India Migration Report 2014: Diaspora and Development 9780415570183, 9780415664998, 9780415634052, 9780415828536, 9781138788190

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India Migration Report 2014

India Migration Report Editor: S. Irudaya Rajan, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala This annual series strives to bring together international networks of migration scholars and policy-makers to document and discuss research on various facets of migration. It encourages interdisciplinary commentaries on diverse aspects of the migration experience and continues to focus on the economic, social, cultural, ethical, security, and policy ramifications of international movements of people.

Also Available India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration 978-0-415-57018-3 India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict 978-0-415-66499-8 India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances 978-0-415-63405-2 India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration 978-0-415-82853-6

Forthcoming India Migration Report 2015: Gender and Migration

India Migration Report 2014 Diaspora and Development

Editor S. Irudaya rajan

LONDON NEW YORK NEW DELHI

First published 2014 in India by Routledge 912 Tolstoy House, 15–17 Tolstoy Marg, Connaught Place, New Delhi 110 001 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2014 S. Irudaya Rajan

Typeset by Solution Graphics A–14, Indira Puri Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh 201 102

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-138-78819-0

Dedicated to Professor K. C. Zachariah, the friend, philosopher and guide who introduced me to the dynamic study of migration and whose enthusiasm and knowledge has been a driving force behind many studies carried out in the field. This year, as he celebrates his 90th birthday, I dedicate this book to him as a token of gratitude and wish him good health.

Too little is known though about migrants, and the effects their mobility has, for themselves, their communities, and economies, and too often policies either ignore or try to reduce migration. The IMR has become a critical source to fill this lacuna to better understand migration and providing concrete suggestions for policymakers. — Arjan de Haan, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada India Migration Report 2014 advances the frontier of the debate on the role of the Indian diaspora and development — a treasure house of analysis, insights and information with a global reach one should certainly not miss. — Piyasiri Wickramasekara, Global Migration Policy Associates, Geneva A rich and timely insight into the multifaceted dimensions of Indian migration. — Margaret Walton-Roberts, International Migration Research Centre, Ontario, Canada

Contents Tables Figures and Boxes Abbreviations Preface Foreword by Oommen Chandy Acknowledgements 1. Diaspora and Development: Critical Issues Dilip Ratha and Sonia Plaza 2. Diaspora and Development: Case Study of the Indo-EU Diaspora Alwyn Didar Singh

ix xi xiii xvii xix xxi 1

21

3. Diaspora and Development: Theoretical Perspectives Amba Pande

36

4. Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development Ajaya Kumar Sahoo

47

5. Engaging the Indian Diaspora for Development Smita Tiwari

60

6. Professional Diaspora Networks and Philanthropy in the Healthcare Sector T. L. S. Bhaskar 7. Return of Diasporas: India’s Growth Story vs Global Crisis S. Irudaya Rajan, V. Kurusu and Saramma Panicker C. K. 8. Punjabi Diaspora and Educational Development Kaveri Qureshi and Filippo Osella 9. Land, Migration and Identity: Changing Punjabi Transnationalism Steve Taylor 10. Diaspora and Remittances Milly Sil

73 88 103

117 132

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India Migration Report 2014

11. Future Diasporas? International Student Migration from India to the UK S. Irudaya Rajan and Neha Wadhawan

149

12. Ethnic Indians in India’s Look East Policy Amit Singh

168

13. The Indian Diaspora in Oman Veronika Deffner

181

14. Indian Migrant Experiences in Oman and Bahrain Radhika Kanchana and S. Irudaya Rajan

193

15. Nitaqat — Second Wave of Saudization: Is it an Answer to the Domestic Discontent? Zakir Hussain

210

16. Kerala Emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects under the Nitaqat Law K. C. Zachariah, S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph

229

17. Migration and Inequality Raju John 18. International Trade in Health Services: An Indian Experience Soumi Roy Chowdhury

249

261

19. Capability Quotient of the North-Eastern Out-Migrants Pinak Sarkar

273

20. Living Conditions of Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India C. Valatheeswaran

287

About the Editor Notes on Contributors Index

300 301 304

Tables 1.1: Diaspora in Australia and the US 2.1: Strategic Dashboard of Indian Policy for Diaspora Engagement 2.2: Matrix of Relevance of Diaspora Activities to Indian Diaspora Categories 2.3: Relevance of Indian Strategic Framework to Indian Diaspora Categories 6.1: 6.2: 6.3: 6.4: 6.5:

Alumni Members by Speciality in GMCANA Alumni Members by Year of Admission in GMCANA Items Donated by the GMCANA to GMC and GGH Items Donated by the AMCANA to AMC and KGH Items Donated by the RMCANA

7.1: City-Wise Distribution of Samples, by Sex 7.2: Educational Qualifications of Return Migrants 10.1: Percentage Distribution of Household-Related Characteristics 10.2: Percentage Distribution of Migrant-Related Characteristics 10.3: Percentage Distribution of Size of Remittances 10.4: Percentage Distribution of Some Remittance-Related Aspects 11.1: Top Five Destinations and Number of Students from India Studying Overseas in 2009 11.2: Statistics Showing Student Visa Application to the United Kingdom, 2007–11 11.3: Answers to the Qualitative Questions Posed to Respondents of the Survey, 2012 11.4: Estimated Cost of Comparable Education (Living and Tuition Expenses) in India and the UK 14.1: Classification of the Questionnaire Responses

6 27 32 32 76 77 79 82 84 91 93 135 137 140 142 151 161 162 164 197

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Tables

15.1: Schematization of the Nitaqat Programme 15.2: Saudization Bands across Various Business Lines 15.3: Reasons for Saudi Unemployment

214 217 221

16.1: Educational Attainment of Emigrants 16.2: Percentage of Emigrants with Given Educational Level 16.3: Employment Status of Emigrants in Selected Countries 16.4: Percentage Distribution of Emigrants by Industry

239 239 240 241

17.1: Inequality Decomposition by Source 17.2: Decomposition of Theil Index 17.3: SOLI Scores for Socioeconomic Groups 17.4: SOLI Scores by Sex of Head of Households, 1998 and 2008 17.5: Factors that Influence Asset-Based SOLI

254 254 256

18.1: Hospitals Surveyed in Thiruvananthapuram 18.2: Hospitals and Mode of Participation in Trade in Health Services 18.3: Foreign Patients in Thiruvananthapuram Hospitals for the Years 2010–11

266

19.1: North-East Migration with Education Level for Males in the Age Group 15–34 years 19.2: All-India Migration with Education Levels for Males in the Age Group 15–34 19.3: Migration for Employment to Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal 19.4: Migration for Education to Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal 20.1: Population of Sri Lankan Refugees Staying at Various Camps in Tamil Nadu as on December 2010

256 258

267 269 275 275 277 279 289

Figures and Boxes Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Diaspora: First and Second Generation, 2010 Indian Diaspora 2011: Non-Resident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin Top 10 Recipients of Migrant Remittances Top 10 Recipients of Migrant Remittances as a Share of GDP Estimated Population of Indian Diaspora (PIOs and NRIs) in Five European Countries, 2011 Size of Indian Diaspora in Five European Countries in 2001 and 2011 Returnee’s Year of Return Occupational Profile of Return Migrants Present Working Status of Professional Return Migrants in India Reasons for Return

10.1 Percentage Distribution of Migrants According to Destination in Dharmaj, Gujarat 10.2 Percentage Distribution of Migrants According to Destination in Mangalam, Kerala 10.3 Percentage Share of Consumption, Investment and Savings Components of Most Important Uses of Remittances 10.4 Percentage Share of Consumption, Investment and Savings Components of Second Most Important Uses of Remittances

6 7 8 9 30 30 92 93 94 96 139 140 145 145

11.1 Students and Job Seekers among Out-Migrants from Kerala 11.2 Student Migrants as Percentage of Adult Migrants

154 154

15.1 Total and Youth Unemployment in Saudi Arabia, 2006–10

219

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Figures and Boxes

15.2 Projected National Labour Force, 2010–50

221

16.1 Population of Kerala and Saudi Arabia 16.2 Population in the Age Group 15–39 in Saudi Arabia and Kerala 16.3 Kerala Emigrants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE 16.4 Age Distribution of Emigrants from Kerala, 2011 16.5 Percentage of Emigrants with 12th Standard or Higher Levels of Education 16.6 Percentage of Emigrants with a Degree 16.7 Employment Sectors of Emigrants 16.8 Percentage Increase in the Number of People in the 15–39 Age Group, 1989–91 through 2031–41 16.9 Reasons for Return of Emigrants for Saudi Arabia and All Destinations, 2007–09

231

19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9

277 281 281 282 282 283 283 284 284

Capability Levels of Migrants Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Delhi Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Karnataka Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Maharashtra Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in West Bengal Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Delhi Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Karnataka Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Maharashtra Education-Led Migration Cohorts in West Bengal

232 237 238 239 240 241 243 246

Boxes 1.1 1.2

Defining Diasporas How Migration and Remittances have Contributed to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 2000–15

3 10

Abbreviations AMC AMCANA ARF ASEAN ATM BP CBSE CDS CII CPR CSSSC DCI DFID DGCI&S DRDO DST EC ECR EEPCO EMRI EU FCNR FCONR FCRA FDI FICCI FRRO GATS GCC GCSE GDP GE GEMS GGH

Andhra Medical College Andhra Medical College Alumni of North America ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Automated Teller Machine Blood Pressure Central Board of Secondary Education Centre for Development Studies Confederation of Indian Industry Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta Development Corporation for Israel Department for International Development Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics Defence Research and Development Organisation Department of Science and Technology European Commission Emigration Check Required Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Emergency Management and Research Institute European Union Foreign Currency Non-Resident Foreign Currency (Ordinary) Non-Repatriable Foreign Contributions Regulation Act Foreign Direct Investment Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry Foreign Regional Registration Office General Agreement on Trade in Services Gulf Cooperation Council General Certificate of Secondary Education Gross Domestic Product Generalized Entropy Global Education Management Systems Guntur General Hospital

xiv

v

Abbreviations

GMC GMCANA GNP HDC HINDRAF HLC HND HRD HRMP HTA ICFTU ICFW ICM ICOE ICOR ICWF IDF IDF-OI IELTS IIEP IIL INA INC INK INO IOM ISO IT ITI JCI JV KGH KMS LMRA LTTE MBA MBBS MCI MDG MIC MIT

Guntur Medical College Guntur Medical College Alumni of North America Gross National Product Hospital Development Committee Hindu Rights Action Force High Level Committee Higher National Diploma Human Resources Development Human Resource Mobility Partnership Home Town Association International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Indian Community Welfare Fund India Centre for Migration Indian Council for Overseas Employment Incremental Capital Output Ratio Indian Community Welfare Fund India Development Foundation India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians International English Language Testing System International Institute for Educational Planning Indian Independence League Indian National Army Indian National Congress Indian Network of Knowledge Indian Nationals Overseas International Organization for Migration International Organization for Standardization Information Technology Industrial Training Institute Joint Commission International joint venture King George Hospital Kerala Migration Survey Labour Management and Regulatory Authority Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Master of Business Administration Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery Medical Council of India Millennium Development Goal Malaysian Indian Congress Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abbreviations

MOIA MoL MoU MP MPI MPS MTCM MTO NABH NGO NQF NRE NRI NRNR NRO OBC OCB OCI OECD OIFC OWRC PBD PBS PG PIO PPP PRO R&D RBI RMC RMCANA RMCOSA S&T SAMA SBI SC SDP

Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Ministry of Labour Memorandum of Understanding Member of Parliament Migration Policy Institute marginal propensity to save Medical Tourism Council of Maharashtra Money Transfer Operator National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers non-governmental organization National Qualifications Framework Non-Resident (External) Non-Resident Indian Non-Resident Non-Repatriable Non-Resident Ordinary Rupee Other Backward Class Overseas Corporate Body Overseas Citizenship of India Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre Overseas Workers Resource Centre Pravasi Bhartiya Divas Points Based System Postgraduate Person of Indian Origin Purchasing Power Parity Public Relations Officer research and development Reserve Bank of India Rangaraya Medical College Rangaraya Medical College Alumni of North America Rangaraya Medical College Old Students Association science and technology Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency State Bank of India Scheduled Caste State Domestic Product

v

xv

xvi

v

Abbreviations

SEC SHG SME SOLI SSA SSE ST TOEFL TOKTEN UCBA UG UK UKBA UKIERI UN UNCTAD UNESCAP UNESCO UNHCR UPA US USEFI USSR VFR WTO

US Securities and Exchange Commission Self Help Group Small and Medium Enterprise Standard Of Living Index Social Security Agreement Small-Scale Enterprise Scheduled Tribe Test of English as a Foreign Language Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals Universities and Colleges Admissions Service Under-Graduate United Kingdom UK Border Agency UK–India Education and Research Initiative United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Progressive Alliance United States United States Educational Foundation in India Union of Soviet Socialist Republics visiting friends and relatives World Trade Organization

Preface After the success of the four annual ‘India Migration Reports’ (IMRs),

it is my privilege to present before you the fifth in the series titled ‘Diaspora and Development’. The overwhelming acceptance the previous migration reports have received has taken the series forward with reprints and Kindle versions being widely circulated in the academic circles. The series has effectively carried out the function of analysing the intricate details of labour migration from India through its theme-specific studies and has successfully compiled the works and thoughts of many academics with noteworthy experience in this field. Widely read and discussed, I hope that the series will make its mark in migration studies as a relevant piece of literature. The India Migration Report 2010 dealt with the aspect of ‘Governance and Labour Migration’ which derived the vivid linkages between policy measures and migration trends, while in the second — India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict — the more economic, socio-psychological study of the migrant population was made. The success of these works made us confident of approaching the theme from more demanding points of views that can connect with the present global economic scenario. Hence, India Migration Report 2012 came up with a sharp theme of ‘Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances’. During the time of a global financial turmoil, this work brought out the obscurities involved in being a labour-rich country like India. Global crisis and labour market tendencies are so closely interwoven that a study of migration without linking it to the bigger picture does not make sense. Taking on a more specific theme, the India Migration Report 2013 talked about the ‘Social Costs of Migration’. The India Migration series aims at researching on the themes of migration from all possible aspects so that the best possibility of India with its rich human resource is not left unexplored. But we also cannot ignore ‘migrants’ as we reap the fruits of migration. What happens to them or what awaits them beyond boundaries needs to be looked at from within both economic and psychological frameworks. The India Migration Report 2014 is dedicated to the Indian diaspora whose sweat and toil forms the building blocks of the development of this nation.

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The chapters of the book are designed in such a way that the readers get to understand the theoretical concepts underlying the diasporic diversity of India and the concept be extended to all relevant sectors of the economy such that their impacts, opportunities and possibilities be rightly assessed. Of the 20 chapters, the first five discuss the general concepts, theoretical aspects and possibilities of development through transnationalism. The next few deal with certain area-specific studies that can reveal the ground realities pertaining to the Indian diaspora across the globe. The final part includes chapters that discuss the issues faced by the diaspora and the economy as a whole owing to the tendencies and occurrences witnessed worldwide. We have tried to include all the relevant hot topics, such as Nitaqat, which are being widely discussed among academics and will be of great use to the policy-makers. In addition, I would like to mention that this volume in the series includes four chapters based on the research funded by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India and Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala through the Research Unit on International Migration and another four based on the research conducted by the students at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram. I would also like to announce the sixth in the series, India Migration Report 2015, on ‘Gender and Migration’, followed by the final volume in the series, India Migration Report 2016, devoted to the migrants in the Gulf. Meanwhile, to invite the attention of the policy-makers towards the issues faced by South Asian migrants, a new series titled the ‘South Asia Migration Report’ is being considered. I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to all the readers and academics for their support that made the ‘India Migration Report’ series a huge success and expect the same in all coming ventures.

Foreword The Research Unit on International Migration was organized early in

2006 through the initiative of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), the Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs Department (NoRKA) and the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram. It formed part of the larger mandate to encourage high-quality research in the field of migration studies, especially in the context of the Malayalees moving to other parts of the world in a big way. The overall aim of the Research Unit is to develop an understanding of the role of migration as a major factor in changing societies in our region, which would help in creating a knowledge and information base for the formulation of futuristic policy. As I understand, this work is one of the important ones undertaken by the Research Unit towards achieving the long-term objective of the research and planning procedure of the country. It also updates us on challenges and current issues of international migration research. As human mobility increasingly becomes a powerful force in the globalized economy, its socioeconomic impacts transcend boundaries and can be felt in home and host countries. India — despite its abundance of critical literature on various facets of migration processes, including remittance transfers, governance structures, trends, and social costs — still has a marked deficit of academic and policy attention on the strategic social and human capital in these movements. The India Migration Report 2014 organized into 20 chapters seeks to contribute to the existing literature on this critical collective resource. It reflects the development potential and impacts of diasporic communities on the sending and receiving countries, family structures, relatives left behind, and labour market outcomes for migrant workers. Some of the broad concerns include the transformative impact of transnational diasporic networks, and the political will of these farflung stakeholders. Through cross-regional perspectives, this compilation seeks to address and engage with these questions and to map out a compelling narrative with the diaspora as the central figure in host and homeland development. Using a plethora of multi-sited epistemologies, the authors within this volume, present the development potential of the diaspora as drivers of social transformation.

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I hope that this publication will add to the knowledge of potential scholars, researchers and policy-makers regarding the series and capacity of the existing literature on migration in India. I congratulate the entire team behind the compilation of the India Migration Report 2014 and hope that this series will continue for many years to come. 13 January 2014

Oommen Chandy Chief Minister of Kerala Government of India

Acknowledgements The overwhelming acceptance that the previous four annual migration reports have received is remembered with gratitude as I present the fifth book of the series titled ‘Diaspora and Development’. The positive response from readers and academics has boosted my confidence beyond limits and also reminds me of the expectations that I ought to meet in my future endeavours. I would like to acknowledge the continued support from the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India — in particular Vayalar Ravi, Honourable Minister; Ranjana Kale, the former Economic Advisor; Prem Narain, Secretary, MOIA; Rajiv Mehrishi, former Secretary, MOIA; T. K. Manoj Kumar, Joint Secretary, MOIA; P. R. Devi Prasad, Economic Advisor, MOIA; Renuka Mishra, Joint Director, MOIA; and Roulkhumlien Buhril, Protector General of Emigrants. I would also like to acknowledge the three former secretaries of the MOIA whose constant help was indispensable to the Migration Unit at the Centre for Development Studies — S. Krishna Kumar, K. Mohandas and A. Didar Singh. At the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), I have always received encouragement, support and guidance from all faculty members as well as the administrative and library staff, in particular Amit Shovon Ray, Director of CDS; Pulapare Balakrishnan, former Director; Bimal Jalan, Chairman; P.Suresh Babu, Registrar; V. Sriram, Librarian; and S. Suresh, Finance Officer. I also thank all the individuals who have generously contributed to India Migration Report 2014 despite their busy schedules and commitments. I take this opportunity to appreciate Sreeja K., Sunitha Shyam, Saramma Panicker C. K., and Arya Suresh, my enthusiastic research team, for their relentless efforts that helped complete this project successfully. At home, I take this opportunity to thank my wife, Hema, and my children — Rahul, Rohit and Catherine — for their emotional support, patience and understanding. My heartfelt gratitude and appreciation also goes to the editorial and sales team of Routledge, New Delhi for all their hard work and dedication that helped bring out this volume on time.

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Diaspora and Development Critical Issues

Dilip Ratha anD Sonia plaza* The fastest way to eliminate poverty and share prosperity is to allow

the poor to migrate to a richer destination. Emigrants help their countries of origin by sending remittances, stimulating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), improving access to foreign capital markets, providing grants for development, establishing contacts to promote trade and investment, and transferring technology and know-how through, for example, professional associations, temporary assignments of skilled expatriates in origin countries, and the return of emigrants with enhanced skills. The research on diaspora issues has expanded in the last decade. However, there has been less progress in the following issues: (a) developing an agreed definition on what ‘diaspora’ is, and (b) building a methodological approach to calculate the number of diaspora abroad for each country. It is important to define diaspora in order to count it. This chapter will present some of the definitions of diaspora that are being used in the context of the migration agenda and in public policy context by policymakers. Data collection on diaspora has not been undertaken systematically. The authors conducted 48 interviews with government officials and diplomats of embassies in Washington DC, Paris, London, Pretoria, and Abu Dhabi to understand the role embassies are playing in enabling their diaspora to make economic contributions to their countries. We found few differences among embassies, including from developed and developing countries, in this respect. We also found that all the embassies lack adequate information regarding the * The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent.

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number of migrants in a diaspora (especially since registration is optional) (Plaza and Ratha 2011). Thus, there is a need to develop a methodology to gather data where possible. Most research on the contributions of diasporas to development in origin countries focuses on highly-educated migrants living in Europe and the United States (US). But both low- and high-skilled diaspora members — whether outside or inside developing countries — make contributions to their homelands (Crush 2011). Developed and developing countries are beginning to implement policies to boost flows of financial resources, skills and technology from the diasporas. In the first section of this chapter, we look at the different definitions of diaspora. The second section presents some basic data on the size of the world’s diaspora living in the US, Western Europe and Australia, as well as comparisons with the overseas Indian numbers. A tentative conclusion is that the potential contribution of world’s diaspora may have been underestimated. In the third section, we discuss the contributions of the diaspora with the final section summarizing and discussing policies that some countries are implementing for promoting diaspora contributions.

Definition of Diaspora A ‘diaspora’ can be defined as people who have migrated and their descendants who maintain a connection to their homeland (Ratha et al. 2011). For more specific definitions according to the US Department of State and the definition used by the African Union, please see Box 1.1. Some countries use a legal definition to define their diasporas as all persons who are of that nationality and their descendants. It includes all the descendants who can acquire citizenship. It varies by country. In the case of Ireland, the right to become an Irish citizen terminates at the third generation. Italy, Israel and Japan grant citizenship base on jus sanguinis or blood kindship. Other countries define their diaspora broadly independently if they have a citizenship from that country. For example, India defines diaspora as all overseas Indians which comprise Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). ‘Overseas Indians are a strong bond with their country of origin. This is reflected in their language, cultures and traditions that have been maintained, often over centuries, and continue to be vibrant and unique’ (MOIA n.d.).

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Box 1.1: Defining Diasporas

The US State Department defines ‘diasporas’ as those migrant groups who share the following features: (a) dispersion, whether voluntary or involuntary, across sociocultural boundaries and at least one political border; (b) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (c) a commitment towards keeping the homeland alive through symbolic and direct action; (d) the presence of the issue of return, though not necessarily a commitment to do so; and (e) a diasporic consciousness and associated identity expressed in diaspora community media, creation of diaspora associations or organizations, and online participation (Department Telegraph 86401, US State Department). This is different from the definition used by the African Union, which defines the African diaspora as ‘consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union’.a Estimating the size of a diaspora is complicated by several factors such as place of birth, time of emigration, citizenship and questions of identity (Ionescu 2006). For example, estimates of US-based diasporas are constructed using the ‘place of birth for the foreign-born population’ available from the US census. Most European Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Japan, and the Republic of Korea classify immigrants based on the ethnicity of the parent, which results in higher estimates of the stock of immigrants compared with a classification based on place of birth. Temporary immigrants may be considered as part of a diaspora but may not be captured in immigration statistics. Note: a The African Union considers its diaspora as the sixth regional economic community (see African Union 2005; UN-OHRLLS 2010).

Estimating the Size of the Diaspora Inadequate data and understanding of the diasporas impair efforts to increase the contributions they can make to origin countries. Changing that should be a high priority for the global community interested in harnessing diaspora resources. Estimates of the size of the different countries diaspora vary depending on the data and definition used. The majority of the estimations are based on the ‘stocks of migrants’ and ‘foreign-born’ data. Thus, many countries seem to underestimate the size of the diaspora since they do not include second and third generations. In the light of the differences in the methodologies used in assessing the diaspora of the regions, a comparative and systematic study of the diaspora in the US and that of the other nations that adopt

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alternative methods is to be done. Questions about place of birth and parental place of birth are used to define the first, second, and thirdor-higher generations.

First-Generation and Second-Generation Estimates The OECD presents information on native-born children of migrants aged 15 and over which includes OECD European countries, the US and Australia (OECD 2012). This data indicates that the size of the second-generation diaspora is about 45.3 million. Thus, taking the migrant stocks and the available second-generation data into account, the size of the diaspora rose to 277 million in 2013 (from 261 million in 2010). According to the OECD, this 45 million includes data of children counted twice if both their parents had been born abroad in different countries. This figure grossly underestimates the true size of the global diasporas. First, ‘first-generation’ migrant stocks are almost certainly underestimated (consider, for example, the undocumented migrants in the US or a large number of uncounted Bangladeshis in India or Zimbabweans in South Africa). The majority of the studies present data according to the definition of ‘people born in other country’. This definition captures only first-generation migrants; it excludes children and grandchildren who may have ties to origin countries. If we use first-generation migrants, the number is roughly 215 million in 2010 and 232 million in 2013. This is the most frequently cited estimate of migrants stock based on United Nations (UN) estimates. Although this data incorporates part of the 2010 round of census, the new data undervalues the number of first-generation diaspora. For example, the immigration data for the Gulf countries is not complete. China, India, South Africa, South Korea, and the US do not have an accurate number of foreign-born migrants since several of them are undocumented and not captured in the censuses (World Bank 2010). In a number of countries like the US, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, the censuses do not include the question on the country of birth. Technically, this makes it difficult to track the diaspora because in reality the foreign-born who have acquired citizenship are not considered foreign nationals in the country anymore. Since diaspora refers to people who have migrated and their descendants maintaining a connection to their homeland, it is important that the place of birth of every citizen and foreign national be rightly recorded.

Critical Issues in Diaspora and Development

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Second, data on ‘second-generation migrants’ in countries other than those in Europe, US and Australia are not available. Definitions of ‘second generation’ also differ. For example, in the European Commission (EC), Eurostat, ‘“second-generation migrants” refer to two different groups of immediate descendants of migrants. The first group, with a mixed background, is defined as persons who are native born and who have one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent. The second group, with a foreign background, is defined as persons who are native born with both parents foreign born’ (Eurostat 2011: 143). As per the OECD definition, the ‘native-born children of immigrants’ are those children aged 15 and above with at least one parent being foreign-born and living in an OECD country. Thus, if a child has both parents born abroad in different countries, he or she is counted twice. In the US, ‘second generation’ refers to all persons born in the US with one or both parents born outside the country. However, there are also other definitions in the literature referring tothe term: (a) 1.5 Generation: children born in their home countries but brought to a new country before the age of 12; and (b) 2.5 Generation: native-born children where one parent is first generation and the other parent is second generation. Third, higher generation diasporas also have strong economic and emotional ties to the origin countries, and again data is not available for almost all countries. The top 20 origin countries for first- and second-generation migrants are shown in Figure 1.1.

New Data for First- and Second-Generation Immigrants in Australia and the US Table 1.1 presents information about the first- and second-generation immigration streams with updated data from the Australia 2011 Census and the US 2010 Census. For the purpose of classifying the newborns in Australia belonging to the second generation on the basis of origin we adopt the following method. If the parents originally are from two different countries, the mother’s birthplace is given priority while identifying the origin of the child. Hence, if the mother is born abroad, the child’s origin will also be traced on that basis. According to the numbers of the ‘Annual Demographics File’ of the US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1998, there were

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Figure 1.1: Diaspora: First and Second Generation, 2010

Source: UN Migrant stocks, European Union Labour Force Survey, 2008 ad hoc module (Eurostat); US Current Population Survey, 2008; Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, 2009; OECD (2012). Table 1.1: Diaspora in Australia and the US

Country Australia Census, 2011 US 1998 US 2010

Native First Second Born (in Generation Generation million) (in million) (in million)

Diaspora First- Diaspora as and Second- Percentage Generations of Total (in million) Population

16.2

6.0

2.2

8.2

51

271.4 269.3

28.7 39.9

28.6 19.7

57.4 59.6

21 22

Source: ABS (2012); OECD (2012); Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013); Pew Research Center (2013).

28.6 million people born in the US with both parents born abroad, or with the mother born in the US and the father abroad, or with the father born in the US and the mother abroad. In 2012, the secondgeneration population has declined. However, according to a 2008 Pew Research population projection, by 2050, ‘an estimated 37 per cent of the U.S. population . . . will be immigrants or the children of immigrants’ (Pew Research Center 2013: 13).

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According to the US American Community Survey, there were 48 million people of German ancestry and 35 million of Irish ancestry compared to only 4.5 million Germans and 1 million Irish first- and second-generation migrants (see Figure 1.1). Of course, such ancestry data provides an upper bound estimate of diasporas in the US. The true figure is somewhere between ancestry figure and that for the first- and second-generation migrants. The Pew Research Center provides an estimation of 177.7 million of third or over generations in the US.

Indian Diaspora Origin countries also use different definitions of diasporas. For example, India uses three categories: NRI, PIO, and Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). Figure 1.2 presents the numbers for the Indian diaspora. There are about 10 million NRIs living in different part of the world. The main concentration of NRIs is in the Gulf. The number of PIOs is estimated to be about 12 million from which the largest group of PIOs live in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the US, South Africa, Mauritius, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Nepal. The total number of overseas Indians reached 22 million in 2012 (see Figure 1.2). India does not allow for dual citizenship but offers an identification card that entitles migrants to specific rights. It issues a PIO card Figure 1.2: Indian Diaspora 2011: Non-Resident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin

Source: MOIA (2012).

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that allows for entry without a visa during the period of its validity. The card also allows a person access to all facilities in the matter of acquisition, holding, transfer, and disposal of immovable properties in India in matters relating to the acquisition of agricultural/plantation properties. However, this card does not allow one to vote.

Contributions of the Diaspora Both sending and receiving countries are beginning to implement policies to boost flows of financial resources, information and technology from diasporas.

Remittances Migrants from developing countries sent at least US$401 billion in remittances to their countries in 2012. Remittances remain a key resource flow far exceeding official development assistance as well as private debt and portfolio equity. India, China, the Philippines, and Mexico remain the largest recipients of migrant remittances, though smaller developing countries, such as Tajikistan, Liberia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, and Moldova receive the most as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). Figure 1.3: Top 10 Recipients of Migrant Remittances

Source: Aga et al. (2013).

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Figure 1.4: Top 10 Recipients of Migrant Remittances as a Share of GDPa

Source: Aga et al. (2013). Note: a Data on remittance inflows and GDP are for 2011, the latest year for which official GDP data is available.

The true size of remittance flows, including unrecorded flows, is believed to be significantly larger. Remittances are the most tangible link between migration and development. Remittances tend to be relatively stable, and may behave counter cyclically — because relatives and friends often send more when the recipient country is in an economic downturn or experiences a disaster. Remittances have been more stable than foreign direct investment, private debt, and equity flows. Nevertheless, even small fluctuations in remittance inflows can pose macroeconomic challenges to recipient countries, especially those with large inflows. Remittances play an important role in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty (see Box 1.2). They help households diversify their sources of income while providing a much needed source of savings and capital for investment. Remittances are also associated with increased household investments in education, entrepreneurship and health — all of which have evidence of the fact that the impact of remittances on economic growth is mixed. Many migrants transfer funds to households in origin countries for investment purposes. Data from household surveys show that African households receiving international remittances from the developed countries in the OECD have been making productive investments like

Box 1.2: How Migration and Remittances have Contributed to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 2000–15

Goal 1: Remittances directly reduce poverty of migrants and their families, offering a vital lifeline for millions of people and a powerful driver of shared prosperity. Evidence from Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and other regions suggests that remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty, as well as indirectly stimulate economic activity. For example, remittances appear to have reduced the share of poor people in the population by 11 per cent in Uganda and 5 per cent in Ghana. Goals 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6: Migration and remittances lead to increased investments in health, education and entrepreneurship. In some countries, remittances contribute to better school attendance, higher school enrolment rates, and additional years in school. Remittances may increase expenditure on education by helping finance schooling and reducing the need for child labour. Girls’ school attendance and educational attainment rise from the receipt of remittances (e.g., Pakistan, Peru). Adolescent girls and women who migrate find opportunities for employment and skill acquisition. Migration also allows women migrants to find greater voice within families (and yet these girls face difficulties and risks at every step of the migration process). However, women are also more likely to act as a safety net for their family back home. The gains to people who move are also important. Research has found that migrants from the poorest countries, on average, experienced a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school enrolment rates, and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality after moving to a developed country. This is an important benefit since the earnings of working-age migrants is also likely to depend heavily on their education level, age, gender, occupation and sector of work, and employment status. Remittances contribute to better health outcomes by enabling household members to purchase more food and healthcare services, and perhaps by increasing information on health practices. Several studies found that higher remittances per capita were associated with greater access to private treatment for fever and diarrhoea. Remittances reduce overall child mortality (a 1 per cent increase in remittances reduces the infant mortality rate by 1.2 per thousand in Latin America). In Sri Lanka, the children in remittance-receiving households have higher birth weight. Migration has been observed to increase health knowledge, which has led to lower rates of infant mortality and higher birth weights in Mexico as well as greater access to maternal care. Increased mobility of workers can, however, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV: male Senegalese migrants were found to have higher rates of HIV-prevalence as compared to nonmigrants from the same origin area. However, remittances and access to knowledge facilitate treatments for HIV and malaria.

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Goal 7: The effects of migration on climate change, on the other hand, are less understood. When migration is induced by a conflict or a natural disaster leading to a sudden inflow of migrants, the displaced people may resort to unsustainable activities in the absence of other means of survival, exacerbating existing environmental problems or creating new ones. Sometimes they move into marginal areas where they are still more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. On the other hand, migration can stimulate the adoption of new techniques and raw materials, leading to more environmentally-friendly production and consumption practices. Migration is itself a mode of adaptation to climate change. Goal 8: Remittances can play an important role in improving access to information and communication technology. Households in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda receiving international remittances also have higher rates of access to mobile phones, radios, televisions, and computers. In short, international and internal migration give rise to a complex set of effects, many of which contribute to achieving the MDGs. Migration and remittances can be a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts. Yet migration and remittances should not be viewed as a substitute for official development aid, as it is private money that should not be expected to overcome structural obstacles such as poor public infrastructure, weak rule of law or poor governance.

buying agricultural equipment, building a house or a business, purchasing land, and improving a farm. The global remittance market is undergoing a major structural change with the increasing popularity of mobile phone- and internetbased remittances. Yet, regulations to combat money-laundering and financial crime have become a roadblock to the adoption of these new technologies for cross-border remittances. There is an urgent need to revisit these regulations. Also it has become imperative now to address whether these new technologies should be regulated under banking regulations or telecom ones, and how the operational risks that might arise can be addressed. Developing countries are paying more attention to remittances and diaspora wealth. There is a broad agreement in the development community now that remittances should be facilitated by reducing remittance fees, and linked to microfinance, financial inclusion and capital market access. Investors and credit rating agencies are paying attention to remittances in the analysis of sovereign creditworthiness.

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Diaspora Bonds Diaspora members can act as catalysts for the development of capital markets in their countries of origin by diversifying the investor base, introducing new financial products, and providing reliable sources of funding. Also many countries are considering issuance of diaspora bonds to tap into the wealth of their diasporas. Diaspora bonds can tap into the emotional ties — the desire to give back — and potentially help lower the cost of financing for development projects back home. According to Nielsen and Riddle (2007), emotion, sense of duty, social networks, strength of diaspora organizations, and visits to the origin country are important determinants of diaspora investment. A diaspora bond — a retail saving instrument marketed only to the diaspora members — can be an effective tool to tap diaspora wealth (Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Through retailing diaspora bonds at small denominations ranging from US$100–1,000, the government or a reputable private corporation in a developing country can tap into the wealth of relatively poor migrants. Besides patriotic reasons and the desire to give back, a diaspora investor may be willing to buy diaspora bonds at a lower interest rate than the rate demanded by foreign investors. In the past the governments of India and Israel have issued diaspora bonds to raise approximately US$40 billion dollars, often in times of financial crisis.1 Ethiopia and Nepal have issued diaspora bonds in the last two years, but were unsuccessful in mobilizing funds.2 One problem was limited marketing and publicity. In general, countries where the diaspora groups are politically opposed to the government or those facing governance problems may 1 According to Chapter 3 in Ketkar and Ratha (2009), the Development Corporation for Israel (DCI) has raised well over US$25 billion from diaspora bonds since 1951. Jewish diaspora investors paid a steep price premium (perhaps better characterized as a large patriotic yield discount) when buying DCI bonds. The State Bank of India (SBI) raised US$11.3 billion through three issues of diaspora bonds, particularly when ordinary sources of funding for India had all but vanished in 1991, following the balance of payments crisis, and in 1998, after the country conducted nuclear tests. 2 See Negash (2009) and Mersha (2009) for a description of the Ethiopian Diaspora Investment Potential and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation’s (EEPCO’s) Millennium Bond. See Plaza et al. (2011) for a comparison of the two Ethiopian issuances.

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find it difficult to issue diaspora bonds. Diaspora investors, like other investors, will be concerned with the government’s willingness and ability to service its debt. Thus, factors such as government reputation, rule of law and protection of property rights will also influence diaspora investors’ decisions to invest in their countries. Ketkar and Ratha (2010) underscore three reasons why there are still very few issuances of diaspora bonds. First, there is limited awareness of this financing vehicle. Developing-country policy-makers would benefit from technical assistance aimed at improving their understanding of how to structure bond offerings, how to register them with regulatory agencies such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and whether or not such instruments need to be rated by rating agencies. Second, many countries still have little concrete knowledge of the capabilities and resources of their diasporas. And, third, in some cases diaspora members may not trust their home country government. Potential issuers of diaspora bonds, however, should be reminded of the risks associated with foreign currency debt. Considerations must be given to prudential risk management before taking on additional debt. Potential volatility in diasporas’ incomes and disruption in relationship with diaspora can also occur rather quickly in some countries where political risks are high. Finally, large foreign currency inflows after a bond issuance require careful macroeconomic management, especially of the exchange rate.

Trade, Investments, Skills, and Technology Transfer Migrants facilitate bilateral trade and investment flows by matching producers of consumer goods in one country with appropriate distributors in the other, and assemblers with the right component suppliers (see Gould 1990, 1994; Javorcik et al. 2006; Docquier and Lodigiani 2007; Docquier et al. 2011; Leblang 2011; Naghavi and Strozzi 2011). Some governmental agencies and private firms in several countries are tapping their diasporas to provide market information about the countries in which emigrants now live. Activities include the establishment of diaspora trade councils and participation in trade missions and business networks. Other countries are offering diaspora members the same benefits and rights as domestic investors. Involvement of the diaspora in sending countries’ economies can take several forms (Kuznetsov 2006; Plaza 2008): (a) licensing agreements to provide technology transfer and

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know-how between diaspora-owned or managed firms in host countries and sending country firms; direct investment in local firms, as a joint venture; knowledge spillovers when diaspora members assume top managerial positions in foreign-owned firms within their country of origin; networks of scientists or professionals to promote research in host countries directed toward the needs of sending countries; temporary or virtual return, through extended visits or electronic communications in professional fields such as medicine and engineering; return to permanent employment in the sending country after work experience in the host country.

There are different types of diaspora knowledge networks.3 Scientists and R&D personnel networks provide knowledge, mentoring expertise and finance (venture capital). Professional and business networks are regional or local networks of skilled diaspora members located in larger cities (Saxenian 2002, 2006). Indian professionals helped to promote India as an outsourcing destination for instance. Relevant associations provide technical assistance and organize conferences, investment forums to match investors with counterparts at home, and recruitment fairs. More industrialized labour-sending countries with large skilledmigrant populations have also been able to tap their expatriates and develop some form of mentor–sponsor model in certain sectors or industries. How the knowledge is transferred varies according to the different types of diaspora networks mentioned here. The skills of the diaspora can be utilized by establishing knowledge exchange networks. China, Chile, India, Ireland, and Scotland have developed professional and business networks amongst the diaspora. In some 3

For example, associations of Chinese and Indian immigrant scientists and engineers exchange information and collaborate in research and development (R&D) projects with scientists in their countries of origin (Saxenian 2002). Financing local sabbatical stays for researchers living abroad as well as the opportunity to teach short courses or workshops are good measures to promote exchange. African associations under this category include the International Society of African Scientists (Delaware) and the Ethiopian Scientific Society (Washington DC), among others.

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countries, encouraging the growth of private-sector networks may be more effective than direct government involvement in establishing links to the diaspora. Governments can help facilitate diaspora networks through the internet, professional associations, embassies abroad, and cultural events.

Collective Remittances Several diaspora groups have begun to contribute financial and nonfinancial resources to its homeland countries, although large-scale investments have not yet emerged. Organizations have been created in Europe, the US, Canada, and some other countries. These organizations pool resources and support their villages or friends. In some cases, they send funds for development purposes, such as constructing a school, providing supplies to schools or hospitals, supporting orphans, and training new migrants arriving at the destination country. A few governments have offered matching grants for remittances from diaspora groups or Home Town Associations (HTAs) to attract funding for specific community projects. The best known of these matching schemes is Mexico’s 3-for-1 programme, under which the local, state and federal governments all contribute US$1 for every US$1 of remittances sent to a community for a designated development project. Little evaluation of the impact of these programmes has been done (World Bank 2005).

Summary and Conclusions The central question regarding migration is not whether there should be more or less of it, but how countries make the best out of it in terms of remittances and developmental impact through timely policy amendments and exploitation of circumstantial opportunities. Our review suggests a number of areas in which future research and debate will be needed to improve policy formulation related to diaspora contributions. These include how to make remittances more effective as tools for poverty reduction and development in migrants’ countries of origin and how to tap into the vibrant communities of the diaspora and work with them as development partners. This chapter covered a diverse range of diaspora issues and provided a number of experiences that are relevant for policy-makers in both developed and developing countries. The main findings are as follows.

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Understanding the Diaspora Efforts to understand the size and characteristics of the diaspora should be a high priority for countries interested in harnessing diaspora resources. Lack of adequate data on the diaspora impairs efforts to improve the contributions the diaspora can make to the origin country. Many migrants are not counted in national surveys, and many descendants of migrants still have emotional ties to the country of their ancestors. Case studies indicate that networks of diaspora families and friends send funds for development purposes such as constructing schools, providing supplies to schools or hospitals, supporting orphans, and supporting small-scale projects. However, little is known about the scale or impact of such activities. More work is needed to estimate the size of the diasporas and in a bilateral matrix format. Also more frequent surveys of diasporas would go a long way in understanding their attitudes toward the present government and emotional and financial ties with the country of origins. Identifying different generations will also allow us to analyze the changes in waves of migration, their economic and educational attainments, as well as present a picture of how different the second generation is from 10 years ago.

Diaspora and Cross-Border Economics Diasporas facilitate cross-border trade, investment, and access to advanced technology and skills. Diaspora networks play an important role in cross-border exchanges of market information about trade and regulations. Diaspora members may also invest directly in origin countries, or provide their expertise to assist investments by multinational firms. Compared with other foreign investors, members of diasporas may accept lower interest rates on loans to home countries because they have (a) emotional ties to home countries, (b) better access to information may allow them to lower risk premium as compared to other foreign investors, or (c) they may have local currency liabilities that makes them less worried than other investors about the potential for currency devaluation or the forced conversion of assets denominated in foreign currencies to local currencies. Diaspora bonds targeted at nationals residing abroad can open opportunities for investment and facilitate investment in their home countries.

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Diaspora and Development Paradigms Harnessing diaspora contributions in the area of trade, investment and technology requires a supportive business climate. Property rights, security, elimination of red tape, and good infrastructure encourage diasporas to invest back home. Diaspora members may be more willing than other investors to take risks in their own country, but such investments require favourable working conditions (De Haas 2006; Page and Plaza 2006).

Allowing of Dual Citizenship Diaspora members sometimes maintain residences both in their origin as well as destination countries. In other cases migrants have a primary residence abroad but return to their origin countries every year to support specific activities. Thus, citizenship and residency rights are important determinants of a diaspora’s participation in trade, investment and technology transfer with its origin country, and make it easier to travel and own land.

Making the Best Use of Embassies and Consulates These institutions can play a key role in reaching out to the diaspora. Steps that could improve embassies’ engagement with diasporas include outreach programmes to gain more information, the training of embassy staff for contacting diaspora members and facilitating investment and trade contacts, and the use of embassies as a vehicle for marketing investment and financial instruments such as diaspora bonds. At home, government initiatives have taken various forms, from the creation of dedicated ministries that deal with migrant communities to the addition of specific functions to such ministries as foreign affairs, interior, finance, trade, social affairs, and youth. In summary, members of the diaspora are playing a role in helping their country develop. The first stage of any successful diaspora policy is an assessment of who the diaspora are, where they are, their interests, objectives and strategies, the actors and main interlocutors, their capacities, and the main obstacles to their involvement in development projects, etc. Without this assessment stage, activities can miss the target and fail because of a lack of understanding of diaspora interests, capacities and needs. Finally, more multidisciplinary analysis is required to guide policy. Even with all the solid empirical studies on the linkages of migration,

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trade and investment available, many questions remain unanswered. For example, there is more need to understand the contributions of both low- and high-skilled diaspora members — whether in the North or in the South.

References African Union. 2005. ‘Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the African Diaspora’. 11–12 April, Addis Ababa. Aga, Gemechu Ayana, Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Sonia Plaza, Ani Rudra Silwal, and Dilip Ratha. 2013. ‘Migration and Development Brief 20’. Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, 19 April. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2012. ‘Births, Country of Birth of Parents, Australia — 2011’. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/Details Page/3301.02011?OpenDocument (accessed 21 November 2013). Crush, Jonathan. 2011. ‘Diasporas of the South: Situating the African Diaspora in Africa’, in Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (eds), Diaspora for Development in Africa, pp. 55–78. Washington DC: World Bank. De Haas, Hein. 2006. Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries. Oxford: International Migration Institute. Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 2013. ‘Australia’s Migration Trends 2011–12’. Economic Analysis Unit, Strategic Policy and Innovation Division, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Government. Docquier, Frédéric and Elisabetta Lodigiani. 2007. ‘Skilled Migration and Business Networks’. Development Working Paper no. 234, Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, University of Milano. Docquier, Frédéric, Elisabetta Lodigiani, H. Rapoport, and M. Schiff 2011. ‘Emigration and Democracy’. Discussion Paper no. 5496, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Eurostat. 2011. Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and Second Generation. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Gould, David. 1990. ‘Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Implications for Trade, Welfare and Factor Returns?’ PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. ———. 1994. ‘Immigrants’ Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implications for U.S. Bilateral Trade Flows’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2): 302–16. Ionescu, Dina. 2006. ‘Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers’. Migration Research Series Paper no. 26, International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

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Javorcik, Beata S., Caglar Ozden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu. 2006. ‘Migrant Networks and Foreign Direct Investment’. Policy Research Working Paper no. 4046, World Bank, Washington DC. Ketkar, S. and D. Ratha. 2009. Innovative Financing for Development. Washington DC: World Bank. ———. 2010. ‘Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the Diaspora during Difficult Times’, Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy, 1(2): 251–63. Kuznetsov, Y. 2006. Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad. Washington DC: World Bank. Leblang, D. 2011. ‘Another Link in the Chain: Migrant Networks and International Investment’, in Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (eds), Diaspora for Development in Africa, pp. 79–102. Washington DC: World Bank. Mersha, Genet. 2009. ‘The Gilgel Gibe Saga: The Bond and Dilemma of Ethiopian Diaspora for a Description of the Main Features of the Millennium Bond’. Ethio Quest News, 5 April. http://www.ethioquestnews.com/Perspective/ Gilgel_Gibe_Saga.html (accessed 29 November 2013). Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). n.d. ‘India and its Diaspora’. http:// moia.gov.in/accessories.aspx?aid=10 (accessed 21 November 2013). ———. 2012. ‘Population of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs): Country Wise’. http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/NRISPIOS-Data(15-06-12)new. pdf (accessed 31 October 2013). Naghavi, Alireza and Chiara Strozzi. 2011. ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Migration, and Diaspora’. IZA Discussion Paper no. 5864, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn Negash, Minga. 2009. ‘Ethiopian Diaspora Investment Potential and EEPCO’s Millenium Bond’. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. http://www. ethiopianreview.info/2010/minga-negash-ethiopia-diaspora-investmentpotential-article-march-2009.pdf (accessed 29 November 2013). Nielsen, T. M. and L. Riddle. 2007. ‘Why Diasporas Invest in the Homelands: A Conceptual Model of Motivation’. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers. cfm?abstract_id=987725 (accessed 31 October 2013). Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2012. Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas. Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. Page, John, and Sonia Plaza. 2006. ‘Migration, Remittances and Economic Development: A Review of Global Evidence’, Journal of African Economies, 15(2): 245–336. Pew Research Center. 2013. ‘Second-Generation Americans: A Portrait of the Adult Children Immigrants’. Pew Research Center, Washington DC. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/02/FINAL_immigrant_ generations_report_2-7-13.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013). Plaza, Sonia. 2008. ‘Mobilizing the Diaspora: Creating and Enabling Environment for Trade, Investment, Knowledge Transfer and Enterprise Development’, in Raj Bardouille, Muna Ndulo and Margaret Grieco (eds),

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Africa’s Finances: The Contribution of Remittances. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press. Plaza, Sonia and Dilip Ratha (eds). 2011. Diaspora for Development in Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. Plaza, Sonia, Mario Navarrete and Dilip Ratha. 2011. Migration and Remittances Household Surveys in Africa: Methodological Aspects and Main Findings. Washington DC: World Bank. Ratha, Dilip, S. Mohapatra, C. Ozden, S. Plaza, W. Shaw, and A. Shimles. 2011. Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills and Investments. Washington DC: World Bank. Saxenian, A. L. 2002. ‘The Silicon Valley Connection: Transnational Networks and Regional Development in Taiwan, China and India’, Science Technology and Society, 7(1): 117–49. ———. 2006. The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS). 2010. ‘Statement at the African Union Consultation with the African Diaspora in the U.S.: Building Bridges across the Atlantic’. http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphan/791/ (accessed 21 November 2013). Unites States Census Bureau. 1998. ‘Current Population Survey, March 1998: Annual Demographic File’. Unites States Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce. http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar98.html (accessed 21 November 2013). World Bank. 2005. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington DC: World Bank. ———. 2010. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. Washington DC: World Bank.

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Case Study of the Indo-EU Diaspora alwyn DiDaR Singh* Human resource mobility is an essential feature of today’s globalized world where integrated world markets, networks and technologies are all contributing to the increasing movement of labour, students, professionals, and families. The migrants of today are the diaspora of tomorrow — and those of yesteryears, that of today. Governments on both sides of the migration chain increasingly recognize the value of the diasporas’ voluntary engagement with their countries of origin and are seeking ways to optimize this engagement. The question facing policy-makers is not so much whether the diaspora can benefit their countries of origin, but what kind of government policies and programmes can foster and promote these relationships. Diasporas are not only key drivers in development efforts but also in strengthening bilateral relations between host and home nations. This potential of the diaspora has gained growing international recognition, both in political and academic circles as well as among diaspora members themselves. Several countries of origin have attempted to formulate polices of diaspora engagement in order to use their overseas communities as a resource for development. Such polices range from securing better welfare conditions for their migrants abroad to promoting investment and contributions to development. Literature on the subject opines that such engagement can be a catalyst to technology transfer, investment and economic development of homeland countries. * A more detailed study on this same topic has been done by the author as ‘Working with the Diaspora for Development — Policy Perspectives from India’, Working Paper no. 376, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. http://www.iimb.ernet.in/research/working-papers/working-diasporadevelopment-policy-perspectives-india (accessed 26 November 2013).

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This analysis examines the link between diaspora and development and concludes that it’s a relationship that needs to be nurtured for mutual benefit. It argues that the Indo-European diaspora has contributed to the economies of the host countries and is now in a position to play a part in India’s developmental efforts. For this a favourable framework needs to be in place. The Indian government’s policies and programmes are steps in this direction and the time is opportune for the diaspora to evolve mutually beneficial strategies with both host and home countries to carry forward the relationship.

Diaspora and Development The term ‘diaspora’ has a specific historical context. In recent times, it has emerged as a generic term to describe communities beyond the boundaries of their culture and nation-states. Just as the history of migration and the settlement of populations have changed, so has the concept of diaspora. With the impact of globalization there have been profound changes in the composition of local, regional and national cultural practices. Diaspora groups, capable of maintaining and investing in social, economic and political networks that span the globe, are of increasing relevance and interest to policy-makers in home countries as well as host countries. Any migrant, displaced or dispersed population cannot automatically be identified as a diaspora. While all Diasporas are products of migration, not all migrations make up a diaspora (Skeldon 1997).1 The existence of diasporas requires more than a mere population of expatriates. It requires members of a community who continue to identify with their homeland and to cultivate ties both between themselves and their homeland. What distinguishes diaspora communities is their on-going or re-awakened attachment and loyalty to their earlier culture and specifically to the homeland. The crucial elements that make the concept meaningful and legitimate to use, is their selfmobilization around their awareness of themselves as diaspora (Sahoo and Maharaj 2007: 113). The continuing existence of the migrant community with their ‘self-awareness’, ‘self-imagination’ and ‘connectedness’ to the country of origin not only lead to the formation of diaspora but also helps in its organization. Diaspora communities invest substantial effort and resources in organizing themselves 1

The term ‘diaspora’ is easily associated with the Jews or Armenians, but almost never to the British.

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effectively to nurture the relationship with their country of settlement, country of origin, other groups of the same nation residing in other parts of the world, and other global and regional actors. These networks of relationships usually carry information and resources that are elements of intricate cultural, political, economic, and scientific trans-state exchanges, especially between country of origin and their diasporas (Sheffer 2003: 26). Defining any group as ‘diaspora’ must therefore be understood in terms of ‘connectedness’ — the desire to and action taken towards such connectedness with ‘home’. Identifying with ‘home’ is no more understood in the ‘classic diaspora’ context of a ‘lost homeland’ but is an extension of a diaspora identity or culture that reaches out to both traditions and language, as also to the homeland country where the migrants originated from. This behaviour or desire is concomitant with being responsible residents of the host country. Today there is no inconsistency between being dependable citizens of the host country while continuing to maintain social and cultural links with one’s homeland. When we talk of ‘diaspora and development’ we presume that not only is there a relationship between the two but that in fact it is a positive and beneficial one! It is akin to presuming that human endeavour automatically has a development angle — one that we need to recognize and promote. This line of presumptive thinking has its origin in the post-World War II development literature and is seen to be closely linked to the politics of the two major trends of the era — capitalism and communism. It presumes that governments established by them somehow can control their destinies and that they can and do work towards improving the human condition (Skeldon 1997). In his seminal work, Migration and Development, Skeldon (ibid.) has correctly pointed out that while we intuitively know what ‘development’ and ‘migration’ mean, defining these two terms can raise several issues. Migration or human mobility encompasses a whole spectrum and types of movement which is why diasporas are not homogenous. Similarly, development too comprises of many parts — economic, social and political. In fact it can be argued that migration and therefore diaspora are integral parts of the development process — both caused and causing change themselves. Literature on diasporas, especially from developing countries, has traditionally supported the idea of the diaspora playing a major role in the development of their home countries. Such ideas include the oft-quoted proposal of Jagdish Bhagwati for a ‘brains tax’ to be levied

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on the incomes of the diaspora from developing countries residing in the developed countries and the proceeds to be remitted to the countries of origin. Other ideas include both philanthropy and in recent years the voluntary contributions or economic remittances from the diaspora to their countries of origin (defined as ‘transfer of money by foreign workers to their home countries’) which in many cases have been higher than the bilateral aid monies given to these countries (Wei and Balasubramanyan 2006) and also usually outpace the official development assistance even from development agencies (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006: 1). An understanding of the relationship between migration and development depends on the theoretical model selected and how the connection is viewed. There are two divergent views on the relationship between migration and development. The first view is the ‘balanced growth’ approach. As part of liberal economic theory, it is suggested that by alleviating unemployment and providing economic support through remittances and development of migrants’ skills migration enhances development in countries of origin, narrows inter-country income disparities, and eventually makes migration unnecessary. The second view is the ‘systematic view’, which does not agree that migration, through remittances and return of skills, automatically accelerates development in the country of origin. Instead, it suggests that migration often distorts the development process through ‘brain drain’ and widening of income disparities. Diaspora should not be seen only as either positive or negative in its contextual sense. For example, the remittances sent back to the homeland by the diaspora can be significant for the local economy yet the fact of the migration that created that diaspora itself reflects a lack of development in the homeland and can and does have negative consequences, for example, on families of migrant workers (Zachariah and Rajan 2012).

Indian Diaspora Policy and Strategy The first question we need to address in the context of Indian diaspora policy is to ask a very basic question — does India have a diaspora policy? Is it stated or written somewhere? Is it clear, transparent and evident in India’s dealing with the diaspora? Looked at formally, there is no ‘white-paper’ on ‘Indian Diaspora Policy’.2 Neither is there any 2 Aspects of the Indian diaspora policy can be seen as publicly first spelt out at the inaugural Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (PBD), 2003 in the speech of the then

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specific policy paper on Indian Migration Policy in the public domain, except for the Emigration Act, 1983. That however does not mean that India does not have a specific policy on diaspora engagement. It is the view of this paper that India does have a robust diaspora engagement policy and one that is evolving with the active involvement of the diaspora itself. This consultative process is mentioned in addresses by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Indian Overseas Affairs at the PBD,3 which is one of the best forums for diaspora engagement. Several experts have referred to the seeming ‘ambivalence’ in both the policy and practice of India’s engagement with its overseas community in the ‘historical’ context.4 India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was seen as somewhat detached from the overseas Indians expecting and asking them to make their own destinies in their host countries. India’s non-intervention in the treatment meted out to the Indian diaspora in instances such as by Idi Amin in Uganda, the Fiji military coup, Malaysia, etc. are cases in point.5 It suffices to state that Indian foreign policy should not be seen to necessarily be the same as its diaspora policy. Second, the geo-political and economic circumstances of India post-1991 (economic liberalization) should not be mistaken or compared to the post-Independence era of the 1950s through to the 1970s. For example, post-1991 opened up the Indian economy to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) — including policies to attract investment also from the diaspora. These changes reflect not just the Indian policy but also the growing clout of the Indian diaspora worldwide. From a seemingly docile working-class brand we see the emergence of the IT-savvy highly-educated and confident Indian professional as the new face or brand that emerged in the 21st century. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (see http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/ch2.pdf [accessed 15 May 2012]). The emerging diaspora policy and various initiatives are found outlined in the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) (see http://moia.gov.in/ [accessed 25 November 2013]). 3 Such interactive diaspora conventions have been attempted by several countries such as Jamaica, Cyprus, Armenia, Ukraine, and India. The PBD is held every January in India and now has a mini-PBD organized for similar interaction overseas as well. 4 ‘Few of these overseas Indians wish to return to their country of origin because the financial and professional inducements of their host countries are generally stronger than the emotional attachments to the motherland’ (Nehru, quoted in Thakur 1985: 357). 5 Thakur (ibid.) refers to Nehru’s ideological foreign policy, which prevented India from interfering in matters ‘which were not of its concern’.

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Irrespective of the historical background, the factual position that confronted Indian policy-makers in late 20th century was a robust and very large Indian diaspora that wished to engage, and that the country could engage with, as a strategic resource. That policy is what has developed into the Indian model of diaspora engagement. India is one of the pioneers in recognizing the importance of its overseas population and establishing an institutional framework for sustainable and mutually beneficial engagement with its diaspora. By creating an independent and effective Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India has given mainstream attention to its very large overseas Indian community.6 Estimated as the second largest diaspora at over 27 million and spread across 189 countries, overseas Indians are today recognized as the ‘Knowledge Diaspora’. Their ‘virtual presence’ across sectors and in most parts of the globe makes them a strategic resource. India recognizes the need, therefore, to bring a strategic dimension to its engagement with its overseas community. It has taken a mediumto long-term view and is attempting to forge a partnership that will best serve India as a rapidly growing knowledge economy — to drive innovation and entrepreneurship — and meet the aspirations of the overseas Indian community as a significant constituency across the world.7 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Handbook for Diaspora Engagement (Agunias and Newland 2012) has outlined ‘Six Actions to Facilitate Diaspora Engagement’. These are recommended policy initiatives that would further diaspora engagement by making the homeland environment more conducive for the relationship. The matrix given in Table 2.1 summarizes the status of Indian strategy in each of these areas. It’s a fairly impressive mark-sheet for Indian strategy. It exhibits a mature and well-developed policy framework that has evolved over the years. 6

Following the two successful diaspora bonds issues of ‘Resurgent India Bonds’ in 1998 and the India Millennium Deposits in 2000, the Indian government established a High-Level Committee on the Indian diaspora whose report ultimately resulted in the formation of the Ministry of NRI Affairs in 2004 (subsequently renamed as ‘Overseas Indian Affairs’). 7 Estimate of diaspora community and policy of the Indian government is as enunciated in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2010 (MOIA 2011).

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Table 2.1: Strategic Dashboard of Indian Policy for Diaspora Engagement Diaspora Engagement Action

Status of Indian Policy

Flexible Citizenship Laws and Residency and Visa Requirements

India does not permit dual citizenship. However, its Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) Card scheme provides for life-time visa-free travel and full residency and employment rights for Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) who are citizens of other countries.

Political Rights

Voting rights have not been accorded to PIOs who are citizens of other countries, however NonResident Indians (NRIs: Indian Passport holders settled overseas) have been recently restored their right to vote by amending rules for registration of voters located overseas.

Special Property Rights

Indian diaspora holding PIO or OCI cards have the right to purchase property in India (except farm and plantation).

Tax Incentives

Reduced customs duty regime is available for transfer of residence of overseas Indians coming back to India including the retention of NRI status up to three years after return. Provisions for transfer of funds for philanthropy and tax exemption for the same are available.

Portable Benefits

Through the provision of Social Security Agreements (SSAs) pensionary benefits of Indian workers and professionals working overseas are both portable and can be totalized in countries where SSAs have been executed.

General Laws

To promote investments from Indian diaspora, several provisions have been put in place ranging from special incentives for bank deposits, investments in the share market, and certain special provisions for OCIs and NRIs for FDI. Also, to encourage employment of overseas Indians, amendments to rules for doctors, scientists, academics, and accountants have been or are in the process of being amended.

Source: Prepared by the author.

India–EU Migration and Diaspora The Indo-European diaspora represents a significant population in its size, spread and depth. Even continental Europe (without including the United Kingdom [UK]) boasts of a strong, successful and

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‘knowledge’-based overseas Indian community. As academics, scientists, technologists, entrepreneurs, artists, and writers, they have distinguished themselves and contributed in considerable measure to the development of their host countries. Yet their engagement — economic, social and cultural — with India is currently short of its potential as compared to their counterparts in North America. As we move forward, both India and the European Union (EU) must draw upon the Indian strategy to widen and strengthen the bridge that the Indian diaspora represents. In the context of this paper, we look at the Indo-EU diaspora across five European countries, i.e., France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium as they not only have the largest presence of overseas Indians in mainland Europe but are also strategically important for India. According to the World Bank estimates of 2011, the Indian Diaspora based in Europe is contributing 8 per cent of the total remittances (some US$64 billion), being worth some US$4.4 billion to the Indian economy. This contribution is real and growing. In terms of investments, the data available unfortunately does not indicate NRI or OCI investments country- or region-wise; however, as the bilateral economic relations of India with the five focus countries of Europe show, trade and investment relations are strong and on the rise. India–EU migration is fast becoming a central element of international relations between India and Europe, both at the bilateral and multilateral level. Interestingly, both sides have a common stated agenda and view migration similarly from the three-pronged approach of promoting legal migration, discouraging illegal migration and working together in the area of migration and development. Literature on migration shows that the current nature of migrant transnationalism is the result of interplay of various historical, political, economic, and cultural factors. For instance, the characteristics of migration between India and the UK are extensively related to the colonial history of the countries. Similarly, the most important reasons for the intensive movement of people between Morocco and France lie in the past French colonial presence in Morocco and in the long history of emigration to France. Obviously this does not hold generally for the Indian diaspora in mainland Europe. Very interestingly, there are some important historical links; for example, the Portuguese connection with Goa, the former Portuguese colony in India; the French connection with Pondicherry, and the Indian indentured-labour origin of the PIOs in Le Reunion and Guadeloupe; and the largest of PIOs in mainland Europe, the Surinamese Indians in the Netherlands.

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Other than that most of the Indian diaspora in mainland Europe is of recent origin — and increasing. It is important to point out here that as in the subcontinent of India, the Indian diaspora cannot be seen or projected as a homogeneous phenomenon. The examples here quite clearly illustrate that. Not only were such emigration waves at different periods of time, they also represent different Indian communities and geographies. However, as Esman (2009: 210) points out, the multifacetedness of dissimilar diaspora communities ‘simultaneously highlights the multitudinousness and dynamism of their collectivities’. In this context must be seen the break-up between PIOs (with European citizenship) and NRIs as depicted in Figure 2.1. Of the five focus countries studied, France (especially the territories of Reunion Island and Guadeloupe) and Netherlands have substantial indentureorigin PIOs. However, even if one were to take all of the Indian diaspora in each of these countries, they do not account for even 1 per cent of the population (except Netherlands at 1.2 per cent). In the overall scheme of things their impact and clout in their host countries is obviously at best limited. The estimate of the size of the Indian diaspora in all of Europe as per the ‘Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’ (GoI 2001), was almost 2 million (1,984,957 as totalled from the country estimates of the report). The estimate of the MOIA in 2011, based on figures provided by Indian missions in the same countries put this at 2.5 million (estimates of all the countries totalling to 2,502,701).8 This indicates a growth of 26 per cent in the last 10 years. If one were to take the five focus countries, it can be seen from Figure 2.2 that there is substantial increase in all of them (ranging from 25 to over 125 per cent), except the Netherlands (at just over 2 per cent). This empirical evidence of steady growth in numbers clearly shows the pull factor operating in Europe and is also a comment on the stability of the Indo-EU diaspora. 8 It is important to also note that data used here is mostly from Indian sources. Data on the ethnicity of residents including migrants is not easy to come by in several European states where such data collection is forbidden by law or tradition. There are also rather bewildering situations; for example, Belgium is caught somewhere between the two traditions of whether to report ethnicity or not (Jacobs and Rea 2005) and finds itself in a stalemate position. The French-speaking part of Belgium tends to follow the French tradition of refusing ethnic categorization, while the Flemish (the Dutch-speaking part) try to copy the Dutch model in distinguishing between locals and foreigners.

Figure 2.1: Estimated Population of Indian Diaspora (PIOs and NRIs) in Five European Countries, 2011

Source: GoI (2001). Figure 2.2: Size of Indian Diaspora in Five European Countries in 2001 and 2011

Source: Data for 2001 had been compiled from GoI (2001) and for 2011 from MOIA (n.d.) and the Indian Missions. Note: (a) The population includes PIOs and NRIs in all the five countries in the years 2001 and 2011; (b) the population of France also covers population of France (Guadeloupe) and France (Reunion Island).

