Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology 9780199698639

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OXFORD

~A\'ID

R.

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

DAVID R. LAW

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

KIERKEGAARD'S KENOTIC CHRISTO LOGY

The research for this book was partly funded by the Arts & Humanities Research Council.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PUSS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, 0X2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © David R. Law 2013 Extracts from Kierkegaard's Writings and Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Extracts from Seren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers reprinted by permission of Indiana University Press. The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2013 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted . by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on anyacquirer. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978-0-19-%9863-9 Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King's Lynn Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disdaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

To my son Alexander Law

Preface Although a work of this kind bears the name of a single author, it owes much to DenkanstOsse provided by colleagues, friends, and family. I am particularly grateful to my son Alexander Law, student of Classics and Arabic at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for allowing me to draw on his expertise in Greek and Latin. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the University of Manchester for funding the research leave that made the preparation of this book possible. References to Kierkegaard's works are firstly to the S0ren Kierkegaard Research Centre's new Danish edition of Kierkegaard's writings, S0ren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS) published by Gads Forlag, and secondly to the Englishlanguage translations published by Princeton University Press, which are indicated by the abbreviation of the title of the relevant work (e.g. PF, CA, PC, etc.). Occasionally reference is made to the first edition of Kierkegaard's Samlede Voerker (SV). References to Kierkegaard's journals, papers, and notebooks appear as SKS/KJN, an abbreviation which refers to the relevant volume of SKS, followed by the ongoing Princeton University Press translations entitled Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks (KJN), of which thus for five volumes have been published. These references are followed by references in square brackets prefaced by 'JP', which refers to Seren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, published by Indiana University Press. Quotations from Kierkegaard's journals, papers, and notebooks are from the first five volumes ofKJN, but follow JP when KJN translations are unavailable. Occasionally reference is made to Seren Kierkegaards Papirer (Pap.), edited by Niels Thulstrup. I am grateful to Princeton University Press and Indiana University Press for permission to quote from their respective translations of Kierkegaard's works, journals, papers, and notebooks. Where Kierkegaard has used abbreviations, which he sometimes does in his journal entries these have been retained. Similarly, if Kierkegaard omits the accents when quoting Greek, the quotation has been rendered as it appears in Kierkegaard's writings and journals. Biblical references generally follow the text as Kierkegaard quotes it in his works and journals. Where this is not the case, quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version Bible: Anglicized Edition, copyright 1989, 1995. Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved. Translations of non-English language literature are my own unless otherwise stated. David R. Law Manchester, March 2012

Contents Abbreviations 1. Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

xi 1

2. The Nature of Kenotic Christology

34

3. Kierkegaard's Knowledge of Kenotic Christology

64

4. Kenosis in Philosophical Fragments

154

5. Kenosis in Practice in Christianity

215

6. Kierkegaard's Existential Kenoticism

267

Bibliography

289

Index

305

Abbreviations ASKB

Auktionsprotokol over Seren Kierkegaards Bogsamling (Auctioneer's Sales Record of the Library of S0ren Kierkegaard)

BA

EPW

The Book on Adler The Concept of Anxiety Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress The Concept of Irony The Corsair Affair Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments Either/Or Early Polemical Writings

ET

English translation

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses For Self-Examination Judge for Yourself! Seren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks Letters and Documents Prefaces SliJren Kierkegaards Papirer Practice in Christianity Philosophical Fragments The Point of View Repetition SliJren Kierkegaards Skrifter Stages on Life's Way Samlede Vcerker The Sickness unto Death The Moment Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Without Authority Works of Love Writing Sampler

CA

CD CI COR

CUP EO

FSE

JFY

JP KJN LD

P Pap.

PC PF

PV R

SKS SLW SV SUD

TM UDVS WA WL WS

1 Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis In the two most overtly Christological works in his pseudonymous authorship, namely Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard advances an understanding of the incarnation that seems to bear a resemblance to kenotic Christology. Johannes Climacus' analogy in Philosophical Fragments of the king who dons peasant garb in order to woo a humble maiden and AntiClimacus' emphasiS in Practice in Christianity on Jesus' concealment of his divinity behind an 'incognito' appear - at least at first sight - to resemble the arguments of kenotic theolOgians that the eternal Logos freely limited his divine mode of existence in order to become a human being. Indeed, H. Roos goes so far as to claim that the doctrine of kenosis is 'der geheime Punkt', the secret point in Kierkegaard's authorship which it is essential to grasp if we are to understand 'the theological Kierkegaard'.1 Similarly, Donald Dawe claims that, 'At the core of [Kierkegaard's1message is a bold assertion of the self-emptying of the Christ who meets men as a man. God in the servant form is at the center of Kierkegaard's thought:2 In this study it is my intention to take up the suggestion of Roos and Dawe that there is an important kenotic strand in Kierkegaard's thought. My contention is that Kierkegaard offers an original and Significant contribution to kenotic Christology. As we shall see, like many of the kenotic theologians of the nineteenth century Kierkegaard argues that Christ undergoes a limitation on becoming a human being. Where he differs from his contemporaries is in emphasizing the radical nature of this limitation and in bringing out its existential consequences. The method we shall employ in this study consists of asking of Kierkegaard' s Christology the questions with which kenotic theolOgians have struggled when attempting to make sense of Jesus of Nazareth. I am aware that this will be a

I

H. Roos, 'S0ren Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre', Kierkegaardiana I (Copenhagen:

C. A. Reitzel. 1955),54-60; 56. 2 Donald G. Dawe, The Form of a Servant. A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), 156-7.

2

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

controversial approach for some Kierkegaard scholars, who will rightly point out that Kierkegaard is deliberately unsystematic and consistently fails to provide a fully elaborated theology. It is my contention, however, that Kierkegaard's deliberately unsystematic approach does not absolve the interpreter from the responsibility of examining the theological assumptions underlying Kierkegaard's thought. Even Kierkegaard's notion of the absolute paradox rests on certain key theological decisions. It presupposes the validity of the Chalcedonian Definition's affirmation that Christ is both truly human and truly divine and is dependent upon decisions concerning the nature of humanity and divinity, namely that they are mutually exclusive opposites. Placing Kierkegaard in the context of nineteenth century debates in kenotic theology and reading him as if he were himself a kenotic theologian engaged in these debates may also help to shed light both on how Kierkegaard was part of a broader theological tradition and on what distinguishes him from that tradition. It is my intention in this study to briri.g Kierkegaard's Christological assumptions into the open and to show that he has developed a type of kenoticism which goes some way to addressing or at least sidestepping some of the problems encountered by contemporary kenotic theologies. This will be achieved by identifying the kenotic motifs in Kierkegaard's thought and bringing Kierkegaard into dialogue with the classical kenotic theolOgians. This will enable us to identify the points of contact Kierkegaard has with the kenotic Christologies of contemporary nineteenth century theology, but will also indicate his originality and distinctiveness. Before we can embark upon a keno tic reading of Kierkegaard's Christology, however, there are two preliminary questions we must address. Firstly, to what extent is it legitimate to regard Kierkegaard as a sort of theolOgian? Secondly, in view of his many critical comments concerning doctrine, is it legitimate to treat Kierkegaard in the theolOgical terms proposed in this study?

KIERKEGAARD AS THEOLOGIAN Several different strategies have been proposed for reading Kierkegaard. Aage Henriksen identifies three possible methods, namely, 'the literary method', 'the content method', and 'the psychological method'.3 Mark Taylor also identifies three approaches to interpreting Kierkegaard, namely what he calls

3 Aage Henriksen. Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 1951). 11. Ralph Henry Johnson describes Henriksen's three approaches as 'the monistic. the holistic. and the historical viewpoints'. but does not explain his reasons for this choice of terms. Ralph Henry Johnson. The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1972).5-7.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

3

the 'biographical-psychological', 'historical-comparative', and 'descriptivethematic' methods.4 C. Stephen Evans likewise identifies three ways of reading Kierkegaard, namely, the philosophical, literary or ironic (j.e. postmodernist), and literary-philosophical approaches.s To these lists of reading strategies we can in my opinion add a further approach, namely, the theological approach. Reading Kierkegaard theolOgiCally, however, is controversial in Kierkegaard scholarship. Louis Mackey holds that Kierkegaard 'is a poet whose orientation is primarily philosophical and theological'.6 He 'is not a philosopher and theologian who puts up poetic advertisements to recommend his product'.7 For Mackey, as the title of his book makes clear, Kierkegaard is 'a kind of poet'.8 Sylvia Walsh and Arnold Come, on the other hand, read Kierkegaard as 'a kind of theologian'. Walsh describes Kierkegaard as 'a religious and philosophical thinker who possessed a touch of the poet',9 while Come sees Kierkegaard as 'primarily a theologian (of a very peculiar kind) who indeed is also a poet, but that his being a poet is precisely in the service of his being a theologian: 10 Joel Rasmussen points out that it is unnecessary to choose between interpreting Kierkegaard as either a poet or a theologian, commenting that, 'frankly, it is unclear to me why Kierkegaard should be considered primarily a theologian rather than a poet, or vice versa. Indeed, to prioritize one over the other is to misrepresent the constitutive and theological relationship between Kierkegaard's

4 Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 27-36. 5 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Frag· ments (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992),2-4. 6 Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), ix. 7 Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, 259. 8 Later in his book Mackey states that, 'Kierkegaard the poet of inwardness did not "really mean» anything.' Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet. 290. Perhaps the most extreme version of this argument is that of Roger Poole, who holds that, 'The aesthetic texts certainly have meanings, but they do not have a meaning. The meanings that are available exist at the level of the displace· ments, the deferrals, and the supplements .... A new reading of Kierkegaard should discover that the aesthetic texts do not mean but are.' Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 5. If Mackey and Poole are right, then I wonder what the point is of reading Kierkegaard at aU. In my opinion it is precisely because he makes a vital contribution to theology by recalling the theologian to the need personally to appropriate Christian doctrine and to follow Christ not merely in thought but most importantly of aU in discipleship that makes Kierkegaard an important theological thinker. 9 Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential Aesthetics (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 1. 10 Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self (Montreal & Kingston; London; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 3. Come points out that the term 'thinker' which Kierkegaard often applies to himself 'is his eqUivalent for "theologian.n Just as he writes "discourses" and not "sermons» because he is "without authority" of ordination, so he uses "thinker" to indicate that he is "a theologian but not appointed.''' Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian, 4, referring to K]N5:NBIO:58 (JP1:667].

4

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

poetics and his incarnational view of God in Christ: l l To do justice to Kierkegaard's thought we must be sensitive to the multiple strands in his thought and be wary of homogenizing the thought of this extraordinarily multifaceted thinker. One of the strands of Kierkegaard's thought is theolOgical in character. The view adopted in this study is that Kierkegaard has some important things to say about theology, and for this reason can be legitimately read as a kind of theologian, albeit a rather unusual one.

KIERKEGAARD AND DOCTRINE A second objection that might be raised against our undertaking to read Kierkegaard in terms of kenotic theology is Kierkegaard's denial that Christianity is a doctrine. In support of this objection the critic could cite numerous passages in Kierkegaard's works and journals where Kierkegaard appears to reject the application of the term 'doctrine' to Christianity and to criticize those who treat Christianity as an intellectual problem rather than as a call to action. A substantial body of literature has grown up in Kierkegaard scholarship which claims that the literary character of Kierkegaard's writings means that it is mistaken to treat Kierkegaard's works as if they were a compendium of Christian doctrine. 12 If Kierkegaard is indeed opposed to conceiving of Christianity in doctrinal terms, then our attempt to identify a kenotic strand in his authorship would seem to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the character of his thought. It could be further objected that in attempting to raise questions concerning the character of Kierkegaard's Christology we are acting in a way that is untrue to the nature of Kierkegaard's reflections on Christ. Do we not fall foul of Anti-Climacus' warning that Christ 'knows that

II Joel D. S. Rasmussen, Between Irony and Witness: Kierkegaard's Poetics of Faith, Hope, and Love (New York, London: Continuum, 2005), 3, original emphaSiS. 12 An early representative of this view is Hermann Diem, who claims that, 'Kierkegaard has no Christian doctrine which could be represented as a system, but only a dialectical method of Christian communication which wants to urge its recipient to exist as a Christian.' Hermann Diem, Philosophie und Christen tum bei Soren Kierkegaard (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1929), vii. Diem makes a similar point in his discussion of Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between the teacher and doctrine in his later Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, where he writes that 'doctrine has been dissolved in existential communication', the result of which is that .doctrine loses whatever validity it supposed itself to possess apart from and prior to the event of existential communication.' Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, trans. by Harold Knight (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 172, 173. Mackey puts this point even more bluntly: 'Above all it is necessary to take [Kierkegaardl at his word when says he has no opinion and proposes no doctrine.' Louis Mackey, 'The Poetry of Inwardness', in Josiah Thompson (ed.), Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City. NY: Doubleday, 1972), 1-102; 61-2. See also Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaard's SO~Tatic Art (Macon: Macon University Press, 1999), 80-3.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

5

no human being can comprehend him, that the gnat that flies into the candlelight is not more certain of destruction than the person who wants to try to comprehend him or what is united in him: God and man' (PC, 77)? Such objections are in my opinion invalid for two reasons. My first counterobjection is that even if we accept at face value Kierkegaard's critique of doctrine, this does not mean that he himself has not taken a stand on doctrinal issues or that his insistence on Christianity as a call to action and a way of life does not raise important theological issues that need to be addressed if we are to respond to his demand to exist Christianly. For example, Kierkegaard's notion of Christ as the prototype and his emphasis on the imitation of Christ raises questions about Christ himself. What are the grounds for the claims Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms make about Christ? Why should we follow Christ and not some other charismatic figure? Why follow anyone at all? And how is the call to emulate Christ to be reconciled with worshipping Christ as divine? How do we know that when we are worshipping Christ, we are indeed worshipping God and not committing an act of idolatry? And if we are worshipping God when we worship Christ, then in what sense is Christ genuinely a human being? The raising of such issues does not mean that we are hubristically attempting to plumb the depths of the divine mind or striving to comprehend Christ and the human and divine natures that are united in him. Weare rather attempting to apply both to Christology and to Kierkegaard's thought the principles of his own understanding of dialectics, namely that it is the task of dialectics to distinguish the paradox from nonsense and to direct each individual to the place where slhe may decide to accept or reject Jesus Christ (cf. CUPl:490-l). My second counter-objection is that an analysis of Kierkegaard's conunents on doctrine will reveal that he does not reject doctrine as SUCh,13 but only certain (mis-)understandings of doctrine. Indeed, it is not 'doctrine' in the sense of the key dogmas of the Christian faith that Kierkegaard rejects but rather doctrine understood as (merely) teaching. It is doctrine as Lrere, rather than doctrine as Dogmatik that is the issue. A good example of this distinction is provided by H. H.'s comments in the first of the Two Ethical-Religious Essays, (Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth' (SKSll:57-93/WA, 47-89). H. H. states that whereas, 'What the philosophers

13 Louis Pojman puts this point forcefully when rejecting Mackey's view that Kierkegaard has no opinion and proposes no doctrine: 'This is a misunderstanding. Kierkegaard is filled with doctrines. What is his theory of subjectivity or his view of the Incarnation but a doctrine?' Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Tuscaloosa. AK: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 162 n.22. original emphaSiS. Heywood Thomas points out that. 'Because it is Paradox that we have here we are confronted with something we cannot understand, something we must accept. Faith is not thus a simple matter of feeling one way or another - there is a core of doctrine. On the other hand. because this doctrine is related to the person's mode of existence it cannot be something that demands simply an effort of understanding: John Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1957), 128-9.

6

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

say about Christ's death and sacrifice is not worth reflecting on', 'With the dogmaticians it is another matter', for 'their point of departure is faith' (SKSl1:641WA, 58). In contrast to the philosophers, 'Dogmatics ponders the eternal significance of this historical fact and raises no objections with regard to any element of its historical genesis' (SKS 11:65{WA, 58, original emphasis). Kierkegaard's attitude to doctrine is thus more nuanced and complex than the hypothetical critic of our study would recognize. 14 An examination of the comments scattered throughout his works and journals will reveal that there are three types of statement that Kierkegaard makes about doctrine. Firstly, there are passages where Kierkegaard simply accepts Christian doctrine as given. Here Kierkegaard seems to accept the doctrinal teaching of the church. Secondly, there are texts where Kierkegaard's criticism seems to be aimed not at doctrine as such but at the way human beings (mis- )treat doctrine or fail to take it seriously. Here Kierkegaard's complaint is that people merely think about doctrine rather than striving to exist in it. Finally, there are passages in which Kierkegaard seems to reject doctrine altogether. These are arguably passages where Kierkegaard's concern at the false relation to doctrine leads him to regard doctrine itself as the problem. We might say that he projects the inadequacy of people's relationship to doctrine onto doctrine itself. The crucial question here is: does Kierkegaard really wish to deny that Christianity is a doctrine or is he merely engaging in rhetoric and hyperbole? To resolve this issue, we need to take a closer look at the three different types of statement Kierkegaard makes about doctrine.

(1) Kierkegaard's Acceptance of Doctrine Kierkegaard does not always seem to have regarded doctrines and dogmas as inherently dangerous to Christian discipleship. In a journal entry made in 1839 he describes dogmas as 'the sacred utterances of Scripture, in short, the whole consciousness of holy things', and criticizes philosophers' misuse of them (SKS18/K]N2:EE153 [JP3:3279]). This is an attitude characteristic not only of the young Kierkegaard, but can also be found at a much later date. In his 'Open Letter' to A. G. Rudelbach (SV XIII:436-44/COR, 51-9), published on 31st January 1851 in Fcedrelandet, he comments, 'I am positive that I have never directed one word against the teaching and the organization of the established order, but I have worked to make this teaching more and more the truth in "the Single individual'" (SV XIII:4411COR, 56). In a journal entry made in 1850 he states

14 For studies ofKierkegaard's attitude to doctrine see Steven M. Emmanuel. 'Kierkegaard on Doctrine: A Post-Modern Interpretation', Religious Studies, vol. 25 (1989), 363-78; Come, Kierkegaard as TheolOgian, 10-14; lee C. Barrett, 'The Significance of Doctrine in Kierkegaard's Journals: Beyond an Impasse in English Language Kierkegaard Scholarship', Journal for the History of Modern Theology, vol. 15 (2008): 16-31.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

7

that, 'On the whole doctrine as it is taught is entirely sound' (SKS24/KJN8: NB22:23 []P6:6702]), a comment he reiterates in an 1851 entry when he writes that, 'My position has never been an emphasis on "doctrine"; my view is that the doctrine is very sound' (SKS241K]N8:NB23:197 [JP6:6753]). In the first of these entries on the soundness of doctrine Kierkegaard further states categorically that he has no issue with doctrine. 'My contention', he writes, 'is that something should be done with it.' And in the final paragraph of the entry he states that what he is contending for 'is perhaps the greatest possible distinction: the kind of daily existence led by one who proclaims the doctrine, whether he has all sorts oflosses from it, or all sorts of advantages' (SKS241K]N8:NB22:23 [JP6:6702]). Similarly, in Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard seems to accept the existence of 'sound doctrine', for he complains that the clergyman's proclamation of sound doctrine is contradicted by the latter's self-centred way of life. Consequently, what he proclaims 'is not really Christianity, however truly he may proclaim the doctrine, "the sound doctrine'" (SV XII:41O/JFY, 133). That Kierkegaard accepts the existence of some form of Christian doctrine is further indicated by his complaint that human beings fail to suffer 'for the Word or for the doctrine' (SV XII 456/ ]FY, 187) and 'that what we have retained under the name of Christianity is anything other than the pure, the sound, unadulterated doctrine' (SV XII 4561 ]FY, 188). Such passages indicate that Kierkegaard recognizes such a thing as Christian doctrine and that there can be a 'sound' form of it. They also make clear, however, that the issue is not the contents of Christianity, but the way in which the individual relates himlherself to these contents. Here the problem is not with doctrine in itself but with its being exploited by human beings as a means not of follOwing Christ but of fostering their self-interest That Kierkegaard accepts that Christianity is in some sense a doctrine is further indicated by his emphasis in Judge for Yourself! on the necessity of suffering for the doctrine. Such suffering makes sense only if there is a doctrine for which the Christian disciple can suffer (XII 407, 440, 456, 458, 465, 468, 47l, 473/JFY, 129, 169, 187, 189, 197, 201, 205, 207). When speaking of 'doctrine' as that for which the diSciple should be prepared to suffer Kierkegaard is using the term more or less synonymously for 'Christianity' or 'Word of God' (SV XII 407, 4561]FY, 129, 187). In a journal entry of 1851, Kierkegaard comments that neither the church nor doctrine needs to be reformed. What is needed 'is penance on the part of all of us' (SKS24/K]N8:NB23:33 [JP6:6727]). He goes on in the same entry to write that, 'The doctrine in the established Church and its organization are very good. But the lives, our lives - believe me, they are mediocre.' In a marginal comment on this statement Kierkegaard explains this mediocrity as due to the proclamation of the doctrine being done 'at too great a distance', with the consequence that, 'Christianity is not a power in actuality, our lives are only slightly touched by the doctrine' (SKS24/K]N8:NB23:33 [JP6:6727]). The problem, then, is not with doctrine, but with the way human beings relate themselves to doctrine.

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christo logy

8

That Kierkegaard understands himself to be working within the framework of orthodox Christian doctrine is evident from the remark Climacus makes in Postscript when reflecting on a review of Fragments in a German journal. IS He writes that despite the 'contrast of form', 'teasing resistance', and 'inventive audacity' employed in Fragments, 'what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in its rightful severity' (SKS7:249n/CUPl:275n, emphasis added). In his own review of Fragments in 'A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature' (SKS7:267-317/CUPl:251-300) Climacus indicates that it is not doctrine as such to which he objects but its false appropriation. In Postscript he complains that, 'it is only all too easy to use the holy names without meaning anything thereby, to rattle off the Christian truth without having the least impression of it' (SKS7:258/CUPl:283). Kierkegaard's acceptance of the validity of doctrine is confirmed by his treatment of specific doctrines. In For Self-Examination he argues that the only way of silencing doubts concerning the truth of the ascension is by imitating Christ in his suffering, which clearly implies Kierkegaard's acceptance of this doctrine (SKS13:91-2/FSE, 68-70). The notion of Christ as the absolute paradox in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding UnSCientific Postscript, and elsewhere, is conceivable only on the basis of Kierkegaard's acceptance of the Chalcedonian Definition that Christ is truly divine and truly human. 16 The

15

The journal to which Climacus is referring is the Allgemeines Repertorium for die theolo-

gische Literatur und kirchliche Statistik. 16 There is widespread agreement that Kierkegaard's understanding of the incarnation is broadly in line with orthodox church tradition. Scholars who see Kierkegaard's Christology as resting on Nicene-Athanasian-Chalcedonian foundations are: Eduard Geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Seren Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing Press, 1938), 64; Reidar Thomte. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1948),215; J. Heywood Thomas. Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 108; George Price, The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaard's Concept of Man (London: Hutchinson, 1963), 196; David J. Gouwens. Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996). 142; Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 63-4; Sylvia Walsh. Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009). 111-13; Lee Barrett, 'The Joy in the Cross: Kierkegaard's Appropriation of Lutheran Christology in "The Gospel of Sufferings"', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2005), 257-85; 257. Barrett holds that Kierkegaard 'preserves the essential emphases of the Lutheran doctrinal heritage' and adheres to the two-natures doctrine, 'while dispensing with the metaphysical superstructure' (p. 257) and 'jettisonling) the metaphysical apparatus' (p. 274). He also claims that Kierkegaard 'highlights not the Chalcedonian formula but the Lutheran doctrine of the states of humiliation and exaltation, where the themes of suffering and joy are most evident. This, rather than the metaphysics of the union of the two natures in one person, provides the underlying framework for his discourses' (p. 270). Barrett is right to note that Kierkegaard preserves the Lutheran doctrinal heritage, but his claim that Kierkegaard has dispensed with the metaphysical dimension is debatable. In my opinion it is more accurate to say that Kierkegaard presupposes the metaphysical apparatus and more accurate to speak of a metaphysical substructure rather than superstructure, namely, the Chalcedonian Definition, underlying Kierkegaard's Christology. The humiliation-exaltation motif is

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

9

Chalcedonian character of Kierkegaard's Christology will become apparent in our treatment of Philosophical Fragments and above all Practice in Christianity.

(2) Kierkegaard's Rejection of Doctrine Evidence that Kierkegaard is against conceiving of Christianity in terms of doctrine would seem to be provided by passages where he appears to reject doctrine outright or states that doctrine is a distortion of what Christianity truly is. In Postscript Climacus states that Christianity is not a doctrine, but an existence-communication. 17 The term 'existence-communication' is not exclusive to Christianity. however, for Climacus also applies it to non-Christian spheres of existence. Thus after briefly summarizing not just the religious but also the aesthetic and ethical modes of existence, Climacus writes that, 'The various existence-communications in tum take their rank in relation to the interpretation of existing' (SKS7:520/CUPl:572). In short, an existencecommunication is something in which the individual exists. Thus in describing Christianity as an existence-communication Climacus wishes to make clear that

not an alternative to but a reworking of the Chalcedonian Definition to bring out more fully its existential dimension. Some scholars claim, however, that Kierkegaard rejects the Chalcedonian Definition. This is the view of Roos, but he fails to give his reasons for holding this opinion. H. Roos, 'Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre', 60. Vernard Eller claims that Kierkegaard was 'offering a doctrine that is in many respects quite different and in some quite counter to customary Christology, although quite in line with the basic tenor of sectarian thought' (p. 353). He goes on to claim that Kierkegaard made no use of the two-natures doctrine (p. 355), and 'was strongly opposed to the traditional. creedal Christology' (p. 366), for 'Contemporaneousness with the Christ of Nicaea and Chalcedon would not satisfy S. K: (p. 376). Eller stresses, however, that Kierkegaard made no use of the two-natures doctrine, 'not because he was intent on deserting orthodoxy. He chose to be unorthodox in the interest of achieving a purer orthodoxy' (p. 355). Eller's reasons for these claims seem to stem from his own hostility towards classical Christology, which he dislikes for two reasons. Firstly. he believes that the Chalcedonian Definition leads to a split within Christ's Person. This seems to be the implication of his statement that Kierkegaard 'consistently referred to Christ under the term "the God-Man,» and he never allowed the slightest grounds for breaking that hyphen apart to examine the two halves independently. The God-Man is not some of God and some of Man; he is not two natures in union; there is no suggestion that either in his being or his actions there is that which can be identified as stemming from his deity as over against that which stems from his humanity' (p. 355). Secondly, creedal theology 'does not so much represent an attempt to understand the historical Jesus and/or the early church's faith in him in terms of the first century situation (i.e. biblical theology) as to explain Christ in

terms of the Greek thought forms that were contemporary at the time the creeds were formulated' (pp. 375-6, original emphasis). Eller holds on these grounds that classical Christo!ogy 'represents another case of bringing Christ to us rather than the reverse' (p. 376). Vernard Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical DiScipleship: A New Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). In my opinion, Eller's critique is based on a caricature of the Chalcedonian Definition, which has no intention of claiming that Christ is 'some of God and some of man', but that Christ is 'truly God and truly a human being'. 17 SKS7:346, 348, 509, 512, 513, 518, cf. 344/CUPI:379-80, 383,560,562,564,570; d. 326.

10

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christo logy

it is not sufficient merely to think Christianity. Truly to grasp Christianity, one must exist in it. In so far as doctrine distracts us from this task it is to be rejected Climacus' suspicion of doctrine is shared by Anti-Climacus, who states in Practice in Christianity that, 'Christianity is no doctrine; all talk of offense with regard to it as doctrine is a misunderstanding, is an enervation of the thrust of the collision of offense, as when one speaks of offense with respect to the doctrine of the God-man, the doctrine of Atonement. No, offense is related either to Christ or to being a Christian oneself' (SKS12:88-9, cf. 145/PC, 106, cf. 141). Anti-Climacus also directs his criticism at individual doctrines, complaining that scholarship 'has invented the doctrine of sin in general', thereby abolishing the single individual and undermining the crucial insight 'that you and I are sinners' (SKSI2:80/PC, 68, original emphasis). This rejection of doctrine also appears in works Kierkegaard published under his own name. In For Self-Examination Kierkegaard states that treating God's Word as a doctrine reduces it to 'something impersonal and objective', whereas Scripture should be a mirror in which the reader sees him/herself and is addressed personally by God's Word (SKS13:69/FSE, 43-4). In the second of Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 'Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins' (SKS12:293-302/WA, 179-88), Kierkegaard states that Christ 'gives you himself as a hiding place. It is not a few grounds of comfort that he gives you; it is not a doctrine he communicates to you - no, he gives you himself' (SKSI2:3011 WA, 187). Christianity is not a series of propositions, but a relationship to a person. Kierkegaard makes a similar point in Judge for Yourselj!, where he writes that Christ 'did not come to the world in order to bring a doctrine.... His teaching was really his life, his existence' (SV XII 4591]FY, 191). Kierkegaard further states that, 'Through the conceiving of Christianity as doctrine, the situation in Christendom has become utter confusion' (SV XII 47S/]FY, 209). Kierkegaard's antipathy to doctrine would seem to be confirmed by several journal entries. In an 1850 entry entitled 'The Tragedy of Christendom is that it has made Christianity into Nothing but a Doctrine' (SKS24/KJN8:NB25:69a [JP3:3018]), he complains that, 'In an older age, when Christianity was understood to be an existing, a discipleship or imitation, the preparation for becoming a teacher was also essentially of a disciplinary nature: learning to be obedient, practicing renunciation and self-denial, the ascetic life, etc.' When Christianity was reduced to a doctrine, however, these qualities disappeared, so that 'the test for being a teacher became a scholarly examination - existence was never asked about all.' This led to the creation of the sciences, which Kierkegaard sees as the human race's attempt to defend itself against Christianity. These sciences are not necessary, however, for the New Testament alone is sufficient and has the advantage of being easy to understand. The difficulty lies not in understanding the New Testament but in doing what the New Testament commands. As an example Kierkegaard cites Christ's commandment, 'Give all that you have to the poor', which is easy to understand

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

11

but difficult to do. It is to avoid taking such commandments seriously that crafty hwnan beings turn to the sciences in order to postpone indefinitely the task of following Christ. Kierkegaard makes a similar pOint in Judge for Yourself! with reference to self-denial. A person who has understood the truth of self-denial so vividly that he is able with his eloquence to convince his entire generation to take it up has in fact misunderstand this truth if he himself does not act upon it. Such a person 'took a wrong turn away from his understanding, or from understanding into a poetic or rhetorical exposition instead ofinto action' (SV XII 400/JFY, 121). In a journal entry dated 1851 Kierkegaard states that emphasis on correct doctrine and the right administration of the sacraments without understanding their existential dimension is paganism (SKS24/KJN8:NB24:7 [JPl:600]). In an entry of 1854 he claims that because his proclamation is 'the proclamation of reduplicated individuality', he does 'not have a stitch of doctrine - and doctrine is what people want. Because doctrine is the indolence of aping and mimicking for the learner, and doctrine is the way to sensate power for the teacher, for doctrine collects men' (SKS26/KJNlO:NB32:102 [JP6:6917]). In another journal entry of the same year, Kierkegaard remarks that Christ did not suffer 'in order to introduce a few doctrinal propositions'. God 'has his sights on something else: the transformation of character' (SKS26/KJNIO: NB34:31 [JP3:2626]). There appear to be two reasons for Kierkegaard's antipathy to doctrine. Firstly, doctrine eliminates the subjectivity that is necessary if the individual is genuinely to appropriate Christianity and become a Christian. In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard complains, 'People have wanted to perform the feat of saying: Christianity is an objective doctrine and it makes no difference how it is served; "the doctrine" is everything' (SV XII 409/JFY, 131). This ignores the existential commitment that is essential to understanding Christianity, for Christianity without action is a misunderstanding of what Christianity truly is. Kierkegaard writes, 'There is an existential qualification of the essentially Christian that is the unconditional condition; otherwise Christianity cannot be introduced' (SV XII 409/JFY, 131). This unconditional condition is 'to die to the world and to oneself'. To leave out the existential is to abolish Christianity. The problem with doctrine, then, is that it leads the individual to adopt an objective relationship to Christianity, which is fundamentally inappropriate to the sort of truth that Christianity is, which can be appropriated only subjectively. Secondly, Kierkegaard sometimes rejects the applicability of the term 'doctrine' to Christianity, because he equates 'doctrine' with 'theory'. An example is provided by an 1854 journal entry in which he writes that with regard to ethics, 'Theory, doctrine, is there to hide the fact that practice is wanting.... Theory, doctrine, produces an illusion, as if one were related to the ethical- by talking about it' (SKS26/KJNI0:NB33:42 [JP4:3870j). He goes on in this entry to accuse 'the professor' of hindering 'the unlearned man by giving him the

12

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

idea that the kingdom of God depends on doctrine'. Kierkegaard sees this as a stratagem employed by the professor in order to increase his self-importance, 'for the more important the doctrine becomes, the more important the professor becomes as well'. Alongside such passages rejecting doctrinE' we can range those where Kierkegaard denies that Christianity should be 'taught', 'lectured about', or 'didacticized'. In a journal entry of 1848 he writes that, 'Xnty is not to be taught. That is why Xt also said, My teaching is food - it is to be made one's own, one is to exist in it' (SKS20/KJN 4:NB5: 10 1 [JP 1:482]). In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard condemns the Christianity of today as 'professorial-scholarly Christianity' and complains that 'the professor shifts the whole viewpoint of Christianity'. The result of the professor's treatment of Christianity is that Christianity becomes an objective doctrine, for, 'To the professor corresponds Christianity as objective teaching, doctrine' (SV XII 463/JFY, 195). Connected with this rejection of lecturing about Christianity is Kierkegaard's'criticism of theology and theologians. In Postscript Climacus criticizes 'learned theology' for playing into the hands of unbelief by proving to the individual what that individual should believe in the passion offaith (SKS7:367/CUP1:30-1). Climacus' criticism of 'the indifferent individual's systematic eagerness to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs' (SKS7:241 CUP1:15) can be understood not only as a criticism of the philosophers' attempts to subsume Christianity into their philosophical systems, but also of the attempts by dogmatic theologians to present orderly summaries of the doctrines of the Christian faith.

