Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier, 1858-1924 1563247232, 9781563247231

Citation preview

IMPERIAL

R IV A L S

IMPERIAL

R IV A LS China, Russia, ana Their Disputed Frontier

S.C.M. Paine

o M.E.

Sharpe

Armonk, New York London, England

Copyright © 1996 by M. E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PubUcatlon Data Paine, S. C. M., 1957Imperial rivals : China, Russia, and their disputed frontier, 1858-1924 / by S.C.M. Paine, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-56324-723-2 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 1-56324-724-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Russia—Foreign relations—China 2. China—Foreign relations—Russia. 3. Russia—Foreign relations—1801-1917. 4. China—Foreign relations—1644-1912. 5. China—Foreign relations—1912-1949. 6. Russia—Boundaries—China. 7. China—Boundaries—Russia. I. Tide. DK68.7.C6P35 1966 327.47051—dc20 96-10750 CIP Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.

© BM(c) 10 BM(p) 10

9 9

8 8

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

In memory erf' John Bryant Paine, Jr.

Contents

List of Maps

x

Acknowledgments

xi

Technical Note

xiii

Abbreviations

xv

Introduction International Issues: The Russian and Chinese Empires in the Industrial Age Regional Issues: The Militarization of the Russo-Chinese Frontier Bilateral Issues: The Nature of Russo-Chinese Relations Domestic Issues: Political Legitimacy and Economic Backwardness Notes

1 3 7 9 12 16

Part I. FVom Manchuria to Sinkiang, 1858-1864: The Demise of Traditional Chinese Diplomacy

25

1. Background: Revival of Russian Interest in the Far East Russia and China in the Age of Commercial Maritime Empires The Demise of the Overland Trade and Geographic Exploration Local Officials and the Myth of Russian Original Sovereignty The Crimean War of 1853 to 1856 and Russia s Turn to the East Notes

28 29 31 35 39 43

2. Traditional Chinese Diplomacy in Retreat: The Treaty of Aigun The Tribute System and the Russian “Barbarians” The Chinese Concept of “Face” China’s Missed Opportunity The Treaties of Tientsin and Aigun of 1858 Notes

49 50 54 57 64 70

3. Capitulation: The Treaty of Peking International Law versus Moral Suasion Russian International Weakness and Chinese Intransigence Russian Mediation of the Treaty of Peking of 1860 The Ramifications and the Myths of Friendship and Original Sovereignty Notes

79 79 84 87 92 97

viii

Part II. Ili, Sinkiang, 1871-1881: A Turning Point in Chinese Foreign Policy

107

4. Ethnic Tensions: The Muslim Uprising and Russian Invasion The Myth of Chinese Original Sovereignty over Sinkiang Russian Expansion into Central Asia The Muslim Uprising of 1862 to 1878and the Myth of Chinese Moderation The Russian Invasion of 1871 Notes

110 112 114 117 120 125

5. Chinese Diplomacy in Disarray: The Treaty of Livadia The Treaty of Livadia of 1879 “Saving Face“ and the Myth of Diplomatic Incompetence Institutional Failures of the Chinese Government The Foreign Policy Debate in China Notes

132 133 135 137 141 145

6. A Reprieve: The Treaty erf"S t Petersburg The Chinese Negotiating Strategy Russian National Dignity The Negotiations and the Myth of Russo-Chinese Friendship The Treaty of St Petersburg of 1881 Notes

151 152 153 156 161 167

Part III. Manchuria, 1896-1905: Russian Railroad Imperialism and the Russo-Japanese War

175

7. The Apogee of Tsarist Imperialism: The Chinese Eastern Railway The Sino-Japanese War erf 1894 to 1895 and the New Balance of Power ill Asia The Russo-Chinese Anti-Japanese Alliance of 1896 The Liao-tung Peninsula Concession of 1898 Exclusive Zones and the Militarization of the Border Notes

178 181 185 190 194 198

8. Over-Extension: The Boxer Uprising and the Russian Invasion The Boxer Uprising of 1900 The Russian Occupation of Manchuria The Russian Troop Withdrawal Agreement of 1902 Escalating Russian Demands and the Myth of Diplomatic Incompetence Notes

209 211 215 219 223 226

9. Roll-Back: The Russo-Japanese War Russia’s “Civilizing Mission" versus Japan’s Foreign Policy Concerns The Russo-Japanese War erf 1904 to 1905 Political Weakness: Instability within the Russian Government The Price of Empire: Economic Backwardness and International Competition Notes

234 235 240 247 250 257

ix

Part IV. Outer Mongolia, 1911*1924: Shifting Spheres o f Influence

269

10. Mongolia: The Last Frontier Spheres of Influence Agreements with Britain and Japan Traditional Ch’ing Administration of Mongolia Ethnic Tensions in Mongolia and the Myth of Chinese Moderation The Chinese Attempt to Absorb Mongolia via Administrative Reforms Notes

272 272 276 278 280 282

11. Tsarist Foreign Policy: Mongolian Autonomy and Chinese Suzerainty Russian Support for the Separation of Mongolia from China The Russo-Mongohan Agreement of 1912 The Russo-Chinese Declaration erf 1913 The Tripartite Kiakhta Conference erf 1915 Notes

287 288 292 295 296 305

12. Soviet Foreign Policy: Mongolian Independence under Soviet Tutelage The Russian Civil War in Mongolia: Ataman Semenov The Russian Civil War in Mongolia: Baron Ungem Soviet Imperialism in the Far East The Myths of the Discontinuity of Soviet Policy and Chinese Moderation Notes

314 316 319 321 325 332

Conclusion The Evolution of China's Russia Policy The Evolution of Russia's China Periicy The Paradoxes of Empire The Past as an Indicate»’for the Future Notes

343 343 346 350 355 358

Bibliographic Essay Secondary Sources in English Secondary Sources in Russian and Chinese Primary Sources Archives Notes

363 363 364 366 367 368

Bibliography I. Archives II. Published Primary Sources III. Published Secondary Sources IV. Reference Works V. Erissertations

370 370 371 380 399 401

Index

403

List o f Maps

Russia and China c. 1855

xviii

Chinese Provinces: Ch’ing Dynasty

xx

Administrative Units in Asiatic Russia: Romanov Dynasty

xxi

The Russo-Chinese Frontier in 1864

26

Russian and Chinese Central Asia in 1884

106

Manchuria before 1917

176

Outer Mongolia c 1924

270

Acknowledgments This work could not have been completed without the help of many persons. I am particularly grateful to the many devoted teachers who, over the years, taught me how to read modem and classical Chinese, grass writing, Russian, and Japanese. Without their help, the documentary material on which this work is based would have been inaccessible to me. In particular, I would like to thank Pei-yi Wu for his infinite patience and willingness to share his erudition in a year-long individual tutorial, and also for his comments on a draft of this work; Yin Shih-tsung, for helping me decipher grass writing in a year-long individual tutorial at the Taipei Language Institute; and the late Michael Kreps for his imaginative and accessible presentation of Russian literature in three seminars at the graduate program of the Middlebury College Russian School. Finally, I am indebted to dozens of language teachers at the Middlebury College Russian School m aster’s program, the Inter-University Center for Chinese Language Studies in Taipei, the Taipei Language Institute, and International Christian University in Tokyo. My career will rest in large measure on the linguistic foundation that these people were instrumental in helping to lay. In addition, I would like to thank those who helped me at various stages of my education. For the intellectual foundation, I am indebted to John P. Le Donne who has set such a high standard in his own books and has also taken the time to ferret out errors in a draft of the current work; to my undergraduate Special Concentration advisers, the late Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, who encouraged me to pursue my own research regardless of how far removed from the current trends in scholarship; to Richard S. Wortman for greatly improving a draft of my dissertation; and to Stephen F. Cohen for taking the time both to develop a fascinating seminar on Soviet history and to write detailed comments on my seminar paper, which enabled me to go on to write much improved papers thereafter. For help in navigating through graduate school, I am grateful to Madeleine Zehn, who kindly agreed to be my dissertation adviser, even though my topic was far removed from her own specialty, and who tirelessly wrote so many letters of recommendation. For reading drafts of the present work, in part or in full, I would like to thank, in addition to the persons specified above, Thomas Christensen, John B. Paine III, Mary E. M. Snitow, Charlotte F. Wunderlich, and Yu Miin-ling. I am also grateful to Yu Miin-ling for providing me with various Chinese sources. Nathanael V. Evans and Randy S. Harden created the maps. At M. E. Sharpe, I greatly benefited from the help of Ana Erlic, Kimberly E. Herald, Paricia A. Kolb, Angela Piliouras, and Debra E. xi

xii

Soled. For advice on the transliteration of Mongolian place names, I am grateful to Christopher Atwood. For sending newspaper clippings for all the years I was overseas, I am indebted to Elizabeth N. Nicholson. Beyond the help of these individuals, I was also fortunate to receive financial assistance from the following organizations: the International Research and Exchange Board1funded nine months of research in Moscow during the 1988-1989 academic year as well as a year of language study in Taipei three years earlier; the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China with support from the United States Department of Education funded twelve months of research in Peking and Nanking in 1990, the China Times Cultural Foundation funded research in Taipei during the spring and summer of 1991 ; the Foundation for Scholarly Exchange provided a Fulbright fellowship for ten months in Taipei during the 1991-1992 academic year; the Social Science Research Council provided a write-up grant for 1992; and the Hoover Institution2 hosted me for a three month post-doctoral fellowship in the fall of 1993 and as a visiting scholar through the spring of 1995. 1 would also like to express my gratitude to the organizations and staff which made their archival collections available to me: I am especially grateful to the staffs at the Ming-Ch’ing Archives in Peking, Academia Sinica and the Palace Museum Archives (both in Taipei), the Archive for Russian Foreign Policy in Moscow, the Foreign Ministry Archives in Tokyo, and the Bakhmeteff Archives in New York, all of which so generously shared their extensive collections of documents on foreign relations. I could not have turned out the final version without hours o f help from Henrietta N. Paine, Charlotte Ann Elleman, and Thomas S. Elleman. Above all I am grateful to my spouse, who by sharing all the travels and humoring the varied inconveniences along the way, made working cm this project so enjoyable. I would like to emphasize that I alone am responsible for all shortcomings of the present work and few the interpretations contained herein. Some errors in interpretation are undoubtedly due to my own stubborn resistance to following some of the suggestions offered by the persons thanked above.

Notes 1. Research for this book was supported in part by a grant from the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the United States Department of State. None of these organization is responsible for the views expressed. 2 The Hoover Institution administered funds from the United States Department of State’s discretionary grant for Studies of Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the former Soviet Union based on the “Soviet-Eastern European Research À Training Act of 1983, Public Law 98-164, Title VIII, 97 StaL 1047-50”

Technical Note Dates have been given in the Gregorian calendar generally used in the W est All Russian dates according to the Julian calendar used until February 14, 1918 (February 1, Old Style), and Chinese dates according to the lunar calendar used until 1912 have been converted. The Julian calendar lagged twelve days in the nineteenth century and thirteen in the twentieth. The transliteration system used for Russian is the Library of Congress system minus the diacritical marks. For Chinese, the Wade-Giles system has been used, except for those names which have entered into common usage by another romanization, for example: Sun Yat-sen, Sinkiang. In the case where multiple names exist for a single place, the usage follows that of the country currently with sovereignty over the area. Words in Cyrillic have been spelled according to the rules of the new orthography, while Chinese characters appear in both their sim plified and complicated forms, depending on the source material. (Simplified characters tend to appear largely in materials published in mainland China after 1949.) All Chinese characters have been reproduced as in the original sources except for the name of Prince Ch’un, or I-huan (© IliE ^ iS ). The character for huan is very rare and, for technical reasons, 1 have rendered it with a water radical instead of with a llf. The terms Chinese, Han, Great Russian, Russian, Soviet, and tsarist have been used as follows: Chinese refers to any citizen o f the Chinese mainland, while Han refers to the Han Chinese ethnic group, which makes up the vast majority of China’s population. Similarly, Russian refers to any citizen of either tsarist Russia (Russia before 1917) or of the Soviet Union (1917-1991), while Great Russian refers to the ethnic group making up the majority of the population of the Russian Republic and a minority in the other former Soviet republics, tsarist, therefore, is used in contrast to Soviet, the former referring to people and the polity before 1917, and the latter, after 1917. Russia is the generic term referring to the general geographic area held by tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Imperial Russian and tsarist are used synonymously: Imperial Russia and tsarist Russia both refer to the polity before the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in 1917. Chinese and Japanese personal names are written with surname first, then given name.

Abbreviations ARFP

Archive for Russian Foreign Policy ( ApxMB BHeiUHeft ITojihtwkh Poocmh), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow. The citations included the title of the document, the Old Style date on the document followed by the equivalent Gregorian date in parentheses, the collection number, the file number, and the page number, if applicable.

BA

Bakhmeteff Archives, Columbia University, New York. The citations consist of the name of the collection (the Witte collection), the box number, file number, part number, document number, and page. Not all documents necessarily have all of these components.

CABM

(C o m p lete a c co u n t o f b arb aria n management). The citations list a volume and page number.

CABM, Archives

(C o m p lete a c co u n t o f b arb aria n management). The volumes for the reign of Kuang-hsii were never published but exist only in manuscript form at the Palace Museum Archives, Taipei, Taiwan. The volumes for 1878 to 1880 are missing. The last volume is for 1898. O f the reigns which were published (see CABM above) all volumes for Hsien-feng (1851-1862) are missing.

CDDMQ

M inisterstvo inostrannykh del (M inistry of Foreign Affairs), CGopmuc MttnsKmsLTmecxHX AOKyiuenroB no

MoHTomcxoMy Bonpocy (23 Aßrycm 1912 r.-2 Hoaßpa 1913 r.) (Collection o f diplomatic documents on the Mongolian question [23 August 1912-2 November 1913]). CTGSMA

nnaBHMH urraß, BoeHHO-yneHUH kom htct (General Staff, Military Scientific Committee), Goopmoc reorpatjMnecKHX,

TonorpamecKHX u eraTHcrmecKHX mrepuasiOB no A3HH (Collection o f topographical, geographical, and statistical m aterials on Asia). Each issue was marked “Top S ecret” The bibliography lists the author and title for each report as well as the volume number. xv

(Foreign relations archives), (Academia Sinica), jfi&fifr (Institute of Modern History), Taipei. The citations include the title, date, collection number, file number, and page number, if applicable. WangYen-wei (30BJ&0 and Wang Liang (î?rE), eds., (H istorical m aterials on international relations from the Ch’ing period). The citation provides a volume and page number. (Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives). The citations specify the collection number (separated by a period), the box number (separated by a hyphen), sometimes a volume number, and page numbers, if marked in the original. (Number one historical archives), (MingCh’ing Archives). (1) “FM” refers to documents from the Foreign Ministry collection. The number refers to a file number. These documents have not been individually numbered, therefore particularly documents within a given file must be located by date and author. (2) “GC” indicates reference copies of palace memorials maintained by the Grand Council (3) “GCRM” refers to rescripted memorials kept by the Grand Council (Ifc•#£#$?). These two categories of memorials from the Grand Council are cited as follows: the name of the memorialist, lunar date by reign title, Gregorian date in parentheses, collection number ( £ ^ ^ - ) , catalogue number ( g ^ ^ ) if applicable, folder number ( # ) , and document number ( ^ ). There are no catalogue numbers for the rescripted memorials. The abbreviations for the reign titles used in the traditional Chinese dating system are: HF for Hsien-feng, TC for T ’ung-chih, KH for Kuang-hsü, and HT for Hsiian-t’ung.

O ner no A3Hanxouy AempraMetrry (Report by the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) [RAD]. These citations consist of a year, ARFP [see above], /. otchet MID [the name of the collection] op. [inventory number], page number. After 1897, these reports were entitled O ner no IkpaoMy Aenaprajmrry (Report by the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

O n er no Ikpoomy JHenapraMemy (Report by the First Department of the M inistry of Foreign Affairs) [RFD]. Before 1898, these reports were entitled O n er no AwavcxoMy jHenapraMetrry (R eport by the A siatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). See RAD above for a description of the citation form at Wang Yen-wei (Î.JBWL) and Wang Liang (ZE^), eds., (Record of important events regarding the inspection o f the West). Entries include a volume and page number.

xviii

Russia and China c. 1855

I , . r J ^

V

x

V

i

>

■

"V*

V .«cow •

/ ' ■. ; • / % S .™ „a . *

#

' ' •‘ xSaratov */ , '

Black

.. ^

( Ufa

I,

y*

•

Zlatoust

1 /; Otewbur^ /

•r ------V*U 5< r TT Bukhara

•

r

*#*

> 7

n

v/ f '


Tomsk

* *y. /.» f t • . #. •' jflLf rV#' *- Jrf *

Omsk

I

T O fr

''

**£ Basin

Tashkent ,Kokani

g * S fe g « 5 M i i^?S?0g à ' > r ^ t a r i m Basin nakiamakan Desert

^ ' Ar a b ian

». -a

xix

^ Kara

,

*9.

Sea

V f /* *

**.

,

4 . «

/

(l

. VvV'* I;

, - » ' V I Xx

etropavlovsk

Pacific Ocean

Center for Cartographic Research and Spatial Analysis Michigan State University

X

X

Administrative Units in Asiatic Russia Romanov Dynasty

Kara Sea

Barents Sea

Governor-Generalship o f the Amur Sea Moscow

Okhotsk

Tobolsk Province Orenburg

Yeniseisk Province

Irkutsk Province

Tomsl

Black Sea

Governor-Generalship* o f the Steppe

Omsk,

Tomsk Province

Irkutsk

Vladivostok

Legend

Tashkent1

s

Governor- Generalship o f Turkestan

Sources: Donald W. Treadgold, The Greet Siberian Migration (Princeton: Princeton University P re s s .1 9 5 7 ),2 6 5 .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Akmolinsk oblast' Semipalatinsk oblast' Transcaspian Syr Daria oblast' Semirech'e oblast' Samarkand oblast' Fergana oblast' Khanate of Khiva

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Khanate of Bukhara Yakutsk oblast' Maritime oblast' Transbaikalia Amur oblast' Kamchatka oblast' Sakhalin oblast' Generalship Boundary

Center for Cartographic noeonrch and Spatial Analysis Michigan State University

Introduction As far as we were concerned, we weren’t responsible for what our tsars had done, but the lands gained from those tsarist treaties were now Soviet territory. We weren’t the only socialist country which had to administer and defend the territory inherited from a pre-Revolutionary regime. We were afraid that if we started remapping our frontiers according to historical considerations, the situation would get out of hand and lead to conflict Besides, a true Communist and internationalist wouldn’t assign any particular importance to the question of borders, especially borders between fellow socialist states.1 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. . . . The Russians took everything they could. Some people have declared that the Sinkiang area and the territories north of the Amur River must be included in the Soviet Union.... The Soviet Union has an area of 22 million square kilometers and its population is only 220 million. It is about time to put an end to this allotment. . . . About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list.2 MaoTse-tung

At the end of the twentieth century, the Sino-Soviet boundary was the longest militarized border in the world and territorial disputes had dominated the last century and a half of Russo-Chinese relations. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Russo-Chinese frontier was a backwater for both empires. At that time neither country had more than a very vague idea about the basic geography of these areas. How the Russo-Chinese frontier evolved from being a remote periphery to a central concern for both countries is the subject of this work. The im portance of the boundary’ issue transcends territorial m atters. Internationally, the evolving boundary line was the East Asian reflection of the new European balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution. Regionally, the disposition of the border determined the geopolitical configuration in the Far East. Bilaterally, it constituted the overriding issue forever plaguing RussoChinese relations. Domestically, the maintenance of empire—the factor which first pitted Russia against China—conferred the status of a great power so crucial to the continuing legitimacy of the ruling houses of both Russia and China. Each of these facets of Russo-Chinese relations will be discussed at length in this chapter and throughout this work. Simultaneously, there will be a careful 1

2

INTRODUCTION

examination of the myths3 which soon became intertwined with Russo-Chinese relations. Originally they ranged from slight exaggerations to deliberate falsifications, which, through repetition, grew and became accepted truths despite the evidence to the contrary. These false beliefs became the prism through which Russians and Chinese viewed each other; they underlay assumptions concerning the nature of Russo-Chinese relations; they became justifications for policy choices; and they even affected how other countries perceived Russia and China. What follows is a diplomatic history; it is not a geographic survey of border markers.4 It focuses on what factors precipitated changes of the border line, the nature of these changes, and their consequences. In the process, it attempts to put bilateral Russo-Chinese relations in the international context of the changing European and East Asian balance of power. In addition, it attempts to examine Russo-Chinese relations in the context of each country’s strategy for security. This entails tracing both the evolution of Russian imperialism and Chinese hegemony in the Far East The period under consideration starts with the signing of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and continues through the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924.s The boundary treaties negotiated in this period delimit the Sino-Soviet border in existence at the fall of the Soviet Union.6 The previous set of treaties—the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the 1727 Treaty of Bura, and the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta—had remained in force for over a century, but in the mid-nineteenth century, new boundary and commercial treaties suddenly ruptured this stability: Russia took the Maritime Province, the northern bank of the Amur (Hei-lung-chiang), parts of the Pamirs and Sinkiang, and ultimately helped to detach Outer Mongolia from the Chinese sphere of influence.7 The 1858-1924 period is crucial for understanding contemporary Russo-Chinese relations for several reasons. First, it constitutes the formative period in modern Russo-Chinese relations: the issues that still bedevil contemporary relations came into being at this time. Second, these years encompass the evolution of the modem boundary which, due to its length and due to the size of the two countries involved, forms the keystone of the current balance of power in the Far E ast Third, the tensions that arose from this repartition of the Far East set the tone for future Russo-Chinese relations; indeed, they go far in explaining such critical events as the 1960 Sino-Soviet split. Finally, these years provide the unique opportunity to examine the consequences of a major realignment of the balance of power in the Far East. This historical information is the only data available from which to extrapolate the possible consequences of the recent reversal in the balance of power between Russia and China. This work is divided into four sections which correspond to the four time periods and the respective geographic areas in which activities along the border were concentrated: (1) the Amur Basin, 1858-1864: Russian expansion to the Amur and Ussuri rivers; (2) Sinkiang, 1871-1881: the struggle for the Hi Valley;

INTRODUCTION

3

(3) Manchuria, 1896-1905: Japanese containment of Russian railroad imperialism; and (4) Outer Mongolia, 1911-1924: Soviet absorption of the Chinese sphere of influence. In the first period, the tsarist government took advantage of China’s defeats in the Opium Wars (1839-1842,1856-1860) and of its paralysis during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) in order to negotiate two highly advantageous border treaties. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Peking moved the border far to the south and set the present Manchurian boundary along the Amur and Ussuri (Wu-su-li-chiang) rivers. During the second period, the Russians deployed troops in 1871 on Chinese territory in the Ili Valley to prevent the Muslim Uprising (1862-1878) in Sinkiang from spreading across the border to Russian co-religionists. Only after the Chinese granted considerable trade concessions and an indemnity under the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg did Russian troops finally withdraw from most of the occupied territory. In the period between the Si no-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the RussoJapanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese successfully not only prevented further tsarist expansion in Manchuria, but even forced Russia to give up the southern portion of its costly far-flung railway concessions in China. This put an end to Russia's attempt to absorb Manchuria surreptitiously under the cover of extending its railway system. The fourth and final section examines the expansion of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia from the fall of the Ch’ing Dynasty in 1911 to the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1924. The Red Army, which entered Outer M ongolia during the Russian Civil W ar, stayed on to ensure the transformation of the region from a Chinese to a Soviet protectorate. The conclusion then summarizes the trends in the conduct of Russian and Chinese diplomacy; examines the paradoxical nature of Russian and Chinese imperialism; and discusses the possible ramifications of the recent shift in China’s favor of the balance of power. International Issues: The Russian and Chinese Empires in the Industrial Age The Industrial Revolution caused a change in the balance o f power not only between Russia and the more-industrialized West European countries but also between Russia mid China. During the period under consideration, territory exceeding the size of India became Russian outright or, in the case of Outer Mongolia, a Russian protectorate. These enormous territorial changes were the Far Eastern echo of a major realignment of the balance of power in Europe caused by the Industrial Revolution.8 The Industrial Revolution heralded a new age of commercial maritime em pires in which control over geographically contiguous territory had become far less important than in the past. Yet, in the

4

INTRODUCTION

mid-nineteenth century, China, Russia, and the decaying Ottoman Empire remained traditional continental empires, struggling to survive in the new age. China and Russia were both empires of vast territorial extent whose original imperial designs had stemmed largely from the requirements of border defense. In both countries, expansion into Central Asia and Siberia had largely been a frustrating quest for defensible borders, under the constant threat of invasion or harassment by neighboring nationalities. In the case of Russia, it was a huge country with few clear natural boundaries, but with vast plains to defend, so historically there had been a tendency to expand outwards to protect a geographically vulnerable center. This led to the gradual expansion of what was considered Russia proper, which in turn required ever more far-flung buffer areas for protection. China, on the other hand, was surrounded by natural boundaries in three directions: mountains in the northwest, west, southwest, and south, and oceans in the east. At the height of Ch’ing expansion, the only area lacking such formidable natural boundaries was in the north, where China first came into contact with Russia.9 Although the decline of the Ch’ing Dynasty neutralized Russia’s main potential rival in the Far East, marauding nationalities presented a constant irritation, if not an overwhelming threat, to Russians living on the frontiers. Predations by the native inhabitants on Russian property gave local Russian commanders both a motive and a pretext to expand their jurisdictions outward in order to end such lawlessness. Even though Russia continued to expand geographically throughout the nineteenth century, its relative economic base, technological level, and standard of living fell ever further behind those in Western Europe. From the Industrial Revolution onward, Russia was never able to match the economic achievements of Western Europe, the United States, or, later, of Japan. Therefore, it became increasingly strained in its efforts to keep up with the scale of foreign policy commitments required of a great power. For Russia, Chinese weakness presented all too tempting an opportunity, particularly when combined with traditional Russian insecurity about border areas. By the second half of the nineteenth century, despite the many limitations of Russian industrialization vis-à-vis the W est, Russia had become far more technologically advanced than China, causing a dramatic shift in Russia’s favor of the relative balance of power with China. This put China in a position of double-jeopardy in its struggle not only to keep the Western capitalists at bay along the coast but also to obstruct Russian territorial ambitions along their mutual border. In the end, because Russia was stronger than China and because their mutual frontier was remote fron the territorial interests of the Western powers, Russia was able vastly to expand its Asian domains at Chinese expense. Y et Russia expanded in Asia due not to national strength but to Chinese weakness. Despite the epochal change in the international balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution, China continued to rely on its traditional formulas for

INTRODUCTION

5

power, which, over the millennia, had proved to be so successful at keeping pre-industrial border peoples in check. These successes had created an arrogance among the Chinese which greatly inhibited their ability to comprehend the magnitude of the changes before them.10 By trying to maintain a hermetically sealed cultural world, the Chinese shut out die new intellectual currents developing in Europe necessary for an industrial revolution. Adapting to such a drastically changed international balance of power proved highly disruptive for China, a country preoccupied with upholding venerable traditions—not with sponsoring innovation—and one long accustomed to holding sway over all its neighbors, not to learning from them. It is hardly surprising that China could not change overnight; for a country of its size and regional diversity to have done so would have been little short of miraculous. Even Russia, which had long had intimate political, economic, and cultural contacts with Western Europe, had extreme difficulties in meeting the new challenges presented by the Industrial Revolution. Given that China lacked such long-standing and intim ate contacts with Europe, the obstacles to industrialization were that much more formidable. Further undermining China’s ability to adapt quickly was the fact that the ruling dynasty was not Han Chinese but Manchu and, therefore, was inherently vulnerable to charges of illegitimacy.11 Indeed, the Manchus emphasized their role as upholders of Chinese traditions precisely to cement their mandate to rule.12 Yet the new world order brought on by the Industrial Revolution required the very break with Chinese traditions which the Ch’ing Dynasty—unlike the ethnically homogeneous Japanese ruling house and its breathtakingly successful reforms during the Meiji period ( 1868-1912)—was so ill-equipped to make. Even worse for China, the rising tensions with foreigners coincided with massive internal rebellions and accelerating dynastic decline. As the Ch’ing Dynasty began to lose control over its own house, with the Taiping and Muslim rebellions, the Russians jumped to fill the vacuum and force a massive redistribution of territory. Thus, between 1858 and 1924, due to a reconfiguration erf*international balance of power caused by the Industrial Revolution and magnified by Chinese dynastic decline, Russo-Chinese relations changed radically and, as a result, reshaped the face of central and northeastern Asia. Yet neither country could fully come to terms with this formal territorial division of the Far E ast While Russia could not justify its gains, China could not accept its losses. Instead, each fostered its own variant of the myth of original sovereignty. Both the Russians and the Chinese13claim that the borderlands historically constituted an integral part of their empire. There is ample evidence that this was not the case, certainly in the time of the Romanov and Ch’ing dynasties.14 Russians were not even in the vicinity until the seventeenth century and did not arrive in significant numbers before the completion in 1905 of the railway connecting European Russia to Tashkent and the linking of Russia's two coasts, between 1891 and 1916, by the Trans-Siberian Railway.15

6

INTRODUCTION

Even today Siberia remains under-populated and cut off from the rest of Russia. Indeed, a case can be made that, despite Siberia’s administrative incorporation into Russia on paper, in practice, its remoteness prevented it from becoming completely integrated into the Russian empire until the Soviet period and therefore it cannot be said to have been historically an integral part of Russian territory. Tsarist tariff policy lends credence to this argument; tariff breaks at Cheliabinsk and Irkutsk treated Siberian grain like a foreign product16 The case for Russia’s historical links to Central Asia is even more tenuous. The native populations of the Soviet Central Asian republics bordering China bear no cultural or linguistic ties to Great Russians. It can be argued that the Central Asian republics never were completely integrated into the Soviet Union, but remain culturally and linguistically distinct While China does possess the more ancient historical claim17 to ties with Central Asia and southern Siberia, the Han are as culturally and linguistically distinct from the native peoples inhabiting these regions as are the Great Russians. Moreover, Ch’ing sources are unclear regarding the extent of Chinese territories; they discuss a plethora of changing place names referring to areas of unknown extent and vague location. Since the Chinese did not master Western cartography until the twentieth century, earlier Chinese maps have more artistic than practical value. Ch’ing boundary negotiators before 1880 often did not have more than a very general idea about where allegedly integral territories were actually located. Court officials in Peking in the mid-nineteenth century displayed an astounding ignorance of the actual extent of Manchuria, the homeland of the Manchu or Ch’ing Dynasty: they knew virtually nothing about the lands north of the Amur and little about the Ussuri River coastal region. Nevertheless, some Chinese have gone so far as to equate tributary relations with sovereignty. Yet, on the eve of the foundation of the Ch’ing Dynasty, Manchu sources refer to China, Korea, Mongolia, and Manchuria as gunm (Manchu for country—or kuo [E9] in Chinese) and essentially accorded each and its respective rulers equal status.18 In fact, the existence of tributary relations with the Russo-Chinese borderlands makes them no more nor less a part of China than were Russia, Burma, Korea and Vietnam, which all had sent tribute missions to Peking at one time or another.19 On the one hand, the denial by the Russians that a boundary issue existed (since they had taken allegedly empty lands) permitted them to delude themselves that the Chinese could not harbor any serious grievances against them. On the other hand, the exaggerated notions by the Chinese of their original patrimony fueled their hostilities toward the Russians. For these reasons, Russo-Chinese relations were much more acrimonious than the Russians imagined. As long as China remained weak, however, it was not in a position to reveal the depths of its anger. For Russia, the rude awakening came after the consolidation of communist power in China in the 1950s and became public knowledge with the Sino-Soviet split and the ensuing skirmishes on the bolder.

INTRODUCTION

7

Regional Issues: The Militarization o f the Russo-Chinese Frontier Russia's expansion eastward transformed it into a Pacific power. In doing so, it posed a permanent security threat to China, Korea, and Japan, and, thereby, transformed the geopolitical alignment in the Far E ast Before the mid-nineteenth century, China had held sway in the Far East, m ilitarily, economically, and culturally. The arrival of Russia on China’s periphery, however, created a new and formidable rival, more dangerous than the other European powers, for Russia alone was primarily interested not in commerce but in the permanent acquisition of territory. The central issue in Russo-Chinese relations was strategic. While Russia directed its energy toward territorial expansion, China used all available means, however limited, in an attempt to forestall this eventuality. Despite Russian protestations to the contrary, Russia did not have significant commercial interests in China; its trade was minuscule compared to that of other European powers, Japan, or the United States. In fact, Russian commerce in China was not conducted primarily at the instigation of private entrepreneurs but rather was heavily promoted and subsidized by the government. Moreover, for Russia the costs of taking and then administering its Far Eastern possessions far exceeded any economic benefits derived from them. Profits were not the objective; rather, the Russian government hoped to promote its notion of national security and its vision of national prestige. To do so, it used commercial penetration as a precursor to territorial expansion. The Russian decision to build the Trans-Siberian Railway and, later, the Chinese Eastern Railway immeasurably heightened China’s security concerns. The completion of these railways led to the m ilitarization of the border and the beginning of an arms race in the Far East since, for the first time, Russia could relatively efficiently deploy troops along its Far Eastern frontiers. Because China lacked this capacity, its primary defense became encouraging internal colonization erf its frontier areas with Han Chinese to make the lands less attractive targets for Russian annexation. Before long, the Russians began to raise the alarm about an impending “yellow p é r ir —their nightmare of China’s teeming population overflowing across the border to overwhelm the sparse Russian frontier settlements. Japanese colonial ambitions in M anchuria further complicated the strategic equation. The success of the Meiji Period reforms made possible Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War and its consequent international recognition as a regional power. Thereafter until its defeat in World War II, it competed with Russia for control of C hina's northern frontiers. Russian unwillingness to moderate its territorial ambitions in the Far East or to reach a compromise with Japan fueled a Japanese arms race with Russia. Only after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War did Russia agree to Japan's long-standing request to delineate spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. But this humiliation at the hands o f an Asian nation brought Russian visions of a “yellow peril” to a new pitch of paranoia.

8

INTRODUCTION

Empire in Asia greatly complicated Russia’s own defensive requirements because massive geographic extent entailed commensurate military expenditures. In the end, these burgeoning Far Eastern commitments, which had been undertaken to maintain the foreign policy of a great power, worked to undermine the foundations of the Romanov Dynasty. They did so in two ways. First, these Far Eastern policies and particularly the attendant costs—such as building the Chinese Eastern Railway; occupying Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising; and the resultant war with Japan—jointly absorbed too many of Russia’s scarce financial resources and demanded burdensome military commitments. This meant that retention of the new territories actually deprived European Russia of funds and thereby played a role in retarding its economic development20 Second, the loss of the Russo-Japanese War led to the Revolution of 1905; took away funds from the defense of European Russia; and left the Russian government with little latitude for policy choices on the eve of World War I. Indeed, from the Russo-Japanese War onward, the fear of a two-front war, one in Europe and the other in Asia, required an enormous diversion of funds to the Russian Far East.21 For Russia, therefore, its turn to the East had unanticipated strategic, military, and economic consequences. For China, the physical territorial losses were enormous: an area exceeding that of the United States east of the Mississippi River changed hands. In Chinese eyes, this represented a gross dereliction of the filial duty to retain all of the lands so carefully accumulated by previous generations and still considered to be part of China’s rightful patrimony.22 Today, the w orld's most populace nation must live with the knowledge that just north across the border lies a vast and comparatively vacant land full of resources still waiting to be exploited—for although Russia had a seemingly insatiable appetite for land, it did not have a corresponding ability to develop all of what it had, much less of what it took. These territorial losses, coupled with their many defeats by the other powers, have prompted the Chinese to see their modem history in terms of their own victimization. The Chinese are wont to claim that China has always been the innocent victim of the predations of rapacious foreigners and never an aggressor itself. This is the myth of Chinese moderation. Non-Han peoples, populating the regions bordering China proper, however, have a very different opinion. In fact, when the Chinese government had the power to do so, it was merciless in putting down insurrections by recalcitrant border peoples. The continuing unrest—some would argue genocide—in Tibet23 is but the latest chapter in a very long history of power politics over weak border peoples. Coercive Chinese policies in Sinkiang and Mongolia fed the ethnic unrest, which in turn contributed to the territorial losses there. In fact, Chinese casualties at the hands of European forces during the Opium Wars do not compare to the wholesale slaughter during China’s campaigns against its ethnic minorities. While China was certainly a victim of imperialism, when it occupied a position of power relative to its weak minorities, its own

INTRO DU CTIO N

9

policies were often less benevolent than those of the W est, which it has so thoroughly criticized. Moreover, its mismanagement of its own border peoples played into the Russians’ hands when abused minorities appealed to Russia for protection from China. China has used the myth of Chinese moderation to avoid facing up to the dark side of its domination of non-Han peoples and to avoid re-êxamining its harsh policies regarding minorities. Instead, it has assumed the role of the forever-righteous victim. Scholars in the West have unwittingly helped prolong the life of this Chinese myth by publishing voluminously on European imperialism ih China, on the Opium Wars, and so on, while writing very little about the fate of China’s many ethnic minorities. Before the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, broadcast throughout the world, many W esterners also viewed China with an equally uncritical eye. They did not dwell on the harsh side of communist rule. Bilateral Issues: The Nature o f Russo-Chinese Relations The Russo-Chinese border gradually assumed a symbolic importance beyond its obvious strategic significance as a line of dispute between two often antagonistic empires. For the Chinese, the boundary became the physical incarnation of China’s failure to fend off the predations of European civilization, while for the Russians, their expanded boundary enshrined their country’s great power status. Thus, the border became a potent, but antipodal, symbol for both countries—for the one it represented failure, for the other, success. In the case of China, many of its history books present the modem period as beginning with the defeats in the Opium W ars, followed by a century of uninterrupted concessions and humiliations before foreigners. The psychological devastation of these unmitigated defeats of a civilization which many Chinese continue to believe is superior to all others24is evidenced in a variety of expressions such as “the humiliations caused by foreign powers” (£M§), “to wipe out the national shame and recover the fatherland” (f^ & liS ), “the loss of economic rights to foreigners” and “to guard against the insults of foreign powers” (Wfê). According to conventional Chinese and Western historiography, modem history marks die first time that China had ever been completely unable to sinicize the outsiders, but had instead been forced, however reluctantly and painfully, to adapt to the world beyond China. The boundary symbolizes this defeat and explains the later resolve never again to relinquish even the smallest part of Chinese territory. This development was brought home to the Soviets in the pitched batdes in 1969 over islands in the Amur River. The border assumed a very different symbolic importance for the Tsarists and later the Soviets. For them, China served as a parade ground to demonstrate Russia’s great power status. Although Russia and later die Soviet Union could not keep up with the great powers economically or, in the end, militarily, the

10

INTRODUCTION

country would prove itself to be a great power in the Far E ast25 For both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, therefore, the period of Russian territorial, and later Soviet ideological, expansion in the Far East became a great source of national pride. These periods were considered heroic eras in the quest by the Russian people to secure its neighbors in the embrace originally of civilization and then of communism. These perceptions fostered the development of two myths. Russians have consistently misinterpreted Chinese outward expressions of friendship and hospitality, which are actually reflections of Chinese norms for etiquette and treatment of guests. In reality, these expressions did not emanate from any abiding sentiments or from genuine friendship. Out of this developed the myth of Russo-Chinese friendship. Based on platitudes exchanged in formal settings, the Russians—both tsarist and Soviet—have consistently argued that their country's relations with China, in contrast to those enjoyed by the other powers, have always been genuinely friendly and that the Chinese have long held them in warm regard. For example, Russian diplomats in the nineteenth century consistently speak of two hundred years of uninterrupted friendship between the two countries.26 Russian delusions of Chinese goodwill allowed diem to claim that their relations with China had a moral character absent from those of the Western powers.27 Because of their supposedly uniquely cordial relations, the Russians insisted that they had a special civilizing mission there, which the Chinese recognized and for which the latter were grateful. This moral high ground then became a justification for further Russian involvement in China. The myth of Russo-Chinese friendship also gained currency in third countries,28 most recentiy during the 1950s at the height of the Cold War, but the myth has its origin in the nineteenth century. The Chinese documentary evidence, however, is overwhelming on this score. Ch’ing officials were clearly aware that the Sung (960-1279) and Ming (13681644) dynasties had fallen when they could no longer defend the northern frontiers from invading barbarians, namely, the Mongols in the case of the Sung and the Manchus in the case of the Ming. After the Opium Wars, many Chinese gradually came to consider Russia the most dangerous European power because Russia came to China not simply for trade, as in the case of the others, but to absorb territory permanently. Only after defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) did the Chinese begin to look upon the Japanese with equal hostility. China’s preoccupation with Russian foreign policy is indicated by the distribution of the archival materials concerning Ch’ing foreign policy: nearly half of all these materials relate to Russia, while less than a third deal with Great Britain, and less than a tenth concern Japan or the United States.29 In these archival documents, Chinese officials, over and over again, describe Russian designs on Chinese territory, using such terms as: “gnawing away like a silkworm” (ÄÄ),30 “gobbling up” (ftf#),31 “eyeing predatorily like a tiger” (^M ),32

INTRODUCTION

11

“drooling at the mouth” ( M ) ,33 “insatiable” (ffhtÄ R ),34 having “evil intentions” (fä'L'),35 “desiring that which belongs to others” (igfig),36 and “unfathomable” (la m f 1behavior. Such documents show cleariy that Russo-Chinese relations were deeply troubled from the start The extent of the divergence between Russian and Chinese perceptions of their relations also reflects the depth of their misunderstandings.38 A parallel myth, to that of Russo-Chinese friendship, is one o f more recent origin; it proposes that the Soviet foreign policy in the Far East was a radical departure from the imperialistic policies of the tsars. This myth of the discontinuity between tsarist and Soviet foreign policy is actually the Soviet variant of the preceding myth: since the Soviets considered the tsarist era to be the incarnation of evil, naturally they claimed that their policies were very different39 In fact, the Soviet achievement of detaching Outer Mongolia from the Chinese sphere of influence, thereby creating a pliable buffer state of its own, was a direct continuation of the emerging tsarist policy for Mongolia; the tsars simply had not dared go through with it for fear of creating an international uproar. Only while the Russian Civil War raged in Siberia did the Bolsheviks make conciliatory overtures to China: during a few uncertain years, the Soviet government offered to annul all unequal treaties and immediately to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China. Once the Bolsheviks took Siberia, however, Soviet diplomats denied ever having made the original offer.40 Soviet resistance to returning the railway, which cut through the heart of Manchuria, or the naval base at Lli-shun (Fort Arthur) and the harbor city of Ta-lien (Dairen or Dalny)—all of which the Soviet Union had regained after Japan’s defeat in World W ar II—continued for a quarter of a century until 1953-55, despite heated Chinese demands fra* their immediate restitution. In the end, the Soviet Union did not return its railway concession to China until several years after the Chinese communists had come to power and long after the other European nations had relinquished control over their concessions.41 Such treatment of a fellow communist state helps undermine the Soviet fabrication that it honored its communist allies and never engaged in imperialistic policies. In fact, its allies were its primary victims. Even so, the myth of the discontinuity between tsarist and Soviet foreign policy had many adherents in the W est42 The fact that Soviet foreign policy in the Far East was a direct continuation of tsarist policies also exposes the chimera of a Sino-Soviet monolith. During the height of the Cold War, one of the factors making the Soviet Union so threatening to the West was the supposed existence of this monolith. But the Soviets, by recreating the Russian empire in the 1920s, also reproduced the same tensions with China that had existed under the tsars. Thus, from the very beginning, there was an absence of the long-term harmony of interests necessary for the existence, let alone the survival, of a Sino-Soviet monolith. This fact, however, was disguised by the myths of Russo-Chinese friendship and of the discontinuity between imperial Russian and Soviet foreign policy.

