in their statements which says a great deal about the difference between the two. Latomus says of the Pope that his main task as the defender of the faith is to protect canon law and reinstate it in honour and dignity, whereas Erasmus calls him the herald of the evangelical doctrine and emphasizes his role as the vicar of Christ.27 For Latomus, in other words, it is first and foremost canon law that contains doctrina, while for Erasmus it is rather the Christian moral dogma.

4.1.5 A sketch of the principles of Latomus’ theology In his letter to Rodolphus, Latomus touches upon several matters that are crucial to our understanding of how he thinks. In conjunction with what has been said about the reading of his Dialogue on the three languages and the study of theology of 1519, we already begin to discern some outlines of Latomus’ theology. In the course of the analysis of the Dialogue we have sketched the ideas that bear on Latomus’ view of the relationship between reality, knowledge and language, and the way it applies to theology. In the Dialogue Latomus put forward 27 Ep. 1033,161–164, in Erasmus: 1922, 104: “Quisquis fauet Euangelicae doctrinae, is fauet Romano Pontifici, qui huius primus est praeco, cum caeteri episcopi sint eiusdem precones. Omnes episcopi Christi vices gerunt, sed inter hos praecellit Romanus Pontifex.”

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an Aristotelian-Augustinian-inspired semantics according to which things are always unchanged and always become manifest to the human intellect in the same way, i. e. in concepts (conceptus). Our knowledge of reality is primarily internal and spiritual, and only becomes external and embodied when it is put into words. In this way a hierarchy between concepts and words is introduced. The former are internal and eternal, common to all, while the latter are external and temporal and can differ according to time and place. But since the words are the individual temporal expressions of the eternal concepts, they are understandable to people who speak the same language and become a vehicle of communication. Latomus also distinguishes between speculative sciences such as dialectics, mathematics, philosophy and metaphysics, and practical sciences such as grammar and rhetoric. The speculative sciences deal with conceptual knowledge, and are therefore superior to the practical sciences which deal with the practical realization of this conceptual knowledge. Above all other subjects theology is enthroned and differs from the others in degree of knowledge. In contrast to the naturally, i. e. empirically founded corporeal knowledge on which the practical sciences rest, and the natural spiritual knowledge on which the inferior speculative sciences rest, theological knowledge has no natural background but is based on the inspiration of divine enlightenment by the Holy Spirit, a lumen superadditum. Latomus’ description of the hierarchy of subjects, as was also mentioned in the section on the Dialogue, closely resembles the Thomist idea of ordo, and indeed his theory of knowledge seems to be inspired by Thomism. The supernatural knowledge of the object of theology, induced by the Holy Spirit, which Latomus also calls lex Christi mentalis and knowledge of veritas evangelica and evangelium scriptum in corde, is the verity revealed to faith which was announced to the Prophets and the Disciples, and which is constantly apportioned to specially chosen Christians. It is not a mystical religious feeling, but a concrete content of faith which is not at odds with but builds on and supplements reason, and which in continuation of the teaching of conceptus is eternal and superior to all linguistic utterances. It is found manifested as language, both in the Scriptures and in the later testimonies of faith, but is in principle perpetuated independently of them. That is why Latomus in the Dialogue concluded: the spiritual revelation of the Gospel in the heart is the final criterion of theology – in evangelicis quaestionibus ultimam resolutionem esse ad evangelium scriptum in tabulis cordis fidelium. The question of how this spiritual revelation is expressed and exists was also suggested in the analysis of the Dialogue. It does so in the performing of the spiritual ecclesiastical teaching office. Here the content of the revelation is defined and determined, and the Church is therefore the outer guarantor of the

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revelation. Here it has been conserved and guarded since the coming of Christ as a depositum fidei (cf. Yves Congar’s phrase in Gielis: 1994, 31, note 55), and here it is handed down, transmitted in a traditio. In the letter to Rodolphus some of these elements are patent. Primarily the concept of authority stands out. Only statements from this traditio are decisive for Latomus, and only on the strength of those can you question and refute theological opinions. What decides the theological truth are the verities of the Christian faith which have been handed down and determined in the Church by the Fathers28 in accordance with the evangelical (NT) and prophetic (OT) authorities29 and which are upheld by the Pope, in councils and in canon law.30 He who will not listen to them but raises doubts about them, and is only willing to submit to the direct and unadulterated sense of the Scriptures (LR 287,24/ b3r,24), has gone astray. The verities Latomus refers to have their source in fides divinitus inspirata (LR 281,33/a3r,33), as he calls it in his letter to Rodolphus with a quotation from the correspondence of Leo the Great, and thus the grounds for the concept of traditio are also suggested here. It is the divinely inspired faith upheld by the bearers of the ecclesiastical teaching office which is manifest through the ages and creates the uninterrupted transmission of the truth into which and under which each Church is fitted. The passage from Latomus’ later Apology against Erasmus, quoted at the end of the section on the Dialogue, confirms what has just been said. Here it is said that both 1) the divinely inspired faith is the basis for the composition of the Scriptures and therefore also a permanent key to the true understanding of them and to the determination of the Church’s dogma on that basis, and 2) that this faith has worked in and been fundamental to the Church ever since its formation, which is why Scripture must also always be seen in the light of the dogmas determined by ecclesiastical symbols. And finally 3) that both Scripture and the confirmed dogma are a testimony of the divinely inspired faith so that the living faith of those who hold office in the Church must also always submit to both Scripture and tradition. Latomus cannot imagine any other point of departure for a theological dis-

28 LR 281,6–7/a4r,6–7: “a maioribus tradita & determinata”; LR 283,8–9/b1r,8–9: “quod tunc orbis plenario concilio res in qua probabiliter errabat Cyprianus decisa esset”; LR 286,7–12/ b2v,7–12: “Ad de quod omnia fere dicta Lutheri a nobis reprehensa, opponuntur fidei principiis, aut saltem a maioribus nostris & orthodoxis patribus decisa, determinata, damnata, anathematizata sunt, & quae sacerdotem ignorare non licet, quod sacris sint comprehensa Canonibus […].” 29 LR 280,3–5/a3v,3–5 (a quotation from one of Leo the Great’s letters): “quae manifestum est per omnia Evangelicis & Propheticis auctoritatibus consonare”. 30 LR 287,23–24/b3r,23–24: “Romanorum Pontificem, vel sacrorum conciliorum auctoritatem […] recipient”; LR 286/b2v11–12: “quod sacris sint comprehensa Canonibus”.

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cussion, without everything becoming relative, as he sees it, and on that ground he protests against Luther.

4.2

The refutation of Luther

Before the refutation of Luther, Latomus briefly addresses the reader directly (LR 289,1–28/b4r,1–28). He emphasizes again that it ought to be superfluous to give arguments for the Leuven theologians’ condemnation of the articles in Luther’s works. Simple and unlearned men must be able to find comfort in Adrian of Utrecht’s endorsement of the condemnation, he who is known for integrity and wisdom both in deed and in print, and learned men must be able themselves to see the absurdity of the Luther works. But yet, so that what has been done with deliberation will not be accused of lack of good sense, as it has been, Latomus has decided “on the basis of the authority of the Scriptures, the correct arguments and the old canonical commentators”31 to try to demonstrate what the denounced Luther sentences contain of true or false. And hopefully without persecuting anyone he will submit his result to the public, so that they can judge whether what is said is right or wrong, and whether Luther proves his statements or not. It will then be up to the reader to take note of this so important matter without being seized by passion or sympathy for either one or the other party. He must note what is being said, not who says it, and finally pray to God for help to make his attempt at judging in the matter honest. The method Latomus has announced that he is going to use, argumentation with the aid of Scripture, the true argument and the old canonical commentators, leaves its distinct mark on the Exposition. The text consists almost entirely of passages from Scripture and long meticulously correct quotations from the Church Fathers, connected by shorter comments. Of the Fathers, Augustine is quoted 210 times (by far the most frequently), Jerome some 30 times, Ambrose and Cyprian 25 times, Gregory, Chrysostom and Origen 15, and Leo I, Dionysius Areopagita, Bede and Bernard of Clairvaux even fewer. Gregory of Nazianzus Ignatius of Antioch, Theodorus, Hilarius and a few others also turn up sporadically (cf. Vercruysse: 1994, 8). Any reason why he has chosen precisely these Fathers and not others is withheld by Latomus, apart from the one he has already given in the title of the work and explained in the letter to Rodolphus. By employing the same authorities that Luther and his adherents acknowledge and use, he hopes to demonstrate that the condemnations also build on them and 31 LR 289,17–18/b4r,17–18: “ex sacrarum litterarum auctoritate, ex vera ratione, & veteribus Canonicis tractatoribus”. Here Latomus refers to Luther’s plea in his rejoinder to the condemnations for “scripturae auctoritas aut ratio probabilis” as proofs.

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not, as has been imputed to them, only the so-called “modern authorities”. And at the same time he seeks to show that it is the denunciator’s way of understanding and employing them which is correct, not Luther’s. Quotations from the Church Fathers and from Scripture stand side by side, so that it might appear that they are of equal weight. That Latomus understands tradition as transmitting the revelation in the shape of a depositum fidei we have seen in the section about the Dialogue, where he also described why this is so. He outlined how the Church and its task grew forth when the perfect knowledge of the teachings of Christ was infused in the hearts of the disciples, lived on in the apostles and was put down in writing with an independent oral tradition alongside, and finally developed into the scholastic theology. Throughout, it had been the chosen bearers of the office of teaching in the Church who attended to the transmission, constantly testing the truth against both the Scriptures and the older tradition. But in spite of the fact that the tradition thus has legitimate divine authority, Scripture is nevertheless above all the other sources of revelation. This is not so apparent in the Dialogue or in the Exposition as in a later work, De Primatu Romani Pontificis adversus Lutherum of 1526. There Latomus writes directly that Scripture is “the acme of authority, because it has an author who can neither be deceived nor deceive”.32 So the traditional witnesses to revelation can err, and must therefore ever and again deduce their interpretation of truth from the Scriptures and test it against them. We have already remarked that the first article in the Exposition takes up maybe half of Latomus’ work, and this suggests that Latomus has understood what is central in the clash with Luther, and that all the other condemned articles in various ways spring from or refer to the central theme treated in article 1. He deals with the problem which was the subject of the first and second articles in the condemnation, and which primarily referred to the sentence “opus bonum optime factum est peccatum veniale” in conclusion 58 of Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute. That is not, however, the text Latomus uses as the point of departure for his refutation, but conclusion 2 augmented by its explanation in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation (WA 2, 410,34– 421,15), a text which has been written in the time between the composition of the condemnation and Latomus’ tract, and in which Luther has been at great pains to present arguments that “any good deed is a sin”. Here Luther’s conclusion declares:

32 Vercruysse: 1988, 387, note 67: “Hae [scil. scripturae divinae] enim sunt in summo culmine auctoritatis, quia auctorem habent, qui nec falli, nec fallere potest.”

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To deny that man sins in the good deed, that the venial sin is not venial by nature, but only as a consequence of God’s mercy, or that the sin stays in the child after baptism, that is the same as simultaneously overthrowing Paul and Christ.33

And Latomus completes the thought: “[Ergo Luther says that] any good deed is a sin, and in one and the same deed is found both the good deed and the sin.”34 Latomus has constructed article 1 thus: first he enumerates a series of logical contradictions which he deems can only follow from Luther’s thesis. Then he enumerates a series of authorities from Scripture and the old tradition as proof of the contrary view, before he finally starts a direct refutation of Luther’s arguments one by one.35

4.2.1 Latomus own argumentation: The logical contradicitions Already in the letter to Rodolphus, Latomus has mentioned Luther’s statement that the good deeds of the saints are sin, meaning that the same deed is both good and evil, as an example of a blatantly heretical Lutheran doctrine indicted in the condemnation. He emphasized there that “nothing can be put more absurdly”36 and this is also his point in article 1. The logical contradictions he enumerates at the start are precisely meant to show the absurdity in Luther’s statements (LR 289,29–291,3/b4r,29–c1r,3). What Luther claims, that any human deed is sin and evil, makes no sense, says Latomus, for it follows logically from it that the Lord’s prayer too, that God will forgive us our sins, is a sin and that the penitence by which man is troubled is equally a sin. And it follows that likewise love of righteousness and hate of unrighteousness are sins and deserve God’s punishment, in accordance with Rom 6:23, “for the wages of sin is death”. How can sin now extirpate sin? Latomus asks. And where is righteousness if God takes delight in sin? Luther even says that no sin is venial in itself, but on the contrary mortal, so that all man’s deeds in themselves must be mortal sins. What can be more absurd and senseless? Latomus asks again. In a way Luther makes himself guilty of exactly the same heresy as various 33 WA 2, 410,35–38: “In bono peccare hominem et peccatum veniale non natura sua sed dei misericordia solum esse tale aut in puero post baptismum peccatum remanens negare, hoc est Paulum et Christum semel conculcare.” 34 LR 289,35–36/b4r,35–36: “Omne opus bonum esse peccatum, & quod in uno & eodem opere sit actus bonus & peccatum.” F/note 4 refers to WA 2, 420,10–31. 35 The logical contradictions, the arguments from the Scripture and the old tradition, and the refutation of the first three of Luther’s arguments will be dealt with in depth below. Afterwards, an attempt will be made to sum up the results in a comprehensive analysis of Latomus’ views on the relationship between sin and good deeds. 36 LR 287,9–10/b3r,9–10: “ut nihil dici possit absurdius”.

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heretics in the early Church, the Manichaeans, the Tatianists, the Cataphrygians, who were all expelled from the Church because they maintained that marriage was and must be sinful. They therefore acted in contravention of Paul’s statement in 1 Cor 7, where he argues that being married, marrying and being unmarried are all, separately and each in their own way according to the circumstances, good deeds and therefore not sins. And thus they acted in contravention of the Church. Another passage in Paul also contradicts Luther, 1 Cor 10:13, where he says that God is faithful and will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, He will also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it. How could such a promise make sense, asks Latomus, if man sins in every deed? For then he will of course be constantly confused because he will never escape sin, and cannot in any way or with any just cause mobilize confidence in a divine promise of a way out and meaningfulness. In addition it seems to Latomus quite absurd that it is a special point for Luther that precisely the deeds of the saints are sinful, since that means that both John the Baptist’s and Paul’s deeds were nothing but sin. Can Paul’s preaching and service for the Gospels really be sin? That is not exactly what he himself calls it in his letters. Latomus believes himself able to mention many other glaring contradictions, but he finds that those mentioned are sufficient, and now goes on to adduce arguments from Scripture for his own point of view. He leaves out the Old Testament, and will adduce a few examples from the New. And only “a few”, he writes, because to enumerate all the existing Scripture proofs against Luther would be too long and too tedious.

4.2.2 Proof from the New Testament To support his views Latomus primarily adduces Luke 2:14 (“on earth peace to men of good will”),37 because like Paul, Phil 2:13 (“God who works in you, both to will and to work for His good will”),38 it proves that the good will (bona voluntas), is not sin but a gift from God. To argue further, Latomus adduces three quotations from Augustine on the human will, in which Augustine writes that the human will can be either turned right or turned wrong, depending on whether it is bound to what is right or to what is wrong, and as it is, so are its deeds. He who fulfils the double command to love in the proper way, i. e. not in the human way but the divine way, can because of that love be said to be “of good will”. This will, 37 LR 291,12–13/c1r,12–13: “In terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis.” 38 LR 291,15–16/c1r,15–16: “qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate”.

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then, is the same thing as what is called charitas in the Scriptures (LR 291,16–25/ c1r,16–25). There are many good deeds that spring from the good will, and referring to the Sermon on the Mount Latomus lists a number of them (LR 291,26–34/c1r,26– 34). Here (Matt 5:3–12) the poor in spirit, the meek, those who mourn, those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, etc. are blessed and that of course means, Latomus concludes, that the deeds mentioned are not sins, for sins can in no circumstances bring salvation. It is said of those who perform them that they shall rejoice and be glad because their reward in Heaven is great. There are also certain deeds with which we please only God or our neighbour for God’s sake (LR 291,35–292,23/c1r,35–c1v,23, with reference to Matt 6:1–18). These are giving to the needy, fasting and praying, and the deeper content of these three types of deeds Latomus explains with a new extract from Augustine.39 Here Augustine says that fasting denotes an overall chastisement of the body, giving to the needy denotes any goodwill or charity in connection with giving or forgiving, and prayer denotes all the ways we may express our desire for saintliness.40 All these practices are a way of chastising corporality, Augustine explains, and thus curb the desire, concupiscentia, which is always there but should not be there, and which sometimes creeps out and eclipses the love, charitas,41 with which God loves mankind. The more we are able to do and hold back, and thus complete, the less concupiscence will come creeping out, and vice versa. Citing Matt 6:22 (“So, if your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light”, and the continuation in Luke 11:36, “with no part of it in darkness”),42 Latomus illustrates that there are deeds which in themselves are neither good nor evil (opera indifferentia), but which are coloured by their intention (intentio). If the intention is turned right, and with the metaphor used here, “in the light”, the whole body, and therefore also all its deeds are also turned right, “full of light”. Here Latomus has returned to what he remarked about will at the outset. To cut his thesis short Latomus here presents no further arguments from the Gospels and moves on to the Epistles. He gives a detailed analysis of the Epistle to 39 De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis VII, 18. The passage is an interpretation of Matt 6:1. 40 LR 292,8–11/c1v,8–11: “Ieiunio scilicet universam corporis castigationem significans, eleemosynis omnem benevolentiam & beneficentiam vel dandi vel ignoscendi, & oratione insinuans omnes regulas sancti desyderii […].” It is debatable what is to be understood by “omnes regulas sancti desiderii” (literally translated: “all the rules for the holy wish”; in French: “toutes les rHgles de l’aspiration / la santit8”, Augustinus: 1966, 155). I have chosen to understand it as the ways regulated by prayer in which one can express one’s wish for saintliness and ask to have that wish granted. 41 Augustine’s text has hilaritas, which brings the text much closer to 2 Cor 9:7, to which the passage refers. 42 LR 292,24–26/c1v,24–26: “Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit […] Nullam habens partem tenebrarum […].”

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the Romans (LR 292,35–294,12/c1v,35–c2v,12) and afterwards adds to it by showing that what he has adduced from Romans is also to be found in the rest of the epistolary texts of the New Testament. The great number of quotations is there for those who think that it is not the content but the quantity of quotations that is decisive. Latomus works his way slowly through Romans in a concentrated and text-orientated manner, and concludes on the basis of his analysis that Paul’s epistle can in no way speak in favour of Luther’s viewpoint. How can we believe Luther’s statement that any good deed is a sin, asks Latomus indirectly, when Rom 2:6–10 says that there will be given to each according to what he has done, and for persistence in doing good, glory, honour and eternal life, but that there will be wrath and anger, trouble and distress for every human being who does evil? And in Rom 2:11–15 it is said that God does not show favouritism, and therefore it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but those who obey it. Here the epistle speaks of the law which is written on every heart, declares Latomus, in accordance with Rom 2:15, and to which everyone’s conscience (conscientia) bears witness. He then goes directly to Rom 4:1–5, in which Paul instances Abraham’s faith as an example of the faith in which he is made righteous (fides, qua justificatus est) (LR 293,14–16/c2r,14–16). To say, as one would be forced to as a consequence of Luther’s viewpoint, that this faith was sin would be tantamount to the absurd statement that Abraham had been justified by sin, and that his sin was accounted justification for him (Rom 4:5). And likewise in Rom10:10, “For with the heart one believes and is justified”. Here Latomus asks: “I wonder if the faithfulness of the heart (cordis credulitas), by which we are justified or are immediately disposed for righteousness is sin, guilt or trespass?”43 Rom 12, where Paul says that mankind must present their bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, Latomus interprets with the aid of a quotation from De Civitate Dei which again emphasizes the importance of free will. Here Augustine writes that a saintly will sanctifies the body, and if this will is always present, everything which happens with this body is without sin for that person (LR 293,26–33/c2r,26–33). As a commentary on the command to charity in Rom 13:8, “Owe no one anything, except to love each other, for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law”, Latomus asks, could the charity for the neighbour be sin, so that the law was fulfilled by sin (LR 293,33–36/c2r,33–36)? For that is in reality the consequence of Luther’s claim. And if that inference is correct, the consequence of Luther’s declaration that all human deeds are sinful will be that the law of love (lex dilectionis), can never be fulfilled. But if that is a correct inference, how can 43 LR 293,21–23/c2r,21–23: “Num cordis credulitas, qua iusti sumus, aut ad iustitiam proxime disponimur peccatum est, culpa, vel offensa?”

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Paul command and urge the living holy sacrifice with love in view, as he does? Why would Augustine say that the law cannot in fact be fulfilled, since there are deeds in which we fulfil it, and deeds in which we do not?44 Latomus ends with Rom 14:17–18: “For the kingdom of God is not a matter of eating and drinking but of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. Whoever thus serves Christ is acceptable to God and approved by men.” It means, explains Latomus, that the one who lives among others in the wisdom, prudentia, not to offend against his brothers, is pleasing to both God and men. Paul himself was a clear example of such a man, and he who, confronted with Paul’s person and testimony, maintains that his obedience and way of life were sinful, seems not to be in his right mind (sanus) (LR 293,36/294,11/c2r,36– c2v,11). Latomus now, as we have mentioned, adduces quotations in proof of the same point from the rest of the epistolary texts of the New Testament, from the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, the Epistle to the Ephesians, the Epistle to the Galatians, the Epistle of James, The Epistels to Timotheus, the Epistle of Peter and the First Epistle of John.45 He points out that the last quotation, 1 John 1:7–9,46 is the same quotation Luther uses as an argument for his viewpoint at the end of conclusion 2 in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation.

4.2.3 Arguments from the old tradition: The three long Augustine quotations From the texts of the New Testament Latomus goes on to adduce authorities from the old tradition. The majority of the quotations (three long and one shorter) are from Augustine, and two shorter ones are taken from Ambrose and Cyprian. There are hardly any comments by Latomus among them. They quite simply are supposed to speak for themselves. Here only the three long Augustine quotations will be reproduced, since what they deal with incorporates the content of the other three quotations. 44 The origin of this reference to Augustine is uncertain. Cf. F/note 42. 45 LR 294,12–296,6/c2v,12–c3v,6: 2 Cor 5:10; 9:6; Eph 2:10; Gal 5:22–23; 6:7–10; 1 Tim 6:17– 19; 2 Tim 4:7–8; Jas 1:16–18; 1:25; 3:17–18; 1 Pet 1:22–23; 2:2–5; 2:12; 2 Pet 1:10; 1 John 1:7– 9. 46 LR 296,1–6/c3v,1–6 (John 1:7–9): “Si in luce ambulamus, sicut & ipse in luce est, societatem habemus ad invicem, & sanguis Iesu Christi eius emundat nos ab omni peccato. Si dixerimus quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus, & veritas in nobis non est. Si confitemur peccata nostra fidelis est & iustus, ut remittat nobis peccata nostra, & emundet nos ab omni iniquitate.” (“But if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of his Jesus Christ cleanses us from all sin. If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.”)

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In Augustine it is declared so often that not every deed is a sin, Latomus says, that there would never be an end of it if he were to adduce all the passages. He has therefore selected three long quotations which he regards as sufficient here. Each of the three quotations, which all derive from the anti-Pelagian works,47 deals in its own slightly different way with the question of the presence of sin in the Christian. Before giving the quotations, Latomus points out that there is some doubt as to whether Augustine only says about the deeds of the believers that they are not sinful (LR 296,7–10/c3v,7–10). In Contra Julianum (IV, 13) he seems to maintain that the deeds of the infidels are sin, and that the infidels have no true virtues, and again in De Civitate Dei (V, 14). If this is so, it means that Augustine does not think that there are deeds which are good in themselves, no matter who does them, nor that man is in possession of a basic goodness which enables him to do good, no matter what kind of relation to God he has. Latomus will not comment further on the question here, but will take it up again and scrutinize it in a later article in the Exposition, viz. the one that deals with whether moral and speculative sciences are sinful (article 4).48 The first quotation is the last chapter in De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis.49 The chapter is in a sense the conclusion to the whole work, and Augustine here sums up what he finds it right or wrong to say regarding what constitutes human justice. He emphasizes that the one who maintains that there have existed or still exist humans who are free of sin, and who therefore need neither the forgiveness of sins nor the redemption of Christ are in opposition to the Scriptures, Rom 5:12, and Matt 9:12–13. Nor can we say that those who have had their sins forgiven live righteously in this life, because then we contradict 1 John 1:8, “If we say we contain no sin, we deceive ourselves.”50 Augustine points out that John does not use the perfect “have contained sin”, but the present “contain sin”, because containing sin is a permanent state for man. How this is to be understood, when at the same time it is the righteous man we speak of, Augustine explains with reference to the two lines in Our Father, 47 De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis 21, 44; De Spiritu et Littera 36, 65; Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum I, 13, 26–14, 28. 48 The three quotations from Augustine all present an openness in the phrasing which means that they can be read and interpreted in different ways without being distorted. Or rather : by laying the emphasis on different parts one can arrive at quite different results. Below they will as far as possible be read through Latomus’ eyes, i. e. the presentation is true to the original, but will not question the aspects that could run contrary to Latomus’ understanding. The ambiguity in them will be dealt with later. 49 LR 296,21–297,29/c3v,21–c4r,29: De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis 21,44. 50 It is the same text Latomus quoted above and which also Luther uses in conclusion 2 of the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation (WA 2, 420,27–30).

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“forgive us our trespasses”, and, “lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil”. The fact is, according to Augustine, that because of original sin man will always contain desire, concupiscentia, in the flesh (caro). The carnal desire is in opposition to the nature of righteousness (iustitiae ratio), which is here understood synonymously with the law, and will always strive, against man’s will, to set the desire for sin in motion. Now and again it deceives and controls man to such a degree that he gives in to concupiscence and involuntarily does and says things he should not. Even though it is concupiscence and not man himself that has moved him against his will, giving in to desire is always man’s offence and it is to remove this offence that it is necessary to pray to God daily to “forgive us our sins”. If man did not now and then sin in that way, although he has received the forgiveness for his sins and is righteous, there would be no need for the prayer “forgive us our sins”. It would then be enough to pray, “lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil”. “Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil”, is of course something we pray for to find strength to withstand the urgings of concupiscence. Containing concupiscence is no sin. It is only sin to allow oneself to be persuaded to consent to (consentire) the desire (concupiscentia). Augustine concludes by emphasizing that we must not say that once the law is received man can keep free of sin, aided by his own will and without God’s grace, and thus not need the prayer “lead us not into temptation”. Such a view is not merely slightly wrong, but directly heretical. But nor should we say that after redemption man contains no sin, not even if we explain it by saying that the freedom from sin consists in never consenting to concupiscence, or that the consent is not to be regarded as sin because God does not impute it to us. To say this is not entirely erroneous, but it is not entirely correct either,51 for it risks blurring the decisive knowledge: that the Christian will always contain concupiscence, which at some point, be it in only a very weak degree, will move him to consent to the desire of the flesh. 51 Here there is a discrepancy between Augustine’s text and Latomus’ quotation. Where Augustine writes “non nimis existimo reluctandum”, Latomus writes “non minus existimo reluctandum” (LR 297,22–23/c4r,22–23). What Augustine means is that this view of the Christian’s sin, where you say that there is no sin although afterwards you explain how to understand it, “should not be fought too eagerly”, because it is maintained by some important person, whom Augustine does not dare to reprehend: “Scio enim quibusdam esse visum, quorum de hac re sententiam non audeo reprehendere.” But even if it is a tolerable way of speaking, Augustine does not find it correct, “quanquam nec defendere valeam”, because saying that there is no sin in a Christian is close to the Pelagians’ assertion of man’s own abilities. When Latomus writes that this view of the Christian’s sin “should not be fought less”, he in a way simply emphasizes Augustine’s own point (but destroys the meaning in the next sentence). It may be a misreading, since the two words in question look alike in the manuscript. But he may also have wanted to emphasize to Luther that he is not even among those who would say that there is no sin in the Christian.

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This is also, Latomus claims, what Augustine says in the next quotation. It is from De Spiritu et Littera52 and deals with the existence of two different kinds of justice. One is in this life, and one in the life to come. The first justice, says Augustine here, is when we walk by faith, the other justice is when we walk by sight. What distinguishes the two types of justice is the degree to which the love of God is realized. Only he who after this life is face to face with the divine has a chance of living divine love to the full in accordance with the full knowledge of God. The one who is righteous in his faith, however, only understands partially, and therefore he can only go part of the way in fulfilling the command of charity. But whereas the perfectly righteous lives in the wish of remaining in a state of perfection, the righteous by faith lives in the fulfilment of duties and the hope of achieving perfection as the reward for fulfilling his duty. This difference, however, is only one of degree in relation to charitas, not in relation to sinning. It is not true that only he who is righteous by sight does not sin. Nor is this necessarily true of the one who is righteous by faith. Even though he has not reached perfection, so that he has had his desire extinguished, it is possible for him to avoid listening to and being tempted by desire, and hence possible for him to avoid sinning. Now and again, though, he will succumb and allow himself to be seduced, and simply listening to or thinking of things he should not and which are against the law is tantamount to assenting to sin, even though in its character it is not a real crime. Therefore it is necessary to pray “forgive us our sin” in Our Father, which is an exact parallel to what Augustine has said in the first quotation.53 Between the two previous quotations and the last long quotation from Augustine, Latomus adduces a shorter quotation from De Bono Coniugali and the above-mentioned shorter quotations from Ambrose’s De Apologia Prophetae David and Cyprian’s Ad Antonianum Epistolae, pars altera. Before he continues with Augustine he mentions that Jerome in his writings also agrees with the others, as for example in Dialogus contra Pelagianos, which Luther uses to prove his point, and which Latomus will deal with later in connection with Luther’s arguments. Latomus thinks quite simply that all these texts must be read in another and better way than the one Luther represents (LR 300,16–17/d1v,16– 17). The third long quotation from Augustine is from the work Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum and deals with the meaning of baptism, with the redemption through baptism, and with the continuance of desire in the one who is baptized.54 Latomus quotes it because it explicitly shows that Augustine does not 52 LR 297,30–298,29/c4r,30–c4v,29: De Spiritu et Littera 36, 65. 53 Latomus has not included the last passage about Our Father in his text. 54 LR 300–301/d1v,18–d2r,24: Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum 1, 13, 26–28.

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say that the desire left in the baptized man is a sin, as opposed to what Luther maintains in conclusion 2 of the Leipzig Disputation. Here Augustine is up against some who have accused him of championing the view that sin is not obliterated in baptism, but only cut off, so that the roots remain and the sin therefore grows out again, only to be cut anew. They are probably deceived, says Augustine, by what is said about carnal desire (concupiscentia carnis), against which the pious Christian must also contend, even though he is improving and filled with the spirit of God. Precisely as in the previous quotations, Augustine’s point is that by virtue of original sin man will always contain carnal desire in this life. Here he emphasizes that concupiscence, together with guilt (reatus), is handed on to all new-born children, but at baptism the guilt and all the sinful deeds are forgiven, and even though concupiscence remains behind it will no longer harm the one baptized, being no longer a sin in itself. Yet it is still called sin (peccatum), because it is created by sin, just as a handwriting is called “a hand” because the hand wrote it, as in “I can recognise his hand in the letter”, and because it can give rise to sinful deeds (peccata). After baptism, then, it is no longer a sin to contain desire. It is only a sin to consent to it. But this consent, even the baptized Christian cannot avoid forever. He will be guilty of it off and on when he is misled by ignorance, or when desire tempts him to it, as Augustine has described in the other quotations. And therefore, even he who is righteous (cf. quotation 1), a believer (cf. quotation 2), christened (cf. quotation 3), in other words Christian, Augustine concludes, must at all times pray not to be led into temptation, and for redemption. Whatever things concupiscence might then give rise to, as long as they cannot only be called sins (peccata), but also crimes (crimina), will be cleansed in the daily prayer and by virtue of sincerity in the matter of giving alms. Here Latomus finishes without any further analytical or explanatory comment. He mentions a few other texts in Augustine which deal with the same themes, from Contra Julianum and De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia,55 and then writes that with these quotations in hand he will now turn to Luther’s proof. Which he proceeds to do.

4.2.4 The refutation of Luther’s Scripture proof: Isaiah 64:6 One by one Latomus goes through every proof in the explanation to conclusion 2 in the Leipzig Disputation, which, as we have already seen, ran as follows: 55 Cf. F/note 103–104.

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To deny that man sins in the good deed, that the venial sin is not venial by nature but only as a consequence of God’s mercy, or that the sin stays in the child after baptism, that is the same as simultaneously overthrowing Paul and Christ.56

In his later answer to Latomus’ work Luther only deals with Latomus’ treatment of the first three quotations, and they are therefore the central ones in the dispute between them.57 The quotations are, Isa 64:6: “We have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s menstrual rag”58 ; Eccl 7:21: “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and never sins”59 ; and Rom. 7:19: “For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing.[…] For I delight in the law of God, in my inner being, but I see in my members another law.”60 Latomus begins by quoting the Scripture text, including the verses that frame it, 5 and 7a: [5a] You have met him who is joyful and works righteousness, in your ways they will remember you. [5b] Behold, you were angry, and we have sinned; in our sins we have always been, and we will be saved. [6] We have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s menstrual rag. We all have faded like a leaf, and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away, [7a] there is no one who calls upon your name, who rouses himself to take hold of you.61

Latomus mentions that there are very different interpretations of verse 6. Luther interprets it as if it is said on behalf of Isaiah himself and with him all the faithful, whereas Jerome and Lyra for example, and also Latomus himself, think that it must have been said by unbelieving Jews in exile. All three concede that it may be a question of both the Babylonian and Assyrian exiles, but prefer to interpret the text as if it were spoken by Jews after the Romans conquered Jerusalem in the year 70 AD. Whether it is an exile before or after the coming of Christ is not 56 WA 2, 410,35–38: “In bono peccare hominem et peccatum veniale non natura sua sed dei misericordia solum esse tale aut in puero post baptismum peccatum remanens negare, hoc est Paulum et Christum semel conculcare.” 57 In all three quotations the verse references are to the Vulgate. 58 LR 301,27–28/d2r,27–28: “& facti sumus immundi omnes nos, & quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae”. 59 LR 305,28–29/d4r,28–29: “Non est homo iustus in terra qui faciat bonum & non peccet.” 60 LR 309,11–14/e2r,11–14: “Non quod volo bonum hoc facio, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. […] Condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, video aliam legem in membris meis.” – Latomus’ argumentation is reproduced close to the original, both to give an impression of how he argues, and to make it easier later to follow Luther’s answer. 61 LR 302,5–11/d2v,5–11: “[5] Occurristi laetanti & facienti iustitiam in viis tuis recordabuntur tui. Ecce tu iratus es & peccavimus, in ipsis fuimus semper & salvabimur [6] & facti sumus ut immundi omnes nos, & quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae, & cecidimus quasi folium universi, & iniquitates nostrae quasi ventus abstulerunt nos, [7a] non est qui invocet nomen tuum, qui consurgat & teneat te.”

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without importance, because if the text is spoken by Jews even after the birth of Christ there is no doubt that they are infidels and do not belong to God’s chosen people. And if it is, as Latomus believes, said by unbelieving Jews, the quotation is no longer interesting as a basis for a discussion of the relationship between sin and good deeds in the Christian, as Luther thinks it is. To decide who is right, Latomus points out, one must use the proper exegetical method. One must compare the verse under discussion to what has gone before and what comes after, and look at the context (LR 302,3–5/d2v,3–5). Latomus primarily maintains that if indeed Luther is right, that it is believers under grace who are the subject of verse 6, he will find it problematic to make sense of the close connection between verses 5a and 6 (LR 302,12–14/d2v,12– 14). For if it is the believers who are called sinners and the object of God’s anger in verse 6, who is it then that in verse 5a is called righteous and someone who is met by God? asks Latomus, taking it for granted that the two persons cannot be one and the same because of their opposite qualities. Again verse 7a will make no sense if Luther is right, because here it says that of those who speak in verse 6 nobody called upon God’s name (LR 302,14–36/ d2v,14–36). If we follow Luther’s interpretation and claim that verse 6 speaks on behalf of the entire faithful people, it will mean that among all the faithful no one has ever called upon God’s name. And that, Latomus points out, is patently wrong and contradicts what is said in other places in Scripture. In proof of this he enumerates a series of quotations from the Old Testament which tell how God’s chosen have called upon Him. It is therefore unbelieving Jews and not believing Christians who are the subject of verses 5b–7, he concludes (LR 303,8–24/d3r,8–24), and that they are in exile is incontestably demonstrated by verses 10–11 at the end of the chapter.62 What they say about themselves when they admit that their righteousness is unclean should therefore be taken literally. They do not call themselves unrighteous, because they really are in the sense that the righteousness of their law has been suspended with the coming of the Gospel. They themselves do not know this to be so, since they are hardened and do not believe in Christ. They call their righteousness unclean because now, after the fall of Jerusalem, they can no longer contrive to keep the Mosaic Law in Jewish fashion, i. e. make sacrifices on Jerusalem feast days, sacrifice the Easter lamb in one particular place, and so on. Everything that according to the ceremonial law belongs to the cult around the 62 Isa 64:10–11: “[10] Civitas sancti tui facta est deserta, Sion deserta facta est, Hierusalem desolata [11] domus sanctificationis nostrae, & gloriae nostrae, ubi laudaverunt te patres nostri, facta est in exustitionem ignis, & omnia desiderabilia nostra versa sunt in ruinas” (“[10] The city of your holiness has been deserted, Zion has become a wilderness, Jerusalem a desolation; [11] The house of our sanctification and our glory, where our fathers praised you, has been burned by fire, and all our pleasant things have become ruins”).

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temple in Jerusalem has been made impossible for them. Therefore Latomus presupposes that it is indeed the Jews after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD who speak. Luther in addition adduces as an argument for his interpretation of the text that confessing our iniquity in the humble way that it happens in verse 6 solely belongs to the righteous under grace (WA 2, 411,11–17). The righteousness of the law does not confess anything to God in humbleness, but is conceited and excuses and justifies itself. Against this Latomus objects that if we look at the context, Isa 63:17.19, “[17] O Lord, why do you make us wander from your ways and harden our heart, so that we fear you not?”, and “[19] We have become like in the beginning, when you did not rule us and your name was not called on us”,63 and Isa 65:2–3a, where God says, “I spread out my hands all the day to an incredulous people, who walk in a way that is not good, following their own devices; a people who provoke me to my face continually”,64 it is evident that it is not righteous people who are the subject here, and hence not in chapter 64 either. Therefore, according to Latomus, Isa 64:6 can only be about the prayer of proud people for earthly deliverance. Often the voice and bearing of the humble and the proud are the same in the Scripture, declares Latomus, and he concedes that this apparent identification between the humble and the proud, or a parallel mention of them, as for example in this text in verses 5 and 6, can make the exegesis of the text somewhat difficult, in that it can make it difficult to distinguish the righteous from the unrighteous. For example Saul and David appeared equal before God, but because David was humble he was forgiven, while Saul was proud and was not. But the apparent identification of parallel mention in no way allows us simply to lump together the humble and the proud, as does Luther, by saying that everyone’s righteousness is simply unclean. Their hearts are different, and that is what is important to God. If you do like Luther, according to Latomus, you simply cease to distinguish right from wrong (LR 304,2–3/d3v,2–8). As an example of where this apparent identification between the humble and the proud may take place (LR 304,8–24/d3v,8–24), Latomus mentions the situations in which the holy pray for the sinful, and in their prayer include themselves among them, for example Daniel’s prayer to God, Dan 9:4–20. That kind of inclusive statement in Scripture does not usually include everyone, but

63 303,31–34/d3r,31–34: “[17] quare errare nos fecisti domine de viis tuis. Indurasti cor nostrum ne timeremus te […]. [19] facti sumus quasi in principio cum non dominareris nostri, neque invocaretur nomen tuum super nos […].” 64 303,35–304,2/d3r,35–d3v,2 : “[2] Expandi manus meas tota die ad populum incredulum, qui graditur in via non bona post cogitationes suas, [3a] populus qui ad iracundiam provocat me ante faciem meam semper.”

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only the majority.65 Jer 6:13 is another example. Here it is said that “everyone from prophet to priest is greedy”,66 and yet none of Jeremiah, Isaiah or Ezekiel was greedy. And when Paul in Phil 2:21 says that “they all seek their own interests, not those of Jesus Christ”,67 he does not include Titus, Timotheus, Peter or the other apostles, who indeed did not seek their own, but what belonged to Jesus Christ. It is the same figure we find in Isa 64:6. The words “We have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s menstrual rag” are not said about everybody, since the holy and righteous are clean, but about most people, as the majority do wrong. When Luther says that Isaiah does not say “we” or “our”, but “we all” and “all our righteous deeds” because he excepts no one, we could answer, says Latomus, that conversely one can argue that he does not say “all”, but “we all” and does not say “all”, but “all our”, and thus solely refers to those of whom he actually speaks. And even if Isaiah might not have talked without this direct limitation in his expression (we and our), we would, as always, have been obliged to look at the text in its context to understand it, and like that we would arrive at the same conclusion: that it is a certain group of exiled Jews who are the subject in this passage from Isaiah, and that 64:6 is therefore not a universal statement. An example of how the context dictates such a limitation of a statement is seen in Jerome’s exegesis of Isa 13:5, where it is said that God would act to “destroy the whole land”.68 Here Jerome says that the context shows us that the verse of course does not mean that God will destroy the whole world, but only the land of the Babylonians and Chaldaeans (LR 304,25–33/d3v,25–33). At the end of his argumentation in connection with Isa 64:6 Luther attacks the scholastics’ view of the law (LR 305,11–26/d4r,11–26). He knows that most scholastics expound Isa 64:6 as a reference to unbelieving Jews and their unclean righteousness, as Latomus clearly does, too. And against that Luther emphasizes that it is wrong to say with the scholastics that the righteousness of the law, and in this case that means the ceremonial law, is unclean in comparison with what they call evangelical righteousness. Because both the ceremonial law and the Decalogue, Luther insists, are instituted by God and are therefore basically good in themselves. Latomus totally rejects this by reference to 2 Cor 3:7–11, in which Paul says that that the glory of the Old Testament is not glory in comparison to the glory of the New Testament, and a reference to Ezek 20:25: “I gave them statutes that were not good and rules by which they could not have life.” What, 65 Latomus here, without mentioning the term itself, refers to the rhetorical figure synecdoche. Its characteristic is that one uses either a universal term for a part or a partial term for the whole. 66 LR 304,14–15/d3v,14–15: “Omnes avaritiae student a propheta usque ad sacerdotem […].” 67 LR 304,16–17/d3v,16–17: “Omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt, non Iesu christi […].” 68 LR 304,32/d3v,32: “Ut disperdat omnem terram”.

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asks Latomus, is the meaning of these statements if not that the ceremonial law in some way, and compared with something else, can be said not to be good?69 The exegesis of Isa 64:6 which Latomus here, in continuation of Jerome, Lyra and others, has produced, in his eyes makes the whole quotation irrelevant to the discussion of the relationship between sin and good deeds among Christians. And of the three quotations the expounding of this quotation therefore may give the best impression of how random and entirely unintelligible Luther’s exegesis is in Latomus’ eyes. As Latomus sees it, we can only arrive at Luther’s result by breaking up the text and interpreting the words as we find convenient, thus pulling the Scripture away from its real meaning towards what one wants it to say (LR 303,2–8/d3r,2–8). Thus by not keeping to the necessary exegetical directions, as Latomus has already suggested at the outset, of placing the verses that have to be expounded within both the wider and the narrower contexts when expounding even a single word, one creates, as Latomus thinks it has been made clear in this context, both errors and confusion in the Scriptures, and it becomes a problem that Scripture can no longer be brought to harmonize with itself.70

4.2.5 Ecclesiastes 7:21 In Eccl 7:20–21 we read: “[20] Wisdom gives strength to the wise man more than ten rulers who are in a city. [21] Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and does not sin.”71 This last verse 21, Luther says in the Explanation to conclusion 2 in the Leipzig Disputation, is normally parried by the scholastics by saying that the righteous man sometimes does the good deed and sometimes sins (WA 2, 411,39–412,7). But that is not how we should understand it according to Luther, because if that were what Solomon had wanted to say he could have expressed it like this: “There is no righteous man who does not sin.” This would then be a parallel to Prov 24:16: “for the righteous falls seven times a day and rises as many again.”72 Why should Solomon add “… who does good deeds and does not sin”, if not, says Luther, to emphasize that the case is paradoxical? That the righteous man is at the same time both righteous and a sinner? Against this Latomus refers to Jerome and Bede as authorities behind his own 69 LR 303,23–26/d4r,23–26: “‘Dedi eis praecepta non bona, & iuditia in quibus non vivent’, nisi iustitia cerimonialis quodammodo & ad aliquid comparata non bona dici possit.” 70 LR 305,9–10/d4r,9–10: “Quod nisi ita scriptura tractetur, innumerabiles generabuntur errores & magna fiet confusio, neque scriptura scripturae concordari poterit.” 71 LR 305,30–32/d4r,30–32: “[20] Sapientia confortabit sapientem super decem potestatem habentes, qui sunt in civitate, [21] quia non est homo iustus in terra qui faciat bonum & non peccet […].” 72 WA 2, 412,6: “Septies in die cadit iustus, et toties resurgit.”

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exegesis. They say exactly what Latomus thinks the verses mean, that Eccl 7:21 and Prov 24:26 deal with precisely the same subject, i. e. that in this life the righteous man lives in the flesh, as Jerome says in his commentary to Eccl 7:21, and therefore, though he is righteous he is subject to vice and sin and needs help from a higher Power.73 And Bede similarly emphasizes in his commentary to Prov 24:16 that we cannot call anyone righteous who seems to fall unless we refer to the minor everyday venial sins which even the righteous cannot live without committing.74 The point in Eccl 7:21 and Prov 24:16 then, according to Latomus, is quite parallel to the central content of the three quotations from Augustine. It is worth noting that with the Bede text Latomus can emphasize that the righteous only commit peccata venialia, and thus sets up the distinction between peccata and crimina on which Augustine touched briefly in the last of the three texts. Luther’s invention, that Eccl 7:21 and Prov 24:16 supposedly express two different things makes no sense at all, according to Latomus (LR 306,13–27/ d4v,13–27). If indeed Luther is right that “there is no righteous man on earth who does good and does not sin” means that the righteous man does the good deed and sins in one and the same act, then what are we to make of Ps 89:48: “what man can live and not see death?”75 Is that to mean that man lives and dies at the same time? Or what about “what man can live and not eat”?76 Does that mean that when somebody lives he eats? In Latomus’ eyes the comparison shows that Luther’s exegesis is quite absurd and distorted (LR 306,30–32/d4v,30–32). To support his own interpretation Latomus now adduces 3 Kings 8:46 (Vulgate; 1 Kings 8:46 in the English Bible), where Solomon also speaks, and according to Latomus says the same thing that is said in Eccl 7:21: “Non est enim homo, qui non peccet.” And Latomus then expounds the matter with the aid of a long quotation from Jerome’s Dialogus contra Pelagianos (III, 4). He sums up the point in his own words, and again it is quite parallel to the central point in the three long Augustine quotations: “Here you see that the fact that man is not without iniquity among the holy means that man cannot forever avoid sin.”77 Latomus is aware that one of the main accusations directed at the scholastics by Luther and his adherents is that they have no idea what the word sin, peccatum, means (LR 307,26–308,28/e1r,26–e1v,28).78 In that connection Luther maintains that he finds his concept of sin, which is wholly different from the scholastic tradition, in the Scriptures. Latomus therefore sets himself the task of 73 74 75 76 77

LR 305,34–36/d4r,34–36: Jerome, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten (ad 7:20). LR 306,1–4/d4v,1–4: Bede, In Proverbia Salomonis II (ad 24:16). LR 306,18–19/d4v,18–19: “Non est homo qui vivat & non videat mortem […].” LR 306,22/d4v,22: “Non est homo qui vivit & non comedit […].” LR 307,23–24/e1r,23–24: “Hic habes quod hominem non esse sine peccato, apud sanctos sit eum non perpetuo carere peccato.” 78 Cf. WA 2, 414,23; 416,38f; 420,15.

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explaining in which way Scripture talks about peccatum, and from there going on to refute Luther. The word peccatum, then, is used in four different ways. Scripture speaks of peccatum as 1) the cause of sin (peccati causa); 2) the effect of sin or the punishment for sin (peccati effectus vel poena); 3) the offering for sin (oblatio pro peccato); and finally 4) that very sin by which God is offended (ipsum peccatum quo deus offenditur) and the soul is declared iniquitous and liable to punishment, that is to say punishment for the deed or propensity by which God is offended by His creation, and His creation offends and displeases God. The latter meaning is the most common in both Scripture and the Church Fathers. The first three meanings of peccatum denote the circumstances of sin. As an example of peccatum in the sense of the “cause” of sin, Origen and Ambrose mention the devil, and Augustine talks of the desire left in those who are baptized or the movements of desire in the baptized one which creates sin in those who consent to it. By the “effect or punishment”, Latomus says is meant the desire and mortality that are the consequence of sin as well as other penalties for sin. As an “offering” for sin propitiatory sacrifices are mentioned. For that reason Christ is also sometimes called peccatum. In the Scripture text used here it is not one of the three first senses of peccatum that is operative. What is said is that man sins, and no man can necessarily be said to sin either because of 1) the devil or the habitual desire, i. e. the desire left behind in those who have been baptized; 2) the punishment for sin; or 3) the offering for sin. Because when he sacrifices for sin, he does not sin. Nor is he sinful even though the movements of desire rule him, as Augustine says in his commentary on the Letter to the Galatians: “Aliud est peccatum habere, aliud peccare” (Epistolae ad Galatas Expositio 48). Ergo it must be the last sense of peccatum that is used in Eccl 7:21. And at the same time Luther’s exegesis of the text, that all the deeds of the righteous are sin, is ruled out, because according to Latomus we cannot say about the one who is guilty of ipsum peccatum quo deus offenditur, that he is righteous. Conversely, as an example of the righteous deed, to illustrate from the opposite perspective that it cannot be regarded as identical with ipsum peccatum quo deus offenditur, Latomus mentions Paul’s collection for Jerusalem (LR 308,28–309,10/e1v,28–e2r,10). He now asks Luther to tell what rational and wise circumstance (circumstantia rationis & prudentiae) is lacking in this deed. Can Luther point out where the evil is in that? Cannot we suppose that Paul is entirely aware of the seven necessary circumstances for a human act which together make his act into a deed that is in accordance with reason and thus is a virtue? Virtue, according to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (II, 6, 15), is a habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus, i. e. a natural habit which is in accordance with reason. If Luther wants to deny the Aristotelian link between

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virtue and the circumstances, he must at the same time deny Augustine, whom Luther himself calls praeclarissimus pater (WA 2, 417,26), because in Contra Julianum Augustine affiliates himself with Aristotle’s definition: “because virtue has been well defined by those who say that virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus.”79 It is now up to Luther to explain in what the carnal element in Paul’s collection for Jerusalem consists. One wonders if Paul does not work voluntarily, spontaneously and joyfully? According to Latomus he does. Is there anything else that drives him to this deed than charitas and iustitiae dilectio, divine love and the love of justice? When Luther realizes this, will he not stop tainting the honour of the saints?

4.2.6 The Epistle to the Romans 7:14ff Without taking a stand as to which is the more correct, Latomus first emphasizes in his exegesis of Rom 7:14ff (LR 309,11–319,5/e2r,11–f3r,5) that the quotation is understood in two different ways in the tradition. According to one wing, which counts men like Origen, Ambrose and the early Augustine, the protagonist in the text is to be understood as a man under the law, that is a man who is not yet justified, whereas the other wing, represented by Jerome, Gregory of Nazianzus, Chrysostom and the late Augustine, regard the text as spoken on behalf of Paul himself and other righteous persons. The latter interpretation the elderly Augustine comes to regard as most in accordance with Paul, and though it might at first sight seem to be close to Luther’s exegesis, and as that is indeed the one Luther prefers, Latomus will now show that it is not consistent with Luther’s thoughts. Consequently, Latomus quotes Augustine’s long exegesis of Rom 7:19ff from Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum in its entirety,80 and so returns to the antiPelagian Augustine whom he invoked in the long quotations earlier in the Exposition. The point in Latomus’ interpretation of Rom 7:19ff is therefore by and large the same as in the three long quotations from Augustine, i. e. that all, including the righteous, always contain desire (concupiscentia), but should not necessarily therefore be termed sinners. From that point of departure it is selfevident to expound Rom 7:14ff as spoken by a righteous man. Augustine explains again what it means that the righteous man is taken prisoner in the flesh (Rom 7:23). He writes: “‘captivantem me’ dixerit carne, non mente, motione non consensione”, i. e. that with verse 23, “making me captive”, Paul means that the speaker is taken prisoner through the flesh, not the mind, 79 LR 309,1–15/e2r,1–5: Contra Julianum IV, 3, 19. 80 LR 310,9–316,29/e2v,9–f1v,29: Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum I, 8, 13–10, 22.

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through motion not consent (LR 316,2–3/f1v,2–3). Augustine from here goes on to understand Rom 7:25, “so then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin”, as a description of the righteous man’s existence in the battle between the carnal desire, alias sin, on the one hand, and the nature of righteousness,81 alias God’s law on the other. With his flesh he serves the law of sin by desiring, and with his mind he serves the law of God by not consenting to desire (LR 316,11–14/f1v,11–14). And Augustine goes on to conclude in connection with Rom 8:1 that only those who consent (consentire) with concupiscence will be damned, and “therefore there is no damnation for those who are in Christ, ‘For the law of the Spirit of life has set me free in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and death’, (Rom 8:2); in other words, Augustine adds, “so that carnal desire does not lay claim to your consent.”82 When Luther in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation asks who dares understand the struggle against God’s law as anything but sinning, so that the speaker in 7:25 also sins in that he quite explicitly says that with his flesh he does not serve God’s law, but that of sin (WA 2, 412,17ff), Latomus answers that Augustine dares understand it as well as say it directly in several places, as has become clear. Latomus determines, with a loose reference to Augustine, that the very fact of concupiscence, which is the movements and rebellion of desire or passion against reason and the law, is no sin unless the consent of reason is connected with it (LR 316,34–36/f1v,34–36). Therefore there are two possibilities that a vice (vitium), which seems to be against the law is not a sin. For one thing 1) it is not a sin in people whose reason or free will does not function (LR 317,9–10/f2r,9–10); nor 2) is it a sin in those who in keeping with reason (LR 317,29–30/f2r,29–30) choose not to consent to it, as said before. As an example of the former category we might mention sleeping people and children, in whom reason is not active or fully developed, and who therefore cannot make a free choice, and the latter are the righteous who after baptism have been cleansed of the guilt of both original sin and real sin, and now can withstand desire with the aid of their reason. The last part of Luther’s criticism that Latomus answers is the charge Luther brings forward in saying that the scholastics, on the strength of Rom 7:18, “for I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out”, conclude that we find goodness difficult and evil easy. And yet, Luther declares, they dare to say that the good deed is without sin. As if, he says, the trouble that hinders a free loving fulfilment of the law is not a hindrance for fulfilling that same law which can only be fulfilled in a pure and free love (WA 2, 412,25–30). To this 81 Cf. the first of the three long Augustine quotations. 82 LR 316,16–18/f1v,16–18: “Lex enim spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu liberavit me a lege peccati & mortis, ne scilicet consensionem tuam concupiscentia sibi vindicet carnis.”

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Latomus rejoins that the propensity for evil and the difficulty of doing good, as said before, do not cause the virtuous deed to become sin. On the contrary it is true that the stronger the propensity for evil, the more meritorious is correspondingly the successful resistance to it. That is what makes people great martyrs (LR 318,1–8/f2v,1–8). In addition, Luther has misunderstood when he says that the law can only be fulfilled in a pure and free love (LR 318,28–36/f2v,28–36). This was apparent, according to Latomus, already in the second long quotation from Augustine’s De Spiritu et Littera, which dealt with two degrees of righteousness, the righteousness by faith and the righteousness by sight. Here Augustine says that the divine law is binding in different ways, depending on which level man has reached. The righteousness by faith can only achieve a fulfilment of the law piece by piece, while the righteousness by sight reaches perfection. Therefore the commandments are also phrased differently. “You shall not covet” is an absolute command to the righteous of faith, whereas “love your Lord” is only for the one who lives by sight (LR 318,31–36/f2v,31–36).

4.3

The relation between sin and good deeds

From what has been said above it follows that the goodness of deeds according to Latomus occupies five levels.83 1–2) At the bottom are found the sinful deeds, which may be either mortal or venial.84 3) Then follow opera indifferentia, deeds 83 Because Latomus allows his arrangement of material to be entirely structured by the argumentation in Luther’s works, it can be difficult to find out precisely how his theology is constituted. Cf. Vercruysse: 1988, 387: “Das Verfahren, die Argumente Punkt für Punkt, per ordinem zu besprechen, ergibt, dass man in De Primatu Romani Pontificis nur eine von der lutherischen Vorlage bedingte fragmentarische Ekklesiologie findet.” The following pages will attempt first to develop Latomus’ view of the relationship between sin and good deeds, on the basis of what has already been presented: The logical contradictions, the proof from NT and from the tradition, and finally the Exposition of Luther’s first three proofs from Scripture. The rest of the Exposition will be included, in an attempt to reach some more precise definitions and thus a more coherent description of Latomus’ theological universe. 84 Cf. the initial listing of logical contradictions in Luther’s thesis (the distinction between venial and mortal sins is present in the title of Luther’s conclusion 2 in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation). Cf. also Augustine’s distinction between more and less sinful deeds in the third long Augustine quotation, where he makes the point that there is a difference between peccata and crimina. Cf. also Augustine quotation no. 2: “non tantum in illis horrendis facinoribus et flagitiis perpetrandis, verum etiam in istis levioribus” (LR 298,22–24/ c4v,22–24), and the Augustine quotation from De Spiritu et Littera in article 4 of the Exposition. Here Augustine writes: “Sicut enim non impediunt a vita aeterna iustum quaedam peccata venialia sine quibus haec vita non ducitur” (LR 432,33–35/v3v,33–35). Also the Bede quotation from his exegesis of Eccl 7:21 was used by Latomus to support what he said about the venial sins.

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which in themselves are neither good nor evil, but which take their colour from the intentio behind them. 4) Good deeds are deeds which are meritorious, i. e. worthy of a reward in Heaven, and finally there are 5) especially good deeds which like the good deeds are meritorious, but can be characterized as “especially good” because their sole purpose is to please God, or the neighbour for God’s sake. What is needful is to concentrate on turning away from oneself towards one’s neighbour and God by chastising carnality in three different ways, fasting, prayer and almsgiving.85 Of these especially good deeds Latomus says that “when this happens [i. e. that God, or the neighbour for the sake of God, are pleased through them] they are without sin, though they can be exercised in such a way that the sin is contained in them”.86 It is true not only of the especially good deeds, but of all deeds, that it is not only the material aspect, i. e. the content of the deed as such, but also the way it is executed which determines its value. A deed, for example giving to the needy, which as far as content goes is suitable to be qualified as especially good, may lose in value if it is not done in accordance with the circumstances demanded (circumstantiae). Latomus emphasized this situation, that both the content of the deed and its execution are decisive, in his exegesis of Eccl 7:21, where he mentioned Paul’s collection for Jerusalem as an example of a good deed. Here he asked if Paul could or could not be taken to be aware of the seven circumstances necessary for a deed to be qualified as good.87 According to Latomus all people are disposed to have good intentions regarding the indifferent deeds or for doing good deeds, since all men have God’s law inscribed in their hearts (Rom 1:15) and are thus able by using their conscience (conscientia) to register what is right and wrong.

4.3.1 Rationality and will All people contain reason (ratio) and will (voluntas), which have a part in qualifying their deeds. In his section on the New Testament Latomus undoubtedly gives prominence to will, with several references to Augustine. He 85 The indifferent deeds were mentioned by Latomus in connection with Matt 6:22: “if your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light.” The good deeds were mentioned in connection with the blessings in Matt. 5:3–12, and the especially good deeds were mentioned in continuation of Matt 6:1–18 on the three ways of chastising carnality : alms, fasting and prayer. 86 LR 292,2–5/c1v,2–5: “cum videlicet per ea soli deo placere intendimus, aut proximo propter deum, quod dum fit sine peccato sunt, quamvis sic exerceri possint, ut in eis contingat peccatum.” 87 That Latomus adduces seven circumstantiae, and lists them as he does (LR 308,31–32/ e1v,31–35F, 35,31–32: quis, quid, qualiter, per quid, propter quid, ubi & quando), suggests Thomist influence, cf. Gründel: 1963, 651.

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begins by quoting Luke 2:14, “and on earth peace to men of good will”, and explains with Augustine that it is the will that decides the quality of the deed and that the good will is identical with charitas. And in connection with the exegesis of Rom 12, again following Augustine, he says that the “living holy sacrifice” (Rom 12:1) means that the body is sanctified by a holy will. He also says (to Rom 14:17) that he who lives in the right way, i. e. without offending his brothers is prudens, wise, but whatever deeper meaning it has, we do not learn. Whether it is because of the right-turned will that he is wise, or whether it is because he has become wise that his will is right-turned, is an open question. Ratio plays no role in the section in which he quotes from the New Testament, but during his exegesis of Eccl 7:21 and Rom 7:19ff it comes to the fore: partly where Latomus, with an Aristotelian definition of virtue, defines ratio as that with which a deed must be in accord to be good, and partly in connection with Rom 7:19ff, where he says that the desire rebels against both “reason and the law”, and that the consensus with desire, which can make a sinner of the righteous, is a consensus rationis, a rational consent. Again in the last part of the commentary on Rom 7:19ff is the importance of reason emphasized. Here Latomus says – against that consensus rationis can make a man into a sinner – that the only thing that can prevent a man from carrying the guilt of containing desire is that he lacks either the full use of rational thought or free will (usus rationis aut liberum arbitrium), as is the case with children and fools, or if he is righteous and can thus withstand the propensities of desire with the aid of his reason (si ratio resistit). Here voluntas is not of great importance, but it warrants a mention. As to Paul’s collection for Jerusalem as an example of a good deed, it is said both that it is in accordance with ratio and that it is moved by charitas and happens voluntarie, prompte, hilariter, i. e. voluntarily, spontaneously and joyfully. Voluntas, then, is also part of the good deed, which is seen in the expression voluntarie, and in that Latomus previously, with Augustine, determined charitas as identical with bona voluntas. It is interesting to note that Augustine apparently has more to say about voluntas than about ratio. All the statements about voluntas in the section with New Testament quotations are either found directly in Augustine’s words or in immediate connection to quotations from him. But in the commentary on Luther’s scriptural proof, where ratio is dominant, it is mentioned without direct connection to Augustine. When Latomus in the section quoting from the New Testament speaks of the good deed, aided by quotations from Augustine, he speaks solely about how the will gives rise to it and that it is dependent on that to which the will is bound. But when he himself in the commentary on Luther’s scriptural proof defines the good deed, he uses Aristotle’s rational definition in parallel with his mention of the presence of charitas and the voluntary nature of the deed. His reference to

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Augustine as also subscribing to Aristotle’s definition of virtue is even misleading. In Contra Julianum, where Augustine mentions it, he does not do so because he thinks that it is the ultimative definition of the good deed, as Latomus suggests. On the contrary he mentions it to point out that it has only come into being because those who defined it did not know that which can redeem and bless man. Thus it makes good sense to those who know no better, but Augustine’s point is that reason cannot cause the deeds to become good in any real sense. Only Christ and the belief in him can do that (Contra Julianum IV, 3, 19). Ratio is mentioned nowhere in the quotations from Augustine alongside the concept of consensus. Where the two concepts are linked into rationi consensus, it is Latomus himself who in his own words sums up the references to Augustine he has so far adduced. In Latomus’ Exposition we do not get a sufficiently clear impression of what Augustine’s concept of consensus covers, but if we look at what follows the quotation about the decisive role of the will in the result of the deeds, which Latomus adduced as an elaborative comment to Luke 2:14, it will be seen that here it is the will which consents to whatever it is, not reason.88 Also the ideas that the use of reason (usus rationis) is absent in children and fools, and that reason resists (ratio resistit), desire in the righteous, are not from Augustine. If we look at how Augustine expresses himself about the righteous man’s resistance to desire, in the commentary on Rom 7:19ff, he does not say ratio resistit, but that God’s law is served with the mind (mens), because one does not consent (consentit) to desire. If we follow the above observation of the connection between consensus and voluntas in Augustine, it means that the will, and hence the human mind, complies with God’s law instead of with desire. In other words there seems to be a discrepancy between Latomus and Augustine in this matter. In Augustine it seems to be the will that decides which way man is turned, while both reason and will play a role in Latomus. Maybe one could say that whereas man in Augustine is ruled by his will, since the will governs his other qualities, in Latomus he is dependent on having both a wellfunctioning reason and a right-turned will. And unlike Augustine it seems in Latomus that it is primarily the ability of the reason to distinguish and thus resist evil and turn to good which is of importance for the goodness of man. Thus, in Latomus it is ratio which rules the rest of man’s abilities. That Latomus mentions the free choice (liberum arbitrium), as that which 88 De Civitate Dei XIV, 6: “Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus? Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus? Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae volumus, laetitia vocatur.” Cf. LR 291,16–19/c1r16–19.

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together with usus rationis influences man’s responsibility, does not necessarily add anything about his view of respectively ratio and voluntas. What it does say is that he emphasizes human freedom as what constitutes a human being, together with the use of reason. But whether the free choice is determined by the will or the reason remains an open question. Traditionally both concepts play a role in what is said about liberum arbitrium.89 In the light of the above remarks it might appear that in Latomus it is primarily ratio and secondarily voluntas which makes the choice. Yet we must not forget that Latomus also underlines charitas and bona voluntas and the presence of voluntariness in the good deed. What that means, i. e. what role the will plays in the good deed will be taken up later in connection with Latomus’ doctrine of grace.

4.3.2 Concupiscence In the three long quotations in Latomus’ text Augustine writes that desire (concupiscentia), is found in the mortal flesh (caro mortalis), and represents the carnal desires that are contrary to the law. In all three passages he emphasizes that concupiscence spurs on man to give in to these desires, in deed, speech and thought. So both the corporal and the spiritual sides of man are influenced and can thus be called carnal. Some scholars have detected a trace of ambiguity in the concept of concupiscentia in Augustine (cf. Seeberg: 1923, 509–512; Hamel: 1935, vol. 2, 16–20; Hermann: 1930, 42, note 2; 48; MacDonald: 1999, 112, quoting De libero arbitrio). They are of the opinion that his work opens up to a double understanding. According to one, which may be read out of the texts Latomus has selected, concupiscentia is not in itself a sin (peccatum), but a result of and a punishment for original sin.90 When concupiscentia in this context is termed peccatum it is only because it is the cause of the concrete sins that might be committed when man gives in and consents to it. According to the other view of concupiscentia in Augustine, desire is understood as identical with original sin. In other words not only as a result of and punishment for it and a cause of concrete sins, but as the cause of, and therefore in nature identical to, Adam’s sin. The difference between 89 LThK, “Freiheit”, 326: “Die Freiheit hat ‘als Ursache den Willen’ (libertas exercitii) und ‘als Wurzel die Vernunft’ (libertas specificationis; Thomas von Aquin), da jede Handlung durch den Willen vollzogen und durch Erkenntnis der Ziele und Mittel spezifiziert ist.” See also Korolec: 1982. 90 Cf. LR 300,30–33/d1v,30–33: “Sed haec etiamsi vocatur peccatum, non utique quia peccatum est, sed quia peccato facta est, sic vocatur ; sicut scriptura manus cujusque dicitur, quod manus eam fecerit.” Cf. also LR 297,3–7/c4r,3–7.

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the two understandings is best seen by taking a look at how guilt is placed. In the first meaning of concupiscentia the guilt of original sin comes before the desire as the result of original sin, whereas the opposite is true in the latter meaning, where desire is the cause of original sin, and therefore also of guilt. The decisive point, then, is what qualifies a thing to be termed peccatum: concupiscentia or reatus. It is in fact possible to read the second meaning out of the Augustine texts Latomus has selected. In the first quotation from De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis, concupiscentia seems to be present in both meanings in the following paragraph: Quod si quisquam asserit de illo peccato esse dictum, quod habitat in carne mortali secundum vitium, quod peccantis primi hominis voluntate contractum est, cuius peccati desyderiis ne obediamus Paulus apostolus praecipit. Non autem peccare qui eidem peccato, quamvis in carne habitanti, ad nullum opus malum omnino consensit, vel facti, vel dicti, vel cogitati, quamvis ipsa concupiscentia moveatur, quae alio modo peccati nomen accepit, quod ei consentire peccare sit, nobisque moveatur invitis (LR 296,36–297,7/c3v,36–c4r,7).

Here Augustine first writes that when we speak of the sin that is in all men we mean the sin which is inherited from Adam, and which resides in the mortal flesh, and whose desires we must not obey. And afterwards he writes that concupiscentia “in another way” (alio modo) has been given the name of sin because consenting to it is sin. The question is how to understand “illo peccato […], quod habitat in carne mortali […], cuius peccati desideriis ne obediamus”. If the text has to be brought to match the fact that in other places Augustine declares that what resides in the flesh (“quod habitat in carne mortali”) and contains the desires (“peccati desideriis”) to be concupiscence, then peccatum is here identical to concupiscentia though in the other sense of the word: concupiscentia as the cause of and therefore of the same nature as original sin. But simultaneously Augustine goes on to say that concupiscentia “in another way” is called peccatum, because it is not a sin in itself, but causes sin if man gives in to it. We might explain it by saying that Augustine here speaks of two levels of desire. That also clarifies why he writes “alio modo” about “peccati nomen accepit”, thus suggesting that the concept of concupiscentia involves two meanings. The difference between the two different levels of desire depends on whether one speaks of desire in the infidel or in the Christian. In the infidel concupiscentia is identical with original sin. But in the baptized righteous Christian the sting has been taken out of desire, and it has been reduced to only being the possibility of sin, i. e. to no longer qualifying the one in whom it still resides as a sinner. In the third of the long quotations, from Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, Augustine makes a statement that is similar to the above. Here, again, he em-

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phasizes that concupiscentia carnis and the guilt for it (reatus eius) are inherited at birth and harm man unless he is baptized, and here we see that guilt is coupled with concupiscentia: Et ista ipsa carnis concupiscentia in baptismo sic dimittitur, ut quanquam tracta sit a nascentibus, nihil noceat renascentibus. Ex quibus tamen si filios carnaliter gignunt, rursus trahitur, rursusque & nocitura nascentibus nisi eadem forma renascentibus remittatur, & insit nihil obfutura vitae futurae, quoniam reatus eius generatione tractus, regeneratione dimissus est (LR 300,35–301,5/d1v,35–d2r,5).

He goes on to say that concupiscentia ceases to be a sin in any real sense after baptism, since the guilt of it is forgiven, and the baptized Christian can now avoid consenting to it, “et ideo iam non sit peccatum, sed hoc vocetur, sive quod peccato facto sit, sive quod peccandi delectatione moveatur, & si ei vincente delectatione iustitiae non consentiatur” (LR 301,d2r,5–7). So it is possible that what Augustine says about concupiscentia is not to be seen as ambiguous, but has to be understood as it is explained here: as something which in one area, viz. in relation to the infidels, is tantamount to original sin, and in another area, viz. in relation to the baptized Christians, is no longer a sin but the result of and punishment for original sin and the eventuality of possible future sins of commission. So it might be that it is the presence of guilt (reatus) (cf. the quotation from Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, which both distinguishes between concupiscentia and reatus eius and links them), which determines whether concupiscentia is peccatum or not. Concupiscentia is in its origin the cause of and therefore bound up with Adam’s guilt, and everyone else’s after him. But at baptism guilt and concupiscence are separated, and guilt, which is what makes us sinners, is removed while the weakened concupiscence remains behind. And yet, in the final analysis, Augustine’s meaning is after all ambiguous. This is especially expressed in the quotation from Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum. In the first remark in the text about what concupiscence is he seems to distinguish between desire as such and what is properly sin, “Sed haec etiamsi vocatur peccatum, non utique quia peccatum est, sed quia peccato facta est, sic vocatur; sicut scriptura manus uniuscujusque dicitur, quod manus eam fecerit” (LR 300,30–33/d1v,30–33). Perhaps the explanation here is that immediately before, he has spoken about the baptized Christians and the fact that they, too, struggle with desire. It is therefore the concupiscence of the baptized Christians he talks about in this passage, not concupiscence as such. But on the other hand the expression “non utique quia peccatum est, sed quia peccato facta est” and the comparison to the relation between hand and handwriting seem to say that concupiscence and sin are two different things. Which reading of Augustine is the correct one cannot be ultimately decided in

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this context, on the basis of so few quotations, if it is at all possible. Reinhold Seeberg, while certainly not solving the problem, has the following commentary : Das heisst aber, dass Augustin eine gewisse Neigung gehabt hat, […] [s]tatt die Concupiscenz lediglich als Folge der Sünde und dadurch als Möglichkeitsgrund neuer Sünde aufzufassen, […] sie immer wieder wie der Realgrund der Sünde [zu behandeln]. […] Deshalb mangelt es an diesem Punkt seiner Anschauung von der Sünde an Klarheit (Seeberg: 1923, II, 511–512).

