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Latin American countries have for a long time been importers of public policies and institutions from the Global North.
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“Assembling a stellar cast of policy researchers this piece uses Latin America as a laboratory to help us understand and explain the various ways in which countries from the Global South export and transfer strong policy innovations across borders. This book achieves its goal of showcasing how Latin American countries have moved beyond what was considered a traditionally receptive role in the field of policy diffusion to an active one where these countries purposefully share the lessons, successes and failures that have emerged from their implementation of specific public policies. A timely volume that will help scholars in the fields of comparative politics, public administration and public policy as well as practitioners interested in transferring policies across countries, cities, and regions” —Raul Pacheco-Vega, Assistant Professor, Public Administration Division, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Latin America and Policy Diffusion
Latin American countries have for a long time been importers of public policies and institutions from the Global North. The colonial legacy and the resulting patterns of international relations during the 20th century favoured a course of adoption and hybridization of political institutions. In recent decades, a new conjuncture has emerged in which Latin American policies have started to diffuse South-South and even South-North. Led by Brazil with Participatory Budgeting and the Bolsa Familia program, other countries in the region soon followed. The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system and bicycle policies in Curitiba and Bogotá have also reached wide international recognition and circulation. And yet, despite Latin America’s new role as a policy “exporter”, little is known about its dynamics, causes and effects. Why have Latin American policies been diffused inside and outside the region? Which actors are involved? What driving forces affect these processes? This innovative collection offers a new perspective on the policy diffusion phenomena. Drawing on different examples from Latin American experiences in urban local policies and national social policies, experts present a new framework to study this phenomenon centred on the mobilization of ideas, interests and discourses for policy diffusion. Latin America and Policy Diffusion will be of great interest to researchers, educators, advanced students and practitioners working in the fields of political science, public policy, international relations and Latin American Studies. Osmany Porto de Oliveira is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp). He coordinates the Laboratory of International Public Policies (LABOPPI) at Unifesp. His areas of research and teaching include the following topics: international relations, public policy, policy diffusion, development cooperation, international organizations and participatory democracy. Cecilia Osorio Gonnet is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policies at the Politics and Government Department, at the Alberto Hurtado University, Chile. Her research and teaching expertise are in public policy, social policies, dissemination of public policies, citizen participation and knowledge, ideas and public policies. Sergio Montero is Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Development at the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. His research interests are in the politics and governance of urban and regional planning; the local and global dynamics behind the circulation, learning and adoption of urban policy models; and local and regional economic development strategies, with an emphasis in Latin American cities and regions. Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite is Professor in Public Policy Management at the School of Arts, Sciences and Humanities of the University of São Paulo. Her research and teaching expertise are in public policy analysis; cognitive analysis in public policy; diffusion of public policies; social policies; neoliberalism and public policies; media, conservatism and public policies; social development analysis (sociological approaches).
Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics
Crime, Violence and Security in the Caribbean M. Raymond Izarali Young People and Everyday Peace Exclusion, Insecurity, and Peacebuilding in Colombia Helen Berents Indigenous Peoples and the Geographies of Power Mezcala’s Narratives of Neoliberal Governance Inés Durán Matute Government and Governance of Security The Politics of Organised Crime in Chile Carlos Solar Media Leaks and Corruption in Brazil The Infostorm of Impeachment and the Lava-Jato Scandal Mads Bjelke Damgaard Public Debt and the Common Good Philosophical and Institutional Implications of Fiscal Imbalance James Odom The Media Commons and Social Movements Grassroots Mediations Against Neoliberal Politics Jorge Utman Saavedra The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-Class Revolt Comparative Insights from Argentina Daniel Ozarow Latin America and Policy Diffusion From Import to Export Edited by Osmany Porto de Oliveira, Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Sergio Montero and Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Studies-in-Latin-American-Politics/book-series/RSLAP
Latin America and Policy Diffusion From Import to Export
Edited by Osmany Porto de Oliveira, Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Sergio Montero and Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite
First published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of Osmany Porto de Oliveira, Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Sergio Montero and Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-33316-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-44613-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC
List of Contributors
Introduction: Latin American Public Policies: From Import to Export
O S M A N Y P O RTO DE OL I VE I RA, CE CI L I A OS ORIO G O N N ET, S E R G I O M O N T E RO, AND CRI S T I ANE KE RCHE S D A SILVA LEITE
How Are Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Disseminated and Adopted in Latin America? A Proposal for the Mechanisms of Diffusion
C E C I L I A O S O RI O GONNE T
The Diffusion of Public Policies and the Bolsa Familia Program in Light of the Mexican Experience
C R I S T I A N E KE RCHE S DA S I LVA L E I T E AND URSU LA D IA S PERES
Regional Diffusion of Brazilian Social and Rural Public Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean
E R I C S A B O U RI N, CAT I A GRI S A, MARCOS AURÉLIO LO PES FILH O , M O I S E S V I L LAMI L BAL E S T RO, MI RE YA E . VALEN C IA PER A FÁ N , E D U A R D O D E L I MA CAL DAS , MARI O L ÚCI O DE Á V ILA , A N D D O R I S S AYA G O
The Diffusion of Social Protection and Food Security Policies: Emerging Issues in Brazilian South-South Cooperation for Development
M E L I S S A P O ME ROY, BI ANCA S UYAMA, AND L A U R A T R A J BE R WAI S BI CH
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía: From Urban Experiment to International “Best Practice” S E R G I O M O N T E RO
viii Contents 7
The Diffusion of Brazilian Participatory Institutions: From Innovation to Internationalization
O S M A N Y P O RTO DE OL I VE I RA
Importing the Participatory Budgeting Model From Porto Alegre to La Marsa: The Circulation and Appropriations of a Policy Device
J O S E P H - D É S I RÉ S OM- 1
Policy Transfer and Resistance: Proposals for a New Research Agenda
L E S L I E A . PA L
Mario Lúcio de Ávila has a PhD in Sustainable Development and is a professor at the University of Brasília in the postgraduate programs in Environment and Rural Development (MADER) and in Public Management. He is researcher at the Brazilian Network for Research and Management in Territorial Development. Moises Villamil Balestro is Associate Professor at the University of Brasilia in the Department of Latin American Studies. He holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Brasília (2006). From 2014–2015 he was visiting scholar at the Goethe Universität Institute of Political Science. He is also a researcher in the area of economic sociology and leads a research group, Comparative Studies on Economic Sociology, registered at the Brazilian National Research Council (CNPQ). Catia Grisa has a PhD in Development, Agriculture and Society. She is professor in the Interdisciplinary Department, Postgraduate Program in Rural Development (PGDR) and Postgraduate Program in Regional Dynamics and Development (PGDREDES), at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Eduardo de Lima Caldas is an economist and professor at the University of São Paulo (USP) in the postgraduate programs in Environment and Society (PROCAM). He holds a PhD in Political Science and is a member of PP-AL Network. Marcos Aurélio Lopes Filho holds a Master’s degree in Environment and Rural Development from the University of Brasilia (UnB) and is a PhD candidate in Global Health and Sustainability at the University of São Paulo (USP). His activities focus on the articulation of Governments, International Organizations and Civil Society Organizations in the design and implementation of public policies for the transformation of food systems, promotion of food and nutritional security, eradication of poverty, rural development, social protection and reduction of inequalities. Leslie A. Pal is Senior Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Carleton. He holds a PhD in Political Science (Queen’s University,
x Contributors Canada), MA in Political Science (Queen’s University, Canada) and a BA, with Joint Honours in Political Science and Sociology (Mount Allison University, Canada). His research uniquely engages public administration and public policy from both a rich theoretical as well as practical perspective. Currently he is working on global public policy networks around public sector reform, focusing specifically on the role of international organizations. He is author of Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times (5th ed.) (2014); Frontiers of Governance: The OECD and Global Public Management Reform (2012). He is co-author with Magdalèna Hadjiisky and Christopher Walker of Public Policy Transfer: The MicroDynamics and Macro-Effects (2017). Ursula Dias Peres is Professor and Researcher in the Management of Public Policy, Social Change and Political Participation at the University of São Paulo (EACH). Melissa Pomeroy holds a PhD in Political Science from the Institute of Government and Public Policy at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She specializes in Participation and Sustainable Development teaching at the same university. In 2011, she collaborated with the creation of Articulação SUL, a research and policy center focused in South-South Cooperation, where she is currently Programme Coordinator. Eric Sabourin is a sociologist, anthropologist and researcher at CIRAD (Agricultural Research Centre for International Development) in the Art-Dev unit, University of Montpellier. He is also a visiting professor at the University of Brasilia, in the Center for Sustainable Development and at the MADER Postgraduate Program at FUP-UnB. Eric is a member and former coordinator of PP-AL Network www.pp-al.org/en. Doris Sayago holds a PhD in sociology from the University of Brasília and a postdoctoral degree from the University of Montpellier. She is a Professor at the Center for Sustainable Development of the University of Brasília – PPGCDS \ UnB. Joseph-Désiré Som-1 is a research fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (Germany). His research focuses on the transnational circulation of democracy schemes and the resource policies pursued by postcolonial states in Africa from a comparative perspective. Bianca Suyama holds an MSc in Development Management from the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 2011, she collaborated with the creation of Articulação SUL, a research and policy centre focused in South-South Cooperation, where she is currently the Executive Coordinator. Mireya E. Valencia Perafán holds a PhD in social sciences from the University of Brasilia (UnB). She professor at the Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine of UnB and researcher at the Brazilian Network for Research and Management in Territorial Development.
Contributors xi Laura Trajber Waisbich is a Brazilian researcher with more than seven years of research and policy experience in the field of Brazilian foreign policy and international development, particularly South-South Cooperation. Currently, Laura is a PhD candidate in Geography at the University of Cambridge and a researcher affiliated with two Sao Paulo–based think tanks: the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) and the South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre (Articulação SUL). She holds a research master’s in political science from Sciences Po Paris.
Introduction Latin American Public Policies: From Import to Export Osmany Porto de Oliveira, Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, Sergio Montero, and Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite
Introduction The movement of political models, public policies and institutions is not a recent phenomenon. Policies traveling from one place to another are intrinsically intertwined with the evolution of political institutions. Southern countries have historically adopted models from the North, owing to different reasons such as colonial legacy, economic dependency on other countries, the circulation of elites, global political trends fostered by Europe and the United States, imposition by international institutions and so on. In the case of Latin America, colonial legacies from Spain and Portugal shaped political institutions in the early stages of nation-state building in the 18th and 19th centuries. During the 19th century, European countries such as France were an important source of influence. For example, the separation of powers, a principle that was born in France from the 1789 Revolution, was included in the first Brazilian Constitution in 1824. Later, during the 20th century, the United States expanded into the South and became one of the major influences in the region. In the late 1980s, the so-called Washington Consensus, a set of neoliberal state reforms and their associated policies, were imposed in Latin America via conditionality mechanisms through the Bretton Woods Institutions, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The case of Latin American policy import is also similar to other countries in the Global South, which follows a North-to-South policy adoption dynamic. However, in recent decades, a new conjuncture has emerged in Latin America that has favored a reversal of exclusively “policy import” processes, enabling a “policy export” movement to emerge. After many Latin American countries went through a period of dictatorship, the democratization that has been taking place since the 1980s and 1990s meant rebuilding and creating new institutions, norms and public policies. National and subnational governments in the region had to cope with long-standing social problems, such as persistent poverty, in a new political context characterized by parallel processes of neoliberalization and democratization of the state, and a lack of resources and state capacity. Despite the challenges of the time, this new political context opened the door to policy innovation and fresh ideas introduced by social movements, civil
2 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. society associations and new political parties. From the late 1980s until the early 2000s, Latin America became a laboratory for public policies, in particular social policy. As Arocena and Bowman (2014, p. xvii) state, there are different public policy fields where Latin America was an innovator, for example “in [the] demilitarization in Costa Rica and Panama, in social security reform in Chile, in multicultural policies for Indigenous peoples in Bolivia, in quotas to increase women’s representation in Argentine Congress, and in equity programs to transfer resources to the poor in Brazil.” In the experience of Latin America, which is the main focus of this book, Brazil is an emblematic case of this movement from policy import to export. Yet, we do acknowledge—and describe in the next section—that policy diffusion processes are much more complex phenomena than “exporting” practices (Porto de Oliveira and Pimenta de Faria, 2017). Until recent years, little was known about Latin American social policy export in the literature on policy diffusion and transfer. Mainstream studies on policy transfer, diffusion and circulation were focused on understanding the adoption of US policies in the UK (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 6), the influence of US policies in Canada (Howlett, 2000), the Europeanization process (Saurugger and Surel, 2006), how OECD was globalizing policy standards (Pal, 2012), the adoption of liberal markets (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2008) and the emulation of Western institutions by African countries (Badie, 1992), to name a few. Another strand of literature was concerned with questions such as understanding actors, mostly governmental and non-governmental (national and international) actors, who are engaged in transfers, their objects, the directions of the movement (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1991; Stone, 2001), as well as mechanisms driving diffusion processes such as coercion, competition, learning and socialization (Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013). This book offers a new path to engage in the debate of the international “travels” of public policies. The cases of study included in this book bring new questions, methods and empirical material to analyze a phenomenon that was previously overlooked by the mainstream literature: Latin America as an exporter of policies. The Brazilian case leads our reflection, which is complemented by Chilean and Colombian examples, as well as comparative perspectives with Mexico and other Latin American countries. The contributions of this book highlight different issues of the policy diffusion debate, such as the diverse strategies for policy export set forth by Latin American countries, bottom-up diffusion and the role of ideas and new power dynamics between Latin American governments and international institutions. In this book, we also leave behind disciplinary battles that foster divisions among experts. We incorporate different perspectives in this book that help us understand international policy diffusion from a multidimensional perspective, building bridges among scholars with different backgrounds. This introduction will present the debate of the field in its first section. The following section will advance the argument of Latin American countries as “policy exporters.” The fourth section frames the theoretical contributions of the book, and the fifth and
Introduction 3 final section discusses the overall methodology used in the book, before moving to the conclusion and next steps.
A Pluralistic View of Traveling Policies Different approaches have been developed to understand the international movement of public policies, enabling the production of analytical frameworks, identifying mechanisms, scales of observation and so on. For example, the term “diffusion” is used in particular by US scholars (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2008), while “transfer” emerged in the British debate (Evans, 2009). The concept of “circulation” is present in the French sociology of public action works, and the “mobilities” proposal was advanced by urban geographers (Peck and Theodore, 2010). These approaches are not always in harmony. In fact, ontological and epistemological conflicts have arisen between intellectual streams, regarding topics such as how policies move transnationally, which objects circulate, which agents participate, the role of culture and contexts and more, bringing not only divisions to the field, but also intense debate.1 This book aspires to move beyond disciplinary divisions and perspectives oriented by research traditions. We believe that there are many overlapping and complementary issues, questions and approaches produced by recent literature. We don’t take a position against a specific trend—for example, Peck and Theodore (2015), whose approach is in opposition with policy transfers—but instead our intent is to build bridges to improve our understanding of the phenomena in a pluralistic and interdisciplinary perspective. We understand that there are different lenses and scales in the analysis of transnational policy movement, and for this reason, rather than choosing between “diffusion,” “transfer,” “circulation” or “mobilities,” we use each term for different aspects of the discussion. In that sense, we follow Porto de Oliveira and Pimenta de Faria’s (2017, p. 30) approach, that advocates for the use of the term “’transfer” in reference to a specific displacement of a policy from one jurisdiction to another, “diffusion” for a collective adoption of a public policy and “circulation” as a longer and wider flow, in time and space, that can also imply back and forward policy “movements.” In the next sections, we will present different traditions of analysis that seek to explain how policies travel. Policy Transfer Within the Anglo-Saxon perspective, policy transfer studies started to gain space in the field of public policy analysis in the 1990s. Authors like Richard Rose, who created the notion of “lesson-drawing,” wrote pioneering works seeking to understand the specific processes of displacement of policies or programs (past and present) from one government to another. Unlike the studies of policy diffusion, which focus on broader and more fluid processes, the studies on policy transfer are interested in understanding how paradigms, lesson
4 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. drawings, institutional arrangements and instruments (and other elements) of a public policy (or a specific program) transition into another context. Policy transfer studies brought the idea that public policies are implemented through a combination of administrative techniques that often originate elsewhere. Rose (1991) stated that policies and programs invariably suffer transformations inside different contexts, creating new meanings and often provoking unexpected changes in an idiosyncratic process of adaptation, which can lead to copies, emulation, hybrids, syntheses and simple inspirations. This perspective was advanced by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), who brought contemporary elements from the public policy analysis agenda into the field of policy transfer studies. According to the authors, it is necessary to map the relevant social and political actors who define what is transferred, for which reasons, where they originate and what are the effects of the process. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) were not only the first cartographers of the field, as Hadjiisky, Pal and Walker (2017) state, but they also produced a framework of analysis, which helped orient research in the beginning of the 2000s. Considering the great number of power imbalances and conflicts between the administrative and political levels (nationally and internationally), it became important to understand the political meaning of the policy instruments that are mobilized, the various directions of the transfers and the nature of the policy learning process (Porto de Oliveira and Pimenta de Faria, 2017). The role of transfer agents was explored in depth by Diane Stone (2001), who suggests that the policy transfer process mobilizes a network of actors that must be studied beyond the relationship between governments. The variety of the actors who interact within the political systems of contemporary capitalist and democratic countries demands the study of interaction patterns between governmental, non-governmental, private corporations and think tanks, both nationally and internationally. Most recent works identified forces that facilitate and constrain the transfer process (Hadjiisky, Pal and Walker, 2017). If the area has advanced in different fronts of research, there are still frontiers to be surpassed. As Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2018) found, the field still needs to explore and better understand the role of private actors, the internationalization of domestic coalitions, the dynamics of resistance towards policy transfer, translation, arenas of transfer and new directions of Southern transfer. Policy Diffusion One of the definitions about diffusion was proposed by David Strang and Sarah Soule (1998, p. 266), who used the term “to denote flow or movement from a source to an adopter, paradigmatically via communication and influence.” Rogers states that diffusion “is the process through which an innovation is spread through certain communication channels in time between the members of a society” (2004, p. 14). Another similar definition was presented by Levi-Faur, who defines diffusion as “the process by which the adoption of innovation by member(s) of a
Introduction 5 social system is communicated through certain channels over time, and activates the mechanisms that increase the probability of adoption by other members that haven’t adopted yet” (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 23). This statement is later enriched by Jordana, Levi-Faur and Fernandez and Marin (2009), presenting diffusion “as the process whereby information on the creation of new institutions is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system in an uncoordinated manner, and prior adoptions of an innovation affect the probability of adoption for some of the remaining non-adopters in the population” (Jordana, Levi-Faur, Fernandez and Marin, 2009, p. 7). These definitions highlight diverse aspects of the process, but all of them agree that a process of diffusion means that during the adoption of a policy, the policy be influenced by the previous decisions of others, at any point during the adoption process. “The policy options in a country affect the political options of other countries, because of what causes the convergence policies” (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, p. 528). This perspective assumes the complete independence of the actors, but it also seems unlikely that convergence will occur exclusively due to coordination among actors, through international cooperation processes or due to pressures from more powerful agents. In other words, diffusion poses that there is interdependence between countries over time, or with a central actor who acts as a transmitter. Countries would neither act in a completely independent manner, nor in a coordinated manner. The diffusion process answers to an uncoordinated interdependence (Elkins and Simmons, 2005, p. 35). “Under this conception, governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments” (Elkins and Simmons, 2005, p. 35). Some of the characteristics of the adoption process that help distinguish it from other phenomena are the following: first, diffusion occurs in waves, starting slowly with the number of actors adopting the initiative, increasing significantly and then decreasing. This implies that, in graphic terms, the adoption rate over time will form an “S” curve (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). Second, diffusion usually presents a significant geographic convergence (Weyland, 2007) in the same area or among neighboring countries, states or municipalities. Finally, it is possible to identify similarities not only between the central characteristics of the policies diffused, but with divergence in other secondary components (Weyland, 2007). Therefore, it is possible to identify which object was disseminated through the wave of diffusion. Finally, many authors have also reached a consensus that there are four mechanisms operating in policy diffusion: coercion, emulation, construction and competition (Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013). Policy Circulation Studies dating from the 1980s were already discussing policy diffusion in French political science, using terms such as “institutional transfer.” In 1988, Badie published a pioneering work on the Arab adoption of Western institutions
6 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. (Badie, 1988). Owing to France’s central place in the European Union process, as well as its colonial legacy, there are important studies related to Europeanization (Saurugger and Surel, 2006), immigration policies (Channac, 2006), and the models adopted in Eastern Europe (Thierry Delpeuch and Vassileva, 2010) and in the North of Africa (Amin, 2010). Bertrand Badie’s work the “Imported State” (Badie, 1992) was an important milestone for the discussion. The book argued that there are state exporters and importers, with Western countries being the former, or the “model,” and the rest of the world being the latter, or “clients.” The author stated that different forces push elites from ex-colonies to adopt institutions from the West. Further studies on institutional transfers brought to the debate the idea of greffe (transplant) and rejection (Mény, 1993). Denying determinisms, Yves Mény (1993) included the exchange element in the process, acknowledging that there is always a reinvention and re-appropriation of political objects. The reflections of Bayart (1996) insisted on the role of context and culture on the adoption of institutions, especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Studies from the sociology of science, especially the contribution of Bruno Latour, brought to the policy transfer debate in France the notion of translation (Hassenteufel and De Maillard, 2013). This means that policies not only travel, but multiple processes of appropriation of the content and meaning of political objects occur along the way. Policies metamorphize as they travel. Another element worth noting in the literature is the role of individuals, elites and professionals that draws on the Bourdieusian oeuvre, with a sociological analysis of elites in international policy circulation. Scholars frequently find that the trajectory of the transfer agents (universities they attended, social or professional class, institutions they worked for and other social circles of belonging) are determinants to policy circulations (Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Mazeaud, Nonjon and Parizet, 2016). Working with a micro-sociology of transfer agents, the authors are able to capture strategies of actors, their connections, motivations to transfer and understanding of policies. Finally, the analysis of public policy instruments (Halpern and Galès, 2011) was important to introduce the notion of “instruments” to the debate, where the objects that circulate are not merely “packs of policies” or technical policy tools, but rather devices that carry an abstract component (idea, political project, worldview) and a concrete one, such as the formal characteristics that are designed to operationalize the policy. The term “circulation” is widely used in the debate, even if it is not universally accepted (Vauchez, 2013). The notion of circulation refers to a transnational movement—which may be more or less broad and may include multiple comings and goings—of different instruments of public action. The circulation of public policies refers to processes that are not necessarily linear and rational. Along the circulation process, policies are transformed and translated by the actors who participate in the transfers, according to their interests. Policies are adapted according to the influence exerted by the contexts where they are implemented, and the circulation process itself has an impact on the places of destination and origin of the policy.
Introduction 7 Policy Mobilities As we have seen in previous sections, authors have sought to conceptualize the role of external policy ideas in policymaking through theoretical concepts such as policy diffusion, policy transfer and lesson-drawing. Gilardi and Radaelli (2012, p. 162) noted that “we still do not know much about how communities of social actors—especially policy-makers—learn.” Emerging debates in urban studies such as those around policy mobilities (McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2015; Bunnel, 2015) help us conceptualize the practices that facilitate policy travel while situating them in a field of power. The authors have been interested in showing the mobilization of urban policies as a socially constructed, politicized and power-laden process. They have argued that a critical analysis of policy circulations should take a relationalterritorial approach that interprets policy as both influenced by situational struggles and circulating ideas and policy models (McCann and Ward, 2011). In the last five years, debates about policy mobilities have introduced methodological innovations into the debate of policy diffusion, transfer and circulation. More specifically, they have advocated for ethnographic methods of inquiry that stay close to the actual practices of situated policy actors without losing sight of political economy analysis (Peck and Theodore, 2012; Roy, 2012; Montero, 2018). This ethnographic sensibility and focus on the everyday practices of policy actors are appropriate to answer the “how” questions about policy movements and, in this context, several studies have been produced, for instance, on the role of conferences (Cook and Ward, 2012; Montero, 2017a) and study tours (González, 2011; Wood, 2014; Montero, 2017b) as the kind of infrastructure that facilitates policy mobility and adoption (McCann, 2011). Policy Diffusion From a Pluralistic Perspective In this book, the authors are not defending a specific position presented by different strands of research, neither interpretative or positivist. We believe that policy diffusion is better understood if considered from a multidimensional approach. In the case of Latin American social policy diffusion, besides the classical governmental actors, agents of development cooperation and civil society are other important elements in the processes. Meanwhile, circulating policies can be both national and subnational, rural and urban. To deal with such diversity, the authors of this book combine different literature such as international relations, public policy analysis, sociology of social movements and urban studies, among others. Here, we consider international policy diffusion. This phenomenon can be analyzed as a movement with different ranges of reach that vary from a punctual displacement from A to B (transfer), a broader flow that can be regional or clustered from A to B to C, to D and so on (diffusion), and a vast movement that implies moving forward and backward, in time and space (circulation). Policy diffusion is not necessarily a rational process, but it is embedded in a
8 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. socio-political process, that implies dynamics of resistance, translation, social construction, learning and mutual-learning, different degrees of induction, directions, power relations and so on. It is led by heterogeneous types of agents who range from international organizations to individuals, passing through to the private sector, philanthropic agencies, think tanks and social movements. These processes occur at multiple contexts—local, international and transnational—where the different forms of culture influence policy diffusion. We share also the assumption that these processes are not linear or rational, and that there are different intervening variables that occur during the process. This proposal is a way to access the complexity of the phenomena and provide a better understanding of how Latin American social policies traveled abroad. We acknowledge the importance of translations and the role of meaning in the transfer processes, and that the objects in motion are transformed along the way. The aim of this book is to discuss Latin American policy “export” through a pluralistic perspective, aspiring to stimulate and open the floor for future research that considers this rich and interesting empirical ground.
The Rise of Latin America as a “Policy Export” Region The main argument of this book is that Latin American countries moved from being mostly countries that “imported” policies from the North and followed recommendations from international institutions, especially the Bretton Woods organizations, to a position of policy innovation and “export.” This movement took off in the 2000s, especially with the Pink Wave and the commitment of different national governments in the region to fight against poverty, hunger and other social problems via state-driven solutions, operationalized with social policies. In different cases, Latin American policy innovations were “exported” with the support and funding from aid and development cooperation policies. These initiatives were led by countries such as Brazil, and international organizations, as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as regional integration organisms, such as the Mercosur and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). In this section, we will briefly present how this movement was produced, and experiences will be described in depth in specific subsequent chapters. It is important to mention that this book does not present only social policies, but includes other Latin American innovations that have spread, such as the Participatory Budgeting (PB). Latin America “Importing” Models From Abroad The history of Latin American political institutions is grosso modo characterized by the process of adopting political models from Europe and the United States.2 In fact, ideas, models and institutions designed and developed in these regions have had a strong influence on the rest of the world. The process of state-building in the 20th century is full of examples of policy mimicry. In the case of Brazil, Getúlio Vargas, who was the statesman behind the construction
Introduction 9 of Brazilian modern bureaucracy in the 1930s, drew inspiration from different fronts (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). He aspired to build a sort of Weberian state that would follow a rational bureaucracy (Abrucio, Pedroti and Pó, 2010, p. 36). In parallel, the Brazilian government had an agreement with American University in the United States, where Brazilian public servants were sent to be trained (Rabelo, 2011). From this exchange, the idea of “scientific public administration” was brought to Brazil. Vargas was also inspired by the Italian Carta del Lavoro, to develop part of the work system and regulation in Brazil. In the period between the two world wars, these ideas of regulating the work system were part of a “shared circulation” of ideas at the global level, leading to state corporatism (Gentile, 2014), which was redesigned within a national fashion according to the political intentions at that time. In the case of Brazil, the trade unions section was of particular influence, and was included in the Constitution of 1937 (Schwartsman, 2009). Moreover, according to Farah (2013, p. 110), one of the first schools of public policies developed in Brazil, the Brazilian School of Public Administration (Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública, or EBAP), was inspired by the French model of École d’Administration Publique (School of Public Administration, or ENA). For a few decades, most Latin American countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes. From this context emerged policy innovations such as the Pension System in Chile, which was considered a model for the region, as well as the first version of the transport policy in Curitiba. However, what stands out from this moment in the 1980s and 1990s are the state reforms that were accomplished in different countries following the recommendations of the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF. The New Public Management ideas were introduced in Brazil during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, with the state reforms under the ministry of by Bresser-Pereira. The process of democratization was the window of opportunity for different ideas conceptualized during the dictatorship, either by grassroots movements at the local level, or social movements, or political forces and intellectuals that were in opposition to the authoritarian government. New ideas also came with militants that were abroad in exile. Examples of policy innovation at the local level can be seen in Ecuador during the 1990s with different elected mayors from the indigenous movement Pachakutic, as was the case of Cotacachi with Auki Tituaña, who used different instruments to bring together social participation and ethnic inclusion in local politics (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). The same was true for Brazil, where innovations emerged in the new Democratic Constitution in 1988 with the universal healthcare system (Paiva and Teixeira, 2014), and participatory democracy devices that obliged social consultation and control in order to implement policies in areas such as health and education. With the so-called Pink Wave, left-wing presidents took office in different countries in Latin America, with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2003), Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007), Bachelet in Chile (2006), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina
10 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. (2003) and José Mujica in Uruguay (2010). The social agenda was at the heart of the programs and political projects of these governments. There was an opportunity to implement ideas carried out by intellectuals and practitioners, based in universities and NGOs, as well as to scale up to the national-level municipal experiences and incorporate long-term plans from social movements. During these years, the policy innovations were more evident, from Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) in Brazil, to multicultural policies in Bolivia and drug legalization in Uruguay. Not only were these experiences flowing between Latin American countries, as seen by CCTs, but they were also spilling over and being transferred to other regions and countries in the South. CCTs based on Latin American models were adopted in the Philippines (Howlett, Ramesh and Saguin, 2018) and in Ghana (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017; Osorio Gonnet, 2018a). Latin American policies seem particularly attractive to other developed countries and international organizations in the field of development cooperation. These policies were addressed to solve the overall situation of poverty and inequality, and were produced in circumstances of limited resources from the state, vast and heterogeneous territories (as in the case of Brazil), fast urbanization, lack of infrastructure, low administrative capacity, complex bureaucracies and powerful oligarchies. This is a set of conditions of different states in the South, which made them specific if compared to the context of public policies designed and conceived in the Global North, such as the ideas of the “New Public Management,” which were in vogue. Social policies produced on fighting against poverty, hunger eradication, providing healthcare, encouraging social participation and implementing urban planning are a few examples of innovations of this kind. At the local level, the example of the circulation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) shows interesting dynamics. According to Mejía-Dugand et al. (2013) this system was initiated in Lima (Peru) with Vía Expresa in the 1970s, and later modernized by Curitiba in 1974 (Irazábal, 2005). However, when Bogotá improved it and implemented it in the late 1990s, this transport policy became an international “best practice” and was adopted around the world. Since 2001, cities as diverse as Guadalajara (Montero, 2017b), Johannesburg (Wood, 2014), or Jakarta (Matsumoto, 2007), and more than 200 others (Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013) have implemented a BRT system, drawing inspiration from Bogotá’s Transmilenio. Another world-recognized program from Bogotá is its weekly car-free program Ciclovía, which has been adopted by more than 400 cities in the Americas (Montero, 2017c; Sarmiento et al., 2017). The so-called social urbanism policies in Medellín, characterized by transport and public space interventions in the city’s peripheries, have also become a policy model adopted in many other cities around the world (Sotomayor, 2017; Franz, 2017). Although North-South policy exchanges persist in the region, Latin American urban planners and policy advocates are increasingly looking at cities in Latin America as legitimate and alternative models beyond examples from the North. Another urban policy innovation is Participatory Budgeting (PB), which emerged during the PT government in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989.
Introduction 11 The PB aimed to include citizens in the process of allocating the municipal budget. Initially developed by the left-wing Workers Party (PT), PB spread rapidly among Brazilian cities in the 1990s (Wampler, 2008). Just over a decade after innovation in Brazil, PB was being adopted by left and right parties (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003). Cities from different countries also came to be inspired by the experience of Porto Alegre in Latin America, which according to Yves Cabannes (2004) was present in Peru in 2003, Colombia, Uruguay, Ecuador and others. The actions of the mayors of Porto Alegre in advertising and their transnational militancy for participatory democracy, through the construction of networks among municipalities, such as the Mercocities, and the organization of events such as the World Social Forum, helped to internationalize the PB. They also played a role as “ambassadors of participation.” In the early 2000s, PB also spread throughout Europe. A cooperation project between the European Union and cities in Latin America, the URB-AL Program, was important for this movement. Shortly thereafter it was also adopted also in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, arriving in the United States from 2008 on, with its implementation in cities like New York and Chicago (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). According to the latest survey, the OP is present in more than 7,000 cities worldwide (Sapage, 2018). At the national level, innovations such as CCT emerged first in Brazil and Mexico in the mid-1990s as a pilot regional experience, and by 2012 had already spread throughout Latin America where 18 out of 20 countries3 adopted them (Osorio Gonnet, 2018a; Sugiyama, 2012). CCTs have the characteristic of providing cash to low-income households, typically including children and young family members, on the condition that beneficiaries will use defined health or education services (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2011). Analyzing the CCTs implemented in the region shows that they share the common features just mentioned, but also variations, which denote diverse levels of complexity. Three aspects are relevant to mention regarding this process. First, its relevance as a social policy in the region, reaching over 100 million people (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2011). In comparison to the rest of the world, they are wider in their scope, level of sophistication and institutional features (Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira, 2009, p. 38). The acquisition of technical knowledge has also contributed in the long term to the improvement of social program measurements, statistics and monitoring in the region. A relevant group of research on CCTs has concentrated on the impact of the programs: on poverty and school absenteeism reduction, improving frequency of health checks among pregnant women and children, and redistribution of income, among others. Along with these impacts, specialists have described and analyzed their characteristics to raise recommendations about their design and implementation.4 This literature is important for the analysis of the programs in the region, but it has also become a reliable reference for their application in other regions of the world. In this sense, a second significant characteristic of CCTs in Latin America is the incidence of their adoption in other developing countries, i.e. in Africa, and even in developed cities like New York (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017; Osorio Gonnet, 2018a; Peck and Theodore, 2015).
12 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. Finally, a third important aspect of this wave of diffusion was the presence of international organizations and a regional epistemic community. Both had a key role in the positive evaluation of the programs in the region (and later in the other regions mentioned), which was built through the accumulation of knowledge and different activities that facilitated the circulation of information (Osorio Gonnet, 2018a, 2018b). In the case of Brazil, it’s worth noting that in the process of formulating and implementing the Bolsa Família Program, the presence of the World Bank did not necessarily establish a compulsory relationship with the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger. In this case, the government developed state capacities that built a cooperative pattern of relationships and exchanges with the World Bank (Leite, Porto de Oliveira and Mafra, 2016). In the 21st century, Latin American policy innovations were not only circulating within countries in the region, but governments in Asia, Africa and Northern governments were also adopting them.
The Main Argument Cases of Latin American policy “export” bring new and fresh empirical material for the research debate on policy transfer, diffusion and circulation. More than that, it helps us understand overlooked features by the literature, which has been focusing on North-North and North-South experiences. Bringing South-South and South-North data to the discussion improves our knowledge of diffusion dynamics, agents, power relations, strategies and directions. It is important to stress that the insufficiency of current concepts has led scholars to innovate both theoretically and methodologically while analyzing cases of Latin American policy diffusion. In this book, our underlying argument is that Latin American countries, in particular Brazil, moved from a trend where major policy transfers were policy “importers” to an important moment in which different countries and cities of the region became “exporters” of policy ideas, technologies and institutions, as evidenced by the cases of PB, Ciclovía, Bolsa Família and Oportunidades, among others. This does not mean that these countries are not adopting policies from elsewhere anymore, but instead that they also became a locus of policy innovation, and that these policies became internationally recognized models. In the next sections, we will present how findings on Latin American experiences can bring light to the current debate on policy diffusion, as well as reinforce certain elements that already share a consensus among scholars. Transfer Agents, Strategies and Dynamics Analysis of Latin American policy diffusion found that processes of “export” were not only initiated by national governments, but also a combination of different agents (governmental, non-governmental, collective and individuals) operating at different levels of government, each carrying particular strategies
Introduction 13 of action. Diffusion is the result of different experiences in policy innovation, that in certain cases were developed at the local level and spread to other cities, then scaled-up to the national level, and later acquired international recognition. This is the experience of PB, which was first implemented in Porto Alegre in the 1980s, and later adopted in Belo Horizonte, Recife and other cities. The internationalization of the model started in 1996, sometimes via strategies of paradiplomacy (the international action of local governments), as shown in Chapter 7, “The Diffusion of Brazilian Participatory Institutions: From Innovation to Internationalization,” written by Osmany Porto de Oliveira. This policy is effective not only because of the international recognition of the idea and its method for including citizen participation in public spending, but also because it meets the political interests of the adopters, as shown in Chapter 8, “Importing the Participatory Budgeting Model From Porto Alegre to La Marsa: The Circulation and Appropriations of a Policy Device,” written by Joseph-Désiré Som-1. In the example of Ciclovía, which is explored in detail in Chapter 6, “Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía: From Urban Experiment to International ‘Best Practice’,” written by Sergio Montero, the relationship between urban policies and international recognition occurs especially through political actors engaged in the legitimization and mobilization of the Bogotá model worldwide. These different cities, Porto Alegre and Bogotá, were acting at the international level, promoting their urban policies to create a brand around the cities and their urban management. In the case of francophone Africa, presented in Chapter 8, the role of Bachir Kanouté, an NGO staff, who serves as “ambassador-importer” of PB in Tunis, is mentioned. The role of individuals, the so-called policy ambassadors, is crucial in different cases. These agents, driven by a personal and professional motivation which mixes their political convictions, worldviews and carrier strategies, are constantly advocating policy models in the transnational arena (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). The support and promotion of PB by the first government of PT (the Brazilian Worker’s Party) mayors in Porto Alegre was crucial for PB’s success. The same was true in Bogotá, when Henrique Peñalosa, the city former mayor, became an “ambassador” of Bogotá’s urban model for cycling and sustainable transport, and his worldview of a city management. When it comes to Brazilian national “export,” the role of the Ministry of International Relations, diplomatic representations and development cooperation are crucal for policy transfer. Eric Sabourin et al. show in Chapter 4, “Regional Diffusion of Brazilian Social and Rural Public Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean,” that the agency of the General Coordination of Humanitarian Cooperation and Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME), overseen by the Ministry of International Relations, transferred funding for the milk bank project in Haiti; a project which was inspired by Brazilian social policies. While analyzing the case of Colombian agricultural policies, the authors find that the concept of the public purchasing from family farming was introduced to Colombia via the Brazilian Embassy. The official Brazilian ambassador to Colombia also acted as a transfer agent in 2012, attending the negotiations of
14 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and facilitating the contact between Colombian and Brazilian representatives. Development cooperation is particularly notable in Brazilian social policy diffusion. As Melissa Pomeroy, Bianca Suyama and Laura Trajber Waisbich show in Chapter 5, “The Diffusion of Social Protection and Food Security Policies: Emerging Issues in Brazilian South-South Cooperation for Development,” social policies were mostly implemented in other countries in the South in large part due to the mediation of the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation. Partnerships are established through different modalities of agreements, including bilateral agreements with international organizations and regional institutions. The authors argue that the Brazilian South-South Development Cooperation mobilizes a constellation of domestic actors and their projects, which affects the transfer of ideas, techniques and technologies in social policies. In fact, in order to implement policy transfers in the area of CCT or Public Purchase from family farming, the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Agrarian Development were called to participate in the process, offering technical assistance to “export” Brazilian experiences to another country. Such technical expertise is a sort of exclusive knowledge of sectorial ministries and other specific agencies of the government, which are not present in the institutions traditionally designed to conduct international relations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Development Cooperation Agency. International organizations are important drivers of diffusion. They are present in different cases discussed in this book, taking part in distinct manners of diffusion. They can act to fund projects, share expertise, name best practices and more. The role of FAO in the case of Family Farming and Rural Territorial Development is important, as well as the World Bank for CCTs and PB. Regional integration is also a key element, both from the point of view of institutions and processes, with CELAC and the Mercosul. In CELAC, a Food Security and Nutrition plan of action was created to discuss and share knowledge among countries in the region. In the case of Mercosul and the Family Farming Purchase initiatives, the Specialized Meeting of Family Farming (REAF) was created. This space was a vindication of social movements to push this agenda of family farming policies on the region. The construction of the Mercocities network, initiated by Brazilian mayors, was also an important arena to diffuse PB in the Southern Cone. The case of Mercosul offers an important example that goes against the arguments of top-down institutional diffusion, where models are imposed by states or international organizations, and shows that bottom-up regional integration dynamics, supported by subnational governments and social movements, have an impact on policy diffusion in Latin American countries. It is important to recognize the role of non-state actors on social policy diffusion in Latin America, as the process of policy innovation depends on the engagement of civil society. This is one of the reasons why the participatory component in public policymaking is strong, especially in Brazil. Tracing the origins of Ciclovía, Sergio Montero shows in Chapter 6 that cycling
Introduction 15 organizations led a pioneering demonstration of 5,000 people in 1974 in Bogotá, asking for permission to close the main streets of the city for bicycles. When this became an established urban practice, think tanks like EMBARQ and philanthropic institutions such as the Rockfeller Foundation helped facilitate the international diffusion of Ciclovía. The case presented in Chapter 8 also discuss the role of civil society on the diffusion of PB, especially through the engagement on the World Social Forums, which were held in Africa. In this movement of Latin American policy “export,” it is important to understand that there are different actors, state and non-state, with heterogeneous levels of power, with actions that can reach different public audiences who are playing in distinct levels and arenas. Ideas, Knowledge and Instruments Diffusion is not only about transferring policies like shipping boxes. When Latin American policy diffusion is unpacked and analyzed, it is necessary to distinguish the objects that are circulating in different dimensions. There is the idea or the political project being carried out by those who advocate and implement the policy. This means that the purpose can be more conservative, progressive, social-oriented or market-oriented, inclusive, exclusive and so on. In this sense, CCT and PB programs were adopted by countries led by both left- and right-wing parties, as shown in Chapter 2, “How Are Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Disseminated and Adopted in Latin America? A Proposal for the Mechanisms of Diffusion,” written by Cecilia Osorio Gonnet, and Chapter 3, “The Diffusion of Public Policies and the Bolsa Familia Program in Light of the Mexican Experience,” written by Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite and Úrsula Dias Peres. The second dimension is policy expertise. Policy intelligence reveals in the fact that the innovation and implementation of social technologies to fight against poverty and hunger led to an increase in Latin America’s political influence on the international political stage. The relationship between Brazil and the World Bank is one example. This organization moved from imposing political reforms in the 1980s to becoming a collaborator of policy development and improvement, as well as one of the most important institutions for the promotion of CCTs in the 1990s, as presented in Chapter 3. Knowledge is also about information, experience, data and evaluations. Keeping with the CCT example, we can observe that the main references in the region are Mexico and Brazil, as shown in Chapter 4. In fact, these countries were pioneers who experienced CCT at the local level, and then scaled it up to the national level. It was not a fluid and simple process, but rather a movement marked by experiments, trials and errors, as well as disputes among different interests and coalitions. This experience was fundamental for Brazil and Mexico to develop their own CCT models, knowing what works and what does not work in a public policy realm and social context of a Latin American country. This fundamental experience made these countries models for the rest of the world, and their experts
16 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. frequently serve as consultants for the United Nations, the World Bank and other organizations. These experts travel around the world facilitating policy transfers, equipping civil servants, and sharing CCT with other regions. The third element are instruments, which capture both the abstract dimensions of policies and include another dimension, which is how ideas and knowledge can be operationalized. It is related to the policy design parts of Rural Territorial Development, Food Purchase of Family Farming, Deliberative Participatory Budgeting, Cycling Lanes and more. These are the rules, mechanisms for access and institutional arrangements that define who can participate (and to what degree), which actors benefit from the policy (and those who do not), how much funding is required, which agents and organizations will operationalize the policies and so on. It is another component that also travels and is translated along the process, owing to political, economic, social and other context impositions. Instruments are adapted and influenced by the variation of state capacities (e.g. a social policy designed for a country the size of Brazil cannot be transplanted to Haiti), budgeting and political conflicts. Resistance Transfers are not always linear, rational and neutral. As we discussed previously, there are different ideas and interests that play an important role in policy diffusion, producing translations in different levels and stages of the process. These translations are often the result of bargaining of the various groups that participate in transfers. Policy diffusion is a site for domestic and international political power and impositions. The social sector reforms that took place in Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s were attacked by social movements and left-wing parties. In the opposite direction, progressive social policies have suffered resistance from the middle and the elite class in Latin America, in some cases fueled by the media (Leite, Cruz and Rosin, 2018). More than that, social policy diffusion from Latin America suffered resistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of the diffusion of Brazilian large-scale farming techniques in Mozambique with the Prosavana Project, Mozambique civil society was divided on the concept, and defended the interests of economically disadvantaged citizens from the private sector. If resistance seems to be present in different degrees within policy diffusion processes, this topic has not been covered in depth so far; it is a new frontier of the area (Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018). Discussing resistance is the proposal of Chapter 9, “Policy Transfer and Resistance: Proposals for a New Research Agenda,” written by Leslie Pal, wherein the author advances five counterpropositions towards conventional assumptions on the policy transfer framework. The first counter-proposition is that transfer is often about paradigm shifts. In this sense, social policies are not only instruments, but rather a new policy paradigm towards fighting poverty via governmental interventions that bind citizens to attend social services to receive income from the state. The second is related to the neutrality of policies, because as mentioned earlier, policy
Introduction 17 instruments always carry a political project that can be adapted to different agendas, as shown by the example of PB, which was used as an example by the World Social Forum activists to the World Bank Institute experts. The idea that transfer is improvement is the third counter-proposition presented in the chapter. As we saw in different cases, transferring models are not necessarily the best solution. The case of neoliberal reforms in Latin America exemplifies this point. The fourth element discussed is in regards to transfer as a channel for success. If the circulation of “best practices” worldwide, such as the case of Ciclovía, is increasing, this does not necessarily mean that it is a fast-track for policy success. In fact, the case of the adoption of such practices in São Paulo during the administration of Fernando Haddad showed an aggressive dynamic of resistance from society (Leite, Cruz and Rosin, 2018). Last but not least, transfer is not necessarily incremental, but must be seen in a bigger picture of long-lasting cross-sectorial policy adoptions that can represent, as Pal writes in Chapter 9, an “an assault, unwitting or deliberate, on existing configurations of institutional power,” as is the case of New Public Management. The proponents of the New Public Management aspired to reform the entire public sector by indicating different sectorial solutions, which were transferred to multiple sectors, producing a counter-movement of resistance towards it in different countries.
Methodological Strategies Public policy methods of analysis are mostly designed to understand political phenomena that occur inside the borders of the state. In fact, Galton’s problem, which relates external influences to the development of institutions, is still a thorn for some public policy scholars, because it reduces units of analysis to territorial circumscriptions (e.g. a district, city, state, country). This is valid for comparative analysis using the classic Mill’s system of agreement (Landman, 2007), as well as for case studies, where units of analysis refer to a spatially bounded phenomenon, according to Gerring (2004). Such a problem was posited by the pioneer observations of Diane Stone (2008), who argued that the classic public policy analysis became a hostage of the state. Stone insisted on the need to overcome the so-called methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). In a similar direction, Jennifer Robinson (2018) looked to urban studies and stated that reforming comparative methods was necessary in order to access the globalization dynamics and effects on cities, in particular how transnational processes shape local outcomes in urban policymaking. Patrick Hassenteufel (2005) also vindicated the need to move from international comparison to transnational comparison, and looked to transfer agents and transnational spaces where ideas and models are diffused and legitimatized. How do we analyze an object that has no boundaries, that occurs transnationally and moves from one jurisdiction to another (sometimes without asking permission for entrance and exit)? This is the main question of policy diffusion that challenges conventional public policy methods. The heart of international
18 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. policy diffusion analysis is to connect both domestic and foreign political realms. It is a natural solution to the trap of “methodological nationalism,” and a bridge between public policy analysis and international relations study, two areas of research that have developed following their own paths, without necessarily having a dialogue (Petiteville and Smith, 2006). However, if policy diffusion analysis has grown precipitously in the past years, it still lacks in-depth reflection on the methods to study such phenomenon. On one hand, from the perspective of quantitative research—especially on subnational policy diffusion—it is reasonable to affirm that there are different strategies that have been used and that characterize such studies, such as regression models (Karch, 2006), event history analysis (Sugiyama, 2012), mixed methods (Linos, 2013) and so on. In spite of this, on the other hand, qualitative studies are still borrowing methodology from other disciplines and areas to validate hypothesis on policy transfer, diffusion and circulation, without a solid reflection on the methodological techniques and tools to study transnational policy movement. In this book, all authors combine different qualitative methodological strategies for analyzing international policy diffusion and building case studies and comparisons, with detailed process-tracing. The methods used by the authors rely on intensive international and transnational field research, document analysis and in-depth interviews. Field immersions are not only used to understand how the policy arrives somewhere and how it is translated, but also how to trace its transnational path, dynamics, forces and constraints. Moreover, field research was also conducted in transnational arenas (such as meetings, conferences and summits) where transfer agents convene and promote the diffusion of specific policy models. Interviews were conducted with important protagonists of the different diffusion processes to explain human agency, such as the “policy ambassadors role,” and the influence of institutions both national and international (e.g. the World Bank) on those engagements of development cooperation driving and facilitating transfers. These three tools were combined to follow the steps of policies traveling across borders and provide information about transfer agents, strategies, translations, power relations, scales and destinations.
Conclusion In the past several years—and especially after the transition to democracy— Latin American countries developed important social policy innovations which spread all over the world. Governments had to cope with rural exodus, fastgrowing urbanization and an increase in population, poverty and hunger in public management contexts with low political capacity, lack of infrastructure and scarce administrative resources and budgeting. Some of the solutions provided by public policies were important innovations that appeared to be useful for other contexts in the South and North. Mayors started to benchmark the innovations of their cities—as PB and BRT—and countries, through the Chiefs of State, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other sectorial ministries, organized strategies to promote national policies abroad, as seen in the case of Brazil.
Introduction 19 Development cooperation agencies and international institutions, such as the World Bank, embraced such innovations—such as CCT—and engaged in the global diffusion of similar policy instruments, under the assumption that policies built in the South to address public problems and provide public services in such contexts would fit better in similar countries, rather than models developed in the North, where not only public administration is different, but also the social organization and economic conditions. The combination of these processes, with the aspiration of Latin American countries and cities to become influential actors on the political world stage, has led to multiple policy transfers. Latin America and Caribbean policy diffusion remains underexplored in the literature. However, as we have shown in this book, these regions do not only offer important examples of policy diffusion, but also an empirical field to test the hypotheses posed by more consolidated studies, and to generate new concepts. Due to the high number of analyses on the diffusion of policies between Northern countries, the literature has been focused on cases of transfer between similar contexts. While there may be similarities between the Northern and Southern countries in the making of public policies, there are important differences in terms of political culture, state capacity, social equality and other factors. The idiosyncrasies of Latin America reveal the potential for theoretical innovation that must be explored, as well as diffusion in other contexts in the South. The purpose of this book is to advance in this direction, seeking to expand the explanatory capacity for the phenomenon of policy diffusion and presenting a pluralistic approach. The golden age of Latin American policy diffusion models coincided with the Pink Wave movement, where an alignment of different progressive heads of state emerged in important countries, as previously mentioned in this introduction. This context has changed completely in the last few years. Venezuela has gone into a progressively deeper crisis after Chavez, and governments have changed their ideological leanings in countries such as Chile and Argentina, and also in Brazil, when the PT left office in 2016 after a controversial impeachment. The changing politics in Latin America challenges the image of some Southern countries as references and “best practice” models for the rest of the world. This leads us to two main questions for future research agendas. The first is in regards to policy export and political change: What happens to policy transfers when the government’s political project changes? Do policies continue to be diffused? Is there a replacement? The second is in regards to the countries as models: When a country stops being a reference for the world, as Brazil was in the field of social policies, does it leave a gap? Who will fill the void? Such questions are food for thought for the next generation of researchers.
Notes 1. See, for example, the critics of Peck and Theodore, as well as McCann, towards what they call an “orthodox” political science perspective on policy transfer, as well as the clarifications and perspective from Dolowitz and Marsh (2012).
20 Osmany Porto de Oliveira et al. 2. We acknowledge the use here of a stylized narrative to synthetize the process. It’s evident that there were different cases where Latin American countries also exported their ideas, policies and institutions. For example, the ideas of development during the 1960s that were fostered by Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado, and supported by CEPAL. However, the quantity of policies “imported” from the North until recently is not insignificant. 3. Cuba and Venezuela had not implemented a CCT (http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/). 4. An extensive literature exists about the impact of the programs. What follows is a sample of some of the most complete works: León (2008); Fiszbein and Schady (2009), Johannsen, Tejerina and Glassman (2009), Cecchini and Madariaga (2011), Cecchini and Martínez (2011) and Adato and Hoddinott (2010). Also certain dossiers of journals, for example, Journal of Development Policy Review 24 (5), Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy and Management 30 (3) and Global Social Policy 11 (2–3).