12

INTRODUCTION

Domestic Issues: Political Legitimacy and Economic Backwardness Before the arrival of the Russians, Chinese expansion differed fundamentally from that of Russia in that the absorption adjacent territories occurred largely 43 due to spontaneous demographic pressures from below, whereas Russian expansion was a policy consciously promoted by its leaders at the highest levels. Also unlike China, Russia had great difficulty populating, never mind developing, the lands it took. In the case of China’s northern frontiers, the Ch’ing government actually had tried to limit any Han infiltration until Russian expansion compelled it to reverse this policy. Although similar in geographical extent, the Russian and Chinese empires were fundamentally different in how they were administered. Russia was an imperialist empire, meaning that it maintained an empire wherein it controlled both the foreign and domestic policies of all its constituent parts. Russia was the sum of its territories and its history was the process of gradually incorporating adjoining territories into the Russian provincial system.44 By contrast, China in the mid-nineteenth century was a hegemonic empire; that is, it controlled the foreign, but not necessarily the domestic, policies of its various parts.45 Relations with its periphery were maintained through the tributary system. Unabated Russian expansion, however, forced the Ch’ing Dynasty to integrate its periphery into the Chinese provincial system, thereby transforming China into an imperialist power. Thus, boundary relations led to important administrative changes in China. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the Romanov and Ch’ing dynasties became caught in the glare of economic inferiority in a world setting no longer hospitable to continental empires lacking a modem economic base. Thereafter, they both struggled to maintain the legitimacy of their continued rule. They did so even as their countries’ statuses in the world were severely eroded by their more industrialized rivals, whose economic and military successes they could not match. This struggle made them cling to past images of their international status. Since both had historically considered themselves to be great powers, neither could easily abandon these pretensions without undercutting its mandate to rule. For a government to acknowledge that its country had fallen from the ranks of the great powers would have been an admission of a gross dereliction of duties, making it vulnerable to charges of having failed to carry out its principal responsibility, namely, the preservation of national security. Neither China nor Russia could effectively use economic or military justifications for greatness. China could and did claim a greatness based on cultural achievements which had made it the most influential civilization in the Far East. Russia, however, could not successfully make such a claim, since its strong historical connections to Europe had rarely provided a correspondingly strong cultural influence: traditionally it had absorbed West European ideas, not the other way around.46 In fact, both countries made a central claim to greatness

INTRODUCTION

13

based on geographic extent.47 This meant that the maintenance of empire was inextricably linked to the perpetuation of the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty in both countries. Therefore, when faced with growing domestic criticism, the Russian autocracy sought to secure its mandate to rule by pursuing the foreign policy of a great power—as proof that Russia remained one—despite the mounting economic evidence to the contrary. Because Russia was unable to pursue such a policy in Europe and in much of the Near East due to the resistance o f the industrialized countries, it had only two possible arenas left to act out its role of great pow er Persia48 and China. China was in the even more unenviable position o f having foreign powers swamping its government with unprecedented demands for what it perceived to be intrusive trading relations. The inability to ward off these intrusions severely eroded the mandate of the Manchus to rule in Han China. This, coupled with a rapidly unraveling domestic situation, put the Manchus in a precarious situation. Therefore, like the Russian government, the Chinese clung to the pretensions, in their case, of an enduring superiority despite the accumulating conflicting evidence. For all of these reasons, the boundary was not an issue on which either government would willingly compromise. This meant that when the Russian government directed its attention to the Far East in the mid-nineteenth century, conflicts immediately arose with China and have been with us ever since. The fragility of rule in both Russia and China made pretenses of governmental prestige all the more im portant for sustaining governm ental legitim acy. Conversely, damage to prestige could threaten that legitimacy. When Russian membership in the league of great powers was threatened by defeats in the Crimean War in 1856, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin after the war with Turkey, and, most seriously of all, by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the autocracy scrambled to repair the damage. In the case of China, this happened when Western trade and diplomatic demands undermined its tributary system for managing relations with foreigners. The very act of so publicly and so radically changing the supposedly immutable49 tributary system undercut the Chinese myth of enduring cultural superiority, which in turn undermined Manehu credibility as effective guardians of Han China. The fragility of rule also made national dignity, in the case o f Russia, and “face,” in the case of China, assume a disproportionate importance. Since weak governments cannot afford many embarrassments casting doubts on their policies, a facade of imperviousness was required, especially in cases of poor judgment. This led to a rigidity in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, which wore off to a degree as the Chinese learned how to use to their advantage international law and European-style balance-of-power politics. Russia, however, became ever more mired down in its Far Eastern commitments, which, once made, it felt unable to renounce for reasons of national dignity. Thus, for both governments, domestic weakness limited flexibility on foreign policy.

14

INTRODUCTION

To “save face” while explaining away these foreign policy failures, the Chinese have conjured up another myth. This myth has been shared equally among Chinese historical figures and among the historians describing their activities. Although many Chinese scholars blame foreign imperialism for initiating conflicts, they have frequently attributed China’s failure to cope with these foreign threats to domestic mismanagement by a few individuals. In the case of the Ch’ing government, acceptance of the responsibility for failure would have meant a “loss of face” for the emperor and, by extension, for the whole Manchu ruling house. In the case of Chinese historians, blaming a limited number of individuals removed the need for a far deeper and more critical examination of their cultural heritage. Therefore, Chinese historiography has mirrored the tendency to make individual unsuccessful Chinese diplomats scapegoats for what were, in fact, pervasive and fundamental institutional failings. With the passing of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and with China’s continuing integration into the global economy, the importance of “face” has eased somewhat Nevertheless, the penchant by the Chinese government to blame individuals as a way to deflect attention from systemic failures has not altogether disappeared. One of the more notable examples of this occurred in 1976 with the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four who were made personally responsible for the devastation of the Cultural Revolution. This tendency to blame individuals has given rise to the myth of the diplomatic incompetence of Ch’ing Dynasty and early Republican period (1912-1949) diplomats.50 Certainly one can make the argument that mid-nineteenth century Chinese officials involved in negotiating with Russia were ignorant of their northern neighbor, but within several decades this situation had changed. Yet, almost without exception, Chinese diplomats lost every set of negotiations with Russia. While Russia did not usually get everything that it wanted, it made consistent inroads, which the Chinese, try as they might, seemed incapable of stopping. Before the late nineteenth century, a crucial factor helping to explain this was China’s enduring reluctance to reveal its negotiations with Russia to other countries, such as Britain. If it had overcome this reluctance, it could have formed mutually beneficial alliances to put pressure on Russia. Ultimately, however, as long as China remained unindustrialized, no amount of diplomatic virtuosity on its part could have made up for the fundamental change in the balance of power caused by the industrialization of its rivals. In the meantime, the progressive deterioration of China’s own internal situation greatly impeded and finally precluded the implementation of a successful foreign policy. For these reasons, the problem resided not in the individual diplomats but in a plethora of problems riddling China’s entire international and domestic situation. Not surprisingly, the Chinese still have mixed emotions about this unsettling chapter of their history. But these mixed, and generally negative, feelings have created a tendency among historians to dismiss the achievements of the diplomats of the late Ch’ing dynasty and the early Republican period.

INTRODUCTION

15

*** A key factor in explaining the endurance of these five myths—original sovereignty, Chinese moderation, Russo-Chinese friendship, Soviet diplomatic discontinuity, and Chinese diplomatic incompetence—relates to the focus of available histories and the source materials on which they have been based. Despite the obvious international importance of Russo-Chinese relations, Russian and Chinese history have primarily been studied either in isolation or in relation to the W est Modem China has also been compared to Japan, but the role played by Russia in Chinese history has generally been minimized.51 The converse is even more pervasive: Russian histories usually treat China superficially or dismiss it altogether. In fact, relations with Russia proved critical for China from the mid-nineteenth century onward, while those with China have become a steadily growing concern for Russia. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the twentieth-century history of either country without the other, so intertwined have their fates become. Yet only a handful of books rely on both Russian and Chinese sources. The consequence has been not simply to lim it but—as indicated by the prevalence of so many myths—to distort our understanding of Russo-Chinese relations. The Russo-Chinese border remains the main strategic fault line in the Far East and essential linchpin of the contemporary international balance of power. In the mid-nineteenth century, the balance o f power suddenly shifted in favor of Russia and did not begin to reverse itself until after the reunification of China under the communists in 1949. Due to the implosion of the Soviet empire in 1991 juxtaposed against the successful economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping (*MvY), this shift in China's favor has recently greatly accelerated. As of April 1991, 10 percent of the 4,600-mile-long border remained in dispute after decades of negotiations.52 Within the next few years, Russia and China signed a series of border agreements delineating disputed segments of their boundary, yet apparently small but key parts were left to “future generations” to resolve.53 As will be shown, the disposition of the Russo-Chinese frontier mirrored the changing relative balance of power between the Russian and Chinese empires. But this balance did not reflect a resurgence of Russia, for relative to the powers of its day, Russia continued to lose ground; rather, the changing balance reflected the collapse of Chinese power caused by the confluence of dynastic decline from within and the challenge of a technologically superior civilization from w ithout Therefore, Russia expanded in the Far East not because of strength but because of domestic and international weakness, which impelled it to play the role of a great power where it could, and because of Chinese weakness, which made China available as a stage for Russia's great-power ambitions. Today the situation has reversed. Russian power has imploded both at home and abroad. But unlike the nineteenth century, today China is resurgent and beginning to close the gap between standards of living. With the growing

16

INTRODUCTION

with the rising tide of Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East, and with the approaching potentially destabilizing leadership changes in China, ongoing border tensions seem likely. They will become particularly dangerous if the politically ambitious in either country attempt to raise the specter of national security to use continuing territorial disagreements as a vehicle to power. These tensions threaten to become particularly pronounced after the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and of Macao shortly thereafter. At that time, Russia’s territorial gains will be the only remaining territorial legacy of the age of imperialism in China. That is, the frontier will constitute the only area where Europeans still occupy formerly Chinese territory or spheres of influence. Therefore, on a whole range of issues—international, regional, bilateral and domestic—the Russo-Chinese border issue promises to cast a long shadow well into the next century. How this all began is the subject of the next chapter.

Notes 1. Khrushchev is discussing the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 284. 2 In this 1964 statement, Mao’s list of victims of Soviet territorial annexations included Mongolia, Rumania, Germany, Poland, and Finland. Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis, 43-4. 3. For more on the political uses of myths, see Henry Tudor, Political Myth, 124-7, 132-3,138-9. 4. For an excellent geographic analysis of all the Russo-Chinese border treaties complete with English translations of the treaty texts and maps, see J. R. V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty, xv-xvi, 5-97. See also Ch’eng Fa-jen ( 4I$cüI I^HI# (A geographic study of the Sino-Russian border). For good collections of maps detailing the evolution of the Russo-Chinese border see: H. C. Darby and Harold Fullard, eds.. The New Cambridge Modern History Atlas, 184-6,274; Albert Herrmann, Historical and Commercial Atlas of China; P. J. M. Geelan and D. C. Twitchett, The Times Atlas of

China. 5. The year 1924 is a watershed for both Mongolian and Sino-Soviet history. That year the Mongolian People’s Republic promulgated its constitution. In addition, Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations were restored after the break following the Bolshevik Revolution. 6. Although there have been certain territorial changes since 1924, most notably the secret incorporation in 1944 of Tannu Uriankhai (Tannu Tuva or Wu-liang-hai), Mongolia into the Soviet Union, Russia acquired defacto if not dejure sovereignty over this area during the period under discussion. During World War II, Joseph Stalin simply made official what had long been the case. Similarly, although Chiang Kai-shek only gave Nationalist recognition to Outer Mongolian independence on January 5, 1946, and Mao Tse-tung, in 1950, China had lost all influence over Outer Mongolia in the early 1920s. The Chinese, therefore, were belatedly recognizing a change that had taken place decades before. In the case of Soviet involvement in warlord politics in Sinkiang during the two decades before World War II, this did not result in territorial changes. Nor did the border war in 1969 over various river islands along the Manchurian border lead to any major

INTRODUCTION

17

boundary adjustments—certainly not on the scale of those from the period between 1858 and 1924. Similarly, to date the ongoing border negotiations of the 1990s do not seem to have led to a major reallocation of territory. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, a history of the Russo-Chinese border from 1858 to 1924 constitutes the history of the modem border. Luke T. Chang, Chim ’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, 26. 7. The only part of the border set by the Treaty of Nerchinsk to remain in force thereafter was the section along the Argun River downstream from Abagaytuy. In the case erf the 1727 boundary documents, only the western section between the first eighteen beacons out of sixty-five remained in force through 1991. This treaty set the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Russia up to Tannu Uriankhai. Prescott, 12,24. 8 For a discussion of the structural impact of the Industrial Revolution, see Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 158-9, passim. 9. Ernest Batson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, 3-4. 10. According to an 1856 entry in the diary of the Russian subject Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, ‘The self-confidence of the Chinese is incomprehensible to the mind. He never praises anything that is not Chinese.” Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, ‘‘3aiBAHMH Kpaii Khtomckoh HiuneptiH m ropOA KynbAxa (/btemiHK notaakh b Kynwixy 1856 r)” (The western part of the Chinese empire and the city of Kuldja [Diary of a trip to Kuldja in 1856]), in Coôpamie cohhhchhh b mrm Tomx (Collected works in five volumes), vd. 2,36. 11. Kauko Laitinen, Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Bingtin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist, 15-30, 145; Ting-i Li, A History of Modem China, 253; Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., ‘The Canton Trade and the Opium War,” 203; James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War, 18,247,275, passim. 12. Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, 5-8. 13. For example, the eight-volume series of historical maps published by the Cartographic Publishing House in the People’s Republic of China maintains very similar external boundaries for China even though the land area controlled by the various Chinese dynasties varied dramatically. The huge loss of territory under the Ming Dynasty, which came between the territorially two largest dynasties, the Yüan or Mongol Dynasty and the Ch’ing or Manchu Dynasty (neither Han Chinese), is concealed by including the Ming with the Yiian Dynasty. In earlier dynasties, the lands of independent border peoples are included as parts of China as if they were provinces. Tan Ch’i-hsiang (ÜÄ?t), ed, 4*11 SÜlfelllÄ (Collection of historical maps of China), 8 vols. For other Chinese sources see: WuHsiang-hsiang (^fg#§), (History of the Imperial Russian invasion of China); Sha-o ch’in-lüeh Chung-kuo hsi-pei pien-chieh shih (History of the tsarist Russian invasion of northwest China); Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (tP llltt£ £ l# fê), Institute of Modem History (iSft£fiff2E0r), (The history of the tsarist Russian invasion of China); Ch’enTeng-yüan (^2Ê7c), (Outline erf Russo-Chinese relations); T’ung Tung ( f*^), ed., (Tsarist Russia and Manchuria), 1-2; Ho Han-wen (M ü^t), (The history of Sino-Russian diplomacy), 21,24,37,64. See also John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, 18-19. In Russian and Soviet historiography, the Russians assume that, in expanding eastward, Russia simply moved into a territorial and political vacuum, and fulfilled its destiny to

18

INTRODUCTION

become a Pacific Ocean power; only the expansionist tendencies of the Ch’ing Dynasty caused conflict. Russian and Soviet literature ignores the element of coercion in the nineteenth-century boundary and commercial treaties. It emphasizes the strong-armed tactics employed by the other great powers while it downplays similar tsarist policies. For the Soviet rebuttal of the Chinese position, see S. L. Tikhvinsky, “For a Scientific Approach to the History of Russo-Chinese Relations (17th-19th Centuries),” 10-11; S. I. Povalnikov, ‘The Second Opium War and Russia,” 182; Victor Louis, The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire, 5. For more information, see the Bibliographic Essay 14. Fred W. Bergholz, The Partition of the Steppe: The Struggle of the Russians,

Manchus and the Zunghar Mongolsfor Empire in Central Asia, 1619-1758, A Study in Power Politics, 419. 15. G. V. Glinka, ed, Asuaiaaui Poccm (Asiatic Russia), vol. 2,539,549. 16. J. N. Westwood, A History ofRussian Railways, 117. 17. James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990,103-8,213-4,217. 18. David M. Farquhar, ‘The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” 199-200. 19. In Chinese historiography, many authors take for granted that much of Siberia and Central Asia had long been Chinese. For each border area, these authors point to the dynasty which extended farthest to justify their territorial claims. These views are fraught with contradictions and greatly exaggerated the integration erf-the borderlands into Chinese territory. On the one hand the Mongol or Yiian Dynasty is considered an alien dynasty which subjugated China before being quite properly overthrown by a Han Chinese dynasty, the Ming. On the other hand, some Chinese imply that the lands constituting the territories of the Yiian Dynasty, most of which had never before been even remotely connected with China, are part of the lost patrimony. By such an accounting, Moscow itself would be part of Chinese territory. Bitterness over the loss of this territory colors Chinese work—Republican (1912-49), mainland Chinese, and Taiwanese. According to Quested, ‘‘Chinese historians for their part have certainly given their signs of disapproval of Russian policy towards their country before 1917, and especially of the annexation of the Amur.” She provides a detailed discussion of the pre-1949 literature, concluding, ‘‘All these were writers of the pre-Communist period, but even the attitude of Chinese Communist historians does not seem to have altered substantially.” She then details the literature through the 1950s. R. K. I. Quested, The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857-1860, xviii-xxi. See also: Sun Fu-k’un (^ H ^ ), (The history of Russian aggression in China), 1-6; Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem, 29-30; T’ung Tung, 1-2. For more information, see the Bibliographic Essay. 20. This argument is discussing in detail in part III. 21. William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914,394-451. 22. Immanuel Chung-yiieh Hsii, ‘The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs. Frontier Defense,” 221-2. 23. Although Amnesty International does not go so far as to accuse China of committing genocide in Tibet, it reports a variety of ‘‘gross human rights violations” perpetrated against those advocating Tibetan independence. Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Repression in Tibet, 1987-1992,” title page, passim. 24. Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development, 50-4.

INTRODUCTION

19

25. As one scholar has written, 'The birth, life and death of the Russian Empire were all linked closely to its struggle to .acquire and retain the status of a European Great Power.” D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, 5. See also the superb work by Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, 19,86-7,95,99,205,345-6. 26. Instructions to Lev Fedorovich Baliuzek, 3/8/1861 (3/20/1861), ARFP,/ 161, St. Petersburg, Glavnyi arkhiv, IV-2, op. 119, 1861, d. 12, I. 43; N. Obruchev, 1895, “CooôpaxeiiHfl Tett OOpynesa Buacasamiue b Haqane flnoHO-IGmiMCKOH bohhm 1895 rojta” (Views of Gen. Obruchev expressed at the beginning of the Russo-Chinese War in 1895), Central State Military History Archive of the USSR, Moscow,/ 447, ed. khr. no. 69, /. 5; Col. Putiat, 1902, "CeicpeTHafi 3aimcKa ObiBuiero Boen arenra b Kmae Teil LLIt. nome, riyrrrr o imipax no oOecneneHmo Hamero no/ioac Ha KpaiiH. BocrOKe” (Secret memorandum by the former military agent in China for the General Staff Colonel Putiat and discussion on the security of our position in the Far East), Central State Military History Archive of the USSR, Moscow, / 447, ed. khr. no. 69, /. 28; “3anHCKa MHHHcrpa (DwHaHOTB o aaœaaHMH no noBoay 3anncKH MHHHcrpa HHOcrpaHHbix Aen, o 3aHffTHH TajuiHbBaHfl” (Note by the minister of finance based on notes by the foreign minister on the meeting about the occupation of Ta-lien [Dairen]), 11/15/1897 (11/27/1897), BA, Witte, box 11, file 22, part 3, no. 8, p. 6; “BoenOMaHHeniuMH aoicnajt Boeiotoro MHHHcrpa b 1900 rojty ” (Most humble report of the Minister of War [Kuropatkin] for 1900), 3/14/1900 (3/26/1900), BA, Witte, box 11, file 27, part 1, pp. 114, 127; A. L. Popov, “Uapacaa ^wuiOMaTHB b anoxy TaräiHHCxoro BOCcraHwa c npejutciOBHeM A J l rionOBa” (Tsarist diplomacy in the epoch of the Taiping Rebellion with a foreword by A. L. Popov), 191, passim; “BcenOA/taHHeifuiaji 3anncica MHHHCTpa hh. aen” (Most humble memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Murav’ev]), 6/4/1900 (6/17/1900), in “BoKoepCKoe BOOCraHHe” (The Boxer Uprising), ed. A. Popov, 15; Oleg Igorevich Sergeev, Kaætecmo tta pyccKOM M nutm Bocrotce b XVII-XIX bb. (The Cossacks in the Russian Far East in the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries), 42-3, 57-8; N. S. Kiniapina, BitmiHaa nomrmKa Poccuh nepBOü nojtOBHHUXIX a (The foreign policy of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century), 275; Raisa Vsevolodovna Makarova, Bheunuta nomrmsi Poocuh na JlawHeM Boome, «ropaa nonoBum XVIIlB-60-e rom XIX b. (The foreign policy of Russia in the Far East, second half of the eighteenth century to the 1860s), 4; lu. Kushelev, Mottromta h MoHTOJtbCKHH Bonpoc (Mongolia and the Mongolian question), 54; Fedor; Fedorovich Martens, Poccua u Kmaü, McTOpHKO-nojtHTHWCKoe HCCJtejtOBaHHe (Russia and China. Historical and political research), 2, 7; A. M. Pozdneev, “0 6 OTHOiueHHHX eBponeftueB k Kirraia Peib npoH3HeceHHafl Ha arcre G-IfeTep6yprcKCXt) yHHBepcMTera 8-ro $eBpajui 1887 roaa” (Regarding the relations of the Europeans with China. Speech delivered at the commencement of the University of St. Petersburg on 8 February 1887 [20 February 1887]), 260-3; Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, PycacoKmaüCKtm Bonpoc (The RussoChinese question), 3-4; Il'ia Semenovich Levitov, jKemopoœHa, tcatc 6y C h 'i-C *iV e rn

«u * # :^

Hvnç-kW

*

J ai'tU'na* )irfn§ > r*

J

-

/v..

K d /O H

Se a

% * «-r

»hanghai

C e n te r fo r C a rto g r a p h ie R e s e a r c h a n d S p a tia l A n a ly s is M ic h ig a n S ta te U n iv e rs ity

1

Background: Revival of Russian Interest in the Far East Before the nineteenth century, China and the West had no diplomatic ties.. .. China did not recognize the equality of other nations.. . . If they [the Westerners] came, they had to respect China as their suzerain and consider themselves as vassal states. . . . At that time, China did not feel that there was any need to have contact with foreign states. Furthermore, were not foreigners just nations of barbarian tribes—they did not understand [the four cardinal virtues of] propriety, justice, honesty, and sense of shame—what good was to be had from contact with them? They came in search of profits; the Heavenly Kingdom granted them favors, let them do business, [and] simply relied on [the policy of] bridling and soothing. If they were not law-abiding, the Heavenly Kingdom would “quell the barbarians.” At that time, China did not know that there was such a thing as foreign relations; it only knew how to “quell the barbarians” and “soothe the barbarians.”1 Chiang T’ing-fu, historian and diplomat, 1938 The history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of colonizing itself. Her area of colonization grows in tandem with her national territory. At times shrinking and at times growing, this age-old movement continues to this very day. It grew stronger with the abolition of serfdom [in 1861], when the population started to pour out of the central black-earth provinces where it had long been artificially concentrated and forcibly held. . . . Therefore, the periods in our history are the stages which our people have gone through in the occupation and development of the land acquired by them.2 Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii, historian, 1911

Russo-Chinese relations during the century and a half immediately preceding the first modem Russo-Chinese border treaty in 1858 had been characterized by stability and relative harmony. The frontier area between the two countries had been a backwater for both empires, whose attention had been focused elsewhere. Then in a six-year period from 1858 to 1864, Russia suddenly gained enormous territories in the Far East. By the 1858 Treaty of Aigun it acquired sovereignty over 185,000 square miles of territory along the northern bank of the Amur 28

BACKGROUND

29

River; by the 1860 Treaty of Peking it took 130,000 square miles along the northern Manchuria coastline between the Ussuri River (Wu-su-li chiang) and the sea; and by the 1864 Treaty of Tarbagatai it gained an additional 350,000 square miles of territory in northwestern Sinkiang.3 Altogether Russia acquired land roughly equivalent to all of the United States east of the Mississippi River. Such figures can only be rough estimates, however, because in the mid-nineteenth century, Russian and Chinese geographic knowledge of their frontiers was still very limited. Before the development of the British maritime trade in China, Russia showed little interest in its Far Eastern domains, while China rarely concerned itself with frontier areas unless the frontier peoples grew restive. Since the previous border treaties concluded in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries contained much geographic information that was wrong,4 neither country had an accurate idea of the extent of its lands until the actual border surveys for the nineteenth-century treaties took place. These enormous territorial changes were, in many ways, the Asian consequences of the Industrial Revolution taking place in Europe and of the age of maritime empires which it heralded. With the Industrial Revolution, Britain, France, and, later, Germany acquired the technological wherewithal and wealth jointly to cut off further Russian expansion in Europe and in much of the Near East and also to undermine Russian trade in China. This led Russia to turn its attention eastward both to learn the reasons for its declining trade with China and to reverse this decline, since tariffs provided a significant source o f government revenue. Moreover, Russia's key international rival. Great Britain, was largely responsible for undermining the overland trade with the latter’s far more economical maritime trade. Therefore, Russia soon became concerned about a possible British encirclement of its own vulnerable Asian frontiers. Thereafter, Russian defeat in the Crimean War fueled these fears. In the process o f investigating the situation, the Russian government soon learned that the Ch’ing Empire was beset by unprecedented internal rebellion and, therefore, not in a position to resist Russian actions. As a result of these changes, China acquired a new importance for the Russian government: Chinese weakness presented the opportunity to secure vast territories for the Russian empire, while fears of possible Western European designs on the Far East precipitated Russian action. Russia and China in die Age of Commercial Maritime Empires The modus vivendi which had operated reasonably well during the long quiescent period in Russo-Chinese relations had been established after a period of great friction in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In the late seventeenth century, China had massed troops on its northern frontier to force the Russians out of the Amur Valley. By the resultant 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by China with a European power, the theretofore undelimited Russo-Chinese boundary was set far to the north of the modem

30

BACKGROUND

boundary which would ultimately run along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. The boundary was further clarified by the 1727 treaties of Bura and Kiakhta, but the easternmost section remained undefined.5 The Treaty of Kiakhta established a unique relationship between China and Russia. In contrast to all other European nations, Russia was permitted to establish a language school and ecclesiastical mission in Peking, with the latter functioning as a quasi-diplomatic embassy. No other country would be permitted to station any representatives in Peking until 1861, when, as part of the terms for the settlement of the Second Opium War, China was forced to allow the establishment of formal diplomatic missions.6 The treaty also set up two trading towns on the border, one at Kiakhta and the other at Tsurukhaitu (Curhaitu). These were, for all intents and purposes, the land-border equivalent to the treaty ports where the other Europeans would acquire similar rights only a century later under the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. In addition, unlike the other Europeans, the Russians were permitted to send periodic trade caravans to Peking, recorded by the Chinese as tribute missions.7 This system continued to function during most of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the situation changed radically. With the Industrial Revolution spreading through Europe—and with the accompanying rapid improvements in transportation and communications; growing importance of foreign markets; enormous expansion of maritime trade; and the international rivalries spurred by these changes—a new age of empires dawned. The tremendous gains in productivity from the Industrial Revolution, combined with the rapid introduction of new technology (particularly in armaments), created an epochal change in the international balance of power. Moreover, because of the complexity and quantity of products produced by factories, international sources of raw materials and foreign markets for manufactures had become highly desirable. What set this imperial competition apart from that of the past was the combined importance of non-contiguous empires coupled with industrialization. Continental empires which had been viable for centuries were suddenly imperiled while far-flung maritime empires had become feasible. In contrast to the expanding French and British empires, which were maritime empires dependent on naval power and its industrial base, Russia and China did not belong to this new age. Both remained continental empires which continued to rely on territorial expansion into, or indirect control over, contiguous areas. With the temporary exception of Russian activities in Alaska before 1867, neither ventured overseas for conquests. Since their primary orientation was landward, neither had a strong navy. In the new world of competing global empires, however, it was no longer sufficient simply to keep neighboring native peoples cowed, which China had done with such success for centuries; it also became necessary to ward off foreigners from afar. This demanded tighter control over frontier lands. A whole new era of international rivalry had dawned, an era

BACKGROUND

31

which Russia and, particularly, China were ill-prepared to join. This new rivalry depended on an enormous economic surplus to fund the expensive military programs necessary for acquiring and then protecting the new maritime empires. China, however, remained caught in its millennial time warp, where success was measured not by progress, a totally alien notion, but by how closely present institutions mirrored those of a legendary past. Before the Opium Wars, the Chinese had never encountered any reason to question the firmly held belief in their absolute superiority over all other peoples in all possible ways. Foreigners were considered a nuisance to be humored at best, and more often to be severely chastised for transgressions against Chinese laws. The Chinese had no need to build global empires, for the outside world had nothing to add to the dizzying achievements of Chinese civilization.8 Russia, though better equipped to join in the international competition among empires, depended on a notoriously weak economy. Not only did it lack the very middle class which had made the Industrial Revolution possible elsewhere, but it was still mired in serfdom, an institution which had not existed for centuries in Western Europe. Moreover, to finance imperial am bitions, the new im perialism depended on trade and industry—two areas where Russia had consistently lagged far behind Western Europe. The Demise of the Overland Trade and Geographic Exploration Before the mid-nineteenth century, the Far East and even the Russian Far East rarely figured in the thinking of Russian statesmen. The victory of Russia’s main foreign rival, Britain, in the First Opium War, and the permanent cession of Hong Kong provided under the resultant 1842 Treaty of Nanking, triggered a chain reaction which would fix the Far East on the agenda of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In the mid-nineteenth century, much of Siberia, including large parts of the regions adjoining China, remained unexplored. In the 1820s this situation began to change with the appointment of one of Russia’s ablest administrators, Mikhail Mikhailovich Speranskii, to the governor-generalship of Siberia and with the exile to Siberia of a number of educated Russians, the so-called Decembrists, who had launched an unsuccessful coup in December 1825 against the new tsar, Nicholas 1. Speranskii drew up the 1822 reforms which reorganized Siberian administration and, in the process, brought the area to the attention of the government in S t Petersburg. In addition, the correspondence of Siberian exiles to their families and friends in European Russia added to the general knowledge about Siberia.9 Traditionally, the Russian government had relied on revenues from the overland trade between Europe and China as a significant source of income.10 Under the Treaty of Kiakhta, this trade was conducted through two border towns. In practice, almost all legal trade flowed through the town of Kiakhta, on the border with Outer Mongolia south of Lake B aikal.11 Before the expansion of

32

BACKGROUND

European maritime trade with China, West European manufactures for sale in China and Chinese tea destined for Western Europe had often been sent overland via Kiakhta. In fact, before 1850, the Kiakhta trade had accounted for between 15 and 20 percent of the total customs revenues for the Russian empire,12 while customs revenues had accounted for about 20 percent of all government revenues from direct and indirect taxes.13 In addition, China had represented an important market for Russian exports. From 1829 to 1850, Russian exports to China had grown from 28.9 percent to 67.4 percent of Russian trade across its Asian frontiers. Whereas in 1829 only 2 percent of Russian cotton manufactures had gone to China, by 1850 this had risen to 51.5 percent.14 Indeed, between 1847 and 1851, almost half of Russian exports of manufactures went to China.15 Nevertheless, in the 1820s, the China trade revenues peaked and declined thereafter. Because the freight costs of shipping tea—which constituted from 90 to 95 percent of Russian imports from China between 1825 and 1850—were only about 5 percent of the overland shipping costs, Russia lost its role as the tea supplier for Europe. In fact, the reverse soon became the case. This meant a sharp drop in customs revenues. With the development of steamships in the 1840s, the sea route became not only much cheaper but also much faster than the overland trade via Kiakhta. Consequently, Russian goods became less and less competitive on the Chinese market, particularly since they were often of inferior quality.16 Not only did Russia’s exports suffer, but so did its imports. The tea which became a popular beverage in Russia from the turn of the nineteenth century 17 onward and which accounted for 90 percent of Russia’s imports through Kiakhta, now faced increasingly stiff competition from the tea shipped by other Europeans to Russia over seas via Western Europe.18 The formerly lucrative tea trade through Kiakhta stagnated in the mid-nineteenth century and was further undermined by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Although it did increase significantly after the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg, this was because the treaty granted Russia a 62 percent tariff reduction specifically for tea shipped overland.19 Only with this preferential tariff treatment could Russia compete with the maritime trade in tea. It never could compete in manufactured goods. The decline in trade attracted the attention of the tsarist government for another reason as well. Russian trade losses directly resulted from the rapid expansion of the maritime trade by Russia’s arch-rival. Great Britain. From the French defeat in the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 until German unification in 1871 (when Germany also became a force to be reckoned with), competition with Great Britain would remain at the heart of tsarist foreign policy. Once the British empire had wound itself around the globe to reach Hong Kong and from there, to threaten extension up the China coast, Russia feared that the British empire was closing in on all sides. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain had developed a rapidly growing trade through Canton. After 1831, when the British government ended

BACKGROUND

33

the monopoly of the East India Company over the China trade, British trade through Canton mushroomed. During the 1830s, this trade expanded to such an extent that the British government pressured the Chinese open up additional ports to foreign commerce. Chinese resistance to these demands culminated in the First Opium War (1839-1842). The fruit of B ritain’s victory, the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, in addition to granting Britain permanent sovereignty over the island on Hong Kong, also opened to foreign commerce five Chinese ports, the first of the so-called treaty ports.20 China, however, in 1844 refused to grant Russia the same privileges as the maritime countries, thereby excluding Russia from the treaty ports.21 Thus, not only did Britain pose a growing potential military threat on the Siberian frontier, but it also had developed a highly profitable new kind of empire based on an industrial economy and on international trade—two areas where Russia was weak. Meanwhile the Siberian fur trade had collapsed due to over-hunting. Profits from this trade had been the original reason for Russian expansion into Siberia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and into North America thereafter.22 Given this decline in profits, combined with the overwhelming naval superiority of Britain, the tsarist government decided to abandon its territories in North America. In 1841 just before the California gold rush, it sold Fort Ross in California. By 1857 it was trying to sell Alaska to the United States, which it finally did in 1867, after a delay caused by the American Civil War.23 With these transactions, Russia had abandoned any attempt to continue expanding overseas to the east, which meant the only direction still open to it was southward into Chinese frontier areas. This set the stage for ongoing conflicts with China throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century. Although Russia had been periodically exploring the Far East since the seventeenth century, the rapid British penetration of China, indicated by the former’s victory in the First Opium War, galvanized the Russian government into action. Indeed, China has less intrinsic importance for Russia than it did as a pawn in the globalizing Anglo-Russian rivalry. Therefore, the growing attention, paid to China by the Russian government in the mid-nineteenth century, did not represent an independent policy decision regarding Russo-Chinese relations, but was more a reaction to a perceived British challenge in a new arena. In this sense, Russian foreign policy in China was reactive—the Russian government felt compelled to play a role there on a par with the others in order to forestall possible security threats to its remote Asian frontiers. The tsarist government followed the decline of the overland trade with great interest and growing concern. In 1843, it established a special committee to discuss measures for shoring up the Kiakhta trade. But soon it became apparent that officials in S t Petersburg had only the vaguest impressions about the territories lying between Russia and C hina This included the Russo-Chinese boundary, whose demarcation remained unclear. Members of the committee realized that further explorations of the Russo-Chinese frontier would be necessary before

34

BACKGROUND

they could take measures to restore the Kiakhta trade.24 Even before the First Opium War, Russia had been aware of the growing presence of Britain in China and of the profitable trade through Canton. In 1803, the tsarist government had sent an expedition under Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtem to explore the estuary of the Amur River and to determine its strategic and economic value. Incomplete explorations during 1804 indicated that the mouth of the Amur was not navigable and that Sakhalin Island was a peninsula.25 This meant that the Amur, and indeed eastern Siberia, had little economic value, since there appeared to be no convenient waterway to traverse Siberia from west to east or to provide access to the Pacific; all other major waterways followed a north-south orientation. Conversely, it meant that no foreign power could easily threaten Russia via trackless Siberia.26 Despite Kruzenshtem’s doubts about the value of the Amur River as a transportation artery linking the Siberian interior with the Pacific Ocean, another explorer came to different conclusions. In 1832, the tsarist government sent Colonel Mikhail Vasil'evich Ladyzhenskii to locate the Russian frontier markers on the Gorbitsa River. (The Gorbitsa River flows southward into the Shilka River, which in turn, joins the Argun [O-erh-ku-na], The confluence of the Shilka and the Argun constitute the beginning of the Amur River.) Ladyzhenskii navigated the Amur as far as Albazin, a town which lay on the northern-most section of the Amur and which had been the focus of dispute in the late seventeenth century. At that time, China had forced Russia to cede control over it in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.27 Ladyzhenskii recognized the strategic value of the Amur and recommended a military occupation of the Amur Basin.28 The government, however, did not follow the recommendation at that time and doubts remained concerning the navigability of the mouth of the Amur. A decade later in 1842, the Imperial Academy of Sciences sent a team of experts to make a definitive study of northern and eastern Siberia. The Academy commissioned a group led by Aleksandr Fedorovich von Middendorf to study all aspects of Siberian geography, hydrography, climate, ethnography, vegetation, and natural resources. From the three years of explorations, Middendorf compiled four detailed tomes of data.29 In addition to these voluminous scientific findings, Middendorf also repotted that the Amur could become a major transportation artery for Siberia.30 The completion of M iddendorfs explorations in 1845 coincided with the rising concern in St. Petersburg about British activities in China: Russia had been frozen out of the thriving treaty port trade which had been given legal sanction three years earlier. To resolve the debate over the navigability and hence, strategic importance, of the Amur, another mission was sent in 1846, this time under the auspices of the Russian American Company, a trading monopoly established in 1799 to develop trade in Russian America. The commander of the mission, Aleksandr M. Gavrilov, concluded, like Kruzenshtem, that Sakhalin was a peninsula and that the mouth of the Amur was unnavigable.31 Thus, after more than forty years of intermittent

BACKGROUND

35

explorations, the Russian government remained misinformed about a variety of basic geographic features of Eastern Siberia. As long as the Russian government believed the Amur to be unnavigable, it considered its control over Siberia to be secure, and the region’s resources to be largely inaccessible. Without a major waterway linking the Siberian interior to the sea, no foreign power could easily invade. Furthermore, with no waterway providing access to Siberian resources, no foreign power would be motivated to do so. In the pre-railway era, unless the Amur were navigable by large ships, Siberia would remain of limited value for Russia, let alone for other countries. This meant that there would be no pressing reason to wrest this territory from China. With inconclusive geographic findings, a conflict brewed in the tsarist government between those who favored an active versus a passive policy in the Far East. Such men as Foreign M inister Count Karl Vasil'evich Nessel'rode, Minister of Finance Fedor Pavlovich Vronchenko and governor-general of Western Siberia Petr Dmitrievich Gorchakov believed that Siberia was neither an economically nor a politically important part of the empire. They also believed that Britain both had a much stronger position in China than did Russia and had numerous means to perpetuate this predominance. Russia, separated from China by the vast Mongol steppe and with only weak forces in Siberia, could not hope to rival Britain’s position. At best, they argued, further exploration would disrupt the already beleaguered Kiakhta trade. Therefore, they wanted to avoid complicating relations with Great Britain and with China by further probing in the Russo-Chinese border area. They hoped to avoid creating tensions in the Far East damaging to relations elsewhere. Those favoring a more active policy included M inister of the Navy Count Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov and Minister of the Interior Lev Alekseevich Perovskii. Their concerns about the vulnerability of the eastern borderlands mounted with the growing number of foreign whaling ships sighted in the Sea of Okhotsk. In the 1840s whaling ships from Hamburg, Great Britain, and the United States appeared with increasing frequency. Fears arose that foreign countries might try to establish footholds along the Siberian coast to serve as whaling outposts. There was also concern that Great Britain might expand its trading bases to northern China and threaten the security of southern Siberia. The discovery of men believed to be acting as British spies in Siberia only increased these apprehensions.32 Local Officials and the Myth of Russian Original Sovereignty By the late 1840s, the increasing concerns about the security of the Asiatic Russian borderlands; the declining Kiakhta trade; and the growing rivalry with Great Britain in the Far East all spurred Nicholas I to appoint two ambitious and talented men to serve in Siberia. In 1847 he appointed Nikôlai Nikolaevich