(3) Kierkegaard's Critique of the Individual's Relation to Doctrine In Postscript Climacus takes 'the older orthodox theologians' to task for objectifying the doctrine of eternal punishment, thereby undermining the inwardness that is decisive for a true understanding of this notion (SKS7:4811 CUPl:530). Here Climacus' criticism is aimed not at doctrine as such, but at the inappropriate way theologians have handled the doctrine of eternal punishment. This doctrine should not be treated as an objective proposition, but should transform each human being's existence. If the threat of eternal punishment does not prompt me to embark on a radical assessment of my life and lead me to repentance and a new beginning, then I Simply have not understood the doctrine, regardless of how much I might know about theologians' teaching concerning eternal punishment. Here the issue is not with the doctrine of eternal punishment as such but with how each of us appropriates this doctrine. That Climacus does not reject doctrine outright is further indicated by the way he qualifies his notion of Christianity as an existence-communication. He

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

13

repeatedly states that although Christianity is not a doctrine but an existencecommunication, this should not be taken to mean that Christianity lacks content. Such a view 'is only chicanery', for, 'When a believer exists in faith, his existence has enormous content, but not in the sense of a yield in paragraphs' (SKS7:347/CUPl:380). Climacus has provided a sketch of Christianity's 'content' in Fragments, where he distinguishes Christianity from the forms of thought with which it has been confused in contemporary society. Climacus himself is not a Christian, and therefore in the most important sense he does not know what Christianity is. Yet he 'knows' what Christianity is to such an extent that he is able to point out that many contemporary understandings of Christianity are in fact misunderstandings. He has resolved to maintain a relationship to Christianity in the hope of becoming a Christian. Indeed, this is the very purpose of Postscript, namely, to consider what it would entail for a human being to relate himlherself to Christianity and whether Climacus himself can take this step. Such knowledge is possible, however, only when the individual has embarked on the task of existing. An individual may not be a Christian, but if slhe has committed his/herself to an existence-communication and strives to live his life according to that existence-communication, then slhe has grasped the fundamental insight that the task facing every human being is not thought but existence, not thinking but existing. Such an individual can appreciate Christianity, even if s/he is not (yet) able to become a Christian, because such an individual is able to recognize the existential commitment that characterizes Christianity: 'To exist subjectively with passion (and it is possible to exist objectively only in absentmindedness) is on the whole an absolute condition for being able to have any opinion about Christianity' (SKS7:254/CUPl:280). The existentially committed non-Christian can look upwards, as it were, and recognize the character of Christianity without having climbed to the higher existential rung where Christianity has its home. Thus although Christianity is an existencecommunication that one grasps only by existing in it, it is nevertheless possible to have some understanding of it even when one has not yet come to exist in it. Climacus thus rejects the application of 'doctrine' to Christianity not because he denies that Christianity has doctrinal contents, but because he associates the term with an intellectual and above all a philosophical approach to Christianity. The problem with doctrine, understood as a philosophical concept, is twofold. Firstly, it reverses the relation the individual should have to Christianity, for it privileges thought over existence, whereas the task with which Christianity confronts the existing individual is not that of thinking Christianity but of existing in it. Secondly, when it is understood as a philosophical doctrine, Christianity is subordinated to and absorbed by philosophical thought (SKS7:346-7/CUPl:380-l). These considerations prompt Climacus to make a distinction between doctrine understood philosophically and what we might term 'doctrine understood existentially', although Climacus himself does not use this phrase. He

14

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christo logy

writes: 'Surely a philosophical doctrine [L~rel that is to be comprehended and speculatively understood is one thing, and a doctrine [L~rel that is to be actualized in existence is something else' (SKS7:346n/CUP 1:379n).18 Climacus does not employ the term, but we might describe this latter form of doctrine as 'existential doctrine'. This type of doctrine requires us not to grasp it intellectually but 'to understand that it is to be existed in, to understand the difficulty of existing in it, what a prodigious existence-task this doctrine assigns to the learner' (SKS7:346n1CUPl:379n). If doctrine is conceived of as something to be realized in existence, Climacus is prepared to concede that the term may be applicable to Christianity. He remarks that 'Christianity is a doctrine of this kind', namely not a doctrine that one speculates upon, which is a misunderstanding in relation to the type of doctrine which Christianity is, but a doctrine in which one is called to exist (SKS7:346n/CUP1:379-80n). Doctrine in this sense is synonymous with the notion of existence-communication. On the basis of such passages it would seem that Climacus is not denying that Christianity has doctrinal content, but is making the point that this content becomes distorted and is misunderstood when we understand it purely conceptually. To overcome this distortion it is necessary not to dispense with Christian doctrine but to recover its existential character. Christianity does indeed consist of doctrines, but these are of a very distinctive and particular kind, which can be grasped only existentially. This understanding of doctrine is confirmed by what Kierkegaard says elsewhere. In For Self-Examination he states that Christianity introduces death as the middle term 'in order to protect the essentially Christian from being taken in vain' (SKS13:98/FSE, 76). That is, if the individual is truly to grasp Christianity, it is necessary that s/he should first die to the world. When this middle term is absent, then Christianity is objectified and thereby falsified. Thus Christ does indeed offer human beings rest, but before the human being can receive it, 'it is required that you first of all die, die to' (SKS13:98/FSE, 76). Kierkegaard makes a similar point in Judge for Yourself!, where he states that, 'every qualification of the essentially Christian is first of all its opposite, whereas in just a human or secular view a thing is just what it is' (SV XII 381nFY, 98). As an example Kierkegaard cites the notion of a life-giving spirit. Whereas from the human or secular perspective 'a spirit that gives life is a lifegiving spirit and nothing more; Christianly, it is first of all the Spirit who kills, who teaches dying to' (SV XII 381nFY, 98). A similar relationship subsists between being intoxicated by the Holy Spirit and sobriety, and between elevation and humiliation. Being intoxicated by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit requires the human being first of all to become sober. Similarly, the elevation of the Christian must be preceded by humiliation: 'In just a human 18 Translation modified. The Hongs translate the first instance of Lcere as 'theory', the second instance as 'doctrine', which obscures the contrast Climacus wishes to make.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

15

view, elevation is only elevation and nothing more; Christianly, it is first of all humiliation' (SV XII 3811JFY, 98). Such passages make clear not that Christianity has no conceptual contents, but that a dialectical, existential relationship must be sustained towards these contents if the human being is truly to grasp what Christianity is. Further evidence that Kierkegaard does not reject doctrine as such is provided by the second of his Two Ethical-Religious Essays, 'The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle' (SKSll:95-110/WA, 91-108). In this essay Kierkegaard's pseudonym H. H. describes the message the Paul was commissioned· by God to proclaim as a paradox: 'The new that he can have to proclaim is the essentially paradOxical' (SKS11 :99/W A, 95). H. H. then goes on to describe this paradoxical 'new thing' which the apostle proclaims as doctrine, but one which cannot be assimilated by thought: 'Even if thought considered itself capable of aSSimilating the doctrine, it cannot assimilate the way in which the doctrine came into the world, because the essential paradox is specifically the protest against immanence. But the way in which such a doctrine entered the world is specifically what is qualitatively decisive, something that can be disregarded only through deceit or through thoughtlessness' (SKS11: 100/WA, 96). Here 'doctrine' is synonymous with 'revelation' or 'Gospel'. This is confirmed by Kierkegaard's imagining what Paul might say to the individual, namely, 'I make you eternally responsible for your relationship to this doctrine by my having proclaimed it as revealed to me and therefore by having proclaimed it with divine authority' (SKSll:lOlIWA, 97). Doctrine here is understood to be something transcendent, whereas, 'All thinking draws its breath in immanence' (SKSll:98/WA, 94). To treat the doctrine immanently is thus to misunderstand it. If Paul were to 'become involved in a purely esthetic or philosophic discussion of the content of the doctrine', he would be 'absentminded' (SKSll:100/WA, 96). Instead, Paul 'must appeal to his divine authority and precisely through it, while he willingly sacrifices life and everything, prevent all impertinent esthetic and philosophical superficial observations against the form and content of the doctrine' (SKSll:100/WA, 96, original emphaSiS). Here it is not doctrine that is the problem, but once again the way the individual relates him/herself to doctrine. Later H. H. comments, 'The doctrine communicated to [the apostle] is not a task given to him to cogitate about; it is not given to him for his own sake. On the contrary, he is on a mission and has to proclaim the doctrine and to use authority' (SKSll:109/WA, 106). Several journal entries confirm that Kierkegaard is not denying doctrine as such, but only inadequate ways of appropriating and relating oneself to doctrine. In an entry of 1848 he comments that whereas there was conflict about doctrine when Christianity was first introduced into the world, 'In Xndom doctrine is rlly taken for granted, so, if there is a dispute about doctrine, it easily turns into a mere sectarian movement'. Where conflict

16

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

should now take place, Kierkegaard emphasizes, is in internalizing doctrine: 'The battle in Xndom ought to be about giving the doctrines ethical power over one's life, as Xnty requires' (SKS20/K]N4:NB4:54 [jP4:4544]). In an entry made in 1849 Kierkegaard stresses that it is not doctrines that are the issue and it is not over doctrines that he wishes to make a stand. If he were to fight over doctrine, he pOints out, 'it is not likely the conflict would become so dangerous, at least in our time, when tolerance is so broad or when indifference is honored in the name of tolerance'. The issue is that Christendom has abolished what Christianity is truly about, namely self-denial and renunciation of the world. Christendom does not wish to hear about such things and yet it still wishes to be Christian. The problem for Kierkegaard is not that Christianity is a doctrine, but that people wish to accept Christianity as only a doctrine and not as a way of life demanding self-sacrifice and renunciation (SKS22/K]N6: NB11:160 (JP1:383]). In a journal entry made in 1854, Kierkegaard attributes the blame for the parlous state of contemporary Christianity not to doctrine but to Christianity's teachers: 'It is not so much the doctrine that has been falsified, but the proclaiming of Christianity, the role of teachers of Christianity' (SKS26/K]NlO:NB36:10 (JP3:3539]). Kierkegaard goes on to liken the teachers of Christianity to contaminated pipes which infect the pure water contained in a reservoir. Here Kierkegaard seems to be implying that there is nothing wrong with doctrine in itself, but in the way it has been communicated, just as there is nothing wrong with the water in the reservoir but only with the way it has been pumped into the city's water supply. In such passages as those cited above Kierkegaard seems to assume that doctrinally everything is in order. The problem is the attitude of so-called Christians, who sustain the wrong kind of relationship to doctrine. This also seems to be the upshot of Kierkegaard's parable of the lawyer and the estate (SKS22/K]N6:NBll:160 (JPl:383]).

The three different types of statement we find in Kierkegaard's works concerning doctrine - acceptance, rejection, and critique of how it is appropriated - indicate that Kierke8aard's attitude to doctrine is a nuanced one and should not be understood as an outright rejection of the doctrinal character of the Christian faith. Kierkegaard's anti-doctrinal statements are not due to his supposed rejection of doctrine, but are directed, firstly, at human beings' inadequate relation to the doctrines of the Christian faith. When Kierkegaard has this problematic relationship uppermost in mind, then he can employ formulae which create the impression that he is criticizing doctrine itself. Secondly, in so far as the term 'doctrine' is identified with philosophy and didacticizing, it is to be rejected. But the term 'doctrine' here is directed not at the core beliefs of the Christian faith, but at intellectualizing approaches to Christianity which fail to grasp that Christianity is first and

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

17

foremost a call to discipleship. These apparently anti-doctrinal statements do not show, however, that Kierkegaard rejects doctrine as such. Doctrine remains necessary, for even an existence-communication must have something to communicate. In short, the problem that Kierkegaard has with doctrine is not with the doctrinal contents of the Christian faith, which he tends to take for granted, but with the way that human beings relate to those contents. Indeed, as Gouwens points out, it is in order to draw attention to the relationship human beings are called upon to sustain to doctrine that 'Kierkegaard adds to those dogmatic concepts ... a set of "metaconcepts" (the absolute paradox, the divine incognito, the impossibility of direct communication, the definition of "faith" in contrast to "knowledge") and also rhetorical strategies (like the two teachers and "the god's poem") that "seek to quicken awareness of the divine" by enticing, provoking, shocking'.19 It is when doctrine ceases to be an existential concern and becomes merely an abstract concept or a theory that it must be rejected. Doctrine as such is not discarded by Kierkegaard. Although Kierkegaard does not reject doctrine as such, but only the inappropriate relation to doctrine, an objector might argue that I have still not proved the legitimacy of my attempting to read Kierkegaard's Christology in terms of kenotic theology. For is my project not guilty of doing predselywhat Kierkegaard is so critical of, namely reducing Christianity to merely a doctrine and eliminating the existential decisiveness that is the life-blood of the true Christian? There is some truth to this objection, for what is presented in this study is a systematic presentation of the Christological 'theory' running through Kierkegaard's works. In my defence I would draw the reader's attention to the following pOints. 1. In so far as doctrine means theory without commitment, Kierkegaard may well be right in his criticisms of doctrine. But doctrine is not merely theory, but is also a call to action. This is evident in St. Paul's appeal to Christological 'theory' in Phil 2.5-8 in support of his exhortation to the Philippians to emulate Christ's humility. It is precisely because Christ has given up his equality with God in order to assume the form of a servant that the Philippians, too, should cultivate the virtue of humility. Here doctrine is not opposed to action, but is the basis upon which action should take place. 2. Kierkegaard's basic point is that we should practise what we preach. But preaching - namely, right preaching, orthodoxy - surely remains essential, if our practice is to be right practice, orthopraxy. As Kierkegaard's pseudonyms recognize and express in their own lives, the individual's life-view or conception of the truth determines the individual's mode of existence. If that mode of existence is to be a genUinely Christian one, then some consideration of its doctrinal contents is essential.

19

Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 143.

18

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

3. Kierkegaard's claim - which he makes particularly forcefully in his attack on the church in 1854-5 - that the New Testament alone is sufficient for the Christian is questionable. 20 We cannot take the New Testament as a straightforward statement of what Christianity is, for it contains problematic texts which accept slavery, the subordination of women, and homophobia. Furthermore, Kierkegaard shows little understanding of the complexity of the New Testament witness, which contains tensions and underdeveloped views of Christ. The struggle of the church until 451 and beyond to establish the appropriate doctrines of God and the Person of Christ was undertaken not in order to evade the demands of Christianity, but in order to make clear the nature of the salvation Christ brings, and how human beings should respond to this gift of salvation. Christians are indeed called upon to be obedient to God's Word, but this requires prayerful yet critical engagement with the biblical texts in order to identify what is of God and what is of man. Even the less problematic texts of the New Testament raise important theological questions that have to be addressed before we can with good conscience follow Christ. For example, the New Testament commandment Kierkegaard cites as sufficient for faith and easy to understand, namely Christ's command to 'give all you possess to the poor', raises the question of who commands this and why I should obey him. In short, the New Testament itself throws up doctrinal problems which have to be addressed if the Christian is genuinely to know what s/he is committing himself to when accepting Jesus as his/her Lord. 4. Kierkegaard seems to deny the possibility of there being any legitimate development of doctrine today. He seems to have little conception of doctrinal development and appears to identify Christianity solely with the New Testament But there is still place for attempting to unfold doctrine in the modem context under the pressures created by modern intellectual and existential challenges. Kierkegaard fails to recognize that the church is always confronted by the problem of interpreting the New Testament witness and communicating it to a new generation of potential believers in new contexts. Repeating the formulations of previous generations is insufficient, if we are genuinely to mediate the existence-communication that is Christianity to a new generation and to confront our contemporaries with the choice of faith or offence. It is my view that Kierkegaard cannot escape the doctrinal issues raised by more conventional theologians. Ultimately these issues will have to be addressed if we are to be confident that when we are worshipping Christ we are indeed worshipping God. There is one further objection that could be made to my project. Hayo Gerdes points out that attempting to systematize the new ideas arising from the

ZO

See David R. Law, 'Kierkegaard's Anti-Ecclesiology: The Attack on "Christendom", 1854-55',

in International Journalfor the Study of the Christian Church, vol. 7 (2007): 86-108.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

19

Christological statements which Kierkegaard makes from the viewpoint of personal appropriation contradicts Kierkegaard's own intentions, for such an attempt annuls his goal of producing 'restlessness oriented toward inward deepening' (SKS13:49/FSE, 20-1). Gerdes has put his finger on a problem that faces every commentator on Kierkegaard. The problem is that commentary on Kierkegaard's thought all too often dissolves the existential tension that permeates Kierkegaard's works. Gerdes suggests that a presentation of Kierkegaard's Christology should understand itself as operating within this limitation, and should not strive to construct a supposedly valid system. Such a presentation is justified only in so far as it undermines modern society's appeal to the alleged antiquatedness of Christian doctrine as an excuse for not follOwing Christ, but it must do so in a way that does not reduce Christianity to a theory but fosters restlessness in the direction of inward deepeninmg.21 To carry out such a dialectical presentation of Kierkegaard's Christology would require the dialectical skills of Kierkegaard himself, however. The present author acknowledges his lack of the dialectical aptitude necessary to do justice to Kierkegaard's writings. My only defence in the face of this objection is to hope that a study of this kind might perform the role of a map of the terrain that will help readers to orientate themselves in Kierkegaard's thinking about Christ and become aware of the fundamental decision with which Christ confronts every human being: will you or will you not take up your cross and follow me? Just as tracing the route on a map with one's finger is no substitute for making the journey oneself, however, so too is an exposition of Kierkegaard's Christology no substitute for allowing oneself to be challenged by the decisive existential questions with which Kierkegaard confronts his readers. It is hoped that this study will shed light on the originality and Significance of Kierkegaard's Christology and show that he offers a form of kenotic Christology which, in contrast to the kenotic Christologies of his contemporaries, is no mere theory but a call to action.

KIERKEGAARD SCHOLARSHIP AND KENOSIS The claim that there is a kenotic strand in Kierkegaard's writings is not new. Several scholars have pointed to parallels between Kierkegaard's portrayal of Christ and certain forms of kenotic Christology. There is, however, little agreement on the form or forms of kenotic Christology allegedly present in the Kierkegaardian corpus.

21 Hayo Gerdes, Das Christusbild SiJren Kierkegaards. Verglichen mit der Christ%gle Hege/s und Schleiermachers (Dusseldorf-Cologne: Eugen Diedrichs Verlag. 1960).77.

20

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

Both Torsten Bohlin and Emanuel Hirsch claim that Kierkegaard can be read in the light of the seventeenth controversy between the Lutheran theologians of Giessen and Tiibingen on the nature of Christ's kenosis, but disagree on the camp to which Kierkegaard belongs. 22 Bohlin claims that Kierkegaard is closest to the Giessen School, which differentiated between possession and use of the divine attributes. During the incarnation Christ continued to possess the powers belonging to his divine status, but chose not to employ them, except occasionally with regard to the miracles. On this view, then, kenosis is a Kivwc1t37 The problem here is that although Kierkegaard does indeed employ the term 'servant' to describe the nature of God's incarnation in Christ, he does not appear to use the term 'self33 3S 37

Dawe. Form of a Servant. 157. Dawe. Form of a Servant. 160. Dawe. Form of a Servant. 159.

J4 36

Dawe. Form of a Servant. 157. Dawe. Form of a Servant. 160.

24

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

emptying', nor does he make it clear what it is of which Christ empties himself on becoming incarnate. Dawe simply equates the servant-form with selfemptying, thereby conflating the form adopted by the incarnate Christ with the means by which this form was assumed. Another scholar who detects kenotic elements in Kierkegaard's thought is Paul Sponheim. In his Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence Sponheim attributes Kierkegaard's kenoticism to Kierkegaard's reluctance 'to leave the christological witness with the naked assertion of a paradox which seems to reduce the unity of the Christ to a matter of words.'38 Sponheim cites several journal entries in which 'one encounters the picture of a kind of daily kenosis'.39 Sponheim returns to the question of Kierkegaard's kenoticism in his later essay in the International Kierkegaard Commentary, where he introduces the notion of kenosis in the course of a discussion of God's transcendence in relation to the creatures he has created. Sponheim draws a parallel between God's omnipotence in creating the world out of nothing and God's concern for the creature, who for God 'is not nothing'. 'In Practice in Christianity', Sponheim claims, 'one finds for God an intensification of this creational "reciprocal relationship" in the reality of the incarnation. The idea of "kenosis," the divine self emptying, is employed to convey this intensification.>40 After pointing to several passages in Practice in Christianity which allude to Phil 2, Sponheim goes on to claim that: The coming about of this incarnate relatedness is rooted in the freedom of transcendence. for 'it was Christ's free resolve from eternity to want to be incognito' (PC, 128-29). A 'most profound' incognito is entailed because to be an individual human being 'is the greatest possible distance, the infinitely qualitative distance, from being God' (PC, 128). Such kenotic action does not yield a Christ who is no longer God. Indeed 'only an Almighty' can wear so 'strict an incognito' (PC, 25). The intenSifying change wrought in the incarnation by God does mean something new for God. for the relationship to the human that God wills in Christ 'can be done in only one way, by altering one's condition in likeness to theirs ["all the sufferers"], if it is not already originally so deSigned, as was the case with him' (PC, 14). What takes place in the coming of the Christ is the realization of creational design and yet there is an intensifying newness. AntiClimacus can speak of the kenotic change as walking 'the infinitely long way from being God to becoming man' (PC. 20).41

Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence (London: SCM, 1968), 177. SKS23/KJN7:NBI8:68 (JP4:4651J; SKS221KJN6:NBI4:118 [JP3:3645); and SKS27/KJNll: Papir:427 [JP3:34421. 40 Paul R. Sponheim, 'Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 47-68; 52. 41 Sponheim, 'Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency', 53. 38

39

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

25

Later in his essay Sponheim again points to the presence of 'a kind of daily kenosis' in the portrayal of Christ in Practice in Christianity. He writes: 'Christ's suffering was voluntary, and Anti-Climacus introduces a kind of daily kenosis in writing of Christ that "he, the abased one, at all times had it in his power to ask his Father in heaven to send legions of angels to him to avert this terrible thing." '42 In a footnote Sponheim takes issue with Gouwens' distinction between Kierkegaard's kenoticism and that of Gottfried Thomasius. Sponheim holds that 'Kierkegaard's emphasis could be served by Thomasius's sense that the Christ retains the "immanent" attribute of "absolute power," but not the "relative" attribute of omnipotence which is the activation or employment of absolute power in relation to the world. Indeed Thomasius can claim that such omnipotence is "in no way an increase but rather a limitation of absolute power." Thomasius specifically speaks of a divesting of the possession, not merely the use, of omnipotence'.43 Another scholar who detects kenotic elements in Kierkegaard is Uwe Gerber, who holds that kenotic Christology 'has certain parallels on the one hand with Hegel's speculatively conceived self-divesting [Selbstentiiusserung] of the Logos until the death of death and on the other hand with Kierkegaard's existential-dialectical determination of "contemporaneity" solely with the abased God-man as the "absolute paradox"'.44 Gerber, however, does not elaborate on the nature of the kenosis which he holds Kierkegaard attributes to the God-man. Stephen Dunning describes Climacus' portrayal of the god's descent to become a lowly servant as 'in the manner of the kenosis in Philippians 2'. Dunning emphasizes that the kenosis does not cancel out the difference between divinity and humanity. The humanity of the god is 'neither Aujhebung nor a mere contradiction'. Nor is the kenosis 'a sublation of apotheosis and theophany, although it does paradoxically accomplish the equality of the former without jeopardizing the asymmetry of the latter'. For Dunning, 'The kenosis reveals a god who is God as-a-man, just as the Lord is said to be Lord preCisely as the servant of those over whom he is Lord.'45

Sponheim, 'Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency', 64. Sponheim, 'Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency', 52 n.14. 44 Uwe Gerber, Christolog;sche Bntwurfe: Bin Arbeitsbuch, vol. 1: Von der Reformation bis zur dialektischen Theolog;e (ZUrich: EVZ-Verlag, 1970), 231. 45 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 171. Dunning also notes allusions to the kenotic Christology of Philippians 2 in Upbui/ding Discourses in Various Spirits: Stephen N. Dunning, 'Transformed by the Gospel: What We Learn about the Stages from the Lilies and the Birds', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2005), 111-28; 123, 125. 42

43

26

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

In his Jesus Christ in Modern Thought John Macquarrie suggests that Kierkegaard's notion of Christ's incognito 'perhaps had its roots in the teaching of some early Lutheran theologians that there was a krypsis or hiddenness of the divine attributes in Christ.'46 Macquarrie goes on to note, however, that 'there are other elements in Kierkegaard's teaching which may be inconsistent with his more robust affinnations of the divine incognito, but which, I think, save him from thoroughgoing docetism and also point to a very profound view of God on his part.'47 Macquarrie is referring to the parable of the king and the lowly maiden in Philosophical Fragments. According to Macquarrie, if the king had decided to dress up as a beggar, in order to woo the maiden, 'that would be a form of krypsis, but also a form of deception, and no true relation could be founded on that,48 It is to avoid creating such an impression that Kierkegaard insists that God assumed a servant form not as a mere disguise but as his actual form. Like many other commentators on the kenotic elements of Kierkegaard's thought, Macquarrie cites SKS4:258/PF, 55, where Climacus speaks of the god being imprisoned in his servant form. Commenting on this passage, Macquarrie writes, 'At this point, we seem to have advanced beyond krypsis, "hiding" or "disguise", to kenosis, "emptying"'.49 Macquarrie concludes that, 'when [Kierkegaardl offers his parable of the incarnation, he has in mind not merely a hiding (krypsis) but a genuine renunciation or emptying (kenosis).'so According to Desiree Berendsen in her review ofPieter Vos's De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden,sl in chapter 4 of his book 'Vos outlines Kierkegaard's Christology, especially its kenotic character (Kenosis means the emptying of God in Christ by becoming servant and persecuted truth). Vos shows that the most important Significance of the Christian phenomenon of imitation as self-emptying and self-denying for the suffering in the world is that it enables people to criticise the regular views and interpretations of suffering in modern culture.'S2 In his study of the first of H. H.'s 'Two Ethical-Religious Essays', namely, 'Does a human being have the right to let himself be put to death?', Lee Barrett claims that in order to intensify the sense of opposition between love and the world that is the subject of the essay, H. H. 'redescribes the tension as an antagonism between the nature of God and the values of the world. Like Lutheran doctrinal theology, the author alludes to the theme of "kenosis," the John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990), 24l. Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. 48 Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. 49 Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 242. 50 Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought, 245. 51 Pieter Vas, De troost van het ogenblik: Kierkegaard over God en het lijden (Baarn: Ten Have, 2002). 52 Desiree Berendsen, 'De troost van het ogenblik [The Solace of the Moment)" Ars Disputandi [http://www.arsdisputandi.org] 3 (2003). 46

47

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

27

conviction that the incarnation of God in Christ itself was an act of selfabasement motivated by selfless concern for the other.' Barrett goes on to note that, 'The essay closely links Christ's divine nature with his abasement, thereby signifying that his willingness to pour out his own self is an essential characteristic of his divinity.'53 Merold Westphal has argued that in Practice in Christianity that 'we find a kenotic Christology (at once a metaphysics and an epistemology) linked inextricably with a kenotic ethic of imitatio Christi.'54 Westphal further argues that accompanying Anti-Climacus' meditation on the three biblical texts around. which Practice in Christianity is organized (Mt 11.28; Mt 11.6; Jn 12.32) 'is also a sub text - Philippians 2:7-8, the Christological hymn that celebrates the self-emptying (kenosis) of Christ Jesus ... '.55 Westphal attributes this kenotic dimension of Practice in Christianity to that fact that, 'Kierkegaard is in many respects simply a good Lutheran'.56 He claims that, 'The distinction in Practice in Christianity between the lowly and abased Jesus with whom we can become contemporary and the exalted and glorified Christ with whom we cannot now, since he has not yet come in his glory, echoes the theologia crucis of Luther's Heidelberg Disputation of 1518',57 particularly Theses 19-21.58 On the basis of the similarity of these theses to themes in Practice in Christianity Westphal claims that, 'Whether or not Kierkegaard was familiar, directly or indirectly, with the Heidelberg Disputation, there can be no doubt that the Anti-Climacus he creates to write Practice in Christianity is deeply attuned to Luther's double thesis that (1) our proper knowledge of God is mediated through Christ in his abasement or lowliness and that (2) in our action before God and in the world we should be not just admirers but above all imitators of precisely this Christ in his abasement and suffering (PC, 40).'59 Westphal's suggestion that kenotic motifs arise in Practice in Christianity as a result of Kierkegaard's Lutheranism is interesting because one of the factors in the development of the kenotic theology of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries was the concern to address certain tensions and problems arising from the classic Lutheran confessions. Westphal, however, does not attempt to identify the type of kenotic Christology present in Kierkegaard's thought or to outline its distinctive features. 53 Lee C. Barrett, 'Kierkegaard on the Problem of Witnessing while Yet Being a Sinner', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Without Authority (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), 147-75; 162. 54 Merold Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense: A Kierkegaardian Look at Divine Transcendence', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004), 19-46; 2155 Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense', 22. 56 Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense', 19. 57 Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense', 19. 58 Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense', 19-20. 59 Westphal, 'Kenosis and Offense', 21, original emphasiS.

28

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

M. Jamie Ferreira has also drawn attention to kenotic motifs in Kierkegaard's authorship. In her discussion of Practice in Christianity Ferreira comments that, 'Anti-Climacus elaborates a Christology that goes beyond the sketch of the "sign of offense" found in Philosophical Fragments (PF, 23-4). [Practice in Christianity] develops a kenotic Christology, a theology of Christ that emphasizes the emptying out (kenosis) of God in Christ, and it seems to locate the kenosis of God in the physical conditions of Christ's poverty and suffering (PC, 40).'60 Some scholars mention in passing the presence of kenotic motifs in Kierkegaard's thought, but do not give the issue any sustained attention. In their discussion of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein John Lippitt and Daniel D. Hutto briefly touch on the presence of kenosis in Kierkegaard's thought, remarking that the notion of the absolute paradox includes the kenotic conception of God and that through appropriation the believer 'discovers a meaning for ideas like revelation and kenosis in her life. '61 Another brief allusion to the possibility of a kenotic reading of Fragments is made by Murray Rae when he describes the god's assumption of the form of a servant as the 'self-limitation of God,.62 Other brief references to Kierkegaard and kenosis appear in James Giles' edited collection of essays on Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought. 63 In their respective studies of Kierkegaard in relation to the thought of the Japanese philosopher Kitaro Nishida, Eiko Hanaoka and Shudo Tsukiyama touch on kenosis, but do not explore in any detail the kenotic aspects of Kierkegaard's thought. 64 Finally, I ought perhaps to mention my own brief discussion of kenosis in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works in my Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian. 65 In this work I argue on the basis of dimacus' analogy of the king and the maiden in Philosophical Fragments that a form of kenotic Christology is present in Kierkegaard's thought. Like Sponheim, Gerber, Dunning, Macquarrie, Barrett, Westphal, Ferreira, Lippitt and Hutto, Hanaoka, and Tsukiyama, however, I do not go on to discuss in detail Kierkegaard's understanding of kenosis. There are some scholars, however, who deny that Kierkegaard advances a form of keno tic Christology. The Arbaughs regard Kierkegaard's insistence that 'the servant's garb becomes God's proper garb' as 'a startling feature in the parable which sets Kierkegaard apart from most believers', who unwittinsJ,y

M. Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard (Malden, MA.; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),173. John Lippitt and Daniel D. Hutto, 'Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein', Proceedings of the Aristotelian SOCiety, New Series, vol. 98 (1998), 263-86; 286. 60

61

62

Rae, Kierkegaard's Vision of the Incarnation, 188.

James Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 64 Eiko Hanaoka, 'Kierkegaard and Nishida: Ways to the Non-Substantial', in Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, 159-71; 170; Shudo Tsukiyama, 'The Religious Thought of Nishida and Kierkegaard', in Giles (ed.), Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, 172-84; 183-4. 65 David R. Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 183-9. 63

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

29

'veer towards docetism'.66 They go on to state, without, however, elaborating on this point, that, 'In incarnation God does not empty Himself or lay aside his glory. It is the very glory and love of God which cause him to literally become man and seek equality with the unequal and even defiant beloved.'67 Despite noting in his study of 'Two Ethical-Religious Essays' that H. H. advances a notion of keno sis, Barrett claims in his study of the 'Gospel of Sufferings' that, 'Unlike the Lutheran doctrinal heritage, Kierkegaard does not elaborate any particular theory of" kenosis,» of how Christ managed to lay aside power and glory, in order to clarify Jesus' pattern of humiliationl exaltation. Instead, Kierkegaard carefully depicts the ideal passional contexts appropriate for understanding this Christological dynamic.'68 Although this may be true with regard to Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, we shall see that a type of kenotic theory is present in Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity. Barrett is right to point out, however, that what he calls the 'passional context' and what we shall call 'kenotic discipleship' is essential for understanding Kierkegaard's Christology. In his Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts Martin Breidert argues against the presence of kenotic Christology in Kierkegaard's thought. He comments: It is ... permissible to speak of a modern kenoticism only where, in the act of becoming a human being, the pre-existent Son of God limits, depotentiates, or reduces himself in his being and activity in some way, in order to enter into human existence. If no attempt is made somehow to explain or make the incarnation intelligible, as is the case for instance with Kierkegaard's paradox, then there is clearly no affinity with modern kenoticism, for kenotic Christology and paradox Christology are mutually exclusive.69

This is another question that we will attempt to address in this study. Are kenotic Christology and paradox Christology mutually exclusive opposites, or can Kierkegaard's paradox Christology be understood as a type of kenotic Christology? More recently Tim Rose has argued in his Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology against reading Kierkegaard as a kenotic theologian, claiming that Kierkegaard's Christology should be understood rather in terms of Luther's

66 George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship: A Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), 133. 67 Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, 134.

Barrett, 'The Joy in the Cross', 272. Breidert. Die kenotische Christologie des 19. lahrhunderts, 23. Other scholars who emphasize the opposition between paradox theology and kenotic Christology are: Hans Urs von Balthasar, 'Mysteriurn Paschale', in Mysterium Salutis. Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik, vol. III12 (Einsiedeln, Zurich und Koln, 1969), 133-326; 151; Paul Althaus, 'Kenosis', in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd edn., vol. III, columns 1244-6; 1245-6. 68 69

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

theology of the cross. 70 Rose cites three difficulties in ascribing a kenotic Christology to Kierkegaard. Firstly, he claims that the tenn kenosis 'does not occur in any of his writings, whether direct or pseudonymous'. Secondly, Kierkegaard makes no mention of contemporary German kenotic theologians, 'even though both Thomasius and Gess were near contemporaries'. Rose points out that, 'Kierkegaard kept a watchful eye on theological developments in Germany', and so we would have expected him to have referred to such theologians, 'if he was in accord with their views, especially as Thomasius purposefully developed his ideas in opposition to Hegelianism'. Thirdly, Rose notes that, 'Kierkegaard owned and studied one work by a kenoticist: Martensen's Christian Dogmatics', and yet despite this and despite the fact that Kierkegaard 'often attacks Martensen on several issues, he fails to raise the subject of kenosis'. On the basis of these considerations Rose concludes that, 'unless he was totally unaware of it (which seems somewhat unlikely), Kierkegaard either largely ignored traditional kenoticism, or he developed a similar theory without the traditional terminology'.71 In my opinion, Rose's second suggestion is the right one. Rose, however, sets himself the task of refuting this claim. Rose's main argument against the presence of a kenotic theology in Kierkegaard's thought is that, 'Kierkegaard limits his discussion to the abasement of Christ on earth, rather than considering a metaphysical abandonment by the eternal LogoS.'72 In support of this argument Rose cites Christian Discourses, 54,73 a passage which he points out 'is set within Kierkegaard's doctrine of Christ as the prototype'. 74 Rose takes this and similar passages (e.g. SKS4:238-91 PF, 31-2; SV XII 433/JFY, 160) to denote Kierkegaard's emphasis on the radical nature of Christ's commitment to the Father. Rose is prepared to acknowledge the presence of apparently kenotic elements in Kierkegaard's discussion of Christ's suffering and incognito, such as SKSI2:136-7/PC, 132-3. He claims, however, that in this passage, 'the limitations of Christ are described, whilst at the same time the omnipotence of God the Son is preserved. There is therefore no abandonment of divine attributes as is found in Thomasius' Christology.'75 In place of a kenotic reading of this passage, Rose suggests that, 'What Kierkegaard is claiming is that the reality of Christ's humanity depends upon the exercising of his divine omnipotence.'76 'Only in this way', Rose continues,

Tim Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001),111-14. Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, 111. 72 Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, III. 73 'He lived in actual earthly lowliness ... he did not choose to be an eminent person and yet a lowly person in his innermost being. No, he literally was the lowly person, and in earnest in an entirely different way than when a king momentarily sets aside his rank and is known by the courtiers, consequently all the more honored - for his humility' (CD. 54). 74 Rose. Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology. 112. 7S Rose. Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, 113. 76 Rose. Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology. 113. 70 71

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

31

'could Christ genuinely share in the grim reality of human suffering and weakness, and be for us the prototype: 77 As evidence for this reading Rose cites Gospel of Sufferings, 63-4 (= SKS8: 360/UDVS, 263).18 Rose admits, however, that the passages he has cited 'would place Kierkegaard's Christology within the bounds of Sturch's somewhat broad definition of kenoticism', namely, that kenosis denotes not only 'theories which assert that the Son no longer possesses, or no longer uses, some of his divine attributes during the incarnation', but also 'views which see the knowledge and power of Jesus as limited, but not those of God the Son, even during the earthly life of Jesus. '79 The passages from Practice in Christianity and Gospel of Sufferings, however, are according to Rose 'clearly' not within the bounds of Thomasius' kenotic Christology. Rose responds to Gouwens' argument that Kierkegaard subscribes to a version of Giessen kenotic theology with the question that, 'This would seem to be in accord with the material cited, but is it really kenoticism in the traditional sense of the tenn?,80 Each of Rose's arguments is in my opinion flawed. Firstly, the fact that Kierkegaard rarely employs the word 'kenosis' does not of itself rule out the possibility that he advanced some sort of kenotic Christology. We must be attentive to the way that Kierkegaard uses Danish tenns that may perfonn the function of the term 'kenosis', notably, forringe, fornedre, ydmyge, which were the terms employed in the Danish translations of Phil 2.6-8 in use in Kierkegaard's day. These tenns, particularly fornedre and its cognates, play an important role in Kierkegaard's Christological works, especially Practice in Christianity. We should at least postpone our decision for or against the kenotic character of Kierkegaard's Christology until we have investigated how he understands Christ's humiliation and have considered to what degree this notion ofhumiliation has points of contact with the Christologies of the kenotic theologians. Secondly, the fact that Kierkegaard does not mention contemporary kenotic theologians does not prove anything one way or the other. Thomasius published the first version of his kenotic Christology in 1845, a year after the publication of Philosophical Fragments, by which time Kierkegaard had arguably already arrived at the main themes of his Christology. Furthennore, Thomasius' article was published in the ZeitschriJt fur Protestantismus und Kirche, a journal that was founded in 1838,81 so its influence may not have spread to Denmark by the time Kierkegaard was developing his Christology in

Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, 113. S0ren Kierkegaard, Gospel of Sufferings, trans. by A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferrie (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1955). 79 Richard Sturch, The Word and the Christ: An Essay in Analytic Christo logy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991),255-6. 80 Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, 113. 81 See Gottfried Thomasius, Das Wiedererwachen des evangelischen Lebens in der lutherischen Kirche Bayerns. Ein Stuck suddeutscher Kirchengeschichte (1800-1840) (Erlangen: Andreas 77 78

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

Philosophical Fragments. Thomasius' mature kenotic Christology did not begin to appear until the publication in 1853 of the first edition of his magnum opus Christi Person und Werk. Volume 2 of this work, which is where Thomasius develops in detail his kenotic Christology, did not appear until 1855, the year of Kierkegaard's death. It is hardly surprising, then, that there should be no mention ofThomasius in Kierkegaard's works and journals. That Gess was unknown to Kierkegaard is even less surprising, since his Die Lehre von der Person Christi was not published until 1856 and the first volume of his final statement of his kenotic theology in his Christi Person und Werk did not appear until 1870. The lack of reference to German kenotic theologians in Kierkegaard's works points not to the unlikelihood of his developing a kenotic Christology, but rather indicates that if any such Christology is present in his works, it must have been developed independently of German kenoticism. Rose's third point concerning Kierkegaard's relationship to Martensen is more complex and will be dealt with in greater detail when we consider Martensen in our discussion of Kierkegaard's intellectual background. Further problems with Rose's rejection of the kenotic strand in Kierkegaard's thought are that he is reliant on a handful of texts and has not considered the Christological questions that these texts raise. For Rose's refutation of the kenotic character of Kierkegaard's Christology to be convincing, he needs to do a thorough trawl of the supposedly kenotic texts of the Kierkegaardian corpus and show how a kenotic reading is mistaken. Rose is indeed right to point out that Kierkegaard's emphasis is on the lowly Christ as the prototype whom we are called upon to follow. This does not of itself, however, exclude the notion of keno sis. Indeed, it is precisely because Christ has put aside the status belonging to his divine nature in order to become a lowly servant that he can become an example of humility for human beings. This ra4ses the question of whether Christ's renunciation of divine status constitutes some sort of kenosis. It also raises a series of Christological questions concerning Christ's pre-existence, the nature of Christ's transition from pre-existence to existence, the relation between this transition and his humiliation, and so on. These questions are not uppermost in Kierkegaard's mind, but he does occasionally address them and they are implicit in his treatment of Christ as the lowly servant. In short, to do justice to Kierkegaard's Christology, we need to look at the theological underpinnings of his notion of Christ as the lowly and abased servant and consider whether they do or do not contain kenotic elements. Finally, Rose's rejection of the kenotic strand in Kierkegaard's thought is based on a debatable notion of kenosis as 'abandonment'. Although this term may be appropriate to Gess, it is certainly not appropriate to Thomasius, who speaks of kenosis as the Logos's freely willed self-limitation by means of his Deichert, 1867),278-304; Karlmann Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie (Erlangen: Martin Luther Verlag in Zusarnrnenarbeit mit dern Verein fiir bayerische Kirchengeschichte, 1993),47-8.

Kierkegaard as Theologian and the Question of Kenosis

33

self-divestment (Selbstentausserung) of the relative attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence in order to reveal in his incarnate life the essential or immanent attributes of truth, holiness, love, and absolute power.82 Despite the objections of Breidert and Rose the consensus of scholarly opinion is that Kierkegaard subscribes to some sort of kenosis theory. There seems to be no consensus, however, on the nature of Kierkegaard's kenotic Christology. As we have seen, Bohlin and Gouwens claim that Kierkegaard is closest to the Giessen School, whereas Hirsch and Walsh argue that Kierkegaard has affinities to the KPVtPtS XP~Uf.WS of the rival Tiibingen School. Roos and Sponheim on the other hand see an affinity between Kierkegaard and Thomasius, while Dawe believes Kierkegaard's understanding of kenosis to be unique and distinctive, and that it marks the impossibility of further development of the kenotic motif. The majority of scholars merely note the presence of kenotic motifs in Kierkegaard's Christology but do not elaborate on them. The fact that opinions vary so much on the question of Kierkegaard's kenoticism indicates how complex the question is. This complexity should make us wary of being too ready to classify Kierkegaard's Christology according to the kenotic theologies of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, it is my contention that there is indeed a kenotic strand in Kierkegaard's thought and that there are points of contact between his Christology and the kenotic theologies of his German contemporaries. It is my further contention, however, that this kenotic Christology was developed independently by Kierkegaard and that he advances an original and distinctive form of kenotic Christology that is markedly different from the kenotic Christologies of his predecessors and contemporaries. To set the scene for our discussion, our first task is to provide a brief sketch of the key features, issues, problems, and history of kenotic Christology.

82 There are also problems with Rose's claim that, 'Kierkegaard's Christology may be more appropriately interpreted along the lines of another development in Lutheran theology: the theology of the cross' (Rose, Kierkegaard's Christocentric Theology, 114). Kenotic Christology and the theology of the cross are not rivals, nor are they mutually exclusive opposites. Indeed, the crucifixion of God's Son is one of the issues that raises the kenotic problem. If Christ really is divine, then how can he undergo the suffering of the cross?

2 The Nature of Kenotic Christology The term 'kenosis' is derived from Paul's use of the term ekenosen in the so-called Christ-hymn of Phil 2.6-11.1 In the first 'stanza' (Phil 2.6-8) ofthis hymn Paul states that 'Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself (heauton ekenosen), taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness' (Phil 2.6-7, emphasis added). On the basis of this passage 'kenosis' has come to be employed as a technical term to denote the means by which divine and human natures were able to be united in the incarnate Christ without compromising the integrity of either nature. This problem of the relationship between divine and human natures in Christ is not unique to Phil 2, however, but is arguably an issue that permeates the entire New Testament, for the New Testament affirms that Christ is divine On 1.1-18; Col 1.15) and yet simultaneously is also a human being who experienced human emotions On 4.6; 11.35), suffering (Mt 26.38; Mk 14.34; In 12.27), and death (Mt 27.50; Mk 15.37; Lk 23.46; In 19.30). The problem of how these apparently contradictory statements were to be held together was a subject of vigorous debate in the early church and eventually led in 451 to the Chalcedonian Definition or 'two-natures' doctrine that Christ is truly God and truly a human being, and that divinity and humanity are united in the one, unified person of Christ without confusion, change, division or separation. The Chalcedonian Definition did not provide a full, comprehensive, coherent Christology, however, but rather laid down the boundaries within which the understanding of Christ must be thought through? It affirms that the integrity of both human and divine natures is preserved in the incarnation and that both natures are united

I The theory that Phil 2.6-11 is a pre-Pauline hymn to Christ incorporated by Paul into his letter to the Philippians was first advanced by Ernst Lohmeyer and has since become widely accepted in New Testament scholarship. Ernst Lohmeyer, Kyrios Jesus. Eine Untersuchung zu Phil 2. 5-11 (Dannstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 1961). 2 For the notion of the Chalcedonian Definition as a boundary. see Sarah Coakley, 'What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does it Not? Some Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonic "Definition''', in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, SI, and Gerald O'Collins, SI (eds.), The incarnation: An interdisciplinary Symposium on the incarnation of the Son of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 143-63.

The Nature of Keno tic Christology

35

in one person and hypostasis. 'The Chalcedonian Definition did not address the question, however, of how the divine and human natures can exist in a single person without either the human nature or the divine nature being undennined. It leaves unclear the precise meaning of its key terms, namely physis and hypostasis, and is vague as to what is necessary to preserve the integrity of each of Christ's natures without rendering the incarnation impossible. Its failure to explain how the two apparently mutually contradictory natures of divinity and humanity can be united in a single person has led some scholars to reject the Chalcedonian Definition as incoherent or unintelligible. 3 'The problem facing Chalcedonian Christology is clearly set out by Stephen T. Davis, who lists what appear to be mutually contradictory attributes possessed by God and human beings. God

Human beings

1 Being necessary 2 Living for ever 3 Being omnipotent 4 Being omniscient 5 Being incorporeal

l' Being contingent 2' Living only for a finite time 3' Being non-omnipotent 4' Being non-omniscient 5' Being corporeal

Davis comments: 'Now here is a problem for all orthodox views of the Incarnation: if properties 1-5 are essential to God; and if properties 1'-5' are essential to all human beings; and if the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation (which includes the "truly human and truly divine" clause) affirms that Jesus Christ must Simultaneously possess all the members of both sets of properties; then the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation spelled out at Nicaea and Chalcedon is incoherent,4 If God is eternal, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, then how can the Second Person of the Trinity, the divine Logos and Son of God, live a life as a human being, limited in time and space? How can the affirmation that Christ is truly divine be reconciled with the claim that he is simultaneously truly human? It is precisely these questions that kenotic theologians aimed to answer.5

See, for example, John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate (London: SCM, 1993). Stephen T. Davis. 'Is Kenosis Orthodox?', in C. Stephen Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 112-38: 116. 5 Some commentators have argued that kenotic Christology falls outside the boundaries of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. This is an accusation made particularly by Roman Catholic scholars against the Lutheran kenotic theories of the nineteenth century. See Michael Waldhauser, Die Kenose und die moderne protestantische Christologie (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1912); Georg Lorenz Bauer, Die neuere protestantische Kenosislehre (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1917). That kenotic Christology is Indeed consistent with the Chalcedonian Definition, however, is indicated by the fact that it is the two-natures doctrine that creates the kenotic problem, for by claiming that Jesus is truly divine and truly human the Chalcedonian Definition seems to be making an incoherent claim that can be resolved arguably only by some sort of kenotic Christo logy. There are, 3

4

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

36

A BRIEF HISTORY OF KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY From the Enlightenment onwards the two-natures doctrine came under increasing pressure. Reimarus sought to explain Christianity as an invention ofthe disciples to further their own selfish economic aims. 6 Lessing raised the problem of the relation of historical events and theological claims,7 while Kant placed the epistemological status of metaphysical and therefore also theological statements in question. 8 These problems were addressed by seeing Jesus primarily as a human being who was the teacher and exemplar of moral values. This increasing trend to emphasize the humanity of Jesus over his divinity was accentuated still further by the rise of the historical criticism of the Bible, which made evident how Jesus was a man of his times and conditioned by the contemporary Jewish and Hellenistic culture of first century Palestine. The development of psychology as a distinct academic discipline brought about a concern with the personality, psychology, and self-consciousness of Jesus. This combination of factors resulted in the increasing awareness of the reality of Jesus' humanity and sharpened the Christological problem of how Jesus of Nazareth could be said to be Simultaneously truly human and truly divine. Those theologians who did not wish to jettison the two-natures doctrine were compelled to find new ways of thinking about humanity and divinity, and how these two natures could be united in the person of Jesus Christ. Several attempts were made in the course of the nineteenth certainty to rethink and reformulate the significance of Jesus of Nazareth and the notion of his divinity. Schleiermacher restated the two-natures doctrine in terms of 'God-consciousness'.9 Christ is the human being who is absolutely Godconscious. As such his entire existence is so focused on God that we can speak of this as the veritable existence of God in him. Schleiermacher, then, proposes an anthropological solution. Christ does not share in the very being of God, but is a human being who is wholly centred on God. 'Divinity' is a circumlocution for a quality of Jesus' human existence, rather than an ontological statement about the character of his being. Hegel reinterpreted the two-natures doctrine in terms of his understanding of history as the process of Absolute Spirit's self-realization in ever higher however. as we shall see. non-Chalcedonian and subordinationist forms of kenotic Christology. where the criticisms of heterodoxy advanced by Waldhauser and Bauer have some justifil:ation. Charles H. Talbert. Reimarus. Fragments (London: SCM. 1971).240-8. G. E. Lessing, 'On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power'. in Henry Chadwick, Lessing's TheolOgical Writings (London: A. & C. Black, 1956).51-6. 8 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1990). 9 Friedrich Schleiermacher. The Christian Faith, edited by H. R. Mackintosh and,. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989). 6

7

The Nature of Kenotic Christo logy

37

fonns. In Christ God knows himself in human consciousness, and the human being knows himself in God, while Christ's death constitutes both the Spirit's most extreme self-alienation into its other and the point at which this alienation is overcome in the Spirit's new and now explicit self-unity.lo Although Hegel is working loosely within a Chalcedonian framework, he does not understand Christ as the personal union of divine and human natures but as the sensuous and concrete representation in human existence of a stage in the self-manifestation of Absolute Spirit. Strauss follows Hegel in holding that as Absolute Spirit God realizes himself fully and truly only when he manifests himself in finite spirits. At the same time, the finite spirit realizes itself only when it immerses itself in infinite Spirit. Through the Spirit's unfolding of itself in history, the human race becomes ever more conscious of humanity's unity with divinity. This idea of unity with God was embodied for the first time in the individual human being Jesus of Nazareth. Speculative philosophy takes up this notion and interprets it in relation to the entire human race. The two-natures doctrine is incoherent when applied exclusively to Jesus, but makes perfect sense when applied to the human race as a whole. II These refonnulations of the two-natures doctrine, however, are arguably a dissolution of the doctrine, for none of them affirms the Chalcedonian Definition as a statement of the constitution of Christ's person, but seeks to anchor the doctrine in anthropology (Schleiermacher) or idealist philosophy (Hegel, Strauss). These attempts to reformulate the two-natures doctrine led to a backlash on the part of Lutheran theologians who wished to affirm the Lutheran Confessions and the Chalcedonian Definition upon which these Confessions were based. Kahler describes this group of theologians as engaging in a positivistic reworking of Christological tradition from either a biblicist or a confessional standpoint,12 while Stephan speak of the attempts to construct a 'restorative theology' capable of meeting the challenges of historical criticism. 13 It is to this movement of the restoration of the two-natures doctrine that the kenotic theologians belong. 14

10 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977). 453-78; Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. One Volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827, ed. by Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 1988).452-70. 11 David Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (London: SCM, 1973), 777. 12 Martin Kiihler, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1962), 14T-92. 13 Horst Stephan, Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Theologie seit dem deutschen Jdealismus, 2nd revised edition by Martin Schmidt (Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1960), 166-88. 14 For surveys of the kenotic theologians. see A. B. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ in its PhYSical, Ethical, and Official Aspects (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1900); Waldhiiuser, Die Kenose und die modern protestantische Christologie; Bauer, Die neuere protestantische Kenosislehre; P. Henry, 'Kenose', Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplement (Paris: Libraire Letouzey et Ane,

38

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

The kenotic theologians are united by their interpretation of the relationship between Christ's divinity and humanity in terms of the suffering Logos who renounced certain aspects, attributes, or prerogatives of his divinity in order to be able to live a genUinely human life. It is their application of the notion of kenosis to the pre-existent Logos and their interpretation of kenosis as the means by which the Logos was able to become incarnate that distinguishes the nineteenth century kenoticists from their seventeenth century predecessors. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Lutheran theologians of Tiibingen (Hafenreffer, Osiander, Nicolai, and Thummius) claimed that during his earthly ministry Christ concealed (krypsis, occultatio) but continued to use his divine powers. Their opponents, the Giessen theologians (Mentzer, Feuerborn), argued for a 'kenosis of use' (kenosis tes chreseos), by which they meant that Christ abstained from using some of his divine powers for the duration of the incarnation. Despite their dispute concerning Christ's exercise of his divine powers during his earthly ministry, the theolOgians of Tiibingen and Giessen were in agreement that the subject of the kenosis is the incarnate Logos (the logos ensarkos, the 'entleshed' Logos). Where these theologians disagreed was in their understanding of the extent of the divine powers of the incarnate Logos. Their nineteenth century successors, however, attributed the kenosis not to the incarnate Christ but to the pre-existent Logos (the logos asarkos, the 'unfleshed' Logos). For the kenotic theologians of the nineteenth century, kenosis is the means by which the Logos accommodates his divine nature so that he is able to assume a form compatible with living a genUinely human existence, albeit without undermining the integrity of either the divine or the human nature. Early attempts to develop a kenotic Christology of this type were made by E. W. C. Sartorius in the 1830s. 15 By the 1840s several theologians seem to have begun developing independently of each other theolOgies containing kenotic elements. In 1844 K. F. Gaupp advanced a form of kenotic theology in his attempt to provide a theological justification of the Prussian union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches,16 while in the same year J. 1. Konig published a Hegelian influenced theory of kenosis in terms of God's self-finitization (Selbstverendlichung) into his other. 17 It was, however, the publication in 1845

1957), vol. 5, pp. 7-161; Dawe, Form of a Servant. Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts; David R Law, 'Kenotic Christology', in David Fergusson (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth Century Theology (Malden, MA; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 251-80; David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis Explored and Defended (London: SCM, 2011). IS For a discussion of the kenotic elements of Sartorius' theology, see Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 30-9. 16 Karl Friedrich Gaupp, Die Union der deutschen Kirchen (Breslau: Ferdinand Hirt, 1844; 2nd partially revised edition; 1847), esp, 98-117. References are to the second edition. 17 Johann Ludwig Konig, Die Menschwerdung Gottes als eine in Christus ge.schehene und in deT christlichen Kirche noch geschehende (Mainz: Zabem, 1844).

The Nature of Kenotic Christology

39

of Gottfried Thomasius' article 'Ein Beitrag zur kirchlichen Christologie' [Contribution to Ecclesial Christology] that made the notion of kenosis a major topic of theolOgical debate. 18 The criticisms levelled by Isaak Dorner and Matthias Schneckenburger against the kenotic Christology Thomasius advances in 'Beitrag', however, prompted him to rethink his position,19 which ultimately led to his magnum opus, the three-volume Christi Person und Werk [Christ's Person and Work] e1853-61; 21856-63).20 It is in the second edition of this work that we find the mature statement of Thomasius' kenotic Christology. Thomasius accepts the Chalcedonian Definition that Christ is both truly divine and truly human, but recognizes that this raises the problem of how a union of divinity and humanity in Christ is possible without compromising the integrity of either nature. Thomasius 'solves' this problem by making a distinc" tion between immanent and relative divine attributes. In order to live a genuinely human life it was necessary for the Logos to limit his divinity, without at the same time compromising the divine fulness which it was the aim of the Logos to reveal to human beings. According to Thomasius, the Logos achieved this by divesting himself of his relative attributes, i.e. the attributes by means of which the pre-existent Logos related himself to the world, namely, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence.21 Such attributes are incompatible with a genuinely human life and thus the Logos renounced them in order to live as a human being. The incarnate Logos, however, did not renounce the immanent attributes of absolute power, holiness, truth, and love, but rather expressed them in a form consistent with human existence. Because the incarnate Logos retained these essential attributes, he 'lacks nothing which is essential for God to be God,.22 Indeed, it is these attributes that constitute the content of the divine revelation Christ brings to humankind. 23 Kenosis thus consists in the Logos' divesting himself of the relative attributes for the duration of the incarnation, but the continued possession of the immanent attributes. Because the relative attributes exist only in God's relation to creation and do not belong to the divine essence, they can be temporarily discarded without undermining the divinity of the Logos.

18

Gottfried Thomasius, 'Ein Beitrag zur kirchlichen Christologie', ZeitschriJt fUr Protestan·

tismus und Kirche, new series, vol. 9 (1845):1-30,65-110,218-58. 19

Isaak August Dorner, Review of G. Thomasius, 'Ein Beitrag zur kirchlichen Christologie',

in Aligemeines Repertorium fUr die theologische Literatur und kirchliche Statistik (new series),

5 (1846), 33-50. Matthias Schneckenburger, Review ofG. Thomasius, 'Beitrage zur kirchlichen Christologie', in Litterarischer Anzeiger fUr die christliche Theologie und Wissenschaft iiberhaupt, ed. by F. A. Tholuck (Halle: Eduard Anton, 1846), first half-volume, columns 129-32, 137-44, 147-52. 20 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk. References are to the second edition. 21 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 11:237-40. 22 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 11:242. 23 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 11:236-7.

40

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

Arguably the most controversial and radical of the kenoticists, however, is Wolfgang Gess (1819-91).24 In his Die Lehre von der Person Christi (1856) and Christi Person und Werk (1870-87).25 Gess criticizes the Chalcedonian Definition as docetic 26 and rejects the immutability of the Logos on the grounds that this doctrine is not supported by Scripture. 27 For Gess it is not the two-natures doctrine but the witness of Scripture which creates the kenotic problem, namely Scripture's affirmation that Jesus' ego is identical with the ego of the Logos. He writes, 'Regarded purely exegetically, there is no result of the interpretation of Scripture more certain and obvious than the proposition that the ego of Jesus on earth was identical with the ego which had previously existed in glory with the Father'. 28 It is also evident from Scripture, Gess claims, that the Son of God was subject to becoming and that the incarnation brought about a change in the Son's condition.29 Gess understands the incarnation as the Son's transition from the state of being 'self-positing' (Sichselbstsetzen) to the state of 'being posited' (Gesetztsein). As he puts it, the Son 'has proceeded from the life of one who posits himself to the life of one who is posited'.30 To avoid affirming two egos or a 'double personality' in Christ, Gess appeals to the theory of creatianism, according to which God creates the human soul to accompany the body created by parents at the moment of their conception of a child. Gess interprets the Virgin Birth to mean that at Jesus' conception the Logos replaced the human soul that God would have supplied if Jesus had been conceived by conventional means. 31 Consequently, 'the insertion of a rational human soul between the Logos and his corporeality ... is ... unnecessary'.32 It is not only his apparent Apollinarianism that drew criticism from Gess' contemporaries, but above all his claim that on becoming incarnate the Logos reduced himself to what was consistent with existence as a human soul. Since all human souls begin life in a state of unconsciousness, Gess argues, the Logos too must have allowed his consciousness to be initially extinguished on becoming a human being. Otherwise, Gess points out, 'The Son would also not really have been identical to us if he had not begun his earthly life with the

24 Breidert considers Gess to be 'the most consistent representative of kenotic Christology' (Breidert. Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 115). 2S W. F. Gess. Die Lehre von der Person Christi (Basel: Bahnmaiers Buchhandlung (c. Detlof), 1856); Christi Person und Werk, 3 vols. (vol. 1: Calw and Stuttgart: Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung, 1870; vots. II-Ill: Basel: Bahnmaiers Buchhandlung (c. Detlot), 1887). 26 Gess, Lehre von der Person Christi, 207. 27 Gess, Christi Person und Werk. 1Il:352. 28 Gess. Lehre von der Person Christi. 292. 29 Gess, Christi Person und Werk. Ill:344-5. 30 Gess, Christi Person und Werk, Ill:353. cf. 448. 31 Gess, Christi Person und Werk, Ill:358-64. 32 Gess. Christi Person und Werk. Ill:409.

The Nature of Keno tic Christology

41

night of unconsciousness'.33 It was only as the young Jesus began to grow and mature that his divine self-consciousness began to return as he gradually recovered the memory of his divine status. A further controversial argument advanced by Gess is that the inner-Trinitarian relations were interrupted for the duration of the incarnation. He claims that the Father's eternal generation of the Son was suspended and the Spirit no longer proceeded from both the Father and the Son, but from the Father alone. 34 Many other kenotic theolOgies were advanced in the mid to late nineteenth century, notably those of Liebner,35 Hofmann,36 Ebrard.,37 and Frank.38 Several theologians advanced a modified version of the kenosis of use, notably Kahnis,39 Luthardt,40 Oettingen,41 Steinmeyer,42 and Vilmar.43 These nineteenth century advocates of the kenosis of use differ from their seventeenth century predecessors, however, in holding the logos asarkos to be the subject of

33 Gess. Christi Person und Werk. III:367. 34 Later representatives of Gessian type kenotic Christology are Reiff. Gretillat, and Godet. Friedrich Reiff, Die christliche Glaubenslehre a/s Grund/age der christlichen Weltanschuung. Ein Versuch. 2 vols. (Basel: Bahnmeier, 1873). Augustin Gretillat. Expose de the%gie systematique. vols. III-IV (Paris et Neuchatel: Attinger Freres. 1888-90). Frederic Godet. Commentaire sur L'Evangi/e de Saint Jean, 3 vols. 2nd edn. (Paris: Sandoz & Fiischbacher; Neuchatel: Librairie Generale J. Sandoz, 1876-77); Etudes bib/iques. voL II, 3ed edn. (Paris: Sandoz & Fiischbacher; Neuchatel: Librairie Generale J. Sandoz, 1876). 35 K. T. A. Liebner, Die christliche Dogmatik aus dem christologischen Prindp dargestellt, vol. IiI: Christologie oder die christologische Einheit des dogmatischen Systems (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1849). 36 J. K. von Hofmann. Der Schriftbeweis. Bin theologischer Versuch. vols. I-1I12 (Nordlingen: C. H. Beck, '1852-5. 21857-60). References are to the first edition. 37 1. H. A. Ebrard. Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte (Frankfurt a. M.: Heinrich Zimmer, 1842), published in English under the title The Gospel History:

c.