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How Are Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Disseminated and Adopted in Latin America? A Proposal for the Mechanisms of Diffusion1 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet
Introduction Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) started in the 1990s mainly as pilot experiences at the regional and municipal level. By 1997 they were already in three countries: Brazil, Mexico and Bangladesh and by 2010 they had been implemented in 29 nations around the world (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The main feature of CCTs is the provision of cash to low-income households, under the condition that families use certain health and/or education services (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2011). The greatest geographic concentration of these programs is in Latin America, where by 2012, 18 countries had already adopted them (León, 2008; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).2 Likewise, the first global programs—Brazil and Mexico— were developed in the region and constitute, together with other countries, emblematic experiences that have been widely disseminated and analyzed. They are also characterized by their extensive coverage (130 million people by 2015, Cecchini and Atuesta, 2017), and because in comparison to the rest of the world they are broader in terms of the benefits they provide and more sophisticated in terms of their institutional characteristics (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009: 38). Evidence suggests that the numerous presence of programs in the region is the result of a diffusion process. This is understood as “a process in which information on policy adoption is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system in an uncoordinated manner, and where the first adoptions of an innovation affect the probability of doing so among those who have not adopted it” (Jordana, Levi-Faur and Fernández i Marín, 2011: 1347). The diffusion approach thus makes it possible to clarify this change in social policies and the reason for the wide dissemination of this type of program in the region. The case of Conditional Transfer Programs in Latin America is an emblematic example of a wave of diffusion that began with two countries in the mid1990s and, by 2012, spread throughout the region (Osorio, 2014, 2018; Morais
26 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet de Sá e Silva, 2017). This was a regional process, where the presence of international organizations, but above all of a regional epistemic community (Osorio 2014, 2017) contributed to this South-South diffusion. In the following years, the CCTs have been exported to other parts of the world such as Africa (Leite and Peres, 2013) and some local experiences in cities of developed countries such as New York and Washington, DC. (Peck and Theodore, 2010; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), being then a clear example of a “South-South” and “SouthNorth” export respectively. This chapter will deal with the diffusion of CCTs at the regional level, paying attention to the mechanisms observed in this process. The objective is to present a proposal for the operationalization of the mechanisms of learning, coercion and emulation that contributes to the understanding of the processes of diffusion of public policies. Progress along these lines is relevant since these mechanisms constitute an essential part of the explanation of this type of phenomenon, since they allow the external and domestic aspects that influence adoption to be combined. Likewise, this is an area not sufficiently developed in the literature in terms of defining indicators that make it possible to differentiate between, for example, learning or emulation. The limits of each are vague, so explicit indicators are required to provide certainty about the characterization, to ensure its usefulness in understanding the phenomenon. This is a key aspect to consider during interpretation and empirical verification (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009). Therefore, indicators are proposed that make it possible to identify the diffusion mechanisms, as well as the national and external actors present and their motivations. The relationship between mechanisms and domestic policy-making processes is also included, since the former cannot be understood or explained without considering the characteristics of the latter. This proposal will be applied to a case study, the process of adoption of the Chile Solidario Social Protection System (CHS),3 in Chile, but it will make it possible to understand the case analyzed, as well as other policy adoptions in diffusion processes in Latin America, such as those proposed in other chapters of this book.
The Policy Diffusion Approach and Its Mechanisms The questions that motivate the policy diffusion approach refer to elucidating the reasons that explain the adoption of an innovation by a state. The assumption here is that such a decision is not exclusively due to internal reasons. To the extent that the diffusion approach began to be applied among states, research has focused on how governments adopted policies and what the characteristics of this process were. The approach has contributed to this understanding by considering “the possibility that policy choices in one country affect the policy choices of other
CCT Programs in Latin America 27 countries, thereby causing convergence policies” (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009: 528). It assumes interdependence between countries in time or the presence of a central actor who acts as a transmitter. Countries would not act completely independently, but neither would they act in a coordinated manner. Therefore, the diffusion process is characterized by an uncoordinated interdependence (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). “Under this conception, governments are independent in the sense that they take their decisions without cooperation or coercion, but interdependent in the sense that they influence the decisions of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdependence” (Elkins and Simmons, 2005: 35). In most cases, the diffusion component is used to test the null hypothesis about national socio-economic and political factors as the causes of policy change. However, it is important to explain that, although the studies seek to prove the influence of external factors, these are not exclusive causes of policy adoption either. Indeed, “most scholars have recognized that few policy adoptions can be explained solely on the basis of internal determinants (no diffusion effect) or policy diffusion (no impact of internal factors)” (Berry and Berry, 2007: 224). Hence the importance of considering models and methods that contemplate both elements, which constitutes a challenge for research in this area. A central component of the diffusion approach is the mechanisms through which it is developed. These would make it possible to elucidate the causal relationship of adoption and whether it is due to a desire for competition among states, whether it seeks to emulate decisions that confer a certain status in the international concert, or was the result of a learning process that made it possible to identify that policy as the most pertinent and functional (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). More specifically, Simmons, Dobbins and Garret distinguish the following mechanisms: coercion, emulation, competition and learning. There is relative consensus on these types of mechanisms, although denominations may vary partially, as may some components of their definition. The mechanism of coercion refers to the imposition of policies on national governments by international bodies or powerful countries. Policy convergence is therefore promoted by dominant actors and is a mechanism that operates vertically. The following three mechanisms operate horizontally among the various actors. Emulation occurs when policies are adopted for their social value, rather than for their own value, thus seeking legitimacy and status. Third, there is competition when countries competing for the same resources adopt the policy of their competitors for fear of economic loss. Finally, the mechanism of learning, which refers to the existence of knowledge of the policy in question and as a result the decision is taken to adopt it (Simmons, Dobbins and Garret, 2008). According to the discussion of the literature, learning would be “a mechanism probably causing the diffusion of policies. Those adopted in some countries result in natural experiments from which others can learn” (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2008: 323).
28 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet
Proposal for the Analysis of the Mechanisms of Diffusion The Definition of the Mechanisms Considering what has already been said, a difficulty present in the mechanisms is that they involveal—though not always adequately defined—two components: the means and the motivations. The attention paid to one or the other varies in the diffusion studies, and also according to the research methods they apply. The identification of the motives and means of each one will contribute to define more precisely its characteristics and then its operationalization. Since the object of study is the diffusion of CCTs in the region, it is necessary to focus on the mechanisms that could explain their spread. Considering the four most accepted by the literature—learning, emulation, coercion and competition—it is plausible to expect the existence of the first three and to discard the last one. This is because competition is best applied in cases where the decisions taken refer to economic interests and in the area of markets, which is not the case of social policies. With regard to the three mechanisms mentioned previously, it is necessary to identify the motivations and means of each of them in order to contribute to their clarification. In learning, the motivation is to adopt the most appropriate policy for the problem; in this sense, it can be qualified as internal or intrinsic, since it emanates from the definition of a public problem to which the actors seek a solution. The central motivation is the solution to the public problem and the decision to adopt the policy that has been implemented by other countries is due to the conviction that it is the appropriate solution. The actors have reached this conviction through a process of knowledge of alternatives and possible results that allows them to conclude that this option is the most relevant to the problem in question and the national context. As for the rationality of learning, it is considered that it will in itself be limited.4 Between the mechanism of learning and emulation, some grey areas are generated that need to be clarified. The motivation is to emulate other countries with higher status, or to adopt the policy because it is the general trend. Therefore, the motive is superficial and may be unfounded or very weak. It also has a symbolic aspect in the sense of conferring a status to which one aspires, and which will be recognized by others. However, this does not imply that the public problem does not exist, but that the decision to adopt that particular policy is more influenced by the expectation of imitating a referent country or by being part of a regional or global trend. The means used in this mechanism, given the motivations, are more limited. And since the decision to adopt that policy would be determined a priori by the desire to emulate, a process of knowledge limited to this alternative would be carried out, without exploring others. When emulating, adaptation to the national context will be limited, given that it would be assumed a priori that the initiative as observed in other countries is feasible to be applied in the national one. With regard to coercion, it has a lower degree of independence (but not null) than the other mechanisms. Policies are adopted due to pressure or incentives, which may be positive (such as a loan) or negative (such as international sanctions or a fine). In this sense, the motivation can be identified as external,
CCT Programs in Latin America 29 in relation to the other mechanisms and would be mainly explained by the influence of another state or international actor (multilateral bank, international organization). With regard to the means, a limited knowledge is made of the imposed policy and may or may not imply adaptation to the national context. Table 2.1 summarizes what has been proposed and also presents the indicators Table 2.1 Definition of Motivations and Means and Their Indicators in Diffusion Mechanisms Coercion
Policies are adopted because of pressure or incentives offered by a more powerful actor. Motivation can be identified as external.
The policy is adopted as it is considered the most appropriate solution to the public problem. Motivation can be qualified as internal or intrinsic.
The adoption of the program is explicitly linked to obtaining financing from multilateral banks. Adoption is linked to the application of a fine, or a penalty if it is not carried out. A limited knowledge is made to the imposed policy. It may or may not imply adaptation to the national context.
Whether or not the public problem in question is part of government program.
Policy is adopted seeking to emulate an actor with greater status or because politics is fashionable. The motive is superficial and may be unfounded (or very weak). Whether or not the public problem in question is part of government program.
The problem is clearly on the public agenda.
The program is not relevant to the public agenda.
A process of knowledge limited to this policy is carried out without considering other alternatives. It does not imply greater adaptation to the national context. Number of Number of meetings Number of meetings between between policymakers meetings between policymakers and experts from other policymakers countries or multilateral and experts from and experts from other countries or banking experts. multilateral banks multilateral banking or international experts. organizations. Existence of ad-hoc Meetings at seminars, Existence of loan congresses, multilateral policy papers or signature protocols, documents. technical cooperation meetings. agreements. Existence of ad-hoc national documents.
Source: Table created by the author.
There is a process of knowledge of alternatives and possible results that allows us to conclude that this option is the most appropriate.
30 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet needed to operationalize this proposal. The latter will make it possible to identify, in an appropriate manner, in primary and secondary sources, the evidence that will allow the presence of one or another mechanism to be concluded. Actors in the National and International Contexts A weakness of the models of analysis of diffusion processes is the assumption of policymakers and politicians as a uniform whole, which turns them into a black box. It is necessary to clarify, at least, who intervenes in the processes, what their competences are, whether they are linked to networks or to epistemic communities. Thus, it is important to distinguish between bureaucrats and politicians, as the former are defined as officials of the public apparatus, and therefore have permanence in the state. They thus present more continuity and systematicity in terms of their presence in the policy formulation process. It can be assumed that they would favor decision-making based on continuity and the tradition of policy antecedents. The basis of their knowledge and proposals is determined by the accumulated knowledge of the institution to which they belong. Furthermore, their scope for action is limited by the regulations of the institution of which they are a part and their powers are more limited. However, in this group, it is necessary to identify among those actors who have been appointed in a position of trust, as opposed to those who have developed a career as a civil servant in the public administration. This will mean partial variations in the aforementioned aspects. The second group refers to positions of political authority, appointed from the executive, the latter’s authorities and the legislative branch. This group of actors has greater margin for action and attributions, which together with their interests could imply more ideological and circumstantial decision-making. As far as international actors are concerned, it is necessary to identify international organizations and experts in social policies and programs. Regarding the former, in this case these are multilateral banks (World Bank, WB, and Inter-American Development Bank, IDB), international organizations dependent on the United Nations (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC) and regional organizations (Organization of American States, OAS). In relation to banking, it is necessary to consider that its central objective is to manage loans in the region, along with contributing to development and overcoming poverty. However, the role they play in providing a meeting place for the exchange of information and the production of knowledge on various topics should also be recognized. With respect to other organizations, it is more limited to technical assistance, counseling and generating spaces for exchange and learning. Now, it is assumed that these organisms are autonomous (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and that they exercise power not only through tangible mechanisms but also by defining the discourse about social welfare (Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs, 1997). International bodies with global and regional coverage act on a wide range of issues. Organizations that share objectives and interests can converge defending
CCT Programs in Latin America 31 certain policies and programs through various types of actions. The first of these consists of monetary loans, which is in fact the main objective of multilateral banks. Second, international organizations provide technical assistance to official agreements with countries. These forms of action are quite evident in the case of multilateral banks. However, the existence of monetary loans does not necessarily imply the search for specific models; moreover, influence can be important without any bank lending to the country. A third type of action, called meditation activities, involves research and discussion of international trends and national policies (Bradford, 2008).5 Organizations dedicated to mediation policy “function as spaces where all kinds of experiences can be transmitted and compared, where ideas are generated and shared, and where forms of actions are discussed” (Jacobsson, 2006: 208). Finally, it is possible to identify a fourth form of action—exhortation—of these organisms, to achieve the change of policies in the domestic spheres. Through documents, reports and other formats, ideas and lessons from the meditation stages are packaged into action plans and concrete recommendations that seek to transfer knowledge and promote specific policies (Bradford, 2008), which are then disseminated intensively through the specialized media (see Table 2.2 for the indicators proposed for these type of activities). With respect to experts, Peter Haas’s definition of epistemic community is relevant to observe their role and participation in this process. An epistemic community is defined as “a network of professionals with recognized experience and competence in a specific area and with a voice of authority regarding knowledge of policies within that area” (Haas, 1992: 3). This group of experts from various disciplines (scientists, NGOs, bureaucrats, journalists and opinion leaders, among others) work (in a very lax way) to improve the scientific and public understanding of a topic (Speth and Haas, 2006: 92). Epistemic communities would play a role in articulating cause-effect relationships of particular problems, helping Table 2.2 International Organizations Activity Types
Monetary loans (only from multilateral banks). Formal and informal technical assistance that is requested by governments to support policy development. Meditation activities involving research and discussion of international trends and national policies (Bradford, 2008). Organizations would function as “spaces where all kinds of experiences can be transmitted, where ideas are generated and shared”, and courses of action are discussed (Jacobsson, 2006: 208). Meditative activities involve hiring experts to guide dialogue and provide recommendations to bureaucrats and politicians (Bradford, 2008). Exhortation activities—seeking policy change. The ideas and lessons generated from the meditation activities of the meditation stages are packaged into concrete plans of action and concrete recommendations that seek to transfer knowledge and foster specific policies (Bradford, 2008).
Source: Table created by the author.
32 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet Table 2.3 Epistemic Communities Indicators
Experts that make them up. How they transmit knowledge about the programs. Means of contact with bureaucrats and politicians. Publications by community members, testimony before legislative bodies, speeches, biographical accounts and interviews (Haas, 1992: 35).
Source: Table created by the author.
states to identify their interests, framing issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient points for negotiation (Haas, 1992: 2). Thus, the assumptions behind this concept refer to the valuation of knowledge as an important dimension of power, and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination (indicators proposed in Table 2.3).
Methodology Applied to the Case Study The methodology used to apply this proposal was a qualitative analysis of a case of CCT adoption, the Chile Solidario program. Following, in a general way, the logic of process tracing, I sought to identify the actors, moments of the program formulation process and the facts that are configured in the program adoption process and that will allow to identify it as a learning process, emulation or coercion. This is done by applying the proposal for the operationalization of the mechanisms and the identification of the actors and their activities already commented on and indicated in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. The choice of the Chilean program is due to the fact that its adoption is in the middle of the wave of diffusion of CCTs that began in 1990 and persists to this day. Therefore, it is not one of the entrepreneurs of the wave, which makes it possible to consider the influencing factors of diffusion at a time when they would exert influence on it. Finally, together with the experiences of Brazil and Mexico, it has generated the attention of academia, international and multilateral organizations and other countries (Veras and Elydia, 2010) due to its complex components. The collection of empirical evidence was mainly through written sources such as official government documents, legislation and speeches. Also, secondary sources such as reports from experts and international organizations on CCTs, analysis of the program formulation process and secondary literature. This information was supplemented with primary sources through the conduct of 20 semistructured interviews based on an initial questionnaire, which allowed for the inclusion of new questions if pertinent. The interviewees were policymakers, politicians, presidential advisors and experts in national and international social policies, who were contacted in Chile during two periods, between November 8 and 12, 2010 and between August and December 2012. Distance interviews were also conducted, especially with officials of international organizations or experts linked to the Chilean case (listed in Annex). The interviewees were chosen by first identifying those who were directly involved in the adoption processes of
CCT Programs in Latin America 33 each program. Once this initial group was set up, the number of interviewees was increased by collecting suggestions from the first interviewees as to who could provide key information for the study. Therefore, a combination of convenience and snowball sampling was used (Atkinson and Flint John, 2001).
Chile’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program: Chile Solidario The Chile Solidario Social Protection System (CHS) was announced in the speech of May 21, 2002, by President Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006), backed by the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia coalition, which had been in power since the return to democracy in 1990. It began to operate that year and still forms part of the programs for overcoming poverty.6 Its objective was “to improve the living conditions of families in extreme poverty, generating opportunities and providing the resources that allow for recovery or have an effective functional and solving capacity in the personal, family, community and institutional environment” (Raczynski, 2008: 10). To this end, it defines 53 minimum quality-of-life conditions, grouped into seven pillars and adopts a strategy of action that touches both demand (families) and supply (services and programs). The CHS has four axes: personalized psychosocial support, family protection bonus, guaranteed monetary subsidies and preferential access to social promotion programs. Psychosocial support is provided to families for two years to help them meet the 53 minimum standards, and is provided by professional monitors. The protection bond is a decreasing monetary transfer, conditioned to the fulfillment of the family contract. This benefit is given to the woman (head of household or partner of the head of household) (Cohen and Franco, 2006). The guaranteed monetary subsidies component consists of ensuring that families that have joined the program and meet the eligibility criteria have expeditious access to a set of state cash transfers. For its part, the preferential access component of social promotion programs provides beneficiary households with priority access to state programs and services (Cohen and Franco, 2006). Analysis of the Diffusion Mechanism, Actors and Policy Formulation Process The following are the main findings that emerge from applying the proposed indicators for understanding CHS adoption, and that preeminently point to the presence of the learning mechanism. This is because the formulation process responds to a mechanism that involved the knowledge of various alternatives, evaluations and analysis of the characteristics of the program to be adopted. Therefore, the presence of coercion or emulation mechanisms is ruled out. Beginning with the motivations of the actors, it is important to note that the initiative was not within the government program with which Ricardo Lagos was elected. By the time the program was adopted, poverty in the country had decreased between 1987 and 2000 from 45.1% to 20.6%, and indigence from 17% to 5.7% (Cohen and Franco, 2006). In spite of this satisfactory decrease, the government’s
34 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet diagnosis for 2002 pointed to worrying aspects. In absolute terms, poverty had done more than indigence, but the intensity of the decrease in the former had lessened since 1996; between 1998 and 2000 it only decreased from 21.7% to 20.1% (Puentes, 2010). In the case of indigence, after a significant decrease between 1990–1996 from 13.0% to 5.7%, no significant variations had been observed between 1996– 20007 (Puentes, 2010; Cohen and Franco, 2006). This evidence—the stagnation in the reduction of indigence or of what was called the hard core of poverty—together with the fact that politicians and government technicians began to question the effectiveness of the social policy applied to date, contributed to the fact that poverty settled strongly on the public agenda (Puentes, 2010). This motivated the government, and specifically the Presidency, to look for alternative programs. Two other governmental actors, the Ministry of Planning and Development (MIDEPLAN)8 and the Budget Directorate (DIPRES, an entity dependent on the Ministry of Finance) were already analyzing the problem in depth (Palma and Ruz, 2005). Specifically, directors and analysts from MIDEPLAN and DIPRES played an important role, studying alternatives and proposals for almost two years before the adoption of the CHS. In this learning process, the national experience was considered in an important way and calibrated with external conceptual frameworks. Pilot programs carried out in communes of Santiago and regions, the Risk Matrix from the World Bank and the integrated approach to poverty that MIDEPLAN was already working on formed a conceptual framework that endorsed the components and activities of the program. In this sense, the existence of accumulated knowledge in this ministry, through working documents and previous discussions on the subject, which also allowed this learning process to be more complete, stands out. Considering the media indicators, the fact that the presence of experts from other countries was very low stands out. The holding of seminars or conferences—the mediating activities of international organizations—was not so significant at the time, and in fact the first International Workshop organized by the World Bank on the subject was held in Puebla between April 29 and May 2, 2002, only a few days before the presidential announcement of the program (Ayala Consulting Co, 2003). In this sense, the policymakers of MIDEPLAN and the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS) knew the experiences of Brazil and Mexico, with their strengths and weaknesses, but they would have privileged a CCT with particular characteristics (MIDEPLAN Directive Interview). It should be noted that a group of relevant actors were the experts in the field from NGOs and study centers. The inclusion of many of them in the public apparatus since the 1990s contributed in this sense, and then the connections between those who were in the state and those who continued in civil society, allowed to generate debates and exchange of ideas, which in the case of CHS was significant. This favored the generation of a certain consensus regarding the theoretical perspective from which to analyze and propose solutions for poverty and indigence. However, their veto capacity or binding participation in the decision-making process is limited. The formulation process does not provide
CCT Programs in Latin America 35 institutionalized spaces for this, since in fact on this occasion, their presence was due to the presidential initiative to convene them. This network of experts inside and outside the state probably constitutes a national epistemic community that has sustained conceptual frameworks and approaches to social policies since the 1980s. Along with this, the proposed indicators have pointed to epistemic communities as an influential international actor in the regional diffusion process (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011; Osorio, 2017). In this sense, the verification of these national experts establishes the challenge of observing the link between these experts and the regional community. The role of the World Bank was identified as formal technical support and later monetary loan for the implementation and training of program monitors (Palma and Ruz, 2005), two of the activities that have been defined for international organizations. Their relationship was more formal with DIPRES than with MIDEPLAN. However, both actors recognized the Bank’s authority as an expert and its recommendations. In this line, the WB’s Risk Matrix was used, which is part of its influence through exhortation, recommending an instrument that was incorporated by the ministry. However, the World Bank’s influence was limited. It was part of the formulation process, but it does not predominate. In fact, it is argued that during the process it would have insisted that greater participation of civil society organizations be considered in the CHS, which was not included (Teichman, 2009). This sheds light on how the influence of these actors is limited to the extent that domestic actors and institutions are stable, strong and technically capable, even with monetary loans involved. In the final stage of the program formulation process, MIDEPLAN (and FOSIS) and DIPRES were asked to work together and present a consensual proposal between the two parties to the Presidency. This joint work forced two ministries to negotiate their program alternatives and support them before the authority. Along these lines, MIDEPLAN, in particular, had a conceptual framework and prior learning that accredited its proposal. In fact, the use of the Risk Matrix endorsed by the World Bank was also a strategic option since the approaches coming from this banking organization were positively received by DIPRES and in general by the government. “Themes that the UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, WB, and IDB discuss, these are topics that the political authorities consider” (MIDEPLAN directive interviews). The authority is thus observed on the basis of the expert knowledge exercised by these organizations and that contributes to legitimize and endorse proposals among national actors. A rational but limited learning process is then observed. MIDEPLAN, faced with the President’s demand to present proposals in 100 days, resorted to the proposals that it had available and that it had been working on. In fact, the proposal to extend the PUENTE program is being made without having evaluations about this pilot yet. In the case of DIPRES, something similar happens, in that it resorted to what had already been discussed jointly with the World Bank. This whole process did not take more than four months, which for the design of a system of this magnitude is a short period of time. These two actors thus presented to the President their proposals, a comprehensive one (MIDEPLAN)
36 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet and an assistance one (DIPRES), which responded to different approaches to poverty. The Executive combined both in a Social Protection System. At this point the President played a central role in the overall design of the program, taking different proposals to address the problem of extreme poverty and linking them to shape Chile Solidario. It was a pragmatic decision, in which the available alternatives were considered and a model was put together. Thus, there is a limited learning process. In addition, the figure of the President in this case is particular and highlights the fact that he is the significant national political actor in the process, as opposed to numerous actors defined as bureaucrats. Given the strong presidentialism in Chile (Huneeus, 2009), the attributions are broad in many areas. Particularly in this policy, the President established the creation of this program as a priority from January 2002, assigned specific tasks and forced interministerial work, cooperation and the search for agreements. He personally followed up on the issue and became heavily involved (interview with former President of the Republic and presidential adviser). In conclusion, the application of the indicators proposed for the understanding of adoption mechanisms makes it possible to conclude the findings discussed in this section in relation to the presence of a learning mechanism in the case of Chile Solidario. By applying it to the matrix (Table 2.1), a synthesis is obtained that illustrates the analysis exercise carried out (Table 2.4). Table 2.4 Chile Solidario Program 2002–2010. Diffusion Mechanism: Learning Motivation
Address the problem of the hard core of poverty. To propose a policy relevant to the issue of poverty, which was placed on the public agenda for 2001–2002 and which was being demanded by various actors.
Empirical evidence of the problem through CASEN Survey9 results, which indicated stagnation in the reduction of indigence. The issue is debated in the public agenda by various actors.
Knowledge accumulated in social entities about poverty. Diagnosis and discussion of alternatives by DIPRES about the weaknesses of the programmatic offer in social matters, with the support and influence of the World Bank in its diagnosis. Diagnosis and discussion of alternatives by MIDEPLAN to tackle poverty from an integral approach. Debate on alternatives by institutional actors (President, DIPRES, MIDEPLAN, advisors) and civil society actors (NGOs, study centers and experts).
CASEN Survey data. DIPRES studies the subject and requests a report on Social Protection from the World Bank. MIDEPLAN, through the Social Division, studies diverse experiences of social programs, which will be used in the Poverty Overcoming Strategy. Presidential Seminar with institutional and civil society actors. A second debating seminar in one of the Study Centers. Meetings between MIDEPLAN/ FOSIS and DIPRES.
Source: Table created by the author.
CCT Programs in Latin America 37
Final Reflections In this chapter, attention was given to addressing diffusion mechanisms in the wave of diffusion of CCTs in Latin America. Through the case of the Chile Solidario program, the proposed indicators were discussed in order to identify these mechanisms and thus contribute to distinguish between the motivations and the means that lead the actors to adopt the programs. In this sense, the evidence points to a learning mechanism in those motivations which originate from an important issue on the public agenda. As for the means of adoption, it was a process of knowledge, study and evaluation of alternatives that concluded in a proposal that considers common aspects to other CCTs, but that denotes a national elaboration. There are no pressures or incentives that could be indicators of a coercive mechanism. Adoption through a learning process also helps to explain that an adopted program presents similarity in the basic components—compared to the region’s overall program—but divergence in that it contains important particular components. In the cases of emulation, it could be observed that programs can be qualified more as a copy to other models in the region without relevant characteristics of their own. Therefore, another question to explore in the future has to do with clarifying the influence of diffusion mechanisms with the final characteristics of the programs adopted. This, applied to more cases in the region, would allow for a deeper understanding of how and what the countries of the region adopted in this wave of CCTs diffusion. The case study has also revealed the presence of actors who, although they do not have decision-making capacity within the process, can exert significant influence, such as social policy experts. The presence of a regional epistemic community has been observed (Osorio, 2014, 2017), which although in this case would not have been significant, deserves attention in terms of analyzing its relationship with possible national communities, or its presence in national organisms that allow it to influence the decision-making processes. This finding also becomes relevant for the understanding of the regional diffusion process of the CCTs, but also for the set of social policies in Latin America. If the region today has a community of experts in the region, they could imply a displacement of other communities or other international actors that have historically exerted influence (for example, multilateral banking). It is also worth exploring the degree of influence and/or dialogue of these experts vis-à-vis national policymakers, which is relevant for understanding the processes of change in social policies. Some future questions refer to the importance of the institutional capacity of domestic actors (knowledge and cooperation resources): does greater institutional capacity contribute to the development of learning mechanisms through emulation and coercion? In the case of Chile, the institutional capacity of MIDEPLAN and DIPRES would be the variable that would explain why learning rather than emulation had been developed. The process developed in the middle of the diffusion wave, when the most relevant CCTs, Mexico and Brazil, were already being implemented. Likewise, MIDEPLAN and DIPRES
38 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet had contact and communication with experts from the multilateral bank. Nevertheless, in spite of the existence of these channels of incidence of external experiences, the national actors only considered part of the knowledge about the regional programs and other indirectly related ones (such as the WB Risk Matrix) to design a particular program with predominance of components of endogenous origin. Consequently, a pending discussion, which goes beyond the limits of this chapter, is to delve deeper into the role and characteristics of these institutional actors in the processes of social policy formulation for the region. Ministries of Finance, Social Development and other ministries play a central role, and it is necessary to distinguish their historical trajectory, their capacities and the evolution of their attributions in the process of policy design and implementation and in the dialogue with other national and international actors. In conclusion, the operationalization proposal for the adoption mechanisms contributes to the policy diffusion studies and in particular to the understanding of the diffusion of CCTs in the region. This regional dissemination, which resulted in a change in policies at the national level, must be analyzed considering the phenomenon beyond the limits of each country, weighing in turn the characteristics of the domestic policy formulation process and its actors. The conjunction of these two levels of analysis, regional and national, applied here for the Chilean case, is therefore fundamental for an exhaustive understanding of the processes of social policy changes in Latin America.
Table 2.5 List of interviews Role
1 Former Chilean MIDEPLAN CCT Director 2 Social Policy Expert Fundación Asesorías para el Desarrollo 3 National Politician. Presidency of the Presidential Advisor Republic of Chile Chile 4 Social Policy Expert ECLAC 5 Social Policy Expert UNDP 6 CCTs Expert ECLAC 7 National Politician. Presidency of the Presidential Advisor Republic of Chile Chile 8 Independent Social Policy Expert 9 National Policy. MIDEPLAN Former Director of the Ministry of Social Development Chile 10 Government DIPRES Official. Budget Division Advisor 11 Government MIDEPLAN Official. Former Director Presidency of the 12 Former President Republic of Chile of the Republic 2000–2006 13 National Expert. DIPRES Former Director of Budget Division
08-11-2010 11-11-2010 09-11-2010 09-11-2010
Santiago, Chile Santiago, Chile Santiago, Chile Santiago, Chile
7-06-2011 Questionnaire via (Questionnaire) e-mail
40 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet Table 2.5 (Continued) Role 14 CCTs Expert ECLAC 15 Government Official. MIDEPLAN 16 CCTs Expert 17 Social Policy Expert 18 World Bank Official 19 Independent Spanish Social Policy Expert 20 Social Policy Expert, MIDEPLAN
UNDP OAS WB
14-11-2011 17-06-2011 20-01-2012 08-02-2012
Skipe Skipe Skipe Skipe
Source: Table created by the author.
Notes 1. Previous versions of this chapter in Osorio, Cecilia (2015) “¿Cómo se difunden y adoptan los Programas de Transferencia Condicionada en América Latina? Propuesta de operacionalización de los mecanismos de difusión aplicada al caso chileno”, in Revista Íconos, Dossier “Cambio de Políticas Públicas en América Latina”. September 2015. Volume 19, Issue 3. ISSN: 1390–1249 ISSN: 1390–1249. pp. 31–48 and in Porto de Oliveira, Osmany; Kerches da Silva Leite, Cristiane; Montero, Sergio and Osorio Gonnet, Ceclia (Coord.) (2019) Difusão de políticas sociais na América Latina: Da importação à exportação. Anais do Seminário Internacional sobre Difusão de Políticas. Editora Hucitec, Sao Paulo (forthcoming). 2. The classification of 20 Latin American countries indicated by ECLAC has been considered: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Of this group, only Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela have not implemented them (León, Arturo, 2008; Fiszbein, Ariel and Schady, Norbert, 2009). Attention has been focused on Latin America, so cases found in Central America, such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have not been considered. 3. The name Chile Solidario, or CHS, will be used as a synonym for the Chile Solidario Social Protection System. 4. It has been assumed that rationality is limited. The model of complete rationality, in which the actors consider all alternatives and this generates a change of opinion regarding the subject, constitutes an ideal model. The definition of limited rationality seems much more adequate to explain decision-making, given the constraints faced by policymakers. It is not possible to know all the possible alternatives (and it is probably not rational to do so), not all the available means are known, nor all the results (Mele and Rawling, 2004). 5. I have taken these definitions of meditation and exhortative activities from Bradford (2008), because they adequately illustrate the activities of international organizations in a case of policy diffusion. 6. In May 2012, a new program was created, Family Ethical Income, which establishes conditional bonuses and transfers for families in extreme poverty and creates
CCT Programs in Latin America 41 a subsidy for women’s employment (Law 20.595). This subsystem, created through Law 20.595 (May 17, 2012), is part of the existing Intersectoral Social Protection System, and complements the previous Social Protection Subsystem called Chile Solidario (www.ingresoetico.gob.cll). The Family Ethical Income coexisted during 2012–2013 with the CHS, with a set of transitional measures that ensure coverage of those who entered the CHS, although from 2014 no new beneficiaries would enter the latter (Law 20.595). 7. It is mentioned that there was even a slight increase in 2000 (5.7%) over 1998 (5.6%) (Cohen and Franco, 2006), although in statistical terms it is not significant. 8. Today Ministry of Social Development, since 2011. 9. CASEN is the Economic Characterization Survey held in Chile since 1985 (every two years). Currently it is named Registro Social de Hogares (Households Social Registry).
References Atkinson, R. and Flint, J. Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies. Social Research UPDATE 33. United Kingdom: University of Surrey, 2001. Ayala Consulting Co. Workshop on Conditional Transfer Programmes (CCTs): Operational experiences. Final report. Prepared for World Bank. Quito: Ecuador, 2003. Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. New York: Cornell University Press, 2004. Berry, F. and Berry, W. Innovation and diffusion models in policy research. In Theories of the Policy Process, 223–260. Edited by Sabatier, P. and Weible, C. Boulder: Westview, 2007. Bradford, N. The OECD’s local turn. In The OECD and Transnational Governance. Edited by Rianne, M. and McBride, S. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008. Cecchini, S. and Atuesta, B. Programas de transferencias condicionadas en América Latina y el Caribe. Tendencias de cobertura e inversión. Policy Paper. Serie Políticas Sociales 224, Santiago: CEPAL, 2017. Cecchini, S. and Madariaga, A. Programas de Transferencia condicionada. Balance de la experiencia reciente en América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago: ECLAC, 2011. Chile. Crea el sistema intersectorial de protección social e institucionaliza el subsistema de protección integral a la infancia Chile Crece Contigo. Law 20.379, 12 September 2009. Cohen, E. and Franco, R. Transfers with Co-Responsibility: A Latin American Perspective. Mexico: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), 2006. Deacon, B., Hulse, M. and Stubbs, P. Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare. London: Sage, 1997. Elkins, Z. and Simmons, B. On waves, clusters, and diffusion: A conceptual framework. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598: pp. 33–51, 2005. Fiszbein, A. and Schady, N. Conditional Cash Transfers Reducing Present and Future Poverty. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009. Franzoni, J. and Voorend, K. Actors and ideas behind CCTs in Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Global Social Policy, 11(2–3): pp. 279–298, 2011. Haas, P. M. Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization, 46(1): pp. 1–35, 1992. Huneeus, C. La democracia presidencial en Chile. How to make the presidential system work. (Coord.) Ellis, A., Orozco, J. and Zovatto, D. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009.
42 Cecilia Osorio Gonnet Jacobsson, B. Regulated regulators: Global trends of state transformation. .In Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of regulation. Edited by Djelic, M.-L. and Sahlin-Andersson, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D. and Fernández I Marín, X. The global diffusion of regulatory agencies: Channels of transfer and stages of diffusion. Comparative Political Studies, 44(10): pp. 1343–1369, 2011. Leite, C. and Peres, U. Origem e disseminação do Programa Bolsa Família: aproximações analíticas com o caso mexicano. Revista do Serviço Público, 64(3): pp. 351– 376, 2013. León, A. Progresos en la reducción de la pobreza extrema en América Latina. Dimensiones y políticas para el análisis de la primera meta del Milenio. ECLAC-AECID Project. Follow-up to the poverty component of the first Millennium Development Goal (AEC/06/003), 2008. Mele, A. and Rawling, P. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Meseguer, C. and Gilardi, F. Reflexiones sobre el debate de la difusión de políticas. Política y Gobierno, 15(2): pp. 315–351, 2008. Meseguer, C. and Gilardi, F. What is new in the study of policy diffusion? Review of International Political Economy, 16(3): pp. 527–543, 2009. Morais de Sá e Silva, M. Poverty Reduction, Education, and the Global Diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. Osorio, C. La difusión de los Programas de Transferencia Condicionada en América Latina 1990–2010, Doctorado en Ciencias Políticas y Sociales. Department of Political and Social Sciences. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2014. Osorio, C. Cómo se difunden y adoptan los Programas de Transferencia Condicionada en América Latina? Propuesta de operacionalización de los mecanismos de difusión aplicado al caso chileno. Revista Íconos, FLACSO-Ecuador. Issue 53. September 2015. ISSN: 1390–1249. pp. 31–48. http://revistas.flacsoandes.edu.ec/iconos/article/ view/1540, 2015. Osorio, C. Cómo viajan las ideas? El rol de las comunidades epistémicas en el diseño de políticas sociales en América Latina. Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia, (68), June: pp. 75–112, 2017. Osorio, C. Aprendiendo o emulando? Cómo se difunden las políticas sociales en América Latina. Ed. LOM, 2018. Palma, J. and Ruz, M. A. Análisis del proceso de formulación e implementación del Sistema Chile Solidario. (Preliminary Report). Participation, Citizenship and Public Policy Programme. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Chile, 2005. Peck, J. and Theodore, N. Recombinant workfare, across the Americas: Transnationalizing “fast” social policy. Geoforum, 41(2): pp. 195–208, 2010. Puentes, G. Unravelling the Policy-Making Process: The Case of Chilean PovertyAlleviation Policy, Doctorate in Philosophy, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2010. Raczynski, D. Chile Solidario System and Chile’s Social Protection Policy: Lessons from the Past and Agenda for the Future. San Pablo, Brazil, and Santiago de Chile: IFHC/CIEPLAN, 2008. Simmons, B., Dobbins, F. and Garrett, G. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
CCT Programs in Latin America 43 Speth, J. and Haas, P. Global Environmental Governance. Island Press: Washington, DC, 2006. Teichman, J. Competing visions of democracy and development in the era of neoliberalism in Mexico and Chile. International Political Science Review, 30(1): pp. 67–87, 2009. Veras, F. and Elydia, S. Conditional cash transfer programs and gender vulnerabilities: Case studies of Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Working Paper International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 69: pp. 1–32, 2010.
The Diffusion of Public Policies and the Bolsa Familia Program in Light of the Mexican Experience1 Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite and Ursula Dias Peres
Introduction In the 1990s, important changes took place in the governmental agendas of Latin American countries. The most important milestone during this period was the formulation and implementation of neoliberal economic policies which, according to Moraes (2002), involved a change in the agenda in terms of a transformation of its shared themes, values and paradigms or “the art of defining the terms of the dispute” (idem 2002: 20). The prescription known as the “Washington Consensus” established reforms in “peripheral countries in light of a political program whose pillars were the opening up of the world economy to the flow of goods, services and capital, and the reorientation and remodeling of the state to be a provider of norms that guarantee the security and profitability of private businesses” (Pereira 2010: 274). The influence of these neoliberal ideas and paradigms of social policies was most visible in the greater value placed on focused compensatory social policies designed to minimize the “negative consequences of this adjustment – such as the high degree of informal work and an increase in unemployment. (. . .) The strategies used to fight the social costs of neoliberal policies were reduced to the strategy of ‘fighting poverty’” (Uga 2004: 58). In this sense, the World Bank played the role of a leading international think tank in this process, based on the publishing of the World Development Report in 1990.2 According to Pereira (2010), it recommended that countries adopt a dual strategy, which needed to combine focused programs with a renewed emphasis on the virtues of economic growth through structural adjustments that promoted denationalization, the opening of markets and privatizations. To the extent that these adjustment generate “social costs” there needed to be focused interventions of a (supposedly) compensatory nature to promote the providing of basic services (above all health, elementary education and family planning), in the form of safety nets and programs for the formation of “human resources” (p. 274). From the point of view of social policies, this represented a profound reversal in terms of what had been installed during the hegemony of the post-war Keynesian paradigm (Hirschman 1989). Social policies came to be classified by the main American think tanks as costs (and no longer as
46 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres preconditions for private investment). In the same manner, policies came to offer more transitory assistance to soften the social effects of crises, guaranteeing the governability of these adjustments (Pereira 2010: 275). The international political scenario changed at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century. Progressive coalitions (called the “pink wave”) won presidential elections in various Latin American countries and opened a window of opportunity for change. In the international scenario, the promotion of the Millennium Objectives (2000) by the United Nations marked a repudiation of the neoliberal legacy of the 1980s and 1990s, which included the imperative of reducing social policy spending (Faria 2012: 336). Various countries in Latin America implemented conditional income transfer policies in the 1990s and the beginning of the following decade, inspired by focused principles of public policies3 (Sugiyama 2012; Gonnet 2018). In general terms, these programs sought to transfer money to the poorest portion of the population, with the requirement that the beneficiaries needed to fulfill certain obligations, termed conditions or targets. The new agenda of social policies that was constructed—with the approval of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank—was based on the fight against poverty and inequality as prerequisites for the social and economic development of these countries, showcasing focused social programs (Tomazini and Leite 2016). More recently during the past decade, there has been a new conservative reaction in the international sphere (namely Trump in the US and Macron in France), which has had a notable influence in Latin America. The emblematic cases were the election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina (in 2015) and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, which brought Michel Temer to power and paved the way for the election of the reactionary Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. From the point of view of social policy4 this marked the end of social citizenship in Brazil, which began with the enactment of the Brazilian Constitution in 1988 (Fagnani 2017). The context of social policy in Latin America has been characterized in general terms by incipient social protection systems, which have been inconclusive and cyclically vulnerable. While universal and focused income transfers have coexisted historically in Europe ever since the implementation of the welfare state in terms of state policy, with the latter complementing the former within a universal context, the Latin American situation has been different. Here conditional income transfer programs which should be the last safety net for the population have been used as showcase instruments to alleviate poverty (Cobo 2012: 21). The comparison of the Brazilian experience with that of Mexico is justified in several aspects. What the Bolsa Familia Program and the Progresa/ Oportunidades Program in Mexico have most in common is that they both belong to a broader effort to fight poverty through economic growth and social development (Levy 2006: 23). Both programs have chosen very similar conditions and share a concern with the intergenerational nature of poverty, but the similarities end there. On the other hand, there are significant differences
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 47 between the federal implementation of these programs and their complex situations of poverty and social inequality. In the first place, they emphasize distinct objectives: the Bolsa Familia Program emphasizes the alleviation of poverty through monetary transfers and handles obligations in a distinctive manner; the Progresa/Oportunidades Program is more focused on breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty (families without children to fulfill obligations—there are no benefits without obligations). In the Bolsa Família Program, a lack of meeting the program’s obligations is met by the actions of a local social worker who helps the family meet the required conditions.5 It is understood that the failure to meet these obligations is a sign of a more vulnerable family (Soares 2010: 159). The context of social policies in the two countries is very different. In Mexico, the Progresa/Oportunidades Program tends to be overloaded due to the weaknesses of the Mexican social protection system. The Bolsa Família Program, on the other hand, was implemented within a context of social policies—of health, education and social assistance—in an open process designed to decentralize administration and broaden coverage (Leite and Fonseca 2011). In this manner, the program follows a broader institutional policy, with each policy having its own objectives and targets which historically have accumulated good results in terms of social indicators to bridge the immense divide that still marks the social area in Brazil. The specific objective of this text is to reflect on the process of formulating this conditional income transfer program in Brazil—the Bolsa Família— examining it in the light of the experience in Mexico. We assume that the broad national and international adhesion to conditional income transfer programs (CITPs) does not imply that there have been homogeneous choices in terms of courses of action and the specific instruments used, due to the idiosyncratic political, social and institutional contexts of social learning (Hall 1993) and the political trajectories in these two countries. The differences in the ways that these policies have been formulated and implemented have produced and continue to produce different results, despite the efforts made by multilateral organizations in these specific historical and institutional contexts. In this work, we will argue that the capacity of these international organizations to influence results in these countries is a variable that is contingent not only on the financial conditions of these policies, but also the conditions associated with social learning and the accumulation and diffusion of experience, which are verified by the trajectory of the formulation and implementation of these policies. In this way, our research hypothesis is that the Brazilian experience has been profoundly marked by endogenous processes of policy diffusion of a federal nature, which explain a large portion of the conditions of the formulation of the Bolsa Familia Program (Leite and Peres 2015). In Mexico, on the other hand, the evaluation of the policies and the economic coalition (Tomazini 2013) legitimized the conditional transfer program within a context of a battle between paradigms influenced by the political parties (idem 2013: 136).
48 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres Methodology This study, in terms of its ends, is explanatory to the extent that it seeks to understand the dimensions that characterize policy formulation and implementation processes (idiosyncratic political, social and institutional contexts of social learning, and the policy trajectories in each of these countries) and, within these processes, the influence of multilateral stimulus organizations (Vergara 1997). The analytic strategy used for this purpose is bibliographic and documental research together with open semi-structured interviews designed to describe the Brazilian experience. The bibliographic research uses secondary data regarding the Mexican experience based on the work of Tomazini (2013). This study has explanatory characteristics and was developed based on various interviews with Mexican political and social actors, in order to illustrate the similarities and differences with the Brazilian case, given that it is not a work of comparative analysis based on comparative theory. Explanatory research has a complex typology, which seeks to identify the determinant factors of certain phenomena, looking for the reasons for a causality, according to Gil (1999). Given this complexity and the characteristics of the studied phenomenon, this study offers proposals for analyzing the Brazilian experience, illustrating the Mexican experience but does not constitute, however, a definitive work about this subject, being rather a contribution to the field of analysis of public policies from the theoretical point of view of neoinstitutionalism, post-positivism and cognitive analysis.
Theoretical Framework: Contexts, Actors and Ideas The conceptual framework is made up of concepts of diffusion and policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Weyland 2004; Oliveira and Faria 2017; Oliveira and Pal 2018), social learning (Hall 1993) and post-positivism (Campbell 2002, 1998; Howlett et al. 2009; Kingdon 2003). According to the introduction of this book, to advance analytically in the study of the diffusion of public policies, it is necessary to theoretically distinguish the concepts of transfer, diffusion and circulation. Authors such as David Dolowitz, David Marsh and Richard Rose have written works that seek to understand the process of a one-off transfer of a policy (or program) from one government to another. Specifically, policy transfer studies are interested in understanding how paradigms, designs, institutional arrangements and instruments (among other elements) of a public policy (or specific program) are transferred to another context. Diffusion studies are based in turn on broader and more fluid processes (above all circulation studies),6 involving the dynamics between countries, regions and municipalities. To the extent that the adoption processes for a policy in one country influence the formulation and implementation of it in another place is the subject of diffusion studies and the analytical focus of this chapter.
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 49 The post-positivist and cognitive perspectives propose that articulating ideas, institutional configurations and political results in specific political and social contexts is of analytical relevance. Hall (1993) discusses how ideas and interests interact in specific institutional contexts to produce policy change. According to the author, there is social learning in this process to the extent to which there is “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience (or policy-relevant knowledge) and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process” (Hall 1993: 278, author’s own emphasis). Specifically, in relation to social learning, Hall (1993) argues that this process can be divided into three levels of change: the broad goals that guide policies in a particular field—the large paradigms of ideas that underpin policies and programs; the policy techniques or instruments—or designs—used to achieve these goals and the more specific aspects of these operational instruments (idem: 278). Situations of change in which operational instruments change, but the policy designs and paradigms that they are based on remain the same, Hall (1993) terms first-order changes. Second-order changes are characterized by changes in the design of a policy or its instruments, which are provoked by past experience, even though the paradigm in question remains the same. Finally, when all three of these components change, this is a third-order change, which involves processes beyond the borders of states in multiple political and social arenas and various actors (Hall 1993: 288). These are more profound changes, involving more robust institutional and policy transformations. While Hall (1993) articulates policy ideas, designs and instruments, Campbell (2002, 1998) classifies types of ideas based on cross-referencing sociological and institutional dimensions. The author defines cognitive paradigms as ideas of a theoretical nature that specify causal relationships and effects, and limit the set of alternatives that policymakers perceive as being useful. The normative structures—values, attitudes, identities—according to the author, are based on debates about policies and restrict actions by limiting the number of alternatives that actors perceive as socially legitimate and acceptable. They operate in accordance with a logic of adjustment and moral and social convenience, rather than a logic based on consequences (Campbell 2002: 24). While normative structures are sociological bases and interpretive conceptual structures are policy paradigms, programmatic ideas are causal ideas that indicate how instruments and institutions should be mobilized in specific situations, in accordance with the principles of the established paradigm (Campbell 2002: 28). Weyland (2004) proposes an analysis of policy diffusion processes based on two categories for the transmission of ideas: direct and indirect. Direct examples consist of country relationships without intermediation through multilateral organizations, based on the similar routes that these countries have in common in terms of their economic, social and historical orders. If, on one hand, direct transmission increases the chances of applying policies due to their similarity, on the other hand it can neglect interesting “off the beaten
50 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres track” experiences (Weyland 2004: 14). The indirect form is based on the actions of model p romoters—think tanks, research centers and international organizations such as the World Bank and the ITO (Mattos 2001). This author cites the importance of these actors, which rests on their diffusion of innovative experiences in isolated countries which do not possess great status. In this manner, these institutions promote looking beyond the experiences of similar countries. However, to the extent that international organizations are aligned with broader political interests, they must be observed in terms of indirect transmission processes. In the first place, models proposed by international organizations may be based on the mistaken belief that there is a universal model that is applicable to all countries. This assumption may lead to excessive uniformity in terms of the policy recommendations made by these organizations, ignoring the undisputed fact that experiences applied in one country may not be applicable to another. Secondly, there is a great risk of there being ideological blinders (Weyland 2004: 13), based on the theoretical-normative orientation of these institutions, which select the experiences that they use to base their models according to their own political-ideological agendas. Last but not least, there is the risk of the submission of countries with few resources to the financing of policies under the control of multilateral organizations that command sumptuous sums and use access to credit as a powerful way to “transmit” their ideas throughout the world. The game of political pressure predominates in these organizations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, in national contexts, in contrast to new forms of governance for public policies, based on pacts and deliberations between strategic political and social actors (Pereira 2010). In this work, we will verify through interviews that this risk is palpable in the Latin American cases examined, but it predominates under very specific conditions which involve budgetary difficulties in governmental entities and the ideological alignment between the government and the model promoting institutions. We use a few of Kingdon’s (2003) analytical categories, such as the window of opportunity, national mood and public policy entrepreneurs. Table 3.1 applies the concepts of Campbell (2002) to the analysis of the diffusion of conditional income transfer programs in Mexico and Brazil.
Table 3.1 Post-Positivist Conceptual/Analytical Framework (Campbell 2002) Structural Norms: Values, attitudes and beliefs Cognitive Paradigms: Interpretive structures Programmatic Ideas: Specific policy designs and instruments Source: Table created by the authors.
The international legitimacy of the fight against poverty agenda Human capital, food security and unconditional income (Tomazini 2013) Focus Instruments: Obligations and cash benefits
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 51 According to Tomazini (2013), historically three lineages of cognitive paradigms can be identified in the Brazilian case—human capital, food security and unconditional income—and in the Mexican case, human capital and unconditional income. According to the unconditional income paradigm, “poverty is the result of a violation of the right to share in the nation’s wealth. The actors of this coalition support universal policies as opposed to focused ones with the conditions associated with the fight against poverty. In this sense, income transfer policies should place a priority on the right to an income which will provide a modest, but ‘socially acceptable’ life” (Tomazini 2013: 121). The concept of food security is historic and polysemic, but it came to be considered a right in the 1990s. According to Belik (2003) “the right to regular adequate food should be mainly seen not as the result of goodwill or charitable actions, but rather an obligation of the state which in the final analysis represents our society. It should be remembered that the concept of food security is still open and under discussion. More recently, food sovereignty and sustainability have also been discussed” (idem 2003: 14). Uga (2004) comments on the concept of human capital: “The theory of human capital states that differences in income are influenced by human capital (above all education) which individuals invest in themselves. The basic rationale can be summed up as follows: (i) increasing the education given to workers, (ii) this will improve their skills and knowledge, (iii) the greater their skills and knowledge, the greater worker productivity will be; and (iv) this greater productivity will end up generating greater competitiveness and thus greater income for these individuals (idem 2004: 59). In terms of designs, instruments and programmatic ideas (Campbell 2002) there are three elements in common between these programs: i) the existence of focus mechanisms; ii) the requirement of beneficiary obligations mainly in terms of health and education to be able to receive these benefits, which are designed to stimulate the accumulation of the children’s human capital; and iii) the fact that these benefits are paid in cash and not in kind. “This set of characteristics can sum up the following interrelated items: the fact that the beneficiary is in general a mother or a woman responsible for children, and is someone who is focused on the well-being of these children” (Soares 2010: 140).
Historical Trajectories and Social Learning: Hypotheses for the Brazilian and Mexican Cases Analyzing the last two decades of the historical trajectories of income transfer policies and programs in these two countries, we can highlight some important events and suggest points of similarity and differences between the formulation processes for these programs. We have opted to develop an analysis of the historical trajectory of these countries, identifying periods of time instead of analyzing these cases separately. The historical trajectories of income transfer programs in Brazil and Mexico during the 1990s have points in common which are interesting analytically in terms of reflecting on the processes involved in the circulation of the ideas that
52 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres involve both of these countries. Rather than explore points of diffusion between these countries, this chapter intends to analyze the origins of the Bolsa Familia Program which have to do with the municipal experiences of the CITPs which began with the pioneer program in Campinas in 1995.7 It should be noted that, as indicated in Table 3.2, the first municipal experiences in Brazil occurred before the implementation of the Mexican Progresa Program in 1997, which reinforces our hypothesis of the endogenous nature of the Brazilian process, at
Table 3.2 A Comparison of Historical Trajectories: Points of Contact Brazil
1991: The presentation and approval of Law 80/1991 submitted by Senator Eduardo Suplicy, proposing a Minimum Wage Program (PGRM). Food Security in the public agenda: Citizens Against Hunger and Misery and in Favor of Life, led by Betinho. 1995: Municipal experiences in Campinas (the pioneer), in Santos, Ribeirão Preto (State of São Paulo) and Brasília (Federal District). 1996: First experiences with federal government initiatives (School Stipend, Food Card, Gas Bill Assistance and Food Stipend); Creation of the Eradication of Child Labor Program (PETI), and the beginning of the implementation of the Continual Loan Benefit (BPC) instituted by the Law of Social Assistance—LOAS. 1999: Special Mixed Commission in the National Congress with the Proposal of a Constitutional Amendment that originated with the Fund to Fight and Eradicate Poverty.
1989–1994: National Program of Solidarity (Pronasol)—featuring a focus on helping the Poor and Indigenous population.