36

BACKGROUND

Murav'ev,33 later to be named Murav'ev-Amurskii (in honor of the river which he secured for Russia) to be the governor-general of Eastern Siberia. That same year he also appointed Gennadii Ivanovich Nevel'skoi to command a naval vessel to supply Petropavlovsk, a Russian base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and other outposts on the Sea of Okhotsk. These two men would shape tsarist foreign policy in the Far East over the next decade. They would provide the impetus for thoroughly exploring the Amur river system and convincing the government to pursue an active policy.34 Although Murav'ev had no special expertise in Asiatic Russia or in RussoChinese relations before his appointment to the governor-generalship, he had an imposing list of accomplishments: bom in 1809, he had done tours of duty in the 1828 Turkish campaign, the 1830 Polish insurrection, and the Caucasian wars. At age thirty-two, he had become the youngest major-general in the tsarist army and, in 1846, he had been appointed governor of the province of Tula. Murav'ev immediately studied Siberia and its natural resources. Soon his ambitions included extending tsarist control southward along the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk.35 The gold deposits particularly attracted his attention since, in 1848, Siberian gold accounted for almost 80 percent of the country’s gold production.36 With this awareness of valuable Siberian resources came the fear that other countries might desire them too. A diehard Anglophobe, Murav'ev soon became convinced that Russia must consolidate its hold over Siberia to pre-empt the British. His overriding concern became the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far E ast37 For Nevel'skoi, the central ambition became exploring the Amur river system. When he met Murav'ev in S t Petersburg soon after their appointments, he described his conviction that the Amur River was too large a waterway to end in sand banks. He argued that published materials of various explorers including Kruzenshtem did not necessarily lead to this conclusion.38 Both men shared the desire to extend Russian domains in the Far East and to make a name for themselves in the process. Nevertheless, until 1853 the policy of caution, favored by Foreign Minister Nessel'rode and Minister of Finance Vronchenko, prevailed. Until then, the Russian government continued officially to recognize the border set by the treaties of Nerchinsk, Kiakhta, and Burn. St. Petersburg, however, was much too far away to exercise much control over the daily activities of Murav'ev and Nevel'skoi. Indeed, a lack of control over ambitious local administrators would be a problem plaguing the Russian government throughout the nineteenth century.39 In a letter written in 1848 to Minister of the Interior Perovskii, Murav'ev summarized his analysis of the British threat to Siberia. He warned that the British would soon tum their attention from south China to the north. To dominate trade in northeast China, they would attempt to take control of the river system, which provided direct access to Siberia via the Amur. In addition, any of the countries which whaled in the Sea of Okhotsk could easily occupy enough of Sakhalin to block access to the mouth of the Amur. Should foreigners

BACKGROUND

37

learn of the rich gold deposits on the north bank of the Amur they might occupy the area. He concluded, “The British need only learn about all of this and they would certainly occupy Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur: it would be a sudden matter, without any consultation of Russia, which, however, would lose all of Siberia, because whoever controls the left [northern] bank and the mouth of the Amur will control Siberia.”40 In notes written between 1849 and 1850, Murav'ev outlined what he believed tsarist goals in the Far East should be. First, Russia should secure its Siberian borders by extending its control over the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Amur River to keep Britain out. Second, Russia should maintain its influence and strengthen its trade in China. Goods should be shipped down the Amur to reduce transportation costs, thus making Russian goods more competitive. Finally, if possible, Russia should seek a predominant influence over the beleaguered Ch’ing Dynasty, which he hoped would remain weak, since a strong neighbor could threaten Russian control over Siberia.41 In an 1849 report to St. Petersburg, he recommended:42 If at the mouth of the Amur, instead of a British fortress, [there] stood a Russian fortress, just like the ones at the port of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka, and if a flotilla went between them, and to be doubly sure, if garrisons, crews and officers were provided from Russia proper for these fortresses and for the flotilla, then with these moderate means Russian control would be guaranteed forever over Siberia and over all of its infinite riches and particularly over its gold, which has already become a necessity for her, as well as over the even richer deposits which. . . are to be found on the left bank of the Amur. These arguments persuaded the Russian government to pursue a policy of cautious exploration of the mouth of the Amur, the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk to the north, as well as the border areas beyond Lake Baikal specified in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Nicholas I wanted to follow up on the findings of Middendorf, who had cast doubts on the accuracy of the geographic descriptions in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. To avoid provoking an international uproar, these explorations under Lieutenant-Colonel N. Kh. Akhte were to be conducted so discreetly that neither the Chinese nor the Europeans would realize that they were taking place.43 Nevel'skoi, however, had already taken matters into his own hands. Impatient with the trepidations of S t Petersburg, he had independently decided to chart the Amur river system. In his memoirs he proclaimed, “I decided to act outside orders. I had and now have one of two [choices], either by acting according to instructions forever to lose for Russia such important regions as the Amur and Ussuri areas, or to act independently, to adapt to local circumstances and contrary to the instructions given me. I chose the latter.”44 During June and July of 1849, Nevel'skoi explored the Amur. He soon discovered

38

BACKGROUND

that two widespread beliefs among members of the Special Committee were wrong: the Amur did not disappear into shoals and Sakhalin was not a peninsula. He learned that, contrary to Kruzenshtem’s findings, the mouth of the Amur could be entered by seafaring ships of all sizes from either the north or the south. Furthermore, he found no signs of Chinese naval forces or garrisons in the area. Nevel'skoi interpreted this to mean that Russia should have no qualms about making any native peoples Russian subjects.45 Although Nevel'skoi insisted that the natives he questioned had claimed to be independent from China, this differed from M iddendorfs account. Middendorf had described the annual border inspections by the Chinese, which took them by boat up the Amur River to the Shilka and then to the Gorbitsa rivers. According to him, the northern bank of the Amur near the right bank of the Nen River (Nun chiang, Nonni, or Naun)46 had been settled by the Manchus since the seventeenth century. In addition, he found the area south of the Amur, between the Sungari (Sung-hua chiang) and Ussuri rivers, to be densely populated by Manchus and Chinese. He did encounter some peoples in his explorations who, though nominally Chinese tributaries, in fact seemed to be independent.47 Likewise, Murav'ev also corroborated that the Chinese conducted annual border inspections along the Gorbitsa River.48 In fact, Chinese control seemed to be slipping from a heyday in the late seventeenth century when, as part of their strategy for negotiating the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Chinese had massed troops on the southern bank o f the Amur to force the Russians out of the Amur Valley.49 In 1700 they had removed their defense commissioner from Aigun on the Amur, where the post had been established in 1683, and moved it southward to Ch’i-ch’i-ha-erh (Tsitsihar).50 Nevertheless, the Chinese had far more continuous contact with the peoples of the Amur Basin than did the Russians, who had only just learned that it was possible to navigate the river. Later ethnographies corroborated these findings—Chinese and Manchu settlements were more concentrated on the lower reaches of the Amur and particularly in the maritime region of Manchuria. This included along the upper Ussuri River and its tributaries, as well as along the Sui-fen River in the vicinity of Vladivostok. There were also notable settlements along die Amur in the two hundred kilometers between the mouth of the Zeia River (site of modern-day Blagoveshchensk) and the mouth of the Bureia River to the south.51 Indeed, those Golds (a Tungus tribe) living in the Ussuri region were still paying annual tribute to the Chinese as late as 1866 because they did not know that sovereignty over the area had been transferred to Russia.52 Soviet sources later chose to overlook this evidence, presumably since it undercut their claims to original sovereignty over all erf Asiatic Russia.® At the beginning of 1850, the Special Committee recalled Nevel'skoi and Murav'ev to S t Petersburg to report on their activities. When Nevel'skoi presented his findings that Sakhalin was an island and the mouth of the Amur was navigable, many committee members. Foreign Minister Nessel'rode in particular, doubted

BACKGROUND

39

his conclusions. Moreover, Nevel'skoi’s insubordination in defying orders to chart the Amur outraged them, especially since they considered the territory to be Chinese.54 The Special Committee issued Nevel'skoi a new set of instructions. This time it ordered him not to venture down any part of the Amur. Again Nevel'skoi disobeyed. That summer he continued his explorations of the Amur. Although the Special Committee had repeatedly warned him not to provoke the Chinese, when he encountered a group of Manchus near the river, he drew his pistol to accuse them of trespassing on Russian territory. What was more, he informed them that the tsarist government would not permit any Chinese vessels to navigate the Amur and had established an outpost on the river to prevent encroachments on its territory. Not surprisingly, when Nevel'skoi and Murav'ev returned to St. Petersburg in December 1850 for another interview with the Special Committee, committee members were more angry than ever. They punished Nevel'skoi for his insubordination by demoting him to the rank of sailor. They also ordered the removal of the outpost and repeated that he was to stay clear of the Amur. Shortly thereafter, however, Murav'ev obtained a special audience with Nicholas I. The tsar sympathized with Murav'ev; restored Nevel'skoi’s rank; and had the Special Committee issue a new set of instructions. Nicholas ordered that the outpost, which had been named Nikolaevsk in his honor, be preserved, rather grandly proclaiming: “Where once the Russian flag has been hoisted, it must not be taken down.”55 The new instructions, however, maintained the ban on explorations any further up the Amur. Should Nevel'skoi encounter any foreign vessels, he was to inform them that they were forbidden to navigate the Amur without Russian or Chinese permission. The Imperial Senate then sent a message to the Chinese government, informing it of Russian exploration of the mouth of the Amur and of Russia’s intention to prevent foreign use of the river.56 The Crimean War of 1853 to 1856 and Russia's Turn to the East Through 1853 the Russian government remained divided over its Far Eastern policy, which in practice meant chaos. Nevel'skoi continued to defy orders from St. Petersburg by occupying places he had been specifically ordered not to occupy.57 Then on June 29,1853, Foreign M inister Nessel'rode sent a message to the Lifan Yuan (ÜfëBrc Court of Colonial A ffairs), the Chinese body in charge of barbarian affairs. The note officially recognized the old boundary described in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk and, thereby, Chinese claims to both banks of the Amur. Therefore, contrary to later Soviet claims,58 as late as 1853, the Russian government considered Chinese domains to include the Amur Valley. In the note, Nessel'rode suggested holding further border negotiations to delimit the easternmost section of the boundary, which had been left unresolved by the existing border treaties. He wrote in a separate note: ‘T h e Russian official in Siberia in charge of the eastern border requests to install border markers on his

40

BACKGROUND

country’s boundary to avoid mistakenly crossing the border.”59 Support for Russian expansion eastward, however, had been growing. In August 1852, Tsar Nicholas appointed one of M urav'ev’s supporters. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, the younger brother of heir apparent, to the newly created Siberian Commission in charge of Russian affairs in the Far East and, in 1853, had him replace Nessel'rode on the Asiatic Committee. Meanwhile, in late 1852, Akhte completed his mission exploring the Amur and reported his findings, which agreed with Nevel'skoi’s. By m id-1853, Nicholas formally abandoned the previous policy of caution: he ordered the establishment of a chain of outposts to consolidate Russia’s position along the Amur, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Sakhalin Island.60 At that time, the Special Committee informed the government of China that Russia had decided to use the Amur to supply its outposts on the Sea of Okhotsk.61 Meanwhile, Russo-Turkish relations were becoming increasingly tense. The disagreement over the treatment of Orthodox pilgrims in the Holy Land culminated in the Crimean War, which began in October 1853. In March of 1854, Britain and France had joined forces to support Turkey and, in September, had landed in the Crimea, laying siege to Sevastopol. By early March of 1855, Nicholas had died and the war was going badly. Austria’s threat, in December, to join forces with Britain and France forced Russia to attend a peace conference in February. The 1856 Paris Peace Conference resulted in a dramatic decline in Russian influence in southeastern Europe. Russia’s loss in the Crimean War had an enormous impact on its international standing, in general, and on its Far Eastern policy, in particular. From the defeat of Napoleon to the eve of the Crimean War, Russia had appeared to be the strongest power on the continent. Thereafter, for the duration of the Romanov Dynasty, Russia did not regain its former pre-eminence. Before the war, few had realized die military significance of the Industrial Revolution taking place in Western Europe but not in Russia. Defeat in the Crimean War, however, caused a major change in the international balance of power, which then led to a turning point in Russian foreign policy.62 Cut off on its European and Near Eastern borders by the industrializing powers, the Far East represented one of the last available areas for Russian expansion. The Crimean defeat would re-channel Russia’s acquisitive impulses from the Near East to the domains of China. In addition, the successes of Russia’s new Far Eastern policy would serve to shore up Russia’s international standing, which had been so grievously damaged at Sevastopol. The outbreak of the Crimean War had also caused renewed alarm in Russia about the security of the outposts on the Sea of Okhotsk. Nicholas, fearing an imminent British assault on tsarist Far Eastern possessions, authorized the first full-scale naval expedition down the Amur within a month of the British and French joining the war on the side of Turkey in 1854. He also informed the Chinese of his actions, explaining that military necessity imposed by war justified

BACKGROUND

41

his use of the river. In May, the Russian flotilla sailed the Amur.63 It would make possible the Russian victories in the few minor naval skirmishes of the Crimean War fought in the Far East.64 Although the Chinese responded by warning the tsarist government against sending a flotilla down the river, they never followed up this threat with any action.65 To China's great misfortune, just when Russia found itself most in need of a significant foreign policy success, China found itself in the midst of a wave of internal rebellions. In 1851, the Taiping Rebellion had broken out and, by 1853, the Taipings had taken Nanking and made the city their capital. Between 1853 and 1856, when the unrest reached its peak, the Ch'ing Dynasty almost fell. In 1852, Murav'ev had concluded that the Taiping rebellion threatened the survival of the Ch’ing Dynasty,66 while a year later, the Russian foreign minister was also speculating about the possible overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.67 Many Chinese shared this view, believing that the Manchus, in the way of all dynasties, had at long last lost their mandate from heaven. The spiral of internal civil war, coastal wars with the Europeans, and inroads from the north by Russia only seemed to bear out these fears. Not until 1864, when the Manchus had recaptured Nanking, did the Taiping Rebellion finally end, leaving much of China destroyed and millions of Chinese dead.68 Other internal rebellions also preoccupied the Ch'ing Dynasty in this period: the Nien Rebellion (1851-68) wracked the provinces o f Shantung, Kiangsu, Honan, and Anhwei; and Muslim rebellions broke out in Yunnan with the Panthay Rebellion (1855-73); and in Shensi, Kansu, and Sinkiang with the Dungan Rebellion (1862-78).69 While the Taiping was by far the most dangerous of these internal rebellions, the cumulative effect of ongoing civil war was devastating for the Chinese economy and military. These upheavals vastly complicated the Chinese government's dealings with the West. With such pressing problems in the heart of China, there were few troops left to defend the northern frontiers against Russia. The Russian government gradually became aware of the rapidly weakening position of the Ch’ing Dynasty.70 It had a unique position to observe the internal tumult in China from the vantage point of its Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking,71 which provided S t Petersburg with regular reports.72 The correspondence of Archimandrite Palladii73 to Nicholas I and Murav'ev, written between 1851 and 1858, outlined the growing unrest in China and the deteriorating economic situation. In May 1856 Archimandrite Palladii described the direness of the situation: At the current time, as a consequence of internal turmoil and the disastrous war which has enfeebled and exhausted the government to the extreme, amidst dangers which here usually suggest either the disintegration of the empire or its complete loss, the [Chinese] government finds itself in the same situation which the Chinese, indifferently but with certitude, call the dynasty's day of reckoning

42

BACKGROUND

for not following the laws of Heaven. Under these circumstances, given the preoccupied state of the government, all actions by foreign powers on the borders of the empire are construed as the beginning of the partition of its possessions in the expected final upheaval.74 Later he wrote: “I have not yet despaired of saving the Manchus, but at the same time I am not deceiving myself about the inevitable consequences, which would accompany a possible revolution in China, that is, the fall of the Manchus and the enthronement of a new dynasty.” He warned that such a revolution would lead to “the division of China.”75 By 1856 Foreign Minister Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov informed the new tsar, Alexander II, that only four provinces remained free of unrest Although he did not get all the provinces right, he did correctly convey the scope of the disaster.76 Through these reports and through the reports of those, such as Nevel'skoi and Murav'ev, stationed in Siberia, the tsarist government learned that it could sail the Amur and Ussuri rivers with impunity, hold these rivers with minimal troop levels, and ultimately take enormous territories at minimal cost. In 1855 the tsarist government decided to resolve the border question once and for all. In September 1855, it officially informed the Chinese government of its claims to the north bank of the Amur, to the coastal region between the Amur and Ussuri, and to navigation rights on both these rivers. It also expressed its desire to limit navigation there to Russia and China. The Chinese responded by informing the Russians that they would not permit the Russians to navigate the Amur in 1856. Although Nessel'rode still believed that the Chinese would fight before they would part with the north bank of the Amur, Alexander II disagreed. Disregarding Chinese prohibitions, in 1855, 1856, and 1857 Russia sent three more major naval expeditions down the Amur. The Chinese then referred to Nessel'rode’s 1853 note which had recognized Chinese sovereignty over the territories north of the Amur, but the Russian government paid no heed. In January 1858, the Russian government established the Amur Company to develop trade, production and lines of transportation in the Amur region.77 With the Taiping Rebellion in full swing, the Chinese were in no position to battle the Russians and the Russians called their bluff.78 The tsarist government rapidly consolidated its position along the Amur by creating a series of outposts and civilian settlements. Despite Chinese protests against these encroachments, the tsarist government began sending Cossack families to settle the region.79 In December 1856, without consulting the Chinese, the tsarist government formally incorporated the region between the Amur and Ussuri into the Russian empire, creating the Maritime Region of Eastern Siberia At the same time, the Kamchatka Flotilla became the Siberian Pacific Fleet. In effect, the tsarist government presented China with a fait accompli. The Manchus no longer controlled the Amur or even the Ussuri; the Russians did.80 This was a belated administrative recognition by the tsarist government of changes that

BACKGROUND

43

had already taken place by late 1854, when, according to Nevel'skoi: “The main goal for which my associates and I had struggled had been achieved: the main points of the region had been occupied and this region had thereby been proclaimed the defacto property of Russia.”81

Notes I. Chiang T’ing-fu (fëglfc),

(Outline of modem Chinese history),

5 2 Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii, Kypc Pycacofi ncropuu (The course of Russian history), part 1, vol. 1, 50. Part of this quotation was originally cited by G. V. Glinka, ed, AmarcxaH Pogchh (Asiatic Russia), vol. 2,1. 3. Alan J. Day, ed. Border and Territorial Disputes, 259-61. 4. J. R. V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty, 5-43; Mark Mancall, Russia and China, Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728, 280. 5. Mancall, Russia and China, 111-40,279-310. 6t The only other Europeans permitted in Peking at this time were the Jesuits, who had been in China since 1552. Their influence was somewhat diluted since they were employed individually at the Chinese court and split by national rivalries, most notably among Portuguese, French, and Italian nationals. 7. Joseph Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62,” 318. & Mark Mancall, China at the Center: Three Hundred Years of Foreign Policy, 10-21.

9. Marc Raeff, Siberia and the Reforms of 1822; A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia

and Asia, 132-3. 10. James R. Gibson, Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and the Kamchatka Peninsula 1639-1856, 224. II. M. Sanjdoij, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia, 62; Galina Nikolaevna Romanova, EKOHOmtecxtte OTHOtueiwa Pocchu h Knraa Ha flammM BocrOKe, XlX-Haiajio XX a (Economic relations of Russia and China in the Far East, nineteenth-beginning of the twentieth century), 42. 12. Petr Ivanovich Kabanov, AstypCKHH aonpoc (The Amur question), 55. 13. M. N. Sobolev, TaMOxemaa nommnca Pocchh bo BTOpofi nonoBtmeXIX B&ca (Customs policies of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century), 842-3. 14. William L. Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization 1800-1860, 87,432-3. 15. Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62,” 335. For other sources corroborating the importance of the Chinese market for Russian manufactures, see: N. S. Kiniapina, Ifoeuntaa nojumnca Pocchh nepeofi nonOBHw XIX & (The foreign policy of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century), 270; Aleksandr Kazimirovich Korsak, HcropmccrcraTHcnnecKoe cßoapemte roproBux CHOmemitPocam c Kmam (Statistical and historical survey of trade relations between Russia and China), 202. 16. Korsak, 112-29; A. Semenov, Hsynemte ncropn,tecKHX cæjteHHH o Pocchhcxoh

BHetuHeit ToproBJie h npoMbonneuHoem c nonoBHHu XVII-ro cmnenta no 1858 roa (Study of historical information about Russian foreign trade and industry from the middle of the seventeenth century through 1858), 216; M. I. Sladkovskii, History of Economic

44

BACKGROUND

Relations between Russia and China, 68-73; Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62,” 319; E. V. Bunakov, “Ü3 HcropHM Pycoco-KHTaHCKMX orHomeHHH b nepeow nojKntHe XIX a ” (From the history of Russo-Chinese relations in the first half of the nineteenth century), 98-9; Blackwell, 82; Steven G. Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization ofAsian Russia 1850-1917, 29; Romanova, 41-3,70-1. 17. Korsak, 147. 18. Ivan Noskov, Kaxnmcian roprOBivi 3a nocneome 8 Jter (The Kiakhta trade in the last eight years), 3; Raisa Vsevolodovna Makarova, Bneuaiaa nojamoca Pooou oa JHajtbHeM BocroKe, nropaa nonotoma XVIIla-öOe rom XIX & (The foreign policy of Russia in the Far East, second half of the eighteenth century to the 1860s), 76. 19. M. I. Sladkovskii, Hcropmt ToproBO-sKOHOtmnecxHX omouiemai uapojiOB Pbccmt c Kmaetu (jo 1917 r.) (The history of trade and economic relations between the peoples of Russia and China [to 1917]), 209, 266-9. Sladkovskii gives the figure in pood, the pre-revolutionary Russian unit of measurement One pood equals approximately 36.11 pounds. His figure for 1848 is 369,995 pood. Sladkovskii provides no figures for 1851 to 1866. Because the Taiping Rebellion severely disrupted trade during most of that period, undoubtedly imports of tea via the border dropped considerably. Ivan Platonovich Barsukov, rpaQ Hhkwbh Hmcomesm Mypaabës-AAiypcxHH(Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskii), vol. 2,107. 20. John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854, 248-63. 21. Korsak, 154-8; Berngard Vasil'evich Struve, MBocnOMHHaHHfl o Ch6hph" (Recollections of Siberia), (April 1888): 148; Bunakov, 99-100; Korsak, 154-65; A. L. Popov, “Uapacaa jpnuiOMaTHfl b anoxy Taitramcxoro Boocramui c npeAHcnoBueM A J1 rionOBa” (Tsarist diplomacy in the epoch of the Taiping Rebellion) 21 (1927): 184, 186; Barsukov, vol. 2, 44; William Frederick Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of

China and Foreign Powers Together with Regulationsfor the Conduct of Foreign Trade, Conventions, Agreements, Regulations, etc., 1-3; Nailene Josephine Chou, “Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ch’ing China: The Case of Sinkiang, 1759-1911,” 188; Masataka Banno, China and the West 1858-1861: The Origins of the TsungliYamen, 140-1. 22 Gibson, 24-5; Robert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History; Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700, 17,47,94,107. 23. Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, 296,444-5. 24. A. Sgibnev, “AMypacaa aiecnejHmui 1854 r.” (The Amur expedition of 1854), 218; John William Stanton, ‘The Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1847-1875,” 99-101. 25. Stanton, 95-6. For information about earlier Russian exploration of the area, see F. A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850, 255-62. The non-Russified variant of Kruzenshtern’s name is Adam Johann von Krusenstem. George Alexander Lensen, The Russian Push toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875, 126. 26. In 1805 the tsarist government had dispatched an embassy to Peking to hold negotiations to delimit the Russo-Chinese frontier, the eastern-most section of which remained undefined, and to secure permission for Russian merchants to trade in Canton The Russian envoy, Iurii Aleksandrovich Golovkin, never completed his mission because the talks foundered during three months of haggling at the border over the Chinese court ceremonial: the Russians refused to kowtow as required by Chinese etiquette. By the

BACKGROUND

45

time Golovkin returned to St. Petersburg, the matter was dropped because of ominous developments in the Napoleonic Wars. Makarova, 68-70; Kabanov, 43-5; R. K. I. Quested, Expansion ofRussia in East Asia, 1857-1860, 11-16. 27. Mancall, Russia and China, 111-62. 28. Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62,” 334; V. Bartol'd, Hcropna myvemvi Boctokb b Eßpone h Pocchh (The history of Asian studies in Europe and Russia), 235-6. 29. Aleksandr Fedorovich von Middendorf, FlyTeuiecTBHe m Ceæp h Boctok Ch6hph (Travels through northern and eastern Siberia), 4 vols., 1860-67. The original German edition was published from 1847 to 1875 under the title Reise in d. aussersten

Norden u. Osten Sibériens. 30. Tikhon Polner, ed., FlptaMypbe. (Dbktu, uwppbi, mômomata (The Amur region Facts, figures, observations), 34-5; Ernest G. Ravenstein, The Russians on the Amur, 114; Petr V. Shumakher, “K hctophh npHoßpereHMH Aiuypa. Choujchhh c KwraeM c 1848 no 1860 poa” (Toward a history of the acquisition of the Amur. Relations with China from 1848 through 1860), 267. 31. Polner, 36-7; Stanton, 101-2; Gennadii Ivanovich Nevel'skoi, nojuumt pyccKHX MopCKHX oQuuepoB m KpaimeM Boctokc Pocchh 1849-55 (Feats of Russian naval officers in the Far East of Russia 1849-55), 42-50. The 1947 edition of Nevel'skoi’s memoirs contains an invaluable bibliography of published primary materials and notes clarifying geographical locations. The pagination, however does not correspond to the earlier editioa 32. Nevel'skoi, 40-1; Barsukov, vol. 1, 35, 46-56, 173, 200, 203; vol. 2, 35, 51; Struve, “Recollections of Siberia,” (April 1888), 152-3, 176, 179; (May 1888), 23-4; Stanton, 138, 142-8, 181-5; Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-62,” 335; Quested, Expansion ofRussia, 42; Popov, ‘Tsarist diplomacy,” 183-4. 33. For a biography of Murav'ev, see Joseph Lewis Sullivan, “Count N. N. MuravievAmursky.” 34. Ivan Fedorovich Babkov, Boatommamut o meii aiyx6e b 3anajwoù Cn6npn, 1859-1875 it. Paarpamnemte c 3anaata>m KwraeM, 1869 r. (Memoirs of my tour of service in Western Siberia, 1859-1875. Delimiting the border with western China, 1869), 59; Stanton, 133; Nevel'skoi, 58-60. 35. Stanton, 105-21; Barsukov, vol. 1,166-72, 180. 36. Barsukov, vol. 2, 28-33; Kabanov, 62; Struve, “Recollections of Siberia,” (April 1888): 164-5; Berngard Vasil'evich Struve, Bocmmmamm o Cti6npH, 1848-1854 r. (Recollections of Siberia, 1848-1854), 20, 52-3. See also Sibir' i russkoe pravitel'stvo;

NeskoTko ob'iasnitel'nykh zametok i dokumentov iz proshedshei vremem (Cn6npb h pyccKoe npaBHTejtbCTBO; HecKOjtbKO oôbaamTemHbix 3aMeroK h AOKyMemoB m npoiuejuuero BpeMemi) (Siberia and the Russian government; Some explanatory observations and documents from past times), 43-67. In 1910 gold production of the Russian Far East accounted for more than one-third of Russian production and 5 percent erf*world production. Glinka, vol. 1,501. 37. Barsukov, vol. 1,200,205-6,212,259. 38. Nevel'skoi, 59; Stanton, 134-6. 39. William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914, 290-2. The problem was net new but had long plagued Russian administration. John P. LeDonne, Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order 1700-1825, 306.

46

BACKGROUND

40. Barsukov, vol. 2,35. 41. Ibid, 46-8. 42. Ibid, vol. 1,206-7. Struve, Recollections of Siberia, 1848-1854, 54-5. 43. Stanton, 146-7, 166; Barsukov, vol. 1, 195-202; Nevel'skoi, 75-6; Shumakher, 266-73. 44. Nevel'skoi, 156-7. 45. Stanton, 149-51; Nevel'skoi, 75-88; Murav'ev to Peiovskii, 9/14/1848 (9/26/1848), in Barsukov, vol. 2,35; Struve, Recollections of Siberia, 1848-1854, 62-3. 46. The Nen River is the largest tributary to the left bank of the Sungari and passes through Ch’i-ch’i-ha-erh (Tsitsihar). 47. Middendorf, vol. 1, 154-5, 157, 163,167. The border inspections are described in more detail by Leopol'd Shrenk in reorpaQH’tecKO-HcmpHvecxaii u AHTpono-3ntœtormecKa8 nacm (Geographic-historical and anthro-ethnological parts), 175-6. For a map showing Chinese columns, artifacts, forts, and trading posts in Manchuria, see “Chinese Landmarks in the Northeast, 600 to 1800 A.D.,” in John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, 15. See also page 17. 48. Barsukov, vol. 2,80. 49. Mancall, Russia and China, 111-40. 50. John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917, paît V, chapter 3, “In the Eastern Frontier.” 51. Leopol'd Shrenk, vol. 1,65-6,72; 0 4 . Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov, Otmir ooemoro oôœpeHHH pycaatx rpamm b Ä3hh (Initial military review of Russian borders in Asia), 86, 127, 136; Barsukov, vol. 2, 167. The three-volume ethnography by Shrenk is a superb work for its time, while Veniukov conducted his thorough survey for the Russia military. See also Golder, 46-8. 52. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, 12. 53. James Forsyth provides a detailed discussion of distortions in the Soviet historiography concerning the Russian conquest of Siberia in A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia ’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990,109-11. 54. Nevel'skoi, 101-8. 55. Ibid, 112. This subsequently became the epigraph for a statue to Nevel'skoi in the public gardens in Vladivostok. John Foster Fraser, The Real Siberia, 207. 56. Nevel'skoi, 111-4; Makarova, 79; Barsukov, vol. 1,281-8; Shumakher, 262-4. 57. Nevel'skoi, 189-97. 58. See, for instance, V. Yasenev and A. Kruchinin, ‘The Truth about Territorial Division between Russia and China,” 150-64; Sergei Leonidovich Tikhvinskii, ed, JbKyMeHTbi aipageraior; nponm (pajt£wpHKaiwi ncropm pyocxo-KimHCXHX othoukhhh

(The documents refute: against the falsification of the history of Russo-Chinese relations); Oleg Igorevich Sergeev, KattiecrBO Ha pycCKOM Jfamum Bocrotce b XVII-XIX hr (The Cossacks in the Russian Far East in the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries), 122.

59. (Memorial from Te-le-k’otuo-erh-chi saying that he had received two letters from Russia and following the custom had given gifts to the courier), Hsien-feng 3/8/5 (9/71853), Ku-kung po-wu ytian MingCh’ing tang-an-pu (ttCg (Palace Museum, Department forMing-C Archives), comp., f t ( C o l l e c t i o n of historical materials on Sino-

BACKGROUND

47

Russian relations during the Ch’ing Dynasty), pien 3, shang, 77-80; CABM, vol. 11, Hsien-feng, 6 ts’e, 32a-33a yeh; Stanton, 206-7; Shumakher. 274-5. 60. Stanton, 193-4,198-202; Barsukov, vol. 1,317-8. 61. Nevel’skoi, 318,258-60. 62. Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, 319-31. According to one scholar, “Modern Russian history, whether considered from an economic or political point of view, did not begin, as is often assumed, with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. It began with the Russian defeat in the Crimean War.” Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia, 5. 63. Barsukov, vol. 1,363; Nevel'skoi, 317-28. 64. Bernard Whittingham, Notes on the Late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia, 2,295-7. 65. Shumakher, 280; CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 10 ts'e, 17b, 18a, 24a, 34b, 35b, 37a-38a yeh; 11 ts’e, la yeh. 66. Barsukov, vol. 2,89-90,104-5. 67. Popov, ‘Tsarist diplomacy,” 186. 68. Alexander Eckstein, China’s Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology, 141-2; Philip A. Kuhn, ‘The Taiping Rebellion,” 264-317; Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, 174,179. 69. Albeit Kahn Feuerwerker, Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modem China, 184-93; Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, Rise of Modem China, 253-6. 70. Popov, ‘Tsarist diplomacy,” 185-199. 71. The Ecclesiastical Mission members did more than provide current intelligence for the tsarist government. The Chinese language center at the mission and the various monographs written by mission members were essential for the development of Sinology in Russia. By the 1850s and 1860s, mission members were writing about the origins of the Manchus, population distribution in China, eastern religions, the salt monopoly, eastern medicine, silk production, and so on. Sinologists at the University of Kazan and the University of St. Petersburg, the two main centers for Chinese studies in Imperial Russia, had generally received their original training at the Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking. Pekinskaia Dukhovnaia Missiia, Tpyjtbt vtettoe PocauiCKOH JJyxoBHOii M hcchh b fktcme (Works by members of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking), 4 vols.; Eric Widmer, The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking during the 18th Century; Ssu-ming Meng, ‘The E-lo-ssu kuan (Russian hostel) in Peking,” 19-46; V. Kryzhanovskii, *TIeperMtxa HasaitbHHKa üeicHHCKOH iJyxouHOft Mhcchh ApxHMaH4pnTa IlajuiaAHJi c renepajiT yßepHaropoM Boctomhoh ChÔhph rp . K K MypaBbëBbtM-AMypcKHM”

(Correspondence between the head of the Peking Ecclesiastical Mission, Archemandrite Palladii and the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Count N. N. Murav’ev-Amurskii); Nikolai Ivanovich Veselovskii, M arepm au juut HCtopuu Pocchhckoh JfyxoBHOH Mhcchh b ITeiame (Materials for the history of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking), 48; Archimandrite Innocent, ‘The Russian Orthodox Mission in China,” 678-85; John Dudgeon, Historical Sketch of theEcclesiastical, Political and Commercial Relations of Russia with China, 45-9; Petr Emelianovich Skachkov, Oveptat ucropHH pyccxoro tam eæ jiem u (Essays on the history of Sinology in Russia), 151-2, 175-8,237-8,288. See also chapter 32, entitled “Oriental Studies,” in George Vernadsky, Russian Historiography: A History, 484-511.

48

BACKGROUND

In 1856 a foreign observer commented on “the advantages possessed by Russia, both in being permitted to maintain a college at Peking, and also in her having coterminous frontiers of vast extent on these borders trading transactions licitly or illicitly occur, to knit closer the political web with which Russia is silently ensnaring the Tartars and Chinese.” Whittingham, 252. Tartars was a synonym for Manchus. 72. Barsukov, vol. 1, 294, 298-305, 452, 483, 489; Kryzhanovskii, book 2, no. 8: 492-512; book 3, no. 9; 5-32; book 3, no. 10: 155-206. 73. Before entering the priesthood Archimandrite Palladii’s name was Petr Ivanovich Kafarov. His name is often translated as Palladius. He became one of Russia’s greatest Sinologists: he compiled a two-volume Chinese-Russian dictionary and developed the system to transcribe Chinese into Cyrillic which is still in use today. 74. Kryzhanovskii, 1914, book 3, no. 10: 171. 75. Ibid., 173. 76. Popov, 'Tsarist diplomacy,” 187. 77. “BucosaHiije yinepauteHHUH ycraB AMypacow KoMnamm” (Imperially approved statutes of the Amur Co.), no. 32668, 1/11/1858 (1/23/1858), Polrtoe sobrame zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii {Homoe coßpamte ïïkohob Pocchhckoh ÜMnepnu) (Complete collection of the laws of the Russian empire), 1858, part 1,24-30. 78. Barsukov, vol. 1,396,424,439,441,486; Shumakher, 282-4. 79. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 10 ts'e, 35b-36b, 37b, yeh; 12 ts’e, 4b, 8a-9a yeh; 16 ts’e, 21b-23a yeh. For numerous memorials by Chinese border officials to the throne describing Russian settlement activities and for official Chinese protests to Russia, see Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, passim. 80. Barsukov, vol. 1,419-21; Shumakher, 289-94; Stanton, 246. 81. Nevel'skoi, 273.

2 Traditional Chinese Diplomacy in Retreat: The Treaty of Aigun [H]e who controls the mouth erf the Amur will control Siberia, at least as far as [Lake] Baikal, and firmly control it: for it is enough to have the mouth of this river and its navigation under lock and key for Siberia . . . to remain the permanent tributary or subject of the power which holds this key.1 Governor-General of Eastern Siberia Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev, 1849 As for the left [east] bank of the Amur River and the Sungari River, it is Chinese territory. This is indisputable. This barbarian [Murav'ev] has the gall to ask Us to cede it. There is no way to decipher his real intentions, but We fear that he has the disposition of a cur or a swine. It will be difficult to reason with him.2 The Hsien-feng Emperor, 1855

Before the Second Opium War (1857-60), Chinese ruling circles had not assimilated the magnitude of the changes confronting them, but still hoped that somehow the old tributary system could be restored and the foreigners expelled.3 Domestic upheaval, ignorance of European politics in general and of Russia in particular, internal politics, and the weight of Chinese tradition all combined to prevent the Chinese from developing an effective strategy to impede Russian territorial expansion. Moreover, the Chinese government rejected the imperative to form alliances and coalitions with foreign states, but still tried to retain the role of grand puppeteer over the unruly barbarians. During the course of treaty negotiations, the Chinese and the Europeans operated at cross-purposes since their two civilizations embodied radically different understandings of international relations, proper conduct, and acceptable economic activities. In the end, superior technology would enable the Europeans to project their power a hemisphere away to defeat the Chinese for a second time. In doing so, they would shatter China’s long tradition of barbarian management and its myth of supremacy. To understand the course of the negotiations and the magnitude of the changes they caused, it is necessary first to describe the traditional way in which die Chinese were accustomed to interacting with foreigners. 49

50

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

The Tribute System and the Russian “Barbarians” Before the Opium Wars, China had conducted its foreign relations through the tributary system, whereby unsinicized peoples, that is, barbarians, recognized Chinese suzerainty by making periodic tribute missions to Peking along accepted routes and under a Chinese escort. The Chinese had seen the world not as a patchwork of competing civilizations, let alone as one of independent, legally equal nation-states. Rather, they saw the world as a dichotomy between one civilization, Chinese civilization, and the barbarism beyond. As one scholar has succinctly put it, “Civilization was, indeed, an empire without neighbors.”4 In this view, the Chinese emperor was not just the emperor of China, but of all civilization. His role was to maintain the harmony of the universe through the proper performance of rituals. There could be no obvious deviation from these ceremonies, because such improprieties could create disharmony in the universe, which would be expressed in natural disasters and other calamities. Therefore, unsinicized peoples interacted with the Chinese government only through the carefully choreographed strictures of tribute missions to Peking.5 They then were rewarded for their cooperation with valuable gifts. This framework had no place for nations interacting on the basis of equality, as required by European international law. China occupied the pinnacle of a pyramid of relations: all others dealt with China from a position of mutually accepted inferiority, symbolized by the tribute ritual and its most graphic part, the mandatory performance of the kowtow before the Chinese emperor by envoys of tributary peoples. This ritual was composed of three obeisances, each of which was in turn composed of three full prostrations with foreheads scraping the ground. The kowtow expressed both the cultural inferiority of the tributary as well as recognition of the universality of Chinese civilization. The tribute system insulated China from the lawless world of barbarism by minimizing any interaction and, thereby, any influence that unsinicized peoples could bring to bear on China. When unrest from the periphery spread to China, as was generally the case in periods of dynastic succession, the unrest was interpreted as an indication of the ruling emperor's personal lack of virtue and of his dynasty's consequent loss of the mandate from heaven to rule.6 Therefore infractions of the tribute system could not be tolerated. Under the tribute system, China had no fixed boundaries but rather a web of bilateral relations with a changing assortment of frontier peoples. This web was organized in a concentric arc of frontier territory surrounding China proper, with the nearer boundary of the tributary forming an inner frontier with China and with the outer extremity of the tributary state forming an outer frontier with the lands beyond. This band of territory changed in size according to the fortunes erf" the tributary peoples and their changing relations both with China and with the alien peoples in the other direction. Meanwhile, the size of China proper also changed according to the dynastic cycle of territorial expansion in the initial

THE TREATY OF AIG U N

51

period of a dynasty, followed by a period of decline and territorial losses, ending with the collapse of the dynasty and a period of civil war before the next dynasty began the cycle anew. The name “China” aptly schematizes this relationship: ri3 gj literally translates as “the central country;” other peoples were perceived in relation to their geographic and cultural distance from this apex of cultural achievement and physical power.7 The Ch’ing Dynasty maintained a special office to administer its tributaries, whom it considered to be barbarians with all the pejorative connotations of the word. It was called the Lifan YUan ( ïlfë fâ ), translated variously as “the Barbarian Control Office,”8 “the Court of Colonial A ffairs,”9 or more diplomatically as “the Court of Dependencies.”10 Below it will be referred to as “the Court of Colonial Affairs.”11 The people under its purview were not considered to be full Chinese subjects: the reason for establishing the office was precisely because these peoples were perceived to be different—outsiders in the most literal sense. The arrival of the West Europeans shattered the tributary system because they, unlike the foreigners who had come to China before, were technologically superior to the Chinese and, therefore, were unwilling to play their prescribed role. Unlike traditional border peoples, they were also able to turn the tables on China in order to impose the European framework for international relations. When the Chinese were forced to accept European notions of fixed territory, sovereignty, international law, and independent nation states with equal legal status, they had to discard their framework of China at the center, surrounded by concentric circles of ever more uncivilized barbarians.12 While China’s modem history has been a history of the struggle of the Chinese people to amalgamate enough of European civilization with their own to become technologically advanced, it has also been a history of their struggle with the ambiguous emotions resulting from importing so many foreign ways. Not only were Chinese officials unprepared to deal with Europeans, but they had a number of crucial misperceptions applying specifically to the Russians. While West European demands for treaty ports were an entirely new phenomenon for the Chinese, advances into Chinese territory by barbarians from the north was a common cause of dynastic collapse. Two centuries earlier, the Manchus themselves had moved from their tribal lands in the north to overthrow the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, once the Manchus understood that the growing numbers of Russian vessels on the Amur river system were not isolated incidents but part of a coordinated policy, they looked upon the Russians with particular fear. They did not immediately understand the economic and military power of the West Europeans, but Russian expansion southward fit the all-too-fam iliar pattem preceding the overthrow of a dynasty. They thought of the Russians in traditional terms: as a potentially dangerous barbarian state moving into China’s outer frontier area.13 Although past experience prepared them to perceive the military side of this threat, they could not visualize its technological orcultural side, for the Industrial Revolution was an unprecedented event in human history.

