Korea And The Cold War: Division, Destruction, And Disarmament 0941690482, 9780941690485

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Korea and The Cold W ar

To Glenn H. Snyder and Norman A. Graebner

Korea and the Cold War Division, Destruction, and Disarmament

Edited by

Kim Chull Baum and

James I. Matray

Regina (Books Claremont, California

© 1993 by Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Korea and the Cold War : division, destruction, and disarmament / edited by Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray p. cm. Includes bibliographical references ISBN 0-941690-48-2 1, Korean War, 1950-1953. 2. Koreàn War, 1950-1953Diplomatic history. I. Kim, Ch' öl-böm. II. Matray, James Irving, 1948DS918.K558 1993 951.9—dc20 93-3874 CIP

‘Regina ‘BooRs Post Office Box 280 Claremont, California 91711 Manufactured in the United States of America.

CONTENTS

Foreword/ vii About the Editors and Contributors / viii Introduction / 1

Chapters 1: Kim Hakjoon, Trends in Korean War Studies: A Review o f the Literature / 7 P arti: DIVISION 2: James I. Matray, Civil War o f a Sort: The International Origins o f the Korean Conflict / 35 3: Kim Chull Baum, U.S. Policy on the Eve o f the Korean War: Abandonment or Safeguard? / 63 4: John Merrill, The Origins o f the Korean War: Unanswered Questions / 95 5: William Stueck, The Soviet Union and the Origins o f the Korean W a r / 111 Part II: DESTRUCTION 6: Karoly Fendler, The Korean War and Eastern Europe: Assistance from Hungary / 125 7: Zhai Zhihai, China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited / 141

8: Michael Schaller, Douglas Mac Arthur: The China Issue, Policy Conflict, and the Korean War ! 167 9: Rosemary Foot, Negotiating With Friends and Enemies: The Politics o f Peacemaking in Korea / 193 10: Ohn Chang-il, South Korea, the United States, and the Korean Armistice Negotiations / 209 P a rtili: DISARMAMENT 11: Jam es I. M atray, Korea's Quest fo r D isarm am ent and Reunification / 231 12: Ahn Byung-joon, The United States, Korea, and Arms Control: A Strategic Review / 253 13: Lho Kyongsoo, East Asian Security Policies in the 1990s: Implications fo r Korea / 263 14: Kevin N. Lewis, Arms Control in Northeast Asia: Lessons from Recent World Developments / 285

FOREWORD

This volume was published first in the Korean language during 1991 with a few differences in the selection of essays. Richard Dean Bums, emeritus professor at California State University, Los Angeles, deserves credit for making possible publication of this book in the United States. His excellent editorial advice and enthusiastic support were invaluable in the successful completion of this project. In addition, the editors are grateful to David Shambaugh, editor of China Quarterly, for granting permission to reprint Professor Zhai's article, originally appearing with the same title in issue number 121 (March 1990) on pages 94 to 115. Special thanks to Juanita Graves at New Mexico State University for her typically outstanding secretarial assistance in the areas of typing and records management. And finally, the editors take great pleasure in dedicating this book to Glenn H. Snyder, political science professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Norman A. Graebner, history professor emeritus at the University of Virginia.

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND THE CONTRIBUTORS

AHN BYONG-JOON is a professor of international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, and former president of the Korean Association of International Relations. His major publications include Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution and The Strategic Defense Initiative: Its Implications fo r Asia and the Pacific. He also has contributed articles to Asian Survey, China Quarterly, and the Journal o f Asian Studies. KAROLY PENDLER is a former diplomat who spent several years representing Hungary in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. ROSEMARY FOOT is the John Swire Senior Research Fellow in international relations of the Far East at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. She earned her doctorate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Foot is the author of The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions o f the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 and A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks. KIM CHULL BAUM is associate professor of international politics at the Korean National Defence University, Seoul, Korea, and a research fellow at the Ridgway Center of International Security Studies, the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of The U.S. and the Korean War and the editor of Perspectives on the Korean War, The Truth About the Korean War, The Korean War: Politics o f Superpowers and the North-South Conflict, and New International Order and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, He is publishing an article in the Korean Journal o f International Relations as well. Kim is president of the Korean War Studies Association.

KIM HAKJOON is chief press secretary and spokesman for the president of the Republic of Korea. Formerly a professor of political science at Seoul National University and an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of Munich, he is the author of Unification Policies o f South and North Korea, 1945-1985: A Comparative Study, Korea in Soviet East Asian Policy, and Korea's Relations with Her Neighbors in a Changing World. KEVIN N. LEWIS is a senior strategic analyst and member of the graduate faculty at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, with principal interests in U.S. defense planning and strategy. He earned his Ph.D. in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981. LHO KYONGSOO is a research associate at the Center for International Security and Arms Control and acting assistant professor in the Department of History at Stanford University. His articles on East Asian security issues have appeared in such leading journals as Asian Survey. JAMES I. MATRA Y is professor of history at New Mexico State University. The author of several articles on U.S. policy toward Korea, his The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, won the Phi Alpha Theta book prize in 1986. He also is the editor of the Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War and currently writing a survey of U.S.-Korean relations since World War II. JOHN MERRILL is an analyst with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. State Department. A specialist in Northeast Asian politics and former Fulbright Fellow at the Asiatic Research Institute of Korea University, he is the author of Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War and co-author of The DPRK: Politics, Economics, and Society. His essay contains personal opinions and not those of the U.S. government. OHN CHANG-IL is associate professor of military history and strategy and director of the division of humanities and social sciences at the Korean Military Academy in Seoul, Korea. He is the author of several articles on U.S.-Korean relations and currently is working on an official history of the Korean War to be written in Korean.

MICHAEL SCHALLER is professor of history and head of the department of history at the University of Arizona. His The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945, won the Stuart L. Bemath book award in 1980. In addition to several articles on U.S. foreign policy in East Asia during and after World War II, he is the author of The American Occupation o f Japan: The Origins o f the Cold War in Asia and Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General. WILLIAM W. STUECK, JR., is professor of history at the University of Georgia. In addition to numerous articles on U.S. policy in Asia during the Cold War, he is the author of The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 19471950 and The Wedemeyer Mission. Stueck received the Stuart L. Bemath lecture award in 1986 and is currently completing work on an international history of the Korean War. ZHAI ZHIHAI is a research analyst at the Foundation for International and Strategic Studies in Beijing, China. He received his bachelor of arts degree in English language and international relations and masters degree in international public policy at the Beijing Second Foreign Language Institute. Professor Zhai has translated several biographies and autobiographies in addition to writing a novel.

INTRODUCTION

On November 20, 1990, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev headed the list of world leaders representing over thirty countries who signed the Charter of Paris. This historic document ended the "era of confrontation and division in Europe” known as the Cold War. "We are closing a chapter in history," President Bush proclaimed. The signators agreed to work in the future for democracy, human rights, and economic freedom in "a peaceful and stable Europe." But while the Paris summit witnessed Europe's liberation from its tragic postwar legacy, the Cold War continues on the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. Since 1945, a nation once known as the "Hermit Kingdom" has had two governments each claiming to represent the entire country. Four decades ago, the nationalist drive for reunification resulted in the outbreak of the Korean War. Today, while much of Europe celebrates a new era of unity and peace, Korea hardly resembles what 19th Century traders and missionaries called the "Land of the Morning Calm." Koreans watched events in Europe during 1989 with great interest and increasing envy. In fact, an atmosphere of excitement and anticipation prevailed throughout the peninsula for most of 1990 as the people thought Korea soon would emulate Germany and achieve reunification. In the midst of this rising hopefulness, scholars from several nations gathered in Seoul for a conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the start of the conflict in Korea. Professor Kim Chull Baum of the National Defence College delivered the opening address with a reminder that the selection of source materials for the writing of history has been shaped and influenced by the perspective of the author. To a greater extent, he continued, historical research has been distorted and even misinterpreted by the prevailing political environment. Kim then noted that this has been especially true in studies offering explanations for various aspects of the Korean War.

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Korea and the Cold War

At the same time, Kim observed that the global transition from Cold War to a new international detente was widening the scope and depth of the debate on the Korean War. Unfortunately, in North Korea, the official history taught to the 20 million citizens living there remained tied to the traditional Communist framework. This continued to be the case even though the Soviet Union had begun in its official comments to admit not only its role in providing wartime assistance to North Korea, but also P'yöngyang's responsibility for starting the war. Kim then observed that despite this optimistic trend, what scholars most needed from Moscow was access to archival materials and freedom to study the Korean War in the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet government at that time revealed its continuing reluctance to permit complete openness, as it prevented Dr. Boris Janegin from fulfilling his promise to participate in the conference. In the interests of historical com pleteness and objectivity, the international academic community needed greater access to research materials especially in the Soviet Union, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Sponsors o f the conference attem pted to achieve broad representation in terms of geography and interpretation. They hoped to ensure the interaction of a diverse spectrum of opinion. For example, Professor Zhai Zhihai from the People's Republic of China accepted an invitation to participate. Although his paper was presented and discussed, Professor Zhai was unable to attend in person. Also, Professor Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago, a leading revisionist writer on the Korean War, agreed to attend. He later found it necessary to decline the invitation because of political differences with the sponsors. Despite the absence of some top scholars, the conference, nevertheless, benefited from the presentation of a series of outstanding papers that sparked lively, provocative, and insightful discussions. This highlighted a number of important lessons about the origins of the conflict, the role of the superpowers in the Korean War, and the prospects for the lessening of tension on the peninsula leading toward the goal of disarmament and ultimate reunification. This volume contains most of the papers presented at the Hilton Hotel between June 14 and 17, 1990. They are organized chronologically but grouped around the three themes of division, destruction, and disarmament. The book begins with Kim Hakjoon's essay surveying recent literature on the Korean War. His article emphasizes the shift in the historiographical debate to a discussion of whether the origins of the conflict were primarily domestic or international in nature. During the past decade, the writings of Bruce

Introduction

3

Cumings have created increasing support for the view that Korea was a civil war. In his essay, New Mexico State University's James I. Matray attempts to redress the balance. He focuses attention on how the Soviet-American Cold War created the circumstances that made possible a military clash in a divided Korea. For years, historians have blamed the United States for creating the Republic of Korea and then leaving it vulnerable to an attack from the north. Kim Chull Baum adds to the validity of this argument in his article through the presentation of solid new archival evidence. Kim places the U.S. decision to withdraw occupation forces from South Korea in June 1949 in the context of bureaucratic battles in Washington, D.C., that the United States and the Korean people would come to regret. A major source of historical controversy since 1950 has been the debate over the Soviet Union's role in initiating the Korean War. Department of State intelligence analyst John Merrill, in his essay, acknowledges that Moscow was aware of the DPRK's plans, but emphasizes the importance of understanding the domestic setting. He poses a series of questions, providing answers that will force readers to reassess previously accepted conclusions about when the fighting actually began and why. William Stueck, a professor at the University of Georgia, does not dispute Merrill's conclusions, but reminds readers that without Soviet support, there would have been no Korean War. In his article, he explains Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's approval of North Korean plans as mainly the product of the Soviet dictator's obsession with maintaining domestic political control inside the Soviet Union. While both Merrill and Stueck agree that Moscow was fully aware of Kim's invasion plans, former Hungarian diplomat Karoly Fendler provides evidence that the Soviet Union's East European allies were unaware of the DPRK's preparations for war. More important, Fendler shows how Hungary's Communist government exploited fears of an expanded conflict to unify the populace behind the regime and consolidate political control at home. He also discusses Hungarian economic and medical assistance to the DPRK during and after the Korean War. Chinese military intervention was the single most important event during the Korean conflict. Zhai Zhihai, a Chinese scholar at Beijing's Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, presents an indepth analysis of the reasons behind the PRC's decision to join the fighting. According to Zhai, Mao Zedong and his colleagues, who were not involved in planning for the Korean War, intervened because the U.S. military advance to the Yalu River constituted a grave threat to China's national security. Michael Schaller of the University of Arizona demonstrates in his article that Beijing's leaders had good

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Korea and the Cold War

reason to be concerned. Douglas Mac Arthur, Schalter contends, wanted to use the Korean conflict as an excuse to extend the war to China, ultimately forcing President Harry S. Truman to recall the general. This paved the way for the start of armistice negotiations, where, as British scholar Rosemary Foot's essay reveals, the United States immediately assumed a belligerent and inflexible posture. South Korea encouraged this truculent behavior, which added a new and difficult dimension to the process of negotiating an end to the war. Meanwhile, Washington's other allies favored compromise. Ohn Chang-il of Korean Military Academy contributes the final essay in the section on destruction. Ohn explains how South Korean opposition to an armistice played a central role in determining the postwar security relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Since 1953, the Korean people have sought to achieve disarmament and reunification without success. In the context of these two issues, Matray surveys the course of events in Korea over the past four decades, focusing attention on how Koreans explain their failure to follow Germany's recent example. Ahn Byung-joon, a professor at Yonsei University, raises concerns in his article about negotiations for disarm am ent in Korea proceeding too rapidly. He shows the importance of the United States maintaining its commitment and ability to defend South Korea against its untrustworthy rival to the north. Stanford University's Lho Kyongsoo agrees. His essay emphasizes the importance of coordinating disarmament negotiations in Korea with the fiiture security policy planning of the major powers, as these nations shape the new world order of the 1990s. Finally, Kevin N. Lewis, a strategy analyst with the RAND Corporation, speculates in his article about the future course o f Korean negotiations, making comparisons with the disarmament process in Europe. His perceptive and insightful essay cautions readers against being overly optimisitic, concluding that the two situations are not entirely analogous. Forty years ago, negotiations to achieve an armistice ending the Korean War were deadlocked. Many observers wondered whether the fighting would ever end. In many ways, the conflict in Korea continues today, as leaders in P'yöngyang and Seoul search unsuccessfully for some form ula to achieve disarmament and reunification. This collection o f essays provides im portant explanations for Korea's tragic history during the past half-century. Certainly, the Cold War heads the list, as Korea's division came to symbolize the postwar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Koreans were not passive actors in this

Introduction

5

unfortunate drama, although few would admit the truth of this judgment. During the 1990s, Korea will no longer be a pawn in global politics, setting the stage for the first genuine test in years of the wisdom and skill of its leaders. This volume will help readers to anticipate the future course of developments on the Korean peninsula, as well as the final outcome.

Chapter 1

TRENDS IN KOREAN WAR STUDIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Kim Hakjoon Research and international interest regarding the Korean War increased significantly in the 1970s. A steady stream of doctoral dissertations on the subject appeared annually during the decade, as did a comparable number of books. In April 1979, the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies in Los Angeles sponsored a panel titled "A Réévaluation of the Korean War." The next year, Bruce Cumings, a leading authority on the origins of the conflict, organized a conference at the University of Washington focusing on the theme "A Thirty-Year Anniversary Conference on the Outbreak of the Korean War." Then, in 1985, the British Association for Korean Studies sponsored a symposium titled "The Réévaluation of the Korean War." Although somewhat behind research trends abroad, academic interest inside Korea relating to the Korean War escalated in the 1980s. In 1987 alone, three conferences were held in Korea related to the war.1 This increased interest in Korean W ar studies reflected greater overall understanding by the Korean academic community of Korean society as well as the contemporary history of Korea. Scholars concluded that the Korean War not only was a watershed in contemporary Korean history, but also an integral event in the flow of modem world history. Renewed interest in the Korean War has occurred for a number of important reasons. First, the emergence of Soviet-American detente in 1 The first conference took place from June IS to 16,1987, and resulted in the Korean publication of A Reexamination o f the Period o f National Disruption Prior to and after the Korean War (Seoul, 1987).

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Korea and the Cold War

the early 1970s brought a deemphasis on the Cold W ar and, correspondingly, on ideology. Such an evolving international environment contributed to more objective studies pertaining to the Korean War, a conflict which was a by-product of the Soviet-American Cold War. Put another way, the ideological restrictions in assessing the Korean War relaxed considerably. Second, critical source materials relating to Korean War studies were either released or uncovered. These can be broken down into four main areas. A significant portion of the primary documents pertaining indirectly and directly to the Korean War, including papers of key figures who played critical policy-making roles, were made available in the United States. These included official documents of the U.S. government, especially those deposited at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and appearing in the Foreign Relations o f the United States series, archival materials located at presidential libraries, private depositories such as the Douglas MacArthur Memorial, and the North Korean documents seized by the United States during the Korean War.2*Documents originating in Great Britain were also released after the mid-1970s. Britain and the United States differed widely on the questions of entering the Korean conflict, continuing the war effort following Chinese military intervention, and negotiating the terms for a cease-fire at the armistice talks. A small number of Soviet and Chinese documents have surfaced since the middle of the 1970s. Soviet works such as The Liberation o f Korea (in Russian), published in 1976, and The Relations Between the Soviet Union and the People's Korea (in Russian), appearing in 1981, both under the auspices of the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., are examples.2 Although these two books do 2 Referred to often as the "Captured North Korean Documents," these last papers cover areas such as the background behind the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as insights into the North Korean leadership's prewar perceptions of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and plans for achieving reunification. For greater detail on these materials, see Kim Hakjoon, "North Korean Studies During the Formation and Initial Period of the Government (I): With an Emphasis on the Captured North Korean Documents of the U.S. Army," Journal o f International Politics (in Korean) 24 (1984): 161-92. 2 These two books have been translated into Korean by the Bureau of Research, National Unification Board of the ROK, under the titles The Liberation o f Korea (1987) and The Soviet Union and its Relationship with North Korea (1987).

Review of the Literature

9

not deal directly with the Korean War, they permit indirect analysis of the conflict in the context of the relationship between these two countries prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Bureau of Communist Party History of the Central Committee School published a chapter in its journal Party History Research in 1980 by Yao Xiu in Chinese titled "The Correct Policy of R esisting the United States and Supporting Chaoxian: In Commemoration of the 30th Departure Anniversary of the People's Volunteer Forces and Its Participation in the [Korean] War." This paper includes a number of new documents relating to China's participation in the Korean War. In addition, Peng Dehuai, who was the commander of the "Chinese People's Volunteers Army" during the Korean War had his memoirs titled Peng De Huai's Recollections published in Chinese by the People's Publishing Company (1981). An English language translation became available in 1984. Finally, the South Koreans released documents after the mid-1970s. The Republic of Korea (ROK) published all 11 volumes of the History o f the Korean War, prepared by the War History Compilation Committee, by 1980 in Korean. Shortly thereafter, the Korean War Institute, founded in 1985, prepared Documents Relating to the Korean War (in Korean). Totaling 1,211 pages, this was the first volume published in Korea consisting of primary sources relating to the Korean War. President Syngman Rhee's wife Francesca published a memoir titled The Korean War and President Rhee (in Korean) which appeared as a series during 1983 and 1984 in the Jungang Daily. Chung Il-Kwon, chief of staff of the ROK Army and commander of the 3d Army during the Korean War, subsequently published his own memoirs in Korean with the title Confidential Records o f June 25: War and Armistice.4 Conversely, no known official documents pertaining to this period have been released by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Nevertheless, the aforementioned "Captured Documents of North Korea" provide a critical alternative method for understanding North Korea's position. A third factor stimulating new research on the Korean War was the conflict in Vietnam. This war sparked a reassessment not only of Asian4 4 These documents are reviewed in greater detail in Kim Hakjoon, "Domestic and International Documents on the Korean War, Part I,” Diplomacy (in Korean) 5 (March 1988): 120-22.

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Korea and the Cold War

nationalism, but of U.S. policy in Asia as well. Writers alleged that in the aftermath of World War II, Asian nationalists sought to break down the existing order, build socialism, and create social revolutions. The Vietnam War, they claimed, was essentially a conflict, civil in nature, between North Vietnam which persued such goals and South Vietnam which did not. Nevertheless, the United States opted to intervene in this conflict for imperialistic reasons. This réévaluation of the Vietnam War contributed to a reassessment of the Korean War. According to some scholars, the United States intervened in the Korean War in order to protect its economic interests despite the fact that the conflict was a civil war in which the DPRK was imbued with the unique characteristics of Asian nationalism whereas the ROK was not.56Revisionist accounts of the origins of the Cold War also fit the Korean conflict into this larger picture of American aggressiveness in the postwar era.6 Fourth, the rise of second generation Korean studies scholars ovptseas brought a revival of interest in the war. In the United States, first generation Korean studies scholars mainly consisted of missionaries or their offspring with a background in Korea and U.S. military and diplomatic officials. During the 1970s, however, a small group of American scholars chose to pursue doctorates in Korean studies and acquired the ability to examine Korean documents. Assessing American foreign policy in a broader context, these scholars naturally turned their attention toward the Korean War. Professor Bruce Cumings' collection of essays titled Child o f Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (1983) is a prime example of the trend. Contributors to this book are heavily critical of the entire spectrum of Korean-American relations from the period of the division of the Korean peninsula through the signing of the armistice agreement. The first volume of Cumings' The Origins o f the Korean War (1981) provided the foundation not only for

5 For examples, see Selig H. Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York, 1978) and Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (London, 1986). The six-hour documentary on the Korean War produced by Thames Television in England titled Korea: The Unknown War, which aired in 1990, also chastises U.S. policy in Asia for its imperialist motivations. 6 For an early example, see Denna Frank Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960,2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1961).

Review of the Literature

11

this revisionist anthology, but full length second generation studies of the war as well.7 A large segment of the research findings relating to the Korean War focus on the origins of the conflict. Major interest centers on the question "who started the Korean War and why?” Researchers asking this question want not merely to define who the "perpetrator" was, but rather to accurately assess the nature of the Korean War through an investigation of its origins. Scholars first accepted as an answer the Stalin initiation theory. When the Korean War broke out, the perception in the West was predominately the traditionalist view. In particular, the United States chose to refer to the Korean War as "Stalin's War." The U.S. Department of State maintained that the Soviet leader caused the outbreak of the Korean War and this judgment, widely reported in the U.S. media at that time, established itself as the prevailing impression among the American public.8 The Stalin initiation theory identified several motives to explain the Soviet leader's decision to start the war. First, the pressure dispersion theory maintained that the Soviet Union wanted to divert the increasing U.S. military pressure in Europe after the formation of the Noith Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Adam B. Ulam agrees with this view, but argues that it would be incorrect to simplify the conceptualization of the Soviet Union's Asian policy as being subordinate to its European policy.9 A second line of thought holds that the Soviet Union precipitated the outbreak of the Korean War to counter the U.S. efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Japan that excluded the Soviet Union. As is well known, the United States initially wanted to transform Japan into an "Asian Switzerland" during its occupation, proceeding in 1945 and 1946 to dissolve Japan's military structure, heavy industries, and business conglomerates. But as the Chinese Communists seemed increasingly likely to attain victory during 1947, the United States became concerned with the need to counter the expansion of Communist influence in Asia and subsequently enacted a new policy aimed at transforming Japan into 7 Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child o f Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 19431953 (Seattle, 1983), and Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes, 1945-1947(Princeton, N.J., 1981). 8 Denna Frank Fleming assesses the analysis that the U.S. Department of State provided during the Korean War and offers specific criticisms. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, vol. 2, p. 60S. 9 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History o f Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York, 1968), 514.

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Korea and the Cold War

a powerful anti-Communist base. As a result, U.S. policy followed a "reverse course" from the initial guidelines, resulting in the formation of the Self Defense Forces together with a conscious effort to promote capitalism and economic recovery. Moreover, right-wing politicians who had been incarcerated as war criminals were released, thereby permitting the revival of a conservative political movement. 1° Stalin understood these developments to mean the potential creation of an anti-Soviet alliance, much like NATO, centered on a new staunchly anti-Communist Japan. Significantly, in February 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was formally concluded to counter "Japan and imperialist countries which may collude with Japan." Moscow sumultaneously launched a propaganda campaign alleging that the United States was in the process of absorbing Asian-Pacific countries into an "aggressive military bloc." At the same time, anti-American demonstrations by the Japanese Communist party were intensified. The main premise of this theory asserts that Stalin calculated that the United States would not intervene to defend the ROK, allowing the Korean peninsula to be communized through a swift military victory. By such a turn of events, communism could solidify its hold in Asia with the bonus of reducing the U.S. posture as well as disrupting Japan's policy of consolidation. George F. Kennan has noted that, although the Japan ingredient was not the most important factor in the Soviet Union's decision to launch the Korean War, it would be most surprising if it was not of any consequence.11 Third, some writers have argued that Stalin was always ready to exploit global weaknesses in order to expand the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Just such an opportunity arose with Secretary of State Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech on January 12, 1950. Six months after U.S. forces withdrew completely from Korea, he stated that South Korea was outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. Additionally, Stalin might have perceived the May 1950 second National Assembly election in South Korea as a weakness given that the right wing under the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Kim Söng-su lost considerable ground. 111 On this policy shift, see Michael Schalter, The Origins o f the Cold War in Asia: The American Occupation o f Japan (New York, 1985). 11 George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy," Foreign Affairs 42 (October 1964), 15.

Review of the Literature

13

At the same time, because the United States had not acted to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining control over the mainland and forming the PRC on October 1,1949, it would not intervene in the event of a North Korean attack on the ROK. Therefore, the exploitation of a weak-point theory stressed the Soviet Union's misperception of U.S. intentions.12 A fourth theory stipulates that Stalin decided to launch the Korean War in order to test the reaction of the West, including the United States, prior to implementing his "grand strategy of global communization." This was the most likely explanation as to why President Harry S. Truman decided to intervene in the Korean War. As Truman noted in his memoirs, as soon as word of a North Korean attack reached the United States, Department « f Defense officials cited such examples as Japan's Manchurian campaign of 1931, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and the 1938 Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Munich analogy suggested that Axis expansion would not have occurred had there been a stronger initial counteraction. The same pattem could be discerned in the case of Korea whereby, if the Communist assault southward was not swiftly halted, Stalin might launch invasions in other areas. Following on the heels of the communization of mainland China, American prestige and credibility would fall even lower after an easy sovietization of South Korea which would also serve to spur other Communist expansionist movements in Asia. Finally, the Sino-American attrition theory asserted that Stalin was apprehensive about the rising power of the Chinese Communist party in Asia. Because Mao Zedong had gained control over the mainland without much assistance from the Soviet Union, Stalin calculated that the PRC would undertake an independent line and become "a second Yugoslavia." This would hinder considerably Stalin's strategy of worldwide domination. So, in addition to weakening the United States, Stalin chose to launch the Korean War to deflate Chinese capabilities, particularly since signs were evident in early 1950 that the Truman administration was considering recognition of the PRC. Stalin wanted to isolate Mao's regime by encouraging a direct conflict between the United States and the PRC. Based on such preconceived steps, China allegedly 12 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1965), 72.

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Korea and the Cold War

fell into a Soviet trap and was pulled into the Korean War which resulted in its denunciation in February 1951 by the United Nations as an aggressor. With Mao's China ostracized by the international community, the United States could apply its policy of containment, thereby confining the PRC's ambitions. 13 Traditionalists, based on the inferences noted above, hold that Stalin took the initiative. They also believe that Stalin conspired with Mao. Specifically, the traditionalists maintain that after the announcement by Andrei Zhdanov in the fall of 1947 calling for a World Communist revolution, the initiative for this Communist revolutionary strategy in Asia was transferred to China whose role was considered to be that of a "junior partner" to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, following on these developments, China secretly concluded a military accord with the DPRK for the coordination of military strategy following an invasion of South Korea under the supervision of the Soviet Union. This argument maintains that the Korean War was the first joint Sino-Soviet strategy to communize Asia. A. Doak Barnett has been a m ajor. proponent of this theory. Following the formation of the PRC, he argues, Beijing became the regional center of Asian communism, and the Soviet Union agreed to transfer regional responsibility to China under the "division of regions principle." He cites as evidence a speech made by Liu Shaoqi on November 16, 1949, during a meeting in Beijing of the Conference of Asian and Australian Trade Unions. In his capacity as conference chairman, Liu declared that "the path taken by the Chinese people . . . is the path that should be taken by the peoples of various colonial and semi­ colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy." Moreover, he added that a national independence struggle was taking shape in East Asia including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan. With regard to the Korean peninsula, "the movement of the Korean people against Syngman Rhee, puppet of American imperialism, and for the establishment of a unified Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be halted." Barnett stipulated that For a detailed review of this theory, see Edgar Snow, The Other Side o f the River: Red China Today (New York, 1962), 654-55. Additional information appears in John Gunther, The Riddle o f MacArthur (New York, 1951), 172. See also, Wilbur Chafee, 'Tw o Hypotheses of Sino-Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War," Journal o f Korean Affairs 4 (October 1976-January 1977), 10-11.

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L iu 's speech should be seen as the PRC's proclamation of its "new m ission” of inspiring Communist insurrection in many Asian countries.14 Harold Hinton has proposed a similar line of analysis. He emphasizes th e participation of various representatives from East Asia, including North Korea, and concludes that "a coordination of the strategies among th e major communist parties . . . of China, Korea, and Vietnam" had begun. According to Hinton, the Korean War was the outcome of the resolution of this strategy.15 On the other hand, Alexander Dallin focuses his attention on the establishment of the "Liaison Bureau" on November 2 0 by the World Trade Federation. He compared this organization with th e Far Eastern Cominform (International Communist Information Committee) which consisted of Soviet, Chinese, Indian, and Australian representatives and was responsive to the directives of the Soviet representative. Dallin argues that this organization pursued the strategy leading to the initiation of a Korean War.16 In the context of the joint Sino-Soviet strategy theory, an interesting interpretation is offered by Marshall Shulman which portrays the Chinese as opposed to the Soviet role. Shulman suggests strongly that, regardless o f the question of Soviet aid, China was prepared to pursue the Korean W ar option as a means to extend Communist revolution in Asia. Ironically, the Soviet Union chose to pursue the Korean War option as well out of concern that China would assume an advantageous position vis-a-vis North Korea. On the other hand, British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee maintained at the time that China's failure to gain admission into the United Nations resulted in its decision to cultivate North Korea so that it could recover from its defeat by a victory in a Korean War. Furthermore, he maintained that if the PRC were recognized by the United States and were admitted into the United Nations that the Korean War would not have occurred.17 Another example supporting the notion o f a direct Chinese involvement in the planning of the Korean War can be found in the 14 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1961), 152. 15 Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston, 1966), 27. 16 Alexander Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia, 1961), 70. 17 Marshall Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, 1963), 41; Clement R. Attlee, "Britain and American Common Aims: Different Opinions,” Foreign Affairs 32 (January 1954), 199.

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Korea and the Cold War

repatriation into North Korea during 1949 and 1950 of Korean soldiers who were part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). There were Koreans who had entered the Chinese army after participating in antiJapanese movements in Manchuria and China during World War II or lived in northern China and Manchuria after the surrender of Japan. However, after the PLA successfully occupied Manchuria in the fall of 1948—it was also at this moment that the DPRK was formed—China began to transfer the Korean soldiers into North Korea. With the fall of Nanjing in May 1949, following a successful crossing of the Yangtze River, approximately two divisions of Korean soldiers under the PLA's 4th Field Army returned to North Korea and were regrouped into the 5th and 6th Divisions of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Moreover, some 12,000 Korean soldiers returned to North Korea in April 1950 and formed the 7th Division in the NKPA. As a result, more than one-third of the NKPA's forces consisted of soldiers who had direct combat experience under the PLA. Those scholars who argue that the PRC was directly involved in the planning of the Korean War even maintain that the Korean soldiers who returned to North Korea did so under a Chinese-North Korean agreement which was in turn initiated by the Soviet Union. For instance, Moon Hee Seok, a Korean military affairs specialist, has noted that "upon the completion of the communization of China . . . the Republic of Korea was chosen as the next objective for a military invasion." In January 1949 at Harbin, an agreement was concluded between the PRC and the DPRK under the initiatives of the Soviet Union, calling for the repatriation of Korean soldiers to North Korea.18 Even the Guomindong (Nationalist) government announced the existence of similar "agreements." As an example, on May 5, 1949, the Central News Agency, a Guomindong organ in Shanghai, reported that, "on March 17, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party concluded a mutual defense treaty with North Korea during Kim II Sung's visit to the Soviet Union." It also asserted that "the two sides pledged joint action in their joint war against the imperialist forces in case North Korea or Communist China is attacked by any imperialist power." The Central News Agency provided as well the following details of the "Korea-China 18 Moon Hee Seok, "The North Korean Army Between the Soviet Union and China," in Kim Sung-ok (ed.), The Future o f China (Seoul, 1967) (in Korean).

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Mutual Defense Treaty" on May 5,1949. First, from July 1 to August 31, 1949, the Chinese Communists agreed to deliver weapons and troops to North Korea from Manchuria. Second, North Korea would receive the highest priority in the allocation of Japanese military supplies as well as Japanese technicians and workers in Manchuria. Third, the DPRK and the PRC agreed to engage in trade based on barter in accordance with each other's economic needs.19 The Central News Agency continued to file reports on this subject. For example, on October 16, 1949, it announced that "two secret agreements were already concluded between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union in Harbin and Moscow." According to the clause relating to North Korea in these agreements, China retained the right to establish air bases in North Korea and to withdraw its military forces in wartime to the Soviet Union through North Korea. In return, the DPRK had the right to deploy troops at Jilin and Andong in Manchuria at any appropriate time.20 To those scholars who emphasize the Sino-Soviet conspiracy theory, the most important event before the Korean War was Mao Zedong's long-term stay in the Soviet Union from December 1949 until February 1950 and the outcome of his summit meeting with Joseph Stalin. In a press conference after his arrival in Moscow on December 16,1949, Mao stated that, during his meeting with Stalin, issues such as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Soviet assistance to the PRC, SinoSoviet trade, and "other problems" would be discussed. Traditionalists maintain that among the "other problems" was Sino-Soviet planning for the Korean War, which in fact received the highest priority. For instance, Dallin, citing a report by a U.S. intelligence agency, states that "Peking and Moscow agreed that North Korea should begin the war and they believed that North Korea would succeed without external military support. Only after the United States begins to win should China receive Soviet air support and military support.” Dallin claims that these agreements were reached during die Stalin-Mao summit. Richard Walker and Philip Mosley hold similar views.21

19 New York Times, May 6,1949. 2® Republic of China, Central News Agency, China Handbook, 1950 (Taipei, 1950), 278-79. 21 Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, p. 87; Philip E. Mosley, The Kremlin and World Politics (New York, 1960), 325; Richard Walker, China Under Communism (New Haven, Conn.,1955), 271.

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Korea and the Cold War

Traditionalists thereby argued that North Korea's preparations for the war occurred in accordance with a Sino-Soviet conspiracy. Seen from this perspective, some have also focused attention on Kim II Sung's March 1949 trip to Moscow and the resultant conclusion of the SovietNorth Korean economic cooperation agreement. During the conclusion of this agreement, the Soviet media reported that henceforth North Korea would receive Soviet assistance "in all areas." The phrase "in all areas" has been interpreted by the traditionalists to cover "military areas" and the Soviet Union used such a general term in order to not take any direct responsibility for the soon-to-be launched attack on South Korea.22 Beyond this source material, the "testimony" of three defectors from Communist rule is frequently cited by the traditionalists. These accounts come from Soviet army officer Kyril Kalinov, who reportedly escaped from East Germany after a tour of duty in North Korea; Yuri A. Rastvorvov, who defected to the United States after having served at the Soviet embassy in Japan; and Paul Monat, the military attache at the Polish embassy in P'yöngyang who defected to the west. All three men recalled that military assistance to North Korea was accelerated on the basis of a Sino-Soviet agreement which finalized plans for the Korean War. For instance, according to Kalinov's recollection, the Soviet Union began modernizing the DPRK's armed forces after dispatching a "Special Soviet Military Delegation" to Fyöngyang following the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from North Korea in December 1948. This special delegation consisted of two artillery specialists, Generals Terenty F. Shtykov and M. Katukov, and an intelligence specialist, Admiral M. V. Zakharov. They were entrusted with completing the modernization of the North Korean armed forces within 18 months, or by June 1950.23 22 Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1955 (London, 1953), 177-78. 23 Kyril Kalinov, “How the Russians Built the North Korean Army," The Reporter, September 26, 1950; Yuri Rastvorvov, "Red Frauds and Intrigues in the Far East," Life, December 1954; Paul Monat, "Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," Life, June 27, 1960. By utilizing these and other sources, Jin-Chull Soh, who subscribes to the SinoSoviet conspiracy theory, has presented a cogent argument on how the Soviet Union supported North Korea militarily. See Jin-Chull Soh, "Some Causes of the Korean War of 1950: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy in Korea (1945-1950) with an Emphasis on Sino-Soviet Collaboration" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1963), 196-97. Moreover, a synopsis is provided in Jin-Chull Soh, "The Role of the Soviet Union in Preparation for the Korean War," Journal o f Korean Affairs 3 (January 1974): 3-14. At

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These sources indicate that, from 1949 until June 19S0, the Soviet Union transferred to North Korea 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 100 Yak fighters, 70 bombers, 100 T-34 tanks, and various other heavy artillery pieces.24* By June 1950, North Korea, able to field a total of 135,000 ground forces, deployed its crack combat units along the thirty-eighth parallel. South Korea's total troop strength at this time numbered only 65,000, with 4,000 maritime police and a 45,000-man police force, all with very limited supplies. It was owing to such circumstances that the DPRK's Minister of National Security Ch'oe Yöng-gön was able to declare on January 21, 1950, that "the People's Armed Forces armed with such modern weapons as airplanes, tanks, and naval vessels is able to successfully undertake any combat responsibility and to engage in combat in order to crush the enemy of the unification of the Motherland and independence." The traditionalist interpretation was immediately denounced by the Communist world. The DPRK insisted that the Korean War occurred because of "a 'Northern invasion' by the U.S. imperialists and its fascist Rhee Syngman regime." According to North Korea's interpretation, the Korean War's "main culprit" was the United States.2^ North Korea has advanced several explanations for U.S. behavior. First, by destroying the DPRK, the United States would be able to utilize the entire Korean peninsula plus Taiwan as a base to contain China. Second, the United States wanted to save the Rhee regime, which allegedly was on the verge of collapse owing to the climax of popular opposition. Third, the United States at that time possessed nearly all nuclear weapons worldwide and it wished to claim victory in a Korean War before the Soviet Union developed into a true nuclear power. Fourth, the United States calculated that the West European imperialist powers would not be against its instigation of a war given that they were receiving benefits under the

the same time, it has also been maintained by some revisionist scholars that the Kalinov article was fabricated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 24 This source material was also accepted as accurate by the U.S. Department of the Army. See Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C., 1961), chapter 2. 2^ Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators o f the Civil War in Korea: Documents from the Archives o f the Rhee Syngman Government (Pyongyang, 1950) and Facts Tell (Pyongyang, 1960).

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Korea and the Cold War

Marshall Plan. North Korea has claimed that, in order to defeat the American-sponsored invasion, it carried out a "just war of national liberation. "26 Opposition to the traditionalist interpretation began to appear in the West with the publication in 1952 of I. F. Stone's book The Hidden Story o f the Korean War.TT Although widely credited with originating the North Korean invasion theory, Stone does not categorically assert that the United States and the ROK started the Korean War, although he does highlight weaknesses in the official interpretation of the U.S. government's role. Stone offers an alternative theory which suggests a "conspiracy" among a specific segment of the U.S. military (in particular, General Douglas MacArthur), South Korea's Syngman Rhee, and Taiwan's Jiang Jieshi. This explained why, according to Stone, MacArthur and his staff were not surprised upon learning of the outbreak of the war. If true, what supports this contention? Stone's interpretation begins with the assumption that Syngman Rhee first suggested the provocation of the Korean War because his government was confronting a grave domestic crisis. Moreover, Stone insists that an attempt was being made by MacArthur to replace the Truman administration's "Europe first" with an "Asia first" foreign policy orientation. Therefore, he conspired with Rhee and Jiang, as well as with Department of State advisor John Foster Dulles, to ensure the expansion of the American commitment in Asia in reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War. Stone's work, however, lacks source materials. It is based primarily on newspaper reports. Nevertheless, his book later had a significant effect on the emergence and growth of revisionism as it related to Korean War studies. For example, Fleming's argument as to the origins of the Korean War is basically a refinement of Stone's analysis. The works of Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, together with that of other revisionists, which will be discussed in greater detail, also were influenced by Stone's work. Stone's book influenced Japanese intellectuals who had a strong leftist perspective, as well as the general public, after it was translated by26* 26 For a detailed review of North Korea's position, see Alfred Crofts, "The Start of the Korean War Reconsidered," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal (April 1970): 109117. 2 2 1. F. Stone, The Hidden History o f the Korean War (New York, 1952).

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Uchiyama Satoshi and published in 1952 by the Shin Hyo Publishing Company in Tokyo.28 Moreover, the publication in Japanese of Japan's Dark Shadow, containing in particular a chapter titled "The Concocted Korean War" which was authored by leading Japanese novelist Matsumoto Kiyohari, can be said to have been based on the rationale underlying Stone's work. In addition, David W. Conde, a foreign journalist residing in Japan, advanced a North Korean invasion theory in his The History o f the Korean War, 1950-1953 (1968), which was translated into Japanese by Mutsui Saburo and released by the Taihei Shuppansha in Tokyo. Conde rejected the legitimacy of the ROK, arguing that the DPRK was the genuine bearer of a "legitimate nationalist liberation power." His work had an important influence on works of future revisionists. Stone's interpretation and the more updated version provided by Fleming survived into the late 1960s as an alternative explanation, although revisionism had not yet become the mainstream view. As circumstances began to change with the onset of the 1970s, revisionist accounts of the origins of the Korean War began to broaden, and the debate accelerated. For example, Edward Friedman and Mark Selden co­ authored a volume titled America's Asia: Dissenting Essays in AsianAmerican Relations. It consisted of a compilation of papers constituting a revisionist overview of U.S. postwar policy in Asia and included several chapters critical of the traditionalist interpretation of the origins of the Korean War.29 The most representative of the articles in America's Asia is that of England's John Gittings. Gittings completely rejects the Soviet conspiracy theory, stressing that Stalin was an accomplished and careful practitioner of diplomacy. Therefore, the Soviet Union under his rule carried out a low risk and defensive foreign policy. Further, Gittings asserts that the Soviet Union's overall capability was much smaller than that of the United States because real industrialization there had only begun in the 1930s. Additionally, because the Soviet Union's capabilities were reduced further by World War II, it is difficult to imagine just how 28 An updated translation was made by Uchiyama Satoshi and published as a single volume by Aokishoten in 1966. 29 Edward Friedman and Mark Selden (eds.), America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations (New York, 1971).

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Korea and the Cold War

the Soviet Union could have chosen to engage in a dangerous clash with the United States over Korea, a prevailing assertion among the revisionists.30 Gittings also rejects the Chinese conspiracy theory. His views are shared by Edward Friedman and Allen S. Whiting. These authors agree on several points. First, the relationship between China and North Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was not so close as to warrant a conspiracy. For instance, although North Korea's first ambassador to China, Yi Chu-yön, arrived in Beijing in January 1950, China only sent a deputy ambassador and a first secretary to P'yöngyang on July 10. This was two weeks after the outbreak of the war and only on August 6 did the PRC name its first ambassador to the DPRK. Although such facts do not necessarily mean an estrangement between Beijing and P'yöngyang, they are sufficient to prove that the PRC did not attach much importance to the Korean issue. Second, tensions surfaced between the PRC and the DPRK before the outbreak of the Korean War, especially a clash concerning the status of the Supoong dam on the Amnok River.31 These writers have reevaluated the labor federation conference in Beijing. They argue that the national representatives who participated did not hold high enough positions to control revolutionary Communist movements in Asia. In fact, it was only a technical meeting for discussion of each participating nation's labor problems and it disbanded shortly thereafter. Moreover, Liu Shaoqi's speech should not be construed as aimed at inciting Communist revolutions in Asia, but rather as an expression of the PRC's pride in the successful accomplishment of the Chinese revolution and the national liberation movements in Vietnam and elsewhere. It should be emphasized that prior to Liu Shaoqi's speech, an "anti-imperialist armed struggle" movement was already in progress in several Asian countries. It therefore would be incorrect to interpret his speech as a marching order for the countries of Asia, including South Korea, to begin an "anti-American armed struggle."32 30 John Gittings, "The Great Asian Conspiracy," in Friedman and Selden (eds.), America's Asia, pp. 108-32. 31 Edward Friedman, "Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power: America Declares War on China," in Friedman and Selden (eds.), America's Asia, p. 218; Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., 1960), 44. 32 Ibid.

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Finally, Gittings, Friedman, and Whiting insist that there is no evidence that the PRC directly stated or suggested its willingness to assist North Korea militarily or otherwise during the period prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. For instance, on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by the DPRK's first ambassador to China, Yi Chu-yön, on January 28, 1930, Liu Shaoqi stated that "China expresses its endless sympathy to the Korean people in their heroic struggle for national independence and unification." A clear distinction must be maintained between psychological sympathy and military assistance. This point is more clearly evident in a subsequent June 1950 editorial by the Xinhua News Agency which proclaimed that "the Korean people must solve the problem of peace and unification in their country through their own efforts."33 The traditionalist argument focusing on the "repatriation of Korean troops to North Korea" also has been reexamined. For example, Samuel B. Griffith, an American specialist on the Chinese armed forces, contends that the probability is very high that China returned the Korean troops to North Korea owing to the PRC's domestic situation, and therefore it was not connected with starting a Korean conflict. He also states that China already had officially announced plans to reduce the size of its armed forces after the successful seizure of control on the mainland. Following such an analysis, Whiting has written that "Chinese Communist concern over military expenditures and preparations for a cutback in its own forces during 1950 made such a transfer expedient from Peking's point of view."34 Even with the "Sino-North Korean mutual defense treaty," signed in February 1950, it is difficult to imagine that the PRC would have entered into a secret agreement with the DPRK to prepare for an invasion southward before it received positive assurances of its own security from the Soviet Union. Additionally, the only evidence of the "Sino-North Korean agreement” was provided by the Guomindong government's Central News Agency. This very point was made by the U.S. embassy, which questioned its credibility in a report filed to its home office from Nanjing. If that is the case, why did the Nationalist government publicize 33 Ibid. 34 Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York, 1967), 347.

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Korea and the Cold War

such a report? In emphasizing the development of a military alliance in East Asia including the Soviet Union and China as well as North Korea receiving Soviet assistance, the Nationalist government might have been trying to influence public opinion in the United States. Such a propaganda campaign could then exert pressure on the U.S. Congress to compel the Truman administration to create a countervailing alliance between the United States and the Nationalist government, as well with South Korea.35 Finally, the Mao-Stalin summit has been reexamined. Whiting has revealed that much of the meeting was concerned with the Sino-Soviet treaty, Soviet military assistance to China, the PRC's recognition of Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and other issues unrelated to Korea. Nevertheless, Whiting believes that Stalin gave Mao some information on preparations for the Korean War. For instance, he asserts that a Chinese field army based in southern China was transferred to Manchuria immediately prior to the outbreak of war together with the repatriation of Korean troops in China. But no direct or official evidence has yet been found indicating that the issue of the Korean War was discussed during this meeting, let alone negotiation of an agreement. A report prepared by a North Korean delegation which visited Moscow on the occasion of Stalin's birthday while the summit meeting was in session confirms this point. Kim Tu-bong, the delegation leader, only noted that "the Soviet peoples await the rapid unification of Korea and salutes our people's struggle for the unification and independence of Korea," without any reference to China. The prevailing view in the academic community holds then that, although the PRC knew of the preparations for the Korean War and hoped for a North Korean victory, it was not actively involved in the process of preparation for it. It is difficult to imagine the PRC's involvement in the preparatory stages for the North Korean attack when it was confronting a number of challenges arising just after a long-term struggle with the Nationalist government. These included such economic problems as the very large military expenditure burden, monetary expansion, and declining productivity in addition to the "liberation" of 35 This point is assessed in detail in Kim Hakjoon, Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945-1984 (in Korean) (Seoul. 1985), 47-50.