2001: The Municipal Government of the City of São Paulo, under Marta Suplicy, implemented four redistributive programs, including the Guaranteed Family Minimum Wage (PGRFM). 2003: National Program for Food Access (PNAA)—implementation of Zero Hunger program. 2003: Implementation of the Bolsa Familia program. 2004: Creation of the Ministry of Social Development (MDS). Source: Table created by the authors.
1997: Progresa (Education, Health and Food Program), the predecessor of the Oportunidades Program, was conceived in an intersectoral manner, focused on the accumulation of human capital and access to health, education and adequate food rights to break the perpetuation of poverty. 2000: The publishing of the positive evaluation of the Progresa Program conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) marked the formation of a critical mass of international support in favor of conditional income transfers. 2001: Oportunidades—Broadening of the Progresa Program.
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 53 least in relation to Mexican influence. However, in terms of national experiences in the implementation of conditional income transfer programs throughout the world, the pioneering role of the Progresa Program needs to be recognized. The 1990s: The Antechamber of the Creation of Income Transfer Programs In Brazil, Silva (2007) considers the presentation and approval of Law No 80/1991 introduced by Senator Eduardo Suplicy, which proposed the Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program (PGRM), to be a prime inflection point in the income transfer agenda. This program was designed to benefit Brazilian residents above the age of 25 with incomes less than 2.25 minimum wages in 2005 values (Silva 2007: 1431). This stimulated a discussion of the articulation between a family minimum wage and education, in order to combat poverty and its perpetuation. In addition to this debate, the paradigm of food security was also an object of discussion at this time in terms of alternative policies to fight hunger, poverty and social exclusion. The creation of the NGO Citizens Against Hunger and Misery and in Favor of Life, led by the sociologist Herbert de Souza (Betinho), was an important landmark, which in fact focused on the paradigm of food security in the debate regarding social policies in the formulation of the program of then-candidate Lula in the 2002 election (Cobo 2012: 151). The 1990s was an important period as the antechamber for the creation of these programs according to Tomazini (2013). Between 1991 and 1997, there was an intense debate over the programs fighting poverty in these countries, the implementation of pilot conditional transfer programs in Mexico and programs in municipalities and the Federal District in Brazil, as well as the formulation of federal mechanisms in both countries (Tomazini 2013: 128). However, one comparison between the Brazilian and Mexican experiences during the 1990s should be emphasized. While in Brazil the approval of Senator Eduardo Suplicy’s PGRM involved the discussion of an unconditional income transfer program, the income transfer programs in Mexico were conditional from the outset (Tomazini 2013: 123). “In 1991, the book Poverty Alleviation in Mexico by Santiago Levy led to the proposal of conditional income transfers. (. . .) The coalition that unites the defenders of ‘human capital’ in Mexico is formed based on considerations and evaluations of programs oriented towards the poor population: the National Solidarity Program (Pronasol)” (idem 2013: 123). The experience with Pronasol between 1989–1994 displayed an endogenous learning process in the Mexican case, which consisted of a focus on the program’s actions with the poor and indigenous population, emphasizing a decentralization in the participation of these communities and an increase in the budget dedicated to social development. In addition to these aspects, one of its components, Solidarity with Children, was an important precursor to the design of Progresa/Oportunidades, given that the program offered stipends to poor
54 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres children that go to school, even though it was very limited in scope (Soares 2010: 143). From a perspective of social learning, as proposed by Hall (1993), the municipal experiences of Campinas, Ribeirão Preto and Santos (in the state of São Paulo) and the experience of the School Stipend Program in Brasília (Distrito Federal) in the middle of the 1990s in Brazil are interesting in terms of the learning of a group of municipal politicians and technical specialists which spread beyond these municipalities and was disseminated in political and epistemic communities that actively participated in the formation of the Bolsa Familia Program a decade later. Interviewed 1 highlights the programs of Campinas—the pioneer program in the country, which began offering payments in March 1995—the Federal District program (under the government of Cristovão Buarque), Ribeirão Preto (similar to that of Campinas), Salvador and Vitória as important Brazilian experiences that predated the Mexican program Progresa. In Campinas the initial motivation of the CITP was linked to the subject of food security. The phenomenon of denutrition became a compulsory notification along with infectious diseases within the context of Betinho’s campaign against hunger. Even though the motto was food security, conditions linked to health and education were instituted (Interviewed 1). It should be noted that these pioneering municipalities in the promotion of minimum income experiences had more elevated levels of human capital than the national average and, in this way, they did not have the same debate that marked the international context, associating the economic crisis and fiscal adjustments with compensatory social policies. In 1996 the first experiences of the Brazilian federal government began with the creation of the Child Labor Eradication Program—PETI and the implementation of the Continual Loan Benefit—BPC instituted by the Law of Social Assistance—LOAS. While in Brazil the structures of social assistance policies developed consistently in the direction of a paradigm of social rights, in Mexico the perception of problems associated with the complex administration of food subsidy programs became more acute. There were 15 food subsidy programs under 10 different secretariats and organizations. Administrative problems, a lack of coordination between management organizations, and the demographic dispersion of beneficiaries indicated a need for change. According to Levy (2006: 5) there was a disequilibrium between the territories with a greater concentration of the poor population (rural areas) and the allocation of budget resources (which privileged urban areas), as well as the inefficiency of food subsidies due to the dispersed nature of the population. In 1997 in Mexico, Progresa (Program for Education, Health and Food), the predecessor of the Oportunidades Program, was conceived of as an intersectoral way to focus on the accumulation of human capital and the access to rights to basic health and education and adequate food to break the poverty cycle (Fonseca and Viana 2007: 1507). We can affirm that this was an important second-order change using Hall’s (1993) terminology. It began with the paradigm of the fight against poverty which had been developing
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 55 in Mexico for a few years, and then there was a migration from a system of food subsidies which the poor received by virtue of being poor to a system in which beneficiaries needed to fulfill obligations to receive these transfers and were given more freedom in deciding how to use them. The focus on developing “human capacities” based on investments in the human capital of children, as a guarantee of access to education, health and adequate nutrition, represented an alignment with long-term objectives to a conditional income transfer program (CITP), completing a trio of characteristics: focus, money transfers and the existence of obligations that were required of these families (Soares 2010: 177). According to Tomazini (2013) the political panorama that marked the ascension of the human capital paradigm in Mexico was the dispute between the coalition of “social reformers” and “technocrats” in the economic area. “The future of Sedesol (Secretariat of Social Development) and Pronasol was a very sensitive subject at the beginning of the Zedillo administration (Valencia Lomelí 2003). The differences between the “technocrats” and “social reformers” were exacerbated between the Finance Ministry and Sedesol teams. This conflict was resolved with an attempt to associate the policies against poverty with the economic reforms that were being implemented in terms of human capital (Levy 2004)” (Tomazini 2013: 129). In this way, there was a political alignment between strategic political actors—in other words, a coalition—and a political context that was favorable to the hegemony of a human capital ideology in Mexico, in which specialists (Santiago Levy), think tanks (World Bank), political entrepreneurs (President Zedillo himself and his cabinet) and an economic agenda of commercial openness sustained the formulation of policies based on this epistemic framework. In this same vein, we can see in the Mexican case that it was possible to diffuse this experience due to the use of primary information and technical statistics to select the beneficiaries and implement an experimental impact evaluation system which was innovative and led to internal impacts, consolidating this program and creating the technical conditions for its continuation.8 In addition to these internal impacts, from an external point of view, these systematic impact evaluations circulated in legitimate publications using scientific experimental methodologies, recognized by the technical apparatus of these countries and multilateral organizations as qualified sources of information about the resources, impacts and effects of these programs in other countries. In a context in which other Latin American countries discussed the pertinence of income transfer programs, the circulation of robust impact evaluations of the Mexican case was important in the formatting process of programs in other countries, such as Brazil for example9 (Soares 2010: 145). The end of the 1990s began a period of important changes in the Brazilian context, marked by the national and international climates (Kingdon 2003) which were conducive to the formulation and implementation of conditional income transfer programs on a federal level. In 1999, the Congress’s Special Mixed Commission proposed a constitutional amendment which gave rise to
56 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres the Fund to Fight and Eradicate Poverty. The public hearings that marked the commission’s decision-making process helped create a political consensus that conditional income transfer programs would be the best course of action to fight poverty in this country (Soares 2010: 182). The Policy Turn of the First Decade of This Century In 2000, the publishing of a positive evaluation of the Progresa Program by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) marked the formation of a critical mass of international support for conditional income transfers. Academics and development banks mobilized themselves through publications and reports praising the Mexican and Brazilian experiences, among others (Lautier 2010: 362). In the next to the last year of the FHC administration (2001), there was an expansion of Brazilian federal government development initiatives and the creation of new ones, notably the School Stipend Program and the Food Stipend Program. These programs featured characteristics which were later perfected under the Bolsa Familia Program, such as a decentralized implementation and a focus on mobilizing municipal instruments that included the great majority of Brazil’s 5,560 municipalities. In 2001, the formulation and implementation processes of the City of São Paulo’s Minimum Wage Program began. This experience is of interest because the same group that coordinated this program in São Paulo in 2001 participated in the federal government’s programs at two crucial stages: the unification of the Bolsa Familia Program in 2003 and the implementation of an important recent change in the Brazil Without Misery Program in 2011. Ana Fonseca, who coordinated the Bolsa Familia Program between 2003 and 2004 and was Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Social Development in 2004, was the coordinator of the municipal minimum wage program under the administration of Marta Suplicy (2001–2004). Within the context of this government, Ana Fonseca was an external actor outside of the political network who had great academic and technical knowledge and was invited to formulate and implement the minimum wage program and designed its implementation strategy after intense negotiations with epistemic and governmental political groups associated with redistributive and emancipatory policies,10 the administration’s bureaucrats and potentially eligible beneficiaries from the city’s most vulnerable regions (Pochmann 2002). There was a conflict between the groups of the ruling party (Labor Party) which were competing for budget resources and disagreed in terms of the cognitive paradigm of development,11 arguing that the investment in the minimum wage would not lead to economic development, a concept which changed after the implementation of the Bolsa Familia Program and was elaborated by Brazil Without Misery12 (Interviewed 1). Also during 2001, there were attempts to negotiate the unification of programs on different levels of the government by the municipal group, given that there was already a Citizen’s Income Program on the state level and scattered stipends
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 57 on the federal level (School Stipend, Food Stipend, Gas Bill Assistance and the Food Card). In 2003 at the beginning of the Lula administration, the policy agenda in the fight against hunger was consolidated in Brazil, led by José Graziano’s team. There were five conditional income transfer programs at the time (the ones mentioned earlier as well as the Eradication of Child Labor Program—PETI) and in February 2003, the recently sworn in government created the National Food Access Program (PNAA), under the responsibility of the recently created Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security (MESA) (Soares 2010: 182). The objective of the ministry was to implement the Zero Hunger Program, developed in 2001 by the Citizenship Institute, an organization unaffiliated with the Labor Party.13 In October of the same year, the income transfer programs were unified (later integrating the PETI) under the Bolsa Familia Program, a process led by Ana Fonseca, who was then the Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Social Development. The stipends were unified and the three levels of government pledged to implement the program under federal coordination, but this was not acclaimed politically at first. This was because there were divergences between the Extraordinary Ministry of Food and Nutritional Security, a group led by José Graziano, and Ana Fonseca’s group, which proposed the unification of all of the stipends. This group left the government and returned later the same year at a time when there were already political groups associated with each stipend, which made the unification process difficult, and there were intense debates between these groups within the same party, such as the debate over the frequency of school attendance as one of the conditions of the unified program.14 In 2004 the Ministry of Social Development was created, bringing with it a discussion of the Unified Registry.15 Observing this process in retrospect, it is notable the speed with which the policy and institutional arrangements associated with social assistance and the fight against poverty were developed at the beginning of the century. However, it should be noted that this is a process shaped by historical components of clear social learning profiting from accumulated experience and knowledge in a temporal horizon: the history of the assistance and fight against hunger policies during their various incarnations during the 1990s, the mobilization of groups linked to the sanitary and social assistance movement that resulted in the Constitution of 1988, the critical mass of support from national and international political and social actors in the discussion of policy concepts, designs and instruments that contributed to the creation of a favorable context for the development of an agenda to combat poverty in Brazil and various other Latin American countries. It may be stated, based on the conducted interviews, that Ana Fonseca’s experiences as a researcher and coordinator and those of her team in various municipal and federal programs were a conveyor belt for the process of the diffusion of these experiences that marked the development of the federal program which legitimated their policy designs, stakeholder mobilization practices, and administrative and institutional arrangements and so on. Ana Fonseca acted as an entrepreneur of public policies, according to
58 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres Kingdon’s terms (2003). In the Brazilian process, there was a clash of two cognitive paradigms, food security and human capital, and the political coalitions which sustained them fought for budgetary and institutional space (Tomazini 2013: 135). Specifically, in terms of the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the contexts of the development of Progresa/Oportunidades and the Bolsa Familia Programs were quite distinct. During the 1990s, Mexico was going through a serious economic and political crisis (due to the Chiapas conflict), which made it an extremely turbulent period. Within this context, it created a consensus between political and social actors in terms of a diagnosis of the negative impacts of this crisis on the poorest portion of the population. However, dissention characterized the interactions between these governmental bodies when the best course of action was being decided. According to Levy (2006: 16) it boiled down to a context that was ripe for change—a new government, a favorable political climate and the accumulation of empirical evidence and administrative experience. The consensus on the battle against poverty was sanctioned by President Zedillo and the Treasury Office, which recognized an opportunity to centralize the control of the budget for social policies. In Brazil, the FHC administration initiated a process of creating federal income transfer programs, which gained momentum under the Lula administration. In his first year of office, Lula had the political force to initiate what may be called a resignification of the federal government’s fight against hunger and poverty, characterized by a new articulation based on the framework of social and economic policies that had already been developed in the country since the 1990s, building upon them and expanding their scope.16
Final Considerations The policy experiences in Brazil and Mexico were laboratories for the formulation and implementation of a focused paradigm of conditional income transfers and, at the same time, propagators of influence via direct or indirect transmission (Weyland 2004). Spread and multiplied internationally, this paradigm was realigned by national experiences through adaptation processes of first- and second-order elements (Hall 1993) within the contexts of normative ideas and political and social processes that attached a new significance to these programs within each national context (Campbell 1998). In terms of recent studies of diffusion, each context generated a distinct translation of the same regionally distributed policy. In terms of indirect transmission, it may be said that the World Bank has influenced these countries through the focused paradigm of conditional income transfers, but it also has been influenced itself. According to our interviews (Interviewed 2; Interviewed 3 and 4; Interviewed 1), it may be affirmed that the implementation of the Brazilian and Mexican programs has been characterized by a reciprocal learning process, in which Latin American countries have received first- and second-order influence (Hall 1993) from the World Bank to the extent that the technical specialists of this institution have recommended
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 59 adjustments in their implementation in terms of coverage and conditions, among other things. These recommendations have had greater policy influence in favorable policy contexts characterized by a paradigmatic alignment of interests as was witnessed during the end of the 1990s in Mexico. On the other hand, the organization itself has been influenced by the accumulation of learning from countries in accompanying the execution of the program.17 The institution has influenced the international perception of a given area of social policy, acting as a sounding board for policy repercussions in countries and regions that are not necessarily similar to their countries of origin, as pointed out by Weyland (2004). Our interviewees cite the existence of an international cooperation network in which technical specialists from the countries that have developed CITPs exchange experiences with their counterparts in the World Bank and other international institutions. The Brazilian model, in contrast with the Mexican model, features substantially greater coverage, given the country’s geographic and social characteristics. The Brazilian Bolsa Familia Program, in attending the needs of 13.7 million families (2018 data), has managed to apply this focused model on a large scale, thus generating a notable economic impact. This impact has received international attention and reinforces the importance of broadening the program’s base. Our interviews suggest, in this manner, that the Mexican model which was consolidated between 1997 and 2001 and the actions of the World Bank, by spreading word of the good results of this experience, created a climate favorable to the formulation of policy alternatives to fight poverty and inequality in Brazil in the form of conditional income transfers. Dulci (2008) argues that the income transfer policy designed in Mexico was a learning tool for other Latin American countries and international institutions (Dulci 2008: 7). However, the implementation of the Brazilian case became a program model via direct mechanisms—the various international missions that came to Brazil to get to know the program—and indirect mechanisms—through the actions of the World Bank, which assumed the Brazilian case as a case to be replicated in other countries, whether they were similar to Brazil or not (Weyland 2004). Compared with the Brazilian program, Oportunidades is a program that is closer to the paradigms of the income transfer program models of the IBRD and the World Bank.18 It is interesting to point out that the Mexican program received the largest loan in the history of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for the expansion of its program to urban areas (Dulci 2008), which indicates the historic dimensions and potential of the Mexican program for Latin America. In analyzing the formulation of the Bolsa Familia Program, it is fundamental to highlight that the program was constructed to a large extent based on the experience of previous income transfer policies (Hall 1993), given that when the state organized and consolidated federal CITPs, there were already various municipal (São Paulo, Campinas and Ribeirão Preto) and state (Federal District, among others) income transfer policies, as mentioned earlier, and these models were nationalized in the process of expanding the Bolsa
60 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres Familia Program. Interviewed 2 and Interviewed 5 highlight the experiences of the Eradication of Child Labor Program and especially the School Stipend Program. Interviewed 1 emphasizes the experience of the Minimum Wage Program in the city of São Paulo as being fundamental in the priority given to the Bolsa Familia Program during the first Lula administration. It was an experience conducted on an unheard-of scale in Brazil, which gave the program’s processes and results greater visibility. The case of São Paulo became the “model” for minimum wages in Brazil, and it was followed by the federal government and legitimized by the technical specialists of the World Bank and the IDB according to Weyland (2004). The technical selection of Ana Fonseca’s team was really a political choice. The World Bank and the IDB became fashionable through their association with a progressive government which separated the CITP from more conservative paradigms, and the federal government brought in a group responsible for an internationally known experience, which legitimized the process of unifying the Bolsa Familia Program. In both cases there were important elements of social learning (Hall 1993). The political and social actors brought present perceptions and learning from past policy experiences to the table. In the first decade of this century, the implementation of the Bolsa Familia Program occurred pari passu with the implementation of a systematic model for social assistance, the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS). It should be noted that these are processes that reinforce each other, despite their having distinct sources of funding: the National Social Assistance Fund—FNAS linked to the SUAS and the Fund for the Eradication of Poverty which provides most of the resources for the Bolsa Familia Program. The BFP has proved to be a program in movement in Brazil, in which families constantly enter and leave depending on their social conditions. The SUAS has supported families with a care network that goes beyond the scope of the BFP, which differentiates the Brazilian CITP from its Mexican counterpart due to its existence within a larger and more systematic social assistance policy. Finally, in this text we have sought to discuss the innovative paths of social policies in Brazil, using the Mexican experience as a mirror (which has also been verified by the experiences of other Latin American countries), specifically in terms of income transfer programs which involve complex, multifaceted processes, because they were not for the most part structured by multilateral organizations, but rather translated by correlation matrices between actors and institutions with dynamic relationships within political, institutional and cultural settings (within which occurred the actions of multilateral organizations). We are not denying the influence of international organizations, especially financial ones in the processes of formulating and implementing these policies, but rather proposing an analysis mediated by historical, economic, political and institutional aspects, valuing a neo-institutional theoretical view and postpositivist and cognitive public policies that can shed a light on approaches for future studies of other sectoral policies and other aspects of the fight against poverty policy addressed in this work.
Table 3.3 List of Interviews
An Ex-Coordinator of the Bolsa Familia Program and Researcher A Director of the Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Social Development A Director of the institution responsible for the implementation of the Chile Solidarity Program and a Congressional Advisor on social issues A Director of Chile 21
Nepp/ Unicamp MDS
São Paulo/SP (by Skype)
São Paulo/SP (by Skype)
An Ex-Secretary of Social Assistance for the City of São Paulo and Coordinator of Graduate Studies in Social Services at Pontifical Catholic University—PUC/SP.
São Paulo/SP (by Skype) São Paulo/SP
Notes 1. This chapter is based on the article: Leite and Peres (2013). 2. World Bank (1990). 3. The “first wave” of programs, during the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, was a “ripple,” that began with Venezuela and Honduras. During the second half of the 1990s, this ripple turned into a tsunami. In 1997 the Oportunidades Program was implemented in Mexico; in 2000 the My Family Program was instituted in Nicaragua; in 2001 the Colombian program Families in Action and the Ecuadorean program Solidarity Stipend—Solidarity Development Stipend were enacted; in 2002 the Chilean Solidarity Program and the Argentinean Heads of Unoccupied Homes Programs were implemented; in 2003 it was Brazil’s turn to implement the Bolsa Familia Program. Other Income Transfer Programs: in 2005: in El Salvador, the Oportunidades Program (Social Protection Network); in Uruguay, Ticket to Citizenship; in Paraguay, Tekoporã and Ñopytyvo (in the Chaco region); in the
62 C. Kerches da Silva Leite and U. Dias Peres Dominican Republic, Solidarity; in Peru, Together; in 2006: in Panama, the Opportunity Network (Fonseca and Viana 2007: 1507). 4. To find out more about the ascension of neoliberal ideas and the instruments that have dismantled the social policy framework in Brazil since the 2016 impeachment, see Leite and Fonseca (2018). 5. In terms of conditions, the fact that they are based on health and education is associated with a concept of poverty and the recovery of citizenship, which have been discussed internationally. However, the determination of the extent of these conditions is given by the structural and administrative possibilities of each country. In Sposati’s opinion (2011) there is an incongruence between the health and educational conditions, given that the first is focused on birth and early childhood (a maternal-child context) and the second on later childhood (primary education). This is explained by the structure of policies on offer, given that the Brazilian education system does not provide education for children from birth to the age of three, and thus education is delayed until a later stage of childhood. Thus, this difficulty in terms of which articulated social policies are on offer determines the possible construction of public income transfer policies. 6. Circulation is a longer and greater flow in time and space that can also imply forward and backward policy movements (Oliveira and Faria 2017). 7. In this work we argue that in addition to these experiences of federal income transfer programs, the experiences of municipal programs in the 1990s influenced the trajectory of the Bolsa Familia Program, through the social learning processes described by Hall (1993). A deeper analysis can be found in Leite and Peres (2015) and Justo (2007). 8. According to González de La Rocha (2010) the use of statistical tools as well as research in rural areas—Encuesta de Características Socioeconômicas de los Hogares Rurales (ENCASEH), and urban areas—Encuesta de Características Socioeconômicas de los Hogares Urbanos (ENCASURB), had a determinant influence on the form of the Progresa and Oportunidades Programs. However, later studies indicated that they possessed a limited ability to maintain the continuity of the selection process to identify needy families, which later led to self-selection and later more in-depth studies of families to complete and complement their registration information statistics. 9. This process will be analyzed in greater detail later in this study. 10. The City of São Paulo’s Minimum Wage Program was articulating the Work Stipend Program, the Beginning Again Program and the Collective Work Action Program (Work Operation). 11. The discussion of the investment in a Minimum Wage Program or economic induction, such as the People’s Bank and Economic Solidarity or even investments in urban and housing infrastructure, was quite tense in the São Paulo government due to the limited capacity of the government to invest at a time characterized by low economic growth and debts inherited from previous administrations. There was no comparable experience in the country in terms of the coverage that was being proposed in São Paulo, and there was still doubt in terms of what would be the results of this policy and whether it would be sustainable or not. Given this, some governmental groups believed that it would be better to invest in economic development programs rather than mere short-term assistance programs. 12. See the design of the Brazil Without Misery Program in 2011, which ties income transfers to productive inclusion, “Misery has different faces and necessities according to the region. The reality of the country is completely different from the reality in the city. That’s why Brazil Without Misery will feature national and regional actions based on three axes: income guarantees, production inclusion and public services” (see www.brasilsemmiseria.gov.br/apresentacao).
The Bolsa Familia Program in Mexico 63 13. To see more on the Zero Hunger crisis and the unification of the cards that generated the Bolsa Familia Program, see Tomazini and Leite (2016). 14. There was a proposal of 85% school attendance as a condition by the group linked to education, which was considered excessive and divergent from the Law of Rights and Bases for Education, which established 65% school attendance as the minimum level (Interviewed 1). 15. The implementation of the Unified Registry was a complex and important policy process, but it will not be analyzed in this work. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see Bartholo and Dutra (2011). 16. It has been argued that the policies used to fight poverty in Brazil began to take a central position within the coordination of policy, including economic policy. There is scientific evidence that the results of activating markets in places where the population receives income transfers, for example, has been incorporated in the discourse of government researchers and technical specialists to justify social spending as an instrument in the reaction of authorities to the economic crises that have afflicted these countries for a number of years. There are various recent studies by IPEA which deal with the importance of social spending in the activation of effective demand and as a factor in economic growth. See: www.ipea.gov. br/portal/ 17. To see more about institutional learning in the implementation of the Bolsa Familia Program, see Leite and Peres (2015). 18. According to González de La Rocha (2010), the central role of evaluations of the impact of the formulation and implementation of the Mexican program has reinforced the hypothesis that technical specialists in multilateral organizations influenced the creation process of the Oportunidades Program.
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Regional Diffusion of Brazilian Social and Rural Public Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean Eric Sabourin, Catia Grisa, Marcos Aurélio Lopes Filho, Moises Villamil Balestro, Mireya E. Valencia Perafán, Eduardo de Lima Caldas, Mario Lúcio de Ávila, and Doris Sayago
Introduction Our research well illustrates the perspective of this book, namely the emergence of Latin American countries as exporters of public policies after being importers of models from the North (Europe or the United States) or transmitted by international organisations (Delpeuch, 2009; Musiałkowska, 2006; Valderrama, 2004). What conditions and factors explain this transition? First, Latin American countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico became potential policy exporters when they began experimenting with and developing their national models, sometimes becoming real laboratories of social, environmental, or rural public policies (Zurbriggen, 2014). We mention Mexico and Costa Rica as examples of the diffusion of environmental policies and promotion of payment instruments for environmental services (Dumoulin, 2010; Ezzine de Blas et al., 2017) and Brazil regarding social policies and instruments of participation (Montero, 2005; Sugiyama, 2013; Pomeroy and Suyama, 2016; Oliveira, 2016). Second, similar to Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, these countries began developing cooperation policies as donors and not only recipients. They developed South-South cooperation programs and initiatives within Latin America or with Africa and Asia (Faria, 2012; Inoue and Vaz, 2013) or trilateral cooperation systems associated with international organisations, especially the United Nations system (Cabral et al., 2013). Finally, these countries played a leading role in regional integration processes: Mercosur, Union of South American Nations (USAN), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Vieira Martins, 2014). In addition, in this movement, they became promoters of the regional circulation of their public policy models associated with the action of inter-American agencies as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) or the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA).
68 Eric Sabourin et al. The Transbrasil project1 seeks to explain the diffusion of Brazilian social and rural development policies in Latin America and the Caribbean through the combination and hybridisation of three categories of public policy internationalisation process referenced in the literature: the circulation of norms and models through international organisations; the policy transfer; and the effects of regional integration. Since the beginning of the 2000s, several public policies and initiatives promoting Family Farming (FF) and Food and Nutritional Security (FNS) have been developed in Brazil under the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA), and Ministry of Social Development (MDS), among others. Noteworthy is the Zero Hunger strategy, National Food and Nutritional Security Policy, ‘family farming law’, and two flagship instruments: the public procurement of food from family farming and territorial policies. Such initiatives and their outcomes positioned Brazil as an international reference regarding public policies on FF and FNS. International organisations analysed, systematised, and disseminated the Brazilian experience worldwide (WFP, 2016; FAO, 2013, 2014, 2015). Furthermore, various countries have sought to establish cooperation agreements and exchanges to learn from and share experiences with Brazil to transfer or adapt such initiatives to their contexts. Brazil has also brought its policies, practices, and learning to several international forums, often in interaction with social movements and civil society organisations. The Transbrasil project investigated the diffusion mechanisms of Brazilian ‘models’ of public policies for FF and FNS among Latin American and Caribbean countries (Sabourin and Grisa, 2018). The purpose of the research was to describe and analyse the modes of dissemination and local adaptation of two rural development programs in a context representative of the international diffusion of Brazilian social policies (Oliveira, 2016). These two policies were the public procurement of food from family farmers (Food Acquisition Program—PAA and the National School Feeding Program— PNAE), which was diffused in Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay; and programs for Rural Territorial Development (National Program for Sustainable Development of Rural Territories—PRONAT and the Citizenship Territory Program—CTP) studied in Argentina, El Salvador, and Uruguay. This chapter comprises three sections: the theoretical and methodological framework; the modalities of diffusion of the two Brazilian policies; and finally, a discussion and comparison of results.
Theoretical and Methodological Elements for the Analysis of the Diffusion of Public Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean The diffusion of public policies refers to ‘a process, either mediated or not, from which a policy related element, or set of elements . . . situated somewhere in time or space, is adopted elsewhere’ (Oliveira, 2016: 224). Our research sought
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 69 to understand the internationalisation of Brazilian pro-family farming policies in Latin America in a context representative of the international diffusion of Brazilian social policy models (Faria, 2012; Oliveira, 2016). The theoretical approach combined views on the internationalisation of public policies (Berry and Berry, 1999; Stone, 2004; Hassenteufel, 2005) and political sociology applied to public action for rural development, extending the proposals by Hassenteufel (2008). The literature from 1990 to the 2000s on the one hand explains the internationalisation of public policies through the globalised circulation of norms (Delpeuch, 2009), and on the other, contends the impact of global ‘pressures’ or ‘penetration’ on the national scale (Dàvila Aldàs, 2011). However, previous analyses of rural territorial development policymaking in Latin America (Massardier and Sabourin, 2013; Sabourin et al., 2016) indicated that these policies are not directly subject to the logic of the globalisation of production and finances. In contrast, explanations must account for socio-political logics other than those restricted to economic and financial globalisation (Bhagwati, 2007). The world politics approach (Rosenau, 1997) has improved and expanded the tools for analysing the transition from a state-centred state to a multicentric world. This literature emphasises the fragmentation of international arenas and complex architecture of their connections (Biermann et al., 2009). On the other hand, the analysis of the policymaking process provides a privileged position from which to observe the rearrangement of these policies and public action for development at the local, territorial, or regional scales. In addition to verifying the transition ‘from national public policies to transnational public policies’ (Hassenteufel, 2008: 16), various sociological factors are present in the configurations of development at the micro-regional or national scales. Camau and Massardier (2009) note a rapid multiplication of public action agents and fragmentation of various powers at the international, national, private, and public levels (Rosenau, 1997). These observations demand a re-reading of the process of policymaking, which Hassenteufel (2008: 23) describes as ‘a collective construction of public action’. This author highlights a ‘contextualized analysis of interactions between multiple and intertwined actors, at various levels, from the local to the international’ passing through the macro-regional level, enabling considering ‘the transformations of contemporary states’ (Hassenteufel, 2008: 23). The complexity of the entanglement or intertwinement of these processes feature the diffusion, circulation, and implementation of rural territorial development (RTD) and public procurement policies among several Latin American countries. Thus, following the analysis of Risse-Kappen (1995), who considers globalisation only one element of the transnationalisation of policies, we sought to articulate three complementary theoretical approaches. These are a) the approach of public policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009); b) that of the transnational circulation of norms (Hassenteufel, 2005, 2008; Dumoulin, 2010); and c) the regionalisation theories approach (Dabène, 2009), which emphasises the mechanism of bottom-up regionalisation (Pasquier,
70 Eric Sabourin et al. 2002). Conceptual elements of these three approaches are described in the following subsections. Policy Transfer According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), policy transfer is ‘the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5). This type of diffusion was central to our research, as Brazil became at once a reference for social policies and pro-FF policies (Pomeroy and Suyama, 2016; Oliveira, 2016), and a promoter of international cooperation through South-South cooperation (Leite et al., 2014). Since 2003, the Brazilian South-South cooperation has been particularly active, with increased resources allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean, mostly to Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) (Caisan, 2013). The recent period corresponded to an unprecedented moment of openness and development of Brazilian diplomacy, when the guidelines of the Zero Hunger Program became a recurring theme in presidential speeches and various international forums. This constituted bilateral and multilateral agendas and influenced the cooperation agreements of Brazil with developing countries (Cunha, 2010). Thus, Brazil had become an international protagonist in the fight against hunger. The country sought to gain a position as a regional leader (Fiori, 2011), competing with other regional powers to claim a seat on the United Nations Security Council (Cason and Power, 2009). Thus, South-South cooperation has become instrumental, favoured simultaneously by the period of socioeconomic growth and intense experimentation of innovative public policies in the country. Moreover, Brazil intended to play a regional leadership alternative to the United States hegemony in Latin America and the Caribbean, allying with Argentina and Venezuela in opening Mercosur (Vieira Martins, 2014). In this context, the Brazilian government with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) developed South-South cooperation programs that sometimes resemble a modality of policy transfer. This was primarily the case of disseminating policies to strengthen FF focused on the public procurement of food from family farmers in Africa (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi and Niger) as well as Latin America and the Caribbean (Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, and Paraguay). Internationalisation Through the Circulation of Norms Some authors argue that the adoption of new policies is less dependent on the direct transfer of policies between countries than on the production and diffusion of norms under the influence of international arenas (Meyer, 1997), academic networks, and expert networks that produce transnational configurations
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 71 (Hassenteufel, 2008; Dumoulin, 2010). Ropp and Sikkink (1999) propose employing the ‘socialization of international norms into domestic practices’ to interpret the internationalisation of policy norms. In the case of Brazilian FNS policies, noteworthy is the predominant role of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in expanding the arenas for debating FNS globally and international exchanges (governmental and nongovernmental), technical cooperation, and humanitarian aid, especially following the food crisis that began in 2007. In this sense, Brazilian diplomacy played an outstanding role in the reform of the United Nation’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS). This role implied establishing in the United Nations system a mechanism allowing social participation in the Committee—the so-called civil society mechanism—and enabling the work of an advisory body, namely the High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE). The HLPE was in charge of promoting studies on and proposing strategies for topics chosen by the CFS. These two innovations strengthened the CFS as a valuable tool for producing and disseminating international regulations related to FNS and FF, favouring the diffusion of Brazilian public policies and programs in these areas. Regarding the support for RTD policies in Latin America, important is the direct and indirect interventions by the European Union to transfer the model of the LEADER program (acronym in French for Links between actions for the development of rural economy) (De Janvry et al., 2004; Musiałkowska, 2006). This transfer was mediated by international organisations (FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development—IFAD) and inter-American agencies such as the IDB (Champetier, 2003) and World Bank (Valderrama, 2004). Subsequently, in the Latin American and Caribbean context of South-South relations, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) ensured Brazil’s privileged role by supporting national policies and regional or inter-American initiatives such as Mercosur’s agricultural research cooperation program (PROCISUR) and Central American Rural Territorial Development Strategy (ECADERT). Dissemination of Policies Through Regionalisation This mechanism involved regional integration institutions as Mercosur and CELAC, which opened an agenda for pro-FF policies (Vigevani and Romanzini, 2011). It refers also to ‘bottom-up regional integration’ with the activities and articulations of civil society representatives in exchanging experiences and learning regarding public policies (Pasquier, 2002). Aspirations for politicalinstitutional changes claimed by social movements are emphasised, especially by the representatives of those ‘forgotten’ by economic and agricultural growth in the last decades. They organise themselves at the regional and international levels as, for example, Via Campesina, the Alliance for the Food Sovereignty of the Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Special Meeting on Family Farming of Mercosur (REAF).
72 Eric Sabourin et al. Since its foundation in 2013, CELAC has prioritised cooperation and the implementation of policies to eradicate hunger and poverty. To this end, critical specialised meetings were held within the framework of the Community, such as the Ministerial Meeting on Social Development, Eradication of Hunger and Poverty, and CELAC Minister’s Meeting on Family Farming. Rondó and Lopes Filho (2016) note that the agreements stemming from these meetings and adoption of CELAC’s ‘Plan for Food and Nutrition Security and Eradication of Hunger 2025’ (CELAC PLANSAN) indicate a concerted effort to regionalise a set of public policies, focusing on those related to FF and FNS. Method An analysis framework was applied to the six relevant countries to characterise the institutions, actors, and arenas involved in the process of the diffusion of public procurement and RTD policies, as well as the factors and modes of diffusion, appropriation, adaptation, or reinterpretation of policy models. The role of South-South cooperation between Brazil and the studied countries, work of international and regional organisations (FAO, WFP, IICA, Mercosur, and CELAC), and national and regional social movements were highlighted in the analysis. Data were collected through documentary research (analysis of archives and governmental documents), interviews with Brazilian public managers responsible for territorial development and FNS, and field research and interviews with the main actors in the ‘importing’ countries (public managers at various government levels, farmers, social brokers, representatives of international organisations, scholars, etc.). In total, 68 semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of international organisations, public officials, family farming organisations, family farmers, and policy brokers.
Embedded Modes of Public Policy Diffusion Policies for Public Procurement From Family Farmers The three studied countries (Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay) recently made normative changes to introduce or facilitate the participation of FF in public procurement, which to a greater or lesser extent resemble the Brazilian ‘model’. Therefore, the ‘convergence’ of public policies and instruments is observed (Hassenteufel, 2014; Evans, 2009) between Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay, and Brazil. This observation prompted the following questions: a) Did Brazil influence these new programs to promote purchasing from family farmers? b) If so, what were the drivers through which such ideas, experiences, and learning were disseminated? c) What causal elements explain the convergence? d) What is the degree of convergence, i.e., would the experiences of Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay be copies of the Brazilian ‘models’?
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 73 Influence of Brazil on Public Procurement in Latin American and Caribbean Countries Documentary research and interviews confirmed that Brazilian ideas and learning regarding the PAA (Food Acquisition Program) and PNAE (School Feeding Program) influenced and supported the debate and institutional changes in Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay. Several statements and documents illustrate this influence. For example, the former Minister of Agriculture of Haiti stated, ‘We were in Brazil at the beginning of the Lula’s Government. We were very interested in knowing the institutional arrangements being made to fulfil the promise of eradicating hunger and poverty. I remember visiting the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Small Farmers (sic), and public procurement agency, and I was very impressed with how the programs worked there’. In the case of Colombia, in addition to statements, a report entitled ‘El Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar—y la economía local’ (Colombian Family Welfare Institute and local economy) in the newspaper El Tiempo (14 October 2011) also stated, ‘Since 2010, on the initiative of the director of the ICBF, [ . . . ] a plan called “Local Purchases” has been promoted, which was inspired by the Zero Hunger Program of Brazil’. Finally, in the Paraguayan case, an official from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, who participates in the Producers’ Groups Committee, noted the Brazilian model as inspiring. This government official, besides being a civil servant, also participated in REAF as a representative of civil society (organiser of producers and activists of FF and FNS causes). As such, the official is a multiposition actor. Thus, the Brazilian experience of public procurement for school feeding is clearly recognised as a source of inspiration and action for the formulation of other policies in Latin America, which are contingent on the local political reality, local institutions, and organisations. Drivers of the Dissemination of Ideas, Experiences, and Learning The research sought to understand and characterise the process of diffusion of the Brazilian model. As such, it sought to identify and analyse the vectors that mediated the circulation and dissemination of ideas and learning on public procurement from FF. Regarding the analytical framework, the Brazilian models were better disseminated because of the combination or hybridisation of several mechanisms. In all countries, several confluent elements prompted the debate on public procurement from FF. Importantly, Brazil’s influence mostly did not occur directly, but through the intermediation and work of international organisations and technical instruments (reports, documents, declarations, regional regulations, and the Internet). In this process, the FAO’s direct and indirect work stands out. On the one hand, several FAO publications contributed to setting the government agenda and promoting the Brazilian public procurement experience (FAO, 2013, 2014,
74 Eric Sabourin et al. 2015). On the other, in all three cases, the incidence and work of FAO technicians in negotiations with national governments was fundamental. In the cases of Colombia and Haiti, this influence permeates the South-South cooperation agreements between these countries and Brazil, with the FAO and WFP acting as key policy brokers. In the case of Haiti, Lopes Filho (2017) noted, ‘The scheme adopted by Brazil to disseminate the models is noteworthy, because although it is clear that the purpose of the agreement is to transfer policies through South-South Cooperation, the FAO and WFP are brokers of this process’. This choice ‘is due, in part, to the dual role played by international organisations as an arena for validating Brazilian instruments and as a vector for the dissemination of these instruments’ (Lopes Filho, 2017, p 121). In the case of Haiti, FAO agents interacted directly with Brazilian public managers to learn about public procurement from FF, and although the BrazilFAO-WFP agreement was carried out by the two agencies, most activities centred on bilateral exchanges between the two governments’ technicians. This arrangement illustrates one of the forms marking initial studies on public policy transfer, which are characterised by the predominance of relations between nation-states (McCann and Ward, 2013; Stone, 2004) and ‘methodological nationalism’, as Stone (2004, p 545) puts it. Conversely, in the case of Colombia, FAO technicians involved in public procurement pilot projects had no direct relations and did not participate in exchanges with Brazilian public managers (PAA and PNAE). The idea of public procurement from FF was encouraged by the Brazilian Ambassadress and FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago-Chile). However, local FAO technicians reformulated this based on readings on the experiences of Brazil, Panama, and Nicaragua (regarding price setting), and learning acquired over time considering the specificities of the contexts in which they worked. Also important is that unlike Haiti, in this case, the social relations between FAO technicians and Colombian public managers prevailed, rather than direct relations between them and Brazilian public managers. Such social relations constituted a key vector in the dissemination of Brazilian ideas on public procurement from FF to the work and articulations of representatives of civil society organisations for exchanging experiences and learning on public policies. Following Pasquier (2002), we refer here to the process of bottom-up dissemination mediated by subnational actors. Lopes Filho (2017) and Niederle (2015) note that inspired by the results of the Brazilian public procurement with family farming sought to influence the decision-making processes of regional integration mechanisms. The Ministerial meeting on the family agriculture of CELAC urged the adoption of regional regulations and similar measures in their countries. Furthermore, since 2007, Haiti’s organisations connected to Via Campesina have exchanged experiences with Brazilian social movements. State action in dialogue with social movements, and interaction and exchanges between peasant organisations contribute to legitimating and locally ‘embedding’ the ideas of public procurement from FF. This institutionalises
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 75 these ideas in national regulations, and ensures they are gradually appropriated, reformulated, and translated ‘from the bottom’ by social grassroots movements. In these mechanisms, Oliveira (2013: 51) contends there is a prominent ‘body of individuals who move around various institutions during the process and who work in and outside these. [ . . . ] The action of individuals and their circulation among the various institutions are crucial in this process’. The ‘individual agencies’ (Oliveira, 2013), networks of relationships and trust, ‘individual circulation’ (Oliveira, 2013), and ‘institutional transit’ (Silva and Oliveira, 2011) influence the convergence of actions and public policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regarding this, Perafán et al. (2018) mention that José Graziano da Silva—former Minister of the Lula Government and responsible for launching the Zero Hunger Program and Food Acquisition Program—served as the FAO’s Regional Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean since 2006. Since 2011, he is the Director-General of the organisation. Besides him, a group of ex-officials from the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and Ministry of Social Development (MDS) work at the FAO’s regional office in Santiago and at the headquarters in Rome, bringing with them a learning background on Brazilian public procurement and expectations for spreading its implementation to other contexts. In the case of Paraguay, the project manager at the FAO is a former head of the MDA, which facilitates the circulation of ideas between countries. Similarly, Lopes Filho (2017: 74) elucidates how the political and institutional trajectories of Brazilians have contributed to disseminating public procurement ideas in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, the adoption of lessons from the Brazilian experience worked differently in each of the three cases. Stemming from the formulation and implementation of the food procurement policy in Brazil, in 2013, the federal government of Paraguay established a law dealing explicitly with food procurement from FF. The political commitment between the presidents of the two countries was fundamental in valuing the Brazilian experience. In the Colombian case, the national change through a directive by the Ministry of Education stemmed from local experiences. In Haiti, despite the initiative by the national government and strong support from international organisations, the proposal remains at the pilot project phase. Convergence, Causal Explanatory Elements, and Translations Besides the drivers of diffusion, the convergence of initiatives of public procurement from FF between Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay can be attributed to various causes. One is ‘transnational harmonization’ (Hassenteufel, 2014) through some countries’ adoption of rules and regulations regarding declarations, recommendations, and resolutions from CELAC and REAF. The second is rooted in similar social problems, namely the need to reduce hunger, poverty, and food insecurity, and to promote FF. Another is the diffusion through international organisations (notably the FAO and WFP) of ‘public policy guidelines,
76 Eric Sabourin et al. content, and tools legitimized by the promotion of “models”, production of reports, comparative data’ (Hassenteufel, 2014: 183). The third cause is the degree of political convergence between governments. However, at the level of national public policies, there is no simple adoption, or guidelines, norms, institutions, or instruments imposed, diffused, or transferred from Brazil. Proposals are nationally ‘translated’ in many ways: literally (reformulation in another language), sociologically (re-problematisation in another context of action), and politically (adaptation to a new institutional context). Therefore, there is a process of ‘hybrid constructions that mix external (new) and internal (pre-existing) elements’ (Hassenteufel, 2014: 185). Thus, although Brazilian ideas, tools, and learning have been diffused and transferred to Latin American and Caribbean countries, the institutional formats of the mechanisms for public procurement from FF have been translated into national and local contexts. More than a ‘copy’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), the Brazilian experiences were emulated or provided ‘inspiration’ for the creation of specific mechanisms in each country. There are differences and similarities between the policies of Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Haiti regarding the exclusive participation of family farmers (or requirement of ‘local purchases’), definition of a minimum percentage of participation by this social category, and maintenance or not of intermediaries. The motivations for the convergence of policies on public procurement from FF are ‘voluntary attitudes’ rather than ‘coercive elements’ (Dolowitz, 2003). The rules and declarations established in regional public spaces, South-South cooperation rules and agreements, and bilateral agreements are akin to solidarity and dialogue-based relations. Furthermore, each country enjoyed the autonomy to ‘translate’ (Hassenteufel, 2008) Brazilian ideas of public procurement into their socio-political and institutional contexts. However, given the disparities between countries in economic power and positioning in global geopolitics, such dissemination and translation processes do not imply symmetrical relations. Thus, although inclined to voluntary actions, these processes reproduced unequal power relations. As such, Stone (2012) reiterates that the translation of public policy is a ‘bricolage’ involving the blending of local practices and borrowed policy practices to build a new and hybrid policy formulation process. Viewing the translation of public policy as a combination of epistemes and value judgements reflects on the process of policy diffusion and transfer (Stone, 2017). Diffusion of Brazilian Territorial Policies in Latin America Unlike in the case of public procurement, Brazil did not become an exporting country of territorial policies. The public policy transfer of the Brazilian Territory of Citizenship program has only been successful in El Salvador. The cases of Argentina and Uruguay reflect a translation with a bricolage of various influences and greater dependence on the context and pre-existing organisations. The dissemination of Brazilian RTD policies in the three analysed
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 77 cases is diverse, as each of the importing countries have a distinct vector of influence. The case of El Salvador illustrates a ‘copycat’ type of transfer of the Territorial Citizenship Program. Its diffusion was motivated by coincidental elements that do not reflect an interest in appropriating the distinctive ideas of this approach, but rather the need to instrumentalise the spaces of participation necessary to identify the local demands the President of El Salvador promised to address during his mandate. In this country, an almost direct policy transfer is evident, insofar as the copying of the Brazilian model of territorial policy is associated with political convergence between the political parties in government (Workers Party—PT in Brazil, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front—FLMN in El Salvador), and the interpersonal relations between the PT, President Lula, and first lady of El Salvador, Vanda Pignato. This refers to a driver that involves political and personal relations at the presidential level, not the circulation of ideas, international organisations, and bureaucracies of the respective countries. Several missions and training ensured expertise mediation by staff members of the division of the territorial development of the MDA. However, this rural territorial policy has rarely been internalised. Political and personal relations were not enough for policy assimilation by the various agents and government bodies of El Salvador. Consequently, the Territories of Progress—the local version of the Territory of Citizenship Program—ceased following the changes of Presidents. The case of Argentina is unusual in that the national RTD program under the National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology (INTA) began almost at the same time as the Brazilian national program under the MDA in 2003/2004. Indeed, since the 1990s, there has been cooperation and mutual influence between institutions of the two countries on the subject of FF, through agronomic research cooperation, discussions within Mercosur, and the creation of REAF through the decision and support of Brazil and Argentina. However, while INTA staff recognise the Brazilian influence in other FF supporting mechanisms, this is not so for the RTD program, which is considered endogenous to the institution. The leading case for this endogenous character is that INTA simultaneously handles agricultural research and rural extension, and has a large capillarity throughout the national territory. At the theoretical-conceptual level, the primary reference is the work of the Latin American Center for Rural Development—Chile (RIMISP), whose experts implemented an IDB mission to conduct a national diagnosis on this subject. Alongside this institutional attempt to estrange their policy from the Brazilian model, the theoretical-conceptual influence of Brazilian geographers (Milton Santos, Manoel Correia de Andrade, and Tânia Bacelar) is acknowledged among Argentinian scholars in the area of territorial development, although without a direct association with policy formulation. The only recognition of Brazilian influence comes from the social movements connected to Mercosur
78 Eric Sabourin et al. bodies, particularly to REAF. Therefore, ‘bottom-up’ diffusion based on regional integration was confirmed. In Uruguay, despite multiple influences, the managers of the Rural Development Directorate of the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fishing (MGAP) assert learning about the Brazilian experience of RTD by the MDA from various exchanges, primarily via the REAF, academia, and IICA. Nevertheless, the conditions in the country are so different from those of Brazil that the Territories of Citizenship program could not work as a model, but as a reference. The ‘Mesas de Desarrollo Rural’ or MDRs (Rural Development Boards) correspond to a double process of decentralisation and a participatory approach within the MGAP. Influences of Brazil Among the three countries studied, the case of El Salvador is the only one wherein the Brazilian RTD policy is a model, the object of a process of public policy transfer. In Argentina and Uruguay, despite efforts by IICA or academia to diffuse a Brazilian model (or in the case of IICA, a Latin American model inspired by Brazilian policy) no public policy transfer occurred from Brazil to these countries. In the three countries studied, as for public procurement, the RTD policy involves several agents of diffusion: bilateral and non-governmental international cooperation (RIMISP); the European Union; the United Nations (UNDP, FAO); IDB and IICA, an Organization of American States body. In certain situations, most of these policy brokers have proposed either a partial or local reinterpretation of the LEADER program European model and of the Brazilian RTD model. However, this influence cannot be directly attributed to the Brazilian policy, but to a convergence of goals in the search for alternatives that could reverse the critical poverty conditions of rural populations in the region, especially in Argentina and Uruguay. Drivers of Diffusion In the case of RTD policies, excluding the case of El Salvador where the government-to-government transfer is explicit, the drivers are distributed between international organisations, academia, and social movements. International organisations have financed diagnoses and studies, for example, IDB in Argentina and Uruguay. IICA proposed a series of training programs in Uruguay and El Salvador. Through Spanish cooperation, the EU has advised the Territorial Planning policy in Uruguay. Scholars (from national universities and RIMISP in Argentina, and Brazilian scholars in Uruguay through IICA) consulted on these policy interventions. In Argentina and Uruguay, the role of the academy (at the international, regional, and national levels) manifests through consultations with scholars (IDB diagnosis in Argentina) or those in positions of trust in the government (National Director of Territorial Planning and Directors of the National Institute of Colonization in Uruguay). The mechanism for bottom-up regional integration
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 79 in the two countries worked through the REAF, albeit without being central or decisive in RTD policies. Transfer, Convergence, and Reinterpretation As mentioned, the Territories of Progress Program in El Salvador is an example of the transfer of public policy mediated by a South-South cooperation agreement. Two key actors played a role in initiating the transfer process—Presidents Funes and Lula—as well as an actor responsible for transferring the objectives and instruments of the Citizenship Program to the country. Perafán (2018) considered this a ‘hard’ transfer that differed from the other two cases, in which dissemination involved the ideas, ideologies, concepts, and notions of the territorial approach to rural development. In Argentina and Uruguay, public managers, scholars, and local actors appropriate territorial rhetoric; however, regarding implementation in Brazil, discourse and practice are separate. In the case of El Salvador, the strength of the discourse depends on the need to establish and maintain arenas of participation, regardless of the other ideas fuelling this approach. The convergence of public policies is evident in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, especially concerning cognitive and functional orders. Regarding reinterpretation, common aspects emerge between the Brazilian and European references. Four features are highlighted here: • •
Actors’ participation, although in Argentina, this is more rhetorical than factual. Implementation by sectorial ministries dedicated to the FF segment in Argentina and Uruguay.
In the case of El Salvador, since it is a transfer of the Citizenship Territories Program implemented through an institutional arrangement directed by the Office of the Chief of Staff, program implementation was entrusted to the Presidency of the Republic. Its focus included actions beyond the agricultural sector, such as health and education programs: • •
The lack of participation of the private sector in territorial policies because of their focus on FF, and lack of interest or availability of other more effective and faster channels of negotiation. Poor incentive structure to engage a wider array of economic and social actors in the policy actions.
