Post-war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 9780755620302, 9781845114619

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For my parents, Hasan Hüseyin and Leyla Özerdem for their tireless love, encouragement and support

Published in 2009 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan a division of St. Martin’s Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2009 Alpaslan Özerdem The right of Alpaslan Özerdem to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Postwar Reconstruction and Development: 3 ISBN 978 1 84511 461 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall from camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

LIST OF TABLES Page 4 Table 0.1: Justification of case studies Page 63 Table 2.1: Weapons collected by ONUSAL 1992–93 Page 126 Table 4.1: Disarmed and demobilized combatants Table 4.2: Weapons and ammunition collected and destroyed Page 157 Table 5.1: Reintegration options according to the number of former combatants choosing each option Page 181 Table 6.1: Differences and similarities between the four DDR cases Page 184 Table 6.2: Strengths and weaknesses of the DDR case study approaches

LIST OF FIGURES Page 155 Figure 5.1: The Afghan DDR flowchart

ACRONYMS AAK ADEFAES

AMF AMM ANA ANBP ANP APC APROCSAL ARENA ASALDIG ATA AVT

Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Association of Demobilized Members of the Armed Forces (El Salvador) Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Afghan Interim Authority Association of Disabled Veterans of the Armed Forces of El Salvador Association of Ex-Combatants and Victims of the War in El Salvador Afghan Military Forces Aceh Monitoring Mission Afghan National Army Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme Afghanistan National Police All Peoples’ Congress (Sierra Leone) Association of Salvadoran Community Promoters National Republican Alliance (El Salvador) Disabled War Veterans Association of El Salvador Afghan Transitional Administration Agricultural Vocational Training

BICC

Bonn International Center for Conversion

CBO CDF CDS CIP COPAZ

Community Based Organization Civil Defence Forces (Sierra Leone) Community Development Specialists (Kosovo) Commander Incentive Programme (Afghanistan) Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (El Salvador) Association of Rural Communities for the Development of El Salvador

ADRC AIA ALFAES ALGES

CRIPDES DDR DFID DIAG

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Department for International Development Disarmament of Irregular Armed Groups

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DPKO

Department for Peacekeeping Operations

EAC ECOMOG ECOWAS EIWP ERP

Employment Assistance Centres ECOWAS Monitoring and Observation Group Economic Commission of West African States Employment Intensive Works Programmes People’s Revolutionary Army (El Salvador)

FAES FMLN FPL

Armed Forces of El Salvador Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador) Popular Forces of Liberation (El Salvador)

GAM GTZ

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) German Agency for Technical Co-operation

HDI

Human Development Indices

ICRS IDDRS ILO INTERFET IOG IOM ISAF

Information Counselling and Referral Service Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards International Labour Office UN-authorized International Forces in East Timor International Observers Group (Afghanistan) International Organization for Migration International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

KFOR KLA KPC KPCT KPS

International Military Force in Kosovo Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Protection Corps Training Kosovo Police Service

LDK

Democratic League of Kosovo

MATs MDU MINUSAL MONUC NACSA NATO

Management Advisory Teams (Kosovo) Mobile Disarmament Unit (Afghanistan) Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo National Commission for Social Action (Sierra Leone) North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ACRONYMS

NCDDR NGO NPFL

National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Sierra Leone) Non Governmental Organization National Patriotic Front of Liberia

OCHA OJT ONUSAL OSCE

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs On-the-Job Training UN Observer Mission in El Salvador Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDC PDK PDPA PNC PRTC

Christian Democratic Party (El Salvador) Democratic Party of Kosovo People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan National Conciliation Party (El Salvador) Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (El Salvador) Programa de Transferencia de Tierras (El Salvador)

PTT RCAF REDES ROP RTG RTGs RUF RVC

Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Salvadoran Foundation for Reconstruction and Development Reintegration Opportunities Program (Sierra Leone) Regional Training Group (Kosovo) Regional Training Groups (Kosovo) Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) Regional Verification Committee (Afghanistan)

SALW SLA SLPP SSR

Small Arms and Light Weapons Sierra Leone Army Sierra Leone People’s Party Security Sector Reform

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UNAMA UNAMSIL UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNIDIR UNITA UNMIK

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone United Nations Development Program United Nations High Commission for Refugees UN Children’s Fund United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UN Mission in Kosovo

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UNRG UNSCR UNTAC UNTAET USAID

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia UN Transitional Administration in East Timor United States Agency for International Development

VTC

Vocational Training Course

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book’s original and significant contribution to theory, knowledge and methods is heavily dependant on the field work undertaken in the four case studies of El Salvador, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Spanning a period of six years from 2000 to 2006, the field research included over 250 semi-structured interviews conducted with policy makers, practitioners, waraffected communities and former combatants. Many individuals and communities have contributed generously from their experiences and knowledge, all of which played an invaluable role in the writing of this book, and although they are too numerous to thank individually, I would like to acknowledge the following individuals and organizations from whom I received indispensable assistance in the planning and implementation of my field research. El Salvador: Alfredo Diaz Barrera, Claudia Diaz Fuentes, Jose Preza and Simonetta Rossi. Kosovo: Carl Jenkins and Dr Pasquale Lupoli from International Organization of Migration (IOM), and United States Institute of Peace which funded a one-year DDR research project conducted with Professor Sultan Barakat. Sierra Leone: Sandi Arnold, Victor Fornah, Augusta Kumba Foday-Kalone and UNAMSIL. Afghanistan: Filippo Grandi, Tajma Kurt, Abdul-Hai Sofizada and IOM. Professor Sultan Barakat, Director of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), at the University of York and Series Editor of the International Library of Post-war Reconstruction and Development has always been a great supporter of this project and I am extremely grateful for his advice and guidance. My special thanks are also due to The Reverend Gareth Wardell (former PRDU Research Fellow) for his excellent assistance with the editing of this book.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants has received growing attention from a wide range of post-war recovery actors in both international and national arenas, as the international community has become increasingly involved in efforts to deal with the diverse array of DDR challenges in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. In most war-affected countries an official end to violent conflict does not guarantee long-term stability, rather it signals the beginning of a long and complex peacebuilding process. The cessation of hostilities inevitably produces a large number of demobilized combatants, most of them lacking any basic means of support or livelihood. Given the poor economic conditions and political instability of many war-torn societies, the argument is that a failure to respond to the DDR challenge can cause high levels of insecurity, and in the worst-case scenario, a resumption of armed conflict. However, is the reintegration of former combatants really an indispensable aspect of the peacebuilding process? If so, to what extent are the recent experience and the knowledge and expertise acquired by the international community and various national actors, sufficient for conducting an effective DDR process that is able to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding? In other words, it is important to ask whether increasing interest in DDR process is political as well as social and economic. With an exponential rise in the number of intra-state armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the international community has moved from its traditional, solely peacekeeping, role to becoming a peace-enforcer and peacebuilder. While the first generation of peacekeeping operations necessitated an involvement in ‘other’ people’s conflicts, the international community has more recently started to act as a

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‘third party’ in environments where it intervenes militarily for ‘humanitarian’ concerns. Therefore, the security of its military forces becomes, if not more than, at least as important as the security needs of war-torn societies. Secondly, since the early 1980s, the waning of the Cold War and the end of some longrunning proxy conflicts in Latin America, Central Asia and Africa, has led many states to undertake Security Sector Reform (SSR) by restructuring their security sector and downsizing their military forces, in order to reduce security costs. Consequently, SSR has become a major tool of the ‘liberal peace’ agenda used by the international community in dealing with former socialist countries in their transition to a market economy. Finally, in parallel with the increasing number of statebuilding interventions in war-torn societies, the DDR of former combatants has become an indispensable tenet of the international community’s peacebuilding strategies. A DDR programme is often incorporated in many peacekeeping operations as part of the liberal peace agenda and is now a regular component of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-state building efforts around the world. After more than a decade of such practice, it is important to step back and ask how relevant the successful DDR of former combatants is to sustainable peace-building processes. This is particularly pertinent because the inclusion of DDR in peacebuilding efforts is based on a number of assumptions. First, it is regarded as a peacebuilding component through which the post-conflict socioeconomic needs of combatants are addressed in order to reduce the likelihood of security risks caused by an unemployed and dissatisfied caseload. In other words, the first tenet of most DDR programmes is that combatants, in their transformation of identity to becoming civilians represent a risk group, and consequently they should be kept ‘busy’ and somehow provided with ‘incentives’ to ensure their support to the peacebuilding process. Related to this first tenet is the second major assumption made by contemporary DDR processes, namely that combatants represent a preferential group in peacebuilding, and consequently they should be provided with quotas in the new security forces and benefit from a range of reintegration options. Although such preferential treatment is rare for other war-affected groups, such as returning displaced populations, the disabled or female-headed households, the ability and willingness of former combatants to use a weapon ensures them a priority place in peacebuilding programmes. Thirdly, the contemporary DDR processes often consider former combatants and the socio-economic and political challenges they face, in isolation from the capacities and vulnerabilities of the population in general. Finally, in war-torn environments where the international community has a specific geo-political and security interest, the DDR of former combatants is given particular attention, and often planned and implemented single-handedly by the international community. While the practice of DDR is based on a number of politically-centred

INTRODUCTION

3

assumptions, the academic study of the DDR process and its impact is also fairly new and a recent development in the post-war recovery field. It has been only over the last 10–15 years that an accumulation of scholarly research and understanding of DDR has started to emerge in academia. Led by a number of prominent scholars, most notably Mats Berdal, Nat Colletta and Kees Kingma, and such organizations as the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, today’s scholars are able to benefit from a rich collection of lessons learned from DDR experiences around the world. However, the current literature mainly focuses on the functional and normative aspects of DDR and to a large extent on the assessment of the successes and failures of such programmes. Consequently, in order to gain a deeper understanding of DDR in a peacebuilding context it is necessary to investigate the process from a political economy perspective, in order that a comparative analysis of a number of carefully-chosen case studies can explore the politics of how such programmes are planned and implemented, and whether or not they have any meaningful impact on the transformation of the power structures that play a significant role in the creation of a fertile environment for conflict. The selection criteria for choosing the case studies of Afghanistan, El Salvador, Kosovo and Sierra Leone are summarized in Table 0.1. With their main tenets, such as the duration of conflict; geographic location; type of peace accord; and characteristics of the caseload in relation to age, gender and other demographic aspects, each case study represents a particular DDR approach in terms of their agents, methods and processes. However, the World Bank’s taxonomy of four key scenarios for DDR is used to compare these different case studies more effectively from a political economy perspective. The first type of DDR scenario used in this taxonomy considers an environment in which there is still no government in power and where internal conflict with splintered, loosely controlled factions is still ongoing; and in addition, weak institutions and control make verification and sustainability of the DDR process more challenging. The second scenario is an environment where although there was no clear winner following an internal conflict, there is now a government in power. Nevertheless, two or more factions still have substantial power; each with fairly well-organized armed forces, and each faction still seeks compensation for relinquishing power. In the third type of scenario, having one clear winner following conflict, there is a government in power, and political and military power sharing is not an issue. Finally, the fourth scenario represents a situation of demilitarization in where there is a clear authority in power; it is peace time or there is only a small scale internal conflict; and military downsizing is undertaken for economic and security reasons.

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Afghanistan

Kosovo

El Salvador

Sierra Leone

Carried out under the supervision of an UN interim administration by an international organization

Received a substantial contribution from civil society and former combatants themselves

Carried out under the coordination of a national authority that was established for this task

Geographical Asia context

Europe

Central America

West Africa

Armed conflict

2 years (1997–99)

12 years (1980–92)

11 years (1991–2002)

A hybrid of Scenarios 2, 3 & 4: A negotiated peace agreement (Chapultepec) initiated DDR of an armed group and downsizing of regular armed forces – UN involvement through a peace monitoring mission and its military component was responsible for monitoring and verification of ceasefire and DDR

Moving from Scenario 1 and Scenario 3: It was a typical Scenario 1 when the DDR process was initiated in 1999. Scenario 3 with exemptions such as the military intervention of external forces (UN & UK) – Strong links between armed groups in Liberia – UN involvement through a peacekeeping mission – Deployment of regional peacekeeping forces

8,000 Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMNL) forces and 30,000 members of the regular armed forces

Over 130,000 combatants from four different armed groups (RUF, AFRC, SLA, CDF)

The process was completed

The process was completed

DDR Process Planned and implemented by an organization established for this task by the international community

23 years (1979–2002)

A typical War-to-peace A typical Scenario 2: Scenario 3: transition No peace agreement With exemptions type – US led military intervention and the continuation of its so called ‘war against terrorism’ – Weak central government – Strong political bases for warlords and commanders – Limited deployment of peacekeeping forces

Caseload & The first phase: DDR Process DDR of around 70,000 Afghan Military Forces. The second phase (Disarmament of Irregular Armed Groups – DIAG) estimates the caseload to be around 120,000 The process is ongoing

such as partly successful in selfdetermination with a UNSC Resolution for governance structure but vague on the future of the province within Serbia – NATO’s military intervention was allied with the main Albanian armed group – One ‘victorious’ side – Deployment of large scale peacekeeping forces Around 16,000 out of 25,000 registered Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants

The process was completed

Table 0.1: Justification of case studies

Child soldiers and female combatants constituted more than one third of the caseload

INTRODUCTION

5

In El Salvador, the DDR process for 8,000 FMLN combatants was initiated by a negotiated peace agreement which ended an armed conflict of 12 years. Although there was no clear winner following conflict, because of the peace agreement there was a functioning government when the DDR process was carried out. Furthermore, the DDR process also incorporated the downsizing of 30,000 members of the regular armed forces. Therefore, with the exception of the DDR Scenario 1, the El Salvador case study included the characteristics from all the other three scenarios. As a response to the DDR challenge in El Salvador the international community, in the structure of a UN mission assisted the government which led the process, but the El Salvador case was particularly important because it involved the participation of former combatants and civil society organizations. The El Salvador DDR was carried out in the early 1990s, and it formed part of one of the first UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War. The Kosovo DDR process started in 1999, and was a typical DDR Scenario 3, since there was one clear winner without any need for political power sharing. The victorious side was the KLA which fought against the Serbian forces and was an ally of the NATO military intervention in the province. Although the winning side did not attain sovereignty over the territory, the UN mission in the province was responsible for governance during the implementation of DDR. With its short duration of two years and a small caseload of 25,000 communitybased combatants without any child soldier element, the case study of Kosovo represented one of the easiest DDR contexts. As the governance of the province was completely in the hands of the international community and Serbia, which still claims to retain sovereignty over the territory, had no involvement in the process at all, the DDR process was planned and implemented solely by the international community. It was a DDR model that represented total control by the international community in all aspects and phases of the process. Meanwhile, although the DDR process in Sierra Leone was also initiated in 1999, it was a completely different situation from Kosovo for a number of reasons. First, when it was initiated the armed conflict was still ongoing between a number of warring factions and the central government was extremely weak. Therefore, the DDR process began in a typical environment of Scenario 1 and by the time it was completed in 2002 it mutated into a Scenario 3, where the government was the winner of the conflict with the assistance of the international community. Third, with a caseload of 130,000 combatants, including large numbers of female and child combatants after a particularly gruesome conflict of 11 years which had torn apart most societal relationships, the Sierra Leone case was one of the most difficult DDR experiences. Finally, as a DDR model it was also completely different because it was planned and implemented under the coordination of a national body specifically established

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to undertake this task. As a nationally led DDR model, the experience in Sierra Leone was also distinctive with its regional dimensions, since it had to deal with the regional links of its armed groups and regional armed conflicts; and the deployment of regional peacekeeping forces played a significant role in its implementation. By contrast to the other three case studies, the DDR experience in Afghanistan is still ongoing to some extent, since although the DDR of 70,000 Afghan Military Forces was completed in 2006, the Disarmament of Irregular Armed Groups (DIAG) with an estimated caseload of around 120,000 combatants is yet to be completed. More significantly, the armed conflict of 23 years did not come to an end with a negotiated peace agreement in Afghanistan, but was enforced by the international community against the Taliban’s power in the country. Indeed, the armed conflict against the Taliban and Al-Qaida is still being waged and therefore it constitutes a typical Scenario 2 DDR environment with a weak central government and the continuing political influence of powerful warlords and commanders. As was the case in Sierra Leone, the DRR experience in Afghanistan represented a highly problematic and complex undertaking with its characteristics of a long and bloody armed conflict and large caseload, and is likewise being undertaken in a poverty-stricken war-torn country. However, in contrast to the Sierra Leone case, the DDR process in Afghanistan was planned and implemented by the international community with very limited input from the national government. Furthermore, the Afghan case was particularly significant as it represented a model in which the international community established a new institutional structure to deal with the entire process from disarmament to reintegration. With the four different DDR models and its four case studies, the main objective of this book is to present a comparative analysis of how these different approaches played a role in the identity transformation of combatants from warriors to civilians at a micro-level and the transition of power structures in terms of access to political and economic assets at a macro-level. In other words, the political economy of how the DDR processes in the four case studies were planned and implemented constitutes the main focus of this book, while the politics of how decisions are made for planning and implementation form the main tenets of discussions. In order to explore the case studies in a comparative way, the book is structured around three main sections. The first section consists of a theoretical conceptualization chapter which starts with the exploration of the key terminology of peacebuilding and security sector reform, and followed by an investigation of DDR phases separately in order to provide an understanding of how these three phases are considered by different perspectives and what are the main challenges in their implementation. Each of these terms is significant for subsequent discussions because the book attempts to place DDR in a wider peacebuilding context and

INTRODUCTION

7

in relation to this conceptual exploration, the four key DDR issues are investigated from a cross-cultural perspective, which are: the dangerous inducements used in disarmament; the use of cantonment as part of demobilization; modalities of financial reinsertion assistance; and the lack of female or child combatant centred DDR methodologies. In the second part of this chapter, the discussions focus on the proposed analytical framework of this book which consists of the following aspects: preferential treatment of former combatants; perspectives of security risk versus human resource development; the participation of national and local actors in DDR processes; and DDR as a social contract. Finally, the chapter identifies, explores and proposes the book’s analytical framework for a political economy investigation of case studies. The second section of the book is comprised of four case study chapters. The overall structure of each chapter is similar, beginning with a conflict analysis offering a historical review of events leading to the DDR process in each case study. The second part of each case study chapter is allotted to a contextualization of DDR experiences. Presenting its main actors, methodologies and programmes, this section offers an overall review of what was undertaken and by whom. Meanwhile, the third part of the case studies, while similar in purpose are each very different in their contents. Exploring the main challenges faced in the case study process, the main objective is to give a critique of how these DDR processes are planned and implemented, and how decisions were made to establish and develop these undertakings. Investigating the power structures behind these decisions, each case study chapter presents different sets of challenges, and this critique was carried out in a way that notes those changes that took place both during and after the implementation phase. Rather than a lessons learned type of assessment exercise, these case study chapters are for the investigation of the political economy that informed the main tenets of those DDR experiences. The final chapter of this book presents a comparative analysis of the four case studies, concluding with an outline of a proposal that identifies a flexible, innovative and integrated approach to how DDR processes could be planned and implemented in order to provide a sound opportunity for an effective interrelationship between DDR and post-war recovery. The first section in this chapter presents the main similarities and differences of the four case study approaches in order to establish their key strengths and weaknesses. The second section will be allocated to review the lessons learned in terms of the relationship between DDR and peacebuilding, and in order to achieve this objective, the following issues will form the main areas of focus: security, governance, socio-economic environment, and justice and reconciliation. The objective in this section will be to gain a better understanding of how the DDR case studies managed or failed in contributing to the overall peacebuilding framework. It is in this context that the investigation of the politics of DDR

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decision making of each approach will be carried out in a comparative analysis. Finally, the conclusions will be presented under the four main themes of: compartmentalization of DDR; ‘reintegration-first’ type of DDR; a community-centred approach rather than one-man-one-weapon strategies; and local participation and ownership.

1 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN A PEACEBUILDING CONTEXT

Peacebuilding is a process, rather than a goal, and should not be considered from the perspective of achieving only a negative peace, which would simply indicate the ending of armed conflict, but rather a positive and sustainable peace, which can ensure security as well as socio-economic, structural, political and cultural stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of relapse into or the continuation of violence.1 In order to achieve this, it is important to bear in mind that peacebuilding is a multi-faceted and multi-agency process accompanied by a wide range of challenges from the creation of a security environment and functional governance structures to responding to the basic needs of war-affected communities. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) can have a number of important effects upon the wider transitional process from war to peace. Hence, it constitutes one of the most critical activities in a peacebuilding context. The efficient implementation of DDR programmes can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally (Berdal, 1996). Experience indicates that there is a symbiotic relationship between peacebuilding and the DDR process. Berdal (1996:73) refers to this relationship as ‘an interplay’ and ‘a subtle interaction’. Although a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved without a successful DDR process, conversely, without a successful peacebuilding process the viability of a DDR process would, in general, be questionable. Even a well-funded and designed DDR process such

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as the one in Côte d’Ivoire becomes a ‘non-starter’ or a factor in the further exacerbation of political tensions if ‘there is no security, no trust, and no nascent cooperation between the parties’ (Heller, 2005:122). Supporting this view, Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a:18) highlight the relationship between economic reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process: Successful long-term reintegration can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun. Liberia is a good illustration of the importance of DDR for peacebuilding from local to national and regional level. From the 1997 elections to the 2002 DDR process, the attempted reintegration of former combatants largely failed, and although it was pledged by Charles Taylor, his government failed to put in place ‘an effective package of incentives that would otherwise pressure fighters to disarm’ and disengage from their respective factions (Pugh, 2000:205). Consequently, many former combatants have not reintegrated in society and hence, it was not surprising to see that fighting between dissident and government forces continued in an unending cycle of instability and violence, with regional spillovers (Olonisakin and Alao, 2005). Meanwhile, poorly conceived and executed DDR programmes can themselves also become a factor in the creation of future conflicts. The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique contributed significantly to the proliferation of weapons not only throughout that country, but also in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi (UNIDIR, 1999; Lala, 2005). The regional considerations in environments such as the West Africa and the Great Lakes Region are particularly important, as any phase of DDR in one country would like to have considerable impacts on conflicts or peace processes in neighbouring countries. Muggah (2004:25) asserts that ‘DDR cannot be carried out in isolation of the instability plaguing other countries in the Great Lakes.’ It was because of this reason that the World Bank started to implement a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MRDP) in 2002, targeting over 350,000 former combatants in nine countries.2 Assefa (1992:40) states the danger of poorly implemented DDR programmes and the threat they pose to the peace process as follows: One factor which can hinder peace agreements is the way in which combatants view their absorption into society at the end of a conflict. If termination of a conflict is to mean combatants will face severe

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unemployment or grave difficulties in resuming normal life after a peace agreement, the enthusiasm among combatants for pursuing peace could be greatly reduced. Based on their experience in the Horn of Africa, Kingma & Grebrewold (1998:12) identify a number of situations in which the reintegration of former combatants and displaced populations may have an impact on the recurrence or development of conflicts. These include the absence of a functioning state and legal system, lack of economic opportunities, competition for natural resources, political marginalization and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems, and the availability of light weapons. In other words, war-torn countries with demobilized combatants run the risk of returning to conflict, if they are not provided with a comprehensive reintegration strategy. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) underline the possibility of how demobilized combatants without proper reintegration can become ‘spoilers’ of peace in such postconflict environments. Pouligny (2004:15) considers the hasty disbanding of the Iraqi Army immediately after the invasion of the country by the US and its allies as one of the main reasons for ‘the rapid proliferation of new militias and armed groups based on religious, ethnic and tribal lines.’ In short, experience shows that there are a number of challenges that negate the chances for better integration of DDR into a given peacebuilding framework. Therefore, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the way that the DDR process is conceptualized and implemented by a wide range of national and international actors, hence the next section will focus on the investigation of DDR key terminology and its principal elements as part of an overall SSR context. Security Sector Reform Security sector reform (SSR) is part of the overall peacebuilding process; a task in which success depends on the holistic and integrated implementation of various post-conflict reconstruction programmes. The primary objective of SSR can be defined as: the creation of ‘functionally differentiated, professional armed forces that are under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use, and are able to provide security for the population’ (Brzoska, 2000:39). This definition identifies the four key areas for security sector reform as being: the political (entailing objective and subjective civilian control), economic development (including minimal resource use by the security sector), institutional (the professionalization of armed forces, police and paramilitary), and societal (the provision of physical security for people). It is acknowledged that the preceding definition also conceals major dilemmas such as the choice between the use of resources and provision of security. Furthermore, it is accepted that SSR is a complex undertaking, because

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the process needs to deal with strong military power bases, which are resistant to civilian control. As Hendrickson states, the security apparatus has to be brought under greater civil control and this restructuring will need to be carried out by emphasizing public security needs. He argues that in Cambodia, the predatory activities of security forces constitute ‘the biggest barrier to increasing state revenue and maintaining public security’ (2001:69). In other words, structural reforms for wider issues of governance both inside and outside the security sector would be essential in achieving this objective, and DDR of former combatants plays a significant role in this process. Moreover, the possible implications of any DDR programme would have a decisive impact on all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. According to the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (2006a:2), DDR ‘is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions.’ The IDDRS (2006b) defines disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programmes in a post-conflict context. Meanwhile, demobilization is defined as a planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. Having been demobilized and transported to their community of choice, the former combatants and their families must establish themselves in a civilian environment. Reinsertion assistance, which is intended to ameliorate the process, often includes post-discharge orientation, food assistance, health and educational support and a cash allowance. Finally, reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities. It is important to note that these three phases are interrelated, rather than sequential, but they can be thought of as part of a sequence of activities that have to happen for a society to recover from armed conflict. Kofi Annan (UNSG Report, 2000:8) emphasizes the interdependency between DDR phases: [T]he disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process cannot be viewed as a simple sequence of events. Rather, these activities form a continuum whose elements overlap with one another, and are related and mutually reinforcing. The success of the process is dependent on the success of each of its steps. As Berdal points out, the conceptualization of different phases and activities can be useful for academic purposes, but to a large extent it is artificial since, ‘not only do demobilization and reintegration activities overlap, but the extent to which their interdependence is recognized and incorporated into

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funding and implementation plans is vital for their long term success’ (1996:39). On the other hand, the practice of DDR tends to present a rather different picture in which as Specth (2003:75) rightly asserts that the ‘phases of DDR are…dealt with rather separately’. The involvement of different types of actors in each phase of DDR, for example, disarmament being often conducted by external military forces while demobilization and reintegration are more in the domain of civilian actors would mean that the planning and implementation of each phase can become an undertaking carried out on its own in isolation. Meanwhile, it is also important to make a distinction between the two distinct types of DDR programmes as demilitarization and those taking place in a war-to-peace transition (Colletta, Kostner & Widerhofer, 1996a). Within a SSR context, the former involves a reduction in the number of military personnel following a decisive victory, with a view to reducing military expenditure in order to take advantage of the peace dividend. In other words, the context of demilitarization implies that the government retains administrative control over the state’s territories and there exists no viable armed opposition. Large scale downsizing as part of peacetime demobilization initiatives can also be considered under this heading. However, in the war-topeace transition scenario, no clear victor emerges and DDR is undertaken as part of a peace settlement. Within this scenario, the outcome of any DDR programme depends predominantly upon the political context in which it is carried out, and the political will among the belligerent parties remains the chief criterion for determining success. In other words, the context of this scenario differs from demilitarization in that if the peace agreement breaks down owing to non-compliance, armed opposition to the government retains territorial control and possesses the ability to re-engage in war-fighting. As a third type of scenario in which DDR can be undertaken is defined by the IDDRS (2006b) as ‘support of law enforcement’ and this can be viewed in terms of DDR as a conflict prevention measure, involving such programmes as community disarmament and the provision of development aid in return of weapons-free zones. As far as the caseload for DDR programmes is concerned, the UN identifies the five target groups as first, adult combatants; second, child combatants; third, those working in non-combatant roles; fourth, combatants with disabilities and illnesses; and finally, dependants of combatants. ‘Combatant’ as a category in general would incorporate both formal soldiers and those who are involved in militia and guerrilla activities. For the identification of ‘child soldiers’, the UNICEF’s definition will be used here, which includes any persons under the age of 18, who are engaged in any kinds of armed groups/forces in any capacity. This includes but is not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups as well as girls recruited for sexual purpose and for forced marriage. The UN Secretary-

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General’s report to Security Council on 30 November 2003 arranged the principles related to child soldiers and referred to them as ‘Children Associated with Armed Conflicts’ (CAAF). Although recognising that the CAAF is a more inclusive term than child soldiers, the latter will be used in this book as it is more widely used as a terminology, but the reference will be to its widest sense possible as represented by CAAF.3 Although the UN recommends the inclusion of the first four groups in all DDR programmes, the inclusion of the fifth group is considered to be dependants on ‘resources and local circumstances’ (2006b:8). Such a categorization is a strong indicator of how the UN still predominantly perceives DDR processes from a ‘one-man-one-weapon’ perspective, which then has a decisive impact on the way DDR programmes are planned and implemented. Globally, there were 22 DDR programmes in 2006, involving over 1.2 million former combatants. While 16 of these cases were in Africa, seven of them were home for more than half of the total caseload. Around 10–15 per cent of former combatants were child, female and the disabled combatants, and only 40 per cent of former combatants were part of regular armies. Although, in 13 of these cases there was a National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR), only in seven of them the state had the full responsibility of the process. An average of three international organizations per country was involved in these DDR programmes, while seven of them were undertaken as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. With an estimated spending of $2 billion, the cost of DDR per former combatant was over $1,500 (ECP, 2007). Considering that in 13 out of these 22 countries the average income per person was less than $500, it is important to question how come that the international community was so generous in responding to the needs of a particular war-affected group, while others such as refugees, IDPs and ‘stayees’ do not enjoy a similar response? Is this an act of pure generosity or actually a matter of ‘prioritization’ by the international community and if it is, why? Disarmament As recommended in the Brahimi Report (2000) on the reform of UN peacekeeping operations, disarmament programmes are considered to be the first phase of an operation aimed at facilitating the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reducing the likelihood of a resumption of conflicts. According to the UN IDDRS (2006c), disarmament consists of four main phases: information collection and operational planning; weapons collection; stockpile management; and destruction. This is usually understood as a linear process intended to achieve the complete elimination of the military capabilities of warring factions. However, disarmament in war-to-peace transition situations seldom ensures a total collection and disposal of small arms and light weapons (SALW).4 As an assessment of the disarmament of the Guatemalan

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National Revolutionary Unit (UNRG) in 1997 stated it would be naïve to assume that the 1,824 firearms handed over by the UNRG represented a significant portion of the military weapons in circulation in Guatemala (Laurence & Godnick, 2001). However, more significantly, this disarmament process indicated the commitment of the UNRG to the peace process. It should be pointed out that the preceding argument is not intended to undermine the significance of disarmament, but to emphasize its real importance at a symbolic level. It is clear that disarmament is a necessary first step in establishing a secure environment. Supporting this view, the UN Security Council (2000:1) described the importance of disarmament at a symbolic level as follows: Even if full disarmament and demilitarisation prove unachievable, a credible programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration may nonetheless make a key contribution to strengthening of confidence between former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability. However, as Berdal (1996) points out, the implementation of disarmament does not provide an automatic guarantee for a secure environment, as the abundance of weapons in war-affected countries is always a potential security problem, and disarmament on its own cannot be considered as a credible option for eradicating or permanently removing the means of violence in the short to medium term. In other words, disarmament could be viewed as a measure to overcome the likely challenge of ‘security dilemma’ in a war-torn divided society. One of the key activities of disarmament, which tends to have a fundamental impact on all phases of the DDR process, is the establishment of individual eligibility criteria. In other words, who will be entitled to register as a combatant; what type of weapon as a minimum, they would need to hand in; and the criteria required for proving that they really were a combatant. If the criteria for eligibility is too strict, there may be many combatants who cannot include themselves in the process, for example, not all those involved in an armed group might have a weapon as they may have been ‘wives’ or sex slaves of combatants, messengers or cooks. On the other hand, if the eligibility criteria are lax and inadequately screened many civilians may be registered as former combatants, adding an unsustainable financial burden to the process. Non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment are recommended as the core principles in the establishment of the selection criteria which would ideally require the participation of all stakeholders from armed groups to national authorities and international actors (IDDRS, 2006c). Before any disarmament proceeds, a number of prerequisite conditions

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should be instituted. According to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, appropriate conditions for disarmament can be considered at two levels: strategic and operational (Last, et al., 1997). At the strategic level the main reference is made to a peace agreement as a vehicle for initiating disarmament. It is emphasized that peace agreements should specify the timing and scope of disarmament, as well as procedural issues such as the sequence of disarmament and the extent to which it can be inspected, the proportion of forces to be disarmed at each stage, and the disposal of weapons and the corresponding supervision of the disposal process. More importantly, it is crucial that if necessary, this process be undertaken under the supervision of an impartial third party with full powers to inspect and investigate, and also enforce decisions, if this has been stipulated by an agreement between the belligerents and an impartial third party. In other words, the consent of warring parties to the DDR process and the participation of neutral observers from the international community constitute two important prerequisites for a successful disarmament process (Swarbrick, 2007). Planning at a strategic level should also include a number of other issues such as the identification of arms entering a region, the routes they follow, and the ways in which weapons are integrated into the economy and society. For example, banditry as an economic activity would generate demand for weapons as an economic commodity. In some countries, the culture of the gun, which is often associated with masculinity, might pose another difficult barrier to overcome, Afghanistan is illustrative of such an environment (Özerdem, 2002; Sedra, 2002). In addition to the planning factors discussed above, there are specific variables which have affected the success of disarmament efforts in Central America and Africa. These include the regional and local dynamics of the conflict, the distribution of weapons, the supply and demand for weapons, and the degree to which the ‘weapons economy’ is integrated into the economy and society (Pouligny, 2004). Even in a small country like El Salvador, urban and rural areas presented different disarmament challenges. Although it is unwise and impractical to have different standards of disarmament for different regions, it may be necessary to expend greater efforts in disarming some areas than others. If two or more forces are being demobilized, as in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, the schedule for disarmament can be organized to draw down forces at a comparable rate (Last, 1999). Operational planning must reconcile the continuing conflict between the interests of all actors. Survey, collection, storage, destruction and reutilization of weapons are some of the issues which must be resolved at this level (Gleichmann, et al., 2004). Each of these stages is necessary for the successful implementation of the disarmament process. For example, after protracted armed conflicts belligerents often lack an accurate assessment of the number or types of weapons in circulation. Moreover, they are likely to be reluctant to

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share such information even if they have it. During weapons collection it is necessary that registration and verification methods are transparent as this is imperative for maintaining a certain level of trust between belligerent groups. For example, Last (1999) identifies a three-way process during which each faction monitors its own process, under international supervision, while progress is made transparent to the other faction(s) through liaison and observation. Storage of weapons is another sensitive aspect of the disarmament process as such storage areas can become valuable targets for would-be bandits or factions that have not committed fully to a peace process. Choosing a suitable place for weapons storage is a critical issue. This can be a permanent facility, such as a military base or police station, or a purpose built temporary structure, or even in some cases sea-containers or railway cars. The security system to be used is often another critical issue and international forces, if available, should be tasked with the protection of storage areas. If the international supervisors do not have the full trust of belligerents, a dual key security system can be utilized, in which a storage facility has two locks, with one key held by the international monitor, while the other is held by a local commander. If the destruction of weapons has not yet been agreed then storage conditions should ensure that they will not deteriorate. As outlined by Gleichmann, et al. (2004), the destruction of weapons needs to take a number of issues into consideration such as safety, cost, effectiveness and the verification of destruction. A number of different methods of weapons destruction are currently used, which range from burning, burying in cement, crushing and cutting to deep sea dumping, smelting and dismantling and recycling. However, before going ahead with the destruction of collected weapons it is important to consider their reutilization as they constitute an important material asset. For example, there are a number of issues that need to be borne in mind in this process such as the future armament needs of security forces as well as the maintenance needs of the collected weapons and logistical arrangements of transportation and storage. To conclude, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sets a number of principles for a successful disarmament process including transparency, sustainability, control, safety, and legitimacy (Hughes-Wilson & Wilkinson, 2001). The issue of transparency in disarmament is essential for gaining and keeping the trust of former combatants and the local population. In other words, belligerent groups must be confident that weapons collected from them do not end up in the hands of rival factions, and this can only be ensured through a transparent process. However, in order to ensure that belligerents continue to support the process, they also need to believe that the disarmament process will be sustainable, which requires sufficient financial and logistical resources from the international community, and comprehensive enough to cover all groups. As well as providing the necessary financial and

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logistical resources, it is also crucial that implementing agencies should show a high level of competence in the control of the process, which is essential for providing an environment of trust for belligerent groups. Safety in the undertaking of disarmament is vital because the collection and storage of weapons may inevitably pose a security risk for the local population and any problems in this process can mean a big loss of credibility for the implementing agencies. Finally, the disarmament process should have legitimacy based on the consent of belligerents and be supported by a mandate given by an appropriate body such as the UN Security Council. However, as well as this formal legitimacy, it is also essential that it is perceived as a legitimate and necessary undertaking by the local population, which necessitates the implementation of public awareness and information campaigns as part of the disarmament process (Gleichmann, et al., 2004). Demobilization Demobilization is the second stage of the DDR process, following disarmament; its form and functions vary according to context. Its main objective can be summarized as being to register, count and monitor the combatants and to prepare them for their discharge with identification documents. At the same time, it is necessary to gather the information required for their reintegration into the community (Gleichmann, et al., 2004:45), and according to the IDDRS (2006d) it is both a physical, and also a mental process. In a typical demobilization process, in addition to removing the symbols of a combatant’s military life, such as their weapon, uniform and rank, demobilization activities can include a survey of combatant’s needs and aspirations, medical examinations, counselling, reinsertion packages and transportation to the community of choice. Cantonment (sometimes termed assembly or quartering) is often seen as an essential element within demobilization, although there were some cases that did not require such a cantonment, which is an issue that will be explored further in the next chapter. The reinsertion phase is also sometimes considered as a separate stage between demobilization and reintegration. However, in the context of this chapter the issues related to reinsertion will be explored as part of the demobilization phase. One of the most crucial issues in the preparation for demobilization is finding the right inducements for each of the parties to demobilize. Such inducements as confidence in the sustainability of the peace process, improvements in the overall security environment and financial benefits tend to play a significant role in encouraging former combatants and their commanders to demobilize. Some of critical questions in demobilization processes are obviously how many combatants are to be demobilized and what the timetable is for such an undertaking. However, it is also important to incorporate issues

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regarding future security forces such as the army and police force. For example, how many former combatants and commanders and from which belligerent groups, will be selected for those forces is often a hugely important question for both strategic and operational levels. Moreover, the demobilization planning should also look into issues such as the future of those former combatants who will not be part of the new security structures. Subsequently, planning for programmes should be influenced by the needs of the combatants and their communities, opportunities in the post-conflict economy, receptivity and the absorption capacities of receiving communities and their need for adjustment time (Last, 1999). With or without a cantonment component, one of the most important aspects of the demobilization process is the registration and identification of each combatant. In some cases combatants may have no documentation and may not be able to read or write. Verification by comrades may then be necessary, or as is often the case, commanders provide a list of their combatants, or combatants come to the registration with a letter from their commanders. After such verification each combatant is often fingerprinted and photographed in order to produce a former combatant identity card that can be used in gaining access to reintegration benefits in subsequent programmes. It is also during this registration phase that the creation of an electronic database would be invaluable for tracking cases later, delivering benefits and allocating resources properly. In the registration of former combatants the following two scenarios are likely to happen, which can produce misleading information concerning the true scope of the caseload. First, in some cases combatants may not feel comfortable enough with the sustainability of the peace process, or being registered as a former combatant that may pose a risk to their lives, for example, if they are going back to communities against whom they carried out acts of violence. Consequently, there might be an under-registration of combatants, while at the same time; there might be false-registration by some civilians keen to be registered as former combatants in order to benefit from reintegration programmes. In some cases, the false-registration would result from belligerent groups’ attempts to inflate the number of their combatants, thereby giving them enhanced political leverage in the peacebuilding process and so strengthening their patron-client relationship with the local population. It should also be noted that demobilization occurs spontaneously in some postconflict contexts, as was the case to some extent, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the first stage of demobilization in the country, more than 400,000 former combatants who were largely not members of the regular army did not receive any reintegration assistance (Alexander and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2005). However, such self-demobilization is distinct from desertion and occurs when there is an environment in which combatants no longer have any formal obligation to be

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part of an armed group. It is sometimes the case that combatants are encouraged to desert by their commanders and comrades in order to reduce competition for the benefits of reintegration programmes. Some may even be coerced to desert, particularly female combatants and child soldiers if their presence is seen as a disadvantage for public relations purposes (Gleichmann, et al., 2004; Pietz, 2004). In addition to basic registration the demobilization process can also include health checks, in order to identify chronic and acute diseases and disabilities, as well as infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and nutritional shortfalls. Through such health checks, vulnerable and special needs groups such as wartraumatized combatants can be identified. The demobilization process can also be utilized for the compilation of a needs survey and skills assessment. Such a survey often includes demographic information on combatants; for example – age, gender, geographic origin, education, skills, length of time spent with the armed group, aspirations for future employment and training needs. It is crucial that such comprehensive information is collected during demobilization as this can provide an invaluable foundation for the design of reintegration programmes (Gleichmann, et al., 2004; Singer, 2005). Another important component in the demobilization process is the provision of counselling in order to ensure that former combatants understand what benefits they can expect from the reintegration process and what their obligations are for the remaining part of the DDR process. Counselling on the challenges involved in the transition to civilian life is critically important, as it can be particularly problematic for those combatants who have been involved in warfare for a long time. Furthermore, the pre-discharge information can be categorized under the headings: economic and financial planning, education and training; accommodation; political and legal civil and political rights and responsibilities; social – stress and trauma management, changing gender roles and children’s education; health – family planning, immunization and basic health; and finally, crisis prevention and reconciliation such as information on non-violent conflict management and transformation mechanisms (Verhey, 2003; Wessels, 2007). For example, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) combatants were placed in ‘solidarity camps’ called Ingando where ‘they received civic education and information on the government’s policies’. This ‘reeducation’ programme was a deliberate attempt by the Rwandan government to respond to the societal impact of the genocide, and included civilians too (Verwimp and Verpoorten, 2004:45). The demobilization process comes to an end with the discharge of former combatants. Depending on whether cantonment is part of this process or not, the discharging of former combatants can be immediately after the conducting of registration and necessary surveys and checks, or when different groups are transported to their respective communities. The organization of

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transportation as part of the demobilization phase can be particularly important. This is especially true if the DDR process is taking place in a very large country where returning to their communities by their own means would simply be either impossible or very difficult for most former combatants. Even if they have the means of paying for their journey the transportation systems existing in the country may be inadequate or completely non-existent. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Mozambique or Angola the transportation of former combatants can itself be a major logistical challenge. Finally, the reinsertion packages which are included as part of the demobilization process would play a critical role in linking the demobilization and reintegration phases, and they will be explored further in the next chapter. Reintegration Reintegration can be defined as an open-ended process during which the DDR programme merges with the ongoing post-conflict process. For Kingma (2001:407) for example, reintegration is not one general process but ‘consists of thousands of microstories, with individual and group efforts and with setbacks and successes’. According to Berdal (1996:39), reintegration programmes are ‘meant to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of excombatants and their families.’ Supporting this view Kingma (2000:28) states that with social reintegration the objective is to create an environment in which former combatants and their families feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. Political reintegration is the process through which they become a full part of decision making processes; while economic reintegration enable them to build up their livelihoods by having access to production mechanisms and other types of gainful employment. Nübler (1997:3) asserts that the long-term objective of reintegration is ‘to enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace’. It is also crucial that the reintegration process recognizes and reinforces local reconciliation processes, since reintegrating former combatants in society can contribute in the long term to the overall strengthening of peace and to reconciliation through growing interaction between different groups and former warring factions (Kingma and Sayers, 1994). In other words, successful reintegration helps in building of mutual confidence among former belligerent groups, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities (Özerdem, 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005; Peters, 2007). According to ILO (1995a), a successful reintegration process can be ensured through three main factors: first, the motivation and determination of former combatants themselves; second, the acceptance and support of the community; and finally, the facilitation of measures provided for employment and income generation. In explaining the importance of the receiving

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community in the successful implementation of the reintegration process, Kingma (2000) asserts that in a number of cross-cultural experiences, there is a clear pattern emerges of more successful reintegration in rural than in urban areas. This is put down to the likelihood of having stronger supporting societal networks in rural than urban areas. For example, in the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Ayalew & Dercon, 2000). According to Ball (2002:90), experience shows that programmes to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life in post-conflict environments are ‘most appropriately linked with economic revitalization activities at the community level’. However, it is important to note that war affected communities are characterized by fragmentation and polarization in which the fighter society has grown apart from civilian society (Nübler, 1997:4). Supporting this view, Kingma (2001) asserts that the history of the war in question and its impact on society, and the degree to which warring factions have managed to reconcile with each other plays a significant role in the outcome of reintegration programmes. According to Colletta Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996b), former combatants will continue to feel stigmatized for as long as they are considered as ‘returnees’ or ‘former combatants’. However, when the community stops considering them as outsiders this provides a high level of psychological support to them. The involvement of the community and ensuring their support in the reintegration process also offers greater opportunities for selfsufficiency and it may help initiate new opportunities which pave the way for fighting factions to co-operate together in achieving common goals (Özerdem, 2002). As far as the community/former-combatant relationship is concerned, there are a number of issues related to social and cultural norms and psychological impact that should be borne in mind. The involvement of the local community in DDR programmes will be further explored in the next section. An important issue that needs to be recognized in the context of reintegration programmes is their sheer complexity. This does not mean that the disarmament and demobilization phases are somehow less complex undertakings, but it is still necessary to bear in mind that reintegration is by nature a social, economic and psychological process that is both slow and costly, and if implemented effectively, it can indeed increase social justice and contribute to the eradication of the root causes of conflict (Kingma and Sayers, 1994). As is the case with the disarmament and demobilization phases, reintegration is also an intensely political process, except that there is only perhaps a higher level of intensity as reintegration would mean a comprehensive involvement in political, economic and social reconstruction, ameliorating the root causes of the conflict as much as possible (Berdal, 1996).

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Kingma (2001:411) emphatically underlines the fact that in reintegration, ‘politics comes first’, which in an ironic way, makes political will from both internal and external actors an imperative for their successful implementation. Without political commitment no matter how well planned and implemented reintegration programmes are they cannot be carried out successfully. As is the case with many DDR experiences, one of the reasons why the process failed in Angola in 1993 was simply because it did not receive the necessary commitment from political leadership and warring factions in the country. At around same time in Mozambique on the other hand, the high political will of the international community and belligerents after the 1992 General Peace Agreement in Rome ensured that the reintegration process could benefit from a full political support. This was largely because the process was developed in a way that enabled all factions to ‘view the political process as one in which they could reasonably hope to compete’ (UNSG Report, 2000:90). In reintegration programmes, which can vary from the provision of access to land and education to vocational training and micro enterprise development projects, former combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the opportunities available to them when they arrive back in their home. If this task has not been covered as part of the demobilization phase, then information, counselling and referral services should be established in order to provide the vital link between former combatants and the services planned for them. The reintegration of former combatants regardless whether this takes place in a rural or urban area, first of all, would need to consider a number of basic needs such as housing, infrastructure and services. However, for the reintegration of former combatants in rural areas, access to land is probably the most important consideration (Bruthus, 2004). The legal status of other returnees, such as refugees and internally displaced persons, and their land rights may lead to a resurgence of community tension. In Nicaragua the core reintegration support for former combatants was land, however the distribution of land promised was either delayed or never took place. In addition to this obstacle, the resettlement of former combatants in Nicaragua was also problematic due to landmines, given that more than 100,000 of them were planted in the country during the war (Spencer, 1997). The core reintegration assistance was to provide material assistance promised by the Chamorro government and land to demobilized combatants, as compensation, but these promises never materialized. Consequently, the case of Nicaragua also clearly illustrated the serious consequences of neglecting such an important factor as the provision of access to land when demobilized combatants regrouped to fight again against the government (Harris et al., 1999). Not responding to the needs of former combatants in rural areas can also have negative repercussions for urban areas in terms of increased migration. For example, in Mozambique, unsuccessful economic reintegration in rural areas ‘led to a steady stream of

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demobilized soldiers in search of employment…to urban areas where there has since been a marked increase in social unrest and criminal activity’ (Berdal, 1996:40; UNODC, 2007). The fluidity of the population between rural and urban areas in the context of Angola was one of the main reasons why an urban/rural divide was not considered as a significant factor, as there were similar challenges of employment and socio-economic vulnerabilities (Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007). On the other hand, according to Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a:58), reintegration activities in urban areas need to be more diverse and of longer duration. For the Ethiopian reintegration experience it was explained that ‘the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, the tightness of the urban labour market’. It is also necessary to verify which vocational skills and livelihoods opportunities would be appropriate to the characteristics of the area as rural, semi-rural and urban. Bearing in mind these socio-economic characteristics and the likelihood of high unemployment rates in a post-conflict environment, the utilization of large public works programmes in the short term is recommended. In Ethiopia the majority of former combatants were referred to short-term public works programmes such as agricultural and construction activities for the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition to Employment Intensive Works Programmes (EIWP) as an economic stimulator and mass employment creation tool, ILO (1997:14) recommends skills training and enterprise development as two key approaches to employment creation for former combatants. It was stated that ‘healthy civilian identity can be encouraged through vocational training and constructive work that contributes to individual and community well-being’. This is particularly important as, unfortunately, the demobilized combatants often enter an economy which is unstable and dependent on international assistance, quickly thereafter becoming members of the growing army of the unemployed. In the Bosniac-majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as much as one third of the registered unemployed were demobilized soldiers (WB-Bosnia, 1997). The lack of economic opportunities is one of the main detrimental factors that discourage combatants from reintegration into their communities. For example, in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Boshoff (2005) argues that due to a lack of employment and livelihoods options, combatants who wanted to demobilize remained hesitant for a long time. Vocational training and micro enterprise development can be effective tools for economic regeneration; however they are often affected by a number of macro economic factors such as structural adjustment programmes, economic reforms, economic stagnation, a narrow industrial base, labour market saturation, high inflation and high military expenditure. In relation to Guatemala, Ratynska (2005:264) rightly points out that vocational training

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‘should be tailored to a need, based on a careful assessment of the employment market and situation.’ Otherwise, as was the case in Mozambique, the vocational training courses can increase the pool of available skills but they would not be in much use without sufficient demand for such skills as a result of low economic activity or saturation of the market in certain sectors and services (Lala, 2005). In order to overcome these factors, micro enterprise development programmes for former combatants should be supported by other programmes and facilities such as information on business opportunities, training, credit schemes and business development advice services (ILO, 1997). A lump-sum cash payment is also sometimes used as part of reintegration programmes however, according to Berdal (1996), experience shows that such payments do not always correlate with an increase in employment rates. Another crucial issue with the reintegration process, which will be explored further in the following sections, is the mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as homogenous. It is important to remember that even in relatively small caseloads there tend to be large variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational skills. Former combatants are likely to have a wide range of needs, capacities and expectations, depending on these characteristics. More importantly, the labelling of former combatants as ‘heroes’ or ‘problems’ as was the case in Namibia can have detrimental impacts on their relationships with the society in general and also between former warring sides. Metsola (2006:1123) describes how former PLAN combatants were seen as national heroes as part of the Namibian post-conflict nation-state building rhetoric, while across Namibian discursive terrain they were often referred as ‘needy, helpless and potentially dangerous: antisocial, roaming from the countryside to the cities, idling on the streets, prone to drunkenness, promiscuity and crime’. Finally, findings from various DDR experiences in Africa and Central America, indicate that where former combatants are involved in the administration of reintegration programmes such as vocational training initiatives, there is the greatest likelihood of success both in terms of cost effectiveness and, in reducing the potential for political tensions, since ‘they are more sensitive to local needs and…appear not only to offer more flexibility, but also to be better geared towards integrating ex-combatants and their dependants into society’ (Berdal, 1996:51). Having reviewed some of general challenges faced during the three phases of the DDR process, the following four areas of concern will be explored as the fundamental issues that require specific attention in most DDR processes. Dangerous Inducements for Disarmament The successful implementation of the DDR process is often directly linked with the mandate, capabilities and effectiveness of peacekeeping forces. The

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examination of the UN peacekeeping missions in the five contexts of Central America, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia concludes that the prospects for successful disarmament diminish the greater the delay in the deployment of the force. Prompt deployment of peacekeeping forces following peace agreements often coincides with a general support for the ceasefire and the presence of the peacekeepers. As time passes, if the disarmament mandate has not been translated into tangible developments on the ground, both the parties and the peacekeepers begin to reside from the commitment, and ‘the resulting erosion of the mandate’ begins ‘an irreversible process’ (Cox, 1996: 132). Having reviewed lessons learned from its peacekeeping operations, the DPKO (1999) recommended the establishment of an integrated technical mission early on, during the peace negotiations. The rapid deployment of such a team can aim at the establishment of communications with partner organizations within the DDR process. This would facilitate the early development of coordination mechanisms, and the establishment of a survey team, to gather socio-economic information from combatants, their intended location of settlement and their expectations concerning the DDR process. The early deployment of a DDR team under UN auspices, either before or shortly after the peace agreement, would help fill the expectations gap prior to the full deployment of peacekeeping contingents, facilitate the development of the programme or demonstrate an early commitment to the process. For example, the quick deployment of the Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) in Aceh on 15 August 2005 successfully filled the ‘potentially harmful vacuum’ until the arrival of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), and also made it possible for the disarmament of GAM to start on the first day of the AMM on 15 September (Beeck, 2007). Another important consideration for disarmament is the consideration for inducements or persuasions to disarm, operating in tandem with coercion or compellence. Inducements, as understood by the UN peacekeeping missions, involved methods of bargaining for, or trading in, weapons. Inevitably, such an understanding led to the establishment of weapons-for-cash programmes. UN disarmament operations that have attempted weapons-for-cash programmes include El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia (Tanner, 1996; World Bank, 1993). Cash as an incentive was also used in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) collected 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenades and two million rounds of ammunition between October 1996 and August 1997 (Boothby, 2001). There are some issues that require particular attention when using cash as an incentive in disarmament programmes, such as the cash amount offered per weapon. According to Faltas (2001), the price does not need to be the full market price,

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but should be enough to make it worthwhile for people to travel and bring in the weapon. However, it is noted that the money received for old weapons can be used for buying newer and more dangerous ones. For example, the payment for surrendering a weapon in Côte d’Ivoire was $900 per combatant, while it was only $300 in neighbouring Liberia, which resulted in many combatants from Liberia going to Côte d’Ivoire in order to benefit from this generous financial package (Isima, 2004). The process in Croatia also tried to avoid the creation of a market attracting weapons from outside the region. Although it was not proved conclusively, there were concerns that weapons were smuggled across the border with Serbia. Instead of cash, the incentives used during the Phase II weapons collection programme in El Salvador were vouchers for supermarkets, pharmacies and shoe stores (Laurance & Godnick, 2001). Overall, experience shows that weapons-for-cash programmes have a negligible positive effect on security, tend to attract old and unserviceable weapons, and often stimulate the creation of illegal arms markets, resulting in an influx of weapons into the society. Berdal (1996:34) explains further that buy-back programmes have limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons in countries which have (1) porous borders with countries with active weapons markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying and criminal use of weapons; (3) a political, economic or security climate which enhances the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon. The buy-back disarmament scheme is Haiti in 1994 was described as ‘a farce’ as it ‘paid for old arms and weapons that were no longer in use’ (Mobekk, 2005:212). It should be noted that although weapons-for-cash is the most widely used method; it is far from being the only approach to disarmament. There is a wide spectrum of methods ranging from a weaponsin-exchange-for-development approach, to the strengthening of cultural norms against the use of weapons (Faltas & Di Chiaro, 2001). For example, a number of weapon collection programmes in a number of countries such as Albania, Cambodia and Mali were undertaken in cooperation with local people with some promising results (Mugumya, 2005). Moreover, experience shows that the most effective inducement and persuasion for combatants to disarm is a credible DDR programme that offers opportunities for new, non-violent livelihoods. Demobilization With or Without Cantonment As explained in the demobilization section, there are a number of justifications for the use of cantonment, and in addition to those the DPKO (1999:36) presents it as a vital requirement for the DDR process, particularly in circumstances in which former combatants ‘have to wait for extended periods before they can be transported to their homes for resettlement’. The cantonment can also be considered as vital when there is a particularly large

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caseload. This would necessitate a phased-out demobilization, allowing local communities the time to absorb each group of demobilized combatants before the arrival of the next cohort. It is also likely that some former combatants will not have a community to return to, if they were abducted from their families when they were children, or if they have committed atrocities against their own communities. Subsequently, they would need time before they could ‘adopt’ a community for themselves. More importantly, child soldiers must be separated from military authority and protected through the establishment of special reception centres during demobilization, as long as their stay prior to being reunited with their families and communities is as short as possible (Verhey, 2002). Furthermore, a comprehensive process of information gathering on former combatants during cantonment will greatly enhance the effectiveness of reintegration programmes. Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a) consider the targeting of reintegration programmes to be critical for their successful implementation. Targeting encompasses beneficiaries who have to be identified on the basis of specific criteria, needs and opportunities. These have to be ascertained via the development of an effective targeting mechanism. For example, the medical care, child-care and education needs of female former combatants will be different from those of male former combatants and child soldiers (de Watteville, 2002). It is clear that the inclusion of cantonment as part of demobilization can provide opportunities for a thorough assessment of the capacities and needs of former combatants and the implementation of an effective targeting mechanism. Therefore, it would be unrealistic not to consider the possible advantages of cantonment as part of the demobilization process. However, a number of commentators on DDR highlight the problems encountered during cantonment (World Bank, 1993; Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b; Berdal, 1996; Kingma, 1997) concerning the living conditions experienced by former combatants, the effect that cantoning thousands of former combatants has on security and the potentially negative impact this can have on the peace process (Hoffman, 2003). In his study, Kingma (1997: 161) reiterates the requirement for an extensive logistics operation to support the cantonment of former combatants. He points out that if adequate facilities are not provided violent activities and rebellion could undermine the demobilization and reintegration process, as well as the total peace process. During the Mozambique DDR process, the demobilization was planned to start 31 days after the October 1992 peace agreement and be completed within six months (UN Report, 1992b). Although, it would have been possible to achieve a more speedy demobilization, the postponement of elections to 1994 resulted in a longer than planned period of cantonment, which in turn created frustration among combatants. This became such a security threat that it led to more than 300 violence incidents against civilians.

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Furthermore, the cost of such logistical operations can prove to be disproportionate to the resources available for subsequent reintegration activities (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b; Lundin et al., 2000). Examples of longer than planned cantonment periods suggest that, as they evolve on the ground, DDR programmes invariably encounter delays during cantonment. In Mozambique, the demobilization was scheduled for six months, but in reality it took over 16 months, which led to insecurity in and around the cantonment sites (Berdal, 1996). The lack of trust between the parties was the main factor delaying the process, as neither party wanted to give a strategic advantage to their adversary, causing disputes over selection and location (Coelho & Vines, 1994). In Somaliland, lack of resources and funding meant that combatants were kept in camps for eight months and in the end appear to have simply left the cantonment areas (Berdal, 1996). Cantonment might also attract communities of former combatants’ families and develop into politically awkward semi-permanent settlements. In the Angolan demobilization process, starting from April 2002, plans were originally made for around 50,000 former National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) combatants. However, more than 85,000 UNITA combatants were registered in 35 cantonment areas while approximately 280,000 family members were gathered in family reception areas. These higher than expected numbers of former combatants and their family members, as well as delays in the international response to the challenge, resulted in the process facing a dire humanitarian situation (Porto & Parsons, 2003). Furthermore, the long delays during cantonment resulted in violent unrest in these camps in Zimbabwe and Mozambique too (McMullin, 2004; Lala, 2005; Spear, 2006). Overall, the concept of assembly and the development of the concept into development poles present a central dilemma to the DDR process. Ironically, the cantonment of combatants reinforces the command structures that the process is intended to dissolve, and in the case of development areas, the former combatants are concentrated and isolated from the community when the objective is, in fact, to dissipate and integrate them within the community. Mozambique and Nicaragua represent DDR programmes that were agreed by all parties during peace negotiations, were fully supported by the international community and were well funded (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996a,b; Berdal, 1996; Kingma, 1997; Spencer, 1997). However, the cantonment of former combatants encountered the same problems, delays, inadequate facilities and an undermining of the peace process. Consequently, the next section will seek to address these concerns by exploring the possibility of demobilization without cantonment.