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Tibet and Taiwan together with mopping-up operations involving remnants of the Guomindong and other insurgencies. At minimum, the Chinese conspiracy theory lost its credibility in response to pressure from the revisionists. This also explains why the Soviet initiation theory was called into question. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion that the Korean War was instigated by an invasion from North Korea held its ground and even the revisionist assault could not shatter the consensus supporting this basic assumption. Not until the early 1970s was there renewed debate over this issue, focusing particularly on two aspects. First, the point of departure came with publication in 1972 of an article by Karunakar Gupta, a professor at Calcutta University in India, in China Quarterly and tided "How Did the Korean War Begin?” Gupta presented evidence to support the theory of an invasion of North Korea by the ROK or, at least, a provocation of the DPRK causing Fyöngyang to initiate the attack. He cites as evidence a newspaper article which included a remarie supposedly made by Commander Paek In-yop on the day of the outbreak of the Korean War to the effect that "we have received orders to push Northward and will soon occupy Haeju."36 To this day, Paek's remark constitutes the major evidence cited by revisionists who advocate the North Korean invasion theory. It is difficult to accept Gupta's article as a sound scholarly work. He relies primarily on newspaper articles which appeared during the few days after the outbreak of the Korean War, compiled when he was a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Politics. Kim Yong-ku sharply criticized the validity of his article and China Quarterly subsequently printed contending views from Robert Simmons, Chong-sik Lee, and W. E. Skillend. These three scholars jointly rejected the North Korean invasion theory and, although Gupta responded to their criticisms, he was not persuasive.3? A second debate centered on Joyce and Gabriel Kolko's landmark work on U.S. foreign policy that appeared in 1972, where they offered two interpretations explaining the origins of the Korean War. The Kolkos first rejected the Stalin initiation theory. Not only did Stalin not provoke 3® Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?," China Quarterly 52 (October-December 1972): 699-712. 3? "Commentaries" by Chong-sik Lee, W. E. Skillend, and Robert Simmons, with a rejoinder by Karunakar Gupta, China Quarterly 54 (April-June 1973): 354-68.

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Korea and the Cold War

the war, they argued, but he had no knowledge of the Korean War until the day it broke out. They claim as evidence the fact that the Soviet Union was not present during the United Nations Security Council meeting which was convened at the behest of the United States on June 25. As a result, the Soviet Union was ignorant and surprised at the outbreak of the Korean War.38 Second, the Kolkos claimed that the Korean War was initiated by the political ambitions of General MacArthur in partnership with Syngman Rhee. MacArthur, they asserted, wanted to become the "American de Gaulle" and the war was the first step towards attaining that objective. With the intervention of U.S. forces in the Korean War, the U.S. policy of "Europe first" would shift to "Asia first" resulting in expanding the war effort to China and overturning the spreading tide of communism in Asia in one grand sweep. The Kolkos maintain that such a turn of events would enable MacArthur to become a "world hero" which would permit him to win the 1952 presidential election in the United States. At the same time, Rhee could realize his dream of unification in addition to overcoming his own domestic political crisis.39 According to the Kolkos, North Korea attacked South Korea because it was provoked by the ROK in response to the joint conspiracy effort of MacArthur and Rhee. Furthermore, the DPRK had no plans to occupy all of South Korea but only the vicinity of Seoul in order to surprise the Rhee government and encourage South-North negotiations for reunification. At this point, North Korea fell into a trap set by MacArthur and Rhee, who quickly called for a wide-ranging retreat by the South Korean forces. Providing the impression that the South Korean government was on the verge of collapse, they were able to influence the decision of the United States to commit combat forces to the war effort. The Truman administration then could realize its goal of expanding military expenditures without the disapproval of the Congress by a fullfledged intervention in the Korean War. It therefore agreed to MacArthur's request for troops.34**

3® Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits o f Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 585-87. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

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Interestingly, as a graduate student at Brown University, William Stueck, now a leading authority on the Korean War, challenged the Kolko explanation. The Kolkos, Stueck emphasized, often used such terms as "perhaps" or "it is possible." In particular, they did not offer an analysis which was based on specific source materials. They merely matched their methodology to fit their preconceived notion.41 It therefore is not surprising that their logical framework was weak from the outset.42 Both the revisionists and traditionalists sought to focus on external factors in evaluating the origins of the Korean War. While the traditionalists argued almost mechanically that the Korean War was instigated by the Soviet Union, revisionists maintained that the United States was responsible. As a result, both South Korea and North Korea were viewed simply as minor actors in the Korean conflict. These attempts to view the outbreak of the Korean War as a byproduct of the Soviet-American Cold War were eventually denounced, with the main point being that both sides failed to take into consideration the domestic setting. It would be virtually impossible to undertake an objective assessment of the Korean War by focusing solely on the global SovietAmerican competition without taking into serious consideration the internal dynamics of the concerned regions. A noted revisionist who emphasized the internal factors was Robert Simmons, who asserted that the Soviet Union was not involved in planning the attack. Simmons writes that Pak Hön-yöng outpaced Kim II Sung in his record as a Communist and as a fighter for national liberation. In a speech to cadres of the South Korean Workers' party, Pak questioned whether ”a leader like Kim II Sung who only awaits a signal from Moscow that it is alright to invade the South can really be considered to be a true fighter for national liberation." He insisted that one must be firmly committed to the "struggle for the liberation of South Korea" as he was. By contrast, Kim II Sung took the lead in calling for a general invasion of South Korea in order to strengthen significantly his position as the "national liberator." Simmons further asserted that Kim II Sung shortened by two months the launching of the Korean War. The 41 William W. Stueck, Jr., "Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis," Pacific Historical Review 42 (November 1973): 537-60. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko responded to William Stueck's critique in "To Root Out Those Among Them," Pacific Historical Review 42 (November 1973): 560-66. 42 Richard W. Leopold made the same point earlier in "The Korean War: The Historian's Task," in Francis H. Heller (ed.), The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence, Ks., 1977), 209-24.

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Korea and the Cold War

original date of early August 1950 was already agreed to by the Soviet Union and the PRC, but Kim acted to speed up the invasion plans to outmaneuver Pak Hön-yöng. Together with the emergence of the theory oh the ignorance or surprise of the Soviet Union articulated by the Kolkos, to which he also subscribes, Simmons asserted that the Korean War was a civil conflict brought on by internal factors in the Korean peninsula.43 Simmons' interpretation sparked another debate. Koh Byung Chul wrote in a review of Simmons' book that more persuasive source materials were necessary with respect to how the power struggle between Kim II Sung and Pak Hön-yöng developed prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.44*In another article, William Stueck was highly skeptical of the assumption that the Soviet Union was ignorant of the eruption of the Korean War. He wrote that, at a minimum, the Soviet Union was not surprised and, contradicting Simmons' view, knew the date of the North Korean attack.43 In addition, Charles E. Bohlen, a distinguished American career diplomat involved in decision-making during the Korean War, wrote in his memoirs that "the claim that the Korean War was not begun by the Soviet Union but was begun due to the North Koreans' independent action is childlike nonsense."46 It is important at this juncture to probe more deeply the assumption that the Soviet Union was surprised at the outbreak of the Korean War. The only primary source that is available is the memoirs of former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev emphasized that the Korean War was Kim II Sung's and not Stalin's idea. According to Khrushchev, when Kim II Sung visited Moscow in 1949 and explained plans for an invasion of South Korea in hopes of receiving Soviet support, Stalin replied that the Korean War had to be carefully thought out and a thorough plan prepared. He asked Kim II Sung to return with a more specific proposal. When Kim II Sung presented a new plan, he expressed his firm conviction that there would be a "certain victory," along with the assurance that U.S. involvement could be avoided. In response, Stalin 43 Robert Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics o f the Korean Civil War (New York, 1975). 44 Koh Byong Chul, review article. The American Political Science Review 71 (September 1977): 1328-30. 43 William Stueck, "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War," World Politics 28 (July 1976): 622-35. 46 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York, 1973), 294.

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gave his approval. Even the date of the invasion was set. That is why Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the time for the war "had arrived" and the Korean War therefore "was begun."47 Stueck has noted that this particular phrase by Khrushchev is completely contrary to the revisionist assertion that the Soviet Union was surprised on June 25. Even source materials in the United States contradict revisionist claims. According to a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of June 19, 1950, titled "The North Korean Government's Current Situation," the Soviet Union's political, military, and economic control over North Korea immediately prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was virtually total. This memorandum can be seen as the joint view of the U.S. intelligence community because the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force all agreed with the conclusions of the memorandum. Seen from this point of view, it is evident that the Soviet Union knew full well of the DPRK's invasion plans. As the theories purporting to the Soviet Union's ignorance or surprise came under increasing attack, the revisionists either remained silent or admitted that the Soviet Union had foreknowledge, although they emphasized domestic factors within the Korean peninsula. For example, some writers asserted that military competition between the ROK and the DPRK resulted in the Korean War. Both South and North Korea engaged in a serious military competition for one year before the war began and increased significantly their military buildups starting in early 1950. Armed clashes during this period were manifold, and the U.S. government acknowledged that the majority of these clashes were instigated by the ROK. These provocations escalated into the eruption of the Korean War.4* Revisionists stress that Syngman Rhee's commitment to the achievement of reunification regardless of cost provoked North Korea. Rhee on numerous occasions had called for unification by force and appealed for U.S. military assistance to achieve this objective. On this particular point, Jon Halliday, the English editor of the Leftist Review, argued that the ROK's president nurtured the intervention of U.S. ground troops in order to destroy the North Korean regime.49 Both the Kolkos and Gupta maintain that the strengthening of the American military 47 Strobe Talbot (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston. 1970), 367-69. 4& Choi Kwang Young, "A Study on the Origins of the Korean War” (M.A. thesis, Seoul National University, 1984). 49 Jon Halliday, "The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and Solidarity," Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars 11 (July 1979): 2-18.

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Korea and the Cold War

commitment to South Korea acted to influence the DPRK. North Korea, they contend, undertook a "preventive measure" on June 25,1950, based on a "passing military advantage." The DPRK calculated, based on John Foster Dulles' affirmation of the military commitment to Korea during a visit to Korea prior to the outbreak of the war, that Rhee was on the verge of implementing unification by force because the United States was preparing to strengthen South Korea. How can one evaluate these assertions? According to Choi Kwang Young, who has meticulously examined the military competition between South and North Korea, "a competition did occur between South and North Korea on the number of troops and although from 1948 until 1949 South Korea initiated this competition, there was no competition between South and North Korea in terms of supplies or training and the North Korean army held an across-the-board advantage." As a result, if we are to differentiate between civilian organizations and combat forces on the basis of equipping oneself under arms, weapons, and training, it is difficult to accept the notion that a South-North military contest was evident, let alone that South Korea initiated that competition. On the point of Syngman Rhee's northern invasion scheme, it is true that he publicly advocated "northward unification," but he only did so to emphasize the need for American military assistance. In fact, South Korea’s military capability in comparison with that of North Korea was inferior and, as such, Rhee was merely following a "policy of bluff." He knew full well that the South Korean army was incapable of undertaking an invasion northward by itself. He also knew that such a move would not be supported either by the United States or its allies. It has to be taken into consideration as well that while advocating unification by force, he also called for peaceful unification. It is true that Dulles suggested a strengthened policy toward South Korea in his address to the ROK National Assembly on June 19, 1950. He declared that "you do not stand alone. So long as you carry on your responsibility with value in the great cause of the freedom of man, you do not definitely stand alone." But in a meeting with President Rhee, Dulles emphasized that one did not need a formal treaty or alliance in the face of a common enemy for common action. He noted further that the U.S. government did not believe that the Soviet Union would launch a war at that time. Although the United States could not commit itself to

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the security of another country in the face of another world war, it could give assistance in the case of an indirect attack. As a result, it is difficult to interpret Dulles' remarks as evidence of the strengthening of the American government's military commitment to South Korea. Problems pertaining to the views of the revisionists have emerged steadily as it has become clear that the Korean War was begun by North Korea's invasion of South Korea. Even Soviet scholars have used such neutral terms as "a military strategy began in the Korean peninsula on June 25, 1950." In his memoirs, the seasoned Chinese diplomat Wu Xiuquan wrote that "the Korean War broke out only a few months after the formation of the new state."50 Undermining the revisionist position further is the work of the Japanese scholar Shinobu Seizaburo, especially his paper in Japanese titled "The Korean War: An Epoch-Making Event in Modem History" in Sänket (August 1965) and his book (also in Japanese) The Outbreak o f the Korean War (1968). A noted Marxist scholar, he emphasizes the mistakes evident in the works by Stone and Conde, rejecting the notion of an invasion of North Korea by the United States and the ROK. He arrives at this conclusion after a careful review of the documents in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Truman's memoirs, MacArthur's memoirs, and other primary source material. Nevertheless, he categorizes the Korean War as being fundamentally a "civil war." Even Frank Baldwin, who is close to the revisionist school, rejects the Northern invasion theory. He bases his conclusion on Embassy at War, the memoirs of Harold J. Noble, who was the first secretary at the American embassy in Seoul during the Korean War. Baldwin maintains that it is difficult to endorse the theory that the ROK prepared an invasion of North Korea or provoked the DPRK to invade South Korea because of Noble's depiction of the atmosphere of chaos surrounding the Rhee government at the time of the attack.^1 North Korea's culpability for the war thus became the majority view in the international academic community, causing the revisionists to change the focus of their analysis. In particular, they began to argue that, v. Tikhomirov, "People's Korea: 30 Years," International Affairs 9 (1975): 49. Hanyang University has translated Wu Xiuquan's memoir and published it in Journal o f Sino-Soviet Studies (June 1984 and August 1984) 51 Frank Baldwin, "Introduction," in Frank Baldwin (ed.), Embassy at War (Seattle, 1975), xv-xvi.

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Korea and the Cold War

because the Korean W ar was fundamentally a "war o f national liberation," it was pointless to debate who first started it. The most representative of scholars to hold such a view is Halliday. He argues that "it is difficult to reply to the question concerning why the Korean War broke out without a legitimate emphasis on the division of the Korean peninsula and its origin." Halliday adds that "the emphasis in the West on who is responsible for the Korean War or counterarguments from the socialist countries de-histories the problem of the class struggle in Korea."52* Cumings' The Origins o f the Korean War also follows on this general line of reasoning. He argues that, in order to resolve the social and economic or class struggle contradictions which emerged after the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), a revolution bent on the destruction of the existing order was inevitable after liberation. Such forces did surface, only to be thwarted by the U.S. imperialist and status-quo policy, even though Cumings dismisses popular support for the conservatives and the anti­ communists who were part of such a policy. Cumings argues that an explosion of class struggle which erupted after liberation and lasted until the outbreak of the Korean War five years later was the cause of a Korean civil war. From such a perspective, he dates the origins of the Korean War not from June 25, 1950, but from a period prior to the war, at minimum the five-year period of modern Korean history after liberation.55 John Merrill advances a similar viewpoint. Merrill argues that the Cheju-do, Yösu-Sunch'ön, and other rebellions were inevitable explosions of the pent up frustrations of the suppressed "revolutionary forces" in South Korea. North Korea, in an effort to show its solidarity with such rebellions, became involved in a military struggle with the ROK, including border clashes which ultimately evolved into the Korean War in the form of a civil conflict.54 Baldwin's opinion is similar. He argues that "the Korean War is the final point of the struggle between the left and the right which began with the liberation of Korea in August 1945, or even as far back as the 1920s with the formation of the Korean Communist Party."55 Australia's Gavan McCormack holds similar views. 52 Cumings (ed.), Child o f Conflict, p. 164. 55 On this point, see the introduction to the first volume of Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War. 54 John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War (Newark, Del., 1989). 55 Baldwin (ed.), Embassy at War, p. xvi.

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He criticizes the military intervention of the United States and the United Nations in what he labels a "war of national liberation."*^ Through the new approach of the revisionists in focusing on the domestic origins of the conflict on the Korean peninsula, a new dimension has been added to the study of the Korean War. But it is also true that a mistake was made in either ignoring or deemphasizing the international factors behind the war. Seen from this point of view, it was perceptive to characterize the Korean War as one of "an international civil war," a point made by the Japanese academic community. As already noted, Shinobu Seizaburo stated as early as 1965 that "the Korean War erupted as a civil war but evolved into an international war with the intervention of the United States." Okonogi Masao has written that "in between the internationalization of domestic politics and the domesticization of international politics during the Korean War, a vicious cycle between international and domestic forces erupted in the Korean War." In his view, "the Korean War was a combined struggle based on a mixture of domestic and international factors."*7 It is from such a perspective that Yonosuke Nagai has characterized the Korean conflict as "an international civil war."58 This overview of recent literature reveals that both Korean and foreign scholars have embarked on new avenues of research relating to the Korean War. Although a basic theme of this essay has been the ongoing debate between the traditionalist and revisionist schools regarding the background of the Korean War's origins, it is important to note that both perspectives have enabled scholars to broaden their inquiries on the conflict. Long considered a by-product of the Cold War, Korean War studies from the outset were influenced by the prevailing international political climate. It was only in the aftermath of the SovietAmerican detente of the early 1970s that a concerted effort was made by the academic community to more objectively assess the various international and domestic dimensions of the Korean War. Although it would be inappropriate to categorically state which explanation or theory carries the most weight based on research findings which have appeared so far, some general observations are possible. *6 Gavan McCormack, Cold War, Hot War: An Australian Perspective on the Korean War (Sydney, 1983). 57 Okonogi Masao, "The Domestic Roots of the Korean War," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira iriye (eds.). The Origins o f the Cold War in Asia (New York, 1977), 300. *8 Yonosuke Nagai, "The Korean Wan An Interpretive Essay," The Japanese Journal o f American Studies l (1981): 169.

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Korea and the Cold War

First, it can be said with a high degree of confidence that the Korean War occurred because of a carefully prepared invasion of South Korea by North Korea. It is difficult to find evidence which supports the proposition of the revisionists who maintain that the Korean War erupted because of a South Korean "conspiracy" with the United States to instigate an attack northward. Nor for that matter is there proof that the United States and the ROK created a "provocation" that started the war. Second, it seems likely that the DPRK's decision to attack was made at the initiative of the North Korean leadership. It seems unlikely that the Soviet Union directed North Korea's invasion of South Korea. Even Khrushchev's memoirs note that Stalin accepted Kim II Sung!&-plan on the conditionJEaUffifr -United"Slates would not become involved. The Soviet Union provided military assistance to North Korea only after that period .Barnes Matray's judgment that if North Korea did not plan for the unification of the Korean peninsula, "there would have been no invasion" of South Korea seems closer to the mark.59 Also, Barton Bernstein's statement that "as a civil conflict, the Korean War was initiated by North Korea which wanted to achieve its own objectives and was also agreed to by Stalin"60 deserves greater scrutiny. A number of other conclusions emerge from this discussion. During the preparations for the Korean War, the PRC realistically did not have any role. In short, there is no evidence supporting the Chinese conspiracy theory. The international Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union also helped to intensify the internal Korean cold war. From such a point of view, it can be seen why the Korean War was not localized. Shortly after it began, the war became internationalized because of the direct influence of the international Cold War. Finally, internal factors in the Korean peninsula unquestionably played a key role. The rising tide of revolutionary forces intent on destroying the existing order cannot be discounted. There was an armed struggle aimed at'the dual objectives ö f national unification and freedom from foreign domination under the banner of "war for national liberation." From this perspective, the Korean War retains characteristics simultaneously of an international and a civil war.

^9 James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 19411950 (Honolulu, 1985). 235. 6® Barton J. Bernstein, "The Week We Went to War: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War," Foreign Service Journal (January 1977): 9.

Chapter 2

CIVIL WAR OF A SORT: THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT

James /. Matray President Harry S. Truman never had anv trouble explaining the origins of the Korean War. "Communism/' he stated frankly in his memoirs, "was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier."1 As Ernest R. May has shown, it was the lessons of the 1930s that created an axiom dominating Truman's thinking in reaction to the North Korean invasion of South Korea.23If the United States did nothing to prevent the Communists from conquering all of Korea, this would encourage more acts of aggression. International developments before World W ar II proved that appeasement, far from halting an aggressor, guaranteed a future war Under tougher circumstances. Truman's advisors shared his judgment that thé Conflict in Korea was the direct result of the global expansionist strategy that the Soviet Union had followed since 1943. Secretary of State_pgan-Acheson, for example, later claimed that Moscow's "dagger thrust pinned a. warning, notice on the wall whick saicL'GİYejup or be conquejredr.lJLA lone dissenter at that time was Soviet expert George F. Kennan, who considered the Korean War "a civil conflict, not an 1 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II: Years o f Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 333. 2 Ernest R. May, "The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated Versus the Axiomatic," Daedalus 91 (Fall 1962): 662-63. 3 Dean Acheson testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1951), 1715,1936.

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Korea and the Cold War

international one; and the term 'aggression' in the usual international sense w as.. .misplaced."4 Forty years after the outbreak of the Korean War the main explanation of its origins has changed dramatically. An excellent illustration of this analytical shift appears on the first page of Callum MacDonald's Korea: The War Before Vietnam. There, the author asserts that the North Korean "attack was the latest act in a civil war which had been taking shape since the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945." Burton I. Kaufman, in his study titled The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, labels the conflict "a true civil war." Even Peter Lowe, who strives in his The Origins o f the Korean War to assess the conflict in light of international developments, concludes that by 1950, the "situation in the Korean peninsula was in essence one of civil war." Recently, John Merrill has charged that previous explanations for the Korean War have ignored the "local setting." In his Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War, he asserts that "the war can be usefully interpreted as a case of intervention in the ongoing civil strife in the South."5 These works reflect an interpretational trend that began in 1981 with the publication of the first volume of Bruce Cumings' influential study titled The Origins o f the Korean War. Relying on meticulous and exhaustive research in both American and Korean sources, he argues that the reasons for the Korean War "must be sought primarily in the events of the period 1945 to 1950 and secondarily in forces descending upon Korea in the period of colonial rule that left their peculiar stamp on the interwar years." As in other areas of Asia, revolutionary nationalism was the primary political force on the Korean peninsula even before the end of World War II. Those favoring radical change were the leaders of a movement dedicated to the destruction of Japanese colonialism, as well as Korea's traditional system of political, social, and economic privilege. The United States, however, was determined to prevent a leftist victory in Korea because its "goal was American hegemony in the postwar J İ George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1:1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 490. V^Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York, 1986), 3; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia, 1986), 32; Peter Lowe, The Origins o f the Korean War (London, 1986), 68; John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War (Newark, Del., 1989), 21.

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37

world." Cumings judges Truman's decision in 1945 to occupy the southern half of the Korean peninsula "an unprecedented act of ambition" and "the first postwar act of containment." U.S. occupation officials purposely followed a counterrevolutionary course, supporting the political aspirations of the conservatives and attempting "through unilateral actions to build a bulwark against communism."6*If the ILS. had not intervened in Korea's civil war, the popular preference for .revolutionary political and economic change would have resulted in the establishment of a Communist govemment.ru.Hng a united Korea. Few writers have embraced the Cumings interpretation in its entirety. But in response to The Origins o f the Korean War, a consensus has emerged that the Korean War had domestic origins and was, in essence, a civil conflict. However, this interpretation, similiar to Truman's in June 1950, offers an oversimplified answer to a considerably more complex question. International factors played a far more significant role in explaining the outbreak of hostilities in Korea than recent scholars have been willing to admit. More important, the domestic origins argument has tended to assign blame for the Korean War almost exclusively to the United States. Yet the real villain in the last century of Korea's history was Japan. If Japan had not conquered Korea in 1905 and incorporated the peninsula into its colonial empire, there would have been no war in 1950. Japan's attack at Pearl Haibor in 1941 had a significant indirect impact on Korea. War with the United States meant that eventual Allied occupation of Korea in some form was inevitable. Postwar isolation from international affairs? was not a realistic expectation for Korea because ending World War II required either destroying Japanese forces on the peninsula or accepting their surrender. The ultimate responsibility for Soviet-American partition of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel in 1945 and the resulting war five years later rests with Imperial Japan. Wartime negotiations among the Allies suggest that a SovietAmerican dispute over Korea's postwar fate, in contrast to military 6 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, Vol. I: Liberation and Emergence o f Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J., 1981), xx, xxiv-xxv, 116,130-31. ? In 1986, Brace Cumings told me at a conference that after World War II, the Allies should have set up a protective shield around Korea so that its people could determine their own destiny without outside interference.

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Korea and the Cold War

occupation, was far from inevitable. As this paper will attempt to demonstrate, there were at least four occasions between July 1945 and April 1948 when Washington and Moscow might have taken steps that could have resulted in Korea's reunification. Each time international factors blocked the implementation of an agreement, and Korea became_a jcaptive^f the Cold WarlsNeither the United States nor the Soviet Union would accept a solution aimed at ending the partition because this might allow its adversary to dominate a reunited Korea. "The ultimate result of a great power rivalry," as-CaHum MacDonald, has.observed, "was to institutionalise [sic] the civil war in two contending states, both committed to the cause of unification."89Having created two Koreas, both the Americans and the Soviets then provided enough support for each side to threaten its rival. Korean leaders in the north and the south could develop plans for achieving reunification through force because their patrons provided them with the means to wage war. Therefore, it was international developments that created the circumstances which made possible the outbreak of Korea's civil war. Few average Americans, let alone any informed observers, would have predicted in 1942 that U.S. combat forces would be fighting in Korea less than a decade later. Before the first year of U.S. participation in World War II was over, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had embraced a policy that sought to prevent a postwar conflict on the Korean peninsula. American officials were aware that Korea, as the strategic focal point of northeast Asia, had been the victim of great power rivalry throughout its history.9 Its future after World War II, therefore, depended on the ability of the Allies to cooperate in negotiating an agreement that would protect the interests of all nations directly involved in the area. The State Department developed plans for the creation of an international trusteeship for Korea that would remove this strategically located nation as a potential source of tension and conflict in the postwar world.10 State Department officials worked on a specific plan for postwar international control over Korea during the autumn of 1942. A projected 8 MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam, p. IS. 9 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics o f the Vortex (Cambridge, 1968), 161; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford, Calif., 1966), 18. 10 James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 19411950 (Honolulu, 198S), 8.

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committee comprised of representatives from China, New Zealand, and the United States would develop a plan "to cooperate with the Korean people in setting up and establishing a national government of Korea and...to assist in forming a temporary trusteeship under which there would be given advice and technical assistance." There also would be measures for coordination with the Soviet Union.11 The Roosevelt administration expected Chinese acceptance of this plan, although Jiang Jieshi preferred Allied recognition of the Korean exiles in China. Enlisting British support would not be easy because Britain was more interested in answering the broader question of Allied policy in all colonial areas than in planning for Korea's future. Discussions in Washington early in 1943 with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden made it clear that the British thought "very little of a trusteeship and would rather have the full responsibility in the hands of one country." On March 27, Roosevelt told Eden that he favored postwar international control over Indochina and the Japanese-mandated islands. Furthermore, "Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States and one or two other countries participating." Eden raised no objections, conveying the impression of British support.12 That same month, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles briefed Chinese Ambassador T. V. Soong on the results of these AngloAmerican negotiations. Roosevelt and Eden, he explained, had agreed on a trusteeship for Korea, but the specific features of the plan would await consultations with the Soviet Union.13 Confident of British and Chinese backing, the State Department finished a specific proposal with details about the machinery to implement, supervise, and finance a program under which Korea would "be temporarily administered...anticipating independence probably with close economic ties to China."14 There was 11 Division of Far Eastern Affairs memorandum. October 10, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/840, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C. 12 Harry Hopkins memorandum, March 22, 1943, and Cordell Hull memorandum, March 27, 1943, Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1943, III: The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1963), 34-37; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull, Vol. II (New York, 1948), 1235-36,1595-%. *3 Sumner Welles memorandum, March 29, 1943, FRUS, 1943, China (Washington, D.C., 1957), 845-46. 14 Memorandum on International Trusteeship, April 15,1943, FRUS, The Conferences a t Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, D.C., 1970), 720-26.

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Korea and the Cold War

some concern that the Soviet Union might not cooperate with a trusteeship scheme. Moscow maintained close ties with Korean guerrillas in Siberia, who would provide an excellent vehicle for exerting Russian influence in postwar Korea. 15 Without an agreement among the Allies that provided for a neutral Korea, a postwar Sino-Soviet contest for control over the peninsula was probable. To the relief of the Roosevelt administration, a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Moscow during October 1943 provided indirect evidence of the Soviet Union's willingness to endorse a Korean trusteeship. There, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov responded favorably when the United States proposed widespread application of the trusteeship principle to resolve the fate of dependent peoples.16 One of Roosevelt's objectives when he traveled to the Cairo Conference in November 1943 was to remove any possibility for a future war in Korea. He hoped to obtain formal British and Chinese consent for an international trusteeship arrangement in postwar Korea that would guarantee the eventual achievement of independence and selfgovernment. The president's efforts were rewarded when Winston Churchill and Jiang Jieshi joined Roosevelt in issuing the famous Cairo Declaration, which promised the liquidation of the Japanese Empire. With respect to Korea, this statement declared that the Allies, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."17 Roosevelt recognized that postwar peace and stability on the Korean peninsuia would depend not only upon the support of Britain and China, but also the Soviet Union for joint action regarding Korea's reconstruction. He left Cairo for his meeting with Joseph Stalin at Teheran intent upon gaining the Russian leader's assent for a Korean trusteeship. On November 30, Stalin voiced approval for the Cairo Declaration. Stanley Hombeck memorandum, August 19,1943, reel 23, folder 1S9, box 51-32, Cordell Hull papers. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 16 Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1304-05; Conference Notes, October 29,1943, FRUS, 1943, 1,666-67. 17 "Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa," Department o f State Bulletin IX (December 4,1943), 393; Roosevelt-Churchill meeting notes, November 24, 1943, British draft declaration, n.d., and American draft declaration, n.d., FRUS, 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran (Washington, D.C., 1961), 389,400,404.

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Roosevelt later avowed that the Soviet leader had agreed specifically that "the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40 year tutelage."18*20 During the spring of 1944, the State Department's Postwar Programs Committee discussed and approved three papers outlining a concrete plan for the occupation and administration of postwar Korea. Securing formal Soviet consent for these plans assumed greater importance with each Allied military victory over the Axis that year. This was true because U.S. military experts had convinced Roosevelt that Soviet participation in the Pacific War would make the defeat of Japan much easier, perhaps removing the need to invade the home islands. ^ Consequently, when Roosevelt arrived at Yalta for his meeting with Churchill and Stalin early in 1945, his main objective was to confirm plans for Soviet entry into the Pacific War, but he also sought an accord that would produce a strong China and an independent Korea. On February 8, Roosevelt raised the issue of Korea during discussions with Stalin at Yalta and proposed a three-power trusteeship, excluding Britain. The president speculated that international control would last twenty to thirty years. Stalin responded that the shorter the duration the better, then arguing in favor of British participation. He also asked about the stationing of foreign troops on the peninsula; both men agreed that there should be no postwar military occupation of Korea. 20 Roosevelt and Stalin, therefore, agreed to a fourpower trusteeship for Korea in addition to the concessions the Soviet Union would receive in return for participation in the Pacific war. Unfortunately, neither Roosevelt nor Stalin anticipated that the defeat of Japan would follow so quickly after Allied victory in Europe. As a

18 Conference notes, November 30,1943, and Pacific War Council notes, January 12, 1944, FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, pp. 366,869. Department of State memorandum, March 29, 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa-The Far East (Washington, D.C., 1963), 1223-42; Postwar Programs Committee minutes, 27th Meeting, May 3,1944, Postwar Programs Committee Minutes, February 1-May 31,1944, box 32, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia; William D. Leahy, 1 Was There (New York, 1950), 250-59. 20 Charles E. Bohlen minutes, February 8,1945, ibid., p. 770.

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Korea and the Cold War

result, the two leaders did not discuss trusteeship in detail at Yalta.21 As the Soviet Union established political control over Eastern Europe following Yalta, some U.S. leaders became fearful that Stalin would pursue "sovietization" in Asia as well. Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal, secretaries of war and navy respectively, had serious doubts about Roosevelt's entire approach toward the reconstruction of colonial areas. Both men worried that the U.S. would surrender areas of strategic importance in the Pacific but other nations would not follow suit. During a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt dismissed these concerns and reaffirmed his support for a system of trustee nations that would derive authority from the proposed postwar international organization.22 That same month, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) formulated a detailed program for the occupation and interim administration of Korea.23 By early April 1945, American plans for Korea's transition from liberation to trusteeship were virtually complete. International developments would rob Korea of its best chance to prevent the three year war that would start in June 1950. After the Yalta Conference, Stalin's determination to establish hegemony in Eastern Europe had caused Roosevelt to question the Soviet leader's willingness to fulfill Allied agreements. This emerging Soviet-American dispute raised doubts about the wisdom of trusteeship for Korea. Nevertheless, when the president died on April 12, he still was optimistic about the chances for continued Soviet-American cooperation despite sharp differences over such issues as the fate of Poland.24 Once Harry Truman assumed the presidency, any foundation for postwar Soviet-American cooperation quickly disappeared. The new president, to a far greater 2 2 * Yalta communique, "Territorial Trusteeship," FRUS, 1945, The Conference o f Berlin (Postdam), Vol. II (Washington, D.C., 1960), 1568. 22 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), 556-57; Cabinet meeting minutes, March 9, 1945, and James V. Forrestal memorandum, March 30, 1945, in Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 33,77-78. 23 SWNCC PAPERS 76, 77, 78,99, 101, March 19, 1945, Record Group (RG) 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. I, NA. 24 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 172-73; Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman's Foreign Policy: A Traditional View," in Richard Kirkendall (ed.), The Truman Era as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 (Columbia, Mo., 1974), 26.

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degree than Roosevelt, was suspicious of Soviet intentions and expected Stalin's actions in Asia to parallel his expansionist policies in Eastern Europe. Less than one week after taking office, Truman reversed Roosevelt's position on the territorial trusteeship issue. The United States now would resist any detailed discussion of the machinery for an international trusteeship system at the San Francisco Conference.25 Truman's decision reflected his intense fears of "sovietization" in Asia and signaled the beginning of a search for an alternative in Korea that would eliminate any opportunity for Soviet expansionism. During the spring of 1945, Stalin showed consistent support for a Korean trusteeship, while Truman remained unenthusiastic about the plan. Finally, the president found an alternative. On the day of his arrival at Potsdam, he received news of the successful testing of the atomic bomb. Stimson recorded in his memoirs that at this point, Truman began "losing his interest" in Soviet entry into the Pacific War.26 Both Truman and newly appointed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes immediately concluded that employing the atomic bomb against Japan would end the war quickly, preempting a Soviet declaration of war. While the main reason for using the bomb was to save American lives, Truman and Byrnes must have perceived the indirect diplomatic and strategic benefits. If Japan surrendered prematurely, the U.S. could avoid the many anticipated complications entailed in Russian participation in the postwar reconstruction of Asia. It also would permit the U.S. to occupy Korea unilaterally and avoid the distasteful necessity for trusteeship. Washington's Korea policy, therefore, experienced a remarkable transformation during the Potsdam Conference. Ignoring planning papers, American military leaders agreed to nothing specific regarding the multinational occupation of Korea. Truman and his diplomatic advisors also discarded trusteeship in anticipation of a rapid end to the Pacific War that would forestall Soviet occupation. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on July 23, Byrnes joined Eden in opposing detailed discussion of trusteeship. Molotov agreed to table his proposal, on the condition that the summary report at least note Moscow's raising 25 "International Trusteeship" memorandum, April 18, 1945, Memoranda for the President, box 737, Stettinius papers; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Andrei Gromyko, June 23,1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, p. 634. 26 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 637.

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of the issue. But when the Allies drafted the final protocol, both Byrnes and Eden opposed the inclusion of a general statement on trusteeship. The conference report only noted that the Allies had examined the trusteeship issue but referred specifically to the Italian colonies alone.27 Despite Moscow's genuine desire to reach an accord at Potsdam, the conference produced no definite agreement on Korea. Perhaps the last chance to avert the Korean War had been lost. William Stueck has argued that trusteeship did not offer a workable solution to the Korean problem, because neither the Allies nor the Korean exiles would cooperate in implementing the scheme.2**We shall never know for certain whether trusteeship was doomed to fail. It is clear, however, that Truman's decision to abandon trusteeship had unfortunate consequences; it led to Korea's partition and the establishment of two governments bent on forcible reunification of the peninsula. Two days after the first U.S. atomic attack on Japan, the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Soviet acceptance of Truman's eleventh hour proposal for Korea's division at the thirtyeighth parallel into military occupation zones prevented Russian control over the entire country.29 But Washington's refusal to finalize terms for a trusteeship meant that there were no guidelines for coordination in the postwar administration of Korea. Worse, once the Soviet Union and the United States each occupied half of the peninsula, ending the artificial division would require a diplomatic agreement. With Soviet-American relations experiencing a steady and serious deterioration in Europe, it was clear that neither Stalin nor Truman would be in the mood to compromise. American occupation forces arrived in southern Korea on September 8, 1945, nearly a month after Russian troops had entered the north. 27 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting minutes, July 23 and August I, 1945, Soviet draft proposal on trusteeship, n.d., State Department minutes, August 1, 1945, and Potsdam protocol, August I, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, pp. 282-83, 550-51, 593, 1493, 1594-95. 2®William Stueck, "The United States and Korea," Reviews in American History XIV (September 1986): 457-58. Bruce Cumings has offered an entirely different judgment. Trusteeship, he argues, was a "paternalistic, gradualist. . . idea that deemed no colonial people fit to run their own affairs without a period of tutelage." Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, Vol. I, p. 106. ^9 Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, pp. 43-47.

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Within a month, the United States confronted agonizing problems in Korea. "Sovietization" north of the thirty-eighth parallel already seemed well under way, while there had been little success in the south in controlling anti-imperialist agitation and revolutionary nationalism.30 Within a few days after occupation began, the Truman administration realized that without a negotiated settlement, it faced a painful choice: either prolonged military occupation and permanent partition or withdrawal and Soviet domination of the entire peninsula. By the middle of September, the SWNCC had revived the trusteeship formula and had begun work on a specific proposal.31 Washington remained hopeful that Moscow would agree to coordinate locally the implementation of uniform occupation policies. However, during early October, the War Department received word that the Soviet occupation commander still was spum ing substantive negotiations. Faced with M oscow's intransigence, the Truman administration decided to approach the Soviet government at the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled for December 1945 in Moscow with a proposal that ultimately would offer a second chance to avert the Korean War. 32 Upon his arrival at Moscow, Secretary of State Byrnes acted to place the Korean matter on the agenda. The final American proposal called for a trusteeship but did not provide a detailed description of the plan. Instead, it focused on the vital necessity for local coordination to lift the barrier at the thirty-eighth parallel. There was a provision, however, for the possible extension of trusteeship to ten years.33 Byrnes requested approval for his proposal, arguing that the creation o f a unified administration was the indispensable first step for Korean reunification, trusteeship, and eventual independence. Molotov countered that a general agreement on trusteeship was a prerequisite for any discussion of specific3012 30 Ibid., pp. 47-51. 31 War Department memoranda, September 18,30,1945, RG 319, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. V, NA. 32 JCS 1483/12, October 3.1945, RG 218, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea, sec. II, NA; Douglas MacArthur to JCS. October 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VI: The British Commonwealth, The Far East (Washington, D.C.,1969), 1071-72; John R. Hodge to War, October 12,1945, RG 319, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, sec. I, NA. 33 Conference minutes, December 16,1945, and U.S. proposal on Korea, December 17,1945, FRUS, 1945, II: General: Political and Economic Matters (Washington, D.C., 1967), 617-21,641-43.

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issues relating to Korea's reunification. He requested a copy of the American proposal and time to study its provisions. On December 20, Molotov accepted Byrnes' argument that local discussion of "urgent" questions was needed, but he wanted prior agreement on a long-term trusteeship plan as well. Therefore, he announced that he would distribute a counterproposal that evening. While he expressed a desire for cooperation, Byrnes alleged that the U.S. plan corresponded to "what Stalin had in mind four months ago in Berlin."34 As he promised, Molotov later circulated the Soviet proposal on Korea. It contained four specific provisions. First, the major powers would establish a "provisional, democratic Korean government" to undertake all necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transportation, agriculture, and culture. Second, representatives from Soviet and U.S. occupation forces would form a "Joint Com m ission” to consult with local Korean parties and social organizations to formulate procedures for the creation of a provisional government. Third, the Soviet-American Joint Commission would "work out measures of help and assistance (trusteeship) in the political, economic, and social progress" of Korea toward democratic selfgovernment and independence. It also would formulate a five-year trusteeship plan and submit it for approval to the four major powers. Finally, within two weeks, the Soviet and American occupation commanders would convene a "Joint Conference" to answer "urgent questions" and begin permanent coordination of administration.35 Byrnes approved Molotov's proposal after he made minor changes. Initially, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. judged the Moscow agreement on Korea as entirely satisfactory. Moscow still desired a united Korea and believed the Korean people favored adopting a socialist system. However, it would not risk the emergence of an anti-Soviet regime and, therefore, refused to end the partition of the peninsula before the successful implementation of a specific plan for a provisional government and trusteeship. Byrnes wanted to find a solution to the impasse that would permit U.S. military withdrawal without denying to the Korean people the ability to exercise the right of national self-34* 34 Conference minutes, December 20,1945, ibid., 697-98. 33 Soviet proposal on Korea, December 20,1945, ibid., 699-700.

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determ ination. He accepted the Soviet proposal because its implementation would achieve these goals. TrumaiVs_adyisors certainly realized that the M nynw agreement would pjeasefew Koreans. But tèm poraix.outside control seemed the only^ way to secure_Soviet cooperation for the attainment of reunification and eventual selfgovernment.— As was expected, news of the trusteeship plan sparked a storm of angry protests in the American zone that bordered on mass hysteria. Extremists held street demonstrations, closed stores and schools, and staged work stoppages. Rowdy youth groups roamed the streets of Seoul intimidating U.S. military government personnel and distributing leaflets and posters decrying trusteeship. By January 1946, conservative leaders had organized an "Anti-Trusteeship Committee" dedicated to blocking the implementation of the Moscow agreement and restoring Korea's sovereignty at the earliest possible date.36 At first, the Communists and members of the extreme left joined all Koreans in denouncing trusteeship. But they suddenly reversed themselves and became the most outspoken defenders of the Moscow agreement. During a demonstration on Januaiy 3,1946, they hastily substituted the word "up" for "down" on their signs, which then read "Up with Trusteeship!" Soviet officials undoubtedly had a hand in ordering the switch, but the Communists could hardly have expected the United States to endorse their political aspirations if they had opposed trusteeship. The extreme left showed remarkable realism in recognizing that fulfillment of the Moscow agreement offered new hope for reunification and independence.37 Obviously, Moscow had no intention of weakening its control in the north without assurances that there would be a friendly Korean government after reunification. However, there was reason for optimism about Korea's future since Soviet-American negotiations at the local level in January 1946 had experienced significant progress.38 In addition, the 36 Arthur B. Emmons III to James F. Byrnes, December 30, 1945, and Hodge to MacArthur, December 30,1945, FRUS, 1945, VI, pp. 1152-54; H. Merrill Benninghoff to Byrnes, January 23,1946, ibid., 1946, VIII; The Far East (Washington, D.C., 1971), 61516; New York Times, January 14,1946, p. 2. 37 New York Times, December 28, 1945, p. 12; Hodge to War, December 31, 1945, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/! 2-3045, NA. 38 Hodge to War, February 19,1946, RG 218, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea (8-2445), sec. Ill, NA; New York Times, February 7,1946, p. 17, and February 8, 1946, p. 12;

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overall Moscow agreement provided a workable formula for ending the partition and eventually achieving an independent Korea. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the U.S. occupation commander in Korea, was not so sanguine. He warned Washington that it could expect a divergence of interpretation when negotiations began for the creation of a provisional government. As an essential precondition, Hodge believed that the U.S. should insist upon the immediate establishment of complete freedom of speech, press, and movement throughout Korea.39 The State Department at first hesitated, but then authorized Hodge to insist on the right of free expression in consultations with the Joint Commission. If Moscow spumed this proposal, Hodge would announce that the Soviet Union was barring free speech and elementary civil liberties. American leaders were confident that popular criticism of Moscow would then force Stalin to retreat and accept Washington's position.40 Soviet and American representatives met in Seoul on March 20, 1946, to commence Joint Commission negotiations. Even before the hard bargaining began, both sides drew distinct lines of disagreement. In his opening statement, Colonel General Terenty F. Shtykov declared that the Soviet government was committed to the attainment in Korea of "a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union." Therefore, the Korean provisional government had to reflect not only wide representation but also unqualified support for the terms of the Moscow agreement. In his response, Hodge emphasized that the United States was determined to see that "a government that corresponds to the views of the majority is established." He argued that only national selfdetermination could produce "the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."41 If the Soviet and American delegates could have found a way to reconcile these U.S. Department of State, The Record o f Korean Unification, 1943-1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents, Far Eastern Series #101 (Washington, D.C., October 1960), 5-6. 39 Hodge to War, January 22,1946, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945), sec. Ill, NA. 40 JCS to MacArthur, Februaiy 28,1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, p. 644. 41 Hodge to Bymes, March 22,1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, pp. 652-53.

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divergent positions at the Joint Commission, there might not have been a Korean War. Despite some disagreements, the negotiators ultimately reached agreement on the first phase of action at the Joint Commission. This stage would include consultation with local parties, consideration of a political platform, recommendation of a charter, and a choice of personnel for the provisional government. The Joint Commission organized three subcommittees to formulate specific measures for attaining each objective.42 This spirit of cooperation abruptly disappeared when the negotiators attempted to agree on the Korean parties eligible for consultation. The Soviets were shocked when the U.S. delegation announced that there were 500 legitimate parties in southern Korea eligible for consultation compared to only forty in the north. When Shtykov objected to consulting groups hostile to trusteeship, American representative William R. Langdon retorted that Korean hostility to the Moscow agreement did not constitute an acceptable criterion for determining legitimacy. Byrnes instantly approved the U.S. delegation's decision to resist Moscow's attempt to exclude from consultation those parties belonging to the "Anti-Trusteeship Committee".4^ Moscow's behavior at the Joint Commission was not surprising. The Soviet Union was exploiting the trusteeship issue as a device to prevent a sizable group of anti-Soviet Korean leaders from gaining access to postwar political power. Yet the United States was in the unenviable position of insisting upon consultation with those very individuals who sought to undermine the work of the Joint Commission. Fears of sovietization dictated the stand of the American delegation. The United States believed that the exclusion of the rightists would ensure a Communist seizure of power.44 Surprisingly, the Soviet-American negotiators appeared to have broken the deadlock with the publication on April 18 of a joint communique. The commission agreed to consult all 42 John Z. Williams to John Carter Vincent, March 25,1946, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/3-2546, NA; Williams to Hugh Borton, April 2, 1946, ibid., 501 .BB Korea/4-246; New York Times, March 31,1946, p. 14. 42 Williams to Borton, April 2, 1946, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/4-246, NA; Byrnes to William R. Langdon, April 5,1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, pp. 657-58. 44 Byrnes to Langdon, April 16, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, pp. 660-61; Langdon to Bymes, August 30,1946, Dept, of State Records, 711.00/8-3046, NA.

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"democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims" and would sign a declaration pledging to uphold SovietAmerican decisions on creation of a provisional government. More important, the communique also included a provision requiring all the signators to accept the trusteeship section of the Moscow agreement.4^ American officials in Seoul were pleased with the compromise because it seemed to permit consultation with the extreme right. Their optimism was premature. When negotiations resumed, Shtykov advocated exclusion of many prominent conservative leaders because they were not affiliated with any specific organized group. The U.S. delegation insisted on consultation with "all schools of political thought irrespective of our estimate of their popular backing." The Soviet representative raised a more serious barrier when he argued logically that a mere signature on a pledge would provide no guarantee of support for the Moscow agreement. Shtykov stated frankly that he would not sanction consultation with those groups most critical of trusteeship. When the American delegation adamantly upheld the principle of absolute freedom of expression, negotiations reached an impasse.4^ On May 7, Hodge informed Washington that he would propose an adjournment of the Joint Commission the following day sine die, claiming that the only way to achieve Korea's reunification was by "standing firm" and "letting the Soviets make the next move."47 For some observers at the time, adjournment of the Joint Commission on May 8 constituted the first step toward civil war. Indeed, during the spring of 1946, rumors about armed clashes at the thirtyeighth parallel increased, while scattered acts of violence were everyday occurrences in the American zone.48 Responsibility for the Joint 45 "Communique Issued by U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on April 18, 1946,” Department o f State Bulletin XVI (January 27,1947): 173. 4 daaunatr China and announced that Cham would now "lam» to the mde" o f die Soviet Union.14 Shortly after, the American ambassador, Leighton Stuart, left Nanjing for the United States on August 2, 1949. Three days later, the State Department published its famous 1054-page White Paper on China.13 Immediately after its policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union was decided, dm CCP waged an aatMmşmmüm campaign agamat the United Stete».*6 The newly established government set out to humiliai» sh» United Smm» by »»pressing its defiance of «mahlmhaé foreign privileges in China. Dy^ e i ng this, the government mflcomd *•1 111 From interviews. In conducting this research, the authors have had several important interviews with relevant people who, because of personal sensitivity, refused to be identified. Since their sources insisted on anonymity, the authors can only attribute their sources as "from interviews." 11 Chairman Mao's address on April 11,1957, cited in Study o f Party H istory Materials, Vol. 22. No. 13 (Beijing. 1982). 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 14. 14 "On the people's democratic dictatorship: Soviet Union our best teacher" (Beijing, 1958); or Selected Works o f Mao Tse-tung ( Mao Zedong), Vol. 4 (Beijing, 1961), 413-15 and 417. 13 China White Paper, issued by the United States Department of State under the title United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Far Eastern Series 30 (Washington, D.C., August 1949). The CCFs soldiers and cadres invaded the American Embassy in Nanjing, molested consular officials in Shanghai and Shenyang, seized the American consul's property in Beijing and jailed Consul-general Agnus Ward in Shenyang.

