India and China: Beyond the Binary of Friendship and Enmity [1st ed.] 9789811594991, 9789811595004

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B. R. Deepak

India and China Beyond the Binary of Friendship and Enmity

India and China

B. R. Deepak

India and China Beyond the Binary of Friendship and Enmity

123

B. R. Deepak Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-9499-1 ISBN 978-981-15-9500-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4

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© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Introduction

Both India and China often talk about their civilizational connections rather glorify them by citing historical records right from the Records of a Historian by Si Maqian (145BC–90BC), followed by Buddhist fraternity upheld by Fa Xian, Kumarajiva, Xuan Zang, Yi Jing, Bodhidharma and many other scholar monks, and finally trade and diplomacy between them over the Maritime Silk Route right up to the advent of the western powers on the political stage. Of late, as some of the researchers have blazed new trails in Sino-Indian relations during the colonial era, both India and China have been talking about their colonial connections. If the former seems to be a distant past, the latter seems to be fresh in our historical memory, for the Indian soldiers stationed in China joining hands with Taiping rebels during the 1860s; the activities of the Ghadr revolutionaries in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Hankou, Nanjing, etc., places during the 1920s and 1930s; the controversial visit of Tagore to China in 1924; and the supreme sacrifice of doctor Dwarkanath Kotnis during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in the early 1940s, find an instant echo in the minds and hearts of the Indian and Chinese people, albeit most of the people in both the countries remain ignorant about these connections owing to various constraints. Nevertheless, if the civilizational connections are tarnished by the incidents of regime changes by Han envoy in Jibin (parts of present Jammu and Kashmir), by the Tang envoys in Kannauj and finally the Ming Admiral Zheng He in south and Southeast Asia, the brilliant side of the colonial connections is eclipsed by the negativity in mutual perceptions. Right from the first ever official envoy, Huang Maocai to Ma Jianzhong and Wu Guangpei, who came to India during late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), demonstrate how little China knew about India, and the same may be true for India if we go through whatever scanty information the Indian soldiers like Gadadhar Singh left behind in wake of the Boxer Rebellion (1901). Most of the Chinese perceptions about India originate from the “Sino-centrist” approaches. From Huang Maocai to Kang Youwei to Lu Xun, the Chinese scholarship has referred to India as a subjugated good for nothing nation, Indian people lazy and Chinese more civilized and advanced. Kang goes on to say that no wonder why the British keep three Indian servants whereas they could have managed with a v

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single Chinese (Kang 1995). Even Lu Xun, whether you call it his jealousy towards Rabindranath Tagore for getting the Nobel Prize or the misunderstanding of India or otherwise, he also prefers a blind Russian poet B. R. Epomehk (1889–1952) than Tagore and calls Indian people “inferior slaves” in a cage. That was not all, he further compares Tagore to “a beautiful yet poisonous datura flower” (Deepak 2014, 152). These images of India more or less remained intact and did not alter even after the liberation. Even though the Republican China viewed Gandhi’s pacifist techniques as “revolutionary” but Mao’s China did not think highly of the Indian Independence struggle. China considered the Indian leadership as bourgeoisie and stooges of the British imperialism. Therefore, according to them, it is little wonder that India inherited one and all British legacies in the neighbourhood including Tibet. It was due to these privileges of India in Tibet that China looked at India with an eye of suspicion. Wang (1998, 76) posits that Nehru’s friendly attitude towards China died with the demise of the Kuomintang (KMT) government. He maintains that soon after the communist takeover in China, “Nehru never raised the issue of Sino-Indian alliance, but tried to bring China under the fold of a certain Asiatic union with India as its centre, thus enabling Asia to have a voice, and meanwhile, enhance his personal and national ego”. An agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India signed on 29 April 1954 was short lived as India refused to renew it in the wake of hostilities in the late 1950s that culminated into a small-scale armed conflict in 1962 and froze relations for almost three decades. Even during this period in time, the helmsman of China compared India to a cow in 1974, which according to him “had no talents and is only food or for people to ride and for pulling carts. The cow could starve to death if its master did not give it grass to eat. And even though this cow may have great ambitions, they are futile” (Garver 2004: 79). India’s neighbourhood policy was also viewed by China as an extension of former’s “hegemonic” ambitions; India’s military intervention in Bangladesh (1971) and Sri Lanka (1987) has been viewed from this perspective. Nehru’s The Discovery of India has been made a reference point by various Chinese academics to illustrate India’s “expansionist” mindset. The nuclear tests by India in 1974, especially those in 1998, have also been seen as a step in this direction and realizing her aspirations to become a great power. China, however, continues to perceive India as a non-player in the world affairs and accords very low priority as far as its foreign policy is concerned, rather it seeks parity for its client state Pakistan in the region and beyond. Unlike China, India has varied views about China. Some political parties in India have been sympathetic not only towards China’s revolutionary struggle and China’s journey through different phases of its history, but also during the time of animosities with India. They were not alone in their appreciation and support for China, many leading Indian elites also viewed China’s revolution as the manifestation of Asian resurgence and a clarion call for ending the colonial rule. Many in India have viewed the rise of China with envy and admiration and have called on the government to learn from the Chinese experience. There are others who view

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China as a threat, but believe in engaging China and propping up India’s strategic assets for any confrontation with China. There are realists, who believe in a tit for tat policy; i.e., if China has courted Pakistan and is containing India to South Asia, they would like India to forge strong defence and economic ties with forces antagonistic to China’s assertiveness such as Vietnam, Japan and the USA. Many believe that India has rightly exposed the bluff of China’s psychological warfare against India during the Doklam standoff (2017), held its ground in Galwan (2020) and payed back China in their own coin. India exposing Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail by bombing terror camps deep inside Pakistan in early 2019 was also a blow China’s entente with Pakistan. Notwithstanding the divergence in views, both India and China had reached a consensus that both will not let the border become an impediment in diversifying relationship in other areas, especially trade and investment. Since 2010, India and China created a Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) mechanism, which by the year 2019 had six working groups looking into infrastructure, energy, environment, hi-tech, pharma and policy coordination. In order to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border, various confidence building measure were signed. With peace at the border and spike in economic partnership, India-China relation were said to have transcended the scope of bilateral relations and acquired global significance. This appeared sensible, as the global political architecture was undergoing a fundamental transformation with gravity increasingly shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This was also witnessed by convergence of their interests at the global and multilateral forums on issues such as climate change, Doha Round of the WTO and democratization of the international financial institutions. In tandem, they created new institutions of global governance such as Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), considered to be challenging the Bretton Woods Institutions of the West. Both underscored the significance of multi-polarity, initiated or became members of an array of multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and G 20. No wonder, in a short span of two decades, bilateral trade approached $100 billion. China’s accumulative investment between 2017 and 2019 reached a whopping $9.5 billion, mostly investing in the “Digital India” start-ups. Some of the most visible enterprises where China has pumped money are Paytm, Zomato, Ola, Flipkart, MakeMyTrip, Swiggy, Big Basket, BYJU’s Hike and the list goes on. Presently, 17 out of 24 unicorns are supported by capital from Chinese brands such as Alibaba, Tencent and GlobalData. As the labour, intensive industries started to become unviable at home, China started to relocate supply chains such as mobile telephony, electronics, home appliances, etc., to India, localizing production and penetrated deep into sectors such as e-commerce, energy, telecom, automobiles, etc. Though balance of trade remained heavily in favour of China owing to the economic structure of both the countries, however, China promised to look into that by making more investments in India on the one hand and providing greater access to India’s pharmaceutical and information technology companies in China. Meanwhile, Indian movies and Yoga captivated the imaginations of a million Chinese people, some of the blockbusters earned more revenue at box office in

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China than in India. Both identified themselves as civilizational states and advocated that civilizational dialogue between them through stronger people-to-people bonding should be initiated, resulting in inking High Level Mechanism on Culture and People to People Exchanges in 2018. The above narrative started to develop fissures when China ignored India’s sensitivities by building China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a flagship of the “Belt and Road Initiative,” passing through disputed territories of Gilgit Baltistan claimed by India. India’s open opposition to the BRI and slow progress on the Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor irked China to the extent that the latter was taken out of the six BRI economic corridors. Dust had hardly settled down on the CPEC, then came China’s rubbing to India on issues such as cross-border terrorism, blocking India’s efforts to bring terrorists like Masood Azhar under the scanner of 1267 sanction committee, and blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Relations reached their nadir and culminated in the Doklam standoff in 2017. China threat theory scaled new heights, and India tried to needle China by issuing visas to the Uighur rebels for a conclave in Dharamsala. Had it not been for the slated BRICS summit in Xiamen, the 73-day standoff would have been prolonged. Two unofficial Modi-Xi summits held in Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) tried to put the relations back on the track; consensus that they will not let the differences turn into disputes and the issuance of strategic guidelines to their militaries in the border areas failed to stop transgressions along the LAC. The security deficit with China resulted upgradation of the Quad and India synchronizing with US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The COVID-19 pandemic further brought bitterness to already strained relations, as India imposed ban on export of the medical equipment to China, evacuated its citizens from Wuhan, cancelled working visas of the Chinese and joined the chorus of 62 countries seeking investigations into the source of coronavirus. Some individuals and organizations in India also joined people and organizations from other countries seeking compensation from China for the health and economic hazards caused by the COVID-19. If this was not enough, the Galwan stealth attack of the People’s Liberation Army on 15 June 2020 that resulted in the martyrdom of 20 Indian soldiers sounded the death knell for the CBMs and the very LAC, as China moved its own claim line further westward, occupied territories between Finger 8 and 4, at Gogra, and Depsang plains, changed the status quo and presented a fait accompli. The mobilization of the forces by China, in fact diverting troops from an exercise in Xinjiang, took India by surprised and forced her to match the Chinese deployment. Since the disengagement and de-escalation process is far from complete, any miscalculation may trigger another conflict worse than the 1962. Undoubtedly, this is manifestation of the regional balance of power favouring China, which has resulted in her “wolf warrior diplomacy” not only along the LAC with India, but also in the South China Sea, across the Taiwan Straits, Hong Kong, etc., places including its spat with the USA. If China and the USA are poised to fight for global hegemony, China continues to pin India down to South Asia through its pivot to Asia, where Pakistan has been a lynchpin from the very beginning. China is also employing its countervailing force to create fissures in

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India’s relations with smaller countries in the neighbourhood. Nepal redrawing its maps, the PLA showing in great numbers across Lipulekh in the middle sector on the occasion of 65th anniversary of establishment of China-Nepal relations, and recently, Pakistan following the suit of redrawing its map are being cited as examples. China’s massive investment in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, building quasi-military infrastructure from Myanmar to Chabahar has not only created anxieties in India but also in the White House. Given the present equations, India-China rivalry will not only be contested in the border areas, Indo-Pacific, but the same will be extended to new territories across Central Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America as both strive to find strategic space, energy resources and markets to fuel their growth. These changes at the bilateral, regional and global stage have forced countries to recalibrate their foreign policy approaches and choices. What are going to be India’s choices along the LAC, in the realm of trade and investment, peopleto-people exchanges, multilateralism and the new cold war between the USA and China? What role the USA and other middle powers will play in this rivalry, how will the regional blocks such as SAARC, BIMSTEC and ASEAN playout in this contest? Will India embrace the USA as analysts have been talking about? What will happen to the BRI, especially when the notions of China’s neo-colonialism and debt traps have been debated fiercely across the continents? Will China be able to overcome the Malacca dilemma by constructing ports like Kyaukpyu and Gwadar? Or will the view of the constructivists prevail that by establishing robust mechanisms, India and China relations will be back on tracks? How will the COVID-19 and Galwan impact on India-China relations? Or will the realists prevail who believe that the war is inevitable in face of security dilemmas of the nations? India-China scholarship has been arguing that India-China relations are too complex to be defined through the binary of friendship and enmity. Will this line of thinking change after the Galwan fatalities? It is in this context that I have tried to find some answers to these questions. The book is divided into three parts, namely India-China Conflict and Cooperation: Assessment and Narratives; Pakistan, BRI and India-China Relations; and Indo-Pacific, World Order and India-China Relations. The first part consists of four chapters where I look into the perceptions and images about India and China built over a long period of time in history. I argue that these are built on shallow understanding of each other and have been further deepened due to protracted rivalry between the two, generating much of the distrust. Though it would be difficult to absolutely erase, these images and perceptions, however, policy recalibration through pragmatic constructivism could be a good beginning. Moving away from the traditional discourse on border issue, I attempt to formulate a paradigm of China’s “victim psychology” and India’s “tough posturing” for cause of the 1962 and provide some plausible solutions. While looking into the CBMs, I argue that these falls short of finding a solution to the border issue and do not minimize the scope of breaking out of the hostilities, as has been demonstrated by the Galwan violence. The fundamental perceptions about Tibet by different stakeholders are formulated on the basis of author’s interviews and enquiries with

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the representatives of the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan Government in Exile, the leaders of Tibetan Youth Congress, the representatives of Students for a Free Tibet, as well as the Tibetan émigré in India and ordinary Indians. I also explore some of the major differences and contradiction between India and China over Tibet; the future course of the Tibetan movement; the reincarnation issue of the Dalai Lama, and India’s “One China Policy,” etc., issues. In Part II, there are three chapters. I argue that India needs to live with the patron–client relationship between China and Pakistan, which has resulted from Sino-Pak animosities towards India. India’s abrogation of Article 370 and joint offensive of Pakistan and China on India’s move, including some Chinese scholars openly suggesting that the abrogation was the main reason behind China’s posturing in Eastern Ladakh has been analysed exploring various viewpoints. While enhancing capacities and capabilities to deal with the challenges arising out of this axis, I opine, India must shift its focus to our northern borders, and deal with Pakistan without making a fuss about it: nonetheless, must continue the policy of strategic engagement with both the countries. As regards the BRI and MSR, apart from examining the triggers and contours of the MSR, the study focuses on responses from various stakeholders. China’s energy security with the BRI countries has been explored, elements of cooperation and competition along with India’s options have been discussed. I have argued that though both India and China have initiated their own domestic, peripheral and external energy strategy, it is pertinent that they cooperate in international energy markets, so as to curb the crude oil prices, bring down the prices of the bids, transportation and share their experience and technologies, which certainly is easier said than done, but not impossible. The last three chapters in Part III focus on the Indo-Pacific, multilateralism and post-COVID-19 pandemic and Galwan Incident. The study evaluates approaches of India and China towards the Indo-Pacific, and as to how the modernization of respective naval forces and overlapping interests has not only given rise to the rivalry between India and China, but also China’s rivalry with the USA. I posit that while maritime exercises have enhanced some mutual understanding between the two, however, effective or inefficient handling of soaring maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific will have far reaching security consequences in the region and world. The study concludes that the narrative of “emerging India,” which was based on India’s robust economic growth, demographic dividend and capacity to handle domestic and global challenges pragmatically has entered unpredictability post-COVID-19 and Galwan; therefore, the kind of equilibrium and understanding India seeks with China is extremely difficult, for China has been vocal to remind India of her asymmetric relationship more often than not. China will have no compulsion to accommodate India’s interest whether bilateral, regional or global. Therefore, India must free herself from any delusion that China will be sensitive to India’s sensitivities; the best India could do is to undertake a comprehensive review of her China policy and formulate a new policy which is long-term, goal oriented and sustainable.

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Notes Deepak, B. R. 2014. “Lu Xun’s critique of Tagore: Sardonic irreverence and misunderstanding.” In: Zhang Xiaoxi. 2014. 《比较文学与比较文化研究丛刊》Comparative Literature and Comparative Culture Studies Series, Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Press. Garver, J. 2004. “One-sided Rivalry.” In: Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (ed) The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, Columbia: Columbia University Press, p. 79. Kang, Y. 1901. 《印度游记》 Indian Travelogue reproduced in Kang Youwei, 《万国游记》 Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 1995.

Contents

Part I 1

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India-China Conflict and Cooperation: Assessment and Narratives

Perception of Images in India-China Relations . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 India-China and the Civilizational Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . 3 India-China and the Colonial Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Post-independence and Liberation Images . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Seizing the Asian Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Widening Gap and New Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 India “Does not Think Big of China” Syndrome . . . 5.2 China “Looks Down on India” Syndrome . . . . . . . . 5.3 China Seeking Parity for Smaller Nations with India 6 “Look Down and not Thinking Big” Paradigms Are Problematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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India-China Border Conflict: China’s Victim’s Psychology’ Versus India’s “Tough Posture” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nehru, a Victim of British Legacies in Tibet? . . . . . . . . . . 2 Zhou Enlai a Victim of China’s “Psychology of a Victim”? 3 Negative Role of the Press and Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Possible Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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India-China and the Tibetan Conflict: Narratives from China, India and the Tibetan Émigré . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Narratives from the Tibetan Émigrés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile . .

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2.2 Tibetan “Radical Organizations” Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Ordinary Tibetan Émigré and Ordinary Indian Approach . 3 The Chinese Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Narratives from India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Tibet Policy of the Indian Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Mainstream View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Other Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Major Differences and Contradictions Between India and China on Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation and Tibet Issue . . . . . . . 6 The Future of Tibetan Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Cooperation and Conflict in India-China Relations: A Crisis of Confidence Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 CBMs Between India and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or the Panchsheel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 CBMs of 1993, 1996, 2003 and 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 New Initiatives and the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Depsang (2013) and Chumar (2014) Stand-Offs . . . . . . . . . 4 Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Convention of 1890 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 June 15 Galwan Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 CBMs Could Lead to Better Regional and Multilateral Cooperation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Pakistan, BRI and India-China Relations

India and China-Pak Axis: From India-Pak Wars to the Abrogation of Article 370 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Raison D’être for the Axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 India-Pakistan Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 China’s Military Assistance to Pakistan . . . 1.3 Nuclear and Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . 2 Nuclear Detonations in the Subcontinent . . . . . . 3 Cross Border Terrorism and China . . . . . . . . . . 4 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor . . . . . . . . . . 5 Abrogation of Article 370 by India . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

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6 Strategic Implications and Choices for India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 India Has to Live Up with the Axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Expand Our Footprints in the Neighbourhood . . . . . . . . 6.3 Adjust to Regional and Global Balance Favouring China 6.4 Coalition of Democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Counter-Terrorism as an Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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India and the Belt and Road Initiative of China: Historicity, Converging/Conflicting Interests and Responses . . . . . . . . . 1 Locating MSR in History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Zheng He’s Maritime Explorations—Realpolitik and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 China’s Perspective of the Twenty-First Century MSR . . . . 2.1 Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 “Twenty-First Century MSR” and India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Soaring Maritime Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Overlapping Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 India’s Responses to China’s MSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The US Factor in Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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China’s BRI, External Energy Quest and India-China Cooperation and Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Energy Security Strategy Along the BRI Countries . . . . . . . 1.1 Securing Energy Through China–Myanmar Economic Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Energy Security and China Central Asia Economic Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Energy Security and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Exploring Possibilities for Cooperation Amidst Competition 3 Challenges for China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Geopolitical Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Socio-cultural Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Localization Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The Ghost of Debt Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part III 8

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Indo-Pacific, World Order and India-China Relations

India-China and the Indo-Pacific: Cooperation and Competition Amidst Soaring Maritime Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Maritime Exercises and Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 First Recent Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The First Joint Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Second Joint Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Third Joint Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Multilateral Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 The First Multilateral Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Other Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 China’s Naval Expansion in India’s Neighbourhood . . . . . . . . . 3 India-China and the Indo-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 India-US Rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 India–US 2+2 Dialogue and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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137 139 139 140 140 141 141 141 142 142 143 146 147 149 150

India, China and Multilateralism: Towards Multi-polarity and Global Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 India, China and the Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 India and China in the BRICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 A Platform for Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Constraints and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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153 153 156 156 160 162 163 164

10 India-China Relations Post-COVID-19 Pandemic and Galwan Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Death of the LCA and the CBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 China’s Two Step Forward One Step Back . . . . . . . . . 2 Negative Impact on Trade and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Chinese Investment and India’s Response . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 China’s Structural Adjustment and India’s Options . . . . 3 Chinese Footprints in India’s Neighbourhood . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 What India Can Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 People-To-People Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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165 167 168 171 173 174 175 177 178 180 181

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About the Author

B. R. Deepak studied Chinese history and India–China relations at Peking University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; and the University of Edinburgh, UK. He was the Nehru and Asia Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Dr. Deepak’s publications include China’s Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road (2018), My Tryst with China (2017), India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches and Responses (2016), India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict (2005), India–China Relations in first half of the Twentieth Century (2001), India–China Relations: Future Perspectives (co ed. 2012), India–China Relations: Civilizational Perspective (co ed. 2012) and China: Agriculture, Countryside and Peasants (2010). His translations from Chinese to Hindi and English include Ji Xianlin: A Critical Biography (2019), The Four Books (2018); Core Values of Chinese Civilization (2018), The Analects of Confucius (2016), Mencius (2017), My Life with Kotnis (2010) Chinese Poetry: 1100 BC to 1400 AD (2011), a translation of 85 selected classical poems for which he was awarded the 2011 “Special Book Prize of China.”

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Abbreviations

AAGC ACBMMF AEP AIIB AMPT ARF ARIA BASIC BCIM BDCA BIMSTEC BRI BRM CAA CBMs CMC CMEC CMMs CNOOC CNPC COMCASA CPEC CRI CTA DBO DTTI FOIP

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control Act East Policy Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control ASEAN Regional Forum Asia Reassurance Initiative Act Brazil-South Africa-India-China Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor Border Defense Cooperation Agreement Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Belt and Road Initiative Bali Road Map Citizenship Amendment Act Confidence Building Measures Central Military Commission China Myanmar Economic Corridor Crisis Management Mechanisms China National Offshore Oil Corporation China National Petroleum Corporation Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement China-Pakistan Economic Corridor China Radio International Central Tibetan Administration Daulat Beg Oldi Defence Trade and Technology Initiative Free and open Indo-Pacific

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xx

FTAAP GCSM GHG IAFS IGNCA INDCs INF IOC IPEC ISA ITSN JuD KMT KP KSEZ LAC LEMOA LEP LSA MSR NAM NASAMS NDPT NDRC NSA NSG NSTC PCART PLA PLAN PPPGP PRC QTTA RATS RCEP ROC RSS SAGAR SARS SCO SFT SIPRI SJM SLOCs SREB

Abbreviations

Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific Gu-Chu-Sum Movement Greenhouse gases India-Africa Forum Summits Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Indian Oil Corp Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor Industrial Security Annex International Tibet Support Network Jamaat-ud-Dawa Kuomintang (now written as Guomingdang) Kyoto Protocol Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone Line of Actual Control Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement Look East Policy Logistics Support Agreement Maritime Silk Road Non-Alignment Movement National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System National Democratic Party of Tibet National Development and Reform Commission National Security Advisor Nuclear Suppliers Group North-South Transport Corridor Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy Protocol on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles People’s Republic of China Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Republic of China Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh Security and Growth for All in the Region Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Shanghai Cooperation Organization Students for a Free Tibet Stockholm Institute of Peace Research Institute Swadeshi Jagran Manch Sea lines of communication Silk Road Economic Belt

Abbreviations

SRF SRs TAPI TCPI TCV TGIC THAAD TR TTIP TWA TWsA TYC UNFCCC UPA USIPC WHO WMCC WPNS

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Silk Road Fund Special Representatives Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline Trade Promotion Council of India Tibetan Children’s Villages Tibetan Government in Exile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Tibetan refugees Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Tibetan Women Association Tibetan Writers Association Tibetan Youth Congress United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Progressive Alliance US Indo-Pacific Command World Health Organization Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs Western Pacific Naval Symposium

Part I

India-China Conflict and Cooperation: Assessment and Narratives

Chapter 1

Perception of Images in India-China Relations

1 Introduction The images we have implanted in our minds as regards the civilizational connections between India and China are benign. The period has been portrayed as that of splendour, glory and friendship. The “learning from civilisations” rather than Huntington’s thesis of the “clash of civilisations” has dominated the discourse in contemporary India and China. While there is substance in this paradigm, however, there are aberrations too, which have been shunned by both the sides. There is no denying the fact that the circulatory movements of ideas, technology, commodities and people, not only enriched these civilisations, but various other polities in the vicinity too. The connections during the colonial times are mostly looked through the prism of British sources, while these are important, but it is important to look beyond these and one could make a case of continuity of the civilizational cousinhood. In modern and contemporary times too, the narrative is either dominated by evoking friendliness of the ancient times or animosities of the British period and those of the 1950s and 1960s. In the light of this, it is pertinent to have a correct understanding about the civilisational dialogue between India and China, which could be conducive for a better understanding between the two.

2 India-China and the Civilizational Dialogue In April 2018 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met for an informal summit in Wuhan, I remember President Xi telling Prime Minister Modi through an interpreter that the bronze statue of “antlered crane” that attracted PM Modi’s attention in Wuhan Museum dates back to 433 BC and that it was discovered from the tomb of Marquis Yi of Zeng of the Spring and Autumn Period. A little later, PM Modi was seeing striking the famous 64 bianzhong or the chime bells

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_1

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discovered from the same tomb. It is in these bells that the date has been inscribed exactly showing that the artefacts are 2400 years old. The Spring and Autumn Period was the time when Chinese silk had already entered India. Kautilya’s Arthasastra mentions of kauseyam cinapattasca cinabhumijah (cocoons and Chinese fabrics are the products of China), the Greek and Roman businessmen sailed to India long time ago and bought Chinese silk in the Indian markets. The line “What characteristics does the moon have, that it perishes and rises again? What is that good thing it has? Isn’t it that rabbit in its belly” in Qu Yuan’s narrative poem Heaven Questioned of 4th Century BC is believed to have come from the Indian legend of “rabbit on the moon”. These are the findings of the great Chinese scholar Ji Xianlin on whom the Government of India conferred Padma Bhushan in 2008 for his contribution towards Indology. Professor Ji (Yu and Liu 2014, 515) is of the view that the line “God releasing his disc and decapitating Yin from Yang” of the above poem is the depiction of Samudra Manthan story in which Indra decapitates Rahu and Ketu. Now, how many in India and China knows that during the time under reference, the civilizational dialogue between India and China was already in place, and the traces of it could be discovered in the textual tradition of both the countries. In the same vein, the selection of Mamallapuram or Mahabalipuram, which falls within the district of Kanchipuram, the capital city of the Pallava Dynasty (275–897) also reinforces civilizational linkages between India and China. For example, the first ever reference to Kanchipuram found in the Chinese texts dates back to first century AD. A detailed description of the sea route between China and Kanchipuram, spelled as Huanhzhi (Kanchi), is found in Chinese historian Bangu’s Han Annals (Geng 1990, 6). The reference states: Huangzhi is big and population huge, and abounds in exotic products…The interpreter, who is a royal official accompanied other assignees to the sea to buy pearls, beryl (vaduriya), precious stones and other exotic products and bartered it with gold and varieties of silks… During the Yuanshi Era of Emperor Ping when Wang Mang executed government affairs, as he wished to show off the brilliance of his majestic virtue, sent rich gifts to the king of Huangzhi, in return Huanzhi sent an embassy along with the present of a live rhinoceros… To the south of Huangzhi lies the country of Sichengbu, (Present day Sri Lanka) it is from here that Han interpreter returned.

Now, what does these records refer to? As pointed out by President Xi (2015, 573) during his UN speech entitled “A new partnership of mutual benefit and a community of shared future” on 28 September 2015 that “We should increase inter-civilisation exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences. The world is more colourful as a result of its cultural diversity. Diversity breeds exchanges, exchanges create integration, and integration makes progress possible.” It was owing to the interactions between diverse civilizations that integrates these in the process of healthy cooperation and benefits. First, for example, Buddhism disseminated from India to central Asia and then onward to China, absorbed various components of other local cultures especially Taoism and Confucianism and enriched itself as a religion and philosophy. It emerged as a new entity creating innumerable new images such as Vimalkirti, Guanyin

2 India-China and the Civilizational Dialogue

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and Mulian and associated sutra unfamiliar to the Indian Buddhism. Along with Buddhism, travelled various thought systems of India and Central Asian polities such as astronomy, literature, music, languages enriching the knowledge systems of the region. To cite an example, A Dictionary of Buddhism compiled by the Japanese scholars lists more than 35,000 entries of Sanskrit in Chinese language. According to professor Yu (1987, 2): These entries are not coined by the compiler, but created by various masters through Han, Jin, and Tang dynasties, and added to the Chinese language as a new component. Every vocabulary is a concept and it could be said that 35,000 new concepts have been added to the Chinese language.

In the process of translation, new theories were invented such as “Five Losses” and “Three difficulties” by Dao’ an, “Ten qualifications” and “Eight prerequisites” by Yan Cong, “Five Untranslatable” by Xuanzang, and “Six Cases” by Zan Ning (Yu 2015, 96). In the same vein, the mystery fiction in the Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties had a solid Indian imprint. In the words of Lu Xun (2001, 27): Since the Wei and Jin Dynasties, with the gradual translation of the Buddhist canons, Tianzhu (Indian) tales also spread to China, the literati loved the mysteries hidden in these stories and used them consciously or unconsciously in their writing, and these gradually became the Chinese products.

Secondly, the technologies such as sugar making, paper manufacturing, steel smelting, silk, porcelain, tea travelled from China to other countries and the world without being patented by anyone. For example, China learned the brown sugar making technique from India, and India in turn the technique of making granulated white sugar from China. Volume 221, Collected biographies of the western regions of the New Tang Annals: Magadha State records says (Deepak, 2018a, b: 289–93): Emperor Tai Zong (of Tang Dynasty) sends envoys to learn the technique of manufacturing sugar, they were instructed to gather all the sugarcane in Yangzhou, squeeze and extract the liquid from it, and adjust the technique so that it’s colour and taste would be even better than the one from the far West.

Thirdly, the unimpeded flow of the people was instrumental in this exchange, understanding and harmonizing relationship between various polities, especially between India and China. The translation industry, for example, it created in China, had people from India, China and many Central Asian polities. Most importantly, these were the people who were responsible for creating the entire repository of Buddhist literature in China and Northeast Asia, which in fact preserved many of the sutras that have been lost in India. The Kaiyuan Era Catalogue of Buddhist Canons and Zhenyuan, New Buddhist Catalogue records that in a span of 734 years starting from 10th year of the Yongping Era in Han Dynasty (67 A.D.) to the 16th year of Zhenyuan Era in Tang Dynasty (800 A.D.), in all 185 prominent translators translated 2412 sutras running into 7352 fascicles (Jiang 2014: 208–09). The stories of Faxian, Xuanzang and Yi Jing’s travels to Nalanda, and Parmartha, Kumarajiva, Bodhidharma’s to China are known to all; moreover, the biographies and travelogues they

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left behind have been instrumental in constructing various historical developments in South Asia. It would be wrong to argue that all was hunky-dory, there were a few aberrations too. If we look at the Han Annals by Ban Gu, we will find references of regime changes in Jibin kingdom and the killing of Azes II by the Chinese forces (Sen 2004, 3–4). Similar incident happened in Kannauj when Harshvardhan’s usurper Arjuna maltreated Tang envoy Wang Xuance; Wang with the help of Tibetan and Nepalese forces defeated Arjuna and took him as a prisoner along with his entire family to Tang capital Xi’an (Ray 2011, 57; Sen 2004, 23–24). During Zheng He’s voyages in the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth century, there are also incidents of regime changes and kings being taken to China. For example, China’s regime change in Annam (Vietnam), extending Chinese tributary system to Siam (Thailand) and Java prior to Zheng He’s voyages, but the defeat of Palembang (a Srivijaya principality) ruler Chen Zuyi and his decapitation in Nanjing during the first voyage (Hsin 1436, 53), as well as the dethroning of Sinhala king Alagagkonara (Hsin 1436, 64–65), and taking him all the way to China in 1411 during the third voyage albeit he was released and sent back the next year are some of the incidents revealing some unpleasant incidents. However, we may also argue that such incidents in the history of two thousand years of exchanges are miniscule. Furthermore, China, perhaps owing to its continental mindset, did not seize territories in the littoral states in Indo-Pacific even though it was in a position to do so. Interestingly, most of the information is found in the Chinese sources, which remains invaluable to reconstruct the history of many ancient polities including India. Conversely, many people in India have attempted to interpret the imprints of Indian culture on the Chinese culture with some sort of superiority complex, as could be reflected in the statements of some Indian scholars and statesmen thus interpreting these images quite differently. For example, during the Parivartan Parav, a nationwide tourism festival in 2017, one of the Indian ministers said that “If China has been controlled culturally by any country, it is India and this fact was accepted by Hu Shih” (Singh 2017; Hu 1932, italics added). Singh was perhaps referring to a China Daily report of September 2014, where the writer on the eve of President Xi Jinping’s India visit had mentioned that it should not take India 20 centuries to reciprocate the tribute Hu Shi once paid to the relationship between India and China during ancient times. “India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20 centuries without ever having to send a single soldier across her border” was what was quoted in the article. The original quote from Hu Shi’s article titled “Examining China’s problems” 《中国问题的一个诊察》is like this: “Rather than sending soldiers, India sent a few missionaries to conquer China culturally.” According to Klyer (2014), “Today China has conquered the hearts and minds of peoples around the world, including [the] Indians.” India perhaps does not appreciate China winning hearts and mind of people across the globe for obvious reasons, as well as the false glory of the ancient times. As a matter of fact, India-China civilizational dialogue has been a two way rather multidimensional dialogue that is proved by the circulatory movement of ideas, people, technologies and commodities between these two and other nations along the various routes of communication, especially the northern, southern and

2 India-China and the Civilizational Dialogue

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the maritime silk routes. The spirit of these exchanges has been summarized by President Xi (2014, 345–46, italics added) in, one of his speeches, when he said that “for hundreds of years the spirit embodied by the Silk Road, namely peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefits has passed down through the generations.” He further said that in order to promote the Silk Road spirit, “We need to respect each other’s choice of development path, need to focus on mutually beneficial cooperation, and advocate dialogue and peace.” It could be established from the available historical records that India-China interaction had been a two-way traffic and besides a few aberrations, had promoted this spirit throughout the history. Therefore, the dialogue of the civilizations essentially reflects harmony in diversity or the unity of the opposites as is expounded by the Indian and Chinese philosophy.

3 India-China and the Colonial Connections It could be discerned that whether the Western civilization represented by the GreekoRomans or the Oriental civilizations represented by the Islamic, Chinese and Indian cultural systems, there was mutual learning and common development. It was owing to the inclusivism of the Orient that the Indian and Chinese civilisations produced more than 50% of the world GDP and maintained that for around 1700 years since our common era. According to studies by Angus Maddison, in 1000 AD, China produced 22% of total world production, and in 1820, it was 32% (Perez Garcia 2019, 3). However, owing to the Western military conquests and plunder, China had to suffer a century of humiliation and India subjugation of the British for over 200 years. It is perhaps during the colonial period, that contemporary images of India and China find their foundations. As Qing [Manchu] China became apprehensive of the threat from the British India, she sent officials to study the reasons behind the demise of the Indian civilization. These eyewitness accounts could be found in the writings of Huang Maocai, Ma Jianzhong, Wu Guangpei and Kang Youwei. If Huang Maocai expressed his nostalgia of the “Five Indies”, Ma Jianzhong and Wu Guangpei held Indian people responsible for their own fate, for they called the Indians as ignorant and their government impotent as they were unable to defend themselves against the British colonizers. Indians were treated as “people of a lost century” and “no more than slaves” (Lin 1994, 39; Sen 2017, 264; Deepak 2018a, b, 300–303). A little later, the fugitive official of the Reform Movement, Kang Youwei lamented how tragic is it to be subjugated nation. So much so, Lu Xun despised Rabindranath Tagore as a “poisonous dhatura” and Indian people as “inferior slaves” in a cage (Deepak 2014, 152). In his opinion, colonized India had become a “shadow country”, namely, a defeated country, and therefore, it was impossible for India to produce great writers and works any longer (Liu 2013). Of course, the deployment of Sikh policemen in Shanghai and other places and their involvement in some of the massacres generated

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further hatred for the Indians. So much so ‘a’san’ that was used to abuse the Sikhs once upon a time, has become a swear word for the entire Indian people! Here again, only negativity has been highlighted, whereas there were stories of camaraderie and support and sympathy for each other. The anti-imperialist efflorescence of the Indian and Chinese people manifested in a major way as a challenge to the colonial order for the first time during the First War of Indian Independence (1857–59) in India and the Taiping Uprising (1850–1864) in China, as for the firsttime Indian soldiers stationed in China switched over to the Taipings and fought shoulder to shoulder against the imperialists and the Qing government. The reports of Indian soldiers joining the Taiping rebels could be found in the memorials of the Qing army generals or other officials of the throne and with the foreigners who were directly involved in this peasant uprising. (Deepak 2005, 139–149). The memoirs such as Cheen Mein Terah Maas (Thirteen Months in China) by Gadadhar Singh (1902), an Indian soldier in China who sympathized with the Boxer Rebellion, are not even known to the people of India and China. This rapprochement continued when more organized struggle for national independence was launched by the Indian and Chinese people. It was due to the synergy between the cultures and the plight of India and China that the nationalists and revolutionaries of India and China developed deep mutual contacts and friendship amidst their anti-imperialist struggle. They became natural allies and thought various ways to dislodge the imperialists out of their countries. The supporters of Tilak, the leader of militant nationalists, carried out activities like Shivaji’s commemorative meetings as far as Tokyo in order to make the Indian voice of anti-imperialism reach outside India. These activities had active support of the Chinese nationalists such as Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat-Sen. Sun Yat-Sen developed strong links with various Indian nationalists and revolutionaries and by using his good offices, introduced them to the leading Japanese personages thus enabling them to carry out their anti-British activities unhindered. Nationalists like Surendermohan Bose, Rash Behari Bose, M.N. Roy, Barakatullah, Lala Lajpat Rai and many other outstanding pioneers of Indian freedom movement maintained good contacts and friendship with Sun Yat-Sen (Deepak 2001, 38–58). Activities of the Ghadr Party that vehemently opposed deployment of Indian troops in China by the British and even joined the Chinese revolution in the 1920s (Deepak 1999, 439–456) went unnoticed as these were the people hounded by the British intelligence. Apart from operating from Japan, the Indian revolutionaries also made China as one of their centres to carry out anti-British activities. Barring a few, most of them were the members of Ghadr Party. Much of the activities were centred around Hankou, the place being the centre of Kuomintang (KMT) government, Shanghai and Hong Kong being the places where Indian settlers including policemen and troops numbered maximum. Their post-Siam-Burma Plan activities find a link with the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC). Ghadr support to the Chinese nationalist government and in turn enlisting latter’s support was the direct outcome of the formation of First United Front in China between the KMT and CPC. Their activities came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the United Front in 1927, though some individuals continued to be active until 1931 and 1932.

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Gandhi’s arrival at the Indian political scene and his movement of satyagraha and ahimsa generated heated debates in China. Chinese people pronounced him as a symbol of “eastern civilisation.” Chinese media paid utmost attention and widely covered Indian freedom struggle in various newspapers and journals. Eastern Miscellany took the lead and introduced Gandhi and Indian freedom movement to the Chinese people. It covered extensively the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920– 22 and Civil Disobedience Movement of 1931–34. Roughly from 1905–1948, the Eastern Miscellany carried over hundred articles covering different aspects of Indian National Movement. The Chinese people showered both encomiums and criticism on Gandhi when he led the non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements. Sun Yat-Sen, however, never approved of his pacifist method of non-violence, for he was of the view that an armed struggle was indispensable for national liberation. Nevertheless, Sun approved of Gandhi’s other pacifist techniques such as non-cooperation and civil disobedience, for he believed, these could be effective in crippling the British economy. Gandhi even suggested these techniques and principle of non-violence to the Chinese people, but came around to the Chinese viewpoint that it cannot be applied to China’s national situation, especially when it was engaged in an armed struggle with the Japanese (Deepak 2001, 87–107). During the War of Resistance and the Second World War, so long as China suffered at the hands of the Japanese, the reverberations were felt in India too. India dispatched a medical mission to China in 1938. Dr. Kotnis, a doctor of this mission, became a martyr when he died while serving wounded soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese people. In 2004, Guo Qinglan, his Chinese wife, wrote her memoirs in Chinese. This author completed the translation in 2006, and when President Hu Jintao visited India, he personally handed the book entitled My Life with Kotnis to the relatives of Kotnis. Nehru made the bonds of friendship even stronger when he visited China in 1939. The Chinese people at first supported the Indian viewpoint that it should not join the war unless it was declared free. Later, they asked support from India for the war effort of allied powers, as the whole situation had changed with the formation of India–China–Burma War theatre. President Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi) visited India in 1940 specially to break the ongoing deadlock between the British and the Congress and seek India’s support for China.

4 Post-independence and Liberation Images The images constructed during the colonial times were further underscored by the northern expansion of the British, especially their military expeditions in Tibet which were anticipated by Huang Maocai and others during their visits to the British India. The inheritance of the British obligations in the Himalayan states including Tibet added fuel to the fire. According to Yang (1992, 228; Li 1956, 195), the Chinese believed that once India became free, Tibet would gladly return to the big Chinese family. They believed that India would not inherit the same old British policies in Tibet, the policies under which Indians themselves had suffered. To their surprise,

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“self-claimed nationalist country—India” was adhering to and continuing the same imperialist policies. Wang (1998, 55) goes a little further in his criticism and posits that independent India “after annexing more than 560 principalities, sent forces into Kashmir and embarked on expansionism… Since then the bourgeois elite of India stepped on the stage of contemporary Asian history and strived for power and hegemony, and acted as if they were leaders.” Appointment of Captain Sathe as Consul at Kashgar in Xinjiang by the Indian government, the Chinese complain, was made without consulting the Chinese government. On 9 October 1948, the KMT government sent separate communiqués to the governments of India, Pakistan and Great Britain requesting that the Trade Regulations of 1908 should be abolished. “The Indian reply, however, was shocking”. It mainly incorporated two points (Deepak 2005, 108): Since the establishment of Government of India, the British obligations and rights under existing treaties with Tibet have been devolved to the present government. The relations between India and Tibet would be governed by the Simla Convention of 1914 and its trade regulations. As regards the Trade Regulations of 1908, they have already ceased to exist. If India had inherited the British legacies, so had China inherited the Mongol and Manchu legacies. If the British were foreign invaders so were the Mongols and Manchus. Mongol expanded their influence to large swaths of territories including Tibet; however, they never directly intervened in the Tibetan domestic affairs. Manchus consolidated their hold on Tibet since 1791 when they drove the Nepalese army out of Tibet. Even now, when China deals with the issue of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, it reiterates this history. For instance, on 19 March, 2019, Geng Shuang, the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while responding to the Dalai Lama’s statement that the future Lama could come from a free country, emphasized on rituals and historical conventions on the one hand and the legal instruments such as “Regulations on Religious Affairs and Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas” on the other. As regards the rituals and conventions, these were laid down by the Qing Emperor Qianlong, once his 170,000 strong Manchu force defeated the Gurkhas in the aftermath of the latter’s invasion of Tibet in 1791. Among these, the most prominent and often quoted by the Chinese is the “29-Article Ordinance for More Effective Governance of Tibet” which stipulated that the Ambans or the Qing imperial resident commissioner in Tibet will enjoy the same status as the Dalai and the Panchen; the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen and various Hotogtu Rinpoche must follow the procedure of drawing lots from the golden urn under the supervision of the Ambans and the same must be reported to the imperial court for approval; a new uniform currency bearing title of the emperor was issued; traders were required to carry a passport; all communication with neighbouring states was to be conducted through Ambans. Some of the Chinese scholars, for example, Li Tieh-Tseng in his book The Historical Status of Tibet traces real Chinese sovereignty over Tibet from 1791 contrary to most of the scholars tracing it from Yuan Dynasty (Deepak 2019). Even then, the Chinese sources have mentioned Tibet as a “subsidiary state”

4 Post-independence and Liberation Images

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(fushuguo) in their historical records, especially those from the Qing Dynasty, the last dynasty in China. If compared to the British control in the Himalayan states, the Chinese “control” was nominal. Therefore, putting these legacies in the narrative of India and China as nation states was sure to invite trouble, which came not so long after India’s independence and China’s liberation.

4.1 Seizing the Asian Leadership India was convinced that any allegiance with either bloc might entangle it with unnecessary problems when general attention was called for economic and social upliftment of the country. At the same time, given India’s geographical position and ties with neighbouring countries the leadership of independent India, especially Jawaharlal Nehru (1946) believed that “India is so situated as to form the centre of a group of Asian nations for defence as well as trade and commerce.” It was in this backdrop that the Indian Council of World Affair (ICWA) was given the task to organize a conference of the Asian countries. To the most controversial decision of the working committee of which Nehru was the chairperson was inviting Tibet to the conference as an independent nation. Tibetan delegate, Theiji Sambo made a speech and the Chinese made no attempts to interfere. However, the Chinese launched a protest when they pointed to the map in the conference hall that showed Tibet outside China. Yang (1992, 229) confirms in his study that the flag was lowered and the map altered. Yang maintains that the Tibetan delegation was dispatched upon the instigation of Richardson. Wang (1998, 61) mentions about Nehru’s speech at the conference, and “India’s ulterior motives in Tibet” by giving Tibet same status as other countries like Afghanistan, Nepal and Burma. Noted Irish historian Nicolas Mansergh (1947, 295–306) has noted that China was opposed to India’s cultural leadership in the region and its representatives lost no opportunity of saying that all nations in Asia were equal that there was no question of leadership. China which had just emerged victorious from the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in which she lost 35 million people found it indigestible to see a poor and backward Asian country like India asserting leadership. Even though India adopted a reconciliatory attitude towards China, however, did punch above its weight as visible from its actions in the region and beyond. India recognized Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty until the 1954 Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India was signed. Thus, China all along believed that India wished to find its place on the high table with the United States and Soviet Union; Nehru could not have thought of achieving it without the support of China, a nation that accounted for one-fifth of the world’s population, asserts Wang (1998, 76). He further posits that “Nehru’s friendly attitude towards China died with the demise of the KMT government; he tried to bring China under the fold of a certain Asiatic union with India at its centre, thus enabling Asia

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to have someone to speak for it, and meanwhile, enhance his personal as well as national ego.” India’s “leadership role” was further exposed during the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference where Nehru was the prime mover behind the conference and main sponsor of the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Nehru’s intemperateness paved way for Zhou seeking commonalities between the Afro-Asian countries not to seek discord. India’s neutrality and its leadership aspirations were denounced by China, China levelled India as a double-dealer nationalist country that harboured the desire to expand outward (Yang 1992, 253, emphasis added). The Tibetan rebellion of 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India were pronounced as handiwork of India, for according to one statement from China, India “practically wants to turn Tibet into their colony or protectorate” (PRC 1959, 80–97). The hostilities along the border, the Dalai Lama’s flight to India in the aftermath of Tibetan upraising in 1959, and India’s refusal to renew the 1954 agreement on Tibet brought the relationship to a nadir culminating into a brief armed conflict over the Himalayas and then a deep freeze in diplomatic relation for almost three decades.

5 Widening Gap and New Rhetoric It could be discerned that the territorial aggrandizement of the British and Manchus turned the peaceful Himalayan region into an area of protracted contest and military conflict on the one hand and the formulation of mostly negative images of each other on the other. However, after a period of three decades of deep freeze, and especially after the change of guard in China that initiated the policy of reform and opening up, both reached a consensus that security issues should not hijack normalizations of the relations. As a result, relations were normalized during the 1970s and given political push during Rajiv Gandhi’s China visit in December 1988. Nonetheless, it appears that both were doing adjustments at the tactical level, but the images of the yesteryears were still in their subconsciousness. These not only were manifested in different shapes and forms, but were perhaps rigidified in the backdrop of the conflict that resulted in various other spinoffs including China’s entente cordiale with Pakistan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative that goes through the disputed region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir claimed by India; the overlapping maritime interest in the Indo-Pacific, etc., issues.

5.1 India “Does not Think Big of China” Syndrome This originates from the “spiritual superiority” of India as witnessed during our civilizational discourse, as well as post-independence infrastructure and industrial superiority of India over China, including the national economy. India inherited a better infrastructure in terms of rail and road, post and telecommunication and even

5 Widening Gap and New Rhetoric

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industries. For example, the first railway line to be built in India was in April 1853, and in China in 1876 during the “Self-strengthening Movement.” When China got rid of the Japanese aggression in 1945, it had 27,000 km of rails comparing India’s 53,596 km. Speaking of infrastructure, even Beijing had no big landmarks except the Russian built Friendship Hotel and the newly constructed Great Hall of the People. There was not much difference in the GDP growth and comprehensive national strength either, albeit China made huge headways in the fields of health, education and social equality. However, India never felt it could learn from China, for she believed she had better political system, a free press and an independent judiciary. Whereas, China was completely an ostracized nation in the West for its poor human right record and political movements it launched to cleanse the society of class enemies, which resulted in the death of millions of its citizens. The destruction of cultural relics, attack on its own historical figures such as Confucius was something Indian people could not have imagined. Even if China made huge strides in infrastructure, manufacturing, new technologies and successfully built its military industrial complex, etc., India believes that in the long run, it would be its strong democratic institutions that will steer it to success. It is bound to become the third largest economy within a decade’s time, its demographic dividend, resilient private sector, and its spiritual wealth will make it more attractive than China in the times to come. Conversely, as China challenges the US hegemony, its slower growth rate, and increasingly bigger appetite for better life style by its millennial population, will question the legitimacy of the Party, the system and ideology. It is in this context India believes that China should not be too cocky about its achievements in the last 40 years whatsoever great these may be.

5.2 China “Looks Down on India” Syndrome China on the other hand, owing to its ideological and political compulsions, levelled India as a stooge of the US imperialism and Soviet revisionism and social imperialism once its relationship deteriorated with India. The Chinese aggressive propaganda could be best summarized by a commentary published in the People’s Daily of 10 August 1968. The commentary declared: “The Indian reactionaries had sold out their national interest for aid from the US imperialists and revisionists and were living entirely by begging and borrowing from them.” After initiating reforms and opening up, China’s economy in the last 40 years took huge strides in every sector. The gap between India and China started to yawn wider in the mid 1990s. Presently, China’s GDP is almost 5 times larger than India. China’s infrastructural development, industrial capacities, health and literacy record is unrivalled in the world, whereas India has lagged far behind, which has questioned the efficiency and efficacy of India’s political system as well as the social structure. The railways which India boasted of once have stagnated at 67, 312 km comparing China’s 121,000, excluding the 30,000 km of high speed railways. In the same vein, China ranks first in the world in having constructed state of the art expressway

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totalling 150,000 km. China’s Internet consumers in 2018 jumped to 730 million from a mere 420 in 2012; implying that at present around 53% of the Chinese population is wired. This is the group that has revolutionized e-commerce in China. Needless to say, China has maintained its leading position as world’s largest exporter, producer of food grains, steel, coal, electricity, etc. In the backdrop of the dividends that China reaped from the globalization, the discourses and narratives about India in Chinese media and even academic works portray India in a pessimistic light and see no future for the country in the global arena, as I reported in an article written for India Today in 2011. Whereas there is truth in what my Chinese friends have seen and witnessed in India, but it is no more a “dead country” as viewed by Kang Youwei and others in the early twentieth century. In my article which was based on my talks with Chinese people, I had written (Deepak 2011), “The ‘honour’ of having the world’s largest slum is also with India’s commercial capital, Mumbai, that ‘dreams’ of catching up with Shanghai. If India is the world’s ‘largest democracy’, it is also the world’s most illiterate, backward, corrupt and chaotic democracy. Some feel that India is ridden with too many religious and ethnic conflicts, others say that the political system in India has failed to guarantee political and social stability.”

5.3 China Seeking Parity for Smaller Nations with India Yet another element of China “looks down” on India is undermining its size, population, economy and military vis-à-vis smaller nations in its vicinity and seeking parity with some of the nations, particularly its pivot and “all weather friend” Pakistan. It is obvious that as the trust deficit widened in the wake of India-China border conflict, China threw its counterweight in the region to undermine Indian interests, the parity with Pakistan explains it all. It has been admitted by the Chinese think tanks and academicians (Ye 2008, 274–78) that the “mono-dimensional China-Pak relationship is focused at military security cooperation with not an endogenous aim but around external security concern that is to counter India” albeit China has shown greater interest to invest in Pakistan since establishment of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. They further posit that “this kind of cooperation, to a greater extent is due to the long rivalry of both Pakistan and China with India, as India for a long time has been number one enemy of Pakistan, and also poses major threat to the security of western China. Therefore, to keep away the common enemy is a decisive factor in this relationship”. This was demonstrated during the India-Pak conflicts of 1965, 1971, 1999 and even during the Balakot terror camp strikes by India, and more recently when India abrogated the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir. The same has been demonstrated in the areas such as nuclear weapons, entry of India to the NSG and the issue of counterterrorism.