A Compendium of Critical Investigations in Support of the Historical Character of the Four Gospels. trans. by James Martin. revised and edited by Alexander B. Bruce (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1863); Das Dogma yom heiligen Abendmahl und seine Geschichte. 2 vols. (Frankfurt a. M: Heinrich Zimmer. 1845-46); Christliche Dogmatik. 2 vols. (Konigsberg: August Wilhelm Unzer, '1851-2,21862-3). References are to the second edition. 38 F. H. R Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, 2 vols. (Erlangen. Andreas Deichert, '1878-80,21885-6), II: 99. References are to the first edition. 39 K. F. A. Kahnis. Die lutherische Dogmatik, historisch-genetisch dargesteUt. 3 vols. (2nd edn. 2 vols) (Leipzig: Dorffling and Franke, '1861-8,21875); Christen tum und Lutherthum (Leipzig: Dorffling and Franke. 1871). 40 C. E. Luthardt, Das johanneische Evangelium nach seiner Eigenthumlichkeit geschildert und erklart, 2 vols. (Nuremberg: Conrad Geiger, 1852-3); Kompendium der Dogmatik (Leipzig: Dorffling & Franke. 91893); Apologetische Vortrage uber die Hei/swahrheiten des Christenthums, im Winter 1867 zu Leipzig gehalten (Leipzig: Dorffling & Franke. 71901); Die christliche Glaubenslehre, gemeinverstandlich dargestellt (Leipzig: Dorffling & Franke, 1898). 41 Alexander von Oettingen, Lutherische Dogmatik, vols. 1-1112 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 18971902). 42 F. K. L. Steinmeyer, Apologetische Beitrage. 4 vols. (Berlin: Wiegandt & Geieben, 1866-73). vol. IV. 43 A. F. C. Vilmar. Dogmatik, Akademische Vorlesungen. 2 vols .• ed. by K. W. Piderit (Giitersloh. Bertelsmann: 1874).

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

42

the kenosis whereas the Giessen theologians applied their version of the theory to the logos ensarkos. In Germany kenotic Christology declined in the 1880s as Ritschlianism began to become increasingly influential in German theological thinking. It experienced a second flowering in Great Britain between c. 1880 and 1930, however, and forms of kenotic theology were also developed in Russian orthodoxy, notably by Michail Tareev (1866-1934) and Sergius Bulgakov (1871-1944).44 Although in the early twentieth century Roman Catholic theology was generally hostile to kenotic Christology,45 a more sympathetic response developed as the century wore on, most notably on the part of Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-88).46 In the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries kenotic theology seems to be undergoing a mini-revival. There has been a renewal of interest in the notion of kenosis, particularly in the idea of God's relation to the world being fundamentally kenotic in nature,47 and several new works on kenotic theology have been recently published. 4s It seems that kenosis will continue to be an issue as long as Christians continue to affirm that Christ is both truly divine and truly human, and that he lived a genuinely human life.

THE TERMINOLOGY OF KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY Despite their variations, kenotic Christologies share the following characteristics. (a) High Christology Kenotic Christologies assume the divinity of Jesus. Like other high Christologies, then, kenotic Christologies are faced by the problem of shOwing how God can become a human being. (b) Pre-existence Kenotic Christologies are concerned to make intelligible how the pre-existent Logos was able to enter limited human existence. It thus presupposes pre-

44 See Nadejda Gorodetzky. The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought (London: SPCK. 1938). 139-56 (Tareev). 156-74 (Bulgakov); Sergius BuJgakov, The lAmb of God. trans. by Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. 2008). 45 See, for example. Waldhauser, Die Kenose und die protestal1tische Christologie. and Bauer. Die neuere protestantische Kenosislehre. 46 See, for example, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Pasch ale, translated with an introduction by Aidan Nichols, O. P. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990), esp. 23-36, 89-91. 47 See, for example, John Polkinghome (ed.), The Work of Love. Creation as Kenosis (London: SPCK,2001). 48 See, for example, Evans, Exploring Kenotic Christology; Brown, Divine Humanity.

The Nature of Kenotic Christo logy

43

existence. Consequently, theologies that do not accept pre-existence, such as that of Schleiermacher, cannot be kenotic. (c) Renunciation of Features of Divinity Kenotic Christologies solve the problem of how the Logos can become a human being by claiming that the Logos gave up, renounced, abandoned, laid aside, divested, or emptied himself of certain features of his divine nature or status. Only by renouncing certain features of divinity was it possible for the Logos to live a genuinely human life. To address the questions raised by kenotic theology, it is necessary to be as precise in our terminology as possible. Much of the confusion concerning kenosis stems from a failure to differentiate between distinct but closely related aspects of the incarnation. Such differentiation is, of course, a difficult undertaking. for ultimately we are dealing with a holy mystery. Our attempt to achieve precision of terminology, however, should not be seen as a hubristic attempt to peer into the divine mind and explain away God's secrets. It is intended merely as a support to our attempts to appreciate the mystery of the incarnation and the greatness of God's love for human beings which the incarnation expresses. In this section, then, we shall attempt to layout as clearly as possible the terminology of kenotic Christology. This terminology is of two types. The first type consists of the terms that have developed in the attempt to articulate more fully the contents of orthodox Christology. The second type consists of the concepts specific to kenotic Christology, which kenotic theologians have developed in order to unfold their understanding of the kenotic character of the incarnation.

Essential and Relative Divine Attributes A key distinction in kenotic theology is that made between essential and relative attributes. Different theologians have adopted different ways of expressing this distinction. David Hollaz (1648-1713) distinguishes between 'energetic' and 'anenergetic' attrihutes. 49 Anenergetic attributes are intrinsic attributes which reside in the very being of God regardless of whether he exercises them or not Such intrinsic attributes are eternity, infinitude, and immeasurability. Energetic attributes, on the other hand, are those related to the carrying out of divine actions in relation to the world. They are the divine attributes that enable an action of the Godhead ad extra. Hollaz makes a further distinction between attributes of majesty that are communicated to Christ's human nature for 'indwelling and possession' and 49 Excerpts from Hollaz's works can be found in Emanuel Hirsch, Hilfsbuch zum Studium der Dogmatik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964).

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those which are communicated for use by the human nature of the incarnate Logos: 'All the divine attributes are communicated to the flesh of Christ with regard to indwelling and possession; but for use and for immediate expression the energetic divine attributes, i.e. those concerned with action, are bestowed upon [the flesh of Christj:5o Christ possesses anenergetic attributes only mediately, because he does not employ them directly in his saving work. Thus Christ does not exercise the attributes of eternity or infinitude during his earthly ministry. The anenergetic attributes are present only indirectly in that they are the backdrop against which Christ exercises his energetic attributes. Thus Christ's exercise of power is due to his possessing the attributes of eternity and infinitude, but this exercise of power is not in itself the exercise of eternity and infinitude. One solution to the problem of how the divine Logos could live a genuinely human existence, then, would be to argue that the incarnate Christ continues to possess but does not exercise his anenergetic divine attributes of eternity, infinitude, and immeasurability, for these are not compatible with a genuine human existence. In his incarnate state, however, Christ exercises his energetic attributes, which are derived from or dependent upon the non-exercised anenergetic attributes. This distinction between different types of divine attributes, however, is most closely associated with Gottfried Thomasius, who, as we saw earlier, distinguishes between what he calls 'immanent' and 'relative' attributes. For Thomasius the immanent attributes are holiness, truth, love, and absolute power. These cannot be given up by the Logos on becoming incarnate, for to do so would result in the Logos' renunciation of his divinity. On the contrary, the revelation of these divine attributes in the Person of Christ is one of the purposes of the incarnation. These attributes, Thomasius argues, are compatible with and have their counterparts in human existence. For Thomasius, the relative attributes are the means by which 'the immanence of God operates in and on the world,.51 These relative attributes are omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, which arise from the relation God sustains to the world and do not belong essentially to the absolute personality of God. This distinction between immanent and relative attributes has been taken up by subsequent kenotic theologians, though with some variation in terminology. In the English-speaking world the terms 'ethical' and 'physical' attributes have been adopted by some theologians in place of Thomasius'terminology.52

Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 328. 51 Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1:208. See for example A. M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 61894), 476-8. 50 52

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Logos Christology It is important to distinguish between the 'logos asarkos' and the 'logos ensarkos'. The logos asarkos is the 'unfleshed' Logos, i.e. the Logos in his non-incarnate state. The term is usually employed to denote the pre-existent Logos, i.e. the Logos prior to his incarnation. If the logos asarkos is understood as the subject of the kenosis, then kenosis is the means by which the transition from pre-existence to incarnate existence comes about. It is the means by which the Logos makes the transition from being the logos asarkos to the logos

ensarkos. The logos ensarkos is the 'enfleshed' Logos, i.e. the Logos in his incarnate state. If the logos ensarkos is understood as the subject of the kenosis, then kenosis is conceived of as an event or action that takes place during the earthly existence of the incarnate Logos. A key question in kenotic Christology is: who is the subject of the kenosis? If the logos asarkos is the subject, then kenosis is the act by which the preexistent Logos became incarnate. If the logos ensarkos is the subject, then kenosis refers to an aspect of Christ's earthly life. On this understanding kenosis would be synonymous with the humiliation Christ suffered during his ministry.

The Union of the Two Natures: The Hypostatic Union Lutheran orthodoxy makes a helpful distinction between the act by which the two natures were united (unitio personalis) and the union brought about by this act of unification (unio personalis). (a) The Unitio Personalis The unitio personalis is the divine act by which the logos asarkos became the logos ensarkos. It is the unique act by which the Logos assumed human nature into his Person and gave it a share in his hypostasis and in his divine nature. 53 (b) The Unio Personalis

The unio personalis is what results from the unitio personalis. It is the union of divine and human natures in the one united Person of Christ, so that henceforth Christ subsists in two natures. 54 Some important distinctions between the unitio personalis and the unio personalis must be borne in mind if we are to understand the nature of keno sis. Whereas the subject of statements concerning the unitio is the logos asarkos,

53

Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 324.

54

Hirsch, Hilfsbuch. 324.

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the subject of statements concerning the unio is the logos ensarkos. Furthermore, the unitio is asymmetrical, whereas the unio is symmetrical. In the unitio it is the divine nature that unites itself with the human nature, not the human nature which unites itself with the divine nature. Once the unitio has brought about the unio, however, the relationship of the two natures in the Person of Christ is one of mutual indwelling and interpenetration (perichoresis). A key question is to which type of union the kenosis belongs. Is kenosis a feature of unitio, unio, or both? The way we answer this question will determine whether we understand the logos asarkos or the logos ensarkos to be the subject of kenosis.

The Personhood of Christ An important issue in evaluating kenotic Christology is the nature of the personhood brought about by the hypostatic union. In short, what sort of person has come about as the result of the union of divine and human natures in Christ and how can we affirm the unity of Christ's personhood if it comprises the two distinct natures of divinity and humanity? A technical vocabulary has been developed in order to address these issues. (a) Anhypostasia Although Christ's human nature is identical with ours, it differs in certain important respects. In contrast to our humanity Christ's human nature is characterized by 'anhypostasia'. Anhypostasia is the doctrine of the impersonality of Christ's humanity. That is, Christ's human nature does not possess a hypostasis or personhood in its own right. The Logos' uniting of himself with a human person would have severe soteriological consequences, for it would mean that only that individual person with whom the Logos united himself would be saved. By uniting himself with an anhypostatic human nature, however the Logos unites himself not with a particular human nature, but with human nature as such. He is thus one with all human beings in their human nature, not merely with the nature of one specific human being. Christ's humanity is anhypostatic, then, in the sense that the Word did not unite himself with a previously existing human being. It is because he unites himself with human nature as such that the incarnation is of universal significance to all human beings. To speak of the impersonality of Christ's human nature does not mean that Christ is not a person, however, but rather indicates that Christ's personhood is situated not in a created person, but in the divine person of the uncreated, pre-existent Logos. Christ's human nature consequently lacks the necessary principle for its own, independent subsistence. This lack is compensated for by the superior subsistence conveyed to the human nature by the divine hypostasis of the Son of God. If Christ's human nature did indeed possess its own

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principle of subsistence, then this would posit two persons in Christ, which would result in Nestorianism. If Nestorianism is to be avoided, we must assume that Christ's human nature does not possess its own hypostasis and principle of subsistence, but has this principle supplied by the Logos. Christ's human nature therefore cannot exist independently of the Logos.55 (b) Enhypostasia This is arguably a more subtle version of the doctrine of anhypostasia. Enhypostasia is the view that Christ's humanity exists only in his divinity, and is incapable of having any existence outside his divinity. That is, Christ possesses a human personhood only through the Logos. Christ's human nature is enhypostatic in the sense that Christ's human personhood has no existence apart from the Logos. This means that although Christ's human nature is not that of a specific human being, but is universal, his human personhood exists only in the concrete fonn of the Person ofJesus Christ. This point is well summed up by E. 1. Mascall, who comments, 'The manhood of Christ is thus from one point of view entirely universal; it belongs to no human person in the whole of creation, but only to the Person of God the Word. But in its union with him it is entirely concrete and particular:56 In summary, then, Christ's human nature is anhypostatic or impersonal, i.e. it does not of itself possess a hypostasis or personhood independent of the divine nature. This should not to be taken to mean, however, that Christ's human nature lacks personhood. Christ's human nature is rather enhypostatic. That is, the person of Christ's humanity is the person of the divine Logos under the conditions of human existence.

The Communicatio Idiomatum The communicatio idiomatum or communicatio proprietatum, i.e. the communication of attributes or properties, is a notion that attempts to articulate how the divine and human natures relate to each other in the unified Person of Christ. In the Christology of the early church the direction of the communication was from Christ's divinity to his humanity. The communicatio idiomatum entailed the communication of the divine attributes to the human nature assumed by the incarnate Logos, but the human attributes were not attributed to the divine nature. The latter was a Lutheran innovation which laid the foundations for the view that the communication of human attributes to the Logos resulted in the modification of the divine attributes. According to the Lutheran Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 322. E. L. Mascall, Christ, the Christian and the Church. A Study of the Incarnation and its Consequences (London: Longman, Green and Co.: 1946), 19, original emphaSiS. 55 56

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doctrine there is a mutual communication of attributes between the two natures. Hollaz provides the following definition: 'The communicatio idiomatum is the true and real mutual sharing in the characteristics of the divine and human natures in the God-man Christ, who is named according to one of the two or according to both natures, which is the result of the personal unity.'57 Lutheran theology attempted to introduce greater precision in the notion of the communicatio idiomatum by differentiating between three, and later four, different types of communication of attributes, namely the genus idiomaticum, the genus maiestaticum, the genus apotelesmaticum, and genus tapeinoticum. (a) The Genus Idiomaticum The genus idiomaticum or idiomatic genus attributes the predicates of the divine and human natures to the Person of Christ. As Hollaz puts it: 'The first genus of the communicatio idiomatum is when the characteristics of the divine or human nature are truly and really attributed to the whole Person of Chris,t, which is named according to one of the two or according to both natures.'58 By virtue of the genus idiomaticum it is possible to speak of Christ as either divine or human, or both simultaneously, and to affirm that Christ suffers and dies, yet governs and sustains the universe. The attributes (idiomata) of the two natures belong to the unified person of Christ, but each nature continues to possess its own distinctive attributes. It is not the case that the attributes belonging to the divine nature become the attributes of the human nature, and vice versa. Hollaz differentiates still further by identifying three aspects of the genus idiomaticum: (a) 'hypostatic' or 'personal' attributes, i.e. the transference of attributes to the Person of Christ; (b) 'idiopoietic' attributes, which consist of Christ's willing appropriation of the attributes of the human nature; and (c) 'energetic' attributes, by which Hollaz appears to designate Christ's activity of attributing value and significance to the experiences he undergoes by virtue of his assumption of human nature. With reference to the suffering of the Son of God Hollaz writes: 'The Son of God truly, really and actually suffered, was crucified. and died. For suffering is attributed to him (a) hypostatically or personally; (b) idiopoieticallyor on the basis of appropriation; (c) energetically or actively:59 This threefold distinction enables the suffering of the divinity to be interpretea as follows. Hollaz writes: '(a) The Son of God suffered according to the human nature, which subsists in the divine personality; (b) God just as truly and really suffered in his flesh as Paul and Peter truly and really suffered in their own flesh; (c) God suffered energetically, i.e. actively, as far as the divine nature of the Hirsch, Hilfsbuch 325-6. Hirsch, Hilfsbuch 326. As Scriptural evidence for the genus idiomaticum Hollaz cites Acts 3.15; 1 Cor 2.8; In 6.62; 1 Cor 15.47; Heb 13.8; 1 Pet 3.18. 59 Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 327. 57

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suffering Christ attributes importance, power, efficacy, and value to the suffering of the flesh: 60 (b) The Genus Maiestaticum The genus maiestaticum is the transference of the attributes belonging to divinity to the human nature, so that the human nature possesses and has use of the divine attributes of majesty and can be named according to these divine attributes. In short, in the united Person of the God-man the attributes of divinity are shared with the human nature, so that the divine majesty becomes the common property of both divine and human natures in Christ. As Hollaz puts it, 'Through and because of the personal unity truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable gifts are given to Christ according to his human nature (Co1.2.9):61 This communication of the divine attributes of glory and majesty to the human nature is possible because Christ's human nature does not exist independently, but subsists enhypostatically in his divine Person. For this reason Christ's human nature is able to participate in the attributes belonging to his divine nature. The human nature is inseparable from Christ's Person, and it is because of this that the human nature can partake in the attributes belonging to the divine nature. This does not mean, however, that the human nature comes to 'own' these divine attributes. The human nature remains human and therefore finite. But because it is enhypostatically united with the divine nature, the human nature shares in the divine attributes without, however, giving up its own attributes or communicating human attributes to the divine nature. This notion of the genus maiestaticum forms the basis of the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquitarianism. It is because the human nature enhypostatically partakes of the attributes belonging to the divine nature that Christ's human nature can be omnipresent. The genus maiestaticum thus constitutes the basis of the Lutheran doctrine of Christ's real presence in the Eucharist. (c) The

Genus Apotelesmaticum

Chemnitz defines apotelesmata as 'the effects. the duties, the works, the merits, or the blessings which Christ bestows as Savior, namely, such things as redemption, propitiation, salvation, and mediation:62 The third subdivision of the communicatio idiomatum, namely the genus apotelesmaticum, denotes the capacity of each of Christ's natures to do what is proper to it in participation with the other nature when carrying out Christ's saving work. As Chemnitz puts it, 'the natural or essential activities or operations of each of Christ's natures concur or join together to produce or accomplish these effects

Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 327. 61 Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 328. Martin Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Cnrist, trans. by J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia. 1971),216. 60

62

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christo logy

(d.'7TO'TfAfup.a'Ta}.'63 Each nature carries out what is appropriate to it, but does so in co-operation with the other nature in order to achieve Christ's redemptive goal. Although both natures co-operate in achieving the same goal, they are not conflated. The human nature suffers, while the divine nature does not suffer, but the divine nature nevertheless supports the human nature throughout its suffering and remains in communion with it. Thus though both natures are active in Christ's redemptive work and are inseparable, they differ in the manner of their activity. Each nature does what is appropriate to it in carrying out ChriSt's threefold office. For example, with respect to Christ's priestly role, the human nature suffers and obeys, but the divine nature affirms the human nature's obedience, permits the human nature to suffer the violence visited upon it, supports the human nature during its suffering, and conveys infinite worth to the suffering undergone by the human nature. 64

(d) The Genus Tapeinoticum The German kenotic theologians of the nineteenth century added a fourth genus to the three forms of communicatio idiomatum advanced by their seventeenth century Lutheran predecessors, namely the genus tapeinoticum or tapeinotic genus. This term is derived from Paul's statement in Phil 2.8 that Christ 'humbled himself (E'Ta'7Tf;'VWU~ €av'Tov) and became obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.' The genus tapeinoticum denotes the humiliation that Christ underwent during his earthly ministry. The nineteenth century German kenoticists held that the Lutheran concept of communicatio idiomatum they had inherited did not go far enough, for it did not take into consideration the impact of the assumption of human nature on the divinity of the Logos. The introduction of the genus tapeinoticum was their attempt to rectify this deficiency. They thus expanded the communicatio idiomatum to include not only the communication of divine attributes to the human nature (genus maiestaticum), but also the communication of human attributes to the divine nature (genus tapeinoticum).

The Three Stat-es A distinction is made in Lutheran Orthodoxy between the two states of Christ, namely the status exinanitionis (state of humiliation) and the status exaitationis (state of exaltation).65 The seventeenth century Lutheran Chemnitz, Two Natures in Christ, 216. As biblical evidence for the genus apotelesmaticum Hollaz cites 1 Cor 15.3; 1 In 3.8; Lk 9.56. Hirsch, Hilfsbuch, 330. 65 The term exinanitio is derived from the Vulgate's translation of iKrfvOJa£v: 'Sed semet ipsum exinanivit, formam servi aCcipiens' (Phil 2.7, emphasis added). 63

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theologians conceived of the status exinanitionis as the state of humiliation undergone by Christ during his earthly ministry. The status exinanitionis is thus a state of the logos ensarkos. This conflates Paul's notions of ~K€VWC1€V [ekenosen] (Phil 2.7) and ~7"a1TE'VWaEv [etapeinosen] (Phil 2.8). For the sake of clarity it would be helpful to hold these two notions apart. The term 'kenosis' should be reserved for the Logos' transition from pre-existent glory, while the status exinanitionis is arguably best understood as the state the Logos enters on becoming incarnate. He gives up the glory belonging to his divine status and accepts the humiliation of being a lowly human being. The status exaltationis is the state Christ entered after the completion of his earthly ministry. For the seventeenth century Lutheran theologians Christ held back or limited the use of his divine majesty during his earthly ministry; but after his resurrection, ascension, and exaltation to the right hand of God he took up again his divine powers and the status he had renounced during his earthly existence. From this there arise the two distinct states of Christ: humiliation and exaltation. It is helpful, however, if we distinguish between three states, namely between pre-eXistence, the status exinanitionis, and the status exaltationis. Theologians who think in terms of two states tend to regard pre-existence and the status exaltationis as one and the same, the status exaltationis being merely Christ's restoration to the status he enjoyed before the incarnation. Because other theologians, however, believe that the status exaltationis involves the addition of something new to Christ's state that he did not possess in pre-existence, it makes for greater clarity if we separate the status exaltation is from pre-existence and speak rather of three states, namely pre-existence (which for the sake of conSistency we will describe as the status praeexistentiae), the status exinanitionis, and the status exaltationis. The term status praeexistentiae or 'state of pre-existence' refers to the state of the Logos prior to his incarnation. It is the state of the logos asarkos. The status exinanitionis is the state the Logos enters as a result of the keno sis, namely the state of earthly humiliation. It is not identical with the kenosis but is rather the consequence of the kenosis. The status exinanitionis is the state of the logos ensarkos, the incarnate Logos. The status exaltationis denotes the state of exaltation to which Christ is raised after his resurrection and ascension. The key question here is whether this state is a state of the (transfigured) logos ensarkos or a state of the logos asarkos. That is, does the Logos take up into the ascended, glorified state the human nature he assumed for the duration of the incarnation or does he discard it?

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

The Extra Calvinisticum Lutheran theologians coined the phrase extra Calvinisticum to describe Reformed Christology. The Reformed position is that Ute divine Word is fully united to but not exclusively and entirely contained within the human nature. Consequently, even during the incarnation the Logos exists not only within the Person of the incarnate Christ, but also outside Christ's human nature (extra camem). Reformed theologians expressed this view in terms of the principle of finitum non capax infiniti: the finite is not capable of [containing] the infinite. That is, Christ's finite human nature is incapable of assuming the divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence in their entirety. For the Reformed theologians this means that Christ continued to exercise his cosmic powers and govern the universe during the incarnation. The Lutheran theologians generally reject the extra Calvinisticum and insist on the principle of neque caro extra logon neque logos extra camem (neither is the flesh outside the Logos, nor the Logos outside the flesh).

A TAXONOMY OF KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGIES One of the problems of evaluating kenotic Christology is the fact that the term 'kenosis' has been used in different ways to refer to a variety of distinct aspects of Christ's nature and miniStry. In the hands of some theologians the term seems to be little more than a circwnlocution for the incarnation. Others see the concept of keno sis as the clue to how the incarnation was able to take place. A third group of theolOgians understands 'kenosis' to refer to the humiliation suffered by the earthly Christ. Other theologians extend the notion of kenosis beyond the incarnation to God's relation to the world as such. Here kenosis means not only the limitations undergone by the Logos on becoming incarnate, but refers to the limitations God has taken upon himself in creating the universe. Christology is relegated to an example, albeit the paramount example, of God's kenotic relation to the world. These different understandings and usages of the term 'kenosis' have led Sarah Coakley to distinguish between three applications of the notion of kenosis: Christological, Trinitarian, and its application to God's relation to the world. 66 Building on Coakley's distinction, we shall differentiate between the follOWing forms of kenotic theology.

66 Sarah Coakley, 'Kenosis: TheolOgical Meanings and Gender Connotations'. in Polkinghorne (ed.), Work of Love, 192-210.

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• Kenotic Christology: we shall employ this term to describe the attempt to understand the incarnation in terms of Christ's having emptied himself of some aspect of his divine status in order to become a human being.

• Kenotic Trinitarianism: we shall employ this term to refer to the view that kenosis is a feature of the life of the Trinity and that the Trinitarian Persons, especially the Father and Son, exist in some sort of kenotic relation to each other.

• Kenotic theism: this phrase will be used to denote the view that God takes upon himself some sort of limitation in creating the universe. God, it is claimed, has limited himself by creating an independent reality than exists over and against him.

• Kenotic theologylkenoticism: we shall employ these terms as umbrella terms to cover all the various ways in which the notions of kenosis can be employed in theological thinking. 'Kenotic theology' and 'kenoticism' are thus generic terms that encompass the three forms of kenotic thinking identified above, namely, kenotic Christology, kenotic Trinitarianism, and kenotic theism. This still leaves open the question of the basic meaning of the term 'kenosis', however, and one of the reasons for the complexity and frequent confusion in discussions concerning keno sis is the variety of ways in which this term has been applied. Does 'kenosis' mean self-emptying, abandonment, self-divesting, renunciation, concealment, reduction, limitation, or humiliation? Which of these is the most appropriate term to capture the meaning of 'kenosis'? The choice of translation will, of course, reflect the respective theologian's decisions concerning certain key Christological issues. In my view, the most helpful way of understanding kenosis is to interpret it as meaning 'limitation'. This allows us to include theologians in our discussion who do not hold that Christ 'abandoned' his divine attributes, but hold that Christ's divine nature was placed under real restrictions which limited his exercise of his divine attributes during his earthly existence. Kenosis theories can then be organized according to the degree of limitation they ascribe to Christ. This allows us to see 'emptying', 'abandonment', 'self-divesting', 'renunciation', 'concealment', 'reduction', and 'humiliation' as different ways in which the limitation imposed on the Logos by the assumption of human nature may have come about. Interpreting kenosis as limitation, rather than the more narrow definition of Christ's 'emptying' himself of something, also has the advantage that it accommodates the other biblical passages which have been drawn into the discussion of keno sis, notably those touching on Christ's development, human experiences and emotions, and lack of knowledge.

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Types of Kenotic Christology The variation among kenotic Christologies makes it very difficult to find a coherent, comprehensive scheme for their classification. There have been several attempts to organize the various theories of kenosis into a system of classification, particularly in the English-speaking world. One of the first English-language commentators on kenosis theory, the Scottish Presbyterian A. B. Bruce, divides kenotic Christologies into four types: (1) 'the absolute dualistic type', represented by Thomasius; (2) 'the absolute metamorphic' type, which is exemplified by Gess: (3) 'the absolute semi-metamorphic' type, represented by Ebrard; and (4) 'the real but relative' type of kenosis, which Bruce associates with Hans Lassen Martensen. 67 Bruce fails to explain his designation ofThomasius' Christology as 'the absolute dualistic type', but presumably he is referring to Thomasius' distinction between two types of divine attributes possessed by the Logos, namely, the essential, immanent or absolute attributes and the non-essential or relative attributes of the Logos. The phrase 'absolute dualistic type' is confUSing, however, firstly because it creates precisely the impression of the Nestorianism that Thomasius believes he is obviating by means of his kenosis theory, and secondly, because the phrase 'absolute dualistic type' would seem to be more appropriate to Martensen's theory of the double life of the Logos than to Thomasius' theory of Christ's renunciation of non-essential attributes. Further confusion is caused by the fact that Bruce describes Martensen's theory by a phrase that seems more applicable to Thomasius' position, namely 'the real but relative' theory of kenosis. Gore follows Bruce in his summary of kenotic theories, but renames Bruce's categories and reduces them from four to three.68 Gore's first category is what he terms 'the absolute kenotic view', which corresponds to Bruce's second category of 'the absolute metamorphic type' of kenosis. Whereas Bruce takes Gess as his example of this form of keno tic theory, Gore opts for Godet's commentary on the Gospel of lohn.69 Gore's second category of kenoticism is what he calls 'the partial kenotic view', which corresponds to Bruce's 'absolute dualistic type'. Gore holds that this type of kenotic theory was 'maintained first in Germany by Thomasius and later, though with great obSCUrity and ambiguity', by Delitzsch?O He chooses, however, to focus on the version of this theory advanced by its recent British representative, A. M. Fairbaim.71 Gore's third category is 'the theory of the double life of the Word',n which corresponds to Bruce's category of 'the real but relative' kenotic type. Gore cites two representatives of this type of kenotic

Bruce, Humiliation oj Christ, 138. Charles Gore, Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation (London: John Murray. 1895). 69 Gore. Dissertations. 184-8. 70 Gore. Dissertations, 189. 71 Gore, Dissertations, 189-92. 72 Gore, Dissertations, 192. 67

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theory, namely R H; Hutton and Hans Lassen Martensen, the latter of whom in Gore's opinion provides the most formal expression of the theory?3 Frank Weston distinguishes between two types of kenosis, namely, 'normal Kenotic theory' and 'extreme forms of Kenotic theory'?4 By 'normal Kenotic theory' he means those theories which distinguish between essential and nonessential attributes. Weston cites Thomasius and Fairbairn as representatives of this form of kenotic theory. 'Extreme kenotic theories' on the other hand, are those that hold that the Logos abandoned not only the non-essential but also the essential attributes of the divine nature. Weston cites Gess and Godet as adherents of this type ofkenoticism. Weston's classification, however, is too broad to be useful and does not allow us to differentiate between the nuances that exist between different types of kenotic theory. Furthermore, 'normal' and 'extreme' are terms that are too dependent upon the perspective of the user. What is normal for one person may be extreme for another person, and vice versa. By introducing value-judgements into the classification of kenotic theories rather than trying to capture what is distinctive about the various theories, Weston has muddied the waters. He does not assist us in establishing a taxonomy of kenotic Christologies. A more nuanced system of classification is prOvided by P. Henry in his article on kenosis in the Dictionnaire de la Bible75 Henry makes a distinction between kenose au sens propre [kenosis in the proper or literal sense] and kenose au sens impropre [kenosis in the non-literal sense]. Kenosis au sens impropre refers to the humiliation of Christ's humanity. In this sense kenosis refers to the humiliation of the earthly Christ. The subject of the kenosis is thus not the pre-existent Logos but the historical Christ. Kenosis au sens propre affects some aspect of the divinity of Christ. The subject of the keno sis is the divine Logos, who gives up some aspect of his divinity in order to become incarnate. Kenosis au sens propre can be understood au sens large or au sens strict, i.e. in the broad or strict sense. Kenosis is understood au sens large, 'if Christ, without abandoning anything of his divinity, takes in addition the form of a slave and, without affecting his divinity, is in turn humiliated and exalted according to his humanity'7 6 That is, kenosis in the broad sense means that the divine Logos suffers the humiliation of the addition of humanity to his divinity without this in any way compromising the fulness of his divine nature.