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Types or Categories of Overseas Indians The Indian diaspora — coming as it does from such a diverse and heterogeneous origin where even today the homeland takes pride in its diversity — there will be and is in fact a plethora of associations and groups within the diaspora ranging from social, cultural, religious, ethnic, regional, etc. to professional and specialized institutions. However, so far as the Indo-EU diaspora is concerned, it would be useful to categorize them into three distinct groups correlated more or less to the three distinct waves of migration that have been referred to earlier in this paper. These are: (a) the ‘old’ migrants or what can be referred to as the ‘indentureorigin migrants’; (b) the more recent (post-Indian Independence) migrants who have chosen to take host-country citizenship; and (c) the NRIs and Indian students who are there mostly in a professional capacity and continue to retain their Indian passports. This distinction is placed here for analytical purposes as it would be useful to see the relevance of diaspora policy initiatives for each of these as quite clearly interventions need to vary along the categories. There are certain historical and noticeable diaspora activities that are seen internationally. Besides remittances and investment, these include philanthropy, knowledge transfer and gender and youth issues. The matrix shown in Table 2.2 places these in the perspective of the three core categories of the Indian diaspora mentioned here to assess their relevance. Table 2.2 indicates that though many of the activities are relevant across the diaspora, there will be some more applicable for only one or two of the categories. The next obvious question that comes up is whether the Indian model of diaspora engagement caters to these differences and is ‘comprehensive’. Table 2.3 presents another matrix that seeks to assess the relevance for different Indian initiatives in the context of the three different categories defined in this section. The logic being that if the elements of the framework are relevant then there is greater potential for diaspora contribution to homeland development. Again it’s a mixed finding in the context of the different groups. Yes, most of the Indian initiatives are of relevance across the diaspora but may be more applicable for one or the other category. This analysis

Table 2.2: Matrix of Relevance of Diaspora Activities to Indian Diaspora Categories Diaspora Activity

Indenture-Origin Migrants

Recent Migrants

Non-Resident Indians

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Not directly applicable Yes Yes Yes Yes

Remittances Not relevant Investment Maybe Knowledge Transfer Yes Philanthropy Gender Issues Youth Initiatives Diaspora Networks

Diaspora Advocacy

Not relevant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, but may not mix Yes with other overseas Indian networks Limited and mostly Yes, for both host Mostly homelandhost country-centric and homeland. centric.

Source: Prepared by the author. Table 2.3: Relevance of Indian Strategic Framework to Indian Diaspora Categories Indian Initiative PIO/OCI Card Pravasi Bhartiya Divas and Pravasi Bhartiya Kendra Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) — Economic Engagement Global Indian Network of Knowledge (INK) for Knowledge Transfer India Development Foundation (IDF) — Philanthropy India Centre for Migration (ICM) — Migration Policy Research SSAs/Human Resource Mobility Partnership (HRMP)

Voting Rights

Indenture-Origin Migrants

Recent Migrants

Non-Resident Indians

PIO card very relevant Relevant

OCI card very relevant Relevant

Not relevant Relevant

Not very relevant

Yes

Yes

Not very relevant

Yes

Not directly applicable

Not relevant

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Not relevant unless they seek employment in India Not applicable

Not relevant Yes unless they seek employment in India Not applicable Yes

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Indian Initiative Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICFW) Gender Initiative — Assistance for Women against Fraud NRI Marriages Youth — Know India Programme/ Youth Clubs/Scholarships

Indenture-Origin Migrants

Recent Migrants

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Non-Resident Indians

Not applicable

Not applicable Very relevant

Not very relevant

Relevant

Relevant

Relevant

Relevant

Relevant

Source: Prepared by the author.

is relevant not just for this question but also addresses another question — that of the Indian strategy’s relevance itself. It shows that the Indian model of diaspora engagement has in fact addressed relevant engagement issues that are relevant for each of the categories and thereby sought to establish a robust framework. However, for any framework to work it needs to be made use of. This obviously implies a proactive role on the part of the diaspora. Quite simply, as is often said — one needs two hands to clap! Research for this paper showed that there is growing interest and much potential on both sides; yet the fact is that the relationship is nowhere near its potential. Both host and home countries need to push the already available opportunities. This framework of Indian diaspora policy meets several criteria of global best practice and needs to be further strengthened. Host governments too would stand to benefit in promoting the Indo-EU diaspora as a bridge for economic collaboration and investment. So how does the future look for this engagement? First, the positives: with the Indian economy growing (even at a lower rate of 6 or 6.5 per cent) at a pace far above most of the Western economies, there is greater interest from overseas Indians, than ever before, in engaging with India. As a growing market, India cannot be ignored. Enterprises with a global plan or footprint have India on their priority list as a destination for business growth and expansion. Despite the issue of delays and cost overruns, once operational, the returns or margins are much higher than most other comparable countries, especially in manufacturing and new business areas. Even in the services sector, which may have lower margins as compared to the country of residence, there is a steady growth in volume, which is good for continuity of business.

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As far as the negative aspect is concerned, corruption is a major hurdle. Whether for a business venture or knowledge-sector enterprise or philanthropic activity, the business environment in India is significantly tougher than in most developed countries. Infrastructure remains poor, healthcare and education is inadequate, and the gaps between rich and poor growing. Notwithstanding the challenges, a recent report commissioned by the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC 2011) reveals that the Indian diaspora is keen to connect with their country of origin. Both first- and second-generation emigrants are open to acting as a bridge to attract greater involvement with the country. They believe there is much availability of talent and expertise in the country as compared to the lack of available skilled persons overseas. All of these can at best be seen as suggestions. There is a need for further policy research — especially to address the lack of reliable data on migration and the Indo-EU diaspora — and of course capacity building and advocacy.9 This paper has been an attempt to place policy perspectives from India in the context of the Indo-EU Diaspora’s role in development. Hopefully it has succeeded in whetting the appetite for more work in the area.

References Agunias, Dovelyn R. and Kathleen Newland. 2012. Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Esman, Milton J. 2009. Diasporas in the Contemporary World. Cambridge: Polity Press. Government of India (GoI). 2001. ‘Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’. Jacobs, Dirk and Andrea Rea. 2005. ‘Construction et importation des classements ethniques: Allochtones et immigrésaux Pays-Bas et en Belgique’, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 21(2): 35–59. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). n.d. ‘Population of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs): Country Wise’. http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/ NRISPIOS-Data%2815-06-12%29new.pdf (accessed 29 November 2013). ———. 2011. Annual Report 2010. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 9 Many areas, for example, that of remittances of different geographical Indian diasporas and various recipient areas, need further research.

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Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC). 2011. ‘OIFC Study on Indian Diaspora in Singapore, UAE and USA — Interim Report’. Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre, New Delhi. Sahoo, Ajay Kumar and Brij Maharaj. 2007. Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader. Jaipur: Rawat Publication. Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. London: Cambridge University Press. Skeldon, Ronald. 1997. Migration and Development: A Global Perspective. Harlow: Longman. Thakur, R. 1985. ‘India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Fiji’, Asian Survey, 25(3): 356–70. Wei, Yingqi and V. N. Balasubramanyan. 2006. ‘Diaspora and Development’, The World Economy, 29(11): 1599–1609. Wescott, Clay Goodloe and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff. 2006. Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection 1998– 2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

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Diaspora and Development Theoretical Perspectives amba panDe Diasporas are fast emerging as one of the agents of development in

the globalizing world. This has led to a growing worldwide interest in integrating the diasporas and contemplating their contribution in the development of both the home and host countries. The diasporas too — owing to increased transnational connectivity — are keenly looking forward to become a part of this developmental process. The challenge for policy-makers, therefore, is to be able to build trust, and encourage and incorporate the diasporas in sustainable development. This paper aims to highlight the contribution of diasporas in the developmental process of the homeland, especially in the context of Indian diaspora. It also emphasizes the efficacy of including the growing tide of the people on the move as one of the factors in development.

Diaspora Engagements in Economic Development: Insights The concept of diaspora has undergone a major transformation over the years. From the imagery of tragic and victimized existence, they have emerged as a vibrant community capable of participating in economic, political and cultural processes of both the home and host countries through their transnational orientation. The initial notions of ‘melting-pot’ style migrant integration and loyalty have also given way to the idea of circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies (De Haas 2005). In fact, diasporas are considered to participate in the development of their countries of origin (when they are) more successful and well integrated in the countries of settlement, in terms of attitudes, know-how, and financial capacity (ibid.). According to the background paper of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD 2007), engaging diasporas for development

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is primarily a ‘question of attitude’ which involves ‘acknowledging their existence and recognizing that their double belonging can be enriching for both origin and destination countries’. As diasporas simultaneously participate in the developmental process of two or more countries, maintaining the networks between these countries is inevitable. Starting from the time of migration, these networks are to be sustained and developed into healthy bilateral relationships between the countries involved. Networks are like a web of transnational ties that connect not only the diaspora–homeland relationships, but also the co-ethnics and co-nationals around the world. According to Adam McKeown (1999: 317), networks exist in the form of ‘institutions, organizations, and personal connections that . . . [can turn] migration into a viable economic strategy and stable system for the circulation of goods, people, information and profit’. Diaspora engagement and participation in homeland development is a dynamic process with no set formula, but for the present discussion five broad areas/avenues of diaspora engagement have been identified. These are: brain gain/trust/circulation/, remittances, investments, philanthropy, and tourism. The involvement of the Indian diaspora in the developmental process is as heterogeneous as the composition itself which includes a wide variety of people and migration streams in its domain. As India embarked upon economic liberalization in the early 1990s, a seismic shift occurred in its policy approach towards the Indian diaspora (Pande 2011). New avenues for diaspora participation were opened which are slowly, but visibly, yielding results in terms of economic benefits and in the context of ‘soft power’. The Indian diaspora also began to realize the enormous economic potential of India and its emergence as an important global power, making for a mutually beneficial win-win relationship. The High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (MOIA 2001: 418) notes that ‘[d]riven by a combustible mixture of nostalgia, guilt, altruism, ambition and profit motive, they [diaspora] seek to interact with India in a meaningful way through business philanthropy, politics, culture and trade’. Some of New Delhi’s recent initiatives in terms of institutional changes include: introduction of Overseas Indian Citizenship (OCI),1 Social Security Agreements (SSAs), bilateral labour Memorandums of 1

The OCI was granted by the Government of India in 2005. In practice it is not a dual citizenship. As per the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), at present the total number of OCIs is 1,203,613.

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Understanding (MoUs), the PIO/NRI University, the Indian Council for Overseas Employment (ICOE), the Labour Mobility Partnership Agreement, the Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF), the Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC), the Migrant Resource Centre, the e-Governance Project, celebration of Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (PBD), conferring voting rights on overseas Indian passport holders (MOIA 2011).2 As far as the diaspora participation in the already mentioned five areas of engagement is concerned, despite lack of sufficient data and development statistics, an attempt is being made here to highlight the growing partnership.

Brain Regain/Brain Circulation and Skill Transfer A number of studies (Stark et al. 1998; Saxenian 2004; Kuznetsov 2011) have highlighted the emergence of brain regain/circulation/ skill transfer as one of the foremost areas of diaspora contribution to the homeland. India’s experience with the Information Technology (IT) industry is cited time and again as one of the best instances of the multifaceted gains in this regard. The role of the highly-skilled Indian diaspora has been of great significance in the growth of India’s IT sector. It has facilitated the gradual evolution of IT and IT-enabled services in countless ways from boosting trust in India’s intellectual abilities and feeding the industry with new ideas, technologies and markets, to mentoring, coaching, and outsourcing, working as intermediaries, and helping bring policy changes. Such an engagement emerged out of a win-win scenario both for the diaspora and for India. The Indian government has also undertaken quite a few initiatives to tap its human capital in foreign countries on virtual, temporary/permanent basis. It initiated some independent programmes, like the Pool Officers Scheme, to attract professionals on temporary basis whereas some are also in operation under Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN). The establishment of the Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK)3 in 2009 is 2

The Representation of Peoples Amendment Act, 2010, has been passed. A notification dated 3 February 2011 was issued, allowing overseas electors’ names to be included in the electoral rolls pertaining to the locality mentioned in their passports as their place of residence in India. 3 Global-INK is a dynamic electronic platform for knowledge transfer, operating as an online web portal to pull in the diaspora as ‘Knowledge’ partners, the institutions

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another significant move in this regard. There are programmes under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan to hire Indian academicians from abroad on high salaries. Indian diaspora is actively investing in the education sector and several top private universities have been started and run by the expatriate Indians. However, India has a long way to go before it can fully translate the brain drain into brain regain/circulation by capacity building and engaging the diaspora talent/resources. Migration of Indian students for higher studies is not only causing India loss of talent but also an annual foreign exchange outflow of US$10 billion (Thaindian News 2009). Skill shortage is starkly visible in the areas of health and education as indicated by the dearth of doctors and faculty, especially at the state level.

Remittances In India remittances are accounted as ‘Private Transfers’ by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). They include: (a) the inward remittances for family maintenance; (b) local withdrawals/redemption from NonResident Indian (NRI) deposit accounts; (c) personal gifts/donations to charitable/religious institutions, generally through current account; and (d) gold and silver brought through passenger baggage. Apart from the Private Transfers statement, financial flows from temporary migrants — working abroad for less than a year — are also reflected in the ‘Compensation of Employees’ account. This item, introduced in 1999, grew from roughly US$100 million in 2000 to a little under US$1 billion in 2010. A glance at the remittance figures over the years show that the flow of remittances grew substantially in the late 1970s but remained more or less stagnant throughout the 1980s. In the post-reform period, the share of remittances kept pace with the significant upward surge in India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Das et al. 2010). The increase during the 1990s reflects a shift of remittance inflow away from semi-skilled and unskilled migrants to highly-skilled and skilled ones, especially from North America (Chandrashekhar 2012) The increase could also have been possible as remittances through informal channels began to switch to formal channels; NRI deposits witnessed higher local usage due to favourable policy framework and opportunities in India (Tumbe 2012). However, the share of remittances in India’s GDP has never gone beyond 4 per cent in all these years. in India as ‘Stakeholder’ partners, and the government as a ‘Facilitator’ to generate new ideas on issues such as development, education and healthcare.

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Diaspora Investment Contributions Taking a cue from the Chinese model, one of the chief aims of New Delhi while formulating the diaspora policy was to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Based on the suggestions of the report of the High Level Committee, a series of reforms and new policies were introduced to ease NRI investment in India. Apart from the Government of India, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) are also occupied with a multi-pronged approach for attracting FDI from the diaspora. Unfortunately, the share of diaspora FDI in India has still not touched double digits and is under great scrutiny due to problems like ‘Round Tripping’ (Kapur 2003). Nevertheless, the government has introduced a liberalized policy framework to enable diaspora investment, like the establishment of the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) under the MOIA, founded in 2007, and easy approval of proposals by both the automatic and government routes with regard to NRIs and Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs) (in which NRIs hold at least 60 per cent of equity). The NRI/OCBs are permitted to invest up to 100 per cent equity in priority areas. In the Small-Scale Enterprises (SSEs), equity participation up to 24 per cent is allowed for NRIs. In fact, diaspora investments could be more relevant with regard to small- and medium-term investments, workable through networks. Making use of small capital and personalized or familial networks, diasporas can effectively invest in the mother countries, gain profits, create employment, train entrepreneurs, and provide funds, markets and channels for exports. Since a majority of the Indian diaspora consists of professionals and entrepreneurs or those in the retail and wholesale business, they can prove to be useful partners for small- and medium-scale investments or joint ventures/brown field investments. However, in India, apart from the general hiccups — like the poor infrastructure, high transaction cost, unfavourable policies and red-tapism, which have made low-cost manufacturing and production significantly uncompetitive than most economies in Asia — there are also a large number of investment restrictions and product reservations on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). It is in this context that de-reservation of products and the need for 100 per cent investment for NRIs and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), under the automatic route in the SME segment have been suggested by the OIFC (2012). This can, at best, take place under collaborative approaches and joint ventures in production and

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marketing involving the diaspora and the local businesses. It is equally important to harness remittances into generating capital for productive investment for the migrant as well as the returnee. Such joint ventures require proper investment advice and facilitation through appropriate networks that can match funds with partners. In the absence of a favourable FDI environment for small- and medium-term investments, the major share of diaspora asset has gone towards portfolio investment and bank deposits. Issuance of hardcurrency bonds to the diaspora is emerging as one of the ways to tap diaspora resources, especially project-oriented investments. Israel (since 1951) and India (since 1991) have been on the forefront in raising funds through hard-currency bonds. Diasporas are considered better informed (than other foreigners), and more willing to take risks due to the ‘home bias’, settle for lesser returns, and play the role of first movers (Terrazas 2010). However, Carmen Voigt-Graf (2005) and several others have pointed out that diaspora funds tend to behave similar to other portfolio investments (causing crisis by sudden withdrawals) and are not as ‘patriotic’ as the governments would want them to be. This problem is clearly evident in India’s case but diaspora bonds remain an important source of capital during hours of crisis or projects-specific funding. Another well-known means of diaspora contribution to the capital market is through NRI deposits. Various NRI deposit schemes have been in place since 1970, broadly categorized under various heads: Non-Resident (External) Rupee Accounts (NR[E]RAs); Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts (FCNR); FCNR banks; Non-Resident Non-Repatriable (NRNR) Rupee deposits; Non-Resident Ordinary Rupee (NRO) Accounts; foreign currency (bank and other) deposits; and Foreign Currency (Ordinary) Non-Repatriable (FCONR) deposits. Such deposits have made the Indian diaspora the country’s biggest overseas lenders, while at the same time becoming the main source of foreign debt. The trend began in the 1990s and by 2006 India’s debt to NRIs was more than that to the multilateral organizations (Lal 2006: 73). The increase in long-term debt is directly linked to the growth of NRI deposits over the years. The share of NRI deposits in India’s external (long-term) debt has been constantly increasing and since 2003 it has remained above 20 per cent. Although it has been within manageable limits for the past several years, the need has been felt to reduce dependence on such volatile deposits (RBI 2004). One option could certainly be to encourage FDIs in small-scale sectors, joint ventures

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and brown field investments. Rupa Chanda (2013) recently pointed out that the question of engaging the diaspora and managing their contributions has to be seen within the larger context of creating a business friendly investment environment.

Philanthropy Philanthropy’s role in development is an upcoming area of attention for the governments. A closer look at the trend of the Indian diaspora’s philanthropy reflects that the funds are distributed largely through informal channels and is mainly guided by traditional concerns of family, kinship, castes, and (overwhelmingly) religious sentiments — ‘added by modern ideas of doing something good for the poor and the needy’ (Niumai 2009). Records show that the larger concentration of philanthropic funds coming through formal channels goes towards health, education and relief/rehabilitation. Of late, the Government of India has awakened to the potential of philanthropic contribution and created institutionalized platforms for these. Other than the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund, a credible effort in this direction has been the India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI) headed by the MOIA. There are numerous diaspora organizations that are actively participating in projects pertaining to health, education and infrastructure in their home states and villages in India. However, Indians appear to have a great mistrust and cynicism towards the official institutions or formal civil society organizations, and prefer to channel funds through organizations where they have personal links through family and friends (Kapur 2004). Therefore, it is crucial for the government to be innovative and establish genuine and credible secular channels of philanthropic contributions. Technology has opened various avenues for not only locating the needy and matching funds but also for monitoring the progress, which can prove extremely effective in cases of remote areas with regard to schools and health centres.

Tourism Diaspora tourism has increasingly created a significant niche market for itself and is being seen as an important tool for not only earning profits but for reinforcing the relationship with the diaspora, especially with the younger generations. There can be distinct categories of diaspora tourism; for example, heritage tourism, medical tourism, business tourism, genealogy or root tourism, religious or faith tourism,

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and visiting friends and relatives (VFR). A combination of these can be provided through customized packages to attract the diaspora tourists. However, some of the prerequisites of diaspora tourism (as with general tourism) remain a safe and secure environment, viable infrastructure, mainly targeting the middle-income group (Scheyvens 2007), and easy visa rules. For India, the 25 million people of Indian descent scattered worldwide can be an important tourism market. The Indian diaspora is a diverse group, with a set of diverse requirements calling for tailormade travel packages. Though the High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora recommended the promotion of diaspora tourism, the Government of India has failed to build upon it. The diaspora does not factor separately in the programmes and policies of the tourism ministry of India, and it does not possess any record of the annual number of diaspora tourists visiting India. The PIOs are counted as foreign tourists, while the NRIs are part of domestic ones. Although private operators in the tourism industry and some state governments (like Gujarat) have pioneered diaspora tourism, if nurtured, the same can do wonders for the Indian tourism industry with far-reaching spillover effects (Pande 2006).

Conclusion/Way Forward To sum up, it can be said that in the present era of heightened sense of integration and connectivity, fostered by transnational networks, both India and its diaspora have slowly picked up the threads of history, presenting a well-timed opportunity to build a mutually advantageous relationship. However, this association is still being redefined and India has a long way to go in this direction even though diaspora participation in sustainable development has significantly increased in the recent past. As it appears, this engagement is more spontaneous, rather than a government scripted one. Nevertheless, a coherent and constructive policy approach is required based on monitoring, experimentation, review, and discussion to maximize the benefits of diaspora engagement. An attempt has been made in this paper to formulate a broad framework (based on the Indian conditions and prerequisites) for regulatory and institutional practices, at various levels, to channel the diaspora resources for optimum utilization. These are as follows: (a) Introducing institutional changes within the governmental framework: This would include initiating institutional changes such as creation of a separate ministry, favourable citizenship laws,

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(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

visa arrangements, residence and property rights, maintaining databases, etc. Initiating suitable programmes and projects: This would include specifically tailored programmes with explicit goals to engage diasporas as development actors, encourage investments, tap into diaspora savings, facilitate knowledge/skill transfer, and promote philanthropic contributions, in addition to monitoring/ evaluating the progress and the impact of the programmes. Decentralization and diversification of the levels of engagement: Since diasporas are inclined towards engaging with their places of origin and friends and relatives on a personalized or informal level, it is prudent to provide opportunities for engagement at the level of their comfort and familiarity. Devolution of institutions is required up to district and village levels, including the private sector in its ambit. Strengthening and institutionalization of networks: Diaspora networks are important sources of locating/searching and connecting/matching the supply and demand sides. Hence, it is extremely important to reinforce/strengthen, or at least partially institutionalize, such networks and to co-ordinate with them to build partnerships between actors at home and the diaspora. Developing a mutually advantageous policy framework: The programmes and incentives offered to the diaspora must take into account their viability and profitability vis-à-vis the diaspora community. Most of the Indian diaspora members are either semi-skilled/skilled/highly-skilled professionals, or (barring IT successes) small-/medium-term businesses and retailers who would like to invest their hard-earned money for profit, even in context of their motherland. Therefore, it is imperative for the government to initiate programmes that are profitable both for India and the diaspora.

The government has to take into account these factors to develop the so-called ‘silver bullets’ (Kuznetsov 2011) or the perfect combination of policies and programmes to engage with the diaspora. The private sector is already very active in this regard but the real challenge for the government is to be able to create a conducive atmosphere by demonstrating good governance, and a transparent, accountable and clean system that can built trust and mobilize the diaspora to engage with the home country.

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References Chanda, Rupa. 2013. ‘Facilitating Skilled Mobility Under Preferential Arrangements’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration, pp. 252–69. New Delhi: Routledge. Chandrashekhar, C. P. 2012. ‘The Source of Remittances’. The Hindu, 19 September. Das, Abhijit, Rashmi Banga and Pritish Kumar Sahu. 2010. ‘Impact of Remittances on Poverty in Developing Countries: Case Study of India’. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)–Government of India–Department for International Development (DFID). http://unctad. org/en/docs/ditctncd20108_en.pdf (accessed 26 November 2013). De Haas, Hein. 2005. ‘International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts’, Third World Quarterly, 26(8): 1269–84. Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). 2007. ‘Working with the Diasporas for Development’. Roundtable 2 Background Paper, Global Forum on Migration and Development, 9–11 July, Brussels. http://www. gfmd.org/en/docs/brussels-2007 (accessed 17 August 2009). Kapur, Devesh. 2003. ‘The Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(5): 445–48. ———. 2004. ‘Remittances: The New Development Mantra?’. G-24 Discussion Paper no. 29, April, United Nations, New York and Geneva. http://www. unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420045_en.pdf (accessed 18 April 2010). Kuznetsov, Yevgeny. 2011. ‘How Can Countries’ Talent Abroad Help Transform Institutions at Home? Instruments and Policies of Diaspora Engagement’. Global Diaspora Strategies Toolkit, Diaspora Matters, Ireland. Lal, Brij V. 2006. The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora. Delhi: Oxford University Press. McKeown, Adam. 1999. ‘Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 58(2): 306–37. Ministry of Overseas India Affairs (MOIA). 2001. ‘Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’. Government of India. http://moia.gov.in/ services.aspx?ID1=63&id=m8&idp=59&mainid=23 (accessed 10 May 2012). ———. 2011. Annual Report 2010–2011. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas India Affairs. Niumai, Ajailiu. 2009. ‘Philanthropy and the Indian Diaspora in the 21st Century’. https://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/files/conf2009papers/Niumai.pdf (accessed 30 January 2013). Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC). 2012. ‘Promoting Investments from the Indian Diaspora: A New Beginning’. Special Report, Confederation of Indian Industry, Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Pande, Amba. 2006. ‘Cashing in on Indian Identity’. The Financial Express, 13 October.

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Pande, Amba. 2011. ‘India and Its Diaspora in Fiji’, Diaspora Studies, 4(2): 125–38. Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 2004. ‘Report of the Internal Group on External Liabilities of Scheduled Commercial Banks’, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. Saxenian, Anna Lee. 2004. ‘The Silicon Valley Connection: Transnational Networks and Regional Development in Taiwan, China and India’, in Anthony P. D’Costa and E. Sridharan (eds), India in the Global Software Industry: Innovation, Firm Strategies and Development, pp. 27–50. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Scheyvens, Regina. 2007. ‘Poor Cousins no More: Valuing the Development Potential of Domestic and Diaspora Tourism’, Progress in Development Studies, 7(4): 307–25. Stark, Oded, Christian Helmenstein and Alexia Prskawetz. 1997. ‘A Brain Gain with a Brain Drain’, Economics Letters, 55(2): 227–34. ———. 1998. ‘Human Capital Depletion, Human Capital Formation, and Migration: A Blessing or a “Curse”?’ Economics Letters, 60(3): 363–67. Terrazas, Aaron. 2010. Diaspora Investment in Developing and Emerging Country Capital Markets: Patterns and Prospects. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/diasporas-markets.pdf (accessed 30 January 2013). Thaindian News. 2009. ‘Students’ Exodus Costs India Forex Outflow of $10 bn: Assocham’, 26 January. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/ students-exodus-costs-india-forex-outflow-of-10-bn-assocham_ 100147339.html (accessed 30 November 2011). Tumbe, Chinmay. 2012. ‘EU-India Bilateral Remittances’. Research Paper no. 360, IIM Bangalore. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119769 (accessed 30 January 2013). Voigt-Graf, Carmen. 2005. ‘Indian Diaspora’, in Mathew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen (eds), Immigration and Asylum: From 1990 to the Present. California: ABC Clio.

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Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development ajaya KumaR Sahoo The term ‘diaspora’ has been increasingly ‘used to describe any population which is considered “deterritorialised” or “transnational” — that is, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe’ (Vertovec 1997: 277). Taking this definition into consideration, especially in this era of globalization and transnational migrations, it is argued that the diasporans are part and parcel of each and every nation-state and no nation-state can restrict the entry (either temporarily or permanently) of citizens of other countries into their geographical boundary. As Oliver Schmidtke (2001: 3) pointed out, the modern societies today are less able to ‘portray themselves as closed, ethnically, or culturally defined communities’. For instance, in Europe, a clear sense of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ that defined the community membership in the past no longer exists today, as ‘migration has undermined the myth of cultural or ethnic homogeneity’ (ibid.). However, the question of citizenship is still being debated in many parts of the world, like central and eastern Europe and the Arab Gulf states. One of the main consequences of this transnational migration is that ‘[l]iberal societies seem to be losing the capacity to provide a set of commonly accepted rules and institutions legitimized by a set of shared values’ (ibid.). As a result it enables the transnational migrants to become an integral part of the nationstate. There have been several discussions on aspects of diaspora and transnational migrations since the last three decades. The diaspora debate, particularly since the onset of the journal Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies has taken many twists and turns, by recognizing many of the old and lost or ‘new ethno-national diasporas’ (Sheffer 2007). The term ‘diaspora’ initially referred to the classical

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cases of dispersion of Jews, Armenians and Greeks; today it applies to almost all people crossing the boundaries of nation-state. As Khachig Tölölyan (1991: 4–5) writes, diasporas ‘now [share] meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community’. Similarly, diasporas have now become so powerful that they influence the economy and polity of the host society and the homeland simultaneously. This chapter tries to examine the contemporary developments in the field of transnational migrations and how such migrations are considered crucial from the perspective of homeland development with the example of the Indian diaspora.

Indian Diaspora The Indian diaspora is considered as one of the most modern and largest diasporas in the world. It has grown apace in the past three decades to 25 million people spread over all continents. Much of the history of early migrations of cosmopolitan traders and merchants from India before the 18th century hardly produced any significant diasporas,1 but they played an important role in globalizing the Indian economic products and culture (Sahoo 2012). As Amartya Sen (2005: 86) notes, ‘ideas as well as people have moved across India’s borders over thousands of years, enriching India as well as the rest of the world’. The Indian trading diaspora that formed as a result of the longstanding business networks is different from other classical diasporas that formed as a result of religious and political persecutions. In some countries with permanent Indian settlements, they became the dominant economic and political clusters not only because of their ethnic composition but also their hard labour and economic success, and this dominant position remained for quite some time until the European powers took over in the 16th and 17th centuries. By the end of 18th century, Indians were found in all countries of Southeast Asia and slowly moved into the Caribbean and African countries by the beginning of 1

The main motive of traders and merchants during this period was to become successful in their businesses; however different circumstances led to the permanent settlement of some of these trading communities in far-away places such as Southeast Asia, and East and South Africa. Claude Markovits (1999: 883) argues that ‘when merchants travel abroad for purposes of business, they are not generally considered migrants, even if their trip results in prolonged residence abroad, which can become in some cases permanent’.

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the 19th century till mid-20th century as a result of growing capitalism and transportation on the one hand and economic and political problems at home coinciding with India’s incorporation into the British Empire on the other (see Brown 2007). The history of the modern Indian diaspora can be comprises three streams. The first includes third- to fifth-generation descendants of the early emigrants during the mid-19th century to the British and other European colonies in Africa, Southeast Asia, Fiji, and the Caribbean as plantation labourers and railway workers under the ‘indenture system’.2 Under this system around 1.5 million people migrated to these destinations (Clarke et al. 1990). Although they played a significant role in different spheres of the host economy and society, their contributions were hardly recognized. For instance, in an environment where a number of races were closely juxtapositioned, Indian diasporics often occupied an in-between space between the colonizer and the territorially-based colonized. They formed a middle stratum between the British and the Black Africans in many parts of Africa (Raghuram and Sahoo 2008). The second phase of migration consists of that of professionally-trained and skilled emigrants, which is referred to in the literature as ‘brain drain’, to the developed countries of the west during the second half of the 20th century. Sunil Mani (2011: 310) argued that the ‘increased high-skilled migration from India has at least two major implications — first, the high skilled migration has resulted in large amount of remittances and second, it has had a deleterious consequence on the supply of high-skilled personnel, especially for R&D [research and development]’. With the onset of globalization and internationalization of the labour force, migration today is no longer associated with brain drain. The migration of Indian labour, semi-skilled and unskilled, to the countries of West Asia and the Gulf following the oil boom during 1970s forms the third stream. Many of them have left behind their families in India and remit savings towards family maintenance and investments. They form the majority among the expatriate Indians and are denied any citizenship rights in the countries of their work. Out of these three streams, the first two produced two distinctive diasporas that may be termed as the ‘old diaspora’ and the ‘new diaspora’ 2

The indentured labourers recruited to various plantations were mainly from the northern parts of India, while subsequent forms of labour recruitments during that time took place from southern parts under kangani and maistry systems (Rajan et al. 2011: 26).

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respectively (Mishra 2007). Their distinctions may be observed from the contexts of their emigration and destinations, socioeconomic background, and the degree of interaction with the motherland. While the new diaspora has retained a vibrant relationship with their family and community in India, a majority of the old diaspora has lost contact with the motherland. The Indian diaspora communities formed during the colonial era were totally denied access even to their own folk attached to different plantations, let alone any to the then existing means of transportation and communication to engage with the motherland. The post-colonial emigrants not only enjoyed the advantage of being trained, middle-class, Anglophone Indians also achieved success and integration in the industrialized countries and earned adequate income. The advantages that they now enjoy are mainly catered by the relationships they could establish with their society and surroundings unlike their predecessors. These relationships range from personal ties with friends and relatives, through informal linkages with the associations, organizations and institutions of caste, religion, region, and language, to official interactions at national levels.

Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development Transnational networks form a precondition to the emergence of transnational communities and the process of this transformation is generally designated as ‘transnationalism’. Basch et al. (1994: 7) define ‘transnationalism’ as ‘the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement . . . Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships — familial, economic, social, organisational, religious, and political — that span borders we call transmigrants’. Transnational migrations and the consequent networks created by migrants have several implications for the homeland as well as the host society. This is especially important in the context of developing countries like India where ‘migration of labour has become a contentious political and development issue’ (Davies 2007: 59). One of the most important dimensions of transnational migrations today is the flow of capital to the homeland because of factors like affluence of diasporic Indians in the host economy and politics, increasing hostility of being an ethnic minority in the wake of political and religious factors, and growth and development of India’s economy and society (Sahoo 2012: 38). This is what Rubin Patterson (2006: 1899) categorized as ‘development by the diaspora’, which according to him

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‘refers to the diaspora working chiefly if not exclusively in helping the homeland develop’. In the last two decades, India has progressed from a poor underdeveloped economy to one of the most successful and prosperous economies in the world because of diaspora contributions, which today are manifold ranging from micro-level ones such as transfer of money/remittances and consumer goods back home, and constructive ideas for community development to macro-level ones like investment in real estate, industries, institutions, and influence in homeland politics, etc. In the following section I will briefly analyze these developments in the context of India.

Economic-Political Development While from a macro level, globalization and transnational migrations have created opportunities for the steady growth of economy for developing countries in the world experiencing significant emigration, from a micro level it has strengthened the social ties that help in rebuilding the ‘community’. The growth of India’s economy in the last two and a half decades is noteworthy. India is now the 11th largest economy in the world (Lewis 2012) and also the second fastest growing economy after China. Much of the credit goes to the Indian diaspora, which has have been the ‘source of technology, capital and markets for some of the high technology industries such as information technology and biotechnology’ (Mani 2011: 313). After liberalization, investment in business sectors, infrastructure, telecommunication, information technology, computer hardware and software, and services have been made by investors from the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Mauritius, Singapore, etc. (MOIA n.d.). Peter Reeves (2009: 59) indicated that ‘a major development, following India’s liberalization and “economic reforms” in the early 1990s, has been an important shift in India’s approach to the international, “globalised”, world economy and, with it, international trade and investment’. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has increased considerably between the years 2000 and 2005, averaging around US$5 billion annually which jumped to about US$19 billion in 2006–07. Similarly, the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) bank deposits increased from US$12.4 billion in 1990 to US$32.5 billion in 2003 (Kapur 2010: 104–12). Besides FDI, India is one of the largest receivers of remittances, with around US$12.9 billion received in 2000, which increased to US$52 billion in 2008 and US$70 billion in 2012 (Ratha et al. 2012).

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In fact, ‘remittances are now second only to FDI by way of capital flows to developing economies’ (Mallick 2010: 33). It is argued here that the Indian diaspora played a significant role in this growth factor. Besides the official and registered channels, as Ludger Pries (2007: 302) argues, there are informal transfer channels which are very significant: Among these is the Hawala system practiced primarily in Pakistan and India. In this case, agreements based solely on trust and personal acquaintance to deposit a certain sum of money in a certain currency in any place in the world are much more timely than official bank transfers which lead to the out payment in another (or the same) currency in any other place on earth and incur comparatively low costs.

There is no uniform and systematic data available on the informal channels of migrant remittances. Puri and Ritzema (1999) noted that, informal or unrecorded remittances have become important dimensions of remittance systems in many Asian countries. According to them: There is anecdotal evidence that only a fraction of the unrecorded remittances represent ‘pure leakages’ and that the largest part are remitted through informal channels to finance domestic consumption, investment and foreign trade transactions in the migrants’ country of origin (ibid.: 1).

Though informal channels of remittances do not figure officially, it played a crucial part in the economic development of migrant families. Transnational migrations play an important role in transforming the quality of life of people living in the migrant’s place of origin. As Vertovec (2012: 85) argued, ‘development should include not only matters of economic growth, but also social (including gender, health, and civil and democratic), environmental, and technological issues’. In India, the case of Punjab state may be cited here, where remittances are used for development purposes. Realizing the gravity of the situation and exposed to high quality civic amenities in the western world, a number of Punjabi Non-Resident Indians embarked on a mission of developing integrated sustainable development of modern civic amenities in their ancestral villages. Modernization of village Kharoudi in Hoshiarpur district by the two NRIs, Dr. Basi and Dr. Gill, [began] to be cited as a role model for many others . . . Today village Kharoudi has cemented concrete roads with solar street lights,

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underground piped water supply, underground sanitation opening into sewerage treatment plant, and with almost universal provision of water supply and sewer connection to every household (Singh and Singh 2007: 225–26, 230).

Various present-day examples reinforce the fact that the physical development of model villages is not the only contribution of NRIs to the development agenda, but their socioeconomic and psychological support towards the course of development has also gained momentum during the recent past. For instance, the case of dowry and female foeticide in Punjab and development of a model village by NRIs to extend socioeconomic and psychological support to the girl-child is noteworthy. The New Zealand-based Shaheed Bhagat Singh Foundation that adopted a model village in Punjab is a case in point: New Zealand-based Shaheed Bhagat Singh Foundation, consisting of members mainly of Punjabi origin, has decided to adopt a Punjab village and turn it into a model place for promotion of girl child . . . “At the birth of a girl child, we would be investing a particular amount in her name in the bank which would be made available to her when she attains the age of 18. The idea is to provide a respectable amount of money when she is of marriageable age so that dowry does not become the cause of her death when she is not even born yet” (Bhatia 2008).

Any development discussion from the migration perspective cannot ignore the contribution of NRIs from Gulf countries. This is especially in the case of the state of Kerala which contributes more than 50 per cent of total Indian immigrants to the Gulf countries. According to the Kerala Migration Survey, 2008 by K. C. Zachariah and S. Irudaya Rajan (2012: 303), ‘the flow of about Rs. 43,288 crores into the Kerala economy by way of remittances did have a very significant impact on the state’s economy’. These remittances are utilized in many ways. [T]he contribution of gulf migration to development can be seen in various areas like housing, transportation, town planning, educational and religious institutions, amenities and other infrastructural facilities . . . The best example for contribution of gulf migration to development is the construction of two international airports in Kerala namely Calicut and Cochin by the initiation and association of gulf migrants. The development can also be noticed in the commercial sector. The growth in number of commercial complexes, jewellery outlets, hotels and hospitals during 1980s and 1990s with international standards proves the contribution of gulf migration to the development (Azeez and Begum 2009: 58).

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Another area where transnational migration had influenced the diaspora and homeland relations is the involvement of diasporic community in the politics of homeland. Members of diasporas participate in the homeland politics, according to Devesh Kapur, in a variety of ways: [I]n some cases, they have the right to vote, either as dual citizens or as citizens residing abroad . . . more importantly, they influence the voting preferences of kin in the country of origin, an influence that is amplified if they send financial remittances. In other cases, they return and run as candidates themselves. Where direct participation is ruled out, diasporas may attempt to influence politics in the country of origin through financial contributions to political parties and candidates (2010: 31).

Socio-Cultural Development In the past kinship networks were maintained through sending remittances, letters and occasional home visits whereas today it is further strengthened with the development of communication networks. It is not surprising to find at least one member, if not more, from each family abroad among the people of Indian origin. As Vertovec rightly pointed out: The everyday provenance of most migrant transnationalism is within families . . . Migrants’ social patterns that span borders variously condition people’s everyday expectations (about potentials for migration, work, household development and individual life course), moral duties (for disseminating information to friends and kin, engaging in reciprocal exchange of resources and enlisting in mutual support), institutional structures (including how best to organize or participate in religious communities and hometown associations) and relations to the state (fashioning practices to manipulate it, contest it or avoid it altogether) (2012: 59–61).

Close kin networks established through marital relations have also facilitated chain-migration of relatives to foreign destinations (see Ballard 2007).3 We have enough evidence to believe that migration and job hunt in foreign destinations is made easier with the presence of close acquaintances in these locations. One of the major concerns 3 In the case of the Gujarati diaspora, for instance, Maritsa V. Poros (2011) shows us how Gujarati migration flows have various historical origins, which resulted in different sorts of social ties that migrants used to move to destinations in East Africa and to New York and London.

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of all parents in the diaspora today is to find a suitable spouse from the same caste if no suitable match is available among the preferred category of relatives. The matrimonial ads on the internet have made it easier to look for suitable brides/grooms on the basis of caste from several websites. Karen Leonard’s ethnographic study shows how this marriage takes place on a transnational space: [I]n Pakistan, UK, and the USA, most parents are arranging the second generation marriages, bridging national boundaries to continue family, caste or religious preferences. There is high level of commitment to weddings, as numerous instances of travel from California to Toronto, from Hyderabad to New Jersey, from Florida to Chicago, from London to Karachi, and so forth, attest. Childhood friends from Hyderabad are, in their later years, bridging religious and national boundaries for the sake of weddings, making numerous visits to relatives and friends around the world en route (1999: 55–61).

Ballard’s chapter also revealed the strategies adopted by South Asian transnational migrants: In the immediate aftermath of migration, most migrants’ marriage strategies are quite straightforward: they continue to make riste [matrimonial alliances] for their children on exactly the same basis, and with just the same kind of status-inspired objective in mind, as they would have deployed had they stayed at home. As a result the vast majority of early settlers’ children’s marriages were arranged and celebrated not in the diaspora, but in the immediate vicinity of migrants’ ancestral villages (2007: 603).

Visits by religious leaders from India, broadcasting of prayer services, proliferation of DVDs based on religious stories such as the Ramayana are important aspects of ‘bringing to life’ religious practices. In the context of the World Wide Web and religious representation, Christopher Helland pointed out: Religion on the Internet is a unique phenomenon . . . People are going online to get information about, discuss, and argue about religious beliefs and practices, as well as to share their religious feelings and concerns, post prayer requests, chat, and even conduct and participate in online religious rituals. This medium has been embraced by most of the world’s religious traditions (2007: 956–57).

One of the several important channels to articulate the religious linkages of Indians today is their visit to the pilgrimage centres like

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birth places of spiritual teachers/gurus (like Puttaparthi in Andhra Pradesh [the birth place of Sai Baba], Kollam in Kerala [the birth place of Mata Amritanandamayi]) and certain important temples (Sri Venkateswara Temple at Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh [the wealthiest temple in India visited by thousands of pilgrims from different parts of the world] and the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab [the prominent Sikh gurdwara visited by all religious groups from different parts of the world]). These personal visits broadly bring two important consequences. On the one hand, it strengthens the linkage between India and the Indian diaspora with religion as a medium, and on the other it provides a better environment for regional development. For instance, the organizations connected with Sri Sathya Sai Baba are spread across 137 countries around the world with more than 1,000 centres, not only promoting spiritual needs of the people but also the practical needs of society in general such as providing higher education to the masses, specialized medicare, and so on. Similarly, the centres and organizations of Mata Amritanandamayi around the world function collectively under the umbrella title ‘Embracing the World’ with several programmes like the Amrita Shree programme for empowering women, the Amrita Kuteeram housing programme that supports home for homeless, and care and education for children, among others.

Conclusion Transnational movement of people across nations and cultures is an inevitable phenomenon of the present-day globalized world, where national boundaries crisscross each other as a result of the far-reaching developments in the field of transportation and communication technologies. The people who are now on the move are labour migrants (both documented and undocumented), highly-qualified specialists, entrepreneurs, refugees, and asylum-seekers, or household members of previous migrants (Brah 1996: 178). The linkages and networks between these groups are established through sharing the news and information of both the home and host countries, which Anny Misa Hefti (1997) says ‘sustains the flow of migration’. Thus, transnational migration offers both opportunities and challenges, hitherto never anticipated, for the diasporas and the homeland. It is now a fact that, in an era of transnational migrations, and in response to the global demands, India has extended the support to her diasporic communities, who in return have participated fully in the development initiatives of the homeland. As Rajan and Varghese (2012: 326) mentioned,

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‘though belated the government efforts to take migrants and transnational citizens of India on board in a vigorous manner is underwritten by nationalistic considerations’.

References Azeez, Abdul and Mustiary Begum. 2009. ‘Gulf Migration, Remittances and Economic Impact’, Journal of Social Sciences, 20(1): 55–60. Ballard, R. 2007. ‘The South Asian Presence in Britain and its Transnational Connections’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij Maharaj (eds), Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, pp. 587–617. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Basch, Linda G., Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects Post-Colonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States. Langhorne: Gordon and Breach. Bhatia, Ramaninder K. 2008. ‘NRIs to Adopt Punjab Village’. The Times of India, 22 January. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com (accessed 10 April 2013). Brah, Avtar. 1996. Cartographies of Diaspora. London: Routledge. Brown, Judith M. 2007. Global South Asians: Introducing the Modern Diaspora. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clarke, Colin G., Ceri Peach and Steven Vertovec (eds). 1990. South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Rebecca. 2007. ‘Reconceptualising the Migration–Development Nexus: Diasporas, Globalisation and the Politics of Exclusion’, Third World Quarterly, 28(1): 59–76. Hefti, Anny Misa. 1997. ‘Globalization and Migration’. Paper presented at the European Solidarity Conference on ‘Philippines: Responding to Globalization’, 19–21 September, Zurich. Helland, Christopher. 2007. ‘Diaspora on the Electronic Frontier: Developing Virtual Connections with Sacred Homelands’, Journal of ComputerMediated Communication, 12(3): 956–76. http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/ issue3/helland.html (accessed 8 February 2013). Kapur, Devesh. 2010. Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Leonard, Karen. 1999. ‘Construction of Identity in Diaspora: Emigrants from Hyderabad, India’, in Carla Rae Petievich (ed.), The Expanding Landscape: South Asians and the Diaspora, pp. 41–69. New Delhi: Manohar. Lewis, Dev. 2012. ‘India Shining?’ The Internationalist at Hawk, 15 September. http://www.theinternationalistathawk.com/india-shining/ (accessed 20 March 2013). Mallick, Hrushikesh. 2010. ‘Remittances, Consumption, Investment, and Economic Growth’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration, pp. 30–67. New Delhi: Routledge.

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Mani, Sunil. 2011. ‘High-Skilled Migration from India: An Analysis of its Economic Implications’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict, pp. 309–30. New Delhi: Routledge. Markovits, Claude. 1999. ‘Indian Merchant Networks outside India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Preliminary Survey’, Modern Asian Studies, 33(4): 883–911. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). n.d. http://www.moia.gov.in/ (accessed 27 November 2013). Mishra, Vijay. 2007. Literature of the Indian Diaspora: Theorizing the Diasporic Imaginary. London: Routledge. Patterson, Rubin. 2006. ‘Transnationalism: Diaspora-Homeland Development’, Social Forces, 84(4): 1891–1907. Poros, Maritsa V. 2011. Modern Migrations: Gujarati Indian Networks in New York and London. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pries, Ludger. 2007. ‘Transnational Migration: New Challenges for Nation States and New Opportunities for Regional and Global Development’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij Maharaj (eds), Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, pp. 298–320. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Puri, Shivani and Tineke Ritzema. 1999. ‘Migrant Worker Remittances, MicroFinance and the Informal Economy: Prospects and Issues’. Working Paper no. 21, Social Finance Unit, International Labour Organization, Geneva. Raghuram, Parvati and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo. 2008. ‘Thinking “Indian Diaspora” for Our Times’, in Parvati Raghuram, Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, Brij Maharaj and Dave Sangha (eds), Tracing an Indian Diaspora: Contexts, Memories, Representations, pp. 1–20. New Delhi: Sage. Rajan, S. Irudaya and V. J. Varghese. 2012. ‘Broadening Exchanges and Changing Institutions: Multiple Sites of Economic Transnationalism’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittance, pp. 322–46. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. Irudaya, V. J. Varghese and M. S. Jayakumar. 2011. Dreaming Mobility and Buying Vulnerability: Overseas Recruitment Practices in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Ratha, Dilip, Gemechu Ayana Aga and Ani Silwal. 2012. ‘Migration and Development Brief 19’. Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank. Reeves, Peter. 2009. ‘An Entrepreneurial Diaspora? Transnational Space and India’s International Economic Expansion’, in Rajesh Rai and Peter Reeves (eds), The South Asian Diaspora: Transnational Networks and Changing Identities, pp. 57–68. London: Routledge. Sahoo, Ajaya Kumar. 2012. ‘Globalization, Diaspora and Transnationalism: Challenges and Opportunities for Indian Diaspora’, in Michelle Williams (ed.), The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation, pp. 30–46. London: Routledge. Schmidtke, Oliver. 2001. ‘Transnational Migration: A Challenge to European Citizenship Regimes’, World Affairs, 164(1): 3–16.

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Sen, Amartya. 2005. The Argumentative Indian: Writings of Indian Culture, History and Identity. London: Penguin. Sheffer, Gabriel. 2007. ‘The Emergence of New Ethno-National Diasporas’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij Maharaj (eds), Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, pp. 43–62. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Singh, Gurmail and Sawarn Singh. 2007. ‘Diaspora Philanthropy in Action: An Evaluation of Modernization in Punjab Villages’, Journal of Punjab Studies, 14(2): 225–48. Tölölyan, Khachig. 1991. ‘The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface’, Diaspora, 1(1): 3–7. Vertovec, Steven. 1997. ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora” Exemplified among South Asian Religions’. Diaspora, 6(3): 277–99. ———. 2012. ‘Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, Michiel Baas and Thomas Faist (eds), Indian Diaspora and Transnationalism, pp. 48–106. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection, 1998– 2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

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move from one place to another and create diaspora in the form of transnational network. As Gabriel Sheffer (1986: 3) says, modern diasporas are ‘ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin- their homelands’. Modern diasporic communities — which live outside but maintain links with their country of origin — are getting larger and stronger, and influencing both domestic politics and foreign relations of a state. In an era of accelerated globalization, the relationship between diaspora and the economic and social development of many countries is increasingly relevant. Governments of many developing countries and other international agencies are acknowledging diasporas’ potential contribution to economic development. The attention has primarily been on the total of economic remittances, which many a times outpace the official development assistance (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006). After the global financial crisis showed sign of recovery, the recorded remittances flow to developing countries reached US$325 billion in 2010, US$372 in 2011 and US$401 in 2012 (Mohapatra et al. 2011). Looking at their importance and their status as a permanent feature in the international system, there is growing interest for diaspora among the policy-makers around the world. Besides academic research, policy-makers are interested in understanding and reacting to the world that is being greatly transformed by diasporas. In the present paper, I have focused on ‘diaspora’ as a factor in the foreign policy-making of its country of origin. It explores, broadly, two set of questions: first, why do countries engage its diaspora? Second, how does diaspora influence its country of origin? The paper examines the Indian diaspora in this context, with reference to their settlement in

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the United States (US) on one hand, and their settlement in the Gulf countries on the other. Further, the paper focuses specifically on economic and political dimensions of states’ policies in 2001–10.

Diaspora and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework Though migration is a natural and continuous phenomenon, any migrant, displaced or dispersed population cannot automatically be identified as a diaspora. The existence of diasporas requires members of a community to continue to identify with their homeland and to cultivate ties both between themselves and the homeland. The crucial element that makes the concept meaningful is their awareness of themselves as a diaspora (Sahoo and Maharaj 2007). Rima Berns-McGown has defined diaspora ‘as a space of connections’ between ‘elsewhere’ (country of origin) and ‘here’ (country of settlement) (2007–08: 7–8). The term ‘diaspora’ has been modified over a period of time, in a way, adjusting and accommodating various aspects of migrants’ life. But the core of the term has remained the same, i.e., being dispersed and yet connected with the root in some way or the other. The foreign policy of a country is determined by a number of internal and external factors. Modern diasporas that have made both borders and citizenship more fluid and permeable than ever, creating a ‘politics of belonging’ that is not territorially bounded (Shain 2007), have become a factor in foreign policy-making. Today many countries are eager to adjust or modify its foreign policy to tap its diaspora.

Why Do Countries Engage its Diaspora? Diasporas are products as well as drivers of globalization. Today they are able to leverage its effects in order to become directly involved in the politics and economic developments of the country of origin. Simultaneously, the countries of origin have become increasingly aware of the fact that their nationals residing abroad represent new opportunities and challenges, and consequently work to co-opt or limit their political influence. Here, in this section, two approaches — ‘interest’ approach and ‘rational choice’ approach — have been used to understand the state–diaspora relationship.

Interest Approach The national interest of a country is one of the most crucial concepts in the study of foreign policy. Countries always act and react to satisfy

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their goals of national interest. The country of origin considers these diaspora engagement policies as an opportunity to further the same. Specific types of policy can enhance flows of remittances, investments, knowledge transfers, and political influence through diaspora groups, back into their homelands (Gamlen 2008). According to Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), the country of origin is interested in three main aspects as far as its nationals abroad are concerned — economic support, political support and social capital upgrading. The potential importance of a diaspora to the country of origin depends on several factors. First and foremost is the size of the diasporic community. If size of diaspora is too small and insignificant, the country of origin may not develop a huge interest, but a large-scale diaspora naturally attracts attention. The second factor is education and skills. The migration of highly-educated and skilled professionals, such as engineers, medical and Information Technology (IT) workers, to the developed world, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by global-level markets, is often perceived in terms of ‘brain drain’. But a country may take interest in its highly-skilled and well-placed diaspora for ‘brain gain’ or ‘brain circulation’ and may consider that the benefits of remittances outweigh the cost of loss of human resources (Page and Mercer 2010). The return migration as well as temporary and circular migration can promote the circulation and exchange of skills and know-how (Keeley 2010). Another important factor is economic activities by the low-skilled diaspora community and remittances received from them by the country of origin. Thus, diaspora-engagement policies are fundamentally about interests. The intended benefit may be economic or political. Financial transfers from the diasporic community to the country of origin have become a prime vehicle for fostering the relationship.

Rational Choice Approach The ‘rational choice’ approach is fundamental in any countries’ decisionmaking process. It helps us to understand states’ behaviour. Rational choice approach, as explained by Duncan Snidal (1985), uses a specific and narrower definition of ‘rationality’ simply to mean that a state acts as if balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes its advantage. From the perspective of rational choice theorists, any rational actor model assumes that actors (such as decision-makers) make choices, which the actors believe, will lead to the best feasible outcomes for them as defined by their personal values or preferences. The interests of the decision-makers may or may not include enhancing

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something called the national interest. The basic instrumental statement of this approach is in choosing between two alternative courses of action, a country is inclined to choose the one for which the perceived value of the result is greater. The choices of model actor (decision-maker) are influenced by various factors. The key factor is information which plays a decisive role for a decision-making process. Depending on the availability of information about number of migrants in each country, their background, and educational and occupational status, a country can make rational decisions and optimize its benefits. Such information may flow along various communication channels on governmental and non-governmental lines. Lack of information may pose constraint in formulation of policies. Further, the personality of the decision-maker, political set-up and process of politics and communication channels in a country are also important in the ‘rational choice’ decision-making. Thus, these two approaches aptly explain a country’s engagement with its diaspora. However, they are not exclusive and often come across each other in their explanation of the phenomenon.

How Does the Diaspora Influence its Country of Origin? A diaspora can be a direct source of advantage to the country of origin when its members have the desire and ability to trade with, invest in and outsource to domestic business. A diaspora can also be an indirect source of advantage when its members act as reputational intermediaries — matching trading partners, supporting contracting by leveraging long-term relationships with people from the new and former homes, and, most importantly, overcoming negative national stereotypes through demonstrations of their capabilities abroad (Kapur 2010). They are responsible for introducing and implementing new technologies in their country of origin, particularly in developing countries. With their capacities, opportunities and propensities to exert influence on behalf of their domestic and external interest, diaspora communities can be regarded as interest groups and political actors. The principal focus of the diaspora, in terms of the country of origin, has been on their substantial financial contributions through remittances — private transfers from migrants to their families. Remittances may have direct political effects if they are used to fund political parties, extremists groups or sub-national movements.

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However, remittances are just one mechanism through which the diaspora has a political impact on the country of origin. Diasporas, given their ‘international location’ are also capable of ‘providing information’ (Shain and Barth 2003) to the foreign policy-makers of the country of origin. They are also able to influence the policies of the country of settlement towards the country of origin. The importance of this mechanism increases with the degrees of political cleavages between the diaspora and governing regime in the country of origin. But in order to exert influence on the foreign policy of the country of origin, a diaspora should have both the ‘will’ to exert influence and the capacity to do that (ibid.: 462). Diasporas employ various strategies and tactics for their survival, organizational consolidation and enhancement of influence in dealing with their country of origin, country of settlement and other actors. Ranging from full assimilation to the host societies, on the one hand, to separation from dominant host societies and eventual return to homeland on the other are among the strategies employed by diaspora members (Sheffer 2003). Thus, diaspora works as a ‘factor’ in foreign policy-making of the country of the origin. They should not be viewed as ‘just another foreigner’ (Kapur 2010) as they demonstrate continuing commitments to the norms, values and aspirations of the country of origin even after moving to the new countries.

Indian Diaspora: Concept and Classification Before looking at India’s diaspora policy, it is imperative to understand whom we call the ‘Indian diaspora’. Generally and vaguely, the term ‘Overseas Indians’ is employed to designate both the Indian Nationals Overseas (INO), and the People of Indian Origin (PIOs). There is marked difference between these two categories of migrants regarding their political status, which they receive in their countries of settlement; the pattern, purpose and duration of their migration; and their population characteristics. The term ‘Indian Nationals Overseas’ is generally referred to as Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). Possession of an Indian passport and the duration of stay are important elements that constitute the status of an NRI. On the other hand, ‘a person ceases to be NRI, on acquiring citizenship of the country of its settlement because there is no provision for dual citizenship under the Constitution of India’ (GoI 1955). The other category of the overseas Indians community is referred to as ‘People of Indian Origin’, who are mainly descendents of the emigrants of indentured labour, especially those

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who were engaged in various plantations, sent by the British in the 19th and the early part of the 20th centuries. They are citizens of their country of settlement and are connected with India by descent or birth (Sahadevan 1995). The Indian diaspora has spread all across the globe.1 Although the Indian community constitutes a microscopic minority in the United States (US) (1.7 per cent), their presence there is vital in terms of economic success. In Canada, the Indian community constitutes 1.8 per cent of the total population. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Indian population is over 1 million, which constitutes 2 per cent of the total population. In the West Asian countries, due to the discovery of vast oil reserves in the late 1960s and the sudden wealth that it brought to the region, there was a demand for new population and skills which was largely filled by Indians. The size of the Indian community in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) is estimated to be about 11 per cent of the total population. The Indian population in these GCC countries mainly consists of NRIs because these countries do not provide for citizenship to immigrants. After their tenure of work is over, they usually return to India. The Indian diaspora comprises skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled migrants. By and large the skilled population has migrated to major industrialized countries; their numbers are comparatively lesser in the Gulf (Chanda 2008).

India’s Diaspora Policy: Historical Background Alan Gamlen (2008) has defined ‘diaspora policies’ as state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders. These range from state-sponsored celebrations and awards for expatriates, bureaucratic units dedicated to the diaspora, external voting rights, and bilateral agreements on social security and pension transferability, right through to the range of mechanisms through which origin states attempt to extract finances, expertise and influence from their diasporas. Gamlen (2006) identifies three types of diaspora engagement policies by country of origin — first, ‘capacity building’, which aims at producing ‘state-centric’ diasporas and developing a set of corresponding state institutions; second, ‘extending rights’ to the diasporas, thus playing a role that befits a 1

The data are mentioned here has been taken from Lal et al. (2006).

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legitimate sovereign; third is extracting obligations from the diaspora, based on the premise that they owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign. In short, diaspora policies are most often interpreted as facets of ‘external’ or ‘extra-territorial citizenship’ (Schiller 2005). The imperial legacy of India had led to the creation of the Indian diaspora. During the colonial period, India’s nationalist leadership first turned its attention to the issues of Indian overseas as far back as 1890 (Lal et al. 2006). Racial discrimination and restrictive immigration policies in the colonies were forging an emotional bond between Indians overseas and the emerging nationalist leadership. Both groups considered themselves engaged in opposing colonial regimes. Before independence, the Indian National Congress (INC) demanded equal rights and status for the overseas Indians with the local people of the land (Sahadevan 1995). Until 1908, the Congress ardently asked the imperial government to adopt a tough attitude towards those selfgoverning colonies that were ruthlessly dealing with Indian interests (Zaidi 1985). The Congress also raised the issue of their conditions of labour. For the INC leadership, the cause of overseas Indians was an extension of the anti-imperialist struggle in other parts of the empire. In 1929, the INC institutionalized this aspect by setting up an Overseas Department under Jawaharlal Nehru (Lal et al. 2006). The 38th Indian National Congress Annual Session in December 1923 declared that unless India became independent, the grievances of Indian diaspora could not be properly remedied (Tinker 1993). On the other hand, the expatriate Indians also contributed to the movement for independence by publishing papers and generating political and public opinion in America and elsewhere to favour India’s freedom struggle (Sheffer 1986). Funds from the diaspora supported the movement demonstrating that the solidarity was mutual (Lall 2001), but nothing substantial was achieved. Hence, the attainment of India’s independence was considered as a pre-condition for the effective protection and improvement in the status of Indians abroad. India’s independence in August 1947 was a matter of delight among Indian emigrants, because they were still ruled by the British. They hoped that India’s independence would bring a relief to their plight; however, contrary to their expectations the Indian independence did not prove to be any relief to their miserable condition (ibid.). India’s policy towards them changed after the withdrawal of colonial power. Jawaharlal Nehru, after taking the leadership of India in post-

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independence, advised the expatriate community of India to be loyal to their country of residence in order to maintain national sovereignty, amicable international relations, non-interference in the affairs of other nations, and the pursuit of non-alignment. He not only excluded the issue of expatriate Indians from Indian foreign and domestic policy formulation, but also actively encouraged the diaspora to integrate into their host societies (Lall 2003). This happened even in the ‘face of persecution and expulsion’ (Singh 1979) of overseas Indians. The policy of ‘abandonment’ continued until the Indian economy was liberalized.

New Diaspora Policies In the post-Cold War period, India’s foreign policy has undergone a drastic change. Several domestic and international incidents took place that compelled India to reformulate its foreign policy. The world was changing from a bi-polar to a multi-polar place, emphasizing on the economic aspect rather than the political. The foreign policy priorities were changing from global and ideological to regional and realistic. The closed Indian economy was opened relatively due to domestic compulsions. This has made an impact on their policies towards the diaspora. Further, change was also visible in the diaspora’s profile, particularly that of the NRIs. The main objectives behind new diaspora policies were to strive towards economic development, find a place in the changed global environment, and utilize the changed diaspora profile for scientific and technological know-how. The advent of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government brought about a radical shift in India’s diaspora policy. The launching of the PIO Card, constituting a High Level Committee (HLC) on the Indian Diaspora,2 celebrating Pravasi Bhartiya Divas and establishing a new ministry — the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004 — were few significant steps towards promoting, nurturing and sustaining a mutually beneficial and symbiotic relationship between India and overseas Indians. The present government, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), has been innovating more policies to involve the diaspora in the development of India. 2

The committee included R. L. Bhatia, Congress Member of Parliament (MP) and former Minister of State for External Affairs; J. R. Hiremath, former diplomat; and Baleshwar Agrawal, Secretary General of the Antar Rashtriya Sahyog Parishad.

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Political Dimension In response to a long and persistent demand for ‘dual citizenship’, particularly from the diaspora in major industrialized countries, the Government of India has started an innovative Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme. Under this, the PIOs are granted Indian citizenship and get all benefits barring the political. They cannot vote in Indian elections and cannot hold constitutional posts. Political rights constitute the core or fundamental element in the concept of citizenship. But this innovative scheme cleverly promotes and facilitates economic investment from the overseas Indian community without providing them political rights. Several other schemes such as Diaspora Knowledge Networks (DKN), Know India Programme (KIP), Scholarships Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), Bilateral Security Agreements (BSAs), Protection of Emigrants against Exploitation in Gulf are being considered as major steps to involve the Indian diaspora. In the last decade, the transformation of the ideological climate in India and the success of the diaspora, especially in the US, have instilled much greater selfconfidence in both. The resulting lack of defensiveness has been an important reason for the growing links and stronger bonds, which have transformed relations between Indian and its diaspora. ‘The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has established the Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) in the 43 Indian Missions across the world in countries that have a significant overseas Indian population’ (High Commission of India, Botswana n.d.). The ICWF is ‘aimed at providing “on site” welfare services on a means tested basis in the most deserving cases’ (ibid.). Further, bilateral social security agreements are being negotiated with various countries to protect the interest of expatriate workers and the companies on a reciprocal basis, particularly with the US. To secure protection of emigrants against exploitation and abuse, India signed labour agreements with Jordan and Qatar in 1980s. The Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed with UAE, Kuwait and Oman.

Economic Dimension The Indian diaspora constitutes an important and unique force in the world economy. In recent years, it is playing a growing role in its source economy. Its contributions include long-term investments; technology and knowledge transfer in fields such as science, IT and medicine; influencing host-country companies to enter into joint ventures; and technology-licensing arrangements with companies in their countries

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of origin. The money that migrants send home is important not only to their families but also to their country’s balance of payments. In many developing countries, remittances represent a significant proportion of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as foreign exchange earnings. The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, maintains records of individuals who obtain emigration clearance to work abroad. Earlier, the destination of Indian workers was mainly the US, the UK, Canada, and other developed countries. But Indian migration to the Gulf accelerated with the discovery of oil fields and the commencement of oil drilling on a commercial basis in this region. The oil price hike in October 1973 marked a major watershed in the migration process (Jain 2005). The massive demand for labour was accounted for by the sudden growth in the construction industry as the Gulf countries, which became immensely wealthy overnight, embarked on building a new infrastructure of roads, ports and airports, as well as schools, colleges and administrative blocks, symbols of new wealth. For the additional labour required, they turned to more distant, non-Arab countries such as India. India has provided special savings, investment schemes and instruments for their non-resident population to bring in capital in various forms into their home countries. These instruments include non-resident local as well as foreign currency accounts and bonds which offer attractive interest rates and tax benefits to facilitate investments and savings by the diaspora population (Chanda 2008). NRIs have been permitted to move capital freely between their home and host countries without much bureaucratic constraint. There are, for instance, Non-Resident Ordinary Rupee (NRO) accounts which are non-repatriable as well as repatriable Non-Resident (External) (NRE) Rupee accounts, and repatriable Foreign Currency Non-Resident (FCNR) accounts. The two latter accounts enable NRIs to bring in large sums of money to start businesses in India and be exempted from taxes on interest earnings. Portfolio investments have also been facilitated for NRIs by making income from such investments repatriable and by not requiring NRI investors to report their transactions to the Reserve Bank of India (MOIA 2011). As a result of such incentives and schemes, through the 1990s and also in recent years, the skilled Indian diaspora population has remitted and invested substantially through the formal banking channels and the stock market. For example, the Reserve Bank of India launched instruments such as the Resurgent India Bonds scheme in 1998 and the India Millennium Deposits scheme in 2000 (Chanda 2008).