6 “Look Down and not Thinking Big” Paradigms Are Problematic

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6 “Look Down and not Thinking Big” Paradigms Are Problematic Both the “looking down and not thinking big” approaches are problematic, for they see India-China relationship through the prism of enmity. It would be a gross mistake if India-China relationship is put in the binary of friendship and enmity. India may not have performed as good as China in the last 70 years; however, there is consensus among various political parties in India that India will be a key driver of global economic growth, as well as an important pillar of multi-polarity. India believes that its robust economic growth since the economic reforms in the early 1990s and a mature democracy are two pertinent factors that have won it respect and put India in a very advantageous position as far as changes in the global political architecture are concerned. It acknowledges the fact that China adapted better to the period of deep globalization and has raced ahead of India in various developmental indices; however, India has faith in its booming information technology, pharmaceutical sector, young work force and its legal and financial institutions. India also believes that its consumption led economic growth will make it immune to the global financial crisis to some extent as was the case during 2008–09 crisis, and that it will adapt well to re-globalization and protectionism initiated by China and the USA, respectively. Politically, India has always aspired to play a leading role in the world affairs, and this has been demonstrated by its role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Korean crisis, Geneva Conference, Bandung Conference, Colombo Conference and so on and so forth during the Cold War. India believes that crossing of the nuclear threshold in 1998 and its impeccable nuclear record has found resonance among the USA as well as European countries, and the signing of the civil nuclear deal with the USA in 2006 is the testimony of this. India’s steadfast fight against terrorism, both internal and external has again resonated well across the globe and has resulted in various bilateral counter-terrorism dialogues and exercises. Having long been acknowledged as a South Asian giant, India believes this is the time to transcend that role and play a more assertive role in the international order. The post-Covid-19 adjustments in the international order provide her an excellent opportunity to recalibrate its priorities.

7 Conclusion It is self-evident that India and China lack mutual understanding owing to the historical baggage they carry. The perceptions and images they have formulated about each other over the period of time are part of the problem. It is owing to these perceptions that “China looks down upon India” and “India doesn’t think big of China”. Both the paradigms are problematic and must be corrected by having a better understanding of history, historical memories and perceptions. The best they could do, especially in the aftermath of the 15 June 2020 bloody clashes at Galwan, is to reset their relationship, identify what is workable and what is not. Channels of communication at

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military and foreign affairs levels must remain open, and both must exercise restraint and show sensitivity towards each other’s core interests. Two areas, where policy can be realigned, are the areas of people-to-people exchange and trade and investment. In this context, I believe, the first ever IndiaChina High Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges inaugurated on 21 December 2018 by the then Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and her counterpart and State Councillor Wang Yi in New Delhi is of great significance. The mechanism is product of the consensus reached between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the unofficial Wuhan Summit in April 2018. The summit marked the rebalancing of India-China relations after a dangerous 73-day military confrontation at Doklam. Equally important is the HighLevel Mechanism on Trade and Investment signed between the two countries during the “Chennai Connect” meeting. The Galwan stand-off has certainly derailed these exchange mechanisms; however, these are likely to be reactivated gradually once the disengagement and de-escalation is complete albeit there are going to be riders as far as investment in some sectors including 5G is concerned. Chinese supply chains in the areas such as mobile phone manufacturing clusters, electronics manufacturing, white electrical appliances facilities, automobile, optical fibre industry and solar panel manufacturing are here to stay. This scope is likely to expand and diversify in other areas as China and USA continue to lock horns over issues concerning geopolitics and trade. One of the areas that demands attention is strengthening and consolidation of Chinese language and China studies in India. If we are thinking of recalibrating our China policy, the same must be long-term, goal oriented and sustainable. Academic collaborations such as work on “mutual translation project” in both countries must be encouraged. The project is likely to be completed in 2021; upon its completion, readers in India will have access to 25 classics, modern and contemporary literary works of China in Hindi. The project not only enhances mutual understanding, but also builds bridges between the scholars, academic institutes and publishing industry of both the countries. Finally, the people-to-people dialogue must be accompanied by the resolution of thorny issues, which call for abandoning the Cold War mentality and the zero-sum games between the two. Both must negotiate mutual, equal and sustainable security as envisaged in some of the confidence building mechanisms. Both India and China need to be mindful of the fact that the bilateral security boundary is not just limited to the border issue, but has sprawled into various other fields such as maritime, rivers, cybersecurity, counterterrorism etc., non-traditional security. Both must agree that India-China relationship is one of the most important relationships that is capable of shaping the future international order.

References

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References Deepak, B. R. (2018). Ji Xianlin: A critical biography. Delhi: Pentagon Press, Original Chinese book by Yu Longyu and Zhu Xuan. 2016.《季羡林评传》Jinan: Shandong Education Press. Deepak, B. R. (2018). Book review of Sen, Tansen. 2017. India, China and the world: A connected history. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. In: China Review International, 23(3) 2018, University of Hawai Press. Deepak, B. R. (2019). China’s hard line on the Dalai Lama not helping Tibet. Sunday Guardian, 23 March 2019. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/chinas-hard-line-dalai-lama-reinca rnation-not-helping-tibet Deepak, B. R. (2011). A bleak view of India from China. 16 June 2011 India Today. https://www. indiatoday.in/opinion/story/a-bleak-view-of-india-from-china-135689-2011-06-16 Deepak, B. R. (2014). “Lu Xun’s critique of Tagore: Sardonic irreverence and misunderstanding. In: Zhang Xiaoxi.《比较文学与比较文化研究丛刊》Comparative Literature and Comparative Culture Studies Series, Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Press. Deepak, B. R. (2005). 1857 Rebellion and the Indian involvement in the Taiping uprising of China. In: Thampi, Madavi. (2005). India and China in the Colonial World. New Delhi: Social Science Press. Deepak, B. R. (2001). India-China relations during first half of the 20th century. Delhi: APH Publishers. Deepak, B. R. (1999). Revolutionary activities of Ghadr party in China. In: China Report, 35(4). New Delhi: Sage Publishers Fei, H. (1436).《星槎胜览》The Overall Survey of the Star Raft. Translated by JVG Mills, Revised, annotated and edited by Roderich Ptak, Harrassowitz Verlag (1996). Geng, Y. (1990).《韩文南亚史料学》Historical Data of South Asia from Chinese sources. Beijing: Peking University Press. Hu, S. (1932).《中国问题的一个诊察》(Examining China’s problems) 10 November 1932《南开 大学周刊》Nankai University Weekly, 134. Available at https://cul.qq.com/a/20170807/036120. htm. Jiang, J. (2014).《试论印度经典的汉译》(On Indian classics in Chinese translation) Zeng Qiong and Zeng Qingyan (Ed.),《认识东方学》(Approaching the East) Beijing: Peking University Press. Klyer. (2014). A warm Indian welcome to a neighbour. 16 September 2014 China Daily https:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-09/16/content_18608745.htm Lin, C. (1994).《中印人民友好关系史:1851–1949》A history of friendly relations between Indian and Chinese people: 1851–1949. Beijing: Peking University Press. Li, T. T. (1956). The historical status of Tibet. Columbia University: King’s Crown Press. Liu, J (2013). Indian studies in China: An assessment. https://indiachinainstitute.org/wp-content/ uploads/2014/04/Liu-Jian_Submission_2013_Edited.pdf Lu, X. (2001).《中国小说史略》A brief history of Chinese Fiction (p. 27). Taiyuan: Shanxi Ancient Books Publishing House. Mansergh, N. (1947). The Asian Conference. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 23(3), pp. 295–306. Nehru, J. (1946). “Colonialism Must Go”. March 3, 1946 Gopal. S. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, first series, vol. 15, p.513. Perez Garcia, A. G. L. (2019). What should we learn from Confucian culture. In: The International Confucian Association. (Ed.), Confucianism and Sustainable Development of Mankind. Beijing: China Translation Publishing House. PRC [People’s Republic of China]. (1959). Concerning the question of Tibet. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Ray, H. P. (2011). Chinese sources of South Asian history in translation. Kolkata: The Asiatic Society. Sen, T. (2004). Buddhism, diplomacy and trade: The realignment of Sino-Indian relations 600–1400. Manohar: Delhi.

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Sen, T. (2017). India, China and the world: A connected history. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. Singh, G. (1902). Cheen Mein 13 Maas (Thirteen months in China). Lucknow: Dilkusha. Singh, R. (2017). India culturally dominated China for the past 2000 years. 23 October 2017 Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-culturally-domina ted-china-for-over-2-000-years-rajnath-singh/story-prTzp9zpDv16OEkywbPPOI.html Wang, H. (1998).《喜马拉雅山情节:中印关系研究》The Himalayas sentiment: A study of Sino Indian relations. Beijing: China Tibetology Publication. Xi, J. (2014). The governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Xi, J. (2015). The governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Yang, G. (1992).《中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史》History of China’s struggle and resistance to the foreign invasion and interference in Tibet. Beijing: China’s Tibetology Publications. Yu, L. (1987) (Ed.),《中印文学关系源流》The origin of Sino-Indian literary relations, p. 108, Changsha: Hunan Literature and Art Publishing House, p. 2 Yu, L., & Liu, C. (2014).《中外文学交流史:中国-印度卷》The history of Sino-Foreign literary exchange: China-India volume. Jinan: Shandong Education Press.

Chapter 2

India-China Border Conflict: China’s Victim’s Psychology’ Versus India’s “Tough Posture”

India and China had a glorious history of cultural and material exchanges, which developed into friendship and subsequently into camaraderie during the first half of the twentieth century when both India and China fought Western imperialism shoulder to shoulder. The fraternity and camaraderie rendered borders meaningless, even if they existed in some shape or form throughout the history of India and China. Faxian (342–424), Kumarajiva (343–413), Bodhidharma (sixth century), Xuanzang (600–664) Yijing (635–713) and innumerable cultural ambassadors from China to India and vice versa moved freely across the Himalayas and represented the spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam or sihai weijia (the world is one family) in true sense. It was the same spirit when the Indian soldiers serving the British in China turned their daggers towards their masters and sympathized with the Taiping cause during the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet, it was the same spirit and synergy between the cultures of India and China that the nationalists and revolutionaries of India and China could develop deep mutual contacts, forge unity and render support and sympathy for each other’s national cause during the early twentieth century (Deepak 2005a, 139–149). But why did this spirit dampen then, and dampen to the extent that India and China had to fight a war in 1962. The reason lies in the expansionist policies of the British and the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the last Chinese Dynasty that resulted into territorial dispute between India and China. After having taken most of the Himalayan states under its wings, the British India borders were extended to the Eastern Turkestan and Tibet, the two peripheries of Qing Dynasty. Eastern Turkestan was incorporated into the empire in 1881 after quelling a rebellion (now named as Xinjiang or the New Dominion), Tibet, which was treated as a vassel could not be integrated despite of the Qing sending a military expedition there in 1910. A year later, the dynasty was overthrown. Since late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the issue has been of protracted contest between the British India and the Qing Dynasty on the one hand and the Republic of India and the respective Chinese governments after the fall of the Qing Dynasty on the other.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_2

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The analyses, arguments and conclusions in this study have been constructed on the basis of Chinese, Western and Indian sources. The official Chinese version of the boundary problem has been derived from Zhongyin bianjing ziwei fanji zhangzhengshi (History of China’s counter attack in self-defence along the SinoIndian borders) compiled by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (1994) and The Sino- Indian Boundary Question (1962, 1965). Li, Jian’s (1992) Xinzhongguo liuci fanqinlue zhanzheng shilu (A Veritable Record of New China’s Resistance to Six Wars of Invasion), Shi, Bo’s (1993) 1962: Zhongyin dazhan jishi (1962: Records of Sino-Indian War) also reflects the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border conflict. Besides, other secondary sources such as Lu, Zhaoyi’s (1996) Yingshu yindu yu zhongguo xinan bianjiang 1774–1911 (British India and China’s South-western Frontier: 1774–1911) published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publication, Beijing; Yang Gongsu’s (1992) Zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe xizang defang douzhengshi ( History of China’s Struggle and Resistance to the Foreign Invasion and interference in Tibet) by China’s Tibetology Publications drawing heavily from the Qing Dynasty, and Republican official histories have been extremely helpful and reflect the Republic of China (ROC) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) perspectives on Tibet question. Works by Wang (1998) and Zhao, Weiwen (2000), etc., scholars, give a bird’s eye view of the border conflict and ensuing developments in the Sino-Indian relations from a military, geo-strategic and economic point of view. On the other hand, side, the Indian official viewpoint is reflected in the heaps of documents published by the Ministry of External affairs from time to time including the voluminous Officials Report (1961), nine volumes of White Papers (1959–1963) and the History of the Conflict with China, 1962 by S. N. Prasad and others. There are scores of other works by Indian army officers and researchers that give invaluable information about the government and military approaches of the conflict. References from various Indian newspapers and journals would be obvious to the readers in this study. The Western works such as Alastair Lamb’s two volumes on the Sino-Indian border and McMahon Line (1964, 1966), Neville Maxwell’s India’s China War (1970) and a study by John Garver (2001) on Sino-Indian relations have been very handy and helpful. However, not many of the above works have tried to look into the misperceptions and miscalculations by India and China during the 1962 conflict. The present study attempts to look into the border issue from a constructivist’s viewpoint and tries to locate the misjudgements and miscalculations of the either side.

1 Nehru, a Victim of British Legacies in Tibet? At the outset, it could be argued that India “injured” Chinese sensitivities in Tibet by informing the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1948 that the British obligations and rights under existing treaties with Tibet have been devolved to the present government, for it sent wrong signals to the KMT as well as its successor, the People’s

1 Nehru, a Victim of British Legacies in Tibet?

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Republic of China (PRC) founded on 1 October 1949. As posited by Wang (1998, 64), India exhibited that it wanted to inherit one and all privileges of the British imperialism in Tibet. Not only this, the Indian government also attempted to force illegal Simla [now Shimla] Convention of 1914 on China that was not even recognized by the British imperialists themselves. Wang further argues that it was primarily due to this wrong attitude and thinking [of the Indian government on Tibet issue] that led to the border conflict in the following years.” This author is of the view that India could have refused to inherit the privileges in Tibet by citing article 6 of the Anglo-Chinese trade regulations of Tibet (1908) which specifically stipulated that Great Britain would relinquish her rights of extra-territoriality in Tibet whenever such rights are relinquished in China. Since Great Britain did not relinquish its treaty obligation in China until 1997 in the case of Hong Kong, it could have done the same in Tibet. The fact remains that the British simply wanted to wash their hands of Tibet, as it was no longer a profitable proposition after the loss of India. Nevertheless, the wrong signals had been sent, and most of the Chinese perceptions veered around these signals after the relations deteriorated. However, China’s perceptions that India attempted to turn Tibet into a “buffer zone” and a “protectorate” or to “cut off Tibet from the motherland” or to “overthrow China’s sovereignty in Tibet” in this author’s views were or if they still exist are miscalculations and misunderstandings. It was these assertions and perceptions of the Chinese leadership and scholarship alike that turned Nehru a villain in the Chinese eyes, and the very belief that since Nehru was a villain he should be punished underpins China’s punitive action against India in 1962 border conflict albeit there were other domestic and international considerations for the Chinese invasion. It was China’s misperception about Nehru and his Tibetan policies that made her to conclude that India was hell bent to “slice Tibet out of China.” However, if we analyse Nehru’s attitude towards China, be it the pre-1949 Republic of China period or the post 1949 People’s Republic era, he attached utmost importance to China as could be gleaned from his relentless writings about China. No other leader in India has perhaps ever attached such an importance to China as Nehru did. As early as in 1927, while reflecting on KMT and Communist Party of China’s (CPC) campaign against the warlords, Nehru in an article entitled “The situation in China and India’s Duty” wrote (Gopal 1976, 327), “Hope it will be possible for the [Seva] Dal to send to China an ambulance corps of trained volunteers, carrying the massage of goodwill to our Chinese comrades and rendering such help as they can for the relief of pain and suffering. China is holding out her hand of comradeship to India. It’s for us to grasp it and renew our ancient and honourable association and thereby ensure the freedom and progress of both these great countries which has so much in common.” In other words, this was the spirit of camaraderie that Nehru wanted to resurrect and envisioned it as a natural course for post 1947 and 1949 Sino-Indian relationship. The same subjected him to criticism by many in India as China increasingly showed its belligerence along the borders. Though India inherited the British duties and responsibilities in Tibet after the British withdrawal from India, Nehru, however, was clear in his approach that what policy India should follow as regards Tibet and China. In early 1947, during the Asiatic Conference in Delhi when Tibetan delegates told Nehru that they would like

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to discuss the border issue with India, Nehru told them that “no political decisions were going to be made [at the Conference] and asked them not to raise any issue regarding borders or political status [of Tibet].” When Chinese delegates protested to the Tibetan map being shown outside China, correction was undertaken when the matter was brought to the notice of Nehru (Li 1956, 195). In later half of 1949, when Tibetans initiated mass expulsion of the Chinese from Tibet, Nehru showed concern and wrote (Gopal 1976, 411), “We are concerned over the Tibetan government’s decision to turn out all Chinese officials in Lhasa. These officials were appointed by the National Government of China; their wholesale expulsion would naturally be regarded as an anti-Chinese rather than anti-Communist move.” In 1950, when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet, Nehru was greatly disturbed. In this backdrop when the United States expressed its desire to supply arms to Tibet provided India would be willing to allow them pass in transit across the Indian territory, Nehru categorically told Henderson, the US ambassador in India that “US could be most helpful by doing nothing and saving little just now. Series of announcements by the US Government condemning China or supporting Tibet might lend certain amount [of] credence to Peking’s charges that great powers had been intriguing in Tibet and had been exercising influence over India’s Tibet policy.” Nehru also requested the USA to stop Formosa [Taiwan] from bringing Tibet to the UN, according to Nehru (FRUS 1950, 550–51), “since Peking charges KMT of intriguing in Tibet, Taiwan raking Tibetan issue at the UN would give fresh ammunition to Peking. Henderson also reported to Acheson that the invasion of Tibet by China did not lose Nehru’s enthusiasm for Peking regime, for Nehru was still convinced that communist China should be admitted to the UN emphasis added).” On the eve of 17-point agreement between Tibet and China, when Tibetan asked Nehru whether India could mediate between Tibet and China, Nehru made no comment but instead advised them that since China would insist on Tibet being an integral part of China; Tibetans would have to accept this point. However, Tibet must not agree to the stationing of Chinese troops in Tibet, as it would have serious repercussions on India (Shakya 1999, 64). In 1953, negotiations started between India and China on Tibet that resulted into the signing of “Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China” on 29 April 1954. Nehru came under a scathing criticism for his enthusiasm for China and the Panchsheel. Nehru remained undeterred and silenced his critics by asserting (Appadorai and Rajan 1985, 116), “In international affairs, we can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion, and not give any other approach a chance?” In December 1956, when the Dalai Lama expressed his desire to stay on in India and not to go back to Tibet in the wake of Chinese democratic reform in Kham (Eastern Tibet) and confrontation arising out of it between the Tibetans and the Chinese, Nehru advised the Dalai Lama to cooperate with the Chinese within the 17-point agreement, as there was nothing India could do to help Tibet (Gopal 1984, 36). It appears that Nehru had also tacitly accepted the Chinese compromise proposal for the Western sector and Eastern sector exchange until 1959. To this effect, we see him

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making statements about non-delimitation and no actual administrative jurisdiction of India in the Western sector. Therefore, China’s perception of Nehru as a villain is unfounded. However, what went wrong in between? This author believes that Nehru wanted China to show an understanding towards Indian cultural and security sensitivities in Tibet within the framework of Chinese sovereignty, so as the fraternity between the two could be maintained and sustained. Zhou Enlai seems to have responded to these sensitivities initially; however, in the wake of Tibetan revolt, Beijing viewed Nehru’s Tibet policy with suspicion and framed her viewpoints about Nehru surrounding these misperceptions. Granting the Dalai Lama refuge and accepting large numbers of Tibetan refugees in India; not punishing the Tibetan émigré for engaging in anti-China activities from India; Nehru discussing Tibet issue in the Indian Parliament; not curbing on anti-China reportage of the Indian press, etc., “acts” of the Indian government were treated as anti-China policies of Nehru and treated as an unwarranted interference in China’s internal affairs. As a result, Nehru’s Tibet policy, if viewed from the Chinese prism, attempted to create a buffer or denying China to exercise her sovereignty over Tibet. Nehru’s policies, however, were not derived from converting Tibet into an “Indian protectorate”, but from a desire to uphold Tibet’s autonomy under Chinese sovereignty as part of India-China fraternity, which would make a real cooperative and strategic partnership between India and China possible at the world stage. In other words, it was autonomy and sovereignty swap compromise; by virtue of which China would show an understanding towards the Indian position by granting autonomy as incorporated in the 17-point agreement, and in lieu, India would respect Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Even after the Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959, when the Dalai expressed his desire to establish a government in exile on 24 April 1959 during his first meeting with Nehru in Mussorrie, Nehru rejected the idea outright and said that it would not be recognized by the Government of India (Gopal 1984, 36). Even after the Longju and Kongka La bloody incidents when Nehru replied to Zhou Enlai’s September 7 letter on September 26, he was still hopefull that a peaceful solution would be found. He revealed in the letter that the Indian government was downplaying border skirmishes and stand-offs in the hope that it would be resolved peacefully. Nehru wrote (MEA 1959): We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides. In fact, our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the government both in Parliament and in the press in our country.

The manifestation of Nehru’s approach is reflected in India being the first nonsocialist country to recognize People’s Republic; accepting Tibet as a part of China; voting against the UN resolution that declared China as an aggressor in Korea; meditating in the Korean crisis; univocally and relentlessly supporting China’s place in the UN; adhering to “one China policy” by supporting transfer of Taiwan to China;

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confirming China’s role in the Afro-Asian movement and so forth, nevertheless, the camaraderie Nehru had envisaged between India and China was too idealistic and difficult to materialize given the ostracization of China by the international community and China’s suspicion and distrust towards countries belonging to the capitalist camp, including India. Nehru’s bonhomie with China went for a nosedive, especially after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. The mounting pressure from the opposition in the Parliament and press; and the vitriolic and vituperative attack from China forced Nehru to take a tougher posture against China. Nehru was dismayed when China dissolved the Tibetan government and its powers and functions were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART), as it was a death knell to the Tibetan autonomy, and the militarization of the Tibetan borders by a powerful army would send the feelings of an uneasy calm across the Himalayas. Non-militarization of Tibet is not tantamount to turning Tibet into a “protectorate” at all. China’s tough military measures in Tibet, and huge domestic pressure forced Nehru to adopt an equally “tough” border policy that ultimately culminated into a unilateral approach and finally into the formulation of ill-conceived “forward policy” in November 1961. This “tough approach” towards China was again envisioned under the premise that China would withdraw rather than use force. The Indian attitude that China would not involve in large-scale offensive could also be gleaned from the absence of Nehru from India prior to the Chinese assault. Nehru had embarked on his Colombo visit on 12 October 1962. However, Indian approach was considered as territorial encroachment by China and could not have been sustained for long. In such a situation, an appraisal of the “forward policy” should have been carried out, but was left to fall prey to yet another miscalculation. Meanwhile, China also fell a victim to the “victim’s psychology”, especially after the Tibetan revolt.

2 Zhou Enlai a Victim of China’s “Psychology of a Victim”? The macropolitical environment that largely divided nations into two camps; China’s “leaning to the one side” and therefore her ostricization by the capitalist camp had forced China to venture on a strategy that would at minimum neutralize the Asian and African countries on the one hand and render the Western economic embargo against China ineffective on the other. Commenting on China’s foreign policy during the 1950s, Wang (1998: 101) posits that “since India occupied an important position in China’s international anti-US united front, China strived to work together with India. The main motive apart from promoting friendship between India and China was to secure India’s neutrality in the Sino-US conflict, render the US encirclement of China bankrupt and create a peaceful environment for China’s construction.” It is clearly reflected from China’s handling of the Korean and Indo-China crises, as well as its pronouncements at the Bandung Conference. Since India played an important role as leader of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), China especially

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Zhou invested lot of political capital and goodwill to nurture ties with India and won her over. Even though Mao was opposed to the “illusions about a third road”,1 Zhou Enlai, however, differentiated between the long term and temporary friends. In the words of Zhou, “As regards friends there are permanent and temporary friends. The latter type also has variations; some could become friends in a certain period, while other would require a long period. The key to the difference is their attitude towards war and peace. From the nature of state, they belong to the capitalist world but oppose the war and show neutrality which is possible…to such countries we cannot adopt a hostile attitude, we must not camp them with the enemies, we can be friends with them (CMOFA 1990: 52 emphasis added). It could be argued that besides the macroenvironment surrounding China in the form of imperialistic wars, the encirclement of China by the USA; the Sino-Soviet split; Taiwan’s attempt to assert independence or win back China and the microenvironment inside China manifested in the form of international isolation, the economic crisis in the aftermath of Great Leap Forward; Tibetan revolt and the three-year’s famine resulted in China developing a “victim’s psychology” as depicted in Fig. 1. Added to the narrative of a “century of humiliation”, such a psychology made China to formulate “ultra-leftist” policies that at times were away from the reality and were full of vengeance. But, does it imply that Zhou did not respond to the spirit enunciated in the policies of Nehru? If we analyse Zhou’s attitude and pronouncements before, during and after his India visits, one can deduce that Zhou was an equal enthusiast for India-China fraternity. Let us examine the following facts: Knowing that India had a Mission in Lhasa, Zhou met Panikar, Indian ambassador to China on 14 June 1952 and proposed that “the Chinese Government was in favour of re-establishing the IndoTibetan relations through consultations, and since the resolution of Tibet problem would require considerable time and measures, the Chinese government is of the view that the Indian Mission at Lhasa may be converted into Indian consulate” (CASS 1987, 175; Deepak 2005b, 147). Following this, in September 1952, the Government of India announced from New Delhi that, as the Chinese government was now conducting Tibet’s foreign relations, the designation of the Indian representative at Lhasa would be changed to consul general and the trade agencies in Tibet would be under Richardson’s supervision (Richardson 1962: 196). Implying that India in principle accepted Tibet as a part of China, however, did not renounce her obligations in Tibet as yet. The related issues were subsequently discussed in the negotiations over Tibet that followed.

1 Mao

wrote his famous essay On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship on 30 June 1949. Mao made it clear that it was necessary for China to “lean to one side” that is the alliance with Soviet Union and other People’s democracies. Mao further elaborated, “all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road”. For full text see Cheng, Pei-kai and Michael Lestz with Jonathan D. Spence (1998). The Search for Modern China: A Documentary History, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

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Macro Environment •Sino-US relaƟons •Sino-Soviet riŌ •Jiang Jieshi •India’s Foreign Policy

Historical background

Micro Environment •Tibet •Economic Policies •3yr Famine

VicƟm’s psychology

InternaƟonal IsolaƟon

InterpretaƟon of InformaƟon

Policy FormulaƟon And Decisions Fig. 1 China’s “Victim’s psychology” and policies formulation

From 26 April to 21 July 1954, when Indo-China and Korean crises were being discussed in Geneva, Zhou wanted the participation of India, expressed his dissatisfaction when India was not invited to the conference (Zhao 2004, 42). Nehru still dispatched Krishna Menon to Geneva, where he had five meetings with Zhou. After the conclusion of Geneva Conference, Zhou thanked Nehru for his contribution when he wrote to him on 14 August 1954 in a telegram (Zhao 2004, 46), “Here, I would like to point out that you have not only expressed your desire for an armistice in IndoChina much before the convocation of Geneva Conference, but also the common efforts by you and other prime ministers of Colombo powers greatly contributed to the progress of Geneva Conference. During the convocation period, the dispatch of Mr. Menon to Geneva by you provided invaluable help to our work. Undoubtedly, your efforts were one of the important elements that contributed to the success of Geneva Conference.” Signing of the “Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China” in 1954 was a landmark as far as building confidence between India and China was concerned. It is generally believed that had India raised the border issue during the negotiations,

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a quid pro quo solution would have been a possibility, i.e. subjecting India’s acceptance of Tibet in lieu of China accepting the McMahon Line. Even though it is a hypothetical question now, but from Zhou Enlai’s propositions between 1954 and 1960 make it clear that China could have agreed to such a settlement. Consider a few excerpts from Zhou Enlai’s speech on 23 April 1955 to the Political Committee of the Asian-African conference (CMOFA 1990, 130; Maxwell 1970, 38): China borders on twelve countries, with some of which the boundary lines remain undefined in certain sectors. We are ready to delimit those sections together with our neighbours. Pending this, we agree to maintain the status quo and recognise the undefined boundary lines as lines yet to be defined. Our Government and people will refrain from stepping over the boundary line. Should such an incident happen, we will be ready to point out our mistake and immediately order the trespassers back into Chinese territory. In defining any boundary line with our neighbours, only peaceful means can be employed and no other alternative should be allowed. Further negotiations can be held if one round of negotiation does not produce any results.

Nevertheless, by now, India had accepted Tibet as a part of China. But, what is intriguing is as to why India did not open the border issue for discussion? Or was it China’s diplomatic maneurability that convinced India not to open it for negotitions? Consider Zhou Enlai’s following remarks made on 7 January 1954 to the Chinese committee set up for Tibet negotiation. The remarks are quoted by Yang (1992: 226, emphasis added) who represented Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: India has inherited some British privileges in Tibet. However, since the return of Tibet to the folds of motherland’s big family, India has accorded China an equal and reciprocal treatment albeit it still desires to maintain its privileges in Tibet. Nonetheless, it has agreed to recall its forces when it saw the futility of keeping them there. We may surmise that the stronger we emerge and the firmer all nationalities unite, Indian attitude is bound to change. China’s India policy should be to win India for peaceful-coexistence with us on the basis of five principles, to make her fight against the American invasion and war. On the other hand, the UK and the US exert great influence on India, and we have dispute with her on several issues. We should endeavour to influence and make her believe that our policy of peace has the force. During present negotiations, we are only prepared to negotiate the problems that are ripe, the problems that are not ripe, for example, the border problems including the “McMahon Line” by way of which Tawang and Loyul etc. regions that originally belonged to Tibet were ceded to India, would be regarded as outstanding issues and would not be raised due to insufficient material, however, would be raised at an opportune time.

In the hindsight, even at that time, China was eying for Tawang albeit she did not make the demand open until the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, the Panchsheel spirit was certainly at play in Bandung too. In the words of Shi (1993, 52), the success of the Bandung Conference for China was a “victory in smashing the international blockade,” and the credit for this victory goes to the “close cooperation between Zhou and Nehru.” During his second visit to India while addressing both Houses of the Indian Parliament, Zhou said (Zhao 2004, 64), “The Chinese Government and people will always remember unequivocal support rendered by the Government of India and its people to us in our struggle of complete reunification of our motherland and the restoration of our rightful place in the United Nations. Likewise, we assure the Government of India and its people that you will always get all-out support from

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the Chinese Government and its people in your struggle to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and promote world peace.” As regards the border problem, Zhou’s attitude was similar to Nehru, i.e. the border should not become a hindrance in developing friendly relations between the two countries. Zhou further expressed that through necessary preparations the problem that has been left over by the history could be resolved through friendly negotiations. It could be reasonably resolved on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, asserted Zhou (Shi 1993, 62). During his third visit to India in 1957, Zhou assured Nehru that China would maintain the autonomy of Tibet under the Dalai Lama’s leadership. This is what Nehru had been advocating and what I have called the “autonomy and sovereignty” swap for Tibet between India and China in the preceding sections. In this respect, Nehru and Zhou had reached an understanding, and the border issue according to both the leaders would also be best resolved through an East–West swap, which Zhou referred to during his India visit in 1960. This could also be ascertained from Nehru’s minutes of a meeting with Zhou in 1954 during Nehru’s China visit. According to Nehru’s minutes of the meeting (MEA 1959, 49–50), “Premier Zhou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard this before though of course the then Chinese government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by the British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese government was of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahan [sic] line.” Even after the breakout of the war, Zhou wrote to Nehru that China looks upon its south-western border as a border of peace and friendship. The dispatch of Chinese border guards to south-eastern part of Tibet was undertaken merely to prevent remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border back and forth and in no way constituted a threat to India (MEA 1959, 27–33). It could also be discerned from the discussion of R. K. Nehru, the then SecretaryGeneral of the MEA, with Zhou Enlai on 12 July 1961 that China was still in favour of not losing India as a partner, and unnecessarily opening a second front with it. R. K Nehru met Zhou Enlai as well as the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of China in Shanghai on July 16, for six long hours. On his return, he reported to Nehru on July 21 that (Noorani 2012a: 47): Zhou En-lai had maintained that China could not recognise the McMahon Line per se. His proposal envisaged its acceptance as part of a package. He complained that Nehru had never spoken of the Aksai Chin earlier and did so only in 1959 and 1960. The six points he had offered Nehru were a good basis. A solution must not be one-sided. There is a historical dispute on the McMahon Line, but despite it “we are ready to discuss it and are not making it a precondition.

R. K Nehru also recalled that during his 1961 visit, Zhou Enlai suggested the return of the Ambassadors to their respective posts. According to R. K Nehru (Noorani 2012b: 92, 94), The 12th July 1961 was the last dialogue between India and China. I came back with some proposals from the Chinese, which were good proposals from our viewpoint as a basis for

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further negotiations, or at least for the relaxation of tension. I remember Chou En-lai told me in July 1961 that, ‘Let us try to reduce tension first even if we cannot settle this border problem. If your top leaders call us expansionist, etc., and we will call you imperialists, it is not going to solve the problem.

From these assertions of Zhou Enlai, it could be ascertained that both Nehru and Zhou tried hard to keep a balance between friendship and the border dispute. The procrastinations on border issue by both the sides, initially aimed at not letting the issue be an irritant in friendly relations, became so hypersensitive amidst the international and domestic events in India and China that it dragged the two nations into a war in 1962. These events together with the toughening stance of Nehru on border after 1959 brought China’s “victim’s psychology” into full play and made China sceptical and suspicious of India’s actions. India’s mediation in the Korean crisis; Nehru Sending Krishna Menon to Geneva in 1954; India’s initiative in the Bandung Conference and so forth were now treated by China as “Nehru wanting India to play an important role at the international stage in the capacity of a big Asian Power (Shi 1993, 31).” The vicious attack even went to the extent that People’s Daily accused “ambitious Nehru” of establishing an India centric empire unprecedented in Indian history! It said that Once India is established “as the centre of economic and political activity” or when “the great empire conceived by Nehru comes into existence,” the small states would be doomed and become vassals of Nehru’s empire (People’s Daily 27th October 1962).

3 Negative Role of the Press and Opposition The negative role of the press in both the countries cannot be denied during the conflict. In India, as the press is not controlled by the government, the views on IndiaChina boundary conflict were mostly cacophonous. Instead of playing a positive role, the Indian press exerted undue pressure on government. For example, when Nehru invited Zhou for a summit in New Delhi, the Indian Express wrote on 16 February 1960 that before entering any negotiations, China must accept two prerequisites [accept McMahon Line and evacuate Aksai Chin] set by New Delhi. The entire opposition criticized Nehru in the Parliament and declared that if the Government was prepared to treat Chou En-lai as an honoured guest, the country was not, because “he is a murderer with the blood of Indian soldiers on his hands,” reported the New Leader on 21 March 1960. Praja Socialist Party and Jan Sangh decided to stage antiChinese demonstrations. Vajpayee, the former Prime Minister of India, ironically was at the forefront of organizing anti-China demonstrations. Hindustan Times wrote on 12 April 1960 that there was “little ground for negotiations.” The pressure on Nehru continued to build before the start of the negotiations. The divergent and hostile views in the Indian press and Parliament about China and its leaders, and sympathy shown to the Tibetans by the Indian press enraged China to the extent that on 30 April 1959 Renmin Ribao warned the “imperialists and Indian expansionists” in the following

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words: “You must stop at once; otherwise you will be crushed to pieces under the iron fist of 650 million Chinese people,” another extremist approach!

4 Possible Solutions It was not until Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua’s India visit in 1980 that India and China agreed to hold talks on the border issue. Between 1981 and 1987, 8 rounds of talks were held in Beijing and New Delhi alternatively. After Rajiv Gandhi’s path breaking China visit in 1988, a Joint Working Group (JWG) was especially established for the resolution of border issue. Between 1989 and 2003, 15 round of talks had been held. Besides, Special Representatives of the two countries appointed to look into the boundary issue during Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003 have held 22 rounds of talks. Furthermore, during Wen Jiabao’s 2005 India visit, an Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary was signed. Irrespective of all these mechanisms, and the parleys of 41 years, the border issue is still awaiting resolution. Nevertheless, the signing of the Agreements on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 1993, Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in 1996, and the Border Defence Cooperation Mechanism in 2013 has created an atmosphere that is conducive for the resolution of border problem; however, the unclearity of the LAC, both sides building infrastructure along the perceived LAC, has resulted in many stand-offs, bloody incidents and change in the staus quo. The incidents like Galwan (2020) will push both to the brink of war; therefore, a comprehensive and new approach at the highest political level is the need of the hour. Could there be a military solution? Is it advisable to go to the war and at what price? Three full wars and a limited-war with Pakistan, failed to solve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan, can a second war solve the much larger boundary issue with China? And, when both the countries desperately need to improve the living standard of their people, can they afford it? More importantly, for India, can she afford to open another front in the north? No, military solution will not solve the problem. It will aggravate the situation, and the fruits of four decades of parleys will go in vain. Can there be a solution in tradition and history? In fact, this is the solution both sides have been seeking ever since the unfolding of the border issue. Both sides submitted heaps of documents and maps in support of their claims and counterclaims as regards the territory in all the sectors. India argued that the Western sector was defined by the Tibet-Ladakh Treaty of 1684, 1842 Treaty between Kashmir and Ladakh on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other, and the Chinese response to the note of British India in 1899 (MEA 1961, 52–54). Since the treaty of 1684 is found in Ladakhi Chronicles only, China questions the existence of such a treaty. China also rejected the 1842 treaty by saying that it was an exchange of notes ensuring mutual non-aggression, nothing beyond that. As regards the British note of 1899, China argued that the proposal put forward by the British to “delimit” the boundary was

4 Possible Solutions

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not accepted by the Chinese government (MEA 1961, 12–17). Various boundary lines such as Johanson Boundary (1865), John Ardagh Boundary (1896) and McCartneyMacdonald Line (1899) are not acceptable to China as these have been drawn as a result of unilateral British surveys in the Western sector and are not delimited on the ground. As regards McMahon Line in the Eastern sector, it is again not acceptable to China as the entire Shimla Agreement was repudiated by China. As regards the traditional and customary boundary lines claimed by India and China, they are like two parallel lines that will never converge. If the Indian side asserts that the official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917 and 1919 showed the customary boundary exactly as depicted in official Indian maps of India today, China is quick to add that the Indian maps of 1938 published by the Survey of India and even 1951 edition of Nehru’s Discovery of India did not show the McMahon Line (Prasad 1992, 226). It could be discerned that no solution could be found if both India and China stuck to their customary lines and treaties. Therefore, it is time that both India and China talked less about history and try to find a solution that is acceptable to both the parties. Can the issue be resolved on the basis of watershed principles? The watershed principle of delimiting boundaries has so far remained the best one. Most of the boundaries have been demarcated on the basis of this principle. China has resolved its border dispute with Myanmar and Nepal on the basis of watershed. For that matter, most of the boundaries drawn by the British in the subcontinent, whether the Durand Line or the so-called McMahon Line of 1914, all follow the watershed principle. India-China boundary could be negotiated afresh on the watershed principle, and it would not be difficult to locate the watersheds from the tri junction of the India, China, Myanmar boundaries till the tri junction of India, China and Pakistan in Kashmir and solve the problem. But, will it be acceptable to both the parties in the face of actual position on the ground? It could be, if both the parties wish to do so; the area falling here and there after joint survey could be sorted out by negotiating the problem of their jurisdiction. However, going by the 26 December 1959 note of China to India, China might have reservations in accepting such an arrangement, for she has clearly said in the note that the watershed is not the sole or main international principle for delimitation of boundaries (SIBQ 1962, 51–52). Other geographical principles, such as river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary. More recently, during the Doklam stand-off in 2017, India too has questioned the watershed demarcation of the Sikkim–Tibet border, for the more precise satellite imageries are quite different from what has been demarcated on the ground in 1890. Could the LAC be the border? For the last four decades or so, the LAC has remained a de facto border between India and China. Meanwhile, both sides have initiated a number of confidence building measures (CBMs) along the border area. Two of the CBMs that are often treated as no war pacts between India and China and possible parameters for future resolution of the boundary issue are: the agreements signed during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narsinha Rao in 1993 and that during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s India visit in 1996. China finds it problematic to

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clarify the LAC, and moreover, she is confident that its accessibility through beefing up of rail, road and air connectivity in the border region has placed it in an extremely advantageous situation. The problem with the LAC as border could be problematic from the Indian point of view as the LAC prior to 1962 was different in the Western sector, whereas it remained unchanged in the Eastern sector. Initially, China had suggested a line on the basis of its 1956 map, but later added the Galwan Valley in the maps produced in 1960 and enforced its 1960 claim line. What about the East–West swap as a solution? It has been seen that in the course of time, China raised its pitch on the places that it considered belonged to her. As regards the Eastern sector, it was only during the 7th rounds of talks held in Beijing from 21–24 July 1987 that China’s stand on package deal went under a change. China no longer pointed to East–West swap. China rather told India that only if India made some adjustments in the Eastern sector, then only could China agree to some concessions in the Western sector (Wang 1998, 317). This author is of the view that China adopted such a position, as India insisted on a sector-to-sector resolution of the border contrary to China’s package deal that applied to all sectors of the border. By agreeing to a sector-to-sector approach, China lost the bargaining power, and it laid larger claims including Tawang in the Eastern sector. At present, some of the Chinese scholars feel that Tawang is the only irritant in the resolution of boundary problem. If India hand over Tawang, China would be willing to make greater compromises in the Western sector. This was explicitly expressed by the Chinese scholarship in Beijing prior to Hu Jintao’s India visit in November 2006 at the sidelines of a seminar organized by the Institute of Asia–Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. This author also presented a paper and enunciated the perspective discussed in this paper. Half a century later, if China is making claim to Tawang, it is contradicting Zhou Enlai’s approach of respecting the ground realities. India at present has come nearer to Zhou’s approach and has expressed its willingness to accept the package deal. If present leadership in China is willing to respect the deal proposed by its leaders, I believe the LAC as a border with minor compromises and accommodations from both the sides could be an option for a resolution. It would not be purely on the principle of watershed and neither on history and customary lines. This in other words is finding the solution on the basis of the “package deal” offered by Zhou Enlai to India in 1960. As revealed by a former Chinese ambassador to India (Zhang 2006, 380–81): Zhou’s proposal called for mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, by way of which China agreed to accept Himalayas as border between India and China in the Eastern Sector by way of accepting the McMahon Line, which was never accepted by the respective central governments of China. China agreed to hand over 90,000 square kilometres of disputed land to India and make major compromise. On the other hand, side, India would have agreed to Karakoram as a border between India and China in the Western Sector, and would have compromised on handing over 33,000 square kilometres of land to China.

This is perhaps the only Chinese source spelling out what the Chinese meant by a “package deal” albeit Zhou Enlai did hint to the same in his press conference on 25–26 April 1960 before his departure from India. During the Q and A session, Zhou Enlai told the reporter of The Hindu (CMOFA 1990: 278–79) that in the Eastern

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sector “we are willing to maintain status quo prior to the resolution of the border. We will not cross this line, moreover during the negotiations; we will never raise the territorial demands as a precondition…. As regards the western sector, we request India to adopt a similar approach to ours in the Eastern sector, this way we would not only be able to reserve our positions but also conduct negotiations.” To another reporter of Aaj, he said , “we have told Prime Minister Nehru several times that we would change our respective maps after the surveys and demarcation of the border. It has been testified by the Sino-Burmese Border Agreement, both sides have to correct their maps, if you unilaterally force your map on others, this is neither a friendly attitude nor equality.” To another reporter from Hindustan Times, Zhou still sounded optimistic about the bilateral relations when he pointed out that “there are no conflict of interests between Indian and Chinese people, we were not only friends in past, but would be friends for thousands and thousands of years in the future also. We would like to ascertain the Indian people that the Chinese government and its people do not have any territorial designs towards India or any country in China’s vicinity (CMOFA 1990: 282)”. The East–West swap still remains the best possible solution to bury the hatchet and rebalance India-China relationship geared towards the changing power dynamics in the region as well as the world. This is the only way to thrash out a framework for the resolution of the border as enshrined in the political parameters of 2005. If agreed, both countries need to conduct joint surveys and demarcate the entire border on the ground, this realizes the third step of the resolution as advocated by the Special Representatives of India and China. Once this is done, further discussions on the CBMs, such as deployment of forces or even demilitarization of the area, could be taken up. The 1962 war was an outcome of miscalculations and misjudgements from both India and China. As the balance of power shifts from Atlantic to Pacific and Asia– Pacific becomes the fulcrum of geopolitics and geo-economics, it is in the interest of both India to resolve the issue as soon as possible, so as positive energy is provided in fulfilling the dream of twenty-first century as an Asian Century. It is high time that India and China resolve its long pending issue of border with strong political will, for India-China friendly relations and border conflict cannot coexist. Therefore, the procrastinations in the resolution of border issue would continue to eclipse the realization of good neighbourliness between India and China.

References Appadorai, A., & Rajan, M. S. (1985). India’s foreign policy and relations. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. CAAS [Chinese Academy of Social Sciences]. (1987).《当代中国外交》Contemporary Chinese diplomacy. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publication. CMOFA [Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CCP’s Central Documentation Research Center]. (1990).《周恩来外交文选》Zhou Enlai on diplomacy. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.

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Deepak, B. R. (2005a). The 1857 rebellion and the Indian involvement in the Taiping uprising of China. In: Thampi, Madhavi (Ed.), India and China in the Colonial World, pp. 139–149. New Delhi: Social Science Press. Deepak, B. R. (2005b). India and China 1904–2004: A century of peace and conflict. New Delhi: Manak Publishers. FRUS. (1950). Foreign Relations of United States (Vol. VI), Washington: United State Government Printing Office. Gopal, S. (1976). Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography (Vol. 1). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gopal, S. (1984). Jawaharlal Nehru, A biography (Vol. 3). London: Jonathan Cape. Li, T. T. (1956). The historical status of Tibet. New York: King Crown Press, Columbia University. Maxwell, N. (1970). India’s China War. London: Jonathan Cape Limited. MEA. (1959). [Ministry of External Affairs]. Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreement signed between the Governments of India and China [White Paper I, II]. New Delhi: Government of India Press. MEA. (1961). [Ministry of External Affairs]. Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question. New Delhi: Government of India Press. Noorani, A. G. (2012a). A Nehru’s dissent. In: Frontline, 29 (13), 44–49 Noorani, A. G. (2012b). Fateful note. In: Frontline, 29 (14), 91–96 People’s Daily. (1962).《从中印边界问题再论尼赫鲁的哲学》Analysing Nehru’s Philosophy from Sino-Indian boundary question. (27 October 1962). Prasad, S. N. (1992) (Ed.). History of the conflict with China, 1962. New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, p. 2; also refer to Deepak (2005). Richardson, H. E. (1962). Tibet and its history. London: Oxford University Publication. Shakya, T. (1999). The dragon in the land of snow: A history of modern Tibet since 1947. London: Pamlico. Shi, B. (1993).《1962: 中印战争纪实》 1962: Records of Sino-Indian War. Beijing: Chinese Earth (Zhongguo Dadi) Publishers. SIBQ. (1962). The Sino-Indian boundary question. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Wang, H. (1998).《喜马拉雅山情节: 中印关系研究》The Himalayas sentiment: A study of Sino Indian relations. Beijing: China Tibetology Publication. Yang, G. (1992).《中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史》History of China’s struggle and resistance to the foreign invasion and interference in Tibet. Beijing: China’s Tibetology Publications. Zhao, W. (2004).《印中关系风云录: 1949–1999》Records of turbulences in Sino-Indian relations: 1949–1999. Beijing: Current Affairs (shishi) Publishers. Zhang, M. (2006).《跨喜马拉雅障碍: 中国寻求了解印度》Across the Himalayan gap: A Chinese quest for understanding India. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House.

Chapter 3

India-China and the Tibetan Conflict: Narratives from China, India and the Tibetan Émigré

1 Introduction Tibet, from the very beginning of twentieth century, was a bone of contention between China and the British. In order to open Tibet for trade, and more so to check the Russian advance, Britain invaded Tibet in 1904 and forced Lhasa Convention on Tibet. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, China tried to restore imperial authority in Tibet but was unsuccessful. The tripartite Simla [now Shimla] Conference of 1914 failed to bifurcate Tibet into an Inner and Outer Tibet, as China disagreed to the boundary alignment between Inner Tibet that would be within the Chinese jurisdiction and the Outer Tibet that would enjoy total autonomy. The McMahon Line, an offshoot of the Simla Conference was never recognized by subsequent Chinese governments as a valid borderline even if the draft resolution was initialled by Chen I-fan, the Chinese plenipotentiary. It was only after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that the sovereignty of China was restored in Tibet by way of signing the 17-Point agreement with Tibet. However, since India inherited the British privileges in Tibet, it became an irritant in Sino-Indian relations. The agreement of 1954 between India and China on Tibet in one way settled the Tibet question for good, for India accepted Tibet as a part of China for the first time. Adherence to the Simla Agreement and continuation of British legacies in Tibet anyhow would have been problematic. As China consolidated its stranglehold over Tibet, she moved closer to the Indian border. The ensuing accusations and counter accusations of transgression by both sides soon made the border tense; obviously, the Cold War climate and the internal and external factors also cast shadow on the bilateral relations. The Tibetan revolt and the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama to India in 1959 further deteriorated relations. The Kongka and Longju bloodshed on border indicated the gravity of the situation, which culminated into a brief border war between India and China in 1962. Whether China acknowledges or not, the Dalai Lama’s stay in India has been a continuous embarrassment for Beijing. It is also true that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan émigré worldwide have found greater support in the west and the USA for © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_3

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greater Tibetan autonomy. China’s abomination for the Dalai Lama and declaring him a “traitor,” “splitist” and the “mastermind” of troubles inside Tibet has won him more sympathizers and well-wishers across the world. Internally, the Dalai Lama is faced with some serious issues, as there appear definite fissures among the Tibetans in India and beyond on the question of autonomy and independence. Since there is an inherent India factor in the resolution of Tibet issue, India and China ought to discuss it at the highest level rather than dismissing it as a simple internal problem. It may be recalled that India refused to renew the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 on Tibet in 1962 upon its expiry after eight years. The rejection of the Chinese proposal for renewal implied that India no more recognized Tibet as an integral part of China. Since then, China became highly suspicious of India. It was only during Vajpayee’s 2003 China visit that India officially signed a declaration that accepted Tibet as an autonomous region of China. Irrespective of this declaration, China would continue to be sceptical of India, and the Tibetans in India as long as the border dispute are not settled for good. According to Wang (1998: 353) Tibet problem, “sometimes has attracted more attention of the people than the boundary issue itself,” therefore asserts Wang, “if this problem is not handled properly, it would be detrimental to the development of future Sino-Indian relations.” Given the significance of Tibet issue, it is pertinent to review the entire issue once again and analyse varying perceptions of each and every stakeholder in it. The perceptions and approaches in this study are based on the interviews of this author with former ministers in the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE), the leaders of Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), people from Tibetan Writers Association (TWsA), Tibetan Women Association (TWA) and representatives of Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) as well as the Tibetan émigré in India and ordinary Indians. In order to get the Indian perspective of the Tibet issue, Indian government officials, academicians as well as leaders or spokesperson of some political parties in India were interviewed. Some of the interviews were recorded but since the interviewees were not in favour of making the recordings public, they required the transcripts to be sent back to them and permitted to make only the transcripts public. To supplement the interviews, questionnaires survey among some Tibetan and Indians were also conducted to gauge their mindset as regards the issue.