Gore, Dissertations, 192-3. Frank Weston, The One Christ: An Enquiry into the Manner of the Incarnation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., '1907, '1914),118, 121. 75 P. Henry, 'Kenose', in Dictionnaire de /a Bible. Suppltiment (Paris: Libraire Letouzeyet Ane, 1957),5:7-161. 76 Henry, 'Kenose', 13. 73 74

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Kenosis au sens strict, on the other hand, holds that the divinity of the Logos is affected in some way by the incarnation. Kenosis in this strict sense exists in two forms, namely in absolute and relative forms. It is absolute, Henry writes, 'if Christ truly ceases to be what he was in order to become something else, if he ceases, for example, to be begotten by the Father, to be God'.77 Relative kenosis au sens strict designates those theories which make a distinction between absolute or ethical attributes such as holiness and goodness, and relative or metaphysical attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience. Absolute attributes cannot be given up by Christ without his ceasing to be divine. The relative attributes, however, can be renounced without Christ losing the absolute or essential attributes of holiness and goodness, which unlike omniscience and omnipotence persist during the incarnation. Another way of expressing this distinction between absolute and relative attributes is to distinguish between the divine essence and the divine condition. On becoming incarnate Christ gives up his divine condition, but his divine essence remains unaffected. This divine condition is frequently understood as 'glory'. In the incarnation Christ renounces the condition of glory which is his by right of his divine nature. His divine nature or essence, however, remains intact. The problem with Henry's categorization of keno sis theories is that it, too, like Weston's taxonomy, is dependent on relative concepts such as 'proper' and 'improper', 'broad' and 'strict'. The applicability of these terms is dependent upon the subjectivity of the user. What is needed is a taxonomy that attempts to identify the controlling idea underlying kenotic Christologies. The follOwing is an attempt to construct such a taxonomy by claSSifying kenotic Christologies according to their controlling idea and the degree of limitation they affirm. Chalcedonian kenotic Christologies are Christologies which affirm the Chalcedonian Definition that Christ is truly human and truly divine, and seek to find ways of defending the two-natures doctrine in the face of contemporary criticism. The Christologies of Thomasius and Frank fall into this category. Thomasius seeks to take further the Christology of the Chalcedonian Definition and the Formula of Concord, which he sees as having been insufficiently developed by his predecessors. It is in order to defend classical and Lutheran Christology that Thomasius introduces his distinction between immanent and relative attributes. Like Thomasius, Frank follows Lutheran orthodoxy in accepting the Chalcedonian Definition that Christ is two natures in one person. 78 He also shares Thomasius' view that neither the Henry, 'Kenose', 13. F. H. R. Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit. II:99. References are to the first edition. For discussions of Frank, see Breidert, Die kenotische Christologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 232-47; Law, 'Kenotic Christology', 264-6. 77 78

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Chalcedonian Definition nor the Lutheran confessions built upon it are set in stone, but 'are conditioned and limited by their respective historical antitheses',19 Consequently, they must be updated in view of modern theological developments. To affirm classical Christology while correcting its inadequacies Frank turns like Thomasius to the notion of kenosis. Frank does not follow Thomasius in arguing for the renunciation of certain attributes, however, but advances a notion of kenosis as the 'transposition' [Umsetzung] of the Son's eternal consciousness into the form of a finite human consciousness subject to temporal becoming. 8o This transposition involves. a 'self-depotentiation' (Selbstdepotenzierung),81 by which the incarnate Son accommodates his divine Logos-consciousness to what is compatible with a human personality.82 Subordinationist kenotic Christologies are Christologies which take the notion of the Son's subordination to the Father as the basis of their understanding of keno sis. Such Christologies defend the notion of keno sis by positing an inequality within the inner-Trinitarian relations. An example of a subordinationist kenotic Christology is provided by Debner. 83 Debner posits the presence within the Trinity of an intra-divine relationship of reciprocal love, which he understands as a mutual 'eternal kenosis' between the three persons.84 The eternal kenosis between Father and Son is the 'key to Christology',85 for according to Debner the inner-Trinitarian subordination of the Son to the Father is 'the eternal possibility of the in carnation'.86 The incarnation is simply the extension into time of the innerTrinitarian relation of the Son's subordination to Father. Biblicist kenotic Christologies are those that attempt to construct a notion of kenosis based exclusively on the Bible with little or no reference to the creeds, definitions, and confessions of the church. The theologians who advocate such Christologies are generally critical of the two-natures doctrine, but nevertheless wish to affirm Christ's divinity and humanity on the basis of the New Testament witness. Hofmann can be placed in this category,87 but arguably its most prominent representative is Gess.

Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, 1:72. Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, II:143. 81 Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, II:144; cf. 101-2, 104, 121, 134. 82 Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, II:121-2. 83 For discussions of Liebner, see Breidert, Die kenotische Christ%gie des 19. Jahrhunderts, 232-47; Law, 'Kenotic Christology', 258-60. 84 Liebner, Christliche Dogmatik, 151, 330. 85 Liebner, Christliche Dogmatik, 149. 86 Liebner, Christliche Dogmatik, ISO, original emphasis; d. 284, 287. 87 Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, II11:20-2. 79

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Gradations of Kenosis Kenotic Christologies can be organized according to the degree of limitation the Logos is believed to have undergone in his earthly existence. That is, we can categorize kenosis theories according to the extent of the Logos's limitation of his divine attributes and powers during his earthly ministry. This will allow us to posit three basic types of kenosis. (a) Minimal Kenosis Theories Minimal kenosis theories affirm that the incarnation involved the minimum reduction of Christ's divine status. There was a limitation only of those features of Christ's divinity which would have made the incarnation impossible if they had been fully expressed. Among the adherents of minimal kenosis theories we might include Ebrard, Kahnis, Luthardt, and Oettingen. In these Christologies the kenosis is minimal because the limitation is not of the divine nature itself, but merely of the full expression of the divine nature. Christ remains fully divine, but does not overtly appear to be fully divine. It is a kenosis of appearance rather than being. The effect is kenotic, but the reality is not. Bruce describes this form of kenotic theory as 'skenosis' rather than kenosis. He comments that, 'Some make the kenosis scarcely more than a skenosis - the dainty assumption by the unchangeable One of a humanity which is but a doketic husk, a semi-transparent tent, wherein Deity sojourns, and throu8h which His glory, but slightly dimmed, shines with dazzling brightness:88 The Logos is unchanged, and the kenosis consists in the addition to the Logos of human nature, an addition which partially and temporarily but never fully conceals the divine glory of the Logos. (b) Medial Kenosis Theories Medial kenosis theories are theories which affirm that not only Christ's divine appearance but also his divine being underwent limitation during his earthly existence, but not to the extent that Christ's divinity was undermined in any way. There are two types of medial kenosis theory. Type I conceives of kenosis as a scaling-down of the divine nature. The flame of Christ's divinity continues to burn unimpeded, but its intensity and brightness is diminished to the level that human nature is capable of bearing. An example of a type 1. medial kenosis theory is provided by Origen, who sees the kenosis as a scaling down of the divine glory to the point where it becomes possible for a human existence to behold it. 89 Type 2 medial kenosis theory conceives of Christ renouncing certain attributes during his earthly existence. Type 2 theologians

88

Bruce, Humiliation of Christ, 8.

89

Origen. De Prine. LiLS.

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distinguish between 'essential" 'absolute', or 'ethical' attributes such as goodness and love, which it is impossible for Christ to give up, and 'relative' or 'physical' attributes which Christ can give up without compromising the essential attributes that constitute the core of his divine nature. There are variations among type 2 medial kenosis theories according to whether it is held that Christ fully gives up his non-essential attributes for the duration of his ministry (Thomasius, Fairbairn), or merely refrains from exercising them or making use of the prerogatives that belong to these attributes (Gore).90 The majority of kenotic theolOgians subscribe to some form of type 2 medial kenosis theory. (c) Maximal Kenosis Theories Maximal kenosis theories are those theories that affirm that the incarnation involved the complete renunciation of Christ's divine nature. According to this theory Christ fully became a human being, which entailed the renunciation of all his divine attributes, powers, and prerogatives for the duration of the incarnation. There are two types of maximal kenosis theory. To type 1 belong Gess and Godet, who argue that while Christ renounced his divinity for the duration of his earthly existence, he was restored to his divine status after the resurrection and ascension. Type 2 is exemplified by Thomas Altizer, who argues that Christ's renunciation of his divine nature is absolute, for at no point does Christ resume the divine status he had abandoned on becoming incarnate. 91

ISSUES IN KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY Our study of Kierkegaard's kenotic Christology will require us to ask of his writings the questions with which kenotic theologians have struggled in their attempts to shed light on the mystery of the incarnation.

90 Charles Gore, 'The Holy Spirit and Inspiration', in Charles Gore (ed.), Lux Mundi. A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation (London: John Murray, 1890). 313-62; 361, n.2; Bampton Lectures 1891: The Incarnation of the Son of God (London: John Murray, 1922), 157-61; Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation (London: John Murray. 1895). 89-90, 204; Belief in Christ (London: John Murray. 1922), 226. 91 See Thomas Altizer. The Gospel of Christian Atheism (London: Collins, 1967), esp. 62-9; 102-22. For Altizer. 'The God who died in Christ is the God who thereby gradually ceases to be present in a living fonn. emptying himself of his original life and power. and thereafter receding into an alien and lifeless nothingness' (p. 110).

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(1) The Impact on his Divinity of the Assumption by the Logos of Human Nature What features of the divine nature does the Logos renounce on becoming a human being? To put it another way, what is the 'object' of the kenosis. What is it of which Christ 'empties' himself? The answer theologians give to this question is dependent partly on their interpretation of eavTov €Idvwu£v in Phil 2.7, but is also influenced by their conception of the two-natures doctrine and whether they ascribe the kenosis to the pre-existent or the incarnate Logos. There is wide variation among kenoticists concerning the aspects of the divine nature that the Logos renounces in order to become a human being. Some kenotic Christologists argue that the Logos renounced certain divine attributes, whereas others argue that the Logos renounced only the prerogatives belonging to the divine status of the Logos. Alternatively, some theologians hold that the Logos retained his divine powers but restrained or concealed the use of these powers for the duration of the incarnation. The question of which aspects of the divine nature were renounced and the degree to which they were renounced is the reason for the diversity of kenotic Christologies. If we hold, however, that the kenosis is an action that is undertaken by the incarnate Logos, then these questions concerning the nature of the selfemptying undertaken by the pre-existent Logos fall away. Kenosis then denotes the human experiences of suffering, and death undergone by the historical Christ in his earthly existence. Here 'kenosis' becomes a metaphor for Christ's humiliation. The situation is complicated still further by the fact that some theologians employ the term to refer both to the humiliation undergone by the pre-existent Logos in assuming a human form and the humiliation suffered by Christ during his earthly existence, a distinction that is sometimes described as 'double kenosis'. An example is prOvided by Bethune-Baker, who understands 'the first great act of the kenosis' to consist in the Logos' forgOing equality with God in order to live a life of service among human beings, for which purpose he took on human form. The second kenotic act consists in the fact that, 'Having entered upon the external conditions of human life ... , he "lowered" himself and became subject even unto death, and that death of the cross.'92 Some of the confusion concerning kenosis, particularly in the early church, is due to the tendency to conflate these two distinct conceptions of kenosis.

92 J. F. Bethune-Baker. An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine (London: Methuen. 1903).295.

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(2) The Duration of the Kenosis Some kenotic Christologists understand the kenosis to be a temporary act of renunciation for the duration of the incarnation. Other theologians view it as an event initiated by the incarnation, but which continues in the Trinitarian life of the Risen and Ascended Lord.

(3) Kenosis and the Conception of Human Nature It is not only the conception of divinity that determines the understanding of kenosis, but also the conception of humanity. Many forms of kenotic Christology are based on the presupposition that there is an affinity between divinity and (sinless) humanity which endows human nature with the capacity for receiving the divine nature. If there were not such an affinity, it is argued, the incarnation would be impossible. Liebner attributes this affinity to 'the eternal primal humanity' (die ewige Urmenschheit) of the Logos,93 and describes the second hypostasis as the 'eternal divine humanity which is immanent in God [ewige gottliche, gottimmanente Menschheit],.94 For Ebrard, the affinity between divinity and humanity stems from the fact that the human being is a 'spiritual being which is eternal in itself' ,95 and 'an eternal ego which is infinite in itself' .96 The divine-human affinity to which most kenotic theologians appeal, however, is the imago Dei. The fact that human beings have been made in the image of God is understood to provide the foundation for the incarnation and to ensure that it is not a violation of the divine essence for the Logos to assume human nature. An example of this appeal to the imago Dei is provided by Frank, who holds that because human beings have been made in the image and likeness of God, human nature is capable of being assumed by the Logos.97 Frank also appeals to the unio mystica of believers, which he sees as the human parallel or image of the hypostatic union of the incarnate Son. The unio mystica reveals the capacity of the human personality with its finite consciousness to take up into itself the infinite content of the divine self-consciousness. 98 It is these features of the human being that comprise the imago Dei and constitute an analogy between the divine absolute personality and the personality of the human being.99 Because of the affinity between God and humanity, it is not a violation of the divine essence for the Son of God to become a human being.

Liebner, Christliche Dogmatik. 53, 54. 94 Liebner, Christliche Dogmatik, 153. Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:6. 96 Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:7. 97 Frank, System der christlichen Wahrheit, II:97-8. 98 Frank, System der christlichen Gewissheit, 1:433-4; System der christlichen Wahrheit, II:96-7. 99 Frank, System der christlichen Gewissheit, 1:348-9; System der christlichen Wahrheit, I:434-5. 93

95

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

(4) The Impact of Kenosis on the.Jftner-Trinitarian Relations How does the kenosis affect the relations between the persons of the Trinity? Does the incarnation change the inner-trinitarian relations or does it leave them unaffected?

(5) The Impact of Kenosis on the Son's Cosmic Powers If the Logos has assumed a human consciousness, then in what way does the Logos continue to exercise his duties of governing and sustaining the world without undermining the human consciousness he has assumed in the incarnation? On the other hand, if the Logos had limited himself by giving up these cosmic powers, what was happening to the universe during the thirty year period of the incarnation?

(6) The Relation between the Three States of the Logos The distinctions between three different states of the Logos raises a series of important questions. 1. How does the transition from the status praeexistentiae to the status exinanitionis take place? How can the transition from pre-existence to existence come about in a way which does not undermine the divinity of the Logos and yet at the same time allows the Logos to live a genuinely human life? This is the 'kenotic' problem. 2. How does the exalted Christ reappropriate the attributes he has renounced during his earthly ministry? If Christ has given up his divine attributes for the duration of his earthly ministry, then how can he take them up again on ascending to the Father? 3. What happens to Christ's human nature in the state of exaltation? The first possible answer to this question is to claim that on his ascension into heaven Christ discarded his human nature. Such a solution would arguably place in question the purpose and significance of the incarnation, which would be reduced to a temporary phase in the life of the Logos. A second possibility is that on his ascension Christ took up his human nature into the Godhead, a view which involves acceptance of the doctrine of the permanence of Christ's humanity. This solution, however, raises a new set of problems. 0) If the ascended Christ retains his human nature and receives back the

divine attributes he renounced during his earthly ministry, does this not mean that divine and human attributes can indeed exist together? If this

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is the case, is there then a need for a kenosis during the earthly existence of the Logos? Can the divine and human natures not exist together in the incarnate Christ in a similar way to their alleged co-existence in the ascended Christ? (ii) If the ascended Christ has taken up his human nature into the Godhead, then does this not imply that a change has taken place in the being of God? Prior to the incarnation, the Godhead existed without the incorporation of human nature, but after Christ's ascension humanity has been taken up into the being of God. This seems to indicate that something new has been added to the Godhead. If this is the case, then it would seem to undermine the doctrine of divine immutability. 4. How and in what way does the identity of the Logos remain the same throughout the three states? Is the status exaltationis merely the restoration of the state of the pre-existent Logos or is there a difference between the two states? AIe the status praeexistentiae and the status exaltationis identical or is the latter state an advance on the former? In other words, does the status exinanitionis add something to the state of the Logos which was not present in his pre-existent state? And if so, in what way is the being of the ascended Christ in continuity with that of the pre-existent Logos?

Our first step in asking these questions ofKierkegaard is to consider to what degree, if any, he was aware of kenotic theology and the issues it raises.

3 Kierkegaard's Knowledge of Kenotic Christology In this chapter we shall be concerned with Kierkegaard's knowledge of kenotic Christology. We will postpone our discussion of Kierkegaard's own form of kenotic. Christology to our examination of his most overly Christological works, namely Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity. Here we shall focus on ascertaining how much Kierkegaard knew about the tradition of kenotic Christology, beginning with his understanding of the 'kenotic' texts of the Bible before examining his knowledge of the history of kenotic Christology, and the degree to which he shared a similar intellectual background and common Christological agenda with contemporary kenotic theologians.

KIERKEGAARD'S KNOWLEDGE OF BIBLICAL 'KENOTIC' TEXTS Discussions of many of the biblical texts upon which kenotic Christology has been based can be found in Kierkegaard's writings. 1 Such 'kenotic' passages are Isa 52.13-53.12; Lk 2.40, 52; Mt 4.1-11/Lk 4.1-13; Mk 13.32/Mt 24.36; Mk 14.32-42/Mt 26.36-46/Lk 22.40-46; Mk 15.34/Mt 27.46; In 17.5; 2 Cor 8.9; Heb 2.18, 4.15; 5.7-8, and above all Phil 2.6-11. These texts all imply some limitation of Christ's divine powers or appear to indicate that Christ underwent genuinely human experiences such as limitation of knowledge, temptation,

I From the Auktionsprotokol over SBren Kierkegaards Bogsamling it is clear that Kierkegaard owned several different versions and translations of the Bible. Kierkegaard owned copies of the Bible in Hebrew (ASKB 1), Latin (ASKB 2), and Greek (ASKB 12. 14-19). The auction catalogue cites three versions of the Danish Bible in Kierkegaard's possession. He owned the 1824 and 1830 editions of Biblia eller den ganske hellige Skrifts Beger (ASKB 6, 7) as well as the translations by C. H. Kalkar (ASKB 8-10) and J. C. Lindberg (ASKB 11). H. P. Rohde (ed.), Auktionsprotokol over Seren Kierkegaards Bogsamling (Copenhagen: The Royal Library, 1967).

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and suffering. What needs to be investigated is how Kierkegaard employed these texts, and to what degree, if any, he understands them in a kenotic sense.

Isa 52.13-53.12: The Fourth Servant Song In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Johannes Climacus introduces Isa 53.2-4 into his critique of childish Christianity. Childish Christianity conceives of Christ as the 'divine child' or 'the friendly figure with the kindly face', and ignores .the fact that Christ was 'the paradox in whom no one could detect anything' (SKS7:543/CUP1:599), as is indicated by Isaiah's prophecy of Christ, which Kierkegaard quotes in full in the draft of Postscript: 'there was nothing in him for the eye, so despised that we regarded him as nothing, indeed, that we regarded him as punished, stricken, and smitten by God' (Pap. VI B 74:81 CUP2:103). In the second of his Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 'Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins', Kierkegaard again alludes to the Fourth Servant Song to Christ, this time to Isa 53.9, when he describes Christ as 'the Holy One, in whom there was no sin and in whose mouth there was no guile' (SKS12:296/WA,181). It is, however, in Practice in Christianity that we find the most extensive references to the Fourth Servant Song. In this work Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus employs the passage in two ways. Firstly, he understands the Servant Song to be one of the means by which people's attention is drawn to Christ. Despite his lowly servant fonn, Christ 'makers] his appearance ... under circumstances that must draw attention to him in a very special way' (SKS12:541 PC, 40-41). Among these circumstances is the fact that Christ's appearance, although not what the majority expects of the messiah, nevertheless 'does more or less correspond to the ancient prophecy with which the people must be assumed to be familiar' (SKS12:54/PC, 41). Paradoxically, then, although Christ appears in a fonn that contradicts human expectations of the appearance of the messiah, people's attention is drawn to him precisely because his appearance is that of the suffering servant of God prophesied by Isaiah. The second reference to the Fourth Servant Song in Practice in Christianity is Anti-Climacus' use of Isa 53.2 to illustrate Christ's humiliation. Christ 'abased himself and took the form of a servant', which meant, as Isaiah prophesied, that there was 'nothing for the eye in him, no splendor so that we should be able to look at him, and no esteem so that we could desire him'. This means that, 'Directly there was nothing to be seen except a lowly human being who by signs and wonders and by claiming to be God continually constituted the possibility of offense' (SKS12:77/PC, 65). Like many of the kenotic theologians, then, Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms draw on the Fourth Servant Song in order to fill in the details of the suffering and humiliation undergone by Christ the servant messiah.

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Lk 2.40, 52: Christ's Growth and Development Other New Testament texts that exercised the minds of the kenotic theologians were Lk 2.40 and 52, which appear to indicate that Christ's knowledge underwent some sort of development during his earthly ministry. These passages, too, occaSionally appear in Kierkegaard's writings. In 1833-4 Kierkegaard attended H. N. Clausen's lectures on dogmatics and took detailed notes (SKSI9/KJN3: Notl:1-8). Among these are notes on a lecture on Christ's personality (SKS19/KJN3: Not1:7, §§41-7), in §44 of which Kierkegaard lists the biblical passages cited by Clausen that demonstrate the character of Christ's humanity. One of the texts Kierkegaard mentions is Lk 2.40, which is cited as indicating the manner in which Christ's bodily powers developed. In his notes Kierkegaard also refers to Lk 2.40 and 52 as evidence that the powers of Christ's soul developed in a human way (SKSI9/KJN3: Not1:7, p. 35). In an early journal entry Kierkegaard cites with approval Carl Daub's citation of Lk2.49·as well as In 9.4, and In 19.30 as a summary of Christ's life (SKS17/KJN1: 00:13 [JP2:279]). Kierkegaard holds that Daub's choice of texts, each of which emphasizes Christ's divinity, must, however, be supplemented by texts which affirm that Christ genuinely experienced a human existence. Among the three supplementary texts Kierkegaard cites is Lk 2.40. In an entry of 1850 Kierkegaard also briefly mentions 'Christ in the temple at the age of twelve' in a discussion of a sermon on Mt 7.7 by Carl H. Visby (SKS23/KJN7: NB15:34 [JP3:3495]). A further allusion to Lk 2.40 appears in the second of the Two Upbuilding Discourses of 1844, which is entitled 'Patience in Expectancy' (SKS5:206-24/ EUD, 205-26). As the biblical text for his meditation on this theme Kierkegaard takes Lk 2.33-40. He focuses, however, on Anna as a model of expectancy and makes no reference to Lk 2.40 and the Christological issues it raises. The picture that emerges is that Lk 2.40, 52 played little role in Kierkegaard's thinking. He rarely cites these passages, and when he does they are cited for non-Christological purposes. The only exception to this are some early journal entries in which Kierkegaard cites Lk 2.40, 52 to affirm the reality of Christ's humanity.

Mt 4.I-U/Lk 4.1-13; Heb 2.18; 4.15: Christ's Temptation The theme of Christ's temptation appears at several points in Kierkegaard's authorship. In his treatment of this theme Kierkegaard frequently conflates the Gospel narrative with Heb 2.18 and 4.15. These texts on temptation are 'kenotic' texts in the sense that they raise questions about the reality of Christ's humanity and the relation of his human nature to his divine nature. Did Christ's divine nature protect him from the possibility of succumbing to

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temptation or did his human nature mean that he was genuinely tempted by Satan? To put it in technical terms, was Christ non posse peccare (not able to sin) or posse non peccare (able not to sin)? In an early journal entry Kierkegaard remarks that 'He is tempted' is one of the statements in which Christ's life can be summed up (SKSI7/KJN1:DD:13 [JP2:279]), but he does not go on to elaborate on this point. In Preface VII Kierkegaard has Nicolaus Notabene quote a slightly modified version of the Greek text ofHeb 4.15, substituting 'of human beings' for 'our', i.e. Nicolaus' text has 'to sympathize with the weakness of human beings' rather than the original 'to sympathize with our weaknesses'. Nicolaus does not employ the text Christologically, however, but cites it in his description of what makes him want to become an author, namely the desire for selfunderstanding (SKS4:499/P, 41). A more important usage of Heb 4.15 appears in Christian Discourses. In his meditation on the invitation Christ makes to those who labour and are heavy laden (Mt 11.28), Kierkegaard reassures the reader that 'the merciful inviter ... himself was tested in everything, yet without sin' (SKSI0:282/CD, 266). In journal entries made shortly after the publication of Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard reiterates this point, interpreting Heb 4.15 as meaning that in becoming a human being Christ was able to put himself in our place and thereby show solidarity with us in our suffering and feel sympathy for our frailties (SKS211KJN5:NB7:14 [JP4:3928], NB7:14a [JP4:3929], NB7:14c [JP4:3931]). Kierkegaard returns to this theme of Christ's solidarity with human beings in his religious writings of 1849-51. In the first of Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, 'The High Priest' (SKS11:249-591 WA, 113-24), Kierkegaard interprets Heb 4.15 as a statement that Christ is able to sympathize with human beings' weaknesses and put himself completely in their place. Because Christ has been tested in all things, there is no human suffering that he has not undergone. Consequently, 'We have such a high priest who is able to have sympathy. And that he must have sympathy, that you see from its having been out of sympathy that he was tested in all things in the same way' (SKS11:252/WA, 116, original emphasis). It is precisely because Christ has genuinely experienced the suffering of a human existence that he 'can put himself completely in the place' of human beings and suffer on their behalf. A little later Kierkegaard writes that Christ, 'too, has suffered hunger and thirst, and just in the most difficult moments in his life, when he also battled spiritually, in the desert and on the cross' (SKS11:2531 WA, 117). A further allusion appears a few pages later when Kierkegaard refers to the temptation after citing Heb 2.18, which states that Christ, 'because he has suffered and himself been tempted is able to help those who are tempted: After arguing that Christ is able to put himself in the place of all human beings because he 'truly learned to know every temptation by holding out in every temptation' (SKS11:257/WA, 120), Kierkegaard cites the

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Temptation Narrative as an example of being tempted in solitude: 'If you are tempted in solitude - so also was he. whom the evil spirit led out into solitude in order to tempt him' (SKSll:257/WA. 121). In For Self-Examination Kierkegaard introduces the concept of Christ's temptation in his discourse 'Christ is the Way' (SKS13:80-92/FSE. 57-70). In order to show the 'narrowness' of the way that is Christ and the suffering that Christ's way entails, Kierkegaard emphasizes that 'this way. which is Christ. this narrow way - it is narrow in its beginning' (SKS13:81/FSE. 58, original emphasis). To illustrate this narrowness Kierkegaard refers to Christ's temptation. stating that: His life from the very beginning is a story of temptation; it is not only one particular period in his life. the forty days. that is the story of temptation - no. his whole life is a story of temptation (just as it is also a story of suffering). Every moment of his life he is tempted - that is. he has this possibility in his power, to take his calling, his task, in vain. (SKS13:81-2/FSE, 58-9)

It is not only Satan who is Christ's tempter, however. for throughout Christ's life there were many others who played this role, namely the people, the disciples, and the mighty (SKS13:82/FSE, 59). Christ's temptation consists in the possibility of his not following through with his vocation and of succumbing to the opportunity of becoming a king and ruler (SKS13:82/FSE, 59). Kierkegaard thus extends Christ's temptation beyond the episode described in the Gospels to the whole of Christ's life. This temptation consisted in abandoning the suffering that belonged to his ministry and seizing political power. There is no hint in Kierkegaard's treatment of Christ's temptation that he holds that Christ suffered only in his human nature. while his divine nature remained unaffected. Indeed, in 'The High Priest' Kierkegaard makes clear that it was out of divine sympathy that Christ, although God, became a human being and took upon himself suffering that went beyond anything ever experienced by a mere human being (SKSll:253/WA, 117).

Mk 13.321Mt 24.36: Jesus' Ignorance of the Time of the Day of Judgement A reference to Mk 13.32 appears in Kierkegaard's notes of Martensen's lectures on speculative dogmaticS. This reference, however. appears in a set of notes that are not in Kierkegaard's handwriting. but which Kierkegaard seems to have acquired from someone who attended the whole of Martensen's lectures. 2 If Kierkegaard read this transcript of Martensen's lectures, he would 2 See Thulstrup's notes in Pap. 13. pp. 3, 44. The notes in Kierkegaard's hand include only Martensen's introductory remarks and the first 23 paragraphs of the lecture series. Kierkegaard

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have been aware of the Christological questions raised by Mk 13.32/Mt 24.36. According to the transcript, Martensen mentioned Mk 13.32 in support of his denial of Christ's omniscience. 'Empirical omniscience', he comments, 'would have cancelled out Christ's true humanity. The true God-manhood lies precisely in the fact that the God-manhood can express itself completely truly within human limitations [lndskramkning)' (Pap. II C 28, vol. 13, p. 52). There is what appears to be an allusion to Mk 13.32/Mt 24.36 in the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1844. In the first of these discourses Kierkegaard remarks that it is praiseworthy if a person 'knows the time and the hour' when he grew.old and became separated from 'youth's thought about the Creator' (SKS5:245/EUD, 246). Another allusion appears in the Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1844, where Kierkegaard cites Mk13.32/Mt 24.36 with reference to the human being who struggles in prayer. Having outlined the nature of the struggle of prayer, namely, that 'the struggler contends with God in prayer, or he struggles with himself and in his prayer calls on God for help against himself' (SKS5:379/EUD, 397), Kierkegaard comments: 'And whatever happens in the meantime [i.e. while the individual is struggling in prayer], which is concealed even from the angels, and whenever the hour comes that no one knows except God, and even though he must buy new oil for the lamp of expectancy more than once, it nevertheless remains certain that anyone who buys from God will never be deceived by having his purchase later prove to be of lesser worth' (SKS5:379/EUD, 398, emphaSiS added). The negligible role Mk 13.32 plays in Kierkegaard's writings seems to indicate a lack of concern with the Christological problem it presents and which exercised the minds of many nineteenth century kenotic theologians. Kierkegaard does not consider Mk 13.32 in Christological terms, but employs it merely to illustrate other, non-Christological issues.

In 17.5: The Incarnate Christ's Renunciation of his Pre-existent Glory ]n 17.5 is mentioned in Kierkegaard's notes of Clausen's lectures as evidence of Christ's glory (SKS19/KJN3:Notl:7, p. 34), but there is no indication of a kenotic understanding of the passage. In Practice in Christianity Kierkegaard paraphrases In 17.5 in a list of New Testament passages which express Christ's glory (SKSI2:170/PC, 167). The most important reference to In 17.5 occurs, seems to have obtained a transcript of the entire 99 paragraphs of the lecture series from someone who attended all of Martensen's lectures. According to Bruun and Jensen in their 'Critical Account of the Text ofJournal KK' (SKS18/KJN2, pp. 587-96), it was the practice in Kierkegaard's era to make use of 'subscription notes' made by professional transcribers who sold lecture notes to students unable to attend the lectures themselves (SKS18/KJN2, pp. 593-6).

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however, in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. In the third discourse of 'the Gospel of Sufferings' (SKS8:347-60/UDVS, 248-63), Kierkegaard draws on In 17.5 in his exploration of how 'sufferings educate human beings for eternity'. Kierkegaard sets the scene for his discussion by considering the case of a youth who desires struggle and sufferings in his life. When young people speak of 'what they wish to be in the world or wish from the world' (SKS8:3471 UDVS, 248), they betray their innermost selves. 'In the wish', the young person 'is totally himself, and the wish is the most accurate representation of his inner being' (SKS8:347/UDVS, 248). Kierkegaard asks us to imagine a young man who did not want a life of pleasure and ease, but wished only for 'struggle and danger and difficulties and sufferings' and to live 'first and last in the tension of exertion, in the vortex of battle' (SKS8:348/UDVS, 249). He did not struggle to achieve a particular goal such as honour, advantage, or power, but 'wanted to struggle for the sake of struggling' (SKS8:348/UDVS, 249). The young ·man, however, has a false understanding of suffering, for he confuses struggle with suffering, and if we were to explain to the young man the real meaning of suffering, he would 'perhaps lose courage' and 'perhaps would sink under suffering' (SKS8:348/UDVS, 250). Kierkegaard does not elaborate on why the young man's conception of suffering is inadequate, but he seems to imply that in confusing suffering with struggle the young man has reduced suffering to temporary, superable impediments that provide merely the foil for his wish to live in the tension of exertion. That is, to put Kierkegaard's point in language he himself does not employ in the discourse, we might say that the young man conceives of suffering as accidental rather than essential. The young man understands suffering to be extrinsic to, rather than constitutive of, his inner being. He sees it as something to be overcome rather than as the means of acquiring an eternal happiness. That suffering is constitutive of the human being's inner being and is the path to an eternal happiness is not an idea that could have originated in a human mind, however. Such a conception of suffering is so alien to human beings' thinking that they can come to know it only through divine revelation. This revelation is provided by Christ, who embodies and exemplifies the Significance of suffering in his own person, for he is 'the only one who went out into the world with the purpose of willing to suffer, with the choice of willing to suffer and with insistence upon it' (SKS8:3491UDVS, 250). It is in order to articulate the nature of Christ's suffering that Kierkegaard paraphrases In 17.5: 'He went out from the Father in Heaven; he relinquished [nedlagdel the glory he had before the foundation of the world was laid - yes, his choice was eternally free, and he came into the world - in order to suffer' (SKS8:349/UDVS, 250). For Christ suffering meant not merely leaving the paternal home, but renouncing the glory he had from his Father.