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Demobilization without Cantonment As preceding discussions show, cantonment can prove detrimental to the effectiveness of the DDR programme by absorbing scarce resources and causing delays that undermine overall confidence in the process. Therefore, it is important to explore possible alternatives to the cantonment of former combatants before deciding whether it constitutes an absolute necessity for demobilization. This view is also supported by the IDDRS and it is suggested that before going ahead with a cantonment element, a number of factors should be born in mind such as the length of time passed since the end of the conflict; the location of former combatants and whether or not they are already with their communities; the security environment; the size of caseload; the resources required for cantonment; and whether alternative methods can be considered in that particular context (2006d). An alternative to cantonment would be the establishment of mobile demobilization centres, to which former combatants simply report, before returning to their communities. Following their registration, they would report periodically to the discharge centre for documentation, screening or benefits. According to the IDDRS, mobile demobilization sites can be a good alternative in three types of DDR context (2006d). First, the caseload is formed by disciplined and recognizable units. Second, in the second scenario combatants are already based with their communities, therefore, it would not make sense to move them from their communities to cantonment areas, and then back to their communities. Finally, in environments where combatants are scattered over a big area and the majority of them are unwilling to demobilize, then such mobile demobilization centres can provide an additional advantage to encourage all combatants to demobilize. The primary advantage of such a system would be the achievement of a shorter demobilization period without the need for setting up camps for cantonment. Such operations are bound to be less expensive to run and logistically easier to implement. They are particularly useful for vulnerable groups whose members might be reluctant to enter camps where they would be subject to attack. As a methodology, mobile demobilization centres are also less coercive and can create wider opportunities for community involvement at an earlier stage. On the other hand, such an alternative method means much looser control over demobilizing forces, which could in turn result in both political and security risks. As there would be much less time available for the whole range of demobilization activities, some of the services that can be provided in a cantonment area may not be possible to achieve (Last, 1999; IDDRS, 2006d). Past experience of demobilization programmes highlights occasions when alternatives to cantonment have been implemented. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia did not require female former combatants to report to cantonment sites. Rather, they were required to report to their communities

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and register, thereby ensuring their entitlement to the same benefits as male former combatants (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). Within the same programme 70,162 former combatants who had served fewer than 18 months were transported to their communities immediately after registration. The programme in Cambodia, planned by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), intended that more than 200,000 militia would disarm without going through the cantonment process (Cox, 1996). These examples represent the exception rather than the rule; they do, however, suggest that demobilization can be achieved without cantonment of the combatants. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the cantonment of former combatants may have the political objective, particularly during the war-topeace transition, of demonstrating the willingness of factions to demobilize, while retaining the requisite forces in concentrated areas where they could be remobilized if the peace agreement is not implemented. In such circumstances, the deficiencies of cantonment in relation to the objective of demobilization, reinforcing and concentrating force structures, represent a political objective of belligerent factions during the cantonment phase. Cantonment allows the belligerent factions to demonstrate a willingness to disarm without actually doing so. Forces are concentrated, and in some cases disarmed, but remain effectively under the control of their force command structures and can therefore be remobilized rapidly if the peace process is not successful. It is therefore possible that the political requirements of the belligerent factions might prevent the implementation of demobilization without cantonment. In such circumstances, it remains the responsibility of the international community and donor bodies to articulate their preferences and so decide on the method to be adopted and on the lump sum and needs to be tailored to meet the individual needs of the former combatant. Not all former combatants will require the same amount of reinsertion assistance, therefore criteria for assistance needs to be established and implemented in a transparent manner. The following sections will explore the different elements and modalities of reinsertion assistance. Financial Reinsertion Assistance Reinsertion of former combatants following demobilization and prior to participation within a reintegration programme constitutes a crucial stage within the overall DDR process. Kostner (2001: 1) states the importance of reinsertion assistance as follows: Upon discharge, an ex-combatant loses his/her source of (formal or informal) income. Immediately thereafter, s/he is normally in a critical financial situation until s/he can generate income through self-

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employment. During this period (the reinsertion phase), an excombatant is in need of special assistance (transitional safety net) to cover the basic material needs of him/herself and his/her family. The basic material needs of former combatants and their dependants can be divided into two areas: household consumption, such as food, clothes, health care and children’s education; and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils (Kostner, 2001). The transitional safety net is often planned for a period of six months to a year after demobilization and delivered through the provision of cash and/or goods. The cash assistance could be provided as a monthly amount or in a lump sum and needs to be tailored to meet the individual needs of the former combatant. Not all former combatants will require the same amount of reinsertion assistance, therefore criteria for assistance need to be established and implemented in a transparent manner. The following sections will explore the different elements and modalities of reinsertion assistance. Cash payments can be used for household consumption and household investment. The advantages of cash as reinsertion assistance, compared to other kinds of material assistance, include the relative ease of distribution, since no transportation or warehousing expenses are incurred. If a banking system is operational, the cash can be paid directly into recipients’ bank accounts, thereby reducing the security risks involved in cash distribution and also strengthening the local banking system. However, it is at this point that the difference between cash payments during the demobilization and reintegration phases needs to be recognized. As the reinsertion initiative serves the purpose of a linkage between demobilization and reintegration, the financial reinsertion might be seen as a reintegration initiative. However, as far as this book is concerned, reinsertion assistance is considered as a transitional safety net. It is accepted that there is in fact no clear correlation between the size of the sum issued and the subsequent employment rate during the reintegration phase. It is asserted that ‘cash payments per se do not address the problems of socially integrating excombatants into society’ (Berdal, 1996:47). However, a study carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann (2001:19) asserts that cash allowances, as a transitional safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering reinsertion assistance. The southern Africa safety-net studies indicate that beneficiaries tend to use cash for social and productive investment only after consumption needs have been met, and show how cash can act as a stimulant to the local economy. Evidence of squandering – on alcohol and gambling, for example – was not found in any of the case studies that looked at how grants were spent.

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Furthermore, the intent of the cash payment in the Ethiopian case was to assist in the establishment of a civilian household. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone (2001:1) specified the objective of the reinsertion support, which also included a cash payment, as being ‘to facilitate the return and initial reintegration of excombatants into their home areas, and to help ensure their basic short-term necessities are accommodated without being an undue burden on the receiving household’. In fact, the Sierra Leone example introduces an important element when considering the reinsertion of former combatants, namely the effect upon the host community and household into which they will be reinserted. Former combatants may have to rely on the informal support structures available from family and community. Consequently, any cash allowance would help to ameliorate the additional drain on resources experienced by the receiving communities and households (Willibald, 2006). Overall, five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reinsertion assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiation criteria, the amount of the allowance, financial education and the development of a noncorruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenge for the DDR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reinsertion assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process. For example, although the donor community provided 89 per cent of funds for the DDR process in Uganda, there was a substantial overlap of activities owing to delays in the mobilization of funds, and consequently, there were occasions when funds had to be loaned from the Ministry of Defence (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). The World Bank plans for demobilization in Cambodia in 2000 also faced similar funding problems, as both donors and government failed in their mobilization. Consequently, the original plan for a severance payment of $1,200 per demobilized Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) soldier was reduced to $240 per veteran. The further demobilization of RCAF soldiers is likely to face problems with the provision of necessary funding (Kingma, 2001). Experience indicates that criteria for differentiating the amounts paid to particular groups must be clearly and transparently established. This is particularly important in order to avoid discrimination, for example against female former combatants. However, the Ugandan reinsertion process adopted an approach based on egalitarian differentiation. It was the same for all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service. In contrast, during the process in Ethiopia, the criteria for differentiating amounts and types of reinsertion assistance included length of service, location of settlement (urban or rural) and level of disability (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). In the Namibian experience, the need for reinsertion assistance was not foreseen at the beginning, however protests from former combatants and the

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resulting threat to security meant that retrospective reinsertion assistance was provided. However, the two criteria for differentiating payment – being unemployed and in service at the time the decision was made – proved difficult to establish. Furthermore, the payments were considered as severance pay and were therefore not calculated on the basis of projected needs (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b; Preston, 1997). The amount of the allowance, as a general rule, should broadly correspond to the level of household income of the general population in order that it does not cause resentment within the community in which the former combatant will settle (Kostner, 2001). In other words, establishing the amount of reinsertion assistance must be based upon information gathered from combatants and the prevailing socio-economic environment into which they are to be inserted. Also, the amount should be calculated so as to avoid creating a disincentive to find employment. Criticism of the reinsertion assistance in Mozambique suggests that it was too generous, creating a sense among former combatants that they were special and they could therefore expect and demand more from the government and international community (UNIDIR, 1996). With Liberia and Sierra Leone cases in mind, Willibald (2006:326) asserts that ‘the provision of cash to ex-combatants can indeed elicit community resentment’ but this would ‘likely to abate once the rationale and, importantly, the potential gains of cash transfers are recognized’. In addition to the level of financial assistance, another important issue is whether this should be paid as a lump sum or by instalments. The World Bank (1993) study shows that former combatants tend to have little success in investing lump sum payments for productive purposes, suggesting that cash payments without financial planning sessions are of limited utility. Depending on their context, former combatants may have little or no experience in managing money or operating within a cash economy. In such circumstances, cash payments should be combined with the provision of finance education sessions as an integral component of the reinsertion assistance. Consequently, the preferred approach should entail payment by instalments that decrease over time, thereby reducing dependency and clearly establishing that the assistance is strictly time-limited. For example, the process in Angola which was initiated in 2002 plans to provide former combatants with one cash payment of $100 in addition to a severance payment in the form of three-months salary (Porto & Parsons, 2003; Dzinesa, 2004). Finally, a non-corruptible identification system must be established during demobilization that will allow former combatants to receive their reinsertion assistance. The establishment of a non-corruptible identification system is imperative in forming and maintaining confidence in the distribution of reinsertion assistance, among both the beneficiaries and the donors contributing towards the DDR programme. The payment list needs to be

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complete and accurate, former combatants should be registered and provided with a non-transferable photographic ID and benefits should be tracked via the DDR programme management information system (Kostner, 2001; Willibald, 2006). Cash allowances should not be considered to be exclusive. For example in Angola, in addition to cash, former combatants were provided with in-kind kit, including clothes, domestic tools, food and agricultural tools (Porto & Parsons, 2003). Free health services may be included in the reinsertion assistance package, especially if former combatants received free medical care during their period of military service. Any health support provided should be targeted at the family of the former combatant and includes children. However, depending upon the social context, it should be recognized that health support may be an element of the reinsertion assistance that potentially causes resentment among the community, especially if medical provision in the community is not freely available. It would therefore be appropriate to channel funds through existing structures that benefit the community as a whole, rather than create DDR specific programmes (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). An element of the reinsertion assistance that targets children of former combatants may relieve some financial restraints for a period of one year. Assistance could include school fees, books and uniforms, and such assistance should be delivered, not in cash, but through a system of vouchers that can be redeemed at schools and shops. In Rwanda for example, one of the main challenges faced by young former combatants and those with children was the payment of school fees (Verwimp and Verpoorten, 2004). Immediately following their return to their community, the most pressing need for former combatants and their dependants is often finding shelter. Assistance can be given either as a cash subsidy or via material inputs such as roofing materials (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). Nevertheless, material assistance, in terms of roofing materials and tools, incurs higher transitional costs; these materials are unlikely to meet the specific needs of individual former combatants and might be sold by former combatants for cash to meet more pressing needs. The special needs of female former combatants should also be borne in mind in this process. For example, in urban areas their housing needs can be covered through the safety net by assisting them with rent fees for a limited period. For those who are in rural areas, cash can be provided for materials for constructing or rehabilitating a house. However, women, particularly those who are single heads of households, can face problems in this process, since they often lack the necessary technical skills. Therefore, the transitional safety net for female former combatants could also include the payment of essential labour for construction of their houses (de Watteville, 2002).

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One Size Does Not Fit for All – Specific Needs of Disabled, Female and Child Combatants Former combatants are a heterogonous group with varied characteristics and needs including men, women, boys and girls, and the gravity of these issues should not be overlooked as different groups may face different difficulties and obstacles in the DDR process. Assessing the diversity of caseloads, special attention needs to be given to the fate of former combatants, who have been disabled because of conflict, as well as female combatants and child soldiers. In addition to these three conventional categories of vulnerable groups within former combatant caseloads, Srivastava (1994) identifies three more vulnerable groups as first, those who left the army before the peace agreement; second, those who were demobilized as senior personnel; and finally, the families of combatants who have died in the conflict. For example, in Ethiopia as the orphans and widows of combatants who died during the conflict were not cared for during the DDR process, many of them were left no option but to beg on the streets (Harris, et al., 1999). Each of these groups can be further sub-divided as former combatants who are from various sides in the conflict and those who were volunteered and forced to fight. However, the focus in this section will be mainly on disabled, female and child combatants as three specific vulnerable groups whose specific needs are often overlooked in the DDR process. The ILO’s (1995a) research on disabled former combatants in African countries indicates that they are often not included in any subsequent training, resettlement or employment schemes held for able-bodied former combatants, resulting in a large number ending up either destitute or dependent on their families and government for survival. Lala (2005:172) states that as the specials needs of the disabled combatants in Mozambique were ignored, their problems ‘such as pension, prostheses and employment were acute especially when they did not have family care’ which ‘led to their discrimination as a burden to the families or communities.’ One of the characteristics of contemporary conflicts is that there has been an increase in the number of female combatants. However, as an ILO study of Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mozambique shows, female combatants had reduced access to land, employment and training opportunities because the designed reintegration programmes did not ensure equal access to them as the most important policy element (1995b). It is also argued that difficulties for female combatants can increase when they do not feel they are being accorded the same equality that they had as part of the army. For example, women as both fighters and war-affected civilians acquire new roles during the war. However, they are usually expected to return to their traditional roles after the war. More importantly, in some traditional societies female former combatants are often considered as war-time prostitutes, which make me them unfit to

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marry (Bouta et al., 2004). Kingma (2002) makes linkages between this attitude and the high divorce rate in Eritrea, where about one third of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) were women. The analysis of socio-economic data on former combatants in Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea has also shown that female former combatants were more vulnerable than their male counterparts (de Watteville, 2002). Consequently, Tegegn (1992) emphasizes the importance of providing female former combatants with special assistance to enable them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life. The IDDRS recommend a gender-responsive approach in all phases and activities of DDR from the negotiation and needs assessment of the process to its implementation and evaluation. For example, it is important either that those who are involved in negotiation for the overall framework of DDR processes should have current and reliable information on the involvement of female combatants in the conflict, or that women should be represented adequately in all decision-making bodies in this process. When the needs of former combatants are assessed, it should be borne in mind that life choices made by women and girls may be quite different from those made by men and boys due to their different roles before, during and after conflict. In the same way, when it comes to demobilization, specific gender requirements should be taken into account, especially if the phase requires the establishment of cantonment sites. In socio-economic reintegration once again, female combatants would have different needs and expectations than male combatants. Therefore, the reintegration process should ensure that traditional society structures do not result in reduced access to reintegration benefits for female combatants such as not being able to attend vocational training courses because of childcare responsibilities or the need to travel long distances to reach training centres; cultural barriers to finding a suitable employment and not having equal access to communal land and farming equipment. At the same time, the reintegration options that are open to female combatants should include those vocational skills such as construction and driving that may not usually be considered as ‘women’s work’ since such skills may have already been acquired during the conflict, and female combatants may want to build on them (2006e). Similarly, in order to respond to the needs for former child soldiers, the World Bank (2002a) presents three components as a prerequisite in their reintegration process: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity. As well as facing a lack of specific programmes designed for their needs, one of the reasons child soldiers join in the outbreak of new conflicts is the intimidation they experienced after their demobilization (GTZ, 2001). It should be borne in mind that the transition from a military to civilian identity may be much more difficult for child soldiers than adult combatants. There may be a number of reasons for this, but the most important is the fact that the only norm most child soldiers will have

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experienced is conflict and in spite of its all disadvantages, in conflict child soldiers ‘may have found a defined role, responsibility, purpose and power in an armed force or group.’ (IDDRS, 2006f:19). The DDR process is also likely to be more challenging for child soldiers than adult combatants, since to start with for example, finding out the age of a child may be a highly difficult task in most conflict-affected environments (the UN’s advocacy position on the minimum age to be part of an armed group is 18). Identifying their families and facilitating reunification is usually a challenging task too, as in some cases, child soldiers may not be welcomed by their families and communities because of what they were forced to do against their communities during the conflict.5 In respect to these particular requirements, it is also clear that the acceptance of families and communities and the means by which this can be fostered and reinforced need to form an integral component in any DDR programme directed at child soldiers. Furthermore, the provision of psychosocial care and support is often much more necessary for child soldiers than adult combatants in order to ensure that they can make the transition into a civilian identity successfully. Finally, the preceding requirements also necessitate a much longer term perspective for the DDR of child soldiers, with a particular emphasis on education (Honwana, 2002). Direct cash payments that may be considered as appropriate reinsertion assistance for adult combatants can be even counter productive as this may increase the hostility and suspicion of communities towards former child soldiers (IDDRS, 2006f). Save the Children (2007:vii–viii) emphasizes the importance of programming for child soldiers to be inclusive of other conflictaffected children, as otherwise ‘they appear to be rewarded for their action during conflict, or to be singled out in way that other, equally vulnerable and traumatized children are not.’ According to an ILO study (1995c), the situation of girl former combatants is often more difficult than that of boys as girls are often used as sexual objects during the fighting, and consequently receive continued abuse after their demobilization, making it difficult to reintegrate them into society. For example, because of their non-combatant roles as ‘wives’, messengers and cooks, most girl combatants tend to be invisible in DDR processes, or in cantonment sites they tend to face a high risk of sexual exploitation and young mothers and their children often experience a total rejection from their communities and experience continuing abuse and stigmatization (Alden, 2002). Consequently, it is necessary to monitor their reintegration process carefully, together with psychological counselling programmes to make sure that the process caters for their specific needs and concerns (IDDRS, 2006f). Having focussed on the terminology; main phases and processes; and challenges of DDR, the next section will present the analytical framework of

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this book that will be used in the exploration of the four main case studies in the forthcoming chapters. Analytical Framework A weapon-focussed disarmament process would be extremely short sighted, as this would be simply to react to the problem but not resolve its causes. In other words, as with the support of discussions in preceding sections, a DDR process that focuses on taking arms from former combatants without linking its objectives to a wider peacebuilding framework is bound to be short lived. Why is it then, that the practice of DDR over the past 20 years has shown all the characteristics of such a limited and short sighted approach? What have been the factors and ideological considerations behind such misguided practice? Hill (2004:13) argues succinctly that the most basic assumptions of classic realism concerning civil wars are that ‘humans seek power and control over others (animus dominandi) and that nothing short of a powerful central authority will restrain them from using force to attain it.’ In other words, from a classical realism perspective, if a third party intervenes in a civil war, then it should be prepared to use force. The realist view would argue that the transformation of warring parties into national army and police forces as part of SSR would likely to intensify the ‘security dilemma’, making the involvement of a third party in the process an imperative. However, it is important to bear in mind that not all warring sides always want total power, and therefore, it is important to question the role of ‘security dilemma’ in the context of DDR. From a neo-realist perspective, it may be argued that third party intervention in such an environment would be the most needed action in order that the critical barrier to peace can be overcome. One of the strong proponents of this view, Walter (2002) considers the role of third parties as the verification of compliance; monitoring of the implementation; and provision of security and trust during the DDR process. On the other hand, Hatzell and Hoddie (2007) would argue that the neo-liberal tradition would approach this challenge from an institutional perspective, advocating that the sustainability of disarmament and demobilization can only be ensured by setting up institutions that would bring the use of coercive force under the umbrella of power sharing. However, as pointed out by Hill (2004:17), warring groups are treated by neorealism and neo-liberalism ‘as rational egoists (rationalism) in a domestic structure defined by the distribution of capabilities (materialism)’ and this view is challenged by constructivism, arguing that politics are socially structured and social structures constitute not only actors’ behaviour but also their identities and interests. Constructivism, which became prominent as an international relations theory in the late 1980s – early 1990s, emphasizes the importance of ideational factors such as ideas, norms, beliefs, identity and culture. Hay (2002:201) argues

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that social constructivism questions reality or what seems to be reality: ‘X need not have existed, or need not be as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.’ Furthermore, social constructivists imply that ‘X is quite bad as it is…We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed.’ What would the constructivist view be able to bring to the study of DDR? It would possible to take one of the main assumptions and primary cornerstones of current DDR practice, which is that DDR is a precondition for peacebuilding, therefore preferential treatment of former combatants is justifiable, and explore this first, from a neo-realist/neo-liberal view and challenge it from a constructivist perspective afterwards. Preferential Treatment of Former Combatants Last (1999) presents a number of justifications for preferential treatment of former combatants. He points out that if former combatants cannot see a role for themselves in the post-war order, they may turn to banditry. It is particularly important that former combatants should not be seen returning to their communities empty-handed. Furthermore, targeted programmes may also be seen as a political payback for leaders who risked a great deal to bring their constituents into the peace process. Supporting this view, Ball (1997) also adopts a view of former combatants as a group of disadvantaged war-affected people, therefore it is necessary that the reintegration process should take into account these inherent weaknesses and adjust their support and programmes accordingly. Here is the Ball’s (Ball, 1997:86) description of a typical former combatant: The typical veteran is semiliterate at best, is unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land, and frequently has many dependants. Some veterans are also physically and psychologically handicapped by wartime experiences. Many find it difficult to take independent initiatives and to cope with the ordinary demands of civilian life. Even when they possess a marketable skill, such as mechanic or driver, ex-combatants tend to have little or no experience in the labour market, having taken up arms at an early stage. They also tend to have an imperfect understanding of the state of the economy. Consequently, ex-combatants often have unrealistic assumptions about civilian life and require a period of adjustment to assess their personal situation and options. Supporting this view, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (1996) asserts that former combatants require preferential treatment from a humanitarian point of view, as they are out of a job and usually away

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from their home upon demobilization. From this perspective, it may be considered normal to face demands from former combatants for the reintegration process to provide them with some tangible benefits and often this is carried out by targeting their needs specifically. It is often argued that, without special targeting there would be a risk of former combatants turning to violence and banditry, which would in turn have a detrimental impact on the peacebuilding process. With parts of Africa and Central America in mind Berdal (1996:39) points out that the failure in meeting ‘expectations of immediate rewards and recognition for sacrifices made during war’ can easily have destabilising consequences. In their post-conflict environments, having lost their previous status and the feeling of security procured by belonging to a group, former combatants can easily feel confused and overwhelmed, which would only exacerbate their dissatisfaction that their expectations are not met. For example, in Namibia where it was assumed that integration would be unproblematic, the process did not envisage any specific demobilization and reintegration benefits for former combatants; most former combatants failed to reintegrate economically and began to voice their anger through demonstrations and the media. As the national security of the country was threatened, the government was forced to respond with various cash payment schemes, and training and resettlement programmes (Preston, 1997; Metsola, 2006). Besides, it is also asserted by some commentators that the targeted assistance has some important economic benefits as this ‘allows for the development of a differentiated, relevant, and cost-effective approach’ (Colletta et al., 1996a:3). According to the BICC (1996), it is important to recognize the potential contribution that former combatants can provide to the general development of their communities and the country as a whole. Furthermore, it is also argued that the special support to former combatants can be justified as they may be considered as a group of war-affected people who sacrificed their life in order to liberate their country, although such a justification would not be possible in certain post-conflict transformation scenarios where there is no clear winner of the conflict, and where former combatants are not returning home as war heroes. Nevertheless, when there is only a limited supply of resources for a wide range of needs, giving priority to former combatants tends to be an approach used frequently in current practice. Bringing the constructivist critique to bear here, it may be possible to argue that, so normative has the close-woven relationship between the DDR of former combatants and peacebuilding become, that the need for a one-manone-weapon approach, with an emphasis on preferential treatment of former combatants is now almost assumed to be the only way of conducting DDR processes. As argued previously, if former combatants do not receive preferential treatment then they would pose a high risk to the sustainability of peacebuilding. However, to explore this further, let us assume that the DDR

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thesis of the need for preferential treatment is valid, and ask ourselves whether we believe this thesis. If the answer is yes, then there would be a preferential treatment and no security risk (Scenario 1), and if the answer is no, then there would be no preferential treatment and former combatants would pose a security risk (Scenario 2). Now, let us assume that the DDR thesis concerned is actually false, and ask ourselves the same question. If the answer is yes, there would be preferential treatment and no security risk (Scenario 3), but if the answer is no, then there would be no preferential treatment and no return to conflict (Scenario 4). To elaborate, in the first hypothetical scenario any rational intervention by the international community, aware of possible dangers which former combatants may pose to security and stability, would apply a preferential treatment for them in the DDR process with the effect that no security risks would be observed (Scenario 1). Again, according to the first assumption, it would be foolish for the international community not to use a preferential treatment because their ignorance and scepticism would be punished by a mass return of former combatants to conflict or to involvement in crime and banditry (Scenario 2). However, if the impact of preferential treatment in the maintenance of security and stability is much exaggerated and is based on a misunderstanding by the international community of overall peacebuilding needs and its own political agenda, then the scenario unfolds rather differently. DDR processes are planned on a misconception, falsely attributing the lack of mass return of former combatants to conflict (Scenario 3) to their own DDR approaches. Yet, if DDR processes resist this false assumption, other means and methods of reintegration such as those community-centred ones can be explored and implemented without fear of the return to conflict by former combatants. Although the actions in Scenario 1 and 3 are the same, in the latter one the decision is based on a social construction. What this demonstrates is that it is the ideas about DDR and peacebuilding rather than DDR and peacebuilding per se, which affects the decision concerning preferential treatment of former combatants. In other words, from a constructivist view it can be argued that first, preferential treatment of former combatants may be undermining the basis of sustainable peace. Second, in the current practice of DDR, preferential treatment is taken for granted as a pre-requisite of peacebuilding. Third, peacebuilding, however, does not often necessitate such a preferential treatment of former combatants, although it is frequently assumed to do so. Finally, preferential treatment in DDR processes may be unnecessary and contingent, and we would be better off without it. This constructivist critique of preferential treatment can actually be substantiated with empirical evidence from the field, particularly the impact of such a treatment on the social reintegration of former combatants themselves.

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The reasons for this are many, such as the issue of the resentment it creates among other war-affected group such as displaced persons who like former combatants, face similar challenges in terms of access to land and means of livelihood. In relation to Angola for example, the research by Porto, Alden and Parsons (2007:146) indicates that ‘there is little that distinguishes the former combatant from other vulnerable groups – they face the same challenges, experience a very similar degree of vulnerability, are equipped with the same very limited set of skills and survive using identical income-generating activities.’ Supporting this experience, during the reintegration of GAM in Aceh it was observed that separating combatants from their communities ‘when providing reintegration assistance might have entailed that eligible groups are missed out and tension, resentment and jealousies are created.’ (Beeck, 2007:33) In Mozambique, around 90,000 former combatants demobilized in the early 1990s, formed a small fraction in comparison to an estimated of 1.5 million refugees and four million IDPs. Therefore, it was important that the focus of reintegration efforts did not target former combatants only, but addressed their needs as part of other population groups for return and reintegration (Berman, 1996; McMullin, 2004; Spear, 2006). Similarly, in Haiti the vocational re-training of former combatants and provision of tool-kits ‘created some animosity among Haitians’ as the view was that the victims of ‘oppression received nothing, but the oppressors had reaped benefits.’(Mobekk, 2005:219). It is also necessary to note that there is no clear-cut difference between combatants and civilians in most armed conflicts, which can complicate such a targeted approach. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that receiving communities may also become resentful towards the preferential treatment of former combatants, especially if they are considered to have been responsible for wartime atrocities and destruction (Kingma, 2001). According to Pouligny (2004:11), the involvement of communities in reintegration programmes would ‘rebuild trust and show that ex-combatants are making a contribution to the community’ and hence, could contribute towards ‘reconciliation’. Spencer (1997) and Ball (1997) warn against the polarization that former combatant centred programmes can cause among war-affected populations and advise that these evolve into community-based programmes as early as possible, in order to be seen to benefit all the severely affected population. For example, with vocational training programmes Nübler (1997:29) urges a ‘mainstreaming of activities wherever possible in order to avoid resentment against former combatants’, which would mean a mid- to long-term marginalization of their position in society. The ILO for example, recommends an inclusive approach which would contribute to the perception that peace will be built on social justice and the general welfare of all. According to some commentators it is crucial that former combatants actually avoid being given the label of ‘former combatant’ as quickly as possible. It is asserted that former combatants should

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be encouraged to disperse rather than concentrate (Mehreteab, 2002), and it is important that former combatants come to ‘identify themselves quickly as civilians’ (Clark, 1995:57). The Occupational Skills Development project in Mozambique, which was implemented by ILO and UNDP with a budget of $14.9 million, resulted in employment for only five per cent of the approximately 7,700 demobilized combatants. The project also largely failed in reaching the remote rural areas where a majority of the population lived and where most former combatants were received. Although it included schemes to finance local initiatives and create employment opportunities, it is reported that 71 per cent of former combatants never contacted those funding services, while 68 per cent stated that they depended on their extended family and friends for addressing their financial needs (Lundin, et al., 2000). In other words, community structures were dealing with what the reintegration programme failed to address, and it is this potential capacity that the current practice tends to neglect or ignore completely. It is clear that local communities play a significant role, not only in social reintegration but also the economic reintegration of former combatants. This role could be encouraged further in order to achieve a wider impact of peace dividends if the international community would start to show greater awareness towards them and opt for a more community-centred approach. However, from a security centred DDR perspective of Collier (1994) this would be almost impossible to achieve because such strategies only focus on the preferential treatment of former combatants, ignoring the involvement of waraffected communities in DDR programmes. However, as many DDR practitioners know only too well, targeting former combatants is not always a choice left to the planners and implementers of DDR programmes. All too often, in order to ensure the participation of belligerent groups in the peacebuilding process, such preferential treatment is dictated by peace agreements. In such a context what needs to be done therefore, is really to strike a balance ensuring that ‘ex-combatants should not receive more support than necessary to help them attain the standard of living of the communities in which they live.’ (Kingma, 2001:410) It is also possible that, while targeting former combatants as a preferential group for the recruitment of a new police force and army, and providing them with specific demobilization benefits, reintegration programmes can be simultaneously designed to respond to the needs of the wider community around them. Emphasizing this point Ball (1997) notes that the community based programmes actually ensure a greater opportunity for former combatants to be rapidly reintegrated. In other words, former combatants should not be targeted in isolation for too long, but considered as individuals who are part of an extended family structure or even within their own wider community. In order to employ such a community-based approach in DDR, the most

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critical issue is how former combatants are perceived, treated and involved in their own reintegration process. This is why the focus in the next section will be on the way the international community, as a third party deals with former combatants from a neo-realist / neo-liberal perspective. The tendency is to see them as a security risk, with the result that the entire DDR process turns into an undertaking in how best to deal with a dangerous caseload so that they are kept busy for as long as possible and do not pose any danger to international peacekeeping troops. Perspectives of Security Risk versus Human Resource Development It is important to note that in the conceptualization of the relationship between DDR and peacebuilding, two schools of thoughts tend to form the contours of the way DDR challenges are perceived and responded to. The first approach is based on a security risk perspective in which former combatants are seen as a security risk both at a micro and macro level (Collier, 1994), while the second one considers it as a development challenge (Berdal, 1996). Muggah (2004) refers them as minimalist and maximalist perspectives, respectively. According to the micro- and macro-insecurity framework, fear of personal violence and theft, namely micro-insecurity, may actually increase in the aftermath of an armed conflict for two basic reasons: first, if the demobilized combatants are not placed into employment, the lack of an income source increases their propensity to commit crimes; and second, former combatants tend to be unskilled, except in the use of weapon, which leads them to find themselves with a comparative advantage in criminal activities. The macro-insecurity aspect on the other hand, argues that demobilization may prove to be a potential threat to post-war peace and stability if former combatants are deprived of economic opportunities and are socio-politically marginalized. Therefore, demobilization can increase macro-insecurity not only by reducing the capacity of a government to defend itself, but also because former combatants can return to arms if their grievances and frustration continues to be neglected, causing insecurity at national, or even regional and global levels. For example, after the end of the war between the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and various Mujaheddin groups a large group of Afghan veterans were involved in conflicts in places like Bosnia and Chechnya. Likewise, the South African firm, Executive Outcomes, is known to provide armed forces to several countries, employing mostly ex-soldiers from the former South African Defence Force (Kingma, 2002). The categorization of development and security perspectives also seems to be in keeping with the way peacebuilding is conceptualized, in which security and development are identified as the two main approaches to it. The first is about a set of urgent political tasks necessary for the maintenance of peace in the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement, while the second is about the

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consolidation of a self-sustaining peace through political, economic and social reconstruction, and reconciliation from a longer-term perspective. In other words, the former is a negative task which attempts to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict, while the latter is a positive task which addresses the root causes of armed conflict (Ramsbotham, 2000). Kingma (2000) argues that the concept of peacebuilding actually provides an important link between the debates on development and security, as increased security and stability are likely to contribute to sustainable development. Moreover, what is important to recognize here is that the DDR challenge could actually link security and development arenas within the peacebuilding framework. Furthermore, Kingma (2002) asserts that increased security and stability, through the reintegration of former combatants would lead to progress in human development, which is a prerequisite for sustainable peacebuilding. Walter’s analysis of 41 countries affected by armed conflict from 1940 to 1990 shows that 17 of them ended their conflict with an officially negotiated peace agreement. However, nine out of these 17 cases returned to war after peace negotiations started and in five out of these nine cases although antagonists signed the peace agreement, they did not implement it (1999). One of Walter’s conclusions is that DDR is a key determinant issue for the sustainability of peace. She argues that whether antagonists sign a peace agreement or not is not a real determinant for the outcome of the peace process, but their will for the implementation of DDR certainly is. For example, in Angola one of the main reasons why the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords failed was the insufficient level of demobilization. Before the 1992 elections, the UN Security Council was informed by its Secretary-General that there was a serious delay in the unification of the national army and demobilization. According to the UN report, the ratio of personnel integrated to the national army by September 1992 was only 19 per cent and of those 45 per cent were from the MPLA and 24 per cent from UNITA (UN Report, 1992a). It is therefore not a coincidence that after this bitter experience in Angola the UN placed a heavy emphasis on DDR in Mozambique before the organization of post-conflict elections (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Alden, 1995; Adekanye, 1997). Such experiences show that the perception of DDR from a security angle shows a close interaction between peacebuilding and the DDR process; however this is perhaps only a limited reflection of the reality. The insecurity perspective can only provide a limited and over simplified picture of a complex relationship. Consequently, this is why the development perspective is essential in order to gain a more complete picture of the relationship between peacebuilding and DDR. More importantly, it is also an imperative not to cause more harm than good during DDR programmes, consequently many opportunities that could be utilized as entry points for a sustainable peacebuilding process are missed.

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In order to explain the relationship between development, peacebuilding and DDR Nübler (1997) utilizes the human resources approach in which the focus is on non-cognitive, motivational and psychological dimensions. By adopting such an approach it is argued that former combatants have the potential to contribute to the general development in their community and country as a whole. Given that demobilized former combatants can sometimes form over 10 per cent of the workforce, their entry into productive activities can certainly contribute to economic development (Colletta et al., 1996a). In addition to their skills and capacities, former combatants can also play a dynamic role in the development of new economic activities and employment opportunities. In Eritrea and Ethiopia for example, former combatants were relatively better educated than general population (Bruchhaus & Mehreteab, 2000; Ayalew & Dercon, 2000). The way in which vocational training and micro-enterprise development programmes for former combatants are planned and implemented could also be considered as another entry point, through which a number of general development objectives can be integrated. However, such a development would require a longer-term involvement from the international community and national actors, which is often a rarity in peacebuilding experiences. Therefore, a more short-term and ad-hoc interest in DDR from an insecurity perspective tends to be opted for in most cases. In Angola, the donor interest in DDR lasted for as long as the organization of elections in 1992, and although there was some ad-hoc provision of vocational training programmes by some international agencies, their coverage and scale were far from meeting the actual needs of combatants (Anstee, 1996). Adopting a purely security based perspective to DDR tends to become particularly dangerous for the sustainability of peacebuilding processes, when the reintegration process considers former combatants as potentially destabilising elements and a major threat to security, if they are kept busy through immediate reintegration in the communities of return. This is ironically a high risk approach as it is likely to alienate its so called target group, forcing them to distance themselves from the DDR process and general peacebuilding activities. Through timely and appropriate reintegration activities it is not only possible to keep former combatants from the temptations of returning to fighting or resorting to crime and banditry, but also to benefit from their direct contribution to the economy. In Namibia and Uganda, timely and significant investment, such as the provision of credit, tools and other forms of necessary assistance in agriculture, marked an increase in the overall agricultural growth, hence generating economic benefits for the wider community (Colletta, et al., 1996b; Metsola, 2006). Another important issue in the context of DDR undertakings clearly related to the dominance of international actors in the planning and implementation of such undertakings. It is clear that in most cases the funding

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for such processes comes from external donors, which effectively introduces the agenda of international community into why and how a DDR process should be carried out. In most cases the international community is not only the source of funding but also a third party who is supposed to act with neutrality to build an environment of confidence and trust among warring groups. However, such the identity of neutral third parties has changed in the period from the end of the Cold War to the present. After the 1999 Kosovo intervention for example, the NATO forces had to act as a neutral third party in the DDR of Kosovo Liberation Army combatants, although it was NATO that brought the conflict to an end by fighting against Serbian forces. In the post 9/11 context, this dilemma concerning third party has been exacerbated further, with Afghanistan providing a good illustration of this. Therefore, the issue of third party intervention and its role in DDR process deserves closer attention, and the following section will examine this from an analytical perspective of ‘power’. Is It a Job for the International Community Only? Actors involved in the DDR process range from UN agencies, national and local government authorities, bilateral funding agencies and international financial institutions to international and local NGOs, community-based organizations and more importantly, former combatants themselves, their families and receiving communities. There is also a clear consensus in the literature that the assistance for DDR, particularly in the reintegration phase should be community-based and structured as part of general post-conflict recovery efforts (Colletta, et al., 1996; Berdal, 1996; Kingma, 2000; Özerdem, 2002; Knight & Özerdem, 2004). The national ownership of DDR programmes is particularly critical as a number of legislative frameworks such as transitional justice and amnesty provisions; citizenship and nationality laws; weapons control and management; justice reform; and legal provisions for new armed forces would all be necessary for the successful integration of DDR in the overall peacebuilding framework (IDDRS, 2006g). However, the current practice indicates that this point is yet to be mainstreamed in the planning and implementation of DDR programmes, since the importance of communities is still not adequately recognized by donors, nor is it incorporated into their undertakings. For example, the international community in its involvement in DDR programmes tends to be reluctant to empower local ownership of the process: ‘in the past, too many DDR programmes were overly controlled by external actors who did not make enough effort to establish true partnerships with national institutions and local authorities, resulting in programmes that were insufficiently adapted to the dynamics of local conflicts, unsupportive of the capacities of local institutions and unresponsive to the needs of local populations.’ (IDDRS, 2006g:3) In

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Eritrea, although the government developed a policy in which programmes were carried out by the country itself, this strategy failed to attract many donors. Consequently, just $48 million was pledged and $10 million was disbursed in terms of external assistance of technical services and financial resources, while the total cost of the DDR programme was over $100 million (Bruchhaus & Mehreteab, 2000). In Mozambique too, although it benefited from much more enthusiasm in donor funding with over $80 million of its DDR budget of $95 million provided by the international community, nonetheless donors were reluctant to involve local actors, and therefore the assistance was disbursed only by international organizations (Lundin, et al., 2000). In his analysis, Hay identifies three faces of power as decision-making, agenda setting and preference shaping, and he notes all of these dimensions play a critical role in the way that the international community actors maintain power over local stakeholders (2002). By elaborating on these three faces of power in DDR processes, it would be possible to gain a better understanding of the above mentioned dominance of the international community in DDR planning and implementation. From a classic pluralist perspective, power is understood in terms of its effects and from a behavioural view, and it is associated with domination or power over others, and finally it is unproductive or zero-sum. To a large extent this is for example, the view adopted by the international community in its relationship with former belligerents. Considering them as a possible security risk, the power relationship is based on the approaches to dominating local authorities and former combatants in carrying out the international community’s agenda rather than using power as a capacity to affect outcomes (Hay, 2002:173). According to the second face of power, setting the agenda for the decision-making process is used for exerting power. It is succinctly argued by Hay that ‘[f]or the art of politics was to steer the agenda is such a way as to avoid the need for formal decision-making on issues where the desired outcome could not be guaranteed’ (2002:175) and this is exactly what happens in most DDR processes. With the funding dependence on external actors, the agenda for the process is often set by international actors, leaving almost no room for the involvement of national and local authorities, and former warring sides. Finally, in the third face of power, preference-shaping, power distorts perceptions and shapes preferences, as is for example, often the case when former combatants are encouraged, channelled or asked to choose a particular reintegration programme such as vocational training over microenterprise development due to time pressure and funding limitations. In parallel with the preceding analysis of power, it can be argued that reintegration programmes that are well-conceived and aimed at sustaining peacebuilding at the grassroots level would make it an essential requirement to take into consideration and build upon the existing knowledge of former combatants and their communities. This would give them a sense of ownership

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and, as pointed out by the International Peace Academy (IPA), it can also ‘enhance the probability of its success. Furthermore, the involvement of former combatants and their communities can also help to ensure the formulation of feasible and appropriate programs since ex-combatants, as well as other local actors, often have a better understanding of the social issues, networks, and structures that have developed during a conflict’ (2002:4). As rightly stated by Pugh (2000), the local ownership of the process and fostering of local norms and values are essential elements of a sustainable peacebuilding process. The value and significance of involving local actors in the planning and implementation of the reintegration process was demonstrated in Somaliland. The National Demobilization Commission (NDC) was established by the government of Somaliland in 1993, following the Borama Peace Agreement. The working structure of the NDC included the direct involvement of war veterans and former combatants, which led to considerable improvements in the effectiveness of programme design and its delivery. More importantly, it meant a visible positive impact on the willingness of former combatants to give up their weapons and merge into communities (Berdal, 1996). Therefore, as Hay reminds us, there is a need for a redefinition of power as ‘the ability of actors (whether individual or collective) to have and effect upon the context which defines the range of possibilities of others.’ However, this positive conception of power can only be realized by ensuring that the overall approach to DDR is based on a framework that recognizes the position of former combatants as agents of transformation moving from a military to a civilian identity. This is why the following section will focus on the process of identity and interest formation from a constructivist perspective and propose social contract theory as a possible framework for DDR planning and implementation. DDR as a Social Contract Disarmament, as understood and practised by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, is defined and constricted by their mandates, taken from the relevant Security Council resolutions. In other words, for UN peacekeeping operations, disarmament is closely associated with demobilization, which is understood to refer to the disarmament and dissolution of force structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status (Tanner, 1996). However, as this understanding of disarmament emphasizes compliance with requirements stipulated within peace agreements, the imperative remains at the strategic and political level. Consequently, there is little or no consideration of the social and economic implications for the former combatants and their dependants as a consequence of disarming. Furthermore, Tanner’s ‘transformation from combatant to civilian’ following the handing-over of a weapon takes no account of what Berdal (1996) refers to as ‘war as social order’,

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the economic value to the combatants of their weapons. It is stated that when combatants are asked to give up their arms, they face a ‘point of no return’: they, and their leaders, must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war (ECHA, 2000: 1). However, disarmament as practised by UN peacekeeping operations appears to show little understanding of this implied contract between the individual combatants and the state. In its simplest terms, the social contract is defined as ‘[t]he imaginary device through which equally imaginary individuals, living in solitude (or, perhaps, in nuclear families), without government, without a stable division of labour or leagues, congregations, assemblies, or associations of any sort, come together to form a society, accepting obligations of some minimal kind to one another and immediately or very soon thereafter binding themselves to a political sovereignty who can enforce those obligations.’ (Honderich, 1995:163) From a Hobbesian perspective, the social contract takes place because ‘giving up ones right to decide what is best for ones long-term preservation, and letting that be decided by a designated person or group of persons called a sovereign.’ (1995:369) Alternatively, Hobbes argues that the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, therefore to escape such an anarchy the social contract is necessary, but as pointed out by Hill (2004:18) in such an anarchy ‘security competition is perceived as zero-sum’. On the other hand, in the Lockean understanding of social contract, ‘the government is a party to the contract, and can be justly resisted if it fails to fulfil its part of the bargain.’ (Russell, 2000:607) According to Hill (2004:19), in the Lockean anarchy, ‘groups do not seek to eliminate other groups, but the possibility that force may be still used to settle disputes remains.’ Rousseau’s social contract on the other hand provides a more inclusive understanding of the relationship between the stakeholders of such an agreement: ‘Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.’ (Russell, 2000:670) Finally, Rawl’s social contract is a hypothetical one and a strongly egalitarian form of liberalism. According to Rawl, when we make choices at the original position of equality on ‘what principles we could agree to on the basis of a desire to further our own aims and interests…we would give priority in choice of principles to avoiding the worst possible life prospects, with emphasis first on the preservation of personal and political liberty and second on the amelioration of socioeconomic inequality.’ (Honderich, 1995:745) The preceding theoretical review of social contract theory shows that, first of all, there is an element of all stakeholders making a decision of giving their hypothetical consent in order to escape from anarchy. They make an agreement to enter a new era so that their needs, expectations and aspirations can be responded to by the new environment created by the social contract between

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them and sovereign. However, secondly, as pointed out by Wolff (1996), sovereignty needs to be worthy of such a consent, providing an environment of peace and security. Otherwise, the whole logic of entering in such a social contract would not meet its main objective, so it is clear that the issues of justice and fairness, at least from Rawl’s perspective, should be an integral part of that contract. In order to support the social contract perspective and its application to DDR, it is important to consider Alexander Wendt’s view on social structures which have the three elements of shared knowledge, material resources and practices. From this perspective, the formation of a civilian identity in a DDR process can be explained through a socialization framework and the degree to which former combatants internalize the norms of civil society. The first degree of internalization is about observing norms when forced; while in the second degree the observation of norms is not only due to coercion but also because they are perceived as being in an actor’s self-interest. Finally, the third degree of internalization involves the observation of norms when they are accepted as legitimate (Hill, 2004). Therefore, the objective of a DDR process is to finds ways of increasing the possibilities of such an internalization of civil society norms by former combatants. In other words, by disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community, which act as impartial mediators; the combatants surrender the security and economic surety that their weapons provide, in exchange for opportunities and assistance in finding new peaceful livelihoods. If the UN’s activities during disarmament cause the combatants to question the organization’s effectiveness, their belief that the peace agreement will be impartially implemented is likely to be undermined. However, it seems that impartiality is sometimes sacrificed for other political priorities. For example, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is mandated with the demobilization of militias, including the pro-independence Falintil. However, it is reported that the UNauthorized International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) were much more concerned with disarming the pro-Indonesian militias than Falintil. In fact, the Falintil militia was allowed to keep its weapons within a cantonment in the town of Aileu (Kingma, 2001: 29). The emphasis on weapons and military forces instead of social contract aspects can be directly linked to the mandates under which peacekeeping missions operate, but it is also a consequence of the involvement of military individuals, and units, as the main implementers of disarmament activities. The influence of the third party missions by virtue of the fact that they physically represent the will of the international community and are the first of the implementing organizations to come into contact with the combatants, cannot be underestimated. The stance adopted by a third party mission is important, as it affects the success or failure of the DDR process. For example, the UN

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peacekeepers’ strategic and tactical stance can influence and dictate the belligerents’ maintenance of consent. Furthermore, the perceptions of the peacekeepers regarding the DDR process can affect the development of institutional attitudes towards the process that either prevents or encourages compartmentalization of the phases involved. A holistic understanding of the process can facilitate implementing structures that are organizationally vertically and horizontally aware. Finally, the combatants must have faith in the ability of the third party to implement not only the disarmament, but also the particulars of the peace agreement. If the DDR process is inefficient and poorly implemented, and if it fails to perceive disarmament from a social contract point of view, doubts will be cast on the outcome of the wider peace process, resulting in an undermining of the peace agreement. Conclusions This chapter consisted of two main sections. In the first part, the chapter explored the concept of security sector reform with an investigation of the key terminology of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The review of the available literature tends to shows a number of paradoxes in the way the DDR literature conceptualize and explain how such undertakings are carried out in the field. A number of key lessons concerning how DDR programmes might be better planned and implemented were identified by focussing on the four key areas of concern for DDR programmes in a peacebuilding context, which were identified as: first, the way that the disarmament challenge is managed solely from a security perspective and how some inducements used in this process can cause more harm than good; second, the use of cantonment mainly for political reasons, without considering possible alternatives and the risk this might pose for the entire DDR process; third, the way that financial reinsertion assistance is not used as an effective linkage between the demobilization and reintegration phases; and finally, how the specific needs of female combatants and child soldiers are not addressed by conventional DDR programmes. In order to address such shortcomings in current DDR practice, the second section presented the analytical framework for the investigation of the four DDR case studies which are to follow. First of all, the chapter investigated the preferential treatment of former combatants by the use of constructivist theory, questioning whether or not the normative assumption of preferential treatment in DDR programmes, which is argued to be necessary to avoid possible security risks, is in fact the reason for missing critical opportunities for community-centred reintegration approaches. The discussion indicated that DDR programmes would benefit greatly by incorporating the needs of receiving communities rather than focussing on former combatants only. Recognising that finding the right balance in responding to the needs of both

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receiving communities and former combatants is a highly difficult and controversial task, however, it should also be noted that the preferential treatment of former combatants is a divisive approach, worsening difficult societal relationships between former combatants and other war-affected groups. It was in relation to this challenge that the second part of the analytical framework focussed on the issue of how to ‘perceive’ former combatants in DDR programmes. The current practice is often based on considering them as ‘security risks’ at the local and regional levels. However, the discussions indicated that this is a short-sighted view, since it fails in recognising the potential contribution that former combatants can make if they are provided with effective socio-economic reintegration opportunities. Consequently, with the juxtapositioning of the perspectives of security risk and human resource development, the discussions considered the way in which the human resource capabilities of former combatants can be identified and incorporated in the planning and implementation of DDR programmes. In order to question why former combatants are perceived from a solely security perspective, the third part of the analytical framework focussed on the way the DDR programmes are often carried out under the leadership of the international community with a very limited involvement from national and local actors. The investigation was carried out by focussing on ‘power as decision making’ in order to explore why and how the international community tends to have the upper hand in DDR programmes, even though the rhetoric for such undertakings often gives the impression that the entire process will be conducted in a partnership between external and internal actors. Experience indicated that this is clearly not the case therefore; the analytical framework raises a number of questions as to how this challenge plays a significant role in the political economy of DDR programmes. Finally, the last part of the analytical framework focussed on social contract theory and the way this can be used to posit an improved approach to DDR programmes. Based on a review of how social contract theory was developed over time by a number of philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls, the discussions indicated that it was likely to constitute a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis of DDR, which would be a critical departure from the conventional way of seeing the process as a linear, mechanical and rigid peacebuilding undertaking. On the other hand, the view of DDR from a social contract perspective may seem to be contradicting with the argument of not seeing DDR from a one-man-one-weapon and security-risk perspectives. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the argument with the social contract perspective is to underline the necessity of determining and acting upon the main parameters or in other words, the political economy, of DDR in a way that the reintegration needs of former combatants and those communities to receive them would be well balanced.

2 EL SALVADOR LAND REFORM-CENTRED REINTEGRATION, LONG-TERM POVERTY AND INSECURITY

On the occasion of his official visit to Washington in February 2007, the President of El Salvador, Elías Antonio Saca González received a warm welcome from President George W. Bush, as one of the strongest allies of the US in Central America. Referring to the Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA, between the US and his country, President Saca proudly stated that his country’s economy had doubled in size and increased its exports by 20 per cent during the first year of the agreement (www.whitehouse.gov). According to the President Saca’s “Safe Country” plan, El Salvador aims to integrate ‘national public policies designed to reach a level of development that will yield a more prosperous, fair, free and democratic society’ over a period of 25 years (harrisschool.uchicago.edu). When President Saca won the presidential election, as the candidate of the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party, against Schafik Handal, the late leader of the left-wing Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in 2004, El Salvador had been at ‘peace’ for 12 years, since the signing of the Chapultepec Accord on 16 January 1992. El Salvador today may no longer be embroiled in the bitter civil war which lasted 12 years, and ravaged the country in the 1980s, killing over 74,000 and displacing a further one million people, but it is still one of the most crimeridden countries in the world because of its violent street gangs known as ‘maras’. With a population of around seven million people, this smallest of the Central American countries (21,041 km2) suffers from poverty and an unequal distribution of wealth. Although there has been a reduction in the levels of poverty from 66 per cent in 1991 to 43 per cent in 2002, according to the figures from the same year, ‘in the rural areas, 56 per cent of the population lived in poverty’ (UNDP, 2005:45) Its economy still depends heavily on remittances

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sent by two million Salvadorans in the US, which amounted to over $2 billion in 2002 (70 per cent of total exports and 14 per cent of the GDP) (Rubio-Fabià, et al., 2004), and it is ironic that one of it most notorious gangs was also started by Salvadoran immigrants in the US. One of the most important aspects of the Chapultepec Accord which was structured over a two-year timetable was its DDR process directed at the FMLN and Salvadoran military structures. By 15 December 1992, the FMLN demobilized all its forces, and became a legal political party, participating in the country’s first post-conflict elections in March 1994. The peace process in the country was monitored by the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which at its peak had close to 1,000 observers. With its four key sections – human rights, military, police, and elections ONUSAL was one of first UN involvements in a ‘peacebuilding’ environment following the end of the Cold War. Departing from its traditional peacekeeping role in war-affected countries, ONUSAL was a peace operation. By February 1993, the army reduced its troop size from 63,000 to the level of 32,000 requiring by the Peace Accords, achieving this as early as 1993, nine months ahead of schedule. The country also began the training of the new civilian police as well as initiating land transfers to former guerrillas, their supporters, and former soldiers through a three-phase programme (LeVine, 1997). Considered from the perspective of what the Peace Accords achieved in less than two decades, El Salvador can be considered a peacebuilding success story. The armed conflict between the government security forces and the FMLN never resumed following the Peace Accords, which is unquestioningly a major achievement. However, looking at the current security situation in the country it could be argued that the violence in El Salvador has in fact remained the same, but has instead mutated in form, from a political / ideological conflict to street crime which is both entrenched and exacerbated by the government’s neo-liberal economic policies. It is also necessary to explore whether the DDR of FMLN and governmental military structures played a role in the increasing levels of insecurity in the streets of the country. Therefore, the question is whether the DDR of former combatants actually has been a contributory factor in the increasing violence in El Salvador. What lessons can be learned from the experience of one of the first UN peace operations and its DDR programme? How come El Salvador, which seems to have achieved so much in the transformation from war to peace, following its peace agreement, has somehow failed to provide a secure and stable environment for its citizens today? El Salvador in Post-Chapultepec Accord In 1838, El Salvador became an independent state in which the levers of power were controlled by a small number of landowners, known as ‘Los Catorce’ (the

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14 families). In the late 1920s, coffee constituted over 90 per cent of the country’s exports, creating enormous wealth for a few families in the urban economy. By contrast, the situation for peasants in the countryside was dismal with extreme poverty, dispossession and political repression. With an entirely coffee-based, mono-crop economy, the country’s political framework was structured around, and subsequently constantly affected, by fluctuating coffee prices (Wood, 2000). The worldwide economic recession of the 1930s brought down the prices of coffee, which for peasants, meant a loss of their meagre wages forcing them into a total destitution. The civilian president MelendezQuinonez who came to power at the 1931 election was deposed nine months later as he failed to pay military salaries. The military ensured tight control over Salvadoran society through militarization. A typical male in rural parts of the country for example, would spend a significant proportion of his life within various military structures. This would start with being drafted as an infantry soldier around 18 and continued by serving as part of escoltas militares in his village until the age of 30. He would then become a reservist until he was fifty (Williams and Walter, 1997). It was the economic oligarchy that ruled the country, while the military’s role was to provide suitable conditions to ensure a consistent supply of cheap labour for the market by suppressing any kind of democratic movement in the country. Therefore, a minor peasant rebellion in 1932 was ended with a bloody military response, massacring over 30,000 people. Starting with the 1932 coup by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez until 1980, all presidents of the country were army officers, a key characteristic of this period was the brutal suppression of rural resistance. After fighting the so called ‘soccer war’ with its neighbour, Honduras in July 1969, over disputed border areas and friction caused by a large population of Salvadorans who had emigrated there in search of land and employment, the political situation in El Salvador deteriorated further in the 1970s, which witnessed the creation of the military leadership’s own party, the National Conciliation Party (PNC).1 It was also around this time that some left-wing guerrilla groups began to take root in the countryside such as The Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) and The People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), carrying out their so called ‘‘ajusticimientos’’ (bringing to justice) acts which involved the kidnapping and sometimes assassination of local government officials (Stanley, 1996). In the 1970s, the peasants experienced a second wave of dispossession with the diversification of export agriculture into cotton and sugar. In order to provide a ready pool of seasonal labour for cotton picking, peasants were deliberately left homeless and unemployed. In other words, the modernization process in El Salvador meant that over 50 per cent of the labour force in rural areas would be unemployed for over 60 per cent of the year. While over 40 per cent of families were landless, only 1.8 per cent of families owned land of more

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than 10 hectares. The government’s industrialization drive during this period meant a further isolation of rural areas as large parts of governmental funding was directed at industrial and urban sectors, however, up to 75 per cent of the population, lacked any regular income to benefit from this industrial expansion (Tarantino, 1999; Wood, 2000). As the power struggle between the opposition Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and PNC continued, there were reports of widespread gross human rights abuses by the military and death squads. Between 1979 and 1981 alone, it is estimated that more than 30,000 people were killed by the army-backed right wing death squads. Such a brutal response to the left-wing dissent played a significant role in the formation of the FMLN in 1980 by the unification of a number of revolutionary groups. Oscar Romero, the Archbishop of San Salvador and human rights campaigner was assassinated in 1980, which led to further polarization of the society and increasing opposition to the state, particularly from the Christian base communities. Another reason the FMLN attracted so many Salvadorans to its ranks during this period was the way many regarded this as an opportunity to take their revenge against landlords and security forces (Wood, 2000). Torres-Divas underlines an important paradox with the creation of revolutionary organizations in El Salvador by pointing out that they ‘were created by men and women who rebelled against the same institutions they were part of, such as the Church, the Christian Democrat Party, the community party, and the university.’ (1997:215) The observations of Mauricio González Ayala (Roque Aguilar as he was known during the war), a high ranking FMLN field officer, as to why so many joined the FMLN is quite instructive in understanding the war in El Salvador: ‘We did not go to the war because we were natural warriors, but it was necessary…the war was imposed on combatants’ (pers. comm., 2005).2 For Walter Funes who is also a former FMLN combatant and Director of REDES, the reasons for joining the FMLN were many, including the murder of two of his family members, the assassination of Archbishop Romero, and the political harassment of the church and students (pers. comm., 2005).3 On the other hand, J. J. Dalton, a journalist and the son of famous Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton, gave a completely different reason for joining the FMLN. Having lived his early life in exile in Prague and Cuba, he entered the war for ideological principles in the late 1970s. J.J. Dalton underlined the fact that although he was coming from a professional middle class family background, most of other combatants were from poor families (pers. comm., 2005).4 The 1980s witnessed a series of important political changes in El Salvador such as the formation of the ARENA by D’Aubuisson in September 1981 and the 1983 constitution which strengthened human rights and democratic structures as well as codifying labour rights, particularly for agricultural workers.