2 Narratives from the Tibetan Émigrés Tibetan refugees (TR) began to enter India in 1959, after the failed Lhasa uprising and subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama into India; at that time, around 85,000 Tibetans came to India. The second exodus was witnessed in the early 1980s and continued till mid 1990s, during this period, 25,000 Tibetans arrived in India. According to the Ministry of Home Affair’s 2009 figures (IE 2018), the major concentration of Tibetan refugees is in Karnataka (44,468), Himachal Pradesh (21,980), Arunachal Pradesh (7,530), Uttarakhand (8,545), West Bengal (5,785) and Jammu and Kashmir

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(6,920). In the words of Karma Rinchen (TOI 2019), the secretary of security department of the TGIE, “On an average the number of Tibetans coming to India was around 3000 till 2008,” however, since then, especially after 2012, their numbers declined drastically, dropping by 97% in 2017. According to the 2009 survey of Tibetan in exile provided by the “Central Tibetan Administration”(CTA), there are approximately 128,014 Tibetan refugees worldwide. Of these, India hosts 94,203, Nepal 13,514, Bhutan 1,298 and rest of the world 18,999 (CTA 2010). According to Thempa Tsering, the then Delhi Bureau Chief of the Dalai Lama, “In India, Nepal and Bhutan, we have 53 settlements; of these we have 37 settlements in India. In India, the settlements are of three types—one is agriculture based, where the people depend on land for their livelihood; second is the agro-industrial settlement; and the third is totally handicraft. Majority of the population dwell in agricultural settlements. Of these, 5 are in Karnataka state, total population is about 40,000. The land provided for us is around 15,000 acres; this is how we came down from the foothills of the Himalayas to the south.” It has been argued that the Tibetans are relatively better off than other refugees. They have a “a functional government-in-exile” (Harrel 1999), a “well-established social and cultural support system” (Holtz 1998) and a Buddhist belief system that enables them to cope with the stress. It is true that they faced hardships when they landed first in India, could not acclimatize to the extreme temperatures of the subcontinent and many lost their lives. It is reported that in eight years’ time, a half of the 2000 Tibetan refugees died at a camp called Buxa near Bhutanese border (Lingi 1991: 10). This has been acknowledged by various interviewees such as Thempa Tsering and Dhondup Dorjee, former Vice President of the TYC. According to Mr. Thempa “We came out from Tibet in 1959, a family of five—two sisters, myself and my parents. One of my sisters died on the way, the other died as we arrived in India… After a few months, I do not remember the date exactly, we were in a camp in the foothill of the Himalayas, these were road construction camps, where my mother died; in a matter of few months, the family of five was reduced to two - myself and my father…”. Dhondup’s parents though young similarly were picked up from the road construction camps for schooling. Sixty years on, the Tibetan community in exile is one of the most successful and well off communities in the world. However, there are problems of assimilation into the host society as well. Misunderstanding still prevails between Tibetans and the locals on various fronts. Local Tibetan schools in the south do not teach local language in schools. Many young Tibetans have left settlements and are running flourishing businesses in various parts of the country. Religion is behind the Tibetan nationalism. The authority of the Dalai Lama has been a link with the past and collective identification of the Tibetans. Tibetan Children’s Villages (TCV), originally founded as an orphanage for Tibetan refugee children in 1960, have grown into an educational system and institution with 18 branch schools and approximately 14,500 students that instil patriotic education apart from introducing lessons in Tibetan history and culture. TCV serves as the primary school system for ethnic Tibetans in exile in India and Nepal. The political consciousness among the Tibetan youths is on the rise, especially since the formation

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of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). How do the Tibetan émigré view China, let us examine the following.

2.1 The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile It appears that within three to six years, the situation may be likely to change. We are now in a hopeful situation that hope is nearer. Therefore, I urge you that everyone should struggle continuously for our common interest as we have done in the past, and we should not lose our morale. In Tibet, not only the older people, but the younger people who accept communist ideology are opposed to Chinese aggression and thus have great moral strength to get Tibet back to Tibetans. The whole Tibetan people have one common goal, “the independence of Tibet.”—The Dalai Lama (1977).

These are the words the Dalai Lama uttered in 1977 during a speech in Bylakuppe, Karnataka, one of the largest Tibetan settlements in India. Of course, the macroenvironment outside India and the microenvironment inside India and China were different then. Ten years later in September 1987, while addressing the Members of the United States Congress, the Dalai Lama proposed a Five-Point plan for the resolution of Tibet issue. A year later, in June 1988, while visiting the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama presented yet another proposal as a framework for a negotiated solution to the Tibet problem.1 The new proposal improvised on the Washington Five-Point proposal. The crux of the new proposal was to turn Tibet into a “self-governing democratic political entity, in association with the PRC.” Presently, the Dalai Lama maintains that the Tibetans are not seeking independence but “genuine or meaningful autonomy” within the constitution of the People’s Republic of China. This has been overtly stated by the Dalai Lama over and again from various forums and reiterated by his representatives on various occasions. In the same vein, the Dalai Lama’s the then representative in Delhi Mr. Thempa Tsering reiterated that “If China wanted sovereignty over entire Tibet, and wanted Tibet to be a part of China, for the first time you are gaining legitimacy, now, you do not have to say China’s Tibet; therefore, in return you have to give what we have been demanding. And moreover, all we are demanding is under the framework of the constitution of China.” This has also been known as the so-called middle way approach of the Dalai Lama for the resolution of Tibet issue. In brief, the Dalai Lama demands “genuine autonomy” within the framework of the Peoples’ Republic of China. However, part one of the Strasbourg proposals that deals with the history of Tibet and deem Tibet 1 The proposals are 1) Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; 2) Abandonment of

China’s population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetan’s as a people; 3) Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 4) Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment and the abandonment of China’s use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste and 5) Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese people (Deepak 2005:445).

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as an independent country before 1949 is troublesome and has not gone well with the Chinese government. The second part is forward looking and deals with future of Tibet. China would remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy, but Tibet would be governed by its own constitution. The government of Tibet would comprise a popular elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature and an independent legal system. The other major hurdle is the demand to restore whole of Tibet known as greater Tibet. The greater Tibet or the so-called Cholka-Sum is the ethnic Tibet which consisted of three provinces, namely U Tsang, Kham and Amdo. When asked why the TGIE is asking for “Cholka-Sum,” Thempa said, “We cannot change our past, however, we can change our future. That is why he [the Dalai Lama] adopted a middle way approach, which is the autonomy for entire areas inhabited by the Tibetans under the Chinese constitution. The TAR has around 2.6 million Tibetans, but you have 3.4 million Tibetan people living outside the TAR. If we are accepting Chinese sovereignty to preserve our culture, our way of life, our heritage, how could we fulfill that when 3.4 million Tibetans incorporated into Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai stay out of autonomy?”.

2.2 Tibetan “Radical Organizations” Approach The Dalai Lama’s government in exile lists Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA), National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT), Gu-ChuSum Movement (GCSM) as the Tibetan NGOs in exile. Apart from these, there are other organizations such as Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN) and the Tibetan Writers Organization (TWO). These are the organizations that have more or less accepted independence of Tibet as their ultimate goal besides other aims and objectives. They have reservations about the middle way as offered by Dalai Lama in Strasbourg. Many of his followers, especially youths belonging to the above-mentioned organizations and NGOs feel that though the Dalai Lama is not cooperating with Chinese but has given up the struggle for independence. This was evident during the Dharamsala conclave held between 17 and 22 November 2008 when over 500 Tibetans from across the world deliberated on the future course of their struggle for identity. Even though the TYC advocates independence, but refrains from adopting violent means to achieve this goal. The former President of the TYC, Mr. Tsewang Rigzin, maintains that “complete independence of Tibet is the only solution. Tibetans have been living under occupation for nearly 60 years. Tibetans can now only survive with China as neighbours.” Similar views are held by other office bearers of the organization including the SFT cadres. “Our penultimate goal is independence for Tibet and that is our legitimate political right. Does not matter how unrealistic it sounds at moment, no matter how long it may take, China may be economically very sound, politically very influential, but the struggle we are in, is a people’s movement, and if we keep on compromising our demands or stand, then I think it will bog down very soon” remarks Dhondup, former Vice President of the TYC. Shibayan in the same vein says that “The ultimate goal

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of SFT is Independence of Tibet, because we believe, that is the only way to truly protect the unique culture and tradition of Tibet.” When asked do not you think it is unrealistic given the political clout and military strength of China, the SFT cadre remarked, “Did anyone ever believe that USSR will break up and the occupied territories will gain Independence. No, but today they are Independent Nations. When Nelson Mandela started the anti-apartheid movement, people said it is not possible, Nelson Mandela will rot in prison. He went on to become the President of South Africa.” While responding to terrorist charges labelled against TYC by China, the TYC president said, “The terrorism charge against the TYC is completely baseless.” “Before saying all this about the TYC, China should prove it. By saying all this, China can fool a few people inside its country but not the international community.” Contemplating on the future of Tibet, he said, “It is hard to predict the future, but violence is not an option for us. All our campaigns so far have been peaceful.” The TYC president said that the Tibetan cause had international support. “We will not be demoralized. Our further struggle will have a set of goals - the ultimate one is to attain complete independence.” The vice president also offered similar answer, “These are completely baseless statements. China must understand that by pronouncing such things, they are making mockery of themselves. International community laughs at them. I met various foreign embassy officials, no one acknowledges such things. And if there are some violent activities inside Tibet and China pronounce them as terrorist activities, international community still would not support them. When they equate TYC with Chechens and Al Qaida, they want to get the support of Russia and other countries in the United Nations. However, if China has any evidence of the TYC indulging in terror activities, they should come out with it. You see, when the prime minister of China blamed the Dalai Lama over Chinese television as a ‘liar’ and the ‘mastermind of the Lhasa riots’ in 2008, His Holiness openly challenged the Chinese that let’s have neutral international investigations and let the truth come out. We did not hear from China a word about this open challenge. They just issue statements and come out with all sorts of excuses to offset the pressure. We have come out clearly and spelt out our stand to these Chinese accusations. But the repression inside Tibet goes on; anyone they want to fix is levelled as a TYC operative, tortured and imprisoned. Recently, Sonam Thapa was sentenced for 10 years in prison for his alleged links with the TYC, his ‘political rights’ were taken off for 5 years.” Reacting to the Dalai Lama’s middle way approach, which seeks autonomy for Tibet under Chinese constitution, Rigzin said: “The middle-path approach is a laidback one. That’s pretty much what it is. There is nothing much we can achieve with it.” But the TYC president agreed that the Dalai Lama had done everything to get the Tibet issue resolved. “He has done everything on his part. He called the meeting because he realized that all this was not going anywhere. I don’t think he should step down.” When asked that in the aftermath of the Lhasa riots, the Chinese government seized a large number of offensive weapons, including 176 firearms, 13,013 bullets, 359 knives, 3504 kg of explosives, 19,360 detonators pieces and two hand grenades (China Daily 2008a, b), he said, “it’s all propaganda, had it been the case, how

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come not a single one of these weapons were used by Tibetans to kill Chinese in Tibet?” Refuting Chinese government’s claim that the TYC is imparting training to its cadres to penetrate into Tibet and create disturbances, the TYC member said, the workshop conducted by the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement and the March to Tibet before Olympic in China was simply to train the marchers on Gandhian principles of non-violent actions and was observed, attended and documented by numerous independent international media including CNN, BBC, Reuters, AFP, etc. Training session had nothing to do with “terrorism” and “guerrilla warfare” as claimed by the CCP. He further said that the “TYC in its history has not been involved in a single incident of terrorism. If China has even the slightest evidence of terrorist involvement by Tibetans, it must not refrain from presenting such evidence to the world and push for international investigations to prove these allegations.” Reasserting TYC’s goal to achieve Tibetan independence, he said “to regain Tibet’s Independence and restore the basic human rights and dignity of the Tibetan people is the legitimate right of the Tibetan people, and we will struggle for Tibet’s Independence till our last breath.”

2.3 Ordinary Tibetan Émigré and Ordinary Indian Approach In order to gauge the approach of ordinary Tibetans towards the Tibet issue, the author made use of a questionnaire that was circulated among the Tibetans as well as Indian students to solicit their views. The questionnaires encompassed all sorts of questions ranging from open and close ended questions; pick one and two questions to the Likert scale questions. In all, 34 Tibetan respondents returned the questionnaires. The questions asked varied from the historical status of Tibet to the unofficial Dharamsala–Beijing dialogue. At the outset, most of the respondents agreed that Tibet issue is a factor in the development of India-China relations. Majority also agreed to the fact that the resolution of the Tibet issue and the border is linked, hence the majority believed that the resolution of the issue is detrimental to the development of healthy relations between India and China. The majority of the Indian respondents viewed the presence of the Dalai Lama in India a stumbling block in bilateral relations. The majority agreed that the resolution of Tibet and border issue will greatly improve the bilateral relations. Majority of the Tibetan respondents viewed that Tibet was an occupied country by China. The Indian respondents, however, greatly differed to the Tibetan view; almost 40% of the respondents agreed that Tibet was a part of China albeit 60% took the line of the majority Tibetan exiles. 100% of the Tibetan exiles believed that Tibet was an independent country historically; whereas, 40% Indian while agreeing that it was an independent country, however, also subscribed to the viewpoint (20%) that it was part of a British India! This approach of the Indians perhaps is an indicator of their ignorance towards history and the facts. As regards the authority of the Dalai Lama, majority of the Tibetan exiles treated him as both religious and political leader; whereas, majority of the Indian respondents treated him as a spiritual leader. The Tibetan respondents squarely blamed the Lhasa

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riots as an outcome of the Chinese policies in Tibet; whereas, the Indian response was varied. A whopping 84% agreed with the Tibetan view, while 16 and 4% also attributed these to an incitement by the west and the Dalai Lama to spoil China’s image, respectively. As far as the TYC being a terror organization is concerned, most of the respondents from both the sides refuted such a character of the organization. They ridiculed China for having blamed the organization when asked to elaborate and responded unanimously that the Tibetan movement was a non-violent movement. When asked about the Western support to the movement, 80% of the Tibetans admitted that the movement was supported by the West, but the sizeable 20% also showed the indifference. To a question whether the Tibetan movement was supported by India or not, the majority of the respondents said NO but ascribed to the Indian sympathy towards the Tibetans. As regards the question whether India should support the movement or not, the majority of the Tibetans answered YES and sought a proactive approach from India. 30% of the Indian respondents, however, did not favour the country supporting Tibetan movement. When asked whether the Tibetans should leave India or not, the Tibetan respondents answered that majority of them would prefer to go back to Tibet once a settlement is reached between China and the Dalai Lama. None of them agreed to the view that they should stay back and assimilate into India. The Indian respondents, however, gave a varied response; while 50% favoured return of the Tibetans immediately, 50%, however, complied with the Tibetan answer. When discussed the assimilation issue with the Indians, they vehemently opposed their settlements in Arunachal. The Tibetans equally did not favour the idea of settling down in Arunachal given the preference between their return to Tibet and Arunachal. As regards the question of autonomy and independence, 40% said they would settle for autonomy, while a whopping 60% demanded independence. In fact, the former also favoured independence, however, agreed to the autonomy settlement reached by the Dalai Lama. Finally, as regards the question of establishing a mechanism between India and China over the Tibet issue, majority of the Tibetans spurned the idea, however, agreed to it if they be made party to the mechanism. Surprisingly, the Indian respondents viewed that such a mechanism would not help the resolution of the issue; only 10% of the respondents agreed to the establishment of such a mechanism. Most of the respondents subscribed to the viewpoint that Tibet was still a future flashpoint between India and China if the issue is not handled properly and the border resolved and demarcated.

3 The Chinese Narrative China has all along criticized and spurned the Dalai Lama’s middle way approach. Qin Gang, the then spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged in one of his press conferences that on the one hand the Dalai preaches the so-called middle way and nonviolence, on the other hand, he is giving free hand to the radical organization “Tibetan Youth Congress” to engage in sabotage, rioting and bloodshed. The aim

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of both these methods adopted by the Dalai Lama is to seek Tibetan independence (Renmin Ribao, March 18, 2008). Reiterating Qin Gang’s remarks, An Caidan, a researcher from China’s Tibetology Research Centre in Beijing said that the myth of Dalai’s middle path is exposed in the following five points: 1. The Dalai clique maintains that “historically and culturally, Tibet is an independent country, not part of China.” 2. The Dalai Lama insists that the Chinese army and military installations should be withdrawn from Tibet, and that the status of Tibet be deliberated in an international conference and Tibet be declared as a “zone of peace” and a “buffer.” 3. That Tibet be allowed to maintain diplomatic relations with other countries or international organizations; 4. The Dalai Lama insists on including 2.4 million square kilometres of Tibetan inhabited areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces in the socalled Greater Tibet enjoying “genuine/meaningful autonomy” that is to say he wants to overthrow the socialist system and regional autonomy of all these areas and wrest the control of “greater Tibet” solely in his own hands. 5. Finally, he maintains that all non-Chinese (read Han Chinese) be thrown out from the so-called greater Tibet. Therefore, if a government allows one of its regions to establish diplomatic relations with other countries or international organizations and withdraws its armed forces from its own territory, could it be called a sovereign nation? According to Qiu et al. (2008), the real motive of “genuine autonomy” could be best described as “sanbuqu” (three-step strategy) to secure Tibetan independence: 1. To secure his return to Tibet through negotiations, for the Dalai clique has failed to achieve any success irrespective of engaging in independence activities for decades from outside China. In order to “directly and more effectively” command the pro-independence activities, it is important to return home first. 2. Second step is to gain political power through “genuine autonomy.” 3. And finally realize “Tibetan independence” through a “referendum”. China has spurned the Dalai Lama’s proposals or the demand for ‘genuine autonomy’ and described them as a ploy to seek independence, semi-independence or even independence in disguised form, for according to China the charter of the Tibetan in exile promulgated in 1991 maintains that efforts shall be made to transform a future Tibet into a Federal Democratic Self-Governing Republic and a zone of peace throughout her three regions and the Dalai Lama as a head of such a future entity. Furthermore, the TGIE in China’s view has continued to expand; in September 2006, the “government in exile” set up seven ministries such as the “Ministry of the Interior,” “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Information,” “Ministry of Religion and Culture,” “Ministry of Education,” “Ministry of Finance,” “Ministry of Health” and “Ministry of Security”; and the Dalai clique has continued to sing the so-called Tibet’s national anthem and hoist the so-called Tibetan national flag, a clear sign of defiance and seeking independence (Qiu et al. 2008). This perspective of China on Tibet and the Dalai Lama has remains intact even now.

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4 Narratives from India With the end of the Cold War and defrosting of the relations between India and China in the late 1970s, India lowered its pitch on Tibet issue. It publically stated Tibet as a part of China, however, it was not until Vajpayee’s 2003 China visit that India officially signed a declaration that accepted Tibet as an autonomous region of China.

4.1 Tibet Policy of the Indian Government In the 1960s and 1970s, India gave preferential treatment to Tibetan refugees over others. This was mainly because the Dalai Lama sought shelter for himself and his people; China sending forces into Tibet, and later the border conflict, played a key role in this. As a result, India allowed the Dalai Lama to establish a Tibetan government in exile, based at Dharamsala, albeit India did not and has not officially recognized it. Although foreigners cannot own property in India, the Indian government provided land and housing to establish Tibetan farming settlements in different regions of India. The Indian government granted Tibetan refugees, who entered India in the 1970s, Indian Residency (IR) Certificates for purposes of identification, employment and domestic travel. The Indian government also pronounced that it has no obligation to assist refugees; it chose to grant these early Tibetan refugees services and opportunities that no other group enjoyed. Since the second flux of the Tibetans that continued till mid 1990s, the Indian government refused to grant them new land, which led to overpopulation, unemployment and food shortages for the refugees in the settlements. At times, it was also reported in the Indian press that there were incidents of Indian government returning to China small groups of refugees trying to enter India. India, in an attempt to improve its relations with China declined assistance to the Tibetan refugees, for China viewed such assistance as Indian support for an independent Tibet and as an affront to Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet. The decreasing assistance is also aimed at stopping the overpopulation of Tibetan settlement. Although India continued to admit Tibetan refugees, the government has denied both IR and identification certificates to the new entrants. This has created serious problems because of employment, international travel and naturalization hinges on possession of these documents. This fact is testified by Thempa Tsering who says that “very few have acquired Indian citizenship. No doubt Indian constitution says that if you are born and brought up in India you are entitled for Indian citizenship, however, most of the Tibetans upon attaining an age of 16 apply for IR (popularly called as residential certificates), and once you apply for IR you lose the chance to acquire Indian citizenship. There are a few, who have acquired Indian citizenship, but, by and large, I think over 94% of the Tibetans hold IR certificates.” Relations with the Tibetan refugees must be examined under two aspects. The first is at the governmental level, and the other at the level of community. As regards

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the former, the Indian government neither supports Tibet’s autonomy nor recognizes the Tibetan government in exile. However, non-recognition to the TGIE on the one hand and acceptance of the TR influx have put the Government of India in a difficult situation. On the one hand, it would continue to like improve its diplomatic and trade relations with China, as these are detrimental to find a resolution to the outstanding problems between India and China; on the other hand, since the Dalai Lama operates from Dharamsala and has been an irritant in building political trust between India and China, India is trying to strike a delicate balance between China and the Tibetan émigré in India. Though India has pledged China that it will not allow Tibetan émigré including the TGIE to engage in anti-China activities, however, owing to its political system, it has been extremely difficult for India to curb and put across the board ban on each and every Tibetan protest or activity in India. Like China, India also upholds the viewpoint that the settlement of the IndiaChina border and Tibet issue is interlinked. Unless there is an overall resolution of the border problem, the issue of TGIE and Tibetan émigré in India would persist. Seen in this light, China’s repeated claims of Arunachal Pradesh have been construed by India as procrastination of or no early settlement of the boundary question. It also believes that unless and until the incidents like 3.14 keep on occurring in Tibet, China would not be confident of its full control over Tibet, hence the Chinese thinking of not solving the border with India. India, however, believes that it is high time that China settles the border with it and posits that a post-Dalai Lama situation may become more radicalized, unpredictable and even violent. In recent years, India has taken some measures to review its Tibet policy. The first move was made in as stated above in 2003 during Vajpayee’s China visit, when India signed a declaration stating Tibet is an autonomous region of China. Secondly, India has been avoiding reference to Tibet at the highest level; this has been manifested in the statement issued at the end of Indian prime minister’s visit to China, whereby India avoided referring to Tibet. However, if we see India’s official statement on 15 March 2008 in the wake of Lhasa riots, India expressed its hope that all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet through dialogue and non-violent means. It is also understood that Indian government asked China not to use force and sort out issue with dialogue. Furthermore, Indian government does not buy the Chinese argument that the Dalai Lama is the mastermind of Lhasa riots or any other turmoil inside Tibet. This is evident from the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement that the Dalai Lama is a man of non-violence. It is also a manifestation of the fact that India does not endorse vituperative denunciation of the Dalai Lama by China. Nonetheless, as and when the relationship has deteriorated as it was in the wake of China’s technical hold on the issue of Pak-based terrorist Massod Azhar in 2016, it was reported that Dolkun Isa, a German national whom China has declared “global terrorist” was issued electronic visa for attending the Interethnic and Interfaith Leadership Conference in Dharamsala, which brought together Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, Taiwanese, Falun Gong leaders as well as leaders of the Hong Kong Umbrella Protest movement, the event eventually did not take place. China protested fiercely the news of Isa.

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As regards relations with the Tibetan refugees at community level, since the Tibetans in India live in relative isolation from local people in order to preserve their distinct religion and culture, there is not a very intimate relationship between the two. Generally speaking, the interaction between the Tibetans and the locals has been harmonious, except a few incidents here and there. Recently, owing to better living conditions of the Tibetans comparing most of the locals, the Tibetans in India have been facing a gradual rejection, as they see the Tibetans as one who have marginalized them from the employment in tourism and some other sector. The locals also feel threatened by the demographical and cultural impact of the refugees. It has come to the surface that many Tibetans are buying up large tracts of land through “benami transactions” [land and property purchases in false names of other persons, who do not pay and merely lend their name, while the real title vests with another person who actually purchased the property and is the benefiting owner]. This may have arisen to the fact that foreigners buying land and property in Himachal and some other Indian states are banned by the local government.

4.2 The Mainstream View The mainstream view in India is somewhat baffled about China’s rebuff to the Dalai Lama’s posture to China and the outcome of the beleaguered dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala. General perception of the Indian public towards the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan émigré has been sympathetic and believes that now, since the Dalai Lama has committed himself to the middle way approach, and no more seeks independence or separation from China, why China should have problems with the autonomy he is asking for Tibet? Moreover, when he is seeking autonomy for Tibet within the constitution of China and is ready to put defence, currency and foreign relations in the hands of the People’s Republic, why should such a strong China worry about such a tiny population of Tibetans creating trouble? Even if a small number of Tibetans upon their return wish to create trouble, China’s military muscle can easily put down such a turmoil or disturbances. Therefore, the mainstream Indian viewpoint would like the Dalai Lama to go back to Tibet. This popular viewpoint of an average Indian has not been reflected in the official policy of the Government of India, for India considers Tibet as an internal matter of China and wishes the parties concerned find a reasonable solution to the problem. The mainstream Indian also buys the theory of “cultural genocide” in Tibet. They are perhaps heavily influenced by the TGIE efficient propaganda, and especially by the on and off Tibetan protests, demonstrations, sit ins, hunger strikes and some extreme steps taken by the Tibetans such as self-immolation particularly at the time when some high-level Chinese leader visits India. Secondly, the frequent baton charge by the Indian police on Tibetan protestors and its instant coverage in the Indian media such as television and newspapers has inevitably influenced the thinking of the mainstream Indians about the Tibetans situation in India. The use of force on protestors generally does not go well with the general populace as they have never

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considered the Indian police as a friend of the people and think that the Indian police has continued to be an instrument of force with the government ever since the colonial days. It is a matter of shame that the colonial police law is still functional and not amended or changed till date. Of course, there are people who believe that the protesting Tibetans should be beaten and taken away by the police, for they are creating troubles for the Indian government as well as for the public by demonstrating time and again. However, such voices are very few and generally are not visible. The mainstream view in India is also heavily influenced by the general misperceptions, misunderstandings, as well as by recent history of India-China relations, especially the 1962 war. Majority of the Indians believe China betrayed India in 1962 by invading Indian territory; therefore, what China says is not to be trusted. China is seen as a very pragmatist, but suspicious country. Moreover, other negative images of China such as the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen incident reassure public that if the Chinese government can kill and torture their own people, the minorities in China could not be better off. The villainous image of China is further reinforced by her political and military support to India’s neighbours such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. Most people believe that half the trouble has been created by China in the subcontinent. Other newspaper reports such as China corroborating with Pakistan on Kashmir, stalling India’s membership to the UNSC, NSG etc. bodies and vetoing and saving the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its masterminds from being declared a terror organization and terrorists has confirmed China’s unfriendliness towards India. However, the misunderstanding also root from the poor understanding of China by Indian people about its culture and civilization; national conditions; minorities, as well as its relations with India and the border war itself. In the same vein, the mainstream Indian is also ignorant about the concept of greater Tibet demanded under autonomy by the Dalai Lama, thus fails to appreciate the perceptions originating from China.

4.3 Other Perceptions The rightist perspective could be attributed to people like Fernandes and his supporters who remain diehard supporter of Tibetan independence. With the demise of Fernandes, this perspective has lost the steam, however, has been supported and kept alive by other right wing organizations such as Abhinava Bharata, Rashtritya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). According to them, a Tibet in ferment makes India’s Himalayan frontiers unstable and insecure. As a democratic country that is hosting such a large number of Tibetans, India has a legitimate interest in what happens in Tibet. Since developments in Tibet have direct consequences for India, Tibet cannot be, as the left parties in India make out, just an internal matter of China. The BJP, though does not rake Tibet issue in public and in its official pronouncements, however, reflects them openly when asked about. “We handed over Tibet to China on a platter,” says a former BJP MP. This, he says,

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is not just the question of a democratic cause. It affects India’s interests directly: The Chinese have set up missile bases and deployed a 500,000 strong army contingent in Tibet. They are also dumping nuclear waste there. Rabi Ray, former Lok Sabha speaker and vociferous pro-Tibet lobbyist, agrees. “What happened, to the resolution passed after the Chinese aggression of 1962, which said we won’t rest ‘till we get back all the occupied land?’” Rigzin speaks in somewhat similar tone when he argues, “Independent Tibet, was an effective buffer state with China, with a 4,000-km border on the Indian side. Before the Chinese invasion, this was manned by a few Indian policemen armed with sticks. Today, India spends Rs. 60 crore daily to guard the same border.” No wonder Narendra Modi invited Sangey, the Tibetan Prime Minister in exile for his swearing in ceremony in 2014. However, refrained from doing the same when he was sworn in as the prime minister of India for the second time in 2019. It is perhaps the student wing, the Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarth Parishad (ABVP) of the BJP that is more aggressive on Tibet issue. They even talk about making Tibet free of China. These are the people who are most vocal in pronouncing human right violations in China and the atrocities China is perpetrating on the Tibetans. The outfit upholds that India does itself a disservice by not standing up to China over its treatment of Tibet. If India wishes to be considered a great power, it needs to display a greater degree of independence and not kowtow to China. With rapid economic growth, a substantial military establishment and robust political institutions, India should stop behaving in a subservient fashion and forthrightly stand up and defend certain inalienable rights of the Tibetans. They do not understand why India has been willing to publicly and abjectly reassure China that the Tibetan exiles will not be allowed to engage in any meaningful political activity. According to them, appeasement of China by India has not succeeded in moderating China’s behaviour. If India cracks down on the peaceful Tibetan protestors, the act is fundamentally contrary to the principles of a liberal democracy that enshrines the right of public political dissent, argues one of the activists. In history, thousands of Indian pilgrims have made pilgrimages to Mount Kailash and Mansarovar Lake in Tibet without needing any permission from the Chinese authorities. If China can lay claim to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds of its cultural, historical and spiritual links with Tibet, the case for India’s claim to Kailash–Mansarovar region on similar reasoning is equally sound maintains one of its cadres. With China’s aggressive posturing at India-China border, incidents such as Doklam and Galwan have given such a perspective more traction and acceptability almost becoming the mainstream view. The centrist perspective on Tibet is perhaps best reflected by the Congress. Unlike BJP and its likes, it does not talk of aggressive posturing against China and neither does it rake the 1962 resolution, albeit passed by its own party. It, however, emphasizes that while it firmly upholds the principles of supporting the territorial integrity of China, and non-interference in its internal affairs, but maintains that peace and stability of multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural societies requires dialogue and accommodation within a democratic framework. Ethnic and separatist problems require political solutions that give every citizen the confidence of being an equal

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stakeholder in the state. It expects that China would put in place policies that would stabilize Tibet and give the Tibetan émigré in India and elsewhere the confidence that they can return to their homeland. The leftist view generally considers Tibet issue an internal matter of China and demands the government and other political parties not to rake it up and does not allow the Tibetans to carry out any anti-China activity in India. However, the leftist also, especially the classical and more radical leftists call for self-determination as a right of all minority nationalities not only in China but also in India. The leftists in India are generally pronounced stooges of the communist countries; their views generally do not find much appeal among the large sections of the population. In fact, their opposition to the India-US nuclear deal was construed as their advocacy for China’s policy as regards the deal itself. Yet another view could be seen in the form of anti-Tibetan lobby in India, albeit very tiny. These are the people who have been directly affected by the Tibetan success story in trade and business. They feel that it is due to the very presence of the Tibetans in the region or vicinity that their business in service sector including hotels, tourism, catering, restaurants, handicraft shops have been affected. Though the Tibetans born in these regions are fluent in local languages but they hardly mix around with the locals. On occasions the outbursts or clashes between the Tibetans and locals have snowballed into grave problems but are very few and not alarming. As regards the Tibetan refugees in settlements, they are aloof and go on to their businesses as usual creating less troubles for the locals. On the contrary, the settlement population has created demands for many local products including fish and meat. In settlements, the TRs have not fringed upon the rights of the locals as the land allocated to them was waste land quite away from local population.

5 Major Differences and Contradictions Between India and China on Tibet Though India considers Tibet as an internal issue of China, China, however, cannot ignore the reality of the Dalai Lama and his supporters being settled in India as refugees. Moreover, since Tibet issue is directly related to the resolution of border issue, it makes it even more sensitive and complex. Some of the major differences and contradictions are listed in the following table.

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Major differences and contradictions between India and China on Tibet question India

China

1

Tibet a part of China

China is apprehensive about India’s acceptance and still believes that India is continuing the British policies in Tibet Sui (2007: 305); “legal significance” to India’s stand on Tibet came only during Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003

2

It is for improvement of India-China relation, and for resolution of the border issue that India accepted Tibet as a part of China, with an understanding that China would recognize McMahon line in the Eastern sector

After signing the 1954 agreement on Tibet, China did not recognize the McMahon Line; willing to accept the Line, provided India made more concessions

3

India shares rich cultural bonding with Tibet

China considers this as interference in its internal relations, an attempt to separate Tibet from China, and realize the idea of strategic “buffer zone.”

4

The Dalai Lama and all other Tibetan émigrés are refugees in India. They have fled to India owing to various problems in Tibet

They were and are being instigated by the TGIE or a foreign country to engage in the separatist and pro-independence activities

5

Does not allow the Dalai Lama and his followers to engage in anti-China and violent activities, albeit India cannot ban public rallies of the protest groups owing to its political system, which China is not willing to understand and accept

Just an eyewash, China is dissatisfied with India’s commitments on the anti-China activities of the Tibetans, for India’s implicit support to the so-called Tibetan government in exile and the Tibet independence activities have continued (Sui 2007)

6

The Dalai Lama, a non-violent man and the spiritual leader of the Tibetans

Mastermind of all the attacks and disturbances in Tibet, a separatist political leader in the guise of a Buddhist cloak (continued)

5 Major Differences and Contradictions …

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(continued) Major differences and contradictions between India and China on Tibet question India

China

7

India wants the Dalai to return to Tibet with his followers

China attaches various conditions before his return to Tibet; rake historical status of Tibet; and even says that India is using the Dalai Lama as a “card” to gain territorial gain. At occasions willing to accept the Dalai back in Tibet but not the émigrés

8

Tibet issue is a factor in India China relation

China though acknowledges this assertion but not willing to negotiate the Dalai or Tibet question with India

9

Arunachal Pradesh part of India Does not accept Arunachal as a part of India. The Dalai Lama wants to compromise on or have sold Southern Tibet (Arunachal) to India

10

Tawang which lies south of the Tawang belongs to Tibet and McMahon Line is part of should be returned to China for Arunachal, a province of India the resolution of boundary issue

11

India not responsible for Western aid to the Dalai Lama’s TGIE; its Tibet policy has got nothing to do with the West

India in tandem with the Western forces raising the Dalai Lama and his followers in India, otherwise “Why is it that an illegal organization of Tibetan exiles in India can survive for so long? Why is it that they find so many sympathizers around the world?” China also fears that there is a tremendous pressure on the Indian government from the West, especially the USA as regards formulating its Tibet policy

12

No comments on TYC, but people in India maintain that it is ridiculous to categorize the TYC and other Tibetan NGOs as terror organizations at par with the Al Qaida

TYC a terror outfit; other Tibetan NGOs as radical organizations aiming to split China

(continued)

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(continued) Major differences and contradictions between India and China on Tibet question India

China

13

So far, no official comments on the “genuine autonomy” of the Dalai Lama for resolution of Tibet issue; however, most people in India feels that this is the best compromise formula for settling the issue

“Genuine autonomy” of the Dalai Lama is tantamount to seeking independence, semi-independence or disguised independence

14

So far, no official comments on Does not subscribe to the idea “greater Tibet”, however, feels of Greater Tibet and sees the that the idea is impractical ideas as a ploy of the Dalai Lama to seek independence for all Tibetan inhabitants in China

15

India hopes that all those Doors open for negotiations involved in the issue [China with conditions; opposed to the and the Dalai Lama] will work idea of India being a facilitator to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet through dialogue and non-violent means. Does not rule out the possibility of a facilitator in the dialogue though not spelled out in public

16

China going back on Deng’s China says Deng never made statement as regards Tibet that such remarks all problems except independence could be discussed; it makes India apprehensive that China changes its policy and words as and when they suit it

17

Tibet is still a flashpoint for future trouble for India and China

Tibet is peaceful, all the people are living in harmony, and if there is a trouble, it has been perpetrated by the Dalai Lama from India

18

The Dalai Lama commands respect inside Tibet and beyond; the deal reached between him and China would be respected by all Tibetans

The Dalai does not represent Tibetan people inside China proper and Tibet

19

The situation in Tibet could The Tibetan issue will die with become more volatile with the the death of the Dalai Lama death of the Dalai Lama; China selecting a Dalai Lama will not settle the issue (continued)

5 Major Differences and Contradictions …

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(continued) Major differences and contradictions between India and China on Tibet question India 20

China The riots/revolt/uprising in Tibet and other Tibetan inhabited areas is the outcome of ethno-sociopolitical and economic problems faced by the Tibetans

“Masterminded” by the Dalai Lama from India

5.1 The Dalai Lama’s Reincarnation and Tibet Issue On 18 March 2019, the Reuters published an exclusive interview of the Dalai Lama in which the Dalai asserted that “In future, in case you see two Dalai Lamas come, one from here, in free country, one chosen by Chinese, then nobody will trust, nobody will respect (the one chosen by China). So that’s an additional problem for the Chinese! It’s possible, it can happen.” On 19 March, Geng (2019), the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to it by saying that: Reincarnation of living Buddhas, as a unique institution of inheritance in Tibetan Buddhism, comes with a set range of rituals and conventions. The Chinese government implements the policy of freedom of religious belief. The reincarnation system is respected and protected by such legal instruments as Regulations on Religious Affairs and Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas. The institution of reincarnation of the Dalai Lama has been in existence for several hundred years. The 14th Dalai Lama himself was found and recognized following religious rituals and historical conventions and his enthronement was approved by the then central government. Therefore, reincarnation of living Buddhas including the Dalai Lama must comply with Chinese laws and regulations and follow religious rituals and historical conventions.

The statement emphasizes two things (Deepak 2019). One, that the incarnation of the Dalai Lama must follow the rituals and historical conventions. And two, it would be decided by such legal instruments as “Regulations on Religious Affairs and Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas.” Now, as regards the rituals and conventions, these were laid down by the Qing Emperor Qianlong, once his 170,000 strong forces defeated the Gurkhas in the aftermath of the latter’s invasion of Tibet in 1791. Among these, the most prominent and often quoted by the Chinese is the “29-Article Ordinance for More Effective Governance of Tibet” which stipulated that the Amban or the Qing imperial resident commissioner in Tibet will enjoy the same status as the Dalai and the Panchen; the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen and various Hotogtu Rinpochs must follow the procedure of drawing lots from the golden urn under the supervision of the Ambans and the same must be reported to the imperial court for approval; a new uniform currency bearing title of the emperor was issued; traders were required to carry a passport;

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all communication with neighbouring states was to be conducted through Ambans. Some of the Chinese scholars, for example, Li Tieh-Tseng in his book The Historical Status of Tibet traces real Chinese sovereignty over Tibet from 1791 contrary to most of the scholars tracing it from Yuan Dynasty. As regards the “legal instruments,” the “Regulations on Religious Affairs and Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas” was issued by the State Administration for Religious Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on 18 July 2007 and went into effect from 1 September 2007. These provide the legal basis for China rejecting any incarnation announced outside Tibet. In all, there are 14 articles in these “regulations” however, article 2 remains most crucial as it stipulates that: Reincarnating living Buddhas should respect and protect the principles of the unification of the state, protecting the unity of the minorities, protecting religious concord and social harmony, and protecting the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. Reincarnating living Buddhas should respect the religious rituals and historically established systems of Tibetan Buddhism, but may not re-establish feudal privileges which have already been abolished. Reincarnating living Buddhas shall not be interfered with or be under the dominion of any foreign organisation or individual.

The two requirements flagged by Geng Shuang make it clear that China will designate its own Dalai Lama and any name proposed by the Dalai Lama or any organization outside Tibet would be deemed illegal. The statements regarding the incarnation by the Dalai Lama and their castigation by China are not new. The Dalai Lama has been saying many things as regards his reincarnation. For example, he has been saying that the issue of reincarnation would be decided by his believers; that there would be no Dalai Lama after his death; or rather a beautiful maiden may be his reincarnation, or his reincarnation would be outside China, and even outside the planet. China has castigated the Dalai Lama’s such remarks as nonserious and laughable. It has argued that since the Dalai is ageing, and because the prospect of the “Tibetan independence” seems bleak, therefore, he has indulged in such talks. Zhu Weiqun, Director of the Ethnic and Religious Commission of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has termed the Dalai Lama’s remarks on reincarnation as “extremely non-serious.” In 2011, while reacting to the Dalai Lama’s announcement of retirement, Qiangba Puncog, the then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s People’s Congress had said that the Dalai’s retirement is “absolutely meaningless.” He said, “Since no country recognizes his self-declared ‘Tibetan Government in Exile’, whatever he does in his illegal political organization is nonsense and Tibet will not be affected at all.” Puncog admitted that the “Dalai Lama, as a Living Buddha and religious leader, does have some influence on his believers,” but also said that “his death is expected to have a minor impact on Tibet, the overall social situation will remain stable, and we are prepared to handle some minor turbulence here and there after his death.” (Deepak 2019).

6 The Future of Tibetan Movement

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6 The Future of Tibetan Movement After the failed Tibetan uprising in 1959, the Tibetan refugees were of the impression that they would be gone for a few months or maybe a few years, but return to Tibet soon. Six decades on they are still in various settlements in India, Tempa and Chopel are lucky to be in the TGIE leading a better life. Though all speak about the generosity showered on them by the Indian government, but there is a sense of frustration in almost all the Tibetan émigré in India. There have been different approaches towards the middle way of the Dalai Lama and are mulling over the possible directions the Tibetan movement will take after the death of the Dalai Lama. There is a sense of despair among the Tibetans when they hear their supreme leader saying that “he had failed in his efforts to negotiate a “middle way” with China by asking for real autonomy, rather than independence.” According to the perspectives coming from various Tibetan émigrés, there could be the following possibilities as regards the Tibetan movement in future: One, the TGIE would continue to be an umbrella organization for Tibetan émigré, and it would continue to engage China into a dialogue according to various sections of the Tibetans including the radical organizations. Most of the Tibetans are likely to follow the initiatives taken by the TGIE as it would continue to represent them in exile. There are various reasons for such as the financing, management and operations of the major settlements and educational institutes in exile; the elected representatives of the TGIE would continue to call for a non-violent struggle as a part of its official policy; its role in uniting the cross sections of Tibetan people. The TGIE parliament had passed a resolution in 1992 that calls for total independence of Tibet through non-violence. The TGIE would continue to pursue dialogue with the Chinese government until something extraordinary happens inside or outside Tibet. In the words of Thempa Tsering, “Tibetan movement will not die, that is for sure. If China thinks that the movement will die with the death of the Dalai Lama, then I think it is a wishful thinking. Tibetan institutions will still follow the course of non-violence. I am not denying the possibility of more fronts but the Tibetans in exile would continue to follow the non-violent struggle. Whatever violent struggle happens inside Tibet, how should the TGIE and India be responsible for that. You see in desperation people can take to anything, we have a saying in Tibet that in desperation you jump uphill. These are some possibilities, but I do not support such activities.” Two, the TYC, TWA, SFT and others would continue to engage in protests such as demonstrations, human chains, rallies, sit ins and hunger strikes to keep the momentum of the movement on the one hand and continue to arouse international support and sympathy on the other. Largely, the direction of their movement will be non-violent as indicated by various factions in their interviews. In the words of Dhondup, “The most important thing for us is to continue the movement. Definitely we are very optimistic, we may not achieve our goal in short run, but there would definitely be a unified movement and will continue in the coming years. The Middle Way policy initiated by the Dalai Lama, will not be able to sustain for say next 10–20 years, today the public is not openly opposing or criticizing the Middle

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Way policy, we have a leader in His Holiness who has that mandate; it is people’s faith in His Holiness that does not permit them to question the Middle Way policy, the Dharamsala conclave is a pointer to that. The conclave unanimously decided and said whatever decision His Holiness takes would be binding on them. Also, that whenever, you change your position we will be behind you. This kind of support is almost impossible in any democratic set up.” Three, it is true that through his personality and the title he carries, the Dalai Lama has been able to enlist massive support internationally. International support among the Hollywood actors as well as among various senators across the world might somewhat wane in his absence. The Tibetans acknowledge this fact; the void left by him would be difficult to fill in. “The absence of the Dalai Lama would be biggest challenge for the Tibetan people. It would be a sad moment for all including China. They will never find a personality like him, who could wield the support of all sections of Tibetan people” says Dhondup. He acknowledges the fact that “It was easy for the world community to support the autonomy policy, and we understand that. He could meet international leaders, even though in the capacity of a religious leader; had he insisted on independence, it would perhaps, have been difficult for him to meet so many world leaders.” It was perhaps in this context that the Dalai Lama has said that his incarnation can take place outside Tibet. Four, the possibility of some elements taking extreme violent measures is also not ruled out by some Tibetans; however, the TGIE and other organizations would alienate themselves from such incidents, as this is bound to put the Indian government in great difficulty vis-à-vis China and cast its shadow on India-China relations. “If the Dalai Lama is not there, there could be more dangers. The Tibetan people are yearning for to get back to their country from India. Different forces could emerge during the period of transition. People could take up different means” asserts Thempa Tsering. Five, however, it is the support within Tibet, and most of the Tibetan émigré in India including the TGIE is banking on. In the words of Tsewang Rigzin, “We in exile are forever grateful for the continuous sacrifices for Tibet’s Independence by Tibetans inside and we must all promise and work towards Tibet’s Independence so that their sacrifices don’t go in vain. At the time, we did our best and as we continue to do so, to disseminate to the international community the true aspirations of the Tibetans inside and the horrible atrocities being committed on them by the Chinese Communist regime.” “Everyone who carries Tibetan blood should be restless until we regain our Independence but that doesn’t mean you get out of control.” In the same vein, Dhondup says that “Tibetans inside Tibet are the true inspiration for us. It is them who are risking and sacrificing their lives for Tibetan cause. They are the one, who have given blood for the struggle. They do not need us to inspire them.”

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7 Conclusion India recognized People’s Republic of China in the belief that she would seek peace in the region by resolving differences and pending issues like border, etc., amicably and peacefully. It was with this understanding that India severed relations with the Republic of China on 30 December 1949. However, India’s hopes were dashed as China invaded Tibet and forced it to sign the 17-point agreement. The invasion subsequently resulted in the Tibetan uprising, flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and dissolution of the Kashag, the Tibetan Parliament by China thus changing the sociopolitical structure of Tibet for the first time in history. Having taken Tibet, China also laid claim to areas of Tibetan religious and ethnic influence that were under Indian jurisdiction. Tibet issue will continue to be a flash point between India and China as long as Tibetan émigré remains in India. The 1962 fiasco could have made India free of any delusion about China’s India strategy, nonetheless, the Galwan incident of 15 June 2020 has forced India to rethink its Tibet policy. It may be remembered that when relations deteriorated with China in the 1950s, India turned a blind eye towards the Tibetan Government in Exile, as well its activities in tandem with the CIA from the Indian territory. Whether we agree or not, the issue is intertwined with the resolution of border issue, which makes it even more complex. In the Eastern sector, China doesn’t recognize the McMahon Line and in Western sector, China is questioning its own claim line of 1960 as could be discerned from the Galwan incident. In the wake of such incidents, many are clamouring for recalibrating our “One China Policy.” It is expected that India will not drastically change its “One China Policy” as regards Tibet and Taiwan, albeit she has made it categorical not to put it in joint declarations and statements as before, for China has not reciprocated to “One India Policy” especially in context of Kashmir and Ladakh, which it continues to show differently and in white in its official maps and state run TV channels and media. The ongoing border stand-off in Eastern Ladakh is also a manifestation of this reality. Therefore, India, less than recognizing Taiwan as an independent country, will be more assertive in its approach, particularly will coordinate its foreign and economic policy with Taiwan’s “Southbound Policy” in ASEAN and South Asia. As regards Tibet, Indian politicians may meet the Dalai Lama quite often on various platforms and occasions; the representatives of the “Tibetan Government in Exile” may find more space in Indian media as has been witnessed recently. The issue may be discussed more frequently with like-minded countries and democracies. With the deterioration in China-US ties, the TGIE and Tibetan Movement as such may get more support in the USA and within its allies. There is likely to be a fallout of such a policy. Though there will not be much change in China’s India policy, for China since long has not adhered to “One India Policy”; she has supported Pakistan’s more often than not, used her international clout to internationalize the issue, has refused to issue visas to Indian army personnel from the Northern Command and people from Arunachal Pradesh. China may ratchet these issues more aggressively, intensify incursions across the LAC and overtly support

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insurgencies in India’s northeast, and through its proxies in other parts of India, which India believes, China has been doing covertly so far. Finally, it may be sensible for China to initiate a dialogue with the Dalai Lama and try to resolve the issue when he is still around. If China fails to address the issue, this could become grave as we have seen how unattended conflicts with ethnic subtexts such as in Palestine, Yugoslavia and Kashmir can erupt in ways that make them virtually impossible to solve. It is in both India and China’s interest not to let that happen in Tibet.

References CTA. (2010). Tibet in exile. https://tibet.net/about-cta/tibet-in-exile/ China Daily. (2008a). Evidence of Dalai clique’s role in riots released China Daily, 2 April 2008. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/02/content_6584305.htm China Daily. (2008b). Dalai’s brag about ’peace’ is nothing but lie. China Daily, 8 April 2008. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/08/content_6600575.htm Deepak, B. R. (2005). India and China 1904–2004: A century of peace and conflict. New Delhi: Manak Publishers. Deepak, B. R. (2019). The Dalai Lama’s reincarnation and Tibet issue. Sunday Guardian, 23 March 2019. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/chinas-hard-line-dalai-lama-reincarnationnot-helping-tibet Geng, S. (2019). Foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang’s regular Press Conference on March 19, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t16 46704.shtml Harrel, B. B. (1999). The experience of refugees as recipients of aid. In: Ager, A. (Ed.), Refugees: Perspectives on the experience of forced migration. London: Pinter. Holtz, T. H. (1998). Refugee Trauma versus torture Trauma: A retrospective controlled cohort study of Tibetan refugees. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186, 24–34. IE [Indian Express]. (2018). Tibetan refugees down from 1.5 lakh to 85,000 in 7 years.Indian Express, 11 September 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/tibetan-refugees-downfrom-1-5-lakh-to-85000-in-7-years-5349587/ Qiu, L., & Tang, Z. (2008).《达赖集团“中间道路”的真正用意就是要“西藏独立》The real motive of Dalai Clique’s “Middle Path” is to seek “Tibet’s independence”. Renmin Ribao (March 29, 2008). Renmin Ribao. (2008).《外交部发言人秦刚举行例行记者会》Foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang’s Press Conference. 18 March 2008. Sui, X. (2007).《中印关系研究:社会认知视角》Studies in Sino-Indian relations: Social cognitive perspective. Beijing: World Knowledge Press. TOI [Times of India]. (2019). 7% drop in Tibetan refugees’ arrival to India from Tibet. Times of India, 17 January 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/97-drop-in-tibetan-refugeesarrival-to-india-from-tibet/articleshow/67566650.cms

Chapter 4

Cooperation and Conflict in India-China Relations: A Crisis of Confidence Building

1 Introduction Even if people have been talking of peace, the global environment in the past one hundred years has been full with conflicts and crises. The two world wars were followed by the Cold War and bloody wars in East Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia including the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and unfolding of the new Cold War between the USA and China. Therefore, even if one talks about peace, the environment around us is full of fear and lingering security threats, which has created problems for genuine cooperation between the countries. As regards cooperation and conflict, there is a continuing debate between the realist and liberalist schools. Realists believe that cooperation is hard to achieve, for power is essentially expansionist; therefore, conflict is unavoidable. Neo realists are also concerned about the distribution of power and the international system. They believe that since there is no sovereign authority in the international system, “the states are given an opportunity to do what they like, which makes it difficult for states to trust each other and cooperate” (Jervis 1978). This leads to the so-called security dilemma, which is the outcome of fear between the states. According to Collins (1996), “perceived external threats (real or imagined) generate feelings of insecurity in those states that believe themselves to be the targets of such threats, thereby leading those states to adopt measures to increase their power and capability to counteract those threats (alliance creation, arms build-ups, and so on).” Therefore, even if there are agreements and crisis management mechanisms (CMMs) or confidence building measures (CBMs) in place between the two, these are likely to be violated by one or the other as has been witnessed during various border standoffs between India and China between 2014 and 2020. Realists have been criticized for their “survival of the fittest approach” and have also been criticized for ignoring other factors such as cultural identities, civil societies and soft power of a state. Jervis (1999), believe that realists would not be able to explain conflict or cooperation in the coming years.