52

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

Moreover, the Chinese did not understand that the overland barbarians—die Russians—and the overseas barbarians—the British, French, and Americans—all shared a common European civilization. Before the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, Chinese memorialists did not generally compare Russian actions in the north to those of the other Europeans in the south. Only with the treaties resulting from the Second Opium War did the Chinese begin to understand the connections among European states. At the same time, they also learned that the Russians did not accept their notion of vague frontiers and shifting alliances. Rather, the Russians saw borders in terms of definite lines drawn on a map and legitimized by treaties. Therefore, although the Manchus clearly considered the Russians to be dangerous, they did not fully understand the nature of the threat. Rather they mistook the Russians for a traditional enemy of the Central Asian variety. Adding to this Manchu anxiety was a gross misunderstanding of the relative power of Russia and Britain. In 1855, the Hsien-feng ( ^ 9 ) Emperor had requested that his officials report to him on the Crimean War. Their memorial described Turkey as a Russian vassal state which “recklessly defied authority” by murdering Russian subjects in Turkey and afterward by invading Russia. When Russian forces threatened to defeat Turkey, the latter had enlisted the help of Britain and France, whose naval forces Russia subsequently obliterated. Britain had then attacked three Russian vassal states, but Russia had defeated the British land and naval forces, almost completely destroying the British army. Russia then had sent a punitive naval expedition, which had bombarded Britain for thirty days. In desperate straits, Britain had enlisted the help of such disparate states as the United States, France, Luzon (the Philippines), and Holland. Britain had also ordered Hong Kong to strengthen its defenses. The memorialists concluded: “Russia is still as strong and prosperous as before. England appears as if it lacks the power to oppose her.” 14 Not only did the Chinese government totally misunderstand who actually had won the Crimean War, but its estimates of Russian military forces during the latter’s various naval expeditions down the Amur consistently exaggerated the numbers and did not accurately distinguish soldiers from colonists. Nor did the Chinese realize that Russian naval forces were not only inferior to those of the British, but vastly so.15 This meant that the Chinese believed that the Russians posed a much greater military threat than they actually did. Moreover, the Chinese did not understand the severe limitations on Russia’s ability to supply troops in the event of border clashes, let alone to send enough colonists to populate the vast expanses of Siberia. Also, as is clear from the misinformation about the Crimean War, the Chinese did not have the vaguest understanding of European politics or of world geography. The islands of Luzon and England, for instance, were located a hemisphere apart, with the former in no position to deploy troops to the latter. In addition, Luzon belonged to Spain, not to England. Nor did the Chinese initially understand the limited scope of European commercial interests as compared to the permanent nature of Russian territorial ambitions.

THE TREATY O F A I G UN

53

Similarly, they did not understand how these differences affected the rivalries among the powers in China. Although the traditional Chinese policy for barbarian management relied on the concept of HIMMM (using one barbarian to control another), the ignorance of Europe by Chinese officials prevented them from using the Anglo-Russian rivalry to their advantage. The Chinese were such an insular people in the nineteenth century that they displayed little curiosity about the lands beyond their traditional sphere of influence. As contacts with the West grew, this insularity often expressed itself in virulent xenophobia, particularly among the literati. For example, through the 1870s, Chinese envoys returning from abroad, far from being sought out for their insights, were treated as pariahs to be quarantined for spiritual pollution.16 Such an outlook prevented the Chinese government from more rapidly acquiring an understanding of the West. In addition, exaggerated ideas about Russian military strength in general, and along the border in particular, led China to follow a much more cautious policy at the frontiers than the circumstances warranted. Russia capitalized on these misperceptions. After an initial period of paralysis as internal rebellions spread and as foreign demands grew, the Manchus decided, in their growing panic to retain the throne, that they must somehow appease the Russians while resisting the other Europeans. They seemed to believe that they could cope with the West Europeans, but that they must proceed with extreme care against the Russians, who were perceived as a potential threat to the survival of the dynasty. Although the Chinese soon realized that the Russians intended to expand their own sphere of influence, the Chinese did not immediately understand that this would mean extending a physical border line and would preclude the old system of vague frontiers merging into a large and fluid buffer zone. The Chinese government concluded that it was essential to prevent the development of a coordinated policy among Britain, France, the United States, and Russia. This fit in with the traditional Chinese strategy for controlling unruly barbarians by maintaining only bilateral relations with them while hindering them from developing such relations among themselves. Traditional Chinese foreign policy was aimed at preventing barbarians from uniting against China, not at promoting alliances for China. This was because China had usually been stronger than any single enemy, so that generally only combinations of enemies were dangerous. Therefore, the Chinese tried to hold separate negotiations with the overseas barbarians, on the one hand, and the overland barbarians, on the other. This tactic actually suited Russian preferences to settle their border affairs without the scrutiny or interference of other powers. It would prove disastrous for China. Since China was weaker than Russia, it needed at least one ally to lim it Russian expansion. This tactic, however, conflicted with the Chinese conviction that China did not require the help of barbarians. Moreover, the veiy act of receiving such help would have been a public admission of weakness and

54

THE TREATY OF A1GUN

entailed an enormous “loss of face.” This would have undermined the Chinese myth of absolute superiority, which for centuries had been the official ideology and a basis for the imperial system. So in an increasingly strained effort to “keep face,” the Ch’ing court long resisted playing the balance-of-power politics practiced in the W est But this pride came at a price. The Chinese Concept of “Face” Since there is no exact equivalent for “face” or “losing face” in European culture and since these concepts played an important role in Chinese foreign policy, it is necessary to understand them and the environment from which they arose. At the most basic level, “face” meant “public reputation.”17 At this level “face” shared a feature with the Western understanding of national dignity: both were primarily concerned with the opinions of others.18 But the operation and ramifications of “face” were complex and differed from those of Western notions of honor and national dignity. In Chinese culture every individual’s sense of self-worth was deßned by the extent to which he felt himself to “have face” before other people, or in Western terminology, to be respected by others. In China, “face” could be had, given, and lost; it was a sense of self-wordi defined not by the individual or by any objective measure for achievement, but by the individual’s image in the eyes of others.19 “Face” could be lost by acts of impropriety, stupidity or meanness, and especially by being publicly shown up. The key was public imagery. Private or concealed stupidity, or meanness did not entail a “loss of face.” “Face” could be given by a person’s providing public tokens of respect to someone who might not have earned or deserved them. In this case, “giving face” meant to create a fiction or outward form to cloak a less pleasant reality. Such treatment was flattering to the receiver and added to his reputation in the eyes of observers.21 Thus, form took precedence over content22 “Face” could be had and maintained by ostentatious displays of magnanimity, generosity, or power, which often would far exceed any direct gains from the display, but served to maintain the imagery of “face.”23 This helps to explain why China traditionally lavished expensive gifts on tribute missions to Peking:24 the emperor was exercising great benevolence to “give face” to the tributaries, who in turn had given the emperor “face” by traveling from afar and kowtowing to him upon their arrival. When the Europeans refused to kowtow before the emperor, in Chinese eyes they were refusing to give the Chinese emperor “face” and thereby committing an unpardonable affront. Likewise, in disputes it was expected that the victorious party make some token gesture to “give face” to the defeated. The gesture was part of the symbolism required to be considered a good winner in China.25 When the Europeans had disagreements with the Chinese, however, they generally demanded total victory, leaving no shred of “face” for the Chinese to salvage.

THE TREATY O F A1GUN

55

In the West such notions as “individual conscience,” the “individual soul,” and “human dignity,” stemmed from the belief, of religious origin, in the inherent value of the individual, independent of his place in society or relationship to others. In the West an individual’s guilt was primarily before God, before his own conscience, or before the law, regardless of what his acquaintances thought, whereas in China an individual was shamed before his acquaintances. In other words, Chinese culture emphasized public shaming, while Western culture stressed private guilt.26 In the West, because an individual could use his inherent value as a human being to make demands on society regarding how it treated him, a whole body of laws began to develop to protect the individual from society. This was not at all the case in China. Moreover, in the West individuals did not routinely either assume the guilt for the crim es—nor take the credit for the achievements—of past generations to the extent that they did in China. Europeans possessed an individual identity which was more important than their group identity, whereas the reverse was the case in China. In the East an individual was subservient first to the emperor, second to his family, and third to his elders, both deceased and living. Children had no light to existence independent of their parents. Rather they were a subordinate extension of their parents. Relationships were seen not in terms of equality, but in terms of an endless hierarchy by age and social status.27 People did not merely have brothers but an oldest brother, followed by a second older brother or alternatively, a first younger brother, a second younger brother, and so on. Primacy was given to the family honor as entrusted to the care of the most senior male member. Improper behavior by any family member reflected not simply on the misbehaving member but on all family members, living and deceased.28 The concept of “face” put the individual at the mercy of society’s demands on him. If his behavior did not measure up, he would “lose face” and thereby damage his and, by connection, his family’s social standing.29 The emperor did not exist independent of this hierarchy of personal relations, but was weighted down by the imperative to maintain the honor of the dead and the continuity of supposedly immutable traditions.30 He was also burdened by the ultimate responsibility for the weil-being of his subjects—a well-being which foreigners and internal rebellion directly threatened from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Fulfilling these and other social obligations was a critical component of his maintaining “face.” 31 This particularly constrained the Manchus since they were not Han Chinese and were therefore vulnerable to the charge of being interlopers. As an alien tribe ruling over a country overwhelmingly populated by Han, the Manchus had to maintain the fiction of the immutability of Chinese traditions in order to preserve their own legitimacy.32 Moreover, because the importance attached to maintaining “face” increased with social standing, the more socially prominent an individual, the more vulnerable he was to “losing face.”33 In this sense, the “face” of the emperor was the most vulnerable of all. Y et the maintenance of “face” was a prerequisite to claim the right to rule.34

56

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

For these reasons, the numerous achievements of Chinese civilization weighed heavily on the Han and on the Manchus in particular they had to live up to them because they were Chinese. In Russia, the tsar could separate himself from the acts of subordinates by replacing them and dism issing their actions as insubordination. In China, on the other hand, diplomatic failures by envoys of the emperor or transgressions by barbarians which went unpunished threatened to make the emperor himself “lose face” and therefore were considered to be crimes of the highest order. For the emperor to “lose face” meant for till Chinese to “lose face,” and the loss, if generally known, became an immutable event in the continuum of history, which could reflect on Chinese far into the future. Hence, the great attention given by each new dynasty to compose the official history of its predecessor. The Chinese tradition of writing histories differed from that of Europe. In the latter, the past was often looked upon as inferior to the present in keeping with the view of history as progress. Therefore, in the West there has been less reluctance to be critical of the past. In traditional China, however, dynastic histories put the rise and heyday each passing dynasty in the most favorable light possible, since all dynasties were part of the supposedly unbroken continuum of Chinese civilization.35 In fact, there were many Chinese dynasties separated by years of civil wars and controlling territories of vastly different extent. Ultimately, this myth of the continuity of Chinese history created a prison for the Chinese, a web of relations from which no Chinese could escape.36 They were trapped in the unbroken genealogy of China. Such an outlook spawned a tribalism among the Chinese, whereby the Wunders of one Chinese reflected on all Chinese and the errors of the long-dead could still shame the living. It is no coincidence that the name of the country corresponded to the name of the ethnic group inhabiting it, and that those members of the ethnic group who lived elsewhere still bore the name of the country no matter what nationality they assumed.37 In Europe, the names of countries generally do not conform to ethnic groups, for Europe was never monolithic the way that China was. Moreover, unlike the Chinese, the Europeans did not feel as weighted down by their history because they could leave much of it behind as they looked forward to progress into the future. The very success of Chinese civilization in Asia made it enormously difficult for China to change when the tide of the Industrial Revolution finally reached its shores. Chinese preoccupation with “face” differed from Russian concerns about national dignity because the Chinese did not think of China in the terms of being a nation-state but rathei as a hierarchy of personal relations with the emperor at the summit among the living and his eldest ancestors above him. Unlike national dignity, “face” was bound up by ties of lineage on the personal level and, on the broadest level, by ties of race. For instance, Chinese concerns over “keeping face” related primarily to their own families, and secondarily to Han Chinese in general,38 since the shared ethnicity implied shared ties of blood. Also unlike

THE TREATY O F AIG U N

57

national dignity, “face” was a two-way street: like national dignity it could be lost, but unlike national dignity it could be given to others. “Giving face” to others played as important a function as that of “losing face.” Finally, since “face” grew out of a world in which there were no separate nation-states, there could be no such thing as “national” dignity. The primary consequences of this world outlook for foreign policy were: Chinese inflexibility about altering accustomed ways of dealing with foreigners; frequent complete misunderstandings by both the Chinese and Europeans about what constituted the key issues for the other party ; and a tendency for each side to dismiss actions by the other as totally incomprehensible or unwarranted. To exacerbate matters, just as the Chinese did not question the inherent superiority of their civilization over all others, neither did the Europeans question that of theirs. Each side assumed that its own way of dealing with others was obviously the right way; those too myopic to recognize this would be coerced. All of this made for very acrimonious relations and left little room for compromise. China’s Missed Opportunity Unbeknownst to the Chinese, Russia’s position in the Far East was actually quite precarious. Defeat in the Crimean War had left intact the Russian self-image of being a great power minus the necessary military and financial underpinnings. Britain and France had successfully deployed and supplied their forces far from home, while Russia, a country possessing both a much larger population and army, had been unable to defend its own territory due to lack o f railways, an adequate road system, and modem armaments.39 Afterward, Russia remained in a weak financial position, since it had financed the war by printing money. Because modernizing Russia’s infrastructure and its military would require enormous capital outlays,40 there were virtually no funds left for a Far Eastern policy. In addition, as inadequate as the transportation system was in European Russia, this problem was immeasurably worse in Siberia. In Eastern Siberia, the roads were often neatly impassable even, during the most hospitable times of year, while the river system offered its own perils.41 This combined with the harsh climate and long distances meant that there were few Russians inhabiting the vast territories in the vicinity of China. For example, even at the height of border tensions in 1857, Murav'ev only had 23,000 troops at his disposal to cover both the Mongolian and M anchurian frontier.42 Siberia would remain sparsely settled by Russians for years. Beyond a lack of funds and population, a weak navy and an unworkable transportation system prevented the Russian government from deploying and supplying significant numbers of troops along its long border with China. Indeed, the Russian border with China only became permanently militarized with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway between 1891 and 1904.43 Before

58

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

then, any significant troop deployments were temporary, such as during the Ili crisis described in the next section.44 Before the 1890s, total Russian troop levels in the Far East were less than 25,000 men.45 Therefore, if hostilities with China had arisen, Russia would have been hard-pressed, particularly since the supply lines were long and inherently vulnerable to interruption and since food supplies in Eastern Siberia were limited.46 Even half a century later, the Russian Far East still relied heavily on Manchurian grain imports to support the local population.47 Despite these shortcomings, Russia considered itself to be a great power and was determined to continue playing the part. This meant its participation in the international competition for empire, which, with the advent of the Opium Wars, was heating up in the Far E ast Therefore, with the end of the Crimean War, the Russian government decided to settle its outstanding issues with China. Over the course of three years, Alexander II appointed a triumvirate of ministers plenipotentiary to secure a list of boundary and commercial demands. In April 1856, he gave Murav'ev plenipotentiary powers to set the border on the Amur from his base in Siberia.48 In February 1857, he appointed Count Evfimii Vasil'evich Putiatin as plenipotentiary to China, while in early 1859 he named Adjutant General Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev temporary diplomatic agent in Peking.49 Although in April 1856 Alexander II also replaced the seventy-six year-old Foreign M inister Nessel'rode with Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov, but those who set the course for Russia’s Far Eastern policy were actually Murav'ev, Putiatin, and Ignat'ev. Murav'ev, Putiatin, and Ignat'ev operated largely independently of S t Petersburg, whose location, at the other extremity of the Russian empire, meant that instructions arrived erratically and often were not relevant to changing circumstances. These three personally ambitious men maximized Russian territorial gains and secured equivalent commercial privileges to the other European powers, by following on the coattails of the Anglo-French military forces and by using generous doses of bravado in order to manipulate fearful Manchu negotiators. Each did so despite minimal financial,50 let alone military, support from S t Petersburg. On January 23,1854, Nicholas I had empowered Murav'ev with the exclusive authority to resolve all boundary matters. In June 1855 after Nicholas’s death, his son, Alexander II, had instructed Murav'ev to negotiate a treaty securing Russian sovereignty over the northern bank of the Amur and trading privileges in north China.51 Following Archimandrite Palladii’s recommendations, Murav'ev tried to arrange to hold these negotiations at the boundary rather than in Peking on the theory that this would minimize outside interference.51 Thereafter, this would become an established practice for the negotiation of boundary treaties with China. Only for matters applying equally to Russia and the other Western powers was it willing to negotiate in Peking. For those which applied exclusively to the Russian boundary, Russia consistently tried to hold talks either in Russia or in the frontier areas.53 This tactic took advantage of the Chinese penchant for

THE TREATY OF AIG U N

59

secrecy as well as their deep-rooted suspicions about Westerners. The Chinese agreed to the proposed border talks in the belief that the negotiations would not involve changing the border set by the provisions of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk or the 1727 treaties of Kiakhta and Bura, but rather would simply be a matter of setting the still undelimited section of the boundary from the Uda River to the sea. This territory had been left undelimited in 1727 because of insufficient available geographical information about the area.54 The rest of the boundary, the Chinese considered long settled.55 Murav'ev scoffed at this plan although he cleariy recognized that Russian possession of the north bank of the Amur violated the provisions of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. He wrote the acting minister for foreign affairs in 1855: “[I]n the matter of delimiting the border with China, the vital goal of Russia is not and cannot be the placement of border markers along the territory, which per force of the treaty [of Nerchinsk] concluded by the envoy Golovnin [sic ] is unquestionably recognized as the dominion of China.”56 Instead, Murav'ev hoped to move the boundary far to the south. In late 1855, Murav'ev informed the military governor of Kirin (Chi-lin), Ching-ch’un ( H ^ ), that Russia claimed the northern bank of the Amur all the way to the sea. Murav'ev not only ignored Ching-ch’un’s response that the entire river ran through Chinese territory, but he went on to say that various other places, although in Chinese territory, would be required by Russia to facilitate land transport to various Russian posts.57 He justified these demands, saying Russian security required the entire left bank of the Amur to protect the Siberian interior from foreign encroachments.58 The Hsien-feng Em peror’s reaction was contradictory: on the one hand, he wanted border officials to stop Russian navigation and colonization along the Amur, but, on the other, he insisted that all defensive measures be secret to avoid causing any incidents.59 Apparently he feared that he lacked the military forces to expel the Russians and therefore hoped that reason could be used to prevail upon them. With mounting evidence that the Russians had ignored Chinese protests to continue their occupation of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, the Hsien-feng Emperor repeatedly ordered his border officials to reason with the Russians, to prevent further encroachments, but to tolerate temporarily any existing ones. This was a “face-saving” way to pretend that the Russian settlements were but a temporary favor granted by China when, in fact, China seemed powerless to stop them. Similarly, the Hsien-feng Emperor had letters sent to Russia appealing to it not to violate China's waterways, but to send any boats by sea. When the Russians refused to yield, he begrudgingly gave them ex post facto permission temporarily to send boats down the Amur to ward off foreigners for the duration of the Crimean War. Once the hostilities ended, however, the Chinese wanted the Russians to raze their new settlements.60 It was in the midst of these exchanges that the Hsien-feng Emperor received the misinformation about the Russian “victory" in the Crimean War.61 His fear of the Russians became so great that

60

THE TREATY OF AIG UN

he continually reiterated to his border officials that under no circumstances were they to let the Russians know that the officials were acting under imperial orders.62 At the end of 1855, when the Heilungkiang military governor, I-ke ( ^ f ê ) , and the Ch’i-ch’i-ha-erh vice commander-in-chief of banner forces, Na Fu-te ( JSfc3j|), requested that local inhabitants and banner troops be armed to resist the Russians, the Hsien-feng Emperor denied their request.63 By then, the Taiping Rebellion was at its height. Yet, as an indication of Russian weakness in the Far East, on three occasions, once each in 1850,1852, and 1857, Manchu banner-men did expel Russian forces from Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces.64 The Hsien-feng Emperor’s insistence that his subordinates at the border avoid fighting the Russians gave the latter the opportunity to consolidate their position along the frontier. By the time the Chinese understood Russian motives, the Russians had expanded and reinforced their settlements with greater supplies of modern weaponry, making them more difficult to dislodge.65 In early 1856 Murav'ev correctly interpreted the Chinese government’s repeated failure to enforce its demands that the Russians withdraw from the Amur to mean that it “absolutely does not want to put itself on hostile footing with us.’’ He wrote off Chinese concerns regarding the Amur area: “[SJpeaking of the inviolability of the Amur, it seems to me that [China] protects the area as its property only because, up to now, the necessity compelling the Russian government to resolve the Amur issue with border markers between the two countries has not been clearly and definitely expressed by us.”66 In mid-1857, he concluded that the Manchu government’s reluctance to cede the Amur primarily stemmed from the fear of “the disclosure before its very own subjects”67—that is, that it feared a hostile public reaction to the loss of the Amur. He did not understand the connection between the Manchus* losing part of what they considered to be their patrimony and their losing the mandate from heaven to rule. The Chinese referred in vain to Foreign Minister Nessel'rode’s 1853 note recognizing the border set by the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta.68 Since the Russians were not burdened by the concept of “face” and since they did not adhere to a static view of history, they had fewer qualms about reversing the policy enunciated just two years earlier by Nessel'rode. The Russian solution to resolving their abrupt change in policy was simply to pretend that nothing unusual had happened. For the Chinese emperor, such a solution would have been far more problematic. The Russians also benefited from the fact that Russia’s China policy was an esoteric topic in Russia and not subject to any particular concern outside the highest circles of government, whereas China’s response to the West was a matter of heated debate among China’s elite. Indeed intense Han literati criticism of China’s faltering barbarian policy greatly constrained the Manchu ruling house. What had become the myth of Chinese supremacy made it difficult for the Manchus to compromise with the Europeans without encountering disruptive

THE TREATY O FA IG U N

61

dissatisfaction from among the Han literati.69 This myth and the Manchu’s need to perpetuate it as a way to legitimate the continuation of their alien rule over Han China greatly limited China’s flexibility in dealing with the Europeans. To admit that China was no longer supreme would be to admit that the Manchu ruling house had failed in its primary obligation to maintain China’s place in the world. Hence its fixation with preserving traditions unchanged regardless of the fact that the very basis for these traditions was being irretrievably undermined by the encounter with Western civilization. The ideology of Chinese supremacy could only be maintained on a foundation of military superiority, yet traditional Chinese civilization could not produce the weaponry or the machinery which were the foundation for the West’s new-found military strength. Although the Chinese had difficulty in devising an effective policy to thwart the Russians, they soon had little trouble surmising Russian intentions. In the beginning of 1856, the military governor of Kirin, Ching-ch’un, memorialized to the throne:70 “For the many years since the settlement [of the border in 1727] during the reign of K ’ang-hsi [the Russians] had obediently respected the boundary. Now suddenly there has been certain conduct, whereby they openly request to delimit the border, but secretly plan to invade our territory. They use the pretext of stopping the British and French so that they can engage in unrestrained behavior. The reason why they did not immediately act in an outrageous manner is simply because they had not finished their preparations.” Ching-ch’un went on to describe his lack of troops and rations, to which the emperor responded that there were no troops to spare due to unrest in Kuangtung.71 By February 1856, the Ch’ing Court had learned that the Russians had defeated the British and French forces in the Far East, during the handful of Crimean War skirmishes fought there. This meant an end to using British and French naval activities as a pretext for a continued Russian military presence along the Amur.72 When in 1856 even more Russian boats plied the Amur than ever before, the new pretext became trade. Yet it was hard to imagine much lucrative trade since both countries agreed that the area was virtually deserted and since the climate was known to be inhospitable. So the Chinese were no more convinced by this pretext than by the previous one.73 By 1857 the Russians were again pressing the Chinese to resolve the boundary issue. In February 1857, Putiatin was named plenipotentiary for negotiations with China. This was done as a way to mollify those in the Russian government opposed to Murav'ev, since Putiatin had never favored Russian occupation of the Amur, but had tended to support Foreign Minister Nessel'rode’s cautious policies.74 In late March of 1857 and various times thereafter, the Russians requested that China allow the new envoy to proceed to Peking for negotiations to resolve all outstanding diplomatic matters between the two countries. Putiatin also proffered his services to help deal with the British. Meeting in Peking was essential, since the Russians hoped to create a precedent whereby, in the future, they would be allowed to send representatives there at will.

62

THE TREATY OF AIG UN

The Hsien-feng Emperor, however, refûsed to allow a Russian diplomat to enter Peking, let alone to seek his help in dealing with another unruly group of barbarians, the British. The emperor replied that it was both unprecedented for Russia to send an envoy to Peking and unprecedented for China to enlist the help of others to deal with Britain. In short, China had nothing to discuss with Russia.75 The notion of forming alliances among equals, which was taken for granted in nineteenth-century European diplomacy, was alien to the sinocentric world of the Ch’ing. Instead, the moral tone of the Hsien-feng Emperor's edicts contained an implicit assumption that at some level the Russians could be drawn into the moral world of the Chinese. He seemed to believe that, once pointed out, the unrighteousness of Russian conduct would be evident even to the Russians and, when recognized as such, would entail a “loss of face” for them.76 It was assumed that the Russians would be loath to “lose face” and therefore would alter their behavior. His attempt to rely on Confucian exhortations about virtuous conduct, however, was irrelevant to the Russian geopolitical calculations of relative strength. Russia did not belong to the Chinese cultural world, nor did it adhere to the myth of Chinese moral superiority or care about the intricacies of “face.” Therefore, homilies about the sanctity of the two countries’ “two hundred years” of friendship fell on deaf ears.77 Although the Chinese had come to understand Russia’s concrete territorial ambitions, at another level they were perplexed. They repeatedly admonished the Russians to honor the two countries’ two-hundred-year friendship by following the existing rules for conduct established under the Treaty of Kiakhta and by respecting the border defined at that time. This reflected a genuine perception that the Russian unwillingness to honor a system which had functioned so well for so long was incomprehensible. The Chinese believed that they had always fulfilled their obligations to the Russians by consistently treating them properly, yet the Russians had suddenly jettisoned any feelings of gratitude and turned on their benefactor. The Hsien-feng Emperor pondered over recent Russian conduct in the spring of 1858: “My China treats people with love and justice; there has never been a case of breaking its promises. I believe that it is impossible for these barbarians [the Russians] to dispute this.”78 The Chinese could not understand why the Russians demanded to negotiate the border in Peking, when China had long been willing to discuss the matter at the frontiers. The Russians had insisted that the border be negotiated; China had agreed, and yet the barbarians refused to show up at the appointed places and had missed an attempted rendezvous at the border.79 The Chinese found such Russian behavior, as they were wont to inveigh, “incom prehensible.”80 Undoubtedly, the Russians also found Chinese behavior to be frequently illogical. The Hsien-feng Emperor adamantly refused to permit any negotiations in Peking, insisting there was nothing to discuss. At the same time, an imperial edict listed numerous important issues outstanding between Russia and China such as the

THE TREATY OF A l G UN

63

boundary, navigation of the frontier rivers, and Russian colonization of Chinese lands; this showed that, contrary to China’s official position, there was actually a whole range of matters demanding immediate attention. The emperor insisted that barbarians could only come to Peking on tribute missions—a solution hardly suited to Russian tastes.81 The Russians informed the Chinese: “But Russia is absolutely not the tributary of any other country. Russia has never paid tribute to China.”82 According to Ch’ing records, however, the Russians had paid tribute in 1655, 1656, repeatedly in 1676, and once in 1727.® The Chinese would not budge. Russian behavior was incomprehensible to the Chinese precisely because the Russians did not adhere to the rules of “face” and therefore their behavior was impossible to predict84 The Hsien-feng Emperor noted that, unlike the French and the British, who had caused problems from the start, “China and the Russian barbarians have been friendly and at peace for over a century without a breach. This is very different from Britain and France.”85 The Hsien-feng Emperor could not imagine the changes that had taken place in Europe as a result of the Industrial Revolution, nor could he imagine the magnitude of the consequent changes in the international balance of power, much less their implications for China. The Russians were extremely concerned, not about personal losses of “face,” but about national honor and national dignity. But national honor related, first, to the perception of Russia by the other great powers and, second, to the Russian government’s ability to maintain the welfare of its people. Totally unlike China, Russian notions of national welfare assumed some kind of progress and thus change. If Russia measured up to its international rivals, then Russian honor was safe. In mid-nineteenth-century China, “face” for the Manchu government had far less to do with barbarian perceptions of China than with Han perceptions of Manchu rule. Although both national dignity and “face” required an audience, for the Chinese the audience was exclusively domestic, whereas for the Russians it was also international. That is, the Chinese cared about the opinions of their fellow Chinese alone, whereas the Russians cared not only about views in St. Petersburg, but also about those in the capitals of the other great powers. Chinese notions of “face,” undeviating traditions, and cultural superiority coupled with the rule of alien Manchus beset by internal rebellion—all these factors worked to hinder the rapid development o f a flexible response to the W est Indeed, the Chinese missed a short but crucial window of opportunity to impede Russian expansion into Manchuria. There were several years before the Taiping Rebellion had reached its peak, when the Russian government remained divided on the issue of Far Eastern expansion. At that time, the Russians still had not sufficiently reinforced their Far Eastern settlements, so that had China, with or without Britain’s help, simply interfered with Russia’s tenuous lines of supply in the fall, this would have led to starvation over the winter. This Chinese foreign policy error occurred due to a lack of essential information.

64

THE TREATY OF A1GUN

Because the Chinese knew little about Europe, they did not know of the severe limits on Russian financial and military resources. Nor did they know of the divisions within the Russian government regarding its Far East policy. Meanwhile, Russian negotiators regularly bullied their Chinese counterparts, knowing full well that the Russian government could not back up any demands with force. In the end, the Chinese succumbed to what was, from the Russian point of view, a masterful bluff, whereby the Russians acted as if they could deploy the same military forces against China as Britain and France had done. The Treaties of Tientsin and Aigun of 1858 After three months of inconclusive haggling with the Chinese, Putiatin gave them a deadline to agree to escort him to Peking. When the deadline passed, he sailed to Pei-chih-li Bay (Po-hai Wan) and the mouth of the river, Peiho, without permission, arriving on August 5, 1857.87 There, the Chinese again refused to allow him to proceed to Peking for border negotiations. The Chinese repeated that only barbarians on authorized tribute missions could go to the capital, where they would be required to kowtow, which Putiatin refused to do; any border negotiations would have to be held at the frontier.88 In early 1858, Putiatin received instructions revoking his authority to settle boundary matters and ordering him to focus on common European matters instead. He was told to remain in China to continue observing the activities of the other foreigners and to insure that any gains won by Britain and France also accrued to Russia; but under no circumstances was he to engage in joint military action. It was not until the following year that Ignat'ev was sent to Peking to continue the border negotiations there. For more than a year Putiatin tried unsuccessfully to start negotiations with the Chinese, who generally refused to answer his correspondence. Like so many other early European diplomats, he found Chinese stubbornness and arrogance exasperating. He expressed his irritation: “If the Chinese government does not follow decent advice . . . then it should be taught a good lesson, it needs to be thrashed.“89 This attitude would later be shared by Ignat'ev as well as many Russian diplomats through the end of the Romanov dynasty and by numerous Soviet diplomats thereafter. For instance, from 1855 to 1857 Murav'ev had thoughts of solving Russia's disagreements with China militarily, although he had changed his mind by m id-1860. Had Putiatin’s negotiations collapsed, Murav'ev had planned to launch an invasion of China. Ultimately, he envisioned that Manchuria and Mongolia would be detached from China and made into two separate principalities under Russian protection.90 Murav'ev’s strategy proved an accurate outline of Russian territorial ambitions in China through the end of the Romanov Dynasty and beyond. The prevalence of these attitudes undermines the tsarist and later Soviet myth that their country, in contrast to the other powers, had unusually noble intentions regarding China.91 From the very

THE TREATY O F AIG UN

65

beginning, there were Russian officials who desired a partition of China; as will be shown, only Russian weakness prevented the full realization of these ambitions. Putiatin successfully took advantage of the mounting military pressure being exerted on Peking by the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force, first, to convince the Chinese to let Russia act as mediator for the peace negotiations and, once in this role of mediator, to use his unique position to secure Russian demands. After the British occupied Canton in December 1857, they began to redeploy their forces northward to threaten Peking. In May 1858, Putiatin joined up with the other Western envoys and returned to Pei-chih-li Bay. He informed the Chinese that they must do his bidding lest the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force take Tientsin (T’ien-chin) and Peking, putting the West Europeans in a position to topple the dynasty. He proffered Russian military aid and matériel, in return for Chinese accession to Russian demands for territory and mostfavored-nation treatment. Then, unbeknownst to the Chinese, Putiatin advised the British to advance on Peking as the only way to exert pressure on the Manchu Court. Anglo-French forces stormed the coastal fortifications at Taku located near Tientsin in May 1858. On June 1,1858, in desperation Su-chang-a (Mî&ffl), an official from the Court of Colonial Affairs in charge of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking, took the Russians up on their offer to act as a mediator with the other W esterners; he expressed a willingness to compromise with the Russians in return for their help intervening with the British.92 By this time, the Chinese understood Russian territorial ambitions but, with the Anglo-French forces poised to descend on Peking, they were powerless to stop Russia at this late date. The viceroy of Chihli (approxim ately Hupeh), T ’an T ’ing-hsiang (Ü JIIS), memorialized that the Russians and the Americans were sitting by, watching China succumb to coercion by the British and French, so that the former two could “enjoy the fruits of the labors [of the British and the French].'’93 He went on to accuse all the Western barbarians of being equally wicked. Chinese resistance to the commercial demands of the Europeans and the United States collapsed over the summer of 1858, when the Chinese signed four separate treaties with the British, French, Americans, and the Russians. Putiatin and the Chinese negotiators—the Mongol Hua-sha-na ( and Grand Secretary Kueiliang (tË H )94—signed the Russian Treaty of Tientsin on June 13, 1858. Ratifications were exchanged on April 24, 1859.95 Because, unlike in the case of die other powers, the primary conflict between Russia and China was territorial and not commercial, the Russian Treaty of Tientsin was ratified with less difficulty than the various treaties negotiated by the others.96 The Russian treaty transferred jurisdiction over Russia from die Court of Colonial Affaiis to the Grand Council, which would henceforth maintain relations with the Russian Foreign Ministry on the basis of equality. Formerly, Russia alone among European powers had been under the authority erf*the Court of Colonial Affairs, along with the other barbarian peoples inhabiting the northern and western frontiers of China: the Mongols,

66

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

Tibetans, and peoples of Eastern Turkestan (modem Sinkiang). For the first time Russia would be included in the treaty port system with the same mostfavored-nation status as the other powers. The treaty also promised the prompt demarcation of the undelimited sections of the frontier. Russia’s treaty left the issue of permanent residence in Peking open, but implied that Russia might assign a representative to one of China’s treaty ports instead.97 The other powers, however, were insistent on this point The new commercial and diplomatic system created under the four treaties included: foreign representation in Peking; the opening of additional treaty ports; terms of equality in the correspondence and the treatment of diplomats; the protection of missionaries; foreign travel throughout China; and a consolidated tariff system.98 The Russians had hoped to no avail, to avoid in the British treaty the inclusion of provisions for the establishment of permanent foreign missions in Peking and for foreign navigation of in-land waterways.99 The Russians feared that the British would eventually use these rights to threaten Russian interests in north China. Later the Russians came to believe that the Chinese negotiators had not fully informed the Hsien-feng Emperor of the text of the Treaty of Tientsin; rather, only when the Europeans demanded the implementation of the treaty did the emperor, much to his anger, leam of the contents. Since the treaty had been negotiated by authorized Chinese representatives and bore their signatures, the Europeans intended to force its implementation regardless of the emperor’s sentiments. The Chinese negotiators were in the unhappy position of having to face the wrath of either the foreigners or their emperor. When they succumbed to the immediate threat posed by the former, they only postponed their day of reckoning when they incurred the rage of the latter. The negotiators of the treaty suffered the unhappy fate common to early Chinese diplomats:100 After an audience with the emperor in December 1859, Hua-sha-na returned home to bid farewell to his family and then poisoned himself, while Kuei-liang requested to be relieved of his duties but was ordered to stay on until the matter had been settled with the Russians. The emperor also ordered Ch’i-ying (H H ), who had signed the British Treaty of Tientsin, to commit suicide.101 As a way of trying to “save face” for the whole nation, these men were made personally responsible for China’s inability to fend off the Europeans. Two more Chinese negotiators, the signers of the Treaty of Aigun, were about to share this unhappy fate. On June 13, 1858, three days after the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin, Su-chang-a informed Futiatin that Murav'ev had concluded a border treaty at the Amur town of Aigun.102 The Chinese had not backed down on their demand that border talks be held at the border. In the spring of 1858, the Hsien-feng Emperor had issued an edict expressing his frustration at getting the Russians to come to the border for negotiations. His appointment as border negotiator of I-shan (3£ Ui), a member of the imperial clan (the emperor’s cousin) and the military

TH E TREATY OF AIG U N

67

governor of Heilungkiang province, he argued, was proof of the sincerity of China’s offers to settle the matter. Originally, in the fall of 1857, the emperor had ordered I-shan to negotiate the border with Putiatin, but after the latter had proved totally uncooperative, the emperor ordered I-shan to take up the issue with Murav'ev.109 Compounding his fears were threats by the Russians in the spring of 1858 that they would join forces with the British and the French unless the Chinese acceded to their demands. A Western alliance against China would result in the realization of the worst fears of the Chinese and would dash any hopes of using the Russians and the Americans as a counterweight against the British and the French.104 The Hsien-feng Emperor believed that China could reach an agreement with the Russians and the Americans but not with the British and the French, who were so “disobedient.” 105 Despite the emperor’s determination to resolve the border issue, in China confusion still reigned about the basic geography of the north Manchurian coastal area. The emperor quoted a memorial by the viceroy of Chihli, T ’an T ’ing-hsiang, and others, where they admitted their complete ignorance of the location of the borderline that the Russians had been proposing since 1855. The memorialists had only been able to find basic information about the borderline long claimed by China. They had memorialized: “We consulted the Collected Statutes. Originally the border was at the Hsing-an [Mountains]. As for the Ussuri River and the Sui-fen River, we do not know the location of these places [mentioned 106 by the Russians], nor do we know the location of their [proposed] borderline.” Similarly, despite the consistent Chinese claims to suzerainty or sovereignty107 over the Amur Valley and Mongolia, in late 1854 Ch’ing officials learned, much to their surprise, that Urga (known as K ’u-lun to the Chinese, or modern-day Ulan Bator), the proposed location for talks with Murav'ev, was nowhere near Kirin (northeastern Manchuria), the location of the undelimited portion of the frontier.108 It took an additional three years for the Hsien-feng Emperor to learn the general locations of the few Manchu settlements along the largely uninhabited Amur River system. Thus, Peking officials knew little about the northern extremities of their empire. Therefore, there was validity to the Russian and Soviet claims that the Chinese had exaggerated notions of their own patrimony, just as the Russians did of theirs. In May 1858, as Murav'ev was sailing down the Amur, he ran into Chinese officials who requested that he postpone his trip to negotiate the boundary. Murav'ev agreed to proceed to the town of Aigun for the talks but noted that he had little time to spare.109 The resulting Treaty of Aigun was negotiated in just six days, between May 23 and May 28, 1858.110 Because of Murav'ev’s poor health, much of the treaty was actually negotiated by Petr Nikolaevich Perovskii, councilor of state in the Russian Foreign M inistry posted to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking.111 The Chinese negotiators were I-shan and Chi-la-mmg-a(l=fl&$JH), the vice commander-in-chief of Heilungkiang province. On June 14,1858, I-shan memorialized to the throne that he had just concluded

68

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

a border treaty with Murav'ev.112 He described how the Russians had threatened to expel Chinese subjects from their homes along the frontier unless China accepted the borderline on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. I-shan had argued in vain that the Russians respect the boundary set in 1727. The Russians claimed that the north bank of the Amur had originally been theirs. They insisted, moreover, that the Amur and Ussuri rivers constituted the best natural boundary between Russia and China, and justified their settlement of the northern Manchurian coastline as necessary to prevent other foreigners from occupying the land. I-shan responded that the north bank of the Amur had long been Chinese, as indicated by their history of collecting tribute there and by the number of their border posts. The Russians then cast aspersions on the Chinese ability to defend the Amur from hostile foreigners, noting that the Chinese could not even defend Canton, which had just fallen to the British in 1857. I-shan had also argued in vain that the Ussuri area was part of Kirin province and therefore not under his jurisdiction. Actually, as Murav'ev indicated later, the Russians understood that I-shan’s authority only extended to negotiating the Amur section of the border up to the Sungari River, but they had forced him to negotiate the rest of the boundary anyway.113 The Russians did not care about whether the treaty was legitimate in Chinese eyes, since they intended to enforce it regardless. Nor had I-shan convinced the Russians of the futility of trying to trade along the frontier, which he insisted was barren and therefore not desirable for the Russians. The only compromise that I-shan secured was an agreement that the Manchus, who had long lived on the north bank of the Amur, could remain in their homes and that these areas would remain under Chinese jurisdiction. Since the summer of 1857, Russia had been trying to have the Chinese government relocate these people to the southern bank and had even offered to provide monetary compensation. All the while, the Chinese had refused.114 Although the Russians conceded this point in 1858, descendants of these Manchu banner forces would remain on the northern bank of the Amur only until 1900 during the Boxer Uprising, when Russian authorities herded most of them into the river to their deaths.115 The negotiations at Ai gun were acrimonious. Murav'ev met Chinese stubbornness with displays of temper. Then each side accused the other of hostile acts: the Chinese accused the Russians of acting in concert with the British, while the Russians, entirely without justification, accused the Chinese of violating the terms of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Murav'ev then resorted to scare tactics: he treated the Chinese to an all-night display of Russian firepower, which lit up the skies and frightened the local Manchu residents. The next day, the Russians issued an ultimatum: the Chinese must sign the Russian treaty or the Manchu population would be expelled from the north bank of the Amur. The Russians rejected the Chinese request to send die draft treaty to Peking for approval, since this would take forty days. In the end, the Russians made several additional concessions: they agreed to be vague about the Ussuri section

THE TREATY OF AIG U N

69

of the boundary by saying that it would be under joint Sino-Russian protection, and they abandoned their attempts to review the trade, communication, and official representation clauses of the previous treaty system .116 These issues, unbeknownst to Murav'ev, were being resolved by Putiatin in Tientsin. I-shan memorialized to the emperor that he had signed the treaty as a temporary measure to quell the Russians lest hostilities break out and endanger the border. He wrote: “Therefore we dared take the liberty to grant their desires by signing and exchanging the treaties as a temporary way to pacify the bestial hearts of the barbarians and thereby extricate ourselves from a dire situation.”117 With British and French forces menacing the Chinese coast and with the Taipings threatening Peking, I-shan could not afford to embroil China in another war. At the same time, he displayed no evidence that he considered the treaty to be a permanent document setting the borderline between China and Russia. Indeed, he seems to have been operating within C hina's traditional system of vague and changing frontiers, which were given up in times of troubles to “placate die barbarians” only to be retaken at a later date when it was possible to “bridle the barbarians” once again. Even though I-shan had had considerable diplom atic experience—dealing with the British in Canton during the First Opium War and barely escaping execution as result of China’s defeat, and negotiating a trade agreement with the Russians, the 1851 Treaty of K uldja—he did not seem to 118 realize that a new age of diplomacy had dawned for his country. The diametrically opposed understandings held by the Russians and the Chinese, regarding the legal force of treaties and the exactitude of borderlines, set the stage for an acrimonious debate over the final ratification of the treaty. The Russian edition of the Treaty of Aigun consisted of three articles. Article 1 set the boundary along the Amur, ceding to Russia the entire northern bank of the Amur, from the Argun all the way to the sea Those lands between the Ussuri and the sea, which had been left undelimited under earlier treaties, were to be jointly administered. In what would become a hallmark of Russian foreign policy in the Far East, the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers were to be open to Russian and Chinese navigation exclusively—other powers were to be excluded.119 Manchu residents on the northern bank of the Amur between the Zeia River and the village downstream of Khormoldzin’120 would be permitted to remain there under Manchu administration and the Russians were to refrain from harassing them in any way. Article 2 permitted the inhabitants along the Amur, Ussuri and Sungari rivers to trade freely with one another. Article 3 set up the exchange of treaty texts: the Chinese retained copies in Manchu and Mongol, while the Russians had copies in Manchu and Russian. No mention was made of which text would be authoritative in the event of translation discrepancies.121 In addition to the boundary revisions, the treaty also lifted the restriction that trade be confined to Kiakhta and one other border town; trade would be permitted all along the border. The Chinese regarded the article dealing with the Ussuri section of the boundary

70

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

with deep concern. One negotiator even threatened to commit suicide if the Russians did not remove the clause. The Chinese negotiators pointed out that the southern Ussuri area was the birthplace of the ruling Manchu dynasty ; therefore ceding these lands would constitute treason.122 The Russians, however, were not impressed by this argument; since they already had de facto control over the area, they saw no reason to back down but sought de jure recognition as well. In January 1S59, the Russian government had already subdivided the Amur region into two administrative regions ( oblasti), the Amur oblast' and the Maritime oblast\ m

Notes 1. Ivan Platonovich Barsukov, /pa$ HuKOsmü HuKommn MypâBbëB-AuypctaiH (Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav’ev-Amurskii), vol. 2,47. 2 CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 4b yeh. Instead of “swine,” the Chinese original reads “sheep.” “Sheep” in Chinese, however, has the connotations of “swine” in English. 3. Masataka Banno, China and the West 1858-1861, 9; Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate, 53,61, passim. 4. Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang, “Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations, 1840-95,” 182. 5. In addition to the official reception of periodic tribute missions to Peking, there was an array of informal relations with foreigners through the ancient Central Asian trade routes. The Chinese government generally did not interfere with this trade as long as two conditions were met: (1) the trade with foreigners must take place on the periphery of China proper or on tributary' lands and (2) under no circumstances could such trade interfere with local peace. The Chinese government would not tolerate unrest resulting from contact with foreigners. Russo-Chinese trade fit within this framework for the two centuries preceding the Opium Wars. 6. Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons point out that the Chinese greatly exaggerated the degree to which their values were actually accepted by the nomadic peoples, who, by Chinese accounts, participated in the tribute system in their book Peace, War, and Trade along the Great Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction through Two Millennia, 3-16,114-5. John King Fairbank and Ssti-yu Teng, Ch’ing Administration: Three Studies, 107-238; Banno, 2-4, 16-17; Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 238-48, 511-2; Mark Mancall, China at the Center, 10-36; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858-1880, 3-11,111-6, 139-52; Cynthia J. Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late Imperial China, 30-1. 7. Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers, 238-48, 511-2; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Ili Crisis, 5-7. 8 Mancall, China at the Center, 16-7. 9. Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, 86; Fairbank and Teng, 158; H. S. Brunneit and V. V. Hagelstrom, The Present Day Political OrganizationofChina, 160. The book provides an excellent guide to the various departments and agencies composing the Chinese government during the late Ch ing period.