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national attitude, or «Mod, deeply footed in Chioalfi m adem taelevy. At the same time, Mao Zedong initiated a nationwide criticism of Washington's China White Paper. Mao himself wrote five articles for the Xinhua News Agency criticizing U.S. China policy, dispelling some people's illusion about Americans, and helping the whole party prepare mentally for a possible confrontation with the United States. It should be noted that the CCP did not want Amènent military ■H rnation, bi M ao's strategic planning, the first pnorety w to avoid stab a prospect But if it failed, the next was to prepare for it. 17 For this purpose, the CCP leadership took the following three measures in the final stage of the liberation war. First, the PRC would accelerate the process of the war so as to lessen the chances of American intervention. Immediately after the three great campaigns which annihilated Jiang's main forces north of the Yangtze River, Mao ordered the 3d and 2d Field armies to prepare for crossing the Yangtze.18 He seemed to believe that the PLA must move at top speed to pursue the remnant Nationalist forces and completely wipe them out in the whole country before the United States made up its mind. The aim, according to the directive of the CCP's military commission in May 1949, was also to occupy the big seaport cities which might be used by the United States as an excuse for intervention. The PLA's strategic plan, after crossing the Yangtze River, was to advance southeastward first and then southwestward. Within the half year, this objective was achieved. By April 1950, all of the mainland except Tibet was brought under the CCP's control. Meanwhile, CCP leaders began to organize an air force and a navy in preparation for liberating Taiwan. ^ Second, Mao Zedong decided to use an unusually large number of forçai in a major campaign as a deterrent as wall as a precaution against any American intervention. He ordered more than one million men to ^ Za Zongyun, Origin and Development o f American China Policy (Beijing, 1987), 255-58. 1& The three strategic offensive campaigns of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) occurred in Liaoshen, Pingjin and Huaihai in late 1948 and early 1949. Almost two million of the Guomindong's forces were annihilated. M ajor Events o f the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Beijing, 1985), 213. *9 Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy towards the United States, 1949-1955,” a paper presented at the Conference on Sino-American Relations, 1945-55, Beijing, October 1925,1986, pp. 3-5.

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wage the Yangtze campaign against Guomindong forces which were numerically inferior. The 2d Field Army was actually designated as the unit to meet the possible American military intervention.^ After sweeping the main Nationalist forces off the mainland, the CCP stationed massive troops in the area of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou, three coastal metropolitan areas that were the most vulnerable and most possible for the United States to attack. A national reserve force was created in Henan province from where it could support the abovementioned three areas.21 Third, Mao Zedmg MMand M a n d I» recover rapidly a d n M M B t the economy in the lthmotoé mnm in preparation inr a passable U.S. blockade. Facing inflation, unemployment, a financial deficit, and harassment by the Nationalist remnants, die CCP decided to centralize economic and financial administration, unify the currency, tighten expenditures, organize food supply, and improve productive efficiency. In fact, China's economy did recover with unusual speed, and output almost doubled from 1949 to 1950.22 At the same time, CCP leaders tried to avoid direct confrontation with foreign countries, especially the United States. Realizing that the PLA lacked knowledge and experience in foreign affairs, the CCP issued strict orders when it marched southward. PLA soldiers were instructed to give protection to all foreign residents in China and to foreign diplomatic personnel. They were also ordered not to attack first foreign troops stationed in China or their warships. The idea was to avoid a direct confrontation with western powers and not to give them any excuse to interfere in China's internal affairs.23 When the Komm War began on Jam 25, 1990, the HhC and the Untied8 m m were not prepared fard. There is evidence to indicate that Beijing was not informed and therefore was surprised by North Korea's military act. First, the CCP decided to have a large demobilization of the PLA in early 1950. By May 1950, the total number in the PLA reached 5.4 million, which had been a heavy burden in the tight financial 2® Yao Xu. From Yalu River to Panmunjom (Beijing, 198S), 2. 21 Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy towards the United States," p. S. 22 Ibid., p.310. 23 Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy towards the United States," p. 6.

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situation facing the CCP leaders and in the ongoing economic reconstruction. In May 1950, the CCP Central Committee decided to demobilize 1.4 million of the PLA force totally and designated Zhou Enlai to be in charge of the work. That started on June 20, 1950, five days before the Korean War broke out, with demobilization committees set up at various levels.24 Second, the Chinese leaders had paid little attention to the Korean peninsula. The Chinese ambassador at P'yöngyang was not in his post until late August 1950. Third, when the war broke out, the Chinese had only the 42d Army of the Fourth Field Corps which was stationed along the Yalu River border area.25 Its principal mission was crop-reduction. The 13th Field Corps was in Henan as a national reserve force, the 9th and 10th Field corps were in the eastern coastal area preparing for the liberation of Taiwan, and the 18th Army was advancing into Tibet. All other armies and corps had been shifted to local production purposes.26 Thus, the Chinese leaders were not informed of the North Korean leaders' decision. Kim II Sung discussed with Stalin his idea of Korean military reunification in 1949. When Mao visited Moscow at the end of 1949, Stalin discussed Kim's military plan in general terms. In April 1950, Kim II Sung paid a secret visit to Beijing on his way back from Moscow. He did not release any details of his militaiy plan or the date of the action.27 Only Stalin was informed of Kim's detailed plan and the possible date for action, because Kim thought the Soviet Union was the only patron capable of helping him achieve reunification. The Chinese leaders had no intention of intervening in the war at its beginning, and they provided only moral support for Kim II Sung. Beijing tried to help Kim materially by sending to Korea, at his request, all Korean Chinese who were then serving in the PLA. The Koreans from China (about 14,000) were organized into one fully armed and equipped division and one cadre brigade.28 Mao was more cautious than both Kim and Stalin. He raised the possibility of American military intervention 74 Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen's Memoir, Vol. 3 (Beijing, 1984), 721-22. 2^ Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, pp. 6-14. 26 From interviews. 27 From interviews. 28 Kim II Sung made this request to Beijing in January 1950. See Nie Rongzhen, Memoir, p. 744.

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during his talk with Stalin in Moscow and with Kim when he visited Beijing, but Kim did not take it seriously.29 Tb» United Stales did intervene on behalf o f Sareb K ona. The Itaanan administration viaread the North Korean attack as being directed by Moscow in support of the world slsaiagy o f international communism, endangering the fundamental principles and objects of American global pafecy, and threatening American national interests. On June 27, Truman only ordered direct American air end naval support for South Koran, bat he also reintervened in the Chinese Civil War by interposing dre Seventh Fleet between die Chinese mainland and Taiwan, to "neutraline" the Taiwan Strait.^ Since the Nationalists on Taiwan had no capability to attack the PRC, it was pointless to protect the mainland and the Seventh Fleet was simply an action to daired Jiang Jieafci. The CCP leaders saw the American action as an "armed aggression against Chinese territory," which confirared Bnipng's w ont frees tdreot the threat from the United States. On June 28, Mao Zedong denounced the American intervention as an "open exposure by the United States of its true imperialist face."31 Zhou Enlai declared that the American actions "constituted armed aggression against the territory of China and a gross violation of the United Nations Charter." Zhou further stated that "no matter what obstructive action U.S. imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain unchanged forever,” and that "all people of our country will certainly fight as one man and to the end to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the U.S. aggressors."32 Mao and other Chinese leaders viewed this development very seriously, and they expected something worse to happen. M ao believed tbre tire United States bad finally rinciriad to involve itself in the Chine«# Gsnil War to rescue the Gnanrendoig. On July 7, the same day as the United Nations Command (UNC) was established, Mao redeployed the 13th Army Corps, which consisted of four armies, from the CentralSouth Military Region to the Yalu River. He reorganized it, together with the local army, as the Northeastern Frontier Defence Army (NFDA), the Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 22. 3®Department o f State Bulletin XXIII (July 3,1950): 5. 3 * Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Oppose U.S. Occupation o f Taiwan and "Two Chinas" Plot (Beijing, 1958) 32 Ibid., pp. 5-6

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predecessor to the Chinese People's Volunteers Army (CPVA).33 Deng Hua, former commander of the 15th Army Corps, was named as the commander of the NFDA. The NFDA's task was to defend the security of the border and to meet any emergencies in Korea. The redeployment began in the middle of July. Qu July 10. "thu C m m m ttm o f Chinese Reopie Agtentt U.S. Invam n of Taiwan and Korea" was estaM Mad in Baiping.34 On August 5 and 18, Mao ordered the NFDA to complete all battle preparations before the end of September.35 At the same time, Mao also ordered the PLA to keep high vigilance along the coastal areas. After closely watching the situation in Korea, General Deng Hua presented his assessment to Mao via Lin Biao in late August. He saw a great danger in the DPRK's rapid push southward, with overextended supply lines and an undefended rear. He predicted that General Douglas MacArthur, the UNC commander, might stage a counteroffensive by making an amphibious landing near Seoul or P'yöngyang.36 Mao agreed with Deng Hua and ordered an additional army corps to strengthen the NFDA. At the same time, Mao cabled Deng Hua's opinion to both Kim II Sung and Stalin, advising Kim II Sung "to go ahead steadily and strike sure blows." Yet both Stalin and Kim II Sung ignored Mao's warning; Stalin instead approved Kim's tactic of "hot pursuit," leaving his rear unguarded and empty.37 In early September, Gao Gang, the chairman of the Northeastern region, also sent his own report to Mao analyzing the Korean situation. Gao apparently believed that the chance for the DPRK to succeed in reunifying the country had passed and that Kim II Sung's military course would be halted. On September 9, Mao instructed the 9th Army of the East Military Region to deploy close to the railway, awaiting further deployment to the Yalu River. True to General Deng Hua's prediction, MacArthur made a very successful landing at Inch'ön on September 15, and the tide of war immediately was reversed. North Korean forces were badly hit under the weight of MacArthur's pincer attack, and the 8th Army began pushing northward. Mao took the situation very seriously. But hwteüi did not give34*67 33 Major Events o f the Chinese People's Liberation Army, p. 315. 34 Xinhua Monthly, May 1951, p. 12. 33 Nie Rongzhen, Memoir, p. 734. 36 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 15. 37 Ibid., p. 22.

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up hope of avobbmg û m b m üm ry involvement. Uncedmn about the A— rican intention, China launched diplomatic efforts after the IncfcNftt landing, mainly through the Soviet Union at the United Nations and through Indian diplomatic channels. It tried to stop the United Nations force at the thirty-eighth parallel.38 When the American forces under aegis of the United Nations recaptured Seoul on September 26,1950, and restored the South Koreans to their position prior to the war, leaden in Washington seriously bnpm to believe that North Korea could be defeated and that all Korea might be united under a pro-American government.3839 Most of the American military leaders favored this idea, and the State Department thought it should not be precluded. Finally, the National Security Couneil recommended to the president that the UNC forces might advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel provided there wees no indicariona o f intervention by the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. On September 29, President Truman approved the recommendation and authorized General Douglas MacArthur to carry the war into North Korea.40 When the United Nations forces w o e poised to cross the parallel, China issued her most strongly worded warnings. On September 30, Zhou Eniai publicly warned, "The Chinese people.. .will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists." On October 2, Premier Zhou formally notified the Indian ambassador, Sardar K. M. Banikkar, that if the American troops entered North Korea, China would intervene in the war.41 All this was assumed by General MacArthur and the political leaders in Washington to be political blackmail.42 Secretary of State Dean Acheson even declared that Zhou Eniai was not an authoritative spokesman.43

38 Ibid., p. 17. 3^ As early as July 1950, United States officials began talking about crossing the thirty-eighth parallel. By the end of September, there was consensus about it. Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions o f the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985). 40 Foster Rhea Dulles, American Foreign Policy, pp. 82-90. 41 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, pp. 17-18. 42 Matthew Bunker Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y., 1967). 43 Dean Acheson's response was that Zhou's "words were a warning, not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not an authoritative statement of policy." See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 96 and 110.

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After United Nations forces recaptured Seoul, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told Chinese leaders that the three (Western) foreign ministers had reached an agreement to not cross the thirty-eighth parallel, and that any further advance northward would have to be decided by the United Nations.44 Soon afterward, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign minister, indicated through Nehru to the Chinese that the United Nations forces would stop 40 miles away from the Yalu River if they were to cross the thirty-eighth parallel.45*The United States had twice gone back on its word passed on through India, and therefore Chinese leaders had reason to believe that the American pledge of not attacking China would be another trick. Zfaw Enlai viawad A w i r a n policy in fhe following By using the bases in Japan, the United States inherited the adventurism of the Japanese militarists, following the history since the war of 1895 and took the track of conquering China, namely, to occupy North-east China before annexing China and to occupy Korea before grabbing North-east China.... For -as, the Kerem question is not simply a question concerning Korea, it is related to the Taiwan issue. The U.S. imperialists have adopted a hostile attitude towards us and set up their defence line in the Taiwan Strait while paying lip service to non-aggr—ı ion andoaaimen u n ion. From the information we got, they wanted tuvalin Chin» Out und uftu oaauMtiiifrNactWfceesa, they wWeeme to attack China.4**

China's response to the American actions was basically defensive and arose out of her concern for her own physical security. Feeling uncertain about real American intentions, the PRC's leaders believed that it would be safer to prepare for the worst. It was only after South Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel that CCP leaders began seriously to consider the next step that China should take. fc m s Batumi that Mao's grammt caasom was dm pkymeai aaovity of dm newly established regime, and that he was mpaciilly worried abm t the possibility that the "new revolutionary regime may be strangled in ill cradle."4? The most likely threat came from the United States, the patron of CCFs rival, the Guomindong. His concern deepened when MacArthur 44 Selected Works o f Zhou Enlai, Vol. 2, p. 51. 45 Ibid., p. 52. This assertion is supported by documents in the Foreign Relations o f the United States, especially the telegram from the American ambassador to India, Loy W. Henderson, September 27,1950. ^ Selected Works o f Zhou Enlai, Vol. 2, p. 52. 4? Mao on Military Affairs, p. 213.

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visited Taipei and later publicly raised the possibility of using Nationalist forces in the Korean battlefield.48 Also at this time, the Nationalist remnants became much more active domestically; sabotage and harassment o f local governments occurred everywhere. In late September, the PRC's public security ministry received intelligence reports that Nationalist remnants would bombard the Tiananmen rostrum with mortar projectiles during the celebration of the National Day on October 1. Mao told all Politburo members not to run away if the bombardment happened.4^

fimm Ü Washington riM a * arirek (M m a m iia M y , it «arid eaiaWiah a hostile regime on the Korean peninsula and deploy its traaps afesng the Sino-Korean border to apply military pressure. This m a s yrenld co—onae a vary fssansiasai so northeastern China, the industrial latlan ri of the country. The task of sustaining a passive defana of the region was impossible.50 "Hoar away troops are needed to guard die Yriu River of one thousand kilometres? Moreover, we-hava to wait there jure aftrr year without Iraowiag when the enemy will cores."51 To Mao Zedong and the other Chinese leaders, the ominous moment they had predicted and had tried to avoid for years did come at last—the necessity of fighting a war against the United States—and MacArthur's open bellicose remarks against China seemed to make war inevitable.52 Mao had to decide quickly whether to enter the war; otherwise it would be too late. It was the most difficult decision the PRC's leaders had to make since the establishment of the new regime. Tofigfcfc a war a p h a s ia state as powerful as the United States, Mao Zedong had to have baril internal are! Soviet rapport. In late September and early October 1950, there were heated disputes in the top leadership of the CCP. On October 1,1950, Urea II ttrep arena 48 Jiang Jieshi announced on August 1, 1950, that the meeting between him and MacAithur had laid the foundation for "Sino-American co-operation" and "final victory" against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Then, on August 26, MacAithur publicly urged that Taiwan be turned into a U.S. defense stronghold. See Congressional Quarterly Inc., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1980), 91. 4^ From interviews. 50 Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States," pp. 12-13. 51 Selected Works o f Zhou Enlai, Vol. 2, p. 51. 52 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 22.

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Mao Zedong reporting the grim picture on the battlefield and requesting the Chinese PLA to dimctly intervene on behalf of the DMMC.S3 On the same day, the CCP convened a special enlarged Politburo meeting which included 10 top leaders and lasted several days, in order to make the final decision on whether to enter the war.54 Gao Gang, the choin—n of the northeastern region, and Lin Biao, one of Mae's favorite generals, strongly opposed sending the Chineee hanses to fight a war against the United States in Korea. The majority opinion in the meeting was that China might not be ahie to wan a war against the United S ates at that time. Lin Biao even refused, with an excuse of illness, to be named by Mao as commander of the CPVA. Mao called Peng Dehuai, the chairman of the northwestern region, back to Beijing from Xian to attend the meeting on October 4, and asked him to head the CPVA. hiao Zedong called on the— who wore opposed to fighting American fiâmes to sammarize the arguments against doing so. They did, stressing Chinese interior economic sfcenghi, inferior military power and lessconsolidated rear defenses. The mainland was newly liberated, with the new regime still being established at the grassroots level, and a great num ber of areas were undergoing land reform . Though the Guomindong's main forces had been defeated on the mainland, its remnants frequently harassed and raided local governments. Some leaders at the meeting asserted that, for China, the major threat was from Taiwan, not Korea. Regarding its American adversary, Amt it mas m ad at hie mooting thm the United Smtes hod eancgad from the S a n d World War as the m ost powerful country in the world. Its annual output of steel in 1949 reached well over 87 million tons, more than 144 times that of China in the same year. The gap between the two countries in electricity, petroleum, other industrial products, and grain was even greater.55 China's agriculture and industry were still recovering. They could barely meet peaceful domestic needs, let alone the needs of a long and largescale war. Second, the United Sam e was thon the only country in the 55 Kim II Sung also sent a telegram to Stalin on the same day (from interviews). 54 From interviews. 55 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 20.

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vfeehl pemorning atomic b w ^ s. ln ear and naval é w É iw e was Qwrwhehwmg, and its war resources seemed ineaÉaattiUe. Though the PLA was numerically superior, a large number of its troops were pinned down all over the country. The strategic reserve forces that could be used were limited. The PLA was still using weapons and equipment captured from the Guomindong and the Japanese, ha ftw pim a m é a y w w é m i inferior to that of the United States. In 1950, one PLA corps had 198 artillery pieces, barely more than one tenth of those possessed by a similar American unit (1428), and even fewer than half those of an American division (476)36 Moreover, the PLA was battle fatigued after four years of civil war without adequate rest and training. Mao Zedong agreed at the meeting that the disadvantages discussed did exist, but said: "What you have said sounds reasonable. But it would be shameful for us to stand by seeing our neighbors in perilous danger without offering any help. "37 To Moo's mM , if China mood toy write North Kama wna m peril, than the Soviet Union could aiao m n 1 by w hn China was in pent, and "Internationalism would be empty talk. "58 Also, he believed that there were some adeaaiapae to China in dispatching troops to Korea. He then made a strategic analysis of the situation. First, Mao bahnaad that after Truman's announcement that he was dispatching the Seventh Fleet to protect Jiang, and after MacArthur's belligerent remarks against China, a ımgor direct Sino- American confrontation was inevitable.5657*59 He pmaiad oat three probable fronts where he thought the United States would stage attacks on China: Korea, Vietnam, and Tassam. The ftostof these was a more favorable battlefield Mr the PRC than the last two, because of its short distance from the Soviet Union and the industrial center of China. If China let Korna become a hostile neighbor, a lange number of China's forces and sesenaaes would have-to heamtioned mdoiiemtly along the 1,000-müe-

long header. Zhou Enlai later explained Mao's thinking to the CPVA's highranking officials: 56 "Study on enemy on Korean battlefield," compiled by the CPVA's War Experience Study Committee (internally circulated). 57 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 20. General Peng Dehuai's Memoirs (Beijing, 1981), 326. 59 Mao Zedong on Military Affairs, p. 351.

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Korea and the Cold War With the decisive duel between China and the U.S. imperialists being inevitable, the question is where to do it; of course it is decided by the imperialists, but in some sense, also by us. Korea as a battleground chosen by the imperialists is favorable to u s ___ Looking at three battlefronts, it is easy to understand that it would be much more difficult to wage a war against America in Vietnam, not to mention of the offshore islands, than [Korea]. Here, we have the most favorable terrain, the closest communication to China, the most convenient material and manpower back-up...and the most convenient way for us to get indirect Soviet support.611

Allen Whiting, when discussing China's motivation to enter the war, emphasized several Chinese interests and goals, including the improvement in Sino-Soviet w lrto w , the enhancement of China's stthaa in Asia, and the reversal in Japanese-American relations.61 According to available Chinese sources, these were considered by the Chinese leaders in making their decision but were less important factors. Mao was forced to enanr the war because of the situation created by the U.S. government. His drowion was b a n d on a choice of the lerot dangerous of his limited options. Were Truman's promises that UN forces would stop at the Yalu River and take no provocative action against China reliable? Everyone at the meeting doubted that they were because America had broken its previous promise, solemnly conveyed through the diplomatic channel of India, to not cross the thirty-eighth parallel. But what advantages would the PRC gain in fighting the most powerful country in the werkt? This was the most hotly debated question at the meeting. Mao and General Peng Dehuai put forward compelling arguments, which amounted to the following three points. First, Keam wee the weak spot in American global strategy. Athough the United Stales was pursuing a strategy of worldwide rnntainmnnt of conununism, its strategic priority still lay in Europe, the Soviet Union being its main rival, he military deployment in 49 countries made its already inadequate military forces even more thinly spread. The wur in Korea would serve to dkuopt America's strategic priorities and overextend its defense line. It could not af&eed to fig * a protrertr1 war in Korea which would make its ill-balanced strategy even6

6® Zhou Enlai's speech lo CPVA Conference, cited in Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 22 fn. 1. 61 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 151-58.

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wuma.62*Baaidae American Umûmi maupumur, im iaar mmaie and km rainetance of its allies to be drawn in would also be advautagmua to Chma.63 Seeead, die atomic bomb had Nmhmhnm. Thai muuahy of atomic bombs meant that it waald be hard for Truomn to use them in a peripheral area because they had bean originally intended primarily to otoeek the Soviet Unit». If the bombs were used against China, thair effect would be limited by China's vastaizeand thinly spread popularisa* In Korea, it would be even move difficult to use the atomic bomb became tho boatrio t o m would be close to each other. In addition, Soviet knowledge of the atomic bomb and poiaoiial ability to vataliate also mdnaad dm tear of dm Chmeae leaders.64 Although the PRC's leaders regarded the atomic bomb as a "paper tiger," they did seriously weigh the consequences of its use. Allen Whiting inferred that "it may be that Soviet Union strategic estimates led the Chinese Communist analysts to recognize the possibility of a U.S. atomic attack but to underestimate its consequences."65 In fact, the Soviet Union's estimate of the bomb's potential did not have much influence on Chinese leaders; they made their own estimate from a purely Chinese perspective.

Thiad, there wee a gmpmpMc adcmm&L. The meram shape of dm Keman peninsula and the mountainous area in North Korea would gseetly limit the mobility of MacArthur's mmhaaiaed forces and ground firepower. By contrast, it would be advantageous for China in conducting defensive actions. Though MacArthur carid obmin part of his tepede support fimm Japan, the greater part of bis supplies would have to be tsansported from the United States—mom than 10,000 miles away. By comparison, China's supply route from beam, and from dm Soviel Umun, would be much shorter.66 Moreover, MacArthur's arrogance and underestimation of China's capability of intervening, his shortage of manpower and the lack of effective coordination of UN forces were also

62 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, pp. 23-25. 65 CCP Central Committee, "Instruction on Current Issue Propaganda," October 26, 1950. 64 Ibid. 65 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 136. 66 CCP Central Committee, "Instruction on Current Issue Propaganda."

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thought to create conditions advantageous to the PRC, if she were to stage a surprise attack. In predicting the course of the war, one participant gave three different possibilities: our neighbor goes into war while peace is maintained in our country; our neighbor goes into war while the enemy bombs our country; our neighbor goes into war while the enemy lands its troops on our coast and the whole country is involved in the war. For the time being, our policy is based on the second scenario.67

The worst case, Mao believed, would be that the CPVA could not destroy the enemy troops in Korea and the Americans would declare full-scale war against China. Then the recovery of the national economy would be delayed and people would suffer for a period of time. However, many CCP leaders believed that it was necessary to make some sacrifices for the sake of the long-term national interest. As General Peng Dehuai stated on October 5, "it is necessary to dispatch troops to Korea. If China is devastated in war, it only means that the liberation war against the Guomindong will last a few years longer."68 Ttaanfam, it was logical that the CCP faariore soteOMd Koma m the place to fight against the United States, believing that the Tronmn administration had taken the first step in invading China from three dtnctions: Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.69 On October 2, Mao Zedong deeided that China should send a force across the Yakı River to support the DPRK, and suggested that we send some forces under the name of Volunteers to fight against America and its running dogs of Syngman Rhee's forces, together with the North Korean comrades, because if Korea was occupied by Americans, the Korean revolutionary forces would be completely eliminated, and the American imperialists would become even more arrogant and militant, and it would be disadvantageous to the whole East.70

The decision to send forces across the Yalu was approved by the special Politburo meeting on the same day, provided that the Soviet Union could provide the CPVA with air force support and war 6 6^ Selected Works o f Chen Yun, 1949-1966 (Beijing, 1982), 112. 68 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs, pp. 257-58. 69 Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy towards the United States," p. 15. Mao Zedong on Military Affairs, p. 345.

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materials J 1 The same day the CCP Central Committee telegraphed this decision to Stalin. Eva* though internal support was reilittoefy sechfc, hfeo still had to seek Soviet backing. Because of American weapon and air superiority, it would be almost impossible for the CPVA to succeed in countering MacArthur's march without Soviet material support— especially its air force support, because the PLA had no air force at that time. The differences between Stalin and Mao can be traced back to the 1930s. When Mao Zedong established his dominant leadership in the CCP, Stalin regarded it with suspicion, considering Mao a nationalist rather than a Marxist. He tried to replace Mao with Moscowindoctrinated leaders. For a time, he was doubtful about whether Mao's success could consolidate the socialist camp, because Mao's efforts at reconciliation with the United States in the 1930s and 1940s did not make him seem to be a staunch fighter against imperialism. Stalin continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Jiang's Guomindong regime until the end of the Chinese Civil War. Though M w w —pmé a policy of k aaiag to wand the Soviet Union, he actually was forced to do « a b y tile persistently hostile American attitudes toward him. In July 1949, Liu Shaoqi, vice-chairman of the CCP, visited Moscow in order to improve bilateral relations as well as to attempt to secure Soviet aid for Chinese economic reconstruction. From December 1949 to February 1950, Chairman Mao was in Moscow at the head of a Chinese delegation. During meetings there, Stalin apologized for his past policy toward the CCP, and the leaders of both countries discussed a wide range of issues, deciding to promote close cooperation between the tw.o countries. Mae Zeë—g and ta lîn signed the Sino-Saviet Tr—ty of Fri—iahif» and Alliance in February 1950. The treaty paved the way tier maaaive Soviet nüttery and economic assistance to C h n a. On the question of Korea, in early 1950 Stalin only discussed with Mao Kim's reunification idea in general terms. In supporting Kim in waging his national liberation war, Stalin, influenced by Kim's optimistic strategic analysis, at first played down the possibility of American military intervention, even when Mao raised the possibility. After the Korean War started, Mao also had different opinions from Stalin about Kim's strategy. 71 From interviews.

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But after MacArthur's Inch'ön landing, when the situation became completely unfavorable to Kim, Slriai immediately became pessimistic. He believed that the advance of the UNC could in no way be checked unless the Soviet Union directly intervened. However, that was the last thing he wished to do. He even aagnly mjualad Nikita KhMMİMİmv’s suggoteiaa of MMİiag a Russian general to organize an effective raawtanoe. He wm W not ran the risk of a d irect Soviet o ilito y rr>nfrr>ntatir>n

Y » t, h> d id IWt WftUt t o laSO N O Sth

Korea. Sariiu was told, on October 2, of Mao's decision to send M aps to Kama to help Kim. He w o relieved that tba C km m e kod helped to solve Ms dilemma. Although he doubted Chinese military capability to win a wur against the United States, he realized that it would be better for rh iiriir troops to be involved than for the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, zÊ m an exchange o f views with the Chinese leaders, Shriin iasnssdintely agreed to provide die PRC with air force support He also promised to equip 100 Chinese divisions wRh Soviet weapons and eihor mar ruatseials—but not free of charge. At that time, Stalin was mainly concerned about the serious Korean situation. The CCP and Stalin therefore agreed in early October that, in the Korean battlefield, the Chinese army would be responsible for the ground war while the Soviet air force would be responsible for the air war. The date for Chinese troops to cross the Yalu River was originally set at October İS, 1950.72 At the conclusion of the CCP special enlarged Politburo meeting on October 8, just a few days after the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, the decision to enter the Korean War was made. On that day, Mao Zedong, in his capacity as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission, officially issued the command sending the CPVA to Korea. In the same order, General Peng Dehuai was named the commander of the CPVA.73 General Peng left Beijing for Shenyang on October 8 to organize his headquarters. By October 11, his first eight divisions (around 80,000) were ready to cross the border.74 However, on October 12, Peng Dehuai received a telegram from Mao, asking him to 72 From interviews. 73 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 25. 74 Yao Xu, "Peng Dehuai's contribution in commanding the CPVA in the Korean War," Research Materials fo r Party History (Dangshi yanjiu ziliao), Issue 1,1982.

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postpone all actions, to remain in Andong and to wait for further instructions. This sudden change was caused by unexpected events on the Soviet side. Moscow had first agreed to send its air force to support the Chinese action, but Stalin changed his mind and decided on October 10 to wait until after the CCP Military Commission issued the order to send the CPVA to Korea. For Stalin, to use Soviet air power was too risky, and it seemed to be best for Soviet interests to have MacArthur checked and at the same time avoid another world war. Stalin was worried about the possible acceleration of military confrontation between the PRC and the United States when China entered the war. If Washington decided to bomb Chinese coastal cities or industrial bases, the Soviet Union would have to support China because of its obligation under the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty which had gone into effect a few months before J5 Zhou Enlai was immediately sent to Moscow to confer with Stalin secretly on October 10. Zhou was authorized to inform Stalin that, if the Soviet Union postponed sending its air force, the Chinese might have to postpone sending troops across the Yalu River simply because the CPVA had no confidence in its ability to check MacArthur's march without Soviet air support.76 On October 11, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao (who was by then in the Soviet Union for medical treatment) met with Stalin. Stalin promised to expedite training Chinese pilots but insisted that it would be better if the Soviet Union did not involve its air force in the Korean peninsula at this time. The Soviet leader then asked Zhou to inform Mao that, in this circumstance, "Comrade Kim II Sung will set up an exile government in Northeast China.”77 Between October 11 and 13, Mao did not sleep for about 60 hours, for he had to make a most difficult decision quickly. Thajuain reason far his daoiaieo to m m 1Chinese troops to K am i was his concern about the sesnnty of his newly established regime. However, he was aware that if, after he involved China in a military conflict with the most powerful country in the world, China lost the war, the comaquflpce would he even aooro.On October 13, after communicating with Zhou Enlai in Moscow and discussing the issue with other colleagues, Mao decided that the7 7^ From interviews. 7^ From interviews. 77 From interviews. This was also released from "Conversation of Chen Yi on April 16,1964," cited in Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 22, fn. 4.

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CPVA should go ahead and cross the Yalu, even without Soviet air support.78 It seems that Mao thought that if confrontation with the United States was inevitable, it would be better to enter Korea before Kim II Sung retreated to China with his government in exile. Mao sent telegrams to both Peng Dehuai at Andong and Zhou Enlai in Moscow on October 13, informing them that "after consulting with other comrades on the Politburo, we felt that it would be advantageous for us to send troops to Korea." The CCP Central Committee decided that "the Chinese Volunteers Army should cross the Yalu River on October 1 9 ,1950."79* W hm Cfcim did enter the Korean War without Soviet air force sMppart, Stalin was so moved by Mao's self-sacrifice and so inpanad by the performance of the CPVA that he offered to increase Soviet aid. By late 1930, the Soviet Union had sent two air force divisions (fewer than 200 jet warplanes) to defend the Yalu River bridges and the main transport line 100 kilometres south of the Yalu River on behalf of the CPVA. Those Soviet pilots were dressed in CPVA uniforms and were instructed to identify themselves as Chinese Russian minority subjects if caught by the enemy. During the whole Korean War, the Soviet Union provided the CPVA with weapons for more than 60 army divisions and equipped more than 10 air force divisions. Moscow also provided 80 per cent of the ammunition for the CPVA. (The CPVA used 3 million tons of military materials and 250,000 tons of ammunition during the Korean War.)80 Thrae was a consensus among the top Chinese leaders that the (Mtfcaaw of the iaiaial CPVA np— linn would haue a grant influence on the « orale aad confidence of the army at the front and the people at hraae. The PRC's strategic planning for the war was based on the assumption that the war might be confined to Korea, with some bombardment of the Chinese homeland.81 With the help of General Peng, Mao made several decisions on the initial operational planning which proved crucial to the subsequent development of the Korean War. 78 From interviews. 79 From Interviews. This was also indicated in Nie Rongzhen, Memoir, p. 737; "October 13, Comrade Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committee reaffirmed the necessity of sending troops to Korea." 8® From interviews. 81 Selected Works o f Chen Yun, p. 99.

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On the force size, Stalin first advised Mao Zedong to deploy only six divisions in the initial stage of the war, for fear that a force larger than that would provoke the United States to escalate the war beyond control and to use the atomic bomb.82 After a careful study of the situation, Mao and Peng doubted the wisdom of the advice. The UNC numbered 14 divisions and two brigades (440,000); its first echelon contained 130,000 troops. The CPVA would be outnumbered if it followed Stalin's advice, and it would surely be outgunned. Peng was worried that after the first engagement, the Yalu River bridges would be demolished and might be difficult to send reinforcements across the river. Mao and Peng reached the same conclusion, that all six corps (18 divisions) in the border area must be deployed into Korea to achieve numerical superiority there and assure victory in the initial engagements.83845In fact, the first entrance of Chinese troops was made by four full-sized corps and three artillery divisions, totaling 250,000.84 Second, Mao instructed Peng on the eve of crossing the Yalu that surprise would be a decisive factor in achieving initial victory. Though MacArthur had the means to conduct reconnaissance, his arrogance and complacency prevented objective analysis of the information he received. Surprise could be achieved both because of his miscalculation of the PRC's intention to intervene and the well-disguised Chinese force deployment. Mao specifically ordered that the Chinese "crossing of the Yalu starts from the evening of October 19 between Andong and Jian. To keep it secret, all crossing should be done in the darkness from dusk till 4 a.m. in the morning." He also insisted that there should be a total news blackout regarding the crossing. Peng ordered his forces to avoid main highways in an attempt to delay detection by the UNC.83 The surprise factor was achieved. Not until the first large-scale engagement had been made and his forces had been badly mauled, did MacArthur leam about the large size of the Chinese forces. Finally, before the CPVA entered Korea, Mao's operational plan was of a defensive nature. He originally expressed his idea in a telegram to 82 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, pp. 25 and 30. 83 Hu Guangzheng, “Wise Decision and Great Achievement: on Decision to Enter the Korean War," Research on Party History (Dangshiyanjiu), Issue 1 ,1983. 84 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs, p. 324. 85 Ibid., p. 30

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CPVA leaders, instructing them "to establish two to three defense lines north of P'yöngyang and Wönsan." He also said that "the offensive operation should not be conducted until after the CPVA has been armed with Soviet equipment and has had enough training." He specifically ordered the CPVA to conduct offensive operations on P'yöngyang and Wönsan six months after it entered the Korean War. 86 But, as Whiting has pointed out, when the UN forces advanced toward the Yalu, "there was no continuous defense line and little direct communication linking the two field headquarters"; "in addition, American reliance upon motorized transport and armoured units left these armies,...strung out over long, hazardous mountain roads. Not only were the U.N. forces split in two, but the two parts were atomized."87 This provided an ideal opportunity for the CPVA to stage offensive operations instead of static defensive ones.88 This alteration of strategy changed the course of the Korean War. M âm the f a * offensive operation was complm*i on November 5, 1060, the CPVA m M tnly disengaged from the United Nahens fames. Why did Beijing not commit its full atm m gth to m immediate all-out atfemuve again* tfcoee forces? This is another mystery yet to be resolved in the West. Whiting advanced several explanations: the need for a greater concentration of forces, the need for a protracted war, and pehtieal considerations regarding testing and examining the UN's response to China's intervention.8? Considering the evidence Whiting then had, his analysis in some respects was well argued. But he overlooked the subtlety of traditional Chinese psychology in conducting war. We can gain a better understanding of this from Peng's later explanation. Peng said: First, though we achieved success in the first offensive operation, the enemy's main force remained intact. With the main body of the CPVA unexposed, it was expected that the enemy would continue to stage an offensive. Second, the enemy had boasted the ability of its airforce to cut off our communication and food supply. This gave us an opportunity to deceive the enemy about our intention. By releasing some POWs, we could give the enemy an impression that we are in short supply and are retreating. Thirdly, the enemy is equipped 8^ Selected Works o f Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, pp. 649-52. 87 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 130. 88 Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, p. 31. 8? Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 130 and 132.

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with air and tank cover, so it would be difficult for us to wipe out the retreating enemy on foot.90

In other words, dm aam a i Hmg's disengagement was to conceal his tfSMfllfe, duceive die enemy, ta d prepare for striking harder blows m M i Arthur's fa — b. During the three years of the Korean War, the Chinese sent in rotation altogether 25 field corps, 70 artillery divisions, 10 railway engineering divisions, three tank divisions, two public security divisions, 12 air force divisions and 15 engineering regiments into the Korean battlefield. The total number of CPVA forces deployed was more than 2.3 million troops, consisting of 66 per cent of the entire field army, 62 per cent of all artillery divisions, 100 percent of all tank divisions, and 70 per cent of the entire air force that the PRC had at that time. The total casualties of the CPVA in the Korean War were 360,000, excluding 20,000 people captured by the UNC.91 China's decision «a aatar the K on— Wer — b arada m a oaky aad UBCMtain situation with a m y complex historical background. S— of the roots of the decision can be found in the history of modem China, but the relations between the CCP and the Roosevelt and Truman decision. When Mao and Truman decided to enter the war, neither was fully prepared, and the consequences seemed uncertain for both of them. Mao had long been psychologically prepared for the possibility, but he certainly was under heavier pressure than Truman, for he was facing a far superior enemy. From Chinese sources now available, we learn that China's participation was neither a long-planned, well-designed operation, nor an action taken as part of the Soviet Union's plan for global expansion. Stalin might have persuaded Mao not to take action if Mao had not reached the conclusion that a Sino-American confrontation was inevitable or if Truman had shown some flexibility in his policy when the CCP took over the mainland. Ideology played an important but not an absolute role in Mao's decision, contrary to the views of most Western historians over the past three decades.

^ Yao Xu, From Yalu to Panmunjom, pp. 39-40. 9 * From interviews.

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Whiting's comprehensive study of China's decision to enter the war, and some of his inferences and conclusions, were closer to the truth than judgments of most other Western analysts. Considering the limited materials he had then from the Chinese side, probably no one could have done better than he. But, as mentioned above, when analyzing an action made by China, a country with a history unlike that of any other nation in the world, no single factor could be regarded as the roots or motivation behind it. In Whiting's book, there is evidence that he was deeply biased ideologically, and that he overlooked many important factors. He was influenced in his inferences by some key assumptions, such as the one that a patron-client relationship existed between Stalin and Mao. This certainly narrowed his angle of view and limited the possibilities he could explore. From what we have discussed, it is clear that China o aiarai the Korean War primarily baotaiae of security concerns. Fearing a growing mitoary thaaat from the United Semes, and believing that Sino-American military confrontation was inevitable, CCP leaders maintained that it might be wise for them to select the time and place to attaok. When American troops, despite Chinese warnings, crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and marched towards the Yalu River, the PRC entered the conflict in support of the DPRK's forces. Over a brief period, the Korean War turned into a Sino-American military conflict. Retrospectively, if the CCP and the Truman administration had better understood each other's intentions, this tragedy certainly could have been avoided.

Chapter 8

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR: THE CHINA ISSUE, POLICY CONFLICT, AND THE KOREAN WAR

M ichael Schalter Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan brown, for the Christian riles, and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the Christian down; And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the late deceased, And the epitaph drear: "A Fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.” Rudyard Kipling

Two weeks after the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, Time magazine lamented the "dizzyingly swift descent from the triumph of the V-J Day to the desperation" experienced by American units in the face of the North Korean assault. While "ruthless Communist tyrants" had enslaved millions of people, "lazy minded" diplomats had provided a "false sense of security" by suggesting that "Asian Communists were not really Communists." Only General Douglas MacArthur, "whose job it was to police the boundaries of chaos in Asia, was not fooled." He had "never for one minute" believed the "U.S. secure in the face of the Red Advance." He had tried to alert his countrymen to the impending disaster, but was "largely ignored" as "too political." Having turned its back on its most qualified expert, Time's staff concluded, the United States had squandered victory in the Pacific.1 On July 31, 1950, MacArthur, by now commander in chief of United Nations forces (CINCUNC) fighting in Korea, flew to Taiwan to confer with Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi, still a pariah to the Truman administration. At the time, public controversy swirled over whether 1 Time, July 10,1950, pp. 14-15.

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MacArthur had received permission or exceeded his authority by visiting the island. The American military attache in Taipei, Colonel David Barrett, found this dispute unremarkable compared to the scene he observed upon MacArthur's arrival. The general strode toward the greeting party, embraced his assumed host and, in a loud voice declared: "My dear Generalissimo, I have waited so long to meet you." An awkward silence followed as Vice-President Ch'en Ch'eng eased away the American's grasp.2 Had MacArthur not spent a lifetime going to extraordinary lengths to publicize himself as the greatest American expert on Asia, and were he not among Jiang's most vocal advocates, one might dismiss this as a mere faux pas. But his confusion revealed much about his isolation from the realities of contemporary Asia. Bom into an army family and shaped by the values of that institution, Douglas MacArthur searched his entire life for the personal and professional recognition that the military never seemed able to provide. He yearned for the power to shape, not merely implement, national policy. The higher he rose in rank, the more frustrated he became with the constraints imposed by the American tradition of civilian supremacy and the complexities of war and diplomacy. Each promotion left him under the control of some higher military or civil authority whom he resented and against whom he felt compelled to rebel. Even as army chief of staff in the 1930s, the Great Depression and the New Deal mocked the Republican orthodoxy and military tradition he championed. Although he never said so, MacArthur found only two effective outlets for his repressed ambitions. Service abroad, especially in Asia, provided release from the constraints and supervision of stateside posts. Also, by the 1930s, he dreamed of a political career leading to the White House. As president, he would control the levers of power that had impeded the fortunes of his father and himself. In 1944 and in 1948, the general sought the Republican presidential nomination. By 1950, he nursed political grievances more than serious ambitions. Still, he was determined never again to allow his own interests or command to be subordinated to national strategy as during the Pacific war and later period of the Japanese occupation. Since his first important commands in the Philippines during the 1920s, he discovered that service in Asia provided exceptional freedom 2 John N. Hart, The Making o f an Army 'Old China Hand': A Memoir o f Colonel David. D. Barrett (Berkeley, 1985), 86. This book is based on Barrett's private papers and quotes extensively from the original letters and diary entries.

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to prove his abilities. MacArthur used his successive commands in the Philippines, Southwest Pacific, Japan, and Korea as part of his struggle to achieve political power in the United States. In Asia, few other great American generals shared the limelight, allies were too weak to complicate planning, and Washington provided relatively little direct oversight. He thrived in an environment where few policy-makers felt the confidence to second guess his actions. A ceaseless promoter of the idea that he possessed unique knowledge of "oriental psychology," the general functioned as a sort of American proconsul for sixteen years. To much of the public, he personified the American experience in midcentury Asia. Yet the drama and nostalgia evoked by MacArthur's name obscured many ironies of his life. Six months before the Pearl Harbor attack, he lived as a frustrated expatriate in Manila. Following his December 1937 retirement from the U.S. Army, his defense program for the Philippines had withered to the point where he became the butt of cruel jokes by both American and Philippine leaders. Only Japan's southward thrust, and Washington's need to throw something into the breach, revived his moribund career. Recalled to active duty in July 1941, MacArthur lived in a fantasy world, woefully misjudging Japanese strength and intentions. As late as December 1941 he insisted the Japanese would not attack before mid1942 and that he could defeat the enemy "with one hand tied behind his back."3 Therefore, MacArthur's defense plans for the Philippines proved worthless. He infuriated President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Department leadership through his hysterical demands for aid impossible to deliver, his alternating predictions of victory and defeat, his backing of a plan for a separate peace with Japan and, finally, his acceptance of a $300,000 private, illegal payment by Philippine President Manuel Quezon.4 3 This was one of the many comments about General Douglas MacArthur from Admiral Thomas Hart, Asiatic Fleet Commmander, that appear in his letters and diaries for 1940-41. They are quoted at length in James Leutze, A Different Kind o f Victory: A Biography o f Admiral Thomas C. Hart (Annapolis, Md., 1981), 185-188, 218-219. For MacArthur's troubles with fellow Americans, see also Theodore White, In Search o f History (New York, 1978), 108; Stephen Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce: A Biography (New York, 1970), 129; Carol M. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years (Bloomington, Ind., 1981). 4 Henry L. Stimson diary entries, January 2, 8, 13, and 17, and February 9 and 23, 1942, Henry L. Stimson papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut; Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York, 1981), 43-49; Executive

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Nevertheless, early in 1942, a "MacArthur craze" swept the United States. This reflected the drama of the siege, MacArthur's dramatic press releases, and the fact that his troops maintained, if only briefly, the one point of resistance early in 1942 against the Japanese advance. As cities and towns renamed bridges, parks and roads in honor of the general, Republican members of Congress demanded that Roosevelt appoint MacArthur commander of the Pacific War, if not all U.S. forces. Roosevelt relented, ordering MacArthur to Australia and appointing him to lead the Southwest Pacific Theater. Against the advice of most of the War Department, Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall awarded MacArthur a Congressional Medal of Honor. Privately, they justified the award as having "morale value" to the public and being useful in heading off the Republican stampede to give MacArthur more resources. As Roosevelt put it, giving MacArthur a medal rather than court martialing him for his "criminal" failures in the Philippines was an act of expedience and "pure yielding to Congressional pressure and public opinion." Nevertheless, by 1942, many Americans had come to believe the heroic "MacArthur legend" and this limited the freedom of action of both Roosevelt and his successor Harry S. Truman. As one war correspondent observed, it hardly mattered what happened on the real battlefield, since "MacArthur talked the greatest war ever fought. "5 In an "off the record" session with journalists in November 1944, during the battle to retake the Philippines, MacArthur railed that wartime aid to China was "absolutely useless." He even questioned the importance of defeating Adolf Hitler's Germany. Instead, all effort should be devoted to his Southwest Pacific Theater. He complained of "treason and sabotage" by Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs. No American leader beside himself understood that the history of the world will be written in the Pacific for the next ten thousand years....we made the same old mistake of intervening in European quarrels we*3

Order # 1, January 3,1942, box 4 (57) and Cash Receipts of February 19 and 25, 1942, ibid., Richard J. Sutherland papers. Modem Military Records Branch, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.; Carol Petillo, "Douglas MacArthur and Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond," Pacific Historical Review 48 (February 1979), 107-17; Communications between MacArthur and Manuel Quezon and Franklin D. Roosevelt during the siege are located in PSF Safe #7, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 3 For a discussion of the reactions to the loss of the Philippines and of Roosevelt's decision to reward MacArthur, see Michael Schalter, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York, 1989), chapters 4 and 5.