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Contrary to the realists’ theory, the constructivists and the idealists agree with the Mencius view of human nature being good 人性善. Mencius upholds that this nature is corrupted by the surrounding and environment, but constructivists believe that good nature could prevent the conflict and a way could be paved for cooperation. Cooperation could be given a full play provided that more and better international institutions are created and perfected. Interdependence and complementarities would lead to cooperation, and a better peaceful international order could be created. They also believe that identical social systems make the cooperation more viable, as has been the example of West Europe. However, their belief in institutionalism has been belied by the fact that states have accepted or entered these in their national interest or when they tend to benefit from them and have come out of these whenever uncomfortable with them. The Brexit, the USA pulling out of Paris Climate Deal, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) could be some examples. Not only this, many states have flouted the norms quite often. This is owing to these approaches that the world has moved from unipolarity to bipolarity, then to uni-multi-polarity for some time and now heading towards bipolarity once again, albeit people are still talking about multi-polarity. The heterogeneous nature of multi-polarity has called for a structural change. Various scholars have tried to find out answers to these structural changes. Samuel Huntington (1999, 35) coined the notion of uni-multi-polar structure with the USA in the core and various other countries extending diplomatic, economic and military support for its initiatives. Some of its representations have been obvious in the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan and the NATO led regime change in Libya and an abortive attempt in Syria. Such a structural arrangement is unsustainable in long term, the Libyan, Syrian and more recent Iranian crises are pointer to this, where the USA including its allies remained non-committal on not only sending the ground forces, but also not backing the use of force. Haass (2008, 44) has argued that “non-polarity” is the answer, where a dozen of countries could have the capability of “exercising different powers.” Giovanni (2009, 9) on the other hand argues that the world is becoming increasingly “inter-polar” which is “multi-polarity in the age of interdependence.” However, this approach has also been challenged by the forces of deglobalization, protectionism and populism. The spread of Covid-19 pandemic has shattered this myth when nations discovered that they were highly dependent on China for many supplies including the raw materials for pharmaceutical industry. People started to talk about relocating such supply chains and decoupling of their economies from China. Multilateralism or multi-multilateralism is not necessarily an ultimate solution to bilateral or multilateral problems, however, is extremely important for crisis and conflict management as well as resolutions and enhancing understanding and cooperation among nations. Therefore, even if the cooperation and conflict have existed side by side, presently, undoubtedly, the balance has tipped in favour of cooperation

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rather than large-scale conflict. In the light of these debates, the signing of a range of crisis management agreements between India and China has also indicated that the cooperation has been favoured irrespective of deep rooted political mistrust between the two, however, the incidents such as Galwan bloodshed on the night of 15 June 2020 have belied such a thinking.

2 CBMs Between India and China With the belief that India and China will resolve their differences and pending issues such as border amicably and peacefully, they signed various CBMs and pledged cooperation in other fields like people-to-people exchange and trade and investment. Let us examine some of the measures India and China have negotiated over the years.

2.1 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or the Panchsheel The first CBM between India and China could be said was the “Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India,” also known as the Panchsheel1 Agreement signed on 29 April 1954. During the 60th anniversary of the agreement, India and China declared the year 2014 as the year of friendly exchanges and various activities were planned. There is a general belief that Nehru propounded these principles by taking inspiration from Buddha’s Dhumma Panchsheel,2 Nehru may have suggested the name; nevertheless, these were the clear creation of Zhou Enlai which could be demonstrated from his speech to the 11 members “Sino-Indian Negotiation Committee” on 7 January 1954. Zhou had said (Deepak 2005, 150), “China’s India policy should be to win India for peaceful-coexistence with us on the basis of five principles, to make her fight against the American invasion and war.” China says that these were propounded by Zhou Enlai and suggested to the Indian delegation when he met the latter on 31 December 1953.

1 These

are: 1. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. mutual nonaggression; 3. non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4. equality and mutual benefit and 5. peaceful co-existence. 2 These are 1. No Killing (Respect for life); 2. No Stealing (Respect for other’s property; 3. No Sexual Misconduct (Respect for our pure nature); 4. No Lying (Respect for honesty) and 5. No intoxicants (Respect for a clear mind).

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The controversy apart, it was a credible CBM even though it immensely favoured China, but India too believed it was a little short than a no war pact. Speaking in the Lok Sabha [lower house of the Indian parliament], Nehru remarked (Deepak 2005, 154) “By this agreement we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia” and that by subscribing to these principles, “one could create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the pledges given.” We will how see how wrong Nehru was when these were grossly violated by China. Nonetheless, the five principles of peaceful coexistence were sold aggressively by both India and China at various forums such as during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung and Colombo Conference in May 1954. During his India visit in 1954 and 1956, Zhou Enlai time and again emphasized the need to adhere to these principles. In a press conference on 27 June, Zhou further elaborated the principles of Panchsheel and allayed fears of neighbouring countries about Chinese brand of communism. He said, “It is possible for various countries of the world to have a peaceful coexistence irrespective of their size and social systems. The people of each country should have the right to choose its way of life and system of governance, and should not be interfered by other countries. The revolution cannot be exported. At the same time, the common will of a nation in any country should not be interfered with. If all the countries of the world handle their relations in accordance with these principles, then the question of threat and invasion of one country by another does not arise, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the countries could be realised (Wang 1998, 97).” According to Wang, Zhou also proposed to Nehru that by adhering to the Panchsheel, India and China should set an example to the world, proving that countries can coexist peacefully. Nehru in fact had been doing exactly the same. This is evident from his speeches during the Colombo Conference. In a broadcast from Colombo, Nehru had emphasized the significance of Panchsheel and had remarked that although the political and economic structure of India and China were different, India was nevertheless being able to sign an agreement with China on the basis of these principles. Since the Panchsheel in his view would guarantee peace in Asia, he recommended the concept to other members of Colombo Conference (Deepak 2005, 157–8). Going by the arguments given by Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the CBM was aimed at creating trust and confidence in each other, and it did create the environment of peace and friendship, the atmosphere of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai (Sino-Indian Brotherhood) could be rightly attributed to these CBMs, albeit was hyped beyond reality by both the sides. Also, as professor Swaran Singh (1998a, 1998b, 505) puts it, “Indian response has to be understood in view of Nehru’s personality and beliefs, he had been India’s sole spokesperson on foreign relations and following the death of Gandhiji (1948) and Sardar Patel (1950) Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly emerged as the single most important leader of the monolith Indian National Congress…a man who sought security in peace.”

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Gradually, these principles have become the basic norms in developing bilateral relations transcending social systems and ideologies. Many academics and strategists are bewildered as to why did not India open border question with China while signing such a CBM? And that why did not India think of a quid pro quo for accepting Tibet as a part of China? The academics have looked these issues from differing perspectives. While some argues that the Dalai Lama’s escape and India granting asylum derailed the CBM (Swaran 1998), Swaran Singh also maintains that Bhai-Bhai atmospheric and Nehru’s single handily China policy could be another reason; I believe more than anything, it was India’s failure to understand China’s stake in Tibet, hence the ambivalent Tibet policy, as well as the maximalist position on the border, which ultimately resulted in hostilities. After the brief conflict of 1962, bilateral relations remained in deep freeze for almost three decades.

2.2 CBMs of 1993, 1996, 2003 and 2005 The Joint Working Group (JWG) on border in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi’s December 1988 China visit could be regarded as the second CBM after the Panchsheel. The JWG also institutionalized flag meetings between military commanders from both sides at the Bumla and Dichu in the Eastern sector, Lipulekh in Uttrakhand in the middle sector and Spanggur near Chushul in the Western sector; this also sets a stage for the CBMs of 1993, 1996 and 2005 as well as some recent new initiatives. Fifteen rounds of talks on border issue were concluded under the aegis of the JWG. The “Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (AMPT),” in the India-China border area signed on 7 September, 1993; the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control (ACBMMF) in the India-China border areas signed on 29 November, 1996; and the Protocol on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (PPPGP) for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed on 11 April 2005 are unique in a way that these are not the by-products of bipolar and unipolar world, neither the Cold War, and nor the asymmetrical force structure between India and China; rather the evolution of these CBMs could be seen as lessons learnt by India and China from the hostilities and Cold War, and the result of the rapprochement and engagement after the establishment of diplomatic ties between India and China. According to Wang (1998, 339) both sides adopted a “realistic and flexible” approach to the knotty border problem and were emerging into an era of mutual comprehension and understanding. The commitment to not to use force by both sides and not to undertake “specified levels of military exercises in the mutually identified zones” further hinted to the fact that both sides were willing to accept the ground realities, albeit article 6 of the agreement clearly pointed out that references to the LAC do not prejudice the respective positions of India and China on the boundary question. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the reference to the LAC was being used for the first time in a formal document signed by both the sides. These exchanges and

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CBMs reiterated the faith in 1954 Panchsheel agreement, even if the document was never renewed after its expiry in 1962, as well as the equality of the relationship. These CBMs emphasize time and again that “India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.” Both undertake to “strictly respect and observe the line of actual control” and will maintain peace and tranquillity along the border, to this end, the two sides will keep their border military presence “to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations.” The 1993 and 1996 CBMs also recommend provisions in the case of border transgression and intrusions. Articles IV and V of the 1993 CBM stipulate that the “two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel of the two countries.” The 1996 CBM built on the foundations of the 1993 CBM is more elaborate and specific as regards military and security relations between India and China. The very first article “Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side” was pronounced as “a virtual no war pact” at the time it went public (Deepak 2005, 352). Article III and IV spell CBMs in military fields, for example “two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, paramilitary forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed forces deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon.” Article IV stipulates the withdrawal of some offensive weapons such as combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and to start with the two sides, etc., as well as avoiding the holding of “large scale military exercises involving more than one division (15,000 troops) in close proximity to the LAC.” Article VI prohibits opening fire within two kilometres of the LAC and that in case of a faceoff, they should exercise restraint and avoid escalation. This article created lot of controversy, when 20 Indian soldiers were brutally attacked by the Chinese at Patrolling point 14 in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. Article VII provides that the two sides shall (a) increase “meetings between their border representatives at designated places, (b) expand “telecommunication links” between these border points and (c) establish “step-by-step medium and highlevel contacts between the border authorities” of the two sides. Article IX stipulates “the right to seek clarification” regarding the “manner in which the other side is observing the agreement” or on any “doubtful situation” in the border region. Article X says that both sides “agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible.” For avoiding intrusions, as well as to “strengthen exchanges and cooperation between their military personnel and establishments.”

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The 2003 Special Representative (SR) Mechanism according to China’s SR, Dai (2016: 269), who negotiated border issue with four Indian SRs between 2003 and 2013, both sides lost an opportunity to resolve the border during early rounds of the SR talks. Dai reveals that it was Vajpayee who during his 1979 China visit had proposed to establish a mechanism of the SRs for border negotiations. “Vajpayee reiterated it again on 23 June 2003, and immediately appointed his Principle Secretary Brijesh Mishra as India’s SR, Wen Jiabao in turn appointed me as China’s SR.” Dai has vividly and candidly penned down his reminiscences about these talks in Chapter 7 titled Dragon and Elephant Tango running into 29 pages and six sections— Taking on the thorny issue; An excellent beginning; Origin of the first political parameters and guiding principles; Arduous exploration for a framework for border resolution; Worth an effort; and Friendly neighbours facing each other. In section two—An excellent beginning, Dai Bingguo says that the mechanism of SR was proposed by the Indian side to China. “Through diplomatic channels India explained to us that through this we would explore the guiding principles for resolving the issue, it will not involve specific negotiations for border demarcation and work on the maps. Second, the goal would be to accomplish the task of the SRs within 4–5 rounds through frequent contacts and talks. Third, India would adopt a constructive approach when negotiating with China.” He says China basically agreed to India’s proposition and proposed that SR consultations must be dealt with political and strategic height, and also from the overall situation of the bilateral relations, must not confine merely to facts as they are. The proposed Indian mechanism also pointed out that the mechanism must transcend the conventional bureaucratic system and seek a new thinking for settling the issue. Mishra’s appointment demonstrated Vajpayee’s desire and determination to resolve the issue. During the first SR talks, Vajpayee told us (Dai 2016, 273), “SRs responsibility is big, I think you must go all out and do it.” During the first round on 23–24 October 2003, Dai told Mishra that we must not leave this historical baggage forever to our younger generations. Mishra appreciated what Dai said and in turn proposed six guiding principles. On 12–13 January, 2004, I invited Mishra for the second round in Beijing. During this round, though India’s stride could not be considered as big, however, it was a pragmatic and flexible approach. As regards guiding principles, Mishra for the first time proposed “give and take” principle and expressed that India was open and willing to keep them aside and would welcome a better proposal from China, writes Dai. During the first and second round when Dai proposed a time frame of 3–5 years for the settlement, Mishra at once chipped in and clarified, if it takes so many years as you have said, perhaps I would not be around to see it. “At the close of the second round, Mishra took me aside and told me to convey a message to the Chinese leadership. He told me, Vajpayee is already 79 years; he is concerned about India-China border issue. Mishra told me he himself was 75 years, and wished to resolve the problem as soon as possible. I was hopeful that with Mishra’s negotiating style, the SRs talks would lead to an early outcome. However, in May 2004 India went to elections and the BJP suffered an unexpected defeat. Afterwards when I met Mishra, he told me, I would have never wished to pass the baton to the others, what is a pity!” (Dai 2016, 275–76).

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The 2005 protocol on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question took the bilateral relations to higher level and attempted to view the relation in a larger and global context. There was an indication that the constructive and cooperative partnership between India and China transcends bilateral and regional configurations but has global implications, and that “both sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question in the context of their overall and long-term interests,” therefore, “differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.” It also talks about “a package settlement to the boundary question” which still remains one of the most viable frameworks for resolving the issue. Pending an ultimate settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and work together to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas. The importance of the mechanism of SR on the boundary question was underscored and stated that the SRs “shall continue their consultations in an earnest manner with the objective of arriving at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement, which will provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the India-China boundary.” The protocol while invoking Panchsheel, reiterated that both sides would abide by and implement the 1993 and 1996 CBMs. In section three, Origin of the first political parameters and guiding principles, Dai says that in comparison with the BJP, the historical baggage the Congress Party carries is heavier. Moreover, it was a weak coalition government, which was restrained by many factors and had limited decision-making ability. It strived for political stability, and its foreign policy priority was India’s relations with South Asian countries and had no urgency for resolving the Sino-Indian boundary question. The SR talks that should be pushed forward, on the contrary faced new challenges, posits Dai (2016, 277). In June 2004, the Indian government appointed Dixit as a new National Security Advisor (NSA) and SR. “When I apprised Dixit that former SR had a timeframe of 4–6 months for reaching an agreement on guiding principles, Dixit hoped the agreement could be reached during the fourth round.” Both side aspired that these should be worked out prior to Wen Jiabao’s April 2005 India visit. In the process of negotiations, the Indian side was apprehensive whether the guiding principles should be discussed first or the framework for resolution of the border. During the fourth round on 18–19 November 2004, Dai proposed the “three-step formula” (First establish the political parameters and guiding principles for resolving the border issue, then establish an agreed framework for a boundary settlement of these guiding principles, and finally demarcate the border on the ground) for the resolution of the border, which was appreciated by Dixit and finally agreed upon by both sides. After Dixit’s sudden demise, India appointed K.R Narayanan as the next NSA and SR. I met him 9 times for 5th to 13th round of SR talks. During the fifth round in Delhi on 10–11 April 2005, both the SR were successful in reaching an agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles, and the agreement was signed during 2005 Wen Jiabao’s India visit.

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In the fourth section, Arduous exploration as regards framework for border resolution, Dai says he conducted next eight rounds with Narayanan. The sixth round which was held between 24 and 28 September 2005 in Beijing was the first meeting for exploring the framework for resolving the issue. During the 7 round between 11 and 14 March 2006 in New Delhi, Dai proposed that there exists a dispute on the Eastern, Middle and Western sectors of China-India border. Both sides need to make a very significant adjustment, which is acceptable to both the sides through a package deal. The eighth round was held in Xi’an and Beijing between 24 and 28 June 2006. “During the 9th round in Delhi on 17–18 January 2007, I told Narayanan frankly that this is our 9th round, I do not wish to discuss it to the 99th round, and I do not wish to keep it for our future generations. China is fully prepared for a political resolution of the Sino-Indian border issue. I sincerely hope we endeavour for finding a framework for resolving the issue at the earliest. Having said this, I expounded China’s views on political resolution. I pointed out, the disputed area is large, and it involves historical background, actual situation, people’s sentiments on both sides, the actual difficulties etc. factors…given these factors if we hold on to just one and ignore others, we would be negotiating endlessly and I am afraid we wound not be able to find a solution in 100 years or even 1000 years. The framework should be more specific than the guiding principles and simpler and clearer than the border demarcation plan.” (Dai 2016, 282). The tenth round from 20–22 April 2007 did not conform to the convention of alternatively holding talks in respective countries. At the request of the Indian side, I came to Delhi and pointed out that while discussing border, we cannot sever history, cannot ignore history, we must factually understand history, justly and reasonably consider the historical factors, we must fully consider Chinese people’s historical and national sentiments towards the Eastern sector. During these five rounds, I fully expounded the Chinese stands from different angles, however, the talks made no progress whatsoever in these two years. Next two rounds (September 2007 and September 2008) were held in Beijing. Our main focus was to keep the channels of talks open, and safeguard the atmospherics, says Dai. He pinned his hope on the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) II as the Congress had emerged stronger in May 2009 general elections. “Narayanan told me that the Indian side hopes to resolve one and all issues between India and China within 3–5 years.” 13th round of SR talks was held in New Delhi on 7–8 August 2009. During this round, I met Narayanan 9 times and we engaged in talks for 12 h. He told me that the sheer number of time I have met you is more than Hillary Clinton had met you, India-China SR talks can be termed as strategic dialogue. I told Narayanan that China has no intention whatsoever to scramble for any ‘sphere of influence’ in South Asia. Though we did not achieve any real progress on border issue, but it was indeed a bit of strategic dialogue as we talked about bilateral, international and regional hotspot issues.” (Dai 2016, 285). In the last two sections, Dai says that he was dealing with the fourth SR from India as Narayanan had been given some other appointment and was replaced by an old China hand Shiv Shankar Menon. The 14th and 15th round were separately held on 29–30 November 2010 and 16–17 January 2012 in Beijing and New Delhi, respectively. Dai posits that Menon’s outlook on Sino-Indian boundary was no different

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from India’s previous interlocutors. Looking back at the SR talks on border, he says it was a worthwhile effort. We were able to formulate a “three-step” blueprint for the resolution of border issue, the first step of which was completed in just two years. After 2005, we entered the second step, after nine rounds of talks we did achieve some progress, but it is a pity that we have not been able to reach a consensus on resolution framework all along. Nonetheless, in the last 30 years, we have been able to put the most sensitive and complex issue of Sino-Indian border on the track of peaceful negotiations, which has promoted strategic trust between the two, and have created conducive conditions for the restoration, improvement and development of bilateral relations. He suggests that mechanism of the SRs should be continued and strengthened. In order to complete the three steps, both must grab opportunities thrown by history and make bold strategic decisions. Dai considers India as an important partner for China’s open door policy. He is of the view that there can never be a colossal turmoil in India; 15% of its people can speak English and is capable of becoming a major power in the twenty-first century. China must treat India not only as a major country in Asia but also as a major world power. China-India relations must be accorded priority and transcend the significance of general neighbourhood diplomacy. According to him, pragmatic cooperation between China and India is very low, which is asymmetrical given the potentialities of both the countries. Moreover, the mechanism of SR has become a platform for strategic engagement and should be optimally used. As far as border issue is concerned, he says that owing to differing stands, the issue is relatively difficult to resolve in a short time, but both have to manage it well and avoid conflict. Since Dai’s departure, 22 rounds of SR talks have been held, the last being on 21 December 2019 in New Delhi between Ajit Doval and Wang Yi “as per the guidance provided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the second informal summit between them in Chennai.” Even though both sides have been reiterating that the special representatives are resolved to intensify their efforts to achieve a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the IndiaChina boundary question at an early date, however, it seems that Article VII of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question has become a big hurdle for China as the article stipulates that “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas” which essentially jeopardizes the principle of give and take.

2.3 New Initiatives and the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) Besides the above-mentioned CBMs, in January 2012, India and China signed Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border

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Affairs (WMCC) at Joint Secretary Level of ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries especially for timely communication of information on the border situation and for appropriately handling border incidents. In March 2012, both sides also agreed to undertake joint operations against pirates and sharing technological knowhow on seabed research. Another CBM in the line of earlier initiatives is the BDCA signed on the basis of “mutual and equal security” on 23 October 2013 during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s China visit. Contrary to the perception that it was signed in response to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) stand-off (Panda 2013), the BDCA was being negotiated for almost a year by the two sides. It could not be signed during Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit in May 2013 owing to the DBO “face-off” and ongoing negotiations on the agreement. The agreement reinforces many points enshrined in the earlier mechanisms except for a few new ones stipulated in the article II and VI. Article II stipulates modalities for implementing the BDCA such as—exchange of information about military exercises, aircrafts, demolition operations and unmarked mines; cooperation in combating smuggling of arms, wildlife, wildlife articles and other contrabands; assist the other side in locating personnel, livestock, means of transport and aerial vehicles that may have crossed or are possibly in the process of crossing the LAC; cooperation in combating natural disasters or infectious diseases that may affect or spread to the other side. Article VI entails that the two sides should not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the LAC. As for Article II, India could have said impressed upon China about the need to combat insurgency and smuggling along its north-eastern border region. India’s north-eastern states bordering Bangladesh, China and Myanmar have been infested with insurgencies and smuggling of arms and drugs and poached animal products. Illegal organizations engaged in such activities have been found all over the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor. If the agreement is carried out in letter and spirit undoubtedly, not only the borders would be tranquil and peaceful but the chances of regional peace and development would be greatly enhanced. Similarly, if article VI is carried in its spirit and letter, the face-offs like DOB would be prevented. Even though the mechanism of BDCA in no way is a solution to the border issue, but it certainly is symptomatic of declaring India-China relations of global strategic importance. Nonetheless, none of these CBMs have been successful in preventing stand-offs along the LAC as demonstrated by the following confrontations.

3 Depsang (2013) and Chumar (2014) Stand-Offs In mid-April 2013, there were reports of at least 40 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops transgressing and camping at Depsang Bulge, 30 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi and almost 10 kilometres inside the “Indian territory” according to media reports.

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The Indian forces also pitched tents almost 200 m away from the PLA and the faceoff continued for three weeks. A similar face-off took place in September 2014 in Chumar sector when the Indian soldier stopped the road construction of the PLA they perceived was being built inside the Indian territory. The stand-off was resolved when India agreed to demolish a recently built observation shelter at Tible and Chinese agreed to restore the pre-September 10 status quo. These face-offs vitiated the atmosphere in India and perhaps in China too just before the maiden visits of the newly elected Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang to India in May 2013 and President Xi Jinping in September 2014. Even though both Indian and Chinese government downplayed the incidents, but starting from 1 May, some articles by academics started to surface in the Chinese print media and hint to the Chinese apprehensions about “aggressive” patrolling in the region as well as upgradation of border infrastructure by India, despite of the fact that India was a latecomer as regards development of border infrastructure. An article by Hu Zhiyong, a professor with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences while calling for a better management of the border issue, maintained that presently India has deployed 45 battalions of police force along the border areas, besides four battalions are in the midst of organization. India plans to add nine more battalions by 2015 (Deepak 2013). Reports about China’s infrastructural development are of major concern for the Indian government, for example, former Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony gave the following statement to the Parliament in March 2011 (Anthony 2011): “The total road network in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is assessed at 58,000 km in 2010. Extension of Qinghai Tibet Railway to Xigaze is in progress. Another railway line from Kashgar to Hotan in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is under construction,” besides there are five operational TAR airfields namely Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa. Antony further said that “necessary steps” were being taken in consonance with India’s national security concerns.” A decade later, according to a Xinhua report (2018), “99% of the villages in the TAR are connected to highways, as the network in the region has increased from 65,000 kilometers to 90,000 kilometers; around 85% of the villages have broadband access.”

4 Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) On 18 June 2017 when the PLA started to extend the road southward in Doklam, the Indian troops crossed the International border over to the Bhutanese side to stop the construction. As could be discerned from the Indian and Bhutanese statements issued on 29 and 30 June, when Chinese army started to alter the status quo in the region by constructing “a motor able road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri, they were stopped by the Indian army from doing so. Indian statement demonstrated the Indian fears of China determining the tri-junction points unilaterally in violation of the understanding reached between the

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Special Representatives of India and China in 2012 on one hand, and with Bhutan in 1998 on the other” (MOFA, Bhutan 2017; MEA, India 2017). This invited such a fury from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence that both reminded India of its Himalayan blunder. Chinese print, electronic and social media was even more bellicose, and the war mongering was raised to such a pitch that use of force appeared imminent. The entire body of Chinese intelligentsia wore the hats of army generals, crossed all limits, as they shouted on top of their voices that India should be taught another lesson, China must liberate Bhutan and Sikkim, should enter Kashmir at the request of a third country, and the list continues. People’s Daily in its official blog warned India that the “border line is the bottom line.” On 11 July, the same paper posted an image from September 1962 front page editorial titled, “If this can be tolerated, what cannot?” People’s Daily’s sister newspaper Global Times provided lot of ammunition to provoke India by spitting venom in its dozens of articles and commentaries, unprecedented in the modern history of India-China relations. Even though serious Chinese scholarship on the Indian side brushed these aside, nonetheless, there is a view in India which holds that perhaps for the first time Chinese diplomacy was hijacked by the very paper and the social media.

4.1 The Convention of 1890 In order to understand the stand-off at Doklam, it is necessary to revisit the great game between colonial India and imperial China as regards their spheres of influence in the Himalayan states. The much-referred 17 March 1890 “Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim” was a spinoff of the 1886 Tibetan invasion of Lingtu, a place eighteen miles within the Sikkim frontier (Bell 1924, 60). However, the Tibetans and Chinese maintained that the post was within Tibetan territory, and even if it was not, since Sikkim was Tibet’s vassal state, it had all the right to do so (Yang 1992, 73–74). The British demanded the withdrawal of Tibet from Lingtu but Tibet refused to budge; on the contrary, Tibet demanded British withdrawal from Sikkim and Bhutan. Wen Shuo, the Chinese Amban or imperial resident in Lhasa, supported the Tibetans but was admonished by the Qing court and dismissed in 1888 for fomenting the trouble. A new Amban, Sheng Tai was appointed in his place (Li 2000, 481). The British resorted to force and ejected the Tibetan army from Lingtu; Sheng Tai memorialized the throne on 18 June 1888, apprising that the Lingtu affair was settled for good. The British have recalled their forces, and the status quo that existed two years back has been restored. Contrary to Sheng Tai’s assurances to the Qing court, the affair was not settled as yet, for the Tibetans were preparing for another battle. It was under such circumstances that the Manchus sent Sheng to Calcutta (now Kolkata) to conduct further negotiations and sign a treaty with the British to settle the Sikkim–Tibet boundary, which he signed on 17 March 1890. According to Alistair Lamb (1966, 127), even after ten years of long discussions from 1894 to 1903, the British and Chinese failed to persuade the Tibetans to accept the 1890 boundary, which had been arranged

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on their behalf. Chinese consulate in Manchester also adheres to this view when a post in its website says that “They (Tibetans) even managed to destroy the border stones erected by Britain in an open protest against the border division and the unfair treaties.” Chinese scholarship on the other hand is of the view that ever since the signing of this convention, China lost its sovereignty over Sikkim (Wang 1998, 56 emphasis added). Notwithstanding the Tibetan disagreement, the convention did decide Sikkim– Tibet boundary. Article 1 of the convention reads: ‘The boundary of the Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluent from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi and follows the above-mentioned water parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.” China has made use of this convention for claiming the tri-junction of India-ChinaBhutan at Gipmochi or Gymochen or Jimu Mazhen in Chinese. However, according to the geographical features the “watershed” and “the crest of the mountain range do not stretch beyond Batang La, 6 kilometres north of Doka La. It is this interpretation which Bhutan and India are holding on to and have infuriated China the most. China since early 2000s has built a motor able road to Shinche La or Shenjiula, however, presently when China wanted to extend it to the Jampheri Ridge near Doka La, roughly over 2 km north of Gipmochi, Indian forces entered the third country to stop the construction. The area of stand-off is a disputed territory between Bhutan and China and both have concluded 24 rounds of talks to resolve the dispute. China has expressed its interest to swap the area with disputed area in North and Eastern Bhutan, but owing to special relationship with India, Bhutan is unable to strike a deal with China. Moreover, according to Bhutan, there is a written agreement of 1998 between Bhutan and China, which says that both will safeguard peace in the area and maintain the status quo. India’s former National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon has also maintained that this is China’s attempt to change the status quo at the tri-junction. On 28 August, both sides announced that they are disengaging and restoring the status quo. Thanks to the BRICS summit that was being hosted by China in Xiamen, thus ended the 73 days’ stand-off.

4.2 June 15 Galwan Incident Galwan, where India had a forward post in 1962, witnessed one of the bloodiest stand-offs on the evening of 15 June 2020 at patrolling point 14 when the Indian soldiers who had gone there to verify the Chinese withdrawal agreed upon by the corps commanders of both sides in a meeting held on 6 June and were ambushed and attacked with iron rods with metal nails on them. Both sides suffered causalities, India reported 20 fatalities including an officer, but China kept its losses secret. The death of Indian soldiers in Galwan, the first after 1962, dealt a heavy blow to the CBMs India and China had signed between 1988 and 2013, as well as the

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“Wuhan Spirit” and “Chennai Connect” that talked about the “consensus” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping that both sides “will not allow their differences to turn into disputes.” In Galwan, it appears that China, rather has thrown down the gauntlet to India, telling her that all the disputed territory between India and China belongs to it, and that it will continue to change the status quo and pass it as fait accompli to India with brute force. “If the satellite images are to be believed, China has crossed its own perception about the LAC in Galwan and moved a few kilometres westward in finger areas of Pangong Tso. The coordinates provided by China to India as regards the boundary in Western sector during the 1960 border negotiations, and later reinforced on ground after the 1962, including on its maps of the official history of the 1962 conflict titled History of China’s Counter Attack in Self-defence Along the Sino-Indian Borders (Chinese edition) published by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences in 1994, has been violated, implying that China seeks boundary beyond these coordinates” (Deepak 2020a). Irrespective of activating the WMCC, having eight rounds of talks at corps commander level on 6, 22, 30 June, 14 July, 2 August, 22 September, 12 October, and 6 November 2020; phone calls between the SRs and foreign ministers, and then meetings between the defense and foreign ministers of both sides in Moscow, but disengagement and de-escalation have not made much progress. Disengagement has happened at patrolling point 14 and 15 by creating “buffer zones” of 4 km separating both forces, but on other points such as Depsang, Gogra and Pangong Tso, China has refused to pull back. Both have deployed forces along the LAC and may be there for a long haul. The issue has been discussed in greater details in Chapter 10 titled “India-China relations post Covid-19 and Galwan.” The stand-off of 2013, 2014, 2017 and 2020 in the Western sector along the LAC demonstrates that any attempts to enhance military capability along the borders by both India and China may create further tension and vitiate the security environment. It is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the border issue is the root cause of most of the trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle animosities in no time; it also indicates that the existing mechanisms fall short of finding a solution to the border issue, especially when both India and China are making fait accompli of the areas under their jurisdictions in the Eastern and Western sectors. Therefore, it becomes imperative for both India and China to show political will and resolve and reach an agreeable resolution to the border as soon as possible. Dai (2016, 283) posits that since 2007 round of the Special Representatives, “our main focus was to keep the channels of negotiations open, and safeguard the atmospherics…” demonstrating that the mechanism of the SR was dead within three years of its inception. Not only the SR, these stand-offs show that the CBMs have been repeatedly violated and made redundant (Deepak 2020b).

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5 CBMs Could Lead to Better Regional and Multilateral Cooperation? Even though the stalemate on the border issue persists, and the gap between India and China is widening in terms of economic development and overall living standards of their population, both have witnessed increased level of engagement at world arena. Both have found some real convergence of interests on issues such as climate change, democratization of international financial institutions through multilateral forums such as Russia-India-China Strategic Triangle; Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); Brazil, South Africa, India China (BASIC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); East Asian Summits (EAS); G 20 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India and China have also initiated dialogue on terrorism, Afghanistan, and high-level mechanism on cultural and people-to-people exchanges. The multilateral cooperation has been used to strengthen bilateral relations by both the countries, and both are working towards raising the level of bilateral relationship with the hope of creating larger stakes in each other’s economic systems through complementarities and interdependence. It may, however, be reminded that diversification of bilateral and multilateral exchange, as well as cooperation on international issues of common concern has been based on the premise that India and China will maintain peace and tranquillity along the border, will ensure the sanctity of the LAC and the CBMs. But, given the nature of transgressions and changing of the status quo as has been witnessed in Galwan, it suggest that India-China relationship is fragile and remains exposed to vulnerabilities by domestic, regional and global posturing of both India and China.

6 Conclusion It could be discerned that as long as India and China have adhered to the provisions of the CBMs, they have managed the border well and diversified their relationship in other areas. However, recent Chinese transgression and stand-offs in Doklam, Nakula in Sikkim, Galwan and Pangong Tso, especially Galwan, where 20 Indian soldiers were martyred, have demonstrated that the violation of the CBMs has brought the relationship to nadir, and that it may require a long time to normalize the relations. Why is there a change in Chinese behaviour? At the outset, it is clear that border is not the biggest agenda for China. China believes that it has not reached the stage where resolution is must. Therefore, “maintenance of peace and tranquillity,” “managing” rather than solving the problem will be China’s top priority, despite of the fact that the cost of maintaining “peace and tranquillity” is becoming higher. China knows that the CBMs will not be enough to resolve the problem, hence no stone should be left unturned as far as infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang is concerned, so as the LAC is made accessible for patrolling and quick deployment in the rear. This was demonstrated during most of the stand-offs in the Western sector, especially in the year 2020. It is out of this

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thinking that China does not support identification of the LAC. China believes that clarification of the LAC will lead to opening more points of friction; moreover, an unidentified LAC will provide China an opportunity to change the goalposts further westward, as was seen in the Galwan Valley. This is also owing to such a proposition that China has pitched for a sort of “demilitarized zone” along the border, which India may be reluctant to accept at this point in time. Nonetheless, the same is mirrored in the so-called buffer zones China created in the place of restoring status quo ante in the Galwan, thus denying India patrolling access to certain points in the areas. As India tries to revamp its own border infrastructure and enable greater accessibility to the LAC, it is bound to create more points of friction and an aggressive response from China, as has been witnessed by the building of Durbak-Shyok-DBO road recently. The choices before India in the short term would be to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border strengthen the existing mechanisms and introduce new ones, especially relating to drones and AI technologies; chalk out a time-bound border infrastructure development plan in terms of rail, road and air connectivity; nodes of internal connectivity initiative such as Bharatmala need to be extended to our neighbourhood, modernization of our defence forces with integrated theatre command, etc. These are some of the measures through which India should be able to uphold the principle of “equal and mutual security” envisaged in the 2012 CBMs, else the gap on the ground will be widened further and India’s position on border weakened. Finally, the “rise of India” and its international image were based on India’s robust economic growth, demographic dividend and capacity to handle domestic and global challenges realistically. As the growth and capacity to handle internal challenges have entered the zone of unpredictability, asymmetries in India-China relations are bound to widen. Therefore, India seeking some equilibrium and understanding with China on various issues may not work to India’s favour. Not only does it put China in an advantageous position, but also provides her with opportunities to rake up new issues. Nonetheless, both India and China need to take a holistic view of the changing regional and global political architecture and rebalance their relations by positioning themselves in the middle of this change by negotiating what is workable and what is not by exploring pragmatic constructivism.

References Anthony, A. K. (2011). China has 58,000 kms of road network in TAR. In: The Hindu, 7 March 2011. Bell, C. (1924). Tibet past and present, p. 60. London: Oxford University Publication. Collins, A. (1996). The security Dilemma. In J. Davis. (Ed.), Security issues in the post-cold war world. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim, available at https://treaties.fco. gov.uk/docs/pdf/1894/TS0011.pdf. Dai, B. (2016).《战略对话:戴秉国回忆录》Strategic dialogue: Reminiscences of Dai Bingguo. Beijing: People’s Publishing House and World Knowledge Press.

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Deepak, B. R. (2005). India and China 1904–2004: A century of peace and conflict. New Delhi: Manak Publishers. Deepak, B. R. (2013). DOB faceoff: Some Chinese perceptions. Chennai Centre for China Studies C3S Paper No. 1150 dated 10 May 2013. https://www.c3sindia.org/china-internal/3600.. Deepak, B. R. (2020a). China won’t accept status quo ante. Sunday Guardian 4 July 2020. https:// www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/china-wont-accept-status-quo-ante. Deepak, B. R. (2020b). Death of LAC, CBMs between India and China. Sunday Guardian 21 June 2020. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/death-lca-cbms-india-china-2. Giovanni, G. (2009). The Inter-polar world: A new scenario. Occasional Paper 79, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2009. Haass, R. N. (2008). The age of non-polarity: What will follow US dominance. In: Foreign Affairs, 87(3). Huntington, S. P. (1999). The lonely superpower. In: Foreign Affairs, 78(2). Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. In: World Politics, 30(2). Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: Understanding the debate. In: International Security, 24(1), 1999. Lamb, A. (1966). The McMahon Line, Volume I and II. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. Li, W. (2000).《清史便年》Annals of Qing dynasty. Beijing: Peoples University Press, Juan 2. MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Government of Bhutan] “Press Release” 29th June 2017 https://www.mfa.gov.bt/?p=4799; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Recent Developments at Doklam Area.” https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28572/Recent+Dev elopments+in+Doklam+Area Panda, A. (2013). Comparing China’s border agreement with India and the ADIZ. In: The Diplomat, 5 December 2013. https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/comparing-chinas-border-agreement-withindia-and-the-adiz/. Accessed on 30 May 2014. Singh, S. (1998a). Three agreements and five principles. In: T. Chung. (Ed.), Across the Himalayan Gap, New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Gyan Publishers. Singh, S. (1998b). Building confidence with China. In: T. Chung. (Ed.), Across the Himalayan Gap, New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Gyan Publishers. Wang, H. (1998).《喜马拉雅山情节:中印关系研究》The Himalayas sentiment: A study of Sino Indian relations. Beijing: China Tibetology Publication. Xinhua. (2018).《西藏“十三五”推进基建 发展新成果加速惠民》Tibet’s “13th Five-Year Plan advances infrastructure development”. 25 January 2018. https://m.xinhuanet.com/xz/2018-01/ 25/c_136923227.htm. Yang, G. (1992).《中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史》History of China’s Struggle and Resistance to the Foreign Invasion and interference in Tibet. Beijing: China’s Tibetology Publications, pp. 73–74; QJWJS《清季外交史料》Sources on Diplomatic History of Late Qing Dynasty, Taipei: Wenhai Publishers (1964), 3(75), 214.

Part II

Pakistan, BRI and India-China Relations

Chapter 5

India and China-Pak Axis: From India-Pak Wars to the Abrogation of Article 370

China–Pakistan axis has been a subject of continuous debate among think tanks and foreign policy formulators of India and beyond and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, for Pakistan is an important pivot in China’s containment of India. Though Wang Hongyu (Chen et.al. 1995, 139) and many other Chinese scholars continue to pronounce that China “does not hope to see discord between India and Pakistan, let alone reap the benefits of such a discord,” however, “iron brother” or “the all whether friend” of China has been an inalienable part of China’s strategic contours in South Asia. The hasty visits of Pakistani leadership to Beijing at the times of crisis with India reveal the depth and breadth of such a relationship.

1 Raison D’être for the Axis What made China to establish such an entente from an Indian perspective is obvious— one, in the wake of Sino-Indian hostilities, China exploited India-Pakistan hostilities to its advantage; two, it diluted Pakistan as a US satellite in anti-communist alliance and stopped terrorism emanating from Pakistan into the restive Xinjiang. Conversely, when India strengthened its relationship with Russia and accorded high priority to its armed forces following the humiliating defeat in 1962, China accused India of “militarism” and wanted to keep Nehru’s sword “blunt” contrary to the following argument made by Wang Hongwei, a veteran India expert in China. According to Wang (1998, 264), “Nehru hated China for not giving him ‘face’ and ‘betraying his friendship.’ In Wang’s words, Nehru also grudged that the ‘sword’ in his hand was not sharp enough. While the ‘betrayal’ was beyond his control, however, the ‘sword’ could have been sharpened by strengthening national defences.” Interestingly, the concept of “face” is not an Indian notion, in other words, Wang is expressing the Chinese psyche, in fact it was China who thought Nehru did not give her a “face” and that it must take Pakistan under its wings, so that any attempt of Nehru to sharpen his “sword” is foiled. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_5

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A study compiled by Zhang (2008) and published by the Social Sciences Academy Press has refuted the Chinese claims that it does not want to see a discord between India and Pakistan let alone reap benefits of such a discord. Ye Hailin, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences confirms India’s assertions about the SinoPak axis. According to Ye (2008, 274–78), “in real terms, Sino-Pak relations turned hot from cold during early 1960s after the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations.” He defines Sino-Pak relationship as “mono-dimensional focussed at military security cooperation” and argues that “Sino-Pak cooperation is not endogenous, but revolves around external security concerns that is to counter India.” “This kind of cooperation, to a greater extent is due to the long rivalry of both Pakistan and China with India; as India for a long time has been number one enemy of Pakistan, and also poses major threat to the security of western China.” Therefore, “to keep away the common enemy is a decisive factor” in this relationship. In recent years, in the wake of China building the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the “one-dimensional” character of this relationship is bound to change as China wishes to make its pivot part of its economic security as well. Now, this kind of definition of the Sino-Pak entente can be clearly gleaned through the historical as well as contemporary events. Let us examine the following:

1.1 India-Pakistan Wars The worsening Sino-Indian relations in the wake of border dispute facilitated a Sino-Pak rapprochement, which according to India was a product of shared hostility towards India by these two countries. China accepted Pakistani proposal of 1961, which set to demarcate the boundary between Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and China’s Xinjiang. Barely three months after the conclusion of 1962 War (2 March 1963), China concluded border agreement with Pakistan. The agreement was described as Sino-Pak border agreement concerning delimitation of China’s Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which was under the actual control of Pakistan. The agreement was said to be temporary, and China would renegotiate the above border with relevant sovereign authority after the resolution of Kashmir dispute. In August 1963, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on aviation. In February and March 1965 both further signed agreements concerning cultural, economic and technological cooperation. There was frequent exchange at the highest level (Wang 1998, 269). The Sino-Pak shared hostility towards India emboldened Pakistan to such an extent that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan declared in the Pakistan National Assembly on 17 July 1963 that “In the event of war with India, Pakistan would not be alone. Pakistan would be helped by the most powerful nation in Asia (Ranganathan and Khanna 2000, 138).” China confirmed Pakistani claims during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict when it created a “crisis” in Sikkim–Tibet border. According to Choudhury (1975, 189), director of research for Pakistan’s Foreign Office between 1967 and 1969, China assured Pakistan that it would respond to an

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Indian attack on East Pakistan [present Bangladesh] not only in that area but also in the Himalayas. In August 1965, Pakistan invaded Indian Kashmir and precipitated the Second Indo-Pak War in September 1965.1 China openly supported Pakistan and termed India as an aggressor. China further accused India of violating Sikkim–Tibet border and amassing forces near Sikkim border in a note of 2 September 1965. According to Wang (1998, 270, emphasis added), “China deemed it necessary to eject invader’s defences and actually supported Pakistan’s combat in the western front.” Ye (2008, 274) also support this view and says that “China staunchly supported Pakistan in its struggle for safeguarding territorial integrity.” At this point, it may be noted that in February 1979, when China invaded Vietnam, in a similar fashion it accused Vietnam of numerous incursions into China. It is an open fact that China’s invasion of Vietnam was meant to punish Vietnam for sending forces into Cambodia and destroying the Chinese supported Pol Pot regime through Soviet help. Replying to the Chinese note on 12 September, India termed Chinese accusations fictious and mischievous. It wrote that the demand of the Chinese Government to dismantle structures and to withdraw troops was meaningless as the Sikkim–Tibet border was the only section of the Sino-Indian border that was well defined. The Government of India even favoured investigations by an independent and neutral observer in this sector in order to witness the actual state of affairs (LDFO 1975, 221). As regards India’s “armed aggression against Pakistan,” India slammed China for distorting facts and recorded that it was Pakistan which committed aggression against India by sending out armed infiltrators into Kashmir across the ceasefire line and followed it up by a massive attack across the international boundary in the Chhamb area of the Indian state (now a union territory). India also cited the report of the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan that had unequivocally stated that it was Pakistan, which violated the ceasefire line in Kashmir by sending thousands of armed infiltrators into Kashmir. This fact has also been acknowledged by the Chinese scholars and cited as the reason for outbreak of the war (Wang 1998, 269). On 16 September, China’s Foreign Office yet again notified Mehrotra, the Indian Charge d’ Affairs in Beijing about the Indian violations and demanded that India dismantle all its defence structures which China considered were built on the Chinese side of the border within three days or else be responsible for all the consequences. Point three of the note touched on Kashmir and Pakistan and noted: Supported by the United States imperialists and their partners, the Indian Government has always pursued a policy of chauvinism and expansionism towards its neighbouring countries. Its logic for aggression is that all places it has seized belong to it and that whatever place it wants to grab but has not yet done so also belonged to it. It was this logic, which motivated the large-scale armed attack the Indian Government launched against China in 1962, and it is 1 In

early 1965, Pakistani leaders adopted a plan to foment anti-Indian uprising in Kashmir. The plan code named “Operation Gibraltar” provided for training, arming and equipping large number of Pakistanis and infiltrating them into Indian Kashmir under regular Pakistani army officers. The plan is likely to be supported by Beijing as top Chinese leaders frequently visited Pakistan during this time. Moreover, the plan was synonymous with Mao’s strategy in Vietnam.

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5 India and China-Pak Axis: From India-Pak … the same logic that motivates the massive armed attack it is now launching against Pakistan. The Chinese Government has consistently held that Kashmir question should be settled on the basis of the respect for Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. This is what is meant by China’s non-involvement in the dispute between India and Pakistan, but non-involvement absolutely does not mean failure to distinguish between right and wrong. It absolutely does not mean that China can approve of depriving the Kashmiri people of their right of self-determination or that she can approve of Indian aggression against Pakistan on the pretext of Kashmir issue. Such was China’s stand in the past and it remains so at present. Yet some countries have acknowledged Kashmir as belonging to India. In that case how can one speak of their non-involvement in the dispute? The question now is that India has not only refused to recognise the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination, but has also openly launched an all-out attack against Pakistan. This cannot but arouse grave concern of the Chinese Government. Reason and justice must prevail in the world. So long as the Indian Government oppresses the Kashmiri people, China will not cease supporting Kashmiri people in their struggle for self-determination; so long as the Indian Government persists in its unbridled aggression against Pakistan, China will not cease supporting Pakistan in her just struggle against the aggression. This stand of ours will never change, however many helpers you may have such as the United States of America, the modern revisionists and the United States controlled United Nations (LDFO 1975, 224–25; Wang 1998, 270).

It is remarkable that China attempted to prove its “innocence” in 1962 by pointing out to the “innocence” of Pakistan in 1965 conflict with India. Forgetting its own territorial aggrandizement, it accused India of launching “unbridled aggression” against Pakistan for territorial grab. It rebuffed Indian demand for neutral observer in the Sikkim–Tibet border, for China expressed contempt for the United Nations and other “helpers” of India [The USA and Soviet Union]. On 15 April 1966, Chen Yi, the then Vice Premier of China remarked during a reception at Dacca in East Pakistan that “If Pakistan is again subjected to aggression, and so long as the Kashmiri people still suffer from suppression, China will continue to give them support (Peking Review 1966, 7).” It is evident from Wang’s argument cited earlier that China was fomenting trouble with India merely to assist Pakistan. When the three-day Chinese deadline expired on 19 September, China in a note of 19 September extended the deadline to 22 September. On 20 September, an agreement on ceasefire was reached with Pakistan. Upon termination of the second three-day ultimatum to India, China announced that the terms of the ultimatum had been met, but India denied the Chinese assertion. During the 1971 Indo-Pak hostilities and the creation of Bangladesh, China vehemently criticized India for interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs and pledged support to Pakistan. It ridiculed the creation of Bangladesh and equated it with the creation of Manchukuo2 by Japan in China’s northeast in 1932. On 5 December 1971, Huang Hua, in a draft resolution submitted to the UN, condemned India for 2 Manchukuo

[Manzhouguo]—the Manchu State—was created by the Japanese on 9 March 1932 with the last Qing emperor Pu Yi, deposed in 1912 as its Chief Executive in order to legitimize their aggression. Japan had claimed that Manzhouguo was a spontaneous development and the Japanese action in Manchuria was necessitated by self-defence. The Indian Viceroy Lytton headed the commission; commission’s report refuted the Japanese claims and refused to recognize the legality of Manzhouguo.

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“creating a so-called Bangla Desh [Bangladesh] and subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan.” China accused India of “big Indiaism” and creating the “so-called refugee problem” as a pretext for its “unbridled armed invasion against Pakistan.” Recalling the Tibetan revolt of 1959, the “commentator” of Renmin Ribao wrote on 6 December 1971 that “A decade back, didn’t the Indian reactionaries also create the ‘Tibetan refugee question’?” The “commentator” further remarked that when the “rebellion of serf-owners” failed [in Tibet], India “abducted” tens of thousands of Tibetans and made it as an excuse to carry out anti-Chinese activities. After New Delhi’s recognition of independent Bangladesh, China once again minced no words to spit venom at India and the Soviet Union. The very fact that China stood as a moot spectator to the agony of its “all weather friend” in 1971 put it in a desperate situation. It could only mince the words like “What kind of nonsense is this Bangladesh?” Does India’s intervention mean that “its neighbours can send troops into India’s West Bengal, Punjab etc. and create a ‘West Bangla Desh’ or ‘Sikhstan’?” “The puppet ‘Bangla Desh’ imposed by the ‘Indian reactionaries’ will definitely come to no good end. “Large scale massacres are taking place in East Pakistan, now under Indian troops’ occupation (Renmin Ribao 8 December 1971; Peking Review, 31 December 1971a, 1971b, 14–15).” Also, if we analyse Kargil coverage in the Chinese media, it had a definite proPakistan tilt in contrast to China’s public pronouncements. Wenhui Daily of 7 June 1999 portrayed Pakistan as a peace-loving country whose resolve to solve the issue through peaceful means was spurned by India time and again. Guangming Daily of 9 June 1999 gave the same impression. It went on reporting to the extent that the Indian Air Force was bombarding positions inside Pakistani territory. The Liberation Army Daily commented with contempt in its 12 June 1999 issue that India was dreaming to be a military superpower and has been exposing its lethal weapons one after another. Yet in another article, the same paper made the following observations about India on 1 July 1999. Firstly, the Indian action in Kargil was a manifestation of its thinking that it was a world power. Secondly, India has been inspired by the NATO led attack on Yugoslavia, a lesson of winning through might. Thirdly, present political leadership was making political capital out of the issue. Li (1999) writing on Kargil in Beijing Review also gave the impression as if India was bent on escalating war, and only Pakistan was offering peace time and again.3 The Chinese must watch the interview of reputed Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi’s given to Geo News of Pakistan to know the entire truth (Sethi 2017). In early 2019, in the wake of India’s air strikes on Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) training camp in Balakot, Pakistan the Chinese media was abuzz with all kind of reports and analysis, but one and all maintained that the source of the present tension between India and Pakistan was India holding Pakistan responsible for the Pulwama terror attack. They posit that India “without any real evidence” identified the Pakistani government as “behind-the-scenes manipulator” of the attack irrespective of the fact that “Pakistan has denied to have any track with the outfit.” Cheng Xizhong, a Senior 3 Chinese media coverage of the Kargil conflict could also be found in China Report, Vol. 35, No. 4, October–December 1999: 527–545.

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Research Fellow at the Chahar Institute, holds that India “unilaterally crossing the Line of Control” is solely responsible for the current tensions. According to him, “unilateral air strikes against the so-called ‘terror camp’ is a serious violation of the [ceasefire] agreement reached between India and Pakistan.” According to a CNR (China National Radio) Defence Time Military Observer, Fang Bing, the Indian airstrikes were not carried inside Pakistan but in the “Pakistan controlled Kashmir.” Chinese media bought Pakistan version that F-16 were not deployed, and that in the face of interception from the Chinese made JF17 (xiaolong or Thunder) the Indian Mirage fighters, prematurely emptied the ammo on a hilltop causing the “death” of ten trees and “did not achieve the desired effect.” Another article questions the $10 billion worth surgical strike by India, whose military assets have been “manufactured in thousand countries.” As regards the “retaliatory strikes” by Pakistan Air Force, the Chinese local media has all the praises for its third generation JF 17 successfully shooting down the “comparatively low grade MiG 21” which established the “superior features” of the Chinese aircraft and the “professional capabilities of the Pakistan pilots.” Some articles are even speculating that India and Pakistan are at the verge of fighting a fourth war, and that India’s only aircraft career Vikrmaditya is eying at Karachi. Nevertheless, they say, so far “Pakistan has clearly gained an upper hand in the conflict initiated by India.” Even the loss of seven Indian Air Force personnel in an MI-17 crash was adjudged as a “big gain for Pakistan” in another headline. An article posted on the Tencent News titled “Is the US brazenly protecting India and unreasonably depriving our Iron Brother, Pakistan of its right to counterattack?” argues that “the US has not persuaded its two allies to stop the conflict in a fair and just manner. On the contrary, it has unreasonably demanded that the Iron Brother Pakistan “refrain from further military action”; to put it bluntly, the USA is asking Pakistanis “not to fight back” thus create a space for the Modi government to “win this war.” Obviously, Pakistan will not submit to India in accordance with the wishes of the USA, concludes the analyst (Deepak 2019a). It could be discerned that though the mainstream English newspaper China Daily and Xinhua reported responsibly, however, various media outlets, especially the social media which cater to domestic consumption has reported the events otherwise. No wonder, right from the early 1960s when China formed entente cordiale with Pakistan, it has portrayed Pakistan as a victim in its domestic media even if the latter was an aggressor in all the wars it fought with India. Therefore, China sympathizing with Pakistan and its proxies the like LeT and JeM should not be surprising.