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Conclusion Thus, presently Indian diaspora with its high level of potential to contribute to its source country’s economy has become a factor in foreign policy-making. India is keen to exploit their potential shows through several diaspora-engaging policies which have come up in the last decade. The recent foreign policy decisions of India certainly exhibit traces of pragmatism. It is trying to economically and politically harness the Indian network and resources that till now only existed in the cultural domain through extended familial relations and the nostalgic search for roots. The socioeconomic profile of the Indian diaspora is also changing with its newly-acquired financial strength. For the government and the people alike, the overseas community support has come to stand for national economic development. The economic consequences of diasporas have been mixed for India. The migration of less-skilled labour to the Gulf countries has had positive effects because of large-scale migration and inflow of huge remittances. However, the migration of highly-skilled labour has had more ambiguous consequences. Their cross-national networks facilitate flow of tacit information, commercial and business ideas, and technologies to India. But the loss of significant numbers of highly-skilled migrants created a vacuum. The political effects of the diaspora creates opportunities as well as challenges to India’s foreign policy, which depends on a combination of factors such as the nature of the country of settlement, the relationship between the Indian government and the diaspora, and the nature of India’s domestic politics. Policy changes in India and global trends portend a potentially large increase in international migration. There is a significant potential for the diaspora to emerge as an important strategic asset in the foreseeable future. But for this to happen, India needs to institute politically difficult policy changes. At the same time, the diaspora needs to both put its money as well as change its priorities on the choice of strategic investments in the country of origin. Policies aimed at the diaspora have to be formulated with regard to policies towards other foreigners and the country’s own residents so as to ensure that they do not create opportunities for arbitrage that inadvertently subverts the goals behind the policies.

References Berns-McGown, Rima. 2007–08. ‘Redefining Diaspora: The Challenge of Connection and Inclusion’, International Journal, 63(1): 3–20.

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Chanda, Rupa. 2008. ‘The Skilled South Asian Diaspora and its Role in Source Economies’. Working Paper no. 34, Institute of South Asian Studies, December, view at http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg (accessed 25 June 2012). Gamlen, Alan. 2006. ‘Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and What Kind of States Use Them?’ Working Paper no. 32, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, School of Anthropology, University of Oxford. ——— (ed.). 2008. ‘Why Engage Diasporas?’ Working Paper No. 63, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, School of Anthropology, University of Oxford. Government of India (GoI). 1955. ‘The Citizenship Act of India, 1955’, 30 December. http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf (accessed 27 November 2013). High Commission of India, Botswana. n.d. ‘Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF)’. http://www.hcigaborone.org.bw/diaspora/indian-communitywelfare-fund-icwf/ (accessed 28 November 2013). Jain, C. Prakash. 2005. ‘Indian Entrepreneurs in the Gulf Countries: Some Case Studies’, India Quarterly, 61(4): 123–42. Kapur, Devesh. 2010. Diaspora, Development and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Keeley, Brian. 2010. International Migration: The Human Face of Globalization. New Delhi: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Lal, Brij V., Peter Reeves and Rajesh Rai (eds). 2006. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Lall, Marie. 2003. ‘Mother India’s Forgotten Children’, in Eva ØstergaardNielsen (ed.), International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lall, Marie-Carine. 2001. India’s Missed Opportunity. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). 2011. Annual Report 2010–2011. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Mohapatra, Sanket, Dilip Ratha and Ani Silwal. 2011. ‘Migration and Development Brief 16’. Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/ Resources/476882-1157133580628/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief16 (accessed 31 July 2012). Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003. International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Page, Ben and Claire Mercer. 2010. ‘Diaspora and Development’, in Kim Knott and Sean McLoughlin (eds), Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities. New York: Zed Books. Sahadevan, P. 1995. India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri Lanka. Delhi: Kalinga Publications. Sahoo, Ajaya Kumar and Brij Maharaj (eds). 2007. Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader. New Delhi: Rawat Publication.

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Schiller, Nina G. 2005. ‘Transborder Citizenship: An Outcome of Legal Pluralism within Transnational Social Fields’, in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Anne Griffiths (eds), Mobile People, Mobile Law: Expanding Legal Relations in a Contracting World, pp. 27–150. London: Ashgate. Shain, Yossi. 2007. Kinship and Diaspora in International Affairs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth. 2003. ‘Diaspora and International Relations Theory’, International Organization, 57(3): 449–79. Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.). 1986. Modern Diasporas in International Politics. London: Croom Helm. ———. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. London: Cambridge University Press. Singh, I. J. Bahadur. 1979. The Other India: The Overseas Indians and their Relationship with India. New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann. Snidal, Duncan. 1985. ‘The Game Theory of International Politics’, World Politics, 38(1): 25–27. Tinker, Hugh. 1993. A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920. London: Hansib Publishing. Wescott, Clay Goodloe and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff. 2006. Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Zaidi, A. M. 1985. Immutable Policy of Friendship and Cooperation: The Foreign Policy of Indian National Congress during the Last 100 Years. New Delhi: Publication Department, Indian Institute of Applied Political Research.

6

Professional Diaspora Networks and Philanthropy in the Healthcare Sector t. l. S. bhaSKaR* Diaspora

philanthropy is one of the integral elements in the contemporary debate on migration and development that attempts to understand the development impact of migration, both at the country of origin and destination. Apart from sending the largest volume of remittances1 to India, the Indian diaspora2 has been very active in its engagement with India, particularly with the states of their origin. The nature of diaspora-giving has evolved in many ways over the decades, so has the strategy of the government in formulating a policy3

* The views expressed in this chapter are strictly the views of the author and do not necessarily represent the organization he represents — the India Centre for Migration. The author would like acknowledge the support of the Provincial Globalization project for the fieldwork done in the district of Guntur (Andhra Pradesh, India), and for the scholarly inputs from Carol Upadhya and Mario Rutten. Further, the author would like to thank Jampala Chowdary, Sriram Sonty and Murthy Mutyala, all from the United States (US), for their views and constant support. 1 India has received a record US$69 billion in 2012 as remittances (see Aga et al. 2013). 2 The Indian diaspora is estimated at 25 million (see MOIA 2013: 4). 3 The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), established in 2004, is the focal Ministry for matters pertaining to the overseas Indians, including both the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and the People of Indian Origin (PIOs). It has instituted several policies to engage with the diaspora since then. Three very important ones relevant to the current paper include the annual convention of Indians, that is, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas; the Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council of Overseas Indians; and the Global Indian Network of Knowledge (INK), an online platform for harnessing the skills of the diaspora (see ibid.).

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to engage with the Indian diaspora. Traditionally the engagement between India and its diaspora happened through ethnic and cultural associations, business councils, entrepreneur networks, professional bodies. However, of late the long-distance nationalism is replaced by the diaspora members travelling to India to monitor and guide the work for which the donation was made to. Moreover, with the advent of internet technology, the overseas Indian community is making effective use of various platforms, including online ones, for voicing their opinions and influencing policy-formulation in India. Pravasis, as the Indian diaspora is called, have been agents of change in India and, more importantly, as goodwill ambassadors of India across the globe promoting India’s interests on the global platform. The Indian diaspora continues to play an effective role in lobbying and improving dialogue on India in political, economic and other institutions overseas. The pravasi community is also playing a critical role in the transfer of knowledge, technology and skills to India, leading to both economic and social development in the country. Their role in promoting investment in India and involvement in various philanthropic activities leading to sustainable development is already well-documented.4 For most diaspora members, the urge to engage with place of origin or the interest to engage with alumni institutions is often an outcome of the interplay of various factors. Overall, it is the affinity with the distant motherland that the individual that manifests through different ways of engagement. One such distinct way is monetary contribution which is often appreciated because of its visibility; healthcare is emerging as a key area of intervention by diaspora donors in the Indian context.

Contributions to the General Hospitals and Colleges The following sections cover details pertaining to contributions by diaspora doctors’ alumni associations of three government medical colleges to their alma mater in Andhra Pradesh. The medical colleges include the Andhra Medical College in Vishakhapatnam, the Guntur Medical College in Guntur, and the Rangaraya Medical College in Kakinada. 4 MOIA (2000) features stories on contributions by prominent Indians overseas and professional networks to various philanthropic activities in India.

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Guntur Medical College Alumni of North America (GMCANA) The GMCANA,5 formed in 1981, has members both from the US and Canada who have graduated from the Guntur Medical College (GMC). The GMCANA has been very active in developing a strategy plan to provide quality healthcare to the people of the district, and have been consequently involved in raising necessary funds to execute its vision. The GMCANA restricts it activities to Guntur General Hospital (GGH) and GMC. The Guntur Medical College, popularly known as GMC among the public, has a rich history dating back to as early as 1848. The college is only about 67 years old; the hospital dates back to 1848. Established as the District Head Quarters Hospital in 1848 on the Madras Trunk Road, the hospital was replaced with a more suitable one with 12 beds at a cost of `4,000 in 1861. The government acquired an 8-acre-64cent plot6 and established a 90-bed hospital in 1908, to which another 100-bed ward was added in 1933. Further in 1954, at an estimated cost of nearly `5 million, the bed strength was increased to 350 by acquiring a new site measuring nine acre. On 7 September 1954, the hospital was converted into a teaching hospital and the bed strength increased to 1,038. However, following the recommendations of the Medical Council of India (MCI), in 1999, two medical and two surgical units were sanctioned, thus also increasing the bed strength from 1,038 to 1,177.7 Currently, the hospital admits 150 Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) students and 100 Postgraduate (PG) students in various departments. The Hospital also provides training for students of General and BSc Nursing, Physiotherapy, Pharmacy, Dental, and vocational training courses. Students from almost 40 nursing institutions in the district send students to the hospital for gaining experience in clinical training. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the number of alumni members by speciality and by year of admission in GMCANA.

5 GMCANA’s Mission Statement (n.d.) reads as follows: ‘To help develop Guntur Medical College and Government General Hospital — Guntur, as the premiere modern medical education facilities for undergraduate and postgraduate medical students, staff, and the medical community at large’. 6 One cent is 1/100th of an acre, equal to 435.6 square feet’. 7 http://dme.ap.nic.in/teachinghosp.htm (accessed 20 January 2011).

221 69 41 38 11 20 11 11 8 6 4 4 2 1

Anaesthesiology Family Practice Radiology Obstetrics and Gynaecology Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Child Psychiatry Pulmonary Medicine Orthopaedics Rheumatology Ophthalmology Endocrinology Nuclear Medicine Dermatology Forensic Medicine

133 58 37 35 22 15 12 10 8 5 4 4 2 1

Psychiatry Paediatrics General Surgery Neurology Allergy and Immunology Pathology Urology Vascular Surgery Radiation Oncology Neonatology Emergency Medicine Pain Management Neurosurgery

101 55 35 28 17 12 12 9 9 5 4 3 1

Source: All tables in this chapter have been compiled by the author from diverse sources which include his personal discussions with scholars and also some unpublished data that cannot be vividly cited.

Internal Medicine Cardiology Gastroenterology Haematology and Oncology Unlisted Nephrology Geriatrics Critical Care Cardiothoracic Surgery Infectious Diseases Plastic Surgery Nuclear Medicine Transplant Surgery Thoracic Surgery

Table 6.1: Alumni Members by Speciality in GMCANA

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Table 6.2: Alumni Members by Year of Admission in GMCANA 1950 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

1 1 3 10 3 1 11 22 26 41 19 37 31

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

39 43 51 49 43 33 1 36 87 1 19 42 23

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

6 15 19 25 19 21 28 34 27 38 36 27 19

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

16 14 8 5 16 5 1 7 3 4 1 5

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate the number of alumni located just in North America. One of the chief co-ordinators8 of the GMCANA’s efforts in Guntur opines that the enthusiasm to associate with the parent institution has been consistently maintained by almost three generations of doctors from 1960 till now. With nearly 30 per cent of GMC’s alumni located in the US and Canada, GMCANA stands to be one of the largest alumni organizations among Telugus and one that has made considerable donations as part of its commitment to GGH and GMC. The major projects implemented by GMCANA for the GGH and GMC include: (a) The GMCANA Auditorium: The GMCANA Auditorium is one of the major projects and was inaugurated during the January 2005 Global Alumni Homecoming. The 850-seat air-conditioned auditorium has additional facilities such as the KRR Seminar Room, CME centre, self-study room for students, the Nuthakki Recreation Centre and three furnished guest suites. Since 2009, the auditorium has sustained on its own without depending on funds from the parent organization, the GMCANA. The list of doctors and others who have contributed to this effort is available on the GMCANA website. An amount of approximately US$648,909 (`32.5 million) was donated to this effort.9 8

Discussions with Y. V. S. Prabhakar Rao of GMCANA (India). Contributions made in Indian Rupee are converted into the US Dollar at the rate of `50 per Dollar. 9

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(b) Podila Prasad–GMCANA Super Specialty and Trauma Centre: The idea to build a Millennium Block with a trauma centre and other sub-specialties was expressed by the then district Collector10 and Chairperson of the Hospital Development Committee (HDC) to the visiting GMCANA team in December 2006. It was around the same time that Podila Prasad, an alumni of GMC, expressed a desire to to donate `50 million to the hospital to expand infrastructure and clinical services. It was then that the GMCANA conceived of a public–private partnership between itself and the government. When the plan was discussed with concerned officials, the then finance minister promised a matching grant of another `50 million in February 2007 to the Centre. Subsequently, an MoU was signed between the GMCANA and the Government of Andhra Pradesh towards implementing this project as a joint collaboration. Actual construction began in September 2009 after acquiring necessary clearances from various departments. The monetary participation pattern currently stands at `50 million from Podila Prasad (GMCANA), `47.5 million from the Government of Andhra Pradesh and `8.5 million from the central government funds. However, after an evaluation of the progress and finances involved, GMCANA has decided to raise another US$275,000 (that is, `13.7 million) towards finishing the entire first floor of the project along with a possible matching grant from the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Overall, the GMCANA had contributed close to US$3 million11 (that is, approximately `150 million) towards finishing the second and third floors of the project and accordingly the Government’s contribution now stands at `97.5 million. Apart from these, the other GMCANA Projects implemented over the years include those shown in Table 6.3.

Andhra Medical College Alumni of North America (AMCANA) The Andhra Medical College (AMC) is one of the oldest medical colleges in India (1923) and is currently affiliated to the NTR Health University. 10

The Chief Administrative and Revenue officer of an Indian district is termed the District Collector. 11 See http://www.gmcana.org/downloads/Podila-GMCANA-superspeciality. pdf (accessed 1 August 2013) for a detailed list of contributors to this effort.

Computers with high-speed internet connections, e-library, educational CD-ROMS including textbooks on CD-ROMS, online journal subscriptions, LCD projector for CME presentations, digital camera, Xerox multipurpose copier/laser printer, scanner and colour printer

Educational materials, books, mannequins and models; 70 chairs to the nurse’s quarters in GGH, Computer

10 classes were renovated with painting, repairs of seating, electrical wiring and fans; all class rooms were equipped with audio visuals, LCD projector, screen, and an audio system

ABG machine, biochemistry lab with immediate lab results

A modern Leica teaching microscope with TV monitor; remote display 30” flat panel TV monitor; computer room with computer, printer, scanner and digital camera; restoration of specimens

300 MA Wipro-GE X-Ray image intensifier; 500 MA X-ray plant

Iridium Brachytherapy unit; radiation therapy caesium kits

Ultrasound machine; foetal monitors; infusion pumps; air-conditioning of labour rooms (general and HIV); colposcope, biological microscope

Neonatal intensive care unit; warmers and phototherapy units; ventilator; incubators; nebulizers; emergency cart; new-born resuscitation kits

Computerized EEG and EMG machines; ECT machines

Nursing School

Renovated Lecture Galleries

Clinical Laboratory

Pathology

Radiology

Radiotherapy

Obstetrics and Gynaecology

Paediatrics

Neurology

(Table 6.3: Continued )

Textbooks and journals (worth over `1.3 million), copier and 60 chairs

CME Centre

Description of the Donation

Educational Environment Library

Department/Project/Others

Table 6.3: Items Donated by the GMCANA to GMC and GGH

Several multipurpose anaesthesia monitors to the OR with spo2, Nibp, ETCO2, temp; laryngoscopes, LMA/s and supplies to the anaesthesia department; computer with printer for anaesthesia department; basic and advanced life support training BLS ACLS and PALS; other anaesthesia equipment and supplies

ENB Sarma super speciality operating room; three emergency operating rooms; Urology endoscopes and equipment electro cautery; proctoscope and coloscope; colonovideo scope; 15 paediatric beds; TVs, VCD player and VCDs; water project supplying running water to paediatric ward 24/7

Drill System

Central monitoring; infusion pumps; defibrillators; multichannel monitor with ECG, Res/Sope/ Temp/ETCO2; three-channel EKG machine

Colonoscope; procotoscope; other endoscopes

Computer

Physical therapy equipment

80 patient beds

Two-storey additional wing; fibre optic bronchoscope; pulmonary function testing machine; nebulizers; Bi pap machine; 30 beds with lockers

Savina adult/paediatric ventilator; Oxylog-2000 transport ventilator; ThymatronECT system IV machine; Schiller ECG machine; Draeger Single and double syringe infusion pumps; Draeger anaesthesia machine and ventilator

Surgery

Orthopaedics

Cardiology

Gastroenterology

Ophthalmology

Physiotherapy

Psychiatry

Government Fever Hospital

Equipment for Intensive Care Unit (ICU)

Description of the Donation

Anaesthesiology

Department/Project/Others

Several educational endowments, awards and scholarships;a wheel chairs and walkers; computerization of old medical transcripts; LCD projectors to Sushrutha hall at GGH and to Cooper Hall at GMC; cots donated to psychiatry and ENT departments in Government General Hospital; 30 semi fowler cots with mattress, pillows and bedside lockers, etc. donated to fever hospital; building of a direct entrance for the public to the auditorium and also as parking place without disturbing the college premises; LCD projectors and CPUs for three lecture galleries

Others

Source: Compiled by the authors from the GMCANA website and from other field sources. Note: Details on donors and their financial contributions are not mentioned to maintain privacy. a A complete list of educational endowments, awards and scholarships is available at the GMCANA Website. See http://www. gmcana.org/educational-endowments.php (accessed 30 July 2013).

Manman Orthodrill to department of Orthopaedics; calposcope to department of gynaecology; multipara monitor with ECG to Cardiothoracic OT; four ECG machines

Items donated in collaboration with the Rotary

Description of the Donation

20 paediatric cots were donated to paediatric department through a combined Rotary GMCANA venture in Government General Hospital

Paediatrics

Department/Project/Others

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The college and the associated hospital, the King George Hospital (KGH), have been centres of excellence in the coastal Andhra Pradesh region. The AMCANA (established and registered in 1981) has been actively contributing to the AMC and the KGH. Apart from the equipment donated to few departments as shown in Table 6.4, the AMCANA contributed to upgrading and creation of infrastructure. The AMCANA Education Centre in the Super-Speciality Block has facilities for organizing lecture programmes along with provision for conferences. Other infrastructure efforts include the AMCANA Steps programme and the improvements made in hostels. The electronic library facility created by the AMCANA, with donations from Annapurna and Jogi Pattisapu, has 20 computer systems with access to electronic journals benefiting the students in the medical college.12 The library operates during the evening after the students are done with their regular class hours. The AMCANA built a Seminar and Conference Hall in the Super-Speciality Block with donations from Kavita Pinnamaneni and Sreedhar Chilimuri. Table 6.4: Items Donated by the AMCANA to AMC and KGH Department/Project/Others Orthopaedics

Casualty Ward Neurosurgery Emergency Medicine Vaccination Programme Emergency Ward Government Eye Hospital Library Rotary Netra Eye Hospital Note:

Description of the Donation Instruments worth `10 million (for trauma surgeries and postgraduate education);b consumables; library with computers for education Ultra-sonography equipment; poly trauma unit; CT Scan Equipment for the department; books for the library Digital X-ray; ultrasound Hepatitis vaccines for three years Stainless steel saline stands; high-end stretchers; suction pumps 25 years of medical journals Books and diagnostic equipment for treatment of glaucoma

Interview with Murali Krishna, Andhra Medical College, 4 June 2013. http://www.hindu.com/2011/02/20/stories/2011022058640600.htm (accessed 30 July 2013). a

b

12

The e-journals are provided through MD Consult, the online portal for medical resources.

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The AMCANA has been very active in imparting state-of-the art training to the students and staff of the college and KGH. For example, the 1987 batch initiated training courses in Basic and Advanced Cardiac Life Support Skills for 53 house surgeons in 2012. These trainings were co-ordinated by the AMCANA and designed by Hema Pandrangi, the US-based cardiologist, and her friends. A workshop on Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) for the resident doctors was conducted, and related equipment was donated to the college. In this regard, the AMCANA’s efforts in starting the Emergency Medicine department in the college are worth mentioning. Apart from the contributions made to the college and KGH, the AMCANA also has contributed to the government regional eye hospital the necessary equipment for cataract surgeries and a spectrum microscope for corneal transplant.

Rangaraya Medical College Alumni of North America (RMCANA) Rangaraya Medical College (RMC) located in Kakinada is one of the premier medical colleges (established in 1958) and currently affiliated to Dr NTR University of Health Sciences. It is attached to a government general hospital which functions like a teaching hospital with a bed capacity of 1,100. The RMCANA has been actively participating in improving the quality of education of the medical college. Projects undertaken by the RMCANA are listed in Table 6.5. Alumni have greatly contributed to the development of the infrastructure of the college. They were instrumental in constructing a guest house with fully-furnished airconditioned (AC) rooms and an open-air auditorium, and a golden jubilee library equipped with a digital section and text books. Alumni have been encouraging meritorious students by donating scholarships to them annually. An on-going annual training course in basic skills for local doctors, students and nurses is being funded.

Inferences and Conclusion The alumni want to support their alma mater because of a sense of obligation, pride and the need to give back. They want to ensure that the quest for excellence they see around them is experienced by the trainees and users of their parent institution as well. To that extent, they want to be involved not only in helping the institutions today, but

Description of the Donation

Four annual merit scholarships from 2012 (US$1,500) for one year Setting up statues of founders and four donors of the college and Rangaraya Medical College Old Students Association (RMCOSA) fort (US$8,000) Purchase of textbooks and journals for library, essential equipment for laboratories and maintenance of auditorium (donations made on an annual basis to the library). The Trust raised US$100,000; the amount was deposited in a bank in 1996 and out of the interest earned every year, half of the amount is added to the principle and half spent for designated activities Emergency Management and Research Institute (EMRI) 108 conducts a skills development programme of three days every year for the local doctors and nurses; raised US$10,000 for training 100 people per year costs A complete library with 24×7 access for the students was constructed in the pre-clinical campus (US$250,000) Equipment for physiotherapy; physiotherapy for nearly 80 outpatients every day; training in physiotherapy for the staff Blood Pressure (BP) monitors for pregnant women (especially for the health check-up during late trimester); room with five beds, equipment, etc. Fully-furnished AC guest rooms and open-air auditorium (US$50,000); the Moturi Auditorium

Table 6.5: Items Donated by the RMCANA

Department/Project/Others

RMCANA Scholarships Founding Father’s Corner

Source: Figures in dollars are collected from http://www.rmcana.org/ (accessed 30 July 2013). Note: a The Society has both resident Indian and diaspora doctors.

Physiotherapy (with Matching Grant from Rotary International) Healthcare for Pregnant Women (in Collaboration with Rotary International) Rangaraya Medical College Old Students Association (RMCOSA) Guest House Neonatal Care Paediatrics Royal Rangaraya Societya

RMC Golden Jubilee Library

CPR Training Programme

Incubators Access to online journals Books to the library every year

v

Dr Bhanu Prasad Memorial Trust

84 India Migration Report 2013

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also be a part of the strategic planning for the future. For example, the GMC alumni do not want their contributions to be limited to dollars and cents alone, but also include ideas and strategies for a brighter future that leads to stronger institutions.13 To impart excellence in medical education and thereby serve the society is the principle that is common across the alumni associations. A preliminary analysis of the donations reveal the fact that attention is paid to contributing equipment and provide necessary training to operate the same. Many visiting doctors, representing the alumni associations, find time to give lectures to resident doctors and other local doctors’ associations and impart training as part of continuous learning. Training of resident doctors, nurses and other auxiliary teams is integral to diaspora philanthropy by diaspora alumni associations.14 Increasing focus is also paid to disciplines in medicine that are not fully developed; for example, departments such as physiotherapy, emergency medicine, etc., have been areas that witnessed interventions by the diaspora doctors, along with transfer of equipment and other related technology and training of manpower. The diaspora alumni associations take a demand-driven approach to philanthropy. Visiting doctors to India take time to visit the institutions, interact with doctors on the needs of the college and hospital, assess and structure the demand, and submit it to the alumni association for evaluation and approval. The need is then circulated in order to to raise sufficient funds to implement the projects. Throughout the process, it is the volunteerism on the part of certain diaspora doctors that drives the process forward. Volunteers, who primarily coordinate efforts on both sides, are critical to efficient implementation. At times the heads of departments in the college collaborate with their diaspora counterparts through personal networks, explain the need and mobilize funds. It is observed that such personal initiatives have seen instant results.15 The act of diaspora philanthropy needs to be understood from a holistic perspective and not merely from the point of view of 13 Opinion as expressed by Jampala Chowdary of the GMCANA, 4 August 2013. 14 From the discussion with Murty Mutyala, who had migrated to the US in 1974 and makes regular visits to India and his institution, the RMC, and has been instrumental in co-ordinating efforts from both sides — the RMCANA and the RMC. 15 Interview with Kalpana Subramanyam, Principal, Andhra Medical College, 4 June 2013.

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donations.16 The act of philanthropy involves spending quality time with doctors who are working in the institutions and the principle co-ordinators raising funds, guiding the institutions to transform into centres of excellence, reasoning with the official machinery to speed up things, and above all, travelling all the way to these cities in India to monitor the progress made. The emergence of the diaspora traveller to the location of the actual project in India is gaining importance. It is observed that the donors are not satisfied with the mere act of donation; they are in fact travelling all the way to India to be involved in the implementation process. A deep sense of gratitude to the institute by every doctor overseas who has established his/her career, made money and now wants to give back to the roots where his/her foundation lies, is prevalent among diaspora doctors. They believe that the best way of involvement is to make their mother institute the best in providing quality education and healthcare.17 Several ways of participation include improving infrastructure and imparting advanced training, counselling prospective emigrant doctors during their visits, creating awareness about opportunities in the field and expectations of the destination countries, and organizing meetings with respective departments in the college and hospital. However, one of the pertinent challenges that need immediate attention is the need to dispel myths about the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) and create awareness regarding the current provisions among the diaspora donors. Reiterating both personal and institutional experiences, one of the key coordinators, who is an active diaspora doctor sums up the scenario. He opines that some of the key challenges most of the donors have faced in the initial stages included the following: non-accountability from alma mater institutions, indifference or delay to follow through, fear of responsibility, slow response from government officials, slow transfer of funds to banks in India, and poor communication from the alma mater.18 However, since the advent of online bank transfers, the emergence of more competent and confident medical faculty, there has been more enthusiasm from selected faculty to liaison with 16

Discussions with Y. V. S. Prabhakar Rao (GMCANA), 29 December 2010. Discussions with Phani Bhushan, Superintendent, Guntur General Hospital, 16 December 2010. 18 Discussions with Sriram Sonty, AMCANA, 4 August 2013. Although this view was expressed in the context of the AMCANA, similar experiences were shared by diaspora doctors from other alumni associations as well. 17

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them for improved delivery of the desired equipment, library books and computers in a more efficient and effective manner to the departments involved in recent years.

References Aga, Gemechu Ayana, Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Sonia Plaza, Ani Rudra Silwal, and Dilip Ratha. 2013. ‘Migration and Development Brief 20’. Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, 19 April. Guntur Medical College Alumni of North America (GMCANA). n.d. ‘Our Vision & Our Mission’. http://www.gmcana.org/vision-mission.php (accessed 17 January 2014). Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). 2000. The Idea of Giving. New Delhi: India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India. ———. 2013. Annual Report 2012–13. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.

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Return of Diasporas

India’s Growth Story vs Global Crisis S. iRuDaya Rajan, V. KuRuSu anD SaRamma panicKeR c. K.* The Indian diaspora has a powerful influence on the global community where Indians constitute a diverse and heterogeneous group that shares an Indian origin and intrinsic values. Earlier migration was associated with the exodus of low-skilled labourers whereas it now relates more to the emigration of highly-skilled workers, professionals, students, etc. The migration of skilled labour in pursuit of better career prospects and living standards started after Indian Independence and gathered momentum with the emigration of Information Technology (IT) professionals in the 1990s. The concept of the brain drain has always been widely discussed, but recent trends show a movement in the opposite direction! Many professionals are returning to their homeland leading to a brain gain. Madeleine Sumption, a policy analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, recently stated that ‘a growing population of highly educated Americans and foreign nationals educated in the States are less committed to living and working in the U.S., preferring to return to their homelands, many of which are emerging economies’ (Hirsch 2012). She also suggests that this trend is strong in China, India and Brazil where dramatic economic growth over the last decade has opened up opportunities for entrepreneurship and led U.S. multinationals to hire overseas employees with Western education (ibid.).

Global Crisis to India Shining While cross-connectivity, made possible by advances in transportation and communication technologies, propelled migration from countries * This research was financed by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India, through its Research Unit on International Migration (RUIM) at Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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such as India a few decades ago, the establishment of off-shore companies in India and booming economy is making the return possible and real to the same country that has witnessed out-migration on a large scale.1 Moreover, as more workers across the professional ladder are migrating overseas in the quest for better economic opportunities, employers are hiring and placing their employees across national borders, especially in newer destinations such as India for economic reasons. On the other hand, Indian professionals abroad, especially in the IT sector, prefer and accept their company’s offer to return to India, especially when the intra-company transfer lands them in management positions similar to the nature of professionals working within India (Upadhya 2010: 309). With a record of the largest remittance-receiving country in the world, India received remittances of US$64 billion in 2011 (World Bank 2012). Notwithstanding the recent fluctuations in the global economy, the fall in Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and growing unemployment levels in the advanced countries, the Indian GDP level has grown rapidly and the country has been witnessing significant technological advancements. This has changed the scenario, with educated and ambitious individuals turning back and migrating to the India that is showing its development potential. In order to support this welcome trend, the Government of India has been implementing various policies such as providing Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards, granting outstanding scholarships to Non-Resident Indians (NRI) and PIOs, financial and other incentives, tax deductions and investment packages to encourage the return of highly-skilled migrants, or in fact, to reverse the process of brain drain. Research studies indicate that return and circular migrations are characterized by emigrants returning to their country of origin. For example, India and China contribute largely to this emerging phenomenon of entrepreneurship boom (Wadhwa et al. 2011) and the effect of brain drain that earlier worked to the benefit of the country of destination has, in fact, reversed to work for a long-term benefit of the country of origin. A survey by Vivek Wadhwa and his team, consisting of 153 skilled Indians and 111 Chinese returnees from the United States (US), reveals that nearly half of the respondents wanted to start companies in their home country (ibid.). The most significant factors drawing both Indians and Chinese home were economic opportunities, 1

The annual report of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) (2010) estimates the Indian diaspora to be 25 million across 189 countries.

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access to local markets, and family ties, with more than 60 per cent of Indian returnees saying that the availability of economic opportunities in their country was a major factor encouraging them to return. Another survey by the Heidrick and Struggles Knowledge Management Centre (2010) reflects that the Indian workforce is considered the ‘most mobile’ in the world followed by Mexicans, Chinese and Turks. While 82 per cent of the respondents conveyed their willingness to come back given a suitable opportunity, only 55 per cent of them were ‘actively considering opportunities to relocate to India’.2 According to Kelly Services India, a global work force solutions provider, around 300,000 Indian professionals are expected to migrate home over the next four years. Interestingly, it is not just the private sector that is attracting Indian returnees. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has hundreds of Non Resident Indian (NRI) scientists keen to be part of India’s defence projects, with the government also eager to attract Indian scientists currently abroad (ILO 2011).

Findings of the Survey The survey on returnee professionals was carried out by the Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram for the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India. The study explored the reasons for return and their post-return settlement. We interviewed 1,106 highly-skilled professionals (both in educational as well as occupational terms) who had returned spontaneously and voluntarily to reside in India during the period 2006–11. We took samples from Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala), Cochin (Kerala), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), Mumbai (Maharashtra), Ahmedabad (Gujarat), Pune (Maharashtra), Delhi, and Bangalore (Karnataka). We followed Snowball Sampling to find out about the return and the resettlement issues faced by the returnee migrants.3 2

The study reached out to over 2,600 senior executives of Indian origin currently based abroad from its global database of over 1.6 million executives. 3 ‘Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. Thus the sample group appears to grow like a rolling snowball. As the sample builds up, enough data is gathered to be useful for research . . . This sampling technique is often used in hidden populations which are difficult for researchers to access’ (Emmanuel n.d.: 39).

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Table 7.1: City-Wise Distribution of Samples, by Sex Male

Female

Total

Thiruvananthapuram Cochin Hyderabad Chennai Mumbai Ahmedabad Pune Delhi Bangalore

86 138 187 166 115 54 34 71 50

16 55 28 11 23 15 15 29 13

102 193 215 177 138 69 49 100 63

Total

901

205

1,106

Source: All tables and figures in this chapter have been compiled from the authors’ field survey.

About 81.46 per cent of the samples were men and 18.53 per cent were women (Table 7.1). While 24 respondents had PIO cards, only 42 possessed OCI cards issued by the Government of India. Many said that possession of these cards had made their mobility easier and that it particularly benefited the younger generation, especially children who wished to move for further studies. Some also felt that this put them at par with Indian citizens. Kerala and Maharashtra seem to have a fairly good number of migrants distributed all over the world, with Kerala having a higher ratio. In Kerala, people prefer to migrate to the Gulf countries, closely followed by Canada, with the US being given the least preference. Migrants from Tamil Nadu mostly prefer the Gulf and other Asian countries in comparison to Europe or the US, while a major proportion of those from Andhra Pradesh migrate to the US. The Gulf countries are inhabited mostly by the migrants from the south Indian states, except Karnataka, which interestingly has no migrant in the Gulf according to the data and prefers the US instead. People in the north Indian states of Delhi and Gujarat prefer the Western countries as compared to the Gulf. Most of the migrants who return to their home towns are from Kerala, closely followed by migrants from Maharashtra while the lowest percentage of returnees is for those from Gujarat. On an average, 23.68 per cent migrants returned from the US after 2006, 16.99 per cent from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 9.04 per cent from the United Kingdom (UK), making these three countries the biggest hubs for migrants. This also suggests that these developed countries have seen a greater outflow of Indian migrants when the global

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crisis hit. Though Oman and Saudi Arabia have also seen migrants returning (5.51 per cent and 6.60 per cent respectively), the impact or outflow has been much lower than from the developed nations. The majority of the returnees in our sample were in the age group 30–39 (44.93 per cent). This is followed by youngsters who have returned — 29.56 per cent (below 29 years). Figure 7.1 shows that there has been an increase in the return during 2006–10. Most of the return migration took place the year 2010 and has significantly diminished in the following years reducing the number of migrants to a very low percentage after 2010, probably due to the aftermath of the recession and the subsequent global economic crisis. In the post-crisis period, the years 2009 and 2010 saw the maximum number of returnees to India with 18.89 per cent and 24.23 per cent respectively. The year 2010 has also seen a huge increase in return migrants (21.79 per cent). The major reason was the global economic crisis that led to job loss and fall in salary in many countries. Besides this, there was hardly any job security, and family ties led to the return of skilled migrants to their homeland. Most of the returnees are professionals or people with high educational qualifications who clearly felt that the growing economy needed qualified individuals. Figure 7.1: Returnee’s Year of Return

The significance of the emerging service sector in India is seen in the fact that 185 of the returnees were from the IT field. The Silicon Valley gives these professionals an opportunity to showcase their talents. A typical response like ‘I wanted to challenge myself professionally and develop myself personally’ shows that returnees with higher qualifications see this as a potential trend. The ‘Other’ category

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comprises economists, social workers, officers, presidents of organizations, industrial designers, job advisers, stock brokers, pilots/captains, fashion designers, journalists, etc., which clearly shows the diversification of jobs and prospects in India. Many studied outside India, which shows that they want to put their brains to use for development of the home economy. Sectors that were earlier abandoned by the homeland have been revived by these migrants as they search for various job markets and self-employment opportunities to build their entrepreneurial skills. Professionally, the majority of the returnees are administrators, IT professionals and engineers. Most of the women prefer to be nurses and academicians; around 80 per cent of the nurses are females. Only the males prefer business and not many women have shown interest in taking up business ventures (Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2). Figure 7.2: Occupational Profile of Return Migrants

Table 7.2: Educational Qualifications of Return Migrants Classes 1–12 Degree Postgraduate Diploma Professional Degree Postgraduation Professional Postgraduation MPhil, PhD Industrial Training Institute (ITI), Certificate Courses Diploma and Others Total

34 108 44 207 171 268 141 83 50 1,106

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Figure 7.3 provides a clear understanding of the work status of the returnee professionals. A huge number of the returnees work in the private sectors, relatively more than the government sectors. As per the earlier data, the majority with professional educational qualifications, return between the ages of 26–30 and employ the learning skills acquired abroad in India. As per the survey, more than half of the returnee emigrants and majority of youngsters invest their skills and talents in the Indian private sector, clearly aiding the Indian economy. Figure 7.3: Present Working Status of Professional Return Migrants in India (in per cent)

On the basis of the collected data, we can say that 61 per cent of the returnee migrants are employed in the private sector. The majority of the returnees in the private sector belong to the age group of 26–40. Only 188 returnee professionals are employed in the central/state government. We have also seen that some of the returnees (133) are self-employed. Within the self-employed category, the majority consists of returnees belonging to the 26–30 age bracket.

Return: The New Indian Trend Highly-skilled professionals like IT professionals and healthcare workers have always found their place in the foreign market. Their migration on a temporary as well as permanent basis had increased with the advent of new technology and greater facilities for mobility provided by the destination countries. The Global Crisis affected the outflow of migrants as well as increased migrant inflow to their homelands. According to the Office for National Statistics, unemployment in the UK rose to 6.30 per cent

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towards the end of 2008, whereby many migrants were laid off there and in other developing countries as the slowdown affected all the sectors in the economy. India, on the other hand, had a very tight monetary policy which allowed the country to stand on its own even during the global recession. Many temporary migrants who have returned to India once they have completed their short-term contracts invest their skills and their savings in business ventures. Also, many migrants eventually return to India, bringing back new skills and fresh approaches gained abroad, strengthening the economy. According to Migration Information Source (MPI 2011), developing nations that were once primarily migrant-sending states are now experiencing a boom that is beginning to increase their attractiveness for highly-educated and highly-skilled migrants and beckoning the diaspora home. India could be one of the world’s largest trading nations, together with China, by 2030 as its economy continues to grow rapidly, even if unevenly. The country is now successfully attracting entrepreneurs and the highly skilled from the diaspora and second generation, particularly to its booming IT industry. A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that depending on the country of destination and the timeframe considered, 20 to 50 per cent of immigrants go home or move on to a third country within five years of their arrival. The main reasons found by the report for this have been categorized as follows (see Figure 7.4): (a) Ageing Parents: Up to 234 respondents said that they had returned because of their elderly parents. They also said that they wanted to contribute to the family by settling near their parents. Some even specified that Indian traditions have to be kept up by taking care of the older generation. For them parents, family and kinship ties play a greater role than any other reason. (b) Contract Got Over/Visa Expired: Almost 208 people migrated under contracts that lasted a year. The host countries do not have enough opportunities for these professional workers. Sometimes their work gets completed much before the end of their work period. In such cases, many of the professionals cannot continue or extend their jobs due to unavailability of work. There are instances that have been reported where returnees returned just after the completion of their contract term which may vary from six months to a year or two.

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(c) Global Recession: Though this has not got priority, it has been recorded as one of the main reasons for return migration, with 171 respondents saying that the recession had led either to job loss or fall in their salary level. In the present scenario, this had a negative impact on their living standards. (d) Plan to Set up Own Venture in India: 126 respondents had already decided to come back to India and set up their own business or take over the family business. They see the foreign experience as a positive point. Most research indicates that large-scale return migration corresponds more to political and economic conditions in the origin country. Migrants may be motivated to return by the prospect of new opportunities at home or if they had achieved their financial goals. Up to 200 of the sampled respondents have started a new venture; 71 out of the 116 who came up with new ventures have invested below `1,000,000 whereas 21 had made an investment of above `2,500,000. Figure 7.4: Reasons for Return (in per cent)

(e) Better Opportunities in India: 100 returnees felt that India is an emerging place where there are lots of new prospects for highly-skilled professionals. One returnee even specified that there are greater opportunities due to opening of multinational hotels. Some have even got government-sector jobs, which ensure job security. A scientist replied that there has been an

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increase in investment opportunities in research. Many come with the hope of opening up new ventures in India. Another common assertion was that they found challenging opportunities in India because of the emergence of new industries, such as retail and media, and subsequent lack of skilled talent. Indeed, numerous business journals confirm that despite the booming economy and vast population, India faces a looming shortage of skilled talent. About 609 respondents think that there are opportunities for professional growth on a general basis. (f ) Others: These reasons include no job security, job transfer, war, harassment from foreign employer, education, and being still on the lookout for jobs in foreign countries. Out of the 97 returnees in this category, some came back to India to further their education. One respondent said that he returned because he had earned enough for himself and his family to live well for quite some years. There were others who also said that they had come back to India to enjoy the rest of their lives after working hard for several years in the foreign country. Another significant reason for return was the hostility towards Indians abroad. Despite being in a professional job, they have experienced discrimination and being sidelined because of either competition in the field or prejudice. Many also stated that while away they missed their favourite festivals and family gatherings. (g) Family Problems: Some cited factors such as differences in culture, spouse’s health condition, and change of job of spouse, etc., as reasons for their return. Some returned because they wanted to renew their married life. Some cases of divorce and illegitimate affairs were reported that resulted from the separation of married couples. A few returned because they had several health issues and could not continue staying in another country anymore. In addition, many among them wanted to learn more about their parental homeland, ethnicity and heritage. (h) Not Satisfied with Jobs: Many of the returnees had faced difficult working conditions and environmental issues, and did not like the work abroad, but had to remain there for a period of time. More than environmental factors, a feeling of alienation became the reason for not liking the job in the foreign country. This clearly specifies that they felt estranged in the work

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environment overseas. Many claimed that they had stressed themselves out to keep their job. The monotonous working environment and the lack of a sense of togetherness also contributed to the aversion towards their job. (i) Marriage: 37 respondents returned because of marriage and these were mainly those aged 29 and below. More men migrated before marriage than women. Men usually tend to take their family with them after marriage, but recent trends show that they prefer coming back and settling in India rather than staying away after getting married. Many returnees had not planned on returning, but said that it was a spontaneous and voluntary return. About 179 of the returnees had been thinking of returning home for about a year because of the economical difficulties caused by the recession, which made them think seriously about the various options in their homeland. Return is a matter of choice between materialistic and emotional lives abroad. Many, especially those who had migrated with their family, had a feeling of insecurity after the 9/11 incident and did not wish to settle abroad. Decisive reasons were always there for those who wanted to return though they sometimes waited for a trigger that initiated the return, and the Global Economic Crisis was one of the factors that gave migrants a valid reason to return to their homeland. When asked whether their job status in their home country is the same as that overseas, 328 responded that they got the same job and were in the same profession, while 131 claimed that they got ‘lower-status jobs’. Some of the return professionals have started their own business; 194 said that they got a ‘higher-status job’ in a metro city as they were recognized for the extra skills obtained from their overseas stay and job. Others said they did not experience any change and felt the job status to be the same as what they had abroad. We came across 453 returnees who did not feel comfortable discussing anything related to their job status. The average growth rate of 9 per cent during this slump season has been an attraction for foreign investors as well as those who want to make it big in the city. The healthy environment in India as well as in other developing countries encourages many MNCs to come here for their growth and sustainability (ILO 2011). According to a senior management executive who returned after a decade from Canada to Pune, ‘the economy in India is healthier than that of North America

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and more growth focused for the next 10–20 years’ (ibid.). Dharmakirti Joshi, Chief Economist, CRISIL Ltd, elaborates: Over the last few years India’s growth rate has gone up significantly. Between 2004 and 2011, average annual GDP growth has been 8.5 per cent. Additionally, India’s growth potential was not dented by the global financial crisis of 2008 and it quickly returned to the eight per cent growth path within a year (ibid.).

According to him, this is different from the economic developments in the West. GDP growth came down sharply following the crisis in both Europe and the United States, where recovery and growth prospects have been weak, and employment has taken a big hit . . . Since India suffers from skill shortages, particularly at the high end of the job market, those returning can easily get absorbed. “The push factor has been shrinking job opportunities in the West and the pull factor has been opportunities for these professions in the fastgrowing Indian economy. India has seen finance, information technology and medical professionals returning. This is a win-win situation for both. India stands to gain from the return of these professionals due do to fastemerging skill shortages in India,” explains Joshi (ibid.).

Overall, a number of factors affect the development potential of returning migrants. These include their absolute numbers; motivation for return; relevance of their acquired skills to the country’s development priorities; legislative, economic and social conditions in the country of origin; and the ways that government and informal networks help returnees reintegrate into society.

Resettlement Issues In this section we will analyze the challenges encountered by the return migrants while settling down in India. Many have come back and settled in the metro cities as it is easier for them to look for jobs or start their new ventures with easily available materials and infrastructure. These can either be self-owned or started as a partnership or joint-family venture. Since their international experience plays an important role in investing and building a new empire in the emerging nation, most of these individuals prefer to work in a private organization. Respondents have foreseen some problems that might arise due to the sudden return to their homeland. Initial change of work can be

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stressful. Those who had a government-sector job back in India did not feel the stress because of the job security they were assured before migrating, but complained about losing seniority because of the priority given to Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). They were also deeply disturbed by problems of corruption and by the failure to get various services in time. Self-employed individuals found that there was a delay in getting sanctions and governance was really slow as no administrative support was provided as in the US. Many felt that although India is an emerging nation, there were greater problems like pollution and environmental degradation. Despite having anticipated or dreamt of returning to India, they had also thought about problems like sanitation, health conditions and lower living standards. Those in the private sector had faced problems related to competition and politics from the higher management. One of our respondents who is an IT engineer said that ‘employers did not account MBA [Master of Business Administration] done from UK as a qualification. I got this job because of prior experience’.4 As per their responses, we have found that their first and foremost work-related problem after return re-establishing their network in a new working environment. The situation is worse when they are IT professionals and have to work according to US or UK timings where they have to attend calls and service their customers in the middle of the night. Those who were in the government sector and had taken a long leave to work abroad felt the transition was smooth, but that there was a slight difference in the working culture or nature. Some women respondents complained that Indian working conditions are not friendly. The returnees cited a new trend that they noticed in India — the ‘impressing the boss’ culture which has been creating quite some problems among the professionals. Also, on a greater note, poor local governance has been another problem they faced. Networking: In the survey, we found that those who migrated and returned used to keep in touch with the families and friends (53 per cent) as well as their profession relations (54.5 per cent). But they did not show much interest in maintaining ties with various religious groups.

4

Personal interview, Bangalore, 6 November 2012.

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Government Policies For those who migrated, the Government of India introduced the PIO card in 1999 and the OCI in 2005. Both cards grant practical parity with Indian citizens but do not permit voting, standing for election or government employment. PIO cards are available to former Indian citizens and their non-Indian born descendents (up to four generations) while OCI is limited to those whose parents or grandparents once had or were eligible for Indian citizenship on 26 January 1950. Also, OCI grants a lifelong visa and does not require reporting to the police for stays longer than 180 days. In addition to these, state governments such as Kerala have set up their own policies and administration agencies to promote economic, cultural ties with the migrants in specific regions — these network policies aim at least in part to promote and facilitate remittance, investments and other resources to help migrants. In 2005, the Indian Government’s Department of Science and Technology (DST) set up a programme called the Ramanujan Fellowship to attract high-calibre scientists and engineers of Indian origin to take up research positions in India. It aims to involve many members of the overseas India science and technology (S&T) communities in harnessing human capital development in India, enhancing Indian high-tech entrepreneurship, promoting Indian participation in mega-science projects, and promoting India as the location for research and development (R&D) outsourcing (MOIA 2007).

Suggestions The government should encourage reverse brain drain as it will help India in its present capital-building ventures as a developing nation. The respondents made various suggestions: (a) The Government of India should provide various types of administrative assistance for those considering re-migration to India because they are not familiar with the working process in the public sector. (b) They would like to see less delay in formalities and procedures such that they do not face many challenges when resettling. (c) Favourable tax regimes should be provided to returnee professionals. (d) Another suggestion is to introduce green card policies that allow naturalized returnees to keep their foreign nationality.

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(e) High-tech parks should be set up in order to attract returnees, in which they can settle and start business under conducive conditions, such as a few years of free office space, tax exemption for their business, etc. (f ) Better working conditions should be provided in the country especially for women.

References Emmanuel, Faran. n.d. ‘Non-Probability Sampling; Convenient, Quota, Snowball’. Canada-Pakistan HIV/AIDS Surveillance Project, National Institute of Health, Pakistan. http://www.hivhub.ir/sites/default/files/documents/ non%20probability.pdf (accessed 4 December 2013). Heidrick and Struggles Knowledge Management Centre. 2010. ‘Global Indian Executive Talent Survey’. Hirsch, Michelle. 2012. ‘US Educated Immigrants Return to Their Homelands’. The Fiscal Times, 14 May. International Labour Organization (ILO). 2011. ‘Migrants Return to India’. World of Work, no. 73, 1 December. http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ magazines-and-journals/world-of-work-magazine/articles/WCMS_ 170535/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 4 December 2013). Migration Policy Institute (MPI). 2011. ‘Issue #4: Highly Skilled Migrants Seek New Destinations as Global Growth Shifts to Emerging Economies’. Migration Information Source, December. http://www.migrationinformation. org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=865 (accessed 4 December 2013). Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). 2007. Annual Report 2006–07. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. ———. 2010. Annual Report 2009–10. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Upadhya, Carol. 2010. ‘Taking the High Road? Labour in the Indian Software Outsourcing Industry’, in Anne Posthuma and Dev Nathan (eds). Labour In Global Production Networks in India, pp. 300–20. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wadhwa, Vivek, Sonali Jain, AnnaLee Saxenian, Gary Gereffi, and Huiyao Wang. 2011. ‘The Grass is Indeed Greener in India and China for Returnee Entrepreneurs: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs — Part VI’. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. World Bank. 2012. ‘India Received $64 Billion in Remittances in 2011’. 23 April. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/04/23/Indiatops-remittances-migration-2011 (accessed 3 December 2013).

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Punjabi Diaspora and Educational Development KaVeRi QuReShi anD Filippo oSella* The

Cambridge International Schools are located in leafy, affluent Phase II of the city of Jalandhar, at the head of a chain of exclusive international schools across the rest of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. This is the top end of international schooling in Punjab, serving the children of Jalandhar’s most wealthy agriculturalists, businessmen and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The schools are English-medium and fee-paying, accredited by the prestigious Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), and follow the CBSE curriculum from grade 9 as well as offer instruction in the International General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE). They are a Cambridge International Examinations centre, and for a fee, offer other British, American or Australian examinations. The examinations are popular: as the headmistress told us, ‘it’s all related to migration and study abroad’.1 The Cambridge schools in Jalandhar were established under the auspices of Global Education Management Systems (GEMS), a private education provider owned by Sunny Varkey, a Keralite Christian entrepreneur based in Dubai. GEMS claims to be the largest private provider of kindergarten-to-grade 12 schooling in the world, commanding a global network of premier international schools catering to over 100,000 students in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Middle East and India, and have also expanded to places with substantial Indian diasporic population such as the United Kingdom (UK) (under the patronage of Tony Blair). The ongoing development of the schools and their curricula, on the other hand, were in the hands of another

* This research was funded by a grant from the European Commission Seventh Framework as ‘Trans-net’; see http://www.uta.fi/projektit/transnet/ index.php (accessed 29 November 2013). 1 Interview, Jalandhar, Punjab, 26 August 2012.

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international educational consultancy, Learning Wings. With the assistance of Learning Wings, the schools were developing a method of ‘amalgamating’ international education with Indian culture and tradition. With brand-new suites of computers, digital smartboards in the classrooms and expensive international textbooks from British publishing houses, the schools cultivate the skills deemed necessary to get ahead in a global labour market, particularly proficiency in Information Technology (IT) and foreign languages. The ethos of the school links learner-centred pedagogy with neoliberalism and a particular take on Indian secularism. As the headmistress explained, it was acceptance, tolerance and appreciation of diversity, but being rooted in one’s own particular culture and religion was the key to producing ‘global citizens’ who could ‘adapt to changes’. The story of the Cambridge Schools’ establishment, and this statement of their curricular and pedagogic goals echo those of other private English-medium schools that we saw mushrooming in Punjab (detailed in Qureshi and Osella 2013). We set out to explore how education in Punjab is changing as a result of transnational involvement. The emergence of such schools was just one of the ways in which Punjab’s profound connectivity with its overseas diaspora has affected the education sector. The configurations of material and ideological power in this transnational space are striking, where Indianorigin entrepreneurs based in the Persian Gulf are able to imagine a global educational market comprising not only southern countries such as India, but also sell educational services to countries like Britain. The growing market for these kinds of private English-medium schools brings to light the significance of education as a channel for young people to head overseas for study or highly-skilled work, and the correspondence between educational provision and the aspirations and spatial strategies of parents and students in Punjab. These dynamics of the education sector have been the prime focus of most research on education in contexts of out-migration which is prominent in regions of Indian Punjab. In this chapter we call for a new research agenda on diaspora and educational development. We first review the existing work on educational development in the context of emigration, and suggest that it has been stymied by methodological nationalism. We then present the findings of a three-year research project on Indian Punjabi transnationalism. Specifically, it is argued that there are four aspects of diasporic influence on educational development that need to be brought more squarely into the frame.

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Emigration Effects on Education The existing research on the effects of migration and diaspora on education has focused on remittances and ‘brain drain’ or ‘brain circulation’. The latest studies conclude that remittances have a ‘qualified’ effect on increasing educational attainment in migrant-sending households (Acosta et al. 2008; Castles and Wise 2008; van Naerssen et al. 2008). However, alongside the qualified ‘direct’ effects of financial remittances, emigrants also have an ‘indirect’ influence on their families, through encouragement, setting an example and showing that investment in education can be ‘a means to secure overseas migration and enhanced social respect’ (Mehta 1990: 157). With respect to the emigration of highly-educated and skilled workers, this has generally been seen in a negative light from the perspective of sending countries. Development experts continue to recommend strategies to discourage ‘brain drain’ and promote the retention and return of highly-skilled migrants (e.g., Dia 2004). Recently, these processes have started to appear more complex (Skeldon 2005). Increasingly, the debates on ‘brain drain’ have been recast through the lens of ‘brain circulation’, whereby highly-skilled migrants ‘do not transfer completely but retain active links with their country of origin by reinvesting, sending remittances and migrating back’ (Vincent-Lacrin 2004: 32). Questions are raised concerning the extent to which the return of even a small fraction of highly-skilled migrants can stimulate the development of high-tech industries however. The unequal terrain on which ‘brain circulation’ is intended to take place might lead us back to the idea of ‘brain drain’ – or perhaps ‘the high status accorded to mobility means that new truths are being normalized’ (Sidhu 2007: 217). Both these strands of research are concerned primarily with the effects of emigration on society and economy. However, the Cambridge Schools point to more complex ways in which educational aspirations and modalities are changing as a result of not only emigration, but ongoing transnational and diasporic connectivity, which has escaped the sustained interest of researchers. Indeed, it is ironic that the transnationalism paradigm, supposed to identify sociocultural processes extending beyond the boundaries of nation-states, has generated a literature so hamstrung by methodological nationalism. Whilst the education sector has been transformed by a shift from ‘a predominantly national education system to a more fragmented, multi-scalar and multi-sectoral distribution’ (Robertson and Dale 2008: 3), studies still presume the nation-state to be the natural entity for analysis and comparison.

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Research Setting Our research sought to explore the educational transformations taking place in Britain and Punjab as associated not with one-off, permanent immigration and emigration, but the ongoing transnational and diasporic connections that have been sustained over generations. In relation to education, this concerns the circulation of people, money, pedagogic goals, institutional forms, and consumption practices. We focused on Punjab as one of the most out-migratory states in India. The largest numbers of Punjabis overseas are in Britain, followed by Canada, the United States (US), the Persian Gulf, Australia, and Southeast Asia (Thandi forthcoming). In Britain, home to the largest number of Punjabis outside India, there are estimated to be some 300,000–500,000 Sikhs, 54,000 Hindus and smaller numbers of Christians (GoI 2001: 122–24). This dispersal is linked to its complex colonial history, with Punjab favoured by the British as a recruitingground for the British Indian army and associated emigration through colonial military and ‘free’ migrations as policemen and watchmen in Hong Kong, Burma and Singapore, and lumbermen and agricultural workers in North America (Fox 1985; Tatla 1995). The post-colonial Indian state reinforced these patterns, locking Punjab into an agricultural development strategy through successive five-year plans which, as Pritam Singh (2006) and Ajit Singh (2010) have argued, stifled the development of industry and knowledge economies in Punjab, and made for an economy and society in which emigration remains an important strategy (Taylor et al. 2007; Nanda and Veron 2009). Of late, the Punjab government has borrowed from the techniques of the Indian state in courting diaspora investment, and instituted schemes to cultivate and rationalize diaspora philanthropy at the Punjab level as well as promote long-term sustainability through part-matching funds (Sahai et al. 2011; Rajan and Varghese 2012). A year of fieldwork was carried out in 2009–10 investigating the transnational lives of Indian Punjabis in the West Midlands, one of the key destination cities in Britain, with complementary fieldwork in the Jalandhar Doaba — the key districts for out-migration in Punjab. In Punjab, we worked with educational institutions that had been established through substantial diaspora involvement, whether as businesses or as philanthropic endeavours. We visited 10 schools, colleges, and IT or language centres that had emerged from our wider ethnographic work with Punjabi migrants and diaspora in Britain. We also carried out interviews with the school management

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and philanthropic networks in Britain, and participant observation at fund-raising events in gurdwaras, youth groups and gala dinners. In addition to the ethnographic work, more than a hundred interviews were carried out with Punjabi migrants and diaspora in Britain, of which 20 were with highly-skilled migrants. Full details of the research and methodology can be found in Qureshi et al. (2012). In the main body of this chapter, we now outline four interwoven strands of ongoing diasporic intervention that we found to be influencing education in Punjab. The first strand to be unpicked concerns history, as we found that the developments in education in Punjab that were associated with diasporic involvement actually invoked earlier debates about education that played out in the colonial era.

History Our research has made us pause to consider the ‘precursors to modern transnationalism’ that are being variously reworked in the contemporary Punjab (Ong and Nonini 1997: 18). European colonialism was a particularly strong period for the transcontinental circulation of educational ideas and practices, setting the stage for contemporary entanglements. In the case of Britain and India, the colonial encounter transformed ideas about knowledge and knowledge transmission in both places, in what might be described as an unevenly-empowered but mutual imbrication between colonizer and colonized. From 1835 the British Indian government became the agency for promoting western knowledge through modern institutions and pedagogic processes. However, Western education was not merely ‘transplanted’ into India but also changed in the process, under the dual demands of economic and cultural imperatives that created a schizophrenic discourse (Chatterjee 1993: 126–28). Western education was an essential element of colonial governmentality. However, the leading intellectuals and revolutionaries of national liberation struggles were equally the products of colonial education (Tikly 2004). In India, most of the members and leaders of the latter 19th-century nationalist organizations were educated not only in English schools in India but also in British universities. The Englisheducated Indian elite held that Western education was one of the most important ‘gifts’ bequeathed to them by the British, whilst they were critical of the standard of education provided in government schools and the ‘denationalizing’ effects that it was having. Western education was thus ‘appropriated’, such that modernity was sought to be made ‘consistent with the national project’ (Chatterjee 1993: 240). At the

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top end, the embracing of Western education culminated in exclusive public schools such as Doon in north India, which were based on the British boarding school model. Notably, it was in such schools that the construction of the ideal modern Indian citizen — rational, secular, metropolitan and nationalist — was elaborated (Srivastava 1998: 40). The dominance of modern education was thus ‘as much the fruit of nationalist strivings as it is of colonial imposition’ (Seth 2007: 182). With even such a cursory view, the valorization of the kind of ‘international’ education purveyed in institutions such as the Cambridge Schools, and the questions raised to do with providing marketable skills alongside a particular national or community-religious context can be appreciated as rehearsing colonial and post-colonial debates. Also important to understanding diasporic interventions in the education sector in Punjab is multi-polarity. Alongside, and in contradistinction with European colonial legacies are other transcontinental formations. Consider the medieval Muslim world, in which clerics, scholars, students, mystics, and traders circulated within the dar-alIslam (domain of Islam) using Arabic and Persian as lingua franca (Cooke and Lawrence 2005). The Cold War offers an alternative scenario of distant places mutually imbricated through exchanges of educational ideas, materials, scholars and students, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) providing assistance in funding Indian universities and thousands of Indian students trained on scholarships in Soviet universities (Roy and Kumar 2007). When we turn to the globalization of education in Punjab, we see reinscriptions of this history and its multi-polarity.

Globalization Schools established through diasporic investment in Punjab were embedded in ‘global educational regimes’ (Jeffery 2005). Private schooling has now expanded so much in India that, according to educationalist Krishna Kumar, it can no longer ‘be linked easily with any specific class of society’ (cited in LaDousa 2007: 139). The market has inevitably skewed the growing private school sector to wealthier states such as Punjab, which has, unusually, seen a significant rise in private schooling in rural as well as urban areas (Kochar 2002). By 2005, 52 per cent of children aged 8–11 in Punjab were enrolled in private schools compared to 31 per cent at the all-India level (Desai et al. 2008); the most recent statistics from 2009–10 suggest that the rate of private school enrolment is accelerating fastest of all in rural Punjab (Pratham 2011). Importantly, following the inclusion of education as

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a tradable service in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) from 1994 onwards, investment in private schools often comes from overseas. A number of large-scale providers operate internationally, including GEMS, the Academic Colleges Group, the Beaconhouse Group, the Delhi Public School Society, and SABIS (Patrinos et al. 2009). Echoing the multipolarity of transnational connections in the field of Indian education, we can see that this is not only a story of North–South diasporic investment — as fostered by the Indian state — but also South–South as in the case of Indian-origin educational entrepreneurs based in the Persian Gulf, and even South–North, as in the courting of GEMS investment by Tony Blair, as we discussed previously. In our fieldwork with schools in Punjab (Qureshi and Osella 2013), we found long-standing traces of British colonial schooling as well as neoliberal values circulating as international content. Run by Anglophile convent-educated teachers, the schools operate on the British public-school model, with prep, day-boarding, a house system, and prefects. Central to their educational projects is English-medium instruction. The necessity of English-medium education is explained in terms of English’s status as a ‘worldwide language’ — as Shalini Advani suggests, ‘with the consolidation of a globalized economy, the new imperial impetus of education and of English language learning has only been strengthened’ (2009: 12). Necessary to the exclusivity of the education is the affiliation to the CBSE, rather than the Punjab state board. ‘Indian adapted’ textbooks from British publishing houses like Cambridge University Press and Heinemann are found in the classrooms and libraries. The classrooms are also full of new technologies such as high-spec computers, multi-media labs and digital smartboards, which are necessary for international education. It is about flexibility, mobility and participation in global labour markets. The schools were all trying to achieve a nuanced ‘amalgamation’ of international education with Indian values, to borrow the words of the headmistress of the Cambridge Schools. The ‘generic’ culture embedded in international curricula was said to be wrong for Indians and therefore needed to be tempered by an approach that incorporated Indian tradition. In each case, this amounted to a need for some religious or cultural content. The Cambridge Schools wanted to instil a respect and knowledge of India’s tradition and heritage, teach an appreciation of tolerance and diversity, and help skilled mobile workers to adapt to the places they migrate to. In other schools, an explicitly religious form of education was preferred. The curricula and

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pedagogies purveyed through international schools in Punjab are therefore not a mere transplantation of western education but a ‘selection’, requiring the objectification of certain ideas about tradition, as Partha Chatterjee (1993) observed of colonial India.

Philanthropy Education has long excited the imagination of philanthropists in the diaspora. Margaret Walton-Roberts (2005) has brought to light the history of Khalsa Middle School in Khankhana, rural Nawanshahr, which was established in 1923 by overseas Punjabis in Stockton, California. The school was intended to provide Punjabi-language education and was inspired by a nationalist and anti-colonial ideology connected to the outlawed Ghadar movement. Bringing us back to the present, a study in 2002 by the NRI Sabha Punjab showed that over half the 50 examples of NRI-funded development projects involved either schools, colleges or computer centres (Chana 2009). A survey in 2004–05 showed that 95 per cent of the investment in rural schools in central Punjab came from NRIs (Kullar and Toor 2009). In 2010, another survey of the Jalandhar Doaba found the education sector running neck-and-neck with sanitation as the top focus for NRI development projects (Sahai et al. 2011). We found that education is a highly distinctive form of philanthropic intervention in Punjab (Qureshi and Osella 2012). At stake is a vision of the next generation and competing ideologies of what society should be. Our work has highlighted the particularity of different groups of diasporic Punjabis who contribute to school projects, which were strongly divided along the lines of caste, religion and political affiliation. Regrettably, even charitably-funded schools can contribute to social inequalities. This was pronounced in the curricula of the explicitly religious schools, but even the secular schools could take on an exclusionary dimension where the use of public resources was geographically restricted to particular patis (colonies) within villages. The terms of management and control of these institutions by NRIs can also reproduce the notion that expertise comes from abroad, and local educationalists may have to fight to put their expertise across to overseas management committees. Like the schools established as businesses, the schools established as philanthropic endeavours were also private and English-medium, offering curricula and pedagogies aimed at creating globally-mobile workers. This was linked to the preferences of the NRI donors, who

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believed that the next generations in Punjab needed the skills that would equip them to head overseas, given the political and economic situation in the state. In general, we found that there was a slippery line between public and private, diasporic entrepreneurship and philanthropy in Punjab. Philanthropically-funded institutions were operating as a blend of charitable venture and enterprise, seeking to raise money through competitive fees structures (see ibid.). The logics of neoliberal globalization were therefore dominant even in philanthropically-funded institutions operating with an egalitarian or religious ethos.