Comparison Between the Two Diffused Policies The first evidence is the influence in different forms and intensities of Brazilian models on public procurement experiences and RTD policies in the studied countries. In most cases, interviewees claimed to know or to have been
80 Eric Sabourin et al. ‘inspired by’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) or to have ‘copied’ the Brazilian model (El Salvador). However, in some cases, this influence was minimised. For the public managers of some importing countries, there is little recognition of the contribution of the Brazilian model. The interviewees emphasised the precedence of endogenous or national instruments, or relativised the decisive character of the Brazilian model, emphasising international organisations or cooperation initiatives with civil society organisations. This discourse was evident in Haiti, where Brazil has a delicate role related to the United Nations peacekeeping military contingent (MinustaH). The interviewed Haitians highlighted the precedence of local experiences, minimising ‘the weight’ of and dependence on Brazilian and international aid. In Argentina, INTA staff claimed that the RTD policy was entirely endogenous. For these public managers, the process of decentralisation and capillarity of INTA naturally and historically endowed their work with a territorial intervention favouring rural development. In Uruguay, public managers recognised external influences, but reported a stronger national and local reinterpretation. The second evidence is Brazilian public policies diffused through the hybridisation of diffusion modes or vectors. These include bilateral relations between countries, South-South cooperation initiatives, the work of social movements, interaction between scholars, influence of several international organisations, and regionalised debates. These indicate the ‘convergence’ of bottom-up public policies. Furthermore, no Brazilian policy was diffused through only one mode or driver. Although all analysed cases provide examples of several diffusion forms, one or two always dominate. Among these mechanisms, Brazil has managed to promote the diffusion of its agenda and policies not so much directly to importing countries, but to United Nations agencies (with FAO and WFP in the field of FNS) or inter-American organisations (RTD for IICA). This was highlighted by Milhorance (2013, 2014) for the case of Africa. This mechanism is the most frequent for diffusing policies for public procurement from FF. Furthermore, public managers of the importing countries generally have contact with FAO consultants and technicians, and direct contact with Brazilian policies or public managers (in the case of Haiti) is unusual. For example, in Colombia, beneficiaries recognise public procurement pilot projects as the ‘FAO-Brazil project’. The REAF case is more related to a ‘grassroots’ diffusion mechanism (Pasquier, 2002). The REAF emerged from the demands of social movements organised at the regional and international levels, particularly those representing the people ‘forgotten’ by economic and agricultural development. Although government agencies have played a significant role in its constitution, especially in the Brazilian case, the REAF’s network ensures social participation in policy recommendations for FF in the region. The REAF unveils how social participation can contribute to deepening the process of regional integration amid dynamics that comprise the active engagement of farmers’ organisations to influence public policies in countries part of the regional bloc.
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 81 The work of academics and researchers on the rural environment has also contributed to the diffusion of Brazilian models, through cooperation agreements and projects between Latin American universities or the dissemination of concepts, interpretations, and analyses of Brazilian public policies. Scholars had already introduced and disseminated the European model of RTD policies in Latin America, for example, the LEADER program (Champetier, 2003; Massardier and Sabourin, 2013). Moreover, United Nations agencies offer a privileged position for the influence of Brazilian scholars, who move from universities to government spaces or vice versa, and from these to international agencies. In Haiti, for example, Brazilians coordinated the two WFP and FAO projects. At the FAO regional office for LA&C in Santiago, Chile, several Brazilian scholars from universities or the Brazilian Government have alternated as FNS policy coordinators or advisors since José Graziano da Silva took over as FAO’s Director-General, leaving his legacy to regional representation. The third evidence emerging from this research is that because of the combination and hybridisation of various mechanisms and endogenous factors of the importing countries, the Brazilian models were adapted to each. Endogenous factors include already existing organisations, institutions, and public policies in the country that generate institutional complementarity or path dependency. For example, Argentina already demonstrated extensive regionalisation of rural research and extension by INTA. Based on INTA’s organisational and symbolic resources, the work on rural territorial development could privilege FF. In Colombia, political and institutional difficulties in breaking from the ‘operators’ of public procurement led to a change in the programs without changing the central stance of the involved actors. These processes are consistent with the relationship observed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2012) between public policy transfer and the cycle thereof. For these authors, when new actors and institutions become involved in policy formulation, they bring different background knowledge, interests, and motivations. Thus, even in cases that remained a reference to the Brazilian model, there was a great capacity for reinterpretation of or adaptation to the national context. According to the typology by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), importing countries’ emerging experiences was inspired by the Brazilian models (and in the case of El Salvador, copied). Following Hassenteufel (2008), we affirm the translation process, which involves re-creating public policy orientations, contents, and tools (Hassenteufel, 2008; Lascoumes, 2006).
Final Considerations The six study cases in Latin America confirm our hypothesis of combination and hybridisation among three main modalities of policy diffusion and exportation: Policy transfer through South cooperation initiatives, policy models circulated through international agencies and trilateral cooperation, and bottom-up regional integration processes led by social movements.
82 Eric Sabourin et al. The comparison between cases enabled the clearer identification of the attributes of regional diffusion vectors for two Brazilian social public policies aimed at FF and rural development. In cases such as Haiti, individual relationships were decisive, and the role was played by multipositioned individuals as brokers or transmitters. In other cases, institutional and organisational relationships were dominant. The scale of adopted policies differed: Some encompassed the national level (Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) and others the local level (Haiti and Colombia). Regarding research prospects, the evolution of these policies suggests the relevance of longitudinal studies. It is possible to see the decline or dismantling of these policies in the importing countries consequent to changes in government or coalitions in power (Argentina, El Salvador, and Paraguay). Even Brazil, where the model originated, has experienced a breakdown in the implementation of pro-FF public policies since the parliamentary coup in 2016. Future and complementary research could seek to better understand the processes of adaptation, reinterpretation, and implementation of public policy models, especially the evolution of their implementation at the local or regional scales.
Annex 1 Interviews Realised in Each Country (Transbrasil Project)
Argentina N° Position
1. National Director 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
National Institute of Agriculture 08/08/16 Buenos and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires Researcher, Responsible National Institute of Agriculture 09/08/16 Buenos for DTR Program and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires Former Secretary of National Congress, Senate of the 08/08/16 Buenos Family Agriculture in ex Nation Aires Minagri Former Representative National Institute of Agriculture 10/08/16 Buenos at REAF and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires Professor and University of Buenos Aires 10/08/16 Buenos Researcher Aires Director of Regional University of Buenos Aires, 9/08/16 Buenos & Territorial Planning Institute of Geography Aires Program Geographer, Director of University of Bahia Blanca and 7/08/16 Buenos Laboratory Agriterris INTA Aires Coordinator Family National Institute of Agriculture 8/08/16 Buenos Agriculture Program of and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires INTA Former President of National Institute of Agriculture 10/08/16 Buenos INTA and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires Former Undersecretary National Institute of Agriculture 9/08/16 Buenos for Agriculture and Vice and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires President INTA Former Coordinator of National Institute of Agriculture 9/10/16 Buenos Family Agriculture at and Livestock Technology (INTA) Aires Procisur Program
Source: Table created by the author.
84 Eric Sabourin et al. Colombia N
1. Responsible for food public procurement in Colombia 2. Manager of MADR 3. Former Manager 4. Diplomat of Consular Sector 5. Departmental Agriculture Manager 6. Family Farmers Association of Carmen de Viboral 7. Family Farmers Associations of Granada 8. Former Secretary of Government of the Municipality of Granada 9. Mayor, Municipal Managers 10. Former Mayor of the Municipality of Granada 11. Manager Solidarity Organisations
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development MADR ICBF Colombian Family Welfare Institute Embassy of Brazil
Secretary of Agriculture of 15/06/16 Department of Antioquia FAO Pilot Project Public Food 15/06/16 Procurement
TEJIPAZ, NGO supporting family farmers
Municipality of Granada
Municipality of Granada
09 /02/17 Medellin
Ministry of Work
24 /02/17 Bogota
Carmen de Viboral
Source: Table created by the author.
El Salvador N°
1. Territorial Advisor 2. Representative of Women’s Group 3. Water Board Directive 4. Family Farmer 5. Director 6. Researcher
Territorial Council of Bahia de Jiquilisco Territorial Council of Bahia de Jiquilisco Territory of Bahia de Jiquilisco Territorial Council of Bahia de Jiquilisco Basic System of Integrated Health SIBASI in Usulután Regional Research Program on Development & Environment—PRISMA
07/09/2016 Usulután 07/09/2016 Usulután 07/09/2016 Usulután 07/09/2016 Usulután 07/09/2016 Usulután 08/09/2016 San Salvador
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 85 N°
7. Specialist Officer
Ministry of Governance and Territorial Development 8. Coordinator of the Technical Secretariat of the Social Dialogue Unit Presidency of the Republic 9. Researcher and Project National Foundation for Coordinator Development—FUNDE 10. Former Responsible FAO, Former Official for Technical Brazilian Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Cooperation in El Development Salvador
08/09/2016 San Salvador 08/09/2016 San Salvador 08/09/2016 San Salvador 03/08/2016 Interview by Skype
Source: Table created by the author.
Haiti N° 1. 2.
Diplomat, Former General Coordinator Former General Coordinator
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brazil) National School Feeding Program, Ministry of Education (Brazil) Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development—MARNDR MARNDR (Haiti)
Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe
Former Secretary of State for Animal Production Director
5. 6. 7.
Former General Coordinator Former Minister
Former Project Coordinator
Former Project Coordinator Director
Local Purchase Facility Unit, MARNDR National School Canteen Program Ministry of Peasantry Promotion Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) World Food Program (WFP)
Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Food Security World Food Program (WFP)
Source: Table created by the author.
20/07/2016 20/07/2016 14/07/2016
Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe Porto Príncipe
86 Eric Sabourin et al. Paraguay N° 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
FAO Consultant, Project Manager FAO National Consultant FAO Consultant FAO Officer in Paraguay Director of Marketing
FAO National Consultant
FAO Consultant FAO Officer in Paraguay
Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Family Farmer in the Arroyo and Estero Region National Congress
Engineer of Public Procurement Agrarian Extension Directorate Technician of Producer Groups Committee Technician
Source: Table created by the author.
Uruguay N° 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Director Researcher, Responsible Family Farming Program Director of Rural Development Head of Decentralisation IICA Consultant Departmental Director of Agriculture Rio Negro Local Technician
IPA Plan Institute National Institute of Agronomic Research
Ministry of Livestock & Agriculture Ministry of Livestock & Agriculture IICA Uruguay Ministry of Livestock & Agriculture
Ministry of Livestock & Agriculture Farmers’ Organisations
Cooperative Farmers and CNFR Family Farmers Union Farmers of CNFR of Rio Negro
Diffusion of Brazilian Social Policies 87 N°
President Coprofam and CNFR
Director, Division of Natural Resources, MGAP Professor, Director Department of Sociology Director of Territorial Planning Management
Mercosur Regional Family Farming Organisation Ministry of Livestock & Agriculture
UDELAR University, Social Science Faculty
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
12. 13. 14.
Director of the Environment Division
Source: Table created by the author.
Note 1. Transbrasil project “Dissemination of Brazilian public policies for family farming in Latin America and the Caribbean” was realised by scholars of the Universities of Brasilia (UnB), São Paulo (USP), CIRAD and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). The project was coordinated by the Centre for Sustainable Development Centre of the UnB and financed by the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).
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88 Eric Sabourin et al. Champetier, Y. La Estrategia de Microregiones: une nouvelle stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté dans les territoires les plus en difficulté du Mexique. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2003. Cunha, B. L. A projeção internacional da Estratégia Fome Zero. In: Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. Fome Zero: uma história brasileira, Vol. 3. Brasília: MDS, pp. 80–89, 2010. Dabène, O. The Politics of Regional Integration in Latin America: Theoretical and Comparative Explorations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Dàvila Aldàs, F. América Latina y la globalización. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, n. 101–102, pp. 33–56, 2011. De Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. Toward a Territorial Approach to Rural Development: International Experiences and Implications for Mexico’s Microregions Strategy. Berkeley: University of California, 2004. Delpeuch, T. Comment la mondialisation rapproche les politiques publiques. LʹÉconomie politique, v. 43, n. 3, pp. 77–99, 2009. Dolowitz, D. P. A policy-maker’s guide to policy transfer. The Political Quarterly Publisch, v. 74, n. 1, pp. 101–108, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.t01-1-00517 Dolowitz, D. P. and Marsh, D. Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making. Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions, v. 13, pp. 5–24, 2000. Dolowitz, D. P. and Marsh, D. The future of policy transfer research. Political Studies Review, v. 10, n. 3, pp. 339–345, 2012. Dumoulin, D. Configurations sociales transnationales: quelles compétences pour les passeurs d’échelles? Exemples des politiques de la conservation de la nature. In: Les approches multi-niveaux des politiques publiques. Montpellier: CIRAD. 10 September 2010. Evans, M. Policy transfer in critical perspective. Policy Studies, v. 30, pp. 243–268, 2009. Ezzine de Blas, D., Le Coq, J. F., Sanginés, A. G. (eds.). Los pagos por servicios ambientales en América Latina: Gobernanza, impactos y perspectivas. México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2017. Faria, C. A. P. A difusão de políticas sociais como estratégia de inserção internacional: Brasil e Venezuela comparados. Interseções, v. 14, n. 2, pp. 335–371, 2012. Fiori, J. L. Brasil e América do Sul: o desafio da inserção internacional soberana. Brasília: CEPAL, 2011. (Textos para Discussão CEPAL-IPEA, 42). Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nation. Alimentación escolar y las posibilidades de compra directa de la agricultura familiar: casos en 8 países. Santiago de Chile: FAO, 2013. Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nation. Scalling Up the Brazilian School Feeding Model: Using South-South Cooperation to Chare Brazil’Experience of School Feeding in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rome: FAO, 2014. Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nation. The State of Food and Agriculture 2015: Social Protection and Agriculture: Breaking the Cycle of Rural Poverty. Rome: FAO, 2015. Hassenteufel, P. De la comparaison internationale à la comparaison transnationale. Les déplacements de la construction d’objets comparatifs en matière de politiques publiques. Revue française de science politique, v. 55, n. 1, pp. 113–132, 2005. Hassenteufel, P. Sociologie de l’Action Publique. Paris: Armand Colin, 2008.
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90 Eric Sabourin et al. In: Sabourin, E. and Grisa, C. (orgs.), A difusão de políticas brasileira para agricultura familiar na América Latina e Caribe. Porto Alegre: Ed. Escritos, pp. 208–234, 2018. Perafan, M. E. V., Grisa, C. and Calderon, P. As compras públicas da agricultura familiar na Colômbia: disseminação, tradução e institucionalização das ideias. In: Sabourin, E. and Grisa, C. (orgs.), A difusão de políticas brasileira para agricultura familiar na América Latina e Caribe. Porto Alegre: Ed. Escritos, pp. 116–140, 2018. Pomeroy, M. and Suyama, B. Transferência de políticas de proteção social e segurança alimentar: Questões emergentes da cooperação Sul-Sul para o desenvolvimento brasileira. In: International Seminar on Policy Diffusion. São Paulo: CEBRAP, 9–11 May, 2016. Risse-Kappen, T. Bringing transnational relations back. In: Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.), NonSate Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5–21, 1995. Rondó, M. and Lopes, M. Política Externa e Democracia: a construção de novos paradigmas em Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. São Paulo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Brasil, 2016. Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. International norms and domestic politics in Chile & Guatemala. In: Risse-Kappen, T., Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–204, 1999. Rosenau, J. N. Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring governance in a Turbulent World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Sabourin, E. and Grisa, C. (orgs.). A difusão de políticas brasileira para agricultura familiar na América Latina e Caribe. Porto Alegre: Ed. Escritos, 2018. Sabourin, E., Massardier, G. and Sotomayor O. Las políticas de desarrollo territorial rural en América latina: una hibridación de las fuentes y de la implementación. Mundos Plurales, v. 3, n. 1, pp. 75–98, 2016. Silva, M. K. S. and Oliveira, G. L. A face oculta(da) dos movimentos sociais: trânsito institucional e intersecção Estado-Movimento – uma análise do movimento de economia solidária no Rio Grande do Sul. Sociologias, n. 28, pp. 86–124, 2011. Stone, D. Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalisation” of policy. Journal of European Public Policy, v. 11, n. 3, pp. 545–566, 2004. Stone, D. Transfer and translation of policy. Policy Studies, v. 33, n. 6, pp. 483–499, 2012. Stone, D. Understanding the transfer of policy failure: Bricolage, experimentalism and translation. Politics and Policy, v. 45, n. 1, pp. 55–70, 2017. Sugiyama, N. B. Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Valderrama, M. Los procesos de descentralización en América Latina y la cooperación europea. In: Rhi-Sausi, J. L. (ed.), Desarrollo local en América Latina. Logros y desafíos para la cooperación europea. Caracas: RECAL-CeSPI, ed. Nueva Sociedad, pp. 49–62, 2004. Vieira Martins, J. R. MERCOSUL: A dimensão social e participativa da integração regional. In: Neto, D. (org.), O Brasil e novas dimensões da integração regional. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, pp. 101–142, 2014.
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The Diffusion of Social Protection and Food Security Policies Emerging Issues in Brazilian South-South Cooperation for Development Melissa Pomeroy, Bianca Suyama, and Laura Trajber Waisbich
Introduction Brazil’s recent trajectory of economic growth with social inclusion has contributed to forge an international image whereby the country was seen as a “laboratory” for policies and programs. Many of those policies, considered “successful” by international organizations, were transferred to other developing countries, making Brazil a paradigmatic “policy exporter” in Latin America. At the same time, when looked through domestic lenses, the internationalization of these same public policies has been increasingly used as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, especially within the context of South-South Cooperation (SSC) (Milani and Lopes, 2014). The term SSC refers to various combined and overlapping practices, including coalition-building to strengthen the bargaining power of developing nations in multilateral negotiations; trade and investment flows; scientific technological cooperation; regional integration and South-South Cooperation for Development or South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) (Bobiash, 1992). This last item includes technical and financial cooperation, grants and loans from developing countries targeting major global developmental problems (Leite et al., 2015). Brazilian SSDC has reemerged with new vigor in the beginning of this century. This resurgence results from both post-neoliberal state activism in Brazil (Hirst, 2011) and from an international context that enabled and valued SouthSouth exchanges of best practices in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (Morais, 2009) and more recently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs or Agenda 2030). Brazilian official resources for development cooperation increased progressively between 2005 and 2012. Despite a downward trend since 2013, as a result of economic austerity and political instability, Brazil development cooperation currently mobilizes more than 120 implementing agencies, including national ministries and agencies, subnational governments,
94 Melissa Pomeroy et al. universities and non-governmental organizations (IPEA and ABC, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2018). Social development projects are a central component of Brazilian technical cooperation, together with agricultural, health and vocational education projects (Leite et al., 2014). Brazilian SSDC on Social Protection and Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) expanded rapidly between 2003 and 2010, responding to and prompted by the domestic success of the Zero Hunger Strategy (Estratégia Fome Zero) and its international diffusion; the priority given to South-South Relations, and particularly to fighting hunger, in Brazilian foreign policy during the Workers Party administrations (2003–2016); and the growing mobilization of domestic actors in these agendas (Leite et al., 2015). Great emphasis was given to technical cooperation, aiming at sharing Brazilian “successful stories”, strengthening institutions and developing capacities in partner countries in order to increase their autonomy to pursuing their own developmental goals. Without disregarding its technical dimensions, it is equally important to acknowledge the political nature of International Development Cooperation (IDC), a field where competing narratives on the meaning of development circulate and where debates, agendas and priorities, however, have been historically dominated by developed countries. Hence IDC has played a major role in establishing social protection as an instrument to reduce poverty and promote development (Santarelli and Suyama, 2016; Bender et al., 2015). During the past two decades, the governments of various low-income countries have begun to introduce new instruments of social protection or have extended or improved existing social protection systems, often incorporating ideas promoted by international actors (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). In order to apprehend those dynamics, recently various studies have been proposing an approximation between the analysis of international cooperation and the policy transfer and diffusion literature. Of particular interest in terms of the present analysis are studies that seek to identify the determinant changes in social protection policies (Bender et al., 2015; Lavers and Hickey, 2015); analyses of Brazilian SSDC in the areas of health (Milani and Lopes, 2014), agriculture (Cabral et al., 2016; Milhorance, 2015a, 2015b) and social policies (Santos, 2015; Pomeroy et al., 2015; Faria, 2012) and the literature regarding the diffusion of cash transfer programs in Latin America (Gonnet and Hurtado, 2012; Sugiyama, 2011; Silva, 2010; Franzoni and Voorend, 2011). In this chapter, we will discuss the contributions of the policy transfer and diffusion literatures in analyzing Brazilian SSDC on social protection. In bridging SSDC and policy diffusion, we seek to explore a set of dynamics inherently belonging to the international cooperation field that contributes to influencing the processes through which learning from Brazilian experiences can, in their turn, influence the adoption of similar policies in other countries.1 This exercise is based, however, on the assumption that SSDC is not synonymous with South-South transfers and South-South learning. On the contrary, the use of these expressions interchangeably decontextualizes and
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 95 depoliticizes SSDC practices (Jules and Silva, 2008). Even though SSDC initiatives operate through the sharing and diffusion of Brazilian policies, we emphasize the importance of analyzing these dynamics taking into consideration their political motivations and implications. As such, we echo those who see SSDC initiatives as instruments of foreign policy, hence subject to a confluence of interests and disputes among various domestic and international actors. In this sense, our central question is “Which factors explain the existence of various concurrent policy diffusion dynamics within the context of Brazilian SSDC?”. Our initial hypothesis highlights the importance of the agency of domestic and international actors involved in a given public policy coalition. Equally important, the choices made by these actors are influenced by the domestic and international contexts in which the public policy is embedded. To answer our central question, we will analyze the different institutional structures used in the implementation of Brazilian development cooperation, characterized by a variety of domestic and international strategies, objects and actors. For this analysis, we will explore, based on the framework proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) the following secondary questions: Why are Brazilian social policies diffused? Which actors participate in this diffusion? What is diffused? How does this diffusion take place? To answer these questions, we will analyze the diffusion of two policy instruments2 from the Zero Hunger Strategy/Brazil Without Misery Program (Fome Zero and Brasil Sem Miséria, respectively), namely the conditional cash transfers in the Bolsa Família Program and the public food procurement from local family farming, a central component of the Brazilian National School Feeding Program and the Food Acquisition Program. We have selected these two instruments for this initial analysis because both are part of the Brazilian cooperation agenda through a variety of cooperation arrangements. This analysis examines the period from 2003 to 2016 and is focused on Brazilian cooperation in Latin America and Africa, regions chosen as foreign policy priorities during this period. Future research on other policies can contrast with or corroborate the results we have obtained. Through this exercise, we also hope to shed light on the little explored field of policy diffusion among developing countries, from the South to the South (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Hadjiisky et al., 2017). The second section will present the analytical framework used to analyze policy diffusion through South-South Development Cooperation, as well as the methodology employed. The third section discusses the overall context in which the diverse institutional arrangements of Brazilian cooperation have been forged. The fourth section will portray the panorama of Brazilian cooperation on social protection and FNS, looking at the diffusion of the two instruments selected. The final section presents our reflections regarding how different institutional arrangements in Brazilian development cooperation can affect the expansion of social protection and FNS policies in partner countries.
96 Melissa Pomeroy et al.
South-South Development Cooperation and the Diffusion of Public Policies—Elements for the Analysis To empirically analyze Brazilian South-South Cooperation, we need to unpack the motivations of the actors who participate in the diffusion processes, the arrangements that structure this cooperation, and the emphasis given to different elements of the traveling public policies. In terms of the object of diffusion, which includes ideas or principles, institutions, policies, and programs or instruments, Peter Hall (1993) identifies three levels where change and learning can occur in terms of the formulation of public policies. The first level is the operational level of the implementation of instruments for a given policy or program (first-order changes), the second level has to do with the policy design (second-order changes) and the third is the more macro-level which encompasses the large objectives and paradigms that guide the policy design (third-order changes). He also adds that the third-order changes depend on social processes and on the ideas that circulate between state and non-state actors, and not just on the decisions and learning of autonomous state bureaucracies or disputes between specific interest groups. In this sense, in terms of the actors participating in the diffusion processes and their motivations, the existing literature identifies a series of public and private, domestic and international actors, as well as the usual decision makers. Of particular interest for our study are the contributions of advocacy coalitions, which bring together governmental and non-governmental actors in advocating for a series of beliefs about public policies in a given sector, and who seek, through minimally coordinated actions, to drive and legitimize particular policy solutions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988). In terms of the methodology employed in this study, participatory observation constituted the basis of the inductive hypothesis explored in this chapter. These observations also allowed us to initially identify various coalitions and arrangements that permeate Brazilian South-South Development Cooperation. The second step was to map and analyze the cooperation initiatives, through which we sought to understand the relevance of the selected instruments to the Brazilian cooperation agenda in its various arrangements. In other words, we wanted to comparatively analyze the presence of these instruments vis-à-vis the entire universe of cooperation initiatives in a given policy area. Various distinct sources were used for this mapping, according to the type of cooperation under review.3 The third step consisted of discourse analysis of the content of the main identified initiatives to understand how the instruments have been framed, presented and shared as to identify: (i) whether the emphasis was on more technical characteristics (first- and second-order elements) and (ii) whether they were connected or disconnected to elements concerning the third order (third-order elements). To corroborate or refute the initial assessment, seven interviews were conducted with stakeholders involved in the selected cooperation initiatives. As such, our research relies on the contributions of constructivism and on the discursive turn in social sciences (and more specifically, in the field of public
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 97 policy analysis) to illuminate the role of discourses embedded in social protection policies in the definition of the problems that policies should address, as well as in the alternatives that are considered viable and plausible following the identification of particular policy problems (or in the diagnosis phase). The process of defining the problems and solutions is mediated by the competition between historically constructed hegemonic and divergent discourses, which dispute the meanings of policies during all phases of the cycle, from their entrance in the agenda to their evaluation (Fischer, 2003; Majone, 1989).
Context and the Institutional Arrangements of Brazilian Cooperation Brazil’s technical cooperation initiatives are characterized by strong institutional fragmentation. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), operating under the Foreign Ministry, is the entity legally responsible for coordinating Brazilian technical cooperation (both received and provided) in accordance with the guidelines established by the country’s Presidency. To this landscape we can add the ministries and public companies in charge of the implementation of technical cooperation and who have the legal standing to act internationally; the multilateral organizations and bilateral agencies from developed nations which act as partners in trilateral arrangements; and other societal actors seeking to influence the cooperation agenda through various channels (Leite et al., 2014). The importance of sectorial ministries and public companies should not be underestimated. Brazilian domestic institutions assume a prominent role in the diffusion of the country’s experiences (Puente, 2010), financing and allocating public servants in the implementation of technical assistance projects, receiving international delegations, systematizing and disseminating knowledge related to their experiences, and participating in regional and international forums. Brazilian SSDC is operationalized through various institutional arrangements established with its various partners. Specifically, cooperation occurs through bilateral South-South partnerships, trilateral cooperation (South-South exchanges counting with the participation of a multilateral organization or a traditional donor) or in regional and cross-regional blocs, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) or the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), respectively. The strategies employed are not restricted to the implementation of projects as they also include the reception of international delegations, the systematization and diffusion of knowledge related to national experiences, exchanges, political participation in regional and international forums and spaces, and the harmonization of policies within a regional and cross-regional context. As such, these cooperation practices include technical exchanges as well as high-level political dialogue. Figure 5.1 illustrates the panorama of SSDC arrangements, relationships and drivers (or motivations) with the central actors being the ABC and the implementing agencies (such as the ministries responsible for public sectorial
98 Melissa Pomeroy et al. New arrangements responsible for disemminating Brazilian experiences
• Strengthening common agendas • Scaling-up of previously cooperation projects (received)
• Diffusion of Brazilian instruments and programs • Influencing global agendas • Brazilian experiences and scaling-up of previously cooperation projects (received)
Implementing agencies + ABC Southern partners
• Exchanges and projects aiming to strengthen national capacities
• Policies and instruments’ convergence and harmonization • Strenghtening of sectorial agendas • Influencing global agendas
Figure 5.1 Brazilian SSDC Institutional Arrangements Source: Elaborated based on Caixeta and Suyama (2014), Leite et al. (2014), Suyama et al. (2016).
policies). The motivations guiding SSDC in each of the arrangements vary according to the history of the relationship, the capacities and skills available and the potentialities perceived by external partners. Looking at this diverse landscape, we emphasize the fundamental role of international organizations that participate in Brazilian cooperation. They mediate and articulate demands and support the execution of Brazilian SSDC, including fulfilling functions that cannot be performed by national structures due to legal restrictions that currently govern the operationalization of Brazilian SSDC. These trilateral agreements result from the opportunities generated by the interplay of a series of factors, including: Brazilian domestic limitations to deal with the growing international demands for technical cooperation, the mobilization and the interest of domestic sector coalitions in internationalizing Brazilian policies, as well the shifting dynamics within the field of international development cooperation. In terms of the international context, it is important to highlight the growing interest of traditional donors in working more closely with the so-called emergent donors, as a way to maintain and increase their presence and relevance in a context of increasingly scarce resources, growing criticism of the legitimacy and/or efficacity of the “help” offered by traditional development cooperation, and intense changes in the roles traditionally played by developing countries (Leite et al., 2015). Trilateral partnerships fulfill, thus, a fundamental role in making possible the broad systematization of knowledge
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 99 and lessons learned about instruments, which is fundamental to the sharing of experiences with other countries, including their diffusion in various languages (Leite et al., 2013, 2015). In addition, trilateral arrangements often present synergies with regional commitments or strengthen Brazilian bilateral agendas. Trilateral partnerships have enabled the formation of new institutions to publicize and transfer Brazilian experiences. Those partnerships were often generated within international organizations, having Brazil as a key partner— in terms of financial resources, knowledge and political legitimacy. Their main mission is to support the diffusion and adaptation of Brazilian policies in other countries. These include, for example, the International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) and the UNDP World Center for Sustainable Growth (RIO+ Center), both in partnership with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); the Center for Excellence Against Hunger in partnership with the World Food Program and the knowledge diffusion platforms World Without Poverty (in partnership with the World Bank) and socialprotection.org (a partnership between the IPC-IG and the cooperation agencies of Australia and Germany). These agreements and the institutions they generated are a clear illustration of the shifting nature of development cooperation, since they capitalize and attempt to respond to the existing domestic institutional limitations in emerging powers and on the political and symbolic changes in the international aid landscape, with repercussions for traditional donors’ strategies. Against this background, we argue that a series of variables determine the arrangements of cooperation initiatives, depending on the nature and motivations of each of the parties involved. Pomeroy et al. (2015) have identified that the fragmentation of the decision-making process of Brazilian SSDC determines the particular contexts of the diffused or transferred policies, because these processes can only be effective if the required skills and installed capacities, interests, resources and actors are mobilized. As we will see further on, the mobilization of these factors can feature greater or lesser involvement on the part of domestic and international actors. In the following section, we will map the actors, the objects and the dynamics that characterize the diffusion of the two selected instruments, unpacking the ways in which they relate with broader debates in the field of international development, in general, and social protection and FSN, in particular.
Cash Transfer and Public Food Procurement: Contexts, Actors, Arrangements and Policy Content To understand the various dynamics of the diffusion of Brazilian policies within the context of Brazilian SSDC, it is important to unpack the contextual elements that enable us to understand the positioning, drivers and motivations and the leadership role of particular actors involved in policy diffusion. It is of particular interest to understand how the normative debate about both policy instruments, as well as the trends related to their implementation in Latin America
100 Melissa Pomeroy et al. and Africa, exercise an influence on the positioning of actors and on the configuration of various arrangements of Brazilian SSDC. The Place of Instruments in the International Solutions Market The rapid growth in the number of countries that have begun to implement cash transfer programs over the past two decades has stimulated a research agenda regarding the diffusion of these instruments of social protection, especially in Latin America (Sugiyama, 2011; Gonnet and Hurtado, 2012; Silva, 2010; Leite and Peres, 2015). Alternatively, the literature on public food procurement has not devoted much attention to diffusion processes. In the specific case of public food procurement for school feeding programs, scholarship attention is relatively recent and coincides with the current convergence between agriculture and social protection present in debates about policy solutions (Devereux et al., 2010). Those are mostly centered on the debate about the effectiveness of this instrument in generating positive developmental impacts for secondary beneficiaries of the program, such as family farmers, suppliers and cooks (Devereux et al., 2010; Sumberg and Sabates-Wheeler, 2011). In the broader normative context, we can identify an emerging global consensus on the effectiveness of cash transfer programs as an instrument to fight poverty. On the one hand, this consensus can be explained by the fact that evaluations about its implementation are invariably positive for the direct beneficiaries of these programs (Devereux, 2012) and also for generating political dividends (Silva, 2010). On the other, at least in Latin America, Kercher and Peres (in this book) indicate that the targeting paradigm of cash transfer programs has played a major role in the rapid regional diffusion of this instrument, since it has been the basic interpretative structure shaping the formulation of policy solutions to the hunger problem in the region. When it comes to the case of public food procurement, such a broad consensus about the role this instrument could play in fighting hunger is much less clear. In this sense, it should be emphasized that the central paradigm of this instrument—in the Brazilian experience—is based on the promotion of concerted territorially sensitive actions related to food supply and food demand as a strategy to fight hunger, at the local level. Structured demand for food, through public food procurement to supply social and social protection policies and programs—allied with other policies that stimulate local and family food production (technical assistance, access to credit lines, access to inputs)—seeks to promote a virtuous cycle to strengthen family farming and its market participation, as well as guarantee income and greater stability to local producers. As a matter of fact, the debate about public food procurement today is mainly related to the polysemic concept of Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) (Maxwell, 1996). Throughout the years, the concept has actually evolved from an initial diagnosis that identified production rates and lack of food as the origin of poor food security to the more contemporary debates, which also recognize
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 101 problems related to access to food production. However, despite the inclusion of the fight against hunger in the successive UN-led development agendas (first the Millennium Development Goals, in 2000, and then the Sustainable Development Goals, in 2015) and the food price crisis of 2007/2008 leading to the international community’s mobilization to generate quick and forceful responses, this conceptual evolution has not been sufficient to completely change the traditional donors’ paradigm that is still mainly focused on increasing food production.4 Coming back to our object of analysis, it is also important to locate Brazilian cooperation on social protection and FSN into the various trends in terms of the expansion of these instruments in the context of Latin America and Africa. In Latin America, the regional diffusion of conditional cash transfer programs indicates that the adoption process for these programs has been rapid, mostly responding to its positive international image and a lack of opposition to cash transfer programs (Silva, 2010). The regional diffusion has been quite uniform, with the basic components of the original Brazilian program being present in all of these nations (Gonnet, 2014 and Gonnet, in this book). The expansion of these cash transfer programs in the African continent, in turn, has been characterized by other dynamics. In the first place, these programs are mostly based on unconditional transfers implemented at the subnational level. Also, programs are generally financed by bilateral or multilateral donors and implemented by international NGOs, with a greater incidence in Anglophone countries (Devereux and White, 2010). The growth in scale of pilot projects has taken more time and faced greater resistance in Africa than in Latin America, as the stimulus for the adoption of cash transfer instruments is perceived as a donor agenda. On the one hand, in the re-assessment of their food assistance strategies in non-emergency contexts, donors have identified that there has been little positive impact from the promotion of FNS, and that it can generate negative effects for local agricultural production. On the other hand, there are some concerns on the part of national governments related to the stability of the financing of these programs, their impact on agricultural markets and the complex institutional structure necessary to implement them (Devereux, 2006). In terms of public food procurement instruments, the Latin American and African contexts differ substantially. In Latin America, the existence of national school feeding programs (also referred to as school meals programs) dates back to the 1940s and 1950s with considerable advances in their institutionalization and universalization since the beginning of this century (FAO, 2013). In Africa, most of the school feeding programs are sponsored by international donors, as they go through a transition from food aid to supporting the establishment of national food access programs led by national governments through “technical cooperation” initiatives. The World Food Program, for example, in its five-year plan of 2008–2013 adopted a transition strategy to substitute the food aid (or food donation) with programs implemented and financed nationally and supplied locally. The World Bank equally considers school feeding programs to
102 Melissa Pomeroy et al. be an important targeted component of social protection networks, mainly in countries that do not have the conditions to implement cash transfer programs (Bundy et al., 2009: 2). The link between family farmers and public food procurement, however, is seen as an available option, but not necessarily an essential component for the structuring of school feeding programs. The Place of Instruments in the Arrangements of Brazilian South-South Cooperation The principal actor responsible for cooperation on cash transfers in Brazil has been the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), which was in 2016 integrated into the Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (MSDA).5 The creation of the MDS, in 2004, occurred during a time marked by the global diffusion of cash transfer instruments, mediated by international organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (Morais, 2011; Sugiyama, 2011; Gonnet and Hurtado, 2012). Despite the increasing international demands for greater knowledge on the so-called Brazilian experiences,6 the convergence of several factors explains why the then ministry did not place a priority to cash transfers on its direct South-South cooperation agenda, leaving it instead to international organizations to diffuse the Brazilian experience of the Bolsa Família program. First of all, MDS did not deem it politically strategic or necessary to use SSDC to transfer the instrument of cash transfers.7 In terms of the motivations of domestic actors in internationalizing this instrument, those promoting the Bolsa Família within Brazil did not see the need to promote this program internationally due to the program’s already existing domestic support (Silva, 2010). Instead, the MDS in its international endeavors placed an emphasis on participating in regional integration organizations such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac).8 In the case of Mercosur, special emphasis was given to the creation of the Mercosur Social Institute (ISM) and the elaboration of the Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan (PEAS) (Caixeta and Suyama, 2014). In the case of the ISM, its projects are centered around Economic Solidarity, Food Security and the Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Mercosur’s Information System on Social Policies and Indicators. The PEAS, in turn, mentions conditional cash transfer programs, under the guidelines for redistribution policies, but with a clear reservation in terms of evidence that these programs effectively address inequality. Even in the bilateral and regional cooperation agenda, the Bolsa Família program is not the main focus of Brazilian activities. In addition, during MDS’s first experiences in Africa, it made the team responsible for cooperation in regard to the Bolsa Família within MDS not prioritize its direct involvement in and with Africa (Leite et al., 2015). On the one hand, international organizations have intensely invested in conditional cash transfer instruments in Africa. On the other hand, MSD’s direct experience
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 103 in Africa was characterized by substantial difficulties in acting in contexts that different greatly from Brazil9 (Silva, 2010).10 It is in trilateral initiatives with international organizations, however, that we find the greatest emphasis on the cash transfer instrument. The International Poverty Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC- IG) was created in 2004 as a global center for the UNDP in partnership with the Brazilian government, namely the Secretariat of Strategic Issues within the Presidency office (SAE) and the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) to “promote the production and diffusion of policy studies and recommendations and the exchange of best practices in development initiatives and the expansion of South-South cooperation” (IPC-IG, 2014). The center was responsible for the first impact study of the Bolsa Família (Fraundorfer, 2013), and its researchers are recognized as key members of the existing epistemic communities on this matter (Gonnet, 2014). In 2015, the IPC-IG launched the socialprotection.org platform, and most of its available documents are about cash transfer policies and programs. Finally, the MDS has maintained a good relationship with the World Bank, in part due to the Bank’s role in structuring the Brazilian domestic program and, at the same time, MDS has maintained autonomy in relation to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency when managing the cooperation demands it received.11 In its relationship with the World Bank, a series of elements have contributed to the diffusion of the Brazilian experience: (i) the participation of Brazilian technical experts in learning communities—facilitated by the World Bank and with support from UNICEF—formed to exchange on cash transfers, targeting medium-level managers and technical experts in developing countries; (ii) the publication of The Nuts and Bolts of Bolsa Família, in 2007, the program’s first technical manual, written by the World Bank; (iii) the World Without Hunger project, launched in 2014, as an initiative by the World Bank based on its “science of delivery” guidelines with the goal of providing “how to” knowledge about Brazilian social protection policies to facilitate their adaptation and diffusion in keeping with the World Bank’s strategy of systematizing development solutions (Suyama et al., 2016).12 A main characteristic of the Bolsa Família Program is the availability of a vast documentation in various languages explaining the technical elements related to the Program and the knowledge acquired in its implementation in Brazil, such as its conditionalities, single registry tools, monitoring tools, targeting tools and so on. It should be pointed out that partner countries have rapidly identified gaps of information/documentation on the political-institutional context of the program’s implementation in Brazil (Lorenzo, 2013). In this sense, a series of additional activities has emerged to partially fulfill the needs of these partner countries. Among them, the MDS set up a series of international seminars. The seminars were originally conceived to meet the growing demands for more knowledge related to the Brazilian experience. In these seminars, the Zero Hunger Program was presented in its entirety, without any special emphasis on the Bolsa Família.13 There, the role played by other international
104 Melissa Pomeroy et al. organizations—in addition to the World Bank—in the diffusion of the Brazilian model of conditional cash transfers should also be pointed out. UNICEF and the International Labor Organization (ILO) also participated in the Brazilian initiatives of SSDC triangulation. These organizations, which are characterized by their “rights-based approaches”, saw in this combination of cash transfer instruments and other policies proposed by the Brazilian model the possibility of furthering debates about more universal models of social welfare.14 A marked difference between those activities and the cooperation on public food procurement is the prominence that Brazil has given to this area in terms of its political agenda. The Brazilian government, beginning with the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003, has elevated the fight against hunger to a priority of foreign policy and argued that solving hunger depended on the state’s political will and investment.15 The way in which this social agenda was brought to the center of policy priorities under Lula required this stated political will to be translated into state-coordinated activities for supply and demand in the agricultural chain of production, not only strengthening family farming, but also farmers’ insurance, minimum price guarantees and public food procurement (Patriota and Pierri, 2013). In this context, SSDC on public food procurement, originally formulated to strengthen family farmers, has gradually been discursively framed in terms of Food and Nutrition Security.16 It should be pointed out that this movement has been led by the same actors who have disputed important domestic changes to this paradigm in relation to school feeding and the promotion of family farming in Brazil, as well as the defense of the international agenda of fight against hunger within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.17 Additionally, Brazilian SSDC on this agenda has mobilized a varied constellation of domestic and international actors. The main governmental actors have been the Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (two separate ministries until 2016), the then-General Coordinating Body for Actions to Combat Hunger (CGFOME, affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Relations) and the National Development Fund for Education (FNDE), which have mobilized high-level financial and political resources to advance the FNS agenda and promote the Brazilian model internationally, with intense activity in regional and crossregional blocs18 (mainly Mercosur, Celac and CPLP) and international organizations, as well as towards the country’s main bilateral foreign policy partners. Due to the positive results achieved domestically, Brazil gained broad international recognition as being a prominent actor in political dialogue and FNS cooperation. By valuing a series of concerted policy actions—and not just the increase in agricultural production—the Brazilian experience has caught the attention of a range of sectorial international organizations, principally the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in a context in which both organizations sought a new legitimizing impetus for their agendas as well as new financial support from non-traditional donors, such as Brazil.19 In the beginning of these partnerships, the issue of public procurement from local family farmers was little known within these
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 105 organizations, calling for a greater leadership from the Brazilian government in the operationalization of joint projects20 (see Saborin et al., in this book). The selection of José Graziano to command the regional office of the FAO in 2006 and his later election to the position of Director-General of the FAO have also contributed to raising the profile of Brazilian SSDC in the agendas of FNS and public food procurement. On the one hand, his role in the highest ranks of FAO has contributed to the mutual reinforcement of these two movements within the organization: greater awareness of the Brazilian model and greater participation of Brazilian experts among the organization’s technical staff. On the other hand, Brazilian actors have also sought to support Graziano’s management of the FAO and the diffusion of the Brazilian model through a greater flow of public resources to the implementation of trilateral projects engaging the Brazilian government and the organization, and the support of important sectors of Brazilian civil society linked to the FNS agenda. Within the context of trilateral cooperation, the most important contributions have been made by the Brazil/FAO International Cooperation Program in Latin America and the Caribbean,21 the Center of Excellence Against Hunger,22 and the Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa).23 The Brazil/FAO Program began in 2008 and reports to the Hunger-Free Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative (2005). Since then, it has resulted in the emergence of a series of national strategies in several countries in the region, inspired by the Brazilian Zero Hunger, and has generated various demands for Brazilian technical cooperation (Maluf et al., 2014). The Brazil-FAO partnership has invested in promoting profound paradigm shifts through the public food procurement and the school feeding programs. Based on the characteristics of the Brazilian experience, the partnership has invested in regional advocacy strategies and in pilot programs, focusing on raising regional awareness on the importance of intersectoral policies and of the linkages between family farming and food quality.24 The Brazil-WFP Center for Excellence, in turn, promotes exchanges between national actors in partner countries, facilitating intersectoral dialogue and offering technical assistance in order to consolidate school feeding policies and programs. The Brazilian School Feeding Program (PNA) is presented as part of the Zero Hunger Strategy, with emphasis on the intersectoral nature of its policies. Finally, PAA Africa’s objective was to promote a link between school feeding programs and family farmers. The strategy was to conduct pilot projects that could support a political dialogue about local public food procurement, seeking the institutionalization of food acquisition instruments from small farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (Milhorance et al., 2015a). Currently, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency is working on a FNS cooperation strategy together with international organizations to strengthen the diffusion of this “Brazilian model” that connects support for both the local food supply and the local demand.25 In terms of bloc cooperation (regional and cross-regional alike), Brazilian actions stand out, both through governmental initiatives—in the past decade led by the Ministry Agrarian Development through its International Advisory Unit—and through civil society mobilization, within Mercosur and the CPLP.26
106 Melissa Pomeroy et al. Within Mercosur, the Specialized Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) is a particularly telling case. This Brazilian initiative came into place as a joint effort by the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the Ministry of Foreign Relations and rural unions and social movements to promote—internationally—the family farming policy model (Büllow and Carvalho, 2012). Beginning with the REAF, a series of regional and bilateral cooperation programs were articulated, as well as cooperation networks between other subregional blocs and multilateral organizations (ibid.). Within the context of the CPLP, the approval, in 2012, of the Food and Nutrition Security Strategy, strongly emphasizing the human right to adequate food, is a clear example of this advocacy work. Sarmento and Pinto (2015) emphasize, among other factors contributing to the formulation of this strategy: the mobilization of civil society and the personal efforts of the actors with political capital (either in governmental bodies, civil society and within the FAO); the leadership and international visibility of Brazil in this arena; and FAO technical and financial support to facilitate political agreements and the strategy itself. In both blocs, the instrument of public food procurement is advertised as part of the Brazilian strategy to fight hunger and promote agrarian development. The recognition of the Brazilian experience also extends to international civil society. International non-governmental organizations such as ActionAid and Oxfam have based their international campaigns to fight hunger on the Brazilian Zero Hunger strategy, focusing on the components of family farming, the participation of civil society, and the centrality of the state action and of public policies, coupled with strong governmental political commitment. These international non-governmental organizations also support various initiatives to engage Brazilian civil society through SSC, such as the Food and Nutrition Security National Council (Consea),27 and to share the Brazilian civil society experience among other international actors. Finally, it is equally important to note how the distinct arrangements of Brazilian SSDC have influenced how the country has structured its responses to partners’ cooperation demands. In this sense, we should recognize that in the beginning of the period under review, the demands received were very broad, centered mainly on “getting to know” how Brazil dealt with issues of fighting hunger and poverty alleviation28 and the Brazilian government itself which had difficulties in explaining the intersectoral and multidimensional nature of the programs under the Zero Hunger umbrella. However, more recent demands have been more often channeled and/or facilitated by the existing arrangements of Brazilian SSDC, either through the regional or cross-regional blocs or through international organizations, with a net variation depending on the international organization. In this sense, the demands related to conditional cash transfers originating in interactions with the World Bank are usually limited to exchanges related to the technical elements of the programs.29 Alternatively, exchanges facilitated by UNICEF or the ILO, for instance, usually include exchanges more centered on broader social protection models. These organizations, whose actions are strongly rights-based, usually see the
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 107 Brazilian experience as a comprehensive use of conditional cash transfers within a broader framework of social protection schemes.30 The same occurs in terms of public food procurement, where currently the FAO and the WFP, through the Center for Excellence Against Hunger, facilitate demands for dialogue with the elements present in the Brazilian models in accordance with specific “niches”, either in terms of geography—in the case of the Center with an emphasis on African countries and in the case of the FAO with an emphasis on Latin America—or in terms of sectors, with the Center’s dedication to the school feeding program and the FAO with a major emphasis given to issues of agrarian and territorial development.31
Concluding Thoughts The analysis of South-South diffusion of policy instruments through development cooperation makes possible to observe—for instance in the case of conditional cash transfers—a clear relation between the order of the aspired (or eventually achieved) policy change, as suggested in Peter Hall’s model, and the arrangements of cooperation channeling the policy diffusion. Both in its bloc and bilateral cooperation forms, the main focus of the diffusion of the Brazilian experience has been centered on elements of the second and third order. The cash transfer instrument has been little emphasized and, when present, it is presented in its broadest form within social protection policies. In both of these forms, Brazilian SSDC between 2003–2016 tended to (i) emphasize exchanges of ideas and principles (for example, income redistribution and the fight against inequality, citizen participation and intersectoral interaction); and (ii) sharing knowledge about Brazilian policies in their entirety (Zero Hunger Strategy/Brazil Without Misery). On the other hand, in its trilateral form, the focus on learning communities and knowledge diffusion platforms tends to be more about technical elements—first order—related to cash transfers instruments. The policies that orient these elements figure only as a contextualization of the Brazilian experience. In the case of the public food procurement, the frontiers between the different cooperation arrangements and the policy change orders they seek to trigger are less clear, with bloc cooperation and trilateral initiatives dealing at the same time with elements of all of the orders—ideas and principles, policies, and specific programs and instruments. In terms of how the diffusion of Brazilian policies occurs, bloc or bilateral SSDC tends to prioritize strategies that seek to coordinate policies and strategies in regional and cross-regional contexts or support the strengthening of national capacities in the design and implementation of programs and instruments. The diffusion of public food procurement through trilateral arrangements also follows this tendency, while in the trilateral cooperation on cash transfers, we observe the strong presence of knowledge diffusion platforms. In terms of the actors who participate in this diffusion and their motivations, we can observe that SSDC was not prioritized on the conditional cash transfer agenda by the main actor responsible for the implementation of this
108 Melissa Pomeroy et al. instrument in Brazil, the then-Ministry of Social Development (MDS). Given the particular international context throughout the analyzed period, marked by a global consensus on the effectiveness of this instrument, and given that this instrument was also perceived as part of the donor agenda in the case of the African continent, the Brazilian actors themselves retreated from their active position in disseminating the Brazilian model. Nonetheless, major international organizations, already mobilized in the diffusion of this instrument, continued to act and exercised a fundamental role in the diffusion of the Brazilian experience of the Bolsa Família. Additionally, this diffusion centered around specific aspects of the Brazilian experience, linked to first- and second-order changes, without great emphasis on the remaining set of associated programs that could spur a discussion of the role of social protection policies from the perpesctive of developing economies. In the case of the diffusion of public food procurement, it may be observed that a series of Brazilian governmental and non-governmental actors played a leading role in emphasizing aspects related to Hall’s third-order changes, including a strong defense of the diagnosis of the structural causes of hunger and poverty and the prominent role of the state-led development. Another element that deserves attention in terms of the analyzed diffusion of the public food procurement instrument is the greater actors’ mobilization. On the one hand, there was a great emphasis on highlighting and promoting the participation of civil society, a fundamental pillar in the aforementioned Brazilian social protection and food security policies. On the other hand, it is also possible to observe that this cooperation invested in the relationship between regional networks and initiatives such as high-level governmental policy dialogue spaces and national and global social participation to facilitate the construction of shared meanings, understandings and frameworks. Those, in their turn, have contributed to mobilizing political support and the harmonization of policies, based on shared ideas and principles. In the past years, the growing body of policy diffusion studies has suggested that the reach of diffusion of policies and specific programs depends on the capacity and legitimacy of the actors who promote them to the extent that they: create evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, provide material resources for cooperation projects or directly provide budget support in the receiving country, give technical support to cooperation initiatives and politically support the legitimization of their proposed solutions. Contributing to those findings, our study examined various SSDC arrangements promoting different strategies contributing to the legitimization of Southern-grown technical and/or political solutions. In terms of cash transfer instruments, this study reveals a large effort made on the part of various international organizations to create a base of evidence and produce documents that explain their technical aspects. Meanwhile, in the case of public food procurement, various arrangements allowed for the sharing and learning of the technical, social and political processes that permit its consolidation in Brazil, in addition to mobilizing governmental and non-governmental political actors who
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 109 Table 5.1 List of Interviewees
Manager of South-South Trilateral Cooperation Projects Senior Research Coordinator
Brazilian Cooperation Agency
International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) Brazilian Cooperation Agency Inter-Ministry Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security (IMCFNS) FAO Latin America Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro
Bilateral Cooperation Coordinator General Coordinator of the Monitoring of Food and Nutrition Security Activities Policy Official Professor. Ex-President (2007–2011) of the National Board of Food and Nutrition Security Professor. Ex-Advisor to Zero Hunger— Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger
10/11/2017 10/10/2017 10/17/2017 10/27/2017
Source: Table created by the author.
can contribute to the sustainability of these policies. Considering that public policies—in general—can affect the distribution of wealth within a given society and that social protection policies—in particular—deal with income redistribution, the analysis of the very object of the transfer and/or diffusion raises the question of the capacity of this South-South cooperation to promote substantive discussions about the impact of the implementation of these instruments on the prevailing social contracts in a range of different Southern countries.
Notes 1. According to the definition of policy diffusion adopted by Simmons et al. (2008). 2. According to the definition of Lascoumes and Le Galès, policy instruments are social-technical devices that materialize the operationalization of governmental action and organize specific relationships between governments and those they govern through their representations and meanings. 3. For bilateral cooperation, the main source for the database constructed by Caixeta and Suyama (2014) and its updates was information from BCA (Source, BCA website). For trilateral cooperation with international organizations, the principal source was their reports and websites. Finally, for cooperation blocs, Caixeta and Suyama (2014) identify the main regional or inter-regional (bloc) institutional structures which the ministries responsible for social protection participate in. Based on the identification of the main blocs, we researched the presence of the analyzed instruments in the cooperation agenda through position documents and other cited secondary sources.