1.2 China’s Military Assistance to Pakistan After forging an entente with Pakistan, China became the largest supplier of weapons to Pakistan. After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it joined hands with the USA in arming Pakistan and various jihadi outfits. The sole object of the Chinese strategy was and still remains to exploit Indo-Pak hostility to its advantage. It is reported that from 1953 to 1977, China extended approximately $3.8 billion in aid to Asian

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states. Vietnam, North Korea, Pakistan and Cambodia were the major recipients of China’s largesse, receiving a total of $2.8 billion in aid (Harding 1984, 128). Since most of these countries were dictatorial and engaged in conflicts, the chunk of the aid obviously was for military purposes. In the 1970s, China provided some 500 T-59 main battle tanks, 25 naval vassals and 300 F-6 combat aircrafts in a $600 million program. The Chinese also constructed a tank repair factory at Taxila and an air force repair factory at nearby Kamra (Talbot 1998, 224). The SIPRI also confirms these reports in its yearbooks throughout the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1976, out of $537 million Chinese weapon exports, a whopping 46 were supplied to Pakistan (SIPRI 1978, 226). In another gesture, China deferred for twenty years’ payment on a 1970 loan worth $200 million and wrote off another $110 million in earlier loans. Chinese shipment of tanks, jet fighters, trucks and small arms helped Pakistan rebuild its shattered armed forces. Citing John F. Copper, Garver (2001, 234–35) reveals that during the mid 1980s, Pakistan alone received $1 billion aid from China. Pakistan became heavily dependent on China. In the 1980s, China showed great enthusiasm in modernizing Pakistan’s armed forces. It was in a better position now, as the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping after Mao’s demise had started yielding dividends. Moreover, in 1980, the Carter administration issued 400 licences to China, majority of them were for the export of military technology, covering radars, electronics, transport aircrafts and helicopters (SIPRI 1981, 181). The Indian Express revealed on 30 December 1983 that Pakistan air force had been strengthened during 1982–83 with the induction of Chinese A-5 and F-6 aircrafts belonging to MiG-19 family. China started supplying these aircrafts to Pakistan since 1965, and by 1983 Pakistan had accumulated some 200. There were also about 32 Saab MF-17 trainer aircrafts, called Mashraq by Pakistan. These aircrafts costing some $1.6 million each have been built at the factory set-up with Chinese help at the capital cost of $30 million at the Pakistan aeronautical complex at Kamra. Yet in another report of 4 February 1990, the Indian Express reported that between 1978 and 1988, China supplied Pakistan with 825 T-59 tanks. Between 1988 and 1992, China further supplied 98 F-5As and 40 F-7 fighter jets. During the 1980s, added to the list were Q-5 Fantan; between 1982 and 83 alone, Pakistan ordered 162 such fighters (SIPRI 1984, 252; 1984, 411). Since 1970, China made it a point to supply Pakistan 50 T-59 battle tanks every year. Besides, submarines, surface to air missiles and Hainan Class FAC, Karakorum—eight jet trainers’ aircrafts, F-7 airguard fighters were in Pakistan’s inventory from China. During the 1990s, the supply continued unhindered. When the USA suspended the sale of 71 F-16 to Pakistan, China readily cooperated with Pakistan in a joint development of FC-1 fighter plane thought to be equivalent of F-16 and fitted with Russian engine (Hindustan Times 27 June 1995). In 1999 alone, Pakistan ordered from China 100 F-7MG fighter aircraft (SIPRI 2000, 409). In 2002, China supplied 40 F-7MG fighter aircrafts out of an estimated order of 80 fighters. It also supplied three Type-347 fire control radar for three Jalalat-2 Class FAC produced in Pakistan, 24 C-802/CSS-N-8 Saccade anti-ship missiles for three Jalalat-2 class FAC and agreed to develop 150 FC-1 FGA aircraft to be duly delivered in 2003. Between 1994 and 2001, China delivered Pakistan 550 QW-1 Vanguard portable surface to air missiles

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(called by Pakistan as Anza-2), and between 1990 and 2001 China supplied Pakistan 8,600 Red Arrow (called Baktar Shikan by Pakistan) anti-tank missiles (SIPRI 2002, 235). Presently, China and Pakistan are jointly producing the JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft, which was introduced in 2011. In 2016, Beijing agreed to sell Pakistan eight modified Yuan-class diesel-electric attack submarines believed in operation by 2028 in a deal valued at between US$4 billion and US$5 billion (Wong 2018). SIPRI data shows that in the past 10 years (2008–18), China has supplied weapons worth over $6.4 billion to Pakistan, with the USA coming a distant second at $2.5 billion (Pubby 2019). Pakistani military is increasingly inducting Chinese platforms in the sea, air and on land, the military interoperability of the two, backed by common platforms has thrown challenges to India’s strategic choices.

1.3 Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Worse than supplying conventional weaponry to Pakistan is China’s role in helping Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons, which has raised serious concerns about China’s part in fostering instability in South Asia. It is believed that since the 1970s, China has been instrumental in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. China provided Pakistan with highly enriched uranium, ring magnets necessary for processing uranium and training for nuclear engineers. Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, in fact, is widely believed to be based on Chinese blueprints. Worse, in 1990 and 1992, China provided Pakistan with nuclear-capable M-11 [DF-11] missiles that have a range of 186 miles. China reportedly has provided Pakistan technology to build a missile that could strike targets within a 360-mile range. New York Times of 4 June 1998 reported that China, a staunch ally of Pakistan, provided blueprints for the bomb, as well as highly enriched uranium, tritium, scientists and key components for a nuclear weapons production complex, among other crucial tools. Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist, remarked Gary Milhollin, a leading expert on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The world was shocked when A. Q. Khan, the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb” was found guilty of running a clandestine nuclear proliferation network, and transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. On 31 January 2004, Khan was stripped of his position as advisor of the prime minister. On 3 February 2004, Pakistan formally charged four of its nuclear scientists and security officials with transferring nuclear technology to other countries at the behest of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the basis of latter’s probe into Iran’s nuclear programme. The very next day, A. Q. Khan accepted “full responsibility for all illegal transfer of technology and sought clemency from President Pervez Musharraf, which Musharraf granted on 9th February 2004 (The Hindu, February 4 and 10, 2004).” The confession and pardon charade apart, the long-suspected role of China transferring nuclear technology to Pakistan was confirmed when the designs of nuclear weapons that Libya obtained from Pakistan were found to be originated in China. According to

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the reports (The Hindu 16 February 2004), “the packets of documents which included some texts in Chinese were detailed with step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion type nuclear bomb that could be fitted atop a ballistic missile.” The wholesale transfer of nuclear technology with documentary details sent shockwaves across the globe as the experts from USA, UK and the IAEA scrutinized the documents turned over by Libya to the USA. China’s clandestine role has been confirmed by none other than A Q Khan in a letter to his Dutch wife Henny, which has been procured by a journalist called Siman Henderson and revealed to media albeit a few paragraphs from it in September 2009. This “leak” confirms China as one of the most dangerous proliferators of nuclear technology in the world and that also to rouge and dictatorial regimes, thus denigrate China as a responsible nuclear power beyond doubt. According to the letter published in the Sunday Times on 20 September, “we [Pakistan] put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250 km southwest of Xian). The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%)”. These are the words of none other than the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb” and confirms China arming Pakistan to realize its strategy of pinning down India to South Asia by hook or crook. Citing the report, Raman (2009), former Additional Secretary of Cabinet Secretariat maintains that “…the disclosures in AQ Khan’s letter of details of the Chinese assistance in developing an atomic bomb for possible use against India would add to the suspicions and fears in the Indian civil society over what they see as China’s malevolent attitude towards India.”

2 Nuclear Detonations in the Subcontinent Exactly 24 years before the 1998 explosion, when India exploded its first nuclear device, China nervously visualized the end of the status quo in South Asian power equations. The test was viewed by Beijing as a tool to subdue its “all-weather friend” Pakistan and nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat to South Asia. It was after the Indian nuclear test in 1974 that China thought it is necessary to nuclearize Pakistan. In the words of Garver (2001, 327), given the greater disparity in Indian and Pakistan power after 1971, a “fourth round” with India using its overwhelming power to subordinate Pakistan decisively may have seemed more likely to China. In such a scenario, Beijing would face “the unpleasant choice of intervening to save Pakistan, thereby assuming the cost of another war with India, or doing nothing while its key south Asian ally was reduced to impotence. Support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme averted such a choice by diminishing the likelihood that India would opt for a decisive war against Pakistan. Therefore, in 1998 when India went nuclear, it showed a similar nervousness and aggressiveness towards India for creating ruptures in its power equations as reflected in Zhang Wenmu’s article of 23 September 1998 in Ta Kong Pao, a mouthpiece of the PRC published from Hong Kong:

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What India is playing at present seems to be the risky game that Germany, Japan, and Italy played in the 1930s and 1940s and Iraq played in the 1980s and 1990s. On the issue of India’s nuclear test and hegemonic behavior in South Asia, the West seems to be repeating the mistake they made in the 1930s when they pursued an ‘appeasement policy’ and tried to ‘shift the peril eastward.’ If the fact that Japan’s starting the ‘18 September incident in 1931,’ Germany’s sending troops into the non-military zone on the Rhine in 1936, and Italy’s annexing Ethiopia were actions not contained by an international effort, marked the beginning of the end of the Versailles—Washington Treaty System, then the mushroom cloud rising once again above South Asia is an open challenge to the forces that try to maintain the system of International treaties in the age of peace and development. However, some Chinese scholars have pointed out that had India adopted a little cautious approach, the new negative factor [the problem of nuclear weapons] in Sino-Indian relations could have been avoided (Sun 2000, 360). China having felt the dilution of its entente with Pakistan in the wake of Indian explosions was at loss. It encouraged Pakistan to conduct its own tests, so as the entente is sustained at any cost. The New York Times on 21st May reported Mr. Ahmed as saying that China would not impose economic sanctions should Pakistan conduct a nuclear test. When asked by reporters whether China had also asked Pakistan not to go nuclear, Ahmed replied. “China has not asked us to do anything which is not in our national interest (Dawn, 21st May 1998).” Finally, as put by Zhao (2000, 378), “Pakistan hesitated for a moment and after two weeks of observation detonated its nuclear devices on 27th and 30th May 1998.” Paying a lip service to the Pakistan’s nuclear tests, China Daily on 29 May quoted Zhu Bangzao saying that China expresses its deep regret over Pakistan’s nuclear test. The English mouthpiece of the CPC quoted Zhu under the headlines “Pakistan Evens Nuclear Account: Sharif.” After the tests, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif praised China for its support during “this hour of crisis” and said Pakistan was proud of its great neighbor (Dawn, 29 May 1998).

3 Cross Border Terrorism and China Owing to its nexus with Pakistan, China always viewed cross-border terrorism in the subcontinent through Pakistani prizm. It is for this reason that since 2009 or post 26.11 Mumbai terror attack by Pakistan based terror outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) that China has come to the rescue of kingpins of these notorious outfits like Hafiz Saeed, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhavi, and Masood Azhar by exercising technical hold for ‘want of evidences’ against them. It was only in 2019 when other countries of the UN threatened to bring the matter for open discussion in the UN that China went on to declare Masood Azhar as an international terrorist. China demands more evidences from India when it is known to the entire world that one of the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani national was caught alive and later sentenced to death. It is unbelievable

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that China does not know about Masood Azhar, the leader of the JeM created by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) in the wake of 1999 hijack of AI flight 814 to Kandahar by Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) of which Masood was a member then and confined to imprisonment in India. The terrorists had then demanded release of Masood and others languishing in the Indian prisons in exchange of civilians in the passenger aircraft. So, what are the real reasons behind China’s support to these terrorists? First and foremost, the JeM and LeT etc. terror outfits have been created by Pakistan with the motive to separate Kashmir from India and flare up insurgency there and elsewhere in India. Since China doesn’t recognise Ladakh and Kashmir as parts of India, therefore, disturbances there serve the Chinese purpose of helping Pakistan in the conflict and force India to fight the proxy war. It is for the same reason, how the Chinese press absolved Pakistan from 26.11 Mumbai terror attacks and blamed it on some ‘Hindu fundamentalists’ as Kasab and others were supporting the Hindu sacred thread on their wrists. Secondly, China’s axis with Pakistan, at least since the advocacy of ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ is not limited to the so-called ‘mono-dimensional’ military security cooperation but goes beyond, especially the maritime and energy security which is evident from the Chinese commitment to invest $71 billion in building the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. India not supplying enough “evidences” to China on all the occasions is a mere excuse, and the real Chinese intention as argued by three Chinese experts in an article published in the Global Times becomes obvious. According to Liu Zongyi, a senior fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, “if New Delhi succeeds in having both the JeM and its leader blacklisted [read with China’s support] Islamabad would be branded as a state sponsor of terrorism and isolated on the international stage.” The scholar also says that China’s “technical strategy” is to question India’s definition of terrorism. Implying that China sees the issue of terrorism with the prism of Pakistan, i.e., to differentiate between the good and bad terrorists. Another scholar, Long Xingchun, a non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies says that if China supports India’s position, it will repudiate its own previous position of technical hold leaving the impression that China was “deliberately blocking India’s bid in the past.” Zhang Jiadong, Director of Centre for South Asian Studies, Fudan University, is perhaps hinting at the Tibetan émigré, when he says that “Many antiChina terrorists organizations and their leaders are still active in many countries and regions and are sometimes treated as guests” an obvious reference that China must not support India when “Tibetan separatists” are operating from India (GT 2019).

4 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor The “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) was propounded by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The “Belt” refers to Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) that aims to integrate China’s westward development strategy with the Eurasian landmass. The “Road” refers to the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) connecting

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China with Africa and Europe by ocean. The BRI envisages to absorb China’s capital and overcapacities through five major goals identified as promoting policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, uninterrupted trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonding. In order to facilitate the above “five connectivity goals,” China identified six major economic corridors along the BRI for a new type of regional development model. These are China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); New Eurasia Land Bridge; China, Mongolia, Russia Economic Corridor; China Central Asia Economic Corridor; China, Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor; and China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC was added to the list during the Second Forum on BRI in 2019 replacing Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM). Of these, CPEC has been considered as the flagship in which China has commited to pump more than $70 billion. China initially committed $46 billion to the CPEC, gradually enhancing the investment to $62 billion and then to $73 billion at present (Live Mint 2017; TRT World 2020). The signing of the CPEC in 2015, especially some of the projects like the Gwadar Port, an oil pipeline from Gwadar to Kashgar, and hydel projects in Gilgit Blatistan instantly changed the behaviour of the Indian government, as all these projects were being executed by China in the Indian claimed territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. India’s lukewarm approach to the BRI on account of not been consulted by China prior to declaring the BCIM as a part of the BRI now turned to aggressive opposition to the project. India’s sensitivities related to sovereignty were spelled out by the then India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar during the sidelines of India-China restructured strategic dialogue in 2017. Jaishankar said (2017), “The fact that China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of this particular initiative. CPEC violates Indian sovereignty because it runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).” If the proceedings of the CPEC are correlated with other hubs and spokes of China’s pivot to Asia, India will not buy the Chinese argument (Lin 2017) that “ if India looks at the Chinese initiative from the prism of geopolitics, its connotations becomes entirely different.” They are bound to become different if China has plans to connect G219 Lhasa–Kashgar highway to G314 Karakoram highway at Shaksgam (area ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963) Pass, then India’s fear about China having DBO base as well as Siachin in its strategic calculus comes true. Therefore, China’s incursions in the Western sector in May 2020 that resulted in bloody clashes at Patrolling Point 14 in Galwan could be regarded as China doing a Kargil the way Pakistan did it in 1999. Despite of the massive deployment from both the sides, the stand-off has not resulted in a conflict like Kargil, nonetheless, if China remains insensitive to India’s sensitivities, the conflict may escalate to new proportion.

5 Abrogation of Article 370 by India The Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that accorded special status to Jammu and Kashmir was abrogated by the president of India on 6 August 2019 after both

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the houses of the parliament passed a motion revoking the status and bifurcating the state into two union territories. The abrogation invited strongest reactions from both Pakistan and China. Reacting to the abrogation and bifurcation, Hua Chunying, the spokeswomen of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) told during a press briefing on 6 August that “China has always opposed the Indian side’s transfer of Chinese territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border into the administrative jurisdiction of India. This position is firm and consistent and has never changed. Recently, the Indian side has continued to damage China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally modifying the domestic law. This practice is unacceptable and will not have any effect. We urge the Indian side to be cautious on the border issue, strictly abide by the relevant agreements reached between the two sides, and avoid taking actions that further complicate the border issue” (Deepak 2019). The statement of the MOFA was not all, Chinese media was set ablaze by rhetoric like “India unilaterally annexes Chinese territory of Ladakh, which equals 7 Shanghais (some said 40 Hong Kongs) into the Indian political map. Even the Chinese scholarship on India scrambled for varied explanations.” According to Hu Shisheng (2019) of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the move is aimed at “strengthening effective control,” “establishing a strong image” and the “promotion and revival of Hindu nationalism.” Hu is of the view that some politicians and elites whose rights have been compromised may encourage the people to engage in violent activities; moderates may join hands with the radicals; and some extremist forces seeking independence may even create terrorist attacks; however, he believes that ultimately normalcy would be restored. Zhao (2019), a researcher with Shanghai Institute of International Studies in an article titled, “Indian Government is carried away by populism” takes a more aggressive line. Reiterating position of the Chinese government, he says that the Indian move “undermined the status quo of the disputed western sector of China and India, which has caused great concern to China.” Zhao does not claim entire Ladakh as Chinese territory, but does mention that it was a “subsidiary of Tibet in history.” He also makes mention of the 33,000 km2 disputed Aksai Chin under the Chinese jurisdiction. According to him, by amending the constitution and creating the union territory of Ladakh, India has “obviously unilaterally changed the status quo of the disputed boundary in the Western sector.” Zhao either is ill informed about the history of the region or is deliberately brushing aside the instrument of accession, when he says that India annexed some parts of Kashmir following the India–Pakistan conflict. According to him, the carving of a new union territory is an “affront to China.” He says that in 1987, Indian government created the so-called Arunachal Pradesh in a similar fashion. Wang (2020) a researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International relations has even attributed the abrogation of the article 370 to the bloodshed in Galwan and says that it has “dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India.” Another article written by Lan (2019) of China Institute of International Studies on 15 August in China Daily opines that the abrogation of the Article 370 has opened a “Pandora’s box” and that “India’s unilateral move to fundamentally change the administrative division of the region and seize Pakistani and Chinese territories has

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angered its two neighbours and invited strong reactions from both.” Voicing concerns of the Kashmiris that the move will change the demography of the region, he attributes it as a “careless move” while ignoring China’s own demographic changes in Xinjiang and Tibet since the 1950s. He opines that the prevailing situation in Kashmir “could trigger a new round of violence in the restive region and the resulting security disaster could trigger a devastating storm in South Asia.” Forget about the articles published by the jingoistic Global Times and the statements such as “We don’t know how India dares to flatly scrap Kashmir’s autonomy” by its equally cacophonous editor Hu Xijin. Chinese media and scholars must know that the “special status” accorded to Kashmir is by India not by any other country and was temporary in nature. It was again India, which took it to the United Nation at a time when China did not even repose its trust in the international organization. Since the UN failed to vacate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir from its armed forces, a prerequisite for the plebiscite, India increasingly adopted bilateral approach demonstrated by the 1972 Shimla Agreement. However, rather than finding a bilateral solution, Pakistan has exported terror by creating terror outfits like Jaish e Mohamed, Lashkar e Taiba, Jamaat ud Dawah, etc., as instruments of state policy. It is in this context that India deemed it fit to put a full stop to the policies which did not yield desirable results in Kashmir. It was also in this context that the Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar told his Chinese counterpart on 12 August on the sidelines of the second high-level cultural and people-to-people exchange mechanism that the abrogation of the Article 370 was an internal affair of India and that the move would have no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control with China. Not satisfied with the Indian reply, China pushed the letter of Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on Kashmir for closed-door informal consultations at the UN Security Council without any outcome, nonetheless, China’s Ambassador to the UN, Zhang Jun told the media after the meeting that the members of the Security Council “expressed serious concerns” regarding the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir, as well the situation of “human rights” there. He reiterated what Wang Yi had told Qureshi in Beijing that the issue must be resolved according to the “relevant Security Council resolutions, the UN Charter and bilateral agreements,” and that it is an internationally recognized dispute. He also said that the “unilateral actions” of India have “changed the status quo” and will aggravate the tensions. As rightly pointed out by Syed Akbaruddin, India’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UNSC that the “two states” [China and Pakistan] have tried to pass off their own statements as the will of the international community. Most appalling was Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Yao Jing’s statement when he said on 4 October in Islamabad that “We (Chinese) are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability” forcing India to lodge a strong protest and seek clarification as regards the change in Chinese position (IE 2019).

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6 Strategic Implications and Choices for India China’s rapprochement with Pakistan irrespective of ideological differences is becoming stronger, especially with Pakistan’s fallout with the USA and China’s massive investment in the CPEC. It is a well calculated move from China’s foreign policy-makers that would have far-reaching implications to India. Militarily, it poses a two front threat [in fact three front before the creation of Bangladesh] to India. Both China and Pakistan would have the last laugh if they are successful in reactivating the third front as well. If the posturing of China in the neighbourhood is to be believed, China is creating more pivots in the neighbourhood. Economically, India would have to divert massive funds to its military build-up at the cost of national economic growth and development. Politically, continued India-Pak embitterment and armed clashes would draw the attention of international community and China could sit on the fence to watch the show on the one hand and develop its economy on the other. As remarked by Garver (2001, 188), the internecine feud with Pakistan pulls India down to the level of Pakistan to China’s benefit. In the light of this, what are the possible lessons and options for India?

6.1 India Has to Live Up with the Axis As Pakistan is obsessed with India militarily and diplomatically and is willing to play the pawn, India needs to live up with this nexus and calculate it in its own military as well as foreign policy calculus. Since it serves the strategic goals of China, it is futile to expect China to dehyphenate India–Pakistan relations. Nonetheless, India must continue to work towards this goal by aggressive diplomacy on the one hand and by strengthening our internal economic and political drivers on the other. Meanwhile, the focus must be shifted from Pakistan to China, as threat from China is bigger than that emanating from Pakistan. Pakistan at best can be handled at local level without making noises about it. Logic demands that India should simply ignore Pakistan baiting in any regional or global forums, for it drags India to the level of Pakistan and indirectly serves the Chinese purpose.

6.2 Expand Our Footprints in the Neighbourhood Strategic engagement also calls for engagement with and improved political, economic and military relations with Southeast Asia, and other South Asian countries, thus integrate India to these countries in a holistic way. India has already initiated a Look/Act East Policy and has increased its presence in Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and Japan, etc., countries. As regards its immediate

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neighbours, India needs to be more magnanimous in its approach while resolving bilateral issues.

6.3 Adjust to Regional and Global Balance Favouring China Today, China feels that it has achieved the goal of transforming China into an Asian power and have started to influence the world affairs with the turning of its economic success story. This is evident from forcing its views on climate change, human rights and preventing the Western leaders to host and meet the Dalai Lama. India must not look for parity with China, but acknowledge the fact of regional balance favouring of China. Therefore, the kind of understanding India had reached with China in the 1980s and 1990s has been belied by China’s assertiveness and belligerence along the border. Nevertheless, India must assert confidence and stand up to China’s assertiveness, as was the case in Doklam and Galwan. It should not be what Sumit Ganguli’s (2001, 96) calls Congress’s policy of “appeasement and muddling through” and the policy of “genuflection before the Middle Kingdom.”

6.4 Coalition of Democracies Post-Covid-19 and Galwan throw new challenges and opportunities to India’s engagement in the neighbourhood and beyond. India must free herself from the delusion that China will be sensitive towards India’s core interests and sensitivities in the neighbourhood. One view is that India may engage with middle powers like France, UK, Japan, Australia, South Korea, etc., in a more proactive manner in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, India can strengthen its coalition with countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Mayanmar and Philippines in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, since the USA is the most important offshore balancer in the region and India’s security and economic interest are getting closed intertwined, it is pertinent for India to shed the erstwhile ambivalence and ambiguity. At the same time, the Russian factor in the region cannot be ignored, India cannot afford to antagonize Russia, rather explore possibilities so as Russia’s relations with the west are normalized.

6.5 Counter-Terrorism as an Opportunity China perhaps for the first time acknowledged publicly on 12 November 2001 at the sidelines of the Foreign Ministerial International Anti-terrorism Conference that it was also a victim of terrorism in Xinjiang (Renmin Ribao 14 November 2001). Tang Jiaxuan, the then Foreign Minister of China said:

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“The “Eastern Turkestan” terrorists were being trained and funded by international terrorist groups, and have engaged in terrorist activities in Xinjiang and other places in China. The out and out “Eastern Turkestan” terrorism is a part of international terrorism and must be dealt firmly.”

It was probably in the wake of 11 September terrorist strikes that China started showing greater interest in Indian offer for establishing a bilateral dialogue mechanism against terrorism. It is apparently concerned over Islamist extremism in Pakistan. They have suspected Uighur Muslims to be trained in Pakistan. Since 2002, there have been many attacks on Chinese engineers working in Balochistan, in two of these, Uighurs were suspected and in one in 2007. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important for China to have an environment of peace in Pakistan on two accounts: one, to prevent the Uighurs’ training in terrorist camps in Pakistan and to carry out the construction work of the projects it has undertaken under the CPEC in violence affected areas in Baluchistan and other parts inside Pakistan. It may be reminded that its commercial port cum naval base in Gwadar and the development of the Saindak copper-cum-gold mines are in Balochistan. The Balochi are strongly opposed to the Gwadar project, which they view as essentially meant to serve the economic and military interests of the Punjabis. Distrusting the Balochs, the then regime of President General Pervez Musharraf resettled a large number of Punjabis, many of them ex-servicemen, in Balochistan, particularly in the Mekran Coast, for working in the Gwadar project as well as in another Chinese-aided infrastructure project for the construction of a coastal road connecting Gwadar and Karachi. The Chinese exploration at Saintan had created a huge hue and cry in the Pak media, alleging that due to no supervision mechanism, the Chinese were extracting more than the desired quantity. This kind of relationship could be shaken at any given point under changed equations and circumstances.

7 Conclusion Sino-Pak nexus is not limited to China arming Pakistan to teeth, but also its tactical, political and economic support to Pakistan in the times of crises. It is obvious that China has all along exploited India–Pakistan hostilities to its advantage; be it the 1965, 1971, 1999, 2019 India-Pak conflicts or the recent abrogation of Article 370. India steering out of China’s South Asia status quo game plan has made it extremely nervous and paranoid. The most astounding example is India’s civil nuclear cooperation with the USA and India’s close proximity with the USA, Japan and Australia. As regards the former, just three days before the NSG meet in Vienna in 2008, CPC’s official newspaper slammed the deal and described it as “a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime.” At NSG also contrary to its earlier commitment that it will play a positive role at the NSG, China joined hold out countries like Austria, New Zealand, Ireland and Switzerland and took a different line creating problems for a consensus on the waiver. It was only after India expressed its disappointment through a demarche to China and George W Bush’s words with the Chinese President Hu

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Jintao that China agreed to a consensus. As regards the latter China was nervous and worried as it thought that the quadrangle was formed in order to contain China. There are other issues such as implicit opposition to India’s bid to the United Nations as a permanent member, even though China has expressed it “supports India’s aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations, including the Security Council”. China may continue to harp that its “all whether, all dimensional friendship” with Pakistan is not directed towards any third country, however, the bonhomie would continue to generate anxiety in India exactly in the same fashion as the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan émigré in India has been creating for China, notwithstanding India’s reiteration that Tibet is a part of China. India, therefore, needs to live with this strategic consideration of Beijing and continues to develop relations with both the countries realistically. More importantly, India needs to engage Pakistan rather than to isolate it.

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Zhao, G. (2019).《印度政府被民粹主义冲昏头脑》Indian government is overwhelmed by populism. Xinmin.cn, 15 August 2019. https://newsxmwb.xinmin.cn/world/2019/08/15/315 71292.html Zhao, W. (2000).《印中关系风云录: 1949–1999》 Records of Turbulences in Sino-Indian Relations: 1949–1999. Beijing: Current Affairs Publishers.

Chapter 6

India and the Belt and Road Initiative of China: Historicity, Converging/Conflicting Interests and Responses

Ever since being elected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012 and subsequently the President of China in March 2013, Xi Jinping has put forth his grandiose ideas like the “Chinese Dream” and “One Belt and One Road” or the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The former aims to “realize great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by realizing the two centenary goals, i.e. to double the 2010 GDP per capita income and build a moderately prosperous society by 2021 when the CPC marks its 100th anniversary, and the second is to turn China into “a great modern socialist country” by 2049 when the PRC marks its centenary. The latter refers to setting up of a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the TwentyFirst Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) reviving China’s ancient connections with Europe by land and sea (Xi 2014, 315–20). These have raised hopes as well as suspicion as to what China is up to, and that even if silk routes existed in ancient times, but what is the relevance of such initiatives in modern times? And also, whether such initiatives are in sync with China’s foreign policy goals such as multi-polarity, common security, and not seeking hegemony, etc. or is the advocacy an antidote to the US foreign policy goals like Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ (QSD), etc., or, is China challenging the US hegemony and rewriting the rules of global engagement? The concept was first proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013 when he said that “To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an “economic belt” along the silk road. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route”. Xi (2014) proposed that traffic connectivity needs to be improved, so as to open the strategic regional thoroughfare from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and gradually move towards the set-up of a network of transportation that connects Eastern, Western and Southern Asia. Chinese President also urged the regional members to promote local-currency settlement so as to improve their immunity to financial risks and their global competitiveness”. Undoubtedly, the economic connectivity is the heart of the matter for which Chinese President also announced © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_6

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the establishment of a Silk Road Fund with $40 billion to support infrastructure investments in countries involved; Xi Jinping pledged $14.49 billion more to the fund during the First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing in 2017. Nevertheless, the notion is equally significant strategically, as it will imply common security or security dilemmas at regional and trans-regional levels. The initiative of building MSR was proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013 in order to deepen economic and maritime links. The MSR begins in Fuzhou in Southeast China’s Fujian province and heads south into the ASEAN nations, crosses Malacca Strait and turns west to countries along the Indian Ocean before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice via the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Under the ambit of MSR, China plans to build hard and soft infrastructure from Indo-Pacific to Africa, including transport, energy, water management, communication, earth monitoring, economic and social infrastructure. The “Digital” and “Health” silk roads are the new additions to the BRI.

1 Locating MSR in History The “Belt and Road” concept is rooted in history as there existed an overland Silk Route and the MSR that connected China to countries across Asia, Africa and Europe. As far as India and China are concerned, both were connected by land and sea for over two millennia; the names of Bengal (that included Bangladesh), Calicut, Cochin, Quilon are frequently mentioned the Chinese historical records. The earliest records about the MSR could be attributed to Han Annals《汉书》which informs us that there existed a maritime route from southern China to India over Malayan Peninsula during the second century BC. Ban Gu, the court historian of Han Dynasty, provides the first detailed account about the MSR in his Han Annals; however, this does not mean to say that the maritime trade route did not exist before the writing of the Han Annals. Han Annals:Treatise on Geography, vol. II by Ban Gu (32-92) has the following account (Geng 1990, 6–7; ISAS 1994, 7–8; Ray 2004, 49–50): From the Zhangsai in Rinan (日南 present day Vietnam) country passing through Xuwen, Hepu, (徐闻, 合浦 present day Xuwen and Hepu counties in Guangdong and Guangxi respectively) it takes five months to reach Duyuan country (都元国 present day Sumatra) by boat; sailing further by boat for four months is the Yilumo country (邑卢没国 in the vicinity of present day Bago region of Myanmar); a further twenty Irrawaddy coasts in Myanmar); days or so sail will take you to Shenli country ( from here ten days or so journey on foot is Fugan Dulu country (夫甘都卢国 Pyay region at the midstream of Irrawaddy in Myanmar). Then a sail of over two months will take you to Huangzhi (黄支国 Kanchipuram), where the customs of the people, parts of present day Hainan). Huangzhi is big are similar tothose of Zhuya ( and population huge, and abounds in exotic products. The place has been paying tribute to Han since the time of Emperor Wu (140-87 B.C.). The interpreter, who is a royal official accompanied by other assignees went to the sea to buy pearls, beryl

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(vaduriya), precious stones and other exotic products and bartered it with gold and varieties of silks. In every country, they got good food and companionship; foreign merchant vassals took them to their further destinations. There were also people who hankered after profit, and there were cases of robbery and murder. Then there were hazards of sea storms and drowning, and those who survived returned many years later. The Larger pearls could reach two centimetres (cun) in diameter. During the Yuanshi Era of Emperor Ping when Wang Mang executed government affairs, as he wished to showoff the brilliance of his majestic virtue, sent rich gifts to the king of Huangzhi, in return Huanzhi sent an embassy along with the present of a live rhinoceros. About eight months sail from Huangzhi will take you to Pizong (皮宗 Pakehan River Bay of Isthmus Kra in Malay Peninsula); a further two months sail will take you to the border of Xianglin (象林 Duy Xuyen in Quang Nam province of Vietnam) in Rinan country. To the south of Huangzhi lies the country of Sichengbu (present day Sri Lanka), it is from here that Han interpreter returned. As regards the location of Huangzhi, there have been varied opinions among the scholars; however, the one which have found currency is that it could be identified with present day Kanchipuram in South India. Chinese scholars such as Feng Chenjun and Han Chenhua support such claim. Sichengbu country that was located in the south of Huangzhi, has been reliably identified with Sinhala or present day Sri Lanka, therefore, Huangzhi may be identified with Kanchipuram. There may be differences among scholars about the exact location of these places, but one thing is certain that people in Southeast Asia and South Asia had established trade and other relations with China since time immemorial; the maritime was one of the main routes of communication between them. As the route gained popularity, many new harbours sprang up along with the old Guangzhou. Ports such as Yangzhou and Quanzhou rose to prominence; it is mentioned in Old Tang Annals. Biography of Tian Shen-gong that when Tang general Tian Shen-gong entered Yangzhou that was controlled by a renegade Liu Zhan, Tian ransacked the city and slaughtered thousands of Persian and other foreign merchants (JTS; Ji 1991, 92). By this time, Quanzhou has also become one of the most important ports in China; here again, there were traders from India, other south Asian and Arab countries. There were Arabian, Indian streets or towns of foreign communities in Quanzhou on the lines of present day China Towns across the globe. Archaeologists have unearthed over two hundred cultural relics of Hindu sculpture in Quanzhou. In 1984, in an archaeological survey, a shivalinga was unearthed from the city wall of Tonghaimenguan in Xiawei village of Quanzhou (Yang 1991, 100) Similarly, Chinese traders settled in Indian port cities. Wang Dayuan of Yuan Dynasty (1279– 1368) and the author of Accounts Of Foreign Islands records that (Geng 1990, 286) while in Nagapattam in Southern India, he saw a Cinastupa (Chinese monastery). The Chinese characters carved on it read, “construction completed in the eighth month of third Xianxiang year during the Southern Song Dynasty in 1267”. If the route originated in Han period, it increased in popularity during the Three Kingdoms Period (220–280) and Sui Dynasty (581–618), prospered during Tang (618–960) and Song (960–1297), and reached zenith during Yuan (1279–1368) and Ming (1368–1644) periods. The Naval Expedition in the Pacific and Indian Ocean

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by Zheng He, at the imperial decree of Ming emperor Yong Le between 1405 and 1433 while demonstrating the great importance of the Silk Road, also establishes the Chinese supremacy in the high seas. The accounts of Wang Dayuan (1330–1350), Fei Xin (1409–1433), Ma Huan and Gong Zhen (1413–1433) who except Wang were part of Zheng He’s maritime exploration reveal that Calicut and Cochin in India rose to prominence as new ports. References of other sea ports such as Mahabalipuram, Goa, Nagapattam, Quilon, Nicobar, Bombay, Malabar, Calcutta and many more could be found in the records left by them.

1.1 Zheng He’s Maritime Explorations—Realpolitik and Problems Zheng He’s explorations started off from Nanjing and some touched the east coast of Africa. The expedition sailed across Qui Nhon in Champa, Surabaya in Java, the bay of Palembang, then Ceylon and finally Calicut. Ships detached to the main fleet visited Bengal and many other places in the east coast of India, Arabia and Africa. The fleet consisted of several tens of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of vessels; the largest expedition comprised over 300 ships and 28,000 men (Ray 2003, 7). The following chart gives a brief account of his seven voyages and places visited: Table 1 Places visited during the 7 voyages of Zheng He No. of voyages

Time

Places visited in South Asia

1

Yongle 3rd–5th year (1405–1407)

Calicut 古里

2

Yongle 5th–7th year (1407–1409)

Cochin 柯枝, Coimbatore 甘巴里, Cail 加异勒, 阿拔把丹 Cannanore, Ceylon 锡兰山, Calicut 古里

3

Yongle 7th–9th year (1409–1411)

Ceylon 锡兰山, Quilon 小葛兰, Cochin 柯枝, Calicut 古里

4

Yongle 11th–13th year (1413–1415)

Ceylon 锡兰山, Cail 加异勒, Cochin 柯枝, Calicut 古里, Maldives 溜山

5

Yongle 15th–17th year (1417–1419)

Calicut 古里, Cochin 柯枝, Ceylon 锡 兰山, Maldives 溜山, Coimbatore 甘 巴里, 沙里湾泥 sharwayn on the east cost of southernmost India

6

Yongle 19th–20th year (1421–1423)

Calicut 古里, Cochin 柯枝, Cail 加异 勒, Chola 琐里, Ceylon 锡兰山, Coimbatore 甘巴里, 山溜

7

Xuande 5th–8th year (1431–1433)

Calicut 古里, Ceylon 锡兰山, Maldives 溜山, Cochin 柯枝, Quilon 小葛兰, Cail 加异勒, Coimbatore 甘 巴里, Bengal 榜葛剌

Source Compiled on the basis of information provided by Geng Yinzeng (1990)

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According to Prof. Ray (2003, 7, 224; Sen 2014), these visits have given rise to various speculations. The sheer size of these explorations must have overawed many rulers to send tribute to China. The motive of these voyages could not have been entirely peaceful. The intention behind these visits contrary to the Chinese claim that they were peaceful and non-expansionist has to be studied carefully. While economic factor was one of the reasons, other factors such as quest for the missing emperor Huidi, at least during the first voyage, to showcase the Chinese cultural and military might, and also rewrite the geopolitical order in Pacific and Indian Ocean were some of the other factors. China’s regime change in Annam (Vietnam), extending Chinese tributary system to Siam (Thailand) and Java prior to Zheng He’s voyages, but the defeat of Palembang (a Srivijaya principality) ruler Chen Zuyi and his decapitation in Nanjing during the first voyage (Fei Hsin 1436, 53), as well as the dethroning of Alagagkonara (Fei Hsin 1436, 64–65), and taking him all the way to China in 1411 during the third voyage albeit he was released and sent back next year are some of the incidents revealing this aspect of Zheng He’s maritime explorations. Therefore, according to Sen (2014), “the portrayal of Zheng He as an agent of peace and friendship is problematic”; however, he agrees that “China’s Silk Road initiatives could boost economies of those in Asia or Europe willing to claim ancient links”. In other words, Zheng He did demonstrate a sense of realpolitik in engaging China in Southeast and South Asia and acting as a countervailing power in all the episodes of regime change. However, we may also argue that Chinese presence in Indo-Pacific was not without the political development in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, even if China had storage facilities in the places such as Malacca and Sumatra, they did not seize territories in the littoral states in Indo-Pacific even though it was in a position to do so; neither did China alter the system of trade in the region. With the imperial ban on further voyages, Confucian bureaucracy’s dislike for trade and power of the eunuchs, and protracted wars with Annam abruptly withdrew the Chinese presence in Indo-Pacific; the Qing (1644–1911) initiated the policy of close doors and was awaken only by the gunboat diplomacy of the west.

2 China’s Perspective of the Twenty-First Century MSR According to the Chinese perspective, ancient MSR must be separated from the Twenty-First Century MSR, as the old ceased to exist after 1840. The ancient MSR centred around the idea of “Sinosphere” the mainstay of which was the so-called tributary system and was clearly demonstrated during different phases of Chinese history, especially during Zheng He’s voyages. However, “the Twenty-First Century MSR is based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, above all on equal footing” (Gong 2014, 5–7). Chinese President Xi Jinping (2014, 345-46 italics added) has also invoked the “Silk Road Spirit” saying that “for hundreds of years the spirit embodied by the Silk Road, namely peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning

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and mutual benefits has passed down through the generations”. He further said that in order to promote the Silk Road spirit, “we need to respect each other’s choice of development path, need to focus on mutually beneficial cooperation, and advocate dialogue and peace”. Gong asserts that “the nature of political, diplomatic and trade exchanges, in the age of advanced technology has posed common financial and security risks”. It is obvious that as China’s economic footprints spreads across the continents, to secure the sea lines of communication (SLOC), boost GDP by developing maritime economy, expands maritime space by initiating various connectivity and capacity building projects in littoral states, and ultimately hedge the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the USA and other security constructs such as QSD are considered important for securing national interets. However, the same will also add to tensions in the Indo-Pacific and force countries in the region to make choices between the competing forces in the region. The component of economic security remains pivotal to the MSR, for the security dividends would be built on the former. There are 32 littoral countries including China that touches the MSR. The combined population of these countries is around 4 billion people, and the GDP of around $30 trillion. The RCEP countries alone account for $26.2 trillion (ASEAN 2020). These are the countries with huge potentials and have achieved rapid economic growth recently; therefore, China sees a huge opportunity to reap these potentials. According to XinhuaNet (2017), in 2017, China’s maritime economy grew by 7.5% annually, generated $1.22 trillion, accounting for 10% of the entire GDP. The aim is to raise it to 15% by 2035. Marine economy is just one of the components of China’s strategy to transform China into a “strong maritime power”; others include making forays into marine science and technology and converting China into a strong naval power. It is in this context that China has undertaken port buildings in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, Djibouti, etc. places. Taking stock of the BRI in the last five years, Ning Jizhen, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and director of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), revealed on 28 August 2018 that the total trade of China with the BRI countries as of June 2018 had reached $5 trillion. China invested $28.9 billion and created 240,000 jobs in these countries. Ning Jizhen revealed that as of now, 103 countries and international organizations have signed 118 cooperation agreements with China on the BRI; the implementation rate of these projects according to Ji has reached 95%. The focus has been on the “six economic corridors” of which China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship, and the work is supposedly progressing smoothly. In order to push the projects signed by China under the CPEC, a CPEC Authority headed by an ex-army general has been created. The construction of China–Laos Railway, China–Thai Railway and Hungary–Serbia Railway has been progressing steadily; construction work on some sections of Jakarta–Bandung high-speed Railway has been initiated, and Gwadar Port could be operated to its full capacity. Other rail projects such as Djibouti–Addis Ababa and Mombasa–Nairobi have been completed (Deepak 2018b). One thing which emerged clearly out of President Xi Jinping’s speech during the second BRI Forum on 26th April 2019 is that China is convinced that the projects signed with 125 countries and 29 international organizations during the first forum

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in 2017 have “taken roots” along the “six economic corridors” in various countries (newly signed China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) maintaining the tally at 6 as the BCIM makes an exit), as China’s trade with the BRI countries exceeded $6 trillion, implying that 50% of China’s GDP originates from these countries. Not only China, but various countries along the BRI including the participants from new entrant Italy (the first in the G7) and Switzerland, etc., also echo President Xi Jinping’s words that the “BRI is a common road of opportunities, a road towards prosperity”. The China club, as many have referred to it, is undoubtedly becoming more and more attractive to the countries across the globe (Deepak 2019).

2.1 Responses There are varied responses from various countries as regards China’s “Twenty-First Century MSR”. These responses vary from jumping the bandwagon by expressing their active participation and cooperation; observing neutrality, while some have proposed counter-initiatives. For example, most of the ASEAN countries have welcomed the idea as it sets to build a single market economic community. Having attended the second forum in Beijing in 2019, this author felt that there was almost an unanimity among the participants that prior to the Chinese initiative, the USA and its allies were the sole providers of the global goods; however, when China is willing to provide the same and wanting to make them inclusive by everyone’s participation, the question has been asked about the intention behind these. The thinking is rooted in China’s massive economic engagement with ASEAN as the block become second largest trading partner of China in 2019 with a trade volume of $644 billion. In the first quarter of 2020, ASEAN replaced both the EU and USA to become the largest trading partner of China. It is owing to such a relationship that most of the ASEAN countries have been “balancing economic development with sovereignty” assert Ghiasy et al. (2018) in a study conducted for SIPRI-FES with the signing of the RCEP, the economic partnership between China and ASEAN is bound to be deepened further. Delegates from South Asia have seen the initiative as a massive opportunity for building capacities and eradicating poverty. China has invested billions of dollars in India’s immediate neighbourhood; in Bangladesh, infrastructure projects over $10 billion are being executed. Nepal is executing China–Nepal Transit and Transportation Agreement that will facilitate the building of a connectivity network in terms of roads, rails, air and optical fibre cables along Koshi, Kaligandaki, Karnali, etc., corridors. Interestingly, during this forum, of all the 13 bilateral and 16 multilateral agreements with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, almost none was in the infrastructure sector. India’s official absence from the 2019 forum was conspicuous even though the flag flew high along the BRI countries flags at every venue of the forum. India has been critical of China’s insensitivities towards India’s core interest in the region, especially China’s investment in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The “high quality development” perhaps is meant to blunt the Japanese pitch

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of building “quality infrastructure” in the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and the Indo-Pacific region where India is a partner country. The presence of the all ten ASEAN countries and many African and Latin American nations at the forum show that the Japanese pitch was never a counter to the BRI. Furthermore, the presence of former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatayama and many other delegates from Japan is confirmation of Japan warming up to the Chinese initiative and is even proposing joint investment in third countries, which China has welcomed for various reasons including financing of the projects (Deepak 2019). Obviously, the Chinese initiative including others such as “Made in China 2025” has invited backlash from some countries, especially the USA. They have blamed China for initiating “neo-colonial” policies and establishing a “China centric” order. The issue of government debt in some countries has been hyped and Chinese loans to such countries are portrayed as debt traps. If one believes in the data provided by the Asian Development Bank, Asia will require an infrastructure investment of $1.7 trillion by the year 2030, which is roughly about $800 billion per annum. If the west remains non-committal towards investing in the region, people will certainly welcome the Chinese investment. For example, the US commitment of investing $113 million in the Indo-Pacific may be the case of too little too late. Nevertheless, some of the concerns are genuine. Some of the smaller participants of the BRI such as Mongolia, Pakistan, Laos, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are deep in debt. China committing $72 billions for the CPEC may be difficult for Pakistan to service; the example of Sri Lanka been forced to swap over $1 billion for Chinese equity is an example often cited to highlight the “ills” of the BRI. Though the Laos high-speed railway may connect China to Thailand, but the cost is too high and Laos may never be able to return the money. In 2018, citing “tough financing terms” Pakistan cancelled the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam project; Nepal and Myanmar followed the suit by scrapping a $2.5 billion and $3.6 billion hydroelectricity project, respectively. In the same vein, Malaysia too has cancelled the East Coast Rail Link and the Sabah natural gas pipeline projects in August once the new regime under Mahathir Mohamad formed the government. These may be few aberrations among the 21,284 projects the Chinese companies have contracted in more than 60 countries between 2015 and 2018 worth $410.78 billion. China perhaps has come a long way to understand the political, economic, cultural, environmental and legal risks of the BRI projects. Unlike the initial phase of the BRI, the projects are weighed for every risk and are subjected to asset-liability ratios and return on capital requirements. Moreover, some of the debt issues may have existed before the Chinese investment, therefore, not necessarily related to the BRI (Deepak 2018b). Even Europe sees opportunities in the MSR in China’s “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the BRI”, a document issued by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2017. The document outlines marine ecological conservation, blue carbon, customs cooperation, and marine research infrastructure as key areas for international cooperation (XinhuaNet 2017). According to a study conducted by Duchâtel and Duplaix (2018) for European Council for Foreign Relations, “European public and private actors that can negotiate advantageous terms with Chinese counterparts may be able to benefit from

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partnerships”. The scholars argue that even though China’s MSR affects Europe in five main areas—maritime trade, shipbuilding, emerging growth niches in the blue economy, the global presence of the Chinese navy, but it also creates space for cooperation. They also suggest that the EU “should emulate China’s blue economy as an engine of growth and wealth, and encourage innovation to respond to well-funded Chinese industrial and R&D policies”. As far as Indo-Pacific region is concerned, the scholars suggest that the EU must maintain strategic balance and uphold the vision of rule-based maritime order.

3 “Twenty-First Century MSR” and India India which is considered as an important country by China along the “Belt and Road” perhaps went overboard to boycott the BRI forums. India’s dissatisfaction primarily originates from: (1) no policy consultations over the concept and more importantly on the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that runs through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), parts of which are under Chinese jurisdiction. India considers POK as an integral part of Kashmir, the sovereignty of which has been decided by the instrument of accession in 1947. India has conveyed to China that there would be no compromise on the core issue of sovereignty in the same way as China has never budged on its “one China” policy. (2) Since China-Pak relationship is primarily considered as an anti-India axis, India believes that both will further pin down India to the subcontinent. Thousands of Chinese soldiers operating in the POK territories go beyond the notion of connectivity and unimpeded trade. (3) Contrary to Xi Jinping’s overtures at the forums that there is no geopolitics in the project, India sees it as China’s ambition to realize its long-term vision for Asian regional and world order where given the nature of India-China asymmetrical relationship and Sino-Pak entente cordiale, India’s strategic space would further shrink. In South Asian context, “India centric” fragmented integration according to Chinese scholars has provided an opportunity to China to build the “community of shared future” with neighbouring countries proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014, which since then has been made integral to the construction of the “Belt and Road”. In fact, Xi Jinping’s reference to “build a big family with harmonious co-existence” just demonstrates that (Yang 2018, 43–50). (4) Another concern flagged out by Ghiasy et al. (2018) is India’s worries about the “dependency trap”. “India, alongside a number of stakeholders, believes that China is deliberately creating dependencies among the states along the MSR to make them strategic dependents and to create economic enclaves. China’s lease of ports such as Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Feydhoo Finolhu in the Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan and Obock in Djibouti is a pointer in this direction.