Parents’ and Students’ Spatial Strategies In Punjab we found that the channel of emigration through overseas study was fuelling the consumption of ‘international’ forms of education such as that purveyed by the Cambridge Schools, but also a whole range of institutions offering private English-medium education and overseas examinations (Qureshi et al. 2013). The very range of destination countries in which parents and students were seeking to position themselves was striking — echoing the multi-polarity we described earlier. British, North American and Australian examinations are all on offer. Parents and prospective migrant students hedge their bets about where they intend to head, deciding at the last minute about which country offers the best chances for permanent residence upon completing a course of study. Importantly, this was not only about parental strategies. The most common story among the migrant students we interviewed in Britain was that the idea of migrating overseas for study emerged from the dynamics of their peer groups rather than family and other personal connections. They would go with their friends to Chandigarh to take their IELTS (English language) tests and encountered educational agents in the city. The attraction of overseas study lay only partly in the strategic pursuit of different capitals, and often had more to do with a desire to interact with ‘foreigners’ and develop ‘exposure’ and cosmopolitanism. In common with Michiel Baas (2012) and Mario Rutten and Sanderien Verstappen (2013), we found that many of the skilled migrants were the first in their families to migrate abroad. Whilst the Punjabi students we interviewed hoped to be able to advance their careers by migrating to Britain, this ambition proved to be unattainable for many (Qureshi et al. 2013). The migrant students from Punjab were not elite and often lacked personal contacts in Britain, which meant that they could be misguided by migration

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agents working on behalf of cheap, ‘third-rate’ educational establishments in which they received a poor standard of education. During their studies they struggled to earn money to pay their fees and were exploited by employers by virtue of racial discrimination, undervaluation of their foreign qualifications and their relative lack of experience of the labour market and contacts — compounded by state policies which only permit students to work limited hours (a safeguard against the ‘illegitimate’ use of student visas). As immigration regimes change rapidly, it was inevitably the students who bore the financial, social and legal brunt of the ever-changing requirements for post-study visas. Migrant students had a marked ambivalence towards migration and they compared themselves unfavourably with their counterparts who had remained at home in India, saying that there was now a lot more scope for highly-skilled and highly-paid work in India, if not in Punjab then in Delhi or Bangalore. Some were intending to return, as there was no longer much of a difference in job prospects, and moreover, their earnings in India could afford a much better standard of living, with domestic help and family close by. There is thus a gap between the expectations and the reality of overseas education, which is, of course, ultimately a market, and therefore constrained by what one can afford.

Conclusions The existing research on educational development has examined questions of remittances and ‘brain drain’, focusing on emigration and its effects on economy and society. Here, we have outlined a different perspective on educational development associated with ongoing transnational and diasporic connectivity. We have sketched out four interlinked strands through which diasporic involvement is changing the education sector in Punjab, each of which needs further sustained research. First, we have outlined historical processes of interaction, imposition and appropriation of educational models and values, which have laid the tracks for contemporary educational entrepreneurship, and rehearse many of the debates over international or ‘cosmopolitan’ education. Research on educational development needs to be more historically informed, as history provides contexts that are being variously reinscribed or reworked in the present. Second, we have explored how diaspora investment interlinks with neoliberal globalization, through the drive for privatization as well as providing

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exclusive English-medium education — with an Indian cultural or religious twist — to produce mobile global workers. These effects on education that cannot be reduced to dyadic relationships between ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries, as is presumed by literature on immigration and emigration. Rather than presuming Western dominance a priori, we found this spatial field to be polycentric, with multiple nodes of ideological and material power. Third, we found that the education sector in Punjab was also changing as a result of philanthrophic investment — associated with diverse ideas about how the next generation should be shaped, and inflected by political affiliation, caste, religion, and locality. There was a slippage between philanthropic endeavours and entrepreneurship, as neoliberal ideologies about the exclusivity of private education and the necessity of fees were found across a range of organizations espousing an apparently different ethos. Finally, when we explored the aspirations of the parents and students who consume international education in Punjab, as a route to emigration through overseas study, we are struck by the ambivalences. The prestige and dividends to overseas study cannot be assumed. Further research into the nature of these ambivalences concerning local versus overseas education is needed, as into the changing class constituencies of these new educational markets, and the question of whether these recent developments are opening transnational education up beyond the English-speaking national elite.

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Cooke, Miriam and Bruce B. Lawrence (eds). 2005. Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop. London: University of North Carolina Press. Desai, Sonalde, Amaresh Dubey, Reeve Vanneman, and Rukmini Banerji. 2008. Private Schooling in India: A New Educational Landscape. New Delhi: Pratham. Dia, Ibrahima Amadou. 2004. ‘The Brain Drain in Selected African Countries: Determinants, Evidence and Impacts’, in Han Entzinger, Marco Martiniello and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (eds), Migration between States and Markets, pp. 186–200. Aldershot: Ashgate. Fox, Richard Gabriel. 1985. The Lions of Punjab: Culture in the Making. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Government of India (GoI). 2001. Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Jeffery, Patricia. 2005. ‘Introduction: Hearts, Minds and Pockets’, in Radhika Chopra and Patricia Jeffery (eds), Educational Regimes in Contemporary India, pp. 13–38. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Kochar, Anjini. 2002. ‘Emerging Challenges for Indian Education Policy’, in Anne O. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reforms and the Indian Economy, pp. 303–28. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kullar, I. K. and M. Toor. 2009. ‘The Use of Foreign Remittances by Central Punjab Farm Families’, in Verne Andrew Dusenbery and Darshan Singh Tatla (eds), Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good, pp. 120–36. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. LaDousa, Chaise. 2007. ‘Liberalisation, Privatisation, Modernisation and Schooling in India: An Interview with Krishna Kumar’, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 5(2): 137–52. Mehta, Swarnjit. 1990. Migration, A Spatial Perspective: A Case Study of Bist Doab-Punjab. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Nanda, A. and J. Veron. 2009. ‘Dreams, Displacement and Development: Some Issues in International Out-Migration from Indian Punjab’, Population and Society, 5(1): 45–90. Ong, Aihwa and Donald Macon Nonini (eds). 1997. Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism. New York: Routledge. Patrinos, Harry Anthony, Felipe Barrera Osorio and Juliana Guáqueta. 2009. The Role and Impact of Public-Private Partnerships in Education. Washington DC: World Bank. Pratham. 2011. ASER 2010 — Annual Status of Education Report. New Delhi: Pratham. Qureshi, Kaveri and Filippo Osella. 2012. ‘Diaspora Philanthropy and Education in Punjab: Gifters, Managers and their Cultural Politics’. Paper presented at the ‘Diaspora and Development: South Asian Diaspora Engagement in South Asia Conference’, Singapore National University, 25–26 September, Singapore.

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Qureshi, Kaveri and Filippo Osella. 2013. ‘Transnational Schooling in Indian Punjab: Designer Migrants and Cultural Politics’, in Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher (eds), Immigrants, Refugees, and Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion, pp. 99–115. New York: Routledge. Qureshi, Kaveri, V. J. Varghese and Filippo Osella. 2013. ‘Indian Punjabi Skilled Migrants in Britain: Of Brain Drain and Under-Employment’, Journal of Management Development, 32(2): 182–92. Qureshi, Kaveri, V. J. Varghese, Filippo Osella, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. ‘Migration and Ambivalence: The Punjab-UK Linkage’, in Pirkko Pitkänen, Ahmet Içduygu and Deniz Sert (eds), Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism, pp. 13–63. Dordrecht: Springer. Rajan, S. Irudaya and V. J. Varghese. 2012. ‘Broadening Exchanges and Changing Institutions: Multiple Sites of Economic Transnationalism’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances, pp. 322–46. New Delhi and Abingdon: Routledge. Robertson, Susan L. and Roger Dale. 2008. ‘Researching Education in a Globalising Era: Beyond Methodological Nationalism, Methodological Statism, Methodological Educationalism and Spatial Fetishism’, in Julia Resnik (ed.), The Production of Educational Knowledge in the Global Era, pp. 19–32. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Roy, J. N. and B. B. Kumar (eds). 2007. India and Central Asia: Classical to Contemporary Periods. New Delhi: Concept Publishing. Rutten, Mario and Sanderien Verstappen. 2013. ‘Middling Migration: Contradictory Mobility Experiences of Indian Youth in London’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 1–19. Sahai, P., K. Chand, P. Kumar, and T. Sahai. 2011. Study of Indian Diaspora with Particular Reference to Development and Migration from the State of Punjab. Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development. Seth, Sanjay. 2007. Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India. Durham: Duke University Press. Singh, Ajit. 2010. ‘Inaugural Speech and Some Reflections on Punjab’s Development’. Paper presented at the Punjab Research Group Conference, Cambridge University, 24 October, Cambridge. Singh, P. 2006. ‘Punjab’s Agricultural Development Path’. Paper presented at the Launch of the Sub-Committee on Development in Punjab Conference, All Party Parliamentary Group Punjabis in Britain, House of Commons, 14 June, Westminster. Sidhu, Ravinder. 2007. ‘GATS and the New Developmentalism: Governing Transnational Education’, Comparative Education Review, 51(2): 203–27. Skeldon, Ronald. 2005. Globalisation, Skill Migration and Poverty Alleviation: Brain Drains in Context. Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. Srivastava, Sanjay. 1998. Constructing Post-Colonial India: National Character and the Doon School. London: Routledge.

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Tatla, Darshan Singh. 1995. ‘Sikh Free and Military Migration During the Colonial Period’, in Robin Cohen (ed.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, pp. 69–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Steve, Manjit Singh, and Deborah Booth. 2007. ‘Migration, Development and Inequality: Eastern Punjabi Transnationalism’, Global Networks, 7(3): 328–47. Thandi, S. Forthcoming. ‘Punjabi Diaspora: Conceptualising and Evaluating Impacts of Diaspora-Homeland Linkages’, in V. J. Varghese, S. Irudaya Rajan, and A. K. Nanda (eds), Migrations, Mobility and Multiple Affiliations: Punjabis in a Transnational World. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Tikly, Leon. 2004. ‘Education and the New Imperialism’, Comparative Education, 40(2): 173–98. van Naerssen, T., Ernst Spaan and E. B. Zoomers. 2008. Global Migration and Development. London: Routledge. Vincent-Lacrin, Stéphan. 2004. ‘Building Capacity through Cross-Border Tertiary Education’. Paper presented at the OECD/UNESCO Australia Forum on Trade in Education Services, 11–12 October, Sydney. Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2005. ‘Transnational Educational Fundraising in Punjab: Old Practices, New Readings’, International Journal of Punjab Studies, 12(1): 129–52.

9

Land, Migration and Identity

Changing Punjabi Transnationalism SteVe tayloR Pursuit of home as an aspect of diasporic identity within a British Indian Punjabi community, a phenomenon that has significant implications on the regional development of Punjab, demands careful understanding and analysis. This chapter tries to examine this particular aspect in detail and shed light on its intricacies. I argue that the British Punjabi transnational pursuit of home and identity is significantly shaped by the rapidly changing social context of East Punjab (hereafter Punjab/Punjabi) as well as social processes within Britain and across the global Punjabi diaspora. Previous studies of Punjabi and South Asian diasporic meanings of home and diasporic identities have focused primarily upon Western and intra-diasporic processes in the (re)production of home and identity, neglecting dynamic South Asian processes. Where the South Asian context has been considered significant, it is represented as static and unchanging. Drawing upon a decade of original, transnational, ethnographic research within the United Kingdom (UK) and India, including fieldwork conducted as recently as 2013, this chapter discusses the rapidly changing social and economic context of Punjab, and in particular the changing role and significance of land ownership and use therein, and the impact of this upon the diasporic Punjabi pursuit of home and identity. This focus is relevant to the contemporary development process of Punjab given that, in common with the dominant representation of the Indian diaspora as ‘agents of development’ by contemporary development discourses (Upadhya and Rutten 2012), many recent commentaries upon Punjabi transnationalism (Singh and Singh 2008; Dusenbery and Tatla 2009; Thandi 2010) celebrate the relationship between overseas migration and — via diasporic remittances, investments and philanthropy within Punjab — regional development. Punjab has witnessed significant out-migration, and subsequent intra-diasporic migration, across the globe and is widely recognized

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as a major outsource of South Asian migration to the UK over the past century. All existing studies of the global Punjabi diaspora emphasize the strength of continuing links between this group, which includes those born and raised away from India, and the people and places of Indian Punjab. The diasporic group under focus here are part of a wider ‘transnational community’, the territory and people of contemporary Punjab are embedded within multiple transnational relations. Previous research (for example, Helweg 1979; Ballard 2003; Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor et al. 2007) also establishes that it is a particular social (caste) group of Punjab — the Jat Sikhs, from the Doaba region — that has dominated migration to the UK. Consequently, this chapter is partly based upon UK research with one Jat Sikh community, resident within the north-east of England and retaining links with predominantly rural Doaba. However, given that transnational processes and relations are ingrained within the lived experience of this diasporic group, empirical research within Doaba, focussing upon fast-changing relations between diasporic Jat Sikhs and resident Indian Punjabis (including non-Jats), which often revolve around the changing significance and ownership of land, directly informs the arguments presented.

Theorising Diasporic Home and Identity ‘Home’ has always been difficult to define as it has numerous meanings. It is both ‘lived’ and ‘imagined’ (Brah 1996) and constituted through multiple (lived and imagined) relationships with people and places (Mallett 2004). Home is often represented as offering complete familiarity and comfort, a place that we either leave and long for, or we move towards, for security and identity. This assumption has been usefully attacked (Brah 1996; Fortier 2003), as it is clear that feelings of comfort and estrangement can be experienced concurrently within the same location, or in relation to the same location and events through different imaginings and memories. The diasporic pursuit of home and identity necessitates human labour and can involve ‘physically or symbolically (re)constituting places which provide some kind of ontological security . . . home is never fully achieved, never fully arrived-at, even when we are in it’ (Fortier 2003: 115–31). It is the ongoing, transnational (re)production of home through human labour within an aspect of the Punjabi transnational community, and its relationship to Punjabi regional development, that is the focus of this paper. Crucially, we need to recognize that the pursuit

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of home is shaped by the dynamic social contexts within which it is (re)produced. In particular, it can be ‘intrinsically linked with the way in which processes of [social] inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under given circumstances’ (Brah 1996: 192). Existing studies of Punjabi migration to the UK, authors focusing upon British migration from other parts of South Asia and wider discussions around the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism do powerfully illustrate that diasporic meanings of home and belonging, as an aspect of diasporic identity, are continually ‘in process’ (Hall 1990). However, the majority of existing studies of South Asian diasporic identities focus too heavily upon dynamic processes of intra-diasporic identity formation within Western societies, neglecting equally important dynamic processes of identity formation within South Asia, the original outsource of migration. Using an empirical study of one Punjabi transnational group as an illustration, I contend that the British-Asian diasporic pursuit of home, as an aspect of British-Asian diasporic identity, is significantly shaped by the ever changing social context of South Asia as well as social processes within Britain and across the global Punjabi (and South Asian) diaspora. In particular, I argue that increasing divisions between the UK diasporic group studied and the non-migrant permanent residents of Punjab, which are intrinsically related to processes of inclusion and exclusion and the rapidly changing social context of Punjab — especially the changing role and significance of land ownership — significantly shapes the (re)production of home and identity amongst the Punjabi diaspora, with implications for regional development.

Caste, Izzat and Land within Punjabi Society Punjabi caste is one mark of identity within Punjabi society and it is according to this that individuals are assigned high or low status. Far from disappearing under the forces of globalization and neoliberalization which have been transforming India since the 1980s, Indian and Punjabi caste distinctions, and their direct relationship to the most extreme forms of exploitation, humiliation and inequality, have intensified in recent years (Teltumbde 2010; Ram 2012). However, manifestations of caste have always varied widely in different Indian regions. Punjab is a Sikh majority state. Despite an explicit opposition to caste differentiation within Sikh scriptures and teaching, caste inequalities and social exclusion on the basis of caste are significant features of the lived reality of contemporary Indian Punjab

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(Judge and Bal 2008; Ram 2012), and there is a strong correlation between caste and class within the region. Jat Sikhs (at 60 per cent of the population) are the most economically powerful, politically/ socially influential and occupationally privileged group within Punjab and the ‘dominant caste’ (Jodhka 2002), owning over 80 per cent of available land. The Punjabi Dalit population is greater in number, but their share of land ownership, at 3 per cent, lower than in any other Indian state, meaning that Jats and Dalits ‘live in extreme contrast of affluence and deprivation’ (Ram 2007: 4068). The relative wealth of the Jat Sikh caste group has partly enabled them to mobilize the resources necessary to dominate migration from Punjab to Western societies, including the UK (Helweg 1979; Taylor et al. 2007). However, this dominance has also been facilitated by the maintenance of intra-caste endogamy across the Punjabi transnational community (Walton-Roberts 2004; Judge and Bal 2008), and through (largely rural village-based) kinship and caste networks that have been crucial to the development of Jat Sikh transnational migration over the past century (Helweg 1979; Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor et al. 2007). These previous studies have also shown that the Punjabi concept of izzat (honour/prestige) is important for understanding caste identity, caste relations and an attachment amongst migrants to Punjab as home even when they are permanently resident overseas. The maintenance and enhancement of izzat within Punjab is an important factor — alongside and intimately related to economic/ material considerations — in the decisions and motivations of Punjabi migrants, with individual behaviour often shaping and reflecting the izzat of the family, kinship group and caste to which one belongs. Jat Sikhs have a historical reputation as expert farmers and agricultural proprietors, with their ownership and cultivation of land being markers of high izzat and attracting high economic returns for much of the 20th century. Land has always been central to the pursuit of material advancement and identity within Punjab. Overseas migration, dominated by Jat Sikhs in Punjab, is seen as having displaced agricultural prowess as an indicator of high izzat and material acquisition within Punjabi society (Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor et al. 2007). I will be arguing that Indian land ownership is still central to contemporary Jat Sikh izzat and caste/class dominance within Punjab and the global Punjabi diaspora, but that high izzat no longer primarily derives from the ownership and control of agricultural land and produce. Izzat is asserted by the use of land for consumer display, which is part of, and has implications for, the (re)production of home amongst the diaspora

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studied. Furthermore, emerging economic, political and legal conflicts over Punjabi diasporic land ownership and acquisition, the dynamism of the region and nation, also have significant implications for the diasporic pursuit of home and identity, and the regional development process.

Jat Sikh Migration, Home and Identity Jat Sikh Punjabi out-migration, including to the UK, has a long history stretching over the past two centuries. It is from 1947, a time of immense upheaval and bloodshed related to partition, to the present day when we have witnessed significant Jat Sikh migration to the UK. Previous studies (Helweg 1979; Ballard 2003) demonstrate that such movement was originally viewed, by migrants themselves and their Indian family and kin, as a predominantly male sojourn for the accumulation of wealth and the maintenance or enhancement of izzat within Punjab, particularly via the expansion of agricultural land ownership. International Jat Sikh migration was driven by (lived and imagined) meanings of home firmly anchored within India and revolving around land, despite the ‘lived experience of locality’ (Brah 1996: 192), for individual migrants, also being partly outside the territory. Existing research has also illustrated that as many of these sojourners became permanent UK settlers from the 1960s onwards, and were joined by wives, children and family members, meanings of home became more complex and multifaceted. For example, it is widely reported that financial remittances to India inevitably declined as migrants settled, were joined by family and often purchased a private UK property. Nevertheless, the simultaneous maintenance of Punjabi property, frequent travel between the UK and India, information technology-aided interaction with Indian kin and Indian diasporic kin across the world, as well as continued orientation to the social and cultural (especially caste) relations of Punjab (Taylor et al. 2007) suggests multiple and transnational Jat Sikh relations with, and attachments to, people, places and imagined homes. It is within the context of multiple attachments to multiple homes, with a particular focus upon second and third (British-born) generations, that previous authors have explored South Asian diasporic identities and associated issues. As suggested previously, the emphasis in relation to the Punjabi diaspora has hitherto been upon the relationship between dynamic social processes within the UK and perceptions of home and belonging. For example, Parminder Bhachu (1985) and

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Avtar Brah (1996) examine relationships between socioeconomic change in the UK during the 1980s (especially recession and rising unemployment), individual and institutionalized racism in the UK and the cultural identities of British Asians. Kathleen Hall (2002) examines the relationship between post-colonial politics in the UK during the 1990s and identity formation amongst British Sikh youth. The influence of South Asia upon diasporic identities is considered highly significant by these studies, but the South Asian social processes involved are not analyzed in any detail and represented as static and unchanging. I wish to add to the existing literature by extending the context within which British South Asian meanings of home and diasporic identities are examined, to include dynamic social and cultural processes within South Asia. If diasporic identities are inherently transnational we require transnational research to investigate them (Levitt 2009). This paper is based upon a transnational, empirical research project, primarily semi-structured interviewing and nonparticipant observation — 72 interviews within the Jat Sikh community of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, UK and 123 interviews in the Doaba region of Punjab, India were conducted between 2004 and 2013. Those selected for interview were representative in terms of gender and age.

From Sojourners to Multiple Homemakers The majority of first-generation migrants in our study arrived in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s with a perception that their migration would facilitate economic gain as well as simultaneously maintain/increase the izzat of the immediate family and the wider kinship and Jat Sikh caste group. Initially, when these single male migrants viewed themselves as sojourners to the UK, the aim was to utilize money earned in the UK to buy agricultural land and increase family holdings in Punjab — a lived and imagined Indian home revolving around land. For example, some respondents recounted how partition meant giving up the ownership of land in West Punjab to move to the East and work as a farmer on someone else’s land. ‘There was little money and the agricultural work was hard work . . . without land there was little security’ (UK Jat Sikh, 69-year-old male). There were families within this man’s kinship group where males had moved to the UK and told of the opportunities of very high and stable earnings. He decided that migration to the UK (in 1956) ‘would be a better way to find security and stability for my family’. The money required

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for his original passage was raised by his wife’s family. As all of our first-generation respondents became permanent settlers in the UK, the priority was to accumulate sufficient money to ensure the migration to, and settlement in, the UK of the immediate family (spouse and children). Most commonly, the trigger for this family migration was the purchase of a private UK house. Although the volume of financial remittance to India has declined as UK settlement becomes more permanent for those in our sample, it has certainly not disappeared. The maintenance of land holdings in Punjab is also very common, and frequent communication with Punjabi relatives, kin and friends in India and across the globe is almost universal, throughout our cross-generational UK research respondents. Many from our sample still currently visit Punjab at least once every two years, although, as we will see here, for some of the diaspora studied recently (2013), these trips are starting to recede as Punjab changes. Overall, though, we can attribute multiple relationships with, and attachments to, people, places and imagined homes within the UK, India and many other locations around the world amongst the Jat Sikh diasporic group studied here. The nature of these multifaceted relationships and attachments, constituting a diasporic pursuit of home, are dynamic and continually (re)produced. Crucially, I want to suggest that this production is influenced by the social context of, and especially processes of inclusion and exclusion within, Punjab as well as the UK and other ‘host’ nations.

Contested Diaspora Spaces There is still a commitment to owning land in Punjab amongst the UK Jat Sikhs studied, with the majority maintaining holdings since the migration of themselves or previous generations. However, this land is no longer primarily used for traditional Jat agriculture but most often to build very large, palatial Indian family homes, particularly as the value of Punjabi agriculture has markedly declined under the forces of neoliberalization and capitalist globalization (Taylor et al. 2007; Ram 2012). The landscape of rural Punjab is punctuated, and in some areas of Doaba dominated, by huge brick-, and often marble-, built Non-Resident Indian (NRI) houses. Some of these are built on the site of an original or existing family farm, others on newly-purchased land. Such sites constitute what Brah (1996: 208–9) terms ‘diaspora spaces’ within Punjab, which forms boundaries of both exclusion and inclusion of the local folks with the diasporic population in the region.

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These NRI houses do illustrate a lasting attachment to people, places and an imagined home within India, as many of our diasporic respondents, particularly first-generation migrants, spoke of the importance of retaining a home within Punjab and that this land should never be sold. Until recently (2013), very few of our second- and third-generation UK Jat Sikhs expressed any intention to dispense with family land or buildings in India as they also stressed the importance of maintaining a tangible connection with the people and places of Punjab, their Indian ‘roots’, for the benefit of their own children and grandchildren. Drawing upon Divya P. Tolia-Kelly’s (2004) analysis of material cultures within British Asian UK houses, material possessions (Punjabi land and buildings) signify enfranchisement to a particular heritage, home and identity (Indian Jat Sikh Punjabi). Certainly, there was a widespread recognition — part of a ‘collective, visual vocabulary’ (ibid.: 319) — amongst our sample (NRI and Indian) that a physical, and most often very ostentatious, home in Punjab is crucial for migrants to (symbolically) illustrate their continuing commitment to their Punjabi heritage, as well as expressing the continuing dominance of the Jat Sikh caste within Doaba (Taylor et al. 2007). It can also be simultaneously argued that the building of large Doaban family houses by our UK sample, the physical and symbolic reconstitution of space within Punjab, is also an attempt to assert the distinction and high izzat of specifically NRI Jat Sikhs, relative to the resident Doaba population and including among them Doaban Jat Sikhs. The pursuit of home and identity, through the symbolic reconstitution of space by building houses within Punjab, can exacerbate and produce boundaries of social exclusion as well as NRI inclusion. Some of the NRI houses have as many as 16 bedrooms and a matching number of bathrooms, and they are often surrounded by large gold-tipped metal fences. There is usually a gold-lettered sign on the gate entrance with the names and country of residence of the owners. The majority of these houses have their own water tanks at the very top which are frequently shaped in the image of a particular symbol to indicate that the owner is an NRI. Such symbols include aeroplanes, eagles and footballs. Both the outside and interior of the UK NRI houses that we visited in Punjab are decorated in a luxurious, Western style, with furniture and decorations, such as leather sofas, very large flat-screen televisions and framed pictures of Western cities and views often imported from the UK. Many of these products and brands are widely available in Punjab and India, but our UK and Indian

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respondents continually emphasized the importance of the UK origin of those displayed within the NRI homes we visited. Guests to these NRI houses were often served popular Western snacks and drinks, such as biscuits from the famous UK department store Marks and Spencer and brands of Scottish whisky. We can suggest a reversal of the process described by Tolia-Kelly (2004) where she examines possessions and artefacts in the British Asian home as signifiers of belonging, geographically and socially, to a particular (e.g., East African-Asian) community, and of opposition to exclusion within wider British society. The NRI houses described here are signifiers of belonging to, and inclusion within, not only Punjab as a region and India as a nation but also the NRI community in Punjab/India and the global Punjabi village diaspora/transnational community. It can also be asserted that these houses are signifiers of exclusion from the resident Doaban/Punjabi population. Interestingly, the UK homes of the majority of NRIs in our study were decorated to emphasize more strongly their belonging to Sikh, Punjabi and Indian communities, as opposed to their NRI status. The artefacts and possessions on display in these homes, such as carpets, rugs, pictures, crockery, ornaments, and religious symbols, were much more likely to signify the Sikh, Punjabi and Indian roots of our respondents. The diasporic pursuit of home occurs transnationally, both ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Fortier 2003) and is intrinsically linked to processes of inclusion and exclusion ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Brah 1996). It is common for NRI houses to stand empty for the majority of the year, being only in use when the owners visit. Until recently, they were an omnipresent symbol and reminder to Indian (Jat and nonJat) residents of NRI distinctiveness and wealth, the former being effectively excluded from a world in which the latter are included. Thus, we encountered intense criticism from our Indian respondents of the NRI buildings within their midst. ‘We are annoyed by the NRI houses . . . they are an insult . . . some . . . people in the same village do not have enough sanitation’ (Jat Sikh Punjabi, 42-year-old male). Our Indian participants also described other ways in which NRIs ‘flouted’ their wealth which was, from their (Doaban) perception, an attempt to emphasize their distinction and superior status (izzat) from the permanent residents of Doaba. ‘They (NRIs) hire the biggest cars and use all the latest gadgets when they come back to Punjab, they are constantly trying to show how they have so much more than us here in Punjab’ (Jat Sikh Punjabi, 22-year-old male). The pursuit of home and

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identity within Punjab — and the use of land therein, amongst the diasporic Jat Sikhs studied — is predominantly conducted through personal consumption and the related assertion of distinction from the resident Doaban population. As I have argued extensively elsewhere (Taylor et al. 2007; Taylor and Singh 2013), with the majority of Punjabi diasporic remittances and investments within India being directed towards such activities, reflective of Indian diasporic remittances and investments to the nation more generally (Guha 2011; Upadhya and Rutten 2012), regional development is undermined as much as promoted by the Punjabi diaspora. We have recently witnessed the development of some similar forms of consumer display (e.g., the building of large, ostentatious houses and the purchase of expensive cars and the latest technological products) amongst non-migrants, albeit the majority being Jats, within Punjab. This is part of the fast-changing social and economic context of Punjab and India, in particular the explosion of rampant and globally-orientated consumerism amongst some elements of Indian society. As one Punjabi Jat Sikh (42-year-old male) put it, many richer people here (in Punjab) have started to build same type large houses . . . with their own water tanks on the top . . . and big televisions and American-style fridges and things . . . the NRIs don’t like it if there is some of these next to them in their village . . . they then build a bigger one with even more things in it . . . they are always trying to show us what they have achieved over there (overseas) . . . we are becoming further and further divided as a community.

Again, such consumer-orientated competition and division does little to promote cohesive regional development. Punjabi community division further and most recently manifests itself in the form of increasing NRI–Punjabi resident conflict over land ownership, as the overall value of land increases within the Doaba region. First, there are rapidly increasing incidences of intra-familial and intra-village land disputes, as local residents assert what they see as their right to own land that they and their previous generations have often cared for on behalf of an absent diaspora. The Head of the recently-formed NRI office of the Punjab government in Chandigarh informed us in 2013 that land disputes are the main issue that their employees deal with, at a rapidly increasing rate, on a daily basis. Second, we are starting to witness the (second-, third- and fourth-) generation NRI sale of land in Punjab, partly related to the aforementioned land disputes but also a

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result of the increasing purchasing power of some resident Punjabi Jat Sikhs. Many of those NRIs who had sold land in Punjab as a result of land disputes — a hugely significant emerging development within the Punjabi transnational community given the aforementioned centrality of land to Punjabi history, identity, prosperity and izzat — expressed bitter resentment towards the local population, particularly in terms of the transnational pursuit/meaning of home and identity. The following story was common amongst this diasporic group: We were forced to sell our family land in Punjab . . . partly because we had an offer for it that we couldn’t refuse, there is so much money there [Punjab] now that you wouldn’t believe, local people are investing in land just to make money, or to sell it to property developers . . . but we also had to sell it because we were always being challenged by members of my father’s own family that they owned it and they had a right to this, that and the other . . . it got nasty at one point, my father spent his last years not talking to his brother in Punjab because of this dispute over who owned what. We don’t have the time or the resources to deal with all that hassle . . . people over there [Punjab] will take you for whatever they can get, even your own family . . . it makes me feel so sad though. That land was our home, it had been in our family for generations . . . it makes me feel like I have had part of my body cut off . . . when we sold it, but enough was enough (UK Jat Sikh, 48-year-old male).

This recent development in the relationship between elements of the UK Jat Sikh Punjabi diaspora studied and their Punjabi home (land and people) not only problematizes and shapes the diasporic pursuit of home and identity as shown here but further alienates the diaspora from the resident Doaban population and their regional development. As one diasporic Jat Sikh recently put it: Organisations and foundations from my family’s village are always coming after us for money . . . to invest in this or that . . . a local school or an internet centre, or a hospital . . . in the past we gave every year . . . there is no way now we got cheated out of our land, our family home . . . let them pay themselves, they have more money than us now . . . anyway we gave in the past and I’m not sure where the money went . . . there are so many people to cheat you there (UK Jat Sikh, 52-year-old male).

The continuing attempt by many of the contemporary Jat Sikhs under scrutiny to use their Punjabi lived home to assert distinctiveness within Punjab via consumer displays does simultaneously suggest

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a continued attachment to the people, places and imagined home of Punjab. However, the nature of this attachment is continually reproduced in the context of social processes within South Asia, the UK, and across the global diaspora. We are particularly stressing the importance of the dynamic social and cultural context in South Asia, and relations of inclusion and exclusion therein, as we feel these have been neglected to date. Having already established that some of these processes in Punjab (NRI use of land for consumer display and intensifying divisions between NRIs and local residents) undermine, rather than promote, regional development (Taylor and Singh 2013), I am now suggesting that very recent NRI/local Punjabi divisions — over land acquisition and use — are further changing, loosening the attachment of the Punjabi diaspora to their ‘homeland’, further undermining any commitment to regional development.

Conclusions There is a long and continuing history, and deeply-embedded cultural tradition, of significant and wide-ranging global emigration from rural Punjab, with the UK historically being the most favoured destination. The pursuit of home and identity amongst one group of these migrants has been examined. This analysis has significance for the regional development of Punjab given that many commentators emphasize the importance of Punjabi diasporic remittances, investments and philanthropy for the regional development of the state. My analysis of the relationship between the changing social and economic context of Punjab and the Punjabi diasporic pursuit of home and identity reveals the particular significance of processes of social inclusion and exclusion, in turn related to the changing significance and use of land, within Punjab. Jat Sikhs are currently the dominant caste of Punjab and have been for the past century. This caste dominance was formerly maintained and expressed through agricultural land ownership and agricultural prowess. However, as agricultural land and labour in Punjab has rapidly declined in value and status, related to the impact of capitalist globalization and neoliberalization within the region, overseas migration (for example, to the UK) has now become the route to high izzat and caste dominance for Jat Sikhs. Consequently, although we can note a continuing attachment to a lived and imagined home, and the ownership of land, within Doaba amongst many Jat Sikhs within our study, the nature of this attach-

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ment has shifted. The search for identity in the context of migration is now conducted through diasporic consumer displays, a symbolic representation of overseas migration and high izzat, within Punjab, such as the development of ever more ostentatious NRI houses on land which would have once been used to display agricultural strength. NRI houses within Doaba, as ‘diaspora spaces’ (Brah 1996), are boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, an attempt to distinguish and divide NRIs from the resident Doaban population. Through participation in global consumer culture within Punjab, the diasporic Jat Sikhs studied here are displaying their inclusion in a life (of conspicuous consumption) that the majority of Doaban residents are excluded from. Crucially, the pursuit of home and identity via conspicuous consumption; the transformation of land-use in Punjab, amongst the Jat Sikh diaspora studied; the intensifying divisions between NRIs and the local resident Doaban population; and, in particular, recent NRI/local conflicts over the acquisition and use of land in Punjab are further undermining the already questionable (Taylor and Singh 2013) commitment of the Punjabi Jat Sikh diaspora to the regional development of the state.

References Ballard, Roger. 2003. ‘The South Asian Presence in Britain and its Transnational Connections’, in Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh and Steven Vertovec (eds), Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, pp. 197–222. London: Routledge. Bhachu, Parminder. 1985. Twice Migrants: East African Sikh Settlers in Britain. London: Tavistock. Brah, Avtar. 1996. Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities. London: Routledge. Dusenbery, Verne A. and Darshan Singh Tatla (eds). 2009. Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Fortier, Anne-Marie. 2003. ‘Making Home: Queer Migrations and Motions of Attachment’, in Sara Ahmed, Claudia Castaneda, Anne-Marie Fortier, and Mimi Sheller (eds), Uprootings/Regroupings: Questions of Home and Migration, pp. 115–37. Oxford: Berg. Guha, Puja. 2011. ‘Measuring International Remittances in India: Concepts and Empirics’. Provincial Globalisation Working Paper no. 1, National Institute of Advance Studies, Bangalore and Amsterdam Institute of Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam. http://www.nias.res.in/docs/ urpp/ProGlo-WP1.pdf (accessed 30 November 2013).

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Hall, Kathleen. 2002. Lives in Translation: Sikh Youth as British Citizens. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hall, Stuart. 1990. ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, pp. 222–37. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Helweg, Arthur Wesley. 1979. Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Jodhka, Surinder Singh. 2002. ‘Caste and Untouchability in Rural Punjab’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(19): 1813–23. Judge, Paramjit Singh and Gurpreet Bal. 2008. ‘Understanding the Paradox of Changes among Dalits in Punjab’, Economic and Political Weekly, 43(41): 49–55. Levitt, Peggy. 2009. ‘Roots and Routes: Understanding the Lives of the Second Generation Transnationally’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(7): 1225–42. Mallett, Shelley. 2004. ‘Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature’, The Sociological Review, 52(1): 62–89. Ram, Ronki. 2007. ‘Social Exclusion, Resistance and Deras in Punjab: Exploring the Myth of Casteless Sikh Society in Punjab’, Economic and Political Weekly, 42(40): 4066–74. ———. 2012. ‘Beyond Conversion and Sankritisation: Articulating an Alternative Dalit Agenda in East Punjab’, Modern Asian Studies, 46(3): 639–702. Singh, Gurharpal and Darshan Singh Tatla. 2006. Sikhs in Britain: The Making of a Community. London: Zed Books. Singh, Gurmail and Sawan Singh. 2008. ‘Diaspora Philanthropy in Action: An Evaluation of Modernization in Punjab Villages’, Journal of Punjab Studies, 14(2): 225–48. Taylor, Steve and Manjit Singh. 2013. ‘Punjab’s Doaban Migration-Development Nexus: Transnationalism and Caste Domination’, Economic and Political Weekly, 48(24): 1813–23. Taylor, Steve, Manjit Singh and Deborah Booth. 2007. ‘Migration, Development and Inequality: Eastern Punjabi Transnationalism’, Global Networks, 7(3): 328–47. Teltumbde, Anand. 2010. The Persistence of Caste: The Khairlanji Murders and India’s Hidden Apartheid. New Delhi: Navayana. Tolia-Kelly, Divya P. 2004. ‘Locating Processes of Identification: Studying the Precipitates of Re-memory through Artifacts in the British Asian Home’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(3): 314–29. Thandi, Shinder Singh. 2010. ‘Punjabi Diaspora: Conceptualizing and Evaluating Impacts of Diaspora-Homeland Linkages’. Paper presented at International Conference on ‘Migrations, Mobility and Multiple Affiliations: Punjabis in a Transnational World’, Centre for Development Studies, March, Thiruvananthapuram.

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Upadhya, Carol and Mario Rutten. 2012. ‘Migration, Transnational Flows, and Development in India: A Regional Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, 47(19): 54–62. Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2004. ‘Transnational Migration Theory in Population Geography: Gendered Practices in Networks Linking Canada and India’, Population, Space and Place, 10(5): 361–73.

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Diaspora and Remittances milly Sil* Diaspora- and remittances-related development issues have been an

area of increased interest in recent times. This has been a crucial concern especially for developing countries and particularly India, which has a large diaspora dispersed around the globe. Being an essential part of policy-making in recent times, many aspects of diaspora-related development have been a part of current literature on migration, with remittances being recognized as a major player in this developmental process. The potential of remittances in fostering development, if managed efficiently, have been increasingly acknowledged through studies in various developing countries. Remittances to India have increased manifold during the past two decades, with the current figure standing at US$69 billion in 2012, maintaining its position as the world’s top remittance-receiving nation. However, on the downside, due to lack of specific micro-level data, much of the impact of both individual and collective remittances on receiving households and communities respectively have remained almost untapped. Existence of variation in the utilization pattern of remittances across Indian states is evident from recent studies (Sasikumar and Hussain 2007; Zachariah and Rajan 2007; RBI 2010), which is intriguing and raises several questions about region-wise uses and impact of remittances. Hence, there certainly arises a need to understand the role played by remittances in different regions in India, to capture the causes and differential impact. This study is an attempt to present the existence of similarities and variation in emigrant profiles and remittance patterns in two highly emigrating villages belonging to two high-emigration states in India — Gujarat and Kerala — to highlight the point that policy-making related * This chapter is a part of the PhD study by the author titled ‘International Remittances and its Impact on Households and Village Development: A Comparative Study of Gujarat and Kerala States, India’.

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to channelizing diaspora remittances for development ought to consider the complexities at the micro (household) and meso (community) levels in India. Dharmaj village in Anand district of Gujarat and Mangalam village in Malappuram district of Kerala had been selected to explore this phenomenon.

Data and Methodology The study adopted an analytical research design with a sample survey approach. Villages having a high percentage of migrant households and receiving high amount of remittances from abroad were chosen as the unit of analysis. Using primarily a quantitative method, two high remittance-receiving villages, Dharmaj and Mangalam, in two of the highest remittance-receiving states in India — Gujarat (approximately `180 to `200 billion) and Kerala (approximately `250 billion) (Sasikumar and Hussain 2007; Zachariah and Rajan 2007) — were selected as the study areas.1 The villages were selected using a fourstage sampling procedure with purposive sampling in the first three stages and systematic sampling in the last stage. A household survey was conducted in the two selected villages with the help of a structured interview schedule. A total sample of 270 households was interviewed in the study with a sample of 120 households in Dharmaj village and 150 in Mangalam village. Any adult member of the migrant households who either was the primary remittance receiver or the head of the household or any member who had information on the migrant, migration process and remittances sent by the primary migrant, were the respondents of the study.

Findings Respondent and Household Characteristics Of the total respondents interviewed (N = 270), 65.9 per cent were males and 34 per cent females. Within the sample households in 1

Dharmaj is a village in Petlad taluka of Anand district in the state of Gujarat in India. This village was representative due to its high emigration and huge inflows of remittances — 70 per cent of households had at least one migrant member residing outside India. Mangalam is a coastal village belonging to Tirur taluka of Malappuram district. Lying in the Malabar coast of Kerala, Mangalam is approximately 36 kilometres from Malappuram town and 9 kilometres from Tirur town; 40 per cent of the households reported at least one migrant member residing outside India.

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Dharmaj, 80.8 per cent of the respondents were male and the rest female, while in Mangalam, 54 per cent were male and 46 per cent female. This indicates a higher number of female-headed households in Kerala compared to that in Gujarat. Religion forms an important variable for consideration, especially in any comparative study within India. In this study, the total figures for religion show that 53 per cent of the total households followed Hinduism and 47 per cent Islam. However, an interesting finding was that in Dharmaj, 100 per cent of the respondents were Hindus while in Mangalam, 84.7 per cent were Muslims and 15.3 per cent Hindus. Some household-related characteristics have been presented in Table 10.1. The overall average number of dependants for the total sample was around three. The average total number of dependants was more in the case of Mangalam (5.39) as compared to that in Dharmaj (2.36). The mean yearly income of households surveyed in Dharmaj was found to be `306,933 whereas that of Mangalam was `119,202. The mean yearly income of households without remittances in both villages was found to be `112,842. In case of Dharmaj it was found to be `212,641, whereas for Mangalam it was found to be much lower at `33,002. This explains the huge dependence of the families in Mangalam on remittance income. The average annual household expenditure for the total sample was found to be `82,707. Since households in villages are expected to have multiple sources of income due to complex labour allocation patterns, a multi-response question on sources of income was asked with responses according to the order of importance beginning from the most important source of income to least. A noteworthy feature in the figures obtained was that for Dharmaj, agricultural income was stated as the most important source of income (42.5 per cent of households) while for Mangalam this was remittance income (79.3 per cent). But it was observed that remittance income forms the second most important source of income for majority of the households in Dharmaj (45 per cent), whereas it is salaried income as well as agricultural income for Mangalam (20.7 per cent each). When it comes to third most important source of income, it was seen that again majority of the households in Dharmaj (27 per cent) had stated remittance income. So, we can infer that even though the households in Dharmaj depend on agricultural income as their main source, remittances, in the form of a supplementary income prove to be a very important source. The finding clearly indicates that the usage of remittances differs in both the villages indicating the existence of state-wise differences.

60,008

Household Expenditure

26,240

176,448

207,890

0.637

0.759

0.484

1.517

SD

100,866

33,002

119,202

0.05

2.13

1.25

6.73

Mean

34,624

43,899

46,674

0.225

1.392

0.570

3.210

SD

Mangalam, Kerala

Source: All the tables and figures presented in the chapter are from the author’s own field survey. Note: SD = Standard Deviation.

212,641

1.08

No. of Hired Labour

Annual Income without Remittances

0.75

No. of Children

306,933

1.28

No. of Members Living Abroad

Annual Income from All Sources (in `)

3.87

Mean

Dharmaj, Gujarat

No. of Family Members

Household Information

Table 10.1: Percentage Distribution of Household-Related Characteristics

82,707

89,796

202,638

0.51

1.51

1.26

5.46

Mean

0.683

1.341

0.533

2.960

SD

37,180

59,269

170,469

Total

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To understand the financial infrastructural outreach and awareness within the households in the remittance-receiving areas is an important aspect of any study on impact of remittances in terms of policymaking. Hence, understanding the access to banking facilities by the remittance-receiving households was considered an essential part of this study. For the total sample, 57.4 per cent of the households had access to banking facilities within the village; 20.4 per cent had access both within the village as well as outside and 19.3 per cent had access to banks only outside the village. In Dharmaj, 87.5 per cent of the households had bank accounts within the village as compared to only 33.3 per cent in Mangalam. This explains the strong presence of financial infrastructure within the village in Gujarat whereas in the case of Kerala it was observed to be weak. This finding is in sharp contrast to the assertion by Sasikumar and Hussain (2007) who state that the state of ‘Kerala [which] enjoys the best network of banks also has maximum remittances coming through formal channels’. Mangalam had only three banks located within the village as compared to 10 in Dharmaj.

Characteristics of Primary Migrants The demographic and social characteristics of the migrants, including the process of migration, countries of residence and their occupations at the destination countries are presented in Table 10.2. While 29.9 per cent of the primary migrants in the total sample were men who had their wives and children mostly left behind, 18.5 per cent were brothers of the respondents at the origin. In Dharmaj, 32.3 per cent of the migrants belonged to the age group 36–40 years and in Mangalam 34.7 per cent of the migrants belonged to a younger age group of 25–30 years. This finding was consistent with those of recent studies by K. C. Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan (2007). Again, in terms of ‘age at migration’, 31.1 per cent of the overall migrants had migrated during ages 26–30, with the figure in case of the village in Dharmaj at 40 per cent. In case of households in Mangalam though, maximum number of migrants had migrated during ages 21–25 (38.7 per cent). Male dominance in migration was observed for both the villages in consonance with the traditional theories of migration, which advocated male dominance, especially from the rural areas where migrants were generally typified as ‘able-bodied males’. On observing the marital status of migrants we found that a total 84.8 per cent of

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the migrants in the selected samples were married, which included 90 per cent of the migrants from the households in Dharmaj and a lesser share of 80 per cent from the households of Mangalam. This is contrary to the findings of an earlier study by Deepak Nayyar (1994) where it was observed that most of the migrants from Kerala were single and in consonance with the recent study of K. C. Zachariah and S. Irudaya Rajan (2007) where they found that 1.2 million wives in their sample households were ‘Gulf wives’. This indicates a change in the pattern since the 1980s. In this study, the mean number of years of education of the primary migrants for the total sample was found to be approximately 12 years. The mean number of years of education of the primary migrants from Dharmaj was found to be higher at 14.2 while the figure for the same variable in case of migrants from Mangalam was found to be lower at 10.17. Out of the total number of primary migrants from the total sample households, 35.9 per cent were involved in low-skilled jobs at the destination. The percentage was much higher in case of Mangalam with 80.6 per cent as compared to only 2.5 per cent in Dharmaj. The number of migrants engaged in business at the destination was considerably higher in the case of Gujarati migrants with 33.4 per cent large and small businessmen as compared to only 6 per cent (only small businessmen) from Kerala. A considerable percentage — 35 per cent — of migrants from Dharmaj were also found to be professionals as compared to only 6.7 per cent from Mangalam. These are very important findings as far as characteristics of migrants sending remittances from different states or regions in India are concerned. Table 10.2: Percentage Distribution of Migrant-Related Characteristics Profile of the Primary Migrant

Dharmaj, Gujarat

Mangalam, Kerala

Relationship with Respondent Son Daughter Brother Father Husband Others

51.7 (62) 0.8 (1) 35.8 (43) 2.5 (3) 8.3 (10) 0.8(1)

62.0 (93) 0.7 (1) 4.7 (7) 0.0 (0) 32.7 (49) 0.0 (0)

57.4 (155) 0.7 (2) 18.5 (50) 1.1 (3) 21.9 (59) 0.4 (1)

Sex Male Female

98.3 (118) 1.7 (2)

99.3 (149) 0.7 (1)

98.9 (267) 1.1 (3)

Total

(Table 10.2: Continued)

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(Table 10.2: Continued) Profile of the Primary Migrant

Dharmaj, Gujarat

Marital Status Single Married Others

9.2 (11) 19.8 (109) 0.0 (0)

18.0 (27) 80.0 (120) 2.0 (3)

14.1 (38) 84.8 (229) 1.1 (3)

Educational Qualifications Primary or Below Secondary Higher secondary Graduate Postgraduate and above

0.8 (1) 5.8 (7) 27.5 (33) 45.0 (54) 20.8 (25)

28.0 (42) 49.3 (74) 14.0 (21) 8.0 (12) 0.7 (1)

15.9 (43) 30.0 (81) 20.0 (54) 24.4 (66) 9.6 (26)

Technical Education Medical Engineering Law Chartered Accountancy Nursing Low skills Accounts Pharma Business administration Others No technical education

1.7 (2) 19.2 (23) 0.8 (1) 6.7 (8) 0.8 (1) 0.0 (0) 1.7 (2) 0.8 (1) 7.5 (9) 1.7 (2) 59.2 (71)

0.0 (0) 6.7 (10) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 54.0 (81) 1.3 (2) 0.7 (1) 0.0 (0) 10. (15) 27.3 (41)

0.7 (2) 12.2 (33) 0.4 (1) 3.0 (8) 0.4 (1) 30.0 (81) 1.5 (4) 0.7 (2) 3.3 (9) 6.3 (17) 41.5 (112)

Occupation Clerical Technical/Mechanical Professional Teacher Small businessman Large businessman Low-skilled jobs

15.0 (18) 10.0 12) 35.0 (42) 1.7 (2) 26.7 (32) 6.7 (8) 5.0 (6)

8.0 (12) 12.7 (19) 6.7 (10) 0.0 (0) 6.0 (9) 0.0 (0) 66.8 (100)

11.1 (30) 11.5 (31) 19.3 (52) 0.7 (2) 15.2 (41) 0.3 (8) 39.3 (106)

Accompanied by Spouse only Spouse and children Spouse, children and parents Not Available

15.8 (19) 58.3 (70) 4.2 (5) 21.7 (26)

0.0 (0) 4.0 (6) 0.7 (1) 95.3 (143)

7.0 (19) 28.1 (76) 2.2 (6) 62.6 (169)

100.0 (120)

100.0 (150)

100.0 (270)

Total

Mangalam, Kerala

Total

The RBI Report (2010) indicates source regions of remittances in India and North America and Gulf countries emerged as the major sources of remittances. Previous decades have also seen a shift in the source regions of remittances from mostly Gulf countries to mostly

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North American countries. Hence, it becomes essential to know the destination countries of migrants who send remittances with possible implications on the size of remittances. This is illustrated in Figures 10.1 and 10.2. We observe that there is a wide difference between the migrants of the two villages in the countries of residence. Overall majority of the migrants’ country of residence has been the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), but 100 per cent of the migrants in the study living in these two countries have been those from the Dharmaj alone, with 35 per cent in the UK and 45.8 per cent in the US. In case of Mangalam, the majority live in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (25.6 per cent) followed by Saudi Arabia (17.4 per cent), with the remaining of them scattered across the Gulf region. In Dharmaj, the rest of the migrants are all scattered across mostly the developing countries with a few in African countries. The mean number of years completed abroad for migrants from Dharmaj is 10.5 which is slightly higher than that for Mangalam — 9.5. Hence, in terms of number of years completed abroad by the migrants, the difference is not high albeit migrants to the Gulf necessarily return at some point as they are not granted permanent residency there. It was stated by the respondents from both Dharmaj as well as Mangalam that a majority of the migrants had migrated for ‘better income opportunities’ (70.7 per cent), with 55.8 per cent in Figure 10.1: Percentage Distribution of Migrants According to Destination in Dharmaj, Gujarat (in per cent)

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Figure 10.2: Percentage Distribution of Migrants According to Destination in Mangalam, Kerala (in per cent)

Dharmaj and 82.7 per cent in Mangalam. However, ‘financial crisis’ was stated as the second ‘most important’ reason for migration. A significant 14.2 per cent of the respondents in Dharmaj had also stated ‘higher education’ as the most important reason for migration, indicating a presence of student migration as a first step and eventually settlement abroad.

Remittances to the Migrant Households Detailed information on the size of remittances received was collected from the sample households. Table 10.3 presents the percentage distribution of size of remittances received by the migrant households. Table 10.3: Percentage Distribution of Size of Remittances Size of Remittances (in `) 110,001 Total

Dharmaj, Gujarat

Mangalam, Kerala

Total

14.2 (17) 31.7 (38) 9.2 (11) 19.2 (23) 25.8 (31)

0.0 (0) 8.0 (12) 42.0 (63) 33.3 (50) 16.7 (25)

6.3 (17) 18.5 (50) 27.4 (74) 27.0 (73) 20.7 (56)

100.0 (120)

100.0 (150)

100.0 (270)

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The mean size of remittances sent per year by the migrants as observed for the total number of households surveyed was `897,960. In case of Dharmaj, the average size of remittances received by the migrant households per year was found to be `94,291, which for Mangalam was `86,200. Hence, the mean size of remittances received by the migrant households did not show much difference. But variations in the size of remittances in terms of remittance size brackets were observed in the households in Gujarat and Kerala. Modes of transfer of remittances enable us to understand the financial structure of the villages. We can observe from Table 10.4 that overall a majority (63.7 per cent) of the sample households received remittances that were directly sent to the bank accounts owned by the family members which were situated in the village itself and 33.3 per cent of the households received remittances sent to the bank accounts of the family members that lied outside. A significant 27.4 per cent of the households received remittances via cheque/draft. This was similar to the findings of RBI (2010) where it was indicated that these two channels of transfer were the most preferred by the migrants. But additionally it needs to be mentioned that a significant 28 per cent of the total households received remittances via informal sources. This indicates that although at a lesser percentage compared to formal sources of transfer, informal sources also exist, including the hawala or hundi networks.2 Village-wise disaggregation shows the usage of informal sources to be more prevalent for migrant households in Mangalam (36.6 per cent) as compared to formal sources (19.1 per cent). Informal agents such as remittances carried by friends or relatives of migrants visiting home or those carried by migrant themselves also play a major role, especially in Mangalam. An interesting feature that was revealed was that 21.3 per cent of the migrant households in Mangalam expressed that they preferred these informal agents for delivery of remittances as they delivered at their doorsteps without 2 Hawala also known as hundi, is an informal value-transfer system based on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers, primarily located in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent operating outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking, financial channels, and remittance systems. Hawala is believed to have arisen in the financing of long-distance trade around the emerging capital trade centres in the early medieval period. Today, it is probably used mostly for migrant workers’ remittances to their countries of origin.

0.0 (0) 84.2 (101) 2.5 (3) 10.8 (13) 19.2 (23) 8.3 (10) 0.0 (0) 0.8 (1) 10.0 (12) 90.0 (108) 96.7 (116) 3.3 (4) 53.3 (64) 46.7 (56)

Whether the household ever received any transfer through informal sources Yes No

Preferred source Formal Informal

Remittances in kind Yes No

Dharmaj, Gujarat

Modes of transfer Draft/Cheque Direct transfer to account in village Direct transfer to account outside village Carried by relatives/friends of migrant Money transfer operator Carried by migrant himself Exchange houses Automated teller machine (ATM)

Remittance-Related Aspects

Table 10.4: Percentage Distribution of Some Remittance-Related Aspects

42.7 (64) 57.3 (86)

78.7 (118) 21.3 (32)

51.3 (77) 48.7 (73)

49.3 (74) 47.3 (71) 58.0 (87) 25.3 (38) 13.3 (20) 11.3 (17) 6.0 (9) 4.0 (6)

Mangalam, Kerala

47.4 (128) 52.6 (142)

86.7 (234) 13.3 (36)

33.0 (89) 67.0 (181)

27.4 (74) 63.7 (172) 33.3 (90) 18.9 (51) 15.9 (43) 10.0 (27) 3.3 (9) 2.6 (7)

Total

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them having to go to the banks or Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) and perceived the mode as ‘hassle free’. All of these cases included those households where the women were left behind with lots of household responsibilities such that they expressed lack of the time to rush towards banks to withdraw money. The respondents expressed that as this process (informal) was relatively inexpensive and quick, with delivery right at the doorstep, the migrants as well as the households preferred these informal agents.

End Uses of Remittances In this section, one of the most important aspects related to remittances has been discussed, which is the end uses of remittances by the households that receive them. The respondents in the study were asked about the uses of remittances for a variety of purposes that have been compiled from previous studies and were asked to rank them in order of importance. Though recent studies indicate considerable overlaps between consumption and investment uses — such as spending on education and health, which earlier was considered to be for consumption, and eventually recognized as investment in human capital (Acosta 2006; Mendola 2006) — in this study the multiple uses of remittances were segregated in terms of purely consumption, investment and savings. The uses of remittances were asked in order of importance to take note of the main needs of the households that were supported by remittance money and further how this money was used when the basic needs of the households and the main purposes, for which they were sent, were met. As far as the most important uses of remittances are concerned, it was found that in the total sample, the majority of households had stated that the most important use of remittances was satisfying the basic minimum needs of the family including food, clothing and other household amenities (65.9 per cent). Although this figure for the households in Dharmaj was found to be a moderate 29.2 per cent, for Mangalam it was unanimous at 95.3 per cent. In case of Dharmaj, medical expenses (23.3 per cent) and especially investment in business and micro enterprises (11.7 per cent), was found to be quite high as the most important use. As far as the second most important use is concerned, it was found to be divided between improvement of house (15.2 per cent), schooling and education of children (13.7 per cent) and medical expenses (12.1 per cent). In the case of Dharmaj, deposits/savings at banks

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(16.7 per cent), improvement of land (8.3 per cent) and loan repayment for expenses incurred due to migration (7.5 per cent) scored more apart from medical expenses again at 15 per cent. As expected, in Mangalam, the improvement and purchase of houses was second most important (39.4 per cent in total). When it came to the third most important use of remittances, a diverse pattern was observed. Medical expenses were the most cited — at 24.1 per cent for the total sample — with 28 per cent of the households in Mangalam and 19.2 per cent of those in Dharmaj citing this use. Purchase of gold jewellery, especially in Mangalam, has been significantly high in terms of third most important use (12 per cent). The jewellery was stated to have been mainly bought for marriages of the women in the household. Uses of remittances were further segregated in terms of consumption uses, investment uses and savings uses. Studies on uses of remittances in India state that remittances were mainly used for consumption purposes (RBI 2010), but more recent discourses on uses of remittances argue that schooling- and health-related expenditure of remittances are basically also an investment for the future (Acosta 2006). Uses of remittances are also differentiated in terms of productive and unproductive uses (Sasikumar and Hussain 2007). Uses of remittances for basic needs and building of houses and purchase of gold (though a kind of investment) are perceived by researchers and policy-makers as ‘unproductive’. There is also, as Sasikumar and Hussain (ibid.) strongly indicate, an existence of a differential pattern of uses of remittances region-wise, ‘after’ the basic minimum requirements of the household are met, especially pointing to differences in the states of Kerala and Gujarat. Hence, in the study an attempt has been made to categorize the uses of remittances into consumption, investment and savings, where uses for basic minimum needs, repayment of any kind of loans and spending for either construction or repair of houses as well as purchase of gold jewellery are categorized as consumption uses. Uses of remittances for purchase or improvement of land, investment in any micro enterprise and in education and health are categorized as investment uses. Uses of remittance money for deposit in banks or savings in banks or similar uses are categorized as savings uses. In Figures 10.3 and 10.4, uses of remittances for different categories (consumption, investment and savings) are presented as a percentage of total most important uses and second most important uses of remittances respectively for households in Dharmaj and

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Figure 10.3: Percentage Share of Consumption, Investment and Savings Components of Most Important Uses of Remittances

Figure 10.4: Percentage Share of Consumption, Investment and Savings Components of Second Most Important Uses of Remittances

Mangalam. From Figure 9.3, it is evident that for all cases (total sample in both villages), most important uses of remittances are definitely for consumption with the maximum percentage in Mangalam (95.3 per cent) which has almost no savings uses and very small investment uses (4.6 per cent), compared to the households in Dharmaj which have more investment uses as the most important use of remittances (41.8 per cent).

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What is noticeable in Figures 10.3 and 10.4 is that as the most important requirement — that is, the basic minimum needs of the family — are satisfied by the migrant households receiving remittances, or in other words, the consumption purposes of remittances met, remittances are gradually used for investment purposes. Hence, the importance for investment and savings purposes rise as the basic minimum requirements are met, which is clearly evident in Figures 10.3 and 10.4 which show that the investment and saving component of bars rise with decreasing order of importance. Certain aspects of collective remittances and their uses in the Dharmaj village in Gujarat need to be specifically stated. The migrant associations in UK related to Dharmaj, as stated by the key informants in the village, played a major role in the development of village facilities, including building of schools and colleges as well as hospitals with modern equipments and services. Migrants from Dharmaj village in Gujarat who had settled in UK for a considerable time of 40 years have their own association and have been participating in developmental activities mainly in their home Dharmaj as well as in their host society. This association in particular has been influential in many developmental projects in the village including building orthopaedic and maternity hospitals with modern equipments, a biotechnical laboratory and a mineral water plant. They continue to contribute to various other infrastructural projects within the village. This has helped in the betterment of the lives of not only village members but also those of nearby villages. Although such an incidence of collective remittances and village development was absent in Mangalam village, through the practice of zakat3 particular to the Muslim community (from information obtained from key informants in the village), certain smaller instances of community development were present, such as contributions to an orphanage.

Conclusion From the findings of this survey, it is clear that variations in remittance patterns, whether in terms of quantum or usage, do exist in various states in India depending on migration histories, patterns and 3

Zakat, considered one of the basic pillars of Islam, is the practice of charitable giving by Muslims based on accumulated wealth, and is obligatory for all who are able to do so. It is considered to be a personal responsibility for Muslims to ease economic hardship for others and eliminate inequality.

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migrant characteristics and therefore more specific state-level investigations are required in order to understand the nature of remittances sent by the Indian diaspora. Both individual as well as collective remittances co-exist, but it again depends on the respective diaspora profiles. These findings also lead to important policy implications on how remittances can be more effectively channelized for development purposes depending on the differential usage pattern existing in the states. For instance, there is a need for more financial awareness and infrastructure for villages such as Mangalam. As we have seen that informal money transfer agents do exist and play a vital role in villages such as Mangalam where only few banks exist and mostly housewives or dependant members receive remittances, there is a need for better financial infrastructure with more outreach and better services and more financial awareness amongst the people in order to bring down informal money transfers. Again, from the uses of remittances for various purposes in this study, it is evident that remittances do reduce poverty and minimize credit constraints of households receiving them; however, promotion of micro finance institutions offering financial products aimed at effective use of remittances in villages such as Mangalam where savings are meagre can lead to more efficient results. Also, promotion of migrant associations such as that which exists for Dharmaj village with effective collaborations with local bodies — such as those existing in Latin American countries which promote matching funds schemes — can provide for further development of villages in India.

References Acosta, Pablo. 2006. ‘Labour Supply, School Attendance and Remittances from International Migration: The Case of El Salvador’. Policy Research Paper no. 3903, World Bank, Washington DC. Mendola, Mariapia. 2006. ‘Rural Out-migration and Economic Development at Origin: What Do We Know?’ Sussex Migration Working Paper no. 40, University of Sussex. Nayyar, Deepak. 1994. Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Orozco, Manuel. 2006. ‘Diasporas, Philanthropy and Hometown Associations: The Central American Experience’. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ getdocument.aspx?docnum=812580 (accessed 1 January 2010). Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 2010. ‘Remittances from Overseas Indians: Modes of Transfer, Overseas Cost and Time Taken’, RBI Bulletin, 13 April.

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Sasikumar, S. K. and Zakir Hussain. 2007. Migration, Remittances and Development: Lessons from India. New Delhi: V. V. Giri National Labour Institute. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2007. ‘Migration, Remittances and Employment: Short Term Trends and Long Term Implications’. Working Paper no. 395, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

11

Future Diasporas?

International Student Migration from India to the UK S. iRuDaya Rajan anD neha waDhawan Over

the last decade, the number of students travelling to another country in pursuit of higher education increased over 75 per cent; estimates indicate that some 3.7 million students migrate globally (Varghese 2008). Current estimates stand at 4.1 million students worldwide (OECD 2012). Globalization processes have been a key driving force that has impacted and spurred international student mobility. Although the rapid growth of student mobility is relatively recent, the desire to acquire higher education beyond national borders is itself not new; students and scholars have always sought learning opportunities around the world as a way to broaden their educational and cultural horizons. What has changed, however, is the overall context of global mobility, both in terms of who is going where, the mix of host and sending countries and the various social and economic factors that motivate students to pursue educational opportunities outside of their home country. What has not changed is the potential for international students who study abroad to permanently settle down in the host country and become part of the wide-ranging Indian diaspora. It is a known fact that the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon was attributed to highly-skilled professionals who were educated in India and decided to get permanently settled in first-world countries, especially in the United States (US) post-1960s. Their presence in different sectors of the host’s economy, especially the Information Technology (IT) sector, medicine, retail, and nursing has been widely acknowledged. Global political and economic changes like the spread of international terror groups, the financial crisis and the formation of the European Union, have been accompanied by the tightening of immigration controls and policies, especially the capping of work visas. In such a scenario,

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amidst increasing privatization of education, the possibilities of the student route resulting in higher chances to work in the host country and hopefully secure a residence permit cannot be undermined. Do international students stand a higher chance of becoming future diasporas? To answer such a question, it is important to delve into the costs and choices that govern international student migration from India. In this chapter, we present some of the data collected by the authors for a research study on international student migration from India to the United Kingdom (UK) sponsored by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies. First, a historical background and detailed explanation of the UK student visa policy is provided to contextualize the data presented. Second, the quantitative data — based on the VFS UK survey — on the socioeconomic profile of respondents, costs, choices leading to student migration, perceptions about education and destination, future prospects, and process of migrating to the host country will be discussed. This data will be interspersed with data from interviews to lay out the contours of the student migration process. To conclude, some points regarding possible policy interventions will be raised and directions for future research highlighted.