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According to Stanley (1996:220), with ARENA’s ‘evolution into a successful electoral competitor, the upper classes and their political allies no longer needed the military to act as a political guarantor and interlocutor.’ Again it was in 1981, that after entering the 1979 junta by reform-minded military officers, the PDC leader Jose Napoleon Duarte became the first civilian president of the country since 1931. Some other important policies undertaken by the junta were the initiation of a land reform programme, and nationalization of the banks, and coffee and sugar markets. Meanwhile, being recognized as a legitimate political party by France and Mexico in 1981, the FMLN launched a number of military offences during this period, taking control of large areas such as the provinces of Chalatenango, Morazan, and San Salvador. In the summer of 1980 alone, the army killed over 6,000 people, adding another 5,000 to this toll by the end of the year. Although the armed conflict in the country was predominantly a civil war, it is also important to note that it was waged during the Cold War years, and to a large extent it was a proxy war between the two superpowers. While the US provided generous economic and military assistance to the government because of the fear of Marxism in its own ‘back garden’, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua were the main providers of the FMLN. By way of illustration, the US military aid increased from $6 million in 1980 to $197 million in 1984, thereby preventing the collapse of the government (Call, 2002). As the 1984 presidential elections approached, so there was an escalation of violence, with the FMLN’s forced recruitment policy, causing thousands to flee from their homes and the military’s campaign of repression which resulted in a death toll of 7,000 with a further 2,300 people disappeared. Duarte became the president of the country again in 1984 and started negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the FMLN. In 1989, the ARENA’s candidate, Alfredo Cristiani won the presidential election, marking an important turning point in El Salvador’s history, as this was the first time that the presidency passed from one elected civilian leader to another. Claiming up to 50 per cent of the country’s national budget, the war now took on a new form with the FMLN’s tactic of focussing on propaganda work. Every guerrilla became a ‘political officer’ and self-sufficient settlements were created, based on socialist principles. In response to this, the army began ‘Operation Phoenix’ around the Guazapa volcano; this involved the deployment of elite forces with the assistance of massive air bombardments, with 13 of them undertaken up to 1990. A dialogue process between Cristiani’s government and the FMLN was initiated in September 1989, but only two months later the FMLN launched a bloody nationwide offensive. However, the defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, which was one of the main supporters of the FMLN, drastically altered the regional power dynamics. With the lack of

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support from Nicaragua, ‘the military situation was stalemated’ and there followed a request from the Central American presidents that the UN become involved in mediation efforts between the two sides (Evans, 1998:172). With the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 693, the ONUSAL was established on 21 May 1991 with initial responsibility for the verification of international human right laws and standards. Not much progress in negotiations was achieved until September 1991 when a meeting between the two sides took place in New York, organized by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then SecretaryGeneral of the UN. The accord signed on 25 September focussed on the negotiating process in one phase, which aimed to establish the necessary conditions and guarantees for the reintegration of FMLN members before a cease-fire. The New York agreement also created a new national body called the Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (COPAZ). Formed by representation from the government, FMLN and all major political parties, with the UN and the church acting as mediators, COPAZ was responsible for the supervision and implementation of all political agreements and peace negotiations. After the 31 December 1991 agreement under the auspices of the UN’s former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, the Chapultepec Accord in Mexico City stipulated that the ceasefire would take effect on 1 February 1992 and after nine months the war would be declared officially ended (UNDP, 2005). In 1992, El Salvador was a war-torn society. The protracted conflict had exercised a major impact on the socio-economic structures of the country. From 1979 to 1984 the damage to infrastructure was estimated at $146 million, while the damage to economy and productivity was estimated at $537 million. The total costs for war-related damages were estimated between $1.8 billion and $2 billion (Torres-Rivas, 1997). Over half of the population were living below the poverty level, and education spending was among the lowest in the world, while inadequate health services resulted in many children dying from preventable diseases. It was in response to the massive reconstruction needs of the country that ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded in January 1992 to include the verification and monitoring of all agreements between the two sides. Its activities expanded further, to cover the Military, Police, Human Rights and Electoral Divisions, and continued until 30 April 1995 when it was replaced with its downsized version, the Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador (MINUSAL). Just taking into account those reconstruction costs covered by the international community gives a good indication of the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the civil war. Covering the period from 1990 onwards, including the cost of ONUSAL and reconstruction assistance, the international community spent $2.4 billion in El Salvador. It is believed that the approximate total cost of the war to the international community from 1980 to 1995 was around $8.1 billion (Talentino, 1999).

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The main provisions of the Chapultepec Accord can be categorized under the following eight headings: Military Reform Measures, National Civilian Police, Judicial Reform, Electoral Reform, Agrarian Problems, Forum for Social and Economic Consultation, National Reconstruction Programme, and Political Participation by FMLN. Through a major security sector reform, the peace accord aimed to develop a new armed forces doctrine, stressing democratic values and prohibiting an internal security role, except under extraordinary circumstances. These was a major turning point for the country’s military structures, as its role throughout history had included both a deep involvement in internal security issues and also direct intervention in politics. It also stipulated the evaluation of army officers was to be undertaken by a commission composed of three civilians and two non-voting military officers. Another important issue in security sector reform was a 50 per cent reduction in military manpower by October 1993, as well as the dissolution of all semimilitary structures such as the National Guard, treasury police, and all elite counter-insurgency battalions, all of which played a bloody role during the civil war. The establishment of a new civilian intelligence service under the President's authority and the training of a new civilian police force for both urban and rural areas, and the banning of all paramilitary groups were other important aspects of security reform measures. Another pioneering aspect of the peace accord was its reference to a National Reconstruction Programme, which demanded that within 30 days of the signing of the agreement, the government should submit a National Reconstruction Plan to the FMLN for its comment. The main objective of the plan was the initiation of development in conflict-affected areas and the facilitation of appropriate measures for the FMLN’s reintegration into the country's civil, institutional, and political life. This was closely related to the agreement that the post-conflict environment should provide the necessary legislative measures for the former FMLN combatants to exercise fully their civil and political rights, as well as the legalization of the FMLN as a political party with the right to full political participation. The other measures, from the judicial and electoral reforms to the initiation of a land reform and socioeconomic forum, have all played a critical role in El Salvador’s relatively successful DDR process. The DDR Strategy Implemented in El Salvador The DDR process in El Salvador involved 30,000 members of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES), and 8,000 combatants and 6,450 ‘injured noncombatants’ and ‘politicians’ from the FMLN. While the demobilization of FMLN combatants took place in 1992, the army demobilization was completed in 1993 (ONUSAL, 1993). The framework of the DDR process was outlined by the Chapultepec Accord under the ‘Cessation of Armed Conflict’ (CAC).

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The timetable for demobilization was set up under four key steps, namely: ceasefire, separation of forces, the end of the military structure of the FMLN, and the UN verification of the first three steps. It was also decided that the FMLN combatants would gather in 50 and FAES in 100, designated points around the country, which would be followed by 15 verification centres for the FMLN forces, and 62 areas for FAES (Call, 2002). However, as no provision was made for food and shelter for FMLN combatants, the UNDP had to respond ‘quickly to solicit emergency supplies and distributed them to each of the points of concentration while acting as a go-between among the government, the FMLN, and ONUSAL’ (2005:20). With a deadline of 31 October 1992, the agreement stipulated that the FMLN would demobilize no less than 20 per cent of its forces until 1 May; no less than 40 per cent in the first month; no less than 60 per cent until 30 July; and finally, no less than 80 per cent by 28 September 1992 (UN, 1995). As will be explained later, the implementation of the DDR process in El Salvador was certainly not without its problems, nevertheless, the following observations made by the UNDP should be taken into account, when considering the challenges experienced (2005:21): the ceasefire, the separation of the belligerent forces, the complete demobilization of the FMLN and of the old security forces, and the substantial reduction of the number of soldiers of the Armed Forces proceeded irreversibly, although not always within the time allotted. As an example of a peace process supervised by the United Nations, El Salvador represents an exceptional case because all military activities were suspended nearly simultaneously and the warring parties accepted their disappearance or reduction to achieve a new society where force would only be used under legal precepts and when all other options had been tried under the new rule of law. The disarmament of the FMLN forces was conducted under the verification of the ONUSAL’s Military Division. Prior to the peace accord, the FMLN submitted its inventory of weapons which was investigated by the ONUSAL, and during the disbanding of combatants, all weapons were stored in lockers. In order to respond to the lack of trust between the two sides, ONUSAL used a ‘dual-key’ system for the storage of weapons. Both the FMLN and ONUSAL commander had a key for each container, and combatants were allowed to keep their personal weapons until the reintegration phase. By 1 April 1993, almost all weapons in the FMLN inventory were destroyed in 15 sites under the supervision of the ONUSAL. However, the discovery of a large arms cache of the FMLN in the capital of Nicaragua confirmed that the FMLN failed in handing in all of its weapons, and following this incident,

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411

Pistols Assault rifles

8,268

Sub-machine guns

239

Machine guns

271

Grenade launchers

662

Mortars and cannons

379 74

Missiles Rounds of ammunition

4,032,606 140

Rockets Grenades (hand, mortar and CN.57)

9,228

Explosives

5,107 Table 2.1: Weapons collected by ONUSAL 1992–93 Source: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1993)

approximately 30 per cent of the total FMLN arsenal were found in a number of neighbouring countries and destroyed (Spencer, 1997). The number of weapons collected ONUSAL in 1992–93 can be seen in Table 2.1. One of the most prominent aspects of the DDR process was the linkage with the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP), which was partly a function of the peace agreement having made no specific reference to the reintegration of former combatants. The primary responsibility with the implementation of the NRP was given to the government’s Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN). Although the plan’s objective was to reflect the interest of all stakeholders in the society, it stated clearly that it would take necessary steps for the support in the reintegration of former-FMLN combatants. Programmes identified for the former combatants included education and scholarship schemes, housing projects, employment and pension programmes and business advancement. The reintegration process had specific provisions for the demobilized FAES members too, such as the payment of their one year salary

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and assistance in the development of projects. However, due to financial problems the government excluded the members of civil defense, those FAES members accused of bad conduct and those who were discharged before the end of the conflict from its caseload of the severance pay; as a result, there was created a large pool of disgruntled former combatants (Call, 2002). The Land Transfer Programme (Programa de Transferencia de Tierras, PTT) was one of the key aspects of the reintegration process. According to the terms of the peace agreement, land would be made available by purchasing it at current market prices from those properties that exceeded the constitutional limit of 254 hectares and those owned by the state. The Banco de Tierras, a land bank, was founded to channel funds for land purchases. As of 1997, the number of beneficiaries from the PTT which had a cost of $105 million was 26,739 former FMLN combatants and squatters, and 7,592 former FAES members (UNDP, 2005). According to McReynolds (2002:161), the main impact of the PTT was its contribution to political and social stability as without such land reform, the FMLN would not agree to go through with the DDR process; it would have been much more difficult to deal with the post-conflict employment challenge; and ironically, many former FAES members, who once fought the FMLN, have now become their supporters because of the FMLN’s ‘advocacy on their behalf in the PTT process.’ For the new National Civilian Police (PNC), recruitment was open to both members of the old police force and the FMLN. Although there was no initial quota for the FMLN and FAES members’ recruitment to the new police force, the negotiations in the post-conflict environment decided on a quota of 20 per cent for each group, leaving 60 per cent of vacancies open to those who did not participate in the armed conflict. The National Academy of Public Safety (ANSP) was set up to train the new police force. The cost of this new academy and its training programme was around $13 million (O’Neil, 1999), which made it according to the UNDP (2005:36), ‘without doubt, the largest and costliest institution of the new political structure’ that was established in post-conflict El Salvador. Subsequently, the new police force managed to deploy around 20,000 police officers by 1999. According to Orr (2001:162), ‘reconciliation among former combatants’ within the ranks of the new police force and the way ‘the force gained popular confidence in a short period of time and used this to good effect during the most fragile early days of the peace’ were remarkable. This was particularly the case considering that the reform of public security services such as the police force and the army was carried out with much resistance from the old establishment, and in most cases, ‘the reluctance of the old forces to disappear had to do not so much with concern for public security as with their members’ desire to preserve their privileges and prerogatives.’ (Costa, 2001:21) The largest bilateral donor for the post-conflict reconstruction was the US which contributed totalling $304 million, as of January 1994, while the largest

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multilateral donor was the Inter-American Development Bank which provided $196 million as of March 1993. The European Union provided $18 million for the reintegration of former combatants, which was mainly used for the purchase of land and for loans for the Usulután programme. The UNDP was involved in a number of NRP programmes and played a pivotal role in facilitating the participation of NGOs in these undertakings, which mainly benefited the FMLN affiliated organizations. Some of the UNDP supported programmes included the agricultural training of 6,300 FMLN combatants; agricultural technical assistance for 6,000 former combatants; and the provision of technical assistance to 10,000 PTT beneficiaries by the National Centre for Agricultural and Forest Technology (CENTA). The Agricultural Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Agropecuario) extended loans to 5,991 former FMLN members and 4,273 demobilized FAES members by August 1995 (UNDP, 2005). There were also a number of specific reintegration programmes for those former combatants located in urban areas, such as the training and credit assistance in industry and services for former combatants and a Programme in Support of the Economic Reinsertion of Commanders and mid-Echelon Personnel of the FMLN. The first programme provided training for 1,328 former FMLN combatants and 2,885 former FAES members. The second programme benefited around 600 mid-level FMLN commanders, 481 of whom received further assistance to set up their own businesses. With assistance from UNESCO, the University of El Salvador provided an educational programme for 1,700 former combatants and police officers (UNDP, 2005). Implementation Challenges The UN’s Lack of Experience and Limited Implementation Time The ONUSAL was the UN’s first post-Cold War mission in which there was a major departure from its traditional peacemaking and peacekeeping roles, into the realm of peacebuilding. It was a part of this newly expanded role that the UN became involved in a wide range of activities, including DDR of former combatants, and at the time, the DDR process in El Salvador was probably their first such involvement, hence the UN system was at that stage an inexperienced actor in this area. The way that the ONUSAL’s organizational responsibilities were structured resulted in coordination problems between independent police and human rights observers. Moreover, police observers did not seem to have had any prior preparation for political awareness and the cultural dynamics of the country (McCormick, 1997). According to O’Neil (1999:152–153), ‘ONUSAL’s military unit lacked the necessary personnel, tactical mobility, or advanced technologies to investigate ex-combatant claims of demilitarization beyond face value’. A good example of this was the case of the FMLN’s secret cache of weapons in neighbouring countries.5

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Furthermore, it was explained that such limitations continued in the reintegration phase too: ‘The United Nation’s lack of expertise in its areas of responsibility, the reformulation of security institutions and the urgent needs of reintegration, quickly became apparent.’ McCormick asserts that the UN should not have been expected to verify whether all FMLN weapons were collected as this was practically impossible, but it could ‘perhaps, have hedged its bets by voicing doubts more openly prior to verification.’ (1997:288) Supporting this view, Francisco Jovel, a former high ranking FMLN commander and a member of the legal commission for DDR within COPAZ, pointed out that even some groups within the FMLN did not know about hidden weapons in the neighbouring countries (pers. comm., 2005). Moreover, the original reintegration strategy which was based on two major assumptions, namely that former combatants would be dealt on an individual basis, and that a quick reintegration would be the best solution, did not incorporate the FMLN in the planning process. According to Roush (1997), the FMLN ‘claimed that it feared for the safety of its sympathizers if the Salvadoran government knew their names’ so they refused to divulge these. Hence, the demobilization process experienced lengthy negotiations and reprogramming, causing long delays. Based on this experience, it was pointed out that ‘there was a need for more inter-party consultation and for an integrated planning process which went beyond the regrouping of troops and the turning over of arms.’ On the other hand, the FMLN’s assumption that communal reintegration could be achieved through land transfer was not a realistic one either. Manuel Melgar, a FMLN parliamentarian and the VicePresident of Congress, accepted that the assumption that such a strategy would work has not resulted in sustainable programmes in such settlements as Segunda Montes, Guaicho and Guazapa. The main idea with these settlements was the indivisibility of the land for the first five years and collective means of production. However, the strategy reached a crisis-point, as when ‘former combatants wanted their piece of land’ (pers. comm., 2005).6 In addition to its inexperience and lack of resources for a successful DDR, the timeframe for all peacebuilding activities was very tight and hence, any problem with either the DDR process itself or a related peacebuilding activity had a major impact on the reintegration of former combatants. It seems that the UN wanted to complete its mission as quickly as possible, and reporting the view of a UN official, Hill and Malik (1996:168) assert that the UN wanted ‘to get out of the place as soon as possible with its victory intact’. The peace accord demanded actions in a number of DDR related socio-economic and political areas, and problems in any of these areas meant delays in the DDR process. For example, the FMLN delayed the demobilization of the first 20 per cent of its forces, claiming that the government did not take appropriate action to satisfy its commitments for humanitarian aid and infrastructure in designated areas

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(Spencer, 1997). Supporting this view, Macías (2002:32) asserts that the ‘[u]naddressed social and economic concerns of former combatants and the communities that received them are continued sources of political instability in El Salvador. Furthermore, the Salvadoran experience demonstrates the importance of defining from the outset the scope and objectives of reinsertion or reintegration programs, as well as measures for assessing their effectiveness.’

Land Reform Problems As one of the root causes of the conflict was landlessness in the country, the land reform aspect of the peace agreement was also one of the most controversial issues during the DDR process. The government faced considerable resistance from landowners during its land reform process as not all landowners were willing to evacuate their land for peasants. The government also claimed that they neither had enough land nor enough funds to buy land in order to comply with the agreement. According to Antonio Alvarez, a former FMLN combatant who was involved in the planning and implementation of the PTT programme as a negotiator, the decision to buy land at its market price also played a role in the creation of this problem, as land prices rapidly increased five to six times (pers. comm., 2005).7 However, as the land reform was a key FMLN demand, the problem was resolved with an agreement between the two sides, which placed a cap on the total number of beneficiaries for land transfers. According to this new agreement, 15,000 FAES members, 7,500 FMLN combatants and 25,000 people who were occupying land in conflict areas were identified as beneficiaries. Due to these delays the deadline of the FMLN demobilization was extended from 31 October to 15 December 1992 (Spencer, 1997; McReynolds, 2002). One of the main problems with the PTT was the list of beneficiaries provided by the FMLN and FAES, as the numbers did not always mesh with the real numbers. The land titling, due to the absence of original titles, bureaucratic bottlenecks and the lack of resources were the main challenges in the land transfer process (UNDP, 2005). According to McReynolds, as a highly politicised process, the PTT system was ‘cumbersome’ with its methods of classification and verification of property ownership. As the land registration system was ‘outdated and antiquated’ it was not easy to ensure the real owners of land. Exacerbating these difficulties, the FMLN was unable to provide accurate beneficiary lists due to the population fluidity in rural areas as well as its lack of organizational resources (2002:142–143). The donor funding policies also had a role in these delays since they imposed certain conditions in regard to the measurement and appraisal of properties, for example landowners could not be paid until all beneficiaries had signed the deed of the property (Del Castillo, 1997). The delays in land transfer had an impact on a number of other DDR and

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general reconstruction programmes such as agricultural credit and technical assistance. It was also not clear whether the assistance provided to support former combatants would be adequate for an effective and sustainable recovery. Three years after the peace accord made a specific reference to land transfer, only 32 per cent of the expected 40,000 beneficiaries had received land. It was reported by the UNDP that ‘[of] the farms that were to be transferred, only 25 had been duly registered while another 186 were still bogged down in the registration process’ (2005:23). Those delays meant that the 1993 planting season could not be utilized by newly demobilized combatants. Spencer (1997:46) lists the reasons for agricultural problems as: ‘administrative delays, limited credit, poor land quality, larger numbers of expected beneficiaries than originally anticipated and the difficulties in relocating landholders who occupied land belonging to landowners who refused to sell.’8 The problem of land quality was particularly acute with those beneficiaries who received their land in the third phase of the programme, and who received what was, according to McReynolds (2002:161), ‘some of the worst land in the nation.’ The interviews with a number of former combatants in September 2005 specifically underlined this problem, since the poor quality of land was given as one of the main reasons why they have been struggling economically since they had benefited from the land transfer scheme. On the other hand, Antonio Alvarez argued that some former combatants ended up with bad quality land because they did not want to leave their original settlements such as those in the northern Chatalanga area (pers. comm., 2005). In April 1996, a total of 2,920 properties with a size of 225,000 acres (128,167 manzanas) were registered and allocated to 32,911 beneficiaries (UNDP, 2005). As of September 1997, the direct beneficiaries of PTT were a total of 36,059 (27,486 FMLN and 8,573 FAES members), and including their families, over 185,000 were directly affected by the PTT. Covering around 104,000 hectares of land which is equivalent to about 7.2 per cent of the country’s agricultural land, the PTT was a major land transfer programme. However, it ‘did not achieve its original goals’ and ‘it has become the victim of a great deal of political fighting and bureaucratic delays.’ (McReynolds, 2002:160). Another important reason why the PTT fell short in meeting the reintegration expectations of former combatants was due to the simple fact that many of them ‘were not naturally inclined toward farming, or lacked training after long years of war.’ (Del Castillo, 1997:357) Supporting this view, Loreno Martinez from the Association of Rural Communities for the Development of El Salvador (CRIPDES) pointed out that the majority of former combatants simply did not know much about agriculture, and they were given the opportunity to become farmers, without knowing how to (pers. comm., 2005).9 Oscar Perez, Sub-Regional Coordinator of World Association

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of Community Radio Broadcasters – Central America (AMARC-CA) and Director of ACISAM, which is an NGO working the area of psychosocial assistance for post-conflict trauma, argued that the diagnosis of land transfer as the main tool for reintegration was an error. Giving insufficient emphasis to vocational training and micro-enterprise was an ideological decision which was carried out by the FMLN leadership. There was no needs assessment of former combatants, and the vertical leadership system of the organization assumed that they knew what should be done for the best interest of all combatants (pers. comm., 2005).10 Emilio Espin from the Fundacion CORDES, which is a development agency working on the reintegration of former combatants, succinctly summarized the way the land reform component was carried out: ‘Not everybody deserved to get land and not everybody got the land they deserved.’ (pers. comm., 2005).11 According to Mauricio González Ayala, at the time of the peace agreement agriculture as an economic activity had already been abandoned by the government as part of its neo-liberal economic policies, therefore most of these former combatants who tried to reintegrate themselves into society through the land transfer scheme live in poverty today (pers. comm., 2005). A group of former FMLN combatants from the Wasapa province could not hide their disappointment with their reintegration benefits. They pointed out that, like many people in the area, they need to feed around ten people in their families with an income of $3 a day. As a result, they were not surprised to see that the youth from the region was leaving the area due to lack of employment opportunities. Candelario Landaverde, one of these combatants asserted proudly that ‘the struggle of the FMLN is not over yet, as our ideals for a better future are still to be realized’ (pers. comm., 2005).12 Furthermore, Carlos Castillo who was an ERP field officer with the nickname of Ramón Torres and was involved in the organization of the reintegration process from disarmament to land transfers, presented a grim picture of how former combatants who benefited from the land transfer programme have started to sell their land because of the poverty they face, consequently the concentration of land in the hands of a few has started again (pers. comm., 2005).13 Antonio Alvarez does not agree with this view, as he believes that the land transfer has been a successful reintegration option. Although, up to 20–25 per cent of former combatants may have already sold their land so far, he asserted that those former combatants who benefited from the land transfer are reintegrated the best, and at least symbolically the land transfer was an imperative for the FMLN. Therefore, he believed that the FMLN was right to ‘encourage’ the land transfer option, but not negotiating supportive mechanisms such as training, micro-credit and farming subsidies was a mistake, and the experience has shown that the land transfer on its own is not sufficient for a sustainable livelihood (pers. comm., 2005).

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Unstable Economic Environment and Limited Donor Response One of the main challenges for the successful implementation of the DDR process in El Salvador was the overall unfavourable economic environment in the country. Orr states that the government was determined to implement the ‘outward-oriented, free-market model it had worked so hard to create’, therefore, although the FMLN put much pressure on socio-economic issues, they ‘were addressed very late in the negotiation process and received little concerted attention’ (2001:167). Furthermore, according to Spencer (1997:43), ‘the government found it difficult to finance the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement while complying with limits it had agreed to as part of a stabilization package from international lenders. Thus the policies used to stabilize the economy were the same ones restricting funds to finance reintegration programs and other peace-building programs.’ On the other hand, the total expenditure by the SRN was around $900 million, and 63.5 per cent of it was allocated for the reconstruction of infrastructure while basic services received 9.7 per cent of it (UNDP, 2005). The market structures in El Salvador have not been conducive to supporting the needs of small farmers, some of whom are those former combatants who benefited from the PTT programme, in a number of ways. Most small farmers still depend on coyotes – predatory middlemen in the market – to sell their products and often they have no power to negotiate prices. Coupled with the infrastructural limitations such as transportation and storage facilities, for most small farmers there is no market beyond coyotes, ‘which means that the advantageous competition promised by neo-liberal economic theory is absent in fact in rural El Salvador’ (McReynolds, 2002:162). In other words, the programmes such as the PTT, which aimed at reforming the land tenure system and providing sustainable livelihoods to many former combatants, face huge economic problems, and to a large extent these problems are determined by national and international economic policies. Putting huge pressure on commodity prices, the government’s economic liberalization programme meant an influx of imports while many small landholders such as those former combatants who benefited from the PTT ‘have had insufficient experience, infrastructure, and credit to engage in the lucrative export markets. Many have been left behind.’ (Orr, 2001:171) Francisco Jovel asserted that certain agricultural sectors are protected by the government such as sugar cane because the main ‘sugar baron’ is closely linked to the ARENA party. According to Jovel, there exists a highly protected internal market for sugar which is three times more expensive than the international market prices (pers. comm., 2005). Oscar Perez argued that the main failure of the peace agreement and postconflict peacebuilding was the lack of attention to the reform of economic and social structures. The overall assumption among FMLN combatants was that the peace agreement would be the starting point for wide-ranging socio-

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economic reform, but ‘nothing has changed with the accumulation of capital and the economic system in general’ (pers. comm., 2005). Supporting this view, Emilio Espin was highly critical of the government’s lack of interest in agriculture. Based on a predominantly leftist perspective on economics, Espin considered agriculture to be a matter of national security and with the diversification of products as well as encouraging farmers to be business focussed and sensitive to the environment he thought that agriculture could be turned into an economic dynamo for many in the rural areas. He considered the region of Bajo Lempa, where his organization CORDES has been working since the peace agreement, to be a good example of how agriculture, if handled well, can provide numerous economic opportunities in a war-torn environment. The region today has the country’s only biological testing laboratory as well as being an attractive success story in the eyes of many of the country’s politicians (pers. comm., 2005). The experience of Adolfo Sánchez, a former combatant from the Los Heroes settlement in the province of Loma de Romas in Guazapa, confirms Espin’s assertion. According to Sánchez, the land transferred to former combatants in the area was the least productive; as the area was graded as Class 7 as far as the soil conditions were concerned. However, through solidarity and the assistance of various organizations the former combatants in the area acted on soil conservation and organic agriculture. Most of these combatants now manage to make a good living out of their land, and are expanding their businesses by incorporating small production activities such as food conserving, bee keeping and wine making. It is also interesting to note that the mayor of the area is from the ARENA party, serving in an area dominated by former combatants. In spite of the fact that this is an exceptional case, Sánchez was highly positive about the constructive nature of the relationship existing between the mayor and former combatants, which has played a significant role in the development of the area (pers. comm., 2005).14 As far as donor fatigue is concerned; as early as 1993, this became a major problem in response to the reconstruction needs of the country. The government was struggling to fund a series of reintegration programmes, such as housing, credit and education. In 1994, this lack of interest from the donor community continued, although they showed some interest in the funding of environmental and infrastructural programmes. According to UNSC (1994:21), donors ‘have often been reluctant to finance some programmes directly related to the Accords that are crucial for peace consolidation.’ It is ironic that the international community, which seemed to be highly supportive of the reconstruction process when the pledges were made at the peace agreement period, had now allowed a funding gap to emerge between pledges and what was actually donated, which for the 1993–96 period was over $600 million. One of the reasons for donor disinterest in assisting the reconstruction programmes

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was their lack of confidence in the SRN, which resulted in its programmes being funded almost exclusively by the USAID. Hence many European donor countries channelled their funding through bilateral and multilateral organizations such as UNDP. Such a shortage in funding began to threaten some of critical DDR programmes and subsequently, additional appeals were made in the mid-1990s. For example, the demobilization of FAES members at a cost of $31 million had a shortfall of $6 million, while various reintegration programmes (microenterprise development, scholarship scheme’s, leaders and mid-level commanders scheme, assistance to wounded combatants, and the re-structuring of the police service) all with a total cost of $58.2 million was suffering from a shortfall of $27 million (Spencer, 1997). On the other hand, it is important to note that, at the time the peace agreement was signed, ‘the overall cost of implementing the agreement had not yet been assessed’ as it was thought that financial implications ‘would have impeded the parties from reaching an agreement’ (Wood, 2000:95). Nevertheless, Tully Curmick, Director of USAID in El Salvador, asserted that, through the assistance from the international community the country enjoyed substantial peace dividends in the early 1990s. For example, one of the indirect dividends of the USAID’s work was through its work with over 300 NGOs, most of which had close links with the FMLN, and the problem was not only due to lack of funding but the way the agreement on its spending was structured. The emphasis on the land transfer and creation of former combatant settlements did not reflect the socio-economic and cultural realities, hence they moved from ‘indiviso to individual properties’ (pers. comm., 2005).15

Political Mistrust and National Reconstruction Plan At the time when the peace agreement was signed there was a high level of mistrust between all stakeholders in the country. According to the UNDP, programmes ‘of dissolution and creation of armed groups and police forces had to be carried out with much tact since the levels of mistrust between the former enemies were still present.’ (2005:21) Carlos Castillo stated why he did not ‘trust the word of the peace agreement’, as he was afraid that once ‘we were disarmed we would be killed; I did not believe that the Peace Accords would actually be implemented and soon after, all matters related to the reintegration of former combatants would be abandoned’ and finally, having spent so many years in arms he did not think that former combatants would adopt a civilian life (pers. comm., 2005). The design and implementation of the NRP was one of the main areas in which the political mistrust between the government and the FMLN showed itself. According to Spencer (1997:45), there were different views on the NRP as the FMLN ‘believed reconstruction would be achieved through the

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strengthening of the weak sectors in the economy which traditionally were governed by the wealthy. The government saw it as providing assistance to wartorn zones and reintegration programs which would, in the short-run, alleviate poverty and in the long-term create employment opportunities.’ In other words, the ideological divide between the establishment and FMLN continued in the post-conflict era, and both sides wanted to reconstruct the country according to their own vision. Dagoberto Gutierrez from the Tendencia Revolucionaria, who is a communist former FMLN member, asserts that ‘the democracy in El Salvador is no good for people and the democracy of people is no good for bankers’ which is a good indicator of the political suspicion of some former FMLN members even many years after the peace agreement (pers. comm., 2005).16 He believes that the post-conflict political system is still based on exclusion and, although the FMLN is now part of the political system it has stopped doing politics. Talking about the reintegration of FMLN members into society is not justified either, because according to Gutierrez they were always part of the society, but the reintegration strategy was to break down their links with the society in general. Therefore, although there was a national plan for the reconstruction of the country, its vision was not shared by the FMLN, as they seemed to consider the process to be a government-centred one, leaving no room for its participation in decision-making and implementation. Such political division and mistrust between the two sides meant delays and ad-hoc implementations. This, coupled with the direct channelling of funds to local authorities for political reasons rather than through the SRN, meant the reconstruction process exacerbated the initial mistrust between the sides (Spencer, 1997). The implementation of reforms such as the demilitarization and reform of the state security apparatus by the government was another factor in generating mistrust between the two sides. For example, although the dissolution of the National Guard and Treasury Police was announced on 2 March 1992, their original identities remained evident in their names to a large extent (National Border Guard and Military Police, respectively) their structures remained intact, not even moving from their original barracks. This was perceived by the FMLN as ‘slight-of-hand’ of the army and the former members of these security structures did not find it difficult to secure jobs in the new police force (Williams and Walter, 1997:154). Furthermore, the ban on the military performing a domestic policing role was one of the key aspects of the agreement, but the rising crime rates have also meant a greater involvement of the military in domestic security than was stipulated in the peace agreement. In order to respond to this challenge, the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP), which was a police training and security institution building framework, initiated and funded by the US, started to use ‘its economic muscle…to successfully promote the original accords by

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conditioning aid on compliance.’ (O’Neil, 1999:150) Nevertheless, due to ‘the composition and training of its agents and commanding officers, the National Police remained a “militarized” security force still engaged in public security functions.’ (Williams and Walter, 1997:156) Other points of concern in the post-conflict relationship between the two sides emerged with the discovery of the FMLN weapons cache in neighbouring countries, the report from the Truth Commission, and pending compliance with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces. The Ad Hoc Commission which was set up in 1992 was highly critical of the military and death squads, although it was pointed out that ‘the flagrant violations of human rights that shook Salvadoran society and the international community were not carried out only by individuals of the Armed Forces, but also by the insurgents.’ (UNDP, 2005:28) The report recommended the transfer or discharge of 103 officers, including virtually the entire High Command.’ (Popkin, 2001:10) Furthermore, the Truth Commission report dated 15 March 1993 linked the country’s armed forces to the vast majority of human rights violations, including the murder of the six Jesuit priests. Subsequently, there was big resistance from the army towards the findings of the report with the members of the armed forces demanding the formation of a similar committee for the crimes committed by the FMLN (Wilkins, 1997). On the other hand, the government’s reluctance in implementing the recommendations put forward by the Ad Hoc Commission was perceived by the FMLN as a lack of governmental support for the peacebuilding process. Francisco Jovel pointed out that the way the President Cristiani declared that some military officers were not prepared to give up their arms was a ‘shocking moment’ in the peacebuilding process, raising suspicions concerning the sincerity of the government in the implementation of the peace agreement (pers. comm., 2005). However, it should not be seen as a surprise that the military and government resisted the findings of the Ad Hoc Commission as such a practice ‘had no precedents in Salvadoran history, especially with regards to the role that civilians were playing in military matters.’ (UNDP, 2005:29)

Internal Struggles and the Transformation of FMLN into a Political Party The FMLN was formed by a number of political parties and organizations. The oldest and most prominent of these organizations was the Communist Party of El Salvador which was founded in the 1930s. Following the Cuban revolution and with the radicalization of the politics in El Salvador in the 1960s, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) (Farabundo Marti) was founded as a splinter group and became the largest and most influential revolutionary organization in the 1970s. Moreoever, a number of other active revolutionary organizations joined them in the 1980s such as the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) which was founded in 1972 and whose principal leader was Joaquín Villalobos;

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the Resistencia Nacional (RN) which was formed as a split group from ERP after the internal assasination of some of its members, including Roque Dalton; and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC). Following the negotiations which took place through the facilitation of Fidel Castro in Havana in December 1979 these five leftist organizations formed the FMLN on 10 October 1980, although they have always had substantial ideological and practical differences. According to Alfredo Diaz, Director of the Veteran Association for example, the transformation of the FMLN into a political party benefited only the Communist Party element of the group (pers. comm., 2005).17 For a former FMLN combatant like Alfredo Diaz, the FMLN as a mainstream political party is interested only in its own benefits, hence the interests of former combatants have been completely forgotten. The disarmament and demobilization of the four other FMLN elements were carried out, Diaz asserts, so that the Community Party could become ‘an employment agency’ for its own members. As far as he was concerned the FMLN became a political party in the way the right wing political interest groups wanted, and the post-conflict reconstruction process did not represent the concerns or the socialist principles of the FMLN. Supporting this view, both Mauricio González Ayala and Carlos Castillo pointed out that the leadership of the FMLN knew that what was negotiated and accepted at the signing of the peace agreement was a new liberal project and the FMLN was incorporated the new political life in a highly disadvantageous way. Moreover, they asserted that the FMLN leadership did not know what would really happen with the DDR process. In their view, the absence of an FMLN monitoring mechanism that would have guaranteed the proper implementation of the process, was a good indicator of this unpreparedness. This was a sentiment shared by many other interviewees including Loreno Martinez (pers. comm., 2005). According to Ayala, the FMLN leadership left the majority of its combatants abandoned: ‘Here is your land and your credit, bye bye’ (pers. comm., 2005). A group of former combatants in Las Pasmas supported this view by pointing out that, since its transformation into a political party, the FMLN no longer considers its former combatants for anything except votes (pers. comm., 2005).18 Agreeing with Ayala’s view, Héctor Alberto Hernández, the Mayor of Jocoaitique, which was the frontline of the FMLN’s northern resistance, also underlined the problem of factionalism and the lack of democratic decision making within the FMLN. His resentment towards the FMLN was clear when he said that ‘Our original expectations from the armed struggle were beyond gaining a piece of land.’ (pers. comm., 2005).19 The response to such concerns from Manuel Manger was an overall acceptance of the fact that deep divisions have emerged between the leadership and members of FMLN as a political party. He asserted that ‘the leadership is not blind to these problems’, but as part of its transformation, the FMLN is

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also facing the question of whether it should go more towards the left or right. The far-left Revolutionary Tendency tries to radicalize the vision of FMLN while the Movimiento Benovador shows less leftist leaning than the FMLN. As part of the political transformation, Manger argued that instead of changing the system, the FMLN ‘took some of the negative aspects of the political system’ in the country, and ‘inclusiveness’ is no longer that important. He also believes that in the post-conflict environment there have been high expectations of the political transformation of the FMLN, but he accepted that they had no electoral experience (pers. comm., 2005). It is also interesting to note that, although the FMLN managed to secure major concessions at the peace agreement almost a revolution through negotiations – as a political party it has failed to win enough support at postconflict elections to form the government. According to Professor Americo Meija from the El Salvador National University, the division and internal fighting between ‘orthodox’ and ‘reformist’ elements of the FMLN is one of the main reasons behind this. Paolo Luers, a former FMLN combatant and prominent journalist, claimed that the FMLN as a political party could not move on from the mentality of ‘opposition movement’, and overall, the party has been experiencing a major crisis with its leaders and a large number of its members leaving (pers. comm., 2005).20 Meija also argued that the population was also scared by ARENA propaganda, such as ‘if FMLN wins, then you have no work’ or ‘if FMLN wins, then we will have communism’. It was explained that the media was effectively used by the ARENA in this propaganda and the population also believes that if there is an FMLN victory at elections, the Salvadorans who live in the US may be sent back home (pers. comm., 2005).21

Weaknesses of Civil Society Organizations One of the main international NGOs involved in the reintegration process was Creative Associates International (CAII) which implemented a number of USAID funded programmes such as the registration, vocational training and reintegration assistance to 6,000 members for the former police service members. In cooperation with the GTZ, the CAII also carried out a status and needs assessment of former combatants one year after their demobilization, which provided a number of useful recommendations for the continuing programmes at the time. In the USAID’s Peace and National Recovery Project, 111 international and local NGOs participated in a project in which Catholic Relief Services, UNDP and two local NGOs, the Salesians and the Foundation for Integral Salvadoran Education (FEDISAL) served as umbrella organizations for several local NGOs. The FEDISAL particularly, played a key role in the provision of training programmes to former combatants: 3,100 FAES and 2,000 former FMLN members. The Eastern Economic Development Coordinating Committee (COMCORDE), another local NGO,

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distributed $435,500 through a micro-enterprise assistance project. The Business Foundation for Educational Development (FEPADE), the Foundation 16 January (F-16), the Salvadoran Corporation for Campesino Training and Rural Development (COSALCYDER), and the Salvadoran Foundation for Reconstruction and Development (REDES) were other local NGOs which took an active role in various reintegration programmes (Spencer, 1997). All these activities undertaken by local civil society organizations (CSOs) might give an impression of a vibrant civil society environment, and to some extent this is true. However, this third sector in El Salvador has always struggled to establish its identity and historically, it was intimidated by the state apparatus. During the war, the FMLN either initiated or worked closely with a number of CSOs in the country, and because of such an interwoven relationship it was very difficult for many CSOs to gain their autonomy from the FMLN. For example, F-16 was one of a number of active local NGOs, which was involved in various reconstruction and reintegration programmes from 1992 to 1995. During these initial years, Cesar Villalona and Daniel Gomez from F-16 explained that there was good scope for involvement in such programmes, which was partly because of the pressure from the international community. However, after 1995 both governmental and international funding started to dry up and with the political transformation of FMLN, there were far fewer opportunities for local NGOs (pers. comm., 2005).22 According to Sonia Aguinada who is a former F-16 worker and who currently works for the National Investment Promotion Agency of El Salvador (PROESA), still being seen as part of the FMLN framework prevented CSOs from taking a more active role in the reconstruction and development activities. During the peacebuilding process, CSOs have faced another problem which was to do with their overall vision. The FMLN as a protector for most CSOs was also the source of inspiration for their work. However, in the FMLN’s transformation into a political party, the work of their affiliated CSOs was left uncoordinated, and the divisions within the FMLN started to reflect themselves along similar fault lines within the third or civil society sector (pers. comm., 2005).23 There were also a number of other civil society initiatives by former combatants for the protection of their reintegration rights such as The Association of Demobilized Members of the Armed Forces (ADEFAES) which was formed in 1994, and their main grievances centred around the fact that the former FMLN combatants had received a better reintegration deal. The ADEFAES claimed that former FAES members were facing difficulties in obtaining credit to build their homes or not being able to benefit from the scholarship scheme as much as the FMLN members did. However, its activities were not always peaceful as they took over the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Finance a number of times during the mid-1990s. However, in June

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1995, they renounced the use of violence. Some other organizations founded by former combatants in the 1990s were The Association of Ex-Combatants and Victims of the War in El Salvador (ALGES), The Disabled War Veterans Association of El Salvador (ASALDIG) and The Association of Disabled Veterans of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ALFAES). As its name indicates, the members of the ALFAES were former army soldiers, while the ASALDIG’s membership was comprised of former FMLN members. Oscar Atilio Chicas and Olga Serrano from the ALGES which is one of the largest veteran organizations with over 6,100 members, pointed to the lack of any formal coordination bodies among CSOs as being one of the main problems for the third sector. For example, although there are a number of war veteran organizations in the country, they occasionally work together. The divisions had been much more visible in the early days of peacebuilding, but they explained that the former combatants from both sides now get together to work on issues which are common for all of them such as their socio-economic welfare. Another problem they observed was the way most CSOs have recently become implementing intermediaries for the government and are no longer involved in advocacy and pressure group activities as they used to. Only a small number of CSOs have been strong enough to influence the work of the government, but for the majority of them this would not be possible (pers. comm., 2005).24

Lack of Provisions for Female Combatants and Child Soldiers One of the main shortcomings of the DDR process was its lack of attention to the specific needs of female combatants and child soldiers. A female combatant in Las Pasmas complained about such a shortcoming as a major problem, particularly in rural areas. She explained that, for most female combatants in rural areas the only real reintegration option was to settle with their families. The treatment of female combatants in urban areas was different as they were given scholarship opportunities to study at high school and university, while for those in rural areas the main option was the land transfer programme. She was really upset to discover that some of the FMLN leadership were sent to Spain to study, while she and many other female combatants in rural areas were not even provided with adequate information on reintegration options. She stated her complaint: ‘during the reintegration period we were blinded by the FMLN, and we did not do anything, but received the orders and obeyed them’ and ‘otherwise we would have been executed’ (pers. comm., 2005).25 Daysi Cheyne, a former FMLN combatant and Director of IMU – a women’s association, relates this problem to the way the peace agreement made no specific reference to women former combatants at all. Although the reaction from female combatants resulted in the formation of ‘Desk for Women’ within

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the socio-economic forum, it soon became a failure as both the private sector and government pulled out from it. Although there were two women – Nidia Diaz and Guadalope Martinez – at the peace negotiations, according to Cheyne, they did not bring much gender awareness to the peace negotiations. She agreed that female combatants faced far greater difficulties in their reintegration partly because of the prevailing social structures and their impact on women. For example, because traditionally land is as seen something that belongs to men, when it was assigned to former combatant couples it was registered in the name of male combatants and, in the event of a separation, many former female combatants were left with nothing. When the former combatant couples were given credit for small business, the money was given to the male combatant. Secondly, female combatants were expected to return to their traditional ‘home maker’ roles as wives and mothers, preventing them from benefiting from other reintegration opportunities such as scholarship schemes (pers. comm., 2005).26 Margarita Posada, a former FMLN combatant and Director of the Association of Salvadoran Community Promoters (APROCSAL) became involved in NGO work during her time with the FMLN back in 1989. She benefited from a scholarship scheme as her preferred reintegration option and graduated in economics at the age of 40. Although she thinks she does not represent a typical case, she felt she has never been undermined in her job because of her gender. However, her main problem was the way her husband expected her to become a house wife after the conflict. ‘His machismo’ she said, was ‘my main problem’ so ‘I divorced him in 1993’ (pers. comm., 2005).27 As well as female combatants, according to Posada, child soldiers were also disadvantaged by the DDR process. The way the strategy treated all sub-groups within the former combatant caseload as the same, meant that special groups, such as child soldiers did not get any psychosocial assistance. They were not entitled to the land transfer, the main reintegration option for them being educational scholarships. Although 33 per cent of the child soldiers were girls, there were no programmes focussed on their specific needs. The programmes for the disabled former combatants did not incorporate child soldiers either. Verhey (2001:19) points out how child soldiers from the El Salvador conflict were pessimistic about their future because of chronic poverty: ‘Some seven years after the peace accord, a few even reported dissatisfaction about being demobilized. This negative experience of economic reintegration is in stark contrast to their motivation for participating in the conflict: to improve the future of their country.’ She asserts that the ‘exclusion of child soldiers in the Salvadoran peace process hindered their reintegration, engendered resentment, and left them socially and economically marginalized.’ (2001:28) In other words, ‘12 years later most child soldiers have become adults with serious mental problems, trying to reintegrate into the society.’ Similarly, the disabled combatants are also facing dire difficulties as ‘surviving with $40 a month

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income is almost impossible’. Their specific health needs have also been largely ignored in the post-conflict process. There were initially 20 centres created by the international community dealing with the needs of disabled combatants immediately after the peace agreement, but by 2005, only one of them was still functioning and it is being run by a local NGO (pers. comm., 2005).

Continuation of Violence With the peace accord there was a total end to the conflict between the security forces and FMLN, but politically motivated violence in terms of assassinations by death squads continued, and even threatened to disrupt the first postconflict elections. In the immediate aftermath of the peace accord the country’s judicial system and police service were also going through a difficult phase due to the lack of funds and organizational problems, and subsequently, to a large extent they were unable to respond to the challenges posed by increasing violence (O’Neil, 1999). According to Paolo Luers, a long civil war, three years of disarmament and two years for the new police force to get ready to deal with the security challenge created significant vacuum, and unfortunately, this was happening in a country with a history of violence (pers. comm., 2005). Furthermore, Miquel Cruz, a post-war violence expert from the Universidad Centroamericano pointed out that, because of the amnesty for war crimes, for most victims of violence during the war it was impossible to obtain justice, consequently some of the violence following the peace agreement was related to such ‘deferred revenges’ (pers. comm., 2005).28 From 1994 to 1996, El Salvador had a homicide rate of 138.2 per 100,000 people, which was the highest in Latin America, while it was estimated that the violent gangs in operation had more than 12,000 members (Stanley and Loosle, 1998). Most commentators and those who were interviewed in El Salvador considered the police force reform as one of the most successful aspects of the peace agreement. For example, Oscar Miranda who joined the new police force as one of its newest recruits in 1993. After his training at the ANSP he worked in the police until 1999 and at the time of the interview he was working as a consultant for the capacity building of the police force in Guatemala. Comparing the police forces in both countries, Miranda believes that the experience in El Salvador was much more positive as it has received greater support from the international community. However, the scope of violence from the early days of the post-conflict period was so enormous that it was too much to handle for a newly formed police force (pers. comm., 2005).29 One of the ‘unexpected’ consequences of the new ‘peaceful’ environment with the ending of civil wars in a number of Central American countries in the early 1990s was the influx of small arms into these countries. Spencer points out that having ‘easy access to arms’, former combatants started ‘threatening to fuel social unrest which resulted from non-compliance with agreements’

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(1997:46). Apart from the problems with the disarmament of the FMLN, Stanley and Loosle (1998) reported that large numbers of weapons owned by the military, such as M-16 rifles, ended up in the hands of civilians through military personnel. According to Francisco Jovel, the FMLN’s weapons which were confiscated by the army during the conflict were not destroyed either, and he believed that most of these weapons also ended up in the hands of civilians (pers. comm., 2005). Paolo Luers also questioned why over 100,000 paramilitaries had never been disarmed and queried what happened to their weapons (pers. comm., 2005). According to the peace agreement the Ministry of Defense was supposed to collect all ‘military use’ weapons from civilians, but this never materialized. A civil society initiated disarmament programme, Goods for Guns in San Salvador managed to collect more than 250 pistols, and 5,000 rounds of ammunition over two days in 1999. Since this programme started in 1996, 9,527 weapons and 129,696 rounds of ammunition were handed in, which is a good indicator of the widespread availability of weapons in El Salvador (Laurance and Godnick, 2000). In 2003, it was estimated that there were at least 400,000 firearms still at large in the country, of which only approximately 173,000 were legally registered with the authorities (Stanley and Loosle, 1998). Miquel Cruz finds the government’s gun policy highly permissive, almost ‘promoting gun ownership’ (pers. comm., 2005). The FMLN tried to change the law and bring in the prohibition of carrying weapons but according to Manuel Marger, its parliamentary majority is not big enough to achieve this, and the ARENA’s close links to the gun lobby means that there is no political will to carry out such a major reform yet (pers. comm., 2005). With the rising crime rate, the number of private security companies also increased rapidly, and in 2003 there were around 20,000 private security agents, while the number of police officers was 12,000. As stated by Godnick and Vásquez (2003:18) such private security companies ‘fuel the legal demand for firearms in the country, but [and] are often sources of weapons for the illegal markets because of lax controls over agents and company stockpiles.’ Furthermore, as pointed out by Costa (2001:24) ‘what seems to be a solution to insecurity can become a source of it. Many dismissed police and military end up working for these companies, which can turn into a new base for criminal operations, hence the importance of strict control and supervision’, a view which was supported by Francisco Jovel, stating that the government is simply ‘privatising’ the security sector (pers. comm. 2005). William Pascacio is the Director of Seguridad y Protecticcion, which is a private security company. When the company was founded all of its agents were former combatants, but the recent growth of the company reduced their level to 50 per cent. Employing former FMLN combatants is a major advantage, according to Pascacio, since owing to the political polarization of the society,

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those with left-leaning sympathies would not trust security companies employing former FAES members. It was argued that apart from immigration to the US, the main new employment area for most former combatants is private security companies. They would earn around $200 a month which is half of what a police officer earns (pers. comm., 2005).30 The problems with the reintegration of former combatants also seemed to have played a role in the increasing level of crime in the country, as some of the demobilized former combatants who were struggling to establish a new civilian life started to join violent gangs and other criminal groups. Supporting this view, according to Spencer (1997:50), disgruntled former combatants as well as criminal gangs were the main sources of violence in the country, as ‘the excombatants alone feel the government has not provided them with sufficient resources for their reintegration.’ This environment was exacerbated by the formation of maras by returning Salvadoran young men with a criminal past in US cities. ‘The maras, often outnumbering the police force, choose criminal activity as a means of survival over education or employment. Through robberies, theft and kidnapping these armed gangs further threaten security and exhaust resources otherwise intended to assist ex-combatants with their reintegration.’ (Spencer, 1997:50) Some of the most infamous gangs in the mid-1990s were the Black Shadow or the White Hand, while a death squad called The National Force Mayor Roberto D’Aubuisson threatened a number of prominent politicians, journalists and academics because of their opposition to the ARENA party. The organized crime in terms of drug trafficking, assassinations and car theft was already increasing during this period, and ‘the disintegration of the family, the critical economic situation affecting large portions of the population, lack of education and the weak legal system’ as well as fear and the widespread availability of small arms were the main causes of violence and the reason why violent gangs have gained support from the general public (Spencer, 1997:52). A public opinion survey in June/July 1996 found that ‘79 percent of the respondents identified violent crime as the number one problem they faced’ (Evans, 1998:175). The gang violence and involvement of security forces in such networks were not a totally new phenomenon for El Salvador, but ‘the scope of the problem appeared to expand dramatically with the end of the conflict’, the restructuring of security forces seemed to have ‘created a permissive context in which it was relatively easy for criminal organizations to operate’ (Stanley and Loosle, 1998). The Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups was founded as a response to the assassination of a number of FMLN activists, former combatants and commanders. The findings of this group also put the blame on the armed forces, trying to discourage the FMLN from full participation in the post-conflict socio-political structures of the

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country. The formation of different war veteran associations, which was in a way a response to the worsening situation of former combatants in the country started to pose an extra security risk, as some of them began to get involved in violent demonstrations. The Revolutionary Front for the Defense of the People (FRDP) which was founded as a movement to express dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies, and other clandestine organizations operating as vigilante groups were getting increasingly frustrated in the mid-1990s (Johnstone, 1997). In 2005, the security situation in El Salvador was worsening further with increasing homicides and crimes related to gang violence. Carlos Castillo and Mauricio González Ayala noted a direct correlation between the high level of crime and the government’s economic policies, and they do not agree with those Salvadoran politicians who claim the violence is the result of the war. They cite the example of Honduras which did not have a civil war like its neighbours, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, but is afflicted with a similar level of violent crime. As far as they are concerned violence is a problem for most Latin America societies, and this is largely to do with the economic policies imposed on them externally (pers. comm., 2005). Dagoberto Gutierrez also observed a much higher level of militarization in Salvadoran society than ever before. He was particularly concerned with the availability of firearms and the role of the military, and he claimed that the government depended on the military more than ever as ‘anti-strike squads’ (pers. comm., 2005). According to Oscar Miranda, the main problem with the security situation is that the government is only interested in responding to violence, but not in its prevention. Their main response strategy in dealing with crime is coercion and this is largely why Miranda left the police force. Supporting this view, William Pascacio argued that El Salvador needed more jobs but not more police or private guards. The principal government policy was ‘strong hand’ strategy and at the time the interview was conducted, the government was involved in its latest policy called ‘super strong hand’. It was asserted that the government finds the selling of its ‘strong hand’ policy much easier than opting for socio-economic programmes aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem (pers. comm., 2005). Furthermore, Miranda does not think the security problem in the country can be resolved unless the government shows political determination in controlling the availability of small arms, demilitarization of civilians, and reform of the justice system (pers. comm., 2005). Conclusions The El Salvador case study shows that negotiated peace settlements, rather than the contemporary practice of third party peace enforcement provide unique opportunities for the demilitarization of a war-torn society. In the way the

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agreement was reached, the overall national and international political conditions were such that the parties involved in the conflict showed a great deal of willingness to go through with the requirements of DDR in the country. Coupled with close monitoring and pressure from the international community for the continuation of the peacebuilding process the main components of the demilitarization process were carried out relatively successfully. Although the international community set a rather unrealistic timeframe for the implementation of the peace agreement, its requirements and DDR initiatives, the overall political conditions were, despite some delays, conducive to ensuring the completion of these undertakings. It is clear that without the involvement of the international community, the war in El Salvador may have continued and the conflicting sides would have found it impossible to reach a peaceful settlement. However, partly because of the changes in international politics in the post-Cold War era, and partly because of the way the population no longer supported the continuation of the war, both the government and FMLN, as well as a wide range of civil society actors, provided the necessary political will and inputs to proceed with the DDR process. For example, LeVine (1997:246) gives much credit to President Cristiani for the protection of human rights and reform after the peace agreement, and his close coordination between ‘the military and diplomatic arms of the government.’ Furthermore, it seems that even the military apparatus of the country was willing to go through with the demilitarization process in line with the new regional and global realities (Williams and Walter, 1997). The Salvadoran experience also shows that a wide range of DDR related programmes in the socio-economic and political spheres of post-conflict reconstruction need to be better coordinated. For example, land transfer without adequate training, credit and facilities to gain access to markets result in outcomes that are unsustainable in the long term. According to Del Castillo (1997:362) short-term reintegration programmes served their purpose of providing former combatants ‘with an alternative to banditry as a means of survival’ however, they ‘were neither well planned, properly coordinated or synchronized with demobilization dates.’ Some commentators are even more pessimistic about what the DDR process for FMLN has actually achieved. According to Loreno Martinez, the reintegration process for most former combatants has meant a return to poverty after trying to change the country for 12 years by arms (pers. comm., 2005). J.J. Dalton summarizes the post-DDR life of many former combatants: ‘They are forgotten and unattended both by the FMLN and government. Every time you meet a former combatant, you know that they have terrible economic conditions. Most migrated to the US. Some entered in the gangs and some are in prison.’ (pers. comm., 2005) This is such a major disappointment for many combatants, and it is very easy to understand

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considering what the reintegration meant for them. Walter Funes explains: ‘It was finishing a stage in your life after 12 years. I left my youth. I was coming back to normal life without being a young man. I had a seven year old daughter I had never met. It has been very difficult to get used to normal life after using weapons for so long. Getting used to the family life and carrying the baggage of war at the same time is difficult. (pers. comm., 2005) The reintegration difficulties faced by different groups within the former combatant caseload were not treated effectively either. The experience shows that those in urban areas were provided with a wider range of reintegration opportunities than those who were in rural areas. There was also a strong discrepancy related to gender. It is clear that to a large extent the DDR process neglected the specific needs of women and most female combatants, particularly those in rural areas, did not benefit from the process fully. According to Cheyne, the problems of female combatants continue to persist so many years after the peace agreement, and unless the machismo culture is tackled it would not be possible to deal with such problems as equal access to employment and education, and domestic violence. She asserted that ‘in the war we had the concept of empowerment of women, but we now need to empower men to move from their machismo.’ (pers. comm., 2005) On the other hand, with its all shortcomings, a number of commentators like Doyle, et al. (1997:372) consider the military element of the UN involvement in El Salvador as successful because not only the armed conflict came to an end, but also the FMLN was fully demobilized and disarmed (if with some difficulty), and government forces were dramatically reduced, restructured, and, after great resistance, purged at senior levels. Although structural changes were not as deep as originally envisioned, unregistered military weapons remain in the hands of civilians, and the military still participates in internal security affairs – despite the new constitution’s clear restrictions on such action – Salvadoran society has been significantly demilitarized. Nevertheless, Benjamin Cuéllar Martinez, Director of the human right institute IDHUCA at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), does not consider the changes in the role of the military substantial, he argues: ‘I have reasons to say that the changes with the military and justice system are nominal and on the surface.’ (pers. comm., 2005)31 Martinez’s views may be deemed to be unjustified considering how much influence the military used to have in the country’s political life before the peace agreement, but the experience in El Salvador clearly shows that a peace agreement and the implementation of a relatively successful DDR process are not enough to provide security in the mid

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to long-term in a post-conflict country. They may be essential ingredients for the establishment of a secure environment, but unless they are supported by a wide range of socio-economic and political programmes, their impact remains short-lived. A post-conflict environment may enjoy an absence of ‘armed conflict’ but violence in different forms can easily continue to wage a new type of social war.