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3.1 Soaring Maritime Ambitions Owing to the massive economic growth rates and burgeoning Gross Domestic Product in these countries along with the trends in maritime environment have forced both India and China to develop new capabilities and power projections. The fundamental factor in China’s military modernization is to increase its power projection capabilities beyond the Chinese borders. This includes the goal of transforming the PLA Navy (PLAN) into a blue water navy, acquiring aerial refuelling capability, creating a rapid reaction force, and bettering its nuclear arsenal. This is primarily because in the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, China realized that mechanized warfare of the industrial era would be gradually replaced by the information warfare. The focus of Chinese military modernization should turn to information and hi-tech war. Factors such as forcible unification of Taiwan over the island’s declaration of independence; restoring the so-called sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea; growing needs to protect China’s Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in order to secure its overseas interests, especially the energy resources; and project its power globally so as to seek an increasingly dominant role in world affairs as it emerges to the status of a strong power from a big power, the modernization of the 225,000 strong PLAN, especially since the 1980s has been going on feverishly. The PLAN has been following a three-step strategy in its modernization process. In the first step, it aims to develop a relatively modernized naval force that can operate within the first island chain, a series of islands that stretch from Japan to the north, to Taiwan, and Philippines to the south. In the second step, the PLAN aims to develop a regional naval force that can operate beyond the first island chain to reach the second island chain, which includes Guam, Indonesia and Australia. In the third stage, the PLAN will develop a global naval force by the mid twenty-first century. In order to achieve this, China’s Central Military Commission under Jiang Zemin developed a three-step strategy. During the first phase, that is by 2010, China must lay a solid foundation for informatized development, and establish informatized systems of the army; during the second phase (from 2011 to 2020), achieve significant progress in information technology, and establish a more comprehensive information system for the armed forces; and during third phase (by 2050), basically achieve the goal of informatized army, and reach the average military level of the developed countries (Xu 2008, 72; Wang 2005, 47–8). Han Junyan (2010), Professor at China’s National Defence University published an article in Huanqiu Shibao, entitled “China’s military must learn to fight the ‘global war’”. Han outlined four broad options for China in order to fight a “global war” on the lines of the US global war strategy. The options for China he said are: (1) China must look for military allies; (2) China must establish overseas military bases; (3) China must use military means to solve the “problem”; and (4) China must participate in international military efforts so as to enhance combat capability of the PLA. As far as setting up military bases is concerned, it has been reported by the Namibian Times that that China plans to set up 18 military bases across the Indian

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Ocean including one in Walvis Bay in Namibia (David 2014; ET 2014; Hartman 2014). The others bases according to the paper include, Chongjin in North Korea, Moresby in Papua New Guinea, Sihanoukville in Cambodia, Koh Lanta in Thailand, Sittwe in Myanmar, Dhaka in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Djibouti in Djibouti, Lagos in Nigeria, Mombasa in Kenya, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Luanda in Angola, as well as in Maldives, and Seychelles, albeit the reports were immediately denied by the then Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng as “inaccurate”, “exaggerated” and therefore “groundless” which he said were based on an unofficial Chinese Internet report. However, if we go through the writings of Chinese strategic analysts like General Zhang (2009, 285) of the Institute of Military Science, it is obvious that China is contemplating to expand its sea power through acquiring military assets including aircraft careers and military bases. As far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, he says that the “possibility (of acquiring bases) cannot be ruled out”, for “if China could acquire naval and air force bases in Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, Pakistan, Iran and Oman, it would enable China to replenish and shield its military assets on the one hand and pin down India on the other. However, the possibility of acquiring bases in Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius is very remote,” maintains Zhang. Nonethless, it appears that Chinese leased Maldivian island of Feydhoo Finolhu could be converted into a military base by China. India on the other hand is also striving to enhance its capabilities by indigenization and overseas procurements. In October 2008, the then navy chief said that “By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three-dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication”.1 It is quite unambiguous that after years of alienation and disenchantment, India has accorded high priority in engaging its immediate and extended neighbours. Inviting SAARC heads of the states to his swearing in ceremony; his first visit to Bhutan and then Nepal as Prime Minister; and a visit to three key Island nations in the Indian Ocean, Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka between 11 and 14 March 2015, Prime Minister Modi has initiated a highly assertive foreign policy. Perhaps taking cues from the Chinese diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region, India signed a series of agreements with the island nations ranging from developing blue economy, developmental strategies to maritime security. India secured infrastructure development rights for two islands in the region—Assumption from Seychelles and Agalega from Mauritius. Giving a fillip to strategic cooperation, Modi also launched a Coastal Surveillance Radar Project in Seychelles. Besides, India also signed an agreement for hydrographical survey for maritime cooperation with Seychelles. It is believed that Seychelles, which currently is an observer, will soon become a full partner in the maritime security cooperation between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka.

1 Global

Security.org “India-Naval Modernization” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ india/in-navy-development.htm (accessed on 24 November 2014).

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3.2 Overlapping Interests If China’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean is becoming a major challenge to India’s maritime security, India’s Act East Policy and increasingly close economic and security ties with ASEAN has made China uneasy when Indian ships sail through the disputed waters of South China Sea. It is in recent years that China has started to define South China Sea as an area of core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. India’s presence in the area has been challenged by China by resorting to various ways. For example, on 22 July 2011, one of India’s amphibious assault vessels, the INS Airavat on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted by the Chinese navy and told that it was in Chinese waters. In June 2012 when four Indian naval ships left the Philippines for South Korea, they were greeted with “Welcome to the South China Sea, Foxtrot-47 [INS Shivalik]” by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) frigates and later escorted for next 12 h. The message was clear that the Indian ships were entering the Chinese waters. In September 2011,when the ONGC Videsh extended the agreement with Petro Vietnam by three-year for block 128, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, reiterated China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea and warned India without naming it that the “relevant countries respect China’s position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue”. The nationalistic Global Times was more aggressive in its editorial published on 14 October 2011 when it wrote: Both countries clearly know what this means for China. China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China in the area. By inking pacts with Vietnam, India probably has deeper considerations in its regional strategy than simply getting barrels of oil and gas. India is willing to fish in the troubled waters of the South China Sea so as to accumulate bargaining chips on other issues with China. There is strong political motivation behind the exploration projects….. China’s vocal objections may not be heeded. China must take practical and firm actions to make these projects fall through. China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries’ exploration. In other words, China should let them know that economic profits via such cooperation can hardly match the risk.

Another newspaper called China Energy News in a front-page commentary published on 16th October 2012 raised the pitch further by noting: India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea. India’s energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool. On the question of cooperation with Vietnam, the bottom line for Indian companies is that they must not enter into the disputed waters of South China Sea. Challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India’s whole energy security and interrupt its economic development. Indian oil company policy makers should consider the interests of their own country, and turn around at the soonest opportunity and leave South China Sea.

Above all China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) called for bids from foreign companies offering exploration of oil in nine blocks in South China

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Sea, including the Block 128. Foreign companies may not be interested in the bids in the disputed region, but the bidding itself is symbolic and assertion of China’s claim in the region. It was perhaps under such a tremendous pressure from China that India communicated openly in 2012 that it also wanted to surrender Block 128 albeit for technoeconomic reasons. India took a 180 degree turn on 15 July 2012 and agreed to stay on when Vietnam requested the ONGC to hold on in Block 128. It is obvious that India has a rather muddled and incoherent policy as regards its exploration in South China Sea. At the outset, when China reacted to India’s presence in South China Sea, India accepted de jure sovereignty of Vietnam in the contracted areas. According to the then spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “the Chinese had concerns but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and have conveyed this to the Chinese”. A little later the then External Affair Minister S M Krishna said India is “purely there for commercial reasons” and for India’s energy security concerns. Of late, India has said that the disputes between different countries in South China Sea are a matter for them to settle; however, India will undertake commercial activities with governments who exercise actual control over disputed territories.

3.3 India’s Responses to China’s MSR As far as “Belt and Road” Initiative of China is concerned, India has been part of the initiative with the signing of the BCIM economic corridor during Chinese Premier, Li keqiang’s India visit in May 2013. The BCIM was made into one of the six economic corridors of the BRI. However, India’s opposition to the BRI and boycott of the two BRI forums presided by Chinese President Xi, Jinping, the BCIM was taken out of the BRI economic corridors during the second BRI Forum in 2019. The BCIM remains an area where policy could be integrated, especially when we are thinking of developing landlocked and underdeveloped northeast region of India. We certainly need to take a leaf out of China’s experience as to how it has developed and connected its south-western and southern states to ASEAN. Is New Delhi ready to forgo its sensitivities in northeast in turn of economic development of the region? Can the trade between China–ASEAN and India–ASEAN percolate to the northeast India and northwest China? The answer to all these questions is yes provided we start looking at boundaries as gateways but not barriers. However, India has been responding to the Twenty-First Century MSR by its own strategy. It has been expanding and strengthening its maritime partnerships with the USA, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, etc. countries on the one hand and engaging ASEAN in various domains on the other. While addressing the annual Delhi Dialogue on ASEAN–India partnership in Delhi on 11 March 2015, India’s the then External Affairs Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj revealed that maritime cooperation with ASEAN was a priority of the government, and that by the end of this year, India will conclude a maritime pact with ASEAN. She said (MEA 2015):

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Enhancing connectivity between India and ASEAN in all its aspects - physical, institutional and people-to-people, is a key strategic priority for us. Our North-Eastern region is our land-bridge to the ASEAN…ASEAN lies at the core of India’s Act East Policy and at the centre of our dream of an Asian century…We also have maritime boundaries with several ASEAN countries, and this is particularly important from a trade perspective. We have started negotiations on an ASEAN-India Maritime Transport Cooperation Agreement, and hope that it will be finalised by the end of the year.

Besides, there is new initiative such as “Project Mausam” initiated by the Ministry of Culture in tandem with Archaeological Society of India (ASI), New Delhi, as the nodal agency and Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), New Delhi, as its Research Unit. The project was launched at the 38th World Heritage Session at Doha, Qatar, on 20th June, 2014. The endeavour of Project “Mausam”: Maritime Routes and Cultural Landscapes is to position itself at two levels: at the macrolevel, it aims to re-connect and re-establish communications between countries of the Indian Ocean world, which would lead to an enhanced understanding of cultural values and concerns; while at the microlevel, the focus is on understanding national cultures in their regional maritime milieu (MoC 2014). Since area covered under the project extends from East Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia, and has been termed as Indian Ocean “world” analysts and media has termed it India’s response to China’s MSR, and even Modi government’s most significant foreign policy initiative designed to counter China, as the project will expand its maritime presence, culturally, strategically and psychologically (Pillalamarri 2014). Pang Zhongying, an international relations professor at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, says that (WCT 2015) “Mausam is a ‘threatening and competing’ initiative that will pose a major challenge to China’s Belt and Road plans, the competing initiatives could turn into a major tussle between the world’s two biggest rising powers”. However, ambassador Le Yucheng holds that (DH 2015) “Belt and Road Initiatives can also be linked with India’s ‘Spice Route’ and ‘Mausam’ projects, thus forming a new starting point and a new bright spot in China-India cooperation”. The idea may be grand but, India at present does not have the financial as well as technological muscle to implement the project, neither has government pushed it the way China has pushed its “Belt and Road” Initiative. If we go through the initiatives of the governments on this front, it does not go beyond a monthly lecture series at India International Centre (IIC), a few workshops and an international conference held in 2015. The kind of information available on IGNCA’s website does not term it beyond a cultural project. The MSR of China is wider in scope and deeper in content, and there are practical goals set by China in terms industrial capacity building, technological cooperation, environmental protection, cultural connections and legal sensitivities more prominently, thus enhancing the scope of the BRI from Eurasia to other continents. Therefore, “Mausam” is merely a cultural project devoid of any strategic intent. Furthermore, India has also been pitching for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). It is understandable that increasing presence of the major maritime powers such as the USA, Japan, Russia, and especially China and its military ties with arch

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rival Pakistan, has created uneasiness in India and the necessity to limit military maritime activity of these powers in the IOR. Strategic proximity to choke points such as the Malacca, Hormuz and Gulf of Aden puts India at a vantage point which was largely ignored until Panikkar (1945, 80) pointed to this in 1945. In his words, “While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India, it is the vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected”. Subsequently during the Cold War, it became the arc of rivalry between major powers and was subjected to militarization. Alarmed by militarization of the IOR, India being the harbinger of non-aligned policy together with many IOR littoral states campaigned for declaring it a zone of peace during the conference of non-aligned states at Lusaka in 1970. In the following year, a Sri Lankan resolution declaring it a zone of peace was adopted which was unanimously adopted by the littoral states in 1979. In 1979, the UN constituted an ad hoc committee to convene a conference in 1981 on the matter in Colombo. T. P Srinivasan, who represented India in the ad hoc committee, recalls (2015) that: The permanent members, except China, did not support the original resolution. France, the United States and the United Kingdom kept out of the committee as they felt that they had been directly targeted…. Till the end of the Cold War, India stuck to the purist interpretation of the zone as an area free of foreign military presence, particularly bases and other facilities, conceived in the context of great power rivalry. Implicitly, India did not object to the movement of warships, as long as they did not threaten the regional states.

The littoral states themselves now worked against it; Pakistan began to emphasize “denuclearization” of the Indian Ocean after the Indian tests of 1974; Sri Lanka was not sure if they wanted the USA out of region; China expressed solidarity for the littoral and hinterland states in seeking to eliminate foreign military presence. The end of the Cold War era saw the USA to establish naval superiority in the region. As ad hoc committee became defunct, India also changed its position. In the face of China’s rise and modernization of the PLA, India initiated its own security measures to strengthen its position in the IOR. It initiated naval exercises with multiple partners including the USA, thus legitimizing the presence of foreign players in the IOR. On 1 December 2014, India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval while delivering the keynote address at the “Galle Dialogue”, held in Sri Lanka’s southern coastal town of Galle, evoked the 1971 resolution and said that “the Indian Ocean has to contribute to the prosperity of different nations, it is necessary that it remains a zone of peace”. Mr. Doval’s remarks were perhaps in response to China’s growing military presence in the island, especially the docking of Chinese nuclear submarine in Sri Lanka a few months earlier in that year. According to Srinivasan (2014): …a new IOZOP will have even less chance of success than the old one. A strategy of enhancing cooperation between the littoral and hinterland states and external powers without the reference to the IOZOP may have a greater chance of success. India has special strengths in combating piracy, alleviating natural disasters and trafficking. The involvement of the U.S. in fighting terrorism may be of an advantage. China has already taken note of India’s

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inclinations in the Asia-Pacific and offered cooperation to avoid the “Asia Pivot” and to adopt an alternative Chinese vision. An opportunity exists for us to develop a third plan of engagement between the regional countries and external forces for fruitful cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

India may not have the capacities and capabilities to match the Chinese MSR; however, she has rolled out its own connectivity initiatives such as the “Act East” policy, “Look North” policy that envisages India’s economic integration with ASEAN and Central Asian Republics. Projects such as India–Myanmar Friendship Road link, which is part of the greater India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway; the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project; the Mekong–India Corridor, which aims to connect India to Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam; development of Sittwe port in south-western part of Myanmar; master plan for integrating India’s northeast to the ASEAN; India’s gas and pipeline projects, Chabahar port development with Iran, and the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), etc. policy initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region.

4 The US Factor in Maritime Security Many in China’s strategic circles believe that Western countries lead by the USA are suspicious of the rise of China, and the grandiose initiatives such as Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund, MSR and most recent Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) has put China at the centre of global geopolitics and geo-economics. These initiative, while challenging the US hegemony in the region has also challenged the US notion of “pivot to Asia”, which is yet to take off but has been viewed by China a rider to the East Asia economic integration (Chen et al. 2014, 78). Not only this, the USA has also created fissures in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and obstructed expansion and cooperation between Asian and European economies by signing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement withe the EU. The TTP and TTIP obstructs China establishing East Asia-Central Asia–West Asia economic and trade cooperation through “overland Silk Route: which in other words also restricts China from expanding its space in the seas (Chen et al. 2014, 78). In the light of these, “Washington will be not as supportive of Beijing’s renewed drive as it was when China started its reform in the late 1970s given the fact that many American strategists now view China as the only potentially qualified rival” argues Zhao (2015), a Ph.D. candidate at Peking University. The growing anxiety has lead the USA to privately acknowledge sovereignty of Japan over Senkaku; this is precisely the reason why Japan has shown interest to develop the Islands, including the dispatch of US soldiers to the islands, albeit there are other issues such as oil and gas reserves in the islands. The US–China trade war and its Indo-Pacific Strategy should also be viewed in this context. In the aftermath of the Covid-19, the US–China relationship has touched a new low. If Pompeo’s speech made at the Nixon Library

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on 23 July is any indication, the USA has identified the CPC as the enemy that must be defeated. In his speech, Pompeo said (2020): …We imagined engagement with China would produce a future with bright promise of comity and cooperation.But today – today, we’re all still wearing masks and watching the pandemic’s body count rise because the CCP failed in its promises to the world. We’re reading every morning new headlines of repression in Hong Kong and in Xinjiang…We must admit a hard truth that should guide us in the years and decades to come, that if we want to have a free twenty-first century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done. We must not continue it and we must not return to it…Perhaps we were naive about China’s virulent strain of communism, or triumphalist after our victory in the Cold War, or cravenly capitalist, or hoodwinked by Beijing’s talk of a “peaceful rise.” …the only way to change communist China is to act not on the basis of what Chinese leaders say, but how they behave…President Reagan said that he dealt with the Soviet Union on the basis of “trust but verify.” When it comes to the CCP, I say we must distrust and verify.

In Beijing’s view, the USA as an offshore power that has no stake in the South China Sea. China considers Japan as most reliable ally of the USA in the Pacific and India as a possible ally in the Indian Ocean. In June 2012, the then US defence secretary Leon Panetta had remarked that India would be “a linchpin” in America’s unfolding new defence strategy that revolves around “re-balancing” its forces towards Asia-Pacific (TOI 2012). The joint Malabar maritime exercises between the USA, India and Japan could be seen in this light. Ever since the normalization of defence ties and nuclear deal in 2005, India and the USA have conducted more than 50 joint military exercises. The Malabar exercises initiated in 1992 now include Japan, Australia and Singapore too. These include search and rescue exercises, helicopter cross-deck landings, underway replenishments, gunnery and anti-submarine warfare exercises, and are termed “complex, high-end operational exercise that has grown in scope and complexity over the years” by the Indian Navy website. The new India-US 2 + 2 dialogue held on 6 September 2018 officially replaced the earlier India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue established in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Notwithstanding the India-China reset during the Wuhan Summit, India is moving closer to the USA as regards security cooperation. India has been granted the “major defence partner” status by the USA and India has been the signatory of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) a variant of the logistics support agreement (LSA) that the USA has with its NATO allies. The “partnership” has been further strengthened by signing the remaining foundational agreements, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) in 2020. The agreements will enable India to operate on high-end secured communication equipment on platforms such as C-130 J, C-17, P-8I aircraft, and Apache and Chinook helicopters procured by India from the USA. Other deals in the pipeline are $1 billion purchase of 24-multi-role Sikorsky–Lockheed Martin helicopters for the Indian Navy, $1 billion National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II), and $2-3 billion unmanned Guardian drones. The tri-service military exercises and anti-terror exercises are also on anvil. Notwithstanding the abovementioned facts, it will be a tardy and expansive excercise to transform the nerve

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system of the existing platforms which are mostly of Russian origin. The Galwan incident of 15 June 2020 in the Western sector has certainly pushed India closer to the USA and we will witness further deepening of India-USA security and economic partnership even in the post Trump era.

5 Conclusion It could be discerned that the Indo-Pacific maritime environment has undergone tremendous changes. The rising China has emerged as a new force in the Pacific with its new assets including the Liaoning aircraft career and has challenged the USA and Japanese dominance in the region, while its port infrastructural facilities in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan has threatened the traditional Indian dominance of the Indian Ocean. Indian Navy’s blue water ambitions are also visible from its increased footprints in the Pacific and the kind of maritime exercises it is engaged with the USA and other countries in the region. China seems to have ambitions to control the SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific maritime sphere and compete with the USA. With the grandiose Twenty-First Century MSR, most of the ASEAN nations seem to have agreed to strengthen their maritime relations with China in the view of economic gains they tend to achieve. This is also deminstrated by the signing of China driven RCEP in November 2020. Nevertheless, smaller countries in the IndoPacific maritime sphere appear to accommodate the well settled USA, dominant China and emerging India at the same time. As for India and China, both have adopted strategies and measure to hedge against each other. China has maintained that its MSR strategy is all about economic cooperation and win-win results, but India has been apprehensive that it may be a larger string of pearls of containment. It is obvious that if China’s increased footprints in the Indian Ocean have thrown new challenges to India’s maritime security, in the same vein, India’s “Act East Policy” under Modi, its increasingly intimate economic and security ties with ASEAN, and especially a “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” signed together with the USA, has made China apprehensive about India’s role in the Pacific. China has shown interest in “Make in India” and “Mausam” initiatives of India, and sees some resonance with its MSR. Therefore, the hedging strategies of both India and China may pave way for cooperation rather than direct confrontation. In order to build trust, both need to be sensitive to each others’ sensitivities in the Indo-Pacific. In the view of this, it would be sensible for both to initiate a substantive maritime dialogue at an early date. In fact, China has been pushing the matter since 2012 when the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi proposed the dialogue with his Indian counterpart S. M. Krishna. In 2014, Yang Jiechi raised the issue again during his India visit, and finally, it was made part of the Joint Statement during Xi Jinping’s India visit in September 2014. According to the Statement (MEA 2014):

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The two sides decided to hold the first round of maritime cooperation dialogue within this year to exchange views on maritime affairs and security, including anti-piracy, freedom of navigation and cooperation between maritime agencies of both countries. They also agreed to hold the consultations on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control at an early date.

Notwithstanding the Joint Statement on maritime security, tensions along the land borders, overlapping interest in the Indo-Pacific, China’s port lease spree in the regions, and securitization of the same, will make it difficult for both to dock their development strategies least to talk about maritime strategies. On the contrary, China’s tough posturing along the border will push India to shed its ambivalences on the Quad, Indo-Pacific, its relationship with the USA and middle powers in the region.

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Han, J. (2010).《中国军队要学会打“全球战争”》Chinese military needs to learn how to fight a ‘global war’. Global Times, 6 June 2010. Hartman, A. (2014). Chinese Naval Base for Walvis Bay. Namibian, 14 November 2014. https:// www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=130693&page=archive-read. ISAS [Institute of South Asian Studies] Beijing University. (1994).《中国载籍中南亚史料汇编》 Vol. I Collection of South Asian Historical Materials from Chinese sources, Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Publishing House. Ji, X. (1991).《中印文化交流史》History of Sino-Indian cultural contacts. Beijing: New China bookshop. JTS [Old Tang Annals].《旧唐书.田神功传》Biography of Tian Shengong, available at http://so. gushiwen.org/guwen/bookv_7570.aspx. Accessed 1 March 2015. MEA. (2014). Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership. 19 September 2014. www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/24022/. MEA. (2015). Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the Inaugural Session of Delhi Dialogue VII, New Delhi. 11 March 2015. http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/ 24899/. Accessed on 14 Mar 2015. MOC [Ministry of Culture]. (2014). Project ‘Mausam’ Launched by Secretary, Ministry of Culture. 21 June 2014. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=105777. Accessed on 14 Mar 2015. Panikkar, K. M. (1945). India and the Indian Ocean: An essay on the influence of sea power on Indian history. In: The American Historical Review 51(2), 314–315. Pillalamarri, A. (2014). Project Mausam: India’s Answer to China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’ The Diplomat, 18 September 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/project-mausam-indias-answerto-chinas-maritime-silk-road/. Accessed 14 Mar 2015. Pompeo, M. R. (2020). Communist China and the Free World’s Future. 23 July 2020. http://www. uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=22458. Ray, H. P. (2003). Trade and Trade Routes Between India and China: C. 140 BC—AD 1500. Kolkata: Progressive Publishers. Ray, H. P. (2004). Chinese sources of South Asian history in translation: Data for study of IndiaChina relations through history (Vol. I). Kolkata: The Asiatic Society. Sen, T. (2014). Silk Road diplomacy: Twists, turns and distorted history. YaleGlobal, 23 September 2014 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/silk-road-diplomacy-%E2%80%93-twists-turns-and-dis torted-history. Accessed 1 Mar 2015. Srinivasan, M. (2014). Indian Ocean has to remain a zone of peace: Ajit Doval. The Hindu, 1 December 2014. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/indian-ocean-has-toremain-a-zone-of-peace-ajit-doval/article6651325.ece. Srinivasan, T. P. (2014). New wars on the Cold War relic. The Hindu, 16 December 2014. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-new-wars-on-the-cold-war-relic/articl e6694860.ece. Accessed on 14 March 2015. TOI [Times of India]. (2012). US, China woo India for control over Asia-Pacific. 1 June 2012. Wang, W. (2005).《中国军队第三次现代化轮纲》On the Third Modernisation of the PLA. Beijing: PLA publication. WCT [Want China Times]. (2015). India counters Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ with competing project. 1 March 2015. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150301000123& cid=1101. Accessed on 14 Mar 2015. Xi, Jinping. (2014). The governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Xinhua. (2013). Xi suggests China, Central Asia build Silk Road Economic Belt. 7 September 2013. http://en.people.cn/90883/8393079.html. Xinhua. (2015). China’s Silk Road strategy draws interest from over 50 countries: Official. 25 January 2015, also see the Global Times. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/903772.shtml. Accessed on 25 Jan 2005.

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Chapter 7

China’s BRI, External Energy Quest and India-China Cooperation and Competition

On 7th September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a concept linking Eurasia by building a Silk Road Economic Belt during his speech at the Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan. A month later, he proposed the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road, which envisages building hard and soft infrastructure from Indo-Pacific to Africa, including transport, energy, water management, communication, earth monitoring, economic and social infrastructure, thus turning the concept into a “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). In 2015, during the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in Sanya, Hainan, China rolled out an action plan that enunciated five major goals of the vision in terms of promoting policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, uninterrupted trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. In order to facilitate these “five connectivity goals”, China identified six major economic corridors along the BRI for a new type of regional development model. These are Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM); China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); New Eurasia Land Bridge; China, Mongolia, Russia Economic Corridor; China Central Asia Economic Corridor; and China, Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor. Of these China has committed 73 billion US dollars to the CPEC, which has been termed as the pilot and flagship of the BRI projects. Owing to India’s opposition to the BRI on the issue of its core interest, China dropped BCIM from the BRI during the second BRI Forum in April 2019 and replaced it with China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which was signed on the 9th September 2018, when China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a statement that China and Myanmar have signed an MoU to build the CMEC. This would be the second bilateral economic corridor after the CPEC and perhaps another flagship as far as connectivity in Southeast Asia and South Asia is concerned. Given China’s economic growth trajectory in the last 40 years since reforms, the greater demand for energy resources is the natural outcome. Although China is now world’s fifth largest oil producer, the country has been a net oil importer since 1993. Since 2017, China has trounced the USA as the largest importer of the crude; in 2018, China’s import reached 9.2 mb/d of crude oil, of which more than © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_7

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half came from the Middle East. Besides economic growth, which has slumped of late, falling domestic output and the ongoing strategic storage are the main reasons for growing imports.1 Though China is the largest consumer and importer of the oil and gas, China’s dependence on oil and natural gas in 2016 was 65.5% and 36.6%, respectively. It is expected that this percentage will remain so in the future too, even if China has been making headways in renewable energy mix. In this context, the countries along the “Belt and Road” are crucial in guaranteeing China’s oil and gas security.

1 Energy Security Strategy Along the BRI Countries The BRI countries have abundant oil and gas reserves and their capacity to export is huge. It has been reported that by the end of 2016, the proven oil and gas reserves of the BRI countries were 139 billion tons and 143.4 trillion cubic metres, accounting for 57.75% and 76.85% of the global total, respectively (Liu et al. 2018, 10). In 2018, although out of 15 top exporters of crude to China, ten were from the BRI countries, and if the Latin America is included, it takes the tally to 13, leaving out the USA and the UK; however, the dependence on a few countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Oman, Iraq and Iran is huge and accounts for almost 60% of its total oil import. It is also owing to the fact that almost half of the oil reserves are found in the region; moreover, the proximity to China also makes it viable as far as transportation cost is concerned. Nevertheless, this is also a cause for concern as both the Middle East and Africa are extremely volatile regions and the transportation through various choke points subjects the imports to various risks. China’s natural gas imports are less diversified comparing its oil imports. Though China imports gas from Australia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the USA, Myanmar and Indonesia, Turkmenistan remains China’s largest exporter of natural gas. China–Turkmenistan gas pipeline was China’s first transnational gas pipeline. China is of the view that at present, its energy security is highly dependent on cooperation with the USA rather than the competition. Nevertheless, there is a general feeling in China that the USA has been aggressively containing China not only in its backyard, i.e. the South China Sea and Taiwan, but also in the Middle East by exercising its control on region’s energy resources. Therefore, from energy security point of view, China considers the USA as a major threat. Although China is hedging the US threat by investing beyond the Middle East including Latin America and Africa, but clearly Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and Myanmar have emerged as the

1 According

to the 2017 edition of the BP World Energy Statistical Yearbook, by the end of 2016, China’s proven oil reserves were only 3.5 billion tons, accounting for 1.5% of the world’s proven natural oil reserves; proven natural gas reserves were 5.4 trillion cubic metres, for details see, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/de_ch/PDF/bp-statistical-review-ofworld-energy-2017-full-report.pdf.

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new guarantors of China’s energy security, which in turn may offer potential opportunities for energy cooperation between China and other countries in the vicinity including India. The six economic corridors which China is building along the BRI countries have been projected as connectivity projects offering a smooth flow of public goods and services, connecting civilizations and peoples alike, thus integrating regions economically and endeavouring towards realizing the goal of shared future. Securing energy security is an extremely important component of the BRI. It is not only the external connectivity but also the inter-provincial connectivity that has been integrated into the larger framework of the BRI. In this context, China has planned to connect half of its provinces with Asia, Africa and Europe. For example, Yunnan has become a hub connecting China to Southeast Asia and South Asia. Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan, would be connected to various transport corridors, the most ambitious of these—the Trans-Asia Railway (TAR) to be completed by 2020, connecting Kunming to Singapore. In the same vein, Xinjiang is turning into a hub for connecting China with Central Asia, and South Asia, and Fujian as a new fulcrum for the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road. It has been reported that by 2020, China will build 172 major water conservancy projects with an investment of $87.6 billion, and by 2030, 1600 airports with an investment of $23.3 billion would be constructed (Liu 2015). Therefore, there is a new wave of competition among the Chinese provinces for the BRI projects inside as well as outside China. Externally, China has built the A, B and C lines of the Central Asian natural gas pipeline, the Sino-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the Sino-Russian crude oil pipeline, and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline. The crude oil transportation capacity of these lines has reached 35 million tons/year and the natural gas transmission capacity 67 billion cubic metres/year (Xie 2017, 15). As China treats India as one of the BRI countries, this study looks into the issue of energy security between India and China, primarily in Myanmar, Central Asia and Africa, and explores if a mechanism for cooperation could be established or not.

1.1 Securing Energy Through China–Myanmar Economic Corridor With its rich oil and gas reserves, Myanmar has emerged as a reliable source of energy for India and China. Both have pursued aggressive energy diplomacy and strengthened their energy cooperation with Myanmar. As far as China’s cooperation with Myanmar is concerned, currently PetroChina, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and SINOPEC have signed agreements for the development of 15 oil and gas fields in Myanmar. Of these, CNOOC Limited has obtained six oil and gas field mining contracts in Myanmar; SINOPEC received the PSC-D oil and gas field in the Mahudang area, and PetroChina obtained three oil and gas fields AD-1,6,8 in Rakhine area; RSF-2 of Tuyuan and RSF-3 oil and gas fields of Gowejo;

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IOR-3 oil and gas fields of Dema and IOR-4 of Mahudang as well as PSC-F oil and gas fields in Naraydiwin (Peng 2018, 25). However, since the open tender process initiated in 2011, a large number of Western (Italy, France, Australia, etc.) and Asian (Thai, Malaysia, South Korea, India, etc.) energy companies have begun to enter Myanmar’s energy market, posing a huge challenge to Chinese energy companies. Although China has obtained 15 of the 38 oil and gas fields, most of these were not obtained through open bidding, but through government to government agreements. According to Dadwal (2013), when open bids were invited in 2013, only one Chinese company could make it to the bidding list comparing seven companies from India. Therefore, it could be discerned that China is facing huge competition in the energy market of Myanmar, asserts Peng (2018). As far as oil and gas pipelines are concerned, China and Myanmar signed an energy cooperation plan for the construction of $2.5 billion China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline in June 2009. PetroChina has 50.9% stake whereas rest is held by Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, South Korea’s Daewoo International, and ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) and GAIL. The total length of the pipeline is 2,402 kms. The pipeline originates in Madeira on the west coast of Rakhine, passes through Mandalay, Mujie, Ruili, Kunming and Guiyang and finally arrives in Guigang, Guangxi. The gas and oil pipelines became operational in 2015 and 2017, respectively, and as reported in July 2018 by various Chinese news reports, the pipeline has unloaded a record 10.98 million tons of crude oil. As of September 2018, the cumulative transportation volume has been recorded at 21.426 billion cubic metres, of which 18.715 billion cubic metres was shipped to China (Deepak 2018). Last year on 19th November, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that during his meeting with the State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi in Nay Pyi Taw, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed the establishment of China– Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which will connect China’s south-western province of Yunnan to Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) forming an equation of three-terminal support (sanduanzhicheng) and three-legged cooperation (sanzudingli). Wang Yi pointed out that the CMEC will open up new vistas for the building of “Belt and Road Initiative” between China and Myanmar. The CMEC envisages to have Kyaukpyu deep sea water port ($1.3 billion) with two berths in its initial phase including Kyaukpyu SEZ ($2 billion); China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline ($5 billion); Mandalay Yida Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone ($4 billion); Tagaung Taung (Dagongshan) Nickel Industry Development Project ($820 million); Letpadaung copper mine project ($1 billion); Kunming-Kyaukpyu railway line; Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse expressway and Kyaukpyu-Nay Pyi Taw highway projects, etc. Though the CITIC Myanmar CEO Yuan Xibin argues that China did not want to have the present 70% stake in the Kyaukpyu port; however, it is widely believed that China wanted to have between 70–85% stake owing to the aborted, $1.5 billion Myitsone Dam project, where China suffered huge economic losses. Also, owing to the debt trap issues, Myanmar cut to size originally conceived ten berth port worth $7.5 billion to present scale of investment. Many of these projects predate the BRI and were negotiated by China taking the so-called airial route. The port is of

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great strategic and economic significance to China as it will give it access to the Bay of Bengal, diversify its energy routes, and cut short almost 5000 kms of the sea route, thus getting rid of the so-called Malacca dilemma. China would be able to stock its energy and other imports from the Middle East, Europe, Africa, India, etc. countries in Kyaukpyu and transport these to China through already functional pipeline, roads and the proposed rail connectivity. India too has strengthened its energy cooperation with Myanmar. In 1998, GAIL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Myanmar for the transportation of 280,000 cubic metres of natural gas/day to be used by West Bengal, Orissa and Mizoram. On 23 September 2007, OVL acquired three offshore deep-water exploration Blocks AD-2, AD-3 and AD-9. In 2014 biddings, the RIL won shallow-water Blocks M-17 and M-18, while oil and its partners got blocks M-4 and YEB (PTI 2014). In August 2018, it was revealed by the Indian Minister of Petroleum that Indian Oil Corp (IOC) is also working with Myanmar companies in setting up LPG storage facilities and Petronet LNG is working on setting up an LNG terminal there. Peng (2018) posits that India is a latecomer in Myanmar’s energy market. It is in a relatively disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China, for of the 38 oil and gas fields that have been tendered in Myanmar, India has only gained about 8. Nonetheless, neither China nor India can squeeze each other out of Myanmar’s energy market. In the words of Peng (2018), the relative advantageous/disadvantageous position of China and India in Myanmar’s energy market makes it possible for China and India to compete as well as cooperate in Myanmar’s energy market. Moreover, multilateral cooperation as regards co-development of energy resources will mitigate investment risks, generate high profits, as far as production, processing, marketing and distribution of the resources is concerned.

1.2 Energy Security and China Central Asia Economic Corridor The BRI Action Plan defines Xinjiang as a core area both politically and geographically. China considers Xinjiang as a “window to the west and central, south and west Asia. Both the medium and long-term goals have been in place to realize the BRI. The medium-term goals are aimed at completing railway and road connectivity between China and Pakistan within 5–10 years, whereas the long-term goals are set to be achieved by the year 2049; these goals are Three Channels, Three Bases and Five Centres in Xinjiang. Three Channels include North-Central-Southern Channels, Three Bases comprise oil and gas, coal and wind power bases, Five Centres are healthcare, traffic, culture, logistics and education (Deepak 2018a, 1–16).” The CPEC will link the Pakistani city of Gwadar to China’s Xinjiang via a vast network of highways, railways and oil and gas pipelines. It has been reported that a pipeline will also be built from Gwadar to Kashgar to transport oil from the Persian Gulf and Iran. From the Gulf, one million barrel would be exported to China, as it is

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getting ready to shift 17 oil exports from the Gulf via Gwadar. The Gwadar–Kashgar pipeline is expected to be completed by 2021. According to Malik (2018, 74) Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “when more oil would be exported to China via the Gulf and Iran, a major source of Chinese oil imports could also boost Pakistan’s trade invariably. The emerging Pakistan under the CPEC would be a “gateway” to China and Central Asia.” The pipeline is not without vulnerability, as the Chinese investment in Gwadar, a port in Baluchistan has been opposed by the Baluchistan Liberation Army, a separatist group asking seeking independence from Pakistan. This together with internal terror outfits within Pakistan has forced Pakistan to raise a division of army for protecting the Chinese investment. As regards Central Asian Republics (CARs), China is relatively a new player; however, in a short span of time, it has upstaged Russia as a dominant trade partner of the region since 2009. In 2014, China’s trade with 5 CARs crossed $45 billion comparing less than $35 billions of Russia’s (Deepak 2016, 27–30). The drivers behind this growth have been energy exports and other natural resources, especially with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The first investment China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) made in Kazakhstan was in 1997 when it purchased a 60.34% stake in AktobeMunaiGas. The CNPC AktobeMunaiGas (CNPC AMG) now owns five oil fields, two gas fields and one oil exploration block in Kazakhstan (Liu and Xia 2018, 1–9). Since then, CNPC has signed six more deals. According to the statistics, there were a total of 2,749 Chinese companies in Kazakhstan by the end of 2015. So far, China has invested nearly US$43 billion in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan has become China’s largest investment destination along the Belt and Road routes (Zhang 2017).The 2,833-km-long China–Kazakhstan Crude Oil Pipeline runs from Atyrau in Kazakhstan to PetroChina Dushanzi Petrochemical Company via the Alataw Pass in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Oil imports through this pipeline have reached the 100-million-ton mark on in 2017. The A and B lines of the Central Asian natural gas pipeline are designed to have an annual gas transmission capacity of 300 × 108 m3 . The starting point is the border between Turkmenistan on the right bank of the Amu Darya, passing through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and entering China in Ergos, Xinjiang. After entering the Alashankou, it is connected to the second line of the West–East Gas Pipeline. The Central Asian natural gas pipeline C line starts from Gdaim, on the border of Tuwu, and enters the Khorgos port of Xinjiang via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It is connected to the third line of the East–West Gas Pipeline. In May 2017, the natural gas pipeline project on the southern line of Kazakhstan was completed. Kazakhstan officially implemented the gas supply agreement with China on 13th October 2017 (Liu and Xia 2018, 1–9). It is believed that if the agreement is successfully implemented, the amount of natural gas imported from Kazakhstan will reach 5 billion cubic metres (Wang 2018). In terms of natural gas, China’s main partner is Turkmenistan. In 2016, Turkmenistan’s proven natural gas reserves were 17.5 trillion cubic metres, ranking fourth in the world. In 2016, China imported 29.4 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Turkmenistan, accounting for 35.8% of the total imports. Since India has boycotted both the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (2017 and 2019) initiated by China owing to India’s territorial concerns in union

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territories of Kashmir and Ladakh, India’s cooperation with China on the CPEC is ruled out, albeit there is a possibility if it is rerouted through CARs and Afghanistan, given the dynamics of Sino-Pak entente cordiale, the possibility of it is remote. There is another view that India could reserve its territorial difference and be a stakeholder as far as investment in the disputed territory is concerned on Russo-Japanese model of investments in Kuril Islands (Deepak 2018, 8); however, Pakistan may not support such an investment and joint development of the disputed territory under its jurisdiction. Given China’s military posturing and bloody clashes between India and China at Galwan in the Western sector, the possibility of such a cooperation is ruled out.

1.3 Energy Security and Africa China has invested more than $34 billion in the energy sector in Africa. Presently, Africa has emerged as China’s second largest source of oil imports after the Middle East, accounting for about 20% of China’s total oil imports (Peng 2018, 22) It has signed a “loan-for-oil” agreement with Angola, and its oil and gas cooperation with Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and other countries is on solid grounds. In the field of natural gas, PetroChina spent $4.21 billion in 2013 to buy 28.75% stake in Italy’s Eni East Africa (OGE 2013) which indirectly obtained a 20% interest in the Block 4 project in the Rovuma Basin in Mozambique, marking the beginning of cooperation between Chinese oil and gas companies and African countries in the natural gas sector. In April 2016, CNPC, Mozambique and South Africa signed a joint development agreement for the Mozambique–South Africa gas pipeline project (Peng 2018). As far as India is concerned, almost 26% of its total oil imports come from Africa. Therefore, energy security with Africa remains an important link in India’s overall relationship with African countries, which has been strengthened and consolidated by holding India-Africa Forum Summits (IAFS) in places like New Delhi (2008, 2015) and Addis Ababa (2011). Countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have emerged partners in India’s energy cooperation. It is generally believed that if China has advantage over India in crude oil, India is better poised as far as natural gas cooperation with Africa is concerned. According to the British Petroleum (BP) World Energy Statistical Yearbook (2017), Africa’s crude oil exports to India were only one-third of the EU’s, and Africa’s natural gas exports to India were just half of the EU. Given the posturing of India and China in the African energy market, it is perhaps futile for both to compete for each other’s share in the market, nor can both afford to follow a strategy to force each other out of the African market. Therefore, there will be an element of competition, but also a room for cooperation. Some of the Chinese scholars believe that India is more competitive than China in the African energy market, for it has both the historical as well as geographical advantages, and hence the energy competition between China and India in Africa will be very intense. Nevertheless, Chinese scholars also posit that China will cooperate with

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India to obtain a corresponding right to discourse in the international energy market dominated by the developed countries. They say China is willing to cooperate with India in overseas energy markets, especially in countries like Iran, Syria and Sudan which are at loggerheads with the USA (Peng 2018, 23). This at times seems possible; however, in the face of the US pressure, it is unlikely that India would be ready for such a cooperation.

2 Exploring Possibilities for Cooperation Amidst Competition If China’s dependence on the Middle East is over, 50% India’s dependence is over 60%. The scarcity of oil and gas, importance of energy resources for economic growth make the competition between the two inevitable. Therefore, energy diplomacy remains integral to their foreign policy. Their overlapping interest in Iran, Myanmar, Russia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Venezuela, etc. countries has intensified the degree of competition. For example, Myanmar, with abundant natural gas reserves, has received economic assistance worth $84 million from China. In the same vein, India and Myanmar signed a $1.35 billion oil and gas development agreement in 2010 and invested in Myanmar’s offshore A1 and A3 oilfield blocks (Feng and Li 2015, 50–51). In June, the same year, China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project took off. Secondly, the state-owned monoliths of India and China competed in the international energy markets, and obviously owing to the deep pockets of the Chinese companies, India lost due to the higher bids offered by the Chinese companies. For example, in 2005, they competed for a Canadian company’s oil and pipeline assets in Ecuador; in 2008, both competed for the Russian Imperial Energy listed in London stock; India’s $600 million bid in Angola was trounced by China’s $2 billion; India’s $3.9 billion bid in Petrokazakhstan was outclassed by China’s $4.2 billion. In the view of such a scenario, in 2005, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s India visit, both sides in the Joint Statement expressed their intention to cooperate in the field of energy security and energy conservation. In the same year, both countries, for the first-time jointly acquired 38% stake in PetroCanada’s Afulat oil field in Syria for $573 million; in 2006, both jointly acquired 50% stake in Colombian oil company Omimex de Colombia, each holding 25% of the share. At the same time, China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau (CPP) undertook the construction of the East– West Gas Pipeline Project in India. The project starts from the city of Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh and ends in the city of Baruch in Gujarat covering a distance of about 1366 km. It is the largest energy cooperation project between the two countries to date (Feng and Li 2015, 50–51). In 2006, the relevant departments of the two countries signed the Memorandum on Strengthening Oil and Gas Cooperation and proposed the establishment of a Joint Working Committee for institutionalized dialogue. In 2007, India and China held an international seminar on “China-India Energy Dialogue” in Shanghai. The next

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year when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China, he emphasized on overseas energy cooperation between the two countries. Undoubtedly, there was some progress in the areas of government consultation, joint bidding, and development; however, the actual cooperation between the two is still limited. It is in this context that the BRI offers some opportunities that could overcome some constraints and pave way for bilateral energy cooperation. According to Chinese scholars (Feng and Li 2015, 52–53), the aim of the BRI is to create a new regional order where there would be implied “distribution of power, benefits, ideas, and responsibilities”. The “Five Connectivity and Three Commons” (wutong/santong), especially the latter that advocates building the community of shared interest, future and responsibility will pave the way for energy as well as cooperation in other domains. What are India’s options vis-à-vis China in the CARs and Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar? Even if India does not have direct land border with the CARs, India has been talking about the “ancient roots”. India has remained disenchanted from Central Asia (CA), that is why a player at the margins. Its trade with CA stands at a poor $700 million. It appears that Modi’s foreign policy is poised to “go global” and has shown interest in region’s energy, trade and investment as well as dialogue on counterterrorism, etc. issues. More importantly, as we see the congregation of major powers in the region, it is time for India to unfold a pragmatic and positive policy and be an insider rather than an outsider in the region. India would be welcomed by CARs, as they would neither like to see the Russian nor the Chinese domination in the region. If the USA prefers China over Russia in the region, India will be supported both by the USA and Russia, for the Indian engagement in the region will offset some of the Chinese influence, thus becoming another pillar in the region. Can India mend and consolidate its ties with Iran to the extent of a pivot or near pivot country? Construction of the Chabahar Port needs to be carried out at a feverish pace, which will serve India’s strategic as well as economic interest in the region. This would be extremely important if India wants to secure energy supplies from the CARs and Russia. Both overland transportation, i.e. Turkmenistan-AfghanistanPakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) and Iran-India-Pakistan Pipeline, and sea routes need to be explored, albeit there are concerns about the overland routes given the volatility in Af-Pak region and the morbid state of India-Pak relations. China on the other hand is quick to exploit discordance between the USA and Iran. If the reports are to be believed, China is negotiating $400 billion deal with Iran for a period of 25 years, which would get China a substantial discount on the Iranian oil. In return, Beijing will invest the said amount in Iran’s industrial sectors including infrastructure and telecom (ET 2020). Secondly, since China has invested heavily in upstream as well as downstream energy infrastructure in the CARs, especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. China controls around 1/3 of Kazakhstan oil and most of Turkmenistan gas exports. As discussed in the preceding sections, China has connected Xinjiang to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through a network of oil and gas pipelines making it a major hub of connectivity. India may consider opening Ladakh and Kashmir, especially Ladakh region for linking it to Xinjiang which would be cost effective comparing the land and sea options from the west. A similar approach could be explored through BCIM

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region. Here again, given the frequency of Chinese transgressions in the area, such a possibility seems remote. Thirdly, in the BCIM countries, oil and gas pipeline network can be built, which can be a hub for energy supply between India and China as well as other Asia– Pacific countries. Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines have played a crucial role in alleviating natural gas shortage, providing 450 million cubic metre of gas to Yunnan. Under the framework of the BCIM, Myanmar has the potential to become the key area to promote Sino-Indian energy cooperation through land and sea. Though India has been undertaking 2600 km Jagdishpur-Haldia and Bokaro-Dhamra pipeline under the Pradhan Mantri Urja Ganga project, and the same is being extended from Brauni to Guwahati for connecting other areas of Northeast India with the Indradhanush Gas Grid by laying 1500-km pipeline, however, if these could be connected to the Myanmar pipelines, it would be more cost effective in terms of transmission and laying of the pipelines. Fourthly, investments in renewable energy including solar, wind, biogas etc. need to be promoted. Though China accounted for about 89% of India’s total imports of solar cells in the year 2017–18, localization of the manufacturing has not happened as desired.

3 Challenges for China Since the investment involved is huge, China has been building a risk management and response mechanism in the BRI countries. It has been turning to the global insurance companies and buying options to hedge the risk, diversifying its models of cooperation; however, the following challenges remain.

3.1 Geopolitical Factors Chinese scholars (Shi 2015) posit that risk-related geopolitics along the BRI countries are huge. Risks such as “Ukrainian crisis and the US-European-Russian rivalry” in the Central Asian region, India’s unwillingness to “accommodate other players in South Asia”, and Japan trying to expand its own “political influence” by undermining the Chinese initiative have thrown challenges to the Chinese investments and diplomacy in these regions. Secondly, risks from terror outfits, nationalistic sentiments and piracy, especially when “Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East have limited security capabilities” the transportation of oil and gas faces greater security risks, especially when more than 80% of the Chinese oil transportation takes place through the choke points like Malacca. Thirdly, there are risks related to “political instability and deep contradictions between political and religious factions”. Some of these risks are synonymous with India’s concerns about the BCIM that covers most of India’s northeast provinces. Though China has been hedging these risks

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and institutionalizing its energy cooperation by way of its engagement in multilateral forums such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Zone, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Group of 20 (G20), and the BRICS, the challenges remain.

3.2 Socio-cultural Factors The regions along the BRI abound in different types of civilizations and religions and have different cultures. Therefore, failing to understand the social and corporate culture of these regions and countries will encounter many challenges. Shi (2015) cites the example of China’s construction and operation of the South Su power plant in Indonesia that witnessed disturbances, strikes and even threats of violence.

3.3 Localization Drive It is evident that countries along the BRI are tightening their control over foreignfunded enterprises. They have adopted restrictive measures in the areas of labour licensing, taxation and environmental protection. For example, they are emphasizing localization in terms of procurement of goods, enlisting engineering services, employing labour, fixing minimum salary and layoff policies have become extremely stringent. Moreover, a series of laws and regulations promulgated in order to attract investment, especially in the Central Asian countries, are issued in the form of presidential decrees, which are subject to change, thus affecting the stability of investment (Wang 2018, 37–40).

3.4 The Ghost of Debt Trap Some of the smaller participants of the BRI such as Mongolia, Pakistan, Laos, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are deep in debt. China committing $73 billion for CPEC may be difficult for Pakistan to service; the example of Sri Lanka been forced to swap over $1 billion for Chinese equity is an example often cited to highlight the “ills” of the BRI. Though the Laos high-speed railway may connect China to Thailand, the cost is too high and Laos may never be able to return the money. In 2018, citing “tough financing terms” Pakistan cancelled the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam project; Nepal and Myanmar followed the suit by scrapping a $2.5 billion and $3.6 billion hydroelectricity project, respectively. In the same vein, Malaysia too has cancelled the East Coast Rail Link and the Sabah natural gas pipeline projects in August once the new regime under Mahathir Mohamad formed

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the government. There are other risks related to exchange rate fluctuations, varied technological standards along the BRI (Deepak 2018b).

4 Conclusion The BRI and China’s energy security remains intertwined. It could be discerned that India and China are fiercely competing for energy resources in Myanmar, Middle East, Africa, etc. regions and countries. As the BRI spans over the world’s major energy production and consumption markets, it creates opportunities for aligning India’s energy policy with China in Myanmar, Central Asia and Russia, for the BRI aims to improve oil and gas investment environment on the one hand and the capital, technology and infrastructure conditions for energy cooperation, which could enable cooperation in the fields such as processing, refining, consumption and services on the other. Since the energy production capacity of India and China has been paced out by the consumption, the energy deficiency is bound to increase in the future. Though both the countries have initiated their own domestic, peripheral and external energy strategy, it is pertinent that they cooperate in the international energy markets so as to curb the crude oil prices, bring down the prices of the bids, transportation, and share their experience and technologies to overcome their dependence on developed countries. Furthermore, building a sizable oil reserves would be too expensive for both, it would be sensible to consider co-financing an oil reserve system for mitigating the risks in the international energy market. They could also work together to improve and maintain energy channels and transportation networks in volatile areas to ensure the safety of sea and land transportation. Gong et.al. (2014) propose four principles that is flexibility, gradualness, openness and consensus for building such a mechanism. Besides, they recommend five components for such a mechanism in the form of international multi-faceted coordination mechanism, information exchange and sharing mechanism, forward-looking technical cooperation mechanism, market joint bidding mechanism, and energy security channel co-construction mechanism. According to them, the mechanism will greatly promote the distribution of benefits and burden sharing between China and India and encourage China and India to make efforts to achieve collective goals. Also, since some of the institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank promote north–south financial cooperation under the BRI, it would make sense if India makes use of such institutions. However, in order to realize an integrated energy market in Asia, a slew of intergovernmental agreement, including the currency swaps, liberalized investment is necessary for the transactions between suppliers and buyers. In short, as world’s most populous countries and energy-deficient countries, both face various uncertainties as regards the energy security. Of course, there would be a certain degree of competition; however, both must establish and institutionalize a long-term win–win cooperation mechanism for sustainable and stable energy security. The BRI does offer a platform to explore such a cooperation.