110 Melissa Pomeroy et al. 4. The L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, promoted by the G8 in 2009, for example, allocates 42% of the funds committed to agricultural development and just 7% to rural development, nutrition or social protection network projects (ONE, 2011). The central objective of the European Union Food Facility, in turn, is to increase agricultural production. 5. In 2019, following Jair Bolsonaro’s election, there were new reforms and MDS has been downgraded to a Special Secretariat status, under the newly established Ministry of Citizenship. 6. Interviewee 1—Representative of an international organization. 7. Interviewees 1 (Representative of an international organization) and 2 (Representative of the Brazilian government). 8. Interviewee 1—Representative of an international organization. 9. Interviewee 3—An academic. 10. The experience of the Brazil-Africa Program for Social Development stands out, and it is supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the IPC-IG. Through this program, the MSD cooperated with the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) project in Ghana, beginning in 2006, whose objective was the development of a National Strategy for Social Protection, whose main feature was a cash transfer program (Souza, 2007). 11. Interviewee 2—Representative of the Brazilian government. 12. To structure its knowledge base, the platform promoted the discussion of themes of particular interest during three seminars, with one of them being exclusively about the cash transfer program and two about sharing the Brazilian experience in terms of social protection policies in a broader fashion. The exclusive seminar about CITs was organized by the World Bank. The themes of greatest interest were: unified registration, the conditions of the Bolsa Familia program, and federal coordination. 13. Participatory observation, 2013. 14. Interviewees 1 (Representative of the Brazilian government) and 2 (Representative of an international organization). 15. There are countless examples of initiatives in the name of Brazilian foreign policy which illustrate this priority. Among them are the leadership of the reform process in the Committee on World Food Security of the FAO, relying on this space as the principal global platform for the full realization of the right to food; leadership in the creation of innovative financing mechanisms in the fight against hunger; its leadership in creating the Specialized Meeting on Family Farming in Mercosul (REAF); the Hunger-Free Latin America and the Caribbean Initiative; and the election of José Graziano as the Director of the FAO, among other examples. See Beghin (2014) and Fraundorfer (2015) for more initiatives. 16. Interviewees 3 (An academic), 4 and 7 (Representatives of the Brazilian government). 17. Interviewee 4—Representative of the Brazilian government. 18. Interviewee 7—Representative of an international organization. 19. Interviewee 5—An academic. 20. Interviewee 7—Representative of an international organization. 21. With participation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the Ministries of Foreign Relations, Social and Agrarian Development, Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger, Fishing and Aquaculture, and the National Development Fund for Education within the Ministry of Education. 22. Created in 2011 to support the development of national capacities in the implementation of sustainable school lunch programs, mainly in the African continent. The Center is a new institution of Brazilian cooperation and is the fruit of a partnership between the Brazilian government (BCA) and the World Food Program (WFP), with support from the National Fund for Education (Ministry of Education).
The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 111 23. PAA Africa was implemented by the Hunger Coordinating Body (CG-Fome), in partnership with the MSD, FAO, WFP and DFID and has consultants in each implementing country. 24. Interviewee 2—Representative of the Brazilian government. 25. Interviewee 2—Representative of the Brazilian government. 26. For more details concerning Brazilian Cooperation within the regional context of Latin America, see Sabourin et al., in this book. 27. Consea was formally dismantled in January 2019, in the first Presidential Executive order coming from Jair Bolsonaro, elected in October 2018. The measure was received with a mix of consternation and concern by a series of national and international political actors and social policy experts. 28. Interviewees 3 (An academic), 2 and 7 (Representatives of the Brazilian government) 29. Interviewee 2—Representative of the Brazilian government. 30. Interviewee 1—Representative of an international organization 31. Interviewee 4—Representative of the Brazilian government 32. The list of the interviewees is not in the order that they were cited to guarantee the anonymity of their statements and opinions.
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The Diffusion of Social Protection Policies 113 Lavers, T. and Hickey, S. Investigating the political economy of social protection expansion in Africa: At the intersection of transnational ideas and domestic politics. Manchester: ESID, 2015 (Working paper, 47). Leite, C. K. S. and Peres, U. D. Paradigmas de Desenvolvimento e Disseminação de Políticas: Raízes Locais da Criação do Programa Bolsa Família. Organizações & Sociedade, v. 22, pp. 621–638, 2015. Leite, I. C., Pomeroy, M. and Suyama, B. Africa Brazil cooperation in social protection: Drivers, lessons and shifts in the engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development. São Paulo: WIDER, 2013 (Working paper n. 22). Leite, I. C., Pomeroy, M. and Suyama, B. Brazilian South-South Development Cooperation: The case of the ministry of social development in Africa. Journal of International Development, v. 27, n. 8, pp. 1446–1461, 2015. Leite, I. C., Suyama, B., Trajber, L. W., Pomeroy, M., Constantine, J., Navas-Alemán, L., Shankland, A. and Younis, M. Brazil’s engagement in international development cooperation: The state of the debate. Evidence Report, n. 59, Rising Powers in International Development. London: IDS, 2014. Lorenzo, Marina Carvalho de: Os desafios para a difusão da experiência do Bolsa Família por meio da cooperação internacional. In: Campello, T. and Neri, M. C. Programa (orgs.), Bolsa Família, uma década de inclusão e cidadania. Brasília: Ipea, 2013. Majone, G. Evidence, argument, & persuasion in the policy process. London: Yale University Press, 1989. Maluf, R. S., Santarelli, M. and Prado, V. A cooperação brasileira em segurança alimentar e nutricional: determinantes e desafios presentes na construção da agenda internacional. Rio de Janeiro: CERESAN, 2014 (Paper for discussion n. 3). Marsh, D. and Sharman, J. C. Policy diffusion and policy transfer. Policy Studies, v. 30, n. 3, pp. 269–288, 2009. Maxwell, S. Food security: A post-modern perspective. Food Policy, v. 21, n. 2, pp. 155–170, 1996. Milani, C. R. S. and Lopes, R. N. Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy transfer em Saúde Pública: análise das relações entre Brasil e Moçambique entre 2003 e 2012. Carta Internacional (USP), v. 9, pp. 59–78, 2014. Milhorance, C. and Gabas, J.-J. Reframing developing from the South? A debate of internationalization of Brazil’s rural policies. In: International Conference of Public Policy, 2, Milão, 2015b. Milhorance, C., Sabourin, E. and Bursztyn, M. Potential and limits to diffusing Brazil’s zero hunger strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The case of Mozambique. In: International Conference of Public Policy, 2, Milão, 2015a. Morais, M. South-South Cooperation: Past and present conceptualization and practice. In: Chisholm, L. and Steiner-Khamsi, G. (eds.), South-South Cooperation in education and development. New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2009. Morais M. Conditional cash transfers and education: United in theory, divorced in policy. PhD dissertation, Colombia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. 2011. ONE, Agricultural Accountability. Holding Donors to their L’Aquila Promises. One Reports, 2011, http://one.org.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/Agriculture_Accountability_ Report_ENGLISH.pdf, Accessed 14 November 2019. Patriota, T. and Pierri, F. Brazil’s cooperation for agriculture development and food security in Africa: Assessing the technology, finance, and knowledge platforms. In: Cheru, F. and Modi, R. (orgs.), Agricultural development and food security in Africa: The impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments. London: Zed Books, 2013.
114 Melissa Pomeroy et al. Pomeroy, M., Leite, I. and Suyama, B. Determinantes do engajamento brasileiro na cooperação Sul-Sul: o caso do Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à fome na África. Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, 39, Caxambu (MG), 2015. Anais do Encontro Anual da ANPOCS. Puente, C. A. I. A cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira como instrumento da política externa: a evolução da cooperação técnica com países em desenvolvimento – CTPD – no período 1995–2005. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010. Sabatier, P. A. and Jenkins-Smith, H. An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences, v. 21, n. 2, pp. 129–168, 1988. Santarelli, M. and Suyama, B. Brazilian food and nutritional security in Africa: Planting seeds in unfamiliar soil. Thematic Report on Social Protection. Rio de Janeiro: Rio+ Center, 2016. Sarmento, F. and Pinto, J. Construção e implementação da estratégia de segurança alimentar e nutricional da CPLP: histórico, balanço e perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: CERESAN, 2015 (Paper for discussion n. 7). Silva, M. M. Conditional cash transfers and education: United in theory, divorced in policy. PhD diss., Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, New York, 2010. Santos, Maria do Carmo Rebouças. Cooperação Sul-Sul Brasileira Analisada à luz da teoria do Policy Transfer. Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, 39, Caxambu (MG), 2015. Anais do Encontro Anual da ANPOCS. Souza, C. Review of the Brazil-Ghana pilot on the exchange of social protection programmes. DFID, 2007. Sugiyama, N. B. The diffusion of conditional cash transfer programs in the Americas. Global Social Policy, v. 11, n. 2–3, pp. 250–278, 2011. Sumberg, J. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. Linking agricultural development to school feeding in sub-Saharan Africa: Theoretical perspectives. Food Policy, v. 36, n. 3, pp. 341–349, 2011, Suyama, B., Caixeta, M. and Macedo, G. Brazilian triangular cooperation in social protection: Contribution to the 2030 agenda. New York: UNDP, 2016.
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía From Urban Experiment to International “Best Practice”1 Sergio Montero
Introduction While Latin America has traditionally imported urban planning and policy models from European and North American cities, in recent decades, several Latin American cities have become policy models for progressive planners and advocates in cities around the world. In the context of region-wide reforms to democratize, decentralize and neoliberalize the once highly centralized Latin American state (Caldeira & Holston, 2015), several cities became sites of increased experimentation in urban planning, urban development and public participation (Angotti & Irazábal, 2017). Latin America became, in the 1990s and 2000s, ground-zero for local policy innovation (Campbell, 1997). Municipal authorities throughout the region reinvented land use, transportation, housing and public space policies to address a range of new and long-deferred infrastructural, social and environmental issues. In this context, a new strand of research emerged in Latin American urban studies that sought to analyze the emergence of these urban policy and planning innovations, including environmental planning and transportation innovations in Curitiba in the 1970s (Irazábal, 2005), participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in the 1980s (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2016; Porto de Oliveira, 2017), the Brazilian Estatuto da Cidade (Fernandes, 2007; Caldeira & Holston, 2015), changes in public space and transportation policies in Bogotá in the 1990s (Berney, 2017; Montero, 2019), or, the most recent addition, the so-called social urbanism policies in Medellín (Brand & Dávila, 2011; Sotomayor, 2017; Franz, 2017). While pointing to specific cities comes at the risk of ignoring less internationally recognized—and perhaps more important—urban policy changes that have happened throughout Latin America, in this chapter I am particularly interested in the relationship between urban planning and world recognition. World recognition is important in the context of urban policy and planning because it legitimizes certain models as appropriate ways of governing, organizing and managing urban space, both in the cities where they originally appeared as well as in the ones that adopt it (Bulkeley, 2006; Roy, 2011; Davis, 2013). Interestingly, many of the currently celebrated Latin American models of urbanism are not necessarily new and are often based on decades of urban experiments and
116 Sergio Montero ideas originating in Latin America and elsewhere. If policy novelty or effectiveness is not sufficient to explain world recognition and circulation, what, then, makes a particular urban policy experiment or planning mechanism a world model? This chapter suggests that in addition to focusing on policy effectiveness or in the unique socio-political circumstances in which new urban policy models emerge, another revealing and less explored path of inquiry in Latin American urban studies lies in studying how certain urban policies are legitimized and mobilized as world models. One way in which this worlding of urban policy happens, I will argue in this chapter, is through the elevation of a particular urban policy or planning mechanism to the category of international “best practice.”
Bogotá: From Urban Dystopia to World Policy Model Traditionally portrayed as an urban dystopia and a city of fear during the early 1990s, Bogotá became a world model of urban planning in less than a decade. In 2007, the American Planning Association dedicated its World Planning Keynote Address to the capital of Colombia under the title “The Miracle of Bogotá.” A year before, the Venice Architecture Biennale gave its prestigious Golden Lion Award to the city of Bogotá. La Biennale’s official webpage read: “The city provides a model for streets which are pleasing to the eye as well as economically viable and socially inclusive. Bogotá is, in short, a beacon of hope for other cities, whether rich or poor” (Biennale di Venezia, 2006). The transformation of Bogotá during the 1990s and early 2000s, based on the promotion of public space, non-car transportation alternatives and teaching citizens “cultura ciudadana,”2 has been internationally celebrated and has become a reference point for many cities in the Global North and the South. Even if Bogotanos are skeptical of the wonders of their city’s planning given the deterioration of transportation infrastructure in recent years (Ardila, 2007; Gilbert, 2008; Bassett & Marpillero-Colomino, 2013), images of bicycles and red rapid buses with dedicated lanes are what now often comes to mind of city planners, bicycle advocates and mayors around the world as they think of Bogotá. While much has been written in the last decade about Bogotá as a model of urban transformation both from a celebratory (Martin & Ceballos, 2004; Montezuma, 2005; Cervero, 2005; Gilbert, 2006) and a critical perspective (Duque Franco, 2008; Gilbert, 2008; Berney, 2011), less is known about the mechanisms and policy circuits that allowed certain urban interventions experimented in Bogotá to become international “best practices” and circulate around the world. In this chapter, I develop a critical analysis of one of Bogotá’s most internationally revered “best practices”: Ciclovía, a weekly street closure program to promote urban biking and physical exercise. During the event, 70 miles (113 km) of streets in the capital of Colombia are closed to car traffic from 7am until 2pm and reserved for cyclists and pedestrians. To give a sense of its scale, in a city of 7.5 million people, the estimated 1 million people that participate in Ciclovía every Sunday is higher than the whole population of Amsterdam.
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 117
Figure 6.1 Ciclovía in Carrera Séptima, Bogotá. Source: Photograph by the author (2008).
Since 2001, cities as diverse as Guadalajara, Jakarta or Los Angeles, among more than 200 others, have referenced Bogotá to implement a similar street closure program. Yet, despite its discovery and celebration in international policy and advocacy circuits in the last 10 years, Ciclovía has a history that spans over 40 years during most of which it remained unknown to the rest of the world. The impetus for this chapter starts from a paradox: while Ciclovía has been happening in Bogotá since the 1970s, it is only in the early 2000s that it became widely known in international urban policy circuits. The aim of this chapter is not to write a comprehensive history of Ciclovía or a detailed account of the changes in laws and city planning codes that allowed the launch and improvement of the program over the years. The city of Bogotá and several authors have already published on this (e.g. Ortiz, 1985; Gomescásseres, 2003; IDRD, 2005; Montezuma, 2011; Del Castillo et al., 2011). Starting from the social constructivist assumption that increases in policy effectiveness or quality do not necessarily explain international recognition and circulation, I seek instead to answer two key questions related to Ciclovía: 1) How have actors, networks and agendas in and outside Bogotá shaped the emergence and re-inventions of Ciclovía over time?; and 2) How and when did Ciclovía emerge as an international “best practice” in urban planning? Although the recent work of Montezuma (2011) has quantified and created an interesting typology of the hundreds of cities that have adopted Bogotá’s Ciclovía around the world, this chapter seeks to move beyond quantification and typologies to provide new conceptual and methodological tools to examine the specific articulation of local and transnational actors, networks and agendas that allowed Ciclovía—and, therefore, Bogotá—to emerge as a world policy model for cities in the North and
118 Sergio Montero the South. In the following sections, I explore different academic debates and theoretical frameworks that can help us answer these two questions by critically examining policy circulations and the concept of “best practice.”
Towards a Critical Analysis of Urban Policy Circulations: Policy Mobilities, Transnational Planning Exchanges, Worlding Practices The circulation of urban policies and planning mechanisms is not a new phenomenon, certainly not in Latin America, where, already in the 16th century, the Law of the Indies constituted a comprehensive urban planning model that Spanish colonists followed in locating, building and populating human settlements in the New World (Solano, 1996; Socolow & Johnson, 1981). Before that, urban historians have showed evidence that pre-Hispanic societies in Latin America such as the Inca, Aztec and Maya already used and mobilized particular urban planning models in the founding and building of cities (Hardoy, 1968). While it is by now widely acknowledged in urban studies that the travel and mobilization of urban planning policies is not new (Harris & Moore, 2013), many urban scholars have also noted that the circulation of policies has accelerated in the last decades (Peck & Theodore, 2010; McFarlane, 2011; Healey, 2013). In this context, certain Latin American urban policy models have also started to circulate widely in recent decades. For instance, Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting has been referenced by more than 1,000 cities around the world (Goldfrank, 2011) while many cities—in the North and the South—have referenced Curitiba or Bogotá to implement changes in transportation planning (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2012). Urban scholars in a variety of disciplines have tried to make sense of these accelerated policy exchanges between cities by developing new critical approaches to urban policy formation and travel. For example, Peck and Theodore (2010) have sought to move beyond the policy diffusion/transfer approach (Rose, 1993; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Simmons et al., 2008), which they see trapped on the rational-choice presumption of policymakers and good policies eventually driving out bad policies “in a process of optimizing diffusion” (Peck & Theodore, 2010, 169). Instead, under the idea of policy mobilities, they have sought to explore policy travel and transformation as a politicized, power-laden and socially constructed process that can happen at different scales of government. Policy actors are also more broadly defined than the policy elites that often inhabit political science studies and include NGOs, consultants, media, planners, advocates, neighborhood associations, among many others. Looking specifically at urban policy mobilities, McCann and Ward (2011) have focused on how policy formation in cities is co-constituted by both connections to other places and situated political contestations. Similarly, urban planning scholars have argued for the need to develop critical approaches to study the contemporary transnational flow of planning ideas (Healey, 2013; Healey & Upton, 2010). For Healey (2013), looking at these flows from an actor-based and
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 119 evolutionary perspective based on the complex dynamics, situated contingencies and micro-practices of urban policy actors can help planners move away from the modernist perspective that has often prevailed in the discipline. While the travel of policies is not their main unit of analysis, the work of Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011) on worlding cities can also be brought to critical debates on policy circulations, particularly to illuminate the relationship between urban policies and world recognition. Looking specifically at city-making strategies in contemporary Asia, Roy and Ong (2011) have sought to shift the debate on contemporary global urbanism from world cities and world-systems to particular “worlding practices.” In this context, they see urban models and inter-city references in and between aspiring “world-class” Asian cities as power-laden practices used by different actors: “the very contested nature of what counts as global in a shifting inter-urban field of power requires urban analysis to capture the reflexive dimension in many urban initiatives that go beyond local improvements to participate, however implicitly, in a bigger game of winning some kind of world recognition” (Ong, 2011, 13). While coming from different academic traditions, these three critical approaches to urban policy and planning share a common concern about the importance of examining urban policy exchanges and travels as a socially constructed, uneven and power-laden process rather than a rational transfer of the “best” policies between context A and context B. To do so, they advocate for qualititative and ethnographic methods of inquiry that stay close to the everyday practices of urban policy actors without losing sight of the actors, networks and agendas in which both policies and actors are embedded.
“Best Practices” and Urban Policy Circulations A framework to study urban policy circulations would not be complete without a critical examination of the notion of “best practice,” which, in recent decades, has become common parlance in urban planning practice. The idea of “best practice” can be traced back to the 1980s when benchmarking became a popular management practice among companies seeking to improve their production processes. As noted by Francis and Holloway (2007, 172), “best-practice benchmarking” consisted in “identifying aspects of an organization’s activity that could be more efficient or effective by comparison with other relevant organizations’ performance.” With the rise of the “new public management” in the late 1980s, the idea of best-practice benchmarking was increasingly adopted by governmental agencies in many countries, including Latin America (Aguilar, 2006). While many volumes, databases and websites on “best practices” for public administrators have appeared in the last decades, Francis and Holloway (2007) have argued that critical studies of “best practices” have been slow to take hold among scholars interested in public policy. As noted by Bulkeley (2006), authors in the lesson-drawing and policy transfer debates were among the first ones to critique the concept of “best practice” in the context of public policy highlighting the difficulties of replicating a successful policy in another
120 Sergio Montero policy context. For example, Radaelli (2004) has critiqued “best practices” as de-contextualized lists and favors instead a lesson-drawing approach in which learning from evidence-based actions (Rose, 2002) is preferred to decontextualized examples of “best practice.” Planners and practitioners have also often pointed to the impossibility of naming a policy “best” or better than others, because the very reason why one policy would be considered better than another depended on the context in which the policy takes shape. While these critiques are valid and powerful, they cannot explain the increasing popularity of “best practices” among mayors, planners, advocates and other decision-makers or why international development and philanthropic organizations continue to create “best practice” guides and fund study tours to influence policy change around the world. It seems, then, that there is something powerful about “best practices” that the “contextual critique,” focused on the difficulty of successful policy transfer between different contexts, was not able to capture. Using a Foucauldian approach rather than the conceptual tools of lessondrawing and policy transfer, Harriet Bulkeley (2006) has argued that “best practices” in the area of urban sustainability can be better understood as a technology of government through which the policy problem of “urban sustainability” is framed, defined and eventually territorialized. Drawing on examples from British cities, she sees the “practice of best practice” as an inherently unstable discursive process that “serves as a means through which actors seek both to understand the messy politics of policymaking, and to lend legitimacy to their interpretations of urban sustainability” (Bulkeley, 2006, 1030). Building on Bulkeley’s critique, Vettoretto has highlighted that the process of making practices into best practices “not only constructs a repertoire of models as guide for local actions, but also demonstrates the empirical possibility (and rightness) of certain principles” such as the idea of international competitiveness, the “good governance” approach or the EU concept of territorial cohesion (Vettoretto, 2009, 1078). More recently, Susan Moore (2013) has showed how New Urbanism proliferated in Toronto because different networks of actors recognized that, by converging around the idea of New Urbanism as a “best practice,” they could “constitute a socio-political force for achieving ends” (Moore, 2013, 3). In other words, as local policy actors recognized the power and legitimacy that a best practice provides, new networks and collaborations of actors and interests were created around it. Other authors have also recently pointed to “best practices” as an important governance mechanism to define the joint mission of governance networks. For example, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) have argued that storytelling through the dissemination of “best practices” can be an effective tool to align the goals of diverse actors and convince them of the urgent need for coordination and joint action. These critiques of “best practice” share a focus in the “practice of best practice” (Bulkeley, 2006) as the key object of analysis rather than focusing on the possibilities and limitations of “best practices” for successful policy transfer. In doing so, they go beyond the traditional contextual critique and point to new forms of power, legitimacy and governance behind practicing “best practice.”
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 121 The remainder of the chapter is divided in two parts according to the two key questions that organize this chapter. To answer the first question (how have actors, networks and agendas in and outside Bogotá shaped the emergence and re-inventions of Ciclovía over time?), part I examines the emergence and transformations of Ciclovía in Bogotá as a result of a tension between globally circulating ideas, forces and agendas and situated political struggles. To answer the second question (how and when did Ciclovía emerge as an international “best practice” in urban planning?), part II examines the constellation of local and transnational actors, networks and agendas that aligned at a particular moment to world Ciclovía as an international “best practice.” In order to reconstruct how the program has been relationally constituted and reinvented over time, I have relied on archival research, interviews with key policy actors involved in the launching and expansion of Ciclovía in and outside Bogotá, including bicycle advocates, transportation planners, public officials and sustinable mobility consultants and participant observation of transportation and Ciclovía conferences in Latin America and the US.
Part I. The Emergence and Transformations of Ciclovía 1974: “The Great Pedal Demonstration”: Ciclovía Beginnings The origins of Ciclovía can be traced back to an experiment3 organized in Bogotá on December 15, 1974, by Pro-Cicla, a non-registered bicycle organization led by three young bike enthusiasts—Jaime Ortiz Mariño, Fernando
Figure 6.2 The Great Pedal Demonstration. Bogotá, December 15, 1974. Source: Jaime Ortiz personal archive.
122 Sergio Montero Caro Restrepo and Rodrigo Castaño Valencia—who wanted to do something about the rapid and sprawling growth that the city was experiencing at the time (Ortiz, 1985). Using their family and political connections, they were able to get permission from Bogotá’s Transportation Agency and City Planning Agency to close to motorized traffic 80 blocks of the city’s two main arteries, Carrera 7 and Carrera 11. They called the event “la gran manifestación del pedal” (the great pedal demonstration) and about 5,000 people participated in it. Ortiz (1985) and Montezuma (2011) have argued that the popularity of cycling in Colombia and the fact that Colombian cyclists had won important international competitions created a favorable disposition towards the initiative among local politicians and potential bicycle users. However, while other street closures and organized bike rides had taken place in Bogotá before this event (Gomescásseres, 2003; Montezuma, 2011), the novelty of Pro-Cicla’s experiment was that it sought to shift the meaning of the bicycle from sport, competition and recreation towards a legitimate way to move around the city. In doing so, the bicycle became a political instrument to make claims over the organization of urban space: The Great Pedal Demonstration, “with the purpose that everybody rides a bike” . . . will not benefit any charity and you do not need to register to participate. There won’t be a starting or finishing line, or trophies. . . . Fundación Pro-Cicla, which makes with this event its first public appearance as the organizer of the great pedal demonstration, is convinced that Bogotá is a city that needs bike pathways. (El Tiempo, 1974) That same day, Pro-Cicla members announced the creation of “The Power of Pedal,” a magazine to keep Bogotanos informed about future bicycle demonstrations in Bogotá. However, the next bicycle demonstration would not take place until almost a year later, on December 14, 1975. While most historical accounts of Ciclovía briefly describe these two experimental events and quickly move on to the institutionalization of Ciclovía in 1976 and its expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, it is worth pausing here and analyzing in more detail the context in which this early politicization of the bicycle happened and the actors, political connections and circulating discourses that were assembled to legitimize this new way of using urban space in Bogotá. A key person behind this early politicization of the bicycle in Bogotá was Jaime Ortiz, a young professor of architecture at the Jesuit Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, one of the founders of Pro-Cicla and also one of the owners of Almacenes Ciclopedia, a famous bike shop in Bogotá. An upper-middle-class Bogotano, Ortiz studied architecture at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, from 1966 until 1970 thanks to a LASPAU fellowship.4 During his time in the United States, Ortiz was very influenced by the critiques of suburbanization and urban renewal programs that were in vogue in US architecture and planning schools at the time. While in Cleveland, he also witnessed the catching on fire of the Cuyahoga River in 1969, a major event behind the emergence of the
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 123 environmental movement in the US, as well as numerous racial and Vietnam War–related riots. Cleveland riots, environmental protests and new approaches that started to link urban and environmental studies deeply influenced him: my first approach to American culture was to the crisis of the American city, to the process of suburbanization, to the deterioration of the city center, to the creation of ghettoes and to the counter-movements happening there . . . my stay and studies in the US radicalized me and when I came back to Colombia in 1970, I realized that Colombian urbanization patterns were following the same characteristics of American urbanization. . . . I found in the bicycle a symbol to discuss that urbanization pattern. Why the bicycle? Because of the importance of the environmental dimension and also for the history and popularity of the bicycle in Colombia at the time. (Jaime Ortiz, personal interview, Bogotá, 2012) Although this chapter suggests that the “great pedal demonstration” organized by Jaime Ortiz and other Pro-Cicla members in 1974 represents one of the earliest attempts to politicize the bicycle in Colombia, it is important to note that this was not a “grassroots” initiative. Low-income Bogotanos had been using the bicycle to move around Bogotá for decades before this demonstration happened and although they were certainly not excluded from participating in the event, Ciclovía was implemented thanks to the personal and political connections of Pro-Cicla members. These ties to high-level bureaucrats in local government agencies made the event possible even if Bogotá planners were skeptical at the outset. Therefore, the emergence of Ciclovía can be better conceptualized as an urban experiment, influenced by both local urban conditions and transnational ideas that started to link environmentalism and urbanization rather than a grassroots initiative or a bicycle movement. This, however, should not undermine the historical relevance of the event. The “pedal demonstration” attracted 5,000 people to the streets and, in highly segregated Bogotá, it was able to draw people from diverse social groups. 1976–1983: Rapid Urbanization, Lack of Recreational Space and Oil Crisis: Institutionalizing Ciclovía In 1976, the City of Bogotá hired Jaime Ortiz to advise the Transportation Department on the institutionalization of the Pro-Cicla bike experiments of 1974 and 1975. Ciclovía’s official establishment marked both the end of ProCicla as a bicycle advocacy group and the beginning of Ortiz’s political career as adviser to a series of mayors, governors and presidents of Colombia. Significantly, it also represents an end to the politicization of the bicycle started by Pro-Cicla: in the hands of the local government, Ciclovía soon became a project that emphasized the bicycle’s recreational aspect over its urban transportation potential. Although Ciclovía was officially institutionalized in 1976 under Mayor Luis Prieto Ocampo, the program lacked regularity during the late 1970s and it even disappeared for a couple of years. It was not until 1983
124 Sergio Montero that the newly appointed Mayor Augusto Ramírez Ocampo showed the local government’s firm support of Ciclovía by expanding it to 33 miles (53 km) of city streets. But why was Bogotá’s local government interested in institutionalizing and expanding these bike experiments and how was this decision shaped by the larger context of local, national and transnational planning paradigms in the 1970s and 1980s? Until 1930, Bogotá conserved the urban organization patterns of a small colonial city (Jaramillo, 1979). In less than 50 years, the city’s population experienced a 10-fold increase moving from 218,116 people in 1928 to 2,718,546 in 1973 (Jaramillo, 1979). Urban growth rates were particularly high during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, when an influx of rural population moved to Bogotá searching for better job opportunities and due to the increasing violent activity of the guerrilla in rural areas. By 1970, urban population was 70% of the total population of Colombia. However, neither the state nor private developers were able to serve this rapid urbanization. For instance, between 1964 and 1973, a period in which Bogotá added 1 million new inhabitants, the state produced only 35,000 social housing units while private developers continued to serve the middle and upper-middle class in the North of the city (Jaramillo, 1979). The lack of affordable housing drove most new migrants to build their own houses in the South and South-West parts of the city, where land prices were low due to the lack of public service provision and the absence of recreational spaces. By 1970, auto-constructed housing in poor areas of the city represented 42% of Bogotá’s total housing stock (Vernez, 1974). When Augusto Ramírez Ocampo took office in 1982, he thought “one of the major problems of the city was related to the use of free time and the huge difference [of options] between people with high and low income levels” (Ramírez Ocampo, interview by Adriana Díaz and Olga Lucia Sarmiento, Bogotá, 2009). While rich Bogotanos had private clubs and cars to leave the city during the weekend, the poor were stuck in a city that did not offer recreational options other than “some enclosed [sports] pitch or drinking beer” (Ramírez Ocampo, interview by Adriana Díaz and Olga Lucia Sarmiento, Bogotá, 2009). After returning from a New York trip, where he was impressed by the street closures of Central Park (Ramírez Ocampo, interview by Adriana Díaz and Olga Lucia Sarmiento, Bogotá, 2009), Ramírez Ocampo became a firm supporter of Ciclovía and, in October 1983, Bogotá organized the first national seminar on Ciclovías to which the mayor invited local and national political representatives. In an introduction to a book published for the occasion, Ramírez Ocampo promoted the benefits of Ciclovía and explained how the example had already spread to other Colombian cities (Alcaldía de Bogotá, 1983). Together with the rapid urbanization and the lack of recreational spaces for the poor that characterized Bogotá in the 1970s and early 1980s, there was also a paradigm shift in Colombia’s urban planning during that time. This was a shift from the modernist planning of the 1940s and 1950s that privileged functionalist divisions of the city, modernist urban design and the construction of high-capacity roads to an integrated planning paradigm that understood
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 125 urbanization in terms of national economic and social development goals (Salazar, 2007). While European architects such as Karl Brunner or Le Corbusier were influential references in Bogotá during the first part of the 20th century (Tarchópulos, 2006), since the 1960s, and particularly during the 1970s, these were overshadowed by North American and Anglo-Saxon economists and planners. US-trained planners brought with them new ideas such as economic and community development and, unlike modernist architects, they were concerned with the impact of the automobile on the urban form because the oil crisis had given them a negative perception of US suburbanization patterns. In Colombia, the influence of economist Lauchlin Currie during the 1970s in city planning is remarkable. Currie, a former advisor of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, came to Colombia in 1949 as part of a World Bank mission and eventually became the director of Colombia’s National Planning Department in the 1970s (Sandilands, 1990). Currie’s many writings on urban planning frequently draw from three city models: US suburbanization and car-dependent sprawl, as a model to avoid; and Singapore’s public housing programs and the British New Towns, as models to follow (United Nations, 1973; Currie, 1976). Currie saw suburbanization as an “inappropriate and extravagant” way of life that the 1973 oil crisis had eventually made evident (Currie, 1976, 21), identifying Los Angeles as a paradigmatic example of US sprawling suburbanization. Therefore, the expansion of Ciclovía during this period became an inexpensive and expedient alternative by which the local government could provide recreational spaces in poor areas of the city and attempt to prevent social unrest in an increasingly segregated city. At the same time, it was viewed favorably by the Colombian planning apparatus and high-level planning experts such as Currie who, in the face of the oil crisis, encouraged dense and bicycle-friendly urban design. 1995–1996: Urban Violence and Public Space: Expanding Ciclovía During the 1980s, as oil prices decreased and concerns over the oil crisis faded, automobility and suburbanization ceased to be a main worry for city planners in Bogotá. During this decade Ciclovía lost momentum and its extension decreased from 33 miles (53 km) in 1983 to only 12 miles (20 km) by the early 1990s. However, in the mid-1990s, Ciclovía’s meaning and practice underwent a substantial makeover in its meaning and practice under another kind of local and national concern: urban violence. The early 1990s was the period when Bogotá registered the highest rate of homicides in its modern history. This was triggered by a significant increase in drug trade in Colombia that fuelled guerrilla and paramilitary activity across the country. During this period, the high homicide rate, the massive disappearance and killing of street children and prostitutes earned Bogotá the title of City of Fear. And, as fear of violence began to dominate the everyday life of Bogotanos, avoiding urban public space became common (Martin-Barbero, 2003). In such circumstances, important reforms along the lines of decentralization, democratization and neoliberalization occurred in
126 Sergio Montero Colombia. After the democratization of local governments in the late 1980s and the decentralization of urban planning responsibilities to the local level in the 1990s, a new generation of elected, ambitious and charismatic mayors emerged in Bogotá that chose to promote public space as a key strategy to re-establish the city, regain citizens’ trust in local institutions and decrease urban violence. For Mayors Antanas Mockus (1995–1997; 2001–2003) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998–2000), public space became a central instrument for teaching and molding citizens in their particular effort to transform the city (Berney, 2011). Antanas Mockus took office in 1995 and became the first elected mayor of Bogotá who was not affiliated with either of the two major political parties in Colombia. A philosopher, mathematician and university professor, Mockus’s strategy for Bogotá was concerned with the notion of “cultura ciudadana,” literally, “citizenship culture.” Mockus’s approach to reducing Bogotá’s high rate of homicide, fear of violence, and its citizens’ lack of hope became teaching Bogotanos civic values. His goal was “to achieve self-regulation in the behavior among citizens” (Mockus, 2001, 3) and he put particular emphasis on citizen encounters in public space. Ciclovía, among other public space interventions, received much attention and significant amounts of public funds from the local government. Indeed, Ciclovía became one of the central axes through which Mockus sought to implement his cultura ciudadana ideas (Paul Bromberg, personal interview, Bogotá, 2012). In 1995, Mockus named Guillermo Peñalosa—Enrique Peñalosa’s brother—Bogotá’s Commissioner of Parks and Recreation. Guillermo Peñalosa, who holds an MBA from UCLA, brought his previous experience in the private sector to Bogotá’s local government and introduced three key innovations to Ciclovía. First, he moved the management of the program from the Transportation Department to the Parks, Recreation and Sports Institute (IDRD), a decentralized unit of Bogotá’s Mayor’s Office. IDRD provided Guillermo Peñalosa with a less bureaucratic and more professional environment where he had more flexibility to partner with different agencies, non-profits and the private sector in order to supplement the agency’s limited budget. Starting in 1997, Ciclovía started to receive approximately 25% of its funding from private sources, although the majority of the budget is still provided by the local government (Del Castillo et al., 2011). Second, this flexibility to partner allowed his IDRD team to expand the attractiveness of Ciclovía for the general public by introducing Recreovía, a program that offered free activities during Ciclovía events, including aerobics and dance workshops, in collaboration with different local institutions and non-profits. Third, he introduced a volunteer program that allowed the expansion of Ciclovía without having to increase the number of IDRD employees. His small but professional team, together with a large number of volunteers, helped him achieve his objective of expanding Ciclovía’s length over 100 kilometers. By the late 1990s, Ciclovía had reached 75 miles (121 km) and a million users every Sunday. In 1998, Enrique Peñalosa took office as mayor and Guillermo Peñalosa left IDRD. Although Enrique Peñalosa continued some of Mockus’s cultura
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 127 ciudadana policies, he gave a more central role to the physical improvement of public space and transportation infrastructure. While Mockus’s efforts focused in teaching civic values to the citizenry as a means of transforming their behavior and decreasing urban violence, Enrique Peñalosa focused on the construction of parks and non-car means of transportation. Based on Curitiba’s transportation planning innovations, the Barcelona model of public space and Dutch bicycle networks, Enrique Peñalosa built Transmilenio, the largest Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in the world, 82 miles (132 km) of bike lanes and rebuilt more than 1,000 public parks (Berney, 2008). Since 1995, Bogotá mayors have maintained the length of Ciclovía, although it lost some miles in recent years due to the construction and operation of new BRT lines. As of 2010, Ciclovía’s total length was 60 miles (97 km), annual costs were about $1.7 million USD (75% coming from public funds), and attendance ranged from 600,000 and 1,400,000 users per event (Del Castillo et al., 2011).
Part II. Worlding Ciclovía 2003–2005: Sustainable Transportation and Public Health Advocacy: Worlding Ciclovía as International “Best Practice” So far this chapter has concentrated on the main changes and mutations that Ciclovía experienced in Bogotá over its 40 years of existence. This section seeks to answer the second key question of this chapter: how did Ciclovía emerge as an international model or “best practice”? From 1974 until 2003, some cities in Colombian and Latin America started a Ciclovía program based on Bogotá’s example. However, it was not until the mid-2000s that Ciclovía emerged as an international “best practice” and started to circulate widely in and outside Latin America. In this section, I argue that four key actors and networks were key in constructing Ciclovía as an international “best practice”: 1) former Bogotá mayors and local officials that traveled the world to speak about Bogotá’s urban transformation, particularly Enrique and Guillermo Peñalosa; 2) a transnational network of sustainable transportation and public health advocates funded by international development and philanthropic organizations that sought to reduce emissions and increase physical exercise in cities around the world; 3) a network of Ciclovía experts that, despite not necessarily being from Bogotá, have successfully implemented a Ciclovía initiative in their home cities and shared technical and administrative details needed to organize an event with culturally proximate cities; and 4) the digital technologies that made possible the instant circulation and viralization of photos and videos of Bogotá, which constitute a key actant—in the terminology of actor-network theory (Latour, 2005)—that has contributed to the circulation of Ciclovía around the world. Enrique Peñalosa is key to the emergence of Bogotá’s new imaginary worldwide. After he left office in 2000, he moved to New York to prepare his presidential candidacy. As a visiting scholar at NYU’s Center for Latin American Studies, he also wanted to take time to reflect on his experience and write a
128 Sergio Montero book on alternative urbanization strategies in developing cities. Thanks to an Eisenhower fellowship, during the first months of 2001, Peñalosa visited different US cities to learn and broaden his network of contacts in the area of urban planning and public space. Later that year, he was invited to give a speech for an event sponsored by the Institute for Transportation and Development (ITDP), a New York–based non-profit that promotes sustainable transportation in developing countries. While ITDP directors had heard of him and Bogotá before, during his presentation they were impressed by his charisma, his rhetorical abilities in English and the way in which he, via PowerPoint, presented a powerful story of urban transformation with the help of pictures, statistics and emotional quotes such as his famous “a quality city is not one that has great roads but one where a child can safely go anywhere on a bicycle.” ITDP, which was growing at the time thanks to the increasing availability of funding from USAID and philanthropic organizations such as the Hewlett Foundation, saw in Peñalosa a perfect messenger to spread its sustainable transportation message worldwide. As much as Enrique Peñalosa became Bogotá ambassador worldwide, he also became ITDP’s ambassador and ITDP funded many of his travels to developing cities, particularly in Asia and Africa. On these trips he worked to convince mayors and local officials of the benefits of building BRTs and bike- and pedestrian-friendly infrastructure. As Peñalosa became embedded in international transportation policy circuits, Bogotá’s urban transformation story became abstracted from the many legal, fiscal and citizen culture reforms undertaken in the 1990s to a streamlined story in which non-motorized physical infrastructure had transformed the city in the three years that Peñalosa served as mayor. This boiled-down story of urban transformation, however, played well among the many mayors and planners in developing cities that sought to start an iconic urban project during their limited time in office. In this context, Bogotá’s transportation policies provided a relatively inexpensive and easy-toimplement example to follow. Many cities around the world sent delegations to learn from Bogotá after Enrique Peñalosa talked to their political leaders and several built a BRT or established a Ciclovía initiative using Bogotá as reference (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2012). Yet, ITDP was conscious that cultural, political and legal variables were important in policy replication and, therefore, it sought to build at least one BRT system on each continent so that these would become “best practices” themselves to smaller culturally proximate cities. For example, to inspire Guangzhou officials to build a BRT, ITDP funded several visits of Enrique Peñalosa to Guangzhou along with study tours of Guangzhou officials to Bogotá. When a BRT was eventually built, Guangzhou set the stage for the dozens of systems that have been built in China. Instead of sponsoring visits and study tours to Bogotá, ITDP would take Chinese officials to Guangzhou. The effectiveness and success of ITDP’s “best practice” strategy to promote BRTs around the world resonated among ITDP’s funders and, some years later, the Hewlett Foundation adopted a similar “best practice” strategy to promote its environmental objectives of reducing emissions by focusing in urban policy
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 129 change in China and Mexico’s largest cities (Hal Harvey, personal interview, 2013). Soon, other international institutions interested in transportation and international development including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank as well as philanthropic and non-profit organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation or the World Resources Institute/EMBARQ also started to use the Bogotá story and Peñalosa’s presentations to promote transportation policy changes in many developing cities at once. In 2003, ITDP organized a four-day international seminar in Bogotá together with the local non-profit Ciudad Humana that brought hundreds of city planners, elected officials, academics, transportation planning consultants and representatives of civic organizations from more than 30 countries from the North and the South. The objective was for other cities “to witness [Bogotá’s] successes first hand” (ITDP, 2003). A 2003 ITDP press release called “Bogotá Shares Urban Revolution With the World,” shows the kind of Bogotá’s successes that ITDP was interested in sharing with other cities: Latin America’s largest network of bicycle routes of 150 miles long (250 km); a world-class Bus Rapid Transit system of dedicated bus lanes called TransMilenio; the world’s longest pedestrian-only street, spanning 10.2 miles (17 km) and hundreds of miles of sidewalks, many through the city’s poorest neighborhoods; Car-Free Sunday [Ciclovía], when many streets are closed to motorized traffic to make space for thousands of cyclists and pedestrians. (ITDP, 2003) Together with Enrique Peñalosa’s travels around the world, this 2003 ITDPCiudad Humana international seminar was an important step in worlding Bogotá’s non-motorized infrastructure and policies as international references in sustainable transportation planning and urban design. While Ciclovía was only one of the Bogotá “best practices” that ITDP was interested in promoting, certainly secondary to BRT, this seminar helped plant important seeds that spread Ciclovía around the world. In particular, the attendance of Enrique Jacoby, from the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), led to the construction of a transnational collaboration of sustainable transportation and public health advocates around Ciclovía. Since the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Ottawa conference in 1986, international public health strategies have been shifting to a new strategy centered on health promotion (Kickbusch, 2003). This new strategy sought to move away from a risk factor approach—based on pedagogical strategies to modify healthy risk behavior—towards a renewed focus on the contexts or “settings of everyday life” that determine health habits (Kickbusch, 2003, 385). Simultaneously, through the Healthy Cities initiative, the WHO has also attempted to strategically focus this new health promotion strategy in cities to create a “strong lobby for public health at the local level” (Kickbusch, 2003). Key elements of the Healthy Cities strategy included the creation of inter-sectoral
130 Sergio Montero participatory committees at the local level with an emphasis on urban policy change. This new strategy advocated from the WHO has made public health advocates more concerned with the dynamics of urban policy and planning in recent decades. Given increasing concerns over obesity and sedentary lifestyles worldwide and new scientific findings that recommended at least 150 minutes of moderate exercise or 75 minutes of vigorous physical activity per week (WHO, 2010a), Ciclovía became an ideal policy aligned with this new public health promotion agenda focused on cities (Cervero et al., 2009; Sarmiento et al., 2010). In 2005, partnering with Ciudad Humana, PAHO and the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) funded a Ciclovía seminar in Bogotá. This collaboration between sustainable transportation and public health advocates was a fruitful one and resulted in the creation of the Red de Ciclovías Recreativas de las Américas (CRA), an institutionalized city network of different cities in the Americas that hold a regular Ciclovía event. Since its creation, the network holds a yearly congress and has a website with an “official” Ciclovía manual in Spanish and English downloadable for free thanks to PAHO and CDC funding. Illustrated with case studies from Bogotá and Guadalajara, the manual contains administrative and logistical details ranging from strategies to convince politicians to implement Ciclovía, to strategies to get funding, to logistical details about how to recruit and manage volunteers to run the event. A regular speaker at CRA events as well as in conferences aimed at bicycle advocates such as the Towards Car-Free Cities network’s annual gatherings is Guillermo Peñalosa. After leaving his job at Bogotá’s IDRD, Guillermo has also traveled the world promoting the benefits of Ciclovía, emphasizing the changes in the mid-1990s under his management and branding Bogotá as a model of urban success. He has given talks in more than 150 cities and, in 2006, he created his own consultancy company through which he has advised officials and planners around the world interested in implementing Ciclovía initiatives (Guillermo Peñalosa, personal interview, 2012). Another set of actors that have been influential in constructing Ciclovía as a “best practice” and mobilizing it around the world have been local leaders that have implemented a Ciclovía initiative in their home cities. For example, when I interviewed the director of Sunday Streets—San Francisco’s Ciclovía—in 2010 she said she had a spreadsheet with 32 cities that she has advised since San Francisco started a regular Ciclovía program in 2008 (Susan King, personal interview, San Francisco, 2010). By the summer of 2013, her spreadsheet included 72 cities (Susan King, personal interview, San Francisco, 2013). Although most local leaders in other cities of the San Francisco Bay Area that have attempted to replicate the program might have not been to Colombia, they have seen videos of Bogotá’s Ciclovía and experienced San Francisco’s program firsthand. Some cities in the area implemented a program and kept the Bogotá reference, for instance Oakland’s Oaklavía, whereas others, such as Berkeley, named it Sunday Streets in a clear reference to San Francisco’s program.
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 131 Randy Neufeld, of the Chicago Alliance for Walking and Biking (AWB), has also been an important promoter of Ciclovía in the US. After attending the 2003 ITDP seminar in Bogotá and being inspired by Ciclovía, he came back and gathered several community leaders to push the local government to do a similar program in Chicago. Whereas the Chicago program has run into many obstacles, AWB was key in spreading the idea of Ciclovía to other US bicycle advocacy organizations through the organization of conferences and retreats. More recently, this organization helped launch the Open Street Project, a USspecific city network that seeks to promote Ciclovía programs by addressing their biggest barrier in the US: their high cost. Unlike Bogotá and most Latin American cities, US cities have to pay for police during the time the event takes place and also for private insurance due to the risk that citizens would sue the city if there are any accidents. Finally, due to the increased use of digital technologies in the last decade, not only is there a mobile infrastructure of city networks, conferences, traveling consultants and study tours that help mobilize policies but there is also a virtual infrastructure in the form of blogs and social networking sites where policies are increasingly mobilized by advocates and other policy actors. Of particular importance for Ciclovía is Streetsblog, an influential policy blog among sustainable transportation and bicycle advocates (Stehlin, 2014; Montero, 2018). Streetsblog’s strategy to promote sustainable transportation policies in the US takes the form of provocative blog posts and short videos of cities with innovative sustainable transportation policies. Its 9-minute Ciclovía video, published in 2007 on its sister site Streetfilms, has the site’s record of visits with more than half million hits since posting. A collective of New York bicycle and transportation activists from Streetsblog and the influential New York advocacy organization Transportation Alternatives shot the video in Bogotá in 2007. Sustainable transportation advocates in cities around the world have used this video to explain the Ciclovía concept to their communities and to convince mayors and key urban decision-makers of its potential value. Streetsblog illustrates a new and successful form of transnational advocacy based on the circulation and viralization of sustainable transportation “best practices.” Similarly, the WHO has also made use of online material and short videos to effect policy change in many cities at once. For instance, in 2010 the WHO hired Guillermo Peñalosa for the campaign “1,000 Cities, 1,000 Lives.” Using videos and visual material from Bogotá and other cities with Ciclovía-type events, the WHO sought to “open up public spaces to health” (WHO, 2010b) and convince urban decisionmakers around the world of the health benefits of street closures and policies that promote physical exercise in urban environments.
Concluding Comments In an article titled “A Global Sense of Place,” geographer Doreen Massey (1991) argued that studying how the economic, political and cultural relationships of a place with the rest of the world change over time was a fruitful area
132 Sergio Montero of investigation that could give us a more progressive sense of place than thinking of places with a unique character, identity and history. I believe Massey’s argument can also help open up new paths of inquiry in Latin American urban studies. While much has been written in the last two decades about certain Latin American cities as innovative examples of transformative urban planning, less is known about the mechanisms and rationalities that allow certain urban experiments and policies to be legitimized as “ models” that circulate while others are rendered immobile despite, even perhaps, proven effectiveness. A critical approach beyond focusing on the difficulties of successful policy transfer— what this chapter has called the “contextual critique” of “best practices”—can help Latin Americanist urban researchers reveal less evident forms of power, governance and legitimacy embedded not only in policy travel but also in the construction of particular policies as international “best practices.” Using Bogotá’s Ciclovía as a case study, this chapter has examined policy formation, transformation and mobilization as a dynamic and relational process constituted by actors, networks and agendas that are both local and transnational. Based on the assumption that policy novelty or effectiveness is not sufficient for world recognition and circulation, it suggested that one way in which a particular policy or planning mechanism is worlded is through its elevation to the category of international “best practice.” While authors in the “policy mobilities” approach have long recognized that policy mutation and transformation is key for policy mobility so that policies can adapt to different settings and the different agendas of mobilizing agents, this chapter has explored policy mutation in the original site of policy experimentation. It showed that changes in the main rationalities behind Ciclovía over time allowed the policy to survive in Bogotá and eventually emerge as an international “best practice” in the early 2000s. Policy mutation facilitates therefore not only policy mobilization but also policy alignment with powerful transnational actors and networks and their agendas. When this alignment occurs, certain policies become international “best practices” and are, therefore, “worlded” as international models of planning in a particular moment of history. The alignment of Ciclovía in the mid-2000s with a transnational network of sustainable transportation and public health advocates in search of policies to materialize their global agendas of reducing emissions and promoting non-motorized transportation and physical exercise in urban environments is at the core of what allowed Ciclovía, after 30 years of almost anonymous existence, to be constructed as an international “best practice” and circulate widely. Finally, an important conclusion of this chapter has to do with the analytical usefulness of the terms Global South and North to explain urban policy circulations. While the travels of Ciclovía or the adoption of Bogotá policies in other cities in the Global South has often been celebrated as South-South policy exchanges, this chapter has shown how the travels of Bogotá’s Ciclovía have often been mediated by North-based organizations such as ITDP, US bicycle advocacy groups, the WHO, PAHO or CDC. This suggests that Southern policies that reach world recognition are also deeply entangled with Northern
Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía 133 policy networks and agendas. In her book Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development, Jennifer Robinson (2006) argued that urban theory needs to move beyond conceptualizations of a modern North and a developing South. The analysis of the actors and networks that have constructed and mobilized Ciclovía as an international “best practice” suggests that we also need to move beyond ideas of Northern versus Southern policy networks towards looking at the multidirectional traffic of policy models and collaborations between policy actors situated in the North and the South. This conceptualization of urban policy and “best practices” can help us reveal less evident local and transnational power relationships and collaborations that shape urban policy and connect cities in complex yet not incoherent ways.
Notes 1. This chapter is based on the following article: Montero, S. (2017). Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía: from urban experiment to international “best practice.” Latin American Perspectives, 44(2), 111–131 2. Literally, a “citizenship culture,” this concept was introduced by Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus and guided his interventions in the city during his two administrations (1995–1997 and 2000–2003). 3. I keep the language of “experiment” found in a article written by Jaime Ortiz in 1985 reflecting on the origins of Ciclovía (Ortiz, 1985). 4. LASPAU (Latin American Scholarship Program at American Universities) was established in Colombia in 1965 by Harvard University, Ford Foundation and the Colombian Institute for Credit and Technical Studies Abroad (ICETEX) to promote university education of Colombian students in the United States.
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The Diffusion of Brazilian Participatory Institutions1 From Innovation to Internationalization Osmany Porto de Oliveira
Introduction Brazil has been an internationally recognized case of social participation. The participatory institutions have been introduced and broadened as of the redemocratization process and the Federal Constitution of 1988. The set of participatory institutions implemented in the country is vast. The Councils, the National Conferences, the Strategic Master Plans and Participatory Budgeting (PB) can be highlighted. These are institutions which operate on the different levels of the federation (municipal, state and federal) and on the varied sectors of public policies. Democratic innovations turned Brazil into an institutionalized social participation experience lab. This lab has gained world attention due to its experiences of published results and its capacity of reinventing the way of producing public policies through the inclusion in the public matters of its citizens and its society in general. Howsoever, before these experiences were put into practice, social participation was the object of social conflict and claim, which took place during the dictatorship period. With the transition to democracy social participation in Brazil was aspired to be strengthened into the state. This chapter aims to present an historic outlook of the participatory innovations in Brazil and its diffusion until the year 2014—deepening at some specific institutions, as the PBs, the Councils and the Conferences—and to point out elements which turned the country into a recognized case due to its social participation experiences.2 Two specific enquires orient this work: How did the social participation institutional innovations emerge in Brazil? How were the experiences diffused in the country and then became international references? This chapter’s common thread follows the argument that Brazil has turned into an emblematic case of social participation, above all, due to the fact that it was capable of creating a variety of innovative institutionalized social participation mechanisms. Two terms were adopted to deal with this chapter’s main object. First, the idea of social participation policy which consists of government initiatives to create and define one or more participatory institutions at its jurisdiction levels; second, the notion of participatory institution, which corresponds to the institution per se.