3 KOSOVO TRANSFORMATION OF A

‘TERRORIST’ ORGANIZATION INTO A ‘CIVIL DEFENCE’ CORPS

The armed conflict in Kosovo between the Serbian security forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (UCK-Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosove) came to an end in June 1999 following the 78 day NATO air campaign. The conflict which was a low level guerrilla war from late 1997 to March 1999, utilized the ethnic cleansing tools of widespread rape and torture, as well as looting, pillaging and extortion, killing around 12,000 people, with 600,000 people internally displaced, while more than 850,000 Kosovars were forced to take refuge in neighbouring countries (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000; Judah, 2000). Following NATO’s intervention, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on 10 June 1999 mandated a UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) supported by an international military force (KFOR). Paragraph 15 of UNSCR 1244 demanded the KLA and other armed Kosovar Albanian groups to bring an immediate end to ‘all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General’. Only 10 days after UNSCR 1244 the ‘Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK’ was signed between the KFOR and the KLA, the first article of which mandates the KLA’s ‘disengagement from the zones of conflict, subsequent demilitarization and reintegration into civil society’. In addition to a number of agreements for the cessation of hostilities, cross-border activity and monitoring of the cessation of hostilities, the Undertaking also set a timetable for the demilitarization and transformation process, stating that the KLA would be given preferential access to available places in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

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The training of the KPC was one of the two major aspects of the reintegration strategy, while the other was the implementation of the Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS). The transformation of the KLA into a civil defence corps was a totally new challenge for the international community. There have been similar security reform initiatives in other war-affected countries, but the experience of Kosovo was unique in the sense that it was carried out by a UN interim administration within the sovereignty of a state that had no input during the planning or implementation of this process. In fact, the creation of this new ‘civilian’, uniformed and ‘multiethnic’ corps was always considered a threat to the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo.1 This clearly results from the type of governance structure created by UNSCR 1244. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo points out the Resolution ‘created a unique political and institutional hybrid, a UN protectorate with unlimited powers whose purpose is to prepare the province for substantial autonomy and self-government’ (2000:259). Although it promised self-governance to Kosovars, it also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Serbia. Kosovo after NATO’s Intervention Kosovo has a land surface of 10,887 km2 with a population of 2.3 million, 90 per cent of whom are Albanians. It lies in the central part of the Balkan Peninsula ringed by mountains and hills, and its armed conflict has to be understood in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Tito’s Yugoslavia consisted of six federal republics including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. As one of the autonomous provinces in Serbia, Kosovo was one of the eight constituent parts of the country (Vojvodina being the other autonomous province). Yugoslavia was a country of diversity, with five nations, four languages, three religions and two scripts. In the aftermath of World War II the task of making a united country out of such diversity was no easy challenge and Tito had one goal: to live in brotherhood and unity. In order to achieve his goal of ‘brotherhood and unity’, Tito had to undertake a precarious balancing act in Yugoslavia. As part of the process of maintaining this balance, Kosovo was granted autonomy in 1974 which gave the ethnic Albanians a voice on the high level Federal Council. Kosovo had its own constitution, like the other republics, and its consent in the decision-making procedure at the federal level became significant where the principle of consensus was followed. Although the 1974 constitution continued to assert that Kosovo was part of Serbia, it was at the same time a fully-fledged federal body (Malcolm, 1998). With a GDP of only US$700 per capita, Kosovo was the poorest part of Yugoslavia. Before the war the economic growth was directly connected to natural resources and the construction of large energy capacities. Subsequently

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Kosovo made substantial contributions to the Yugoslav economy, producing seven per cent of electricity, 14 per cent of coal, 32 per cent of lead-zinc, 52 per cent of refined lead-alloy and 67 per cent of refined silver. However, Kosovo’s participation in Yugoslavia’s overall productivity was only about two per cent. The main reason for this was that the developed parts of Yugoslavia such as Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia became large centres of processing industries and exports, while other parts, such as Kosovo, became a centre of energy related and metallurgical products. In other words, 47 per cent of the national production in Kosovo in 1988 was based on the mining industry, while the other two main sectors were agriculture with a share of 20 per cent, and trade and tourism with 16 per cent. On 11 March 1981 Albanian students at the University of Pristina rioted. Although the riot started after a student had found a cockroach in his soup, and the demonstrations were initially for the improvement of conditions at the university, they quickly turned into protests about the authorities in Kosovo, resulting in fighting between the police and demonstrators, and riots throughout the night. These demonstrations and riots continued in the coming days and weeks, having enormous political and psychological impact in a country where such forms of open protest were virtually unknown. During the 1980s the security threat was not purely associated with the security forces and the state. From 1981 to 1989, in a time when regional leadership was given to the Albanian Communist Party, almost half of the Albanian population were arrested, interrogated, interviewed or reprimanded. In October 1987 a state of emergency was declared in Kosovo with little effect (Judah, 2000). As part of Tito’s policy of mixing ethnic blocks and discouraging nationalist tendencies by moving Serbs to different regions, there was a proportion of 10:1 between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. In an effort to change this ethnic balance, Serb refugees from the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were encouraged to settle in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998). Manipulating the Kosovo Serbs’ dissatisfaction in an environment where accusations and counter-accusations about Albanian and Serbian nationalism were the political norm, in 1987 Slobodan Milosevic, then the Deputy Leader of the Serbian Communist Party, addressed a crowd of Serbs in Kosovo Polje. In response to their grievances he said ‘No one should dare to beat you!’2 Two years after this speech, the autonomy of Kosovo was revoked. Furthermore, the ‘Programme of Measures’ brought in by the Serb state in 1989 restricted the rights of Albanians to hold state sponsored employment or to teach in Albanian. As a counter-measure to these restrictions, a parallel education system was established along with a range of parallel civil society services. Albanian society, whilst not satisfied with this state of affairs, had learned to cope with the restrictions imposed in 1989. The Kosovars established parallel systems in order to respond to felt needs

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in education, health care and other welfare services. The budget for these services was provided by contributions from Albanians in an obligatory form. In addition to taxing those in Kosovo, the Kosovar diaspora were also taxed, and they paid three per cent of their net income (Ogden, 2001). Most of the funds in this budget were allocated for education from primary to university level. The health services were provided at the health centres of ‘Mother Teresa’ which is a local humanitarian association. In the political sphere, as a reaction to the dissolving of the provincial assembly of Kosovo and revoking of their autonomy, Albanians held a secret referendum in May 1992 to elect a new republican assembly and government. Ibrahim Rugova, the sole candidate, was elected President with 99.5 per cent of the vote, while his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won 75 per cent of seats in the Parliament. The policy of Rugova was one of passive resistance. He believed that by internationalizing the problem, leading the Albanians to boycott elections and censuses, creating a shadow republic and denying the legitimacy of Serbian rule, independence for Kosovo could be obtained. Meanwhile, the KLA which was established in 1993 believed full independence for Kosovo could only be achieved by force. The collapse of the economy in neighbouring Albania and the subsequent loss of control by the government and army led to the mass-availability of arms in Albania, supplying the KLA with multiple small arms for the first time. Politically diametrically opposed to Rugova’s approach, they found it difficult to raise Albanian support publicly. They had communist roots linked to the ‘Enverists’ of Albania (Malcolm, 1998) and were labelled ‘terrorists’ by the international community and a ‘figment of Serbian propaganda’ by Rugova. In addition to their belief in Rugova, the reluctance of the Albanians to support a violent uprising could have been attributed to the devastating impacts of the war in Bosnia. A fear of similar bloodshed and destruction would have been a strong motivating factor in support of pacifism. On the other hand, it should also be noted that Albanian cultural tradition has a history of seeking revenge for spilt blood (Malcolm, 1998).3 Concerns about security issues were heightened during 1998, with fighting between the KLA and the security forces. Both the Serb forces and the KLA were responsible for human rights abuses. For example, the massacre of the Jashari and Lushtaku families (when 58 people were killed by security forces, including 18 women and 10 children) took place in this period. A direct result of the threat to the Albanians’ security needs by the Serbs, was the rise of the KLA and their eventual acceptance by the community. In other words, the Albanian political objective of self-determination changed to one of independence or secession. There were attempts at diplomacy to negotiate a peaceful settlement, with third party intervention by the United States and the international community which culminated in the peace talks held at

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Rambouillet in February 1999. The differences in political opinion on the Albanian side manifested themselves at Rambouillet where it was difficult to reach consensus within the group (Weller, 1999). It was Hacim Thaci, one of the founding members of the KLA, who achieved legitimacy and recognition at Rambouillet for himself and the KLA. With no agreement on the Yugoslav side, diplomatic efforts at peaceful resolution were abandoned and NATO carried out its strikes on FRY, which ended with the Kosovo Peace Accords of 3 June 1999. NATO’s stated reasons for bombing were to maintain peace and security in the Balkans and to avert a ‘humanitarian disaster’ in Kosovo (Clarke, 1999). On the other hand, Chomsky claimed that other underlying reasons included the question of NATO’s reputation, the fact that its 50th anniversary was upcoming, and the particular interest which Madeliene Albright, the then US Secretary of State, had in this issue. It is also thought that NATO misjudged Milosevic’s reaction in thinking he would comply with their demands without any need for bombing. The legality of NATO’s action was challenged by Russia, China and India, amongst others, as it acted outside the authority of the UN, contravening UN Charter, Article 2.4.4 The key issue was sovereignty. China and Russia both have internal problems with minority ethnic groups and were concerned to ensure unilateral interventions by the western NATO alliance were not seen to have established any legal precedence. According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), ‘the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority of the population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule’. Following NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the UN has been involved in a unique state building experience. With the withdrawal of Serbian military and administrative structures from the province, every aspect of governance has had to be restructured from scratch. The report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (2000:294) described the challenge of post-conflict recovery when UNMIK moved into Kosovo as follows:5 Empty streets. Shattered shops. No water. No work. Smoking ruins. Murders in the open streets. Dead bodies and piles of garbage. Not a newspaper to buy, not even a loaf of bread. Not a child in school. No fields safe to plough. Most of the livestock lost. No one in charge. In facing such a major state building challenge the UNMIK was structured around four ‘pillars’ of post-conflict reconstruction activities: Pillar I:

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humanitarian affairs, led by the UNHCR; Pillar II: civil administration under UNMIK itself; Pillar III: democratization and institution building, led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and Pillar IV: economic development, managed by the European Union. The activities led by UNHCR have been phased out with improving humanitarian conditions in the province. The UNSC Resolution 1244 mandated a three-phased process for Kosovo’s administration, and Pillar II which has given this responsibility to UNMIK was, for the first phase of this process, providing basic civilian administration by an international presence where and for as long as this was deemed necessary; while the objectives of the other two phases are the administration by provisional self governing institutions, pending a political settlement; and administration by institutions established under a political settlement. The role of the third pillar has been that of building the institutions of a free, pluralistic and democratic society. Under the lead of the OSCE, the responsibilities of Pillar III were many, such as the protection of human rights and freedoms, the organization of municipal and provincial elections, and the initial training of the Kosovo Police Service, the judiciary and the corrections services. Under Pillar IV, various activities from the rehabilitation of schools and the physical infrastructure, water, electricity, roads, airport, telecommunications, postal services, to the revitalization of the agricultural sector and the establishment of a Central Fiscal Authority and the Banking and Payments Bureau, had to be initiated from the early days of post-war recovery. However, according to the report prepared by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000:122), the Kosovo economy in the early days after the UNMIK’s presence in the province described the complexity of the task ahead: The only truly vibrant economic sector is the flourishing black market. Privatization has made slow progress – perhaps fortuitously, as only the existing mafia structures are likely to have benefited...The continuing job crisis presents the greatest challenge to the Kosovo economy...The population shift from the rural areas to the cities has further compounded the problem of urban unemployment. Strategies to combat joblessness in Kosovo have to be developed urgently...More speedy recovery presupposes, of course, a much more focused – and more generous – effort on the part of the international donor community. However, apart from the lack of clarity concerning a sustainable political settlement, the revitalization of the economy has probably been the least successful part of the state building experience in Kosovo. Under the EU’s leadership it was thought that a small geographical area like Kosovo with a

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population of just over two million could make a quick recovery. However, the unemployment rate continues to be over 60 per cent in the province, with the post-conflict reconstruction process proving to be rather limited in its impact on the provision of livelihoods and employment opportunities. DDR of Kosovo Liberation Army From July 1999 to August 2002, at the request of the UNMIK and KFOR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) undertook the implementation of the ICRS which aimed to provide support mechanisms for demobilized KLA combatants in their return to a post-conflict society. The overall objective included the following activities: facilitation of access to timely, accurate, and unbiased information on reintegration opportunities; assisting in the establishment of small business enterprises; and training for and referral to employment opportunities. The disarmament and demobilization phases in Kosovo included the principal activities of registration and a needs assessment survey. The registration of former combatants was completed by August 1999 and in September the KLA went through disarmament which produced around 10,000 small arms; including 800 machine guns, 300 anti-tank weapons and 178 mortars, as well as 5.5 million rounds of assorted ammunition, 27,000 hand grenades, 1,200 mines and over 1,000 kg of explosives (NATO, 1999). Although, Hashim Thaci reassuringly stated that ‘a soldier did not get his weapon to keep in his hand or in his house…He got it to fight to liberate Kosovo from Serbia. That objective is realized, and our objective now is to restructure and integrate ourselves into society’ (New York Times, 1999), the small number of weapons collected showed that the KLA still preferred to hide a large cache of arms. For the reintegration of former combatants, the ICRS/Reintegration Fund and Kosovo Protection Corps Training (KPCT) programmes were undertaken at eight IOM Sub-Offices which were established in Ferizaj, Gjakova, Gjilane, Mitrovica, Peja, Prishtina, Prizren and Skanderaj (Sub-Offices in Skanderaj and Mitrovice were merged in Spring 2001). The ICRS programmes are implemented through Community Development Specialists (CDS) while the implementation of KPCT is carried out by Management Advisors and the Training Facilitators. The Management Advisory Teams (MATs) were IOM staff who were seconded to the KPC and operate in-situ from the different KPC Regional Training Groups (RTGs). In accordance with this structure each MAT has established a KPC/IOM Operations Support Office at each of the designated RTGs. The main responsibility of MATs is to shadow the KPC and offer management advice and capacity building through on-the-job training throughout the life of the KPCT programme (ICRS, 2000b; IOM, 2002). The initial estimate for the number of KLA combatants was 8–10,000. However, by November 1999 the number of registered combatants had

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reached more than 25,000. After examination of the caseload, 16,229 were expected to require social and economic reintegration support through the Reintegration Fund of the ICRS. According to the data on demographic and employment characteristics compiled by the ICRS during the registration process, it is possible to establish an overall profile of a ‘typical’ former combatant in Kosovo as follows (ICRS, 2000): ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

male (only 3.33 per cent of registered combatants were female) 20–40 years old 50 per cent likelihood of having six to 15 dependants 75 per cent chance of living in their own or family homes 60 per cent possibility of having a heavily damaged or destroyed house relatively well educated with only 25 per cent likely not to have had a high school education; fought less than two years 30 per cent possibility of having been unemployed before the war 30 per cent chance of wanting to work for the security forces 30 per cent likely to want to return to their former occupations 60 per cent likelihood of having training needs

The way that the ICRS/Reintegration Fund programme was initially designed had a very simple but at the same time, crucial purpose that could be identified as building linkages between the human resources of former KLA combatants and employment opportunities. The total Reintegration Fund expenditure per project from July 1999 to March 2001 averaged out at $8,813 per project, or in other words, $1,130 per direct beneficiary (ICRS, 2001). The average Reintegration Fund project per capita cost and beneficiary per capita cost have shown a decreasing trend from the beginning of the Reintegration Fund programme throughout its implementation. During this period, the main method of providing assistance to former combatants was through the ‘Livelihood and Enterprise’ category whose share in the ICRS programme was more than 50 per cent during the second quarter of the implementation (ICRS, 2000a). The other important characteristic was the domination of agricultural projects. For example, there was a big increase in the number of agricultural projects during the third quarter, which were often single-beneficiary projects and comprising the provision of cows, agricultural equipment and machinery. Although, the ICRS attempted to encourage multiple-beneficiary projects, it seems that they did not bear fruit owing to the domination of agricultural projects. Given the considerable training needs indicated by KLA combatants, it was particularly frustrating that most of the 32 vocational training centres in Kosovo were destroyed and looted during the war. Consequently, in order to initiate Vocational Training Courses (VTCs), the ICRS programme had first, to

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renovate and then equip 11 training centres. At these 11 locations, 18 course subjects were offered which represented a capacity of 79 classes across Kosovo. The length of time for all training courses was set as three months. Former combatants were provided with appropriate work-related clothing and stipends of DM 150 ($85) per month, and the next step was to take a ‘Business Planning’ or ‘Career Development’ workshop depending on whether the former combatant sought self or private/public company employment. Both of these workshops were organized by the IOM’s Employment Assistance Centres (EAC) programme. Taking a one-week business planning workshop was a prerequisite for an ICRS/Reintegration Fund grant application for the establishment of self-employment initiatives. A two-day career development workshop aimed to improve former combatants’ referral chances by providing them with interview and presentation skills, and CV prepatation methods. The participants of these courses were also provided with stipends (ICRS, 2000b). The On-the-Job Training (OJT) route lasted between three to six months, during which former combatants were given training in already established enterprises. The role of ICRS in this process was the identification and registration of service providers and the preparation of a tailor-made OJT with the potential employers. This would suit the needs of the company and also take into account the need to develop the skills and capacities of former combatants. During the OJT period, former combatants were paid stipends, in addition to some assistance being offered to the employing entity. In the case of securing full-time employment with an enterprise that has acted as a service provider, each former combatant was also provided by the ICRS with an individual comprehensive tool kit to be owned by the former combatant, but to be used in the place of employment (ICRS, 2001). In addition to technical vocational training courses and the OJT option for former combatants securing employment, the ICRS programme also initiated projects in Agricultural Vocational Training (AVT). Three municipalities were selected for the AVT pilot projects that included the basic rehabilitation and reequipping of the agricultural departments, the installation and/or rehabilitation of borewells, as well as the reconstruction of greenhouses and the reestablishment of seed banks. The training format of AVT was similar to the one for technical vocational training courses. It was set as a three-month fulltime course during which the participating former combatants were paid a stipend of DM 150 per month. The courses comprising 450 places per term were in various aspects of improved agricultural production and management. The KPCT was designed to train the 5,052 selected members of the KPC, 3,052 of whom were to be active full-time members and 2000 of them reservists. Out of 5,052 positions, 36 places were allocated as ‘senior managers’, while 421 were designated as ‘middle managers’ and 4,595 as ‘field members’.6 Five hundred of the positions, 298 actives and 202 reservist positions,

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respectively, were allocated for civilians and minorities. All minority and civilian allocations were made at the ‘field member’ level. Organizationally, the KPC’s has a centralized command structure, in which decisions are made at headquarters level and implementation instructions are passed down to the seven Regional Training Group (RTG) Commanders for execution. It is important to note that the way the structure of KPC mirrors the KLA’s wartime structure, as well as inheriting its leaders and loyalties, poses serious questions for the overall success of this transformation process (Cooper, 2001). In parallel to the structure and responsibilities envisaged for the KPC by the international community, the KPCT aimed for the transformation of former KLA combatants into a civilian, uniformed, multi-ethnic corps through a training programme with the following objectives: first, to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and community of Kosovo; second, to respond to any human or natural disaster affecting the population and territory of Kosovo; third, to conduct search and rescue operations; fourth, to provide assistance to UNMIK and KFOR when required. The two phases of the training programme were carried out between 21 February and 31 July 2000, and 1 August 2000 and 31 May 2001, respectively. The main purpose of Phase I of the programme was to raise KPC members’ awareness of the organizational structure, the importance of their transition from military to civilian organization, the established organizational mandate and general awareness of topics related to the newly established mandate (KPCT; 2001, 2002). Having completed this introductory section in April 2000, the training programme focused on short courses on priority topics such as basic fire fighting, medical first aid, search and rescue, and emergency operations, as well as other courses such as human rights and language classes. On-the-job coaching and the implementation of humanitarian projects were also initiated during this period. Following these training programmes in Phase I, Phase II training focused on the development of the individual and collective skills of selected KPC middle and senior managers. KFOR also had a much more active involvement in the training process in this phase. In addition to providing skills sustainability training for over 80 per cent of the KPC, a primary aim of the training was to prepare the KPC management for their public service duties through broad international contact. Subsequently, courses focusing on pertinent civil protection, managerial and language skills took place not only in Kosovo, but also in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary and the United States. Implementation Challenges Limited Structures with Identification and Taxonomy of Skills The necessity and importance of taking a broad view of skills and human competencies in the process of assessing former combatants’ skills is

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imperative for all targeted planning of reintegration. During the registration process in Kosovo between 23 July and 30 November 1999, former KLA combatants were asked to complete a questionnaire which included general questions on their personal and employment characteristics. However, the reintegration programme did not carry out any further skills assessment in order to provide a better baseline for various micro-enterprises and training programmes implemented within ICRS and KPCT initiatives. After the registration survey, each individual initiative (such as vocational training courses, Reintegration Fund projects and the training of KPC members) should have made greater use of skills assessment. The decisionmaking process for designing such reintegration projects did not have the chance to utilize any information on former combatants’ capabilities at the cognitive, affective and psychomotor levels (Nubler, 1997). The questionnaire survey’s results provided some cognitive information as it enquired on former combatants’ formal knowledge and skills, but idiosyncratic experience could not have been assessed by this methodology. On the other hand, the way that micro-enterprise development projects were planned, in close collaboration between IOM field staff and former combatants, meant that such idiosyncratic experiences may have been assessed by allowing for the design of tailor-made projects. More importantly, the assessment of such capabilities should have been an integral part of vocational and KPC training courses. As well as the testing of learned formal knowledge, these training courses should have had mechanisms for assessing idiosyncratic knowledge and improved capabilities at the affective and psychomotor levels. Considering human resource formation comprises of emotions, attitudes, values and norms at the affective level, these training courses could have deliberately targeted improvement of the former combatants’ punctuality, respect for authority, self-reliance, attitude towards work and the ability to make decisions (Nubler, 1997). There is no doubt that some of the former combatants may have acquired such skills as part of their training courses. However, the lack of practice and hands-on experience opportunities at the training courses was a major obstacle for the development of manual skills as part of the psychomotor area. The reintegration strategy has not provided a clear taxonomy of skills according to different labour markets and occupations. It was important that the skills and competencies of former KLA combatants were classified as vocational, managerial and entrepreneurial. First of all, this would have avoided the ad-hoc organization of vocational training courses. For example, there was no particular logical reason why all vocational courses were of three months duration. For those former combatants who had already acquired skills in the subject area of their courses, a three-month period of training may have been adequate, but as the field research findings indicated, that was not the case for

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those at beginners’ level. More importantly, the logic for organizing all types of vocational training courses (from plumbing and electrical installations to computing) to be of the same duration is particularly questionable. The argument for treating all former combatants equally can be put forward here, as the payment of stipends has been a part of vocational training courses. However, it is also probable that such reasoning may have resulted in a big sacrifice in the overall quality of learning. The possibility of unequal treatment could have been avoided through the development of appropriate response mechanisms. The programmes implemented by IOM have indeed provided appropriate fora for the effective allocation of various competencies. For example, the micro-enterprise development aspect was an ideal mechanism for the utilization of entrepreneurial and managerial skills. The establishment of vocational training courses in a wide spectrum of subjects also provided opportunities for former combatants to develop new or existing vocational competencies. It is therefore praiseworthy that the IOM’s strategy managed to adopt a high degree of flexibility in responding to the changing and varying needs of former combatants. Apart from catering to different types of competencies and skills with its different ICRS programmes, it was clear that the IOM managed to renew its approach, according to the information accumulated, with the development of the reintegration strategy. It was this ethos of flexibility that enabled the IOM to show a marked degree of agility in its strategy and so ensure its programmes were increasingly relevant to the needs of former combatants. It was a strategy that attempted to regenerate itself, based on an increasing understanding of the context throughout the implementation. On the other hand, the lack of an overall assessment of the economic context, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of the labour market in Kosovo, was to have negative implications for the planning and implementation of the process. The ILO (1997) explains that promoting employment for former combatants requires careful analysis and understanding of the functioning of the local labour market. In their manual on ‘Training and Employment Opportunities for Ex-Combatants’, the ILO (1997:49) stresses the importance of labour market information (LMI) analyses which ‘...constitute an appropriate approach to address employment questions for general economic development as well as for sector-specific post-conflict rebuilding’. The ILO notes that, the lack of an effective LMI mechanism inhibits the planning, implementation and evaluation of employment programmes for former combatants. It was also apparent that the reintegration strategy in Kosovo could have benefited greatly from appropriate information on existing and future potential markets, the needs of people to be reintegrated and employed, and the possibilities for education, vocational and business training.

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Problems with Application of Skills and the Utilization of Human Resources The reintegration strategy implemented by IOM experienced major difficulties in meeting the needs of a larger caseload than was initially expected within the limits of its programme budget. The figures on Reintegration Fund projects, the average project per capita cost and beneficiary per capita cost, showed that the strategy had a decreasing trend in its spending throughout its implementation. For example, while the total Reintegration Fund expenditure per project in the first (July to October 1999) quarter averaged $13,227 per project, it was only $8,813 in the seventh (January to March 2001) quarter (ICRS, 2000; 2001). No matter how carefully reintegration programmes are designed, if there is inadequate caseload projection, or the registration process is open to manipulation, then it is still likely that the implementation process will experience finance-related challenges. In addition to such financial challenges, the reintegration strategy seems to have experienced some coordination problems. The involvement of different agencies in the same task naturally brings different agendas, mandates, and modes of operation. Although the reintegration strategy was designed and implemented by the IOM at the request of UNMIK and KFOR, coordination problems can and did occur even in a carefully designated working relationships framework like this. For example, the six monthly staff changes at KFOR caused some difficulties in programme continuity. The KFOR officers interviewed explained that a careful hand-over process mitigated the possible negative impact of staff turnover.7 However, the interviews with UNMIK and IOM staff indicated that working with a new officer every six months meant that working relationships had to be re-established from the beginning each time.8 Considering the decisive role that human relationships play in whether programmes are successful or not, the likelihood is that KFOR staff changes will have increased the possibility of such problems. It is also crucial to consider the underlying reasons for designating the structure of the reintegration strategy. if one starts to consider the way that some training programmes were planned and implemented, the issue of keeping former combatants ‘busy’ as an over-arching aim seems to have been a strong argument. Various ICRS projects and the KPCT were under pressure to keep former combatants occupied in order to reduce the possibility of them becoming a security risk in Kosovo or becoming involved in regional conflicts such as the one in Macedonia. Therefore it would not be too unrealistic to assume that the IOM, as the main implementing agency, was probably under pressure to ensure that former combatants were provided with various training and enterprise development programmes. This may have been one of the reasons why some training courses, such as fire-fighting were persistently made part of the overall KPC training structure, even though there was no projected need for such large numbers of fire-fighters in the corps. It was perhaps this similar perception that also formed the underlying rationale for various VTCs.

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In other words, the economic recovery of Kosovo probably was not the main or only motivation for training so many former combatants in different sectors of the reintegration strategy. The goal of ‘keeping former combatants busy’ was as important as economic considerations. Seen from the perspective of the need to maintain local and regional stability, this may have been considered a well-justified objective. However, when it starts to overcome the objectives related to economic recovery, then the reintegration strategy also starts to lose its principal vision. The objective of ‘keeping former combatants busy’ should be understood and appreciated, but the apparent indifference to the way in which this is done needs to be reconsidered. If security concerns start to assume a greater level of importance than the reintegration strategy’s economic objectives, then it is likely to result in ad-hoc initiatives with unsustainable consequences. It is imperative to realize that, the dissatisfaction, which may result from the economic outcomes of a reintegration programme, can also turn into security risks.

Challenges for the Sustainability of Micro-Enterprise Development Projects The effective utilization of human resources requires supportive policies and complementary measures for both the supply and demand side of the labour market. Moreover, the provision of employment and livelihood development programmes as part of the reintegration strategy need to be seen as an integral part of the overall reconstruction process. However, the strategy in Kosovo failed to utilize any type of labour market assessment, consequently it is difficult to claim that any targeted planning was carried out towards this aim. On the other hand, the economic reintegration of former combatants can be analysed in terms of their involvement in the reconstruction process. It is clear that those former combatants who were assisted through enterprise development projects had a good opportunity to acquire a sustainable livelihood, although that depended on a number of overall economic market factors. For many former combatants these enterprise projects represented a once in a life-time opportunity; and most of them were not only breadwinners for their immediate family but also to their extended families. These projects meant employment to other former combatants and civilians too and their positive implications for the regeneration of the economy can easily be estimated. The provision of employment in certain sectors was to have a trickle-down effect in other related areas.9 Reintegration Fund projects have therefore, proved themselves to be an appropriate way of responding to the needs of the economic environment in Kosovo and it could be claimed that small enterprises (created or supported through the ICRS’ Reintegration Fund programme) have played an important role in the rehabilitation of the economy in Kosovo. There were a wide range of livelihood and small enterprise development

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initiatives which were undertaken as part of the ICRS programme. From carpentry, agriculture and chicken farming to auto-mechanics, bee-hiving, graphic design, hairdressing and tailoring, these were some of the projects undertaken by those former combatants who were interviewed by the author. There were two distinctive groups among the beneficiaries, those who had the same business before joining KLA and those who were embarking on a new occupation. The type of assistance needed by the former group was often in terms of replacement of machinery and equipment which was either damaged during the war or had become out-of-date over the years. They already had an established system of production and a customer base. However, the initiation of a new business or livelihood enterprise for those in the latter group was much more challenging. They were mainly those who had a technical school or university degree but had been unemployed for a long time, or some who had just completed an IOM VTC course and planned to establish their own business. Former combatants in this group were much more vulnerable to market forces. On the other hand, it was also some former combatants from this group who came up with some innovative enterprise ideas. One such innovative initiative was a fish farming project in Istog. The former combatant was a graduate of the Faculty of Economics (Pristina University), but was working as a farmer before joining KLA.10 Given that the Municipality of Istog is rich with fresh water resources and the village where the former combatant lived has a number of springs, the initiation of fish farming as a business was a very sensible decision. However, the initiation of such a business requires a large investment for the construction of pools and the initial buying of fish and fish food. The former combatant concerned had submitted his proposal as a joint application with another four former combatants, which meant that they could receive more than DM 11,000 ($5,100) from the ICRS’ Reintegration Fund for the establishment of their business. It was explained that the business was making a profit of at least DM 3,000 ($1,400) per month, and the former combatant was very confident about the expansion of their business in the future. The main strength of this project was the existence of an available market for their produce, which was not the case for some other projects. The marketing of products and competition with similar internal and external products was one of the main challenges faced by most projects. The challenge of competition was particularly severe for those former combatants whose enterprise was based on their skills such as auto painting, plumbing and electrical installation. Such skill-based jobs already constituted the primary form of employment for many Albanian Kosovars before the war due to the discriminatory employment policies imposed on them by the Milosevic regime in Serbia. Before the war, employment opportunities in the public sector were almost nil for Albanian Kosovars. Therefore the market for such skill-based

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enterprises had already been fairly well utilized. However, as the lack of employment opportunities is still the norm in Kosovo, such enterprises tend to be the only way out for many Kosovars, including former combatants. As a result, some small enterprises face harsh competition owing to market saturation. For example, the number of auto-vulcanizers one after another, particularly on road sides, all around Kosovo is one manifestation of this phenomenon. An auto mechanic former combatant in Malisheve explained that there were as many as six auto mechanics on a short length of the road where his workshop was.11 He owned his premises before joining KLA, and at the time he was the only auto mechanic in the area. However, the other workshops, some of which belonged to other beneficiaries of the ICRS programme had been opened up since the peace agreement, posing greater competition. Another beneficiary, a former combatant who owned a cattle farm, explained that his enterprise had the capacity to produce 40 litres of milk a day, but as imported products tend to be cheaper than his, it was proving difficult to sell his products.12 The lack of a tax system on imported products when the reintegration process was carried out meant that imported products would always be much cheaper than his farm’s milk. As he did not think the situation would improve in the future, he had decided to raise cattle for meat only, which was more profitable for him. It was apparent that it was not only cattle farming that faced such marketing problems. A former combatant who used his ICRS assistance to initiate a chicken farming project in Barileve (Pristina Municipality) complained that he often needed to reduce his prices because of the competition with cheaper imported eggs.13 The key challenge for him was the fact that the main ingredients of chicken feed were imported from Serbia or Hungary and processed in Kosovo, so the principal input for his chicken farm was expensive. Against this disadvantaged position, he does not have the facilities for mass production, which is the other reason why his products cannot be as cheap as those from abroad. On the other hand, some marketing concerns raised by former combatants may be the result of not utilizing fully those existing items in the market. For example, another former combatant, who also benefited from the Reintegration Fund programme by establishing a chicken farm in Barileve, claimed that marketing his product was never a problem.14 Egg production in Kosovo is far below the needs of the market, but he made individual agreements with a number of shops in Pristina. Therefore his farm was not affected by market fluctuations. According to him, the market for eggs was under-utilized in Kosovo, and the main reason for this was the costly initiation of such business. His calculations for establishing a small size chicken farm suggested a start-up figure of DM 60,000 ($28,000) as an initial investment, and it was rightly argued that the risk of investing so much money for somebody who does not have relevant experience in chicken farming would be too much to take. For example,

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the other two former combatants who have been employed by him for a period of at least six months, as part of the deal with the Reintegration Fund programme, did not have any experience in chicken farming. However, as he had done chicken farming before joining KLA, his business did not have any operational problems, and he made a profit of DM 1,300 ($600) per month while paying monthly wages of DM 350 ($170) to the other two former combatants. Due to the IOM’s well established sub-office structure there was an imaginative approach to the development of small enterprises and livelihood projects. The expertise and local knowledge of the staff seemed to play a critical role in identifying projects appropriate to the local economic environment. The grant approval process took around seven to eight weeks. Before proceeding with the implementation of projects, ICRS staff would first visit the site of the proposed project and take photographs of the site for their records. If the proposal was approved by the Coordination Cell in Pristina, then at least three price quotes for the requested materials had to be received before proceeding with procurement. Once the materials were received for the project, the implementation took place in close collaboration with the ICRS staff. The interviews with former combatants clearly emphasized that the outreach during and after the actual implementation of projects was considered as constituting valuable support and guidance. Throughout the project development processes, the local staff met with beneficiaries several times and carried out job counselling sessions in order to design tailor-made small enterprise projects for them. Although, such visits to IOM Sub-Offices meant that former combatants became comfortable with the ICRS staff, and a good level of trust was established between them, some beneficiaries claimed that they had to visit the sub-office as many as 20 times. For those former combatants who lived in the same town where their IOM Sub-Office was, this may have not been too inconvenient. However, given that a large percentage of former combatants lived in rural areas, these visits to the sub-office may not only have been inconvenient, but also expensive. Most of the former combatants interviewed did not think that the processing time for their projects was too long. However, some of them stated that although the ICRS’s livelihood and enterprise development programme was supposed to provide a quick response to their economic needs following demobilization, they had to wait too long for their projects to be initiated. Apart from such factors as former combatants’ skills and choice of enterprise, and local economic realities, the project design was affected by the availability of funds. In conjunction with the trend towards decreasing funding for the average Reintegration Fund project per capita cost and beneficiary per capita cost, former combatants were asked to form teams in order to secure a grant from the Reintegration Fund programme. Although such an approach

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was useful for making enterprise development initiatives more complex projects in terms of their scope and budget size, it also meant that some teams may have been formed on an artificial basis. This was clearly observed with some of the Reintegration Fund projects visited by the author. Former combatants were not hiding the arrangements they made with their so called ‘partner’ former combatants. It was often on the basis of buying their share out once the business had started to make profit. Consequently, the claim to have provided sustainable employment for a given number of the caseload through such Reintegration Fund projects, needs to be regarded with caution. In the context of long-term sustainability and plans for the future, a number of issues were clearly observed in the interviews. Firstly, the former combatants were overall very pleased with the assistance they received from the ICRS programme. They often rated it as adequate or excellent, and it was emphasized that, in addition to financial support they also found the counselling support from the ICRS staff a very important component in the successful implementation of their projects. The way that the work-plan of projects was often divided into several tranches according to specific project requirements meant that the implementation process was overseen by the ICRS staff continuously. In other words, the staff ’s responsibility was far from ending with the provision of materials, which often seems to be the case in this kind of micro-enterprise development programme. The project process was carried out under close monitoring by the ICRS staff, which made possible the identification of problems during implementation so that the necessary steps could be taken to solve them. Secondly, most of the former combatants started to make a profit from their businesses either immediately or between one and three months after starting. Although they sometimes had to wait for the design and procurement of materials for their projects, the beneficiaries were very pleased that their projects provided them with a regular income. They also seemed to be very confident for the future of their enterprises. It was stated by most of them that they were very confident of the fact that their businesses would still be making a profit the following year. The confidence in their enterprises meant that not only have they invested some of their own savings, if they had any, in the establishment of their projects, but also they were planning to re-invest their profits back into their businesses. Thirdly, it is significant that almost none of the beneficiaries had taken another loan for the establishment of their enterprises. Although some of them had borrowed small amounts of money from a relative or friend, none of them took a loan from a lender. In the absence of banks or other financial structures for the provision of micro-credit schemes, it may have been expected that some of the beneficiaries would do this. However, it would appear that taking a loan with interest is not commonly practised among Albanian Kosovars because, the

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existence of strong inter-family relationships means such financial matters tend to be resolved within their families’ own means. It was also stated that more than half of those former combatants who had been receiving some financial assistance from a relative abroad before joining KLA, no longer had such support, owing to a variety of reasons. This meant that, without the ICRS’ support, most of the livelihood and enterprise projects could not have been established by recourse to former combatants’ own resources and financial mechanisms in Kosovo. It was for this reason, perhaps, that most of the beneficiaries considered their ICRS supported projects represented a once in a life-time opportunity. Finally, it was clear that the successfully implemented micro-enterprise projects would have substantial spin-off impacts on the local economy. Although many of these enterprises were not in a position to provide large scale employment, they were meant to provide a regular income for former combatants who often had many dependants. Some projects have had a number of former combatants as direct beneficiaries, and some of them also employed former combatants. Almost all projects were family run enterprises, providing employment to former combatants’ children, brothers or other close relatives. In some cases, an enterprise was the sole source of income for as many as 30–40 people. Therefore, it is important to note that each enterprise developed with the ICRS assistance has had much wider economic implications than just providing employment to individual former combatants. In an environment where the manufacturing sector has ceased to exist and the only employment opportunities were often those provided by the international community, these micro-enterprises represented the only possibility of a regular income for many Kosovars, as well as a large percentage of former combatants. Most beneficiaries thought that they would get a good return from their investments in the long-term, if not in the near future.

Limited Employment Opportunities after Vocational Training Courses The reason for choosing a particular vocational training subject varied greatly from respondent to respondent. Some former combatants had already worked in the subject of their choice of VTC for a long time, and wanted to strengthen their theoretical knowledge, or prove their skills with a diploma. Some former combatants chose their particular VTC subject because they had already studied that subject before joining the KLA. It was also interesting to note that, for some of them, the choice of subject was based on the expectation that there would be a high level of demand for that particular profession, such as civil construction and plumbing in the post-war recovery process. However, some former combatants attended a particular VTC, because their main choice of subject was full so they had to opt for their second or third options. In some cases, the reasoning for VTC attendance was more worrisome. For example,

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one respondent explained that the only reason he took his carpentry course was because he wanted to be eligible for the Reintegration Fund programme. In a number of cases the respondents did not think that they would find employment after their VTC, but they thought that the skills gained from the course would be useful for domestic DIY, or they were attracted by the stipends paid during courses.15 It seems that almost all respondents felt that the VTC courses they took were highly useful for them. However, it is clear that there were a number of organizational problems. First of all, the length of time for VTCs was a major area of complaint. Those interviewed explained that three months for some subject matters such as construction, arc & gas welding, carpentry and computing were too short to learn both the theoretical aspects and also to practice what had been learned during the course. In fact, the lack of time for practice was perhaps the key area of complaint. It seems that on particular courses and at some training centres, the participants faced severe shortages of equipment and materials to practice. One respondent was lucky enough to practice at his friend’s carpentry shop during the course, but he pointed out that many of his classmates did not have a similar opportunity.16 At an automechanic and carpentry course in two different regions, the participants were unable to acquire any practice at all. In some cases, the training courses were stopped after one week of their initiation and re-started after four months. Although, some training centres were clearly under-resourced, at some centres the courses were not long enough to utilize all machinery and equipment donated by foreign countries. Nevertheless, almost all respondents stated that they had excellent instructors who tried to compensate as much as possible for the lack of machinery and equipment through their lessons. After their training, almost all respondents stated that they felt fairly or very competent with their new skills. However, again all of them also said that they would like to take further training to improve their skills. Competence with skills has the advantage of being quantifiable, and it is good that the course participants were provided with a diploma at the end of their training. As pointed out earlier, for those working in their chosen subject of vocational training for a long time, gaining a diploma was very important. However, it was not clear that all courses utilized a marking and examination scheme to test what was learned and whether that was sufficient for graduation. Although the literature prepared by the IOM mentions various schemes of testing as part of the VTCs, this was not confirmed by the respondents. Those respondents who had already completed their courses explained that they were not asked to take any kind of examination or practical test at the end of training. Attendance on their respective courses was adequate for payment of their stipends and graduation at the end of three months. This seems to pose major problems for the reliability of diplomas provided by VTCs. For example,

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it is likely that some former combatants attended their courses because they were paid stipends, and did not learn much because they had no interest whatsoever in their subject. However, the VTC system provided these participants with the same diploma or certificate as those who really wanted to excel in their chosen subject. This was clearly unfair to those who made the effort to benefit from their VTCs. Although the majority of the respondents thought that the training programme they undertook would be useful for finding a job, they also complained about the lack of employment opportunities for somebody with their skills in their settlement or municipality. Meanwhile, some respondents explained that it would not have been easy before the war, but because of the reconstruction process they thought that there would be lots of employment opportunities for certain professions such as plumbing and carpentry. It was also argued by a female former combatant that it would be much easier to get a job in the public sector for those who had contacts in local authorities.17 By the time the interview was carried out, she was working at a municipality without having been paid for over two months. She explained that if she did not get paid and could not find an alternative job, then she would like to emigrate. Like this female former combatant, due to the lack of employment opportunities, a number of other respondents were already planning to immigrate, mostly to places where they already had some relatives living. A respondent, who had worked in Switzerland as a construction labourer, was looking at ways of going back there, though he said it was a difficult journey via Albania and a dangerous boat trip to Italy as the first time he had entered Switzerland illegally.18 Another respondent, who is an unemployed farm labourer, explained that he hoped his wife would be able to obtain a German visa soon, so he could go there with her.19 However, he had no passport and could only travel to Germany as a tourist with his travel documents. On the other hand, if he could manage to open a shop in his town he would not consider emigrating as he would like to stay close to his extended family. None of the respondents stated that being a former combatant had or would have a negative impact on their employment prospects. On the contrary, for many of them being a former combatant was an advantage, as they felt that the population in general were more prepared to give them employment as they had fought for their ‘country’. Most of them believed that other Kosovars showed them more respect. However, they did not think that it would automatically help them with new employment prospects. Although only a few respondents had a job when interviews were conducted they rated the employment prospects of somebody with their skills in Kosovo in the near future as either fairly good or excellent. Most of them were expecting to earn between DM 250 ($120) and DM 750 per month if they managed to establish their own business. In fact, almost all respondents wished to start up their own

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business as a plumber, carpenter or electrician and in order to do this they needed financial support. In some cases it was just to buy simple tool kits, and in some cases to initiate more complex business plans. They often explained that the VTC they undertook was an important step forward in their lives, but not enough to satisfy their aspirations. In the then economic environment of Kosovo, having a certain skill did not guarantee employment opportunities. The lack of opportunities in the public and private sector meant that they would start their own business. Most of the respondents identified starting their own business as the first thing they would like to do, if they managed to save some money from their earnings in the next five years. For some, to build their own house was more important, but none of them identified buying a car or investing in hard currency or gold as a means of investment. It was also interesting to note that buying agricultural land was not identified as a priority, not even by those currently involved in farming. The initiation of their own business was also seen as the creation of employment for the respondents’ own relatives. Having a shop or business was seen as a way out from their economic difficulties. Planning to invest in a business or housing also indicated the former combatants’ strong hopes for the future. To emigrate abroad was still in their plans for some, but it was only a possibility if they could not manage to get their business up and running. After a vocational training course if former combatants wanted to benefit from the ICRS Reintegration Fund programme they were required to attend one of the Employment Assistance Centres (EAC) workshops. If they were planning to establish an enterprise, they were asked to take the EAC’s ‘MicroEnterprise Set-Up’ workshop as a prerequisite entitlement for assistance from the Reintegration Fund programme. If they were planning to work as an employee, after their VTC, they had the option of taking the EAC’s ‘Career Development’ workshop. As the EAC’s workshop initiatives started towards the end of this research, only nine of the former combatants interviewed stated that they had taken these workshops. Overall, workshops seemed to be beneficial to the former combatants, but it was observed that the content was too heavy to be absorbed in the set time. The ‘Micro-Enterprise Set-Up’ workshop attempted to cover a wide range of financial issues in the context of enterprise establishment in five days. Therefore, it was clearly an important initiative to take a holistic approach to enterprise development and long-term sustainability. The allocated time for the workshop did not seem to be adequate in order to learn various business planning issues. It may have been long enough for those who had experience in business, but for a former combatant who had neither experience nor education in a business related subject the course content was hard to follow. The main theme for the two-day ‘Career Development’ workshop was

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preparing a CV because a CV for job applications had previously been uncommon in Kosovo. It was only with the arrival of the international community, and due to the fact that they were the main employment providers in the province, that the practice of using a CV became part of the general recruitment process. In order to prevent former combatants from being disadvantaged for not knowing how to prepare a CV, this initiative was also worthwhile. However, it is not possible to claim that it achieved its aim fully. Due to the fact that the workshop attempted to introduce a new concept and tool, and also tried to teach how to prepare one at the same time, the time given was too limited for the task. Many ICRS’ local staff explained that after these workshops, former combatants still came back to them for help with the preparation of their CVs.

KPC’s Organizational Challenges One of the over-arching themes to emerge from interviews with former combatants was the pride that KPC members enjoyed in being part of their organization.20 First of all, they considered themselves as ‘heroes’ and ‘victors’ of the war against the Serbian regime. They had endangered their lives for the protection of their nation and ‘country’ as they had been expected to do, and they were proud of the fact that they had taken up arms for the defence of their motherland. In fact, as far as they were concerned, they not only won the war, but had become the allies of such countries as the USA, UK and other major western powers. This was a point which many of the respondents had difficulty in understanding and the reason for the various changes in attitude of the major powers towards the KLA. They thought that the KLA was initially considered to be a group of ‘terrorists’ by the West at the beginning of 1990s. They were never taken seriously or includes as part of the negotiations to solve the Kosovo crisis. However, during the late 1990s they came to be regarded as ‘freedom fighters’. During the NATO intervention, they became the allies of a victorious West, who won the fight, resulting in a drastic change in the way they were perceived by their ‘allies’. However, most of them felt that they were now no longer treated as ‘heroes’, but as a threat to the future of Kosovo. A KPC member explained that when the international community ‘needed’ the KLA, they were their military ‘allies’, but after the war they were asked to become a civilian organization.21 The overriding feeling of not being ‘respected’ enough, or at all, by the international community seemed to be a major contributory factor to the resentment that some KPC members were now feeling towards their ‘allies’. Various examples given in the interviews all pointed to a common theme, that of the need or desire to be treated like ‘equals’, ‘partners’ or ‘allies’. The way in which training courses were planned and conducted, without the participation

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of KPC members, and the perception that they were being treated like a ‘source of cheap labour’, or a ‘group of criminals’ were all cited as examples to demonstrate their perception that they were no longer respected by the international community, as was the case during the war. In addition to the above reasons for the growing resentment towards the international community, their salary and working conditions could be seen as another reason. According to different ranks, the respondents earned a monthly salary of between DM300 and 600 ($140–280). All respondents stated that their salaries were insufficient. Apart from a couple of respondents who did extra work at weekends to earn additional income, most explained that they had no time or energy to do other work after working six – seven hours at their RTGs five days a week. What they earned as a salary was in fact in line with what other similar professionals earned in Kosovo. For example, police officers and teachers earned approximately DM 350 per month, and the salary of doctors was about DM 600 a month. Therefore, although they were dissatisfied with their salaries, they were also aware that this was due the general economic conditions in Kosovo. In regard to working conditions, these were often rather basic and it seemed that KPC members were trying to make the best of what was available to them. Some RTGs had problems with basic infrastructure such as water and sanitation, and consequently the working conditions at these RTGs were particularly poor. Obviously, in the context of working conditions, it was important to consider other limitations such as the lack of machinery and equipment for carrying out the responsibilities expected of them. Respondents felt a certain level of disappointment with the fact that they may have become experts on communications or fire fighting after their training, but they had no proper equipment to do the job at their RTGs. In return, this was perceived as evidence that they were not being taken seriously by the international community. In the way the relationship was structured, KPC seemed to be put in the position of a dependant actor. Hence, it may be possible to explain why some KPC members found themselves in a love-hate relationship with the international community. On the one hand, they were full of resentment, but on the other, they felt that they had needed the international community not only to win the war, but also after the war, to become an army, as well as to have an independent Kosovo in the future. In order to realize the aim of creating a civilian, uniformed, multi-ethnic corps, 10 per cent of the available KPC positions were allocated to civilians and minorities. The fact that out of 500 available positions for civilians and ethnic minorities, so far only 143 were filled demonstrated the challenge involved in creating a multi-ethnic corps. The 10 per cent allocation for ethnic minorities may represent the pre-war demographic characteristic of the population, and it was fair that there were efforts made to attain the same level of representation

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within the membership structure of KPC. However, it should be accepted that KPC is an organization with a structure that resembles an army more than a civil defence organization. Given that there were serious atrocities against ethnic minority communities after the end of the war in June 1999, it was perhaps hoping for the impossible to expect that the positions for ethnic minorities in the KPC would be filled without problems. It should also be considered that those positions filled by ethnic minorities would be at field member level, which meant that they would have no direct involvement whatsoever in the decision making process of KPC. Therefore, whilst it was clearly a step taken in the right direction, it is important not to be too hasty in expecting that this would result in a multi-ethnic organization in any true sense. Due to above mentioned challenges it will certainly not be easy to create a multi-ethnic staff structure for KPC. However, it would be unfair to think that the challenge is purely the result of KPC’s characteristics. Peer pressure was given as one of the main reasons why some ethnic community members, particularly Serbs, had to give up their positions at KPC. Although there is clearly a lack of trust between Albanian Kosovars and the other ethnic communities, it seems that the high command level at KPC desires to fill all available positions allocated to ethnic communities and civilians. Considering the seriously damaged nature of reciprocal relationships between different ethnic groups in Kosovo, some may argue that such aspirations currently are unrealistic. It may be the case that the KPC command’s desire to create a multiethnic corps is simply a means of meeting their agreement obligation with the international community. However, such an argument would ignore the other side of the coin, which is the possibility that, no matter how much the KPC may try to attract ethnic community members, the healing of damaged societal relationships in Kosovo will need time. It may also be the case that some interest groups within different ethnic communities may consider the creation of a multi-ethnic KPC a threat to their positions, which are based on the manipulation of ethnic differences in Kosovo.

Reintegration of KLA combatants and the Future of Kosovo The preceding discussions have shown that the reintegration process has been crucial for the post-war recovery process in Kosovo owing to two overall factors. First, its impact on the labour market and the economy of Kosovo in general, which were explored under the concept of micro level insecurity, second due to the interaction between the reintegration process and security at the provincial and regional levels, which will be explored in this section. It is clear that the former combatants’ aspirations for the future of Kosovo include full independence. It is in this same context that KPC is inevitably considered as the future army of Kosovo. Although the KPC is far from being a satisfactory structure for former combatants, it seems that they have accepted

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its principal characteristic of being a civilian protection corps for the time being. The possibility of becoming an army in the near future seems to be a key motivational factor for many KPC members. In contrast to other former combatants, KPC members were selected not only because they passed the KPC Recruitment Battery Test, but also because of their relatively long-term loyalty to the KLA. For example, in terms of their length of time with the KLA, only 25 per cent of respondents who were assisted by the ICRS programme had an involvement of over 12 months, while out of 34 KPC members interviewed, 29 of them said that they had spent more than 12 months with KLA. Therefore, it would not be too unrealistic to claim that these referrals had perhaps aimed to provide a gainful employment for those former combatants who had formed the ‘hard core’ of the KLA. It was also essential that KPC members would not desert their forces in order to join the fighting in southern Serbia or northern Macedonia. Some KPC members did leave the corps in order to support the armed conflicts of Albanians in neighbouring countries; however it seems that their numbers were limited. The interviews with former combatants showed that the conflict in Macedonia was not considered as a ‘motherland’ duty for the majority of them. They certainly sympathized with the Albanians in Macedonia over the causes of their fighting, but this did not seem to be a strong enough reason to cause large scale desertions from the KPC. On the other hand, no matter how comprehensive and responsive the reintegration strategy had been in Kosovo, it would not have been able to prevent all former KLA combatants from joining in these regional conflicts. There may be various reasons for this. Some may feel that their loyalty or obligation to other Albanians in the region is much stronger than any economic incentives that could be provided for them. Some may consider fighting as the only way of sorting out differences, and for some fighting may be the activity they feel best qualified to engage in. Furthermore, considering that the registration process of former KLA combatants was itself open to speculation, then it is very hard to state whether those who joined in the regional conflicts are really former KLA combatants or not. For the future of Kosovo, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) presented four essential elements to be borne in mind: the relationship of the province to the FRY (now Serbia); the relationship of Kosovar institutions of self-government to any continuing UN administrative presence and to the KFOR security presence; the nature of Kosovo’s borders and its relationship to neighbouring states; and the definition of Kosovo as an entity within the international community. Moreover, the Commission’s report (2000:259) presented five possible options for Kosovo’s future, one of which was full independence. It stated that after the province-wide elections an eventual demand for an independence referendum by elected Kosovar officials would be legitimate, and it should be ‘granted as expeditiously as is prudent’. In

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the context of deciding what precise form of independence, the Commission (2000:259) recommended ‘conditional independence’ as the best possible option for Kosovo. Furthermore, a conditional independence is considered as a necessity, because it is claimed Kosovo lacks ‘the means to defend itself against external attack’ and ‘the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and inter-ethnic-peace’ (2000:59). It was also the concept of ‘conditional independence’ that Agim Çeku considered as a suitable path for Kosovo, explaining that the international community could set conditions in terms of human rights, democracy and multi-ethnicity for the Kosovars.22 According to him these conditions would be seen as challenges to be overcome for Kosovars’ long-awaited independence, integration with Europe, establishing good relationships with its neighbours (including Serbia) and working in collaboration with the international defence forces in Kosovo. This is the vision of Kosovo given by the then Commander of KPC, which was pointed out by many other former KLA combatants during the interviews. It can be summarized that a vision of independence, conditional or not, was considered as the most important desire of former KLA combatants, and probably by a very large percentage of the population. As long as this vision is provided with clear conditions to be met, former KLA combatants expressed their willingness to cooperate with the international community and take the necessary steps to achieve independent statehood. In order to resolve the political deadlock over the future status of Kosovo, the process of UN-sponsored talks were initiated in November 2005, and the UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari proposed his plan to set Kosovo on a path to independence in February 2007. As expected, the Ahtisaari plan was widely welcomed by the Kosovar Albanians while it was rejected by the Serbs. Both the President of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu from the LDK, and Prime Minister Agim Çeku who is a former KLA commander, have worked closely with the US in pursuing their aspirations for full independence, while Serbia, supported by its traditional ally Russia, is intent on avoiding such an outcome. It was not surprising therefore, when Russia expressed its dissatisfaction in June 2007, with the amendments made on the Ahtisaari plan. Although Russia pulled its peacekeeping forces from Kosovo as early as 2003, receiving bitter complaints from the Serb minority in the province, it threatened to use its veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent full independence for Kosovo. The Kosovo independence efforts took another important step with Hashim Thaci’s win of the parliamentary elections on 17 November 2007, as he promised to declare formal independence after the UN’s deadline of 10 December 2007 for Kosovars and Serbs to reach a deal. Finally, Kosovo declared itself independent on 17 February 2008, which is already recognized by a number of countries such as France, Italy, Turkey, UK and US. As expected, Serbia has refused to recognize declaration and future membership of the EU is probably the

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strongest ‘carrot’ the international community can use to persuade change its mind, since the country nurtures strong aspirations to be part of the EU in the near future. Considering the views of former combatants interviewed on the reconstruction of Kosovo, which were also echoed in the interview with Agim Çeku, there is a strong perception that the international community has largely failed in the reconstruction process. Although, there is an overall appreciation of the presence of the international community particularly its military presence, their efforts towards reconstruction have not met the expectations of former combatants. This view can obviously be challenged, but it is clear that the way in which the role of KPC in the reconstruction process has been kept within very limited parameters also means that they, understandably, have come to the regard the reconstruction of Kosovo as being the responsibility of the international community. The opinion ‘if Kosovo has made any progress in its reconstruction process it has been due to the efforts of Kosovars but not the international community’ was quite common among former combatants, but the reconstruction of Kosovo is still seen as the responsibility of the international community. Adjusting the process by giving further responsibility to the KPC would require three prerequisites in order to expect any substantial and effective involvement from it: first, the provision of training to improve KPC’s human resources in the areas of construction and programme management; second, the provision of the necessary equipment and machinery to take an active and efficient role in the reconstruction; and finally, the improvement of coordination and trust between KPC and the international community. The interviews with KPC members have shown that there was a strong desire for active involvement in the reconstruction process. The pride and patriotism of former KLA combatants can easily be harnessed for building schools, roads, houses and hospitals. Far from constituting a security risk, they are a resource that can work towards the recovery of the ‘motherland’. Conclusions The knowledge acquired and discourses presented in this chapter have shown the international community’s strategy for the reintegration of former KLA combatants in Kosovo, to be innovative, flexible and ambitious in character, providing gainful employment and a livelihood framework for the majority of assisted former combatants. The Kosovo case study supports the view that there is an important linkage between the successful reintegration of former combatants, and the protection and strengthening of the security environment at both micro and macro levels during a war-to-peace transition. It was difficult to assess whether former KLA combatants had a direct and widespread involvement in the regional conflicts in Macedonia and Southern Serbia due to the speculative nature of information. Nevertheless, it can be argued that

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without the reintegration strategy in Kosovo there would have been a wider involvement of former KLA combatants in those regional conflicts. Meanwhile, it is due to the reintegration strategy that former combatants in Kosovo were given an effective alternative in the re-establishment of their lives in the post-conflict environment. Consequently, it is clear that this has played a significant role in the maintenance of security at the micro level. It should also be noted that the caseload in Kosovo in comparison to other DDR caseloads in different African and Central American countries posed far fewer challenges owing to its demographic, social and economic characteristics. For example, the caseload in Kosovo was mainly from one ethnic group which constituted the ‘victorious’ side. A majority of former combatants had only a short period of involvement with the KLA and had relatively high level of education with strong family ties. Nevertheless, within the socio-economic and political realities of Kosovo, the challenge of reintegration has been enormous. This was particularly the case with the provision of meaningful employment opportunities in an environment where the unemployment rate in general is as high as 70 per cent. Bearing in mind the realities of such an environment, the following issues can be identified as lessons learned from the Kosovo reintegration process. The Kosovo experience shows that targeting former combatants as a specific beneficiary group is important and necessary for security considerations. However, the biggest mistake to make in the design and implementation of reintegration strategies would be to consider former combatants purely from a security risk perspective and so adopt the approach of keeping them ‘busy’ as the over-arching aim. In other words, the process needs to consider its caseload more from a human resource development perspective. More importantly, it is necessary to ensure consistency in the provision of reintegration benefits in order to avoid some former combatants being left unassisted due to financial limitations, as this can itself pose the highest security risk to the peace process. An effective allocation of human resources to vocational, management and entrepreneurial areas, an overall assessment of the economic context, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of the labour market, should be carried out before completing the framework of the reintegration strategy. This would provide a better understanding of the reintegration challenge in general and identify possible opportunities to be utilized in due course. Therefore, in terms of the most suitable type of programmes for employment opportunities, vocational training courses should not be seen as a cheaper alternative to microenterprise development programmes. Vocational training is only truly effective if there are adequate employment opportunities in the local labour market for the graduates of such courses. More importantly, training programmes should consider the importance of improving affective and manual skills as part of