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In the discourse on 'The Care of Indecisiveness, Vacillation, and Disconsolateness' (SKSlO:89-98/CD, 81-91) in Christian Discourses Kierkegaard makes a similar point to that made in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits when he writes that the Christian can learn from the obedience of Christ, 'who himself learned obedience and was obedient, obedient in everything, obedient in giving up everything (the glory that he had before the foundation of the world was laid), obedient in doing without everything (even that on which he could lay his head), obedient in taking everything upon himself (the sin of humankind), obedient in suffering everything (the gUilt of humankind), obedient in subjecting himself to everything in life, obedient in death' (SKSI0:93/CD, 85, emphasis added). Christ's obedience in giving up his divine glory is a model which all Christians are called upon to follow. There are two kenotic elements in these passages. Firstly, Kierkegaard clearly takes In 17.5 to mean that Christ renounced the glory he enjoyed in his pre-existent state in order to become a human being. The incarnation involved the transition from glory to the loss of glory. Secondly, the incarnation also involved the movement from glory to suffering. It was in order to suffer that Christ came to earth. Does this transition from being the immutable and glorious pre-existent one to being a suffering human being mean that Christ's divine nature underwent some sort of change? Kierkegaard does not address this question. but his statement that Christ's choice to renounce his glory and become incarnate was 'eternaUy free' indicates that Christ is the same Christ in both pre-existent and incarnate states. These two states are united by Christ's eternal decision to enter human existence in order to suffer. Incarnation and suffering are therefore not a 'change' in Christ but an expression of his eternal nature. There is a parallel here with the assertion of Thomasius and others that the continuity between pre-existence and the status exinanitionis lies in the resolution of the pre-existent Logos to enter human existence for the purpose of redeeming humankind.

Heb 5.7-8: Christ Learned Obedience through his Suffering As we saw in our discussion of Kierkegaard's treatment of Jn 17.s in the third discourse of 'Gospel of Sufferings', Kierkegaard holds that the idea that suffering determines the human being's eternal happiness is so alien to human thinking that it could not possibly have originated in a human mind but must be prOvided by divine revelation. To unpack the educative function of suffering Kierkegaard introduces Heb 5.8, which forms the main text of the discourse: 'Although he was a son, he learned obedience from what he suffered' (SKS8:349-50/UDVS, 250). Christ's entire earthly life, Kierkegaard claims, 'was the heaviest suffering, heavier than any mortal being's can ever be, heavier than any human being can imagine, heavier than any language can

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express' (SKS8:354/UDVS, 255). The claim that Christ learned from this suffering, however, is a controversial one, for it implies a lack. or deficiency on Christ's part which needs to be rectified by his undergoing an education. Christ, however, as Kierkegaard himself states in the third discourse, is co-eternal with the Father, knows the Father's mind, and is omniscient (SKS8:352, c£ 360/ UDVS, 253, cf. 263). How, then is it possible for Christ to learn anything? Kierkegaard is able to affirm that Christ underwent a learning process during his earthly life by unfolding the nature of learning. The learning that can be acquired through suffering differs fundamentally from other forms of learning. The conventional view is that learning entails the amassing of more and more items of knowledge. Learning through suffering, however, does not consist in amassing knowledge but in learning anew (SKS8:352-3/UDVS, 252). Suffering educates people by turning them inward towards their inner being (SKS8:355/UDVS, 256). Suffering teaches the learner to focus on him/herself and to question the person s/he has become. To employ the language of Karl JasperS', we might say that suffering is a boundary-situation. When the human being encounters the boundary of suffering, the collision sends shock waves reverberating into the centre of his/her being, plaCing in question the mode of existence that that human being had constructed for him/herself. As Kierkegaard puts it, 'the school of sufferings is a dying to and quiet lessons in dying to' (SKS8:356/UDVS, 257, original emphasis). It is the opportunity for giving up finite goals and becoming attentive to new possibilities. Suffering, then, first teaches the human being to pay deeper attention to him/herself. It teaches the human being to learn anew. The 'subject matter' of this 'learning anew' is obedience. Suffering teaches obedience: 'Without sufferings one cannot learn obedience, because the suffering is the very guarantee that the attachment is not self-willfulness, but the person who learns obedience learns everything' (SKS8:356, cf. 357/ UDVS, 257, cf. 259). In suffering the learner learns to put aside his or her own will. In doing so, s/he learns both about him/herself and about God. Kierkegaard writes: 'When a person suffers and wills to learn from what he suffers, he continually comes to know only something about himself and about

his relationship to God; this is the sign that he is being educated for eternity' (SKS8:355/UDVS, 257, original emphasis). What is it, then, that the human being learns from suffering about himself and his God-relationship? What is the nature of the 'education for eternity' and how does learning obedience bring it about? Obedience educates the human being for eternity because it places the eternal and the temporal, God and the human in their proper relationship. In learning obedience in the school of sufferings one learns the eternal truth that God rules: 'But what is all eternal truth except this: that God rules; and what is obedience except this: to let God rule; and what other connection and

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harmony are possible between the temporal and the eternal than this - that God rules and to let God rule!' (SKS8:356/UDVS, 257). This obedience to God constitutes the presence of the eternal within the human being: 'Indeed, if you, disciplined by sufferings, have ever subjected yourself in perfect, in unconditional obedience, then you have also discerned the presence of the eternal within you, then you have found the peace and rest of the eternal' (SKS8:356/ UDVS, 258). Christ, too, has learned this obedience, for he, too, through his suffering has wholly submitted his will and is utterly obedient to God. This obedience learned by Christ, however, applies only to his humanity. In the final paragraph of the discourse Kierkegaard makes dear that it is not Christ's divine nature but only his human nature which learns obedience through suffering. His divine will was in eternal harmony with that of the Father, consequently there was no need for Christ in his divinity to learn obedience. Human beings, however, can learn obedience only through suffering. If this were not the case, then Christ, since his will is in complete harmony with that of the Father, would not have needed to have suffered. As a human being, however, it was necessary that Christ in his human nature should, like all human beings, learn obedience through suffering. In what appears to be an allusion to Phil 2.8, Kierkegaard writes that, 'The obedience belongs to [Christ's] abasement, as it says: He abased himself and became obedient' (SKS8:360/UDVS, 263). In assuming human nature, then, Christ necessarily underwent the human experience of learning obedience to God through suffering. Heb 5.8 constitutes a kenotic passage in the sense that it seems to deny omniscience to Christ. It thus belongs with passages such as Lk 2.40, 52; Mk. 13.32/Mt 24.36, all of which the Church Fathers had difficulty in reconciling with Christ's divine nature. Kierkegaard solves the problem by understanding Heb 5.8 to refer to the obedience learnt by Christ's human nature. This strategy is similar to that of the Fathers, who likewise ascribed passages implying Christ was limited to Christ's humanity. Kierkegaard's treatment of the passage differs from the Fathers in one important respect, however. What is uppermost in Kierkegaard's understanding of the text is not the Christological problem it poses, but its significance for Christian obedience. Just as Christ suffered and was obedient despite his suffering, so too should those who follow Christ learn obedience through their suffering. Kierkegaard subordinates the underlying Christology of Heb 5.8 to the call to discipleship.

Mt 26.36-46/Mk 14.32-42/Lk 22.40-6: Jesus' Anguish in the Garden of Gethsemane Another important passage for kenotic Christology is the account of Jesus' anguish in the Garden of Gethsemane. This passage has been taken as

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scriptural evidence for the reality of Jesus' humanity and raises the problem of how Christ, if divine, could have undergone such self-doubt and anguish. For the nineteenth century kenotic theologians this is one of the passages that creates the 'kenotic problem', namely how to reconcile affirmation of Christ's divinity with a full recognition of the reality of Christ's humanity and the limitations to which it was subject. The Gethsemane account was a passage that clearly moved Kierkegaard, and he makes frequent references to it in his journals and published works. In Fragments Climacus draws on the Gethsemane story to emphasize the reality of Christ's suffering. It is precisely because the servant form he has assumed is not mere appearance but a genuine reality that Christ must suffer and die (SKS4:240/PF, 33-4). The grief unto death which Christ underwent in the Garden, however, is made still more intense and bitter by human beings' refusal to acknowledge the necessity of his suffering: 'if I pleaded with him to spare himself and remain, I no doubt would see him grieved unto death, but grieved also for me, because this suffering must be for my benefit; but his sorrow would also be the sorrow that I could not understand him. 0 bitter cup - more bitter than wormwood is the ignominy of death for a mortal - how must it be, then, for the immortal one!' (SKS4:240/PF, 34). In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard refers to Jesus' struggle in Gethsemane as the disciples slept as an example of Jesus' loneliness (SKSI0:266/CD, 252), while in a journal entry made around the time of the publication of Christian Discourses he comments on Christ's 'infinite grief' on finding the disciples sleeping and having to struggle all alone (SKS20/KJN4:NB4:97 [JP4:4613]). In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard also cites the Gethsemane account in order to emphasize the human suffering of Christ, commenting that Christ 'has experienced all human sorrow more grievously than any human being' (SKS1O:283/CD, 266). Also in Christian Discourses Kierkegaard reflects on a painting in a church depicting Christ's receiving the cup of suffering. This is a springboard for a meditation on how suffering is swallowed up in victory (SKS 10: 114-15/CD, 103-4). This should console the human being undergOing suffering, who can take comfort in the fact that suffering exists only in the realm of temporality and will be swallowed up in the victory of eternity. In a journal entry of 1848 Kierkegaard sees Christ's prayer in Gethsemane as an expression of the 'dialectical definition of faith'. In praying to God to remove the cup of suffering, but adding the words 'if it is possible', Christ shows that he is willing to accept the opposite of that for which he prays. This is the movement of resignation whereby one accepts in obedience whatever the divine will decrees, whether it coincides with one's wishes or not. Christ, then, provides us with an example of obedience to God's will (SKS20/KJN4: NB5:1O (JP3:2468]). The contrast between Christ's agony in Gethsemane and the sleep of the diSciples is interpreted by Kierkegaard in another journal entry as an

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expression of the relation between humanity and divinity: 'This is how the human is related to the divine: the disciples sleep - while Christ suffers.' Sleepfulness is a sign of spiritless ness, although in the case of the disciples their slumbering is due to their exhaustion through suffering. Nevertheless, it remains true that 'the more spirit the more sleeplessness'. It is precisely because Christ has the most spirit that he suffers: 'therefore, if one is God and becomes an individual hum. being, that is already infinite, absolute suffering in and of itself, for spirit is sheer wakefulness and activity; human beings are more or less drowsiness' (SKS211K]N5:NB7:106 [JP4:4624]). It is precisely because of his divine nature that Christ suffers, not in spite of it. Kierkegaard also employs the Gethsemane episode as an example of Christian obedience. Thus in the third discourse of 'the Gospel of Sufferings', Kierkegaard takes Christ's acceptance of the cup of suffering as an example of his learning the obedience unto death spoken of in Heb 5.8 and Phil 2.8 (SKS8:354/UDVS, 255). Christ's obedience to the divine will and his readiness obediently to accept suffering is the model of Christian discipleship. If we would be followers of Christ we too must suffer in obedience to God's will. In a journal entry of 1851 Kierkegaard interprets Christ's complaint to the diSciples, 'Could you not watch with me one hour' (Mt 26.40/Mk 14.37), as an expression of the intenSity of Christ's human suffering. 'Here', Kierkegaard writes, 'for one moment, Christ is the suffering human being who for his own sake craves the sympathetic participation of another human being' (SKS241 KJN8:NB23:159 [JP3:3235]). Despite this expression of his human nature, however, Christ remains the teacher of human beings, for he warns the disciples not for his sake but for theirs to 'watch and pray that you do not fall into temptation' (Mt 26,4l1Mk 14.38/Lk 22.46). In For Self-Examination Kierkegaard emphasizes the intensity of the suffering Christ underwent in the Garden of Gethsemane, where, even before the crucifixion, he was already a dying man: 'If the suffering on the cross was a death agony - ah, this agony in prayer was also a mortal combat; nor was it bloodless, for his sweat fell like drops of blood to the earth' (SKS13:86IPSE, 63). In the fifth number of The Moment Kierkegaard alludes to Mt 26.39/Mk 14.36 in his critique of the church. He contrasts the suffering of Christ with the pleasant lives of the clergy by making a sarcastic reference to official Christianity's pleading with God that he take away the 'cross' and 'bitter cup' of well paid, prestigious positions in the church (SKS13:251/TM, 200). As well as interpreting the Gethsemane passage as an expression of the reality and intensity of Christ's suffering, Kierkegaard sometimes uses it to illustrate aspects of his analysis of the human condition. In The Concept of Anxiety Vigllius Haufniensis cites as an example of anxiety the statements in the Gospels that Christ 'was anxious unto death, as well as the words spoke by Christ to Judas: What you are going to do, do quickly' (SKS4:454/CA, 155; cf. SKS13:86/FSE,63).

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The common theme in Kierkegaard's various citations of the Gethsemane passage is his emphasis on the reality of Christ's suffering. Kierkegaard's Christ is no docetic Christ, but a Christ who is deeply involved in the suffering of human existence.

Mt 27.46/Mk 15.34: The Cry from the Cross Kierkegaard occasionally employs Mt 27.46/Mk 15.34 in a non-Christological way, as is the case for example in Vigilius Haufniensis' introduction of the cry from the cross in his discussion of anxiety (SKS4:454/CA, 155). Kierkegaard also draws attention to human misunderstandings of the cry from the cross. From the human viewpoint Jesus' cry of abandonment can appear to be one of three things. Firstly, 'to many in their ungodly error the words "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" no doubt sounded like a justified nemesis' (SKSll:67/WA, 61; cf. SKS20/KJN4: NB5:99 [JP1:323j). Secondly, Christ's sense of God-forsakenness on the cross is conclusive proof that God was not with him and that he was not one with the Father (SKS13:87/FSE, 64). Thirdly, for those who accept that Christ is indeed the Son of God, his cry from the cross appears to be impatient and untrue (SKS21/KJN5:NBlO:l64 [JP1:333]). These are, however, fundamental misunderstandings. For Kierkegaard, the cry from the cross is first and foremost the ultimate and most intense expression of Christ's suffering as the God-man. In an early journal entry (1837) Kierkegaard states that Christ's cry of God-forsakenness is one of the sentences which sum up the whole story of Christ's life (SKS17/ KJN1:DD:13 [JP1:279j). In Practice in Christianity Anti-Climacus claims that the God-man exists so completely as an individual human being that he 'is in the power of his incognito'. It is in his being bound by the human incognito he has assumed during his earthly existence that the possibility of Christ's suffering lies. Anti-Climacus writes, 'Only in this way is there in the profoundest sense earnestness concerning his becoming true man; this is also why he suffers through the utmost suffering of feeling himself abandoned by God' (SKS12:136/PC, 132). The cry from the cross arises from Christ taking humanity so seriously that he is prepared to undergo the most extreme experience of human nature, namely, God-forsakenness on the cross. In Practice in Christianity, then, the cry from the cross seems to arise primarily from Christ's human nature. It is because the God-man has genuinely assumed human nature and become an individual human being that he is capable of undergoing suffering. Elsewhere Kierkegaard emphasizes that Christ's suffering goes far beyond even the most terrible suffering endured by human beings. In Christian Discourses he states that Christ 'has experienced all human sorrow more grievously than any human being, he who at the very end was abandoned by

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God' (SKS10:283/CD. 266). In a journal entry of 1848 Kierkegaard interprets the cry from the cross as the deepest possible expression for 'the yawning gulf of separation betw. being hum. and being with God' (SKS20/KJN4: NB5:99 [JP1:323]). Christ's experience of God-forsakenness is the most intense expression of the infinite qualitative difference between God and humankind. for the cry from the cross expresses Christ's experience of human separation from God. It is thus simultaneously the expression of Christ's true humanity and. as the expression of the infinite qualitative difference that is the criterion of separation of humanity from God, it is the expression of his divinity. As both GQd and a human being Christ experiences in his very person the utter separation of human beings from God and does so more intensely than human beings could ever experience. Christ's experience of the separation of human beings from God accounts for Kierkegaard's frequent emphasis, particularly in his later writings and journal entries, on the extreme nature of Christ's suffering. In Three Discourses at the Communion on Friday Kierkegaard describes in 'The High Priest' how Christ 'was scorned, persecuted, insulted, mocked, spat upon, flogged, mistreated, tortured, crucified, abandoned by God and crucified amid public exultation' (SKS11:254/W A, 118). Christ underwent such suffering in order to put himself in the place of every human being, for there is no human suffering that Christ himself has not undergone. Christ suffers out of sympathy for human beings and through his suffering is able to comfort all human beings in their suffering: 'The one who unconditionally suffers most is the one of whom it is veritably true - through his doing it - that he unconditionally has no other comfort than to comfort others' (SKS11:2551W A, 119, cf. 122). It is the intensity of his suffering that enables Christ to become 'the Comforter' of all human beings (SKS11:255/WA, 119). A little later Kierkegaard cites the cry from the cross as an indication that Christ was tempted in a way that went beyond anything experienced by human beings. After listing a variety of human temptations which Christ himself underwent but resisted, Kierkegaard writes, 'but no, surely no human being has experienced that spiritual trial. the spiritual trial of being abandoned by God - but he was tempted in that way' (SKSll:257IWA,121). Kierkegaard continues this theme of the intensity of Christ's suffering in For Self-Examination, where he describes Christ's experience of God-forsakenness on the cross as the 'extremity of superhuman suffering! Oh. a human heart would have burst a little sooner - only the God-man must suffer all through this final suffering' (SKS13:87/FSE, 64). In a journal entry made in 1852 Kierkegaard describes the cry from the cross as Christ's 'final suffering, the most terrible of all' (SKS25/KJN9: NB27:38 [JP4:4699J), while in 1854 he emphasizes the qualitative difference between Christ's suffering and human beings' suffering (SKS25/K]N9: NB29:66 (JP4:4980j). In this latter journal entry he criticizes his earlier treatment of the cry from the cross in For

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Self-Examination, where he 'all too hastily made it into a theory' and implied 'that every martyr will experience in a minimal way something similar'. The problem with his treatment of Christ's experience of God-forsakenness in For Self-Examination is that it suggests that there is only a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference between Christ's experience and that of other human beings. Christ's suffering, however, differs not merely in degree but also in kind from that of all other sufferers. This qualitative difference stems from the fact that in contrast to all other human beings Christ suffered voluntarily. 'The point here is that there is this difference between the Godman and the witness to the truth: the God-man voluntarily undertook to suffer unconditionally - consequently this last, most horrible suffering [of the sense of abandonment on the cross]' (SKS2S/KJN9:NB29:66 [JP4:4980]). It is because he is the God-man that Christ must suffer. For Kierkegaard the cry from the cross does not place in question Christ's divinity, but is a statement of the depths of suffering the God-man was prepared to undergo for the sake of humankind. In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard links Christ's cry of God-forsakenness with the other words Christ spoke from the cross and interprets it as one element of Christ's conversation with himself and with God: 'So he is crucified. He uses the time of the death struggle in conversation with himself and with God. He does not say much; once every half hour he says something. The suffering overwhelms him, and he bows his head; he cries out, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me!'" (SY XII 448/JFY, 178). Kierkegaard emphasizes, however, that 'this is not the way, with bowed head, that he is to die' (SY XII 448/JFY, 178), for the cry from the cross is followed by the words 'It is finished' (Tn 19.30) and 'Father, into your hands I commend my spirit' (Lk 23.46) (SY XII 448/JFY, 178). Kierkegaard does not elaborate on this point, nor does he explain the relation of the cry of anguish to Christ's other words. The cry from the cross seems to be the last and deepest expression of the suffering which Christ has taken upon himself out of love for human beings before bringing his ministry to a close. In a journal entry of 1854 Kierkegaard interprets Jesus' cry of abandonment on the cross as an expression of the suffering of divine love (SKS26/KJNlO: NB31:86 (JP4:4715j; cf. SKS13:212-13/TM, 165). Love, Kierkegaard claims, involves change: 'The beloved naturally understands that being loved means that the lover is changed according to the beloved's will and conception; a lover understands that lOving means being changed into likeness to the beloved, becoming what the beloved wishes or wants him to be.' To love, then, means becoming what the beloved desires. God is love, and thus he too is prepared to change himself for the benefit of the beloved. God, however, is immutable and therefore cannot change. There is thus, as Kierkegaard puts it, 'a contradiction in God', namely, 'He is love and yet he is eternally unchangeable. Consequently, he cannot be changed - and yet he is love' (SKS26/KJNI0:

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NB31:86 [JP4:4715]). This contradiction is the source of agony both for God and for the beloved, for although God is love he cannot change himself for the benefit of the beloved. Consequently, though God loves the beloved, he must make the beloved unhappy. It is this contradiction that underlies the cry from the cross. Although Christ's suffering on the cross was terrible for Christ, Kierkegaard holds that 'it would have been still more terrible for God to hear it. To be unchangeable in this way - terrible! But, no, this is not what is terrible, but to be unchangeable this way and to be love - what infinitely deep, inscrutable griefl' (SKS26KJNlO: NB31:86 [JP4:471S)). Precisely because of the depth of his suffering, Christ's cry from the cross is not a refutation of his divinity, but is on the contrary an indication that he is indeed the Son of God. As Kierkegaard puts it, 'precisely the· enduring of suffering to the uttermost, precisely this was, before God, the expression of his being Son of God' (SKS25/K}N9: NB29:46 [JPl:369]; d. SKS25/K]N9: NB27:38 []P4:4699]). Kierkegaard sometimes reflects on the grounds of Christ's experience of extreme suffering. In a journal entry of 1849 he argues that Christ's words from the cross can be true only of Christ and never of any other human being: 'They can only be true when God speaks them, or rather, also when the Godman speaks them' (SKS21/KJNS:NBlO:164 (JPl:333]). Thus whereas from the human point of view Christ's words on the cross are impatient and untrue, they are nevertheless true when spoken by Christ. Christ really does experience God-forsakenness on the cross. Kierkegaard's argument here, which he does not develop in any detail, seems to consist of two points. Firstly, in the case of human beings God is always present, even when a human being experiences the greatest sense of God-forsakenness. For anyone to claim that slhe is forsaken by God is thus simply wrong. God is there, even when the despairing individual is utterly blind to his presence. Secondly, Christ is God and as such is the truth. He cannot lie and he does not deceive. His words from the cross must therefore be taken at face value. He is not acting a part, nor is it only his human nature but not his divine nature that suffers. The unified person of the God-man truly suffers God-forsakenness on the cross. This, Kierkegaard comments, 'expresses the greatest pain' (SKS21/K]N5: NBIO:164 [JPl:333]). In Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Kierkegaard attributes Christ's cry from the cross to his guiltlessness. Because every other human being is guilty, slhe can never doubt God's love in the midst of suffering, for this suffering can be understood as the just punishment for guilt. Because the human being suffers as guilty, slhe has no grounds to challenge the view that God is love. Christ, however, suffered guiltlessly. Consequently, he - and only he among all human beings - has the right to question God's love. Only he as the guiltlessly suffering one truly experiences God-forsakenness, precisely because the link between suffering and guilt has in his case been broken

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(SKS8:365-8/UDVS, 268-272).3 Christ can make his cry from the cross precisely because he is guiltless. No other human being can legitimately do this. Christ's cry from the cross is an indication of his sinlessness and guiltlessness. It does not trouble Kierkegaard as an indication of Christ's lack of divinity. Kierkegaard also interprets the cry from the cross as a test or trial of Christ. In a journal entry made in 1848 Kierkegaard states that the cry from the cross is 'freedom's most extreme spiritual trial. Unimposed, freely appropriated suffering contains, at its most extreme point in the dialectic of responsibility, the painful idea that God allows hum. beings to sense that [God] himself has freely appropriated it' (SKS20IKJN4: NB4:95 [JP4:4611]). Kierkegaard makes a similar suggestion in a later journal entry when he describes Christ's experience of God-forsakenness on the cross as 'the final humiliation, the last, in which God puts him to the test to see whether he will still hold fast to God' (SKS2S/KJN9: NB27:38 [JP4:4699]). The cry from the cross is a trial because Christ's crucifixion tests to the utmost Christ's trust in God. Christ's life, Kierkegaard comments, was a 'life of anguish and a death anguished to the point of despairing over God's help' (SKS25/KJN9: NB30:30 [JP3:3585]). This conception of the crucifixion as a trial or test seems to be what underlies Kierkegaard's comparison of the cry from the cross with Simeon's words to Mary at Jesus' presentation in the temple: 'And a soul will pierce though your own soul also' (Lk 2.35). According to Kierkegaard Simeon's words to Mary refer not only to her future pain at witnessing her son's death, but also to the doubt she will experience: 'was not the whole thing a dream, a delusion, the whole affair of Gabriel being sent by God proclaiming her to be the chosen one, etc.' (SKS25/KJN9: NB28:99 [JPl:364]). Mary's doubt, Kierkegaard claims, is a human version of Christ's cry from the cross. This implies that Kierkegaard understands the cry from the cross to be an expression of Christ's doubt. Christ's cry from the cross is not only a trial for Christ but also for all those who would follow him. Kierkegaard cites with approval a comment by Gerhard Tersteegen that the thief on the cross beside Christ was converted by Christ's prayer of forgiveness for those who had crucified him (Lk 23.34), but the thief's faith was then immediately tested by Christ's cry of abandonment on the cross (SKS22/KJN6: NBl1:182 [JP4:4750]). In a late journal entry Kierkegaard also suggests that the cry from the cross was employed to rule out human strategies for dealing with suffering. The cry

3 For a discussion of Kierkegaard's notion of Christ's guiltless suffering in Upbui/ding Discourses in Various Spirits, see David R. Law, 'Wrongness, Guilt, and Innocent Suffering in Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Part Two, and Upbui/ding Discourses in Various Spirits', in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits' (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2005),315-48, esp. 325-37.

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from the cross 'signif[ies] that the prototype [Forbilledet] is not characterized by Stoicism or Stoical self-satisfaction.' Christ has not resigned himself to his fate, nor does he seek escape by means of suicide. These are the methods of the Stoic, 'who wants to exclude all impressions other than himself and, when he can no longer manage that, prefers to destroy and annihilate, if possible, his self' (SKS25/KJN9: NB30:101 (JP4:3903j). Precisely because Christ does not shirk the terror of existence but experiences it to the full, his words from the cross are, Kierkegaard claims, 'consoling to those who imitate [Christ].' As the prototype Christ shows that the martyr's agonizing moment of weakness when he 'was on the verge of losing his conception of himself, as if he had been abandoned by God' belongs to the God-relationship. It ensures that the human being has given up all self-satisfaction in relationship to God. As Kierkegaard puts it, 'In a certain sense it may be said that to feel abandoned by God belongs to the proper emptying out of the human being standing face to face before God, so that the martyr is not motivated by self-satisfaction' (SKS2S/KJN9: NB30:101 (JP4:3903]). In this sense of abandonment by God the martyr loses his conception of himself. That is, up to the point of despairing of God the martyr had defined himself in terms of his relationship with God. The sense of abandonment by God, however, undermines this conception of self In expressing this radical self-doubt, however, the martyr regains himself at a higher level, for he has now stripped away all the last vestiges of resistance to God. No self-satisfaction, no hope for himself, no sense of gain or self-interest is left in the martyr's God-relationship. God has become all in all. As Kierkegaard puts it, if feeling abandoned by God belongs to the Godrelationship, then 'there is nothing depressing in having to be reminded that one has undergone this human suffering of feeling abandoned by God, of lOSing the conception of oneself, precisely because having suffered the uttermost gives one the conception of himself again, on the highest level' (SKS261 KJNIO: NB31:86 [JP4:47IS]). Kierkegaard also takes Christ's cry from the cross as the basis for his criticism of contemporary Christianity, particularly its leading figures. In what is most probably a reference to Martensen Kierkegaard complains that whereas Christ's life was a life of angUish that culminated in his cry of despair from the cross, the life of the theology professor is one of comfort and enjoyment. How ironic, Kierkegaard scoffs, that the theology professor's comfort 'is chargeable to the account of "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?'" (SKS25/KJN9: NB30:30 (JP3:3585]). Kierkegaard makes a similar complaint in the sixth number of The Moment, where he charges official Christianity with holding 'that Christ in the most dreadful tortures, even abandoned by God, expired on the cross, in order that we should have the pleasure of spending our time and diligence and energy on sagaciously and tastefully enjoying this life' (SKS13:264-5/TM, 211). Earlier in the fourth number of The Moment Kierkegaard had railed against the clergy for selling

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goods under a false name. By removing from Christianity the call to follow Christ in his suffering the clergy have falsified Christianity. Instead of following the suffering Christ the church has preferred 'to become a power and to gain the things of this world by falsely stamping what was served in suffering to the last and to the utmost, to being abandoned by God' (SKS13:212/TM, 165). Such behaviour, Kierkegaard complains, is tantamount to 'enriching oneself by counterfeiting customs stamps or forging the labels of famous factories!' (SKS13:212/TM, 165). Through the clergy's dishonest distortion of Christianity, millions have been 'cheated out of the highest and the holiest, cheated by leading them to think that they were Christians' (SKS13:213/TM, 165). In contrast to the Fathers, the cry from the cross does not present Kierkegaard with the problem of reconciling the apparent despair of the crucified Christ with the impassible, omniscient, and omnipotent Logos. For Kierkegaard the fact that the God-man is capable of uttering the cry from the cross indicates the omnipotence of his resolve to become a human being and the magnitude of his love. His resolve is so absolute and 'his unrecognizability is so omnipotently maintained' (SKSI2:136/PC, 131) that the God-man is genuinely subject to the suffering of feeling himself abandoned by God. A common strategy among the Fathers for dealing with the problem of Christ's suffering was to ascribe suffering to Christ's human nature, while the divine nature remained unaffected. This is a strategy that Kierkegaard does not adopt. On the contrary, Kierkegaard does not divide the natures but holds on firmly to the hypostatic union, for it is not only Christ's humanity but also his divinity which suffers. Indeed, unlike the Fathers, Kierkegaard sees Christ's suffering and the invitation Christ makes to all human beings to follow him in suffering as an indication of Christ's divinity. As Kierkegaard puts it in his journal, 'But how divine - to invite man to sheer suffering and agony - truly this assures one of the rightness of his cause - it is divine!' (SKS25/KJN9: NB27:38 [JP4:4699]).