And Seeberg refers to how Luther in his commentary to the Lombard’s Sentences of 1509–10 had remarked on the unclarity in Augustine’s writing about concupiscentia. Luther writes: It looks as if Augustine understands concupiscence in two ways: in one way in which he inculcates the trespass, culpa, […] and in another way in which concupiscence is understood without the trespass and hence it is not evil in and of itself, but only a punishment and evil “per accidens”.91

That Augustine’s texts represent both understandings of concupiscentia means that both Latomus and Luther can refer to him for the understanding of sin after baptism. Latomus makes the idea his own that desire is only to be understood as a punishment, because then the sting is taken out of the sin remaining after baptism, which consists in the continued presence of concupiscence. Luther, on the other hand, refers to the idea that concupiscentia and original sin are identical, because then the continued presence of concupiscentia after baptism leads to a much more radical understanding of the sin of the baptized Christian than Latomus’. That Latomus wants to understand concupiscentia as punishment is clear from his exegesis of Eccl 7:21, where he speaks of desire in a way that is not very far from that sense. Even though he first says that the cause of sin (peccati causa) according to Origen and Ambrose is the devil, he holds to the idea that concupiscentia is peccati causa, and makes it clear, with reference to Augustine, that by “cause” he does not here mean the cause of original sin, but the cause of the concrete sins if we consent to the desire left behind after baptism. And subsequently he also declares desire to be peccati effectus vel poena, the effect or punishment of sin. And as Latomus emphasizes in conclusion, none of these things are really sin as such (peccatum), but only circumstances connected with sin. By sin he understands that by which God is offended (ipsum peccatum quo deus offenditur), but he does not give a more detailed explanation of what this means. Of original sin and guilt he says only that he indirectly has admitted the 91 WA 9, 75,36–40: “videtur Augustinus concupiscentiam dupliciter capere, primo prout includit culpam […], alio modo sinitur cum exclusione culpae. Et sic non est per se mala, sed est poena tantum et per accidens mala.” Cf. Seeberg: 1923, II, 509, note. 1.

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existence of original sin by talking of concupiscentia as a punishment. So it may just as well be the concrete sins of commission he emphasizes with the expression ipsum peccatum quo deus offenditur.

4.3.3 The struggle between sin and righteousness The struggle between righteousness and sin, which in Latomus turns into the struggle of reason and will against the carnal desire on the one hand, and for God’s law on the other, is at the heart of the dispute with Luther. That Latomus is basically in disagreement with Luther as to how to understand the concept of sin appears when he expounds Rom 2:12–15 concerning the law written in our heart. He sees it as a statement which declares the basically good nature, and hence good abilities of fallen man.92 That is also the interpretation of sin that causes Latomus to make a critical remark about Augustine’s view of the infidels’ inability to do good, with reference to a later treatment of the question. And yet what he sees as entirely unacceptable in Luther is not that nonChristians are supposed to be unable to do the good, but Luther’s paradoxical claim, as Latomus sees it, that sinning and good deeds become one, and that also he who is “holy”, i. e. Christian, righteous and redeemed, is therefore inherently guilty of mortal sin. It is to refute this, to his mind, absurd claim once and for all that Latomus adduces the three long quotations from Augustine which all deal with precisely the baptized Christian’s relation to sin. By including the first of these in his text Latomus makes it clear to Luther that he is certainly no Pelagian, and hence that it is in no way his intention to maintain the ability of man at God’s expense. Augustine of course makes it abundantly clear that there is no man who is free of sin and who does not need the saving grace of Christ for the forgiveness of his sin, and that after the 92 Cf. Grane: 1975b, and the analysis of that text in 1975a, 37–39. Here Grane shows that even though Luther’s exegesis of Rom 2:12–15 in his lecture on the Epistle to the Romans in certain places is very close to scholastic theological considerations on praeparatio ad gratiam, possibly because Luther found the passage in Paul difficult, it is possible to explain how Luther after much hard work reached an interpretation that suited him. Having considered the context in Romans he finally decided to accept Augustine’s interpretation no. 2 in De Spiritu et Littera. Here Augustine says that Rom 2:12–15 is about godless heathens who can fulfil parts of the law but not all of it, and Luther concludes that in any real sense, i. e. in relation to God, they can do no good deeds, as the fulfilling of the law allows for no compromise. It gives food for thought that Luther does not at all mention or touch upon the fact that Augustine argues for this partial fulfilment of the law in the infidels by referring to the remains of the image of God. It does not seem to interest him. What interests him is to declare that Paul’s intention with Rom 1–3 is to make it clear that all, both Jews and heathens, are constrained under sin.

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remission of sin there is no man who lives righteously and does not sin. Man can never at any time hope to keep free of sin unaided. For that he will always need the aid of God’s grace (gratiae dei adiutorium) (LR 297,26–28/c4r,26–28). But according to Latomus it is a far cry from there to say that the Christian is a sinner and his good deeds are mortal sins, unless they are remitted, as does Luther. Indeed Augustine says that harbouring desire is not sinful, but only giving in and consenting (consentire) to it. So even though there is a vestige of concupiscentia left in the Christian man, he is not eo ipso a sinner. In baptism he has been given help by God’s grace (gratiae dei adiutorium) in the shape of forgiveness for both the guilt of original sin and his actual sins of commission, and the desire that is left in him can therefore no longer harm him. He is thus able primarily to do good, i. e. curb his desire.93 With the aid of grace he has become wise (prudens). He knows that he pleases God and is well-regarded among men by not offending his brothers. He brings his body as a living holy sacrifice, that is he contains a holy good will (bona voluntas) and is thus able to love his neighbour like himself as God has ordained it. This bona voluntas is also called charitas in the Scriptures, says Latomus with Augustine, and when he goes on to say that charitas is the love with which God loves mankind, we are coming full circle: the man who is loved by God becomes a representative of divine love, charitas, in his own loving deeds. By chastising the carnal desire in three optimal ways, viz. by mortifying the flesh (fasting), by giving and forgiving everything he can (giving alms) and by always turning to God in the desire to be holy (praying), he curbs his concupiscence and keeps on the right path. The man who can do all this is filled, both before and after the grace of baptism, with the faith in which he is justified (fides, qua justificatur), also known as “the faithfulness of heart in which we are righteous or immediately disposed for righteousness” (cordis credulitas, qua iusti sumus, aut ad iustitiam proxime disponimur). Even though it is a faith and not a sight, and thus an imperfect knowledge of the divine, it is a piecemeal knowledge of God’s will. Though it is not perfect, it is sufficient, being all that can be achieved in this life. However man does not become righteous all at once and without the need of God’s grace. It is not only the sinner who needs that grace. The righteous believer also, as Latomus pointed out with the aid of Augustine, unendingly needs to ask for aid from God’s grace not to be led into temptation. For he, too, as was said, always has concupiscence in him, and hence the possibility of succumbing to desire, which he will do now and again. Concupiscentia may deceive him or make use of a possible ignorance in him, and in that way occasionally entice him to give 93 To fully describe Latomus’ view, his statements about Christian existence found in the section “Proof from the New Testament” are also utilized here.

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in to desire and so sin, by trespassing against God’s law. Yet, and it is important to Latomus to make this point in relation to Luther, it is only venial sins that the believer commits, and that naturally does not make him guilty of mortal sin, but only makes him one who contains desire and has happened to commit an acceptable error. It is for these venial sins he prays “Our Father, forgive us our sin”, and is indeed given the cleansing redemption of sin which is yet another aspect of gratiae dei adiutorium. In spite of them his deeds are still generally good and righteous, and he is still on his way to perfection. And the more he is eventually able to fulfil that is right, Latomus says with Augustine, the more he will control desire (LR 292,20–21/c1v,20–21). It is only if he commits really mortal sins, i. e. true crimes (crimina), that the direction of his way through life will change. Latomus sums it up thus: It is quite clear that Augustine thinks that the righteous believers’ deeds are not sins, and that the believers because of the faith that works in charity have true virtues, though they may not have all virtues, or the greatest virtues which can in no wise grow further.94

4.4

Latomus and Augustine

In the previous pages there is a fair number of things that remain unclear. We are not given a clear picture of how Latomus understands peccatum. We can still ask whether he shares Augustine’s opinions on sin and its nuances on which he relies so much. In addition, the picture we get of grace, gratia, and its function is also unclear. It is not clear what the idea of redemption is. Nor do we get an overview of what such concepts as charitas and fides mean in their full extent. Undoubtedly the germ of a fuller treatment of the matters that are still obscure could be latent in the criticism Latomus directed at Augustine. In connection with the three long quotations from Augustine, for example, Latomus initially declares that it is debatable whether he thinks the infidels’ deeds are sins, so that the infidels have no true virtues, which is to say that Augustine perhaps does not accept the existence of opera indifferentia. Augustine of course does not relate explicitly to the existence of an opus indifferens (which is a much later expression of the phenomenon), but he seems to think that the infidels cannot do good deeds. If that is true, there is a marked difference between Augustine and

94 LR 296,10–14/c3v,10–14: “satis apparet mentem Augustini illic esse quod fidelium iustorum opera non sunt peccata, ac fideles ea fide quae per dilectionem operatur veras habere virtutes, quamvis forsan non omnes aut non summas, & quae amplius crescere non possint.”

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Latomus which was probably already suggested in connection with their views on ratio and voluntas. Luther deals with the question of the existence of actus medius in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, both in conclusions 1 and 2, and here denies that such a thing exists, in spite of the decision against Jan Hus at the council in Konstanz.95 Since it is found in conclusion (no.2) which Latomus has decided to expound in detail in his first article, Latomus considers it, but emphasizes that he actually does not deem it relevant to the matter of “omne opus bonum est peccatum”. The question of actus medius of course concerns the infidels, and not as here the sin or lack of sin of the righteous. But when that is said, he is of the opinion that it is nonsense for Luther to say that on this point scholastic theology is in opposition to biblical theology. It is not as black and white as that, says Latomus. Among the old theologians one can find people who accept the existence of actus medius, and on the other hand opponents of it may be found among younger theologians. Gregory of Rimini, for example denies it, nor does Thomas think that such an individual act exists as is morally neither good nor evil. Latomus, however, thinks that it is debatable if Gregory of Rimini’s way of thinking does not in fact make the talk about the indifferent act possible (LR 332,3–333,15/h1v3–h2r,15). But in article 4 of the Exposition (“Of how far moral virtues and speculative sciences are sin”), Latomus takes up the question and tries to show that Augustine in spite of what he said is as a matter of fact of the same opinion as himself in this question: that Augustine like Gregory of Rimini can be interpreted in a way that makes room for actus medius (LR 429,20–435,25/v2r,20– x1r,25).

4.4.1 Does opus indifferens exist? The point for Luther in the passage that is mentioned in article 12 of the Condemnation, and which article 4 in the Exposition primarily deals with, is that because man’s nature is sinful, everything he achieves on his own, without the healing grace, is also sinful and erroneous. To this Latomus rejoins that if it is true it means that all sciences, both the practical, including artes liberales, and the speculative sciences are sins and errors. And that, Latomus thinks, speaks against fact, as everyone knows that many sciences and arts are cultivated by evil people (LR 431,22–23/v3r,22–23) without this lessening the quality of science or art. The sciences are truth in embryo, and they remain so no matter who takes them up. Latomus therefore 95 WA 2, 415,34–416, 8. Cf. F/note 351.

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thinks that the fact that every man, as the God-created imago dei that he is, has what in itself is right and honourable and good inscribed in his heart, and is thus predisposed to receive the truth. Everyone simply has something good in his nature which makes him reasonable and receptive to teaching, and with the aid of this natural virtue even the evil person can find his way to the good act (LR 431,16–18/v3r,16–18).96 When Latomus has to explain how knowledge functions in the sciences, he is close to what he said in the Dialogue. First and at the bottom, at the first level of certainty (primum gradum certitudinis), we find the practical sciences to which anyone, including the idolaters and heathen, have access by naturale lumen rationis (LR 430,32–34/v2v,32–34). It corresponds entirely to what was said in the Dialogue: that everybody has access to the practical sciences which are found at the lowest level and rest on a natural, i. e. empirically founded corporeal knowing.97 They are directed at a praxis that is lower-ranking than speculation. Next come the speculative sciences which are again accessible to the infidels. The insight into them Latomus calls a habitual or actual knowledge of apparent and necessary truths, which the soul discerns above itself in the light of the first truth of everything (prima veritas) (LR 430,20–22/v2v,20–22; 431,1–4/v3r,1–4). In the section on the Dialogue we saw that the understanding of the speculative sciences also happens by naturale lumen, but at a higher level than the practical sciences, as they rest on a natural spiritual knowing.98 We are still dealing with the natural sphere, i. e. what is empirically accessible to created man by the natural light of the intellect. But it is no longer only the corporeal or practical which is the object of knowing, but the spiritual, and the speculative. In other words it is not external, corporeal, visible functions that come to be known, but inner spiritual invisible truths with which the soul joins up by observing the corporeal and thereafter rising above it.99 Latomus consolidates his view of knowing in the sciences with the aid of several different quotations from Augustine. Primarily from a passage in Retractationes, where Augustine says that “many unclean have been able to gain knowledge of many verities;”100 and a quotation from De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, in which Augustine asks: “Who dares to say that God’s gift is sin? For the soul and the body and everything good that is embedded naturally in the 96 It was precisely the same thing Latomus discussed in the Dialogue in connection with the mention of conceptus and how to achieve knowledge of them. 97 The expression “empirically founded corporeal knowing” is our terminology. 98 Again, the expression “natural spiritual knowing” is our terminology. 99 The distinction between practical and speculative sciences is parallel to the distinction between words and concepts. 100 LR 430,27–28/v2v,27–28: Retractationes I, 4, 2: “multos immundos multa vera scire potuisse”.

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soul and in the body are also God’s gifts in the sinners, since God and not they themselves created them.”101 In this question, of knowing in the sciences, it immediately seems that Augustine and Latomus agree. On the question of moral virtue, i. e. the deed that is qualified as good, they possibly do not agree so much. Latomus himself has already called attention to this, and here he does so again. In Contra Julianum and in De Civitate Dei as well, Augustine says that “the infidels’ whole life is sin and in the infidels there is no true virtue”.102 Latomus at this point does not take Augustine’s statement so seriously (LR 431,36–432,9/ v3r,36–v3v,9). Firstly because in this context (against Luther) the topic is not the deeds of the infidels, but the deeds of believing sinners, and Latomus and Augustine, as has been seen, can agree that they are not necessarily sins. Secondly he does not think that Augustine means what he says in a way that precludes opera indifferentia, and this he goes on to attempt to demonstrate. Augustine’s qualification of the deeds of the infidels as sin, should be seen, Latomus says, under a “concomitant”, not a “formal” aspect (concomitanter, non formaliter). This is to say that something about their deed is wrong, but not the deed in itself. It may be, for example, that the infidel acts in infidelity, or with infidelity as a goal, or that he directs his deed towards a goal that is not good, or that he acts out of fear of punishment or desire for profit or honour. To prove that this is not utterly unfounded, Latomus adduces a long quotation from De Spiritu et Littera in which Augustine expounds Rom 2:14 on “those who by nature do what the law requires”.103 Augustine writes that if this text concerns people who are not under grace, it must mean that at least the contours of the image of God exist in spite of sin, and that it can therefore be said that even the infidel sinful man to a certain degree acts according to the requirements of the law, or has some knowledge of the law. The fact is, he says, that even heathens have done things which measured by the yardstick of righteousness we can in no way censure, but must praise. But on the other hand, if we look at the aim of their actions there is hardly one of them that can be called righteous, and it is the aim of one’s action that is important. Therefore all that their good deeds will do for them on the Day of Judgement is that they may suffer a somewhat lighter punishment. For little as it harms a righteous man in relation to eternal life that he has committed a few venial sins, without which we cannot live this life, it does not profit an unrighteous man in relation to everlasting redemption that he has

101 LR 431,9–12/v3r,9–12: De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia I, 3, 4: “Quis audeat dicere donum dei esse peccatum? Anima enim & corpus & quaecunque bona animae & corporis naturaliter insita etiam in peccatoribus dona dei sunt, quoniam deus non ipsi ista fecerunt.” 102 LR 432,1–2/v3v,1–2: “omnis vita infidelium peccatum est, & quod apud infideles non est vera virtus”. Cf. Contra Julianum IV, 3, 17–19, De Civitate Dei V, 14. 103 LR 432,13–433,1/v3v,13–v4r,1: De Spiritu et Littera 27–28, 48.

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done a few good deeds, which even the most evil man in the world has done at some point. So Augustine here says that there are “some good deeds” (aliqua bona opera), which are done with the wrong aim and therefore do not profit the infidel who does them (sic ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio), but which nevertheless merit praise (merito recteque laudamus). Latomus regards this as a carte blanche to speak of the existence of opera indifferentia. The question remains, however, whether Augustine would call these deeds “moral virtues”, as Latomus would have it, and if he would thus step back from what he said in Contra Julianum.104 If we read on in the quotations Latomus adduces, still from Contra Julianum, Julian takes a view that makes Augustine express himself in very sharp terms about the question.105 As Augustine sums it up, Julian has admitted that the good deeds of the infidels, though they are good in the eyes of men, and as he conceives it may be called true virtues, since they are both good deeds done without sin and deeds done by wills which are like “good trees”, still will not lead these men to eternal redemption. And here Augustine then says that he wants Julian to know that Augustine only calls that will good, and that deed good, which man is granted through God’s grace in Christ, through which alone man can be led to the Kingdom of God. So even if something seems praiseworthy and fruitful among men, it is not necessarily good, if it is unfruitful to God. Julian can therefore hold forth as much as he will about these apparently good deeds, but for Augustine only that is good which is granted to man through grace in Christ and which relates man to God. The love of the world (amor mundi), does not come from God, and the love of enjoying what has been created (amor fruendi creaturis) is not of God either, if it is without the love of and from the Creator (amor creatoris). Only when that amor dei is present by which man is brought to God, and which comes solely from the Father through Christ by the Holy Spirit (LR 433,33–35/v4r,33–35), can creation be loved in the correct way. Without amor dei it is impossible. The conclusion from the quotation must be that the deeds which Augustine in De Spiritu et Littera terms good and praiseworthy, but without importance for redemption, cannot in fact be called virtuous or good. They are good only in the eyes of man, but this is not valid because it is not true in relation to God. It is a straightforward supposition that here we have the same type of deeds that he mentioned in the quotations from Retractationes and from De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, in connection with what he says about cognition in the sciences. The 104 It must be emphasized that Augustine here is only treated in the light of the texts found in Latomus. Whether the result is quite in accordance with Augustine’s views as such cannot be determined conclusively in this context. 105 LR 433,7–13/v4r,7–13; 433,23–434,7/v4r,23–v4v,7: Contra Julianum IV, 3, 33.

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quotation therefore strengthens Augustine’s previous statement in Contra Julianum and opposes Latomus’ view. This is even brought out in Latomus’ concluding summary of article 4 (LR 434,8ff/v4v,8ff). He sums up that Augustine here has said that he only calls that vera virtus and bona voluntas which is worthy of reward in Heaven, whereas everything else which has its source in infidelity or has infidelity as its goal, or springs from amor mundi, is mala voluntas and falsa virtus. It is directed at a wrong goal (non rectus finis), and therefore the intention (intentio) behind it, and hence the deed itself is evil (malum). It is self-evident that precisely the concomitant determination (concomitanter), i. e. the aim of the deed, which Latomus has just determined as something which does not formally (formaliter) make the deed evil in itself, is precisely what in Augustine’s eyes determines the quality of the deed. But Latomus does not give up. He explains the quotations from Contra Julianum by claiming that Augustine here turns against those who say that the wise man should enjoy his own soul and its virtues and should thus enjoy and show the greatest love (summus amor) for creation. And that of course is erroneous, Latomus agrees (LR 434,18–22/v4v,18–22). “And yet”, he says, between this good and evil there is something which is neither worthy of eternal retribution nor influenced by a distorted goal. Something by which man is unfruitfully good, that is he has a good will and does a good deed, in return for which he does not bear the fruit of eternal life, but in return for which nor does he deserve to be punished.106

Thus Latomus maintains his own view, and to make Augustine harmonize with it he explains that when Augustine says that the infidels have no true virtues, it is one among several true virtues he deprives them of, viz. the one by which man is good in an absolute sense, and worthy of receiving redemption (LR 433,2–5/ v4r,2–5). According to Latomus there are also other, inferior virtues which in truth do not spring from charitas, which is the form of amor dei which leads man to eternal life, but which spring from another side of amor dei, which both sinners and infidels can fulfil (LR 433,16–21/v4r,16–21). An example of this might be when a heathen, or a believer, for that matter, keeps away from a concupiscent tendency because it is not consonant with right reason (recte rationi consonum) (LR 434,28.34/v4v,28.34) and is good and beautiful as well as honourable. It is a fact, says Latomus (LR 434,29–435,6/v4v,29–x1r,6), that the one who approves of a sentence because it is true honours the first truth, through which all truths are true, even if it was only the obviousness of the created truth 106 LR 434,22–27/v4v,22–27: “Et tamen in medio inter hoc bonum et malum est aliquid nec dignum retributione aeterna, nec perverso fine infectum in quo est homo steriliter bonus, id est bonam voluntatem & operationem habet pro qua non reportat fructum vitae aeternae, pro qua etiam non meretur puniri.”

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that actuated his approval. And in entirely parallel fashion, if the will strives for anything because it is good or venerable or in accordance with right reason, it seems at the same time to venerate and love and embrace venerableness itself. And so it loves God virtuously, because God is the source of the good and the venerable, and of reason. He who fully loves something, because this something fully is as it is, he uses creature well and not without amor dei, even though it is not a love that is dignus vita aeterna (LR 435,3/x1r,3). Therefore, Latomus says, in the quotation from Contra Julianum Augustine also adds the sentence “quo pervenitur ad deum non est nisi a deo patre per Iesum Christum cum spiritusancto” (LR 435,4–5/x1r,4–5) when he speaks of amor dei. Because in that way he implies that another amor dei exists, in which one is not led to God. Latomus ends by emphasizing that only an uncommonly stubborn disputant would maintain that this amor dei is not found in those who do not know the true God, but only in the believing sinners. The good God does so many things, including for the unworthy ; he makes the sun rise for both good and evil, so there is no reason to believe that all the things done by sinners in the secondary way defined above, i. e. in accordance with the natural law in their hearts, are without God’s grace and special favour (gratia dei et specialis favor) (LR 435,11/ x1r,11). In that connection Latomus adduces two additional references to Augustine in conclusion, to emphasize that he has Augustine on his side: One to De Spiritu et Littera, in which Augustine’s point is that both the faith with which men believe and the will that goes before the faith belong to God’s grace;107 and another to De Patientia, saying that the patience with which a heretic endures torture is also the gift of God.108 These things, man’s will, faith and patience, are all according to Latomus natural qualities in man which are present before their owner has been made deserving in God’s eyes, and therefore his opinion is that the quotations support his own view. Thus he ends the passage by emphasizing yet again that “from this it follows that it is not improper to place a deed in the sinner which is not evil but good, though not worthy of eternal life”.109 Latomus’ recruitment of Augustine’s authority in this matter seems to be somewhat forced. We cannot help noticing that he has to make use of special interpretations, particularly in claiming that by speaking of “amor dei quo pervenitur ad deum” Augustine implies that an amor dei exists which does not lead to God. We learned from the Augustine quotations that Augustine distinguishes between what is good in the eyes of man and what in the eyes of God, and only the 107 LR 435,14–19/x1r,14–19: De Spiritu Et Littera 32, 55–33, 57. 108 LR 435,19–21/x1r,19–21: De Patientia 26, 23–27, 25. 109 LR 435,23–25/x1r,23–25: “Hinc sequitur non esse inconveniens, ponere in peccatore, quaedam opera non mala, imo bona, sed non meritoria vitae aeternae.”

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latter good is a real good, because only through that can that which is good among men become truly good.110 He maintains that there is a germ of the Godlike left in the infidel, in the shape of a residue of reason, but he refuses to accept their goodness as something really good. That is of course a difficult position to defend, as we see in Contra Julianum, where Augustine tries to retort to the logical counter-question of why their good deeds, which are not really that, are termed “good” when in reality they are not. To this Augustine rejoins that the “goodness” or “praiseworthiness” which is ascribed to these deeds belong to God, who can use evil in a good way. But for the evil wrongdoers themselves it is nothing but sin.111 Latomus does not think in that way. To him a declaration that a thing can be both good and un-good at the same time is a contradiction, because he can only understand a thing as either good or evil. There can be degrees of good, but not both good and evil simultaneously. What Augustine says about how things can have different values to God and men respectively, and how the same deeds can be both good and sinful, depending on him with whom they are associated and from whose perspective they are seen, is not so far from Luther, and Latomus’ failure to understand Augustine’s position therefore resembles his failure to understand Luther’s. If we look at the understanding of opus indifferens, or actus medius, as it is also called in the medieval tradition, we will realize that the medieval theologian who is probably most influenced by Augustine, Gregory of Rimini (d.1358), cleaves closely to his master and declares that actus medius does not exist, as Latomus himself also on the one hand pointed out about Gregory and yet again did not. His argument against Gregory is the same as that against Augustine (LR 332,15–23/h1v,15–23). He is of opinion that both Gregory and Augustine say that a deed exists which is less good, and therefore not meritorious, but on the other hand is not sin because it is not a trespass against the law. And that, according to Latomus, might well be called an actus medius. It gives food for thought, however, that it was generally accepted in the tradition that Gregory did not accept the existence of the indifferent deed. Representatives of both Thomism and Ockhamism, for example Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), in Book III of their Commentaries on the Sentences, dis110 Cf. Grane: 1975a, 50, note 101: Here Augustine, in his exegesis of Rom 2:17–29 on the Jews’ fulfilment of the law, explicitly uses the distinction between deeds which are good coram hominibus and coram deo and declares that the former are not good in any true sense. 111 Contra Julianum IV, 3, 32: “Ex quo colligitur, etiam ipsa bona opera quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene utitur malis. Ipsorum autem esse peccata, quibus et bona male faciunt; quia ea non fideli, sed infideli, hoc est, stulta et noxia faciunt voluntate: qualis voluntas, nullo modo christiano dubitante, arbor est mala, quae facere non potest nisi fructos malos, id est, sola peccata.”

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tinction 28 (as to whether man can fulfil God’s commandments without grace) cite Gregory as an example of an authority they disagree with, and they develop their considerably more positive view of the existence of actus medius on the basis of a critique of him (Cf. Vind: 1994, 69, 72 and 76). In this context it again seems, as was the case with his theory of knowledge, that Latomus is closer to a Thomistically inspired way of thinking than to an Augustinian. The very fact that he accepts opus indifferens indicates the influence of a source other than Augustine; and the way in which he develops his proof of opus indifferens, vividly describing how it is good to cultivate the secondary truth in relation to the primary, which is the source of all things, because the secondary stems from and exists and is cultivated in honour of the primary, appears Thomistic. Equally the way in which he describes how opus indifferens can be the result of gratia and specialis favor dei is reminiscent of the Thomist gradation of the functions of grace. The idea of ordo which is traceable like that of the hierarchy of sciences in the Dialogue, could well in a way be Augustinian, since expressions such as prima veritas, summus amor and res summa diligenda (434,20–21.30/v4v,20–21.30) are common and used by thinkers of Neoplatonic-Augustinian as well as Aristotelian-Thomist inspiration. Nor does Latomus so far use the concept of causation, which is otherwise typical of Thomist terminology, in his description of the order of the world. Nevertheless the impression remains that the whole conception of the differentiated, coherent order of human affairs in the divinely created world has greater similarity to Thomas than to Augustine. It is not uninteresting that Latomus mentions Thomas as one of the modern theologians who do not accept an actus medius, without further comment. He is right to do so, inasmuch as Thomas for a start is unacquainted with the question of actus medius, which is a subject that was revitalized by the nominalists. And secondly because Thomas only accepts the existence of a thing that is not neutral, but has intrinsic value and thus by virtue of that takes a specific position in the system of nature/supernature. At the same time it has become clear that Latomus in fact concurs in Thomas’ view of the gradation of goodness, although he uses the term actus medius of secondary goodness. And thus he does not in reality differ much from Thomas’ way of thinking. The reason why he adduces Thomas against himself, is therefore presumably that he is trying to create a basis for a common “catholic” standpoint in the Exposition, i. e. a standpoint which will not offend any of the various schools, but which all can endorse. In that way the best Roman phalanx against Luther and his adherents is drawn up. Here we may see a germ of the later Tridentine theology.

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4.4.2 The rational in Latomus The different understandings of opus indifferens are connected quite closely with the different views of ratio and voluntas, as we have already seen. Like Latomus, Augustine speaks of a ratio in man and a rational knowledge of the law (= a Godlike quality), which was not obliterated in the Fall, but for him it does not influence whether man is good or evil. The important thing is what man’s aim is, what he is directed at. And what directs him towards a goal is the will. The will’s dependence on and agreement with something else as the decisive factor for the quality of deeds was what Augustine expressed early in Latomus’ Exposition in his commentary to Luke 2:14,112 and in his argumentation against Julian his understanding of will is made quite explicit, especially just before the part of the work which Latomus chose to adduce. In Latomus’ quotation the difference between bona voluntas and impia voluntas was clear, and it also became clear that what decides the quality of will is that by God’s grace through Christ by the Holy Spirit man is given amor dei and thus becomes right-turned: but just before that Augustine determines without hesitation that because the “good deeds” of the infidels spring from ill will, they are not good but sins.113 In contrast, it is clear that what is important for Latomus is exactly the rational understanding of the law with which everyone is born as part of their Godlike quality, and which was not entirely obliterated by the Fall. The accordance with right reason, recte rationi consonus (LR 434,28.34/v4v,28.34), as that which constitutes the good, is emphasized several times in his argumentation for the indifferent deed. Therefore he will have no part in writing off the less good deeds which are rational and thus in a secondary sense pleasing to God, which the infidels can be shown to do. The interpretation of Latomus as a “rationalist” is supported both by the fact that elsewhere in the Exposition he writes openly that the brain or reason (cerebrum vel ratio) is the first and the greatest thing in man (LR 335,25–26/ h3r,25–26), and by his rejoinder in article 1 to Luther’s use of Gal 5:17, “for the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh, for these are opposed to each other, to keep you from doing the things you want to do” (LR 319,23–320,2/f3r,23–f3v,2). Latomus here describes, with a reference to a quotation from Jerome, how the justified man’s soul (anima) exists immediately between the flesh and the spirit. It is carnal when it delights in 112 On Augustine and the will, cf. Seeberg: 1923, II, 414; 419; 420; 432; 433, note 1. 113 Contra Julianum IV, 3, 32 (quoted before): “Ex quo colligitur, etiam ipsa bona opera quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene utitur malis. Ipsorum autem esse peccata, quibus et bona male faciunt; quia ea non fideli, sed infideli, hoc est, stulta et noxia faciunt voluntate: Qualis voluntas, nullo modo christiano dubitante, arbor est mala, quae facere non potest nisi fructos malos, id est, sola peccata.”

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carnal desires, and spiritual when it follows the Holy Spirit, i. e. understands with it and is taught by it. Thus man has two wills (voluntates), a carnal and a spiritual (LR 320,30–35/f3v,30–35), and when Latomus has to explain how man then avoids the carnal will and complies with the spiritual, he says again that ratio is decisive. He writes that “passions and feelings in the sensitive part [of man] can be ruled, curbed or regulated by reason, and thus the use of them can be good.”114 Yet it must not be forgotten that Latomus, as we saw earlier, also speaks of the good will in connection with charitas, when he speaks of the perfect and real good in which man is given part through grace.

4.4.3 Sin It has not become entirely clear from the comments we have seen on concupiscentia what sin is, neither in Augustine nor in Latomus, but the discussion of opus indifferens throws light on the understanding of sin. On the basis of Augustine’s statements about and explanation of “omnis vita infidelium est peccatum” we can conclude that peccatum in the sense of original sin means to him that the will is not turned right because man has not yet received grace in the form of amor dei from the Father through Christ by the Holy Spirit. The basic understanding of peccatum in Augustine is thus a will turned wrong, and the concomitant absence of relation to God.115 It is this basic understanding of sin that makes it impossible for Augustine to operate with opera indifferentia. Even though he, as we have seen, speaks of a reasonable residue of the Godlike in fallen man, which enables him to perform earthly good deeds in the eyes of man, this has no influence whatsoever on the same man’s moral standing and value in relation to God. By way of contrast, peccatum in the sense of original sin is not a matter of will turned wrong in Latomus, but a sign that man has fallen out of the perfect righteousness he possessed before the Fall. At one place in article 1 he writes that man’s ignorance and difficulty in doing good may be part of his created nature, thus at the same time rejecting Augustine’s declaration that concupiscentia is equal to original sin (LR 365,28–33/m2r,28–33). Consequently the rebellion of our emotional side against reason cannot in itself and in its essence (secundum se et essentialiter) be said to be sin, as it may have been there from the first creation. What happened at the Fall, is not as in Augustine that man’s will was turned in the opposite of its original direction, but that man lost the original gift of 114 LR 322,30–32/f4v,30–32: “quia passiones et affectus partis sensitivae ratione regi possunt, & frenari vel ordinari, & tunc earum usus erit bonus.” 115 Cf. Seeberg: 1923, II, 511, note 1. For more recent literature see Esa Ranikko: 1997, 58–71.

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righteousness116 and is therefore left with the natural struggle between emotion and reason. This leads to another and less radical view of how original sin influences man. In Augustine it pervades him and determines him, including his apparently good deeds, as wholly evil. In Latomus it influences man in a way that determines him as mostly evil, as it removes from him the possibility of doing the perfectly good deed and avoiding concupiscence, but at the same time it leaves a possibility of doing some secondary good, with the aid of the remaining reason. Here we see again how important it is how concupiscentia is understood in Augustine. If it is understood in the way with which Latomus chooses to affiliate himself, where desire is nothing but a result of original sin, what is said about sin will be eased considerably. The simple fact will then be that the guilt of original sin and real sin is forgiven and removed at baptism, and the man who is thus cleansed, though he still harbours concupiscence, can choose not to consent to desire, aided by his reprieved reason, and thus avoid being termed “sinful” (LR 317,2–7/f2r,2–7). With that understanding of sin Latomus secures that the full concentration is on the concrete sins of commission after baptism. The hegemony of original sin, in the shape of the loss of the order of the original righteousness, is obliterated at baptism, the guilt of it forgiven, and neither will return, unless the baptized Christian commits a mortal sin.117 But if the case is, as Luther prefers it, that concupiscentia is understood to 116 Latomus does not mention the concept of iustitia originalis, but it can be inferred from his other statements that that is what he has in mind here. 117 Mau (1987, 288) is not right to accuse Latomus of only emphasizing the concrete sins and making little of the existence of original sin, and in that sense subscribing to another concept of sin than Augustine. That Latomus has another concept of sin than Augustine has been made clear in this study, but that that constitutes the difference (that where Augustine talks of original sin Latomus only talks of sins of commission) is wrong. It is true that Latomus uses his quotation from Confessiones (LR 317,20–22/f2r,20–22; Confessiones I, 7, 11) to point out that little children have no personal guilt and therefore are not sinful, and he does not mention Augustine’s point (that little children in spite of their lack of personal guilt contain the guilt of natural sin, and therefore are indeed sinful). But understood on the basis of the context it is clear that Latomus’ intention with the quotation is different from Augustine’s. Augustine wants to point to the guilt of original sin, and hence the necessity of baptizing the child, but where Latomus utilizes the quotation in the Exposition he talks of the time after baptism, when the guilt of original sin is forgiven and its power is nullified, and therefore he concentrates on the personal guilt in connection with consensus with concupiscence. Augustine himself calls attention (both in the quotation mentioned and in the next one from De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione I, 17, 22) to the fact that children have no concupiscence because they cannot yet themselves control their actions. The difference we note between Augustine and Latomus in this passage is again the different weight given to ratio and voluntas. It is Latomus who points out the lack of reason in children in the text from Confessiones and links it to the question of consensus. But Augustine’s point is the contrary, that from their birth onwards little children contain the will turned wrong which characterizes original sin.

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equal original sin, it will be impossible to speak thus of sin and its hegemony. It then becomes markedly more difficult to figure out what happens at baptism, when concupiscence, alias original sin itself, is not removed. If Augustine himself has the opinion about concupiscentia that was suggested in the section dealing with desire: that before baptism it equals original sin, and that after baptism it does so no longer, he is then placed directly between Latomus and Luther, each of whom affiliates himself with one of the two aspects.

4.5

Grace

Even though Latomus by virtue of his more positive view of the effect of original sin immediately seems to ascribe several good qualities to fallen man, and a greater moral ability than Augustine grants him, he can in no way be termed a Pelagian. In one place he emphasizes that man is not by nature created to be without sin.118 For that he will need the grace of God, that is he needs grace to become fully righteous and find his right place in the divine order. For the natural things also we need to be aided by God. Speaking of indifferent deeds Latomus is very careful to define their existence as an aspect of gratia dei or specialis favor. Grace (gratia) is thus in Latomus both the all-embracing power of God which upholds everything, and the quite special help which exclusively directs man towards Him. In the commentary to article 4 of the Condemnation, in article 2 on penance in the Exposition, we get a good impression of his view of the different functions of grace (LR 379,3–11/c1r,3–11). The condemnation quotes Luther’s statement, that “without God’s grace which first forgives guilt man cannot get the promise that he can seek forgiveness”.119 To this Latomus answers that if only Luther here had said that without grace we could not get the promise of forgiveness, that could have been acceptable. The fact is that the will that precedes faith, and faith itself, and the prayer that comes after, and the admittance to the sacramental means, belongs to God’s grace, as they are divine gifts in which the sinner does not himself have any part. For nothing but the punishment for sin is caused by the sinner. But these “graces” in the plural do not forgive man’s basic sin, only the grace of charity (charitas) can do that. Only that leads man to God. Without it no other of God’s 118 LR 355,11–13/l1r,11–13: “sic modo quodam speciali deus est impeccabilis. Ipse enim per naturam, caeteri per gratiam.” This statement also supports the thesis that Latomus subscribes to the concept of the gift of original righteousness. 119 WA 6, 176,21–23: “sine gratia dei primo remittente culpam, nec votum remissionis quaerendae homo habere potest.”

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gifts lead to Him (LR 379,8–11/c1r,8–11). And it cannot be a prerequisite for receiving the promise of itself. Latomus treats at length of the gradation of grace in the middle of article 1 of the Exposition, commenting on one of the quotations from Augustine adduced by Luther in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, conclusion 2 (cf. WA 2, 417,14–25). The quotation derives from a letter to Jerome and deals with the virtues: And so that I can briefly sum up in general terms what my understanding of virtue is, in the context of living right: virtue is charity with which that which ought to be loved is loved. It differs from person to person, in some larger, in others smaller, in some it is not found at all, but most fully, and in such a form that it cannot be augmented it is in no one, as long as he is alive. But as long as it can be augmented it is because of iniquity that it is less than it should be. Because of this iniquity there is no righteous man on earth who does good and does not sin. Because of this iniquity, not every living man will be justified in the sight of God, and because of this iniquity we deceive ourselves and do not contain the truth if we deny that we contain any sin. Therefore, no matter how much progress we make, it is necessary that we say “forgive us our trespasses”, although everything spoken, done and thought has already been forgiven at baptism.120

Luther regards this quotation as the supreme example of “omne opus bonum est peccatum” (WA 2, 417,26–28). Latomus in his turn can see that Luther has a point, and is therefore immediately sceptical as to whether one can at all use the letter to substantiate Augustine’s intention and meaning. But on the other hand he knows that Augustine later re-read the letter and did not retract anything in that connection, so he himself must have been satisfied with its content (LR 338,1–17/h4v,1–17). Latomus therefore tries to explain what Augustine could have meant in the letter, and does so in a way altogether reminiscent of his explanations of the Augustine references in the discussion of opus indifferens. There is no doubt that here again it is revealed that Latomus is no Augustinian, since he cannot accept that according to Augustine there is only one way of doing good, and that is through fulfilling the commandment of charity, granted through grace. But from this passage, as we have remarked, we get a good impression of 120 LR 337,23–36/h4r,23–36: “Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeam notionem, quod ad recte vivendum attinet. Virtus est charitas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est, plenissima vero & quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, est in nemine, quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet ex vitio est. Ex quo vitio non est iustus in terra, qui faciat bonum et non peccet. Ex quo vitio non iustificabitur in conspectu dei omnis vivens, propter quod vitium si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosmetipsos seducimus, & veritas in nobis non est, propter quod etiam quantumlibet profecerimus, necessarium est nobis dicere, dimitte nobis debita nostra cum iam omnia in baptismo dicta, facta, cogitata dimissa sunt.”

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Latomus’ doctrine of grace (LR 338,17–34/h4r,17–34). He points out that there are many different virtues, corresponding to many different forms of human abilities. There are corporal virtues (virtutes corporis), virtues in the natural soul (virtutes animae naturalis), acquired virtues (virtutes acquisitae), and divinely infused virtues (virtutes infusae). Aided by all these virtues people live the upright life in different ways. But among them there is only one by whose aid we live right, not just in some way, but directly and absolutely, and on the strength of which the right journey towards eternal blessing is undertaken. Through this virtue, says Latomus, a source of water springs forth which quickens to eternal life in the one who has it. This virtue is the virtue of charity (charitatis virtus). Where the other virtues turn parts of man right, the virtue of charity turns the whole man right. It quite simply shapes all the other virtues. It is found in the will, which thereupon makes use of all the other qualities of the soul by filling, reviving and completing them. The virtue of charity does not belong to the natural or acquired virtues, but with faith and hope belongs to the theological virtues although it is greater than faith and hope, because it is their form. Which is to say that faith, hope and charity belong to the virtues infused by God. All the other virtues are results of the grace of God which is common, while the virtue of charity springs from God’s special grace which forgives man his guilt and leads him to God. One must however be aware, Latomus says, that even though fallen, justified man has been granted the virtue of charity, he has not thereby achieved perfection (LR 338,35–340,3/h4v,35–i1v3). The virtue of charity is not fully unfolded in this life, because it does not have the optimal conditions for existing as long as man is in the mortal flesh and still contains concupiscence. Justified man is therefore until his death on a journey towards perfection, and constantly needs renewed aid from God’s grace in the shape of forgiveness for the venial sins which he cannot avoid, and renewed strengthening of the virtue of charity. Latomus thus rejects Luther’s critique of what the latter dubs “the pestilential gloss” (WA 2, 419,15–28),121 which has it that God does not demand the sublime and absolute fulfilment of the command of charity of the man who is still on his way (status viatoris) towards perfection (status comprehensoris) (LR 357,9–14/ l2r,9–14). Here Latomus has returned to what he previously used the three long quotations from Augustine to explain, especially the second of the three, in which Augustine talked about the difference between the existence by faith in this life and the existence by sight in the life to come. Here, in connection with the saving grace, we see what place is given to the will in Latomus’ universe. In the sections describing ratio as the supreme part of man, bona voluntas and charitas were also mentioned as constitutive elements of 121 Cf. F/note 510, for examples of the “pestilential gloss” (Bonaventura and Biel).

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the good deed, and we are now better placed to understand that mention. When man through grace receives the virtue of charity, he receives an extra supernatural form which turns all his other natural and supernatural qualities right. One might say that man is given an additional piece of equipment which justifies him, i. e. enables him entirely to be turned the right way. This supreme supernatural quality in man, which is created by the infusion of grace in the shape of charitas, is found in the supernatural good will. This is a way of understanding bona voluntas which has much in common with Thomas.122 What Latomus says about the gradual ascent of the virtues and the gradations of grace are also unmistakably Thomist. It reflects the whole Thomist system of nature and supernature, in which the things find their hierarchical place in a rational metaphysical order, which on one hand makes it possible to speak of natural, human and created activity independent of the supernatural, divine and creating activity, but which on another sees everything in the light of the divine and emphasizes that nothing of the natural, human and created is quite as it should be, until grace is added and completes nature. We get a sense of this structure in Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences, Book III dist. 27, quest. 2, art. 3. Here Thomas has explained why voluntas and not ratio, though basically ratio is the master of voluntas, is the subject of charitas, because with charity we have to do with an affective element, and in art. 4 he now explains how the hierarchy of virtues is to be understood when man through grace has received charity. Here we also find a possible explanation of why Latomus, in his section on the New Testament quotations, says that he who has received grace will become wise (prudens). Thomas here defines prudentia as the perfection of reason (perfectio rationis), which becomes entirely possible only when grace, which works like charity in the good will, suffuses everything. Thomas writes: On the second point it must be said that the lower powers are not made perfect by the perfection of virtue except by the participation in the perfection of the higher powers. But since the higher-ranking things are formal causes in relation to the lower-ranking, they are in a way more perfect. The formal cause is what is shared from the higher in the lower. Therefore, for the perfection of virtue in any power, as many forms are required 122 LThK, “Thomas v. Aquin”, 124–125: “Untereinander stehen die nach ihren verschiedenen Objekten zu bestimmenden Seelenvermögen in einem Ordnungsverhältnis. Die vornehmste dieser Potenzen ist der Intellekt des Menschen […]. Dem Intellekt folgt als ein Strebevermögen geistiger Natur der Wille. […] Den Unterschied von Verstand und Wille begründet Thomas damit, dass erstere auf das Seiende bezogen ist, sofern es ein Sein in der erkennenden Seele erhält, während der Wille auf die Sache geht, wie sie in sich besteht. […] Schlechthin steht der Wille, dessen Wahlfreiheit Thomas in der Differenz der begegnenden Einzelgüter zum Guten schlechthin begründet sieht, unter dem Intellekt. Nur unter der Voraussetzung, dass sich beide Kräfte auf dem einen Gegenstand richten, der seinshaft über dem Menschen steht, hat der Wille in diesem Leben den Vorrang.” See also Georg Wieland: 1982, 680.

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as are higher-ranking in respect of that power. For example reason is higher-ranking than concupiscence, because it determines it in a way. And so prudence, which is the perfection of reason, is the form of (i. e. something which shapes) temperance, which is a concupiscent virtue. Similarly, the will is higher-ranking than reason, when the act of reason is viewed as voluntary and meritorious; and so charity is the form of prudence and temperance. Similarly, the essence of the soul is superior to the will, insofar as the will and all the powers of the soul flow from the essence; and therefore grace, which is the perfection of the essence of the soul, which establishes it in spiritual being, is the form of charity, as well as prudence and temperance. Charity would not be a virtue if it were without grace, just as prudence would not be a virtue if it were without charity, in the sense that we talk of the infused virtues which are meant to be meritorious. Nor would temperance be a virtue without charity and prudence.123

In article 1, in an answer to Luther’s use of Matt 13:33 on the kingdom of heaven as a leaven (WA 2, 414,29–415,27), Latomus describes the way in which grace suffuses and renews man (LR 327,18–23/g3r,18–23). What is the leaven, he says, is grace which has been granted man in the spirit of faith. And exactly as the case is with the leaven in the part of the flour it suffuses, that it creates and maintains its nature so that the flour is leavened, so it is with the grace of Christ in the part of the soul it inhabits. Its effect is that man by virtue of it becomes good, holy and divine.

4.6

Freedom

Even though Latomus refers the absolute good to God’s grace and maintains that man cannot come to be entirely right-turned without it, it does not mean that he does not on the other hand maintain man’s freedom. Like other scholastics, but unlike Luther, Latomus claims that man always has a free choice (liberum arbitrium). At the end of article 1 he writes a short separate article about it, in 123 Thomas, In Quattuor Libros III, dist. 27, quest. 2, art. 4, ra. 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod inferiores vires non perficiuntur perfectione virtutis, nisi per participationem perfectionis a superibus. Cum autem superiora sint formalia respectu inferiorum, quasi perfectiora; quod participatur a superioribus in inferioribus, formale est. Unde ad perfectionem virtutis in aliqua potentia tot formae exiguntur, quot superiora sunt respectu illius potentiae; sicut ratio superior est quam concupiscibilis, quasi ordinans ipsam; et ideo prudentia, quae est perfectio rationis, est forma temperantiae, quae est virtus concupiscibilis. Similiter voluntas est superior ratione, secundum quod actus rationis consideratur ut voluntarius et meritorius; et ideo caritas est forma prudentiae et temperantiae, similiter essentia animae superior est voluntate, inquantum ab essentia et voluntas et omnes vires animae fluunt. Et ideo gratia, quae est perfectio essentiae animae, constituens ipsam in esse spirituali, est forma et caritatis et prudentiae et temperantiae; nec caritas esset virtus si esset sine gratia, sicut nec prudentia si esset sine caritate, loquendo de virtutibus infusis ordinatis ad merendum: neque temperantia sine caritate et prudential.”

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which he answers Luther’s statements about the will at the end of conclusion 2 of the Leipzig Disputation (WA 2, 421,7–15). Here Luther says that in the picture he has drawn of the relation between God and man there is no room for liberum arbitrium. He rejects the scholastic phrase, that something can be whole (totum), but not totally (totaliter), of God, and declares that man in any act that could be termed willing is passive, insofar as his action completely and wholly (totus et totaliter) derives from God: the will is moved only by grace, in a manner quite parallel to the relation between a carpenter and his tool. Latomus thinks that Luther’s statements are blasphemous, since in that case God would also be the cause of the deeds of the wicked, and that is of course out of the question (LR 370,9–371,27/m4v9–n1r,27). And even if it should turn out that Luther only spoke about willing the good, that too would be erroneous, because the free choice which is cured by grace, partly (partialiter) causes man to will the good, so that it primarily belongs to God and secondarily to man: “Because God would not have given man the commandments if the freedom to do anything with them did not exist. But if the freedom to fulfil them were sufficient there would be no need of God’s grace.”124 Latomus thus does not think that there can be general agreement as to Luther’s statement that man’s will is moved by grace alone. He reminds us that in Scripture men are not called hoes and ploughs, but peasants, tenant farmers and so on, and that they are even called God’s helpers and cooperators (adiutores et cooperatores). And conversely God is called man’s helper and cooperator. All this means that man can act, and is not only subject to something or receives something, even though God’s grace is always the greatest. As proof Latomus adduces 1 Cor 3:6, “I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase”, and quotations from two letters from Augustine to Valentinus. Valentinus finds himself among Manichaeans, who teach that man does not have a liberum arbitrium, and is not to be judged according to his deeds on the Day of Doom. Here Augustine asks how they imagine the world could be saved if God’s grace did not exist? And conversely, if freedom did not exist, how then judge the world? The pure Catholic faith which must be disseminated is, according to Augustine, the knowledge that liberum arbitrium exists for both the good and the evil life, although it should not imply that man is capable of anything without God’s grace, neither to turn from evil to goodness, to make continuous progress in goodness nor to reach the eternal good, where he no longer fears to fall short. Latomus thinks that what he has adduced must be sufficient to refute Luther, and points out that the question of man’s freedom is one of the most difficult and 124 LR 370,22–24/m4r,22–24: “Deus enim homini praecepta non daret si in eis liberum arbitrium nihil faceret, & si liberum arbitrium sufficeret gratia dei necessaria non esset.”

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therefore would require several volumes, were it to be treated properly. He rounds off by saying that he does not understand why Luther, going on from the rejection of liberum arbitrium, attacks the expression facere quod in se est (LR 372,1–23/n1v,1–23). Latomus quotes Luther as saying in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, conclusion 2 that liberum arbitrium cannot “do what is in it” because it can do nothing but despair of itself and resort to God’s grace (WA 2, 419,40–420,4). But is not that “doing what is in one”? Latomus asks. “Doing what is in one” is tantamount to doing what is in one’s power, or using the power one has. Latomus compares his understanding of facere quod in se est in the relationship between God and man to an invalid, who does what is in him to become well, when the doctor comes and gives advice. If the doctor cannot come he will send someone else, and if he has no one to send, a friend will be asked to go. If a friend is not to be had the sick man will have to direct his prayers to God. This example of how we cannot help ourselves but do something for oneselves by asking others for help, is not that “doing what is in one”? Latomus thinks so. He points out that facere quod in se est is not only a formulation you find in Thomas and the modern theologians, but an idea that suffuses the tradition, and in proof of that he adduces quotations from Origen and Augustine. The Augustine quotation is from his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, where he says of the bad habit: “Conquering it [i. e. the bad habit] is very difficult and yet one will conquer also that habit if one does not let oneself down and is not afraid of the Christian struggle.”125 Paul too speaks of facere quod in se est in Heb 6:1, in saying that one has to see to it that no one falls away from God’s grace, and in 2 Cor 6:1, on not receiving the grace of God in vain. It is notable that among the recentiores Latomus mentions only Thomas by name. This is yet another sign that Thomas is one of his greatest sources of inspiration. If that is true, it is doubtless also correct to see liberum arbitrium as an action which activates both will and reason. This chimes in with the reference to Thomas which was noted above, and corresponds best with what has been said about Latomus’ view of ratio and voluntas. The most common translation of liberum arbitrium is “free will”, but in this context “free choice” is better suited.

125 LR 372,16–20/n1v,16–20: “Item Augustinus de sermone domini in monte, lib. i. de consuetudine mala loquens ait. Hanc vincere difficillimum est, & tamen etiam ipsam consuetudinem, si se quisque non deserat, & Christianam militiam non reformidet vincet.”

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The parable of the prodigal son as an image of the relation between man and God

By way of an introduction to article 2 of the Exposition, Latomus writes a paragraph on man’s relation to God, built on the parable of the prodigal son (LR 373,6–374,25/n2r,6–n2v,25). Formally the description has much in common with the medieval praxis of piety, in which an examination and description of the stages of the soul in relation to God is no uncommon phenomenon. But though the form thus differs markedly from the scholastic form we have hitherto encountered in Latomus’ theology, the content is not incompatible with what has already been presented. Latomus introduces his paragraph with a quotation from De Civitate Dei, in which Augustine says that two different types of love exist: “Two kinds of love have created two states. Love of self has created an earthly state which goes as far as contempt for God, and the love of God has created a state which goes as far as contempt for oneself.”126 This quotation Latomus uses to conclude that exaggerated and chaotic selflove is the reason why the soul turns and goes away from God. The sinful soul wants to glorify itself by itself, as if it were its own good. But when this good which it has in itself is not sufficient to satisfy its concupiscence, because it is a sickly and frail good, it is also forced to go away from itself and turn to things carnal and emotional, which rank even lower. And thus it will be turned ever further away from God. Thus we see, Latomus remarks, that the soul, when it moves away from God, first turns towards itself, and then turns away from itself, goes on and is removed even further, following the transient desires of the senses. And the opposite movement is the same, when the soul returns to God. Then it takes the first step towards itself, to return to God through itself. The various stages of the soul in relation to God Latomus finds excellently described in the parable of the prodigal son, Luke 15:11–32:127 Because he first asked his father for the part of the fortune that was his to take, as if he entirely despised owning the paternal fortune and wanted freedom in his natural boons and to be his own master, which for a long time he had not been able to do. Therefore he is said immediately to have travelled abroad to a distant area, where he turned away not only from God the Father but also from himself, and desired to fill his stomach with the feed of the swine, but could not do that either. Here we notice the soul’s departure from God because of sin, then follows the return to God. Thus turned towards himself, he said, “How many of my father’s hired servants have more than enough bread, but I 126 LR 373,7–9/n2r,7–9: “Fecerunt civitates duas amores duo. Terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum dei. Coelestem vero amor dei, usque ad contemptum sui”; cf. De Civitate Dei XIV, 28. 127 Latomus’ interpretation of the parable is here given in its full extent.

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perish here with hunger! I will arise and go there etc.” Here it is seen that the first step taken by the soul which returns to God has been taken when it is said that it turns into itself. In the same way you here see the still material love which does not yet derive from true charity (charitas), but from desire (cupiditas), where the sinful soul thinks of its own advantage and has not yet discarded its private feeling for itself. This soul has its eye on the reward and plans to say (Luke 15:19), treat me as one of your hired servants who work for a wage and are not endowed by the inheritance. But when he approached he gave up this feeling of a hired servant, when his father came running and kissed him, and now he did not say what he had planned, but simply (Luke 15:21), Father, I have sinned against heaven and before you. I am now no longer worthy to be called your son. Here cupiditas has been conquered by charitas, and the desire for the easy way out has been exchanged for the desire for righteousness. Now the insufficient remorse (attritio), has been made true remorse (contritio), and it has happened through the father’s kiss which, although it denotes the divine charity, can also, without prejudice to the better sense, suitably be understood as the sacrament of atonement or the sacramental absolution, in which are given: the ring as the sign of the Holy Spirit and the living faith, the best robe that is charity, and shoes that is the preaching of the Gospel and the Christian dogma, in which the emotions are strengthened so that they will not hereafter touch the ground. Thus returned, to the Church, that is, he is found worthy of eating the fattened calf, which means receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist. This is one way in which the sinner is led back to grace, to wit the way of charity : when he thinks of his own poverty and his father’s wealth, he is led from love of himself via the conceived hope of the divine goodwill to love of God. And this is the primary way and almost the most natural and suitable for a free-born soul.128 128 LR 373,25–374,25/n2r,25–n2v,25: “Is enim primo a patre petiit partem substantiae se contingentem, velut fastidiens paternam pro indiviso possidere substantiam, & volens in suis bonis naturalibus habere libertatem, & esse sui iuris, quod non poterat esse diuturnum, ideo statim dicitur profectus peregre in regionem longinquam, in qua non solum a deo patre, sed & a seipso recessit, & cupiebat ventrem implere de siliquis porcorum, nec poterat. Hic notatur recessus animae a deo per peccatum, deinde sequitur ad deum regressus. Tunc ad se reversus dixit, quanti mercenarii in domo patris mei abundant panibus? ego autem hic fame pereo surgam & ibo & c. Hic notatur primus gradus animae revertentis ad deum cum dicitur ad se reversus. Item hic habes amorem adhuc mercenarium, qui nondum est charitatis sed adhuc cupiditatis, ubi anima peccatrix proprium commodum cogitat, & nondum exuta privata sui affectione, de mercede sollicita est, ac se dicturam proponit. Fac me sicut unum mercenariis, qui pro mercede serviunt, ad quos non spectat haereditas, sed in progressu hunc mercenarium affectum relinquit, dum pater accurrens osculatur, iam non dicit quod proposuerat, sed solum pater peccavi in coelum & coram te, iam non sum dignus vocari filius tuus. Hic cupiditas charitate superata est, & affectio commodi cessit affectioni iustitiae. Iam attritio facta est contritio, & per hoc osculum paternum, quod licet divinam significet charitatem, tamen sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae, etiam convenienter accipi potest reconciliationis sacramentum sive sacramentalis absolutio, ubi annulus spiritussancti signaculum & fides viva redditur, & stola prima id est charitas, & calciamenta id est evangelii predicatio, & Christina disciplina qua muniuntur affectus, ne post hac terram tangant. Sic in domum id est ecclesiam ductus dignus habetur, qui vitulum saginatum comedat, id est eucharistiae sacramentum accipiat. Iste est unus modus quo peccator ad gratiam reducitur, per viam scilicet amoris, dum attendens suam

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Latomus says here that the natural soul’s leaving God because of the concupiscent love of self, since “he wanted freedom in his natural boons and to be his own master” (LR 373,27–28/n2r,27–28), is bound to fail. It cannot be satisfied and therefore forever seeks out new places, a search which within itself contains the germ of the return to God: “Here one notices the soul’s departure from God because of sin, then follows the return to God” (LR 373,31–33/n2r,31–33). So man has in his nature a spiritual connection to God which will often lead him back in spite of his various attempts to rebel. But Latomus emphasizes that the return to God is not man’s own merit. The wish to return is always ruled by the greedy self-love (cupiditas). Only when God himself approaches man is self-love changed into love of God (charitas), and the reconciliation brought about. Thus Latomus sees man as inseparable from God, and this corresponds to the real inseparability of nature and supernature which was seen in his doctrine of grace. It is the fact that supernature completes nature. But at the same time it is seen how respectively man’s and God’s own activities each in their own way come into their own, and this corresponds to the fundamental separation between nature and supernature, and to the concept of both human freedom and the unique importance of the saving grace. It is worth noting that Latomus at the end emphasizes that This is one way in which the sinner is led back to grace, i. e. the way of charity : when he thinks of his own poverty and the father’s wealth, he is led from love of himself via the conceived hope of the divine good-will to love of God. And this is the primary way and almost the most natural and suitable for a free-born soul.129

It is man’s natural and most obvious way that Latomus defines here, but there are also other ways for sinners to relate to God and be led back to Him. The way that is best known, after the road of charity, is the road of fear (LR 374,25–376,4/ n2v,25–n3v,4). It is of use, Latomus says, to those who are hardened and who are depraved rather than improved by flattery and lightness. Of them it says in Isa 28:19: “and it will be sheer terror to understand the message”. These people can only be led back to righteousness through fear. Exactly as it was with the first step towards God in self-love in the more heedful sinner, the fear in the hardened sinner mainly springs from his love of himself and his own needs. Where selflove in the heedful sinner made him long for what is pleasant, it makes the hardened sinner fear what is unpleasant. This unpleasantness is initially coninopiam & patris abundantiam, ab amore sui per spem de divina liberalitate conceptam, perducitur ad dei amorem Et est iste modus primus, & quasi magis naturalis maxime conveniens animo ingenuo.” 129 LR 374,20–25/n2v,20–25: “Iste est unus modus quo peccator ad gratiam reducitur, per viam scilicet amoris, dum attendens suam inopiam & patris abundantiam, ab amore sui per spem de divina liberalitate conceptam, perducitur ad dei amorem. Et est iste modus primus, & quasi magis naturalis maxime conveniens animo ingenuo.”

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firmed and strengthened in the meeting with God’s omnipotence, wisdom and justice, because when facing these three the hardened sinner fears not only the unpleasant, but damnation itself. But God’s judgement is not a damnation, but a way of reaching out to that hardened sinner, to make it possible afterwards to lead him back to Himself. Latomus mentions a series of examples from the New Testament of this secondary method of re-establishing man’s relation to God, the parable of the king who wished to settle accounts with his servants (Matt 18:23–34), the story of the tower that crushed eighteen people (Luke 13:1–5), and John the Baptist’s words in Luke 3:7–17. He also quotes Augustine’s commentary on 1 John: If there is no fear there is nothing which charity can penetrate, just as we see that a thread is pushed in with a needle when something is sewn. The needle goes in first, but unless it comes out again the thread will not follow, and thus fear first occupies the mind but it does not stay there, because it has penetrated to introduce charity.130

Latomus ends by writing that in addition to these two well-known ways, the two different roads, the road of charity and the road of fear, which both played an important role in the practice of penitence at the time, there are also other ways in which God turns man towards Him and saves him. But these other ways belong to the divine wisdom and are therefore hidden.

4.8

Faith

Latomus’ view of faith still remains to be dealt with. In his previous pages faith as a preliminary stage to righteousness has been treated, “the steadfastness of the heart in which we are […] immediately disposed for righteousness” (cordis credulitas, qua […] ad iustitiam proxime disponimur), and faith as something natural which comes before the infusion of the saving grace, because it precedes the access to the sacramental means through which grace is granted (LR 293,21– 22/c2r,21–22; 379,3–10/o1r,3–10). Latomus has also dealt with the act of faith itself as the place of justification (fides, qua justificatus est), and “the faithfulness of the heart in which we are righteous” (cordis credulitas, qua iusti sumus), and he has said that grace is granted in the spirit of faith (gratia nobis donata in spiritu fidei) (LR 293,14–15/c2r,14–15; 293,21–22/c2r,21–22; 327,19/g3r,19). And finally he has added that with absolution we are granted the living faith (fides viva) (LR 374,15–16/n2v,15–16), that after justification we live by faith and 130 LR 375,30–34/n3r,30–34: Super Epistola Joannis, tract 9,4: “Si nullus timor, non est qua intret charitas, sicut videmus per setam introduci linum, quando aliquid suitur. Seta prius intrat, sed nisi exeat non succedit linum, sic timor primo occupat mentem, non autem ibi remanet timor, quia ideo intravit ut introduceret charitatem.”

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walk in faith, as it is an incomplete yet piecemeal knowledge of God’s will (LR 297,31–36/c3r,31–36), and that faith is one of the three divinely infused virtues, faith, hope and charity, which like hope is subordinate to charity (LR 338,20–23/h4v,20–23). He has noted that Augustine agrees with him that man has true virtues through the faith that works by love (fides quae per dilectionem operator) (LR 296,10–14/c3v,10–14). It is a reasonable supposition that what Latomus says about faith fits in with what he says about grace and freedom. The nuances of faith, like the gradation of grace and the emphasis on freedom, presumably reflect the existence of both the natural and the supernatural level in the relation between man and God, i. e. the fact that man is God’s creation and totally dependent on Him (the real inseparability of nature and supernature), but simultaneously by virtue of the creation is His inferior free cooperator (the fundamental separation of nature and supernature).

4.8.1 Latomus on fides in article 2 of the Exposition Latomus devotes a passage to faith in article 2 of the Exposition, on penance, in defence of articles 5 and 7 of the Leuven condemnation. Here Luther was accused of maintaining (art. 5) that it is heretical to hold that by the sacrament of the new law grace is given to those who do not bolt the door (LR 379,29–31/ o1r,29–31).131 Luther’s grounds are that it is not the sacrament as such, but the belief in the sacrament, which justifies (art. 7) the belief in Christ as God’s word, he who said that “whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt 16:19). “You have what you believe”, Luther emphasizes, thus declaring that the effect of the sacrament depends neither on the deeds of the receiver, the quality or quantity of his remorse nor on the priest, but only on the receiver’s belief in redemption (LR 383,20–23/o3r,20–23). In defence of article 5 Latomus refers to the quotations and the argumentation he has previously adduced against the content of point four in the denunciation: “without God’s grace, which first forgives the trespass, man cannot be given the promise that he can ask forgiveness” (LR 380,2–21/o1v2–21) Here he showed that will, faith and prayer as an expression of God’s general grace go before the access to the sacramental means, and that the saving grace is not granted man until in the sacrament. So in one way faith comes before the sacraments, and the faith which is the subject here does not save man. Latomus says a little later in the Exposition: “There is nothing to prevent us from the belief that 131 Cf. WA 1, 544,33–41.

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God is truthful in his promises and that we receive the sacraments in that faith, but yet do not obtain God’s grace.”132 It would also be absurd to claim, says Latomus, that it is the faith of the one who receives the sacrament that justifies, because what are we then to do about the christening of children? Children lack the personal faith (fides propria), and yet they are justified at their baptism. Nor can we say that it is the faith that is present in those who perform the sacrifice of the Mass or who baptize that justifies, because it sometimes happens that they are infidels and baptize the child with the aim of working that which the Church works. It is after all determined in canon law that both Jews and heathens are allowed to perform baptism. The faith that justifies is therefore the faith of the Church (fides ecclesiae). That is the faith that works in the sacraments with the merit it has been given by the suffering of Christ. It is in that light that the quotation from Augustine is to be understood to which Luther often refers and which runs: “What is the great power in the water that it touches the body and washes the heart, if not because the word works, not because it is said, but because it is believed?”133 According to Latomus “quia creditur” here refers not to any one personal faith, but to the faith that is found in and passed on by the Church and is therefore elevated above and fundamentally independent of personal faith. Personal faith is not necessary for justification, as we have seen in the example of the unconscious and therefore unbelieving children, but nor is it without importance. In conscious adults their faith is involved in their justification, understood as an arrangement that precedes the reception of the effect of the sacrament, a dispositio praerequisita (LR 380,20/o1v,20). Latomus then adduces a series of proofs from the letters of Leo I and Cyprian, and concludes that it is “the sacrament itself that when it is received confers grace on the one who does not bolt his door”.134 In his defence of article 7 Latomus deals more thoroughly with his view of faith (LR 384,3ff./o3v,3ff.). He is surprised that Luther apparently thinks that there is remorse, contritio, without the belief in the words of Christ, and which does not stem from the power invested in the priest; for Luther says: “But I say to you that if you, even after you have repented, go to the sacrament and do not

132 LR 389,19–21/p2r,19–21: “Nihil itaque prohibet credere deum esse in promissis veracem, & cum ea fide sacramentum recipere, nec tamen dei gratiam assequi.” 133 LR 380,16–18/o1v,16–18: “Quae est tanta virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat, & cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo, non quia dicitur, sed quia creditor.” F/note 55: In Ioannem, tract. 80, 3, often quoted by Luther, cf. for example Sermo de Poenitentia, WA 1, 324,16ff. 134 LR 381,10–11/o2r,10–11: “Ex his liquido constat ipsum sacramentum dum suscipitur, gratiam conferre in non ponente obicem.”

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believe in absolution, the sacrament will be death and damnation for you.”135 This cannot be correct, Latomus claims, because the penitent has the true faith, if not fully developed (fides vera saltem implicita), in relation to all the things that must be believed, among which one is that the priest can give absolution to a penitent sinner. What Luther says about having to believe fully that you will be forgiven, or have been forgiven, when the priest absolves you and intones the words of the absolution to you has nothing to do with the Catholic faith (fides catholica) and it makes absolution unnecessary. The man who is on his way to eternal life (viator) cannot be certain of his holiness and venerability through anything but the certainty of probability (certitudo probabilitatis). And that is no more than a supposition, and stands side by side with anxiety and fear of the opposite. So we can be released from our sins by the priest, even though we fear that we have not been, just as our prayers can be heard though we fear and doubt. That was the plight of Job (Job 9:16): “If I summoned him and he answered me, I would not believe that he was listening to my voice.” Nevertheless faith is necessary in prayer, as it is in receiving the sacraments. This is written in Mark 11:24: “Therefore I tell you, whatever you ask in prayer, believe that you have received it, and it will be yours”; and Jas 1:6: “but let him ask in faith, with no doubting”. Latomus cannot understand that if Luther says in the Sermon on Penance that a true confession of impenitence is counted as penitence with God,136 why then does a true confession of lack of faith not count as faith too? There are people who want to believe but cannot and who exclaim in pain, “Lord, help my unbelief!” (Mark 9:24), and pray with the apostles: “Lord, increase our faith!” (Luke 17:5). In some places Luther even agrees in this, for example where he admits that a grown-up man does not undeservedly go to the sacrament of the Eucharist in the Church’s or someone else’s faith.137 Just as the individual can doubt his own absolution, so the priest, in spite of his belief in Christ’s words that “whatever you loose…”, can fear with his reason (rationabiliter), that the penitent is not forgiven. It may happen that some hindrance to the reception of the sacrament is hidden in the receiver, in the shape of insufficient penitence and pain. The power of the keys simply cannot be used on the one who does not feel enough pain at his sins. Here Latomus has thrown light from a different angle on why it is not the personal faith of the individual or of the priest that is decisive for justification, 135 LR 384,5–7/o3v,5–7: “Ego autem dico tibi quod si etiam contritus accesseris & non credideris in absolutionem, sunt tibi sacramenta in mortem et damnationem”; WA 1, 324,11– 12. 136 WA 1, 321,36–38, Sermo de Poenitentia. 137 WA 1, 333,13–29, Sermo de digna Praeparatione Cordis pro suscipiendo Sacramento Eucharistiae.