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References Dadwal, S. R. (2013). Myanmar opens to business opportunities: but it is sustainable? IDSA Comment, 14 June 2013. https://www.idsa.in/discommends/MyanmarOpenstoBusinessOppor tunitiessrdadwal140613.html Deepak, B. R. (2016). India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches and Responses. Delhi: Vij Books. Deepak, B. R. (2018). China’s global rebalancing and the New Silk Road, Springer. Deepak, B. R. (2018a). Watch out for Kyaukpyu port and China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Sunday Guardian, 24 November 2018. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/watch-kya ukpyu-port-china-myanmar-economic-corridor. Deepak, B. R. (2018b). China’s global and civilizational re-balancing and India’s options. In: China and the world: ancient and modern silk road, 1(1), 1–16, Singapore: World Scientific. Deepak, B. R. (2018c). China’s belt and road initiative in unlikely to fail. Sunday Guardian, 28 September 2018. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/chinas-bri-unlikely-failchinasbri-unlikely-fail. ET [Eurasian Times]. (2020). US exasperated over Iran–China $400 billion pact. Eurasian Times, 12 July 2010. https://eurasiantimes.com/us-exasperated-over-iran-china-400-billion-pact/. Feng, N., & Li, Y. (2015).《‘一带一路’倡议下中印能源合作前景浅析》A preliminary analysis of China-India energy cooperation under the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Contemporary World, November 2015, (p. 50–51). Gong, Q., Yang, W., & Lu, P. (2014).《中印能源共赢性发展互动机制探讨》Exploring a winwin enry development mechanism for China and India. South Asian Studies Quarterly, 2014(2), 85–89. Liu, B., Zhang, Y., & Zhu, T, (2018).《中国与“一带一路”沿线国家能源合作问题探究》Research on energy cooperation between China and the ‘Belt and Road’ countries. Crossroads: Southeast Asian Studies (5), 10. Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences. Another source puts it at 133.8 billion tons and 155 trillion cubic meters respectively, accounting for 57 and 78% of the world’s remaining total reserves. It also depends on the number of countries included in the BRI, generally the number has varied between 25 and 30. Liu, J. (2015).《一带一路”将给工商界带来八大机遇》‘Belt and Road’ will bring eight major opportunities to the business world. DagongBao, 19 May 2015. https://news.takungpao.com/mai nland/focus/2015-05/3003993.html. Liu, M., & Xia, P. (2018).《全球影响力分析框架下的中哈能源关系研究》Research on ChinaKazakhstan energy relations under analysis framework of global influence. Sino-Global Energy, 23(8), 1–9. Malik, A. R. (2018). The China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC): A game changer for Pakistan’s economy. In: B. R. Deepak (Ed.), China’s global rebalancing and the New Silk Road, Springer. OGS [Oil and Gas Editors] (2013). CNPC completes buy of stake off Mozambique, 29 July 2013. https://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/07/cnpc-completes-buy-of-stake-off-mozambique.html. Peng, N. (2018).《中印在海外能源市场的竞合博弈》China-India competition and cooperation in the overseas energy market. Journal of South Asian Studies, 2018(2), 20–27. National Institute for South China Sea Studies. PTI (2014). ONGC Videsh to get stake in Myanmar oil and gas block. The Economic Times, 8 April 2014. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/ongc-videsh-to-get-stake-in-mya nmar-oil-and-gas-block/articleshow/33448804.cms?from=mdr. Shi, Z. (2015).《能源资源合作:共建“一带一路”的着力点》Energy resources cooperation: Focus on building the ‘Belt and Road’. Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 36(1). Wang, L. (2018).《一带一路背景下中国与中亚国家能源合作》Sino-Central Asia energy cooperation under the Belt and Road. Practice in Foreign Relations and Trade, pp. 37–40. Xie, K. (2017).《着力推进“一带一路”国际能源合作》Focus on promoting the ‘Belt and Road’ international energy cooperation. China Science and Technology Enterprise, June 2017, p.15.

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Zhang, J. (2017). China, Kazakhstan deepen energy cooperation. Belt and Road Portal, 21 July 2017. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/home/rolling/20467.htm. Zhang, Y., Liu, C., & Jiang, X. (2017).《一快推进“ 一带一路 ” 能源合作的思考与建议》Suggestions on Accelerating the Energy Cooperation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences), 34(2), 2018.

Part III

Indo-Pacific, World Order and India-China Relations

Chapter 8

India-China and the Indo-Pacific: Cooperation and Competition Amidst Soaring Maritime Ambitions

India and China are increasingly being seen as the twin engines of world growth. With the initiation of policies of economic liberalization, both have benefitted immensely and their global economic and political profile has risen enormously. With increasing global trade, both have relied on Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), as over 80% of their trade including the oil and gas is dependent on merchant shipping. From this perspective, both the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, especially the choke points such as Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, have been considered vital for security. China has viewed India as a hurdle in realizing her ambitions in the Indian Ocean. In the words of Zhang (2009, 331), a PLA officer, “India has a ‘stranglehold advantage’ over China in the Indian Ocean, therefore it is primarily India that severely restricts China going south, into the sea and even global”. India too has been very sceptical of China’s moves, nevertheless, non-traditional security threats such as narcoterrorism, piracy and global terrorist networks make it imperative for both India and China to have some kind of coordinated approach in maritime matters. The new trends in maritime environment have forced both to shed their continental mindset and develop new capabilities and power projections. Though there exist a huge security deficit between India and China owing to each other’s security dilemmas, the same has also forced the two to engage in confidence building measures (CBMs) bilaterally and multilaterally. With initiation of the Look East Policy (1991), subsequently renamed as Act East Policy (2014), “the Indian Navy resumed the conduct of joint bilateral naval exercises, after a period of virtually 25 years (Chaudhary 1999, 138)”. Now, the Indian Navy conducts annual maritime exercises like the Varuna with France, Konkan with Great Britain, Indra with the Russia, Malabar with the USA, Japan, Australia and Singapore, Simbex with Singapore, and IBSAMAR with Brazil and South Africa. The exercises are aimed at building confidence, strengthening naval interoperability and cooperative security with friendly nations. As far as China is concerned, owing to the hostilities of the 1960s and subsequent deep freeze in the bilateral relations, the security issue has remained a very sensitive © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_8

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rather hypersensitive one. Security deficit is so huge that both have blamed each other for initiating policies of containment by ganging up with the third parties. However, if one analyzes the security environment around us, there has been a definite but incremental improvement. The establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG) for the resolution of border issue during Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 China visit, the 1991 and 1996 CBMs, 1992 visit of Sharad Pawar, the first ever by an Indian Defence Minister, could be considered as path breaking in one sense or another. The CBMs in the military field along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has enabled peace and tranquillity along the borders and enabled exchanges between the armed forces of India and China; however, incidents of transgression and dangerous stand-offs such as Doklam and Galwan have also questioned sustainability of these CBMs. Last two decades have witnessed a flurry of political and diplomatic engagement between India and China culminating in signing agreements of cooperation in military and civilian fields. For example, Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes’ China visit amidst the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) scare in 2003, not only resulted in the attitudinal change in Fernandes’ anti-China rhetoric, but it was also during this visit that both India and China decided to step up military-to-military exchanges, hold a counter-terrorism dialogue and increase CBMs to maintain peace along the LAC. In 2004, Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan paid a return visit to India. In February 2005, Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) member, General Liang Guanglie, who later became the defence minister, visited India. In May 2006, Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, visited China; during his visit, Mukherjee also visited some of the most sensitive military installations such as Chinese Centre of Space Conduct and Control, Lanzhou Military Command, and signed the “Memorandum of Understanding for Reinforcing Communication and Cooperation in the Defence Areas” with his counterpart Cao Gangchuan. The memorandum called for military training, military exercises, counter terrorism, fight against piracy, joint search and rescue, and personnel communications, etc., between the armies of India and China. This led to holding of the first ever joint military exercises in Yunnan in 2007; since then eight rounds of “Hand-in-Hand” joint military exercise focused on counter terrorism have been held. The last round was held in Shillong, Meghalaya, in December 2019. In November 2008, General Wu Shengli, member of the Chinese Central Military Commission and Naval commander-in-chief, visited India. This was followed by the visit of Deputy Chief of Staff, Ma Xiaotian, in December. In August 2010, India cancelled defence exchanges with China after Beijing refused visa to Lt. Gen. B. S. Jaswal, head of the northern command, India was further irked by China when the latter started to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir. The exchanges were restored and furthered with the visit of India’s army chief Bikram Singh to China in July 2014, followed by Xi Jinping’s India visit in September 2014 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s China visit in 2015. As India, snubbed Beijing’s invitation for the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017, both the armies were locked in a dangerous 73-day long stand-off at Doklam. From 21–24 August, Chinese State Counsellor and Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe paid an official visit to India. In his meeting with the then Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, the two

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countries decided to expand “the engagement between their armed forces relating to training, joint exercises and other professional interactions”. Both sides also decided to work towards a new bilateral MOU on defence exchanges and cooperation to replace the MOU signed in 2006.

1 Maritime Exercises and Exchanges These high-level visits demonstrate that defence exchanges are in consonance with the overall development of India-China bilateral relations. As far as naval exchanges between India and China are concerned, there have been exchanges at the levels of service chiefs, functional level and military education. The naval ships have been making port calls, there are naval exercises between the two navies, and two are also cooperating in fighting piracy in the Gulf of Eden. The first ever Indian ship to visit China was the old INS DELHI in 1958. After that owning to the snowballing of the Tibetan and border issue that culminated into the 1962 conflict and subsequent deep freeze in bilateral relations, there was no defence cooperation between India and China until early 1980s when the border issue was opened for negotiations. Naval exchanges started very late; it was only in 1992 that an agreement on a port call by the Chinese vassals to India was also signed during Pawar’s China visit. The Chinese reports also say that the proposal to conduct joint naval exercises was also proposed by the Indian Defence Minister (XHH 2003). In 1995, two Indian naval ships also visited China on a port call.

1.1 First Recent Contact As India unfolded its LEP/AEP, multi-dimensional exchanges including defence with various countries in Southeast Asia increased tremendously. Early in 2000, for the first time, Indian naval flotilla of six capital ships that included a submarine entered the contentious South China Sea calling on ports in Singapore, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Japan and Indonesia for over a month (Mehta 2000). In September 2000, INS DELHI and KORA were offered a warm welcome in Shanghai. Joint exercises included exchange of personnel and basic manoeuvres. “The exercises lasted almost eight hours. Language definitely was a problem, but it was successful considering the fact that it was our first combined exercise”. It was reported that there was no reluctance on the part of the Chinese to receive the Indian ships. “They gave us a rousing welcome and accepted our invitation to the International Fleet Review in Bombay the next year”. To venture into the South China Sea was not an offensive attempt, but part of a “detailed plan to expand the horizons of our maritime diplomacy” according to a senior naval officer (Joseph 2000).

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1.2 The First Joint Exercise The first ever joint search and rescue exercise code named “Dolphin 0311” between India and China was held on 14th November 2003 at the East China Sea near Shanghai. Indian Navy’s destroyer RANJIT, corvette KULISH and replenishment tanker JYOTI, led by Flag Officer Commanding of the Eastern Command, ViceAdmiral O.P. Bansal lead the Indian side. In Shanghai, they were received by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) East China Sea Fleet commander and Vice Admiral Zhao Guojun along with Shanghai Vice Mayor Feng Guoqin. The officers from both sides visited each other’s naval vessels and played friendly sports matches. According to the China Radio International, this was the fourth time that the Indian ships visited Shanghai (CRI 2003). The first ever “search and rescue exercises” China had conducted with a foreign navy way three weeks earlier on 22nd October with Pakistan’s “Babur” in East China Sea (Zhang 2009, 138). According to Chinese reports, the idea of joint naval exercises was conceptualized during Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes’ China visit in April 2003. However, there was visible difference as far as content of the exercise was concerned. The Indian side had proposed to conduct these at Malacca Straits on the lines of India-Indonesia and India-US anti-piracy exercises, but the Chinese side was of the view that since anti-piracy exercises were conducted by coast guard ships; therefore, China proposed to conduct search and rescue exercises. After many rounds of mutual consultations, the Indian side agreed to the Chinese proposal (Tang 2003).

1.3 The Second Joint Exercise Next joint search and rescue exercise code named “India-China Friendship-2005”, first in India, was held on December 2005 off the Kochi coast. These were limited to communication between the two ships, manoeuvre procedures and exercises relating to casualty evacuation according to the naval sources. The two Chinese ships, which participated in the exercises included SHENZHEN, a Luhai class destroyer commanded by Captain Zhu Jianda and WEISHANHU, captained by Chen Zailiang. The vessels were equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and a Harbin Z9C helicopter on board. INS GOMATI and INS SHARDA from the Indian side participated in the exercises. These exercises according to Zhang, a PLA military strategist, were the first ever joint exercises China conducted with foreign navies outside China (Zhang 2009, 139). China considers these exercises in the Indian Ocean as major breakthrough. It believes that the Indian military establishments in and around such as Mumbai Naval Shipyard are considered as high-end military secrets, and the vicinity as extremely sensitive. It is for these reasons that in October 2000, the bid of China Harbour Engineering Company for underwater sludge cleaning of the Mumbai Port Authority was blocked. Chinese were taken aback when on 28th March 2004, the port was thrown

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open to 18 member Chinese military delegation led by General Cao Gangchuan ever since it was established in the year 1799. The visitors also visited Delhi and aircraft career VIKRANT (Sina.com 2004).

1.4 The Third Joint Exercise On 16th April 2007, India and China conducted yet another joint naval exercise in the Yellow Sea near Qingdao. India’s missile destroyer RANA and RANJIT engaged in manoeuvres such as light communication, semaphore communication and formation transformation exercises with China’s Beihai Naval Fleet Destroyer QINGDAO. Over 1000 officers participated in the exercises that lasted for 3 h (Chen 2007). The naval exercises were being held under the landmark bilateral Memorandum of Understanding inked in May 2006 to step up military exchanges and cooperation in tune with the growing political, economic and commercial ties between India and China.

1.5 Multilateral Exercises In 2007, between 15th and 20th May, Indian and Chinese naval ships participated in the “2007 Asia International Maritime Defence Exhibition” and the “Second Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Multilateral Naval Exercise” organized by Singapore. Other countries that participated in the multilateral drills off Singapore included the USA, France, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Korea, etc. 12 nations (Xinhua 2007).

1.6 The First Multilateral Exercises From 23rd to 24th April 2014, India and China conducted yet another multilateral joint maritime military exercise at north-eastern port of Qingdao, the headquarters of China’s North Sea fleet. Other countries that participated in the drills, included Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, Indonesia and Pakistan. The fleet review and maritime exercise took place at the sideline of the annual meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the USA established grouping of 20 countries. India, Bangladesh and Mexico are the observers in this grouping. Irrespective of the US and Japan’s participation in the WPNS, the USA opted out from the exercises as China did not extend an invitation to Japan owing to the deteriorating relations and rivalry over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. India sent its naval stealth frigate INS SHIVALIK; India’s naval chief could not participate due to resignation of the Navy Chief D. K. Joshi a month earlier.

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1.7 Other Exchanges INS RANA, SHIVALIK, KARMUKH and SHAKTI of the Eastern Command, made a four-day port visit to Shanghai in 2012 after a gap of five years, albeit there were reports of Chinese warnings to Indian ships while entering the South China Sea. The defence ties were normalized in the wake of Defence Minister’s China visit in 2013. Following this, a hospital ship of the Chinese navy, Peace Ark visited India in August. The visit signalled an increased level of interaction between the Indian and Chinese navies, especially after the military exchanges were halted owing to China’s refusal to grant visa to Lt. General Jaswal. The last time an operational People Liberation Army (PLA) warship had come to the Indian ports was a PLA ship’s port call in Kochi on its way back to China from anti-piracy duties in the Gulf of Aden. The decision to restore defence ties including naval exercises was taken during Antony’s China visit. During their stay in Mumbai, Peace Ark crew visited the Asvini Hospital and Brahmaputra class frigate of the Indian navy. Sailors from the two countries played friendly football and basketball matches (Xinhua 2013). Between 9th and 12th May 2012, ZHENG HE, the Chinese cadet training ship, visited Kochi and had an interactive session with their Indian counterparts. The visitors were also showcased the training facilities at the Southern Naval Command, and also Indian Navy’s Sail Training Ship INS SUDARSHINI and Maritime Museum at INS DRONACHARYA. The Indian officials were also invited on board the Chinese ship and both sides played friendly matches of football and volleyball. In 2019, two Indian battle ships, including the biggest indigenously built stealth destroyer INS KOLKATA, arrived at the port city of Qingdao to take part in the Chinese Navy’s fleet review on the occasion of the PLAN’s 70th founding anniversary on April 23rd. Since 2016, India and China are holding the “India-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue”. The first such dialogue was held in New Delhi in January 2016 and the second in Beijing in July 2018. According to the MEA statement, “The dialogue covered issues of mutual interest, including, exchange of perspectives on maritime security, developments in international regimes such as UNCLOS and IMO and prospects for maritime cooperation”. During the second dialogue, the Indian side also elaborated on India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region as articulated in Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (MEA 2016,2018).

2 China’s Naval Expansion in India’s Neighbourhood It was beyond any doubt that in the wake of China’s hostilities with India, it acted as a countervailing force in the region vis-à-vis India, encouraged anti-India forces in the subcontinent and supported military dictatorships in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Though China has never admitted to the “string of pearls” theory to contain India, the port development it has undertaken in India’s immediate neighbourhood has

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been perceived by India as security threats. For example, China has built a naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan, as part of the CPEC project, the flagship of the Belt and Road Project. It may be a commercial port; however, in the case of hostilities, the facility could be used as a military base. China arming Pakistan with J-17, S20 diesel-electric submarines based on the Yuan-class (Type 039A-series) design, and nuclear weapons demonstrate the utility of Pakistan as a pivot of China. China’s investment and lease of Hambantota port for 99 years in Sri Lanka shows China’s depth in the region. In Bangladesh too, China could convert Chittagong Port into a military one along the lines of Gwadar in Pakistan. China’s deepening engagement in Myanmar, especially after the conclusion of CMEC that envisages to have Kyaukpyu deep sea water port, China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, Mandalay Yida Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, Tagaung Taung Nickel Industry Development Project, Letpadaung copper mine project, Kunming-Kyaukpyu railway line; Mandalay-Tigyaing-Muse expressway and Kyaukpyu-Nay Pyi Taw highway projects, etc. (Deepak 2018). Besides, it has also increased its footprints in Maldives and Seychelles. In 2016, China started to construct its first ever naval base abroad in Djibouti. Besides, China is also deploying its submarines and surveillance ships in the IOR. In the face of such challenges, India has devised its own strategies. In the region, it has strengthened its strategic and economic partnership with BIMSTEC and ASEAN countries on the one hand, and signed strategic pacts for opening up naval bases with the offshore countries like US and France on the other. The idea of the IndoPacific Strategy and Quad, which has been increasingly seen by China as a containment policy, is gradually getting lodged into India’s military and foreign policy calculations.

3 India-China and the Indo-Pacific Chinese academics too have attributed the coinage of the Indo-Pacific construct to Cdr. Khurana(2007, 139–153) who first explained it as a concept in an academic paper titled “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation” published in the January issue of the Strategic Analysis in 2007. The construct referred to a maritime space stretching from the littorals of East Africa and West Asia, across the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean, to the littorals of East Asia. The term did not find much currency in the Chinese discourse even if it was referred to by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe during his Speech to the Indian parliamentarians in the same year, for they believed that India was out of the Asia–Pacific construct. Irrespective of Chinese reservations, the construct has been readily accepted by the Indian strategic community and the national leadership alike for the very thinking of the Chinese. China started to feel discomfort as the construct started to appear in the official discourses of the governments. It appeared in Defending Australia and its National Interests, a defence White Paper issued by the Australian Government on 13 May 2013, where the term was referred to as many as 56 times. The White Paper referred

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to it as a new “strategic arc” and “system” where US ally Japan will remain a “major power” and India playing an “increasingly influential role”. The White Paper called for a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific and a rules-based global order (AGDoD 2013). In June 2013, the idea of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) was conceptualized during the US–India Strategic Dialogue of 2013 in New Delhi. The Joint Statement that was issued at the end of the dialogue reaffirmed India and USA’s shared vision for peace and stability in Asia and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In order to advance the US interests in the Indo-Pacific, the US Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) has authorized $1.5 billion for each fiscal year from 2019 and 2023 to the Department of State. Both India and the USA have “reaffirmed the importance of maritime security, unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation, and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with the international law”. In the Joint Statement issued during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s US visit in June 2017, India and the USA pledged to promote stability across the Indo-Pacific region, increasing free and fair trade, and strengthening energy linkages. Similar statements emanated from the first and the second quadrilateral talks between Japan, India, USA and Australia in 2017 and 2018; however, the construct of Indo-Pacific must not be confused with the formation of the “Quad”. More recently, during the Indo-Pacific Business Forum held in Washington, the Trump Administration announced $113.5 million in immediate funding to seed new strategic initiatives in areas such as enhancing US private investment, improving digital connectivity and cybersecurity, promoting sustainable infrastructure development and strengthening energy security and access. References to “Free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) has often been interpreted as countering China’s assertiveness in the South China sea and the Indian Ocean Region with willing and able US allies in the region. Since the USA has deemed China as a “coercive”, “revisionist” power following “predatory” economic policies, and India being projected as a “lynchpin” in the US strategy, China has denounced the IndoPacific Strategy as a containment theory aimed at diminishing China’s geopolitical and economic influence. Undoubtedly, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is the outcome of the shift in the balance of power shifting from the west to the east. It has been estimated that by 2050, the region will account for over 80% of the global GDP (DoD 2012; Deepak 2018b; Zhang 2017). In May 2018, when the USA renamed its Pacific Command (PACOM) as US Indo-Pacific Command (USIPC), China reacted strongly in an editorial published by the Chinese edition of the Global Times saying that the “two long-term goals of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy is the mutual strategic depletion of China and India”. It compared the strategy as “a big pit” that will bury both the rise of China and India. Other Chinese scholars like Yang and Wang (2018) from the Communication University of China and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations posit that India will continue to readjust its policies to best serve the Indo-Pacific Strategy so as to realize the “dream of becoming a great power”, meanwhile, counter China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and “balance China’s rise” by joining the USA and other countries, albeit there are others like prof. Ma (2019), who believes that countries like India and South Korea will try to “maintain a relatively balanced and

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detached position between China and the USA to safeguard their core and longterm interest”. Li (2018; Deepak 2018b), a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University’s Institute of International Relations, says that the main purpose of the Indo-Pacific strategy by the USA is to establish an Indo-Pacific geopolitical order that targets China on the one hand, and formulate a trade rule centred on itself on the other. Li maintains that “whether it is Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” or Trump administration’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the constant theme of the US Asia– Pacific strategy is to weaken or marginalize China’s regional influence”. Unlike the past, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” according to Prof. Li transplants the concept of a security alliance into the practice of building an economic alliance, which will halt the economic integration in the region. Zhang (2017) echoes Li’s views, however, adds that “deconstruction and reorganization of the order in the Asia–Pacific region is part of the reconstruction of the world order” and hope that multilateralism prevails in the new order. As regards the USA injecting $113.5 million in the region, Chinese academics sees the security in command shifting to economy in command in the Indo-Pacific but are still sceptical of the USA and its allies committing investment in the region. Ma (2018), a professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University, has termed it as “economic edition” of the Indo-Pacific accompanying its “military edition” in the region, the main motive of which remains to counter China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. Prof. Ma has pronounced it as “barking dogs seldom bite” phenomenon. According to him, since the Indo-Pacific region overlaps with China’s “TwentyFirst Century Maritime Silk Road”, Southeast and South Asian countries are eagerly waiting to board the “Belt and Road” ship and improve their lot. China’s strong economic ties with the ASEAN irrespective of its disputes with various member states in the South China Sea will make it difficult for the Southeast Asian and smaller South Asian countries to forgo their interests, believe the Chinese scholars (Deepak 2018b). Earmarking $1.5 billion for each fiscal year between 2019 and 2023 is for the promotion of democracy, combating cyber security threats, people-topeople exchanges, human right defenders and developing power strategies between the USA and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. As far as India is concerned, they still question India’s relevance in Indo-Pacific Strategy. In the words of Zhang Feng, an adjunct professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, India, undoubtedly is an Indian Ocean country. When did it become a “Pacific country” and “Indo-Pacific” country? According to him, India’s primary concerns lies in the Indian Ocean; therefore, its strategy is the “Indian Ocean Strategy” not the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”; it is merely because the confluence of its “Act East Policy” and Southeast Asia that it has endorsed the Indo-Pacific Strategy. He argues that the bottlenecks in India’s strategic capability have limited India’s investment in the South China Sea and Pacific region. He believes that India joining the Quad was the outcome of its malevolent relations with China before and during the Doklam confrontation. Post Doklam truce, especially after Modi-Xi unofficial summit in Wuhan, China, appears to be very positive about what Prime Minister Modi spoke at Shangri-La Dialogue (Deepak 2018b).

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Was it the rebalancing of India-China relations at the unofficial summit or India being sensitive towards the Chinese sensitivities or the differing perceptions on the Indo-Pacific and India’s own vision of SAGAR, standing for Security and Growth for All in the Region that Prime Minister Modi made it clear during his speech at the Shangri-La dialogue that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country”. India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific according to the Chinese is a positive one, the “six elements” such as openness, inclusivity, common prosperity and security, globalization and connectivity except the “freedom of navigation” largely conforms to the Chinese notion of the new type of international relations paradigm. The Indo-Pacific Strategy certainly is not limited to the Quad as it has already incorporated Mongolia and Indonesia, many more may join. Meanwhile, shelving of the Varghese report titled “An India Economic Strategy to 2035: Navigating from Potential to Delivery” by Australia perhaps owing to China factor where China’s ambition to become the predominant power has been cited as a concern for both China and Australia could be a setback. Integrating security, economic and development investments in the Indo-Pacific could be a difficult task for even the allies and partners of the USA, and China may have the last laugh. As pointed out by prof. Zhang Feng that the Doklam was instrumental in India’s rethinking on Quad, if that is the case then, Galwan could be instrumental in India lodging both the Quad and Indo-Pacific Strategy in its military and foreign policy.

4 India-US Rapprochement Many in China’s strategic circles believe that Western countries, especially the USA is suspicious of the rise of China, and see her grandiose initiatives such as Asia Infrastructural Development Bank, Silk Road Fund, BRI and the Free Trade Area of the Asia–Pacific (FTAAP) as a challenge to the liberal order. China, on the contrary, sees these as institutions supplementing the existing global governance structure with no aim of challenging the US hegemony. Zhao (2015) argues that many US strategists view China as “the only potentially qualified rival”. The growing anxiety has lead the USA to privately acknowledge sovereignty of Japan over Senkaku; this is precisely the reason why Japan has shown interest to develop the Islands, including the dispatch of US soldiers to the islands, albeit there are other issues such as oil and gas reserves in the islands, maintains Zhao. Chinese scholarship believes, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is nothing but a larger version of the “pivot to Asia” aimed at containing China (Ma 2018; Yang 2018; Zhang 2020). As for the US presence in the region, China considers the latter as an outsider, an instigator and troublemaker who besides maintaining its hegemony and containing China, has no locus standi in the SCS. China prefers to engage the claimant nations bilaterally and has expressed its commitment towards the Code of Conduct negotiated by the ASEAN in 2002. Conversely, the USA believes that China is reclaiming and militarizing islands and shoals in the SCS and threatening regional stability. The USA fears that China’s

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intention is to make a fait accompli in the region by dredging and reclamation that will adversely impact on the freedom of navigation in the region. It is in this backdrop that the USA has used PA-8 surveillance aircrafts and bombers to reinforce the “freedom of navigation and overflight” in the region. Presently, China believes that USA will not confront China by crossing the 12 nautical miles territorial limit for surveillance; if it does, there may be miscalculation and the stability in the region will be threatened. In Beijing’s view, if Japan is the most reliable ally of the USA in the Pacific; in the Indian Ocean region, the USA is nurturing India as a possible ally. In June 2012, the then US defence secretary Leon Panetta said that India would be “a linchpin” in America’s unfolding new defence strategy that revolves around “re-balancing” its forces towards Asia–Pacific (TOI 2012). The joint Malabar maritime exercises between the USA, India and Japan could be seen in this light. Ever since the normalization of defence ties and nuclear deal in 2005, India and the USA have conducted more than 50 joint military exercises. The Malabar exercises initiated in 1992 now include Japan, Australia and Singapore too. These include search and rescue exercises, helicopter cross-deck landings, underway replenishments, gunnery and antisubmarine warfare exercises, and are termed “complex, high-end operational exercise that has grown in scope and complexity over the years” by the Indian Navy website.

4.1 India–US 2+2 Dialogue and China Ever since the signing of the “New Framework for the India-US Defence Relationship” in 2005, which was renewed for another ten years in 2015, and the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2012, India-US defence ties have expanded exponentially. According to a report by Political–Military Affairs Bureau of the State Department, US–India “defence trade increased from near zero in 2008 to over $20 billion in 2020”. These include MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, Apache helicopters, and the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure. India is the first non-treaty partner to be offered a Missile Technology Control Regime Category1 Unmanned Aerial System—the Sea Guardian UAS manufactured by General Atomics. The bureau continues to support advocacy for the Lockheed Martin F21 and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15EX Eagle as part of India’s future fighter aircraft acquisitions. Though the security cooperation is on an upward trajectory, there are also some points of frictions pertaining to oil procurement from Iran, S-400 missile defence system from Russia, limiting H1-B visas, imposition of tariffs, and US restriction on exporting submarines, etc. Nevertheless, both are optimistic as engagement has been strengthened by way of a new India-US 2+2 dialogue. The India-US 2+2 dialogue took off in September 2018.It has replaced the earlier India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue established in 2010 and 2015, respectively. The new ministerial dialogue involving foreign and defence secretaries/ministers of both sides is aimed at enhancing strategic coordination and maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The much-awaited dialogue was

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unilaterally postponed twice in April and July 2018by the USA owing to “unavoidable reasons”. Chinese scholarship on India at that time speculated that the real reason behind the US decision was India’s oil and arms imports from Iran and Russia, respectively. They also cited Trump’s displeasure with India, and India imposing up to 100% tariff on imports from the United States in retaliation to the US tariffs. Long (2019), director of the Indian Research Centre at Xinhua Normal University and a senior researcher at the Chahar Institute, had opined that “there was a long-standing deep rooted mistrust between India and the USA. On the one hand, the USA is wielding the stick of “protectionism” against India, and on the other, by unfolding its “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the USA wants India to make a choice between China and the USA. Given the choice, China is more “reliable”, argues the scholar”. Prime Minister Modi’s pronouncements on the Indo-Pacific during the Shangri-La Dialogue (2018) and the Wuhan unofficial summit (2017) have been interpreted in this context. Nevertheless, in India, many believed that the real reason was US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo’s North Korea visit, as denuclearization of north was at the top of Trump’s agenda. Nikki Haley, US envoy to the United Nations, had then clarified that the postponement was not due to the tensions in bilateral relations (Deepak 2018a). China must have had a close watch at the proceedings of the new dialogue, as the US officials prior to the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defence, James Mattis’ India visit, have underscored the “China focus” of these talks. Randall G. Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, while speaking at an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had said that “China and how to respond to it will be front and centre” of the dialogue (George 2019). He did raise India’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia and ruled out any waiver, albeit he did talk about the USA providing India alternate platforms. He also talked about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the militarization of the South China Sea and said that we need to have an alternative and the USA is talking with India. It is interesting to note that Zhang Jun, China’s assistant foreign minister said on 27th August that India was a natural partner in the ancient Silk Road and remains in the Belt and Road Initiative. He also tried to address India’s concerns about China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) when he said that it was a pure economic initiative and does not alter China’s position on Kashmir. In fact, China’s investment in the disputed territories was one of the reasons as to why India did not participate in the BRI Forums hosted by President Xi Jinping in 2017 and 2019. Notwithstanding the India-China reset during the Wuhan Summit, India is moving closer to the USA as regards security cooperation. India has been granted the “major defence partner” status by the USA and India has been the signatory of the Industrial Security Annex (ISA) and all four foundational agreements, which will allow India to procure sensitive technologies of duel use from the USA. Since 2008, India has been operating on high-end secured communication equipment on platforms such as C-130 J, C-17, P-8I aircraft, and Apache and Chinook helicopters. Other deals in the pipeline are the purchase of 24-multi-role Sikorsky-Lockheed Martin helicopters for

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the Indian Navy, National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMSII), and unmanned Guardian drones. The tri-service military exercises and anti-terror exercises are also on anvil. The Indo-Pacific certainly has gained traction. In China, many believe that “India is the best choice for the USA to balance China”. Professor Zhang Guihong of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, says that China on the one hand needs to strengthen its economic engagement with India, while on the other allay India’s security concerns as regards Kashmir issue, China’s relations with Pakistan and other smaller states in South Asia. In the same vein, India needs to address China’s security concerns as regards the Tibet, Taiwan and East Turkistan, etc. issues. It appears that both India and China remain sceptical of each other’s moves, as has been demonstrated by the Doklam and Galwan confrontations. Therefore, close India-US defence cooperation is certainly going to ruffle many feathers in the power corridors in Zhongnanhai; however, India would be jeopardizing its relations with China, if it acts as a front state of the USA. In the same vein, if the USA would like to offset China’s geopolitical pull in the region and globe by way of India confronting China, certainly the USA is mistaken. Nonetheless, China also needs to be sensitive towards India’s concerns and not push India in the US embrace (Deepak 2018).

5 Conclusion It could be discerned that the Indo-Pacific maritime environment has undergone tremendous changes. PLAN has emerged as a new force in the Pacific with its new assets including the Liaoning and Shandong aircraft careers, has challenged the USA and Japanese dominance in the region while its port infrastructural facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan has threatened traditional Indian dominance of the Indian Ocean. PLAN docking its nuclear submarine in Sri Lanka is just an example of increased footsteps of the PLAN in the Indian Ocean. China’s shipbuilding is going on a frenzied speed; Fanell (2020), Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the US Pacific Fleet estimates that “PLAN by 2030 will consist of 450 ships and a submarine force approaching 110 submarines”. He further says that “since 2008, the PLAN has dispatched 35 naval escort task forces through the Indian Ocean and into the Gulf of Aden, and PLAN ships have visited over 60 nations. India should expect to see PLA Navy aircraft carrier strike groups operating in the Indian Ocean in the next 1–3 years”. Undoubtedly, a powerful PLAN is part and parcel of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation. Indian Navy’s blue water ambitions are also visible from its increased footprints in the Pacific and the kind of maritime exercises it is engaged with the USA and other countries in the region including China. The Indian Navy has plans to add 2 aircraft carriers, 56 ships and acquisition of 30 submarines to the existing inventory. Although the Indian Navy and PLAN are engaged in thigh level exchanges and joint maritime exercises, the content, breadth and depth of these exercises have been abysmal, the personnel and assets engaged in such exercises are miniscule

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if compared to India’s exercises with the USA and other countries. Therefore, these could be regarded not more than some simple confidence building measures. Conversely, the soaring ambitions of the IN and PLAN, the overlapping interests, the new MSR of China, and the US factor in the region, the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Strategy throw huge challenges for maritime cooperation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how effectively the USA, China and India handle the overall maritime security environment of the Indo-Pacific region. As regards the littoral states in the Indo-Pacific, they appear to accommodate the well settled USA, emerging China and India at the same time.

References AGDoD [Australian Government, Department of Defence], (2013). Defending Australia and its National Interests. https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf Chaudhury, R. R. (1999). India’s maritime security. India International Centre Quarterly, 25/26(4/1) (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 129–139. Chen, F. (2007).《中印海军青岛附近黄海海域举行联合演练》https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ jjzg/2007-04/17/content_852430.htm. Accessed on 22 November 2014. Ross, C. D. Y., Devary, Rustici, & Lin, S. J. (2014). “Not an idea we have to Shun”: Chinese overseas basing requirements in the 21st Century. Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7. National Defence University Press, Washington, DC. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ ChinaPerspectives-7.pdf. CRI [China Radio International], (2003). Important events in 2003. https://english.cri.cn/349/2006/ 04/21/4480121.htm. Deepak, B. R. (2012). Should India get embroiled in the South China Sea? C3S Paper No: 1014 dated on 9 August 2012. https://www.c3sindia.org/eastasia/3005 Deepak, B. R. (2018a). Watch out for Kyaukpyu port and China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Sunday Guardian, 24 November 2018. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/watch-kya ukpyu-port-china-myanmar-economic-corridor. Deepak, B. R. (2018b). China watching India-US 2+2 dialogue with keen interest. Sunday Guardian, 9 September 2018. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/china-watching-india-us-22dialogue-keen-interest. Deepak, B. R. (2018c). China riled by the Indo-Pacific construct. Sunday Guardian, 18 August 2018. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/china-riled-indo-pacific-construct. DoD. (2012). Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India. The US Department of Defense, 6 June 2012. https://archive.defense.gov/tra nscripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054. ET [Economic Times], (2014). China denies reports to set up 18 naval bases in Indian Ocean. 27 November 2014. Fanell, J. E. (2020). China’s global Navy eyeing sea control by 2030, superiority by 2049. Sunday Guardian, 13 June 2020. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/chinas-global-navy-eyeingsea-control-2030-superiority-2049. George, V. K. (2019). China will be ‘front & centre’ of 2+2 talks, says U.S. official. The Hindu, 29 August 2018. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-will-be-front-cen tre-of-22-talks-says-us-official/article24812791.ece. Han, X. (2010).《中国军队要学会打“全球战争》Chinese military need to learn how to fight a ‘global war’. Global Times, 12 June 2010.

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Zhang, J. (2020).《美日印澳“四边对话”与亚太地区秩序的重构》The “Quad” between the US, Japan, India and Australia: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific regional order. Studies in International Issues, 8 October 2018. https://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2018-10/08/content_40526064.htm. Zhang, S. (2009).《中国海权》China’s Sea Rights. People’s Daily Publication, Beijing. Zhao, M. (2015). ‘March Westwards’ and a New Look on China’s Grand Strategy. Mediterranean Quarterly, 26(1), 97–116.

Chapter 9

India, China and Multilateralism: Towards Multi-polarity and Global Governance

If the trajectories of political, economic, cultural and social influence are used to determine the nature of the global power structure, it can be said that the nineteenth century was a unipolar world dominated by the Great Britain; after the Second World War, the USA filled the void left by the decline of Britain, but also witnessed simultaneous rise of the Soviet Union. As the world was divided into the socialist and capitalist blocks, bipolarity was established. However, with disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, uni-polarity was established with the USA at the helm of power. In the twenty-first century, as countries reaped benefits of globalization and liberalization, other centres of power started to emerge, mirrored in the rise of China and emerging economies like India and Brazil. As globalization made the world highly interdependent, establishment of multilateral mechanism for aligning national development strategies through better coordination and consultation became the norm. The last three decades could be attributed to multilateralism in the age of global interdependence. Multilateralism may not necessarily be an ultimate solution to bilateral or multilateral problem, however, could be important for conflict resolutions and enhancing understanding and cooperation among the nations. The convergences of India and China on climate change, albeit there are some visible shifts in their strategies of late, formation of the BRICS, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are just a few examples. These are established on the premise that India and China relationship transcend the scope of bilateral relation and must be viewed from a global perspective; and that they must not let the differences to grow into disputes and conflicts.

1 India, China and the Climate Change India and China, and many other developing countries, are at an important stage of industrialization and urbanization and are facing enormous difficulties in controlling greenhouse gasses. If compared with the USA, there is a lot of catching up to be done. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_9

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For instance, in India, China and the USA, three largest emitters of the greenhouse gases (GHG) have 18, 113 and over 800 motor vehicles per thousand people. The per capita production of CO2 in these countries is 2.6, 8.13 and 19.86 tons, respectively. Even if India is at number 4 in terms of total volume of emissions (if we put the European Union at number 3), India only emits 6.96% of the global emissions comparing 14.4% by the USA, and over 25.26% by China. Similar indicators could be applied across various domains of public life in these countries, indicating that it is not a level playing field for India from any perspective (Deepak 2016, 24). It was precisely owing to such an asymmetry in development levels that India in tandem with China took to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in particular that developed countries should be taking lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions and providing financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building support to developing countries, for the global warming is not caused by a couple of decade’s development in India and China, but by the accumulated carbon emissions by the industrialized countries over two hundred years. The same stand was reiterated in October 2009 Memorandum of Understanding between India and China, and even between the USA and China in 2014. India and China have been emphasizing that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol (KP) are the most appropriate frameworks for addressing climate change. This was reflected in 2009 Copenhagen Summit when both India and China categorically opposed both the Danish and Tuvaluan drafts, which envisaged deeper cuts in global emissions, as well as limiting the global temperature rise to within 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C, and reiterated that the premise for discussion should be KP and the Bali Road Map (BRM) rather than bringing in a new protocol. However, in 2015, both moved away from their rigid stand of yesteryears and were willing to negotiate climate change alone with other stakeholders; the US–China and India–US climate change announcements prior to the Paris Conference that brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change demonstrated this fact (Deepak 2016, 25). The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4th November 2016, and as of March 2019, 195 UNFCCC members signed the agreement. Citing the deal bad for the USA and its economy, President Trump, announced on 1st June 2017 the decision of the USA to withdraw from it. The decision drew a flak from many criticizing him (Duke 2019) that it “would provide serious cover for major emitters like China and India”. As far as China is concerned, ever since the advocacy of building “a new type of major power relationship” by President Xi Jinping in 2013, China has been taking proactive approach as regards managing and handling issues with the USA. A year later in November 2014, it quickly reached a deal with the USA on Climate. The article 3 of the US–China Joint Announcement stipulates that the USA will reduce its emissions by 26–28% below its 2005 level in 2025. China declared that it intends to achieve the peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030 (TWH 2014). Since then both sides have been strengthening their policy dialogue and practical cooperation that includes, joint clear energy research, utilization and storage of CO2 , cooperation of HFCs, building low carbon

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cities and trading in green goods, etc. These emission cuts were reiterated by President Xi Jinping during his September 22–25 US visit. Buoyed by the success of its seven pilot schemes for “cap and trade” (Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hunan, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin), Xi announced that China will implement “a cap and trade system” by 2017 albeit analysts believed that allocating permits equitably could be a herculean task for China, especially when energy consumptions and growth rates varied drastically from region to region (Deepak 2016, 26). Another announcement that attracted worldwide attention was Xi Jinping offering $3.1 billion in climate finance for developing countries, which is a notch above the US pledge of $3.0 billion Green Climate Fund, signalling that China is ready to share greater responsibility at the international stage and help the developing countries to mitigate their emission concerns on the one hand and that the developed world in not doing enough to mitigate similar concerns of the developing countries on the other. India perhaps will not be in such a position and will continue to uphold it earlier position till the time some parity is achieved on the emissions. Nevertheless, the timings of the US–China announcements in 2014 and 2015 perhaps set a stage for the success of Paris meeting, and put heat on others too. As far as India is concerned, being the third largest emitters of the GHGs, it pledged a 20– 25% reduction in emissions intensity from 2005 levels by 2020. However, as every country was supposed to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) ahead of December 2015 climate change conference, India submitted the same on 1st October 2015, which pledged to reduce the emission intensity of its GDP by 33–35% by 2030 from 2005 levels and produce about 40% of its electricity from “non-fossil fuel based sources” like solar, wind or hydropower. These commitments could be fulfilled only if India spends $2.5 trillion till 2030 at current prices (Deepak 2016, 26). It appears that though China has moved away from the notion of differentiated responsibilities albeit it does make mention of it in the US–China climate announcement made in Beijing in 2014, India owing to huge asymmetries in emission as well as development with China and developed world is sticking its guns to the old notion as demonstrated by India’s the then environment minister Prakash Javadekar’s speech in New York. Moreover, as India maintains a robust growth trajectory, it would require more energy resources for faster growth that will ultimately uplift millions of its poor from poverty; it is this vulnerability that India unlike China has not announced when its emissions might peak. India’s emission commitment and economic vulnerability is also an opportunity to forge closer technological cooperation with developed countries. In this regard, the US–India deal to “enhance cooperation” on cutting emissions and investing in low carbon energy sources signed in 2015 is a pointer. Though the deal cannot be compared to the US–China deal, nonetheless, India’s two-pronged strategy of dealing with the emission cuts could be seen as a fine balancing act as for now. How successful PM Modi would be treading this line, we will have to wait and watch. Interestingly, with the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, China would be forced to recalibrate its G-2 strategy to a more diversified multilateral cooperation. Though some may see a window for China to take the global leadership as regards

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climate change governance, however, given the slowdown in its economy, ongoing coronavirus and trade war with the USA, it may help rebuild global shared leadership by replacing the Sino-US G2 partnership with a Climate 5 (C5) partnership that comprises China, the EU, India, Brazil and South Africa as argued by Zhang et al. (2017a, b) in their study. The grouping accounts for 22% of the world economy, 19% of the global trade and contributes more than 50% to the world’s economic growth. However, if we analyse China’s GDP, it is bigger than the GDP of the rest 4 and its contribution to world economy over 33%.

2 India and China in the BRICS The acronym, BRIC, was coined by O’Neill (2001), an economist with Goldman Sachs in a paper entitled “The World Needs Better Economic BRICs” published in 2001. Yet in another paper, Wilson and Purushotaman (2003) argue that over the next 50 years, the BRICs could become a much larger force in the world economy and could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. For example, the GDP of the BRIC countries would be around 85 trillion USD comparing 66 trillion of the G6 countries. Therefore, the notion signals a shift in the global economic power away from the G7 economies towards the emerging economies. The BRIC thesis holds that China and India will become the hub of world’s manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will become leading suppliers of raw materials. This, however, may not hold true for the future, as China is determined to move away from the labourintensive industries to R&D and high-end manufacturing, as could be gleaned from its “Made in China 2025” strategy. During the third BRIC leaders’ summit in China (2011), President Hi Jintao invited South Africa to the club, thus taking the number to five and making it the BRIC into BRICS. At present, the BRICS accounts for more than 25% of the world’s land mass; more than 40% of world population; over 50% of world economic growth; and around 30% of the world economy. Even though, South Africa’s 366 billion US dollar economy and population of 49 million pales in comparison to other BRICS members, especially China and India, however, it is the most advanced economy in Africa; the largest trade partner of China in Africa; and more importantly will provide a gateway to the BRICS into Africa for greater trade and investment. Furthermore, South Africa’s entry has given the BRICS a voice in the African Continent and is bound to strengthen the economic base of a multi-polar world on the one hand and create conditions for strengthening of the global peace and security on the other.

2.1 A Platform for Cooperation The BRIC was formally institutionalized as an international forum during the first BRIC summit hosted by Russia in June 2009 albeit the BRIC Foreign Ministers

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had met in Yekaterinburg a year earlier. The summit primarily dealt with the global economic crisis and looked for answers as how to build a new international financial system. In this regard, the Chinese and Brazilian move to invest 40 and 10 billion US dollars, respectively, in International Monetary Fund (IMF) bonds was considered as a move to diversify their dollar-heavy currency reserves, as these nations, especially China, were increasingly apprehensive about the safety of the exchange reserves held in US dollar denominated assets. It was owing to this fact that the BRIC nations called for the reforms of the world organizations, including the financial institutions and the United Nations, and demand greater role for the emerging economies in these bodies. This is obvious from the BRIC foreign ministerial meeting on 16th May 2008 in Yekaterinburg prior to the first BRIC summit at the same place in 2009. During the meeting, the BRIC nations called for the emerging economies to play more assertive role in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A week prior to the Yekaterinburg summit, Brazil and Russia offered $10 billion each to the IMF and China announced plans to invest a total of $50.1 billion. India on its part has committed to contribute $3 billion. This was also approved by the G20 summit held in South Korea in November 2010 of which all the BRIC nations are members. The reform of the world financial institutions is considered as an important step towards a more legitimate, credible and effective system of governance where emerging economies like India and China will find greater representation. Notwithstanding the “imaginary” foundation of the BRICS, and challenges the grouping is facing internally and externally, its 12-year short journey has indeed achieved remarkable growth and is increasingly been seen as a major economic grouping contributing tremendously to the global economic growth and governance. With the establishment of mechanisms like an agricultural information base system (2010), the stock exchanges of the BRICS emerging markets (2011), agreements to promote trade in local currencies (2012), BRICS University League (2013), BRICS New Development Bank (2014), BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (2015) BRICS first Regional Centre of the New Development Bank in South Africa (2017), etc., have demonstrated that the BRICS has emerged as a fine example of multilateralism. It has also demonstrated the desire of the emerging economies to assume greater responsibilities in global financial governance albeit its power of discourse remains limited as it holds only 13 and 15% of the voting rights in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively. It was agreed during the 8th summit in Goa, India, that an independent BRICS Rating Agency would be established to transform global financial architecture based on the principles of fairness and equity. It is believed that the West led agencies such as S&P, Fitch and Moody’s that account for 90% of the rating market have somewhat jaundiced approach towards the developing countries. For example, in May 2017, Moody’s ratings agency downgraded China’s credit score, warning that economy-wide debt is expected to rise as potential economic growth slows over the coming years. Both India and China had slammed Moody’s “inappropriate methodologies” at that time (PTI 2017).

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Globalization vs. De-globalization

The retrenchment of the West led by the USA; fissures in the Western alliance; doubts over the success of the European Union following the BREXIT and economic slump in most of the countries, the refugee crisis, Covid 19 pandemic, etc., issues have increasingly made countries look inward, so much so the USA has pulled out of the Paris Climate Change Agreement and the WHO. The BRICS though made a strong pitch for globalization during the 9th BRICS summit in Xiamen, however, the coronavirus spread and India–China border flare up will create difficulties for cooperation. Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China remains a mammoth connectivity initiative of the century geared towards boosting regional as well as global growth, its endorsement by BRICS has been problematic as there are differing perceptions about some of the BRI corridors amongst the BRICS countries.

2.1.2

South–South Cooperation

It is evident that the developing countries would like to break free from the subservient role they had with the industrialized economies and forge stronger economic and political relations among themselves, which are based on mutual respect, equality and win–win cooperation. The establishment of the BRICS and its affiliated institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingency Reserve Fund should be seen in this light. China’s connectivity initiative appears to offer such a model for cooperation, which is seen as less exploitative and more relevant to mutual development, but concerns of neo-colonialism and debt traps remain. Even within the grouping, smaller countries are apprehensive about the ultimate goals of the connectivity initiatives. However, it is the fact that the BRICS countries, especially China, have been instrumental in south–south finance flows; today, China’s policy banks lend more capital than any other bank in the world. The cooperation has resulted in foreign direct investment, trade, transfer of technology especially in mining, energy, infrastructure, etc., sectors. South–South cooperation has been one of the major themes of the summits, but despite of the fact that Brazil is a huge commodity market, Africa and Russia are rich in natural resources, India, the biggest agricultural economy, and China the largest exporter of commodities and production capacities, the intra-trade between BRICS countries remains abysmal. For example, in 2015, it stood at about $250 billion. Though Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for doubling this number to $500 billion by 2020, nonetheless, in the wake of Covid-19 disruption and border tensions flaring up between India and China, the target will remain a far cry.

2.1.3

Global Governance

The paradigm shift in the global economic and political structure has resulted in structural adjustment in the global governance system. The G20 demonstrated that

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the developed and developing countries could sit together at the high table, while the birth of various new mechanisms such as BRICS, SCO, NDB, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund indicated that the emerging economies were capable of reshaping or willing to supplement the existing governance mechanisms with new ones. Being the founder members of many of these mechanisms, both India and China, are playing a leading role and building bridges between the developed and developing countries and adding multitude of wealth to the global economy. Nevertheless, there are voices that the establishment of these institutions including the NDB and AIIB have challenged the post-World War II order. The fact remains that the establishment of these institutions is the outcome of the Bretton Woods System that has been on shaky grounds after the 2008–09 financial crises as well as the Euro crisis, a reminder that if the institutions like IMF, the WB and ADB continue to attach strings to the developmental aids and loans, there is going to be a serious demand for alternative institutions. Especially when the global economic recovery is weak, the establishment of such institutions will promote infrastructural as well as social and economic development in the regions.

2.1.4

Counter Terrorism

BRICS countries remain committed to combat terrorism in any shape and form and believe that there is a need to expand practical cooperation in intelligence sharing, capacity building, and providing security to their sprawling interests abroad. In this context, a Counter-Terrorism Working Group was established during the 8th summit in Goa and held its first meeting. The group agreed to expand counter terrorism cooperation further to include measures for denying terrorists access to finance and terror hardware such as equipment, arms and ammunition. The second meeting was held in Beijing on 17th May 2017 and conducted extensive discussions on the issue affecting region and beyond. India has been urging the BRICS nations to back its efforts for the adoption of a comprehensive convention on terrorism at the UN and shed the ambiguity on “good” and “bad” terrorists.

2.1.5

Combating Global Warming

At a time when the USA is withdrawing from multilateral arrangements such as the Paris climate agreement, BRICS countries have repeatedly expressed their commitment towards the Paris deal and the emission cuts they have undertaken for combating the global warming. No one denies the fact that the combined population of 3 billion people and a GDP of $17 trillion will have a huge impact on global emissions; however, can the BRICS initiate joint research and development into new energy technologies? It has been expressed by some of the BRICS countries like Russia and Brazil that they do not want to be seen as exporters of their natural wealth.