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can't hope to solve because they are insoluble....Europe is a dying system. It is worn out and run down, and will become an economic industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia... .The lands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history.. .for the next ten thousand years.

Journalists loved this kind of rhetoric and conceded to MacArthur the role of global sage and Asia expert.67 The public mythology surrounding MacArthur remained a powerful force in the aftermath of Japan's defeat. In August 1945, as Harry Truman weighed whether to appoint MacArthur occupation commander in Japan (a move demanded by the Republican press and bloc in Congress), the new president lamented his options. He told Harold Ickes it was not fair to "blame on him the appointment of MacArthur as the chief commander in the Far Eastern Area." The Interior Secretary admitted that, politically, the president "couldn't do anything else." The blame was "due to Roosevelt" who made a terrible "mistake in taking MacArthur away from the Philippines." He should have left the general "to clean up his own mess," allowing the Japanese to solve the M acArthur problem. The two men complained that while most Americans considered MacArthur a "hero," he was a military fraud. Yet, Ickes admitted, denying MacArthur command in Tokyo would only "make a martyr out of him and a candidate for president." Truman disputed only one point, predicting that "MacArthur would probably be a candidate anyway."7 In spite of his fame, MacArthur by most measures failed in all of his successive Asian commands—the Philippines, Southwest Pacific Theater, Occupied Japan, and Korea. In each, critical lapses in his military skill, political judgment and knowledge of Asia proved disastrous. Through all of these events, despite boasts of his expertise, Asia served mainly as a platform for a relentless effort to impress Americans with his capacity to lead the United States. As MacArthur 6 On MacArthur's views of the future of the Pacific, see "Notes on Meeting in the Pacific of Admiral Sherman and MacArthur,” November 9, 1944, box S, Operational Archives, Admiral Forrest Sherman papers, Center for Naval History, Washington, D.C.; Bert Andrews of the New York Herald Tribune gave Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal notes on MacArthur's talk quoted in the text. See diary entry of November 22, 1944, James V. Forrestal papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey; Turner Catledge, A/y Life and the Times (New York, 1971), 155-59. 7 Diary entries of August 18, 26, 1945, Harold L. Ickes papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Robert Ferrell (ed.), O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman (New York, 1980), 61.

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admitted to an aide in 1948 who urged him to return to the United States to campaign for the Republican nomination, he wanted to remain "out here [where] I have a certain mysticism.” As soon as he returned home, he explained, he would become just another "political target."11 MacArthur easily identified the Truman administration as his "political target" after 1948, blaming most postwar problems in Asia on its alleged coddling of Chinese communism. He emerged as the most persistent advocate of military action against the People's Republic of China (PRC). As with most issues, MacArthur personalized complicated policy questions. For example, he attributed Communist postwar success in China to the appointment of George C. Marshall, an old rival, as mediator in the civil war. In July 1946, MacArthur told Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal that while Jiang Jieshi and his government "might not be the best in the world," they "were on our side and should be supported." He accused State Department China specialists of "disloyalty" for exposing Guomindong corruption. A few months later, MacArthur charged that Marshall sought a temporary truce in China only to win a place on the ticket "with Truman in the next [presidential] campaign."89*During his pursuit of the presidential nomination in 194748, MacArthur pandered to Congressional Republicans who demanded aid for China, describing Nationalist China on one occasion as the "fundamental keystone to the Pacific Arch." The Truman administration ignored the "global picture" and thought only about Western Europe. MacArthur proposed an "integrated solution" to the Cold War, starting with the suppression of Chinese communism.1®

8 MacArthur to Robert E. Wood. November 16, 1947, MacArthur File, Robert E. Wood papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; MacArthur to Hanford MacNider, October 14, 1947, MacArthur Presidential Candidacy File, Hanford MacNider papers, ibid.; Diary entries of September 11, and December 20, 1947, Robert Eichelberger papers, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. 9 Diary entry of July 10, 1945, Forrestal papers; Memorandum by E. A. Bayne of conversation with MacArthur, December 21, 1946, folder 7, box 1, W. Walton Butterworth papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia; Diary entry of March 22,1948, Eichelberger papers. MacArthur statement, March 3,1948, Record Group (RG) 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), sec. 20, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.

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On the eve of the 1948 presidential election, when it appeared Truman would lose, several Republican politicians approached MacArthur about his becoming a special military adviser to Jiang Jieshi. MacArthur responded that he "would not be averse to adding this responsibility to his present one in Japan." He spoke as well of a plan to drive the Chinese Communists from Manchuria which he "could accomplish...in six months by air action with a force of 1000 suitable aircraft." He then could occupy and administer Northeast China as a "trustee" for the Nationalists and, thereby, safeguard all Asia from communism. Truman's victory precluded these possibilities.11 After the Nationalist regime fled China during 1949, MacArthur conceived of Taiwan as a critical outpost from which to halt and then roll back Communist forces on the Asian mainland. His commitment stemmed from several sources, including his belief that the Soviets had targeted Asia for their main offensive against the West. Equally important, the general's policy and pronouncements made him the hero of the so-called China bloc in Congress, a diffuse group of mainly Republican legislators whom he saw as key political supporters. Simultaneously, MacArthur's service as Occupation commander in Tokyo was reaching the point of diminishing returns. Seemingly endless squabbles between the State and Defense departments over rearmament and post-occupation bases had blocked a peace settlement with Japan. If, by some miracle, the two agencies did agree on treaty terms, MacArthur dreaded the possibility of the occupation ending without his first securing a new high profile assignment in Asia. He believed that a confrontation with China, or a commitment to Taiwan, would submerge State and Defense department objections to a Japanese peace treaty while assuring a major new command for himself. During 1949, President Truman, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and MacArthur all debated whether to extend U.S. military protection to Taiwan. While all agreed that Communist control of the island would give China and the Soviet Union greater control of the sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia, neither civilian policy­ makers nor the JCS favored an American defense commitment to the 11 Sir Alvary Gascoigne to Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, December 26,1947, FO 371/63830, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, England; Gascoigne to M.E. Dening, February 28,1948, FO 371/69818, ibid.

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Nationalist-held island. MacArthur, in contrast, insisted that "if Formosa went to the Chinese Communists our whole defensive position in the Far East was definitely lost." Eventually, it would push "our defensive line back to the West Coast of the continental United States." Informing the JCS that "By hook or by crook, we must keep Taiwan out of Communist hands," MacArthur during 1949 proposed several schemes to protect the island. These included putting Taiwan under American "trusteeship," under the control of some other "safe nation," or even returning it to the Japanese—which, for the moment at least, meant himself. 12 MacArthur also endorsed a proposal made by Claire Chennault, the World War II flying ace, military adviser to Jiang and co-owner of Civil Air Transport. Chennault had recommended that Washington create a five-hundred plane air force piloted by American volunteers, and a small navy, to protect Taiwan and "blockade and destroy China's coastal cities." Late in 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) discovered that MacArthur permitted some Japanese aviators to travel to Taiwan to assist the Guomindong air force. Rumors circulated in Taiwan that MacArthur had a secret plan to "thwart a communist takeover" of the island. MacArthur and his top staff fed these rumors by meeting frequently with such American "entrepreneurs" and soldiers of fortune as Chennault, former OSS head William Donovan, Preston Goodfellow, and William Pawley, who sold arms to the Nationalists and served as an informal link between Taiwan and Pentagon officials.13 In December 1949, MacArthur told Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, then visiting Tokyo, that a Communist takeover of Taiwan would prove a "fatal" blow to American security in the Pacific. ^ Transcript of a meeting with Colonel Babcock, November 10, 1949, JSSC 388.1, Japan, sec. 1 (9-1-47), RG 218, JCS Records; Report by the JSSC to the JCS on "Impact of an Early Peace Treaty with Japan on U.S. Strategic Requirements," November 30, 1949, JCS 1380/75, ibid.; Notes on a memorandum of conversation with Goldthwaite Dorr by John Howard, December 8, 1949, Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1949, VI: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington, D.C.,1977), 1128; Notes by Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees of MacArthur's opinions on a Japanese peace treaty, December 14, 1949, CJCS 092.2, Japanese Peace Treaty 1950, RG 218, JCS Records, NA. *3 Report of a meeting between MacArthur and Claire Chennault, November 21,1949, NLT-12, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); Memorandum of conversation: MacArthur briering to Huber Sub-committee, September 5,1949, CCS 452, China (4-3-43), sec. 7, pt. 5, RG 218, JCS Records, NA.

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Even "Japan in enemy hands" would not be so dangerous. MacArthur recommended that Truman declare the island "neutral" territory, forbidding attacks upon it by the Communists or from it by the Nationalists. This would secure the area without actually committing American forces. Later, the United States could sponsor an "independent" Chinese regime on Taiwan.14 Fortunately for MacArthur, the rapid deterioration of American relations with the PRC early in 1950 created a new opportunity for adoption of his program. In January, the Communists seized American consular property in Beijing, provoking a withdrawal of all American diplomats. The next month, the signing of a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance undermined predictions of an early split. These developments eroded the influence of "moderates" within the State Department and helped carry the day for MacArthur and other "hardliners." During the spring of 1950, Truman authorized resumption of small scale arms sales to Taiwan while Chennault, Goodfellow, Donovan, and other "private" activists funneled additional American weapons to the Nationalists. Donovan coordinated an effort to gain possession of a fleet of Chinese government aircraft in Hong Kong which the Nationalists claimed to have sold to Chennault but which Beijing insisted remained Chinese government property. Donovan also conferred in Tokyo with M acA rthur and his intelligence chief, M ajor General Charles Willoughby, regarding his plans to establish spy networks in China and assist anti-Communist guerrillas on the mainland. Both men encouraged the idea and promised unspecified support.15 Meanwhile, Preston Goodfellow, who was close both to MacArthur and South Korean president Syngman Rhee, shuttled between Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei during early 1950. He spoke of organizing a "foreign legion" of Chinese Nationalist and Korean troops to undertake operations against North Korea and China. In January and again in March, 14 Notes by Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees of Mac Arthur's opinions on a Japanese Peace Treaty, December 14, 1949, CJCS 092.2, Japanese Peace Treaty 1950, RG 218, JCS Records, NA. 15 William M. Leary, Perilous M issions: Civil A ir Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1984); Slessor to P. Reilly, December 30,1949, FO 371/83012, PRO; Fergusson to Gascoigne, February 11, 1950, FO 371/83013, ibid.; Michael Schaller, The American Occupation o f Japan: The Origins o f the Cold War in Asia (New York, 1985), 251.

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Goodfellow informed Taiwan's ambassador in Washington, Wellington Koo, o f M acArthur's "sym pathetic...reaction to carrying out an underground activities program on the mainland." Willoughby and others on MacArthur's staff proposed channeling funds for these activities through Tokyo to circumvent the administration's "deep-rooted objection” to providing direct assistance to a Taiwan still controlled by Jiang. Koo later discussed with Defense Department officials a plan for Mac Arthur to send weapons, planes and pilots from Japan to Taiwan "without necessarily obtaining the formal approval of Washington." The ambassador revealed that some aid had already come through this "back channel" and that MacArthur and Willoughby were working with Chennault, Goodfellow, and Donovan to set up an intelligence net in China and supply weapons to Taiwan and anti-Communist guerrillas on the mainland.17 MacArthur's efforts to increase the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan were abetted by a change in administration policies. As diplomats Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles played a more active role in forming Chinese and Japanese policy, the State Department adopted a more sympathetic line on Taiwan and a tougher approach toward Beijing. Rusk and Dulles advocated "covert action in support of resistance on Formosa" and moves to "draw the line in Asia" by defending Taiwan, increasing aid to Southeast Asia and Korea, and pushing through a Japanese peace treaty. The State Department proposed to Truman the possibility of arranging Jiang's "retirement,” protecting Taiwan through the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet, and increasing military assistance to the Philippines, Indochina, and Korea.18 Encouraged by this, the evidence suggests that, in May 1950, MacArthur, retired Admiral Charles Cooke (then an adviser to Jiang), and Nationalist General Ho Shi-chi (a member of the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo) discussed a military pact linking Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Ho later told *6 Oral History, vol. 6, pts. A and J, Wellington Koo papers, Columbia University Library, New York, New York. 17 Ibid. 18 Memorandum by General J. H. Bums to Dean Rusk, May 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.,1976), 346-47; Memoranda by Fisher Howe to W. Park Armstrong, May 31,1950, ibid., pp. 347*49; Rusk's report of May 31, 1950, box 18, Chinese Affairs Lot Hie, Records of the Department of State, NA; For a fuller discussion, see Schaller, The American Occupation o f Japan, pp. 260-71.

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Wellington Koo that Mac Arthur wanted Jiang to deploy several thousand Nationalist soldiers in South Korea to deter or beat back an anticipated northern invasion. However, Jiang's exorbitant demands for payment delayed a decision and "discussions were still going on when the war in Korea actually broke out."19 Historians assessing MacArthur's role in the Korean War have, given this background, missed a critical aspect of his behavior. Much effort has been spent judging the wisdom of his battlefield strategy and examining the mounting confrontation between the general and the president which led to MacArthur’s recall. While these questions deserve careful scrutiny, scholars have overlooked or misconstrued his agenda for picking a fight with China. Almost as soon as the conflict in Korea erupted, MacArthur alluded to his desire to widen hostilities into a crusade against China and communism. A strategy for carrying the war into China underlay his determination to liberate North Korea. Its origins long antedated the devastating Chinese intervention of November 1950, and its implications went far beyond the geographical and political concept of limited war. In July 1950, before UN forces had taken the military initiative in Korea, Generals J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt S. Vandenberg conferred with MacArthur in Tokyo. Collins recalled that MacArthur's plea for reinforcements "gave me the impression of addressing not just his immediate listeners, but a larger audience, unseen." He told the two members of the JCS that a victory in Korea would "check Communist expansion everywhere and thus obviate the necessity of our being fully prepared to meet aggression elsewhere," especially in Europe. He wanted to "grab every ship in the Pacific and pour the support into the Far East." "Delays or half-way measures" would prove "disastrous." After destroying Communist troops on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel, MacArthur would "compose and unite" Korea—even though he had no authority yet to do so. Vandenberg worried that this might provoke Chinese intervention and require "an advance into Manchuria." MacArthur doubted it. But since Manchurian and Siberian links with Korea depended on tunnels and bridges, "he saw a unique opportunity for 19 Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson and his assistant Paul Griffith met regularly with Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo, often sharing sensitive material with him. See memoranda of conversation with Paul Griffith, June 3 and 7 , 19S0, box 180, Koo papers; Memorandum of conversation with John Foster Dulles, June 12,1950, ibid.

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the use of the atomic bomb to deal a crippling blow to these supply routes."20 Turning to his China policy, MacArthur told General Collins that he intended to visit Taiwan. Despite his public interest in Jiang's offer to send Nationalist troops to fight in Korea, MacArthur admitted privately that he opposed this since the poorly trained and equipped forces would "be an albatross around our necks for months." Instead, he wanted more American troops and an opportunity to brandish Taiwan as a threat against the Chinese mainland. MacArthur concluded his meeting with the visiting army and air force chiefs with an inspirational declaration: "We win here or we lose everything; if we win here, we improve the chances of winning elsewhere."21 In addition to advocating pressure on the PRC, MacArthur rejected the distinctions, made frequently by President Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, between shielding Taiwan from a Communist takeover and supporting Jiang's domination of the island or reconquest of the mainland. Even "if he [Jiang] has horns and a tail," MacArthur told political adviser William Sebald, so long as the Generalissimo was "anti-communist we should help him." The State Department should "forget its vendetta...and assist him."22 Following MacArthur's July 31 visit to Taiwan, the general's incessant calls to assist the Nationalists led Truman and the JCS to send presidential adviser W. Averell Harriman and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway on a mission to Tokyo. Harriman pressed the UN commander to stop contradicting administration policy. Although MacArthur pledged his loyalty, "for reasons which are rather difficult to explain," Harriman confessed that he and the general failed to come "to a full agreement on the way he believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo." While MacArthur praised Truman's action toward Korea, he ridiculed the administration's China policy. The president and secretary of state should defer to him, the 20 J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons o f the Korean War (Boston, 1969), 81-85. 21 Ibid. For the leaking of MacArthur's recommendations to Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, see Excerpts, July 9, 1950, Drew Pearson papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. 22 Diary entry of July 24, 1950, William Sebald papers, Chester Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

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greatest American expert on "Oriental psychology." Westerners, he explained, "hate to die." With "Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, folding their arms as a dove" and with that "MacArthur folded his arms and sighed." MacArthur promised to "obey any orders he received from the President" and not permit Jiang to drag the United States into a war with China. However, Harriman reported, MacArthur made the promise "without full conviction." He even suggested "it might be a good idea" to settle the China question by permitting Jiang to attack the mainland. Either he would win or you could "get rid of him that way." The general claimed that increasing Taiwan's power would destabilize Guomindong leadership, delay UN seating of Beijing, and, possibly, fracture Mao Zedong's support which would "encourage a split with the Soviets." Instead of "kicking Jiang around," Washington should take advantage of the "great potentialities" for covert operations in China. Although he did not reveal it, MacArthur had probably begun assisting Guomindong guerrilla operations against the mainland.23 General Ridgway found MacArthur obsessed by China and Taiwan. Ridgway recalled, in the midst of their consultations on the proposed Inch'ön landing, the UN commander kept changing the subject. Although MacArthur no longer thought the Communists would invade Taiwan, he told Ridgway that he got "down on my knees" and "prayed nightly that they will." He would then go to the front and "deliver such a crushing defeat it would be one of the decisive battles of the world—a disaster so great it would rock Asia and perhaps tum back communism."24 Years later, Paul Nitze, head of Policy Planning in the State Department in 1950, recalled that throughout the Korean War, MacArthur cared less about Korean unification than the "restoration of Jiang to the mainland." MacArthur knew that Jiang could never make it back on his own. The

23 Memorandum of conversation between MacArthur and W. Avereli Harriman, PSF 129, Harry S. Truman papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri. Excerpts, with some significant deletions, of this conversation appear in FRUS, 1950, VI, pp. 427-30 and VII: Korea (Washington. D.C., 1976), 542-44. 24 Notes on conference with MacArthur, August 8, 1950, box 16, Matthew B. Ridgway papers, U.S. Military History Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War(Garden City, N.Y., 1967), 37-38.

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United States would have to "defeat the Red Chinese armies, and that could be done only with nuclear weapons."2^ Throughout the Korean War, Taiwan was the touchstone for foreign policy explosions. For example, in mid-August the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) asked MacArthur to send a message to the group's Chicago convention, scheduled for the end of the month. On August 20, the general responded with a bitter critique of administration policy designed to dispel "misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific." He described Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender" (terms suggesting more than the official policy of merely shielding the island) commanded by a courageous ally, Jiang Jieshi. MacArthur again asserted that his intimate knowledge of "Oriental psychology" proved that Asians "respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership." Implicitly, he contrasted his own record with the alleged timidity of the president.2^ Truman, Acheson, and Harriman interpreted the VFW message as a ploy to force the administration into making an "unlimited commitment" to Jiang. Moscow and Beijing, Acheson feared, would use it to rally Asian nationalism against the United States. American allies would conclude that both military and foreign policy were under the dominance of an "uncontrollable military commander." Jiang would be impelled to carry out some "provocation" against the PRC while the Chinese Communists might launch a preventive strike against Taiwan having concluded that the island was a "springboard” for an American attack against them.22 When an outraged Truman compelled MacArthur to "withdraw" his already publicized VFW message, the general, in a conversation with an aide, "burst into a long tirade about a State Department clique attempting to undermine his position.” He "pilloried

2^ Interview with Paul Nitze. December 2,1986, in John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1989), 84. 2*>Selections from the message were printed in The New York Times, August 29,1930, and U.S. News and World Report 29 (September 1 ,1930): 32*34. 22 Memoranda for file by George Elsey, August 26 and October 2, 1930, box 72, George Elsey papers, Truman Library: Lucius Battle, "Memorandum for the Record of the Events of Saturday August 26, 1930," Dean G. Acheson papers, ibid.; Unsigned report, "Foreign Policy Aspects of the MacArthur Statement," August 26,1930, ibid.

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the State Department and said that one of these days he intended to blast them wide open."28 Following the Inch'ön landing and the rout of the North Korean army late in September, the United States raised the stakes of war. The administration spumed peace overtures from several sources and resolved to unify, by force, all Korea. Early in October, under the fig leaf of a new United Nations resolution, American troops crossed the thirtyeighth parallel and began their ill fated advance to the Yalu River. Most officials in Washington agreed with MacArthur that the PRC was unlikely to enter the war to defend the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Apparently, little serious thought was given to the possibility that Beijing might consider its own security and credibility at stake once American forces crossed into North Korea. Evidence from Chinese sources suggests that the PRC feared American occupation of North Korea would, at best, transform Manchuria into a hostage. At worst, MacArthur would use his victory to bully Washington into supporting a more hostile policy towards the PRC.29 What strategists in Beijing perceived more clearly than those in Washington was that MacArthur might not have cared about the dangers of Chinese military intervention, but he actually coveted an opportunity to engage the PRC. While the general never explicitly admitted this, his provocations and actions are difficult to explain in any other way. When Indian ambassador Sardar K. M. Panikkar communicated Zhou Enlai's October 3 threat that if American troops crossed the thirtyeighth parallel, they would "encounter Chinese resistance," MacArthur disparaged the warning as "pure bluff." He told British diplomat Sir Alvary Gascoigne that if Beijing really wanted to deter the United States, it would not have used the left-leaning Panikkar as a channel. Gascoigne's summary of MacArthur's position for the British Foreign Office reveals the extent of the general's optimism: In any case MacArthur claimed he had plenty o f troops [to deal] adequately with the Chinese and even with the Russians if they 28 Diary entry of September 4,1950, Sebald papers. 29 The best current analysis of Chinese perceptions of American policy in Korea during the early phase of the war appears in a study by RAND Corporation Analyst Jonathan Pollack. iSee his "Korean War and Sino-American Relations," in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (eds.), Sino-American Relations, 1945-55: A Joint Reassessment o f a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del., 1989), 213-38.

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Korea and the Cold War should prove so foolish as to enter the arena at this stage. The Chinese, he said, had neither troops nor equipment nor air power to take him on—if the Chinese had come in three weeks ago it might have been another matter.... If the Chinese came in, MacArthur would immediately unleash his air force against towns in Manchuria and North China, including Peking—he knew Chou must know that, and must realize his (MacArthur's) vastly greater potential in the air, on the ground and on die sea. Chou's statement to Panikkar was just blackmail.30

Buoyed by MacArthur's confidence and afraid of the political backlash should they "leash" a winning general, the JCS, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, Acheson, and Truman agreed that the UN commander should drive toward the Yalu even if limited Chinese forces intervened. They left most of the details to MacArthur's "judgment." The only limit on his authority was an instruction to "obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory." Given MacArthur's ability to intimidate his nominal superiors, the Chinese leadership was probably correct in its surmise that the danger of not intervening in Korea far outweighed the costs. The responsibility had fallen upon Beijing to bring U.S. policy-makers to their senses. As one Chinese official later put it, Mao Zedong bet that a blow from China would help the moderates in Washington suppress extremists like MacArthur. Chinese strategists had hoped to form a resistance line somewhere in the middle of North Korea, but MacArthur's rush toward the Yalu meant an engagement much closer to Chinese territory. When Chinese troops launched a brief but fierce assault south of the Yalu early in November, MacArthur dismissed it as a bluff and bullied the JCS and Truman into permitting him to bomb the sensitive Yalu bridges as a prelude to an "end the war offensive." In the middle of November, he told Sebald that when Chinese and North Korean troops were pushed across the Yalu, the "Korean campaign would be at an end." Although he expected to respect the border, "should the planned operation fail and Communist forces continue to stream into North Korea from Manchuria," MacArthur saw "no alternative from a military point of view to bombing key points in 30 MacArthur's remarks are found in Gascoigne to Foreign Office, September 28 and October 4,1950, FO 371/83008, PRO.

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Manchuria." Then the "fat would be in the fire” because it would "probably bring about a countermove by Soviet Russia."31* Reflecting on MacArthur's motives at the end of November, Matthew Ridgway thought the general envisioned himself as the "swordsman who would slay the communist dragon" and save Asia. His strategy included use of Chinese Nationalist forces to fight both in Korea and on the Chinese mainland.3? Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and the JCS, in contrast, feared getting "sewed up" in the "wrong war" against the "second team." As soon as the dimensions of China's intervention became apparent, they sought primarily to preserve American troops, arrange an armistice, avoid a wider war, and strengthen the defenses of Western Europe. Committing additional men, weapons, and prestige to Korea undermined these priorities. Civilian and military planners contemplated operations against China primarily as a last resort, to cover an evacuation or retaliate if the Communist powers launched air attacks against South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan. They toyed with but ultimately scrapped the idea of air and naval strikes against the Chinese mainland. For tactical, strategic, and political reasons, the administration rejected use of atomic weapons. While the administration collaborated with Taiwan in small scale guerrilla operations, it strongly opposed using Nationalist troops in Korea or in major operations against China. What officials in Washington had difficulty understanding was the degree to which MacArthur both personalized the Korean W ar and considered it a political springboard. In his mind, only one critical position existed in this or any war—the one permitting him to exercise command. As during the Pacific War, he complained that his domestic enemies preferred to see "MacArthur lose a battle rather than to see America win a war." In his formal reports to the JCS, and in numerous press interviews, MacArthur insisted the United States could threaten or even attack China with impunity. Instead of settling for a restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel divider, he demanded pursuit of Korean unification. He labeled as "appeasement" all talk of a "limited war," fearing that a military stalemate which left Korea partitioned would prove useless or worse for him politically. 31 Diary entry of November IS, 1950, Sebald papers; Memorandum of SebaldMacArthur conversation, November 14,1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, pp. 1148-49. 3? Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 37-38.

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On the other hand, a victory in North Korea and a roll back of Communist power in part of China would transform the Cold War and put MacArthur in a powerful political position. Within a few days of the Chinese intervention, MacArthur proposed that he be sent to "negotiate directly" with Jiang on how to use Nationalist troops.33 But then, as afterward, MacArthur hesitated to define the "victory" MacArthur sought. His successor, Matthew Ridgway, surmised that he did not mean merely the destruction of enemy forces in the field and unification of Korea under a democratic government. Rather, "what he envisaged was no less than the global defeat of Communism, dealing Communism a blow from which it would never recover and which would mark the historical turning back of the Red Tide." Thus, he wanted to destroy the "air bases and industrial complex in Manchuria" as well as the remainder of China's "industrial centers." He planned to equip and carry Jiang's troops to the mainland to "break the Communist hold." He believed the "Chinese masses were ready to welcome Chiang back.” Although MacArthur doubted the Soviets would enter this "preventive war on Red China," if they did, Ridgway guessed, the general would probably have "urged the further step of an attack upon the USSR."34 Fearful that a wider war with China would endanger both Japan and Western Europe, nearly all Truman's advisers rejected MacArthur's strategy. They believed the United States would be lucky to achieve an armistice to restore the prewar status quo. But MacArthur demanded escalation, not negotiations with Beijing. Late in December, he raised the possibility of using atomic bombs against "critical concentrations of enemy power in Manchuria." He advanced a plan including provisions to "blockade the coast of China, destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war," secure Chinese 33 MacArthur to JCS, November 28,1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, pp. 1237-38; Summary of MacArthur to JCS, ibid., p. 1253n; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, III: The Korean War (Wilmington, Del., 1979), 335-37; Diary entry of November 28, 1950, Eben Ayers papers, Truman Library; Memorandum of conversations at NSC meetings by Philip C. Jessup, November 28, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, pp. 1242-49; Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography (New York, 1983), 598-99, 601-03; "MacArthur's Own Story,” U.S. News and World Report 29 (December 8,1950): 16-22; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 62-76. 34 Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 145; See also, "An Interview with General Matthew B. Ridgway," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 65 (October 1982): 279-308.

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Nationalist troops to fight in Korea, and "release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison...possibly leading to counter invasion against vulnerable areas of the Chinese Mainland." Besides halting the current offensive, MacArthur argued, these measures would "neutralize" the PRC's warmaking ability "and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it.” Failure to act, the general predicted, would result in the loss of Southeast Asia and Japan and would "insure later defeat in Europe itself."35 Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Acheson's closest adviser on Asian policy, thought that MacArthur strongly desired an "all out war against China." Because everyone realized that Chinese troops would overwhelm American ground forces, MacArthur's strategy implicitly required "mass destruction of Chinese cities" with atomic weapons.3^ Privately, JCS chairman General Omar N. Bradley concluded that MacArthur "was monumentally stupid, had gone mad, or had rejected JCS and administration policy to keep the war localized. Instead, he risked an all out war with China, regardless of the consequences." The JCS wrung their hands in dismay. Vandenberg lamented the uselessness of sending MacArthur direct orders since "he wouldn't obey them anyway.” Truman complained privately that "MacArthur as usual has been shooting off his mouth," and once more considered relieving him.37 Despite MacArthur's effort to stampede the Truman administration into a war with the PRC, the actual battlefield situation in Korea began to stabilize in January. Ignoring mounting evidence that UN forces could hold the bulk of South Korea without any substantial reinforcements, MacArthur continued to issue warnings that his command faced

35 Memorandum, July S, 1951, G3 091 Korea TS, box 38 A, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, NA, cited in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions o f the Korean Conflict, 1950 - 1953 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), 114-15; MacArthur to the Department of the Army, December 30, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, pp. 1630-33; Ridgway to Collins, December 29,1950, box 22, Ridgway papers. 36 Interview with Dean Rusk, November 10,1986, cited in Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, p. 84. 37 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 62,73-76; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II: Years o f Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 437; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, pp. 601-05.

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"complete destruction" unless he were allowed to attack China.38 By now, Bradley and the Joint Chiefs concluded that MacArthur's demands had less to do with the real battlefield situation than with his desire to avenge the "Red Chinese generals who had made a fool out of him" and of his "infallible 'military genius'." The JCS decided that Ridgway, the new 8th Army commander, deserved the credit for demonstrating that the Chinese could be stopped in Korea with limited, conventional means. As General Bradley later wrote, even though the JCS continued to address messages to MacArthur, they no longer considered him the decisive factor in Korea. In their minds, at least, he was "kicked up stairs to chairman of the board and was, insofar as military operations were concerned, mainly a prima dona figurehead who had to be tolerated."39 During the first months of 1951, MacArthur grew furious at his diminishing role. By March, Truman's advisers guessed the Chinese might be willing to begin armistice talks aimed at restoring the prewar Korean boundaries. The prospect of W ashington negotiating a compromise terrified MacArthur who anticipated being blamed for the failure to achieve victory. After the JCS rebuffed MacArthur's demand to bomb additional targets along North Korea's border with China and the Soviet Union, Sebald found him "tired and depressed." He complained about the "lack of instructions regarding his mission in Korea," claiming that he "no longer knows what he is supposed to do.” In the middle of February, MacArthur told Sebald that he had conceived of a new "concept to bring China to her knees by" means of a naval blockade and air power. The task would take less than a year, although he "was not clear about whether the Soviets would come in or not."40 In his memoir and in several posthumously released interviews, MacArthur elaborated on this plan which he claimed would win the war "in a maximum of ten days.” The general asserted that he recommended "massive air attacks" against North Korea coupled with a move to "sever Korea from 38 JCS to MacArthur, January 9, 1951, RG 9, Douglas MacArthur papers, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia; MacArthur to JCS, January 10, 1951, RG 6, ibid.; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, p. 616; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 515; Truman, Years o f Trial and Hope, pp. 492-95; Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 121-22. 39 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 255; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, p. 623; Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, pp. 432-40. 40 Diary entries of February 8 and 17,1951, Sebald papers.

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Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive waste...across the lines of enemy supply."41 Whatever else he had in mind, it is certain that during the spring MacArthur sought authority to use atomic weapons. On March 10, he requested that the Joint Chiefs make available to him on an "on call basis" atomic bombs for use on "D-Day" should the Soviets invade Japan. It was "vital," to react immediately to a Soviet attack, he reported, without taking the time to refer the question to Washington. Although the JCS shared MacArthur's anxiety about Soviet threats to Japan, it was nearly as fearful of the general's judgment as of the Communists. The JCS stalled, agreeing only to "consider" his request.4243 MacArthur spoke publicly with increasing bittemess about his disagreem ents with the Truman administration, complaining to journalists about Washington's responsibility for the "savage slaughter" in Korea and denouncing plans to resurrect the thirty-eighth parallel divider. Nevertheless, the administration resolved to make a peace overture to Beijing, an offer which implied a willingness to discuss regional disputes, such as Taiwan, Indochina, and a Japanese treaty following a Korean armistice. The prospect of any negotiations with China enraged MacArthur. He denounced the peace initiative as an unwarranted "military restriction" on his command. Instead of talking to the PRC, the general recommended sending the Seventh Fleet closer to the China coast as "a show of force." Once again, the JCS stalled.42 41 Late in 19S2, MacArthur urged President-elect Dwight Eisenhower to spread a "belt of radioactive cobalt” along the Sino-Korean border and then invade North Korea with Chinese Nationalist troops and American marines. In 1954, MacArthur told journalists (who kept the story secret for a decade) that he wanted to drop as many as fifty atomic bombs on Manchuria before laying a barrier of radioactive waste and invading North Korea. It is uncertain that he actually proposed this in 1951. 42 MacArthur to the Department of the Army, March 10,1951, CX 57399, DA IN 9243, and JCS to MacArthur, March 23, 1951, "Record of Actions Taken by the JCS Relative to the UN Operations in Korea from June 25,1950 to April 11,1951," by JSSD, P&O, box 224, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, NA. 43 JCS to MacArthur, March 20, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII: Korea and China, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1983), 251; MacArthur to JCS, March 21, 1951, ibid., pp. 255-56; Draft texts of presidential statement, ibid., pp. 253-54,263-64; MacArthur to JCS, March 21 [25?], 1951, C58575, DA IN 14526, "Record of Actions Taken by the JCS Relative to the UN Operations in Korea from June 25,1950 to April 11,1951,” by JSSD, April 27, 1951, P&O, box 225, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, NA.

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On March 24, MacArthur decided to make a "show of force" politically when he preempted the administration's peace proposal. In a Tokyo press release, he condemned the pretensions of "Red China" to great power status and declared it inadequate to the "challenge of modem war." Even under the "inhibitions which restricted]" his actions, China could not achieve its goals in Korea. Unless the "enemy" commander met him on the battlefield to sue for peace, he threatened to take the war to the "coastal and interior bases" of "Red China." Peace would come with no change in Taiwan’s status, no UN seat for China, and no "sacrifice" of any part of Korea. MacArthur and his closest confidant in Tokyo, Major General Courtney Whitney, described this bombshell as a desperate move to stop "one of the most disgraceful plots in U.S. history." MacArthur told Sebald that Truman and his advisers had conspired to "hand over...Formosa to Red China." MacArthur hoped to antagonize the PRC, scuttle the administration's peace initiative, and increase public pressure for a showdown with Beijing.44 Truman's advisers considered MacArthur's "latest bomb," as one Pentagon official called it, a bald attempt to seize control of the nation's foreign policy. They shuddered at the general's public assertion that he could, if he wished, carry the war deep inside China. Officials admitted that "it would be perfectly obvious if it were anybody else who had made the statement which MacArthur made...he would be relieved of his command at once." However, many shared the concern of Under Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett that MacArthur's talk of humiliating the PRC as a means of ending an unpopular war had broad public support. If the president fired the general, the Republicans would accuse him of "being on the side of sin." Truman merely sent MacArthur a reprimand about making unauthorized policy statements and awaited the next crisis. A Washington Post cartoonist parodied the act, depicting Truman waving the message under MacArthur's nose and declaiming "Honest, no fooling this time." Disdainfully, the general directed an aide to "file this one with the others."45 44 FRUS, 1951, VII, pt. 1, pp. 265-66; The New York Times, March 24,1951; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1965), 387; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York, 1956), 467; Diary entries of April 8 and 11, 1951, Sebald papers. 45 Diary entry of March 26, 1951, Eichelberger papers; Acheson memorandum of conversation with Robert A. Lovett, March 24, 1951, box 66, Acheson papers; Washington Post, March 31,1951.

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As if on cue, MacArthur soon provoked a new crisis. On April S, Republican House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts released a telegram from the general responding to the congressman's demand that Truman "open a second front in Asia" by helping Chinese Nationalist troops invade the mainland. "Without a single GI being forced to place foot on the soil of the Chinese mainland," Martin had declared, this strategy would punish the aggressor, relieve pressure on Korea, and save American lives. Unless Truman planned to win the war, he should be charged with the "murder" of thousands o f GIs. MacArthur's reply of March 20 (actually composed before the peace initiative flap but released later) applauded Martin's statement. In Asia, MacArthur declared, the "Communist conspirators...elected to make their play for global conquest." American defeat in Asia would doom the free world. "We must win," MacArthur wrote, for "there is no substitute for victory." The general followed the letter with interviews stressing a similar theme.46 For Truman, this "rank insubordination" provided "the last straw." The president wrote on his desk calendar that the "situation with regard to the Far Eastern General has become a political one." Although he wanted his inner circle to endorse independently his conclusion, he had decided that the "Big General in the Far East must be recalled."47 MacArthur's threats and tantrums seemed particularly worrisome because they coincided with a real military crisis in Northeast Asia. In early April, intelligence sources revealed a huge buildup of Chinese troops and aircraft in Manchuria, coordinated with a concentration of Soviet submarines northeast of Japan. The JCS feared these forces might be employed in a new offensive to drive UN troops out of Korea or even to attack Japan. (The build up was probably designed to deter or respond to MacArthur's threatened American escalation.) To counter this possible threat, the JCS and the president wanted to transfer atomic weapons from control of the civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to the U.S. Air Force. This idea worried AEC chairman Gordon Dean, who feared that Truman and the JCS might use atomic bombs in inconclusive tactical warfare which would diminish their value as a psychological deterrent. 46 MacArthur letter to Joseph W. Martin, FRUS, 1951, VII, pt. 1, p. 299. 47 Entries of April 5 and 6,1951, box 278, PSF, Truman papers.

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Dean especially opposed giving MacArthur, "who had little knowledge concerning effects," access to nuclear weapons. On April 6, Truman conferred with Dean regarding the buildup in Manchuria and the massing of Soviet submarines at Vladivostok and Sakhalin. He feared a new Chinese offensive in Korea coordinated with a Soviet attempt to "take the Japanese islands and with the submarines cut our supply lines to Japan and Korea." Truman ordered Dean to transfer to the U.S. Air Force nine atomic bombs destined for Guam and Okinawa.48 Despite this decision, neither Truman nor the JCS trusted MacArthur any longer in a position where he might create an incident and then demand atomic or conventional attacks upon Chinese or Soviet targets. General Bradley admitted he "was now so wary of MacArthur” that he "deliberately withheld the message [regarding the transfer of the bombs and authority to attack China] and all knowledge of its existence from him, fearing that he might make a premature decision in carrying it out. "49 This dilemma increased the determination of Truman and his advisers to remove the Korean commander. By replacing MacArthur with a reliable officer, the President could rid himself of a ruthless critic in league with the Republicans, cover his domestic flanks, assure the support of the JCS in his decision by giving the new commander the authority denied MacArthur, and, he hoped, deter Sino-Soviet escalation by leaking word of the atomic bomb transfers. On April 8, the JCS and Truman's leading civilian advisers recommended MacArthur's relief. The president announced his concurrence the next day, telling members of his staff he "was sure MacArthur wanted to be fired." Arrangements were made to appoint Ridgway to fill MacArthur's several posts. Truman signed the necessary orders on April 10, as the shipment of atomic weapons to the Pacific began. The president never publicly linked the two elements of his decision.^ 48 Entries from the diary of Gordon Dean, March 27-April 5, 1951, in Roger M. Anders (ed.), Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary o f Gordon E. Dean (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), 127-41. 49 Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, pp. 630-31; FRUS, 1951, VII, pt. 1, pp. 307-09, 316-19,337-44,364-66. 50 Edward M. Almond Oral History, U.S. Military History Institute; Diary entry of April 8, 1951, Sebald papers; D. Clayton James, The Years o f MacArthur, III: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1963 (Boston, 1985), 599; Diary entries of April 5-10,1951, box 278,

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Several days before Truman recalled him, MacArthur told his closest aides he would be fired. He "intimated that his removal was [part of] a plot in Washington" to "hand over” Taiwan to "Red China." The Philippines would fall next, followed by Japan. Then "our whole position in the Far East would crumble."*51 Few of Mac Arthur's predictions came to pass. Despite his hopes, following an inconclusive Congressional investigation and the opening of armistice talks with China, the public and the Republican party lost interest in both his strategy and his presidential candidacy. Nevertheless, Mac Arthur probably took solace in having helped poison the well of Sino-American relations for a generation. America's "greatest expert on Oriental psychology," it is safe to say, knew little about Asian realities and not much more about American politics. He played the role of spoiler, not builder. American policy in Asia finally achieved a peaceful balance by the coming to terms with the Chinese regime he had hoped to destroy.

PSF, Truman papers; Bradley and Blair, A General's U fe, pp. 631-35; Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years (New York, 1982), 353-58. 51 Diary entries of April 8,11,1951, Sebald papers; See also, memorandum for diary, April 12,1951, Ridgway papers.

Chapter 9

NEGOTIATING WITH FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: THE POLITICS OF PEACEMAKING IN KOREA

Rosemary Foot The Korean armistice negotiations represented one of the most difficult bargaining processes of the Cold War period, lasting some two years and requiring 575 meetings to effect a settlement. With the improvement in United Nations Command (UNC) battlefield fortunes following the defeats in the winter of 1950-1951 and the failure of the Chinese-North Korean offensives in April and May 1951, the time seemed ripe in the summer of 1951 for settling the conflict. The Truman administration's desire to maintain unity among its Western allies, coupled with the realization that any substantial push into North Korean territory would encounter stiffer enemy resistance, encouraged a tempering of American objectives. The Chinese inability to overcome the problem of their over-extended supply lines, combined with the successful American adaptation of their own strategy of "luring the enemy deep" into hostile territory, convinced the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of the need to contract their goals. An armistice, therefore, seemed mutually advisable and desirable. Why did this conflict prove so difficult to resolve? Until comparatively recently and with the publication of a number of new works,1 the dominant explanation for the protracted nature of the talks derived from the conclusions of those who had been closely involved 1 Barton J. Bernstein, "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?" in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child o f Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle, 1983); Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia, 1986); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (London, 1986).

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with the negotiations on the U.S. side. Charles Turner Joy, William H. Vatcher, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Mark Clark all provided graphic accounts of what for them had been a gruelling experience.2 Their studies also influenced those interested in the more theoretical questions surrounding bargaining and strategy. Fred Dele in How Nations Negotiate referred frequently to the Korean experience in his influential work, as did Bernard Brodie in War and Politics. These authors have argued that the UNC proved to be a weak negotiator and made concession after concession to the patient and intransigent Chinese, whose own negotiating demands grew ever larger. They have also argued that U.S. administrations were unwilling to use the military force that was necessary to convince the Communists to concede. Rather, they allowed their enemies to engage them in a war of attrition, in which the Communists were willing to expend the lives of their soldiers, while Americans wanted to end the fighting. This portrayal of U.S. flexibility in contrast to Communist intransigence has never been an adequate explanation for the lengthy nature of these negotiations. It neglects detailed consideration of the difficulties of successfully applying coercive diplomacy. It also ignores the impact of using military personnel in highly political discussions. Such a depiction of a U.S. willingness to compromise also neglects the presence of domestic political critics in the United States who were only too ready to equate compromise with that negative term "appeasement." This portrayal also does not take into account the complicated decision­ making structure present during the Korean negotiations. As head of the UNC's delegation, the United States did play the dominant role in the talks but was still constrained, not only by Western allies who preferred flexibility, but also by Asian allies, especially the Republic of Korea (ROK) who encouraged intransigence. This depiction of the U.S. role in the discussions also does not consider the delay that policy divisions within the administration caused. There was disagreement between those officials in Korea and those in Washington, as well as those among officials from different executive departments in the nation's capital. These opposing positions were forged into a policy consensus during the course of the negotiations rather than prior to the talks.

2 C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York, 1955); William H. Vatcher, Panmunjom: The Story o f the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York, 1958); Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y., 1967); Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York, 1954).

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Though each of these features warrants further discussion, this paper will focus only on these latter elements in the armistice negotiations— inter-allied bargaining and inter-departmental discussion. It will concentrate on the U.S. role in the process and predominantly on the first nine months of the armistice discussions. The most progress was made during the first nine months and the negotiators came tantalizingly close to an agreement during that time. If we examine closely the Americans who were involved in the Korean armistice talks, we encounter many who had long been openly uneasy about the notion of compromise and lengthy negotiation. President Harry S. Truman once complained that 17 days was too long to negotiate the great issues at Potsdam; "why in 17 days you can decide anything," he said.3 Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson's dislike of negotiating with adversaries except from a position of strength has often been noted. The joint State-Defense department study, NSC-68, described by one of Acheson's biographers as a "thoroughly Achesonian exposition," eschewed diplomacy as a means of dealing with the Soviet Union, seeing such action as a distraction from "building positions of strength around the Soviet periphery."34 Acheson's Republican successor, John Foster Dulles, has also been described as reluctant to enter into negotiations, believing that when an opponent sought to negotiate, this was "a sign of weakness and/or failure."56In these circumstances, Dulles believed it best to drive home the advantage. The civilian dislike of negotiation was even more pronounced in the military branch of government. However, it was these officials who were chosen to search for a settlement of the Korean conflict. It was politically useful for the United States to be able to claim it was confining the armistice discussions to military matters between field commanders. As Acheson said, it avoided the issue of U.S. non-recognition of the PRC and DPRK, and prevented such questions as the status of Taiwan and Chinese membership in the United Nations from being raised.^ But it 3 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way o f U fe (New York, 1980), 182. 4 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York, 1972), 161; MacDonald, Korea, p. 24. 5 Ole Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science 1 (March 1970). 6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 533.

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also meant that those directly engaged in the talks had little experience and no stomach for achieving the task. As the RAND specialist assigned to the negotiating team suggested, what the military negotiators would have preferred was final positions that they could stick to rigidly in order "to avoid the difficulties of negotiating."7 The UNC team's distaste for the bargaining process was also reflected in the virulently hostile and racist terms which its members used to describe the opposing negotiators' team. UNC commander General Matthew B. Ridgway called them "treacherous savages." Chief UNC negotiator Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy's opinion was that they were "common criminals."8 There was little inherent in military training, with its emphasis on action and concrete achievement, that was appropriate to such a passive process. U. Alexis Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean conflict, subsequently claimed that for these reasons he had been against the military participating in the truce negotiations. "They were not practiced in foiling propaganda ploys or keeping cool during deliberately offensive harangues about themselves and their country," he argued. Furthermore, Johnson regretted their lack of negotiating experience and the need for their instructions to come through "military channels as orders which tended to produce a certain rigidity in how they were implemented."9 However, the State Department should bear primary responsibility for contributing to that outcome since it refused Ridgway's request that his delegation be provided with political advisers. The Chinese did not make a similar mistake. Chiao Kuan-hua, who headed a department at the Foreign Ministry, was in the background at P'anmunjöm and he was joined by a vice-foreign minister and, for a time, by the director of the American and Oceanian Department in the ministry.10 7 Herbert Goldhammer, "The Korean Armistice Conference," RAND study, December 1951, p. 271. 8 Toyko to Washington, August 7, 1951, Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1951, VII: Korea and China (Washington, D.C., 1983), 785-89; Vatcher, Panmunjom, p. 204. 9 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand o f Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1984), 12728. 10 MacDonald, Korea, p. 117; Wilfred Burchett, At the Barricades (London, 1980), 161; Wu Hsiu-chuan, Eight Years in the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs (Beijing, 1985), chapter 3. This is not to claim, however, that the Chinese also did not find the idea of negotiating with the United States unpalatable. China's pride in its ancient civilization,

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The negative American attitude toward the negotiations undoubtedly slowed progress. However, other factors served to complicate the search for an agreement, notably the complex decision-making structure that existed for each protagonist. For example, the Communist negotiating team consisted of two military commands. Though it is difficult to establish the relationship between them, indications are that the Chinese (whose troops controlled three-fourths of the front line) dominated the formulation of policy objectives but were not entirely unresponsive—at least in the first year of the talks—to North Korean preferences. The Soviet role also merits consideration because it was clear that Moscow, as head of the socialist camp and as the sole supplier of North Korean and Chinese military equipment, intervened at significant moments in the negotiating process. Soviet UN ambassador Jacob Malik's broadcast in June 1951 and Moscow's role in November 1952 during the UN General Assembly debate on the armistice negotiations are two examples of how the Soviet Union could intervene to shape developments. The U.S. government, as head of the UNC, played the dominant role in the talks, formulating and transmitting policy positions through national rather than through UN channels. Nevertheless, those nations contributing to the war effort on the UN side did have some influence over U.S. policy choices. The necessity for maintaining this allied coalition therefore often required negotiations, too, though of a rather different kind from those taking place at P'anmunjöm. Britain, Canada, France, Australia, among other Western allies, hoped for a relatively speedy end to the Korean conflict. They often attempted to persuade Washington to be more flexible. These allies were constrained in their criticism of American policy, especially by the argument that failure to support Washington's objectives could result in Congressional retribution in the form of renewed unilateralism and reduced financial assistance. But having chosen the UN route, U.S. and its sense of triumph and unity after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, gave its leaders a renewed strength of purpose and resolve. Such attitudes may have reinforced the Communist belief that history was on its side and that Communist nations when engaged in struggles with capitalists, were involved in wars of the just against the unjust. As with the U.S. experience of fighting “crusades for democracy" there was little room in the Communist conception of war for compromise either. Furthermore, in the Chinese language the word for compromise has negative overtones-hence their preference for thinking in terms of mutual interests.