THE TREATY O FA1G UN

71

10. Banno, 3. 11. For translations of Chinese official titles and government offices, I have relied on Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. 12. Mancall, China at the Center, 66. 13. CABM and Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu î|5) (Palace Museum, Department for Ming-Ch’ing Archives), comp., fô iîfl (Collection of historical materials on Sino-Russian relations during the Ch’ing Dynasty), 3 pien are replete with reports by Chinese border officials describing Russian boat and troop movements along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Chinese clearly regarded these activities as encroachments on Chinese territories: the emperor repeatedly instructed his officials to tell the Russians to cease engaging in behavior that the Chinese considered to be provocative and unrighteous. 14. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 10b, 15a-16b yeh. It is unclear what areas the Chinese meant when they mentioned the three Russian vassal states of (Pa-li-li-huo), (A-li-ma), and (Ying-chi-wen, rendered here without the □ radical). The memorial lists (Big Luzon) and /J 'S ^ (Little Luzon). Little Luzon refers to Manila and Luzon, to the island of Luzon. The term Big Luzon however, does not conform to conventional usage. See Institute for Advanced Chinese Studies, The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Chinese Language, vol. 6,220; vol. 20,269. 15. R. K. I. Quested, Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 46,48, 51-2,70,221. 16. Only in 1868 did the first two Chinese officials go to the West; they were treated as personae non gratae upon their return. Hsii, China ’s Entrance, 168-71. See also J. D. Frodsham, The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals of Kuo Sung-t’ao, Liu Hsi-hung and Chang Te-yi. Frodsham describes the activities of China’s first representative in Great Britain in 1876 and the hostility with which that representative was treated upon his return to China. For more information about Chinese ignorance of Europe, see James M. Folachek, The Inner Opium War, 18, 139,141, 178, 180, 194, 201-3, 284. See also the introductory essay to Frodsham; Hao and Wang, 147. 17. Jon L. Saari provides this concise definition in his essay, “Breaking the Hold of Tradition: The Self-Group Interface in Traditional China,” 33-4. Chang-tu Hu provides a similar, concise definition: “In traditional China ‘face’ meant one’s accumulated moral and social prestige in the eyes of the community.” Chang-tu Hu, China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, 493. For similar opinions see, Emile Bard, Chinese Life in Town and Country, 55; Sybille van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis, 99-100. 18. “Losing face” depended on the presence of a witness. As Martin C. Yang writes, “[T]he question of losing or not losing face is based on anticipation of the effect upon a third person or party. If the indignity has not been witnessed or is certain to remain unknown to anyone else, then bitterness may be roused but not the sense of losing face” (A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province, 168). For a discussion of national dignity and prestige, see Martin Wight, Power Politics, 96-9, 193; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 77-91. 19. Lloyd E. Eastman, Family, Fields, and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in China’s Social and Economic History, 1550-1949,37. 20. According to Wolfram Eberhard, ‘The element of shame come in only when the sinful act became public knowledge” (Guilt and Sin in Traditional China, 122, and 13,

72

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

120). Yang, 168; William Gascoyne Cecil and Florence Cecil, Changing China, 166. For an example, see Chinese Academy of Social Sciences ( 4* Institute of Modem History (The history of the tsarist Russian invasion erf China), vol. 4, shang, 65. 21. Hsien Chin Hu, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face,’” 56; Gerald F. Winfield, China: The Land and the People, 30. 22. Wakeman notes the importance of form in the context of the First Opium War. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate, 46. 23. Richard J. Smith, China’s Cultural Heritage: The Ch’ing Dynasty 1644-1912, 212-3; Dennis Bloodworth, The Chinese Looking Glass, 299; Chang-tu Hu, 493; Daniel Harrison Kulp, Country Life in South China: The Sociology of Familialism, vol. 1, 200; William L. Parish, Village and Family in Contemporary China, 260; Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, 37; Arthur H. Smith, Chinese Characteristics, 17. 24. For a Russian description from 1856 of the connection between “face” and gift-giving, see Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, “3anaAHhiH Kpaft Khtohckoh HMJiepnH h ropOA KyjtbAxa, (zIhcbhhk noeüucH b KynbAAcy 1856 r.” (The western paît of the Chinese Empire and the city of Kuldja [Diary of a trip to Kuldja in 1856]), Coôpame covmemm b turnt romx (Collected works in five volumes), vol. 2,16-17. 25. David Bonavia, The Chinese, 57; Hsien Chin Hu, 57; Bloodworth, 301-3; Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, vol. 2, 209-10. As Bonavia has written, “It [face] is an unwritten set of rules by which people in society cooperate to avoid unduly damaging each other’s prestige and self-respect.” He continues: “The idea of ‘being a good loser,’ considered important in Western ethics, is replaced with ‘being a good winner’ in Chinese ethics.’’ (57). 26. Eberhard, 2. For a different view, see Pei-yi Wu, The Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographical Writing in Traditional China, 216,229,231-4. 27. Eastman, Family, 34-5. See also Charles O. Hucker, “Political Institutions,” 571. 28. Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, 36, 92. 29. Saari, 36; Hsien Chin Hu, 50-1; Eberhard, 4, 123. For contemporary examples of this, see Richard W. Wilson and Anne Wang Pusey, “Achievement Motivation and Small-Business Relationship Patterns in Chinese Society,” 196, 198-9, 206; Emily M. Ahem, “The Power and Pollution of Chinese Women,” 277; T’ung-tsu Ch’ii, Law and Society in Traditional China, 29-30. 30. For a thorough discussion of dynastic legitimacy in pre-Republican China, see Hok-lam Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234), 13-17, 27,42-7, 117, 128-31. See also Thomas A. Metzger. The

Internal Organization of Ch’ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communication Aspects, 30. 31. Eberhard, 4; Yang, 169; Bonavia, 58; Saari, 34. 32. Kenneth E. Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues: The Mu-fit System in the Late Ch ’ing Period, 12; Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century Regionalism, viii, 259. The fact that the Manchus were not Han may help explain their inability to embark on a reform program on the scale of that of the Meiji Emperor in Japan. For them it may have been more difficult openly to break with tradition than it would have been for a Han

TH E TREATY O F AIG U N

73

dynasty, which could not have been subject to charges of being foreign and thus illegitimate. 33. Hsien Chin Hu, 47, 57. Hu’s examination of “face” still remains the most thorough analysis of this elusive topic. Hu subdivides “face” into two subcategories: ( 1) lien and (2) mien-tzu. (Both terms translate to “face” in English.) Hu provides a detailed discussion of the numerous Chinese expressions related to “face.” Yang also discusses the relevance of social status to the “loss of face.” Yang, 167-70. According to Prasenjit Duara, “Trust was an extremely significant aspect of face.” Presumably for the Manchus, maintaining such trust in Han China would have been more complicated than for a native Han dynasty (Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942, 182; see also Eastman, Family, 37). 34. Eberhard, 123^1. 35. Hsü, China’s Entrance, 157-8; Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, 129-41; Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China (1644-1911), 381-5. According to Balazs, although the last emperors in the preceding dynasty were routinely vilified to show the passage of the mandate of heaven to the new dynasty, “[distant founders or the mighty who were long since dead could be lauded or criticised without embarrassment” (132). See also Michael Loewe, Imperial China: The Historical

Background to the Modem Age, 282-90. 36. To this day, Chinese speak of three thousand years of unbroken history, arguing that the very continuity of Chinese history distinguishes Chinese civilization from all others. 37. This outlook has greatly changed in recent years, particularly among overseas Chinese, but the attitude persists in mainland China, where the successes of overseas Chinese are given particular attention because these people are considered to be Chinese first and bearers of a foreign nationality only a distant second. 38. The Manchus became tied into this system since they were the rulers of China and therefore responsible for its well-being. 39. John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874, 324,339-41; William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914, xviii-xix. 40. Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 34-8. 41. James R. Gibson, Feeding the Russian Fur Trade, 113-40. 42. Barsukov, vol. 2,154-5. 43. See chapters 7 through 9. 44. After the signing of the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg which ended the Ili crisis, Russia demobilized the troops it had deployed along the border. Edwin George Bilof, “The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East 1880-1888: A Study of the Operations of the General Staff,” x. 45. “BoenOAaHHeräiiHH AOiena4 Boemoro MuHMcrpa b 1900 rojty ” (Most humble report by the Minister of War [Kuropatkin] in 1900), 3/14/1900 (3/27/1900), Bakhmeteff Archives, Columbia University, Sergei Iul'evich Witte [hereafter: BA, Witte], box 11, file 27, part 1, pp. 157-8; “3anucxa reHepa^AjrMoraHTa KyponaTKHHa no BoanpauietiHH c üßJibHoro BocTOKa” (Memorandum by Adjutant General Kuropatkin upon his return from the Far East), 7/24/1903 (8/6/1903), BA, Witte, box 11, file 27, part 2, pp. 25-6. Kuropatkin mentioned that Russian force levels in the Far East had increased 400 percent between 1893 and 1903. In his report for 1900, he indicated that 42 battalions and 28 squadrons, totaling 50,000 men were stationed in the Amur area In the 1903 memorandum, he indicated that forces in the Far East had reached 83 battalions and 90 squadrons.

74

THE TREATY OF AIGUN

Comparing the 1900 figures, this would indicate that in 1903 Russia had about 100,000 soldiers deployed in the Far East. Therefore, if troop levels had indeed increased 400 percent since 1893, that would make troop levels in 1893 of about 25,000 men—in other words, about the same number as under Murav'ev in 1857. See also John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East, 57. 46. Gibson, 60,225. 47. G. V. Glinka, ed., Astmacaa Pooam (Asiatic Russia), vol. 1,511. 48. John William Stanton, “The Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1847-1875,” 242. 49. Petr V. Shumakher, “K Hcroptm npMoßpereHHH Afttypa. CnomeHMfl c KwraeM c 1848 no 1860 ida” (Toward a history of the acquisition of the Amur from 1848 through 1860), 286,304. 50. Ignat'ev’s numerous complaints about his shabby treatment by the tsarist Foreign Ministry show that the Russian government was not interested in properly funding one diplomatic representative in Peking. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, Marepnajuj orwcmuHecn K npeÔbJBamuo b Kmae H H UmaneBB b 1859-60 rojtax (Materials related to N. P. Ignat'ev’s stint in China from 1859 to the 1860s), 52,85,99,132,134-6,176,279. Other comments indicate that the Russian Orthodox Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking was not well supported either. Barsukov, vol. 2,142. 51. Shumakher, 281,284-5; Berngard Vasil’evich Struve, BocnCMmamw o Cn6npH, 18481854 r. (Recollections of Siberia, 1848-1854), 169. Struve, upon graduating from the Imperial Lycée at age twenty in 1847, had been sent to Eastern Siberia to work under Murav'ev, whom he soon came to admire greatly (p. 6). 52. V. Kryzhanovskii, “flepenMCKa HaqajibHHKa IleKHHCKOH üyxOBHOH Mhcchh ApxHManapHTa IlajuiaAHfl c r eHepajiTyOepHaropoM Boctowoh Ch6hph Tpi H. R MypaBbëBMM-AMypCKHM” (Correspondence between the head of the Peking Ecclesiatical Mission, Archimandrite Palladii and the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Count N. N. Murav’ev-Amurskii), 1914, book 3, no 10,170,172. 53. Of the treaties discussed in the present work, the two concerning Sinkiang signed in 1879 and 1881 were both negotiated in Russia; the initial treaty granting Russia a railway concession in Manchuria in 1896 was secretly negotiated in S t Petersburg; the 1902 agreement governing the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion was also largely negotiated in St. Petersburg; and finally, before 1924, treaties concerning Mongolia were all negotiated either in Russia or in Mongolia. The only exceptions to this rule were the 1896 Liao-tung concession agreement and the 1913 Sino-Russian Declaration concerning Outer Mongolia, which were negotiated in Peking. 54. Mark Mancall, Russia and China, 307-8. 55. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts'e, 8a-b, 10a-byeh. 56. Barsukov, vol. 2,125. Murav'ev incorrectly spells the surname of Fedor Alekseevich Golovin, the signer of the 1689 Treaty erf Nerchinsk. 57. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 8a-9a, 18b-21ayeh. 58. Shumakher, 282. 59. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, Ylts’e, 9a-10bye/i. 60. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 10 ts’e, 17a, 18a, 23b, 30a-31a, 33a, 35b, 37b yeh; 11 ts’e, 14a yeh; Shumakher, 277-281. See also Ku-kung po-wu yllan Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, passim. The documents contained in this latter series are very similar in nature to those in CABM.

THE TREATY O F AIG UN

75

61. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 10b, 15a-16b yeh. 62. Ibid, 2a-3b, 4b-5a, 8b-9b yeh. 63. Ibid., 16b-17b yeh. 64. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World, 119. 65. Shumakher, 277-81; CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 16b-17a yeh. For information about the increases in Russian troop deployments in the Far East, see nos. 32863,33192,33461,33802,33988,35857, Polnoe sobranie zakonov (Ibjmoe coôpamte 33LKOHOB PooamcxoH Hhatepm) (Complete collection of the laws of the Russian empire), 1858-1860. 66 . Barsukov, vol. 2,142. 67. Ibid, 154. 68 . CABM. vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 19b yeh. 69. Polachek discusses in detail the tensions between the Manchu court and the Han literati, and how these tensions circumscribed Chinese diplomatic initiatives. See Polachek, 3, 11-2, 134-5, 177,276,283,285-7, passim. 70. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 23b yeh. For other examples of Chinese suspicions of Russian motives, see: vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 15 ts’e, 13b yeh; 16 ts’e, 19a, 22a-b yeh. 71. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 23b-24a yeh. 72. Ibid., 26a-b yeh. Some of Murav'ev’s letters to the Lifan Yiian expressing concern about British activities in the Far East have been reprinted in Barsukov, vol. 2, 123. 73. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 13 ts’e, 9b, 15a yeh; 16 ts’e, 16b yeh; 16 ts’e, 19b-20a yeh. 74. Shumakher, 286; G. T. Timchenko-Ruban, “IlpHœeÆHHeHMe k pyocntM BJtajenHflM ripHaMypbfl, Caxarawa h VccypuHCKoro Kpaa” (The Russian annexation of Priamur'e, Sakhalin and the Ussuri region), 191. 75. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 15 ts’e, 8b-9a, 13b-14a, 18b yeh. 76. In the Chinese moral world a “loss of face” entailed “intense humiliation” and so was carefully avoided. The main criterion for having face consisted “of the virtues of a decent man.” To threaten another by suggesting that his behavior did not measure up gave a “moral advantage” to the accuser. Of course, this only worked if the accused cared about keeping face. “As a person who does not care for hen [face] is unamenable to social sanctions, so society exerts the greatest possible pressure to implant in him the consciousness of lien.” Hsien Chin Hu, 48, 54. For the role of face in enforcing social sanctions, see van der Sprenkel, 99-100. 77. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 20b yeh. 78. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 22 ts’e, 3a-b yeh. 79. Although both sides had been interested in holding negotiations in 1855, treaties were not signed for another three years, until 1858. One reason for the long delay related to problems in communication: letters from the Russian Senate to the Lifan Yiian followed a cumbersome postal route via Kiakhta to Urga and from there to Peking. This generally took about two months. Because of delays in communications, negotiators sent to survey the border for Russia and China missed each other in 1855. The Chinese waited at the Gorbitsa River (a tributary of the Shilka River), while the Russians waited 400 miles away to the southeast at the Sungari River. Because of the enormous distances involved

76

THE TREATY OF A1GUN

and the short summer months, a missed rendezvous meant that negotiations would have to be postponed for a full year since the Amur could only be navigated for half the year. The rest of the year it froze. Ignat'ev, Materials, 72-3; CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 10 ts ’e, 17a yeh; 11 ts’e, 2a, 3a-b, 4b, 5b, 9a, 15b, 27b-28b yeh; Glinka, vol. 2,493-5. 80. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 21 ts’e, 4a yeh. The Chinese repeatedly referred to the Russians as ta$!| or unfathomable. See: vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 12 ts’e, 4b, 13b yeh; 13 ts’e, 10a yeh; 15 ts’e, 26byeh; vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 20 ts’e, 25byeh. 81. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 15 ts’e, 26b-28a yeh. 82. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 18 ts’e, 33b yeh. See also Putiatin to Grand Council, Hsien-feng 8/2/8 (3/22/1858), Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, chung, 413. 83. Fairbank and Teng, 193-7. See also Grand Council, Hsien-feng 7/7/16 (9/4/1857), Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, shang, 359-61. Whether the Russians considered these to be tribute missions is another matter. In the case of 1727, the Russian trip to Peking probably had to do with the signing of the treaties of Kiakhta andBura. 84. According to Hsien Chin Hu, a person who “does not want face,” means that he “does not care what society thinks of his character, that he is ready to obtain benefits for himself in defiance of moral standards. On such a person social sanctions lose their effect, as he does not recognize the rules of the game. Moreover, should he be in the habit of ‘not wanting lien [face]’ his fellows would find it impossible to predict his behavior. Such an individual few people will care to deal with unless under the force of circumstances” (51). According to Metzger, “the effectiveness erf*disciplinary sanctions largely depended on the officials’ sense of responsibility and shame” (402). Since the Russians did not consider their conduct to be irresponsible or shameful, moral exhortations had no effect. 85. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 19 ts’e, 23a yeh. For another edict expressing similar sentiments, see: vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 20 ts’e, 25b yeh. See also Hsien-feng to T’an T’ing-hsiang, Hsien-feng 8/2/25 (4/8/1858), 8/3/13 (4/26/1858), Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, chung, 422-3,443-4. 86. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, public opinion would become more important in Russia and national dignity would have an equally important domestic audience, but at the mid-nineteenth century, the audience was still primarily international. 87. Stanton, 261-2, Shumakher, 286-91. 88 . CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 15 ts’e, 20b-22a, 25b yeh; 16 ts’e, 3a, 26a-27a yeh. 89. Archimandrite Palladii, “ JpeBHHK ApxHMaHitpHTa n a jin a jH fi 3a 1858 r . ” (Diary of Archimandrite Palladii for 1858), 245. In a similar vein, Nicholas I had told Murav'ev in 1853: “The Chinese must comply with our rightful demands, and if they do not want to, then you now have military forces: we can make them” (Barsukov, vol. 1,484). 90. Barsukov, vol. 1, 485-6. See also vol. 1, 602, vol. 2, 286; Akhilles Ivanovich Zaborinskii, ‘Tpa$ Hmcojiafi HHKOJiaeBHi MypaBbëB-AMypCKHH b 1848-1856 it . OiepK h iiMCbMa” (Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskii, 1848-1856. Article and letters), 645. 91. Tsarist and Soviet secondary sources, with very few exceptions, argue that Russia behaved much better toward China than did any other power. The only notable exception to this view is expressed in some early Soviet literature from the 1920s, which branded tsarist Russia as equally imperialistic as the other powers, but believed that Soviet Russia

THE TREATY OF AI G UN

77

had overturned these policies to open a new era in international relations. Thereafter, the tsarist and Soviet points of view on this matter scarcely differ. For examples of the tsarist view, see: Fedor Fedorovich Martens, Pocchh h Khtsh, HcropHKO-nommnecxoe HCnejtOBamie (Russia and China. Historical and political research), 2; A. M. Pozdneev, “0 6 OTHOujeHHHX enponeHuen k Kriraia. Penh npcnoHeceHHaa Ha aicre C nerepôyprcxoro YmiBepcMTera Sit) «fcespajifl 1887 roja” (Regarding the relations of the Europeans with China. Speech delivered at the commencement of the University of St. Petersburg on 8 February 1887 [20 February 1887J), 228-63; Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, PyccKO-KmaiKKHH Bonpoc (The Russo-Chinese question); Il’ia Semenovich Levitov, jKejTWpoocHH m u dyipepma KonoHHH (Yellow Russia as a buffer colony). For examples of the Soviet view, see: N. S. Kiniapina, Bhoimbh nommnca Pocchh nepBOii nojWBHHbi XIX a (The foreign policy of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century) ; Raiso Vsevolodovna Makarova, Bueurntut nommnca Pocchh Ha JfamHeM BocroKe, Bropan nojnem a XVIIIn-60-e rojm XIX a (The foreign policy of Russia in the Far East, second half of the eighteenth century to the 1860s); Oleg Igorevich Sergeev, KaßaiecrBO tta pyocxoM JßmueM Bocrotce b XVII-XIX bb. (The Cossacks in the Russian Far East in the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries), 43-4,57-8. 92. Quested, Expansion of Russia, 48; Shumakher, 294-5; Ignat'ev, Materials, 3-4; PaUadii, “Diary,” 1912: 245-7,255-60; Stanton, 278-9,282,284,285. 93. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 21 ts’e, 38b yeh. Later the Chinese envoys who negotiated the Treaty of Tientsin, Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na, used the same expression. See 24 ts 'e, 2Aayeh. 94. For biographical information on Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na, see Arthur W. Hummel, ed.. Eminent Chinese of the Ch ’ing Period (1644-1912), 428-30. 95. The text appeared in three translations—Russian, Manchu, and Chinese, with the Manchu text being authoritative. The treaty was concluded in such haste, however, that the Russian and Manchu texts did not fully conform and there were two versions for each text. Palladii, “Diary,” 1912: 263-4; Banno, 132-3. For a list of inconsistencies between versions, see Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, chung, 607-8. 96. Henri Cordier, L’Expédition de Chine de 1857-58: Histoire diplomatique, notes et documents (The expedition to China of 1857-58: A diplomatic history, notes and documents) 404-5. 97. Fairbank and Teng, 158-163; Banno, 40-1, 127; William Frederick Mayers, Treaties between the Empire ofChina and Foreign Powers, 102; “TitaHMßHHCXHH TpaicraT Meacjy PoocueH h KmaeM 06 ycnoBwax nojiHTineciCMX B3aHMOOTHOuieHMH” (The Treaty of Tientsin between Russia and China about the conditions of mutual political relations) in Petr Emel'ianovich Skachkov et al., PyccKO-arraHCKHe OTHOutettHB, 16891916, O^HttHammte jtOKyhteHTU (Russo-Chmese relations, 1689-1916, official documents), 30-4. The text is also reprinted in Polnoe sobranie zakonov, no. 34697, 7/2/1859 (7/14/1859), 1859, part 1,667-71. 98. Mayers, 11-20,59-71,84-92,101-4. 99. Palladii, “Diary,” 1912:269. 100. Hsieh, 251. 101. Shumakher, 322; Palladii, “Diary,” 1912: 277-8; Hummel, 134. 102. Shumakher, 301. KB. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 17 ts’e, 2ayeh; 21 ts’e, 4b yeh; Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., “Canton Trade,” 201.

78

THE TREATY OF A1GUN

104. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 21 ts’e, 13b,3a-b, 12a yeh; Hummel, 391-3. 105. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 22 ts’e, 18a yeh. 106. CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 21 ts’e, 50b yeh. Quested cites other examples of this ignorance of geography. Quested, Expansion ofRussia, 57-8. The Collected Statutes ( # categorized Chinese laws by chronology, governmental office and governmental function. It was first published in 1690 and then revised and enlarged in 1732, 1764, 1818, and 1899. Metzger, 212-3 ; Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in imperial China, 53. 107. Under the tribute system, the Chinese emperor claimed to be suzerain over his tributaries. Sovereignty was a European notion requiring acceptance of the concept of the nation-state and clear territorial boundaries. Neither of these had a place in the traditional Chinese conception of the world. 108. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 10 ts’e, 8b yeh; Quested, Expansion ofRussia, 7. 109. Barsukov, vol. 1,509-12. 110. For accounts of the negotiations see: Barsukov, vol. 1,509-12; Shumakher, 278, 288,297-301,33+42; CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts’e, lla-15a yeh; (Memorial from I-shan saying that he had been forced to sign the Treaty of Aigun by Russian commissioner Murav'ev), Hsien-feng 8/4/21 (6/2/1858), Ku-kung po-wu yüan Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, pien 3, chung, 5049. 111. Banno, 128. 112. CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts’e, 11a-15a yeh. For further information on the negotiations for the Treaty of Aigun, see Ch’ang Ch’un (HH) and Na Ch’in (iftft). ed., Li Kuei-lin (^ fê # ) and Ku Yttn (SIM), comp., (Kirin gazetteer), 55 chüan, 14a-15a yeh. 113. Barsukov, vol. 2,170. 114. CABM, vol. 12, Hsien-feng, 16 ts’e, 17a yeh; vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 17 ts’e, 18a yeh; 18 ts’e, 33a yeh; 21 ts’e, lb-2a, 5a-6b yeh. 115. See chapter 8 for a more detailed description of the massacre of Chinese civilians on the northern bank of the Amur. 116. Shumakher, 297-301,334-42; CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts’e, 1la-15a yeh. 117. CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts'e, 15ayeh. 118. Wakeman, ‘Canton Trade,” 201 ; Joseph Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 180062,” 330,343; Hummel, 391-2. 119. John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917, part HI, chapter 2, ”On the Offensive 1848-94.” 120. The Chinese referred to Khonnoldzin' as Huo-erh-mo-le-chin village ( MMMUrW IE). Ting Tsz Kao, The Chinese Frontiers, 119, 315. The characters are given in a footnote. 121. Skachkov etal., Russo-Chinese relations, 29-31. 122. Quested, Expansion ofRussia, 147-8. 123. “CeHaTCKHH, no BucoqaiuiieMy noBejiemno—O HeKoropux ynpanneitHH ripHMopcKOH oOnacTbio Boctoihoh Ch6hph” (Senatorial, per Imperial command—concerning several changes in the administration of the Maritime region or Eastern Siberia), no. 34010, 1/2/1859 (1/14/1859), Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 1859, part 1,6-8.

3 Capitulation: The Treaty of Peking We fear that the more land these [Russian] barbarians get, the more they will desire; they just revive old tricks to make additional demands.1 We humbly believe that the various barbarians have the habits of curs and swine. The English barbarians are the most unrighteous and uncontrollable, but the Russian barbarians are the most cunning.2 Chief representative for the emperor Prince Rung and others, 1860 Such are the Chinese that [when with] those whom they fear; when they see force and the determination to use it to achieve a goal at any price; when they are treated rudely, persistently, and even arrogantly—then they are polite, genial, cooperative, [and] obliging; but when they see force which is not overwhelming, but instead, the desire to be pleasant to them, moderation, friendliness, [and] modesty—then they become, [to put it] more precisely, insolent, impudent and stubborn.3 Negotiator for the Treaty of Peking Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, 1861

The negotiations in Peking in 1860 would permanently change Chinese perceptions of the Russians. The Chinese would consider them no longer to be barbarians of the traditional Central Asian variety but rather to be an unusually dangerous sub-species of the European-genus. During the final stages of the Second Opium War, in desperation, the Chinese accepted Russian offers to act as an intermediary in order to bring an end to the hostilities. Only afterward did the Chinese realize that, far from mitigating British and French demands as promised, they had actually added theirs to the list. In fact, the Russians provided no significant mediation in return for their enormous territorial gains under the peace settlement. They were able to do this by taking advantage of British and French military pressure on Peking and of Chinese ignorance regarding European politics. International Law versus Moral Suasion Although the Hsien-feng (^£M) Emperor did not intend to implement the Treaty of Aigun, he also did not dare antagonize the Russians by openly disavowing the 79

80

THE TREATY OF PEKING

agreement. This has led to confusion over whether the treaty ever was ratified. According to Ignat'ev, Kuei-liang (fê il) had told Putiatin that the treaty had been ratified by imperial edict on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month of the eighth year of the reign of Hsien-feng (June 15, 1858), but the Veritable Record for the Ch’ing Dynasty has no entry for this date.4 There was an edict reprinted in The Complete Account o f Barbarian Management (Ü$$HÜj£cî5fc) dated the fourth day of the fifth lunar month (June 14, 1858), but it merely recounted that I-shan (^ ll|) had signed a treaty under duress and reiterated that there could be no compromises on the border. Nowhere did the edict express explicit acceptance of the treaty.5 Since Putiatin could not read Chinese, he could not verify the contents of the edict shown to him by Kuei-liang. In addition, Kuei-liang had compelling reasons to try to mollify the Russians. First, China’s relations with Britain and France were deteriorating to the point where renewed hostilities seemed imminent. Second, on a more personal level, Kuei-liang must have known about the fate of Ch’i-ying ( ^ H ) , whom the emperor had condemned to suicide for mismanaging relations with Britain in 1844.6 Therefore, Putiatin’s ever more bellicose manner could not have but made Kuei-liang uneasy. One possible explanation for the controversy might be that Kuei-liang may have attempted to “soothe the barbarians’’ by stretching the truth in order to tell the Russians what they wanted to hear. In any case, once the Hsien-feng Emperor learned of the contents of the treaty, officially he ignored its existence: he made no formal protest to the Russian government in St. Petersburg nor did he publicly renounce it Since, as Murav'ev was well aware, the Treaty of Aigun did indeed exceed the jurisdiction of I-shan, under European legal norms renunciation by China would have been a legitimate action. Public renunciation might even have aroused some sympathy in Britain, which did not favor further expansion of the Russian empire. By pretending the treaty did not exist, however, the Hsien-feng Emperor unwittingly played into the hands of the Russian expansionists for they took his silence as acceptance of the terms of the treaty.7 This allow'ed the issue to remain unsettled while military tensions built between the Chinese, and the British and the French. The Second Opium War then precipitated a cascade of events which would include the ratification of the Treaty of Aigun. The Hsien-feng Emperor still did not seem to realize that the Russians were unlike the Central Asian barbarians of the past and would have to be treated differently. Although he understood that, for lack of adequate military forces, I-shan had signed a document to placate the barbarians at the border, he did not seem to foresee any consequences arising from not enforcing its terms —central Asian barbarians were not the object of great respect in China. As in traditional cases of restless barbarians on the periphery, the Hsien-feng Emperor tried to handle the matter locally at the border. He repeated his standing orders that I-shan make the Russian barbarians follow the path erf*righteousness.8 Moral suasion played a key role in the Confucian order even when interacting

THE TREATY OF PEKING

81

with barbarians, who, by definition, belonged to another world.9 In European foreign relations, international law played the role that moral suasion did in China. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Chinese knew little about European international law. Not until 1864 after the Opium Wars was the first international legal textbook translated into Chinese.10 Therefore, they had no easy way to understand or to evaluate the legal concerns of foreigners in China. Although China had a long and well-developed legal tradition of its own, it differed greatly from that of Europe. First, given the Chinese world outlook placing their emperor at the summit of all human relations and given their view of foreign relations as exclusively tributary relations, international law did not exist in their legal tradition, which was “overwhelmingly penal in emphasis.” It focused on “acts of moral or ritual impropriety or of criminal violence,” 11 which, if allowed to continue, could threaten the cosmic order. In addition, key concerns of international law were entirely absent from Chinese law. For instance, contract law was ignored and property rights were subsumed under penal law, while the day-to-day regulation of commerce and industry was left to the associations of craftsmen and merchants, known as the hongs (fy) or guilds.12 This meant that disagreements on commercial matters depended not on abstract legal principles but on personal relations, or kuan-hsi (IBfö),13 with the relevant hong, a situation which the Europeans found intolerable. Second, law played an important, but less central role in the governance of China than it did in Europe. At a time when Europe was developing political systems based more and more on the rule of law, China remained a society that, albeit with a venerable legal tradition, was actually more firmly rooted in the kuan-hsi system. The determinants of the kuan-hsi between two persons included the combined ties of lineage; family friendship of previous generations; geographic origin; a teacher-student relationship; a bureaucratic superior-subordinate relationship; a schoolmate relationship; a relationship between bureaucratic colleagues; marriage; and sworn brotherhood.14 Kuan-hsi could then be enhanced or weakened by the degree of shared kan-ch’ing (Jjglf)—the mutual sentiments required for genuine friendship.13 An individual’s personal power depended on the extent of his kuan-hsi network, meaning the number and strength of these relationships based on common ties. In China, instead of attempting to rely exclusively on a universalistic solution such as law, reliance was also placed on die particularistic web of kuan-hsi.16 Therefore, many situations that would be resolved in Europe with a legal solution, in China required personal connections. This meant that, from a European point of view, in China like cases often produced inconsistent results, due to the relative kuan-hsi networks of the parties involved. Foreigners were automatically at a great disadvantage in this system since they lacked strong kuan-hsi networks in China. The importance of kuan-hsi also greatly complicates the work of the historian, since it is extremely difficult to reconstruct evolving kuan-hsi networks, much less to chart the interaction among several of these networks of constantly

82

THE TREATY OF PEKING

reshuffling relationships. Moreover, kuan-hsi functioned most effectively when its precise extent remained vague, both to protect the many relationships forming an individual’s power base and also to strengthen his bargaining position. Like a good poker player, the holder of significant kuan-hsi deliberately kept much of his hand secret to further his own game. A third factor distinguishing Chinese from European law was that, under the Confucian tradition which permeated Chinese law, there was no notion of equality before the law. Punishments varied according to seniority, family relationship and status.17 Law was not a mechanism for legal equals to settle disputes; instead “the official law always operated in a vertical direction from the state upon the individual, rather than on a horizontal plane directly between two individuals.”18 Therefore, there was no precedent for legally equal states using law to regulate their interaction. Nor was the emperor necessarily bound to the laws of his empire since he could issue new edicts at will. Thus, the Chinese did not share the European understanding of treaties as binding agreements, not subject to unilateral changes, made between legally equal parties.19 In China, the latest imperial edict was binding regardless of whether it contradicted the published legal code or ratified treaties.20 Moreover, legal precedent “played an unusually large role in the Ch’ing legal system,”21 while Western international treaty law was an unprecedented phenomenon in China. There is no reason to assume that the Chinese cared about, much less understood, the European notion of treaty ratification as the formal acceptance of a treaty by the appropriate government body. The emperor may have deliberately left the status of the Treaty of Aigun vague in the hopes that he could first deal with the British and French troops, which posed an immediate threat to the capital, and later tackle the boundary problem. This would fit Chinese preferences for dealing with one enemy at a time. The Hsien-feng Emperor did not realize that, in the European mind, treaties could not be left in limbo: they demanded ratification or annulment. For the West Europeans, who were accustomed to uniform, stable, and comprehensive published laws, the Chinese legal system, particularly when combined with the vagaries of kuan-hsi, was unacceptable. The emperor’s policy, which boiled down to sermonizing the Russians on their unethical territorial encroachments while taking no military action to back up these lectures, soon proved untenable. In late 1858, “to soothe” the Russians, the Hsien-feng Emperor devised a new formula: he described I-shan’s concessions under the Treaty of Aigun as “an expedient” and recommended that the Russians be given “temporary” use of the northern bank of the Amur. But under no circumstances would they be allowed in the Ussuri coastal region. I-shan must reprimand the Russians and make them “return to submission.”22 Eventually, the emperor expanded this formula to indicate that China had “lent” the “uninhabited” portions of the north bank of the Amur for “temporary” habitation by the Russians.23 By early 1859, the emperor was recommending accepting most of the Russian version of the regulations for the border trade in the hopes

THE TREATY OF PEKING

83

that they would dien forget their demands for the Ussuri coastal area. While he was attempting to “soothe” the Russians, his edicts to his own border officials assumed an ever more menacing tone.24 In addition, due to the pressing military exigencies posed by the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force, he had ordered the redeployment of border troops to Tientsin. Deprived of troops and weapons, all I-shan could do in the spring of 1859 was to memorialize that he lacked the forces to stop the Russians from navigating the Ussuri and Sui-fen rivers. He seemed to have decided to permit these activities to avoid provoking a conflict which, though he did not say so, he could only lose. Unimpressed, the emperor ordered I-shan to cease making “excuses,” to which I-shan responded that the Russians not only ignored, but were openly hostile toward, his repeated attempts to “elucidate and enlighten” them. The emperor fumed.25 On June 16, 1859, the emperor dismissed I-shan from his post, but ordered him to remain temporarily. The emperor was less charitable toward I-shan’s subordinate, the vice commander-in-chief of Heilungkiang province, Chi-laming-a ( who was not only dismissed but also put in the cangue and escorted around the Ussuri area to make him “lose face” with a public humiliation.26 The emperor’s anger at I-shan continued to grow. In an edict dated July 29, 1859, he raged that there was no way to amend the Treaty of Aigun, since the Russians would not stand for it, yet the treaty was unacceptable.27 Unable “to soothe the barbarians” or force them into submission, the Hsien-feng Emperor fell back on another strategy: to “save face” for his own failed policies, he tried to lay the blame for China’s current difficulties on one man, I-shan. On August 18, 1859, the Chinese sent a letter to the Russians blaming I-shan for mismanaging the treaty negotiations and promising to deal with him severely.28 On August 29, 1859, the emperor recalled I-shan to Peking, had him put in the cangue, and subsequently delivered him to the gates of the Russian hostel as living testimony that China did not recognize the Treaty of Aigun and that I-shan was personally responsible for bungling the negotiations.29 Because the Russians refused to drop the matter of the ratification of the Treaty of Aigun, over a year after its signing the Chinese finally took an explicit stand: thereafter, they repeatedly and consistently informed the Russians that they did not recognize the treaty.30 Yet, the Hsien-feng Emperor offered no positive advice to I-shan’s replacement, T ’e P’u-ch’in ( Although humiliating I-shan might have served as a device for the emperor “to save face” for the unfolding debacle on the Amur, it did nothing to address the underlying change in the balance of power which had made the Russian advances possible. By the late 1850s, China had lost its brief window of opportunity independently to pre-empt Russian territorial expansion: the Russians had established a series of outposts; Murav'ev had secured the support of Alexander II; and British and French forces were soon to converge on Peking. By the late 1850s, all the Hsien-feng Emperor could do was to repeat to.T ’e P ’u-ch’in the same assortment of increasingly irrelevant threats and admonitions that he had