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but the Catholic faith (fides catholica), which presumably is identical to what he earlier called the faith of the Church (fides ecclesia). He writes: In the same way it is the Catholic faith that justifies, not the faith with which it is believed that one man or another is redeemed, because the penitent can believe himself absolved without reason, just as the priest can prematurely perform the laying on of hands, and according to Jerome might harbour some of the pride of the Pharisees, so that he supposes he looses the culpable and binds the innocent.138

So we have to distinguish between personal faith and the faith of the Church. On the one hand we cannot know if God’s absolution of us is certain. But on the other hand, we cannot doubt God’s mercy and power because of articulus fidei, the words of the Creed about the forgiveness of sins. In the same way God’s forgiveness through human agency can also be uncertain, although we regard it as indubitable, in the belief that everything the priest looses on earth shall be loosed in Heaven (LR 385,33–386,2/o4r,33–o4v,2). Luther’s mistake, according to Latomus, is that, with an expression from formal logic, he ascribes the certainty of the major premise for a logical conclusion to the minor premise. For it is certain that anyone whom the priest looses is loosed, but whether he looses this or that person can be doubted rationally (rationabiliter) as there can be a deficiency in the penitent and a misuse of power in the priest. It is entirely parallel to the example that anyone whom an able doctor cures will be cured, but in reality there can be an error in connection with this man, because of which a doctor who performs all the tricks of his art cannot after all heal.139

“Nevertheless I think”, Latomus goes on, that it is more likely that the priest not only declaratively but also truly forgives the sins, binds and looses them because it is said: “If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you withhold forgiveness from any, it is withheld” [John 20:23].140

138 LR 385,12–16/o4r,12–16: “Item fides quae iustificat est fides catholica non fides qua creditur quod iste vel ille sit absolutus, cum possit poenitens temere credere se absolvi, sicut & sacerdos potest cito manum imponere, & iuxta Hieronymum aliquid habere de supercilio phariseorum, ut putet se noxios solvere & innoxios ligare.” 139 LR 386,19–26/o4v19–26: “Causa erroris Martini est quod certitudinem maioris propositionis minori applicat. Certum est enim quod quemcunque sacerdos soluit solutus est, sed utrum hunc aut illum solvat rationabiliter dubitari potest, cum possit esse defectus in poenitente & abusus in sacerdote, sicut in simili quemcunque peritus medicus sanaverit sanatus erit, sed in applicatione circa hunc hominem error esse potest, propter quem medicus faciens quae sunt artis non tamen sanabit.” 140 LR 386,27–30/o4v,27–30: “Tamen probabilius credo quod sacerdos peccata remittat liget & solvat non solum declarative, sed vere propter id quod scriptum est Quorum remiseritis peccata remittuntur eis, & quorum retinueritis retenta sunt.” There is an interesting critical change of this passage in the edition from1550, cf. Fischer. The publisher, Latomus’ nephew, has not found it strong enough to use the expression “Tamen probabilius credo quod sacerdos” and has therefore instead written “Alioqui mihi non dubium est quin sacerdos”.

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He begins to make the case that this ambiguity when we speak of faith, by which personal faith is marked by uncertainty and doubt, while the faith of the Church is marked by certainty, must not frighten those who hear it (LR 386,27–388,9/ o4v,27–p1v,9). There is reason to trust that it is good and right the way it is, and this reason is that it is written (scriptum est) in John 20:23, Matt 16:19 and in Matt 9:8 that God has given man the power to loose and bind sins on earth. These decisive Bible texts, says Latomus, have not been phrased in a way which can be interpreted as if they simply announce that the priest alone has been given the task of showing and explaining God’s power. They unambiguously declare that the priest is to wield divine power itself. And because it is stated as it is in Scripture, we do not have to understand (intelligere) this power to acknowledge it. We only have to accept it in humble faith (credere) that God can do more than man can grasp (Eph 3:20), humbly concede (sapere) that God has been assigned to each according to his measure of faith (Rom 12:3) and glorify (glorificare) God, who has given such authority to men (Matt 9:8). What seems impossible to man, God makes possible. He washes away our sin in baptism, he forgives the sinner through penance, and in the words of Christ he transforms the created into the blood and body of Christ in the Eucharist. None of this can be understood unless it is believed: si non creditur, non intelligitur (LR 387,28/p1r,28).

4.8.2 The relationship between fides propria and fides ecclesiae Thus in Latomus faith is regarded from two different aspects, from a human and from a divine aspect. The word “faith” covers both men’s personal faith and the divine faith, which is present in the Church and passed on at the administration of the sacraments. It is important not to mix up the two aspects, although they are of course proper to the same area. Latomus’ point in what has just been said is to emphasize that we have to submit to the Church and not be troubled by our doubts about ourself. But without losing our grip on the necessary distinction between the two aspects, we can, however, observe how man’s personal faith moves and develops by virtue of the faith of the Church. In that way it also becomes clear that it was correct to assume that what Latomus says about faith, like what he says about grace and freedom, reflects the existence of the natural and supernatural levels in the relation between man and God. The first step, as is now clear, is the fides propria which moved by will is a preparation for justification, a dispositio praerequisita. So far it is a natural So he has wanted to emphasize even more strongly that there can be no doubt about the priest’s divinely sanctioned power.

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ability in man and springs from God’s general grace, i. e. the part of the working of God’s grace which maintains and supports the created qua created. It is the faith Latomus has described as “the faithfulness of the heart, by which […] we are justified or are immediately disposed for righteousness” (cordis credulitas, qua […] ad iustitiam proxime disponimur). To understand it one may look back to the description of the soul in the exegesis of the parable of the prodigal son, who after having been entirely turned away from God, takes the first step towards himself, and hence the first step back to God. On the one hand this faith is acquired before justification in accordance with the Scriptural words that “whatever you ask in prayer, believe that you have received it, and it will be yours” (Mark 11:24), and “but let him ask in faith, with no doubting” (Jas 1:6). But on the other hand it is not necessary for the justification, since it may well happen that the one who is absolved does not himself believe that he has been (LR 388,10–11.15–17/p1v,10–11.15–17). Thus, in contrast to what Luther writes, it is not man’s faith, according to Latomus, which is a necessary disposition for receiving grace, but his remorse (attrition), which through grace becomes contritio. Latomus has also described it in his exegesis of the parable of the prodigal son, and he again emphasizes it in developing what he says about faith in article 2 of the Exposition (LR 388,10– 389,25/p1v,10–p1r,25). The importance of contrition for each man’s responsiveness to grace is witnessed by the Scriptures, whereas “you cannot easily find that kind of evidence for the justification of the man who is absolved sacramentally by faith alone without contrition”.141 He then adduces a quotation from Augustine’s Enchiridion (82, 22) in support of his view, and concludes that Augustine regards the quantum of pain as important for justification, and wants the sinner who feels pain to the full to be immediately absolved, if the sufficiency of pain exists for the priest. And the one who trusts that he is absolved through his pain, Latomus chides Luther, cannot be said to trust his own deeds, but God’s gifts, because true penitence (vera poenitentia) is a gift from God (LR 389/p2r, 9–10). Here the distinction between attritio and contritio comes to the fore. Even though man feels sufficient pain to be disposed for the reception of grace, his remorse (attritio) is insufficient. It does not become sufficient until after the infusion of grace when it is transformed into contritio, and only now can we contemplate true penitence. The distinction between the two forms of remorse is of course set up to avoid accusations of Pelagianism akin to the one Luther indirectly levels at Latomus and those who are disposed like him. Once we have understood what Latomus says about remorse, it becomes clear how senseless it 141 LR 388,24–26/p1v,24–26: “Huiusmodi testimonia non facile reperies de iustificatione eius qui sacramentaliter absolvitur, ex fide sola sine contritione.”

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must seem to him that Luther says that a contritio without faith exists. When contritio does not obtain until after the infusion of grace, the first stage of faith must come beforehand, and in addition faith is an even less important disposition for the infusion of grace than attritio, the preliminary stage to contrition (LR 384,8–10; 388,10–17/o3v,8–10; p1v,10–17). Latomus has taken great pains to make it clear that neither of the natural dispositions mentioned, the possible first stage of faith and the necessary but insufficient remorse, justifies man. If man does not hinder it by “bolting the door”, grace is granted at the reception of the Eucharist, and what works in the Eucharist is the faith of the Church with the merit it has been given by the suffering of Christ. The divine supernatural grace which is here granted to man in the spirit of faith (gratia nobis data in spiritu fidei) gives the receiver of the sacrament a part in Christ’s merit as it forgives him his sins and infuses the virtue of charity (charitatis virtus). In that, all man’s other virtues are turned right and perfected, both the corporal, the natural, the acquired and the two other infused virtues, the virtue of faith (virtus fidei), and the virtue of hope, and the justified man is now able to live aright. The virtue of charity, as has been seen, is the greatest of them all, as it is the form of all other virtues. But faith and hope, as the divinely infused virtues that they are, and therefore superior to the others, are of special importance for the existence of the righteous man. As we have already said, Latomus emphasized his agreement with Augustine that the believing justified man has true virtues through the faith that works in love (fides quae per dilectionem operatur). On the receipt of the sacramental grace, the personal faith moves from its first to its second stage. The natural disposition for justification which is a result of God’s general grace now turns into the perfect supernatural unfolding of the virtue of infused faith (virtus fidei infusus), by virtue of God’s special grace and infusion of charitatis virtus. It is still a fides propria, but now in a divinely qualified sense. Just as the first stage of the faith could be compared with the soul turning to God, in Latomus’ exegesis of the parable of the prodigal son, the second stage can be compared to the sacramental union between man and God which is described at the end of the same text. Here it is said that only when God grants his love in the sacrament of absolution is man’s insufficient remorse turned into true contrition, its love changed from self-love to love of God and the ‘living faith’ given (fides viva redditur). This was also the thinking behind Latomus’ conclusion that the truly contrite (contritus) has the true faith (vera fides) (384,8–10/o3v,8–10).142 142 It is not possible to find better support in the text of the Exposition for the development in the concept of faith than what has been adduced here. The reason is that Latomus did not intend to give a description of it in the tract against Luther where the theme, as Latomus

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The second stage of faith is no longer marked by the same doubt and probability as the first stage. The man who possesses viva fides/virtus fidei infusus as his own has a greater certainty because with the living faith the truth of the Gospel (veritas evangelica) has been put into his heart, which means that he now has a piecemeal understanding of God’s will. He finds himself where “credo ut intelligam” is now taken for granted. In the exegesis of the parable of the prodigal son it was described as his having been given the living faith, and as shoes the preaching of the Gospel and the Christian dogma, so that his feelings were fortified and he no longer needed to touch the ground. This faith is common to all members of the Church. But a few chosen believers, as was seen in the Dialogue, reach a higher stage of the understanding of faith by virtue of a lumen superadditum, which gives them a spiritual insight into the divine mysteries. They understand better than others what constitutes veritas evangelica. Latomus has described it directly in the Dialogue under the names of theologia speculativa and theologia scholastica, and thus he suggested that this special knowledge is meant for the few that are to lead the many on the right path, i. e. the few who are to fill the ecclesiastical teaching office. God gave in Christ His theology […] the truly subtle and spiritual one, particularly to His disciples, to whom it was granted to know the mystery of the kingdom, gradually leading them too, away from the flesh, until by the flame of the Holy Spirit, purged of all rust and dross, they could fully understand this fluid and spiritual theology, with no need of corporal aids, but beholding the divine glory of Christ with unveiled face.143

That virtus fidei infusus is a necessary condition for receiving lumen superadditum was seen when Latomus in the Dialogue spoke of the right way of working. Here he wrote that the young theologian must first submit to the Church and have a “strong and loyal acceptance”, alias virtus fidei infusus, of “what has been entrusted”, before he can begin to rise in the hierarchy of knowledge towards the perfected state where lumen superadditum is necessary. But the added light, on the other hand, is in no way a necessary concomitant of the virtue of faith. Finally we must remember, while considering the infused virtue of faith, that it will not have reached perfection until in the life to come. It is precisely not a himself points out several times, among others where he asks about Augustine’s view of opera indifferentia, is only the conditions for the baptized justified Christians and not for the pre-Christians. 143 Guelluy : 1941, 60/Latomus: 1905, 67 (quoted before): “[…] subtilem vero et spiritualem seorsum discipulis, quibus datum erat nosse misterium regni, succesiue et illos a carne abducens donec igne spiritus sancti, rubigine ac grossitie deposita, liquidam illam et spiritualem pleno haustu caperent theologiam, non iam carneis adminiculis indigentes, sed reuelata facie diuinam christi gloriam speculantes […].”

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perfect, but an imperfect understanding of God’s will, both for those who only reach its lower stages, the loyal acceptance of what has been entrusted, and for those who reach its higher stage, the spiritual insight. Therefore there will always be a possibility in this life that the first stage of faith and the uncertainty and doubt it entails will make an appearance, just as there is a possibility, because of the imperfect charitatis virtus, of committing venial sins and thus not fulfilling the command of charity to the full. Therefore the movement in which the viator submits to the faith of the Church and is unaffected by his personal belief is permanently relevant, just as it is relevant for the same viator to seek forgiveness in the sacraments for his still forgivable sins. It has now become clear that faith must be seen both as an aspect of man’s own natural ability, and as an aspect of God’s supernatural work. The distinctions between fides as dispositio praerequisita, fides catholica ecclesiae and fides viva/ virtus fidei infusus mark the fact that the natural and supernatural levels in God’s ordo are both separated and connected. That man is God’s cooperator, since he can naturally turn his soul towards receiving God’s grace, though it is God who works everything, both by giving man the aid of His general grace and infusing the saving grace and the supernatural ability. Also the distinction between on the one hand man’s personal faith (fides propria), which basically can only be a probable certainty (certitudo probabilis), and on the other hand the Catholic faith of the Church (fides catholica ecclesiae), which is divine and represents the certainty of the things that must be believed, and which is contained in the Creed (in articulis fidei), reveals both the separation and the union between God and man. So the two kinds of faith have to be kept apart, but are interwoven: fides propria is a preliminary stage to justification by virtue of God’s general grace and is, by virtue of fides catholica ecclesiae through the infusion of God’s special grace in justification, turned into viva fides/virtus fidei infusus after justification. The superior divine faith that is present in and passed on by the Church is of great importance, since it works in man by the giving of grace through the sacrament, which when it is renewed imparts its truth to him. And the divine faith is always the one in which man must take refuge. But man’s position as God’s cooperator is continuously emphasized, since with God’s aid he is also active in the justification with his personal faith.

4.9

The Church

Before we can leave Latomus we must pause over his understanding of the importance of the Church. He himself thinks it is decisive. He has even chosen to move his commentary on article 3 of the condemnation, which deals with indulgence, to the end of the Exposition, so that he can round off the whole work

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with a section on the Church, which is what article 6 of the Exposition is: an overview explaining what the Church and its means of grace are.144 Latomus’ view of the importance of the Church has come through in the previous sections. Especially two functions have been mentioned, which are both necessary for the maintenance of the Church; the teaching office, the task of which it is to pass on and protect the truth of the Gospel, and the stewardship of the power of the keys, the task of which it is to administer the bestowal of God’s grace in the sacraments. The teaching office was especially mentioned in the Dialogue, and again in connection with the condemnations and the letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam. In the section on the Dialogue it was said that the special spiritual revelation for the few and wise is an inner criterion of the true doctrine, which finds expression in the teaching office of the Church. Latomus described how this revelation had manifested itself through the ages in the chosen ones in the Church, been developed from the disciples and Apostles as the first direct revelation witnesses, via the combination of the written word and oral tradition of the Church Fathers, to the scholastic system of the universities in Latomus’ own time. Here he thus emphasized the important part played by the university professors and professors of theology in the stewardship of the ecclesiastical teaching office. They, among others, now were the bearers of the revelation, and therefore their task was to define and defend the content of the revelation on behalf of the Church. In another passage in the Dialogue he also emphasized that this conduct of the office was not an impalpable phenomenon, but a concrete job of understanding the Scripture and the ecclesiastical tradition. But as was seen in the analysis of the condemnations, the university professors did not have the final power to determine and define the true dogma; that belonged to the head of the Church, the Pope. The existence of the power of the keys, for Latomus, is a prerequisite for discussion of man’s justification. The whole nature/supernature scheme is not understood as an isolated spiritual fact, but is inextricably bound up with the power of the keys. Throughout Latomus has emphasized that the kingdom of God only becomes real through the sacerdotal power to distribute the sacramental means of grace. First and foremost in baptism which with God’s grace removes the guilt and power of sin, and infuses the supernatural virtues, and thus forms the basis of the life of the right-turned Christian. Secondarily in penitence, which with its purification and reinforcement of the pardon of divine 144 For a more thorough examination of Latomus’ ecclesiology, cf. Vercruysse: 1988. The article analyses the view of the Church in Latomus’ later work De Primatu Romani Pontificis adversus Lutherum of 1526. Latomus’ view of the Church here seems to be no different from what can be read out of the Exposition.

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grace, and renewed provision of the infused virtues, helps the Christian on his way in the imperfect life of this world, towards perfection in the life to come. As opposed to the teaching office, the power of the keys is not connected to definite persons, but to Christ’s institution of it. It can therefore, as Latomus said in the section on the law, be managed by all priests to whom it has been entrusted, even infidels.

4.9.1 The Episcopal office There is one ecclesiastical office in which the two things, the defence and dissemination of the true doctrine and the communication of God’s grace in the sacraments, are performed in one overall pastoral function, and that is the episcopal office. The bishops in a special sense, and the supreme bishop of the Church, the Pope, in a unique sense, are duty-bound to see to the administering of the sacraments, and that the Gospel is passed on in a pure form. In article 6 of the Exposition Latomus briefly explains his view of the episcopal and papal office in a refutation of Luther’s critique of the papacy in both the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation and in the Resolutions to the Ninety-five Theses (LR 465,21–467,1/bb4r,21–cc1r,1). First he considers the episcopal office as such, here taking as his point of departure Matt 24:45/Luke 12:42: “Who then is the faithful and wise servant, whom his master has set over his household, to give them their food at the proper time?” He concludes that the trusty and wise servant is the overseer of the other servants, not their ruler, which better fits the Greek “episkopos”, in Latin “superintendens”. Even though bishops and presbyters were mentioned on an equal footing in the Early Church, “bishop” denoting a person of a certain age, and “presbyter” a person with a certain office – at least it would appear so from Jerome145 – and although Paul too with the term bishop understood all presbyters, going all the way from bishop to deacon, Latomus nevertheless believes, unlike Luther, that from the beginning there has been a difference between the two offices, presbyter and bishop, and that the latter’s power has always been the greater and more important. This, he says, can for example be seen in Dionysios who was Paul’s disciple, and from Ignatius’ letters, he who was the disciple of John the evangelist. Just as he thinks that the office of bishop is the highest ecclesiastical office, so Latomus thinks that the care of the whole Catholic Church has been entrusted to 145 F/note 130: Epistola ad Evangelum 146, 1, and Commentaria In Epistolam Ad Titum, ad 1:5. Cf. Luther in Resolutio Lutheriana super Propositione sua XIII. se Potestate Papae, WA 2, 227,33–228,35, and 229,29–230,2.

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Peter and all that came after him by divine right, “so that all degrees and dignities through patriarchs and archbishops right down to the last bishop in the body of the Church should be distributed in the best possible way so that each kept his rights”.146 This is also the opinion of men as great as Augustine, Leo I, Chrysostom, Gregory the Great and Bernard, and for the time being Latomus is going to cleave to that with a clear conscience and strong backing. The Fathers mentioned accept all the usual Scripture proofs for Peter’s chair : Matt 16:19, “I will give you the keys”, Luke 22:32, “but I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail”, and John 21:17, “Tend my sheep”. Even though Christ praises the unity of the Church in these places and in Peter instructs every bishop, it is yet not without importance, Latomus thinks, that Christ spoke directly to Peter, which both Peter and the other Apostles understood after the coming of the Holy Spirit, because this caused Peter to stand up and speak at the election of Matthias (Acts 1:15–22), and to preach after the miracle at Pentecost (Acts 2:14–36). At the meeting of Apostles it was he who ended the conversation (Acta 15:7–11); in Antioch he allowed himself to be lifted on high.147 And to him did Paul come in Jerusalem after having journeyed through all the world, and at God’s command gave to him the gospel he had preached to the heathen (Gal 1:18; 2:7–9). It is probably also due to divine providence that Peter and Paul both stayed in Rome and suffered martyrdom there, because in that way, Latomus concludes, did God let it be known that His Church should be one, and be united in one mortal bishop. That is probably also the background to Cyprian’s statement that the Catholic Church consists of one episcopal office, with changing bishops. It is given to any bishop to give absolution in agreement with the order which is divinely vested in them, but it primarily belongs to the one in the Papal See. The Pope, then, is the highest universal pastor, who under him has a number of bishops who locally attend to the pastoral function he passes on. The two offices, the Pope and the bishops are thus in reality one episcopal office, which is primarily administered by the Pope and secondarily by his subordinate bishops. That both parties, both the Pope and subordinates, have the task of seeing to the conduct of the office of teaching and the administration of the power of the keys is not said directly by Latomus, as that is not what he needs to bring home to Luther, but is implicit in the Scriptural proof he adduces as the basis of his understanding. For one thing he says of a bishop that he is “both loyal and wise” and “has to give them their stipulated food in time”. For another, he says in the three Scriptural texts in support of the Pope that the office of the Vicar of Christ 146 466,7–10/bb4v,7–10: “ut omnes gradus & dignitates in corpore ecclesiae decentissimo ordine per patriarchas, & archiepiscopos usque ad ultimum episcopum disponerentur, salvis unicuique suis iuribus.” 147 F/note 139: Legenda Aurea, cap. 44.

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as the leading pastor (John 21:17) implies taking care of both the sacramental (Matt 16:19) and the didactic aspect (Luke 22:32). The reason why Latomus at the end of the section on the Pope does not mention the teaching function, but only the administration of the power of the keys, is presumably that he is in the middle of a chapter in defence of indulgence, and therefore the sacramental aspect is in focus. Already in the letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam have we seen Latomus’ emphasis on the importance of the Pope as the highest bishop: that the Pope legitimately has the status of powerful spiritual head of the Church. For a start he did not really think that the Exposition was necessary, since the condemnations from Cologne and Leuven had already been sanctioned by the Holy See. And later in the letter, in his rejoinder to Luther’s attack on abuses in the Roman Church, he enjoined confidence in the person of the Pope and insisted that the sovereign pontiff had nothing to do with ecclesiastical abuses. Instead of being carped at he should be exhorted to administer his divinely granted principate with the aid of divine laws, and thus see to the purgation and re-establishment of respect for doctrina, represented by the regulation of matters ecclesiastical in canon law. Latomus’ consideration of the power of the council in relation to the Pope also showed clearly that he could not imagine any other possibility than that one man with divine authority, and not an assembly in which no one knows the centre of power, must lead Christianity on the right path.

4.9.2 The importance of the Church It is evident that Latomus’ interest in ending the Exposition by emphasizing what the Church is springs from the great threat to the existing order which the theologians of the Roman Church recognized in Luther’s thoughts from 1517 onwards. Just as the dispute with the humanists was not only an intellectual disagreement about the elements and quality of education, but was a struggle between power interests, so was the battle against Luther not only a theological dispute on the true understanding of the Gospel, but also a power struggle. The men of the Roman Church, including Latomus, were afraid of losing power to the new tendencies, as several examples have already shown. It was to counteract that, and demonstrate how things must and should be done, that Latomus in 1519 wrote the Dialogue, in 1520 chose to write the Exposition, and finally brought it to completion with a short tract on the Church (LR 449,16–451,10/ y4r,16–aa1r,10). By giving that treatise a markedly rhetorical form, Latomus emphasizes the importance of the message in the text. The piece is not only a general explanation of the exterior conditions of Christianity, but a tract in the shape of a sermon

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about how Christianity is manifest in the world in the shape of the visible Church, the Roman Church. He introduces the sermon with a prayer that the conditions of the Church may be optimal. That it will have the best bishops to lead and hedge in an obedient flock, and embrace a strong doctrine, authority and obedience, justice and piety. He then begins to preach on what the Church is. He deploys two images of it: that it is a people (populus), and that it is the body of Christ (corpus Christi), and thus he emphasizes that it is a state or an organism, a well-ordered unity. Christ is the head of the Church, its prince, and it is He who has instituted its order which is thus divinely sanctioned. It is hierarchically arranged in the best way, so that each level is given what is due to it. Because of his corporeal absence Christ has appointed first the Apostles, and then the bishops and priests as his vicars. Both in the introductory prayer and in the sermon itself Latomus thus emphasizes the Pope’s and the bishops’ power and their function as the spiritual leaders of the Church. As the basic and preserving principle, says Latomus, Christ has instituted the virtue of charity. It is with its aid that the various links of the order are structured and preserved and are able to withstand the power of the Devil. The Church thus is a clear macrocosmic parallel to man. Charitatis virtus is also the decisive factor in the justification of the individual and influences the other hierarchically arranged qualities of lower order. Even though the Church, by virtue of its divine character, is always present and undisturbed, its life and true incorporeal, spiritual, future and invisible nature is hidden from most people. Its secret is only revealed to the few, and thus Latomus emphasizes the existence and importance of the administration of the office of teaching by the chosen ones. He then adds new aspects of the meaning of the power of the keys, by making it clear that the Church, even though invisible, is at the same time visible. It has a visible, established order, which shows and unites what is invisible, and this order is the work of the priests and the sacraments. This is where the believers must turn, and that is the order to which they must cling. The relation between the visible and the invisible, which of course is what explains the inner divine nature of the external Church, is a lesson Latomus is at great pains to read to Luther. After the ecclesiological sermon he therefore explains the importance of understanding in detail what the relationship is between the visible and the invisible in the church (LR 456,24–457,10/aa3v,24– aa4r,10). Even if a priest were to err now and then, and were to loose what should not be loosed or bind what should not be bound, because he cannot see into the hearts of men, it is most important to know, says Latomus, that when he wields his power wisely and there is no hindering disposition in the one who submits to him, he really binds and looses, closes and opens, forgives and insists, not only

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outwardly, corporally and visibly, but also inwardly, spiritually and invisibly. It is important carefully to note this, because he who looks at one thing only can very easily go wrong. If one is only aware of the invisible things and ascribes everything to the invisible faith, one underestimates the visible administrators and secrets. And conversely, if one only looks at the corporal and visible things without considering the invisible things that give them their being, life and work, one ascribes far too much to the visible offices and secrets. Catholic doctrine unites both, ascribing to each what is theirs, so that as in man, neither the body nor the soul alone, but both in simultaneous union form the whole, and just as the soul exists without the body, but not the body without the soul, so the two sides of the divine, the visible and the invisible, work together for redemption in this life, though the invisible can in principle be separated from and exist without the visible, but not vice versa. That the invisible virtue can in principle be found without the visible secret goes to show that it is God’s work in the spirit that is decisive. Because, as Latomus emphasizes, the Holy Spirit also effects man’s redemption through bad administrators. But the corporal, visible aspect is a divinely instituted remedial measure which is to make the divine and ineffable present to man’s limited understanding.148

4.10 Latomus’ relation to Augustine The best way of summarizing the central points of Latomus’ theology is to sum up his relation to Augustine, because the study of this relation brings out the nuances in his theological understanding in spite of the unsystematic character of the Exposition. His relation to Augustine has been the subject of a series of short learned articles. Charles B8n8’s “Saint Augustin dans la Controverse sur les trois langues / Leuven en 1518 et 1519” (B8n8: 1968) deals with how Latomus in the Dialogue responds to Mosellans’ and Erasmus’ use of Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana as an authoritative argument against the conservative scholastics. What Latomus does, according to B8n8, is that on the one hand he accurately but ironically summarizes some of the humanist views inspired by Augustine, and also now and then goes into a discussion and argumentation directly against De Doctrina Christiana itself. On the other hand he also uses the same work positively to buttress his own view. He tries to show that where Augustine has said anything which militates against Latomus’ own view of 148 Unfortunately it exceeds the limits of this study to give a more detailed analysis of the ecclesiological sermon and of the rest of the statements concerning the Church found in article 6. The intention here is simply to give an impression of how Latomus towards the end of the Exposition gathers his theology under the aspect of the Church.

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things, Augustine is either mistaken or in disagreement with himself. B8n8’s point is that Latomus does not in the least intend to read Augustine – but only to use him for his own purpose, and he concludes that Latomus is part of an antihumanist tradition which uses De Doctrina Christiana with a negative intention, namely to combat humanism.149 Marcel Gielis in “L’Augustinisme anti-8rasmien des premiers controversistes de Leuven. Jacques Latomus et Jean Driedo” (Gielis: 1994) takes a different view of Latomus’ use of Augustine in the Dialogue. He sets out to show that the theology at the university of Leuven contained traits which were to become characteristic of the later modern Catholic theology which marked the time from the Council of Trent to Vatican II, and that these traits came out in the controversy with Erasmus and were very much inspired by Augustine. He argues his case by referring to Latomus’ own statement in the later Apology against Erasmus, that Erasmus mostly based his view on Origen, while Latomus himself regarded Augustine as the most distinguished authority. Attention has already been called to Gielis’ results in our section on the Dialogue. It was there emphasized that he is right that Latomus’ semantics are inspired by Augustine’s (and here it is worth remembering that semantics inspired by Augustine was common scholastic property), but that Latomus’ epistemology must be said to be of a more Thomistic than Augustinian character. Rudolf Mau has also written a short article about Augustine’s authority in the controversy between Latomus and Luther, “Die Autorität Augustins in der Kontroverse zwischen Luther und Latomus” (Mau: 1987), which has already been mentioned in our treatment of the Exposition. Mau is of the opinion that Latomus uses Augustine to prove that sin in any real sense should only be understood as the precise sin committed in accordance with the will. But, as has been said before, this is a simplification of Latomus’ concept of sin, built on a faulty reading of Latomus’ use of Augustine’s Confessiones in the Exposition (LR 317,20–22/f2r20–22). Joseph E. Vercruysse is last among those who have written about Latomus’ relation to Augustine. In his article “Die Stellung Augustins in Jacobus Latomus’ Auseinandersetzung mit Luther” (Vercruysse: 1994) he tries to establish if it is correct to maintain that Latomus and Driedo were precursors of the later golden age of Augustine studies at Leuven in the 16th century. He calls attention to the fact that Latomus nowhere says directly why Augustine plays such an important 149 B8n8: 1968, 31: “Il existe une tradition antihumaniste qui a pr8tendu s’appuyer sur le De Doctrina Christiana. Tradition fort ancienne, puisqu’/ la fin du XIVe siHcle Giovanni Dominici, dans sa controverse avec l’humaniste Salutati, pr8tendait s’appuyer sur le trait8 d’Augustin pour proscrire toute culture antique. Elle a ses repr8sentants en Martin Dorp, dont le correspondance avec Prasme montre qu’il savait utiliser le De Doctrina Christiana contre les thHses humanistes; et surtout en Jacques Latomus, comme nous l’avons montr8.”

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role in the Exposition, and that therefore it may have been Augustine’s importance to Luther which made the Church Father such an important piece in the game. In a later work by Latomus, De Primatu Romani Pontificis, Augustine is not quoted to nearly the same degree.150 But the composition and content of the Exposition show, as has also been demonstrated, that Latomus had extensive knowledge of Augustine and prized him highly. As proof of Latomus’ predilection for Augustine, Vercruysse quotes the same passage from the later Apology against Erasmus as does Gielis: “nos vero Augustino primas partes dedimus” (Vercruysse: 1994, 16). And in another passage in Responsio ad Lutherum of 1525, Latomus also explicitly praises Augustine: […] I would prefer Augustine before everyone else, for in my opinion the piety of faith wavers least in him, and the purity of the doctrine shines most brightly, as do the very great and wise insight of what he has to say and the humility conjoined with charity, indeed the sweetest love of the catholic peace.151

In the Apology against Erasmus, Latomus writes that Augustine speaks in the same way “de habitu, qualitate, gratia et dono” as the modern theologians whom Luther castigates (Vercruysse: 1994, 11). So to Latomus Augustine’s statements are proof against Luther that he himself and the medieval scholastic theologians with him are in the right. Therefore, Vercruysse concludes, it might be said that Latomus’ interest in or use of Augustine was a harbinger of the later flourishing interest in Augustine at Leuven. Though we cannot really call Latomus an Augustinian, and though he did not study Augustine solely for the sake of it, his extensive use of the Church Father as the main authority and main argument in several connections threw a special light on Augustine and demonstrated his authority and orthodoxy to later generations. The conclusion of the various studies is that none of B8n8, Mau, or Vercruysse regard Latomus as an Augustinian. Though Vercruysse states that Latomus quotes Augustine very loyally, both B8n8 and Mau believe they can demonstrate a lack of respect in Latomus in relation to the meaning and coherence of Augustine’s works. Whereas Gielis’ claim that Latomus is an Augustinian seems to be imprecise. This fits well enough with what surely must be the conclusion in

150 It could also have been the controversy with the humanists, which clearly was closely connected with the controversy with Luther, which was the cause of Augustine’s coming to play the role he did, cf. B8n8: 1968. 151 Vercruysse: 1994, 18: “[…] Augustinum omnibus anteferrem, quod (meo judicio) minime omnium in Augustino vacillet fidei pietas, maxime reluceat dogmatum sanitas, dictionis maxima, et prudentissima circumspectio, et humilitas cum charitate coniuncta, et suavissimus denique amor catholicae pacis.”

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this present study : that Latomus is not strictly speaking an Augustinian, in neither the Dialogue nor the Exposition. That Vercruysse is right to say that Latomus was very well read in Augustine’s works is demonstrated quite clearly in the Exposition (Vercruysse: 1994, 8–9). As we have mentioned, there are more than two hundred quotations from Augustine, far more than from other Fathers, and they have been taken from 46 works. The quotations are spread evenly across the Exposition, except for article 6 on indulgence, which as has been said had more the character of a short separate tract on the Church. Why Augustine is so popular with Latomus does not have a simple answer, but there is no doubt that Vercruysse is also right to say that the struggle against Luther must have been an important concurrent factor. Latomus knew that Luther set great store by Augustine. Ever since Bartholomaeus Bernhardi’s disputation in 1516 (Quaestio de Viribus et Voluntate Hominis sine Gratia disputata, WA 1, 142ff), which Luther had written, and in which he built on his results from the lecture on the Epistle to the Romans 1515– 1516, with explicit reference especially to Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works, Luther publicly referred to Augustine as one of the major authorities for his viewpoint (Leif Grane: 1975a, 24ff). In the introduction to the theological theses at the disputation in Heidelberg in 1518, he writes, as is well-known, that the theses have been taken from Paul, and from Augustine as Paul’s most loyal exegete. And Luther’s enthusiasm for Augustine went all the way up into the Ninety-five Theses and the controversy over indulgence. This is prominent not the least in article 2 of the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation.

4.10.1 Latomus’ use of Augustine It has become clear that Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works in particular were the object of Latomus’ attention in the Exposition, in connection with the points that were taken up in that context.152 As we have seen, it is to those works that Luther referred in making his case, and this of course has to do with the fact that they treat the subject that is central in the discussions between Luther and the scholastic theologians: the question of the relationship between man’s own ability and God’s grace. Latomus has taken great pains to quote Augustine precisely, and also to demonstrate his own complete agreement with him. This has especially been 152 References have primarily been to the following works: De Spiritu et Littera (412), De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis (420), Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum (420) and Contra Julianum (421). Also De Civitate Dei (413/426) has played an important role. It was written at the time when the Pelagian controversy was in the air ; cf. LR 297,30–298,20/c4r,30– c4v,20.

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seen in two places: both in connection with the question of the infidels’ ability to do good deeds, opus indifferens, and in connection with the letter from Augustine to Jerome dealing with the virtue of charity, and on which Latomus based the exposition of his own doctrine of grace. We have shown how in both connections he kept close to the wording of Augustine’s text, but nevertheless used it exclusively for his own purposes, and left out or re-interpreted what went against his own view. He had no use for Augustine’s understanding of Original Sin, according to which fallen man can do nothing of his own accord, nor with Augustine’s emphasis on the fulfilment of the command of love as the only way of doing anything good in relation to God. It has also become clear that Latomus is much more of a rationalist than Augustine. Where Augustine stresses the will and its dependence on either good or evil as the basis of deeds, Latomus stresses the rational understanding of good or evil, and our reason’s choice of one or the other aided by the will. But if these differences between Latomus and Augustine can be demonstrated, we can also point to similarities between them, or rather connections in which Latomus seems, and to some extent rightly so, to invoke Augustine’s authority. This is primarily true in the question of the Christian’s condition after baptism. As we have seen, it is quite clear that in Augustine there is a tendency to tone down the sin of the baptized Christian, the explanation being that the presence of concupiscence after baptism is no sin as long as the baptized man does not consent to it. And this is in keeping with his distinction between more and less serious sins, where he has an obvious expectation that the baptized justified Christian supported by grace will only be culpable of the venial sins. Both tendencies have to do with the fact that Augustine can be said primarily to have a horizontal doctrine of justification with a sanative tendency. He has declared that fulfilling the command of charity is the only way of doing right in relation to God, in which Latomus as we have seen disagrees with him, except when it concerns men in a state of grace, but that the degree of fulfilment varies with the degree of righteousness in the individual. After the infusion of the grace of baptism, it will grow with time and be perfected after death, when the believer shall have become the perfectly righteous creature who will behold God face to face (LR 297,30–298,20/c4r,30–c4v,20). The more, as Augustine writes, you are able to combat concupiscence the more you will be able to perfect yourself (LR 292,20–23/c1v,20–23). All this is fully in keeping with Latomus’ way of thinking. He, too, thinks that the baptized righteous Christian has been justified as he has received God’s grace through the sacraments in the form of the virtue of charity, which like a mould for a material substance perfects man’s nature and turns it completely right. Thus he will be able in the future to do the good and avoid the bad, and he grows in holiness the more he performs good deeds and withstands desire.

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Yet even in these questions where Augustine immediately sits well with Latomus, disagreements can be found. We have seen as much in the question of concupiscentia. Here Augustine says what Latomus cannot accept, i. e. that from one aspect concupiscentia can be seen as being the cause of, and therefore by nature identical with, Original Sin.

4.10.2 Augustine as a source of inspiration for both Latomus and Luther The best way of demonstrating what a sphinx-like theological thinker Augustine is, and why he can therefore be used by later theologians such as Latomus and Luther, might be to compare Latomus’ use of him with Luther’s. As has been suggested during the analysis of the Exposition, what happens in several cases is that what Latomus finds important in Augustine is what Luther does not like. Luther’s use of Augustine has been studied several times (cf. especially Hamels extensive work: Der junge Luther und Augustin; Hamel: 1934; 1935), but Leif Grane’s work is better suited in this connection (Leif Grane: 1975a, 23– 62).153 He studies Luther’s use of Augustine in the lecture on the Epistle to the Romans, which is probably the text where Augustine’s interpretations of Paul in the anti-Pelagian works are deployed to the greatest extent. The point Grane makes is that Luther does not regard Augustine as being on a level with Paul, but as being an excellent interpreter of him (interpres eius fidelissimus).154 Accordingly Luther is not minded to agree with Augustine in every regard. On the contrary, he takes the liberty of quite exclusively using only the parts of Augustine’s works which fit into his own context. Already here we see a difference from Latomus, in their views on the authority of the Church Fathers. For Latomus it is most important, in upholding his view on Scripture and tradition as equal windows of revelation, though the tradition is subordinate to the Scripture, that the orthodox tradition can be read in full accordance with Scripture, with itself and with the present. To make clear how it is fruitful to compare Luther’s use of Augustine with that of Latomus, one or two examples should be given (Grane: 1975a, 39ff). In connection with his interpretation of Rom 2:13, Luther draws on Augustine to approve his own imputative concept of justification, although to do so he has to strain the meaning of Augustine’s text in De Spiritu et Littera. There is no doubt, Leif Grane writes, that here Augustine has not thought like Luther, that righteousness is imputed to the sinner. It is for all that something he really possesses and contains as his own. According to Grane the misunderstanding is closely 153 The same results, but differently angled, can be read in Grane: 1973 and 1975b. 154 The quotation is from the introduction to the Heidelberg disputation, WA 3, 353,8–14.

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connected to Luther’s misunderstanding of Augustine’s concept of Original Sin and concupiscentia, because Luther identifies peccatum originale with concupiscentia, as can be found as early as his first lecture on the Psalms, and he cites Augustine in support of it. In the scholium to Rom 4:7 Luther comments that Augustine has most excellently pronounced on Original Sin and imputed righteousness in a quotation from De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia. But while Augustine in the quotation in fact speaks of concupiscentia carnis, and points out that though it is forgiven at baptism it persists, but is now no longer counted a sin, Luther, identifying concupiscence and sin, thinks that Augustine means to say that sin is forgiven at baptism, not so that it is removed, but so that it is not imputed. In that way Luther manages via Augustine to have it confirmed that righteousness must necessarily be an imputed righteousness. But when we read Augustine’s true intention in this text, writes Grane, he is in reality closer to the scholastics (including Latomus) than to Luther, seeing concupiscentia as a punishment, not as sin after baptism.155 The same thing is to be seen in the reading of Luther’s use of Augustine in connection with the exegesis of Rom 5:12ff (Grane: 1975a, 42ff).156 In the quotation to which Luther refers, Augustine tries to demonstrate that in Rom 5:12ff we have to do with Original Sin, and in that way he and Luther are in full agreement. But at the same time Grane says: [Z]ugleich gilt für ihn [scil. Augustin] als Voraussetzung, dass die Erbsünde durch die Taufe getilgt wird, sodass nur die Strafe der Sünde, die Begierde, zurückbleibt, die mit Hilfe der Gnade niederzuhalten, dann die weitere Aufgabe des Menschen ist. Die Erbsünde ist mit anderen Worten für den getauften Christen ein zurückliegendes Stadium. Übrig bleibt der durch die Gnade unterstützte Kampf mit den fleischlichen Begierden (Grane: 1975a, 45).

And in Luther it is not like that. Grane says of Luther’s interpretation:

155 Even if Grane’s interpretation is correct, it does not seem to be quite fair to Hamel simply to dismiss him with: “Man kann jedoch die Schwierigkeit kaum dadurch überwinden, dass man wie Hamel auf Unklarheiten bei Augustin hinweist, die Luther überwunden haben soll, indem er eine von den verschiedenen Linien bei Augustin konsequent weiterfolgte. Dazu ist De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia zu unmissverständlich” (Grane: 1975a, 42). Hamel does not pretend to want to overcome the trouble that some aspects of Augustine are “un-Lutheran”. He only calls attention to the fact, and the results of our study seem to confirm him, that there is both an aspect of Augustine which Luther can subscribe to and an aspect Latomus, and with him other scholastics, also can subscribe to. It does not weaken Hamel’s point that Luther misreads the quotation from De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia which Grane here deals with, so that he makes the aspect that absolutely does not fit with him, but with his opponents, speak in favour of his own views. 156 This Augustine quotation is found in De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum.

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[A]ber auch wenn die Gnade gekommen ist, verbleibt die Sünde. Da die Erbsünde nach Luther mit concupiscentia identifiziert werden muss, ist es für das Verständnis der christlichen Existenz entscheidend, dass das Verbleiben der Sünde berücksichtigt wird (Grane: 1975a, 46).

The Augustine Luther here consciously or unconsciously chooses to re-interpret is unmistakably the Augustine to whom Latomus adheres. And the converse statement is also true. The Augustine Latomus does not like is the one with whom Luther affiliates himself. This is for example seen in connection with Rom 2:14, where Luther in the lecture on the Epistle to the Romans uses Augustine’s interpretation in De Spiritu et Littera. Augustine here has several suggestions for the interpretation of the text, one of them being, and this is what Luther affiliates himself with, that by “natural fulfilment of the law” we are only to understand a partial fulfilment of it, which has no bearing on the relation to God (Grane: 1975a, 37–38). Here Luther even quotes the same text that Latomus quoted in article 4 of the Exposition, but uses it to say the opposite. Where Latomus, to maintain the existence of opus indifferens, here called attention to what Augustine says about the remains of the image of God and the concomitant “aliqua bona opera”, which though they are directed at the wrong goals, and thus are of no avail in relation to redemption, are nevertheless called “good”, Luther entirely overlooks Augustine’s reference to imago dei and quotes verbatim (here in Grane’s German translation): Denn so wenig einige lässliche Sünden, ohne die dieses Leben nicht gelebt werden kann, den Gerechten vom ewigen Leben ausschliessen, so wenig nützen dem Gottlosen einige gute Taten, die wohl auch der schlechteste Mensch in seinem Leben aufzuweisen hat, für das ewige Heil (Grane: 1975a, 37).

In this way Luther, in agreement with the interpretation of Augustine which has been put forward during the analysis of the Exposition, declares that only the deeds that are done in charity through grace in Christ are truly good.157 In Latomus’ and Luther’s use of the quotation about the virtue of charity, from Augustine’s letter to Jerome, we see a similar phenomenon.158 As we have seen, Luther cited it in article 2 of the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation to declare, “omne opus bonum est peccatum”, whereas Latomus was uncertain about the interpretation of it, because he was unwilling to accept that in Augustine there is only one way of doing good deeds. We could go on finding examples of the divergent uses of Augustine, but what we have glanced at here may suffice in this connection. The interesting thing is that the more examples one adduces the clearer does it become that by studying 157 Cf. the earlier analysis of Contra Julianum IV, 3, 33. 158 Cf. the section on “Grace”.

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and comparing Latomus’ and Luther’s resort to Augustine the more the discrepancies between the two are thematized. It comes to the fore that their disagreement really is about the sentence “omne opus bonum est peccatum”, about what sin is and what happens to man in justification. Latomus is wholly in agreement with what Grane has characterized as typical of Augustine as opposed to Luther, i. e. that Original Sin is a thing of the past for the baptized Christian, so that after baptism there only remains the struggle against carnal desire, supported by grace. That means that henceforth the attention is directed at the deeds. And that, according to Luther, is an entirely erroneous focus.

5.

Luther’s Pamphlet Against Latomus

Luther heard rumours of Latomus’ tract already in March 1521 (WA B 2, 275,10– 11) and received it at Wartburg around May 26th from Melanchthon (WA B 2, 347,5–8), shortly after the printing on May 8th. To Melanchthon he writes: “I am reluctant to answer Jacob Latomus, because I had already readied my mind for quiet studies, but I do see that it is necessary that I answer myself. On top of that I feel distaste at reading his long and badly written contribution.”1 He started writing around June 8th and was done twelve days later, on the 20th (WA 8, 45,15; 128,29; WA B 2, 354,19–20). On July 15th he had sent this pamphlet, Rationis Latomianae pro incendiariis Louaniensis Scholae sophistis redditae, Lutherianae confutatio (“The Lutheran confutation of the Latomian exposition in defence of the firebrand-sophists of the Leuven university”) to the printer, and the first parts in print were ready already at the end of that month (WA B 2, 365,34–35, note 14). At the end of September Melanchthon sent “Lutheri Amtikatolom” to Willibald Pirckheimer and Bernhard Adelmann (Melanchthon: 1971, 139,28– 30). Luther’s pamphlet was much shorter than Latomus’ tract, because it deals only with Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus and with the three Scriptural texts from the first article of the Exposition, Isa 64:6, Eccl 7:21 and Rom 7:19.2 Luther keeps quite close to Latomus’ text, but constantly has in mind that first and foremost he will put forward his own point of view. The pamphlet consists of first an introductory greeting addressed to Justus Jonas, then a rejoinder to Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus, and finally a concentrated analysis of the three Scripture texts mentioned. The style is violent and exudes displeasure. We sense that Luther is tired of answering that kind of work at this time. One cannot help supposing that settling 1 WA B 2, 347,5–7: “Ad Iacobum Latomum invitus respondeo, quod iam animum composuerim quietis studiis, et video tamen necessarium, ut ego ipse respondeam; accedit taedium legendi eius tam prolixi et male scripti.” 2 Printed in WA 8, 36–128, and in Studienausgabe, vol. 2, ed. Hans-Ulrich Delius, Berlin 1982, 405–519. In the following pages references are mainly to the former.

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scores with scholastic theology in the form it takes in Latomus’ tract, and which builds on a reply to works by Luther published several years ago, is a thing of the past for Luther after the events at Worms. We might ask why he feels duty-bound to answer Latomus at all. There seems to be no immediate need for that, but as we have seen, Luther emphasized in his letter to Melanchthon that he needed to answer it himself. Leif Grane has suggested (cf. Grane: 1977a) that this might have been for the sake of the university in Wittenberg. Latomus wrote his tract to do his duty as professor, and the task that went with it of representing the university of Leuven, and it is possible that Luther now reciprocates for Wittenberg. But Grane also notes that it would no doubt have been important to Luther, for the sake of the redemption of souls, to follow the Papal process, of which of course the Latomus controversy was part, to its very conclusion, so that ordinary people would not be persuaded by his opponents.

5.1

The introductory letter to Justus Jonas

Justus Jonas was one of Luther’s friends and adherents, and had very recently taken over the posts of canon at the Allerheiligen diocese in Wittenberg, and professor of canon law at the university. It is no wonder, therefore, that Luther would have wanted to send him a special greeting and wish him good luck. But there may be another reason why the pamphlet is dedicated particularly to Justus Jonas (cf. Grane: 1977a). In Erfurt, where Justus Jonas had studied, and where he took his doctor’s degree in law in 1518, he had belonged to the circle of humanists around Konrad Mutian. In 1519, at the suggestion of the Elector, he visited Erasmus (Ep. 963, in Erasmus: 1913, 577f), and was the one Erasmus wrote to when he sent the news of the burning of Luther’s books in Leuven (Ep. 1157, in Erasmus: 1922, 375f). By dedicating his book to him, Luther again calls attention to the connection between his own case and Erasmus’. This also appears explicitly in the text. Here he mentions Erasmus’ controversy with Latomus of 1519, and declares that on that occasion Latomus was completely defeated (WA 8, 43,9–11). Also the markedly humanistic style in the letter of dedication points in the same direction. Luther is trying, perhaps a final time, to plead his case with Erasmus and his adherents. He complains that he has had to tear himself away from his peaceful occupation3 to spend time reading the empty nonsense of this “sophist” (as he calls 3 In a letter to Spalatin of May 14th (WA B 2, 337,32–34) Luther writes that he has started reading the Greek and the Hebrew Bible, is following up on his Second Lecture on the Psalms, writing a popular work on penitence (Von der Beichte, ob die der Papst Macht hat zu gebieten. Der 118. Psalm) and the Wartburg postil.

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him). In one way, he says it is a waste of time to rejoin, because in the days of wrath (irae tempora) (WA 8, 44,16), which Luther lives in there is no time to dispute about grace and good deeds, but only for prayer that the devilish regiment, as Luther sees the Roman Church, may perish. Luther accuses Latomus of only publishing his Exposition because he is supported by the papal bull of excommunication. And though Latomus tries to give a justification for the Leuven condemnation, he still makes himself guilty of what Luther has, from the very outset, deprecated: lack of argumentation. With a confidence that is bloated because of the bull, Latomus has written a book which he has not even deemed it necessary to write with care and due deliberation (diligentia et iudicium) (WA 8, 44,4), but has been satisfied simply to come out with something arising from what he might have recently read, or what had come into his mind. One gains neither wit nor erudition, ingenium or eruditia (WA 8, 44,7),4 by reading such a book. There is no reason to waste Justus Jonas’ time with a long letter, Luther finishes, so he will move on to his comments on Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus. He finally warns Justus Jonas that now that he is going to teach canon law, he must make sure to teach the students to forget what they have learned and to shun like the pestilence what the Pope and the papists determine and affirm. Because Luther has shown once and for all that canon law cannot be used for anything but good fuel, witness the book fire in front of the city gate of Wittenberg on December 10th 1520. Fighting your enemies in their own field, Luther says, is the only way to continue the battle, once you are forced to be in their midst and cannot exterminate them with force. It is of interest that almost at the same time that Luther writes this, Justus Jonas decides to give up his position as professor of law, because he cannot with good conscience teach canon law. He remains as diocesan canon, but is instead transferred to the faculty of theology where he later is awarded a doctorate.

5.2

The rejoinder to Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus of Monckedam

In his rejoinder to Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus, Luther touches upon most of the matters Latomus has raised. For a start he comments on Latomus’ jibe that Luther has once said that he submitted to the authority of the Pope and yet does not do so (WA 8, 45,17–46,5). Luther for his part is sorry that he has ever said anything of the sort, for now he has realized that the Pope is Antichrist, an understanding that has been several years coming, and that the universities are his collaborators, and that trusting 4 When Luther uses these two words, it is a renewed reference to the humanists.

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them is therefore worse than anything. Luther really used to think, in accordance with the accepted understanding, that the Pope, the councils and the universities were the highest authority on questions of theology, even though they said many things that seemed absurd to him and contrary to Christ. He believed that here and there in the universities theologians must surely be hiding who would protest in ungodly cases. But eventually, because the Pope and the universities took offence with Christ as a sign that is opposed (Luke 2:34) and conducted themselves in an excessively ignorant and infamous manner, an insight (cognitio), and courage (animus) grew forth in Luther, which enabled him to see things clearly and act upon that. Luther also hits back at Latomus’ accusation that he is devoid of evangelical humility (modestia evangelica) (WA 8, 46,6–47,9). In his letter to Rodolphus, Latomus writes that Luther has written his works with a hardened mind (obfirmatus animus) (LR 278,28/a2v,28), and points out that the lack of humility in which it results especially finds expression in the rejoinder to the condemnations. He distinguishes between Luther’s person and his works, and emphasizes that it is in connection with the works, not necessarily the person, he speaks of a lack of modestia. Yet it is implicit in Latomus’ statement that as the works are what they are, and as Luther’s mind, as he says, is obfirmatus, Luther’s person does not differ much from his work. Luther sees through this. He calls attention to the fact that he can luckily pride himself on never having attacked another’s life and reputation, and that in his criticism he has always focused on the matter in hand, i. e. the dogmas, endeavours and ideas that are un-pious and offensive to God’s word (dogmata, studia, ingenia in verbum dei impia et sacrilege) (WA 8, 46,11–12). He compares his task with John the Baptist’s, Christ’s and Paul’s, and rhetorically asks Latomus if he also regards them as lacking in evangelical humility when they sharply rebuke ungodly ideas? Luther knows what Latomus understands by evangelical humbleness. That is obediently to submit to the “pontifical idols and sophistic ignorants” of the day, i. e. the theologians of the Church and the universities.5 And that is the opposite of what should really be done, because we should rather, as he himself does, submit to the work of disseminating the Gospel, whatever that leads to in the way of rebuke and criticism from other people, be they high or low. Luther emphasizes that there is no evil intent in his service for the Gospel. It harms no one, but is useful for those who will listen. It is therefore himself, and not Latomus, who has true humility. For according to Luther, Latomus advocates both opposing the Gospel and coming down hard on and exterminating those who are in his way. On the question in the letter to Rodolphus about how to deal with abuse in 5 WA 8, 46,32–33: “pontificibus idolis et sophistis idiotis”.

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Rome, Luther primarily attacks Latomus for not knowing whether to keep silent or speak, and instead referring to an unnamed man who has pronounced upon it in what Latomus thinks is a wise way (WA 8, 47,9–50,9). Latomus also dares to call himself “magister theologiae”, says Luther, adding that Latomus in his Exposition certainly acts as one of the most acute of that ilk, yet he does not know about the things that belong to everyday life, or what gives solace to souls in distress. On the contrary he knows how the souls are situated in purgatory, something that is far from human senses and about which Scripture says nothing at all, and deals with it in a whole separate article in the Exposition. That is the way with the Pope and his adherents, Luther says, and that is what the Papal bull prescribes: we must be ignorant of what children have insight in, and on the other hand have insight into things which even the angels know nothing about. The three possible ways of dealing with the abuse in Rome suggested by Latomus’ wise man, Luther mocks: the honest appeal to the Pope keeping one’s own moral self-discipline in mind, prayer to God, and a patient acceptance that God’s ways are wise and inscrutable. The wise man in other words suggests that we inferiors must behave ourselves, keep silent and hope for God’s goodwill, and then things will probably be all right with our betters. What is this, other than an absurd turning upside down of the relation between shepherd and sheep, leader and people? asks Luther. Figuratively speaking the wise man says that the sheep must begin by herding themselves on pasture and prepare the pasture for the shepherd, and people must themselves show the way and prepare the road for the leader. This is of course in no way how things are supposed to be. He who has been called has been given the task of preaching the Gospel to all of creation, and since the Pope is created, one is also allowed to tell him the truth if he does not know it. God’s word is bound to no man, Luther emphasizes. The case is even that the more powerful a prince is, the more should he be reproved if he errs. And this is particularly true of the ecclesiastical princes, whose errors endanger souls, unlike those of the secular princes. With a secular prince indeed one has to be particularly lenient, unless he trespasses against God’s word which must be obeyed more than men’s, because unlike the ecclesiastical leader he has his office from God. God, according to Luther, does not know the horde of priests found in the Church and who are appointed neither by God nor man, but have promoted themselves to rulers. In the Church God has only appointed preachers and servants of the word (evangelistae et verbi ministri) (WA 8, 49,27–28). Luther thinks that with this one piece of advice as to how to deal with the papal abuse, Latomus has shown himself to be full of “the spirit of Satan”.6 He and his kind do not care too much about the cause of the Church, the errors of the priests 6 WA 8, 49,40: “sese spiritu Satanae plenum esse”.

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and the redemption of souls, as if the whole problem were the guilt of a secular tyrant who jeopardizes his subjects’ lives and chattels. And thus they participate in the Antichristian display of power in order to lead souls into perdition. There is absolutely no hope, says Luther, that Latomus and those similarly disposed can read, understand and piously teach the Scriptures and preach the doctrine of Christ. “But a rebellion is to be feared, and neither superiors nor inferiors will improve as the result of a sharp rebuke.” Luther quotes this statement verbatim from Latomus’ argumentation against the critical attitude to the head of the Church (WA 8, 50,10–30). Here Latomus is much like Erasmus, who throughout the development of the Luther case held back, and preached a peaceful solution to the problems. And in connection with the letter to Albrecht of Brandenburg Erasmus, as has been shown, spoke much like Latomus of the abuses in Rome. To Luther such an irenic attitude was both erroneous and dangerous. For, as he says to Latomus here, hearing someone speak like that is like hearing a Jew speak. The Jews were also afraid that Christ would incite a rebellion against them, and they did not improve by listening to him either. But should Christ have been silent, then? The rebellion Latomus fears is the one that destroys the bodies, but the one that kills souls he defends. In that way he sets corporal peace above the redemption of the soul. In addition, Luther says, there is no reason to fear rebellion less than when God’s word is preached, because God, who is the God of peace, is present. If that leads to unrest there is nothing to be done, because then it is because the godless will not listen to the word but want to maintain their own concept of truth. And Latomus had better not try to circumvent the argument by claiming that he has not spoken of the preaching of the Gospel but about admonishment, for the preaching of the Gospel and admonishment are inseparably connected, as Luther sees it: “We know that Christ himself was unable to teach the Gospel without admonishing. […] The Gospel is the salt of the earth, it scorches to cleanse, accuses to heal, and rebukes to redeem, kills to bring to life.”7

5.2.1 On the right to dispute and true authority Luther answers Latomus that he did indeed once wish to dispute (WA 8, 50,31– 53,7). That was before he knew that the “masters” were fools, but more recently he has in no way said that he presented anything for disputation, but on the 7 WA 8, 50,26–29: “Scimus quod Christus Euangelium ipse non potuit docere, nisi reprehenderet. […] Sal terrae est, mordet ut purget, arguit ut sanet, increpat ut salvet, occidit ut vivificet.”

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contrary he has declared his willingness to go to the stake for his views, as Latomus and his cronies very well know. However, he has not at any time, nor earlier, pretended to want to dispute about views on which he was adamant. In the question of the right to dispute, Luther rebukes Latomus for referring to Leo I without in fact listening to what Leo says. Because where Latomus according to Luther prohibits even answering a heretic, that is not, says Luther, Leo’s intention. He only says that they should not be allowed to dispute in public. In this matter, however, Luther misunderstands Latomus, for a little later in the letter to Rodolphus, Latomus states that we have a duty to call attention to errors, i. e. answer the works of heretics to counteract the dissemination of their views, but that this duty does not extend to answering everything they write, as one rejoinder to one text by a heretic is sufficient answer to the rest of the work. But, asks Luther, who has any right at all to decide whether a thing is heretical or not, and can therefore be the object of disputation? Latomus has said with several references to Leo that matters that have been defined in the prophetic and evangelical Scriptures (WA 8, 50,32–33) cannot be the object of disputation, but the question is what is understood by “prophetic and evangelical”. There is no doubt, Luther says, that here Latomus among others understands himself and his companions: Latomus thinks that he and his are the prophets and the evangelists and know truth from falsity. They declare that “we are ‘magistri nostri’, we judge, we cannot be wrong, the world submits to us, what we say must be regarded as articles of faith, evangelical, and prophetic”.8 This is exactly the charge Luther levelled at the Leuven theologians in his rejoinder to the condemnations, and it is not a wholly unjust accusation. The Exposition made it clear that Latomus regards university theologians as appointed with divine sanction to take care of the teaching office, although their work always has to be sanctioned by the Pope as the highest authority of the Church. They are as it were cooperators in the dissemination of the truth. However, Luther says, that that is supposed to be the case cannot be seen in any way from the work of magistri nostri, for they do not prove what they claim to prove. Their self-assurance is built on nothing beyond their supposition that they are right. They do none of the hard work it takes to reveal the truth. What was really their duty, i. e. finding proof, they refer to the hearts of the believers. Even though it may seem that Luther here just returns to the condemnation and its unfounded labelling of a number of his sentences as heresy, that is not the case, because although it is the reproof Latomus has tried to refute by writing the Exposition, Luther does not think he has succeeded in that. Therefore the same accusation of petitio principii with which Luther ended his rejoinder to the 8 WA 8, 51,37–52,2: “Nos sumus Magistri nostri, nos iudices, nos non possumus errare, nobis orbis obnoxius, quicquid dixerimus, articulus fidei, Euangelicum, propheticum est.”

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condemnations is still valid in relation to Latomus’ works, as Luther has already said in the letter to Justus Jonas (cf. also WA 8, 56,23–33; 57,5; 57,25–26). For, as he says, the way in which Latomus argues in the Exposition seems for a start to contain a hidden logic, occulta dialecta (WA 8, 52,34), the knowledge of which Latomus seems to take for granted, but which is not. And secondly Latomus himself thinks that he has adduced a long series of Church Fathers who contradict Luther and to whom we must submit, “unless”, Luther quotes Latomus, “one will maintain that they have said contradictory things”.9 And Latomus apparently does not suppose that Luther will do so, safe in his belief that Luther is not a prophet, and therefore does not know the truth. But, Luther says in conclusion, he has not been idle while Latomus was reading the Church Fathers, which he and his ilk otherwise used to despise, and Luther has found out that the Fathers were more often than not human beings, made mistakes, said contradictory things, and slept. Therefore Latomus’ triumph and his book are built on a foundation of sand which will collapse when Luther opens his attack on the Exposition.

5.2.2 The commentary to the four sentences Luther will now briefly turn to Latomus’ commentary in the letter to Rodolphus on the four damned sentences which Latomus claims are contrary to the basic tenets of the faith. The first is “Deus praecepit impossibilia”. The sentence Latomus refers to as argument for his own point of view, “deus praecepit impossibilia, anathema sit”, as was said in the section on the Exposition, derives from a work by Pelagius, ascribed in the Medieval tradition to Jerome. In medieval theology the sentence was used in connection with maintaining the freedom of man, as for instance in Gabriel Biel’s Collectorium, which Luther had read and glossed upon in 1514.10 But not until 1519 did Luther get into a dispute explicitly about “deus praecepit impossibilia”, in connection with the Jüterboger Franciscans and Johan Eck.11 The phrase is found in article 11 of the condemnation, which is probably where Latomus has found it. It is possible but uncertain whether he has read Luther’s pamphlet against Eck, Contra malignum I. Eccii iudicium M. Lutheri defensio of 1519 (WA 2, 628–642). Luther emphasizes that he has always been of the opinion, and also explicitly emphasized it in his answer to Eck, that to be true “Deus praecepit impossibilia” 9 WA 8, 53,1–2: “nisi velint (inquit) eos dixisse pugnantia asserere”. 10 Cf. StA, 424, note 124; Biel, Sent. 2, dist. 28, qu.un. concl. 2 K. 11 Cf. StA, 423, note 121: WA 2, 650,9–33; WA B 1, 390,44–54.

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must of course also include the words “for us” (nobis) and “without the grace of God” (citra gratiam dei). But even though Latomus apparently knows that Luther makes this addition, he will not accept it,12 and Luther has little good to say about that. Latomus’ explanation of why he disregards Luther’s addition is however good. He refers to the passages in Luther’s exegesis of the Ten Commandments, where Luther writes that he does not think that any man in this life will have a share in the grace that grants the complete fulfilment of the law, and Latomus concludes that it is a statement that clearly runs counter to and undermines the additions nobis and citra gratiam dei. Luther does not comment on that objection until the end of his rejoinder to Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus (WA 8, 56,15–57,2). Here he writes that the claim that no one reaches the fulfilled grace in this life is not his own invention, but something Augustine says in Retractationes in the sentence, “so all Commandments are regarded as fulfilled when that which does not happen is forgiven”.13 And in addition, by saying that it does not happen, Luther has not said that it cannot happen, wherefore Latomus’ conclusion is wrong. Because, says Luther, there is no doubt that God can grant a grace so great that it fills everything, as was the case with the Virgin Mary. Even though He does not do that for everyone. Though it was merely Latomus’ intention to call attention to the fact that Luther seems to deny that man in this life can ever fulfil God’s commandment in grace, Luther (and indeed not quite fairly) begins to accuse him of belonging to those who adduce “Deus praecepit impossibilia, anathema sit” in defence of liberum arbitrium outside grace (WA 8, 53,14–56,14). In answer to the sentence from Pseudo-Jerome, which Luther calls “a small human decree” (decretellum quoddam humanum) (WA 8, 53,17), he loosely refers to a decision of the council in Carthage in 418 which denounces Pelagianism. It says: “He who has said that we can fulfil God’s commandments without God’s grace shall be anathema.”14 Seeing that grace is not mentioned in the Pseudo-Jerome sentence and that it was also the absence of emphasis on grace that was condemned in Carthage, Luther

12 Even on that background it is uncertain whether Latomus has read the pamphlet against Eck, for he does not use the phrasing found in the pamphlet. So which wordings of the reservation about “us” and “in grace” Latomus precisely refers to, if any, is not clear. 13 Cf. StA, 429, note 161: Augustin, Retractationes 1, 18, 3–5 (1, 19, 3): “omnia ergo mandata facta deputantur, quando quidquid non fit ignoscitur.” 14 WA 8, 53,32–33: “Qui dixerit nos posse mandata dei implere absque gratia dei, anathema sit.” Cf. StA, 425, note 127: Concilium Carthageniense, can. 5: “[…] quicumque dixerit […] et si gratia non daretur, […] tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere divina mandata, anathema sit.”

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manages to equate the Pelagians with the theologians who claim that PseudoJerome’s sentence is true.15 The manner in which the latter then explain the meaning of “the small human decree” makes it all even more grotesque, adds Luther, because they know very well that they have a problem when they maintain that God’s commands are not impossible for man to fulfil without grace, in that they risk minimizing or at worst totally overlooking the importance of grace. Therefore they introduce the scholastic distinction of the double fulfilment of the law, according to which it can be fulfilled in two ways: in accordance with the content of the deeds and in accordance with the intention of the law-giver (secundum substantiam factorum et secundum intentionem praecipientis) (WA 8, 54,3–5).16 This means that man may by nature be able to fulfil the law as regards the deed as such, i. e. its immediate content. But they cannot do so in respect of the law-giver’s real intention with the deed, i. e. its goal, which is that it must be done in love of God. For that, grace is required. In Luther’s eyes the distinction is absurd, because it means that God becomes an unreasonable debt collector who is not satisfied that the commandments are simply fulfilled, but demands that in addition they have to be fulfilled in grace. And then grace is no longer grace, but an extra demand in addition to the law. What they say is: “The free choice has fulfilled God’s law, but God is not satisfied with that”; which, according to Luther, is “the most impious and blasphemous sentence of all”.17 In addition, says Luther, directly addressing the nominalists and perhaps particularly Gabriel Biel whom he knew well, they have even phrased it in such a way that they ascribe so much to man’s own power that God must of necessity grant his grace as a result of the human effort.18 That is what they mean by facere quod in se est, and according to Luther it flies in the face of everything both Paul and after him Augustine have said. It empties the New Testament of all meaning and reduces Christ to a mere example for the time to come, a teacher. All the distinctions the scholastic theologians have drawn up concerning the stages of faith (fides informis, fides acquisita, fides generalis et specialis)19 have been cooked up with the same purpose. With their aid, even though it is im15 Here it is interesting to know that the sentence from “Jerome” was in reality written by Pelagius, a fact unknown both to Luther and Latomus. 16 Cf. StA, 452, note 128: The phrase is found already in high scolasticism, in both Bonaventura (Sent. 2, dist. 28, art. 1, qu. 2 concl.) and Thomas Aquinas (S. Th. 1, 2 qu. 109, art. 4). 17 WA 8, 54,9–11: “Nempe legi dei satisfecit liberum arbitrium, et deus in hoc non est contentus, quae est sententia omnium impiissima et sacrilegissima.” 18 Cf. StA, 426, note 136: Biel, Sent. 2 dist. 27 qu.un. art. 2 concl. 4 K, samt dist. 28 qu.un.art. 2 concl. 1 I. 19 Cf. StA, 426, note 140, about the various distinctions.

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possible to fulfil the law without grace, as far as the intention of the law-giver is concerned, they can make it so easy to achieve grace once the deeds in agreement with the content of the actions have been acquired, that the consequence is that both the first and the second degree of fulfilment fall to liberum arbitrium, and in such a way that man with his free choice rules over God’s grace. All this can be summed up in scholasticism’s doctrine of the moral neutral good, bona moralia, bona neutralia (WA 8, 54,36). And this belongs, Luther explains, under what they call the tenets of faith. So they have as many basic tenets of faith as they have testimonies of the Fathers, council resolutions, papal doctrines and their own feelings. And even though the doctrine of the morally neutral good is only something that belongs to the theology of “the moderns” (theologia recentiorum) (WA 8, 55,2), which for Luther means scholastic theology as such, Latomus claims that he can find exactly the same in the old Fathers of the Church. Luther adduces a number of texts in Scripture which for him is proof that this scholastic understanding of law and grace is erroneous and contrary to biblical theology : Rom 8:3–4, Acts 13:38–39, the Heb and Matt 19:24–26. Based on Rom 8:3–4 (“For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do. By sending his own Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin and for sin, he condemned sin, in order that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us”),20 Luther declares that unless one refers “impossibile erat legi” to the intention of the law-giver, it will here be clear and unmistakable that the law does not profit man in justification. But intentio praecipientis (WA 8, 55,12–13) cannot be applied to the lacking capacity of the law, because the text also says that the law was weakened by the flesh, and that statement does not agree with the claim that the flesh can fulfil the law in accordance with the content of the deed but not in accordance with the intention of the law-giver. Because then it is not the flesh that causes the law to be annulled, but the law-giver, who is not satisfied with the first stage of the fulfilment of the law, and demands more. “Thus the law is strengthened by the flesh but weakened because of the lawgiver’s intention”,21 and that is patently blasphemous. Luther continues: in Matt 19:24–26, as is well known, Christ says that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God. And at the surprise of the disciples that it is thus impossible to be redeemed, and to their question of who then can be redeemed, Christ does not deny that it is impossible, nor does he change it to say instead that it will be 20 WA 8, 55,8–11: “Nam quod impossibile erat legi, in quo infirmabatur per carnem, deus misit filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati, et de peccato damnavit peccatum, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis.” 21 WA 8, 55,19–20: “et sic per carnem lex bene firmatur, sed per intentionem praecipientis infirmatur.”

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difficult, but answers: “With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.”22 And it should be noted, says Luther, that this is said not about the rich man but about the possibility of redemption. As it is the rule of the Spirit that must have dominion in the New Testament, as Paul says in 2 Cor 3:6, and that means the preaching of grace (praedicatio gratiae) (WA 8, 56,7–8), we could have wished, Luther says, that Pseudo-Jerome’s phrase had never been pronounced or at least not disseminated. For the only thing that befits the Christians is to preach and acknowledge the glory of God, i. e. preach the impossibility of man and the possibility of God, as does Christ in this place. And any means that can emphasize or strengthen liberum arbitrium, must be removed (one such means being the little decree), so that a pure understanding of God’s grace and the plight of man (cognitio pura gratiae dei et nostrae miseriae) (WA 8, 56,13– 14), can be preserved. At last Luther points out that in very truth he says nothing about this matter but what the scholastics say themselves.23 Because they also say that perfect grace is not granted in this life, and consequently not the perfect fulfilment of the law either, as they have to admit that grace is not given except to the fulfilment of the law. Accordingly they must basically agree that fulfilment of the law in this life can only happen at the moment when the lack of fulfilment, in Augustine’s words, is forgiven by virtue of God’s mercy. In one way Luther’s critique of Latomus here seems to be unfair, since what he attacks is not the actual critique Latomus brought against Luther in this matter. We will form a better impression of whether Luther is unfair by reading the passage in Latomus’ Exposition in which he expounds the quotation from Augustine’s Retractiones: “so all commandments are regarded as fulfilled when that which does not happen is forgiven.” He does so in answer to Luther’s citing it in conclusion 2 to the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation (LR 336,11–28/ h3v,11–28). Latomus writes that to expound the text we must presuppose that when Augustine answers the question as to whether anyone in this life fulfils all God’s commandments, he regards living without sin and fulfilling all commandments as one and the same thing. It then becomes clear that Augustine’s meaning is that no sensible man can fulfil all commandments, because he sins in certain ways, and by doing so trespasses against the law. But it does not mean that he will be damned, because among the commandments a means against human weakness has been provided, i. e. the humble prayer and the voluntary forgiveness of fraternal injustice (LR 336,19–20/h3v,19–20). Face to face with the divine judgement, then, that man will be regarded as having fulfilled all commandments who has fulfilled most of them, and has been granted absolution for 22 WA 8, 56,4–5: “impossibile est apud homines, sed apud deum omnia sunt possibilia.” 23 StA, note 169 refers to Thomas, S.Th. 1,2, qu. 109, art. 9 ad 1; ib. Art. 10 ad 3.