140 Osmany Porto de Oliveira The strategy used for the chapter’s elaboration was developed mainly from data collected in the last years’ experience of research on the social participation field. I aimed to blend primary sources collected in the scope of research on PB in different Brazilian municipalities (Porto de Oliveira, 2017), a field mission which took place in Brasília during the First National Seminar for Social Participation (2011), besides complementing it with secondary literature and technical and law-making documentation. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first one briefly describes the social movements’ course before the Constitution of 1988, emphasizing some characteristics of the Brazilian civil society in this period and its claims towards social participation. The second part presents democratic innovation experiences which emerged as of the Federal Constitution of 1988, emphasizing particularly three emblematic cases of PB, the Councils and national and municipal Conferences. The third part considers the participatory institutions diffusion from three movements: horizontal diffusion, among municipalities; the scaleshifts, from municipal to state and federal levels; and the internationalization.
Organized Social Movements and Associativism at the End of the Military Period Some preliminary elements emphasized by the civil society literature need to be mentioned in order to present a brief genealogy of the institutionalized social participation in contemporary Brazil. First, Brazilian society was historically marked by practices of coronelism (rule of coronels), clientelism and an “exchange of favours” dynamics founded on vertical relations. Public policies production during the dictatorship period was centralized and was also marked by relations as the ones described previously. Second, as of the end of the 1970s, when the political opening process was started, yet in the dictatorship period, a set of movements oriented by discourses of heterogeneous matrixes begins to exert some degree of political influence in the country. These movements had as their set of ideas the discourse of Liberation Theology, the left-wing militants and the new syndicalism. Between 1983 and 1984 the largest Brazilian society mass expressions until then, as an example, took place, the so-called Diretas já, claiming for the end of dictatorship and the return of direct elections for president. Third, also during the 1970s and 1980s varied-purpose associations proliferated in Brazil, from movements around agrarian issues, as the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST—Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra), syndicalists, as the Unified Worker’s Central (CUT—Central Única dos Trabalhadores), to ones oriented by the municipal initiative, as the Neighbourhood Friends Societies (SAB—Sociedades de Amigos de Bairro). Associativism begins to express an active social role, for example, to promote rights guarantee (Avritzer et al., 2004, p. 13). Fourth, the social movements since the dictatorship period claimed for social participation on public matters, its extension and effectiveness through state
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 141 institutions. Further these associations were struggling for greater autonomy from the state. At the national level, during the constituent assembly, a set of varied groups were involved in the elaboration process of the Constitutional Letter in 1988 and managed to include participation in the final text (Souza, 2001, 2005). At the local level, in Porto Alegre, associations as the Union of Associations of Porto Alegre Residents (UAMPA—União de Associações dos Moradores de Porto Alegre) and the Rio-Grandense Federation of Neighbourhood Friends’ Associations (FRACAB—Federação Rio-Grandense de Associações de Amigos de Bairro) were crucial for the production of PB. The idea of including society on the budgeting process would come from social groups, before becoming a program implemented by the government (Fedozzi, 2000). Lastly, previous experiences of social participation were being executed or tested in Brazil (Souza, 2005; Marquetti and Campos, 2008). Pioneering methods of social participation emerged in Recife in the 1980s, through Mayor Jarbas Vasconcelos, member of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB—Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro), by means of the City Hall in the Mayor in Neighbourhoods Program (Programa Prefeitura nos Bairros). In addition, early experiences of social participation in budget allocation were started in Pelotas (Rio Grande do Sul) by Mayor Bernardo de Souza (PMDB), in the 1980s (Schneider and Goldfrank, 2005, p. 228), and also in Lages (Santa Catarina) and Vila Velha (Espírito Santo) (Teixeira and Albuquerque, 2006, p. 179). The pioneering aspect of these experiences encouraged, incited and inspired the implementation of participatory experiences in Brazil.
Innovation: The Federal Constitution, Participatory Budgeting, Councils and Conferences The Federal Constitution of 1988 The great mark of the social participation policies expansion in Brazil was the redemocratization during the 1980s and specially the Federal Constitution of 1988. Along with the new Constitution in 1988 a set of proposals were made effective in the form of rights and complemented through Constitutional amendments and laws throughout the following decades. These are norms that not only provide for social participation, but also provide ways of guaranteeing public administration transparency and accountability. Furthermore, the Constitution increased the autonomy of subnational institutions and their collecting capacity. This has contributed for the municipalities to be able to innovate in different scopes and, above all, on those regarding social participation policies, as the emblematic case of PB (Souza, 2001, p. 86). In the Federal Constitution the Articles 194 (social security), 198 (health), 204 (social assistance), 206 (education) and 227 (child and adolescent) instituted the decentralized and democratic dimension on the management of sectorial policies on the referred areas. Article 79, which creates the poverty eradication and fight fund, also establishes that a “Monitoring Advisory Council
142 Osmany Porto de Oliveira must include social participation of the civil society”. The Constitution also reinforced the role of the Public Prosecutor on the horizontal control of the public administration activities and brought more transparency with the habeas data. In the Magna Carta was also instituted the mechanism of impeachment for the executive chief, which was used to oust from power President Fernando Collor in the early 1990s and President Dilma Rousseff in 2016. The budget was also subject to constitutional innovation. The Constitution established, in Article 165, an association between budgeting and planning through the Pluriannual Plan (PPA—Plano Plurianual), the Directive Budgeting Law (LDO—Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias) and the Annual Budget Law (LOA—Lei de Orçamento Anual), a tripod which aimed to organize the government’s public policies goals, allowing greater social control over government actions. In the last years programs for participatory PPA were instituted for municipal and state-level governments (cf. Santo André and Rio Grande do Sul), as a method to deepen social participation on budget procedures, mainly after the creation of the City Statute. Regarding the cities, Article 29 of the Federal Constitution establishes in Subsection XII the “cooperation of representative associations in the municipal planning”. Articles 182 and 183 standardized the urban policies, defining the Strategic Master Plan as a basic tool, mandatory for cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants, in order to organize the development of the city social functions. In 2001 the urban policy was complemented by the City Statute, through bill number 10.257, which established, in Article 2 Subsection II, the “democratic management through the participation of the population and representative associations of varied segments of the community on the designing, execution and advising of plans, programs and projects of urban development”. The City Statute established in Subsection XIII the “hearing of the municipal Public Power and of the interested population on the implementation process of enterprises and activities with potential negative effects on the natural or constructed environment, the comfort or the safety of the population”. And above all in Chapter IV “On the democratic management of the city” establishes a set of social participation instruments, through the presence of informed bodies on urban policies at the different levels of the federation, execution of debates, hearings and public consultation, conferences on urban matters, bills, plans, programs and projects on urban development by popular initiatives, participatory budget management which includes the execution of debates, hearings and public consultation for the PPA, LDO and LOA, as conditions for its approval in the Chamber of Representatives. Along with the institutional innovations mentioned, there was a strong idea of social participation on the core of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) government program, which was applied on management strategies of varied sectors of public policies. It was a method of public management identified as “the PT way of government” (Bittar, 1992, p. 210) which can be translated, synthetically, in a method of management that “looks for a permanent citizens’ political participation, above all, through its groups, as a decisive way for
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 143 the construction of a society effectively democratic, of social welfare and free men”, being its proposal of participatory government “the transference of real power to the majority of the population” from which “the emphasis on proposals of popular participation regarding public policies formulation, decision, execution and control” emanates (Bittar, 1992, p. 211). From the redemocratization on, PT has won elections and was at the helm of governments of Brazilian large cities. Cities such as Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, Belém, among others were managed by PT mayors. This scenario was progressively broadened, having PT mayors in 32 cities in 1988, 53 in 1992, 115 in 1996 and 187 in 2000 (Souza, 2001, p. 87). These cities were constituted as fertile fields for the implementation of the participatory project, identified as the “the PT way of government”. In the capitals governed by PT public policies councils were created, beyond those established by the Constitution and above all, the PBs were diffused throughout Brazil. In the following paragraphs the case of Porto Alegre will be presented. Then we are going to approach municipal Councils, federal Councils and the public policies national Conferences. Participatory Budgeting PB was initially developed in Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul State, in 1989, during the administration of Mayor Olívio Dutra from PT. The city already had strong associativism and counted on active social movements, which were vindicating at that time greater participation in public policies (Abers, 2000; Fedozzi, 2000; Santos, 2003). For its part, the PT had in its political project the idea of governing with the “masses”. The “PT way of governing” foresaw the creation of popular councils (Bittar, 1992). PB was the fruit of this confluence of the PT of Porto Alegre, on the one hand, and the demands of social movements, on the other. According to Tarso Genro, former mayor of Porto Alegre (1993–1997, 2001–2002), and Ubiratan de Souza, who was General Coordinator of the Planning Office (GAPLAN) of PB in Porto Alegre (1993– 1998), this experience was inspired by the principles of the historic Commune of Paris and the Russian Soviets (Genro and Souza, 1997, p. 23). At the beginning, PB was a device to produce a form of collaborative management in the municipal administration. The idea underlying the proposal was, in the words of Genro and Souza (1997, p. 18), “to democratize democracy radically, to create mechanisms in order for it to corresponded to the interests of the vast majority of the population”.3 The administration of the Porto Alegre City Hall invested, therefore in the institutional design of a policy capable of channeling the idea of radical democracy into practice. The city developed, based in the interaction between government and community, a methodology of participation in municipal spending.4 The initial model of PB can be presented as a participatory institution, with the purpose to include the citizen in the process of allocating the municipality’s investment resources. The process took place in an annual cycle divided
144 Osmany Porto de Oliveira into stages. Local assemblies, the so-called regional plenaries, took place first. At this stage citizens met in a local forum to vote for policy priorities. In this same assembly, representatives of the city districts called PB Councilors were elected. In the following stage, the Councilors discussed the most voted policies in regional plenaries, in a central forum, the Participatory Budgeting Council. Public policies received weights in terms of priorities, which were proportional to a set of criteria, in order to favor the most deprived regions. Once the public policy demands were selected, the municipality assessed their viability and proceeded to the policy implementation, which was accompanied by the citizens. The institutional design of PB was able to combine the dimension of direct citizen participation in public policies to the representative dimension, through PB Councilors. After a few years PB included also thematic assemblies to discuss issues in specific sectors.5 PB suffered resistance, either because of the lack of interest from the middle class in the city of Porto Alegre, which was not sensitized to participate in the process, or from the elites, who delegitimized the policy and the opposition, which sought to undermine the experience.6 There is a set of results obtained through PB, which was important to raise interest in the experience from other mayors, activists and academics. One of these is the dimension of social justice and inclusion. As the population of the poorest regions began to participate in the decision-making process, they started to bring policies to the outskirts of the city and vulnerable districts. Basic services provision such as street paving, health units, sanitation systems started to be improved or implemented in certain regions. There was a process of decentralization of public services, which were before concentrated in the center of the city. Another element concerns the greater involvement of citizens in public policy, which made PB a public and formative space, serving as a sort of “school of democracy”. In addition, the PB, which was the flagship of the PT’s administration in the city, showed electoral results in Porto Alegre, insofar as mayors from this party were elected for several times, ruling the city for 16 consecutive years. The expansion of PB’s in Brazil began after the experience of Porto Alegre and increased progressively in the following years. As PB expanded, new adopters included specific innovations (digital technology, forums for young citizens, biannual cycle, etc.). State capitals such as Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), Recife (Pernambuco), Belém (Pará) and other metropolitan cities such as Santo André, Guarulhos and Osasco, in the State of São Paulo, or smaller municipalities such as Canoas (Rio Grande do Sul) and Ipatinga (Minas Gerais) adopted PB. However, PB was not only implemented by PT and leftwing administrations. Municipalities governed by other parties, such as the PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal—right), PMDB (center) and PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira—center-right) also followed the same path (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003), as will be described later in this chapter. The international diffusion of the PB reached high levels in our days, having been adopted in all the regions of the world, counting more than 7,000 experiences (Sapage, 2018), including important cities like New York (United
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 145 States of America), Paris (France), Lima (Peru), Maputo (Mozambique), among others. The national and international diffusion of PB led to the emergence of different versions of the model, which included variations both in its institutional design and in the political project. Today PB has acquired very different meanings from the early years of Porto Alegre, of a radical democracy project. Municipal Councils The Councils were the most diffused participatory institutions in Brazil. At the municipal level there were more than 20.000 distributed in a universe of 5.565 municipalities (Vitale, Gurza Lavalle, Porto de Oliveira and Serafim, 2014). The Councils are established by the Federal Constitution and regulated by different laws sanctioned in the last years. These participatory institutions were guaranteed by normative instruments in groups of the public policies sectors. The creation of the Councils followed the decentralization process of public policies. Regarding it Soraya Côrtes stated that A common characteristic to these processes has been to condition the transference of financial resources from the federal level to the subnational government level, aiming the creation of participatory forums on the federal, state and municipal level of the public management. (Côrtes, 2005, p. 145) In short, in order to execute transference of resources from the federal level to the sectoral policies in the local level the existence of Councils was established as a condition. In the 1990s the Councils became mandatory to the management of public policies through a set of infra-constitutional laws. The Child and Adolescent Statute establishes the creation of child and adolescent rights Councils and Tutelary Councils. In the health area, the Health Organic Law defined as the Council’s responsibilities to formulate strategies and control the execution of health policies, including those regarding resources. The Organic Law of Social Assistance defines the Councils as deliberative instances which belong to the decentralized system of the area (Brasil, 2014, p. 41). Synthetically the Councils are participatory institutions compounded in equality by members of the government and the civil society, which are responsible to control, follow, inspect and execute sectorial public policies. Regarding municipal Councils, according to Tatagiba (2002), three kinds can be distinguished: the Program Councils, the Theme Councils and Policies Councils. The first ones are those associated to government programs and articulate functions for their execution. These are the Councils of programs such as Habitation or School Feeding. The second is the Theme Councils, which can be created by the municipality or by incentives from the state government. These are institutions which emerged due to the specificities of the municipality local context, such as
146 Osmany Porto de Oliveira specific social demands or particular (social) movements. Among the examples Councils of culture, sport, youth can be included. The third kind of Councils represents those linked to policies that are articulated in the purview of the Brazilian federative system that are often required by law as a condition to the execution of public policies by the municipal public power. According to Tatagiba (2002, p. 50) these Councils “became key factors on the processes of decentralization and democratization of social policies”. They are specifically the Health, Social Assistance, Education and Child and Adolescent Councils. They work as spaces for absorbing society demands, negotiating social groups’ interests and including the voices of those who have less access to the state. They work also as institutions for following and exerting social control over public policies. The presence of Municipal Councils varies accordingly to the city and strongly depends on the political situation of the municipality. In a survey executed by Gurza Lavalle, Porto de Oliveira, Serafim and Voigt (2011) 35 Councils were found operating in Guarulhos. In Porto Alegre, in its turn, there were around 25 Councils.7 These examples show how the number of Councils can vary according to the municipality. Another participation instrument which emerged parallel to the Councils in the municipal scope was the Conferences, which are going to be described in the following section.
The Municipal Conferences As a general rule the Conferences are convened by the mayor, but there is no mandatory frequency. The Municipal Conferences have the comprehensive goal of promoting a debate between government and society, through actors involved in varied sectors of public policies. One of its aims is to “establish a pact in order to achieve certain goals and priorities, and also creating an important space for experience exchange” (Polis, 2005, unpaged document). According to the Polis Institute, regarding the function of “public policies assessment”, the Conferences must happen every two years, in a way that it allows the continuity or revision of government action instruments aiming to solve problems of a public nature. In the Cities Statute is also established that the Conferences must be conducted at the three levels of government and the Ministry of Cities convenes National Conferences of the Cities that are produced through state and municipal level processes (Polis, 2005). The Councils and Conferences were instruments which had a large space in the federal purview. Their functioning is going to be presented in detail in the following paragraphs.
The National Councils and Conferences Among the innovations that were created, recreated and broadened in Brazil, two experiences stand out for making social participation gain national scale: the National Conferences and Councils. This movement challenged classical thesis from political science in which the growth of social participation is
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 147 inversely proportional to its geographic scale, that is, the smaller the scale the larger the social participation and vice versa (Pogrebinschi, 2012). Many of the policies produced by the Brazilian Federal Government were channeled through these two participatory institutions, relying on the participation of millions of people in their formulation and decisions. In between 2003 and 2011, 73 Theme National Conferences took place, from a universe of 114 executed in the last 70 years, involving around 5 million people. In the mentioned period 33 out of a total of 61 Councils were created (IPEA, 2011, p. 21). The National Conferences are experiences that date back to the Getúlio Vargas period. However they were only invigorated, broadened and mobilized as of 2003 through Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) entering the Presidency of the Republic. The National Conferences were convened by the Executive Power through its ministries, secretaries or national councils, and were organized in partnership with civil society through commissions, forums or work groups, the national conferences are completed when directing their demands to the Executive and Legislative Powers in the form of administrative and legislative directives. (Pogrebinschi, 2012, p. 8) According to the Federal Government in the last years the National Conferences “were executed from an innovative congressional format: they start at the municipal level and after state level meetings they finally converge to a synthesis event at national level” (Presidência da República).8 The comprehensiveness areas of the Conferences are sectorial and can be divided in themes such as (1) health, (2) minorities (LGBT, indigenous people, racial equality promotion, etc.), (3) environment, (4) state, economy and development (solidarity economy, food and nutrition security, science, technology and innovation), (5) education, culture, social assistance and sport and (6) human rights (IPEA, 2011, p. 24). In the 73 National Conferences more than 40 different themes were contemplated involving more than 5 million citizens. The National Councils also exist in different sectors of public policies and have an advisory, deliberative and normative character. They have a parity composition, as the municipal councils, being 45% of its members from the government and 55% from the civil society (IPEA, 2011, p. 21). Many government programs in the habitation, social assistance and health areas go through the National Councils and even foreign policy was subjected to social participation through the Participatory and Social Mercosul Brazilian Council instituted in 2007 (IPEA, 2011, p. 30). The National Councils and Conferences are related, the latter are more punctual activities, and the first last longer in time. This way the Councils that are in the same political sector of a certain Conference can continue their actions. According to Pogrebinschi, the Public policies national councils are, therefore, institutions that keep up the work of the national conferences during its interstices, be it guaranteeing
148 Osmany Porto de Oliveira that demands in them presented to be converted into policies (for example through bill projects support motions), be it promoting their execution (for example through normative acts that are specific to them, as the resolutions), be it monitoring them (for example through their ordinary and extraordinary meetings, as well as their work groups and internal commissions). (Pogrebinschi, 2012, p. 27) In this way the link between Councils and Conferences reinforces the quality of their activities. The democratic innovations in Brazil were broad and diverse, being established in all levels of the federation. This has made the country a laboratory for social participation experiences. However, the implementation of participatory institutions does not guarantee its success. Understanding if their actions were effective is necessary. A great part of the literature on the effectiveness of social participation policies has been optimistic, even though recently skeptical positions have also emerged.
Diffusion: Domestic and International The diffusion of social participation policies is associated to a set of social, political-partisan, individual and institutional mechanisms. Three characteristics are important to be deepened in this process: the horizontal diffusion, between homogeneous government levels for example; scale-shift, from a government lower level to an upper one, as the transfers between the municipal scale to the state scale; and the internationalization which can be summarized as the globalization of Brazilian experiences. The diffusion process of social participation policies in the last 30 years can be considered a factor which has contributed to the settling of such practices in contemporary Brazil, for the ways of producing public policies transformation in the country, and their consolidation as a reference.
The Horizontal Diffusion The horizontal diffusion at the municipal level can be observed through the Councils and PBs. Brazil had 5.570 municipalities in 2013. The Councils had a wide diffusion, above all, due to the fact that they were institutionalized, first in the Constitution and, later through the decentralized universal policies system. Through institutional mechanisms which made the Council mandatory, their diffusion began to be massively induced in Brazilian municipalities. In a work published by the Federal Government, a reference was made to Ivo de Carvalho’s study, according to which in between 1991 and 1993, more than 2.000 Health Councils were created in Brazil, compounding an average of 2 Councils implemented per day, and three years later they were present in around 65% of Brazilian municipalities (Brasil, 2014, p. 42). In 2001, in areas in which they
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 149 are required by law, there were 5.426 Health Councils, 5.178 Social Assistance Councils, 4.036 Child and Adolescent Councils and 4.072 Education Councils, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Vitale, Gurza Lavalle, Porto de Oliveira and Serafim, 2014). The Councils’ exponential growth happened due to their institutionalization. The fact that social movements and political parties had an important role through the militancy around the defense of participation, deliberation and social control in the Constitution cannot be neglected. In this sense a mechanism of social and political diffusion can be observed. The institutionalization forerunner activism seems to have been a precondition to the massive diffusion. The partisan dimension in the Councils case can interfere in the areas of those which are not required by law. In the case of Guarulhos, as an example, it was observed that social participation was part of the city government through the entrance of PT which created 18 new Municipal Councils out of a total of 34, in between 2005 and 2010 (Gurza Lavalle, Porto de Oliveira, Serafim and Voigt, 2011, p. 25). The case of PB is diverse as there is no mechanism of institutional induction operating in the diffusion process as it is the case for the Councils. This is a movement that is influenced for individual and political mechanisms. The character of the PBs makes them more volatile and vulnerable to political changes. It happens once the PBs are not required by law, usually consisting of government programs which are supposed to be implemented by the mayor. It means, in general terms, that the implementation of PBs depends on the mayor’s decision to implement them or not. Brian Wampler (2008, pp. 85–87), as an example, when studying the phenomenon of PBs diffusion in Brazil identified three kinds of actors in the process of PBs adoption. They are individual actors, with different levels of engagement who support the process of PBs diffusion. The public policies developers are very motivated actors aiming to implement PBs. The policies defenders, in their turn, offer partial support to its implementation, but they are not willing to put their careers at stake for such matters. Lastly the formal adopters are government employees who offer minimal support, and are little prone to dedicate time and energy to the PB. The PB was one of the PT’s flagships and it was adopted in different municipalities in which the party has won elections, as described in the beginning of this chapter. However, PB adoption is not exclusively associated to the cities in which PT was in the government. If we use as reference the study by Ribeiro de Grazia (2003), which has conducted the first survey on PBs in Brazil in 2000, when the universe of experiences was of 103 municipalities, only 50% were governed by the PT. Half of these experiences were managed by other parties. The PSDB, the main opponent to PT, governed 13% of these experiences and the PMDB 9%. In emblematic cases, such as the ones from Recife and Guarulhos, the implementation of the PB is not bound to PT. Differences regarding the intensity of the experiences are important to be noted. In Recife, for example, as discussed before, there was already the Mayor in Neighbourhoods Program as a social participation program and a primary
150 Osmany Porto de Oliveira form of social participation on the budgeting process. It means that participation was already part of the government project. In Guarulhos, the Green Party (PV—Partido Verde) was the first one to implement an early form of PB. In both cases, however, PT has exerted a relevant role in the investment of PB settling in the cities, redefining policies, aiming to bring closer together the city government and more distant areas of the city, reaching in a more direct way the citizens and involving them, on one hand, on public debates and, on the other hand, assigning a more central role in the city management politics. Effectively, these policies are no longer a peripheral element of the government and become an essential institution in municipal policies of PT management.
The Scale-Shifts The agency of individuals as a mechanism is also present in the scale-shift of PB to the state level. The experience from the government of the city of Porto Alegre has been transferred for a short period of time to the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. Olívio Dutra, the PB founder, had a crucial role taking the PB to the state government when he was elected in 1998, and transformed it in his “main strategic instrument of public management” (Farias, 2003, p. 217). The PB lasted only one term once PT lost the elections and this policy was not considered a successful experience (Schneider and Goldfrank, 2005). Later in 2010, Tarso Genro, also former mayor of Porto Alegre, was elected Governor of Rio Grande do Sul and under his government the social participation agenda was given priority, including participation forms in the budgeting process. Social participation, in general, and PB in particular, are part of the political project of these individuals. Both Dutra and Genro were initially mayors who were deeply committed to PB and who later became governors of this state. The life course of these political men and, mainly, their circulation from one institution to another, contributed to take PB from the municipalities to the state. Dutra and Genro acted as policy ambassadors, activists of the participatory cause, who independently from the institutions (municipality or state) they were part of defended PB in their government programs (Porto de Oliveira, 2017). Despite the fact that PB was the “participation star” of PT (Porto de Oliveira, 2017), this policy was not implemented at the federal level. In certain moments the proposal for a PB was defended and its adoption studied, but it has not been implemented.9 At the national level, the growth of social participation experiences also coincides to the PT entrance, bringing a participatory impetus. The strategy used was to invest in Federal Conferences and in National Councils, besides stimulating other varieties of participatory institutions. The interaction between civil society and state was strongly channeled through these institutions, which were invigorated since 2003, as described before. With the election of Dilma Rousseff in 2010, a new group was formed in the Presidency of the Republic General Secretariat.
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 151 The project to create a National System of Social Participation (Sistema Nacional de Participação Social) emerged, which would define social participation as a “government method”. During a national event, held in 2011, to discuss the System in Brasília, Jonh Gaventa, an expert in the area, said that he believed “that the model of participation, which has been developed here in Brazil, is important not only for you, but it is a model that has to be used all around the world” and he also insisted on the fact that the future of participation in Brazil “also affects the future of people who are fighting for participation around the world”, claiming that “What you do is very, very important for the rest of all”.10 The policy was decreed in 2014 by President Dilma Rousseff through Decree Number 8.243. The proposal of the National System of Social Participation was the broadest one so far, as it had federal scale. As a matter of fact this policy would reinforce a set of participation spaces, such as Councils and National Conferences which were already functioning, providing greater institutionalization, organization and systematization to the participatory process. In addition the project would also make participation rules clearer to citizens. However the decree was suspended in the same year by the Chamber of Deputies.11
The Internationalization of Participatory Budgeting12 PB is one of the Brazilian participatory institutions which had the greatest international repercussions. Other institutions such as the Councils, for example, despite having wide internal diffusion, lack evidences regarding internationalization. PB, in its turn, had a high international repercussion. Not all experiences are directly inspired by the one from Porto Alegre or the models developed in Brazil. Furthermore, as mentioned the PB political and technical content has been adapted and translated to the different contexts where it has been adopted, pulling it away from its original proposal of radicalization of democracy, as presented in Porto Alegre. The PB international diffusion was influenced by a set of factors (Porto de Oliveira, 2017), from which only the action of individuals and international institutions are going to be approached in this next section. Ambassadors of PB and Transnational Arenas The work of a group of individuals was fundamental to set PB on the international agenda, as well as diffusing it in a punctual manner to different international cities and organizations. The internationalization process has its start through the action of politicians from Porto Alegre who promoted PB during the 1990s. Mayors such as Tarso Genro and Raul Pont (1997–2001), as well as administrators such as Ubiratan de Souza and others, “have travelled the world” publicizing the Porto Alegre experience (Bogotá mayors and elites, such as Peñalosa, also performed similar actions in the case of the bike lane, as presented by Sergio Montero in this book). These Porto Alegre PB ambassadors
152 Osmany Porto de Oliveira were crucial for this policy internationalization, establishing relations with mayors from Latin American cities (for example such as Montevideo and Rosário) and European ones (Barcelona and Saint-Denis), through progressist orientation, generally from parties linked to the communist and socialist left-wing. In addition to the defense and personal publicization of these actors at that time, books were translated and studies published on the Porto Alegre experience. The PB diffusion among the cities of the Southern Cone has gained additional strength through the construction of the network Mercocidades, as of the mid-1990s, which included mayors of cities ideologically aligned with Porto Alegre and sharing a common political project.13 This process was built as a mechanism of opposition to the regional integration, performed in the scope of the Mercosul which was being consolidated as an economic bloc in the region and was being promoted by the heads of states in the region of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. They had as an objective to include the “voice of the cities” in the process of regional integration; the network also worked as a platform for promoting exchanges of varied practices on urban management, including the PB. In this sense, the regional integration “from the bottom to the top” (as argued by Eric Sabourin et al., in the chapter in this work) also helped the diffusion of PB in Latin America. After the first World Social Forums (WSF), as of 2001, under the government of Tarso Genro and João Verle (PT) in Porto Alegre, PB began to be recognized by varied municipalities, politicians, public administrators, journalists and left-wing militants all over the world. The WSFs not only spotlighted PB, but also launched this instrument as “hope for another possible world” (the event’s motto was “another world is possible”) through the democratic path, working as a showcase and space for meetings of those who were engaged in the process of deepening democracy. As of this moment a new group of “PB Ambassadors” kicked in, which were distinguished from the Porto Alegre original ones. Among them the Europeans stood out, they have followed PB in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Porto Alegre and acted as go-between to Latin America and Europe. They are a cosmopolitan group that was going to substitute the previous generation of “ambassadors” as of the moment PT lost the elections for mayor in Porto Alegre in 2004. The new “ambassadors” took part in the process of PB implementation in European cities as of the 2000s and gathered great expertise on the subject. The work along with PB becomes their main professional activity. The “ambassadors” act in varied places of the world and institutions (national and international, governmental and non-governmental), during a long period on the promotion of PB, publishing materials, offering consultancy and performing advocacy for its implementation. Their practice follows the process of PB massive diffusion, which exceeds the Latin American and European region and gains planetary scale. These “ambassadors” are protagonists on this process. After that, a third group of “PB Ambassadors” emerged, one that has regional acting. This new generation becomes specialists in PB for specific regions, as Sub-Saharan Africa (Francophone or Anglophone), North America and other
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 153 countries. This group starts acting by the end of the first decade of the 2000s when the experiences in Africa emerge, a place where PBs grew exponentially and also in the United States.14 The international diffusion of PB is marked by the presence of a restricted group of individuals who promotes it actively and constantly at the international level. This group, beyond advising governments, international and non-governmental organizations on the adoption and implementation of PB, also organizes events, publishes materials on the topic (academic articles, books, guides, reports etc.). The role of the “ambassadors” on the organization of events on PB (such as roundtables, panels, workshops, etc.) on transnational arenas of dialogue about management of urban policies must be stressed. Their acting happens on global arenas, such as the World Urban Forum, the meetings of Metropolis Network (Rede Metropolis) and Cities and Local Governments United (Cidades e Governos Locais Unidos), or regional ones as on the Africités Network Conference (a meeting of African local authorities) or yet on PB national meetings (in Brazil, United States, Portugal, etc.). Taking part in these events is important in order to join the circle of PB diffusers and get to know the most recent and innovative practices (as in the case of La Marsa that has received the Africités award, described by Joseph-Désirée Som-1 in this work). There is a small group of “ambassadors” which frequently takes part in them. In these spaces practices are diffused, contacts are established, ideas are legitimated, resources are gathered in order to implement PB. The transnational arenas are important locus for policies diffusion. The international institutions and transnational networks also play a meaningful role in the massive diffusion of PB. International Organizations and Cities Networks As the empirical cases presented in previous chapters of this work (Chapters 2, 3 and 5), international organizations—such as the UN, the European Union and the World Bank—have also had an important role on the promotion of the PB. The UN and World Bank approaches have been happening since the mid-1990s, but it has become more direct and intense after the WSFs in 2000, through the funding of experiences and transference projects, the production of technical knowledge, events organization and other actions. PB transferences are multiplied once international organizations take action, producing a massive PB diffusion movement on a global scale. UN-Habitat through the Urban Management Program for Latin America and the Caribbean, which operated from Quito in Ecuador between 1997 and 2004, was an important PB diffusion center in the region. The European Union, in its turn, implemented the URB-AL Program, a program of decentralized cooperation among cities from Europe and Latin America, stimulating the exchange of PB ideas, knowledge and techniques between the two regions. The World Bank had an important role on the promotion of PB projects in developing countries, in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. PB was one of the policies repeatedly recommended to cities of underdeveloped countries by the
154 Osmany Porto de Oliveira World Bank (as the citation on the opening of this chapter shows) and this institution was committed to projects and cooperation for PB development and implementation on relevant cases in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Madagascar (the World Bank also has an important role in the diffusion of Conditional Cash Transference policies, as can be seen in the chapter of Cecilia Osorio, Melisssa Pomeroy and Bianca Suyama, in this book). The cities’ transnational networks constituted another important actor in the process. Mercocidades was of the pioneering networks, along with others, such as the Local Authorities Forum for Social Inclusion and Participatory Democracies and the United Cities and Local Governments. These spaces were used to connect people interested in the adoption of participatory institutions, as mayors and “ambassadors”, to exchange knowledge and to help broaden the international PB insertion. As result of this massive diffusion process multiple translations occurred, be it in terms of participation methodology or the PB political content. Each PB adopter (mayor, “ambassador”, international organization, network, etc.) transformed and gave new meanings to this instrument according to their own political and ideological interests (as observed in the La Marsa case presented by Joseph-Désirée Som-1, in this work). This characteristic allowed the emergence of different ideas associated with PB (such as democracy radicalization, social inclusion, transparency, accountability, social control, etc.) and participation methods which can be deeper and include the citizen in the public debate or less deep, working just as a consulting tool on their preferences on public resources investments.
Conclusion Throughout this chapter the aim was to cover the social participation course in Brazil until 2014 considering two points: policies innovation and diffusion. The participatory institutions introduced an innovation on how public policies are produced in Brazil. Participation became part of the Constitutional Letter, being guaranteed as a citizen’s right. Greater transparency for administrative actions was ensured. Vertical social control mechanisms were instituted, as well as liability methods. Areas such as health, social assistance, child and adolescent, education, urban planning, poverty combat, public budget, among others, were contemplated by participatory rights in the Constitution of 1988. In addition, municipal policies such as PB were created, broadening the possible channels for society participation in public matters. The diffusion of social participation policies in Brazil and participatory institutions present distinctive dynamics. The first one regards social and political process of including the participation concept in the government agenda. In Brazil a set of ideas aiming to broaden and deepen social participation gained legal force, as in the Councils case. The second one regards the effectiveness in the form of laws, which have created mechanisms of institutional induction
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 155 from the government national level to lower ones, producing a massive diffusion of Councils in Brazil. Regarding PB, its adoption or continuity is not bound to an institutional obligation, so that other forces are necessary, such as the parties’ political relations, individual actions, mayors’ interests, learning processes and so on in order to guarantee its adoption. When we compare domestic and international diffusion, PB domestic adoption is much lower than the Councils’ scale, while at the international level PB has obtained more prominence when compared to other social participation policies produced in the country. The internationalization follows another dynamic. In the PB case the constant “participation ambassadors” for transnational advocacy was key for its international diffusion. Its promotion was also associated with the engagement of international organizations and the relations among cities’ networks. In spite of the efforts to deepen democracy and create a diverse environment of citizen and social participation in public policies in Brazil, the recent unfoldings in local and national politics are changing this scenario. Previously consolidated spaces, such as PB, have been reducing, at the same time as its international expansion is growing fast. At the national level, participation of society is not a priority in the present day. The question that requires an answer in future research is why and how participatory democracy can return. Table 7.1 Interviews quoted Interview
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Coordinator Former Mayor NGO staff NGO staff NGO staff
Porto Alegre City Hall Porto Alegre City Hall Cidade—NGO Enda-Ecopop Participatory Budgeting Project
2011 2011 2011 2012 2013
Source: Table created by the author.
Notes 1. All direct quotes from Portuguese texts in this chapter were translated from the original. 2. This chapter does not deal with developments of the participatory institutions and those of democracy in Brazil after 2015, due to the fact the country’s political situation has been substantially altered and no in-depth research on this subject has been conducted after that date. It is worth mentioning that participatory institutions are disappearing in Brazil, including PB. In 2019 the President signed a Decree on April 12, extinguishing all collegiate bodies created by Decrees or Ordinances, which according to Bezerra et al. (2019) on what regards organs including the participation of civil society, represents the possible disappearance of half of the 70 institutions that are estimated to exist. 3. Translation by the author from the original in Portuguese, as well as all the other translations in this chapter.
156 Osmany Porto de Oliveira 4. Interview: NGO Diretor, Porto Alegre, 2011. 5. Initially the following Thematic Assemblies were created: Mobility and Transport, Health and Social Assistance, Education, Culture and Leisure, Economic Development and Taxation and City Organization and Urban Development. 6. Interview: former mayor of the city of Porto Alegre, Porto Alegre, 2011. 7. Cf. www.observapoa.com.br/default.php?p_secao=53. Acesso em: 05 de janeiro de 2015 8. Cf. www.balancodegoverno.presidencia.gov.br/democracia-e-dialogo/1.-participacaosocial. Accessed on January 5, 2014. 9. www.planejamento.gov.br/assuntos/planeja/orcamento-federal/noticias/governoestudo-implementar-o-orcamento. Accessed on March 1, 2019. 10. Participation in the First Social Participation National Policy Seminar. Audio recording, author’s original file. 11. www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/POLITICA/476677-DEPUTADOSDERRUBAM-DECRETO-DOS-CONSELHOS-POPULARES.html. Accessed on March 1, 2019. 12. This section is based in my research on the international diffusion of Participatory Budgeting, which has been presented in detail in my previous book, International Policy Diffusion and Participatory Budgeting: Ambassadors of Participation, International Organizations and Transnational Actors (Palgrave McMillan, 2017). 13. Interview conducted with Porto Alegre’s former mayor, 2011. 14. Interviews conducted respectively with: Enda Ecopop NGO employee, Dacar, 2012; Participatory Budgeting Project NGO employee, 2012. 15. The institutional affiliation is in reference to the one at the moment of the interview conduction or the position occupied during the time he or she worked with PB.
References Abers, R. Inventing local democracy: Grassroots politics in Brazil. Lynne Rienner, Londres, 2000. Avritzer, L., Recamán, M. and Venturi, G. O associativismo na cidade de São Paulo. In: Avritzer, L. (org.). A participação em São Paulo. Unesp, São Paulo, 2004. Bezerra, C. et al. Um decreto contra a participação. Os riscos à democracia no Brasil. Carta Capital, 13 abr., 2019. Bittar, J. (org.). O modo petista de governar. Partido dos Trabalhadores, São Paulo, 1992, 324p. Brasil. Participação Social no Brasil: entre conquistas e desafios. Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República. Brasília, 2014. Côrtes, Soraya M. Vargas. Arcabouço histórico-institucional e a conformação de conselhos municipais de políticas públicas. Educar em Revista, n. 25, 2005, pp. 143–174. https://doi.org/10.1590/0104-4060.371. Farias, C. F. Do conflito jurídico ao consenso democrático: uma versão da implementação do OP-RS. In: Avritzer, L. and Navarro, Z. (orgs.). A inovação democrática no Brasil. Cortez, São Paulo, 2003, pp. 217–248. Fedozzi, L. O poder da aldeia: gênese e história do Orçamento Participativo de Porto Alegre. Tomo, Porto Alegre, 2000, 240p. Genro, T. and Souza, U. Orçamento Participativo: A experiência de Porto Alegre. Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, São Paulo, 1997. Gurza Lavalle, A., Porto de Oliveira, O., Serafim, L. and Voigt. Guarulhos as best case: Mapping participatory governance structure and social conflicts. Relatório de pesquisa não publicado, 2011.
Brazilian Participatory Institutions 157 IPEA. Democracia participativa. Desafios do Desenvolvimento, Ano 8, n. 65, 2011. Marquetti, A. and Campos, G. Democracia e Redistribuição: apontamentos iniciais. In: Marquetti, A., Campos, G. A. and Pires, R. (org.). Democracia participativa e redistribuição: análise de experiências de orçamento participativo. Xamã, São Paulo, 2008, pp. 13–30. Pogrebinschi, T. Conferências nacionais e políticas públicas para grupos minoritários. Texto para discussão 1741. IPEA, Brasília, 2012. Polis, I. Conferências Municipais. Dicas, n. 230, 2005. Porto de Oliveira, O. Le transfert d’un modèle de démocratie participative: Paradiplomatie entre Porto Alegre et Saint-Denis. Collection Chrysallides, IHEAL/CREDA, Paris, 2010. Porto de Oliveira, O. International policy diffusion and participatory budgeting: Ambassadors of participation, international organizations and transnational networks. Palgrave McMillan, 2017. ebook. ISBN: 978-3-319-43337-0. Ribeiro, A. C. T. and Grazia, G. de. Experiências de Orçamento Participativo no Brasil: Período de 1997 à 2000. Editora Vozes, Petrópolis, 2003. Sader, E. Quando novos personagens entram em cena: experiências e lutas dos trabalhadores da Grande São Paulo (1970–1980). Paz e Terra, Campinas, 1988. Santos, B. (dir.). Democratizar a Democracia: os caminhos da democracia participativa. Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, 2003. Sapage, S. Orçamentos participativos espalham-se pelo mundo, com Portugal na dianteira. Público, 22 Oct., 2018. Schneider, A. and Goldfrank, B. Construção institucional competitiva: o PT e o Orçamento Participativo no Rio Grande do Sul. In: Lubambo, C., Coêlho, D. and Melo, M. A. (orgs.). Desenho institucional e participação política: experiências no Brasil contemporâneo. Editora Vozes, Petrópolis, 2005, pp. 221–254. Souza, C. Federalismo e descentralização na Constituição de 1988: processo decisório, conflitos e alianças. Dados, v. 44, n. 3, 2001, pp. 513–560. Souza, C. Sistema brasileiro e governança local: inovações institucionais e sustentabilidade. In: Lubambo, C., Coêlho, D. and Melo, M. A. (orgs.). Desenho institucional e participação política: experiências no Brasil contemporâneo. Editora Vozes, Petrópolis, 2005, pp. 108–130. Tatagiba, L. Os Conselhos Gestores e a democratização das políticas públicas no Brasil. In: Dagnino E. (org.). Sociedade Civil e Espaços Públicos no Brasil. Paz e Terra, Campinas, pp. 47–104, 2002. Teixeira, A. C., Albuquerque, M. do C. Orçamentos Participativos: Projetos políticos, partilha de poder e alcance democrático. In: Dagnino, E., Olvera, O. and Aldo, P. (org.). A disputa pela construção democrática na América Latina. Paz e Terra, Campinas, 2006. Vitale, D., Gurza Lavalle, A., Porto de Oliveira, O. and Serafim, L. Participatory democracy in Brazilian cities: Challenges for urban governance. Paper apresentado na 54. Conferência da Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Filadélfia, 2014. Wampler, B. A. difusão do Orçamento Participativo brasileiro: “boas práticas” devem ser promovidas? Opinião Pública, v. 14, n. 1, 2008, pp. 65–95.
Consulted Websites www.balancodegoverno.presidencia.gov.br/democracia-e-dialogo/1.-participacaosocial. Consulted in: January 5, 2015. www.observapoa.com.br/default.php?p_secao=53. Consulted in: January 5, 2015.
158 Osmany Porto de Oliveira www.planejamento.gov.br/assuntos/planeja/orcamento-federal/noticias/governoestudo-implementar-o-orcamento. Consulted in: March 1, 2019. www.ufmg.br/conselheirosnacionais/programa-de-formacao-de-conselheiros-nacionais.html. Consulted in: January 5, 2015. www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/POLITICA/476677-DEPUTADOSDERRUBAM-DECRETO-DOS-CONSELHOS-POPULARES.html, Consulted in: March 1, 2019.
Importing the Participatory Budgeting Model From Porto Alegre to La Marsa The Circulation and Appropriations of a Policy Device Joseph-Désiré Som-1
Introduction The use of the participatory budget has spread widely throughout the world since its inception in Porto Alegre in 1989. There are now thousands of cities around the world experimenting with participatory budgeting schemes, more than 350 of which are African cities (Cabannes & Delgado, 2015; Kanoute, 2011; Porto de Oliveira, 2016 Kanouté & Som-1, 2018). Several studies clearly show the international circulation of this participatory democracy institution (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, 2017, 2019; Mazeaud et al., 2016) and the variations to which it is subjected during its circulation (Sintomer et al., 2012; Mansuri, 2013). However, very few empirical studies offer an analysis, based on a comparison with the Porto Alegre ideal-type, of how the participatory budget is translated into an African context. There is even much less work on the dissemination and translation of the PB in Arab countries. Yves Cabannes’s research provides the first study that analyses the participatory budget in Africa (Cabannes, 2007) while Osmany Porto de Oliveira analyses the role of participation ambassadors in the circulation of the PB to Africa (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, 2017). Recently, researchers have documented the process of deploying the PB in the countries of the Maghreb, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia. This present study demonstrates the important role that political circumstances, ambassadors, and brokers of participation (Som-1 et al., 2017) play in the circulation and appropriation of the PB, but also the competing logics that govern the implementation of the PB at the local level and its sustainability (Goehrs, 2017). Studies also show that the Tunisian case is unique and carries an important emotional dimension that must be taken into account in order to understand its success compared to the other attempts that have failed in the Arab world (Weyland, 2012). The PB allows citizens to deliberate on limited objects of the municipal budget and to participate in the entire public action process. In a context of political fluidity and legal uncertainty, its gradual implementation since 2012 has meant both a challenge to the authoritarian centralism of the previous regime and a desire to go beyond the representative democracy that
160 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 seems to be emerging. Indeed, from the early hours of post–Ben Ali Tunisia, there were initiatives to institutionalize participation in the wake of its social democratization movement. The participatory budget (PB) of Tunisia’s municipalities quickly became a prominent mechanism of this movement. At present, nearly thirty municipalities have adopted the PB in Tunisia, including the municipality of La Marsa. La Marsa, a municipality in the wealthy suburbs of Tunis that has gradually implemented the PB system ever since 2013, is now a model for the Maghreb. (It was awarded third place in the PB’s African Excellence Award at the Seventh Africities Summit in Johannesburg in December 2015.) In Tunisia, this system of participation in local public action was part of the decentralization of policy trajectories (Som-1 et al., 2017) and was part of the reformist myth of the State (Hibou, 2009). What is the name for the BP in Tunisia? What was its import trajectory? In what way and by whom was the Porto Alegre case translated into this context of politically fluid conditions? What remains of the Tunisian experience of political emancipation and the social justice ambitions of the Porto Alegre PB? Based on these questions, our contribution focuses on tracing the process of importing the PB into Tunisia. Specifically, we highlight the role played by the World Social Forum, in particular 2013 and 2015 when it was held in Tunis, but also the role of its other previous events, especially when it was held in Senegal of 2011. We also demonstrate how and by whom the design of the PB is developed and implemented into Tunisia. The historicity and temporalities specific to the PB in Tunisia will shed light on the local ownership of this internationalized system. This contribution is the result of a research project on local democracy in Tunisia that began in February 2013 when I wrote a report for the NGO Foundation for the Future (FFF) on the capacity-building needs of Tunisian civil society on local power. FFF is at the heart of the history of PB’s import into Tunisia. After that, from March 2014, I worked as an embedded sociologist with the association L’Action Associative, which initiated the implementation of the participatory budget in Tunisian municipalities. My aim in this study is to present the trajectory of the PB’s import from Porto Alegre to La Marsa and the local appropriations to which it was subject. Methodologically, I use the information I accumulated throughout almost three years of participant observation, but I also make full use of different sources and methods. I participated in various citizens’ assemblies in the town halls where the participatory budget (PB) was being set up since March 2014. There, I observed the training of facilitators, citizen forums, the meetings of PB delegates, or the meetings of municipal councils. I also participated in the activities of citizen committees. I have complemented this work with semi-structured interviews that I conducted with all stakeholders involved in this co-production of local public action. The interviews take into account the trajectories of civic engagement that reflect local dynamics of participation. I conducted about forty interviews, twenty of which were held in the only town hall of La Marsa. I also interviewed town hall officials (political and administrative), elected delegates
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 161 of the PB, members of citizen advisory committees, facilitators, and members of the organizations implementing and financing the PB process. I also interviewed the national heads of local collectives, the deputies of the Constituent National Assembly, and members of the Constituent Commission of Local Authorities.
The Participatory Budget in Tunisia: An Engaged and Democratic Revolution The History of Participation in Tunisia: Authoritarianism and Developmentalist Injunctions It would be incorrect to think that the process of importing the PB into Tunisia has been linear or strictly situated in the post–Ben Ali era. During the Ben Ali era in Tunisia, various mechanisms within local authorities were aimed at involving citizens in local decision-making. However, it should be recalled that formalizing the participation of citizens within mechanisms of local decisionmaking, even budgetary, is not sufficient to talk about local and/or participatory democracy. While it is true that Ben Ali’s Tunisia used to set up formal mechanisms of civic participation, it was not until the fall of the authoritarian regime in Zaïm that the first experiments with participatory budgeting were set up. Indeed, during the reign of Ben Ali (1987–2011), the Tunisian state was encouraged by neoliberal doxa—in which participation is one of the modalities of democratization processes and above all, an instrument of good governance, as well as one of the conditions for foreign donor aid—to promote the establishment of several participatory mechanisms at the local level; it did so as much for the development of policy as for municipal management. Current research largely documents how these participatory mechanisms, which were set up as part of development policies in the Gafsa mining basin, served the regime’s authoritarian control over local social movements, and offered professional conversion paths to politicized and dissident actors, thereby containing their disputes, and imposing a grammar of “good participation” (Allal, 2016). Berry-Chikhaoui on her part, shows us how the establishment and development of neighbourhood committees in Tunisia since the late 1980s, and their development since the early 1990s following an injunction from President Ben Ali, stems from a desire by the authoritarian state to extend its mechanism for controlling citizens through what it calls empty “shells” made available to local RCD elites1 (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2011). Neighbourhood committees were thus a mechanism implemented under the Ben Ali era, and were situated in the context of the liberal and democratic reforms required of donors in order to involve citizens in municipal management. The aim was to establish groups of citizens at the heart of each district who were consulted by the municipality, and often by the central authority, on various aspects of land management. It is worth mentioning that the department that had to deal with their legal recognition and organization was, according to
162 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 the law, not situated at the level of the municipalities, but rather at the level of the governorate, i.e. at the level of the central state. Very quickly, it appeared that these neighbourhood committees were politicized by Ben Ali’s RCD party and were perceived as outgrowths of the ruling party. These committees often served as a corridor for the cronyism and patronage that characterized the management of public affairs throughout this period,2 at the same time as they were one of the mechanisms used in the local control of populations.3 On the eve of the revolution, local politics in Tunisia were thus marked by authoritarianism and nepotism within its municipalities. The classification proposed by Marie-Hélène Bacqué makes it possible to categorize the different cases that understand themselves to be participatory (Bacqué et al., 2005). This classification proposes five ideal-types based on criteria that are founded on political will, socio-political contexts, and procedural causalities. We can thus distinguish between “managerial” models, models of “participatory modernization”, of “local democracy”, of “empowerment”, and of “participatory democracy”. These “different participatory models only make sense on the basis of their inclusion in global developments that go far beyond them . . . taking into account both the general dynamics of neoliberal globalization and particular social and political contexts” (Bacqué et al., 2005). They can thus be expressed and realized according to five different scenarios: neoliberal, authoritarian, social-liberal, social-democratic, or that of participatory governance. According to these models, the two cases mentioned earlier were situated at the junction of neoliberalism and authoritarianism, at the same time as they proceeded from the managerial model and the model of participatory modernization, which were major trends in Ben Ali’s reformist narrative of Tunisia (Hibou, 2006). It can therefore be said that a “grammar” of participation was deployed in Tunisia since the late 1980s within the double register of good governance and developmentalist policies. In the case of La Marsa, these were the two trends that we found in the appropriation regimes of the PB as an instrument of participation. The Introduction of the PB in Tunisia: A Procedural Revolution Since the fall of the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia has served as a favourite election ground and as a testing ground for international civil society and international organizations that proclaim to promote and defend the universal value of democracy. Tunisia, the first Arab country to drive out its dictator in 2011, was bestowed with the honour of having served as the launching pad for the Arab Spring. Among the many NGOs that opened their offices in Tunis, one has had a particular impact on the history of PB imports into Tunisia: the Foundation for the Future (FFF).4 Created in 2005 with its headquarters in Amman, the FFF’s mission is “to foster democratic and civic space across the BMENA region”. It set up an office in Tunis in 2011 as a result of the revolution. It is this office that, in partnership with the organization VNG-I, 5 organized a meeting from 14–15 September 2012 under the theme of “Local Governance
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 163 and Civil Society in Tunisia: Challenges, Interactions and Perspectives”. This meeting was intended as a framework for setting the agenda for public action on local governance. Its ambition was to promote an approach to local governance that emphasized both an inclusive and participatory approach to local governance, and its specific mechanisms. It affirmed its desire to encourage the implementation of participatory budgets in its municipalities. Of the four sessions that structured this two-day programme, three were devoted to approaches to local public action and the processes involved. The last session was devoted to a specific mechanism: the participatory budget of the municipality. Three people were invited to present on “the participatory budget, a tool for participatory democracy that is still too little known in Tunisia”.6 They were Daniely Votto Fontoura, from the municipality of Porto Alegre (Brazil); Mamadou Bachir Kanouté, with EndaTM/Ecopop (Senegal); and Bruno José Daniel Filho, from the Administrative Development Foundation of Sao Polo (Brazil). Two speakers present at this session were members of the Tunisian Association of Urban Planners (ATU), and members of the Centre de Formation et d’Appui à la Décentralisation (CFAD), a Tunisian state agency under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Interior and Local Development. The case of Porto Alegre was therefore presented here as an ideal-type, and part of the narrative of the democratization of Brazil in the early 1990s. Bachir Kanouté is the main author of a two-volume training manual on participatory budgeting for French-speaking African countries. His organization was leading the implementation of the PB in Senegal and was at the centre of most of the initiatives and convergences on the PB in Africa. This presentation of the PB as an instrument and vehicle for democracy was made in the presence of Mokhtar Hamami, Director General of Local Government in the Ministry of Interior and Local Development, and Imed Hammami, President of the Constituent Commission on Local and Regional Government of the ANC, two of the officials of several ministries and agencies historically involved in the decentralization process in Tunisia, and of course, of donors who supported or wished to support Tunisia’s decentralization process and its local governance. In addition to the heads of the two organizational structures (FFF, VNG-I), the two-day meeting was introduced by Mehrzia Laabidi, the Vice-President of the Constituent National Assembly (ANC), and Abderrazk Kilani, the Minister to the Head of Government and responsible for maintaining relations with the ANC. Moncef Marzouki, the President of the Republic of Tunisia, closed the meeting. Thus, all structural levels of Tunisian power (presidential, legislative, government) actively participated in this space of reflection on the trajectory and modalities of local governance in Tunisia. All these actors were thus made aware of the PB at the same time as relationships were established between them. The second key step in the transfer of the PB to Tunisia is the training of consultant facilitators in local governance and participatory budget from 11 to 21 June 2013 in Tunis, which was organized at the initiative of the FFF in
164 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 partnership with Enda Ecopop. The twenty or so participants that were recruited from the heads of the ministerial departments were in charge of finance, decentralization and local development, or were municipal officials, heads of NGOs and associations working on local governance, or institutions involved in capacity building and civil society training. The aim was to train people who would be able to lead the implementation of a participatory budget for municipalities in Tunisia from beginning to end. The main initiators and facilitators of the participatory budget in its first phase of installation in Tunisia (2013–2015) came from this gathering. The training was mainly provided by Bachir Kanouté, who, from that moment on, became the main ambassador for, and importer of, the PB into Tunisia. The third pivotal moment was the Tunis International Conference on Citizen Participation and Budgeting and Management of Local and Regional Affairs in Africa, which took place at the Tunis Congress Centre from 4 to 6 December 2013. It was organized by Enda Ecopop in collaboration with the General Directorate of Local Authorities (DGCL) of the Ministry of Interior and Local Development of Tunisia, the Programme of Support for Decentralisation in Africa, United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG-A), and the International Observatory for Participatory Democracy in Africa (OIDP-A). “This meeting was organized with the support of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the African Development Bank and several other partners”.7 It brought together local elected officials and municipal councillors; heads of ministerial departments in charge of decentralization policies, governance, and local development; heads of civil society organizations; the technical and financial partners and structures involved in providing advisory support to local authorities; and researchers and academics. The findings were introduced by the Minister of the Interior of Tunisia in the presence of his counterparts from Senegal and Madagascar. Also present were the ambassadors of France and Germany in Tunisia, the Secretary General of United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG-A), the Vice-President of the International Observatory for Participatory Democracy (OIDP), and the Coordinator of the Programme to Support Decentralization in Africa. A statement was produced at the end of this conference that enshrined the commitment of the states and structures present to making the participatory budget a “catalyst for shared management and citizen control of public action”.8 The fourth pivotal moment in the implementation of the PB in Tunisia occurred mainly at the local level, in this case at the municipality of La Marsa, and was the subject of detailed treatment in a section session on the deployment of the PB in La Marsa. Research suggests that the movement of the PB to Tunisia is largely the responsibility of participation ambassadors (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, 2017, 2019), the latter of which are supported by brokers of participation. Before more closely investigating how the PB was re-appropriated in La Marsa, we will examine the role of these ambassadors and brokers of participation, and the arenas of circulation that foster the dynamics of the transfer of public policy.