84

THE TREATY OF PEKING

made to I-shan. These were based on the Confucian ethic of “enlightening” the barbarian to instill obedience.31 In fact, the only way to shift the balance of power in China’s favor in the short term would have been to join with the other powers against Russia, something the Chinese were unwilling to do. Russian International Weakness and Chinese Intransigence Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev arrived in Peking in the midst of the furor. In the beginning of 1859, St. Petersburg named him as the temporary diplomatic agent in Peking to replace Petr Nikolaevich Perovskii. Perovskii had been attached to the Russian Orthodox Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking and had helped Murav'ev negotiate the Treaty of Aigun. After returning to Peking from the negotiations on the Amur, Perovskii had tried unsuccessfully to secure Chinese ratification for the Treaty of Aigun and, only after a long struggle, had achieved ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin. With no more success, he had also tried to negotiate an additional treaty delimiting the easternmost section of the border. The Chinese not only refused to do this, but no longer agreed to the necessity of delimiting that section of the border.32 Since some of Perovskii’s problems had stemmed from his connection to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, which the Chinese argued made him inappropriate for negotiating treaties, Ignat'ev had been sent as a replacement.33 Ignat'ev arrived at the Mongolian border town of Kiakhta on April 29,1859, with the 380 cartloads of arms promised by Putiatin in the hopes of securing more favorable treatment from the Chinese. Ignat'ev, however, was reluctant to deliver the arms to the Chinese. Should a pretext arise, he planned to deliver them instead to Eastern Siberia, whose defenses he found to be sorely wanting. The Chinese gratified him to the extent that they rejected the arms, but they went a step further to reject his appointment as well. They refused to permit any special diplomatic agents into Peking, saying that only Russian religious officials affiliated with the Ecclesiastical Mission were allowed there. Even though China was in the midst of a war with Britain and France, Chinese officials attempted “to keep face” by holding fast to the myth of Chinese supremacy and self-sufficiency: they turned down modem arms with the smug response that China did not require foreign help.34 Ignat'ev’s arguments with the Chinese continued at his arrival in Peking on June 27, 1859, when a squabble erupted over the quality of the palanquin he would be allowed to use for his debut in the city. He soon became very pessimistic about his chances for success. He complained to his father that he lacked any official diplomatic title, money, and even clear instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He blamed Perovskii for wasting all his energies seeking the ratification of the commercial Treaty of Tientsin, which Ignat'ev considered of little practical use, while ignoring the much more important territorial Treaty of Aigun.35 Russia did not belong to the new world of overseas economic

THE TREATY OF PEKING

85

empires and had relatively minor trade interests in China compared to the other Westerners.36 As a land-based military empire, its primary concern remained territorial. Although the thought of taking territory did appeal to the Russian Foreign Ministry in the abstract, concrete financial woes and diplomatic isolation in Europe did not permit a costly Far Eastern policy. Therefore, as much as it desired that the provisions of the Treaty of Aigun be strictly enforced and that Britain be prevented from acquiring any privileges in China at the expense of Russia, it was still chary of coming into conflict with either China or Britain.37 Ignat'ev complained of Chinese hostility to Russians, writing on July 8, 1859: “The Chinese, who have lived with us in friendship for over a century, have now started to look upon us as enemies, but not open ones like the British, but as secret ones because of our impotence or faintheartedness. ” Chinese memorials corroborate this evolving attitude. One describes the chief British negotiator. Lord Elgin, as “deceitful and savage, quite unlike a normal person” but suggests that “the Russian barbarians . . . are still more deeply to be hated.”39 In March 1860 Ignat'ev wrote to his father that “after the adventures of 1856 through 1859 and Russian activities on the Amur, the Chinese mistrust us, considering us cunning, treacherous, and untrustworthy neighbors.”40 The Chinese were in the process of revising their formally more benevolent opinion of the Russians. Ignat'ev faced the same Chinese officials as had Ferovskii: Su-shun 0 § lt),41 a member of the imperial clan, who served concurrently as an official in the Court of Colonial Affairs and as head of the Ministry of Revenue, and Jui-ch’ang # ) , the head of the Ministry o f Justice. Although Ignat'ev insisted on bringing up the Treaty of Aigun, the negotiators in Peking refused to discuss it. In the first meeting on July 10, 1859, Su-shun indicated that Ignat'ev could return to Russia, since China had already ratified the Treaty of Tientsin. Su-shun further stated that China would not uphold the Treaty of Aigun, since it regarded Russian occupation of the northern bank of the Amur as a magnanimous temporary loan of territory by China. Ignat'ev bristled.42 Shortly after this meeting, Ignat'ev presented a list of demands which included the full demarcation of the entire boundary; the opening of the Chinese interior to Russian trade; and the establishment of consulates in Mongolia, Manchuria and Kashgaria. When the Chinese described the Russian occupation of the Ussuri coastal region as a breach of friendship, Ignat'ev responded that Russia already had defacto control over the area.43 The arguments became more bitter in ensuing sessions. Ignat'ev repeatedly petitioned the C ourt o f Colonial A ffairs to replace the two Chinese plenipotentiaries, who in turn suggested that Ignat'ev retire from Peking or, better yet, be replaced himself.44 The Chinese threatened military action, arguing that the Ussuri coastal region was part of Manchurian lands and therefore the patrimony of the ruling house of China. Agreements made by I-shan had no force, since he did not use the appropriate seal. For overstepping his authority, he had been demoted. In a final effort to restore the status quo, the Chinese *

TO

86

THE TREATY OF PEKING

insisted that any further border negotiations could only be conducted by the militaty governor of Kirin.45 According to Ignat'ev, he resorted to what he considered to be the Chinese negotiating technique of repeating the same thing ad nauseam without losing his temper.46 On one occasion, he accused Su-shun of not understanding propriety, since Ignat'ev understood this to be the ultimate insult to any mandarin. The Chinese admonished Russia to live up to its treaty obligations and cease trying to occupy the Ussuri region. They pointed to the magnanimity with which China had granted temporary occupation privileges to Russians along the Amur and with which it had agreed to the Treaty of Tientsin. Ignat'ev, however, considered Russian control of the Ussuri coastal region critical. Most important was his fear that if Britain occupied the ports there and on Pei-chih-li Bay, it would be able to dominate Peking and Japan. By December 1859, the only progress that Ignat'ev had made was to get the Chinese to admit that the Treaty of Aigun existed and that the east bank of Ussuri was uninhabited. But they still considered the treaty invalid, since I-shan had signed it before the emperor had read its contents.47 In response, Ignat'ev threatened that Russia might become compelled to act in concert with the British.48 In fact, this is exactly what Russia had already been doing.49 Lacking both funds and military forces, Ignat'ev believed that the only way to reap benefits for Russia would be to insinuate himself in the role of intermediary between the allied forces and China by exaggerating to each side his influence over the other. He hoped to use British intransigence to make Russian demands appear comparatively moderate and then to convince the Chinese that the survival of the Manchu dynasty depended on Russian cooperation for leverage in order to secure Russian demands.50 Yet the Chinese continued to refuse to negotiate with a man who proclaimed himself plenipotentiary, but who lacked the supporting paperwork—a man who had arrived in Peking uninvited and who then boorishly refused to leave. Ignat'ev concluded that Russia’s only recourse would be to continue the de facto occupation of the Ussuri coastal region and to use the unfolding Anglo-Chinese war to its advantage.51 Much to the horror of Ignat'ev, over the summer the Chinese informed the British about the ongoing territorial dispute with Russia.52 The Chinese, however, did not seem to have recognized the opportunity to use Britain to impede Russian territorial expansion, nor did Britain seem to be aware of the significance or amount of the territory involved.53 The Russians, however did not know this. In late 1859, Murav'ev described the Russian vulnerability to British intervention: Whether or not the boundary question regarding the territory from the Ussuri to the sea is resolved before then in Peking—it does not matter because, both in relation to the European powers and to America, we retain all of our rights on the basis of the Treaty of Aigun and the edict of the Chinese emperor, reported to Count Putiatin, concerning the establishment of the border along the Amur and the Ussuri; but if.

THE TREATY OF PEKING

87

under the influence of fears of the seizure of Peking, the Chinese emperor concludes such a treaty with the Anglo-French, which entrusts them with the protection of the northern border of his empire and [if he] abandons himself completely to their protection from Russia, and for this lets them occupy the bays and harbors in Korea and Manchuria and [lets them] have their residents everywhere—then our situation will become extremely difficult, and although possession of the Amur and the right to the shores of the Ussuri will remain ours, but our naval forces here will be completely paralyzed by the proximity to an English station, and the 200-million-strong Chinese empire will organize and arm its fo rc e s right up to our borders under the supervision and guidance of the Anglo-French!54 Like Murav'ev, Ignat'ev also saw China through the prism of the Anglo-Russian rivalry.55 On August 21,1860, Ignat'ev described the precariousness of Russia’s position in a letter to the director of the Asiatic Department of the tsarist Foreign Ministry, Egor Petrovich Kovalevskii: With a plausible pretext and with a single blow, the English have decided to destroy that influence which, in the minds of the Europeans, we must have acquired in Peking through our efforts over the years and through the exclusive right of our Ecclesiastical Mission to remain in the capital, in exchange for a guardianship imposed by England In addition. Great Britain wants to stop all further expected attempts on our part at territorial acquisitions in the Far East, considering them dangerous to English naval domination.56 The Chinese, however, did not realize that the British forces in China, consisting of 21,000 troops and over 100 ships,57 probably exceeded all Russian forces for the entire Russian Far East and that the British certainly had far more vessels at their disposal. A British redeployment of these forces northward would have posed a considerable threat to the scattered Russian forces. Moreover, the Russian Foreign M inistry did not necessarily share Ignat'ev’s or M urav'ev’s burning enthusiasm for territorial acquisitions at all cost, although it was more than happy to accept free faits accomplis. The Chinese, lacking this information, tenaciously clung to their tradition of conducting secret bilateral negotiations with all outsiders.58 Only after their defeat in the Second Opium War did they make a concerted effort to learn about Europe and, by the end of the 1870s, some officials had become very knowledgeable. But this knowledge came too late to retain control over the Manchurian littoral. Russian Mediation of the Treaty o f Peking of 1860 Circumstances soon began to work in Ignat'ev’s favor. By March 1860, both the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion had reached critical stages. The

88

THE TREATY OF PEKING

Anglo-French forces had blockaded Pei-chih-li Bay and were preventing rice shipments from reaching Peking. Meanwhile, a huge force of Taipings was rumored to be headed toward the capital. The Anglo-French forces moved on Pei-chih-li, taking the fortifications at Taku on August 21; occupying Tientsin on August 23; and marching toward Peking on September 8, 1860, in hopes of securing their demands in the capital.59 Ignat'ev’s opportunity to push his advantage came not as a result of Russian actions, but as a result of the climax of the Anglo-French war with China. As a final attempt to fend off the British who were threatening Peking, the Chinese made a grave miscalculation: on September 18, 1860, in retaliation for the British kidnapping of the prefect of Tientsin, they seized two British negotiators and a number of other hostages of different nationalities. The Anglo-French forces immediately moved on Peking. In an equally grave miscalculation, the emperor ordered the execution of one of the negotiators before fleeing from the capital on September 22, leaving his half-brother. Prince Kung ( S I& E ; I-hsin ^ f f ) , in charge of negotiations. On September 26, the Anglo-French forces reached the imperial summer palace outside Peking; on October 13 they entered the city; and on October 24, they burned the summer palace in retaliation for the murders of over half the hostages (twenty-one British and French nationals in all), some of whom had been tortured to death at the palace.60 Lord Elgin chose the strategy of burning the palace ‘“ to make the blow fall on the Emperor, who was clearly responsible for the crime committed; without, however, so terrifying his brother [Prince Kung] whom he had left behind to represent him, as to drive him from the field.’”61 The British calculations in burning the palace seem to have been correct, for four days later the emperor sued for peace.62 Ignat’ev took the opportunity to send the Chinese a letter blaming them for not accepting Russian mediation and thus allowing the current denouement. He promised to save Peking provided that the Chinese did his bidding and concluded his lecture, writing that Russia alone “sincerely favors the Manchu dynasty and desires its survival. It’s high time you understood this!”63 The Anglo-French negotiators delivered an ultimatum to Prince Kung, demanding monetary compensation for the allied prisoners who had died in captivity, the punishment of the officials responsible, and the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin. The allied forces expected an answer within two days or they would renew hostilities. That day, despite the warnings over the years from Chinese officials that the Russians were no less evil than the British or the French, Prince Kung accepted Ignat'ev’s offer to act as an intermediary.64 As the price, Ignat'ev required complete information about Chinese negotiations with the other powers and accession to all of Russia’s territorial, commercial, and other demands.65 Ignat'ev gloated, “In this we got the opportunity to control the relations of the Chinese government with the allies.”66 The Chinese similarly capitulated to the allied demands: the British on October 24, and the French on October 25, signed their treaties of Peking with China.

THE TREATY OF PEKING

89

These recognized the Treaty of Tientsin; permitted permanent diplomatic residents in Peking; provided for an indemnity; opened Tientsin as a treaty port; expanded the British concession in Hong Kong to include Kowloon; and provided an amelioration of various trade regulations according to British and French wishes.67 Ignat'ev failed in his efforts to prevent the allies from securing diplomatic representation in Peking, but he did convince them to put off the move until the spring of 1861. This meant that Russia would seek inclusion of an article providing for permanent representation in its treaty, which was signed on November 14, 1860, just after the allied forces had evacuated Peking.68 Although Ignat'ev had become privy to the negotiations of the other powers, he carefully conducted his own business secretly. His treaty negotiations did not begin until October 26,1860, the day after the French treaty had been signed and two days after that of the British. To prevent the others from knowing that any negotiations were under way, Ignat'ev had empty sedan chairs dispatched each morning to suggest that he was out and about. China had acceded to Ignat'ev’s demand that none of its negotiators be men who had been involved with the negotiations with the allies, but reappointed the two mandarins whose 69 dismissal Ignat'ev had repeatedly demanded in the past: Su-shun and Jui-ch’ang. During the negotiations, the Chinese repeated their position that they would temporarily lend the Russians the north bank of the Amur, but could not permit them on the ancestral lands of the Manchus in the Ussuri coastal region. Ignat'ev refused to concede these points, but offered other concessions instead: Russia would not demand a consulate in Ch’i-ch’i-ha-erh or Chang-chia-k’ou (Kalgan); it would permit Chinese subjects to continue living along the Ussuri river as Chinese subjects; and it would lim it to 200 the number of Russian traders in Peking.70 In the end, the Russian Treaty of Peking reconfirmed thé validity of the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin, setting the boundary on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. It provided for duty-free trade along the border and for Russian consulates in Urga, Mongolia, and Kashgar (K’a-shih-ke-erh or K ’a-shih), Sinkiang. It also defined the western border for the first time.71 Ignat'ev gloated to the Foreign Ministry: “ [W]e have been allotted, with consent of the Chinese government, the region lying between the Ussuri River, Lake Hsing-k’ai [Lake Hanka or Khanka], the Sui-fen River, the Turnen River and the sea, which we actually have no right whatsoever to possess, if we only took the Treaty of Aigun and the emperor’s edict to Kuei-liang as our basis.”72 He pointed out that Russia had taken all of the Manchurian ports and had defined eastern and western sections of the Russian border with China. He also proudly noted that Russia had concluded an advantageous treaty with Chinese consent “on the heels of the allies, without spilling any Russian blood and without taking military action as they had done.”73 This remarkable achievement transformed Ignat'ev into a national hero, lauded in successive generations of Russian history bocks.74 For the Chinese, when they realized how they had been duped by a man who had no resources at his disposal, this episode added to their

90

THE TREATY OF PEKING

sense of national humiliation and anger. Russian’s foreign policy in the Far East had been formulated not by those in St. Petersburg but primarily by just three individuals: Nevel'skoi, Murav'ev, and Ignat'ev. For the Hsien-feng Emperor, the “loss of face” must have been irreparable. Unfortunately, in the absence of a rich biographical literature on late Ch’ing emperors, it is difficult to know much about their personalities from their often dry, formal edicts. The basic facts are known: just before the Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 1860, the Hsien-feng Emperor fled the city, never to return. Less than a year later he died at the age of thirty. Apparently thoroughly humiliated by the peace terms, he kept delaying his return to the capital7s where, by the new rules of diplomacy, he would have been required to receive the foreign envoys in an official audience, during which, for the first time, foreigners would not have been obliged to perform the kowtow. The end of the kowtow symbolized the end of the tributary system and of foreign relations as the Chinese had understood them. It meant that the emperor could no longer ensure the correct performance of rites and thereby protect his mandate from heaven to rule.76 After the signing of the peace treaties in 1860, the Hsien-feng Emperor “gave himself to excesses, probably with a view to self-destruction” and died in 1861.77 Unlike the Chinese, the Russians and other W esterners felt no overwhelming burden of tradition. Thus, they were able to engage in much more flexible foreign policies than was China Any Western setbacks could be reversed at a later date with no crushing obligations to protect the honor of the ancestors. Implementation of the Treaty of Peking's provisions concerning the western section of the boundary required a detailed border survey. For this purpose, on May 13,1861, a Russian border commission assembled inTarbagatai (T’a-ch’eng). The Russian and Chinese border commissioners completed this task three years later on October 7, 1864, by signing the Treaty of Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) and accompanying map.78 The actual surveys did not begin until July 11,1862, and did not proceed smoothly. Each side tried to enlist the support of the frontier peoples and repeatedly tested the other’s military resolve.79 Force wem out, as a Russian border commissioner, Ivan Fedorovich Babkov wrote, “Eventually, the deployment of our forces on the border clearly demonstrated to the Chinese that we had the means to uphold our demands with an armed hand whenever we wished.”80 He saw no coercion in this, writing, “The deployment of our forces along the border on our side of the Chinese pickets, under no circumstances can be considered a violation of international law or of friendly relations: all forces are deployed on the lands of the Kirghiz, who are Russian subjects, and . . . are under strict orders never to cross the permanent Chinese {ticket line.”81 The Russians were ordered to set the boundary according to topography, not ethnicity.82 This would leave a border problem to fester into the twentieth century, with disgruntled border peoples periodically fleeing from one side to the other. Babkov summed up the tsarist attitude toward ethnic minorities

THE TREATY OF PEKING

91

inhabiting the borden “The direction of the boundary depends on political considerations and, in view of the importance of government interests, it is necessary to sacrifice the local interests, in essence, of the most inconsequential part of the border inhabitants. In this connection, the separation of Kirghiz groups by the boundary, which evidently did not seem necessary for economic relations, is necessary owing to political necessity.“83 Haggling continued for months. The Russians refused to use any Chinese maps, saying they could not accept maps from people who did not have even the most rudimentary training in cartography. The Chinese tried unsuccessfully to argue that the Treaty of Peking could not be taken as the basis for the boundary survey since the official who had negotiated in Peking had not understood local conditions. Later a Chinese negotiator would express the opinion that if his government had understood how detrimental the Treaty of Peking was to its interests in western China, it never would have signed.84 A key disagreement revolved around differing interpretations of the picket lines referred to in article 2 of the Treaty of Peking. The treaty did not mention that there were multiple lines of pickets.85 The Chinese argued that the treaty referred to their outermost line of pickets, while the Russians said that it referred to the inner permanent line of pickets, which the Chinese said were internal pickets. According to one estimate, the difference in territory between the two lines of pickets may have amounted to as much as 350,000 square m iles.86 To bolster their case, the Chinese said that the habitation of the area between the picket lines by Chinese subjects proved Chinese sovereignty, to which the Russians countered that although the Chinese may have controlled these peoples fifty years earlier, this power had slipped from their grasp and Russia had asserted its control to maintain order on the steppes, thereby making these people Russian subjects. The first round of negotiations ended without result in September 1862.87 The Russians continued to employ coercion to enforce their interpretation of the Treaty of Peking. Their independent border surveys in the summers of 1862 and 1863 led to skirmishes between Russian and Chinese troops. Babkov explained an important facet of the tsarist strategy for the negotiations from 1858 to 1864: Russia first established de facto control of an area and only afterward negotiated a treaty legitimating Russian sovereignty—the kind of ex post facto diplomacy typical for territorial disputes. China, weakened by years of strife, was in no position to resist, particularly since a Muslim uprising was rapidly spreading through Sinkiang and even threatening the site of negotiations. Thus, for a second time, external circumstances worked in Russia’s favor to allow it to confirm its control over another large swath of territory. At the signing of the Treaty of Tarbagatai, the Chinese told the Russians that Muslims had taken Wu-lu-mu-ch’i (Urumchi) and were preparing to move on Tarbagatai and Hi (Kuldja). The uprising would delay the installation of border markers scheduled for the spring of 1865 until 1869, the year after the suppression of the rebellion.88

92

THE TREATY OF PEKING

The Ramifications and the Myths of Friendship and Original Sovereignty There were a number of lasting consequences from the treaties of Aigun, Tientsin, Peking, and Tarbagatai. First, China’s loss of the Opium Wars and the treaties which this loss entailed marked a turning point in Chinese diplomatic history: as far as Europe was concerned, the tribute system was dead and being replaced by European-style diplomacy. In the past, the Chinese had sinicized the outsiders; under the new world order, it would be China which would succumb to outside influence and gradually become Westernized. The defeat in the Second Opium War, the imposed treaties redrawing Chinese boundaries, and the opening of more ports to foreign commerce gradually made many Chinese realize that their country could not continue as before. Ultimately, this led to a critical re­ examination of Chinese civilization as well as a study of European civilization, which in turn accelerated the Westernization of China. Following the loss of the Second Opium War, one of the first informed Chinese accounts of the Western politics and geography was finally widely circulated among officials. A Short Account o f the Maritime Circuit by HsU Chi-yü (ßfcÄfif) had been excoriated by Chinese conservatives when it had originally been published in 1848, but by 1866 it had been reissued and made a text at the government language school.89 The loss of the Opium Wars and ensuing treaties led to a deepening cleavage within Chinese government circles between those who favored some degree of Westernization and those who remained implacably hostile. As with the Slavophile and Westemizer debate in nineteenth-century Russia, one consequence was to weaken the government’s base of support, since the group of people in theory most loyal to the government was riven by disagreement. Both the Chinese traditionalists and the Slavophiles favored foreign policies which their respective governments lacked the means to carry out—the former with demands to expel the foreigners forcibly and the latter with unrealistic plans for the Balkans. Both limited their governments’ room for maneuver on foreign policy issues.90 Despite the resistance of the traditionalists, Russian territorial encroachments ultimately forced China to adopt European notions of sovereignty, territory, and boundaries.91 The tribute system of vague alliances extending to territories of unknown extent functioned as long as China was the only great power. A new multinational world had barged in on China, a world where China no longer sat at the center of all civilization, but rather at the periphery of a new industrial culture sweeping the world. After the Second Opium War, China was forced to adopt the trappings of European diplomacy: adherence to formal treaties; regulation of commerce by international law; acceptance of foreign residents in its capital; and eventually the posting of Chinese diplomats abroad. This in turn required China to set up the administrative framework to deal with these new foreign missions in the capital. On January 13, 1861, Prince Kung, Grand Secretary

THE TREATY OF PEKING

93

Kuei-liang, and Grand Councilor Wen-hsiang ( jtfê ),92who had all been intimately involved in the negotiations with the powers in Peking, proposed the creation of an institution to regulate relations with foreign countries. This institution came to be known as the Tsung-li ko-kuo shih-wu ya-men ( P I Central Administrative Office for Foreign Affairs) or Tsungli Yamen. No longer would Russians be under the jurisdiction of the Court of Colonial Affairs ( 3 ^ 1 ^ , Lifan YUan), nor the other Europeans, under the Bureau of Receptions Chu K ’o Ssu) of the Ministry of Rites OSoß, Li Pu).*3 A second important development was the probability that Russia would become a Pacific Ocean power and would thereby acquire the international prestige of being able to project its influence in Asia. As one contemporary observer remarked, Russian possession of the northern bank of the Amur marked “the commencement of a new era for Siberia.”*4 Without the Amur River, Russia could not have begun developing Eastern Siberia before the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and without the port of Vladivostok, Russia could not have maintained a Pacific fleet. The success of M urav'ev and Ignat'ev immeasurably boosted Russian prestige, which had been so damaged by the Crimean War. Without sending any troops and, by Ignat'ev’s own account, with the most underfunded mission in China, *s Russia had managed to secure what would be the most long-lasting gains by any foreigners: it had acquired sovereignty over an additional 665,000 square miles of territory96 and had gained the same commercial advantages accorded to other European nations. The loss of the Crimean War had imperiled Imperial Russia’s claim to great power status. Like China, Russia had been defeated on its own soil by countries that could project supply lines from far across the seas, while it could not maintain supply lines at home. As in China, defeat had dealt a shattering blow to a rigid domestic system: five years after the 1856 Paris Peace Conference, Russia emancipated its serfs in 1861 and entered what became known as its period of great reforms. Unlike China, which continued to resist sweeping domestic reforms, Russia could more readily absorb some of the industrial culture of the West. Because it was a part of Europe and had long interacted with West European countries, it was in a much better position to analyze the military, industrial, and commercial achievements of the West. Moreover, because it had already twice attempted to reform its government institutions along European lines under Peter I (1689-1725) and Catherine II (1762-96), and because the Russian elite pursued a European-style education, Russia could more easily graft parts of the European system onto Russia than could the Chinese. It would take China almost another half century to attain the level of economic development already achieved by Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Ironically, the very success of Russian territorial expansion in the East further burdened its weak economic base. As one scholar has concluded: “To a large extent several characteristic features of Russian economic backwardness—the existence of serfdom, the huge military budget and the predominant influence of

94

THE TREATY OF PEKING

the state —can be traced to Russia’s political expansion.”97 The maintenance of a vast empire required a large military, which, in the absence of a big surplus generated by a vibrant economy, required pervasive state intervention to funnel resources into the military. But funneling such enormous resources into the military retarded the development of other economic sectors, which, in turn, impeded overall economic development. Thus, a vicious circle was created by the Russian government’s insistence on maintaining the foreign policy of a great power in the absence of the necessary economic base.98 A third major development was that Russia achieved its territorial gains at the price of growing Chinese hostility. Over a century later a Chinese scholar wrote: “Actually, it was from May, 1858 to November, 1860—a span of thirty months—that the [Chinese] Empire lost over729,000 square kilometers of frontier territory. This loss, tremendous as it was, would soon be dwarfed by the incalculable loss of honor and prestige.”99 Thus, in 1980 the “loss of face” was still felt. It is hard for non-Chinese to appreciate the legacy of bitterness left by these territorial losses. The Chinese no longer looked upon the Russians as traditional Inner Asian barbarians but as opponents combining the threat of traditional barbarians with the technological superiority of the Europeans.100 The mid-nineteenth-century treaties destroyed the culturally neutral Kiakhta system101 and imposed an unapologetically Western trading system. This system would eventually succumb to world war and communist revolution, but the territorial changes remain fixed on the map. For the Chinese people, their present northern border is an incarnation and potent symbol of China’s failure and humiliation at the hands of foreigners in general, and of the Russians in particular. The Russians did not seem to have been aware of this consequence until many, many years later, when a unified China shocked the Soviet Union with its fury over the possession of small islands in the Amur in 1969. Concerns for Chinese sensitivities clearly did not cross Russian minds in 1860, when, in addition to signing the Treaty of Peking, they established the town of Vladivostok at the southernmost tip of the newly acquired territory. The town’s Russian name translates as “Ruler of the East.” 102 On the contrary, the Russians, by propagating the myth of Russo-Chinese friendship, convinced themselves that they were actually the unique European benefactors of China. After the negotiations for the Treaty of Peking, Ignat'ev had listed the services he rendered to China as mediator with the allies: he mentioned twenty-five concessions on matters ranging from a reduction in the indemnity to an agreement not to bring any French corpses into Peking proper, but to deliver them directly to the cemetery. With the exception of the indemnity, these matters all related to die terms of the temporary occupation of Peking before the withdrawal of troops in the fall of 1860; thus they related to the setdement of matters which had no long-term significance.103 By Ignat'ev’s own list, he secured no amelioration erf the West European commercial demands, nor of their demand for permanent representation in Peking; he simply delayed the arrival of the foreign missions

THE TREATY O F PEKING

95

by a few months, giving Russia more time to settle its own business with Peking in private. In practical terms, his services to the Chinese seem minimal, while his own gains involved the permanent cession of the northern Manchurian coastline. Ignat'ev’s list of his numerous services to the Chinese gave rise to the myth of Russia’s special relations with China. Generations of Russians and Soviets came to believe that their country’s policies toward China, in contrast to those of the self-serving Western powers, were also in China’s own interests and that China recognized this and was grateful for all the help rendered by Russia over the years. For instance, in 1881 the renowned Russian international legal expert, member of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professor at the University of St. Petersburg, and Russian legal representative at the Portsmouth Peace Conference of 1905,104 Fedor Fedorovich Martens, wrote in his book

Russia and China: From the very beginning of the relations of Russia with China, the Chinese trusted her, they always absolutely distinguished the Russians from the other European countries, which they [the Chinese] called foreigners and even “overseas devils.” The direct geographic proximity, the respect which the Russians always gave to the customs and habits of the Chinese, the clear desire of the Russian government to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with China created for Russia an exceptional position in her relations with this neighboring empire.105 Similar views were expressed in 1887 by the famous Russian Mongolist and the co-founder of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, Aleksei Matveevich Pozdneev: Russia never took and must never take the well-beaten but sordid path of the Europeans: she has her own history of relations with China and her own goals in the East, which are completely different from the goals of Europe. Chipa fully recognizes this. This is the reason for the hostility toward the Europeans. . . . (T]he name of Russia is used in China unquestionably, though not always consciously, with love. The Chinese government, and likewise her people, cannot but feel a regard for Russia: it cannot forget that Russia saved it from humiliation before its people in 1859 and gave it the opportunity to enter into negotiations with the Europeans without the roar of English cannon; similarly, it well knows that only since Russia came to border directly on China did peace reign in her own boundaries and did the willfulness of the nomads, who had created anxiety in China for whole centuries, . come to an end.. 1 0 6 One Russian even wrote, “More than once Russia had the complete opportunity

96

THE TREATY OF PEKING

to seize territory from the completely defenseless country, for ex. during the Taiping and Dungan rebellions, when the power of the Manchu house seemed shaken to the core, but Russia did not desire to take advantage of the difficulties in China.” 107 Contrary to this writer’s understanding of the facts, the treaties of Aigun, Tientsin, and Peking were all signed in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, and China lost additional territories to Russia during the Dungan Rebellion (discussed in the next section). By a Russian estimate made in 1881, Russia gained 223,018 square miles of territory by the Treaty of Aigun and 124,179 ^ 106 square miles by the Treaty of Peking. In 1900, just months before Russian troops invaded Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising in an unsuccessful attempt to annex the province. Minister of War Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin wrote: “Among Asiatic nations, our relations with China are the most ancient and peaceful. Despite the vast extent of our border and despite our ties with China going back over two centuries, the peace between us has never been broken. More than once we helped China out of difficult situations, in 1860 in her struggle with England and France, in 1876 during the insurrection in Kuldja [Ili] and in 1895 during the struggle with Japan.” 109 As will be shown in the following two sections, the Russian military occupied Ili, Sinkiang, in the 1870s and expelled Japan from the Liao-tung Peninsula in 1895 so that Russia itself could occupy the area in 1898. Contrary to Kuropatkin’s beliefs, these actions did not constitute helping China but rather helping oneself to China.110 Ever since the signing of the Treaty of Aigun, there has been an ongoing dispute between China and Russia about the original sovereignty over the boundary area. The Russians admit that they were not in the area until the seventeenth century and then only in small numbers. While the Chinese tribute system certainly did extend into parts of what became Soviet Central Asia and Siberia, and into Outer Mongolia, it is not always clear just how far into Siberia these tribute relations extended, or how regular the contacts were. Before 1800, the Chinese government had only explored the northern bank of the Amur on one occasion (in 1765). According to the report of that expedition, the area was uninhabited and extremely cold.111 However, the area on the Siberian coast south of the Amur and to the east of the Ussuri River (site of present-day Vladivostok) constituted the northern Manchurian coastline and had long been settled by M anchus.112 Indeed, the name, Ussuri, is derived from the Manchu name, Usuli. 113 Such etymological information supports other evidence provided by the pattern of settlement along the Amur. That is, while the Manchus and the Chinese possessed active ties with the Manchurian coastal region between the Ussuri and Amur rivers, these ties became tenuous further inland along the Amur. These Manchu lands had become a part of China with the creation of the Ch’ing Dynasty. Therefore, while the Chinese claims to original sovereignty over the Russian Maritime region are strong, they are considerable weaker for the lands further inland.

THE TREATY O F PEKING

97

Inland along the Amur, the native population was both more varied and more scattered. While different tribes from time to time had paid tribute to the Chinese, these peoples were neither Han nor Manchu. Although their dress and features were A siatic—and in this sense were closer to the cultural world of China than to that of Russia—they were linguistically and culturally distinct from both the Han and the Manchus.114 Like their contemporaries, the American Indians, these peoples lacked the organization and the technology to maintain their independence once there arose an outside interest in their lands. In the mid-nineteenth century, with the spread of European notions of territorial sovereignty, these peoples were no longer left to haphazard contacts, but were incorporated into the empire of their dominant neighbor, that is, Russia. Facilitating this process was the policy of the Ch’ing Dynasty not to permit Han settlement in the Manchu homelands.115 The absence of a significant Chinese population made the areas far more vulnerable to outside occupation. As for the rest of the frontier, even by Chinese accounts, the relationship between China and the peoples of Mongolia and Sinkiang was a tributary one, extended to non-Chinese, for the Han did not settle in numbers in the frontier areas of Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria until the nineteenth century. China had also maintained tributary relations with Russia, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, and other nations, which are now all independent countries recognized as such by both mainland China and Taiwan. Although border disputes remain with certain former tributaries over the exact location of the boundary line, these disputes have resulted from the complexity of surveying a border of such extraordinary length and geographical ruggedness. Today China does not make claims over the territorial heart of these states but over their periphery.116 Thus China’s own modem diplomacy indicates that it does not consider the existence of tributary relations in the past to translate into valid claims to sovereignty in the present. More plausibly, much of the frontier areas was not historically an integral part of either Russia or China, but rather became caught in a struggle between two enormous land empires until it was eventually swallowed up by one or the other. Culturally, the frontiers were neither Han Chinese nor Great Russian, but were populated by ethnic groups which had much more in common with like groups across the border than with either ruling majority group. The issue of original sovereignty has been tendentious due to contemporary political considerations. If much of the frontier is composed of colonies, though they be contiguous ones, then the implication is that they might share the fate of other colonies and of the empires to which they belonged. Empires dissolve and colonies seek independence.

Notes 1. CABM, vol. 19, Hsien-feng, 69 ts’e, 21b yeh. 2 Ibid., 42a yeh. Ch’ing memorials were routinely written by multiple authors. Compilations of memorials, such as CABM, did not necessarily list all authors but often

98

THE TREATY OF PEKING

just the principal one. Instead of “swine,” the Chinese original reads, “sheep.” 3. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, Ortèmaa 3am iCKa nosammH b A3uaTCKHH flfimpTamHT b m eape 1861 rojta reHepast-ajhtOTaHTOM H f l H m aTbeauM o juifuw m TtnecKHx atoiuemtax ero bo Bpem npeômamw b K m ae b 1860 rojty

(Report submitted to the Asiatic Department in January 1861 by Adjutant General N. P. Ignat'ev about diplomatic relations during his tour of duty in China in 1860), 129. 4. Petr V. Shumakher, “K HCTOpHM npnoßpereHHn AMypa. CHomewui c KirraeM c 1848 no 1860 ida” (Toward a history of the acquisition of the Amur. Relations with China from 1848 through 1860), 316; Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, MarepHajmi OTH Ocaim eca k npefowamno b Knrae H H H m anesa b 1859-60 rojax (Materials related to N. P. Ignat’ev’s stint in China from 1859 to the 1860s), 212; R. K. I. Quested, Expansion ofRussia in East Asia, 153;CABM, vol. 16, Hsien-feng, 46 ts’e, 40b-45a yeh; (The veritable record for the Wen-tsung Hsien [Hsien-feng] Emperor), chiton 167,5-8. 5. CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts’e, 15a-b yeh. Quested interprets this imperial edict as an implicit ratification the Treaty of Aigun, arguing that the edict “more or less” accepted the treaty. Given that the emperor explicitly ordered the signing of the Treaty of Peking, and thereby clearly demonstrated his plan to ratify that treaty, this vague edict, which Quested translates into English, should not be interpreted to indicate Chinese ratification of the Treaty of Aigun at that time. Quested, Expansion of Russia, 129-30, 152-3. Similarly, Masataka Banno implies that the treaty was originally ratified (China and the West 1858-1861, 128,148). 6. Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, China’s Entrance into the Family ofNations, 41-4,80. 7. Ignat'ev to Grand Council, Hsien-feng 9/12/27, Ku-kung po-wu yiian Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu (Palace Museum, Department for Ming-Ch’ing Archives), comp., (Collection erf historical materials on SinoRussian relations during the Ch’ing Dynasty), 3 p ie n , hsia, 889. & CABM, vol. 14, Hsien-feng, 25 ts’e, 15a-b yeh. 9. T’ung-tsu Ch’ii, Law and Society in Traditional China, 263. 10. Usa, China’s Entrance, 127. 11. The Ch’ing legal code makes no mention of international law. Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China, 3, 4, 60-1. This excellent book is unusual in that it is co-authored by a lawyer and a China specialist The introductory essay provides a lucid analysis of Chinese law under the Ch’ing. 12. Bodde and Morris, 4; Sybille van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China, 89-90. 13. Although Folsom eschews using the term kuan-hsi —he uses the word friendship instead—his book about the mu-fit system provides a detailed case study of how personal connections and patronage operated in practice. See Kenneth E. Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues, especially pages 17-25. For more information about kuan-hsi, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “The Concept of Guanxi and Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting,” 209-36; Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism, 48-58; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928, 36-47, 68; Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawslri, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, 50-4; Lloyd E. Eastman, Family, Fields, and Ancestors, 36-7,244. 14. Nathan, 48-55. 15. Eastman, Family, 36.

THE TREATY O F PEKING

99

16. This factor helps to explain why leadership changes remain so traumatic in China; for when the person at the summit of power dies, so does his kuan-hsi network. It then takes time for vying potential successors to extend their kuan-hsi networks into the void left by the departed leader. 17. For instance, parents could kill children without punishment, whereas an accidental homicide of a parent by a child entailed an automatic death penalty. Ch’ii, 21-67,226, 278. 18. Bodde and Morris, 4. 19. Hsii has an extensive discussion of China’s view that treaties were not binding. In the mid-nineteenth century, China had remarkably few treaties. Its first four Europeanstyle treaties and amendments thereto were signed between 1689 and 1851 and were all with Russia. These treaties defined the boundary and regulated the bender trade. Since China had compelled the Russians to accept Chinese terms for the border in 1689 and since China did not object to maintaining trade at the border, there was no reason for China not to adhere to the terms of these treaties. Hsii, China’s Entrance, 46, 89-90, 111-2, 139-40. China’s fifth treaty, the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, was signed with Great Britain and, within a few years, parallel treaties were signed with France and the United States. In these treaties the tables were turned; foreign powers forced China to accept their terms. As a result, there was difficulty enforcing the foreign residency terms of these treaties. In the case of the 1858 Treaty erf"Tientsin, the Ch’ing “showed no intention of following the treaty clause that permitted foreign ambassadors to live in Peking.” Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modem China, 162, 181. Thus, even immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin, the Chinese were not adhering to key provisions. See also Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict 1834-1860, vd. 1,333-4,530; Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Submission 1861-1893, vd. 2, 52, 191; Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy 1880-1885,41; S. M. Meng, The Tsungli-Yamen: Its Organization and Functions, 17. It is worth noting that, under modem international law, the validity of treaties signed prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations is not affected by whether or not they were negotiated under duress. Louis Henkin et al.. International Law Cases and Materials, 640. 20. Bodde and Morris, 64; Hsieh, 35,83. 21. Thomas A. Metzger, The Internal Organization o f Ch’ing Bureaucracy, 186. See also pages 160-1,185. 22. CABM, vd. 15, Hsien-feng, 33 ts’e, 24a-25a yeh. The term the Hsien-feng Emperor uses in his edict is “BfK'SUBK.” 23. Ibid.,37 ts’e, 16a, 20b yeh;38 ts’e, 5b-6b yeh. 24. Ibid., 36 ts’e, 8b-9b yeh. 25. Ibid., 33 ts’e, 4b yeh; 37 ts’e, 13a-14a, 18a, 20a-b yeh For other information about the lack of Chinese forces on its Manchurian frontiers, see Quested, Expansion of Russia, 206-9. 26. CABM, vd. 15, Hsien-feng, 38 ts’e, 1lb yeh; 40 ts’e, 32a yeh 27. Ibid., 40 ts’e, 34a yeh. Here the emperor did not seem to consider the treaty binding from a legal point of view, but from a practical (me; he had come to realize that the Russians intended to force Chinese acceptance and adherence to the Treaty of Aigun, regardless of Chinese objections.