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those he has not fulfilled. This is entirely parallel to the relationship between a lender and a debtor, explains Latomus. The debtor is also regarded as having paid everything if he has paid part of his debt and the rest has been remitted at his request. Especially if an agreement has been made between lender and debtor that if the debtor cannot pay, the lender will be satisfied and remit what is owed when he entreats him sincerely. Here Latomus, following Augustine, argues with prayer and forgiveness in connection with the complete fulfilment of the law, exactly like Luther, and he does not mention the double fulfilment of the law. Yet if we take a closer look at the text it is revealed that Latomus is not of the same opinion as Luther. Latomus does not say that the incomplete fulfilment of the law is forgiven for nothing by God’s mercy, as Luther does. On the contrary he says that it will be forgiven because he who cannot fulfil the law completely fulfils another part of it, viz. “the humble prayer and the voluntary forgiveness of fraternal injustice”.24 By this Latomus undoubtedly means the ecclesiastical penitence, where the prayer for forgiveness and the voluntarily compliant mind are prerequisites for the granting of the sacramental absolution. Seen from Luther’s point of view, the prayer for forgiveness in Latomus therefore becomes yet another practised deed of law, not a true and humble prayer for mercy. Perhaps we might even interpret Latomus’ way of expressing himself as to say that he actually calls prayer and the compliant mind a commandment. He writes: “inter mandata provisum est fragilitati humanae remedium.”25 Although Luther seems on the face of it to be unfair to Latomus in his answer to the four first sentences, he probably is not after all. When we bear in mind everything else that has been presented in connection with the Exposition this becomes clearer. Even though Latomus in his tract does not mention the double fulfilment of the law directly, and does not speak in the same pointed way about facere quod in se est and accordingly about liberum arbitrium, like for example Gabriel Biel, his views are still vulnerable to Luther’s critique, because Latomus also is of the opinion that a morally neutral deed (opus indifferens) exists, which men can do without grace, and which makes him worthy of neither damnation nor redemption. And among these indifferent deeds he counts man’s natural faith, will and patience, which as he later explains are fruits of God’s general mercy and go before the saving grace proper and dispose man for it. In what he says about faith the same thing can be seen. Here Latomus repeats that man’s own natural faith is a previously acquired disposition for receiving the sacra24 LR 336,19–20/h3v,19–20: “humilis oratio & fraternae iniuriae voluntaria remissio”. 25 Whether this is mandatum in the sense of commandment or regulation is difficult to determine. If it is the latter, the “regulation” is part of the process of redemption and is not demanded of man.

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mental grace. And the similarly natural but insufficient attrition (attritio) is not only a given but indeed a necessary antecedent disposition for receiving the sacramental grace. It has also become clear in connection with the Exposition that Latomus maintains liberum arbitrium in his argument against Luther, and explains that the expression facere quod in se est means doing our best in connection with the free choice. For Latomus both expressions denote the fact that men do what they can in relation to God, and thus, instead of being reduced to stones and tools, as he thinks is the case in Luther, they are God’s free cooperators in the process of redemption, although, as he emphasizes, it is always primarily God who acts, and only secondarily man. Luther now continues his comments on Latomus’ answer to the question of the presence of sin after baptism. Luther has insisted on the sentence that sin remains after baptism, on the basis of Paul, Rom 7, whereas Latomus here tries to prove the contrary with the aid of Gregory the Great, two adversaries who are not, to Luther’s mind, of equal stature. Luther immediately attacks Gregory’s exegesis of John 13:10ff and queries the glaring contradiction: Gregory says that “the one who has bathed is completely clean”, whereas Christ said: “The one who has bathed does not need to wash, except for his feet, but is completely clean.” What uncleanliness, inquires Luther, is that connected with the feet? Does Christ declare him not quite clean in the sense that he still needs to wash his feet? In Luther’s eyes that can only mean that “sin is entirely forgiven in baptism, and yet it remains”.26 “Because how can everything be washed away if not because everything is forgiven and granted through grace? Why wash it, if not because its nature is such that it has really remained?”27 This is something Luther will deal with later at greater length. Here and now he will only make it clear to Latomus that if we interpret Gregory as Latomus does, Gregory is yet another example of what Luther has already said, that the Fathers were only human, and could err. Of the third sentence, the one saying that not every mortal sin must be confessed, Luther has little to say but that even though it has been damned in a council, the fact has no validity if there is no basis for damning it in the Scripture. And such a basis Luther cannot find anywhere. In addition he says that he will now speak more radically on this question than he has done before in the works on which the condemnations build, because he is no longer of the opinion, as he was before, that any demand for confession should be made at all.28 The confession, in the form it has in the contemporary Church is only a 26 WA 8, 57,17–18: “Quid est hoc aliud quam peccatum in baptismo totum ignosci, et tamen reliquum esse.” 27 WA 8, 57,22–23: “Quomodo ergo omnia abluta, nisi quia per gratiam remissa et indulta? Quomodo lavandum, nisi quia vere in natura sua reliquum est?” 28 StA, 431, note 189: Luther himself refers to Von der Beichte, ob die der Papst macht habe zu gebieten. Der 118. Psalm, 1521: WA 8, (129) 138–185; 186–204 (Psalm 118).

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human tradition, and as such should be removed from the Church. Latomus does not even disagree with him that human traditions must be removed from the Church, Luther says, if we are to believe his statements in the Dialogue.29 In answer to Latomus’ claim that the last sentence “any good deed in the living saints is a sin” is in opposition to the words of the Athanasian Creed (“And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting”),30 Luther answers that it is quite unreasonable. It irritates him that Latomus, when Luther discusses the sin contained in the good deed, forever calls it peccatum damnabile, and at the same time admits that the good deed may contain a peccatum, which is veniale. Luther himself believes that he says exactly the same as Latomus. It is as if it is decisive who pronounces a sentence. When the scholastics claim something, it is acceptable, but when Luther says the same thing it is not. For example they can approve Gerson’s words that no sin is forgivable by nature, but only as a result of God’s mercy,31 and at the same time denounce Luther for making the same utterance. The question arises, however, as to whether Luther ascribes the same meaning to peccatum veniale as does the scholastic tradition, including Latomus. The answer to this will hopefully be found in the following pages. Luther ends by declaring that Latomus’ letter to Rodolphus is the portrait of a sophist, that is, one who in his facial expression and in his words simulates humbleness, but who apart from that is brimming over with unheard-of pride, arrogance, haughtiness, cunning, evil, impudence, condescension, ignorance and stupidity.

5.3

Isaiah 64:6

First Luther refers to Latomus’ way of dealing with the first article of the Exposition “omne opus bonum est peccatum”, in which Latomus first lists logical contradictions, then argues for his own view, and finally argues against Luther’s Scripture proofs. Luther now wants to answer to this exactly by explaining these proofs: Isa 64:6, Eccl 7:21 and Rom 7:19ff. Luther first and foremost upbraids Latomus for making it uncertain what the 29 StA, 431, note 190: Latomus, De Trium Linguarum Et Studii Theologici Ratione Dialogus: “Scriptura etenim sacra suam authoritatem habet immediate a Deo, non quia Petri, aut Pauli, aut Matthei, neque ecclesia addit ei authoritatem,[…] non ita accipiendum quasi consuetudo, aut populi Christiani tacitus consensus eam canoni scripturae adiunxerit […]: quod enim communi hominum consensu fit, communi consensu tolli potest.” 30 WA 8, 58,9: “Qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam aeternam.” 31 Cf. StA, 432, note 198: Gerson, De vita spirituali animae, lect.1 Corollarium 1.

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subject of Isa 64:6 is.32 He does not think we can trust Jerome so far as Latomus does, since Jerome himself writes to Augustine that he generally is in the habit of quoting the opinions of others in his works. And seeing that apart from the reference to Jerome Latomus does not argue particularly well for his exegesis of the Scriptural text, its meaning becomes exceedingly vague. Luther will now therefore try to determine the meaning of the text, for as he says: “One has to struggle with certainties.”33 He agrees that it deals with Jews in exile. Not because Latomus and his adherents say so, but because the text itself compels him to (WA 8, 60,12–13), and he denies that it can be about the Assyrian exile, as Jerusalem was not destroyed in that connection, and the tribe of Judah was not taken captive, two events that are referred to in this text. If, as he says, he can now also prove that it is not about the Roman conquest of Jerusalem in 70 AD, there is only the Babylonian captivity left. He then quotes the text, as did Latomus, not stopping at verse 7a, however, but continuing all the way to verse 12: [5a] You have met him who is joyful and works righteousness, in your ways they will remember you. [5b] Behold, you were angry, and we have sinned; in our sins we have always been, and we will be saved. [6] We have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s menstrual rag. We all have faded like a leaf, and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away. [7a] There is no one who calls upon your name, who rouses himself to take hold of you; for you have hidden your face from us, and have delivered us into the hand of our iniquities. [8] But now, O Lord, you are our Father ; we are the clay, and you are our potter ; we are all the work of your hands. [9] Be not so terribly angry, O Lord, and remember not iniquity forever. Behold, please look, we are all your people. [10] The city of your holiness has been deserted, Zion has become a wilderness, Jerusalem a desolation. [11] The house of our sanctification and our glory, where our fathers praised you, has been burned by fire, and all our pleasant things have become ruins. [12] Will you restrain yourself at these things, O Lord? Will you keep silent, and afflict us so terribly?34 32 Luther had referred to Isa 64:6 many times before in his works. It is found already in Dictata Super Psalterium and Annotationes quinduplici Fabri Stapulensis Psalterio Manu adscripta of 1513. And then in the lectures on Romans and Hebrews, in the independent explanation to conclusion 6 of the Heidelberg disputation (WA 1, 365ff), the gloss on Galatians, 1519, the Explanations to conclusion 2 of the Leipzig Disputation, the rejoinder to the condemnations and in Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorum and Grund und Ursach aller Artikel D.M. Luthers, so durch römische Bulle unrechtlich verdammt sind. Cf. StA, 433, note 204. 33 WA 8, 59,17–18: “Certis pugnandum est.” 34 WA 8, 59,25–60, 2: “[5a] Occuristi laetanti & facienti iustitiam in viis tuis recordabuntur tui. [5b] Ecce tu iratus es & peccavimus, in ipsis fuimus semper & salvabimur [6] & facti sumus ut immundi omnes nos, & quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae, & cecidimus quasi folium universi, & iniquitates nostrae quasi ventus abstulerunt nos, [7a] non est qui invocet nomen tuum, qui consurgat & teneat te, [7b] abscondisti faciem tuam a nobis et

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The first thing Luther points to is that Latomus makes not the slightest mention of the last part of verse 5b (“and we shall be saved”) in his refutation. Instead he combines verses 5a and 6 against Luther, and claims that here we deal with two different kinds of people, the righteous and the unrighteous. And since the believers are only righteous and not unrighteous, Luther’s claim that the whole chapter is spoken on behalf of the believers comes to nothing. But, Luther answers, what of the sentence “and we shall be saved”? We find these words where the verses have begun dealing with the unrighteous, and so according to Latomus with the infidels, and yet they will be saved. To Luther this sentence is proof that he rightly believes that none of the verses can be spoken on behalf of infidel Jews, for only the chosen believers will be saved (WA 8, 60,3–5). Already at this point Luther says, is Latomus an inept interpreter (WA 8, 60,9). Luther then goes on to say that in verse 12 there is a request that God show goodwill for the miserable people in question and rebuild Jerusalem: “Will you restrain yourself at these things, O Lord? Will you keep silent, and afflict us so terribly?” (WA 8, 60,16–35). Therefore this chapter must relate to a historical period in which Jerusalem was yet to be rebuilt, for the Holy Spirit is not so stupid, Luther says, that it makes people pray for things that are evidently impossible. Already in the period of the Old Testament it had been determined, and clearly also revealed to the Prophets, and perhaps especially to Isaiah, that after the coming of Christ God was to be worshipped in spirit and truth (John 4:21.23) and no longer on Sinai or in Jerusalem. And therefore it cannot possibly be the period after the coming of Christ we read about in Isa 64. Ergo, Luther concludes, without a doubt it deals with Jews in the Babylonian exile.

5.3.1 The Holy Spirit as the sender of Scripture Pursuing this, and in answer to Latomus’ statement that the humble and the proud sometimes seem identical in Scripture, Luther enjoins that we must be careful not to ascribe blasphemous behaviour to the Holy Spirit (WA 8, 60,36– 61,40), which we would be doing by saying that it sometimes speaks on behalf of infidels and blasphemers. How can you imagine, Luther asks, that a prayer that is so humble and pious and so pure of heart and earnest as this one in Isaiah could allisisti nos in manu iniquitatis nostrae. [8) Et nunc domine, pater noster es tu, nos (vero) lutum, et fictor noster tu, et opera manuum tuarum omnes nos. [9] Ne irascaris domine satis, et ne memineris ultra iniquitatis nostrae. Ecce, respice, populus tuus omnes nos. [10] Civitas sancti tui facta est deserta. Sion deserta facta est, Hierusalem desolata est, [11] Domus sanctificationis nostrae et gloriae nostrae, ubi laudaverunt te patres nostri, facta est in exustionem ignis, et omnia desiderabilia nostra versa sunt in ruinas. [12] Nunquid super his continebis te domine, tacebis et affliges nos vehementer?”

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be spoken by blasphemers? If anyone is infidel, his prayer will also be sin and blasphemy. “The Spirit”, on the other hand, “belongs to the body of Christ, and in the saints it helps them in their weakness and sighs and intercedes for them” (Rom 8:26).35 It is true that the Scriptures contain examples, as Latomus mentions, where the Spirit through holy people intercedes for infidels, but it never prays as one with them (in persona eorum), as Latomus also says. Christ cried for Jerusalem, not as one with the city, and Paul prayed for the Jews, but not as one of them. But that is not the case here. Isaiah does not pray for anyone else, but makes himself one with those he prays with and for. It is very important, Luther emphasizes, not to claim anything of which Scripture has no example, and since there are only examples which say that the Spirit belongs to the body of Christ, it demonstrably never belongs to any foreign devilish body, but only Christ’s. Only there does it speak, live and rest, and it cannot while praising God at the same time speak out of the blasphemer’s mouth, because it is always the case that he who speaks and he whose mouth he speaks out of at least have to be in accordance as to words, disposition and wish, i. e. inwardly, if he cannot in strength and in deeds, i. e. outwardly. If Latomus and those like him had said that the Spirit recited the words of the infidels, it could have been accepted, but that it would pray and act at one with them cannot be accepted.36 Luther finally points out that Isaiah in this passage says, “behold, we are all your people”, and “O Lord, you are our Father ; we are the clay, and you are our potter ; we are all the work of your hand.” Can we say about the Jews, after the coming of Christ, that they are God’s people, asks Luther, and that they are created by God? Are they not enemies rather than sons, and the work of Satan rather than God, since they do not acknowledge the Creator? And one cannot explain it away by saying that “pater”, “fictor” and “factor” are ordinary general terms, for there is no doubt that the prophet speaks in the Spirit and that the words emanate from the affection of the Spirit (ex affectus spiritu). The words, after all, are part of the Holy Canon (WA 8, 61,19–20). In a way you might say that Luther here turns Latomus’ own argument against him. Just as Latomus thought that Luther in his exegesis of Isa 64:6 inadmissibly throws together the righteous and unrighteous as one, Luther now accuses Latomus of the selfsame lapse. Thus they both maintain that basically we must be acutely aware of whom the text deals with, believers or infidels, and they both maintain that the other mixes it up or makes it unclear, because his method of 35 WA 8, 61,5–6: “Spiritus est corporis Christi et in sanctis adiuvat infirmitatem eorum, et gemit et postulat eis.” 36 Sections WA 8, 61,16–19.36–40 have been left out in this connection. It has not been possible to come to a final decision as to what Luther means in these two paragraphs. At the same time the content does not seem to be important for the cohesion of the text.

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interpreting the text is wrong. Here it is thus demonstrated that their respective points of departure for reading Scripture are altogether different and do not at all harmonize. At this point it is not too early to sum up.37 Latomus believes that the cry “we have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s rag menstrual”, quite simply and directly means that we have to do with unrighteous people and not about the righteous. He admits that in certain places it can be difficult to determine who speaks, because the saints may take it upon them to pray for the infidels by making themselves one with them. But in a passage like this there is no doubt in his eyes that it is the unrighteous who pour out their troubles. Here Latomus thus takes the words for what they are, in the conviction that they refer to one overarching conceptual God-created connection which is derived from the knowledge of things.38 A connection in which the being presents itself in the same way to God and man, although man’s insight is incomplete. So when it is said about anything, including in the Scriptures, that it is “pure”, then it really is clean (unless we have to do with a lie), since it refers to the God-given concept of “purity” and when it is said about a thing that it is impure, then in the same way it truly is “impure”. Any other understanding of the relation between reality and language Latomus can in no way accept. That is precisely what emerged from the comparison between Latomus’ and Augustine’s words about good deeds. Latomus could not accept Augustine’s point that something could be good and evil at the same time, that is, according to whether it is seen through the eyes of man or God.39 Luther does not subscribe to the same philosophical understanding of the relation between reality and language as Latomus, and therefore does not like him interpret the words in Scripture according to the conviction that they refer to one overarching continuity of being. On the contrary he supposes that Scripture, being the words of the Spirit and thus holy and canonical, denote a God-given connection to be taken serious at it appears. Therefore when it says in 37 These considerations build exclusively on the analyses that have been made above. 38 This corresponds to what Latomus explained in the Dialogue in connection with the relation between things, concepts and words 39 What is explained here is close to what Saarinen explains at greater length about the semantics of the via antiqua in connection with Thomas, in the article “Metapher und biblische Redefiguren” (Saarinen: 1988, 22–24). And this means that when later in the article (1988, 32, note 54), Saarinen, supported by Luther’s criticism of what Latomus says about peccatum, makes Latomus into an Ockhamist, it is imprecise. Latomus is rather a Thomist, as has already been seen in the analysis of the Exposition, and that Antilatomus is said to be anti-Thomistic seems therefore to be quite precise. Except of course for the consideration that in several places Luther accuses Latomus of representing nominalistic theology, because Latomus deals with questions such as opus indifferens and facere quod in se est, which often appear in nominalistic contexts.

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the Scriptures that the righteous are unclean, they are indeed unclean, although they are at the same time righteous, even though it does not immediately fit a conception like Latomus’, in which being is the same for men and God. Luther thus subscribes to Augustine’s proposition that what we say about things depends on the point of view from which they are seen and described.

5.3.2 On the simple and singular meaning of Scripture Luther thinks that he has now sufficiently demonstrated that in no way can Jews at the time of the New Testament be the subject of Isa 64, and this becomes even clearer, he says, when we look at what the text says. Accordingly he attacks Latomus’ assertion that universal statements in the Scriptures are most often to be understood as statements which only denote something partial. Luther lists some of the examples Latomus gives of this, as Phil 2:21 and also Isa 64:6, and declares that he is either evil-minded or stupid, for his examples are quite unreasonable, and he distorts the figura he refers to, the synecdoche.40 We cannot simply make grammatical figures identical at will 40 All the way through Antilatomus, apart from in one passage (WA 8, 59,13), Luther uses the term “figura”, and not “tropus” for synecdoche metaphor, metalipsis, hyperbole, etc. In this he differs from Quintilian, who in his Institutio Oratoria, which we know for a fact was at the time known to Luther and appreciated by him, separates tropes and figures (without quite succeeding) in books 8 and 9 (for the following cf. Hilgenfeld: 1971, 155–160; Lausberg: 1973). Quintilian admits that tropes and figures have certain traits in common, “utraque res a derecta et simplici ratione cum aliqua dicendi virtute deflectitur” (“both involve a departure from the simple and straightforward method of expression coupled with a certain rhetorical excellence”) (Quintilian: Institutio Oratoria III, IX, I, 3). And their purpose is the same: “usus quoque est idem; nam et vim rebus adiciunt et gratiam praestant” (“Their employment is also the same. For they add force and charm to our matter”) (Institutio Oratoria III IX, I, 2). These common traits have led to what Quintilian also notes himself, that many mix up the two terms, or subsume the tropes under the figures. It is very important for Quintilian, however, to distinguish between them. According to him tropes are applied to single words, whereas the field of operation of the figures is the whole speech. It is characteristic of the trope that it is mutatio (Institutio Oratoria VIII, 6, 1) and translatio (Institutio Oratoria IX, 1, 4) of the basic meaning of one word into a new meaning. While the figure is conformatio (Institutio Oratoria IX, 1, 4) of speech from the primary and general meaning into a new meaning: “arte aliqua novata forma dicendi” (“a form of expression to which a new aspect is given” (Institutio Oratoria III, IX, I, 14). The figures are divided into figurae verborum and figurae sententiarum. The difference between the two is in the degree of linguistic concretization. The former are about the concrete linguistic expression itself, which is changed, for example by emphasis, climax, harmony, etc., whereas the latter goes beyond that level and has to do with the overall structures of thought (Lausberg: 1973, 309, § 603). The tropes have nothing to do with figura verborum, but may, even though Quintilian does not say so directly or seem to be interested in a linking of tropes and figures, be said to be figura sententiarum in a lesser perspective, i. e. at the level of the single word. (Institutio Oratoria VIII, 6, 1: “tropus

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without giving reasons why, and in Luther’s eyes this is what Latomus does. In the matter at hand it is even additionally important that the interpretation is well founded. It is a question of the interpretation of Scripture, and hence of what is true and false. Therefore it is the duty of every interpreter as far as possible to prove that the text must be understood in the way he says; not that it can. If one only offers a suggestion of how things can possibly be understood and not how they necessarily must be understood, one brings confusion into the Scripture (confundere divinas scripturas) (WA 8, 62,22–23). Again it is interesting to compare Luther’s statements about Latomus with Latomus’ statement about Luther. Precisely Isa 64:6 was for Latomus proof that Luther did not keep within the necessary exegetical directives and simply broke up the text and interpreted it as he thought best. As Latomus said directly, unless Scripture is treated in the way he himself has exemplified, “it gives rise to several errors and the confusion becomes great”.41 In other words they again accuse each other of the same failing: random and confusing exegesis of the text resulting in erroneous interpretation. Luther explains why he regards Latomus’ examples as unreasonable (WA 8, 62,24–63,23). First Latomus says, to refute Luther’s argument, that when Scripture says that every man’s righteousness is unclean, then with the aid of the synecdoche it simply means that the righteousness of some is unclean. But when Latomus comes to the statement, “There is no one who calls upon your name”, and when he puts the words “all our righteousnesses are unclean” into the mouths of infidel Jews after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD, he conversely does not est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in aliam cum virtute mutation”; Lausberg: 1973, 441, § 894. Cf. also Hilgenfeld: 1971, 157–158, note 600). In his section on “Figura und Tropus” (Hilgenfeld: 1971, 155–173), Hilgenfeld shows how the tradition from Quintilian was taken up in Erfurt by Luther’s teacher Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen, but that he subsumed the tropes under the figures figurae grammaticalis locutionis. The trope was here defined as “novata locutio contra communem usum loquendi” (and thus took over some of the definition that in Quintilian only belonged to the figure), but also as mutatio and translatio (158–160). Hilgenfeld also tries to show how Luther does not begin to use the term “tropus” until after De Servo Arbitrio (1525), urged by Erasmus and the Swiss reformers, and first makes use of the word in its real meaning and synonymous with figura in Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis (1528) (163–167): but that his earlier use of figurae both in Antilatomus and in Contra Henricum Regem Anglicae (1522), is very close to the later tropus (169–172). From this Hilgenfeld infers that Luther has probably been inspired by Usingen’s division of tropes, and therefore, at least in 1528, is conscious that he can take tropi and figurae grammaticae as one (171–172). Hilgenfeld, however, is not aware that Luther actually mentions tropus synonymously with figura once in Antilatomus. He tries to say something about how Luther’s understanding of the difference between figura and tropus was formed in the years 1521–1528 to be completed in Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis, where the two terms are used about the same thing (172, note 664). Judging by Antilatomus, however, it seems as if Luther when it was being written had the same opinion on the synonymy between the two terms as in the later Eucharist pamphlet. 41 305,9–10/d4r,9–10: “innumerabiles generabuntur errores & magna fiet confusion”.

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take up the synecdoche to say that it is only a few who do not call upon God’s name, or that it is only some of the infidel Jews who speak here, for then the texts would not support his view so strongly. Luther points out that to refute Latomus he might simply turn Latomus’ statements upside down and apply the synecdoche to the statements to which Latomus does not, and vice versa. Thus he could beat Latomus completely with his own weapons. But of course Luther will not do so, since he has just asserted that it is no viable way of arguing. On the contrary, he will try to explain something to Latomus about how grammatical figures are used in Scripture, and when we should therefore have recourse to them in order to understand a statement. He begins by referring to a statement from Augustine that “figura nihil probat” (WA 8, 63,26).42 Because that, Luther says, is the very truth and what all agree on, that figurative expressions prove nothing (WA 8, 63,24–65,17).43 We must not in any interpretative connection, and certainly not when expounding Scripture, have recourse to figurative expressions just because we find it suitable (pro mera libidine) (WA 8, 63,28). On the contrary, we should avoid them and rely on the simple pure and primary meaning of the words (simplex pura primariaque verborum significatio) (WA 8, 63,29), until we are forced to do something else (WA 8, 63,29). If we do not, we will create a Babylonian confusion of words and languages. It might on the face of it seem that Luther here agrees that words only refer to one context, a view that has just been ascribed to Latomus. But that is not the case. When Latomus determines the one context of a word it is not with reference to the words in themselves, but to the overall context of which the words are part. In Latomus it is the world created by God which represents a coherent entity, and its meaning is summed up in conceptus. What is one, therefore, seen from a linguistic point of view, is not the words but the concepts. They are eternal, identical whatever the place or time, whereas the words, as was seen in the section on the Dialogue, are temporal reflections of the concepts which may sometimes differ in form. Therefore two different words may well refer to the same single concept in the overall context, and therefore what dictates the meaning for Latomus is not the meaning of the word as such in the contextual connection, but the overall concept to which it refers and which is above the concrete text.44 42 Cf. StA, 439, note 248: Augustine, “Epistula” 93, 8, 24: “Quis autem non inpudentissime nitatur aliquid positum in allegoria pro se interpretari, nisi habeat et manifesta testimonia quorum lumine inlustrentur obscura?” StA, 2, 439, note 248, also has another reference to Augustine, but the one quoted here is the one Latomus thinks Luther relates to, and the one Latomus answers in his Responsio in 1525. About the latter, cf. StA, 2, 439, note 248. 43 WA 8, 65,7–10 to be moved so it is goes before WA 8, 65,18ff. 44 For a more detailed analysis of this, cf. Saarinen: 1988, 22–24.

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In Luther, by way of contrast, words only have one sense as they are found in a text. But that does not mean that they only have one valid meaning, namely the basic meaning. When Luther said that figures must not be used at will, and cannot prove anything when utterly unfounded, he said at the same time that we must keep the primary meaning in mind until forced to do otherwise. This means that when the context of a text makes it clear that the word is to be understood in another sense than the basic meaning, we must submit to that. Therefore to understand a text Luther refers both to the simple pure and primary meaning and to awareness of the context, whereas Latomus refers to the possible ambiguity of the words and awareness of the unity of the super-textual conceptual connection. In other words Luther takes care to find out what modus loquendi is present in a text, and on the basis of that takes the words at their surface value, whereas Latomus takes care to hold on to the single overall true conceptual framework, and fits the concrete meaning of the words into that. Luther admits that figurative expressions are found everywhere, but he points out that judicious consideration (iudicium) (WA 8, 64,8), is needed when dealing with them. He gives Latomus a series of examples of places in which it is either appropriate or inappropriate to refer to a figurative meaning, for example these lines from the Aeneid, “Of noble Trojan family will Caesar be born”, and “remember, Roman, you are appointed to rule other peoples”. In the first example one would not be able to plead synecdoche and thus make “Caesar” mean all roman emperors. Or one might in fact do so, but would never persuade the interpreters of grammar (grammatici) to accept it. In the other example it is not about one Roman without the use of synecdoche, but with the use of synecdoche it concerns all Romans. This, too, any grammarian would immediately grant. There is no absolute rule for when the reference to figures is suitable, but according to Luther there are different rules that can lead us on the right way. Reading expressions figuratively for example is appropriate where the context of the words or their patent absurdity force us to do so (circumstantia aut evidens absurditas).45 That means that where either the context shows that we are dealing with a figure, or where taking a figuratively used expression literally results in nonsense, we are obliged to recognise the presence of a figure of speech. That for example the disciples’ two swords in Luke 22:38 do not mean swords of iron is mostly shown by the context of the words, but also to a certain degree the comparative absurdity of them. In Matt 19:29, however, we see solely from the

45 WA 8, 63,30: “donec ipsa circumstantia aut evidens absurditas cogat figuram agnoscere”. WA 8, 64,10–11: “Duo ista habemus, quae nos dirigant, Absurditatem rerum et circumstantiam verborum.” WA 8, 64,18–20: “non patior, quam diu non docuerit absurditatem aut circumstantias necessitatem, sed urgebo eum, ut simplici, propria et primaria significatione debeat intelligere.”

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absurdity of the content, that a man who leaves his wife will receive a hundredfold, that it is not to be understood as a corporal leaving and receiving. If we bring this rule to bear on Isa 64:6, says Luther, it becomes clear that we can neither argue with the context of the words or the absurdity of things in the passage, and hence not for any use of grammatical figures. There is nothing in this Scriptural text that resists the simple, pure and primary meaning of the words, and accordingly they are to be understood exactly as they stand: “all our righteousnesses are unclean”. “Thus”, Luther concludes, “this authority for the time being stands unvanquished, and laughs at Latomus’ efforts and premature boastfulness, and proves that any righteousness is unclean, any good deed a sin.”46 There is also another rule to add to the use of figures in Scripture, because it is a rule in the Scriptures that when it quite simply wants to determine a universal meaning, where synecdoche and interpretation in a particular direction in other words are out of the question, it not only presents a universal and affirmative statement, but adds a universal and negative statement. Many examples of this are found, says Luther, and adduces a whole series (WA 8, 64,34–65,7). This rule also applies to Isa 64:6. First we have a number of affirmative statements: “We have all become unclean, etc.”, and then the negative follow : “there is no one who calls upon your name, who rouses himself to take hold of you.” When all that is said, and we are first and foremost obliged to study and abide by the simple pure and primary meaning of the words, it has to be said at the same time, Luther concludes, that the synecdoche is the sweetest figure, and a necessary (necessaria) (WA 8, 65,7), figure in the Scriptures, as it is a symbol of God’s love and mercy (WA 8, 65,7ff). The interdependence between law and Gospel, judgement and mercy is often expressed through it. When it is said that God smites and destroys, and thus that the law becomes valid and God wields his judgement, it is not to be understood that he utterly destroys or annihilates everything. Here the synecdoche comes into play, so that we understand that he strikes everything when he strikes a part of it, and that the statement is not to be taken in isolation to be about the God of wrath, but in a larger perspective about the God of mercy, who chastises to redeem, kills to bring to life. All this shows us that Luther is in no way hostile to figurative expressions. On the contrary, he regards them as indispensable and necessary for the biblical message, if of course they are correctly understood. And therefore, to repeat, it is not only the meaning words have when they do not perforce appear in figures that is valid, as if their figurative function could be taken to be less correct than 46 WA 8, 64,22–24: “Et sic stat auctoritas ista adhuc invicta et ridet Latomianos conatus et praeproperam iactantiam probatque, quod omnis iusticia est immunda, omne opus bonum est peccatum.”

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their basic meaning. Indeed, we must understand that Luther refers to the simple, pure and primary meaning of words, as well as to the consciousness of the textual context, i. e. an awareness that sometimes they are also used figuratively. A word has a primary meaning, and on the basis of that it can become part of a figure, which is then the adequate meaning of the word in that part of the text. But the figure is always inseparably connected with the primary meaning, for we can only understand the figure if we understand the primary meaning. Luther’s referring to Augustine’s “figura nihil probat” is not a denial of the importance of figurative language as such, but a refutation of proof built on ad hoc invented figurative meanings which are not firmly based in the text, pro mera libidine (WA 8, 63,28).47 In closing Luther mentions another four examples of how he thinks synecdoche is used in Scripture. It is not immediately clear how the figure is to be understood here, until it becomes apparent that Luther’s use of the figure is on the level of thought, not of grammar. He mentions Matt 12:40, “so will the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth”, Matt 27:44 on the robbers at Golgotha who mocked Jesus, and Pss 78:18 and 105:40 about the Israelites in the desert, who partly tempted God, partly prayed to Him. Luther does not explain the first two examples from the Gospel of Matthew, but the last two, from the Psalms, he expounds: “This is said as censure and praise respectively, as if it were about all of Israel, […] where the whole is understood for the part.”48 If his examples from Matthew are to be understood in that light, we must imagine that in 12:40, “so will the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth”, we have to do with the life of Jesus as an image, which ex parte denotes the whole, i. e. God coming to man in Christ. And in 27:44 we see the same thing. Here we have to do with a specific event of the Passion, which likewise ex parte denotes the whole, i. e. the guilt of all men and subsequent denial of Christ. That Luther’s examples are to be understood in this way is probable if not certain, especially when we compare with the example given earlier of God’s judgement as a synecdochic expression of the law’s function as a taskmaster driving to Christ. That Luther uses synecdoche as a theologically determined figure of thought, and thus suddenly as a figura sententiarum, says something about how freely he relates to the grammatical-rhetorical tradition49 and the degree to which he

47 Cf. Luther’s critique of Erasmus’ exegesis in De Servo Arbitrio, Hilgenfeld: 1971, 163–166. 48 WA 8, 66,17–18.19: “hoc in vituperium dicitur quasi totius populi Israel […] hoc in laudem dicitur, sed utrunque per synecdochen, totum pro parte.” 49 Bartholomaeus Arnoldi von Usingen gave the name figurae rhetoricales to Quintilian’s figurae sententiarum and separated them from figurae grammaticales, which was the overall term for three figures, of which one was figurae grammaticalis locutionis alias the tropes.

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instead emphasizes and is aware that it is the authority of the Spirit and its choice of figurative speech which primarily determines the exegesis.

5.3.3 Judgment and mercy, wrath and grace Luther is now satisfied that he has refuted Latomus’ claim that it is infidel Jews after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD who speak in Isa 64:6. All that is now left is to treat how such things, “we have all become unclean, and all our righteousnesses are like a woman’s menstrual rag”, can be ascribed to the believers (WA 8, 66,24ff). He will first do it summarily, and then in connection with the text (WA 8, 66,24–69,33). In conclusion 2 to the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation (WA 2, 415,18– 416,8), he says, he has said under reference to Ps 143:2 (“enter not into judgement with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you”), that men’s good deeds are of such a character that they cannot pass God’s judgement (WA 8, 66,31–67,3), because as is said in Rom 2:6, He will “render to each one according to his works”, and since His judgement is true and just he does not damn men whose deeds are entirely irreproachable. But according to the quotation from the psalm he damns all the living, which accordingly means that no man’s deeds are good, unless they are ruled by God’s forgiving mercy. Realizing this, Luther says, is the only way to true fear of God, and hope. But that is exactly the wisdom (sapientia) (WA 8, 66,39), Luther’s accusers denounce him for, because they teach the opposite thing, that there are good deeds which are worthy of praise and honour, and in return for which God in accordance with Rom 2:6 justifies them. In that way, as Luther sees it, they inflate themselves as regards the deeds, and rob people of the possibility of true fear of God: they create arrogant people. With this first summary statement Luther has briefly sketched the contrasts between himself and Latomus, and if we compare the analysis of the Exposition it is clear that he hits the mark. Not so much in connection with Latomus’ treatment of Isa 64:6, on the basis of which Latomus does not even want to discuss the sentence “omne opus bonum est peccatum”, but in a more basic sense in connection with what Latomus holds opus bonum to be. For Latomus believes that the good and praiseworthy deed, deserving of reward, exists, although in a gradable sense as secondarily and primarily good, and that it is to be seen as an important part of man’s relation to God both before and after the saving grace. According to Luther the quotation from Isaiah confirms his view of the reUsingen deals not at all with the rhetorical figures, but expressly refers them to the subject of rhetoric. Cf. Hilgenfeld: 1971, 158–159.

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lationship between man’s deeds and God’s judgement and mercy. He makes certain reservations as to his interpretation of the quotation, as if to mark that no one has a monopoly on an exhaustive interpretation of the Scriptures (WA 8, 67,4–5), but he does think that his interpretation now stands all the stronger and better supported, in the light of his disagreement with Latomus. What Isaiah wants to make clear here, according to Luther, is that everything relies on whether God shows himself merciful (secundum misericordiam), or judgmental (secundum iudicium) to man. Even pious and righteous men (pii et iusti viri) (WA 8, 67,8), whose righteousness outside the judgement, under the rule of grace, could be pure, have no standing if they are under the judgement of God’s wrath. They will then be comparable to the most unclean sinners (similes sint novissimis et immundissimis peccatoribus) (WA 8, 67,10). But, and this is important as God’s judgement is true and just, it is necessary that the righteous who are judged are both righteous and yet unclean (simul eos esse iustos et tamen immundos) (WA 8, 67,14). So although it is the truest righteousness (verissima iustitia) (WA 8, 67,20), we deal with, it is nevertheless on a par with the unclean and suffers under the same sanctions as the unclean. And it does not do so innocently (innocenter) in the eyes of the God of justice, even though it is innocent in the eyes of men and in our conscience (innocenter coram hominibus et in conscientia nostra) (WA 8, 67,1–22): “So to God we are all sinners, if He sits in judgement, and will perish if He grows angry ; but if he covers us in mercy we are innocent and pious, both for God and for all of creation. That is what Isaiah says here.”50 On the basis of this Luther explains verse 5a (“You meet him who joyfully works righteousness”) (WA 8, 67,35–68,5.12–16.37–39). This, he says, applies not only to those who act righteously, operarii iustitiae (WA 8, 68,1), because those acts of righteousness are all called unclean here, but to those who create righteousness also (factores iustitiae) (WA 8, 67,40), in their time and for the people they live among (factores iustitiae, however, are also necessarily operarii iustitiae). When such creators of righteousness are found, it is a sign that God’s grace rules, and this Luther describes in the following way, with close reference to Isa 64: When the times are happy and justice makes progress, which is certainly your rule of grace, you are also full of grace and meet them and receive them with open arms; they call your name and you hear them, they rouse themselves to take hold of you, they stay

50 WA 8, 67,32–34: “Omnes ergo coram eo peccamus si iudicet, et perimus si irascatur, qui tamen si misericordia nos operiat, innocentes et pii sumus, tam coram eo quam omni creatura. Hoc est quod Isaias hic dicit.”

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with you and you show them all mercy as you did in Moses’ days in the desert. Then it is time to walk in your ways, to remember, praise and thank you for your blessings.51

The meaning in verse 5a is therefore that Isaiah reminds men of the time of grace (tempus favoris) (WA 8, 68,39), in his prayer of lament, and points out that what happens in the time of wrath (tempus irae) (WA 8, 68,2), is that even though there are good and righteous people, God’s anger allows them to produce nothing. Thus, they cannot work as factores iustitiae, and work up a righteousness by which God’s wrath will be softened and held back. What is usually granted to righteousness will not be granted them, but the opposite: their righteousness will be reckoned as nothing, and they are destroyed (consumuntur) together with the impious (impii) (WA 8, 68,3–4). So the fact is that in the time of flourishing righteousness, God makes the sins of the impious white as snow and does not punish them, nay, does not even impute it to them (WA 8, 68,16–23). But in the age of wrath and the collapse of righteousness, all the righteous deeds of the righteous are made unclean and are punished with the others’ sins and tangled with evil. The righteous here are given over to their iniquities (iniquitas), and God allows that what they have deserved through their sins happens to them, i. e. that they are like one who is unclean. “Thus, when mercy has been taken away our iniquities (iniquitates), sweep us away like the wind, and all our righteousness (universae iusticiae) can do nothing against it.”52 It is incontestable, Luther concludes, that this text with its entire context, judged on the meaning of the words and with its simple and complete meaning, can withstand Latomus. It is incontestable, I say, that when the cloud of grace has been removed, the good deed is by nature (natura sua) unclean, the deed that is otherwise regarded as being pure and worthy of praise and glory when mercy forgives.53

As we hear Isaiah lament here, such are the conditions for good deeds (opera bona) (WA 8, 69,8), outside of grace. But, and again this is important, “if they

51 Cf. WA 8, 68,7–12: “Quando leta sunt tempora et prosperatur iustitia, quod utique gratiae tuae regnum est, tu quoque propitius es, occurris et obviis manibus eos suscipis, invocant nomen tuum et exaudis, surgunt et inveniunt te, tenent te et parcis omnibus, ut tempore Mosi in deserto. Tunc est incedere in viis tuis, tunc est memorare, laudare, gratias agere tibi pro beneficiis effuses.” 52 WA 8, 68,21–23: “Sic misericordia ablata iniquitates nostrae sicut ventus auferunt nos, nihil valentibus adversus eum universis iusticiis nostris.” 53 WA 8, 69,4–6: “Stat, inquam, opus bonum natura sua esse immundum, ablata nube gratiae, quod sola misericordia ignoscente purum, laude et gloria dignum habetur.”

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were not really unclean and evil, the just judge would not deal with them like that”.54 The point of it all is what Luther mentioned at the beginning: to understand the meaning in Isaiah as it has here been set out is the only way of true fear of God, and of hope. Once we have understood what is said as to man being nothing in himself, that it is really natura sua that he is unrighteous and worthy of damnation unless the cloud of grace rests upon him, and thus understood man’s utter dependence on the grace of God, we will understand how rich God’s grace, which favours the unworthy (indignos) (WA 8, 69,11), is for man, and that we must rejoice from the bottom of our heart, and love and extol the richness of that same glory and grace. This is the true worship of God (cultus dei) (WA 8, 69,13), Luther insists, which these sophists who talk about consequences and circumstances, and who think they are the only ones who can expound the Scriptures, are well on their way to destroying. Luther has now determined that the deeds of man are by nature unclean if God’s mercy does not forgive them, and thus that all men are sinners without divine grace. But at the same time he tells in his analysis of how peccatores and iusti are found side by side who are not of the same kind, but who can become equal because it is God’s will, either because He accounts the deeds of the sinners as nothing or because He destroys the righteous equally with the sinner. Thus on the one hand Luther maintains that all men’s deeds are unclean because all men are sinners without grace, but on the other hand that some people do exist who are righteous and pure, but who, in what Luther calls the days of wrath, become unclean because of God’s judgement, and similar to (similes), but not one with the worst sinners. Also that others are found who are unrighteous and unclean, except if the merciful God in the so-called time of grace chooses not to punish them for their sin or impute it to them, by which, if we take the idea to its conclusion, they become similar to, similes, but not one with the righteous. If we make it clear to ourselves that the righteousness these iusti possess is not a righteousness they have in their nature, and which is characterized by the goodness of their deeds (a righteousness Luther has flatly denied with reference to the scholastics in his first summary section), but a righteousness of faith, then his thinking, which might otherwise seem contradictory, makes sense. In the introduction to this section he has emphasized that it is now a question of treating how Isa 64:6 can be attributed to the believers (ista fidelibus tribui possint) (WA 8, 66,24). Indeed, the whole point of his exegesis of the quotation in relation to Latomus has from the beginning been that it is a prayer on behalf of the believers. Therefore the ones he calls “iusti” in his text are the pious (pii), 54 WA 8, 69,9–10: “Et tamen nisi vere impura et mala essent, iustus iudex non sic cum eis ageret.”

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who are righteous in their faith, and in contrast the ones he calls “peccatores” are the ungodly infidels (impii). And notably, the deeds of the righteous in their faith are unclean in themselves (natura sua), but clean by virtue of faith. Therefore they are “verissime iusti”, while the deeds of the infidels are unclean in themselves and even more so by virtue of their faith, seeing that it is unbelief. Therefore they are “novissimi et immundissimi peccatores”. The righteous believers happen to be those who in the time of grace are operarii iustitiae, and some of them even factores iustitiae, and thus Luther emphasizes that he does not speak of an idleness of faith in contrast to an activity of deeds, but of the faith which gives rise to true good deeds. So here he says that all men in their nature, natura sua, have the same relation to God, but at the same time distinguishes between the relation to God of believers and infidels. What the infidels are not to God, that is: iusti, the believers are, although by nature they are all unclean sinners. And yet it is not quite so simple, and this is what makes Luther’s exegesis of the Isaiah quotation so difficult. For even the believers are destroyed and consumed here55 because God is wrathful, and are thrown back in their iniquitas without being able to do anything to avert it. And that, Luther emphasizes several times, happens not unjustly, but justly. How that is to be understood, without weakening the image of the merciful God and the preaching of redemption for all who believe, is not immediately clear. A possible explanation may be that when he speaks of two different times, tempus irae and tempus favoris, Luther does not mean the eternal, final judgement or redemption, but refers to historical time. There is something that speaks for this, when we recall that in his preface to Justus Jonas he dubbed his own time a “time of wrath”, but also when we look at his description of how the time of grace and the time of wrath are to be understood in relation to the quotation from Isaiah. Here he seems to be thinking of historical times when he says that the time of grace is a time for progress, flourishing righteousness and joy, and the time of wrath a time for destruction, collapsing justice and sorrow. If that observation is correct, the discourse on being under wrath and judgment is not in this context an announcement of the final judgement of those who live in the time of wrath, but only speaks of how God at times brings about the punishment of both believers and infidels, because they are all sinners. Such punishment is not the final judgement of the believers, but only an expression of the use of the law as our accusator driving to Christ. 55 WA 8, 67,32–34: “Omnes ergo coram eo peccamus si iudicet, et perimus si irascatur, qui tamen si misericordia nos operiat, innocentes et pii sumus, tam coram eo quam omni creatura.” WA 8, 68,3–4: “sed ipsi una cum impiis consumuntur, iustitia eorum nihili habita”.

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This interpretation is supported by Luther’s conclusion to the whole analysis. Here he says directly that the rule of wrath of which he has spoken here is not a final judgement, but exists to reveal the nothingness of man and God’s love, and is thus the only true way to true worship, in fear of God and in hope, for those who know the promise that He will come to the aid of the unworthy. Luther’s earlier description of the synecdoche as an image of God’s love and mercy expresses the same thing. Here his point was that when it is said that God smites and destroys us, meaning that the law comes into force and God exerts His judgement, it must not be understood to mean that He entirely annihilates or destroys everything. By virtue of the synecdoche it is to be understood in the sense that He strikes all when He strikes a part. The statement, therefore, is not to be seen in isolation as describing the God of wrath, but in a larger perspective indicating the God of grace. But when God’s wrath here is then seen as a punishment and as an aspect or a part of His greater and more all-embracing grace, that is not the only thing that can be said about God’s wrath. For even though it is important to emphasize that the Isaiah quotation is not to be understood as speaking of the final damnation of the believers, it must not on the other hand be understood as the final redemption of the infidels, and as such as an utterance that takes the sting out of God’s will. Luther makes a distinct difference between infidels and believers, to mark that it is not without significance where one is situated. Whether the wrath to which the infidels are subjected is therefore also only a trial, and part of the reception of the greater grace, is an unanswered question, but should probably be answered in the negative. Even though Luther says that in the time of grace God accounts the sins of the ungodly as nothing, this does not mean that the infidels will be ultimately redeemed, if, as in the statement about the believers and wrath, we refer that statement to historical time, just as it did not mean that the believers under wrath have been ultimately damned. It only means that for a period the infidels enjoy God’s mercy. If Luther’s thoughts are taken to their conclusion there is not much doubt that God’s wrath and judgement are serious, so that they may also lead to the opposite of redemption. It must be so, or the text quoted is no source of true fear of God in the believer, as Luther puts it is. In the previous sections Luther has expounded the quotation from Isaiah in such a way that its meaning stretches across the history which is enacted on both sides of the coming of Christ. According to Luther Isa 64 reflects one of the two ways God can deal with man, one of his two distinct historical times, the time of wrath and the time of grace, which may come at any time. Therefore it has now been established once and for all that Latomus’ application of the quotation to one definite historical time and one particular historical people is wrong (WA 8, 68,15–16.27–32). Luther even calls Latomus’ attempt to relate the text to infidel Jews in a past era frigidissima, the most barren of all. It is so self-evident, Luther

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thinks, that Isaiah here laments on behalf of all righteous believers in a fervent prayer to God that the time of wrath may stop and the time of grace return. And that all believers at all times may have need of that prayer is plainly without doubt in Luther’s eyes, as has indeed become clear. For example there is no time at which it is more suitable for praying with these words than Luther’s own time, as he has expressed it in the letter of dedication to Justus Jonas. And the final section of his 1519 Commentary on Galatians is a good example that he meant that seriously (WA 2, 617,14–618,2). Here he chooses to quote Isa 63:14–64 and 64:5–12 in their full extent, as a prayer of lament on behalf of his own time, and ends by wishing, “may God infuse the perturbation of this prayer in our hearts, so that we can soften His anger as soon as possible”.56 For Luther pious and believing men of the time of the Old Testament are on an equal footing with pious and believing men after the coming of Christ. That is how it must be, he says, for the flesh of Christ and the Apostles was in them, which alone is enough to enable us to say that they were pious and believing, since we rightly believe that the flesh of Christ is found in a direct line through all of mankind and forward to the holy virgin mother and has been a chosen seed.57

It is the same Spirit that was in mankind before Christ that lives in the believers today : “The times, the things, the bodies and tribulations may change, but the same Spirit, sense, food and drink of everything remain throughout everything.”58 If this is not so, we question the value of the Old Testament, he goes on, because then it is nothing but a testimony of past events and deals with people whose righteousness is no longer valid. The theologians of Leuven might as well burn David’s psalms and start writing some new ones, because then the old psalms will no longer have relevance for contemporary man.

5.3.4 Law and Gospel Luther has now approached the last theme he takes up in connection with the quotation from Isaiah: the understanding of spirit (spiritus) and letter (litera),

56 WA 2, 618,1–2: “Et utinam huius orationis affectum deus in cor nostrum infunderet, quo iram eius quamprimum mitigaremus!” 57 WA 8, 66,27–30: “Nam Christi et Apostolorum caro adhuc in illis erat, ob quam solam possumus eos dicere fuisse pios et fideles, quando suae carnis linea merito credatur per totum genus humanum usque in virginem matrem sanctum et electum semen fuisse.” 58 WA 8, 69,24–26: “Variant secula, res et corpora et tribulationes, sed idem spiritus, idem sensus, eadem esca, idem potus omnium per omnia manet.”

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gospel (euangelium) and law (lex).59 That was the last point on which Latomus criticized him, the understanding of the relationship between the old and the new covenant. Latomus adduced 2 Cor 3:7–11 and Ezek 20:25, intending to determine the general understanding in scholastic theology of the relationship between the justice of the law and of grace. According to the scholastics the justice of the law belongs exclusively to the Old Testament, and is a term for the Jews’ misunderstood observance of the Ceremonial Law. In their opinion the belief that through it we achieve righteousness before God has lapsed, and been replaced with the coming of Christ, at which it has been revealed that the law is spiritual and inscribed in the hearts of the believers and therefore demands a filling of the heart. The time of the Old Testament is here a thing of the past, and the time of the New Testament is what counts now. The old has been left behind and something new has come in its stead.60 But, as Luther says here, the error is that the scholastics compare law and law and not law and grace, that they understand the Gospel as a teaching of laws (WA 8, 70,15–18). And that is not how the matter stands. The law as such is one, he emphasizes, and it is holy, righteous and good, as Paul writes in Rom 7:12. But that which was good in itself could not be good for men because of their error (vitium) (WA 8, 70,32–35). Therefore Ezekiel is right (20:25) that God gave the people of the Old Testament statutes that were not good and rules by which they could not have life (WA 8, 71,13–16). Luther thus on the one hand thinks that believers are found in all ages, which is why in the days of the Old Testament there also existed a chosen believing people who would come to be redeemed, and who gave the testimony of faith which is the Old Testament. But on the other hand he regards the fate of the people of the Old Testament as sealed and their endeavours to be in vain, because they had only the law and not yet grace. Thus seen from one angle, the Jews are doomed although they were God’s people and had received the law from him, because God kept the true righteousness and worship away from them. In Adnotationes Quinduplici Psalterio adscripta of 1513, where Luther in the commentary to Ps 43:18, “and all this came upon us”, refers to Isa 64:6, he addresses the question. There he says: These verses [i. e. from verse 18ff] can all together be interpreted as concerning the corporal persecution of the saints. For the corporal destruction and fall of Israel is a mystery, says the Apostle (Rom 11:25). In truth, Jeremiah (14:7f) and Isaiah (64:6f) 59 WA 8, 69,35–71,24. The themes of law and gospel are only treated as they are found in this passage. 60 Cf. StA, 447, note 332: “In der scholastischen Lehrtradition ist vom Evangelium in der Regel unter dem Oberbegriff ‘Gesetz’ die Rede.” Cf. here a series of references to Thomas’ Summa Theologica.

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lament in the same way, as if they themselves were among those who were part of the destruction.61

But seen from another angle there were a chosen people in Old Testament times who carried the body of Christ in them and gave testimony to the true righteousness of faith and who received redemption. However, after the coming of Christ the law no longer stands alone. For since the law in the beginning, even though it was good in itself, was only harmful to man, God gave us the fulfilment of it with the Gospel: Christ. This did not mean, Luther says, that the law was abrogated, as the scholastics would have it with the Ceremonial Law : rather it was confirmed. When Christ came, the true meaning of the law was revealed. It had not been given to be fulfilled by men in a righteousness of the law, but to reveal their sins, cf. Rom 3:9 and Gal 3:22, and drive them to Christ. But it was not until the grace in Christ had been revealed and the fulfilment of the law had been given, that it became possible for man to receive and bear this real meaning of the law. Luther describes it by saying that the law and grace were veiled on Mount Tabor until the Transfiguration (Matt 17:1 and others) (WA 8, 70,22–25), and that Moses had to veil his face until the coming of Christ (2 Cor 3:13), because before that day no one could bear the true power of the law (WA 8, 70,22–25). As the law is to the time of the Old Testament, so the Gospel is to the time of the New Testament. This too must be regarded from two different angles. Seen from one point of view, the grace of God which was hidden before Christ, has been revealed with Him, for the redemption of all mankind. But seen from another point of view, there are also after the coming of Christ those who are righteous in the law who yet remain hardened and will perish. The Gospel was thus in one way present in the Old Testament period, i. e. as a promise, but in another way not, as grace was hidden. And likewise the law of damnation was in one way present in the New Testament period, i. e. as confirmed and thus a constant threat, and in another way not, as Christ has fulfilled it and thus redeemed mankind. Thus separate and yet inseparable, the Law and the Gospel belong together in the office of preaching at all times, one as the office of the letter (litera) (WA 8, 70,19), the other as that of the spirit (spiritus) (WA 8, 70,18–22). The letter attaches to the Law, the spirit to grace, the letter to the Old Covenant, which was incomplete, the spirit to the New Covenant which is completion. The clarity of the law is the knowledge of sin (cognitio peccati) (WA 8, 70,21), the clarity of the 61 WA 4, 493,8–12: “‘Haec omnia venerunt super nos’ etc. Possunt autem haec universa intelligi de persecutione corporali Sanctorum. Nam mysterium esse dicit Apostolus casum et perditionem carnalis Israel [Rom 11:25]. Verum et Is. et Ier. in hanc eandem sententiam flebiliter loquuntur tamquam ipsi sint inter istos pars perditionis, ut Iere. in Isai. 64,6f.”

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spirit is the revelation or knowledge of grace, which is faith (revelatio seu cognitio gratiae, quae est fides) (WA 8, 70,21). For the law brings wrath and kills (Rom 4:15) whereas the spirit gives life (2 Cor 3:6) (WA 8, 70,28–29; 71,12–13). Because the Gospel was there as a promise of the redemption for the believers in Old Testament days, and because the law is there as a confirmed threat of damnation of the infidels in New Testament times, it holds good of both the Old and New Testament periods that just as the Law of the Decalogue is good if it is fulfilled, i. e. if you have the faith which is the fulfilment of the Law and righteousness, so it is in contrast death and wrath and not good for you if you do not fulfil it, i. e. if you do not have the faith however many of its deeds you do […] likewise any law of ceremony is good if you fulfil it, not with deeds but in faith, i. e. if you fulfil it in such a way that you know you are not righteous in the law of ceremony but in the faith. Conversely it is un-good, death, wrath, if you fulfil it outside faith, which is the same thing as not fulfilling it.62

As will be seen from this, Luther has a somewhat different understanding of the history of redemption than Latomus. He operates in two directions: in a progressive perspective and an eternal perspective. Luther confirms that it is correct that the Gospel’s righteousness in Christ takes over from the righteousness of the law (the progressive perspective) and that at the same time it is wrong because it confirms the righteousness of the Law (the eternal perspective). Latomus only had his attention on the progressive perspective. He regarded the two periods before and after Christ as taking over one from the other, and the time of the New Testament as revealing the Old Testament period to have been a time of decline. And in Luther’s opinion that is both right and wrong, because the time of the New Testament is no more true than the time of the Old, as Latomus claims, but is other than the Old. But its otherness consists in rising above the old time and completing its incompleteness. That is to say that on the one hand there is a development from the Old Testament to the New, and on the other hand there is not. Therefore the two perspectives are equally necessary and legitimate. Luther ends his analysis of the quotation from Isaiah by returning to the attack on Latomus’ use of synecdoche, thus to repeat that Latomus’ exegesis is of absolutely no value. If someone wants to use the Holy Scripture against him, and he feels hard pressed, he and those like him will invent all sorts of excuses and distinctions to shirk the issue. But something that is simple, constant and one, they are unable to devise. “Among our masters”, Luther concludes, 62 WA 8, 71,4–6.9–12: “Sicut lex decalogi est bona, si servetur, id est, si habeas fidem, quae est plenitudo legis et iustitia, contra mors et ira et non bono tibi, si non serves, id est, si non habeas fidem, quantumlibet eius opera facias […]: ita ceremonialis quaecunque bona est, si eam serves, non autem operibus, sed fide eam servas, id est, si sic opereris eam, ut non in illis sed in fide scias esse iusticiam. Contra non bona, mors, ira est, si extra fidem serves, id quod est, ac si non serves.”

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there is no interest in the simple truth, but in ambiguous and unstable phantoms. If it were me who were to work with opinions, analogies and a multitude of possible interpretations in that way, I would not want to be a Christian. For how could I hope to find the consolidated truth in these storms and waves? So what are we left with? That Latomus, because he cannot prove that figurative expressions are used here, is forced to make room for this quotation adduced by way of proof, without figurative speech, taken in its most simple and original meaning, to wit that the righteousness of all men is soiled and that without God’s mercy all men are unclean.63

5.4

Ecclesiastes 7:21

Luther goes on to deal with Latomus’ rejection of his interpretation of Eccl 7:21: “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and never sins” (“non est homo iustus in terra, qui bene faciat et non peccet”) (WA 8, 73,2).64 First of all he ridicules Latomus’ threat at the end of his analysis of the Scriptural text (WA 8, 73,1–17). Here Latomus says, after having adduced Paul’s collection for Jerusalem as an example of a good deed, that really Luther has to submit to that and thus stop tainting the glory of the Saints by saying that their good deeds too are sins. This means, Luther says here, that the glory of the saints (gloria sanctorum) (WA 8, 73,4), in Latomus is tantamount to their good deeds without sin (opus eorum sine peccato) (WA 8, 73,4–5). The consequence of that is that when Psalm 3:4 says that “you are my glory”, it means “you are my good deed without sin”! What can it mean, asks Luther, other than that one creates one’s own gods, as it says in Exod 32:23, viz. the good deeds? It corresponds to what is said in Isa 2:8: “They bow down to the work of their hands, to what their own fingers have made.” According to Luther this is a wildly distorted understanding of what is meant in the Bible by the gloria of the saints. For God’s saints are abashed at their work for God, and boast solely of Him, exactly as it says in Jer 9:23, “let not the mighty 63 WA 8, 72,25–32: “nec esse apud Magistros nostros studium simplicis veritatis, sed variae et inconstantis elusionis. Si mihi sic laborandum esset opinionibus, similitudinibus, varietatibus, nollem Christianus esse. Quomodo enim veritatem solidam in his procellis et fluctibus invenire sperarem? Quid ergo reliquum est? Nempe, quia figuram hic esse non potest probare Latomus, cogetur autoritatem citra figuram simplici et propria significatione admittere, omnesque omnium iustitias esse pollutas et omnes homines esse immundos citra dei misericordiam.” 64 This text is found in several places in Luther’s early works: several times in the lecture on the Epistle to the Romans (WA 56, 288, 7f, the three texts Isa 64:6, Eccl 7:21 and Rom 7 are found together for the first time), in the preparatory draft of the Heidelberg disputation, in conclusion 2 of the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, and finally in Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorum (WA 7, 136,20– 138,23) and Grund und Ursach aller Artikel D.M. Luthers, so durch römische Bulle unrechtlich verdammt sind (WA 7, 433,23–37). Cf. Zschoch: 1993, 21–23, and StA, 450, note 364.

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man boast in his might”, and in 1 Cor 1:31: “Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord.” These passages Latomus knows, and yet in his heart he has a different opinion of faith and deeds (de fide et operibus) (WA 8, 73,16), from what the Scripture preaches. And as the mouth speaks out of the abundance of the heart it is not possible for him, even if he wanted to try, to hide that he is in fact an idolater, one who worships good deeds.

5.4.1 The general exegetical rules In connection with this text Luther accuses Latomus of no longer living up to the rules in the exegetical sermon he preached in connection with the quotation from Isaiah (WA 8, 73,18–21). Everything he said there, about coherence, context and the genre of speaking (consequentia, circumstantia et filum locutionis) (WA 8, 73,18), he now abandons. And he does so, Luther claims, because he can see that in this connection it will not get him far. Therefore he has recourse to something else: other exegetes and other Scripture texts that, he claims, say the same as Eccl 7:21. Luther admits that it is difficult to get a grip on the text in Ecclesiastes (WA 8, 73,21–28; 74,8–23). In his work on interpreting the text he has several times tried to circumvent its statement with all sorts of explanations, including those Latomus gives. But the text has constantly offered resistance and has united with other texts which point to every good deed’s being a sin. And as it seems to point in that direction in clear words (aperta verba) (WA 8, 73,24), and as no one can produce any other understanding of it, until the Spirit grants a better, Luther for the time being connects it with these other clear and unmistakable texts which say the same thing, and thus he must stay with what the words say (id quod verba sonant sequar) (WA 8, 74,14). Of course we may fear, he says, that we have not quite understood the meaning of the text, and that thus it is neither quite clear nor quite hidden, but then it is better to have a God-fearing or no interpretation of it than a blasphemous one. And he thinks that his exegesis of the text, which accuses good deeds of being fruitless and of no use to God, is much more pious than Latomus’ which presents and praises those deeds to God. In conclusion 2 to the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, Luther’s point was to emphasize that Eccl 7:21 and Prov 24:26 do not have a common theme, so it is he himself who has brought up Prov 24:26. The comparison between this text and Eccl 7:21 he obviously seems to have said enough about, because here he only criticizes Latomus’ reference to 3 Kings 8:46 (WA 8, 73,30–74, 7).65 If one has to demonstrate the meaning of a text by using other texts, says 65 The designation 3 Kings 8:46 refers to the Vulgate, as mentioned before. In the English translation this is 1 Kings 8:46.

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Luther, these others must be evident (evidentes) (WA 8, 74,8) and 3 Kings 8:46 (“non est enim homo, qui non peccet”), according to Luther, is not a text which evidently says the same as Eccl 7:21. In Ecclesiastes “homo” is connected with “iustus” and “bonum facere” with “non peccare”, while in Kings it only says “homo” and “non peccare”. Who can claim that “man” and “righteous man” are one and the same? And that “sinning and doing good deeds” is the same as “sinning”? The fact is even, Luther emphasizes, that “man” and “human” in Scripture are nearly always used about the sinner and not about the righteous man, as for example in Gen 6:3 (“my Spirit shall not abide in man forever, for he is flesh”), 1 Cor 3:4 (“are you not being merely human?”), and Rom 3:5 (“I speak in a human way”). One might, he continues, say that 3 Kings 8:46 (“non est enim homo, qui non peccet”) is a parallel to the first part of the sentence in Ecclesiastes: “non est homo iustus in terra” (WA 8, 74,23–75, 26). And the statement in Ecclesiastes is even more radical than in Kings, because when the expression “faciens bonum” is added, it means in Hebrew that this is not only an “operator bonorum”, who is parallel to operarius iustitiae in connection with the quotation from Isaiah, but one who is the originator of all the good, parallel to the factor iustitiae mentioned before. So it is not just a question of personal goodness, but about active goodness which bears fruit in the world. And yet it is said that he sins. How much more, Luther asks, must not those who are just good for themselves, operatores bonorum (WA 8, 74,26), the subject of 3 Kings, be called sinners? In addition the text in Ecclesiastes explains that this righteous man sins when he does good deeds, not that he sometimes does good deeds and sometimes sins, as Latomus wants to read it. Because he who knows Hebrew, Luther argues, knows that the conjunction “and” is really superfluous in the kind of sentence we deal with here. It might as well have said, “… qui cum bene fecerit, non peccet” (“… who when he does good deeds does not sin”). That is what we find in Gen 17: 14, for example (“any male who is not circumcized in the flesh of his foreskin and he shall be cut off from his people”), and Exod 12:15 (“anyone who eats what is leavened, and that person shall be cut off from Israel”). On this point Luther’s argument is not exactly crystal clear. Not that it is untrue that “and” in Hebrew often occurs in the way he says, but is that what is afoot in the text of Ecclesiastes? Immediately it makes no sense to say, “qui bene faciat, non peccet” without a conjunction, and indeed, Luther himself introduces a “cum” in the sentence when he removes “et”: “[…] qui cum bene fecerit, non peccet” (WA 8, 74,36). But even though he thus seems at first glance to have a weak case with the reference to Hebrew he has presented here, it can on the other hand be maintained that the conjunction “and” in Hebrew generally does not denote an opposition as Latomus has it, but a co-ordination or even simultaneity. It irritates Luther that Latomus does not answer what Luther said in con-

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clusion 2 of the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, that it seems superfluous when the Ecclesiast adds “qui faciat bonum et non peccet” to “homo iustus”. With the aid of Bede, Latomus has tried to explain away the fact that it is said about the righteous man that he sins, by saying that it is only the venial sins (peccata venialia), and not serious sins which are at issue, so he can still be called righteous. But this attempt to grade sin is unacceptable to Luther. And what of “qui faciat bonum”? Latomus gives no answer as to why that qualifies “homo iustus”. At first sight the Ecclesiast might here seem to say that there is also another kind of righteous man, who does not do good deeds, but of course Latomus would not be able to accept that either. Therefore, according to Luther, it cannot be understood otherwise than in the way he put it in the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation: the Ecclesiast says that the righteous man does good and sins in one and the same act. At the end of his concrete criticism of Latomus’ exegesis of Eccl 7:21, Luther demonstrates three in his eyes glaring errors in Latomus’ argumentation. First his attempt to take Luther’s argument ad absurdum with logical syllogisms (WA 8, 75,27–76,17). Luther does not take Latomus’ objection at all seriously, and therefore does exactly what had been Latomus’ intention: he reduces the argumentation ad absurdum. He quotes a logical principle which he claims to have from Aristotle,66 “from the impossible anything follows” (ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet). In other words, from nonsense nothing can be concluded. Pursuing this Luther asks, if this is true cannot we deduce just about anything out of Latomus’ examples? When Latomus says that Ps 88:49 (“there is not a man who lives and does not see death”) in the light of Luther’s exegesis of Eccl 7:21, must have the absurd meaning that man lives and dies at the same time, one might as well by the rule of logic “ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet” come to the opposite conclusion: ergo, he does not live and die at the same time. The point is that the premise is impossible, as no one lives when he sees death. And likewise with Latomus’ other logical arguments. We can deduce anything from them, since the premise is impossible, because only when the premise is true can the consequence be true. Therefore we have to ask, if this is the case and anything thus is possible and therefore without importance in the examples Latomus adduces, why does he discard one of the possible inferences rather than any other? Secondly Luther notes that Latomus might have thought that the verb in the second part of the sentence was to be understood as a future tense, or that there was a hidden adverb (WA 8, 76,18–77,7), so that also Ecclesiastes would read, 66 StA, 453, note 393, thinks that this is a conscious misrepresentation of the sentence “impossibile autem ex impossibili accidit” in the work De coelo, in which Aristotle discusses the logic of the possible and impossible. Aristotle, De coelo 1, 12.

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there is no righteous man on earth who does good deeds and who “does not want to sin” or “does not sometimes sin”, i. e. sins at times when he is not doing good. All one can say to that, says Luther, is that if that is the case, Latomus here reveals that not only is he ignorant of logic, but he knows no grammar either. He who elsewhere, according to Luther, in his Dialogue and with reference to Aristotle, has expressed the opinion that the study of language is without true importance because all men have the same understanding of things within them, he cannot even bring to light these spiritual qualities (passiones animae) (WA 8, 76,28–29), common to all men, which by his own account ought to enable him to understand and speak precisely. Perhaps, Luther observes, it is a punishment for the disdain he has earlier shown of linguistic knowledge that he has now become what he was in reality pleading for in the Dialogue: without language. The point here, according to Luther, is that it is revealed that Latomus’ most fervent wish is to be able to interpret Eccl 7:21 as if it contained an “aliquando”, and refer sin to the evil deeds outside the good deed (WA 8, 77,5), and that he therefore is guilty of petitio principii, which has been mentioned a number of times, presupposing that which he wants to prove. Yet, Luther goes on (WA 8, 77,8–37), even if these errors of logic and grammar had not been demonstrable, Latomus thirdly has the basic drawback that he does not know the correct distinction between what can be ascribed to a thing as its essential qualities (modus praedicandi per se) (WA 8, 77,8–9), and what can be ascribed to it as its accidental qualities (modus praedicandi per accidens) (WA 8, 77,8–9). For sin, as opposed to what the scholastics believe, is present in the good deed as long as man lives, as it is said to be one of man’s essential qualities, like the ability to laugh. Sin, like being able to laugh, is in the words of Aristotle, a propria passio (WA 8, 77,13) in man, propria passio meaning something which is always ascribed to a thing, like the sum of the angles in a triangle, or a number’s being either even or uneven (WA 8, 77,13).67 Eating, sleeping and death, which were the things to which Latomus compared sin in his arguments, are not among the qualities we can ascribe to man as essential (praedicatio per se), but are qualities we can ascribe to him as accidental (praedicatio per accidens).68 That we here speak about qualities in man means that none of them are identical with man. So we cannot say that as man has the ability to laugh, so he always laughs, or man has the ability to wake, eat, sleep and die and therefore always wakes, eats, dies. But we can say that man exists, and therefore has the ability to laugh, eat, sleep and die, and these qualities, be it remembered, are different, some being essential qualities, praedicatio per se, as Luther has emphasized, and others accidental qualities, praedicatio per accidens. Being able to 67 Cf. StA, 455, note 399: Aristotle, Metaphysica 3, 2. 68 WA 8, 77,10.13–14: “Praedicatione perseitatis”, “praedicatione per accidens”.