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their implementation programme for the provision of technical knowledge. From punctuality and self-reliance to the ability to make decisions, such skills should be considered as important as teaching the repair of broken pipes, the installation of electricity systems or the painting of a car. The reintegration strategy should also contain complementary measures for the supply side of the labour market. The provision of incentives to employers through on-the-jobtraining schemes is a good example of such a measure to be incorporated into the supportive policies for the demand side. Enterprise development programmes should acknowledge that those former combatants who embark on a new occupation are likely to be much more vulnerable to market forces since, by contrast with former combatants who were involved in the same occupation before joining the armed forces, they will not have an established client base. The provision of enterprise development schemes should bear in mind the possibility of over-saturation of the local market, therefore the type of projects supported should be decided according to the market thresholds for the need of that particular product or service. Micro-enterprise schemes are likely to have substantial knock-on impacts on the local economy through the provision of not only a regular income, but also employment opportunities to former combatants’ extended families. The KPC members’ pride in being a member of their organization should have been recognized as an important factor in the way the international community conducted its relationship with KPC. It is not possible to ignore the fact that only a couple of years ago they were ‘allies’ with the international community and fought together against the Serbian regime, so they clearly need time for the adaptation to their civilian identity. It should be borne in mind that although the KLA did not have a proper military structure and necessary resources, after their ‘transformation’ to the KPC they acquired a hierarchical organizational structure with a large pool of trained members of staff. In other words, KPC is much nearer to an army in character and resources than the KLA ever was before its demobilization. The further involvement of KPC members in the reconstruction process can be an excellent vehicle for building up strong relationships between them and the international community. In order to ensure the effective involvement of KPC in the reconstruction of Kosovo, the international community should meet the KPC’s training, machinery, equipment and finance needs. Through their effective involvement in the reconstruction process KPC members would then, not feel totally dependant on the international community, but would share in the rebuilding of their ‘motherland’

4 SIERRA LEONE HARD CASELOAD, DIRE CIRCUMSTANCES AND NATIONALLY COORDINATED REINTEGRATION

In 2002, Sierra Leone completed a four-year DDR programme for a caseload of over 72,000 former combatants. Under the coordination of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), the country went through one of its most critical peacebuilding processes, at the end of which, Dr Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary of the NCDDR, stated that he was ‘no longer aware of any illegal armed groups posing a threat to the state of Sierra Leone.’ (www.fosda.org). If true, the total eradication of armed groups in Sierra Leone heralded a new era for this small war-torn West African country. However, the streets of the capital, Freetown, which become ‘home’ for many former child soldiers in 2005, told a different story about the achievements of the DDR process. With a budget of $36.5 million, it was one of the main undertakings of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which demobilized over 24,000 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and 37,000 Civil Defence Forces (CDF) combatants. Nearly 7,000 of those demobilized were child soldiers (Malan, 2003). Starting with the establishment of the NCDDR in 1998, the DDR process in Sierra Leone was carried out in three phases in a variety of peace-to-war environments ranging from high intensity conflict and negotiations to international intervention and post-conflict reconstruction, which therefore, deserves special attention in order to understand the wide spectrum of political challenges involved and their impact on DDR processes. Phase I from June 1998 to June 1999 saw an environment of fierce fighting in Freetown and political instability in the country, leading to military intervention by the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), while in the Phase II from July 1999 to May 2000, the DDR process was re-initiated as a

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requirement of the Lóme Peace Agreement but interrupted by the increasing intensity of the conflict, resulting in another military intervention but this time by the British armed forces. After the signing of the Abuja II Ceasefire on 15 May 2001 a Joint Committee on DDR (GoSL/RUF/UNAMSIL) was established, thereby initiating Phase III of the DDR process which came to an end in January 2002. During the Phase II and III of the DDR process, 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed, which was a major achievement for the establishment of security and stability in the country, although it is widely believed that large caches of weapons were hidden away by the various armed groups (Ginifer, 2005). The Sierra Leone DDR process was also particularly significant as it was undertaken in parallel with another two significant peacebuilding measures, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Special Court. Both of these programmes were closely linked with the objectives of the DDR process, as the Lóme Peace Agreement had granted a blanket amnesty to the leaders and combatants of armed groups and their collaborators. Consequently, while the DDR process was trying to provide meaningful alternatives with the reintegration of former combatants into post-conflict society, the country was going through two very different approaches to dealing with its highly destructive and bloody armed conflict experience. At times, it was clear that the Special Court activities were completely counter-productive for the reconciliation objectives pursued by the TRC programme. For example, when the Special Court started to indict the leaders of armed groups, former combatants were expected to continue with the reintegration activities, and furthermore, they needed to consider the impact of the TRC in their social reintegration. In other words, having been torn apart by a 10 year long armed conflict, which killed an estimated 50,000 people and displaced over half of its population of about six million, the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone with DDR as one of its main components, was characterized by contradictory interventions undertaken in an ad-hoc way during a short span of time. Nevertheless, the President Ahmad Kabbah of Sierra Leone in his opening statement to the UN Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa which was held in Freetown on 21 June 2005, stated that ‘All post conflict programmes – be they political, social, or economic – depend on DDR and how people judge its success. Sierra Leone's DDR programme has been assessed as successful by all stakeholders and has provided the basis for the progress recorded in our post-conflict stabilization and development programme.’ The Sierra Leone Conflict: 1991–2002 For the political economy of the civil war in Sierra Leone, Zack-Williams (1999) identifies the personalized rule of the All Peoples’ Congress (APC) leadership

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and a number of structural problems such as deteriorating trade conditions and the irrationality of post-colonial development strategies as the main causal factors. In addition to these internal factors, the role of Charles Taylor, the then President of Liberia and his attempt to assert control over Sierra Leone’s diamond-rich areas also need to be considered when assessing the causes and impact of the conflict. However, it is also necessary to analyse these causes within the context of Sierra Leone’s colonial past. Therefore, it is important to start the investigation here, with the country’s designation as a British colony for freed slaves. Creoles, or freed slaves, started to settle in Freetown in 1787, 46 years prior to the ‘Abolition of the Slave Trade’ Act being passed by the British Parliament in 1833. They formed the ruling elite of the country, while the hinterland was dominated by two ethnic communities – the Mende in the southern part of the country and the Temne in the north. The chiefdom structure was the main unit of social solidarity for these two ethnic communities in which the chief was the ‘father of his people’, while it also turned into the lowest unit of administration during the colonial period. Hence, a local chief had to maintain a fine balance between these two roles which often contradicted each other. The Creoles’ influence over trade structures was weakened by the arrival of Lebanese in the 20th century, and according to Bøås (2001:707), ‘Sierra Leone was not a united nation that emerged to life when independence was granted in 1961…the foundation for the neopatrimonial state was definitely in place’. Nevertheless, at its independence Sierra Leone was regarded as the ‘Athens of West Africa’ with its high quality civil servants and outstanding university (Hirsch, 2001:13). It was argued that neopatrimonialism has remained as the main characteristic of governance in the country following its independence in 1961, evident from the patron-client relationship between the state and rural chiefdoms to the structure of political parties. The Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was founded to challenge the Creole domination, and under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai, played a critical role in the path to the independence, but its authoritarian rule which was based on chiefdoms and British officials came to an end in 1967 through the election victory of the All People’s Congress led by Siaka Stevens (Bøås, 2001). According to ZackWilliams (1999:144), ‘Stevens’ rule marked the beginnings of thuggery in the political process of the nation’ and the 1970s were marked by ‘the growing contradiction of peripheral capitalism and the politics of clientelism’. In 1968, the income from diamond mining was around $200 million, but it was only about $100,000 by the time Stevens left power, as the ‘political class and a parasitic Lebanese business clique’ were looting the country’s diamond revenues. His personal wealth was estimated at $500 million while he organized a lavish Organization of African Union summit in Freetown with a budget equal to the government’s annual spending (Adebajo, 2002:81). In order to

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sustain his regime, Stevens operated a network of patronage in the politics and economics of the country, which is best described as a ‘shadow state’. Meanwhile, the combination of the rising oil prices in the late 1970s, the worldwide decline in coffee and cocoa prices, and a reduction in iron ore and diamonds, hit the economy badly. Hence, the revenues in the 1980s could no longer meet government expenditure caused by the shadow state. ZackWilliams states that with the worsening economic conditions, ‘government ceased to have any meaning to the vast majority of rural and urban dwellers.’ (1999:145) Furthermore, during his 17 year rule Stevens’ authoritarian rule, the role of civil society in political life diminished, although the press managed to remain vibrant and highly critical of government (Adebajo, 2002). When Joseph Momoh became the new President of the country in January 1986, he promised a ‘New Order’ regime which came with the IMF’s structural adjustment programme to sort out the failing economy. However, as pointed out by Bøås the neopatrimonial demands of the state for keeping a pool of jobs to reward its loyal clientele could not be satisfied with the economic conditionalities of international creditors. Subsequently, the neopatrimonial state went further into crisis as ‘Momoh was unable to resolve the contradictions between an official aid-supported state ad the shadow state built on the clandestine diamond trade.’ (2001:709) It was against this background that the insurgency by the RUF began, as it attracted many young unemployed men who had been let down by the neopatrimonial economic system and penalized further by the rigours of the structural adjustment programmes. According to Riley and Sesay (1995:125), ‘[s]imple theft by rebels, disaffected or unpaid soldiers and others has become a way of surviving adjustment.’ When the RUF under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, started its insurgency in Kailahun District in March 1991; apart from Charles Taylor of Liberia, they had two important resources for their fighting. First, the lumpen youth who were disillusioned by the neopatrimonial state and influenced by the Libya’s Green Boook ideology; and secondly, the rich diamond fields of eastern Sierra Leone (Abdullah, 1998). The term lumpen was used to describe the troubled educational and social background of the youth in the RUF movement, most of whom also had drug addiction problem. The RUF also abducted and drugged children to ‘produce vicious behaviour’ as well as recruiting marginalized rural youth who were ‘contemptuous of traditional authority’. Child soldiers were also recruited from ‘street children’ who either lived permanently outside without any family, or maintained some contact with their families but spent the majority of their daytime in the streets, which was to a large extent a poverty related phenomenon (Zack-Williams, 1999a). Aggressive ‘Rambo’ type films were shown to young captives in order to inspire them to become fierce fighters (Richards, 1996). It is also noted that ‘armed banditry in a diamond-rich and inaccessible forest landscape makes for a perfectly viable economic way of life’ (Richards, 1995:152).

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The interviews with former RUF and AFRC combatants in Sierra Leone in August 2005 confirmed the above mentioned reasons for them having become combatants and the way in which they were trained and forced to take part in atrocities.1 Moreover, as pointed out by Bangura (2002:145) the ‘fuzzy panAfrican radicalism’ with its rhetoric of ‘equality, liberation, and anti-corruption’ was also used extensively by its leadership. Eldred Collins who joined the RUF in 1990 and became Head of its Political Section, asserted that ‘the RUF was a revolutionary organization fighting for socio-economic, political and cultural changes in the system. No amount of pain, talking or negotiations would have brought the changes under the APC rule. The people in Sierra Leone were crying for change. The only way to change it was through war.’ (pers. comm., 2005).2 The following excerpts are from the RUF’s national anthem (Bergner, 2003:41), which presents clearly the RUF’s revolutionary rhetoric: Go and tell the President, Sierra Leone is my home Go and tell my parents, they may see me no more When fighting in the battlefield I’m fighting for ever Every Sierra Leonean is fighting for his land Sierra Leone is ready to utilize her own All our minerals will be accounted for The people will enjoy in their land RUF is the saviour we need right now The RUF also benefited from Taylor’s loan of hard-core National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fighters, as the RUF’s insurgency was to some extent, Taylor’s revenge against the APC government’s decision to support the ECOWAS Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia. On the other hand, according to Bangura (2002), the insurgency with the support of Taylor would have happened anyway, as members of RUF and NPFL knew each other from their training days in the military camps of Libya and, with the support of Muammer Qaddafi, they wanted to overthrow their respective governments. In the first year of the armed conflict only, over 10,000 people were killed, half a million people became either refugees or IDPs, and around 400,000 people were trapped in areas controlled by the RUF (ZackWilliams, 1999). In April 1992, Momah was removed from power by Captain Valentine Strasser, who then formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), with the stated aim of fighting against corruption. Strasser struck a new deal with international creditors and began a new stabilization programme which resulted in unemployment for over 30,000 workers. Meanwhile, the RUF started to threaten interior districts and in 1995 the government asked the South

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African security firm Executive Outcomes (EO) to intervene at a cost of $1.7 million a month. The EO intervention was not the first corporate security involvement in Sierra Leone, as it followed the failure and departure of the Gurkha Security Group which suffered heavy losses, including the killing of its American commander, Robert Mackenzie in early 1995 (Hirsch, 2001). According to David Francis, the deal with EO had two aspects: cash arrangements and diamond mining concessions. He notes that the security provided by EO was bound to be short-lived, while the assistance of ECOMOG and the Kamajoras in their success against the RUF was probably understated. It is pointed out that the price for security paid in Sierra Leone was far too high and it was ‘a new form of neo-colonialism which weak states like Sierra Leone have to contend with in the post-cold war era.’ (1999:335). Hence, the government could not afford its services very long, and after EO’s departure the Kamajors and the Mende traditional hunters emerged as a new fighting force, called the Civil Defence Force (CDF), against RUF (ZackWilliams, 1999). It was also during this period that the close relationship between SLA soldiers and RUF rebels in the instigation of violence and looting began to come to the surface, which led to the emergence of the term ‘sobels’ (soldier-rebels) (Richards, 1996). Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the leader of SLPP won the 1996 elections and signed the first peace agreement in Abidjan in November that year. However, the coup by Paul Koroma in May 1997 ousted President Kabbah and, using the tensions between Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and CDF, Koroma with the Kamajors and the RUF formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The ECOMOG’s intervention brought the junta to an end in February 1998 and Kabbah returned to office. However, the ECOMOG forces remained only in the capital and the war in the hinterland was worse than ever with massive destruction, loss of life and widespread rape and amputations, and in January 1999 the AFRC/RUF managed to control substantial parts of Freetown for a week (Bøås, 2001). In this particular attack alone, more than 6,000 civilians were killed while thousands of young men and women were abducted in the capital. Many residents of the city experienced maiming and physical abuse whilst their houses and entire possessions were pillaged and burned (Bangura, 2002). Throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG played a critical role in the establishment of peace in the country. However, formed by mainly Nigerian and small contingencies of Ghanaian and Guinean troops, the ECOMOG was persistently affected by the shortage of weapons, machinery and equipment. Fighting against a guerrilla group in inaccessible forested countryside was a major challenge in itself, but coupled with shortages of not only helicopters but also trucks, medical supplies, communication equipment and even uniforms, the ECOMOG forces always faced an uphill struggle in

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their day-to-day operations. The deployment of 50 unarmed military observers by the UN also created major resentment among ECOMOG troops, as the UN observers were much better paid and resourced. The lack of military coordination, especially Anglophone and Francophone contingencies and the domination of its command structure by Nigerian officers were other factors which served to undermine the ECOMOG’s peacekeeping operations (Adebajo, 2002). Furthermore, Kabbah’s position worsened further with the reduction of ECOMOG forces, as Nigeria started to pull back its troops after the election of Olusegun Obasanjo, as Nigeria’s first civilian president since 1983. Following international pressure from the US, UK and the UN for a non-coercive strategy President Kabbah agreed to sign a cease-fire agreement with Foday Sankoh in Lóme on 18 May which led to the signing of the Lóme Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Following the return of Sankoh and Koroma to Freetown, the UN Security Council Resolution 1270 established the UNAMSIL, authorizing a peacekeeping force of up to 6,000 troops under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in February 2000, troop numbers were increased to 11,000. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to bring security and stability to the country, and fighting resumed in May 2000 with the capturing of 500 UN peacekeepers by the RUF. In order to stop the crumbling of the peace process any further, the UK sent a military team of 800 paratroopers to support the government. The British armed operation named ‘Operation Palliser’ formally ended on 15 June although a number of military advisers remained with UNAMSIL and the SLA. On 5 July 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1306, imposing an embargo on the sale of rough Sierra Leone diamonds, which was further strengthened by measures undertaken by the diamond industry to clamp down on the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’(Bernath and Nyce, 2002). These critical developments ultimately led to the arrest of Sankoh and the re-election of Kabbah as president in May 2002 which marked the complete cessationof the civil war in Sierra Leone. Kandeh (2003:213) rightly questions how Sierra Leone managed to hold free and fair elections less than a year after the end of the conflict when this had not been possible in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. He identifies four main reasons which are important to bear in mind in gaining a better understanding of the post-conflict environment. First, ‘the RUF insurrection was not based on ethnic mobilization’; second, ‘the disarming of RUF combatants ensured that the lion…could not howl its competitors into beating a hasty retreat into exile’; and third, ‘the United Nations deployed its largest peacekeeping force in what became a test case for the UN in conflict resolution’; and finally, ‘internal pressures for democratization in Sierra Leone were far more intense, cohesive and irrepressible than in many of the other failed states of Africa.’

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The agreement signed between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002 established the Special Court in Freetown with a mandate which was originally given by the UNSCR 1315 on 14 August 2000, to try those ‘deemed to bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leone law committed after November 1996’. On 13 May in the same year, the government appointed four Sierra Leoneans and three non Sierra Leoneans as commissioners for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a one-year operational period. After collecting 7,100 statements from victims, perpetrators and witnesses of war crimes and atrocities, on 14 April 2003, the TRC began its public hearings, including statements from President Kabbah. The Special Court indicted nine senior commanders from different factions and called for the arrest of Liberian President Charles Taylor. The RUF leader Foday Sankoh died of pneumonia in July 2003 without being tried by the Special Court but the trials of other indicted commanders started in March 2004. The last UN peacekeeping troops left the country in December 2005, bringing the UNAMSIL mandate to an end, and in April 2006 Charles Taylor was charged with war crimes in Freetown, but due to regional security concerns, he was transferred to The Hague in June, where the Special Court will use the International Criminal Court facilities during his trial. The trial began in summer 2007. The DDR Strategy Implemented in Sierra Leone The initial work on the DDR process in Sierra Leone was begun at a UN conference in New York in July 1998, which aimed to raise funds for ECOMOG operations, DDR, and other emergency and reconstruction programmes. This took place against a political background in which the ECOMOG forces were capturing a number of eastern districts from the RUF, and President Kabbah had appointed the ECOMOG Commander Maxwell Khobe as the country’s Chief of Defense Staff, placing the CDF under the control of ECOMOG. The NCDDR, with the funding from the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) which was managed by the World Bank, aimed for the DDR of over 75,000 combatants from the SLA, AFRC, CDF and RUF. However, soon after the DDR process started, the conflict situation worsened with the AFRC and RUF attacked Freetown, as a result, the first phase of DDR managed to disarm and demobilize only 3,000 combatants most of whom were SLA soldiers. Initially, the disarmed combatants in Phase I were kept in a camp at Lungi, but following the deterioration of security, they were moved to the prison in Freetown. This maltreatment meant that when Freetown fell on 6 January 1999, many of them rejoined the RUF (DPKO, 2003). The arrest and sentencing to death of Fadoy Sankoh for his crimes of treason exacerbated the situation further, and it was not before the Lóme Peace Agreement of July 1999 that the DDR process had any hope of continuing.

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Article 16 of the Lóme Agreement focuses on the DDR of combatants, stipulates: the process commence six weeks after the signing of the agreement; that the SLA be restricted to their barracks and their arms stored under the surveillance of third party peacekeeping forces; and while ECOMOG would provide security guarantees to all combatants, the international community was requested to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance for DDR. Consequently, a Joint Operation Plan, involving the government, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and other partners, launched the second phase of DDR in October 1999. Aiming to disarm and demobilize up to 45,000 combatants by 15 December of the same year. The second phase also failed to achieve its objectives, with a little over 18,000 combatants only, most of whom were CDF members, going through the process. One of the main financial and technical supporters of this phase was the British Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) as the UK pledged $7.1 million for training and equipping a national army. However, DFID felt obliged to withdraw its support because of the worsening security situation in May 2000, criticizing the inadequate capacities of UNAMSIL for the tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and assisting the government in peacebuilding (Bernath and Nyce, 2002). The period from May to November 2000, which is referred as the Interim Phase, managed to process a further 2,600 combatants, but the main and final phase of the DDR process was initiated by ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in May 2001, and disarmed and demobilized over 47,000 combatants until January 2002, bringing the total number of combatants completing DDR since 1998 to over 72,000. A total of 69,463 ex-combatants were eligible to receive reintegration support, and 56,127 had registered with NCDDR (Comninos, et al. 2002). The 2002 Survey on Reinsertion and Reintegration Assistance to Excombatants by the NCDDR shows that over 90 per cent of the caseload was between 18 and 49 years old, while up to 12 per cent were female. Of the 5529 former combatants interviewed, almost six per cent belonged to the AFRC/SLA, 58 per cent to the CDF and 36 per cent to the RUF. About 36 per cent of the former combatants had never attended school, and about 55 per cent had received primary and secondary school education, while only one per cent of the entire caseload had received higher education; 33 per cent of the respondents were farmers, but 52 per cent of all former combatants did not state their occupation before the war, indicating that they were either students or unemployed (NCDDR, 2002a). The following tables show the number of combatants demobilized according to their armed groups and phases, as well as weapons and ammunition collected and destroyed in different phases of the DDR process.

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Phase I

Phase II

Interim

Phase III

Total

RUF

187

4,130

768

19,267

24,352

CDF

2

8,800

524

28,051

37,377

2,994

2,366

593

5,953

AFRC

2,129

445

2,574

Others

1,473

298

463

18,898

2,628

47,781

Ex-SLA

3,183

Total

2,234

72,490

Total Number of Combatants Demobilized Table 4.1: Disarmed and demobilized combatants (NCDDR, 2002)

Weapons Ammunition

Phase II and Interim

Phase III

Total

16,329

26,001

42,330

300,455

935,495

1,235,950

Table 4.2: Weapons and ammunition collected and destroyed (Morse and Knight, 2002)

In terms of its institutional framework and the specific activities undertaken in each phase of the DDR process, Morse and Knight (2002:3) highlight the strong institutional support provided by national and international actors. They argue that the Sierra Leone DDR process received ‘political will’ from all actors and the establishment of the NCDDR is a good example of this as ‘an independent institution equipped with the necessary authority and legitimacy to act on policy’ meant that the NCDDR was well placed to organize and manage the process. The Executive Secretariat of NCDDR was responsible for overall programme planning, coordination and implementation. With a main office in Freetown and five regional reintegration offices the Secretariat

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actually managed the entire DDR process. It also carried out the coordination with the National Commission for Social Action (NACSA) which was responsible for reintegration assistance programmes (DPKO, 2003). Furthermore, the MDTF as a single body to pool funding was considered to be ‘enormously beneficial’ to the process, in addition the UK’s financial and technical support which played a vital role in the DDR process. More importantly, according to Morse and Knight (2002) the involvement of the international community as a neutral third party was particularly necessary as the DDR process in Sierra Leone was taking place in a no-clear-winner type of war-to-peace transition scenario. The implementation of disarmament and demobilization was carried out by focussing on a pair of districts at a time and working in them simultaneously within a one-month timeframe. Having officially declared the end of disarmament and demobilization in two districts, the process moved to two new districts. According to Thusi and Meek (2003), this approach was to deal with the concentration of combatants in certain districts and deal with the mistrust and tensions between RUF and CDF. The reception centres around the country were used for the registration and collection of weapons and conducted disarmament in five phases, namely: assembly, registration, weapons collection, eligibility certification and transportation. Apart from the formal disarmament phase, in order to capitalize the positive political environment created by the peace process, a UNDP led Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program (CACD) was carried out in mid 2002, collecting 9,000 weapons (UNAMSIL, 2003). During the demobilization phase the primary objective was the further preparation of former combatants to enter civilian life. This incorporated a number of different activities such as counselling, information about civilian life, sensitization seminars and civic education. However, such activities were undertaken only in Phase II and III, as initially the demobilization in Phase I entailed basic camps for surrendered AFRC members. The cantonment in Phase II was for RUF members and took place in rehabilitation camps that could house large numbers of former combatants for up to 90 days. Although the CDF members were not placed in cantonment, the camps in the RUF held areas became dysfunctional, and with the resumption of the conflict there was extra pressure on the functioning camps to hold combatants for much longer periods than initially planned. Such conditions resulted in riots and demonstrations, and in some camps the NCDDR staff members were beaten by combatants (Ginifer, 2003). However, by Phase III the process of cantonment became voluntary following the Abuja Peace Agreement when there was improved security in the whole country and those former combatants who wish to go back their homes immediately could do so. Consequently, the main demobilization activity

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involved the registration of combatants and issuing them with an ID card, making the process highly efficient and putting all former combatants – RUF and CDF – on an equal footing. However, the negative side of such a fast-track demobilization was that it prevented the process from conducting medical and education screening, and other counselling and sensitization activities (Moser and Knight, 2002). As part of the demobilization phase, former combatants were also provided with reinsertion packages aimed at assisting them during the first three months of their reintegration (Thusi and Meek, 2003). This assistance, entitled ‘Transitional Safety Allowance’ in Phase I and II, and ‘Reinsertion Benefit’ in Phase III, comprised a lump sum of $150 as well as $15 for transportation expenses. The provision of such cash assistance had been regarded as a possible incentive to buy new weapons, but according to UNAMSIL (2003), it actually played a critical role in accelerating the process, with 47,000 combatants disarming, compared to an estimate of only 29,000. Thusi and Meek (2003:33) consider the disarmament and demobilization in Sierra Leone to be a ‘phenomenal achievement’ that ‘created conditions conducive to peace and stability’ in the country. Without this ‘successful’ DDR process, the 2002 elections, which were considered to be free and fair, could not have gone ahead. The main achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phases, include: the way in which they were targeted and able to delegate responsibilities to specialized agencies, such as the role of UNICEF with child soldiers; the witnessing of arms destruction by communities, which increased people’s trust in the peace process; the broadening of the objectives of disarmament through supplementary programmes such as CADC; and the reduction of the cantonment period from 21 to seven days which considerably speeded up the demobilization phase. Although the disarmament and demobilization phases managed to achieve successful results, the challenge of reintegration was the litmus test of the entire process. The main reasons why the reintegration process proved to be particularly challenging were related to the duration and characteristics of the armed conflict, and the socio-economic realities of the post-conflict environment. The conflict in Sierra Leone was particularly gruesome, involving such tactics as forcing child soldiers to commit atrocities against their communities ensure they would have no opportunity of returning home; the mass pillaging and raping of civilian communities; even amputation of hands in order to scare people off participating in the elections. Consequently, the social reintegration of combatants, especially for child soldiers proved to be an especially challenging hurdle. Secondly, by the end of the conflict Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 175th out of 175 listed countries in the 2003 Human Development Index. In a socio-economic environment in which adult literacy rate was 36 per cent (18 per cent for females), life expectancy was 34.5 years and GDP per capita was $470 (75 per cent of the

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population were living in absolute poverty on less than $2 per day) the reintegration phase needed to promise meaningful employment and livelihoods for up to 70,000 men and women (UNDP, 2003). In the face of such difficult conditions, a key achievement for the reintegration process was its success in ensuring the participation of both governmental and non-governmental organizations; as well as the NCDDR the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) played a significant role in this phase. The main objective of the reintegration phase was ‘to help excombatants become productive members of their communities; to provide them with marketable skills and access to micro enterprise schemes; and to support social acceptance through information dissemination measures, social reconciliation, and sensitization processes.’ (Ginifer, 2003:3) Although the NCDDR approach targeted former combatants as individuals, the GTZ expanded its reintegration activities in order to include the receiving communities too. In addition to a wide range of peacebuilding programmes from education to economic empowerment, GTZ with its 650 staff, conducted three-month training programmes in micro-project management. Nevertheless, as expected the social reintegration was the most problematic part of the process, given that most former combatants ‘had to overcome the resentment of communities recalling crimes committed during the war’ and ‘the provision of targeted assistance to ex-combatants has often been perceived as rewarding the perpetrators of the violence, and not as an investment in peace and security.’ (Ginifer, 2003:4) As part of the Reintegration Opportunities Program (ROP), former combatants were provided with a number of training options such as educational, vocational and agricultural courses or they could opt for entrepreneurial support, with subsistence allowances for a maximum of six months and the provision of vocational tool kits in most cases. Approximately 56,000 former combatants took an option with the ROP; 6,000 of these were child soldiers who were incorporated in UNICEF’s reunification and educational programmes and 2,500 former combatants were absorbed into the new armed forces. The remaining 11,000 combatants who registered but did not opt for any of the ROP programmes were assumed to prefer selfreintegration in order to avoid the stigma related to being a former combatant. Some of them may have wanted to avoid the state having a record of their whereabouts (UNAMSIL, 2003). When a delay of about 11 months, between the provision of Reinsertion Benefit and reintegration assistance, started to cause disgruntlement among former combatants, the NCDDR, UNDP and UNAMSIL devised a supplementary reintegration programme called ‘Stopgap’ which provided employment opportunities in employment intensive community infrastructure projects.3 As of June 2003, at a cost of $844,000 there were 69 Stopgap projects

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approved, and according to UNAMSIL (2003:6) these had a major social impact since they resulted in former combatants working side by side with community members, rehabilitating community infrastructure and agricultural land, often that which they had destroyed or pillaged themselves…They dined and played football together. Each project has a story to tell. Each community has benefited from the rehabilitated infrastructure…and also benefited from a rekindling of community camaraderie and a softening of mindsets opening possibilities for healing and reconciliation. There were also a number of other employment initiatives such as the road maintenance course provided by the Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) and the fishing programme provided by the Social Awareness Movement (SAM) at Goderich. After the SLRA course, former combatants formed small construction companies which were given road reconditioning contracts by SLRA, and they employed the youth from their respective communities. At Goderich, having engaged in a three year programme of boat building and fishing, the combatants formed their own fishing association and they have ‘excelled’ in their new occupation (World Bank, 2000). Implementation Challenges Large Caseload for Reintegration and Security Challenges The initial estimates for the number of combatants to register in Phase III was around 28,000, but more than 47,000 of them went through the disarmament and demobilization phases, subsequently, it was clear that the NCDDR and the international community were facing a major challenge. The lack of reliable data on numbers of combatants was once again proved to be critical for good planning. This challenge was also noted by Eric Jumu, the regional coordinator of the NCDDR, who pointed out that ‘when the process started nobody was certain about the number of combatants, and it was also difficult to guess what they would like to do after demobilization’ (pers. comm., 2005).4 It was clear that in the Sierra Leone context, this was an almost impossible task as the DDR programme initially started when more than two thirds of the country was under the RUF’s control. The security situation was still highly challenging even after the Abuja Peace Agreement in 2001 consequently it was difficult to establish effective data collection mechanism that would avoid such critical challenges to the programme later on. Once all areas became accessible to the NCDDR in mid 2001 the reintegration phase started to accelerate. The provision of security and ensuring that the NCDDR had access to all parts of the country were critical issues for Phase II. At the Lóme Peace Agreement the ECOMOG forces were given responsibility to guarantee

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security for all demobilized combatants while the UNAMSIL peacekeeping forces were to monitor the disarmament activities. However, as the ECOMOG had been part of the fighting in one way or another during the 10 years of armed conflict, the RUF combatants demonstrated a marked lack of trust in ECOMOG’s ability to act as a neutral third party. Hence, according to Jumu, indicated that they would be unwilling to disarm to them (pers. comm., 2005). When ECOMOG forces left Sierra Leone in 1999, the task for the UNAMSIL forces doubled as the provision of security and stability became their responsibility too. According to DPKO (2003), this was one of the reasons why the reception centres in Magburaka and Makeni in the north of the country became vulnerable to attack as the UNAMSIL had to spread its resources thinly all over the country. Francis Kai-Kai noted that the inadequate security provision at the disarmament centres had resulted in ‘unarmed UNAMSIL Military Observers registering ex-combatants without weapons.’ Furthermore, the UN Military observers showed a great deal of variation concerning which weapons and ammunitions are deemed acceptable for the registration which ‘resulted in staggering variations of individual perception of what to accept or reject as weapon or ammunition.’ The lack of a proper screening mechanism to avoid fake combatants and the use of different criteria for adult and child combatants, and the way this was exploited by armed groups, as accurate age verification was almost impossible, played a significant role in ending up with a larger-thanexpected caseload (2000:11). It was also noted that the poor security in disarmament sites made them unattractive to combatants, and this problem was tackled over time by the deployment of UN military presence, however, it is clear that this was a high risk factor that could have destabilized the entire DDR process. Nevertheless, Joe Edkins who was the Chief of the Intelligence Unit at UNAMSIL argued that the mission’s force enforcement, observer and DDR civilian elements worked extremely well, proving that it was one of the most integrated UN missions (pers. comm., 2005).5 He accepted that in the early days all of the 14 reception centres all over the country worked in a haphazard way as they were not sure what exactly they would get from combatants. However, the main advantage of UNMASIL was that it was on the ground for a long time and had a good idea about who they were dealing with. It was also important that the UNAMSIL operated with a peace enforcement mandate and was prepared to use force and used it when necessary. Edkins argued that the reason armed groups complied with the DDR requirements was partly because of this peace enforcement mandate. Uju Elasinbo from the UNAMSIL’s DDR section noted that the armed groups also needed time to see that the post-Abuja peace agreement period was genuine; hence they started to lend their trust to the process and cooperate in the DDR activities more willingly (pers. comm., 2005).6

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Compartmentalization of the DDR Process DDR activities ‘cannot be viewed in isolation but rather as continuous and complimentary processes. These processes should be concurrently implemented within a sound political and security framework, followed by attempts to provide basic social safety nets and humanitarian assistance.’ (KaiKai, 2000:2). This was the way the NCDDR described how they planned to carry out the DDR process in Sierra Leone. However, the way the DDR process was planned and implemented meant that there was a certain level of compartmentalization between its three phases. Although the NCDDR had the overall coordination role in the entire process, due to the different types of actors involved in each phase, a separation of activities, particular from those in disarmament and demobilization to the ones in reintegration was clearly evident. In other words, the process was not sufficiently joined up to enable a smooth transition of institutional experience from the disarmament and demobilization phases to reintegration. The disarmament and demobilization components were conducted from a military point of view with a military lead and as a military task, but the reintegration activities were then handed over to civilian actors. As a plan it was fairly straightforward, but during implementation, it turned out to be much more complex than was originally envisaged. According to Edkins, the main reason for this was the lack of a proper infrastructure for adequate information collection and storing in each phase of the process, but particularly in the disarmament and demobilization phases. Hence, groups of former combatants disappeared, some gave up training and overall, once former combatants were dispersed, it was hard to keep track of their whereabouts. The problem was further exacerbated with the involvement of a high number of local agencies as implementing partners in the reintegration phase (pers. comm., 2005). On the other hand, Eric Jumu identified the good working relationship between different stakeholders as one of the main strengths of the DDR process, as this was ‘due to political will of the government and international community.’ However, pointing out the need to consider DDR as a confidence building process, Jumu asserted that it was necessary to involve both military and civilian actors and the process had to be carried out step-by-step. For example, after the arrest of Foday Sankoh the disarmament and demobilization of combatants became a highly sensitive issue, and it would not have continued without the direct involvement of the third party military actor in the process (pers. comm., 2005). According to Bengt Lyunggren from UNDP, apart from the challenge of compartmentalization, the other main shortcoming was the way the reintegration phase did not intend to build institutions (pers. comm., 2005).7 The involvement of military actors in disarmament and demobilization, and

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mainly civilian actors in the reintegration phase was one of the main reasons behind this shortcoming, as the institutional building could have only been achieved with the benefit of a long-term perspective. More importantly, it was argued by Lawrence Sesay, Director of The Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE) that the reintegration was considered as a ‘project’ rather than as a ‘process’, and hence those former combatants who opted for educational assistance as part of the reintegration phase had to leave the school once the programme was over, as there were no provisions made to avoid such a problem (pers. comm., 2005).8 Apart from the compartmentalization of its three phases, the main criticism of Jonathan Sunday from the Office for National Security was the way the DDR was conducted in isolation from an overall SSR. He argued that the DDR process should have been carried out in relation to the re-structuring of the army and police force. It was only in the later stages of the reintegration phase that the international community realized this particular shortcoming, and he complained that not even having a database of former combatants posed a particular security risk for the country. Approaching the problem from a poverty perspective, he was concerned that those former combatants who found themselves in poverty after their reintegration assistance, continued to pose a risk. However, further assistance to former combatants should be carried out with care as it was likely to create more resentment among the military personnel. As the police force had received better assistance during their restructuring, there was already a considerable level of dissatisfaction towards the post-conflict reconstruction process and these problems were to a large extent due to the absence of a proper SSR strategy (pers. comm., 2005).9

Eligibility Criteria and Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups The eligibility criteria in Sierra Leone was as follows: ‘Every combatant must demonstrate that he/she is a combatant member of one of the fighting forces at the time of the signing of the Lóme Peace Agreement and should present an acceptable proof of participation in the armed conflict. In addition, he/she should provide a serviceable weapon during disarmament…Combatants under 18 years of age and associated with any of the established groups, presenting themselves at the disarmament centres are also accepted with or without weapons.’ (Kai-Kai, 2000:8–9) With these eligibility criteria 6,845 child soldiers, consisting of both boys and girls, were registered with the DDR programme. However, it was also noted that there were many children and women who were involved in the armed conflict as messengers, sex slaves and ‘wives’ of combatants. It was reported that most of these vulnerable groups were excluded from the reintegration benefits since they could not register as a combatant because the criteria set for registration could not be met by most of those vulnerable group members. Some of them were also disqualified by their

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commanders, and there was no way that they were actually part of the rebel groups. In some cases according to Elasinbo, due to limited communications in the country combatants did not know about the DDR process at all so they failed to register (pers. comm., 2005). The ‘one person, one gun’ type of eligibility criteria proved to be problematic for some adult combatants too. As it was seen as too exclusive by RUF commanders, there were concessions for crew weapons, radio operators and auxiliary groups. Although, such concessions helped speed up the process of disarmament, it meant more discretionary powers for rebel commanders as they were the ones to decide whom to include in each group. Another unexpected outcome of these concessions was the fact that there was no longer a need to match the number of weapons with combatants registered, hence it was noted by DPKO (2003) that this was one of the factors for the bigger than expected caseload at the disarmament phase. The presence of UNICEF in Sierra Leone was critical for child soldiers, ensuring that at least they had a specialized UN agency dealing with their reintegration. However, it was also reported that the personnel involved in the DDR process were not fully trained to deal with the specific needs and problems of these vulnerable groups. As the war Sierra Leone had involved an exposure to high levels of brutality by children, or being forced to commit atrocities, the psycho-social reintegration needs of child soldiers needed to be considered much more carefully. Faulkner (2001:499) presents the child soldiers challenge succinctly: The net result of dehumanising the children of Sierra Leone, as in similarly affected countries, is the production of a horde of insensate killers outlawed by their families, afraid of rehabilitation for fear of reprisals, and who are effectively forced to stay in the company of armed gangs—a surrogate ‘family’. The future for young people trapped in this way is bleak; with no access to education or the normalising influences of a stable, secure family setting, they are at the mercy of forces over which they exercise no control, and from which there appears to be no escape, certainly while the country seems incapable of finding a way towards durable conflict resolution. In other words, the approach to the needs of child soldiers should not have been from a purely educational perspective either. As many child soldiers had no chance of going back to their families and communities, it was essential for them to gain meaningful employment at the end of their reintegration. The interviews with child soldiers presented a grim picture of their lives in the streets of Freetown. Most of them had no connection with their families as they had been rejected after their return to communities. Some of them could

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not return to their communities at all, and after their vocational training course, they sold their toolkits and at the time the interviews were conducted in August 2005 their main concern was to find enough money to buy food and drugs (pers. comm., 2005). The female combatants, camp followers and ‘bush wives’ formed a particularly vulnerable group. Due to the stigma attached to being a former combatant, most of them did not come forward to register themselves. On the other hand, Zoe Dugal from the UNDP Sierra Leone argued that it was strict registration criteria which had led to the exclusion of most female combatants not the social stigma, because with so many difficulties in their lives she noted that social stigma would not have been a priority (pers. comm., 2005).10 Most ‘bush wives’ stayed with their husbands as they could not go back to their communities. The lack of a gender officer in the institutional structure presented itself in the overall reintegration strategy which did not incorporate the specific interests and needs of female combatants. In other words, in the way they were planned and implemented the reintegration projects were male needs/interests oriented. As Lawrence Sesay observed, so many registered female combatants were left out as there were no specific projects for them (pers. comm., 2005). It was noted by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004:37) that large numbers of female combatants ‘were often in a position of needing to disarm and demobilize with the unit with which they had been abducted. Further, the shortage of psychological services in the post-war period has undoubtedly had an impact on the post-conflict experience of these women.’

Difficulties with Cantonment and Controversial Reinsertion Assistance The issue of cantonment was one of the most problematic aspects of the DDR process in Sierra Leone. The way it was used changed with the evolving peace process. For example, in Phase I it was more like the provision of encampment for the surrendered AFRC combatants, while in Phase II the objective was to have medium-term rehabilitation camps for large numbers of RUF combatants. As a number of demobilization centres were overrun by combatants during the fighting between Phase II and III, those centres that remained had to deal with much larger caseloads than they were originally designed for, leading to disgruntlement among combatants, and in some cases, riots. It was noted that the scarcity of suitable camps was an issue particularly in the east and northeast which caused delays in the planned timetables for DDR (Malan, et al., 2003). According to Sullay Sesay who was the NCDDR Field Officer in the Eastern Office, former combatants in Phase II were kept in the cantonment areas too long, on the suspicion that they would return to fighting. Overall, logistics such as the provision of water and other facilities; lack of funding in general; and the transfer of former combatants to their communities proved to be the most challenging aspects of cantonment (pers. comm., 2005).11

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The cantonment element during Phase III on the other hand, was much shorter. Apart from the registration and issuing ID cards, this rapid ‘rolling’ disarmament allowed combatants to return to their homes if they wished to do so. Those who wanted to stay until they had made a decision on their return had the option of staying in a cantonment area. This meant that both CDF and RUF combatants were treated on an equal basis, where previously cantonment had been only for the latter group. However, rapid demobilization meant that a number of activities that are normally carried out in a cantonment area, such as health screening, civic education or post-conflict sensitization could not be undertaken. An almost a spontaneous return such as this also put extra pressures on the absorption capacities of receiving communities. In the absence of a more orderly return, the initial days of going back home were much more challenging for the war-affected communities of Sierra Leone. Elasinbo also noted that such a rapid demobilization phase did not allow many former combatants to think through what they wanted to do with their reintegration assistance and where to return (pers. comm., 2005). Owing to this new approach to cantonment and demobilization, the reinsertion assistance given to former combatants in Phase III was also much less problematic for the donor community. In Phase II by comparison it has been perceived as a cash-for-weapons type of assistance, which led to uneasiness among donors and the population in general. According to DPKO (2003) the main benefits of the reinsertion assistance were to facilitate the return process by providing former combatants with a transport allowance; to help with meeting the basic household needs of former combatants upon return to their communities; and to provide the NCDDR with lead-time so that it could identify and prepare local agencies that could work in the delivery of reintegration programme assistance. According to the evaluation carried out by Humphreys and Weinstein (2004), the reinsertion assistance was spent mostly on family needs and living expenses, which on average was Le 71,000 and 144,000, respectively.12 Former combatants also saved around Le 40,000 for future needs. On the other hand, it was also noted that the difficulties of social reintegration owing to the legacy of the conflict on societal relationships was exacerbated because of the reinsertion assistance, as this was seen as a direct reward to those who had committed horrific atrocities against members of their own communities. To overcome this problem the NACSA also provided community development programmes, while vocational training courses were made available to dependants of former combatants, abductees, child mothers and other vulnerable groups (DPKO, 2003).

Lack of Consistent Funding If there was one particular challenge put huge strains on the implementation of reintegration projects that was the lack of consistent funding. Even the pledges

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made by donors at the June 2001 Paris Conference were insufficient, and the additional numbers of disarmed combatants served only to worsen the situation. The single payment of Le 300,000 which was part of the new reinsertion package in Phase III necessitated a good flow of funding (Malan, et al., 2003). It was clear that once former combatants were demobilized and returned to their communities, they would be in a critical situation without any means of employment or livelihoods. Having removed from their current means of livelihood through disarmament, it was an integral part of the new social contract that they should receive rapid economic reintegration assistance. However, the delays in funding coming from the MDTF meant that the ROP options could not start quickly enough. The limited local institutional and human resource capacities also played a role in the delayed delivery of reintegration benefits, but the lack of funding for these projects was much more critical. As some former combatants refused to leave the demobilization areas without seeing tangible reintegration benefits coming forward, they also started to pose a security risk. For example, Dawo who was the DDR District Reintegration Officer in Bombali pointed out that when they did not receive the necessary funding for the payment of Le 60,000 monthly stipends in time, his colleagues were stoned by former combatants (pers. comm., 2005).13 The stopgap projects implemented by UNAMSIL and UNDP tried to deal with this problem and were successful to a large extent. With a duration of from two to three months, each stopgap project cost about $15,000. The Stopgap Programme targeted around 5,000 former combatants and 1,500 community youth, representing a ratio of 70:30, over two years. The labour intensive community infrastructure projects ensured there was employment for many former combatants until they started to benefit from the reintegration assistance. The UNAMSIL evaluation of this programme showed that the stopgap projects provided employment for former combatants in the most volatile areas; contributed to the peacebuilding by focussing on reconstruction of infrastructure and services; and strengthened community capacities to undertake development initiatives (2003). Furthermore, the stopgap projects were also significant in terms of social reintegration as they provided excellent opportunities for former combatants and members of their receiving communities to work together. Nevertheless, such an approach was unable to meet all the shortcomings of the main reintegration phase, as they did not fundamentally alter the fact that thousands of former combatants were still waiting for their reintegration assistance. More importantly, the stopgap projects experienced a number of problems such as the time lag between project approval and actual initiation and implementation; working arrangements with implementing partners were not always clear, and physical difficulties related to poor road conditions hampered progress (UNAMSIL, 2003a).

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Flawed Reintegration Options and Difficult Economic Environment For the long-term sustainability of reintegration the provision of training opportunities was no doubt, critical, but without follow-up employment opportunities it was difficult to ensure that former combatants would start to earn a living from their new skills and would not return to previous means of livelihood through a barrel of gun. Owing to the serious lack of employment opportunities in the country as a whole, it was noted that many former combatants invested their reinsertion assistance into buying equipment for diamond mining, a major increase was reported in the number of men involved in diamond mining after the demobilization phase (DPKO, 2003). The flawed design of the reintegration phase was identified by PRIDE as a major cause of difficulties faced in the DDR process. In particular, the failure to take into consideration the economic activities in different regions meant the strategy was ill suited to the economic realities of the country. For example, he noted that most former combatants came from agricultural communities therefore it would have made more sense to prepare them for return to their communities through agricultural assistance. Moreover, this would have helped alleviate the additional burden brought by the return of former combatants to these communities. More careful preparation in the planning phase, would have led to greater incentives given to agriculture projects. As it was however, most former combatants opted for vocational training courses because of the stipends provided (pers. comm., 2005). On the other hand, John Paul, Director of NACSA pointed out that migration from urban to rural areas had already begun before the war, owing to poor infrastructure and housing in the hinterland and this urbanization was a major pull factor for former combatants. He noted that most former combatants did not see agriculture as a ‘proper’ employment; hence a majority of them opted for vocational training courses (pers. comm., 2005).14 Eldred Collins considered ‘the money poured into the reintegration did not make any change. The vocational training courses were a total waste of time.’ Furthermore, he argued claims that former combatants wanted vocational training were false, as on the contrary they wanted agricultural support (pers. comm., 2005). Supporting this view, Lyunggren noted that the reintegration phase did not target the real needs of communities and fell short in addressing a diversity of needs in terms of skills. The vocational training provided was rather opportunistic as it managed to keep former combatants busy for a while in a particular type of activity without asking how many carpenters, auto mechanics or electricians Sierra Leone’s economy could absorb (pers. comm., 2005). The assessment conducted by Comninos and his team in 2002 claims that half of those who completed a vocational training course had managed to reintegrate into the economy with an average income of around Le 52,626 per

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month. They also estimated the actual percentage of those employed after the reintegration assistance to be rather higher than that indicated by their research. This view was supported by Elasinbo’s observations too, as in some small settlements the only carpenter or electrician for example, was a former combatant and they were practicing those newly gained skills at the vocational training courses Humphreys and Weinstein (2004:36) claimed that ‘42 per cent of those that had completed training had found jobs since finishing. Of those that found work, 72 per cent did so in the first three months after training…Importantly, 74 per cent believe that their current job is directly related to the skills they received in training.’ These promising results were not shared by Eric Jumu who noted that actually only a fewer former combatants were in employment after their vocational courses and many of them actually sold their toolkits by the end of their training. Nevertheless, Elasinbo noted that having sold their toolkits most former combatants invested the money in an alternative business scheme. For example, the bike-taxi business is an area that flourished among former combatants. Having paid $100 for a bike, a former combatant could make around Le 20,000 a day, which would be sufficient to make a living and save money to pay off the debt for the bike in about six months. In some regions, it was reported that 80 out of 100 bike-taxi businesses were owned by former combatants (pers. comm., 2005). As far as the duration, facilities and quality of trainers are concerned; the vocational training courses presented a bleak picture. The vocational training courses, as Comninos et al. (2002) suggested, should be considered as ‘basic skills development programmes’ because of their low standards and long-term training inputs. Lawrence Sesay also supported this view pointing out that former combatants did not have a real opportunity to gain a viable skill at the end of a six month training course which was often conducted with limited physical and human resources. It was noted that the majority of these training centres were established out of blue because of the funding availability, but did not have much experience in training. Raising the expectations of former combatants by telling them that they would become a carpenter or electrician at the end of six months, actually did more harm than good in some cases. The international NGOs such as GTZ, which received additional funding from the German government, ensured better training facilities, but not all INGOs and their local partners did a good job with the training (pers. comm., 2005). It was reported that the former combatants’ main complaints on vocational training courses were ‘incompetence, un-kept promises, inefficiency and delays in the provision of toolkits and allowances.’ (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004:33). Nevertheless, it should also be noted that some former combatants did not have much interest in the training course they took. The interviews with former combatants indicated that, for some of them the main incentive was to benefit

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from the stipends paid during the course but they never had any intention of practicing that particular skill subsequently (pers. comm., 2005).

Weak Civil Society Organizations and Human Resources One of the main challenges for the reintegration phase was to find local partners who could work in the implementation of ROP options such as technical and vocational training courses. The limited institutional capacities and a shortage of local NGOs and CBOs meant that the NCDDR did not have the chance to select local partners with adequate delivery capacities. The lack of infrastructure and communications, and human resources were major factors negating for the effective implementation of reintegration projects. Noting the positive impact of the reintegration process for the strengthening of associational life in the country, Jumu identifies the lack of local civil society organizations as one of the main weaknesses of the DDR process (pers. comm., 2005). Supporting this view, Elasinbo noted that as the capacity of local organizations was so limited that in most cases to employ people to work in the process was a major challenge. The international community needed to help local populations to form their NGOs and CBOs (pers. comm., 2005). However, considering that there were 494 implementing partners, 307 of them in Western Area alone, also indicates that with the availability of funding there was an influx of local training centres and NGOs during the reintegration phase. The NCDDR (2002) seems to perceive this as an achievement, but the interviews with the key DDR stakeholders in Sierra Leone showed that the coordination of so many implementing partners was actually one of the most critical problems. The civil society organizations that were involved in the DDR process in Sierra Leone can be categorized into four groups: the first group constitutes those NGOs and CBOs which were funded solely by the NCDDR, called ‘contractual partners’. The second group was referred to as ‘parallel partners’ and they were the agencies funded by other donors such as DFID, USAID and GTZ. Organizations in the third group were funded by both NCDDR and other agencies, hence they were called ‘co-funding partners’. Finally, those organizations involved in the process but not recognized formally by NCDDR form the last group. It is important to note that 90 per cent of all local partners were the contractual ones. The majority of local partners were involved in the provision of vocational training courses, and 302 of them only were in the Western Area (NCDDR, 2002; NCDDR, 2002b). The main advantage with the involvement of local actors in the reintegration process was the way this encouraged social reintegration. For example, the PRIDE held a series of sensitization meetings to explain the mandate and works of TRC, the Special Court and how the successful

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reintegration of former combatants can enable long-term reconciliation. Their in-depth understanding of local culture and the legacy of conflict was of critical importance in the implementation of these meetings. Local informal networks play a significant role in day-to-day life n Sierra Leone and a local actor like the PRIDE was well-placed to tap into these resources. They also represented a number of other advantages such as encouraging local ownership, local capacity building, human resource development and cost effectiveness. However, it is important to note that they were largely contractual partners, emerging as a result of funding availability and almost all of them were created when the NCDDR started the reintegration phase. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that some of them were established with the simple reason of profit making. A number of interviewees also noted that large amounts of money paid for the educational materials for trainees for example, never reached their aimed beneficiaries. The issue of corruption was not only to do with civil society organizations either. Most interviewees identified it as one of the most important post-conflict challenges faced by Sierra Leone.

Difficulties with Social Reintegration Social reintegration was particularly difficult for the rural youth as they found it highly challenging to return to their communities. The majority of these combatants had no proper education or job before the war, as most of them had been abducted from their families when they were children. The stigma attached to the label of ‘former combatant’, and the atrocities committed during the war were a constant reminder for these young men and women that although the war was now over, their struggle with building a new life for themselves had only just started. According to Sullay Sesay, those communities which accepted former combatants gave the following reasons for their forgiveness: ‘we forgave them for God’, ‘we forgave them for government’ and ‘we forgave them for the sake of our children’s future’ (pers. comm., 2005). However, without meaningful employment, added to difficulties in securing the acceptance of their communities, it was clear that the demobilized youth could quickly became a security risk, and therefore, according to Eric Jumu, it was vital that the government target the youth in its governance and reconstruction strategies, for example, in making job creation for the youth a priority and ensuring that the reconstruction projects benefited those communities which received high number of former combatants (pers. comm., 2005). According to Lawrence Sesay, the individual targeting of combatants had a negative impact on their social reintegration, and it would have been more productive to deal with them as part of their communities. For CDF combatants particularly, this would have been quite easy and possibly the reintegration strategy would have adopted a 50-50 per cent approach, so that the receiving communities could have benefited from the process directly. This

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would not only have avoided the resentment which developed among community members, but also could have helped provide better linkages between the reintegration of former combatants and reconstruction programmes in general (pers. comm., 2005). On the other hand, as was quite rightly pointed out by Elasinbo, the reintegration programmes should not be overburdened either, as they tend to deal with a specific caseload. It would not be possible to do everything for the population in general, and if public information was handled carefully, the communities would be able to see that the DDR of former combatants is actually of direct benefit for them (pers. comm., 2005). Nevertheless, as a long-term strategy John Paul recommended that the government’s policy should no longer make a distinction between former combatants and communities. It is essential to seek alternative ways of generating resources for them, but in this process, former combatants should be treated as an integral part of their communities (pers. comm., 2005). Social reintegration has strong linkages with justice and reconciliation issues and the creation of an environment characterized by dialogue has to be a priority in the reintegration process. However, those who committed crimes and atrocities should be tried. Jumu asserts that the Special Court plays a significant role because, ‘to move the impunity of criminals sends a strong signal to the population in general that it is not acceptable to fight and deal with politics in a violent way’ (pers. comm., 2005). Nevertheless, Zoe Dogal argued that it was very difficult to coordinate the activities of the Special Court and TRC as they took place in the same period. It was noted that if the justice and reconciliation elements had to be dealt with at the same time, the mandates of those two initiatives would have to take into account each other’s work. Pointing out the limited funding for the TRC, Dogal observed that ‘trying people had 10 times more money allocated than reconciling them’ (pers. comm., 2005). Furthermore, Sullay Sesay argued that the information sensitization programmes for communities such as radio phone-in programmes; soap operas centred on plots concerning the acceptance of combatants by their communities; drama groups; and documentaries all played a significant role in easing the social reintegration for former combatants. On the other hand, he argued that no matter what had been done it would have been difficult to change the different levels of acceptance. For example, while some communities believed that former combatants may have secret powers for ensuring good harvest, in another community a female combatant was rejected by the local chief and only a request from President Kabbah would convince him to change his mind (pers. comm., 2005). According to Humphreys and Weinstein (2004:40), there were some differences based on which armed groups former combatants were fighting with and at what rank, and where they were reintegrating. It seems that ‘CDF members, and Mendes from all factions, found it less difficult to reintegrate...Lower rank combatants had an easier time

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reintegrating, while higher rank commanders found it hardest to gain acceptance. Notably, combatants who had been abducted into the different armed factions found it no easier to reintegrate than those that had joined voluntarily’. Dogal noted that traditionally Sierra Leone society is forgiving and has its own mechanisms related to this, such as cleansing rituals. Consequently, it would be important to avoid interference from outsiders (pers. comm., 2005). Having conducted a DDR impact assessment mission in both rural and urban parts of the Kenema, Bo and Freetown provinces, Uju Elasinbo argued that former combatants in these areas were no longer seen as trouble makers. It was interesting to note that most of them did not want to be identified as former combatants. Apart from a few crime cases reported to the police, it was apparent that former combatants did not tend to become involved in crime. When she asked communities whether they would allow their daughters to marry a former combatant, to her surprise, the answer was usually positive. Incidences of this response were particularly high in the south, with CDF combatants, and even RUF members and there seemed to be a good level of integration between former combatants and communities (pers. comm., 2005). Supporting the activities undertaken by the government for the social reintegration of former combatants, Collins noted that former RUF combatants ‘are trying to melt into the society’ without leaving any visual sign (pers. comm., 2005).

Regional Pressures As most armed conflicts in the West Africa have been somehow connected with each other since the end of Cold War, the DDR processes in the region were also closely interlinked, as disarmament in one country can easily mean a high availability of weapons in neighbouring countries, or that combatants simply move from one country to another, with the result that demobilization in one country would mean a large pool of men ready to be recruited in another. This was the case between Sierra Leone and Liberia during their civil wars, and many DDR attempts and phases have taken place since the early 1990s. Ginifer (2005:12) rightly argues that the RUF could not have sustained its military campaign without direct assistance from Liberia and other neighbouring states. Furthermore, ‘Cote d’Ivoire at various points during the conflict provided safe sanctuary and passage was provided for war materiel to the NPFL’. Similarly, the way in which the conflict erupted and changed its dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire was interwoven with the DDR processes in Sierra Leone and Liberia. For example, taking place around the same time, the reintegration package in Liberia was $300 while it was $970 in Côte d’Ivoire, and Dugal asked succinctly ‘which one would you have chosen’ in order to point out why many combatants from Liberia had registered themselves as combatants in Côte d’Ivoire (pers. comm., 2005). Hence, many combatants demobilized in Liberia

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did not surrender their weapons, and it was likely that their weapons were ending up in Côte d’Ivoire. As pointed out by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN SRSG for West Africa, there is a need for a regional approach which ‘is particularly important because the crises [in West Africa] are increasingly interconnected…They are all fuelled by arms trafficking and are characterized by the use and recruitment of mercenaries and child soldiers and by cross-border movements of armed groups.’ (Bernath and Martin, 2004:1) Supporting this view, it was explained by Ginifer (2005:30) that: Cross-border movements of SALW are highly likely due to poor border security and controls, but the extent of the problem is unknown due to a lack of reliable data. Movement of SALW is more likely to be out of Sierra Leone than in as demand for weapons in Liberia and other West African counties is higher than in Sierra Leone. The fact that weapons can be traded in as part of DDR programmes in Liberia (for US$300) and Cote d’Ivoire has led to an exiting of some weapons and ex-combatants from Sierra Leone. Consequently, Molloy stressed that, when the UN intervenes in West African conflicts, it is essential that it has a good understanding of belligerents and their leaders as they are ‘mobile across porous borders, are highly experienced in manipulating aspects of various Peace Processes, particularly the DDR aspects, to their political and financial advantage.’ (2004:1) Supporting this view, the ‘Seminar on the Challenge of Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in DDR Programmes in West Africa’, which was held in on Dakar on 8 April 2005 concluded by urging a strengthened role in DDR for a regional organization like ECOWAS (UNOWA, 2005:4): Considering that armed conflicts in West Africa are generally regional and spread across states’ borders, it is important that reintegration programmes follow an integrated approach that takes into consideration the subregional dimension of the issues. Subregional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, should be strengthened and should contribute, in an appropriate and realistic way, to the planning, coordination, information sharing and implementation of DDR programmes in general and reintegration activities in particular, especially in those crossborder areas which tend to escape from the authority of governments.