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 165
Arenas and Actors of the PB Traffic to Tunisia The Role of Participation Ambassadors and Brokers The PB’s participation ambassadors have been defined as “the most active promoters of this public policy. Specific attributes characterize them: 1) they have authority over the PB, which can be political, technical or expert in nature; 2) they promote the PB independently of the institution in which they work; 3) they carry out continuous action throughout the international dissemination process of the PB” (Porto de Oliveira, 2016, p. 96). In addition to being endowed with these characteristics, the PB participation-embassadors’ level of intervention also extended beyond a single country. Thus, all the ambassadors described in Porto de Oliveira’s research were involved either on an international scale (Yves Cabane, Giovanni Allegretti, Nelson Dias, etc.), or, on a continental or regional scale (Bachir Kanouté, Jules Ngueubou, etc.). In an original contribution in which he again takes up the concept of the development broker proposed by Olivier de Sardan (Sardan, 1993), Mohammed Benidir draws our attention to the actors of the associative world that he calls “associative development brokers” who appropriate the rhetoric of participation within the framework of the implementation of development policies that involve development agents, technicians, administration, consultants, etc. (Benidir, 2015, 2016). Based on these two theoretical considerations, we propose and introduce the notion of “participation brokers or PB brokers” who are all the actors (associations, administrative, consultants, government agencies, etc.) who participate at the local/national level in the reception and dissemination of public participation action plans, in this case, the participatory budget. We will see that the role of the ambassadors and brokers of participation is central to understanding the dynamics of the transfer of the PB into La Marsa, and more broadly into Tunisia. The first mention of the PB in an institutional framework is at the conference in September 2012 organized jointly by FFF and VNGi. The leaders of the NGOs Foundation for the Future and VNGi, who are both Tunisian, played a leading role in identifying this mechanism as a solution to rebuilding relationships of trust between the population and the local level of public authority, i.e., the town hall. The Senegalese NGO Enda Ecopop, whose Executive Secretary, Bachir Kanouté, was at the centre of the international dissemination of the PB in Africa, served as a hub for this arena of circulation. Bachir Kanouté played a facilitating role between the Tunisian government, foreign donors, and the NGOs FFF and VNGi in imposing the PB as the panacea through which local democracy would take shape in Tunisia. His position as facilitator was attested by all the speakers I interviewed both in Tunisia, and in Maputo or Paris in different arenas (i.e., the International Conference on Participation in Maputo Mozambique, the World Social Forum of Tunis, and the Congress of the GIS Participation and Democracy) where he was known for the role he played in the dissemination of the PB in Africa. He is also the one who trained the first
166 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 PB facilitators in Tunisia. It is during such a training course that Manuella Honneger, a German Swiss woman who had recently obtained a doctorate in political science, acquired the training and established the relationships that would enable her to participate as an expert from the Tunisian association L’Action Associative (L’AA) in the implementation of the PB in Tunisia. The AA was chaired by Kouraiche-Jaouahdou, a Tunisian who had much experience in the field of associations and international partnerships. He had worked for Oxfam in Tunisia, and for a few years, for the United Nations in Geneva. He was also the one who succeeded in requiring that a Swiss woman be part of a team that was initially reserved for Tunisians only. Kouraiche-Jaouahdou was also the one who mobilized his network of knowledge to engage the services of an astute expert from the Tunisian administration that could convince the municipal executives that it would be in their interest to experiment with the PB. It is noteworthy that the core of the AA’s argument to municipal executives was to introduce the PB to them as a managerial and controlled process. In this case, the participatory budget of the municipalities in post–Ben Ali Tunisia was even presented by its promoters as a mechanism for domesticating the dynamics of protest from below, a mechanism that offered managerial and political advantages to the municipal executive. Indeed, Kouraiche and his team, composed of Manuella Honneger and a civil servant (whose anonymity must be maintained), emphasized the tax revenue benefits generated by the PB, which would be perceived by the population as an indicator of the transparent management of public finances on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of the gains in political legitimacy inherent in the participation of the population in municipal deliberations. The AA promoters insisted on the PB as a process. It was a question of an imperfect dynamic that could improve but was above all progressive. The progressive nature of the system that was highlighted made it possible to anticipate criticism of the system. It also made it possible to insist on the collaborative nature of the system, which was presented to each actor as a participatory project in its very design. The use of the term “PB process” became part of a new vocabulary of participation in post–Ben Ali Tunisia. Thus, in Tunisia, the PB of the municipalities was set up as a management project that regulates unwanted forms of participation. National government authorities and international donors were involved in the implementation of the PB in Tunisia from its inception. They funded all the public meetings that allowed the idea of this transfer of public policy to mature. They were the ones who financed the training delivered by Bachir Kanouté, and the remuneration of AA experts and the communication expenses related to the production of flyers for the convening of citizen forums. At the state level, Moktar Hamami was the backbone of his participation in the top-down institutionalization of the PB in Tunisia. He had held the positions as the Director of the General Directorate of Local Authorities (DGCL) within the Ministry of the Interior, and then the Director of the Training and Support Centre for Decentralisation (CFAD), which he reformed before once again taking up the position as the Director of Local Authorities of the Ministry of the Interior and Local
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 167 Development. He then once again took up the same position in the newly created Ministry of Local Authorities, which split from the Ministry of the Interior. He maintained close links with Bachir Kanouté in collaboration with whom he organized the Tunis International Conference on Citizen Participation, Budgeting and Management of Local and Regional Affairs in Africa, which took place at the Tunis Congress Centre from 4 to 6 December 2013. I had the opportunity of working with him on Bachir Kanouté’s introduction during the organization of a two-day seminar on participatory budgeting in Africa held at the World Social Forum in Tunis in 2015. As we can observe, various local actors understood all the advantages they could draw from implementing the PB in Tunisia. As Montero points out, “In other words, as local policy actors recognized the power and legitimacy that a best practice provides, new networks and collaborations of actors and interests were created around it” (Montero, 2017). Other participation ambassadors and brokers were involved in one or in other stages of the implementation of the PB in La Marsa. They very often permeated the arena of participation in Tunisia with their presence at international arenas like the World Social Forum. The Role of International Arenas in the Circulation and Consolidation of the PB in La Marsa: The Case of the World Social Forum The history of PB’s circulation in Africa is very closely linked to international circular arenas (Saunier, 2008) such as the World Social Forum or the Africities Forums. However, few studies offer a “transnational political ethnography”9 (Cefaï, 2012; Porto de Oliveira, 2017) of these arenas and of how these major meetings promoted the circulation of the PB in Africa. The recent work of Osmany Porto de Oliveira (Porto de Oliveira, 2019) demonstrates how, from the case of the Africities 2012 conferences in Senegal, the PB has gradually established itself as a good practice and then a model of local democracy and/ or of good governance by local authorities. During the first World Social Forum in Tunis from 26 to 30 March 2013, the NGOs FFF and VNGico organized a session dedicated to local democracy. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was a partner in this activity, as was the Tunisian Association of Urban Planners (ATU). This twohour workshop examined the ways in which the decentralization process in Tunisia could promote both better governance practices and the emergence of local democracy in post-Arab Tunisia. The issue of the participatory budget was approached from this double angle: as a practice of good governance, and as an instrument of local democracy. The speakers referred to the work of the workshop held on 14–15 September 2012, in which Bachir Kanouté and the Brazilian city officials who had been experimenting with the PB since its inception participated. The reference to Porto Alegre was based on the examples used by Daniely Votto Fontoura10 from the municipality of Porto Alegre during his presentation at this previous meeting. A parallel was drawn
168 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 between the PB’s experiment in Porto Alegre in a context of authoritarian loosening, and the political situation in Tunisia, which was beginning its democratic learning process. It should be noted that the discussions focused less on the design of the PB itself (structure, financing, participants, scope, etc.) than on its expected or supposed effects on the orientation of the decentralization process. The predominance of Tunisian urban planners among the participants may explain the content of the exchanges. Nearly fifteen people attended this session in the buildings of the University of El Manar, which hosted this 2013 edition of the WSF. The work of the 2013 WSF thus enabled local brokers to constitute allies for the dissemination of the PB in Tunisia. It is noteworthy that the actors who organized the workshop in September 2012, which was the first place to discuss the opportunity to introduce the PB in Tunisia, are those who organized this session during the 2013 WSF. It was also these actors who were involved in the organization of the training of PB facilitators from 11 to 21 June 2013 in Tunis, which serves as a starting point for the dissemination of the PB in Tunisia. Julien Baudout, the programme officer at FFF, was the same person who organized the March session of the 2013 WSF, where a large part of the exchanges were devoted to the PB, and the training of PB facilitators in June of the same year. The WSF plays an authoritative role in the moment the PB is legitimized in Tunisia. The situation was different for the 2015 edition of the WSF, which was more focused on consolidating the PB dynamic in Tunisia and held a broader perspective on Africa, especially North Africa. This very specific session on the PB in Africa brought together nearly two hundred (200) participants over two days. This session was organized by Enda Ecopop (Senegal), whose Executive Secretary was Bachir Kanouté, the main ambassador for the circulation of the PB in Africa and AfroLeadership. It was also organized by a Cameroonian NGO, AfroLeadership, working on participatory mechanisms such as the PB, OpenGov or OpenData in Central Africa, which was under the leadership of the research director, Joseph-Désiré Som-1, who was working in partnership with several Tunisian and international institutions and organizations. This session took place on 26 and 27 March 2015 under the thematic title of “Participatory democracy—is it as much a vehicle for social and political change in Africa as it is elsewhere?” The first day of this session on the PB was divided into two parts and took place at two sites. The first part took place at the main site of the WSF 2015 at El Manar University. A three-hour workshop was devoted to the PB in North Africa. It was attended by municipal officials, NGOs, international partners, participation ambassadors from Europe and North and South America, and participation brokers working in Africa, Europe, and America. The second part of the second day took place at the headquarters of the municipality of La Marsa, which had been experimenting with the PB since 2014. The second day was held in the conference room of the municipality of the city of Tunis. It was dedicated to the development of the PB in Tunisia.
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 169 On the first day, the first part was organized in the form of a workshop, and took place on 26 March from 8:30 am to 11:00 am in the Mini Amphi 146 (Faculty of Law) of El Manar University, under the thematic title, “The issues and challenges of participatory democracy in the Mediterranean”. The objective was to create a framework for the exchange and circulation of knowledge and good practices in participatory democracy in the Mediterranean region. Eighty participants from the five continents, the majority of them from the Mediterranean, attended the meeting. The introductory presentations were given by actors from Maghrebi municipalities (Hmed Guidara,11 the financial director of the Sfax-Tunisia City Hall), academics (Inès Kalai, University of SousseTunisia), institutional support actors (Yosry Magdiche,12 Centre de Formation et d’Appui à la Décentralisation-Tunisie), city management professionals (Yassine Turki,13 Tunisian Association of Urban Planners), international partners (Amine Abassi,14 CoMun-GIZ), actors of decentralized cooperation at the Mediterranean level (Eva Gallardo Flores, Mediterranean Network of Medinas),15 and citizens involved in participatory democracy mechanisms (Bèdis Bouziri, a facilitator working with the participatory budget of the City of La MarsaTunisie). Ghazi Gherairi, a professor at the Faculty of Law, Political, and Social Sciences in Tunis was the moderator. The presentations stressed the need for a strong political will that would open participatory democracy processes in the Mediterranean. Stakeholders and participants focused on the legal framework (legislative and regulatory) that would have to govern the decentralization process in order to provide a legal framework for the flourishing of the PB. The second concern of the participants was the issue of administrative reform. For them, the PB needed and should try to result in a new administrative culture where transparency, access to municipal information, delegation, and accountability all have their place. The PB would also need to allow for the active participation of citizens, which meant that municipalities would have to learn to communicate with their citizens, and participation frameworks would have to be simple and adapted to the cultural context. Finally, participants expressed expectations about the ability of the PB to establish mechanisms that would allow for the representation of populations traditionally marginalized by public action or because of historical processes. As could be evidenced a few months after the start of the PB experiment in Tunisia, the participants were still reflecting on the strategies for implementing the PB in North Africa. The WSF thus allowed networking and strategic sharing and convergence. Tunisia was already a leader in promoting the PB in North Africa, even though Morocco had experienced the PB before it had (Goerhs, 2017). The second part of the first day was devoted to a working visit to the town hall of La Marsa, Tunis-Nord (14h30’–17h30’). It consisted of a meeting that took place within the municipality of La Marsa with all the stakeholders in the participatory budget process with which this town hall has been experimenting since January 2015. It took place in the proceedings room of the city hall, and brought together about forty participants. For three hours, the mayor, city councillors,
170 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 city hall officials, the citizen delegates who had been elected during the participatory budget process, facilitators, and city citizens interacted with the twenty or so guests present. These guests included internationally recognized PB specialists, such as Giovanni Allegreti (Center for Social Studies—University of CoimbraPortugal, Independent Authority for Participation of Tuscany Region-FlorenceItaly), representatives of local development organizations and cities, such as Magali Fricaudet (Commission Inclusion Sociale, Démocratie Participative et Droits Humains/ Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis-CGLU), organizations from the North and South involved in the PB deployment (SAHA-Madagascar NGO; Learn to Count-France), academics (Lex Paulson-Science Pô, Inès KalaiUniversité de Sousse), and international partners (GIZ, RMM, CILG-VNGi). In his introductory statement, Maher Zaher, Vice-President of La Marsa City Hall, presented the experience of the participatory budget of his municipality. Then, Neila Hammami and Mongi Ben Salem took the floor as the PB facilitator and the citizens’ delegate, respectively. This was followed by a period of exchange moderated by Joseph-Désiré Som-1 of the NGO AfroLeadership. The second day of the session, 27 March 2015, was devoted to a workshop (9:30 am–6:00 pm) that took place in the conference room of Tunis’s city hall, which was a partner in the event, and was structured around two panels and a collective brainstorming session. The theme of the workshop, “Participatory democracy as a vehicle for social and political change in Africa as elsewhere?”, lent its name to the whole session. The objective of the workshop was to take stock of the contribution of participatory democracy mechanisms in general, and of the participatory budget in particular, to social and political change. Based on the challenges and opportunities that emerged from this panorama, ways were outlined in which cooperation could be strengthened between organizations/actors in order to extend and strengthen participatory democracy and its impacts on populations. This workshop brought together about forty participants. After the welcome address, Seifallah Lasram, Mayor of Tunis, reminded everyone that the opportunity for such a conference existed because his country was in the process of democratization. It was then the turn of Mokhtar Hammami, Director of the General Directorate of Local Authorities of the Ministry of Interior of Tunisia, to point out that Tunisia was involved in a profound process of local governance reform in which participatory democracy played a key role. This was followed by a memorandum on guidelines by Bachir Kanouté, Executive Coordinator of Enda Ecopop, and held the Focal Point position for the Africa Region of the Observatory for Participatory Democracy (OIDP). The first panel was entitled “Crossed Views on Participatory Democracy in the World”, and was designed to take stock of the panorama and mosaics of examples of participatory democracy conducted around the world in order to demonstrate their specificity. This panorama aimed to identify the advances and difficulties of participatory democracy, and to illustrate how each case was part of a local and/or global process. The introductory presentations made by Dimitrios Roussoupoulos, writer, and an activist of participation and political
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 171 ecology from Montreal, Canada, shared the beneficial effects of the Charter of Rights and Duties of the City of Montreal, Canada, on local participatory democracy. Stela Farias, former mayor of Alvorada in the suburbs of Porto Alegre, Brazil, and Carlos Siegle de Souza, deputy to the Secretary General of the Porto Alegre City Council, each described the context of the emergence of the participatory budget in this city and its beneficial effects on the populations on the margins, and the 25 years of the PB’s history in Porto Alegre. Inès Sallem, from the management unit of the participatory communal investment plan project within the Caisse de Prêts et de Soutiens aux Collectivités Locales (CPSCL)16 of Tunisia, shared her experience on the process of change initiated by the Government of Tunisia, which would allow the operationalization of participatory democracy as established in the Tunisian constitution. Djamel Sandid, head of international relations for the city of Nanterre, France, shared the experience of the city dimension of participatory democracy on the outskirts of the huge urban complex that is Paris. Giovanni Allegreti, an academic and the co-director of the Independent Authority for Participation of the Tuscany region of Florence, Italy, who moderated this panel, shared Mozambican experiences of participatory budgeting, and the particular challenges and requirements faced by participatory budgeting processes in Africa. The second panel focused on “the impact of participatory democracy on people” and discussed how participatory democracy could contribute to changes in African societies and in other parts of the world by addressing social inequalities and acting as a dam against the ravages of neoliberalism and elite power confiscation. This panel, moderated by Bachir Kanouté, explored the benefits of participatory democracy through several cases and approaches. This is how Charlie Ngounou, an AMFI17 expert, illustrated how the PB contributed to improving the city’s economic resources. In his presentation, which was based on the experience of the PB in Madagascar, Parfait Randianitovina, from the NGO SAHA-Madagascar, insisted on the benefits for the production of social housing and access to basic social services. Yacine Turki, academic and president of the Tunisian Association of Urban Planners, explained how participatory democracy is changing the way urban planning is thought about. Kacem Dhaouadi, member of the executive council of the city of Menzel-Bourguiba, Tunisia, shared how the PB contributes to improving local services in this city. Gilles Pradeau, coordinator of the NGO Learning to Count, screened a documentary film that expounded on how children learn about transparency through participatory budgeting in high schools in Europe. Finally, Karel Janecek, founder of the Democracy 2.1 Foundation, shared his experience in reinventing and renewing democracy through ICTs. As soon as the WSF 2015 ended, Democracy 2.1 would support several town halls, including La Marsa, in improving the choice of projects and delegates within the PB process. The collective brainstorming session moderated by Magali Fricaudet, Coordinator of the Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights Commission of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), was a reflection on “African and international networks of local actors in participatory
172 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 democracy”. The exchanges focused on the work carried out by institutions working for the promotion of participatory democracy and local development in Africa, and their relations with the rest of the world, including UCLG-Africa and OIDP-Africa. This session thus highlighted how the international municipalist movement, particularly through their African representations, played a leading role in the circulation and consolidation of the African PB. It also highlighted how the WSF served as an arena of circulation for the PB in Africa, and as a space for the consolidation of the PB in Tunisia. African organizations played a key role here in the circulation of expertise and good practices, and in the training and support and development of the PB on the continent. The role of the OIDP and UCLG-A, which participated in the financing of PB promotion activities by the NGO Enda Ecopop, illustrated the place of the international municipalist movement in the dissemination of the PB in Africa. Enda Ecopop organized several training sessions each year for PB facilitators, and for the training of local authorities or administrative officials involved in decentralization processes. The Tunisian case is emblematic of this support where the last training took place from 21 to 30 March 2018 in Tunis. During this international training of instructors session on local leadership for governance and sustainable development organized by Enda Ecopop in collaboration with CFAD Tunisia, Onu Habitat, and OIDP, and led by Bachir Kanouté, a module was dedicated to the PB as an example of good practices in local governance. What also emerges from the analysis is that the 2015 WSF made it possible to see how actors in the North (France, Canada) and South (Cameroon, Madagascar, Congo, Senegal) are contributing to the reflection on how to implement the PB in Tunisia, and on the expectations and potential effects of the PB both on local governance and on its political effects. Porto Alegre was at the heart of the narrative about the PB as evidenced by the two Porto Alegre representatives who were present on the first panel that examined the political and governance implications of the PB. Even if the mythical account of the Porto Alegre experience seems to be fading, it remains as a kind of horizon, an idealtypical model with regards to its reception in Tunisia. This is so even if, upon examination, the PB of La Marsa, as much as the remaining Tunisian cases, is more directly inspired by the capitalization of the example of the city of Fissel, which is documented in a two-volume manual produced by Enda Ecopop edited by Bachir Kanouté.18
Import Route of the PB in Tunisia The Effects of the Singularity of the Socio-Political Context of the Transfer of the PB to La Marsa The implementation of the PB in Tunisia has not been linear or smooth. During the training workshop for advisor facilitators in local governance and participatory budgeting on 11–21 June 2013, each of them was assigned a perimeter,
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 173 a territorial area in which he or she was responsible for promoting the PB. Very quickly, promoters were faced with several challenges, two of which will be discussed in this chapter. The first issue was that of convincing municipal authorities to embark on the PB process even though the provisions applicable to municipalities did not seem to provide for such a mechanism. Secondly, the question arose about the financing of this activity, because the individuals who were not members of public administrations were trained not so much because of the way the association of which they are members had signed on, but because of their known or recommended capacity to absorb the training and to be able to independently lead a PB implementation process in a Tunisian municipality.19 Among the trained people were consultants, academics, community leaders, and several civil servants working for a municipality or for government agencies in charge of supervising and financing the activities of the municipalities. Trained municipal officials or public administrations did not take the initiative to initiate a PB process in the municipality from which they came. This did not prevent them from later leading PB processes initiated by others in their town or in another town where they were invited to act as consultants. The steps that the municipality of La Marsa took for the implementation of the PB were already being taken by December 2013. This raised the problem of the absence of a legislative framework for participatory democracy in the two texts that organize municipalities and regional councils in Tunisia. These are Act No. 75–33 of 14 May 1975, promulgating the Organic Law of Municipalities, as amended and supplemented by subsequent texts, and in particular, Organic Law No. 2008–57 of 4 August 2008, Act No. 75–35 of 14 May 1975, on the Organic Law on the Budget of Local Authorities, as amended and supplemented by subsequent texts, and in particular Organic Law No. 2007–65 of 18 December 2007. The second text is Organic Law No. 89–11 of 4 February 1989 on Regional Councils, as supplemented by Organic Law No. 93–119 of 27 December 1993. This legal silence in the organic laws that organize the functioning of the municipalities reflects the authoritarian centralism that marked the management of the municipalities over the successive authoritarian regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. It should perhaps be recalled that during this period the municipalities had very little autonomy from the central government. This control of the municipalities was also exercised through the control of the municipal council. While it is true that municipal councillors are formally elected by the people, the actual appointment is made by both the ruling party and those in charge of the administration. This is how a former president of the municipal council of the municipality of Gabes explained his rise as mayor of the city to me: I had been contacted by the governor of the governorate who first proposed to me that I should become a municipal councillor. He had heard of my interest in the management of the city and felt that my professional accomplishments were a guarantee of my competence. After this first term as
174 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 councillor, it was necessary to change mayors according to an old unwritten law that would require that from one term to another the mayor be from one of the two large areas that historically rival the Gabes. That is how he proposed that I become mayor. Once I accepted the position, I was plunged into a routine election by the party. Then there were the municipal elections, the outcome of which is known in advance. That is why I had always considered my function to be less of a political position than one of responsibility for the management of the town.20 In order to overcome the absence of a legislative framework for the deployment of the PB in Tunisia, several avenues were explored because the existence of scattered texts could be mobilized to justify the implementation of participatory democracy mechanisms. Sometimes, it was a question of invoking the code of spatial planning and urban development promulgated by Law No. 122 of 1994, 28 November 1994, which speaks of a participatory technique by citing the mechanism of public inquiry. The other track was the sum of the memorandums and decrees of the Ministry of the Interior whose objective was to provide a framework for the demonstration of the reformist will of the state. These included the memorandum of the Minister of the Interior No. 1675 of 7 June 1991, Decree No. 967/1992 of 22 May 1992, which provides for the establishment of an administrative service in each governorate to monitor the neighbourhood committees mentioned earlier. Thus, the legislative framework for the exercise of decentralized authorities remained silent on mechanisms such as the PB. However, municipal councils would move in the direction of the PB thanks to the interstices of the Code of Planning and Urban Development promulgated by Act No. 122 of 1994, 28 November 1994, which envisaged a process of citizen involvement, and to the strengthening in favour of participatory democracy made largely through successive drafts of the ANC’s constitutional provisions. It must be pointed out that the managers of the municipal administration who were committed to redeeming their reputation also made the extensive reading of the provisions of the development code possible. This is the case in particular of the Secretary General of the municipality of La Marsa, who was identified by several inhabitants as one of the henchmen of the Trabelsie21 family, so named after the wife of the deposed president. For several years, several citizens and delegates of the municipality’s PB would never cease to remind me that he was the general secretary of a municipality headed by the former first lady’s nephew and as such was complicit in the indiscretions of the mayor to whom he served. Several issues were thus woven through the elasticity of these interpretations of the texts. Once the agreement had, in principle, been reached with the municipality’s managers, L’Action Associative proposed a roadmap to the municipality based on the following points: (1) the signing of a PB agreement between the municipality and the associations listed in the directory of the municipality concerned, (2) the municipal executive’s choice of the position and the part of the budget
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 175 submitted to the PB, (3) the training of the facilitators who would run the system, (4) the holding of citizens’ forums in the districts, (5) the evaluation of the projects voted on by the citizens during the forums on the technical services of the municipality, (6) the arbitration by the assembly of delegates of financed projects, (7) the deliberation and vote of the municipal council on the selected projects, (8) the implementation of the projects, (9) the monitoring and evaluation of the projects by the citizens’ delegates and the citizens themselves, and finally, (10) the renewal or not of the PB for the next financial year, as well as its possible extension in terms of open sections and allocated budget level. This scheme was strongly inspired by the manual on the PB in Africa, the writing of which was coordinated by Bachir Kanouté and funded by Onu-Habitat. The Implementation of the PB at La Marsa The first task that the leaders of the association L’Action Associative set for themselves was to mobilize financial resources that would allow people to dedicate themselves to the promotion and implementation of the PB. After making contact with several international donors, the organization received initial funding from a German cooperation agency, the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), which was later replaced by funding from the European Endowment for Democracy, which is a European Union fund for the promotion of democracy oriented towards civil society organizations and movements. As soon as the funding agreements were obtained, L’Action Associative contacted the heads of the municipalities that served as pilot municipalities. Six municipalities were contacted. The approach was the same in each of the municipalities, as well as the difficulties that arose. The presidents of special delegations hesitated on many fronts. Municipal leaders pointed to the lack of a regulatory framework, to the risk of “slippage”,22 to the difficulty of choosing the budget line to be submitted to the citizens for deliberation, to the lack of resources to finance the process, or to their lack of democratic legitimacy. The strongest reluctance was from municipal officials. They argued that the lack of technical knowledge of citizens and their lack of knowledge about administrative procedures was likely to create conflicts between the administration and citizens. The AA negotiating team was composed of three people who had to answer the same questions from one municipality to another and allay the concerns of the municipal leaders. While Honneger emphasized the process’s ability to improve relations between local government and citizens, one of her colleagues reassured community leaders that they would retain control of the process. The latter, who had also participated in the training of counsellor facilitators, was a career civil servant. He knew the codes of the administration and presented himself as the guarantor of a controlled process. It was through his personal network that contacts with the municipalities were established. The President of the AA played increasingly on his qualities as a communicator to smooth the edges. When the municipal authorities were convinced by the
176 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 process, they submitted the project to the municipal council for deliberation. After approval by the municipal council, a municipal decree was issued that officially committed the municipality to the PB process. The municipal by-law indicated the budget line and the total budget amount that would be allocated to the PB. It took three months to convince the municipalities to become involved in the PB process. The municipal council of La Marsa adopted the decree to create a PB in February 2014. To have legal force this municipal order had to be ratified by the Governor of Greater Tunis who, as of May 2018, had not yet ratified the decree. The choice of the budget line and its allocation was a central issue in the negotiation process between the municipality and the AA. The municipality of La Marsa took the least risk by devoting 1% of its investment budget to the PB. La Marsa chose to open a “public lighting” line. To what extent was this choice dictated by its willingness to rid itself of a problem?23 To situate the issue properly, it should be understood that nearly 30% of the inhabitants of La Marsa were settled in residential areas outside of established regulatory boundaries.24 In comparison, in the municipalities of Gabes and Menzel-Bourguiba, those in charge of the municipality who wanted the process to be as visible as possible chose the budget line. They openly asked themselves the following question: What is visible to citizens? In Menzel-Bourguiba, the choice was made to spend the budget on a park, while in Gabes, the choice was made to beautify the city. Gabes thus opened 3% of its investment budget to the direct deliberation by citizens. When the municipality of La Marsa agreed to engage in the process, the AA organized a meeting between the municipality and the associations listed with the municipality’s services. The objective of this meeting was to encourage the support of civil society, which had to be part of the process. After preparatory work with L’Action Associative, the municipality invited the associations registered in its file. During the meeting, the AA presented the PB, and the mayor’s officials explained why they had decided to set up the PB, the budget line they had chosen, and their desire to collaborate closely with civil society. At the end of the meeting, a PB agreement was signed between the municipality and civil society, in which they mutually committed themselves—the municipality to lead the process to its conclusion and to respect the choices of citizens, and civil society to participate in the facilitation of the process. This agreement was made in a participatory way between the municipality and civil society. It is understood that the municipality and the AA carried out initially preparatory work. It is within this agreement that the PB cycle, the rules of the game, and the role of each actor were set. Let us return to some of the elements of this agreement, which became the subject of deliberation between the municipality and civil society. First, there was the issue of the section open to the PB. The municipality of La Marsa as well as all the other municipalities were categorical. They decided on their own which section to open. That was their exclusive prerogative. When they felt that the process was well established and that citizens were ready, they would allow the item to be chosen at deliberative meetings. The same reasoning
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 177 applied to the budget line. Concerning the latter point, additional arguments were made about the legal responsibility of the city council on public accounts. One of the most debated points was whether or not to elect citizen delegates. An explanation is in order here. As stated earlier, during the citizens’ forum, the second day was devoted to voting on projects and delegates. Indeed, in the formula chosen by the AA, each neighbourhood citizen forum chose three projects to finance, as well as three delegates who would represent the neighbourhood during the delegates’ forum. This delegates’ forum brought together representatives from each neighbourhood. It was within this delegates’ forum that the final selection of projects was submitted to the municipal council for deliberation for incorporation into the following year’s budget. The main dividing line in the choice of these citizens’ delegates was between civil society and the municipalities. The municipalities proposed a process built on consensus in order to avoid conflicts between people that could negatively affect the process. Civil society, for its part, proposed that elections be held so that the process was democratic. Several speakers expressed the importance of voting as a way of legitimizing the process and learning democracy. It was the point of view of civil society that would prevail. Even if there were only three candidates, a vote would still be taken. Another element of discussion was the representativeness of the delegates. Some felt that out of three delegates, it had to be possible to represent gender and youth. In other words, among the three delegates, there had to be a man, a woman, and a youth. The deliberation would produce results that differed from one municipality to another. In La Marsa, they decided to vote the delegates in three stages: one election for a woman, one election for a young person, and one last election open to everyone. Each participant in the citizen forum could participate in the three times of the delegates’ vote, including in the vote of each delegate. As soon as the municipal decree and the PB agreement were signed, the AA organized the first two training sessions. The first one was for the officials of the municipality. It dealt with the rules of the game of the PB, the communication strategy towards the citizens, and the presentation of the municipality’s administrative accounts to the citizens. The participation of administrative managers and municipal staff was not identical from one municipality to another. In La Marsa, technicians and communication managers were present, and they actively participated, while council members were not very present. In contrast, in Menzel-Bourguiba and Gabes, the entire municipal council was present, as well as the technical staff. The second training course was intended for associations registered in the municipality’s database. It was indeed the municipality that invited the associations. The aim of this training was to work on the challenges of the PB in terms of transparency and the accountability of the municipality towards the citizens on the one hand, and in order to recruit volunteers who would act as facilitators throughout the PB process. Here again, we observed significant differences from one municipality to another. In La Marsa, the spectrum of associations was quite wide. Their only common point was that they were created after 2011.
178 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 They were located in different districts of the municipality, and worked on quite different themes. The training focused on how the PB process helped to build a civic and democratic culture. Neighbourhood/zone forums normally took place according to the vote of delegates and projects, three for each. Then it was the turn of the delegates’ forum to choose the priority projects out of the fifteen submitted according to the budgetary evaluation made by the city hall services within the limits of the budget opened by the city hall to the PB process. The projects chosen at the end of the deliberations of the PB delegates were submitted to the municipal council, which thus included them in the corresponding headings for the following budget year (N + 1).
Conclusion Upon examination, the process of the circulation of the PB from Porto Alegre in Brazil to La Marsa in Tunisia was a non-linear and non-direct process. It was part of the broader framework of the international dissemination of the PB as a good practice in local governance. At the forefront of this international dissemination were participation ambassadors who operated at the transnational/international level, and who were relayed and supported by participation brokers who operated mainly at the local level, even if they were often part of broader networks promoting participatory mechanisms such as the PB. We also observed that the ideal-type of the Porto Alegre PB was very present at all stages of the transfer from the PB into La Marsa. The international arenas, with the participation of PB ambassadors from Porto Alegre, bore the story of the Porto Alegre example case, which was almost mythicized since it was rarely the subject of critical discussions during these moments of participationist liturgy that we observed. The World Social Forum, an international arena born in Porto Alegre, played a leading role as the arena in which the PB moved into Tunisia. The World Social Forums of 2013 and 2015 in Tunis then served in turn as a trigger and consolidation point for the dynamics of the PB in Tunisia and particularly in La Marsa. However, after the review of the La Marsa PB, one may wonder what remained of the Porto Alegre model in the PB in Tunisia. While the pyramid approach of Porto Alegre was also adopted at La Marsa, it differed from the experience of Porto Alegre where there was a PB council that negotiated directly with the municipality’s executive on the total budget amount, and itself defined the rules of the game and budget priorities. In the design of the PB in La Marsa, a fixed number of delegates were granted to each of the five territorial areas defined for the conduct of neighbourhood assemblies, unlike Porto Alegre where this number was proportional to the number of participants in each neighbourhood forum/citizens. In the case of La Marsa, there was also a concern about gender representation that took the shape of a quota for women and youth appointed as elected delegates to the PB.
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 179 However, perhaps the biggest difference was in the leadership of the PB transfer process. In Porto Alegre, the PB was an initiative of the municipal executive that involved the non-profit sector in its implementation. In La Marsa, the non-profit sector led the process because it is from this sector that the municipality’s transfer procedures and canvassing work disseminated so that it could join the PB dynamic in Tunisia. This was reflected in funding methods because for the first two years at least in La Marsa, international donors, to support the process, funded the AA. Indeed, ever since 2016, the municipality has been operating its PB process almost autonomously. The low level of the investment budget of the municipality of La Marsa (1% in the first year) was also explained by the municipality’s withdrawal from the initiative to test the PB. The strong involvement of the non-profit sector cannot make us forget the very strong presence of the public authorities, and in particular the Ministry of the Interior which ensured the supervision of the municipalities and its concerned agencies in each phase of the process of transfer of the PB in Tunisia. This is because the state integrates the PB in Tunisia into a broader framework of participatory planning at the local level. According to several state officials, the PB was intended to extend to all municipalities in Tunisia.25 From this perspective, it was one of the pilot mechanisms of local participatory governance alongside the Participatory Communal Investment Plan (PIC), which was being tested over the same period in several Tunisian municipalities. While discussions were still on-going on the concrete modalities of the overlap, or even the interweaving of all these participatory mechanisms, it already seems clear, and to return to the typology of Marie-Hélène Bacqué, that the state favoured a management vision of this mechanism unlike in Porto Alegre where the political dimensions, particularly of political and social emancipation, were clearly put forward from the beginning of the PB. These competing visions on the PB in Tunisia were also observable in terms of the World Bank’s hostility to this mechanism, even though it played a leading role in its transfer to several African countries (Porto de Oliveira, 2016). Thus, for the preparation of the 2017 budget year, the World Bank required all municipalities wishing to benefit from its budget allocations via the Loan Fund to adopt a minimum municipal investment budget that competed with the PB and marginalized the issue of citizens’ participation in public deliberation. The PB therefore continues to be at the centre of two managerial visions of local participatory governance in Tunisia that deserve further examination in subsequent work on the transfer of this public action mechanism in Tunisia/Africa.
Notes 1. Activist of the RCD, Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, the ruling party and chaired by Ben Ali. 2. Amin Allal’s work explores the various aspects and modalities of this state patronage and nepotism. See Allal Amin, “Neoliberal reforms, clientelisms and protests in authoritarian situations”, Les mouvements contataires dans le bassin minier de Gafsa en Tunisie (2008); Allal Amin, “Les configurations développementistes
180 Joseph-Désiré Som-1 internationales au Maroc et en Tunisie: des politiques tranfers à portée limitée”, Critique internationale, 2010/3 n°48, pp. 97–116. DOI: 10.3917/crii.048.0097. It is very useful to mention the work of Béatrice Hibou, La force de l’obéissance, op. cit. 3. Isabelle Berry-Chikhaoui, “Les comités de quartier en Tunisie: une illusion démocratique”, Mouvements 2011/2 (n° 66), pp. 30–39. 4. Its acronym comes from its English name: Foundation for the Future (FFF). Based in Amman (Jordan), it is founded and managed by a Tunisian woman, Nabila Hamza. She is known as an expert and human rights activist in the Maghreb. For more information on the organization and its president, see http://latunisiededina. blogspot.fr/2015/08/qui-est-nabila-hamza.html; http://foundationforfuture.org/ en/WebPresence.aspx; http://foundationforfuture.org/en/WebPresence/AboutUs/ VisionMandate.aspx. 5. The International Development Centre for Innovative Local Governance, VNG International’s regional office in Tunisia, is a development and cooperation agency that focuses particularly on the development of municipalities and local and regional government throughout the MENA region. 6. Presentation sheet of the event prepared by FFF. 7. www.endaecopop.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85:con ference-international-international-tunis-on-citizen-participation-and-budgetingand-management-of-local-and-regional-businesses-in-Africa&catid=45:articlesaccueil. 8. Tunis Declaration on Citizen Participation in the Management of Local and Regional Affairs in Africa. 9. I take here the methodological approach proposed by Osmany Porto de Oliveira to understand the role of Africities in the circulation of the PB in Africa and apply it to the World Social Forum in Tunis in 2013 and 2015. 10. Votto Fontoura represents the municipal council of the municipality of Porto Alegre, and therefore, also the point of view of the elected representatives. 11. He also works as a consultant facilitator for the PB in several Tunisian cities and as a consultant in local governance in Africa for the World Bank and other international donors. 12. Fountoura represents the municipal council of Porto Alegre, and hence the point of view of those elected. 13. Urban planner and academic, then the president of the Tunisian Association of Planners. He is one of the main actors in the decentralization process in Tunisia after 2011. He also works for VNGi as a consultant, but also for the European Union or other international donors in Tunisia and North Africa. 14. A member of the support unit for municipalities in the Maghreb. He has since led numerous actions to promote local democracy in Tunisia on behalf of the GIZ. 15. This network is at the heart of participatory democracy experiences and in particular of PB in North Africa and particularly in Morocco. 16. The main public funding agency for local authorities in Tunisia. 17. The International Association of Francophone Mayors. 18. Interview. 19. Interviews in June 2014, Program Manager of the Foundation for the Future (FFF) who was responsible for organizing this training session. 20. Interviews in 2014 with a former mayor of the municipality of Gabes on the sidelines of the launch ceremonies of the PB in the city. He will not attend the process because he believes that it is a waste to entrust the management of the city to incompetent people who barely speak French and have a questionable level of education. I met him in a café not far from the town, where other former town councilors, as well as academics and journalists, are sitting at the table. This seems to be a meeting place for a certain elite of the city that has been banned since 2011 because of their participation in the old regime.
Importing the PB Model to La Marsa 181 21. The Trabelsie family, named after Ben Ali’s wife, is considered corrupt and prejudicial. Its members will participate in the patrimonialization of State property and thus contribute to the bad reputation and hatred of the Tunisian presidential couple. 22. Interview. 23. This is the opinion of a central actor in the process who requires anonymity. 24. Comments made by municipal officials during informal interviews. Similar remarks, without the figures, were made by one of the vice-presidents of the council during a deliberation of the municipality open to citizens’ delegates. 25. Interviews with senior officials of the Centre de formation et d’appui à la Décentralisation and with officials of the Caissela Caisse des Prêts et de Soutien des Collectivités Locales in Tunisia.
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Policy Transfer and Resistance Proposals for a New Research Agenda Leslie A. Pal
The policy transfer literature has focused on the mechanisms of transfer, its networks and flows, agents and actors, epistemic communities and international organizations, but has generally neglected resistance to transfer. This neglect was perhaps understandable in the early days of the framework, when both Richard Rose and later Dolowitz and Marsh could almost casually observe that globalization and interdependence would naturally increase the amount of lesson-drawing and transfer activity. But it marks even current and more critical analyses of transfer—Peck and Theodore, in Fast Policy, refer to “sprawling networks” of transfer, its “intensity” and “velocity” and how it is so “profound and irreversible” that it renders “anachronistic the notion of independent, ‘domestic’ decision-making” (Peck & Theodore, 2015: 3). This sense of inevitability of course has been tempered in various ways. Dolowitz and Marsh discussed the link between policy transfer and policy failure, arguing that transfer could be uninformed, incomplete, or inappropriate. They also noted that transfer could be voluntary as well as coerced, but paid more attention to the voluntary varieties than to the coercive ones. The more sociologically inclined students of transfer have argued that it involves “translation,” and that without appropriate conversion and reconfiguration, transferred policies will not adhere (or be accepted). As well, various case studies have pointed out the sometimes tortuous routes and obstacles that transfer agents must navigate—again, suggesting more deeply embedded dynamics of resistance in the transfer process, often rooted in institutional and cultural blockages (Common, 2013). The populist eruptions in Europe since 2016, as well as the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil, should alert us to the importance of resistance, but in fact it has been a feature of policy transfer dynamics well before that. We need look no further than the Latin American experience with the so-called Washington Consensus in the 1990s. The scars of that period led to significant intellectual retaliation and repudiation (Kuczynski & Williamson, 2003) as well as the emergence of counter-models such as the “Brasilia Consensus” (Casanova & Kassum, 2014). The conventional policy transfer literature had a sanitized image of global interdependence, borrowing, “catching up,” promoting “best practice,” and “learning,” but the world since 2000, and
184 Leslie A. Pal especially since the financial crisis of 2008, seems to be a world of open resistance and rejection, if not contempt, for the “models” that have so confidently been peddled in the global policy transfer process. Transfer, borrowing, and diffusion of course continue, since governments need to solve common and shared problems and they will look to international lessons and examples, but the global flows are more complicated and choppy. They confront growing counter-dynamics of blockage, resistance, and even deep reversal. This chapter is a brief attempt to sketch some of the factors that explain resistance to policy transfer. In brief, we argue that the conventional policy transfer framework has five key assumptions: 1. Transfer is instrumental: It consists of techniques or policy instruments. 2. Transfer is neutral: Its consequences do not affect distributions of institutional power. 3. Transfer is improvement: Its results are about “betterment” or “improvement” with respect to the original policy problem. 4. Transfer channels success: It is grounded in causal models of “what works” and an epistemology of successful “lessons learned.” 5. Transfer is incremental: It is a process of small changes, usually sector specific, without wider social implications. We pose five counter-propositions: 1. Transfer is often about—or is connected to—paradigm shifts. A carbon tax, for example, is not simply a tax, but reflects a policy paradigm about climate change. A shift from pooled to private pensions is more than an accounting entry. 2. Transfer may appear technical, but is often an assault, unwitting or deliberate, on existing configurations of institutional power. Improving the administration of a court system, for example, can upset the balance of power among magistrates and the legal community. 3. Transfer increasingly has been about austerities and disciplines, of “public bads” rather than “public goods.” The EU’s austerity measures against Greece are a case in point. The Latin American experience in the 1990s was a vivid example. 4. Transfer seems to be seeking inspiration from poisoned wells—the EU, liberal democracy, modern capitalism. Each of these has failed in some spectacular ways in the last decade, and have had rocky histories. 5. Transfer can appear as an innocuous accumulation of technical standards and techniques, but at some point can be perceived as an assault on “life worlds.” The Brexiters’ claim that they “wanted their Britain back” was a rejection of the EU’s apparently technical regulatory regimes and its apparently ethically unobjectionable Europeanization project.
Policy Transfer and Resistance 185 Rather than assume that transfer itself is unproblematic, and that the impediments and blockages are all on the side of the transfer target (e.g., cultural or institutional or strategic considerations), we first examine the assumptions underpinning the prevailing notions of transfer, and then explain why we should normally expect some measure of resistance. We will not over-theorize “resistance” here—it can be within state agencies, institutions, or social actors themselves—and we will not judge its normative character.
Assumption 1: Transfer Is Instrumental There is a wide range of the “what” that can potentially be transferred or diffused. A conventional way of imposing some order on this variety is to think in terms of layers or a rough hierarchy from the instrumental to the fundamental. Dolowitz and Marsh identified eight categories: “policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 12). They argued that it was important to “distinguish between policies, which are seen as broader statements of intention and which generally denote the direction policy-makers wish to take, and programs, which are the specific means of the course of action used to implement policies” (ibid.). This is similar to Hall’s classic distinction between settings (instruments), hierarchy of goals, and paradigms (Cairney & Weible, 2015; Hall, 1993, 2013). The same strategy is used in the advocacy coalition framework, distinguishing between deep core beliefs, near (policy) core, and secondary aspects (instruments) (Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These classifications clearly imply a difference between deep policy change—paradigms— and more incidental policy change—instruments. Paradigms are wider and more encompassing, and more deeply embedded in institutions and practices, whereas instruments are more superficial and liable to change, and less institutionally anchored. A liberal versus a social democratic welfare state is a difference of paradigms, with clear institutional and ideational/attitudinal differences (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001). On the other hand, the settings of a particular benefit (e.g., pensions) are incidental and easily adjusted. The assumption underpinning this strategy of distinctions is that most policy instruments or tools could just as easily be used by one paradigmatic policymaker as they could by another—like hammers or drills, they are only distinguished by the “settings” that policymakers choose. If this is the case, and it is likely to be the case with most policy instruments, then the opposition or resistance to differential settings should be quite minimal. If a pension is increased or lowered by 1 per cent, it might generate some criticism and some opposition (in the case of cuts), but nothing systemic. The same should be true in most cases of transfer, if the transfer appears to consist simply of tools and instruments—e.g., conditional cash transfers, participatory budgeting, tobacco advertising bans, product standards, or regulations.
186 Leslie A. Pal Our counter-proposition is two-fold, one fairly banal but the other more substantive. The banal proposition is that a good deal of policy transfer is in fact not about instruments or tools, but about paradigms. If they involve paradigms, they must then involve substantial institutional changes, which in turn imply deep shifts in policy ideas/rationales, and configurations of power (more on this later in the chaper). The best example is the European Union (EU) and its accession and neighbourhood policies. To accede to the EU, a country must accept the acquis communautaire with its thousands of provisions that cut across virtually every policy field and governmental activity. The possibility of this paradigmatic change with either Ukraine or Turkey eventually joining the EU has generated resistance both within the countries, and in the case of Ukraine, from Russia which feared that “transfer” would take Ukraine out of the Eurasian project. The attempted transfer of Brazilian large-scale agricultural production techniques to Sub-Saharan Africa in the ProSavana Project was resisted precisely because it represented a change in paradigm (and hence in social relations), not just farming techniques. Democratic transition in central and Eastern Europe, entangled with EU accession but with a broader agenda of transforming former communist states into liberal democratic and capitalist regimes, was another example of paradigm transfer (Carothers, 1996, 2002). Anti-corruption regimes (World Bank, IMF, and OECD), public health schemes (WHO), and most recently climate change policy, are all examples of attempted transfers of deep change, of paradigmatic shifts. Some social and political actors may welcome the transfers and be their champions within their respective domestic regimes, but it is naïve to assume that change this deep and broad will not generate resistance. A good deal of the current development literature is struggling with the puzzle of why, despite billions of dollars and years of effort, governance regimes in target states have not improved (Andrews, 2013; Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2012). Brussels was shocked by Brexit and growing anti-EU populism. But we should expect resistance in the case of transfers that involve paradigm shifts. These shifts can disrupt institutions, and while they might create winners, they also create losers, and losers fight back (Pal & Weaver, 2003; Trebilcock, 2014). The specifics of resistance are more complex—it can take time (a slow burn) for coalitions to form, to find leadership, and then erupt in opposition. Or it can be a long march through the institutions, passive resistance and programmatic sabotage. Or it can even be the articulation of a counter-paradigm, as was explicitly the case with the “Brasilia Consensus.” The point is that the transfer literature has paid insufficient attention to this aspect of transfer because it has often ignored paradigm shift in favour of the transfer of policy tools and instruments. The large body of scholarship on CCTs, for example, has tended to focus on the technical aspects of the transfer, and less on the resistance (Osorio, 2018; Sugiyama, 2011). This is our second point, somewhat less obvious: many policy tools are not purely instrumental or innocent of the policy paradigms from which they spring. Some tools, however innocuous and apparently technical, carry paradigmatic DNA. The example we used earlier was the carbon tax. In one sense,
Policy Transfer and Resistance 187 it is just another tax, and its “settings” can vary in terms of incidence, phase-in, and off-sets. It is often sold as simply a technical solution to emissions, and particularly with off-sets of other taxes would be revenue neutral and should make no difference to taxpayers. But the proponents of carbon taxes also justify them in terms of an impending global climate crisis, the need to transition to a low-carbon economy, and perhaps even to a completely different form of society and economy (Klein, 2014). It is easy to understand the resistance of communities to shutting down their coal plants and hence their livelihoods, but less easy to understand the visceral opposition to something as seemingly innocuous as a carbon tax. We can only understand that if we understand that some policy instruments are connected, and indeed expressive and symbolic of, major paradigm shifts and the embedded actions that come with their implementation. Accepting the small instrument is a slippery slope to paradigm change, and so big battles are fought over seemingly small stakes. Other examples include: • • •
Contract farming is an agricultural policy instrument, but when combined with other (possible) instruments such as investment promotion, introduces a new model of farming (Milhorance, 2019). Municipal bicycle lanes seem like just an accommodation for commuters who prefer to bike, but can be viewed as an “assault on the car.” Raising the eligibility age for public pension benefits from 65 to 67 not only has major financial implications, but is also a paradigm shift in the sense of one’s “working life.”
The examples could be multiplied, but our point is that policy transfer often involves the conscious attempt to transfer entire “systems” or paradigms, and even in cases where the transfer appears to be technical or instrumental, those techniques and instruments retain trace elements of their originating paradigms. In both cases, since the changes are deep and wide, we should expect resistance.