Background to the Study The increase in demand for international students globally is motivated by a host of factors. International students are highly valued in the UK and the US as they are willing to pay premium tuition fees apart from higher living costs; these costs being much greater than what they would have paid in their home countries and are up to three times the amount charged to local students in host countries. An important incentive for attracting foreign students is that they raise the performance standards of these universities, which is important as it bears a positive influence on their global ranking (Khadria 2002). Another important factor influencing policy design is the negative population growth rate in most host countries (with the exception of the UK and the US). A large and ageing work force combined with low fertility rates highlight the need to attract a young one. The period of studentship helps assess the potential and benefit of offering a work visa or residence permit after completion of education. Hence, attracting international students is a necessity as they can be potential employees in the host country and join the workforce after completing their education.

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India is both a regional host country as well as a leading sending country with regard to international student migration. India has one of the world’s largest higher education systems, comprising more than 350 universities and 16,000 colleges. The Indian government has enacted policies encouraging and helping more international students from developing countries to study in India. Simultaneously, as the number of international students from India increases, so will the complexity in their mobility patterns. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics, the total number of students from India studying overseas is 195,107 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2011). The top five destinations for Indian international students are the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia (Table 11.1). Germany used to feature in the top five till 2007 while China is emerging as a popular destination for Indian students. Table 11.1: Top Five Destinations and Number of Students from India Studying Overseas in 2009 Destination United States United Kingdom Australia New Zealand Russia

Number of Students 101,563 34,065 26,573 5,710 4,314 (in 2008)

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), in Naujoks (2009).

According to a country profile report authored by Daniel Naujoks (2009) for the US-based Migration Policy Institute (MPI), [t]he Institute of International Education reports that India has been the leading source of foreign students in the United States since 2000–2001. In the 2007–2008 academic year, 15 percent of all foreign students admitted were from India, corresponding to almost 95,000 people. The majority of these Indian students pursue graduate studies, as did three out of four Indian students in 2006–2007. However, the number of Indians submitting applications to US graduate schools shrunk 12 percent for the 2008–2009 school year compared with 2007–2008, according to a report from the Council of Graduate Schools. Studying in the United Kingdom has been a tradition for many Indian middle-class families. After a temporary slow down, this movement gained momentum again in the last decade when British universities started to

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hold student fairs in India and recruit students directly. For this purpose, at least 14 British universities have opened full-time offices in India. In 2007, Indians made up 6.4 percent of the country’s 374,000 foreign student enrollments, as reported by the Atlas Project — up from 4 percent in 2003. The UK Higher Education Statistics Agency reports that the majority of them are enrolled in graduate programs, the biggest number in business studies, followed by engineering and technology, and computer science (Naujoks 2009).

While substantial research has been conducted on indentured labour, Gulf migration, migration of skilled professionals, marriage migration, etc. from the perspective of host countries, there is a dearth of information and conclusive data on the numbers regarding international student migration from India, the choices and processes involved and the costs of migrating internationally for education. Various stakeholders ranging from banks which provide loans and remit money from parents to children studying abroad, to the role of education fairs, education consultants and visa service companies like VFS that facilitate the student migration process have not been adequately studied. Moreover, students do not come under the purview of international laws that protect migrant workers rights. They face several vulnerabilities due to their young age, expectations and differences in cultural, social, racial, and economic relations in the host country. In the past few years, news reports have covered the plight of Indian students who were left in the lurch when the host country withdrew licenses and shut down universities, for example, the case of the London Metropolitan University in the UK. In other cases, students were tricked by agents who charged large sums of money and misled students on visa types, course options and costs. Moreover, as our study reveals, most students see higher education opportunities as a means of settling down in the host country and in a majority of cases, students are allowed to work a limited number of hours to pay for their living expenses. They usually work at minimum wages and are a supply of cheap labour in host destinations.

Methodology While international agencies like UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), and host countries have collected some data on this issue, there has been no comprehensive study on international student migration from India from a sending country

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perspective. Therefore, the Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) conducted a study to understand the costs and choices affecting international student migration. The major reasons for international student migration fall into three categories according to Cummings (1993): (a) shortage of domestic opportunities, especially in some subjects, like aeronautics design, hospitality training, etc., which prompted many students, and governments to to sponsor students, to seek education in other countries; (b) the commercial value of a foreign degree earned abroad from a prestigious university; and (c) learning and experiencing ‘another country and culture [which] encouraged many to seek education in foreign countries’ (Cummings 1993: 37, cited in Varghese 2008: 13). N. V. Varghese (2008) lists eight driving factors that influence international student mobility and they are: cost of education, ideological affinity, language proficiency, perceived academic superiority of institutions in host countries, exposure to foreign language and culture, better employment opportunities, increasing income levels in countries of origin, and easier visa formalities. The CDS study is a contribution to the growing literature on student mobility as it reveals that in a majority of cases, student migration is often the gateway for permanent stay in the host country. This is eased by policies in many destination countries that allow students to convert their student status into a residence permit if they find a job within a certain time after graduation, for example, Australia and, to a lesser extent, UK. With tightening immigration regimes in the West, are Indian labour migrants turning to educational migration to gain easier entry into such countries and eventually secure job opportunities? What are the costs of international student migration in comparison to education in a good public/private institution located within the country? What is the role played by agents, diaspora organizations, alumni networks, and visa facilitation centres in the student migration process? Traditionally, the US and the UK have been favoured destinations for educational migration. What is the role of parents and their educational exposure in the choices leading to international migration for education? Does the shrinking family size and expanding middle class affect family decisions to migrate for better future? What are the costs involved and how are they met by the student’s family, how important is the availability of student loans in influencing decisions to migrate? These were some of the questions that the research team set out with to try and answer through a study on international student migration

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from India. Moreover, the CDS has been conducting a detailed large survey at the Kerala-state level for the past 15 years. Already, five rounds of the Kerala migration survey have been conducted by CDS, Thiruvananthapuram and the data shows that students are emerging as an important aspect to observe through these surveys as well (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). The experience of working on the Kerala Migration Survey indicates that student out-migrants from the state have overtaken job seekers (Figure 11.1). The data shows that student migration from Kerala has increased from 15 per cent in 1998 to 35 per cent in 2011 (Figure 11.2). Figure 11.1: Students and Job Seekers among Out-Migrants from Kerala

Source: Zachariah and Rajan (2012). Figure 11.2: Student Migrants as Percentage of Adult Migrants

Source: Zachariah and Rajan (2012).

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This paper is primarily based on data collected through a survey of respondents via a short questionnaire canvassed to prospective students, and supplemented with interviews conducted with current students, and parents of current as well as prospective international students from India. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with multiple stakeholders, Indian government officials involved in policymaking and programme implementation relating to higher education, companies like VFS, education/career consultants, and alumni networks in India. The research team interviewed embassy officials based in New Delhi from five countries, namely the UK, Australia, Canada, the US, and Germany responsible for facilitating student visas and universities based in India as well as officials involved in international education policy-making in the host country. They were requested to provide relevant data regarding student migration and share their perceptions with the research team. This paper focuses on data primarily collected through from 112 prospective students applying for student visas to the UK across five cities in India in 2012. These questionnaires were placed in VFS centres where the prospective student submitted his/her visa application, and were filled by the respondents themselves on a voluntary basis. The study defines prospective students as those who have secured admission offers and confirmed them for 2012–13, made provisions for financing the costs of migration, paid fees, and is applying for/ awaiting visa to depart to host country. To get the questionnaires to prospective students and accompanying parents, the team sought and received permission to canvass questionnaires at VFS visa services locations via the UK Border Agency (UKBA) in Delhi, Chandigarh, Chennai, Hyderabad, and Cochin. Embassy officials have also shared data collected on numbers of Indian students migrating to host countries over the years, preferred degrees and universities, number of Indian students granted residence permits after completion of education, inward receipts for education in India, information on scholarships funded by the government and by universities, and on accredited education agents in India. In addition, the research team met with representatives of the British Council and the United States Educational Foundation in India (USEFI). Questionnaire-based and in-depth interviews with prospective students and parents of students studying abroad were also conducted. Researchers approached educational agents in Delhi and Chandigarh during December 2012 to understand the expertise and costs involved in the application process. A consultation was held on 2 February 2013 in

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Chandigarh with consultants working in the educational migration sector and their opinions and inputs were sought to understand the myriad ways in which international migration of students in India (especially in the north-west region) takes place.

International Student Migration to UK The United Kingdom (UK) is amongst the most favoured destinations by international students for higher education. The strength of international students in the UK increased from 209,554 in 2000 to 368,968 in 2009. As per data released by the International Institute of Education, most international students in the UK came from China and constituted over 12 per cent of all international enrolments in 2009. However, there has been a decline in the number of Chinese students in the UK since 2006. Shahana Mukherjee and Rupa Chanda (2012: 13) show that ‘between 2000 and 2009, the number of Indian students who chose UK for higher education increased’ remarkably by 256 per cent ‘from 3962 to 34,065’. The numbers grew annually since 2000 and ‘peaked in 2003 when the intake rose by 73.2 percent’ (ibid.). As a result of such exceptional growth, Indian students represented 9.2 per cent of all international students in UK in 2009, up from a mere 1.8 per cent in 2000 . . . Such phenomenal growth in Indian student enrolments could be in part due to the tightening of immigration (and student visa) policies in the US, following the terrorist attack in 2001. As a result of this, the flow of students may have been partially diverted towards the other Englishspeaking markets like the UK and Australia (ibid.).

However, the US retains the highest share of Indian students — almost 50 per cent of all international students from India continue to migrate to the US. Mukherjee and Chanda further show that the UK continues to be the favourite destination for higher education among Indian students within Europe, and this can be ascribed to to a number of factors (ibid.). Due to the British colonial rule for over 200 years, ‘India has shared a long-standing relationship with Britain and this has often encouraged more Indian students to choose the UK for higher studies’ (ibid.: 19). Another result of colonial rule has been that ‘English-speaking countries have a natural advantage over others and this is an important reason why Indian students choose the UK. Familiarity with the English language often ensures that Indian students are able to’ communicate with the native population and ‘integrate into a new environment with minimal difficulties’ (ibid.).

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Despite the advantages however, a lot of Indian students have most often favoured the US over the UK for higher education. This is somewhat due to certain features of the US education system that give the country a firm upper hand over other host countries. ‘The US has over 4000 accredited institutions’, mostly private and some large public universities which can absorb more students than most other countries (ibid.: 20). The presence of a large number of institutions also implies that compared to the UK, students can choose from a wider range of institutions and courses within the US. A majority of the most reputed institutions in the world are also located in the US which is another factor that attracts international students seeking quality education. Therefore, the US provides greater variety and flexibility to international students compared to the UK (ibid.).

Among the primary factors that influence decisions regarding host country and choice of courses for Indian students is the high financial cost of overseas higher education. ‘Both the US and the UK charge premium fees from international students, tuition fees in UK can be up to “U.S.$ 10,000 cheaper, for a similar degree in a British Institution”’ (Verbik and Lasanowski 2007, quoted in Mukherjee and Chanda 2012: 20). Mukherjee and Chanda (2012) contend that ‘living costs in the UK are significantly higher than in the US’, which makes the UK a ‘more costly destination overall’ and becomes a ‘deterrent for Indian as well as other international students’ (ibid.). What is perhaps more relevant in the case of India is the perception of higher education in the US. A degree from the US is still considered more valuable and useful in securing better jobs. Therefore, many students choose the US over other countries to ensure the highest returns on their financial investment. Moreover, as most Indian students who migrated abroad for higher education traditionally went to the US, an average Indian student’s awareness of possibilities in the ‘foreign’ market is skewed in favour of the US. Many of the prospective students in India also have family linkages with US returned Indians, which aids the favourable impression about the US for higher studies (ibid.).

However, this is an important factor in the case of the UK as well. The existence of kin networks in host countries exerts a major positive influence on the decision-making involved in international student migration.

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UK International Student Visa Policy: The Indian Experience The UK has taken various initiatives to promote student mobility between countries and ‘establish stronger academic ties with India. An example of this is the UK–India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI) which was launched by the British Council in 2006, with the aim of promoting educational links between UK and India’ (Mukherjee and Chanda 2012: 23). Substantial progress has been made in the past few years as the UKIERI ‘established partnerships between universities, facilitated grants and enabled [increased] mobility of students between India and UK. These include 182 UK–India partnerships involving 600 institutions on higher education [and] research, schools, professional [and] technical skills, and 55 individual awards for PhD students and scholarships and other achievements’ (ibid.). The Study India Programme is an initiative by the UKIERI that ‘enabled 393 British students to visit India’ from the year 2006 (ibid.). Several UK universities have set up regional offices in India — including Middlesex University, University of Greenwich, Lancaster University, Imperial College London, University of Leeds, University of Birmingham, University of Oxford, and Oxford Brookes University — which have signed MOUs and developed partnerships via ‘course tie-ups, faculty exchanges and research tie-ups, in addition to student recruitment from India’ (ibid.). Marketing UK universities has been a positive strategy for the UK in India. The British Council, in collaboration with several universities ‘have held two large scale education fairs each year, covering nine cities in India’, providing a platform to many prestigious universities. These fairs provide an abundance of information by covering a range of issues that concern decisions relating to visas, living costs, employment and subject selection. Smaller cities and towns have also been targeted ‘by conducting virtual discussions over the internet’ (ibid.). Apart from ‘increasing the visibility of the UK’ as a preferred ‘higher education destination’, these activities have managed to give information on the eligibility, process and quality of UK education. According to Mukherjee and Chanda (ibid.), the payoff for UK has been remarkable as ‘about 27,000 Indian students were recruited’ through these UK education fairs. Some scholars have claimed that while ‘the UK benefited from the tightening of visa restrictions by the US, following the 9/11 attack in 2001, recent developments have created a considerable barrier’

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for many Indian students migrating to the UK (ibid.: 25). The Points Based System (PBS) introduced in 2008 made the visa application process much stricter than before. The new student visa system (under Tier 4 of PBS) requires colleges and universities to carefully monitor international students and report those who fail to attend courses after obtaining visas. Universities who wish to recruit international students would require a special license to do so. Matters worsened in early 2010 when the UK Border Agency (UKBA) temporarily banned visa applications from North India (New Delhi, Chandigarh and Jalandar) following a sudden spurt in these applications from 1,380 in 2008 to 13,500 the following year. Though a part of it could be due to a drastic fall in applications to Australia (following the racial attack on Indians), this raised serious concern about the ‘student’ route being used to find employment in the UK. Following this, the UKBA revoked the licenses of 97 Tier 4 education providers and suspended the licenses of another 37. The situation has deteriorated since then, sparked off by an early 2011 advert on Indian streets which revealed a scam that sold student visas for legal entry into UK. This incident, coupled with recent occurrences of illegal migration via the student route has given way to tighter regulations. Institutes wanting to sponsor foreign students now have to be classified as a Highly Trusted Sponsor by the UKBA. Student applications are also being put through tighter scrutiny as students are now required to secure considerably higher scores (5.5 in IELTS [International English Language Testing System] and 87 in TOEFL [Test of English as a Foreign Language]) to be eligible. The most recent step was taken on 25th October, 2011 when the UK banned the financial statements of 1,900 Indian banks for student visa purposes. This has been implemented as part of the reforms introduced to have stricter vigilance over student migration and to ensure that students coming from India have legitimate proof of the funds required to support their stay in the UK (ibid.).

The sequence of ‘extreme steps taken to reduce illegal migration are likely to have a strong impact on the flow of genuine students from India’ in addition to increasing the costs and risks involved in migrating to the UK (ibid.: 26). Thus, it is possible to say that ‘the implementation of new visa regulations in the UK may have caused a serious setback in its appeal to Indian students, who are now more likely to look at other destinations for higher education’ (ibid.). The UK government has reviewed and reformed the major migration routes to the UK over the last couple of years. This includes working routes, education, family, and employment-related settlement. The aim has been to reduce net migration to the UK and to address

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abuse, whilst ensuring that the UK continues to be a destination of choice for high-quality students and skilled and highly-skilled workers. The UKBA claims that each review included a global consultation on government proposals. The government announced changes to the student route on 22 March 2011. The package of reforms to Tier-4 (student) of the PBS System was targeted towards tackling abuse within the student migration system (so the changes here reflect the areas in which abuse of the system had been detected) while continuing to attract and support genuine students wanting to study at good education providers in the UK. The announcement followed an extensive consultation, which generated over 31,000 responses. The PBS is the visa application process in which the applicant must acquire a certain level of points from stipulated attributes and meet the UK’s immigration rules in order to be issued with a visa. The PBS was introduced gradually to work and study routes since 2009. Long-term students have to apply for UK visas under Tier-4 PBS. For courses of less than six months or English language courses lasting up to 11 months, students may apply for a student visitor visa. The UKBA policy states that university students would ‘retain their right to work 20 hours per week part-time and to do work placements’ where work/study ratio is 50:50 (UKBA n.d.). ‘Students at publicly funded FE [Further Education] colleges [would] continue to be able to work 10 hours a week part-time. Other students would not be allowed to work part-time and work placements [would] have to be 66:33 in favour of’ study to work (ibid.). Only postgraduate and governmentsponsored students would be allowed to support dependants, who would also be permitted to work. Several interview respondents felt that the UK had become more difficult to work in as compared to Australia where immigration was relatively easier. It must be noted that these reflections are based on the semi-structured interviews for this study conducted mostly in Delhi and Chandigarh while the questionnaire-based data has a dominant Chennai sample. Student migration to the UK rose substantially till 2007 but is on a rapid decline since 2010 as per the findings of the CDS study. It seems that stringent controls introduced have sent out the message that applying for residence permits and work visas will be even more difficult, discouraging potential students who aspire to be part of the diaspora in the host country. Table 11.2 presents data collected from the UKBA office in New Delhi on applications received since 2007 till 2011. While the issue rate had fallen in 2009, it increased over the

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next two years. However, application rates are expected to be even lower in 2012 and 2013 due to the recent change in policies which is reflected in these findings. Table 11.2: Statistics Showing Student Visa Application to the United Kingdom, 2007–11 Year

Received

Issued

Issue Rate (per cent)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

34,000 41,000 93,000 59,000 43,000

22,000 28,500 59,400 41,000 32,000

65 70 64 70 75

Source: Data provided by the UKBA upon request during interaction with CDS research team in July 2012.

The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) is a centralized application process for UK undergraduate study. It makes applying for full-time undergraduate degree courses and Higher National Diplomas (HNDs) straightforward and easy to understand. The British Council website (n.d.) states: All UCAS institutions are recognised by the UK government or offer courses that are validated by UK government-recognised universities. Applicants through UCAS can make up to five choices at once on one application, apply to a wide range of different courses and institutions, apply online using UCAS Apply and track the progress of applications. All international students who apply through UCAS are said to be treated fairly under UCAS procedures and rules (ibid.).

However, no such institution exists for diploma students, who form a bulk of prospective students as per the CDS study. Diploma students are more prone to be misled in student migration to the UK and to Australia. The study also highlights the variety of courses that students at the master’s level opt for in terms of education abroad — courses that are possibly not available yet in India or offered by very few reputed institutes — where the competition is very intense which makes it very difficult to qualify. Students whose parents had studied abroad were more confident of their experience and benefits while there were others who were totally dependent on the agents for guidance regarding selection of appropriate courses and information about the costs involved.

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Data from the CDS Study As mentioned earlier, the findings presented in this chapter are primarily based on the prospective student survey carried out in five cities across India — a total of 155 total questionnaires, with 62.6 per cent males and 37.4 per cent females. A large proportion — 51.6 per cent — were from Chennai while the rest were from the other four cities. Out of the respondents, 75 per cent were Hindu and 72.3 per cent reported to be leaving for postgraduate study. Most of these findings can be corroborated by the semi-structured interviews where the reasons behind particular answers could be probed; however, some interesting divergences did come up during the interviews which could not be captured in the sample survey. For example, out of the 127 respondents who answered the specific question, 88.2 per cent reported that the degree matters more than destination. However, the detailed interviews revealed a different picture. It seemed that the destination emerged as a stronger reason in terms of international exposure and future opportunities to work and live in the host country. When asked about the reasons for not studying in India, out of 105 respondents, almost 80 per cent reported that stronger presence of alumni networks abroad aided in securing work opportunities after the completion of education. Other reasons that made it less attractive as a viable option included lack of basic amenities, desire for international exposure, and peer pressure, amongst others (Table 11.3). Table 11.3: Answers to the Qualitative Questions Posed to Respondents of the Survey, 2012 Question Did you take a year off to apply and prepare for admission abroad? Do you have any relative who has studied in the UK? Do you have a relative in the UK with whom you can stay when there? Does studying abroad improve one’s chances of getting work in the destination country? Would you like to work abroad after completing education? Would you like to work in India after completing education? Did you approach any agent for help with the application process? Did you find the agent’s fee reasonable? Did you receive a scholarship? Are you taking an educational loan? Source: Field survey conducted by the CDS.

Yes (in per cent) 37.4 28.9 25.7 75.4 50.0 81.3 55.1 88.9 30.5 49.6

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Table 11.3 shows the responses to qualitative questions posed via the questionnaire. Among the students, 37.4 per cent said that they had taken a year off to prepare for the application process. Among them, 73 per cent had been financed by their parents while 14.3 per cent had savings to depend on with another 12.2 per cent taking a loan. Over 75 per cent of the respondents felt that studying abroad improved chances of getting work in the destination country. Out of the respondents, 50 per cent reported that they would like to work abroad after completing education while 81 per cent said that they would like to work in India instead. Almost 50 per cent reported that they had taken an educational loan and around 30 per cent had received some scholarship towards their education in the UK. A substantial 67 per cent stated that they had appeared for the IELTS examination to go to the UK. Several students interviewed, both prospective and current, reported that they have themselves or know several others in a similar position who have written the TOEFL/IELTS exams many times in an effort to pass the exam. Now, they have to not only pass but also score high enough points to make it on the PBS. It seemed that the agent nexus in the northern part of the country, especially in Chandigarh and surrounding areas, was more prominent and a lot of money was spent by prospective students in studying for TOEFL/IELTS examinations even before the application stage. Our analysis indicates that the most preferred country was the US followed by the UK and Australia, despite the tightening of entry-level requirements based on English language abilities. The UK has a university structure that dates back to medieval times and some universities are hundreds of years old. Politicians and bureaucrats alike have studied in the UK and a degree from a prestigious university in the UK is held in high regard. Hence, over generations, those who could afford it would definitely send their children to the UK to study. Our survey also revealed that only 26 per cent students had considered similar education opportunities in India while an overwhelming 73 per cent were not. Table 11.4 demonstrates the fact that the estimated cost for a comparable degree in India was lower than in the UK for each estimate cost bracket. Yet, the data points out that most students would prefer to study abroad than in India. It must be noted that most students, i.e., around 70 per cent would fall into the category of spending any amount between 500,000 to 2 million for the educational degree. Most households in India would not be in a position to afford such expensive education for their child. It emerged from the interviews

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that future prospects of employment and a better life led many to invest in a possibility of settling abroad via the international student migration route. Table 11.4: Estimated Cost of Comparable Education (Living and Tuition Expenses) in India and the UK Cost of Education 2 million

In India — Reported Students (in per cent) 16.7 28.8 36.4 9.1 6.8 2.3

In UK — Reported Students (in per cent) 17.6 23.5 37.3 9.8 8.8 2.9

Source: Field survey conducted by the CDS.

Not all students are able to secure all the funding required for their education at once. Some depend on sponsorships from relatives or siblings who are working in the destination country or are a part of the diaspora settled in the UK. In order to sponsor a student to come to the UK, institutions needed to be ‘accredited by either Ofsted or its devolved equivalents’ (UKBA n.d.). Sponsoring institutions were required to ‘achieve Highly Trusted Status by April 2012, and be accredited by a relevant agency by the end of 2012. During the transition period there [would] be an interim limit on numbers sponsored by those institutions which had not meet [this] criteria’ (ibid.). The study revealed that prospective students and parents felt that reputed universities charge more since they have the Highly Trusted Status and there is increased competition to get in. On the other hand, newer universities are lesser known, more risky and hence cheaper. The earlier policy allowed students who had completed their course of study to extend their stay in an effort to seek employment in the country. This policy was amended and a halt on letting students stay back was issued. A UKBA spokesperson said: ‘Students should come to the UK to study not work. That is why this April we stopped the automatic right for students to stay on and find work after their studies’ (Coughlan 2012). This decision has however been revoked for PhD students completing their study in the UK as of 6 April 2013 (UKBA 2013a). As per the new policy, there would be a limit on the time that could be spent on a student visa to three years at lower levels (National

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Qualifications Framework [NQF] 3-5), as now, and five years at higher levels (NQF 6), with exceptions for students studying for professional qualifications or a PhD. Sponsors would be asked to vouch for academic progression where students were not moving up to the next NQF level. Tier-1 Post-Study Work would be closed from April 2012. However, graduates with a graduate-level job offer with a registered sponsoring employer would be able to switch to Tier-2 (skilled worker) whilst in the UK. For this group, there would be no resident labour market test and the numbers would not be part of the annual limit on Tier-2 visas. A new graduate entrepreneur route has been recently introduced for those students who have world-class innovative ideas and want to develop their business in the UK. In addition, the UK Border Agency is conducting more interviews as part of the visa application process, including for students. Applicants are informed if they are required to attend an interview. If not, their applications will continue to be processed on the basis of the documents they have submitted. Since the end of July 2012, visa officers have been able to refuse an application if they consider that the applicant is not a ‘genuine’ student. From 20 May 2013, when a person applies for a Tier-4 student visa, they may have to sit for ‘a short interview’ when they visit ‘the visa application centre to submit their application and biometric information . . . The interview will focus on [the] reasons for coming to the UK; this is known as a credibility interview’ (UKBA 2013b). The visa officer is then sent a report of the interview, who will consider it alongside the ‘visa application and supporting documents’ (ibid.). The applicant may be ‘called for a further interview if the visa officer needs more information’ (ibid.). Many students apply for scholarships but these are few in number and mostly students based in larger cities have access to information regarding such opportunities. The survey was based in the larger cities of India and the data reveals that only 40 of the 155 respondents had received some form of scholarship towards their education in the UK. Hence, several students migrate without any financial assistance to a much more expensive country. Most students today have to depend on loans to finance their education. Banks require collaterals which the families of these students have to provide in order to secure the loan. Details of the loan sanctioned are required before filling up the visa application form and this question was also canvassed as part of the questionnaire. Most respondents of the survey reported that they had secured loans from commercial banks.

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Conclusion We can infer from the data presented here that many Indians who go abroad for higher education also seek employment opportunities outside India. As a prospective MBA student mentioned, ‘it is easier to pay education loans quickly if you earn in dollars or pounds. If I had to earn in rupees and pay back my loan, I will live like a pauper all my life’. It is therefore a combination of attaining quality education in addition to employment opportunities that result in more Indians going to the US or the UK for higher education. It has been established that the linkages between student migration, prospective immigration and their role in the future of the diaspora needs to be studied in much more detail. The preliminary results presented in this chapter point to interesting patterns and relations that must be explored further. It is important to study other destination countries in comparison to each other to provide important links and explanations. Consultants who work as unscrupulous agents must be regulated and such practices must be understood in greater detail. A comprehensive policy overseeing international student migration will be a step in the right direction.

References British Council. n.d. ‘Education UK and English — Frequently Asked Questions’. http://www.britishcouncil.org/es/armenia-education-uk-and-english-faqeducation.htm (accessed 14 December 2013). Coughlan, Sean. 2012. ‘Overseas Students “Cannot Leave or Stay” in Visa Delays’. BBC News, 18 July. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education18888210 (accessed 30 July 2012). Cummings, William K. 1993. ‘Global Trends in Overseas Study’, in Craufurd D. Goodwin (ed.), International Investment in Human Capital: Overseas Education for Development, pp. 31–46. New York: Institute of International Education. Khadria, Binod. 2002. ‘Skilled Migration from Developing Countries: Study on India’, International Migration Paper no. 49, International Labour Office, Geneva. Labour & Immigration Research Centre. 2011. Migration Trends and Outlook 2010–2011. Wellington: Labour & Immigration Research Centre, Department of Labour, Government of New Zealand. Lall, M. 2008. ‘Indian Students in Europe: Trends, Constraints and Prospects, Living in “the Age of Migration”’. Briefing Paper, European Network of Contemporary Academic Research on India. Mukherjee, Shahana and Rupa Chanda. 2012. ‘Indian Student Mobility to

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European Countries: An Overview’. Research Report no. 2012/12, CARIMIndia, European University Institute and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India%202012 %20-%2012.pdf (accessed 13 September 2013). Naujoks, Daniel. 2009. ‘Emigration, Immigration, and Diaspora Relations in India’. Migration Information Source, October. http://www.migration information.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=745#5 (accessed 12 October 2013). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2012. Education at a Glance, 2012: OECD Indicators. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. UK Border Agency (UKBA). n.d. ‘Summary of the New Student Policy’. http:// www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/news/summarystudent-policy.pdf (accessed 14 December 2013). ———. 2013a. ‘6 April Changes to the Immigration Rules’. http://www.ukba. homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2013/april/10-rules-april (accessed 23 April 2013). ———. 2013b. ‘Student Visa — Ethiopia’. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov. uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2013/may/20-tier4ethiopia (accessed 14 December 2013). UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2011. Global Education Digest 2011: Comparing Education Statistics across the World. Montreal and Quebec: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Varghese, N. V. 2008. ‘Globalization of Higher Education and Cross-Border Student Mobility’. Research Paper, International Institute for Educational Planning and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/2008/Globalization_ HE.pdf (accessed 13 December 2013). Verbik, Line and Veronica Lasanowski. 2007. ‘International Student Mobility: Patterns and Trends’. The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, London, September. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection, 1998–2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

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Ethnic Indians in India’s Look East Policy amit Singh In the contemporary globalized world, the diasporas have emerged as a powerful factor in developing relations between the nation-states. Notably, the Indian diaspora has acted as a catalyst in strengthening bilateral relations between India and the host nations. The India–US Civil Nuclear Deal is a case in point, as ethnic Indians in the United States (US) successfully lobbied for clinching of the nuclear deal. However, the recent incidents of maltreatment of ethnic Indians in Malaysia and racist attacks on the Indian students in Australia seem to have gone against the general trend of strengthening relations between India and the host countries. Nevertheless, the Indian diaspora has the potential of furthering India’s relationship with the host nations. The Indian diaspora across the world ranks second after the Chinese. Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) are present in all parts of the globe. It has been estimated that the overseas Indian community, numbering over 25 million, is spread over 189 countries (Dubey 2003). While the history of the Indian diaspora dates back to the pre-Christian era, large-scale emigration of Indians took place mainly in the 19th and 20th centuries. The colonial period witnessed unprecedented emigration of indentured and other labourers, traders, professionals, and employees of the British government to the European (British, French and Dutch) colonies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. However, it was only post-World War II that the most far-reaching emigration of Indians took place, mainly of professionals, to the developed countries namely England, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s saw millions of Indians migrating to the Gulf and West Asian countries. In today’s globalized world, Indians in various sectors like Information Technology (IT), medicine and trade are finding opportunities abroad, which also include a large number of students

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seeking admission in developed countries, thereby adding to the numbers of the diaspora. At present, the Indian diaspora constitutes more than 40 per cent of the population in Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Guyana, and Surinam (GoI 2001: 257–59). Every Southeast Asian country has either PIOs or NRIs. An estimated 6.7 million Indians reside overseas in Southeast Asia, with onethird living in Malaysia and Singapore, 85,000 in Indonesia, 150,000 in Thailand, and 50,000 in the Philippines (MOIA n.d.). Myanmar has a sizeable number — approximately 2 million. The rest are scattered over the remaining Southeast Asian countries. The numbers are not sufficiently large for leveraging the diaspora in these countries, but they are considered important (Sridharan 2008: 79–80). Hence, this chapter is an attempt to critically analyze the impact of India’s diaspora policy with regard to ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia. It seeks to answer the following questions. What bearing has India’s contemporary diaspora policy had on the Indian diaspora in general and on Southeast Asia in particular? What is the fallout of ‘India’s Look East Policy’ on the Indian diaspora? And does India differentiate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ diasporas in the sharp societal cleavages of the host countries?

Historical Background The politico-economic and sociocultural ties between India and Southeast Asia go back to the pre-Christian era. That era dominated by the mercantile links also brought Hinduism and Buddhism to the region. The Indian influence is quite visible even in today’s Southeast Asia, especially in their language, customs and the rituals of the royalty. Hindu concepts of kingship and Hindu administrative institutions and ceremonies became so deeply embedded in the royal culture of Southeast Asian nations that even after the Islamization of some states these practices remain till date. The Indian migration during this period was relatively small in scale and limited in geographic scope (Tarling 1992). India constantly derived considerable economic benefits from its contacts with Southeast Asia. Export of gold and spices from the region to India characterized the trade relations of pre-modern periods whereas in recent times, remittances were sent back home by migrant Indians. The only difference was that in the former period, India supplied goods while in the latter period it primarily supplied labour. During the colonial period, the interaction between Southeast Asia

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and India was limited due to colonization and whatever interaction they had at that time was dependent on the colonial masters. The bulk of Indians migrated during the colonial era as plantation workers (GoI 2001: 243–71). Initially, the condition of Indians in British colonies was not much better than that of slaves. Once Indians were certain that they were there to stay permanently, they adjusted themselves to their respective societies (Lal 2003: 156–67). While it could be discernible that during colonial period, the British were only interested in replacing ‘slavery’ by recruiting ‘indenture labour’ from India, the policies it pursued were essentially to facilitate labour emigration rather than to mitigate their plight in the plantation barracks. Not only were they ‘encouraged’ to renew the period of their contract under the indenture system, the colonial rulers actively discouraged the labour from returning by charging heavy amounts of money for their return passage. This essentially served the interests of the British colonial masters rather than that of the exploited Indian plantation worker (Agent of the Government of India in Malaya 1923–24). Following the ban on the indenture system, the British encouraged the indenture labour to settle down in their island colonies. The British position was that the Indians were simply citizens of whichever colony they lived in. The British left most of their colonies with the legacy of conflict between the indentured labourers and the ethnic population of the host country. Indian nationalism played an integrating role in mobilizing the Indian diaspora around the world to gain India’s independence. They were exhorted to identify with India’s cause as only a free India could hope to protect and safeguard their interests. Since most of them were taken under a coercive colonial rule, they were visualized by the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Indian National Army (INA) as a segment sharing the sociocultural space within India. Hence, the overseas Indian community supported most of the activities of the INA and the INC wholeheartedly. This India orientation of the ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia was strengthened by periodic visits by Indian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore, and Srinivasa Sastri. The leadership of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose led to a substantial number of Indians joining the INA and the Indian Independence League (IIL) during World War II. The IIL was established in Malaya and other major Southeast Asian centres during the Japanese occupation to recruit men, collect funds and coordinate the Indian Independence Movement, which was spearheaded by the INA. Men

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and money poured into the independence movement on an unprecedented scale from all over Southeast Asia, particularly from Burma and Malaya. The Indian community in Rangoon on Netaji’s birthday in January 1945 demonstrated their trust and confidence in INA by organizing a massive rally, and donating gold and jewellery in large quantities towards India’s freedom struggle. In his message to the ethnic Indians in Burma Netaji said: When the history of India’s last war of independence comes to be written, Indians in Burma will have an honoured place in this history (Ayer 1972; Bose 2001: 134–35).

However, the whole independence movement collapsed, following the failure of the INA, the Japanese surrender and the death of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in 1945 (Sandhu 2008: 151–210).

The Cold War Era India’s interaction with the Southeast Asian region during the Cold War was more visible in bilateral relations with individual countries namely Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia rather than with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nehru’s experience of Non-Alignment influenced the entire Southeast Asian block. During the hour of crisis, New Delhi received support from some of the Southeast Asian nations, especially Malaysia during the 1962 Sino-India War and the 1965 India–Pakistan War and some of them supported India’s stand on Kashmir. They also came out openly to extend help and cooperation to India during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis and were among the first few countries to recognize Bangladesh. Despite having historical linkages with the region and support from the ASEAN countries on these critical issues, the India–Southeast relations can be summarized as a ‘missed opportunity’. This is primarily because India and ASEAN did not resolve their differences in their bilateral relations, especially in the Cold War period. While discussing India’s diaspora policy one observes that after independence, India followed the policy of dissociation with regard to its diaspora. The basic principles of India’s foreign policy were laid during the independence under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1957, Nehru stated: Indians abroad should always give primary consideration to the interest of the people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be

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placed in a position of exploiting the people of those countries; in fact, we have gone thus far and said, if you cannot be, and if you are not, friendly to the people of that country, come back to India and do not spoil the fair name of India (Nehru et al. 1972: 353–68).

This quote reflects the importance that he attached to the positive role Indians could play overseas by assimilating themselves in the host countries. Nehru did not want the presence of Indians to have a negative impact on India’s relations with the host countries. Subsequently, there was noticeable continuity and change in India’s diaspora policy but most of the successive governments followed Nehru’s path blindly. Therefore, the conditions of the overseas Indian community deteriorated in most of the host nations especially Myanmar, Malaysia, Fiji, and some of the African and Caribbean countries (Singh 2011: 85–105). In 1977, when a non-Congress government led by the Janata Party assumed power, the first signs of an official rethink vis-à-vis the diaspora appeared. Although, the Janata government did not remain in power for very long, the debate on expatriate Asians had restarted within the Indian government.

India’s Policy towards Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia did not play a major part in India’s foreign policy calculations during the 1960s, a period when India was facing major security threats from Pakistan and China. The exigencies of the Cold War, as well as political and economic considerations at home had a hand in the shaping of India’s policy towards the region. This preoccupation with its immediate neighbourhood held back India from formulating a policy towards ethnic Indians. The Indians in Southeast Asia do not evoke the suspicion and hatred of the indigenous peoples. They are small in number, most of them belonging to the weaker economical stratum of the society of the host nations, and politically they do not have much influence (Singh 2010: 443–47). V. Suryanarayan (2003) briefly illustrates two examples that are given here to examine India’s policy towards overseas Indians in Southeast Asia. The first relates to the status of Indians in Myanmar, where, unfortunately New Delhi attached greater importance to the improvement of state-to-state relations rather than protecting the legitimate interests of the Indian community. Soon after independence,

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the Burmese government initiated radical land reforms, which hit the interests of the Indian Chettiar community. A total of 2,700,000 acres of land including 14 per cent of the total cultivable land in Burma was nationalized. The market value of the land was estimated at K700 million. Despite the excellent equations between New Delhi and Rangoon, India could not persuade Burma to pay adequate compensation to the landlords. According to informed estimates, by the end of 1961, only K17,500,000 had been paid as compensation. During the second wave of nationalization in the 1960s under General Ne Win, in furtherance of the Burmese Way to socialism, Rangoon nationalized the petty retail shops owned by the Indians — 12,000 shops with assets worth K150 million were taken over by the government. An even greater setback was that the Indians were not even allowed to repatriate their savings. The repatriates complained of demonetization of currency notes, expropriation of properties, confiscation of valuables and other unimaginable humiliations. According to a policy note issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, from June 1963 onwards, 144,353 repatriates from Burma have returned to India. Even after a lapse of 40 years, the compensation due to these people has not been settled. New Delhi’s official stance had been that nationalization was strictly a matter of domestic jurisdiction (ibid.: 80–81). The PIOs who had to flee Burma were very disappointed with the government’s policy. The hard reality was that India was hardly in a position to provide any relief to them in the wake of the 1962 conflict with China. India also needed Burma’s help to tackle the Naga insurgency. Military intervention was not an option and the isolationist General Ne Win was not concerned about international opinion (Sharma 2008: 1–12). A. Mani argues in Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia (Mani et al. 2008) that in Thailand and the Philippines the Indian migration was mostly from Punjab and Sindh. As non-Muslims from these areas were extremely conscious of their ethnicity vis-à-vis Islam, they preserved their religious identity as Hindus and Sikhs after migration by maintaining close kinship ties. But Tamils in Thailand have been assimilated into Thai society through inter-ethnic marriage as they were small in number and felt no compulsion to zealously protect their Indian or Hindu identity. A crisis in Malaysia on the issue of work permits was averted by New Delhi, due to behind-the-scenes diplomacy by the Indian government. In order to solve the acute problem of unemployment, the Malaysian government in 1968 introduced the system of work permits

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for non-citizens in specialized categories. In 1969, Kuala Lumpur announced that the work permits would not be renewed, which, for all practical purposes was a warning to non-citizens to quit their jobs. If the Government had strictly enforced the rules, 55,000 Indian labourers would have lost their jobs. The Government of India and the representatives of the Malaysian Indians were able to persuade the Government to modify the regulations. Kuala Lumpur agreed to speedily dispose-off the applications for citizenship; those who applied for citizenship would be given employment passes. Those who were eligible for citizenship could also apply for it during the work permit period. If the citizens were not forthcoming, non-citizens could continue in their jobs. The last concession was a boon for the Indians, because Malays at that time were unwilling to work in the plantations. A few months later, the Malaysian government extended the work permits of all those who had applied for citizenship. However, the communal violence, which took place in Malaysia in May 1969, had a traumatic impact on the minority groups. Nearly 60,000 Indians voluntarily returned to India during this period (Suryanarayan 2003: 80–81). Therefore, India’s diaspora policy during the Cold War period or after the few decades of the Indian independence can easily be identified as a policy of dissociation with regard to their diaspora residing not only in Southeast Asia but any part of the world.

Diaspora in India’s Look East Policy The presence of the ‘new Indian Diaspora’, which consists of highlyskilled people, has enhanced India’s image in Southeast Asia especially in the field of IT and medicine. The Government of India is taking great interest in the Indian diaspora, which is evident from the Report of the High Level Committee and establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). Increased growth in trade and investment between India and ASEAN has had a positive effect with a surge of migration of skilled workers, professionals and business people to almost all the countries of ASEAN. There is a great demand and respect for these Indian professionals who are so different from the Indian immigrants who went to Southeast Asia in the 19th century, especially under the indenture system. The proactive Diaspora Policy, or from ‘active-disassociation’ to ‘active-association’, started especially after 1991, when the Indian economy faced severe crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its foreign

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exchange reserves. The crisis triggered a process of economic reforms as India prepared itself to exploit the opportunities to counter the threats arising from globalization and liberalization. There was a deep realization that India needed to restructure itself economically and needed investment for infrastructure restructuring, and neither the Indian state nor private sector had the capacity to counter the drastic situation. If India intended to develop economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalizing world, it had to aggressively pull Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and the infusion of new technologies. In this context, the larger policy shifts appears in the re-engagement of India with its diaspora in the 1990s because only affluent section of the overseas Indians, i.e., NRIs, could have become safeguards for the Indian economy in the 1990s (Dubey 2003: 141). This was the same time when India also initiated its ‘Look East Policy’ under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao’s Congress government. The Prime Minister’s proposal had instant and successful results, with India becoming a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in January 1992 and full dialogue partner in December 1995. In July 1996, India became a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As a result, it interacts with ASEAN in various bodies and meetings, which now includes 10 countries of Southeast Asia (Kaul 2001: 41–66). When India initiated its Look East Policy towards the Southeast Asian Countries, the large presence of the ethnic Indians in the region was unquestionably in the minds of the foreign policy-makers but unfortunately India could not explore this aspect in strengthening the bilateral as well as multilateral relations with the ASEAN countries despite having historical linkages and geographical proximity. India also missed the opportunity to constructively engage its diaspora and gratify the aspirations of the diasporic community. In the March 2003 incident, when nearly 300 Indian citizens, mostly IT professionals in Kuala Lumpur, were ‘maltreated’ and ‘interrogated’ by the Malaysian authorities, the Indian government reacted sharply and warned that any repetition of such incidents would affect bilateral ties. The Government of India indicated that it would reexamine bilateral agreements and other trade related concessions given to Malaysia. Foreign Regional Registration Offices (FRROs), including the one in Bangalore, were ordered to verify the credentials of Malaysian nationals registered here. India also expressed its inability to host the Malaysian Health Minister towards the end of March 2003. Earlier in the same month, during the visit of the Malaysian Entrepreneur Development Minister, his talks with Indian ministers

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were confined to the harassment of Indian IT professionals, instead of the proposed agenda. Similarly, the Ministry of Sports in consultation with the External Affairs Ministry ordered a last minute pull-out of the Indian hockey team from the prestigious Azlan Shah Cup hockey tournament that year (Singh 2007). Another example of government apathy towards the Indian diaspora is during Malaysia’s recent unrest, in November 2007, when the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) internationalized the wretched condition of the ethnic Indians in Malaysia; the Government of India’s initial response was reticent. If the incidents of March 2003 and November 2007 are compared, in the latter, the Indian government acted as a mute spectator and merely paid lip-service. However, one can also argue that all those who became the victim of ill-treatment in Kuala Lumpur on 9 March 2003 were Indian Citizens or NRIs; hence, New Delhi reacted sharply. But, on the other hand, those involved in the November 2007 incident were Malaysian citizens of Indian descent. Therefore, the Indian government did not act swiftly as they refrained from interfering in the internal matters of Malaysia. Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that even long after their migration, the people of Indian origin still consider themselves as Indians and whenever they are in trouble in the host countries they look towards India to protect their interests. On Indian diaspora policy per se, New Delhi wants to engage the PIOs but without any liabilities. The reason is quite clear as the PIOs at present do not create economic clout for the Indian government as compared to the NRIs. And, ‘after all it is all about the money’; therefore, New Delhi has been biased in its approach with regard to the people of Indian origin. Thus, once again this bias or the policy of ‘dissociation’ towards the PIOs was witnessed. It has also been witnessed that during the ‘pro-diaspora’ years, the Indian government never uttered a single word regarding the plight of the ethnic Indians residing in Myanmar at the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas or with the military junta of Myanmar. The same ‘passive’ attitude of the Indian policy-makers regarding the Indian diaspora applies not only to the ASEAN countries, but to most countries where India has sizeable expatriates. The Indian community is divided on the Indian government’s current policy of developing links with wealthy and successful overseas Indian communities and its celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas. In 2003, Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) President Datuk Seri Samy Vellu was awarded the Indian Diaspora Award, but some Malaysian Indians feel that poorer overseas Indian communities have been

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neglected. Likewise, the Indian government’s dual citizenship policy for NRIs is sometimes seen as restrictive and confined largely to Indians residing in affluent Western countries. The economic and technological rise of India brings benefits to the Indian diaspora, especially those who have been neglected for a long time. The rise of India has provided powerful linkages for selected groups of Indians situated outside India but it remains to be seen how this new global diasporic exchange will benefit the whole Indian community (Lal 2003: 167). The time has changed; hence, a more proactive diaspora policy is required. India has the moral duty to address the concerns of ethnic Indians anywhere in the world, without jeopardizing the relations with host countries. Only then will the condition of PIOs as well as that of India improve globally, as PIOs constitute more than 75 per cent of the Indian diaspora. On India’s ‘Look East’ Policy per se, C. Raja Mohan (2003) pointed out that there was scepticism within the country and the Southeast Asian nations about it. During the Cold War, India and ASEAN drifted apart, and the Look East Policy sought to reconnect the two economically. As India’s economic reforms unfolded, there was no let-up in the pace of diplomacy towards the region, which saw steady gains. Neither the controversial Indian nuclear tests of 1998, nor the economic crisis in East Asia in the late 1990s, came in the way of rapid expansion of India’s relations with the region. Trade between India and ASEAN has multiplied fourfold — from US$3.1 billion in 1991 to about US$12 billion in 2002. Yashwant Sinha, the Indian foreign minister during the Vajpayee government, pointed out at Harvard that India had quietly moved into the second phase of its Look East Policy. Phase-I of the policy was characterized by trade and investment linkages. Phase-II, according to Sinha, is marked by ‘arrangements for FTAs and establishing of institutional economic linkages with the ASEAN countries’ (ibid.). India’s Look East Policy, which was initially directed towards Southeast Asian countries, also included China, Japan, South Korea, and other Asia-Pacific nations during the second phase. Sudhir Devare (2006) pointed out that the Indian diaspora is substantial in number and influential in Southeast Asian countries but not in the case of East Asia. The second phase of the India’s Look East Policy is over and now the time has come for India to lay the ground work for the third phase in which they have to concentrate on the strategic aspects of the bilateral as well as multilateral relations in which the presence of the Indian diaspora in ASEAN as well as in East Asia and the Pacific can play a

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pivotal role in strengthening India’s profile in the region as they are carrying huge potential.

Conclusion It is interesting to note that no other country in the world is characterized with such diversity as India in terms of culture, language, region, religion, and other forms of social stratification. Emigration from India too has been widely varied in social characteristics, such as in levels of education, caste and class, place of origin, and religious and linguistic affiliations. The Indian diaspora is highly differentiated especially in the case of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ emigrants. The Indian policy towards the Indian diaspora has also varied from the colonial times to the early years of independence and on to the present times. India’s diaspora policy is not static. It has evolved during various political phases in India’s political history; the sensitivities of the nationalist struggle, the winning of independence, and the trauma of partition and the creation of the Republican constitution of the Indian Union engendered important changes in India’s relations with the diaspora. A concern for the treatment of Indian migrant labourers during the nationalist phase was replaced by post-colonial disavowal after independence of any lingering responsibility for those who were now part of a separate nation ‘overseas’, and later, a tendency to view the skilled migrants who left India as brain drain. However, by the last decade of the century, during the period of rapid economic liberalization, the value of the diaspora was rediscovered, and India adopted a constructive approach towards the Indian diaspora. It has been witnessed that India’s Look East Policy does not explore the potential of the Indian diaspora, and therefore may be summarized as a missed opportunity. If Indian policy-makers concentrated on the diaspora in the Look East Policy then the results of the policy may be more fruitful. Notwithstanding certain inaction and apathy by the Indian government, the diaspora emerged as a powerful factor in developing relations between nation-states. Now, Singapore is using the Indian diaspora as an asset by wooing the cash-rich Indian diaspora in the US for investments, technology and other expertise. This could be an eye-opener for India as well as the host countries having a sizeable number of Indian diaspora. The growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean region and in Southeast Asia is a critical reason for both the countries to engage strategically in the region. China has strengthened its naval presence

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in the South China Sea and is endeavouring to do the same in the Indian Ocean. China is also derecognizing the possession of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and others in the South China Sea. From the ASEAN perspective, India is seen as a possible counterweight against China in the region and they could rely on New Delhi to balance Beijing’s growing clout. At present, the China is using its soft power especially the large presence of its diaspora in the ASEAN region strategically. As a result, the ASEAN countries are not able to firmly oppose Beijing’s overarching behaviour in the South China Sea. Currently, 30–40 million ethnic Chinese reside in Southeast Asia and Beijing is also deriving considerable amounts from its diasporic communities. In this respect, New Delhi should learn from Beijing with regard to their proactive diaspora policy as the large presence of the Indian diaspora in the region with nationalist fervour among the overseas Indian community could act as a lynchpin in fulfilling India’s strategic dreams in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, New Delhi should use the large presence of the ethnic Indians in the region as an asset not as a liability. This is, therefore, an opportune time for India to substantially, rather than symbolically, recalibrate its diaspora policy. This recalibration can pay rich dividends to its on-going Look East Policy.

References Agent of the Government of India in British Malaya. 1923–24. Annual Report of the Agent of the Government of India in British Malaya. Madras: Manager of Publications. Ayer, S. A. 1972. Story of the INA. New Delhi: National Book Trust of India. Bose, Sisir Kumar. 2001. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. New Delhi: National Book Trust of India. Devare, Sudhir. 2006. South Asia’s Look-East Policy: How Does Southeast Asia Figure? Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Dubey, Ajay (ed.). 2003. Indian Diaspora: Global Identity. New Delhi: Kalinga Publications. Government of India (GoI). 2001. Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. Kaul, Manmohini. 2001. ‘ASEAN-India Relations during the Cold War’, in Frédéric Grare and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy. New Delhi: Manohar. Lal, Brij V. (ed.). 2003. The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora. Singapore: National University of Singapore.

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Mani, A., K. Kesavapany and P. Ramasamy (eds). 2008. Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). n.d. ‘Estimated Number of Overseas Indians’. http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/NRISPIOS-Data.pdf (accessed 10 June 2013). Mohan, C. Raja. 2003. ‘Look-East Policy: Phase Two’. The Hindu, 9 October. Nehru Jawaharlal, M. Chalapathi Rau, H. Y. Sharada Prasad, B. R. Nanda, Sarvepalli Gopal, and Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund. 1972. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. New Delhi: Orient Longman. Sandhu, K. S. 2008. ‘The Coming of the Indian to Malaysia’, in K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani (eds), Indian Communities in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies. Sharma, J. C. 2008. ‘Poised to Play Important Role’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 3(2): 1–12. Singh, Amit. 2007. ‘The Indian Diaspora as a Factor in India-Malaysia Relations’, Article no. 2349, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 7 August. http:// www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2349 (accessed 10 June 2013). ———. 2010. ‘India’s Look-East Policy and the Indian Diaspora’, World Focus, October, 443–47. ———. 2011. ‘India-Malaysia Strategic Relations’, Maritime Affairs, 7(1): 85–105. Sridharan, Kripa. 2008. ‘India and Southeast Asia in the Context of India’s Rise’, in A. Mani, K. Kesavapany and P. Ramasamy (eds), Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies. Suryanarayan, V. 2003. ‘Indian and Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective’, in Ajay Dubey (ed.), Indian Diaspora: Global Identity. New Delhi: Kalinga Publications. Tarling, Nicholas (ed.). 1992. The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From Early Times to C. 1800, vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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The Indian Diaspora in Oman VeRoniKa DeFFneR Since the oil sector began to develop in 1967 and with a change of government in 1970, the Sultanate of Oman has experienced a swift and intensive modernization resulting in far-reaching economic, social and political transformations (Valeri 2009; Pradhan 2013). The growing economy has led to a rapid increase of jobs and branch offices of foreign companies in Oman have multiplied. These developments have accelerated the need for a skilled workforce even more. This demand has had to be satisfied through recruiting foreign workers for low-paid and well-paid jobs. The most important economic activities and the highest demand for urban labour force are concentrated in the capital area of Muscat. According to the latest census in 2010, expatriates numbered 816,000 amongst the total population of more than 2 million in the Sultanate. While the labour outflow from India to other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) decreased towards the end of the 2000s, the number of Indian migrants to Oman has continuously increased. In 2010, 105,807 Indians migrated to Oman (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). Indian expatriates from all levels of society have played a decisive role in the development of the oil sector and the overall modernization of Oman. One of the reasons for this are ‘their astute skills and close commercial relations with the rulers’ (Pradhan 2013) that go back to pre-oil times and the commercial trade in the Indian Ocean. In Oman, Indians cover a very wide range of positions in the hierarchy of the labour market, from unskilled workers to professionals working for the Omani government and businessmen (ibid.: 10). Especially for the ‘mobility-prone Malayalees’ (Bomhoff 2013), the modernization dynamics in the Gulf made it possible to find — in comparison to their home country India — better-paid jobs to enable their families back home to lead a better life. A survey by the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, counted 29 emigrants per 100 households in 2008 (Zachariah and Rajan 2012).

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On average, Keralites stayed in Oman for 8.52 years in 2008 (Zachariah and Rajan 2012: 46). Keeping this in mind, the objective of this chapter is to reflect on — in addition to the already in-depth analysis of the economic and social impacts of Indian migration to the Gulf (Zachariah and Rajan 2012; Rajan 2013) — the individual situation of Indians working and living in Muscat. As the data on foreigners living in Oman shows, the country has a considerable heterogeneous, international population. Yet, the Omani society presents a very clear separation between the ‘economic space’ and the ‘socio-cultural space’ (Pradhan 2013). The first section of this contribution gives an overview on the characteristics of the Indian migration dynamics and the employment situation — regarding the possibilities and restraints — in the labour market in Oman. The second part outlines the diaspora life of Indians in Muscat against the backdrop of the academic understanding of the term ‘diaspora’. This paper thus looks at how the availability of economic, social and mobile capital shapes the way a diaspora is lived. The empirical findings, on which the following reflections are based, emanate from a socio-geographical research project, which has been carried out in Muscat since 2010. The aim of this qualitative empirical research is to understand the production of space and society in Muscat through social practices of identity and community-building, networking and mobility within different migration groups. Because of the high proportion of Malayalees amongst the Indian migrants in Oman, this research project has been extended to Kerala, where it focuses on the translocal practices of migrants and returnees back home. It intends to figure out the importance of mobility as a capital and the impact of movements on social changes in India.

Characteristics of Indian Migration and the Employment Situation in Oman Since the beginning of the oil-sector development, the migration system in the Gulf States has significantly changed multiple times. In the early stages, employees were mainly recruited from other Arab countries. In 1975, three-quarters of all migrant workers in the GCC were Arabs (UN-Habitat 2012). Since the 1990s following the Gulf War, the countries of origin shifted decisively: the labour force has been increasingly and predominantly recruited from South and Southeast Asia. Today, Asian communities make for the largest group of migrants in Oman. Of the total amount of non-Omanis in Oman, 54 per cent

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come from India, 15 per cent from Bangladesh and 2 per cent from Sri Lanka — just to mention the three largest minority groups (Ministry of National Economy 2009). The high percentage rate of Indians also originates in the longlasting history of trade relationships between the Gulf and India. However, the role the Indian community played for the Omani economy changed in the 20th century ‘from primeval commercial exchanges to high-tech-based corporate practices and innovative consumer services’ (Pradhan 2013). Together with an increasing number of labourers from Uttar Pradesh, Malayalees from Kerala as well as other south Indian migrants from Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu represent the highest share amongst the Indians in the GCC (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). A significant difference between the Indian community and other migrant communities in Muscat is that they are represented throughout all social strata. The majority of the Indian employees in Oman hold down low-paid or sponsored workers’ jobs in the service sector (especially in the construction industry, as domestic workers or cleaners). The Indian Embassy estimates that — based on the occupationwise work statistics — these blue-collared labourers (i.e., small items salesmen, domestic workers) account for 82 per cent of all Indian employees in Oman. Engineers and technicians amount to less than 10 per cent, while white-collared workers (e.g., executives, supervisors, accountants, scientists) add up to 5 per cent (data from 2010, unpublished document by the Indian Embassy, Muscat). They work in positions requiring high qualifications such as banks, national or international private corporate groups (especially finance) and Information Technology (IT) companies. Another specific phenomenon of the Indian community is, compared to other nationalities, that some of them have specific privileges and influential positions in the government or business sector. This can be explained with a long-standing trust and sympathy of the leading royal family, due to historical connections with trader families mainly from Gujarat, positive experiences and a mutual understanding in terms of sociocultural values (family, privacy, religion, etc.). The educational level of the Indian migrants is as diverse as their employment positions are. Yet, it also reflects their distribution in the different social spheres in the hierarchy of the labour market. The qualifications of Indian migrants for the most part — except for Keralites who usually hold above-average education levels — do not exceed low to medium standards; 76 per cent of Indians in Muscat

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have not graduated from secondary school and only 15 per cent are university graduates (Ministry of National Economy 2009). Men dominate the Indian workforce in Muscat with only approximately 7 per cent of the employed Indian labour immigrants being female. However, the female quota amongst the migrants varies considerably depending on their social standing and occupational field. The total foreign labour-force participation rate for males was as high as 77 per cent in Oman in 2008 (UN-Habitat 2012). At the low-salaried end of the labour market house-maids amount to 10 per cent of all Indian workers, a comparatively large number. Only a few Indian women can be found in highly qualified jobs (0.5 per cent of white-collared workers). However, even fewer work in such demanding jobs and contribute to a double-income household together with their husbands or, alternatively, live as singles all at once. Usually, many highly-skilled women do not have a job if their husbands already work. Instead, they look after family members, who have accompanied them abroad (i.e., husband and children), and/or their relatives in India. Throughout the years, the labour market in Oman has remained — like in all Gulf States — very hierarchical and segmented. The top earners amongst the international employees, who also enjoy the most privileges, are a small number of expatriates from economicallyadvanced countries. There are also highly-skilled Indians holding higher positions in the labour market hierarchy, but their salaries usually amount to far less than those of Omanis and Western expatriates. But, the majority of the Asian migrants are employed in the construction industry, or trade, manufacturing or agricultural sectors, or as domestic workers. The general working conditions they are forced to accept are significantly below that of the natives (ILO 2009: 3ff.) (e.g., working hours, consistent wage rates, etc.). Nevertheless, the Omani economy continues to depend on the foreign workforce even though the government has actively taken on countermeasures, known as ‘Omanization’, a policy aimed at systematically replacing foreign employees with Omani natives. In 1985, 52 per cent of the labour force in Oman were from overseas; a decade later in 1995 they amounted to 64 per cent (United Nations Expert Group 2006). According to the Ministry of National Economy (2009), in 2007 the percentage of foreigners in the private sector even totalled 77 per cent as opposed to 22 per cent of Omani nationals. The Omanization policy mainly succeeded in the public sector, where the quota of Omanis is estimated at 80 per cent with an upward trend. Then again, this sector offers less employment opportunities than other

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areas of the economy (Gonzales et al. 2008). Of the 638,000 foreign employees working in the private sector in 2007, 62 per cent were of Indian nationality. The second largest group of nationals are migrants from Pakistan (ca. 13 per cent), followed by Bangladeshi (ca. 12 per cent), Filipinos (ca. 2 per cent), Sri Lankans and Egyptians (ca. 1 per cent each; ILO 2009; Ministry of National Economy 2009). European expatriates are included in the category ‘other nationalities’ with ca. 9 per cent. The percentage of Indians working in the public sector is 39 per cent (Pradhan 2013). Omanis avoid insecure, poorly-paid jobs with a low reputation, thus making it necessary to recruit foreign employees. In addition to the lack of an unskilled native workforce, Oman does not have enough citizens to staff the better-paid, more prestigious and highly-qualified job positions. Hence, foreigners take on these jobs. Despite being highly trained however, these foreign employees work under the same precarious employment conditions as unskilled nationals from other countries do. Their employment contracts are usually temporary and can be made redundant on short notice too. In addition, the paradoxical situation of the society has to be considered as another challenging point for foreigners working and living in Oman. On the one hand, a large number of migrant communities live here and they amount to at least half of the urban population. They also hold very specific yet different positions in the hierarchical Omani society. On the other hand, Omani society has developed strong mechanisms of exclusion towards non-Omani nationals. Restrictions for foreigners include not being able to obtain Omani nationality or, in general, buy property. Exceptions proving the rule are mainly a number of Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) who have been offered Omani citizenship over time because of the long-term presence of their families in the country or special services to the Sultanate (e.g., after long employment or services for the Royal Court, Military, etc.). This is conditional on passing the Arabic language test. Disadvantages of achieving Omani nationality are that the citizenship of origin has to be relinquished. The granting of citizenship also gives the right to a piece of land to build a house on. But, there is another exception concerning the ability to buy property. There are designated residential areas of private investment partnerships that came up in the last decade. But this property ownership also expires after 99 years. Such practices, which would politically justify and symbolize to foreigners that they are

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accepted as ‘part of the society’, are still largely legitimized by political, social and cultural hegemony.

Indian Diaspora in Muscat Theoretical Considerations of ‘Diaspora’ The Jewish diaspora seen as the archetype (Safran 1999), e.g., the Armenians, Turkish, Greeks, Palestinians, Chinese, or the African diaspora of former slaves in the Americas (Braziel and Mannur 2003), also comes under the purview of theoretic considerations of diaspora. William Safran (1999) gave an often cited definition of ‘diasporas’ as being ‘expatriate minority communities’ which were dispersed from their centre, i.e., their home country, to the periphery or to another country. They cultivate a collective memory and melancholic attempts to keep myths of the home country alive. The immigrants do not feel fully accepted by the receiving country; instead they hope to return to their country of origin one day. They feel responsible for the safety and prosperity of their native country. Lastly, their collective identity and belongingness is shaped by the existing ties to their home country. Increasingly however, current research has found that the wish to return to or constant references to one’s place of birth have become a less important criteria for diasporas (Clifford 1999). Diaspora was mostly used in the context of the previously-mentioned historicallyand politically-motivated archetypes, and helped emphasize their religious significance (Braziel and Mannur 2003). Nevertheless, one should mention that there are important differences between diasporas and communities (Dahlman 2004). Communities, created by the feelings of belonging in national, social, ethnic, religious, or other cultural categories that are not considered diasporas can still exhibit diasporic dimensions to their practices and cultures with some communities being more diasporic than others (Clifford 1999: 310). The concept of diaspora is changing and now has more positive connotations, be they anything from latent to openly positive (Mayer 2005). Diasporic ties have become an economic success. For this reason, diasporas are now also conceptualized as a resource or asset (Kokot 2007). An underlying question is whether ‘expatriate minority communities’ are by definition diasporas if they are developed mainly through international labour migration by choice. More crucial than obtaining a steadfast scientific answer is trying to determine whether the migrants themselves feel uprooted and in misery (Mayer 2005),

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perhaps even discriminated against, excluded or marginalized from the society in which they find themselves (Clifford 1999).