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People-to-People Exchange

People-to-people exchanges are the pillar of all bilateral and multilateral exchanges. It is the cultural capital of a country that has attraction and lays foundations of understanding between the people. As regards the people-to-people exchanges between the BRICS nations, even if there are various exchanges such as cultural festivals, media and film exchange, BRICS scholarships programmes, they seem to have made little impact. There remains a huge room to strengthen and broaden the scope these exchanges. The establishment of BRICS University League is an excellent example. There is a need to institutionalize these mechanisms and establish even more at various levels.

3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization The SCO has become an important multilateral institution promoting regional security, as its security boundaries have sprawled into energy cooperation, military cooperation, counter terrorism, intelligence sharing and above all promoting the proliferation of connectivity thus galvanizing the economic integration in Eurasia, yet it is not a military block or an alliance directed towards any specific country. With India and China, the two largest and fastest developing countries as its members, the contribution they are making together with other members to the global economic growth and prosperity is quite significant. The SCO spirit of inclusivity, unimpeded trade and investment and the greater flow of human recourses is necessary for innovation and capacity building between the nations, regions, and the world. This also reflects the thinking of the SCO that disequilibrium in the global wealth distribution could be offset by greater openness, demolition of the trade barriers and through proliferation and docking of connectivity initiatives in the region. An open and innovative Asia will certainly push the global economic growth, regional economic integration and also build trust between the countries. This is necessary if the dividends of the 4th industrial revolution are to be reaped by countries across the globe, the developing countries in particular. As far as India is concerned, it became a formal member of the SCO during the 17th summit on 8th June 2017 in Astana, Kazakhstan. At the outset, the SCO provides India an opportunity and an excellent platform to engage with other member states in Eurasian continent and calibrate its policies in the region accordingly. Secondly, we must not forget that in 1996 when Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the “Shanghai Five” the idea behind was to resolve the border disputes, and downsize military forces along the borders. If the relations are turned benevolent through this platform, the same could be achieved in South Asia, albeit the disputes are more complex, as could be gleaned through frequent border standoffs between India and China. The better management and resolution of the borders paved way for better connectivity between China, Russia and other Central Asian Republics. Thirdly, since fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism is another

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important goal of the SCO ever since its formation in 2001, and especially since the Tashkent Summit in 2004 when a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was officially inaugurated; the expansion of the SCO would entail a more coordinated approach on terrorism. Sharing of intelligence, counter terrorism operations and combat experience, etc., of various countries will come handy. More importantly, this multilateral mechanism has provided an opportunity for India and Pakistan to open channels of communication even if the bilateral dialogue between the two remains stalled. The first ever SCO RATS legal experts meeting in Islamabad between 23rd and 25th May 2018 is just an example. Fourthly, the large-scale Peace Mission military exercises of the SCO, which have gained importance in the backdrop of the Islamic State spill over into the region, will provide the new entrants, especially India, a rare opportunity to engage with the PLA and Pakistan army at the same time. Since the exercises promote interoperability, mutual trust and transparency, it may help to ease up some misgiving about the PLA in India on the one hand, yet bring the Indian army face to face with the Chinese personal, technological and integrated command capabilities of the PLA on the other. Fifthly, since most of the SCO members have huge stakes in Afghanistan’s security, political and economic stability, they need to devise a magic formula, for the security situation in Afghanistan has been worsening, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are escalating, peace with the Taliban that again owing to diametrically opposite perspectives between some member countries is elusive. In this context, the Wuhan and Chennai unofficial summits between president Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi gains traction, where both the leaders reached some consensus on taking joint projects in Afghanistan. However, the Galwan bloody standoff has dashed all such hopes of cooperation at bilateral and multilateral forums. The Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA) between China, Pakistan, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan that has been docked with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will further test India’s diplomatic manoeuvrability with the Central Asian Republics and China. Having said that, since regional and trans-regional connectivity, expansion of trade, investment and commerce is the top priority of China in Eurasia and beyond, and since the mechanism of “Belt and Road” is an important instrument in realizing the policy goals, India may not be averse to connectivity with China or any other country minus CPEC and unfold a pragmatic and constructivist approach. It would make sense if India’s connectivity projects, especially the North– South Transport Corridor (NSTC), and various other connectivity projects inside India and Southeast Asia, could be docked to similar Chinese initiatives in Southeast Asia, Central Asian Republics and Russian projects in the region. As regards, China’s role, since China’s GDP surpasses the combined total of all the members, it offers immense opportunities for member states to benefit at bilateral and multilateral levels. Until 2017, the SCO was limited to China, Russia and Central Asian republics, the inclusion of India and Pakistan has certainly extended the SCO multilateralism to South Asia, thus expanding its diplomatic, economic, cultural and security boundaries, and making it perhaps world’s largest multilateral institution in terms of population, geographical area, and economy. Secondly, China has committed along with other members that the SCO is not a security or military bloc directed

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against any country, the institution rather calls for peace, stability and prosperity in the region and fight together the traditional and non-traditional security challenges in a better and coordinated way. Afghanistan could be one of the litmus tests for such coordination where every member of the SCO has its stake. It will also test China’s leadership in the SCO and its balancing act with the member states. Thirdly, by way of advocating Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has already asserted the leadership role in Eurasia and most of the economic corridors of the BRI run through Eurasia, which will not only bring in physical integration, but more importantly economic integration as well, thus providing regional peace and stability. China has put huge stakes in these corridors; for example, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor alone will incur around $73 billion to China’s exchequer. Fourthly, even though some countries have cried foul as regards China’s assertiveness in the region, nonetheless, China’s advocacy of integrated markets with unimpeded trade, investment and currency, the notion of common and collective security, as well as the “community of shared future” will be put to test. Finally, since some of the corridors have faced opposition from certain countries, it remains to be seen how different connectivity initiatives by the member states could be aligned; for example, the Gwadar and Chabahar ports that tend to benefit Central Asia and South Asia alike.

4 Constraints and Challenges Regardless of the potential and opportunities, multilateralism is not without constraints and challenges. Each nation in the forum has its own priorities, they do not have a common agenda; BRICS is a typical example. Added to this, they are not an economic block like the European Union or a political alliance like the NATO, albeit capable of converting their economic prowess into a greater geopolitical clout; all have diverging interests, and at times conflicting (Cohen et al. 2010). First of all, the mammoth economic growth of some member counties is dependent on manufacturing based on raw materials such as iron ore, copper, aluminium, fossil fuel and natural gas; technological breakthrough in renewable energy could shift the balance again in favour of G7 and could result in slower economic growth than anticipated. Secondly, the so-called currency manipulation by some BRICS countries has “harmed” the manufacturing in some countries, as admitted by the then Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega. Currency swaps and transaction in Yuan, though taking place in some degree, but has a long way to go. Thirdly, there is an asymmetric relationship between the polities and economies of these groupings. For example, the economy of China is bigger than the rest of the nations and holds over $3 trillion of reserves, over 30% of the world reserves; its political clout is also bigger, as it holds veto power in the UNSC, besides being talked as the G2 partner with the USA. China though favours UNSC reforms, but is the only P5 country that does not support India’s membership to the Council. These economic and military asymmetries will result in security dilemmas, as has been the

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case with India and Russia vis-à-vis China. China trouncing Russia as the largest trade partner of the Central Asian republics is a pointer to this. It is also for this reason that if China talks about connectivity, trade and investment through the BRI, Russia is quick to bring security on the agenda. Fourthly, the political equations between India, China and Russia are impregnated with “mutual mistrust” and huge “security deficit”, especially between India and China on the issue of border, and China’s entente cordiale with its “all weather friend” Pakistan. China’s support for Pakistan on Kashmir issue, raking it in the UN, and wanting to grab more territories in Ladakh, has deepened mistrust between the two. Border standoffs such as Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) make cooperation extremely difficult. Fifthly, domestic issues, especially the increasing social imbalance in the groupings such as BRICS could pose serious challenges to the internal security and economic development in these countries. And finally, even though India has welcomed South Africa’s entry into the BRICS folds, but it is believed that the entry has also intensified rivalry between India and China, for China would like to dilute IBSA by amalgamating it into the BRICS. India knows that China has a domineering role in the BRICS, NDB, SCO and AIIB, therefore, will pursue bilateral and multilateral engagement on the on its own terms.

5 Conclusion Multi-polarity in the age of global interdependence has posed challenge to the international governance system that was dominated by the Westphalian and Bretton Woods systems in which the developed countries led by the USA remained at the centre, while developing countries at the periphery of the governance. The international financial crisis perhaps for the first time challenged the existing global governance structure when emerging economies like China and India resiliently not only overcame the crisis, but also helped other developing countries to tide it over. As rightly remarked by the former U.S. Secretary of state, Kissinger (2014) that the “world order is at a turning point”. The shift was confirmed as the economic output proportion of the emerging economies in the global economy rose to 30%, whereas the ratio of the developed G7 economies registered a substantial decline touching 47%. Therefore, the power shift as well as the diffusion led to the crisis of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the current global governance institutions, as the emerging economies asking for more representation and voice in these institutions became a trend. The paradigm shift undoubtedly resulted in structural adjustment in the global governance mechanism, thus making the establishment of groupings such as BRICS, SCO, BRICS, NDB, AIIB, even BRI of China possible. While this showed the eagerness of the developing and emerging economies to take more responsibilities in the global governance, but the same has also raised many eyebrows in the developing

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world as regards the intent of these groupings, especially the role of China, the prime mover behind such groupings. Even though the paradigm shift in the global governance has given India and China a bigger say as well as bigger responsibilities in the evolving global ecosystem, however, there remains huge asymmetries in their power and economic structures visà-vis developed economies. Ideally, the groupings could have aligned their respective development strategies with various initiatives, however, increasing asymmetries in their power structure, failing to resolve sensitive bilateral issues, growing rivalry between the USA and China, and China viewing India joining the USA in its containment strategies like the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quad, has deepened the suspicion between the two and made the defined aims and objectives of various multilateral groupings difficult to realize.

References Cohen, A., Curtis. L., Scissors, D., & Walser, R. (2010). Busting the Brazil/Russia/India/China (BRIC) myth of challenging U.S. Global Leadership. The Heritage Foundation, paper no. 2869, 10 April 2010. https://report.heritage.org/wm2869. Accessed 28 February 2011. Deepak, B. R. (2016). India and China: Foreign policy approaches and responses. New Delhi: Vij Books. Duke, R. (2019). Leaving the Paris agreement is a bad deal for the United States. Foreign Policy, 19 May 2009. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/19/leaving-the-paris-agreement-is-a-bad-dealfor-the-united-states/. Kissinger, H. (2014). Henry Kissinger on the assembly of a new world order. Wall Street Journal, 29 August 2014. https://www.wsj.com/articles/henry-kissinger-on-the-assembly-of-anew-world-order-1409328075. O’Neil, J. (2001). Building better global economic BRIC. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 66. https://www.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/building-better-doc.pdf. PTI [Press Trust of India] (2017). Moody’s cuts China’s rating on debt concerns. The Hindu, 24 May 2017. TWH [The White House] (2014). U.S.-China joint announcement on climate change. The White House, 11 November 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/ us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change. Wilson, D., & Purushothaman, R. (2003). Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050. Goldman Sachs global economics, Paper No. 99, https://www.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming. pdf. Zhang, H., Dai, H., Lai, H., & Wang, W. (2017a). U.S. withdrawal from the Paris agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China’s response. Advances in Climate Change Research 8(4), 220–225. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927817301028?via%3Dihub. Zhang, Y., Chao, Q., C., Zheng, Q., & Huang, L. (2017b). The withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris agreement and its impact on global climate change governance. Advances in Climate Change Research, 8(2017), 213–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.08.005.

Chapter 10

India-China Relations Post-COVID-19 Pandemic and Galwan Incident

The Covid-19 that spread from Wuhan in China and the Galwan ambush in Eastern Ladakh by the People’s Liberation Army are two such black swan events that are likely to damage India–China relations beyond repair. As India grapples with the Covid-19 onslaught on its people and economy, China’s bellicosity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has added to India’s troubles. Fatalities of the Indian soldiers in Galwan, first since the 1962, have ended whatever little trust was between the two. With India overhauling its China policy, which seems imminent, how will it impact on India’s thinking on the border, trade and investment, our immediate and extended neighbourhood and people-to-people exchanges with China? Will it be the business as usual or are we witnessing a tectonic shift in India–China relations, let us examine and find some answers. On 21st January 2019, while addressing hundreds of senior officials from all provinces and autonomous regions at the Communist Party School in Beijing, President Xi Jinping told them that “We must maintain a high degree of vigilance. We must keep our high alert about any ‘black swan’ incident, and also take steps to prevent any ‘grey rhino’” (Lin and You 2019). A “black swan” incident refers to an unforeseen occurrence that typically has extreme consequences, while a “grey rhino” an obvious threat that can be ignored. The coronavirus 19 that struck Wuhan first in December 2020 (Zu et al. 2020) and then spread to over 219 countries, infecting more than 17 million people and killing 675,060 people across the world by the end of July 2020. The virus thus not only proved to be a “black swan” incident for China but also to the world. Zu et al. (TSCIO 2020) argue that China took prompt action, timely recognized the new virus and shared the viral gene sequence to the world. It was in the wake of China’s prompt response that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January 2020 and named the disease as Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) on 12 February 2020. The West led by the USA, however, believes that China has concealed the extent of the coronavirus outbreak, under-reported both total cases and deaths it suffered from the disease (IE 2020a). If the interviews given by Yan Liming (2020), a virologist at the School of Public Health, University of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. R. Deepak, India and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4_10

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Hong Kong, who escaped to the USA, are to be believed, Chinese government knew about the virus but covered it up. Dr. Yan calls it a “PLA virus” and not of natural origin. She says that even a fake genome sequence was shared on 12 January but was subsequently replaced by a new one, as the pandemic spread outside China. Yan’s version has been dismissed by China as “unfounded’ and “hearsay”; however, notwithstanding such reports, there appears to be initial laxity on the part of Wuhan authorities in recognizing the gravity of the pandemic when the virus was detected in early December 2019 for obvious reasons of “losing face” to the higher authorities and putting lid on a “negative news.” Having realized the gravity of the situation, China did demonstrate greater transparency and swiftness comparing the SARS scare in 2003. Chinese government instantly quarantines 11 million residents of Wuhan, and three new hospitals were built in 10 days with a capacity of 3500 beds (Deepak 2020a). Though the World Health Organization did not recommend travel or trade restrictions against China, however, it was understandable that many bordering countries sealed their borders, many cancelled flights and evacuated their citizens from Wuhan and issued travel advisories. India too brought back 647 of its citizens by special flights from Wuhan. The fear of the pandemic forced India to cancel all visas to Chinese nationals as people tested positive for the virus in states such as Kerala, Bihar and Delhi. The move to evacuate citizens from Wuhan and issuance of travel advisories by a few countries including India certainly irked China, as she believed that such measures by countries will flare up already tense situation. Chinese ambassador to India, Sun Weidong revealed that Chinese State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi did tell his counterpart Mr. S. Jaishankar over telephone that “We don’t think it is helpful for a certain country to hype up the situation or even create panic” (Deepak 2020a). It is perhaps owing to certain decisions of India that neither Prime Minister Modi made a call to President Xi Jinping during the Wuhan outbreak, nor did Xi called Modi when India grappled with the pandemic in subsequent months. As countries and regions reel under the lockdown, the pandemic is denting economies across the globe. According to the “World Economic Outlook Report” updated for June 2020 by the IMF, global growth is projected as −4.5% for the year 2020. The adverse impact on low-income households is particularly acute, imperilling the significant progress made in reducing extreme poverty in the world since the 1990s (IMF 2020). This will impact adversely on India and China, countries that have alleviated almost 1.2 billion people out of poverty in the phase of globalization and trade liberalization. The liberalization is likely to pave way for protectionism, and diversification of certain supply chains will be imminent, as these have been drastically disrupted, and some have demonstrated that there is heavy reliance on China. The Covid-19 pandemic also took strategic rivalry between China and the USA to new heights and has certainly pushed India closer to the USA. The USA seems to have freed itself from the delusion of China as non-enemy and the misbelief that liberalization and globalization will affect a peaceful transition in China. It is in the wake of such a thinking that there are mummers about hard decoupling of the US economy with China, changes in international order, deglobalization and even

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the very way of life of the people. Experts are predicting imminent decoupling in selective sectors such as telecom, electronics and ICT (Deepak 2020b). Being a close US ally, Japan announced allocation of $2.2 billion to help Japanese enterprises to move their production facilities out of China. As for the EU, though it has pronounced China as a “systemic rival” since 2019, but will there be a domino effect, it remains to be seen. At this point in time, it appears that Brussel has been disappointed rather displeased by China’s “mask diplomacy” in Europe sending signals as if the EU was incompetent in handling and supporting its fellow members such as Italy and Spain in the times of crisis. The decoupling will further impact adversely on Chinese and global economy. The plunge in global economic growth could be worse than what has been suggested by the IMF. As India struggled to contain the Covid-19 pandemic through lockdowns and social distancing between March and June 2020, China mobilised massive forces, heavy artillery, tanks, armoured vehicles and aircrafts along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. The PLA quickly captured vantage points, changed the status quo, erected structures and denied India access to the positions which she used to patrol in April. The areas the PLA encroached included patrolling points in Depsang plains, Galwan, Pangong Tso, Hot Springs and Gogra heights, and there were scuffles at Naku La in Sikkim also. When India resisted, the Chinese reacted aggressively resulting in the first serious clashes on 5 May 2020, brutally injuring 76 Indian soldiers at Pangong Tso. This was just a precursor to the 15 June savage attacks of the PLA on a small Indian contingent at patrolling point 14 in the Galwan Valley. The ensuing body blows resulted in 20 fatalities on the Indian side and an unknown number of deaths on the Chinese side. Chinese scholars of South Asia blame it on India, as they believe that India is taking advantage of deteriorating Sino-US ties and flaring up incidents along the border, pushing out Chinese companies from fair competition in the Indian markets by bringing in new FDI rules, and joining the USA and its allies in containing China. Conversely, India believes that China is taking advantage of India’s Covid flare up to occupy more territories along the LAC, it is provoking its neighbours to open up new conflict zones with India. For example, India’s army general hinting at China for Nepal claiming Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpyaudhura as it territories and altering its age old map in the wake of India’s Dharchula–Lipulekh road (NDTV 2020). How has Covid-19 and border stand-off that enters its seventh month impacted on the bilateral relations, let us evaluate the following variable:

1 Death of the LCA and the CBMs On the night of 15th June 2020, when Indian soldiers went to verify the disengagement plan reached by the corps commanders for Patrol Point 14 on June 6, the Chinese not only had not withdrawn from the point, but ambushed Indian soldiers, used metal rods and nail studded clubs in most barbaric way. The exchange of body blows resulted in casualties on both sides. The Indian side reported 20 fatalities including a colonel; Chinese side did not make their deaths public. The stand-off and

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the barbaric attack resulted from China’s deployment of forces in the rear from the just concluded military exercise. India retaliated by mobilizing of its own forces and equipment to deal with the Chinese challenge. Though both have activated military and diplomatic channels for disengagements and de-escalation, however, the very confrontation and deployment means that the PLA has shown utter disregard for the LAC and the CBMs, thus spiralling the bilateral relations to a new low. This is perhaps the most fatal blow to India–China relations since 1962 and will comprehensively transform India’s approach and responses towards China.

1.1 China’s Two Step Forward One Step Back As China’s military and economic muscle bulged, starting from the mid 1980s, she began to take maximalist position on the border dispute; replicated South China Sea strategy of island reclamation, militarization, changing the status quo, and present a fait accompli of the disputed area. It is owing to this approach that resolution of the border is not the main agenda of China. Added to this, people (Jha 2020) argue that basic premise of the 1993 “Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity in the Border Regions” was that “China and India would go back to the strategic cooperation on international issues that had existed between them at the height of the Cold War.” However, this understanding has taken a beating given the salami slicing tactic of China along the LAC. This view has been refuted by Chinese scholars (Long 2020; Liu 2020) who in turn has blamed India for “nibbling” Chinese territory though her “forward policy” along the border and has attributed the occurrence of the incident to “India’s domestic political process and its China policy going astray over the years.” Some attribute, erosion of the so-called understanding or “consensus” between India and China to India cementing civil nuclear deal with the USA in 2008. Prime Minister, Narendra Modi “aligning India with the US on key issue of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” followed by the US granting India the “major defence partner” status after both signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) a variant of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) that the USA has signed with its NATO allies. Both tried hard to restore the consensus reached in Wuhan after the Doklam stand-off (2017), but China remained apprehensive about India not implementing the “consensus” in letter and spirit. The visits of the Chinese leaders, according to Jha (2020), were “designed to enlarge his own image” by Modi. Besides cosying up to the USA, many in India believe that China was unhappy about the abrogation of the Article 370 and bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories (Malik 2020; Deepak 2019a). The Chinese have also expressed concern over the abrogation and have gone on record to say that the bifurcation has posed a “challenge to the sovereignty of Pakistan and China”. The Indian move has prompted China and Pakistan to “take counter measures.” The very issue, in the words of Wang (2020a), a researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International relations, has “dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India.” Similar views

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have been expressed by Long (2020), when he says that India has been “constantly finding opportunities to nibble the Chinese territory, and has often taken advantage of China’s domestic difficulties and conflict with the United States to seize territory.” The Chinese are quick to remind India that it was this thinking of India that eventually led to an armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border in 1962. India’s rebuff to China on the BRI on account of the CPEC and India beefing up border infrastructure, in particular roads like Durban–Shyok–DBO and Dharchula–Lipulekh, are pronounced as some of the triggers of Galwan, Pangong Tso, Hot Spring and Naku La stand-offs. But, is this true? One, there may be some logic to these assertions; however, these stand-offs are not one of the incidents, had it been the case, incidents like DBO-Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017) would not have happened at all; number of incursions along the entire LAC would not have jumped to such a proportion. Two, since China has built state of the art infrastructure across the Line of Actual Control, logically, it has better access to the LAC in terms of patrolling and deployment in the rear. Relying on the tactic of “two step forward and one step back”, China changes the status quo and present a fait accompli, as has been the case in Pangong Tso, Depsang plains and Hot Springs. If this is resisted by India, China is quick to ask for disengagement by way of withdrawing a few kilometres from the point of frictions after having moved two step forward and imposing a “buffer” on India on its own claim line, as was witnessed in Galwan in June–July 2020. Three, since the LAC largely remains a huge grey area on ground where the Indian and Chinese perceptions differ, China, relying on its better accessibility to the LAC, has the scope to shift the line further west in the Western sector. This has been demonstrated by ever increasing transgressions, mostly in the Western sector by the PLA—the Galwan Valley (2–3 kms); the Srijap range where India’s claim line extends to Finger 8, but does not control the areas beyond Finger 4, an area of 35–40 kms now occupied by China (Panag 2020); and Naku La in Sikkim. Similar incidents can happen in other sectors where perceptions differ and China laying claim to the areas falling within its so-called traditional customary line. For example, in the Middle sector, areas such as Nilang-Jadang, Bara Hoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal, Shipki La and Spiti area could be next flashpoints. Interestingly, having reinforced its 1960 claim line in the Western sector, China is playing victim and blaming India for “provoking the incident” in Galwan Valley “intentionally” and “trying to change the status quo unilaterally”, but the ground reality reveals the opposite. Wang Dehua, a veteran of India–China relations in an article in sohu.com on 19 May 2020, even warned Prime Minister Narendra Modi that “Boundless is the sea of misery, yet a man who will repent can reach the shore nearby” (Deepak 2020c). In fact, some of these are new areas of transgression, which are not even flagged in the 23 contested areas (11 in Western sector, 4 in Middle sector and 8 in Eastern sector) identified by both sides since formation of the Joint Working Group (JWG) in 1988 and later during the exchange and comparison of maps in 2000 and 2002. China’s modus operandi remains the same, as has been witnessed in the South China Sea, i.e. reclaim the unchartered territory, build infrastructure, militarise it and then present a fait accompli. According to General Malik (2020), “any intrusion across the

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LAC and then trying to defend the area involved would be “occupation.” Therefore, posits Lt. General Panag (2020) that “China cannot be allowed to get away with usurping Indian territories like it has done till now. This confrontation must end with status quo ante of 1 April, 2020 and sanctification of the LAC with formal exchange of maps.” Former Army General Malik (2020) is of the view that “If LAC not marked soon, it will remain vulnerable to face-offs and India and China may end up deploying more troops there, just like it is on the LoC with Pakistan.” Four, it is also for this reason that China is not interested in identification of the LAC. The very identification according to China will open a can of worms and would complicate the matter as was revealed by Wang Xin, director of Border and Ocean Affairs of the MOFA during the 2nd track II dialogue on border issue in Shanghai in November 2019. Five, China believes that it has not reached the stage where resolution is must, therefore, “maintenance of peace and tranquillity”, “managing” rather than solving the problem will be its top priority, albeit Chinese scholars have told this author that the cost of maintaining “peace and tranquillity” is becoming higher and higher. Nevertheless, provides China with an opportunity to push the LAC westward if not challenged. In event of friction, China strategy would be to occupy the disputed land by moving two steps and force a buffer area separating the two forces by stepping back one step, as has happened in Galwan. China has also pitched for the so-called “early harvest” fruits, which according to my understanding is nothing but going to the sectoral approach, and will lead to nowhere. As for India, though late comer in infrastructure development along its borders, of late she is also ramping up border infrastructure “rapidly”, which has caused uneasiness to the other side of the LAC. Although the 255-km-long Darbuk-ShayokDaulat Beg Oldie (DS-DBO) Road took 19 years to complete, nonetheless, it will make accessible many areas of the LAC for patrolling and will keep an eye on Chinese movements in Aksai Chin, which is a few kilometres away. The road also endangers China’s G219 highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet on the one hand and Karakoram highway on the other. Chinese transgressions in Depsang and Galwan demonstrate this anxiety of the Chinese. They were not to claim higher grounds overlooking the DS-DBO road and block it in event of hostilities. India has initiated 60 more such projects that are part of the 3300-km road network along the border, the work of which was supposed to be completed in 2019, but according to the BRO officials, only 75% of the work has been completed. Surveys for border rail projects such as Bilaspur–Manali–Leh, Misamari–Tenga–Tawang, North Lakhimpur–Bame– Silapathar and Pasighat–Teju–Parsuram Kund–Rupai are on and are supposed to be completed by 2025. Notwithstanding India beefing its border infrastructure, there remains huge asymmetries in border infrastructure between India and China. For example, the “Thirteenth Five-Year Plan” (2016–2020) allocates 200 billion RMB ($20.5 billion) for infrastructure development in Tibet. There are 90,000 kms of roads inside Tibet (Xinhua 2018). The Lhasa–Shigatse Highway, which is being accorded top priority is expected to be completed by the year 2020. Furthermore, the work to connect Lhasa– Shigatse Expressway and the Gesa section of Beijing–Tibet Expressway commenced

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in 2018, and once connected, it is estimated that PLA can supply logistics support in less than 4 days traversing a distance of 3725 kms from Beijing to Lhasa and then further to the border areas. The highways are being connected with rail connectivity. For example, the Lhasa–Shigatse line that was opened to traffic in 2014 is being further extended as Lhasa–Nyingchi Railway and Shigatse–Yadong line, the latter falling in Doklam area. The construction of Sichuan–Tibet Railway has been in full swing. China believes that the opening of this line will alter China’s disadvantageous position in Tibet, especially in the so-called “South Tibet”. China claims that once the line passes through Linzhi and Nanshan, logistics constraints as regards the areas will not be a concern in event of “an incident”; China holds that areas such as Zayul, Motuo, Cuona and Longzi have been held by India. In addition, Chinese strategy also includes Xinjiang–Tibet Railway from Hetian, Xinjiang, the Yunnan– Tibet Railway from Lijiang, Yunnan, Gansu–Tibet Railway from Lanzhou, Gansu and Shigatse to Yadong and then to the Gyerong Port on the Sino-Nepal border, and even a Chengdu–Qinghai line connecting Golmud that will eventually cross Kunlun Mountains through Korla and join Sichuan-Tibet and Qinghai–Tibet lines is under construction (DW News 2018; Beyondnew 2020). No doubt, infrastructure asymmetry is visible, but it is perhaps the new “development”, i.e. India building border infrastructure which has been a cause of concern to China. As a result, China has been making forays into new areas simply for “holding the line” as they perceive. India perhaps will too “hold the line” if more areas are accessible once the infrastructure is laid. This, however, will give rise to Galwan (2020) and Doklam (2017) like confrontation and could lead to a larger conflict. This is also out of this thinking that China is contemplating demilitarization of the LAC. India too perhaps could think of such a proposal if she feels comfortable with the notion of equal and mutual security, for the cost of maintaining “peace and tranquillity” is becoming higher for both India and China.

2 Negative Impact on Trade and Investment The disruption in the global supply chains in the wake of the Covid-19 has given rise to two sentiments in India, also reflected in Atamnirbhar (self-reliance) Bharat programme of the government. The first is the swadeshi “movement”, which has been there for some time. This is also flared up by the organizations like Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) with a “boycott made in China” agenda. The agenda has taken roots in public minds, especially after the Galwan Valley stand-off and fatalities. Since 25th May 2020, the SJM has launched “Swadeshi Self-Reliance Campaign” with a five-point program. The very first point is boycott of Chinese products. This can also be discerned from government declaring 42 of the Chinese Apps as dangerous in early June, followed by the launch of “Remove China App” developed by One Touch AppLabs, then banning 59 Chinese apps including TikTok, SHAREit, Mi Video Call, UC Browser and adding 47 clones of banned apps in the list in July. TikTok, which has the largest consumer base outside China, has estimated a loss of

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$6 billion after the ban. Various states followed the suit cancelling projects signed with the Chinese companies in sectors such as automobile, railways including the Vande Bharat, telecom, energy and road infrastructure worth billions of dollars. It may be remembered that contracted value of the Chinese projects in India is over $60 billion. India has made it clear that if there is bloodshed at the border, it cannot be business as usual. Chinese analysts like Yuan Jirong (2020), a former correspondent of People’s Daily in India, do believe that ban and the border stand-off in Galwan cannot be treated as isolated events, however, maintains that it is also owing to the “rise of Hindu nationalism, and India’s mentality and ambition to become a major power.” According to Yuan, India is “evolving from a regional troublemaker to a regional strategic competitor of China,” a popular discourse making rounds in academic as well as media writings in China. The second is the dream of making India an alternative global supply chain destination. As Covid-19 triggered a debate on decoupling of the supply chains from China, India changed its FDI policy on 17 April 2020 to protect Indian companies from “opportunistic takeovers and acquisitions,” implying that India abolished the automatic route that does not require government and Reserve Bank of India’s permission. Many in India linked the policy change to the People’s Bank of China increasing its stake in India’s largest private credit institution, the Indian Housing Development Finance Corporation from 0.8% to 1.01% (Xinhua 2020). China immediately rebutted the Indian move, deemed it “discriminatory” and demanded rectification. Draphant (2020; Sina.com 2020), a Chinese start-up that assists Chinese investment in India, in a study argued that “although the policy is aimed at India’s neighbours on the surface, but among all the neighbours, only China has made significant investments in India. In essence, the policy is aimed at Chinese companies. The policy change involves a variety of Chinese direct or indirect investment behaviours in India.” India deem these as initial responses to China’s posturing at border, there may be more in the offing. India emerging as the next supply chain destination is rather a hype and exaggeration. It took China 40 years to develop a supply chain system with the support of its detractors such as the USA and Japan. It may take many more decades for India to realize the same, but shutting doors to Chinese investment may further prolong it. Going by Moody’s Investor Services, the prospects do not look optimistic, for India’s sovereign rating has been downgraded to the lowest investment grade of “BAA3” from “BAA2” on 1 June 2020. The agency also maintained the outlook from “stable” to “negative” (IE 2020b). The USA-China decoupling is bound to happen in some sectors but do not forget China is the third largest importer of the US goods. If China cannot replace the USA as main security provider in the Asia–Pacific, in the same vein, the USA cannot replace China as the main supplier of the manufactured goods. On the other hand, China too has intensified relocation of its labour-intensive manufacturing supply chains to other countries, especially the developing countries. Countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand in Southeast Asia and India and Bangladesh in South Asia are the biggest beneficiaries (Deepak 2020b). Since the focus of most of the governments for the period 2021–2025 will be health of their economies, trade and investment cooperation between India and China will

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be crucial, albeit would be determined by the benevolent or malevolent nature of the relationship.

2.1 Chinese Investment and India’s Response Chinese investment in India has risen up exponentially. Between 2017 and 2019, Chinese investment in India reached $9.5 billion, of which $5billion was pumped by the Chinese companies in the Indian starts-ups, mostly in the “Digital India” project. Alibaba, Shunwei Capital, Fosun Tencent and Xiaomi are the largest investors injecting money in consumers, food-tech, logistics, retail, artificial intelligence, Internet of things and fintech, etc., sectors. Chinese brands such as Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo and Huawei have captured 72% of India’s market share. Other industries such as energy and pharmaceutical have also witnessed deep penetration from China. China’s investment in this sector, nonetheless, will face a stiff competition from local giant like Reliance Jio in the long run, for bigwigs of tech world such as Google, Facebook, Intel and Qualcom have shown great interest. Facebook, Google, KKR and Vista have invested $5.8 billion, $4.5, $1.5 and $1.5 billion each in Jio. Jio apart from having the above market share of the Chinese in mind will also participate in the bidding of 5G spectrum, thus keeping Huawei out of India. Huawei has already announced that they are reducing 50% of their employees in India. Chinese media was abuzz with the news of India launching a $6.65 billion plan on June 2, targeting five global smartphone manufacturers, encouraging them to invest in or expand their smartphone production lines in India. In addition, two other plans will help India produce smartphones and parts worth $133 billion by 2025. There are assumptions that these moves, which are part of Atamnirbhar (selfreliance) Bharat program, will gradually push Chinese companies out of the Indian market. Nevertheless, other supply chains in sectors such as electronics, home appliances, optical fibre cable, solar cells will continue to be dominated by the Chinese in the foreseeable future, for most of these have been localized. Other sectors that will continue to be interdependent are pharma, energy and automobile. Although the Covid-19 exposed India’s excessive dependence on active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) from China, but cooperation in this sector has emerged as the one having huge complementarities. According to the Trade Promotion Council of India (TCPI), India imports 53 APIs and critical key starting materials (KSMs) from China accounting for 70% of its API requirements (BioWorld 2020). According to a report in Economic Times, the total pharmaceutical and organic chemical imports from China are close to $10 billions of which bulk drug imports are more than $2.5 billion in value as per a report by Haitong Securities (ET 2020). Indian companies such as Laurus, Granules India, Solara Active Pharma were listed as having significant exposure. Even though the government is thinking of building new pharma parks, but the low cost of the API and medical equipment from China will continue to attract Indian pharma sector. Not only this, 25,000 Indian students studying medicine in China on competitive fee structure add another dimension to this cooperation.

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Energy and automobiles sectors are other promising areas where policy could be aligned. India targets to increase the share of manufacturing in GDP to 25%, which looks difficult to achieve given that growth has contracted by 1% in the July– September quarter of 2019–20 from 6.9% expansion a year ago. China’s MG Motor started selling cars in India in 2019, and the company has not fully made its promised investment of $650 million in India. Great Wall Motor has not yet started production in India, but in February said it plans to invest $1 billion in the next few years. Since the Covid-19 and tensions at the border has thrown many uncertainties, they are likely to withhold their decision to go ahead with the investment unless and until the government of India opens doors for such investment selectively.

2.2 China’s Structural Adjustment and India’s Options India’s policy formulators must understand that it is owing to the structural adjustment in the Chinese economy that labour-intensive industries are either being phased out or relocated to other advantageous locations in Southeast and South Asia. Even if, China has been cautious in its investment approach, but has selected some sectors where it has carved a nisch for itself. For example, mobile telephony, electronics, e-commerce, machine tools and logistics. This is not surprising, as “Made in China 2025” is geared towards letting the Chinese manufacturing move up the value chain in production and innovation during Xi Jinping’s “New Era” from the labour intensive and low end manufacturing of the reform era (1978–2012). One of the most ambitious goals it has identified is to achieve 40% “self-sufficiency” by 2020, and 70% “self-sufficiency” by 2025 in core components and critical materials in a wide range of industries, including aerospace equipment and telecommunications equipment and achieve international recognition for Chinese brands (Deepak 2018a). Ten core areas the strategy has identified are (1) New advanced information technology, including artificial intelligence and quantum computing, (2) Automated machine tools and robotics, (3) Aerospace and aeronautical equipment, (4) Maritime equipment and high-tech shipping, (5) Modern rail transport equipment, (6) Self-driving and new-energy vehicles, (7) Power equipment, (8) Agricultural equipment, (9) New materials and (10) Biopharma and advanced medical products. Of these, China has already made huge inroads in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, high-speed rail and aerospace. The Chinese ambitions have been pronounced “bad for America” by the US officials, and Trump administration has justified the need for a US military space force by 2020. This is also one of the reasons for ongoing Cold War between the USA and China. In this context, it is not surprising that almost 50% of China’s GDP is accounted by its trade with Asia, China sees an opportunity in strengthening its economic partnerships with Asian countries by initiating connectivity and industrial capacity building projects. China joining the RCEP and concluding FTAs with most of the countries in the vicinity, securing its energy supply routes by ports facilities in Myanmar and Pakistan demonstrate this fact. China’s engagement is futuristic in this area which

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has gradually and steadily expanded into South Asia, for Asia or rather Eurasia has become the fulcrum of geo-economics as well as geopolitics. India must take these factors into consideration while formulating its policy towards China and other players in the region. As regards India’s options, I believe hard decoupling from China by any nation is impossible. Therefore, India must identify sectors where investment could be attracted with active consultation and policy coordination. China’s investment in “Digital India” happened because it is a growing sector and hassle free comparing other sectors where issues related to labour laws and land acquisition are problematic. While safeguarding big data remains a worrisome proposition, but India also needs to worry about lower labour productivity, higher land and industrial electricity costs, higher capital costs, higher logistics and compliance costs, a sudden policy change, delay in performance of government contracts, costly legal procedures and so on, which are visible bottlenecks for attracting investment, despite of the fact that “ease of doing business” in India at present has climbed up to the 77th position from 140th in 2014, nonetheless, compared with many developing countries, India’s “cost of doing business” is still very high. Therefore, when it comes to factors and resource costs of land, labour, capital, raw materials and electricity, India needs to take measures to make these competitive. The price of industrial electricity is too high, which limits the development of enterprises. India lacks world-class infrastructure, especially in logistics, which is necessary for rapid movement of goods in and out of India and a necessary condition for international production networks. Logistics costs in India account for 13–15% of the product cost, compared with a global average of 6%. High logistics costs increase operating costs and hinder competitiveness of the industry. It is possible to create our own supply chain clusters, provided we acts now, identify sectors, make a 27 years’ roadmap and execute it in letter and spirit. If acted upon I am sure at the 100th anniversary of India’s independence, we would be a different India.

3 Chinese Footprints in India’s Neighbourhood As India–China border stand-off continues to impact relationship, China’s has further strengthened engagement with India’s neighbours in the backdrop of Covid-19 pandemic. The “Silk Road of Health” diplomacy has been extended to countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal through a virtual meeting between Wang Yi and his counterparts on 27 July 2020. According to a report by Xinhua (2020; XinhuaNet 2020) Wang proposed that “four countries consolidate consensus of solidarity against COVID-19, carry out joint cooperation mechanism on COVID-19 response in the region, enhance cooperation in the fight against the pandemic and in vaccine, and accelerate economic recovery and development after the pandemic.” Earlier China had extended “Silk Road of Health” to Central Asia and ASEAN. Early in May during a speech delivered at the 73rd World Health Assembly, President Xi Jinping unveiled slew of measures to fight the Covid-19 on a global scale, which included $2

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billion international aid, coordination with the UN to establish a global humanitarian crisis response hub in China and provision of any vaccine as a global public good. The “Silk Health Road” entering various regions is likely to benefit from this aid money. Perhaps avoiding adding fuel to fire, China did not invite Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Covid-19 diplomacy could be regarded as one of the many measures to consolidate China’s relationship with these countries. China is solidly dug in the subcontinent owing to the countervailing nature of China’s power in the neighbourhood, and China’s larger strategy of its pivot to Asia, in which pinning India down to South Asia is the unstated objective. With the rise of China’s economic and military muscle in the last 40 years, China’s engagement in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood has increased manifolds. Countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have deep economic and security ties with China and are heavily tilted towards China. In Bangladesh, China has invested over $10 billion in infrastructure projects. Nepal is executing China–Nepal Transit and Transportation Agreement that will facilitate building of a connectivity network in terms of roads, rails, air and optical fibre cables along Koshi, Kaligandaki and Karnali, etc., corridors. Interestingly, during the second Forum on Belt and Road in 2019, of all the 13 bilateral and 16 multilateral agreements with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, almost none is in the infrastructure sector (Deepak 2019a). China’s investment in the region has been astronomical, amounting to $13.87 billion to Bangladesh, $3.11 billion to Sri Lanka, $1.34 billion to Nepal, $970 million to Maldives and $12.9 billion to Pakistan (Tambi 2018). Pakistan has been a lynchpin and willing pawn of Chinese strategy. Ignoring India’s sensitivities as well as environmental concerns, China is building dams in Gilgit Baltistan in disputed territory between India and Pakistan; CPEC, the flagship of China’s BRI also runs through this territory violating India’s sovereignty. China’s deepening engagement in Myanmar, especially after the conclusion of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which will connect China’s southwestern province of Yunnan to Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) demonstrates consolidation of China’s hold in Myanmar. The CMEC envisages to have Kyaukpyu deep sea water port ($1.3 billion) with two berths in its initial phase including Kyaukpyu SEZ ($2 billion); China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline ($5 billion); Mandalay Yida Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone ($4billion); Tagaung Taung (Dagongshan) Nickel Industry Development Project ($820 million); Letpadaung copper mine project ($1 billion); Kunming–Kyaukpyu railway line; Mandalay–Tigyaing–Muse expressway and Kyaukpyu-Nay Pyi Taw highway projects, etc. (Deepak 2018b). In India’s extended neighbourhood, China has unfolded its “small state diplomacy” aggressively having regional and global ramifications. Ren (2020) in a paper written for the Institute of South Asian Studies identifies three major drivers for China’s “small state diplomacy in the IOR”. According to him, “Geographically, the small island states protect the critical and strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs); geopolitically and geo-economically, they provide political and economic values worth exploring; and geo-strategically, they could assist China in managing

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competition with the other major powers.” It is in the view of these drivers, he says, China has promoted its relations with the four small island states in the IOR, namely, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles, to unprecedented levels. As China’s dependence on imported crude oil exceeds 70% and China’s investment in the region and beyond deepens, China deems it fit to secure and safeguard the SLOCs for its energy security and economic interests. China’s bilateral trade volume with Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Maldieves and Seychelles stood at $ 4.5 billion, $842 million, $397 million and $61 million, respectively (Ren 2020). As part of its expansive BRI, China has undertaken construction of 42 ports in 34 countries. In the words of Sun and Zoubir (2017), research fellow at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, the construction “aims at providing a great opportunity for its military forces to deploy globally in order to provide public goods, engage in international peacekeeping, provide military training, humanitarian aid, consular protection, convoy for commercial ships, and engage in joint military rehearsals.” China considers these small states in the IOR as indispensable nodes in balancing the growing presence of the USA and India in the Indo-Pacific, especially the three “pivotal states” of Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka according to Sun and Zoubir (2017).

3.1 What India Can Do India needs to unfold a workable connectivity strategy with our neighbourhood. New initiatives such as “Bharat Mala” a network of 5000 kms of roads connecting the Himalayan states of India with a capital of $2.2 billion needs to be carried out in letter and spirit and at war footing. In the same vein, the “Sagar Mala” project whereby all coastal cities in India would be interconnected through road, rail, ports and airports through a special development package needs to be sped up. Simultaneously, the nodes of these projects must be extended to India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood and aligned with the SAGAR and IORA vision. India must strengthen its strategic and economic partnership with BIMSTEC and ASEAN countries. The RCEP is an opportunity to integrate Indian economy with the region; nevertheless, safeguards against Chinese products flooding Indian markets must be negotiated. Meanwhile, strategic location of India’s northeast needs to be utilized for building bridges with the region, without the development of northeast India, Act East Policy will not reap much dividends. Rebuilding and reopening the Stillwell Road could be one of the options. In this context, we must have an assertive approach as regards the BCIM. In the backdrop of the Galwan incident, perhaps there will not be any taker for such an approach. Conversely, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, cooperation with the Quad will be emphasized, not only in the field of security but also economic. India needs to be magnanimous in its approach as far as resolving bilateral problems are concerned. The arm twisting by way of economic blockades in case of Nepal, and stopping of gas supplies to Bhutan sometimes back, will only harm our own national interests. Furthermore, India’s non-committal approach needs to be

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changed for good, and whatever she commits needs to be delivered. For example, some of India’s projects in Nepal such as Rs. 33,108 crore Pancheshwar multipurpose project on Mahakali river envisaged in the 1990s and revived during Prime Minister Modi’s Nepal visit in 2014 has not made much progress. A police academy promised to Nepal by India in the 1990s, revived by our Prime Minister in 2014 did not make progress either. The Chinese seized the opportunity and built a swanky academy with a cost of $350 million in a record two years’ time and gifted it free of cost to Nepal in June 2017. Finally, as could be discerned from the above, it is economy stupid! In November 2017, during a two two-day Nepal Investment Summit, 89 companies from China committed an investment of $8.3 billion in various sectors compared to an investment of $317 million committed by 21 Indian companies present at the Summit. Even Bangladesh and Sri Lankan commitment far exceeded the Indian investment. Therefore, India needs to strengthen its economic drivers, build capacities in every field that will make it competitive and attractive market not only for our neighbours but globally too. In this context, it is necessary for India to forge closer economic ties with China, benefit from its over capacities and deep pockets and lay the ground for a better economic flight. The option of 2 + 1 in the vicinity could be explored for viable joint projects. We must think beyond the security prism as far as trade, transport and tourism is concerned and certainly should not take our cultural ties in the region for granted.

4 People-To-People Exchanges As India and China grapple with the twin disasters of the Covid-19 and Galwan, disruption caused to their bilateral and multilateral engagement is unprecedented. In late 2019, India and China resolved to hold 70 activities, including cultural, religious and trade promotion events besides military exchanges to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Covid-19 and the bloody clashes in the Galwan have dealt a heavy blow to these activities. Nevertheless, it is believed that the disruption will help both to reset their relations and work on the modalities of possible cooperation in certain areas where both may be comfortable with. It is impossible to have a robust relationship without people’s engagement in different domains. The very understanding of the history may be jaundiced as it remains now. A correct understanding of the history on both sides needs to be developed including their imperialist as well as imperial legacies in the Himalayan regions. Both must recognize that it was the unhindered circulation of ideas, technology, objects and people that enriched the Indian and Chinese civilizations, not the inheritance of the legacies of their masters. As both lay emphasis on them being civilizational states, they need to develop civilizational studies with the focus on historical sources in each other’s textual and oral tradition. In this context, both had decided in 2019 that they will trace their civilizational links and conduct events

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to celebrate these. China had planned to hold an International Xuanzang Forum, advancing studies related to the Chinese scholar who studied in Nalanda for four years during his 16 years stay in India. There is a huge scope for cooperation, a Buddhist corridor could be established and further connected to other South Asian countries, say Nepal and Sri Lanka. These measures would be conducive to lay a solid foundation for connectivity, trade and commerce, and above all a robust bilateral relation. Unfortunately, tourism is the sector that has been hit the worst. Collaboration in the field of traditional medicines, Yoga, and cinema has a huge room. In recent years, China has been captivated by Indian Yoga and Bollywood films. There is a new interest in India’s Ayurveda in China. Conversely, a section of Indian population is also inclined towards traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and acupuncture therapy. It has been reported that by 2018, export and import of the TCM reached $5.7 billion; there were 300,000 TCM clinics around the world with over 400 million people using TCM. As for the Ayurveda, it generated $1 billion revenue; had 789, 000 trained doctors and 702 educational institutions (Wang 2020b, 69–70). Ayurveda’s dissemination into China is as old as the dissemination of Buddhism to China. According to Ji Xianlin, one of the tallest Indologists in China, ancient India’s surgical procedures had probably been introduced into China during the Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties. In the same vein, Chinese scholar monks disseminated TCM to India (Wang 2020b, 70). Wang (2020b, 74) suggests that an exchange mechanism for TCM and Ayurveda can be established between China and India, same can be replicated across other multilateral forums such as BRICS, SCO, G20, Boao Forum and BCIM economic corridor; joint training and exchange of personnel in this domain; establishment of Ayurveda and Acupuncture clinics in respective countries; trading and market access to each other’s traditional medicines could be initiated. Chinese and Indian studies in each other’s countries need to be encouraged and strengthened, so as capacities are built across government and private sectors for better understanding and employment opportunities. Especially in the Indian context, the development of China studies has resulted from a knee jerk reaction of the government. The 1962 conflict saw the establishment of Centre for Chinese Studies in Delhi; Doklam in 2017 resulted in the MEA establishing an in-house Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies (CCCS); any untoward incident with China wakes up the government for strengthening our relationship with the Indic civilizations, establishment of Buddhist corridors, purchase of arms and ammunition, revamping of border infrastructure, etc., measures. India dropping Chinese as one of the options in the secondary education and probing the Confucius Institutes and Chinese language programmes assisted by China will further impact negatively on people-to-people exchanges. There is need to have a long-term view of each and every variable of India’s engagement with China rather than looking for cosmetic and myopic remedies. Academic activities through webinars will go on unhindered albeit may not see the magnitude of the way Indian and Chinese scholars frequented institutes in respective countries. Some of the projects undertaken by both the government such as “Cooperation in mutual translation and publication of Classic, Modern and Contemporary

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Works” that envisages each translating twenty five of their classical, modern and contemporary works will go on unhindered. Sahitya Akademy’s translation project that aims to translate ten Indian modern and contemporary works into Chinese has been completed on the eve of the SCO summit in Russia. Remember, it was the translators from India, China and Central Asian countries that built a huge repository of Buddhist literature in China and were responsible for changing the entire sociocultural landscape of east Asia in ancient times. The momentum that was being witnessed in the publishing sector of both the countries has been disrupted too.

5 Conclusion The ground reality demonstrates that we are far from seeing global solidarity and global solutions in the fight against Covid-19. In the face of global leadership void in the post-Covid-19 world, especially when the credibility of global institutions like the WHO is fast eroding, we are likely to witness gradual collapse of the liberal international order, realignment of geopolitical and economic forces, perhaps bitter political struggles, fall of regimes and even bigger racial and religious divide across the globe. The retrenchment, protectionism and nativism will further get strengthened across the globe, and the globalization and liberalization will witness a gradual retreat. This will result in exclusivism, racial discrimination, further divisions within diverse societies in the name of religious and other identities. If the spat over Covid-19 between the USA and China has damaged their bilateral relations drastically, then Chinese “salami slicing” along the LAC and Galwan brutality is likely to free India from the delusion that China can be trusted. Externally, India–US security partnership will be further strengthened. The Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad will gain traction, and trade and investment will witness an incremental rise. Initial thinking of India that she does not want to be caught in a zero-sum geopolitical contest between the two hegemons perhaps will be revaluated. Economically, India is likely to benefit from the decoupling of the Western countries with China, as well as from China’s economic rebalancing in the region. Though the China baiters may suggest India’s “decoupling” with China, but hard decoupling is impossible. Though multilateralism will get a beating, nonetheless, India’s engagement with China in the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), etc., will continue. In the neighbourhood, India must take China’s pivot to Asia in its strategic calculus and devise feasible strategies to deal with the existing and new challenges from the pivot in making states. The people-to-people exchange should be encouraged and strengthened. India has to acknowledge the reality of China’s rise, asymmetries in relationship, dynamics of global and regional balance of power and major power relations. We need to carry out a comprehensive review of our China policy, and has to restructure and recalibrate it by leveraging all instruments of state policy. India must recognize, what is workable, achievable and what is not, accordingly reshape engagement with

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China on the basis of pragmatic constructivism. Foreign policy and military affairs cannot be hijacked by sporadic outbursts of national sentiments, rather they need to be goal oriented, long-term and sustainable. There should be no room for cosmetic changes, knee jerk reactions, lip service and lopsided approaches. Finally, India’s economic growth and her capacities to handle domestic and external challenges will enable it to seek an equilibrium and understanding from China along India’s borders, as well as for its regional and global aspirations. As long as India’s growth trajectory remains weak, social cohesion and communal harmony remain in disarray, the kind of understanding India seeks from global player will be impossible.

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