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laugh is a quality in man at any time, no matter where he is, or what he is doing, whereas sleeping, eating, and dying only appear occasionally. Likewise with sin. It is also part of man’s essential nature, as long as he lives, no matter where he is or what he does. That is what Ecclesiastes says with “man does good and therefore sins”. The man who does good is the subject and sin his essential quality (eius passio) (WA 8, 77,18). True, Luther here tries to use Aristotle’s distinctions in his own interpretation, but as will be seen, the conclusion does not build on Aristotle, but on the Ecclesiast. It is because the Ecclesiast says that the man who does good sins, that sin is called propria passio in man. So here we find a good example of how Luther derives his anthropology solely from the statements of Scripture, and in a way one may add that he thus becomes guilty of a kind of petitio principii, like Latomus. Where Latomus derives his anthropology from his combined philosophical and theological point of departure, and does not question that, Luther derives his from Scripture: but Luther will of course maintain that he does so rightfully, since the Scripture is the true theological authority. On the other hand, though Luther does not deduce his conclusion from Aristotle, this text is an example that shows that he does not despise Aristotle as such, but only the erroneous use of him. Aristotle cannot be used as a theological authority, as the scholastics do, but he can very well be used as a competent philosophical authority, i. e. one who has made very good sense about how the life of man is constituted on a purely human level. But as a thinker who only explains life on the purely human level, he is to be found in a quite different place, and far below the biblical testimony that explains human life at the divine level.

5.4.2 What is a good deed? Luther now seems to have said enough about the concrete exegesis of the text. His next step is to use the text as a point of departure for a statement as to what a good deed is. First and foremost he deplores Latomus’ use of the quotation from Jerome’s Dialogue with the Pelagians (WA 8, 78,1–79,16). In his eyes it is nothing short of insane to take a quotation which has never had anything to do with Eccl 7:21, and then claim that the two texts deal with the same thing. The point in Jerome’s quotation may well be that no one, not even the Saints can avoid sin forever, but it has no demonstrable connection with Eccl 7:21, and Latomus apparently does not think that there is any burden of proof on him to show the connection. He finds it enough to list the quotations side by side. Jerome’s quotation concerns the serious sins (robusta peccata) (WA 8, 78,33), which are sometimes committed by the Saints, says Luther, but that is not what he and Latomus are

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discussing. They are disputing about the daily sin which is inherent in man (de quottidiano inherente) (WA 8, 78,34), and which Latomus calls the venial sin. Even though Luther mainly rejects Latomus’ use of the Jerome quotation, he is not particularly enthusiastic about the quotation itself. He is not sure that he agrees in the interpretation of Acts 13:22, “‘David will do all my will’, and yet he sinned now and again”, regarding which Jerome explains “all my will” as “sometimes” or “mostly”. Luther himself would interpret the text in a different way, i. e. with Augustine, whom he has already adduced before (“God’s commandments are fulfilled when that which does not happen is forgiven”), but he does not want to denounce Jerome’s method, as it is just possible that Acts employs a synecdoche. However he certainly does not agree with Jerome’s accusation that Paul, in the same quotation, either sinned or at least did no good deed, in writing to Timothy in 2 Tim 4:13 that “when you come, bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas, also the books, and above all the parchments”, not to mention other occasions when he worried about quotidian things. Luther counters that Paul himself has said, in 1 Cor 10:31 and Col 3:17, that “whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus”, and therefore it is true, Luther concludes, that “the ordinary life of the righteous man is nothing but good deeds”.69 Here for the first time we see a difference in the understanding of sin in Luther and Latomus. Latomus would never say that the justified man had sin as his everyday companion, as does Luther. That is why he cannot accept the presence of concupiscentia as a sin, but only a punishment. According to him the righteous man is devoid of sin until in concrete cases he is tempted to commit minor sins of commission, the so-called peccata venialia. Even though they are concrete separate sins, they remain nevertheless minor, because they are committed by one who is otherwise righteous,70 and Latomus would never think of saying that the righteous commit peccata robusta. In his ears that would be a contradiction. What Luther says about venial sin is therefore quite different from what Latomus says, when he says that it adheres to everyone. It is not inextricably connected to certain deeds as it is in Latomus, but as Luther has determined shortly before, it is one of the essential qualities of man, a so-called propria passio in him. It is present before the concrete deeds he may do, whatever they may be. What makes it venial is not its insignificant character but God’s will. Having thus marked the distinction between sin and definite deeds, he goes 69 WA 8, 79,6–8: “Melius Paulus ipse: ‘Omnia quaecunque facitis, sive comeditis, sive bibitis, omnia in nomine domini nostri Ihesu Christi facite.’ Communis vita iusti non est nisi mera bona opera.” 70 Cf.StA, 457, note 410: Here there is a reference to Thomas’ doctrine of peccata venialia.

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on to look at the relation from the other side. There is no connection between definite deeds and righteousness. Luther subscribes not at all to the gradation of deeds according to their content and circumstances which Latomus elaborates, in which sin is the lowest common denominator and redemption the highest. All deeds, says Luther, important and unimportant, are of the same nature as that from which they spring: faith and righteousness or infidelity and sin, as long as we do not talk of the blatantly evil deeds, the so-called peccata robusta. For Luther, then, it is not important, as it is for Latomus, what the deeds concretely are, and in extrapolation of that, whether they are found at a higher or lower moral level. To him it is only important what brings them about, and this is quite parallel to what was seen to be important for Augustine in the section on Latomus’ Exposition. Luther uses the revelation of Jerome’s error (WA 8, 79,5), as he calls it, in connection with the mention of 2 Tim 4:13 to emphasize once more that the Church Fathers have no authority in themselves, but only when they are supported by clear Scripture texts. In a dispute like this, he says, we must find support in the divine, i. e. in trustworthy and evident testimony. Human testimony, however, is only of value in a human context, such as in private conversation or in politics. In connection with Latomus’ reference to Paul’s collection for Jerusalem as an example of a good deed, Luther has occasion to determine more precisely what in his opinion is decisive for the nature of the deed (WA 8, 79,17–82,26). In order to convince Latomus how wrong it is in a theological connection to determine the goodness of a deed on the basis of its content and circumstances, Luther puts himself in Latomus’ place and imagines that there are saints who can present good deeds without sin to God. Such a man would then, Luther says, stand before God and say : “Look Lord God, this good deed I have done with the aid of your grace, there is no error or sin in it, nor does it need your forgiving mercy, which I do not ask for it either, moreover, I want you to judge it with the truest and severest judgement. For I can boast of it to you because you cannot condemn it, as you are righteous and truthful. Indeed, unless you deny yourself you will not condemn it, I am sure. There is now no need for mercy to forgive the guilt in this deed, as your prayer teaches, it is quite superfluous here. All that is needed is righteousness to crown the deed.”71

71 WA 8, 79,21–28: “Ecce dominus deus, hoc opus bonum per tuae gratiae auxilium feci, non est in eo vicium aut peccatum ullum, nec indiget tua misericordia ignoscente, quam super eo nec peto, deinde volo, ut iudicio tuo verissimo et strictissimo ipsum iudices. In hoc enim gloriari coram te possum, quod nec tu possis illud damnare, cum sis iustus et verax, imo nisi teipsum neges, non damnabis, certus sum, non iam opus misericordia, quae remittat debitum in isto opere, sicut oratio tua docet, evacuata hic est utique, sed tantum iustitia, quae coronet.”

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He must necessarily be able to say this, if Latomus is right, because one should always speak the truth, especially to God, and the truth is that one no longer needs God’s mercy or needs to fear God’s judgement, because one is allowed to trust and hope “in this deed and the gift received from grace” (in opere ipso et accepto dono gratiae) (WA 8, 79,32–33). For even if God destroys good beings, he does not therefore damn or reject them. Therefore he can also destroy such a Saint with his deed, but he cannot condemn or deny him, because with Ps 45:3 it is manifest that “you love righteousness and hate unrighteousness”. “And thus”, Luther says, “through the grace of God (per gratiam dei) (WA 8, 80,6–7) we have something which we can muster in this life and before God’s judgement, and we can safely set aside His mercy as well as His judgement.”72 However, Luther goes on to say, if the case is as he has just presented it what are we to say of Ps 142:2, “enter not into judgment with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you”, a text he also adduced in the introductory summary section for Isa 64:6? And what of Paul’s statement in 1 Cor 4:4: “For I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted”?73 How can Paul avoid being acquitted if there is righteousness and no sin in the good deed? asks Luther. He did good deeds, as Latomus himself has noted. Deeds which were good in all possible ways according to the circumstances and the virtues, quite in accordance with Aristotle. Does Paul lie, then, when he says he is not acquitted? Hardly. Or could it possibly be the incompleteness God punishes in the good deed? Probably not that either, for Latomus himself says that incompleteness is not sin but punishment, and that on the contrary it increases our goodness the more we are able to withstand it, so that the more failings we have, the better. It therefore seems that the two sentences, Latomus’ statement “I have a good deed without sin”, and Paul’s “but I am not thereby acquitted” are mutually exclusive. It may be that as a rejoinder Latomus, as an example of Saints who really have done good deeds and never broken faith with God, will adduce Jer 17:16 (“I have not run away from being your shepherd, nor have I desired the day of sickness. You know what came out of my lips; it was before your face”),74 and 2 Kings 20:3, where Hezekiah says: “O Lord, please remember how I have walked before you in faithfulness and with a whole heart, and have done what is good in your sight.”75 72 WA 8, 80,6–8: “Et sic per gratiam dei habemus, quod in hac etiam vita et ante iudicium dei opponamus et tam misericordiam quam iudicium euis secure posthabeamus.” 73 WA 8, 80,11–12: “Sed et Paulus i.Corint.iiii. ‘Nihil mihi conscius sum (ecce bona opera), sed in hoc non iustificatus sum.’” 74 WA 8, 80,29–31: “Tu scis, quod egressum est de labiis meis, rectum in conspectu tuo fuit, diem hominis non desideravi, tu scis, te pastorem sequens.” 75 WA 8, 80,31–33: “Obsecro, domine, memento quaeso, quomodo ambulaverim coram te in veritate et in corde perfecto, et quod placitum fuit coram te, feci.”

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Should Latomus do so, Luther must answer that Jeremiah and Hezekiah do not say that they did not sin in these things. They presumably agree with Paul in 1 Cor 4:4, and thus, like Paul they speak out of their conscience. But that means nothing, Luther emphasizes, because “those who in the eyes of men and in their own conscience are irreproachable are not justified in that in God’s eyes, but by someone else, namely Christ”.76 The point therefore is that the truly righteous are not justified in themselves by their own goodness or righteousness, but only by Christ’s righteousness, in faith in Him. There is nothing of their own they can abide by and be safe in their relation to God. It is all nothing. No one, to look back briefly at what has been said in this section, is given a gift by the grace of God (acceptum donum gratiae) (WA 8, 79,32–33), which makes him righteous in himself and by nature (cf. WA 8, 69,4–6), and which he can present to God. Nobody has “through the grace of God” (per gratiam dei) (WA 8, 80,6–7), anything he can muster in this life and before God’s judgement, anything by dint of which “we can safely set aside His mercy as well as His judgement”.77 If we believe we do, we trust in ourself instead of God, and according to Luther that leads to the opposite of true good deeds. But men can trust in something other than themselves, and that is Christ, the word of God. That is the way it is, says Luther. By the word (verbum) (WA 8, 81,10–11), one can with trusting confidence (cum fiducia) (WA 8, 81,12) remain standing, before God too, and say : “I know that you cannot condemn this, for it is justified in itself, not only because it knows nothing against itself, it does not fear your judgement and does not seek mercy. We can muster that before you, as it is your equal in all things.”78

For the sake of the word, which is God’s own and not mankind’s, men can die assured that it is the pure truth (pura veritas) (WA 8, 81,19). They cannot do as much because of their good deeds. When Paul and Hezekiah speak in the quotations cited above, they do not speak with prejudice about their own deeds, but in the expectation of mercy, by whose benefaction, beneficium (WA 8, 81,24), they expect the crown of glory, without the consciousness of anything against themselves. All believers do thus. Hope (spes) (WA 8, 81,25), which they have, does not expect the wrath but the glory, as it says in Tit 2:13, and they hope not because of the deeds, but because of God’s mercy (misericordia dei) (WA 8, 81,26). 76 WA 8, 81,3–4: “Et tamen qui coram hominibus et conscientia sua irreprehensibiles sunt, non iustificatur coram deo in hoc, sed in alio quopiam, nempe Christo.” 77 WA 8, 80,6–8: “[…] tam misericordiam quam iudicium eius secure posthabeamus”. 78 WA 8, 81,12–15: “scio, quod hoc non potes damnare, hoc enim est iustificatum in semetipso, non modo nullius sibi conscium, hoc non timet tuum iudicium nec quaerit misericordiam, denique hoc tibi opponere possumus, cum sit tibi per omnia aequale & c.”

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This same thing, i. e. that men can hold on to God’s word and present it to him, is not true of the use of the word, the office for the word and the occupation with the word, but only for the word itself. For once the word enters into the human connections something human is added to it, so that it is no longer God’s own pure and unblemished word, and therefore no longer pura veritas (WA 8, 81,19). Here Luther strikes at Latomus’ way of thinking about grace, and with him most other scholastics, whatever their philosophical and theological differences: the thought that the saving grace, per gratiam dei, as Luther expresses it, causes man to have a supernatural virtue infused, which Luther calls an extra donum, which in its form completes nature in supernature, and thus makes man worthy in God’s eyes. This is a wholly unacceptable thought to Luther. In this section he also makes an observation which throws some light on the exegesis of Isa 64:6. With the sentence “For even if God destroys good beings, he does not therefore damn or reject them”,79 Luther expresses what was seen in the Isaiah quotation: that the believers can very well perish (perire) and be destroyed (consumi), because of God’s will, but they are not therefore condemned or ultimately denied by God.80 A little later he adds yet another explicative statement to the Isaiah quotation. The sentence “those who in the eyes of men and in their own conscience are irreproachable are not justified in it in God’s eyes, but by someone else, namely Christ”81 supports the interpretation offered of Luther’s reading of Isa 64:6. From this can be deduced that Luther was right when by the truly righteous (verissimi iusti) (WA 8, 67,20) in Isa 64:6, he meant the righteous in faith. His point in this section is that we cannot trust to anything human, and certainly not our own deeds, not even the use of, the office for or the occupation with God’s word. We have to trust to the pure truth, which is solely Christ, who is God’s spoken word about His mercy. And if we do, our deeds spring from the right place, because then it is true that “the ordinary life of the righteous man is nothing but good deeds”.82 Luther knows that faced with all this Latomus might protest that what Luther says about not being conscious of any sin, and yet at the same time knowing that one is not therefore justified except in Christ as God’s word, is being too certain 79 WA 8, 80,3–4: “Neque enim deus, etsi creaturas bonas destruat, ideo eas damnat aut reprobate.” 80 WA 8, 67,32–34: “Omnes ergo coram eo peccamus si iudicet, et perimus si irascatur, qui tamen si misericordia nos operiat, innocentes et pii sumus, tam coram eo quam omni creatura.” WA 8, 68,3–4: “sed ipsi una cum impiis consumuntur, iustitia eorum nihili habita.” 81 WA 8, 81,3–4: “Et tamen qui coram hominibus et conscientia sua irreprehensibiles sunt, non iustificatur coram deo in hoc, sed in alio quopiam, nempe Christo.” 82 WA 8, 79,8: “Communis vita iusti non est nisi mera bona opera.”

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of one’s own ability (WA 8, 81,27–82,18), because “nobody can be sure if he has such a deed”.83 The notion that Latomus might say something of the sort is not unfounded. From what he said about faith in the Exposition, it could be seen that Latomus, in accordance with prevalent scholastic theology, denies that we can be certain of our own redemption and advances the idea that we must rest in the faith of the Church instead of our own. Even though our own faith may grow over time, concurrently with our participation in the sacraments and the gift of grace contained in them, it cannot grow to full certainty. For Luther such a concept of certainty of faith is quite erroneous, and can be relegated to the philosophers of antiquity who doubted everything. As a Christian one must fight for truth, but who is willing to make an effort and fight for what is doubtful and uncertain, and deliberately beat the air with their fists? he asks. If we were both to contain good deeds and at the same time could never know when we had them, there would never be peace. First of all, Luther says, it is not at all uncertain what good deeds are. Paul of course does not say, “I am in doubt”, in 1 Cor 4:4, but: “I am not aware of anything against myself.” Hezekiah does not say : “I am in doubt whether I have done what is good in your sight.” Nor does David in Ps 7:9 say, “judge me according to my doubts”, but: “judge me according to the integrity that is in me.” Secondly there is no doubt either that the deed is in sin (opus esse in peccato) (WA 8, 81,36), for Paul does not continue, “but I doubt whether I am thereby acquitted”, but: “but I am not thereby acquitted.” And David does not say in Ps 143:2, “who knows if everyone living is righteous before you?”, but: “no one living is righteous before you.” In that way God has arranged things wisely. He has informed mankind in the best way and assured them both about their deeds and about their impotence. He has taught them that the good deeds are evident, as it says in Gal 5:22: “but the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, etc.” And in Matt 7:20: “you will recognize them by their fruits.” But in addition he has taught them that these deeds are not without error and sin, in order that men do not trust to them, and he has assured us that we can confess our sin in every deed, without doubt or false confession. And again, and this is the most important thing, so that men can have unshakeable peace, God has given them his word in Christ (verbum suum in Christo) (WA 8, 82,9). When they rely on that with trusting confidence they can be secure against all evil. That is the rock of mankind. Here they dare importune God with his own promises, his truth and his own word. For who, Luther asks,

83 WA 8, 81,28: “quia nemo est certus, an tale opus habeat”.

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can judge God and His own word? Who can accuse or condemn the faith in His word? So it is Latomus and not Luther himself, and here he returns to what he wrote at the beginning of his section on Eccl 7:21, who must stop tainting God’s glory by raising an idol of the doubtful and infidel deeds of men.

5.5

The conclusion of Ecclesiastes 7:21 – introduction to Romans: What is sin?

Luther now writes a very long section about the meaning of peccatum (WA 8, 2,19–99,24) in the Scriptures, as a rejoinder to Latomus’ considerations on the same theme. They form an ending to his exegesis of Eccl 7:21. Some are of the opinion that it is an independent section in Antilatomus (e. g. Frick: 1953, and Højlund: 1992), but as Hellmut Zschoch has correctly shown (Zschoch: 1993, 24–25) the section fits into the structure that is also characteristic of the exegesis of Isa 64:6: first some introductory sections about the exegesis of the text, then some central thematic paragraphs about the content of the text. This section on peccatum is closely connected to Latomus’ argumentation in connection with Eccl 7:21, Latomus having discussed both the nature of the good deed and sin. On the other hand Luther in this section primarily relies on Paul, and especially his Epistle to the Romans, in his argument for what sin is, and the section, therefore, is also a beginning of or introduction to the last part of Antilatomus, the exegesis of Rom 7. In this passage Luther is mainly offended by the fact that Latomus in his attempt to define peccatum advances no less than four different meanings of the word (WA 8, 82,19–33). Luther lists all four of them, and then asks in what Scripture Latomus has found them. Latomus mentions Origen, Ambrosius and Augustine as progenitors of his view, but are they Scripture? Luther goes on to demonstrate that Latomus even refuses to call that man a sinner who contains peccatum in the second of the meanings given, “concupiscentia seu motus eius post baptismum” (WA 8, 82,33). Already here Luther is at the core of the disagreement between Latomus and himself, as it unfolded in the analysis of the Exposition, and will unfold again in the following pages. Before he begins the detailed explanation of his understanding of peccatum, Luther exhorts the reader to be “free and Christian, to be bound to no man’s word, but constantly to profess the Holy Scripture” (WA 8, 82,33–83,25).84 As such a man he must relate to what the Scripture terms peccatum, and not be led 84 WA 8, 82,34–36: “liberum esse et Christianum, in nullius hominis verba iuratum, scripturae sanctae constantem professorem.”

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astray by others who ostensibly speak more intelligibly about peccatum by calling it imperfection, punishment or error (imperfectio, poena, vitium). The fact is, Luther says, that the Holy Spirit is the sender of the Scripture, repeating his admonition when tackling the quotation from Isaiah, and it knows well enough how to speak. It does not need men’s explanative inventions. According to Luther, Latomus cannot prove his understanding of peccatum with one single Scripture text. And at the same time the whole Epistle to the Romans, and especially chapters 6–8, speak against him with great power. Therefore Luther will now on the basis of Rom 6 and 8 (chapter 7 is dealt with separately in the last section of Antilatomus) set out what is said about peccatum.

5.5.1 On understanding the meaning of words Luther begins with some reflections on the understanding of the meaning of words, as he also did in addressing the Isaiah quotation (WA 8, 83,26–86,31). Back then we saw that according to Luther the understanding of words is not determined by one overarching super-textual conceptual continuity of being, as Latomus would have it. On the contrary, they must be understood in the simple, pure and primary sense, and from the context in which they are found. The reference to the context betokens that a word can also have a figurative sense, so that the word with the use of a figure can be taken beyond its primary meaning to a new meaning. The word and the figure do not therefore have a less “correct” meaning than the primary meaning, but an extended one. Luther builds on that here. Peccatum, he says, has only one basic meaning in Scripture: Sin is in truth nothing but that which is not according to God’s Law. It is manifest in Rom 7:7 that “through the law came cognition of sin”, just as the contrary, that with sin comes ignorance of the law. For sin is a darkness which the law illuminates and reveals, so that we will know it.85

But once that is said, he continues, it must at the same time be stated freely and joyfully (libenter asserimus et gaudemus) (WA 8, 83,31.32), that Scripture is full of such grammatical figures as synecdoche, metalepsis, metaphor, hyperbole and so on.86 Indeed, nowhere else are they as frequent as in Scripture, and they 85 WA 8, 83,28–29: “Peccatum vero nihil aliud est, quam id quod non est secundum legem dei. Stat enim sententia Ro. vij. ‘Per legem cognitio peccati’, sicut econtra per peccatum ignorantia legis. Peccatum enim tenebra est, quam lex illuminat et revelat, ut cognoscatur.” 86 StA, 464, note 463: “Metalepse (= Metonymie), Bezeichnung einer Sache durch ein nicht für sie übliches Wort, das aber mit ihr in einen Zusammenhang steht; Metapher, Gebrauch eines Wortes im uneigentlichen, bildlichen Sinn; Hyperbel, Übertreibung.”

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cannot be controlled, because they belong exclusively to their users. The user can create any number of new meanings, as Horace says in De Arte Poetica: “You speak excellently if you make a wellknown word new through a competent connection.”87 But you cannot therefore say that a word which can be used as a figure in so many ways has the same unlimited number of primary meanings (significationes propriae) (WA 8, 84,9–10), because that would lead to a Babylonian confusion of words in the world. And therefore Luther deprecates the Hebraists who, referring to the Targumic interpreters Onkelos and Jonathan, believe that all the figurative senses are primary, and hence also think that to help the unlearned they will have to purge the use of figures from Scripture, and only pass on the most uncompromisingly primary meaning. What you have to do, Luther says, is neither to accept the multitude of basic meanings (aequivocationes) (WA 8, 84,18), nor entirely remove the figurative meaning of words, because in the first case you become confused in thought and mind, and in the second the joy and interest in the statements are taken away, as well as some of their scope and effect.88 We must, however, as often as possible find the singular, simple primary meaning (una simplex significatio proposita) (WA 8, 84,20–21), and then set up images and figures next to it. Then the parts will come together in an intelligible whole and become profitable. As he says: “I do not know what energy is found in the figures so that they so powerfully penetrate and influence, so that everyone by nature fervently wishes to both hear and talk through them.”89 He then adduces four examples of figurative speech in the Scriptures, and in all four he points to the use of metaphor : Deut 4:19, Deut 6:7, Exod 32:25 and 87 WA 8, 84,5–6: “Dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum/Reddiderit iunctura novum.” Horace, De Arte Poetica 47 (StA, 464, note 465). The quotation is also used in two other places: In Contra Henricum Regem Anglicae (1522) and in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis (1528) (cf. Hilgenfeld: 1971, 167–172). Hilgenfeld tries to show that in the two early texts Luther’s use of the quotation is a little different from his use in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis, so that it fits his theory that Luther developed his concept of synonymy between tropes and figures between 1521 and 1528. He says that whereas in the text on the Eucharist the emphasis is on the definition of the trope as a renewal, novatio, in the earlier texts it is on the expression “iunctura”, i. e. on the wish to prove that what the grammarians teach about figurative speech is legitimate. But at the same time Hilgenfeld has to write this in connection with Antilatomus: “In der Confutatio legt Luther dabei die Betonung auf das Wort ‘iunctura’, wobei er allerdings eine figura-Theorie vorauszustezen scheint, die im wesentlichen der Tropuslehre des Grossen Bekenntnisses entspricht, wie an der Anwendung deutlich wird” (1971, 169). If it is correct, as it has been suggested, that Luther supports his argument on Usingen’s redefinition of Quintilian, then “novatio” also plays an important part in Antilatomus. 88 WA 8, 84,19–24: Luther says that figurative speech strengthens both memory and understanding, memoria and intelligentia, and gives pleasure to the soul, voluptas to animus. 89 WA 8, 84,24–25: “Nescio enim, quae sit figurarum energia, ut tam potenter intrent et afficiant, ita ut omnis homo natura et audire et loqui gestiat figurate.”

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Ps 119. If anyone came and told him that there is a proper basic meaning of the words to which he calls attention as figurative in all four texts, he would have to accept that, he says. But at the same time some of the profit of reading and hearing the Scriptural texts would also disappear.90 It would be like being removed from Paradise to earth if one were always to speak in direct statements and listen to them without figures, and nothing would be won by it, for the figures, let us not forget, denote both the primary meaning and something more and different. An example is Deut 6:7, for which the Vulgate has “et narrabis ea filiis tuis”. Narrabis means here “you shall tell”, but if we translate the Hebrew word with acues, “you shall sharpen these things to your sons”, the meaning becomes clearer, in Luther’s opinion. For the rest of the verse shows that there is more involved than telling something, when it continues: “you shall talk of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise.” If anyone were to protest that acues has to do with swords, not with words, and that the Hebrew word must therefore mean narrabis, that will be correct in one way. But in another, Luther still thinks that acues is a better, and perhaps the only, translation,91 because with acues it is emphasized that what is spoken of here is that word of God which Paul also mentions in 2 Tim 4:2 (“insta opportune, importune, argue, increpa, obsecra”), and which continually has to be treated, inculcated, enjoined and revealed, so that human traditions that make it blunt will not come into being. And Luther completes the image by referring to Eccl 10:10: “if the iron is blunt, and the edge is not sharpened, more strength must be used.”92 Here it becomes clear that the figurative interpretation of the text, just like Luther’s demonstration of the synecdoche above,93 is theologically determined. This is also true of his interpretation of the three other texts. Creavit (“He created”) in Deut 4:19, Luther says, has in Hebrew a metaphor wrapped up in it, so that it should really be translated blandificavit (“He caressed”). In that way the content of the text becomes much deeper and more sermon-like, because then it is said that God wants to lure men to Him with the beauty of his creation 90 WA 8, 84,30.32–33: The figurative speech is sweeter, more powerful and satisfactory (dulcius, potentius and plenius), and it contributes to the formation of piety and movement of the emotions (eruditio pietatis, concitatio affectuum). 91 WA 8, 85,18–19: “[…] permittam tibi, sed magis credam priori ut gratiori significationi et fortasse soli”. 92 WA 8, 85,23–24: “si ferrum rubiginosum fuerit, et facies eius non deterantur, roborabuntur vires & c.” 93 Unlike what he did in connection with the synecdoche, Luther here takes his point of departure in the metaphor of the word, the trope according to Quintilian, and only then moves on up to the level of thought figura sententiarum, in connection with the linking of present and future, Old and New Testament.

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and invite them to His love. In Exod 32:25 nudum (“naked”) should be translated ociosus (“barren”, “unfruitful”), because then we come to understand that the text talks about the people as being spiritually undressed, and thus turned away from God. And finally, Luther says, meditare (“meditate on”) in Ps 119:16 and 24 should instead be translated “turning your attention towards something in devotion”, because then the text will include the kindly and considerate aspect which is found in the true relation between men, and between man and God. That there is a connection between the Old and New Testaments is quite clear in the four examples. Both in connection with the interpretation of Deut 6:7 and of Exod 32:25, Luther mentions that Paul refers to and explains the texts in his letters, indeed, the meaning of the quotations from the Old Testament becomes even clearer and more distinct in Paul. In a comment to Exod 32:25 Luther explicitly mentions that the figurative translation of the Hebrew word, which he translates into the latin ociosus, contains an aspect that points to the future (WA 8, 85,33–35). The metaphorical meaning, then, says something not only about what is in the text, but also about what it will lead to, what it will become in the future. But “now to return to what all this is about”,94 says Luther. Latomus has created a number of meanings for the word peccatum and claims that they mean something, when viewed separately. Now this something is capable of explanation without being inseparably connected with the primary meaning of peccatum. Latomus himself says this overtly when he asserts that the first three senses of “sin” are not actually sin, but only circumstantial to sin, and that for example concupiscentia, which he says is peccatum in another sense of the word, is not a sin in the person in whom the concupiscence is found.95 Thus he has added new fuel to the Babylonian confusion of languages to which Luther has already adverted, and which is only a source of concealment, not of understanding of or joy at either the words or the matter (WA 8, 87,24–27). By not wanting to make clear to himself what the meaning of peccatum is, i. e. that which is not in accordance with God’s law, Latomus has no eye for what peccatum means when it is figurative. The fact of the matter is, Luther says, that peccatum does have both a primary and a figurative meaning, which are different and yet cannot be separated. Understanding the two senses is for Luther probably the most essential demand if we are to understand the language of Scripture. The crux of the matter is summed up in Rom 8:3, and thus Rom 8:3 comes to be

94 WA 8, 86,31: “[…] ut ad institutum veniamus.” 95 What we see here in Latomus is not an Occamistic case of equivocation applied to the word peccatum (cf. Saarinen: 1988, 32, note 54) but the common scholastic attempt, which Thomas also represents, of circumventing the Scriptural discourse of sin in the Christian. Cf. StA, 457, note 410.

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emblematic for Luther’s entire section on peccatum: “de peccato damnavit peccatum”, “because of sin he damned sin” (WA 8, 87,27–30).

5.5.2 Sin in literal and figurative sense Central to the understanding of both the literal and figurative senses of peccatum, says Luther, are texts such as 2 Cor 5:21, Rom 8:3 and Hebr 4:15.96 Here it is said that when Christ was sacrificed for us, he was made sin in a metaphoric sense (metaphorice) as he thus became similar (similis) to the sinner in all things, damned, abandoned, and belied, so that in nothing was he different from a real sinner except in not himself having brought about the guilt and sin he carried.97

What this means Luther explains in greater detail (WA 8, 86,31–87,30). It is necessary, he says, that the metaphor contains a difference from the real thing on which it is based, because the metaphor, as the rhetoricians say (WA 8, 87,3), is a similarity (similitudo) (WA 8, 87,2–3) and not an identity (identitas) (WA 8, 87,3). And the things that are transferred in the metaphor are transferred according to the similarity (secundum similitudinem) (WA 8, 87,3–4). Otherwise there would be no transference (translatio) (WA 8, 87,4). Luther declares that this is what Paul refers to in both Rom 8:3, “God sent his own Son in the likeness of (in similitudinem) sinful flesh”, and in Heb 4:15, “one who in every respect has been tempted according to similarity (pro similitudo), yet without sin”. To repeat, the similarity between sin in the literal and figurative senses consists in this, that Christ in all things became like the sinner (WA 8, 87,33–88,3). All the misery found in men after the sinful deed, viz. fear of death and hell, was felt and borne by Him. But the difference from the human sinner consists in the fact that Christ did not contain sin, and thus no guilt either. He therefore had not deserved the punishment He suffered for the sin imputed to Him, but was delivered to it for the sake of mankind (WA 8, 88,1–2). Now Luther explains that 96 (Vg) 2 Cor 5:21: “Eum qui non noverat peccatum pro nobis peccatum fecit.” Rom 8:3: “Deus filium suum mittens in similitudine carnis peccat et de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne.” Hebr 4:15: “Temptatum autem per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato.” 97 WA 8, 86,31–34: “Christus dum offeretur pro nobis, factus est peccatum metaphorice, cum peccatori ita fuerit per omnia similis, damnatus, derelictus, confusus, ut nulla re differet a vero peccatore, quam quod reatum et peccatum, quod tulit, ipse non fecerat.” Ringleben (1997, 342, note 21) has studied whether there are similar references to 2 Cor 5:21 elsewhere in Luther’s works, but without result. Nor has he been able to find parallels in other exegetic analyses of the text (Augustine, Thomas, Nikolaus of Lyra, Melanchton).

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in this transfer (translatio) there is not only a transfer of words, but also of things (non solum est verborum, sed et rerum metaphora), because our sins have really been taken from us and been placed on Him, so that one who believes in Him really has no sins. Transferred to Christ and absorbed in Him, the sins no longer condemn the man who believes. […] Therefore just as figurative speech is sweeter and more efficacious than simple and ordinary speech, so real sin is onerous and unbearable for us, but transferred and metaphorically it is most welcome and salutary.98

So just as Christ is really the rock in 1 Cor 10:4, so Christ is in truth sin. Likewise he is the copper snake (Num. 21:8f; John 3:14), the Easter lamb (Exod 12:3–11; 1 Cor 5:7), and everything that is said about Him. But that does not make the words snake or rock into two different words, both the snake or the rock and Christ. We do not say of David and Solomon that on the one hand they are David son of Jesse, on the other Christ, on the one hand Solomon, son of David and on the other Christ. Yet we say truly that Christ is David, Solomon, Aron and all the signs (symbola) (WA 8, 87,21) of the Old Testament. And because of this Christ who is made sin, His similarity (similitudo) (WA 8, 87,22) is also called sin, i. e. the sacrifices of the Old Testament (oblatio veteris testament) (WA 8, 87,22–23), so that there does not remain a difference in sin (diuersitas) as Latomus would have it, but a similarity (similitudo) (WA 8, 87,23), through everything. It is this similitudo, Luther finishes, which gives occasion for the figures and at the same time represents a common meaning (vocem communem reddit) (WA 8, 87,24). There is no doubt that Luther here makes use of the classical rhetoric, just as we have already seen in the other examples of his use of figures. It was suggested above that he shows signs of relying heavily on Usingen’s re-definition of what Quintilian says about tropes and figures (and this is basically true of metaphor as well as synecdoche, metalepsis, hyperbole, etc.) and therefore uses the two terms synonymously as a common term for the word-figures which by mutatio, translatio and novatio add a changed, transferred and hence new sense to a word. It has also been shown how Luther, interpreting synecdoche, broke this schema and understood the trope/figura grammaticalis as a figura sententiarum, i. e. a figure of thought, not of words. In doing so, he did no more than express what is inherent in both Quintilian’s definition and especially Usingen’s re-definition of tropes and figures, namely that in a minor perspective, i. e. on the level of the word, the trope works in the same way as figurae sententiarum in a larger perspective, on the level of ideas. But in that way Luther breaks with the 98 WA 8, 87,6–7.10–12: “Et in hac translatione non solum est verborum, sed et rerum metaphora. Nam vere peccata nostra a nobis translata sunt et posita super ipsum, ut omnis qui hoc ipsum credit, vere nulla peccata habeat, sed translata super Christum, absorpta in ipso, eum amplius non damnent. […] Proinde sicut figurata locutio est dulcior et efficatior quam simplex et rudis, ita peccatum verum nobis molestum et intolerabile est, sed translatum et metaphoricum iucundissimum et salutare est.”

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praxis, both in Quintilian and Usingen, since Quintilian attempted to separate tropes and figures, and Usingen also explicitly refused to mix figurae rhetoricales and figurae grammaticales. In this passage Luther applies 2 Cor 5:21, Rom 8:3 and Hebr 4:15 as central texts, as they can be readily connected with the rhetorical definition of the metaphor as tropus par excellence.99 According to classical rhetoric the distinguishing mark of the metaphor is that like tropes generally, it is a transference (translatio; the Latin translation of Greek letavoqa),) and already here the connection with Luther’s text is visible. In addition there is the special consideration as regards the metaphor, according to Quintilian, that its translatio must take place in relation to similitudo, i. e. a similarity between what is denoted by the primary meaning and by the metaphorical meaning. This, too, is entirely parallel with Luther’s definition, and useful in connection with the Scripture texts to which he refers (Rom 8:3 and Hebr 4:15).100 Also the immediately difficult phrase in Luther, non solum verborum, sed et rerum metaphora, can at first sight be connected with the basic theme res – verba in classical rhetoric. According to Quintilian all speech consists of “things and words”: “oratio […] omnis constat rebus et verbis” (Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria VIII, Pr., 6). Res is the object that exists in the mind and is treated of in speech, and verba are the linguistic means of expression (Lausberg: 1973, 47–51, 99 Lausberg: 1973, 283, § 554: In Aristotle the trope is identified with the metaphor. Referring to the metaphor as one among several tropes, as Quintilian does, belongs to a later time. And yet, Quintilian’s definitions of tropes as an overall concept, and the metaphor as trope, also have a lot in common, since the essential characteristic of each is translatio. As we have mentioned, Luther does not term the metaphor tropus but figura in Antilatomus. 100 Luther’s definition of a tropus in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis, where he also gives the quotation from Horace, is very similar to what he says about the metaphor in Antilatomus (Hilgenfeld: 1971, 167–168). In other words there seem to be signs of a certain inconsequence in Luther’s use of the term “trope” in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis. As we saw above, he also uses the word “trope” in the same way as in his discourse on figures in general in Antilatomus. Thus it seems that Luther first describes “tropes” as an overall concept, i. e. as grammatical figures as such (WA 26, 271,9), but the examples of tropes he then uses are metaphorical. Later he says about the synecdoche in the words of institution, that it is not a trope (WA 26, 440,5–6), which of course it is, if “trope” is the term for figures in general. So here, by “trope” he means “metaphor”. But at the same time he says of synecdoche that the one who does not know it does not know grammar/rhetoric; in other words he speaks of synecdoche as a trope on a level with metaphor (WA 26, 443,13–16). The confusion probably has its root in the fact that there is little to distinguish the definition of the trope as the overall concept from the metaphor as the most important trope. That it was common at Luther’s time to identify trope with metaphor is seen in Melanchthon’s rhetoric (Hilgenfeld: 1971, 161, note 617). Melanchthon mentions that there is no real difference between the terms trope and metaphor. They are interchangeable, so that the metaphor may actually also be the common term for the other types of tropes. In the present study “trope” will be understood as identical with “figura”, and “metaphor” will be used in particular about one among the different kinds of tropes/figures.

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§45–52; 139–140, §255). What determines res and the translation of it into verba is the interplay between natura, ars and usus.101 Res is the object which, derived from the regularities of nature by ars, is present to the mind, and by virtue of usus is expressed in words, verba, as “the contemporary empirical usage”.102 The basic semantic relation between res and verbum is: Der Bezeichnung der gemeinten […] res dient das durch die consuetudo der res von Anfang an zugeordnete verbum proprium. Die Eigenschaft eines Wortes, für eine bestimmte res eine verbum proprium zu sein, heisst proprietas (Lausberg: 1973, 276, §533).

101 In his book Quintilian og den antikke sprogteori, Pinborg has explained how the ternary natura, ars, and usus in Quintilian is the point of departure for res: “Natura [a concept covering the experienced given which is created by watching nature and its regularities] is the basic element. Where it is not present, or rather: where it is somehow incomplete in essential respects, no development is possible. Natura is in accordance with reason, i. e. it has a rational structure, and can therefore be the basis of artes, indeed nature itself is the real artifex, the one who practises artes (Pinborg: 1963, 8–9: “Cicero (‘De Leg.’, I, 26) has a striking formulation of the same idea: ‘At the instigation of nature several artes were invented when reason very cleverly imitated nature and so achieved what is necessary for life’”). To perfect nature, ars is necessary, nature alone not being enough. For the perfect orator ars even in a certain sense plays a greater role than nature. But ars is always merely an observation of nature’s own rational structure. Quintilian emphasizes this idea again and again in the most diverse contexts. Ars is not a structure imposed from without, […] it is an observation and systematizing of the regularities inherent in nature, which are then made the object of imitation. In that way nature becomes part of a development that is acquired and deepened through practice (usus) and reaches its perfect form in the custom (consuetudo) where nature has been realized in practice. However, consuetudo has a tendency to split up: not everybody is equally good at imitating nature. There is an element of randomness in usus. The decisive usus cannot therefore be a haphazard version of nature which does not realize it fully, but it must be the customs of the skilled, consensus bonorum, which is the norm. This is true of all human skills which fall under the concept of ars, both what we call sciences, and what we call morals and habits. Only this highest consuetudo is the perfect development of nature; it is the most important link in the ternary. Man’s nature is only completed through ars and usus. The three concepts, as has been seen, imply each other, are correlative: they can only be understood in connection, and continuously interlock. No human reality exists, which is only natura, only ars, only usus. When we nevertheless sometimes speak for simplicity’s sake as if it did exist, we designate the phenomenon with the part of the ternary concept that seems prevailing.” (Pinborg, 1963, 10–11). 102 Cf. Lausberg: 1973, 254, §463, on latinitas, which is the overall term for the idiomatically correct expression.The most important rule for latinitas is consuetudo which is defined in Lausberg as “contemporary empirical usage among the educated” (“der gegenwärtige, empirische Sprachgebrauch/der übereinstimmende Sprachgebrauch der Gebildeten”). Lausberg sees usus and consuetudo as identical, whereas Pinborg (1963), as has been seen (cf. the previous note), speaks of them together, but in the sense of respectively “practice” (usus) and “custom” (consuetudo).

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But when we speak of tropes, verbum proprium has been replaced: “Der tropus als immutatio setzt ein semantisch nicht verwandtes Wort an die Stelle eines verbum proprium. Der Tropus ist somit eigentlich eine improprietas” (Lausberg: 1973, 282, §552). The figurative meaning, improprietas, here seems to mean that the semantic that is constituted by consuetudo is broken, and another semantic relation different from consuetudo is introduced. The fact is that “Der Tropus ist nicht eine chaotische improprietas, vielmehr geschieht die semantische Übertragung innerhalb bestimmter semantischer Beziehungen” (Lausberg: 1973, 283, §555). And thus tropus is “eine ‘Wendung’ der Bedeutung, und zwar cum virtute [cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria VIII, 6, 1], also nicht als vitium der improprietas” (Lausberg: 1973, 283, §552). In agreement with this, Quintilian writes that “a noun or a verb is transferred from a place to which it properly belongs, to another where there is either no literal term, or the transferred is better than the literal term” (emphasis added).103 So according to Quintilian the metaphorical meaning, when it is correct and well-founded, is no less correct than the literal meaning, entirely as Luther has declared several times. On the contrary, it is better.104 The question is therefore if the term “improprietas” in classical rhetoric has to do with the correctness of the meaning or simply marks the metaphor’s departure from consuetudo. The similarity, similitudo, in metaphor is, as we have seen, the semantic relation which warrants the transfer, translatio. There must be a similarity between the two elements, res, mentioned before the metaphor, in the shape of transference of a verbum proprium from one thing to its new function as verbum improprium cum virtute for the other thing, is appropriate. In Rhetorica ad Herennium the metaphor is defined: “translatio est, cum verbum in quandam rem transfertur ex alia re, quod propter similitudinem recte videbitur posse transferri” (quoted from Hilgenfeld: 1971, 160, note 609). And in Donatus it is expressed a little more ambiguously but apparently close to Luther’s way of putting it: “Metaphora est rerum verborumque translatio” (also quoted from Hilgenfeld: 1971, 161, note 614).105 What Luther says, then, about metaphor, along with his other considerations 103 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria VIII, 6, 5: “Transfertur ergo nomen aut verbum ex eo loco in quo proprium est, in eum in quo aut proprium deest aut translatum proprio melius est.” 104 When there is no literal term for something (proprium deest) and the metaphor thus is indispensable, we have to do with a catachresis, Quintilian declares, i. e. a proper abusio (VIII, 6, 34–36) (Lausberg: 1973, 288–291, § 562). Yet it does not look as if that is the type of metaphor Luther refers to. Both in his examples and in his overall considerations he emphasizes that the figures are added and extend the propria significatio of the words. Not that they turn up where there is no primary meaning. 105 Hilgenfeld: 1971, 161, note 614. Hilgenfeld seems to be the first to have found this clear parallel to Luther’s work in classical rhetoric. Ringleben, 1997, 343, note 21 refers to Günter Bader, who has found a parallel phrase in Bonaventura.

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on the meaning of the figures in Antilatomus, can at one level very well be elucidated in terms of classical rhetoric. In the previous pages it has become clear several times that Luther believes that the Scriptural use of figures is necessary and efficacious where it is appropriate. He finished the section on Christ as sin with the following words: “the figurative speech is sweeter and more efficacious than simple and ordinary speech.”106 Already in connection with the quotation from Isaiah he had said that the figures were necessary (necessariae), and that it was only their being used at will (pro mera libidine), that he opposed. In connection with Eccl 7:20 Luther spoke freely and joyfully (libenter […] et gaudemus) about their presence, and declared that their work was to strengthen the memory and the understanding and give pleasure (memoria, intelligentia, voluptas), that they are sweeter more powerful and satisfactory (dulcius, potentius, plenius), and work for the formation of piety (eruditio pietatis) and the movement of the emotions (concitatio affectuum). In all the examples he has given of figures in Scripture, both of synecdoche and metaphor, the figure contributes to making the meaning of the text clearer. Luther even said in connection with Deut 6:7 that the metaphorical translation of the Hebrew word to “acues” instead of “narrabis” might be the only proper translation.107 In all this he is close to Quintilian’s views of the importance of tropes. As we have seen Quintilian regards the figurative meaning, when it is appropriate, as better than the literal meaning. He, too, underlines its efficacy and power as compared to the literal sense. According to Quintilian it represents the endeavour to find the most suitable expression of what is to be said to the one who is to hear it, and thus it is a question of making things clear, and enhancing the clarity of the expression.108 He looks at three levels of style, subtile, medium, and 106 WA 8, 87,10–12: “figurata locutio est dulcior et efficatior quam simplex et rudis.” 107 WA 8, 85,18–19: “[…] permittam tibi, sed magis credam priori ut gratiori significationi et fortasse soli” (emphasis added). 108 Pinborg: 1963, 67, on Quintilian’s view of figurative speech: “‘Now, there are some words which are of such a nature that one can express the same thing with different expressions, and yet there is no reason, from the point of view of the content, to prefer one to the other (for example ‘ensis’ and ‘gladiolus’ for sword), whereas other words can be used figuratively to denote things that already have a name (for example ‘ferrum’ and ‘mucro’). But in such cases it is usually the case that some words are either more decent or grand or pleasant or sonorous” (Institutio Oratoria VIII, 3, 16). So one now has to choose the word or the form which apart from being correct and apt suits one’s stylistic level. Quintilian is here in opposition to the ‘Atticistic orators’, who claim that for the designation of each thing there is only one ‘mot propre’. These orators of course also limited the language to only one function, that of teaching (docere), whereas Quintilian did not only want speech, like dialectics, to designate things concisely, but also to designate things in a fuller and more striking way by giving them greater appeal and greater power of expression. Only in this ‘eloquentia’ is the content of things fully unfolded (II 16, 10). This is the task of language: to be the full expression of nature. The language is the expression of logos, which first and foremost means that it brings the logos found in the things forth to a clear understanding.”

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grande, which correspond to the three functions docere, delectare and movere, as three different but equal possibilities of speaking adequately, which must all be employed, depending on what the subject is.109 And this goes well together with what has been observed about Luther’s view of figurative speech. That Luther is influenced by rhetoric in this way is nothing new. Birgit Stolt has in several cases demonstrated the close connection between Luther’s works and classical rhetoric, and has refuted the earlier opinion that Luther regarded rhetoric as superfluous.110 In a text such as the Second Lecture on the Psalms, for example, Luther’s interest in rhetoric comes to the fore (AWA 1, 386ff), and this is not the first time it happens. Already from Dictata super Psalterium it is clear (cf. Siegfried Raeder : 1961; and Helmar Junghans: 1985, 240–273). In Operationes in Psalmos Luther declares the Holy Spirit a divine artist and an incomparable orator,111 and the Book of Psalms to be affectuum palaestra,112 and thus indirectly the grammatical-rhetorical analysis to be the best point of departure for interpretation of the statements in the Scripture. Indeed, all the way through his lecture he uses grammatical-rhetorical observations as the basis of his exegesis.113 That the comparison of Luther and Quintilian, which so far in this study has been used to explore Luther’s relationship to rhetoric, is not entirly spurious can be seen from Luther’s own statements. In a letter to Spalatin of November 29th 1519, he writes: 109 Pinborg: 1963, 62: “In rhetoric there are three types of style (XII 10, 58ff): subtile, medium, grande. The first is best suited to representing (docere) and therefore approaches sermo, the second to pleasing (delectare), and the third to influencing (movere): These three levels of style, however, must not according to Quintilian be understood as absolutes; the limit between them is fluent, and there are several levels of transition (XII 10, 66–7). Therefore the orator is not supposed to limit himself to one of them, on the contrary they must all be used, depending on what the subject is, where one is to speak, and what one wants to achieve at that specific moment (XII 10, 69–70). As Norden has emphasized, (Norden, Antike Kunstprosa I, 11) one is not primarily supposed to find a personal style, but one has to seek the correct one, the one that best serves the speaker’s purpose in the given situation.” 110 Stolt: 1969; 2000. In the former Stolt critiques Irmgard Weithase’s treatment (Weithase: 1961, 80–86) of Luther’s relationship to rhetoric (Stolt: 1969, 123ff) and here demonstrates the close connection between Luther’s statements, his works and the rhetorical tradition. Cf. also, Alfsv,g: 1987; Oberman: 1984; and Junghans: 1998. 111 AWA 2, 165,1: “divinum artificem et rhetorem incomparabilem”. 112 AWA 2, 62,6–9: “cum enim psalterium sit nonnisi affectuum quaedam palaestra et exercitium”. 113 Cf. AWA 1/I, 386ff, especially 396: “Schon dieser exemplarischen Überblick macht deutlich, welche Bedeutung Luther in den Operationes den rhetorischen termini, insbesondere den Tropen, als Interpretationshilfe zum Erkennen der Idiotismen der Psalmensprache zuweist. Sie dienen dem rationalen Erfassen der Eigenart der Psalmensprache, die vom Herzen kommt und zum Herzen geht. Dieses Miteinander von ‘intellectus’ und ‘affectus’, von Erkennen und Erfahren macht die Besonderheit von Luthers zweiter Psalmenauslegung aus.”

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Quintilian must in truth be the only one who creates the best young men, nay makes real men of them. […] I actually prefer Quintilian to all other authorities, because he institutes eloquence at the same time as demonstrating it, i. e. he teaches both by the power of the word and his example in a highly loyal way.114

And in a later after-dinner speech Luther, patently enthusiastic, says: “The reading of Quintilian is so delightful and allures the reader to such a degree that he is at all times forced to read on. For Quintilian brings it into one’s heart.”115 It seems that Luther has read Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria in connection with the university reform in Wittenberg in the spring of 1518, when a lecture on him was first arranged.116 But at another level we can at the same time trace a difference from classical rhetoric in Luther, since the figurative meaning to him contains something above and beyond what is in keeping with classical rhetorical theory. Would for example a trained rhetorician accept Luther’s arguments for similitudo, which are of course first and foremost based on the statements of Scripture? In the four examples of metaphor in the text of the Old Testament (narrabis, creavit, nudum and meditare) he does of course first argue both the meaning and the figurative meaning on the basis of slight differences in Hebrew combined with the context. But the final and definitive argumentation rests on the scriptural futurist meaning of the word, and hence of the figure, i. e. it rests on an explanation of the Old Testament text based on the New Testament (as regards narrabis and nudum), or on the specific proclaiming content of the text: God as creator (creavit) and God as love (meditare). And in the section on Christ as sin Luther only argues for similitudo on the basis of the Scripture: because it is told in 2 Cor 5:21, Rom 8:3 and Hebr 4:15 that Christ became like the sinner, yet without sin, Luther holds that a similitudo exists between the two elements which is not at the same time an identitas. For the human mind, which reflects nature, and which when adapted by ars according to usus results in “contemporary empirical usage among the educated”, however, it does not seem at all clear that there could be a similarity between the Son of God and sin, which is the opposite of God, and that there 114 WA B 1, 563,2–3.9–12: “Quintilianus vero unus sit, qui optimos reddat adulescentes immo viros. […] Ego prorsus Quintilianum fere omnibus authoribus praefero. Qui simul instituit, Simul quoque eloquentiam ministrat, id est verbo & re docet quam fidelissime.” 115 WA TR 2, 411,19–21 (2299): “Quintiliani lectio adeo iucunda est et ita trahit lectorem, ut continuo cogatur pergere legendo, den er bringt einem ins herz hinein.” 116 AWA 1, 387, note 150; 388, note 152: “Nach Ausweis des Personen- und Zitatenregisters (WA 63) und des Registers zu WA B bezieht sich Luther vor 1518 nicht auf Quintilian.” AWA 1, 388: “Leider fehlt eine Untersuchung darüber, welchen Stellenwert Quintilian im Rhetorikunterricht der Zeit davor hatte – seit 1470 wurde die ‘Institutio’ ganz oder teilweise in vielen Ausgaben gedruckt.”

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could thus be a basis for a metaphor. Instead there seems to be an opposition between the two objects talked about. This no more than reinforces what has already been briefly noted: that the figures according to Luther particularly contain and reveal the theological meaning of the text. The fact of the matter is (as Luther has already said in connection with the Isaiah quotation) that it is the Spirit that speaks in Scripture, and is therefore also the one who exclusively and at pleasure determines the use of the figures,117 and accordingly the figurative meaning cannot be finally determined within the framework of traditional grammatical-rhetorical analysis. True, the Spirit uses human language, and therefore the grammatical-rhetorical analysis cannot be dispensed with, but it often takes something above and beyond that – a kind of leap – to understand the use the Scriptures make of the figures.118 What is more specifically inherent in this specifically theological use of figures, and therefore of rhetoric, will be discussed in the following section. In the Christian tradition of interpretation as compared to classical rhetoric, a change happens in the views on the relationship between verba and res (cf. Brinkmann: 1980, 21ff, 169–170, 214ff, 260–276). Supported by Augustine’s semiotics in De Doctrina Christiana, the general idea was gradually formed that the Bible had a singular field of meaning as compared to profane literature. Augustine distinguishes between 1) res which is not used as a sign, 2) vox119 as a sign for res, and 3) res which in itself is a sign for another res. According to him, then, we find a reality that is non-signifying, signs for reality and a signifying reality. Profane literature only has the meaning of vox-res, whereas the Bible in addition contains a meaning of res (res-res). Even though it was eventually realized that profane literature also could embrace a more profoundly understood reality, and that its meaning thus sometimes went beyond vox-res, so that a sensus subtilior of profane literature was eventually also dealt with, there was still a distinction made between the profounder meaning of profane literature and 117 In Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis Luther says that the Scripture has its own way of using the figures, which is not necessarily identical with the ordinary human way : “Erstlich, da frag ich nichts nach, Ecolampad hat nicht fur sich genomen zu troppen ynn gemeiner rede, Sondern ynn der schrifft, Da mus er auch ynn bleiben und der selbigen art und weise folgen […]” (WA 26, 382,19–22). 118 Cf. Raeder’s analysis of Luther’s exegesis of Ps 22:17: “Angesichts der Absurdität der jüdischen Deutung muss folglich die Grammatik sich nach der Theologie und damit nach der Wirklichkeit richten: ‘Also bleibt allein die Grammatik übrig, der es geziemt, der Theologie zu weichen, da nicht die Wirklichkeit (res) den Worten, sondern die Worte der Wirklichkeit (rebus) unterworfen sind und weichen und die Beziehung mit Recht dem Sinn folgt und der Buchstabe dem Geist’ (WA 5, 634,14–16)” (Raeder : 1977, 51ff, here 53). 119 Vox according to Augustine is divided into various sensuous signs, of which words have the highest rank, as they can substitute for the others. It was the task of writing (littera) to fix and show the transitory signs (Brinkmann: 1980, 25).

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the profounder meaning of Scripture. The sensus subtilior of profane literature was termed integumentum, and that of Holy Scripture allegoria (Brinkmann: 1980, 169–170). The difference was that integumentum came into being when fictive things or events pointed to another reality, whereas in allegoria120 it was things in the shape of elements in the sensed and created world, or historical events, which were signs of another reality.121 This form of allegory, which was reserved for the biblical universe, is according to Brinkmann called hermeneutic allegory (Brinkmann: 1980, 219–226). It basically has its source in Paul, from texts such as Gal 4, where he interprets the Old Testament story of Hagar and Sara “per allegoricam”. As a technical definition of the hermeneutic allegory, Brinkmann cites several texts of the Church Fathers, for example this sentence from Ambrosius: “Allegoria est, cum aliud geritur et aliud figuratur”; and a quotation from Augustine, which runs: “sed ubi allegoriam nominavit Apostolus (Paul in Gal.), non in verbis eam reperit, sed in facto” (cf. Brinkmann: 1980, 221: Ambrosius, De Abraham XX, xx; Augustine, De Trinitate XV, 9).122 Typology, which is the type of interpretation Paul uses in Galatians, and which is widely employed in the Epistle to the Hebrews, falls under Brinkmann’s definition of hermeneutic allegory (Brinkmann: 1980, 251–252). Typology can briefly be characterized as the relation between times, e. g. the times of the Old and New Testaments, which is reflected in images and figures, “tupoi”, pointing forward and revealing the contemporary interdependence and separation (continuity and discontinuity) of the two times, and their common redemptivehistorical perspective in what is at the same time a timeless eternal meaning (continuity), and a forward-pointing temporal movement in which the new comes into being and the old perishes (discontinuity).123 This combination of timeless meaning and temporal movement can be expressed with the temporal 120 Here we deal with hermeneutic allegory, see below. 121 Brinkmann emphasizes that we must distinguish between whether res or facta has allegorical meaning (Brinkmann: 1980, 222.224). 122 One must be aware, however, that the term “allegory” was not only represented in the form of the hermeneutic allegory in Christian tradition. Brinkmann’ so-called “rhetorical allegory” is also found in use. It strictly follows the rules of classical rhetoric, and in one sense was only a simplified enlargement of the rules for using metaphor. Quintilian writes about it (Institutio Oratoria VIII, 6, 44): “allegoria, quam inversionem interpretatur, aut aliud verbis aliud sensu ostendit aut etiam interim contrarium” (“Allegory, which is translated into Latin by inversio, either presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the meaning of words”). Its object was not the figurative meaning of res, but of vox. Cf. Brinkmann: 1980, 214–219. 123 Instead of the term typus several exegetes also used the term figura. Figura goes back to Paul’s usage in 1 Cor 10:11 (Brinkmann: 1980, 254). The term cannot immediately be identified with the concept of figure in rhetoric, cf. Auerbach: 1999, 106–110; 124–125. Auerbach here (p. 110) says that the word is given a peculiar new meaning in the Christian world.

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adverbs tunc-nunc (the relation between the Old and the New Testament) and nunc-tunc (the relationship between the New Testament and fullness of time) (Brinkmann: 1980, 255–256). Typology differs from the overall concept of hermeneutic allegory in that it is characterized by two historical events or things being linked. This is to say that not only the signifier, but also the thing or event signified are historical. Side by side with typology we find the more spiritualizing allegorical interpretation, which is also contained in Brinkmann’s concept of hermeneutic allegory, and which is represented by such authorities as Filon and Origen. In the Middle Ages two allegorical forms of interpretation existed side by side in the quadruple interpretation of Scripture.124 What characterizes the spiritualized allegorical interpretation is that it spiritualizes the signified and thus distances it from the historical basis which is characteristic of the typology.125 In the Christian tradition of interpretation, then, res is no longer as in classical rhetoric the object that exists in the mind and is treated in speech, which corresponds to the vox-res relation in Augustine.126 A member has now been added to res, so that one res can denote another res. Things in themselves acquire the possibility of bearing a figurative sense, and thus another, or perhaps rather an even richer ontology than the classical is introduced. In other words there no longer exists a semantic relationship between word and thing only, but also between thing and thing. Res can create a connection between things and events in one time and something in another time. And it is entirely up to the Scripture to make a really existing thing or event point to another thing or event. Thus the pragmatic view of classical rhetoric, in which being is the ever newly experi-

124 Cf. Jensen: 1999, 60 (with a reference to Brinkmann): “In the biblical-exegetical considerations in the Middle Ages themselves, on the other hand, the typological interpretation is precisely not thematized as a separate form of interpretation. On the contrary it comes to be assimilated with the allegory in the four levels of interpretation.” 125 Auerbach: 1999, 116: “In the difference between Tertullian’s more historical-realistic way of interpreting and Origen’s more allegorical-moral method, another conflict within early Christendom, well-known from another context, also comes to the fore: One party strove to turn the content of the new doctrine, and especially the content of the New Testament, in the direction of the purely spiritual, and as it were weaken its historical character, while the other party wanted to maintain this character, which was then seen as having an enormous range of meaning. In the West this latter tendency has conquered absolutely, even though the other one has never entirely lost its influence, which is seen already from the intruded doctrine of the four levels of interpretation; for although this doctrine allows the literal or historical level to remain, it tears apart its connection with the equally real prefiguration, inserting other purely abstract interpretations instead of or on a par with the (pre)figural interpretation.” See also Auerbach: 1999, 129–131. 126 Although vox covers more than verbum. Verbum is only the words, while vox is also other sensuous things.

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enced given (the interplay between natura-ars-usus), is abandoned, and an extended dynamic-historical concept of being is introduced. There is no doubt that Luther also makes use of this Pauline-Augustinianinspired tradition of interpretation in his exegesis of the Scriptures. Firstly he unreservedly accepts the overall thought, that Scripture has a particular field of signification in comparison to profane literature, and secondly he uses the resres structure in several instances. This is seen both in the structure of two of the four examples of metaphor (narrabis and nudum), in which Luther argues for the metaphor with the redemptive-historical covenant idea which links together the Old and New Testaments. And it is seen even more clearly in the section on Christ as sin, which clearly contains the typological element, since the “types”, “figures”, or “symbols”, as Luther calls them here are mentioned expressly.127 Luther mainly builds on the typological res-res structure in his exegesis.128 The dynamic, truly historical concept of being which typology reproduces in a way more pointed than the spiritualized allegorical interpretation, was something he already touched upon in Antilatomus in connection with the quotation from Isaiah. Here he emphasized that Christ has been present in all the chosen throughout the ages (WA 8, 66,27–30), and that it therefore is the same meaning, i. e. Christ, which in different historical figures is revealed in the biblical texts both before and after the Coming (WA 8, 69,24–26). That is what creates the typological structure of the text, and that structure reflects, as it is supposed to, both continuity and discontinuity. It holds good that everything is the same from the beginning (the timeless, eternal aspect) and yet is not; the forward-looking aspect in the typology, combined with the timeless, eternal aspect, expresses that a development happens in that which is always the same. The old covenant is at the same time confirmed and discontinued with the new one, and therefore one must, as Luther does it in his treatment of the Isaiah quotation, operate with both an eternal and a progressive redemptive-historical perspective at once. But that Luther accepts the res-res structure with a typological slant does not mean that he accepts the spiritualized allegorical interpretation. On the contrary he is extremely critical of most of the allegorical interpretation of his contemporaries, which he can trace to Origen, and which he thinks have no place in the exegetical work. This view is reflected in the statement in Antilatomus, in which he says against Latomus’ random use of figures that we must not have 127 WA 8, 87,13–15.20–21: “Ut ergo Christus vere petra dicitur ab Apostolo i. Corinth. vij. ‘Petra autem erat Christus’, ita Christus vere est peccatum. Item Christus est serpens aenenus, agnus paschalis et omnia illa de eo dicta. […]“vere dicimus: Christus est David, Salomon, Aaron, et omnia illa veteris testamenti symbola.” 128 We do find examples of allegorical interpretations in Luther which are not typological, but they become less and less frequent (cf. Raeder : 1983, 260, note 60: reference to Ebeling: 1969, 53, 72).

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recourse to the figures pro mera libidine (WA 8, 63,28). And in the Second Lecture on the Psalms his rejection of this “erroneous” form of allegorical interpretation is clearly expressed (WA 5, 644,1–646,23). It began, he says, in Alexandria, culminating with Origen, and was taken up by Jerome. The great error they all committed was that they began by linking Paul’s statement on the letter and the spirit in 2 Cor 3:6 with the typological interpretation in Gal 4, added something of their own, “until he (i. e. Origen) taught that the historical sense was the literal and repudiable one and only the spiritual sense was to be accepted”.129 And this error retained its hold in the time that followed. With the disappearance of the Church Fathers and the decline of the times, Luther writes, people began to take the Scriptures apart in various ways, on the basis of the idea of a lower and higher meaning, until at the time of the universities the well-known quadruple interpretation of Scripture had been arrived at. It was disseminated by people like Thomas and Lyra, and with time led to the result that no one had any understanding of Scripture, because Saint Thomas with all the Thomists and the entire group of scholastic teachers have never had or taught a genuine and legitimate understanding of a single chapter in Paul or the Gospel or any book of the Scriptures, as experience has shown us.130

Luther emphasizes that what happened with the introduction of this misunderstanding of letter and spirit was that the Old Testament was regarded as a dead historical past and therefore superfluous (WA 5, 645,6–9), and that the traditional typological interpretation was thus undermined. Instead the socalled “spiritual” meaning was vigorously interpreted as these people saw fit (WA 5, 646,3–7) without maintaining the authority of the Scriptures, and they even began commenting on Scripture to such a degree that its meaning was quite lost (WA 5, 645,30–36). So where it really is about Christ, in their hands it came to be all about themselves, of which their inclusion of Aristotle’s ethics is an example (WA 5, 645,10–13). Scripture has only one meaning (WA 5, 645,23–24), Luther goes on to say in the lecture on the Psalms, which can be read as both letter and spirit. And that is what the scholastic scholars do not understand. The only legitimate point of departure for reaching the one and singular meaning is first of all to read what the text says, i. e. to consider the language and the context. Entirely in harmony with what we have hitherto observed in Antilatomus, this language and text 129 WA 5, 644,14–15: “donec historicum sensum literalem et fastidiendum et solum spiritualem acceptandum doceret”. 130 WA 5, 644,31–34: “Neque enim S. Thomas cum omnibus Thomistis universisque scholasticis doctoribus unius capituli vel in Paulo vel Euangelio vel quocunque libro scripturae intelligentiam germanam et legitimam unquam aut habuit, aut docuit, ut evidens est experientia.”

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analysis in Operationes in Psalmos also includes the figurative meaning. It is not a meaning different from the primary meaning, but is proper to it, when it is used correctly in accordance with the rules for the figures. Luther underlines this in his interpretation of Ps 2:3: The entire verse is allegorical […]. By “allegorical” I do not mean the same as the modern exegetes, as if there were a historical meaning to search for underneath, which would be different from the one that has been expressed, but that he (the prophet) has expressed the true and real meaning in figurative speech.131

Even though the figurative speech is often cryptic (WA 5, 645,22–25) and hence difficult for the human intellect, when it is there it is the real and unambiguous meaning which has its origin in the primary meaning. This use of figures is far beyond the understanding of the scholastics (WA 5, 645,16–22). They suppose the figures to express something other than the literal meaning, something “mysterious”, which in Luther’s eyes is the same as meaningless. And if they were not limited by the quadruple interpretation they would therefore be ready to allow as many meanings in Scripture as there are grammatical figures. Yet the proper meaning which is arrived at through the concrete work of interpretation can be understood both according to the letter and according to the Spirit. And now Luther has returned to what he said in connection with the quotation from Isaiah: that Holy Scripture must be understood in the Spirit, i. e. in faith.132 Only there is its meaning revealed. If, on the other hand, we understand it literally its meaning remains obscure. That it is to be understood in Spirit is the “extra”, the “leap” in understanding which causes the figurative expressions in the Bible ultimately to break up the grammatical-rhetorical analysis. The question now is how to understand Luther’s statement that the metaphor “Christ has been made sin” describes not only transferral of words but also of 131 WA 5, 51,33.36–38: “Est autem totus versus allegoricus. […] Non autem allegoricum dico more recentiorum, quasi alius sensus historialis sub eo sit quaerendus, quam qui dictus est, sed quod verum et proprium sensum figurata locutione expresserit.” 132 Raeder : 1977, 29–30, finds the same considerations in Operationes: “Der von Luther als ausschliesslich erkannte literale oder legitime Sinn ist nichtsdestoweniger geistlich gemeint und geistlich zu verstehen. Der Prophet ‘redet Worte des Geistes, da er in den Geist versetzt ist’. Weil er aber im Geist redet, ‘muss er im Geist gehört warden’. Im Geist hören bedeutet für Luther aber dasselbe wie im Glauben hören: Der Prophet ‘redet im Geist und fordert Glauben’. Insgemein muss man alle Worte Gottes ‘im Geist und im Glauben hören’. Geist, Glaube und Gnade gehören ebenso zusammen wie auf der Gegenseite Fleisch, Werke und freier Wille. Die Wirklichkeit des Geistes und des Glaubens ist nicht mit den Händen zu greifen; denn der Geist redet ‘von einer abwesenden und nicht in Erscheinung tretenden Wirklichkeit (res) die durch den Glauben zu ergreifen ist.’ […] Im Geist bedeutet zugleich ‘vor Gott’ und bezeichnet die eigentliche Wirklichkeit.”