Empirical Findings about the Indian Diaspora in Muscat Depicting everyday life and the organization of one homogeneous Indian community or diaspora in Muscat is nearly impossible. The possibilities and available assets to shape one’s life are just too diverse. Thus, it seems to be more reasonable to speak of various Indian communities rather than only one. The Keralite community in Muscat, for instance, has produced useful social networks. It has to be mentioned that it is rather a community that is built on the requirements everyday life abroad poses. The community-belonging is based on supporting or doing each other a favour because of residential or professional proximity, rather than distinguishing itself through identity criteria such as religion, social community (caste) or the actual place of origin. Although seldom admitted by the migrants, language plays an unobtrusive yet decisive role in choosing social contacts and networking amongst the expatriates. These language-related preferences can be especially observed amongst the non-working housewives accompanying their husbands abroad. The decisive criteria for the temporary lifestyle an expatriate leads in Oman are one’s occupation and job position. They help to secure not only economic capital, but also social and mobile capital. Thus, the lifestyle of the well-paid and higher-qualified Indians, who come to Muscat as young professionals or as experienced experts, spells unlimited mobility and sufficient funds. Even if their stay in Muscat is long term (in some cases lasting their entire professional life of up to 40 years), most of them do not maintain private contacts with Omanis — or for that matter other Asian migrants. The social networks of Non-Resident Indians (NRI) abroad generally comprise only relatives and a close-knit circle of friends, but are much smaller than at home. ‘Real’ social life is instead lived and maintained in their home country. They go home as often as possible for social functions and the annual holiday of one to two months. Interview partners in Muscat describe their contacts to colleagues or neighbours — no matter which nationality — as ‘polite, but reserved’. How members of the well-made up Indian community spend their leisure time and make use of their environment depends entirely on which phase of life they are in. Families and elderly couples regard

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living in Muscat as very pleasant, often citing aspects such as safety, peace and quiet as well as tidiness and order and comparing them to life in large Indian cities. The desire to move to another country is rarely pronounced. Instead, the close spatial proximity between Oman and home is seen as a significant advantage. The scenic charm of Oman’s countryside and the recreational possibilities it offers are little availed. Free time is mostly spent within the vicinity of the metropolitan area of Muscat. Going on holidays in Oman is not an option for the majority of the Indians. They would rather spend their free days in India or elsewhere (often combined with visiting relatives living in other countries abroad). For younger Indians of the middle and upper class, who do not have any family yet, there are two specific downsides to life when working in Muscat — lack of opportunities for social interaction and actual places to mingle, and hence, non-existing entertainment possibilities. Wealthier young Indians therefore expand their spatial radius of action by going on regular trips with friends to Dubai or venturing out into the Wadis, the desert interior for instance, or other outdoor activities like beach-camping. This allows them to consume alcohol in ‘unobserved’ spaces or to go to parties and clubs, which are usually in some of the international hotels in Muscat. This generation of 20- to 30-year-olds is internationally-orientated and has come to acquire global consumption patterns. For them, Muscat or Oman is usually only a stepping-stone in their career. Surprisingly, this age group also tends to keep to themselves; they do not seek international contacts. By contrast, the unskilled or low-qualified immigrants have to deal with entirely different restraints. Usually, they are not accompanied by family members as neither the legal regulations of their working visa, nor the requirements of their employments and the financial limitations in Oman allow for it. Consequently, the labour immigrants live on their own in a foreign country separated from their families — with all the consequences of the social costs of migration (Rajan 2013). The length of the migrants’ stay in Oman is tied to the employment contract and is limited to two years. Each time it ends, it can be prolonged by no more than another two years. Their only ambition is to cover their living expenses and help provide for their relatives at home in India. The well-elaborated scheme of overseas recruitment policies and practices from India (Rajan et al. 2011) supports low-skilled workers, who cannot avail of personal contacts or networks of friends or relatives already working overseas, in finding employment abroad.

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They do this by initiating and organizing recruitment campaigns and agencies and providing extensive information online on diaspora and emigration services. The national manpower recruitment agencies only hire workers in India. Therefore, employees that were recruited for a specific job or company in Muscat or Oman tend to keep to themselves even within the Indian working community there. As a sizeable amount of their salary — low as it is — is sent home as remittances, most workers cannot participate in local society or socially interact with others. Long working hours do not allow for much leisure time either. As a result, this huge number of anonymous modern wage slaves lives very isolated — spatially as well as socially — due to their very restrained economic and mobile capital, dedicating their lives entirely to working hard. Social interaction — if it takes place at all — is limited to the circle of co-workers, driven by the necessity to share the bedroom and the restrained spatial radius for the hardly existing leisure time. The unskilled, low-paid workers mainly live a precarious life throughout their stay in Oman. By having to hand in their documents to their employer, they are degraded legally to inferior residents. Being allowed to stay or leave is dependent on the goodwill of their employers. Instances such as exploiting work conditions, overdue salary pay-outs or various forms of harassment through sponsors have risen and been brought to light (ILO 2009). The position of the Indian Embassy or the Indian Social Club regarding such incidences is not an easy one. They are not authorized to interfere in judiciary issues of the Sultanate let alone express legal or political demands to protect Indian employees. Nonetheless, the Embassy is the only representative body for Indians in Oman. Through organizations such as the Community Welfare Section or the Indian Social Club, the Embassy acts as a mediator.

Conclusion The Indian community only occasionally interacts with the surrounding Muscat environment and society. Their view is more pragmatic, as their stay is mainly driven by the intention to make money to have a better life back home — and not by specifically being abroad. They maintain strong bonds to their origins, expressed by identifying themselves with and belonging to their regional identity. For the highly-qualified Indian workers the city is merely a place to boost their professional career and live a comfortable life. The possibilities, conditions and interests for Indians to interact with

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Muscat’s society differ greatly. The extent to which this is possible depends on the individual’s social status, i.e., their working position there. It either makes the process easier or more difficult. Economic migration is generally triggered by the hopes for a better life after returning home and as a consequence the expectations and the motivation are high no matter what social reality turns out to be. This applies, indeed, to most of the Indian immigrants irrespective of their social and working positions in Muscat. But, many Indians are neither interested nor expect to be integrated — in the sense of having all the rights of a fully-recognized citizen — into the host society of the Sultanate. Irrespective of the length of an individual’s stay in Oman, the majority never put their return home to India into question. Therefore, they still maintain strong ties and networks in their home country, India. The social contacts in their ‘temporary home’ Oman follow a more pragmatic approach to facilitate everyday life, but are not considered stable and lasting bonds after returning home. Hardly any of the interviewed NRIs showed a specific interest or need to identify themselves with one of the subset Indian communities in Muscat to keep their roots alive, as is often the case in diasporas, whose members have had to leave their home country not because of economic reasons, but for political ones. However, while analyzing the Indian diaspora in Oman, the extensive heterogeneity (regarding religion, language, regional origin, etc.) of the Indians living in the country have to be kept in mind — particularly if a so-called community is only defined by its ‘Indian-ness’. Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish a local network for the limited time in Oman in light of the strict, predetermined rights and obligations, possibilities as well as restraints of the Omani society towards foreigners. Thus, it is possible to observe specific patterns in the translocal practices of coping with everyday life that are shared amongst the Indians in Oman.Therefore, the Indian diaspora in Oman might come close to the already mentioned definition of ‘diaspora as a resource’. The condition of being on ‘stand-by’ in Oman, and to a certain extent excluded from being integrated into the host society is only occasionally perceived as a suffering. Yet, the feeling of having to suffer arises when it comes to an individual’s perceived freedom, his/her ability to move around freely and his/her overall autonomy in the host country. All of the interviewees found it much harder to accept being constricted in mobility than not having other rights or being integrated into the host society. Being able to move around freely is considered to be a very important aspect

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of an individual’s dignity and self-recognition. Not being able to determine their own spatial movements strengthens the feeling of being an inferior ‘second class’ inhabitant, tied to a specific locality, which in this case is mainly the migrant’s working place. This is likely to emphasize a feeling of ‘suffering’, which is constantly reproduced by the lack of the ‘relevant’ capital (economic plus mobile capital) and the sense of longing for home.

References Bomhoff, Manja. 2013. ‘Life-Long Mobilities and its Impact on the Elderly’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report: 2013 Social Costs of Migration, pp. 48–66. New Delhi: Routledge. Braziel, Jana Evans and Anita Mannur. 2003. ‘Nation, Migration, Globalization: Points of Contention in Diaspora Studies’, in Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader, pp. 1–22. London: Blackwell. Clifford, James. 1999. ‘Diasporas’, in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (eds), Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, pp. 215–51. Cheltenham: American Anthropological Association. Dahlman, Carl. 2004. ‘Diaspora’, in James Duncan, Nuala Johnson and Richard Schein (eds), A Companion to Cultural Geography, pp. 485–98. Oxford: Blackwell. Gonzales, Gabriella, Lynn Karoly, Louay Constant, Hanine Salem, and Charles A. Goldman. 2008. Facing Human Capital Challenges of the 21st Century: Education and Labour Market Initiatives in Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. International Labour Organization (ILO). 2009. International Labour Migration and Employment in the Arab Region: Origins, Consequences and the Way Forward. Beirut: International Labour Organization. Kokot, Waltraud. 2007. ‘Diaspora as a Resource: Transnational Networks as Cultural Capital — Factors in European Integration?’ http://www. ethnologie.uni-hamburg.de/de/_pdfs/kokot_projekt_diaspores.pdf (accessed 25 January 2013). Mayer, Ruth. 2005. Diaspora: Eine kritische Begriffsbestimmung. Bielefeld: Transcript. Ministry of National Economy. 2009. Statistical Year Book 2009. Muscat: National Center for Statistics and Information, Ministry of National Economy, Sultanate of Oman. Pradhan, Samir. 2013. ‘Oman-India Relations: Exploring the Long-Term Migration Dynamics’, in Steffen Wippel (ed.), Regionalizing Oman: Political, Economic and Social Dynamics. Dordrecht: Springer. Rajan, S. Irudaya (ed.). 2013. India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration. New Delhi: Routledge.

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Rajan, S. Irudaya, V. J. Varghese, and M. S. Jayakumar (eds). 2011. Dreaming Mobility and Buying Vulnerability: Overseas Recruitment Practices in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Safran, William. 1999. ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’, in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (eds), Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, pp. 364–80. Cheltenham: American Anthropological Association. United Nations Expert Group. 2006. ‘International Migration in the Arab Region’. UN Expert Group Meeting, 15–17 May, Beirut. http://www. un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P14_PopDiv.pdf (accessed 28 May 2013). United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 2012. The State of Arab Cities 2012: Challenges of Urban Transition. Nairobi: UN-Habitat. http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID= 3320 (accessed 25 May 2013). Valeri, Marc. 2009. Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State. New York: Columbia University Press. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection, 1998–2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

14

Indian Migrant Experiences in Oman and Bahrain RaDhiKa Kanchana anD S. iRuDaya Rajan* The

migration of Indian nationals to the Gulf has been significant since the 1970s and prominent in the current times. Currently, more data tends to be available on the Indians in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) than in rest of the Gulf countries and focused studies on Indian migrants living in the six host countries of the Gulf is relatively small (for instance, Percot 2006; Onley 2007; Ali 2010; Gardner 2010, 2011; Venier 2011; Vora 2011; Osella and Osella 2012; Rajan and Joseph 2013). Statistics and research from the perspective of the home country at the migration research unit of the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) is encouraging about the impact of migration and remittances on India and particularly Kerala (Zachariah and Rajan 2012; Rajan 2013). Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, and Oman (collectively referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], formed in 1981) extensively import foreign labour, after an economic transformation in the region with the discovery and export of oil.1 The countries have a highly restrictive policy on granting citizenship or naturalization to non-nationals (it is based on blood or descent), and the elaborate restrictive and limited rights-environment exposes the expatriate workers to acute vulnerabilities and exploitation (for wider discussion, see Longva 1999; Kapiszewski 2006; Fargues 2011). The migrant population of Indian nationality in the Gulf countries could * This research was financed by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India, through its Research Unit on International Migration (RUIM) at Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. 1 GCC nations own a significant proportion of the world’s known oil and natural gas reserves (and are estimated to comprise 46.7 per cent of the global oil trade).

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be roughly estimated to be 5 million among the total GCC population of nearly 40 million (Lal et al. 2006; Rajan and Nair 2006; Rajan 2012). Even though the six GCC countries follow a similar policy and work conditions, the significance of the expatriate population in each country and generally, the actual profile, conditions and experiences of the migrants could be different, reflecting the specific context and in accordance with factors such as size, total population and economic standing of each host country. Oman and Bahrain stand somewhat different in the region in terms of their prior historical trade links with the Indian coast. We witness an older and a more settled presence of some Indian communities. This is true in the case of the UAE as well. In addition, Oman and Bahrain have a more mixed cultural composition even in the religious sense, compared to the rest of the Gulf countries that are majorly adherents to Sunni Islam. Oman is the second-biggest nation in the region after Saudi Arabia and has a population of over 3 million. Oman has less oil resources and follows a decisive strategy to promote industrialization and diversify its economy into other areas, for example, in tourism- and gas-based industries (its natural gas reserves are claimed to rank 28th in the world). Oman’s foreign population in 2009 was nearly 36 per cent of its total population of roughly 3 million. The biggest expatriate group is Indian (the Indian embassy’s estimation is approximately 550,000). The next sizeable portion is represented by Pakistan. Oman has a more successful experience with ‘nationalization’ — compared to its neighbours, a bigger size of its citizens are actually actively engaged in the labour market. The GCC countries emphasized the nationalization policy more vigorously from the year 2000 — for example, specifying quotas in public/private sector employment with the objective of increasing national composition in the workforce. Omanization initiatives were introduced with specific occupations/ sectors targeted at a time and with attention to the implementation in a phased manner. The extent of the initiatives’ success is affirmed by the direct feedback from the expatriates themselves. A few sectors where nationalization has been successfully implemented include the banking sector, the running taxi service (which was introduced in 1990 and mandatorily dominated by Omani drivers), the Public Relations Officers (PROs) in all enterprises who form the liaisons with the government regarding all sorts of employee concerns, and small grocery and stationery stores which were traditionally run by expats.

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Bahrain is a cluster of islands (a 33-island archipelago) and has the smallest land area among the GCC nations. Another distinguishing factor is that it is the only GCC country with a significant Shia population — nearly 70 per cent of its population. Bahrain’s economy is somewhat fragile, having come to be linked over the years to that of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, especially in its tourism and commercial sector in the service industry. Bahrain’s foreign population is 666,172 according to the official census in 2010. The biggest expatriate group is that of India, with a population of around 350,000 as per the estimates from the Indian embassy. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Philippines can be cited as the next sizeable national groups. Bahrain is often hailed as the most accommodating host country for migrants in the Gulf region. It is in part because there is an official policy on human rights and anti-trafficking. Migrant workers are allowed to join trade unions (albeit sans a voting right). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 2006 Report says, ‘The Workers’ Trade Union Law of September 2002 introduced the right to belong to trade unions in Bahrain . . . workers in the private and public sector may join trade unions, including non-citizens, who make up the majority of Bahrain’s workforce’. Bahrain is the first (and only) country in the region to extend the benefit of organization to the migrant workers. But as the report also says, ‘while in theory, they [foreign workers] are allowed to join unions and run for union office, they prefer to stay out of union activities as they have no protection against dismissal’ (ibid.). Bahrain also recently constituted a single body to regulate everything connected to foreign labour, called the Labour Management and Regulatory Authority (LMRA). It has yet a wide gap on the ground to fulfil the proclaimed promise of abolishing the sponsorship/kafala system.2 Fieldwork and Personal Interactions: The paper draws on the questionnaire survey developed as a part of a larger study on the impact of the global crisis on South Asia migration to the Gulf, organized by the CDS, Kerala with support from the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India (for more details, see Rajan 2012). The personal interactions were conducted by the first author during the doctoral fieldwork carried out in Oman and Bahrain in early 2011. The fieldwork comprised semi-formal interviews held during a period

2 In simple words, a combination of work and residence permits chains a worker to one sponsor/employer.

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of three months, divided between Oman and Bahrain. Interactions were conducted with a cross-section of the Indian migrant population: low-income blue-collar workers, executive and other professionals and those running business enterprises. For the major part, the age group was between 20 and 50 years and male. It reflects the existing overall composition of the expatriate population. There was also the opportunity to interact with individuals of the other sex and of different generations. Some serious limitations in the field include transport, access to sites and groups of expatriates. The difficulty was more acute in Bahrain, particularly once the anti-government protests broke out (from mid-February 2011), when physical movement and access became constrained for the remaining period of the fieldwork.

Feedback from Questionnaires Table 14.1 gives a comparative note on the migrant’s profile from the questionnaire responses in Oman and Bahrain. There was difficulty in collecting the questionnaires. The sample is limited and is not assumed to represent the Indian migrant group. Nevertheless, it gives one a snapshot of the migrants. The respondent groups in both the cases were mainly representative of the blue-collar and low-paid workers. In general, we note that the responses were similar. The broader characteristics of the Gulf migrants confirm the popular image: generally blue-collar, male, of the productive age group, and living alone without family. In both Bahrain and Oman, the majority of the migrants have at least a secondary education and have a prior work experience in India. Visa is the most expensive item and is usually secured via family and friend networks. In general the present host country is their first destination (a few have prior experience in the UAE), and none have a contract before arrival and are generally unaware of the terms therein. Similarly, the majority have regular employment; standard work hours are eight hours per day for six days per week. The most common option for housing is a shared rented room or apartment and money is sent home increasingly through formal institutions (in Bahrain largely through transfer agencies; and in Oman more via banks). The remittance sent home appears, especially among the nonwhite-collar migrants, to be nearly or more than half of the monthly salary (or, the entire amount of savings).

Male; majority are Hindus; age group mainly between 24–40; equal number of married and unmarried respondents; all from the southern states, dominantly Kerala and Andhra Pradesh

Majority have secondary education or a bachelor degree and do not have vocational qualifications; all have prior working experience in India, in small jobs or professions, with approximate earning between `5,000–10,000

For most, Bahrain is their first host country (a small number have first experience in the UAE); the majority have already spent between three to five years and a few, more than 10 years but fewer are newcomers, with less than two years

Nearly all have come with a work visa (very few on a tourist or visit visa); visa is mostly acquired via relatives or friends (in less cases via agents, whether authorized or unauthorized); most paid at least `50,000 for the visa (on average between `60,000–80,000); visa fee is highest in the total expenditure incurred including travel, insurance, passport, and other charges

Basic profile

Competence

Experience with host country

Visa

Bahrain (No. of Survey Responses: 28)

Table 14.1: Classification of the Questionnaire Responses Oman (No. of Survey Responses: 57)

v

(Continued )

Nearly all have come with a work visa (few on a visit, or free visa); for the majority, the visa is acquired via relatives (for a small number via authorized agents and friends); on an average, most paid between `50,000– 75,000, followed by `100,000 and above (including few that came via authorized agent), for the visa. Visa fee comprises the highest expenditure item

For almost all, Oman is their first host country (two had first experience in the UAE); generally more seem to come in the second part of the year; majority have spent more than 10 years (those who came in 1990–95, followed by those in 2001–07)

Majority have a bachelor’s degree, at least a secondary education; very few have additional vocational qualifications like a degree or diploma; most have prior working experience in India, earning `5,000 on average

Male; majority are Hindus, followed by Muslims and Christians; age group between 30–50 years; majority are married; dominantly from Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, followed by Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

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In all cases, there is no contract before arriving in Bahrain

Respondents are in the low-income and other work categories, for instance, carpentry, and a lesser number in white-collar jobs; few not in regular employment are engaged in daily/piece-wage (including possibly a number of ‘undocumented migrants’) jobs

Place of work for white-collar and lower staff workers is mainly the office, the rest work at a shop or site; location is within the city or the suburbs; minimum number of hours at work is eight per day, generally six days a week. The shop-staff appear to work odd hours and all seven days and those working at a house also seem to have low pay combined with bad working hours.

The lowest salary figure is 60 Bahraini Dinars;* the average is between BD 80–100 (a rare number in the below the white-collar category touch BD 350); in most cases, salaries are paid as per ‘contract’ and there are not many occurrences of delays in payment

Work

Conditions

Compensation

Bahrain (No. of Survey Responses: 28)

India Migration Report 2013

The least salary figure in sample is 75 Omani Riyals;** the average is between 100–200 RO; a camp-boss gets about 330 RO and a civil engineer 450 RO; salaries are paid as per ‘contracts’ not much delays occur

Place of work is at a workshop or construction or public site and office for the majority; location is in the city, suburbs or in rural areas; the standard is eight hours at work per day, generally six days a week; for example, camp bosses/foremen work seven days and long hours, while municipality workers work five days per week.

Respondents are mainly in the blue-collar work category (labourers, cleaning and maintenance, municipality workers), and also work as foremen or civil engineers; many worked under the government, followed by being employed by local companies

Generally there is no contract before arrival in Oman

Oman (No. of Survey Responses: 57)

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Accommodation, expenses of work permit renewal and travel to India is mostly provided by the employer; no free food is provided usually and the responses are divided in half on provision of transport to workplace and for medical treatment (mainly acknowledged as affordable)

Nearly all the respondents’ passports are held by the employer; nearly all affirm salary/wage as being lower to that paid to a national for the same work (a few among the white-collar respond in the negative); treatment by the employer is generally alright

Almost all live alone, without family; the majority live in a rented room/apartment, labourers live at the worker camp and there are usually four persons per room.

Expenditure per month is kept at a minimum; for the low-salaried, expenditure nears half of the income; the majority use money transfer agencies or banks as mode of sending money to India

Affirmative in the majority that the crisis resulted in loss of jobs in Bahrain; most affected sector is construction and business; there is no reduction in wages or noticeable increase in number of migrants returning to India or those expected to return

Facilities

Fairness

Family

Expenditure, savings, remittance

Effect of the financial crisis

Responses are mostly in the negative when asked whether the crisis affected jobs in Oman; most affected sector is civil and construction; an engineer answers in the affirmative: 225 jobs lost, 50 per cent reduced wages in his company and 15 acquaintances returned to India!

For the workers, expenditure averages 25–30 RO; all saving seems to be sent to India; the majority use banks to send money to India (very few mention agencies, followed by hundis)a

Almost all live alone, without family; the majority live in the worker camp, or in a rented room/apartment with an average of four to five persons per room

Nearly all the respondents’ passports are held by the employer; most respond in the affirmative to restriction on movement; responses are divided equally on whether salary/wage is lower compared with that paid to a national for the same work; treatment by the employer is alright

Expenses of work permit renewal and travel to India is mostly provided by the employer; no free food and the responses are divided on provision of transport and coverage of medical expense; a few respond in the positive to being sick after arrival — reasons given included heavy work, lack of good food and climate

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Positive; rating as per most selected purposes: (8) start/ expand a business, (1) buy land, (2) build home, (4) education expenses, and (5) marriage expense

Goal-specific savings account

Positive; rating as per most selected purposes: (11) financial investments, (8) start/expand a business, (2) build home, (4) education expenses, (1) buy land, and (6) marriage expense

Majority said no/don’t know (it is possible that they did not understand the question); favoured business is real estate or construction among those who said yes

Oman (No. of Survey Responses: 57)

India Migration Report 2013

Source: Field Survey conducted by the authors. Note: a ‘Technically, a hundi is an unconditional order in writing made by a person directing another to pay a certain sum of money to a person named in the order. Hundis, being a part of the informal system have no legal status and are not covered under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Though normally regarded as bills of exchange, they were more often used as equivalents of cheques issued by indigenous bankers’ (RBI n.d.). * Bahraini Dinar (BD) = `158 = US$2.65 (as on 1 July 2013). ** Omani Riyal (RO) = `155= US$ 2.59.

Majority responded in the affirmative to starting a business in India; favoured type: shop/business, restaurant, tourism, transport, garments, software, tailoring, grocery, and agriculture

Assistance on return to India

Bahrain (No. of Survey Responses: 28)

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The cost of living appears higher in Bahrain, from the salary and savings/expense levels. The financial crisis has affected jobs and business in Bahrain on a wider and more visible scale. In Oman, the response usually was a minimal or no direct effect, except specifically in the construction sector to an extent. However, there has not been a very marked increase in the return to India by the migrants in the cases of both Bahrain and Oman resulting from the crisis. Migrants welcome an avenue to channelize their remittances to goal-accomplishment via the creation of a unique savings account. They prefer to avail of an opportunity to create an income-generating option as a return plan. Interestingly, none chose the option, ‘to save for retirement’. To the question on assistance with training to start a business on returning to India, the majority expressed uncertainty; it could indicate the lack of clarity regarding what such training could entail and its actual utility.

Other Comments (a) Remittances are not sent on a monthly basis in most cases. The frequency often depends on the earning level (for example, a maintenance worker in Bahrain working in a residential complex earns 110 BD per month [plus, any over-time pay] and sends a lump-sum remittance home every two to three months, after allowing for roughly 30 BD for his monthly expenses). (b) In the cases where a contract exists, ‘annual leave’ to India is usually once in every two years (often three years) for two to four months, with the air fare being borne by the employer (the option of cash conversion is sometimes availed). (c) At times the sponsor or kafil and the actual employer/place of work are different. Called ‘free visas’ in common parlance, workers are brought with visas on a sponsor’s name and allowed to work for another entity or on their own — they are often also charged a monthly fee. Selling of visas by some nationals is a wide practice and a convenient source of supplemental income. (d) Middle- and higher-income migrants (including those engaged in entrepreneurial activity) generally do not show a preference to disclose salary/earning or remittance figures — possibly due to the fact that most surveys appear to specifically target the low-skilled workers.

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It is observed that the migrants in both countries have not been widely affected by the financial crisis. It is primarily the migrants engaged in construction and related sectors who have been relatively affected (more in Bahrain). Majority of the respondents show no notable long-term planning after return to the home country. The low-skilled and blue-collar workers seem to be preoccupied with the short- and medium-term goals: first, loan servicing and repayment and second, meeting the regular expenses of the family in India. A few talked about building a house or acquiring land as a medium-term investment option. Most migrants in the low-income group state that they were not clearly aware of the specific terms of the job contract, let alone before arriving in the host country (the practice is said to be improving in Bahrain with the new LMRA provisions). In both the countries, there is repeated mention of either regular delays or nonpayment of salary (in increased incidence in Bahrain as an effect of the financial crisis).

Observations on the Living Experiences of Migrants Bahrain Bad Housing The housing status of the blue-collar workers who live outside the company-provided labour camps is very often deplorable. Workers often live in ‘independent’ accommodation for several reasons — it is not provided by the employers, or they choose this option for the purpose of saving money (to save part of accommodation allowance by paying cheaper rent), or because the migrants are ‘undocumented’, forced to find housing options (the runaways or those overstaying their visas). Accommodation quarters are often unsafe, cramped, and lacking in facilities. One of the site visits showed a ‘newly’-constructed room atop a ground floor, with walls and also the ceiling made of plywood, and no window (let alone an air-conditioner for the extreme summers in the region)! The recurring incidents of fire-related accidents at living quarters linked to low-paid migrants are a testimony to the prevalence of poor safety and minimum standards. In a fire accident in Manama, the suggested cause was short circuit due to electricity not being installed properly and lack of proper cooking facility (cooking is commonly done in the corridors) (Torr 2011). The

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general verdict would be that the local landlords hardly care about ensuring basic amenities for their property. The process of renting out and collecting the monthly dues is often sub-contracted; thus, the landlords remain aloof and unconcerned.

Trafficking of Women Bahrain proclaims itself an entertainment get-away in the region, second to Dubai and it caters in particular to visitors from Saudi Arabia. Proximity is a key attraction factor (via the popular 26-km King Fahd Causeway), as also is the relative liberal atmosphere and pro-tourism policy of Bahrain. Before the more recent imposition of restrictions, entertainment hubs are said to have been plentiful with freer drinks and dancing bars. Every such hotel or club hosted dancing girls of several nationalities — including, the Indian mujra3 dancers that were popular. Girls from Russia comprised a sizeable number (possibly owing to their not requiring a visa). Prostitution is also said to have been rife. Bahrain has an appellation of being an ‘entertainment paradise for the Saudis’ but perhaps there was a perception that it had become cheap tourism and a concern to the values of Bahrain society. Today, there is more regulation and the scene appears much controlled: running dance bars is banned in three-starred hotels and below. Hence, the scope of trafficking of women and prostitution assumedly has come down significantly. Local human rights activists continue to express frustration that the sphere of protection or justice remains limited, because legally the definition of ‘trafficking’ in Bahrain is limited to or equated with prostitution.

Vulnerable Fishermen Indian migrant ‘fishermen’ in the Gulf are less known despite being probably an older migrating group and also one of the most exploited labour groups. Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are possibly an exception to represent this group. The Kanyakumari Fishermen Association stands proof of this expat-worker group in Bahrain. Usually, they come on a ‘sea men’ visa and there is ordinarily no contract, living accommodation or air ticket provided. The majority appear to have coastal 3 Mujra is a dance form that originated in the Mughal era, performed by tawaifs (courtesans) combining elements of native classical Kathak and Hindustani classical music like ghazals and thumris (see Dewey 2008: 147–49).

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origins, hailing from Tamil Nadu — Tuticorin, Kanyakumari, Ramnad regions — and also from India’s neighbour, Bangladesh. Their issues might be somewhat different: the work/living sites are closer to the water-front like near Sitra, Muharraq and Manama in Bahrain. Often, many are said to live on the boats and have problems with proper accommodation. The fishing work is limited to nine months in the year and they work in shifts of 3pm –6am with no day off. There exists the danger of being arrested if the boats are found drifting and caught off the Qatar shores, which has happened often in earlier years. In such cases, fishermen face a penalty and a period of imprisonment (Toumi 2011b).

Oman Abuse in the Interior Regions Monitoring the conditions and well-being of migrant workers is an additional challenge in Oman (like Saudi Arabia) because the country has much larger interior and secluded areas. Therefore, the scope for abuse is larger and quite prevalent in Oman. The harshest cases are reported in the interior regions and they get less or late media coverage. The most problematic area is that of the domestic workers, as vouched for by the high number of complaint cases. Gaining access to the public for information or for assistance outside the sponsor’s home gets much slimmer. Peoples’ attitudes in the rural interior are also sometimes said to be less considerate to migrants than for example, in the more urban areas of Muscat, Sohar, Sur, or Salalah. Oman was the last country to abolish slavery in the region in 19704 — it is alleged that persistence of such attitudes among some sections of the population is partly an explanation for the extent and the nature of abuse prevalent here which is acknowledged by the police, activists and respective embassies of the sending countries. Although Oman is known to be friendlier to Indians/Asians as compared to the other countries in the Gulf region, the instances of exploitation that we found there proved the argument to be wrong. An embassy official even shared a personal opinion that Oman in reality is second only to in terms of exploitation.

4 Slavery was abolished in 1962 in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and in 1963 in the UAE.

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Runaway5 Domestic Workers They run away in desperation because of harsh conditions found at the sponsor’s house and/or due to the attraction of better earning opportunities on getting out. The domestic workers do not usually have knowledge of the full implications of running away from the sponsors’ houses and of their alternative options. They are often unaware that they cannot work again and stand to lose their legal status; they might anticipate being put in jail. One of the new demands by the Indian embassy that each domestic worker be given a mobile phone with a valid SIM card by the sponsor was noted to have a welcome effect towards empowering and keeping a domestic worker better connected with the world outside. Some of the runaways succeed in reaching relevant help channels or the embassy and get assistance to return to India. Frequently, these domestic workers defer the prospect of returning home because of the shame/trauma of their experiences and try to stay in the loop as long as they can survive (even foregoing an opportunity like amnesty). Those runaway domestic workers who become undocumented are fortunate if they find work with a new employer, although clandestine. They are either given accommodation by the new employer, or they find other runaway domestic workers to share an accommodation with or take shelter with a willing male expatriate worker. The runaway domestic workers experience a status of acute vulnerability owing to: their undocumented status, the need to find a roof over their heads, the financial necessity to meet daily costs in the host country (and back in India), and by the dependence on the cooperation/goodwill of another male co-expatriate. Many women end up being taken advantage of.

Conclusion From the ground observations, two key problematic areas concerning the expatriates are the continuing practice of passport-retention by the local sponsors/employers and the neglect of the dimension of justice. 5

A worker is marked as a runway and as being undocumented if he/she chooses to work for another sponsor without changing her visa accordingly (which is highly cumbersome to accomplish and also with the consent of the earlier employer).

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The holding of passports is a prevalent problem observed in both the countries (endemic to the Gulf region in general). It is central to making the expatriate workers vulnerable to exploitation and to restriction on their mobility in the host country. Nearly all GCC countries have declared an official ban on it yet the actual picture on the ground is different — retention of passports of migrants by employers is still a recurrent and de facto practice. It is a routine at the low-skilled level, but the practice is normally applied to other professional levels as well, except at the higher executive and senior positions. The high proportion of regular grievance cases noted in Bahrain and Oman is supporting evidence — for example, at the monthly ‘Open House’6 organized by the Indian Embassy. The kafil/local sponsor is technically ‘responsible’ for the expatriate worker while he is in the host country and the safe-keeping of the worker’s passport also comes under his sway. But, it is widely understood that the kafala practice in the Gulf countries acts to protect and privilege the interests of the local employer in most cases. The widespread lack of implementation of justice is a crucial problem that encourages the perpetration of injustices to continue and proliferate. It is rare for a culpable employer to be actually punished for the abuse or crime committed, in spite of a court verdict (e.g., convicted for withholding a passport, physical or other abuse, or other misuse of power). The ‘best’ or most practical solution almost universally sought is the route of ‘compensation’ for the migrant victim, who afterward is generally packed off to the home country. The staff at the diplomatic missions appear to be primarily engaged in a ‘firefighting’ and ‘mediating’ role, as also are the local activists working against migrant exploitation (expat or otherwise). Most often, when we say that a migrant worker is being ‘helped’ it simply means that he/she was being actively persuaded to reach a settlement/compensation with the employer and to negotiate for the return of the passport. It is a principal leverage enjoyed by the local employer. It is popular knowledge (including among the local police) that a worker (especially, a ‘runaway’) is very often slapped with arbitrary allegation of a crime by an employer (e.g., theft). He/she becomes liable 6 The migrants are invited to air grievances directly with the concerned officials at the Embassy, thus facilitating quicker action to be initiated. Usually, it is attended by the Embassy’s empanelled lawyers and also a group of expat/ other activists from representative associations and is open to media (the Ambassador might also participate, like in Bahrain).

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for ‘absconding charges’ (monetary penalty for discontinuing work before the end of a contract). The criminal charge makes the worker liable to be jailed for an undetermined period until proven otherwise. Horton (2009) appropriately sums it up. The same applies to the case of ‘free-visas’ — punishing only the migrants without also tackling the extensive practice of the native sponsors’ ‘selling’ of visas will not address the issue effectively. In a rare and recent instance in Qatar, a sponsor was publicly indicted and fined a hefty sum for the practice (Toumi 2011a). As per the feedback received, Indian migrants fare relatively better in Bahrain and Oman, than their compatriots do in other Gulf countries. Structural limitations on the workers and the profiles of the Indian expatriates are similar. In Bahrain and Oman, the oil and related industry is less predominant as a work sector. A second aspect is that there is a much bigger size of ‘old-timers’ or long-time Indian residents, sometimes more than three or four generations. This suggests a better integration and the formation of lasting bonds in these societies. Oman, Bahrain and the UAE share this aspect of having a bigger and older resident Indian merchant community as countries with a history of trading with India. Finally, it is reiterated that among the migrant community in the Gulf, the section engaged in skilled, professional and entrepreneurial activities often goes unaccounted for (in addition to the blue-collar migrant component); it is also a notable presence in the case of Oman and Bahrain.

References Ali, Syed. 2010. Dubai: Gilded Cage. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dewey, Susan. 2008. Hollow Bodies: Institutional Responses to Sex Trafficking in Armenia, Bosnia, and India. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. Fargues, Philippe. 2011. ‘Immigration without Inclusion: Non-Nationals in Nation-Building in the Gulf States’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 20(3/4): 273–92. Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca, New York and London: ILR Press. ———. 2011. ‘Gulf Migration and the Family’, Journal of Arabian Studies, 1(1): 3–25. Horton, Les. 2009. ‘Lock up Rogue Sponsors – Not their Victims!’ Gulf Daily News, 23 October. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 2006. ‘Trade Union Rights in Law’. http://archive.is/x8VH (accessed 16 December 2013).

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Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2006. ‘Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries’. Paper prepared for the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, 15–17 May, Beirut. Lal, Brij V., Peter Reeves and Rajesh Rai (eds). 2006. The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Paris: Didier Millet, in association with National University of Singapore. Longva, Anh Nga. 1999. ‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf’, Middle East Report, 211: 20–22. Onley, James. 2007. The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth Century Gulf. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Osella, Caroline and Filippo Osella. 2012. ‘Migration, Networks and Connectedness across the Indian Ocean’, in Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar (eds), Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Percot, Marie. 2006. ‘Indian Nurses in the Gulf: Two Generations of Female Migration’, South Asia Research, 26(1): 41–62. Rajan, S. Irudaya (ed.). 2012. India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances. New Delhi: Routledge. ———. 2013. India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. Irudaya and Jolin Joseph. 2013. ‘Adapting, Adjusting and Accommodating: Social Costs of Migration to Saudi Arabia’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration, pp. 139–53. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. Irudaya and P. R. Gopinathan Nair. 2006. ‘Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Gulf States’, in Brij V. Lal, Peter Reeves and Rajesh Rai (eds), The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Paris: Didier Millet, in association with National University of Singapore. Reserve Bank of India (RBI). n.d. ‘Hundies’. http://rbi.org.in/scripts/ms_ hundies.aspx (accessed 18 December 2013). Torr, Rebecca. 2011. ‘80 Homeless after Deadly Blaze’. Gulf Daily News, 6 February 2011. http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx? storyid=298763 (accessed 17 December 2013). Toumi, Habib. 2011a. ‘Hefty Fine for “Free Visa” Trafficker in Qatar’. Gulf News, 20 October. ———. 2011b. ‘Qatar Detains 32 Bahrain-Based Indian Fishermen’. Gulf News, 16 July. Venier, Philippe. 2011. ‘Development of Entrepreneurial Initiatives in the UAE among Kerala Emigrants’, in S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot (eds), Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives, pp. 164–94. New Delhi: Routledge.

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Vora, Neha. 2011. ‘From Golden Frontier to Global City: Shifting Forms of Belonging, “Freedom”, and Governance among Indian Businessmen in Dubai’, American Anthropologist, 113(2): 306–18. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection 1998– 2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

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Nitaqat — Second Wave of Saudization Is it an Answer to the Domestic Discontent? zaKiR huSSain Saudi Arabia recently announced a plan — Nitaqat — for increasing Saudization in private-sector enterprises. Official statistics reveal over 550,000 Saudi job seekers, including women, in a country of 8 million foreign workers predominantly employed in the private sector. Nitaqat has undertaken two distinct measures. First, to limit the ability of private-sector enterprises to employ expatriate workers; and second, to limit the duration of expatriates’ residency to a maximum of six years. The term ‘Saudization’ has various definitions. However, its central theme revolves around ‘localization of job’. This is achieved based on the concept of increasing the percentage share of national labour force vis-à-vis foreign contract workers excessively employed in the private sector. According to Looney (2004b), Saudization is a process of replacing ‘the expatriate workforce with a locally qualified and skilled workforce’. The Ministry of Labour (2008, quoted in Torofdar 2011: 3) defines ‘Saudization’ as ‘part of a greater vision aimed at increasing self-sufficiency and security within Saudi society’. Saudization is modelled on a quota-based reservation of economic sectors, with its objective being to ‘increase the number of nationals in the private sector while reducing the proportion of expatriate workers’ (Looney 2004a; Torofdar 2011). To augment the policy of Saudization, government set up, in 1999, two main agencies — ‘the Human Resources Development (HRD) Fund and the Co-operative Training Scheme for Saudis’ (Torofdar 2011). Saudization was first effectively announced in 1994, focusing on obtaining three intertwined goals: (a) ‘increasing employment for Saudi nationals’; (b) ‘reducing and reversing over-reliance on foreign workers’; and (c) ‘recapturing and reinvesting income which otherwise would have flowed overseas as remittances to other countries’ (Torofdar 2011; also see Looney 2004b).

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The pitfalls of presence of expatriate workers in the region were pointed out by experts in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the oil-rich countries continued with their open-door demographic policy, as their domestic labour markets failed to evolve a flexible structure and adjust with the growing demand for labour required to execute developmental projects. The inflow of contract workers did not decline with the decrease in oil wealth, as hypothesized by experts. The economy and society got addicted to cheap expatriate workers. As a part of the social agreement, the region’s political system also promoted the inflow of expatriate workers. In all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)1 countries, expatriate workers are predominantly deployed in the private sector. Except in 1950, the Saudi government encouraged expatriate workers in the private sector and reserved the public sector exclusively for nationals. The share of nationals employed in the private sector increased subsequently with the rapid growth in the sector. However, the public sector, dependent upon oil revenue, could not expand with the rapidly growing labour force in the country. The Nitaqat programme was conceived as part of a 25-year grand employment generation programme aimed at eliminating unemployment among the nationals in a three-phased manner. It aims to generate approximately 1.12 million jobs by 2014 and reduce economic loss by reducing wealth remittance, approximately SR100 billion (US$27 billion) annually. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the third-largest remittance paying country in the world, next only to the United States (US) and Switzerland. Area-wise Saudi Arabia is slightly more than one-fifth the size of the US and in population Saudi Arabia ranks 14th among countries that have a population size smaller than that of the US. Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to examine the following aspects of the Nitaqat programme: (a) How does the second wave of Saudization differ from the earlier versions? 1 The GCC was formed in 1981 and comprises the six Gulf countries, including Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The main aim of the bloc was to defend the member countries from the two big regional powers — Iran and Iraq. However, the bloc assumed economic significance after 1990 and presently contains 45 per cent oil and 25 per cent gas deposits of the world. The bloc is a rich trillion dollar-plus buyers’ market.

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(b) What is the contextual reality of Saudization? Is it a response to the Arab Spring?

The Second Wave of Saudization In the present context, Nitaqat (‘scope’, in Arabic), is meant to limit private-sector companies’ employment of expatriate workers. According to Al-Alami, a US-educated management consultant, the new Nitaqat programme was part of a 25-year plan drawn up in the mid2000s to gradually wean the economy off foreign labour dependence with a skilled Saudi workforce to replace it (Ottaway 2012). Official statistics reveal that the private sector employs more than 90 per cent of the total 9 million expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Nitaqat aims to achieve its objective by applying three distinct policy measures: (a) limiting the ‘scope’ or ‘ability’ of the private sector enterprises to employ foreign workers; (b) limiting the ‘duration’ of foreigners’ stay in the Kingdom; and (c) a ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy. Nitaqat divides private-sector enterprises into four categories — Silver/Excellent, Green, Yellow, and Red — depending on the degree of adherence to quotas of Saudization. The new programme avoids the earlier blanket imposition of 30 per cent Saudization on all companies; it proposes 205 categories of quotas, depending upon the size of the enterprise and nature of work. For instance, in the banking sector, 70 per cent employment will be reserved for Saudis, in the media 19 per cent, and in the construction sector 10 per cent. As reported in Arab News, ‘[c]ommercial establishments, insurance companies and public schools will have the same 19-percent quota, according to Al-Madinah. Some job categories do not have quotas, while others are reserved exclusively for Saudis . . . [t]he Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry ordered the immediate Saudization of shops selling women’s clothing, including abayas and lingerie (2011b). It further stated that ‘all saleswomen should be Saudis’ and that the working time should follow ministry regulations (ibid.). In addition, there are ‘exclusive working zones’ for women (ibid.). A total of 49 economic activities, including four recent ones — petrol stations, work related to stone, granite and tiles; and transport of goods and passengers outside cities have been added to the Nitaqat list (Arab News 2012). Companies categorized as ‘Silver/Excellent’ and ‘Green’ need to meet 100 per cent Saudization. ‘Silver’ companies have a grace period of one year, ‘Green’ ones six months and ‘Yellow’ companies nine months. ‘Red’ enterprises are deprived of all benefits, including issue

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of visas, renewal of iqama (work permit), transfer of visas, opening new branches, or facilities with Labour Offices. If they do not improve their nationalization records within six months, they also face closure. According to the Labour Minister, around 30–40 per cent enterprises fall in this category. ‘Green’ companies enjoy complete freedom to manage their expatriate workers. They can transfer or change the services or professions of expatriate workers and even transfer them without fulfilling the condition of spending two years with their current employers. They can renew the iqama irrespective of their period of stay in the Kingdom. They are also authorized to sign up expatriate workers of the ‘Red’ and ‘Yellow’ categories directly even without taking permission of their current employers. According to Haatab Al Anazi, spokesman of the Ministry of Labour, the new system allows renewal of iqama for expatriates working in ‘Green’ and ‘Silver’ companies freely; iqama of the foreign workers in ‘Red’ companies will not be renewed, irrespective of the years they have spent in the Kingdom, ‘Yellow’ companies will need to correct the Saudization conditions to get the iqama of their workers renewed. Expatriate workers of ‘Red’ companies would not be allowed residency of above six years. The Nitaqat system does not apply to the household sector, which absorbs a sizeable percentage of expatriate workers. Table 15.1 schematizes the provisions of the programme. By this, government plans to generate approximately or absorb around 50 per cent, including graduates, of the total national labour force. According to David B. Ottaway, the Saudi government has ‘adopted the U.S. Republican political mantra, “jobs, jobs, jobs.” It is pressing the private sector as never before to solve a problem it cannot: jobs for 250,000 to 300,000 Saudi university graduates and other youth entering the labor market every year’ (2012: 5). The labour minister Adil Fakih recently announced the launch of a new programme ‘Jahiz’ or ‘ready’ which ‘will create job opportunities for Saudi students who have just finished their scholarship programmes abroad and returned home’ (Zawya 2012). Since King Abdullah ascended the throne in 2005, under international scholarship programme the kingdom has sent large number of students, particularly to the US for higher education. Approximately 130,000 students are abroad and the total cost incurred on their scholarship is estimated approximately of $5 billion (Knickmeyer 2012). Prior to 2001, 66,000 Saudi students were present in different universities and colleges of the US; however, after 9/11 the US authorities almost

Concession

l

l

l

l

Features regarding Expatriate Workers

Applications for visas will be received according to the new rules provided the enterprises do not fall to a category lower than Green after granting the visas; Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every two months.

Can change their professions, including those restricted to Saudi nationals except for professions exempted (these professions are reserved for Saudis even in the Silver/Excellent category categories like receptionist, expediter, cashier, civil security guard, etc.); Can transfer their services to themselves together with change of profession simultaneously (in Silver/ Excellent category, an enterprise will be allowed to transfer the services of expatriate workers to it together with change of profession simultaneously provided the enterprise does not fall below the excellent category; it does not submit applications for transfer of workers’ services more than once every two months); Can transfer their services to themselves even if the worker has not spent two years with his current employer (Silver/Excellent group companies will be allowed to transfer the services of expatriate workers to it without the need to fulfil the condition that the worker should spend two years with his current employer); Can renew their work permits irrespective of their period of stay in the Kingdom, provided the remaining period before the expiry of the iqama is at least three months on the day of renewal of the work permit; Can sign contracts with expatriate workers from companies and establishments falling in the Red and Yellow categories and transfer their services to themselves without the consent of the employer.

Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for exit-only visas (i.e., one visa for every two workers departing from the Kingdom for good); Can change the profession of their expatriate workers except for professions restricted for Saudi nationals; Can renew work permits irrespective of the workers’ period of stay in the Kingdom; Can directly sign contracts with expatriate workers from Yellow and Red companies (provided it does not drop below the Green category).

One year

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

India Migration Report 2013

Green

Grace Period

Penal Action

Concession

Provision

v

Silver/Excellent

Category

Table 15.1: Schematization of the Nitaqat Programme

214

Grace Period

Penal Action

Concession

Grace Period

Penal Action

Can avail the benefits provided they do not fall to a lower category after visas have been granted; Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every two months.

Applications for new or seasonal visas will not be accepted; Cannot transfer the services of expatriate workers to itself; Cannot change the profession of its workers; Their expatriate workers can freely sign contracts with a new employer.

Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for exit-only visas, provided the two workers have actually departed from the Kingdom and the application for replacement visa is submitted within one year from the date of departure of the first worker; Can renew the work permits of its expatriate workers provided they have not spent a total of more than six years in the Kingdom, irrespective of the period the worker has spent with the employer.

Cannot change workers’ professions; Cannot transfer expatriate workers’ services to themselves; Cannot get any new, replacement or seasonal visas; Cannot open files for new enterprises (whether they are entities or branches) at the labour offices; Cannot renew work permits; Cannot stop their expatriate workers from signing contracts with a new Silver or Green company employer.

Can renew the work permits of expatriate workers irrespective of their period of stay on the condition that the remaining period in the visa does not exceed three months on the date of renewal of work permit.

l

l

l

New rules do not apply to household servants; Renewal of their iqama is not linked to the duration of stay in the country; Their visa would be automatically renewed, depending upon the sponsors’ will.

Six months

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Nine months

l

l

l

l

l

l

Six months

l

l

v

Source: Compiled by the author from various Gulf-based newspapers and concerned websites.

Miscellaneous

Red

Yellow

Concession

Grace Period

Penal Action

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closed the visa service to Saudi students. As a result, by 2004, their number declined to 1,000. It was only after the ‘pivotal meeting in 2005 at the president’s ranch in Crawford, Texas’, that the King was able to convince George W. Bush that ‘the education program’ between the two countries ‘was crucial for the two countries’ long-term relationship’ (Knickmeyer 2012). ‘The stated goal of the programme, which, the Arab News daily in December reported cost more than 20 billion riyals [US$5.3 billion]), is to prepare Saudi nationals to replace expatriate workers in better-paid technical jobs in the kingdom, reducing unemployment’ (McDowall 2012). The wave of returnees . . . is growing yearly. From just a few hundred graduates from U.S. institutions in 2006, their number reached 6,000 in 2012, a 50 percent increase . . . [Mody] Alkhalif [director of cultural affairs at the Saudi embassy in Washington] said, “very few” graduates were electing not to return home. Another embassy official quoted in March by the English daily Arab News said that so far “only 13 students applied for citizenship in the United States” (Ottaway 2012: 4).

How Nitaqat is Different from Past Efforts The programme avoids taking direct administrative measures by imposing a blanket quota or restricting inflow of contract workers in the country. But it has indirectly prepared the ground for it by tightening the private companies’ employability of expatriate workers: ‘the state will impose a six-year cap on residency visas for expatriate workers, if their employers fail to meet quotas’ (Sfakianakis 2011). The new programme ‘is more dynamic and pragmatic’; it is based on ‘applying 205 categories of quotas that vary on the line of “work” and “size” of the company’ (ibid.). The criterion of reserving jobs is based on a meticulous approach of striking a balance between creation of employment opportunities for Saudis and economic viability of private enterprises. The programme systematically analyzes current and projected demands for jobs and the economic capacity of different enterprises to absorb Saudi employees. Its provisions also seem futuristic, proposing adoption of Saudization in a phased manner. Table 15.2 provides the estimated level of nationalization required for companies employing 3,000 and more people in Saudi Arabia. The thriving private sector has maintained its growth and competitiveness on account of cheap, efficient contract workers working for long hours; non-Saudis are paid one-fourth the average salary of Saudis. For instance, in 2009 the average monthly private-sector wage

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Table 15.2: Saudization Bands across Various Business Lines (in per cent) Category of Profession Transport of Goods within Cities Farmers, Fishermen and Herdsmen Agriculture, Fishing, Grazing, and Horse Rearing Agriculture and Livestock Production Pharmacies and Drug Stores Foreign Schools Building Materials and Construction Construction Maintenance, Operation and Subsistence Nutrition Services Laboratory Manufacturing Health Services Wholesale and Retail Trade Private and Public Schools for Boys Accommodation and Tourism Ground Transportation to Passengers, within Cities Storage Insurance and Business Services Mines and Quarries Cement Industry Trading Gold and Jewellery Air Transport Collection Offices and Real Estate Services Personal Services Printing, Publishing and Media Electricity, Gas and Water Kindergartens, Institutes and Colleges Maritime Transport Communications Community Services and Social Work Petrochemical, Coal and Rubber Private and Public Schools for Girls Oil and Gas Extraction Security Guards Employment Agencies Financial Institutions Offices of Public Services Recruiters Eligibility Source: Al Masah Capital Limited (2011: 33).

Red Yellow Green

Excellent/ Silver

7 1 4 5 9 6 4 3

11 8 13 9 14 14 7 6

21 26 26 26 29 29 30 30

22 27 27 27 30 30 31 31

4 11 7 9 9 14 5 4 9 4 9 7 9 9 4 4 14 7 14 9 9 9 19 39 14 51 51 49 9 9

15 16 19 19 24 19 17 11 29 19 29 29 28 29 17 12 34 19 34 29 29 21 44 49 34 76 76 64 29 29

30 31 34 34 36 39 41 44 44 54 59 59 59 59 59 64 64 69 69 74 74 74 74 79 84 86 86 89 89 89

31 32 35 35 37 40 42 45 45 55 60 60 60 60 60 65 65 70 70 75 75 75 75 80 85 87 87 90 90 90

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for nationals was SR3,137 per month, and for expatriates for the same job, was around SR765. The authorities have also raised minimum wages in the private sector to encourage Saudi employment.

Nitaqat and the Arab Spring The timing of the renewed emphasis of Saudization under the new name of Nitaqat seems essential and opportune for the Kingdom now, both from the political as well as economic angles. Politically, Saudi Arabia needs to insulate itself from the political ‘tsunami’ of the Arab Spring, spearheaded by the youth who are mainly discontented with the growing unemployment, social inequality and suspicious role of the regime. The government has vigorously revised, at least in policy prescription, the employment policy of the private sector and attempted to generate employment opportunities. It has mandated the private-sector firms to employ a certain percentage of the nationals. Economically, the regime can afford the high cost of addressing emergent problems and create an enabling atmosphere for redressing and mitigating socioeconomic and political discontent. The high level of oil prices have given an enormous economic capability to the regime to afford a lavish lifestyle and largely unproductive policies to appease the citizens, particularly the youth who are witnessing a relatively high level of unemployment. The immediate objectives of Nitaqat are: (a) neutralizing the spill-over effects of ongoing regional turbulence in the country by reducing unemployment among citizens, thus ensuring a medium- to long-term socioeconomic and political stability in the country; (b) stimulating economic growth by plugging the huge remittance outflow; (c) preparing the nationals to take up their labour market responsibilities through better education, training and skill upgradation programmes and weeding out skill mismatch; and (d) reducing dependence upon expatriate workers through effective labour management policy.

Unemployment John Sfakianakis, Chief Economist, Banque Saudi Fransi (SFB), views the new programme as ‘desperate measures’ in ‘desperate times’

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(Sfakianakis et al. 2011). Another thing that perhaps goaded the Saudi authorities to announce the new policy is the increasing unemployment among nationals, despite the large number of jobs generated in recent years and the robust economic growth. According to official statistics, unemployment is currently running as high as 10.5 per cent (see Figure 15.1). Figure 15.1: Total and Youth Unemployment in Saudi Arabia, 2006–10

Source: ILO (2009: 2).

Men in the age group 20–24 experienced 30.3 per cent unemployment, while 12.7 per cent men in the age group 25–29 are without work. According to Al-Dosary et al. (2005), around 20–30 per cent university graduates are unemployed. Another source estimates that unemployment rose to more than 30 per cent from about 12 per cent between 2000–05. Citing the latest statistics, the Labour Minister Adel Fakieh, noted that ‘there were about 500,000 unemployed Saudi men and women against the presence of eight million foreigners, of whom about six million are employed by the private sector’ (Arab News 2011a). Overall, unemployment in Saudi Arabia ‘is running at 10.5 per cent’ of which ‘28 percent . . . were women and 40 percent high school graduates’ (ibid.). Citigroup’s Chief Economist for the Middle East Farouk Soussa warned that: serious imbalances have been building in the country over decades and that we believe require urgent attention: only 40% of Saudis of working age are

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in employment, 43% of 20–24-year-olds are officially unemployed, 51% of Saudis are below the age of 21, expat workers make up 90% of the private sector work force (quoted in Zawya 2011).

Locating Causes of Unemployment The foremost reason for high rate of unemployment among nationals lies in resource distribution — the distribution of oil wealth among citizens on the principles of natural justice than on economic rules of efficiency and marginal productivity, which suited the objectives of the political regime to maintain its legitimacy by lavishly purchasing the will and consent of the citizens. Since the first oil bonanza occurred in the region, other productive forces such as agriculture, sea-based economic activities and the service sector gradually lost their sheen and the classic ‘Dutch disease’ gripped the economy. Furthermore, private sector jobs came to be regarded as menial and below par socially and culturally, fit only for migrants. The Saudis, consequently, opted to remain unemployed rather than be employed in the private sector. In the Gulf, there is a problem of reluctance by citizens to take up technical and productive jobs and their preference of administrative, office and supervisory jobs . . . Their preference of the public sector is also aggravating the redundancy problem and widening the gap in real production (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, quoted in Kawach 2010).

Ramadi (2005) cites the reasons for Saudi unemployment as given in Table 15.3. According to Torofdar (2011), ‘unemployment among nationals is driven by a number of factors such as lack of skills, low motivation to work, and high salary expectations’. Figure 15.2 shows the projected rate of job requirements over the next five decades. It also characterizes the possibility of two major trends in the Saudi labour markets, including its impact on society in the long term: one, an ever-increasing rate of male–female labourforce participation; and second, increasing share of female labour force in the total. The participation of male and female labour force will almost become equal, with economic necessity giving way to gender equality and mitigating gender bias. John Willoughby (2004) termed this a silent revolution in the GCC labour market which would potentially replace the expatriate workers.

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Table 15.3: Reasons for Saudi Unemployment Issue

Private-Sector Justifications

Labour

The relatively high cost of Saudi manpower.

Social and cultural perceptions

Saudis are reluctant to take up and seriously pursue certain types of jobs. Work-related social status affects marriage and other social relations.

Control over process of production

Expatriate workers are more disciplined. They are prohibited from changing jobs without their sponsor’s permission.

Lack of social integration in a multicultural environment

Local populations are reluctant to integrate into multi-cultural work environments, fearing that it might diminish their existing status.

Job tenure

Saudi workers cannot be dismissed easily.

Inadequate qualifications

Saudi employees may have inadequate qualifications, lack English fluency or have a non-technical background.

Mobility

Saudi workers are less mobile than foreign workers.

Source: Ramadi (2005). Figure 15.2 Projected National Labour Force, 2010–50

Source: http://www.zwaya.com (accessed 11 December 2013).

Politically, the new programme seems a timely motivated intervention in the labour market, which has become a hot playground of restive youth politics. This is most likely due to the demonstration effect (emphasis added) of the Arab Spring currently underway in the entire

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Islamic Crescent. Another plausible reason for the Nitaqat policy is the aspect of diverting the hearts and minds of the Sunni majority population through regional balancing. The Kingdom appears more concerned with maintaining peace and stability in the oil-rich eastern region, which is Shia-dominated. Shias account for approximately 10–11 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s population and are more susceptible to the current upheaval. The Sunni Saudi regime is also cautious about the rising Shia crescent in the post-Saddam Gulf era and in the wake of the Arab Spring which emphasizes rule by majority. Demographically, the Shia population is larger than the Sunnis in the Gulf region, constituting approximately 61 per cent of the total population (Hussain 2012). Iran is emerging as a natural leader of the Shia sect, leading to a Shia encirclement of Sunni Saudi Arabia (emphasis added). To counter Iran’s growing influence and isolate it in the region, Saudi Arabia invited, in the recent annual GCC meeting, two Sunnimajority countries — Morocco and Jordan — to join the bloc. It has also renewed its interest in Yemen and is promoting a regime change in Syria, a staunch Iranian ally. The Saudi King also proposed to form a Gulf Union by forgoing an alliance with Bahrain. He urged the kings, emirs and sultans gathered at the meeting, ‘you all know that we are targeted in our safety and security’ (Knickmeyer and Delmar-Morgan 2012).

Economic Rationale of the New Programme Another significant reason for announcing the new policy is the financial luxury which allows Saudi Arabia the fiscal profligacy after a long time. It is estimated that due to sustained rise in oil prices the Kingdom has a surplus of approximately US$500 billion. This luxury of surplus finance has occurred after more than one and half decades; between 1985 and 1998, the Kingdom managed its expenditure through deficitfinancing and increasing its debt–GDP (Gross Domestic Product) ratio, which was reduced to 16.7 per cent in 2010 from 21.6 per cent in 2009. Besides these surpluses, Saudi Arabia has huge cash deposits in Western countries and a huge sovereign wealth fund (see Hussain 2009). It has more than 1.5 trillion SR additional wealth for emergencies. For instance, after the 1990 debacle, Kuwait utilized its wealth deposited under the Fund for Generation for reconstruction of the country. In addition, growth rate of the non-oil economy is less prone to fluctuation and has maintained a consistent rate of growth than the

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oil economy. This means that the Saudi economy is heading towards diversification, which will open more avenues for job creation. The economy will expand laterally. Thus, more people will be involved in the economic and political systems and the country will move towards democratization in the medium to long run.

Feasibility, Expectations and Impact of the New Programme The Nitaqat programme has evoked a mixed response among different stakeholders.

Officials and Government Employees According to the Labour Minister, the plan will help reduce joblessness in the country. He also expects it to ‘end 99 percent of black-market work visas’ and said that with ‘help from the private sector, this market would be totally dissolved. “The program will also end commercial concealment, where foreigners run businesses under Saudi cover”’ (Arab News 2011a). According to the ministry, ‘50 percent transport companies have achieved the required Nitaqat level. “The Saudization levels set by the Nitaqat program in each sector are determined by what can be achieved practically,” it said’ (Arab News 2012). Due to Nitaqat, ‘250,000 Saudis were employed in less than a year. Before introducing the system in Shawwal 1432H, it took five years to create such numbers of jobs for Saudis. Nitaqat also helped 54,000 women get jobs within seven months’ (ibid.). The Labour Minister has great hopes of meeting the challenges of unemployment. He maintains that ‘if the government succeeded in pushing even 50 percent of private Saudi companies into the green zone, “after three to five years, we will run out of real Saudi job seekers”’ in the Kingdom (Ottaway 2012: 6).

Reactions of the Business Class and Private Sector On Nitaqat, a Saudi businessman opined thus: We have had such proposals in the past. Now the question is: Are they feasible? . . . [L]et us take the case of accountants. Almost all the accountants working in Saudi Arabia have been here for more than six years. If we send them back home tomorrow, do we have enough accountants to replace them? These questions need to be asked . . . Another Jeddah-based businessman Ahmad Al Faroqi too expressed fears that such a decision would

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impact negatively on the Saudi business sector . . . “Many jobs here require qualified expatriates, and at the same time, there are no Saudis ready to do these jobs,” he said (Arab News 2011a).

Increasing the employment share of Saudis in private enterprises through administrative measures instead of following economic rules would bring irrevocable economic losses to the companies and will compel employers to shut down their units in the short to medium run. As noted by the Labour Minister, almost 40 per cent of the enterprises will fail to meet the Saudization targets, and hence face the axe. The six-year departure programme of expatriates may also induce experienced workers to seek employment in other neighbouring countries before their term expires.

An Alternate View of Nitaqat The provision of six-year residency applies only to those expatriates whose companies fail to meet their targets of Saudization. The companies would prefer to become capital-intensive rather than expanding horizontally. This will reduce the demand for more workers in the long run. Higher wages will be paid to workers, as capital will be cheaply available. Silver/Excellent and Green companies will also earn the opportunity to poach on workers from the Yellow and Red companies. These companies can also recruit or transfer workers, letting the workers complete two years under their sponsors. The official government figure of unemployment in the country also requires scrutiny. It is around 10.5 per cent of the population, which was estimated at around 28 million in 2010. Thus, the absolute number of unemployed in the country is around 2.94 million. This is only 32.6 per cent of the total 9 million expatriate workers present in the country. The government can easily create space for these unemployed Saudis in the private sector, which can absorb this number comfortably. Two conclusions may be thus drawn. Either the government is not furnishing the exact percentage of unemployment in the country or there is much ado about nothing. The government has attracted the attention of the public and given them a sense of care and sympathy, particularly in the current political milieu. In both cases, the expatriates should not worry much about their future in the country.

Policy Attention The new policy should address the private sector’s labour dilemma. The Labour Ministry should strike a balance between Saudization

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and the economic capacity of the private enterprises to afford Saudi employees. Moreover, the provision of grace period needs attention. The failing companies would simply fill up their quotas with unqualified Arabs and bail themselves out. This will hurt the economy in the long run. For the employed Saudis, these jobs will be sinecures. In the medium to long run, the economy will generate a substandard national labour force and there will be a compromise with low productivity, low competitiveness, and the country will have to go again for skilled expatriates. The authorities should also analyze the impact of a six-years residency cap on expatriate workers. This may promote a flight of experienced and trained guest workers to neighbouring countries, which will mean a net loss to the Saudi economy; the country will incur an undue cost of training new workers every six years. A better policy would be to screen out the excess and inefficient labour ab initio. For this, a few actionable steps may be considered: (a) A holistic labour market survey could be undertaken, including gender, skill, age cohort specifics, and market requirements. The labour deficit should be managed by the central authorities by fixing a quota for each country and visas issued accordingly. (b) The multiple sponsorship (Kafala) system should be managed; otherwise, this would lead to a potential leakage in the new system. The problem of skill mismatch could be removed by policy attention at the following levels: (a) Hardware Reform: Reform in the national education system and expansion of relevant infrastructure facilities. The curriculum at all levels — school, college, university — should be flexible, so changes as per requirements of the labour market can be brought in. (b) Software Reform: Transforming the Saudi minds towards education and employment responsibilities. To achieve this, preference for suitable subjects and the significance of modern education in terms of career, economic contribution and corporate work ethics should be promoted. The intervention of religion in the education system, mode of learning and overemphasis on traditional subjects among students should be changed through

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persuasion, reservation and implementation of strict eligibility criteria for employment, particularly in the public sector. Punctuality, responsibility and accountability should also be brought into the employment criteria. The subcontracting of labour that has mushroomed in the Kingdom in recent years needs serious attention. This has generated a huge opportunity for exploitation of expatriate workers by agents, sponsors and other intermediaries involved in the migration process. It is found that a worker, mostly unskilled, is getting as low as SR250 per month; the rest is appropriated by the intermediaries. The authorities should also pay attention to those sectors that are exempted from the new programme and those enterprises marked as ‘Red’. The problem of illegal or overstaying expatriates will emerge soon. The six-year residency cap of Red-category enterprises will compel workers to flee. In such a situation, intermediaries will exploit the situation: sponsors will issue excess fake visas in sectors that are exempted from the Nitaqat programme. The Labour Ministry needs to be vigilant at two levels, mainly: (a) the number of visas issued in those sectors that do not fall in any of the four categories; and (b) maintaining updated records of expatriate workers. At the administrative level, authorities should be prepared to deal with the problem of overstaying migrant workers; locking them up would not be the appropriate solution. Companies that employ them should be made liable if their workers run away. Close cooperation with the labour-sending countries will also help in managing the problem of illegal emigration and other related problems. Since all GCC member countries are facing the dilemma of guest workers, they should formulate a common policy. Any policy pursued in isolation would not lead to optimum benefits.

References Al-Dosary, Adel, Syed Masiur Rehman and Shahid Mir. 2005. ‘An Integrated Approach to Combat Unemployment in the Saudi Labour Market’, Journal of Societal and Social Policy, 4(2): 1–18. Al Masah Capital Limited. 2011. ‘MENA: The Great Job Rush: The “Unemployment” Ticking Time Bomb and How to Fix It’. http://almasahcapital. com/uploads/report/report_23.pdf (accessed 9 December 2013). Arab News. 2011a. ‘Labor Minister Explains Expat Time-Bar Plan’, 31 May. http://www.arabnews.com/node/379191?quicktabs_stat2=1 (accessed 10 December 2013).