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Conclusions Referring to Robert Kaplan’s view of the conflicts in West Africa as uncontrollable warfare based on primitive societal conditions (1994), Hirsch rightly points out that the war in Sierra Leone ‘is a story of flawed leadership and voracious greed, and of political failure at regional and international levels to prevent the tragedy that has befallen an entire population’ (2001:13). From the exploitation of its natural resources to the lack of conflict prevention measures and ill equipped peacekeeping operations, regional countries and the international community did everything to prove Kaplan right to show that the cultural and sociological failures in African society are ‘endemic and irreversible, virtually beyond human control.’ (Hirsch, 2001:17) Given that the Sierra Leone DDR process is considered to be an example of best practice, Lyunggren argues that although there were mistakes in the process, the safety nets provided by the international community, such as stopgap projects, addressed the majority of these shortcomings. It is also important that, with the implementation of the DDR programme, the population started to believe in the political process and they are willing to get involved in its development. The country has also enjoyed improvements in governmental policy and in the strengthening of trust and confidence towards its national institutions. It was also noted that, what was collected in disarmament was considerably less than had been expected. The DDR process probably managed to collect one third of all available weapons, and while the majority of arms in Sierra Leone had travelled to other countries in the region (pers. comm., 2005). The Sierra Leone DDR experience also indicates that the three phases of the process should not be disassociated from each other; it is important that former combatants understand that the disarmament phase is closely linked with the benefits of reintegration assistance, so that there would be no need for cash-for-arms type assistance. For the undertaking of disarmament and demobilization, a third party intervention was important in Sierra Leone, but this involvement needs to be supported with adequate resources to ensure the provision of security and continuous funding; otherwise thinly spread resources had the capacity to create huge security risks. It is also of critical importance to pay special attention to the particular needs of vulnerable groups such as children and women. Child soldiers require more than educational assistance in cases like Sierra Leone, they are not always accepted by their families and communities consequently, receiving a livelihood at the end of their reintegration assistance is as critical for them as it is for adult combatants. The main excluded group from the DDR process in Sierra Leone were women as bush wives, slaves or fighters. As well as the social stigma that goes with being a female combatant they were also failed by the lack of gender sensitive approaches to reintegration. In 2002, the following was how the Women’s

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Commission assessed the successes of the DDR for young men and women in Sierra Leone (2002:12) as follows: Thus far, DDR has been effective in providing a needed carrot to those being asked to disarm, demobilize and commit to peace. The symbolic destruction of weapons, family reunification and initial support in steps toward a new life have all been critical to paving the way to security and peace. However, gaps in the DDR, combined with the limitations of its education, livelihood and community advocacy programs, have left young people angry and disappointed. The DDR thus far, then, appears to have been more an initial critical security and psychosocial program seeking to address immediate needs than a reliable reintegration mechanism. Without additional follow-through, the discontent that is already breeding among those formerly with fighting forces will spread.

5 AFGHANISTAN MUCH POLITICS, NOT MUCH LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND NO SUSTAINABILITY

Having been torn apart by a devastating armed conflict with a number of distinct phases over the previous 23 years, a new opportunity arose for peace in Afghanistan with the Bonn Conference of December 2002. In order to achieve sustainable peace in Afghanistan, one of the main priorities for the postconflict reconstruction process identified in Bonn was the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants. To undertake this enormous task the international community opted for the creation of a new organization in 2003, Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), which has been the principal planning and implementation agent of the DDR strategy. With a projected life span of three years envizaged for its existence the ANBP was structured within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and mandated with the provision of assistance to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in the DDR of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF). The targeted caseload was formed by a loose network of military units which had fought against the Soviets and the Taliban, and by the time the DDR process was initiated these units had registered themselves with the Afghanistan Ministry of Defence (MoD). However, it should be noted that they were far from being under the complete control of the GoA given the realities of the power structures in the post-Bonn political environment. Military power was used by the commanders of hundreds of armed groups to receive political and economic benefits throughout the country; some of these groups were allies of the US-led military intervention against the Taliban in 2002. The main goal of the DDR process was outlined by the ANBP (2004:5) as being ‘to decommission the military units belonging to the AMF by collecting and storing weapons in [the] possession of AMF personnel and providing those

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AMF members with opportunities for employment’. In other words, the strategy seemed to include all the elements of a typical DDR process. However, it is important to note that there are also major differences between how each phase of the process was conceptualized in Afghanistan and how they would usually be understood in DDR-related literature. For example, disarmament in the context of the Afghan DDR process meant a voluntary submission of all heavy weapons and only some small arms in return for tangible transition assistance to facilitate civilian livelihoods. Demobilization was also different from its usual classical definition, since at the time of its implementation almost all of the combatant caseload was part of their civilian communities, living with their families. Hence, the process of reintegration did not really mean a ‘reintegration’ in a classic sense, as former combatants would not need to return to their communities. As most combatants were already community based, the reintegration phase was really all about the provision of an alternative livelihood for them, so that their dependency on commanders as an ‘employer’ could be eradicated. In other words, the primary objective of the Afghan DDR process was to break down the link between combatants and their commanders, so that ‘warlords’ and commanders could no longer assert their influence via militaristic power bases. The DDR process took place as part of a wider security sector reform in the country, as it was undertaken in parallel with the creation of a formally trained and ethnically balanced Afghan National Army (ANA). Estimates made at the Bonn Conference for the number of combatants who would need to go through a DDR process resulted in a figure of 100,000, although the size of caseload was reduced by almost half during the implementation of the programme. There are different views as to why such a caseload reduction was necessary, which varied from the belief that commanders overstated the number of their combatants in order to get a larger share of salaries paid by the Ministry of Defence, to the DDR strategy not having adequate time and resources to deal with such a large caseload. However as was rightly pointed out by Dennys (2005:2), ‘the numbers indicate nothing about the reality of disarmament, its effects and outcomes across Afghanistan.’ As of 1 July 2006, the total number of AMF members who had entered the DDR process was 63,380 and 55,804 of them had opted for a reintegration option. The disarmament process collected 36,571 small arms and 12,248 items of heavy weaponry. Afghanistan in Post-Conflict Recovery Afghanistan is a landlocked country sharing borders with Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. With a territory stretching over an area of 652,225 square kilometres, it is home to an estimated population of 25 million people. The main ethnic groups in the country are Pashtun, Tajik,

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Hazara, Uzbek and Turkmen. With Islam as the major religion, approximately 90 per cent of the population are Sunni Muslims, while the remaining approximately 10 per cent are Shiites. The society is structured around kinship networks ordered along tribal and ethnic lines: ‘The most successfully enforced form has been the patriarchal society. Men’s control of women, together with senior’s control over juniors and cooperation among male peers organizes the Afghan people into families.’ (Rubin, 2002:41) Throughout its history, Afghanistan has found itself between the forces of different kingdoms and empires; the 19th Century witnessed the meddling of the Russian and British Empires in their colonial pursuit of leverage in the area. King Amanullah Khan attempted to modernize the country in the early 20th Century, seeking to create a radical reform process similar to that taking place under the leadership of Atatürk in Turkey. He was keen to secularize the country, but it was his desire for the emancipation of women which provoked the staunchest opposition from the traditionalist and religious power bases of the country. He was forced to flee the country in 1929, setting stage for the more cautious, incremental reforms introduced under King Mohammed Zahir Shah. However, his reign and the monarchy itself were brought to an end in 1973 in a coup organized his cousin, Mohammed Daoud with the help of the Soviet-trained Afghan Army. Only five years later, the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the leadership of Mohammed Taraki, overthrew Daoud’s government. The reforms in land redistribution, education, emancipation of women and secularization introduced by the PDPA resulted in high levels of resistance against this Soviet puppet regime. In order to overcome increasing public unrest and avoid a possible US intervention, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In the 10 years that followed, a number of resistance groups known as Mujaheddin, which were funded and armed mainly by the US, Pakistan and a number of oil-rich Arab countries fought against the Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 leaving in place a Soviet-back government, under the leadership of President Najibullah, who was later overthrown by the Mujaheddin in 1992. Until the emergence in 1995/96 of the Taliban as the new actor in the Afghan conflict, the country underwent another phase of civil conflict during which various Mujaheddin groups fought against each other for the control of Kabul and the other key cities. The Taliban as a movement relied on poorly educated young men, most of whom were the children of those Afghans who took refuge in Pakistan. Although their name is derived from the Persian word ‘Talib’, meaning student, the Taliban typically had only limited and very partial knowledge of Islamic and Afghan history, or even the Quran. Influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, the Taliban models a strict and, in the eyes of many other Muslims around the world, distorted understanding of the practice of Islam. In their

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isolation in Pakistan, they had little if any contact with respected Muslim scholars and have been unbending in their refusal to tolerate discussion (Maley, 1998; Rashid, 1999). The Taliban’s support in Afghanistan has always been from the Pashtun community, making the southern provinces of the country fertile ground for their activities. Moreover, the Taliban leadership has been almost exclusively Pashtun, and it was because of this ethnic identity and total linkages that they enjoyed widespread support from both the government and people of Pakistan (Rashid, 2002). The Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 1996 effectively brought to an end the regime of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and large parts of the country came under Taliban control without much resistance. After so many years of bloody civil conflict, the Taliban as a religious student movement promised to bring peace to Afghanistan, to establish law and order and to disarm the population, which is an important factor in understanding why they did not initially experience much resistance from the population during their conquest of the country. However, in the north of the country seven groups joined together to form a United Front in order to resist the Taliban. While the Taliban drew its support from Pashtuns, the Northern Alliance was comprised of the key minority groups: Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras. The union was mainly led by General Dostum (Uzbek) and Ahmad Shah Massoud (Tajik) and it was largely due to in-fighting between these allied groups that the Taliban succeeded in their steady conquest of the northern regions, such that by 1999 the Northern Alliance controlled only 10 per cent of Afghanistan (Pohly, 2002). In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, it was the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden, which led to the US military intervention in 2001, and to the current ‘post-conflict’ era which ensued. Throughout the Afghan conflict, a number of external actors such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan have each played a significant role hence it would not be an exaggeration to call it, in some senses a proxy war, particularly during the Soviet invasion and occupation, when Afghanistan became a battleground between the two Cold War superpowers. During the late 1980s, Afghanistan was the largest recipient of personal weapons, so much so that by 1992 it had more of those weapons than ‘India and Pakistan combined’ (Rubin, 2002:196). Following the Soviet withdrawal, US interest in Afghanistan waned to a large extent, but Pakistan continued to be key player in the conflict in different roles and capacities. For example, Pakistan provided a safe home to many Mujaheddin groups out of a desire to exercise control over Afghan politics as part of its defence strategy against India (Marsden, 1999). The Directorate of Inter Services of Intelligence (ISI) was the principal mechanism for Pakistan’s assistance in terms of finance, weapons and logistical support to various Mujaheddin groups, particularly Pashtun Islamists. Finally, Pakistan was the place where the forces of the Taliban were educated in thousands of madrasas (religious schools) of the country.

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The result of 23 years of conflict in Afghanistan has been widespread devastation throughout the country, including: the uprooting of around five million people, and the laying of over 10 million landmines during and after the Soviet invasion which have continued to kill and injure thousands of people each year. According to the UNDP’s 2004 estimates, the overall literacy rate is less than 30 per cent, while this drops to only 12.7 per cent for women. The life expectancy at birth is 44.5 years, and less than one quarter of the population has access to safe water. Overall, Afghanistan’s Human Development Indices (HDI) value of 0.346 is situated at the bottom of the list of low human development countries, while compared with its neighbours, Afghanistan has the lowest HDI indicator (i.e. Pakistan: 0,497; Iran: 0.732 and Turkmenistan: 0.752) (UNDP, 2004). It should also be noted that in terms of security, services and infrastructure there has always been a big gap between the capital Kabul and the rest of the country. According to Rubin (2002), for those who live in rural areas, which form around 85 per cent of the population, the state has always been alien and interaction took place only when the state wanted to interfere in the lives of the peasantry. In other words, the state was not linked in any significant way to the rural population, thereby creating a vacuum of political and institutional sovereignty. The state existed more or less only in the capital, and its weak structures exercised very little ‘reach’ into the different corners of this large, mountainous, war-ravaged country. However, even the situation in Kabul in Donini et al.’s vivid description, makes for sad and curious reading concerning life in the capital three years after the Bonn Agreement (2005:11). In three years the population of the city has more than doubled, reaching a staggering estimate of 3.4 million…A murky pall of pollution hangs over the congested capital. Housing is a very serious problem: corruption, land-grabbing and speculation are pushing the poorest segments of the population out of the center, and into progressively more insalubrious shelter. At the same time, Klondikestyle construction is gripping the city. Garish marble-covered luxury houses are replacing traditional bungalows; concrete and glass office blocks and car dealerships are incongruously sprouting among the drab mud houses of urban misery…the vast expanses of poverty branch out from the city center to squalid squatter settlements in bombed-out neighbourhoods and up the barren hills where the drudgery of carrying water, securing some protection against the bitter cold, and basic human survival are not much different from what they were in Taliban times.

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Another legacy of the protracted conflict in Afghanistan is the culture of ‘warlordism’. Military commanders or tribal chieftains with their large groups of combatants and weapons have waged war in different permutations of alliances and groups throughout the conflict. As they have exercised their military power in their areas of ‘sovereignty’, so they have also gained substantial economic benefits from a series of illegal activities such as the ‘taxation’ of goods at borders, drug and arms trafficking and the extortion of money from the civilian population. Warlords are often referred to as ‘regional commanders’ by the international community, which is a euphemism according to Sedra (2002:5–6), since he asserts that ‘the term warlord, with its pejorative meaning intact, is the most appropriate means to describe them. True to the term, these figures rely on war, violence and general instability to generate resources and consolidate their power.’ It was against this background of abject destruction that the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, entrusted Afghanistan to govern itself – initially through the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and subsequently the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) with limited administrative assistance from the UN and the newly established International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UN Security Council Resolution 1401 of March 2002 established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with the purpose of enhancing the role of the UN in helping the Afghan interim authority in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, and appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as its SRSG. The ATA’s top posts were distributed among four Afghan factions, and it was headed by the Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai. As part of the goal of establishing a broad-based government in the country, more than 1,500 delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga designated Zahir Shah, the ageing former king, as the Baba, or Father of the Nation, while Karzai assumed the position of President of the new ATA which was responsible for the preparation of the new constitution which was signed in 2004. Karzai won the country's first direct presidential elections, and following this, Afghanistan successfully held its national assembly elections in 2005. The DDR Strategy Implemented in Afghanistan Not being a peace agreement the Bonn Agreement did not make explicit references to the implementation of DDR; however it stated that all Afghan armed forces, the Mujaheddin groups and other armed groups would be integrated under a new structure, AMF. The salaries of combatants within the AMF would be paid by the Ministry of Defence until their DDR, which was considered an essential measure to prevent them from becoming involved in insurgency activities. It was the 2002 ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability’ conference in Petersberg in Germany that established the main conditions of DDR in Afghanistan as well as initiating the creation of a new

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national army. The establishment of ANBP was announced at the February 2003 Tokyo Conference on the Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan. It was part of the overall security sector reform package which identified five pillars: the building of a national army (ANA); the building of a national police service (ANP); judicial reform; counter-narcotics and finally, the DDR process. Consequently, as a three year programme in partnership with UNAMA and UNDP the ANBP formed one of the main elements of the Afghan government’s security sector reform. Whilst UNAMA provided overall policy guidance, ANBP received administrative, technical and operational support from UNDP. The Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (ADRC) was established to form a focal point to represent the government’s involvement in the process. With a central office in Kabul, the ANBP had eight regional offices: Bamyan, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul/Parwan, Kandahar, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif. It was run by around 60 international and 630 national staff. As of 1 July 2006, the total budget of ANBP was nearly $141 million, over $91 million of which was provided by Japan. In addition to Japan, are a number of other countries such as UK ($19 million), Canada ($16 million), the US ($9 million) and the Netherlands ($4 million) contributing to the budget for the DDR process, channelled through the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund Afghanistan Country Window (ANBP, 2006). It is important to note that Japan’s lead country position for the DDR process was actually highly problematic. Having provided huge financial assistance with little political clout during and after the first Gulf War in 2001, Japan was eager to become more actively involved in Afghanistan. However, its responsibility as lead country for the DDR process was to a large extent in contradiction with its own constitution, which forbids Japanese support for or involvement in any military process abroad. In other words, all decisions that Japan took during the DDR process in Afghanistan necessitated a careful balancing act and the need to consider the reaction of the Japanese parliament. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was able to have only a limited involvement in the DDR process and this is a good illustration of how Japan struggled to hold in tension between the demands of its constitution and its role as lead country for DDR. Yuichi Inouye, the then Counsellor for DDR at the Embassy of Japan in Kabul explained that although JICA had over 30 DDR specialists working in the country, they were unable to work on the DDR process in any significant way, being limited to the provision of training to trainers for VTCs (pers. comm., 2005).1 The Afghan DDR strategy in any given area of the country began with the verification of combatants, which was carried out by a Regional Verification Committee (RVC) of five respected civilian individuals from that particular area. The objective of this particular undertaking was to select and verify that candidates nominated by the MoD were actually bona fide soldiers. At each

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verification area the selection had to be approved by the team leader of the Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU). It was only after this verification that a MDU was deployed to work on a particular military unit by providing the functions of disarmament operations, security and administration. There were four MDUs at the beginning of the process, but with the expansion of the process, at one point there were eight units in operation. At each MDU there were representatives from the MoD and ANBP, and the latter provided an international member of staff as the team leader. As well as supervising the verification process the team leader was given the responsibility of overseeing the whole disarmament process. Another key actor in the disarmament process was an International Observers Group (IOG) which was formed by representatives from UNAMA, officials from various national and international organizations, and donor countries. The IOG was tasked with the provision of impartial oversight of the DDR process. The flowchart of the DDR process can be seen in Figure 5.1. The actual disarmament phase itself had three main steps: first, checking the identity of the candidate against the verification list prepared by RVC and confirming the eligibility of his weapon; second, issuing a day pass so that the candidate could have access to a regional ANBP office; and finally, transferring collected weapons to the central storage facility in Pul-e Charki and registering all necessary information on weapons such as their model and serial number, and sending this information to all ANBP offices via satellite link. All ineligible weapons, explosives and ammunition that were collected during the disarmament phase were handed over to the HALO Trust for destruction. The entire demobilization process for a former AMF combatant in Afghanistan took only a day, during which he had to go through a five-step process. He was first, briefed and shown a documentary on the DDR process; secondly, he was interviewed by a caseworker to obtain information on his education, skills, work experiences and aspirations; thirdly, he was asked to choose an appropriate reintegration package with the assistance of his caseworker who also acted as an employment officer; fourthly, he would have taken an oath of conduct, promising that he would not bear arms for illegitimate purposes; and finally, he was given a food package of 126 kilograms. Fingerprints and photographs were taken and at the end of the day, each former combatant was issued with an identification card based on the registration of all the information obtained during the interview process. Each former combatant was then asked to come back to their regional ANBP office on a given date for job assignment. At the end of this process, ANBP (2004:11) claimed that the combatant ‘is now a civilian’, but was he really? The reintegration phase was based on three main objectives: first, it was aimed to be multi-sectoral which meant former combatants were given a wide choice of reintegration packages. The choices ranged from agriculture,

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DDR Flowchart MOD Operational Group

Verification

MDU

Regional Office

Disarmament

Demobilization

RVC Selection of individuals and units

Units decommissioned IOG

National Army Volunteer Centre Selection criteria To be validated by MOD/ OMC-A

Military Selection Tests

Deferred pass (valid for up to 18 months)

For those who wish to join the ANA

Reintegration

Fail

School / College (maximum time 18 months and as a civilian)

KMTC

Figure 5.1: The Afghan DDR flowchart (Source: ANBP, 2006)

Civilian Job/ Training

Civilian

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vocational training, business opportunities and demining to wage labour, teacher training, opportunities in the construction sector and joining the ANA or Afghanistan National Police (ANP). The second objective was focussed on an integrated approach in which, when and where possible, former combatants would be placed in various programmes run by different ministries and international agencies. Finally, the reintegration phase wished to provide ‘[l]ongterm solutions as opposed to short-term interventions’ (ANBP, 2004:12). According to data collected from demobilized combatants, 89 per cent of them were soldiers, while 11 per cent were officers. The overall average age of the caseload was 28 years old, with the average age for officers 37 years; whilst 39 per cent of them were Tajiks, and 35 per cent were Pashtuns. More significantly, over 80 per cent of the caseload was illiterate. As of 1 July 2006, the breakdown of former combatants and the different reintegration options which they took is presented in Table 5.1. The programme implementation had four main phases, the first of which was initiated on 24 October 2003. This phase which was also known as the Pilot Phase, aimed at testing the DDR process in five regions: Kunduz, Gardez, Kabul/Parwan, Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar, and had a caseload of over 6,200 former combatants and collected nearly 5,000 weapons. The key characteristic of this phase which distinguished it from those that followed was its use of a cash payment of $100 in two instalments with the first being given during the demobilization and second one three months later during reintegration. In other words, the ANBP strategy tested the use of a buy-back approach which resulted in commanders in some regions extorting the payment from combatants through intimidation and violence. Consequently, the cash payment element was suspended. Another element of the programme which was tested and then had to be suspended was the option of interim wage labour opportunity for two weeks between the demobilization and reintegration phases. Initially it was thought that these two weeks would allow former combatants to think about their reintegration options. However, with the suspension of cash payments and having no interest in taking part in the scheme this gap between demobilization and reintegration was closed and representatives of the reintegration ‘Implementing Partners’ were placed within ANBP regional offices. This meant that former combatants had to make their decisions on reintegration options on the same day they were demobilized. Finally, the pilot phase also showed that the DDR process would be likely to face huge difficulties in persuading commanders of AMF to take part in the process. Some commanders refused to hand over lists of their combatants. It was clear that commanders did not want to give up their power bases and it was as a response to this that the ANBP initiated a Commander Incentive Programme (CIP). The initiative consisted of providing opportunities to

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Reintegration Total

Percentage (%)

Total Reintegrated

55,804

Agricultural

23,940

42.90

Vocational training

11,736

21.03

Small business

14,251

25.54

Demining

843

1.51

ANA

713

1.28

ANP

98

0.18

374

0.67

2,759

4.94

Teacher Training Not participating in reintegration

Table 5.1: Reintegration options according to the number of former combatants choosing each option (Source: ANBP, 2006)

commanders in terms of government appointments, economic packages and redundancy payments. Decisions regarding the CIP package were made by a Government Appointment Panel (GAP), and for example, out of 96 cases reviewed by the GAP in May 2004, 27 commanders were absorbed into ANA, 15 into ANP and nine into civilian posts within various ministries. As well as providing a financial redundancy package to 42 out the 96 commanders, three of them were even sent to Japan on a two-week cultural tour. According to ANBP (2004:16), after participating in sightseeing tours, having meetings with various officials and taking part in seminars on public administration those three commanders returned to Afghanistan ‘with renewed determination to reconstruct their country and a desire to encourage other military leaders to join the DDR programme’.2 Meanwhile, under the two-year redundancy package arrangement it was intended that the first year’s payment would come from ANBP while the government would cover the cost of the second year. Funded by Japan the financial redundancy package would cease if the commander

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found alternative employment. Although the CIP had a certain impact on the programme the overall progression remained limited and by the time almost a year had passed since the initiation of the pilot phase, the rate of former combatants who had gone through the DDR process was only around 10 per cent of the caseload. On the other hand, the main turning point for speeding up of the process came not with these operational measures, but due to the political needs of the government and commanders. The organization of the presidential election on 9 October 2004 meant that a secure environment had become essential for all parties, particularly for the government, and it was agreed that by the election time up to 60 per cent of the caseload would have gone through the DDR process. Consequently, it was not surprising that President Hamid Karzai issued two decrees during this phase in order to exert further pressure to speed up of the process. Starting in April 2004, the Main Phase 1 included eight regions and, having disarmed over 8,500 former combatants, this phase ended on 12 September 2004. Almost 6,000 weapons were collected during this phase, and it was not without its difficulties particularly with the reintegration aspect in Mazar-e Sharif. In response to this the ANBP opted for the decentralization of its international advisors from Kabul headquarters to its regional offices. This led to a closer cooperation between those advisors and the different Implementing Partners. Nevertheless, there was also dissatisfaction among AMF officers with the range of reintegration packages, who felt what was offered was perhaps good enough for soldiers but not for them. In response to this a training option for qualified officers was established with 600 teacher positions provided in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and UNDP in November 2004. Another important learning point from this phase was the realization that the ANBP’s public information campaign was not reaching its target group effectively. Some interesting steps were undertaken, such as promoting the DDR process over a six month period through ‘New Home, New Life’, the BBC World Service’s popular soap opera in Afghanistan. However, public information continued to be a problematic part of the process. The period from 13 September to 24 October 2004 marked itself as a distinctive phase in the DDR process, as AMF units around the country were issued specific dates for them to meet the objectives of the process with those who did not meet the targets being removed from the government payroll. In the Main Phase 2, nearly 7,000 combatants were disarmed and nearly 5,000 weapons were collected. It is important to note that, although this phase covered a period of around 40 days, it was much more effective than previous ones. The main reason for this can be identified as the political willingness of the government and commanders themselves, as for example, many of them tried to disassociate themselves from their military units in order to ensure a place in the new Afghan government. This phase was particularly significant as

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it was during this period that the governor of Herat, Ismail Khan was dismissed, with his military power being eradicated in a matter of days. The Main Phase 2 was also significant because the DDR process dealt with its first two women combatants. The following phase in the implementation which started on 25 October 2004 and ended on 19 March 2005, also benefited from the organization of the parliamentary elections in October 2005, which saw pressure placed on commanders to disarm in order to take part in the elections. According to the political party law, the military units which had links to political parties had to comply with the requirements of the DDR first. For example, in Mazar-e Sharif, both General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Mohammad Atta agreed to enter the DDR process for this reason, making this region the first in Afghanistan, to be declared completely disarmed of AMF units. The government also put more pressure on commanders to meet their deadlines for disarmament by using their payroll as leverage against them. As of December 2004, the Main Phase 3 disarmed nearly 10,000 combatants and collected over 6,000 weapons. The final phase of the implementation came to an end in June 2005. By 31 March 2005 over 13,000 AMF members had been disarmed and 7,000 small and 1,000 heavy weapons were collected. In the same period more than 11,000 former combatants went through the reintegration process (ANBP, 2005). For the implementation of reintegration packages, the ANBP worked with 31 implementing partners, including a wide range of international and national NGOs. As it is not possible to focus on all different types of reintegration programmes implemented by the 31 different partners, this section will present the approach to small business creation undertaken by one of the main implementing partners as an example. The provision of small grant assistance of $700 for small business start-up consisted of four main phases: business training, assessment of project proposal, delivery of assistance and monitoring. The entire process was based on the procurement and delivery of equipment and materials for the initiation of a new business or the strengthening of an existing one. There was no cash provision, apart from paying rent for shop premises in some cases. The process was implemented through a caseworker approach in which a caseworker dealt with a FC from the beginning to the end of the small business establishment. Each caseworker was involved in working through all stages of the process. Having a pool of trained caseworkers who could undertake tasks in all the four stages of the process meant a high level of flexibility for implementing partners. This approach was also particularly effective in the establishment of a productive rapport and the building of confidence between former combatant and caseworker. In the case of illiterate former combatants, caseworkers wrote project proposals on their behalf and in some cases they were helped by literate former combatants. Clearly, this process

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was dealt with diligently by caseworkers as almost all former combatants pointed out their satisfaction with the assistance they received from their caseworkers. The most contentious and difficult phase in the small business provision was the assessment of the project proposals. During the pilot phase in a certain region, the implementing partner decided on the sources of materials and equipment on the basis of its initial market research. Materials and equipment were delivered to former combatants at their business premises. However, other field offices of the same organization used the three quotations system, in which the organization chose the cheapest option among three quotations provided for each item of materials and equipment. Experience showed that the three quotation system was much more effective as part of the procurement process. However, the main difficulty with the three quotation system was with illiterate former combatants as they found it difficult to find and verify quotations according to the guidelines provided by the organization. On the other hand, this system provided a high level of transparency and accountability. Almost all former combatants interviewed expressed their satisfaction with this system as they knew exactly how much was spent on their businesses. The system also provided a greater sense of ownership of the process and allowed former combatants to gain experience in how to source and procure the best available items for their businesses. It was also in this phase that former combatants had to deal with the legal papers relating to their businesses. As was the case with the three quotation system, illiterate former combatants found the preparation of these papers much more difficult than the literate ones. Some former combatants complained that they had to visit the organization over 20 times in order to sort out their quotations and legal papers. In some cases there were considerable delays in the establishment of businesses. Some former combatants had to wait for over two months, although this was the case for only a minority of cases. Most former combatants started their business within 20 days of the completion of their business training. The main issue in the delivery phase related to the number of tranches for the provision of equipment and materials. During the pilot phase the organization tried a system of over three to four tranches in some cases. Dividing the assistance over too many tranches like this meant that the assistance provided was not more than $200 at each tranche which in turn had a detrimental impact on the viability of businesses. The method of many tranches seems to have been used to keep former combatants busy over a long period of time in order that they could be kept under close supervision by project staff. However, this approach did not have any meaningful benefit in ensuring the long-term sustainability of businesses. Those former combatants who received their assistance over one or a maximum of two tranches felt that

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they could use the budget available for their business establishment more effectively. Implementation Challenges Tenuous Security Environment Since the Bonn Agreement one of the main obstacles to the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan was the fragility of security. The US military response to the presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaida members in different parts of the country, particularly in the south, has meant the continuation of armed conflict with corresponding high levels of violence. It is ironic that under the Taliban regime the majority of the population enjoyed a better level of security and stability than in the post-conflict environment which was supposed to bring peace to the country. In tandem with the ‘war against terrorism’ waged by the US, there has also been a vicious lawlessness in most parts of the country. In the north, the power struggle between the Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami, Uzbek Junbishi-Milli and Hazara Hezb-Wahadat continued well into the 2002–03 period, fuelling rivalry and occasionally resulting in fighting in urban centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif, illustrating that even the local allies of the US were not readily willing to create a secure environment (Sedra, 2002). There have been similar skirmishes in the West too, but compared to the south and southeast, this region has enjoyed a relatively better security environment. The security in the Pashtun dominated south, has gradually worsened following the regrouping of the Taliban to such an extent that in 2007, most parts of the south once again, became no-go areas for the international community. The international military forces were waging a war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in the south on a daily basis, finding it very difficult to remain in control of the region. Furthermore, the military attacks on the international community’s presence, both military and humanitarian; kidnappings; assassinations of local and national politicians; suicide bombings; and looting and extortion of private properties have unfortunately, been part of day-to-day life in post-conflict Afghanistan. The close relationships between i the US-led military intervention, the ineffective reconstruction process and security challenges in the post-Bonn Afghan context were succinctly portrayed by Rubin, et al. (2003:18–19) The overthrow of the Taliban by a combination of intensive bombing and funding numerous commanders all over Afghanistan both destroyed the effective if brutal security system of the Taliban and created units of armed men only loosely accountable to any political structure. These militias have captured control of various areas and assets, including roads, customs posts, mineral resources, and markets in opium and other smuggled goods. Key leaders in the central government have formed alliances with networks of these traffickers, creating a political base out of [a] criminalized war economy.

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It was within such a security environment that the DDR process was initiated and carried out, and it is clear that it was far from conducive to the undertaking of a sensitive peacebuilding programme. Without trusting the security environment in the country, many armed groups were naturally unwilling to go through the disarmament phase as this would also mean an invitation to attacks from rival groups. The environment of suspicion and mistrust of the presence and activities of other groups made the tasks of the DDR process extremely difficult. Even if they wanted to go through DDR, the security provision was far from adequate to guarantee their well being after handing in their weapons. Rubin et al. give an interesting example of the road construction project between Kabul and Kandahar in order to illustrate the close links between security, reconstruction and successful DDR. The project, funded by Japan, did not even start in 2003, because of the poor security conditions in the area, as the US forces in Kandahar did not give sufficiently high priority to it and the Afghan forces could barely be deployed in the area due to poor road conditions. As a result, this ‘conundrum of road building illustrates the chicken-egg like quality of the relation of security to reconstruction. So does the problem of demobilization: even fighters willing to take up offers of civilian employment might be reluctant to hand over their weapons without guarantees of their security from attack by rivals. In both of these cases, and in many more, the difficulties of making the transition to autonomous provision of security require an external security assistance force.’ (2003:19) The deployment of ISAF was supposed to deal with the security challenge in the country, but to being with, it was not universally welcomed by all armed factions and its presence has even been disputed by the Northern-Alliance controlled ministries. More importantly, its jurisdiction was limited to Kabul and its immediate vicinity, until NATO’s take over of command in 2003 meant that there was a major security vacuum in the countryside of Afghanistan in the early days of the reconstruction process. According to Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand (2004:43), the ‘war on terror’ waged by the US in Afghanistan ‘has been a prime obstacle’ to the establishment of security because ‘through its support of the warlords that helped to topple the Taliban regime, through its repeated offensives in the South and East’ it prevented the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul. Another important element of security in connection with the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan has been the increasingly dominant role of the military in various recovery programmes. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which include combat forces, military personnel and civilian expertise have been involved in a wide range of programmes such as relief aid distribution, needs assessment, coordination of aid work, liaison with regional commanders and security. The core argument for the justification of PRTs

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relates to the provision of such activities in areas which are not suitable for civilian actors to operate effectively due to security challenges. However, most PRTs were not deployed in low security areas until 2004, and Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand (2004:48) point out that there is an overall confusion within the aid community concerning the role of PRTs in general as it ‘refers to a variety of different mandates and forms of organization, and is as such difficult to pin down.’ The combination of a confusing agenda of PRTs and civilian-military identities; limited deployment of ISAF in the countryside resulting in a security vacuum outside the capital; the US’s continuing war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban; and weak, inadequate and largely non-existent national security structures meant that the DDR process in Afghanistan had to be initiated in a highly unfavourable environment. Nevertheless, Mohammad Masoom Stanaczai, the then Deputy of the Afghan government’s Demobilization and Reintegration Committee stated that in the early days after the US-led military intervention, there existed a window of opportunity to initiate a successful DDR process since, at the time local warlords would have been more easily ‘convinced’ of the need to disarm (pers. comm., 2005).3 However, because of a weak central government and the unwillingness of ISAF to take risks, this was a lost opportunity.

Missing Link between Reconstruction and DDR The analysis in the preceding section has already referred to the relationship between post-conflict reconstruction and DDR in Afghanistan. As is the case in most DDR experiences around the world, the Afghan DDR process has also failed in making the necessary connections with its implementation environment. It seems that the whole planning and implementation of the programme took place in total isolation from the overall reconstruction and peacebuilding activities. This was one of the main criticisms pointed out by most interviewees in Afghanistan, underlining the fact that the DDR process missed many opportunities in linking its objectives and outputs to the overall post-conflict reconstruction of the country. Thruelsen (2006:18) asserts that this shortcoming was a result of the fact that the Petersberg Decree ‘did not set up the conditions for an integrated approach where the overall strategy concerning the rebuilding of the country was taken into consideration, meaning that the broader objectives in recovering Afghanistan from 23 years of war were not incorporated into the structure and planning of the DDR programme.’ This was to exercise a particularly negative impact on the sustainable reintegration of former combatants. For example, when it came to deciding what vocational training skills to focus on or what type of micro enterprises would be the most suitable for the economic realities of the country, there was no clear coordination between reintegration and employment opportunities and

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community development. Not identifying such reconstruction priorities and how the DDR process might be utilized to address such needs was clearly a major shortcoming of the process. Considering its massive budget and the high expectations invested in its successful outcome by the population in general, the DDR process should have been planned in a way that was much more integrated with the overall peacebuilding framework. As pointed out by Thruelsen (2006:19), such a ‘focussed incorporation of the recovery strategy for Afghanistan could have braced other recovery programmes, thereby accelerating the process in achieving peace and stability.’

Poor Programme Management Ironically, the main challenge faced during the implementation process was, a result of the programme management shortcomings of the ANBP. The way which the Afghan DDR strategy was conceptualized necessitated the creation from scratch of its implementing body for all of the three phases. This new institutional model for DDR meant that the task was undertaken by an organizational body without any institutional experience and memory. In other words, everything had to be established from the beginning, which meant that the ANBP first had to find its own identity and stand on its own feet before becoming active and effective in the DDR process. In defence of structuring a new organizational body like ANBP, Peter Babbington, the then Acting Programme Director of ANBP, stated that there were no other realistic options at the time, referring to the absence of international military forces on the ground (pers. comm., 2005).4 It was as a result of this decision that, according to Lisa Pinsley who was involved in the process from the very beginning, the programme did not know what it was really about until half-way through its implementation period (pers. comm., 2005).5 The ANBP had to establish and staff its headquarters and regional offices before it could start to undertake any aspects of the programme and, according to Pinsley, its overall programme management was poor. One of the main reasons for this was the very simple fact that the programme objectives were not at all clear. The programme tried different approaches as pilot projects, and as Pinsley pointed out they were unsure as to what would be the best for Afghanistan. Within this framework, the ANBP needed time to channel its resources and capacities for the actual implementation of the programme. However, even after it was formed and had consolidated its institutional structures, the programme management problems continued, the most important of which was the coordination of reintegration work carried out by its 31 implementing partners. All of the implementing partners, which included both international and Afghan NGOs, had the freedom to adopt their own approach in their reintegration programmes such as income generation projects – agricultural and small business initiatives, VTCs

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and demining. This flexibility was so much so that, two implementing partners in the same region could have had completely different approaches to the same type of reintegration option. For example, in some cases while one implementing partner provided its assistance ‘in kind’ which meant that the assistance would be delivered in terms of equipment, materials and training, another implementing partner opted for the provision of ‘cash’ as a main means of its assistance. This meant that in some cases, a certain caseload of former combatants in the same area got their assistance for the same reintegration option in completely different ways. This had a number of difficult implications, for example, if former combatants had failed to establish a successful business through one approach, then they would turn up at the door of the other implementing partner demanding further assistance through their approach. More importantly, the sheer large numbers of implementing partners meant that the ANBP had to channel significant amounts of resources for the monitoring and coordination of their activities. Most implementing partners complained about the way their work was coordinated by the ANBP too, since they felt that the coordination mechanisms often undermined their motivation and confidence owing to too much intervention from the centre, while in other cases, some implementing partners thought they did not receive adequate guidance and coordination.

High Implementation Costs With a total cost of $141 million the Afghan DDR process was one of the largest ever DDR programmes carried out by the international community. However, its main financial contributor Japan was highly critical of the ANBP’s budgetary spending. Yuichi Inouye highlighted the fact that up to $40 million of their budget was spent for the maintenance of ANBP. He was also extremely concerned about the generous incentive packages for commanders. At the time of the author’s interview with him, up to $5 million of the budget was being spent for this purpose. According to Inouye, with UN levels of salaries for international and local staff, and a large headquarters office in Kabul, as well as six regional offices and their logistical and transportation requirements, initiating a new institutional body to undertake the DDR process, rather than using the more conventional means of utilizing the resources of peacekeeping forces and international organizations, proved to be an expensive undertaking (pers. comm., 2005). To use an alternative metaphor, as an organizational agent the ANBP was a big engine with high fuel consumption. In terms of its expenditure, in 2004, nearly $17.5 million of its $77 million of the DDR budget was spent for project management and operational costs of ANBP, while the largest item in the 2004 budget was for reintegration with a spending of over $31 million. It is also interesting to note that while the cost of disarmament was $1.2 million, nearly $4.4 million was spent for the CIP.

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As part of the CIP, commanders were taken on a trip to Japan, which according to Babbington, had the objective of showing them that they could live their lives in a different way. It was also thought that by utilizing the charisma and influence of these commanders, there could actually be opportunities to deal with the challenges of narcotics and the illegal market (pers. comm., 2005). It is not possible to verify how successful the ANBP was with its objective of convincing commanders that they could actually live their lives differently by giving them the example of life in Japan, although it is clear that this initiative successfully managed to keep these commanders occupied with sightseeing activities rather than consolidating their influence base in Afghanistan.

Constrained Local Ownership One of the main challenges and areas of criticism levelled at the Afghan DDR process was the lack of local ownership in the process and how the ANBP as a planning and implementation mechanism left hardly any room for the Afghan government to take an active role in the process. According to the March 2005 dated DDR Public Investment Programme document, the Government of Afghanistan states that ‘One of the aims of the ANBP is to transfer ownership and responsibility for DDR to the Government. With the creation of the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (D&R Commission), the President hoped to engage various related ministries in reintegration efforts. ANBP works regularly with the MOD to assist it in the DDR process. In fact, it is hoped that the MOD will be able to spearhead disarming and decommissioning of units in the next four to six months.’ (2005:6). On the other hand, the Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (ADRC) felt that their incorporation in the process was sidelined to a large extent, since the main decision making mechanism was the ANBP. The high level officials at the ADRC pointed out that their involvement was confined to more a symbolic level rather than as an active partner in the process (pers. comm., 2005).6 The way the DDR process was conceptualized played a significant role in this, as the ADRC was expected to undertake all policy development and coordination responsibilities by only four members of staff. It was clear that the ADRC was not really expected to be playing a central role in the process. Nevertheless, Babbington stated that the Afghan government hosted more than 20 different warlords within its ministerial structures, and argued that it was one of the main reasons that the ownership of the ANBP by the government had become highly difficult. For example, while the DDR process was taking place there needed to be a major reform process within the Ministry of Defence in order to speed up the programme. He also claimed that the criticism of a limited involvement of national authorities in the process is ill

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founded as the ANBP was acting on behalf of Afghanistan. Therefore, he pointed out that the criticism of limited local ownership is actually unfounded. According to Babbington, the ANBP worked closely with the government holding regular meetings with the Ministry of Defence, and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups DIAG process would be led by the government and this is what the ANBP had always wanted (pers. comm., 2005). However, the critical issue is whether or not the ANBP has managed to pass on its institutional experience with the DDR process to its governmental counterparts in a way that can be used during the DIAG process. The field research in Afghanistan failed to substantiate this assertion. The national authority representatives interviewed, including a number of ministers who asked for anonymity, were highly critical of the way the DDR process was carried out largely without any significant involvement by their government. When the DIAG programme started, the Afghan government found itself in a position as if there had not been a major DDR process undertaken in their country. In other words, Afghanistan was asked to invent the wheel twice for its DDR challenge.

Slow Implementation From its inception in 2003 to the summer of 2004, the DDR process achieved hardly anything tangible. Almost an entire year seems to be wasted, and this was for two main reasons. First, it seems that the staffing of ANBP did not reflect the enormity of the DDR task to be undertaken in Afghanistan. A question that was repeatedly asked by both ANBP staff and those other interviewees was whether the organization’s human resources were adequate for the challenge. It seems that the employment of relatively inexperienced staff in fairly senior posts at ANBP was one of the reasons that there was a high level of timidity in decision making. On the other hand, Babbington emphasized the difficult political contextual environment of Afghanistan as one of the key realities necessitating the DDR process to move slowly (pers. comm., 2005). Dealing with a highly politicized working context and warlords turned into politicians within the government would clearly have been a major challenge for most practitioners, but not having appropriate previous work experiences did not help the situation either. The second reason for slow implementation, which was probably a more decisive factor than the first one, was the fact that the government was generally quite unwilling to push the DDR process forward. Given, that the government included some well known warlords and commanders, it was perhaps not surprising that there was only lukewarm interest from the government’s side. In such circumstances, it was very difficult for ANBP to do anything that would speed up the process. Filippo Grandi, the then Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of UNAMA also supported this view, noting

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that he did not consider the slow implementation at the beginning to be anything to do with the ANBP. Rather, in a particularly significant observation, Grandi asserted that a DDR process can be successful only as far as the overall work of peacebuilding is successful in the political process (pers. comm., 2005).7 This is a hugely important issue that is often overlooked in the analysis of DDR processes. From this perspective, it is essential to critique such processes within their overall political framework; not to do so would be to neglect a critical element of the equation. It would perhaps have been possible to seek the assistance of the United States, the key international actor in Afghanistan to put pressure on the government to this end. However, the US was heavily involved in its so called war against terrorism in Afghanistan and was concerned not to upset those warlords and commanders with which it was allied. Consequently, the DDR process had a very slow start at the beginning, which continued until the momentum that was created by the organization of the Presidential elections in October 2004. Indeed, responding to criticism about slow implementation, Babbington argued that the DDR process had actually advanced much more quickly than other aspects of the five-pillar system such as the reform of justice system and police service, and fight against narcotics (pers. comm., 2006).8 In terms of the speed of the process during the reintegration process, the ANBP Client Satisfaction Survey results show that the median waiting time for former combatants to enter into a reintegration package was about 35 days; 39 per cent of the respondents had to wait less than a month, while 21 per cent waited for up to two months and 13 per cent for around three months (2005a). However, it was also reported that in some cases former combatants had to wait for up to six months for their reintegration packages, and this was particularly problematic as the food packages provided at the demobilization phase only lasted for two months. Consequently, with 2,500 former combatants in the north, who had to wait for their reintegration packages for six months Dennys (2005:5) notes that ‘both they and their communities are extremely angry over the delay, which has put them in a financially precarious situation and caused unnecessary social stresses on the communities.’

Limited Reintegration Choices According to the ANBP’s Client Satisfaction Survey results, 31 per cent of the respondents were ‘very happy’, while 69 per cent of them were ‘happy’ with the reintegration options provided (ANBP, 2005a). However, before accepting the viability of these results, it is important to note some characteristics of the Afghan culture in order to gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of their ‘satisfaction’. First of all, in Afghan society it would be considered rude to question the ‘value’ of something that has been provided by outsiders. As Afghans accord great importance to the comfort and happiness of their guests,

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it would be totally out of character if they were to start to devalue something that was provided as a ‘gift’. A good example for this particular characteristic of Afghan society was also acknowledged by ANBP in its interpretation of data on the satisfaction with the incentive food package. According to the survey, 72 per cent of the respondents said that they consumed the package, while only six per cent of them accepted the selling of its contents. ANBP (2005a:14) states that this does not correspond with the experience of ANBP staff as, outside many distribution centres, ‘small informal markets were established…where excombatants sold their incentive package.’ This biased view in favour of consumption also shows that most respondents felt it was too rude to admit that they actually sold a ‘gift’ given to them. Secondly, asking a group of people whether they are satisfied with the choices that are provided to them without telling them what other choices they could have been offered is somehow a futile undertaking. In other words, it is not surprising if they indicated their overall satisfaction with the reintegration options, because they probably did not know what else could possibly have been offered to them. Finally, 70 per cent of the respondents mentioned that it was their caseworker who played an important role in making their decision on the reintegration package. This is a very high percentage considering that only 10 per cent of them indicated it was their families who influenced their decision (ANBP, 2005a). This is an especially low percentage in a country like Afghanistan where family forms the main unit of the society. Therefore, the findings of this survey for the satisfaction with reintegration choices may not be entirely plausible. Overall, the weakest part of the DDR process in Afghanistan was the reintegration phase. This is particularly ironic considering that the ANBP was created within the framework of UNDP, and it was hoped that the Afghan reintegration would have actually been particularly developmental in its approach to the challenge, channelling the vast experience of its mother organization in this field. However, this was the area in which the process performed badly, and this view was shared not only by the government and NGO community in the country but some UN staff too. Considering the short-termism of ANBP as the main area of shortcoming, Grandi stated that the ANBP failed in the utilization of UNDP’s resources in the process. At the implementing partner level, if we focus on the work of the implementing partner given as an example earlier, the main complaint from former combatants regarding small business start-up was the size of assistance available. The majority of former combatants thought that $700 was too small a sum with which to establish a viable business. This was particularly the case for those former combatants living in urban areas, especially Kabul, as they had to budget for much larger overhead costs such as higher rents. Considering that up to 80 per cent of former combatants who benefited from this option, were

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illiterate, the short duration of business training at some field offices of the organization should be considered as a point of concern. Although, the majority of former combatants interviewed confirmed their satisfaction with the business training process, those former combatants assisted by some particular offices seemed to have benefited from it more as they showed a greater understanding of how to run a small business. The organization identified two main reasons for the relatively short duration of business training: first, it was thought that a longer period of training would have meant a greater burden of travel and accommodation expenses for those former combatants who lived far away from their reintegration unit. The second reason related to the way former combatants were sent by ANBP in an ad-hoc manner, creating large influxes during certain periods.

Ineffective Communications & Public Relations The ANBP’s Client Satisfaction Survey shows that the information and public awareness side of the DDR strategy largely failed in meeting its objectives. The findings from the survey make appalling reading, as 94 per cent of the respondents indicated that knew ‘nothing at all’ about the process they were about to go through. In other words, a very large majority of the caseload in the Afghan DDR process had hardly any knowledge of a programme planned for them, and once the process started for 99 per cent of the respondents the main source of information was radio. In regard to the sources of information, the survey pointed out two major lessons for making programme assumptions. First, it was wrong to assume that commanders would be a good conduit for passing information to their combatants. Although many commanders had been given briefings about the DDR process before its implementation, obviously they failed in informing their combatants, since out of 529 combatants who heard about the DDR process from sources other than radio, colleagues or relatives only 141 of them mentioned their commanders as a source of information. Secondly, the assumption of RVCs as a vehicle for passing information to combatants was also wrong, because only 32 out those 529 combatants indicated they were their main source of information. The survey presents a better set of results concerning the provision of information during the DDR process itself. It seems that caseworkers who acted as a cross between both social worker and employment officer during the demobilization phase did a good job, as 33 per cent of the respondents felt they were ‘very well’ informed, while the remaining 67 per cent indicated they were ‘well’ informed about the reintegration packages (ANBP, 2005a). Nevertheless, Richard Starck who undertook a $400,000 USAID funded public information programme on the DDR programme was highly critical of the ANBP’s public information strategy. He believed that not having the right calibre of people to do the job and more importantly, the refusal of the senior level management of

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ANBP to accept that they did not know about public relations issues were the main reasons for the failure (pers. comm., 2005).9

Negative Impact of Poppy Cultivation Throughout the Afghan conflict one of the constant features of rural life in the country was poppy cultivation. In parallel with the progression of the war, there was an increasing trend towards poppy production and the opium trade, as the country’s warlords and, to some extent, the rural population in general enjoyed a steady income from it. Considering that farmers can earn ten to thirty times more from the cultivation of opium than wheat as a crop, and with their dilapidated agriculture infrastructure of destroyed irrigation networks and landmine polluted cultivable lands as a result of the country’s long civil war, farmers understandably opt for a lucrative crop like poppy. By 1999, with its weak state structures, porous borders, cash hungry warlords and ongoing armed conflict, Afghanistan had become the largest heroin producer in the world (Rashid, 1999; Goodhand, 2002). According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) estimates, the opium production reached a record level of around 4,500 metric tonnes in 1999, but owing to the Taliban’s strict rules for the eradication of poppy cultivation (some commentators argued that the reason behind the Taliban’s strict control over poppy production this policy was to increase the market price of opium) it almost stopped in 2001. However, since the US led military intervention in the country there has been a substantial increase in opium production and in 2006, it reached its highest level of 6,000 metric tonnes. Today, 90 per cent of the world’s opium trade originates from Afghanistan, accounting for a multi billion dollar sector (Sarwary, 2007). With such a big financial resource it has been relatively easy for the armed groups in Afghanistan to find the necessary cash for their weaponry needs, and drug trafficking has always been the chief income for warring factions in Afghanistan throughout its conflict. This trend has continued into the postBonn Agreement era too, and according to Ahmed (2004), the opium trade is ‘financing warring factions and undermining Kabul's authority. It is also a source of funds for the Taliban and their allies as well as Al Qaeda’. As explained by Chandra (2006:78), a complex network of relationships between different actors is the primary reason for the way in which this highly profitable trade has been sustained for such a long time: Over the decades of civil war, a well-knit network evolved between poppy cultivators, local commanders, warlords, government officials, heroin processors, smugglers, drug dealers and traders. As warlords, who often doubled up as druglords, re-established themselves after overthrowing the Taliban in 2001, they needed to finance their huge militias, often running into thousands. Mujahideen warlords were quick

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to revive the drugs network that was built during the 1980s and was left untouched during the Taliban period. Furthermore, it was argued that some of these warlords have continued to occupy positions in the Afghan government, and more than $7 billion from the drug trade in 2005 ended in the coffers of warlords. More importantly, as succinctly pointed out by Chandra, the Afghan case presents a major paradox between security, drugs and the US led ‘war on terror’, since warlords benefiting from the lucrative drug trade are ‘often accounted under the Afghan Defence Ministry as Afghan Military Force, have been assisting US coalition troops against the Taliban and their allies in the south and south-eastern Afghanistan. This has been a serious restraining factor in both the disarmament of the militias and in initiating counter-narcotics operations.’ (2006:79)

Cultural Resistance for the Demilitarization of Society Apart from the preceding operational challenges faced during the implementation of the DDR process in Afghanistan, it should also be noted that the demilitarization of the society and of the human ‘mind’ is a particularly difficult problem given a number of cultural factors. It is clear that an armed conflict of more than two decades has not only polarized society along ethnic lines, but also made an environment of fighting and violence normative for many generations. Considering the strong cultural tenets of masculinity, family honour and tribal loyalty that play a significant role in the formation of socioinstitutional structures in Afghan society, and the impact of the war in terms of lack of security, dire economic conditions and weak central government power for the provision of rule of law and justice, it is not surprising that gun ownership is a common practice in the country. For example, Sedra (2002:37–38) identifies three main reasons why disarmament of the civilian population would be such a major problem: ‘guns have become an inalienable part of Afghan culture, a sign of manhood that are fired in the air at celebrations such as weddings or to mark the birth of a child…with the security situation so precarious, Afghan men are unlikely to relinquish their weapons for they serve as the principal guarantor of their property and physical security…with the lack of employment opportunities in the country; weapons are a source of income for men’. The experience since the Bonn Agreement does not encourage the views to think that any of these socio-economic challenges will be resolved in the near future, but at least the current peacebuilding process is trying to tackle them. However, the challenge of the culture of peace is likely to be much more difficult to establish and the place of guns in the Afghan society needs to be seen from this perspective too. It is important to bear in mind that a DDR process can only provide a temporary contribution to the peacebuilding process

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and provides an opportunity for the transformation of combatant identity towards a more civilian one. However, unless Afghan society can come to recognize the problem of the ‘gun culture’ in its socio-cultural structures, it will be impossible to ensure a real demilitarization in the country. It is true that none of the other environmental factors, such as the provision of viable security, or the justice and employment structures that are necessary for a widespread demilitarization are present yet, but this should not be a reason for not recognizing the cultural element of this challenge. This is particularly important considering that, according to a survey conducted by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRCA), 65 per cent of the respondents identified disarmament as ‘the single most important action for improving security’ (2004:10). It was reported that this was even higher in those provinces with powerful commanders such as in Mazar-i-Sharif which is home for the Northern Alliances’ Tajik and Uzbek factions. 87 per cent of the respondents there saw disarmament as a priority. In other words, it is necessary to question the role of the socio-cultural values of the society in the successful implementation of a DDR process and to accept that if there is to be any change towards the culture of peace, this would be likely to come about only in the long-term. It is clear that the purpose of this perspective is in no way to excuse the shortcomings of the Afghan DDR process, but rather to contextualize it in a more realistic way, so that some problems experienced with disarmament can be better understood. Conclusions The most prominent feature of the Afghan DDR was the way it was highly politicized during its planning and implementation. From the donors’ security priorities in the country to warlords’ greed for power and the post-conflict government’s political structures, all have played a significant role in the DDR process. Although the international community was acting as a third party and therefore supposed to be neutral, the reality was rather a different story. The various lead donors in the security sector reform process all had their own priorities, and unless the DDR process served their own particular interest, they did not demonstrate much constructive engagement with the process. The rearmament of various armed groups by the US for its war against terror is probably the best example of how the agendas of different lead donors conflicted with each other. On the one hand, the DDR advocated the disarmament of combatants and on the other hand, the re-armament of various factions was taking place at full speed. The DDR process meant that the MoD formally de-financed more than 76,000 soldiers, creating $70 million savings in the national revenue expenditures (ANBP, 2005). In addition to the collection of small arms and weapons, according to ANBP the collection of heavy weapons was perhaps the

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most successful aspect of the entire DDR process and as of 1 July 1006 it had managed to collect 12,248 of them. According to ANBP estimates this represents the vast majority of all working and repairable heavy weapons known to exist in Afghanistan (ANBP, 2006). According to Grandi, the main achievement of the DDR process was the dismantling of the military structure which would otherwise have been a parallel system to the new governance structure. On the other hand, he also explained that the DDR process had probably only weakened the patron-client relationship between commanders and combatants, rather than actually breaking it down completely. Moreover, from a more realistic perspective Grandi asserted that what has been collected during the disarmament process is actually ‘a drop in the ocean’ since at the micro level, the availability of small weapons is still a significant issue (pers. comm., 2005). In 2002 when the DDR process in Afghanistan was still being planned, this author argued that the traditional sequencing of DDR processes should be reconsidered, and possibly move straight towards reconstruction activities without implementing the disarmament and demobilization phases (Özerdem, 2002). My argument was that, no matter how carefully the disarmament process is carried out, given the security, socio-political, economic and cultural realities of the country, it would be unlikely to provide a major breakthrough for the disarmament challenges of the society at the micro level. Secondly, as combatants were already living with their communities at the start of the DDR process, the demobilization phase was also semi-defunct. A bold undertaking like a reintegration-led DDR process would have meant the availability of much larger resources for the implementation of reintegration programmes. Politically, this would not have been the most desirable approach as far as the international community is concerned; but having seen the challenges experienced during the implementation of the DDR process and their impact, it seems that the idea of a reintegration-led process seems to hold its ground. For the disarmament of heavy weapons the process was successful, but with small weapons what has been collected is once again, ‘a drop in the ocean’. Meanwhile, it is succinctly pointed out that although the shortcomings of the DDR strategy in Afghanistan are recognized by policy makers, ‘in Kabul there is an understanding that the programme must be “sold” as a success. The deeply ingrained policy mistakes at the beginning of the process predetermined that the programme would not be able to have the effect the Afghan people wanted, which was total disarmament. Instead Afghanistan received a diplomatic fait a complis and was short changed.’ (Dennys, 2005:10–11)

6 CONCLUSION A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Recovery from armed conflict is a problematic and highly complex task. Divided societal relationships; low security and instability; destroyed infrastructure and services; along with non-functional governance structures and a ruined economy are just some of the critical areas that need to be addressed in order to generate a process capable of opening up new perspectives and opportunities for sustainable peace. Given that even the continuation of an environment of negative peace is itself a major challenge for most war-torn societies, the transformation from war to peace with the objective of laying the foundations for positive peace requires clear vision, huge determination and coordinated political will. Just as it is important not to consider ‘peace’ as a single good or end product, so too it is vital that the postwar recovery is structured and undertaken as a dynamic process. There are a wide range of components necessary for completing the ‘puzzle’ of post-war recovery, and the impact of each component is likely to result in an interwoven pattern of relationships at both the vertical and horizontal levels. One of the main reasons for the failure of post-war recovery and peacebuilding is the illdefined and ad-hoc way in which relationships between the different levels of agencies, institutions, programmes and processes, are structured and more importantly, the way objectives are defined and set, not according to the real needs, expectations and aspirations of war-torn societies, but according to externally driven mandates, values and interests. For post-war recovery to be sustainable the establishment of security and stability is essential and it would not be possible to envisage such an objective being achieved without dealing with the reintegration of the combatants who have waged the war. From their disarmament to demobilization, the

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reintegration of former combatants is likely to play a critical role in all levels and structures of the peacebuilding process. Consequently, as was the case with many war affected environments, the DDR of former combatants in El Salvador, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan had to be given the highest priority in order to give the transformation of peace a chance in these war-torn societies so that it no longer meant a simple absence of violence. The investigation of these case studies confirmed that without a DDR process, to initiate a peacebuilding process would not have been possible. Although its necessity is clearly substantiated, it is still important to identify why certain approaches work better in some contexts than others, hence a comparative analysis will be carried out in this chapter in order to achieve this objective. The final chapter of this book will start with a brief comparison of the different approaches undertaken in the four case studies by focussing on their strengths and weaknesses. The objective of this comparison will be to elaborate their principal characteristics and to summarize the primary DDR challenges discussed in each case study. Having provided an overview of each case study chapter, the second section will outline the lessons learned in terms of the relationship between DDR and the four main aspects of post-war recovery: security, governance, socio-economic environment, and justice and reconciliation (Miall, et al., 2000) The analysis in this section will provide an understanding of how the DDR case studies succeeded or failed in contributing to the overall peacebuilding framework. The objective will be to present those aspects of each approach which worked or did not work, and more importantly, to investigate the politics of DDR decision making at work in each approach in a comparative analysis. Finally, the chapter will conclude its discussions under the following four main themes: compartmentalization of DDR; ‘reintegrationfirst’ approaches to DDR; community-centred approaches rather than oneman-one-weapon strategies; and local participation and ownership. Case Study DDR Approaches Each case study in this book represented a particular DDR approach undertaken in the aftermath of armed conflicts which differed from each other according to their duration, geographical context, international response and resolutions. For example, while the armed conflict in Kosovo lasted less than two years, it was around 11 years in Sierra Leone and El-Salvador, and over 20 years in Afghanistan. While the Kosovo case was a ‘clear winner’ scenario with a strong level of self-determination within a vague framework of sovereignty, the Afghan case represented a ‘no-peace agreement’ scenario, in which peace was enforced externally. Although El-Salvador and Sierra Leone represented ‘peace agreement’ scenarios for DDR, it was more through negotiations in the former and external military intervention in the latter. Representing four different geographical contexts, namely Africa, Asia, Central America and

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Europe, the way the international community responded to these conflicts and assisted the respective war-torn societies in their post-conflict recovery was also different, resulting in different approaches to the DDR challenge. However, before focussing further on the differences between the case studies, it is important to underline the similarities between them. First of all, the DDR process in all four cases was part of a UN Security Council Resolution, outlining the structure of DDR process, its caseload and contours of reintegration benefits. This is significant as it indicates that the DDR process is often drawn up by the international community, and supported by third party intervention. In all four cases, the involvement of international military forces in terms of monitoring and peacekeeping was also critical as they had an active participation not only in the provision of security but also a direct role in activities such as the collection and destruction of weapons, and disbanding of combatants. Nevertheless, a common phenomenon with the provision of international military forces in all cases was that in terms of their size and resources they struggled to cope with the scope of the security challenge. Based on a UN resolution and the deployment of peacekeeping forces for security, the international community seems to make a considerable effort to provide a legal framework for DDR, but it fails to resource such processes adequately, and more critically, the wider international politics tend to interfere with the scope, geographical jurisdiction and mandate of such deployments. Secondly, an unfortunate commonality between all four case studies was that the DDR processes had to deal with larger than expected caseloads. There seems to be a major discrepancy between what the estimated of a possible caseload and how many combatants actually turn up to register during disarmament. The reasons for this phenomenon may be fourfold. Firstly, no matter how hard the parties involved try, the realities and characteristics of waraffected environments are such that it is almost impossible to come up with an accurate estimate, as even the armed groups themselves do not have a proper inventory of their forces. Secondly, commanders tend to use the disarmament criteria for their benefit and allow non-combatants to register as this is likely to create a larger post-DDR constituency for themselves; especially if they are planning to enter into post-conflict politics. This would also be likely to give them a greater degree of leverage during peace negotiations, hence the distribution of extra weapons and combatant confirmation letters to relatives and friends or even to those who are prepared to buy them or share the forthcoming reintegration benefits with commanders, is not a totally unusual practice. Third, the registration criteria may be too lax, such that each combatant can register by satisfying the bare minimum criteria, and whatever weapons they are left with may be passed to civilians allowing them to register too. Finally, the DDR process may be based on inadequate assessment and

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surveys, so the baseline data does not reflect the real size of armed groups – this may have an impact in either direction, resulting in larger or smaller caseload sizes than expected– and is often the result of weak checking and control mechanisms to avoid fake registrations at the disarmament phase. Whatever the reasons may be for this problem it is clear that the larger than expected caseloads tend to pose a major challenge to the successful implementation of DDR processes, as the initially estimated and obtained funding ends up being spread too thinly to meet the needs of a larger number of combatants than initially planned. In all four cases the process had to deal with this challenge, and it was one of the main obstacles to the long term sustainability of these interventions. The DDR cases had to be implemented in unfavourable post-conflict economic conditions. Characterized by high unemployment, limited means of livelihood, collapsed markets, destroyed infrastructure and constrained credit conditions, the post-conflict economic environment is the most critical challenge for the long-term economic sustainability of former combatants. Benefiting from the reintegration options, such as vocational training and micro-enterprise development, may give former combatants a chance to start a new life, but this dream does not always last long as former combatants struggle to transform their newly acquired skills into sustainable employment or livelihoods, and a new business may need much more than start-up assistance to survive. Most former combatants in all of the four cases were aware of the chance of a new life given to them by their reintegration assistance, but they were left with frustration that this opportunity did not materialize into meaningful employment for them. The disadvantages of a post-conflict economic environment could have been better managed, as will be argued later on, by placing reintegration activities into a more realistic framework. However, it is also important to note that the general economic difficulties severely limit the chances of success for reintegration projects. Consequently, in order to maximize expected outcomes from DDR programmes, it is vital to address the underlying economic conditions of the environment in which DDR takes place. Just as unfavourable economic conditions were present in all four case studies so weak state and governance structures constituted another important common characteristic. Depending on the history of the country and characteristics of the conflict, there were variations in the ability of the state to take a role in the reconstruction and reintegration activities, but overall, the DDR programmes had to operate in an environment in which they could not rely on the support of sound institutional structures. The state, which was struggling to provide the most basic conditions and services such as security, education, health and welfare generally, was unable to ensure the effective DDR of former combatants. This shortcoming was overcome to some extent with the assistance of third party intervention, but that also brought its own set of challenges to the planning and implementation of DDR programmes.