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things: “In this transferral there is not only a transfer of words but also of things.”133 Is it the classical-rhetorical semantic relation res-verbum, which is in play here? Or is it rather the Pauline-Augustinian res-res? Or perhaps some third possibility? Scholars such as Eberhard Jüngel and Joachim Ringleben suggest that in Luther there are rudiments of the modern concept of metaphor, which emphasizes its creative power : the metaphor is an expression of an “Eigentlichkeit”, because it contains the meaning of something that could not otherwise be expressed.134 This raises the question of the metaphor as improprietas – a question which is not so easy to decide. That Luther keeps close to the rhetorical definitions as regards improprietas has already been established, but to consider the question, we must bear in mind what the concept of “impropriety” covers. The term “improprietas”, as has been suggested, may have nothing to do with the correctness of the meaning, but simply denote the metaphor’s aberration from usus and consuetudo. Regarded in relation to usus/consuetudo the metaphor is “improper”, but at the same time it may well be both better and more correct than significatio propria, because when it is adapted to the accepted rules for the metaphor (similitudo), it can be legitimate and an expression of the best sense in the context in which it is found. Thus we can at the same time say that it is “improper” in relation to the common use of the word, and that it carries a sense which in this context is “proper”. Seen this way a correspondence can be seen between the views of Ringleben and Jüngel and the results of the present study.135 133 WA 8, 87,6–7: “Et in hac translatione non solum est verborum, sed et rerum metaphora.” 134 Jüngel says (1978, 48): “Luther verwendet die Figur der Metapher ihrerseits metaphorisch, und zwar nicht, um eine uneigentliche Redeweise noch uneigentlicher werden zu lassen, sondern um die christologisch-soteriologische Metapher kraft ontologischer Reduplikation als eigentliche Redeweise zu erweisen.” Cf. Ringleben: 1997, 340–341 and note 15. 135 It is Jüngel’s claim, that the metaphor’s character of “impropriety” (improprietas) in classical rhetoric designates the metaphor’s ability to express the truth. In his article “Metaphorische Wahrheit” (Jüngel: 1980), he tries to determine the classical understanding of metaphor and find elements in it which point towards a more modern theory of metaphor. Since the modern theory determines the metaphor as “eigentliche Rede” and thus wants “die Metapher von einem sprachlichen Grenzphänomen zu einem Grundvorgang der Sprache avancieren zu lassen” (1980, 108–109), it is of course the question of what is meant by the metaphor’s character of “impropriety” in classical rhetoric, which is in focus: “Wie verhält sich die leta¦oqa zur akgheia?” (ibid., 106). In classical rhetoric (and here Jüngel primarily thinks of Aristotle) “[vermag] die Metapher […] hinsichtlich der Frage nach dem Was der Dinge nichts mehr auszurichten; sie ist nur Mittel der Wirkung der Aussage, ihres Angreifens und Ankommens bei ihren politischen und forensischen Adressaten […]. Der Redner, der Dichter können im Grunde nichts sagen was für das Was, sondern nur was für das Wie spezifisch ist. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit ist die Frage nach dem Was. Die Frage nach dem Wie gilt dem Problem, wie sich das bereits als wahr Erkannte bei den anderen durchsetzen kann” (ibid., 111). The “impropriety” of the metaphor in other words describes that it is only important for the vocative situation, but Jüngel declares that here there

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is an aporia in the definition of the metaphor in classical rhetoric, because it presupposes – in this Jüngel regards as an error – that speech proper is only in a secondary sense vocative (ibid., 112), and that language basically can do without the metaphor (ibid., 124). Jüngel finds that the rudiments of his own criticism of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor can be found in Aristotle’s own remarks. First of all Aristotle regards the metaphor as being a discovery for the one who uses it and for passing on new knowledge to the one who hears it (ibid., 130), and therefore one can ask whether “die Sprache als Anrede […] der Wahrheit einfach fremder sein [kann] als die Sprache als Aussage? Die aristotelische Analyse der Funktion der Metapher entlässt aus dieser Fragestellung nicht, sondern weist auf ihre Weise in sie hinein” (ibid., 133). Another notable thing about the metaphor, the catachresis, the dead metaphor (which has become indispensable, so that the metaphor here takes over the position of the literal expression) leads to “der viel weiter gehenden und die Prämissen der durch diese Wertung gar nicht tangierten Sprachtheorie in Frage stellenden Vermutung, dass auch die als herrschenden Bezeichnung geltenden Wörter zum grossen Teil ursprünglich solche Metaphern waren” (ibid., 134). Jüngel thinks that in Luther (ibid., 135– 137, note 85), Vico and Nietzsche, a development happens away from the description in classical rhetoric of the metaphor as figurative and towards a modern theory of metaphor (ibid., 109, note 7). Jüngel’s point here is thus the same as that of our study : that in the authors of antiquity (ibid., 132ff. Jüngel speaks not only of Aristotle but of his “school”, in which we must assume he also includes Quintilian, since he begins using the Latin rhetorical terms instead of the Greek shortly after this point in his article) there are tendencies to regard the metaphor, when it is appropriate, as an adequate and hence better expression of the truth than significatio propria. But according to Jüngel they do not take the decisive step in that direction – which is why their theory contains the aporia mentioned. The question is, however, if one cannot understand Quintilian as has been suggested in the present study, so that the term “improprietas” has to do not with the “truth” of the metaphor (here expressed as the “correctness of the metaphoric meaning”), but only with its position (i. e. its deviation from the basic consuetudo) in the rhetorical description of the language, which is regarded as a unity which slowly moves towards perfection? Pinborg has argued convincingly for this in Pinborg, 1963. He directly quotes Quintilian for that which Jüngel tries to read indirectly in Aristotle, but in which he is hindered by Aristotle’s emphasis on the metaphor’s character of “impropriety”, that the character of language as such is metaphoric: “The figures have continuously been changed and they change with usage. If we therefore compare the older language with ours, nearly everything that is said is a figure” (Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria IX, 3, 1; cf. Pinborg: 1963, 51). According to Pinborg Quintilian prefers usus to ratio (Pinborg: 1963, 54, 66) and does not distinguish between dialectics and rhetoric as Aristotle does (cf. Jüngel: 1980, 133). Pinborg writes: “Quintilian […] did not (only) want speech as well as dialectics to denote things precisely, but to denote them in a fuller and more effective way by giving them greater appeal and greater power of expression. Only in this ‘eloquentia’ is the content of things really fully developed. This is the task of language: to be the full expression of nature” (Pinborg: 1963, 67). Quintilian thus regards oratio as a further development of sermo and makes no distinction between ordinary speech (sermo) and embellished speech (oratio) (cf. Pinborg: 1963, 61). Therefore the concepts of latinitas and proprietas are not strictly speaking positive virtues, but are means to avoid errors. They are a foundation on which a sound natural style can be built: “The Style must primarily cover the content; it must not be misunderstandable – it must not deviate too much from the sound usage. We must use natural speech, not in an archaizing sense: the original speech of the ancients, but a speech that follows usus and thus develops to ever greater perfection” (ibid., 55). Only ornatus expresses a positive search for the special virtues. With that one can “perfect one’s endeavours” (ibid.): “The embellishment of the

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If what Ringleben and Jüngel, however, mean is that it is the catachrestic metaphor, the abusio proper, which is used by Luther, a disagreement with them is more obvious, since he does not seem to employ it, as has been demonstrated. Regarding the question of verbum-res, an attempt has been made here to show that Luther’s analysis of Christ-as-sin cannot be maintained within the traditional rhetorical semantics. Seeing that the similarity between the two res in question (Christ/sin) is not natural to human thought, founded as it is in the tension field between natura, ars and usus, the necessary foundation of the relation between verbum proprium and verbum improprium, as it is defined in rhetoric, is broken. In addition it has to be said that if we are dealing with the Christian tradition of interpretation and its introduction of the res-res semantics, it cannot actually be said to move within the understanding of verbum-res in classical rhetoric either, because the res-res semantics, as has been made clear, also goes beyond classical semantics.

5.5.3 Breaking with classical rhetoric and radicalizing the Christian tradition of interpretation The statement on metaphora rerum seems to depart from classical rhetoric, and to be at the same time a radicalizing of the res-res structure in the Christian tradition of interpretation. That the text breaks with classical rhetoric has already been carefully argued in our discussion of Luther’s observations on similitudo, but it also seems apparent from a simple reading of what it says. It clearly does not merely say that the understanding of peccatum in its figurative sense is legitimate in that it obeys the semantic rule of a similitudo between the two things (res) designated by the word peccatum as verbum proprium and as verbum improprium: the sinner as the one who is guilty of acting against the law of God, and Christ as humbled and made equal with the sinner, yet guiltless. The expression “non solum…, sed…” by virtue of the negation and the addition136 says more than that there is a similarity between the two res, and therefore a transfer of peccatum from the old to the new meaning can take place. Supported by the explanatory conclusion, the quotation overtly asserts that Christ’s suffering and death for man causes a real transfer of sin from man to Him, so that the man who believes no longer has any language happens in the same way as education, is only a continuation of it” (1963, 58). It “causes an addition of pragmatic elements to the purely semantic function of the sermo” (ibid., 61). 136 In contradistinction to Donatus, Luther’s expression, because of the negation and the addition, contains an explicit expansion of the statement which one cannot take for granted in Donatus. It is possible, but not clearly expressed.

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guilt. With the expression “non solum…, sed…”, then, Luther emphasizes that here he uses the metaphor in a way that is not immediately to be found in the view of classical rhetoric on the relation between res and verba. He makes it clear that it is not only by virtue of the similarity between the object described literally and metaphorically that we can speak metaphorically, but that the actual subject of the literal description, sin, in reality is transferred to the metaphorically described object, Christ. Here the metaphor is more than a further development on its way to the perfection of the ever newly experienced given (natura-arsusus). It announces a wholly new form of being in the shape of a re-creation of the existing conditions. We may now ask whether it is the Pauline-Augustinian-inspired semantics, and the concomitant extended ontology, that are present in the text. We have already noted that these developments make it possible to speak in an extended way about reality, compared to classical rhetoric, as they allow the things in themselves, res, to have a figurative meaning. In one way we might say that the res-res structure is present in the sense that the sin as res is interpreted in Christ as res, so that a connection with a redemptive-historical perspective is created between the two. The act of redemption itself becomes central. We might say that the major typological perspective to which Luther refers immediately after this in the text (the symbols of the Old Testament = Christ, and the sacrifice in the Old Testament as a metaphor for Christ in the same way as sin), is seen in a minor perspective in the passage on metaphora rerum. The passage expresses the dynamic-historical connection which Christ creates and which exists on a minor scale for the individual, the pro-me aspect. Its connection with the typological structure is also seen when we read further on in Antilatomus. Luther uses the rest of the work to explain that this minor redemptive-historical perspective, which is the redemption in faith for the individual, has a past, a present and a future aspect, and that it thus contains the forward-pointing temporal movement and at the same time the timeless, eternal meaning. This, too, can be described with tunc-nunc-tunc like the major history. Sin rules before God’s grace (tunc), is forgiven by God’s grace and set at nothing (nunc), but is still present in a ruled form, until it is finally destroyed at death (tunc). And at the same time Luther several times emphasizes that everything is ended, completed and eternal in the belief in Christ.137 137 The typological element contained in the passage is touched upon by Ringleben in “Luther zur Metapher” (1997, 347): “In Wahrheit, d. h. in Gottes Augen oder in Ewigkeit, sind wir daher, mit Christus schöpferisch zusammengeschaut, schon wirklich ohne Sünde. Für Gott gehört ewig zusammen, was für uns zeitlich sich auseinanderlegt, weil er selber in die Zeit gekommen ist! Wir müssen noch mit Christus eins werden, und nur der Glaube nimmt diese Einheit vorweg und weiss, dass wir in Christus sind und Christus in uns ist […]. Die in ihm vorgenommene reale Übertragung (metaphora) ist für uns notwendig ein Geschehen

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But at the same time the passage on metaphorum rerum is a radicalization of the res-res structure. It expresses something that the res-res structure does not immediately make possible, because what Luther says is not only that the sin, res, has a transferred meaning that points to another res, Christ, and that together they indicate a simultaneously progressive and eternal redemptive-historical connection. He says that the sin itself as res is transferred to another res and is thus removed. The nam-sentence (Nam vere peccata nostra a nobis translata sunt et posita super ipsum) is explanatory of metaphora rerum, so that not only Christ, but the transfer of sin itself becomes the real meaning of the real metaphor (Ringleben 1997, 344–345; Jüngel, 1980, 47–48). What makes the passage a radicalization of the res-res structure is the ontological statement of the text. The res-res structure does not call attention to the re-creation of being in the same direct way as the explanation of metaphora rerum in the nam-sentence. This is not to say that the res-res structure says nothing about the re-creation of being. The combination of eternal timelessness and temporal movement in one is an expression of a quite unique concept of being. It avers that something exists that is the real thing, but at the same time it continually comes into being at the expense of something else, which perishes. And it is in fact the same being of which the nam-sentence speaks: the re-creation of sinful man in faith by virtue of the removal of sin. As has been suggested, it can be read out of the rest of Antilatomus that it must be regarded as something simultaneously punctual and spatial. But nevertheless the passage is a radicalization of the res-res structure, since Luther here chooses to include in the metaphor itself the fact that in the belief in Christ a real change of existing conditions takes place. Because the metaphor here does not deal with the transfer of meaning from one thing to another, but with a transfer of the thing itself, so that it is removed from its original place and moved onto the other, it is a break with the traditional res-res structure, which

in der Zeit; daher vermittelt die sprachliche Metaphorik den Übergang von Ewigkeit (Einssein vor Gott) und Zeitlichkeit (Unterschied von Christus und Sündern). Die sprachliche Übertragung der Metaphern vermittelt Zeit und Ewigkeit, spricht sie zusammen.” See also Ringleben: 1997, 362–363. In Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis Luther says directly that the typology and the figurative speech are closely connected: “Denn die heilige schrifft helt sich mit reden, wie Gott sich helt mit wircken. Nu schafft Gott alle wege, das die deutung odder gleichnis zuvor geschehen und darnach folge das rechte wesen und erfullunge der gleichnissen, Denn also gehet das alte testament als ein gleichnis furher und folget das newe testament hernach als das rechte wesen, Eben also thut sie auch, wenn sie tropos odder newe wort macht, das sie nympt das alte wort, welches die gleichnis ist und gibt yhm ein newe beutunge, welche das rechte wesen ist” (WA 26, 382,25–383,3).

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gives occasion for drawing parallels with parts of Luther’s work entirely different from the more traditionally typological. For example it seems that we can shed light on the text in Antilatomus through a comparison with a passage from Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis (WA 26, 241–509). It is the passage in which Luther considers the scholastic-philosophical doctrine of praedicatio identica (WA 26, 437,30–445,17). It comes after all his more overall thoughts on tropes in general and tropes understood specifically as metaphors, and thus after the parts of the text which most immediately invite comparison with Antilatomus.138 But it does not seem that it is reference to the same figure which makes two Luther passages mentioning figurative speech comparable, but rather the use to which the figures (even when they are different) are put. The point in the passage is that the figures are used, and what they are used for. Earlier in the text Luther has tried to explain to Zwingli that figurative speech is not symbolic statements, but statements of being.139 The “est” we find in a figurative context is not synonymous with “means” or “symbolizes”, as Zwingli would prefer it, but a direct statement that something “is” as described. And the argument of Zwingli, that what is then said is absurd to the believing thought, does not hold, says Luther. It will of course always be so if we speak of the carnal thoughts of the believers, but to faith it will be clear (WA 26, 270,5–8). That the figurative speech is a statement of being which speaks of a new reality is the central point in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis, and particularly in the section “De praedicatione identica”. Figurative speech in Scripture is something unique, Luther says, because what is described via the figures is God’s interventive change of reality (WA 26, 382,25–383,3). God quite simply changes what the words in their primary meaning speak of, and makes it new in all its being via the metaphor (Christ is the lamb, the rock, etc.) (WA 26, 271,8–280,3; 383,14–386,3), and with the aid of the synecdoche He causes a being to be present next to but identical with another being, so that together they become a new being (WA 26, 437,30–445,17). And the figure is not only a question of comprehending a new aspect, the re-creation happens in the figure. The figurative speech is in other words synonymous with the well-known statement that God’s word “creates what it mentions”.140 138 Ringleben: 1997 uses this first part of Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis in his article and shows the connection it has with Antilatomus. However, he does not make it clear that a shift is seen in Vom Abendmahl from discussion of tropes in general and metaphors specifically, to discussion of the synecdoche. 139 WA 26, 268,15–280,3. 140 WA 26, 282,39–285,5: “So ist sein Wort […] ein machtwort, das da schaffet, was es lautet. Psalm 33. (9.) Er spricht, so stehets da […].” Työrinoja (1987, 233) has noted in a reading of Luther’s late disputations that his view of language is expressive of a theological realism:

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To show the Schwarmgeister, to use one of Luther’s expressions, what he means, Luther puts forward a number of examples of how two beings can become one by virtue of God’s word. The two clearest are the Trinity and Christology. In the Trinity God has “taught us to believe and say that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are three different persons, and yet each is the one God”.141 Here we have a unity in nature. And in the case of Christ it is true that He is both God and man. Here two natures have become one being, not as a unity of natures, but as a unity in the person. So, “we have two unities, of nature and of person, and they teach us that the principle of identical statements is not contrary to Scripture, and that two different beings can be called one being”.142 Luther goes on to enumerate other examples, e. g. angels and flames of fire, which he calls the unity of the deed, because it is not a natural unity, such as the Father and the Son being one nature in the divinity. Nor is it a personal unity as God and man are one person in Christ. Let it be called “a unity of deed”, because the angel and the form he assumes do one and the same deed.143

The Holy Spirit and the dove is also an example, here of the unity of form, whilst finally bread and body is an example of a sacramental unity. The various examples show that these are not philosophically contrived unities, but unities of which Scripture tells us, and which are hence the kind of unities they are described as. That these unities are what they are it is not necessary to argue further, because “the clear Scripture and God’s manifest deed” in it “stand before us”.144 The fanatics and Wycliffe and the Roman theologians, however, all wanted to explain these unities in a way that takes ordinary human logic into account, by

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“Luther’s conception seems to presuppose that the words, as used by the Scriptures, are not terms (in the sense of philosophy and logic) at all. In other words, between the new words (nova vocabula) and the things (res) there is no such semantical relationship as is presupposed in philosophy and logic. In the new language or in the form and mode of speaking of the Holy Spirit (forma et modus loquendi Spiritus Sancti), there is no gulf between words and things, but they are in a way one and the same reality. The new words of theology do not signify things through the concepts of mind. Therefore one cannot find any rational philosophical semantics or logic for them.” WA 26, 440,21–23: “Der hohe artickel der heiligen dreyfaltigkeit leret uns gleuben und reden also, das der Vater und son und heiliger geist seyen drey unterschiedliche persone, Dennoch ist ein igliche der einige Gott.” WA 26, 441,9–11: “Da haben wir zwo einickeit, Eine natürliche und personliche, die uns leren, das nicht widder die schrift sey die predicatio identica, odder das zwey unterschiedliche wesen ein wesen gesprochen warden.” WA 26, 441,24–28: “Es ist nicht eine natürliche einickeit, wie ynn der Gottheit Vater und son eine natur sind, Auch nicht eine personliche einickeit, wie Gott und mensch eine person ist ynn Christo, Las sie gleich heissen Wirkliche einickeit, darumb das der Engel und seine gestalt einerley werck ausrichten.” WA 26, 441,40–442,1: “die klare schrifft und das öffentliche werck Gottes stehet da”.

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which two different beings cannot be one being, and in a sense Luther basically agrees: What is an ass cannot be an ox. What is a human being cannot be a stone or a piece of wood. It would not do for me to say of Saint Paul, “it is a certain stone or a piece of wood”, unless I gave stone or wood a new meaning and made them into new words, as I have mentioned earlier. All common sense in all beings must admit that this cannot be changed.145

But this form of logic, he says, has a drawback, because it does not make allowances for grammar. And that is precisely what his own objection – “unless I gave stone or wood a new meaning and made them into new words” – addresses: If one wants to know about logic before one is familiar with grammar, teach before listening, judge before talking, nothing good will come of it. Logic quite correctly teaches us that bread and body, dove and Spirit, God and man are different natures. But one should first go to grammar for help.146

Grammar reveals that things are not always as human logic would have it: “Where two different beings have become one being, it [grammar] also comprises two such beings in one expression, and where it sees the unity in the two beings it also speaks about them both in the same terms.”147 This does not mean that grammar neutralizes ordinary human logic, and that the basic determination as such of the beings is abolished. What happens, and what grammar speaks of, is that two different beings are united and are given a new unique nature even though they still each retain their own nature (WA 26, 444,39–15). In reality it corresponds to what Luther has explained from the outset in the Antilatomus in the relation between the basic meaning of words and their figurative meaning. And in the dispute over the Eucharist this has deceived Luther’s opponents who, as he says, “have concluded from the unity of the whole, to the unity of the parts and vice versa”.148 Luther now enumerates a number of examples, this time from everyday 145 WA 26, 439,7–12: “was ein esel ist, das kan ia nicht ein ochse sein, Was ein mensch ist, kan nicht ein stein odder holz sein, Und leidet sich nicht, das ich wolt von S. Paulo sagen: Das ist ein leiblicher stein odder holz, Ich wolt denn stein und holz ein newes wort und newe deutunge machen, wie droben gesagt ist, Solchs alles mus alle vernunfft ynn allen Creaturn bekennen, da wird nicht anders aus.” 146 WA 26, 443,10–14: “Denn wo man wil Logica wissen, ehe man die Grammatica kan, und ehe leren denn hören, ehe richten denn reden, da sol nichts rechts ausfolgen. Die Logica leret recht, Das brod und leib, taube und geist, Gott und mensch unterschiedliche naturn sind, Aber sie solt zuvor auch die Grammatica hören zur hülffe.” 147 WA 26, 443,14–17: “Das wo zwey unterschiedliche wesen ynn ein wesen komen, da fasset sie auch solche zwey wesen ynn einerley rede, Und wie sie die einickeit beider wesens ansihet, so redet sie auch von beiden mit einer rede.” 148 WA 26, 443,33–34: “de unitate totali per unitates partiales et econtra syllogisant”.

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language, of synecdochic language treating different entities as if they were one. For example the statement “here are 100 shillings” when you proffer your purse, or “it is red wine” when you point to a barrel of wine, and he concludes as follows: “We should take no notice of the nonsense of these subtle sophists, but look at how the expressions of everyday language are used.”149 His point here is that reality is larger and deeper than ordinary human logic normally imagines, and it is revealed in the language we use (Baur : 1993, 24). He points to the fact that precisely in the art of speaking is this insight essential,150 and thus this passage is once more a reference to grammar and rhetoric.151 But this second time around the reference to rhetoric is not caused by an awareness of the importance of the speech event, the three elements of elocutio: docere, delectare and movere. Instead it is caused by an awareness of rhetoric’s sense of language as man’s access to reality, which is also to be found in Quintilian.152 Quintilian regarded language as the highest virtue of man, higher than reason.153 149 WA 26, 444,36–38: “Denn man mus nicht achten, was solche spitze Sophisten gauckeln, sondern auff die sprache sehen, was da fur eine weise, brauch und gewonheit ist zu redden.” Cf. Jüngel: 1980, 105–106. 150 In Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis Luther uses the terms “grammar” and “oratory” synonymously, cf. WA 26, 271,9; 443,9. 151 The treatment of the passage on Christ as sin has thus gone through three phases. First it was considered on the basis of the classical rhetorical tradition, then from a Pauline-Augustinian-semantic tradition, and finally again based on classical rhetoric. It is this last point based on rhetoric that is central to Jüngel and Ringleben, cf. Ringleben: 1997, 363–364: “Dabei hat sich immer wieder gezeigt, dass er die traditionelle Ontologie und formale Logik (als abstrakt) zurücksetzt gegenüber Rhetorik und Grammatik […], und dies stets unter Berufung auf den lebendigen Sprachgebrauch. Statt die Schulphilosophie einfach zu übernehmen, ist Luther unterwegs zu einem Denken von der Sprache her – im Interesse der Theologie. Daher seine Hochschätzung der Sprache selber : grammatica et usus loquendi…, quem Deus creavit in hominibus (De Servo Arbitrio WA 18, 700,35).” But neither Jüngel nor Ringleben – demonstrated as far as Jüngels was in an earlier note – is aware that the idea of figurative speech as the highest level of language is found explicitly in Quintilian and accordingly is not only a modern trait. 152 Cf. Pinborg: 1963, 67: “This is the task of language: to be the full expression of nature. The language is the expression of logos: which first and foremost means that it brings the logos found in the things forth to a clear understanding.” 153 Pinborg: 1963, 66–67: “Each being has its own virtue which it especially must develop. This virtue springs from nature: ‘Virtue is nothing but the perfect and completed nature’, Cicero says (‘De legibus’ I, 25). – Man’s virtue is reason and language. In all other points it is inferior to other creatures. This virtue must therefore be developed to perfection. The result of this evolution, human culture, is the highest nature can reach (Quintilian, ‘Institutio Oratoria’ IX 4,5). This train of thought is a widely used topos in ancient literature; thus it is found again in several passages of Cicero (e. g. in ‘De invention’ I, 5 and in ‘De oratore’ I, 33) and in Isocrates (‘Panegyricus’ 47–48). As opposed to the philosophers, the rhetoricians now stress language at the expense of reason. In reality language is first in importance to man. There are several species of animals that possess a certain degree of reason: they can build nests, bring up their young, store up food for the winter, and even produce things that man cannot, for example honey or wax (‘Institutio Oratoria’ II, 16, 16). In spite of that we

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As we have seen, he thought that eloquentia, i. e. figurative speech, was the highest level of language, since language precisely by virtue of the innovative character of the figures increasingly reveals the logos, and thus is unendingly subject to a development towards perfection. But again this second time, Luther breaks with the rhetorical praxis which only deals with one language, “contemporary empirical usage among the educated”, and its development within the ever-newly-experienced given (the interplay between natura-ars-usus). The rhetoricians do not operate with a distinction between human and divine usage, as Luther does. Even though he enumerates a number of examples of figurative speech from everyday language in which reality is invoked in a way that is innovative, and which eludes a strictly logical analysis, these examples are of course not entirely comparable with the examples from Scripture. They do not re-create reality and go beyond human reason in the way the examples from Scripture do. Where figurative speech in everyday language is a development of or a new perspective on the given, and thus can be characterized as “completion”, the figurative language of Scripture is an inroad on the given and a change of it: a “re-creation”. So although an analogous relationship can be demonstrated between figurative language in Scripture and in everyday language, the figurative language of Scripture, as Luther has said elsewhere, is something unique compared to everyday speech. Indeed he introduces the section on praedicatio identica by arguing for a special hermeneutics of the Scriptures: Thus I maintain, entirely against all reason and subtle logic, that two different beings can very well be one and be called one being. My reasons are the following: firstly that in God’s word and deeds we must “take all reason and wisdom captive”, as Paul teaches us in 2 Cor 10:5, and allow ourselves to be dazzled and led, directed, taught and subjugated so that we do not become God’s judges in His words: because we will surely lose when we raise ourselves up to be judges of God’s word, witness Ps 51:6. Secondly, when we take ourselves captive and confess that we do not understand His words and deeds, we must be satisfied to speak about His deeds in His own words, plainly and simply as He has prescribed it to us and told us, and not undertake to use our own words because they might be better and different, because we are bound to be wrong if we do not plainly and simple-mindedly repeat His words which He speaks to us, as a little child call them dumb creatures because they lack the ability to express connected words. When already sermo has so much value, how much more valuable is not oratio! Quintilian gives yet another proof of the precedence of language over reason. Only with language is reason realized. Without language reason can be compared to a sword which is stuck in the sheath (‘Institutio Oratoria’ VIII pr. 15). Reason has to be realized in practice before it can be of any importance. Without oration man cannot therefore fulfil his nature and become ‘virtuous’. Therefore the complete man is a vir bonus dicendi peritus, a good man, experienced in speaking. As the ability to express oneself in oratio, eloquentia, is man’s highest nature, there is no doubt that it is possible for man to reach the highest degree of eloquence (‘Institutio Oratoria’ I pr. 20).”

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repeats the Creed or Our Father after his father. Here one has to go blindly and in darkness, and simply cling to the word and follow that, for here we find God’s word: “This is my body”, simple, clear, ordinary and unshakeable words which have never been a figure of speech, neither in Scripture nor in any other utterance.154 We must embrace them in faith, dazzle reason and take it captive. We must repeat these words and keep to them – not as subtle sophists but as God speaks them to us.155

Thus the study of grammar and rhetoric can help men on their way to reading what is said in the Scriptures, but not to understanding it. For understanding, the captivity of reason and submission to God’s word in faith are needed. This is entirely parallel to what Luther says in the Second Lecture on the Psalms. First we must work with the literal meaning, i. e. the grammatical-rhetorical analysis, but to understand the message of the Scripture we must in addition understand the same literal meaning in the Spirit, i. e. in faith. To return to the controversial passage in Antilatomus, what is happening here is precisely that the figure (here the metaphor) has creative force and therefore it expresses that which cannot be said in any other way, and which is beyond human reason: that in the belief in Christ man is really freed of sin. That by virtue of Christ’s deed for man, His suffering and death, a re-creational change of being happens which is inaccessible to human logic (Cf. Mostert: 1983, 353). In concluding the passage Luther says that “this matter should rather be expressed and understood with feelings than with words”,156 which is not to be understood as an emphasis on “feelings” in a modern sense, at the expense of intellect. 154 This statement must not be misunderstood as meaning that the words of institution are not figurative. They are, but they are not metaphorical in the way Oekolampadius would like to see, so as to avoid the real presence, because according to Luther one cannot argue for a similitudo between bread and body (WA 2, 6, 385,14–386,18). They are synecdochical (WA 2, 442,20–28; 444,1–3). 155 WA 26, 439,29–440,9: “Und also widder alle vernunft und spitze Logica halte ich, das zwey unterschiedliche wesen wol ein wesen sein und heissen muegen, Und ist das mein ursache: Erstlich, das man ynn Gottes wercken und worten sol vernunft und alle klugheit gefangen geben, wie S. Paulus leret 2. Corint, und sich blenden und leiten, furen, leren und meistern lassen, auff das wir nicht Gotts richter werden ynn seinen worten, denn wir verlieren gewislich mit unserm richten ynn seinen worten wie Psal. 50 zeuget. Zum andern, wenn wir denn nu uns gefangen geben und bekennen, das wir sein wort und werck nicht begreifen, das wir uns zu friden stellen und von seinen wercken reden mit seinen worten einfeltiglich, wie er uns davon zu reden furgeschrieben hat, und fursprechen lest und nicht mit unsern worten als anders und besser davon zu reden furnemen, Denn wir werden gewislich feylen, wo wir nicht einfeltiglich yhm nach sprechen, wie er uns fur spricht, gleich wie ein iung kind beym Vater den glauben odder Vater unser nach spricht, Denn hie gilts ym finstern und blintzling gehen und schlecht am wort hangen und folgen, Weil denn hie stehen Gottes wort ‘Das ist mein leib’ duerre und helle, gemeine, gewisse wort, die nie ein tropus gewesen sind widder ynn der schrifft noch einiger sprache, mus man die selbigen mit dem glauben fassen und die vernunfft so blenden und gefangen geben, Und also nicht wie die spitzige sophistria, sondern wie Gott und furspricht, nach sprechen und dran halten.” 156 WA 8, 88,2–3: “haec res magis affectibus quam verbis tractari et capi velit”.

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Instead it must be understood as a reference to the confident understanding of faith instead of the explanatory understanding of reason.157 Additionally, it is not simply the case that the figure pronounces the word and it is received in faith. As the word is said and heard, what is said happens. The preaching of God’s word coincides with God’s work. What Luther advances against Latomus is thus that it is of paramount importance to listen and receive when the word of God is heard. Later (1537) Luther will say about Christian speech that the words are baptized in Christ, i. e. in addition to their basic meaning they are given another and new meaning (cf. Ringleben: 1997, 350, note 42; Schwarz: 1966, 334, note 148; Jüngel: 1978, 43). And this other new meaning is made not by man but by God, and is only understandable as it is revealed in the Scriptures. Therefore if we are to understand God’s word, we must take the carnal reason captive, i. e. the reason which wants to rule over what is said, and we must allow ourselves to be led in faith, as Luther prescribes in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis. This does not imply any sacrificium intellectus, but is a matter of knowing the right distinction between reason and faith, where reason and faith are each assigned different areas of action: the area of reason is primarily the secular, whereas that of faith is the divine (cf. Jüngel: 1978, 40–43). And yet it is not so simple. It is too crude just to make that distinction between the two, and regard them as two different mental operations with no mutual connection. Even though they basically work each in its own sphere, they are at the same time inseparably connected. The presence of faith brings about an illumination and a training of reason, so that 157 Cf. Zur Mühlen: 1995a. Zur Mühlen shows how Luther’s concept of faith is a combination of intellectus and affectus, in that understanding is a condition for any form of affection, while the affection in its turn makes what is understood come alive. The affection is the anthropological home for the spiritual experience and the spiritual life (Zur Mühlen: 1995a, 110). Zur Mühlen goes on to explain how Luther’s concept of affectus differs from that of the Middle Ages (ibid., 111): in Luther the interest in affection is not directed by the need, as in the Middle Ages, that one’s own affections should become one with those of the Scripture, but by the interest in being struck by the Scripture’s own affection. What interests in relation to the meditation on the suffering of Christ is not the affectively attainable monastic ideal of humility (humilitas), but instead the act of God which is expressed in the suffering of Christ, and which aims at faith. In Luther the case is not that man has to make this divine act effective in his own deeds after he has understood it affectively. Instead, via the Scripture’s own affection, man is pulled into the effectivity of God’s deed outside himself through faith (ibid., 111). The affection, then, is not for Luther man’s own movement toward the divine, but means being drawn by God’s deed into the relationship to God which is faith, cf. zur Mühlen (1995a, 113): “Zum alles tragenden Grundaffekt wird aber bei Luther das mit dem Glauben verbundene Vertrauen […]. [Der Mensch] kann in seinem Wesen nicht durch die Vernunft, sondern nur durch den Glauben erkannt werden, der das Herz des Menschen von der sich selbst begründenden Eigenliebe befreit und sich als ein durch den Heiligen Geist neu ermöglichte Grundvertrauen auf Gott gründet. Liebe und Hoffnung werden zum lebendigen Ausdruck jener affektiven Existenzbewegung des Glaubens.”

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the latter can be used both to deal with the matter of theology and to deal with secular questions in the right way (cf. Zur Mühlen: 1995b, 160. 171). Just as the words were “baptized” in Christ, one might say that reason is “baptized” in the believer. That man realizes the foreign, external, and therefore re-creative character of the Word, and his own inability to understand it with his natural reason, also entails a reflection on what can and must be said in a theological context. Facing this task one must as carefully as possible see to it that everything which belongs to the revealed word of God is said, no matter if it does not fit within our own natural rational limits of understanding (cf. Grane: 1975a, 158). The “baptized” reason must be used to say it in the right way illuminated by faith (cf. Mostert: 1983, 353–359). So it is permissible to try to say what has to be said in our own words. Luther sometimes talks of philosophizing with Scripture, which for example the theologians of the early Church brought off successfully (cf. Schwarz: 1966, 292; Mostert: 1983, 347, note 9; 840). But reason must not rule God’s word and seek to force its own understanding on it, as Luther thinks happens with Latomus, and those similarly disposed.158

5.5.4 Christ as the centre of Scripture From what has been said here it will be seen that the norm for whether we find human or divine figurative speech is whether these statements are to be found in “Scripture” or not. It is when facing the statements of the Scriptures that reason is taken captive, and the submission to the understanding of faith takes place instead. But to avoid misunderstanding this it must clearly be understood what Luther means by Scriptura. In the well-known introduction to the Wartburg postil (1522) in which Luther gives instruction on what to look for and expect in the Gospels, he has very clearly stated his view of Scripture (WA 10/I, 1,8–18). Holy Scripture, he says here, is not two consecutive books, the Old and the New Testament, as many believe. Holy Scripture is really the Old Testament only, whilst the New Testament is the written testimony of the Gospel, which has come to throw light on Holy Scripture and reveal it as the book of promises (WA 10/I, 1, 13,3–6; 15,1–17; 17,4–12). Additionally he makes it clear that the Gospel is not identical with the 158 Cf. Grane: 1975a, 158: “Die falsche Theologie, […] will die Bibel als Material benützen, das zusammen mit anderem Material geeignet erscheint, Theorien über das Verhältnis von Gott und Mensch auszubilden. Sie will in ein System von vernünftigen Argumenten die rechten Formeln finden, an denen man sehen kann, wer Gott ist, und wer Mensch ist.” This is the question that is central to Luther’s critique of the scholastics’ use of philosophy in his rejoinder to the condemnations.

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various and highly different texts of the New Testament (WA 10/I, 1, 9,6–12), but is the central matter with which all texts of the New Testament deal: “The Gospel is a tale of Christ, the son of God and David, dead, resurrected and appointed Lord. That is the central content of the Gospel.”159 So the Gospel does not coincide with any book, but is the oral sermo on Christ (WA 10/I, 1, 17,7–8). In that way Christ is the centre of the Scriptures, promised in the Old Testament and witnessed in the New (cf. Ringleben: 1997, 355–356). This is what moves Luther to depart from the canon, as he does now and again, and to distinguish between the words of the Scripture in the plural, verba, as human words, and the words of the Scripture in the singular, Verbum, as God’s Word (cf. Mostert: 1998a, 32, note 60). Verba is the whole Bible regarded as the two books, The Old and the New Testaments. Verbum is Scripture regarded as the sermo on Christ at any time, both before and after the Coming. Verbum must always be searched for among the verba of the Bible, but does not coincide with them. The criterion for whether the figurative speech is human or divine, whether Verbum is found in verba, is thus whether it is about Christ, God who became human (cf. Mostert, 1983: note 113, quoting Ebeling, 1991, 452: “Die Logik der Hermeneutik ist keine andere als die Logik der Christologie.”). That was what Luther meant when he said in Palladius’ and Tilemann’s disputations that the words were baptized in Christ. Christ incarnated is the arrival of the Word of God to man and thus the key to the divine usage (cf. Steiger : 1996, 23). Therefore it is characteristic of this usage that it expresses what characterizes Christ the person: communicatio idiomatum, i. e. the exchange of qualities between Christ’s divine and human nature. “Die Grundregel der communicatio idiomatum lautet: Was vom Menschen Christus gilt, wird mit Recht auch von Christus als Gott ausgesagt und umgekehrt” (Schwarz: 1966, 309). Luther ends Antilatomus by pointing to this, and he emphasizes it as the most essential argument against Latomus and others similarly disposed. That is basically what they have not understood, and if they have not understood that, they have misunderstood everything. Latomus is quite wrong when he speaks about sin, says Luther, because along with his sophists he has never had any idea what grace and sin, law and Gospel, Christ and man are. The one, then, who wants to talk in a Christian way about sin and grace, about law and Gospel, Christ and man, basically does not need to talk of anything but God and man in Christ, and he must take the greatest care that he expresses both natures with all their qualities, about the complete person, and yet be careful not to ascribe to it what only belongs to God or only to man. Because one thing is 159 WA 10/I, 1,6–8: “Da sihestu, das das Euangelium eyn historia ist von Christo, Gottis und Dauids son, gestorben und aufferstanden unnd zum herrnn gesetzt, wilchs da ist summa summarum des Euangeli.”

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talking of God incarnate or man made divine, another is only speaking of God or man. In the same way, sin outside grace is one thing, while [sin] in grace is something else. Accordingly, one might imagine that God’s grace or gift had been “iniquitized” and that sin had been “gracified”, as long as we are here, so that the sin because of the gift and grace is now no longer sin.160

The question that arises here is how the linkage from the Christological formula to the talk of sin and grace comes about (Ebeling: 1985, 203; Ebeling: 1989, 143). For an explanation we must consider what is contained in the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum (For what follows cf. Steiger : 1996; Ebeling: 1989, 128–177). It is not “only” a statement about the person of Christ, but has a wider significance. According to Luther it also says what Christ worked, in saying what He was: Christ was God who became man so that man could be saved. The Christological doctrine of communicatio idiomatum has, as Ebeling calls it, a “characteristic doubling” (Ebeling: 1989, 167). It is not only about Christ the person, but also about His deeds (cf. Ebeling: 1989, 167; Steiger : 1996, 5, note 17). That God became man in Christ, and that Christ thus contains two natures in one person, is the background to what is said about His deeds, for example in the section on sin in Antilatomus. That Christ was man means that He was like mankind as such. He took upon Himself everything that characterizes man: damnation, desolation, shame, fear, even death itself (cf. Steiger : 1996, 5.7; Cf. Ebeling: 1989, 173). But on the other hand it was because of Christ’s divine nature that He did not become identical with man, but only like him, for by virtue of His divine nature He had no sin and guilt, and by virtue of that He conquered death. The doctrine of double nature is in a way a short formula for the whole act of redemption: death on the cross (the human nature of Christ) and resurrection (the divine nature of Christ) (cf. Ringleben: 1997, 352). The characteristic trait of Christ is thus that as the god-man (person) He took man’s place (deed) and brought about the exchange of sin and righteousness between Himself and man (the soteriological aspect of communicatio idiomatum), which is analogous to the exchange between the essential qualities in the person of Christ (the Christological aspect of communicatio idiomatum). 160 WA 8, 126,21–32: “quia quid gratia et peccatum, quid lex et Euangelium, quid Christus et homo sit, cum suis sophistis nunquam cognovit. Nam qui de peccato et gratia, de lege et Euangelio, de Christo et homine volet Christianiter disserere, oportet ferme non aliter quam de deo et homine in Christo disserere. Ubi cautissime observandum, ut utramque naturam de tota persona enunciet cum omnibus suis propriis, et tamen caveat, ne quod simpliciter deo aut simpliciter homini convenit, ei tribuat. Aliud enim est, de deo incarnato vel homine deificato loqui, et aliud de deo vel homine simpliciter. Ita aliud est peccatum extra gratiam, aliud in gratia, ut possis imaginari gratiam seu donum dei esse impeccatificatum et peccatum gratificatum, quam diu hic sumus, ut propter donum et gratiam peccatum iam non peccatum sit.”

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Denn das, was ursprünglich i.b. auf die Kommunikation zwischen den beiden Naturen Christi gesagt war, wird nun auf das “pro nobis” hin neu formuliert. Die christologische communicatio idiomatum ist Modell für die soteriologische: “Hie hebt sich nu der fro(e)lich wechssel vnd streytt / Die weyl Christus ist gott und mensch / wilcher noch nie gesundigt hatt / vnd seyne frumkeyt vnu(e)birwindlich / ewig / vnd almechtig ist / sso er denn der glaubigen seelen sund / durch yhren braudtring / das ist / d(er) glaub / ym selbs eygen macht vnd nit anders thut / den(n) als hett er sie getha(n) / sso mussen die sund ynn yhm vorschlunde(n) vn(d) erseufft werden…also wirt die seele vo(n) allen yhren sunden / lauterlich durch yhre(n) malschatzts / das ist des glaubens halben / ledig vnd frey / vnd begabt / mit der ewigen gerechtigkeit yhrs breu(e)dgamss Christi” (Steiger : 1996, 6).

But the soteriological exchange between Christ and man is different from the Christological exchange between the two natures of Christ. Where the latter is an equal exchange, the former is not. In the exchange between Christ and man, solely Christ is giving (cf. Ebeling: 1989, 175). That the Christological and the soteriological aspects of communicatio idiomatum in that way are inseparable is precisely what Luther asserts in the summarizing comments on Antilatomus: “The one, then, who wants to talk in a Christian way about sin and grace, about law and Gospel, Christ and man, basically does not need to talk of anything but God and man in Christ”. Because “die Vereinigung Gottes mit dem Menschen eröffnet die Vereinigung des Menschen mit Christus” (Ebeling: 1989, 169), the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum with its two aspects (Christology (person)/soteriology (deed)) is the basic theme of all Christian theology. Everything that must and can be said about the relation between God and man must take its point of departure in a representation and dissemination of the person and deeds of Christ. Thus it is not strange that it is Christology which is the centre of the summarizing comments in Antilatomus, Christology which together with the Trinity is listed as the first and most essential of the synecdochic entities in Vom Abendmahl Christi, and Christology as res ineffabilis et incomprehensibilis which is central to Luther’s theological work in the late disputations. Mostert gives the following precise characteristic of Luther’s theology : the new departure “gewinnt er an der Christologie (mit Einschluss der Trinitätslehre), die von Anfang an, allerdings erst langsam sich entdeckend, das geheime Movens seiner Theologie ist” (Mostert: 1983, 350, with a reference to Schwarz: 1966).

5.5.5 Interpretation of Scripture Having thus said which word is conferred on man as a new reality, we have said little about how man relates to that word. Can he simply accept that this is what it

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is all about, and then take pains to keep to it? Can the theologian understand Christ as a condition for understanding, start reading the Bible grammatically and rhetorically, and thus work his way towards the goal of understanding in faith which enables him to speak theologically? Is that what Luther understands as exegesis, and thus what he calls on Latomus to do? What has been said above makes it clear that Christ as God’s word comes from without to man. It is in no way part of the world known to him. It comes as something utterly new and unknown, and “creates what it mentions”, whereby it re-creates what exists. And the character of the re-creation of the word is nothing man can control as it happens, and which can therefore be seized by man’s natural tool, reason. On the contrary it makes itself the ruler of man, conferring faith upon him, and that means trusting to something other than himself. The recreation of the word calls man out of his old reality, away from himself, and incorporates him in the new reality, turned towards the other and external. And that event takes place both immediately and eternally and all at once, yet gradually and temporally and piecemeal. Because God’s word in Christ in that way becomes the ruler of man and not vice versa, it remains external, outer and alien. The way we can put this is that in His Word God becomes God again for man, while man before he received the word strove to be his own master. All this is concentrated in Luther’s view of exegesis, as we can read it in the introduction to Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorum (WA 7, 94,1–101,9).161 Here Luther describes the inseparable connection between Scripture as God’s living word to man and the exegesis of Scripture, while underlining that man is not, nor will ever be, master of God’s word. Because just as the originator of Scripture is not really human but divine, so exegesis is not a human but a divine phenomenon. What offends Luther and what he takes up again in Assertio omnium Articulorum, is the ever recurring problem that the scholastics do not use Holy Writ as an authority above all else, but mostly find support among human writers and exegetes. And in that way they believe that they abide by the generally accepted rule that “Holy Scripture should not be interpreted in one’s own spirit”.162 This is a rule, Luther remarks, which has even been articulated in Papal decretals, but which is understood by very few. The scholastics make it mean the opposite of what it in simple fact intends, assiduously ensuring that Scripture is not interpreted in its own spirit but in that of its interpreters (WA 7, 96,11–19). They think that by constantly referring to human commentators, and ultimately the 161 The text was written a few months before Antilatomus, in opposition to the papal bull of excommunication and thus also against Latomus’ work and the Leuven condemnation. Its central point is the argument which has always been central to Luther’s criticism of Latomus: the question of authority ; cf. Mostert: 1998a. 162 WA 7, 96,10–11: “Non esse scripturas sanctas proprio spiritu interpretandas”.

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Pope’s authority as the supreme interpreter, they make sure that the exegesis of Scripture does not become arbitrary, and of this Latomus’ Exposition is a good example. Luther says: This understanding, I say, Satan himself has no doubt introduced to call us away as far as possible from what is ours, i. e. Holy Scripture and make our understanding of the Scripture hopeless for us, but the way we should rather see it is that the Scriptures are only to be understood in the spirit in which they are written, a Spirit we nowhere find more present and living than in the holy texts themselves which it has itself written.163

Therefore, as the Church Fathers did, one must sit down to read the Scripture itself, because “here [the Spirit] has established its hiding place”.164 Only by virtue of Scripture can it be determined what is true and what is false. It must be the judge of all opinions, new as well as old, “which means that in itself it must be the safest, easiest and most accessible, its own interpreter, proving, judging and illuminating everything in everything”.165 That Scripture in this way is clear in itself and needs no explanatory glosses is something Luther has emphasized countless times in Antilatomus, and in the section on what sin is, in connection with Eccl 7:21, he says directly that “Scripture is common to all, sufficiently accessible as far as it is necessary for redemption, but also sufficiently obscure for meditative minds. Let everyone seek his part in this the most inexhaustible and the most common word of God.”166 For the concrete exegesis this means that we must put our nose to the grindstone of Scripture and work with it daily (WA 7, 97,5–9). But the workload is not caused by the Scriptures’ being obscure or hard to understand, so that we must perspire to put the obscurity behind us. Instead the cause resides in the fact that in our very point of departure we block the reception of the words of Scripture with our own spirit, and that this spirit, spiritus proprius, must therefore be expelled (cf. Mostert: 1998a, 12–13).167 However, this expulsion does not come about by virtue of our efforts, but through the Spirit. Luther elucidates 163 WA 7, 96,37–97,3: “Hanc, inquam, intelligentiam absque dubio Satanas ipse invexit, quo nos a nostris, id est sacris, literis longissime avocaret et desperatam scientiam scripturae nobis faceret, cum sic potius sit intelligendum, scripturas non nisi eo spiritu intelligendas esse, quo scriptae sunt, qui spiritus nusquam praesentius et vivacius quam in ipsis sacris suis, quas scripsit, literis inveniri potest.” 164 WA 7, 97,9: “Hic enim posuit latibulum suum.” 165 WA 7, 97,22–24: “[…] hoc est, ut sit ipsa per sese certissima, facillima, apertissima, sui ipsius interpres, omnium omnia probans, iudicans et illuminans […].” 166 WA 8, 99,20–23: “Scripturae omnibus communes sunt, satis apertae, quantum oportet pro salute, satis etiam obscurae pro contemplatricibus animabus. Quisque suam sortem in abundatissimo et communissimo verbo dei sequatur […].” 167 In a sense, as Mostert also calls attention to, it is a common hermeneutical reflection Luther here expresses.

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it thus: “The spirit will then come of its own and drive out our spirit, so that we can practise theology without danger.”168 Despite appearances, there is no opposition between the high level of activity of the exegete and the workings of the Spirit; cf. Mostert: Luther [stellt sich] als ein Theologe dar, der gleichsam alle Kräfte seines Intellekts, seines Glaubens, seines Affekts, seines Herzens und seines Gewissens aufbietet, um den Inhalt, das Wort der Schrift zu hören und zu empfangen. Zwischen der lebendigen Aktivität des Schriftauslegers Luther und dem einzigen Ziel dieser Aktivität, nämlich dem Hören und Empfangen, besteht nur scheinbar ein Gegensatz, in Wahrheit aber vollendete Kongruenz, sofern das Hören und Empfangen selbst zur höchsten Form der Tätigkeit warden (Mostert: 1998a, 10).

To the negative function, the Spirit’s expulsion of man’s own spirit, a positive function can be added (For the following, cf. Mostert: 1998a, 15–16). For as Luther says: “[…] the Spirit clearly gives enlightenment and teaches that insight is given only through God’s words.”169 This is not to say that one complex of thought is substituted for another. By the workings of the Spirit, rather, it happens that the whole idea of Scripture as a system of thoughts and ideas disappears, and it is transformed from being a written text to being the word of mouth: Christ who is given to man in faith. Diese Mündlichkeit der Schrift, von Luther immer wieder vorgehoben, hat fundamentaltheologischen Rang […]. [D]as Wort [ist] als die wahre Seinsweise des Inhaltes der Schrift die äusserste Zuspitzung ihrer Wirkmächtigkeit; denn als Wort ist die Schrift gerade dem Zugriff des Denkens, des spiritus proprius, entgegengesetzt. Die Mündlichkeit, Worthaftigkeit, Sprachlichkeit des Gegenstandes der Schrift ist für Luther die denkbar schärfste Hervorhebung ihrer Externität, ihrer Wirkungsmächtigkeit, ihrer Autorität (Mostert: 1998a, 15).

So it is in its character of coming to man from without, and thus being external and in contrast to what man himself imagines the authority of Scripture to be, that its authority consists. That was also what Luther said in making the connection with the first half of his exegesis of Eccl 7:21: because God’s word in Christ (verbum suum in Christo) comes to man from without and never becomes something man possesses himself and can present to God, man can find support in it as his own with trusting confidence (cum fiducia). Instead of regarding exegesis as a movement from man towards God, it has to be turned around and be regarded as a movement from God to man. It is God Himself who speaks and enlightens man with His word in the Scriptures: God’s 168 WA 7, 97,34–35: “spiritum autem sua sponte venturum et nostrum spiritum expulsurum, ut sine periculo theologissemus.” 169 WA 7, 97,26–29: “clare spiritus tribuit illuminationem et intellectum dari docet per sola verba dei”.

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word “shall not be sought or learned by man, but men shall be judged by God’s word”.170 Compare Grane: Die wahre Theologie besteht darin, die Schrift sagen zu lassen, wo der Mensch sich in seinem Verhältnis zu Gott befindet. Aber wo der Ausleger es als seine einzige Aufgabe betrachtet, die Schrift zu Wort kommen zu lassen, wird er selbst ein discipulus passibilis, mit dem geschieht, was die Schrift sagt. Es kann kein Rede davon sein, dass das Verstehen eines ist und die Aneignung ein anderes. Nein, das Verstehen ist selbst das Ereignis (Grane: 1975a, 159).

We have to bear in mind that the interplay between the negative and positive functions of the Spirit and the understanding it engenders, is not a once-only event, an insight that comes to man once definitively and thereafter stays with him. As we have already noted, the calling of the Word of God from the old to the new reality has simultaneously a momentary and a progressive character. It happens both all at once and gradually. Therefore exegesis is a life-long process in which man works with Scripture and its words, Verbum in verba, and is fortified by it, allowing what Scripture says to befall him.171 About this Albrecht Beutel says: Im Wort der Schrift sieht Luther den Grund des Glaubens vorgegeben. In Sachen des Glaubens möge man sich darum an die Schrift halten, nicht an die Vernunft. Denn die Schrift ist uns nicht umsonst gegeben: Würde das natürliche Vermögen der ratio genügen, so wäre uns die Schrift nicht not gewesen. So aber müssen wir uns nicht nur an die Schrift halten, sondern, wie Luther in mehrfach wiederholter Ausdrücklichkeit präzisiert, in der Schrift bleiben. Dieses Sein in der Schrift hat Luther in ein Bild gefasst, das das Verstehen dieser offenbar mit Bedacht gewählten Präposition auf die Spur bringen kann und darum ungekürzt zitiert sei: “Aber wiltu dem boesen feynd nit ynss netze fallen, sso lass yhr klugelln, dunkelln und subtiliteten faren und hallt dich an disse gotliche wort, da kreuch eyn und bleyb drynnen wie eyn hass ynn seyner steynritzen; spatzirstu erauss unnd gibst dich auff yhr menschen geschwetz, sso soll dich der feynd furen unnd tzuletzt stortzen, das di nit wissest, wo vernunfft, glawb, gott unnd du selbst bleybst” (Beutel: 1991, 226–227). 170 WA 7, 98,6–7: “[verba divina] non autem per homines quaeri et disci, sed homines per ipsa iudicari”. 171 Cf. Rothen: 1990, 77: “Die Schrift umfasst das Leben der Menschen, umfasst alle seine unergründlichen Rätsel! Sie kann deshalb nicht verstanden werden in dem Sinne, dass man sie objektiviert und sie mit einem Begriff zu erfassen oder in einem Erleben in sich aufzunehmen versucht. Es braucht vielmehr ein ganzes langes Menschenleben, ein langes, treues Wirken […] dazu, dass man den rechten Geschmack an der Schrift bekommt.” Rothen criticizes Ebeling for focussing far too much on “understanding”, and too little on how Luther talks of “tasting” the Scripture (1990, 78). – Speaking of exegesis raises the question of its arbitrariness – and if we were to give an answer on the basis of Luther’s works, we would have to deal with the question of the double clarity of Scripture. However, this is too wide and complicated a subject to take up in this context.

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On sin

In a certain way the section on Christ as sin sheds some light on the rest of Antilatomus: both on what has gone before this section, and what follows. Antilatomus proves a good example of how Luther practises the ideas of hearing and disseminating Christ as God’s word. It has been seen how he takes both a philological, i. e. grammatical-rhetorical, approach in connection with Isa 64:5 and Eccl 7:21, and how he then moves on first to the contextual connection and then to the Christological. He always works with the unambiguous and surface meaning of the words, whether it is the basic meaning or the figurative. But at the same time he clearly presupposes the workings of the Spirit in the interpretation. The presence of the Spirit is necessary so that the obscurity or confusion in the exegesis, which Latomus represents, is avoided. A study of the first part of Antilatomus makes it clear that Luther adheres to his own definition of what theological speech is. What is treated is always concerned with the person and deeds of Christ. And Luther attempts to say what can be said in that respect, and to prevent what violates or wants to dominate the revealed God’s word which is Christ. This is equally descriptive of the rest of the work, which many regard as its most important part.

5.6

On sin

Already in connection with the quotation from Isaiah and Eccl 7:21, Luther has said much on the basic meaning of sin, but very little about its figurative meaning. In connection with the Isaiah quotation he has said that all, both believers and infidels, by nature (naturae suae), are unrighteous and sinners unless the cloud of grace rests upon them and mercy forgives, and in connection with Eccl 7:21 he has declared that sin must be freed from the deeds, and basically be defined as part of man. Sin is an essential quality, a propria passio, in man, and thus something that stays with man all his life and of which he cannot rid himself. Its continuing presence is the reason why man at no time in his life can trust his own relation to God in any way, but must always, conscious of his own ineptitude, adhere to and seek refuge in Christ as God’s pure and true word. The question now arises, what will happen more concretely to sin and its basic meaning, when its figurative meaning is added? What are in other words the deeds of Christ? This is what Luther tries in greater detail to explain to Latomus in the second half of Antilatomus. It has been shown above how what characterizes the deeds of Christ analogously to what is characteristic to his person, is the happy exchange which in Him takes place between God and man (communicatio idiomatum with a soteriological bias), and the unio connected with it. Thus what the second part of Antilatomus addresses is a description of what happens in the dynamic-his-

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torical connection which God, both in the major (redemptive-historical) perspective and in a minor perspective (the pro-me aspect), creates in Christ. Luther’s business, here seen from the pro-me aspect, is to explain the typological structure, tunc-nunc-tunc, the existence of the progressive temporal movement and the timeless eternal meaning in one, which characterizes the divine reality that was conferred on man in Christ. In other words the central theme in the second half of Antilatomus is the theme that was also defined earlier : that sin rules before the grace of God (tunc), is forgiven by the grace of God and counted as nothing (nunc), but is still present as ruled, until it is finally destroyed at death (tunc). And at the same time everything is ended, completed and eternal in the belief in Christ. Whereas Luther throughout Antilatomus refers to passages from the whole Bible in support of his views, he mainly bases the second half of the work on the Epistle to the Romans. First in Rom 6 and 8 (the section on ruling and ruled sin), then on all of Romans (the section on the way in which the Law and the Gospel deal with sin), and finally on Rom 7. It therefore makes good sense to divide the rest of the text into thematic sections, even if this does some violence to the overall structure which follows the three central Scriptural texts, Isa 64:6, Eccl 7:21 and Rom 7. It can be roughly divided as follows: 1) The question of what sin is before and after baptism: ruling and ruled sin. 2) A treatment of this at greater depth: the Law’s and the Gospel’s way of dealing with sin (corruption and anger vs. the gift and grace). 3) The conditions for the baptized: Christian man.

5.6.1 Rhetoric instead of philosophy as the point of departure Luther opens by emphasizing that the scholastics have understood some of what the substantia of sin is, namely the offence against God and transgression of God’s law (offensio dei et legis dei transgression) (WA 8, 88,4–5). But they have not understood what it is according to the other categories, quantity, quality, relation, activity and passivity.172 Therefore Luther will now base his treatment of peccatum on them. What one must primarily know, Luther says, is that he uses the term substantia with reference to Quintilian instead of Aristotle (WA 8, 88,15–19). By substantia he therefore understands everything of which we can first ask what it 172 WA 8, 88,5–6. Cf. StA, 469, note 516: “Nach Aristoteles betreffen die ‘Grundformen’ von Aussagen (categoriae) die Bestimmtheit eines objektiv seienden, insofern es dasjenige ‘ist’, als welches es bezeichnet wird. […] Als Kategorien nennt Aristoteles ausser der substantia (oder quid est), quantum, quale, ubi, quando, facere, pati, habere, situm esse, ad aliquid.” Cf. Aristoteles Topika 1, 9.

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is (quid sit), i. e. what its nature is, and then go further into the qualities of this nature by asking how big it is (quanta), of which character (qualis), and so forth. The qualities quantus, qualis and the rest are thus secondary in relation to the category quid, which is the first to define the substance. As it happens Aristotle thinks like that, too, says Luther, whereas the scholastics ascribe its own nature, quidditas, to each category.173 What Luther tries to emphasize here is presumably174 that he does not want to deal with the essence and being of things, but instead wants to treat them in accordance with rhetoric.175 What is meant becomes clearer if we recall the pragmatic character of Quintilian’s concept of res:176 res as the object which, derived from the laws of nature with the aid of ars, is present in the mind and by virtue of usus is expressed in verba as the “contemporary empirical usage”, thus the existing (res) as the constantly newly experienced given (the interplay between natura, ars, usus). Res is not defined here as a strictly philosophical “ens quod habet proprium esse nec est in alio” (WA 8, 88, note 1), but is viewed more broadly as the given which is experienced and articulated in speech. If we understand substantia as identical with the rhetorical concept of res, and from there practise delineating it by means of the categories quid, quanta, qualis, etc., we will strengthen our memory, understanding and knowledge much more, to Luther’s mind, than the scholastics can achieve with their logical-philosophical way of relating to substantia and the categories (WA 8, 88,22–25). Thus what Luther seeks to call attention to is again that the biblical testimony is inaccessible to logical-philosophical analysis, and therefore is better viewed from a pragmatic, linguistic angle, such as the one rhetoric represents, where what is said is taken at its surface value, no matter whether it can be analysed with general logical concepts or not.177 And this point of view must naturally be seen in the light of Luther’s view of God’s word as the unique, special word which creates what it designates, and which therefore beyond the possibilities of profane

173 Cf. StA, 469, note 517: “Der Ausdruck quidditas (Washeit) wurde als Wiedergabe des aristotelischen ‘quid est’ (das Was einer Wesenheit samt ihrer notwendigen Merkmale) durch Übersetzung aus der arabischen Literatur (Avicenna) in der Scholastik gebräuchlich. […] Thomas v. Aquin, Summa Theologiae 3, qu.2 art.1, ‘Sic…loquimur de natura, secundum quod natura significat essentiam, vel quod quid est, sive quidditatem specie. ’” 174 A more detailed demonstration of this interpretation must rely on a careful study of the concept of substance in Aristotle and Quintilian, which it has not been possible to carry out in this context. 175 Cf. what has been presented above regarding his sympathy for rhetoric. 176 StA 469, note 515: “Nach Quintilian meint substantia stets das Wesen der Sache (z. B. der Rhetorik) und wird synonym mit res gebraucht.” 177 This corresponds to the way Luther chose to view the synecdochic unities in Vom Abendmahl Christi.Bekenntnis.

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language (which rhetoric represents) has the power to simultaneously enunciate and create a new reality. When reading Luther’s fairly systematic attempt at explaining to Latomus, in connection with the Epistle to the Romans, how Christ’s deeds are to be understood, it should always be borne in mind that he thinks in this way. The attempt is quite simply a concrete example of the difficult art of discoursing on res ineffabilis, and is therefore also, as will become quite clear, ultimately characterized by the logical-philosophical aporia which characterizes theological speech. As Mostert expressed it: [M]an [muss] von der ineffabilis res, nähmlich “Gott ist Mensch”, redden […] und [darf] sich nicht unter das Präjudiz der formalen Logik stellen […]. Man muss […] imstande sein, die Wirklichkeit nicht unbedingt aus der [eigenen] Vernunft denken zu wollen […]. Wie vielmehr Gott sich als Mensch identifiziert hat, so soll sich die Dialektik (Logik) an dieser Wirklichkeit als Vernunft identifizieren. Im Unterschied zu den Häretikern, bei denen es die Logik ist, die ihnen Schwierigkeiten bereitet […], bemüht sich Luther um eine Sprache, die […] als Einübung der Vernunft in die Logik Gottes spricht. [Luther] sucht keine neue Ideologie, sondern eine theologische Grammatik, die es jedem Christen erlaubt zu sagen, was wirklich ist (Mostert: 1983, 353–359).

5.6.2 Ruling and ruled sin Sin, as we have mentioned, is two different things, depending on whether one speaks of it without or within grace, in its basic meaning or as metaphor. Luther again refers to Rom 8:3 and 2 Cor 5:21, and repeats that Paul in both passages uses both senses of the word sin. Both the metaphorical meaning which is Christ, and the basic meaning which is what is against God’s law (WA 8, 91,4–12). This corresponds to what Luther says in his summing-up: “Sin outside grace is one thing, while [sin] in grace is something else.”178 Outside grace and the metaphor it is always natura sua and according to its substance truly sin, vere peccatum (WA 8, 88,10–11), i. e. an offence against God and a transgression of His law, no matter how serious it is, because the substance, to repeat, is determined not by the category of “size” but by the first and decisive category : the question of what a thing is (quid sit) (WA 8, 88,11–15). So what characterizes this substantial sin (peccatum substantiale) (WA 8, 88,25) outside of grace, Luther proceeds to ask, and answers as promised with reference to the other categories (WA 8, 88,28–36). It makes man guilty before God and disquiets his conscience, and with every day it drags him into greater evils. As regards quantity, quality and activity it is mighty, and it reigns re178 WA 8, 126,29: “aliud est peccatum extra gratiam, aliud in gratia”.

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garding where and when, because it is always strongest, everywhere and in all its power. As regards the category of passivity, i. e. what it is subjected to, it is nothing, because it cannot stand arraignment by the law and will not be touched. It belongs in the heart and its direction is straight to hell. As regards the category of relation, i. e. what it has relations to, it is at its worst by far, because it is contrary to grace and subject to God’s wrath and rage. Thus it rules, and men serve it. But in grace, i. e. after baptism and the infusion of God’s power (infusa virtus dei) (WA 8, 88,26), it is not yet nothing, but is nevertheless broken and subjugated, so that it no longer can do what it could before. With reference to Mark 3:25, John 12:31 and Gen 3:15, Luther describes how the reign of sin was divided, the prince of the world was driven out and the head of the snake crushed, with the coming of God’s kingdom. Only a little remained, in a parallel to the story of the peoples who were vanquished at the entry of the sons of Israel into the land of Canaan, but who were not destroyed until David arrived (WA 8, 88,37–89,6). Thus called into the realm of faith through the grace of baptism, we have taken power in the realm of sin, after all its powers have perished. Only a few remnants stay behind in the limbs, which resist and refer their character and nature to the race that was destroyed. These remnants we should eradicate with our own fist, but it will happen when our David has fortified his realm and taken his royal throne.179

These two ways for sin to exist outside and within grace, before and after baptism, Luther now (with a reference to Rom 6:12: “non regnet peccatum in mortali vestro corpore”), calls peccatum regnans and peccatum regnatum, ruling and ruled sin (WA 8, 94,2–5), and it is the latter of the two senses of sin that is central in the dispute between him and Latomus (WA 8, 89,10–12). The question in Luther’s eyes is whether sin in grace, after baptism is still to be regarded as peccatum or not. According to Luther Paul has spoken clearly about this, and not even Augustine, whom he generally values greatly and calls summus omnium (WA 8, 89,22), and whom Latomus refers to as his primary source, will be allowed to change Paul’s words. Augustine is not infallible, says Luther, even though he has kept quite close to Paul’s understanding in many passages, and here Luther refers to the letter to Jerome, which he himself mentioned in conclusion 2 to the Explanation of the Leipzig Disputation, and on which Latomus commented without really knowing how to interpret it (WA 8, 89,35–90,8). So if disagreements can be demonstrated in Augustine’s works, as Latomus’ Ex179 WA 8, 89,6–10: “Ita nos in regnum fidei vocati per baptismi gratiam, regnum peccati obtinemus, cesis omnibus viribus eius, tantum in membris reliquiae manent, remurmurantes et generis deleti sui ingenium et naturam referentes, quas nostro marte abolere debemus, fiet autem, ubi David noster confortato regno sederit in sede maiestatis suae.”

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position forces us to assume, it cannot be helped. As Luther puts it: “if he is really in disagreement with himself, this is of no importance to me” (WA 8, 90,11– 12).180 “As I said, I do not trust him enough.”181

5.6.3 What happens in baptism? A close reading of Rom 8:1–4 (WA 8, 91,1–92,10), Luther says, shows that Paul tells us that because of sin God “damned” sin. Not “removed” sin, as Latomus would have it. And Paul simply does not say what he says because he knows no better. On the contrary he expresses himself as he does because his ability to explain himself is God-given, and he therefore knows what is right to say (WA 8, 91,15–18). What happens to sin in baptism, which Paul expresses with “damned” instead of “removed”, is that sin is taken captive in man waiting for its annihilation, exactly as a condemned robber who is imprisoned waits for his execution. Just as this robber is really a robber, even though he has been taken prisoner, so sin is also really sin by nature (naturaliter) (WA 8, 91,36), after baptism. But where before baptism this was the case both in substance and in the various subcategories of quantity, quality and activity, it is now only sin in its substance and passivity (WA 8, 91,34–37). This means that it is of the same nature as before, i. e. that which is against God’s law, but it is no longer mighty and ruling, is indeed now the object (= passivity) of a control to which it was not subjected before: “The movements of anger and desire are the same in the pious man as in the impious, the same before and after grace, just as it is the same flesh before and after grace, but in grace it can do nothing, outside grace it prevails.”182 Thus sin still exists after baptism – compare the image of the peoples in Canaan after the coming of the sons of Israel – but its power is broken. Therefore Paul does not say in Rom 8:1 that the law of the Spirit of life in Christ has freed me from sin and death, but that in Christ it has freed me from the law of sin and death (WA 8, 91,40–92,10). The law of the Spirit of life which does what Christ has earned, which is the proper deed of the law of the Spirit (opus proprium legis spiritus), has not yet freed man from death or from sin, but will eventually do so: there is still dying to do and fighting against sin. But it has freed us of the tyranny of sin and death. Death and sin are there, but they can no longer harm us. Here one might ask, is what Luther says so very far removed from Latomus’ statement? After all Latomus admits that there is a residual propensity for sin in 180 WA 8, 90,11–12: “sit sane sibi contrarius, […] mea nihil refert.” 181 WA 8, 90,10: “(ut dixi) Augustino non satis credo”. 182 WA 8, 91,37–40: “Nam idem prorsus est motus irae et libidinis in pio et impio, idem ante gratiam et post gratiam, sicut eadem caro ante gratiam et post gratiam, sed in gratia nihil potest, extra gratiam praevalet.”

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man after the grace of baptism, and it can flare up because of man’s weakness, so that even saints sometimes commit venial sins and are in need of forgiveness. And at the same time he says that after the infusion by grace of the virtue of charity as a virtus infusa (an expression Luther himself has just used) man is enabled to more or less avoid this sin. It no longer reigns over man. Luther even expresses himself in several passages in ways that are very close to what Latomus says about how the justified man must avoid consenting to sin, the concept of consentio. “To him”, Luther says, “who truly consents (consenserit) with the condemned [i. e. sin] will happen what is described in John 16:8.11, ‘The Spirit will convict the world because the ruler of this world is already judged.’”183 And he continues: “[sin after baptism] is in need of mercy, and is in its nature an evil and an error, and if you consent (consentias) with it you have also made it your master, served it and sinned mortally.”184 Luther goes on to urge that man himself ought to execute the sentence (debemus et ipsum exequi) (WA 8, 91,28), ought to eradicate the remnant of sin with his own fist (nostro marte abolere debemus) (WA 8, 89,9), and about how it is up to the diligence of man to eradicate the remains (reliquias quasdam, quae nostra demum cura sint exterminandae) (WA 8, 88,38–89,1). Is this any different from what Latomus says about using the free choice (liberum arbitrium) not to consent with sin, after will and reason have been turned right by grace? Is it not all simply a dispute about words, because Luther insists on calling sin after baptism sin, and Latomus just as insistently does not? Luther enumerates a number of Scripture texts from Paul (Rom 8:13, Col 3:5, Rom 6:14) which call for the mortification of the flesh (membra mortificari), and uses them to argue that the real sin is still present in man after baptism (WA 8, 92,12–37). He then asks rhetorically : What then, are we all sinners? No, on the contrary, we are righteous, but through grace. Justice does not reside in these kinds of qualities, but in God’s mercy. The fact really is that if we remove mercy from the pious, they are sinners and truly have sin. But because they believe and live under the reign of mercy, the sin is both damned in them and enduringly mortified. Therefore it is not imputed to them. This is the most glorious forgiveness of baptism.185

183 WA 8, 91,25: “qui vero huic damnato consenserit, incurret illud Iohan. xvij. ‘Spiritus arguet mundum de iudicio, quia princeps mundi iam iudicatus est.’” 184 WA 8, 96,30–32: “[…] quod misericordia egeat et natura sua malum et vitium sit, cui si consentias, etiam regnare fecisti et servisti ei ac mortaliter peccasti”. 185 WA 8, 92,38–93,1: “Quid ergo? peccatores sumus? imo iustificati sumus, sed per gratiam. Iustitia non est sita in formis illis qualitatum, sed in misericordia dei. Revera enim si a piis removeris misericordiam, peccatores sunt et verum peccatum habent, sed quia credunt et sub misericordiae regno degunt, et damnatum est et assidue mortificatur in eis peccatum, ideo non imputatur eis. Ista est remissio baptismi gloriosissima […].”

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Is this ineffable mercy of God (ineffabilis dei misericordia) (WA 8, 93,10) not enough for Latomus? Luther asks. That God justifies man from all sin and regards him as if he were without sin, if only he continues to mortify that which is already damned and condemned to death by Him (WA 8, 93,8–12)? If any man were to rejoin that that which is not imputed is already not sin, he must remember, warns Luther, to turn it the right way. It is not because it is not sin that it is not imputed. Sin is fully and wholly sin in its substance and nature, as he has already declared many times. But because God does not impute it to man, it is nothing, devoid of power. So the whole business depends on God’s imputation, not the substance or its nature. As Luther says: One wonders “if the imputation alone has changed the thing and nature?”186 Latomus would have the forgiveness of mercy come after in such a way that it is by virtue of nature that sin is not sin. And that is truly sacrilege, Luther concludes (WA 8, 93,15–17): “With all this it has been demonstrated that any good deed is a sin, unless mercy forgives.”187 In this way Luther denies that the character of sin is changed in baptism. As he said before, “the movements of anger and sin are the same in the pious man as in the impious, the same before and after grace, just as it is the same flesh before and after grace, but in grace it can do nothing, outside grace it prevails”.188 Righteousness is not located in inner qualities in man, but in God’s mercy, which was also what Luther used all his energy to demonstrate in connection with the quotation from Isaiah and the first half of Eccl 7:21. This is diametrically opposed to Latomus’ view. Luther is right in saying of Latomus that he wants to understand real sin as obliterated in baptism and penitence and then no longer existing in man. There is a remnant of carnal desire (concupiscentia) left in man, which can hinder the completion of justification, Latomus admits, but as has become clear, he refuses to call this remnant sin.

5.6.4 Effective justification Forensic justification and imputed righteousness thus having been mentioned, it is still necessary to remember what Luther adds about baptism, shortly after he has emphasized the forensic and imputed aspects:

186 WA 8, 92,19–20: “An imputatio hic sola mutavit rem et naturam?” 187 WA 8, 93,18–19: “Ex iis puto defensum nunc, Omne opus bonum esse peccatum, nisi ignoscat misericordia.” 188 WA 8, 91,37–40: “Nam idem prorsus est motus irae et libidinis in pio et impio, idem ante gratiam et post gratiam, sicut eadem caro ante gratiam et post gratiam, sed in gratia nihil potest, extra gratiam praevalet.”