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Arab News. 2011b. ‘Labor Ministry Outlines Saudization Percentage’, 14 June. http://www.arabnews.com/node/380653 (accessed 15 July 2011). ———. 2012. ‘Nitaqat Expanded’, 13 August. http://www.arabnews.com/ nitaqat-expanded (accessed 9 December 2013). Ghafour, P. K. Abdul. 2011. ‘Saudization Campaign Gets Fresh Impetus’. Arab News, 9 May. http://dev2.arabnews.com/node/376866?quicktabs_ stat2=1 (accessed 25 June 2011). Hussain, Zakir. 2009. ‘India Woos GCC Sovereign Wealth Fund: Policy, Scope and Precautions’. Policy Brief, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. ———. 2012. ‘Syria and the Evolving Politico-Strategic Dynamics in the Gulf’. Sapru House Paper, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. International Labour Organization (ILO). 2009. ‘Saudi Arabia: Economic Weakness Led to Unemployment Rate Hike’. G20 Statistical Update, G20 Meeting of Labour and Employment Ministers, 20–21 April, Washington DC. http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/events/G20_ministersmeeting/G20SaudiArabia-stats.pdf (accessed 14 December 2013). Kawach, Nadim. 2010. ‘Arab States Need to Create 40 Million Jobs by 2020’. Emirates Business 24/7, 20 July. Knickmeyer, Ellen. 2012. ‘Saudi Students Flood In as U.S. Reopens Door’. The Wall Street Journal, 27 July. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 2702304830704577492450467667154.html (accessed 9 December 2013). Knickmeyer, Ellen and Alex Delmar-Morgan. 2012. ‘Bahrain, Saudis to Clinch Ties’. The Wall Street Journal, 13 May. http://online.wsj.com/article/S B10001424052702303505504577401941800223750.html (accessed 11 December 2013). Looney, Robert. 2004a. ‘Can Saudi Arabia Reform its Economy in Time to Head Off Disaster?’ Strategic Insights, 3(1). ———. 2004b. ‘Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?’ Strategic Insights, 3(2). McDowall, Angus. 2012. ‘Wider World opened to Saudis Studying Abroad’. Reuters, 6 June. Ottaway, David B. 2012. Saudi Arabia’s Race Against Time. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Middle East Program. Ramadi, M. A. 2005. The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements and Challenges. New York: Springer. Sfakianakis, John. 2011. ‘Riyadh: New Employment Rules to Shake up Saudi Private Sector’. Arab News, 15 June. http://www.arabnews.com/node/ 380796 (accessed 10 July 2011). Sfakianakis, John, Daliah Merzaban and Turki A. Al Hugail. 2011. ‘Quota Counting’. Saudi Arabia Economics, 14 June. Torofdar, Yusuf Abdul-Jobbar. 2011. ‘Human Resource Management (HRM) in Saudi Arabia: A Closer Look at Saudization’. Paper presented at 14th International Business Research Conference on ‘Research for Re-thinking’, 28–30 April, Dubai.

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Willoughby, John. 2004. ‘A Quiet Revolution in the Making? The Replacement of Expatriate Labor through the Feminization of the Labor Force in GCC Countries’. Working Paper no. 2004-18, Department of Economics, American University,Washington DC. Zawya. 2011. ‘Replacing Expats’, 5 June. http://www.zawya.com/story/ ZAWYA20110605052943/ (accessed 20 June 2011). ———. 2012. ‘380,000 Jobs in 10 Months for Saudis Thanks to Nitaqat’, 17 September. http://www.zawya.com/story/380000_jobs_in_10_ months_for_Saudis_thanks_to_Nitaqat-ZAWYA20120917042326/ (accessed 9 December 2013).

16

Kerala Emigration to Saudi Arabia Prospects under the Nitaqat Law

K. c. zachaRiah, S. iRuDaya Rajan anD jolin joSeph A majority of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries exhibit demographic imbalances, to different degrees, owing to a high percentage of non-nationals in the population, and their expanding youth populations. Demographic trends have a decisive influence on a country’s economic, labour and population policies and migration is a key social policy intervention that allows governments to control and regulate the volume and nature of its demographic base. Beginning in the 1970s, the GCC has woken up to the challenges posed by its shifting demographics and implemented a series of corrective policy measures that aim to bring about governmentally administered changes in population — both quantitative and qualitative. The Kerala–Saudi Arabia migration corridor is a product of unique geopolitical, economic, sociological, and religious dimensions that have historically linked both places together. In Saudi Arabia, much like other countries of the GCC, demographic factors such as ageing, small or shrinking populations, together with burgeoning economic opportunities and vast resources, have long acted as pull factors for migrant workers from the Indian subcontinent. Saudi’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 was US$693.73 billion and its per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was US$9,163. In contrast, Kerala’s State Domestic Product (SDP) was US$31.9 billion in 2011 (about 4.6 per cent of Saudi’s) and per capita SDP was US$1,040 (about 1.1 per cent of Saudi’s). Low per capita income and slow economic growth induced many Indians (notably from Kerala) to seek their fortunes on Gulf shores. However, migration is only one component of a complex chain of processes that shape the sociopolitical landscape of a country. A comparative evaluation of the demographic dynamics of Saudi Arabia and

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Kerala affords critical insights into labour market characteristics, current government policies and the potential outcomes of these policies for Kerala and the wider Indian subcontinent.

Demographic Rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s Nitaqat Law The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in Western Asia by land area, constituting four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula. However, it has a small population relative to total land area of 2,148,690 km. Saudi Arabia is among the fastest growing nations in the world in terms of population growth. The Kingdom’s population grew threefold from 7.3 million in 1975 to 27.1 million in 2010. Of this, foreigners account for upwards of 8.4 million. In comparison, Kerala’s total land area is only about 39,000 km but population-wise Kerala is marginally ahead of Saudi Arabia; the difference is about 15 per cent. Kerala’s population in 2011 stood at 33.4 million with about 2.3 million people from the state living abroad. This situation was very different in the past and is presumed to look very different in the future. The population of Kerala in as far back as 1881 was greater than the population of Saudi Arabia in 1951. At the time, Saudi’s population of about 3 million was about one-fourth of Kerala’s population of 14 million. Kerala continues to lead in terms of absolute population figures however; the rate of population growth has significantly receded. Saudi Arabia is quickly closing the gap. By 2021, Saudi’s population is projected to be at par with Kerala’s, each about 34 million, and by 2051, Saudi’s population is expected to be about one and half times the population of Kerala (Figure 16.1). Alongside exponential population rise, the Kingdom’s labour markets have witnessed specific demographic pressures that triggered the move towards immigration caps and work-force regulations. First and most noticeable is the Kingdom’s youth boom. Second, these new entrants into the labour market lack adequate skills and training required to participate in the economy and effectively contribute to economic growth. As a result, the Kingdom continues to be directly dependent on expatriate human resource. Third, the irregular entry and stay of unauthorized migrant workers has further undermined the position of citizens in the Kingdom. These demographic realities are unavoidable. Given the growing need to employ local youth and balance new and emerging challenges,

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Figure 16.1: Population of Kerala and Saudi Arabia

Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

it seems instrumental to analyze the localization policies against the backdrop of broader demographic and development processes.

Youth Bulge One of the defining characteristics of contemporary Arab societies is the large and expanding youth population. The size and trend of population in the young working ages in Saudi Arabia are critical factors in determining the country’s migration policy. In 1951, population in the age group of 15–39 years in Saudi Arabia was only about 25 per cent of the corresponding population in Kerala. By 2011, the number of persons in the age group 15–39 in Saudi exceeded that in Kerala by nearly 20 per cent. The demographic contrast between Kerala and Saudi is all the more startling when populations in the emigration-prone ages are compared. Emigration from Kerala stemmed primarily from the young working age population. Nearly 90 per cent of the emigrants from Kerala were in the age group 15–39 at the time of emigration. The gap between Kerala and Saudi in the matter of population in the young working ages is set to widen very rapidly in the coming decades. The expected numbers in 2051 are 15.4 million in Saudi and just 7.6 million in Kerala. The Kingdom’s unprecedented ‘youth bulge’ has not yet crested, which means the country faces the

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problem of providing an additional 100,000 jobs per year for those Saudi nationals aged 20 or under who shall enter the work force in the next two decades. These large cohorts of young (and oftentimes unemployed) people pose a cascade of socioeconomic and political challenges for the Saudi government (Figure 16.2). Figure 16.2: Population in the Age Group 15–39 in Saudi Arabia and Kerala

Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

Education and Training Deficit The Saudi population pyramid paints a picture of a burgeoning young working population — a good sign for any developing economy. However, local youth are ill-equipped to enter the workforce and contribute productively to the Kingdom’s development. In a country where over 51 per cent of the population is below 25 years, education is a vital and strategic area to enhance strong long-term sustainable economic growth and employment opportunities for citizens. Saudi Arabia may benefit from a demographic dividend; a surge in productivity and growth as those workers join the labour pool but the dividend pays off only if the country provides its youth adequate educational and economic opportunities to develop their skills. Currently the skill level of nationals is painfully lacking and there are concerns about quality and market suitability of graduates. Often, nationals are also prohibitively expensive to employ in lower-level positions. Thus, Saudi Arabia faces a complex challenge — that of attracting and

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retaining talented overseas employees with critical skills while ensuring jobs to its swelling working-age populace. The sharp contrast between Saudi Arabia and Kerala in terms of education and other human resources is also an important factor in the tightening of the labour market in Saudi Arabia. According to the results of the demographic survey conducted by the Department of Statistics and Information, Ministry of Economy and Planning, in 2007 the incidence of illiteracy among the Saudi population was 13.7 per cent whereas Kerala boasted of close to 100 per cent literacy. These percentages have been on the increase steadily in recent years. Investment in human capital has become a top priority for the Saudi government, as is evidenced by the tripling of spending on education since 2000 — growing from SR 105 billion in 2008, SR 122 billion in 2009, SR 137 billion in 2010, and SR 150 billion in 2011 to SR 204 billion in 2013. The Education Ministry’s 10-year strategic plan (2004–14) to overhaul the education system is an important milestone that can help unlock the country’s invaluable human potential and ensure lasting growth and a knowledge-based economy.

Over-Reliance on Expatriates Much has been said regarding the dependence of GCC economies on the temporary immigration of foreign workers to offset relatively small national populations, low local participation rates and skill shortages. In recent years however, Saudi Arabia has witnessed an upsurge in fertility rates and population growth, leading to a gradual rise in the proportion of the population that is of working age. Despite this increase in absolute numbers, the share of nationals in the labour force has not seen commensurate increase. In 2010, unemployment rates rose to 13 per cent among all males and were estimated to be as high as 35 per cent among males between ages 20 and 24. This has resulted in large reserves of unemployed locals, particularly youth and women causing the country to continue its dependence on foreign labour and expertise. While immigrants constitute only a third of the population, they comprise two-thirds of the total labour force and over 88 per cent of the private sector labour force according to a report by the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 2008, latest figures indicate that private labour force participation rates of expatriates are as high as 95 per cent. In 2005 two GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), hosted as much as 3.3 per cent and 1.7 per cent of all migrants in the world respectively and this trend has con-

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tinued steadily despite upheavals such as the Global Recession and Arab Spring. This relentless demographic ascendance adds a potentially destabilizing dimension to the interdependencies that have long bound Saudi Arabia to the state of Kerala. Rapid demographic changes coupled with the presence of a sizeable non-national workforce produced some of the most intense pressures on labour markets observed anywhere in the world (World Bank 2004) sparking considerable resentment and anxiety among Saudi citizens.

Status of Immigrants Although entry and stay of foreign workers is regulated under the kafala or ‘sponsorship system’, loopholes exist that allow workers to bypass state controls and join the labour market without being tied to a specific job or employer. In addition, annual pilgrimages to Mecca (Haj and Omra) open doors to thousands of foreigners for overstaying the visa making it impossible to accurately estimate the stock of foreign workers in Saudi at any given time. The operation of informal economies and migration intermediaries has further encouraged both irregular and regular migration flows (ILO 2009) and the large-scale settlement of illegally resident immigrants. As a result, low-wage sectors are vastly expanding, thus perceptibly flattening the wages across such sectors and escalating the need to resolve the status of the illegally resident population.

Saudi’s Labour Localization Policies and the Nitaqat Law While policy-makers recognize the lasting contribution of expatriates to the country, a revamp of the size and quality of the foreign workforce is long overdue. The Saudi Arabian government has framed institutional arrangements and programmes through which it aspires to influence demographic change and shed its current migrantdependent economic model by increasing the proportion of native workers in Kingdom’s labour force. Two such policy measures were introduced as prophylactics against impending demographic downfall: ‘Saudization’ and ‘Nitaqat’.

Saudization ‘Saudization’ refers to an implicit policy programme undertaken by the Saudi government since 1994 to amend the imbalances in the

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labour market and increase workforce participation of citizens to an economically sustainable level. This is also an attempt to recapture and reinvest the immense capital fleeing the country through foreign labour remittances, estimated at 20 billion SR annually. The basic principle of the system was the need to appoint a certain percentage of Saudi citizens in all the establishments existing in the Kingdom. The percentage varied in accordance to the activity of the establishment. Generally it was fixed at 30 per cent. The system, however, did not achieve the desired objective. These quotas were widely resented by businesses that were forced to pay above-market rates for low-skilled and unmotivated local workers. More than 6.5 million expatriates are currently working in the private sector. This compares with only 700,000 Saudi workers, constituting 10 per cent of that value. Moreover, 2 million work visas were issued during the preceding two years. The continued overwhelming dependence of the private sector on foreign workers outweighed the bureaucratic controls on both foreign and national companies in obtaining visas and ongoing government efforts to promote labour nationalization. The government required a strategic rethink to mitigate, if not solve, the local unemployment quandary.

Nitaqat More recently, the Saudi Arabian government has been trying to revitalize the localization policy, considered critical to the long-term stability of the country. The Kingdom’s latest indigenization strategy — ‘Nitaqat’ — came into effect on September 2011. The main obstacle faced under the previous system was that it was impractical to apply one fixed percentage across all sectors and industry verticals. Nitaqat’s requirements varies from segment to segment, ranging over 6 per cent for construction jobs to 30 per cent for oil and gas extraction and over 50 per cent for banks and financial institutions (for firms with under 500 employees) (Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank 2013). This programme divides the labour market into 41 activities and each activity is grouped under five sizes (Giant, Large, Medium, Small, and Very Small) resulting in 205 categories in all. The performance of the establishment in the localization of jobs is to be evaluated by comparing it with similar establishments to have fair standards for the evaluation. After the evaluation, Nitaqat classifies these establishments into Ranges (Excellent, Green, Yellow, and Red) based on the ratio of the

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citizens working in the establishment. The motive behind applying the Nitaqat system is to make the appointment of Saudi citizens a competitive advantage in the various establishments in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Labour (MoL) in Saudi Arabia granted several advantages to Excellent and Green categories by giving them the eligibility to issue work visas for the development of new businesses. Furthermore, the MoL will give them the ability to sign contracts with non-Saudi workers from the establishments of the Red and Yellow ranges. This will result in granting the establishments that have achieved high rates of localization the opportunity to appoint non-Saudi workers from among the available talent pool in the Kingdom. In contrast, the establishments in the Red and Yellow Ranges will be forced to speed up the localization of the jobs or lose control over the non-Saudi workers in the establishment and not be allowed to obtain new work visas to appoint non-Saudi workers or set up subsidiaries or branches. Alongside expulsion or deportation of undocumented workers after the grace period, it promises a system that will reliably identify those who are authorized to work in Saudi Arabia and prevent identity theft/spurious visas as well as end the hiring of future unauthorized workers. It offers a ‘path to legality’ to illegally resident expatriates and mandates that all workers be accounted for on a public database. Overall, Nitaqat has the potential to introduce much-needed market adjustments to enhance the efficiency of the private sector.

Kerala Emigrants in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia was the preferred destination for emigrants from Kerala in the early years of Kerala emigration to the Gulf countries. According to the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 1998, Saudi Arabia had 38 per cent of the total number of emigrants from Kerala. The UAE ranked only second with 27 per cent. By the turn of the 21st century, however, Saudi Arabia lost some of its glamour in comparison to the UAE. From 1998 to 2003, the proportion of Kerala emigrants in the UAE increased from 31 per cent to 36.5 per cent while in Saudi Arabia it decreased from 37.5 per cent to 26.7 per cent. Between 2008 and 2011, migration flows to the UAE ebbed by 3.2 percentage points owing to the recession; at the same time emigration to Saudi Arabia increased by 2.2 percentage points. Saudi Arabia remained, however, second to the UAE in emigration from Kerala (Figure 16.3).

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Figure 16.3: Kerala Emigrants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Surveys of 1998, 2003, 2008, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Sex Composition Emigrants from Kerala are predominantly males regardless of destination. The overall proportion of female emigrants is only about 12–13 per cent. Among Kerala emigrants to Saudi Arabia, females are even fewer — only 9.8 per cent. In 2008, the proportion of females among Saudi emigrants was 7.9 per cent while contrastingly that among emigrants from Kottayam district was 53.9 per cent. This is presumably because emigrants from Kottayam included a large number of nurses and nursing assistants.

Age Distribution Nearly 70 per cent of Saudi emigrants were aged between ages 25 and 45 years. Only 1.5 per cent were 60 years of age or older. For a single five-year age group, the largest proportion was in the age group 25–29 years — about 21 per cent. The average age of the Saudi emigrants in 2011 was 35 years. The average Saudi emigrant is slightly older than those in other Gulf countries. At the time of the survey, the average age of Saudi emigrants was 34.96 (33.05 for all destinations) while the average at the time of emigration was 24.78 (26.39 for all destinations) (Figure 16.4).

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Figure 16.4: Age Distribution of Emigrants from Kerala, 2011

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Educational Attainment On almost all counts, Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia are relatively poorer in educational attainment compared to Kerala emigrants in other countries. Among Saudi emigrants, only 28.3 per cent have completed 12th standard. This compares with 39.9 per cent among all emigrants from Kerala. The corresponding proportion is as much as 44.5 per cent among emigrants in Kuwait, 42.1 per cent among those in Qatar and 41.8 per cent among emigrants in the UAE (Figure 16.5). The average years of schooling of Saudi emigrants (9.5 years) is the same as that of all emigrants from Kerala. However, Saudi’s average is lower than that of the UAE, Kuwait and Oman (Tables 16.1 and 16.2; see also Figure 16.6).

Employment Status Two-thirds of Saudi emigrants from Kerala were employed at the time of emigration, about a fifth was unemployed and one-eighth was not in the labour force. Employment ratio among emigrants in Saudi (66.7 per cent) is much higher than that in other GCC countries. Consequently, the proportion of those outside the labour force is much less in Saudi (Table 16.3).

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Table 16.1: Educational Attainment of Emigrants

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman All Kerala

Average Years of Schooling

Proportion with 12th Standard or Higher

9.5 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.7 9.5

28.3 41.8 44.5 42.1 36.0 39.9

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. Figure 16.5: Percentage of Emigrants with 12th Standard or Higher Levels of Education

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. Table 16.2: Percentage of Emigrants with Given Educational Level

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman Kerala

12+

Degree

No Formal Education

28.3 41.8 44.5 42.1 36.0 39.9

11.1 17.5 18.3 19.2 12.0 18.4

5.0 8.1 15.3 6.8 6.0 9.3

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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Figure 16.6: Percentage of Emigrants with a Degree

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. Table 16.3: Employment Status of Emigrants in Selected Countries Saudi Arabia Employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force Total

UAE

Kerala

66.7 20.8 12.5

50.0 32.2 17.8

54.1 26.7 19.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Sector of Employment The vast majority of Kerala emigrants in Saudi work as labourers in the non-agricultural sector. They constituted 43.5 per cent in Saudi, 43.7 per cent in the UAE and 42.4 per cent across the GCC. Selfemployed emigrants were 14.6 per cent in Saudi as compared to 11.5 per cent in the UAE or 12.2 per cent for all emigrants (Figure 16.7).

Industrial Affiliation of Emigrants The largest proportion of Saudi emigrant workers is employed in the ‘transport and storage’ industrial group, employing 22 per cent of working emigrants. The corresponding percentage for all emigrants from Kerala is 17.6 per cent, and only 15.2 per cent among emigrants

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Figure 16.7: Employment Sectors of Emigrants

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

in the the UAE. About 19 per cent of Saudi emigrants are employed in construction-related industries, compared with 17 per cent among emigrants in the the UAE. The principal occupation of Saudi emigrants from Kerala is sales. More than one-fourth of the emigrants are sales persons. Other occupations in which large numbers of Saudi emigrants are engaged are: drivers of motor vehicles (10.8 per cent), barbers/hair dressers (5.2 per cent), construction workers (4.3 per cent), electricians (3.3 per cent), and nurses/nursing assistants (3.2 per cent) (Table 16.4). Table 16.4: Percentage Distribution of Emigrants by Industry Industry

Saudi

UAE

Kerala

Agriculture and Fisheries Mining and Quarrying Manufacture Electricity, Gas, Water Construction Trade

14.5 0.6 5.2 2.2 19.1 18.4

13.0 0.9 5.8 3.1 17.0 18.6

12.1 0.6 5.6 2.7 18.7 16.9

(Table 16.4: Continued)

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(Table 16.4: Continued) Industry

Saudi

UAE

Kerala

Repair of Cars, Household Goods Hotels and Restaurants Transport and Storage Finance Real Estate Business Education, Health, etc. Personal Services Others

2.8 2.5 21.9 0.6 0.1 5.1 5.4 1.7

4.8 5.9 15.2 1.0 0.6 6.0 4.8 3.1

4.2 4.5 17.6 1.0 0.3 7.1 5.5 3.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Emigration Prospects With the stricter enforcement of Nitaqat law from July 2013, emigrants without appropriate emigration documents will have to leave Saudi Arabia. According to several media reports, around 2 million foreign workers are expected to lose their jobs and return due to the tightening of the Nitaqat law. In this context, the growth prospects for Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia are thrown into question.

Prognosis Based on Past Trend In recent years, emigration from Kerala to Saudi Arabia followed an uneven path. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of emigrants decreased by 4 per cent. In the next inter-survey period, 2003–08, the number of emigrants increased marginally by 2.7 per cent. Between 2008 and 2011, there was a sharper increase of 14 per cent. Is the acceleration in emigration during 2008–11 a trend-setting development? Not likely. The steep increase during 2008–11 could be explained by the relatively larger impact of the global recession of 2007–08 on the UAE than on Saudi Arabia. A growing number of emigrants in the UAE, who lost their jobs as a result of recession, moved instead to Saudi Arabia. The acute increase in the number of emigrants in Saudi during 2008–11 should be treated as a special case, and not as indicative of a long-term trend. Consequently, if the past trend is any guide, emigration to Saudi Arabia in the coming years is likely to be relatively stable, experiencing neither large decreases nor significant increases.

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Demographic Trend as a Determinant of Future Emigration As stated earlier, Kerala emigrants stem predominantly from the young working ages. In the past, nearly 90 per cent of the emigrants were between 20 and 39 years of age at the time of emigration. The number of persons in this age bracket has been decreasing steadily in Kerala since 2001. It would decrease more sharply in the coming decades. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, population in the young working ages has been increasing in recent decades and would continue to increase for some more years. Under these circumstances, the prospects for any increase in emigration from Kerala to Saudi Arabia are dim. In fact, if demographic trends are the only determinants, future emigration should be from Saudi Arabia to Kerala, not the other way around! Under such unfavourable demographic conditions, how is it that Kerala continues to send out large numbers of emigrants to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries? The answer lies in replacement migration. Every emigrant that goes out of Kerala state is replaced by an in-migrant from another state in India. What is lost through external migration is replaced by internal migration from other demographically-rich states within the country (Figure 16.8). Figure 16.8: Percentage Increase in the Number of People in the 15–39 Age Group, 1989–91 through 2031–41

Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

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Prognosis Based on Wage Differentials The average wage among unskilled workers in Kerala has increased from `150 to over `450 during the past 10–12 years. On the other hand, corresponding wages in Saudi Arabia did not increase as fast as it did in Kerala. Wage differential among unskilled labourers between Kerala and Saudi Arabia has narrowed down considerably in the last decade. As wage differentials between the two regions flatten out, it will naturally depress the rate of migration. At the same time, the cost of emigration from Kerala has increased precipitously. Under these circumstances, emigration from Kerala to Saudi is likely to follow a downward slope.

Competition from Other States in India Another factor that could stand in the way of acceleration of emigration from Kerala is competition from other states within India. The number of emigrants from other states across India is increasing much faster than that from Kerala. This is indicated by the number of Emigration Check Required (ECR) passports issued in various states in India. The number was highest for Kerala ever since statistics became available. However, since 2008, more passports were issued in Uttar Pradesh issued than in Kerala. In 2011, the number of ECR passport issued in Uttar Pradesh was 155,300 as compared to just 86,780 in Kerala. The number from Kerala is likely to decrease further while that from other states is likely to increase. In addition, the wage rates in these states are much lower than those in Kerala. These statistics point towards a possible decrease in emigration from Kerala, not only to Saudi but also to most Gulf countries.

Lessons from Recent History: The Impact of the Global Recession of 2007–08 on Migration The Global Recession of 2007–08 was said to have had a considerable impact on the economy of Gulf countries, especially the UAE. In 2009, the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) undertook a special study to assess the impact of the global recession on the employment and return emigration of Gulf emigrants from Kerala and arrived at the following conclusions. The number of Kerala emigrants who returned due to the recession was not as large as originally projected. Even as some returned, new emigrants and some former emigrants returned to the Gulf.

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Recession was not much of a deterrent for re-emigration. Household remittances at the state level in fact increased during the recession months, although there were several households whose remittances decreased. In terms of return emigration during the recession, migration experience in Saudi was similar to that in other Gulf countries. About 7–8 per cent of the emigrants who were in Saudi in 2007 returned home during the recession period. Among them, only about 30 per cent returned because of recession-related reasons as compared to 36 per cent for other Gulf countries. Thus, the impact of recession on Saudi emigrants was much less compared to that of other Gulf countries.

Nitaqat and Emigration Prospects In a normal year, a fairly large number of Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia return to Kerala. It is part of the normal emigration process, not only for Saudi but also for all Gulf states. For example, according to KMS 2011, about 52,000 emigrants from Saudi returned to Kerala in 2010. The corresponding number was about 45,000 in 2008. They returned much before the enforcement of Nitaqat law. The number of Kerala emigrants in Saudi who applied for emergency certificate (3,610) is only 7 per cent of the number of emigrants who returned in 2010, three years before the enforcement of the Nitaqat law (Figure 16.9).

‘Dirty Jobs’ and Emigration Prospects It is a paradox that in Kerala today, high unemployment rate (above 10 per cent) and non-availability of workers in several occupations co-exist. This occurs due to the unwillingness of Kerala youth to do ‘dirty jobs’ involving manual work. There is a stated preference towards white-collar jobs and government services. Alternatively, many prefer to remain unemployed and live on remittances sent by relatives abroad. Such work not taken by Kerala workers is undertaken by replacement workers from other states. The same is the case in Saudi Arabia. With the enormous wealth of the country augmented by mounting oil prices, the locals are not willing to accept manual labour. In the absence of local workers, critical sectors such as construction and maintenance are manned by emigrants from India and other countries.

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Figure 16.9: Reasons for Return of Emigrants for Saudi Arabia and All Destinations, 2007–09

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2009 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

In the past, street cleaning and other sanitation work have been hit hard by the Saudization programmes as almost all workers in this sector were foreigners. This section suffers from unstable job conditions, low wages and expendability, thus making it difficult to draw native workers to take on entry-level and menial jobs. Saudi ministry officials have realized that the percentage of mandatory employment of Saudi nationals in contracting companies that carry out sanitation and street cleaning projects cannot be maintained and will have to be reduced. The same thing would be true in jobs requiring high skills, as Saudis with the necessary technical qualifications may not be available for some more years.

Emigration Begets Emigration There are now nearly 600,000 Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia. There is considerable empirical evidence that suggests many of the new emigrants to Gulf countries are from households of former emigrants. Once a household becomes accustomed to emigration and remittances from emigrants, networks facilitate the perpetuation of this connection.

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An Uncertain Future Demographics alone cannot explain how swiftly labour market reform has become Saudi Arabia’s preoccupation. There is sound economic rationale behind a move to place the country’s development in the hands of its own citizens. An equally significant factor would be economic expansion in Kerala. Kerala’s demographic contraction is well underway, but its economic expansion supported by inputs from its emigrants is still in progress. By the very nature of migration phenomena, it is difficult to develop a statistical model to predict future emigration trends to any country. Migration flows depend not only on demographic, economic and social macro-determinants, but also more importantly, on political decisions of the government in power. At first glance, current political trends do not seem to favour Kerala migration to Saudi Arabia. Naturalization and immigration control is a high-ranking issue on the Saudi political agenda, which has considerably strained its relation with India and other South Asian sending countries. It is a commonly held belief that recent immigration policies have made the goals of better wages, improved working conditions and upward mobility ever more distant for many expatriate workers in the Kingdom. On the other hand, we have seen past India–Saudi emigrations persist not withstanding three decades of increasingly restrictive immigration policies and the financial crisis. Although the Saudi government is formally complying with Nitaqat, it has opened avenues for ‘legalization’ of workers and even shifting of workers from one sponsor to another. Under these circumstances, we recall the main thrust of the report on KMS 2011. Emigration from Kerala to the Gulf countries (including Saudi Arabia) has seemingly reached its point of inflexion. In the coming years, Kerala’s emigration to Saudi is likely to witness a considerable downswing from the present level, albeit gradually. Despite Saudization efforts, the country continues to depend on foreign labour to fill both high- and low-skilled jobs. Programmes for development and training of a local labour force have been too modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Saudi labour market. At least for now, migration still appears to be the answer to the demands of this dynamic economy.

References Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank. 2013. Saudi Arabia Economic Report 2012. Lebanon: Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank.

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International Labour Organization (ILO). 2009. ‘International Labour Migration and Employment in the Arab Region: Origins, Consequences and the Way Forward’. Thematic Paper, Arab Employment Forum, International Labour Office, 19–21 October, Beirut. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 2011. ‘World Population Prospects: The 2011 Revision’. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm (accessed 20 December 2013). World Bank. 2004. Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract. Washington DC: World Bank.

17

Migration and Inequality Raju john* Kerala’s development experience has always received attention at the national and international levels. In early economic literature, Kerala is perceived as a state where comparatively lower levels of income (Net State Domestic Product) co-existed with high levels of human development (UN and CDS 1975). More recent studies however proclaim that though Kerala experienced faster economic growth in the postreform period, the state has also been experiencing widening interpersonal inequality during this period. K. K. Subrahmanian and Syam Prasad (2008) attributed Kerala’s increasing inequalities to ‘excessive’ liberalization and globalization policies and lack of proper tax and social security policies. Padmaja Mishra and Ashok Parikh (1992) discussed the high levels of inequality between urban and rural sectors in Kerala. The role of caste in Kerala’s inequality is emphasized by Ashwini Deshpande (2002). Problems in tax policy and development expenditure (Pal and Ghosh 2007) and the differential effect of globalization, economic reforms and neoliberal policies among different occupational groups (Jha et al. 2007) are reasons suggested by other authors. However, one of the most potent factors of inequality that has been completely kept out of analysis relates to international migration and international remittances. Remittances sent by international migrants were as much as a third (31 per cent) of Kerala’s Net State Domestic * This chapter is based on my MPhil work on ‘Role of Migration in Inequality: An Analysis in the Context of Kerala’. I am grateful to my supervisors Professor S. Irudaya Rajan and Dr Vinoj Abraham for their guidance, support and encouragement. I also thank Mrs Sreeja and Dr Sunita from the Research Unit on International Migration, Centre for Development Studies (CDS) for the help they offered me on dealing with the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) database.

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Product (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). Over the past decade, remittances coming to Kerala increased by 254 per cent, but the proportion of households with an emigrant or the proportion of households that received remittances from abroad remained stagnant at about 17 per cent since 1998 (ibid.). This suggests that the vast majority of Kerala households (over 80 per cent) who are still not direct participants of this great phenomenon transforming Kerala’s economy and society are excluded from the benefits of migration. Given the relative earning differentials between international migrants and non-migrants, can we attribute the rise of inequality in Kerala’s economy to international migration? Has a stagnant base of migration though with high returns from migration increased inequality in Kerala? Given this background, it is important to explore the relationship between international migration and inequality in the Kerala context. The objective of this paper is to understand the role of migration in Kerala’s economic inequality: whether migration causes inequality in living standards between migrant and non-migrant households.

Review of Literature Theoretically, whether migration and remittances contribute to increasing or decreasing inequality depends on who is migrating. Remittances from migrants coming from poorer segments of the population are likelier to contribute to a reduction in inequality because, on average, poorer families would receive the extra income from remittances. Conversely, if migrants belong to already rich households, remittances are likelier to increase inequality, as richer families will benefit from the extra income. This point is emphasized by Oded Stark et al. (1986) and Richard C. Jones (1998).

Data and Methodology The Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala, conducts periodic Kerala Migration Surveys (KMSs) to monitor the current status of emigration from and return emigration to Kerala. So far five such surveys have been carried out in 1998, 2003, 2007, 2008, and 2011. The KMS is a unique and reliable panel data set on emigration from Kerala, of those households that were surveyed for both 1998 and 2008 rounds. This paper seeks to understand the role of migration in Kerala’s inequality scenario using data generated by the CDS.

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Methodology Analysis using Proxies of Income Most of the aforesaid studies on the migration–inequality relationship use income or proxies of income like household expenditure to understand the role of migration in inequality. These studies believe that income or its proxies are the best tools to understand standard of living. Decomposition of Gini coefficient of income by source is the dominant method adopted to explore the migration–inequality link. The KMS does not have data regarding income of migrant and nonmigrant households. However, data on household consumer expenditure, savings and investment are available in the 2008 round of KMS. Thus, an analysis using consumer expenditure will give only a static picture. Still an effort has been made to make use of the available data as it can clearly reveal the direction of the impact of migration on inequality. Following the method suggested by Robert I. Lerman and Shlomo Yitzhaki (1985) the Gini coefficient for total income, ‘G’, can be represented as G = ∑ k =1 Sk Gk Rk where K

Sk = Share of source ‘k’ in total income Gk = the source Gini Rk = Gini correlation of income from source ‘k’ with the distribution of total income

This logic is used to derive the method of Gini decomposition. Using the method of Gini decomposition enables estimation of the effect that 1 per cent change in income from source ‘k’ will have on total income inequality. This effect is given by MI = ((Sk* Gk* Rk )/G) – Sk, where ‘MI’ refers to marginal impact of change in an income source on inequality.

This method is used by researchers worldwide due to its intuitive interpretability in ascertaining the marginal impact of remittances on inequality. But unfortunately, data on indicators for a proxy of income are available only in the 2008 round of KMS, and that too for only 3,000 households. An analysis using consumer expenditure only gives a static picture.

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Asset-Based Analysis Studies have proved that when data on income or its proxies are not available, asset-based indices of standard of living (sometimes referred to as asset indices) can be used as an alternative tool for understanding household socioeconomic positions (Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Sastry 2004). The Asset Index is often used in the empirical literature on poverty and inequality analysis as a proxy variable for household income. The use of the asset index to understand standard of living became popular after the pioneering work done by Deon Filmer and Lant Pritchett in 1999. This paper seeks to understand the role of migration in inequality by using a Standard Of Living Index (SOLI), which is a weighted average of the scale-free indicators of standard of living: the indicators being house characteristics, consumer durables characteristics and land size. The weights are the scores of the first principal component generated through factor rotation method. SOLI is subjected to decomposition of Generalized Entropy (GE) measures of inequality by subgroups (migrants/non migrants).

Generalized Entropy Measures of Inequality The general formula for Generalized Entropy (GE) measures is given by GE(a ) =

 1 N  y a  1  ∑  i  − 1 a (a − 1)  N i =1  y  

Here, ‘y’ is the mean income per person (or expenditure per capita). The values of GE measures vary between zero and infinity, with zero representing an equal distribution and higher values representing higher levels of inequality. The parameter ‘a’ in the GE class represents the weight given to distances between incomes at different parts of the income distribution. The most common values of ‘a’ used are 0, 1 and 2. GE (1) is Theil’s T index and GE (0) is Theil’s L index. Theil index can be decomposed into within and between group components. Let us take the issue of migration’s role in inequality. The statistical technique of Theil index decomposition decomposes the total inequality (measured using Theil index) into two components. (a) Within group inequality: It represents the contribution of inequality within group to total inequality. When migrant and

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non-migrant households are taken, both are not homogenous groups. Households in each of these groups have diverse socioeconomic characteristics that cause some inequalities within the group, which are reflected in income/consumption pattern/asset holding of the households. This inequality would definitely contribute to total inequality and is represented as ‘Within group inequality’. (b) Between group inequalities: Different socioeconomic groups differ in their standard of living, which creates inequality between groups known as between group inequality (for further details, see Haughton and Khandker 2009). To understand the role of migration in inequalities, one has to replace income using asset-based standard of living index. The application of Theil decomposition is not the best method to understand the role of migration in inequality. It only gives an idea about inequality within and between groups. But given the non-availability of data on proxies of income in a manner that facilitates comparison of role of migration in inequality over a reasonable period, this is the best method available.

Panel Regression Analysis Even if aforesaid analyses reveal some role of migration in inequality, the apparent contribution of migration in inequality in these may be due to some other factors. These factors may be present in a disadvantageous manner in non-migrant households, thereby making them relatively disadvantaged in terms of SOLI score. It is important to control for the other factors to see whether migration matters in standard of living. To accomplish this, panel regression of values of SOLI on various factors affecting inequality is also performed.

Results and Discussion Analysis using Proxies of Income Average consumer expenditure of migrant households is `6,189.9 which is higher than non-migrant households by `1,159. Since data on income is not directly available, data on household consumer expenditure, saving and investment is added up to have a proxy measure of income (referred to as ‘income’ itself in this chapter). This ‘income’ is subjected to Gini decomposition technique of Lerman and Yitzhaki

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(1985) to have an idea about role of migration and remittances in inequality. The results are shown in Table 17.1. Table 17.1: Inequality Decomposition by Source 1 Income Source Remittance Income Other Income

2 Sk

3 Gk

4 Rk

5 Share

6 Impact

0.15 0.85

0.90 0.52

0.49 0.85

0.15 0.85

0.06 percent –0.06 percent

Source: All tables in this chapter are prepared by the author based on calculations made using the raw data collected through the KMS 1998 and 2008, conducted by CDS, Thiruvananthapuram.

Column 5 of Table 17.1 shows the share of each income source on total income. Column 6 shows the effect that 1 per cent change in income from source ‘k’ will have on total income inequality. As the Table 17.1 shows, a 1 per cent increase in remittance will increase inequality in consumption expenditure by 0.06 per cent. Remittances do seem to have some effect on increasing inequality, but only by a small measure.

Asset-Based Analysis The mean value of asset indicator remains higher for migrant households in both 1998 and 2008. The mean values of the asset indicator for non-migrant and migrant households were 23.03 and 34.21 in 1998. In 2008 the corresponding figures were 40.16 and 51.27. Table 17.2 shows the decomposition of total inequality in the scores of asset indicator among the households into between-group (migrant and non-migrant) and within-group components for both 1998 and 2008. Column 2 shows the total inequality of asset indicator which is represented by Theil’s T (GE [1]) index. This index is decomposed into within and between components in Columns 3 and 4 respectively. Columns 5, 6 show the percentage share of within and between components in total inequality. Table 17.2: Decomposition of Theil Index 1 Year

2 Total

3 Within

4 Between

5 Within Share

6 Between Share

1998 2008

0.28 0.12

0.26 0.12

0.02 0.01

93.32 per cent 94.28 per cent

6.68 per cent 5.72 per cent

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Table 17.2 shows a decline in overall inequality of asset ownership in the 10-year period. It is the inequality between groups that matters more in total asset inequality. In 1998, around 93 per cent of total inequality in asset-based standard of living in Kerala was due to inequality among migrant and non-migrant households. Around 7 per cent of total inequality in asset-based standard of living in Kerala was due to inequality between migrant and non-migrant households. In 2008 around 94 per cent of total inequality in asset-based standard of living in Kerala is due to inequality among migrant and non-migrant households. Around 6 per cent of total inequality in asset-based standard of living in Kerala is due to inequality between migrant and non migrant households. Thus, inequalities between migrant and nonmigrant households do contribute to total inequality but by a small amount. More importantly, migration’s contribution to inequality has declined in the past one decade though marginally. The migrant– non-migrant households vary significantly on their assets and living standards and this contributes positively to the inequalities in the society in general. But one fails to gather sufficient evidence to prove that the magnitude of the contribution is substantial. As mentioned before this result is based on GE (1) Theil’s T measure of inequality. When Theil’s L was used the contribution of within group component rose to 95 per cent in 1998 and 96.8 per cent in 2008.

Household Characteristics and Asset-Based Inequality It is possible that various other inequalities among households are reappearing as inequalities among migrant/non-migrant households. This demands the identification of other factors that are causing inequalities among households. The information about other socioeconomic characteristics of the households available with the 1998 and 2008 rounds of KMS is used to see if standard of living of households (represented by SOLI) varies with those characteristics. Information is available about the following characteristics in the 1998 and 2008 rounds of KMS: (a) Sex of head of household: In 2008, male-headed households had 45.22 as the average value of the asset index, while it was only 41.23 for a female-headed household. Corresponding figures for 1998 were 27.54 and 26.75 respectively. Thus, gender gap in SOLI widened in the 10 years.

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(b) Caste and migration: Based on information about religion and caste of members of households, they are classified into Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC) and General. Table 17.3 shows the mean value of asset index for these three socioeconomic groups. Table 17.3: SOLI Scores for Socioeconomic Groups

General OBC SC/ST

Migrant 2008

Non-Migrant 2008

Migrant 1998

Non-Migrant 1998

55.26 49.49 38.43

45.26 39.61 27.92

39.77 31.89 18.02

27.56 22.84 11.90

In 1998–2008, the relative positions of SC/ST, OBC and Generalcategory households remained same for both migrant and non-migrant households. This indicates that migration reinforces existing intergroup inequalities. But the disparity between migrant/non-migrant households (migrant being better than non-migrant) behaved differently for the three socioeconomic groups in the 10-year period. While the disparity fell for General, it increased for OBC and SC/ST. The improvement in SOLI for migrants/non-migrants in the 10-year period is almost the same for all three socioeconomic groups.

SOLI Scores and Sex of Head of Households Table 17.4 shows the mean SOLI score of male- and female-headed households in 1998 and 2008. Male-headed households have a higher SOLI score than female-headed ones. But this difference is reduced by migration in both 1998 and 2008. Gap between migrant and nonmigrant is higher for female-headed households in both 1998 and 2008. Thus, migration plays some role in reducing gender-based inequality in household asset ownership. Table 17.4: SOLI Scores by Sex of Head of Households, 1998 and 2008 Sex of Head of Household

Migrant

Male, 2008 Female, 2008 Male, 1998 Female, 1998

51.70 50.33 34.28 33.63

Non-Migrant 41.95 34.39 23.84 19.90

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Panel Regression Analysis The Panel Regression model has asset-based SOLI as the dependent variable. Migration is represented by the ratio of number of migrants to total household size. This will be referred to as ‘migration intensity’, represented as ‘MIGINTEN’. Among the factors other than migration that determine SOLI, caste of household members is represented by a dummy (CASTE) which is zero for non-SC/ST households and one for SC/ST households. Sex of head of household is also represented by a dummy (HDSX); it is 0 if head of household is male and 1 if female. Another dummy (YD) is put for the year, say 1998 or 2008. The number of people who are employed but not migrants will be represented as ‘NMEMPL’. An interaction term (INTER) of caste (dummy) and migration is also included in the model. The results of panel regression are shown in Table 17.5. The results show that migration intensity (MIGINTEN) positively and significantly influences asset holding of households. On the other hand, non-migrant employment (NMEMPL) does not have any significant impact on asset holding of households. Hence, migrant households may be able to acquire more assets than non-migrant ones, leading to widening of inequalities in asset holding between migrant and nonmigrant households. Thus, the regression result indirectly confirms the role of migration in creating inequalities between migrant and non-migrant households. Even though caste and sex of head of household have a significant impact on asset holding, they are not interacting with migration. The differences in significance of migrant and non-migrant employment point to the role of migration in inequality.

Summary and Conclusion This study tried to understand the impact of migration and remittances on Kerala’s inequality scenario. An attempt has been made here to examine whether migration caused inequality between households with or without migrants, and if so, to what extent. The dominant analytical technique adopted in studies examining the migration–inequality link is to estimate the marginal impact of a change in remittances on some inequality measure (mostly the Gini coefficient). An analysis of this sort was done using data on income proxies, mainly consumer expenditure data, obtained from the 2008 round of the KMS. This analysis revealed that 1 per cent rise in remittances coming to Kerala raise the Gini coefficient by 0.06 per cent; thus, remittances have a direct positive impact on inequality but the magnitude of influence

Table 17.5: Factors that Influence Asset-Based SOLI Dependent Variable: Asset-Based SOLI Model

Regressors Constant

MIGINTEN

Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

Fixed Effects

Random Effects

Fixed Effects

Coefficient (t value) (p value)

Coefficient (t value) (p value)

Coefficient (z value) (p value)

Coefficient (t value) (p value)

31.386 (35.1)* (0.000)

30.065 (31.01)* (0.000)

31.028 (35.05)* (0.000)

30.065 (30.7)* (0.000)

6.221 (6.39)* (0.000)

2.962 (2.6)* (0.000)

5.041 (5.5)* (0.000)

2.962 (3.26)* (0.001)

2.285 (1.29) (0.198)

–1.406 (–0.11) (0.916)

2.286 (1.25) (0.211)

NMEMPL

–1.22 (–0.9) 0.37

CASTE

–8.227 (–5.58)* (0.000)

–5.569 (–2.42)* (0.016)

–7.605 (–5.02)* (0.000)

–5.57 (–2.01)* (0.045)

HDSX

–5.063 (–5.1)* (0.000)

–4.416 (–3.24)* (0.001)

–4.888 (–4.96)* (0.000)

–4.416 (–3.18)* (0.002)

YD

13.705 (15.27)* (0.000)

13.867 (19.74)* (0.000)

13.781 (19.72)* (0.000)

13.867 (19.77)* (0.000)

–1.056 (–0.51)

–2.043 (–0.86)

–1.409 (–0.73)

–2.043 (–0.83)

0.317 0.073 0.16

0.322 0.053 0.149

INTER R square

0.158

Within Between Overall

– – –

0.322 0.053 0.149

F statistic

56.37

69.538* Chi square (6) = 471.66

Wald 2.35*

F test that all u_i = 0 Hausman Specification Test Number of Observations

Chi square = 18.24 (p = 0.0057) 1,770

Note: * Significant at 5 per cent level.

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was not very high. Had data on income proxies been available for the 1998 round of KMS, one could have conducted the same analysis for both 1998 and 2008 rounds and compared the results. Since this was not possible, further analysis could not be made based on proxies of income. Since information on asset holding and housing conditions were available for both 1998 and 2008 rounds, an asset-based SOLI was used to compare the role of migration in inequality in the years 1998 and 2008. To ascertain the contribution of inequality between migrant and non-migrant households to overall inequality a decomposition of Theil index of SOLI scores was done. This showed that inequality between migrant and non-migrant households contributed to only 7 per cent of total inequalities in 1998 and 6 per cent in 2008. The rest was contributed by inequality within migrant and non-migrant households. Thus, it was inequalities within migrant and non-migrant households that mattered. Migration did have a positive role in inequality but not very high. Migration reinforces caste-based inequality in household asset holding but not gender-based inequality. Finally, the study tried to filter out migration’s impact on standard of living by running a panel regression to control other factors that influence standard of living, indicated by SOLI scores of panel households. This analysis revealed a positive and significant role for migration in determining the standard of living of the household, but also showed an insignificant role in non-migrant employment. This difference in significance indicated that inequality between migrant and non-migrant households was widening. Quantification of role of migration in inequalities confirmed that migration created inequalities in standard of living between migrant and non-migrant households. Migration and remittances had a positive but not substantial impact on inequality between migrant and non-migrant households. However, even if the effect of migration on inequality was small in comparison to other unexplained factors, panel data analysis showed that its role in inequality was significant. In short, though migration may not be a cause to worry as an explanation for inequality currently, it may be so in the future.

References Deshpande, Ashwini. 2002. ‘Does Caste Still Define Disparity? A Look at Inequality in Kerala, India’, The American Economic Review, 90(2): 322–25.

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Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett. 1999. ‘The Effect of Household Wealth on Educational Attainment: Evidence from 35 Countries’, Population and Development Review, 25(1): 85–120. Haughton, Jonathan and Shahidur R. Khandker. 2009. Handbook on Poverty and Inequality. Washington DC: World Bank. Jha, Raghbendra, Raghav Gaiha and Anurag Sharma. 2007. ‘Mean Consumption, Poverty and Inequality in Rural India in the Sixtieth Round of the National Sample Survey’. Working Paper no. 2006/11, Australia South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University. Jones, Richard C. 1998. ‘Remittances and Inequality: A Question of Migration Stage and Geographic Scale’, Economic Geography, 74(1): 8–25. Lerman, Robert I. and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1985. ‘Income Inequality Effects by Income’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(1): 151–56. Mishra, Padmaja and Ashok Parikh. 1992. ‘Household Consumer Expenditure Inequalities in India: A Decomposition Analysis’, Review of Income and Wealth Series, 38(2): 225–36. Pal, Parthapratim and Jayati Ghosh. 2007. ‘Inequality in India: A Survey of Recent Trends’. Working Paper no. 45, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. Sastry, Narayan. 2004. ‘Trends in Socioeconomic Inequalities in Mortality in Developing Countries: The Case of Child Survival in Sao Paulo, Brazil’, Demography, 41(3): 443–64. Stark, Oded, Edward J. Taylor and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1986. ‘Remittances and Inequality’, The Economic Journal, 96(383): 722–40. Subrahmanian, K. K. and Syam Prasad. 2008. ‘Rising Inequality with High Growth, Isn’t This Trend Worrisome?: Analysis of Kerala Experience’. Working Paper no. 401, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. United Nations (UN) and Centre for Development Studies (CDS). 1975. Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy: A Case Study of Selected Issues with Reference to Kerala. New York: United Nations. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012. Kerala’s Gulf Connection 1998– 2011: Economic and Social Impact of Migration. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

18

International Trade in Health Services An Indian Experience

Soumi Roy chowDhuRy* India’s emergence in the world economy as one of the fastest growing economies can be attributed to a large extent to the rapid growth of its service sector. The rate of service-sector growth has surpassed the growth of agriculture, industry and the rest of the economy in general. The share of service sector in GDP was 55.40 per cent in 1999–2000 which reached 64.36 per cent in 2008–09. Also, the growth performance of various sub-sectors of the service sector differed significantly among them. Services have also emerged as a major area of India’s external trade. Significance of trade in service sectors is reflected in the academia but the lack of an empirical foundation of its various sub sectors is the major barrier behind the proper realization of the potential. This chapter is a modest endeavour to analyze India’s trade in services, focusing on one of its fast-growing components, which is trade in health services.

GATS Formation and Health Sector The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS 1994) that came into force on 1 January 1995 paved the way for liberalization of services. The World Trade Organization (WTO) members for the purpose of structuring their commitments have used a classification system comprising 12 core service sectors (WTO 1991). The health sector

* This is an abridged version of a chapter from my MPhil Dissertation at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, affiliated to the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I am grateful to my supervisors Professor S. Irudaya Rajan and Dr K. N. Harilal for all their support in the completion of this work.

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was one of these 12 sub-sectors that were opened up for liberalization. The four modes as defined by the GATS are the means of trading services. (a) Mode 1 — Cross-Border Trade: It is the application of information and communication technologies to treat patients. Generally termed as ‘e-health’, it need not involve face-to-face physical interaction between the provider and recipient. (b) Mode 2 — Consumption Abroad: It involves movement of patients from one WTO country to another for treatment. The treatments for which they move are mostly non-emergency in nature. This is commonly called ‘Medical Tourism’. (c) Mode 3 — Commercial Presence: It is the route of Foreign Direct Investment into the territory of other WTO member countries, in the form of foreign participation or ownership of hospitals, clinics by a foreign entity. In most cases the extent of participation has been through collaborations and tie-ups. (d) Mode 4 — Movement of the Natural Persons: Medical professionals move from one country to another to deliver medical services through this mode. The interest of countries in liberalizing the health services was negotiated during the Doha rounds and it was decided that the importer countries should authorize the medical specialists entering their country and determine their qualification before granting them permission for entry.

Trade in Health Services: A Review India’s schedule of commitments1 in the GATS round of negotiations showed a scanty and skewed distribution with narrow focus on the 1 India’s schedule of commitments portrays four sectors of health such as medical and dental services; services provided by the midwives, nurses, physiotherapists and paramedical staff; hospital service; and veterinary services. Commitments are taken on the four modes of trade and on two aspects — national treatment and market access. The Uruguay rounds of negotiations have seen commitments only in the hospital sector, with three modes kept as unbound and a 51 per cent foreign equity ceiling. Conditional offers under the Doha round of negotiations have seen the opening of all sub-sectors other than veterinary services which was further opened for liberalization during the revised offers.

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hospital sector during the Uruguay round. The fact that trading in health services is beneficial to the economy was realized for the first time by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1998) through its series of publications on issues of trade in health services. With this initiative, defensive positions as exerted by the developing countries have been improved upon in the subsequent Doha round of negotiations. The conditional and revised offers of 2004 and 2005 on medical and dental services, and also the services provided by midwives and nurses mirror the improvement made by India ever since the Uruguay round. Even for the hospital sector, the foreign equity threshold has been increased and transfer of latest technologies approved. There are three sets of literature which deal with the issue of international trade in health services. The first brought in the issue of various opportunities of developing countries in trading health services and the constraints they could face (UNCTAD Secretariat 1998). Alternative studies focused on discussing the effectiveness of international agreements in context of a particular country. International agreements are guided and should be motivated in accordance to the comparative advantages enjoyed by the respective country (Smith, Blouin et al. 2006). In the Indian context, Rupa Chanda has been writing extensively on the GATS aspects of health trade (Chanda and Smith 2006; Smith, Chanda et al. 2009); her array of writings spread from evaluating the GATS commitments in the Indian health sector to mode-wise analysis of the same. The next set of literature (UNESCAP 2009; Banik et al. 2011) argued for the need to build a database to forecast the market data properly and their potential implications in the domestic health sector.

Indian States and Trade in Health Services Anecdotal evidences and case studies are common forms of representing the estimates of trade through health sector. No systematic evaluation of the sector is done since the initiative of the Ministry of Commerce and Intelligence in 2011. The Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) in their pilot survey of eight cities in India — Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Trivandrum, Mumbai, Pune, and Delhi — in 2011came up with the estimates of the amount of trade taking place in the health sector. The need for the information arises

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from the scope of the bargaining power India can gain during the bilateral and multilateral negotiations.2 The pilot survey aimed to measure total exports and imports of health services by categories during 2010–11 (in thousand rupees). Apart from medical tourism, categories such as medical transcription, telemedicine form an important part of trade in health services. The report also estimates the amount of trade being carried out by the major trading partner of India in terms of revenue earned and number of foreign patients. The report gives the number of patients coming to avail different treatments. The study is of immense importance to policy-makers since it highlights the perceived barriers of different stakeholders engaging in international trade in health services. Much of the revenue of international trade comes from medical tourism. Though the phenomenon is not widely prevalent across all Indian states, few states have started recognizing its benefits and have taken necessary steps to foster its growth. The Tamil Nadu government has opened a new medical tourism desk at the Tamil Nadu tourism complex and listed 25 state hospitals that will invite foreign patients. The tourism department of Chennai is a similar case. Chennai has been declared India’s Health Capital, attracting 45 per cent of health tourists from abroad (Tattara 2010). The Department of Health and Family Welfare has been promoting Gujarat Medicare Tourism through signing a Memorandum of Understanding of the Medical Tourism Council with the private hospitals of the state (Bhattacharya 2008). The Maharashtra government in collaboration with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) Western Region Council has launched the Medical Tourism Council of Maharashtra (MTCM) (De Souza 2007, cited in Reddy and Qadeer 2010). We therefore see that India has been unable to come up with a national framework on the estimates of medical tourism, and not much has been done on this front until the recent move of the ministry. This lack of initiative is responsible for putting India at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power during the bilateral and multilateral agreements. It also adversely affects the domestic policies in this regard. With this motivation, this paper strives to explore the practicalities of the extent of medical tourism taking place in the modern medicine sector in the city of Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. 2

The author was a field investigator for the project named ‘International Trade in Health Services’ undertaken by the DGCI&S and Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta (CSSSC) for the Kerala chapter.

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Thiruvananthapuram and Trade in Health Service The motivation behind choosing Thiruvananthapuram lies in its unbroken tradition of attracting tourists from all over the globe. Kerala is rated as one of the top three tourism destinations in the world by the World Travel and Tourism Council. Kerala has gained international attention for health tourism and has emerged as a hub of the traditional but popular alternative medicine, Ayurveda, which was the pioneer of health tourism in Kerala. The state is also witnessing a surge in the inflow of medical tourists in dental care and modern medicine (CII 2011). The Kerala government, in association with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), undertook an international conference on medical tourism during 2007 and 2011. A primary survey of the hospitals of Thiruvananthapuram is the first attempt towards an empirical investigation of the amount of trade in health services.

Methodology A primary survey of modern super-speciality hospitals in Thiruvananthapuram, the capital city of Kerala, has been undertaken.

Unit of Analysis The survey was conducted across 20 super-speciality hospitals of Thiruvananthapuram using a structured questionnaire. Revenue should be the ideal parameter in measuring health trade. Private hospitals surveyed in the city were reluctant to provide information on revenue, hence the ‘number of foreign patients’ is used as an alternative parameter.

Sampling Design The samples are chosen such that the statistics reflect the parameters of the population. The 20 hospitals included in the survey represent around 70 per cent of the total hospitals of the city and more than 90 per cent of the total foreign patients treated in all hospitals taken together. These 20 hospitals follow the given criteria. (a) Only private super-speciality hospitals were chosen for survey. (b) All the accredited hospitals (Joint Commission International [JCI], National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers [NABH], International Organization for Standardization [ISO], etc.) were included.

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(d) Hospitals with well-established websites are included in the survey since websites are the primary source of information for potential foreign patients.

Interviews In-depth interviews have been carried out with the top management of the selected institutions like directors, managing directors of the hospital and other higher ranking officials on the condition that their identity is kept confidential.

Time Length The survey was carried out in September–November 2011. The data pertains mainly to the financial year 2010–11 (1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011).

Results of the Survey Table 18.1 shows the 20 super-speciality hospitals chosen for the survey. They are private hospitals specializing in different fields. Most hospitals are multi-speciality hospitals, but we also find hospitals with narrow areas of specializations like eye care, infertility treatments and dentistry. Table 18.1: Hospitals Surveyed in Thiruvananthapuram Hospitals Kerala Institute of Medical Science (KIMS) Credence Hospital Samad IVF Hospital S. P. Fort Hospital S. U. T. Hospital Cosmopolitan Hospital Anayadil Hospital Chaithanya Eye Research Centre Ananthapuri Hospital Vasan Eye Care Hospital Yogiraj Centre for Dermatology and Cosmetology Lords Hospital Chelsa Medical Care Divya Prabha Eye Hospital Jubilee Memorial Hospital

Speciality Multi-disciplinary super-speciality Comprehensive multi-speciality hospital Specializes in infertility treatment Multi-disciplinary super-speciality Multi-speciality hospital Multi-speciality hospital Tertiary care hospital Eye hospital Tertiary care hospital Eye hospital Dermatology and cosmetology Multi-speciality Tertiary care hospital Eye hospital Tertiary care hospital

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Speciality

P. R. S. Hospital Sree Ramakrishna Hospital Arumana Hospital Meditrina Hospital Ahalia Foundation Eye Hospital

Multi-disciplinary hospital Cooperative hospital Tertiary care hospital Multi-speciality Eye hospital

Source: Primary survey findings, 2011.

The questionnaire used for the survey spreads across the four modes of trade. The aim was to identify the popular modes functioning in the case of Thiruvananthapuram. An upshot of the survey is provided in Table 18.2 which lists down the hospitals surveyed and the corresponding modes they practice. Table 18.2: Hospitals and Mode of Participation in Trade in Health Services Hospitals

Mode 1

Mode 2

Mode 3

Mode 4

KIMS Credence Hospital Samad IVF Hospital S. P. Fort Hospital S. U. T. Hospital Cosmopolitan Hospital Anayadil Hospital Chaithanya Eye Research Centre Ananthapuri Hospital Vasan Eye Care Hospital Yogiraj Centre for Dermatology and Cosmetology Lords Hospital

Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No No No No No No No

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No

No

No

Chelsa Medical Care Divya Prabha Eye Hospital, Jubilee Memorial Hospital

No No No

No No No

No No No

P. R. S. Hospital Sree Ramakrishna Hospital Arumana Hospital Meditrina Hospital Ahalia Foundation Eye Hospital

No No No No No

Yes/No records No No Yes/No records No No No Potential Potential

No No No No No

No No No No No

Source: Primary survey findings, 2011. Note: No records: for those hospitals that cater to foreign patients but have no documentation of their flow. No: for those hospitals that don’t cater to the foreign patients Yes: for those hospitals that do cater to the foreign patients.

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Table 18.2 reveals that Mode 1, i.e., telemedicine practice, and Mode 3, i.e., foreign investment in the hospital sector, don’t have much presence. Thiruvananthapuram hospitals participate in international trade in health services primarily through Modes 2 and 4. Incidentally these two modes ensure face-to-face interaction between doctors and patients. Table 18.2 will be further elaborated upon to describe Mode 2 of Medical Tourism in detail. Medical tourism is defined by the movement of patients from one country to another to seek treatments unavailable or expensive to undertake in their home country. Kerala was traditionally recognized for the inflow of tourists to avail Ayurvedic treatments. This paper attempts to explain the movements of patients for modern medicine.

Thiruvananthapuram and Medical Tourism Table 18.2 shows that 11 out of the 20 hospitals have affirmed the treatment of foreign patients in 2010–11. Most of these hospitals don’t have detailed records of their foreign interaction; moreover, they haven’t faced any enquiry regarding their foreign transactions before. Lack of data availability is a stumbling block in estimating the market data. Hospitals could only provide the number of foreign patients treated in their units during 2010–11. KIMS (see Table 18.1) is the only institution that keeps a systematic record of its foreign interaction and has undertaken major initiatives for promoting the business of medical tourism luring more than 150,000 foreign patients in the last six years. Table 18.3 shows the inflow of foreign patients to these 20 hospitals and highlights the initiatives taken by these hospitals to foster the development of this mode. The patients of KIMS outnumbered the rest of the hospitals. Apart from KIMS, the Chaithanya Eye Research Centre and Vasan Eye Care encounter around 1,000 to 35,000 patients and for the rest of the hospitals, it ranges from 100 to 500. This shows that the distribution of health-service providers engaged in overseas trade institutions is highly skewed; the share of foreign patients treated in the hospitals is restricted only to a few hospitals. Hospitals are practising and offering some initiatives to attract their flow, such as providing a travel desk at airports, health packages and other cashless benefits. Medical tourists come to avail a wide range of treatments, ranging from cardiac and orthopaedic care, general surgery, cosmetic treatment, and ophthalmology, to fertility treatment and dental care.

36,357

5,000 1,100 400–500 500 250–300 200 100

100

50–100

250–300

KIMS

Chaithanya Eye Research Centre Vasan Eye Care Hospital S. P. Fort Hospital Ananthapuri Hospital Cosmopolitan Hospital Anayadil Hospital Credence Hospital

S. U. T. Hospital

Samad IVF Hospital

Yogiraj Centre for Dermatology and Cosmetology

Maldives

Maldives

Maldives (>95 per cent of the patients) and other 76 countries around the world Maldives Maldives, European countries Maldives and rarely Europe Oman, Maldives Maldives, Iran, New Zealand, and Europe Maldives Maldives, United States (US) and rarely Europe Maldives, Middle East, Denmark

Countries

Cashless benefits Cashless benefits No separate activity Cashless benefits No separate activity No separate activity Travel desk with special services including accommodation Soon to set up a separate cell on medical tourism Telemedicine and package — Treat and Retreat No separate activity

International patient cell

Activities to Promote

Source: Primary Survey Results, 2011. Note: Cashless benefits are tie-ups of the hospitals with the Maldives government. They are a reimbursement mechanism for the treatments availed by the Mali patients.

No. of Patients/ Year

Hospitals

Table 18.3: Foreign Patients in Thiruvananthapuram Hospitals for the Years 2010–11 (in number)

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The size of the economic activity of KIMS in the international market given by the number of foreign patients treated is indicative of being the biggest hospital of Thiruvananthapuram. It constituted more than 90 per cent of the medical tourists of the city and offers over 40 speciality treatments ranging from general medicine, surgery, fertility treatments, to Ayurvedic rejuvenation. Well-equipped with all the modern facilities like internet, fax and telemedicine procedures, it has a separate international patient cell that takes care of the travel, accommodation, medical procedures, and visas of foreign patients. Thus, in keeping with the well-known Ayurvedic treatment, hospitals of Thiruvananthapuram are making their foray into capturing the international market of health through modern medicine.

Summary Studies of trade in health services are few, which motivated the need to study the emerging concern. The paper dealt with identifying and exploring ways of trading health services. In the global context, medical tourism is practised as the most popular mode. Developing countries — both Asian and non-Asian — are the host countries for medical tourists. Not all states invite foreign patients in India, although we can locate a few hubs exploring their comparative advantages, namely Delhi, Mumbai, Kerala, Chennai, Bangalore, and Kolkata. The reasons behind the patients’ flow from different countries depend on specific advantages India enjoys and disadvantages their home country incurred. But conclusive arguments on the extent of the growth of medical tourism are limited to the unavailability of national data framework. This motivated the need for a primary study of the hospitals of Thiruvananthapuram where medical tourism and movement of natural persons emerged as popular modes of trading health services. A majority of the countries reported in the survey have had a consistent flow of patients over the years, the most important being Maldives. All hospitals have a significant presence of Mali patients, which is not exclusively determined by the cost advantages but by cultural affinity and geographical distance between the two locations. Exploiting the potential of health trade market will further depend on balanced policies and regulations beneficial to the destination and source countries. The direction of future research can lead to analysis of the sustainability of the domestic health sector when confronted with such an inflow.