Assumption 2: Transfer Is Neutral This assumption is twinned with the first. If transfer is mostly about tools and techniques, about instruments and their settings, it should have only technical and incidental effects. But if instruments and tools carry paradigmatic DNA, they are likely to have deeper institutional effects. Rather than neutral program techniques, they encapsulate configurations of power and project them into the changes they might trigger through the transfer process. As we noted earlier, the changes resulting from transfer can create winners and losers, and can potentially upset existing configurations of power. Those who lose through transfer will resist, block, or try to blunt it. An example is the transfer of rule of law and judicial reform in central and Eastern European countries as part of EU accession (Delpeuch & Vassileva, 2013). These reform packages were not simply technical changes to improve judicial efficiency. The rule of law has a specific institutional configuration of power that stems from historical
188 Leslie A. Pal struggles between the Crown, Church, and Parliaments in Europe, and indeed can be traced back to Roman law (Fukuyama, 2014). Transferring or injecting it into a different system with different traditions (particularly Soviet) will challenge the balance of interests embedded in institutions. Market reforms in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s were clearly about much more than economic policy, and various scholars have highlighted the fraught and risky programs of economic reform that were, in effect, attempted redistributions of political and social power (Teichman, 2001; Weyland, 2002). The case of Uber is another illustration of the power dynamics linked to transfer and diffusion. Uber is disruptive precisely because it overturns the taxi licensing and regulatory regimes that prevail in many countries/cities. Those regimes usually limit the number of licenses or plates, thereby restricting supply, and also closely regulate fares. Uber completely disrupts that model by providing a technological “hailing” platform that allows drivers and passengers to connect directly. The universal reaction of the taxi industry has been defensive, demanding policy responses that protect the existing configuration of its investments and economic power. The adoption of different regulatory models that in some measure accommodate Uber will inevitably be much more than the technical change of a regulatory regime. They will rebalance economic interests, creating new winners and losers. Ironically, some transfer agents themselves have been more alive to this dimension of transfer than the literature itself has. According to Peck and Theodore, the World Bank “defanged” the models of participatory budgeting that it was promoting, precisely because the original models implied a degree of citizen participation and control over public spending that was inconsistent with the Bank’s neoliberal agenda (Peck & Theodore, 2015; Porto de Oliveira, 2016). It understood the power implications of a budgetary technique. The OECD came to the same realization over a decade ago (Pal, 2012). In 2009, the Economics Department published a study on the political economy of reform (the policy transfer of neoliberal economic programs and policies), and noted that the costs of reform are often incurred up-front and concentrated among specific groups. Another study, entitled Making Reform Happen (OECD, 2010), reviewed some of the most challenging areas of structural reform: opening markets to competition, pensions, tax reform, environmental policy, education, health, modernizing government, regulatory reform, and fiscal consolidation. The problem faced by all governments in these areas was devising “strategies for securing adoption of such reforms that prevent the opponents of change from blocking reform, but that also address their legitimate concerns about its distributional consequences” (OECD, 2010: 13).
Assumption 3: Transfer Is Improvement If the conventional transfer literature has neglected the distributional impacts of transfer, and how these might trigger resistance among losers, this may be linked to a deeper assumption that most of the effects of transfer will be
Policy Transfer and Resistance 189 positive, that they will deliver improvements to policy problems. If we examine the tradition of “lesson-drawing” that stems from Rose’s early work, it emphasized the “puzzling” behind policy, the search for answers and models that will “solve” a policy problem. Rose explicitly framed the international work of transfer agents as seeking to make things better in other countries by improving both their policies and their institutions. Other threads of literature that are not explicitly within the transfer framework but which speak its language, such as international development and good governance, unself-consciously portray their work as improvements—democratization, anti-corruption, regulatory efficiency, service improvement, gender equity in the public service. These are all so self-evidently positive that it is not entirely surprising that the darker distributional impacts are sometimes minimized or ignored. These are transfers of “public goods.” In the long run, they will benefit all citizens. There is mild and transitory pain, but for long-term gain. The entire framing of transfer is benign and beneficial, almost therapeutic. The tonalities of transfer have audibly changed since the 2008 financial crisis, though the Latin American experience in the 1990s with the imposition of market disciplines was strongly critical of “improvements in the long run.” We may be in a different world, a world where a good deal of policy transfer is the transfer of austerities and disciplines, of pain, of “public bads.” As mentioned, this is not entirely new of course—there are legions of critics and a history of opposition to the Washington Consensus, structural adjustment, and various imperialistic adventures by the United States in particular, particularly in South America. As well, if one looks closely at the policy transfer and best practice advice emanating from many international organizations in the past 20 years (that is, pre-dating the 2008 crisis), there is a deep, resonant, and consistent chord that reform is necessary, but inevitably painful. We can use the OECD once again as an example, since its only real business is the encouragement of public sector and policy reforms. The OECD was established in 1961, and as a cheerleader and coordinator of both its member states and an increasingly widening orbit of observers and partners, it has witnessed and responded to multiple crisis, from the first OPEC oil embargoes in the 1970s, to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, to the 2008 financial meltdown. Its constant theme has been the need for governments to adapt and continuously reform, improve agility through hard choices. Its models and practices glow with promise (the OECD’s motto is “Better Policies for Better Lives”), but have a dark aura of discipline. This is the other, darker side of transfer, the side that is often shrouded by the emphasis on transfer as improvement and learning. In a sense, the 2008 financial crisis simply raised this enduring theme to a higher register and made it more audible. The transfer of austerity and discipline self-evidently creates losers, legions of them, and they are bound to resist. The imposition of various austerity regimes on Greece by the European Commission, IMF and European Central Bank, and the furious resistance by Greek governments and citizens to that imposition, is the most dramatic example of this transfer dynamic, but it
190 Leslie A. Pal has played itself out in various national public management reform strategies (Andrews, 2011; Bozeman, 2010; Cepiku & Savignon, 2012; Pollitt, 2010). With the onset of the fiscal crisis, government response has been framed in terms of austerity measures and cutback management (Kickert, 2012). The pattern of responses has been analyzed, for example, in various special issues of journals that appeared in 2011–2012: Public Organization Review (2011, 11(1)), Social Policy & Administration (2011, 45(4)), Governance (2012 (25(1)), International Journal of Public Sector Management (2012, (25(6/7)). The focus was on austerity techniques and their policy instruments (Cepiku & Savignon, 2012), with one literature review defining the typical concepts of “austerity management” as “austerity, budgets, budgetary process, cutbacks, compressing, decline, deficit, downsizing, downshifting, fiscal balance, fiscal stress, reallocating, retrenchment and slimming down” (Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014: 100). As with the spread of NPM, research seems to show a variety of responses and policy mixes across countries (Lodge & Hood, 2012; Roberge & Jesuit, 2012), with strategic centralized priority-setting being the least palatable (Pollitt, 2010). But in all cases, public sector reform has involved austerity and discipline, the transfer, borrowing, and learning of models of cutbacks and reductions, of the administration of pain. Ultimately, of course, these may lead to improvements and “better policies for better lives,” but in the short term they are disruptive and in almost all cases will generate reaction and resistance. And no one actually believes that the “short term” will be that short. The lesson for transfer research from these examples is to make sharper and clearer distinctions about the distributional impacts of transfers. As an extension of the previous counter-proposition, we should acknowledge that some policies will create winners and losers, even if they may be generally “beneficial.” More pointedly, we should also understand that some policies have discipline and restraint at their core, and in that respect create almost nothing but losers—the winners are abstract categories (future generations; the planet). This sets up completely different dynamics of transfer, as well as of policy management.
Assumption 4: Transfer Channels Success The logic of transfer as lesson-drawing is that lessons are indeed drawn—from best practices, from evident successes, from things that “work.” Nobody wants to transfer failure. If we set aside for the moment the cases of coercive transfer and concentrate only on instances of voluntary transfer, we can posit several logics or patterns. Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett (2008a) identify four mechanisms of diffusion of market models—coercion, competition, policy learning, and emulation (we set aside coercion). Competition involves states adopting “market friendly” policies and institutions because they will make their markets attractive to investors. Policy learning is a mechanism whereby countries draw lessons, based on observation and rational assessment of efficacy, from other countries’ experiences, and then apply those experiences in their own context. Emulation is a mechanism of diffusion drawn from sociological research that
Policy Transfer and Resistance 191 emphasizes that borrowing takes place within a shared set of meanings as to appropriate social actors, societal goals, and the means for achieving those goals. As they argue: “While policymakers see themselves as collectively trying to divine the ‘best practice’ in each policy area, and see policy as evolving toward more and more effective forms, in fact policymakers are seldom able to judge whether a popular new policy improves upon the status quo” (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2008b: 32). Emulation relies on voluntary adoption of new policies in a context where “followers” typically are ready to copy the example of countries or IGOs considered to be “leading.” Emulation has a strong element of bounded rationality—policymakers cannot really be certain about the empirical efficacy of many policies—so they make the best guesses that they can, but also take their cues from who is defined as “leading” and what is defined as a “best” practice. Another well-known logic is institutional isomorphism. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism—coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism occurs in instances where organizations are dependent on other organizations or subject to their rules. This helps us explain isomorphism at the national level, but with respect to isomorphism across national boundaries—global convergence around certain models—mimetic and normative isomorphism hold more explanatory potential. Mimetic isomorphism occurs in conditions of uncertainty and goal ambiguity, inducing new organizations to search for “models” or “best practices.” This can be informal and even ritualistic and, ironically, a way of proving innovation: “Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency” (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). Normative isomorphism is most characteristic of professionalization at the organizational level. Professionalization of a field depends on the development of its “cognitive base” and the “growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse rapidly” (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). It can be extended as a model, however, of more generic borrowing because of the acceptance of practices in a “field” such as NPM. These two approaches or logics differ in scale, of course, with institutional isomorphism focused more on organizations and professions, but the logic of borrowing, learning, and transfer is the same in both: the transfer occurs because something is perceived to “work” (competition, learning, mimetic isomorphism) or because it is normatively supported as “best practice” (emulation, normative isomorphism) in a field of practices. This suggests something that is underestimated in transfer research—a wider backdrop or context of broad “systems” that seem to work and are therefore worthy of emulation. The specific borrowings or lessons are drawn against that backdrop. For the last few decades it has been taken for granted—even with some debates and fierce criticisms— that liberal democracy and modern capitalism are successful paradigms (we
192 Leslie A. Pal could possibly add the EU project as another). Each of these has been shaken to the core in the last decade. Perhaps more precisely, certain key aspects of each have been challenged if not rejected. If liberal democracy is associated with a high-spending and heavily regulatory welfare state, open borders, high immigration, and cosmopolitanism, then this package is being challenged. If modern capitalism is associated with globalization, free trade, off-shoring, and income inequality, then this package is also being challenged. Combined, these developments provoke two types of resistance which are relevant for policy transfer. One is the resistance of some national elites to both the models themselves, and the prescriptions that flow from them. Why should countries try to learn from Washington, when Washington is described by its own president as a swamp that needs draining? President Duterte of the Philippines openly called President Obama a “son of a whore” and EU members like the UK and France as “hypocrites” for their colonial pasts. It is not lost on other countries—Brazil, for example—that the “West” holds itself out as a beacon of good governance while its leaders wrestle with corruption and police brutality (the US), rising anti-immigration sentiment (UK, France, and Germany), fiscal chaos (Portugal, Italy, and Spain), and a general inability to stimulate economic growth. The second type of resistance, one that is channeled by politicians, is the resistance of electorates. The populism that has so bewildered commentators and observers during the US election and the Brexit referendum is a populism that seems to be rejecting both the shibboleths of conventional liberal democracy and of contemporary capitalism, a revolt against elites (Hochschild, 2016; Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016). Latin America of course had its own populist movements for exactly the same reasons (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969; Weyland, 2017). National moods are swinging towards autarchy, borders, and blockages, for “going-it-alone” strategies in a more turbulent world. The lesson for transfer research is not that policy transfer will necessarily diminish, or that lesson-drawing will disappear. It is that, first, there might be more widespread and deeper resistance to any policy transfers that naïvely assume the legitimacy of the conventional political and economic paradigms of the past. Try saying “multiculturalism” in Germany or France; try proclaiming the benefits of free trade in Wallonia. Second, with the de-legitimization of the conventional policy systems and of their national exemplars (the US and the leading EU members), we should expect new exemplars or sources of transfer ideas. The best candidates are think thanks, foundations, public sector consulting firms, and various academic institutes or research centres. These will have the reputational capital of objectivity and some evidentiary basis for their recommendations. Some types of international organizations that are more research-based (the OECD is a leading example), or more technically oriented in the regulatory field, might also qualify. A third lesson is that transfer dynamics in the future may be less global than regional, or along new vectors (less state-to-state transmission and more a mixture of market, non-government, and state engagement in transfers). Policy transfer of more conservative policies in Latin America, for example, may be led by Brazil. In Asia, it might be a
Policy Transfer and Resistance 193 combination of, or competition between, China and Japan. There might be more exchange among Lusophone countries (some 250 million native speakers), with Brazil as its exemplar (current problems notwithstanding). Overall, there may be less West/North to South transfer, and more South-to-South transfer. All point to a different context for policy transfer from the past; that invisible lubricant—a general and even unconscious acceptance of systemic political and economic paradigms—can no longer be taken for granted.
Assumption 5: Transfer Is Incremental Let’s assume for the moment that each of the conventional assumptions about policy transfer discussed to this point is correct—(1) it is typically technical, about mere instruments; (2) it has no major distributional effects; (3) it actually addresses policy problems and makes things “better”; (4) it borrows from successful models and best practices. We can set our counter-propositions aside. The final assumption in the conventional policy transfer literature is that transfer is incremental, normally the borrowing of tools and techniques that make small-ish changes in specific policy sectors. We can take the case studies from a recent collection on policy transfer as an illustration (Hadjiisky, Pal, & Walker, 2017): court system reform; trucking regulation; tobacco advertising; farming techniques; food safety standards; participatory budgeting; trade union regulation. To be fair, most of these case studies identify the translations and modifications in the transfer process, and indeed some of the resistances that arise. But our point here is that almost all research on policy transfer is sector-specific, and is usually at the level (to use Hall’s terminology), of settings and goals, rather than paradigms. In public management reform and the spread of NPM, it deals with public sector organization and processes, and the transfer of techniques like accrual budgeting, contracting out, de-agentification, and performance pay (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Van de Walle & Groeneveld, 2016). This is a fairly broad policy sector, and has been the focus of significant research, often with the finding that the spread has been variable and uneven at best, and usually blocked by the path dependencies of administrative cultures and institutional rigidities (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011; Margetts, 6, & Hood, 2010). Our counter-proposition imports an argument made earlier that a good deal of policy transfer is not simply about tools and instruments, but about paradigms, and even if they seem to be just about tools, the tools themselves resonate with the paradigms from which they spring. Our example was the carbon tax. But let’s take this one step further. Let’s assume three distinct policy fields (they can be quite disconnected—health care, trucking regulation, and immigration, for example)—Sector A, Sector B, Sector C. Now let’s assume a slow drizzle of successful transfers in each sector, transfers of instruments that should have no connection to each other (e.g., health billing methods, truck lengths, refugee determination)—Sector A (xa, ya, za . . . na), Sector B (xb, yb, zb . . . nb), Sector C (xc, yc, zc . . . nc). The conventional assumption, since these are different sectors with different transfers, is that any “accumulation of transfers” occurs only within
194 Leslie A. Pal that sector, and indeed that the accumulation itself is normally distributed and only rarely amounts to a phase shift or paradigm change. Again, the example of NPM is instructive, precisely because it has a wider scope (potentially the entire public sector), and a more clearly defined set of elements. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017) nicely summarize this array as a “menu,” and point out that transfer recipients were more likely to mix and match offerings from that menu than to adopt the NPM paradigm (or variants) as a whole. But even their analysis, and much of the work on the transfer and diffusion of public management practices, assumes that while major institutional changes might occur (say, in previously communist regimes) that these changes were still contained within the state sector. If we relax the assumption that the sectors are siloed, and at the same time relax the assumption that the drizzle of transfers is normally distributed (without tipping points or phase changes), we have the possibility of something more interesting and fundamental—the possibility (for resisters it will be seen as the “threat”) of a fundamental transformation that is crosssectoral and possibly even societal. How could this be? With respect to the policy sectors, even if they appear to be completely different realms, their practices may be seen (within the country) as some sort of expression of national character or national practice. An extreme example that demonstrates this dynamic with stark clarity is the transformation underway in some Gulf states, particularly in Qatar (Tok, Alkhater, & Pal, 2016). The country now has the highest per capita GDP in the world, generated by vast natural gas reserves and a shrewd development of its LNG industry, making it the world’s largest single LNG exporter. It has a native Qatari population (2017 figures) of around 313,000 (with the ex-pat labour force, the total population is around 2.6 million). While it had developed its oil reserves starting in the 1950s, it was a relatively small player in OPEC, and its gargantuan gas revenues only began to flow in the mid-2000s. Since then, the country has been on a massive transformational experiment—the Qatar National Vision 2030’s goal is: “transforming Qatar into an advanced country by 2030, capable of sustaining its own development and providing for a high standard of living for all of its people for generations to come” (Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008). The Vision has four pillars: human development, social development, economic development, and environmental development. These were elaborated in the Qatar National Development Strategy which contained a summary of programs and projects within them: sustainable economic prosperity (20), human development (73), social development (51), environmental development (10), and developing modern public-sector institutions (16) (Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2011). This total of 170 projects was extraordinarily ambitious, given the even larger number of specific targets associated with all these projects. These projects have been joined by the blue whale of all development project—the FIFA World Cup in 2022.
Policy Transfer and Resistance 195 Qatar is undergoing this transformation in the space of one generation, in a country with a tiny Muslim population, that two generations ago was moderately wealthy but could remember its immediate past as a sleepy emirate that had (in the 1930s) depended on pearl fishing for its economy. The pace and scope of change is massive and is based almost entirely on the transfer— importation—of Western standards and practices in every policy realm. Obviously, this has generated debate about national character, Muslim practices, religion and ethics, the role of women and of the family. Policy transfer on this scale is more than the transfer of tools and instruments, and even more than the transfer of policy paradigms—it is a transfer of civilizational practices (the “West” if you will), and quite understandably the debate (and the resistance) has focused on the effects on what we might call the “life world” of Qataris, that connective tissue of norms and practices that make up the lived, everyday social environment. Of course, Qatar is an extreme example, but the idea that the apparently desiccated and technical contents of a policy sector can touch the “life world” is evident in more developed and stable contexts. As another example, in Canada, agricultural subsidies through supply management (of milk, chickens, eggs, and turkeys) have been defended as protections of the “family farm.” Canadians also regard their health care system with almost religious reverence (partly because it’s better than the US), and see any challenges to the public sector monopoly model as an attack on what it means to be Canadian (Maioni, 2014). Brooks (2009) makes a similar argument about the privatization of pensions in Latin America. These policy initiatives actually involved fundamental changes in norms about social protection, the role of the state, and new forms of market relations and property rights. If apparently disparate sectors can be connected and their practices seen as expressions of national character, we can add the point that the apparently disconnected drizzle of policy transfers may have (or be perceived to have) an underlying logic. How could the transfers expressed in Sector A (xa, ya, za . . . na) + Sector B (xb, yb, zb . . . nb) + Sector C (xc, yc, zc . . . nc) have anything in common? In the Qatar case, they are routinely framed as expressions of “the West.” Other “packages” have historically been abbreviated this way as well: the “Washington Consensus,” “neoliberalism,” “market friendly.” Seen this way, of course, these packages are clearly being characterized by the logic of capitalism, a logic that cuts across policy sectors and can become viral as it invades and disrupts both policy sectors and “life worlds” more broadly. The long history of resistance to market-oriented reforms (or transfers that can be characterized as nothing more than the invasion of heartless, capitalist principles) can be quite easily understood if we grasp the logic of transfer as non-incremental, potentially disruptive across sectors, and as an assault on “life worlds.” The otherwise (for elites) inexplicable Brexit vote (if we do not simply reduce it to “fear and anger”) makes sense as this type of resistance. For Brexiteers, the EU was a massive policy transfer machine, churning out endless directives and regulations that had an inner EU logic that ultimately
196 Leslie A. Pal was rending the fabric of British life (the “life world”) into something “not British.” As Nigel Farage, the then leader of the UK Independence Party, put it in his first speech to the European Parliament after the Brexit vote: The biggest problem you’ve got and the main reason the UK voted the way it did is because you have by stealth and deception, and without telling the truth to the rest of the peoples of Europe, you have imposed upon them a political union. . . . Because what the little people did, what the ordinary people did—what the people who’d been oppressed over the last few years who’d seen their living standards go down did—was they rejected the multinationals, they rejected the merchant banks, they rejected big politics and they said actually, we want our country back, we want our fishing waters back, we want our borders back. (The Independent, 2016)
Conclusion The counter-propositions in this chapter are by no means a rejection of the policy transfer framework. It remains true—perhaps even more so today than when the framework was first developed—that domestic policymaking is strongly influenced by external factors and actors. At minimum, there is the ineluctable global integration of transportation, communication, and economic and financial systems. Countries have to interact and (sometimes) cooperate around shared policy problems. The global canopy of international organizations, actors, and networks has grown and thickened, and they very much remain in the transfer business. The simple logic of lesson-drawing and learning takes place daily for good, technical reasons—when confronted with a policy problem, it makes sense to see what others have done, what seems to work, and what mistakes to avoid. Understanding the dynamics of transfer are as important as ever. Our point has simply been that the logic of transfer is actually liable to generate more resistance (among elites, within institutions, and among populations) than has traditionally been acknowledged. The transfer literature has not been completely blind to this—obviously, it is rarely possible to take a policy or program from Country A and simply export it to Country B. To the extent that the transfer does appear to occur, or that a transfer process is underway, analysts have highlighted ways in which that transfer is mediated in some fashion (through institutions), or “translated” into a local policy dialect. There is of course a mountain of research on failed or blocked transfers (Stone, 2017), especially in the development field, but not normally within the policy transfer theoretical framework as such. So, despite the acknowledgement of the micro-dynamics of transfer and the translation or transformation that usually occurs, we argued that the core (often unstated) assumptions of the conventional policy transfer framework have conspired to underplay the dynamics of resistance.
Policy Transfer and Resistance 197 From a research perspective, how would this affect research on policy transfer? Corralling some of the implications we drew earlier, and adding to them: 1. In describing the “what” of transfer, try to understand whether it is a policy instrument, a program, or a paradigm. Obviously, these are not easy distinctions to make (Daigneault, 2015), but if our argument is correct, then the paradigmatic quality of the item being transferred will be an independent variable explaining the degree and perhaps the type of resistance to it, and consequently the degree of success of the transfer. This point extends even in cases where the transfer is about something that seems obviously instrumental, technical, or minor. Is there, as we put it, any “paradigmatic DNA” evident? Often, we can understand otherwise apparent over-reactions (resistance) to policy transfer as resistance to these trace elements, not the transfer itself. 2. Consider the potential distributional effects of a policy transfer. Are costs and benefits concentrated or dispersed? Who are the winners and losers? What resources do they have to support or oppose? Are transfer agents aware of the distributional implications, and does the transfer process reflect that awareness (i.e., loss mitigation strategies)? 3. Building on the second point, is the transfer a transfer of austerities, of cuts, of “public bads” in a broad sense? Research is showing that the policy dynamics of austerity measures differ dramatically from those of benefit expansion (Van Nispen & Scholten, 2016). Transfer studies should capture this. 4. Provide a better understanding of the systemic backdrop or context for transfer, of what is considered successful or prestigious enough to be emulated. Sometimes this is coerced—the clearest model was the bi-polar Cold War context where different countries “borrowed” from their respective hegemons. They rarely had a choice, and it was clear that there were competing systems and competing standards. Policy transfer studies came of age, coincidentally, during the period of US and Western hegemonic dominance, of neoliberalism’s finest hour. That hour is far past now, and we are back to a world of competing systems and models, and where there is more open disdain for both the economic benefits of contemporary capitalism/globalization, and even for the political benefits of liberal democracy/pluralism (Diamond, Plattner, & Walker, 2016; Legutko, 2016). 5. Transfer studies should adopt a longer view (similar to the advocacy coalition’s “10 year” frame) and a more cross-sectoral one. What looks like an incremental process of transfer within a single policy sector may actually be part of a longer phase shift that coalesces across sectors into something much more significant. A final point is that if resistance to policy transfer is indeed to become a sharper theme in global policymaking in the next years, then an emergent niche
198 Leslie A. Pal in the field should be the study of the techniques of resistance—how things get blocked and reversed (Scott, 1985, 1990) will be as important as how things get translated and adopted.
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Note: page references in italic refer to figures or tables. Acronyms frequently used in the index: CELAC – Community of Latin American and Caribbean States CITP – Cash Income Transfer Program FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FNS – Food and Nutritional Security MDS – Ministry of Social Development PB – participatory budgeting PT – Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) REAF – Special Meeting on Family Farming of Mercosur RTD – rural territorial development SSDC – South-South Development Cooperation actants 127 L’Action Associative (L’AA) 160, 166, 174–176 actors/agents (theory): actor-networks theory 127; definition of 118; and epistemic frameworks 55; and Jaime Ortiz (Ciclovía) 13, 122–124; as multi-positioned individuals 73, 75, 82; and policy convergence 27; policy entrepreneurs 50, 55, 57–58 ambassadors see policy ambassadors Argentina: and imports of Brazilian RTD policies 67, 68, 70, 76–81 associative development brokers 165; see also Bachir Kanouté; Fonseca, Ana; policy ambassadors Bachir Kanouté, Mamadou (Enda Ecopop): as associative development broker (ambassador) 13, 165–166; as PB expert and facilitator 163, 164, 172, 175; at the World Social Forum 167, 168, 170, 171 Bacqué, Marie-Hélène 162, 179
Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine (former Tunisian President) 160, 161–162, 166 Benidir, Mohammed 165 “best practices”: as a technology of government (Foucauldian) 120; and Ciclovía 116, 119–120; and international transportation policy networks 127–130 Betinho, Herbert de Souza 52, 53, 54 Bolsa Familia program (Brazil): background context 45–48; actors/ agents of diffusion 54; and cash transfer instruments 102–103, 104; cognitive paradigms of 51; compared with Progresa/Oportunidades program (Mexico) 46–47, 51–53, 52, 59–60; and food security paradigms 50, 51, 52, 53–54, 57; and Mercosur 102; obligations and benefits 51; and social learning 51–53, 52, 54, 59–60, 62n7; and temporal points of contact 51–53, 52; and the World Bank 46, 49–50, 55, 58–60; and Zero Hunger strategy 52, 56–57
204 Index Bolsa Familia program (Brazil) antecedents (1990s): Campinas cash income transfer program pilot 52, 52, 54, 59, 61; Citizens Against Hunger and Misery and in Favor of Life (NGO) 52, 53; the Continual Loan Benefit (BPC) 54; debate on conditional vs. unconditional 53; Eradication of Child Labor Program (PETI) 54, 57; Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program (PGRM) 52, 53 Bolsa Familia program (Brazil) antecedents (2000s): Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security (MESA), 57; Food Stipend Program 52, 56–57; National Food Access Program (PNAA) 52, 57; São Paulo Minimum Wage Program 52, 56, 60, 62n10–11; School Stipend Program 56 Bolsa Familia/Progresa/Oportunidades comparison study 46–47; theoretical framework 48–51 Brazil: constitutional history overview 1–2; and Latin America as a policy importer 8–12 Brazil Federal Constitution of 1988: overview of 9, 46, 57; and participatory budgeting 139, 141–142, 145, 148–149, 154 Brazil Without Misery Program 56, 62n12, 95, 107 Brazilian policy exports (regional): and convergence of policies and instruments 27, 72, 75–76; drivers of 73–75, 78–79; international and regional mechanisms of diffusion 69, 71–72, 80; and international circulation of norms 68–69, 70–71; policy export capacity 67; and policy transfer theory 70; and political vs. internalized convergence 76, 77–78, 79, 80; see also FAO; FNS; policy embedding/embeddedness; public procurement and family farming; rural territorial development (RTD); Transbrasil project 68, 87n1 Brazilian School of Public Administration (Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública EBAP) 9 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 10, 128–129 Campbell, J. L.: and cognitive paradigms 49, 50, 50, 51, 53; and normative structures and programmatic ideas
50–51, 50, 58, 115; and postpositivism 48 Campinas cash income transfer program pilot project 52, 52, 54, 59, 61 carbon tax policies 186–187 Caro Restrepo, F. 121 cash income transfers (CITs) see conditional cash transfer instruments Castaño Valencia, R. 121 CELAC see Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Center of Excellence Against Hunger 105, 110n22 CFS (United Nations Committee on World Food Security) 71 child and adolescent rights 145 Chile (government organizations): Budget Directorate (DIPRES) 34–36, 36, 37, 39; Ministry of Planning and Development (MIDEPLAN) 34–36, 36, 37, 39–40, 41n8 Chile Solidario (Conditional Cash Transfer program): absence of emulation and coercion mechanisms in 33; actors’ motivations 28, 33–34, 36; case study methodology 32–33; CASEN Survey (Economic Characterization Survey) 36, 41n9; indicators of learning mechanism in 34, 36, 36, 41n9; individual actors 30–32, 36; international actors (organizations) and types of actions 30–31, 31; networks of experts 34–35; and poverty vs. indigence rates 33–34; role of government organizations 34–36, 36, 37, 39–40, 41n8; Social Protection System (CHS) objectives and services 33, 40n6, 46 Ciclovía: as a technology of government (Foucauldian) 120; as a world policy model 117–118; and actor-networks 127; construction of as a “best practice” 116, 117, 119–120, 127–131; and the “Great Pedal Demonstration” 121–123, 121; institutionalization of 123–125; and international transportation policy networks 127–130; and Jaime Ortiz 13, 122–124; and Pro-Cicla bike experiments, 116–117, 123–124; role of Enrique Peñalosa in 128–130; sustainable transportation work with ITDP 128–130; and urban planning paradigm shifts 124–125; and urban policy circulations 118–119;
Index 205 worlding sustainable transportation and public health advocacy 127–131 Ciclovía and Bogotá: and public space and citizenship culture 126–127; rapid urbanization and lack of recreational spaces 124–125; urban transformation of 116–118; urban violence and public space use 125–127, 128 Ciclovía, in transnational arenas: and digital technologies 131; and local initiatives world-wide 130–131; and public health advocacy 129–130; and sustainable transportation 127–129; and urban planning and environmentalism 122–123, 125 circulations see policy circulations Citizenship Territory Program (CTP) 68, 76–78, 79 coercion (mechanism of diffusion) 2, 5, 27, 28, 190–191 coercive isomorphism 191 cognitive paradigms: of development 56–57; of food security and human capital 50, 51, 53; unconditional vs. conditional incomes 50, 51, 52, 53, 101 Colombia: import of family farming procurement policies 73–74; translation process 81 Committee on World Food Security 71, 110n15 Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 71 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC): and “bottom up” policy diffusion mobilizations 71, 72; Plan for Food and Nutrition Security and Eradication of Hunger 2025 72; public procurement and family farming 71–72, 74, 75; role in regional integration/cooperation 8, 14, 67, 75, 102, 104 Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) 97, 104, 105, 106 competition: and diffusion of market models 190; as one of four mechanisms of policy diffusion 2, 5, 27, 28, 190–191 conditional cash transfer instruments, Poverty Alleviation in Mexico (Levy) 53 conditional cash transfer instruments (CCTs/CITPs) 101–103, 104; definition 11; for fighting poverty 33, 100, 102–103, 108, 116; and Food
and Nutritional Security (FNS) 101, 107; overview of 25–26; and regional epistemic communities 12, 26; see also Bolsa Familia program (Brazil); Chile Solidario; public procurement and family farming; and SSDC public procurement programs 102–107; and UNICEF and International Labor Organization (ILO) 103–104; World Bank role in 19, 58–60, 102–104, 106, 110n12 conditional income paradigm in Mexico 53, 55 conditional income transfer programs (CITPs) see conditional cash transfer instruments conditional transfer programs (CCTs) see conditional cash transfer instruments Congress Special Mixed Commission (Brazil) 55–56 CONSEA (National Council for Food and Nutritional Security) 68, 106, 111n27 convergence: and coercive isomorphism 191; definition 26–27; geographic 5, 59; and individual actors 75, 163; of policies and instruments 27, 72, 75–76; political vs. internalized 76, 77–78, 79, 80; through the World Social Forum 169; through transnational harmonization 75, 98; voluntary motivations for 76 CTP (Citizenship Territory Program) 68, 76–78, 79 “cultura ciudadana” (“citizenship culture”) 126 Currie, L. 125 Dabène, O. 69 development cooperation: and conditions in Brazil 10; role of in Brazilian social policy diffusion 14; direct and indirect transmission of ideas 49–50, 58, 59, 71, 73–74 Dobbin, F. 2, 3, 27, 190, 191 Dolowitz, David P.: and actors 2; definition of policy transfer 70; eight categories of transfer 185; in the field of policy transfer studies 4, 48, 69, 95, 118, 183; and translation and hybridization 76, 81 École d’Administration Publique (School of Public Administration, or ENA) 9
206 Index El Salvador: import of Brazilian RTD policy 77, 79; import of Brazilian Territory of Citizenship program 76, 79 emulation: characteristics and motivations of 26, 27, 37, 190–191; and diffusion of market models 2, 190–191; as one of four mechanisms of policy diffusion 2, 5, 27, 28, 190–191 Enda Ecopop (NGO) 164–166, 170, 172; vs. learning 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 37; see also Bachir Kanouté environmentalism 122–123 epistemic communities 30, 55; and the Bolsa Familia Program 54, 56, 103; definition and indicators of 31, 32, 35; and the policy transfer literature 183; regional 12, 37, 54 European Union: accessions and exits as paradigm shifts generating resistance 186, 187–188, 191; and Brexit as paradigmatic life-world assault 195–196; (LEADER) program and RTD 71, 78, 81 “family farming law” see public procurement and family farming FAO see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Filho, L. 72, 74, 75 FNS see Food and Nutritional Security Fonseca, A. 47, 54, 56–58, 60 Food Acquisition Program: PAA Africa 105, 111n23; PAA Brazil 68, 73, 74 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): and family farming procurement policies 14, 73–74, 80; and FNS policies through SSDC 71, 104–107; and Latin American policy exports 8, 72, 73–74, 75, 84–86; modes of dissemination of 68; and Rural Territorial Development 14, 71, 78, 81; and South-South cooperation 70, 110n15 Food and Nutritional Security (FNS): and “civil society mechanism” 71, 105; and conditional cash transfer instruments 101; dissemination of through SSDC 94, 95, 100–101, 104–105; donors agenda and resistance in Africa 101; evolution of in social protection 100–101; and framing of conditional cash transfer programs 101, 107; and High-Level Panel of Experts on
Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) 71; international diffusion of 68, 69, 70; local adaptations of 68, 71–72; regional organizations for diffusion of 72, 73; and UN institutions for diffusion of 70–71, 80–81, 105 food security: vs. agricultural development 110n4; and Brazilian diplomacy (through FAO) 71; and CITP conditions 54, 57; and civil society-government dialogue and participation 108; and the Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program (PGRM) 52, 53; role of international organizations (FAO) 14 food security paradigms: in Bolsa Familia and Progresa/Oportunidades programs 50, 51, 52, 53–54, 57; and Citizens Against Hunger and Misery and in Favor of Life (Brazil) 52, 53; and CITP conditions linked to health and education 54; and definition of cognitive paradigm 51; for fighting against poverty 54–55; relationship to human capital paradigm 54–55 Foucault, M. 120 Foundation for the Future (FFF) 160, 162–164 Fund to Fight and Eradicate Poverty 55–56 Garrett, G. 2, 3, 27, 190, 191 Genro, T. (former Porto Alegre mayor) 143, 150, 151, 152 Gil, A. C. 48 Graziano da Silva, José 57, 75, 81, 105, 110n15 “Great Pedal Demonstration” 121–123, 121 Guangzhou 128–129 Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program (PGRM) 52, 53 Haas, P. 31–32, 32 Haiti 73–74, 80 Hall, P.: and second-order changes 49, 54–55, 58–59; and social learning concept 48–49, 60, 62n7, 185; and South-South diffusion of policy instruments 96–97, 107; three orders of social learning and change 49, 96, 97 Hassenteufel, P. 72, 75–76; and translation 6, 76, 81; and transnational spaces policies and agents 17, 69–70, 71
Index 207 High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) 71 human capital paradigms: in Bolsa Familia and Progresa/Oportunidades programs 50, 51, 52, 53, 54–55; defined 51; and unconditional income paradigm 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 101 hybridization 73–76, 80, 81, 82 IDB (International Development Bank) 35, 59, 60, 67, 71, 77, 78 IDC (International Development Cooperation) 94 IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) 71 IICA (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture) 67, 71, 72, 78, 80 ILO (International Labor Organization) 35, 103–104, 106 IMF 9, 50, 186, 189 income transfer programs and the Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program (PGRM) 52, 53 Institute for Transportation and Development (ITDP) 128–130 institutional isomorphism 191 instruments: defined 16; and family farming vs. cash transfer program diffusions 100–102; of public procurement and family farming policies 68; for social participation and ethnic inclusion 9 INTA (National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology) 77, 80–81 Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) 67, 71, 72, 78, 80 International Development Bank (IDB) 35, 59, 60, 67, 71, 77, 78 International Development Cooperation (IDC) 94 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 71 International Labor Organization (ILO) 35, 103–104, 106 international organizations: actions and expertise of 30–31; disseminating Brazilian policy innovations, 68; as drivers of diffusion 78–79; and participatory budgeting diffusion and cities networks 153–154; and regional epistemic community 12; role in policy diffusion 14; and structural
adjustment policies 189–190; see also specific organizations IPEA (Participatory and Social Mercosul Brazilian Council) 147 ISM (Mercosur Social Institution) 102 ITDP (Institute for Transportation and Development) 128–130 Keynesian paradigm 45–46 Kingdon, J. 48, 55, 57–58 Kouraiche-Jaouahdou 166 Latin America: diffusion of transport policy 10; emergence as a “policy export” region 8, 9, 12–16 Law of Social Assistance (LOAS) 54 learning mechanism, vs. emulation 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 37 lesson drawing 3–4, 7, 119–120, 183, 189, 190, 192, 196; and policy transfer as success assumption 190–191 Local Governance and Civil Society in Tunisia: Challenges, Interactions and Perspectives meeting 162–163 Lula da Silva, L. I.: fight against hunger 53, 57, 58, 73, 75, 104; and minimum wage program 60; and participatory institutions 147; and Pink Wave 79 Marsh, D. 2, 4, 48, 69, 70, 76, 80, 81, 95, 118, 183; see also Dolowitz MDS see Ministry of Social Development mechanisms of diffusion: actor categories and predictable behaviours 30, 31, 31; coercion 27, 28–29, 29, 33; competition 27; and direct and indirect transmission of ideas 49–50, 58, 59, 71, 73–74; emulation 26, 27, 28, 33, 37, 190–191; emulation vs. learning 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 37; and epistemic communities 31–32, 32; the four types of 2, 5, 27, 28, 190–191; horizontal and vertical operations of 27; and independence of policy adopters 5, 27, 28–29, 29; learning 27, 28, 33; vs. learning 29, 32, 33, 37; of market models 190–191 means and motives 28, 29 Mercocidades or Mercocities (cities network) 11, 14, 152, 154 Mercosul 14, 110n15, 152 Mercosur Social Institution (ISM) 102
208 Index Mercosur (Southern Common Market): agricultural research cooperation program (PROCISUR) 71; and arrangements of South-South regional cooperation 97, 102, 104; Brazilian regional leadership in 8, 67, 70, 102; and Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) 97, 104, 105, 106; and diffusion of the Bolsa Familia program 102; for dissemination and regional integration of policy 8, 70, 71; and family farming organizations 87; and RTD policy dissemination 72; and social movements/civil society mobilization 71, 77–78, 105; Special Meeting on Family Farming of Mercosur (REAF) 14, 71, 77, 105–106 Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan (PEAS) 102 methodologies: beyond comparative and nationalist models 17–18; Bolsa Familia/Progresa/Oportunidades comparison study 48; for Chile Solidario conditional cash transfer program study 32–33; and study of regional Brazilian policy exports 68–72; for study on participatory budgeting in Tunisia 160–161; for study on regional diffusion of Brazilian policies 68–72; suggestions for improvement 197–198 micro-practices 119 Millennium Objectives (UN) 46, 93 Minimum Wage Program (PGRM) Brazil, 52, 53 Ministry of Social Development (MDS): and cash transfer instruments 102–104, 107–108; creation and reorganization of 52, 75, 110n5; and National Food and Nutritional Security Policy 68; and the Zero Hunger strategy 68 mobilities see policy mobilities Mockus, A. 126 municipal Councils (Brazil) 145–146 National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA) 68, 106, 111n27 National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology (INTA) 77, 80–81 National Program for Sustainable Development of Rural Territories (PRONAT) 68
National Program of Solidarity (Pronasol) 52, 53, 55 National School Feeding Program (PNAE) 68, 73, 74, 95, 105 neoliberalism 162, 171, 188, 195, 197 normative isomorphism 191–192 Oliviera Porto de, O. 159, 164, 165, 167, 179 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2, 186, 188, 189, 192 Ortiz, M. J. 122–124 PAA: Africa 105, 111n23; Brazil 68, 73, 74 paradigm shifts: and food procurement and school feeding programs 105; and policy resistance 185–187; in urban planning 124–125 paradigms: battle of 47; cognitive 49, 50, 50, 51, 53, 100–101, 104; of food security and social rights 53, 54, 54–55, 100–101, 104; in Hall’s orders of social learning theory 49; vs. instruments of policy transfer 185–186; of neoliberalism 45; of planning 124–125; in policy diffusion and transfer 3, 4, 48; and post-war Keynesian 45–46; and resistance 16, 191–192; of suburbanization 125 participation ambassadors and brokers see policy ambassadors Participatory and Social Mercosul Brazilian Council (IPEA) 147 participatory budgeting (PB): historical overview 139–140; and the federal constitution of 1988 141–143; municipal councils and conferences 145–146; national councils and conferences 146–148; in Porto Alegre 10–11, 143–145; role of municipal councils 143–145; socio-political contexts of 140–141, 172–175; and the Workers Party of Brazil 10–11, 13, 147, 149–150, 152; and the World Bank 17, 153–154, 179, 188 participatory budgeting (PB) diffusion: through ambassadors from Porto Alegre 151–152; horizontal 148–150; through international organizations and cities networks 152, 153–154; mayors and the diffusion of
Index 209 participatory budgeting 13, 143; and paradiplomacy (bottom up diffusion) 12–13; role of ambassadors in transnational arenas 151–153; and second wave professional ambassadors 152–153; and social movements and associativism 140–141; state-level scale-shifts 150–151 participatory budgeting (PB) in La Marsa: absence of legislative framework for 173–174; associations and municipality agreements 174–175; challenges 172–173; and citizen participation 176–177; compared to Porto Alegre model 178–179; training sessions 177–178 participatory budgeting (PB) in Tunisia: and Foundation for the Future (FFF) 160, 162–164; import route and implementation 175–178; and neighbourhood committees 161–162; and participation ambassadors and brokers 164–167; policy circulation and consolidation (World Social Forum) 167–172; and policy decentralization 160; singularity effects and socio-political context 172–175; and transfer of the Porto Alegre model through conferences and training sessions 163–164; translation processes 159–161; and typology of participatory models 162 Pasquier, R. 69–70, 71, 74, 80 PEAS (Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan) 102 Peñalosa, E.: Bus Rapid Transit and parks focus of 126; as policy ambassador 13, 126–130, 151 Peñalosa, G. 126–127, 130, 131 PGRM (Guaranteed Minimum Wage Program) 52, 53 PNAE (National School Feeding Program) 68, 73, 74, 95, 105 policy ambassadors: diffusion from Brazil through government agencies 13–14; and participatory budgeting (PB) in Tunisia 13, 152–153, 164–167; for transnational diffusion of participatory budgeting (PB) 151–153; see also Bachir Kanouté policy circulations: and conditional income transfer policies 10, 46; debates and definitions 3–6, 9–10, 25; and Latin America as a policy
exporter 8, 9, 19, 46; of norms (international) 69, 70–71, 73–75; vs. policy mobilities 3, 7, 118–119, 132; of technical and primary information from Mexico favoring adoption by technical apparatuses in region and in international organizations 55; urban 7, 118–119, 132; and World Social Forums 167–172 policy diffusion: approaches to 4–5, 7–8, 25–26, 49; through circulation of norms 70–71; definitions 25, 68–69; drivers 78–79; through hybridization vectors 75–76, 80, 81; international 7–8, 17–18, 70–71; and international circulation of norms 69, 70–71; and Latin America policy exports 7–8; and policy dynamics 12–15; vs. policy transfer 3–4; and political contexts 15; waves of 5 policy diffusion, transnational: and ambassadors 151–153; and Ciclovía 122–123, 125, 127–131; convergence and harmonization 75, 98; spaces and agents 17, 69–70, 71 policy embedding/embeddedness: and convergence 75–76; and discourses 97, 132; and international transportation circuits 128; and regional policy diffusion 72–79; and resistance 183, 185, 187, 188; in socio-political processes 7–8, 73–75, 95, 119, 160 policy instruments: definition 109n2; vs. paradigms 185–187 policy mimicry 8–9 policy mobilities 3, 7, 118–119, 132; see also policy circulations policy transfer research: in the AngloSaxon world 3–4; and “lesson drawing” 3, 189; and resistance to participatory budgeting 175–176, 188; and resistance to transfer 183–184, 196; and settings and goals focus (incremental changes) 193–196; social constructivist approaches 117, 119, 132; suggestions for improved methodology 197–198 policy transfer research assumptions: counter-propositions 184, 185–186; transfer channels success 190–193; transfer is improvement 188–190; transfer is incremental 193–196; transfer is instrumental 185–187; transfer is neutral 187–188
210 Index policy transfer resistance: and the assumption of legitimacy 192–193; and austerity programs 189–190; and four mechanisms of “market friendly” policies 190–191; and life worlds 194–196; and paradigm shifts 185–187; and “public goods” vs. “public bads” 189–190; and social policies as paradigms 16–17; underexplored in research 183–184, 196 policy transfers: “copycat” 77, 79; defined 70; distinguished from instruments 185; and paradigms 184, 185–186; vs. policy diffusion 3, 3–4; theories 69 policy translation: and bargaining/ resistance 16, 183, 193, 196; and hybridization 73–76, 80, 81, 82; massive diffusion of in Latin America 153–154; of participatory budgeting (PB) in Tunisia 159–161; in policy transfer research 4, 17; and sociopolitical contexts 8, 16, 18, 58, 81 Porto Alegre see participatory budgeting post-positivist theories 48–51, 50; see also social learning Poverty Alleviation in Mexico (Levy) 53 Prieto Ocampo, L. 123 Pro-Cicla 121–123, 121 Progresa/Oportunidades programs (Mexico): compared with Bolsa Familia 46–47, 51–53, 52, 59–60; and conditional vs. unconditional transfers 52, 55; historical trajectories and social learning 51–53, 52; and second-order change (Hall) 54–55; and Solidarity with Children 53–54; and the weakness of social protection in Mexico 47 Pronasol (National Program of Solidarity) Mexico 52, 53, 55 PRONAT (National Program for Sustainable Development of Rural Territories) 68 ProSavana Project 186 public procurement and family farming: in Africa 70; and bottom-up dissemination 74–75; Brazil’s political prominence in 104–105; vs. cash transfer program instruments 100–102; circulation vectors of 73–75; in Colombia 13, 74; Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 71–72, 74, 75; and
convergence 75–76; and cooperation agreements 14, 68; and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 14, 73–74, 80; in Haiti 74; and Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) 67, 71, 72, 78, 80; in Paraguay 73–75; and REAF 14, 71, 77, 105–106; regional integration/organizations 2, 14, 69–70, 71, 74, 78–80, 81; role of FAO 14, 73–74, 105; and SouthSouth cooperation 72; and the SSDC 14, 95, 104–105; and the World Food Programme (WFP) 70, 73–74, 75 Ramírez Ocampo, A. 124 REAF see Specialized Meeting of Family Farming regional integration/organizations: “bottom up” 2, 14, 69–70, 71, 74, 78–80, 81; CELAC Food Security and Nutrition plan of action 14; Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 8; diffusion vectors 73–76, 80, 81, 82; Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) 67, 71, 72, 78, 80; Mercocities networks 11, 14, 152, 154; Mercosul and Family Farming Purchase initiatives 14; see also CELAC; Mercosur Risse-Kappen, T. 69 Rose, R.: and actors 2, 118, 189; and lesson-drawing 3–4, 120, 183, 189; and translation 4, 48 Rosenau, J. N. 69 RTD see rural territorial development rural territorial development (RTD): agents of diffusion 78; and Argentina 77–80; and convergence 79; and drivers of diffusion 14, 78–79; and the European Union (LEADER) 71, 78, 81; and Mercosur 72; and the National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology (INTA) 77, 80–81; and National Program for Sustainable Development of Rural Territories (PRONAT) 68; and policy transfer theories 69; and unsuccessful policy export attempts 76–78, 79; and Uruguay 78, 79 school feeding programs: and Brazilian municipal councils 145; and cash
Index 211 transfer programs 100, 101–102, 105, 107; National School Feeding Program (PNAE Brazil) 68, 73, 74, 95, 105; and public procurement and family farming 68, 73 school meals programs see school feeding programs School Stipend, Brazil 52 Simmons, B. A. 2, 3, 5, 27, 118, 190, 191 situated contingencies 119 social contestation 140 social learning: in the Bolsa Familia program (Brazil ITP) 54, 59–60, 62n7; and Chile’s Budget Directorate (DIPRES) 34–36, 36, 37, 39; and direct and indirect transmissions 49–50; in Mexican Pronasol program 53; and paradigm-normative structure interactions 49; and points of contact 51–53, 52; post-positivist theories of 48–51, 50; and SouthSouth diffusion of policy instruments 96–97, 107; and the World Bank and IDB 60 social participation policies: Brazil as a laboratory for 139; diffusion from Porto Alegre 10–11, 13; instruments and norms 141–142; and internationalization of participatory budgeting 147, 151–154; national conferences and municipal councils 146–148; and participatory institutions 139; and state-level scale-shifts 150–151 social protection and food security policies: Brazil seen as a policy “laboratory” 93; and Brazilia; foreign policy objectives 104–105; and Brazil’s cooperation partners 106–107; and Brazil’s work with the FAO 105; discourses embedded in (hegemonic and divergent) 97; and FNS normative context of instruments of 100–102; and human capital initiatives World Bank, 34, 45–46, 55, 99, 101–102; and mobilization of civil society 105–106; and proliferation of CITPs 46, 61n3; and proliferation of instruments of social protection 94; and resistance to policy initiatives 195; and the role of the Brazilian MDS 102–104; see also Zero Hunger Strategy Solidarity with Children program (Mexico) 53–54
South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC): as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy 70, 93–95, 104–105, 110n15; cash transfer program instruments 100; and Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) 100–101; and Food and Nutritional Security (FNS) 94, 95, 100–101, 104–105; fundamental role of international organizations 98–99; government and civil society mobilization 101–102, 105–107; institutional arrangements of 97–99, 98; and Mercosur (Southern Common Market) 97, 102, 104; and mobilization of networks for partners 106–107; normative context and actor motivations 99–100; postneoliberal resurgence of 93–94; and public procurement and family farming 14, 95, 104–105; and social learning theory 96–97, 107; support mobilization for policy instruments 104–105; and trilateral cooperation 67–68, 81, 97–99, 98, 103–107, 109 Specialized Meeting of Family Farming (REAF): and civil society 71, 73, 77–78, 79, 80, 105–106, 110n15; and regional policy integration 14, 71; and transnational harmonization/ convergence 75; and Uruguay 78 SSDC see South-South Development Cooperation Suplicy, E. (Senator) 53 Suplicy, M. 56 Territorial Citizenship program (Brazil) 77, 79 Territories of Progress Program (El Salvador) 77, 79 Tomazini, C. G.: and cognitive paradigms 47, 50, 51, 55, 58; and conditional income programs 46, 47, 48, 53 Transbrasil project 68, 83–87 transfers see policy transfers Transmilenio 10, 128–129 transport policy diffusion 10, 128–129; see also Ciclovía Tunis International Conference on Citizen Participation and Budgeting 164 Tunisian Association of Urban Planners (ATU) 163, 167 Uber 188 unconditional income as a cognitive paradigm 51
212 Index UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 35, 78, 99, 103, 167 UNICEF 103–104, 106 United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 71 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 35, 78, 99, 103, 167 URB-AL program 11 urban policies: and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 10, 128–129; geography and policy mobilities 3, 7, 118–119, 132; innovations of 10–11; and theories of circulation 118–119; see also Ciclovía; participatory budgeting Uruguay 78, 79 VNGi (NGO) 165, 167, 170 Wampler, B. 11, 149 “Washington Consensus” 1, 45, 183, 189, 195 Weyland, K. 5, 59; Brazil-Mexico study 5, 48–50, 58, 59, 60; and direct/ indirect transmission of ideas 49, 50, 58, 59, 60; and resistance to transfer 159, 188, 192 Workers Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT): constitutional innovations of 142–143; creation of participatory budgeting 10–11, 13, 147, 149–150, 152; in Porto Alegre 143, 143–145; and social participatory innovations in government 142–143 World Bank: and the Risk Matrix 34–36, 38; and development cooperation 8, 18, 34; and participatory budgeting (PB) 17, 153–154, 179, 188; and policy expertise 15–16, 30, 35, 36, 49–50, 103; and political interests 9, 18, 50, 55, 186; as proponent of conditional programs 1, 12, 14, 102, 103–104, 106, 110n12; role
in diffusion of conditional income transfer instruments 19, 58–60, 102, 104, 106, 110n12; and rural and territorial development initiatives 71; and social learning and paradigmatic alignment 34–36, 36, 38, 58–59; and social protection/human capital initiatives 34, 45–46, 55, 99, 101–102; and transportation development policy 125, 129 World Development Report (World Bank) 45–46 World Food Programme (WFP): and public procurement policies 70, 73–74, 75; and RTD polices 80, 81; and SSDC 104, 105, 107, 110n22 World Social Forum (WSF): and diffusion of participatory budgeting (PB) 11; for exchange and circulation of knowledge about participatory budgeting (PB) 168–170; and participatory budgeting (PB) diffusion 152; and participatory budgeting (PB) in transition to democracy 167–168; to promote participatory budgeting (PB) as a solution to social inequalities 171–172; to showcase participatory budgeting (PB) practices around the world 170–171; and the World Bank 153–154 worlding cities defined 119 Zero Hunger strategy: and the Bolsa Familia program (Brazil) 52, 56–57; and Brazilian development cooperation 94–95, 105, 107; and the Brazilian School Feeding Program (PNAE) 105; and Brazil’s international leadership of the fight against hunger 70, 75, 103–104, 105; and the “family farming law” 68; and international NGOs 106; reasons for diffusion of 95