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administrations had to remain at least outwardly responsive to other nations' initiatives. Furthermore, should W ashington become too dismissive, it risked the possibility that attempts would be made to take negotiations out of its hands and place them into those of the UN Security Council or General Assembly. Allied support for certain U.S. policy positions had therefore to be gained. While these same Western allies could help prevent the UNC team from issuing ultimata and breaking off talks, they also could serve to delay the presentation of UNC negotiating positions while agreement was sought. The formulation of the "greater sanctions" policy was a particular example of this type of complication. Beginning in the middle of November 1951, a State-Defense department consensus was being forged on the type of inspection thought necessary to prevent the future violation of the armistice agreement. The Defense Department would only agree to moderate its position on inspection inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and at key points outside of it, if the State Department could secure allied and particularly British agreement to a statement (to be known as the "greater sanction”) making it plain, that if the Communists violated the armistice, then retaliatory action—bombing of northern China and blockading the China coast— would be forthcoming.! ! Although the matter was first raised with the British ambassador in Washington on November 21, substantive discussion of the proposal with the British foreign minister Anthony Eden did not take place until November 28 when Western allies had gathered in Rome for a NATO meeting. The major inducements offered Eden to gain his agreement to the greater sanctions statement was the prospect of an armistice sooner rather than later and a willingness on Acheson's part to allow the British to remain uncommitted to specific courses of action against the PRC. Nevertheless, the British foreign secretary remained lukewarm about the proposal, especially regarding plans for a blockade against China.1112 Consultations with cabinet colleagues on the matter were essential, Eden 11 Memorandum of conversation, November 16, 1951, 795.00 Korea, box 4276, Record Group (RG) 59, Records of the Department of State, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C. 12 Memoranda of conversations, November 21 and 28, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, pp. 1156-58 and 1189-93.

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argued. Not until December 3 was he able to provide their view which stipulated that the United States should continue the search for an acceptable inspection system and only in the event that the UNC team failed to achieve this would the greater sanction policy come into operation. The Truman administration would not accept these qualifications. The United States believed that, regardless of the extent of inspection achieved, a statement carrying the threat o f retaliation would be necessary to deter the Communists from renewed hostilities. Further discussion with the British government ensued.) 3 Though committed in principle, London worked to soften the terminology that the U.S. administration initially wished to see used to describe the greater sanctions. Whereas the first American draft of the greater sanctions statement implied that in the event of renewed aggression the countries responsible would receive full retribution without geographical limitation, the British wished to propose a weaker formula that read "in the event of a renewal of aggression, it might not be possible to confine hostilities to Korea." The Truman administration compromised accepting "the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.")4 Other governments, such as the Canadian, Australian and South African, followed the British lead in recommending textual changes. Eventually, like Britain, they gave their assent to the modified wording. However, the position for the UNC negotiators in Korea was that well over a month had passed since this agenda item had been introduced into the discussions at Panmunjöm, a month during which the delegation had more or less marked time. If Western allies could be a mixed blessing regarding forward movement in the talks, the South Korean government unequivocably was13 13 Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, November 30, 1951, FO 371/92759, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, England; Memoranda of conversations, December 3 and 14,1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, pp. 1221-23 and 1331-32; Memorandum of conversation, January 7, 1952, Dean G. Acheson papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; Summary of Truman-Churchil! Talks, January 9, 1952, President's Secretary File (PSFO, Harry S. Truman papers, ibid. 14 Memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1951, FO 371/99564, PRO; Memorandum of conversation, January 7,1952, Acheson papers; Summary of TrumanChurchill Talks, January 9,1952, PSF, Truman papers.

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to prove a detriment to progress. South Korea was in many respects a dependent state, but Syngman Rhee, the ROK's president, could demonstrate the "power of the weak" by the extreme and unexpected nature of his actions. He threatened to withdraw ROK forces from the UNC, troops that held two-thirds of the line. There were limits as to how far Rhee would be allowed to go, as the development of contingency plans to remove him demonstrated.15 Still, he could block the path to agreement in myriad ways. For example, ROK army units were responsible for causing a number of incidents within the neutralized area surrounding the conference site, which increased the level of animosity between the two delegations and interrupted the talks. 16 Seoul also was responsible for stiffening the UNCs position on the rejection of the thirty-eighth parallel as the ceasefire line (agenda item 2). Administration officials believed that any attempt to accept a settlement on that line "would have incalculably explosive results in the ROK."17 Should there have been any doubt in the administration's understanding of that, Rhee threatened to withdraw his cooperation with the armistice efforts. Rhee's tactics represent only part of the explanation for why the UNC would not agree to a ceasefire based on the status quo ante; the administration advanced strong military and psychological arguments to support an improved geographical position. However, the South Korean president's adamant stand, backed by allies in Congress only too ready to label agreement at that line an "appeasement peace," made its mark on the Truman administration and contributed to its inflexibility on agenda item two. In other ways, too, Rhee could force his preferred position on UNC negotiators. On September 20, 1951, for example, the same day that Beijing and P'yöngyang had suggested the resumption of negotiations (in recess since August 23), Rhee maintained publicly that, despite an imminent move toward an agreed ceasefire at the line of contact between opposing forces, the city of Kaesöng should come into UNC hands. Admiral Joy, chief UNC negotiator at that point, recorded in his diary 15 Kaufman, The Korean War, pp. 272-74 and 318. *6 Daily Korean Bulletin, August 20,1951, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), no. 2467 (Alexandria, Va., 1987). 17 Memorandum by John Paton Davies, "Kansas Line Versus 38 Parallel," August 3, 1951, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), NA.

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that the reason the delegation had put forward the proposal for the retention of Kaesöng was as a "sop to the ROK government."1®Its effect was to hold up agreement on the demarcation line, which had otherwise been resolved in principle, for over two weeks. More dramatic was the ROK leader's decision at the close of negotiations to release those North Korean prisoners in UNO custody who did not wish to be repatriated, rather than letting them be handed over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) as had been agreed. While the Eisenhower administration struggled to curtail Rhee from initiating further unwelcome moves of this kind, the UNC team in Korea sought to assure the Communists that any armistice agreement would be honored by the South Koreans. As with the earlier position concerning Kaesöng, Rhee's actions on this occasion served to delay the signature of the armistice agreement by another month. Moreover, in U.S. ambassador to Japan Robert D. Murphy's view, Rhee bore the responsibility for thousands of extra casualties. For without South Korea's action, Murphy believed that an armistice would have been signed in time to avoid them.19 Earlier, in May 1953, Western allied and South Korean positions were sharply pitted against each other. In the final stages of the discussion of the prisoner of war (POW) policy, the Eisenhower administration agreed with the UN commander's suggestion that the North Korean prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated should not be handed over to the repatriation commission, but should be released in South Korea as soon as the armistice agreement had been initialed. The United States also argued that the NNRC could operate on the basis of unanimity in its voting. Both of these policy positions had been put forward in order to placate Rhee (and some of his supporters in the U.S. Congress) and to win his acceptance for the armistice agreement.

111 Memorandum of conversation, September 20, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, p. 928n; Allen E. Goodman (ed.), Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference (Stanford, Ca., 1978), 68. 19 Memorandum of conversation, June 30,1953, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, box 1, RG 59, Dept, of State Records, NA; FRUS, 1952-1954, XV: Korea (Washington, D.C., 1984), 1200; Memorandum by Robert D. Murphy, June 20, 1953, Robert D. Murphy papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

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However, these positions were to prove unacceptable to the Western allies. Only with "great difficulty," for example, was the Canadian foreign minister restrained from publicly denouncing the latest UNC stand on the POW policy. In Parliament, Prime Minister Winston Churchill berated the U.S. truce negotiators for dragging their feet. As State Department official Ward P. Allen put it, anxiety and concern were being expressed in the Netherlands, Britain, Canada, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, and Italy, as well as in neutral nations. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith warned that the position with the allies was deteriorating daily while Rhee continued to foment "public opposition to any armistice along present lines." In this instance, Smith recommended that the administration establish a compromise with its Western allies, offering Rhee "the bait of a security guarantee" to get him to support the newly amended U.S. negotiating position.211 Meanwhile, further animosity was created between the negotiating teams at P'anmunjöm, and further delays were introduced into the talks after the period when the major concession over the POW issue had been made. Allies from East and West served to complicate the negotiating process for the United States, but so too did members of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, notably those directly engaged with the talks in Korea. On occasion, it was less a question of transmitting policy positions from Washington and having them introduced into the ceasefire proceedings, and more a matter of negotiating between the executive branch and the UN commander in the field. It was as though there were a double set of negotiations in progress at times, between Washington and Tokyo on one hand and between the UNC and the Communist commanders on the other.21 On nearly every point at issue in the first nine months of the negotiations, General Ridgway, who had replaced General Douglas Mac Arthur as the UN commander in April 1951, showed considerable 211 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), 169-74. 21 D. Druckman discusses ideas similar to these in terms of "dual responsiveness . . . where a negotiator monitors for movement on the opposing side and for evidence of preferences on one's own side,” (except that Ridgway was not searching too hard for preferences). D. Druckman, "Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiations as Dual Responsiveness," in I. W. Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications (Berkeley Hills, Ca., 1978).

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reluctance to modify UNC negotiating positions, even when his team in Korea had opened the bid well above the minimum requirements. As early as July 13, for example, Ridgway informed Washington that he would be willing to recess the conference over the Communist agenda item concerning foreign troop withdrawal. On July 20, he went further and requested complete support for his decision to interrupt the talks unless the Communists accepted the four agenda items already agreed on. Moreover, he wanted to issue this ultimatum publicly, a course which Washington did not approve. In the administration's view, it would raise the prestige factor to such a degree for the Communists as to make it more difficult for them to concede the point. In addition, "world opinion" would not support breaking off the talks over this particular issue.22 These requests, made at the start of the negotiations, indicated the mood in which Ridgway approached these discussions. He also was capable of tying the Truman administration to positions it did not feel strongly about. During the recess in the talks between late August and October 1951, over the alleged violation of the conference site's neutrality, Ridgway refused to reopen discussions at the original conference location of Kaesöng and pressed to renew the meetings at Fanmunjöm. When on September 20, the Communists proposed resuming the talks at Kaesöng, Ridgway's intended reply was so angry that an immediate redrafting exercise began in Washington. The UN commander was subsequently instructed to delete the "purple adjectives” which gave his message "a necessarily truculent tone," though the substance of his response remained unchanged .23 It survived, therefore, as a tough message (if a little more courteously phrased) but still unbending on the point of Kaesöng, a matter that Washington considered of secondary importance. As State Department Counsellor Charles Bohlen acknowledged on September 26, the administration had got itself tied up quite unnecessarily over the location question, and now that the

22 JCS to Matthew B. Ridgway, July 15, 20,21, and 28,1951, FRUS, 1951, VH, pp. 682,711-13, and 714-18. 23 JCS to Ridgway, September 5,20,21, and 22,1951, FRUS, 1951, VH, pp. 882,923, 928, and 931.

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issue had been raised publicly, it was difficult for the UNC to back down.2* Further disagreement between Tokyo and Washington occurred in late September 1951. When it seemed probable that the talks would shortly resume, Ridgway announced that the UNC negotiating team would be proposing a DMZ of some 20 kilometres north of the battle line. Only if Beijing and P'yöngyang dropped their insistence on the thirty-eighth parallel as the ceasefire line would he allow the delegation to offer concessions. To do otherwise, he warned, would be taken as a weakening of the U.S. position. As with the general's earlier suggestions, this proposal prompted more discussions in Washington. The dominant view was that Ridgway's proposed course of action took no account of the Communist concessions that were in the making on August 23, that the southern boundary he was proposing included some territory beyond his present positions, and that he was not even suggesting the line o f contact as the southern boundary of the DMZ. General Omar N. Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), concluded that the UN commander had "decided not to follow our views."25 These tensions over the approach to the negotiations occasioned a trip to Korea later that month by Bohlen and Bradley. However, the visit accomplished less than it might have because Ridgway's thinking seemed to have a greater effect on these two officials than did Washington's on the UN commander and his negotiating team. As Admiral Joy recorded in his diary (a report that was subsequently confirmed by Bohlen's account of the meeting), the commanders in Korea persuaded Bradley and Bohlen of the UNC's favorable military position and in consequence agreed with the two officials that "we would not be in a hurry to meet with Commies or present our new UNC proposed zone....Time and the approach of winter is working to our advantage. Therefore, it is better from our stand point not to hurry a meeting of the delegations."2^ Those directly involved with the negotiations in Korea continued then to adopt the approaches that were harsher than those thought 2* State-JCS Meetings, September 26,1951,795.00 Korea, box 4276, RG 59, Dept of State Records, NA. 25 Ridgway to JCS, September 24, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, p. 934; State-JCS Meetings, September 26,1951,795.00 Korea, box 4276, RG 59, Dept of State Records, NA. 2® "Memorandum for the Secretary," October 10,1951, box 233, RG 330, Records o f the Department of Defense, NA; Goodman (ed.), Negotiating While Fighting, pp. 51-5.

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necessary in Washington. Perhaps because of the Defense Department’s respect for the tradition of allowing the commander in the field as full a latitude as possible, they were reluctant to inform him fully about the thinking in Washington and in allied capitals. The result was that already complex negotiations met with additional, probably avoidable, obstacles. Political direction of the conduct of the negotiations should have been much greater. Ridgway should have had a number of high-ranking foreign service personnel directly attached to the negotiating team, providing it with advice and reminding it of some of the broader points at issue.2728Instead, a great deal of responsibility remained in the hands of military men who were unfamiliar with the idea of bargaining and whose troops were still fighting the forces of those with whom they were conducting the discussions. There seems little doubt, however, that the UNC negotiators' task was made even tougher because of policy positions remaining fluid in Washington, even as discussions were well advanced on particular points. Though it was essential for the administration to remain responsive to Com munist negotiating initiatives, W ashington nevertheless seemed at times uncertain about the objectives it sought. The ceasefire inspection issues and POW policy, for example, (agenda items 3 and 4 respectively) were debated simultaneously in Washington and at the conference site. On the eve of the negotiations, the U.S. position on item 3 had been to seek to organize a ceasefire commission with supervisory autonomy and powers of inspection entailing free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea in order to ensure that there was no reinforcement of men or materiel or preparations for the renewal of hostilities. In early October, Ridgway suggested that the UNC did not need unlimited inspection because this would not ensure security but would only "multiply serious causes for friction...with no comparable gain." Joint inspection at ground, sea, and air ports of entry, plus joint observation of the DMZ would be sufficient, he argued.2^ A State Department official, in response to this proposal, went even further and 27 When General Mark W. Clark replaced Ridgway as UN commander, some attempt was made to remedy this position, with the decision to have closer liaison between Robert D. Murphy, the U.S. ambassador to Japan in Tokyo, and UN Command Headquarters. It was also decided to provide Clark with two psychological warfare specialists and daily resumes of U.S. news stories and editorials on relevant subjects. General Mark W. Clark to JCS, June 5,1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, XV, p. 309. 28 Ridgway to JCS, October 4,1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, p. 998.

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recommended simply joint inspection of the DMZ. Even if there were a buildup of troops or supplies, he argued, the UNC would be unlikely to take any action unless such increases were accompanied by an overt act of aggression.29 This suggestion in turn ignited an intense debate between the State and Defense departments with the latter trying to support Ridgway's proposal while the former began discussion with UN allies on the greater sanctions statement. Such activity also instigated a consideration o f related issues concerning the relative merits and demerits of allowing the rehabilitation of military facilities in Korea, with the eventual decision that repairs would be permissible with the exception (at that stage) o f airfields.30*Meanwhile, discussions at Fanmunjöm on agenda item 3 had been in progress for two weeks. Similar fluidity characterized the administration's POW policy. The initial position was to press for an exchange of POWs on a one for one basis until all UNC prisoners were released. Then the remaining Communist prisoners would be returned. On July 5, however, the Army Department's chief of psychological warfare first raised the issue of whether all POWs in UNC camps should be repatriated, given that in his view many would likely be "severely punished, sentenced to slave labor, or executed," an outcome that would have a detrimental effect on future U.S. psychological warfare operations. The JCS' and Secretary of Defense's early interest in the political benefits of such a policy was quashed, however, when Secretary of State Acheson pointed out that the "overriding consideration should be the prompt return of all UN and ROK POWs. "31 However, in late October, R esident Truman raised doubts about the morality of sending back those prisoners who had "cooperated" with the UNC administration in the camps.32 This remark 29 JCS to Ridgway, October 23,1931, ibid., p. 999n; Memorandum of conversation, November 2,1951,793.00 Korea, box 4276, RG 59, Dept, of State Records, NA. 30 Memorandum of conversation, December 10,1931, PSF, General, Truman papers; Ridgway to JCS, December 8,1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, p. 128In. 3 * Memoranda of conversations, July 3 and 31 and August 27,1951, G3 383.6 TS, box 174, RG 319, Records of the Department of the Army, NA; Memorandum o f conversation, August 27, 1951, FRUS, 1951, VII, pp. 857-59; Memorandum of conversation, 693.00 China, box 3003, RG 59, Dept of State Records, NA. 32 James E. Webb, "Meeting with the President Monday, October 19,1951, Korean Negotiations," RG 59, PPS Records, NA.

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initiated and shaped a new phase of the policy debate. By December 7, Ridgway was being instructed to introduce the notion of non-forcible repatriation for POWs at the talks, though he was told that it was not necessarily the administration's last word on the topic. Positions were crystallizing, however. When Acheson reversed himself and began fully to support giving prisoners a choice concerning their destination on release, the argument was as good as over, especially because the few with doubts were reluctant to advance a position that contradicted presidential predilections. Domestic developments further confirmed the wisdom of Acheson's and Truman's position as some sixty Senators made moves to present a resolution calling on the administration to be unflinching in its support for non-forcible repatriation. At the end of February, therefore, the policy consensus was finally reached; force would not be used to return prisoners.33 It had been some two and a half months since discussion had begun on this agenda item. These features associated with the Korean armistice negotiations illustrate some of the reasons why the talks proved to be such a lengthy process. They demonstrate that a considerable part of any bargaining activity will be directed toward gaining the support and commitment of one's own allies.34 They also show the utility of being sensitive to intragovemmental bargaining models while taking account of a background of shared images and values. In focusing on the "negotiations with friends" and not just on the "negotiations with adversaries," bargaining takes on a more multi-layered complexion. In the Korean case, attention to inter-allied and inter-departmental negotiations also shows that there was a kind of negotiating continuum in place. Between the two extremes of flexibility and inflexibility in policy positions, there were coalitions forming at or near one or other of these polar opposites. Though the composition of these groupings did vary over time, and leaving aside (as has been the case throughout this paper) domestic political factors, we can see arrayed toward the inflexible end of the continuum the military commanders in Korea, certain members of 33 Memoranda of conversations, February 8,1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, XV, pp. 40-45; Bernstein, "Struggle over the Korean Armistice," p. 280; Memorandum of conversation, February 27,1952,795.00 Korea, box 4277, RG 59, Dept, of State Records, NA. 34 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J., 1977).

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the Pentagon in Washington, and the South Korean government. Conversely, toward the flexible end were the Western allies and some members of the State Department. Where the presidents and their secretaries of state chose to settle along this iine was vital to the success or failure of one coalition's policies and to the perception of the best means of achieving certain objectives at the talks. Negotiating with friends might not have been as difficult as negotiating with the enemy, but the energies that had to be devoted to that activity, especially in the circumstances of the Korean conflict, were clearly considerable.

Chapter 10

SOUTH KOREA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

Ohn Chang-il Korean-American relations began in 1882 when the United States became the first Western power to sign a treaty with Korea. The main purpose of the treaty was to protect American citizens and facilitate American trade with other countries, especially China. When Japan, having emerged as a powerful nation after the successful completion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, annexed Korea in 1910, the American government registered no protest. Relations between the United States and a "vanished" Korea thereafter were informal and were limited to trade and missionary activities. Even these contacts declined markedly under Japanese pressure. Few Americans knew much about Korea at the end of World War II, as President Harry S. Truman noted in his memoirs, "other than that it was a strange land in far-off Asia."1 American entry into the Pacific War caused the United States to formulate a Korea policy. But the Korean War marked a more significant turning point in the process of shaping relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States. Before June 25, 1950, unable to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union for the future of Korea, the United States wanted to internationalize the responsibility for the security of Korea and to withdraw militarily from the peninsula "as quickly and gracefully" as possible. It did so because the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the top military advisory group in the U.S. government, consistently asserted that Korea had little strategic importance. The North Korean attack showed that, to the contrary, it did. When news of this Communist aggression ricocheted around Washington, the attitude 1 Harry S. Truman, Years o f Trial and Hope (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 316.

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among policy-makers was emotional. Most shared the view of "we've got to do something" but could not agree on what. "How dare such a small country like North Korea defy against the authorities of the United States and the United Nations" was the reaction of Washington. Quite naturally, an accusing finger was pointed at the Soviet Union. President Truman, the key figure in the decision-making process, thought that "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier." He decided to hit the Communists hard and thereby prevent further escalation of their forays and a possible worldwide conflagration.2 Therefore, the United States intervened with combat troops as part of a "police action" for the United Nations. This direct American military intervention was also important because it marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between the ROK and the United States. This paper will discuss how the fighting ended in the Korean W ar and the measures taken to secure the armistice arrangement. In doing so, it will reveal how these events helped to clarify the basic nature o f subsequent relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea. O f central importance in determining the future of KoreanAmerican relations was the unwelcome Chinese intervention in Korea during the fall of 1950. It changed a "police action" into a conflict that risked another world war. General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the JCS, underlined the danger in the hearings before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees on May 15, 1951, when he warned that even a limited war with Communist China in Korea "would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."3 In short, for military leaders in Washington, the Soviet Union was the primary enemy, and Europe's defense was the first priority in the worldwide Cold War confrontation. Civilian leaders agreed with the military, though they appreciated the symbolic and political value of winning in Korea. Washington policy-makers were annoyed that the United States was fighting World Communism's second team in Korea, while the first string unit remained on the sidelines.

3 Statement by General Omar N. Bradley, Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee hearings. General Bradley Files (1951), Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.; See also, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, M ilitary Situation in the Far East, pt. II (Washington, D.C., 1951), 731-32; Truman, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 446.

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Immediately after the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined the fighting, American military leaders in Washington recommended that the United States should abandon Korea as soon as possible. At a meeting of military and civilian policy-makers held on December 1,1950, General J. Lawton Collins, the Army chief of staff, said that "Korea was not worth a nickel while the Russians hold Vladivostok and positions on the other flank." When asked whether UN troops could establish a defensive line and hold it, thereby halting the Communist advance, military leaders, including Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, were pessimistic. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Walter Bedell Smith sided with General Collins, advising that the United States should evacuate Korea. Disturbed by this talk about the necessity of total withdrawal, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, who hoped to find a solution short of complete pullout, inquired whether it was worth trying to obtain a cease-fire based on the status quo ante-bellum. Military leaders agreed with the suggestion. However, they accepted the idea only if continued military efforts to achieve this objective did not impair the security of U.S. troops. Civilian policy-makers, on the other hand, amply stressed that the importance of not having Communist aggression justified taking some risks.4 The hope of unifying Korea by force that had dominated U.S. thinking since the dazzling success of the amphibious operation at Inch'ön now was laid to rest. This would be the political price paid for the decision to wage a "limited war." Recovery of the thirty-eighth parallel by UN troops in the spring of 1951 created the circumstances necessary for armistice negotiations to start. After almost a year of bitter fighting, both sides could expect only to restore the status quo ante with slight change, and, therefore, realized how costly it would be to try to gain more. Accepting the fact that the Korean issue could not be solved by military and political measures confined to Korea, the JCS specifically restricted the conduct of the fighting in Korea. As UN commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway, General Douglas MacArthur's successor, could not withdraw UN forces 4 Memorandom of conversation by Philip Jessup, December 1, 1950, Foreign Relations o f the United States (FRUS), 1950, VII: Korea (Washington, D.C., 1976), 1276-81; Official Meetings and Conversations of Dean Acheson, University Press of America (UPA) Microfilm, reel 3, pp. 455-60; Notes Prepared by Dean Rusk for Secretary Acheson, December 1,1950, ibid.

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from Korea at his own discretion. Ridgway also could not make general advances beyond the Kansas-Wyoming line (roughly the current demarcation line) just north of the thirty-eighth parallel without prior approval. He was forbidden to take any military action against Chinese territory without permission. Based on these instructions, Ridgway was to limit the fighting and inflict maximum damage on the enemy to force the Communists to accept a cease-fire. Ridgway told Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, his successor as the commander of the 8th Army, that "acquisition of terrain in itself is of little or no value."56In contrast to Mac Arthur, the field commander was amenable to Washington's military strategy, and the battlefiont soon stabilized. Meanwhile, the National Security Council (NSC) produced NSC48/5, a comprehensive policy paper about U.S. objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia which President Truman approved on May 17, 1951.6 The new policy as defined in this paper was to seek a viable arm istice which would terminate the fighting by punishing the Communists until they accepted an honorable truce. Although they had dropped their recommendation for total withdrawal from Korea without obtaining concessions with regard to subsequent political consequences, the military leaders did not recognize any other options but the continuation of military action until the Communists agreed to negotiate a cease-fire. The NSC stipulated several retaliatory measures if the Chinese would attack UN forces outside Korea or UN troops faced possible destruction in Korea. These included a naval and air blockade of the PRC, military action against selected targets outside Korea, and either defensive or offensive use of the Chinese Nationalist forces. Honorable termination of American involvement without losing face was therefore firmly established as the preferred solution in Korea. I b e plan to cease fighting and leave final solutions to future negotiations was acceptable to nations friendly with the United States. 5 Letter of Instruction, General Matthew B. Ridgway to Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, April 22,1951, UN File, RG 59, Department of State Records, NA. 6 NSC-48/1: "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Asia," December 23, 1949; NSC-48/2, December 30, 1949; NSC-48/3: "U.S. Objectives. Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia," April 26,1951; NSC-48/4, May 4,1951; NSC-48/5, May 17,1951; NSC File, Modem Military Branch, NA; NSC Meetings, President Secretary's Hie (PSF), OF 471, Harry S. Truman papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

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These American allies, worried about "seemingly" mistaken U.S. priorities, argued that Europe should be the only place defended in any major confrontations with the Communists. Great Britain especially desired an end to American involvement in Korea because the United States might waste its resources fighting for a strategically less crucial area in East Asia. However, the two countries agreed neither to appease nor reward aggression, but rather to fight on unless forced out of Korea.7 Following Truman's recall of Mac Arthur in April 1951, the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the UN Command (UNC) in Tokyo, and the allies of the United States with troops fighting in Korea had reached agreement on the political objectives, as well as military strategy and tactics to be pursued in Korea. The chief political objective was to stop aggression and leave the unification of Korea to future negotiations. Military strategy was not dramatic, calling for holding the Kansas-Wyoming line until the enemy accepted an honorable cease-fire. Tactically, the UNC, while not seeking further territorial gain or launching an offensive northward, was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy by its superior fire-power, but only in Korea unless the enemy escalated the intensity and geographic scope of the fighting. But ROK president Syngman Rhee, his government, and the people of South Korea opposed any settlement short of the unification of Korea. Their outcry was ignored as a presumptuous attitude by the other nations, including the United States. This strong opposition to a truce was a lingering problem that the United States eventually would resolve only after great embarrassment and difficult negotiations. Having abandoned the goal of reunification before an armistice, Washington's main challenge was finding a way to start negotiations for a cease-fire. The U.S. government made the first move. There were several fruitless attempts to obtain a signal from the Communists. One was by Charles Bohlen, U.S. ambassador in Paris. Others were by the State Department's Charles Burton Marshall in Hong Kong and by 7 U.S. Delegation Minutes of the First Meetings of President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, December 4, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, pp. 1361-74; Minutes of the Second Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, December 5, 1950, ibid., pp. 1392-1408; Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, December 7, 1950, ibid., pp. 1449-61; Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, December 8, 1950, ibid., pp. 1468-75; Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Truman-Attlee Discussions, ibid., pp. 1476-79.

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American and Swedish diplomatic channels in Moscow. The successful contact was made through George F. Kennan, a former State Department official working at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. In the middle of May 1951, Secretary of State Acheson asked Kennan to contact Jacob Malik, Soviet ambassador to the United Nations. Kennan was to clarify American intentions in Korea and to probe those of the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, Kennan communicated his desire to meet with Malik. Malik invited Kennan to his summer house on Long Island. On May 31, the two diplomats discussed possible ways to solve the Korean problem through negotiations. Unable to give an outright answer on behalf of the PRC or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Malik arranged another meeting. When they met again on June 5, Malik told Kennan that the Soviet Union desired a peaceful settlement in Korea as soon as possible. He also advised Kennan to directly approach the North Koreans and the Chinese, since the Soviet Union would not participate in formal discussions for a cease-fire.8 Washington concluded that the Communists had agreed to settle the Korean problem not on the battlefield but at the negotiating table. Malik, in his UN radio speech on June 23,1951, suggested an initial step for the talks. He argued that discussions should be started between the belligerents for "an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel." (South Koreans could be heard gasping.) "Was it possible to take such a step?" Malik asked rhetorically. He answered that it could be possible if both sides wanted to stop the fighting.89 In response, People's Daily, a Beijing newspaper, later reported that the Chinese people endorsed Malik's proposal as a constructive way to restore peace in Korea.10 The remaining problem was by what channel and at what level the talks should be initiated. At first, American military leaders were somewhat reluctant to assume the responsibility for the talks and events following the armistice. However, they were persuaded by their civilian counterparts who argued that it would be desirable to arrange the meetings between the military 8 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, Vol. II: 1950-1963 (Boston, 1972), 36-37; Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 532-33; Dean G. Acheson, The Korean War (New York, 1969), 120-21. 9 U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, XXV (July 9,1951): 45. 10 Truman, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 456.

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commanders in the field. This would make it possible to exclude from the negotiations for a cease-fire thorny political issues such as the status of Taiwan and Chinese representation in the United Nations. Although Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg insisted that the burden of initiating talks should be imposed on the enemy by punishing him severely, U.S. military leaders accepted the idea of starting talks through an overture to the Communists from General Ridgway.l1 An exchange of messages followed, resulting in the opening of the Korean truce talks. Military representatives of both sides met for the first time at Kaesöng on July 10,1951. It soon became obvious that another front had been added to the Korean War. On July 26, at the tenth session of the armistice talks, the two sides formally agreed on a five-point agenda: 1. adoption of agenda; 2. fixing a military demarcation line; 3. concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea; 4. arrangements relating to prisoners of war; 5. recommendations to the governments of concerned countries on both sides.1112 The verbal sparring at the negotiating table was as tedious and unproductive as the actual sniping in the combat zone. After tortuous meetings and interruptions, the two sides accepted a provisional demarcation line for thirty days on November 27, 1951. After this deadline passed, a de facto cease-fire emerged under a tacit agreement not to provoke each other beyond tolerable limits. But it was the issue of prisoners of war (POW) that most prolonged the fighting. The Communists for over a year did not agree to the principle of voluntary repatriation suggested by the UNC. Finally, the Communists relented, opening the way to an agreement on a revised military demarcation line on June 17, 1953.13 The two sides, it seemed, had found a substitute for victory. 11 Acheson, The Korean War, p. 121; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 533-34; James F. Schnabel and Robert G. Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, Vol. Ill: The Korean War (Wilmington, Del., 1979), 567. 12 Ridgway to JCS, July 26, 1951, JCS Records, RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945), sec. 55, NA; The New York Times, July 27, 1951; U.S. State Department, A Historical Summary o f U.S.-Korean Relations, 1934-1962, Far Eastern Series #11 (Washington, D.C., November 1962), 98; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons o f the Korean War (Boston, 1969), 330-31. 12 For the details of negotiations, see UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, 19511953, parts I, II, III, IV, Modem Military Archives Division, NA.

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President Syngman Rhee and the people o f South Korea were adamant in opposing any arrangement short of the national reunification. As early as May 26,1951, the Rhee government announced that it would continue fighting alone if any truce did not provide for the unification of Korea.14 Thereafter, Rhee mobilized the people behind this cause, denouncing the truce at the thirty-eighth parallel as "another Munich appeasement."15 The United States now paid the price for ignoring the interests of the South Koreans. On the night of June 17, 1953, thousands of Korean prisoners broke out of four major prison camps, at Kwangju, Nonsan, Masan, and Pusan with the full connivance of South Korean security guards.16 South Korea's actions should not have surprised the United States. Two years earlier, the Rhee government stated five conditions for its accepting a cease-fire. On June 30,1951, when General Ridgway radioed his intention to begin the talks, President Rhee and his cabinet members conferred regarding Ridgway's message to the Communists. At this meeting, President Rhee and his ministers adopted a proposal that identified five conditions for a cease-fire: 1. the complete withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea; 2. the total disarmament of the North Korean Communists; 3. a UN guarantee to prevent any third power from giving assistance to North Korea; 4. the full participation of an ROK representative in any international conference or meeting discussing the Korean problem; 5. no arrangement compromising the administrative sovereignty and territorial integrity of Korea.17 U.S. ambassador to Korea John J. Muccio, who was visiting President Rhee at that time, cautioned South Korea's leaders against hasty decisions and public announcements. As a result, the Rhee government sent its fivepoint proposal to General Ridgway without public announcement. Muccio and Ridgway recommended that Washington attempt to soothe the South Koreans and thereby overcome opposition to a cease­ fire agreement. They suggested the appointment of a senior officer of the ROK Army as a member of the UNC delegation to the truce talks. The 14 UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, p. 5. 15 The New York Times, May 27, June 6 ,1 1 ,13,26.27, and July 1,1931. 16 The New York Times, June 18,1953; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C., 1966), 542. 17 UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, p. 6.

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U.S. government acted on this advice and Major General Paik Son-yup was selected as ROK representative for the UNC delegation and Major General Kang Mun-bong as alternate. 18 However, the ROK remained opposed to a cease-fire agreement not in line with its conditions. For U.S. government officials, Rhee was guilty of "recalcitrance." His uncooperative attitude became one topic of the dialogue between Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk during Senate hearings about the truce in Korea: M r. Rusk. O ne interesting thing that has surprised us a little is the attitude o f the South Koreans. Tw o weeks ago we were very troubled about what we felt was a irrational and irresponsible attitude on the part o f som e o f the leaders there, and after the M alik statem ent we thought w e m ight get quite violent reactions from the South Koreans. W e had a num ber o f talks with them , both in Pusan and w ith the A m bassador here, and I think it is fair to say this, that at the present tim e the South Koreans are saying, "W ell, we can't, o f course, give up the policy o f unification. N o Korean could do that. W e will see that our point o f view is heard. But so far as action is concerned, we will act in accordance with U.N. and U.S. policy." The Chairm an. This old Syngm an Rhee the other day said, "Oh, no; we w on't budge an inch. W e are going to have all Korea." M r. Rusk. W e will undoubtedly get additional speeches o f that sort, but we have been told pretty flatly that those will be in fact speeches, but what they do about it will be something else. The Chairm an. Can't we shut him up? Mr. Rusk. He has m ade those speeches despite continuous efforts on our part to shut him up, so I don't think we will be successful in that.

Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey then asked whether the South Korean commander in the field would have a voice in deciding the matters on a cease-fire. Rusk replied: General Ridgway's representative will be accompanied by a senior Korean officer, who will not bis a full plenipotentiary, along with General Ridgway's representative. If the issues were not so important we might concede him the status of full equal, but we feel that our national interests are so great here that we must have Ridgway's representative as the No. 1 man representing the UN side, and the other man would be there as his assistant, would be allowed to say18 18 Ibid., p. 10.

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Korea and the Cold War something if he wanted to, but there would be no question as to his status. He would be assisting General Ridgway's representative. 19

Thus, the American government decided that the United Nations and the United States would ignore the opposition if not participation, of the South Korean delegate in the negotiating process, except to let him "say something." Almost all South Koreans opposed an armistice which failed to unify Korea. On April 21, 1953, the ROK National Assembly passed a resolution calling for the support of President Rhee’s objective to unify Korea, even by force. Rhee ordered the Korean representative on the UNC delegation to not take part in the final sessions of the armistice negotiations. President Rhee, backed by the Korean National Assembly, notified President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States, Truman's successor, that, if the UNC agreed to permit the Chinese Communist forces to remain in Korea, he, Rhee, would withdraw his forces from the UNC and fight alone.1920 Rhee's voice became louder and more shrill as a cease-fire became more likely. From a position of apparent weakness, President Rhee was cleverly creating the bargaining chips to achieve an armistice on his terms. He opposed any arrangement short of unification of Korea, demanding that Chinese forces leave Korea at once, North Korean troops be disarmed, and the United States should help South Korea in the latter's effort to unify Korea. If these conditions were not fulfilled, he vowed, South Korea would withdraw its forces from the UNC and fight on for complete victory. Washington frowned on the "irresponsible action" of Rhee, but considered South Korean cooperation necessary for implementing an armistice. General Mark W. Clark, Ridgway's replacement as UN commander, was especially worried about the possible withdrawal of ROK forces from UN control because South Korean troops were defending an increasing portion of the front. Aware of this leverage, Rhee now applied more pressure, demanding a mutual security pact from the United States. When he met General Clark on May 12, 1953, the South Korean leader in addition to requesting a "unilateral 19 u.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1951, III, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1976), 552-53. 20 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York, 1954), 261; Hermes, True Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 442-43.

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US commitment to a mutual security pact," made a plea for supplies to equip a larger number of ROK forces. Rhee pledged also that he would not withdraw South Korean forces except as a last resort. Following this conversation, Clark reported to Washington that "he is bargaining now to get a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he is having a voice in the armistice negotiations.”21 Washington's scenario was different from what Rhee had in mind. Rather than a bilateral mutual security pact, the United States wanted to issue a "greater sanctions declaration" of the UN members participating in the Korean War committing them to protect South Korea against another possible invasion and warning of the grave consequence of the renewed aggression in Korea. President Rhee, however, having experienced the ineffectiveness of the collective guarantee by the United Nations against armed aggression, demanded a unilateral American commitment to preserve the security of South Korea. Clark and the new U.S. ambassador to the ROK, Ellis O. Briggs, when they visited Rhee on May 25, 1953, told the president that a bilateral security treaty was undesirable because it would "weaken” the "greater sanctions” proclamation as well as compromising the international character of the effort in Korea. "I am deeply disappointed” was Rhee's first comment. He then stated defiantly, "You can withdraw all UN forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us. We made our mistake perhaps in the beginning in relying upon democracy to assist us. Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstances."2223Alarmed, Clark cautioned Washington about the possibility o f Rhee undertaking unilateral actions, such as the release of the anti-Communist North Korean prisoners without warning, a public announcement to withdraw his forces from the UNC, and refusal to withdraw from the demilitarized zone in order to continue the fighting.2^ Thus, President Rhee made it plain that he would not take the prescribed medicine.

21 Mark W. Clark to JCS, May 13, 1953, JCS Records, RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. 128, NA; Schnabel and Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, III, p. 987. 22 Clark to JCS, May 26, 1953, Schnabel and Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, III, p. 989. 23 Ibid.; Clark to JCS, May 29,1953, JCS Records, RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945). sec., 129, NA.

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For the worst contingency, the 8th Army had prepared "Operation Everready." The plan envisioned three contingency situations. First, "ROK troops, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UN directives;" second, "ROK government and military units proceed along an independent course of action;” third, "ROK government, military units or people are overtly hostile to UN troops.” Under the first two contingencies, precautionary measures were to be taken, including disarming disloyal ROK units and restricting civilian and military movements. Under the third scenario, however, the 8th Army planned to execute a military coup against the Rhee government in order to secure the armistice by proclaiming martial law in the name of the United Nations and seizing dissident military and civilian leaders.24 These alarm ing developments received imm ediate political consideration in Washington. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, General Collins, and other key members of the State and Defense departments convened in Dulles' office on May 30,1953, to discuss the subject of a bilateral security pact with the ROK. The conferees agreed to recommend to President Eisenhower that the United States enter into a mutual defense security treaty with South Korea, similar to the one with the Philippines, provided that the Rhee government would cooperate in carrying out an armistice agreement and pledge to leave its forces under the UNC's control. American policy-makers, however, balked at approving the proposal to establish a UNC military government in South Korea in accordance with "Operation Everready” if the ROK refused to accept the deal. To do so, they argued, would contradict what the United States was fighting for in Korea.25 At a subsequent White House meeting, President Eisenhower approved the recommendation of offering a mutual defense pact to President Rhee.26 In the end, the Eisenhower administration was so determined to end the fighting in Korea that it was willing to submit to Rhee's blackmail. 24 "Operation Everready." May 4,1953, JCS Records. RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (319-45), sec. 130, NA. 25 Memorandum for the Record, by Major General C.D. Eddleman, "Conference on the Current Difficulties with the ROK Government Due to Their Dissatisfaction with Armistice Terms," ibid. 26 Clark to JCS, May 31,1953, ibid.

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Rhee wanted to secure the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty before the negotiation of an armistice. On June 2,1953, he therefore sent a letter to President Eisenhower offering a public pledge to accept the truce agreement on the condition that a mutual security pact be concluded first. This pact would provide for continuing U.S. m ilitary aid and "immediate" military intervention in case of renewed Communist aggression and thereafter a possible crusade to unify Korea by force.2? Rhee had inflated his demands. Disturbed by these conditions, the American government instructed General Clark and Ambassador Briggs to blackmail President Rhee. The U.S. representatives met with the South Korean president and stressed the link between ROK cooperation regarding the truce and postwar U.S. military and economic aid and, especially, a mutual defense treaty. They asked whether the U.S. government could count on South Korean support. President Rhee was evasive.28 He already had in mind another strategy to force the American government to acquiesce to his demands. Immediately after the release of the North Korean POWs, President Rhee frankly admitted his complicity in the prisoner escapes. "According to the Geneva Convention and also the principle of human rights," he declared, "the anti-Communist Korean War prisoners should have been released long before this."29 His way was far simpler than any previously discussed solution at Fanmunjöm. In fact, Rhee's "unpredictable" and "obstructive" action served the UNC and the Communists. Not only did it reduce the number of non-repatriates under the UNC control, it provided a face-saving pretext for the Communists, who could argue that these prisoners had been kidnapped by Rhee and his "gang.” At any rate, President Rhee upheld the principle of human rights, though for reasons quite different from those motivating U.S. policy. In a sense, the action of President Rhee ensured a victory in the battle for principle that had prolonged the fighting for over a year. For Eisenhower, this presumptuous action of Rhee was a "suicidal strategy." Nevertheless, the president confessed at a cabinet meeting on 2? For the text of Rhee's message, see UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, pp. 172-74. 28 Schnabel and Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, III, p. 1000. 29 The New York Times, June 18,1953; UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, p. 237.

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June 19,1953, that "Communism is still our principal enemy in Korea.” Cabinet members discussed how to conciliate the South Koreans and salvage the situation, focusing particularly on assessing the degree o f popular support for Rhee, the attitude of South Korean military leaders, and the security of American troops and installations.30 It soon was clear that Rhee's suicidal strategy was effective in negotiating with the United States. The Eisenhower adminstration acted promptly to meet his demands. Despite the tension resulting from Rhee's unilateral prisoner release, the U.S. government sent Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson to discuss outstanding differences. Initially, Secretary of State Dulles had invited President Rhee to come to Washington, but Rhee declined. "I am too busy to go there," he explained, and invited Secretary Dulles to come to Korea instead. Robertson's visit to Korea was a compromise. On June 26, 1953, Robertson paid a courtesy call on President Rhee and carried on serious discussions with him thereafter until July 12. Rhee presented four new conditions for South Korea's accepting an armistice: The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, formed to facilitate the exchange of prisoners, should assume control over the non-repatriates in the demilitarized zone; a definite time limit should be set for the post-armistice political conference; U.S. economic and military aid should continue, and twenty divisions of the ROK Army should be built up; and a mutual defense pact by the United States should be guaranteed.31 Washington readily accepted the four conditions, although Eisenhower explained to Rhee that Senate ratification of a mutual security pact would be necessary. On June 28, however, Rhee demanded additional conditions as the price for his cooperation with an armistice agreement. The United States should aid South Korea in creating more than twenty divisions if necessary; the United States should join not only in withdrawing from 30 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, June 19, 1953, Cabinet Meetings, Ann Whitman File and Legislative Leadership Meeting, June 24, 1953, Legislative Meetings File, Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 31 Walter S. Robertson to John Foster Dulles, June 26, 1953, Top Secret File, 795.00/6-2653, declassified by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Case No. 391; Schnabel and Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, HI, pp. 1018-19.

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the political conference, if the conference failed to reach an agreement on the future of Korea in ninety days, but also in resuming the war to achieve victory. In return, Rhee promised to leave the ROK Army under the UNC's control as long as the Eisenhower administration cooperated with the ROK government's efforts to unify Korea.32 Rhee’s demands had now reached exorbitant levels. Alarmed at this new development, President Eisenhower again discussed the matter with his major advisors. Pursuant to their recommendation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger M. Keys, on June 30, 1933, informed General Clark that the security of UN forces would remain his overriding concern. Although there would be no intention to withdraw immediately from Korea, the Eisenhower administration wanted Clark to consider taking some measures which might give the impression that the United States was preparing to withdraw its troops. He then requested that Clark offer an assessment of the possibility of the South Korean military's taking "action" against Rhee in order to prevent him from sabotaging an armistice.3233 Clark and Robertson opposed any threat of withdrawal unless the United States was willing to remove its troops from Korea. Clark dismissed the possibility of the South Korean military acting against Rhee unless given definite assurance of support by the United States.34 Thus, President Eisenhower had few ways to keep President Rhee in line except by giving him what he wanted. At the subsequent meetings between Rhee and Robertson, each side submitted a draft of a mutual defense treaty. The Korean version contained several features unacceptable to the United States. Article 2 provided for recognition that lawful ROK jurisdiction extended to the Yalu River. Article 5 demanded immediate U.S. military action in case of armed attack on South Korea. Article 9 did not provide for any way to terminate the pact by either side, therefore envisioning an indefinite commitment. The U.S. draft, on the other hand, stipulated that "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such 32 Robertson to Dulles, July 1,1953, declassified under the FOIA, Case No. 391. 33 Roger M. Keys to Clark, June 30,1953, quoted in Schnabel and Watson, History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, III, p. 1021. 34 Clark to JCS, July 2, 1953, JCS Records, RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. 132, NA.