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References Banik, Arindam, Prabir De, Pradip K. Bhaumik, Sheikh Md. Monzurul Huq, and Bhuban B. Bajracharya. 2011. ‘Trade in Health Services in South Asia: An Examination of the Need for Regional Cooperation’. Social Science Research Network eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1933088 (accessed 2 December 2013). Bhattacharya, Mousumi. 2008. ‘Advantage Gujarat in Medical Tourism’. Paper presented at the Conference on ‘Tourism in India — Challenges Ahead’, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode, 15–17 May. http://dspace. iimk.ac.in/bitstream/2259/581/1/405-417+Mousumi.pdf (accessed 2 December 2013). Chanda, Rupa and Richard D. Smith. 2006. ‘Trade in Health Services and GATS: A Framework for Policymakers’, in Chantal Blouin, Nick Drager and Richard Smith (eds), International Trade in Health Services and the Gats: Current Issues and Debates, pp. 245–304. Washington DC: World Bank. Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). 2011. ‘Kerala Health Tourism 2011’. http://keralahealthtourism.in/about.html (accessed 26 June 2012). De Souza, Wilfred. 2007. ‘India a Global Destination for Medical Tourism’. Express Travel World. http://www.expresstravelworld.com/200703/man agement05.shtml (accessed 27 November 2009). General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 1994. ‘India: Schedule of Specific Commitments’. GATS/SC/42. Kerala Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS). 2010. ‘Annual Report 2010–11’, no. 16. Ministry of Commerce and Intelligence. 2011. ‘International Trade in Health Services’. Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics and Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta. Reddy, Sunita and Imrana Qadeer. 2010. ‘Medical Tourism in India: Progress or Predicament?’ Economic and Political Weekly, 45(20): 69–75. Smith, Richard, Chantal Blouin and Nick Drager (eds). 2006. ‘Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Introduction and Summary’, in Chantal Blouin, Nick Drager and Richard Smith (eds), International Trade in Health Services and the Gats: Current Issues and Debates, pp. 1–16. Washington DC: World Bank. Smith, Richard D., Rupa Chanda and Viroj Tangcharoensathien. 2009. ‘Trade in Health-Related Services’, The Lancet, 373(9663): 593–601. http://www. thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(08)61778-X/ abstract (accessed 9 December 2013). Tattara, Giuseppe. 2010. ‘Medical Tourism and Domestic Population Health’. Working Paper no. 2010_02, Department of Economics, University of Venice. http://ideas.repec.org/p/ven/wpaper/2010_02.html (accessed 2 December 2013).

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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Secretariat. 1998. ‘International Trade in Health Services: Difficulties and Opportunities for Developing Countries’, in Simonetta Zarrilli and Colette M. Kinnon (eds), International Trade in Health Services: A Development Perspective, pp. 1–28. Geneva: United Nations. UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). 2009. Medical Travel in Asia and the Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities. Thailand: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. World Trade Organization (WTO). 1991. ‘Services Sectoral Classification List Special Distribution’. No. MTN.GNS/W/120.

19

Capability Quotient of the NorthEastern Out-Migrants pinaK SaRKaR In India, internal migration is assuming greater significance with the emerging development dynamics and its ensuing implications. The Census 2001 shows that internal migration in India has gained impetus and is intensifying rapidly. This study primarily focuses on youth migration, comprising the education- and employment-led migrants from the eight north-eastern peripheral states to the four major destinations — Delhi, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and West Bengal. The main thrust of the paper is two-fold; first, exploring the capability quotient/skill levels of migrants (educational attainments) originating from the north-eastern regions, and second, examining the patterns of the migration cohort groups at the destinations. The skill level of migrants is very important because it reflects the quality of migrants and the level of migration streams such as low-, mediumand high-skilled migration from north-east India in relation to its economic backwardness and sociopolitical crisis. On the other hand, the purpose of examining the patterns and exposition of the migration cohort groups for both education and employment is to identify the states from where out-migration for these two purposes are more intensifying and propelling at different durations. It also reflects the changing pattern of the various state-wise cohort groups. Though there are various theories that can be applied in this study, the ‘Push-Pull’ framework seems to be the most appropriate one. In the context of the north-east, lack of educational infrastructure, economic development, meagre employment opportunities, and the persistent sociopolitical unrest are the ‘push’ factors that determine migration from these states. On the other hand, states or regions with metropolitan centres like Bangalore, Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata, and Mumbai are attracting migrants from the backward regions by providing

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educational infrastructure and employment opportunities that act as ‘pull’ factors.

Capability Level of North-Eastern Youth Migrants The capability level of north-eastern youth migrants is determined while focusing on the age group of 15–34. This is the most mobile age group; young people migrate in search of better employment opportunities and attainment of quality education. Though this age group constitutes both education- and employmentled migration, this section mainly addresses the combined mobility of both reasons in reference to the skills acquired at the place of origin before migration. The major limitation is the inability to differentiate between both categories as the education-level data provided by the Census limits only to the duration and age category, not specifying the reason for migration. Therefore, while assessing capability, we lack information about the reason for migration. We thus confine this section to only male migrants in the 15–34 age group and attempt to compare the capability or skill level of youth migrants from the northeastern states to that at the all-India level. The capability level of migrants addresses various aspects of migration dynamics. First, it explains the quality of migrants from a region. Second, it defines the level of migration streams such as low-, mediumand high-skilled migration. Third, the capability level of migrants from a particular region also defines the availability of educational infrastructure in a region. To verify the skill level of migrants, the absolute number as provided by the Census 2001 are converted to per thousand of total migrants for both the north-eastern migrants and migration at all-India level. In Tables 19.1 and 19.2, we can observe that for the illiterate category, the proportion is higher for the migrants from north-eastern states, with 230 migrants (per thousand) in contrast to the all-India figure of 141 (per thousand). Whereas for the literate category, it is 771 (per thousand) in the north-eastern region, which is much less than the all-India level of 859 (per thousand). Interestingly, although the literacy rate of six out of eight north-eastern states is higher than the all-India level (Census of India 2001), the outflow of illiterate migrants from the north-eastern states is much higher, implying that the illiterate workforce is unable to find much opportunity in their own states.

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Table 19.1: North-East Migration with Education Level for Males in the Age Group 15–34 years (per thousand) Duration

ILL

LiTT

LiTT B M/S

M/S B Grd

< 1 year 1–4 years 5–9 years 10+ years All duration*

268 211 240 234 238

732 789 760 766 762

416 392 420 439 417

224 274 235 231 241

Grad Tec < Deg nt Tec Tec = PG 5 8 5 3 5

62 83 74 68 72

12 18 11 8 12

Source: All tables and figures in this chapter have been prepared by the author based on Census 2001 data. Note: * ‘All duration’ is the average of all the duration groups. The literate categories will not exactly add up to the total literates. This gap is because there are literates whose qualifications are not known. ILL = Illiterate; LiTT = Literate; LiTT B M/S = Literate below matric/ secondary; M/S B Grad = Matric/secondary but below graduate; Tec < Deg = Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree; Grad nt Tec = Graduate and above other than technical degree; Tec = PG – Technical degree or diploma equal to degree or postgraduate degree. Table 19.2: All-India Migration with Education Levels for Males in the Age Group 15–34 (per thousand) Duration

ILL

LiTT

LiTT B M/S

M/S B Grd

< 1 year 1–4 years 5–9 years 10+ years All duration*

288 141 140 119 172

712 859 860 881 828

346 335 366 383 358

243 333 324 341 310

Note:

Grad Tec < Deg nt Tec Tec = PG 15 25 19 19 20

69 110 108 102 97

22 39 26 20 27

* ‘All duration’ is the average of all the duration groups. The literate categories will not exactly add up to the total literates. This gap is because there are literates whose qualifications are not known. ILL = Illiterate; LiTT = Literate; LiTT B M/S = Literate below matric/ secondary; M/S B Grad = Matric/secondary but below graduate; Tec < Deg = Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree; Grad nt Tec = Graduate and above other than technical degree; Tec = PG – Technical degree or diploma equal to degree or postgraduate degree.

In the case of out-migration from the north-eastern region, except for the group ‘Literate below matric/secondary’, the number of migrants with higher educational level (capability) for every thousand total migrants is considerably lesser than the all-India level in all the

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duration groups. The reason for higher number of migrants from the north-eastern states can be attributed to the availability of quality primary and school-level education in the north-east region, i.e., the literacy rate has increased; on the other hand, there is a lack of avenues for higher education which is creating a mismatch (Shimray et al. 2009). Data provided by the Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2010, reveals that in five out of the eight states, budget allocation for higher education is less than the national average. These states allocate more than half of their budget for primary education, while secondary education receives only onethird to one-fourth. The education-led mobility in this region arises due to various reasons and a prime motivation is the desire among parents to send their children to distant and better places for higher education after completing matriculation and higher secondary in the region. M. P. Singh (2007) found that students securing higher ranks in 10th and 12th standards have a tendency to compulsorily move outside the region for pursuing higher/technical education. The other type of mobility occurs among people who after completing school-level education move out of the region for employment purposes in the absence of better scope of higher education and employment opportunity in their region. The other migration-boosting factor is persistent poverty as agriculture remains the main occupation (Lama 2006). Figure 19.1 provides a representation of skill levels of migrants from the north-east regions as against the all-India level. It gives the average representation of all duration groups in Tables 19.1 and 19.2, showing it as ‘India All Duration’ and ‘North-east All Duration’. It is evident from this figure that the flow of skilled migrants to that of per thousand migrants from the region starts decreasing in comparison to the all-India level with every higher educational attainment. The graph shows that the skill base of migrants from the north-eastern regions is low, with few migrants having technical/higher education skills, adding majorly to the low-skilled migrant workforce of the country.

Migration Cohorts Cohorts of Employment-Led Migrants by the States of Origin A cohort of migrants means the number of people staying at a particular destination from the same place of origin. Investigating migration cohorts is useful as this study revolves around issues of mobility from

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Figure 19.1: Capability Levels of Migrants

Note: ILL = Illiterate; LiTT = Literate; LiTT B M/S = Literate below matric/ secondary; M/S B Grad = Matric/secondary but below graduate; Tec < Deg = Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree; Grad nt Tec = Graduate and above other than technical degree; Tec = PG – Technical degree or diploma equal to degree or postgraduate degree.

the place of origin to the destination along with the durational aspects of it; hence it detects the origin-wise migration cohorts at the destination. In this section, all the four destinations — Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal — are clubbed together and an attempt is made to identify origin states that have higher dominance in migration (Table 19.3). Table 19.3: Migration for Employment to Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal North-Eastern States

Less than 1 year

1–4 years

5–9 years

10+ years

Sikkim Arunachal Pradesh Nagaland Manipur Mizoram Tripura Meghalaya

8.60 10.60 30.80 19.70 3.40 12.90 14.00

7.70 7.40 32.00 17.20 3.90 16.90 14.70

6.60 5.30 39.80 14.20 3.80 15.90 14.40

70.00 4.90 40.30 8.90 3.90 18.50 16.50

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Total

Note: Assam is excluded as it alone constitutes more than half of the total share.

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Migration cohorts are determined taking each duration group of ‘Less than 1 year’, ‘1–4 years’, ‘5–9 years’ and ‘10+ years’ as 100. At each duration group, percentage share is calculated to analyse the dominance of state-wise cohort at the four combined destinations. Nagaland has the biggest cohort group in in all the durations after Assam. The next biggest migrant cohorts are from Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura. In the case of Manipur, there is a huge difference in its share in the ‘Less than 1 year’ group, with very high domination (share) at 19.7 per cent and comparatively less in the ‘10+ years’ group at 8.9 per cent. The major reason for such inconsistency in the migration trend can be attributed to the fact that among the bigger cohort groups or states, migration from Manipur has increased recently, acquiring a modest share in the first two duration groups. This can be attributed to the growing political instability and insurgency in Manipur, pushing the young population to cities in search of better employment opportunities. As this increase in mobility is a recent phenomenon, the share of people from Manipur in the ‘10 years and above’ duration group is lesser than in the bigger cohort states. A similar pattern is witnessed for Arunachal Pradesh, where the migration cohort at each individual duration group is in accordance with a pattern very much like Manipur. Though the share of migrants from Arunachal Pradesh is lower than Manipur, the pattern is similar; percentage share for the duration group is higher for the ‘Less than 1 year’ group at 10.6 per cent, whereas it is only 4.9 per cent for ‘10+ years’, which reveals the fact that increase in mobility from Arunachal Pradesh is a much more recent phenomenon, or in other words, migrants from this state do not stay for longer duration. In the case of employment-led migration from Nagaland, the pattern is opposite to that of Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. The share is lower at 30.8 per cent for the duration group of ‘Less than 1 year’, and 40.3 per cent for ‘10+ years’. The reason for this reverse tendency can be the fact that as the shares of migrants from the other northeastern states are increasing over the years, that of Nagaland is reducing in the more recent duration groups.

Cohorts of Education-Led Migrants by the States of Origin The purpose of this section is to investigate the pattern of educationled migration cohorts at the destination, and verify whether the pattern is in conformity to that of employment-led migration cohort as discussed in the previous section (Table 19.4).

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Table 19.4: Migration for Education to Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal North-Eastern States

Less than 1 year

1–4 years

5–9 years

10+ years

Sikkim Arunachal Pradesh Nagaland Manipur Mizoram Tripura Meghalaya

6.00 10.40 11.10 43.50 11.60 8.80 8.70

6.60 9.60 12.10 41.90 9.20 10.30 10.20

9.50 10.50 14.10 39.10 6.40 13.20 7.20

13.40 13.60 8.20 12.60 1.30 34.10 16.80

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Total

Note: Assam is excluded as it alone constitutes more than half of the total share.

The migration cohort from Assam is excluded as in Table 19.3. The Manipur cohort has the highest share of people in the duration group of ‘Less than 1 year’ at 43.5 per cent, but the share is reduced to 12.6 per cent for ‘10+ years’. The main reason is the socioeconomic crisis in the Manipur valley, as argued by Oinam (2003); because of political instability and infiltration most parents think it is better to exile their children to another part of India without a second thought about the kind of courses and education their children take up, and the objective is to keep their children in safer places rather than staying in Manipur. As the share is very high in the lower duration group and very less in the higher duration one, it can be concluded that, the out-migration from Manipur to cities for education is a much more recent phenomenon. A similar trend in mobility is observed in the case of the cohort group from Mizoram, with a huge difference between the share in the lower and upper duration groups. In the lower duration group of ‘Less than 1 year’ the share is 11.6 per cent, whereas for ‘10+ years’ the share is only 1.3 per cent, implying that out-migration from Mizoram for education purposes is gaining prominence. However, a different pattern is observed for migration cohorts from Tripura, Meghalaya and Sikkim. The pattern is dominated with higher share in the higher duration groups and lower share in the lower ones. For Tripura, the share is 8.8 per cent for ‘Less than 1 year’, while it is astoundingly high at 34.1 per cent for the higher duration group of ‘10+ years’, implying that the flow of migration from Tripura for education is not a recent occurrence, as a huge chunk of migrants from the state are settled in the destination for 10 years and above.

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One need not be confused with the meagre shares of lower duration groups in the region. It is only an aftermath of the sparkling increase in the share of migrants from the states like Manipur and Mizoram in recent years.

Reason-Specific Migration Cohorts at Each Destination State To get a detailed picture of the migrant cohort groups at each destination state separately and access the different patterns between them, we analyse the duration-wise dominance of cohort groups for both employment- and education-led migration. This section too excludes Assam in the analysis.

Cohort Groups for Employment-Led Migration In the previous section it was observed that the Nagaland cohort group is the most dominant one across durations, but in this section, the dominance of Nagaland cohort is highest only in Delhi across all the durations, which on average is around 50 per cent of the total share (Figure 19.2). This high share of the Nagaland cohort in Delhi had influenced the previous section, where on aggregate analysis of all the states, Nagaland was projected as having the highest dominance across durations. In the case of Karnataka (Figure 19.3), the Manipur cohort acquires the highest share with 37.7 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ category, whereas, it is only 13.1 per cent for ‘10+ years’. This means that the increase in the share of Manipuri migrants in Karnataka is a very recent phenomenon. Conversely, the Sikkim cohort that has a higher share of 23.7 per cent in the ‘10+ years’ duration group has only 4.9 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ group, which either means increase in the share of other cohort groups or actual reduction in the flow of employment-related migrants from Sikkim to Karnataka in recent years. In the case of Maharashtra (Figure 19.4), the share of the Manipur cohort is highest with a dominant share of 34.2 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ category, implying increase in flow in recent years, whereas for Tripura the share for the same is 10.7 per cent which is a reduction from 26.9 per cent in the ‘10+ years’ category. In West Bengal, the share of the Tripura cohort is dominant across all the duration categories. But, for the recent year categories, i.e., ‘1–4 years’ and

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Figure 19.2: Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Delhi (in per cent)

Figure 19.3: Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Karnataka (in per cent)

‘Less than 1 year’, the share is reduced to 45.8 per cent and 31.7 per cent respectively (Figure 19.5).

Cohort Groups for Education-Led Migration Following an analysis of the share of cohort groups across durations in the aggregate of the four destination states, it was observed that the Manipur cohort obtained the dominant share. A similar observation is made when the study is disaggregated for each state separately except for West Bengal, where Tripura holds the dominant share.

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Figure 19.4: Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in Maharashtra (in per cent)

Figure 19.5: Employment-Led Migration Cohorts in West Bengal (in per cent)

In Delhi, the Manipur cohort is dominating across the durations, with 60 per cent in ‘Less than 1 year’; the share has increased from 26.2 per cent in the ‘10+ years’ category (Figure 19.6). This tremendous increase in the proportion has considerably reduced that of Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya. Unlike these states, Mizoram like Manipur, though less in number has witnessed an increase in share in recent years; for example, the share for the Mizoram Cohort for ‘10+ years’ is only 1.5 per cent, but in the ‘Less than 1 year’ duration category, it has acquired a share of 11.6 per cent.

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Figure 19.7 observes that for Karnataka too, Manipur cohort has the highest dominance with 40.6 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ category, which is an increase from 7.3 per cent in the ‘10+ years’ one. On the other hand, the dominance pattern in the duration categories is just the reverse for Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. In the case of Sikkim, the share of the ‘Less than 1 year’ duration category has reduced considerably from 41 per cent in ‘10+ years’ to 8.8 per cent. Figure 19.6: Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Delhi (in per cent)

Figure 19.7: Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Karnataka (in per cent)

For Maharashtra, the share of the Manipur cohort is highest across durations, including that for the ‘Less than 1 year’ category, which is

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36.8 per cent. It is lower than the proportion for the ‘10+ years’ duration group, where the share is 47.4 per cent (Figure 19.8). On the other hand, the share of the Arunachal Pradesh cohort has increased from 5.3 per cent in the ‘10+ years’ category to 12.1 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ one. Tripura is the most dominant group across all the durations followed by Manipur among the cohort groups that have migrated to West Bengal for educational purposes (Figure 19.9). But it is observed that Tripura is losing its share in recent years with only 36.3 per cent in the ‘Less than 1 year’ category as compared to 66.7 per cent in Figure 19.8: Education-Led Migration Cohorts in Maharashtra (in per cent)

Figure 19.9: Education-Led Migration Cohorts in West Bengal (in per cent)

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the ‘10+ years’ one. Manipur, which has acquired second position in the ‘Less than 1 year’ category with a share of 27.5 per cent, has emerged strongly with negligible share in the higher duration groups. The same is observed for the Sikkim cohort, where the share for ‘Less than 1 year’ is 18.7 per cent, and increase from 4.8 per cent for the ‘10+ years’ category.

Conclusion In this chapter, data obtained from the 2001 Census is used to investigate the capability quotient of migrants and also the dominance of cohort groups from the north-eastern states to the four major destinations — Delhi, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and West Bengal. The analysis helps us to conclude that the migration stream from the north-eastern peripheral states is mainly dominated by the illiterate. This is peculiar since literacy rates in these states are higher than the national average. While examining the literate group, it is observed that except in the case of ‘literate below matric/secondary’, the number of educated or skilled migrants from the region is far less than the all-India average, with very few possessing technical skills. This shows the backwardness of higher education facilities in the region which is acting as a ‘push’ factor and prompting low-skilled migration. The chapter also investigates the migrant cohorts at the place of destination from these states and suggests that there is a transition occurring in the migration stream in terms of states of origin and destination. The tendency to move out to a new destination for certain groups of migrants in the duration category of ‘less than one year’ has seen a tremendous increase. The share of the Manipuri cohort for education as a reason for migration has grown tremendously in recent years. It is termed a recent phenomenon because its share in almost all the destination states in the duration category of ‘10+ years’ is negligible. In the case of the employment-led migration cohort, Nagaland becomes the most dominant cohort group when destination states are taken in aggregation, whereas it has the highest dominance share only in the case of Delhi when taken in disaggregation. For Karnataka and Maharashtra, the dominant migrant group in all durations for employment is Manipur, while for West Bengal it is Tripura. This suggests that Manipur is emerging as a major migratory region from north-east India. The reasons behind this outflow of Manipuris for education and employment are the socio-political unrest, insurgencies and disorder that the state has been suffering from for some time.

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References Census of India. 2001. Office of the Registrar General of India, New Delhi. Lama, P. M. 2006. ‘Human Resource Management in the North East Region: Newer Dimensions and Potential Areas’, Manpower Journal, 41(2): 225–42. Oinam, B. 2003. ‘Pattern of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on Manipur’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38(21): 203–37. Shimray, U. A., M. D. Ushadevi and Institute for Social and Economic Change. 2009. Trends and Patterns of Migration: Interface with Education: A Case Study of the North-Eastern Region. Bangalore: Institute for Social and Economic Change. Singh, M. P. 2007. ‘Brain Drain and North East’. http://www.Kanglaonline. com (accessed 30 April 2012).

20

Living Conditions of Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India c. ValatheeSwaRan* No continent is immune to refugee flows across state borders. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2012), there were 15.4 million refugees worldwide at the end of 2011. The number of refugees has fluctuated over time due to newly arising conflicts, return movements, civil war, and natural disasters. Asian countries, in particular, have been affected by this. Among Asian countries, Sri Lanka is of particular concern due to a large continuous outflow of refugees in recent years. After three decades of civil war between the Sri Lankan Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, many Sri Lankan Tamils have sought refuge in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu since 1983, which was much higher than the flow to other countries. The influx of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into India comprises four phases: first during 1983–88, second 1990–94, third 1995–2002, and the last 2006–09. Overall, nearly 303,000 Sri Lankan refugees entered India from 24 July 1983 to 21 July 2010. Of these, about 100,000 refugees were sent back to Sri Lanka in two phases (in 1987–89 and 1992–95), and another 100,000 returned to Sri Lanka or went to other third countries on their own with valid travel documents (Valatheeswaran 2010). As of July 2010, about 100,794 Sri Lankan refugees officially reside in camps or outside them in Tamil Nadu. Up to 73,388 of * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international conference on ‘Assessing the Complexities of South Asian Migration’, Wilfrid Laurier University, hosted by the International Migration Research Centre, Waterloo, Canada during 19–21 May 2011. I am grateful to Dr S. Irudaya Rajan, Chair Professor at Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, Kerala for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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them stayed in 115 government-run camps (started in mid-1980s) in 26 districts in Tamil Nadu. Most of the camps were in rural areas (Table 20.1). Almost 27,330 non-camp refugees stayed outside the camps with friends, relatives or in rented houses. Some refugees who arrived in India by air on a short-term visa due to a turbulent situation in Sri Lanka and continued to stay in Tamil Nadu included noncamp refugees. Such refugees had to register at the nearest Foreigner Registration Office (police station). Tight internal security prevails in two special camps with 76 refugees in both Chengalpattu taluk of Kanchipuram district and Cheyyar taluk of Thiruvannamalai district in Tamil Nadu. We focus on Sri Lankan refugees who have been staying in camps in Tamil Nadu for more than two and a half decades. The existence of Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu remained uneventful until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India, on 21 May 1991 by a suspected Sri Lankan Tamil suicide bomber. Thereafter, the Indian government placed restrictions on their entry into India. There was much hostility towards the presence of the refugees in Tamil Nadu and they lost any sympathy and support they had in India following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. The Indian government attempted to move the non-camp refugees into camps for security reasons, and camps in nearby coastal areas were closed down and shifted to isolated interior regions to prevent contact amongst refugees in different camps. It also cancelled their relief assistance programme and the education facilities that the children of the refugees enjoyed. Moreover, due to lack of bilateral support from the Sri Lankan government and the ban on LTTE in India, the movements of Sri Lankan refugees were restricted by the Government of India. They were kept in camps under 24/7 police surveillance and often treated with suspicion by the Indian government, which made it difficult for them to work outside. Even if they were ready to work, the local people were unwilling to hire them, being apprehensive about their background. The Sri Lankan refugee camps were also neglected in later years by both the Government of India and Tamil Nadu. All this made it difficult for Sri Lankan refugees to live in these camps. Refugees often tried to escape to seek a decent living outside. Such attempts got them arrested by the local police. There are instances when women preferred to work as prostitutes rather than stay inside the camp in difficult conditions (Dasgupta 2005). Thus, this chapter addresses the following research questions: To what extent are household livelihood assets necessary for survival

Coimbatore Cuddalore Dharmapuri Dindigul Erode Kanyakumari Karur Krishnagiri Madurai Namakkal Perambalur Pudukkottai Ramanathapuram Salem Sivagangai Theni Thiruvallur Thoothukudi

Districts

9 4 8 8 4 4 2 3 3 3 1 3 1 8 6 2 2 3

1,180 432 651 986 1,201 426 573 345 1,465 709 60 978 932 878 1,028 14 1,400 518

90 39 51 116 101 49 19 20 75 78 0 109 210 102 102 0 170 518

No. of Total Single Camps Families Families 477 201 329 415 757 199 286 156 799 415 35 500 418 507 439 16 655 237

Male 422 178 324 413 703 191 248 159 817 386 47 472 404 476 493 11 603 225

Female

1–11 years 899 379 653 828 1,460 390 534 315 1,616 801 82 972 822 983 932 27 1,258 462

Total 239 109 196 409 476 83 148 100 1,142 236 15 315 385 591 326 2 685 136

Male 318 85 211 509 459 100 150 90 961 207 14 260 360 546 313 3 487 122

Female

12–17 years 557 194 407 918 935 183 298 190 2,103 443 29 575 745 1,137 639 5 1,172 258

Total 2,904 1,066 1,440 1,948 2,982 1,008 1,436 694 2,560 1,334 171 2,208 1,547 1,584 2,142 28 2,841 1,087

Total

4,360 1,639 2,500 3,694 5,377 1,581 2,268 1,199 6,279 2,578 282 3,755 3,114 3,704 3,713 60 5,271 1,807

Total No. of Persons

v

(Table 20.1: Continued)

1,429 511 673 1,024 1,435 493 716 336 1,322 653 80 1,098 754 738 1,070 15 1,458 539

Female

Above 18 years 1,475 555 767 924 1,547 515 720 358 1,238 681 91 1,110 793 846 1,072 13 1,383 548

Male

Table 20.1: Population of Sri Lankan Refugees Staying at Various Camps in Tamil Nadu as on December 2010

Contents 289

115

1 1

2 9 14 6 2 6

19,358

76 0

915 858 1,166 957 534 1,076

2,443

76 0

119 98 140 113 48 0

9,488

0 0

408 350 536 544 285 524

Male

0 0

809 702 1,072 1,011 592 986

Total

9,097 18,585

0 0

401 352 536 467 307 462

Female

1–11 years

Source: Department of Rehabilitation, Government of Tamil Nadu, 2010.

Grand Total

Kancheepuram Thiruvannamalai

Special Camps

Tiruchirappalli Tirunelveli Thiruvannamalai Vellore Villupuram Virudhunagar

Districts

No. of Total Single Camps Families Families

(Table 20.1: Continued)

7,441

0 0

459 249 262 428 117 333

Male

0 0

919 508 499 941 229 649

Total

7,092 14,533

0 0

460 259 237 513 112 316

Female

12–17 years

0

722 888 1,275 1,047 633 1,001

Female

76 0

1,503 1,753 2,605 2,033 1,214 2,106

Total

20,360 19,910 40,270

76 0

781 865 1,330 986 581 1,105

Male

Above 18 years

73,388

76 0

3,231 2,963 4,176 3,985 2,035 3,741

Total No. of Persons

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available and accessible in the camps? What help have the refugees been receiving from government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other players to improve the security of their livelihoods? What is the durable solution for the protracted refugee situation in India? This paper is organized as follows: the first section describes the importance of the study and research questions. The study area and methodology are discussed in the second section and the third examines the availability and accessibility of household livelihood assets in the camps. The last section discusses sustainable solutions to the protracted situation1 of Sri Lankan refugees in India.

Study Area and Methodology This study is based on both primary and secondary data. To address the issue of inflow and outflow of Sri Lankan refugees in India, refugees staying at various camps, and government expenditure on them, the study used secondary data collected from the Department of Rehabilitation, Government of Tamil Nadu. To analyse the living conditions of Sri Lankan refugees in camps in Tamil Nadu, the study used primary data collected through a field survey conducted during February– March 2010 as well as case studies carried out in April 2010. The field survey included 100 sample households and 12 case studies in two refugee camps out of the 115 camps in Tamil Nadu, i.e., Puzhal refugee camp in Thiruvallur district and Thenpallipattu refugee camp in Thiruvannamalai district. Before choosing the sample refugee camps, data on district-wise refugee population was collected from the Department of Rehabilitation. We found that these districts have the highest refugee population in the state, accounting for up to 13 per cent of the total population. In particular, Thiruvallur district has the second largest refugee population in the state. It had 1,646 households with a total of 5,387 refugees. Puzhal camp has the highest number of refugee residents in Tamil Nadu. It accounts for 408 households with a refugee population of 1,283. Thiruvannamalai district has 14 refugee camps comprising 1,166 households with 4,176 refugees. Thenpallipattu camp had the second largest refugee population (532 refugees in 145 households) in the district. These camps have been in 1

The UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in any given asylum country.

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existence for over two decades. Hence, the probability of getting reliable information on them was higher. Household characteristics are also very similar in these camps. Further, the police prevail to a lesser extent in these camps as compared with others. Therefore, I decided to collect primary data from these camps. A selection was made randomly to obtain a sample of 30 households from Thenpallipattu camp and 70 households from Puzhal camp. The total population of the sample households was 432, consisting of 232 males and 200 females. A structured questionnaire was used to collect background information on the refugee households such as socioeconomic characteristics, occupational distribution, income and expenditure pattern, and assets position. The language of interaction was Tamil.

Selected Livelihood Assets This study identifies five types of capital assets (human, social, natural, physical, and financial) upon which livelihoods are built. Based on that, we discuss here the availability and accessibility of capital assets and how they help refugees in their struggle for livelihood.

Human Capital It represents the skills, knowledge, ability to work, and good health that together enable people to attain a higher income and better livelihoods. Sri Lankan refugee children living in Tamil Nadu were permitted to study in the local government schools free of cost up to the 12th standard, and also accessed reservation seats from the state government since 1989. They were admitted in schools even without having produced transfer certificates from the schools they last attended in Sri Lanka, and could continue their studies up to the university level. Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, their admission in all schools/colleges was suspended and reservation seats were withdrawn by the state government (Valatheeswaran and Rajan 2011). However, after receiving many requisitions from the refugee community, the government allowed them to study up to 12th standard in schools in Tamil Nadu during 1993–94. They restored their admission in higher education when local NGOs appealed to the state government in May 1996. The refugee students now get free education along with free uniforms, noon meal, bus passes, textbooks, notebooks; 11th standard students are also given bicycles. They are allowed to continue their study anywhere in Tamil Nadu with admissible cash dole and other assistance. They have been accessing the

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renewed quota system in higher education since 2006, which includes 20 seats for medical, five for law, 25 for engineering, 30 for polytechnic, seven for agriculture, and one for veterinary science. About 20,849 refugee children benefited from these schemes in 2008. This study found that out of the total refugee population in the sample camps, nearly 432 and 126 students study in Puzhal and Thenpallipattu camps, respectively. Two nursery schools operate in each camp and trained teachers and educated refugee youth work in the schools. The local NGOs also offer guidance on getting admission in schools and colleges. Further, it provides English language coaching and financial assistance every year to meet school or college fees, hostel fees and travel expenses. After their education, many youth have found employment in the private sector. Health status is important because it directly affects livelihood of people. Nearly 33 per cent of the refugees had a serious health problem in the sample during the six months prior to the survey. This is due to poor sanitation facilities in both the camps. There is no proper provision to control the flow of waste water from houses inside the camps. The septic tank is also not kept clean, resulting in a terrible stench in the camp with the sewage overflow. These lead to the spread of communicable diseases such as skin-related problems, small pox, jaundice, diarrhoea, and typhoid. However, the government provides free medical services in government hospitals and primary health centres situated in nearby camps. In addition, the refugees receive financial assistance for major medical treatment sanctioned from the Sri Lankan Tamil Special Relief Fund on the recommendation of the district collector. The Tamil Nadu government is implementing an Integrated Child Development Scheme to enhance the nutritional level of children, pregnant women and lactating mothers in the state. From April 2007, the scheme was extended to cover women and children staying in the refugee camps. The Tamil Nadu government has also extended the Dr Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Assistance Scheme to include pregnant Sri Lankan women refugees in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lankan refugees are also covered under the Chief Minister’s comprehensive insurance scheme; those who have severe health problems can get free medical services in government-approved hospitals.

Social Capital Sri Lankan refugees receive a cash dole from the state government; but it was insufficient to meet their basic needs which led to the refugees expanding their social networks, connectivity, formalized groups,

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and relationships of trust and reciprocity to survive in the new social environment they live in. About 45 per cent of household members have been participants of at least one formalized institution. Self Help Groups (SHGs) play a major role in refugee camps. Local NGOs have organized the SHGs among the women refugees of the camp. It consists of 12–15 members working together to improve their lives. The NGOs also provide training in record-keeping and accounts-management to help the women pool their resources efficiently. Savings gradually build up and the group deposits the money in a bank. Due to the SHGs, refugees are now less reliant on unscrupulous moneylenders and can avoid rising debts to some extent. They also have greater economic independence and can make choices about their future livelihood. The NGOs encourage and provide grants to SHGs to start businesses in the refugee camps. The state government is also providing a one-time grant of `10,000 to each SHG in the camps. Sri Lankan refugees suffer from psychological disorders due to the war, loss of their family members and close relatives, and displacement and inability to adjust to new surroundings. NGOs have been providing counselling programmes since 1988, which led to reduction in refugee suicides and increased capacity to cope with different situations. NGOs also provide medical and health care programmes to enable them to lead socially and economically productive lives. Special attention is paid to mothers and children. Due to limited government assistance, refugees are forced to rely on social connections in the informal economy to make a living. The camp refugees have good connections with outsiders (local Tamil people) and non-camp refugees, who help them to get employment in the labour market. The young educated refugees get guidance from NGOs regarding availability of private-sector employment. Furthermore, refugee medical students, whose education is supported by NGOs, visit the camps to treat chronically ill patients. They all play a major role in helping Sri Lankan refugees maintain their health status. Apart from social networks in India, communication and ties with relatives and friends living abroad have helped refugees to survive the harsh conditions in India. Such help comes as remittances and through refugee networks which increase information flows and trade. The majority of remittances come from their family members and relatives in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), France, Australia, and Canada. Remittances act as social security and also serve as

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investment in business and education and hence help in rebuilding livelihoods. Refugee households receive remittances to cover expenses for serious illnesses, life course events, children’s education, and debt repayment. The camp refugees also have connections with the organization of Sri Lankan doctors now living abroad. They provide training to refugees as health workers, which include examinations and award of certificates. The training focuses on primary health care comprising preventative measures, nutrition, child and maternal care.

Natural Capital Accessibility of natural resources is limited for refugees in Tamil Nadu. They do not get quality drinking water; in both the camps we found that households mainly get water from borewells, water vendors and wells in nearby areas. The hand-pump water is of inferior quality. However, they use it for washing, bathing, cooking, and drinking. Some well-off households get their water from water vendors and use water filters to purify it. But most of the poor households suffer due to poor-quality drinking water. Also, as the water is not boiled before use, it has resulted in widespread health problems in the camps. In summer, the camps face severe water scarcity. Puzhal refugees mainly get water from vendors, but the Thenpallipattu refugees have to cycle several miles to fetch water. The Indian government does not allow refugees to access land and forest resources. Refugees have no legal rights to own or buy land or houses in India, but they can own and purchase cattle for their survival. However, this study found that many Sri Lankan refugees who have married Indian citizens have bought land and houses close to the camp through their relatives and friendship networks, and also mingle with the local people. In Thenpallipattu, refugees get involved in agricultural activities with the help of the local inhabitants. Puzhal camp has no forest nearby, but Thenpallipattu has a small forest area close to the camp. Refugees use some of its resources such as firewood and timber for construction. They also use the land to graze their cattle and for burying the dead.

Physical Capital Lack of proper shelter is a major problem in both camps. Out of the total number of households, nearly 75 per cent lived in katcha houses made of thatched leaves and wood. The rest of the households stay

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in pucca houses with bricks wall and asbestos, cement, concrete and iron-sheet roofs, a door and small windows. However, they have very little living space, making the inside of the shelter extremely hot. High temperature in summers and heavy rains during monsoons make life in the shelter difficult. The government had constructed them more than 10 years ago as temporary housing. These houses are now in a poor condition in both camps. Hence, the state government has been providing cash assistance under the Tamil Nadu government’s Infrastructure Development Programme to improve the physical infrastructure of the camp, which includes repair of huts, provision of drinking water, toilets, sanitary arrangements, roads and street lights. Approximately, `270 million was spent by the state government for infrastructure development during 2004–09. The Tamil Nadu government started the Welfare of the Sri Lankan Refugees Scheme in 2007 to improve the standard of living in the camps. The state government provided `421.4 million under this scheme in 2007. More than 80 per cent refugee households have television sets, mobile phones and jewellery. During the crisis, refugees sold their televisions and mobile phones and often mortgaged their jewels to make ends meet. Only 47 per cent households have cows, goats or poultry. Livestock is a very essential livelihood option among the refugees. The Puzhal camp refugees keep only hens because they do not have enough space near the camp to graze cows or goats, as it is located near an urban area. However, the Thenpallipattu refugees rear cows, goats and poultry as there is agricultural land and forest available for the purpose close to the camp. Thenpallipattu camp refugees also sell their livestock and milk to meet their household expenses. About 50 per cent households mostly use kerosene for cooking purposes. The state government provides kerosene to refugee households at a subsidized rate (10 litres for `90) through ration shops. Nearly 40 per cent of the households use firewood and the rest use agricultural crop waste and gas. Some households use electricity for cooking purposes but are unwilling to reveal details because the state government provides electricity only for lighting purposes, and if they reveal this information, they may lose the electricity supply in their homes.

Financial Capital This study found that the income of Sri Lankan refugees comes mainly from three sources: monthly cash dole from the state government, labour income and remittances. The cash dole is a regular flow of

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income to refugee households. Since April 2006, the head of the family has been getting `1,000; each additional member aged 12 years gets `750, the first child (below 12 years) and each additional child gets `400 under the state government relief assistance programme. Sri Lankan refugees had stringent restrictions on their freedom of movement and were not allowed to work outside the camp following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Presently this condition has undergone a sea change. Refugees are now moving freely from camps to outside areas and are also working outside the camps. They are mostly engaged in casual labour jobs as they do not get regular employment. Employment opportunities mainly depend on social networks, ties with their countrymen who migrated earlier, and the local people. At the camp level, the monthly income of a Thenpallipattu household is higher than that of a Puzhal household. The reason is greater availability of employment opportunities for the Thenpallipattu camp refugees in the local labour market. Moreover, young and educated Thenpallipattu refugees mostly work in the private sector at Thiruvannamalai, Vellore and Chennai towns. But Puzhal refugees mostly depend on unskilled labour employment (as porters, painters or quarry workers) as they do not get regular employment in the labour market. Also, most of the women in Puzhal camp households do not seek employment outside the camp due to lack of employment opportunities and unfamiliar market conditions. But in Thenpallipattu camp, women work in the agricultural sector and in stone quarries. Out of the total sample households, 30 per cent have received remittances during the last six months, which they get occasionally as direct transfers through bank accounts. According to the field survey, most of the households receive remittances in both camps, but are unwilling to reveal information about their economic status, fearing that if the state government comes to know about their economic status, then it would not provide any relief assistance to them. Only 15 per cent of the households in the sample reported that they have bank deposits.

Conclusions Under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee or its 1967 Protocol, the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are no longer in need of international protection under broader refugee criteria following the end of prolonged civil war in Sri Lanka in May 2009. Further, the Sri Lankan government also started rebuilding development

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activities and initiated rehabilitation programmes to resettle the internally displaced people in their own land. Hence, this is the right time to find durable solutions for their protracted refugee situation in India. India does not have specific national laws outlining the rights and treatment of refugees. However, India has already granted rights to Tibetan refugees who fled to India following the Chinese army attack on Lhasa in 1959. These rights have enabled them to engage in gainful employment activities, get school education in the Tibetan language, maintain their culture, and even travel abroad and return to India. The Government of India also encourages them to take up Indian citizenship (Kharat 2003). It led to many second-generation Tibetan refugees being born and brought up in India and taking up Indian citizenship. Also, Nepalese can enter India freely and those with documentation enjoy most of the rights available to Indian citizens under the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty between both countries. They are also allowed to stay in India, seek employment and enjoy other facilities (Chimni 1994). To find a sustainable solution to the protracted situation of the Sri Lankan refugees in India, the Indian government has to draw up an agreement with the Sri Lankan government. Under the agreement, the Indian government can repatriate them to Sri Lanka, especially those who wish to return as Sri Lankan citizens. According to our field survey, Sri Lankan refugees feel that there is no security for them in their home country. Hence, the Sri Lankan government should provide them legal and physical protection and should resettle them in their own land where they had lived before. Some refugees are unwilling to return to Sri Lanka, especially those who have married into Indian families and entered into inter-caste marriages in the camps, and therefore are considered Tamil refugees of Indian origin. The Indian government should grant citizenship to those who desire to permanently settle down in India. Moreover, they should also be legally integrated into their area of settlement through social policies of housing, employment, education, and health whereby they are made part of the socioeconomic dynamics of the country.

References Chimni, B. S. 1994. ‘The Legal Condition of Refugees in India’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 7(4): 378–401. Dasgupta, Abhijit. 2005. ‘Long-Term Camp Life and Changing Identities of Sri Lankan Women Refugees in India’, Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology, 2(2): 1–12.

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Government of Tamil Nadu. 2010. Annual Report 2009–10. Chennai: Department of Rehabilitation. Kharat, Rajesh. 2003. ‘Gainers of a Stalemate: The Tibetans in India’, in Ranabir Samaddar (ed.), Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947-2000, pp. 281–320. New Delhi: Sage Publications. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2012. ‘2011 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons’. Division of Programme Support and Management, Geneva. Valatheeswaran, C. 2010. ‘Livelihood Strategies of Sri Lankan Refugees in Tamil Nadu’. Unpublished MPhil Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Valatheeswaran, C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2011. ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India: Rehabilitation Mechanisms, Livelihood Strategies, and Lasting Solutions’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 30(2): 24–44.

About the Editor S. Irudaya Rajan is Chair Professor, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram. He has coordinated six migration surveys in Kerala since 1998 (with Professor K. C. Zachariah) and the Goa Migration Survey 2008, been instrumental in organizing Gujarat, Punjab and Tamil Nadu migration surveys, and also published extensively in national and international journals on social, economic and demographic implications on international migration. He is editor of the annual series, India Migration Report, and also Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Migration and Development (Routledge).

Notes on Contributors T. L. S. Bhaskar is Chief Administrative Officer and Head, Skills, Capacity Building and Training at the India Centre for Migration, New Delhi, India. Soumi Roy Chowdhury is Doctoral Fellow at the University of New Mexico, United States. Prior to this, she was associated with the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Veronika Deffner is Lecturer at the RWTH Aachen University, Germany. Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, India. Raju John is Assistant Professor at Baselius College, Kottayam, Kerala, India. Prior to this, he was with the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Jolin Joseph is Doctoral Fellow at York University, Canada. Prior to this, she was working on a project on Saudi Arabia at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Saramma Panicker C. K. is a researcher currently working on a project on skilled migrant workers at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Radhika Kanchana is Doctoral Fellow at the French National Council for Scientific Research, Paris, France. V. Kurusu is with the Department of Business Economics at Kelkar Education Trust’s V. G. Vaze College of Arts, Science and Commerce, Mumbai, India.

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Filippo Osella is a Reader in Anthropology at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. Amba Pande is associated with the Centre for South, Central, South East Asian and South West Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Sonia Plaza is a Senior Economist in the Economic Policy and Debt Department, and Co-Chair of the Diaspora Thematic Working Group, Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank, and also a Research Fellow of the IZAInstitute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany. Kaveri Qureshi is John Fell Research Fellow at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Oxford University, United Kingdom. Dilip Ratha is a Lead Economist and Manager at the Migration and Remittances Unit, and Head, Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank. Ajaya Kumar Sahoo is Assistant Professor and Director at the Centre for Study of Indian Diaspora, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, India. He is also the editor of South Asian Diaspora. Pinak Sarkar is Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Milly Sil is Research Assistant at the School of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, United States of America. Alwyn Didar Singh is Secretary General, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), New Delhi, India. Prior to this, he was Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India. Amit Singh is an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India. Steve Taylor is Reader in Sociology at the Northumbria University, United Kingdom.

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Smita Tiwari is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, India. C. Valatheeswaran is Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Neha Wadhawan is Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. K. C. Zachariah is Honorary Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India.

Index 9/11 attack 98, 158, 213 Al-Alami (US-educated management consultant) 212 Amrita Kuteeram housing programme 56 Amrita Shree programme 56 Andhra Medical College (AMC) 78, 82–83 Andhra Medical College Alumni of North America (AMCANA) 78, 82–83; Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) 83; equipment donated by 82; state-of-the-art training 83 Anglophone Indians 50 ‘Annual Demographics File’ (US Census Bureau) 5–6 Arab Spring 212, 218, 221–22, 234 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 175 Asset Index 252, 255–56 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 171–72, 174–75, 179 Bahrain: bad housing 202–3; foreign population 195; Indian fishermen 203–4; Indian mujra dancers 203; living experiences of migrants in 202–4; policy on human rights and anti-trafficking 195; prostitution 203; ‘sea men’ visa 203; trafficking of women 203 Bangladesh crisis (1971) 171 bank deposits 27, 41, 51, 297 bankruptcy 174 Bilateral Security Agreements (BSAs) 68 Bose, Netaji Subhas Chandra 170–71

brain circulation 38–39, 62, 105 brain drain 24, 49, 62, 105, 112; phenomenon of 149; suggestions for reversing 101–2 brain regain 38–39 British Council 155, 158, 161 Cambridge International Schools 103–5, 108–9, 111 capital flow, to homeland 50 capitalism 23, 49 caste and migration 256 caste-based inequality 259 Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) 103 Centre for Development Studies (CDS), India 90, 153–54, 162–65, 181, 193, 244, 250 child mortality 10 citizenship: concept of 68; dual see dual citizenship; extra-territorial 66 civil society organizations 42 close kin networks 54 Cold War 67, 108, 171–72, 174, 177 colonial education 107 communication channels 63 communication networks, development of 54 communism 23 ‘Compensation of Employees’ account 39 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 40, 265 country of origin 2, 14, 16, 22–24, 34, 52, 54, 60–62, 65, 99, 105, 186; emigrants returning to 89; influence of diaspora on 63–64 credit rating agencies 11

Index cross-border trade 16, 262 decision-making 63, 157 Department of Science and Technology (DST), India 101 Diaspora Knowledge Networks (DKN) 14, 68 diasporas: in Australia 5–7; bilateral trade and investment flows 13– 15; bonds 12–13, 16; concept of 36; contributions of 8–11; countries engaging in, reasons for 61–63; country of origin, influence on 63–64; and crossborder economics 16; definition of 2–3, 61, 186; and development 17, 22–24; dual citizenship 7, 17; economic development 36–38; embassies and consulates, use of 17–18; estimating the size of 3–4; and foreign policy 61; importance of 62; in India see Indian diaspora; India–EU migration and 27–29; investment contributions 40–42; knowledge networks 14; migrants, first and second generation 4–5; participation in homeland development 37; principal focus of 63; ‘Six Actions to Facilitate Diaspora Engagement’ 26; size and characteristics of 16; transnational networks 50–51; in the United States (US) 3, 5–7 Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S), India 263 Doha round of negotiations 263 dual citizenship 7, 27, 68; allowing of 17; policy for NRIs 177; provision for 64 ‘Dutch disease’ 220 economic development 67, 70, 99, 273; of country of origin 61; diaspora engagements in 36–38,

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60; of homeland countries 21; of migrant families 52 educational entrepreneurs 109, 112 education in Punjab 25, 37, 51, 104; British public-school model 109; Cambridge Schools 103– 5, 108–9, 111; charitably-funded schools 110; emigration effects on 105; English language learning 109; English-medium education 111, 113; ‘global educational regimes’ 108–10; history of 107–8; international schools 110; modern education, dominance of 108; overseas examinations 111; parents’ and students’ spatial strategies 111–12; philanthrophic investment 110–11, 113; private schooling 108; for producing ‘global citizens’ 104; Punjabilanguage education 110; research for analysis of 106–7; significance of 104; standard of 107; ‘thirdrate’ educational establishments 112; Western education in 107–8, 110 e-Governance Project 38 ‘e-health’ 262 embassies and consulates, use of 17–18 Emigration Act (1983), India 25 Emigration Check Required (ECR) passports 244 emigration clearance, to work abroad 69 equity flows 9 ethnic Indians, in Southeast Asia: and bilateral relations with individual countries 171; during Cold War era 171–72; harassment of Indian IT professionals 176; historical background of 169–71; Indian influence 169; issue of work permits in Malaysia 173–74

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ethnic minority 50, 60 European Union (EU) 28, 149 ‘expatriate minority communities’ 186 financial capital 296–97 Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA), India 86 foreign currency: accounts 69; bank and other deposits 41; debt 13; Foreign Currency (Ordinary) NonRepatriable (FCONR) deposits 41; Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts (FCNR) 41, 69 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 1, 9, 25, 40–41, 51, 175, 262 foreign exchange reserves 174–75 Foreign Regional Registration Offices (FRROs) 175 gender-based inequality 256, 259 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 109, 261–62 general hospitals and colleges: Andhra Medical College Alumni of North America (AMCANA) 78–83; diaspora’s contribution to 74; doctors’ alumni associations 74, 85; Guntur Medical College Alumni of North America (GMCANA) 75–78; quality of education of the medical college 83; Rangaraya Medical College Alumni of North America (RMCANA) 83 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee (1951) 297 Geneva Protocol (1967) 297 Gini decomposition 251, 253 Global Education Management Systems (GEMS) 103 global financial crisis 60, 98; effect on outflow of migrants 94; India Shining 88–90; job loss and fall in salary 92

Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) 36 Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK) 38 global labour markets 104, 109 Global Recession (2007–08) 234, 244–45 global remittance market 11 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 8, 39, 69, 89, 222, 229 Gujarat Medicare Tourism 264 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 65, 181–82, 193, 206, 211, 233; demographic imbalances 229; nationalization policy 194; silent revolution 220 Gulf countries: demand for labour in 69; implementation of justice 206; kafala practice 206; migration from Kerala to 91 Gulf migration, contribution of 53 Gulf Union 222 Gulf War 182 ‘Gulf wives’ 137 Guntur General Hospital (GGH) 75 Guntur Medical College Alumni of North America (GMCANA) 75–78; alumni members by speciality in 76; alumni members by year of admission in 77; GMCANA Auditorium 77; Hospital Development Committee (HDC) 78; items donated by 79–81; major projects implemented by 77–78; monetary participation pattern 78; Podila Prasad–GMCANA Super Specialty and Trauma Centre 78 hawala (hundi) network 52, 141 health services, international trade in: Ayurveda 265; GATS formation and health sector 261–62; hospitals and mode of participation 267; Indian states and 263–64; medical tourism and 262; methodology

Index for studying 265–66; results of the survey on 266–70; review of 262–63; super-speciality hospitals 265; Thiruvananthapuram and 265 higher education, overseas: cost of education in India and UK 164; educational loan for 163, 165– 66; favourite destination for 156; financial costs of 157; Higher National Diplomas (HNDs), UK 161; International English Language Testing System (IELTS) 159, 163; Points Based System (PBS), for visa application 159– 60; Study India Programme 158; Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) 159, 163; UK as preferred destination for 158; UK–India partnerships for 158; Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) 161; see also student migration Hindu administrative institutions 169 Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) 176 homeland development, diaspora engagement in 37 Home Town Associations (HTAs) 15 household remittances 245 human capital: development of 101; for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India 292–93 human resource mobility 21 India: budget allocation for higher education 276; Department of Health and Family Welfare 264; Department of Higher Education 276; economic and technological rise of 177; ethnic Indians, in Southeast Asia see ethnic Indians, in Southeast Asia; freedom struggle 66; human capital development in

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101; independence of 66, 170–71; Look East Policy 169, 174–78; nationalism 170; occupational profile of return migrants 93; overseas recruitment policies 188; Peace and Friendship Treaty with Nepal 298; as remittancereceiving country 89; science and technology (S&T) communities 101; service sector, emergence of 92; Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in see Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, in India; Tibetan refugees in 298 India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI) 42 India–EU migration 27–29 India Millennium Deposits scheme (2000) 69 Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) 38, 68 Indian Council for Overseas Employment (ICOE) 38 Indian diaspora 7–8, 48–50; as ‘agents of development’ 117; business networks 48; concept and classification 64–65; diaspora activities, relevance of 32; economic benefits 37; economic dimension of 68–69; and economic liberalization 25; economicpolitical development 51–54; estimated population of 30; foreign policy 61, 67–69; High Level Committee (HLC) 37, 40, 43, 67, 174; historical background of 65–67; history of 49; India–EU migration and 27–29; Indian Diaspora Award 176; Indian Strategic Framework 32–33; and India’s policy towards Southeast Asia 172–74; investment contributions 40–42; and Look East Policy 174–78; overseas Indians, types of 31–34; philanthropy 42, 73–74; policy and strategy

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24–26; political dimension of 68; professionally-trained and skilled emigrants 49; questionnaires, feedback from 196–201; remittances 39; size of 30; sociocultural development 54–56; strategic engagement 27; survey on returnee professionals 90–94; tourism 42–43; transnational networks 50–51 Indian migrants to Muscat: empirical findings about 187–89; legal regulations of working visa 188; theoretical considerations of ‘diaspora’ 186–87 Indian migrants to Oman: characteristics of 182–86; development of the oil sector 181; educational level of 183; employment situation 182–86; female quota amongst 184; labour market 181–84; Omani citizenship, grant of 185; ‘Omanization’ policy 184; social impacts of 182; trade relationships, history of 183 India’s economy: development of 36–38; growth of 51; liberalization of 25, 37, 51; reforms 51 India Shining 88–90 India–US Civil Nuclear Deal 168 Information Technology (IT) 38, 62, 88–89, 104, 121, 149, 168, 183 International English Language Testing System (IELTS) 111, 159, 163 International General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) 103 International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) 152 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 26 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 265 investment contributions, diaspora 40–42

iqama (work permit) 213 izzat (honour/prestige), Punjabi concept of 120, 122, 124–29 Jat Sikh community 118; contested diaspora spaces 123–28; family migration 123; financial remittances to India 121, 123; izzat and caste/class dominance 120; maintenance of land holdings in Punjab 123; migration, home and identity 121–22; from sojourners to multiple homemakers 122–23 job security 92, 96–97, 100 Joint Commission International (JCI) 265 joint ventures 14, 40–41, 68 kafala (sponsorship system) 195, 206, 225, 234 Kerala: benefits of migration 250; migration–inequality relationship 251; Net State Domestic Product 249–50 Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 53, 154, 236, 250 Kerala–Saudi Arabia migration: age distribution 237–38; comparison with UAE 236–37; and competition from other states in India 244; demographic factors 229; demographic trend, future prospects of 243; ‘dirty jobs’ and emigration prospects 245–46; educational attainment 238; education and training deficit 232–33; empirical evidence 246; employment status 238–40; Global Recession (2007–08), impact of 244–45; immigrants, status of 234; industrial affiliation of emigrants 240–42; labour force participation rates 233; Nitaqat and emigration prospects 245; over-reliance on expatriates

Index 233–34; and population of Kerala and Saudi Arabia 231; principal occupation of emigrants 241; prognosis based on past trend 242; prospects of 242–46; Saudi Arabia’s Nitaqat law 230–31; sector of employment 240; sex composition 237; uncertain future of 247; wage differentials, prognosis based on 244; youth bulge and 231–32 King George Hospital (KGH) 82–83 Know India Programme (KIP) 68 knowledge diaspora 26 knowledge networks, types of 14, 68 knowledge transfers 31, 62, 68, 74, 107 Labour Management and Regulatory Authority (LMRA) 195, 202 Labour Mobility Partnership Agreement 38 Learning Wings (educational consultant) 104 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 287–88 licensing agreements 14 Look East Policy, India 169, 174–79 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 176 Medical Council of India (MCI) 75 medical tourism 262, 264, 268; Thiruvananthapuram and 268– 70 Medical Tourism Council of Maharashtra (MTCM) 264 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) 37–38, 68, 158 micro finance institutions 147 Migrant Resource Centre 38 migrants: in Australia and the US 5–7; bilateral trade and investment flows 13–15; first and second

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generation 4–5; foreign-born 4; global crisis, effect of 94; ‘meltingpot’ style integration and loyalty 36–38; occupational profile of return migrants 93; remittances see remittances; return migrants see return migrants; transnationalism 28 migration: economic 190; India–EU migration 27–29; male dominance in 136; Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 10–11; and relationship with development 24; transnational 54 Migration and Development (Skeldon) 23 migration–inequality relationship: asset-based analysis 252, 254– 56; Generalized Entropy (GE) measures 252–53; household characteristics and 255–56; panel regression analysis 253; proxies of income analysis 251, 253–54, 257 Migration Information Source (2011) 95 migration intensity (MIGINTEN) 257 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 10–11 Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) 25–26, 29, 40, 67, 90, 195; Centre for Development Studies (CDS) 90, 150, 153–54, 162–65, 181, 193, 244, 250; establishment of 174; Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) 68; Research Unit on International Migration 150, 153 Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) 143, 147 money transfers, informal 147 Naga insurgency 173

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National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH) 265 National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 165 ‘native-born children of immigrants’ 5 natural capital 295 Nehru, Jawaharlal 25, 66, 170–72 Nitaqat programme, Saudi Arabia: alternate view of 224; and Arab Spring 218, 221; business class and private sector, reactions of 223– 24; and causes of unemployment 220–22; Co-operative Training Scheme for Saudis 210; debt– GDP (Gross Domestic Product) ratio 222; deficit-financing 222; demographic rationale behind 230–31; difference with past efforts 216–18; economic rationale of 222–23; and emigration prospects 245; enforcement of 242; feasibility, expectations and impact of 223–24; Human Resources Development (HRD) Fund 210; iqama (work permit), renewal of 213; male–female labourforce participation 220; objectives of 218; officials and government employees 223; policy attention 224–26; private sector’s labour dilemma 224; projected national labour force 221; and projected rate of job requirements 220; quota-based reservation 210; requirements 235–36; Saudization bands across various business lines 217; Saudization in private-sector enterprises 210; schematization of 214–15; second wave of Saudization 212–16; subcontracting of labour 226; unemployment, issue of 218–20

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 291 non-migrant employment (NMEMPL) 257, 259 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) 2, 7, 27, 29, 64, 67, 89–90, 103, 168–69, 187; deposit accounts 39, 51; dual citizenship policy for 177; in GCC countries 65; investment in India 40 Non-Resident Non-Repatriable (NRNR) Rupee deposits 41 Non-Resident Ordinary Rupee (NRO) Accounts 41, 69 Non-Resident (External) Rupee Accounts (NR[E]RAs) 41, 69 North-Eastern out-migrants: capability level of 274–76, 277; cohort groups, for education-led migration 281–85; cohort groups, for employment-led migration 280–81; education-led, by the states of origin 278–80; education level for males 275; education, primary and school-level 276; employment-led, by the states of origin 276–78; migration cohorts 276–80; migration for education 279; migration for employment 277; ‘Push-Pull’ framework 273; reason-specific migration cohorts 280–85 NRI Sabha Punjab 110 NTR Health University 78, 83 official development assistance 8, 24, 60 oil boom in 1970s 49, 168 Oman: abuse in the interior regions 204; Indian migrants to see Indian migrants to Oman; living experiences of migrants in 202–4; nationality 185; runaway domestic workers 205; slavery 204

Index Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 3–5, 95 Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 100, 256 outsourcing 14, 38, 101 Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) 7, 27, 37, 68, 89, 91, 101 Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs) 40 overseas higher education see higher education, overseas Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) 34, 40 overseas Indians: persecution and expulsion of 67; types of 31–34; voting rights 38 Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) 38 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) 2, 7, 27–29, 40, 64, 89, 91, 168–69, 173, 176–77, 185 philanthropy 42, 73–74, 107, 110– 11 physical capital 295–96 PIO/NRI University 38 Points Based System (PBS), for visa application 159–60 portfolio investment 41, 69 Pravasi Bhartiya Divas (PBD) 38, 67, 176 pravasis 74 Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund 42 private debt 8–9 private investment partnerships 185 Protection of Emigrants against Exploitation in Gulf 68 public–private partnership 78 Public Relations Officers (PROs) 194 Punjab: caste, izzat and land 119– 21; channel of emigration 111; diasporic home and identity 118–19; diasporic land ownership

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and acquisition 121; education in see education in Punjab; intracaste endogamy 120; Jat Sikh migration see Jat Sikh community; non-resident Indian (NRI) houses 123–25; philanthropic intervention in 110–11; Punjabi migration to the UK 119; regional development of 117; rural villagebased kinship 120; transnational community 118; transnationalism 104, 117 racial discrimination 66, 112 Rangaraya Medical College (RMC) 83 Rangaraya Medical College Alumni of North America (RMCANA) 83; items donated by 84; strategic planning for the future 85 religious representation 55–56 remittances 8–11, 51–52, 64, 105; channels of 52, 141; characteristics of primary migrants 136–40; collective 15; ‘Compensation of Employees’ account 39; crossborder 11; ‘direct’ effects of 105; economic 60; end uses of 143–46; global market 11; hawala (hundi) network 141; household 245; household-related characteristics 134–35; impact on economic growth 9; inward remittances 39; to migrant households 140–43; migrant-related characteristics 137–38; Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 10–11; modes of transfer of 141; percentage distribution of size of 140; private transfers 39; size of flow 9; and social security 294–95; top 10 recipients of 8–9; used for development purposes 52 replacement migration 243

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research and development (R&D) 49, 101 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 39, 69 Resurgent India Bonds scheme (1998) 26n6, 69 return migrants: educational qualifications of 93; government policies on 101; new Indian trends 94–99; occupational profile of 93; present working status of 94; reasons for return 95–98; resettlement issues 99–100 Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia (A. Mani) 173 Saudi Arabia: Arab Spring 218, 221–22, 234; causes of unemployment in 220–22; debt–GDP (Gross Domestic Product) ratio 222; employment ratio among emigrants in 238–40; Kerala emigrants in see Kerala–Saudi Arabia migration; labour force 234; labour localization policies 234; Ministry of Labour (MoL) 236; Nitaqat law see Nitaqat programme, Saudi Arabia; oil and gas extraction 235; ‘Saudization’ policy programme 210, 217, 234–35; undocumented workers, deportation of 236 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) 233 Scheduled Castes (SCs) 100, 256 Scheduled Tribes (STs) 100, 256 Scholarships Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC) 68 schools: British colonial schooling 109; Cambridge Schools 103–5, 108–9; charitably-funded 110; Khalsa Middle School 110; private schooling 108 ‘sea men’ visa 203 self-employment 93, 100

Shaheed Bhagat Singh Foundation 53 ‘silver bullets’ 44 Sino-India War (1962) 171, 173 skill transfer 38–39 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 40 Small-Scale Enterprises (SSEs) 40 social capital 62, 293–95 social inequalities 110, 218 Social Security Agreements (SSAs) 27, 37, 68 ‘soft power’ 37, 179 South Asian transnational migrants 55 sovereign creditworthiness, analysis of 11 Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Army 287; Tamil refugees see Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, in India; Tamil Special Relief Fund 293 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, in India: assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 288, 292, 297; ban on LTTE 288; Dr Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Assistance Scheme 293; employment opportunities 297; financial capital 296–97; health status 293; human capital 292– 93; Infrastructure Development Programme 296; Integrated Child Development Scheme 293; natural capital 295; physical capital 295–96; population of 289–90; psychological disorders 294; quota system in higher education 293; refugee camps 288, 291; relief assistance programme 288; remittances 294–95; selected livelihood assets 292–97; sent back to Sri Lanka 287; social capital 293–95; standard of living in the camps 296; study area and methodology 291–92; Welfare of

Index the Sri Lankan Refugees Scheme (2007) 296 Standard Of Living Index (SOLI) 252–53, 255; factors that influence asset-based 258; scores for socioeconomic groups 256; and sex of head of households 256 state–diaspora relationship, reasons for: interest approach 61–62; rational choice approach 62–63 student migration: destination for higher education 156; major reasons for 153; overseas higher education, financial costs of 157; part-time and work placements 160; as percentage of adult migrants 154; plight of Indian students 152; Points Based System (PBS), for visa application 159–60; role of parents in 153; students and job seekers among out-migrants from Kerala 154; students studying overseas 151; Study India Programme 158; Tier-4 student visa 165; top five destinations 151; UK Border Agency (UKBA) 155; UK student visa policy 150, 158–61; to United Kingdom (UK) 156–57; visa facilitation centres 153, 155; see also higher education, overseas super-speciality hospitals 265–66 sustainable development 36, 43, 52, 74 technology-licensing arrangements 68 telemedicine 264, 268, 270 Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) 159, 163 Theil index 252–54; decomposition of 254 Tibetan refugees, in India 298 tourism 42–43 trade unions 195

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trafficking of women 203 Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) 38 transfer of technology 14 transnational community 118, 120, 125, 127 transnational migration 47–48, 50– 52, 54, 56; South Asian 55 transnational networks 43, 50–51, 60 UK Border Agency (UKBA) 155, 159, 165 UK–India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI) 158 UK–India partnerships, for higher education 158 unemployment 24; causes of 220– 22; in Saudi Arabia 219–20; in the UK 94 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 108 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 91, 103, 193, 233, 236–37 United Kingdom (UK) 27, 91, 117, 139; cultural identities of British Asians 122; Higher National Diplomas (HNDs) 161; international student migration to 156–57, 160; international students 150; Punjabi migration 119; racism, issue of 122; student visa application to 161; student visa policy 150, 158–61; undergraduate degree courses 161; unemployment in 94; Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) 161; universities, marketing of 158 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 263 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 152; Institute of Statistics 151

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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 287 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 67 United States (US) 61, 139, 149, 211; ethnic Indians in 168; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13 United States Educational Foundation in India (USEFI) 155

Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), UK 161 voting rights, on overseas Indian passport holders 38, 65 Western education 88, 107–8, 110 World Trade Organization (WTO) 109, 261 World War II 23, 168, 170