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So we should not say that baptism does not remove all sins, it does in truth remove them all, but not according to their substance. The greater number according to substance, and the totality in accordance with its power. At the same time it also removes them every day according to substance, so that it is extirpated.189

Here he emphasizes, apparently in contradiction to the forensic and imputed aspect that a change of man does indeed occur at baptism, since sin is removed, immediately as regards its reign, and in a progressive sense as regards its presence. The question here is, what change does Luther mean, granted that he has just said that the nature of sin remains the same? If we recall Luther’s words on baptism, we come closer to an answer : that sin came to be ruled because virtus dei was infused in baptism (and this virtus is not a supernatural form which completes man’s nature, a notion of which Luther has previously emphasized that he will hear nothing). That the reason why sin can do nothing in grace is that Christ has earned for man the law of the Spirit of life, of which the real work (opus proprium legis spiritus), is to free man immediately from the law of sin and death, and eventually entirely from sin and death, because there is a constant need for mortification and working against sin; and that man was “called into the kingdom of faith by the grace of baptism”. Other statements also point to what is at stake. Where Luther spoke of sin as a captive he said, “but what are the chains in this captivity? Isa 11:4, ‘Righteousness shall be the belt of his waist, and faithfulness the belt of his loins.’ And likewise Psalm 68:18, ‘You ascended on high, leading a host of captives in your train and receiving gifts among men.’”190 With all these passages Luther says that what occurs in baptism can in no way be ascribed to men, but is the work of God.191 The Power of God (virtus dei infusa), which is infused at baptism is God’s mercy, and it has not one but two aspects, the immediate remission of sin and the permanent expulsion of sin. This is the double gift of baptism: the assurance of immediate remission of sin and the goodwill of God (remission and removal in regard to the rule of sin), and the initiation of the progressive sweeping out of sin which lasts unto death (remission and removal in regard to the presence of sin). These were the two things Luther expressed when he spoke about the law of the Spirit of life the real work of 189 WA 8, 93,3–6: “Non ergo dicendum, quod baptismum non tollat omnia peccata, vere omnia tollit, non secundum substantiam, sed plurimum secundum substantiam et totum secundum vires eius, simul quottidie etiam tollens secundum substantiam, ut evacuetur.” 190 WA 8, 91,28–31: “Quae sunt autem vincula huius captivitatis? Isa. v. ‘Et erit fides cinctorium renum eius et iustitia cingulum lumborum eius.’ Sic psal. lxvij. ‘Ascendisti in altum, captivam duxisti captivitatem, accepisti dona in hominibus.’” 191 Luther explicitly expresses this in the section on baptism in De Captivitate Babylonica: “The baptism we receive through the hands of man is of course not men’s baptism, but Christ’s and God’s baptism.” (WA 6, 530,24–25: “Non enim hominis est sed Christi et dei baptismus, quem recipimus per manum hominis […].”)

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which (opus proprium) is to work what Christ has earned, i. e. the deliverance of man from the law of sin and death (remission), and the future deliverance from sin and death (the expulsion of sin). Both fall to man’s share in faith, hence the phrases “being called into the kingdom of faith by the grace of baptism” and “faith being the shackles of captivity”. That faith is not man’s own deed, but denotes that we partake of the work of Christ by God’s mercy,192 is suggested when Luther links the expression “faith as the shackles of captivity” with the quotation from Ps 68:19: “You ascended on high, leading a host of captives in your train and receiving gifts among men” (WA 8, 91,28–31). It is Christ who by virtue of his death and resurrection for man brings about both the immediate and the progressive removal of sin by the Spirit in faith. The effective side of the workings of baptism is thus part of the change in the relationship between God and man of which the forensic side of the workings of baptism is also an expression. In faith God at the same time confers on sinful man both the divinely ascribed righteousness and the workings of the incipient divine cleansing. The forensic and the effective aspects of baptism are therefore closely connected. Neither of the two aspects is present without the other. In His mercy God has chosen to be merciful to sinful man, and by the Spirit in the belief in Christ has given him His immediate remission of sin, and hence the removal of sin in regard to its reign. And at the same time He has chosen to let sin remain in man until death, so that at all times man needs to take refuge in His mercy and only gradually to expel sin by the Spirit in the belief in Christ, and thus remove it in regard to its presence. In Antilatomus Luther puts it thus, in an instruction on how things are constituted: Listen, dear brothers! We confess that good deeds are pleasing and that we entirely are redeemed through them. But they are not good in the sense that they are without sin, but because they have been done in the struggle against sin. Because that is what good deeds entirely consist in, that the sin is in us and that we battle with ourselves so that it shall have no dominion and so that we shall not obey its desires. Indeed, it is a fact that the severity of divine law could also demand of us that there was no such battle in us, for God did not create us like that in the beginning: “God made man righteous but he has brought confusion on himself with innumerable questions”, as the sage says. For because of this misery we are hindered in being whole-hearted in God’s law. And the part of us which battles against ourselves is in opposition to God’s law. Yet God has promised mercy and remission of sin to all who at least do not consent to this part, but battle against it and zealously work to eradicate it. This zealous work is pleasant to Him, 192 On this point, also compare its expression in De Captivitate Babylonica, WA 6, 530,15–18: “[…] quo solo, etiam si caeteris omnibus carere cogereris, servaberis. Est enim opus dei, non hominis, sicut Paulus docet. Caetera nobiscum et per nos operatur, hoc unicum in nobis et sine nobis operator” (emphasis added).

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not because it is worthy in itself, but because He himself takes compassion and has promised to show mercy. In order that you will therefore not grow conceited or arrogant you have something in yourself which gives you reason to fear judgement and severity and take refuge only in mercy, since it is because He shows mercy, and not because you run that your deeds are good. So you will judge yourself in one way according to the severity of God’s judgment, and in another way according to the goodness of His mercy. And these two ways of seeing things you will not be able to separate in this life. According to one part all your deeds are dirty and unclean, because of the part of you which is contrary to God. But according to the other you are completely clean and righteous. And as testimony that you are so, you have been given the sign of baptism in which in truth all your sins are forgiven, indeed totally forgiven, but where they are not all destroyed. For we believe that without a doubt all sins have been forgiven, but every day we are preoccupied with and expect that a destruction and total eradication of all our sins will take place. And those who work for this do good deeds (emphasis added).193

5.6.5 The paradoxicality of justification At first blush it seems easy to understand what Luther has said thus far : God has chosen not to impute the existing sin to man, and in addition He expels it with time. Nor does man act in baptism, but through the conferred faith in Christ he becomes the object of God’s work. But is it really so simple? The question arises as to whether the apparently harmonic relation between the imputed and the effective righteousness fits with what has been said above. In 193 WA 8, 95,25–96,11: “Ecce, optimi fratres, fatemur opera bona placere omninoque per ea nos salvari, sed non sic sunt bona, quod sine peccato sint, sed quia adversus peccatum pugnando facta sunt. Hoc ipsum enim bonum opus est totum, quod peccatum in nobis est, et nobiscum ipsis pugnamus ne regnet, ne obediamus concupiscenciis eius. Iam licet rigor legis divinae etiam hoc exigere possit, ut ista pugna in nobis non sit, quia tales non creavit nos ab initio, ‘rectum fecit deus hominem, ipse se miscuit infinitis quaestionibus’ (ait sapiens). Nam hoc malo impedimur, ne toti simus in eius lege, et pars nostri, quae nobiscum pugnat, legi eius adversatur. Tamen promisit misericordiam, et ignoscentiam omnibus, qui saltem non consentiant huic parti, sed pugnent adversus eam et abolere studeant. Hoc studium placet, non quia dignum, sed quia ipse indulsit et acceptare promisit. Proinde ne infleris aut superbias, habes in teipso, unde iudicium et rigorem metuas, et ad misericordiam solam tete conferas. Hac enim miserente, non te currente, bona sunt opera tua. Aliud ergo de te iudicabis secundum rigorem iudicii dei, aliud secundum benignitatem misericordiae eius. Et hos duos conspectus non separabis in hac vita. Secundum illum omnia opera tua polluta et immunda sunt propter partem tui adversariam deo, secundum hunc vero totus mundus et iustus. Atque ut hoc sis, Baptismi symbolum pro testimonio habes, in quo verissime omnia peccata tibi remissa sunt, remissa inquam in totum, sed nondum omnia abolita. Credimus enim remissionem peccatorum omnium factam absque dubio, sed agimus quottidie et expectamus, ut fiat etiam omnium peccatorum abolitio et omnimoda evacuatio. Et ii, qui in hoc laborant, faciunt opera bona.”

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his exegesis of 2 Cor 5:21, Luther did not restrict himself to saying that sin was forgiven but remained. What he said was that in faith sins are transferred from man to Christ, “[…] so that one who believes in Him really has no sins”. The sins had been “transferred to Christ and absorbed in Him”.194 As we have seen Luther’s point was that the Gospel of Christ when it is preached and heard “creates what it mentions”, that is to say causes an immediate re-creation of the being. When accepting the word in faith the old man is extirpated, as sin is removed, and the new justified man comes into being. At the same time it was said quite clearly, both in the analysis of the quotation from Isaiah and of the first half of Eccl 7:21, that the believers are not righteous by nature, but by grace. When the cloud of grace is removed from them they are unclean and worthy of condemnation, because they always contain sin. So what we have is not a harmonious relation between imputed and effective justification, but a paradoxical one. To speak both of the immediate re-creation in faith and the maintenance of the presence of sin unto death calls for contradiction. This element of the paradoxical corresponds to the typological structure of divine reality which has been noted several times: the existence of the timeless eternal meaning and forward-pointing temporal movement in one. As we have observed before, it is a concept of being that expresses that something exists from the very beginning, as essential, at the same time that it constantly comes into being at the expense of something else, something inessential, which slowly perishes. This means that what on the one hand always exists and is the same, on the other hand unendingly comes into being as something new. This is the strange fact that characterizes the reality conferred on man in Christ. Nor does the “easy” statement that God in Christ by the Spirit through faith personally deals with man through baptism seem immediately to fit Luther’s conception of man’s activity in connection with baptism. Also in the “instruction” quoted above as to the way things are constituted, man’s own activity seems to play a great part. Here Luther says: “that is what good deeds entirely consist in, that the sin is in us and that we battle with ourselves so that it shall have no dominion and so that we shall not obey its desires”, and “God has promised mercy and remission of sin to all who at least do not consent to this part, but battle against it and zealously work to eradicate it”. Of course it must be seen in connection with Luther’s emphasis that “this zealous work is pleasant to Him, not because it is worthy in itself, but because He takes compassion and has promised to show mercy […] since it is because He shows mercy, and not because you run that your deeds are good”. But it is still difficult to get away from man’s own significance. 194 WA 8, 87,8–9: “[…] ut omnis qui hoc ipsum credit, vere nulla peccata habeat, sed translata super Christum, absorpta in ipso”.

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Thus several things are obscure. How are we really to understand and express the combination of forensic and effective justification, if the complexity in their relations is to be taken into account? Is it at all possible to characterize justification sufficiently with the two concepts? And how are we to understand what Luther says about the activity of man while at the same time emphasizing that God alone works? There seems to be a synergetic element present in Luther’s theology which is not so very far from Latomus. As we have seen, Latomus also made it clear that it is first and foremost God who works for, in and with man, and that man only cooperates with God in a secondary sense. Before trying to determine these questions in greater detail through the reading of the last part of Antilatomus, the exegesis of the Epistle to the Romans, we must pay attention to yet another section from the exegesis of Eccl 7:21 (WA 8, 94,16–37). Here the paradox is present in what Luther says about man’s justification, and we get an impression of how different it is from what Latomus says. In that way this section leads on naturally to the analysis of Rom 7, in which Luther tries to go further into the matter. Luther here deals with Latomus’ charge against him of being just as bad as the Manichaeans, Cataphrygians and Tatianists, who were all expelled from the Church after denouncing marriage as sin, and thus acting in contravention of Paul’s statement in 1 Cor 7:28ff. Here Paul argues that being married, marrying and remaining unmarried can all, each in its own way, be the right thing to do, and therefore according to Latomus cannot be characterized as sin. According to Luther, Latomus wilfully misunderstands him with that accusation. Luther would never maintain that Paul in 1 Cor 7:28ff speaks of anything but what he says in Rom 6:12, as to not letting sin reign in the limbs. In other words the matter in hand is justified man’s way of relating to the ruled sin, and not the raging of the ruling sin, as Latomus accuses Luther of saying. Once that misunderstanding is out of the way, he says, he and Latomus do not seem to be so far from each other as to the understanding of the scriptural passage. Latomus himself says that the saints at times commit venial sins (peccata venialia) (WA 8, 94,35–37), and this, says Luther, is closely akin to what he himself says about the ruled sin. And yet the two theologians are poles apart in their interpretation of the passage in Paul, because as became apparent in the exegesis of Eccl 7:21, Luther and Latomus have widely different understandings of peccata venialia. In Latomus the venial sin is identical with the rare insignificant sins of commission which the righteous may unwillingly happen to commit. But they are of no great weight, as they are committed by one who is in all else righteous, who seeks refuge in the sacrament of penitence and is there forgiven for them. Latomus sees justified man, though still making insignificant errors, as at bottom righteous in and of himself, by virtue of the infusion of God’s grace in the shape of a supernatural virtue which completes nature. To Luther, on the other hand, pec-

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catum veniale is the term for the sin which always adheres to the believer as one of his essential qualities. In its nature and substance it is identical with sin in the infidel and has nothing to do with concrete deeds, although it cannot avoid leading to them. But by virtue of God’s mercy it is nevertheless not the same as in the infidel, for because of His favour it is paradoxically removed in both an immediate and a progressive perspective for the one who believes in Christ. So here justified man is seen as basically sinful in and of himself, and as righteous outside himself in Christ, solely by virtue of God’s merciful will, because of Christ, not to impute sin in the present and, in a progressive perspective, finally to remove the sin which is constantly inherent in man. That this disagreement is found between Luther and Latomus in spite of the apparent and superficial agreement, can be read out of Luther’s words when he tackles 1 Cor 7:28ff. He there emphasizes that he in fact is much more radical in what he says on the subject of Paul’s Epistle than is Latomus. Where the latter only speaks of alternatively sinning or doing good, Luther has already in the conclusion 2 to the Explanations to the Leipzig Disputation, with a reference to 1 John 3:9, averred that the righteous man cannot sin (non potest peccare) (WA 8, 94,20–25; cf. WA 2, 420,22ff). That is of course a stronger expression than saying that the righteous man does not sin, non peccat. And once it is said, according to Luther, it is also clear that the one who indulges in carnal desire in marriage, and thus gives to flesh what it demands, sins, because all agree that conception takes place in sin (WA 8, 94,25–29). Thus the virgin sins when marrying and does not sin: “[…] ergo peccat nubens, et non peccat” (WA 8, 94,29–30), which is a rephrasing of what Luther elsewhere expresses in the well-known phrase simul iustus simul peccator.195 The believing virgin is fully and entirely righteous in respect of God’s grace; at the same time she is fully and entirely a sinner in respect of His law. This corresponds to what Luther has said earlier in the instruction about how things are constituted: So you will judge yourself in one way according to the severity of God’s judgment, and in another way according to the goodness of His mercy. And these two ways of seeing things you will not be able to separate in this life. According to one part all your deeds are dirty and unclean because of the part of you which is contrary to God. But according to the other you are in every way clean and righteous.196

This manner of speaking is far beyond Latomus’ horizon. 195 Cf. Jüngel: 1999, 183, note 148–149. Jüngel here refers to a number of passages both in early and late Luther, where the expression is found in various wordings. 196 WA 8, 96,2–6: “Aliud ergo de te iudicabis bis secundum rigorem iudicii dei, aliud secundum benignitatem misericordiae eius. Et hos duos conspectus non separabis in hac vita. Secundum illum omnia opera tua polluta et immunda sunt propter partem tui adversariam deo, secundum hunc vero totus mundus et iustus.”

The Epistle to the Romans

5.7

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We have already noted that Luther does not take up new matter in the last third of the work, which ends with a concrete exegesis of Rom 7:14–8:1. The question that remains is still the character of sin after baptism. And this entails the nature of the work of Christ. Luther now attempts to explain his views in even greater detail than before. He begins his exegesis here differently from his method in the two other texts, Isa 64:6 and Eccl 7:21. This time he more or less avoids entering into a detailed discussion of Latomus’ reading. It is enough for him to note that Latomus moves “pale and timid, silent and cautious”197 through Rom 7:14–8:1, and only at the end makes digressions and collects quotations from the Fathers. So it seems that Luther is unaware that Latomus’ “interpretation” of Rom 7:14–8:1 consists in a single long quotation from Augustine’s Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum. This is no doubt why Luther suddenly thinks Latomus is cautious. The Augustine text does not offend him to the same degree as have Latomus’ own efforts hitherto. Yet in spite of the caution, Luther says, the fact remains that the point in Latomus’ section on Rom 7 is that what Luther with Paul calls sin after baptism is termed by Latomus and the Church Fathers a defect or imperfection (WA 8, 101,29–30.34–37). And therefore the caput dissensionis (WA 8, 101,38) is exactly what it has always been: whether it is because of its nature or solely because of the forgiving mercy that a sin, or as Latomus would have it, a weakness is not against God or His law (WA 8, 101,38–40). Thus Luther thinks he has Paul on his side, whilst Latomus has the Fathers on his. Or at least he thinks he has (WA 8, 101,40–102,3). That Latomus adduces the words of the Creed about believing in the remission of sins as an argument for his interpretation is unexceptionable, Luther concedes (WA 8, 102,33–36), but when the grounds for his conclusion are that sin after baptism is no longer a sin, he is in error (WA 8, 102,37–38). Latomus’ mind plays tricks on him here, and brings him into opposition to Paul, and to try to solve that problem he and others like him have invented the various scholastic distinctions of sin, for which they cannot, however, find any authority in Scripture (WA 8, 102,38–103,2). For his part Luther believes that with the aid of the Spirit, illustrante spiritu (WA 8, 103,4), he can find a way of speaking which takes into account both the piety of the Creed and Paul’s way of expressing himself, and thus he will not have to transform peccatum and give it several senses, but can understand it directly, simply and in its primary sense, simpliciter, proprie et germane (WA 8, 103,4–9). 197 WA 8, 99,30: “pallidus et trepidus, silens cautusque.”

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5.7.1 The treatment of sin according to the Law and the Gospel “Holy Writ speaks of sin in two ways, in one way through God’s law, in the other through God’s Gospel. These are God’s testaments instituted for our salvation, so that we can be freed of sin.”198 What this consists of is now treated in detail by Luther. The way of the Law consists in revealing sin, so that man understands what it is outside grace and in its primary sense (WA 8, 103,37–105,35), i. e. that it comprises two things: the corruption of nature and God’s wrath (corruptio naturae et ira dei) (WA 8, 103,39). The corruption of nature is sin as a basic leaven in man which takes the shape of concupiscence (concupiscentia), and comes to fruition in evil words and deeds.199 God’s wrath is sin as death and damnation to man. Luther characterizes these two aspects of sin as two evils, a first, interior, and a second exterior evil, of which the exterior is greater than the interior. The first, interior evil, corruptio naturae, man has brought upon himself. The other exterior evil, ira dei, is imposed on man by God. If only the corruption of nature existed as the first, interior, and lesser evil, man might have submitted to that and suffered it. But as wrath exists as the second, exterior, and greater evil, which goes hand in hand with the corruption of nature, man is threatened by death and hell, and this makes it impossible to man to be at ease in the first evil. The two evils maintain every man as a liar and a child of wrath in all respects. Not even apparently good deeds, be they art, science, wisdom or strength, are of any use to him, as the scholastics, well exemplified by Latomus, think. But in so far as these deeds truly are good deeds (WA 8, 104,41–42), says Luther, as they are God’s gifts, the law reveals not that they are evil in themselves, but that they are used for evil purposes because of the hidden original sin. Because of sin man trusts the apparently good deeds, and boasts of them instead of trusting and boasting in the Lord. Because this happens their hearts are even hardened, so that they in no way desire grace. The hardening has as its result that they are satisfied by doing the temporal good deeds, and neither can nor will accept that there is anything evil in goodness and wisdom, righteousness and worship of a visible and timely nature. This shows us how deep the sin is and how great the

198 WA 8, 103,35–37: “Scriptura divina peccatum nostrum tractat duobus modis, uno per legem dei, altero per Euangelium dei. Haec duo sunt testamenta dei ordinata ad salutem nostram, ut a peccato liberemur.” 199 Cf. also WA 8, 96,33–36, where Luther also talks of peccatum and concupiscentia as two inseparable things: “[…] peccatum et concupiscentiam eius. Verba Pauli aperta sunt, peccatum, fomes ipse, naturale malum, concupiscentia, motus eius, huic non obediendum, illud destruendum dicit [Rom 6:6] ‘ut destruatur (inquit) corpus peccati’”.

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wrath, within which all men are confined, and thus how the revelation of the law far surpasses natural reason. “The Gospel, however, speaks of sin in such a way that it removes it and thus follows in the most beautiful way upon the law, because the law led us into and buried us in sin through the acknowledgement of it, which caused us to long for the deliverance from sin and sigh for grace.”200 Just as the law taught man that sin is twofold, so does the Gospel. Just as sin, seen from the viewpoint of the law, is the corruption of nature and the wrath of God, from the viewpoint of the Gospel it is justice and God’s mercy (iustitia et gratia dei) (WA 8, 105,39). So here the subject is sin in grace and sin as a metaphor (WA 8, 105,36–107,12): “Through justice He heals the corruption of nature, the justice which is in truth God’s gift, that is faith in Christ.”201 This justice is in opposition to sin and is nearly always understood in Scripture as the root whose fruit is the good deeds (WA 8, 106,4– 6). And “the companion of this faith and justice is grace or mercy, God’s goodwill, in contrast to the wrath which is the companion of sin, so that everyone who believes in Christ shall have a merciful God”.202 Luther here states that he understands God’s mercy as goodwill (favor dei), and not as a quality in the soul as he perceives the scholastic theologians to do.203 Just as wrath is a greater evil than the corruption of nature, so grace is a greater good than the healing of righteousness, which comes from faith. Just as it is wrath that causes man to be threatened with death and destruction, it is grace that gives joy and peace to mankind (WA 8, 106,13–15), “because the remission of sin and peace are mainly ascribed to the grace of God […]”.204 Faith (righteousness) is thus the gift and the interior, minor good which is in opposition to sin (the corruption of nature), the interior, minor evil which it extirpates, whereas grace (God’s mercy or goodwill) is the exterior, major good which is in opposition to wrath (death and hell) as the major, exterior evil (WA 8, 106,20– 22). As wrath and grace are outside man (extra nos) (WA 8, 106,37–38), the fact 200 WA 8, 105,36–38: “Euangelium contra sic tractat peccatum, ut ipsum tollat, et sic pulcherrime legem sequitur. Lex enim introduxit et nos obruit peccato per cognitionem eius, quo fecit, ut ab illo liberari peteremus et gratiam suspiraremus.” 201 WA 8, 106,1–2: “Per iustitiam sanat corruptionem naturae, iustitiam vero, quae sit donum dei, fides scilicet Christi.” 202 WA 8, 106,6–8: “Huic fidei et iustitiae comes est gratia seu misericordia, favor dei, contra iram, quae peccati comes est, ut omnis qui credit in Christum habeat deum propitium.” 203 WA 8, 106,10–11. Cf. StA, 492, note 660. Here a number of quotations fromThomas’ Summa Theologiae are adduced, which show that Thomas both represents the idea of gratia as qualitas quaedam, and the idea of a dilectio dei, which can be compared with what Luther says about favor dei. The latter, however, must be separated from its effectus, which is infusio gratiae, according to Thomas. 204 WA 8, 106,18–19: “Nam remissio peccatorum et pax proprie tribuitur gratiae dei.”

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about them is that they are poured out as a whole (in totum effundatur) (WA 8, 106,38), because God relates to the person as one, in wrath or grace, so that the one who is under wrath is totally under wrath, and likewise with grace. Whoever God receives in grace He receives completely. God does not divide grace, just as He divides His gifts. He does not love the head and hate the feet, does not favour the soul and hate the body. And yet He gives the soul something which He does not give the body, and the head something which He does not give the feet. Likewise with wrath. The one He is angered with He is completely angered with, even though He does not punish him completely. But whereas He is thus differentiated and manifold in His gifts and in His punishment, in His grace and wrath He is one. Therefore grace and gifts, wrath and punishment must be kept apart, as only grace is eternal life and wrath eternal death (WA 8, 106,37–107,12). In Rom 5:17, Luther says, Paul distinguishes between grace and the gift: “For if, because of one man’s trespass, death reigned among many, then God’s grace and gift in this one man Jesus Christ has flown over to more.”205 And Luther expounds it thus: What he calls “the gift of this one man’s grace” is faith in Christ (which he also in several places calls the gift). It is given us in the grace of Christ, because He alone of all men was pleasing and welcome to God and had a merciful and mild God, so that He earned this gift and also this grace for us.206

Luther adduces John 1:17 (“the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ”) as a Scripture reference, and also John 1:14 (“full of grace and truth”), and he continues to explain that the truth that flows from Christ into us is faith, and grace accompanies faith because of the grace of Christ, witness again John, who says (1:16): “and from His fullness we have all received, grace upon grace”. This means that man has received his grace, i. e. that God favours him, because of the grace of Christ, because of which God favoured Him (WA 8, 106,33–34). Luther having now laid down the main characteristics regarding sin without and within grace, he can arrive at the heart of the matter : the conditions of the baptized (WA 8, 107,13–109,10). About this he says: The righteous believer no doubt possesses grace and the gift. Grace, which completely pardons him so that the person is accepted completely and there is no longer room for wrath in him. And the gift, which heals him from sin and from the entire corruption of 205 WA 8, 106,23–25: “haec duo sic Ro. v. distinguit: ‘Si enim unius delicto mortui multi sunt, multo magis gratia dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit.’” 206 WA 8, 106,25–28: “Donum in gratia unius hominis fidem Christi vocat (quam et saepius donum vocat), quae nobis data est in gratia Christi, id est, quia ille solus gratus et acceptus inter omnes homines, propitium et clementem deum haberet, ut nobis hoc donum et etiam hanc gratiam mereretur.”

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soul and body. So the most ungodly thing to say is that the baptized is still in sin or that not all sins are completely and entirely forgiven. Because what is left of sin where God shows goodwill and will know of no sin? Where he accepts it with all his being and hallows it all?207

But that this is the situation after baptism must not be ascribed to man’s own purity (nostra puritas), but solely to the grace of the favouring God. Everything is forgiven by grace, but not everything is healed by the gift. The gift is infused, the leavening is mixed in and works so that it can extirpate the sin which the baptized one is already forgiven. And while this extirpation is in progress, sin is still called peccatum and is also truly sin by nature, but now a sin without wrath and the law : it is a dead and harmless sin (= the ruled sin) (WA 8, 107,24–26). For grace there is thus no sin, because it is pleased with the whole person. But for the gift the sin is there, which it extirpates and fights. Yet on the other hand, the baptized one would not be pleasing or have grace without the gift which works at sweeping out sin: Thus I say and teach that every man should know that in each of his deeds he harbours as much sin as is left of sin in him which has not yet been expelled, because as the tree is, so are the fruits. And he must know this, so that he shall not brag before God of a purity he has in himself, but he shall brag in the grace and gift of God, because he has a merciful God who does not impute this sin to him, and even gives the gift by which He extirpates it.208

At last Luther adduces a number of Scripture texts in confirmation of what he has put forward. In Luke 24:47 Christ says that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be proclaimed, and in Matt 3:2 and 4:17 it says the same: “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” And that, insists Luther, tallies entirely with what he has just said: “As long as sermons are delivered, as long as life is lived, there must be repentance and renewal so that sin can be extirpated.”209 “Penitence is the change of corruption and the constant renewal away from sin which faith works, God’s gift, while forgiveness is the gift of grace, so that no sin is found 207 WA 8, 107,13–19: “Iustus et fidelis absque dubio habet gratiam et donum: gratiam, quae eum totum gratificet, ut persona prorsus accepta sit, et nullus irae locus in eo sit amplius, donum vero, quod eum sanet a peccato et tota corruptione sua animi et corporis. Impiissimum ergo est dicere, baptisatum esse adhuc in peccatis, aut non esse omnia peccata plenissime remissa. Quid enim ibi peccati, ubi deus favet et nullum nosse vult peccatum, totusque totum acceptat et sanctificat?” 208 WA 8, 108,2–6: “Ita dico et doceo, ut omnis homo in omni opere suo sciat se tantum habere de peccato, quantum in ipso nondum est eiectum peccatum, qualis arbor, talis fructus, ne glorietur coram deo de mundicia sua in seipso, glorietur autem in gratia et dono dei, quod faventem deum habet, qui hoc peccatum non imputat, insuper donum dedit, quo expurget.” 209 WA 8, 109,17–19: “Quam diu praedicatur, quam diu vivitur, poenitendum et novandum est, ut peccatum expellatur.”

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under wrath.”210 So life must be changed and this is done by faith, as it extirpates sin, and one must be under the reign of God, which grace causes, as it forgives sin (WA 8, 109,21–22), because it is a fact that “as I have said, the law causes sin to be acknowledged, but Christ heals by faith and leads back to the grace of God”.211 All this, he says, corresponds closely to the parable in Matt 13:33 about the leaven in the three measures of wheat, the parable of the good Samaritan in Luke 10:33ff and the statement in John 13:10 that one who has bathed is completely clean but still needs to wash his feet. That he is clean is due to grace, but yet he washes his feet for the remaining sin through the working faith (WA 8, 109,31–33). The difficulty, however, is not so much understanding the first set of concepts, wrath and sin, but to understand the second. What does Luther mean by “grace” and “the gift” respectively?212 As an aid to elucidating this, we will briefly attempt to show how Luther uses many different words to denote the same matter, seen from different standpoints. It becomes clear when we study how in different passages he uses the expressions virtus dei and infusa, and also the combination virtus dei infusa. He used the expression in Antilatomus, and again when he characterized the ruled sin after baptism. Virtus dei infusa was in that connection expounded as God’s justifying mercy, with its two aspects, forensic and effective. In the Second Lecture on the Psalms, in the commentary to Ps 21:14, “Be exalted, O Lord, in your strength” (Exaltare, domine, in virtute tua), Luther explains what virtus dei encompasses (WA 5, 595,1–31). He first gives an explanation of what virtus denotes in common usage, and then adduces a number of examples of the use of the expression in Scripture: Ps 45:2 (Vulgate), “God is our refuge and our strength” (Deus noster refugium et virtus), in 1 Cor 1:24, where Paul calls Christ virtus dei, and Rom 1:16: “the gospel is the power of God (virtus dei) for salvation to everyone who believes.” From all these passages, he says, we learn that Here virtus dei is that by virtue of which He is mighty in His saints through the Spirit, through which the saints can do everything they are able to do, as it belongs to them

210 WA 8, 109,13–15: “poenitentia est immutatio corruptionis et renovatio de peccato assidua, quam operatur fides, donum dei, et remissio gratiae donum est, ut non sit ibi peccatum irae.” 211 WA 8, 109,30–31: “Lex peccatum (ut dixi) cognoscere facit, sed Christus per fidem sanat et in gratiam dei reducit.” 212 Cf. Højlund: 1992, 38, note 7. Here he enumerates a number of the most important passages containing donum and gratia found in Luther’s works, from the Lecture on Romans 1515– 16, all the way up to the exegesis of Isa 53 i 1544.

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almost like a natural power which is implanted by the word of God, just as warmth belongs to the fire, weight to a stone and the like.213

In the commentary to Ps 17:7, “Wondrously show your steadfast love, O Saviour of those who seek refuge from their adversaries at your right hand” (WA 5, 477,29–478,8), God’s right hand, i. e. God’s power or strength, virtus dei, according to Luther is God’s grace, goodwill and mercy (gratia, favor, misericordia dei), with which He powerfully protects men against all their enemies.214 And because of that, Luther goes on, Isaiah in chapter 53:1 calls Christ the arm of the Lord, Ps 97:1 (Vulgate) says that “His right hand and His holy arm have worked salvation for him”; 1 Cor 1:24, which he has cited already, calls Christ “the power of God and the wisdom of God”, and Rom 1:16 the Gospel virtus dei. And he sums up: Ergo: God’s word, which is Christ preached to us, is that by which, as by an unvanquished right arm, an immovable rock, an untouchable foundation, a cornerstone, and a most victorious horn, we are preserved, strengthened, edified, united and victorious in all things through everything. Let this be said once and for all about God’s right arm, since nothing but God’s word animates, sustains, forms, educates, trains, protects, preserves and lifts us to victory in eternal life.215

So virtus dei denotes both God’s strength, the Gospel, that by which He is powerful in His saints through the Spirit, God’s right hand, God’s grace, goodwill and mercy and God’s word. And as is made clear in the two passages from the Psalms, they are all poetic transcriptions for the work of Christ. The same is true when we study what, according to Luther, can be infusus. Here things are simply seen from another angle than that adopted for virtus dei. Now it is not only God’s work in an overall perspective which is looked at, but the work of the same God, as it falls to man’s lot. In thesis 25 in the Heidelberg Disputation, Luther says of the righteous man that he is not righteous by virtue of a righteousness acquired with deeds, but by virtue of God’s justice (iustitia dei), which is infused (infunditur) through faith. Because “grace and faith are infused (gratia et fides infunditur) without our 213 WA 5, 595,14–17: “Ex quo patet, quod virtus dei hoc loco ea est, qua in sanctis suis per spiritum potens est, per quam omnia possunt sancti, quaecunque possunt, cum sit eorum haec velut naturalis et verbo dei ingenita virtus sicut calor igni et lapidi gravitas et similia.” 214 WA 5, 477,33–34: “[…] dextera, potentia seu virtus dei est ipsa gratia, favor misericordia dei, qua nos potenter invitis omnibus hostibus servat”. 215 WA 5, 477,37–478,3: “Summa: Verbum dei, quod Christus est praedicatus nobis, est, quo velut dextera invicta, petra immobili, fundamento inconcusso, lapide angulari, cornu victoriosissimo servamur, consistimus, aedificamur et copulamur, vincimus in omnibus et per omnia. Hoc semel pro omnibus de dextera dei dictum sit, nec enim alio quopiam quam verbo suo nos vivificat, gignit, alit, educat, exercet, protegit, servat et triumphat in aeternam vitam.”

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deeds, and when they are (qua infusa), the deeds now follow”.216 And the one who does deeds which come from such a faith knows that they are not his own but God’s. For him that righteousness is sufficient as his, which comes from faith in Christ, i. e. Christ is his wisdom, righteousness, etc. The righteousness of God we here contemplate, then, is Christ’s righteousness. Christ is iustus because He is the one who fulfils all God’s commandments, and therefore He is also the one through whom man fulfils all commandments when He has fallen to the lot of man through faith (WA 2, 364,24–26): “Because when Christ lives in us through faith He moves us to deeds through this living faith in His deeds.”217 In conclusion 2 of the Explanation to the Leipzig Disputation, which Latomus used as the point of departure for his assault on Luther, Luther adduces Matt. 13:33, on the leaven in the three measures of wheat, as Scriptural proof that there is sin in the good deed, that sin is not forgivable because of its nature but because of God’s mercy, and that sin remains after baptism (WA 2, 411,1–3). The flour, Luther says, is man, and the leaven is the hidden Christ, the grace that is conferred on man in the spirit of faith.218 And he goes on to say that as the leaven does not immediately leaven the whole dough, so the infused grace (gratia infusa) is not immediately distributed in the whole body, but little by little it leavens man and makes him similar to it. Therefore sin is left behind here, but because it has begun to be extirpated it is not imputed to the one who extirpates it. This is what it means that the sins are forgiven in baptism: that they are not imputed, not that they are totally extirpated.219

The same thing is said by Luther in his comment on Gal 5:17, in his Galatians Commentary of 1519: As the water that is poured into the wine on the altar first fights with the wine until it is absorbed and becomes wine, so grace is hidden, and as was said above, the leaven in the three measures of wheat, until it has leavened it all.220

216 WA 2, 364,8–9: “Sine enim opere nostro gratia et fides infunditur, qua infusa iam sequuntur opera.” 217 WA 2, 364,30–31: “Quia dum Christus in nobis habitat per fidem, iam movet nos ad opera per vivam illam fidem operum suorum.” 218 WA 2, 414,23–24: “Sat nunc est, farinam esse nos homines, fermentum absconditum Christum, gratiam nobis largitam in spiritu fidei.” 219 WA 2, 414,34–39: “Sed sicut fermentum non subito fermentat conspersionem totam, ita gratia infusa non mox diffunditur per totum corpus, sed paulatim totum hominem fermentat sibique similiem reddit. Quare peccatum ibi reliquum est, sed, quia ceptum expurgari, non imputatur expurgatori: hoc est enim, in baptismo omnia peccata remitti, non imputari scilicet, non autem penitus evacuari.” 220 WA 2, 586,20–23: “Sic aqua vino infusa in altari primum pugnat cum vino, donec absorbeatur et vinum fiat: ita gratia et, ut supra dictum est, fermentum in satis tribus absconditur, donec fermentetur totum.”

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Thus what can be infusus can be God’s justice, grace and faith, and in different ways it is all an expression of the doings of Christ as they are apportioned to man, just as the various expressions of virtus dei were poetical transcriptions of Christ’s doings in an overall perspective. In the Sermon on Two Kinds of Righteousness (1519) Luther expresses quite precisely what he means by virtus dei infusa. The sermon takes its point of departure in the hymn of the Epistle to the Phillippians, Phil 2:5f which brings to mind Ps 68:18, which Luther adduced as scriptural proof for what happens in baptism: “You ascended on high, leading a host of captives in your train and receiving gifts among men.” Of virtus dei infusa he says: That is how to understand this passage in Ps 31:2: “In you, O Lord, do I take refuge; let me never be put to shame! In your righteousness deliver me and rescue me.” He does not say “in my”, but “in your”, i. e. in the righteousness of Christ my God which has become ours by faith, by grace, by the mercy of God, and in the book of Psalms this is in many places called “the work of the Lord”, “confession”, “God’s power” (virtus dei), “mercy”, “truth” and “justice”. All these things are terms for faith in Christ, indeed for the righteousness which is in Christ. Therefore, the Apostle dares say in Gal 2:20, “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me”, and in Eph 3:17, “that He may grant you that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith”. This alien righteousness, which is infused in us, infusa nobis, without our deeds, through grace solely, as the Father inwardly draws us to Christ, is set up against original sin, which similarly is alien, is innate and inflicted solely by heredity without our deeds. And thus Christ drives out Adam, more and more day by day, in accordance with the growth of this faith and acknowledgment of Christ. Because full righteousness is not infused at once, but it begins, proceeds and is eventually completed through death.221

Here Luther says directly that the various terms, opus dei, confessio, virtus dei, misericordia, veritas and iustitia are terms for the righteousness which is in Christ, and which is infused (infusa) into man by fides/gratia/misericordia. It is alien to man and is therefore infused from outside, ab extra. This is the righteousness by which Christ is just and justifies by faith, and that is how what is 221 WA 2, 146,20–35: “Sic intelligitur illud ps. xxx. In te, domine, speravi, non confundar in aeternum: in iusticia tua libera me, non ‘in mea’, sed ‘in tua’, inquit, id est in iusticia Christi dei mei, quae est per fidem, per gratiam, per misericordiam dei nostra facta, et haec vocatur in psalterio per multa loca opus domini, confessio, virtus dei, misericordia, veritas, iusticia. Omnia haec sunt nomina fidei in Christum, immo iusticiae quae est in Christo. Unde Apostolus ad Gala: ij. audet dicere: Vivo iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus, et ad Ephe. iij. Ut det vobis Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris. Haec igitur iusticia aliena, et sine actibus nostris per solam gratiam infusa nobis, trahente intus scilicet patre nos ad Christum, opponitur peccato originali, quod alienum similiter est sine nostris actibus per solam generationem nobis cognatum et contractum. Et ita Christus expellit Adam de die in diem magis et magis, secundum quod crescit illa fides et cognitio Christi. Non enim tota simul infunditur, sed incipit, proficit et perficitur tandem in fine per mortem.”

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found in 1 Cor 1:30 works, He “who became to us wisdom from God, righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (sapientia et iustititia et sanctificatio et redemption) (WA 2, 145,9–12). It is this righteousness which is given to man in baptism and at the time of every true penance, so that man can boast in Christ and say that everything that is His has been apportioned to him, just as in the relation between a bridegroom and a bride (WA 2, 145,14–21). As will be seen, the expression virtus dei infusa denotes Christ and His works in all the passages mentioned, but is transcribed with words (as far as virtus dei is concerned) as different as: God’s power, the Gospel, that by which God is mighty in His saints through the Spirit, God’s right hand, God’s grace (gratia), God’s goodwill (favor), Gods mercy (misericordia), and God’s word. And as regards infusus: God’s grace (gratia), God’s justice (iustitia), and faith (fides). This observation is useful in figuring out what Luther means when he speaks of grace and the gift. Also when referring to grace and the gift he uses several different transcriptions of both concepts. Both terms together he calls the Gospel. “Grace” (gratia) he calls God’s mercy, misericordia dei (WA 8, 106,6), God’s goodwill (favor dei) (WA 8, 106,7.22), the external good, bonum externum (WA 8, 106,22), and he also talks of a gift in connection with grace. The gift of grace (donum gratiae) is remission (remissio) (WA 8, 109,15). “The gift” (donum) he calls both God’s justice (iustitia dei) (WA 8, 105,39; 106,1), faith in Christ (fides Christi) (WA 8, 106,2; 106,25), the healing of justice (sanitas iustitiae) (WA 8, 106,17), the internal good (bonum internum) (WA 8, 106,20), and the evangelical leaven (fermentum Euangelicum) (WA 8, 106,21). And as a parallel to the gift of grace equating with the remission of sin, Luther defines the “gift” of the gift as the constant renewal away from sin (renovatio de peccato assidua) (WA 8, 109,14). If we compare what he says about grace and the gift with what is said of virtus dei infusa, there seem to be many parallels. Virtus dei, which has been described as God’s work in an overall perspective, was characterized by the words gratia, favor and misercordia, like “grace”. And what could be infusus and was described as God’s work, as that which is apportioned to man, like the “gift” was characterized by the words iustitiae dei and fides. God’s work in an overall perspective as well as God’s work as it is apportioned to man are united in Christ, as became clear from the examples adduced, especially from the Sermon on Two Kinds of Righteousness. Here virtus dei infusa was found as one expression, and Luther explained that God’s work, in an overall perspective, i. e. His mercy, power, truth and justice (misericordia, virtus, veritas and iustitia) are thus also here names for God’s work as it is apportioned to man, i. e. the righteousness which is in Christ and which is infused in man by faith, grace and mercy (fides, gratia, misericordia). We even see how several words, misericordia and iustitia,

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are found so to speak on both sides in this text, just as other texts showed how gratia was used both of virtus dei and of what is infusa. God’s work in an overall perspective, and God’s work as it is apportioned to man, which can be seen as a parallel to what is said about bonum externum and bonum internum, are thus united in Christ. That in this way it is Christ who is the centre of man’s justification has already been suggested in the previous section on ruling and ruled sin. This was especially seen in Luther’s use of the quotation from Ps 68:18 (WA 8, 91,28–31). The terms virtus dei for “God’s work in an overall perspective” and infusus for “God’s work as it is apportioned to man” can be applied to the forensic and effective aspect of justification, respectively. Equally grace and the gift are clearly expressions of the two different sides of the one work of Christ. In Antilatomus Luther determines grace as the greater exterior good, which confers immediate remission of sin and hence the removal of sin as regards its reign. Grace seen from God’s point of view is total, that is, in His mercy God receives the complete man and regards him as totally pure and righteous, and in that way grace is here an expression of the forensic and imputed aspect of justification in Christ. In contrast, it characterizes the gift that it is the minor, interior good which extirpates sin understood as the corruption of nature, and thus causes the removal of sin in respect of its presence. The gift is not total like grace, but is rather a “partial perspective”, i. e. it differs in size from man to man. In that way it is an expression of the ever-growing effective and extirpatory aspect of justification in Christ. Luther also emphasizes here that the two aspects are inseparable. Neither of them, grace or gift, the forensic or the effective aspect, can be present without the other : For grace there is no sin, because it takes pleasure in the complete person, but for the gift the sin is there to be extirpated and fought. But nor would the person be pleasing or possess grace, if it were not for the gift which works to extirpate sin in this way.222

And that the two aspects are united in Christ and are thus two sides of the same matter, that is of His works, also emerges. This was what Luther intended with his reference to Rom 5:17: “For if, because of one man’s trespass, death reigned among many, then God’s grace and gift in this one man Jesus Christ has flown over to more.”223 Here he emphasized that it is because Christ was pleasing to God and had a merciful God, and thus earned righteousness for man, that grace 222 WA 8, 107,32–35: “Gratia quidem nullum ibi peccatum habet, quia persona tota placet, donum autem peccatum habet, quod expurget et expugnet, sed et persona non placet nec habet gratiam, nisi ob donum hoc modo peccatum expurgare laborans.” 223 WA 8, 106,23–25: “haec duo sic Ro. v. distinguit: ‘Si enim unius delicto mortui multi sunt, multo magis gratia dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit.’”

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and the gift are apportioned to man through the faith in Him. This is also expressed in the reference to John 1:16: “And from His fullness we have all received grace upon grace.” And later Luther says explicitly that such is the case: “[…] Christ heals by faith and leads us back to God’s grace.”224

5.7.2 Mysterium Christi Luther is aware that what he says about “grace” and “the gift” as it has just been detailed, may be misunderstood. When we read it, it might immediately be possible to understand what he says about “grace” and “the gift” as an affair between God and man, which is close to what the scholastics say about man’s justification. Seen from Latomus’ point of view, “grace” (i. e. special grace), should be the basis for the infusion of the virtue of love in man, and “the gift” would be the virtue of this actual infused love which causes supernature to perfect man, and causes him to be turned right (though still as “viator”, i. e. on his way to the final perfection).225 But that is absolutely not how “grace” and “the gift” are to be understood. They can only be understood in relation to Christ as will have been seen, and Luther now emphasizes it yet more heavily. The important thing, he says, is to understand what faith in Christ is (fides Christi) (WA 8, 111,27–112,15). And he here rigorously dissociates himself from everything he sees as scholastic misunderstanding. It has to be grasped that God has not given men his grace (gratia), and gift (donum), so that they can then lose their way in themselves and in these gifts of His (WA 8, 111,29–30). The intention is not that men should find rest in that which they have received, and feel secure and satisfied there (WA 8, 111,34). Faith is not, as the scholastics think, a quality in the soul (WA 8, 114,22–23), in which one can seek support after having received it (WA 8, 112,10). On the contrary what is characteristic of faith is that it is trust in a man, God’s son, whom God in His mercy has provided so that man can trust in Him and not in themselves: Christ (WA 8, 111,27–28). It has been God’s will that we find support in Christ, so the incipient righteousness is not enough for us, unless it adheres to Christ’s righteousness and flows from Him. […] He has wanted us to be drawn into Him, more and more day by day, not rest with what we have received, but be transformed fully into Christ.226 224 WA 8, 109,30–31: “[…] Christus per fidem sanat et in gratiam dei reducit”. 225 Cf. Luther’s earlier derisive characterization of the erroneous understanding of “grace” and “the gift”, which heavily emphasizes how not to understand the two terms. 226 WA 8, 111,31–35: “[…] voluit, ut in Christum niteremur, ut nec iustitia illa cepta nobis satis sit, nisi in Christi iustitia haereat et ex ipso fluat. […] sed in illum nos rapi de die in diem magis voluit, non in acceptis consistere, sed in Christum plane transformari”.

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Therefore, he says (WA 8, 111,36–112,15), Paul clearly emphasizes the preaching of faith in Christ in such a way that it is not only understood as a righteousness that comes through Christ or from Christ, but which also leads into Christ. In faith man is led into Christ and transformed into Him and in a sense hidden there until God’s wrath is assuaged. So faith is nothing in itself, but is that man hides under the wings of Christ and boasts in Him. It is the very fact that man seeks refuge in Christ: It is faith only which makes you a chicken and Christ a hen, so that you may hope under his wings. […] You must know that faith is that you have adhered to Him, boasted in Him because He is holy and just for you. See, this faith is the gift of God which obtains God’s grace for us and extirpates sin, and makes us safe and secure, not because of our deeds, but because of Christ’s, so that we can live and remain forever as is written; “His justice lasts forever and ever (Ps 112:3).”227

Thus Luther has not only dissociated himself from the scholastic misunderstandings, but also from too much focus on “grace” and “the gift” as respectively the forensic and effective aspect of justification. When Luther refers to and uses the two terms, which of course he does, it is to emphasize that justification in Christ has two time dimensions: the immediate and the progressive. But the paradoxicality which exists between them and which makes it difficult to explain their mutual relationship reveals that they are not transparent logical-philosophical time dimensions, but time dimensions that only make sense, or rather, perhaps, become real to the believer who hears Christ proclaimed. If we try to account for them and the relationship between them with rational schematic tables, we thereby easily get the meaning wrong, and what may happen is that we will lose sight of Christ. This opens up the danger of making the same error as the scholastics, according to Luther. What he criticizes them for is exactly losing sight of mysterium Christi in their attempt to decipher the rational truth of divine reality on a logical-philosophical basis. Seen from the belief in Christ, however, the two aspects make sense as two sides of one and the same matter : the simultaneous existence of the timeless eternity present in the moment (the forensic aspect) and the progressive temporal movement (the effective aspect) in the workings of Christ, which become man’s in faith. So dealing with them is also part of the attempt to say who Christ is and what He works for man. 227 WA 8, 112,8–9.11–15: “[…] ea demum fides est, quae te pullastrum, Christum gallinam facit, ut sub pennis eius speret. […] fidem esse scias, si ei adheseris, de ipso praesumpseris, quod tibi sanctus iustusque sit. Ecce haec fides est donum dei, quae gratiam dei nobis obtinet et peccatum illud expurgat, et salvos certosque facit, non nostris, sed Christi operibus, ut subsistere et permanere inaeternum possimus, sicut scriptum est: ‘Iustitia eius manet in seculum seculi.’”

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What Luther states in this section is that faith, fides Christi, is man’s transformation to Christ and hence also the presence of Christ in man, both in an immediate total and a progressive partial perspective. This means that it is the happy exchange between Christ and man, the exchange which characterizes the workings of Christ: communicatio idiomatum with a soteriological bias. In faith God and man are united in Christ, and here the disagreement between Luther and Latomus is concentrated. Even though they might seem basically to agree, since neither of them says that what remains after baptism is damnabilis, whether they call it peccatum or poena, they in no way agree de causa ipsa, says Luther (WA 8, 112,16–19). Because in making nature innocent by ascribing to it that which belongs to God’s grace, thus making men secure (securi), Latomus diminishes the knowledge of mysterium Christi, and thus also the praise and love of God. He quite simply does not have an eye for the inordinate goodness of God’s grace, which is spread over sinners (WA 8, 112,19–23). Luther’s use of the expression fides Christi is nevertheless still difficult to grasp. Speaking of the two pairs of concepts peccatum/ira and donum/gratia, Luther spoke about fides Christi in connection with donum, i. e. in connection with one aspect, the effective one, of what has been described as two aspects of justification. But in what we have just read he goes into a subtler understanding of fides Christi. Here faith in Christ is the exchange between Christ and man, in which both aspects of justification, the forensic and the effective, are apportioned to man, to repeat: “Faith is that you adhere to Him, boast in Him because He is holy and just for you. See, this faith is the gift of God which obtains God’s grace [= gratia] for us and extirpates sin [= donum].”228 A little later in the work Luther says as much again, with a reference to Rom 5:15: “The grace of God and the free gift they have by the grace of Him.”229 One might express it, well knowing the danger of systematizing Luther’s expressions too readily, thus, that the “overall” gift in other words is Christ, granted in faith, and it entails the two “inferior” gift aspects, i. e. remissio (gratia) and renovatio (donum). The point is that as Christ is present in faith, the major exterior good (grace) and the minor interior good (the gift) are apportioned to man.230 Not to misunderstand what Luther means when he speaks of fides Christi, it is as well to note his emphasis that faith is nothing in itself, but is what connects man to Christ. Therefore it is not fides Christi, which is central, but fides Christi, i. e. Christ’s person and work which is conferred and received in faith, and it must 228 WA 8, 112,11–13: “[…] fidem esse scias, si ei adheseris, de ipso praesumpseris, quod tibi sanctus iustusque sit. Ecce haec fides est donum dei, quae gratiam dei nobis obtinet et peccatum illud expurgate”. 229 WA 8, 114,14–15: “gratiam et donum in gratia illius habent”. 230 Cf. the fact that Luther has spoken about donum gratiae as remissio in contrast to donum (i. e. the gift of donum), which is renovatio de peccato assidua (WA 8, 109,14–15).

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not be overlooked that the genitive can be both subjective and objective. It can mean both Christ’s own faith, i. e. the faith for which Christ is the subject, and man’s faith in Christ, i. e. the faith in which Christ is the object. Earlier it was shown with a quotation from Steiger, as well as a quotation from De libertate christiana, what is meant by the assertion that the person and work of Christ are conferred on man in faith. In faith Christ and man become one, so that sin is vanquished and justice reigns, both in a momentary and total, and a progressive and partial perspective. This does not mean that man becomes God because God became sin. In Christ man becomes God’s without becoming God, because in Christ God became man’s without becoming sin.231 As Mannermaa expresses it: Die Rechtfertigung ist nach Luther nicht ausschliesslich eine neue ethische oder juristische Relation zwischen Gott und Mensch. Wo ein Mensch an Christus glaubt, ist Christus selbst in der ganzen Fülle seines göttlichen Wesens im Glauben anwesend. Luther versteht die Gegenwart Christi auf eine so konkrete Weise, dass Christus und der Christ “eine Person” bilden. Im “fröhlichen Wechsel” wird der Mensch der Idiome Gottes teilhaftig (Mannermaa: 1989, 92).

Here the faith of Christ is taken to be a subjective genitive (Christ as subject): as the conferred God’s work in men without men,232 which was what Luther expressed in Antilatomus with the quotation from Ps 68:18. Similarly faith can also be seen from the other side, as man’s reception of Christ as the same God’s work (the objective genitive; man as active). This, too, has been suggested above; here faith was explained as a combination of man’s intellectus and affectus, in which the principal basic affection was trust in God, awakened by the Spirit. And in the section on “Interpretation of Scripture” it was demonstrated how the appearance of faith and its understanding is worked in man, as man receives the work by the Spirit, in which the Spirit extirpates everything that is man’s own (the negative side), and refers him solely to cling to Christ as God’s word (the positive side). And it was emphasized that this work by the Spirit was not a single event, but has aspects of both moment and progression, and thus continues all the way through life. This corresponds to Luther’s statement that faith is not a thing man has, a quality of the soul, but something he does, when and whenever he takes refuge in Christ: “[…] you must know that faith is that you adhere to Him”.233 231 The character of the unity again corresponds to the way Luther explained the unity and the simultaneous difference of essence in the biblical synecdochal unities in Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis. 232 See De Captivitate Babylonica, WA 6, 530,15–18: “[…] quo solo, etiam si caeteris omnibus carere cogereris, servaberis. Est enim opus dei, non hominis, sicut Paulus docet. Caetera nobiscum et per nos operatur, hoc unicum in nobis et sine nobis operator.” 233 WA 8, 112,11: “[…] fidem esse scias, si ei adheseris […]”.

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The character of the relationship of faith as being turned towards Christ, as the alien external word which grants man a new self which turns him away from himself, is inseparably connected with the thought that man takes part in God’s qualities through faith. These qualities are not granted to and do not complete the man who exists already, but on the contrary the man who already exists is transformed and re-created by the happy exchange, so that he gives up everything he was before and becomes a new re-created man, God’s creature. Having the divine qualities apportioned in the faith in Christ, then, means being turned away from the old self and turned to God in the belief in Christ, which is man’s original destiny, so that he “comes to himself” outside himself. Jüngel expresses it as follows: Doch nun muss […] geltend gemacht werden, dass das den Sünder derart ansprechende, ihm derart nahe kommende rechtfertigende Wort diesen gerade nicht in sich bleiben lässt, sondern den inneren Menschen aus sich herausruft und heraussetzt. Bliebe der innere Mensch in sich, dann wäre er in der Tat nicht gerechtfertigt. Das ist ja schon die schöpfungstheologische Bestimmung des Gott entsprechenden Menschen: aus sich herauszugehen, um ausser sich bei anderen Personen und vor allem bei der Person des ganz anderen Gottes zu sich selbst zu kommen. […] Das rechtfertigende Wort vom Kreuz spricht den inneren Menschen auf dieses Ausserhalb seiner Existenz an, damit er dort zu sich selbst komme und also wirklich und effektiv erneuert wird. “Ist jemand in Christus, dann ist er eine neue Kreatur” (2. Kor. 5,17) (Jüngel: 1999, 181– 182).234

The workings of the spirit for the emergence of faith, in the shape of extinction of what is man’s own and the granting of Christ as God’s word, is identical with what Luther in the section on Romans characterized as respectively the law’s and grace’s way of relating to sin. Here he said that what the law says about sin works the acknowledgement of sin in the man who is not hardened, but who hears the words of the law (= the negative side). Through that the law causes man to long to be freed of sin and to sigh for grace. What the Gospel says about sin, according to Luther, “follows in the most beautiful way upon the law” as it works what the law could not. By preaching the metaphorical sin, which is the word and work of Christ, the Gospel confers the desired deliverance on sinful man by removing the sin (= the positive side). 234 Actually it here looks as if Jüngel takes into account the Finnish Luther scholarship’s critique of German Luther scholarship, which is accused of being too forensic and being unaware of effective justification. And at the same time the comment is an indirect critique of a tendency Jüngel seems to see in Finnish Luther interpretation (cf. his note to Mannermaa, Jüngel: 1999, 181, note 145): a tendency to speak of Christian being as an immanent component in man, which plays down or even overlooks the externity of the Word and thus the character of Christian being as being in relation to something else, and thus being a relation. The relation between being and relation is not antagonistic in Jüngel, as the quotation also shows.

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Unio between God and man in the belief in Christ by virtue of the happy exchange thus takes the shape of death and resurrection before the eyes of man. It develops as a simultaneous destruction of everything that is man’s own and a re-creation as God’s creation.235 About this Jüngel goes on to say : 235 In Antilatomus one is not told much more about the cross-theological movement by which the preaching of Christ and hence the emergence of faith in man is shaped. But this is described by Luther in the section “De Spe et Passionibus” for Ps 5:12 i the Second Lecture on the Psalms. Even though hope is central to the section Luther mostly speaks about all three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity, for the same basic definition is true of them all: according to Heb11:1 and Rom 8:24 they relate to the things that are not seen (AWA 2, 294,1–9): “Rom 8:24. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees?” Likewise, he who believes what he sees, what does he believe in? He who loves what he sees, what does he love?” (AWA 2, 294,2–4). What characterizes true hope, true faith and true charity, then, is the fact that they are hope for, faith in, love of the promised, invisible incomprehensible God which we have only heard mentioned by the word. And this fact, says Luther, is by far the worst for man, for it means that he must give up everything visible, sensible and comprehensible. And it can mean nothing but tribulation for carnal man, whose every wish is to believe in precisely what is visible, sensible and understandable. When the carnal old man therefore hears the word, the fight starts in him, and its purpose is to mortify and tear down the old and create and build the new. “It is quite certain”, he says, “that grace, i. e. faith, hope and charity are not infused unless sin is removed, i. e. the sinner is not justified unless he is damned, is not brought to life unless he is killed, will not ascend to heaven unless he descends into hell, as it is said everywhere in the Scripture. Therefore there must of necessity be bitterness, tribulation, suffering, under which the old man sighs, suffering his destruction with pain. But if he is persevering in this tribulation and expects the hand of the Creator and the infusion of grace into him, he will be accepted and come into possession of faith, hope and charity which are infused in this circumstance. And it happens as often as things happen to us that are contrary to us and our will, and it happens the more, the more it is contrary to us. This I say, is not only the way the first grace is infused, but also the way in which any increase happens that comes after it, because the old man is crucified more and more, and sin is extirpated more and more, as grace proceeds more and more until death” (AWA 2, 299,20–300,13). Here, as in so many other instances, Luther uses the image of the wedding as an illustration: “Christ the bridegroom encompasses his bride with a pleasure which is contrary to the flesh, i. e. after the embraces. But the embraces themselves are death and hell” (AWA 2, 301,22–302,2). A little later in the text Luther directly calls this simultaneous destruction and construction the passive life, in contrast to the active life (AWA 2, 302,9–303,19). The active life is the life in which men put their trust in the present that is visible, i. e. the merits and the progress, and that, says Luther, only causes prejudice, and it puffs up wisdom (1 Cor 8:1). The passive life on the other hand, is the one he has just described. It destroys and disintegrates the active life, so that nothing meritorious remains at all in which man can rejoice, hope and pride himself. This passive life, which is synonymous with tribulation, removes everything from man and leaves him with God alone, and thus it leads man to God: “If we pull through this, after all is lost, also the good meritorious deeds, we will find God in whom alone we can have faith, and thus we ‘are saved in hope’ (Rom 8:24)” (AWA 2, 302,20–22). Therefore only the passive life is in truth the purest, therefore it also works hope and glory, and in that we must be transformed in the image and example of Christ our leader and King (AWA 2, 303,5–7). As an example of the active life Luther mentions Cicero’s statement that “the conscience of a well-performed life is the most pleasant memory” (AWA 2, 305,2). Luther admits that it is a true statement, but at the same time the conscience Cicero talks about is

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Das Rechtfertigungsurteil ist also in einem doppelten Sinne effektiv : es tötet den alten Menschen, der mit Christus mitgekreuzigt ist und mitbegraben ist, um zugleich einen neuen Menschen zu konstituieren (Röm. 6,5; 2. Kor. 5,17) – und das so, dass eine und dieselbe Person beides zugleich ist: ein vergehender, mit dem gekreuzigten Christus dem Nichts ausgelieferter Sünder und ein mit dem auferstandenen Christus ins Sein gerufener und im Werden begriffener Gerechter (Jüngel: 1999, 183).

It is important to keep the accentuation of the two sides of faith together as one, seen as God’s workings in man without man (the subjective genitive) and seen as man’s reception of the same God’s work (the objective genitive). The two sides are aspects of one and the same faith in Christ, which is Christ as God’s saving work in man without man (one side) of man (the other side). The difficulty of understanding fides Christi, however, is not yet overcome. We are left with a need to have a more detailed answer to what it means that man, as Luther expresses it, “is transformed into Christ” and is “drawn into him”. Later in Antilatomus Luther says, “It is important that you are pulled into Christ”,236 as it is described in Isa 2:10 and in Cant 2:14. The question does, however, arise as to how much remains to say about it that has not already been said. Beutel has in several places called attention to what has been emphasized earlier, that there is a limit to how much can be said about Christ and his work: [Luther hält] die Neigung, die unio cum Christo auf den Begriff bringen zu wollen, aus sachlichen Gründen für unangemessen […]. Was Gott redet und tut, kann die menschliche Natur weder fassen noch verstehen. Könnte sie es, “so hette unser herr Gott sein maul wol konnen zu halten. Sed es heisst supra et contra racionem” (WA 37, 296,37–297, 1). Supra rationem heisst es, weil die Vernunft das Wort nicht fassen kann. Contra rationem heisst es, weil die Vernunft auch dies nicht fassen kann. Was Gott den Menschen kundgibt, lässt sich nicht “begriffig” (WA 10/I, 1, 193,1) machen. Es lässt sich nur glauben (WA 33, 253,26–29). “Nisi credamus,… est ineffabilis” (WA 31/II, 437,16) (Beutel: 1993, 88–89).

And Työrinoja has made the same observation (we refer here to communicatio idiomatum with a Christological bias, but it is also true, as has been shown, of communicatio idiomatum with a soteriological bias): According to Luther, the grammar in all its forms is in itself valid. But when the thing itself (res) is greater than it is possible to comprehend by means of grammatical and philosophical rules, then they have to be rejected. Especially in theology, one must take care with analogies, etymologies, consequences, and examples based on these rules. the most corruptible, precisely because it is the most pleasant. For the Christian, therefore, it is true that it is rather the consciousness of a life that is well endured (i. e. led to nothing) that is the most pleasant, so “he who boasts boasts in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31)” (AWA 2, 305,3– 5). 236 WA 8, 115,14: “In Christum tete rapi oportet […].”

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One has to be contented with the formulas prescribed by the Holy Spirit and to remember that the thing itself is ineffable and incomprehensible (Työrinoja: 1987, 226).

This does not mean that nothing can be said about the work of Christ. The sections on the ruling and ruled sin, and about the gift and grace, are examples of how it is possible to say quite a deal with a point of departure in the scriptural statements (seeing that Luther uses Rom 6:12 and Rom 5:15.17 respectively). But in character it is not a transparent logical-philosophical exposition, but a detailed text-orientated exegesis of the scriptural statement which eventually ends in a logical-philosophical aporia. The tension between the momentaneously total and the progressively partial (the forensic and the effective), and the understanding of what it means to “be pulled into Christ” is not explained in a way that satisfies human reason. It remains part of mysterium Christi, hidden in darkness and “in nebula”.237 When what can be said has been said, the listener is thus left with the wish to know more, if he relates to it with a ratio which is not yet “baptized”, i. e. enlightened by faith. So what Antilatomus reveals is what Beutel puts like this: [F]ür das Geheimnis des Glaubens erscheint Luther die überkommene theologischphilosophische Begriffssprache offenbar als unzureichend. Stattdessen ist sein Reden ganz am modus loquendi scripturae orientiert, sei es in indirekter Aufnahme oder in spielerischer Aus- und Fortführung der biblischen Formen (Beutel: 1993, 77).

Here the point of figurative speech comes into play. As has been shown, Antilatomus is a good example of how Luther to a high degree allows the biblical rhetorical figures and the biblical imagery to say what has to be said. The question arises as to whether one can observe a development in Luther in relation to how the theological statements can and should be realized. It gives food for thought that the attempts that have been made at figuring out and systematizing Luther’s ontology, i. e. his doctrine of the reality and being created in the believer by the word that is heard, are all based mainly on the early Luther (cf. Ebeling: 1993; Juntunen: 1998; Leoni: 1998; Mannermaa: 1993). Around the time of the First Lecture on the Psalms, 1513–15, Luther did not shrink from using a decidedly philosophical language to expound what it means that Christ is present in faith. But as time goes by, as seems to have become clear in this context, he largely restricts himself to the biblical usage, i. e. the biblical images and expressions which describe the divine reality. This is the case in Antilatomus, and in Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis, and also in the great 237 WA 40/I, 229,22ff (cf. Mannermaa: 1989, 64): “Iustificat ergo fides, quia apprehendit et possidet istum thesaurum, scilicet Christum praesentem. Sed quo modo praesens sit, non est cogitabile, quia sunt tenebrae, ut dixi. Ubi ergo vera fiducia cordis est, ibi adest Christus in ipsa nebula et fide.”(

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Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians of 1535 (cf. Mannermaa: 1989). We have only to consider the way in which the concept of substance is problematized in Antilatomus, where the reference is to the pragmatism of rhetoric, which in Luther’s thinking means to the autonomy of God’s word, and not to philosophical speculation. Here Luther’s censure of philosophy is sharp, and his point is that that the business of theology is this res ineffabilis et incomprehensibilis (though it has made its appearance in the human world and language). He repeats the point in the later Christological and Trinitarian disputations. In other words this may mean that here we see a turn towards language, which in Luthers case means towards the unique meaning of God’s word as revealed in Scripture, which is characteristic of Luther’s way of expressing himself. He was absorbed by and used rhetoric in his early years, but we may ask whether he did not develop his view of the importance of rhetoric from its being a school discipline which was an aid in the interpretation of the texts, to being an essential tool for calling attention to and supporting the creative uniqueness of the word of God,238 the personal grammar of the Holy Spirit.239 If we regard Luther’s understanding of language in the context of the medieval philosophy of language, it must be said that Työrinoja’s conclusions are very apt. Luther’s understanding of language can be said to be influenced by both the via antiqua and the via moderna. From the via moderna Luther includes the concept of the absolute power of God, God’s potentia absoluta, because transferred to language it gives him a possibility of emphasizing the strength and power of the word of God contrary to human ideas about being, whilst inspired by the via antiqua he introduces an extreme realism-of the-word-of-God (which, however, is in no way identical with the type of concept-realism the antiqui spoke for),240 as it has already been shown above in a quotation from Työrinoja: Luther’s conception seems to presuppose that the words, as used by the Scriptures, are not terms (in the sense of philosophy and logic) at all. In other words, between the new words (nova vocabula) and the things (res) there is no such semantical relationship as is presupposed in philosophy and logic. In the new language or in the form and mode of speaking of the Holy Spirit (forma et modus loquendi Spiritus Sancti), there is no gulf between words and things, but they are in a way one and the same reality. The new words of theology do not signify things through the concepts of mind. Therefore one cannot find any rational philosophical semantics or logic for them (Työrinoja: 1987, 233). 238 This thesis of the development of Luther’s view of rhetoric will only be suggested here. A vindication of it must depend on more thorough studies of Luther’s use of rhetoric. 239 Työrinoja: 1987, 230, note 18: “Spiritus sanctus habet suam grammaticam.” Disp. de div. et hum. 104, 24. 240 Cf.Latomus’ understanding of the relationship between words and concepts.

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5.7.3 Excursus: Other interpretations of gratia and donum: Rudolf Hermann, Regin Prenter and Tuomo Mannermaa The interpretation of gratia and donum in the Antilatomus has interested many scholars of Luther. Though a proper survey of the scholarship in this field cannot be given here, a presentation of some of the most enticing examples of how Luther’s ideas on gratia and donum have been interpreted is appropriate. The intention is to show how difficult it is to get a clear picture of what Luther actually means, and thus to put into perspective the attempt in these pages to clarify the two concepts.241 Rudolf Hermann is perhaps the first to have made a thorough study of Antilatomus, and hence also of the understanding of gratia and donum (Hermann: 1930, 68–108). His interpretation of the two concepts has in many ways been seminal for a number of Luther scholars after him. He emphasizes as a point of departure that God’s work in baptism is complete, and a whole, and yet can be divided into two: remissio and abolitio, and that it is these two “aspects” of baptism that we find again in gratia and donum. The goal of all of God’s work is to free man of sin, and this work is apportioned to man in a double form, i. e. from without (gratia) and internally (donum). For Hermann the question now is how to understand this emphasis on the internal, on donum, in a way that does not abruptly bring Luther’s theology close to that of the Catholic Church: Soll plötzlich, wie es in der römischen Theologie durchweg zugeht, das Werden des neuen Menschen und seiner aufweisbaren Gerechtigkeit in den Vordergrund treten und Gottes Barmherzigkeit und Gnade nicht mehr ein und alles sein? (Hermann: 1930, 77).242

We get our answer to that, Hermann goes on to say, when we compare what Luther says about mortificari with what he otherwise says about the grace of baptism. The way in which we must then understand the extirpation of sin, which, significantly, is expressed in the passive (Hermann: 1930, 78), is that it denotes “entrance into God’s work”, not “the fulfilment of a contract already agreed on” (Hermann: 1930, 80). So what is expressed with mortificari, which in other words is the same as donum, is that the grace of baptism does not conquer man without at the same time conquering through him (Hermann: 1930, 81). 241 I am acutely aware that I have not integrated Ernstpeter Maurer’s Der Mensch im Geist. Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie bei Hegel und Luther, Gütersloh, 1996 in my work, even though Maurer gives important interpretations of the Antilatomus. Furthermore I have only briefly drawn in Rudolf Hermann’s interpretation of Luther – another lapse which must amount to a deficiency in a book such as the present. Hermann’s awareness of the importance of both language and typology in Luther’s thinking should have been commented in greater detail. 242 Hermann: 1930.