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measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."35 Clearly, the United States was not willing to assume unilateral responsibility for the defense of the ROK, even under a mutual defense treaty between the two countries. President Rhee, by contrast, insisted on an indefinite and unilateral U.S. commitment, not only to the military protection of South Korea, but also to Korea's unification. Both sides were willing, however, to consider the Rhee-Clark-Robertson talks as a satisfactory basis for further discussions at a later date to iron out the details. Robertson left Seoul for Washington on July 12, thereby ending his eighteen-day ordeal of negotiations with South Korea's aged and stubborn president. He could consider his mission a success because he carried Rhee's letter to Eisenhower pledging not to disrupt the armistice.36 The United States now could conclude an armistice without fear of the South Korean president engaging in "obstructive" actions. As part of the bargain, the United States made four promises in return: The United States would sign a mutual defense pact, provide long-term economic aid, extend military assistance to maintain twenty ROK Army divisions with Navy and Air Force units, and engage in close consultation and cooperation before, during, and after the post-armistice political conference to determine Korea's future. As an armistice seemed imminent, Rhee seized the spotlight once again. The South Korean president sent a message to Secretary of State Dulles on July 24, asking for definite answers about the two "vital questions" of inclusion of "immediate and automatic military support” in the proposed pact, and U.S. participation in resuming military efforts "to eject the invaders from Korea" should the political conference fail. Secretary Dulles was disappointed with the "uncertain" attitude of Rhee. In his reply, he complained that the Eisenhower administration "believed that the attitude of your government toward a truce was already decided." 35 U.S. draft of Mutual Defense Treaty (Submitted to President Rhee by Robertson), July 4, 1953, and ROK draft of Mutual Defense Treaty (Submitted by President Rhee to Robertson), July 9, 1953, in Memorandum on Dulles-Rhee Talks, August 1953, declassified under the FOI A, Case No. 8102237. 36 For the text of Rhee's letter to Eisenhower, July 11, 1953, see UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, pp. 367-68.

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Dulles reiterated the importance of Rhee's cooperation if South Korea expected to receive U.S. post-armistice aid. "We shall now consider our situation" was Rhee's response when he received the reply through Ambassador Briggs.37 Both sides were dissatisfied, and the issues remain unresolved. A revision of "Operation Eveneady” constituted another option for the United States to secure the armistice. This plan contained several measures to be taken immediately by the 8th Army commander. They ranged from relief of disloyal ROK commanders, to withdrawal of all logistic and air support, to securing custody of dissident military and civilian leaders, and finally to control of Korean transportation and electric power. It also specified the measures to be recommended if South Korean opposition to the truce continued. These included reductions in U.S. aid to the ROK, withdrawal of recognition of the Rhee government, blocking Korean dollar and sterling accounts, initiating an anti-Rhee publicity campaign, establishing a naval blockade, and proclaiming martial law in extreme cases.38 Thus, the U.S. government, especially the military, was ready to take all necessary measures to secure the armistice and prevent the South Koreans from resuming the war. After more than two years of frustrating and bitter negotiations, it took only twelve minutes for the two chief delegates to sign the armistice documents. At 10 a.m. on July 27,1953, the two senior delegates entered the room and signed the eighteen copies of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the supplementary agreement—twelve each in English, Chinese, and Korean. When they completed the signing twelve minutes later, the two chief delegates glanced at each other for a moment and simultaneously departed. All military actions in Korea and surrounding waters halted at 10 p.m. on July 27,1953. Neither side claimed victory, nor acknowledged defeat. The war had ended, and "an uneasy quiet spread over unhappy Korea," as former Secretary of State Dean G.

37 Rhee to Dulles, July 2 4 ,19S3, in Dulles-Rhee Talks, August 1953, p. 6. For the full text of Dulles' letter to Rhee, July 24,1953, see UNC Korean Armistice Negotiations, pt. IV, pp. 430-32. 38 JCS to General John E Hull, October 10.1953, JCS Records, RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. 137, NA; Hull to Ridgway, October 24,1953, ibid., sec. 139.

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Acheson later observed.39*But that was not the end of the story with regard to U.S.-ROK relations. Unable to sit idle in ensuring that President Rhee kept his promises, Secretary of State Dulles announced that he would visit Korea in order to clarify and confirm the new Korean-American relationship. President Rhee was quick to identify what he wanted from the secretary: a commitment to "fighting the Communists or dying. "40 Accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Carl McCardle, Consultant Arthur Dean, and Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Kenneth T. Young, Secretary o f State Dulles arrived in Korea on August 4,1953. Thenceforth, Dulles and Rhee negotiated doggedly over the next four days, mainly on a defense pact, until the treaty was initialled on August 8,1953. At his first meeting with President Rhee on August 5, Secretary Dulles emphasized the importance of his visit: We are trying to create a new basis for the relations of Korea with the rest of the world. You know, we have always met with some of the other big nations and have decided what to do about Korea and then simply informed Korea of the decisions. But we're not doing that any more. My own coming out here is of tremendous importance. This is the first time in all history anything like this ever has been done—for the Secretary of State of a major power to go all the way across the world to talk with the President of a small nation, and try to bring its policies in accord with the small nation's. Whatever we may decide in these matters is of small importance. The big thing is that we came at all.

President Rhee seemed to agree. "It's the first time in fifty years," he said.41 Rhee and Dulles then entered into extensive discussions about the political conference, economic and military aid, and the defense treaty. They met five times during the period from August 5 to 8. The major issue at the meetings was the proposed mutual defense treaty. President Rhee's reliance on the treaty for the defense of South Korea was almost total. "Our whole life and hope depend on it," he said without any hesitation. He wanted the treaty for South Korea's protection not only against the Communists but, significantly, also against the 39 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, p. 150. 4® The New York Times, July 30,1953. 41 Memorandum for the Record, First Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles, August 5,1953, declassified under the FOI A, Case No. 164.

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Japanese. Therefore, his objective was to make implementation of the treaty as strong and binding as possible. On the other hand, Dulles desired to not lose American freedom of action. The secretary of state solemnly advised the ROK's president of the importance of having a treaty that would receive from the U.S. Senate "overwhelming consent.” Dulles based his concept on the concerns and needs of a great power, whereas Rhee was negotiating from the position of a weak, small nation with nothing left but a "seeming" ability to cooperate or disrupt the armistice. President Rhee worked hard to strengthen the pact, insisting on a NATO-type of treaty with the United States for the security of South Korea and, by implication, his regime. He also lobbied for automatic effectuation and indefinite duration. However, Dulles was just as determined to make the treaty acceptable to the United States and successfully resisted Rhee's demands. Secretary Dulles and South Korean Foreign Minister Pyön Yöng-tâe initialled the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States on August 8,1953. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty consisted of six articles, Articles 3 and 6 comprising the heart of the pact: A rticle III. Each Party recognized that an arm ed attack in the Pacific A rea on either o f the Parties in territories now under their respective control, o r hereafter recognized by one o f the Parties as law fully brought un d er the adm inistrative control o f the other, w ould be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to m eet the com m on danger in accordance with its constitutional process. A rticle VI. This treaty shall rem ain in force indefinitely. E ither Party m ay term inate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.42

By this act, the United States assumed unilateral responsibility for the security of South Korea. This was an obligation which it had been exceedingly reluctant to accept ever since its temporary occupation of the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of World War II. American intervention in the Korean War had then decisively altered the relationship between the United States and the ROK. North Korea's attack had swept away the last limits on the U.S. commitment to South Korea's survival. Dulles revealed this when he said after the initialing ceremony on August 8 that the mutual security "pact is sealed in the 42 U.S. Department o f State Bulletin XXIX (August 17, 1953): 203-4; The New York Times, August 8,1953.

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blood o f our boys."43 Deterring future Communist aggression and preventing any attempts to achieve reunification by force were Washington's twin objectives in "bestowing" a mutual defense treaty on South Korea. The joint communique asserted that there would be no unilateral South Korean action during the forthcom ing political conference.44*According to the treaty, the South Korean government was prohibited from taking "unlawful means" to unify Korea and the United States was permitted to retain freedom of action in determining what to do for South Korea. Top decision-makers also made this clear. After the signing of the treaty on October 1, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles once again warned the Communists and the South Koreans together not to provoke "undesirable actions."43 President Eisenhower, too, in his message to the Senate, confirmed that the basic aim of the treaty was to deter aggression by demonstrating American determination to defend the "Free World." Also, it stood as a warning to both the North and South Koreans that the United States would not tolerate any attempts to settle remaining problems by force.46 After ratification by the South Korean National Assembly on January 15,1954, and the U.S. Senate on January 26,1954, the treaty became fully operative. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty opened a new era in KoreanAmerican relations. The United States had tried to avoid the sole responsibility for the defense of South Korea following the Japanese surrender after the Pacific War. Because of this reluctance, the United States internationalized the Korean issue, and, even after the Korean War, desired to remain one of many nations to issue a warning o f "greater sanctions" against the Communists if there was any resumption of aggression in Korea. The South Korean government under President Rhee, on the other hand, badly wanted some form of unilateral U.S. commitment to preserve the security of the ROK. President Rhee, in forcing the United States to satisfy his demands, succeeded by employing a "suicidal strategy" of threatening to break the armistice and resume the war. The United States thereby became the sole protector of South Korea, and the dependency relationship "remains a hostage of the 43 The New York Times, August 8,1953. 44 U.S. Department o f State Bulletin XXIX (August 17,1953): 203-4. 43 Statement of Dulles, October 1, 1953, Alphabetical Files, box 319, John Foster Dulles papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey; The New York Times, October 1,1953. 46 Dwight D. Eisenhower to U.S. Senate, January 11, 1954, Speeches Series, Ann Whitman Files, Eisenhower papers; The New York Times, January 13,1954.

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strategic balance on the Korean peninsula."47 In this regard, the ending of the Korean War in accordance with Rhee's version of "a substitute for victory"— the mutual defense treaty— was very significant because it shaped Korean-American relations for the next four decades. The American military once had failed to find any strategic importance in Korea and recommended withdrawal. It then changed its mind after the North Korean invasion. Following Chinese intervention, the JCS supported a "no-win" strategy in the Korean War and accepted the newly established battlefield stalemate. The JCS justified its action on the basis that, although U.S. possession of bases in South Korea was not significant to American security interests in the region, the enemy's fortification of those bases would constitute a severe threat to the defense of Japan.48 The American military in this way voiced its belief that the defense of Japan was closely related to the defense of South Korea. During the 1970s, the American military appeared to appreciate the necessity of securing forward posts in South Korea, especially after the United States returned Okinawa to Japan and the Soviet Union showed its keen interest in expanding its influence and power in the Pacific by reinforcing its Kamchatka naval bases. This became clear during the period of debate on whether the United States should withdraw its ground troops from Korea under the Carter administration. As long as Korea remains a source of potential renewed war, and unless the United States and the Republic of Korea abandon their commitment of keeping peace and stability as a precondition for the peaceful unification of Korea, the two countries might have no options other than maintaining the relationship they established in 1953. It is fair to say, though, that patronage and reluctance, especially on the part of the United States, was vivid when this relationship was being formulated. However, because almost all circumstantial factors have changed since then, reciprocity and equal partnership should be the main theme on which future relations between the two allies ought to be based. Managing and maintaining friendly relations in the 1990s will not be easy, but will need a tender and delicate touch.

47 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship (New York, 1982), 89. 48 Statement by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the JCS, JCS Records, RG 218, CJCS File (1953), NA.

Chapter 11

KOREA'S QUEST FOR DISARMAMENT AND REUNIFICATION*

James I. M atray Since 1945, the quest for disarmament and reunification has dominated the history of Korea. A national commitment to ending the artificial division of the peninsula played a central role not only in explaining the origins of the Korean War, but also in the negotiations to achieve a cease-fire beginning in July 1951 at Kaesöng. Significantly, Article 4 of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953, provided for the calling of a conference of interested parties to negotiate the evacuation of foreign troops from Korea and "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question."1 In October 1953, the United States, acting as the agent of the United Nations, met with representatives from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) at P'anmunjöm to determine a date and location for a postwar political conference. Negotiations reached a quick impasse because of the Communist demand that the Soviet Union attend as a neutral. "After a series of sterile and vituperative meetings," Callum MacDonald has written, "the US representative walked out on 12 December. "2 Korean reunification, nevertheless, was a major topic of discussion at the Geneva Conference, which opened on April 26, 1954. These negotiations proved sterile because of the inability to arrive at a formula * A shortened version of this article appears in the SHAFR Newsletter 23 (December 1991): 13-28. 1 Ohn Chang-il, "Agenda Item S: Referral of Political Questions,” in James I. Matray (ed.). Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War (Westport, Conn., 1991), 11-12. 2 Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York, 1986), 256-57.

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for holding nationwide elections. Syngman Rhee, the president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), demanded as preconditions the disarmament of North Korean forces and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea. For their part, the Communists vetoed UN supervision of the elections, logically arguing that the United Nations was not neutral in the Korean affair. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union applied much pressure to break the deadlock, focusing instead on the crisis in Indochina. Therefore, Korea's unification was postponed to suit the interests of the great powers.3 After Geneva, there was no real progress toward achieving national unity for over a generation. Predictably, the DPRK insisted that the United States was responsible for perpetuating the partition of Korea. Surprisingly, leading politicians in the ROK came to share that judgment. This essay will attempt to explain why so many Koreans have blamed the United States for Korea's continuing Cold War. Also, it will summarize the recent negotiations between Seoul and P'yöngyang, highlighting the differences between the divisions of Germany and Korea in an effort to show that the two cases are far from analogous. Finally, it will offer a prediction about the likely future course of events leading to Korea's eventual reunification. Korea's contact with the outside world has almost always led to unhappy experiences. Geography provides probably the most important explanation for this historical pattern because the Korean peninsula constitutes the strategic focal point of Northeast Asia. As a result, the Korean people have been the long-suffering victims of great power rivalry throughout most of their history. Traditionally, Russia, China, and Japan— Korea's more powerful and aggressive neighbors—participated in the contest to establish control over the peninsula. China had been directly involved in Korea's internal affairs for hundreds of years prior to Korea's emergence as a united nation in the 7th Century. Thereafter, Korea was a tributary state of the Tang and Sung dynasties, until the Mongols conquered the peninsula in the 13th Century.4 3 H. W. Brands, "The Geneva Conference of 1954," in Matray (ed.), H istorical Dictionary o f the Korean War, pp. 165*66; MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam, p. 257. See also, Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990). 4 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston, 1978), 277-323. See also, Ki-bæk Lee, A New H istory o f (Korea (Cambridge, 1985).

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Japan was still a young nation when it first challenged China for control over Korea. In the late 16th Century, the legendary Hideyoshi mounted two massive invasions of the Korean peninsula that witnessed unprecedented levels of brutality, death, and destruction. For the next three hundred years, the Japanese were preoccupied with domestic politics and the Koreans enjoyed a rare period of freedom from outside interference. But following the Meiji restoration in 1868, the SinoJapanese competition for dominance in Korea resumed. Ultimately, Japan and China went to war over the peninsula in 1894. The militarily superior Japanese won an easy victory and eliminated Chinese influence from Korea. However, Russia then challenged Japanese hegemony over the peninsula, leading to the Russo-Japanese W ar in 1904. Japan's military triumph was quick and complete, confirming its preeminent position in Korea. The Japanese formally annexed Korea in 1910, systematically integrating the peninsula into its imperial structure during the next decade. While enslaving the people and attempting to destroy Korea's cultural heritage, Japan brutally suppressed any evidence of dissent.56 Given Korea's history, it is not surprising that it is an ancient Korean proverb that laments "A shrimp is crushed in the battle of whales."^ But Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 created new hope among the Koreans that their nation soon would enjoy a restoration of independence and self-government. This was because the United States now joined the com petition to determ ine Korea's destiny, ending a century o f indifference. Ironically, in 1882, the United States had been the first Western nation to sign a treaty with Korea. In addition to commercial provisions, the accord included a pledge that in the event "other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices...to bring about an amicable arrangement." When the Japanese annexed Korea, however, Washington did nothing. Realizing that he could do little to preserve Korea's freedom, President Theodore Roosevelt, in the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1903, acknowledged

5 Donald S. MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder, Co., 1990), 25-41; Takashi Hatada, A History o f Korea (Santa Barbara, Ca., 1969), 37130. 6 Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story o f the War (New York, 1982), 3.

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Japanese hegemony in Korea, in return for Japan's acceptance of American domination over the Philippines.7 Roosevelt's decision to ignore American treaty obligations, though legally indefensible, nevertheless, reflected a proper understanding of the extent of American interests in Korea. The distant Asian peninsula was neither politically nor economically vital to the United States. Korean nationalist leaders, however, denounced Roosevelt for committing an unforgivable act of abandonment. Today, most Koreans no longer blame the United States for acquiescing in Japanese annexation. Instead, they believe that Roosevelt authorized Japan's conquest of Korea. President Woodrow W ilson's unwillingness at the Versailles Conference after World W ar I to insist on a restoration of Korea's sovereignty only confirmed and deepened the feeling of bitterness and betrayal among the Korean people.8 Consequently, when the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, Koreans expected President Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue a public declaration that Korea's independence was a major war aim. Unfortunately, Japan's defeat would not bring Korea's liberation, but military occupation and seemingly permanent partition. Anti-Americanism in Korea today has its roots in the perception that the United States has often followed policies detrimental to the Korean people. For Koreans, Americans have perceived Korea as a subject state and engaged in behavior reflecting attitudes of arrogance, racial superiority, and contempt. Many believe that Korea must gain redress for the pattern of unfairness and discrimination in Korean-American relations. Viewed in this way, anti-Americanism emerges as an attempt to remedy a traditional Korean sentiment known as han, or a smoldering bittemess about past wrongs.9 This profound Korean unhappiness and dissatisfaction derives from the mistaken conviction that Korea has been and should be the most important priority in U.S. national security 7 John Wilz, "Did the United States Betray Korea?" Pacific H istorical Review 54 (August 1985), 243-70; Fred Harvey Harrington, "An American View of KoreanAmerican Relations, 1882-1905," in Yur-bok Lee and Wayne Patterson (eds.). One Hundred Years o f Korean-American Relations, 1882-1982 (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1986), 4667. 8 MacDonald, The Koreans, p. 43. See also, Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, 1963). 9 Jinwung Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Causes," Asian Survey X X IX (August 1989): 755.

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planning. Koreans simply have failed to understand or accept as reasonable American policy toward Korea since 1941. For the past halfcentury, the United States has sought stability on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia. Rhetorically, Washington has supported dem ocratic principles and national self-determ ination, but these objectives have been a secondary concern having only a tangential relationship to the more basic considerations of security and power. A few key American policy decisions after World W ar II have infuriated even the the most moderate Koreans for more than four decades. Roosevelt's support for a postwar trusteeship in Korea heads the list. Also, Koreans have never forgiven the United States for dividing their country in 1945 and indeed blame the Truman administration for Korea's partition. They have consistently refused to accept the fact that the alternative to division was a united Korea under Communist rule. This attitude reflects the tendency of Koreans to overestimate the power of the United States to control events in world affairs. Many Koreans consider the continued presence of American troops on the peninsula the greatest barrier to reunification. Ironically, some of these same people view U.S. military withdrawal from Korea in June 1949 as an act of abandonment that invited the North Korean invasion exactly one year later. Few Koreans appreciate the extent of U.S. commitments in South Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean W ar.19 South Koreans naturally are grateful to the United States for com m itting ground troops to prevent North Korean forces from conquering the peninsula in 1950. Anger and disappointment have lingered, however, as a consequence of Washington's refusal to fight for reunification following Chinese military intervention. Older Koreans have had no trouble insisting that an attempt to achieve Korea's reunification was worth the risk of another world war. Until recently, Koreans generally have supported the alternative of retaining U.S. combat forces in Korea after the armistice in 1953. For the United States, a permanent American military presence on the peninsula after the Korean W ar has been vital to the preservation of stability in Northeast Asia. This explains the continued deployment of 38,000 American * *9 For a discussion of U.S. commitments in Korea prior to the Korean War, see James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu, 198S).

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soldiers in Korea today. But a growing number of Koreans not only doubt that renewed war is probable, they also refuse to believe W ashington's promise to comply with a South Korean request for military withdrawal. A poll of university students in 1988 revealed that nearly half thought that the continued presence of U.S. forces made "the division of Korea permanent."11 Obviously, the unpredictable behavior of the North Koreans provides more than sufficient justification for an American military presence in Korea. Fyöngyang has maintained a large military establishment since the end of the Korean War. It showed its determination to achieve reunification through force of arms on countless occasions since 1933, with the last major border incidents occurring in October 1981. Subsequently, the DPRK resorted to terrorism to destabilize the ROK. In October 1983, North Korean army commandos exploded a bomb in Rangoon killing nineteen people, including four ROK cabinet members. As recently as November 1987, North Korean agents were responsible for the bombing of Korean Airlines flight 858.12 Even though the threat of war has receded since 1990, the ROK still has hesitated to request a withdrawal of U.S. troops. Korean radicals have pointed to this policy position as proof that neither the United States nor the South Korean government genuinely desires reunification. Most young Koreans neither trust nor respect the United States. In contrast to their parents, they reject the favorable postwar image o f the United States as the nation in Korean affairs. This earlier perception was consistent with the traditional Asian view of international relations. In the Korean language, the word sadae describes a relationship between two nations reflecting the Confucian family system in which the younger brother served his older brother, while the "senior” brother recognized a duty to provide help and guidance to his "junior." To an extent, current anti-Americanism derives from Korea's unfulfilled expectations in this relationship. For example, Koreans are unable to understand recent changes in the U.S. economy and resent Washington's efforts to open Korea's markets to American goods, especially beef, cigarettes, and automobiles. Militant students have not hesitated to attack the U.S. 11 Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” p. 753. 12 MacDonald, The Koreans, pp. 259-62.

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embassy and U.S. Information Service centers. They also have staged firebomb and stone assaults on U.S. military bases and family housing facilities. Burning the American flag, carrying banners denouncing the United States, and chanting anti-American slogans have become standard features at student demonstrations regardless of the issue.13 American behavior during the Seoul Olympics in 1988 further damaged this sadae relationship and tarnished the image o f the United States in Korea. Many Koreans were offended when American athletes, marching into the Chamshil stadium during the opening ceremonies, broke ranks and held up signs for the television cameras. They felt insulted when runner Carl Lewis shoved Korean security guards on arrival at Kimp'o Airport and swimmer Matt Biondi refused a glass of water for fear o f becoming ill. A worse incident occurred when two American swimmers stole a statue from a Seoul hotel. Koreans agreed that NBC's coverage of the Olympics was distorted, devoting too much time to a defeated Korean boxer's refusal to leave the ring and a coach's physical attack on a referee for alleged unfairness. From the Korean perspective, NBC provided detailed coverage of the PRC's records, while not giving a fiili account of Korea's accomplishments. Finally, Koreans found particularly humiliating non-sports coverage o f sweatshops, prostitution, and foreign adoption of Korean children.14 American involvement in South Korea's domestic politics arguably has generated most of the hostility toward the United States since the Korean War. Koreans charge that the United States has sponsored military dictatorship in Korea, therefore delaying the achievement of democracy. From the American perspective, U.S. tolerance for eighteen years of the dictatorial regime of Park Chung Hee was not difficult to understand since this was consistent with U.S. objectives since World W ar U. Park brought political stability to the ROK. Also, his leadership in the economic field drove South Korea down the road to economic development. At the time of Park's assassination in October 1979, the U.S. no longer had to look at South Korea as a financial burden dependent for its very survival on American assistance—amounting to 13 James I. Matray, "Diplomatic History as a Political Weapon: An Assessment o f Anti-Americanism in South Korea Today,” SHAFR Newsletter XX (March 1989): 1-14; Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea," pp. 751-52. 14 Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” p. 756.

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$12.5 billion in economic and military aid by 1976. But from the Korean perspective, American backing for Park was indefensible. The United States, critics charged, was responsible for perpetuating military rule in South Korea.1^ President Jimmy Carter was sensitive to these complaints. During the political turmoil following Park's assassination, Carter seemed to identify the achievement of democracy as the most important U.S. interest in Korea. As a result, Washington pressed the new government under Chun Doo Hwan to lift martial law and commute the death sentence imposed on dissident leader Kim Dae Jung. To accomplish this objective, the U.S. suspended economic development talks with the ROK and persuaded the Asian Development Bank to halt plans for loans to South Korea. Although Chun relented and lifted martial law in December 1980, American tactics were risky because they might have produced even greater instability south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), therefore, inviting an attack from the north. Already, Carter realized that the most important American interest in Northeast Asia was preventing a new war, which required deterring the DPRK. In July 1979, after a visit to South Korea, he had declared, in a reversal of his previously announced intentions, that there would be no reduction of the American military presence on the peninsula. *6 Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980 signaled an end to what had been a brief, aberrant period in U.S. policy toward Korea. For the past decade, stability rather than progress toward democracy has been Washington's primary concern. For example, Chun Doo Hwan was the first head of state to visit President Reagan after his inauguration. Not only did Reagan laud Chun's leadership, he also announced that there would be no reduction of U.S. troop strength on the Korean peninsula. As one U.S. official declared at the time, "security is the uppermost element in our minds....It's not the intention of this administration to go into the internal state of affairs in the ROK." In February 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz visited Korea and stated flatly that American troops would not leave the ROK until there was a fundamental change in North Korean behavior. For the Reagan administration, the ROK's ^ Matray, "Diplomatic History as a Political Weapon," pp. 1-14. ^ U.S. Information Service, Korea: A Chronology o f Recent Events (Seoul, June 1988).

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economic development during the 1980s constituted a tremendous policy victory. In 1982, Washington was elated that more than half of Korea's imports came from the United States, double the amount received from Japan. W hile helping the American economy, South Korea was providing proof of the superiority of capitalism over communism as a model for development in the underdeveloped areas of the world.17* At the same time, the ROK's record with respect to progress toward democracy remained an embarrassment. In May 1980, Chun sent a detachment of South Korean special forces to the southwestern city of Kwangju to suppress anti-government protests against the imposition of martial law. In the violence that followed, government troops killed about two hundred people. Student dissidents immediately blamed the United States for the Kwangju incident, because under an agreement dating from the Korean War, South Korean troops were under U.S. operational control. If the United States was not guilty of complicity, American approval for the Chun government's request to release the troops meant that at least it was indirectly responsible for the tragedy. Most young Koreans still believe that the United States "master-minded" the Kwangju incident as part of a policy to strengthen Korean authoritarianism. In response, Washington pressed Chun to allow more political freedom, persuading him in January 1982 to end the 37 year old midnight to 4:00 a.m. curfew. In November 1983, Reagan visited South Korea and called for greater respect for human rights. Three years later, Washington supported the petition-writing campaign that eventually persuaded the ruling party the following year to permit a revision in the constitution providing for popular election of the president. By the summer of 1988, opposition parties had majority status in the National Assembly.1* Progress toward democracy fundamentally changed the nature of political protest in South Korea. In place of their push to end military dictatorship, dissidents struggled for independence from foreign intervention in internal affairs and for real progress in negotiations for reunification that began two decades ago. During the early 1970s, both the ROK and the DPRK advanced proposals leading toward a 17 Ibid. ** MacDonald, The Koreans, 158-62. See also, Matray, "Diplomatic History as a Political Weapon," pp. 1-14.

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reconciliation, but neither held much chance for success. Fyöngyang's consistent position was that there could be no positive movement in the negotiations until the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. It demanded talks directly with the United States, whereas the ROK insisted on bilateral discussions and rejected U.S. military withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations. During the 1980s, South Korea's steadily improved world position placed rising pressure on the increasingly isolated North Korean regime to compromise. In 1983, representatives from the PRC arrived in Seoul for the first time to resolve an airplane hyjacking incident, opening the way for "tennis diplomacy" the following year when a South Korean team traveled to China. Then, in 1988, both the PRC and the Soviet Union participated in the Seoul Olympic Games. In June 1990, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco moved the ROK and the Soviet Union even closer toward a normalization of relations.19 Another Korean proverb—tong-sang i-mong—aptly describes the current state of the negotiations regarding reunification. It means "same bed, different dream." When the two Korean prime ministers met for the first time in Seoul early in September 1990, they reached some agreements. Both sides accepted proposals for a public declaration of non-aggression, installation of hotlines between military commands, an end to slander and vilification in public pronouncements, and removal of all military equipment from the demilitarized zone. However, the North Korean delegation made further progress contingent on resolution of three issues. First, the DPRK demanded that the ROK drop its proposal for the admission of both Koreas to the United Nations, accepting instead the North Korean plan for sharing a single seat. Second, P'yöngyang insisted on the release of a student dissident and two clergymen convicted of violating a South Korean law prohibiting visits to the north. Finally, the North Koreans called for termination of the annual U.S.ROK joint military exercises known as "Team Spirit."20 South Korea refused to satisfy North Korean demands, but did advance an alternative proposal consistent with its previous emphasis on the need for "confidence-building" measures in the reunification process. 19 U.S. Information Service, Korea. 2° The Korea Times, September 6,1990, p. 1.

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The ROK proposed shelving plans to seek admission to the United Nations in return for agreement on gradual increases in the exchange of people and economic cooperation. "This," South Korea's prime minister declared, "should involve the opening of southern and northern societies to each other, leading to expanding...cooperation to build the social, cultural, and economic foundations of a single national community." Fyöngyang and Seoul would agree to direct inter-Korean trade, the joint development of resources, and the reconnection of roads and rail lines between north and south. In addition, the ROK advocated free travel by dispersed family members older than 60, mutual public access to radio and television, and the establishment of liaison missions in Fyöngyang and Seoul. Finally, South Korea believed that both governments should agree to recognize and respect each other's political and social systems until the achievement of reunification. Following these measures for political "confidence-building," military "confidence-building" would begin, leading to arms reduction. In response, North Korea reiterated that South Korea would have to satisfy its three conditions before the start of substantive negotiations on a plan for reunification.21 During October 1990, the Korean prime ministers met for a second time, on this occasion in Fyöngyang. North Korea acknowledged that real progress would require an elimination of mutual distrust. However, the DPRK stressed the importance of rejecting any action that confirmed the existence of two Koreas. Also, Fyöngyang insisted that the military component was an integral part of the reunification process. North Korea's prime minister emphasized that the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the peninsula was "an indispensable element to easing the high military tension." The South Koreans remained inflexible during these negotiations.22 Consequently, when the ministers met for a third time in December 1990, the two sides were far apart on specific steps toward achieving the goal of reducing military and political tensions and increasing contacts between the two Koreas.2^ This allowed the North Koreans to pose as patriotic nationalists and champions of juche or selfreliance in resolving Korea's problems. The ROK's determination to 21 Ibid. 22 The Korea Times, October 18,1990, p. 2. 22 New York Times, February 19,1991, p. 3.

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apply for separate membership in the United Nations implied that it wanted to perpetuate Korea's division. At the same time, South Korea's refusal to budge on the "Team Spirit" issue gave Seoul the appearance o f favoring a continuation of foreign military occupation of the country. Finally, the ROK's unwillingness to release the visitors to P'yöngyang raised questions about the extent of individual liberty in South Korea. For South Koreans, the absence o f dramatic progress toward achieving reunification during 1990 was not just a disappointment; it was a surprise. In their search for an explanation for the failure to achieve political amalgamation, many once again pointed an accusing finger at the United States. A recent poll found that nearly half of all university students consider the United States "the greatest impediment to Korea's reunification."24 All Koreans desperately wanted national unity, and therefore foreign involvem ent provided a sim ple and powerful explanation during recent years, as it did in the past, for Korea's ongoing tragedy. Few Koreans understand that the inability to accomplish quick reunification resulted from the fundamental and profound differences separating the two Koreas. In North Korea, there is a socialist economy, a regimented society, and a totalitarian political structure. In sharp contrast, South Korea boasts a market economy, a relatively open society, and an increasingly pluralistic political system. A merger o f these thoroughly different models of development would be nothing short of a miracle. Germany's reunification created unrealistic expectations among the Korean people. The two situations are entirely different, especially with respect to the issue of political legitimacy. In 1945, the Soviet Union imposed a political, social, and economic system on East Germany without regard to the will of the people. Arguably, the vast majority of East Germans never accepted the legitimacy of Communist rule. Once Moscow decided that it could live with German reunification, East Germany's reason for existence disappeared and its citizens were able to fulfill their long-standing desire for amalgamation with West Germany. By contrast, the Communist rulers in North Korea came to power in 1945 with widespread popular support. There can be no question that the DPRK has a greater claim to legitimacy than does the ROK. Soviet 24 Kim. "Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea," p. 753.

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troops occupied East Germany throughout the postwar period, whereas the Red Army withdrew from Korea before the end of 1948. For more than forty years, North Korean leader Kim II Sung has enjoyed genuine popular support because the people believe, for better or for worse, that Communist rule has been in their best interests. This has removed any necessity for the DPRK to compromise in the negotiations for reunification. There are other important differences. First, members o f the left in East Germany had far less to fear from reunification than will those in North Korea. West Germany tolerated leftist political activity and the Social Democrats possessed both widespread popular support and considerable political power. Since 1948, the South Korean government, following a pattern existing under prior American military rule, has outlawed and brutally suppressed all leftist political activities. Second, the East German people always knew more about life in West Germany than do North Koreans about circumstances in South Korea. Contributing to this disparity was the existence of West Berlin in the heart of East Germany. Surely the presence of a South P'y5ngyang after the Korean W ar eventually would have made more difficult the Communist task of m aintaining political dom inance. Finally, G erm any achieved reunification only after its European neighbors, especially France and the Soviet Union, decided that a united Germany no longer posed a military threat. In Korea, the division continues, although only the PRC and Vietnam have objected to reunification. Thus, domestic rather than international factors explain Korea's inability to emulate Germany and achieve rapid reunification. Nevertheless, Germany's reunification offers some important clues for predicting the future course of developments in Korea. Some Koreans talk about the coexistence in a united Korea of both systems, but this can never work. One Korea inevitably will absorb the other and no one expects the DPRK to survive. Once the North Korean people gain access to complete information about events outside Korea and become aware of the superior quality of life in the south, there can be no doubt that, given a free choice, they will opt for amalgamation with South Korea. Even defenders of Kim II Sung acknowledge the failures of the northern

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system. The Fyöngyang regime has been guilty of a massive fabrication of history while purposely isolating its people from outside contacts.2^ North Korea's leaders remain defiantly self-confident despite the collapse of Communist regimes throughout Europe. Following the failed coup in the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991, DPRK Vice President Pak Sung Chul acknowledged that a "vortex of fast changing history" was underway. But he then proceeded to brush aside the meaning of recent international events, claiming that the "invincible might of our own style of socialism is being highly demonstrated."26 In reality, North Korea for some time has been suffocating under a failed socialist economic system. Observers believe that a poor harvest in 1991 added food shortages to insufficient fuel as the DPRK's most pressing problems.27 Perhaps more threatening in the long run, the North Korean people labor in a totalitarian society that denies any opportunity for individual self-expression. Eventually, Communist leaders will no longer be able, as they have in the past, to exploit hatred and fear of the United States as a means to preclude dissent and mobilize the people behind national goals. Party leaders undoubtedly are aware that the dream of reunification has become a nightmare. In 1990, a Soviet diplomat reported that the pressure of increasing isolation has begun to create strains in the North Korean leadership.28 Speculation now centers on what will happen in North Korea after the death of the "Great Leader," Kim II Sung, who is eighty years old and has groomed his son as his successor. Beginning late in 1990, the diplomatic and economic pressures on the DPRK grew rapidly, ultimately forcing P'yöngyang to make substantial concessions. In October, the PRC signed a commercial treaty with South Korea. The Soviet Union, after establishing diplomatic relations with the ROK in September 1990, informed P'yöngyang that it would accept only hard currency in return for such commodities as oil.29 Moving toward an overall reconciliation, the two Koreas agreed in 2^ Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (New York, 1989), 215. 26 New York Times, September 13,1991, p. 13. 27 New York Times, December 13,1991, p. 16. 28 The Korea Times, September 20,1990, p. 2. 29 New York Times, February 4,1991, p. 16.

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February 1991 on procedures for selection, training, and management of joint table tennis and soccer teams to participate in international competitions in Japan and Portugal, respectively. However, that same month, the DPRK called off the upcoming fourth round of prime ministerial negotiations when the United States and the ROK reduced by one third but refused to cancel the "Team Spirit” joint military exercises.30 Then P’yöngyang suffered perhaps its most damaging diplomatic blow. In April, President Gorbachev, following a four- day visit to Japan, met with Roh Tae Woo for the third time in ten months, this time in South Korea on Cheju-do. Before departing, he announced that Moscow "would not be an obstacle" to the admission of the ROK to the United Nations. In return, Roh pledged $2 billion in credit to the Soviet Union to purchase South Korean consumer goods and heavy equipment and $1 billion in direct aid. Climaxing the visit was the agreement to sign a mutual cooperation treaty that would pave the way for a tenfold increase in bilateral trade to $10 billion annually within five years.31 South Korea's emerging partnership with Moscow left North Korea in an increasingly uncomfortable position of diplomatic isolation. Worse, Chinese Communist leader Li Peng informed the DPRK that the PRC would not block the ROK's entrance into the United Nations. Its hand forced, P'yöngyang applied for adm ission to the international organization on May 29, 1991, abandoning its longstanding insistence upon sharing a single seat with Seoul. On August 9, the UN Security Council gave approval to the applications of the DPRK and ROK for admission to the body. The South Korean government was jubilant, one official asserting that UN membership for both Koreas would "cement peace and ensure stability."3? Shortly thereafter, the DPRK and the ROK agreed to resume the prime ministerial meetings, while students from both North and South Korea met at the DMZ to hug and sing unification songs. Expectations for an early end to the artificial division of the peninsula were on the rise when North and South Korea formally joined the United Nations on September 17, 1991, as its 160th and 161st 30 New York Times, February 13,1991, p. 10, February 19,1991, p. 3. 31 New York Times, April 20,1991, p. 3, April 21,1991, p. 3. ^ N e w York Times, August 6,1991, p. 2, August 9,1991, p. 4.

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members, respectively. Seoul insisted that, like Germany, seating both Koreas in the international organization would not prevent but shorten the time necessary to achieve reunification.33 At this time, evidence that the DPRK would be able to produce nuclear weapons within one to three years emerged as a new barrier to reunification. On September 14, a defector from North Korea named Ko Young Hwan, who had been a senior diplomat, confirmed that the DPRK was developing nuclear weapons at two sites. According to Ko, the DPRK wanted to send the ROK a message that "No matter what you have now and how well you live, we have the w eapons."34 Concern regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities in fact had grown steadily in the wake of the Iraq W ar which highlighted the threat of nuclear proliferation. In April 1991, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon had stated that the United States viewed "nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula as the number one threat to the stability of East Asia." Satellite reconnaissance photographs had revealed that the DPRK was constructing a heavily-guarded nuclear installation at Yongbyön, 55 miles north of P'yöngyang. North Korea claimed it was an electricity plant, but there were no generators outside the facility or cables emerging from it.35 At a news conference on April 12, South Korean Defense M inister Lee Jong Koo said that the ROK might have to stage a commando raid to destroy the nuclear plant in self-defense. The DPRK insisted that it had neither "the need nor the capacity" to develop nuclear weapons, indicating in June its willingness to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct inspections inside North Korea.33*536 Most observers doubted P'yöngyang's sincerity. This was because the DPRK had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but then refused to allow the IAEA to conduct inspections. In April 1991, one expert predicted that by 1995, North Korea would be able to build six nuclear weapons annually. The following month, Japan terminated talks in Beijing with North Korea for the nomalization of relations because of 33 New 34 New 35 New 36 New

York Times, August 13,1991, p. 9, December 13,1991, p. 16. York Times, September 14,1991, p. 2. York Times, April 7,1991, p. E2, April 10,1991, p. 25, June 9,1991, p. 11. York Times, April 16,1991, p. 3, June, 1,1992, p. 5.

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the DPRK's inflexibility on the inspection is s u e d Seizing the diplomatic initiative, President Roh, in a speech before the United Nations in September 1991, advanced a plan for reunification that required the DPRK to end its nuclear weapons program and allow inspections. In response, Kim Yong Nam, the DPRK's foreign minister, reiterated his government's previously stated position that the United States would have to withdraw all nuclear weapons from South Korea before Fyöngyang would allow inspections inside North Korea. The DPRK also broke off talks in Brussels with the IAEA.3738 Cleverly, Washington then took action "to turn the screws" on the DPRK. On September 27, President George Bush announced that, as part of his new sweeping arms reduction initiative, the United States would remove all ground and sea based short-range nuclear weapons from South Korea. Later, the Bush administration, in response to North Korean criticism of the U.S. proposal as inadequate, even added the nuclear weapons on F-16s at Kunsan airbase as part of the withdrawal package.39 Some observers had been advocating this step to call the DPRK's bluff for some time. However, the South Koreans had opposed any reduction in the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. For its part, the Bush administration wanted to avoid even the appearance of intending to abandon the ROK.40 But neither Seoul nor Washington could ignore any longer the danger of nuclear weapons in North Korean hands. Not surprisingly, when the fourth meeting of the Korean prime ministers convened on October 22, South Korean Prime Minister Chung Won Shik insisted that the DPRK halt its nuclear weapons development program and immediately allow inspections. Without compliance, Chung said, "none of your peace proposals can be accepted at face value." In response, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong Muk advanced new 37 New York Times, May 26,1991, p. 17, August 21,1991, p. 4. 3®New York Times, September 25,1991, p. 12, October 6,1991, p. 4. 39 New York Times, October 19,1991, p. 4. Robert Morris of the National Resources Defense Council estimated that the United States during recent years had maintained 40 nuclear artillery rounds and 60 air-delivered nuclear weapons. New York Times, October 27,1991, p. 14. ^ N e w York Times, February 4,1991, p. 16, June 2,1991, IV, p. 18, June 14,1991, p. 9, October 20,1991, p. 3.

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conditions, calling for the right to inspect nuclear installations in South Korea and the removal of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" of protection from the ROK. Surprisingly, there was "modest progress" on the last day of the meeting. In a friendly and upbeat atmosphere, the two prime ministers agreed to draft and sign a comprehensive accord aimed at easing tensions. Each side made concessions: North Korea dropped its precondition demanding the total withdrawal of U.S. troops and South Korea agreed to approve a non-aggression pact prior to the negotiation of an agreement formally ending the Korean War.41 Still, the issue of nuclear weapons remained unresolved, as the DPRK referred to the ROK’s demands for inspections as "brazen and provocative." At the same time, an ROK Defense Ministry report o f November 1 expressed grave concern about the DPRK's ability to mount crude nuclear weapons on Scud missiles, declaring ominously that the North Korean nuclear program "must be stopped at any cost."42 Observers speculated that Pyöngyang was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons to bolster its legitimacy, thus compensating for imminent economic collapse and diplomatic isolation. Exploiting his advantage, Roh delivered a speech on November 9, 1991, stating that the United States had removed the last of its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The ROK, he promised, "will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," if the DPRK made the same pledge. Although Pyöngyang had been calling for a nuclear-free Korea for years, it rejected the proposal.43 Washington now sought outside assistance to increase the pressure on North Korea. Japan's prime minister announced that Tokyo would not consider recognition of or economic aid to the DPRK until it permitted inspections. Moscow already had ended all access to nuclear technology and assistance because of the issue. In November, when Secretary o f State James A. Baker III visited South Korea to participate in the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Forum, he declared that "the greatest threat to regional security and stability in this area is the threat of nuclear arms development by North Korea." Unfortunately, the PRC refused to 41 New York Times, October 23, 1991, p. 12, October 24, 1991, p. 11, October 25, 1991, p. 3. 42 New York Times, October 27,1991, p. 14, November 10,1991, pp. 1,11. 43 New York Times, October 27,1991, p. 14, November 9,1991, p. 3.

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join this diplomatic full-court press. At a press conference at the close of the meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen suggested that the United States was being impatient. He called for "dialogue, not pressure," thereby allowing North Korea to save face.44 W ithout the PRC's support, the United States doubted that the DPRK would abandon its nuclear aspirations. Consequently, when Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney visited the ROK late in November, he announced that the United States would halt its program then underway for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, which had called for a reduction in troop strength to 30,000 by 1995. In addition, W ashington would authorize the sale of Patriot missiles to the ROK and stage a huge air show in South Korea early in 1992, including stealth fighters, AWACs, and anti-missile weapons.4* Evidently, this U.S. commitment to strengthen the ROK's defenses had an effect on the DPRK. On November 27, P'yöngyang issued a conciliatory official statement lauding Bush's decision to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. More important, the DPRK said that it would sign an agreement on simultaneous inspections in both Koreas once the United States commenced complete military withdrawal. While the DPRK would negotiate with the United States on inspections, it would pursue an accord with Seoul to make Korea non-nuclear.46 Once again, the United States forced North Korea's hand and endorsed the idea o f mutual inspections. "This is as close as one can come," one U.S. official noted, "to calling the North's bluff."47 On December 11, 1991, the fifth session o f the prime ministerial meetings convened in Seoul. The ROK reaffirmed that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea. If P'yöngyang permitted inspections in North Korea, Seoul would allow the DPRK to inspect military and civilian installations in South Korea. Complaining of pressure for "forced inspections," Prime Minister Yon revived as preconditions the removal 44 New York Times, February 10, 1991, p. 25, November 12, 1991, p. 12, November 14,1991, p. 14, November 15,1991, p. 12. 4 * The United States recently had withdrawn 5,000 troops from Korea. New York Times, July 3,1991, p. 4. 46 New York Times, November 21,1991, p. 6, November 22,1991, p. 7, November 27, 1991, p. 3. 47 New York Times, December 12,1991, p. 2.

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of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," the signing of a treaty to denuclearize Korea, an end to the "Team Spirit" military exercises, and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the peninsula.48 To the surprise of almost everyone, on December 13, the prime ministers signed the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and Cooperation." Under its terms, the two Koreas renounced the use of armed force or acts of terrorism against one another, as well as efforts to overthrow either side’s government. They also pledged to restore telephone and mail service, promote economic exchange, reunite separated families, rebuild rail lines and roads across the DMZ, and establish within five months a Joint Military Commission and hotlines between military commanders. The prime ministers stopped short of calling this a peace treaty, noting that the Korean W ar would not formally end until the armistice agreement was replaced with a permanent accord. Still, as one ROK official remarked, the treaty was a "historical milestone and an evolution in inter-Korean relations" and the first step toward reunification. By contrast, pessimists noted the absence o f provisions regarding nuclear inspections. The accord also relied on vague language, such as a key passage providing that "disputes arising between the two parties shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations." Worse, a North Korean official had stated just before announcement of the agreement that the DPRK had to protect its "clean society against pollution by stinking, corrupt cultures."49 Nevertheless, President Roh hoped to exploit the momentum. On December 19, 1991, he delivered a television address calling for immediate agreement on a plan for mutual inspections without which there could be no further progress in negotiations on other matters. In response, Kim II Sung claimed that the DPRK lacked both the money and the technology to build nuclear weapons. In a meeting with U.S. Representative Stephen J. Solarz, the chair of the House Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kim advanced new conditions: proof of the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from the south, simultaneous inspections, and discussions only with the United States.50 Once again, 48 Ibid.; New York Times, December 11 ,1991, p. 5. 49 New York Times, December 13,1991, pp. 1,16, December 14,1991, p. 1. Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, the first Western official to discuss the inspection issue with Kim II Sung directly, reported that the "Great Leader” appeared to be healthy and vigorous. New York Times, December 19,1991, p. 3, December 20,1991, p. 14.

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observers were surprised when the Koreans overcame these barriers. After Fyöngyang promised an early agreement on inspections, Korean representatives met at P'anmunjöm. On December 25, the DPRK dropped its demand for confirmation of U.S. withdrawal of all nuclear weapons and removal of the "nuclear umbrella” protecting South Korea. Six days later, the two sides signed an "expression of principles" supporting a mutual pledge not to "test, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." Although the details on compliance remained vague, a Joint Nuclear Control Commission would have the right to inspect any nuclear installation suspected of being used for anything other than peaceful purposes. The ROK dropped its demand for IAEA inspections, while the DPRK abandoned a provision that would have barred mock military exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons.51 Ironically, the United States was becoming alarmed about what appeared to be the ROK's mad quest for reunification and disarmament. President Bush, prior to his visit to Japan in January 1992, stopped in Seoul and expressed concern to Roh about the overly rapid pace of recently negotiated agreem ents. Verification o f North Korean compliance, he cautioned, was vital. According Hyun Hong Choo, the ROK ambassador to the United States, Fyöngyang would announce specific procedures for inspections after Bush's departure. Seoul was so confident of Fyöngyang's sincerity that, in early January, it canceled "Team Spirit.” Roh stated publicly that this time the DPRK would follow through because it was nearly bankrupt and further intransigence would bring economic sanctions. Some South Koreans remained suspicious. According to Yang Sung Chul, a professor at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, the North Koreans "want to buy time. The [DPRK's] leaders need to show some evidence of positive action so that they can ease the pressure, and so that they can make some progress with Japan."52 Outsiders speculated that Roh's haste was a reflection of domestic political concerns, in particular the upcoming 1992 presidential election. They also felt that Roh wanted to gain a place in history as his nation's reunifier, hoping to arrange a summit with Kim II Sung for this purpose. In the end, Bush supported Roh's aspirations. Before the National 5 * Chicago Tribune, December 27,1991,p. 1\\N ew York Times, January 1,1992, p .2 52 New York Times, December 13, 1991, p. 16, January 6, 1992, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, January 6,1992, p. 6.