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In all four cases, the start of the peacebuilding process heralded a new era not only for civilians but combatants too, hence, there was an environment of raised expectations among them. Most former combatants in the case studies believed that the reintegration assistance could really change their lives. There tends to be an initial trust and high level of expectation concerning the ability of the international community to change their lives simply by providing sufficient financial resources to enable them to end up with a new prosperous life. The military and economic might of the rich western countries, and their involvement in these conflicts as a third party, tend to produce unrealistic expectations in former combatants that they will change all the ills and misfortunes of their lives. Unfortunately, in these case studies such hopes were quickly tainted, as former combatants came to realize shortly after the DDR process started that the international community’s abilities would fall well short of creating a new world for them. In all four cases the regional context played a significant role, not only during the conflict, but also during the DDR processes. The movement of weapons and combatants from one country to another can have a decisive impact on the success or failure of a DDR process. Unless porous borders can be completely patrolled, which is an impossible task for most war-torn societies, the DDR processes will need to give careful consideration to the range of regional factors that can exacerbate insecurity; by providing safe havens for hidden caches of weapons, temporary homes for combatants and opportunities for illicit trading activities. It is a well known fact that most armed groups sustain themselves through drug trafficking, natural resource exploitation, weapons smuggling and human trafficking, and these activities do not simply come to an end with the start of a DDR process. Any crackdown by the third party forces to stop such illicit activities may mean a temporary relocation to neighbouring countries, or alternatively, the post-conflict security vacuum and an increasing number of unemployed demobilized combatants can result in a fresh supply of human resources for such criminal activities. Finally, the four case studies underlined another major commonality, namely the importance of socio-cultural factors in the successful implementation of DDR programmes and their long-term sustainability. From their indigenous forgiveness mechanisms to traditional values governing gender relations, the receiving communities were always critical to the real chances of successful reintegration. Without their acceptance, toleration and forgiveness the reintegration of former combatants in some of the case studies would be meaningless. The case studies not only underlined the importance of sociocultural values but also how little the DDR processes actually do to deal with them effectively. In all cases there was a certain degree of lip-service paid to the importance of considering such traditional structures and their significance of social reintegration in the entire process, but in terms of resources allocated for

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such a critical task the four case studies fell well short of taking appropriate actions. The receiving communities were not considered a high priority and they entered into the reintegration picture if and when their dissatisfaction or refusal to accept combatants became a major threat to the overall peacebuilding process. Having reviewed the main similarities between the four case studies, this section will now present a review of the DDR approaches undertaken in the four case studies. Exploring their key characteristics, the review will provide a comparative analysis of their main strengths and weaknesses. The summary of differences and similarities between the four case study DDR approaches can be seen in Table 6.1. Based on a peace agreement, the DDR process in El Salvador was for both governmental security forces and an armed guerrilla group. Although there was no clear winner at the end of the war, the negotiations under the guidance of the international community resulted in a peace agreement. There was no military intervention for peace making but the UN mission in El Salvador was probably the first peace operation which included the elements of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The anti-governmental armed group considered the peace agreement a major achievement in bringing the government to address their concerns such as security sector and land reforms, consequently; it was a relatively willing partner in the implementation and successful completion of the DDR process. Owing to the longevity of the conflict over a 12 year period, the former combatants from the guerrilla group were returning their communities after a lengthy separation. However, because of the ideological nature of the conflict they were welcomed as heroes by their own communities. There were acts of gross brutality and human rights abuses, but these were mainly committed by governmental security forces, therefore, their downsizing and reform were seen as an appropriate measure by the guerrilla group and its supporters. The caseload was distinctive with a relatively high proportion of female combatants who were expected to return to patriarchal societal structures, and the political transformation of the guerrilla group was also significant in the way the DDR process was planned and implemented. The El Salvador DDR can be described as a government led process with wide participation and support from the guerrilla group and the international community. The way, it was structured by the peace agreement, with the government taking overall responsibility for the planning and implementation of DDR, but as the guerrilla group transformed into a political actor as part of the peacebuilding process it became directly involved in the decision making process. The international community acted as a third party and referee for the emerging problems and disagreements. The process was also characterized by

SIMILARITIES

DIFFERENCES

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El Salvador

Kosovo

Sierra Leone

Afghanistan

• DDR of both governmental security forces and armed group. • Peace agreement. • Anti-government armed group considers itself as the winner of the war. • Support of all sides for DDR. • Long period of separation from community. • Gross brutality committed by governmental forces. • Big caseload of female combatants. • No cantonment. • Strong political involvement of the armed group. • Active involvement of the armed group into planning and implementation of DDR.

• One armed group to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate. • Peace agreement. • The armed group to DDR is the victorious side. • Support of the armed group for DDR. • Most combatants were community based. • No gross brutality committed by armed group. • No major female and child combatant caseload. • No cantonment. • Emergence of various political parties from the armed group. • The DDR was planned and carried out by external actors.

• A number of armed groups for DDR. • Peace agreement. • Through various warto-peace stages. • No clear winner. • No strong support from all armed groups. • Long period of separation from community. • Gross brutality committed by all armed groups. • Large child soldier caseload. • Cantonment. • Limited desire for political involvement. • Substantial involvement of the government in planning and implementation.

• DDR of armed groups which were considered as national security forces. • No peace agreement. • No clear winner but groups to DDR are considered in the winning side. • Limited support from warlords for DDR. • Most combatants were community based. • Relatively little gross brutality though excesses carried out by some groups. • No female caseload, some child soldier involvement. • No cantonment. • Extensive involvement of warlords in government and governance of the country. • Limited involvement of government in planning and implementation of DDR.

• • • • • • • • • •

UN Security Council mandate for DDR. Involvement of international peacekeeping forces. There was no overall agreement on the size of caseload. Limited economic capacities of absorbing environment for reintegrated former combatants. Weak state and governance structures. Rural-urban and external migration experienced during and after DDR. High expectations of substantial rewards as part of DDR. Involvement of external armed groups and combatants in varied degrees. Involvement in illicit activities such as natural resource exploitation, and drug and arms trade. Role of gun culture as an impact of conflict and/or socio-cultural characteristics of society. Table 6.1: Differences and similarities between the four DDR cases

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its short time frame. The disarmament and demobilization phases were achieved very quickly as it did not incorporate a cantonment element, but when it came to the reintegration phase due to its dependence on land reform for progress, there were considerable delays. As a DDR model, the El Salvador experience was also significant in the way it tried to address one of the root causes of the conflict which was about the distribution of land in the country. The Kosovo DDR on the other hand, was for an armed group which was an ally of the international military intervention which brought the UN protectorate structure to the province. Although the military intervention itself was carried out without a UN resolution it ended with a peace agreement and the DDR process which were mandated by a UN resolution. The armed group which went through the DDR process was the ‘victorious’ side at the end of the conflict and the majority of its combatants had not been involved in the fighting for more than two years. With its short duration, single-target group caseload and the small number of relatively well educated combatants to be reintegrated, the Kosovo DDR was a less problematic case than similar undertakings in other parts of the world. For example, the phenomenon of child soldiers was absent, there were very low numbers of female combatants and no cases of brutality carried out by the armed group against its own people. Although the process had the full support of the armed group, the entire process was planned and implemented by the international community. As there were no local governance structures at the time the DDR process was initiated, the undertaking of all activities was reliant on the institutional structures created by the international community. The process had a quick demobilization phase without the need for cantonment, as almost all of the caseload was already community based. The DDR process in Kosovo also witnessed the transformation of the armed group into a number of political parties which became major contenders in the post-conflict political life of the province. Moreover, the most interesting characteristic of the process was the fact that it took place in a country whose sovereignty was further threatened by the entire reintegration process, as it created the core of the future army of Kosovo. In other words, the DDR model in Kosovo was an internationally-led and implemented process in which the caseload and any ‘national’ and local institutions had a very limited involvement in the entire process. As a major contrast to the Kosovo case, the DDR experience in Sierra Leone presented a model of a national government led and coordinated process. With the characteristics of a multi-armed group caseload; this was a ‘no clear-winner’ scenario after a brutal and highly destructive armed conflict. The extensive involvement of female combatants and child soldiers meant the Sierra Leone context was possibly one of the most problematic cases. With the abduction of children to force them to commit atrocities against their own communities and lengthy separation from their families, the DDR in Sierra

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Leone represented the most difficult social reintegration scenario. It was also significant that the DDR process was conducted through various stages of a war-to-peace transition. From a high intensity of conflict, through peace negotiations and military intervention to post-conflict reconstruction, the DDR process was undertaken amidst different political and security environments. Each phase in this process had its toll in the way the DDR process was planned and implemented, but it is important to note that a national DDR authority remained as the main coordination and implementation body for the entire process. As a nationally led model, the Sierra Leone experience had all the elements of a ‘typical’ DDR process, including cantonment, though there were variations in the way they were carried out between the different phases of the process. Finally, the DDR experience in Afghanistan represented a completely new model in which a new institutional body was founded to undertake the entire process. Dealing with a large caseload consisting of different armed groups but considered as national security forces, the Afghan DDR experience presented a framework of hybrid structures and characteristics. Although it was based on an agreement, it was not a peace agreement in a traditional sense, and while the DDR process was being undertaken, the international community was also involved in an on-going war against some armed groups in the country. There was no clear winner after the international military intervention, but it had ousted a government that was not recognized by the majority of countries in the world and those armed groups that allied themselves with the international community formed the main elements of the new governmental structures. Nevertheless, even those groups were reluctant to give their full support to the DDR process, and the main advantage of the caseload was the fact that most combatants were already community based. Therefore, without any need for cantonment, the DDR model in Afghanistan progressed relatively quickly once it was initiated after long delays caused by political bickering. The presence of warlords in post-conflict governance continued to be a major challenge for the process, as it had to deal continually with the challenges of insecurity, illegal drug and trade activities, and a lack of political will. The DDR model had room for involvement of the national authorities on paper but in reality, from the planning to the implementation it was largely an international affair. Table 6.2 presents the main strengths and weaknesses of the DDR approaches in a comparative way, but it should be noted that only the main characteristics of these models were considered and a wider analysis of their strengths and weaknesses will be presented in the following section.

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El Salvador

Kosovo

Strengths

Weaknesses

Allowed the involvement of all parties concerned.

Inadequate time frame for the proper implementation of the process.

Based on a comprehensive peace agreement.

Too much reliance on a particular type of reintegration assistance.

Addressed the root causes of the conflict.

Lack of monitoring mechanisms by the international community.

Relative political willingness for a rapid implementation of the process.

Limited or partisan involvement of civil society organizations.

International and local political support and willingness.

Lack of a clear vision for the future of the province.

Adequate security provision by the international community.

No local involvement in planning and implementation.

Relatively small coordination challenges.

Worsening trust between combatants and the international community.

Flexible approach to changing circumstances.

Limited attempt to merge with wider reconstruction concerns.

Sierra Leone Nationally led and coordination

Afghanistan

planning and implementation.

Compartmentalization of the process through different types of actors.

Strong international support and willingness to assist in the process.

Too many implementing partners without adequate resources.

Sound coordination between national and international actors.

Inadequate security provision by the international community.

Strong national backing from the government and public in general.

Discontinuities in the willingness of armed groups to participate.

Relatively unproblematic and continuous donor support.

Planned and implemented by an international organization.

One single institutional structure to coordinate the entire process.

Limited transfer of ‘know-how’ to national actors.

Use of DDR as a conditionality for participation in elections.

Too many implementing partners and difficult coordination.

Well structured disarmament teams with appropriate expertise.

Lack of institutional capacity and experience.

Table 6.2: Strengths and weaknesses of the DDR case study approaches

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The DDR and Post-Conflict Recovery: a comparative analysis Security In all four cases, the implementation of the DDR process played a significant role in the improvement of post-conflict security conditions. Apart from Afghanistan, the signing of the peace agreement and reintegration of former combatants in the other three case studies meant an almost total end of armed conflict related violence. In the case of Sierra Leone, the way the DDR process was carried out over three phases (owing to repeated interruptions by the conflict), seems to be an exception. However, the completion of the DDR process and organization of elections in 2002 was a major turning point for the Sierra Leone peace process. Consequently, it would be possible to argue that there was a direct coordination between the assumption of an improved security environment and the implementation of DDR; however, it is important to note the changes in security environment over time and how the long-term impacts of DDR play a role in this evolution. For this particular issue, it is critical to investigate the case of El Salvador as the security situation there is in a dismal state 15 years on from the ending of hostilities. There may no longer be an armed conflict, but would be difficult to claim that it is a relatively safe place for its citizens to live. In order to initiate the analysis on security and the way the DDR case studies contributed to it, Afghanistan would be an interesting starting point as compared to other case studies, as the security environment showed the least improvement after its DDR process. The DDR process in Afghanistan ironically, created a vacuum of security in certain areas, especially in those provinces with a composition of different ethnic groups. For example, the disarmament of Brigade 856 which was made up of mainly Tajiks and Tatars in Bamyan and Baghlan resulted in great security concerns for the Tajik and Tatar minorities of the area where the main ethnic group is Hazara. There were claims that the Hazara dominated provincial government was discriminating against Tajik and Tatar villages in the area, preventing them from accessing reconstruction programmes. Furthermore, as local Hazaras blamed the Brigade for allowing the Taliban to enter the area in the 1990s and carry out massacres, the disarmament ‘led to great concerns amongst the unit’s soldiers about possible retribution by the Hazara community’ (Dennys, 2005:6). Ironically, parallel to the DDR process, there was also rearmament of some groups, in terms of stockpiling of weapons, rearming former or new combatants, re-selling weapons and trafficking in them. Dennys (2005:7) estimated the rates of rearmament to be between 2 and 20 per cent, indicating that ‘the DDR programme has in no way addressed the informal structures but sustained the façade of the cohesive AMF structures’. Giving a number of examples of security incidents throughout the country, Dennys makes the connection between the incomplete disarmament or rearmament of groups

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and those security challenges. For example, Haji Rahim, Commander of Division 26 in Sangcharak rearmed up to 100 of his former combatants to clear local people’s demonstrations against his illegal tax, or the situation identified by UNAMA in the central region where one of the commanders ‘has over 12,000 light weapons and is trafficking in them in order to replace the income he has lost through disarmament’ (2005:7). Incomplete disarmament has also become an important reason for the low security environment in the case of El Salvador. Owing to mainly time limitations, the disarmament phase managed to collect only a small percentage of available weapons as the FMLN had hidden large caches of weapons in neighbouring countries. Although these were later discovered and destroyed, it is not clear how many weapons from the FMLN and FAES ended up in the hands of civilians. Similarly, what was collected by the Sierra Leone and Kosovo disarmament process was only the tip of the iceberg. In all four cases it was widely believed that what was handed in by former combatants was simply the bare minimum requirement for their registration, otherwise it would have been difficult to claim that these disarmament undertakings created a SALW free environment. In the case of Sierra Leone, the majority of weapons that were not handed in found their way into the conflicts of neighbouring countries such as Côte d’Ivoire. The hidden weapons in Kosovo are not likely to be re-used unless there is a return to an armed conflict against Serbian security forces. Although it seems that the full independence desired by the Kosovar Albanians may take a while to come, it is highly unlikely that the international community would let the province be engulfed in a new armed conflict. Having gone through the DDR process of over 60,000 combatants, Afghanistan is still far from being a post-conflict country. The ongoing war between NATO forces, and the Taliban, particularly in the south and southeast of the country, continues to pose a major a security challenge to the peacebuilding efforts in the country. Apart from this conflict, another significant cause of insecurity in Afghanistan is the continuing existence of the so called ‘illegal armed groups’. It is expected that there are more than 100,000 Afghans in over 1,800 groups and their disbandment is yet to be achieved and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) will probably be one of the main litmus tests for peacebuilding in Afghanistan (Bhatia, 2007). First of all, the separation of those included in the DDR programme and left for the DIAG process was not always a clear cut undertaking and at times it seemed to be rather arbitrary. For example, due to funding restrictions the DDR of the Brigade 856 in Bamyan province was able to target only some of its caseload, and subsequently only 400 soldiers who were under the command of General Rahmatullah were selected, leaving 800 soldiers for the DIAG process. Given that the DIAG process will not provide programme benefits on an individual basis, it is not surprising that those remaining 800 soldiers were ‘said to be very upset’ (Dennys, 2005:6).

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Secondly, there are serious concerns with the DIAG strategy and its achievability in the context of Afghanistan. The strategy tries to meet its objective through a three phase plan which consists of: 1– voluntary compliance; 2– negotiated compliance; and 3– enforced compliance. It is hoped that illegal armed groups will accept the offer of the Afghan government and willingly turn in their weapons and disband, and the strategy was structured in a way which assumed that most armed groups would be dealt with in this phase. In order to support this phase, the government needs to take action on the issues of establishing gun laws and issuing regulations for private security groups, and as a reward to those groups which disband voluntarily the strategy plans to provide their communities with development incentives. Once this phase is completed, the negotiated compliance phase will start, and the main mechanism to convince armed groups will be negotiations initiated by government, religious leaders and community elders with an identified deadline. There will still be the ‘carrot’ of community development incentives in this phase, but they will be available only until a set deadline. Overlaps between the first two phases are expected. Finally, once the negotiated compliance phase has expired, non-compliant illegal armed groups will be put on a ‘shame list’ and considered criminal. Obviously, the next action will then be to exert force on them to ensure their compliance with disbandment. This probably will be the most controversial aspect of the DIAG and could easily exacerbate the insecurity situation in many parts of the country. On the other hand, the DIAG programme in general, is likely to face a number of other challenges which will play a detrimental factor in the establishing of security. First of all, while the DDR programme was very much a ‘one-man-andone-weapon’ type of strategy which channelled all of its support to individual combatants, the DIAG’s incentives are targeted at communities only. This was largely due to Japan’s insistence as they did not wish to be seen to be supporting illegal groups with their assistance. However, this makes the assumption that joining such illegal groups was actually a choice for most of those combatants. In reality, as was the case with the AMF, combatants joined these groups for economic reasons, as they often comprised the only regular employment opportunity for them. In other words, the disbandment of those illegal groups, without the provision any assistance to individual combatants can be highly problematic, forcing them into other criminal activities. Second, the DIAG process also plans the legalization of certain groups such as those working for security companies and those who are fighting with the coalition forces against the Taliban. Clearly, this would be an exemption from disarmament and in other words, at the end of the DIAG process, Afghanistan would still be left with a large number of armed groups whose leaders have close links with criminal activities. As pointed out earlier, in order to sustain the initial security benefits gained by the implementation of a DDR process, other security sector reform

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elements need to be undertaken too. This is particularly important in the medium to long term, as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants can create a false impression of an improved security environment. As observed in the El Salvador and Sierra Leone case studies, the establishment and training of new security structures such the army and police force need to be undertaken in parallel to the DDR process. However, the downsizing and reform of existing security forces, as was the case in El Salvador, can easily mean a vacuum of security in the country which can create opportunities for the emergence of crime networks and gangs. Due to a combination of such reasons, the security situation following the peace agreement in El Salvador has deteriorated gradually and the country is struggling with the legacy of this postconflict problem. Combined with poverty, the return of gang members from the US and the availability of unemployed demobilized combatants and SALW, there was fertile ground for crime networks to put down strong roots in the society immediately after the DDR process. The government’s lack of action in controlling SALW through legislation and policing has led to a situation which appears to be completely out of control. As a result, it would be fair to argue that although El Salvador managed, by means of peace agreement, to bring to an end the violence related to the armed conflict, it has so far failed to address the high levels of crime and violence in its post-conflict period. In Sierra Leone, the post-2002 period has been fairly stable without any major security threats in the country. The population at large still expects the post-conflict benefits to somehow reach them one day, and they hope for the continuation of peace in the country. However, there seem to be two possible threats to the continuation of security in Sierra Leone. Firstly, the problems related to governance, particularly with the issues of corruption, tend to be resolved by the government. For the majority of the population to be able to trust the institutions of democracy and continue to support the peacebuilding process, they need to see clear and decisive steps being taken to prevent corruption within state structures and organizations. Secondly, there is a large group of disgruntled and dissatisfied youth in the country, the majority of whom are those child soldiers who emerged from the DDR process. Considering the role of lumpen youth in the emergence of the armed conflict in 1991, it is crucial that the country starts urgently to deal with the socioeconomic needs of this group. When the DDR process failed to address the needs of female combatants properly, most ‘bush wives’ and other groups of girls and women involved in the conflict chose a life with their ‘husbands’, but for young male combatants, the streets of Freetown became a new home for them. For most of them, five years on from the ending of the conflict, ‘peace’ means little more than empty promises and many of them hope to see a relapse into conflict since it meant some sort of order and structure in their lives, and a livelihood to feed themselves.

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In terms of their overall impact on security, among the four case studies, the DDR in Afghanistan seems to have been the least effective one, although it must be stressed that for the continuing security problems there are a number of other factors such as the continuation of the war against the Taliban and alQaida, the fragile political environment, the high level availability of SALW in the hands of civilians, opium production and the overall environment of poverty in general. The collection of high numbers of heavy weapons in its disarmament phase should be seen as one of the main achievements of the Afghan DDR process, but it is clear that the small weapons which were collected are only a tip of the iceberg. The former combatants who went through the DDR process may have been satisfied with their reintegration packages to some extent, but it would be premature to say that the DDR process managed to break down the power relationship existing between commanders and combatants. Ironically, in some cases the reintegration process has further strengthened this relationship, especially between low ranking commanders and combatants, as some agricultural reintegration packages in particular formed small teams of combatants as beneficiaries, most of whom were headed by low ranking commanders. They continue to cultivate their land under such organizational structures in which low ranking commanders act as team leaders. In the remaining three case studies, the DDR – security relationship is quite different. As the armed conflicts in Sierra Leone and El Salvador came to an end with a peace agreement, the environment there has been a more conducive to the establishment of security and stability in these countries. However, the security situation has been adversely affected by a number of other factors in El Salvador and, although there is no insecurity resulting from armed conflict, the country today is suffering from a high level of gang violence related to criminal networks. The security situation in Sierra Leone has been stable, however the youth in general and those child soldiers who went through the DDR process in particular, need to be assisted further in order to sustain the security benefits of the DDR process. As Kosovo represented a completely different type of scenario with the characteristics of its conflict and the way it came to an end, there was no direct correlation between the DDR of the KLA and the overall security environment. However, the current problems with personal security in the province have some linkages with the DDR process, since some former KLA combatants have become involved in organized crime such as the smuggling of arms and drugs, and human trafficking. Although the security situation derived only positive benefits from the DDR process in the shortterm, if the local politicians continue to ignore those problems with personal security, then the DDR of KLA may be perceived as one of the reasons for security problems in the medium to long term.

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Governance In terms of governance related issues, the El Salvador case is particularly interesting. As the DDR in El Salvador was closely related to land reform and the re-structuring of the security forces, it has had a decisive impact on the governance of the country. Firstly, with all its shortcomings the land reform aspect was nevertheless, a major achievement for the DDR process. With over 35,000 direct beneficiaries and 7.2 per cent of the country’s agricultural land, the land reform process addressed a significant problem in the country’s governance structures. For decades, the landless peasants were used by the rich elite of the country to further their economic interests with the help of the heavy-handed actions of the army as a direct control mechanism against dissent. By providing land to those marginalized groups, the DDR process completed a delayed and protracted land reform challenge in the country. Consequently, it was significant that the DDR process prioritized this issue in its implementation, although this programme could have had much wider impacts on governance and socio-economic development, if it had been supported by a number of other economic programmes. As discussed in Chapter Two, the lack of any micro-credit mechanisms to support agricultural schemes, the shortcomings of skills and interests necessary to cultivate land among former combatants, and the poor quality of land distributed were all significant factors in preventing this programme from having much wider positive impacts. Nevertheless, it is due to the land reform process that former combatants and their families experienced a direct peace dividend which was critical for the continuation of their support in the peacebuilding process. The downsizing of the army and its restructuring along the recommendations of the Ad-Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces and the Truth Commission were also critical, DDR-related steps which exercised a major impact on the improvement of governance in El Salvador. As part of the peace agreement, it was required that the army would have no direct involvement in the provision of domestic security which would be entirely the responsibility of the police force. Although the army continued to have a certain involvement during the security vacuum which emerged with the retraining period for the new police force, overall, this objective has been achieved to a large extent, which marks a significant turning point in the governance of the country. The army in El Salvador is no longer a key actor in the process of governance, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now fully under civilian control. Once again, this is a major achievement in a country where for decades the army was historically either directly or indirectly the main actor in the governance process. The political transformation of the FMLN from a guerrilla group to a political party was also another significant contribution of the DDR process. Required by the peace agreement, this political transformation opened up a new

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environment for political decision making in the country. Although many supporters of the FMLN considered this transformation to be a betrayal by their leadership of their core ideological principles, it should be noted that without this political transformation, it would have been difficult to ensure the support of the FMLN for the peacebuilding process. It is also interesting to note that, although the FMLN always claimed to be representing the interest of the large mass of the population, it has failed to win any of the elections since the peace agreement. Although the FMLN leadership argues this was largely because they were not ready and prepared to work effectively in a democratic framework immediately after the peace agreement, in reality the issue was largely because what they offered as a model for governance was not what the majority of the population wanted to see in their country. The DDR process in El Salvador was also significant for the overall strengthening of civil society in the country. When the process was initiated, the majority of civil society organizations were affiliated with the FMLN and worked under its umbrella. However, over time most of these FMLN affiliated civil society organizations have started to gain much more independence in their decision making. The provision of funding from non-FMLN supporter donors such as the US and EU, has meant that some civil society organizations moved from being FMLN oriented implementing agents, to being civil society organizations with an independent and critical voice. Likewise, the DDR process in Sierra Leone was also a significant factor for the revitalization of civil society organizations in the country. As the reintegration phase required the involvement of civil society organizations, particularly in the provision of training courses, there was an influx of local civil society organizations. However, by contrast with El Salvador, the civil society organizations in Sierra Leone were entirely dependent on external funding and in most cases the very reason for their existence was the availability of such funding. Therefore, most of them had an existence which paralleled to the availability of funding and, with the completion of the reintegration phase, most of them ceased to exist. Again, in contrast to the El Salvador case, the civil society organizations in Sierra Leone suffered from a lack of appropriate skills and human resources. To some extent this was the case in Afghanistan too, but due to a much lengthier involvement on the part of the international community in the provision of humanitarian and development aid in the country, it was an easier task for the international and national NGOs to find appropriate human resources for their programmes. The return of refugees and other diaspora also eased this challenge. However, stronger state structures in El Salvador have provided an operational environment more conducive to civil society organizations than those in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the overall contribution of the DDR process to good governance in Afghanistan was more limited than the changes which took place

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in El Salvador. The main achievement was probably its contribution to the organization of relatively free and fair elections in the country. It is important to note that the elections and the DDR process had an inter-connected relationship. Without the organization of the first general elections, the DDR process could have faced even further delays, as different warlords and commanders did not make any moves towards disarmament and demobilization without first being sure that they would have an active political role following DDR. At the same time, without initiating the DDR process it would have been impossible to create the minimum levels of political trust and confidence which were a prerequisite for holding the first elections. The Afghan situation is again distinguished from the El Salvador case by the way which warlords and commanders have continued to keep their influence over large areas in the country. Their alliance with the US in the war against terrorism has further legitimized their position. Hence, the Afghan case has much to learn from the experience of El Salvador in terms of the restructuring of the security forces and the political transformation of armed groups. According to Dennys (2005), the DDR process in Afghanistan has not improved the dismal human rights situation much either, as commanders at various levels continue to commit human rights violations with impunity, indicating that the gun continues to be main instrument of decision making in the country. He considers this situation to be partly a consequence of the failure of the international community to deal with ‘the underlying structures and those who are the key protagonists (i.e. the low-level commanders)’ who have ‘contributed to the situation that Afghanistan faces today.’ (2005:10) In the case of Kosovo, the DDR process resulted in the transformation of the KLA into a number of political parties and a civil defence corps. In terms of political transformation, the political parties such as the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) that emerged from the KLA structures formed an important alternative to the political dominance of Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and since then, have taken on active role in the governance of the province. However, as they are all in agreement with the independence aspirations for Kosovo the divisions between them are much less significant and divisive than those experienced by the FMLN after its political transformation in El Salvador. Nevertheless, the problem with the political transformation of the KLA is that the political debate is still focussed on independence rather than on those more socioeconomic concerns such as employment, economic revitalization and personal security. It seems that these more practical issues are still more of a concern for the international community, while the Albanian political parties in the province are entirely preoccupied with a single issue of independence. According to Cocozzelli (2004:7) for those parties, ‘being the party in power at the time of the achievement of independence is seen as the only way to achieve the historic

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goals of either particular party.’ Neither LDK nor PDK ‘has a valid claim on the Albanian electorate outside of these two competing types of rhetoric centered on Albanian national liberation. The parties are not differentiating themselves based [on] economic or social proposals, but rather through claims to have done or to be doing more to achieve the goal of national independence.’ In other words, the political transformation of the KLA has not produced substantial policy and governance differences, as the political scene is still almost exclusively concerned with the independence question. The other important impact of the DDR process on the future governance of Kosovo is likely to be in relation to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). As explained in Chapter Three, the creation of such a semi-military structure is accepted by almost all stakeholders as being the future army of Kosovo. Although its current responsibility is more to do with the protection of the province against natural hazards, with its hierarchical structure, uniformed staff and training received by the international community the KPC would have little difficulty in turning itself into an army. For the majority of the population this may not represent a significant problem but for the minorities in the province, it may mean a direct threat to their security and well being. Although its structure allocates quotas for the minority groups at the field level, it has become apparent from the structures of KLA that it is unlikely to meet the objective of being a multi-ethnic organization. It should also be borne in mind that although they feel indebted to the KLA for its armed struggle against the Serbian regime, many supporters of LDK always looked at the KLA with suspicion, and their attitude towards KPC is not very different. Therefore, the future of KPC as a governance issue and its transformation into a regular army will need to be considered carefully, considering that Kosovo has already declared its independence from Serbia. Based as they were on a peace agreement the DDR processes in El Salvador and Sierra Leone were always in a much better position to exercise a direct positive impact on improved governance in the country. Being charged with such tasks as reform of the distribution of land and reform of civil-military relationships in the country, the El Salvador DDR has assisted the society to move forward towards more democratic structures with respect for human rights. It is clear that, although it would not be able to transform all the challenges related to governance by simply addressing the need for security sector reform, nevertheless, the El Salvador case study shows that the DDR process can be innovative and radical in the introduction of changes in postconflict societies. It was the energy of the DDR process that brought the protracted land reform challenge of the country to an end, and it was again the requirements of DDR that the army underwent radical downsizing and adopted principles and rules based on the respect of human rights. These are crucial achievements for a country like El Salvador and, although it would be an

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exaggeration to interpret all these successes as being the result of the DDR process, its contribution should nevertheless, be recognized. In contrast to the El Salvador case, the DDR process in Sierra Leone limited its scope to the more traditional activities of the demobilization of armed groups and provision for the economic reintegration of former combatants. Neither the overall security sector reform nor other governance issues were brought into the DDR framework in a particularly effective way. As the DDR process itself had been a protracted one, it seems that the objective of a quick implementation has prevented the process from forming stronger linkages with wider governance issues. Ironically, the governance issues related to DDR in the context of Kosovo are yet to emerge. As a result of the vagueness regarding the future sovereignty of the province and whether or not it will become an independent country one day, many of the governance issues have intentionally been put on ice until now. Most day-to-day governance concerns are considered and carried out by the international community, while the local politicians are pre-occupied with the independence issue. How the consequences of the Kosovo DDR process, especially those in relation to the existence of KPC, will develop in relation to this is yet to be seen. The political transformation of KLA into a number of political parties was certainly a positive move for the governance of the province, but how the KPC will shape up in the future, in particular how it would react to a possible decision by the international community to opt for a settlement that is less than full independence, is likely to play a critical role in the future governance of Kosovo. Socio-Economic Development Assessing the real socio-economic impact of DDR programmes is a difficult task. First of all, it is noted that they affect the lives of many more people than simply their direct beneficiaries. For example, in Kosovo the beneficiary caseload for the reintegration process was only a little over 17,000 combatants, but when extended family structures in the province are taken into account, it would be more accurate to assume that the Kosovo DDR had a direct economic impact in the lives of over 100,000 people. The same argument would also be plausible for the other three case studies. It is also necessary to consider how the reintegration assistance has changed the lives of combatants in the medium to long-term. Although the end-of-project evaluations tend to indicate a much more positive outlook on this particular issue, as was seen in the case of El Salvador, going back to the same country in the future may demonstrate completely different results in respect to the effectiveness and sustainability of reintegration projects. In order to overcome with this challenge, the focus in this section will be first, on the Afghan case as the DDR process has recently been completed, and the analysis will try to make some projections concerning its economic impact.

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The first point to be noted in the Afghan case is that only 21 per cent of former combatants opted for VTCs, which was smaller than those former combatants who chose the small business (26 per cent) and agriculture (43 per cent) options. Considering the economic realities of the country and the dependence on agriculture as the main source of income, it was expected that the agriculture option would form the lion’s share of reintegration programmes. However, it is also true that there is a big shortage of skills in Afghanistan, consequently it might have been expected that more former combatants would have wanted to take a VTC as a reintegration choice, but they did not. It seems that a good proportion of former combatants were choosing VTCs in the early stages of the DDR process, however, they must have thought that the easiest and quickest access to their reintegration assistance would be through the small business option rather than participating in a VTC. This may have been the main reason why a larger proportion of former combatants chose the small business option at the time of their registration with ANBP. However, it is clear that this ran contrary to the very simple fact that not everybody has what it takes to be a business person or entrepreneur. Running a business seemed to have been considered the most suitable option for those who have no other skills. The three most important factors in the viability and sustainability of businesses were: whether the former combatant had any previous business experience, whether the business existed before the assistance, and whether the former combatant had any personal savings to invest in the business. It is unrealistic to expect that businesses would be viable and sustainable with such a relatively small initial capital sum for their establishment. Their long-term sustainability is also closely related to the overall economic environment in the country. For example, most businesses were enjoying an economic environment more conducive to success in 2005 than in 2006. If the economic situation continues to deteriorate there may be a rapid increase in the number of failing cases. Grocery/general stores seem to have been the ‘default’ type of small business for all those former combatants who have had no previous business experience or skills. Former combatants could/should have been encouraged to opt for other types of shops but the size of initial budget seems to have been the determining factor. Most of the failing or critical cases were grocery stores and there may be a number of reasons for this. First, there were already many small sized grocery shops in the country, since opening a grocery shop is seen as the easiest way of creating a means of livelihood in a time of high unemployment. Consequently, those former combatants who opened up a grocery shop simply added to an already saturated market. Secondly, some stock may have been consumed by former combatants’ families. Finally, most grocery shops sell their goods on credit, creating financial turnover and cash-flow problems. The location of a grocery shop plays a significant role in its viability, but overall they seem to have been the weakest type of small business.

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The saturation of the market with the concentration of businesses in a particular sector, area or type of shop not only impacted grocery shops. For example, it was estimated that 40 out of 150 ‘windows & doors’ businesses in a particular neighbourhood of Herat were those resulting from the reintegration assistance given by a particular implementing partner. They have already started to experience the results of this market saturation with most of them complaining about a major reduction in their profits. A more careful overview of business types and locations could have avoided this saturation problem to some extent. Assisting former combatants to become a partner in an existing business was a common pattern of reintegration support. This seemed to be particularly necessary from most former combatants as the chances of opening a viable business with a budget of $700 were rather slim. However, during the field research the visits to most of these cases failed to find former combatants present at their business premises. There were always reasons given as to why the former combatant was not present, such as being away buying stock in rural areas or resting at home, etc. Whilst, these reasons may be true, being realistic, it is also likely that many of them may already have left those partnerships. The ANBP’s Client Satisfaction Survey results could be considered as a good indicator for the impact of the reintegration process on the socioeconomic environment. For example, almost all respondents considered the agricultural package which included options such as animal husbandry, beekeeping, or the provision of seeds, fertilizers or tools as ‘mediocre’. Two thirds of the comments from the respondents were highly critical such as ‘Two months ago, I got one dairy cow and one calf. Both of them (were) small and thin and also not good. I am unsatisfied about that.’, ‘I received 57 chickens, (only) 30 are left, the others died.’, ‘It was not satisfactory. We need more help in agriculture, especially in irrigation and cultivation.’ (ANBP, 2005:17) The reintegration packages available to former combatants were not only inadequate, but also they seem actually to have negated the long term economic sustainability of some beneficiaries. For example, in terms of its economic effects, the issue of literacy, which was an important factor in deciding what kind of reintegration package was offered to former combatants is likely to have a number of long lasting impacts for the economic sustainability of the caseload. Almost all illiterate former combatants were ‘encouraged’ to opt for agricultural or husbandry schemes, which meant that if they did not own much land then the reintegration package helped them only with diversifying their income but not really with ensuring a sustainable livelihood. For most former combatants the lack of agricultural land was the main challenge, and therefore the provision of a fixed amount of grain or a number of animals often had only a limited impact on their economic situation. At times the provision of animals to a big number of former combatants in the same region also meant that there

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was a saturation of the market with the products of that particular animal, whether goats, sheep or cows. It should also be noted that the provision of extra seeds for agriculture or animals for husbandry did not always translate into the provision of employment to former combatants. Traditionally, those who are involved in agricultural production are usually women and children, and considering that men were away from home for considerable periods of time during their attachment to armed groups, it is unrealistic to assume that as soon as they receive their reintegration package they would replace women and children in those sectors. Therefore, it is possible that the provision of agricultural reintegration packages has probably meant an increase in the workload of women and children. Meanwhile, literate former combatants were provided with a much wider choice of reintegration packages such as vocational training in carpentry, masonry, tailoring, plumbing, computing and English language, as well as micro-enterprise development and teacher training. According to the ANBP’s survey, the level of satisfaction with vocational courses was much higher than it was for the agricultural package, with 71 per cent of the respondents indicating that they were ‘very happy’ with the conditions provided for their training courses (2005). However, this should be taken as indicating the provision of sustainable employment, because as was the case with agricultural and husbandry schemes, those training options also resulted in market saturation for certain vocations. For example, the training of a large group of former combatants in certain skills meant that there was a big increase in the number of carpenters or tailors in a particular region, subsequently forcing them to migrate to urban areas (Dennys, 2005). More importantly, the quality of vocational training provided was also questionable. According to the respondents of the ANBP’s survey, 39 per cent of them considered they had not acquired any new skills at all, while the remaining 61 per cent said that they gained ‘some new skills’ from their courses (2005). Moreover, based on the ANBP’s own assessment in terms of the small business creation option, the reintegration process could be considered as a total failure; 38 per cent of the respondents considered this option as ‘not good’, while the verdict from 60 per cent of the respondents was a dismal ‘mediocre’. Out of 204 respondents, only four of them thought that this option was ‘very good’. This particular reintegration package meant that former combatants started a wide range of businesses such as food stalls, pharmacies, tailoring shops, bakeries and car repair workshops, but the following comments from respondents show why in terms of long-term economic sustainability, not much should be expected from this component: ‘The amount received was too little. I bought only inexpensive equipment.’, ‘Most of the tools which (were) given to me are useless and the given support is not too helpful for me.’, ‘$700 is not enough for business.’ (ANBP, 2005:20)

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It is interesting to note that almost all of the problems that undermined the economic impact and sustainability of the DDR programme in the Afghan case were also the main areas of concern in the other three previous case studies. It was the lack of supportive economic structures and financial assistance programmes which meant that the land reform element in El Salvador fell short of realizing its objectives fully. The quality of training programmes was questionable in both the Kosovo and El Salvador cases too, and more importantly, the provision of vocational training did not make the necessary linkages with micro-enterprise development. The Kosovo case was more active on this issue than the programme in Sierra Leone, as there was a better utilization of small business development and on-the-job training options. Nevertheless, in both cases, the combatants who benefited from the vocational training were affected by market saturation for their particular vocational skills. Similarly, the creation of micro-enterprises in certain economic areas, such as the case with grocery shops in Afghanistan, was evident both in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. In other words, it seems that hardly been any lessons have been learned from the previous cases and reflected on in the planning and implementation of the Afghan case. It would be fair to claim that almost all cases studies repeated similar mistakes in the economic reintegration of former combatants. As was explained earlier, the unfavourable nature of the overall economic environment was the main hurdle for former combatants in all case studies. It is clear that without addressing the overall economic framework it would be impossible to achieve large scale positive outcomes with economic reintegration. The principal argument in response to those failings is put forward by the international community to observe that it would be impossible for DDR programmes to tackle such issues, since the revitalization of an entire economy is a major post-war recovery task in itself and its scope and hurdles would be too great to consider and address through a DDR programme. There is a certain element of truth in this response, but the argument here is not to try to solve all of a country’s post-conflict economic problems through its DDR programme. However, the major shortcoming of all DDR programmes is that they do not appear to consider the overall economic environment at all. There is almost a total isolation and compartmentalization of the process from the other peacebuilding activities. None of the four case studies in this book, or any of other DDR undertakings over the last two decades seem to make any deliberate attempt to link the DDR process with the overall macro-economic environment. Solving all post-conflict economic problems through DDR is clearly unrealistic and cannot be expected, but conducting a general economic assessment for skills, enterprises and resources in advance of a reintegration phase should not be too much to ask for. The interesting issue here is that in

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most cases the international community conducts such studies in one way or another, and although they may not all be very exhaustive and detailed, a number of specialized UN agencies and international NGOs tend to have such information. However, the problem is often with the sharing of such information as inter-agency competition prevents various international and national actors from working in a fully coordinated manner. For example, one of the reasons the DDR implementing agency in Kosovo could not gain access to such available information was that the other agency had an interest in getting involved in the reintegration phase and felt that to share information in this way was against their organizational interests. Looking at the overall economic impact of the DDR programmes it would be possible to summarise that the former combatants had benefited from the reintegration packages in the four case studies had benefited from an important opportunity to gain a meaningful employment and livelihood for themselves. In those cases where former combatants had pre-war experience with that particular employment or skill, the chances of sustainability were much higher than for those who gained a new skill or employment as part of their reintegration package. The availability of greater levels of economic reintegration options was critical, as an over-emphasis on the land element in El Salvador had constrained the long-term economic viability of former combatants. More importantly however, it is essential that the necessary financial and human resources, and time are invested in the implementation of these programmes, as the poor quality of training or lack of assistance in the initiation of new businesses tend to be the main factors undermining long-term sustainability. On the other hand, while it is possible to make some limited generalizations concerning the economic reintegration of former combatants and its overall impact on the economic environment, when it comes to the issues affecting social reintegration it is necessary to focus on the characteristics of the particular context and it would be better to avoid making generalizations. The main reason for this is due to the fact that with social reintegration, the critical factor is not former combatants, but the communities receiving them. In other words, the willingness and absorptive capacities of receiving communities play a much more significant role in the successful social reintegration of former combatants than does the combatants’ desire to return home and live with their communities. It is clear that for a successful reintegration to take place, both sides need to be willing to strive for such an outcome, but as the current practice is often focussed on encouraging former combatants to return home rather than preparing communities to receive them more effectively, the discussions here will concentrate on this particular issue. The experience derived from the four case studies shows that the following factors play a significant role in the way receiving communities accept former combatants in their midst.

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If the armed conflict had an ideological element and represented the dissent of a particular group against an authoritarian regime, as was the case in El Salvador and Kosovo, then the process of social reintegration tends to be much easier as former combatants return home as ‘heroes’. Overall, it can be assumed that when such former combatants go back home, the receiving communities, at least in the short to medium term, will do all they can to welcome former combatants and be prepared to share their resources more willingly. If former combatants have spent a considerable period of time with an armed group, then their social reintegration is likely to be more difficult than those who had a much shorter assignment. Again the El Salvador and Kosovo cases are good examples. In El Salvador as most former combatants were involved in the armed conflict for over five to ten years, it was more difficult for them to give up their ‘combatant’ identity and the solidarity which they enjoyed during the conflict, than it was for those former combatants in Kosovo, who on average spent less than two years in the conflict. In parallel with the duration of armed conflict, the likelihood of psycho-social factors being an issue becomes much more critical. Former combatants are more likely to experience posttraumatic stress for example, after a long armed conflict than a short one such as the armed conflict in Kosovo. In Afghanistan as most former combatants were already community based, the social reintegration element similarly to the ones in El Salvador and Kosovo, was not a major issue. Among the four case studies, Sierra Leone was the one facing the most critical social reintegration challenges. As explained in Chapter Four, the characteristics of the conflict, namely its duration, type of armed groups and the involvement of combatants in atrocities, meant that the community side of the social reintegration process was vital and necessitated major attention during the DDR process. From stigmatized ‘bush wives’ to child soldiers who had killed and maimed their own family and community members, the whole social reintegration was to a large extent dependant on how prepared and willing the receiving communities were to forgive and accept the returning former combatants. Although the receiving communities had received hardly any direct assistance from the DDR process in Sierra Leone, they did all they could to deal with this difficult task. The reasons for their acceptance varied and often they had a pragmatic approach to it, as they wanted to see an end to the armed conflict. They had no choice but to deal with the societal wounds of their long, bloody conflict in order to give peace a chance. It was for their children’s future that they accepted the return of those former combatants who committed atrocities against them. Some of these reconciliation issues will be explored further in the next section. Overall, in terms of their impact on the socio-economic environment the four DDR case studies show a great deal of similarities between them. The El Salvador case was probably the most different one in terms of its land reform

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component as the main element of economic reintegration. The other three DDR processes used the provision of small business creation and vocational training as their main components. By opening up new businesses in such postconflict contexts, where there were very limited employment opportunities in general and to a large extent suffering from where there was a shortage of vocational skills, these DDR processes were clearly instrumental in the post-war recovery of these countries. However, it would be prudent to come up with a cautious estimate of their overall economic impact, given the serious organizational and financial problems that emerged with the sustainability of newly created micro-enterprises and the difficulties of finding employment at the end of VTCs. Consequently, it would be unrealistic to assume that all former combatants who went through these DDR processes ended up with meaningful employment. Nevertheless, considering how difficult it is to keep a new business going even in a developed country context, stimulating the local economy through the injection of financial resources for the creation of new businesses and training former combatants in various vocations should still be considered a positive step forward. The main shortcomings with these undertakings in all of the case studies were related to their overall quality; appropriateness and integration with the local economy; and the mechanisms of additional financial and organizational assistance for their sustainability. Justice and Reconciliation It may be possible to argue that by conducting a successful DDR process it would be likely to make a positive contribution to security, governance and the socio-economic environment. However, it would not always be the case that a similar correlation exists between DDR and justice and reconciliation. In some cases, ironically way a successful DDR process may actually exacerbate the problems related to justice and reconciliation. In order to explore this dichotomy, discussions in this section will start with an exploration of the relationship between DDR and justice. Apart from the Kosovo case, the other three case studies but particularly in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, the special treatment of former combatants through their reintegration packages actually created a certain level of resentment among the population in general. In Sierra Leone for example, as most former combatants had committed atrocities against the civilian populations it was a major challenge for civil society to forgive and accept them. However, obviously those who committed war crimes and terrible atrocities, actually being almost ‘rewarded’ through the provision of reintegration options was a very difficult fact to accept for the victims of atrocities and other war-affected communities such as returning refugees, war widows and receiving communities. This resulted in a feeling of social injustice, and such preferential treatment continues to be one of the main dilemmas of DDR processes around the world. With a minimum attention being given to the

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needs of receiving communities by the DDR programme, such feelings of social injustice were further exacerbated. It would have been possible to deal with the perception of social injustice by developing alternative strategies to the one-man-one-weapon type of reintegration approach. However, apart from some ad-hoc responses which were designed in order to deal with the increasing level of dissatisfaction in society, the Sierra Leone DDR process made no deliberate and targeted attempt to deal with this challenge. Another level of interaction between the DDR process and justice elements in Sierra Leone was related to the work of the Special Court. It was important to bring to justice war criminals such as commanders and politicians like Charles Taylor in order to sustain the peacebuilding process in the country. However, its timing was poorly judged as it meant that while the DDR process tried to encourage commanders and their combatants to agree with its conditions, alternative signals were being given by this attempt at retributional justice. Total immunity for former combatants had already been tried as part of the Lóme Peace Agreement and it had not produced expected outcomes, such as large numbers of former combatants agreeing with the DDR process. It was clear that immunity from justice may be an important incentive for the leadership of armed groups, but for ordinary combatants those incentives related to their security and livelihoods were of more critical importance. On the other hand, as four out of 11 originally indicted militia leaders were already dead (Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Hinga Norman) and Charles Taylor is currently being tried in The Hague, the sentencing of the remaining three militia generals to life imprisonment in July 2007, came at a cost of over $90 million! Nevertheless, according to human rights organizations this was an important victory as such sentencing would send a strong signal to future would-be perpetrators that wars also have their own rules. In other words, ‘no impunity’ was a necessary message for promoting the sense of justice in the country, but as the Special Court had tried only a very small number of militia leaders its impact in bringing justice could not be considered very significant in the eyes of the victims of atrocities and their relatives. Furthermore, the Court was supposed to try ‘those bearing the greatest responsibility’, but for many Sierra Leoneans some of those indicted were not the real perpetrators behind war crimes and atrocities. More importantly, for many in Sierra Leone, the huge budget that was needed for trying such a small number of individuals could have perhaps been used more effectively if that money was invested in the country’s dilapidated education and health services infrastructure. Funded mainly by the US and UK and not having many Sierra Leonean at a senior level, the Court also had serious problems with its legitimacy, as it was perceived as a tool imposed on the country by the old colonial power. Furthermore, the Special Court also seems to have had a negative impact

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on the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as it took precious financial assistance away from the TRC, and due to its indictments the scope of the TRC was narrowed down considerably. For example, certain key people did not testify in the TRC because of the Special Court, and rather than creating an environment of tolerance and forgiveness due to the work of TRC and truth-telling, the Special Court resulted in a tense political mood in the country. Mandated by the Lóme Peace Agreement to provide an impartial record of the atrocities and human rights abuses that took place from 1991 onwards, the TRC was also responsible for dealing with the issue of immunity by responding to the needs of victims, and promoting an environment of reconciliation between the perpetrators and victims of the conflict. After the publication of its final report in 2004, the government’s response to the work of the TRC so far has not been encouraging, as there no proper action was taken to establish a commission to implement the TRC’s recommendations. In the case of Sierra Leone therefore, it would possibly have been more effective to postpone of the justice element until the full completion of the DDR process. For example, in the case of Kosovo a number of prominent KLA commanders such as the former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, were charged with war crimes by the United Nations tribunal in The Hague but this took place only six years after the DDR process had come to an end. In terms of social justice, the El Salvador case study also provided a number of important lessons, particularly on the issue of land distribution and its impact on the creation of an environment of reconciliation. For the poor of the country it was critical that they were moved from the position of landless and marginalized populations and be given an opportunity to make a living in their own right without being forced to work on land owned by a few landowners. As a highly divisive issue since the independence of the country, landlessness was always considered an obvious indicator of the lack of social justice in the country. By addressing this issue as part of the DDR process, El Salvador achieved an important outcome for dealing with this protracted problem, and this is probably one of the main guarantees for the country not relapsing into another civil war. For large populations there is no longer a perspective of marginalization based on landlessness, and although it is true that the majority of the population fails to benefit fully from globalization and the neo-liberal economic policies of the government, they do not seem to be strong enough for the masses to mobilize themselves for an armed struggle. The political transformation of the FMLN was another positive drive for the creation of a reconciliation environment in El Salvador. The way this process took place immediately after the peace agreement and the way that, since then the FMLN has remained committed to the conventional political framework, has enabled a reduction in divisions between the main political

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contenders of the country. The FMLN is no longer considered by the supporters of the ARENA party to be a guerrilla group, trying to change the governance of the country forcibly. It should be noted that the FMLN as a political party has remained in opposition since the peace agreement, and this has been reassuring for the right-wing political establishment of the country. Furthermore, with the recent attempts at embracing neo-liberal economic structures through various trade and tariffs agreements with the US, it would be hard for the FMLN to change the economic system of the country even if they managed to come to power. Although the FMLN’s political transformation created a feeling of disillusionment among its supporters and now subsequently, there is an accumulating reaction at grassroots level towards its leadership, nevertheless the overall political stability and political reconciliation in the country should be considered a significant achievement. In a way, El Salvador continues to be a country of paradoxes. It is one of those rare countries in the world where it is possible to enter its parliament building without any significant security checks and searches, but it is also the same country in which the simple act of taking a taxi may for a foreigner, easily result in his/her kidnapping. Likewise, the children of the middle classes feel themselves safe only in large shopping centres. Another case study country which provides a rich understanding for the issues of justice and reconciliation and the way a DDR process can have a critical impact is Afghanistan. The country has suffered and continues to suffer in the post-Bonn Agreement period, from a number of social injustices at different levels. From the marginalization of the Hazaras as an ethnic group throughout its history, and the urban-rural gap in accessing any type of services provided by the state, to the dismal position of women in relation to their socioeconomic and cultural rights in the society, Afghanistan’s social injustices will take generations, to disappear, if at all. Some of these social injustices are based on the traditional structures of Afghan society, but it should also be noted that they were severely exacerbated by the long armed conflict during which various population groups were displaced countless times with little if any means of socio-economic security. Furthermore, the country’s formal justice system is very weak and it is often carried out according to informal, tribal and traditional justice structures. As part of the Bonn Agreement’s pillar system, the Italian government has taken responsibility for reform of the justice system but this is one of the pillars that has seen very little activity over the last five years. The complexity of the challenge appears only to have been deepened by the prevailing political environment in the country. In relation to the DDR process, there have been no significant efforts to secure the indictment of some of the warlords for their role in the human rights abuses in the country. In the fragility of the peace and on-going political machinations the country’s strong former warlords and commanders continue to exercise significant leverage against the