100

THE TREATY OF PEKING

28. CABM, vol. 16, Hsien-feng, 41 ts’e, 3T7b-38byeh. 29. Ibid, 42 ts’e. 2b yeh; 47 ts’e. la-b yeh; Ignat'ev, Materials, 46,58. 30. CABM, vol. 16, Hsien-feng, 41 ts’e. 37b-38b yeh; 46 ts’e, 23a-b yeh; 47 ts’e, la-2a yeh. 31. Ibid, 43 ts’e, 7b, 1la yeh. 32. Ignat'ev, Materials, 4546; CABM, vol. 15, Hsien-feng, 37 ts’e, 16a yeh; Quested Expansion ofRussia, 161-7,172. 33. Joseph Fletcher, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800-1862,” 345. 34. Shumakher, 302-7 Ignat'ev, Materials, 12-38; CABM, vol. 13, Hsien-feng, 21 ts’e, 28a, 49a yeh; 22 ts’e, 1la yeh. In the early summer of 1858, Putiatin had written the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Tientsin, Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na offering to provide military assistance. Originally he offered to provide 10 military instructors, 50 cannon, and 20,000 rifles to help it fend off the British, but he subsequently reduced this to five or six instructors, 10,000 rifles, and 10 cannon. Thereafter, the Chinese turned down the offer but, after defeats in the battles during the Second Opium War, the Chinese changed their mind to request the delivery of the weapons, which were received at Kiakhta in early 1862. The final delivery included 10,000 rifles and other armaments but no Russian instructors. Quested Expansion of Russia, 67, 115, 140-3, 157,175-7,272-3,275; Ignat'ev, Materials, 5-7,4224,463. 35. Ignat'ev, Materials, 3946,52-3,58. For the Chinese copies of his correspondence for 1859 to Chinese diplomats, see Academia Sinica ( Institute for Modem History Hiilfrlê • ffîSfë (The four-country [Britain, France, United States, Russia] new archive; Russian archive), 609-10,614-5,622,624-6,635-7,63940,642-3, 657,666,6934,699-700,705-7. 36. Morse, vol. 1,557. 37. Ignat’ev, Materials, 85,107-9. 38. Ibid., 51. For similar opinions see; 57-8,61,64,96. 39. CABM, vol. 17, Hsien-feng, 55 ts’e, 29a-30a yeh; Quested Expansion ofRussia, 248. 40. Ignat'ev, Materials, 177. 41. Su-shun (Üffit) presided over the ill-fated regency established upon the death of the Hsien-feng Emperor. A coup d’état by the Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi resulted in his execution. For more information, see Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese ofthe Ch’ing Period, 666-9. 42. Shumakher, 308; Ignat'ev, Materials, 404,55-6,65-6,103; Hummel, 666-9. 43. Ignat'ev, Materials, 90-92. 44. Ibid., 64,97-9,126-8,130. 45. Shumakher, 309-22; Ignat’ev, Materials, 57-60. 46. From the descriptions provided in Chinese memorials, the Russians were known for losing their tempers during negotiations. 47. Ignat’ev, Materials, 100-1,111-25,157-66. 48. Shumakher, 316-22; Ignat'ev, Materials, 212. 49. Henri Confier, L’Expédition de Chine de 1860: Histoire diplomatique, notes et documents (The expedition to China of I860; A diplomatic history, notes and documents), 208-9,400; Morse, vol. 1,507-8. 50. Ignat'ev, Materials, 83-9, 94; Ignat'ev, Report, 16-18; Quested Expansion of Russia, 257.

THE TREATY O F PEKING

101

51. Ignafev, Materials, 104-7. 52. Ibid, 298-9. 53. Quested, Expansion of Russia, 187, 282; Gerald S. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-1860, 289-90,293-1. 54. Ivan Platonovich Barsukov, /pa$ Hwcomü UtKomemm MypàBt&t-AuypCKtm (Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskii), vol. 2,284. 55. Ignat'ev, Report, 1-10. 56. Ignat'ev, Materials, 299. 57. Quested, Expansion ofRussia, 282. 58. When the British belatedly learned of the contents of the Russian 1860 Treaty of Peking, they were stunned. British newspapers were full of articles accusing Russia of “cowardly” using British military victories for its own territorial expansion. Ignat'ev, Materials, 443. 59. Ibid, 189-91,200,221-95,303-5,328. 60. Hummel, 380-1; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, Rise of Modem China, 215; Morse, vol. 1, 600-11. 61. Banno, 51. Banno is quoting Elgin to Russell, 10/25/1860, Parliamentary Papers, no. 66 (2754), Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859-60, pp. 213-5. 62. CABM, vol. 19, Hsien-feng, 65 ts’e, 5b, 3\byeh. 63. Ignat'ev, Report, 239. 64. Ignat'ev, Materials, 343-58; Ignat'ev, Report, 234-8; John William Stanton, 'The Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1847-1875,” 380. For examples of Chinese warnings that the Russians were not to be trusted, see Hsien-feng 7/7/1 (8/20/1857), WHB, et. al., Hsien-feng 8/3/19 (5/2/1858), et al.,Hsien 10/5/29 (7/17/1860), Ku-kung po-wu yuan, Ming-Ch’ing tang-an-pu, 3 pien, shang, 338, chung, 455-7, hsia, 961-3. 65. Ignat'ev, Report, 240-1. 66. Ibid, 247. 67. William Frederick Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, 37-43,72-5,105-12; Ignat'ev, Materials, 298-9. 68. Ignat'ev, Materials, 298-9,359-69; Ignat'ev, Report, 270; Banno, 38-40,93. 69. Ignat’ev, Report, 270,283-6,292; Mayers, 105-12. 70. Ignat'ev, Materials, 386-91,393; Ignat’ev, Report, 283-4,288,293-5. 71. “IleKIfHCKHH JtOnOJlHMTeJTbHiJH AOTOBOp 06 OnpeiteJieHHM pyCCKO-KHTaHCKHX rparam, noptunce AHnnoMannecKHx CHOtuemiH h o Topronie b ICyjibAxe” (Supplemental Treaty of Peking on the determination of the Russo-Chinese boundary, rules for diplomatic relations and on trade in Kuldja [Ili]), in Petr Emel’ianovich Skachkov et al., PyŒxo-KmaffCKHe ormtuemut, 1689-1916, OtpmjmJibmie jotcyiueHTbi (Russo-Chinese relations, 1689-1916, official documents), 34-40. The text is also reprinted in Polnoe

sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (fjo/mœ co6ptume 33lkohob Pöcamacoü Hmkphh) (Complete collection of the laws of the Russian empire), no. 36459,12/26/1860 ( 1/7/1861), 517-24. At the time of the 1727 border treaties, neither the Russian nor the Chinese empire had extended far enough into Central Asia to come into contact with each other there. But after the Ch’ien-lung Emperor subjugated Zungharia and Kashgaria in the mid-eighteenth century, and after Russia had expanded its dom ains into Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, the two empires had absorbed the intervening buffer area. Richard A. Pierce,

102

THE TREATY OF PEKING

Russian Central Asia 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule, 43; Ivan Fedorovich Babkov, BoatOMnamw o Moeü aiyxße b 3anajHOH Cn6npn, 1859-1875 it. Psapanneme c 3arwmiu iùrraeM, 1869 r. (Memoirs of my lour of service in Western Siberia, 1859-1875. Delimiting the border with western China, 1869), 142-58. From the tsarist government’s point of view, the treaties of Aigun and Peking had consolidated Russia’s position in the Far East in the nick of time. By the mid- 1850s, Britain and France were pressuring China to permit foreign navigation of her internal waterways, which would have given them access to the rivers flowing into the Amur, and thereby to the heart of Siberia. When they secured this right in 1858 in Tientsin, Russia already had legal control over the north bank of the Amur under the Treaty of Aigun. A. L. Popov, “Ußpaean jtfrutOMaTHfi b anoxy TawnwHCxoro BoœraHHa c npeaHCJiOBiieM A J l rionoBa” (Tsarist diplomacy in the epoch of the Taiping Rebellion with a foreword by A. L. Popov), 193. 72. Ignafev, Materials, 387. These areas were all in the vicinity of Vladivostok. 73. Ibid., 394. 74. Ignat'ev went on to become the head of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1864 he was made ambassador at Constantinople and thereafter played a crucial role in the diplomacy surrounding the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to 1878, including drawing up the Treaty of San Stefano. In these negotiations he acquired the reputation of “the most talented liar on the Bosphorus.” In 1881 he served as the minister of internal affairs and supported conservative Pan-Slav policies. Gerald Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810-1895, 96-7. 75. Hsü Li-t’ing (The emperors Hsien-feng and T’ung-chih), 200-7. 76. According to Hok-lam Chan, a key facet of dynastic legitimacy was “semantic legitimation” which “consisted of the articulation and manipulation of rituals and symbols.” The end of the tribute system deprived the Ch’ing dynasty of a key component of this semantic legitimation. Legitimation in Imperial China, 45. 77. Hummel, 379-80; Banno, 215,217. 78 Ignat'ev, Materials, 472-3. A protocol and map delimiting the Ussuri sector of the boundary had been signed on June 28,1861. “iJpnojTHHTejibHaa crann k IleiawacOMy 4oroBopy o pa3Mene icapraMH h paarparonetiHH b YocyptwacoM Kpae” (Supplementary article to the Treaty of Peking concerning the exchange of maps and demarcation of the Ussuri region), 6/16/1861 (6/28/1861), in Skachkov, Russo-Chinese Relations, 41-2. See also Babkov, 75-9. The treaty of 1864 was signed by Consul-General of Ili (Kuldja) Ivan Zakharov, Colonel of the Separate Siberian Corps of the General Staff Ivan Babkov, General of Uliastai Ming I (3/3it), Amban (imperial regent) of Tarbagatai Hsi Lin ( MM), andTarbagatai Brigade Commander Bolgosu “HyiyaicacMH iqjoroican o pa3Mexe8aHHH pyocxo-KHTaHCKOM rpaHHUu” (Chuguchak Protocol on the demarcation of the RussoChinese boundary), in Skachkov, Russo-Chinese Relations, 46-9. Other boundary protocols were signed in Khovd (Kobdo, Khobdo) in 1869 and Tarbagatai in 1870. Ting Tsz Kao, The Chinese Frontiers, 163. 79. Babkov, 90-2,101,16489. 80. Ibid., 179. 81. Ibid., 182-3. 82. Ibid., 206.

THE TREATY O F PEKING

1Q3

83. Ibid, 210. 84. Ibid, 258 85. China marked its western boundary with several lines of parallel pickets. The inner-most pickets were permanent, while the outer ones were moved from time to time. Ibid, 162-3,197-227. 86. Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers, 193. 87. Babkov, 162-3,197-227. 88. Ibid, 229-50,255-6,262-6,279,286-92,360. Babkov believed that the uprising compelled the Chinese government to accept the much-disputed Russian draft treaty of Tarbagatai. 89. Fred W. Drake, China Charts the World: Hsu Chi-Yii and His Geography of 1848,3-5. For the section on Russia, see 128-31. 90. Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang, “Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations,” 172-88; James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War, passim; Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 208-10,218; Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 31-2,50-1,62,70-84; Barbara Jelavich, A Century ofRussian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914, 173-5,185,194,197, 201,213-5,261 ; Dominic C. B. Lieven, Russian and the Origins o f the First World War, 153-4. 91. Hao and Wang, 194-99. 92. Wen-hsiang was “the most famous and best regarded court bureaucrat of his day .. . [Thomas] Wade claimed he had ‘never encountered a more powerful intellect,’ and others described Wenxiang as the most able, most advanced, most patriotic, most prepossessing in appearance, most honest, most modest, or simply best man in China.” Pamela Kyle Ciossley, Orphan Warriors, 141-2. See also 143-5; Hummel, 853-5. 93. Banno, 219-36; John K. Fairbank and Sstt-yu Teng, Ch’ing Administration, 158; Marie Mancall, China at the Center, 16-17. 94. Thomas Witlam Atkinson, Travels in the Regions of the Upper and Lower Amoor and the Russian Acquisitions on the Confines of India and China, 335. The French ambassador to SL Petersburg, the Duke of Montebello, made a similar comment on February 28, 1861, when he predicted that Russia would ultimately become a Pacific Ocean power rivaling Britain, France, and the United States. Henri Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances Occidentales 1860-1902 (The history of the relations between China and the Western powers, 1860-1902), vol. 1,97. 95. Ignat’ev, Materials, 108-9,252-3,279. 96. Alan J. Day, ed.. Border and Territorial Disputes, 259. 97. M. E. Falkus, The Industrialisation ofRussia 1700-1914, 17. 96. This argument is developed in detail in part in. 99. Kao, 124. 100. Nailene Josephine Chou, “Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ch’ing China,” 167,175-8,204,212-3. 101. Mark Mancall, Russia and China, 274-6. 102. Vladivostok was settled in 1860 and incorporated as a city in 1876. G. V. Glinka, ed, Asmiacaa Pooam (Asiatic Russia), vol. 1,346. KB. Ignat'ev, Materials, 379-84; Ignat'ev, Report, 253. Ignat'ev listed twenty-five accomplishments on the behalf of China; (1) reduction of the indemnity, (2) agreement by the French to accept a palace different from the one originally demanded, (3) agreement not to try Chinese officials in a military court, (4) agreement for the gradual, rather than

104

THE TREATY OF PEKING

immediate, return of all Catholic church property, (5) return of allied troops to Tientsin before the signing of the Treaty of Peking, (6) reduction of the troops in Peking from 4,000, to 500 for the French and 1,000 for the British, (7) no additional demands from those made earlier, (8) end of demands for the bodies of two dead French hostages, (9) assistance to make the delivery of the silver indemnity, ( 10) agreement by the allies not to redeploy their troops, (11) agreement not to send troops to the southern part of Peking, (12) agreement by the British to return the Manchu, Fei, and not to take other Manchu officials prisoner, (13) agreement by the French to cease asking to see the French text of their 1858 Treaty of Tientsin which had been destroyed during the sacking of the palace at Hai-tien, (14) convincing the British to speed up the signing of their convention, (15) cease firing ceremonial cannon, (16) withdrawal of demands on China to finance a cemetery for the deceased hostages, ( 17) agreement by the French not to bring the bodies of the deceased hostages into Peking but to deliver them directly to the cemetery, (18) agreement by the French not to set off cannon during the burial services, withdrawal of complaints about the stolen crosses, and agreement by the British and French not to enter the Forbidden City, (19) agreement by the French to accept Chinese, not French troops, to oversee the return of Catholic missionaries, (20) agreement by the British to sign and exchange its treaties in the Palace of Ceremonies, (21) agreement by the allies to return their Chinese mercenaries from whence they were hired and to hasten their withdrawal from Peking, (22) agreement by the allies to withdraw from Peking for the winter, (23) end to looting by allied troops, (24) agreement by the allies not to enter Chinese temples, (25) prevention of the destruction of the cities of T’ung-chou, Tientsin, and various temples. Materials, 379-83. 104. See chapter 9 for a discussion of the Portsmouth Peace Conference concluding the Russo-Japanese War. 105. Fedor Fedorovich Martens, Pocchh h Kmati, HcropHKO-nOJwnnecKoe HCJiejtOBaHHe (Russia and China. Historical and political research), 2. For related opinions of Martens, see “ 3anncKa (Dl fl). MapreHCa ‘Eßpona h Kurari (Memorandum by F. F. Martens, ‘Europe and China’), 182-5. He repeats the myth that Russia helped China after the Sino-Japanese War when Russia helped expel Japan from the Liao tung Peninsula only to occupy the area herself three years later ‘The magnanimous defense of China by Russia after the Sino-Japanese War, even further strengthened the long-standing feeling of good neighborliness, which the Chinese people felt for the Russian people” (183). 106. A. M. Pozdneev, “0 6 OTHOtueHHHX eBponeräieB k Kirran. Petb nporcHecëHHaa Ha aicre C-IferepCypixacoro VHHBepcuTCTa 8-ro «feBpajia 1887 roaa” (Regarding the relations of the Europeans with China. Speech delivered at the commencement of the University of St. Petersburg on 8 February 1887 [20 February 1887]), 262-3. 107. lu. Kushelev, Mohtojwb h Mohtomckuh Bonpoc (Mongolia and the Mongolian question), 54. The Dungan Rebellion refers to the Muslim Rebellion ( 1862-78) discussed in chapter 4. 108.1. Strel'bitskii, 3&oejn>Hue npno6perema Pooam b uapcwoeamie fhmepaTopa Anoccawpa Il-oro c 1855 no 1881 rvjt (Russian territorial acquisitions during the reign erf Emperor Alexander II from 1855 through 1881), 4-5. See also Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov, TkxKMenbHue npHoOpeTenwa h ycryracH Pocchh 3a nocne/mwe TpnauaTb jict, 1850-1880” (Russian territorial acquisitions and cessions during the last thirty years, 1850-1880), 124, 137-8. Strel'bitskii has trouble

THE TREATY OF PEKING

105

with his mathematics when he attempts to convert versts to miles. He estimates that Russia gained 507,552 square versts by the Treaty of Aigun and 282,610 square versts by the Treaty of Peking. He claims that this would be 10,489.91 and 5,840.88 square miles respectively. Since cme verst is equal to .6629 miles, one square verst is equal to .4394 square miles. The correct conversion to miles has been given in the text above. Other sources provide somewhat different estimates. According to Day, the Treaty of Aigun gave Russia sovereignty over 185,000 sq. mi. (480,000 sq. km.), while the Treaty of Peking provided an additional 130,000 sq. mi. (340,000 sq. km.). Day, 259-60. Given the limitations of geographic knowledge at the time of the 1689 and 1727 border treaties, it is not surprising that the territorial estimates vary. The original border line was not precise, since the geographic landmarks mentioned in the early treaties were not necessarily accurate. 109. “ BcenoitaHHeftiiiHH itOKJtajt Boetmoro (VbntMCrpa b 1900 roay” (Most humble report by the Minister of War [Kuropatkin] in 1900),” 3/14/1900 (3/27/1900), BA, Witte, box 11, file 27, part 1, p. 127. For additional related observations by Kuropatkin, see Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, PyccKO-KmtiMCKHH Bonpoc (The Russo-Chinese question), 3-4. 110. The view that Russia had treated China better than the other powers was widespread among Soviet scholars. See, for instance, M. I. Sladkovsky, The Long Road: Sino-Russian Economic Contacts from Ancient Times to 1917, 198, 202; Aleksei Leont’evich Naiochnitskii et al., KanOHHSUtua/i namnwea KanmajmcnnecxHX AepxaB m /JamneM BocroKe 1860-1895 (The colonial policy of the capitalistic powers in the Far East, 1860-1895), vol. 1, 96,99, 102-3; Evgenii Leonidovich Besprozvannykh, flptiaMypte b euerem PyccKO-KtmitCKMX omotuemm , XVII-cepejuata XIX a (The Amur region in the system of Russo-Chinese relations seventeenth-mid-nineteenth century), 172. See section of Bibliographic Essay on Russian sources. 111. Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” 41. 112. M. Stepanov, IOxHO-Yœypfm(X3m Kpait (The southern Ussuri region), 12-14; Aleksandra N. Novitskaia, HfxHO-YœyptmciatH Kpaü h nepeœjtemm (The Southern Ussuri region and its settlers), 20. 113. V. K Arsen'ev, Kmaihat b YocyptmCKOM Kpae, 1900-1908 m (Chinese in the Ussuri region, 1900-1908), 1. The name, Amur, follows neither the Chinese, MUtC (Hei-lung-chiang or Black dragon river) nor the Manchu, Sakhalin'-ula. It might be derived from the middle syllables of the Mongolian, Khara-muren. While the Manchu also means “black dragon river,” the Mongolian simply means “Mack river.” Apparently, the Russians originally called it Mamur, but later the Russian explorer, Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov (c. 1610-67) referred to it as the Amur. Frants Shrenk believed that the Russian name, Amur, derived from the name used by one of two native groups: the Golds who called it Mangu at the Nivkh people (referred toby die Russians in the past as Giliaks) who called it Mamu. N. Shchukin, Istoriia reki Amura (The history of the river Amur), 5; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia, 207; Frants Shrenk, “Pogcwi iJaiibHero Bocroica” (Russia erf the Far East), 162-3. 114. Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov, Chair Boemtoro cßospemn pycacHX rpamm b Asm (Initial military review of Russian borders in Asia), 83-156; Leopol'd Shrenk, r eorpa^tnetxo^cropmeacaa n Ampono-jrHOjnnetecKaa racm (Geographic-historical and anthro-ethnological parts), vol. 1,12-79; Glinka, vol. 1,123-44.

106

THE TREATY OF PEKING

115. Fletcher, “Ch’ing loner Asia,” 39-40,47. 116. The two cases where China does retain control over a former tributaries are Tibet and Inner Mongolia

Part II Ili, Sinkiang, 1871-1881: A Turning Point in Chinese Foreign Policy

108

Russian and Chinese Central Asia in 1884 éômipalatinsk^“^

m wJ*r m

'C l

/

* U** f Boi^nasft rzjh\

f\ t

(!£ £ & Z j r TalktPasdk. \ j m a y o f isiv a d m V * rK* \ * * \ Targagatai

f

ont Tashkent d l8 Bukhara*

B S \

a i \ f v^ix^jÊr^ffLTjKé jt _ tNin^-yuam] M \Iw \ | S^a rikgU + ^

? \ **

l 'M b r_ a KokarnmJF

m e m u zart Ra.

Iain arkand

lilzb el y ,

ieäss - «fl

'ar,m Taklamaken Kashgari a

■ v . t /Suo-M lSi*'

C m//

Oman ZM

290km 0

350mi

109

Center for Cartographic Research and Spatial Analysis Michigan State University

4 Ethnie Tensions: The Muslim Uprising and Russian Invasion In Europe, we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our spirit and drive us thither.1 Novelist Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky, 1881 [Russia] is like a thief who has already barged through closed doors and now has fully cased the area.2 Various Chinese officials, 1880

In the 1860s the Muslim uprising, which had impeded the border surveys stipulated by the Treaty of Tarbagatai, spread throughout Sinkiang and threatened to cross the frontier into Russian Central Asia. As had been the case with Murav'ev and Nevel'skoi, local officials disregarded the stated policy of the Russian central government, took matters into their own hands, and independently occupied territory. In 1871 the governor-general of Turkestan, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman, ordered his troops to take the strategic Ili Valley in Sinkiang, thus setting the stage for the Ili crisis.3 Also as in the case of the mid-nineteenth-century border treaties, a debacle in the Near East had damaged Russian prestige sufficiently to propel Russia to seek compensation elsewhere. In this case, the 1878 Congress of Berlin took from Russia many of the territorial advantages it thought it had won in the 1877 to 1878 war with Turkey.4 When China seemed to be starting on a new round of internal uprisings, Russian officials seized the opportunity to extend their control deep into Sinkiang, just as their predecessors had taken control over the Amur and Ussuri area during the Taiping Rebellion. Russia again acted when China appeared overcome by internal turmoil and unable to react to Russian advances. Unlike the previous case, however, China was able to recover, albeit temporarily, to quell the Muslim uprising and then to use its forces massed in Sinkiang in order to pressure the Russians into withdrawing. China succeeded because the balance of power in Sinkiang favored it over Russia. In this sense, the Ili crisis 110

ETHNIC TENSIONS

111

was anomalous, since at no other time until the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in 1917 would the local relative balance of power favor China. This was in large measure because in 1891 the Russians decided to allocate the massive funding necessary to build the Trans-Siberian railway and redress the balance permanently. The situation was also anomalous for another reason. A fter quelling the Muslim uprising in 1878, China first sent an ill-prepared envoy to Russia to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops. The resultant 1879 Treaty of Livadia, far from securing a comprehensive troop withdrawal (for Russia retained the most strategic areas), required that China pay a large indemnity for the occupation costs incurred by the Russians and also that China permit them commercial privileges throughout Sinkiang and Mongolia as well as far south to the Yangtze River (Ch’ang-chiang) at Han-k’ou (Hankow). When the Chinese government belatedly understood the scope of the debacle, it refused to ratify the treaty. Unlike the case of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, this time China was able to pressure the Russians into replacing the Treaty of Livadia with a new document, the 1881 Treaty of S t Petersburg, which was much more favorable to Chinese interests. That China was able to do so was directly related to the relative balance of military power at the border and the financial troubles besetting Russia domestically, making attractive the offer of a large indemnity in return for foregoing various territorial acquisitions and commercial opportunities. During the diplomatic uproar over the Russian invasion, China continued the difficult transition, precipitated by the disastrous negotiations at Aigun, Tientsin, and Peking, from handling relations with Russia in an ad hoc manner under the direction of local officials to developing a professional diplomatic corps based in Peking. The contrast between the negotiations for the treaties of Livadia and St. Petersburg is quite remarkable in this respect It helps illustrate the general trend in Chinese diplomacy, beginning with the formation of the Tsungli Yamen in 1861, toward the professionalization—and ultimately the Westernization—of the Chinese diplomatic service. By 1881, when the Ili crisis ended with the signing of the Treaty of S t Petersburg, some Chinese diplomats had acquired a firm understanding of international law and knew how to use it to China’s advantage. They had learned that boundary treaties set precise border lines that could not be easily changed. In learning this lesson, they realized that the territorial interests of Russia threatened China far more seriously than did the more ephemeral commercial concerns of the other European powers. Unfortunately, many other Chinese officials displayed a crude xenophobia devoid of an understanding of the true challenge posed by the West. They did not comprehend that the West with its overwhelming technological superiority could relatively easily to force its commercial demands upon China. With fresh memories of the successful outcome of the Ili crisis, such officials would favor a hard-line foreign policy, which the Chinese government was ill-prepared to pursue.5 Their ill-conceived policies would work to undermine many of the achievements of their more knowledgeable, but less numerous, counterparts.

112

ETHNIC TENSIONS

The Myth of Chinese Original Sovereignty over Sinkiang Sinkiang represented a strategically crucial area for China, not so much for the intrinsic value of the land itself, but as a buffer zone from which to defend the Chinese heartland. Historically, nomads had invaded China through the key mountain passes. Therefore, during the Ch’ing Dynasty, the Chinese devoted enormous resources to extending their control into the area.6 The T’ien-shan Mountains divided Sinkiang into a northern and southern half, while the Altai Mountains formed the boundary with Outer Mongolia. The Muzart Pass in the Ili region and the Dabachin Pass7 south of Wu-lu-mu-ch’i provided the main transportation links between northern and southern Sinkiang.8 North of the mountains was Zungharia and its nomadic world of the steppe, while south of the T ’ien-shan lay Kashgaria with the Tarim Basin and its oasis agriculture, as well as the wasteland of the Taklamakan Desert. The main cities in Kashgaria were located at the foot of the mountain chains delimiting the Tarim Basin with the exception of the gap at Yen-ch’i: the T ’ien-shan marked the extent of the Tarim Basin to the north, the K ’u-lu-k’o to the east, the K ’un-lun and A-erh-chin to the southeast and south, and the Pamirs to the west.9 The Ili Valley, located in the midst of the T ’ien-shan, ran east-west across Sinkiang. In it were located nine walled cities. It provided access to crucial mountain passes, making it an essential transportation link not only east-west but also north-south. Therefore, Chinese control over all of Sinkiang depended on the retention of the Ili Valley.10 The strategic importance of Ili was reflected bureaucratically: during the Ch’ing, the Ili Valley town of Hui-yiian (also known as Ili, New Kuldja or Manchu Kuldja) became the administrative center for both Zungharia and Kashgaria.11 The strategic value of the Ili Valley was clearly recognized at the time. Because the Muzart Pass controlled communication between the Russian steppe and Sinkiang, the Russians had already built a road in 1845 connecting the Ili Valley town of Ning-yiian (then known to the Russians as Kuldja and now called I-ning) to the military outpost at Orenburg at the southern extremity of the Ural Mountains. An 1851 commercial treaty between Russia and China extended to Russia the right to establish consulates in Tarbagatai, located on the main route both between eastern and western Asia and between Siberia and Zungharia, and in Ili, situated to the south. Then in 1854 the Russians founded the city of Vemyi (Alma-Ata), located in the lower Ili Valley on the route to Kashgaria while, under the 1860 Treaty of Peking, the Russians founded a consulate in Kashgar.12 From the Russian point of view, as long as the upper Ili Valley remained outside their control, it formed a naturally fortified point from which an attack could be launched against Russian Turkestan, while its connection to Kashgaria via the Muzart Pass made it the key invasion route between northern and southern Sinkiang. Indeed, the Ch’ing had repeatedly sent their armies through this pass to maintain their control over Sinkiang. Economically, the Ili Valley constituted one of the largest and most fertile oases of Central Asia and

ETH NIC TENSIONS

113

the richest in Sinkiang, located on the key trade route connecting Tashkent and Kashgaria—there was no better trade route for maintaining Russian commerce with China. It was known not only for its production of grain and cotton but also for its mineral resources.13 Historically, despite fervent Chinese assertions to the contrary,14 Sinkiang had never been an integral part of China, but was rather the home to various and changing tributaries.15 According to Owen Lattimore: The history of the Chinese in Central Asia, therefore, is a history of imperialism, of conquest The Chinese could not here expand, adding contiguous region to contiguous region as they did in their advance toward the Yangtze and beyond, but had to subjugate and dominate from afar. They had, moreover, to compete with the imperialism of the steppe, which also attempted to assert its control over the oasis world. The record of the Chinese in Central Asia is therefore by no means continuous; in fact, their effective control has been estimated at only about 425 of about 2,000 years.16 Another scholar has written, “Even the most powerful dynasties in pre-modem times, the Han and the Tang (A.D. 618-907), could not permanently govern Mongolia, Manchuria, or Central Asia.”17 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu writes: Chinese relations with the Hsi-yii Sinkiang], ever since the Han period, had revolved around the three phases of conquest, appeasement, and relinquishment, as reflected in the three historical concepts of Grand Unification, Minor Unification, and Precarious Security. The Western Region was never an integral part of China proper, but a frontier area. During the Ch’ing period Sinkiang was in essence a military colony of the Manchus. But after the [1881] Treaty of SL Petersburg the Ch’ing government took the unprecedented step of raising its status to that of a regular province. Thus, for the first time in history Sinkiang was on a par with the rest of the empire. It was indeed a landmark in Chinese frontier history.18 «

Only during the last dynasty did China finally take over all of what is now Sinkiang province.19 The first three Ch’ing em perors launched repeated expeditions to extend Manchu control into Central Asia, while the fourth emperor, Ch’ien-lung (§ËfÜ), completed the task in a spectacular campaign defeating Zungharia in 1757 and the remaining pockets of unrest in Kashgaria in 1759. His general, Chao-hui (^fclS), engaged in what today would be considered genocide: “He hunted down and killed most of the surviving Zunghars that could be found, while a few groups were deported to Manchuria.”20 It has been estimated that 80 percent of the Zunghar population perished during the unrest. To populate the void, Ch’ien-lung relocated people en masse as colonists.21 Those resettled included Han Chinese and Dungans (sinicized Muslims) from

114

ETHNIC TENSIONS

Kansu and Shensi, and Uigurs22 (Muslim agriculturalists) from Kashgaria. To enforce Manchu control, the Ch’ing garrisoned the area with banner forces composed of Manchus and Mongols. In addition, like Siberia, Sinkiang served as a place of exile for criminals and political prisoners. It was Ch’ien-lung who named the area Sinkiang, or the “New Dominion” nine years after the conquest in 1768.23 Before that time, it had been known as Hsi-yii, or the “Western Frontier.” Both names convey the sense that the area had historically recent and territorially weak connections to the rest of China. The name “Western Frontier” implies that, at that time, the area was not considered by Chinese to be an integral part of China but, rather, a frontier region in the framework of tributary relations. Under this framework, tributary nations functioned as buffer states, not as integral parts of China.24 The payment of tribute and exchange erf*gifts symbolized friendly relations and at most an alliance but certainly not sovereignty in the modem sense. Integral parts of China, after all, did not send tribute missions: Chinese provinces paid taxes, not tribute. At that time, no Chinese would have argued that these places had the same status as the Chinese heartland. It was only after extended contact with Europeans and after the loss of territory to them in the form of concessions and official border treaties that some Chinese scholars have tried to equate tributary status with sovereignty to justify Chinese rule over Sinkiang, Tibet, and Mongolia—places where, before 1949, the Chinese population was vastly outnumbered by native peoples. Russian Expansion into Central Asia By chance, just after Chinese imperialism had reached its peak and had begun to decline in the late eighteenth century with the passing of the Ch’ien-lung Emperor, Russian imperialism entered a new dynamic phase with conquests in southern and eastern Russia. In the mid-nineteenth century, tsarist Russia rapidly took the vast territories in Central Asia, bringing it for the first time into close contact with Chinese territories in Sinkiang. After founding Vemyi in 1854, the Russians took Tashkent in 1865; subjugated the Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara in 1868; defeated the Uzbek Khanate of Khiva in 1873; and conquered the Uzbek Kokand Khanate in 1876. To incorporate these areas into the tsarist administrative system, the governor-generalship of Turkestan was established in 1867 and Central Asian oblasti (bolder provinces) were set up in Semipalatinsk in 1854; in Syr Darya and Semirech'e in 1867; and in Uralsk, Turgai, and Akmolinsk in 1868. After the Russian invasion of the Ili Valley in 1871, an oblast' of Kuldja was established in 1873.25 Thus, Russian expansion into Ili was simply the latest part of its southward movement into Central Asia. The annexation of the Ili Valley would have completed the Russian occupation of the basin of Lake Balkhash since they already controlled the seven rivers flowing into i t (The name erf Semirech'e (seven rivers) oblast' is derived from these rivers.) The emerging

ETHNIC TENSIONS

115

frontier between Chinese and Russian Turkestan26 for the most part followed impassable natural barriers such as the Pamirs and T ’ien-shan ranges. It was only possible to cross in a few places, and the Ili Valley was one of these.27 Since the emerging frontier followed geographic features, it did not conform to ethnic divisions. Historically, the peoples on both sides had ongoing contact, as nomads migrating across the border according to the seasons and also as traders plying their wares.28 Most shared the Muslim faith, although sects varied by ethnic group. Thus, these peoples had indisputable ties with each other that were historically far stronger than any ties they had with Russia or China. As in the case of the native inhabitants along the Amur, the Muslims of Sinkiang had become pawns in the nineteenth-century competition for empire and were similarly in the process of being swallowed up by the dominant power. For both China and Russia, Sinkiang had appreciable strategic importance. As two great land em pires, they shared sim ilar m ilitary concerns in defending long frontiers populated by ethnically diverse peoples who did not necessarily welcome rule from afar. Both feared any outside interference, whether from Great Britain (in the case of Russia) or from Russia (in the case of China). There were several reasons for the rapid advance of Russia into Central Asia. Foremost, a key strategic problem for the Russian military has always been an illusive quest for defensible natural borders largely absent on the great plains of Russia. In the case of Central Asia, although the indigenous peoples were no match for modern weaponry, those living in the areas just beyond Russian control continued to loot Russian territories and otherwise disrupt economic life. Therefore, Russian troops would penetrate farther afield only to encounter new groups of hostile peoples. The personal ambitions of local Russian commanders gave further impetus to this process. In addition, the Russians wanted to forestall British penetration of Central Asia and also hoped that they could use Russian dominance to put pressure on India as a way to undermine British opposition to Russian advances on the Bosporus.29 Thus, Russian expansion in Central Asia became a part of the so-called Great Game,30the Anglo-Russian rivalry to establish spheres of influence from the Near East to the Far East. Sinkiang became the easternmost periphery of this struggle, which focused mainly on control of Persia and Afghanistan in the late nineteenth century. Russia also had economic ambitions in Central Asia. When the American Civil War disrupted the international cotton market, Russian textile manufacturers had to search for local sources.31 The Russians optimistically hoped that they could develop a profitable trade with Sinkiang, Persia, and India. But like earlier Russian expansion into the Amur Valley and Ussuri coastal region, that into Central Asia became a financial drain. From 1868 to 1878, these Central Asian acquisitions generated about 32 million rubles in revenues but cost the government 99 million in outlays.32 As the Russian government had hoped, its continued advance southward into what became known as Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan did cause alarm in Britain

116

ETHNIC TENSIONS

with regard to its colony in India. Lest this alarm become excessive and precipitate hostilties in Central Asia, in late 1864 Foreign Minister Gorchakov felt obliged to issue a circular to various foreign governments to assuage their fears about uncontrolled Russian expansion. In many ways it represents a candid explanation for tsarist foreign policy: The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised States which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organisation. In such cases, it always happens that the more civilised State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours. First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but are in their turn exposed to the attacks of the more distant tribes. The State is bound to defend them against these depredations, and to punish those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organisation makes it impossible to seize. If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilisation has as yet no hold upon them. The work has then always to be done over again from the beginning. In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced submission. But soon beyond this second line other still more distant tribes come in turn to threaten the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless labour and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilisation an impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance. Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her Colonies, England in India—all have been forced, less by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know when to stop.... The Imperial Government thus found itself, in spite of all its efforts, in the dilemma we have above alluded to, that is to say, compelled

ETHNIC TENSIONS

117

either to permit the continuance of a state of permanent disorder, paralysing to all security and {»ogress, or to condemn itself to costly and distant expeditions, leading to no practical result, and with the work always to be done anew; or, lastly, to enter upon the undefined path of conquest and annexation which has given to England the empire of India, by attempting the subjugation by armed force, one after another, of the small independent states whose habits of pillage and turbulence and whose perpetual revolts leave their neighbours neither peace nor progress.. .. It is needless for me to lay stress upon the interest which Russia evidently has not to increase her territory, and, above all, to avoid raising complications on her frontiers, which can but delay and paralyse her domestic development. .. Very frequently of late years the civilisation of these countries, which are her neighbours on the continent of Asia, has been assigned to Russia as her special missioa33 Thus, according to Gorchakov, Russia had two goals in Central Asia: a desire to secure defensible borders and a mission to civilize its neighbors. Thereafter, the notion of a civilizing mission became a fixture of tsarist foreign policy in Asia. The Muslim Uprising o f 1862 to 1878 and the Myth of Chinese Moderation By the mid-nineteenth century, the ethnic mix in Sinkiang included Uigurs, various Mongol tribes, Kazakhs (Turkic-speaking Muslim steppe nomads) and Kirghiz34 (Turkic-speaking Muslim Alpine nomads). Although many of these groups were mutually hostile, most shared a common overriding animosity toward the Chinese.35 According to a contemporary Russian observer, “We find that there are no local, tribal or religious ties among the tribes of different peoples and that the difficulty in reaching the area also divides them geographically, so that discord among them could go on for an indeterminately long time. From our side, the absorption of small tribes has already been done with considerable success.”36 The Imperial Russian General Staff reported that “the various tribes in western China fight among themselves [but] share a common hatred of the Chinese, whom they look upon as their enslavers.”37 The report went on to describe the venal local Chinese officials, addicted to opium and ignorant of local customs, who showed no concern for the local inhabitants but only for Chinese merchants.38 Another Russian observer explained, “The despotism of the Chinese, the oppression of the people by the venality of the Chinese authorities—all this is alive in the memories of the population of western China—and it had to be subjected to heavy and unbearable calamities in order for it to resent Chinese domination.”39 Minority peoples’ discontent with Chinese rule in the frontier areas of Turkestan had a long history, with continuous uprisings from the eighteenth century onward.

118

ETHNIC TENSIONS

There were revolts of Muslims living in the Sinkiang from 1755 through 1758, in 1765, in 1815, from 1817 through 1826, from 1830 through 1835, in 1847, in 1852, in 1854, in 1857, and 1862 through 1878.40 This frequency of revolt during the Ch’ing Dynasty, and indeed to this day, demonstrates that these peoples wanted to free themselves from Chinese rule. Moreover, the death toll was enormous.41 According to one estimate, the Muslim uprising in northwest China reduced the population of Kansu from l5 million to one million and involved the death of nine-tenths of the Chinese population and two-thirds of the Muslims.42 Even in 1910, the population of the Hi Valley had not reached its pre-uprising level.43 Thus, Chinese control over Sinkiang depended on military occupation and was still continually challenged by the indigenous population. At the time when the Muslim uprising began in Shensi in 1862, the Chinese government felt unable to take firm action and left its suppression in the hands of poorly equipped and often corrupt local officials. Indeed, before the unrest broke out, an assignment to Hi, which should have been a hardship post because it was on a remote frontier, was actually highly desired by officials because of the lucrative opportunities for corruption there.44 Once the uprising started, administrative corruption impeded military action. According to a Sibo Mongol observer, Chinese administration of the Hi region was incompetent; the Chinese officials ignored their soldiers, who despised them in turn. Then, when the uprising started, officials, instead of spearheading the defenses, tried to flee, only to be massacred themselves.45 The Ch’ing government initially did little to slow the spread of the Muslim uprising in northwest China since it was beset by the final stages of quelling the Taiping Rebellion, which had devastated the southern half of China from 1850 to 1864; still in the midst of putting down the Nien Rebellion, which affected four provinces in eastern China from 1851 to 1868; and also trying to control another Muslim uprising in Yunnan from 1855 to 1873. Exacerbating the problem was a power struggle set in motion when the death of the Hsien-feng Emperor in 1861 left the throne occupied by a five-year-old and power in the hands of an unstable regency composed of eight regents and two empresses dowager. The Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi ( ££€) did not really begin to consolidate her control until 1865 with the first demotion of Prince Kung ( 3SÎS3:). She only completed the consolidation a few years after the sudden death of the other empress dowager in 1881 and the permanent demotion of Prince Kung in 1884.46 In die absence of firm policies from the government, the uprising spread rapidly from Shensi to Kansu. It then spread to Zungharia in the second half of 1864, when “ [i]n less than six months the entire area north and south of the T ’ien-shan Mountains, a territory three times larger than France, went out of Ch’ing control.’’47 The fighting was vicious on both sides, with high civilian casualties. For example, according to eyewitnesses, the rebels massacred up to 130,000 people when they took T arbagatai.48 In addition to administrative corruption, the reasons behind the uprising stemmed

ETHNIC TENSIONS

119

from long-standing ethnic tensions between Chinese officials, appointed from the outside, and the local Muslim inhabitants. In 1865 the Russian Ministry of the Interior sent a team to investigate the cause of the Muslim uprising by interviewing Kirghiz and Kalmuks (a Mongol people) living on Russian territoiy along the Chinese border. The Russians learned that the Dungans, a Sunni Muslim people, who in dress and language appeared Chinese, were the main instigators of the uprising. Previously, die Dungans had used their role as a bridge between the Muslim and Chinese worlds to promote their trade with both groups. The Chinese, however, looked down on them. Starting in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Chinese attempted to sinicize them further by decreeing that all men have queues, the long braids obligatory in Manchu society, and that women have bound feet, the custom among the Han Chinese. Various administrative rules were designed to force the Dungans to marry their daughters to non-Muslim Chinese^ a practice which the Dungans found particularly offensive. In addition, the Dungans considered Chinese taxes ever more onerous.49 According to the secret annual reports put out by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Dungans had long been dissatisfied with Chinese rule, with the most intense dissent centered in the Kashgarian cities of Kashgar, Aksu, and Yarkand. The fact that many of the troops and officers in Ili were Dungans greatly facilitated the spread of the uprising.30 From 1864 to 1866, the grand minister consultant in Ili, Ming-hsti (98M), and his successor, Jung-ch’Uan ($ !^ ), repeatedly requested Russian troops and arms to put down the uprising, but to no avail.51 Instead, the tsarist government focused on cutting off communications between the rebels on Chinese territory and the Russian Muslims. At that time, the Russian Kirghiz were trying to aid the rebels and the Russian government suspected that the Dungans were acquiring some of their arms from Russian territory. Russian problems with controlling the Kirghiz also had a long history as the latter continually looted trade caravans. Therefore, the Russian government wanted to prevent the unrest from spreading to its own volatile border population. Meanwhile, in 1865 and 1866, the Dungan rebels repeatedly tried to enter into relations with the tsarist government, which refused to reciprocate. By 1866 the situation had so deteriorated in Western China that the tsarist government closed its consulates in Ning-ytian and Tarbagatai. The Chinese slaughter of Dungans, in their campaigns of 1866 and 1867, and the internal fighting between the Dungans and Uigurs in 1867 exacerbated the refugee problem, with many Dungan, Kalmuk, Sibo, and Solon sympathizers with the uprising fleeing to Russian territory. Despite Chinese protests, tsarist officials had granted them permission to stay in hopes that they would permanently settle on the Russian side of the frontier and help populate the region. Under the Treaty of Peking, however, the Russians were actually obligated to repatriate these people to China.52 By 1867 the tsarist government was demanding compensation from the Chinese government for damages incurred from the uprising and in 1868, despite all efforts, the uprising began to spread

120

ETHNIC TENSIONS

into territories which the tsarist government considered its own.53 When the Chinese began to regain control over the situation in 1869, the rebels retreated into Mongolia, threatening Russia’s main communication and trade route to Peking via Urga. In 1870 the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Mikhail Semenovich Korsakov, deployed a Cossack squadron to Urga both to protect the tsarist consulate there and to maintain order in the city. The rebels, however, took Uliastai (Uliasutai, Uliassutai) in western Mongolia, thereby spreading the uprising deep into Outer Mongolia. The tsarist government responded by sending reinforcements to Mongolia.54 Despite Russian efforts to defend Urga and its trade routes through Mongolia, banditry continued. Then in 1871, the Uigur sultan, Abil-Oghlu, organized an independent khanate in die Hi Valley. From this base, he interfered with Russian trade; harbored Russian fugitives; clashed with Russian boundary troops; and, most important, had territorial ambitions beyond the border set by the 1860 Treaty of Peking.55 In addition, another Muslim leader, Yakub-bek, who had been active in the vicinity of Wulu-mu-ch’i, the location of one of the two key passes connecting Zungharia and Kashgaria, seemed to be moving toward Hi, the location of the second such pass.56 Meanwhile, Russian trade with China had been halved as a result of the disruption in the overland trade routes.57 As the uprising shifted from remote parts of Sinkiang into areas which the Russian government considered to be strategically important in Outer Mongolia and near Ili, and as a hostile khanate emerged on the border, Russia re-evaluated its policy of non-intervention. The Russian Invasion of 1871 The 1870 severing by the rebels of the main line of communication between S t Petersburg and Peking proved to be a turning point in Russian policy: the tsarist government authorized its envoy in Peking, Aleksandr Georgievich Vlangali, to work out a plan with the Chinese government to halt the uprising.58 In 1871 the tsarist government sent another detachment to Urga in support of the Chinese government because the rebels had reached the environs of the city and had threatened to cut off all the Russian consulate’s communications with the outside. This deployment freed up Manchu troops for duty in eastern Mongolia to restore communications with Chang-chia-k’ou, a city located at the easternmost end of Inner Mongolia on the Great Wall, to the northwest of Peking. The tsar approved of the plan, developed in meetings in February and April of 1871, calling for joint Russian and Chinese suppression of the uprising. However, according to the 1871 annual report of the Russian Foreign Ministry: Meanwhile, events on our border overtook our plans somewhat. In May of this year, a detachment guarding our border was unexpectedly attacked by the Sultan of Toranginsk. Our troops crossed the border and, in July, Major-General Kolpakovskii reported the occupation of Kuldja [Ning-yiian] and the entire Ili Valley.