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Assembly, he proclaimed that "The day will inevitably come when this last wound of the cold war struggle will heal. Korea will be whole again." Visiting the DMZ, he could not resist the chance to comment on the DPRK's precarious position, stating that North Korea was under the control of "a failed regime that produces only misery and want. "53 During late January, the Bush administration announced that its under secretary of state for political affairs soon would hold an unprecedented meeting in New York with a representative from North Korea to discuss the inspections issue. Unfortunately, by early February, the DPRK again had declared that it would not permit access to North Korea.54 Korea will achieve reunification. When this occurs, it will end the most tragic era in its long history. There is a word unique to the Korean language that characterizes well the last century of Korea's history. It derives from a city near the east coast and just north of the thirty-eighth parallel called Wont'ong. In July 1953, several South Korean combat units left Wont'ong to fight in the last battles of the Korean War, although the negotiators at P'anmunj5m already had agreed on terms for an armistice. These soldiers experienced a deep sense o f anger, bittemess, and resentment because they expected needless death to rob them of the chance to fulfill their hopes and aspirations. Since then, South Koreans have used the word wont'onghada to describe situations of extraordinary and poignant tragedy in which fate forces an individual to make a choice involving unfairness and waste. The United States bears much responsibility for making the last half century of Korean history wont'onghada. But today, no foreign power blocks Korea's path to arms reduction, national unity, and, ultimately, prosperity and democracy. If the Korean people fail to realize these goals, they will at long last have only themselves to blame.3

33 New York Times, January 7,1992, p. 8. 34 New York Times, January 15, 1992, p. 12, January 22, 1992, p. 12; Chicago Tribune, January 18,1992, p. 11.

Chapter 12

THE UNITED STATES, KOREA, AND ARMS CONTROL: A STRATEGIC REVIEW

Ahn Byung-joon Shortly after taking office, the Bush adminstration conducted a strategic review of the U.S. position in Asia and Korea. This occurred in response to the end of the Cold War, the momentous domestic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and mounting trade and budget deficits. As part of this endeavor, Washington had under consideration a three-stage plan to reduce American forces in South Korea. But as President Bush leaves office, North Korea still poses a military threat. There have been suggestions to link the phased American disengagement to arms reduction and confidence-building measures. This requires negotiations between hostile regimes in the north and the south on the Korean peninsula where a cold war is still continuing mainly because the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) refuses to abandon its commitment to dominate the entire country. There has been a divergence between the global strategic trend toward detente and the Korean confrontation. This raises a difficult question of synchronizing the American global strategy with the policy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) directed at North Korea. When W ashington’s regional interests have diverged from Seoul's local interests, Korean-American relations have become strained. An example of this is when the Nixon administration withdrew the 7th Infantry Division and the Carter administration sought to redeploy the remaining 2d Infantry Division during the 1970s.1*

* Ahn Byung-joon, "South Korea and Taiwan: Local Deterrence,” in James W. Morley (ed.), Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region (Lexington, Mass., 1986), 93-

110.

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The Bush administration's attempt at troop reduction raises a similar question although the international and domestic situation has changed substantially. The central theme of this essay is that any adjustment in the U.S. military presence should be made without undermining the deterrence that has kept peace on the peninsula since July 1953. To do this it is necessary to make troop reduction conditional on substantive changes in the attitude of the DPRK regarding arms control. Otherwise, it might well send the wrong signal and damage not only deterrence, but also the chances for constructive dialogue between the north and the south on which the ultimate resolution of the Korean question depends.2 Therefore, Bush's strategic review in East Asia presented both challenges and opportunities for regional and Korean security. First, the review prompted the ROK to "Koreanize" its defenses to assume a leading role while the United States continues to provide support. As a result, it became a catalyst for arms control negotiation and confidence­ building measures between the north and the south. Second, making adjustments in the Korean-American security relationship requires both sides to practice decision-sharing along with burden-sharing on important issues of mutual concern. The method of doing, this is as important as the result in sustaining a healthy partnership for peace, prosperity, and stability. Third, to achieve arms control in the Korean context, it is important that political talks for confidence-building precede or parallel military talks because of the nature of DPRK-ROK relations which entails military and political struggles for security and legitimacy. Only after substantial agreements on operational arms control are reached can there be agreements on structural arms control in Korea. Finally, long­ term troop reduction prospects and arms control in Korea depend on restraints in arms supply as a result of crossrecognition, North-South political talks for confidence-building culm inating with a peace agreement, and an international guarantee for these arrangements by the major powers with vital stakes in the Korean peninsula. In response to the Nunn-Wamer amendment in the 1990 Defense Authorization Act, the United States is adjusting its forward deployment in Korea. This is prompting the ROK to "Koreanize Korean defense" to play the lead role by the end of this century. According to the report that the Bush administration submitted to Congress in April 1990, the United States' role in Asia is to become that of a regional balancer. The Korean 2 Ahn Byung-joon, “Decision-sharing in Korea-U.S. Relations," Korea and World Affairs 14 (Spring 1990): 5-15.

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role is a supporting one which provides for a three-stage reduction of American military forces within this decade until South Korea assumes the leading role. As relations with the Soviet Union improved after 1985, the United States' role in Asia shifted from a hegemonic power containing Soviet expansion to a regional balancer assuring peace and stability. No other power can fill the vacuum should the United States leave Asia because none would be acceptable to the other countries in the region. Consequently, for the present, the United States has little choice but to maintain a credible presence to protect its interests and to preserve a secure environm ent for democracy and a free market. As Paul Worlfowith, under secretary of defense, explained in a report to the Congress, many Asian countries expect the United States to play the role o f "a regional balancer, honest broker and an ultim ate security guarantor."3 For this purpose, the United States has been committed to sustaining a forward military deployment in Asia. As part o f Bush's planned adjustment, it intends to reduce by 10 percent the 135,000 troops currently deployed in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines by 1993. It is calling upon Korea and Japan to increase the level of burden-sharing for maintaining American troops. But Washington has made it clear that the United States will maintain its security relationship with Japan not only for mutual interests but also to keep Japan from rearming beyond its security relationship with the United States. During the 1990s, the United States plans to implement a three-phase adjustment in its presence in Korea. Washington's objectives are to deter North Korean aggression, reduce political and military tension by encouraging dialogue, and transform U.S. forces from a leading to a supporting role. In this review, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney elaborated on the three phases.4 In Phase I, which could span the years of 1991-1993, the United States envisions a force reduction of about 7,000 personnel, including 2,000 air force personnel and approximately 5,000 ground force personnel. To help trigger direct military talks between the DRPK and the ROK, Washington wants Seoul to appoint the chief delegate to 3 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 3,1990, p. 10. 4 A Strategic Framework fo r the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century, Defense Department Report to the Congress, April 1990, pp. 15-17.

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the Military Armistice Commission at Fanmunjöm. It also is asking the Korean side to increase the amount of burden-sharing to $1.3 billion. In Phase II, which could last three to five years, Washington plans to reexamine the North Korean threat and to consider restructuring the 2d Division into a smaller one, depending on improvement in North-South relations and Seoul's military capabilities. It has been suggested that Washington can transfer operational control over Korean land forces to Seoul in this period. In Phase in, which could last for five to ten years, the United States expects South Korea to be ready to take the lead role in its defense so that Washington can station a minimum of force necessary to maintain deterrence and to play a supporting role. In order for South Korea to take the lead role as called for in the report, it should be prepared to achieve a state of self-sufficient defense. For this purpose, Seoul needs to exercise autonomy in command structure, surveillance capabilities, and arms control negotiations with Fyöngyang. The South Korean armed forces need certain autonomous rights in military operation and intelligence before assuming operational control and the chief delegate function at P'anmunjSm. To do so requires the ROK and the United States to redefine the command structure under the Combined Forces Command in such a way that the ROK can shape its deterrence and defense strategy independently. Partly for this reason, the Korean armed forces are creating a position of integrated commander for military strategy. South Korea also must increase its surveillance and intelligence capabilities. Given the short warning time (said to be about 24 hours in contrast to some 70 days in Europe), the Korean defender should be able to gain insight into the potential attacker's military activities. But the ROK is currently lacking this capability and dependent on the United States. A long-term plan for acquiring this is needed. For some time South Korea has to rely on the U.S. air and naval forces for surveillance and intelligence-collecting facilities. In preparation for arms control negotiations and to compel the DPRK to accept the existing reality along the DMZ, the ROK must represent the southern side at the Military Armistice Commission. Initially, appointing a Korean general as the chief delegate by the UN commander can be a first step toward this goal. Even though the northern side will strongly protest against this action at the beginning, it would be legal. As time

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progresses, Fyöngyang will find this a useful means to develop access to the South Korean military if it is serious about arms control. U.S. reduction of military forces, South Korea's efforts to Koreanize defense, and arms control negotiations must be treated in terms of their interaction. Similarly, adjustment in the South Korean-American security relationship has to be conducted through close consultation and coordination. This is the meaning of "decision-sharing." To accomplish the objectives of maintaining deterrence, reducing tension, and making a smooth transition, both sides must avoid taking any unilateral action. Three principles need to be observed for this purpose: consistency, feasibility, and consensus. To ensure consistency, adjustment must be compatible with the strategic objective of maintaining deterrence and lessening tension. More often than not, economics and politics have dictated military reviews in the United States, and South Korea might not be an exception to this rule. Yet taking such action without consistent and coherent strategies invariably results in defeating the very goal the reviews are seeking. It is crucial to building peace and stability that efforts at achieving detente be undertaken without damaging deterrence. Hence, there must be strategic consistency among Seoul's unification policy (Nordpolitik) and security relations with Washington. To achieve feasibility, reduction of American forces must be based on a careful assessment of the existing political and military reality. The primary role of U.S. forces in Korea is to deter aggression and hence of a political nature. Their abrupt withdrawal could destabilize the military balance. This is why the matter of feasibility must be reassessed in terms of North-South Korean relations as the Defense Department's report has acknowledged. Arriving at a consensus is important because, ideally, it is better to make adjustment through agreement. This is not to say that South Korea has a veto power over American foreign policy-making. It is only to stress the importance of consultation and coordination, for the way in which Washington carries out policy adjustment could well determine its credibility, not merely in Korea but throughout the region. This principle applies equally to the Korean side. Building consensus on important issues among top leaders, working-level officials, experts, and other cognizant persons is the best means of fostering partnership. It is in this cooperative spirit that the ROK's foreign and defense ministers and the

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American ambassador and military commander in Seoul have formed an ongoing forum to discuss details of adjustment. Beyond this level, there is a need for taking joint action between the ROK National Assembly and the U.S. Congress, passing a joint resolution making further reduction of troops contingent upon the DPRK's comparable response in concrete forms of either constructive dialogue or confidence-building measures. Given the high degree of distrust and hostility that has existed between the DPRK and the ROK, it will be difficult for the two Korean states to accomplish an arms control agreement without first taking some confidence-building measures. In other words, political dialogue must precede or commence with arms control negotiations. This means that only after some "operational steps" are agreed on can there be agreement on "structural steps” for arms control. As long as Kim II Sung seeks to legitimate his political system by denying the very legitimacy of the South Korean system, there is little prospect for productive negotiation.^ This is why the ROK has consistently called for direct political talks between representatives of the two authorities including summits in order to blunt the DPRK's attempt at a united front strategy. Therefore, it is essential that there be further political talks between the existing regimes before other pending issues can be discussed. Should Pyongyang continue to refuse to recognize the South Korean government and instead advocate meetings of social groups along with government authorities, confidence cannot be built. In Korea, such operational steps as advance notification of military exercises, invitation of observers, exchange of data, and disengagement of forward deployment from the DMZ, are necessary in order to prevent accidents, surprise attack, or any misjudgments. Seoul has made various proposals including most of these safeguards.^ Since 1986, the ROK has been trying to make the annual Team Spirit exercises less provocative by notifying the other side and by inviting it to send observers. In order for the north and the south to build military confidence, they must exchange data and have open on-site inspection. More importantly, disengaging 3 3 Ahn Byung-joon (ed.), Asian Security Issues, Regional and Global (Berkeley, 1988), 198-205. 6 Ahn Byung-joon, "Arms Control Proposals of North and South Korea and their Implications for Korean Security," Korean Journal o f International Relations 26 (Winter 1986): 143-55.

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their forces from the DMZ to a rear area is immediately needed, as one Soviet arms control expert recently suggested.7 This takes on urgency because 60 percent of the DPRK's one million forces are deployed along the DMZ, located only 35 miles from Seoul. Because there has been little communication and exchange between the north and the south, promoting exchange and cooperation in economic, humanitarian, and cultural fields in themselves are true confidence-building m easures. It is not feasible to accom plish reunification without first building peace and cooperation. Opening an era o f negotiation amounts to the first operational step toward arms control. Limiting offensive equipment and forces on both sides contributes to structural steps toward arms control. In Korea, the DPRK has maintained an offensive strategy and the ROK has responded with a defensive strategy. Moreover, the North Korea has more tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and commando-type special forces than South Korea, while the Seoul government has developed mostly light infantry divisions and high quality air forces. P'yöngyang has proposed cutting both sides' forces to 100,000 within three years. This is highly unrealistic but more importantly the north has been silent on its superiority in offensive equipment and force levels. This disparity needs to be addressed as the priority item rather than merely limiting the number of soldiers. With enormous differences in the strategic concept, structure, and deployment of their forces it will be extremely difficult and time consuming for the DPRK and the ROK to take structural arms control steps. Only after the north and the south complete the last stage of reductions to parity at an agreed upon level can all U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea. W hat is important in Korea is to commence exploratory talks on confidence-building and arms control issues, for doing this will improve political relations. Seen from this perspective, 7 Alexei Arbatov, "Pacific Vortex: Arms Control and Related Security Problems for the Far East,” a paper for the conference on "In Search of a New Order in East Asia" sponsored by the Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley; Dong-a Ilbo, February 1-3,1990.

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making an adjustment in U.S. military deployment can be used as an effective card to attract the DPRK to begin serious arms control talks for its own survival and coexistence, especially in the prospect that South Korea's military capabilities might surpass North Korea's some time in the 1990s. Assuming that South Korea and the United States adjust their security relationship by linking force reduction to improved North-South Korean relations through decision-sharing, Bush's strategic review and South Korea's response to it will contribute substantially to arms control on the peninsula. However, this prospect depends on a gradual development of arms supply restraints by the major powers as a result of detente, crossrecognition, confidence-building, and arm s control agreements by the two Koreas. Such a process will include a peace agreement between the north and the south, which will require an international guarantee by the concerned powers. The end of the Cold War in East Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, and South Korea's Nordpolitik have combined to transform the relationship between the two Koreas and the major powers from de facto to de jure crossrecognition. It is remarkable that the Soviet Union dropped the Korean question from its global rivalry with the United States and even from its alliance with North Korea. This was dramatically demonstrated by the summit between then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and ROK President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 4,1990. Now that Moscow's views on security have edged closer to Seoul's and Washington's, it is natural that the Russians will restrain their arms supplies to the DPRK just as the Americans have done with the ROK. Moscow's normalization of diplomatic relations with Seoul makes it easy for Beijing to follow suit, albeit slowly. Beijing has supported peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In this sense, crossrecognition is building a positive atmosphere for the major powers to restrain their arms supplies to their respective allies. The international environment and South Korea's success in its Nordpolitik have exerted enormous pressures on North Korea to embrace confidence-building and arms control, and even a peace agreement with South Korea. Most of Pyongyang's proposals on these issues have been propaganda. Immediately after the ROK revealed its plan for the Roh-

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Gorbachev summit, however, Fyöngyang issued a statement calling for arms control negotiations in which it expressed a willingness to have direct talks with Seoul.89Perhaps, this was an attempt by the regime to survive its self-imposed isolation. After President Roh stated in his speech to the United Nations in October 1988 that he would discuss any topics including arms control and nonaggression pacts,19 there was a real possibility of constructive dialogue on these issues whenever Fyöngyang decided to cooperate. However, any agreement on arms control and on the method of substituting a new peace agreement for the armistice will have to be first negotiated directly between Seoul and Fyöngyang. Unfortunately, Fyöngyang periodically insists on tripartite talks for this purpose to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington. Unless bilateral talks between the DPRK and the ROK yield substantial results to generate mutual trust, it is unlikely that either Seoul or Washington will participate in further tripartite talks. However, after producing verifiable agreements between themselves, the two Koreas can invite Washington to bilateral negotiations if Seoul and Washington share a common perspective. In a similar vein, Moscow and Beijing also could be invited to participate. Solution of the issues in North-South relations must be Koreanized: they must be settled among the Koreans themselves according to the principle of self-determination. But such solutions cannot be effective without an international guarantee from the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. These powers should urge the DPRK and the ROK to resolve their disputed issues peacefully through dialogue. Once certain agreements are reached, they have an obligation to guarantee their implementation. When the agreements concluded between the two Koreas are signed, the major powers can legally dispose of the legacy of the Korean War as well as the Cold War in Asia. Reunification also must be accomplished by agreement between the two sides and the major powers. One hopes that genuine movement toward removing the division of the Korean peninsula will begin as early as possible so that the Cold

8 Korea Herald, June 2,1990, p. I. 9 Korea Herald, October 19,1988, p. 1.

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W ar in Northeast Asia will end as it recently has elsewhere in the international community.

Chapter 13

EAST ASIAN SECURITY POLICIES IN THE 1990S: IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA

Lho Kyongsoo Improvement in bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning in 1985 dramatically reshaped the conduct of superpower relations and substantially altered the context of world politics. Although substantial differences remained, the two superpowers sustained forward momentum toward new agreements on bilateral and multilateral security issues. Overall prospects for talks aimed at reducing strategic weapons (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), an eventual treaty banning chemical weapons, and the proposal to allow unarmed NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft to overfly each other's territory (Open Skies) seemed promising even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1 Together with the ongoing political and economic transformation of Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, EastWest tensions have virtually disappeared. Should the European peace process continue in a stable fashion, it is likely that detente among the major powers in the 1990s will initiate a tension reduction process for the Asian region. Although Soviet and American initiatives aimed at promoting region-wide confidence and security-building measures in Asia were limited before 1991, there had been growing interest in both W ashington and Moscow about implementing such measures on the Korean peninsula. This fact, as well as that the region has been the primary focus of Soviet-American tensions in East Asia, meant progress (or its absence) there would necessarily condition any subsequent initiatives towards the Asian region 1 These and related bilateral items were to be on the agenda at the summit meeting between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled for late May 1990.

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as a whole. This paper will evaluate whether a mote constructive regional approach by the United States and Russia could contribute to a lessening of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Clearly, greater Russian-American cooperation in East Asia will provide a favorable climate for interKorean discussions. If the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan were to actively promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the picture would look even brighter. Nevertheless, lasting stability in Korea will depend on the attitudes and behaviors of the two Koreas themselves. Less than a year after the Berlin Wall was toppled in November 1989, Western attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had undergone a profound transformation. The United States and its NATO allies faced a much diminished security threat from the East; the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance was for practical purposes already an anachronism, and a Communist bloc military assault on Western Europe was unrealistic. Instead, the growing concern of Western, especially American, strategists now was not so much how to deal with potential Soviet armed aggression, but how to ensure successful economic reform in the Soviet Union and keep it from falling apart.23 Disturbing evidence of mounting internal political and economic unrest in the Soviet Union contributed to U.S. worries about the viability of the Soviet regime, and forced American observers to contemplate the possibility o f a post-Cold W ar Europe mired in chaotic, unstable transition. A disintegrating Soviet Union in the face o f impending German unification raised fears (justified or not) in other European countries, posing a new dilemma for European security and stability.3 The centrifugal tendency shown by minority republics along the Soviet periphery made the problem of political cohesion particularly acute. Ironically, a desire not to make matters worse for Moscow was evident in Washington's policy towards its erstwhile adversary. This conciliatory turnabout was readily apparent in the U.S. handling o f events in Lithuania in 1990. Although W ashington criticized M oscow and 2 John Lewis Gaddis' proposal for Western economic assistance to Moscow illustrates this shift of concern. John Lewis Gaddis, "Coping with Victory," The Atlantic M onthly (May 1990): 49-60. 3 'Together Again?" The Economist 17 (June 1989): 13; Charles Krauthammer, "Return of the German Question,” Time 25 (September 1989): 88. For a thoughtful German perspective on the problems of German unification, see Wolfgang Schäuble, "Relations Between the Two States in Germany: Problems and Prospects," International Affairs 64 (Spring 1988): 209-16.

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expressed sympathy for Lithuania's political aspirations, it took no steps that could undermine the Soviet position. Such response by the Bush administration was a fitting contrast to the hawkish attitude shown to Moscow in 1988 by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.4 The internal problems in the Soviet Union, along with changing Soviet perceptions of its military security requirements, led Moscow to reorder its external priorities. To stabilize the external environment and deal with its internal crisis, the Soviet leadership showed unprecedented willingness to accommodate Western interests. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev understood that it was not the security threat from the West but the stagnant Soviet economy that presented the greatest long-term challenge to the survival of the Soviet Union. Successful reform and restructuring in the economic sector required extensive external assistance, thereby creating added incentive for continued Soviet cooperation with its former enemies. As in the United States, he had high hopes for positive economic returns from a general shift of military production resources to the civilian economic sector.56Some high-ranking Soviet scientists recently lectured members of the U.S. Congress about the merits of purchasing advanced materials and technologies developed for Soviet space and military programs.^ In another example of Soviet "creativity" in turning swords into plowshares, Moscow offered its SS-20 intermediate-range missiles (654 SS-20 missiles were to be destroyed under the 1987 INF Treaty), minus their nuclear warheads, as launch vehicles for foreign commercial satellites.7 Leading Soviet economic planners busily shuttled back and forth between W estern capitals providing assurance of Moscow's commitment to economic reform, seeking in return cooperation and increased material assistance. The changed Soviet strategic outlook was evidenced during Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow on April 23, 1990. A particularly symbolic event, it was the first trip by a senior Chinese leader since Zhou 4 Asking himself the rhetorical question, "Does he trust Mikhail Gorbachev?", Weinberger asserted that his answer was negative, explaining that it was dangerously naive to "believe that the USSR had ceased to be a threat because it is making some efforts to respond to its own internal economic difficulties." Caspar Weinberger, "Arms Reductions and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Spring 1988): 719. 5 Alexei Kireyev, Conversion: Goods Instead o f Weapons (Moscow, 1989). 6 John Holusha, "Soviets Sell Tech in U.S.,” San Jose Mercury, May 6,1990. 7 This venture, however, might contravene the terms of the INF Treaty. See William J. Broad, "Soviets Want to Sell Cold-War-Surplus Missiles," New York Times, October 22, 1989.

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Enlai last visited in 1964. The trip returned Gorbachev's earlier visit to China in May 1989, at which time the two Communist powers agreed to set aside past differences and expand cooperative relations. However, the rude greeting Li Peng received upon his arrival from hundreds of Russian students shouting "Li Peng go home" (and the fact that Soviet authorities allowed such demonstrations) revealed that the two countries were then following different political paths. Official discussions reportedly avoided potentially troublesome ideological issues, concentrating instead on such practical matters as agreements on further troop cuts along the Sino-Soviet border and the exchange of Chinese consumer goods for Soviet credits to finance nuclear power plants for the energy-starved People's Republic of China (PRC). Outside observers noted that the visit was at best "correct but cool."89Moreover, the Soviet leadership did not portray the talks as an important milestone in bilateral relations with China, and played down its potential strategic significance as a possible lever in dealings with the United States.^ Moscow's efforts to thaw Soviet-American relations came against a background of profound, and probably irreversible, trends in the world political, military, and economic context. First, in the political dimension, the sustained trend towards multipolarity accelerated the process o f eroding the postwar bipolar structure of international relations. Japan's spectacular rise to global economic and political prominence, the impending market integration of Europe then scheduled for 1992, and the rise of newly industrialized countries produced a profound redistribution of relative political power amongst states. While the United States and the Soviet Union retained their absolute positions of supreme military prowess, the functional value of this military might in the nuclear age continued to decline. As the Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts clearly demonstrated, using military power as an instrument of policy exacted great material and psychological costs but failed to produce outcomes that satisfied superpower political objectives.

8 The Economist, April 28,1990, p. 34. 9 Sergei Goncharov, Hua Di, and John Lewis, "The New State of Sino-Soviet Relations", unpublished paper prepared for an internal seminar at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, April 1990. Excerpts from the paper appeared as an article in the San Jose Mercury, May 3,1990.

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The transfer o f advanced arm am ents and the diffusion o f technological and industrial capability to make advanced military systems furthered this process of multipolarization. In the 1980s, many nations, including the poorest, developed considerable m ilitary capabilities. A few, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan, possessed or were on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. As a result, the margin of absolute military superiority that the superpowers enjoyed earlier diminished considerably. Even in the area of conventional arms, modem weapons were more precise, longer-range, and vastly more destmctive. At the lower end of the technology scale, chemical weapons emerged as a "poor man's nuclear option” for countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria among others and their production has become widespread.10 That such weapons along with ballistic missiles came to dominate trade and transfers in arms had the paradoxical effect of making the world at once both more dangerous and also more multipolar. Nevertheless, there were limits on the use of force, not only for the superpowers but for others as well, because of the diminishing political and economic returns to be gained from the exercise of such destructive military power. Whereas military power became functionally less attractive as an instrument of policy, non-military sources of power grew in importance. For example, Japan, with its enormous financial, technological, and economic resources, emerged to rival the United States in world stature. Japan's global economic power made it more powerful than the Soviet Union in the contemporary world setting. Finally, the resurgence o f domestic priorities in the foreign policies of the superpowers had a profound impact on both the American and Soviet outlook on world affairs. For much of the postwar period, both superpowers tried to shape the flow o f international events. This tendency was particularly noticeable during the height of the Cold W ar when foreign policy successes or failures were seen to be directly tied to the survival of the international political and economic system. Especially for the Soviet Union, continuing to pursue an aggressive foreign policy ran the risk of fomenting deep resentments within the domestic polity. Therefore, Soviet leaders had to move toward adopting full-fledged market-oriented

10 Robert Shuey, M issile Proliferation: A Discussion o f U.S. Objectives and Policy Options, CRS Report for Congress. February 21,1990, p. 56 ff.

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economic reforms. Without these reforms, Gorbachev and his allies knew that the Soviet economy would almost certainly suffer paralyzing deterioration.11 The primacy of domestic factors in formulating external policy was not limited to the Soviet Union. For the United States, domestic affairs came to weigh much more heavily on foreign policy decisions. Washington's reluctance to become embroiled in regional conflicts, its desire to restructure its security commitments to its European and Asian allies, and its demands that West European nations and Japan assume a larger share o f economic assistance to the developing countries all stemmed from a new appreciation of fiscal constraints. During its second term, the Reagan administration recognized increasingly that public opinion was against costly overseas involvements. In an era of budgetary and trade deficits, American strategic thinking at the outset of the 1990s increasingly paid attention not only to the magnitude of potential threats, but also the material and political constraints on shaping policies designed to meet them.12 Because o f these and other considerations, there emerged a disinclination by both superpowers to become involved in local conflicts. American and Soviet disengagement from regional affairs will not necessarily lead to sudden power vacuums, nor to an equally sudden escalation of tensions. Nevertheless, with the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over, the dismantling of their extensive network of superpower security alliances worldwide will create dangers of unexpected and unwanted conflict in some areas. Anticipating and preventing such developments will remain in the interest of the major powers, and in the larger interest of world security and stability. If the major powers find cause for concern about their future security, it will be largely because of the potential for instability in East Asia. Unlike Europe, die security situation in the region suffers from still simmering military conflicts and unresolved territorial issues. Some potential problem areas include Indochina and the Philippines, along with 11 Ed A. Hewett, "Prognosis for Soviet Economy is Grave, but Improving," New York Times, March 25,1990. 12 Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, Discriminate Deterrence, Report o f the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, especially pp. 5-22 and 57-62.

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issues concerning Hong Kong's future after 1997 and how this may effect Taiwan's relationship with the PRC. But the greatest danger of military conflict exists on the Korean peninsula, where two of the world's largest armed forces, both heavily armed with modem weapons, confront each other across a fragile truce line. Recent global and regional trends reduce the probabilities for another major conflict in East Asia, but the possibility for such cannot be excluded. The prospects for stability in East Asia over the next decade will depend as much, if not more, on the kinds of policies followed by Asia's remaining Communist states as it does on changes in Russian and American policies toward the region. There are now only three East Asian Communist regimes: China, North Korea, and Vietnam. In the wake of political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe, all three face the future with far less conviction and much less international support than at any time in the past. Beijing, P'yöngyang, and Hanoi, moreover, are saddled with increasingly weak economies that are unable to generate sufficient growth to meet expected future demands. The PRC's economic performance, which registered nine percent average annual growth rates for much of the 1980s, was expected to show a sharp decline in the 1990s.13 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not made public any useful information on its economy for some time. However, frequent exhortations for increased agricultural and industrial production by the Communist party paper, Nodong Shinmun, and calls for "speed campaigns" to raise output of various commodities, indicate considerable economic difficulties.14 Vietnam's circumstances are not much better, although Hanoi has shown signs that it might be serious about its commitment to Doi Moi reforms. By the middle of this decade, all three of these regimes will probably face serious internal instability stemming from changes in political leadership. China is under the control of an ineffectual octogenarian leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping. At 80, North Korea's Kim II Sung is also nearing the end of his life. Hanoi is ruled by the 77-year old Nguyen Van Linh who is reported to be seriously ill. These aging firstgeneration revolutionary leaders might be able to hold onto power until 13 The Economist Intelligence Unit (E1U) Country Report: China, North Korea, no. 3, 1989. 14 For an example, see Nodong Shinmun, April 24,1990, p. 5.

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they pass from the scene, but their brand of leadership clearly will not assure sufficient flexibility for their respective countries to adjust to rapid changes in the international setting. This will be particularly true in the world economic context where frequent swings are the norm rather than the exception. The problem of succession in East Asia's Communist countries is made especially acute because the designated heirs to these elderly leaders—Jiang Zemin in the PRC and Kim Jong U in the DPRK, for instance-have so far shown little evidence that they are capable o f effective leadership once their mentors have passed away. Under such conditions, the likelihood of stable transition to the next generation o f rulers seems remote. More likely is either of two equally undesirable outcomes: one is a chaotic fragmentation of these societies following a failed succession, which could destroy the existing system of rule; the other is a further tightening of central control to prevent the first scenario from coming to pass. One way to avoid the above problems might require the potential successors to cast themselves as reformers. But if the East European experience is any guide, this too would be difficult. After all, no "reform Communist" leader in Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia has managed to remain in power. Not suprisingly, then, these Asian Communist states show little willingness to restructure their policies. Having watched the fates of Communist leaders such as Erich Honecker in East Germany and Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, Deng Xiaping and Kim II Sung are not likely to encourage reforms that could easily get out of control. Potential middle-of-the-road Communist cadres in the PRC and the DPRK might not actively wish for reforms either if they are aware of the current contempt suffered by their East European counterparts. In die final analysis, China, Vietnam and North Korea will not be able to swim against the tide forever. In spite of their leaders' attempts to retain control, pressures will grow, if only because they can no longer isolate themselves as in the past. O f the three, Vietnam could be the Erst candidate to undertake substantial reforms. Vietnam has little to gain from an alliance with the PRC; Hanoi has historically been at odds with China and does not model itself after Beijing. Moreover, the Vietnamese are not burdened by a dysfunctional political system which depends on cult worship of a particular leader as is the case in the DPRK. And, at

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this juncture, Hanoi is less politically insecure, and therefore less stridently defensive, than either Beijing or Fyöngyang. The Vietnamese leadership has also had ample opportunity to pay attention to the success o f its ASEAN neighbors. It also is conceivable that the PRC could surprise the world with an early return to reform. The Tiananmen pro-democracy incident came very close to toppling the Communist government. There can be no doubt that another popular uprising will come. The dissatisfied young people who challenged the existing regime are still there, and their ranks can only grow, especially if economic conditions deteriorate. Deng's successors), who do not have his personal authority and power (if not ruthlessness), will probably fail if they order a sim ilar bloody suppression of the next democracy movement. Even if they managed to hold onto power by brutal means, this will destroy the regime's international image and irreparably discredit China's foreign policy and international standing. At least some in Beijing seem aware o f this probability. As one Chinese official reportedly put it in an interview with foreign journalists, Beijing has no desire to join a "rejectionist front'' of hard-line Leninist states who are "a club of nobodies." 15 The DPRK is in an altogether different situation. North Korea has not experienced a meaningful period of reform as in China, and it still is reluctant to accept the need for change. As a result, P'yöngyang faces increasing isolation in the international community and, except for its potential to launch another war, is doomed to political and economic irrelevance. Suppression of political and human rights in the DPRK have few parallels. North Korean citizens, for instance, are divided into categories according to their perceived loyalty to the cult leader Kim II Sung. The category to which one belongs determines occupation, dwelling, and access to material comforts (such as they are).16 North Korea, in fact, is said to be the country most on Chinese minds when they worry about their own country's future.1? Pyongyang's unpredictable and often violent acts in the external arena, moreover, are probably as unsettling to Chinese leaders as they are to the West. The Soviet Union shared these concerns but, increasingly ^ Robert Delfs, "European Chill: China Wary as Marxist Dominoes Fall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 11,1990, p. 17. 16 John McBeth, "Classified Conditions," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 19, 1989, pp. 27-28. 17 Delfs, "European Chill," p. 17.

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more disaffected with the extremes of Kim Ii Sung's rule, Moscow was far less reticent than China in criticizing North Korea.18 In other instances, objective Soviet Asian experts, among them Rafik Aliyev and George Kunadze at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), have tried to impartially advise North Korea to undertake, for its own sake, much needed internal reforms.1920Although Fyöngyang clearly has been unhappy with Moscow for some time, it cannot afford to dismiss Soviet and now Russian criticism lightly. The DPRK, for instance, cannot resort to playing off Moscow against Beijing as it had in the past. The Soviet Union, moreover, had been the largest supplier of modem weapons to P'yöngyang. North Korea had also become increasingly more dependent on Moscow for trade and economic assistance. According to one W estern estimate using Soviet data, Moscow's trade credits to North Korea amounted to $554.9 million during the first half of 1988.20 The Soviet Union's disenchantment with P'yöngyang during the 1980s came close to resembling the long-standing U.S. disaffection for Kim D Sung's regime. This shared perception of North Korea's obstinacy and unrealistic stance on regional and international issues was in evidence during a recent international conference on Northeast Asia, where American and Soviet participants reportedly expressed similar concerns about North Korea's internal and external policies.21 The United States and Russia now have a mutual interest in maintaining stability in the peninsula. For Washington, this objective has been an integral part of its postwar strategy of containment and reassurance of regional allies in East Asia including the Republic of Korea (ROK). Having accomplished the first objective, the remaining policy challenge before the United States is how to reduce its military presence in the region without unintentionally creating a destabilizing power vacuum 18 For example, see Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 29 and July 1, 1989. Soviet travelers to North Korea, especially journalists, have reportedly been under strict surveillance. 19 For a sense of Moscow’s reassessment of the situation in Korea and of the AsiaPacific region just prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, see George Kunadze, "New Political Thinking as Practiced by the USSR in the Pacific," unpublished paper delivered at the International Conference on Northeast Asia, co-sponsored by George Washington University and Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17-19,1990. 20 Ei u Country Report, p. 40. 21 Kim Jin-hyun, "Puk'han, sso-Il Wonsaek-jok Bi'nan" ("North Korea Harshly Critical of the Soviet Union and Japan"), Dong-A Ilbo, May 22,1990, p. 14.

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and abandoning its commitments to its allies. In meeting these goals, the U.S. task is made easier because Washington's principal East Asian allies, Japan and the ROK, previously thought not quite ready psychologically, are now both more capable of assuming primary responsibility for their own security. As it transfers increasing security responsibilities to its regional allies, the United States will have to exercise caution, being sensitive to legitimate concerns about Japan's growing military power and not underestimating the potential for instability in Korea.22 For the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the challenges of regional policy in the 1990s are much more numerous and varied. First and foremost, it will have to resolve its outstanding differences with Japan including its dispute with Tokyo over the Northern territories.23 Second, the CIS must be conscious of the latent potential for worsened relations with the PRC. A number of possibilities, ranging from increased ideological differences to more traditional interstate rivalries, could still undermine the recent trend toward mutual accommodation. Ideological incompatibility could become acute now that a democratic government has replaced the Soviet regime in Moscow. Russia must also make a fundamental decision concerning its policy towards the Korean peninsula. It cannot maintain its current approach, warming to Seoul, while also continuing assistance to North Korea. Ironically, at this juncture, residual Soviet influence on P'yöngyang could be a stabilizing element. Nevertheless, the inherent contradictions in the current policy will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Moscow to be on friendly terms with both Koreas over the long term.24 Issues such as the promotion of greater trade and economic interdependence with East Asian economies, creation of a viable infrastructure for the development of Russian Asia, and more active participation in regional associations, also will determine how well the CIS integrates into the post-Cold War East Asian setting. 22 A recent Pentagon report to Congress on future U.S. security strategy in the AsiaPacific region reflects appreciation of these concerns. U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework fo r the Asian Pacific Rim (Washington, D.C., April 1990). 23 Nobuaki Tanaka, The Impact o f Historic Changes in East-West Relations on the Far East, International Institute for Global Peace (IIGP) working paper, Tokyo, December 25, 1989. See also, Gerald Segal, "The New Soviet Maritime Strategy in the Pacific," Naval Forces 6 (1989): 14ff. 24 For more detailed discussion on this point, see Lho Kyongsoo, "Seoul-Moscow Relations: Looking to the 1990s," Asian Survey 29 (December 1989): 1161-66.

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Given its pressing internal problems, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the CIS will be able to tackle these and other challenges in the near future. Therefore, the United States and its regional allies will remain primarily responsible for taking the initiatives to reduce tensions in the region. Moscow, however, can help at a minimum by lending moral and political support to these efforts. It also can refrain from arms sales to unpredictable regimes, at a time when the temptation to do so for purely financial reasons is high.25*Such restraint will be especially critical with respect to future arms shipments to the DPRK, in particular advanced weapons systems that could seriously destabilize the regional military balance. P'yöngyang is already a grave military threat to the region with its arsenal of modified Scud-B and possibly even extended range Scud-PIP missiles.2^ There already is some evidence that these missiles might be armed with chemical warheads. North Korea's purported civilian nuclear program also has come under increasing international suspicion, especially during 1991. All these international efforts to enhance security in the region are of considerable importance. Ultimately, however, a lasting solution to the Korean problem will lie in the hands of the two Koreas themselves. Other regional actors have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. But without fundamental agreement to reduce tensions between the two governments in Korea, the problems stemming from their military confrontation will continue to cloud security prospects, not only for the Korean peninsula but for he whole region as well. South Korea's apprehension of renewed North Korean aggression has dominated its security concerns for four decades. Since 1953, the ROK's security policy has sought to develop internal and external sources of strength to offset the DPRK's greater military capability and to deter war. A less visible component of South Korea's security strategy toward North Korea has been its willingness to wait for positive changes to take place 25 Robert Pear, "Prospects of Arms Pacts Spurring Weapons Sales," New York Times, March 25,1990, p. 11. 2^ North Korea acquired its initial Scud-Bs from Egypt, probably in 1976, in return for assistance given to Cairo during the October 1973 war. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. and W. Seth Cants, "The North Korean Scud-B Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review 1 (April 1989): 177-81.

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in Fyöngyang’s domestic politics and in its relations with the outside world. The record of North Korea's aggressive behavior, however, scarcely justifies optimism in South Korea. Seoul's profound concern with the North Korean threat arises from two crucial and interrelated factors. First, the sheer scale of the DPRK's spending on arms demonstrates its determination to develop and maintain an independent offensive military capability. Fear in South Korea remains great, even though the population of North Korea, at approximately 20 million, is roughly half that of the ROK. Also, the South Korean gross national product (GNP), at about $160 billion in 1989, is nearly five times that of North Korea. Indeed, grave concern continues precisely because of this extraordinary paradox in the DPRK's policy toward the ROK. How could P'yöngyang allocate vast sums to the military sector, at great and increasing costs to its deeply troubled economy, unless North Korean leaders have a hidden agenda contradicting their stated desire for peaceful resolution of the Korean impasse? The second important reason for South Korean reservations derives from North Korea's unrealistic approach to the matter o f national reunification. At every discussion aimed at finding a workable path to create the framework for a mutually acceptable reunification plan, P'yöngyang has insisted on a format that seeks, either directly or indirectly, to diminish Seoul's legitimacy as the principal interlocutor of its political destiny. A standard North Korean tactic, for example, has been its insistence on talking to the United States first, then to the ROK, on matters relating to resolution of the Korean question. By taking this approach, P'yöngyang hopes to create the impression that Seoul is under the direct control of the United States and therefore illegitimate. Another standard North Korean tactic has been to demand as a precondition to their participation in political and arms control discussions the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, not mutual and balanced reductions of all forces on both sides of the demilitarized zone. As one know ledgeable observer points out, North Korea's "seem ingly conciliatory gestures" up to now have been little more than "attempts to refurbish its tarnished international image."27

27 Han Sung-ju, "Relations Between North Korea and the United States," unpublished paper delivered to the 4th ROK-U.S. Conference on North Korea, Co-sponsored by the

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This mindset is evident in nearly every North Korean proposal. The DPRK’s fixation on ways to undermine the South Korean government’s legitimacy and bargaining position prior to any real discussions has been behind its insistence on a tripartite conference format where North Korea deals with the United States while South Korea is assigned a role as an observer. Moreover, for all their seemingly benign intent, North Korea's arms reduction proposals in 1988 and 1989 did not depart from past practice in any essential respect.28 Until recently, Fyöngyang insisted on discussing disarmament only with the United States, rather than dealing with Seoul as an equal. North Korea has had great difficulty realizing and accepting that the very basis of its relationship with South Korea, as well as the world political and security environment, has undergone profound changes and left the DPRK more and more in a strategic conundrum of its own making. It has been on the basis of this prevailing pattern of North Korea's unyielding stance that South Korea has sought to strengthen its independent defense capability. In the 1950s and 1960s, Seoul's defense strategy entailed mainly investment in the modernization of the armed forces commensurate with the level of North Korea's offensive military capability. Given P'yöngyang's across-the-board superiority in armaments, Seoul has had to play catch-up for a considerable time. A substantial proportion of the national budget, therefore, was allocated to force modernization and training when it could have been invested in more productive endeavors. And because it was even more essential to deter war than be capable of defending against an attack, South Korea continues to see validity in maintaining its security ties with the United States, despite full awareness of the political and propaganda mileage that P'yöngyang derives from criticizing this bilateral partnership. Under present conditions, it is difficult to fault the logic of deterrence based on the Seoul-Washington alliance, especially when this arrangement is Korean Association for Communist Studies and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, August 8,1989. 28 For instance, see On A ll Inclusive M easures to Guarantee Peace fo r the Independent and Peaceful Reunification o f the Country, Communique on a Joint Meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, P'yöngyang, November 7,1988, especially pp. 6-8.

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maintained by Seoul at a political cost to itself. Alternative options, such as substantially increased defense expenditures in place of U.S. security commitments, would not only be undesirable economically, but more importantly, could touch off a serious arms race. Far from being destabilizing, South Korea's current security policy (together with American forces in Korea) ensures military stability in Korea and in the region. South Korea's economic growth has allowed Seoul to add an important new dimension to its security policy in recent years. Beginning with the 1970s, Seoul sought to use its expanding international trade and economic ties to enhance its diplomatic campaign to establish itself as a legitimate and responsible member of the international community. In line with this strategy, the ROK undertook to contribute toward humanitarian and development-related activities of multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). South Korea also began to provide bilateral aid in the 1980s to countries within the Asian region and, where its international aid budget allowed, to developing countries outside of the region. This effort continues into the present decade, with economic assistance even flowing to Eastern Eu rope .29 Thus, South Korea has decided to forego obvious immediate domestic benefits in the interest of long term international gain. The ROK wants to act like and be recognized as a responsible member of the international community. South Korea's increased economic capability has clearly played an important role in creating a diplomatic opening to Eastern Europe, the CIS, and the PRC. For these countries, it has become clear that Seoul is no longer a mere dependency of the United States and Japan, a prominent theme in their evaluation of South Korea in earlier writings. Although the goal of normalized relations with these countries was a consistent foreign policy goal for Seoul dating from the early 1970s, South Korea's diplomatic effort alone probably would not have been sufficient to bring about this change of view in Moscow or Beijing, let alone in Budapest or Warsaw. Their reassessment of the ROK had much to do with Seoul's expanding regional and global economic importance.29 29 South Korea recently provided a second "soft" loan package to Hungary in addition to an earlier 1988 loan for $125 million. "Bank Group to Loan Hungary $40 Million," Korea Newsreview, April 21, 1990, p. 22.

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South Korea's activist diplomacy toward the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has accelerated the process leading toward diplomatic normalization. The ROK's initiative toward these countries, known as Nordpolitik, provided a formal policy context for Seoul's northward diplomacy. It also allowed the DPRK to see that the thrust of this policy was in its own best interests as well. That these interests were there was made evident by the rapid growth in economic and political exchanges that developed after 1988. It was fortunate that South Korea's drive to open ties with Communist countries anticipated the East-West rapprochement. The evolution of Soviet and East European attitudes toward Korea from the late 1980s reflected the correspondence of mutual interests and effectively prom oted greater accom m odation and cooperation by all sides.30 The positive momentum generated by this cooperative thaw, should it continue, will contribute substantially to improvement in the security environment in Northeast Asia. What more can be done by Seoul at this juncture to further promote the cause of tension reduction and peace in Korea and in Northeast Asia? Some observers of the Korean situation point to factors that, in their view, provide the necessary reassurances that Seoul would need in order to adopt further political and military measures to reduce tensions on the peninsula. First cited is South Korea's own indigenous military capability and its productive industrial base. In their view, this alone is sufficient to allay Seoul's fears of being absorbed by North Korea. Second, they point to the improvements in Seoul's relations with Beijing and Moscow as an "informal guarantee" that both the PRC and the CIS, separately and/or together, would provide some restraint on the DPRK. To underscore this point, they characterize North Korea as a regime which, in spite of its self-conscious rhetoric about juche (self-determination, self-reliance), remains heavily dependent on its traditional patrons. Third, they also note the resilience of Seoul's long-standing partnership with Washington. Even in the event of American troop reductions or complete withdrawal, the continued validity of the bilateral Seoul-Washington mutual defense treaty, together with the practical economic and political interests that the United States has in South Korea, would act as sufficient deterrents against another North Korean attack.31

30 Lho, "Seoul-Moscow Relations," p. 1165. 31 Doug Bandow, "Leaving Korea," Foreign Policy 77 (Winter 1989-1990): 77-93.

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These critics are calling on Seoul to undertake a fundamental review of its bilateral security relationship with the United States in conjunction with a basic reassessment of P'yöngyang’s intentions and capabilities. Unfortunately, these critics, for all their constructive intentions, are premature in believing that the security environment in Korea has undergone sufficient change at present to warrant a fundamental, and potentially destabilizing, change in the existing framework of deterrence. The time is right for an openness of mind, and for measured steps aimed at creating the bases for cooperative relations in Korea. However, the necessary preconditions to justify substantive steps toward changing the existing arrangement have not yet been met. Even the improvements to date are conditional and by no means assured of long term continuity. For substantive transformation of the unhappy Korean situation to take place, the foremost change in existing arrangements has to take place not in South Korea but in North Korea. This change can come in one of two ways: either Kim II Sung and his old-guard revolutionary generation must be replaced by a more pragmatic group of leaders or, unlikely as it might seem, the present North Korean leadership must undergo an objective, non-ideological, reappraisal of the existing reality in Korea and in the world today. In either case, unless and until P'yöngyang clearly shows by word and deed that it is prepared to face the permanent reality of a legitimate South Korean government, regardless of P'yöngyang's own preferences, prospects for real dialogue and genuine accommodation between the two Korea are at best dim. Given available evidence, Kim II Sung is not under any immediate threat to his life despite his advanced age. Neither does he seem prepared to foresake his life-long revolutionary goals nor allow others to abandon his flawed vision. Results of North Korea's recent elections for the Supreme People's Assembly showed little significant personnel changes and few signs of changing doctrine.32 Over the longer term, however, Kim II Sung will eventually pass from the scene. It is not known whether his departure will produce a battle for succession in P'yöngyang as is endlessly speculated. But this, after all, is not the really important 32 Nodong Shmmun on April 24, 1990, printed an editorial under the title "Juche sasang-üi k i’chirul nop'i deulgo u'ri-üi sahwae chu'üi chongkwön-eul to'uk k'anghwa haja" ["Let us hold the banner of Juche high, and strengthen our socialist basis of power"].