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government and international community, consequently it is highly unlikely there will be a series of indictments for war crimes any time soon. However, this is an issue that the country will need to face one way or another in order to give reconciliation a proper chance. The critical point will be when to start such a process and how to assess its positive outcomes against the threats it may pose for the continuation of the peacebuilding process. The experience of the Special Court in Sierra Leone should prove instructive in the planning and implementation of such a process. This comparative review of the four case studies shows that it would be difficult to make direct correlations between DDR, and justice and reconciliation issues. It is clear that the implementation of DDR was instrumental in enabling an environment more conducive to social justice and reconciliation to develop. The El Salvador case was particularly encouraging as it incorporated the issues of land and security reform and political transformation. However, these benefits were also supported by a range of other post-conflict recovery activities mandated by the peace agreement. Once again therefore, it was clear that the signing of a peace agreement is likely to have a long-lasting impact on the sustainability of peace. The Sierra Leone case was particularly interesting as the peacebuilding process had both elements of retributive justice against those leaders committed war crimes, and truth and reconciliation for the population at large. The timing of these undertakings was particularly critical as the Special Court experience ended up having more negative impacts than positive ones, especially on the DDR and TRC processes. The DDR element was not particularly significant for the justice and reconciliation issues in Kosovo. However in the event that full independence is granted, these issues will become particularly prominent in the relationship between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. It is in this context that the role of the KPC as the core of a future Kosovo army will be particularly critical. Conclusions The DDR related literature is full of studies on lessons learned and the recommendations made to ensure improved practice. From a retrospective point of view, academic literature and practice reports on DDR programmes around the world are not short of guidance on how various DDR strategies could have been carried out better. Moreover, the UN’s recent work – The Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) is a comprehensive undertaking which provides a set of guidelines for all phases of the DDR process from planning to monitoring and evaluation. However, it is clear that in terms of making informed decisions by practitioners, ironically the challenge is not about gaps in current knowledge, rather it related to how that knowledge is prevented from being applied. In other words, the

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politics of DDR from international relations to power structures between commanders and combatants all play a significant role in the shaping of what is witnessed as the end product of a DDR process. A common concern raised by all practitioners interviewed in this research was the way they could not plan and implement what they thought they should have as far as the best practice DDR knowledge is concerned. Therefore, the conclusions of this book will avoid the presentation of a set of guidelines for best practice, but instead will present an alternative approach to DDR which could result in an improved strategy for dealing more effectively with its politics and power structures. In order to achieve this objective, the first point for discussion here will be on how not to compartmentalize the DDR process. Human Resource Development Approach As is already apparent, a wide range of activities is involved in each phase of DDR including: the collection and destruction of weapons in disarmament; training needs survey, health checks and reinsertion assistance in demobilization; and micro-enterprise development projects, vocational training, education and psycho-social projects in reintegration. For such a wide range of activities, it is inevitable that a wide variety of actors are needed to undertake the entire process. For example, given that the security component is a major cornerstone of any DDR process, it would not be possible to carry out a DDR process in most war-to-peace transition scenarios, without the involvement of third party military actors. However, the involvement of military actor brings its own working principles, methods and structures which are markedly different from those used by civilian actors, although civil-military cooperation has made substantial progress in DDR operations over recent years. Consequently, although it is not the case for all DDR undertakings, the involvement of third party military structures in disarmament tends to create divisions between this particular phase and the following demobilization and reintegration initiatives. In practice different models have been developed over the years, such as the national coordination strategy used in Sierra Leone and the creation of a new international institutional body to coordinate the DDR activities in its three phases which was the case in Afghanistan. Moving from this actor-centred approach to deal with the compartmentalization challenge, the methodology to be proposed here is more in terms of a new conceptualization to inform all phases of the DDR process; namely, the approach of human resource development. Simply by taking this approach and its requirements as the main elements of guidance in the development of DDR strategy it would be possible to structure and carry out all activities with a minimum level of risk of DDR phases being compartmentalized from each other. As the main focus of human resource theory, the capacities of former combatants in the caseload and their maximum

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level utilization and development would inform the specific decisions to be made in terms of what to establish as registration criteria; how to collect weapons and carry out the standard demobilization activities; and also what the main employment options to be provided in the reintegration phase should be. In other words, rather than simply focussing on quantitative aspects of combatants such as their numbers and age structure, and the number of weapons in their hands, the DDR process then would start to bear in mind qualitative aspects such as the links between combatants’ capabilities and their effective and sustainable application in the peacebuilding framework. Through this perspective, former combatants would no longer be a group of potential trouble makers but a caseload able to contribute to the recovery of their country. They would no longer be put through a mechanical process of ‘armscollected’ and ‘inducement-provided’, but be treated with dignity in order to benefit from the non-cognitive, motivational and psychological dimensions of their reintegration. Their existing skills would no longer be ignored and the process would be in terms of perceived skills more than vocational ones. At the same time emphasis would be placed on how best to harness their motivation, expectations and ambitions for rebuilding a new life for themselves. Nübler considers the use of a human resource development approach in the context of DDR as ‘the effective deployment of existing skills, qualification and competencies of ex-combatants for the maximum achievement of individual, social, organizational or national goals and objectives of demobilization’ (1997:8). Although in this proposition the human resource development approach is recommended mainly for achieving a more effective use of former combatants’ skills, it is possible to expand its scope to include all activities within DDR as an umbrella concept. In line with Nübler’s preconditions for the actual use of former combatants’ skills, the reintegration of combatants through a human resource development approach would be based on a rigorous methodology for the identification and taxonomy of skills during the disarmament and demobilization phases (1997). It would make a distinction between functional and extra-functional competencies which would include such capabilities as cooperation and communication, flexibility, logical thinking, diligence, responsibility, and solidarity. On the other hand, vocational skills could be categorized further in terms of their sectors such as industrial, commercial and agricultural, and levels of competency in terms of semi-skilled, skilled, master craftsmen and technician. Moreover, the taxonomy of skills through a human resource development approach would also explore the former combatants’ management and entrepreneurial skills which are particularly critical in the creation of small business employment opportunities. With the application of a human resource approach in all phases of a DDR process, before starting to implement any employment and livelihood programme in the reintegration phase, the process would explore the economic

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environment’s demands for skills and employment opportunities. Therefore, rather than a sequential progress, while the primary reintegration activities are undertaken, various planning requirements such as demand and employment opportunity assessment for the reintegration phase would be carried out at the same time. The reintegration activities would also try to derive benefit from holding-up non-monetary motivation goals to former combatants, such as mobilizing them for the reconstruction of their communities. Their future expectations for employment would be tailored to their work experience prior to joining the armed group in addition to those vocational skills gained during the conflict. It is through the same perspective that the elements of social, cultural and institutional barriers would be considered with respect to different identifiable groups within the caseload. The barriers faced by female combatants, child soldiers, and those combatants who are disabled or from minority groups should all be considered not only during the reintegration phase but also during disarmament and demobilization. For example, the registration criteria would be critical in determining how inclusive the process would be for those different combatant groups. Alternatively, the type or means of reinsertion assistance provided in the demobilization phase would be decisive for their successful reintegration. The conventional questions of reintegration, such as what vocational training subjects should be introduced; whether formal education option for child soldiers is necessary; what work opportunities there are for female combatants; how small businesses would be set-up and what kind of post-project assistance they may need; and how the reintegration phase could be better linked with the overall post-war recovery process, can be answered more effectively once these preceding issues have been addressed. Reintegration First! The use of a human resource development approach underlines the importance of another critical requirement for the successful implementation of a DDR process, which is the need to consider the challenges of reintegration before making plans for disarmament and demobilization. This is particularly important not only in order to avoid the compartmentalization of DDR, but also in order to make sure that former combatants continue to support the peacebuilding process. Along with many other examples, the case studies in this book have shown that the international community has the tendency to place primary emphasis on disarmament, considering the collection of weapons from the hands of combatants as being ‘mission accomplished’! With the allocation of large financial resources, if there is a cash-for-weapons component in disarmament or long-term cantonment in demobilization phases, when it comes to actual reintegration the process suffers from an overall complacency and a lack of enthusiasm and funding. One response to such challenges is the

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argument that it would be more effective to consider the DDR process in reversal. In other words, instead of starting the establishment of a strategy by solely focussing on how many weapons there may be to be collected and how former combatants could be encouraged to return home in the shortest time possible, it is necessary to question those matters related to reintegration, some of which are related to what employment opportunities already exist for the potential former combatant caseload; what would be their impact on societal relationships once they return home; what would happen to child soldiers if they are not accepted by their families; and what legal opportunities exist for the political transformation of armed groups. A strategy that adopts the identification of the main prerequisites for reintegration first and subsequently decides on the work plan for the disarmament and demobilization phases would also be more appropriate for the application of a social contract perspective in the DDR process. Not only doing it but also making sure that it is perceived in that way by former combatants. The emphasis would be on how to set the new parameters of postconflict life for former combatants through a new social contract that would send out a message much more conducive to the security and overall well being of such a caseload. Removed from a short-sighted view focussed only on security concerns, social contract perspective would help develop new opportunities and areas of linkages between the capabilities of former combatants and the post-war recovery process in general. In other words, a social contract perspective in the planning of DDR would not only assist the prioritization of reintegration activities over others, but would also support a human resource development approach and expand the overall scope of DDR much wider than simply the security concerns of the international community. Rather than prioritizing the well-being of external military forces over issues of how former combatants would feed their families, the DDR process would become realistic about what it is for and how it would make sure it turns out to be a process that helps to generate dignity and self-respect for all parties concerned. Some of the capabilities identified within the human resource development approach such as motivation, solidarity, attentiveness, diligence and openness to life-long learning would also be easier to utilize with the support of a social contract perspective. As discussed earlier, whether or not the conflict came to an end with a negotiated peace agreement and how much participation former combatants have had in the designing of a DDR process would all be critical factors in achieving such a view. Increasingly however, a negotiated peace agreement is an exception rather than the rule in contemporary armed conflicts, a ‘reintegration-first’ type of planning would help create a sounder environment of trust and confidence between the stakeholders of DDR. Especially in the eyes of those former combatants who are forced to give up their weapons through an external military intervention,

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such a focus on reintegration would be an important substitute for a new negotiated social contract. The reintegration-first concept can also be translated literally and explore the ways of implementing reintegration without conducting disarmament and demobilization. The recent cases such as Kosovo and Afghanistan where combatants were mainly community based did not necessitate the inclusion of a conventional demobilization phase with a cantonment element, hence, the demobilization phase became much less significant than it was for some of African DDR experiences in the early 1990s. However, the implementation of disarmament before any type of reintegration activity is still considered a taboo subject by many organizations in the international community. The provision of reintegration assistance without disarmament would have been perceived as politically dangerous by many donor countries. Although disarmament is a highly divisive issue and might do more harm than good, the international community continues to insist on this issue. It is accepted that at a symbolic level at least, disarmament sends a strong message to the population in general for the compliance of armed groups with requirements of the peacebuilding process. However, rather than remaining stuck in a quagmire of political bickering over disarmament for nearly two years as occurred in the context of Afghanistan, causing considerable delays in the reform of security sector and governance structures, it would have been worthwhile questioning what would actually have been lost by initiating the reintegration activities without insisting on disarmament taking place first. In the case of Afghanistan, reintegration without disarmament was dismissed largely due to Japan’s political position on neutrality as the lead country for DDR, and their concern not to be seen as supporting those militia groups that were still holding their weapons. Reintegration without disarmament is still considered technically not to be operational and politically not to be acceptable and applicable in the current peacebuilding environments. However, it is also observed that the need for such undertakings may be emerging more strongly in the near future. For example, if and when there is the possibility for the reintegration of Kurdish Peshmerga and Shiite armed groups in Iraq, an insistence on disarmament prior to reintegration may not prove to be an effective strategy. Therefore, although it may sound like a radical departure from the one of the central and ‘sacred’ tenets of DDR orthodoxy, when the conditions are such that the disarmament itself would only have a very limited contribution to the establishment of security and stability, then it is important to consider carefully those direct benefits to be gained from reintegration. In environments where re-armament is only a matter of will, and breaking down the power relations between commanders and combatants is a priority, then it is advisable to consider how to proceed with reintegration without making disarmament a pre-condition. Such an approach would be particularly effective in avoiding the conventional

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one-man-one-weapon type of DDR strategy and considering communitycentred reintegration options as the main framework for relationships between combatants and receiving communities. Community-Centred Reintegration The discussions in this book strongly emphasized the importance of receiving communities in the successful DDR of former combatants. In some cases such as Kosovo, in which former combatants return home as ‘heroes’, the role of receiving communities may be considerably less significant than those DDR environments such as Sierra Leone where the acceptance of former combatants by receiving communities is highly sensitive and complex because of the impact of war on those communities. Nevertheless, the role of receiving communities, which may be in terms of their absorptive capacity, sharing of natural resources, creation of employment opportunities, and capacity to deal with justice and reconciliation issues, would have to be considered as the main tenet of any DDR process. Under current practice, any attempt to deal with receiving communities tends to be rather ad-hoc and is more in terms of a response to an emerging security crisis created by a conventional former combatant-centred DDR approach. In other words, when the receiving communities start to refuse to accept more former combatants in their amidst or when violence breaks out between receiving communities and returning combatants, the DDR processes being to respond to this problem by opening VTCs to community members or building a community facility such as a school or health clinic. The weapons-for-development approach is used by a number of international organizations and national programmes in order to encourage communities to participate in civilian disarmament initiatives. With the utilization of a similar reasoning that, in return for arms and weapons handed in by communities, such disarmament programmes can provide financial support for the development of infrastructure and services to be used by that particular community. The incentives packages may vary but the main objective of this approach is to break down the dependence of communities on guns for their security and livelihoods, by mobilizing a peer pressure process within the community to encourage more people to accept the conditions of disarmament. From Mali and Uganda to Albania this strategy has been used with encouraging results, and the DIAG strategy in Afghanistan was the application of this concept in a DDR context, rather than a civilian disarmament process. As of August 2007, over 27,000 light and 4,000 heavy weapons, and nearly 300,000 rounds of ammunition were collected as part of the DIAG process. Adopting a three-step compliance strategy from voluntary and negotiated to enforced compliance, the DIAG process intends to use community projects as incentives in the voluntary and negotiated compliance

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stages. However, over the last year since its initiation in summer of 2006 the DIAG completed only one such community development project which was the rehabilitation of 95 km irrigation canals in the Mahmoud Raqi district of Kapisa Province. This project was expected to benefit over 240,000 people directly in the district, and there are plans for two other districts which have successfully implemented DIAG, to be rewarded with a micro hydro power station and veterinary clinic (ANBP, 2007). As the exploration of the case studies indicated the incentives, in terms of community development projects can encourage communities to be more willing to accept returning combatants. However, the role of communities and the way in which they might be better prepared, resourced and encouraged to build a new social contract with former combatants needs to be made an integral part of the DDR planning and implementation. The recent trends in various DDR programmes and recommendations made by the IDDRS also indicate that there is now a strong recognition of this particular requirement. However, the problem is likely to be in terms of finding a right balance in responding to the needs of combatants and communities at the same time. It is important to ask how feasible it is to expect combatants to agree with the conditions of DDR if the benefits are centred on community development. Especially in cases when combatants are going back to communities where they are part of a minority group or where they have spent long periods away from their homes and no longer have a strong affiliation with their communities. In other words, as rhetoric goes the community centred DDR approach may tick all the right boxes, but how viable it would be to implement as a principal strategy for reintegration in a typical DDR process may be another matter. The wide variety of factors and contexts would all have an impact on the decision making of this issue, nevertheless without trying to be prescriptive and attempting to come up with a blueprint it would be fair to say that reintegration strategies should all incorporate community development projects as a rule rather than an exception. Their overall percentage in terms of the financial resources allocated for them against more conventional combatant-centred projects is likely to vary. For example, although it was not initially planned, the community development projects implemented as part of the reintegration process in some provinces of Sierra Leone had a ratio of 50:50. In other words, the allocation of resources for community development projects was not a concern to former combatants, since they continued to benefit from the process on an individual basis. Consequently, the critical point is perhaps with the diversification of reintegration options, whilst ensuring that former combatants do not receive less. For example, it is clear that there would always be a need for VTCs and small business development options for the successful reintegration of former combatants on an individual basis. However, there would be two ways of linking and responding to the needs

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of communities and combatants. First, this could partly be achieved by opening-up some reintegration options to other vulnerable groups, such as returning refugees and IDPs or women headed households in the community. Second would be by providing a wider selection of initiatives, some of which may be for example, the anti-personnel landmine clearance projects that employ trained former combatants; or establishing community agriculture centres for crop diversification and product marketing; or the reconstruction of damaged public buildings such as schools and clinics by employing former combatants and community members together; or initiating labour-intensive infrastructure programmes such as rebuilding roads and clearing irrigation channels. This is in no way an exhaustive list, but the point to bear in mind here is that they would all be packaged as an overall reintegration response. Therefore, rather than separating out the reintegration benefits into those that are for former combatants and those for receiving communities, a better strategy would be to plan them as an integrated package which would be put forward right at the beginning of the DDR process. This approach would also be likely to contribute to the establishment of a new social contract between communities and former combatants, which is essential for social justice and reconciliation. Local Ownership One of the main prerequisites for a community centred DDR approach would be likely to be the involvement of national and local actors in the planning and implementation as ‘stakeholders’. There is a mixed picture as to how much involvement local actors had in some of the recent DDR experiences, which was also an issue with the case studies covered in this book. While the Kosovo case had no involvement of any ‘national’ authority and local NGOs, the process in Sierra Leone had the full ownership of the government and a high number of newly established local NGOs took part in the implementation of reintegration options. Similarly, the experience in El Salvador showed a strong ownership by the national authorities as the entire process was undertaken by them. The involvement of international NGOs was more to support the system rather than to run its main components. On the other hand, as far as the Afghan experience was concerned this was another case of total dominance by the international community in the entire DDR process. Although, the paperwork and rhetoric of the process argues for the wide involvement of governmental bodies in the process, in terms of being a real stakeholder in the process, the main decisions for planning and implementation were made by the international community. The Afghan DDR process did not allow the national authorities to learn from the experience fully either, as they were consulted but not made part of the decision making progress. Local NGOs were included by the implementing agencies involved in the reintegration phase, but it is questionable how much real local ownership was achieved through their participation. In

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other words, there is a need to consider the question of what is understood by ‘local participation’ and ‘local ownership’. In those DDR cases with limited involvement of local actors the argument used by the international community is often in terms of ensuring neutrality with the leadership of a third party in the process; or how difficult and ineffective it would be to expect local actors to be involved in the process fully given the inadequacies in their capacities and capabilities. Although this argument is plausible to some extent, it is also possible to argue that if a country like Sierra Leone, with very limited institutional and human resources, can take the lead role in its DDR, then it would be possible to consider the same approach in many other cases. The placement of key people with international experience, with the facilitation of the international community as occurred in Sierra Leone would be a viable model to ensure the local ownership of the process. As well as assisting the process financially, such nationally led processes may also require the assistance of the international community with the provision of security. It seems that one of the reasons why there is reluctance among local NGOs to take a greater role in DDR processes is to do with the security and well-being of their own staff. Dealing with former combatants is sometimes a risky task, given that the beneficiary group are accustomed to resorting to the barrel of gun to get their way. Facing possible delays and problems in the demobilization or reintegration phases tends to cause security crises in most DDR processes, and without full security backing, particularly from the international community it would be highly problematic for local NGOs to take an active role in DDR. Some of their problems experienced in the implementation phase would be similar to those faced by many other local NGOs in any type of reconstruction and development work in war-affected areas. However, it is also important to recognize the special characteristics of their beneficiaries within a DDR process, and to take the necessary precautions to help encourage their involvement in the process. Another component that is highly critical but equally ignored in DDR programmes is the role of the private sector and their involvement, particularly in the reintegration phase. The discussions on the community centred approach and reintegration-first type strategies showed that a successful DDR cannot be achieved only by supporting the ‘supply’ side but it is necessary to work on the ‘demand’ side too. For example, the review of the case studies underlined the challenges related to the overall post-conflict economic environment and their impact on the reintegration phase. The DDR programmes that helped to revitalize those potential employers for the reintegrating of former combatants were more successful in creating more meaningful employment opportunities. The provision of VTCs and assistance in the establishment of small businesses would be efficient only to a certain extent in tackling the enormous challenges

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of unemployment. This is not a problem only for former combatants but for all people in a post-conflict country, and once they complete their VTC or start a new business, former combatants must compete with the rest of the working age population in a highly limited employment market. Therefore, it is critical that, as well as making much greater efforts towards full local ownership and community centred implementation of DDR processes, there also need to be bridges built with the private sector for the creation of employment opportunities. It is vital that the potential of the private sector, hitherto largely ignored by the international community, be recognized and its capacities harnessed as one of the main dynamos of the reintegration process. It is necessary that through the diversification of reintegration options, the role of the private sector and the ways in which it can be encouraged to participate more fully in the reintegration phase, need to be made a central part of the planning process. This is an area clearly yet to be tapped by DDR practitioners and it is likely to provide many opportunities for policy makers to identify possible linkages between DDR and the overall peacebuilding context. The common criticism of the way DDR processes are carried out in isolation without any linkages to the overall post-war recovery framework can be better addressed to by putting much more emphasis on the private sector. Such an approach would be a positive and highly visible demonstration of the fact that the DDR process is not only for former combatants only but for the society at large. It would also enable the development of a more robust social contract between combatants and receiving communities as the stimulation of private sector capabilities would be likely to translate itself into greater employment opportunities for all.

NOTES

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4

Notes to Chapter 1 Using Galtung’s definition of positive peace – the removal of structural and cultural violence – the concept of positive peace has played a significant role in the evolution of the context of peacebuilding and broadly includes any activity designed to prevent and help resolve violent conflict (1990). Those countries have been involved in the MDRP are Namibia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Central-African Republic, Burundi and Zimbabwe. For the definition of child soldiers there are a number of international standards can be taken as a reference point such as the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocols; the UN Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC); the ILO Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour; the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the Security Council Resolutions 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005); the Cape Town Principles; and the Paris Principles. The most widely accepted definition of small arms and light weapons is provided by the 1997 ‘Report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms’. This distinguishes between small arms, which are weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons which are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. The small arms category would include revolvers and self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub machine guns and light machine guns, while light weapons would include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles,

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portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and mortars of calibres less than 100mm (www.smallarmsnet.org). Child soldiers are frequently forced to commit atrocities directed against their own communities/families as a mechanism for severing community links and ensuring loyalty to the armed group. Notes to Chapter 2 The name ‘soccer war’ comes from the fact that the war was ignited by nationalistic feelings aroused by a series of soccer matches between the two countries. Interview with Mauricio González Ayala was conducted in San Salvador on 16 September 2005. Interview with Walter Funes was conducted in San Salvador on 20 September 2005. Interview with J.J. Dalton was conducted in San Salvador on 28 September 2005. Interview with Francisco Jovel was conducted in San Salvador on 16 September 2005. Interview with Manuel Melgar was conducted in San Salvador on 27 September 2005. Interview with Antonio Alvarez was conducted in San Salvador on 24 September 2005. As a response to delays in land transfers as reintegration assistance, the UN declared its concerns over the preceding issues in the ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Status of the Implementation of the Peace Accords in El Salvador’ on 25 January 1996. Interview with Loreno Martinez was conducted in San Salvador on 16 September 2005. Interview with Oscar Perez was conducted in San Salvador on 22 September 2005. Interview with Emilio Espin was conducted in Bajo Lempa on 22 September 2005. Interview with a group of former FMLN combatants including Candelario Landaverde was carried out in Wasapa on 17 September 2005. Interview with Carlos Castillo was conducted in San Salvador on 16 September 2005. Interview with Adolfo Sánchez was conducted in Los Heroes on 24 September 2005. Interview with Tully Cormick was conducted in San Salvador on 28 September 2005. Interview with Dagoberto Gutierrez was conducted in San Salvador on 14 September 2005.

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17 Interview with Alfredo Diaz was conducted in San Salvador on 14 September 2005. 18 Interview with a group of former FMLN combatants was conducted in Las Pasmas on 18 September 2005. 19 Interview with Héctor Alberto Hernández was conducted in San Salvador on 25 September 2005. 20 Interview with Paolo Luers was conducted in San Salvador on 21 September 2005. 21 Interview with Americo Meija was conducted in San Salvador on 17 September 2005. 22 Interview with Cesar Villalona and Daniel Gomez was conducted in San Salvador on 26 September 2005. 23 Interview with Sonia Aguinada was conducted in San Salvador on 23 September 2005. 24 Interview with Oscar Atilio Chicas and Olga Serrano was conducted in San Salvador on 27 September 2005. 25 Interview with this female combatant was conducted as part of the focus group meeting with a group of former FMLN members in Las Pasmas on 18 September 2006. Her identity was kept anonymous for the protection of her well being. 26 Interview with Daysi Cheyne was conducted in San Salvador on 21 September 2005. 27 Interview with Margarita Posada was conducted in San Salvador on 23 September 2005. 28 Interview with Miquel Cruz was conducted in San Salvador on 28 September 2005. 29 Interview with Oscar Miranda was conducted in San Salvador on 26 September 2005. 30 Interview with William Pascacio was conducted in San Salvador on 26 September 2005. 31 Interview with Benjamin Cuéllar Martinez was conducted in San Salvador on 27 September 2005.

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Notes to Chapter 3 After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992. Kosovo as a province of Serbia was part of the FRY at the time the NATO intervention and the UNSC Resolution 1244 took place. However, the FRY became the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 and both Montenegro and Serbia declared independence in 2006. Kosovo holds a special significance in Serbian cultural history, because Prince Lazar, patron of Serbia fought a battle against Sultan Murat of the

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Ottoman Turks on Kosovo Polje (literally a field near today’s Pristina in Kosovo) in 1389. The Milosevic’s nationalistic propaganda created the myths “... that it was this Turkish victory that destroyed the medieval Serbian empire, and that the defeated Serbs were immediately placed under Ottoman rule” (Malcolm, 1998). Such false and structured myths were widely used by Milosevic for the creation of his greater Serbia aspirations throughout the 1990s. 3 The Kanun of Lek Dukagjini is the 15th Century law which codifies the law of blood vengeance (Malcolm, 1998). 4 Article 2.4 of the UN Charter: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. 5 Quoted from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo report (2000:120) 6 The overall demographic and socio-economic characteristics of senior managers can be summarized as follows. The caseload is predominantly male (only one female joining the central staff), and relatively young (two thirds under 40). Only 13 per cent are single and only 22 per cent have less than tertiary education. One third of senior managers were associated with the KLA before 1998. Half of the key leaders indicated that they were with the military prior to their application to the KPC. The majority of middle managers are also male, with only eight female members in the group. One third are under 30, and only 37 per cent have less than tertiary education. A quarter of middle managers were in education and 18 per cent were with the military prior to their application to the KPC. Only 6 per cent of middle managers were associated with the KLA before 1998. The caseload of field members includes 117 females (out of 3,500). 70 per cent of field members are under 30, and half are single. Only 15 per cent have less than secondary or high school education; 19 per cent were in the education sector, with 15 per cent and 12 per cent in the construction and agriculture sectors respectively prior to their application to the KPC. Only 3 per cent of the field members were associated with the KLA before 1998. 7 Interviews with KFOR staff were carried out in Pristina in July 2001. 8 Interviews with over 10 IOM staff were carried out in Pristina, Prizren, Peja and Mitrovica in October 2000 and May and July in 2001. 9 Interviews with over 40 former KLA combatants who benefited from the ICRS programme were carried out in May and July 2001. 10 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Istog on 10 July 2001. 11 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Milasheve on 11 July 2001.

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12 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Peja on 8 July 2001. 13 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Barileve on 15 May 2001. 14 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Barileve on 15 May 2001. 15 Interviews with those former combatants were conducted in Mitrovica on 11–12 May 2001. 16 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Pristina on 14 May 2001. 17 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Pristina on 16 May 2001. 18 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Prizren on 8 May 2001. 19 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Pristina on 15 May 2001. 20 Interviews with over 34 KPC members were conducted in May and July 2001. 21 Interview with the former combatant was conducted in Mitrovica on 14 July 2001. 22 Interview with Agim Çeku was conducted in Pristina on 12 July 2001.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Notes to Chapter 4 Interviews with 25 former RUF and AFRC combatants were conducted on different dates from 8 to 26 August 2005. Interview with Eldred Collins was conducted in Freetown on 17 August 2005. Stopgap is the popular title for the Short-term Support to Ex-Combatants in Special Emergency Conditions programme. Interview with Eric Jumu was conducted in Freetown on 12 August 2005. Interview with Joe Edkins was conducted in Freetown on 11 August 2005. Interview with Uju Elasinbo was conducted in Freetown on 17 and 18 August 2005. Interview with Bengt Lyunggren was conducted in Freetown on 15 August 2005. Interview with Lawrence Sesay was conducted in Freetown on 12 August 2005. Interview with Jonathan Sundaywas conducted in Freetown on 19 August 2005. Interview with Zoe Dogal was conducted in Freetown on 19 August 2005. Interview with Sullay Sesay was conducted in Freetown on 16 August 2005. 1 US Dollar is about 3,000 Sierra Leone Leone. Interview with Dawo was conducted in Freetown on 12 August 2005. Interview with John Paul was conducted in Freetown on 19 August 2005.

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Notes to Chapter 5 Interview with Yuichi Inouye was conducted in Kabul on 11 May 2005. Those three commanders were Mir Alam of the 54th Division in Kunduz, Haji Abdullah of the 15th Division in Kandahar and Wali Mohammad of the 70th Division of Mazar-e Sharif. Interview with Masoom Stanaczai was conducted in Kabul on 10 May 2005. Interview with Peter Babbington was conducted in Kabul on 12 May 2005. Interview with Lisa Pinsley was conducted in Kabul on 11 May 2005. Interviews with ADRC staff who wished to remain anonymous on 10 May 2005. Interview with Filippo Grandi was conducted on 16 May 2005. Interview with Peter Babbington was conducted on 8 June 2006. Interview with Richard Starck was conducted in Kabul on 19 May 2005.

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INDEX

Absorptive capacities, 199 Accountability, 160 Aceh, 26, 43 Ad-Hoc Commission, 190 Afghanistan, 3, 4, 6, 16 147–59, 161–9, 171, 172, 174, 176, 181, 183–7, 189, 191, 192, 195, 198, 200, 201, 204, 206, 210, 211 AFRC, 4, 121, 122, 124–7, 135, 221 Agricultural schemes, 190 packages, 196, 197 projects, 94 reintegration packages, 197, 189 Vocational Training, 95 Al-Qaida, 6, 161, 163, 189 AMF, 147, 148, 152, 154, 156, 158, 159, 185, 187 ANBP, 147, 153–9, 164–74, 195, 197, 212 Angola, 16, 21, 23, 24, 29, 34, 35, 43, 46, 47, 217 ARENA, 55, 58, 59, 70, 71, 76, 81, 82, 204 Armed forces, 3–5, 11, 33, 45, 48,

61, 62, 74, 77, 78, 82, 116,118, 122, 129, 152 Armed groups, 4, 6, 11, 13, 15, 72, 83, 117, 118, 125, 131, 142, 144, 147, 152, 162, 167, 171, 173, 177–9, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192, 194, 197, 200, 202, 209, 210 Assistance, 5, 12, 19, 24, 31, 32, 34, 35, 41, 43, 47, 48, 52, 53, 59, 60, 64, 68–73, 76, 77, 79 94–6, 102, 104, 105, 108, 117, 122, 127–33, 136, 137, 139, 143, 145–8, 150, 152, 154, 159, 160, 162, 165, 168, 169, 178, 179, 184, 187, 194–6, 199–201, 208, 210, 214, 218 agricultural, 138 educational, 133, 145 external, 49 financial, 34, 105, 153, 198, 203 material, 23, 32, 35 reinsertion, 7, 12, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 135, 136, 138, 206, 208 special, 32, 37 technical, 65, 68, 125

242

POST-WAR RECOVERY

Atrocities, 28, 43, 111, 121, 124, 128, 134, 136, 141, 142, 182, 200–3, 218 Belligerents, 16–8, 23, 49, 53, 144 Benefits, 18–20, 30, 31, 35, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 69, 75, 115, 133, 136, 137, 145, 147, 152, 177, 186–9, 205, 210, 212, 213 Berdal, Mats, 3, 9, 12, 15, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27–9, 32, 41, 45, 48, 50 BICC, 3, 40, 41 Bonn Conference, 147, 148 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 19, 24, 26, 88, 89 Bush wives, 135, 145, 188, 200 Business, 25, 63, 65, 71, 77, 79, 93, 95, 98, 101–4, 107, 108, 119, 139, 156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 169, 170, 178, 195–9, 201, 207, 208, 212, 214, 215 Buy-back programmes, 27 CAAF, 14 Cambodia, 12, 26, 27, 31, 33, Cantonment, 7, 18–20, 27–31, 37, 38, 52, 53, 127, 128, 135, 136, 181–3, 208, 210 Cash-for-weapons, 136, 208 CBOs, 140 Ceku, 113, 114, 221 Chapultepec Accord, 55, 56, 60, 61 Child soldiers, 4, 13, 14, 20, 28, 36–8, 53, 78, 79, 117, 120, 128, 129, 133, 134, 144, 145, 182 188, 189, 200, 208, 209, 217, 218 Civil society, 4, 5, 52, 76, 77, 81, 84, 87, 89, 120, 140, 141, 184 war 39, 55, 59–61, 80, 83, 118, 123, 143, 171, 203 Cold War, 1, 2, 5, 48, 56, 59, 65, 84, 112, 143, 150

Colletta, Nat, 3, 10, 13, 22, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33–5, 41, 47, 48 Combatants, 1, 2, 4–7, 9–56, 58, 61, 62–73, 75–85, 93–105, 107–9, 111–8, 121, 123–33, 135, 137–9, 141–5, 147, 148, 152–4, 156–60, 163, 165, 168–70, 173–90, 194–202, 206–15, 218–20 AFRC, 121, 135, 221 caseload, 79, 85, 148, 181, 209 CDF, 117, 141, 143 demobilized, 1, 11, 23, 24, 28, 44, 45, 68, 126, 131, 156, 179, 180 disabled, 14, 36, 79, 80 disarmed, 124, 137 educated, 47, 94, 149, 150, 182 ex-, 22, 24, 25, 32, 40, 43, 44, 50, 78, 82, 98, 125, 129, 131, 144, 207 FMLN, 5, 61–5, 67–70, 77, 81 KLA, 4, 93–7, 111–5, 189, 220 male, 37, 79, 188 RUF, 123, 131, 135, 136, 143 UNITA, 29 Commander(s), 4, 6, 17–20, 62, 65, 66, 72, 82, 96, 113, 122, 124, 134, 143, 147, 148, 152, 156–9, 161, 165, 168, 170, 173, 174, 177, 186, 189, 192, 202–4, 206, 210, 222 Community disarmament, 13 Community-based, 43, 44, 48 Community-centred reintegration, 53, 211 Compartmentalization, 8, 53, 132, 133, 176, 184, 198, 206, 208 Conflict transformation, 41 Conflict-affected, 38, 61 Constructivism, 39, 40 Coordination, 4, 5, 26, 65, 78, 84, 99, 103, 114, 117, 123, 126, 127, 132, 140, 144, 162–6, 183–5, 206

INDEX

COPAZ, 60, 66 Côte d’Ivoire, 10, 27, 143, 144, 186 Crime networks, 188 Criminal activities, 45, 179, 187 gangs, 82 groups, 82 networks, 189 operations, 81 organizations, 82 CSOs, 77, 78 Cultural barriers, 37 DDR, 1–16, 18, 20–3, 25–31, 33, 42, 44–50, 52–4, 56, 61–8, 70, 72, 75, 78, 79, 84, 85 115, 117, 118, 124–8, 130–5, 137–48, 152–9, 162–70, 172–95, 198–215 activities, 131, 132, 206 case studies, 7, 53, 176, 184, 185, 200 cases, 178, 181, 214 challenge(s), 1, 5, 45, 46, 167, 176, 177 combatant centred, 7, 221 community centred, 212, 213 experience(s), 3, 5–7, 23, 25, 145, 163, 182, 183, 210, 213 model, 5, 6, 182, 183 planning and implementation of, 48, 54, 178, 180, 181 programme(s), 2, 9, 10, 12–4, 21, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 44, 46, 48, 49, 53, 54, 56, 72, 117, 118, 130, 133, 144, 145, 157, 163, 165, 170, 178, 179, 185–7, 194, 198, 199, 202, 205, 212, 214 requirements, 31, 37, 38, 50, 84, 87, 104, 131, 159, 165, 193, 206, 208, 210 strategy, 61, 124, 147, 148, 152,

243

153, 164, 170, 174, 206, 211 successful, 2, 9, 61, 66, 85, 128, 162, 163, 201, 211, 214 typical, 5, 148, 183, 212 Demilitarization, 3, 13, 65, 73, 83, 87, 172, 173 Demobilization, 1, 7, 9-23, 25, 27–35, 37–9, 41, 43–7, 49–53, 61, 62, 66, 67, 72, 75, 76, 84, 93, 103, 116, 117, 127, 128, 130, 132, 135–8, 143, 145, 147, 148, 153, 154–6, 162, 163, 166, 168, 170, 174, 175, 182, 188, 192, 194, 205, 210, 214 activities, 18, 30, 207 centres, 30, 135 phase(s), 18, 21, 22, 23, 93, 127, 128, 130, 132, 136, 138, 168, 170, 174, 182, 207–10 planning, 119 process, 18–21, 28, 29, 66, 154 programmes, 30 Democracy, 73, 133, 188 Dependents, 13, 14, 25, 35, 40, 50, 94, 105, 136 Destruction of weapons, 17, 146, 177, 206 Development, 3, 7, 11–3, 17, 21, 23–29, 33, 41, 44–7, 49, 53–5, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 92, 93, 95–100, 103, 104, 108, 115, 116, 118, 119, 123, 125, 128, 133, 136, 137, 139, 141, 145, 147, 151, 164, 166, 169, 178, 187, 190, 191, 194, 197, 198, 206–9, 211–5 business, 25, 198, 212 community, 93, 136, 164, 187, 212 economic, 11, 47, 76, 92, 98 enterprise, 24, 99, 100, 103, 104, 108, 116

244

POST-WAR RECOVERY

human, 21, 46, 128, 151 human resource, 7, 45, 115, 141, 206–9 international, 125, 147 sustainable, 46 United Nations, 3, 17 DFID, 125 DIAG, 4, 6, 167, 186, 187, 211, 212 Disarmament, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–9, 21, 22, 25–9, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49–53, 62, 69, 75, 80, 81, 93, 117, 127, 128, 130–7, 143, 145, 147, 148, 154, 155, 159, 162, 165, 172–5, 177, 178, 182, 184–9, 192, 205, 206, 211 activities, 52, 131 centres, 131, 133 operations, 26, 154 process, 15–8, 39, 148, 154, 174, 186, 211 programme(s), 14, 26, 81, 211 scheme, 27 successful, 16, 17, 26 Donor, 31, 33, 34, 47–9, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 92, 124, 136, 137, 140, 154, 173, 184, 191, 210 DPKO, 26, 27, 124, 127, 131, 134, 136, 138 Drugs, 135, 171, 172, 189 East Timor, 52 ECOMOG, 121–5, 130, 131 Economic reintegration, 10, 21, 23, 37, 44, 54, 79, 94, 100, 137, 194, 198, 199, 201 Economy, 16, 19, 24, 34, 40, 47, 55, 57, 60, 70, 73, 89, 90, 92, 100, 111, 120, 138, 175, 198, 201 crop, 57 local, 32, 105, 116, 201 market, 3, 6, 7, 54, 118

war, 161 weapons, 16 ECOWAS, 117, 121, 144 Education, 20, 23, 25, 28, 37, 38, 60, 63, 71, 76, 82, 85, 89, 90, 98, 108, 115, 128, 129, 134, 141, 146, 149, 154, 158, 178, 202, 206, 220 children’s, 20, 32 civic, 20, 127, 136 finance, 34 financial, 33 formal, 208 higher, 125 tertiary, 208 El Salvador, 3–5, 16, 26, 27, 55–85, 176, 180–94, 198–200, 203–5, 213, 218 case(s), 5, 190–2, 194, 198, 200, 205 case study, 5, 83, 193, 203 DDR, 5, 180, 193 Elections, 10, 28, 46, 47, 56, 59, 76, 80, 90, 92, 112, 113, 122, 123, 128, 152, 192 Employment, 20, 21, 24, 25, 32, 34, 36, 37, 44, 45, 47, 57, 63, 64, 69, 73, 75, 82, 85, 89, 93–8, 100–9, 112, 114–6, 129, 130, 134, 137–9, 141, 148, 154, 158, 162, 163, 167, 170, 172, 173, 178, 187, 192, 197, 199, 201, 207–9, 211 gainful, 21, 112, 114 meaningful, 115, 129, 134, 141, 178, 199, 201, 214 opportunities, 44, 47, 69, 73, 93, 94, 98, 101, 102, 105, 107, 108, 115, 116, 129, 138, 163, 172, 187, 201, 207–9, 211, 214, 215 prospects, 107

INDEX

structures, 173 sustainable, 104, 178, 197 Ethiopia, 22, 24, 30, 33, 36, 47 European Union, 65, 92 Exploitation, 38, 145, 179, 181 FAES, 61–5, 67, 72, 76, 77, 82, 186 Family, 32, 33, 35–7, 58, 82, 94, 105, 115, 120, 134, 136, 146, 169, 172, 200 extended, 44, 107, 194 members, 29, 58 planning, 20 Female combatants, 4, 20, 36, 37, 53, 78, 79, 85, 135, 180–2, 188, 208 Financial assistance, 34, 105, 153, 198, 203 FMLN, 5, 55, 56, 58–82, 84–6, 186, 190–2, 203, 204, 218, 219 Food, 32, 62, 71, 101, 135 assistance, 12 package, 154, 168, 169, 197 Funding, 13, 29, 33, 44, 47–9, 58, 67, 71, 72, 77, 103, 124, 127, 135–7, 139–42, 145, 161, 178, 186, 191, 208

245

Human development, 21, 46, 128, 151 Human resource development, 7, 45, 54, 115, 141, 206–9 Human rights, 56, 58, 60, 65, 74, 84, 90, 92, 96, 113, 173, 180, 192, 193, 202–4 Human trafficking, 179, 189 Humanitarian, 2, 12, 29, 40, 66, 90–2, 96, 124, 132, 161, 191

Gangs, 55, 56, 80, 82, 84, 134, 188 Gender, 3, 20, 25, 37, 79, 85, 135, 145, 179 Governance, 5, 7, 12, 88, 91, 119, 141, 176, 181, 183, 188, 190–4, 201, 204 issue(s), 193, 194 structure(s), 4, 9, 88, 174, 175, 181, 182, 190, 210 Great Lakes Region, 10 GTZ, 76, 129, 139, 140 Guatemala, 15, 24, 80, 83

ICRS, 88, 93–5, 97–105, 108, 109, 112, 220 IDDRS, 12–5, 18, 30–7, 38, 48, 205, 212, 231 Identity transformation, 6 IDPs, 14, 43, 121, 213 ILO, 21, 24, 25, 36, 38, 43, 44, 98, 217, 220 Independence, 29, 52, 90, 111–3, 119, 186, 191–4, 203, 205, 219, 220 Information campaign, 158 Infrastructure, 23, 60, 66, 70, 92, 96, 110, 129, 130, 171, 175, 178, 202, 211, 213 In-kind kit, 35 Instability, 1, 10, 67, 117, 152, 175 International community, 1, 2, 4–6, 14, 16, 17, 23, 29, 31, 34, 42, 45, 47–9, 52, 54, 60, 71–4, 77, 80, 84, 88, 90, 96, 105, 109, 110–4, 116, 125, 127, 130, 132, 140, 145, 147, 152, 161, 165, 173, 174, 177, 179, 180, 182–4, 186, 191–4, 198, 199, 205, 208–10, 213–5 IOM, 93, 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 220 ISAF, 152, 162, 163

Health care, 32, 90 HIV/AIDS, 20

JICA, 153 Justice, 7, 22, 43, 48, 52, 57, 80, 83,

246

POST-WAR RECOVERY

85, 142, 168, 172, 173, 176, 201–5, 211, 213 Karzai, 152, 158 KFOR, 87, 93, 96, 99 112, 220 Kingma, Kees 3, 11 KLA, 4, 5, 87, 88, 90–7, 101–3, 105, 109, 111–6, 189, 192–4, 203, 220 Kosovo, 3–5, 48, 87, 88–103, 105, 107–16, 176, 181, 182, 184, 186, 189, 192–4, 198–201, 203, 205, 210–3, 219, 220 KPC, 87, 88, 93, 95–7, 99, 109–14, 116, 193, 194, 205, 220, 221 KPCT, 93, 95–7, 99 Land purchases, 64 reform, 59, 61, 64, 67, 69, 182, 190, 193, 198, 200 titling, 67 transfer, 64, 66–9, 72, 78, 79, 84 Landholders, 68, 70 Landowners, 56, 67, 68, 203 Liberia, 4, 10, 26, 27, 34, 119–24, 143, 144 Livelihoods, 21, 24, 27, 52, 70, 93, 129, 137, 148, 178, 202, 211 Local market, 116 ownership, 48, 50, 141, 147, 166, 167, 213–5 stakeholders, 49 Logistics, 28, 135 Lóme Peace Agreement, 118, 123, 124, 130, 133, 202, 203 Lumpen, 120, 188 Macroeconomic, 24, 198 insecurity, 45 level, 6, 114

Maras, 55, 82 Media, 41, 76 Microcredit, 69, 104, 190 enterprise, 69, 77, 97, 105, 116, 129, 163, 201 enterprise development, 23–5, 47, 49, 72, 97–8, 100, 104, 115, 178, 197–8, 206 Enterprise Set-Up, 108 insecurity, 45 level, 45, 111, 114–5, 174 Military intervention, 4, 5, 91, 117, 118, 147, 150, 161, 163, 171, 176, 180–3, 209 service, 35 Minimalist and maximalist perspectives, 45 MINUSAL, 60 Monitoring and evaluation, 205 Mozambique, 10, 16, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 36, 43, 44, 46, 49 MRDP, 10 Mujaheddin, 45, 149, 150, 152 National authorities, 15, 166, 183, 213 NATO, 5, 48, 87, 109, 186, 219 NCDDR, 14, 117, 124–30, 132, 135, 136, 140, 141 Neo-liberal, 39, 40, 45, 56, 69, 70, 203, 204 NGOs, 48, 65, 72, 76, 77, 139, 140, 159, 163, 191, 213, 214 Nicaragua, 23, 26, 29, 59, 60, 62, 83 One-man-one-weapon, 8, 14, 54, 202, 211 On-the-job training, 93, 95, 198 ONUSAL, 56, 60–3, 65 OSCE, 92

INDEX

Paris, 137, 217 Peace, 2–5, 9, 11, 12, 39, 42–6, 50–2, 55, 56, 64, 71, 72, 76, 83, 91, 113, 117, 122, 128, 129, 146, 147 150–3, 161, 164, 172, 173, 175, 176, 180, 188, 190, 200, 204, 205, 217 accord, 3, 46, 56, 62, 62, 66, 68, 72, 79, 80, 91, 218 enforcement, 83, 131 enforcer, 1 process, 10, 17–9, 28, 29, 31, 40, 46, 53, 56, 62, 79, 115, 123, 127, 128, 135, 144, 185 talks, 190 Peaceful, 52, 59, 77, 80, 84, 90, 91 Peace agreement 4, 5, 9–13, 16, 23, 26, 28, 31, 36, 44–6, 52, 53, 56, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70–6, 78, 80, 81, 84, 85, 102, 122, 127, 130, 132, 133, 152, 180–5, 188–93, 205 Abuja, 127, 130, 131 Borama, 50 Lóme, 118, 123, 124, 130, 133, 202, 203 negotiated, 4–6, 209 scenarios, 176 Peacebuilding, 1–3, 6–11, 19, 39–42, 44–9, 53, 54, 56, 65, 66, 70, 74, 77, 78, 84, 117, 118, 125, 129, 137, 161–4, 168, 172, 175, 176, 179, 180, 186, 188, 190, 191, 198, 202, 205, 207, 208, 210, 215, 217 activity(ies), 47, 66, 163, 198 framework, 7, 11, 39, 46, 48, 164, 176, 207 process, 1, 2, 9, 11, 19, 41, 44, 46, 47, 50, 74, 77, 84, 117, 118, 161, 172, 176, 179, 180, 188, 190, 191, 202, 205, 208, 210

247

programme(s), 2, 70, 129, 162 Peacekeeping, 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 16, 125, 131, 145, 165, 177, 180, 181 Police, 11, 17, 56, 60, 61, 65, 73, 80, 81, 83, 89, 143 civilian, 56, 61, 64 force, 19, 64, 80, 83, 133, 188, 190 force (new), 72, 76, 80, 87, 92, 168 military, 56, 60, 73 national, 74, 153, 156 officers, 64, 65, 81, 110 service, 72, 76, 80, 87, 92, 168 Political reintegration, 21 Political settlement, 92 Poppy cultivation, 171 Post-conflict, 11, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 41, 46, 48, 56, 61, 64, 69, 73–6, 80, 82, 84, 86, 91, 93, 98, 115, 117, 118, 123, 128, 133, 135, 136, 141, 148, 150, 161–3, 173, 177–9, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 198, 205, 214, 215 economic environment, 178, 214 environment(s), 22, 24, 41, 64, 76, 86, 115, 123, 128, 161 reconstruction, 2, 11, 12, 64, 75, 84, 91, 93, 117, 133, 162, 163, 182 recovery, 48, 91, 148, 177, 185, 205 Poverty, 6, 55, 57, 60, 69, 73, 79, 84, 120, 129, 133, 151, 188, 189 Power, 3, 5–7, 12, 16, 38, 39, 48–51, 54, 56–9, 70, 88, 109, 113, 119, 121, 134, 142, 147–9, 152, 156, 159, 161, 172, 173, 189, 192, 202, 204, 206, 21, 212 bases, 12, 148, 149, 156 military, 3, 12, 147, 152, 159 structures, 3, 6, 7, 147, 206

248

POST-WAR RECOVERY

Preferential treatment, 2, 7, 40–4, 53, 54, 201 Private sector, 79, 108, 214, 215 PRTs, 162, 163 Psychosocial assistance, 69, 79 care, 38 program, 146 PTT, 64–8, 70 Rambouillet, 91 Re-armament, 173, 210 Receiving communities, 19, 33, 43, 48, 53, 54, 129, 136, 137, 141, 179, 180, 199, 202, 211, 213, 215 Reconciliation, 7, 20, 21, 43, 46, 64, 118, 124, 129, 130, 141, 142, 176, 200, 201, 203–5, 211, 213 Reconstruction, 2, 11, 12, 22, 46, 60–4, 68, 70–3, 75, 77, 84, 91, 93, 95, 100, 107, 114, 116, 117, 124, 133, 137, 141, 142, 147, 161–4, 174, 178, 183–5, 208, 213, 214 national, 61, 63 post-conflict, 2, 11, 12, 64, 75, 84, 91, 93, 117, 133, 162, 163, 183 process, 71, 73, 75, 93, 100, 107, 114, 116, 133, 147, 161, 162 programmes, 11, 61, 68, 71, 124, 142, 185 Refugees, 14, 23, 43, 89, 121, 191, 201, 213 Registration criteria, 135, 177, 207, 208 of combatants, 128 Reinsertion, 7, 12, 18, 21, 31–5, 38, 53, 65, 67 assistance, 7, 12, 31–5, 38, 53, 135, 136, 138, 206, 208 Reintegration, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9–11, 12–3,

15, 18–21, 22–5, 28, 29, 31–3, 36–8, 40–5, 46–7, 48–50, 53, 54, 60, 62–5, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 93–5, 97–104, 106, 108, 111–8, 125–9, 130, 132–48, 153, 154, 159, 163–6, 168–70, 174, 175–80, 182–5, 189, 191, 194–202, 205, 206–8, 209–11, 212, 213–5, 218 activities, 12, 24, 29, 47, 118, 129, 132, 144, 178, 208–10 assistance, 19, 23, 43, 76, 125, 127, 129, 133, 137, 139, 145, 178, 179, 184, 194–6, 210, 218 benefits, 19, 37, 41, 69, 115, 133, 137, 177, 213 comprehensive, 11 economic, 10, 21, 23, 37, 44, 54, 79, 94, 100, 137, 194, 198, 199 fund, 93–104, 106, 108 initiatives, 206 opportunities, 54, 79, 85, 93, 129 option(s), 2, 51, 69, 78, 79, 148, 156, 157, 165, 168, 169, 178, 199, 201, 211–5 packages, 154, 158, 159, 168, 170, 189, 196, 197, 199, 201 phase(s), 21, 32, 48, 53, 62, 66, 129–33, 137, 138, 140, 141, 148, 154, 156, 169, 182, 191, 198, 199, 207, 208, 213–5 process, 9, 12, 20, 21–5, 28, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 50, 63, 64, 69, 76, 84, 102, 111, 115, 128, 129, 140, 142, 159, 168, 182, 189, 194, 196, 197, 200, 212, 215 programme(s), 10, 19, 20–5, 28, 31, 36, 43, 44, 49, 65, 71, 72,

INDEX

77, 84, 97, 99, 100, 129, 136, 142, 144, 159, 164, 174, 195, 205 social reintegration, 21, 22, 42, 44, 118, 128, 129, 134, 136–8, 140, 141, 143, 179, 183 standards, 12, 205 strategy, 11, 66, 73, 88, 97–100, 112, 115, 116, 135, 141 successful, 21, 22, 69, 114, 179, 199, 208, 212 Reintegration-first, 8, 209, 210, 214 Relief, 76, 162 RTGs, 93, 110 RUF, 117, 118, 120–8, 130, 131, 134–6, 143, 221 Rugova, 9 Safety nets, 132, 145 SALW, 14, 144, 186, 188, 189 Security, 1–3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17–9, 21, 27–32, 34, 39, 41, 42, 44–7, 49–54, 58, 60–2, 64, 66, 71, 73, 74, 80–3, 85, 87–92, 94, 99, 100, 111, 113, 114, 115, 118, 122–5, 127, 129–33, 137, 141, 144–6, 148, 151–4, 161–3, 172–4, 175–81, 183–90, 192–4, 201, 202, 204–6, 209–14 challenges, 130, 161, 163, 186 company(ies), 81, 82, 187 council, 14, 15, 18, 46, 50, 60, 87, 91, 113, 123, 152, 177, 181, 217 dilemma, 15, 39 environment, 9, 18, 30, 114, 161, 162, 185, 186, 188, 189 forces, 2, 12, 17, 19, 56, 58, 62, 80, 87, 89, 90, 94, 180, 181, 183, 186, 188, 190, 192 issues, 61, 90

249

needs, 2, 12, 90 risk, 7, 18, 42, 45, 49, 54, 83, 99, 114, 115, 133, 137, 141 risk perspective, 45, 54, 115 sector, 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 53, 61, 81, 148, 153, 173, 180, 187, 193, 194, 210 sector reform, 61, 88, 205 vacuum, 162, 163, 179, 190 Sierra Leone, 3–6, 33, 34, 117–46, 176, 181–4, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 198–200, 201–5, 206 Skills assessment, 20, 97 SLPP, 119, 122 Social capital, 10 contract, 7, 50, 51–4, 137, 209–13, 215 reintegration, 21, 22, 42, 44, 118, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 140–3, 179, 183, 199, 200 Societal structures, 180 Socio-economic characteristics, 24, 220 data, 37 development, 190, 194 Somaliland, 29, 50 Special Court, 118, 124, 140, 142, 202–5 SSR (Security Sector Reform), 2, 9, 11, 13, 39, 133 Stakeholders, 15, 49, 51, 63, 72, 118, 132, 140, 193, 209, 213 State, 2, 11–4, 51, 56, 58, 64, 73, 77, 88–92, 112, 117–23, 129, 143, 144, 151, 171, 178, 181, 188, 191, 204, 220 building, 2, 91–2 intra-, 1 nation-, 2, 25 West African, 117

250

POST-WAR RECOVERY

Storage of weapons, 17, 18, 62 Surveys, 20, 178 Sustainability, 3, 10, 17–9, 39, 41, 46, 47, 96, 100, 104, 108, 138, 160, 178, 179, 194–201, 205 Taliban, 6, 147, 149–51, 161–3, 171, 172, 185–9 Taylor, Charles, 10, 119, 120, 124, 202 Thaci, 91, 93 Third party, 2, 16, 39, 45, 48, 52, 53, 83, 90, 125, 127, 131, 132, 145, 173, 177–80, 206, 214 Tranches, 104, 160 Transitional safety allowance, 128 TRC, 118, 124, 140, 142, 203, 205 Trust, 10, 17, 18, 29, 39, 43, 48, 62, 72, 82, 103, 111, 114, 124, 128, 131, 145, 153, 154, 179, 184, 188, 192, 209 Fund, 124, 153 Halo, 154 Truth-telling, 203 UN, 4, 5, 13–5, 26, 46, 48, 52, 56, 60, 62, 65, 66, 88, 91, 112, 113, 118, 123, 124, 134, 139, 144, 152, 165, 169, 171, 182, 199, 217, 218, 220 involvement, 85 military, 131 mission, 5, 87, 131, 180 peacekeeping missions, 14, 26 peacekeeping operations, 14, 50, 51 report, 46 resolution, 177, 182 Security Council, 18, 46, 60, 87, 113, 123, 152, 177, 181 UNAMA, 152–4, 167, 186 UNAMSIL, 117, 118, 123–31, 137

UNDP, 3, 17, 44, 55, 60–8, 72, 76, 125, 127, 129, 132, 135, 137, 147, 151, 153, 158, 169 Unemployment, 11, 92, 93, 115, 121, 178, 195, 215 UNHCR, 92 UNICEF, 125, 128, 134 United States, 90, 96, 168 Secretary of State, 91 UNMIK, 87, 91–3, 96, 99 UNSC, 4, 92, 219 Urban/rural divide, 24 USAID, 72, 76, 140, 170 Veteran association, 75 Violence, 9, 10, 15, 19, 28, 41, 45, 56, 59, 78, 80, 82–6, 122, 129, 152, 161, 172, 176, 185, 188, 189, 211, 217 Vocational training, 23–35, 37, 43, 47, 49, 69, 76, 94–8, 105, 106, 108, 115, 135–40, 156, 157, 163, 178, 197, 198, 201, 206, 208 Vouchers, 27, 35 Vulnerable groups, 30, 36, 43, 133, 134, 136, 145, 213 War against terrorism, 4, 161, 168, 192 crimes, 80, 124, 201–5 to peace transitions, 4, 9, 13, 14, 31, 56, 114, 127, 175, 183, 206 Warlordism, 152 Warlords, 4, 6, 148, 152, 162, 163, 166–8, 171–3, 181, 183, 192, 204 War-torn, 1, 2, 6, 11, 15, 60, 71, 83, 117, 175–7, 179 Weapons, 10, 13, 15–8, 26, 27, 48, 50–2, 62, 63, 65, 66, 74, 81, 85, 93, 118, 122, 125–8, 131, 133–6,

INDEX

143–6, 147–52, 154, 156, 158, 159, 162, 172, 173, 174, 177, 179, 185–9, 206, 207, 208–11, 217 active markets, 21 and trafficking, 185, 186 collected, 17, 63, 93 collection, 14, 17, 27, 127 control, 48 heavy, 148, 159, 173, 174, 189, 211 light, 11, 12, 14, 186, 217 personal, 62, 150 re-selling, 185 smuggling, 172 Welfare, 43, 78, 90, 178 West Africa, 4, 10 119, 144, 145 World Bank, 3, 10, 33, 34, 124 Youth 69, 85, 120, 130, 137, 141, 188, 189

251