ETHNIC TENSIONS

121

In light of these events, the Chinese Government hurried to inform our representative in Peking of its readiness to take over the area occupied by us and named the former Ili general Jung [-ch’iian] for talks on this subject59 These two paragraphs were all that the report contained on the fateful decision by Adjutant-General Kaufman, the governor-general of Turkestan, to send the military governor of Semirech'e oblast', Major-General Gerasim Alekseevich Kolpakovskii, to occupy the Ili Valley. Chinese insistence on the return of Ili and Russian demurrals would dominate Russo-Chinese relations for the ensuing decade, and would almost lead to war. Kaufman had suggested in 1870 that Russian troops should occupy the Ili Valley, but the tsarist government rejected the idea. In May of 1871, however, Kaufman staged a fait accompli: tsarist forces took the Ili Valley with fewer than 2,000 troops on July 4,1871.60 As military governor, Kaufman had broad powers relating to foreign affairs, including the plenipotentiary powers to fight the Central Asian peoples and negotiate agreements with them.61 With continuing Uigur and Kirghiz cooperation in banditry and disorders on Russian territory, coupled with the apparent complicity of the sultan of Ili, Kaufman took matters into his own hands and invaded.62 The Chinese were so out of touch with events in Ili that they only learned of the Russian invasion two months later when the Russians officially informed the Tsungli Yamen on August 2 8 ,1871.63 From the very beginning, the tsarist government did not necessarily plan to return all of the occupied territory, a total of 1,200 square m iles.64 According to the Russian Foreign Ministry: “As far as the transfer of the Ili Valley or part of it to China is concerned, according to the opinion of the M inistry of Foreign Affairs, this can only take place in the event that the Chinese Government presents us with adequate guarantees of an enduring re-establishm ent of its authority there, that is, when it has an adequate number of troops there and when its communications with the Chinese interior can be completely secured.”65 The tsar did, however, issue an order, on December 21, 1872, requiring the return of the Ili region once Russian trading interests and tranquillity on the border had been secured, a promise which was repeated thereafter.66 But soon the Russian Foreign M inistry presented China with additional conditions: Russia would “keep the Ili region as long as the northern route to Uliastai and the southern route to the western-most gate of the Great Wall [Chia-yti-kuan] are not in Chinese hands.”67 A Russian Foreign Ministry report elaborated on this strategy: 1. For our part, it is necessary to support a determination among the Chinese to restore their authority and therefore assure them of the complete sympathy which we have for this cause. Demand of them the introduction of energetic measures for the suppression of the rebellion in Wu-lu-mu-ch’i and other areas overtaken by the uprising.

122

ETHNIC TENSIONS

with the goal of restoring direct communication between Ili and Peking. Make this an indispensable condition for the return of Kuldja [Ningyiian] to them and show them the futility of their persistent demands to get Kuldja back from us before the implementation of this program. 2. Regarding the assistance, which we could, if needs be, render China—explain to Jung [-ch'iian], that this assistance mainly could be moral, that is, occupying a position in the West; we could thereby give the Chinese the possibility to focus their efforts in the direction of Wu-lu-mu-ch’i. Should they demand assistance in the form of military forces from our side, then in such a case, we would assume the right to secure from the Chinese corrections of our boundary, in the sense of more closely corresponding to our current requirements; the opening of trade routes not only in Western China, but also in the very center of the Chinese Empire; and finally compensation to our traders for the losses borne by them during the plundering of Uliastai.68 Thus, within a year of the invasion, the Russian government was already contemplating seeking territorial changes as well as trading privileges extending to the heart of China. In 1873, when the Kokandian general, Yakub-bek, tried to assert his control over the disparate forces of uprising and to establish a khanate of his own, the Muslim uprising threatened to become far more dangerous to both Russia and China. Since the Russian strategy in the Far East was to surround itself with weak neighbors, under no circumstances did the tsarist government want to see Yakub-bek establish a strong unified state for himself in Turkestan with the potential of incorporating adjoining Muslim lands.69 Russian suspicions regarding Yakub-bek were also aroused by his original refusal to recognize the border provisions of the 1864 Treaty of Tarbagatai—refusal evidenced by his claims to territory on the Russian side of the boundary and his attempts to enlist the support of the Kirghiz living there.70 Most threatening of all, the Russian government suspected Yakub-bek of having British sympathies because Great Britain had helped supply him with arms. Some feared that Britain intended to extend a neutral zone to include Kashgaria in order to create a buffer state between India and Russian Turkestan. In addition, the sultan of Turkey, an enemy of Russia but friend of Britain, had granted Yakub-bek the title of emir and was also supplying him with arms.71 The Russian government seemed to hope that it could use Yakub-bek to gain leverage over the Chinese government and then withdraw all support for him when a final settlement with China was reached. In 1872 Kaufman sent Russia’s first envoy to Yakub-bek. The envoy. Colonel Baron Aleksandr Vasil’evich Kaul’bars, signed a trade agreement which allowed Russian subjects to trade freely throughout Kashgaria.72 A contemporary commentator wrote: “This treaty had political as well as commercial significance. By concluding a separate treaty with Yakub-bek, as a leader of an independent state, the Russian Government, although not directly, had indirectly recognized the lands seized by Yakub-bek

ETHNIC TENSIONS

123

from China as lands no longer belonging to China.”73 On August 23, 1873, Minister of War Dmitrii Alekseevich Miliutin had an unofficial meeting with one of Yakub-bek’s envoys.74 At the same time, the Russian government tried to increase its leverage over the Chinese government. In 1874 the Russians provided food at premium prices to Chinese troops in eastern Sinkiang in return for permission to extend Russian trade caravan routes and in 1875, the Chinese commander in charge of suppressing the uprising, Tso Tsung-t’ang (;fc ^ £ ), signed an agreement with the Russian explorer, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Sosnovskii, to secure Russian supplies of grain.75 The Russian envoy in Peking tried to pursue a sim ilar strategy of offering further help in provisioning Chinese troops in return for extended trading privileges in the Chinese interior. The Chinese were adamant, however, that trade matters could not even be discussed before the return of Hi. The Chinese also turned down Russian requests to review the existing trading rules or to compensate Russian traders for losses incurred during the uprising. Frustrated, Alexander II then ordered his envoy in Peking to put pressure on the Chinese government by informing them that “in the event of further delays in the satisfaction of our demands, we will be forced to abandon the rules governing peaceful policy and to coordinate our actions with the policy adhered to by the Governments of those European Powers, who insistently demand the fulfillment of their wishes.”76 Thus, force would be an integral part of Russia's China policy. On March 31, 1876, a special meeting under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of War concluded that the tsarist government should support the return of Ili to China in order to impede Yakub-bek from establishing a strong Muslim state on the Russian border. To aid the Chinese, it would authorize supplying their troops with grain. But it planned to make the return of Ili and any additional food supplies to Chinese troops contingent upon greater access to internal Chinese markets and trade concessions. In addition, it would try to retain the T ’e-k’o-ssu River (Tekes)—which meant retaining control over the most strategic part of the Ili Valley, the Muzart Pass—and it would require an indemnity to cover losses incurred during the unrest.77 Meanwhile, the Chinese had made great progress in putting down the uprising. On February 22,1867, the Chinese court had appointed Tso Tsung-t’ang as the imperial envoy in charge of m ilitary affairs in Shensi and Kansu. He had already had years of military experience in campaigns against the Taipings and, by the time he quelled the Muslim uprising in northwest China, he would become one of China’s greatest nineteenth-century military leaders. Upon his appointment, he initially focused his energies on putting down the Nien Rebellion in Shensi and Shansi, which he accomplished by 1868 after the deaths of thousands of Muslims. His success has been attributed to his strategy of long, careful planning followed by short, brutal campaigns. By January 4,1878, he had retaken all of Sinkiang except those areas occupied by Russia, thereby meeting the original Russian terms for returning Ili.78

124

ETHNIC TENSIONS

As the Chinese success in putting down the uprising became more apparent, the Chinese government became more intransigent on trade issues. In 1876 the Russian Foreign Ministry complained in its annual report that the Chinese wanted to engage in discussions only at the level of local authorities or military commanders in the field to secure Russian food and armament supplies, while they would discuss little in Peking. The Russians interpreted these tactics as an attempt to avoid giving any discussions an official character so that the Chinese government would in no way be obliged to make concessions. Since the Russians perceived their influence to be slipping in Peking, the tsar ordered the new envoy there, Evgenii Karlovich Biutsov, to put more pressure on the Chinese government, whereupon he repeated the previous year’s threats about Russia’s being compelled to act as belligerently as the other European powers.79 By 1877 the tsarist government became so irritated with the Chinese government that it ordered a stop to the provision of all food and transportation to Chinese forces from Russian territory.80 For the Chinese, the experience of the Ili crisis only increased their already growing hostility to the Russians. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported: “The main reason for the dislike of us displayed by the Government of the Chinese Emperor lies in our refusal to return Kuldja [Ning-ytlan] to the Chinese and in their extreme mistrust of our future policies on the western border.”81 Meanwhile, infighting between die Dungans and the Uigurs as well as the unexplained death of Yakub-bek in 1877 accelerated the collapse of the uprising.82 The Russian preoccupation with trade concessions seemed unwarranted, since Russian trade with China remained limited and forever at a deficit.83 Yet the Russians focused much of their diplomatic efforts with China on amelioration of trading rules and on the establishment of consulates and trading stations further and further into the Chinese interior. Part of this had to do with Russian delusions about the trade possibilities for Sinkiang in general and for themselves in particular. But more important, trade took on a different function for the tsarist government than for other European governments. Russia used commercial penetration as the precursor to permanent territorial acquisitions. The Chinese were well aware of this strategy and warned against it at length in their memorials.84 Moreover, as an empire contiguous to China, Russia had a strategic interest in asserting military control as far into China as possible, whereas the other Europeans focused on maximizing revenues from the China trade. Although Russia certainly desired greater commercial profits, it was unable to compete with the other powers in this sphere. Compared to Western Europe, its commercial sector was hopelessly backward, with those in aristocratic circles disdaining commercial success and with the bulk of the population only a decade out of serfdom. (Serfdom lasted until 1861.) Being unable to assert appreciable economic power in China, the Russians relied on a more basic form of influence: direct territorial occupation. With the quelling of the Muslim uprising, the Chinese were in a position to

ETHNIC TENSIONS

125

demand the opening of negotiations with the Russians for die return of Ili. The Russians were also eager to hold negotiations to resolve their growing list of trade demands. According to Minister of War M iliutin, the upper echelons of the Russian government decided in a meeting in March 1879 that: The main question was whether or not we should return Kuldja {Ningytian] without fail to the Chinese, and, if we should, what kinds of advantages in our relations with China we should obtain in return. We came to the conclusion that national dignity demanded of us the honest fulfillment of the promise, repeated more than once—to return Kuldja, but ndt before concessions had been secured from the Chinese, such as: regarding certain trade matters and regarding the resolution of our many previous complaints, and likewise regarding the correction of our boundary with China to the north of the T'ien-shan, and, in particular, regarding guaranteeing the safety of the population in the Ili region to be ceded by us to the Chinese. These negotiations are the subject of the next chapter.

Notes I. Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky, Diary of a Writer, trans. Boris Brasol, vol. 2 (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949). Excerpted in Robert A. Goldwin et al., eds. Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, 274. 2 The Chinese officials are referring to the Russian occupation of Ili, Sinkiang. Li Cben-nan et al., KH 6/9/13 (10/16/1880), MCA, GC, 3-161-7706-31. 3.1 believe that the term “Ili crisis’’ was coined by Immanuel C. Y. Hsii in his book

The Ili Crisis: A Study ofSino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881. 4. Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974, 172-88; Hsii, Hi Crisis, 55. 5. Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang, “Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations,” 172-88. 6. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 169-71; Wen-Djang Chu, The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878, 4-5; Edward Shou-tsu Su, “Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang: A Comparison of International Relationships Outside and Inside the Communist System,” 26. 7. Douglas Carruthers, Unknown Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-West Mongolia and Dzungaria, vol. 2,378. & In Chinese sources, northern Sinkiang is often referred to as the Northern March (^ihitJS), while the southern part is called the Southern March (5^lili?f£&). James A. Millward, “Beyond the Pass: Commerce, Ethnicity and the Qing Empire in Xinjiang, 1759-1864,” vol. 1,4. 9. Hsii, Ili Crisis, 16; Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” 58; Millward, vol. 1,5. 10. Hsii, Ih Crisis, 59; Millward, vol. 1,100. II. Ho-dong Kim, “The Muslim Rebellion and the Kashgar Emirate in Chinese Central

126

ETHNIC TENSIONS

Asia, 1864-1877,” 6. Kim’s dissertation is remarkable in that it makes use of Uzbek, Turkish, Uigur, Chinese, Russian, Japanese, French, German, and English sources. Millward, vol. 1,100; Eugene Schuyler, Turkestan: Notes ofa Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja, 272. 12. Hsü, Ili Crisis, 16,18. Tarbagatai lies to the east of the Zungharian Gate, “the one and only gateway in the mountain-wall which stretches from Manchuria to Afghanistan, over a distance of three thousand miles.” Carruthers, vol. 2,406,409,415. Central State Military History Archives of the USSR, Moscow, “MHeHne IlocnaHHHica b neunte, /letter, Ct. Cob. BtouoBa, no tcHTaitCKOMy aonpocy” (The opinion of the envoy to Peking, Active Privy Councilor Buitsov, on the Chinese question), St Petersburg, November 1878, TsGV-IA f. 447 ed. khr. no. 9, 19. Evgenii Karlovich Biutsov was the Russian envoy to Peking and intimately involved in the negotiations with the Chinese over the fate of Ili. He considered Russian control over the Ili Valley to be a major improvement over any steppe border. 13. N. M. Przheval'skii, “O bo3mojkhoh BOime c KtfraeM” (On the possible war with China), 294; Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, “06 ynpaBJtHeMH Ka3aicaMH Bonhiitoro 3tcy3a” (On the administration of the Kazakhs of the Great Horde), 1856, in Coôpame cmimemm b nmn mmx (Collected works in live volumes), vol. 4, 20; Hsii, 7/t Crisis, 16-18; Louis E. Frechtling, “Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881,” 474; Millward, vol. 1,4. According to an eye-witness account by Schuyler published in 1876, “Almost everything I saw in the valley of Ili led me to believe that this was in every respect the richest portion of the Asiatic provinces recently occupied by the Russians” (279-80). 14. See maps of Yiian, Ming, and Ch’ing dynasties in Tan Ch’i-hsiang ( 1SÄÄ), ed, (Collection of historical maps of China); Wu Hsiang-hsiang (^fflifê), fft (History of the Imperial Russian invasion of China), 4; Sha-o ch’in-lüeh Chung-kuo hsi-pei pien-chieh shih( èt'fS (f 4 Bl0 JtiÜW5Ë) (History of the tsarist Russian invasion of northwest China), 3-59; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences B*), Institute of Modern History (iSftSfcffl&flf), (The history of the tsarist Russian invasion of China), vol. 3,1-76; Ch’en Teng-yüan ( ),(Outlin of Russo-Chinese relations), 14-18. 15. John K. Fairbank and Ssii-yu Teng, Ch’ing Administration, 152-4, 157, 162-3, 176,193-7. 16. Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers, 170-1. Lattimore cites Skrine, who notes that in the last 2,000 years China lost control of Kashgaria four times, but conquered it five times. Skrine was the British consul-general in Chinese Turkestan from 1922 to 1924. Clarmont Percival Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, 58. 17. Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, 19. For a similar view, see Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-1884,” 207. 18. Hsti, Ili Crisis, 193. 19. During the Yiian Dynasty, administration of modem Sinkiang was split between two khanates. Therefore, the Yiian did not control all of Sinkiang. David Morgan, The Mongob, xii. 20. Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 293-4. 21. Wen-Djang Chu, 1-3; Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, 11; Hsii, Ili Crisis, 16; A. D'iakov, “BocnoMHHaHHa hjimhckoYo ch6hus o ityuraucKOrapa«ihhcxom Boocratmti b 18641871 rojax b Hjwhcxom Kpae” (Recollections

ETH NIC TENSIONS

127

by an Hi Sibo about the Dungan-Taranchi uprising in 1864-1871 in the Ili region), 232-4; Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” 64-5. Kim estimates that 70 percent of the Zungharian population perished: 40 percent from smallpox and 30 percent at the hands of Ch’ing troops, while an additional 20 percent fled the area (2). According to Owen Lattimore: “In the course of the Manchu conquests of Central Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century 30 per cent of the population of Jungaria [Zungharia] was exterminated, 40 per cent died of epidemics and other causes, and 20 per cent fled away. In repopulating the region the imperial policy was to mix Uighurs, Chinese, Mongols, and other groups” (Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia, 126). 22. Tsarist sources refer to these Uigurs as Taranchis. They were originally from the Hi Valley. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modem History of Soviet Central Asia, 15; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, 126. 23. Hsii, Hi Crisis, 6. 24. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” 38; Mark Mancall, China at the Center, 10-36; Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” 63-89. 25.1. V. Shcheglov, XpOHOjnnneaaui nepeieub BaxHemmtx Jtatmbix H3 ncropnn Ch6hph 1032-1882 (Chronological list of the most important facts from the history of Siberia 1032-1882), 608,620,643,675,694,727; Pierce, 6,19,23,49,58; G. V. Glinka, Ä3HäTCxan Poccuh (Asiatic Russia), vol. 1,347; Hugh Seton-Watson, Decline ofImperial Russia, 1855-1914, 86. For more information about the Russian conquest of Central Asia, see: Wheeler, Modem History, 31-77; Michael Rywkin, Russia in Central Asia, 18-28; Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, “Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884,” 131-50; David MacKenzie, “The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan,” 208-34; Seymour Becker, “Russia’s Central Asian Empire, 1885-1917,” 235-56. A complete list of oblasti and gubemii, and the dates of their establishment is provided in A. M. Prokhorov, ed.. Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 7,466-9. In the tsarist provincial system, a gubemiia was the equivalent to a province, while an oblast’ was similar, but tended to be located in a recently incorporated area on the border. 26. Modern-day Sinkiang comprises what was often referred to in the nineteenth century variously as Eastern Turkestan or Chinese Turkestan, while Russian Turkestan was often called Western Turkestan. In the Soviet period this latter area comprised the Soviet republics of Kazakh S.S.R., Turkmen S.S.R., Uzbek S.S.R., Tadzhik S.S.R., and Kirghiz S.S.R. The terminology is somewhat complicated, since the term “Eastern Turkestan” was sometimes used to refer to Kashgaria, the section of Sinkiang south of the T’ien-shan. Other names for Kashgaria include: Hui-pu (PUSH or Muslim tribes), Hui-chiang ( (Uli or Muslim frontier). Southern March or T’ien-shan nan-lu), Chinese Turkestan, and Altishahr. Millward, vol. 1,4. I have used the term “Sinkiang” to refer to the entire area of modem Sinkiang, and Kashgaria for the section of Sinkiang south of the T'ien-shan. In general, I have tried to avoid using the terms “Eastern” and “Western Turkestan,” since they can be confusing. The reason for introducing the word “Turkestan” is that it includes areas on both sides of the border which share a similar ethnic composition and in this sense represents a single region. 27. L. F. Kostanenko, “RacyHrapmt, BoemoCraTOCTHiecicHH («epic TeHepajibHOro LÜTa6a nojucoBmnca J l Typnecranocoro renepaji-fyOepnampa, renepeui-Ajhicrrama, reaepam or

HmpainpffH A H. Kyponanoma, aca3amma 21 aarycra 1916 r. jenyrammt or

BIBLIO GRAPHY

375

moejtemta r. Taiwcema (Speech delivered by the Governor-General of Turkestan, Adjutant General of the Infantry, A. N. Kuropatkin, on 21 August [3 September] 1916 to the deputations of the population of the city of Tashkent). Twiorpa58,102/1.77,104/1.703, 105/1.708,112.119,136,150W.72, 158,180,194,328,352 parallels with, 98n.5,304 Peking government, 319,321-2,326-7, 331,337«J 3 ,352 P’eng-hu ch’iin-tao. See Pescadore Islands People’s Republic of China, 4,15,97, 168/1.77,286«.66,344,353 See also Sino-Soviet split Ferovskii, Lev Alekseevich, 35-6 Perovskii, Petr Nikolaevich, 67,84-5 Persia, 13,23/1.48,115,180,198/1.9, 207/1.777,225,258/1.77,272,274 Pescadore Islands, 181 Peter I (the Great), Emperor, 23«.46,93, 210

Petropavlovsk, 36 Périma. See Pai-tu-na Planson, Grigorii Antonovich, 231 «-82 Pleske, Edvard Dmitrievich, 250 Fo-hai Wan. See Pei-chih-li Bay Poland, 16/1.2,319 Polovtsov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, 204/1.98 Port Arthur. See Lü-shun Port Shestakov, 183 Portsmouth Peace. See Russo-Japanese War Portugal, 43/1.6,143 Potu. See Pai-tu-na Potuna. See Pai-tu-na

INDEX

Pozdneev, Aleksei Matveevich, 95, 129n.4/ Provisional Government, 315-16,320, 333/1.72,336/1.46 P’u-lun, 139 Pusan, 182,239 Putiatin, Evfimii Vasil'evich, 58,61,64-7, 80,84,100/134 Rafalovich, Artur Germanovich, 262/1.74 Red Army. See Soviet Russia, Red Army Rennenkampf, Gea Pavel Karlovich Edler von, 213 Romanov, Petr Mikhailovich, 188 Roosevelt, Theodore, 243 Rotshtein, Adolf Iu., 188 Rozen, Baron Roman Romanovich, 207/1.737,224,230/1.75,238-9, 243,257 Russia, xiii, 23/1.46, 168/1.3, 182,315 attitude toward Asians, 183,235,237-8 China trade, 7,29,124,155 civilizing mission in Asia, 10,110, 117.236.246.347.356 economic backwardness, 4, 124,250-2, 254,256-7,263/1.84,264/1.708, 267/1.733,351-3 industrialization, 4,184,251,254-5, 343 local autonomy, 4,37,58,110-11,121, 167,211,217,248,349 national dignity, 7,13,56-7,63, 76/1.86,136,153-5,159,161,254, 352.356 Revolution of 1905,8,243 Revolution of 1917,16/1.5,315-6, 333/1.72 weakness,85, 111, 135,147/1.25,180, 247-8,253-4,263/1.99,266/1.728, 267/1.735-6,343 Westernization, 5,93 See also Great Britain, Anglo-Russian rivalry; Balance of power; Commonwealth of Independent States; Kiakhta, trade; Mongolia, Russian aid and advisers; Soviet Russia Russian American Company, 34 Russian Civil War, 3,11,315,318,328,

413

Russian Civil War (continued) 358,358-9/1.2 Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, 30,41, 47-8/1.77,65,67,84,87 Russian expansion, 7,10,28,33,116-17, 250-1,289-90,344,347-9,352 360/1JO Amur Basin, 1,2,18/1.79,28,40,110, 347 Central Asia, 4,101/1.77,151 and economic backwardness, 93-4, 252-7 Manchuria, 3,29,64.178,183, 190-1, 216,219,221,223,230/1.68, 232/1.98,238,275,306/1.9,314, 344,348-9,360/1.75 strategy of mediation, 61,65,79,86, 88,94-5,287-8,290,293,302, 327,346 Outer Mongolia, 2-3,16/1.2,64,141, 190-1,272,287-9,299-300, 306/1.9,314,323,348-9,360/1.75 Sinkiang, 1,2,29,141,178,182,191 tactics, 58,75/1-53,64,74/1-53,209, 348-9 trade as a precursor for, 7,61,124, 196-7,292,324,346 See also treaties of Aigun, Peking, St Petersburg; Japan, impediment to Russian expansion; Spheres of influence Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). See Soviet Russia Russo-Asiatic Bank, 202/1.64 Russo-Chinese Bank, 187-8,195 Russo-Chinese Declaration (1913), 295-8, 300-3,317-18,328,331 Russo-Japanese War ( 1904-1905), 3,187, 225,242-4,348,360/1.77 cost 245,262/J.74 impact of, 7,8, 13,180,196-7,223, 246,248,272,274,278,353, 360/1.27 Portsmouth Peace, 95,274-5 Russo-Mongolian Agreement ( 1912), 292-3,295-8,302-3,317-18,330 Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), 13,

414

INDEX

Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) (continued) 102/1.74,110,135,143-4,170/1-52, 184 St Petersburg, 1881 Treaty of, 3,32, 73/l44, 111, 113,156-63,169/1-37, 171 passim, 273,328 parallels with, 304,344 See also Qi Valley; Livadia, Treaty of; Tariffs Sakhalian, 213,2Z7nJ6 Sakhalin. See Sakhalian Sakhalin Island, 34,36,38,40,235, 243-4,360/1.77 Samara, 185 San Stefano, 1878Treaty of, 102/1.74, 170/1-52 San-to, 280,289,316 Sarikol Range, 274,283/1.72 Saits, 128-9n.40 Satow, Sir Ernest M., 235,241,349 Sayan Mountains, 328 Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich, 275-6,287, 290-1,294,306/1-5,313/1.97 Scott Sir Charles, 248,263/1.93 Scramble for concessions, 190,192,210 Self-strengthening movement 163, 172/1.85.186 Semenov, Ataman Grigorii Mikhailovich, 315-17,319-20, 334/l25 Japanese support, 316-17 SemipalatiDsk oblast1, 114 Semirech’e oblast', 114 Seoul, 239,242 Shanghai, 207/1.728,245 Shan-hai-kuan, 190,218,220,240 Shansi, 123 Shantung, 41,189-90,236 Shengking province. See Fengtien province Shensi, 41,114,118,123,134 Shen-yang, 180,221,226/iJ,238,244 Shen-yang. Battle of, 242,245 Shilka River, 34,38,75/1.79 ShimoQOseki, 1895Treaty erf, 181,345 Shou-shan, 212 Sian See Hsi-an Siberia, 6,11.31,93,112,196,2556, 316,319,356-7 Chinese claims to, 18/1.79,96

Siberia, Chinese claims to (continued) defense erf, 33,57-8,73-4/1.45,167, 179,197,215,290,328,347-8 exploration erf, 31 gold, 36-7,45/J36 See also Amur Basin; Amur River Sibo, 119 Sinkiang, 114,123,125/1.8 ,158,221, 273,276,281,303,307/1-22,316. 344,350,355 administrative reforms, 1656,344-5 Chinese claims to, 97,113-14,126/1.76, 126/1.79,128/1J 8 ,167 strategic importance, 112,165 trade. 111, 133-4,142,155,169n23 See also Border peoples; Hi Valley; Kashgaria; Muslim Rebellion; Myth of Chinese moderation; Russian expansion; Zungharia Sinminting. See Hsin-min-t’ing Sino-French War (1884), 132,145,163, 182,344 Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), 3, 104/1.705,145,186,197,249,274 impact erf, 7,10,173/1.95,180-2, 2045/1.96,240 Sino-Soviet split 2,6,16/1.7,348 1969 border war, 9,16/1.6,94,283/1.76, 331,354 Sino-Soviet Recognition Treaty (1924), 325-6,329-30,340/1.89 Sixty-four settlements. See Aigun, Treaty of Skrine, Clarmont Fercival, 126/1.76 Slavophiles. 23/1.46,92 Sokobin, Samuel, 321,326,337/i_56 Solon, 119 Sosnovskii, Lieut.-Col. M., 123 South China Sea, 357 Southern March, 125/1.8,127/1.26 South Manchurian Railway, 187,193. 196,212,215,243 Soviet Mongolian Friendship Treaty (1921), 322,325,330 Soviet Russia, 276,314,319-22,327, 330,333/1.9,333/1.77,339/1.76. 342/1.707,345,349,350-1,353-4, 357-8,363 Red Army, 3.317,319-23.3256,328,

IN D EX

Soviet Russia, Red Army (continued) 337/1,56,340/1.83 See also Chinese Eastern Railway, return to China of; Mongolia, Russian aid and advisers; Sino-Soviet split; Tarant Uriankhai Soviet Union. See Soviet Russia Speranskii, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 31 Spheres of influence, 189,191,221 Russian and British, 190,272-4 Russian and Chinese, 2-3,221 Russian and Japanese, 7,191,224, 239-41,243,248/L28,260nJ4, 272-6,284n22, 284nJ8,287-8, 292,296,298,304,315,320,344, *3AO

J 1TO

Russian policy of exclusion in, 69,194, 198/1.9,209,215,218,224, 229n34,244,292,294,324-5,347 Spratly Islands, 357 Sretensk, 185 Stalin, Joseph, 16/1.6 Stanton, Edwin F., 326,340/1.85 Stilwell, Gea Warren Joseph, 130/1.78, 340nM Stoddard, Col Charles, 128/tJO Subotich, Gea Dean Ivanovich, 235-6 Su-chang-a, 65-6 Su-choa See Chia-ytt-kuan Suez Canal, 32 Sui-fen River, 38,67,83,89,20ZnS7 Sun Pao-ch’i, 297-8 Sung-a-ch’a River, 255,267n.141 Sungachani River. See Sung-a-ch’a River Sungari River, 46/1.46,49,75«.79,162, 183 navigation of, 69,133,135,142,153, 162,172/1.79 See also Amur Basin, Chinese settlement of Sung dynasty, 10 Sung-hua-chiang. See Sungari River Sun Lieh-ch’en, 343 Sun Yat-sen, 329 Su-shun, 85-6,89, 100/1.47 Syr Darya oblast', 114 Szechwan, 314 T’a-ch’eng. See Tarbagatai

415

Tadzhikistan, 115,127/1.26,273,362/1.47 Ta-hei-ho. See Sakhalian Taiping Rebellion, 3,5,41-2,44/1.79,60, 69,87-8,96,110,118,123, 129/1.47,144,185,289,352 Taiwan, 97,181,358,363 Takahira Kogoiö, 243 Taklamakan Desert, 112 T’a-k’o-she-na, 169nJ7 Taku,65,88,212 Ta-lien, 178,195,207/1.727,242-3 256 return to China of, 11 Russian occupation of, 190-2,205/1.98 Japanese administration of, 196, 207/1.728 Talki Pass, 133,160-1 Tang dynasty, 113 Tannu Mountains, 328 Tannu-Ola. See Tannu Mountains Tannu-Uula See Tannu Mountains Tannu Tuva See Tannu Uriankhai Tannu Uriankhai, 277,291,296-7,301, 303,316,318,327-30,352 boundary, 17/1.7,307/1.22 Soviet annexation erf, 16/1.6,285/1.47, 329 T’an T’ing-hsiang, 65,67 Taranchis. See Uighurs Tarbagatai, 90-1,112,118-19,152,157, 162,229/1,54 Tarbagatai, 1864 Treaty of, 29,90-1, 102/1.78,103/1.88,158,328,352 amendment of, 133,142,152,161 Tariffs, 6,29,31-2,163, YT2nX2,188-9, 256 Tarim Basin, 112 Tashkent, 113-14 Tea trade, 32,44/1.79,207/1.777,245 Tekes River. See T’e-k’o-ssu River T’e-k’o-ssu River, 123,133,154,160-1 T’e P’u-ch’in, 83 Three Emperors’ League, 151,168/t.i Tiananmen Massacre, 9 Tibet, 8,18/1.23,106«.776,114,165, 167,274,277,281,286/1.66,290, 298,316,331,350,357,361/iJ9 Tibetan Buddhism. See Lamaism Tideman, P. G., 229/1.45

416

INDEX

T’ien-chin. See Tientsin T’ien-shan Mountains, 112,115,118, 125, 127/1.26 Tientsin, 65,83,88, 100/iJ4,104/1.703, 134,153,162,212,228/1.28,245 Tientsin Massacre (1870), 136,147/1.26 Tientsin, 1858 Treaty of, 65-6,77/1.95, 84,86,88-9,96,99/1.79, 102/1.77, 137 Tomsk, 185 Trade. See Great Britain, China trade; Kiakhta, trade Transbaikal, 181,199/1.20,316,319 Trans-Siberian Railway, 7,93,111,184, I99n21,289,353-4 Amur Railway, 179,181,245,274 and colonization, 179,255-6 construction of, 185,196 inefficiency, 208/1.735,241,261/1.49 and militarization of border, 57,163, 197,210,246,347 plans for, 178-9,181-2,184 threat to Japan, 179,185 Treaties, 58,74/i_53,245,262/1.77, 310-11/1.68,348 Chinese understanding of, 69,82, 99/1.79,99/1.27 Chinese violations, 99/1.79,345-6,348, 359/1.72 Soviet violations, 320,323,330,348 tsarist violations, 119,187,197, 202/1.67,225,229/i_52,330,348 unequal, 11,22/1.47,321,332/1.7 Tributary system, 6,12,23/1.49,49-54, 64,78/1.707,96-7,114,166,276, 331 demise of, 13,90,92,102/1.76,165, 181 Russian tribute missions, 30,63, 76/1.53,97 Tripartite Agreement (1915), 298-305, 305/1.2,307/1.79,311/1.76,314, 317-18,323,328,330-1 Triple Intervention, 181,185,202/1.64, 244 Trotsky, Leon, 342/1.707 Tsarist Russia. See Russia Tseng-ch’i, 212,217 Tseng Chi-tse, Marquis, 151-3,155-61,

Tseng Chi-tse (continued) 163-5,171/1.68,172/1.79,344 Tseng Kuo-fan, 152 Tsingtao. See Ch’ing-tao Tsitsihar. See Ch’i-ch’i ha-erh TsoTsung-t’ang, 123,130/1.78,135,136, 141-2,147/iJO, 147nJ7,153,159, 178,305 Tsungli Yamen, 93, 111, 138-40,146/iJ, 147/1.30-7,148/IJ9,152,164, 217,230/1.69,280,359/iJ Tsurukhaitu, 30 Tsushima, 182 Tsushima Straits, 242 T’u-lu-fan, 134,152,162 Tumen River, 89,183,238 T’ung-chih Emperor, 118, 139,172/1.56 T’ung-chih Restoration, 163,172/1.86 T’ung-chou, 104/1.703,162-3 Turfan. See T’u-lu-fan TurgaioMirt', 114 Turkestan. 112,114-15,117,122, 127/1.26,141,273 See also Central Asia Turkey, 122,156,168/iJ, 170t52,247 See also Congress of Berlin; Crimean War; Russo-Turkish War Twenty-One Demands, 275,284nJO, 304 Tz’u-an, Empress Dowager, 118,139 Tz’u-hsi, Empress Dowager, lOQ/i.47, 118,138-42,144-5,150/1.74, 210-11,226/1.7 Uchida Yasuya, 239-41 Uda River, 59 Ufa, 185 Uigurs, 114,117,119-21,124,127/1.22 Ukhtomskii, Prince Esper Esperevich, 188,190,202/1.62 Ulan Bator. See Urga Ulan Ude. See Verkhneudinsk Uliassutai. See Uliastai Uliastai, 120-2,134,152,162,277, 298-9,303,328 Ungern (-Sternberg), Lieut-Gen Baron Roman Fedorovich von, 315, 319-22 United States, 22/1.47,35,52,99/1.79, 115,211,219,229/1.49,230/1.64-5, 231/1.97,251,2MnJ2,298,318,

INDEX

United States (continued) 331,354,367-8,368-9/1.2 China trade, 7,195 Ural Mountains, 112,185,314 Uralsk oblast', 114 Urga, 67,75/1.79,89,120,276,280,289, 292-3,298-9,303-4,314,318-19, 321,324,326,339/1.76,340/1.84 Uriankhai. See Tannu Uriankhai Urumchi. See Wu-lu-mu-ch’i USSR. See Soviet Russia Ussuri River, 67,70,83,96,159, 185, 255,267/1.747 boundary, 3,29-30,68-9,102/1.78 See also Amur Basin; Peking, Treaty of Uzbeks, 114 Uzbel Pass, 274 Vavilov, Lieut., 229/1.45 Verkhne-Blagoveshchensk, 214 Verkhneudinsk, 276,316,333/1.77 Vemyi, 112,114 Viceroyalty of the Far East, 224,256, 268/1.748 Vietnam, 97,132,163 Vilenskii (-Sibiriakov), Vladimir Dmitrievich, 336-7nJ52 Vladivostok, 1,93,94,103/1.702,179, 184-7,191,196,238-9,243-4, 255,274,316,319,321 Vlangali, Aleksandr Georgievich, 120 Vogak, Maj. Gen. Konstantin Ippolitovich, 224,231/1.94 Vronchenko, Fedor Pavlovich, 35-6 Vyshnegradskii, Ivan Alekseevich, 184 Wade, Thomas, 103/1.92 Wang Cheng-t’ing, 331 Wang Wen-shao, 220 Wei-hai-wei, 190,203/1.77 Wen-hsiang, 93,103/1.92,139,144, lSQ/i.72 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 191,205 /1.98 Witte, Count Sergei Iul'evich, 182-9,193, 2Q5/t98,212,215,238,243,24950,253,255,264«.707,367 foreign policy analysis, 182,191-2, 195,198/1.9,209,218-19,223-4, 236,289 World War 1,8,266/1.726,275,298,304,

417

World War I (continued) 312/1.78,314-5,318,349 World War II, 11,16/1.6,167,245,351, 360/1.77 Wrangel, Baron Petr Nikolaevich, 319 Wu-ch’ang, 134 Wu-liang-hai. See Tannu Uriankhai Wu-lu-mu-ch’i, 91,112,120-2,134,152, 162 Wu-su-li-chiang. See Ussuri River. Yakub-bek, 120,122-4,273 Yalu River, 223-4,241-2 concession, 232/1.96,238-9,244, 259/1.22 Yamagata Arimoto, 239 Yang-ju, 218-9,229/1.47 Yangtze River, 111,113, 134,190,274 Yarkand, 119,229/1.54 Yellow peril, 7,234,246 Yellow Sea, 191 Yen-ch’i, 112 Yen Hui-ch’ing, 323,331 Yenisei River, 327 Ying-k’ou, 134,229n.54, 240 Russian occupation, 212,216-8,221-2, 226-7/1.75,229/1.52,231/1.82,238 Ying-k’ou-Tientsin Railway, 212,218 Yongampo, 238 Yuan Shih-k’ai, 289-91,297,331n53 Yuan dynasty, 17/1.75,18/1.79,126/1.79, 276 Yunnan, 41,118 Yunnan Railway, 187 Zabaikal. See Transbaikal Zaisan, Lake, 133,161 Zakharov, Ivan, 102/1.78 Zeia River, 38,69,213,255 Zhomini, Aleksandr Genrikhovich, 132, 141, 151,154-5,158-9,161,164, 169/1.57,170/1.50, 178 Zlatoust, 185 Zungharia, 112,118,120 Chinese conquest of, 101 n.77, 127/1.27, 276-7 Zungharian Gate, 126/1.72 Zunghars, 113,127/1.27,167,285nJ7

About the Author

S. C. M. Paine completed a bachelor’s degree at Harvard University, a master’s degree in international relations at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, a doctorate in Russian and Chinese history at Columbia University, and a m aster’s degree in Russian at Middlebury College Russian School. Dr. Riine also holds certificates from Columbia University’s East Asian Institute and Harriman Institute. Dr. Paine has spent three years in China and Taiwan, one year in Russia, and one year in Japan engaged in research and language study.