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Man must receive the grace of baptism, and therefore the grace of baptism creates the hearts which have ears to hear, and the hands which pray (Hermann: 1930, 82). Hermann asks why Luther distinguishes at this point between gratia and donum, since he did not do so in the Lecture on Romans. There gratia denoted the justification of Christ before God for the redemption of mankind, and donum was solely a term for God’s conferment on man of this redemption. And in a sense this is still the case in the Antilatomus, Hermann claims. To him the distinction between the two is solely introduced to fit the distinction in law between ira dei and corruptio naturae. The distinction between gratia and donum may thus be said to have been made to distinguish between the God who is not touched by sin, and the justified sinner. And in faith in Christ they are both connected (Hermann: 1930, 84). “Es geht darum, dass die Gnade den Menschen zwar ganz gerecht, aber zugleich ganz zum Kämpfer macht” (Hermann: 1930, 87), and this means that grace and the gift are not two “graces”, but that one God’s grace which says to the sinner – not a fictive, but a real sinner : “You are righteous” (Hermann: 1930, 88). In other words, we have to understand the distinction between grace and the gift from the perspective of the workings of God, as God is the subject of both. He is gracious and giving, and therefore what grace and the gift are finally about is a distinction between on, the one hand, the predestined workings of God, and, on the other hand, His workings in time, by which faith is awakened (Hermann: 1930, 90). This, concludes Hermann, shows that the two concepts do not stand in a primary or secondary relation to each other (Hermann: 1930, 84). He emphasizes that grace and the gift are one in Christ, as Luther expresses it via Rom 5:17: “In der Person Christi sind gratia und donum […] gleichsam noch eins” (Hermann: 1930, 92). As Christ transmits to man the goodwill from God that rests on Him [= gratia], He awakens faith in Himself and thus brings to life a new mankind under the righteousness of faith [= donum] (Hermann: 1930, 91). Hermann sums up his view of the inseparability and yet disparity of grace and the gift as follows: Gott schenkt der Person, die er allein durch seine Gnade selig macht [gratia], den Glauben [donum] und zieht sie damit in Christi Gerechtigkeit hinein, und er trägt sie als Sünder, indem er seine Gnade [gratia] durch das Geschenk des Glaubens an Christus [donum] und durch die Fülle seiner Gaben, die der Verstrickung des Menschen in Zeit und Welt nachgeht [dona], zur vita aeterna durchführt (Hermann: 1930, 97).

Gratia and donum are thus connected through the belief in God. But nevertheless man can only possess faith when he separates it from grace, since ultimately grace means the total righteousness of man, that is, that presence of God which is

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directed toward man, and which ensures his existence which is simultaneously his creation. Grace and the gift (faith) are distinguished in the sense that sayingyou-to-God is the condition for saying-I-to-myself (Hermann: 1930, 108). As will be seen, some of the problems characteristic of the treatment of grace and the gift which we have encountered here are also found in Rudolf Hermann. Hermann also maintains that grace and the gift are two aspects of God’s one justifying work, and that grace thus describes the superior, total, immediate forgiveness of sin, and the gift the inferior, partial, progressive extirpation of sin. And this suddenly throws up the difficulty of explaining how donum is equal to fides. As Hermann himself puts it: “Zu erwarten wäre ja wohl, dass dem favor, bzw. der misericordia, die fides entspräche und dass die heilende Gerechtigkeit das donum gratiae wäre” (Hermann: 1930, 77). And again: “[A]ber nun erinnern wir uns, dass die fides selbst donum heisst! Die Folge wäre also, dass die Gnade kein Ganzes wäre und den Menschen vor Gott nicht mehr zum Ganzen machte?” (Hermann: 1930, 96). Hermann tries to explain his way out of the problem, not entirely successfully, as becomes clear when he says that grace and the gift are “connected in the belief in Christ” (Hermann: 1930, 84), and “gratia und donum sind also durch den Glauben an Gott miteinander verbunden” (Hermann: 1930, 108). That means that fides cannot exclusively be equal to donum. The same thing is seen when he separates faith and “the gifts” and thus makes fides the connecting link between, or a nodal point of, the forgiveness and the extirpation of sin (see the quote on the previous page). So for Hermann, faith sometimes seems on the one hand to denote the union of God and man, thus being the place where both gratia and donum are found, and on the other hand, at other times, it is only the perspective of the expulsion of sin; in Hermann’s words: “sein[ ] [i. e. God’s] zeitlich-glaubenwirkende[s] Handeln” (Hermann: 1930, 90). It may be the case that the problems of speaking about faith are dependent on how Christ’s importance is accentuated. Hermann is not unaware of this. As we have seen he strongly emphasizes that “in der Person Christi sind gratia und donum […] gleichsam noch eins” (Hermann: 1930, 92). Yet in another passage in his book one has a stronger sense that perhaps there is some truth to the notion that an equation of donum and fides pushes Christ a little into the background. It is a passage in which he interprets what Luther says about the two fortresses (a section of the Antilatomus which will be the next concern of this present study) (Hermann: 1930, 166–171). Hermann understands the two fortresses to be grace and the gift respectively. But in reading about the first fortress we come across the concept of vera fides, which runs counter to making that fortress stand for gratia, and therefore Hermann is constrained to make the following comment in connection with this first fortress:

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Das heisst also doch wohl: die gratia Christi enthällt auch unseren Glauben, und einen Glauben ohne sie gäbe es nicht. Aber es heisst doch wohl auch: die gratia Christi wird erst in ihrem eigenen donum, also der fides, vollständig und bliebe ohne sie ein Fragment. Der Glaubende macht erst die Gnade wirklich, will sagen zum zeitlichen Ereignis, wie erst der Empfänger ein Geschenk wirklich macht – was wiederum in sich schliessen wird, dass der Glaube unveränderlich den Charakter des Geschenks behalten muss, weil er sonst überhaupt nichts wäre (Hermann: 1930, 167).

What Luther means by “the true faith” is then developed in a long note in which Hermann concludes: “[E]s geht darum, dass die fides, so hoch sie auch zu stellen sei, nicht gleichsam als ein Ding an sich betrachtet werden dürfe. Die Beziehung der fides zu Christus kann deshalb nicht eng und innig genug gedacht werden” (Hermann: 1930, 167). Thus faith is defined at the end of the same note as ein Hinausgehen über die “Seele”, über alle qualitates, potentias und habitus, und ein Sich-Festhalten an der gratia Christi. […] […] Das “Sich-Stützen auf” Christi Gerechtigkeit, das se proiicere auf den, von dem man weiss, dass er in gratia Dei steht und keiner Verurteilung unterliegen kann, [macht] allein den Glauben zum Glauben (Hermann: 1930, 169).

Thus Hermann says here precisely what has also been pointed out in the present work. Does he then come to the same conclusion about Christ as has been the telos of my enquiry? Does he emphasize Christ’s own real presence, and hence man’s real union with Christ in faith, as the overriding and essential concept? That he possibly wants to understand faith separately from Christ’s person, i. e. that he mainly accentuates the objective genitive in fides Christi, may be sensed in the following line: “Indem er uns also, so dürfen wir sagen, die Huld Gottes, die auf ihn, dem Einen Menschen ruht, vermittelt, weckt er den Glauben an ihn selbst und ruft dadurch die neue Menschheit der Glaubensgerechtigkeit ins Leben” (Hermann: 1930, 91). And perhaps it comes out again in the conclusion to his note on vera fides, where the reality created between God and man in faith is sketched out without mention of Christ: [E]s [handelt] sich beim Glauben um die eigentümliche Wirklichkeit […], die durch das in Wort und Tat bestehende Zusammensein von Gott und Mensch konstituiert wird und sich in der Sündenvergebung und dem Neuwerden durch sie vollzieht (Hermann: 1930, 169).243 243 It is not easy to decide whether the critique brought forward here is fair or not. Hermann’s book is so comprehensive that a thorough test of his view would be a volume in itself. Peura’s critique of Hermann (Peura: 1998, 47 and 61), does not seem to be justified, however. Peura says that Hermann separates grace and the gift, and then reduces the gift to nothing but a relation (1998, 47): “Hermann thus succeeds in excluding the gift as a renewal of the Christian from the doctrine (locus) of justification.” He even repeats the assertion (1998, 61, note 39): “Hermann solves his problem by emphasizing God’s favor and reducing God’s gift to its minimum, i. e. to a relation to God.” Firstly, what has been said above seems

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In his thesis Spiritus Creator and in the article “Luthers Lehre von der Heiligung” Regin Prenter treats in detail what is said in the Antilatomus about grace and the gift (Prenter : 1944, 56 ff; 1958, 64–73).244 To an apparently greater degree than Hermann, Prenter emphasizes the real presence of Christ, before he begins to interpret what is said about gratia and donum: In the belief in Christ we own the reality of his redemption as our own reality. His victory is our victory. And this is not to be understood in a figurative sense, but quite literally. […] Fides Christi is a real union with the living Christ as a redemptive reality. […] The fact is that the real community between Christ and the believer is the necessary prerequisite for the righteousness of Christ in reality – not only in thought – being imputed to us, and our sin in reality being imputed to Christ. […] The remission of sin and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, if it is supposed to be gospel, must be proclaimed so that the Christ who once completed the work of atonement is now given to me as a gift, so that the first thing I know is that the living Christ is with me, and hence I can also know that he is my righteousness (Prenter : 1944, 54–55).

Like Hermann, Prenter then states that grace and the gift cannot be separated (Prenter : 1944, 58). He is of the opinion that they each denote an aspect of a tension in Luther’s theology : predestination (grace) and atonement (the gift) in the work of God. But, as Prenter says, Luther himself does not miss a solution to this tension, as “only in Christ can gratia and donum be regarded as reality. Outside Christ they are empty concepts” (Prenter : 1994, 59). As Prenter thus seems to emphasize the real presence of Christ in faith to a higher degree than Hermann, he is faced to a correspondingly higher degree with the problem we sensed in Hermann, and over which we have stumbled in our own analysis of gratia and donum: how can fides Christi both be a central concept for gratia and donum and equal donum? In a description of how grace and the gift are united in fides Christi, Prenter demonstrates this ambivalence in the concept of faith-and-gift: It is now clear how gratia and donum are united in the concept of “fides Christi”. Because grace and the gift in Christ are immediately one, so the very fact that Christ sacrifices himself for us because of him being divine and human is both God’s selfdevotion to us (and thus the expression of his grace to us) and – as the self-devotion of Christ because of this same human divinity is so divinely unlimited that it allows to make it clear that Hermann does not separate grace and the gift, but on the contrary regards them as inseparable and impossible to see as either superior or inferior (Hermann: 1930, 84). And secondly, the character of the gift as a renewal of the justified Christian can hardly be said not to be present to the mind of one who says: “[E]s [handelt] sich beim Glauben um die eigentümliche Wirklichkeit […], die durch das in Wort und Tat bestehende Zusammensein von Gott und Mensch konstituiert wird und sich in der Sündenvergebung und dem Neuwerden durch sie vollzieht” (Hermann: 1930, 169; my emphasis). 244 We rely here for the most part on Spiritus Creator (1944).

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everything, including his own immediate filial relation to God, to be common to us and Him – our righteousness before God. Therefore it is a fact that the one who in faith is one with Christ, in Him owns both grace, which is God’s merciful disposition towards us, revealed in Christ’s self-sacrifice to us, and the gift; because Christ’s self-sacrifice to us means that a war has been declared on our entire old man, that faith stands alongside Christ, or rather in Christ and fights against our entire old man (Prenter : 1944, 63; my emphasis).

Here it seems that in faith in Christ, in which Christ Himself is present, man has both gratia and donum, and at the same time faith is the sin-expelling donum in itself. Prenter thus seems to be making a distinction between the primary donum, which is Christ’s presence in faith and man’s concomitant part in both grace and the gift, and the secondary donum which is the fight against sin initiated by the presence of Christ – a distinction which is very much like the one made in these pages. He even writes directly that “faith comes into being as donum dei [which we take to be the secondary donum] by our acceptance of Christ as donum dei [the primary donum] (Prenter : 1944, 67). In general his considerations must be said to be very close to the present interpretation; witness his concluding remarks: Because Christ in us is an expression of God’s constant favour which makes complete humans of us, we are entirely redeemed, here and now, by faith which adheres to Christ and is therefore always accompanied by God’s favour, which is expressed in Christ. We are not redeemed because this belief in Christ is a part of us, a new nature in us, a better ‘I’ which is entitled to God’s acceptance. Luther’s distinction between gratia and donum makes it possible for him to maintain the whole realist understanding of the presence of Christ in us, and of faith as a real new life out of this reality, and yet simultaneously maintain that this new life is not and will never be owned by us, but that on the contrary as God’s gift in the strictest sense of this word, it will never cease to judge our whole real self as sinful (Prenter : 1944, 66).

Here again, however, one senses a distinction between “the presence of Christ in us” and “faith as a real new life out of this reality”, a distinction which we have tried to avoid in the present work.245 245 Bengt Hägglund in his interpretation rebukes Prenter for presenting an “‘Osiandrian’ solution […] (the innate Christ is our justification)” to the problem of fides Christi (Hägglund: 1959, 332–341). Such an interpretation, says Hägglund, does not take into account the aspect of Luther’s concept of faith that the faith is directed at the corporeal Christ and the work He did for man. It is not faith in itself, but only faith ob gratiam Christi, which brings forth the mercy of God. Here Hägglund seems not to be aware of the point that our investigation has made, namely that faith is not anything in itself, but is man’s becoming one with Christ. That the central aspect of fides Christi is not a belief in the corporeal Christ and his work, situated in the hidden interior of man in man’s secret mind, as Hägglund defines it, but is the actual living person and work of Christ, which is conferred and accepted (cf. the way in which Hägglund divides the concept of faith into two: Faith as “the inner

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hidden re-creation through which man’s relation to God is changed and the inner will is changed”, and faith as “the continued, growing faith, the firm conviction which is a faith perceptible in experience, a rudimentary insight into the remission of sins” (Hägglund: 1959, 338–339). Here Christ is not mentioned at all). Even though Hägglund recognises that the unity between grace and the gift is found in Christ (Hägglund: 1959, 339), it does not seem to be of great importance to his interpretation. Erik Kyndal also speaks differently from Prenter about Christ’s presence in faith (Kyndal: 1961). He directly attacks Prenter’s interpretation of donum as “the (in faith) ‘present Christ’ as ‘God’s gift’ to us”, which according to Kyndal means to Prenter that “the concept of donum (at least also) [seems] to have to contain the ‘alien justice’ of faith” (Kyndal: 1961, 157, note 181). Kyndal does not think that this can be read out of the Antilatomus, although it may be found elsewhere in Luther, where Christ is spoken of as a gift and an example. In Antilatomus, Kyndal says, gratia is “primary and logically speaking preordained = the reality of the forgiveness of God in Christ, whereas donum is a new reality in us as life out of grace and as such in itself (incipient) righteousness”. This new reality, says Kyndal, Luther understands, in contrast to Latomus’ understanding of “donum” as an “infused quality”, as being – in faith – under grace. Because “the righteousness of faith” is found in grace, it is still alien and external, but the presence of Christ that Prenter speaks of “must, however, […] be understood as ‘the reign’ of Christ in faith, understood as the realized reign of grace in man”. In his article Kyndal in other words speaks of faith as “the gift of the Spirit” in man (Kyndal: 1961, 158), as “a new I” (Kyndal: 1961, 159), a healing of the person, “who now – in faith – so to speak has moved to the side of God in the fight against sin in the shape of his own ‘old man’” (Kyndal: 1961, 159). This is not to say, Kyndal affirms, that when he speaks about faith Luther speaks of “a new quality in man” (Kyndal: 1961, 160): Luther emphasizes that we deal with righteousness of faith, i. e. “only by abiding by Christ as God’s forgiveness (the ‘alien’ righteousness) in the denunciation of one’s entire old man as a sinner is faith itself righteous”, and “man himself – i. e. the believer – is therefore still righteous only because of God’s forgiveness” (Kyndal: 1961, 160). So Kyndal speaks of “the righteousness of faith”, and not about the righteousness of Christ which becomes man’s through faith. And when he goes on to argue his case and adduces the sections in Antilatomus, Rom 5:15 (Kyndal: 1961, 160), and the expression “in Christum plane transformari” (Kyndal: 1961, 161), which accentuates Christ’s presence in faith, he interprets them as expressions which deal with the need for certainty in faith and speaks of a “congruence of faith with Christ” (Kyndal: 1961, 160–161), not of man becoming one with him. That Kyndal thus distinguishes between the righteousness of Christ and the righteousness of faith in a way that does not correspond to the way in which either Prenter or this study speaks of the faith of Christ/ the righteousness of Christ in faith, seems to emerge from the following: “Thus the ‘righteousness’ of faith is God’s forgiveness in Christ as my new reality […]. In that way faith is righteous because it ‘is covered by Christ’s righteousness’ because it is under grace” (Kyndal: 1961, 162). And “the righteousness of faith is of the same character as the righteousness of Christ (qua homo), ‘the true humanity’ of the righteousness of faith. The modus of the message, however, is ‘congruence’ in the belief in the word, not a substantial participation” (Kyndal, 1961, 162, note 200). “In faith I am really a ‘new man’, it is not God who believes in me; but God gives me to believe” (Kyndal, 1961, 163–164). Asger Chr. Højlund’s thesis is the last example to be mentioned here of this tendency to emphasize faith at the expense of Christ. Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (1993b) has identified the deficiency of the thesis on this particular point: “The question, however, is whether he [i. e. Højlund] thinks sufficiently radically about faith, so as to really hold on to the fact that donum is God’s justifying work in us […] or whether the strong emphasis on faith, faith with a capital “F” in actual fact covers an uncertainty concerning who acts in faith. […] And this is caused by the author looking more at faith than at Christ, or that he does not see the

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With reference to Prenter’s awareness of the fundamental questions he himself asks of Luther, Tuomo Mannermaa has given us an interpretation of gratia and donum which is even more radical regarding the real presence of Christ in faith.246 Mannermaa first of all points out that after Luther’s death a shift happened in relation to Luther’s understanding of justification. Where justification for Luther comprises both the imputation of the forgiveness of the sinners because of the merits of Christ, and the real presence of Christ in faith, the latter was in later Lutheranism defined exclusively as sanctification next to and after justification, a separate work which followed justification (Mannermaa: 1999, 168ff). That is not, Mannermaa reminds us, what Luther wrote. What is conferred on man at the forgiveness of sin, i. e. justification, is not an independent influence on man, which is separate from God, not a virtue or quality, but Christ himself in his complete person. In faith man accepts not only Christ’s work of atonement and forgiveness, but the person, the God-man Christ himself in his own reality. Christ in other words does not remain outside man to work new affections in him,247 but is united with man so that a so-called real participation in the person of Christ is conferred on man. Christ lives in man, so that unio between God and man comes into being (Mannermaa: 1999, 175). This Mannermaa connects to the concepts of gift and grace: [I]n der Person Christi verbinden sich sowohl Gottes ‘Gunst’ (favor) – das heist die Sündenvergebung und die Aufhebung des Zornes –, als auch Gottes ‘Geschenk’ oder ‘Gabe’ (donum) – das heist Gott selbst, der sich in der ganzen Fülle seines Wesens als anwesend erweist. Im Glauben selbst ist Christus real anwesend (in ipsa fide Christus adest) und somit auch seine Person und sein ganzes Versöhungswerk […]. Christus ist – mit den Begriffen von Chalkedon gesprochen – ungetrennt, aber auch unvermischt sowohl als donum als auch als favor (Mannermaa: 1999, 169).248 radicality in righteousness being Christ’s righteousness” (Kjeldgaard-Pedersen: 1993b, 377–378). For, as Kjeldgaard-Pedersen puts it – and this indeed concerns all the interpretations mentioned, including Hermann’s and Prenter’s: “[W]hat is, basically, the meaning of fides Christi? Is it the belief in Christ, the faith whose object is Christ and his work, or is it really the faith of Christ, so that the word “faith” is an expression of the irrational and hidden reality that Christ himself is actively present with all his righteousness, and precisely in that way is man’s justification in relation to God?” (KjeldgaardPedersen: 1993b, 376). 246 Tuomo Mannermaa: 1989, 17–18; 1990, 325–335; 1999, 167–197. In 1990, Mannermaa interprets the core theme of Antilatomus, and in 1989 he refers to Antilatomus (1989, 30– 31), but relates more explicitly to the great commentary on Galatians 1531/35. In 1999 he does not refer to Antilatomus, but gives an overall account of his Luther-interpretation starting from the relation favor-donum. 247 Cf. Mannermaa’s criticism of the neokantian “transzendentale[n] Wirkungsdenken[s]” in the 20th century reception of Luther, 1999, 170–171; 179–181. 248 This point, the emphasis on the close connection between favor and donum, is explicitly what Mannermaa deprecates Jörg Baur’s interpretation for not having in the article “Einig

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So Christ is the leaven, “die uns geschenkte Gnade in dem Geist des Glaubens” (from the Explanations to the Leipzig disputation, WA 2, 414,23–24), which more and more is infused in the entire man and makes him like Himself, i. e. transforms him into the image of Christ (Mannermaa: 1999, 184). This transformation, Mannermaa emphasizes, is however incomplete in this life. It is not fulfilled until after death. He emphasizes that it is important to remember that man never ceases to be a sinner, even though his sin is not imputed to him: “Die Schuld der Sünde ist zwar abgelöst, aber die Sünde selbst bleibt, bis dass auch sie vertrieben worden ist. Der Christ lebt nähmlich im Übergang (in phase) oder Durchgang (in transitu) von der Sünde zur Gnade” (Mannermaa: 1999, 184). Mannermaa declares two things to be needful for the correct understanding of Christ’s presence in faith. Firstly, he says, it is important to know that Christ, as Luther expresses it, lives in the darkness of faith. So it surpasses the power of thought to understand how He is present, and faith is therefore the understanding that sees nothing. But where a true confidence of heart exists in this darkness, Christ shows himself as a presence in the clouds of faith (Mannermaa: 1999, 182–183). Secondly it is important to be aware that this transformation of man does not mean a progressive development of man “in der er sich nach seiner eigenen Wesensform entfalten würde” (Mannermaa: 1999, 185). The new life does not belong to the Christian himself, even though it is inside him, but it is the life of Christ which resides in the Christian. The Christian himself no longer lives, but Christ lives in him (Mannermaa: 1999, 185). Mannermaa goes on to describe – in a way which is closely akin to the emphasis in the present study, that unio takes the form of death and resurrection for man – how the Christian’s own form is destroyed so that Christ can take shape in him. This destruction is a suffering (passio) for the old man, which is why the new life is also called passiva vita purissima, where the only thing the Christian has left onto which he may hold is pure hope, spes purissima in purissimum Deum.249 But the destruction also means resurrection with Christ, and sharing in the divine qualities: “Luther sagt, dass die Wohltat des Kreuzes, die uns selbst und alles, was uns gehört, tötet, darin besteht, dass wir der göttlichen Natur teilhaftig gemacht werden” (Mannermaa: 1999, 185). The Christian, like Christ, is thus in nihilum redactus and is progressively destroyed. But at the same time he becomes congruent in faith with the divine nature of Christ, although only as a beginning (Mannermaa: 1999, 188). The strength of Mannermaa’s interpretation as compared with the others, is in Sachen” (Baur : 1989). See also Mannerma’s more detailed explanation of the intimate connection in 1999, 186. 249 On this point Mannermaa refers to the digression “De spe et passionbus” in Operationes in Psalmos as we have previously done (note 235 above).

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the heavy emphasis on Christ’s real presence in faith, and the maintenance of Christ as a key when talking of gratia and donum. Thus far Mannermaa’s interpretation and ours agree. We may well ask, however, how Mannermaa would relate to the passage from Jüngel, which was quoted above (p. 284) to emphasize how important is the accentuation of the externity of the word for the human who partakes in the divine qualities of Christ. The passage describes how the transformation and re-creation of the Christian, with Christ present in faith, is determined by Christ’s “alien character”, and thus has the quality of turning man out of and away from himself, instead of being an occurrence immanent in man. It is on this precise point, the question of the Christian’s being as an immanent or transcendental being, that Stefano Leoni has criticized Mannermaa’s interpretation of the early Christmas sermon on the prologue to John, of 1514 (Leoni: 1998). Leoni calls attention to Mannermaa’s having overlooked that a shift takes place in the sermon, from a description of the Trinitarian immanent relational being, in which God in a movement from Himself comes to Himself outside Himself, to the Christological transcendental relational being, in which man in Christ in a movement away from himself comes to himself outside himself. Mannermaa therefore inadvertently interprets the being that is apportioned to the Christian as a relational immanent being, instead of a relational transcendent being. Where the former form of being exists in a movement from itself in relation to itself, the other form of being exists in a movement from itself in relation to someone else. Another question to ask of Mannermaa’s interpretation of Luther must be how he understands the life of the Christian. Does his accentuation of the unioidea lead him to an emphasis on the visibility of Christian life? In his article “Glaube und Bildung und Gemeinschaft” (1999) at first glance it might appear so. Here he expands the idea of unio to comprise both the Christian ecclesiastical communio and the secular Christian community. He goes out of his way to stress that the divine love which is found in each Christian by virtue of Christ’s presence in faith underlies and realizes both the Christian communio, and the secular Christian community. They both need the people who abide by what the law of love, alias the golden rule, demands (Mannermaa: 1999, 192). And these people are created as they share in Christ through the word and the sacrament (Mannermaa: 1999, 190). In other words Mannermaa imagines that Christianity, when correctly understood, if it comes into its own, will saturate society from the individual in the ecclesiastical community and on to the secular world beyond. It is nevertheless important to notice Mannermaa’s accentuation of the creation of the Christian as he shares in Christ through the word and the sacrament. More light is thrown on what he means by this in Der im Glauben Gegenwärtige Christus (Mannermaa: 1989, 79). Here he describes how the Christian cannot

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know when he invokes God’s help in extreme need, because there the Spirit of Christ comes to his assistance, and cries to God with a cry which men cannot hear (Mannermaa: 1989, 80). With these so-called groanings too deep for words (Rom 8:26), the Spirit encourages the believer to take courage and invoke God himself by grasping the word: “Wir haben nur das Wort allein, und wenn wir es ergreifen, kommen wir in unserem Kampf ein wenig wieder zu Atem und seufzen. Und dieses unser Seufzen empfinden wir irgendwie, aber den Schrei hören wir nicht (WA 40/I, 582,24–26) ” (Mannermaa: 1989, 80). In other words, it is one thing what reality is seen from the divine point of view, and another, what this looks like to man. Here the point is that the reality which is the reality of the Spirit of Christ is invisible and inaudible to man and only visible and audible to God. Mannermaa describes this in the form of a long quotation from the Great Commentary on Galatians: Wir fühlen das völlig gegenteilige. Es scheint uns, dass dieses unser geringes Seufzen nicht so die Wolken durchdringt, dass es nur im Himmel von Gott und den Engeln gehört würde. Wir meinen nähmlich vor allem im Angefochten-Sein, dass der Teufel entsetzlich gegen uns brüllt, der Himmel kracht, die Erde erzittert und alles am Zusammenfallen ist, dass alle Kreaturen uns mit Unheil drohen, die Hölle sich öffnet und uns verschlingen will. Dieses Gefühl ist in unseren Herzen, jene entsetzlichen Geräusche und schrecklichen Erscheinungen hören und sehen wir. Und das ist, was Paulus in 2. Kor. 12 sagt, dass, “die Kraft Christi in unserer Schwachheit vollkommen wird”. Denn Christus ist nähmlich dann tatsächlich allmächtig und regiert und triumphiert dann wahrhaftig in uns, wenn wir sozusagen so vollschwach sind, dass wir kaum seufzen können. Aber Paulus sagt, dass dieses Seufzen in den Ohren Gottes ein allgewaltiger Schrei ist, der Himmel und Erde gänzlich erfüllt (WA 40/I, 583,8–19) (Mannermaa: 1989, 81).

And Mannermaa concludes: [E]s besteht also kein Zweifel daran, dass Luther das “Seufzen des Geistes” als eine gewissermassen “andere Wirklichkeit” im Menschen versteht: Moses schrie gar nicht zu Gott [cf. WA 40/I, 583,32–584,18], aber Gott sah den Seufzer des Geistes im Herzen des Moses und hörte ihn als einen gewaltigen Schrei. […] Weil der Schrei des Geistes nicht mit den Sinnen wahrnehmbar ist, “haben wir nur das Wort” (solum verbum habemus) – wie Luther sagt. Im Ergreifen des Wortes findet der Christ in seiner Verzweiflung ein wenig Trost, so dass er auch “selbst” zu Gott zu “seufzen” beginnt (Mannermaa: 1989, 83; 85).

But, as he further emphasizes: Der sinnenhaften Erkenntnis nach (quoad sensum) ist das verheissende Wort wie ein kleiner und unbedeutender “Mittelpunkt”. In Wirklichkeit aber ist es ein unendlich grosser “Bogen”, der Gott selbst und alle seine Schätze fasst. […] Das Wort und nicht der Mensch selbst, ist somit nach Luther der aktive Faktor. Das Wort gebiert den Christen. Es handelt sich also um Gottes Wirken im Menschen (Mannermaa: 1989, 85).

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What Mannermaa describes here reinforces what we have seen: that unio between God and man in Christ takes the form of death and resurrection for man, i. e. the Sermon on Christ manifests itself as a Cross-theological movement. In that connection the Second Lecture on the Psalms was invoked (see note 537), in which Luther had this to say : This [i. e. the destruction of the old man, where everything that is contrary to it happens to it], I say, is how not only the first grace is infused, but also how any augmentation happens which follows after it. The old man is always crucified more and more, and sin is extirpated, as grace always proceeds more and more until death.250

So it seems that the way in which the sweeping out of sin has been defined in the present investigation is compatible with Mannermaa’s reading: the sweeping out of sin then happens, as confessing Christians who look to Christ in faith for protection take pains to do what belongs to human life, “because when Christ dwells in us through faith he moves us to deeds through this living faith in his deeds”.251 When this study maintains that the sweeping out of sin for man himself takes the shape of a service, i. e. as a confession and the acceptance of Christ as God’s promise of the forgiveness of sins, it closely resembles Mannermaa’s accentuation of the word and the sacrament as man’s only refuge. Seen in that light, the “change” of outward conduct as a result of Christ’s presence in faith which Mannermaa sketches in his article “Glaube und Bildung und Gemeinschaft” (1999) could be understood as the consequence of Luther’s doctrine of justification, when it is thought through and viewed from an ideal point of view, i. e. from the supposition that all adhere to the word, which of course they neglect in fact to do. And the conclusion furthermore must be that the change, if it really happened, would not be visible to men as a new form of life, since it would still be the reality of the revealed God which came as a contrast to the senses of the justified but still-sinful man’s own senses, and which would only make itself felt when men at all times recognised their ineptitude and adhered to God’s outer, revealed and sacramentally proffered word. It is thus always a reality that is hidden or ambiguous to men, either because they cannot see it as it belongs to the realm of opposites, or because if they think they can see it, they cannot know what is behind it: sin or God’s justice.

250 AWA 2, 300,10–13): “Iste, inquam, est modus non modo primae gratiae infundendae, sed et cuiuslibet eius sequentis augmenti. Semper enim magis ac magis crucifigitur vetus homo, expelliturque peccatum, ingrediente semper magis ac magis gratia usque ad mortem.” 251 WA 2, 364,30–31: “Quia dum Christus in nobis habitat per fidem, iam movet nos ad opera per vivam illam fidem operum suorum.”

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5.7.4 The life of a Christian: The two fortresses (Romans 8:1) Rom 8:1 is for Luther the central message as to how life is lived by the believers: “There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus who do not walk according to the flesh” (WA 8, 114,9–16). These two fortresses, Luther says, have been provided by God so that sin is not damning for the believer. 1) First and foremost the believers are in Christ and find comfort under the shadow of his righteousness, like chicks under the wing, or as it is put more clearly in Rom 5:15, “gratia et donum habet in gratia illius”; and 2) in addition they do not walk according to the flesh of sin, i. e. they do not consent to the sin they still have (WA 8, 114,13–16). The first fortress, Christ himself, the means of atonement (WA 8, 114,18), is the most important and strongest fortress, and the one out of which the other flows (WA 8, 114,29–30). It is the object of the true faith (vera fides) (WA 8, 114,21–22.27), which is characterized by a refusal to be torn away from the grace of Christ. True faith is solely supported by its knowledge that Christ is in the grace of God and cannot be judged, and no more can the one be judged who has abandoned himself to Him (WA 8, 114,21–25). The first fortress is thus the fact that man in the belief in Christ has grace (the redemption of sin) and the gift (the extirpation of sin) in the grace of Christ, cf. Rom 5:15. It is the belief in Christ as donum acceptum (WA 8, 114,28), “the primary gift”, as described above. The other fortress also has importance, but only by virtue of the first, in virtute prioris (WA 8, 114,30), because God has made a covenant with those who are in Christ by virtue of the true faith which adheres to Him, so that there will be no judgement of them if they fight against themselves and their sin. This does not mean, says Luther, that there is no judgement because they do not sin, or because there is no sin in the good deed, as Latomus thinks. It means that because they are in Christ and therefore do not walk according to the flesh, there is no judgement (WA 8, 114,30–35). Fortress number two can thus be said to be an elaboration of the “gift” aspect of the secondary gift, i. e. of the extirpation of sin in fortress number one (which meant that man in the faith in Christ as the “primary” gift has the two gifts, “grace” and “the gift”). It makes the point that the belief in Christ engenders the unending battle against sin in the intention of sweeping it out.252 252 The two fortresses in fact correspond well enough with the two justices in Sermo De Duplici Iustitia. Here the first justice is also in a manner of speaking “the entirety”, i. e. it denotes Christ’s work for man in both a forensic and an effective perspective, whereas the other justice stresses the effective aspect and man’s involvement in it. In the sermon Luther describes under the first justice (= fortress 1) how all sins are absorbed in a moment by virtue of the happy exchange in faith, by which “Christ’s justice [becomes] our justice, and everything that is His, even Himself becomes ours” (WA 2,

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The two fortresses could in a way also be applied to respectively grace and the gift, the forensic and the effective aspects of justification. The first fortress would 146,8–9), “because it is impossible that sin adheres to Christ, and anyone who believes in Christ adheres to Christ and is one with Christ, having the same justice as Him” (WA 2, 146,13–15). Christ and the believer become one, or as Luther more radically puts it with reference to Gal 2:20: “it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me”. But at the same time as sin in this way is totally absorbed and denied (the forensic perspective) it is still there and has to be expelled day by day until death (the effective perspective). Luther also expresses this in connection with the first justice, saying that Christ’s alien justice is not conferred in one go, but begins, and grows, and is not completed until death. It is contrasted with original sin, Christ with Adam, and “thus Christ drives out Adam day by day, more and more, according to the growth of this faith and as understanding of Christ grows” (WA 2, 146,29–35). But Luther goes on to describe that there is also another justice (which may be compared to fortress number 2), next to or after the first, corresponding to the existence of two forms of sin. Just as original sin and the actual sin cannot be separated, since the latter has its origin in and is caused by the former, the first and the second justice are inseparably connected, as the first justice gives birth to the second: “This justice [i. e. the second justice] is the work and fruit of the first justice and is caused by it as it says in Gal 5:22: ‘But the fruit of the Spirit (that is the spiritual man who comes into being in the belief in Christ) is love, joy, peace, patience, goodness, etc.’” (WA 2, 147,7–9). The other justice, which Luther also calls man’s own, iustitia nostra et propria (WA 2, 146,36) and which is comparable to the actual sin (WA, 2, 147,24), finds expression in three things which are inseparably connected: 1) that the flesh is mortified and the desires crucified in relation to oneself, which follows from the fact that spiritual man belongs to Christ (Gal 5:24) and therefore hates himself and does not seek his own, 2) that spiritual man, thus turned away from himself, is turned towards his neighbour in love, seeking what serves him, and 3) that through these two things, the moderation to himself and the justice to his neighbour, he does God’s will and thus lives devotedly in relation to God in humbleness and fear of God (WA 2, 146,38–147,6; 147,13– 18). That the second justice is called iustitia nostra et propria, Luther emphasizes, does not mean that man exercises it alone, but that in it man cooperates, cooperari, with the first and alien justice (WA 2, 146,36–37: “[…] non quod nos soli operemur eam, sed quod cooperemur illi primae et alienae”). But nor does this mean that man’s own deeds (the second justice) enter into a cooperation with Christ’s workings (the first justice). The second justice is the necessary and inevitable result of man’s share in the first justice. So it is having a part in Christ’s alien justice, i. e., Christ’s presence in man by the Spirit through faith, which gives birth to the second justice, and it is therefore also an aspect of Christ’s work, although it is secondary in relation to the first justice (WA 2, 147,19–23). Just as the second justice is dependent on and springs from the first, the first cannot be present without the subsequent existence of the second: “The second justice completes the first, because it always causes Adam to be destroyed and the body of sin to disintegrate”, as it says in Rom 6:19: “For just as you once presented your members as slaves to impurity and to lawlessness leading to more lawlessness, so now present your members as slaves to righteousness leading to sanctification” (WA 2, 147,12–13.24–26). The inseparability of the two justices Luther describes with the wedding image: “Ergo the voice of the bridegroom is raised through the first justice, saying to the soul: ‘I am yours’, through the second justice the voice of the bride, saying: ‘I am yours.’ Then a permanent perfect and complete marriage has been formed, as is said in Cant 2:16: ‘My beloved to me, and I to him’, i. e. ‘my beloved is mine, and I am his’” (WA 2, 147,26–30).

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then be the forgiveness of sin (grace) as the greater, exterior total good in Christ’s grace, whereas the second fortress would be the sweeping out of sin (the gift) as the minor, partial good in the grace of the selfsame Christ. But Luther rather seems, as we see in his reference to Rom 5:15, to understand the first fortress as faith in Christ (= the “primary” gift), which contains both the forgiveness of sins and the expulsion of sin. Understood in that way the conceptual pair “grace” and “the gift” are not directly applicable to the two fortresses, because then “the gift” is also contained in the first fortress. The question arises whether the forgiveness of sin, i. e. grace, is then correspondingly a part of fortress number two, since it is inseparable from the gift, the extirpation of sin which is primarily emphasized here. In point of fact not too much effort should be put into uniting what is said about the gift and grace, and about the two fortresses. The explanation of the workings of Christ in Antilatomus takes the form of concrete exegesis, so that what is said about grace and the gift is connected terminologically with Rom 5:15 and 17, whereas what is said about the two fortresses is connected with Rom 8:1. Consequently the choice of words cannot always be fitted snugly into a higher, terminologically consistent unity, which is of course also true of the language in Paul. It fits into a higher unity which is consistent in terms of meaning, but this unity is expressed in differing and sometimes terminologically disparate pairs of concepts or images. Fortress number two is the more interesting in this connection, since number one has been dealt with in the previous pages, and because number two in addition deals with the very question which has not yet been addressed: man’s activity in connection with the expulsion of sin. The question is, does the mention of man’s role in connection with the driving out of sin makes it a synergism, in spite of Luther’s having described the very same expulsion as a divine work by the Spirit and referred it solely to God’s mercy? In connection with the first part of his analysis of Eccl 7:21, Luther referred to the saints’ fight against sin in a way that throws light on fortress number two. Here he said that good deeds are to be assessed according not to the nature of the deeds, but to what causes them. Thus what decides whether they are good or sinful is whether they spring from faith or unbelief. That makes faith in Christ the only good deed proper, since it determines all other deeds.253 And Luther 253 Cf. the excursus “De Fide et Operibus” in the second Lecture on the Psalms (WA 5, 394,33– 34; 395,6–16): “[T]hat is, truth is truly service and the first deed of the first commandment. […] Because just as the first commandment is the yardstick, the measure, the rule and the virtue of all other commandments, on which they depend, live and are revived like all limbs by the head, so faith is the deed, head, life and virtue of the same commandment, and is in truth the universally real which is one in all things, so that no deed is good unless it has been engendered by faith, nay, unless it is completely permeated and saturated by faith as a new

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went on to develop the thought that the only thing man can therefore do is to disdain all that is his own and believe in someone else (alio quopiam), the only pure truth (pura veritas), i. e. Christ as God’s word. Whatever else he does that keeps to this will be good deeds. It corresponds to what Luther said in a combined quotation of 1 Cor 10:31 and Col 3:17 (“whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do everything in the name of the Lord Jesus”),254 to which he concluded that the ordinary life of the righteous, i. e. of the believer, is nothing but good deeds (WA 8, 79,8). Accordingly the fight into which man has been thrust thus consists primarily in confessing his sins, and in faith adhering to Christ as the only one righteous. This was what Luther expressed with his two perspectives, of judgement and mercy, which men have to deal with in this life and which they can never separate: “[…] According to one [perspective] all your deeds are dirty and unclean because of the part of you that is contrary to God. But according to the other you are completely clean and righteous.”255 God wants sin to be enlarged so that the judgement will be unmistakable to man, and that his son will be held up there as a refuge, so that men are driven to Christ, and fearful, desperate and sighing, will seek refuge under His wings (WA 8, 114,37–39). The sweeping out of sin will then happen as the confessing Christian, who looks to Christ in faith for protection, takes pains to do what belongs to human life.256 This was what Luther expressed in thesis 25 to the Heidelberg Disputation in the following way : “Because when

leaven. But faith can in no way be present unless it is a living attitude beyond doubt, by which man is certain beyond all certainty that he pleases God, that he has a mild and merciful God in all things he might do or accomplish: mild in good things, merciful in evil. Because what is faith if it is not such an attitude?” Also in De Libertate Christiana and Von den Guten Werken faith is emphasized as the only good deed. 254 WA 8, 79,6–8: “Omnia quaecunque facitis, sive comeditis, sive bibitis, omnia in nomine domini nostri Ihesu Christi facite.” 255 WA 8, 96,2–6: “Aliud ergo de te iudicabis bis secundum rigorem iudicii dei, aliud secundum benignitatem misericordiae eius. Et hos duos conspectus non separabis in hac vita. Secundum illum omnia opera tua polluta et immunda sunt propter partem tui adversariam deo, secundum hunc vero totus mundus et iustus.” 256 This, too, can be illuminated on the basis of “De Fide et Operibus” in the Second Lecture on the Psalms (WA 5, 396,31–397,8): “Thus all deeds are equal in faith, however this may appear. Because that alone is the deed of all deeds. But where there is a difference between deeds, faith is either lacking, or it seems in the eyes of fools that there is a difference between the deeds. For the one who believes in God it is no matter whether he gives alms or prays or serves his brother, since he knows in all things that he serves God and pleases Him, no matter if his deeds are great or small, noticeable or insignificant, brief or lengthy, and nor does he choose one particular deed, and conversely he does not deny any, but as Samuel says, ‘he does whatever his hand finds’. But where faith is not present the most unhappy occupation seethes with distinguishing, choosing and refusing deeds, since they stupidly and impiously believe that one deed will be more ‘correct’, and another less.”

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Christ dwells in us through faith He moves us to deeds through this living faith in His deeds.”257 This seems to show that when Luther speaks of the extirpation of sin he implies at the same time the forgiveness of sin, since it is by virtue of the forgiveness of sin that man cooperates in the extirpation of it. The partial and progressive fight against sin cannot be separated from the total and momentary confession and forgiveness of that sin. Seen in this perspective “grace” may well be said to be contained in fortress number two. Johannes Horstmann, a Danish pastor and Luther-scholar, is the interpreter of Antilatomus who in the best way has expressed why the forensic and effective aspects of justification are inseparable, and why we therefore both talk of a partial extirpation of sin in a progressive perspective which involves man, and about total forgiveness of sin in an immediate perspective which, from the outside and without his participation, makes man entirely clean and righteous; and in addition he calls attention to how the partial, effective aspect must correctly be understood: The partly-partly of the partial aspect is no addition to the totally-totally of the total aspect, but is the necessary expression of it and has it as its unalterable and permanent prerequisite. In the partial aspect, having to fight every day against the sin in the flesh and to mortify the deeds of the body, and also being able to do this through the Spirit – and thus be the object of God’s sin-extirpating activity – is insolubly connected with having, in the total aspect, to confess oneself a sinner whose whole righteousness before God is the remission of sin. And the criterion for man’s confession of his sin in the total aspect not being hypocrisy is that in the partial aspect he must know that it is demanded of him that he must fight the old Adam. By thus fighting man will not eventually get to where he no longer needs Christ and grace – as the misunderstanding […] finds it necessary to understand it. How would man be able to do that when he – precisely by fighting against the sin in the flesh, and of course it is the justifying grace, and solely that, that releases this fight – is forced to acknowledge and confess himself a sinner? Where this fight is inevitable, and as long as it is, it is clear to the fighting man that he is a sinner, for he who sins in one thing sins in all. As long as the least sin is left in man, therefore, which has not been swept out – and as long as it goes on, the fight in man bears witness to that, and it cannot end until the corporal death – so long will this unswept sin make it clear to man that in himself, when he disregards the imputed righteousness, he is completely a sinner who has nothing to boast of before God (Horstman: 1981, 58).

Horstmann’s text is very close in meaning to the quotation from Antilatomus which has already been quoted above:

257 WA 2, 364,30–31: “Quia dum Christus in nobis habitat per fidem, iam movet nos ad opera per vivam illam fidem operum suorum.”

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Thus I say and teach that every man should know that in each of his deeds he contains as much sin as is left of sin in him which has not yet been expelled, because as the tree is, so are the fruits. And he must know this, so that he shall not brag before God of a purity he has in himself, but he shall brag in the grace and gift of God, because he has a merciful God who does not impute this sin to him, and even gives the gift by which He extirpates it.258

5.7.5 The exegesis of the Epistle to the Romans 7:14–8:1 This interpretation of the fight against sin is supported by the very last section of Antilatomus, in which Luther verse by verse expounds Rom 7:14 to Rom 8:1, the latter of which texts gave rise to what has been said about the two fortresses. Here in Paul, according to Luther, is described explicitly how the lives of Christians take the form of a fight against the sin which is never absent. In the whole passage, 7:14–8:1, says Luther, Paul moves in the most pleasant way between flesh and spirit, and changes between synecdoches on both sides to emphasize that the whole is denoted by the part and vice versa (WA 8, 121,11– 12). So when we speak about the part (ex parte), we simultaneously speak about the whole (totus), or how the thing is by nature (proprius) (WA 8, 119,35–120,1). When it is said of Paul that he partly acts according to the flesh, partly does evil, and only partly understands because he understands according to the flesh, one cannot therefore conclude that he does not at all act according to the flesh, do evil, or that he understands completely (WA 8, 120,3–8). He who is a weak or small man is not eo ipso not a man (WA 8, 119,36–120,1), Luther says, and it is likewise with sin. Even though it is a ruled sin which does not kill, damn and submit the complete man to wrath, it is still wholly and completely sin (WA 8, 120,5–12). The category of quantum has nothing to do with quid, but is subordinate, and comes later, as Luther has determined earlier. In this way he seeks to express that one and the same man (unus et idem homo) (WA 8, 124,36), Paul himself and with him all the saints, as a complete man is both: carnal, seen from one angle and spiritual seen from the other. Under grace he is spiritual, but under the law he is carnal, and in both cases the same Paul (WA 8, 119,14–16). So there are not two wills in one and the same man, which from a partial point of view fight each for their half, as Latomus would like to see it (WA 8, 119,13–14). There is one whole man who is subjected to two different laws, the law of the limbs, which Luther also calls the will of the flesh, and the law of the mind, which 258 WA 8, 108,2–6: “Ita dico et doceo, ut omnis homo in omni opere suo sciat se tantum habere de peccato, quantum in ipso nondum est eiectum peccatum, qualis arbor, talis fructus, ne glorietur coram deo de mundicia sua in seipso, glorietur autem in gratia et dono dei, quod faventem deum habet, qui hoc peccatum non imputat, insuper donum dedit, quo expurget.”

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is called the will of the Spirit (WA 8, 122,29–33). And these two wills are external powers which both in their own right dominate the complete man,259 depending on which forum he is facing: on one hand he faces the God who justifies man, and here the will of the Spirit rules, and on the other side he faces his own sinful I, and here the will of the flesh rules (cf. Jüngel: 1999, 184). Luther, however, goes on to say that the same man wants the good as whole (totus), and the evil as less whole (minus totus) (WA 8, 122,24–25). Even though he thus wants to emphasize the simultaneousness, i. e. that the entire man wants both the evil and the good, there is an inequality in this totality and simultaneity. It is the saint, i. e. the believer Luther alludes to here, and therefore the Spirit has the upper hand at the expense of the flesh. The flesh is totus, but minus totus, it is always real flesh, but it is weak. The cause is that grace and wrath, as Luther has emphasized before, are total, and thus cannot fight each other : “The gift means that he is spiritual and under grace, in the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ. Sin makes him carnal, but not under wrath, because grace and wrath do not clash, fight each other or rule each other, as the gift and sin do.”260 This “theological imbalance”, as Jüngel calls it (Jüngel: 1999, 187), must be emphasized so as to avoid that “trotz allem Reden vom Neuen alles beim Alten bleibt” (Jüngel: 1999, 187, note 165, quoting Ebeling: 1979, 155): Es kommt zu einem Übergewicht des Gerechtseins, es kommt zu einem Fortschreiten des Gerechten in der Gerechtigkeit. […] Es ist von erheblicher Bedeutung, dass das gerechtsprechende Urteil Gottes, die sogenannte Imputation, die dem Sünder Gottes Gerechtigkeit zuspricht, stets als das den Sünder aus sich selbst herausrufende und heraussetzende schöpferische Wort verstanden wird, das durch diese seine das menschliche Ich versetzende Kraft dieses auch wirklich gerecht macht (Jüngel: 1999, 188).

But this must not change the totus-aspect, which Luther throughout maintains: Die Simultanität von Sündersein und Gerechtsein erweist sich nun als Gleichzeitigkeit desselben Ich an zwei verschiedenen existentialen Orten: einerseits bei sich selbst, andererseits in Christus, und so bei Gott. “Ein Sünder bin ich in mir selbst ausser Christo, kein Sünder bin ich in Christo ausser mir selbst” (Von der Winkelmesse und Pfaffenweihe (1533), WA 38, 205,29). Und ausser mir selbst in Christus finde ich mich selbst, werde ich ein ganzer Mensch (Jüngel: 1999, 188).

259 Luther has actually described this best in De Servo Arbitrio in the image of man’s will as a draught animal which slaves for one of the two wills/powers, Satan and God, WA 18, 635,7– 22. 260 WA 8, 119,16–19: “Donum facit, ut sit spiritualis et sub gratia, in gratia unius hominis Ihesu Christi. Peccatum facit, ut sit carnalis, sed non sub ira, quia gratia et ira non conveniunt, nec sese mutuo impugnant, nec alterum alterius dominatur, sicut donum et peccatum faciunt.”

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It is of great importance to Luther to emphasize that what makes man able to fight against sin and avoid consenting (consentire) to it is not his own powers, his nature, but God’s grace in Christ who is present in man by the Spirit through faith. That this is a fact we find exemplified several times in this text; on grace it says: “If grace is lacking, [sin] really damns, but now grace hinders his evil nature in judging.”261 “Therefore we are forgiven nothing thanks to ourselves, nothing is clean because of us, but because of God’s grace and gift only.”262 And on the Spirit: “One thing [doing evil], he [i. e. Paul] says, is here hindered by the other [not wanting to do evil] but in such a way that the Spirit has the upper hand, and it is ascribed to it that he does not do, and does not want to do, evil” (to Rom 7:19–20).263 “It [sin] is great and is removed by a great gift of God and forgiven by great grace, because of the Spirit which is not contrary to but loves God’s law.”264 Of faith as God’s gift Luther says: “[I]t is the same sin, but the pious have an antidote, they [i. e. the impious] do not have it.”265 Earlier, in the introduction to the exegesis of Rom 7:14–8:1, he defined this antidote which the pious unlike the impious enjoy as “the power of faith” (virtus fidei) (WA 8, 118,24). And finally Luther talks about Christ where he describes the raging of sin in the pious too, and where he even appeals to our experience that this is so: “Who does not feel that that is how things are inside him? Who never feels the crazy thoughts and urges that spring from cupidity and anger, however much against one’s will?”266 To withstand and fight the raging of this sin, he says, is an immense piece of work and a very great burden, so that the fight demands an energetic war campaign, “and therefore Christ is also called the Lord of hosts, and ‘the King mighty in war’, because He not only opposes these strong attacks with his gift, but also conquers them”.267 According to all this, Luther ends his exegesis, what is central is Paul’s cry in Rom 7:25: “Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Here Paul does not give thanks for his own righteousness but for God’s mercy through Christ. It is Christ and Him alone man must put up before God, under whose wings he must 261 WA 8, 123,14–15: “Si desit gratia vere damnat, nunc naturam eius malam gratia, ne damnet, prohibit.” 262 WA 8, 124,15–16: “Quare nihil nobis nostra gratia indulgetur, nihil ex nobis mundum est, sed ex sola gratia et dono dei.” 263 WA 8, 122,11–12: “Alterum enim hic dicit per alterum impediri, sic tamen, ut spiritus praevalet et illi tribuatur, quod non operetur, non velit malum.” 264 WA 8, 122,36–38: “Magnum est et magno dono dei tollitur et magna gratia ignoscitur, propter spiritum, qui non repugnat, sed condelectator legi dei.” 265 WA 8, 123,11–12: “vere idem peccatum, sed pii antidotum habent, illi non habent”. 266 WA 8, 122,42–123,2: “[Et] quis non sentit ita in se fieri? Quis non furiosas libidinis et irae cogitationes et motus sensit unquam, quantumlibet invitus et nolens?” 267 WA 8, 123,5–7: “unde et Christus ‘dominus exercituum’ vocatur et ‘rex potens in praelio’, quia hos magnos impetus per donum suum non solum sustinet, sed vincit etiam”.

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hide, and in whose grace he must rejoice and boast in grace and the gift (WA 8, 124,18–21). It must be entirely clear that the magnification and confession of sin and the recourse to grace are God’s work (opus dei), He who is miraculous in His saints, as He works His entire will in them, even though they seem to contain sin, and indeed do. That He is “miraculous in them” means that His will is precisely not the sin that is in them, but is their sanctification from it (WA 8, 124,30–34). This must be the basis on which we are to understand what Luther says, in various passages in Antilatomus, about man’s own work. Man is really involved in the extirpation of sin, but it is as a tool for God’s workings in it by the Spirit through the faith in Christ.268 In Luther the concept of the lack of consensus with 268 Just as it was fruitful in connection with the cross-theological movement, which forms the Sermon on Christ to add to Antilatomus a passage from the excursus “De Spe et Passionibus” to Psalm 5:12 in the Second Lecture on the Psalms (see note 537), it is also fruitful in connection with God’s work in man, because in the same excursus Luther goes on to emphasize that it is not man himself but God who acts in the so-called passive life: “The purpose of testing you in hopelessness or a shaking of your conscience is not that you should seek shelter in the deeds, but rather that you are to be called away from the deeds because this the most spiritual, although bitterest fight must find its victor inside you alone, with God alone, while only hope sustains and awaits, and God determines the whole outcome” (AWA 2, 304,17–21). “Therefore it is an error to maintain that free will is active in the good deed when we talk about the inner deed, because wanting this, which we now call believing, hoping, loving is a movement, an emotion, a guidance by the word of God, and a continuous cleansing and renewal of the mind and the senses from day to day, in the appropriation of God. Although this suffering/passivity is not always equally intense, it is always a suffering, passivity. ‘See’, Jer 18:6 says, ‘like the clay in the potter’s hand, so are you in my hand, O house of Israel.’ Which activity, I ask, does the clay have when the potter shapes it into a form? Is it not rather a passivity we see here? By which the idea of the craftsman nevertheless develops it from its lack of form to a likeness. Through the hope that gives birth, as tribulation works, we are thus shaped in the likeness of the divine image and are created in His image (Col 3:10; Eph 4:23), who created us” (AWA 2, 320,15–321,5). This emphasis on passivity/suffering does not mean, however, that man does not do good deeds (AWA 2, 307,3–308,23). Luther himself asks the rhetorical question in the middle of the text: “Why, then, are we enjoined by so many commandments from Christ and the apostles to do the good, to sow, to build on the foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, etc. (1 Cor 3:12)?” (AWA 2, 307,3–5). Here it is all a matter of understanding what constitutes good deeds, Luther says. The true good deeds are the ones which come into being as a consequence of the mortification and cleansing which happens with the infusion of faith, hope and charity, mortificatio et purgatio (qui fit infusione fidei et spei et caritatis) (AWA 2, 307,11–12). For at this cleansing man is emptied of his deeds and learns to trust only in God and to do good deeds, now not to his own merit, for which he seeks a reward, but not imputing anything to them but serving God through them. Therefore the way to understand it, says Luther, is that where the Scripture commands that the good deed must be done, man must know that he is hindered in doing it, because he cannot, and thus he must die and be buried and accept that God works in him. And this means that the good deeds happen when God entirely and completely acts in man so that no part of the deed has to do with man. Therefore there are both merits and no merits in men, Luther says: “They are there because they are God’s gifts and His deeds alone. They are not there because man cannot impute more to himself as regards them than the most wretched sinner in whom God works

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sin is a question of the simultaneously sinful and justified man’s true divine service (the confession and the acceptance of Christ as God’s word to the forgiveness of sins), whereas in Latomus it was a question of the striving of justified man to do good deeds and avoid sinful ones, aided by his natural powers, reason and will, more or less restored by grace. Thus in Luther the concept of “consentio” has nothing to do with the enacting of various concrete deeds by man, but has to do with the single “deed” which is submitting in faith to Christ, God’s word. “So Paul sums up the life conditions for the pious man in this world by saying, “So then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin (7:25), I myself, one and the selfsame man.”269 “I myself”, says Paul, not “someone else”, and “I serve”, not only “I have sin”, but “I serve it”, which means the same as “my flesh serves it” (WA 8, 125,3–4). And serving sin is and cannot be other than acting against God’s law. This service is a reality and is evil even though the Spirit withstands it and will not be conquered by it. That is the way it must be, according to Luther (WA 8, 125,4–6.9). And therefore the continuation, Rom 8:1, “There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus who walk not according to the flesh”, must be understood to mean that there really is no condemnation for the believers, but that in no way is there no sin. The sin which is always there would be to condemnation, had not grace and the gift in the grace of Christ had the upper hand (WA 8, 125,12–17). That is the simple and straightforward meaning of the words in the Scripture, Luther says, and nothing can change that, unless scriptural proof of the contrary can be adduced (WA 8, 125,24–26). When Latomus strives to maintain that an “aliquando” exists in connection with serving sin, i. e. that man sometimes serves it and sometimes not, it is not nothing” (AWA 2, 308,8–10). Thus all mankind is, was and remains equal in the eyes of God and cannot be conceited in relation to each other, as is written in 1 Cor 4:7: “What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it? “The righteous and the unrighteous are in God’s eyes the same as regards their deeds, because according to the law the righteous man has no reason to feel superior, and the unrighteous no reason to despair. Both must put their hope in God.” As regards this outer deed or the outer work, as Luther calls it, in which God works good deeds through justified man and which is the fruit of the inner deed (AWA 2, 317,8–10), one may say that a “cooperation” and “activity” take place (AWA 2, 320,25–321,5). How, is illustrated by Luther with the image of a sword which does not act on its own, is passive, the object of an action. Still, as regards the wounds suffered, the sword has cooperated with its movement for the one who cuts with it: “Therefore, just as the sword does not cooperate in its movement, thus the will does not cooperate in seeking its own, which is a movement from the divine word, just something that happens with will, which then cooperates in the work of the hands in praying, walking, working, etc.” (AWA 2, 321,2–5). 269 WA 8, 124,34–36: “Concludit ergo Paulus conditionem vitae pii hominis in hoc seculo dicens: ‘Igitur ego ipse mente servio legi dei, carne autem legi peccati’, ego ipse unus et idem homo.”

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true, according to Luther, neither in connection with the direct service of sin (servitus peccati simpliciter), which the infidel represents, nor the service of sin in the flesh (servitus carne peccati), which is the burden of the believer. Everything that he who is the slave of sin does is a sin, no matter whether one or the other kind of servitus is the subject, because it is the “gift” of sin (and here Luther of course plays on the vocabulary in Antilatomus in general) that this is so. And therefore servitus is not a term for a deed (opus) either, but for a state (status), which includes life-long activity (WA 8, 125,35–39). When that is said, it must be added, Luther continues, that Paul clearly distinguishes between serving a thing directly (simpliciter), and serving it in the flesh (carne) (WA 8, 125,32–34). They are two different states. The righteous serve God directly, because it is a matter of the person, i. e. the whole, whereas the hypocrites only serve him in the flesh, because they serve him in deed, not in the faith of the heart. And with sin it is the converse. Here it is the righteous who serve in the flesh, whereas the unrighteous serve it directly. Both parties thus do wrong, since they both contain a service for sin, and therefore both can be called “hypocrites” (hypocritae). But as Luther says, the infidels are hypocrites who are worthy of condemnation, while the believers are hypocrites who are worthy of redemption. The infidels appear upright in the eyes of men but are in reality, i. e. in the eyes of God, evil. And vice versa as regards the believers. They look evil in the eyes of men, but are in reality good in the eyes of God (WA 8, 125,41–126,5). Because the infidels do not acknowledge their radical sin, but take pains to do everything that appears good, they seem to men strong and ideal, since men first and foremost love the lovable (cf. Conclusion 28 in the Heidelberg Disputation, WA 1, 365,1–20), whereas the believers acknowledge the radical sin and thus their own urge to do like the infidels; and in constant confession and refuge in Christ because they know that they are not able to do what they must, they do not like the infidels attempt to justify themselves by virtue of the apparently good, but instead humbly give themselves to the work nearest at hand, no matter what or how. Those who do this seem to others not strong and exemplary, but instead weak and despicable, in the same way as Christ in His human life. But the love of which the believers thus become the expression when ever it does so, i. e. when sin does not mark them, is the divine love which creates the lovable out of the unworthy, and which is contrary to human love which finds and loves the lovable (cf. Conclusion 28 in the Heidelberg Disputation, WA 1, 365,1–20). What is suggested in few words here at the end of Antilatomus is thus what Luther in other passages describes in greater detail, that the believers because of the presence of Christ are formed by Him, and become like “christs” for their neighbours. We do well to bear in mind that the way in which infidels and believers appear is not unambiguous for men. We cannot, once we have become aware of the

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difference, distinguish between the infidels and the believers because of their outer appearance. Luther describes very minutely what a dangerous and unpredictable, and hence what a hidden or at least inscrutable thing is sin (WA 8, 123,36–124,9). It constantly changes faces, and when one side of it rests, the other rages, as is for instance the case in the relationship between concupiscence and laziness. And as Luther says: “If we take energetic action against them, pride (superbia) is awakened” (WA 8, 124,3). One cannot therefore say that the passion rests now and then: “The flesh is a living thing, which changes in constant movement when the objects move.”270 And therefore any man must always in every deed fear and thus confess his sin, and can do nothing but flee from himself to faith in the external redemption which is God’s grace in Christ, the word. And only God can then distinguish between those who realize this, and those who do not, but who to men might look as if they do.

5.7.6 Epilogue Luther now sums up his pamphlet against Latomus with the important section to which reference has already been made several times. In a theological context the matter of God and man in Christ all-important. In addition, he points out, those who do not know this cannot speak correctly, because along with his sophists he [i. e. Latomus] has never had any idea what grace and sin, law and Gospel, Christ and man are. For the one, who would speak in a Christian way about sin and grace, about law and Gospel, Christ and man, basically does not need to talk of anything but God and man in Christ. And one must take the greatest care to express both natures with all their qualities about the complete person, and yet be careful not to ascribe to it what belongs only to God or only to man. For it is one thing to speak of God incarnate or man made divine, another only to speak of God or man. In the same way, sin outside grace is one thing, while [sin] in grace is something else. Accordingly, you might imagine that God’s grace or gift had been “iniquitized” and that sin had been “gracified”, as long as we are here, so that the sin because of the gift and grace is no longer sin.271

270 WA 8, 124,9–10: “[quia] caro res viva est, in assiduo motu est, qui mutatur mutatis obiectis”. 271 WA 8, 126,21–32: “Quod facit, quia quid gratia et peccatum, quid lex et Euangelium, quid Christus et homo sit, cum suis sophistis nunquam cognovit. Nam qui de peccato et gratia, de lege et Euangelio, de Christo et homine volet Christianiter disserere, oportet ferme non aliter quam de deo et homine in Christo disserere. Ubi cautissime observandum, ut utramque naturam de tota persona enunciet cum omnibus suis propriis, et tamen caveat, ne quod simpliciter deo aut simpliciter homini convenit, ei tribuat. Aliud enim est, de deo incarnato vel homine deificato loqui, et aliud de deo vel homine simpliciter. Ita aliud est peccatum extra gratiam, aliud in gratia, ut possis imaginari gratiam seu donum dei esse

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After this Luther will finish his work, because everything else in Latomus’ Exposition concerning, for example, penance and indulgence, he does not find it worth wasting energy on. In Latomus everything is proved on the basis of human writings, and that, of course, has no validity for Luther when theology is the subject. In that case only Scripture is valid (WA 8, 126,32–127,3). Another reason why nothing more has to be said in this case is that Luther now believes he has demonstrated that the scholastic theology which Latomus represents is nothing but ignorance of the truth and an offence when it is put alongside the Scriptures (WA 8, 127,3–36). In that connection Luther does not care that he is accused of not valuing canonized theologians such for example as Thomas, since he does not regard canonization as at all important, if the theologian at the same time in his work gives evidence of contradicting Scripture. According to Luther Thomas wrote much that was heretical, and introduced Aristotle into the world of theology, Aristotle, “the destroyer of the pious doctrine”.272 Therefore Luther is in some considerable doubt whether Thomas has been damned or sanctified. He is more willing to believe that Bonaventura ended up on the right side. Luther is of the opinion that he himself is quite competent to judge. He has, as he says, grown up among scholastics, knows the spirit among his most learned contemporaries and has read deeply in the best of their output. In addition he has at least partially been educated in Holy Writ, and has also undergone some tribulation as regards experience in spiritual matters, which he does not think for example Thomas’ works are marked by. Therefore Luther with a good conscience recommends contempt for the scholastic theology and philosophy, two things which are to him closely connected: Be careful that no one deceives you with philosophy and empty fraud (as I boldly and confidently interpret the scholastic theology), which builds on human tradition, on the basic principles of this world (these are the laws of bulls and everything that is determined beyond the Scriptures in the Church) and not on Christ.273

This philosophy and scholasticism are harmful, not beneficent to theology. Nor is it obvious, he says, if you look at history, that they are necessary. In the period before they came into being the Gospels were taught in a quite different way. The teaching had an entirely different character, as you will become aware when you impeccatificatum et peccatum gratificatum, quam diu hic sumus, ut propter donum et gratiam peccatum iam non peccatum sit.” 272 WA 8, 127,20: “vastatoris piae doctrinae”. 273 WA 8, 127,27–31: “Videte, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam (hanc ego scholasticam Theologiam interpretor fortiter et cum fiducia) secundum traditiones hominum, secundum elementa huius mundi (haec sunt iura bullarum et quicquid ultra scripturas statutum est in Ecclesia) et non secundum Christum.”

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think of Christ’s own teaching, which was through parable and example. Therefore it is here clear that Paul wishes that only Christ should be taught and heard. But who cannot see how much the Bible is read in the universities? Compare those who lecture on the Sentences and on philosophy with those others who have written about the Bible, or who teach it – the Bible which ought to flourish and reign as the most important of all. Then you will see what position is accorded God’s word in the universities.274

Luther finishes by once again, as in the introduction, complaining that he has wasted precious time on Latomus. He would much rather have dedicated himself to the task he has started in his exile, the translation of the New Testament. He also complains of not having the use of his books in Wartburg. He only has the Bible, and that makes it difficult for him to answer Latomus properly, because to do so he ought to check whether Latomus has quoted the Fathers correctly. However, if at some other time it becomes possible for him, he may return to Latomus and answer the rest (which of course he never did). But at the same time he exhorts his adherents, Justus Jonas, Andreas Karlstadt and Nikolaus von Amsdorf to accept the assignment of replying to the rest of the Exposition. They, too, should feel duty bound to defend the honour of the Gospel: Because I wish you also would do something for the word, so that I can take time off and be able to serve the poor people a little. You beginners should try your strength, as well. And that happens best while I am still alive, should I be in any position to help, of course. But now I pray that you will accept this book. I am happy not to have it on my hands any longer.275

This marked the end of the dispute between Luther and Latomus, at least on Luther’s part. He never again dealt with Latomus’ Exposition, nor with his subsequent works.276 Latomus, on the other hand, answered Luther’s Antilatomus with his Responsio ad Libellum a Luthero emissum,277 printed in 1526 with his third anti-Lutheran tract, De Primatu Romani Pontificis adversus Lutherum. Nor was this the last word heard in Latomus’ anti-reformatory fight. 274 WA 8, 127,32–36: “Clarum est hic solum Christum doceri et audiri velle Paulum. Quam vero Academiae legant Biblia, quis non videt? Confer legentes, scribentes super sententias, super philosophiam, cum iis, qui super Biblia scripserunt aut ea docent (cum illa potissima omnium florere et regnare debuerint), et videbis, quo loco verbum dei Academiae habeant.” 275 WA 8, 128,25–29: “Velle enim et vos aliquid pro verbo facere, ut ego feriatus et vulgo misero aliquando servire possim. Vos tyrones etiam oportet exerceri, atque id optimum fuerit me vivo, si quid forte iuvare queam. Sed quaeso, en accipe librum, quam gaudeo illum apud me amplius non morari.” 276 He did come back to the Leuven theologians in a row of theses and in his “last polemical writing” just before his death (and right after Latomus had died): Luthers “letzte Streitschrift” (Contra Asinos Parisiensis Lovaniensisque) 1545/46, WA 54, 444–458. 277 Parts of this pamphlet are quoted in the notes to the edition of Antilatomus in StA. The quotations have not been included in this study.

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In 1525 he published the tract De Questionum generibus quibus Ecclesia certat intus et foris together with the pamphlet De Ecclesia et de humanae Legis Obligatione and a small tract De Confessione secreta against Oekolampadius’ and Beatus Rhenanus’ commentaries on Tertullian. In 1530 Libellus de fide et operibus et de votis monasticis atque institutis monasticis was published against a Protestant tract from the Netherlands entitled Oeconomia christiana. And in the year of Latomus’ death (1544) two short “Epistulae” were published, respectively an answer to Melanchthon’s tract De Ecclesia et de Auctoritate Verbi Dei, and to his answer to Thomas Campeggio on behalf of the protestants during the religious colloquies in Worms. Latomus left behind several unpublished manuscripts which were printed on the initiative of his nephew in Latomus’ Opera Omnia of 1550. The texts in question were an unfinished answer to Erasmus’ De Sarcienda Ecclesiae Concordia, a tract on the indissolubility of marriage, the collection De quibusdam Articulis in Ecclesia Controversis, a Questio Quodlibetica, and finally an account of the discussion regarding the most important reformatory issues of dispute, such as justification, merits, penitence, deeds, sacraments and so on, which Latomus had as an inquisitor with William Tyndale who was imprisoned in the castle of Vilvoorde (cf. Vercruysse: 1985, 11–12). Even though Luther did not return to Latomus, their discussion does not seem to have left him unaffected. In a series of later table talks he mentions Latomus by name and expresses his appreciation of his stature: “[…] Latomus only has been the finest writer against me […]; all the others, including Erasmus, are as croaking frogs.” “Latomus is the best of all those who have written against me. He deals very deftly with the Scriptures, but nevertheless pulls everything in the direction of deeds. […] Latomus’ shortcoming is that he does not know the nature of sin and grace […].”278

278 WA TR 1, 202,1–7 (463): “Die Papisten und ich schreyben ungleich wider einander. Ich komme meditatus et satis hostiliter ad pugnam und hab all mein ding fur zehen jaren mit dem Teuffel versucht und erhallten uns weys, das es den stich hellt, sed Erasmus et alii hatts nie keiner mit ernst gemeinet. Unus Latomus ist der feinst scriptor contra me gewest. Et signate vobis hoc: Unus Latomus scripsit contra Lutherum; reliqui omnes, etiam Erasmus, sunt ranae coaxantes.” WA TR 2,189,22–27 (1709): “Latomus. Latomus optimus omnium, qui contra me scripserunt. Valde dextre tractat scripturas, sed tamen trahit omnia ad opera. Erasmus. Erasmus non est aequalis Latomo. Hoc deest Latomo, quod naturam peccati et gratiae non scit Latomus. (June 12th to July 12th 1532). Cf. also WA TR 4, 145,21–146,21 (4119): “Latomus. Postea fiebat mentio Latomi Galli, qui contra Lutherum scripsisset. Respondit Lutherus: Ille omnium antagonistarum meorum erat insignis. Cuius status principalis erat: Quidquid ab ecclesia est receptum, hoc non est reiciendum. Hoc est argumentum plausibile. […] Ideo argumentantur sic papistae: Impossibile est Deum relinquere ecclesiam suam, quia vobiscum, inquit Christus, ero usque ad consummationem saeculi, ergo. Respondeo: Das vobiscum muss man wol distinguiren, quae scilicet sit vera ecclesia, an sint afflicta corda an puserones illi Romani?” (November 16th to 17th 1538). And

WA TR 5, 75,6–8 (5345): “Silvester primus scripsit contra Lutherum, in Germania Eccius. Latomus fuit doctissimus adversariorum Lutheri; is serio scripsit.”

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