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question. What matters is what sorts of policies the successor regime will adopt. Whoever triumphs will have to create a new and different basis for political legitimacy than that which allowed Kim to rule over a North Korea in decline. If Kim remains in power much longer and refuses to implement necessary economic and political reforms, the deterioration in North Korea by the time he dies will be profound. This will be no small problem for his successors to overcome. No more than the Soviet Union was able to restructure its internal system without a more peaceful and constructive relations with the outside world, North Korea too will have to open itself to the outside unless it is prepared to accept potentially catastrophic consequences.. There have been some tentative signs in recent years that North Korean leaders realize their self-imposed dilemma.33 P'yöngyang's announcement of a joint venture law in 1984, seemingly designed to emulate post-reform China's policy of controlled economic interaction with the outside world, was one such example. Yet, apart from the vague provisions of the joint venture law, the lack of a viable maiket structure and the absence of planning to implement even the most basic marketoriented economic policies means that few foreign investors would be willing to act on North Korea's offer. The DPRK has squandered its finances on erecting monuments to Kim II Sung and building mammoth projects designed to impress outsiders but that are in fact white elephants. The half-hearted joint-venture law revealed Pyongyang's insufficient understanding that substance is at least as important as form, in economic matters no less than in the realm o f political and security policy. Unfortunately, the record of P'yöngyang's ability to repay loans to the international banking community is as discouraging as its promises to seek peaceful accommodation with the ROK. South Korean companies, in fact, are reported to have quietly retired nearly $200 million of the DPRK's debt.34 Lest this assessment of the DPRK seem unfair, let us briefly evaluate South Korea's record. The ROK too has made its share of mistakes in its competition with the DPRK. Seoul is perhaps as much at fault as 33 Sheryl Wu Dunn, "Now, North Korea Would Like to Reach Out,” New York Times, July 9,1989, p. 18. 34 Urban C. Lehner, "North Korea is Attempting to Shroud Its Economic Ills with Showcase Projects," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, July 17,1989, p. 2.

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Fyöngyang for not seeking a more peaceful modus vivendi with the DPRK at an earlier date. But Seoul's most strident anti-Communist policies were shaped by the politics of the Cold War and pursued in a period devoid of East-West dialogue. With the arrival of detente in the early 1970s, however, and particularly after Seoul adopted a reshaped foreign policy after 1973, it has pursued an accommodation with Fyöngyang. Even the failure of detente at the end of the 1970s did not alter Seoul's awareness that, over the long term, cooperation and reconciliation with the DPRK, the Soviet Union, and the PRC would be crucial to any peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. A useful illustration of the ROK's pragmatism is how Seoul resisted the impulse to vilify Moscow and abandon further peaceful overtures after the Soviets shot down a Korean passenger aircraft. In doing so, it had to swallow deep anguish. But the ultimate reward for patience came in 1988 when the Soviet Olympic team arrived in Seoul for the summer games and saw how conditions in South Korea differed vastly from their preconceived notions. Much the same sort of prudence and pragmatism prevailed over South Korean responses to unfavorable North Korean actions. Fyöngyang's attempts to assassinate South Korean political leaders, first in 1968 and more recently in 1983 in Rangoon, were completely reprehensible acts. South Korea has shown restraint in other ways. One useful area for comparison with respect to arms control relates to defense spending. What would be the prospects for arms control in Korea, for example, if Seoul were to truly engage in a tit-for-tat arms race with Fyöngyang? If the ROK, for instance, were to match the DPRK's spending on defense in terms of percentage of GNP, the race would quickly tilt in favor of South Korea unless Moscow and/or Beijing came to Fyöngyang's immediate assistance. But Seoul's security doctrine does not stress military superiority. It concentrates instead on matching, but not exceeding, North Korea's military capability. If the circumstances were reversed, would the North Korean leadership exercise similar selfrestraint? Once again, the DPRK's record of past and current behavior does not allow much room for optimism. Thus far, the assessment of the prospects in Korea seems rather gloomy. But it is well to remember that the one constant in history is change, and therein lies the opportunity for betterment. With the passage

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o f time, changes in leadership might work to bring about rational thinking in North Korea. In South Korea, it is of vital importance to look beyond the record of past North Korean behavior if it is to clearly recognize and respond in timely fashion to evidence of positive changes in North Korea. At no other time since the end of the Korean War has this been more critical than now because the most important leadership change in North Korean history must take place soon. It is in the long term interest of South Korea, and also in the interest of peaceful reunification, for Seoul to continue with its policy o f restraint. Also, the ROK must continue to take steps toward improved ties with Fyöngyang—even if these steps seem to be dangerous, unilateral concessions to an untrustworthy rival. Recently, South Korean interest in confidence-building measures (CBMs) as an adjunct to the arms control process has grown substantially. The Seoul government has expressed its readiness to adapt the successful European experience with building CBMs to the Korean situation.35 This is an encouraging and timely development. There are several reasons why Seoul might wish to promote CBMs with North Korea sooner rather than later. First and foremost, by doing so, the ROK assures itself of having initiated the peacemaking process. Thus, Seoul sets the tone and pace of all subsequent bilateral discussions. It will be Pyongyang that will then have to respond, and its failure to do so would further discredit its position internationally. Second, Seoul can create the basis for Moscow and Beijing, not to mention Washington, to apply greater pressure for reforms in Fyöngyang. Third, the ROK must consider the domestic political context in South Korea. The generation of young students who do not recall any of the enormous hardships suffered during and immediately after the war, and who in their idealism and new­ found sense of nationalism see reunification as the overriding goal of national policy, will not be persuaded by arguments aimed at prudence and caution. If only to defuse volatile student demands on this issue, South Korea should take the initiative even before any leadership transition in Fyöngyang.

35 Im Dong-won, Director, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), "Pyung'hwa chungch'ak-eul wi'han daechollyank kusang" ["Conceptualizing a Grand Strategy for Peace"] (Seoul, June 1989).

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There are other less obvious merits to a more daring South Korean approach toward North Korea. One is that a more forthcoming attitude in Seoul might help the moderate and progressive elements in the DPRK who wish to speed the process of reform. In addition, if potentially risky openings toward North Korea are made, then the overtures should come while the presence of American troops in Korea still provide an additional margin of security. Undoubtedly, there always will be an element of risk involved for Seoul in accommodating any North Korean security demands. Given current favorable security trends in the region and in the world, it is an opportune moment to propose a framework for CBMs that does not necessarily require the DPRK to provide clear evidence that it will behave. Given North Korea's troubled situation, Fyöngyang, because of its own pressing needs, finally might be ready to undertake some genuine steps to increase cooperative relations. The European example might indeed be a viable way to commence the North-South confidence-building measures. The European process, though not applicable everywhere in the Asian region, might work in Korea where the confrontation is similarly land-based. There are close parallels. Applicable elements from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act would include voluntary prenotification o f large military exercises and invitations to outside observers, these practices having already been unilaterally adopted and implemented by the ROK and U.S. forces in Korea. Should North Korea also see benefit in these CBMs, future steps might include adoption of Stockholm-type accords such as provisions for mandatory international observation of military activities, mutual exchange of annual calendars listing planned military activities, and procedures for on-site inspection of compliance with these measures. In the end, the successful outcome of any confidence-building and arm s reduction process in Korea will depend on North Korea's commitment to building a peaceful framework for ROK-DPRK relations. Sadly, the course and outcome of discussions so far between the two Koreas still reflect P'yöngyang's disinterest in achieving a meaningful agreement to reduce tensions. Irrespective of the DPRK's stance, the ROK has a clear and continuing interest in making explicit its proposals

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for arms control in Korea.36 Seoul must show its readiness to allow diplomacy to prevail over purely military or technical concerns. South Korea's development of a detailed plan for confidence-building and security-building measures applicable to the Korean peninsula will provide the opportunity for it to demonstrate in the clearest possible terms its desire to reach a breakthrough with North Korea. Seoul also must persist with its efforts to induce Pyongyang's cooperation even if there are no visible results over the short term. The United States and the CIS can help the Korean arms control process by working together to impress on Pyongyang that neither nation will accept the threat or use o f force as an agent of political change in the Korean peninsula, any more than they are prepared to do so in Europe. The start of a realistic and sustained confidence-building process by Seoul and Pyongyang, when it comes, will signal the beginning of an end to the embittered rivalry between the two Koreas, and open the way to finally build a more durable framework for peace in Northeast Asia.

36 For a cogent argument in favor of a forward-looking South Korean arms control policy, see Ha Yong-sun, Hanbando-eui Jeon'jaeng-gwa Pyong'wha: K un'sa-jok Kin'jang-üi Kujo [War and Peace in the Korean Peninsula: The Structure o f M ilitary Tension] (Seoul, 1989).

Chapter 14

ARMS CONTROL IN NORTHEAST ASIA: LESSONS FOR RECENT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS

Kevin N. Lewis With recent favorable political developments around the world and arms control progress in several different negotiating forums, it may seem excessively prudent to urge caution regarding any far reaching scheme for arms reduction in Northeast Asia. Certainly, recent events in Europe suggest how abruptly long-standing logjams can be broken, seeming to invalidate the pessimistic views held by many. Accordingly, observers of the Northeast Asian scene are beginning to ask, if such progress has been realized elsewhere, then why not hope for similar dividends in Korea? Recent progress in the European arms reduction arena is the result of a rather unique combination of developments not likely to be replicated in other regions. M oreover, the context in which arms control proceedings in Northeast Asia should be viewed cannot be divorced from the overall strategic environment which is quite different from the environment in other areas. This paper argues that unless one adopts as an objective "arms control for its own sake," observers ought to proceed very cautiously, mindful of the total strategic environment. In other words, it would be unwise to attempt any simplistic extrapolation from the recent history of arms limitation efforts in other regions and under other circumstances to the unique and demanding security context of Northeast Asia. However, none of these cautions should be taken as an argument against developing a more concrete basis for possible future progress toward mutual and verifiable arms limitation in Northeast Asia. As we

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have recently seen in Europe, years of difficult and slow progress yielded little in the way of fruitful force reductions.1 However, this undistinguished record did help the W est exploit the dram atic developments that have swept across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although earlier negotiations might not have produced much of real consequence, they did provide a foundation for the creation of institutions, frameworks, and rationales that have now been put to work speedily and to good effect. In essence, previous arms limitation efforts did not produce useful results, but they might have made more likely the successful pursuit of meaningful negotiated outcomes once other developm ents unlocked the potential fo r m ajor arm s control progress. This point is an important one. When asked about the phenomenon of scientific breakthroughs, the French biologist Louis Pasteur noted that "chance favors the prepared mind."2 In other words, while the potential for truly meaningful arms control in Korea and Northeast Asia presently may not be very promising, it is nonetheless possible that future developments (most notably, some kind of reconfiguration in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) after Kim II Sung's death) might open up some promising avenues for real reductions. As in Europe, it might be possible to prepare the terrain for significant movement toward force limitations or tension reductions that might encourage developments not typically thought of as being on the arms control "agenda." Nevertheless, a number of pitfalls might follow from proceeding too quickly, such as creating an adverse environment for relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). This could occur, for example, by stimulating overly optimistic expectations in domestic audiences on both sides of the Pacific. The potential downside associated with these and other eventualities is sufficiently great to recommend a slow but well-conceived approach to Northeast Asian arms control. Europe's current prospects for breathtaking progress in force limitation and operational restriction protocols, the shifting political environment, and other developments have changed the entire European 1 U. Nerlich and J.A. Thomson (eds.). Conventional Arms Control and the Security o f Europe (Boulder, Co., 1988). 2 As the Brooklyn Dodgers' Branch Rickey once put it, "Luck is the residue of design."

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security environment almost overnight. Such events hold out hope for greater stability and security in areas of potential friction elsewhere in the world. However, it is important to recall that before the fall of 1989, talks on enhancing European security by means o f force reductions and operational constraints proceeded desultorily for years. The predecessor to the current CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) process—the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions)—began in the 1970s, as did the CSCE (which might ultimately become a central component in a future universal collective security system in Europe). However, for a number of reasons—not the least of which involved the relative unwillingness of either the United States or Soviet bloc in Europe to entertain any real change in the political predicates of the strategic balance— such talks produced little in the way of meaningful outcomes. In terms of their significance, events since 1989 have eclipsed those of the entire preceding epoch o f European-oriented arms control. Observing a long-standing stalemate broken up so rapidly in Europe raises a number o f questions. Could the same kind o f dramatic breakthrough occur in Northeast Asia? If so, how might progress in arms and tension reduction be facilitated? If not, what are the special circumstances o f the modem Korean rivalry that demand special accommodation? Finally, regardless of the answer to these points, what can we say in general about the nature of "dramatic" developments in arms control: the causes, and the factors contributing to their ultimately successful implementation, ratification, and integration with other security and diplomatic requirements? Perhaps the most powerful force behind the push for arms control today is the potential it offers for reducing the costs to both sides of participating in an ongoing military competition. Regrettably, to date the record regarding this oft-touted payoff of arms control is quite mixed. In a num ber o f Soviet-American forums, the demonstrable savings produced by treaties were modest, whereas the "costs” of successful arms control— in terms of the acquisition of bargaining chips, verification, and so-called "payoffs" to some constituencies required to produce adequate home-front support—were often not trivial. Conventional arms control might bring the opportunity to break from this mixed experience, given the high costs of these forces and the national economic circumstances of those involved. Indeed, a large part of former Soviet President Mikhail

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Gorbachev's interest in European conventional force reductions involved the easing of the Soviet Union's oppressive military burden, which was for a long time large enough to inhibit prospects for the Soviet Union's domestic economy. The same set of pressure might push Communist North Korea toward embracing serious arms reduction as well. In the DPRK, the "guns vs. butter" situation is even more striking than in the former Soviet Union. Estimates of that nation's defense burden run from 10 to 18 percent of GNP, depending on one's definitions and assumptions. In relative terms, the ROK is less encumbered, but any savings— not only in budgetary terms, but with respect to labor, research and development talent liberated from arms competition— would be desirable. To illustrate such matters, Table 1 shows the present relative costs of participating in the Korean standoff across national economies, and compares these statistics with other noteworthy cases. Table 1 COMPARISON OF DEFENSE BURDENS: SOME SELECTED CASES (1987) ROK

DPRK

Defense Spending ($ Billions)

5.7

4.2

Defense as Share of GNP/GDP (%)

4.7

>10

U.S.

25.4

1.0 205

560

245

489

Defense Spending per Capita

135

195

($ Thousands) Active Armed Forces (Thousands)

629

842

2163

1.5

3.9

Germany

288.4 6.1 1170

Active Military Personnel

Japan

0.9

0.2

34.5 3.1

0.8

per Population (%) Source: IISS, Military Balance, 1989.

As background information, the U.S. data declined in real terms since fiscal year 1985, a development not closely related to arms control progress. The Japanese defense burden figure (one percent of GNP) is typically cited by many in the United States as "inadequate,” given the great size of the Japanese economy and the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan. The West German data are roughly typical within European NATO countries in terms of defense as a component of GNP. Therefore, both Koreas fall into the high end of the relative defense-burden range worldwide, with North Korea residing near the

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very top o f the list. Certainly the burden of defense on the ROK is not manifestly intolerable, particularly when compared with the costs of any breakdown in deterrence. Indeed, given the present state of the Korean economy, current levels of defense outlays can probably be maintained without forfeiting prospects for satisfactory long-term growth. However, should prudent and tangible force reductions permit any decrease in defense burdens, this would be most welcome. Given the manifestly superior economic health of the Pacific region's democratic economies, those nations can obviously tolerate even higher levels of defense spending without risking unacceptable economic damage. To compete with its southern neighbor, Fyöngyang must endure disproportionately greater sacrifices. These sacrifices might not be entirely disadvantageous from a long-term strategic perspective. To the extent that its enormous diversion of wealth and population to defense deprives the DPRK’s citizens of comforts enjoyed in thriving capitalist societies, a huge defense burden could ultimately contribute to political and economic reform. The DPRK can maintain its sacrifices only as long as it can promote a siege mentality among its citizens. So far, it has done so successfully. But as recent events in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and elsewhere indicate, an unlimited willingness to sacrifice is not necessarily a foregone proposition. For this reason, the risks and indirect benefits of what some call a "cost-imposing" strategy need to be considered with other factors unique to the region. Although the Northeast Asian negotiating environment has many unique features, basic principles of arms control seem widely applicable. Such principles aside, what specific issues might be considered while exploring the prospects for possible practical initiatives? The factors that have led to the apparent millennial developments in Europe are unique. They are the result of a complex combination of fortuitous events. This represents an irony of sorts. One could argue that the key developments which have unfolded in Europe were inevitable (for example, that the Soviet centrally-planned and highly militarily oriented economy was bound to eventually collapse and that Germany was bound to reunite). What is bizarre about recent developments is that they have happened more or less all at once. Even so, there was no deus ex machina here. It is easy to forget that many key processes and trends—Western European economic and political integration, increasing economic interdependence, relaxation of military tensions—have been unfolding and gaining in strength for years.

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Given the allegations by some that arms control techniques and objectives might be transplanted wholesale from the European theater to Northeast Asia, it is worthwhile to note some major differences that could effectively prohibit such a schemed The most obvious difference between the European and East Asian strategic settings is the loci of the relative centers of strategic gravity in both theaters—that is, the number and capabilities of the various sides that can be said at any given point in time to be following major independent policy courses, distinct from those with whom they might nominally consider to be aligned. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had their internal difficulties, but even at the height of such problems (especially following the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1967 and in the wake of periodic Soviet aggressions against its own confreres), the overall situation remained bipolar. In contrast, the situation in Northeast Asia has been far more complex over time. The democratic "axis" in Northeast Asia (the United States, the ROK, Japan, and, indirectly, various others) has remained fairly steadfast over the years, albeit with some adjustments.34 But the corresponding situation north of the thirtyeighth parallel has been far more fluid and unpredictable. Not since the early 1960s has anything resem bling a united Communist front existed. Obviously, the more independent parties exist in any set of discussions. The more singular their relationships with friends and adversaries, the more complex the situation becomes. Resolving the circumstances for a multipolar arms limitation system in Northeast Asia will pose an array of challenges. A related factor on which key strategic circumstances in Northeast Asia differ from those in Europe concerns the roles played by nuclear­ armed superpowers, not only as members of defense and deterrenceoriented coalitions, but as the political leaders of those organizations. In the NATO/Warsaw Pact standoff, the deeply integrated and central 3 The initial promise of Combined Forces in Europe (CFE) and other talks faded considerably in the spring of 1990. The Soviets, greatly concerned with the ultimate politico-military status of Germany, adopted a much more reluctant stance, and it was possible that much of the promise of ongoing negotiations could have withered. In other words, the euphoria over what is "possible" in arms control should be taken with a grain of salt pending the successful resolution and implementation of such treaties. 4 Moreover, the degree of alignment (particularly in a military sense) has been more vague than it has been in Europe, even among the non-Communist parties.

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participation of the United States and Soviet Union meant certain risks— in particular, serious escalation should conflict occur. On the positive side, that involvement tended overall to have a stabilizing and dampening effect on the behavior of the counterpoised coalitions. This occurred for many reasons. One involved the historical primacy of the European defense problem in the strategic calculus o f the superpowers. The stakes in Europe were so high, and the commitments so deeply ingrained, that it was impossible to imagine any major crisis or conflict in Europe not having worldwide repercussions. For instance, U.S. planning for war in Europe typically took place in the context of a presumed global war, and possibly a global nuclear conflict. In Northeast Asia, this was far less the case for both superpowers, especially for the Soviet Union. For instance, in recent decades, the relative "control" that the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China (PRC) for that matter, has been able to exercise over the behavior of the DPRK has been limited. It is also not as incredible to imagine a conflict on the Korean peninsula remaining limited, just as it did from 1950 to 1953. This would render some of the stakes in arms limitation and tension reduction relatively less critical to some of the parties involved at various times; such a fact might complicate negotiations in any of several ways.5*I Northeast Asia's political agenda differs considerably from that in Europe. In particular, the European agenda has been devoted to assuring the continuation of a well-defined status quo, whereas the Asian agenda ultimately seeks fundamental shifts in the strategic context—notably unification.* This complicates the picture. Blending arms reductions with the ongoing goal of unification requires all concerned parties to address two major issues at the same time: the arms reduction part of the 5 Though, it should be noted, the reverse could apply. * It is true that German reunification was also a goal, particularly in Germany. However, this objective differs from the case in Korea in several important ways. For one thing, as a national objective, reunification has traditionally been subordinated to (and more recently, strongly linked with) coalition policy. The question of reunification as a strategic, purely political and economic, aim also differs in each theater. External stakes, meaning the touted generalized anxieties falling under the aegis of the so-called "German question," have differed dramatically in Europe and Asia. So too has the presence of large foreign forces (notably in Germany), not to mention the history of these forces' activities. The political status of Germany dating from conditions existing at the end of World War II has played a unique role in the question of German, but not Korean, reunification. Finally, compared with the sorts of social, economic, administrative, and other contacts that have existed between the two Germanies, the two Koreas have been extraordinarily isolated.

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equation in its own right, and the dynamic peninsular political agenda, notably reunification. Because a major reduction in military capability on both sides on the Korean peninsula implies a fundamental change in the relationship between the two parties, any major progress in this direction would raise new and complex questions. For instance, this might possibly require new Japanese and Chinese security arrangements. Another major set of differences pertinent to the prospects for arms control in Northeast Asia follow from the strategic geography of the Korean defense problem. There are major similarities between the defense of the ROK and the defense of West Germany prior to 1989. The compact strategic geography in each theater prohibits the trading of space for time: a steadfast defense must be conducted as far forward as possible. This has led to stationing of large and ready forward-force complements, which influences the deterrence and escalation strategies of both sides. But many key dissimilarities can be cited. One comes from the defense strategy adopted by the Allied forces in South Korea, which follows the lines of a classic barrier defense.7 Another dissimilarity—the presence o f the relatively small, routinely forward U.S. conventional forces— raises additional strategic questions. Most important of all, perhaps, is the much more central role that maritime power plays in the Northeast Asian region. Central Europe is predominantly a continental theater. Whereas maritime power would play a key role in any major conflict there, the main emphasis has been on large, opposed ground and tactical air formations. In Northeast Asia, the peninsular nature of Korea, the involvement of offshore forces and allies, the capabilities of the increasingly capable Soviet fleet, and certain command arrangements all have added a new wrinkle to the problem of arms limitation. Because this issue is so important, it will be discussed further Historical experience offers another contrast. From time to time, there have been enormous tensions in Europe. Until recently, the Warsaw Pact has maintained a menacing, fully offensively-oriented military posture. However, in spite of the peregrinations of the military balance, the effects of episodes outside metropolitan Europe (Suez, Vietnam, and Cuba to name a few), the periodically bellicose nature of Soviet policy,7 7 Over the years, proposals to fortify the inter-German border to the same degree met with profound resistance, not because the idea was not militarily sensible or because its costs were prohibitive, but because in West German eyes, this would serve to codify the division of the two Germanies. The same logic has not been at work in Korea.

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and occasional crises (Berlin, various Soviet invasions of its allies), no war has actually begun in Europe since World War II. This condition no doubt follows from many factors, including the theater military balance, the deliberately close linkage of European theater defense with the U.S. strategic nuclear posture, and the existence of other nuclear players (Britain and France). It might also follow from the Soviets having never viewed the military option as a sufficiently attractive one to justify the potential gains of aggression. The same has been untrue in Korea. The 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, a climatic event that continues to add unique characteristics to planning for both deterrence in the present, and for the possible transition to a more peaceful future, has been observed. Taken together, the issues involved represent a great dissimilarity between the two major land theaters in which Communist and Western forces have been opposed throughout the Cold War. What then makes for success in conventional arms control in Korea? That is unknown, largely because a completed "success" has not been witnessed. In the near future, there indeed might be the signing of a treaty in Europe, followed by its speedy and permanent implementation. But this result is not a sure thing. Yet if this happy result does occur, as most expect, it most likely would be attributable to several factors. First, the steadily worsening social, political, economic, and other problems which the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and their former Eastern European allies have faced over time have left their economies teetering on the brink of collapse. Reform for the sake o f national survival— and not for the sake of improved external relationships— has become essential. Reform meant the end o f Soviet controls in Eastern Europe and the imposition of major cost-cutting efforts in the Soviet and Eastern European military establishments. This erosion of capabilities in the traditional W arsaw Pact structure did far more to prom ote meaningful, negotiated arms reductions than any amount of good faith or desire to reduce inter-bloc tensions. The DPRK labors under enormous burdens, many of them attributable to the massive scale of its military enterprise and to the "garrison state mentality" with which it is associated. How long the citizens of the DPRK will continue to tolerate this oppressive state of affairs cannot be said, though historically the tolerance of that population seems remarkably high.8 8 It is undeniably true that this "tolerance" derives from, among other things, the unique political circumstances in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),

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Second, the events of 1989 in Europe came on the heels of more than a decade of often mixed, but frequently vigorous, arms-control-oriented interactions. Beginning with the signing of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, the evolution of the SALT, START, INF, MFR, CFE, various space and strategic defense limitations, and assorted other arms control initiatives can be traced. Some of these might not have been very productive or even very sincere, but they produced a climate within which the speedy adjustment of arms control proceedings to reflect new developments became possible. One should not underestimate the advantage of having in place a tested negotiating system. Third, arms control requires a sincere commitment not only to the process but also the ultimate objectives being pursued. A government, moreover, must be able to require the support of those internal constituencies whose acceptance of treaty terms would be essential— notably the military. Imagine the disruptive effects of a substantially different government assembling in P'yöngyang after the death of Kim II Sung. It might have no interest in ongoing force reductions, perhaps out of a need to consolidate its position at home by the usual technique of threat-mongering. In South Korea, even tentative arms control steps might fuel existing concerns about the nature of the U.S./ROK security relationship, and about Korea's strategic role in Northeast Asia generally. The more variables that are introduced into the equation early on, and the greater the politicization of arms control, the more expectations might outstrip what is realistically possible. For this reason, management of domestic and coalitional reactions in even a preliminary arms control effort should be a central consideration in the design of such a policy. Democratic governments are more susceptible to the need to manage such effects than are totalitarian ones. Progress in arms limitation will, for instance, inevitably create expectations among the domestic citizenry on both sides. However, in each of the Koreas, the forms these might take could differ substantially. Arms limitation will be seen on both sides as a major step toward the ultimate goal of unification, and momentum for quick gains could develop. Moreover, the domestic situation in the ROK—particularly notably the ability of Pyongyang to maintain the national illusion of aggressive U.SVRepublic of Korea (ROK) intentions. Whether such tolerance could long survive the easing of government controls in North Korea remains to be seen.

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among younger Koreans with no direct memory of the Korean W ar— holds out some interesting and possibly difficult prospects. There is a growing sentiment that too much money spent by Seoul on defense is slowing down the achievement of an even more impressive rate of economic growth. Given developments in Europe and in various Third W orld locales, the Korean standoff could be viewed as a last and increasingly anachronistic vestige of a fading Cold War. If, as one Soviet leader noted, "the appetite grows with the eating," then initial steps toward military conciliation and tension reduction might release pent-up opposition to anything resembling a prudent approach. How do these particular circumstances square with the contemporary case of the Koreas? A short survey reveals some areas of coincidence and some of divergence. It would be in the interests of all involved in the Northeast Asian balance today to reduce their economic and social burdens of defense in the region. It also is in everyone's interest to do anything possible to reduce the probability of a catastrophic and costly conflict. Although many approaches might be followed in pursuit of these goals, presumably everyone agrees on the advantages of the ultimate reunification of Korea and the removal of the need for external security guarantees. At this point, however, the similarities to the recent European context end. Although all governments are interested in maintaining sufficient popular support for their defense efforts, the DPRK government has a vested interest in sustaining in the minds of its population the image of a bellicose American-inspired and supported threat. This distracting and distorting image seems their best means for thwarting any serious aspirations by the populace toward a more sound economy or movement toward political reform. This all could change in the future. Moreover, there is very little in the way of an existing framework of previous serious negotiation on which to build. Tracing the origins of the CFE process back only to the 1970s, one might come to the following conclusion: It took an enormous effort (with few commensurate payoffs) to create the favorable circumstances within which progress became possible. This is not necessarily evidence of any central intransigence, reluctance, or other structural impediments to progress in arms control. Rather, it is a consequence o f the enormous difficulties that have attended the establishment of a sound negotiating forum involving many

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nations, each with different concerns. Given the circumstances already described that apply to the unique Asian situation—a fluid and multipolar constellation of interests, an atmosphere of suspicion, and the heavy political loading of the ROK/DPRK dialogue— one might reasonably suspect that many preliminaries would have to be undertaken before any realistic chance for progress in a Korean arms limitation forum could occur. Also worth noting is that the future for consolidating the gains begun in Europe might not be as entirely bright as some now imagine it to be. For quite a while, the Soviets balked at continued arms control progress over the question of Germany's ultimate membership status within the NATO system, possibly because of problems Gorbachev might have been facing with some of his conservative constituencies at home. In other words, there is liable to emerge a growing gap between the potential for accomplishments in Europe and actual results. It therefore would be wise to inspect closely the proposals of those who believe the "dramatic progress in the European sort" can be readily transposed onto Northeast Asia. Many difficult questions would remain even if we could somehow overlay the European experience (or our superpower strategic nuclear experience) onto a quite different East Asian setting. Such questions include: Should comprehensive or more limited reductions be pursued? W hat institutional frameworks should be devised and nurtured? What parties should be involved, either "at the table" or else in some other observer status? W hat geographic regions are we talking about? What forces or weapons are involved, and how would these be counted or monitored? How might one restrict mobilization capabilities on the assumption that reductions in routinely ready forces could be arranged? Some of the unique features of the Northeast Asian context that are likely to make these issues difficult to resolve have already been stated. At the risk of digressing, let us consider two issues that seem particularly difficult. First, there is the problem of reconciling the approaches o f North and South Korea to arms control which have been quite different to date. Seoul has historically advanced gradualist proposals on arms control and ultimate unification. The South Koreans have sought to establish in incremental steps a series of precedents which would eventually build political understanding and tension reduction. This approach seems sensible in light of recent experience elsewhere. In contrast, P'yöngyang has denounced such approaches as unworthy and

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aimed at preserving the present division of Korea, and has consistently proposed radical initiatives. These have been variants on Kim II Sung's June 1973 call for the immediate removal of U.S. conventional forces and nuclear weapons, and the reduction of both the ROK and DPRK armies to approximately 100,000 men. A keen understanding of the regional political context is not required to recognize that such proposals derive from propagandiste motives, and not on a realistic intention of bringing about actual reductions. North Korea's simple strategy might not prevent reasonable progress, but it definitely places South Korea's allies on the political defensive. Recent indications suggest that North Korea has become more subtle in structuring its agenda. To capitalize on the hopes of those everywhere in Northeast Asia that progress such as that made in Europe might be replicated in this region, P'yöngyang might well continue to be more subtle, measured, and apparently reasonable in its initiatives. This might occur as well in response to Seoul's conciliatory Nordpolitik and the DPRK's increasingly isolated position. However, in the short run, the ultimate aim must be not the rendering of the same old propaganda struggle in a more subtle light, but rather the continuing pursuit of diplomatic, economic, and military policies making untenable anything but a sincere commitment to realistic talks. Seoul's strategy has become the expansion of diplomatic contacts with others in the region who can behave in more moderate and productive ways. For instance, following the 1990 Soviet-American superpower summit in Washington, South Korea's president Roh Tae Woo met with Soviet President Gorbachev in San Francisco. Prospects of such future events stimulated enormous anxiety, because the possible ultimate isolation of North Korea was seen as a key factor in undermining P'yöngyang's ability to follow an obstinate course. This raises hopes about the ultimate prospects for tension-reduction measures. However, continuing caution must be exercised. To avoid a damaging and fruitless propaganda war, it is imperative that any ROK or UN proposals for arms reductions have the following characteristics. First, clarification of ultimate objectives to disarm allegations of footdragging or slavish devotion to the status quo. Second, coherence in light of the larger Northeast Asian security situation. Finally, involvement of all concerned parties to avoid the unilateralist and radical flavor of a DPRK agenda that might appeal to audiences in South Korea by

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promising immediate reductions in defense burdens and more autonomy and liberation from an onerous U.S. presence. Such objectives, existing in an atmosphere of changing domestic expectations, might raise some serious political risks, because they place in conflict two essential elements of the larger security problem. Specifically, the feverish defense preparations by the DPRK all these years, and the state of the military balance in the Koreas, makes the role of the United States as a deterrent force obviously central to continuing stability in the region. Therefore, satisfying the domestic outcry for a reduced burden would involve the maintenance o f an absolutely undiluted U.S. commitment and presence in South Korea. With the traditional U.S. military presence (including nuclear forces) in the ROK, and the nature of the command arrangements and divisions of labor in South Korea's defense concept, maintaining at least the present level of U.S. involvement would seem to conflict with several factors. These include the historically adamant position of the DPRK for immediate allied withdrawal and denuclearization of the Korean region. Also, domestic concerns in South Korea about the future nature of the U.S./ROK military relationship is important. The insistence by many across the Pacific to bring U.S. forces home for budgetary and political reasons is another factor to consider. Finally, anxieties would emerge not only in Korea but throughout East Asia and the Pacific were the United States to signal a reduced military interest in the region. Here, events in Korea should not be separated from other developments throughout East Asia and the Pacific, such as the removal of U.S. forces based in the Philippines. Obviously, one cannot have it both ways. Therefore, we need to weigh the relative advantages of these two altematives-the radical and gradual approaches-to arms limitation in Korea. The gradualist (or incrementalist) approach has numerous advantages. This approach will probably yield meaningful, long-term progress that can be verified, justified politically, and expected to ensure maintenance of an adequate set of deterrence conditions throughout its evolution. It also presents the most favorable conditions for keeping open important options, a particularly significant consideration given the uncertain political climate that might arise after the passing of the present P'yöngyang leadership. The disadvantages of this approach are political, or more properly, propagandists in character. A perception by some in South Korea that adequate progress was not being made (or even pursued) could inflame anxieties, opposition, and doubts about Seoul's real intentions. This

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warrants particular concern because a strong propaganda program from Pyöngyang would be inevitable. There are serious disadvantages to this approach, particularly with the many complexities of the Korean strategic situation, and the relative lack of previous experience. If something resembling the DPRK's radical proposals on arms control were to be adopted, its success would depend on a number of factors that have not been adequately addressed, and in some cases have not been considered at all. We can infer from the European experience that truly meaningful conventional arms control reductions "live or die on the details." It is one thing to espouse various long-term objectives such as a lasting peace, or reductions in tensions, budget burden alleviation, and progress toward larger political goals. It is another to bring any arms control scheme-especially one that was multifaceted, multiparty, and had major reductions-to fruition in terms likely to be acceptable to both sides. To reiterate, we need only revisit the European experience. Until recently, proceedings there have not yielded a great deal. Even after 1989, there were not only political problems, but also definitional controversies, technical questions, and coordination issues. It is true that dramatic developments in Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union accelerated greatly the glacial and often frustrating course of this process, opening up some avenues to real and positive movement. But aside from the matter of ultimately realizing the benefits of a negotiated scheme, many technical and logistical problems remain. A short sampler of these problems would include those related to definition, logistics, and verification. Factoring in other topics-such as worldwide U.S. m aritime capabilities, Japanese forces, PRC forces, and the like-w ould only compound these matters. This suggests that a primary goal o f the government in Seoul should be the education o f its domestic populace in the whys and wherefores o f arms control, both in general terms, and as fa r o s unique Northeast Asian circumstances are concerned. In Europe and the United States, the interested public has, over time, become well informed about what some called the "theology" of arms control. To take one example, the basis of the 1979 "Two-Track" INF deployment and negotiation system rested from the start on complex strategic principles. Although the general public was unaware of the full import of all the issues, the strategic arguments put forward at the time of the affirmation of the Two-Track strategy were sufficient to allay the anxieties of most of the Western European electorate. Imparting such a

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degree of sophistication throughout key domestic constituencies is something that Seoul might wish to consider carefully. A second important problem relates to the highly maritime nature (at least from a military planning point of view) of the Northeast Asian defense problem. The crucial component of any future Korean conflict scenario would be the outcome of engaged ground force formations. Similarly, the fate of maritime operations would be very important to the outcome of a major land war in Europe. But in relative terms, absolute sea control would be a more immediate strategic-operational priority in the Korean theater than would be the case in a European conflict. This however, in addition to the maritime balance in the region and certain geographical realities, adds wrinkles to an already complicated regional arms-control problem. Some o f the leading issues are as follows. First, the narrow, peninsular layout of the land theater means that sea power can play a much more direct role in the progress of the land battle (decisively demonstrated in the Korean War). Second, the escalation dynamics of maritime warfare (both by region and type o f conflict) can be extraordinarily volatile, especially when the stakes are high, as they are here. Third, given the small forward routine U.S. deployment in the ROK (compared with that now in Europe), and the economic interdependence of all nations in the region, control of sea lines of communication from the start of any conflict is a crucial priority. Finally, the great emphasis placed by the DPRK on its own ground forces (in terms of quantity and, gradually over time, quality as well), the necessity of South Korea and its allies to rely on technological substitutes (sea and air power alike) to counterbalance the sheer numbers of DPRK troops is unarguable. The then Soviet Union and many of its allies had called for an extension of air-land force arms reduction talks to include maritime forces.9 Therefore, it is quite possible to imagine that, as a part of a new initiative toward arms limitation discussions on traditional army and air force units in Korea, the Communist government might insist on inclusion of regional U.S. and other naval forces in the talks. Failure to include these forces, they might argue, would be proof of American "insincerity" to explore avenues for negotiation. However, there are so 9 Marshall Akhromayev, a special arms control advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev, told the U.S. Senate, "Sooner or later if we do not want to stop the negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, naval forces negotiations are unavoidable." "Limits on Navy or No More Treaties," Defense Week, May 14, 1990, p. 15.

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many compelling reasons for not including naval forces in such arms control regimes-and for that matter of not addressing even in principle the general issue of naval arms limitation—that conflict over this point would be virtually inevitable. These reasons are beyond the scope of this paper.10 Suffice to say that insistence on inclusion of maritime forces in any regional arms limitation arrangement could immediately become an almost insurmountable obstacle to any progress. The degree to which this issue is pressed by Pyöngyang can be viewed as a litmus test of the DPRK's real commitment to bringing about progress of any sort. Collectively, the points introduced in this paper so far comprise a set of basic issues to be considered before embarking on any program of arms reduction initiatives in Korea. The observations on historical experience have chiefly drawn on the European experience, including the promising events during 1989 and the less dramatic developments of earlier decades. The basic principles and protocols of conventional arms control, as far as developed and applied to arms limitation problems in other regions and functional areas, probably apply equally in Northeast Asia. As a first-order proposition, however, that is perhaps where the useful parallels end. The Northeast Asian strategic situation, its history, its military balance, its political and military relationships, and many other factors are different from those characterizing any other wellknown situation. Such special circumstances need to be evaluated in thorough detail before launching any diplomatic initiative. There are risks of doing more harm than good in the long run by rendering the process, in its delicate, early stages, vulnerable to accusations of obstinacy and other exploitative attacks from Pyöngyang. In other words, if the parties involved are serious about meaningful arms reductions, they need to proceed earnestly but cautiously. At present, however, even with the most cautious approach, the prospects for orderly, tangible arms control among the parties involved in the Korean strategic balance are at best guarded. As recommended above, for the time being, the current task before us should be one of preparing for possible future initiatives that might pay handsome dividends if the

10 They include, to name a few, the relatively greater reliance on sea power by the United States as part of its overall strategic concept; the technological and personnel superiority of the U.S. Fleet; the imminent block obsolescence of large elements of the Soviet Fleet (which makes its limitation a true case of converting a necessity into a virtue); the difficulty in dealing with naval forces on anything other than a global basis; a quite different history of arms control experience.

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strategic and diplomatic context in Northeast Asia changes rapidly.11 Such preparations would cost and risk relatively little while representing a potentially sound investment in the future collective security o f Northeast Asia. The most important of these radical developments concerns the succession prospects in North Korea following the departure of Kim II Sung. The historical climate of mistrust, enmity, and recalcitrance characterizing intercourse in Korean affairs bears Kim's personal signature. One wonders how his passing might lead either to opportunities to change this regrettable state of past affairs or, less optimistically, to instabilities that could actually increase the risks o f conflict in the near-term. For the short run, arms reduction options should be conditioned by three generic scenarios: Continuity o f the Present Regime: By definition, this would require few modifications of overall arms limitation strategy, whatever that might be. However, experts note that it is unlikely that Kim Jong II could play the same role as his father, except possibly in a symbolic, and probably temporary, fashion.12 Therefore, we must be prepared for some kind of undetermined change in the situation. An Unstable Future: There might be a period o f considerable turbulence and disruption following the death of Kim II Sung, during which North Korea might seek to maintain its integrity by increasing its emphasis on the apparent external threat. Should this happen, failure by the concerned democratic governments to be forthcoming on arms reduction would have great propaganda value, but such caution would be justified strategically. M ovement Toward North Korean Perestroika: In this, the most favorable scenario, the post-Kim government in North Korea would recognize the great burdens its military preparations and garrison-state psychology had imposed on its society, and might seek to modify its behavior in desirable ways, possibly redirecting military efforts to imitate the economic miracle that South Korea has achieved. Under this scenario, arms limitation might begin to follow the recent European 11 Based on the historical record, the odds of an arms control success in Korea being so precipitated are better than the odds of more gradual movement. 12 Kong Dan Oh, Leadership Change in North Korean Politics: The Succession to Kim II Sunge, RAND Report R-3697-RC, October 1988.

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model, dove-tailing nicely with economic and political initiatives aimed at ultimate unification. Each o f the latter two scenarios needs to be balanced into a comprehensive policy for Korean arms limitation for the long run. But in the short run, a few issues need to be resolved independent o f which of the preceding three scenarios is thought to be the most likely to transpire. Regardless o f what the future may hold, other factors need to be examined before committing ourselves to any particular negotiating framework. Arms control for its own sake has been viewed by many as a good thing. Yet there are pitfalls that must be avoided, both to preserve the present (admittedly precarious and costly) military balance and to avoid undermining our joint political and strategic situations in other respects. Three such issues are worth mentioning briefly. The Russian Agenda in Northeast Asian Arms Control: Prior to the breakup o f the Soviet Union, concrete proposals from Moscow in this area were few. But because it is possible that Russia would elect to play a more activist role in any future set of negotiations, this probability should be carefully anticipated. After all, compared with their European situation, the Russians have a far less central stake in the progress of such negotiations. Combined with their various economic and other woes, the Russians might have an incentive to get out in front of such talks and try to expand their scope and accelerate their pace. Because the Russians have much to gain and little to lose by so doing, they might be tempted to push the pace of talks beyond what some of the more actively involved parties might be willing to consider—raising the specter o f political difficulties at home. On the other hand, the Russians must be fully encouraged to participate in such discussions, chiefly to inhibit any possible recalcitrance in Fyöngyang. The Nature o f the ROK/U.S. M ilitary and P olitical Relationship: Over time, this relationship has proven both robust and flexible in the light of changing realities. Given current political and economic realities, further evolution in this relationship will undoubtedly occur. We already have seen evidence of such shifts, most notably consideration of a new command structure of ROK/U.S. forces, adoption of a lower profile of U.S. troops, and shifting divisions of military labor. Such initiatives cannot be isolated from our overall arms control strategy. How these factors might be reconciled is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is imperative to assure a sound linkage between arms control options and military choices. Arms control for its own sake might be desirable in

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principle, but to stand a chance for success and to accomplish its primary objective of enhancing overall security , the closest possible connection of these two vital policies must be assured. Dom estic Issues Associated with A nns Control: As noted earlier, there is the necessity for any democratic government to strike a balance between the practical side of govemment-to-govemment dealings and the management of popular opinion at home. Several pertinent aspects of this question come to mind. They include a growing sense of dissatisfaction in South Korea with the residual and apparently ever-more anachronistic "cold war" aspects of the Korean standoff, the perceived heavy burdens of defense, the equitable sharing of burdens among the United States and Korea, the nature of U.S./ROK command, and strategic relationships regarding trade. Other issues of interest in W ashington include sentiments relating to U.S. forward-defense burdens in a "new post-cold war age," the costs of such commitments, U.S. Pacific strategy, and the role of American military power in the modem age. Hopes for arms reductions can be enhanced or upset by domestic perceptions. Many important issues— for one, the future status of the command structure in Korea—might require revamping regardless of the existence of arms control talks, and therefore all concerned governments should craft their policies wisely, communicate them clearly, and do what they can to inform the public as to the most important technical, strategic, and other issues that must be addressed. This essay suggests that the approach followed so far by the government in Seoul— its emphasis on incremental progress and its expansion of political contacts through its Nordpolitik—is a sound one. But at present, it is vital to stress two essential points. First, anything to do with the possible future arms control agenda must be linked closely and formally with other policy matters, military and non-military. There is an erroneous belief in some quarters which holds that arms control can or even should proceed along a basically independent path. This proposition is rather dangerous, and it certainly is not conducive to the design of meaningful arms reduction initiatives able to stand the tests of time and real-world political stresses. A second major conclusion that follows from this essay concerns the nature of the U.S./ROK military relationship and the present and ultimate status of U.S. military forces in South Korea. If P’yöngyang were to have its way, this complicated question would be swiftly settled: the U.S. would depart the scene, and all problems would disappear. Putting aside the self-serving quality of such reasoning, this prospect raises enormous

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transitional and implementational questions. Arms control is desirable, but not arms control at too high a price or with too much risk. The U.S. presence in Korea might decline further in the next few years, but this will be largely for economic reasons that would tend to apply regardless of other developments.13 As has been seen at repeated points in post1953 history— and especially in the wake of President Jimmy Carter's 1977 abortive decision to withdraw the 2d Infantry Division— U.S. forces play a very important deterrent role on the peninsula. With proper management, however, this role would not be diluted, even with minor force cuts. Other objectives, such as turning over the supreme theater command to the Korean military and moving toward a lower overall U.S. presence, should be pursued with vigor. Again, these are issues that would exist independent of arms control aspirations. In sum, the essence of the U.SVKorean military relationship benefits both parties greatly, and its basic structure should be preserved pending a meaningful and enduring condition of ROK/DPRK political rapprochement, one including all appropriate safeguards and guarantees. Because that would depend absolutely on a fundamental change in the world view and behavior of P'yöngyang, it is hard to predict when and how this development might play out. But, as suggested above, careful preparation— such as preliminary negotiations, even ones that were not invested with many hopes for success—might increase the options for effective exploitation of a favorable political change in North Korea when and if it comes. In addition to maintaining the present deterrence equilibrium in Korea, it also makes good sense to place no restrictions on arms reduction options to any Seoul/P'yöngyang dialogue, but to invite others into the overall negotiating forum, especially the Russians. Pending a major shakeup of the government in the DPRK that would unlock the door to a possible speedy resolution of intra-Korean difficulties, it might be necessary to involve other nations (the CIS especially, but perhaps also the PRC) with the aim of applying indirect influence to P'yöngyang to induce it to behave in a more internationalist fashion. There are risks

13 In 1990, for instance, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced fairly modest (5,000) U.S. troop reductions and the closure of certain U.S. facilities in Korea.

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involved in such a scheme. But in balance, with sufficient planning, these risks can be minimized.