2 Cor 8.9: Though Christ was Rich, he became Poor for the Sake of Human Beings There is probably a reference to 2 Cor 8.9 in a journal entry made in 1848, where Kierkegaard interprets the passage as a reference to the incarnation and links it with Phil 2.7. The text's richness-poverty motif is taken to refer to Christ's transition from being God to becoming a poor servant: 'Yes, in one sense he more than put himself in our place, for it is most burdensome to become poor when one has been rich, to become unhappy when one has been happy. No hum. being has been tested by such a reversal as this: to be God and then to become a lowly servant, to come down from earth to heaven' (SKS211 K]N5:NB7:14b [JP4:3930]). This passage should not be understood in a

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Gessian sense to mean that Christ ceased to be God for the duration of the incarnation and became wholly a human being. This is evident from a significant shift in tenses in the passage. Although Kierkegaard speaks of 'having been rich' and then 'becoming poor', of 'having been happy' and then 'becoming unhappy', he does not describe Christ as 'having been God' and then 'becoming a servant'. Rather he states that the greatest imaginable reversal is to be God, and then become a human being. That is, Christ remains God even though he has assumed the form of a servant. There appears to be an allusion to 2 Cor 8.9 in Kierkegaard's meditation on 'The Care of Abundance' in Christian Discourses. In this discourse he discusses how the wealthy Christian should deal with his wealth, namely by being 'just as ignorant of his earthly wealth as the poor Christian is of his earthly poverty. Just as the latter does not talk about his earthly poverty, he does not talk about his earthly wealth; they both talk about the very same thing, about the heavenly wealth, about existing before God as one who prays and gives thanks for the daily bread, as one who is God's steward' (SKSlO:43/CD, 31-2). It is only in this sense that 'the rich Christian has joy from his earthly wealth' (SKSlO:43/CD, 32). In the course of this discussion Kierkegaard appears to link the rich Christian's attitude to wealth with 2 Cor 8.9. He states that the rich Christian 'always bears in mind that he who possessed all the world's wealth gave up everything he possessed and lived in poverty, that consequently the life of holiness is lived in poverty, and thus in turn in ignorance of all the wealth that is possessed' (SKSI0:43/CD, 32, original emphasis). Christ thus provides the example of someone who, although rich, lived as though he were not rich. It is this attitude which the wealthy Christian should emulate. The third discourse in Part Two of Christian Discourses, 'the joy of it: that the poorer you become the richer you are able to make others' (SKSlO:125-341 CD, 114-23), seems to be a meditation on 2 Cor 6.10, in the course of which Kierkegaard appeals to 2 Cor 8.9 as the basis for understanding the relationship between riches and poverty: 'the greatest wealth [is] to be able to make others rich, this way to riches by becoming poor oneself' (SKSI0:12S/CD, 114). Indeed, this is the way to become truly rich. The riches of which Kierkegaard is speaking, however, are the 'goods of the spirit' (SKSI0:1321 CD, 122). Loss of earthly goods and the poverty this loss brings about is the way to spiritual goods, for, 'The poorer you become, the less frequent will be the moments in your life when you are selfishly occupied with yourself or with what in itself is selfish, the earthly, which draws a person's thoughts to himself in such a way that he no longer exists for others' (SKSlO:132/CD, 122). Christ provides the prototype for this relationship between riches and poverty. In what is clearly a reference to 2 Cor 8.9 Kierkegaard states that Christ 'was poor, but he certainly made others rich! And his life never expresses anything accidental, that he was poor in the accidental sense. No, his life is the essential truth and therefore showed that in order to make others rich one must oneself be poor'

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(SKSI0:132-3/CD. 122). For Kierkegaard. Christ 'was poor as long as he lived here on earth; therefore it was his task as long as he lived, every day, every hour, every moment, to make others rich' (SKSlO:133/CD, 122). Christ's poverty was necessary, because only by being poor himself was he able to give himself wholly to the task of making others rich. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, Christ 'did not descend from heaven in order to become poor. but descended in order to make others rich' (SKSlO:133/CD, 123, original emphasis). Poverty is not an end in itself. but is the means by which Christ makes others rich. Christ was not forced into poverty, but 'became poor, since it was his own free decision, his choice' (SKSlO:133/CD. 123, original emphasis). Yet, 'His decision was not to become poor, but his decision was to make others rich, and therefore he became poor' (SKSI0:133/CD, 123, original emphasis). Christ's poverty was also comprehensive. He was not poor in some areas, but not in others. In order to be poor in every respect and with regard to every human being, 'He lived as an outcast from human society, he associated only with sinners and publicans', which brought him a low reputation with his contemporaries (SKSIO:133/CD, 123).

Phil 2.6-11 Kierkegaard somewnes makes use ofPhil2.6-11 to expatiate on a pOint or to add a rhetorical flourish to his argument. In doing so, he often employs the biblical text in a way which distances it from its original meaning. Several instances of this type of use of Phil 2.6-11 can be found in Kierkegaard's writings. In Part Two of Either/Or B cites Phil 2.6-7 in his criticism of A's aesthetic mode of existence: 'And Christ did not regard it robbery to be equal with God but humbled himself, and you want to regard the intellectual gifts bestowed upon you as a robbery' (SKS3:25/E02:15-16). Here, then, B employs Phil 2.6-7 to contrast the aesthete's behaviour unfavourably with that of Christ. Our understanding of B's criticism depends on how we interpret the term 'robbery' in this passage. B seems to take Phil 2.6 in the sense of res rapta: Christ was equal with God. therefore he did not need to seize or 'steal' this equality, for it was already his. 4 In short, Christ was divine. Nevertheless, 4 According to the res rapta theory, ap1Ta.YfLoS [harpagmosl refers to something Christ already possesses. To have equality with God is not thus not a robbery (or a preswnption) on his part because it is something which he possesses by right, presumably by virtue of his being in the form of God. Phil 2.6 could thus be translated as 'Christ did not regard it as robbery to be equal with God'. When ap1TaYfLos is understood in this sense, Phil 2.6 becomes an affirmation of Christ's divinity. Christ was equal to God and this equality was his by right. For a discussion of res rapta and other interpretations of ap1TaYfLos, see R. P. Martin, Carmen Christi. Philippians ii.5-11 in recent interpretation and in the setting oj early Christian Worship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 134-64.

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despite his divinity and equality with God, Christ did not insist on his divine rights but humbled himself. Presumably the application of 'robbery' to A must be understood as having a meaning that parallels the meaning of the term when applied to Christ. This would mean that B's criticism of A is that A, like Christ, does not need to seize or steal the intellectual gifts which life has given him. These gifts rightfully belong to A and his possession of them is therefore not a 'robbery'. In contrast to Christ, however, the aesthete does not humble himself, but insists on exploiting his considerable intellectual gifts. These gifts, howeyer, as the context of the passage and B's further criticism makes clear, are not placed at the service of others, but are selfishly employed in 'hypochondriacal keenness and sophistry' in the service of A's self-interest and aesthetic enjoyment. Two pOints of interest emerge from B's criticism of A for our consideration of kenotic elements in Kierkegaard's writings. Firstly, as indicated above, B seems to understand ovx ap1Tay!-'ov ""Y1}oa'To [ouch harpagmon hegesatoj in the sense of res rapta. This implies that Kierkegaard understands Phil 2.6 as a statement of Christ's divinity. The second point of note arises from the second part of B's quotation from Phil 2, namely, that although Christ was equal with God he humbled himself [ydmygede sig selvj. Since this phrase immediately follows B's statement that Christ did not count it as robbery to be equal with God, it seems likely that 'humbled himself' renders eav'TOV EKEVWU€. This would appear to indicate that B understands kenosis as a euphemism for humility rather than as a statement of how the incarnation took place by some sort of selfemptying. A further point of interest is the use of 'ydmyge' to translate K€v6w. This is not the term employed in Biblia eller den ganske hellige Skrifts B~ger, which translates eav'Tov EKEVWO€V as 'forringede sig selv'. Nor is it the term use to render €'Ta1T€I.VWU€V eav'Tov in Phil 2.8. There may be another example of the literary or rhetorical use of the Philip· pians text in Prefaces. Nicolaus Notabene ironically applies what is possibly an allusion to Phil 2.7-8 notto Christ but to scholarship. In a satire on the inability of philosophers to live according to the philosophy of universal doubt they claim to espouse, Nicolaus comments that scholarship 'does not make great demands; it appears in a humble form [i ydmyg Skikkelse]; it expresses itself with the condescension [Nedladenhed] oflove' (SKS4:511/P, 50). Another example of this type of use of the Philippians Christ-hymn appears in The Sickness unto Death. Anti-Climacus introduces Phil 2.7 in a passage in which he criticizes as comical the man who 'stands and says the right thing, and consequently has understood it, and then when he acts he does the wrong thing, and thus shows that he has not understood it' (SKS11:204/SUD, 91). As an example of such a comical individual, Kierkegaard cites the person who claims to have understood Christ but does not act accordingly:

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When I see someone who declares he has completely understood how Christ went around in the form of a lowly servant, poor, despised, mocked, and, as Scripture tells us, spat upon - when I see the same person asSiduously make his way to the place where in worldly sagacity it is good to be, set himself up as securely as possible ... then I have often said privately to myself: 'Socrates, Socrates, Socrates, can it be possible that this man has understood what he says he has understood? (SKSll:20S/SUD, 91-2)

In their notes on this passage the Hongs make the plaUSible suggestion that Kierkegaard is alluding to Mynster (SUD 179 n.26). In the eighteen upbuilding discourses published in 1843-4 Kierkegaard occaSionally alludes to or cites verses from Phil 2.6-11. In the second of his Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 (SKS5:129-42/EUD, 125-39) Kierkegaard makes what appears to be a reference to Phil 2.1 0 when he argues that to use doubt to overcome doubt is 'doubt's stratagem to make a person believe that he by himself can overcome himself, as if he were able to perform the marvel unheard of in heaven or on earth or under the earth' (SKS5:13l1EUD, 128; emphasis added). A similar rhetorical use of Phil 2.10 appears in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where Johannes Climacus writes: 'Por the person who with infinite passion has had the inwardness to grasp the ethical, to grasp duty and the eternal validity of the universal, no terror in heaven, on earth. and in the abyss can compare with that of facing a collision in which the ethical becomes the temptation' (SKS7:234/CUP1:259). Among the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1844 Kierkegaard briefly alludes to the 'form of a servant' in the discourse on John the Baptist (SKS5:269-821 EUD, 275-89), but uses the phrase to refer to those who are genuinely servants and who should consequently recognize their status and the necessity of their decreasing in the presence of someone who should increase. As Kierkegaard puts it, there are 'many who at an early age are given to understand humbly that for them the form of a servant is not something assumed, those who at an early age are prompted to bear in mind that for them there is someone who must increase while they decrease!' (SKS5:27S/EUD, 281). Although not overtly Christological this passage nevertheless does have Christological implications. There is present in the text an implied contrast between 'form of a servant' when applied to figures such as John the Baptist and when applied to Christ. In the case of John the Baptist and other human beings the 'form of servant' is not something assumed. That is, they are by nature servants, whereas Christ's servanthood was something assumed in order to become a human being. More important than Kierkegaard's use of Phil 2.6-11 to add rhetorical flourishes to his consideration of non-Christological issues is his employment of it in his discussions of the Person of Christ. Each of these is important for giving us an insight into how Kierkegaard understood the Philippians hymn at different stages in his intellectual development.

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Kierkegaard's Lecture Notes The young Kierkegaard made acquaintance with the theological use of Phil 2.6-11 in the various lectures he attended as a student. The notes of these lectures have been preserved among Kierkegaard's papers, thus enabling us to gain an insight into some of the possible influences on Kierkegaard's understanding of Phil 2.6-1l. Several references to Phil2.6-U appear in Kierkegaard's notes on Clausen's lectures on the Person and Work of Christ (SKS19/K}N3:Notl:7, pp. 32-53), which formed part of Clausen's course on dogmatics. Clausen seems to have subscribed to the ethical interpretation of the Philippians text. This would seem to be indicated by the fact Kierkegaard notes that Clausen regards Phil 2.3-5, which form part of Paul's introduction to Phil 2.6-11, as evidence that Paul understands Christ's assumption of the form of a servant as an example of obedience, love, and self-sacrifice (SKS19/K}N3:Notl:7, p. 48). Phil 2.7-8 is also briefly mentioned as an indication of Christ's obedience and 'the lowliness of his circumstances' (SKS19/K}N3:Notl:7, p. 33, 35). Kierkegaard also notes Clausen's interpretation of Phil 2.6-11 in metaphysical terms. Among the passages Clausen cites as evidence that 'Chr. reveals God's being on earth and is therefore depicted as the object of reverence' Kierkegaard mentions Phil 2.7 and 2.10 (SKS19/K}N3:Notl:7, p. 36). A few pages later Kierkegaard's notes mention Phil 2.10 in conjunction with the genus majestaticum (SKSl91KJN3: Not1:7, p. 39), an indication that Kierkegaard was aware of the communicatio idiomatum from an early date. A further reference to Philippians occurs in a marginal comment on Clausen's discussion of the biblical texts which deal with Christ's human nature, where Kierkegaard remarks that, 'A merely apparent hum. nature is suggested at Rom 8:3; Phil 2:7, but these prove nothing against the reality of his nature' (SKS19/K}N3:Not1:7, p. 35). In other words, Clausen seems to have made Kierkegaard aware that although these two passages could be taken to support docetism, they do not actually deny that Christ was truly human. According to Kierkegaard's lecture notes, Clausen cited Phil 2.9 as one of the New Testament texts which express 'Chr.'s glorification, whereby he is distinguished from every hum. being' (SKS19/KJN3:Notl:7, p. 34). Kierkegaard states simply 'vtPova(}a~ Acts 2:33; Phil 2:9.' This would seem to indicate that either Clausen or Kierkegaard himself understands vtPova(}at [to be exalted] in Acts 2.33 and V1TEpvtP0va(}at [literally, to be super-exalted] in Phil 2.9 to be synonymous. References to the Philippians hymn can also be found in Kierkegaard's notes of Martensen's lectures on speculative dogmatics of 1838-39 (Pap. II C 26-8, vol. 13, pp. 3-116). Both these references, however, come from the transcript Kierkegaard owned rather than from his own notes. The first reference is to Phil 2.7 and 2.10 as referring to the status exinanitionis and

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the status exaltationis respectively (Pap. II C 28; Pap. 13, p. 66). The author of these notes, however, has misquoted €aV70V €KfVWGf as €K€JIWGf GmV70V. Paragraph 99 of the notes lists Phil 2.9 as one of the biblical supports for the doctrine of apocatastasis (Pap. II C 28; vol. 13, p. 115).

SKS17IKlN1:CC:2, p. 152 Of particular interest in giving us an insight into the young Kierkegaard's understanding of Phil 2.6-11 are the Latin translations of Paul's letters which Kierkegaard undertook in 1834, presumably as part of C. E. Scharling's course in exegesis.s Kierkegaard used Bretschneider's Greek-Latin dictionary in the preparation of these translations,6 but as Bruun and Jensen point out, 'It is no surprise that the schooled philologist Kierkegaard uses the dictionary very judiciously, and one can perceive in him a great desire to find new and different solutions from the ones which Bretschneider gives: 7 Among Kierkegaard's translations of the New Testament is a translation of Philippians. The decisions Kierkegaard has made in rendering into Latin the problematic terms in the Greek original gives us an insight into his understanding of the Philippians hymn at this stage in his thinking, particularly when contrasted with the standard Danish translation of the time, namely the Biblia eller den ganske hellige Skrifts Beger, and with the Vulgate. 8

5 In the winter semester of 1834-5 C. E. Scharling offered a course on Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, which may have prompted Kierkegaard to embark on the translation of Philippians and Colossians. This is the view of Ammundsen and, more recently, Bruun and Jensen (Valdemar Ammundsen, SBren Kierkegaards Ungdom: hans Slregt og hans religiese Udvikling (Copenhagen: Gads Foriag, 1912), 89; Niels W. Bruun and Finn Gredal Jensen, 'Critical Account of the Text', in KJN!. pp. 427-33; 428). Kierkegaard made his translations from Knapp's edition of the Greek New Testament, of which he owned two editions: Georg Christian Knapp (ed.), Novum Testamentum Graece (Halle: Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1829, 1840; ASKB 14-17). In his discussion of Phil 2.7a Kierkegaard follows Knapp in omitting the movable nu from tlav'TOV EKlwUfV. For a discussion of Kierkegaard's Latin translations of the ~reek New Testament, see Kalle Sorainen, 'Einige Beobachtungen im Bezug auf die lateinischen Ubersetzungen S0ren Kierkegaards aus dem griechischen N-:uen Testament', Kierkegaardiana 9 (I 974), 56-74. For a critique of Sorainen and an alternative view of Kierkegaard's Latin translations, see Niels W. Bruun and Finn Gredal Jensen, 'Kierkegaard's Latin Translations of the New Testament: A Constant Dialogue with the Vulgate', in Lee C. Barrett and Jon Stewart (eds), Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, volume 1: Kierkegaard and the Bible, Tome II: The New Testament (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 221-36; 226. 6 Carl Gottlieb Bretschneider, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Johannes Ambrosius Barth, 2nd revised edn. 1829). 7 Bruun and Jensen, 'Kierkegaard's Latin Translations of the New Testament', 225. 8 Since the bible translations of Kalkar and Lindberg were published after Kierkegaard's translation of Philippians, we can leave them to one side.

Kierkegaard's Knowledge of Kenotic Christology Phil

Greek

2.6a

2.6b

Danish

Vulgate

Kierkegaard's translation

€v /L0P¢>flIJEOV &rrapxwv

hvilken, der han var i Guds Skikkelse,

qui cum in forma Dei esset

ollx 4fJ'1TaY/LOv

ikke holdt det for et Rov at va-re Gud lig;

non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo sed semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens

qui quamquam erat in similitudine Dei non furtum habuit similem esse deo

a,

~y..]oaTo

2.6c

TO EivaL i aa (J£~

2.7a

(LU'

EauToII

£KEvWO£

2.7b

/LOp"'~V Aa/3wv

2.7c

" 0/LOLW/La.n , EV QIJ8pOJ7TWV YEVO/LEVO,

2.7d

Kat C1)(..]~TL

.souAoli

w,

EVPEIJEt, av/Jpw1To,

2.8a

'

.

~Ta1TE'LVWO'E'V

'-avTov

2.8b

2.9a 2.9b-c

89

YEVO/LEVO, &rr..]KOO, /L~PL Oava:rou .. . &rrEpu.pwaE •.•

exap,aaTo aVTtjJ TO oJlop.a

70 im€P wav

ovo/La •••

men han forringede sig seiv, idet han tog en Tjeners Skikkelse paa, og blev Mennesker lig, og da han var funden i Skikkelse sam et Menneske,9 fornedrede han sig seiv, saa han blev lydig indtil D0den ... h0it oph0iet ... skjenket ham et Navn, sam er over alt Navn ...

in similltudine hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo humillavit semet ipsum factus oboediens usque ad mortem ... exaltavit ... donavit illi nomen super omne nomen ...

sed sese exinanivit servi forma suscepta in similltudine hominum constitutus et Iigura inventus est ut homo exinanivit sese metipsum obediens factus ad mortem ... superexaltavit ... et largitus est ei nomen super omne nomen ...

2.6a

Kierkegaard's translation of os ... il1T6.pxwII as qui quamquam erat indicates that he understands Phil 2.6 as concessive rather than causative. That is, for Kierkegaard it was despite rather than because Christ was in the form of God that he Wldertook the actions described in the subsequent verses. This means that Kierkegaard assumes that Christ's actions in Phil 2.6b-8 stand in contrast to what he is by virtue of his being in the form of God. That is, because Christ is in the form of God we would not expect him to carry out the actions described in Phil 2.6b--S. Kierkegaard's translation of ~v jJ-op1>iJ (JEOV as in similitudine Dei is surprising. The primary meaning of similitudo is 'likeness' or 'resemblance'. The term can also be employed to convey the meaning of 'imitation' and 'analogy'. The advantage of the choice of this term to translate jJ-oP1>~ is that it is able to address the problem of how Christ can be 'in' a form. The phrase ~II jJ-op1>iJ is an Wlusual one. We should

9

Phil 2.8 in the Danish Bible.

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Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

expect the author of the Philippians hymn to have written either I-'Opq,~v (Jwu EXWV, ie. Christ having the form of God, or lv q,t)(m BEOU tmapxwv, i.e. Christ being in the nature of God. To what degree Kierkegaard was consdous of the problem Phil 2.6 presents is impossible to ascertain. He has, however, eliminated the difficulty posed by the Greek text by translating EV I-'opq,iJ as in similitudine. The problem with this translation, however, is that it obscures the contrast Phil 2.6-11 makes between I-'opq,~ BEOU and I-'Opq,~ SovAov. As we shall see in due course, Kierkegaard translates the latter phrase as forma seM, thus rendering the one Greek term I-'opq,~ by two different Latin terms. Can we establish on the basis of the translation of EV I-'opq,iJ (JEOU as in similitudine Dei whether Kierkegaard held Phil 2.6 to refer to Christ's preexistence? His use of similitudo to translate I-'opq,~ may indicate that he did not conceive of Phil 2.6 as a reference to pre-existence, for it is difficult to conceive of Kierkegaard holding that the pre-existent Christ only resembled God, which would imply a gradation of divinity within the Godhead. God the Father would seem to be God in the full sense, while Christ was only the similitude of God. This would be Arianism, yet it is clear from elsewhere in his writings that Kierkegaard was orthodox in his understanding of the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation. It thus seems likely that Kierkegaard understands Phil 2.6 to be a reference to the logos ensarkos. As the logos ensarkos Christ is God under the conditions of existence. Consequently, he is not directly identifiable as God, but is nevertheless the similitude of God.

2.6b Kierkegaard translates ~y~aa'To as habuit, which corresponds to the Danish 'holdt det for'. Kierkegaard's choice of habuit over the Vulgate's arbitratus est may be due to the influence of the standard Danish version of 2.6b. It is difficult to be sure why Kierkegaard has opted for furtum rather than the Vulgate's rapina as a translation for ap'TTayl-'o, especially since the Latin Fathers usually rendered ap'TTaywJs as rapina. Alternatively, Kierkegaard may have been aware of the figurative meanings of furtum. Not only can it mean 'theft' or 'robbery', but also 'trick' or 'intrigue'. If Kierkegaard was conscious of this range of meanings, it may be that he chose the term furtum in order to emphasize that Christ's equality with God ('TO dva, ,aa (JECP) was not a deception but was genuine. Nevertheless, the fact that Kierkegaard has opted to translate ap'TTayl-'OS as 'theft' or 'robbery', albeit by a different term from that of the Vulgate, indicates that he subscribes to the interpretation of ap'TTayl-'os as res rapta. That is, Kierkegaard, like many of the Latin Fathers,1O understands ap'TTayl-'oS' to mean 10 The interpretation of d(YTTayl-'os as res rapta was - with some exceptions, notably Hilary _ advanced by the Latin Fathers: Tertullian, de resurr. carn. 6; adv. Prax. 7; adv. Marc. v.20; Ambrose, defid. II. 8; Augustine, Sermons 92,118,183,186,213,244,264,292,304; cf. in Psalm. xc.

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'a thing having-been-snatched', i.e. a thing obtained by robbery or theft. On this understanding, ap7TaY/Los refers to something Christ already possesses. Consequently, equality with God is not thus not something he has arrogated to himself, for it is already his by right by virtue of his being in the form of God When ap7TaY/Los is understood in this sense, Phil 2.6b-c becomes an affirmation of C?rist's divinity. Christ was equal to God and this equality was his by right. Kierkegaard thus seems to understand the verse as an affirmation of Christ's divine status.

2.6c Kierkegaard's translation of 'TO Elva, i'ca 8Eep seems to have been influenced by the official Danish translation, for 'similem esse deo' seems to be closer to the Danish 'at vrere Gud lig' [to be like God] than to the Greek original. Kierkegaard has chosen to translate i'ca as similem, a cognate of the earlier similitudo, meaning 'like' or 'similar'. In contrast to the Vulgate, then, which takes the phrase as an expression of Christ's equality with God, Kierkegaard seems to understand the phrase to mean that Christ was similar to God. This choice of terms thus again seems to imply an Arian or Semi-Arlan (homoiousian) interpretation of the passage. 2.7a

This is the point in his translation where Kierkegaard comes close to the Vulgate. Like the Greek term KEVOW the Latin term exinanio has the meaning of 'to empty'. We cannot straightforwardly conclude from this, however, that Kierkegaard's translation of €K'VWCE as exinanivit indicates that he conceives of Christ as emptying himself of something in order to become incarnate, for Kierkegaard employs the term again to translate €'Ta7TE~VWcEV in 2.8a (the Vulgate more accurately renders €'Ta7TE~VWCf:V as humiliavit). The crucial question here is what Kierkegaard understands by €K'VWCE. Does he understand it to refer to self-emptying or humiliation? Since Bretschneider cites as the meanings of KEVOW 'vacuum facio, exinanio; ausleeren; spolio', it is certainly possible that Kierkegaard conceives of £aV'ToJ) €K'VWCE as denoting selfemptying. If he understands the term in this sense, however, it makes his second use of exinanivit in Phil. 2.8a difficult to understand. If Christ has emptied himself of his divine attributes or prerogatives by the act of kenosis described in Phil. 2.7a, then how is he able to empty himself a second time in Phil. 2.8a? If he has already divested himself of his divine status, then how is a second divestment possible? Put at its most simple, if something has been emptied once, how - if it is indeed empty - can it be emptied a second time? Such considerations lead to the conclusion that it is 'Ta7TELVOw that determines the meaning of KEVOW/exinanio for Kierkegaard. That is, he understands this

92

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

cluster of terms as synonyms for humiliation. This, however, raises the question of why Kierkegaard chose exinanivit over humiliavit. The likely answer is firstly that Kierkegaard wished to distinguish his translation from that of the Vulgate, which employs humiliavit. Secondly, an alternative translation lay close at hand, since in his entry on KG6w Bretschneider states not only that the term can denote emptying, but also that eavTov h€VWUE is ' \ , \ 11 synonymous W1.th ETa7THVWUEV EaVTOV. If this interpretatio~ is correct and Kierkegaard understands exinanivit in the sense of humiliavit, then it would seem to indicate that at this stage of his thinking Kierkegaard conceived of kenosis primarily as an act of self-hwniliation on Christ's part rather than as an act of self-emptying or abandonment of certain divine attributes or prerogatives on the part of the pre-existent Christ.

2.7b Kierkegaard's translation of 1.w£Xl>~ as forma, in contrast to his translation of the term in Phil2.6a as similitudo, eliminates the parallelism of the phrases Jv p,oPrPfJ (}eov and p,oprP~v SovAov, and thus obscures the contrast between Christ's divine and hwnan forms. Kierkegaard has chosen to translate p,oPrP~v SovAov Aa{Jwv as servi forma suscepta. The thinking underlying this translation becomes visible if we compare it with the Vulgate's formam servi aCcipiens. The Vulgate translates the nominative singular masculine second aorist participle Aa{Jwv as a present participle, i.e. as if it were Aap,{J&.vwv. This translation is acceptable because the Vulgate clearly understands Aa{Jwv to be governed by €KfVWUe, since accipiens is governed by exinanivit and is also determined by the tense of exinanivit. The Vulgate solves the problem of the two aorists JKfVWUE and Aa{Jwv by translating JK€VWUe by means of the perfect exinanivit, and Aa{Jwv as a present active participle, i.e. accipiens. This gives the meaning of simultaneity to both terms. That is, the Vulgate takes €K€VWUE and Aa{Jwv to refer to simultaneous actions. Christ 'empties himself' by taking on the form of a servant. This is also the translation adopted by the Biblia eller den ganske hellige Skrifts Beger, which like the Vulgate understands the kenosis to consist in Christ's assumption of the servant form: idet han tog en Tjeners Skikkelse paa. Kierkegaard, however, adopts a different solution from that of the Vulgate and the standard Danish version by translating the accusative p,oprP~v SovAov AafJwv into the ablative absolute servi forma suscepta. In doing so he changes II 'In N. T. Phil 2, 7. iavTov EKEVWrlE, se ipse spoJiavit nimirum honoribus divinis .... Alii: humilern se gessit. ita ut conveniat cum ETa1TEivwrlEV EavTov' [In NT Phil. 2.7. EaV'I'OV EKEVWrlE. he certainly stripped himself of his divine honours. Alternatively: he behaved humbly in such a way so that it agrees with ETa1TdvwrlEV EavTcw J. Bretschneider, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum, 1:664.

Kierkegaard's Knowledge of Kenotic Christology

93

the aorist active participle (A«/3wv), a grammatical form unavailable in Latin, to the perfect passive participle (susceptus, having been taken up), thus rendering the meaning as 'with the form of a servant having been taken up'. In adopting this translation, Kierkegaard remains truer to the tenses of the Greek original than the Vulgate. On the other hand, by employing the perfect passive participle rather than the Vulgate's present active participle Kierkegaard weakens the notion of Christ's agency, which seems to be emphasized in the Vulgate's use of aCcipiens (accepting the form of a servant). These, however, are nuances of translation that may be due rather to the difficulties of rendering a Greek text into Latin than to any theological considerations on Kierkegaard's part. Nevertheless, the basic thrust of Kierkegaard's translation is clear. Phil 2.7b-d should be understood parenthetically or epexegeticallyas qualifying exinanivit in 2.7a. The phrases in Phil2.7b-d express in more detail the nature of Christ's humiliation, namely that despite his similitude with God Christ adopted the form of a servant and thus came to resemble an ordinary human being. In other words, if we wish to know what Christ's humiliation consisted in, we must turn to 2.7b-d for the answer. The fact that.Kierkegaard employs the term similitudo as one of the terms to describe Christ's humanity, however, indicates that Christ's being is not exhausted in his becoming an ordinary human being. The term expresses that Christ appears to be human. This is probably not to be taken in a docetic sense, but is most likely employed in order to indicate that though Christ is indeed a human being, yet he is at the same time more than just a human being. 2.8a

The fact that Kierkegaard translates E'TU7T€I.VWC1€V by exinanivit would seem to indicate that he understands Phil2.8a to pick up on the themes of humiliation introduced in Phil2.7a. This is a further indication that he sees Phil 2.7b-d as an epexegetical parenthesiS to 2.7a. Christ's primary humiliation was giving up his likeness with God and becoming a servant. Phil2.8a indicates the extent of Christ's self-humiliation. He was prepared not merely to live as an ordinary, lowly human being despite his divine likeness, but was also prepared to undergo the humiliation of death, thereby demonstrating his obedience.

2.9 The only other points of note in Kierkegaard's translation are found in his treatment of Phil 2.9. Whereas the Vulgate translates tJ7T€PVt/JWC1€ as 'exaltavit' [he exalted] Kierkegaard opts for the superlative form 'superexaltavit' [he super-exalted]. This raises the question of whether Kierkegaard believed at this point in his thinking that Christ was raised to a higher status

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

94

than he had occupied in his state of pre-existence prior to the incarnation. Alternatively, Kierkegaard may simply have chosen 'superexaltavit' as a literal rendering of tnrepvt/Jwa€ and given little thought to the theological issues his translation raises. Despite the difficulty of fully penetrating Kierkegaard's mind when he made his Latin translation of Phil 2.6-11, some significant facts emerge from our discussion. It seems likely on the basis of Kierkegaard's choice of tenns that he did not read Phil 2.6-8 as a reference to Christ's transition from pre-existence to the incarnate state, but rather as a reference to the humiliation of the incarnate Christ. This humiliation consists not in the transition from preexistence to incarnation, but in the already incarnate Christ's refusal to exploit his divine similitude in order to live his earthly life in the form of a servant, i.e. a lowly human being, even to the point of dying a humiliating death. This is not to deny that Kierkegaard subscribed to the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence. As we shall see in due course, Kierkegaard accepted this doctrine without demur. It merely means that at this point in his thinking Kierkegaard did not read Phil 2.6-11 as a description of the metaphysics of the incarnation but rather as an expression of the willing self-humiliation which Christ took upon himself during his earthly ministry. This means that the subject of Phil 2.6-11 is the logos ensarkos, the God-man in both natures, rather than the pre-existent and therefore pre-incarnate divine Logos. If this is the case, then Kierkegaard was at this pOint in his thinking fully in line with the mainstream Lutheran interpretation of Phi12.6-11 as laid down by the Decisio Saxonica of 1624. Alternatively, we may be guilty of reading too much into Kierkegaard's Latin translation. Kierkegaard's sometimes idiosyncratic choice of Latin terms may have been motivated not by theological considerations but simply by his desire to provide a Latin translation that differed from that of the Vulgate. Bruun and Jensen note that, 'Kierkegaard is in a constant dialogue with the Vulgate, which he ambitiously strives to surpass: 12 If this is the case, then his choice of terms may have been influenced simply by the desire to be different, rather than by any theological reflections, What this exercise does show us, however, is that Kierkegaard was well acquainted with the locus classicus of kenotic Christology from an early date.

Philosophical Fragments In Philosophical Fragments Climacus frequently employs terminology drawn from Phil 2.6-8 to unfold the nature of the non-Socratic teacher. We shall postpone our discussion of Climacus' employment of the concepts of

12

Bruun and Jensen, 'Critical Account of the Text ofJournal KK', 441.

Kierkegaard's Knowledge of Kenotic Christo logy

95

'lowl~ess' and '~ervant form' to chapter four. Here we are concerned only to examme how Clunacus employs direct quotations from Phil 2.6-11. Surprisingly, although the work is peppered with references to the servant form, there appears to be only one substantial quotation from Phil 2.6-11 in Philosophical Fragments. This appears in Climacus' discussion of the situation of the contemporary follower, where Climacus states of the god that, 'He humbled himself and took the form of a servant' (SKS4:259fPF. 56). What we appear to have here is a quotation of Phil2.7a-b. Of significance is Climacus' translation of €o-v-rov lK€VWUe as 'forringede sig selv'. The Hongs have translated the phrase as 'humbled himself', but 'forringe' contains the idea of reduction or limitation. Climacus' translation would thus at least imply the possibility of a kenotic understanding of Phil 2.7a. That is. kenosis involved the limitation of the divine nature in order that the god could assume the form of a servant. Climacus merely states this as a matter of fact. however. and does not offer any explanation as to how the god can assume the servant form and still retain his divine status.

The Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1844 The first of the Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1844 is a meditation on the theme of: 'To need God is a human being's highest perfection' (SKS5:291-316f EUD, 297-326). Kierkegaard considers the needful, destitute human being who finds comfort in the grace of God. But what is the grace of God? It is not something obvious in the world and should not be equated with receiving all that one desires (SKS5:297/EUD, 301-2). On the contrary, the grace of God is not glorious in the earthly sense of riches, power, and fame. To urge someone to be content with divine grace in this sense would be greeted with a smile. for an individual 'graced' by wealth and fame would regard it as self-evident that he should be content with his good fortune (SKS5:294/EUD, 300-1). Such an understanding of grace, however, confuses 'the earthly and worldly difference' with 'the God-difference' (SKS5:297/EUD, 301). The grace of God is not mediated by material and temporal things (SKS5:297/EUD, 302), but is something that is glorious in and for itself. It is for this reason that the human being can in his/her destitution find comfort in resting contented with the grace of God. Such a human being is like the destitute person who 'dared to enjoy the friendship of a powerful personage, but this powerful man could do nothing for him (that the grace of God allows the absence of earthly evidence corresponds to this), nevertheless. the fact that he had such a friendship was nevertheless already very much' (SKS5:297/EUD, 302). Here, however, the destitute individual may face a problem. Although he may recognize that 'the powerful man actually was not able to do anything for him, ... how could he be definitively convinced that God cannot - he is, after all, almighty!' (SKS5:297fEUD, 302). It is this awareness that God could act,

96

Kierkegaard's Kenotic Christology

yet apparently refuses to do so, that accounts for the human being finding it difficult to rest contented in the grace of God. The human being is impatient and wishes to enjoy and profit from the grace of God in the immediate present. It is at this point that Kierkegaard introduces what seems to be an allusion to In 17.5 and Phil 2.7. Kierkegaard speaks of the impatience that 'is cooled and calmed down in the quiet incorruptibility of the inner being' as the human being comprehends better and better the maxim 'be contented with the grace of God' (SKS5:297/EUD, 302). As a result of the cooling and calming down of impatience, Kierkegaard writes, 'the heart is stirred and sometimes, at least, sees the divine glory that had taken on a lowly form' (SKS5:297/EUD, 302-3). Even if this divine glory vanishes. leaving the human being in his or her Original destitution, that person can still take comfort in being contented with the grace of God, which it is 'the only blessedness' to possess (SKS5:297/EUD, 303). Through being content with God's grace and suffering the hardships of life with patience. the human being may gain a glimpse of the divine glory, but even if the divine glory is not visible or vanishes, the individual should still remain in contentment, for s/he has the assurance of the grace of God. Kierkegaard does not specify the nature or identity of the lowly form assumed by the divine glory, but it is difficult not to read it Christologically. The fact that God himself has become a lowly servant should give the believer the strength to endure the hardships of life. God's solidarity with the destitute believer should comfort the believer. It is this comfort given by the lowly form God has assumed that constitutes divine grace.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript In the course of his critique of childish forms of Christianity in Postscript Climacus takes issue with what he believes to be a misunderstanding of the nature of the paradox of the incarnation. During this discussion he appears to allude to Phil 2.6-8. For childish Christianity the paradox consists in the contrast between Christ's humiliation and his divine glory. Childish orthodoxy, Climacus writes, 'drawls] decisive attention to the fact that Christ at his birth was wrapped in rags and laid in a manger - in short, on the humiliation of his coming in the humble form of a servant, and believes that this is the paradox in contrast to coming in glory' (SKS7:5411CUP1:596). This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the paradox, however, for, 'The paradox is primarily that God, the eternal has entered into time as an individual human being: Consequently, 'Whether this individual human being is a servant or an emperor makes no difference', for, 'It is not more adequate for God to be a king than to be a beggar; it is not more humiliating for God to become a beggar than to become an emperor' (SKS7:5411CUPl:596).

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Childish Christianity reduces the paradox to the humorous. It identifies the humiliation of Christ with his decision to become a servant rather than to accept the high office of king or emperor. Childish Christianity assumes that 'it is easy to understand that God becomes a particular human being', and that the difficulty lies only in God having become 'a lowly and despised human being' (SKS7:5411CUP1:596-7). This is humorous because it reduces the difference between God and humankind to merely a relative difference. Childish Christianity fails to recognize that for God to be even the highest and most exalted of human beings is a humiliation, for there still remains a qualitative difference between God and the human. The paradox, however, is not between the two human states of kingship and servanthood, between high and low human status, but between the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, the holy and the sinful. It is the entry of God into human existence that constitutes the humiliation and which gives rise to the paradox, because eternity is a fundamentally and qualitatively different category from human existence. The contradiction that gives rise to the paradox lies not within existence, but between existence and eternity. The paradox and the humiliation it entails is that God has entered a sphere that is in fundamental opposition to his divine nature.

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits The first discourse of Part Three of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits is a meditation on what it means to be a follower of Christ. Kierkegaard takes as his text Lk 14.27, but in the course of unpacking the meaning of this text, he draws on numerous other passages from Scripture in order to unfold ever more fully the nature of Christian discipleship. One of the passages he cites is Phil 2.5-8. The text of the discourse, Lk 14.27, makes clear that following Christ means taking up one's cross. But what does it mean to take up one's cross? The answer is prOvided by Mt 16.24, which makes clear that, 'To carry one's cross means to deny oneself' (SKS8:322/UDVS, 221). But this then raises the question of the nature of self-denial. How should I deny myself if I am truly to be a follower of Christ? The answer to this question is provided by Phil 2.5-8, which Kierkegaard cites as follows: it was 'this mind that was in Christ Jesus, he who thought it not robbery to be equal with God but humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even to death on the cross.' In this discourse, then, Kierkegaard takes Phil 2.5-8 as an exposition of Christian discipleship. Although Kierkegaard has placed this passage in quotation marks it is not a direct quotation but a paraphrase of Phil 2.5-8. Kierkegaard has omitted the phrases €v p.op¢iJ 8EOU lnrapxwv and Jl-Op¢~v 8ovAov Aa{Jwv from his quotation. He also seems to have translated €K&WUE as 'fornedrede sig selv', i.e. he humbled himself, rather than as 'forringede sig selv', i.e. he 'reduced himself'.

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Alternatively, he may have conflated €KEVWaE with €'Ta:TrELVWaEv, and understood both terms to refer to Christ's humility. Kierkegaard has probably altered the text in order to bring out more fully its teaching on self-denial. This would account for his omission of Phil 2.6a and 2.7b-d, since these omissions allow the contrast between Christ's equality with God and his humbling himself to become more prominent. Kierkegaard has eliminated precisely those elements of the text which speak of the incarnation. The text thus becomes a statement of the incarnate Christ's self-denial. Despite his being equal with God he did not exploit this equality, but denied himself in humble obedience for the whole of his earthly life. Kierkegaard's adaptation of the text to bring out more fully the theme of self-denial also explains his handling of individual elements of Phil 2.6-S. His paraphrase of Phil 2.6-8 dearly indicates that he understands the phrase oux ap7TaY/kov 1}y~aa'To 'TO Elva! raa ()EcjJ to mean that Christ is equal with God. This is tonfirmed a few pages later when Kierkegaard states that, 'He who was equal with God took the form of a lowly servant' (SKSS:326/UDVS, 224). Here Kierkegaard has eliminated all ambiguity by removing the problematic phrase oux aprraY/kov 'ljy~aa'To and turning Phil 2.6c into an overt statement of Christ's divinity. Kierkegaard thus again seems to subscribe to the res rapta view of Phil 2.6b-c. That is, Christ does not need to seize equality with God because he is already in possession of it. Christ is an example of self-denial precisely because he lives as a lowly servant despite being equal with God. Kierkegaard takes the phrase 'obedient unto death' (Phil 2.8b) to indicate that discipleship is a lifelong task. The true disciple does not take up his cross just once and then lay it down. True diScipleship means taking up one's cross, and continuing to carry that cross for one's entire life. The cross of self-denial, Kierkegaard emphasizes, 'is to be carried in obedience unto death, so that the imitator [Efteif~lger], even if he does not die on the cross, nevertheless resembles the prototype in dying "with the cross on'" (SKS8:323/UDVS, 221). Kierkegaard, then, takes Phil 2.8b-c as complementing Mt 16.24. Whereas Mt 16.24 speaks of the need for the diSciple to take up his cross, Phil 2.8b-c describes 'the next step', namely, 'the protracted continuation' of carrying one's cross (SKS8:323/UDVS, 222). It expresses the necessity of constant and continual self-denial on the part of the diSciple. Although /kOpcP~v 5ovAou Aa{3wv is eliminated from Kierkegaard's quotation of Phil 2.6-8, he does allude to the phrase later in the discourse as a summary of the behaviour expected of the Christian disciple: 'To follow Christ means, then, to deny oneself and means to walk the same road Christ walked in the lowly form of a servant, indigent, forsaken, mocked, not loving the world and not loved by it' (SKS8:32S/UDVS, 223; emphasis added). It is noticeable that Kierkegaard has again adapted the biblical text to suit his purposes, for he has added 'lowly' (ringe) to the phrase 'form of a servant'. In doing so, he has again brought out the contrast between Christ's divine status and the human form

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Christ assumed during his earthly existence. That Christ, who was equal with God, should have walked the earth in the lowly form of a servant means that Christ is the ultimate exemplar of self-denial. If you call yourself a Christian, you must follow his example, take up your cross and deny yourself. There may be a further allusion to the Philippians text in what appears to be a reference to Phil 2.9: 'Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every other name.' Allusions to this passage occur in Kierkegaard's discussion of a young man standing on the threshold of life, where many roads lie open before him (SKS8:326!UDVS, 225). To aid him in deciding which road he should follow the young man 'would make careful inquiries into where each particular road leads or, what amounts to the same thing, try to find out who has walked this road previously' (SKS8:326!UDVS, 225). To help him in his decision, we might 'mention to him the famous, the eulogized, the glorious names of those whose memory is preserved among the people' (SKS8:326!UDVS, 225). The young man, however, would narrow the choice down until there remained 'the one and only name'. It is the road that this single, most excellent of all names has followed that the young man, too, will follow. What, then, is this name? 'This name', Kierkegaard says, 'is the name of our Lord Jesus Christ' (SKS8:327! UDVS, 226). Christ is the one name, who has gone before us and shown us the path we must tread to eternal happiness (SKS8:328-30IUDVS, 227-9). He is thus the only name and the name above all names, for he is the prototype whom human beings are called upon to follow: There is only one name in heaven and on earth, only one road, only one prototype. The person who chooses to follow Christ chooses the name that is above every name, the prototype that is supremely lifted up above all heavens, but yet at the same time is human in such a way that it can be the prototype for a human being, that it is named and shall be named in heaven and on earth, in both places, as the highest name. (SKS8:327/UDVS, 225-6)

And because 'the name of Christ is the one and only name in heaven and earth', this means that, 'Between heaven and earth there is only one road: to follow Christ' (SKS8:330/UDVS, 229). This, however, is a road which we can all choose, and if we wish to be followers of Christ we must choose this road. Kierkegaard's allusion to Phil 2.9 in his discussion of the young man's lifechoices is another example of his adaptation of the Philippians text into a vehicle to express the nature of Christian diScipleship. In Kierkegaard's hands the text is no longer simply a statement of the glory of the exalted Christ, but a call to follow Christ on the road of self-denial which he trod before us. In Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Kierkegaard is thus not overtly employing Phil 2.6-11 to address the issues raised by the two-natures doctrine. There is no hint of a doctrine of kenosis here. The passage is employed as an example of the behaviour that is expected of the follower of Christ. This

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seems to indicate that in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Kierkegaard subscribes to the ethical interpretation of Phil 2.6-11, i.e. the reason for the presence of this text in Paul's Letter to the Philippians is to encourage Christians to adopt a moral stance and mode of behaviour appropriate to followers of Christ. Whereas modern scholars tend to interpret the Philippians hymn as a call for humility and obedience,13 however, Kierkegaard interprets it in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits as a call to be prepared to suffer as Christ himself suffered. Nevertheless, although in the first discourse in Part Three of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Kierkegaard takes the Philippians hymn not as a Christological text but as an exhortation to self-denial, kenotic elements do appear to be present in his thinking about Christ in this discourse. These kenotic elements emerge in Kierkegaard's reflection on the nature of Christ's self-denial. Christ was equal with God and yet assumed the form of a lowly servant; What was it that Christ denied himself in doing so? Kierkegaard's exposition implies that Christ's self-denial consisted in two things. Firstly, it involved the renunciation of privileges belonging to his divine nature. As equal with God Christ had the power to 'command legions of angels, 4ldeed, could command the world's creation and its destruction' (SKS8:326/UDVS, 224). Kierkegaard thus seems to subscribe to the view of Christ as the divine Logos responsible for creating and sustaining the universe. Despite this power over the universe, however, Christ chose to become a lowly servant and 'walked about defenseless; he who had everything in his power surrendered all power and could not even do anything for his beloved disciples but could only offer them the very same conditions of lowliness and contempt' (SKS8:326/UDVS, 224). At first sight Kierkegaard's statement here would seem to imply that Christ lost his powers over creation on becoming a human being. On this reading, Kierkegaard would indeed seem to be advocating a kenotic Christology, namely, one whereby Christ gave up his cosmic powers on becoming incarnate. The next sentence Kierkegaard writes, however, must make us question this judgement: 'he who was the lord of creation constrained nature itself to keep quiet, for it was not until he had given up his spirit that the curtain tore and the graves opened and the powers of nature betrayed who he was: if this is not self-denial, what then is self-denial!' (SKS8:326/UDVS, 224-5). This passage seems to indicate that Christ did not renounce his power, but continued to exercise it secretly. In terms of the Tiibingen-Giessen controversy, this would seem to mean that Kierkegaard belongs to the Tiibingen camp. The fact that for Kierkegaard Christ exercises his power rules out the Giessen view of kenosis as KEI'W(JL> 'T~" Xp~(J€w>, Le. that Christ continued to possess his divine powers, but abstained from using

13

For a summary of ethical interpretations of Philippians, see Martin, Carmen Christi, 84-8.

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them. Kierkegaard's position in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits seems to be closer to the argument of the Tiibingen theologians, namely that Christ retained his divine powers during his earthly existence but concealed them behind his servant form. The incarnation thus involved not a kenosis but merely a Kp";"ns T~S xp~a£ws. There appears, however, to be a hint of another type of kenosis theory in Kierkegaard's reflection on Christ's servant form in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, for in the passage quoted above he states that Christ 'constrained nature itself to keep quiet' in order to prevent nature from revealing his identity. It would seem that if Christ had not restrained nature during his earthly ministry, nature would inevitably have revealed his divine status. It is thus only by exercise of his divine powers to constrain nature that he is able to live a genuinely human life as the lowly servant. Christ's exercise of his divine powers to restrain the manifestation of his divinity seems tantamount to a renunciation of his divine equality, for during his life Christ is powerless to do anything for his disciples other than to offer them the lowliness and contempt he himself undergoes. Furthermore, Christ's dominion over the created order is exercised in such a way that creation cannot reveal Christ's equality with God until Christ has given up his spirit at the crucifixion. Christ's exercise of governance over the universe thus seems to transform the universe into a place where his divinity is powerless. This would take Kierkegaard's argument back to a position similar to that of the Giessen camp, which holds that Christ continued to possess his divine powers during the incarnation, but refrained from exercising them. Underlying Kierkegaard's reflections on the nature of Christ's self-denial there thus seems to be a paradoxical conflation of the Tiibingen and Giessen pOSitions. Like the Tiibingen theologians he holds that Christ exercises his divine power of governance over the universe in secret. This means that Kierkegaard subscribes to the KP";"M T~S xp~a£ws view of the incarnation. On the other hand, Kierkegaard holds that Christ employs his divine power of governance to create for himself a state of powerlessness within creation. On assuming the lowly form of a servant Christ is reduced to powerlessness, for he is no longer able to reveal himself within the created order. This would seem close to the Giessen view of the incarnation as a KEVW(ns T~S xp~a£ws, Christ's renunciation of the use of his divine powers. Paradoxically, however, Christ's renunciation of the use of his divine powers comes about by means of his exercise of divine power: through his exercise of divine power he makes impossible his exercise of divine power. Interestingly, Kierkegaard's exposition would prOvide a solution to some of the criticisms levelled against the Giessen position, namely, how can divine powers be present and yet not be used? Is a non-active omnipotence a contradiction? According to Kierkegaard Christ exercises his omnipotence by making impossible its exercise during his incarnate state. Consequently, Christ's divine power of omnipotence is both used and not used.

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But perhaps we are pushing Kierkegaard too hard on this point. His main purpose in this discourse is to emphasize Christ's self-denial as a model for Christian discipleship. He was not concerned to provide a Christology, and this lack of concern may account for the lack of Christological clarity in his exposition of Christ's self-denial.

Works of Love In the course of a discussion of the invisibility of God Kierkegaard cites Phil 2.7. 'God', Kierkegaard notes, 'is not like a human being; it is not important for God to have visible evidence so that he can see if his cause has been victorious or not; he sees in secret just as well' (SKS9:147/WL, 145). It is only worldly human beings who demand visible signs, but Christianity has no need of them, for Chpstianity desires inwardness on the part of human beings. External signs, on the other hand, promote only outwardness and worldliness. For this reason, God wishes to wean human beings 'from the worldly point of view that insists on visible evidence' (SKS9:147/WL, 145). Consequently, although Christ could have provided evidence to prove his status such as summoning twelve legions of angels (Mt 26.53), he refrained from doing so and reprimanded his disciples when they demanded visible Signs. This desire to 'have a decision in the external sphere' is precisely what Christianity does not want. By means of its lack of empirical evidence to support its claims, Christianity 'wants to test the individual's faith, to test whether the individual will keep the secret offaith and be satisfied with it' (SKS9:147/WL, 145). Consequently, the only external signs Christianity permits are those which heighten the offensiveness of Christianity and make it impossible to appropriate Christianity 'outwardly'. The sacraments are such 'offensive' signs (SKS9: 147IWL, 145), for they are not 'proofs' of Christianity, but are arbitrary signs which place human beings before the decision of offence or faith. It is this contrast between the inward and the outward, and the need to place each human being before the choice between offence or faith that is the reason for Christ's servant form: From the worldly point of view, it would also have been a much more certain way if Christ had sought to show who he was by means, perhaps, of splendid processions instead of taking the form of a lowly servant without ever being noticeable, so that he looked just like any other human being and in a worldly way completely failed his task - but this is precisely the spiritual trial in which faith is tested. (SKS9:148/WL, 146)

For Kierkegaard, then, Christ adopted the servant form in order to make impossible a decision about faith in the external sphere. To have faith means accepting Christ as the lowly servant.

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Christian Discourses Several of the Christian Discourses contain allusions to Phil 2.6-8. In 'The Care of Lowliness' (SKSlO:48-57/CD, 37-47), Kierkegaard makes a connection between Christ's lowliness and that of the lowly Christian. The bird and the lily, despite their lowliness, do not have the care of lowliness. This is 'because the bird is what it is, is itself, is satisfied with being itself. is contented with itself' (SKS10:48/CD. 37). 'For the bird there is no question of to be or not to be' (SKS10:49/CD. 38). It simply is what it is. Like the bird, the lowly Christian does not have the care oflowliness. The lowly Christian. however. differs from the bird 'in having to be tested in this difficulty of the beginning, because he is aware of the distinction, lowly/eminent' (SKS10:50/CD, 39). In contrast to the bird. the lowly Christian knows that he is a lowly human being and knows that others also know this (SKS10:50/CD, 39). The lowly Christian is aware that he is denied the advantages of earthly life and that from the perspective of other people he is a lowly human being. The lowly Christian, however, does not take other human beings but his relationship with God as the basis of his self-understanding. Understanding oneself before God is a more reliable criterion for self-understanding because only God 'knows what each human being is in himself. because he is that only by being before God' (SKS10:511CD. 40). The reverse of this is that the person who does not understand himself as existing before God is not himself. The lowly Christian, then. 'is himself before Golf (SKSlO:51/CD, 40. original emphasis). This is where he differs from the bird, which Simply is and has no conception of its lowliness. The lowly Christian. however. knows his lowliness and the difficulty he faces is to be himself in his lowliness not before human beings but before God. Being oneself before God, however, means that the worldly criterion of lowliness loses its power. The lowly Christian knows that he is lowly. but he 'does not exist essentially for this idea ... because essentially he is and wants to be himself before God' (SKSIO:52/CD, 41; original emphasis). Kierkegaard expresses this task of becoming oneself before God by making a distinction between being a human being and being a Christian, between being made in the image [Billede] of God and having God as a prototype [Forbilledel: 'As a human being [the lowly Christian] was created in God's image, but as a Christian he has God as the prototype' (SKSlO:52/CD, 41; original emphasis). The prototype is the 'unsettling thought that calls to one' (SKSlO:52/CD, 41); it is 'a summons'. a 'rigorous requirement, ... an incentive for everyone who sees it. everyone for whom it exists' (SKSlO:53/CD, 42). It is also 'a promise'. Indeed, 'no other promise is so reliable, because the prototype is indeed the fulfilment' (SKSlO:53/CD, 42). This is where the difference between the bird and the Christian can be clearly seen. The bird has no prototype, 'but the prototype exists before the lowly Christian, and he exists before his prototype - he

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can continually grow to resemble it more and more' (SKSlO:53/CD, 42~. Consequently, Kierkegaard writes, 'The lowly Christian, who before G~~ IS himself, exists as a Christian before his prototype' (SKSlO:53/CD, 42, ongmal emphasis). What, then, is this prototype? The prototype is the incarnate God who assumed the lowly form of a servant. In a creed-like summary in which he combines Phil 2.6-8 with other elements of the Christian story, Kierkegaard writes that the believer: believes that God has lived on earth, that he has allowed himself to be born in lowly and poor circumstances, yes, in ignominy, and then as a child lived together with the ordinary man who was called his father and the despised virgin who was his mother. After that he wandered about in the lowly form of a servant, not distinguishable from other lowly persons even by his conspicuous lowliness, until he ended in the most extreme wretchedness, crucified as a criminal - and then, it is tru~, left behind a name. (SKSlO:53/CD, 42)

In his acceptance oflowliness, in his refusing to allow himself to be elevated, in choosing as his disciples 'lowly persons of the Simplest class' (SKSIO:53/CD, 42), and in his seeking the company of those the world has rejected and scorned, the incarnate God has through his life of lowliness 'shown what significance the lowly person has and, alas, what Significance, humanly speaking, an eminent person really has, how infinitely much it can signify to be a lowly person, and how infinitely little it can signify to be an eminent person, if one is not anything else' (SKSlO:53/CD, 42-3). 'The lowly Christian', Kierkegaard states, 'believes that this prototype exists right before him' (SKSI0:54/CD, 43). He sees. however, only the prototype's lowliness, not his glory, 'because the glory must be believed' (SKSlO:S4/CD, 43. original emphasis). Just as the glory of the prototype is invisible behind his lowly appearance to the unbeliever. so too is the joy of the lowly believer in the prototype concealed from other people. Even when the lowly Christian 'is absorbed in his prototype', the onlooker 'sees only a lowly person before him' (SKSI0:53/CD, 43). The lowly Christian thus resembles the prototype, for the unbelieving onlooker saw not Christ's glory but only his lowly person. The lowly Christian 'believes that this prototype, if he continually struggles to resemble him, will bring him again, and in an even more intimate way, into kinship with God, that he does not have God only as a creator, as all creatures do, but has God as his brother' (SKSIO:53/CD. 43). There is a difference between the lowliness of the lowly Christian and the prototype's lowliness, however, namely that the lowly Christian 'is not in the situation of having himself chosen this slighted or despised lowliness and to that extent does not resemble the prototype' (SKSIO:53/CD, 43). The incarnate God, then, has chosen to live a life of lowliness, whereas the lowly Christian has no choice in the lowliness of his existence. By assuming a life of lowliness, however, the

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incarnate God provides the lowly Christian with the means of casting aside the care of lowliness. The prototype 'by means of lowliness compassionately ~poses himself on [the lowly Christian], as it were, as if he would say, Poor man, can you not see that this prototype is before you?''' (SKSlO:S31 CD, 43). Because of his relationship with the prototype the lowly Christian is lofty despite his lowliness. He has been freed from the care of lowliness. Consequently, the lowly Christian does not speak. of his lowliness, but should he do so, 'it is never sadly' (SKSlO:S4/CD, 43-4). Indeed, his lowliness 'only reminds him of the prototype while he thinks about the loftiness of the prototype - and when he does that, he himself more or less resembles the prototype' (SKSI0:54/CD, 44). The pagan, however, is weighed down by comparison with others, and falls into despair. Just as the God-relationship liberates the individual from the care of lowliness, so too does it liberates the individual from the 'care of loftiness'. This is the subject of the fourth discourse of Part One of Christian Discourses (SKSIO:S8-68/CD, 48-59), which although not reflecting the language of Phil 2.5-11 as closely as some of the other Kierkegaardian texts, nevertheless works with the lowliness-loftiness motif that characterizes Kierkegaard's interpretation of the Philippians hymn. The 'eminent Christian' is the individual who, 'When he speaks with God, he discards all earthly, all sham pomp and glory, but also all the untruth of illusion' (SKSlO:611CD, 51), for the eminent Christian believes in 'a changeless God who wants obedience, the same in the greatest as in the least' (SKSlO:611 CD, 51). Because he believes in an immutable God who is not swayed by the status of human beings, the eminent Christian 'understands that it is an illusion ... that God would therefore also be different toward him, this powerful authority, different than toward every other, unconditionally every other human being, that toward him the unchanged God would not be the same unchanged one, unchanged as the eternal, more changeless than the rock' (SKSlO:62/CD, 52). Yet this immutability does not mean that God is powerless to act should he desire to do so. On the contrary, the eminent Christian knows that while God requires the same of all human beings regardless of status, he is 'certainly able omnipotently to change everything even more terribly by his omnipotent word, to change both thrones and governments, both heaven and earth' (SKSlO:62/CD, 52). God's unchangeability manifests itself also in his attitude to sin. The eminent Christian 'believes that before this God he is a sinner and that this God is equally zealous against sin, whoever the sinner is' (SKSlO:62/CD, 52). The eminent Christian also 'believes that he stands in need of the gracious God's forgiveness every moment' (SKSIO:62/CD, 52). It is at this point that Kierkegaard introduces the theme of Christ in his lowliness. It is because of the eminent Christian's need of forgiveness that 'he believes that God has walked in lowliness on earth and in this way has judged all such

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worldly power and might to be nothing' (SKSlO:62/CD, 52). That is, from the perspective of the eminent Christian the lowliness of Christ has an ethical impact. It places the eminent Christian's status in its true light, namely that he is no higher than any other human being. That Christ, though God, should assume a life of lowliness is a revelation of the fact that God has no favourites and that human status counts for nothing in God's eyes. Although Kierkegaard wishes to argue that there is no essential difference between the lowly and the eminent Christian, he nevertheless holds that it is more difficult for the eminent person to be a Christian. This, he claims, is the teaching of Scripture. 14 It is true that the lowliness necessary to becoming a Christian 'is not the external but the internal, a feeling of one's own lowliness, which the eminent can have just as well as the lowly' (SKSIO:65/CD, 54). It is also true that 'the essentially Christian is a much too spiritual power to speak about external lowliness' (SKSlO:65/CD, 54). Nevertheless, 'Scripture, however, perhaps out of circumspection and in its knowledge of the human heart, also speaks about it in another way, speaks about literally being a lowly person' (SKSIO:65/CD, 54). This combination of both internal and external lowliness is expressed in the person of the prototype. Kierkegaard writes: 'He lived in actual earthly lowliness; therefore, when he resolved to be the prototype, he did not choose to be an eminent person and yet a lowly person in his innermost being. No, he literally was the lowly person, and in earnest in an entirely different way than when a king momentarily sets aside his rank and is known by the courtiers, consequently all the more honoured - for his humility' (SKSIO:65/CD, 54, original emphasis). Here Christ seems to have renounced not only his external glory, but has also accepted lowliness into his innermost being, so that he literally was the lowest of all human beings. There is no notion of the concealment of divine powers in this passage. Christ seems genUinely to have emptied himself of all that would set him apart from the lowliest of human beings. Despite Christ's lowliness and renunciation of his glory, Kierkegaard goes on to indicate in the discourse on 'The Care of SelfTorment' (SKSlO:79-SS/CD, 70-S0) that Christ retained the attribute of omniscience. Although Christ knew the fate that lay ahead of him, he 'bore the enormous weight of this superhuman knowledge every day' (SKSIO:S51 CD, 76). He thus, as the prototype, teaches the Christian 'to fill up the day today with the eternal and not with the next day' (SKSIO:S4/CD, 75). In his discourse on 'The Care of Indecisiveness, Vacillation, and Disconsolateness' Kierkegaard describes the obedience of Christ in language that seems to be coloured by Phil2.6-S, Heb 5.S, and In 17.5. The Christian, Kierkegaard writes, should emulate the obedience of Christ, 'who himself learned obedience and was obedient, obedient in everything, obedient in giving up

14

Kierkegaard presumably has Mk 10.23-5 in mind.

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everything (the glory that he had before the foundation of the world was laid), obedient in doing without everything (even that on which he could lay his head), obedient in taking everything upon himself (the sin of hwnankind), obedient in suffering everything (the guilt of humankind), obedient in subjecting himself to everything in life, obedient in death' (SKSI0:93/CD, 85). Two aspects of this passage are of significance for our investigation of Kierkegaard's kenotic Christology. The first is that Phil 2.6-8 clearly permeates this passage and is for Kierkegaard a central biblical witness to Christ's obedience. Secondly, we have here an indication of what it is that Kierkegaard believes Christ to have renounced on becoming incarnate, namely 'the glory that he had before the foundation of world was laid' (SKSlO:93/CD, 85).15

The Sickness unto Death In The Sickness unto Death there are several allusions to Phil 2.7b. AntiClimacus writes of Christ that, 'he can abase [fornedre] himself, take the form of a servant .. .' (SKSl1:237/SUD, 126)}6 He attributes Christ's selfabasement to his love of hwnankind, commenting that, 'Out of love God becomes a man', thereby giving human beings a true example of what it is to be a human being (SKSl1:239/SUD, 127). In a clear allusion to Phil2.7b, AntiClimacus then goes on to write that, 'As man [God] takes the form of a lowly servant' (SKSll:239/SUD, 128). The reason for God's choice of the servantform is his intention to 'show[ ... ] what it is to be an unimportant man so that no man will feel himself excluded or think that it is human status and popularity with men that bring a person closer to God' (SKSl1:239/SUD, 128). Two points are of interest here. First, Anti-Climacus seems to subscribe to the notion of a double kenosis. God first becomes a hwnan being, and then 'as man' assumes the form of a servant. Second, the choice of the servant form is made for reasons of inclusivity. God wishes to address ail human beings, regardless of their status, and for this reason makes himself one with the lowliest echelons of human society.

SKS22IKJN6:NB14:118 {JP3:3645j Kierkegaard quotes with approval a comment made by Luther on Phil 2 that 'Christ humbled himself - not: he was humbled'. Kierkegaard takes this to be an indication of Christ's 'infinite elevation' and 'his infinite qualitative difference from every human being', namely that 'he himself, without conditions, 15 The Hongs claim that this is a reference to 1 Pet 1.20 (CD, 442 n.l01), but it seems to me to be more likely that Kierkegaard is here alluding to In 17.5. 15 Translation modified. The Hongs are inconsistent in their translation of 'fomedee'. Here they translate it as 'debase', elsewhere they translate it as 'abase',

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must give consent to every humiliation he suffers and approve that he will submit to this humiliation.' In this journal entry Kierkegaard interprets Phil 2.10 as an expression of this infinite elevation: 'there was in heaven, on earth, in the abyss no one who could humble him - he humbled himself.' That Kierkegaard understands this humiliation to consist of suffering is indicated by the way he seemingly unconsciously glides from the concept of humiliation to that of suffering. Christ's elevation over humiliation in the sense that he cannot be humbled by anyone but can only humble himself constitutes, Kierkegaard claims, 'infinite elevation over suffering, but also qualitatively infinite, more intensive suffering.' That Christ has infinite elevation over suffering is due to his not having suffering imposed upon him, but his freely ch